

‘Visible Hectares, Vanishing Livelihoods’: A case of the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme in southern Matabeleland - Zimbabwe

Clifford Mabhena

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of

Doctor of Social Sciences (Development Studies)

Faculty of Social Science and Humanities

University of Fort Hare

2010

Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any other degree. It is my work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature

Date

Abstract

Land reform has been going on in Zimbabwe since the state attained independence from Britain in 1980 as a way of enhancing agrarian livelihoods for the formerly marginalized people. This study argues that, the Land Reform Programme in Southern Matabeleland rather than enhancing agrarian livelihoods, well established livelihoods have actually been drastically reduced. This has been exacerbated by the state programme of land re-distribution that prescribes a 'one size fits all' model. Yet this is contrary to the thinking in development discourse that equitable land distribution increases rural livelihoods. As a way of gathering data this study utilized ethnography and case study methodologies. I spent two years interacting and interviewing purposively selected new resettles, communal residents, migrant workers and gold panners in this region. Results from this study confirm that, land reform has greatly reduced livelihoods, particularly agrarian livelihoods. Also, this research has found out that, the majority of residents now depend on off-farm livelihoods such as gold panning and migration to neighbouring South Africa. This thesis therefore concludes that, despite a massive expropriation of former commercial farms, people of Southern Matabeleland have not benefitted much as the village settlements (A1) and the small size farms (A2) have not received support from this live-stocking community. People in this region pin their hopes on livestock rearing to sustain their livelihoods and this study therefore recommends that, any agrarian transformation programmes should address the issues that promote livestock rearing.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to all the fieldwork participants whose thoughts and perceptions form the bedrock of this study; and particularly my key informants Thabani Moyo, Dula Ncube, Ronnie Sibanda and Thabiso Mlilo for their interest, enthusiasm and commitment to seeing my fieldwork a success.

I acknowledge the unwavering support given by the Provincial land officer, Mr. Moyo for allowing me to use his District Land Officers for Gwanda and Umzingwane districts as key contacts in conducting fieldwork in resettlement areas. Special thanks to Thabani Moyo for facilitating rapport with politically charged District Land Committees.

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Professor Leslie John Bank, for his guidance, patience and hard work throughout the years. Without his encouragement and invaluable comments this thesis would never have been written.

For their intellectual input many thanks to Professor Gary Minkley and Dr Erik Hofstee.

To Govan Mbeki Research and Development Centre I pay my gratitude for the financial support you provided to make this study possible.

I do not know how to express deep gratitude I owe to my family in particular my wife Violet Mabhena (nee Zulu) and my daughter Ntombikayise Mabhena who endured long periods of separation while I was pursuing this study. I dedicate this thesis to you, and god bless you my darlings. Last but not least I thank my parents Jerick Mabhena and Cecelia Mabhena for encouraging me to pursue a study at this level whilst they are still alive. I thank you.

Table of Contents

Declaration.....	ii
Abstract:.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Matabeleland South Map	ix
Acronyms	x
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALISING RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LIVELIHOOD IN SOUTHERN MATABELELAND.....	1
1:1 Introduction	1
1:2 Debating Land Reform	3
1:3 Perspectives on Development	8
1:4 The Top-Down and the bottom up paradigms	13
1:5 Matabeleland and the dilemma of internal colonization	18
1:6 Sustainable Livelihoods paradigm	21
1:7 Agrarian livelihoods imposed.....	26
1:8 Location of study districts in Matabeleland South	32
1:9 The study area.....	34
1:10 Research Methods: approaches and orientation	39
1:11 Thesis map	44
Chapter Two.....	47
Ethnicity and the Dynamics of Political Domination in Southern Matabeleland	47
2:1 Introduction	47
2:2 Making of Ethnicity before Independence	48
2:3 Chiefship and Ethnicity in Wenlock	50
2:4 Traditional structures as colonial agents	54
2:5 The problems of eviction	56

2:6 Transition to independence and Gukurahundi.....	58
2:7 Gukurahundi and revival of ethnicity	62
2:8 Development, Changing Authorities and Internal Colonialism 1980-1988	64
2:9 Post-Unity and the development agenda 1987-2007.....	68
2:10 Conclusion.....	75
Chapter 3.....	77
The Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme and its Consequences	77
3:1 Introduction	77
3:2 Land apportionment and uses before the Fast Track.....	79
3:3 Politics of Land distribution and unsettled land in Southern Matabeleland	81
3:4 Fast-track land distribution in Southern Matabeleland.....	88
3:5 Land Reforms: a comparative assessment	101
3:6 Conclusion.....	108
Chapter 4.....	110
Living off the Land: Pastoral and Agrarian Livelihoods.....	110
4:1 Introduction	110
4:2 Conceptualising Pastoralism	111
4:3 Access to grazing land.....	117
4:3:1 Communal areas	118
4:3:2 A1 resettlement schemes	124
4:3:3 A2 Resettlement model	128
4:5 Cropping livelihoods	136
4:5:1 Is it land for the sake of it?	137
4:6 Cropping livelihoods in the villages	143
4:7 Conclusions	145
Chapter 5.....	147
Command agriculture and its dilemma	147
5:1 Introduction	147
5:2 Why Command Agriculture?.....	147

5:3 Makwe irrigation scheme and its activities	154
5:4 Arrival of Soldiers and operation Maguta in Makwe	158
5:4 Command agriculture and livelihoods of Makwe villagers.....	163
5:5 Conclusion.....	173
Chapter 6.....	175
Gold panning: An alternative livelihood strategy	175
6:1 Introduction	175
6:2 Gold panning in Zimbabwe	176
6:3 Comparative studies on artisanal mining	179
6:4 The panning process	181
6:4:1 River/stream bank panning	182
6:4:2 Disused mines panning.	184
6:4:3 Small scale open cast panning	186
6:5 Implications to rural livelihoods	190
6:6 Institutional influences	193
6:7 Implications to those in the margins and the challenge of development change agents.....	195
6:8 Conclusions	200
Chapter 7.....	202
Migration and land reform	202
7:1 Introduction	202
7:3 Deportees: A vicious circle!.....	210
7:4 Women as cross-border traders	216
7:4:1 Why do they trade	220
7:4:2 Challenges facing women traders.....	220
7:4:3 Coping strategies of women traders	222
7:5 Livelihood contexts	223
7:6 Conclusions	226
Concluding Remarks.....	228
Bibliography	235

Appendices.....	257
-----------------	-----

List of Tables and Figures

Matabeleland South map	32
Gwanda District sketch map	34
Umzingwane sketch map	36
Table 3:1 How land was apportioned in 1930	79
Table 3:2 Legislation related to land acquisition	90
Table 4:1 Where cattle graze in communal areas	117
Table 4:2 Where cattle graze AI resettlements	124
Table 4:3 Animal related problems	132
Figure 4:1 Cattle dip tank used by rustlers	131
Figure 5:1 Zimbabwe Maize area harvested 2000-2005	148
Figure 5:2 Zimbabwe overall maize productions 2000-2005	149
Figure 5:3 Zimbabwe total cereal production 2000-2005	150
Figure 5:4 Orchard section of Makwe irrigation before Maguta	159
Figure 5:5 Soldiers relaxing at Zamanjalo bottle store	170
Figure 7:1 Alan and his relatives in Gwanda town	205

Acronyms

AGRITEX	Agricultural Technical and Extension
ARDA	Agricultural and Rural Development Authority
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
DLC	District Land Committee
DDF	District Development Fund
DFID	Department for International Development
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FTLRRP	Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme
IOM	International Office for Migration
LGPO	Local Government Promotion Officer
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PDC	Provincial Development Committee
PF ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
RDC	Rural District Council
RDDC	Rural District Development Committee
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
ZANLA	Zimbabwe Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALISING RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LIVELIHOOD IN SOUTHERN MATABELELAND

They said one man one farm but in this district the deputy minister and Member of Parliament has allocated himself and family members numerous farms. What is saddening is that when doing this, he displaces people who were settled as early as 2000. Some are actually war veterans who fought for this country and also took a lead in land occupations in early 2000. It's very unfair what politicians are doing to us (War veteran, 12/05/07).

1:1 Introduction

In this thesis I intend to explore the implications of the recent Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRRP) for the lives and livelihoods of residents in two districts in the province of Matabeleland South in Zimbabwe. The research for this thesis has been based on in-depth qualitative interviews and historical research in the latter province during the years 2005 to 2007 and seeks to contribute to current debates about the significance and meaning of land and livelihood reform in contemporary Zimbabwe. Questions of land reform in Zimbabwe are often addressed at the national level and presented as such in the local and international media and political debate. However, land and livelihood reforms are experienced by Zimbabweans at the local level and it is critical for us to understand local variation if we are to develop a full and comprehensive picture of the impact of land reform in this country.

The primary contribution of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of the very specific conditions that exist in southern Matabeleland that have shaped the manner in which land reform has been experienced in this area. I will argue that due to the particular history of this region, its relationship to the ruling political party and the nature of the rural economy there, which has been based on pastoral rather than crop production, the reform programme has impacted on rural household in this region in very particular ways, which have not been adequately represented in the discussion of current agrarian change in Zimbabwe.

If you were to visit Southern Matabeleland today after close to three decades of black majority rule one would probably define it as a dry region, 'backward', poverty stricken and lifeless. Indeed it might be regarded as a backward region compared to the Mashonaland

provinces of Zimbabwe. Hammar and Raftopoulos (2003) argue that the 1980s were marked by the successful expansion of public services and basic infrastructure such as health and sanitation, water supplies, education and roads mainly to formerly neglected rural populations. There was a strong drive to villagise the local rural population during this period and to centralise service delivery in new village settlements and development. Robins (1994), notes that one of the key motivations for the villagisation drive was the desire amongst the political elite to bring a dispersed and scattered rural population under control. Local resistance to villagisation resulted in the failure of many rural development projects, as local people were not consulted in the development process. The suspicion of government development projects and agendas were underpinned by a history of ethnic antagonism which resulted in the widespread persecution of Ndebele residents associated with Zimbabwe African Peoples Union during the 1980s. The Mugabe regime was determined to pacify this region and bring it firmly under the control of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF).

By the 2000s, Matabeleland South had experienced little sustained agricultural development, although the state had achieved some success in forcing rural communities into closer settlement villages. The rural economy was dominated by pastoralism, which was seen as the mainstay of the rural economy. However, pressure on resources and the failure of economic and development initiatives had resulted in many household having to pursue multiple livelihoods strategies for survival. Fast track land reform has increased access to land but has not seemingly improved the pastoral or agrarian livelihoods of local people, hence my title ‘visible hectares, vanishing livelihoods’. One of the features of the past decade has also been the large exodus of rural people into South Africa as migrants and traders, and the relative importance of cross border remittances and trading networks to survival in rural areas. The development of new off-farm livelihood pursuits, such as gold panning, had also become a feature of the region economy which has been under constant stress and duress as a result of the economic crisis in the country. In this thesis I hope to be able to reveal the complexities of this changing rural landscape and social economy against the backdrop of the monumental political and economic changes that have beset Zimbabwe in the past decade.

1:2 Debating Land Reform

In 2008, in the face of widespread international condemnation of the detrimental impact of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, the distinguished Africanist scholar Mahmood Mamdani published a controversial defence of the Mugabe government's policies and approach to rural development and land reform. Mamdani essentially argued that the land reform programme has been a success, despite widespread suggestions to the contrary. He asserted that far from being a crazy despot bent on undermining the national economy and impoverishes the people of Zimbabwe; Robert Mugabe had successfully corrected long-standing colonial imbalances in the rural economy and extended democracy and popular participation in the society and the economy. Mamdani's argument was received with a mixture of applause and disbelief in academic and development community.

In challenging Mamdani's position, Scoones (2009) argued that the undemocratic political culture of coercion, cronyism, corruption and incompetence that underpinned the land reform programme and made it difficult to present this programme as unproblematic, democratic and progressive. He also argues that the potentially beneficial impact of the programme was undermined by a lack of funds, the absence of adequate technical assistance and coordination amongst stakeholders. However, Scoones (2009) does not approve of the common media representation of the programme as a total failure. He suggests that it is incorrect to assert that political cronies have been the only beneficiaries of rapid land release and resettlement, that there has been no new investment at all in new settlements and schemes to help implement the programme and that agriculture in Zimbabwe is generally in ruins because of the transfer of ownership on white commercial farms. Cousins et al. (2009) support Scoones by suggesting that findings from Masvingo province in the south of Zimbabwe have revealed that good crops were harvested in the 2005/06 cropping season. Cousins et al. (2009)¹ also note that livestock production in southern Zimbabwe has remained vibrant in many areas through a fundamental restructuring of both production systems and commodity chains. In a sense they concur with Mamdani (2008) that drought has played a role in constraining cropping output on land reform farms in recent years and is undoubtedly a critical factor in the current food crisis. But it is also suggested that inadequate supply of inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, exacerbated by corruption in the allocation of inputs, as well as a dire shortage

¹ See Concerned Scholars Bulletin no.82, summer 2009 (eds) Jacobs, S. And Mundy, J.

of foreign exchange has had a detrimental impact on rural development. The collapse of the old commercial farming economy together with non-production on some of the farms taken over by the new elite, they argue, has certainly contributed to the wider crisis.

Ranger (2009) also reacts to Mamdani by questioning his conclusion that 'Western Countries' have contributed to the crisis in Zimbabwe by noting that ZANU PF's rural support base had waned despite the land redistribution programme and that this was shown by the loss of almost all seats in Manicaland and the solid votes the opposition garnered in Mashonaland constituencies. Mashonaland, especially rural Mashonaland has for many years, even prior to independence been a strong support base for ZANU PF, and for 25 years since independence ZANU PF has always been assured of a landside in any elections.² Ranger wonder how such a loss of support can be construed by Mamdani to constitute evidence of local popular support for land reform. Ranger goes on to state that Zimbabwe peasants confront hunger, disease, repression on an ongoing basis. The redistribution of land, he continues, has been conducted in a way that makes a mockery of the potential of peasant production in the countryside (2009:14).

Despite the trenchant criticisms, some scholars such as Moyo and Yeros, (2009) have defended Mamdani's analysis. These scholars base their arguments on the premise that the crisis in Zimbabwe has been compounded by the ZANU PF government's bold Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme and that 'Western Countries' have overreacted to the measures taken that adversely affected whites. Moyo and Yeros' arguments are to a large extent supporting Mamdani's argument based on his premise that Zimbabwe's deeply unequal and racialised agrarian relations were historically unjust and unsustainable. They went further and noted that the rule of law, urban land occupiers and the decline in agricultural production created a deeper form of democracy that can only be set on a more meaningful and stable footing by structural changes. Moyo and Yeros conclude that the land reform process has indeed created the social and economic foundation for a more meaningful democratization process and believe it is time to address the deficiencies of the land reform programme and rebuild institutions (2009:29). In making their argument, Moyo and Yeros (2009) acknowledge some of the points made by Cousins et al (2009) and Scoones (2009)

² Election results in Zimbabwe 1980 to 2000. The results of these elections reveal that ZANU PF started losing support in most urban centres in the Mashonaland provinces but maintained support in the rural areas. Things changed for the rural party in the 2008 election when the opposition garnered solid votes despite the land reform programme provoking one to argue that there are other factors that have contributed to this waning support.

and suggest that, firstly, peasant production should be made the pillar of the economic recovery, through subsidized inputs, fair prices and secure tenure; secondly, that agriculture be technically upgraded under the control of an organized peasantry, and thirdly that agro-industries be revived and the farm labour question resolved (2009:32).

One striking feature of all the above debate and many other contributions to the discussion on land reform in Zimbabwe is that land reform is often seen as synonymous with agrarian reform, namely the extension and consolidation of crop production. This has been a long standing inclination within the rural debate in Zimbabwe and can in part be attributed to the manner in which discussion of socialist transformation in the countryside has developed. Since the transition to democracy and even before, the focus on state intervention in rural areas has been to encourage modernisation through villagisation and closer settlement. In this scheme, improved crop production has been seen as the main plank for rural development. This model of agrarian change was even applied to southern Zimbabwe where environmental conditions were less able to support crop farming and closer settlement, and where local populations were mainly pastoralists. The introduction of National Socialism in Zimbabwe required a national plan and programme for rural upliftment and modernisation and this took the form in communal areas of villagisation and resettlement schemes, not dissimilar to those already introduced in Ethiopia and Tanzania (cf. Scott 1998; Hyden 1980; Donham 1999). The model adopted by ZANU drew heavily on a standardised ideology and practice of villagisation schemes developed in these and other socialist countries. Scott (1998) has argued that those who planned such schemes often ‘carried in their mind’s eye a certain aesthetic, what one might call a visual codification of modern rural production and community life’. He continues to suggest that: ‘like a religious faith, this visual codification was almost impervious to critics or disconfirming evidence... and was generalised and applied uncritically in widely divergent settings with disastrous results’ (1998: 253).

What Scott (1998) is suggesting here is that there was an ideological commitment to villagisation at the centre which was insensitive to local and regional variation in climate, ecology, livelihood and community. What is interesting about the debate generated by Mamdani and the various commentaries on his position is that crop production and crop producing outcomes continue to dominate the discussion. It is as if the logic of state policy has been followed through in the contours of the academic debate. One of the missing dimensions is the realisation that large parts of Zimbabwe are comprised of areas where

mixed farming predominates and livestock rearing and pastoralism is at least as important as crop farming in the making of rural livelihoods. In this thesis, I want to contribute to the above debate about the meaning and significance of fast track land reform in Zimbabwe, while at the same time inserting a perspective from the pastoral periphery of Matabeleland South, where official programmes of villagisation have long been resisted and rejected by the local population, who have little interest in sustained crop production.

The subject of this thesis is land reform and its ability to promote rural livelihoods. Using Gwanda and Umzingwane districts of Matabeleland South province in Zimbabwe as a case study, I argue that land reform as has been conceptualized in Zimbabwe since 1980, rather than enhancing agrarian livelihoods has systematically marginalized the rural people of Matabeleland leading to reduced livelihoods. This has been the result of the state promoting a 'one size fits all' land resettlement model. My fieldwork, rather than suggesting that the land reform in particular the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme has contributed to the livelihoods of residents of southern Matabeleland has actually seen agrarian livelihoods being reduced; and this according to fieldwork evidence, is as a result of the state focusing more on village settlement type (A1) and small scale farms (A2). This scenario has increased the reliance on off farm activities such as gold panning and migrant remittances as vital sources of livelihoods.

The problem addressed in this dissertation is that in spite of all the benefits noted by champions of the Fast Track land Reform Programme in addressing issues of rural livelihoods, people of this region remain vulnerable to hunger and poverty³. It is not surprising that some of the residents of this region eat one meal per day and this has seen a rise in malnutrition levels among children and adults (UNICEF 2006). Children have dropped out of school because parents cannot raise enough money to meet school obligations. Close by, mines that used to provide employment for out of school youths have closed down leaving residents with no option but to either rely on food handouts from the state and NGOs or pursue other un-orthodox coping strategies to eke out a livelihood. In fact FTLRRP has created more visible hectares while at the same time leading to vanishing livelihoods in southern Matabeleland. When I completed my last days of fieldwork in 2007, the rate of

³ Sithole and Ruswa (2003:2) cite some key objectives of the FTLRRP as decongestion of communal areas, indigenize/de-racialise the large Scale Commercial Farm Sector, reduce poverty, Promote sustainable utilization of land, increase contribution of agriculture to GDP, and create sustainable economic, political and social stability.

inflation in Zimbabwe had surpassed the million percent mark making life even more miserable for rural residents who had limited financial capital at their disposal for the scramble for basics such as maize meal and sugar. Yet gold panning activities on the other hand had created a 'new' class of residents in rural Gwanda and Umzingwane where as the results of my study show that gold panning and other off farm activities such as migration and cross border trading are gradually becoming prominent in these areas. However not all engaged in these activities make ends meet. One of the limitations of this study is the technology collapse in Zimbabwe; hence I encountered serious problems to accessing site maps for the study areas from the Department of Lands and Resettlement.

This study assumes that an equitable distribution of land increases livelihoods. Arguments by scholars in the social sciences especially those specializing in rural development and livelihood studies recognize the importance of land as a base to curb rural poverty. Chambers and Conway (1991:6) note that any strategy for environment and development for the 21st century which is concerned with people, equity and sustainability has, then, to confront the question of how a large number of people can gain at least basically decent rural livelihoods in a manner which can be sustained, many of them in environments which are fragile and marginal. The assertion by Chambers and Conway (1991) reinforces the notion that for development and in particular rural development to be realised in developing countries, the issue of sustainability of the natural resource base is critical. By implication the natural resource base in this study is the land that has been acquired by the state on the understanding that land to the people will promote decent rural livelihoods and rural development.

Prior to the implementation of the FTLRRP, NGOs played a pivotal role in rural development. NGOs such as Christian Care, World Vision and the Lutheran development services provided essential services such as water points, sanitation facilities, agricultural inputs, livestock support and training to uplift the standards of living of the people of this region. When the government introduced the FTLRRP, it banned NGOs engaged in rural development claiming that they were pushing a regime change agenda. The banning of development oriented NGOs resulted in the state taking the lead in rural development in the region, and at most bringing development initiatives top-down.

In all the election processes from 2000 through to 2008, the ruling ZANUPF party utilised slogans such as 'Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land' as a clear indication that

with land people can improve their livelihoods especially rural livelihoods. Slogans like these one culminate in what Appadurai (1996) called 'ideoscapes' resulting in phrases such as 'there is no freedom, democracy and sovereignty without land'. It is not surprising that the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme was dubbed 'The Third Chimurenga'⁴ by the state apparatus.

1:3 Perspectives on Development

Gardner and Lewis argue that in virtually all its usages, development implies positive change or progress. It also evokes natural metaphors of organic growth and evolution (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 3). The Oxford Dictionary of current English defines it as "stage of growth or advancement" (1988:200). As a verb it refers to activities required to bring these changes about, while as an adjective it is inherently judgmental, for it involves a standard against which things are compared. While '*they*' in the South are underdeveloped, or in the process of being developed, '*we*' in the North (it is implied) have already reached that coveted state (Gardner and Lewis 1996:3).

Defining development as economic growth is still common today. Indeed after the debt crises of the 1980s and subsequent structural adjustment programmes, economic reform and growth are very much at the top of the agenda for organisations such as the World Bank. Gardner and Lewis (1996) argue that behind these aims is the assumption that growth involves technological sophistication, urbanization, high levels of consumption and a range of social and cultural changes. For many governments and experts the route to this condition was, and is, industrialization. Successful development is measured by economic indices such as Gross National Product (GNP) or per capita income. It is usually assumed that this will automatically lead to positive changes in other indices, such as rates of infant mortality, illiteracy, malnourishment and so on. Even if not everyone benefits directly from growth, the 'trickle-down effect' will ensure that the riches of those at the top of the economic scale will eventually benefit the rest of society through increased production and thus employment (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 7).

⁴ Chimurenga a Shona word that means war of liberation and from this premise the programme was regarded as a war to liberate black people from the colonial bondage by availing vast tracts of land to the marginalised communities, black and poor citizens.

One major drawback in defining development as economic growth is that in reality the ‘trickle-down effect’ rarely takes place; growth does not necessarily lead to enhanced standards of living. Throughout the 1980s development became linked to what was termed the ‘basic needs’ movement, which stressed the importance of combating poverty rather than promoting industrialization and modernization. Mosley (1987) noted that during the 1980s, development work was aimed first and foremost at satisfying people’s basic needs. In the 1980s basic needs were met by the state while from the 1990s onwards the state adopted the market approach. In recent development discourse, development policy has been curved to match practice and hence Mosse (2005) contends that at best, the relationship between policy and practice is understood in terms of an unintended ‘gap’ between theory and practice, reduced by better policy more effectively implemented.

Post independence states or governments in Africa have taken over the reins of power and in pursuing similar development discourses if not similar to those of their former colonial masters. Manifestations of this are clearly visible in the relationship between the centre (urban/capital cities) and the periphery (mostly rural areas). A good early example is Ferguson’s (1990) *The Anti-Politics machine*⁵. In his thesis Ferguson documents the failure of development projects in Lesotho. Here Ferguson views development as a social entity in its own right: the set of development institutions, agencies, and ideologies peculiar to our age (Ferguson 1990:9). Ferguson suggests that insiders and sympathetic outsiders in the development industry see development planning and development agencies as part of a great collective effort to fight poverty, raise standards of living, and promote one or another version of progress (1990:10). Ferguson refers to these agencies, ideologies and their planning processes as the development apparatus. Development apparatus to Ferguson should be understood as a tool at the disposal of a planner, who will need good advice on how to make the best use of it (1990:10).

The argument advanced by Ferguson (1990) here is that there is often conflict when proponents of ‘Western expert Knowledge’ and those of indigenous knowledge come into contact, and that, thereafter, resistance to development interventions on the part of the local

⁵ In acknowledging the expansion and entrenchment of state power, Ferguson concludes that development apparatus in Lesotho was not a machine for eliminating poverty that was incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy but was a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, which incidentally took poverty as an entry point...In Lesotho, at least the ‘development’ apparatus was capable of suspending politics from the most sensitive political operation...and Fergusons refers to that as the anti-politics machine (1990:255-56).

people is interpreted in the powerful Western hegemonic discourse as reflecting ignorance. Ferguson's (1990) schema nevertheless is relevant in a scenario where a national project conceived at national level is imposed at a local level. The tendency here is that no matter how beneficial the project might be perceived by the development apparatus it might not enlist the support and interests of the local people (whom it is assumed are objects of development) as is demonstrated by the case of the FTLRRP in Southern Matabeleland. Nevertheless development apparatus has come to haunt the development field as technocrats continue setting the development agenda, in particular the rural development agenda. For instance the integrated approach is one of the development strategies that has been adopted by the Zimbabwe government since independence. A number of programmes and projects aimed at improving the life of the rural poor have been modelled along this line of thought. The major aim of the Integrated Rural Development strategy has been to reduce poverty and improve rural people's lives. This strategy also envisaged integrated planning and skills development⁶. According to the Matabeleland South Provincial Poverty Reduction Plan (2005-2015), there is a very close relationship between poverty and development or lack of it. Most of the development initiatives have been designed with the express purpose of trying to eradicate poverty or at least reduce it. However, most of these initiatives have failed because they have not meaningfully involved the people who are afflicted by poverty. The interventions have also failed to recognize the very pivotal role that individuals and communities play in the alleviation of poverty. As a result, communities have been regarded as passive beneficiaries of development projects. A good example of how these models have been of little benefit to locals is demonstrated in chapter five where the introduction of command agriculture has been viewed by informants as a 'disturbing approach' to community irrigation farming.

Research, conducted for the Matabeleland South ten year plan⁷, revealed that the lack of organizational capacity by service providers (actors), has affected service delivery, and this has created a dependency syndrome among the rural poor. On this note, the culture of looking for external support at the expense of local initiatives has been engrained in people, leaving them as bystanders in the development process. Though communities are poor, I argue that communities do have internal coping mechanisms. These mechanisms manifest themselves in

⁶ . First five year National Development plan Volume 2, 1984.

⁷ Author was part of the team that conducted fieldwork for this report under the auspices of the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) 2005 financial year.

the way people survive on the little they have. Rural people in southern Matabeleland engage in self employment activities such as cross border trading, income generating projects, gold panning and market gardening for survival. Through social networks and kinship relations, rural people survive also on migrant remittances. Selling of small stock such as goats and chicken to provide for the household is common in Gwanda and Umzingwane, but the sale of cattle among my informants is viewed by some as a last option. In Makwe for instance, irrigators would share whatever produce they had with their kinsmen in Lushongwe and Wenlock communal lands.

Yet studies in other societies depict a similar scenario where those who are part of the development apparatus ‘see what they want to see’ rather than what the people want to see and know. For instance Fairhead and Leach (1996), present a particularly vivid example of the ability of the development discourse to create false knowledge and thereafter exercise power, based on that false knowledge, over specific local situations or populations. They show how over the last century scientists and policy makers have fundamentally misunderstood, misinterpreted and misread the landscape of Kissidougou in Guinea. That landscape comprises grassy savannah with patches of semi-deciduous forest surrounding most villages. The assumptions that the administrators made, supported by ecologists and scientists, was that those patches of forest were the last relics of what had once been a completely forested landscape. The dominant belief was that the forest was systematically degraded and destroyed by local land use activities. Through their fieldwork Fairhead and Leach (1996) found that according to local knowledge the climax vegetation of the area was, in fact, savannah, not forest. Fairhead and Leach conclude:

“Kissidougou provides an extraordinary example of the production of erroneous knowledge concerning landscape history and the degradation problematic. While perhaps extreme, it does show that even the apparently most secure analysis and received wisdom can be challengeable, and exemplifies relationships between power and knowledge...”(1996:291).

Robertson (1984), alludes to the fact that development planning may be embedded and concludes by seeing the development apparatus as a practical tool for the solution of universal problems. Development planning for Robertson is to be understood as “mankind’s most ambitious collective enterprise” (1984:1), the activity of nation states attempting to bring into being ideal worlds (Ferguson 1990:10). To Ferguson development agencies in this

view are left with the task of trying to implement these often unrealistic plans. This brings us to the question raised by Mosse (2005) earlier that what happens if instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events? This true in this study as the elite continue leasing out land (against the state policy of one person one farm) an indication of multiple land ownership as depicted in the quotation at the begging of this thesis. This implies that although in theory the state has a policy of one person one farm literature review and interviews conducted indicate that there is a problem of multiple farm ownership in Zimbabwe in general and Matabeleland is no exception.

Scholars in the Marxist domain argue that capitalism as a mode of production is exploitative. Wood (1999), dealing with the effects of English agrarian capitalism, states that ‘the conditions for material prosperity existed in early modern England in historically unprecedented ways, yet those conditions were achieved at the cost of widespread dispossession and intense exploitation. These new conditions also established the foundation and seeds for new and more effective forms of colonial expansion and imperialism in search of new markets, labour forces and resources’ (Woods 1999:194). To Woods, this means, among other things, that people who could be fed are often left to starve. Irresponsible land use and environmental destruction are also consequences of the ethic of productivity for profit-as we have seen most dramatically in recent agricultural scandals (Woods 1999:194). Radical critiques of the International Development Discourse who take a Marxist and dependency theory approach argue that the purpose of development projects is to aid capitalists’ exploitation in a given country (Ferguson 1990:11). Lappe and Collins (1979), Lappe et al (1980) cited in Ferguson (1990), reason that poverty is not a sui generis fact or consequence of global scarcity but only a symptom of powerlessness...the International Development Project...does not make the radical changes in political and economic structures that could alone empower the poor, and therefore, aid projects cannot be expected to help eradicate poverty since they only reinforce the system which in the first place causes the poverty. They further argue that the development project gives a negative impression of this kind of intervention as it reinforces the powerful instead of solving problems of hunger. Ferguson (1990) further acknowledges that neo-Marxists argue that the development project is not a humanitarian attempt to overcome poverty but is an important instrument of imperial and class based control. Heyer dismissing the liberal view notes that there “appears to be little

foundation for the assumption that the activities of the Rural Development project leads to improvement of the welfare of the rural population let alone the rural poor” (Heyer et al 1981:10).

Yet, Sahlins writes that “It is necessary to remind ourselves that our pretended rationalist discourse is pronounced in a particular dialect (Sahlins 1993:12 cited in West and Sanders, 2003). This has led to West and Sanders (2003) suggesting that the idea of modernity, indeed, arose within the context of Western European societies in the ‘age of discovery’ - a moment of encounter with cultural Others provoking a search for self-identity as well as a quest for a means of asserting vis-à-vis cultural Others. At the same time, modernity has been taken up by Western Europe’s others in distinctive ways and reconceived in relation to local cultural logics and practices. Hence scholars now speak of vernacular modernities: Indian modernity Kaviraj (2000); Afro-modernity Hanchard (1999), (cited in Sanders and West 2003:9). Appadurai has provided a useful conceptual framework for exploring this complex world of multiple modernities. He suggests we understand cultural interconnectivity in terms of what he defines as a variety of scapes-for example, *enthoscapes*, *mediascapes*, and *financescapes*, *technoscapes*-formed of cultural flows that move over, and superimpose themselves on, geographical landscapes. Among these he includes *ideoscapes*-chains of ideas, terms, and images that can be condensed into key words (e.g. *freedom*, *welfare*, *rights*, *sovereignty*, *representation*, *democracy*) and exported to new contexts (Appadurai 1996:36-37). The ideas advanced by Appadurai are applicable to the Zimbabwean context where the state believes the FTLRRP is a necessity to safeguarding national ‘sovereignty’, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ at the expense of productive utilisation of the land. It does not take into account the interests of beneficiaries; yet Ferguson suggested that for a development project to succeed it should be of interest to the target group.

1:4 The Top-Down and the bottom up paradigms

For a project to be of benefit to the intended beneficiaries it must be identified by them and should address their problem through its sub problems. Yet in many Third World countries the identification of a problem and the subsequent solution to it has largely been a programming exercise of technocrats in the public sector and NGOs. There has hardly been any meaningful input to influence policy or programming from the beneficiaries, and the only input in the programming process has been the so called consultative meetings through local

government structures. For instance in Zimbabwe the village development committees and ward development communities have been largely used by the state to rubber stamp state priorities. In most cases projects let alone policies, are channelled through these sub-national institutions with the sole aim of enhancing ‘community participation’ by the ‘local’ in state driven activities. If the village committee adopts a state activity, then passes on the adoption to ward level through to the Rural District Council; then the activity is regarded as having the support of the ‘locals.’⁸

The deeply destructive tendencies within the development arena to generate deceptive oversimplifications and misrepresentations of the ‘local’ have generally, if erroneously, been associated with ‘top-down’ approaches to development that are imposed on local populations by exogenous agents.⁹ The top down approaches have largely been pursued under the pretext that underdeveloped countries have to be assisted to modernize, and hence modernization theory as the way out of underdevelopment. Modernization theory does not distinguish between different groups within societies, either because it assumes these to be homogenous (the mass poor) or because it believes that eventually the benefits of growth are enjoyed by all. The communities at the receiving end of development plans are, however, composed of a mixture of people, all with different amounts of power, access to resources and interests. Gardner and Lewis (1996) sum up by noting that the fundamental criticism of theories of modernization is that they fail to understand the real causes of underdevelopment and poverty (1996:15). By and large, dependency theory has been criticized for its part in viewing development as a tool for exploiting the underdeveloped countries; neglecting the reality that in the underdeveloped world, there is also an uneven balance between the urban and the rural. These theories assume that change comes ‘top-down’ from the state; they ignore the ways in which people negotiate these changes and, indeed, initiate their own. Both theories are fundamentally deterministic and are based upon the same fundamental rationalist epistemology (Hobart, 1993:5; Long and Long, 1992:20).

Yet, despite a major shift in development thinking and practice that, at least since the 1980s, has resulted in the creation of the more populist paradigm of ‘bottom-up’, ‘grass-roots’ solutions to underdevelopment, the negative consequences of power relationships are as

⁸ Authors experience as a development practitioner in southern Matabeleland (1987-1997), and personal conversations with development workers and councillors in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts (2004-2008).

⁹ See Bologna, S (2008).

pernicious as ever. The Southern Matabeleland case, as I shall show in the chapters that follow, provides a clear example where imbalance in power can create these relations. But let us consider briefly the origins of ‘bottom-up’ approaches to development and how they have been received, understood and internalized in the ‘development industry’. Ironically Zimbabwe attained independence in the 1980s when this bottom up approach was in its formative stages and was the in-thing in development discourse

It is truism that knowledge is power...Those who are powerful and dominant have the greatest accumulation of wealth, a centralized and interconnected system of communication, an ability to determine what new knowledge shall be created, and controls over information from the centre to the rural periphery. The association of outsiders’ modern scientific knowledge with wealth, power and prestige generates and sustains beliefs in its universal superiority, indeed beliefs that it is the only knowledge of any significance (Chambers 1983:75-76).

Chambers (1983) was one of the first scholars to critique the top-down approach as he regarded it as imposing ideas and hence development on people without their consent. As the quote above illustrates Chambers (1983) felt that the rural periphery was marginalized and development activities were coined at the centre and that this has caused many development initiatives to falter. Although Chambers’ assertion was based on the assumption of the Developed World dictating to the ‘Third World’, he singled out the rural third world inhabitants as the worst affected by the hegemonic top-down approaches. In his book *Rural Development: Putting the Last First* he argued for the recognition of the fundamental importance of the rural poor in the third world and thus argued for the bottom up approach to rural development. His argument was that by promoting bottom up approaches in project identification, appraisal, implementation management and evaluation would upset the hegemonic operation of power and thus create a space for local voices and knowledge to shape and dominate development interventions and their outcomes. Chambers (1983) has over the years been an advocate for participatory methodologies to promote rural development and more specifically Participatory Rural Appraisal which he defines as ‘a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act (Chambers 1994:953). Chambers argues that the ‘top-down mode’ starts with disciplinary specialization and uses tools to examine the rural situation. Bottom up analysis starts with the condition of poor people, their resources, aspirations and problems...it entails trying to see from within” (Chambers,1983:184). He thus called for a “new professionalism” that could embrace multiple disciplines, and for a

reversal of the way development operates, in particular for a reversal of analyses from top-down to bottom-up.

Henkel and Stirrat say: “It is now difficult to find a development project that does not in one way or another claim to adopt a ‘participatory’ approach involving ‘bottom-up’ planning, acknowledging the importance of ‘indigenous’ knowledge and claiming to empower local people” (2001:168). Yet those claims so often are nothing but rhetoric precisely because on the ground agents are expected, and prefer to work with, readymade models. The way the three tier resettlement model in Southern Matabeleland was sidelined by the FTLRRP is indicative that state power and hegemony can set its own models that are at variance with those set by the target beneficiaries. For instance as will be argued later the apportionment of land expropriated from former white commercial farmers in this region into village settlements and small scale commercial farms was not accepted by locals of this region. In a similar vein James (1999) says, “Even in its currently fashionable style of allowing for ‘community participation’, empowerment, a ‘people focused approach’ and ‘listening to the voices of the poor’, development discourse rarely engages with the human realities of the situations in which it is employed and applied” (1999:13). Cooke (2001), notes that participatory development is dominated by what he calls a ‘proselytizing euphoria’ when what is needed is a critical understanding of the dangerous limitations of participatory processes which, he argues are often little more than coercive persuasion. Cooke drawing on Schein’s work on Maoist China defines coercive persuasion as a type of brain-washing whereby participatory processes become merely a ‘technique’ for ‘consciousness-changing’. Project outcomes are shaped by the interventionist. “Grassroots, participatory, peasant oriented rhetoric... [resulted in] an ideological unanimity that facilitated Maoist oppression and it can be argued with hindsight, development programmes that led to devastating famine and authoritarian oppression” (2001:120). Furthermore Cooke points out that:

Coercive persuasion suggests that participation can indeed be co-opted for a range of agendas other than those with the needs of the poor and oppressed at heart...It also suggests that participatory development with an espoused and genuine commitment to meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed and to raising their consciousness on the part of the change agent are not in themselves...a safeguard against disastrous outcomes from participatory development (Cooke 2001:121).

Yet despite such warnings of how grassroots, participatory approaches to development can (and have) become a new tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), they continue to be employed, often uncritically, by numerous development interventions. Even early critics such as Chambers (1983) stressed the importance of not merely adopting bottom-up discourse as though it were a gospel, an all purpose blue print. Looking back at Ferguson's work in Lesotho, the development apparatus although recognizing the need for target group participation for the success of the Thaba Tseka project did not take into account their interests. Instead the development apparatus brought in a planned intervention, a technical one for that matter, to solve non technical problems which resulted in the development apparatus expending huge amounts of resources in infrastructural development projects like roads, the construction of district offices and others that had no direct linkage to the reduction of poverty at household level. Ferguson (1990) argues that planned interventions may produce unintended outcomes that end up all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control-authorless strategies...that turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility. Here Ferguson supposes that there is a complex relation between the intentionality of planning and the strategic intelligibility of outcomes; intentional plans are always important but never in quite the way planners imagined (1990:20). The collapse of the Thaba Tseka project in the early 1980s is a manifestation that top-down planning coupled with 'window dressing' popular participation by the target group is not the best approach to solving problems of rural poverty let alone to improve rural livelihoods.

The FTLRRP in Matabeleland is one such example that is indicative of the dangers of taking the target beneficiaries for granted in development planning. Though the FTLRRP was a reaction to the macro-political climate prevailing in the country then; it is worth noting that hegemonic approaches cannot improve the living standards of the rural poor. There is need for serious consideration in establishing the interests of the target group, their capacities, and capabilities as they try to eke out a livelihood. Beckman (1977) claimed that rural development projects serve to subject peasants to the imperative of producing for the external market under monopolistic relations of exchange (1977:3). For instance in the Zimbabwean context the introduction of command agriculture (as discussed in chapter five) in community irrigation schemes and the subsequent command to sell all produce to the state owned Grain Marketing Board at pre-determined prices reduces the irrigators to objects of production for

the state while at the same time eroding kinship relations, social connections and networks that have been constructed over time.

In recent years development theorists have shifted their attention to sustainable livelihood approaches in an attempt to recognise the importance of the development apparatus and the target group in development programming. As Chambers pointed out the mere cooption of beneficiaries in a project that is then claimed to be popular participation cannot guarantee the success of that project. What is required is a true involvement of beneficiaries at all levels of the programming process. Dahl reflecting on characteristics of democracy singles out government responsiveness to citizens on a continuing basis. He believes that the key requisites for achieving this end are the citizens' opportunity to formulate preferences; signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and have those preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government (Dahl in Josephs 1999:40). Bougi in his thesis *France-Afrique...* views power in Uganda as being reconfigured not only on the basis of principles advanced by outside forces, but through the forging of new domestic arrangements that combine hegemonic and participatory principles (cited in Josephs 1999:67). This reconfiguration of power in Uganda is manifest in Zimbabwe especially in Matabeleland where the hegemony of Mashonaland on the former manifests itself in the way development institutions are dominated by people from the latter region who do not have a full grasp of the socio-cultural life of the inhabitants. A good example is the staffing of senior government ministry posts with people from the dominant Shona tribe despite locals having requisite qualifications. This leads us to the unpacking of the concept of internal colonization and its implications for land reform, livelihoods and rural development in southern Matabeleland.

1:5 Matabeleland and the dilemma of internal colonialism

Whether a bottom up or a top down approach is coined by the Zimbabwe state, the status quo in southern Matabeleland largely remains the same. This has been aggravated by the notion that this region has been marginalized politically, socially and economically. This marginalization can be viewed as a form of internal colonization. Barrera states that the term 'internal colonization denotes "a structured relationship of domination and subordination which is defined along ethnic and /or racial lines, when the relationship is established or maintained to serve the interests of all or part of the dominant group...in which the dominant

and subordinate populations intermingle” (1997:194). On the other hand Bohmer writing on internal colonialism in the USA, notes that “the theory of colonialism explains the oppression of people by colour...the violence of the colonizer, the exploitation of their land, labour, natural resources, and the systematic attempt to destroy the culture of non-European people in the search for profits” (1999:90). Bohmer further indicates that in this process, governments must actively participate to create internal colonies, providing coercive force to control those who are colonized, while legitimating patterns of domination with laws. Yet studies in the USA have shown that racial and ethnic groups tend to reject attacks on their culture by rejecting calls for assimilation, and promoting and maintaining their own set of values, and control of resources in their own communities. Bohmer acknowledges that the theory of internal colonialism views capitalism as the core of racial oppression. Gottlieb (2005) further supports Bohmer (1999) by noting that internal colonization is a social and cultural set of mechanisms by which American society reinforces its divisions of class and race to sustain the wealth and power of its dominate elite. Dirks argue that colonialism is systematic configurations that inter wines cultural hegemony and socio economic factors. Dirks note that “if colonialisms can be seen as a cultural formation, so also culture is a colonial formation. Culture was fabricated for the means and ends of colonial conquest, and culture was invented in relationship to a variety of internal colonialisms.”

The concept of internal colonialism emerged from the dependency theories of the 1980s. Here the main argument centred on the core or centre and the periphery. In many countries the national elite marginalised those in the periphery, and according to Chambers (1983), there was an overt situation where the urban elite marginalised the rural periphery. In developing countries the marginalisation of the rural was even extended to certain regions in the country. The main focus of internal colonialism was to extract resources from the periphery and develop the centre. In the developed world the case of England versus Ireland is a case worth noting if we are to understand the meaning and the roots of internal colonialism. In all these endeavours the centre wants to extract resources for the benefit of the elite. Closer to Zimbabwe, a good example is the apartheid system advanced by the Nationalist party in South Africa in the 1970s where they created Bantustans. The main objective of creating the Bantustans was the need to extract labour from these entities for the apartheid mines.

The concept of internal colonialism is applicable in the scenario being analysed in southern Matabeleland. Unlike in the USA where scholars such as Bohmer and Gottlieb among others concentrated much on the race of the population in coming up with some conclusions on the state of ‘internal colonialism’; in southern Matabeleland, internal colonialism is mainly based on ethnicity. The fact that in the 19th century, the *Ndebele* people ruled and dominated the *Shona*, post independence ascendancy of the *Shona* ethnic group to the ‘state’ provided leverage to overturn that domination. As is argued in subsequent chapters the defeat of ZAPU in 1980 provided an opportune time for the *Shona* ethnic group to exercise hegemony in all spheres. As I present some evidence in the section on development hegemony in post independence Zimbabwe, I point out how schools, government ministries and departments, retail and commerce industries were dominated by one ethnic group. This trend followed through to land distribution whereby people from Mashonaland provinces were allocated land in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts of Matabeleland. The majority of my informants preferred a land reform exercise that would avail more grazing land rather than an exercise that would avail more human settlement land. But because of the hegemony of the state and its apparatus the concerns of the people of the region were not taken into account in planning resettlement schemes. This as is argued created a sense of resistance that resulted in the state using coercive means to enlist compliance from residents of Southern Matabeleland¹⁰. Findings in this study point out that even the FTLRRP suffered from the same fact as elaborated by case studies in chapter 5. Internal colonialism depends on placement of external elite as is the case with land parcels allocated to ZANU PF elite and these elite as argued clashed with the locals in their endeavour to access grazing land. This has frustrated development from below. The nature of land distribution has been based on patron client relationship in this region. Furthermore, in the case of Matabeleland internal colonialism is more of a political nature rather than an economic one. For instance the genocide committed by the 5th brigade created an unequal relationship between residents of Matabeleland and other citizens of the country. In this case the systematic marginalisation has been propelled by the notion of ethnicity. Ethnicity has become a vehicle of domination and has created unequal citizenship and politically southern Matabeleland can be equated to a Bantustan.

¹⁰ The deployment of the 5th Brigade (Gukurahundi) in Matabeleland South in February 1984 is one such means the state tried to retain loyalty and allegiance of residents of this area.

1:6 Sustainable Livelihoods paradigm

In recent times, thinking about poverty and sustainable development has begun to converge around the linked themes of vulnerability, social protection and livelihoods. A popular definition of livelihood is that provided by Chambers and Conway (1991:7) wherein a livelihood ‘comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of a living’. Ellis (2000:7) acknowledged that this definition with minor modifications has been utilized by several researchers adopting the rural livelihoods approach (Carswell, 1997, Scoones, 1998). This has been accompanied by the development of a variety of approaches to analyse situations and assess the likely impact of project interventions. These include a vulnerability analysis, social analysis/social impact assessment and sustainable livelihoods approaches (sometimes referred to as livelihood security or livelihood systems approaches).

Townsend (1985) argues that Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) attempts to bridge a gap between macro policies and micro realities (and vice versa) an effort that neither poverty reduction programmes nor participatory development initiatives have been able to accomplish. Their limitations are that anti poverty endeavours have usually been conceived and implemented from the national level, using per capita income or consumption measures and manipulation of sectoral policies as points of departure. Little if any attention is paid to the manner in which people live and the resources used for pursuing livelihoods¹¹. Bryceson, (1996), and Berry, (1989; 1993), argued that social and kinship networks are essential for facilitating and sustaining diverse income portfolios. Twigg (2001) on the other hand argues that a sustainable livelihood approach is essentially a way of organizing data and analysis or a lens through which to view development interventions. Taking a holistic view of a project (need, focus and objectives), provides a coherent framework and structure for analysis, identifies gaps and ensures that links are made between different issues and activities. The aim is to help stakeholders engage in ‘debate’ about many factors that affect livelihoods, their relative importance, the ways in which they interact and the most effective means of promoting sustainable livelihoods (2001:1)

Nel and Hill, (1996), contend that the unit of analysis in livelihood investigations is likely to be an identifiable social group and it is crucial not to assume homogeneity in populations or

¹¹ Townsend (1985): A Sociological approach to measurement of poverty, journal of Oxford papers.

within households themselves. Certain issues must be taken into consideration when thinking about livelihood strategies and what the livelihood portfolio of different social groups look like and how positive are the choices that people make. None of these statements are very new but arguments on the limitations of poverty and livelihoods research have recently become common debates again. Nel and Hill, (1996,) further note that the livelihoods approach tends to universalize poverty and the ways to alleviate it. Considerable debates exist on the form and relationship between subsistence, market and commercialized forms of agriculture and their relationship. The sustainable livelihoods approaches assume that in all areas livelihoods are agrarian in outlook which is not always the case. For instance Wolmer and Scoones (2003) argue for agrarianisation to promote rural livelihoods yet Bryceson (1997) has argued that off farm activities which occupy an important place in rural livelihoods have led to de-agrarianisation in many rural Third World countries.

The sustainable livelihoods literature draws attention to the concern that livelihoods not only improve as a result of policy interventions, but that they improve in a sustainable manner. The well known ‘livelihoods pentagon’ (Scoones, 1998, Hall, 2007) depicts the dimensions of livelihoods and the interdependent relationship between five dimensions of livelihood assets, or capitals: human capital (education and skills), social capital (relations and networks), natural capital (land and water), financial capital (money and loans), physical capital (infrastructure and assets). In recent years the United Nations has included political capital as the sixth asset in the sustainable livelihoods framework. The relation of these assets/capitals is a key factor in promoting sustainable livelihoods. For instance, the FTLRRP has provided more natural capital (land) but has not complimented it with other capitals to enhance sustainable livelihoods.

In more recent times, rural development policy has been constructed around a particular narrative centred on assumed efficiency of the small family farm. Agriculture as the mainstay of the rural economy in Southern Africa, can, it is argued, be transformed through technology transfer, supported by effective extension services, input supply and credit systems (Wolmer, and Scoones 2003). The use of agriculture as an economic engine has been stifled in recent years in Zimbabwe by the controversial (FTLRP). Wolmer and Scoones (2003) noted that that small scale farming is not economically viable, and that those rural dwellers are not interested in “proper” productive, efficient farming in any case (South Africa). On the other hand Bryceson argued against the notion that rural livelihoods are basically based on

agriculture in contemporary Africa. In fact Bryceson contends that Africa has been experiencing a wave of de-agrarianisation. De-agrarianisation is defined as a long process of: (1) occupational adjustment (2) income-earning reorientation, (3) social identification, and (4) special relocation of rural dwellers away from strictly peasant modes of livelihood (Bryceson, 1997:4). Off-farm activities such as gold panning; and outward migration to neighbouring countries, are a manifestation of de-agrarianisation in Southern Matabeleland (Chapters 6 and 7) and this is a symptom of multiple livelihood strategies employed by individuals, families and households.

Findings from this study indicate that people of Gwanda and Umzingwane have multiple livelihoods. The general notion that rural people depend solely on subsistence agriculture is being further challenged in current rural development debates. Meagher and Mustapha (1997) for example identified three broad positions in respect to the contribution of non-farm activities to rural livelihoods. The first is that increasing non-farm activities facilitate rural development (Bryceson and Jamal 1997:64). The second position argues that “increasing involvement in non-farm activities contributes to a breakdown of rural society. Studies by Beckman (1987) and Watts (1995) point to the fact that non-farm activities draw labour out of agriculture and intensify rural labour shortages. The third position is that the impact of non-farm activities varies according to class, agricultural systems and economic context (Berry 1993; von Braun and Pandya-Lorch 1991). In chapter 6 on gold panning as an alternative source of income in southern Matabeleland, and chapter 7 on land reform and migration I demonstrate how these activities have become significant sources of income for some households of this region. For instance one of my informants indicated how his household earned a living with the available options:

I depend on this small field to cultivate maize when the rain falls. If the rains do not come I expend a lot of my energy trying to get feed for my livestock. With goats I take whatever maize stalks are available and feed them during drought years. I also collect “umchachacha” which grows well during drought years and feed my goats. With cattle I cut grass and store it so that when my cattle are desperate for food I feed them. Before the fast track we used to at list lease graze in some paddocks in John Hunt’s farm but since the farm was taken over for relief grazing by the land committee it has been over-grazed and there is no proper system of rotational grazing... Of course of late I have engaged in gold panning to try and make ends meet. With what I get from my panning activities I use it to buy basic commodities and pay for services for my household. Whatever is left I buy livestock. If it is a small sum I buy goats and if it’s large sum I buy at

least a heifer. Two of my sons are working in South Africa and seldom send some groceries and money through “omalayitsha (Thobekile Sibanda, 16/12/06).

Observations from fieldwork in Gwanda and Umzingwane indicate that some households use proceeds from off farm activities such as gold panning and migrant remittances to increase their livestock herds and homestead improvements, while some spend the income on luxurious activities such as the purchase of electric gadgets, expensive clothes, and beer. Most young male gold panners who frequented Makwe business centre were notorious for competing in buying beer and bidding for prostitutes¹². Besides income, people engage in other social activities to earn a living; for instance women in Lushongwe are members of various clubs that do not focus on raising income but rather fulfilling community obligations. They engage in educational programmes to address issues of hygiene, sanitation and generate mitigation measures for members of their ‘communities’ affected and infected by HIV/AIDS.¹³ For several years now women have been trained as pump minders and actually repair their water points without necessarily waiting for DDF pump minders who have been unable to do their maintenance work because of the harsh economic situation prevalent in the country. Kinship networks have been strengthened by the economic situation such that those extended family members with resources are engaged in alleviating the plight of the have-nots significantly. This is demonstrated by remittances coming from extended family members in the diaspora which as a source of support adds to the diversified livelihoods which enhances kinship relations in rural Matabeleland. Judging by these findings I believe it will be incorrect for one to think that rural livelihoods are basically land based in contemporary Southern Matabeleland. Although agriculture is the back-bone of rural livelihoods, rural communities in recent years have pursued more of these off farm activities than agricultural based livelihoods.

However, agrarian livelihoods despite the challenges faced by the local population have not been forsaken as the local population still invest in livestock and other agricultural inputs. The state and NGOs have provided humanitarian assistance in terms of food handouts in an endeavour to mitigate the effects of the drought and the economic hazards in the study area but the politicisation of food aid by the state has left some residents vulnerable¹⁴. Some

¹² Fieldwork notes 2005-2008.

¹³ Interviews with members of the Vukani women’s club/project 2006-2007.

¹⁴ Fieldwork evidence revealed that humanitarian assistance in terms of food handouts is heavily politicised in southern Matabeleland. For instance subsidized maize from GMB I was told was the preserve of ZANU PF card

NGOs have coined numerous programmes to teach locals life surviving skills in a collapsing economy, for example, Lutheran Development Services is promoting goat projects in Gwanda South and encourages people in that area to sell their goats when they are fat to earn more money (cf, Bornstein, 2005). From this premise I emphasize that rural people have multiple livelihoods and by combining their indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge, are in a position to generally eke out a livelihood from whatever means are at their disposal. The land reform programme was viewed as having the potential to increase livelihood sources of the poorest but cronyism, corruption, nepotism and ethnicity has seen the programme destroying even the well established livelihood patterns in Southern Matabeleland¹⁵.

It is worthwhile to note that sustainable rural livelihoods can be sustained if the rural people themselves are involved in all levels of projects and programme developments that are designed for their benefit. Development apparatus will not achieve their objectives if the target population has no interest in the activity or are not informed. As has been shown top down approaches largely fail to attract the attention and participation of those on the margins in addressing issues of poverty and livelihoods let alone underdevelopment. It is clear that hegemony is not restricted to 'Developed Countries' versus 'Less Developed countries' but cascades down at national level between the urban and the rural. It further cascades to some regions in one country dominating other regions as is the case with Matabeleland. Matabeleland has been constructed as an object for development by the hegemonic forces in Mashonaland, but in their construction, the interests of residents of Matabeleland, particularly Southern Matabeleland have not been taken into account. What is good and works in Mashonaland should work in Matabeleland; but the reality is that Mashonaland is largely a crop farming area and cropping models like the A1 and small scale farms can work well to uplift the living standards of the rural poor; but the same cannot be said for Matabeleland which is semi-arid and requires livestock farming support as well as irrigation development. It is therefore on this note that I argue that the FTLRRP has largely reduced livelihoods of rural residents of Southern Matabeleland.

carrying members. I found that NGOs were non partisan in food distribution but concentrated on communal land rather than "new resettlement areas" opened up by the FTLRP.

¹⁵ See chapter 5 on command agriculture at Makwe irrigation scheme.

1:7 Agrarian livelihoods imposed

One of the central observations made in this thesis is that development and government agents in Matabeleland South have consistently and persistently promoted crop production at every opportunity, despite adverse ecological, social and economic conditions. The tendency of these agencies to see and promote crop farming and associated agrarian livelihoods as superior and more desirable than livestock based livelihood has had profound implications for the failure of rural development in this part of Zimbabwe. In local accounts of livelihood change in this region, this trend was commonly noted.

One of my informants, Sibongile Ndlovu who was 18 years in the early 1960s recounted how they had depended on subsistence crop farming in the arid region of Gwanda by planting millet and sorghum:

We used to grow sorghum and millet for subsistence and as the colonialists' regimes brought in more and more Agricultural Demonstrators, we shifted gradually to maize farming as per the advice of these state agents. We complained that because of the dry conditions and unpredictable rains, it was unsustainable to grow maize. However these Demonstrators told us that there were under instruction from the District Commissioner to promote the growing of maize; and year after year they brought in new seed varieties. I remember that every year there was an R...something... type of seed variety. Of course we depended on livestock as a safety net in case we reap nothing from the fields. Those regarded as Master farmers were privileged to farm in Mankonkoni irrigation scheme and exchanged their maize surplus with goats and at times cattle," (Sibongile Ndlovu, 12/01/06).

Sibongile is one of many of my informants who argued that the advent of democracy in 1980 tried to promote small grain production through the then Department of Agriculture and Extension Services (AGRITEX), an extension exercise that has encountered much resistance from local crop farmers. Even research done by ENDA Zimbabwe (1994) confirms that small grain is more reliable than maize, in Gwanda South, change agents from 'both' government and the NGO sector had found it extremely challenging to convince residents in this region to increase the hectareage of small grains because maize meal is their staple food. A retired AGRITEX officer recalled how they organized field days and area shows to promote these crops in the period 1980 to 1990;

The state had the resources in the first decade of independence and we had the support at local level from a large number of NGOs who were into rural

development. We conducted numerous workshops with master farmers and those in associations or clubs but the hectareage of small grains increased insignificantly. People of this part of the country have passion for livestock and certainly view crop farming as mere means of reducing costs of buying maize the staple food otherwise livestock farming is more pronounced than crop farming. People in this region view livestock both as a social and an economic asset” (Bango-retired, AGRITEX officer, 17/05/06).

Efforts have been made even prior to independence to support irrigation development to supplement crop farming but results have not always been positive. The Give a dam campaign, a programme aimed at involving the locals in identifying dam sites in their localities is one such initiative that had the capacity to at least alleviate problems of food insecurity¹⁶. The programme failed in the late 1990s when donor funding was not forthcoming and the state could not assume responsibility. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the state provided seed parcels and fertilizer to rural residents in an endeavour to promote crop farming for both subsistence and national food security but with little success. It is an open secret in the province that tons and tons of seed maize and fertilizers distributed as ‘support’ to communal farmers have found their way into general dealers’ shops in other provinces where crop farming is more reliable¹⁷. The introduction of command agriculture in 2005 is one element of land reform that has seen cereal and vegetable production deteriorate in communal irrigation schemes. For instance the case of Makwe irrigation scheme that I present in detail in chapter five highlights some of the short falls of forced collectivization. The situation I observed at Makwe resembles the situation observed by Verdery (2003) in post socialist Transylvania where collectivization had been intense during the Soviet era and crumbled with the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. In the Makwe case a well maintained community irrigation scheme that was a major supplier of maize and horticultural crops was not viable as a result of the introduction of command agriculture (cf. Chapter 5). Recently the state has engaged in a massive agricultural mechanization programme country-wide and it is therefore not surprising that the much publicized agricultural mechanization programme in Zimbabwe today might see most of the ploughs and harrows in backyard

¹⁶ The Give-A-Dam Campaign was a brain-child of rural residents of Matabeleland South Province in reaction to persistent droughts. The programme was coordinated by the Provincial Development Committee and its sub structures. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) coordinated donor support to finance the construction of dams in all the then 6 Districts in the province. Local communities identified sites and provided labour on site (See Matabeleland South 5 year and annual plans 1985-90; 1995).

¹⁷ Authors experience as a development worker in the region.

shops¹⁸. People of this region remain ‘poor’ and have even engaged in unorthodox means of earning a livelihood such as gold panning and illegal migration to countries such as South Africa and Botswana. The argument here is that the state sees the needs of the locals through its own lens; what it perceives as the needs of the locals. As I have revealed from the interview with Sibongile Ndlovu, even the colonial regime viewed the growing of maize as a solution to promote local and national food security, an endeavour that has been futile.

Land reform in this province has largely promoted the establishment of village type resettlements that have received little support from the local leadership and development organisations working in the province let alone the intended beneficiaries. A three tier resettlement model¹⁹ was piloted in the province especially in the dry areas of Gwanda and Beitbridge districts as a reaction to calls by the majority of residents to promote intensive livestock farming and irrigation development. This programme was overtaken by events when the government introduced the (FTLRRP). The introduction of the FTLRRP in the year 2000 worsened the plight of residents in the region. Instead of following the envisaged provincial plan especially local needs for resettlement, the state expropriation of ‘white’ owned commercial farms was followed by two resettlement models namely A1 (a village type settlement) and A2 (medium sized commercial farms). As I argue later on, the resettlement model adopted by the state for this province has been of little benefit as most residents felt villagisation was not a priority while A2 land parcels were inadequate for extensive livestock farming. In addition state bureaucrats and politicians resettled people from urban areas and from other provinces on land the inhabitants had long depended on for relief grazing in drought years. People in this region have lost potential grazing land, and losing grazing land means a drastic reduction in sources of livelihood as livestock is their mainstay. Besides losing grazing land, people in this region for years have depended on wild fruits, vegetables and *amacimbi* (Mopani caterpillars) that were mostly harvested in former commercial farms that had well managed forests. Some households depended on seasonal labour in the former commercial farms to enhance their food security, and could use wage labour to buy breeding stock to replenish their livestock herds after the devastating drought of

¹⁸ Agricultural mechanisation was championed by Reserve Bank Governor as a reaction to shortage of farming (due to economic sanctions) inputs in communal, A1 and A2 areas. The programme has been criticised in my study area as it has been labelled a ‘vote buying’ exercise targeted at enlisting support for the ruling party. Even party members have challenged the programme at local level as implements were being distributed corruptly by state officials, war veterans and party officials.

¹⁹ A resettlement model that apportioned land into grazing paddocks, irrigable field and land for intensive cattle breeding/fattening.

1991-2. Without these livelihoods it has turned out to be a nightmare to survive on the land. Without multiple livelihood strategies farming has become unsustainable as a main source of livelihood, especially given the established dependency on multiple sources of livelihood.

Overall, evidence I collected on the impact of FTLRRP reflected mixed perceptions, with some beneficiaries claiming that access to additional land and resources had greatly enhanced their livelihoods, while in others access to land per se had made little difference. Alan Moyo one of my respondents who has settled well in South Africa and has managed to buy over 30 head of cattle since 1995 laments that:

The villagilisation of the former Shoka farm has reduced grazing land for my livestock, because John Hunt allowed me to lease graze my stock during the dry months of the year and this was good for my cattle. I do not believe that this type of land reform is of benefit to our community. We need grazing land not new villages in our area. After all those settled in these farms do not even come from our communal area. I bought the bulk of my heifers from John Hunt who used to sell these to locals every May. Since 2002 when John Hunt was evicted from this farm I have struggled to replace my cattle that succumbed to the 2000/01 drought. Locals are not willing to sell anymore as their stock has also diminished (17/12/06).

On the other hand Ngwenya from Umzingwane A2 farm praised the land reform programme:

This is the best achievement the government has done since independence. I never dreamt of owning a piece of land in this prime farming area of Esigodini. Although the plots are small at least half a loaf is better than nothing (Ngwenya, 09/10/06).

The contradicting statements by Alan Moyo and Ngwenya suggest that one cannot simply claim that the land reform programme has been either a success or a failure, rather its impact depends on who has what and what type of farming one is engaged in. For Alan the loss of Shoka farm as a source of grazing land depicts a failed attempt by the state to promote livestock rearing whereas for Ndlovu, his allocation of an A2 plot in the prime crop farming area of Esigodini in Umzingwane district suggests that the FTLRRP has been a success.

Hall (2007) notes that internationally, studies have demonstrated that the impact of land redistribution on incomes, quality of life and livelihoods may take some years to become apparent. Referring to the longitudinal study by Kinsey in Zimbabwe, from the 1980s to the late 1990s, Hall (2007) shows that a positive impact on livelihoods is not guaranteed, but

only contingent on the manner the implementation, both prior to and the following transfer of land rights. Hall further argues that:

“The key lessons that can be drawn from (a) range of country studies are that, irrespective of the political and historical milieu, the transfer of land alone is not sufficient and requires buttressing by settlement support provision from a range of institutions and sectors. In the absence of on-going support and capacity building, new land owners will run the risk of being set up to fail. For development activities on acquired land to be sustainable and to impact positively on the lives of beneficiaries, requires a comprehensive, responsive and on-going interaction between those requiring and determining the support they require and those who provide such support” (Hall-PLASS 2006: 41).

Sithole (2000) acknowledges that Zimbabwe has experienced two authoritarian regimes; one colonial spanning 90 years and the other post colonial from 1980 to date. The post colonial government has been heavier handed on Matabeleland since the discovery of arms caches in former ZAPU owned farms in the early years of independence. With mistrust that has always been prevailing between the two parties, ZANUPF predominantly *Shona* and drawing most of its support from Mashonaland provinces, and ZAPU drawing its support from the *Ndebele* who occupy the two Matabeleland provinces and part of the Midlands, the arms cache discovery was an opportune time to demonstrate the supremacy of the *Shona* over the *Ndebele*. The conflict known as ‘*Gukurahundi*’ following the arms discovery instilled a sense of fear among the *Ndebele* who felt that they had to accept the dominance of the *Shona*. This will be further illustrated in the second chapter where I demonstrate how Matabeleland has been constructed as an object of development by the state development apparatus (Ferguson, 1990). In keeping with my view scholars like Gottlieb (2005) refer to this as ‘internal colonialism’. I demonstrate this by examining the socio-political economy of Matabeleland from an historical perspective.

Stepan in his studies of authoritarian regimes mentions five groups with such regimes. The first group is the core supporters of the regime who are characterized by a siege mentality and will see opposition as a ‘clear and present danger’ to their interests. These will actively support repressive measures against any opposition (Stepan cited in Sithole 2000:68). The coercive apparatus that maintain the regime in power forms the second group of the regime supporters. In this group are the military and security forces that will tend to identify strongly

the interest of their organisations with those of the political regime. In the case of Matabeleland the fifth brigade (*Gukurahundi*) acted in that fashion. The third group identified by Stepan is the regimes passive supporters, who will submit to authoritarian hegemony under the weight of the first two groups. In this category are mostly the middle class who remain ‘quiescent and pliable’, and may even be used by a ‘cohesive and self confident authoritarianism (2000:68). The last two groups identified by Stepan are the active and passive opponents of the regime that are regarded as the regimes detractors-the opposition. From Stepan’s typology, the majority of residents of Matabeleland fall predominantly in the last two groups and this has created uneven development between Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Even when land reform was instituted in the early years of Independence Matabeleland did not benefit as much as Mashonaland, and suffice to say that people from the Mashonaland provinces occupied resettlement schemes in Matabeleland, a scenario that did not happen in Mashonaland. The Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme did not spare the residents of Matabeleland this domination as productive farms were allocated to the active and coercive supporters of the regime at the expense of residents of Matabeleland²⁰.

The unity accord of 1987 ushered a new era whereby the absorbed ZAPU leadership had to convince its supporters to support the regime despite the suffering they had endured under *Gukurahundi*. The FTLRRP, although it provided residents of Matabeleland with an opportunity to increase their land holdings after government expropriated former commercial farms, the model of re-distribution was designed at central level and did not consider the geographical, cultural differences, and preferences of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. As I conducted my ethnography in Gwanda and Umzingwane people noted that in this region they pin their livelihoods on livestock rearing and any land reform programme should address live-stocking needs. Following Stepan’s assertion of active supporters, the unity accord created more active supporters of the regime in Matabeleland who also pursued hegemonic tendencies as illustrated by the quotation at the beginning of this chapter. Those who have actively supported the regime like the local Member of Parliament as depicted by the war veteran in the quote, marginalized those without ‘power’ to stamp their authority on the land


²⁰ Interviews with communal respondents who were deprived land in resettlement areas as a result of supporting the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party.

despite having been used by the government to occupy and dispose of the previous white commercial farmer.

One striking feature from the interviews I conducted is that it is becoming evident that agrarian livelihoods are part of a multiplicity of rural livelihoods in Southern Matabeleland. Yes, people continue tilling the land for subsistence if the rains do come and rear livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys in an endeavour to sustain their livelihoods. The land reform has for some provided a window of opportunity to increase agricultural output whereas to some it has deprived them of key grazing land as is further argued in subsequent chapters. One cannot safely say rural people base their livelihoods on agriculture alone but also eke out a livelihood from other off farm activities such as gold panning, migrant remittances, social connections and networks. In fact the results of this study point out that though more land has supposedly been made available by the FTLRRP, the rural people of Gwanda and Umzingwane have shifted a great deal from agricultural activities. This supports what Bryceson (1997) referred to as de-agrarianisation in the rural third world as more and more rural dwellers shift from agriculture to off farm activities.

1:8 Location of study districts in Matabeleland South

The study was based on field and historical research in two districts in Matabeleland South, located in southern Zimbabwe. In the discussion below I will highlight some of the main features and characteristics of my research area and will also explore the manner in which the research for this project was undertaken. In the discussion I note my own long-term involvement with the areas and the issues under investigation and stress the critical importance of using qualitative and historical research methods to unravel the complexities of changing local level responses to government policy and livelihood practice in Matabeleland South. In the final part of this section I will provide a map of the thesis argument, which begins with two historical chapters on changes in regional politics and land use practice in southern Zimbabwe, before moving onto a series of detail ethnographic accounts of different aspects of local livelihood strategies in the study area.



Map of Matabeleland South province: source: Wikimedia.org.

This province is located in the South Western part of the country and is characterized by droughts and cyclones. This province is host to the busiest inland border post namely Beit-Bridge, which is a ‘get away’ to sea ports in South Africa. On the western side Matabeleland borders Botswana; and South Africa on the southern side. To the north it borders Matabeleland North Province, Midlands Province to the North East and Masvingo Province to the East. This province is predominantly a savanna type of vegetation which is more suitable for livestock rearing than crop farming. There are seven districts in this province, namely Beit-Bridge, Bulilima, Gwanda, Insiza, Matobo, Mangwe and Umzingwane. Although the province has a number of ethnic languages, the province is predominantly *Ndebele* speaking. Prominent languages in the province in addition to *Ndebele* are *Kalanga*, *Sotho* and *Venda*. In the last national population census, the province recorded a total population of 681,477 (2002 census). As noted earlier on, the main agricultural activity in the province is livestock farming. However because of recurrent droughts, the province,

according to the division of livestock of the Ministry of Agriculture, by the end of 2003 had lost over 35,000 cattle to drought and other livestock related diseases.²¹ The introduction of the FTLRRP also saw over 90% of livestock owned by displaced former white commercial farmers either being slaughtered, sold, stolen or poisoned further depleting the already depleted herd²². This has had negative consequences for livestock farming in the past eight years as is examined in chapter four.

Politically Matabeleland South has been dominated by opposition politics since the attainment of independence in 1980. It was only a ruling party province in the years following the unity accord of 1987 but after the death of the late leader of ZAPU Dr Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo (1999), and the subsequent formation of the MDC, the ruling party lost its grip on the province. This perhaps can be explained by the fact that this province has been marginalized in terms of real growth since independence and furthermore the conflict that occurred in the 1980s still haunts most people in this province (See also chapter five on command agriculture).


1:9 The study area

I had worked in Matabeleland South province for 15 years when I commenced field work in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts in April 2005. My experience in rural development activities and their challenges enabled me to conduct an ethnographic study of the impact of the land reform in these areas. Gwanda district is the drier of the two districts and is largely a live-stocking district that has vast gold deposits that of late have been explored by some households. As indicated on the map the district is located in the southern part of the province and shares seven (7) boundaries with Beitbridge Rural District Council to the South, Matobo Rural District Council to the North West, Republic of Botswana to the South West, Umzingwane Rural District Council to the North, Insiza Rural District Council to the North East, Mberengwa and Mwenezi Rural District Councils to the East. (See map of Matabeleland South). The area is a semi-extensive to extensive livestock ranching region supported by the cultivation of drought tolerant small grains, for example, sorghum and pearl

²¹ Statistics of livestock deaths in the province obtained from the division of livestock of the Ministry of Agriculture

²² Interview with Provincial Livestock Development Officer 12 December, 2005.

millet²³. This district has been carved out of the greater Wenlock area and is mostly inhabited by *Ndebele*, *Sotho*, *Jahunda*, *Banyubi* and *Venda* ethnic groups. Although these ethnic groupings have their own subcultures, they nevertheless regard themselves as *Ndebele*. According to the 2002 population census, Gwanda district population is 116,658 made up of 55,859 males and 60,799 females.



Sketch Map for study areas in Gwanda district: by the author

In Gwanda district I conducted fieldwork in Garanyemba and Wenlock Communal lands; Mvana/Konongwe A1 settlements²⁴. In brief Garanyemba communal land is mountainous and grossly unsuitable for crop farming. Even the little crops the Garanyemba villagers grow in their small fields are subject to marauding baboons and monkeys. Mtandawenema Village where fieldwork was carried out is close to former Shoka and Timber farms that now host a small A1 scheme and three A2 farms. The village is located among the Garanyemba hills and

²³ See also Robins (1989); 'The politics of resettlement and land use in Matabeleland south. A new model with a familiar face and also Robins (1994) his case study of Garanyemba communal area under model D.

²⁴ AI settlements are a village type settlement brought about by the FTLRRP and are apportioned into arable; homestead and grazing land, while A2 are small farms subdivided from expropriated former white commercial farms and are meant to be run on a commercial basis according to the objectives of the FTLRRP.

villagers cultivate an average of one hectare, mostly maize and some small grains such as sorghum and millet.²⁵ Their major source of livelihood is livestock husbandry and remittances from relatives in South Africa, Botswana and overseas. Fieldwork interviews indicate that these villagers used to lease graze their livestock, especially cattle in the former Shoka and Timber farms. Their communal grazing had been overgrazed due to an increase in the number of livestock as those working locally and in other countries invests in cattle.²⁶ Other studies conducted by NGOs, for instance (Lutheran Development Services, 2005) revealed that over 50% of youths in this village work illegally in South Africa while the other 50% is a mix of school going youths and gold panners.²⁷ Those who engage in gold panning from this village have to travel to other areas as there are no gold deposits close-by.

Wenlock communal land is the western part of Gwanda district. It encompasses four wards, that is, ward six Mtshabezi area; ward seven, and ward eight which include Makwe irrigation scheme where a detailed account of limitations of external driven rural development models has caused untold suffering for the intended beneficiaries. This is where Makwe irrigation scheme is located and command agriculture was introduced in 2005 (see chapter 5). The last ward in this communal land is Lushongwe, ward nine where over 70% of its residents engage in either legal small scale gold mining or illegal gold panning to eke out a livelihood in addition to livestock farming. Ward eight is within the gold belt and mines such as Horn mine, Freda mine are located in this ward. Wenlock communal land suffered a great deal in terms of land dispossessions during the Rhodesia era as it borders the scenic Matopos National park and the Matopo mountain ranges; and again because of the mountains during the *Gukurahundi* era discussed in the next chapter had more deaths than the other areas as a lot of people went missing without trace; it is assumed that they were thrown into deep curves.

Mvana and Konongwe are A1 villages. The area is dry and unsuitable for crop farming; however the resettled villagers are trying to eke out a living from dry land farming which has proven unreliable as they have only harvested a reasonable maize crop once in the seven


²⁵ Robins (1994:109) in his study of the ARDA initiated mode D resettlement project (Garanyemba communal area) concluded that villagisation collided with the exigencies of social and economic life in Matabeleland. The rectangular grids of the land use maps did not accommodate a semi-arid landscape in which key resources such as water points and browse are widely dispersed across both space and time.

²⁶ Interview with Alan Moyo December 2005.

²⁷ See baseline data by Lutheran Development services 1999.

years of the establishment of the settlement.²⁸ Close to Mvana there are four new A2 farms, which were pegged as self contained plots when the FTLRRP started but later on Government turned all self contained plots into A2 farms.²⁹ The average size of these farms is 400 hectares.

I also conducted fieldwork in the Umzingwane district (see map).



Sketch Map for study areas in Umzingwane district: by the author

The district is located in the north of the province and is 80 kilometres from Gwanda town the provincial capital and 40 kilometres from Bulawayo the second largest city in Zimbabwe. The district centre Esigodini is located along the Bulawayo Beitbridge highway. In the south it borders Gwanda district, in the east Insiza district, to the west it shares a boundary with Matobo district, and in the North it shares a boundary with Umguza district a district in Matabeleland North province.³⁰ The district comprises 4 communal lands namely: -

²⁸ Fieldwork notes from October 2005 to April 2007.

²⁹ Information given by the district land officer

³⁰ Umzingwane district profile

Esiphezini, Matopos, Mzinyathini and Swazi. There are four (4) traditional chiefs and eight (8) headmen. The district has 17 wards; of which five (5) are resettlement and twelve (12) are communal wards, represented by 17 elected councillors. In this district I conducted research in Sezhuba village, in Swazi communal area and in six A2 farms in the subdivided Essex vale farm and at Kondwane/Malungwane AI villages. Like Gwanda the post independence changes in the local governance system had a strong bearing on the distribution of land and other resources in this district. In the case of land distribution, both study areas suffered from the effects of 'internal colonization' as my respondents were regarded as enemies of the state for quite a long time. For instance many of my respondents and informants experienced the evils of the '*Gukurahundi*'. Furthermore the majority of informants remembered the bad mannered 'boys', the Local Government Promotion Officers (LGPOs) in their conduct of development activities in their communal areas. When I interviewed Khumalo in 2006, he recalled how in the 1980s they were instructed to elect VIDCO members who were the choice of these 'civil servants' not their choice in an effort to extend the long arm of the ruling party in Swazi communal areas a well known ZAPU stronghold. He also remembered how projects were brought top down by state bureaucrats without consulting them and how these projects never sustained their livelihoods as they had no bearing on their needs. A good example remembered by *Khumalo* was the construction of the Mtshabezi dam that has remained a white elephant for the last 15 years.³¹

Gwanda and Umzingwane districts like most districts in Matabeleland South suffer from a high youth emigration rate. The proximity of the districts to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana, coupled with the harsh economic environment has resulted in the mass exodus of both skilled and unskilled youth. The high incidence of gold panning has been associated with a corresponding increase in illegal settlements and dwindling legal livelihoods. The result of this has been a disrupted social fabric, which is associated with high rates of HIV and AIDS and poor health standards. Police records in the districts indicate high levels of theft and vandalism of infrastructure after the introduction of the FTLRRP in 2000. Besides theft of water engines in new settlements, police records in the district indicate high levels of

³¹ Mtshabezi dam was constructed in Wenlock communal area without consulting people and contractors had a tough time in trying to build the dam wall as it continuously washed away until local leaders came to the technocrats rescue by conducting a traditional ceremony. Nevertheless the dam was not a priority as the soils around were not suitable for irrigation development. In fact people downstream along Mtshabezi River lost livelihoods as they used to cultivate vegetables on the fertile banks of the river. Of late (2007), the State has proposed pumping the water to Bulawayo some one hundred kilometres away.

poaching and cattle rustling. Land degradation caused by overstocking, gold panning, deforestation, veld fires, and stream bank cultivation casts doubt on the sustainability of agriculture as a resource for future generations.

Interviews with government and Rural District Council (RDC) officials revealed that these districts have many opportunities for development; for instance, the south of Gwanda district has an abundance of underground water which could be tapped for development purposes. Some potential irrigable land exists in the district and it can be developed for the communities benefit. Irrigation infrastructure does exist in some schemes in the two districts and needs to be upgraded. Dams' sites were identified in the district during the Give-A-Dam era of the 1990s but remain undeveloped. The districts are a good livestock area and also boast of an abundance of wildlife, '*amacimbi*', minerals, pit and river sand.

1:10 Research Methods: approaches and orientation

This study is based on qualitative methods as the matter at hand required a detailed ethnographic enquiry. The fact that I had worked in the province of Matabeleland South before and the fact that I come from one of the districts (Umzingwane) was a bonus for the successful completion of interviews with key informants despite the prevailing political situation during the course of my fieldwork. Again as scholars like Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000) point out, the use of the language of respondents is vital in soliciting reliable and valid information. Being a Ndebele first language speaker created a good working relationship with my informants and support from the local leadership since the majority of researchers who had done land use assessments before have worked through interpreters as they came mostly from Mashonaland provinces.

Because of the sensitive nature of my study in contemporary Zimbabwe, I had to draw a convenient sample that would facilitate a better understanding of issues at hand. Of the seven districts in Matabeleland South province I deliberately chose Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The choice of these two districts was based on the ecological conditions and the type of resettlement models adopted in the said districts. Gwanda falls predominantly in region V that is characterized by droughts and low rainfall (annual average of 450mm), whereas Umzingwane is predominantly in ecological region IV and receives slightly more rainfall (550mm). Gwanda is predominantly a live-stocking district whereas Umzingwane has some

pockets of arable land suitable for crop farming. The other variable for selecting the two districts was that I had worked in these districts before as a development practitioner and had an understanding of some of the problems of the two districts. I actually employed a snow ball sampling technique to access my informants. My relationship with land institutions in the two districts also enabled me to take part in an A1 and A2 audit exercise of the Ministry of State Security; Land Reform and Resettlement in Umzingwane district.

“Hello sir, how can I help you”, asked the receptionist in the provincial headquarters of the Ministry of State security, Land Reform and Resettlement. “Can I see the provincial land officer” I replied. “Do you have an appointment with him”, she asked, and before I answered, Mr. Moyo the provincial land officer entered the reception and with nostalgia of our days working together in Gwanda district quickly interrupted us and shook my hand and quickly pulled me over to his office. “What are you up to you lecturer”, referring to my job title at Great Zimbabwe National University. “I know you have joined the academic field and now you will be troubling us time and again asking us to allow your students to research on the impacts of the fast track land reform”, he said laughing loudly and at the same time asking how my family was doing. We shared a few moments reflecting on our past experiences together working in this province before I moved to Masvingo for a university job as Coordinator of the Institute of Adult Education in the newly established Masvingo State University (later on renamed Great Zimbabwe National University). “Oh yes, I will be sending some of my rural development students to get a feel of what is happening in your department, but today I am the student asking for permission to carry out a study on the impact of the land reform on rural livelihoods with special attention on the districts of Gwanda and Umzingwane”. “You never stop studying my friend, what are you studying now since you completed your Masters degree in 1998?” I quickly handed over my letter of introduction from the director of the Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research. He put on his spectacles and read through frequently nodding and then extended his hand once more and congratulated me for pursuing a doctoral degree. We discussed the modalities of my research and as a former colleague he assured me of maximum support to carry through my study despite the political sensitivity of my topic. During my presence he phoned his land officers in the two districts and informed them of my study and asked them to give me maximum support and also to introduce me to their District land committees. I thanked him for his cooperation and promised to keep in touch with him whenever I encountered

problems, or needed further assistance to conduct my fieldwork. For the next two years I interacted with Moyo on a number of occasions and was even drafted into the provincial team of assessors for the farm utilization study of the Department of Land Reform and Resettlement. This was one of the happiest times in my fieldwork as I had doubted that I could receive such support from government staff as the land reform programme was a topical issue and some foreign researchers had been banned for portraying a bad image of the whole FTLRRP.

After holding several meetings with government departments, Council Chief Executive Officers and their councils; District and village level land committees; in August/September 2005 I conducted a pilot study in Gwanda district. I conducted the pilot study in Gwakwe village, ward six, Nyandeni old resettlement scheme and Nyandeni self contained plots. A total of 25 respondents were interviewed by me and the district land officer for Gwanda district as my assistant. Interviews were conducted in *IsiNdebele* the local language. I had a set of guiding questions and we made sure that any emerging issues from the interviews were noted. The pilot study was carried out over a period of six weeks bearing in mind that by then I was still struggling to secure study leave from my employer Masvingo State University and also registered for my degree on a part time basis. The pilot study revealed many gaps in the issues I was looking at and it was evident that a structured questionnaire would not work to study in detail this topic. The land reform programme being a topical and very sensitive issue in Zimbabwe I had to trade very carefully as security agents' eyes and ears were on the ground.

After the pilot study I noticed that the only way forward was the revision and conversion of the questionnaire into an interview guide. It was evident that the topic would be better studied through a detailed combination of methods and techniques. More precisely participatory techniques proved to be the way forward. Thus staying among the respondents creating rapport, networks with 'actors' and 'brokers' in the land reform programme and a sense of belonging, proved vital for the successful conduct of my study.

In October 2005 I interviewed eight technocrats from government ministries who had a bearing on land reform, and rural livelihoods in Matabeleland South province. I followed that by interviewing the Two Council CEOs of Gwanda and Umzingwane Rural District Councils, their heads of departments and Council Chairpersons.

In the last two months of 2005, I carried out interviews in Mvana, Makwe and Lushongwe areas of Gwanda district. Here the respondents were asked to tell their life history, experiences of land distribution, including the FTLRRP; their sources of livelihood, problems and coping strategies. It was a long process to extract meaningful information from informants in that it needed patience and follow up interviews. I had to contend with attitudinal issues from some respondents who were somehow reluctant to divulge personal information and to comment on the FTLRRP especially in A1 areas. Here some respondents felt that by bringing out negative issues in relation to the land reform programme they might be evicted from their plots though I had assured them that I would not disclose their names and that the research was for academic purposes. I camped at Makwe irrigation scheme to cover Lushongwe and Mvana/Konongwe respondents for six weeks.

The same technique was used in Kondwane and Essex vale ranch where I camped at Esigodini for another six weeks at the beginning of 2006. The main focus here was to build trust, solicit information and create an environment conducive to follow up and repeat interviews. In January 2006 I carried out an intensive ethnographic study of purposively and conveniently selected respondents and informants in the two districts of Gwanda and Umzingwane. During this period I personally interviewed sixty respondents who included war veterans, former white commercial farmers, married men and women, single parents and the youth. Furthermore during this period I had the liberty of being invited to take part in an intensive two week assessment of A2 farms in Umzingwane district by the District Land Committee; to me this was a valuable opportunity to gather additional data on the performance of A2 farmers in this district. This opened cordial relations between me and the District Land Committee.

During the course of my fieldwork I held a number of informal discussions with key informants in the two districts. I held four focused group interviews with members of the Vukani Women's club, Lushongwe women's community irrigation project, the association of small scale miners and representatives of gold panners. Spontaneous discussions were also held with a number of individuals as some would approach me in either Makwe or Esigodini where I literally established my bases to cover the selected areas in the two districts; these included war veterans, security agents, some informants I had interviewed before who wished to clarify or add new information on the topic. Spontaneous discussions were also initiated in places where informants socialized, for instance in bottle stores and cattle sales pens.

As I camped in the research areas I made a number of observations that exposed some of the salient issues about the respondents, including their way of life, their cultural patterns, norms, values, taboos, the way they survive on the land they occupy and their fears and hopes for a just land programme that would address their real and felt needs. I used this technique throughout the research process. I also visited gold panning sites where I observed the impact of this activity on the environment and also the social relations that developed between gold panners and young women selling food stuffs and clothing in these sites. I had an exciting encounter with illegal immigrants to South Africa when I visited the IOM centre in Beitbridge.

From mid December 2006 to May 2007 I held forty repeat interviews with the respondents I had interviewed in 2005 and 2006. I also held discussions with the Makwe irrigators in an attempt to find out more about the effects of command agriculture on their livelihoods. Discussions were also held with representatives of the local War Veterans Association. During these encounters with my informants I took some photographs depicting my encounters with a variety of informants and respondents.

As a matter of protocol I introduced myself to the Provincial Land Officer who subsequently introduced me to his District Land Officers of Gwanda and Umzingwane. I also introduced myself to the two Chief Executive Officers of the said districts who in turn introduced me to their district land committees and councillors of the selected wards and villages where research was conducted. This I did to solicit acceptance and support for my study. Having worked in Matabeleland South Province for over fifteen years in rural development programmes in various organisations and capacities, I received a warm welcome from the Provincial and District leadership. The fact that I was studying at Fort Hare was enough evidence that I was not anti-government as security agents thought, but one of those on the Presidential Scholarship programme. Interviews were conducted in Ndebele the main language of these districts. I openly told my informants about the purpose of my study and assured them that whatever names appeared in this thesis would be pseudo-names and that there was no way I would divulge their identities to anyone without their consent.

In preparing for further fieldwork and writing of this thesis I have presented conference papers at two Anthropology Southern Africa and one Social Transformation conferences in South Africa.

1:11 Thesis map

In this first chapter I provided a critique of the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (FTLRRP) and also gave a theoretical perspective of development highlighting the effects of the top down/bottom up paradigm and the concept of internal colonialism. In this chapter I also unpacked the rubric of livelihoods and some of the approaches that have dominated the development discourse in recent years. As I unpacked the livelihoods approach I also elaborated on some of the livelihoods of residents of Gwanda and Umzingwane. A situation analysis and location of the study districts was given. I ended this introductory chapter by detailing the methods I used to conduct the study; in fact the study adopted ethnographic methods.

The second chapter strives to illustrate how Matabeleland has been constructed as a development object. Here I argue that ethnicity and political domination by the *Shona* and ZANU PF party have contributed to the dwindling livelihoods of people in southern Matabeleland amid a massive redistribution of land. The understanding from scholars like Gudeman (2001), is that land is the base, that if secured can increase the rural economy. The question is why the livelihoods of southern Matabeleland residents have dwindled and changed yet the base has been expanded through the expropriation of former commercial farms. A historical narrative of the region will illustrate how Matabeleland has been underdeveloped despite close to three decades of post colonial rule. Conclusions drawn from this chapter demonstrate that Matabeleland has been treated unfairly in terms of land distribution and rural development despite the unity agreement between ZANUPF and ZAPU PF suggesting that the marginalisation of this region is still an ongoing programme.

The third chapter focuses on the consequences of implementing land reform programmes in Zimbabwe. Here I also demonstrate how the FTLRRP has changed the landscape of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. I use case studies to demonstrate the consequences of the programme. I further explore what effect land reform in Africa and the world has had on the rural peasantry. I compare these processes drawing similarities and differences with the option adopted by the Zimbabwe Government. The lessons drawn from the literature suggest that orderly planned land distribution has the capacity to promote better living standards and

can increase agrarian livelihoods. In illuminating the pros and cons of land reform approaches, I strive to situate southern Matabeleland as a marginalized province in Zimbabwe. Conclusions from this chapter show that the FTLRRP has adversely affected rural livelihoods in the province and study districts.

In the fourth chapter I argue that livestock farming is the pillar of rural livelihoods in southern Matabeleland. Here I explore how the land redistribution programme has promoted or hindered livestock farming in the province. The major conclusions from this chapter indicate that the best resettlement model for southern Matabeleland is one which focuses on livestock farming more than crop farming. Given the arid conditions of the province extensive livestock rearing can reduce food insecurity and promote other livelihoods of residents of the region. Educating their children, the ability to access health services, food self sufficiency are examples of such livelihoods. In fact the state apparatus have misrepresented the landscape of the region. Nevertheless if well ‘supported’ some A2 crop farmers in Umzingwane district can produce as well as the previous white commercial farmers.

The fifth chapter is a case study of Makwe irrigation scheme under Command Agriculture; a state land reform model that has seen management of community irrigation schemes such as Makwe taken over by the army. The chapter demonstrates how command agriculture (Operation Maguta) has impacted on the way of life of Makwe villagers and the Wenlock area at large. The main findings of this command style of land husbandry illustrates that livelihood strategies and safety nets that have been embedded in the way of life of these irrigators have been grossly affected by this land reform model. Conclusions from this case study emphasize the repercussions of top-down development approaches and the dangers of militaristic interventions in civil affairs.

Chapters six and seven examine some of the coping strategies that households in the study area have adopted as a way of cushioning themselves from the impacts of the FTLRRP. Chapter six focuses on gold panning as a livelihood strategy adopted by some residents in an effort to reduce vulnerability. Chapter seven focuses on outward migration to neighbouring countries especially South Africa by some household members in an effort to earn income and remit home. A section in this chapter explores how women have been caught in the business of informal cross-border trading as a result of dwindling local sources of livelihoods.

The major conclusions drawn from chapters 6 and 7 reveal that more and more rural people are turning to off farm activities for a living. The chapters also reveal the heterogeneity in the way households benefit from multiple livelihoods. In fact gold panning and migrant proceeds have sustained most households during the current economic crisis though some households have not benefitted much from these activities. Again this shows that there is heterogeneity in the way households benefit from multiple livelihood activities.

In the last chapter I synthesize the findings and draw conclusions based on the premise that the 'one size fits all' Land Redistribution model reduces rural livelihoods in this province.

Chapter Two

Ethnicity and the Dynamics of Political Domination in Southern Matabeleland

2:1 Introduction

Matabeleland is part of Zimbabwe, although history shows that the Ndebele are descendants of the Zulu and other ethnic groups from South Africa. The salutary history fact has had a profound impact on the political development of Zimbabwe and has fundamentally shaped the way in which Matabeleland is constituted within the Zimbabwean polity. It would be extremely difficult to understand the social, economic and political dynamics of southern Matabeleland without recognizing the role of ethnic conflict and persecution in the making of this region. In this chapter I seek to argue that the current hegemony of the *Shona* people in Zimbabwe and their desire to dominate *Ndebele* communities in the south has contributed significantly to the marginalisation of southern Matabeleland over the past 30 years. As I proceed I engage with the scholarly debate on the political and economic history of this region and explore the role of ethnicity and internal colonialism in shaping current political and administrative systems and livelihood opportunities in the region.

As has been discussed in the previous chapter internal colonialism in this region has largely been shaped by historical and ethnic factors that have come to dominate the political landscape of Zimbabwe before and after independence. In post independence Zimbabwe the struggles for land dramatically shifted from white colonial occupation to local level struggles for land and resources by formerly marginalised communities as the government in 2000 introduced the FTLRRP. This programme shifted a large chunk of former commercial farm land from white farmers to black ‘farmers’ for both settlement and commercial farming. The dynamics of land-use and settlement formation in this region will be the focus of the next chapter where I explore the local level manifestation and experiences at a community and household level of the fast track land reform programme. In this chapter, however, I will focus mainly on the changing political landscape in the region since the 1980s and the

growing significance of ethnic consciousness and identification in the politics of development. I suggest that a fundamental theme in this history has been the desire and quest by the ruling, *Shona*-dominated ZANU PF to construct, under the auspices of ‘development’, a system for the political domination and control of Matabeleland.

In the chapter I begin by exploring the historical roots of the *Shona-Ndebele* conflict in Zimbabwe. Here I note that while there are significant cultural differences between these two ethnic categories, I also concur with scholars who stress the invented and flexible nature of ethnic construction and identity. I note that the definition and composition of both groups has changed historically in relation to struggles for resources and land and provide a background to the political desire for *Shona* domination in the post-1980 period. This provides the context for a detailed discussion of the *Gukurahundi* campaign, which allegedly sort to root out political dissidents, but was effectively translated at the local level to an exercise in ethnic cleansing. The chapter documents the impact of *Gukurahundi* on rural communities in both the research areas and explores the consequences of this process for the dynamics of rural development in Matabeleland. It argues that while the region has been exposed to a form of internal colonialism, the attempt by the ruling party to dominate and control rural communities in this region has been largely unsuccessful. Amongst the legacies of the ethnic violence of the 1980s is that there are low levels of trust of the state by local communities and a lack of commitment by the state to the local level development agenda. It is also noted that the state’s lack of political legitimacy has resulted in it continuing to rely on a combination of coercion and co-option to achieve its objectives.

2:2 Making of Ethnicity before Independence

In my readings on the history of Zimbabwe I learnt that between the eighth and the tenth century AD, the *Shona* people occupied the area now called Zimbabwe, slowly displacing the *Khoi-San* people (Bushmen) who had occupied much of the country for several thousand years previously. The *Shona* were a cattle herding and crop-farming people. From about the eleventh century onwards, they built large stone buildings and towns of up to 20,000 people. The most famous of these is Great Zimbabwe, just located 20 kilometers outside of what is now called *Masvingo*. The *Shona* kingdoms were significant powers and traded both with groups in the interior of Africa and with Arab, Portuguese and Indian traders on the coast of what is now Mozambique (Munro, 1994, Moore, 2005).

Towards the mid-19th Century, the *Rozvi* Empire, whose hereditary ruler bore the title of *Mambo*, was in a state of decline. The *Rozvi* were further weakened when an *Nguni* group under the leadership of *Zwangendaba* killed the ruling *Mambo*. By the time the *Ndebele* arrived under the leadership of *Mzilikazi*³², they found the *Shona* communities scattered and without leadership. There was therefore little organized resistance to the settling of *Ndebele* in what is now Matabeleland, in Southern and Western Zimbabwe³³. Ranger (1999) acknowledges that the arrival of the Ndebeles in present day Zimbabwe meant the incorporation of tribes such as *Kalanga*, *Jahunda*, *Banyubi* and *Lozwi* into what became the *Ndebele* state.³⁴ Their incorporation was not by design, but the result of conquest. In some cases the invading Zulus and Swazis (*abeZansi* and *Abenhla*)³⁵ faced serious challenges as going on the landscape, especially around the Matopos area, and they had to depend on the advice and guidance of the indigenous inhabitants of these hills. Noel Hunt a Native Commissioner during the early days of the colonization of Zimbabwe had these words to say about the Ndebele Chiefs:

“They have been ruling these people ever since they emerged from the Congolese forests (referring to Mashona and other tribes)...They know how to rule blacks. When the white man came to Rhodesia, you did not have to consult any Mashona or Karanga or anybody else at all because they’d all been conquered and defeated by the Amandebele. The de-facto rulers of every square inch of land and the de-facto rulers of every single head of cattle in Rhodesia were the Amandebele”, (Hunt in Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000:93).

Yet these sentiments had serious consequences for the inhabitants of Matabeleland in post independence Zimbabwe, as we shall see in relation to the ‘*Gukurahundi*’ conflict, and the rhetoric of its predominantly *Shona* soldiers in the section that follows later.

The first permanent white residents of Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, were a tiny number of missionaries who arrived in the 1850s and 1860s, though a few Portuguese traders, soldiers and missionaries had penetrated into Zimbabwe as early as the 1500s (Moore, 2005). White settlers began arriving in large numbers with the ‘Pioneer Column’ in 1890, looking initially

³² Mzilikazi son of Matshobana was one of King Shaka’s chief induna who fled his brutality during the umfecane era. He was the first king of the Ndebele nation and like Cecil Rhodes, is buried in the Matopos hills, at Entumbane.

³³ See Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000) *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests* of Matabeleland.

³⁴ See Ranger 1999 *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*.

³⁵ See William F. Lye (1969), *The Ndebele Kingdom South of the Limpopo*. Here he emphasises that the core Nguni group was referred to as *abeZansi* (southerners) and *Abenhla* (those incorporated to the Ndebele state in present day Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Limpopo provinces of south Africa in the early 19th century).

for precious minerals but later deciding to stay for the country's agricultural potential. In 1893 and 1896, respectively, the *Ndebele* and *Shona* uprising against the white settlers were crushed, in what is popularly termed the 'first *Chimurenga*', or war of liberation (Munro, 1994:9). The second *Chimurenga* was the bitter and protracted guerilla war waged intensively in the 1970s by ZIPRA and ZANLA guerillas of the Patriotic Front.³⁶

When the *Matabele* were defeated in 1893, they had sought refuge in the Matopos hills south of Bulawayo. Because of the scenic nature of the hills, and the need for cheap labour for the mines, Rhodes persuaded the *Ndebele* chiefs to come out of the hills to pave way for the establishment of a nature reserve which was in later years to be named Rhodes Matopos National park.³⁷ All arable land around Bulawayo was alienated to whites and blacks were moved to dry land that lay south of the Matopos in what became the present day Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The annual report, Matopos, for the year ending March 1900 (Ranger 1999:87) commented that:

"There are large tracks of uninhabited desert country in the west and south west of the district covered with Mapani trees. The Matopos range is the only part that can be said to be well populated".

By May 1901 nothing less than a 'general exodus from the hill country' was reported, due to the depredations of baboons and locusts and other factors. In June 1901 'exceptionally good crops' were achieved in the virgin *Mapani* soils in contrast with poor harvests in the over-farmed Matopos- "the natives are continuing to leave the hills" (Ranger 1999:87).

2:3 Chieftainship and Ethnicity in Wenlock

The notion of ethnicity is both amorphous and imbued with extreme doses of subjectivity. Kellas, for example defines ethnicity as a state of being ethnic, or belonging to an ethnic group. On the other hand the United Nations defines ethnicity as referring to membership in a culturally-and geographically defined group that may share language, cultural practices, religion or other aspects. Within these national groups there are further divisions that can be termed as ethnic groups; for instance South Africans can be of *Zulu*, *Xhosa*, *Sotho* or *Venda* ethnic groups. The same can be said of Zimbabwe where the prominent ethnic groups are

³⁶ See Barry, 2004; Zimbabwe, The Past is the Future, p31, The Zimbabwe Liberators Platform: What happened to our dream?

³⁷ The National park has since dropped the name "Rhodes" in a move to give local names to national institutions and enterprises.

Ndebele and *Shona*. Some scholars have tried to distinguish between nationality and ethnicity. The United Nations views nationality as referring to country of citizenship; however some scholars and development practitioners use nationality to mean ethnicity, although the two terms are technically different. It is therefore important to note that people can share the same nationality but be of different ethnic groups and at the same time people of the same ethnic identity can be of different nationalities. For instance there are *Ndebele* citizens of Zimbabwe and at the same time there are *Ndebele* of South Africa.

Eriksen (2002) comments that Weber (1980) [1921] discarded ethnic community action as an analytical concept since it referred to a variety kinds of phenomena. Weber in Eriksen (2002) also held that ‘primordial phenomena’ like ethnicity and nationalism would decrease in importance and eventually vanish as a result of modernisation, industrialisation and individualism. On the contrary, ethnicity, nationalisms and similar forms of identity politics grew in political importance in the world throughout the 20th century, particularly since the Second World War (Eriksen, 2002:2). In everyday language the word ethnicity still has a ring of ‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations’, but in social anthropology it refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive. Although it is true that ‘the discourse concerning ethnicity tends to concern itself with sub-national units, or minorities of some kind or another (Chapman et al. 1989:17), majorities and dominant peoples are no less “ethnic” than minorities (Eriksen, 2002:4). In contrasting racism and ethnicity, Banton argues that ethnicity is generally more concerned with the identification of “us”, while racism is more oriented to the categorisation of “them” (Banton, 1983:106cf, Jenkins, 1986:177). To Banton it implied that race is a negative term of exclusion while ethnic identity is a term of positive inclusion. Mitchell (1956) further explores the ‘us’ and ‘them’ ethnic classification using the Kalela dance.³⁸ This resulted in him concluding that the concept of stereotyping refers to the creation and consistent application of standardised notions of the cultural distinctiveness of a group. This led to Eriksen’s argument that stereotypes are held by dominated groups as well as by dominating ones, and they are widespread in societies with significant power differences as well as societies where there is a power equilibrium between ethnic groups (Eriksen, 2002:24). This brought him to the conclusion that ethnicity is a product of contact not of

³⁸ See Mitchell (1956) in Eriksen 2002:23). Though the Kalela dancers were dressed in a modern way and the dance was not part of their traditional cultural repertoire, the dance itself, songs and the message passed distinguished between ‘us’ and ‘them.’

isolation, and the idea of an isolated ethnic group is meaningless. By implication, ethnicity entails both commonalities and differences between categories of people—both complementarity and dichotomisation (Eriksen 2002:35)³⁹.

Ndebele is a grouping of various ethnic groups that reside in Matabeleland. These are the core groups who came to Zimbabwe under the leadership of *Mzilikazi*, the *Kalanga*, the *Sotho*, *Venda*, *Jahunda*, *Nanzwa (Nambiya)* and other smaller groups that were already resident in the area. However early colonial administrators tended to present a complex ethnic picture of the region, especially the area around Matopos hills where I conducted numerous interviews and personal observations during the course of this study. Ranger (1999) acknowledges that the colonial administrators saw the indigenous *Banyubi* people of the hills as the very much non-Ndebele—*‘the most ignorant and coward natives I have seen,’* wrote Assistant Native Commissioner, *Umlugulu* in March 1900, *almost the whole population being a very poor class of the MaHoli*. The word *‘Amahole’* was used derogatorily by the *Ndebeles* to refer to tribes other than the *Swazi* and *Zulu* who had an Nguni affinity⁴⁰. Jackson reported that if ‘the bulk of the people are of the Banyubi hill tribe occupying the rugged Matopos range...the subsidized Indunas are Matabele’⁴¹. Indeed there is evidence that different sorts of ‘non-Ndebele’ who lived in the hills in the mid 1890s felt not only different from but actively hostile towards their Ndebele overlords. Many *Shona* speakers, captured in *Ndebele* raids before 1893 and placed under *Ndebele Indunas* in or around Matopos, now took the opportunity to escape after the collapse of the *Ndebele* rule. Assistant Native Commissioner *Mlugulu* in June 1897, for instance further reported that: “a great many Amahole who were placed under either *Hluguniso* or *Dhliso* have left *‘Egubeni’* for their original homeland, *‘Ebuswina’*, near Victoria (now *Masvingo*). They have no intention of returning. It appears that all *Amahole* in the Matopos Hill are desirous of seeking pastures new,” (Ranger 1999:100). After 1896, the Native Department officials did not wish to reconstruct the Ndebele state. Instead they tried to hold the societies of central Matabeleland together by constructing an *‘Ndebele’* ethnicity on what was perceived to be Zulu cultural practices. For instance colonial administrators enforced payment of *lobola* (bride-price) which they thought

³⁹ See also Mitchell 1956 where he describes how an individual can behave as a ‘tribal’ in some situations and ‘town dweller’ in others.

⁴⁰ Williams (1969): The Ndebele kingdom south of the Limpopo.

⁴¹ Monthly report, Matopo-Mawabeni June 1899, NBE 1/1/1.

characteristic of *Nguni* societies and discouraged the bride service on the *Banyubi* practice⁴². Indunas and their courts were entrusted to enforce marriage law so that the domestic issues of the *Banyubi*, *Kalanga* and other groups were determined in isiNdebele before an Ndebele induna. Missionaries used *isiNdebele* or more often *Zulu* as a language of church and school (Ranger 1999:101).

The construction of an *Ndebele* nation or ‘community’ through the incorporation of various ethnic groups supports the idea raised by Anderson that all communities are invented and using his words ‘imagined communities’. The construction an ‘*Ndebele* ethnicity’ shows that while it was initially invented to facilitate colonial rule, it was the Ndebele themselves who subsequently made the label meaningful, and at various times contested its meaning (Schech and Haggis 1991:281). Schech and Haggis further argue that while ‘*Ndebele*’ was crafted out of various ethnic groups, missionaries were central in classifying and naming groups of local people reified as tribal groups, whose access to missionary and colonial resources was contingent on their newly ascribed social identities. Inscription (of local languages) and ascription (of identities based on apparent differences in language) were key processes in this phenomenon. Chimhundu (1992) argues that at successive meetings of the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Society Conference (SRMSC) during the 25 year period from 1903 to 1928, several rival missionary societies operating from Mission Headquarters conveniently situated far away from one another were brought together by common interests to discuss a single orthography for *Shona*, which they all needed to use for evangelical work in their respective zones of operation. The development of written literacy and the shaping of ethnic identities were key outcomes of this conference. Ranger argues the same for the case of Matabeleland where missionaries developed written literacy and missionary activities around the *Zulu* language despite the presence of other ethnic languages such as *Kalanga*, *Nyubi* and *Sotho* for instance. This has led Ranger (1993:64) to argue that ethnicity was created not only by colonial officials, but was also imagined and manipulated by African nationalist politicians, church leaders and others. On the other hand Moyana and Sibanda (1999) argue that there was peaceful cross fertilization of ideas and beliefs between the *Shona* and the Ndebele groups (1999:18-19). Nyathi (2001) gives an example of Lobhengula who was

⁴² To be a son in law of a Banyubi household, the man had to work for the in-laws demonstrating his industriousness. Some oral evidence gathered by the author put the time-span at least seven years.

treated for a chronic ailment by a *Shona* traditional healer after his *Zulu (Ndebele)* traditional healers had failed to contain the ailment for a long time.

2:4 Traditional structures as colonial agents

Like most African countries Zimbabwe prior to independence in 1980 had been under colonial rule for 90 years. The indigenous black people had social institutions that governed its members. For instance, the institution of the King (*inkosi*) in the *Ndebele* culture was respected as was the institution of the chief (*mambo*) in Shona society.⁴³ Some of these institutions survived colonization; for instance chieftaincy remained a strong institution even during colonization. Chiefs were maintained by colonialists if they agreed to carry out administrative duties assigned to them. In some instances, disobedient chiefs were removed and replaced by ones appointed by the British and Rhodesia rulers. It was common in British territories to appoint chiefs as noted by Berry (1993) in her classical study; '*No Condition is permanent*':

Observations by Berry (1993) were common in most British colonies in Africa, and Zimbabwe then Rhodesia, was no exception. Where chiefs were very powerful and could not be intimidated by the British settlers, the latter introduced the concept of 'headmen', a phenomenon that exists to the present day in Zimbabwe. However in contemporary Zimbabwe the headman (*umlisa*) reports to the chief (*induna*), and is viewed as a representative of traditional authority in the absence of a chief. Below the headman, there is the institution of kraal head (*usabhuku*)⁴⁴. The latter represent and present problems and proposals of a kraal and there can be as many kraal heads as there are kraals in the Chief's or Headman's area. The main function of these traditional institutions is to regulate the way of life of a particular society; thus traditional institutions sanctions norms, customs and values of a society. At kraal level kraal heads are empowered by the chief to allocate land for fields and homesteads. They can also preside over kraal courts; if the case cannot be solved or settled at kraal level it is referred to the headman and if not solved at the headman's level, the issue is sent to the chief who has the final decision or judgment. It is worth noting that traditional

⁴³ See, Alexander, Ranger and McGregor (2000): One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland; Donald Moore (2005) *Suffering for Territory... Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe*, and Ranger (1999) *Voices from the Rocks, Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*.

⁴⁴ Donald Moore (2005): *Suffering for Territory* and also Ian Scoones (1996) *Range management science and policy*.

positions in an ideal Zimbabwean cultural context are inherited; what sociologists' term ascribed status.

The 'concept' of headmen and kraal heads was an invented tradition in Matabeleland as an endeavour to exact control by the colonial administrators who felt some chiefs were disloyal and still harboured the idea to create a Matabeleland homeland. To the Native Administrators this could cause secession and hence the appointment of these functionaries to diffuse the idea. It is associations like *Sofasonke* which grouped the inhabitants of the Matopos against evictions and the Old *Nqama* Regiment in Wenlock which claimed land taken over by white settlers in the early 20th century. The claim of land by these associations was locally and historically specific and it is worth noting that when independence came, the new resettlement models did not take these local claims into consideration thus letting outsiders settle in the acquired farms at the expense of those who had established their claim earlier. Unlike in South Africa, the land reform programme in Zimbabwe did not consider 'land restitution' as a model to address the dispossessions of the colonial era and as I have already mentioned this has seen the State parceling out land parcels without ethnic or customary considerations (refer to FTLRRP Section)

In Matabeleland Kingship was paramount before Lobhengula 'disappeared'. After the fall of the *Ndebele* kingdom chieftainship assumed a paramount status and even when massive eviction of people from Matabeleland South to *emaguswini* (Matabeleland North) occurred⁴⁵, people moved with their chiefs. In some cases Ndebele chiefs became rulers of the new land in spite of having found inhabitants in those areas. This was because when Mzilikazi drifted north towards to what now is Zambia he had conquered and captured some of these subjects and when he drifted back southwards to die in the Matopos, his mark as a feared warrior was still alive in the minds of the *Abashankwe*, *Lozwi* and *Tongas* of this area. Colonial administrators by 1939 had established a Chiefs council in the Matabeleland region. Alexander et al (2000) points out that in the beginning chiefs used this council to complain about lack of development, for instance inadequate schools, clinics, poor state of roads among many other demands. But later on under the influence of the Matabeleland Home Society, chiefs began to demand a just deal for the region from government. They cited better

⁴⁵ Alexander, McGregor and Ranger; Violence and memory. One hundred years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland for a detailed narrative of evictions from Essexvale (now Esigodini), Filabusi and Matopos during the period 1920s to the 1950s.

roads, schools and other social amenities in Mashonaland as compared to next to nothing in the Matabeleland region. These demands culminated in the great Matabeleland Home Society Conference that was attended by all chiefs, headmen and elders in December 1945. The conference demanded the formation of a chief's assembly in Matabeleland. This assembly was actually registered by the Native Commissioner in 1952, (Kriger, 1988, Alexander et al 2000:91)

2:5 The problems of eviction

The entire *Ndebele* heartland on the highveld around Bulawayo was alienated to white settlers; Ndebele cattle were looted on a grand scale. The land Commission of 1894 defined the *Ndebele* 'home' as the inhospitable Shangani and Gwaai reserve, areas which whites disdained and which the Ndebele had used less for settlement than for hunting, grazing and refuge (Ranger 1967). It is estimated that 100 000 herd of cattle were taken by mid 1894, and when the rinderpest struck in February 1896, remaining herds were further decimated, fuelling the momentum for uprising (2000:21, Fontein, 2006)

The introduction of the Land Husbandry Act in the early 1950s had a negative effect on the livelihoods of people in southern Matabeleland bearing in mind what had transpired at the close of the 19th century as depicted above. This Act followed the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that segregated land on racial lines. The 1930 Act was a reaction to the official agrarian planning of 1925. In an effort to encourage black people to desist from shifting cultivation and encourage them to farm commercially, Farrer 1925 noted that "you know how to do it", referring to black farmers who had worked tirelessly in the commercial farms and at the same time on their own subsistence fields. Farrer was very skeptical of the continuous eviction of natives from the land they had been moved to earlier. Farrer admitted in his annual report (1925) noted in Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 2000:

"That perpetual evictions had made Africans into 'wanderers', with no confidence that the whites would leave the reserves themselves alone if they proved fertile. There was no incentive for them to improve."(Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000:70).

However the Native Commissioner envisaged the introduction of compulsion as new judiciously placed contour ridges and supervision of the methods of ploughing were required. As Alexander noted, the Native Commissioner further stressed that:

“As the question of improvement of stock, (it) must be taken out of (the Africans) hands altogether. The matter is a national one...it has been proved that the native is incapable of looking after or improving his one source of security. The obvious solution is a strict culling of his herd and the compulsory acquisition by him of an approved bull” (Alexander et al 2000:71).

This blanket statement by the Native Commissioner regarded people in Matabeleland as having no capacity to rear livestock yet at the same time acknowledging that it was their only source of security. On the other hand, Farrer an agricultural expert had seen the dangers to the environment of continuous evictions but his suggestions were ignored by Law and Order Maintenance Act an oppressive piece of legislation. By 1951 the Land Husbandry Act was put into motion. Commentators of this oppressive piece of legislation acknowledge that it was the work of agricultural experts and a duplication of the Betterment Planning in South Africa’s former Homelands.⁴⁶ The legacy of the Land Husbandry Act (1951) and centralization of planning resulted in the enforcement of the digging of contour ridges. Contemporary Zimbabwean land experts such as Moyo (1995) ascertained that the digging of contours (*imigelo* in *Ndebele*) was bitterly contested by chiefs and their subjects throughout the country. One can draw conclusions that the politics existing during the colonial era was evidence that the bigger question being addressed was that of land. The land dispossessions had confined black people regardless of ethnicity to marginal lands in all the then five administrative regions of the country. I agree with scholars like Moyo (1995) that the land question was the impetus for the waging of the liberation war and in fact, the land question has a long history spanning before colonization when the *Ndebele* disposed the *Karanga* and the *Kalanga* of their land and livestock. This is why the lashing out of *Gukurahundi* under the guise of hunting down dissidents was used to repossess lost ‘power’ over land and its resources by Shona people linked to the Mugabe party. In fact the politics of land redistribution in Matabeleland is closely linked to the dispossessions that happened in the 19th century. The question to ask therefore is what relevance does this history have on the current politics and the development discourse pursued by the mostly *Shona* dominated state? Does the current politics of land distribution favour or inhibit rural development in Southern Matabeleland in the current scenario of the FTLRRP? The subsequent chapters try to answer these questions in much more detail.

⁴⁶ See Ntsebeza: Democracy Compromised.

2:6 Transition to independence and Gukurahundi

After a protracted armed struggle Zimbabwe finally attained independence in 1980. The people of Matabeleland believed that ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA had fought the war decisively and deserved to rule the country; but that was not to be the case in the 1980 elections when ZANU PF and its ZANLA guerilla movement emerged victorious in a landslide victory.

The delegation to the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in 1979⁴⁷ went under the banner of the 'Patriotic Front', and this created a feeling among the guerilla group and its supporters that whatever agreement was reached on the Zimbabwe question, they were ready to act collectively. But when the agreement was finally signed that paved the way for the first democratic elections, ZANU declared that it would contest the election outside the Patriotic Front Alliance. ZAPU according to Nyathi (2001) was caught unaware and tried all avenues to maintain the alliance by even registering as the Patriotic Front in the general elections.

One may ask the question: why at the last minute an alliance, with the blessing of the Frontline states and the Organisation of African Unity, could decide to approach the elections separately. In many ways the Patriotic Front was a front of convenience-within it Mugabe continued to speak for ZANU, Nkomo continued to speak for ZAPU and the two parties continued to operate as independent entities. Hyden (2006) gives a useful observation of the tendency of African leaders when they are at the gates of assuming 'power'. Hyden (2006:59) states that: "even though the struggle against colonialism had brought them together in a more or less united front, their arrival at the gates of the state at independence forced upon them the challenge of working out a governance formula that accommodated those many contending group interests. In Kenya for instance, the Kikuyu who led the Mau Mau movement against the British in the 1950s claimed a larger share of the cake after independence. When Zimbabwe turned to majority rule in 1980, the Shona affiliated to Robert Mugabe's ZANU party demanded a similar deal". Hyden's observation supports the notion that the ethnic composition of ZANU PF and the limited positions of 'power' if they contested the elections as patriotic front, would deprive some close associates positions of power and authority in a new state. This probably is one of the explanations for ZANU PF

⁴⁷ The 1979 Lancaster house Conference was organised by the Thatcher government and paved way for elections in 1980.

deciding to go it alone. The other reason can be traced back to the split between ZANU and ZAPU in 1963 (Barry, 2004, Sithole, 2000, Ranger, 1999, Alexander et al 2000, Bhebe 1995). External factors contributed too; for instance President Kaunda in Zambia was supporting Nkomo of ZAPU while the Thatcher government in England was also displaying a preference for a ZAPU election victory. The tendency of African leaders to change goal posts at the last minute is not peculiar to Kenya and Zimbabwe but common to other African leaders and parties when they are knocking at the doors of the state. Hyden (2006) acknowledges that in other African countries, the process of gaining control of the state entailed similar issues of bargaining for advantages and preferences. Hyden further noted that in the USA the state is an instrument in the hands of a corporate class whereas in Africa it is an arena from which to draw as much resources as possible. So if the two parties had contested the elections as the Patriotic Front, the competition for positions of power and authority would have been stiff. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004) noted that even prior to independence the unification of ZIPRA and ZANLA under Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) faced some setbacks because it was clear that Robert Mugabe was not for the idea.⁴⁸

Joshua Nkomo the leader of ZAPU, a strong believer in traditional shrines, and a Kalanga by birth, took his election campaign on 24th February 1980 to *Njelele* where over 300 000 people from all over the country converged to celebrate what they thought was the victory of ZAPU under its election tag Patriotic Front.⁴⁹ The reason why Nkomo opted for *Njelele*, some commentators believe was an effort to report to the ancestors that they had brought back their land stolen by white settlers. Again they had defeated the enemy because of their guidance; hence a big thank you was befitting *Njelele* the supreme God shrine. Ranger (1999) in his classic book *History and Politics of Southern Matabeleland, Voices from the Rocks*; states that Nkomo had thirty years earlier been informed by the voices at Dula that it will take thirty years to reclaim the land, and 1980 was exactly thirty years since that pronouncement, and hence the belief by residents of Matabeleland that ZAPU would win the election despite the split of the Patriotic Front. The day coincided with heavy rain, thunder and lighting and to the people present was a sign of appreciation by the ancestral spirits. An interview with *Masuku*

⁴⁸ See also Stoneman and Cliffe (1989:23-24). during the formation of ZIPA Mugabe was in detention in Mozambique

⁴⁹ The 24th of February 1980 was like an independence day as civilians including this author who was 18 years by then braved the rains to listen to the election manifesto of the Patriotic Front. There was pomp and fun; people ate meat and drank traditional beer. It is worth noting that the symbol used by the Patriotic Front was appealing to everyone present as it depicted a soldier/guerilla carrying a baby with hoes on either side signaling the need to farm now that the country was finally destined for the hands of blacks.

revealed that Nkomo had blundered by assembling such a large number of people near the shrine because the shrine had its own special people to consult, and feasting on the vicinity of the shrine was taboo according to the *Banyubi* tradition⁵⁰.

On the 4th March 1980 election results were announced by the Commonwealth Secretary General Sir Shridath Ramphal. ZANUPF won 57 parliamentary seats out of the 80 contested by blacks; PF won 20 in the Matabeleland constituencies, in those Midlands areas where there was an Ndebele presence, and parts of Mashonaland West where ZIPRA forces had been very active during the war. The minority parties won only three seats (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989:34-35). ZAPU loss at the polls came as a shock to many of its supporters. ZAPU supporters as well as ZIPRA guerillas and the party leadership were convinced that ZANU PF's victory could only have resulted from foul play.⁵¹ With this defeat, local ZAPU leaders thought "only freedom for Mashonaland" would follow. Thus the ZANU PF leaders were now ready to take the reins of power. Sithole (2000), views the ethnic divide as contributing to the defeat of ZAPU in the elections. The *Shona* constituted about 80% of the black population whereas the *Ndebele* (from which ZAPU drew much of its support) constituted only 20% and inhabited areas around Bulawayo. *Ndebeles* had dominated the *Shona* prior to the imposition of colonial rule. At independence the Ndebele lost their pre-colonial dominance to the ascendant *Shona*, who were the beneficiaries of a democratization process and had been largely responsible for the defeat of the white regime (Sithole, 2000:70). The assertion by Sithole that ZANLA was largely responsible for the defeat of the white regime is hotly disputed by many Ex-ZIPRA combatants who believe the Zimbabwe liberation history is biased towards ZANLA⁵²

The victorious ZANU PF invited PF-ZAPU to form a coalition government and Nkomo became the first Minister of (Internal) Home affairs, also in charge of the police. Nkomo had earlier on declined the offer of ceremonial president, a post that was later on taken by Canaan

⁵⁰ My interview with Masuku an elderly resident of Njelele area on 18 April 2006 informed me that if a large group feast on the vicinity of Njelele shrine the gods get angry and this affects the rain patterns in the country.

⁵¹ See Joshua Nkomo, *The Story of my Life* (1984:210)

⁵² Some Ex-ZIPRA combatants I had interacted with since the ceasefire talked of ZANLA guerillas as cowards who expended lots of time doing political mobilization rather than fighting the enemy. One Ex-ZIPRA and a retired Brigadier from the Zimbabwe National Army whom I interviewed during field work spoke of victories scored by ZIPRA such as downing the Viscount that was supposed to be transporting General Peter Walls commander of the then Rhodesia forces and also the attack on fuel tanks in Harare.

Banana, an Ndebele⁵³. During this early period the British were busy integrating the three warring armies, ZIPRA and ZANLA guerillas and the Rhodesian forces to form the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Because these two parties had historically been suspicious of each other as Sithole (2000:71) noted, the discovery of arms caches on ZAPU owned properties was enough evidence for ZANU PF to dismiss ZAPU from the coalition government.⁵⁴ Those farms and other properties were confiscated by the ZANU PF government in a march into Matabeleland. ZANU PF got support from its “civilian core-supporters” among ethnic Shona who approved the harsh and repressive measures emitted by the regime in Matabeleland and the Midlands (Sithole 2000:73). Bourgi France (cf Richards, 1999) gives a classical view-point on the ascendancy of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement in Uganda when it took over the state. Bourgi in the Ugandan context, viewed power as being reconfigured not only on the basis of principles advanced by outside forces, but through the forging of new domestic arrangements that combine hegemonic and participatory principles (cf Richards, 1999:67). The view by Bourgi on Uganda is applicable to the Zimbabwean scenario as ZANUPF struggled to gain power in Matabeleland, through the introduction of unpopular local government structures, VIDCOs an issue examined under the section on development marginalization. With the dissidents destroying Government property in the two Matabeleland provinces and the Midlands, the government decided to form a separate Brigade known as the 5th Brigade that was only answerable to the Prime-Minister. The North Koreans provided technical training and logistics. In what I call the ‘*overt sphere*’, the brigade was formed to deal with the dissident menace whilst in what I call the ‘*covert sphere*’ was an attempt to reclaim Matabeleland from the Ndebeles.

⁵³ My familiarity with ZANUPF politics suggests that though in practice is dominated by Shona ethnic group, the leadership of the party try to portray a national character by incorporating a hand full of Ndebele sympathisers into less important position of power. The appointment of Reverend Canaan Banana is a good example.

⁵⁴ The discovery of arms has not been clearly explained. Some political scientists believe they were planted by ZANU PF intelligence agents so as to claim that ZAPU wanted to start a civil war. Recent studies point to Apartheid South Africa Intelligence services as having planted the weapons as a way of fuelling conflict between the two parties. This discovery led to factional fighting in urban assembly points for guerillas notably Entumbane, Chitungwiza, Connemara, and Glenville. Poor treatment, selective promotion and marginalization of ZAPRA fighters in the ZNA resulted in some deserting the army, either becoming dissidents or skipping the border to South Africa. Dissidents were mostly discredited by locals because of their appetite of too much food when locals were starving; hence the name ‘silambe over’ we are very hungry and hence locals saw them as state agents.

2:7 Gukurahundi and revival of ethnicity

Gukurahundi is a traditional *Shona* term, which means the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains⁵⁵. In post independent Zimbabwe, the term *Gukurahundi* is a euphemism used for the actions of the Fifth Brigade in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands during the early to the late 1980s. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) revealed that in October 1980, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe signed an agreement with the North Korean President, Kim Il Sung that they would train a brigade for the Zimbabwe National Army. As per the agreement in August 1981, 106 Koreans arrived to train the new brigade, which the then Prime Minister said was to “deal with dissidents and any other trouble in the country”⁵⁶. Joshua Nkomo leader of the mostly *Ndebele* ZAPU, asked why this brigade was necessary, when the country already had a police force to handle internal problems. He suggested the ruling party would use it to create a one party state. The Prime Minister replied by saying dissidents “watch out” (CCPJ, 1989) and further announced that the brigade would be called “*Gukurahundi*”. A retired Colonel I interviewed revealed to me that this brigade was composed of 3500 ex-ZANLA troops from *Tongogara* Assembly point, just a few ZIPRA (who were later on withdrawn) and Tanzanians. In their fieldwork Alexander et al (2000) also found that the Fifth brigade was dominated by *Shona* speakers, while civilians made repeated reference to non-Zimbabweans within their ranks. They were usually identified as Mozambicans, due to the use of Portuguese and *Sena*; others referred to soldiers having nose rings, complexion that were darker than normal and rather strange features (Alexander et al 2000:218). The first commander of the Brigade was Colonel Perence Shiri.⁵⁷

The Fifth Brigade was different from all other army units, in that it was not integrated into the army. It was answerable only to the Prime Minister and not to the normal structures of the army; their codes, uniforms, radios and equipment were not compatible with other army units. Their most distinguishing feature in the field was their red berets. In February 1983, the

⁵⁵ A report compiled by the Legal Resources Foundation and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace entitled “Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace, A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1989”. The chaff, i.e. “hundi”, remains after the corn has been removed during the process of thrashing corn. It originates from the *Shona* peasant population.

⁵⁶ Dissidents were a mixture of deserters from the ZNA, and discontent former ZIPRA Forces after factional fighting in Entumbane and other urban assembly points. Later on there was a claim that Apartheid South Africa was supporting them under the name Super ZAPU. Some claim that they were state agents

⁵⁷ Retired Colonel (Zimbabwe National Army,) now A2 farmer in Gwanda District- interview 15/12/2005.

brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North and exactly a year later in February 1984 was deployed in Matabeleland South. The operations of the Fifth Brigade in both Matabeleland provinces was similar and carried the same rhetoric that all *Ndebeles* were dissidents, needed to be eliminated, and had raided the cattle of their ancestors in the 19th century and hence revenge was inevitable. During this period a 24 hour curfew was imposed depriving residents of access to food and other livelihoods.

Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000) in their fieldwork in northern Matabeleland reveal that the Fifth Brigade directed its energies to political mobilization over and above the massacre of civilians, what Ranger and Bhebhe aptly describe as “politicization without politics” (1995:19). From one interview Alexander and Ranger transcribed a text by one headmaster citing misconceptions by one *Gukurahundi* commander who insisted that ...dissidents had been at the school that day, “We were surprised for we had not seen or heard of any around the school. On trying to prove and explain to them we just found ourselves being beaten again of not knowing *Shona* language which they were using” (Alexander et al 2000:218). The brigade’s operations were crucial in giving a political and ethnic meaning of the violence. The almost entirely *Shona* speaking brigade regularly used an overtly tribal and political discourse, and its all encompassing violence could not be explained as militarily motivated. The Fifth Brigade commanders and soldiers told people that they had been ordered to ‘wipe out the people in the area’, to kill anything that was human...that the *Ndebeles* were dissidents, making women and children as well as men targets. “The child of a snake is a snake” as one respondent put it (Alexander et al, 2000:222, Hammar, 2006). Ironically ZANUPF politicians and the Fifth brigade soldiers sought to enhance and exploit ethnic divisions among the ‘*Ndebele*’ as they tried to convince the “*Kalanga*” that they were in fact *Shona*, and also tried to convince the “*Tonga*” that they should distance themselves from the trouble making “*Ndebele*”. In some instances these soldiers invoked what I have stated earlier namely the tendency by the *Shona* ethnic group was for the politics of revenge. Turton (1997) and Fardon (1996) argued that ethnicity is powerful precisely because it can come to be perceived and experienced as an ancient, unchanging, natural source of identification and difference. In my fieldwork my informants constantly referred to the *Gukurahundi* era as one of the recent overt actions by ZANUPF that the Matabeleland landscape should be transformed and show a significant presence of the *Shona* ethnic group.

This is demonstrated by evidence collected that showed that after this era many Shona people began to settle in resettlement areas in Matabeleland South especially in village settlements.

Acts of violence perpetrated by the Fifth brigade were given specific local meanings as a result of its tribalistic rhetoric. For example, rapes committed by ZNA soldiers and dissidents might be described simply as abuse of power; rapes committed by the Fifth brigade were perceived to be a systematic attempt to create a generation of Shona children. Such interpretations extended to the meanings attached to development projects linked to the conflict; these initiatives were not seen as ‘developmental’ in intent but as heralding the introduction of Shona students to Matabeleland⁵⁸. Other commentators used ‘tribal’ explanations much more explicitly to describe the dominant *Shona* state in handling the situation in Matabeleland; for instance a Guardian reporter spoke of ‘a thousand years’ of hostility between the ‘*Ndebele* and the *Shona*’; Observer correspondents emphasised the ‘tribal basis of Zimbabwean politics, and added that “the *Shona*” had good reason to hate the ‘*Ndebele*’, who in the 19th century had specialised in roasting *Shona* babies alive (Ranger 1985:3). Makambe (1992) accused dissidents of representing ‘an exclusively Ndebele political outfit and murdering both ‘*Ndebele*’ sell-outs and *Shona* opponents. Makambe wrote that in response “the reaction of the wider Shona society was both swift and violent and cites calls for draconian government action to prevent “all...*Shona* being eliminated (Makambe 1992:20, 34, 69). The dominant position of Shona in bureaucratic positions was also indicative of the thrust to turn Matabeleland into an object of development with the Shona ethnic group at the helm. As we shall see in the following section the use of Shona Local Government Promotion Officers to spearhead rural development in rural Matabeleland is indicative of this hegemony.

2:8 Development, Changing Authorities and Internal Colonialism 1980-1988

Barrera (1997) states that the term ‘internal colonialism denotes “a structured relationship of domination and subordination which is defined along ethnic and /or racial lines, when the relationship is established or maintained to serve the interests of all or part of the dominant group...in which the dominant and subordinate populations intermingle” (1997:194). Bohmer (1997) further indicates that in this process, governments must actively participate to create

⁵⁸ Personal experience of the author.

internal colonies, providing coercive force to control those who are colonized, while legitimating patterns of domination with laws. The argument raised by Barrera (1997) and Bohmer (1997) is true in the case of southern Matabeleland as the state felt obliged to control the region. However, in the case of southern Matabeleland political domination by the state and its apparatus was the primary aim and not exploitation of economic resources. Colonialism is usually associated with the extraction of resources from subject populations but in the case of southern Matabeleland, the state went through the motions of development in a very uncommitted fashion and tended to be satisfied that it had achieved its objectives as long as the necessary political structures and controls had been put in place. Domination and exclusion were more important than exploitation of resources and the ability to exploit, in situations where that was intended, was undermined by resistance. This resistance is shown by the state resorting to the politics of patronage in the allocation of resettlement land. For instance, resistance by people in southern Matabeleland to move to resettlement areas such as Nyandeni in 1984 resulted in the state bussing people from other provinces to occupy these schemes an endeavour that has seen conflicts between these people and the locals. The control of district and local authorities by people aligned to the ruling party was viewed as necessary by the state in an effort to assert power and authority in the region that had been dominated by ZAPU people.

Therefore, development and practice was also shaped by both the politics of the new state and 'military hazards'. With ZAPU dominated District Councils, the state felt its control over the resources and development of Matabeleland was being frustrated, and therefore an alternative development structure should be put in place to provide checks and balances on the activities of ZAPU councillors. In its endeavour to pursue this line of thought the state introduced new cadres at the District Administrators office, the Local Government Promotion Officers (LGPOs). LGPOs were mainly drawn from Ex-ZANLA guerillas and received some basic training in Local Governance at Domboshawa Public Service Training Centre. Their mandate was to promote the establishment of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). These new institutions came into being after the Prime Minister's directive of 1984 which also saw the establishment of the posts of Provincial Governors; the latter being appointed on loyalty to the ruling party by the Prime Minister. LGPOs did not get the co-operation they demanded from the communities of the region as they were distrusted because of their ethnicity. In some circles the formation of

VIDCOs was regarded as a ZANU PF mechanism for controlling Matabeleland (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989). In state rhetoric VIDCOs were there to promote local decision making and should be viewed as structures promoting democratic governance. Dahl, in characterizing democracy contends that governmental responsiveness to citizens on a continuing basis requires that citizens being given an opportunity to formulate preferences, signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and have those preferences 'weighed equally in the conduct of government (cf Richards, 1999:40). In southern Matabeleland citizens were neither given the opportunity to formulate preferences nor signify their preferences. Development discourse was more hegemonic than democratic and more resources went to Mashonaland provinces.

The introduction of LGPOs coincided with the launching of the Mass National Literacy Campaign. Ironically, District Literacy Coordinators who spearheaded the campaign at district level in Matabeleland were drawn exclusively from ex-ZIPRA combatants, largely because of their conversancy with the *Ndebele* language. The logic behind this may be explained by the notion that literacy and numeracy teaching was conceived nationally and only possible if promoted in the mother language of the participants, as shown by UNESCO studies Worldwide. The role of District Literacy Coordinators was not seen as threatening as they had no influence over policy matters like their counterparts (LGPOs), who were directly involved with local government institutions. In their role of establishing VIDCOs, LGPOs had to carry out political re-orientation for the members of these committees; and one of the key attributes of being a member was loyalty to the state and the party. This caused serious development problems as people were reluctant to partake in these committees for various reasons: VIDCO members were targets of dissidents who regarded them as sell outs, while on the other hand the state would only channel development aid through these institutions. The hatred of VIDCOs was further exacerbated by Governor Mark Dube who noted in the Herald of September 1983; "The menace of dissidents is going to be destroyed. With the introduction of the new VIDCO system we will know each other at village level. Strangers will be required to produce letters of introduction. This will help root out robbers who steal from us and kill us". Caught in this 'catch 22' scenario, development planning moved at a snail's pace in Matabeleland. The process of extending the reach of the state marginalized traditional authorities in the country and was a sign of a confident new regime forging ahead for its vision of modernity for the young nation (Raftopoulos 2004:5). With ZAPU

councillors sidelined, VIDCOs and WADCOs took centre stage in an effort to promote rural development under instruction from LGPOs who also took over the distribution of drought relief from the Department of Social Welfare. With drought relief distribution an added responsibility for LGPOs, local people were forced to co-operate or else starve. Drought relief became a 'carrot and stick' affair. This further aggravated the precarious positions of locals and made them more vulnerable to the dominance of state agents.

The land resettlement programme in this part of the country suffered a setback as people were unwilling to leave their communal areas for the newly acquired resettlement schemes. As I mentioned earlier on, residents of Matabeleland pin their hopes for a livelihood on livestock, and any development programme that does not take on board security of livestock is assured of failure.⁵⁹ Alexander (1991) concludes that political conflict undermined effort by local leaders to lobby ministries and establish patron-client relationship with national politicians. For much of the 1980s, the states relationship with the people of Matabeleland was shaped by military and political, not developmental goals (1991:582).

Hyden (2006) argues that the 'state' in Africa is problematic for three specific reasons: it lacks autonomy from society that makes it an instrument of collective action. Instead it tends to respond to community pressures and demands that undermine its authority as a public institution. It fails to operate as a corporate entity, a system (2006:65). In the case of Matabeleland I tend to disagree with Hyden in the sense that people from this region had made it clear to the state that the best resettlement model is that which will give preference to livestock raising but the state would not listen. In this scenario the pressure and demands from the locals have been interpreted as subversive. The second reason advanced by Hyden is that state officials do not adhere to the formal rules that constitute public authority. They tend not to distinguish between what is private and what is public, with the result that citizens lose confidence in their readiness to act in the public interest and instead look at these officials as primarily motivated to feather their own nests using public resources (2006:65). The Willogate motor vehicle scandal in 1988⁶⁰ and the lease grazing on unsettled farms in

⁵⁹ This point is visited in much depth in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that the reluctance and demands for a grazing land model of resettlement by local people was interpreted by the ZANU PF dominated government as subversive and prevented the development of a 'patron-client' relationship with national ZAPU politicians.

⁶⁰ Brian Raftopoulos in David Harold Barry (2004:7), edited, Zimbabwe; The Past is the Future. Politicians, Senior Civil servants and Members of Parliament abused the car scheme at Willowvale motors to benefit their friends and associates prejudicing the state company millions of dollars. Raftopoulos acknowledges that the Willogate scandal in 1988 and the executive pardoning of its perpetrators, was indicative that state.

Matabeleland by civil servants and politicians are two cases that support Hyden's theorization of a typical African state. Lastly Hyden contends that individuals appointed to public office rarely subordinate their personalities to the definitions of the role that they are expected to perform. This augurs well with his theorization of the economy of affection whose core principles is that who you know is more important than getting things done (2006:72). Hyden concludes by noting that the state in Africa is not an independent system of power that operates predictably and provides guidance to society. It is not the kind of "development machine" that nationalist leaders had hoped for and International donors expected to find in a place for their funding (2006:65). Hyden says that things get personal in such states, but in this case there was a systematic attempt by ZANU PF to structure power in predictable ways. They created a development model in their own image and interests. The introduction of villagisation and 'grids' (Robins, 1994), met stiff resistance from residents of Gwanda (chapter 4).

2:9 Post-Unity and the development agenda 1987-2007

The use of a coercive apparatus to force people in Matabeleland to submit to state hegemony was tested in the 1985 parliamentary elections. Having unleashed the Gukurahundi in 1983 and 1984, in Matabeleland, ZANU PF lost all seats in this region and it was obvious that it could not rule Matabeleland without the cooperation and support of ZAPU. Roseberry (1994) states that hegemony maybe shaped overtime among many variables talking about it, and acting upon it, but the issue of dominance of the state over the community remains. Roseberry in this sense argues that state-community relations may be interpreted as hegemonic processes that overtime develop "a common discursive framework"; a shared state authorized language of cognition, control and contestation (1994:363). Taken from Roseberry's argument, there are two schools of thought about the unity agreement between ZANU PF and ZAPU. The first is that for ZANU PF to rule the entirety of the country, ZAPU was a necessary evil to win support in Matabeleland and hence the strategy to incorporate it into ZANU PF. In the process the ruling party should maintain hegemonic. Since the use of a coercive apparatus had not yielded the desired results a negotiated 'incorporation' was inevitable. The other school of thought which critical debates have emanated since the unity accord in 1987 is that ZAPU gave in to prevent further

authoritarianism began to show itself towards a one party state. He calls this process 'class formation within closed doors'

extermination of its supporters by state secret agents after the withdrawal of the Fifth brigade. After two years of negotiations the unity agreement was signed on 22nd December 1987 by Joshua Nkomo representing ZAPU and Robert Mugabe for ZANUPF. Close associates to the negotiation like the late Reverend Canaan Banana acknowledged that the name ZANUPF bogged down negotiations several times⁶¹. Welshman Ncube in Banana (1989:166-73) argues that unity opened up or broadened “democratic expression”. People were free to express their views without fear since the conflict had ended.

At a communal level people were not happy about the unity though it brought an end to harassment by state agents and dissidents. They were bitter about the failure of the united party to acknowledge the atrocities committed by the Fifth brigade let alone embrace their quest for a resettlement model that catered for their livestock without necessarily moving them from their present location (Robins, 1994:103-4). One of my informants commented “Ndebeles take time to grapple with a situation...once they joined ZANUPF, they are more ZANU than ZANU, and you see these ZANU splitting all over”. However scholars such as Ncube (1989) argue that unity was more a matter of loyalty than good sense. Dumiso Dabengwa, the former ZIPRA military supremo revealed in January 2008 when he quit ZANUPF that he was ‘never’ ZANU and was forced by loyalty since Nkomo his leader had accepted the unity terms⁶². The death of Nkomo and the birth of the MDC in 1999 saw the region shifting allegiance to the MDC in signaling dissatisfaction with ZANUPF. Of course country-wide people in urban centres had shown great affection for the MDC party.

On the development front unity saw the return of surviving ZAPU local leaders taking up again the positions of councillors. The VIDCO and WADCO system was revived and new elections were held of which most were filled by those functionaries who did not join the old ZANUPF during the ‘dark days’. From literature and the personal experience of this author, though development planning was largely participatory at district and provincial levels, the implementation of these plans remained a pipe dream as the central government brought development projects top-down. For instance, the members of the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) Matabeleland South (1999) complained that the problem with the provincial planning was that it was wholly ignored by central government. By implication,

⁶¹ Chiwewe ‘Unity negotiations’ in C Banana: Turmoil and Tenacity in Zimbabwe 1890-1990, Harare, College press 1989.

⁶² See Chronicle January 5,2008.

central government projects funded through ministries and donors mushroomed haphazardly without being drawn from the PDC plan. In one provincial planning meeting I attended in 2000 Provincial Governor Welshman Mabhena argued that Provincial plans are nothing but a waste of man hours due to the government's top down approach. Provincial planners in the same meeting (30 March, 2000) queried whether there was a way legally to avoid planning altogether; they condemned planning as the 'most difficult and frustrating activity', and the plans themselves as 'Tiger documents' that continuously decorate their shelves without the slightest chance of implementation.

Richards (1999) in theorizing local governance, democracy and development in Africa argues that, local governance has been an extension of the central state to the community (1999:285). He further notes that, for most of independent Africa, the promotion of local governance as an institution for advancing popular democracy and economic development has been a qualified success at best. However, as an institution for the provision of community services under the control of central government, it has largely been a failure (1999:285). Olowu advances two important contributions by local governance to economic growth: local governance can enhance allocative efficiency in the production of goods and services as they are the closest to the market; can help mobilise resources and mobilise support for the provision of social and economic infrastructure because of their proximity to the people and the knowledge of the locality (cf, Richards, 1999:287). Langrod has argued that local governance is contradictory to democracy by stating that "since democracy moves inevitably and by its very essence towards centralization, local governance, by the very division which it creates, constitutes, all things considered, a negation of democracy. Local governance and democracy triumphant represent diametrically opposed tendencies (cf Richards, 1999:290). Olowu suggests that failure of local governance results in alternative structures such as local development associations, civil society organisations, and cites the *Njangis* in Cameroon as alternatives to pursue local socio-economic growth. In Matabeleland, the establishment of the Matabeleland Development Association in the mid 1980s was a reaction to the neglect of the region in the development process.

In all the development plans for the Matabeleland region, the Provincial Development Committees (PDC), the case that Matabeleland had been neglected prior to unity, graced the

introduction of the development plans time and again in the late 1980s and the 1990s⁶³. The trend was the same at District level where the Rural District Development Committees (RDDC) sounded the same as their provincial counterparts. So the neglect of the Provincial Plan by Central Government meant a neglect of district development. This reveals how ‘internal colonialism’ subject those ‘colonized’ to the status of second class citizens as projects come top-down without consultation with the beneficiaries. As Ferguson (1990) argued, this does not result in tackling the problems bedeviling the would-be beneficiaries. Hansen and Stepputat (2001) also argue that hegemony also works through the development of technocratic programmes and institutions that govern by virtue of routines, internal bureaucratic logics, and allotted resources without being directed by political forces in any strict sense (2001:27). This ‘bureaucratic hegemony’ as illustrated by the sentiments of the provincial planners in Matabeleland earlier on, may have been deliberately done to frustrate the development endeavour of the region by national central government bureaucrats. For instance, the construction of *Mtshabezi* dam was done without consulting the locals and henceforth regarded as a national project depriving locals’ of access to its water. This has resulted in the dam being a white elephant, fifteen years on since locals do not see its value, instead complain that it has impacted negatively on their downstream activities such as nutrition gardens and water for livestock. The state has of late proposed to construct a pipeline that would link this dam with Umzingwane dam and supply the city of Bulawayo some one hundred kilometres away. This shows how central planning and indeed top down approaches to rural development subject locals to the agony of state power and authority.

The introduction of the FTLRRP, like the previous land resettlement models enforced in Matabeleland have seen conflict between communal residents and those resettled. The conflict in this region is compounded by the fact that residents of this region prefer a model that focuses specifically on decongesting communal areas in terms of livestock, not people. The FTLRRP as shall be seen in the following chapter still gives limited attention to livestock grazing land. Suffice to note that the A1 model is unacceptable to most residents of southern Matabeleland, but because the programme is top-down, residents have found themselves deprived of grazing land when resettlement took place people were settled on farms adjacent to their communal areas. Furthermore, these communities prior to the FTLRRP, used to lease

⁶³ Matabeleland South, 5 year Development Plan 1990-1995.

graze their livestock on these farms. Their hope was that this programme would open up more grazing land and they expected the state to give them first preference to these farms.

It is worth noting that development projects such as the Give-A-Dam campaign, a brain-child of the local leaders collapsed pre-maturely when donor funding was cut off as a result of the FTLRRP. The state could not take over responsibility of the Give-A-Dam Campaign yet still pressurized the community to engage in crop farming as part of its agenda to combat food insecurity⁶⁴. Irrigation development needs water and without adequate dams, Matabeleland cannot engage in meaningful crop farming. Women's income generating projects such as nutrition gardens have collapsed as boreholes have dried up hence it would have made sense if more dams were built to augment water sources.

The involvement of NGOs in the development arena dates back to the days of Rhodesia. The isolationist settler state of 1965-1980 and the rural peasant resistance it incited transformed church state relations. Religion, particularly 'traditional religion' became a vehicle of social activism in resistance to the state (Lan, 1985). The Rhodesian Front government formulated a community development policy in the late 1950s and implemented it in the early 1960s, in an effort to shift the responsibility of social welfare and development away from the state toward rural communities through self-help (Bornstein, 2005:13).

In the first decade of independence 1980-1990, the church once more (as was in the colonial era) was politically aligned with the state. Doctrines of Christian socialism propounded a welfare state model that promised to ease economic inequalities created by colonialism and to bring justice to all Africans. In the 1990s when the state adopted the World Bank/IMF Economic structural adjustment programme, there was an influx of NGOs. Religious and secular NGOs collaborated with the state in programmes of economic development as the state was streamlined and the civil service was reduced in number. In the late 1990s, faith based NGOs such as World Vision and Christian Care were active in community development throughout the country (Bond, 1998). In southern Matabeleland the prominent NGOs were the Lutheran World Federation, Christian Care and later on Heifer International. These NGOs operated mainly in communal areas rather than in the new resettlement areas

⁶⁴ The Give a Dam programme is one of the few projects residents of Matabeleland South actively participated in by contributing labour and food for those working on site because it appealed to them unlike other projects such as moving into "lines" in re-organized villages and new resettlement schemes. Most of these projects did not appeal to the locals and hence technocrats faced a lot of resistance in most parts of the province.

crafted by the ZANUPF government. The argument for not operating in resettlement schemes cannot be ascertained at this stage. During the drought periods of 1982-83, 1987, and 1991-2, 1994, these NGOs' approaches to drought relief included rehabilitating, upgrading, and building small dam structures to alleviate surface water shortage, assisting women to improve household garden plots, creating community based agribusiness dealer networks, and providing credit schemes to solve the problems of a limited cash economy in rural areas. NGOs assisted (and trained) communities in conserving primary water supplies by protecting water springs, constructing deep and shallow wells, drilling boreholes, and building pumps. NGOs also initiated irrigation schemes and provided training in soil and water conservation. Articulated explicitly the work of these NGOs was the idea of holistic development. This approach 'bridged the gap' between the spiritual and the material worlds, and between the rich and the poor (Bornstein, 2005). The main point about NGOs working in this region was the attention they gave to livestock rearing. The Heifer International coined a project called 'pass a heifer scheme' in Gwanda district that saw households getting heifers from the NGO and passing on the heifer to the next household when it calves. However the introduction of the FTLRRP saw these organisations banned by the state as they were accused of working for the regime change agenda. This left the locals with only the state apparatus that had neither the resources nor the will power to support development activities in this region. The lack of state resources nevertheless was not confined to southern Matabeleland alone but it was common throughout the country.

The major problem faced by people in Matabeleland is that the state plans for agricultural land reform, are based on the requirements of people in Mashonaland provinces who have suitable arable land and receive fairly good rains. This tendency has seen plans drawn up by experts in Matabeleland gathering dust. Without proper acknowledgement of the interests of Matabeleland residents, this led to the unity agreement being viewed as a trick to further underdevelop the region resulting in loss of support for the so-called united ZANUPF. Even the (MDC) has been viewed by people in Matabeleland as still harbouring the dominating tendencies of the *Shona* as evidenced by the split in 2005, which resulted in most of the *Ndebele* leadership forming a splinter MDC party as a reaction to these tendencies by the dominant *Shona* leadership of the party.

Richards (1999) in concluding his analysis of state conflict and democracy in Africa, acknowledges sentiments echoed by Ottaway (1999:316) that, the power of nationalism has

globally arisen again since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He further notes that this has resulted in a world in which it is becoming possible both to challenge existing power relations among ethnic groups and to re-think the territorial arrangements that put specific populations within current boundaries. This provokes me to pose a question; is Matabeleland legitimately placed as part of Zimbabwe considering its ethnicity and hegemony subjected to by the current state? This question might sound justifying a federal state but the reality is that if colonial boundaries remain unchallenged, some communities will remain objects of dominant ones. The case of Matabeleland is tricky because of the influence and power of the *Zulu* ethnic group in the construction of this region, and the latter being regarded as foreigners by the dominate *Shona* ethnic group.

As debated in chapters 6 and 7, development marginalization of Matabeleland has seen many young people from this region resorting to an un-orthodox means of earning a living such as gold panning and illegal migration to countries such as South Africa and Botswana. This has left southern Matabeleland with few able bodied persons to engage in either subsistence crop farming or livestock rearing. Furthermore the HIV/AIDS pandemic has also reduced the young, able bodied workforce in southern Matabeleland.

I have shown how Southern Matabeleland has been ‘internally colonized’ and constructed as an object of development by the state in Zimbabwe. From this narrative, it is evident that southern Matabeleland and Matabeleland region in general, has been marginalized by the state in social, economic and developmental terms. NGOs were trying their best to engage with the communities in development projects but their unwarranted ban has left people in this region stranded and suffering from extreme poverty. Authors such as Alexander (1991) contend that the state relationship with people of this region has been based more on political and military confrontation at the expense of development. It was the defeat of the *Ndebele* warriors in 1893 that paved the way for the massive evictions of the *Ndebele* from the Highveld to the dark forests of the *Shangani/Gwaai* reserve. Invading white settlers in the process, also confiscated *Ndebele* cattle, a major livelihood for this ethnic group. Fast tracked evictions and the occupation of *Ndebele* land deprived residents of livelihoods as they were dumped in the inhospitable (*emaguswini*) ‘Dark Forests’ to use Alexander’s term, mosquito and tsetse fly infested, in what is today Matabeleland North Province. Descendants of the white settlers faced the same problem of eviction during the FTLRRP beginning in 2000. Of course most of these white farmers lost their livelihoods; however there is a feeling

among some residents who had over the years depended on mutual understanding to lease grazes their livestock that they were affected by the FTLRRP as we shall see in the next chapter.

State initiated land reforms in the 1980s and 1990s failed to attract the majority of Matabeleland residents because the villagisation model of resettlement was against their wish for more grazing land. Those who took up the village resettlements found themselves targets of dissidents. The unity agreement of 1987 ushered a new era as peace returned to Matabeleland, though the same development discourse remained shaped at central government level in Harare even in other parts of the country; people of southern Matabeleland felt real development was a preserve of Mashonaland provinces.

The FTLRRP coincided with the stiff challenge the ZANUPF government faced from the MDC, and the death of Joshua Nkomo shifted allegiance from the united ZANUPF to the MDC. As a way of punishing residents of Matabeleland, the state further pursued vigorously the A1 resettlement model (settling outsiders in adjacent acquired farms), with a leap service A2 model viewed by the state as accommodating their grazing requirements. Against all odds, the people of Matabeleland have survived on this land through complex livelihood strategies, young people are engaged in illegal gold panning, and migrating to other countries, especially South Africa and Botswana, to fend for their households. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate how livelihood strategies have been affected, and changed over the years in southern Matabeleland as a result of the state's 'one size fits all' land redistribution model.

2:10 Conclusion

The politics of domination shaped the development agenda in southern Matabeleland. The 1980s conflict left this region without development initiatives for a number of years. The fact that projects were brought top down without consulting the locals resulted in a number of state initiated projects remaining as white elephants in this part of the country as people had no interest in them. Again these white elephants were as a result of a development system that focused mainly on political control. The evidence given in chapter 3 shows some limitations to the 'one size fits all' resettlement model and maybe studies in other parts of the country might show a similar trend. In the case of southern Matabeleland the need to control the region by the ruling party, can then be concluded, led to political structures which created

opportunities of placement of loyal party members in positions of power and authority. A majority of those placed in these positions were selected on ethnic lines. NGOs that over the years had provided some development assistance to the region have been reduced to food relief agents rather than development partners with communities of this region. This situation is the critical context at the time that the rapid land reform occurs.

Chapter 3

The Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme and its Consequences

3:1 Introduction

This chapter argues that the land question in Southern Matabeleland let alone in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts has been largely shaped by the politics of domination. The assumption by the state that land reform should be a uniform activity across the country had serious consequences to the livelihoods of residents of this region. Even during the days of the willing buyer willing seller era, land redistribution in southern Matabeleland did not address the needs of the locals as the state concentrated on trying to secure political allegiance by designating village settlements that were of little value to the locals. The FTLRRP introduced in 2000 although viewed as an opportunity for the locals to acquire land was still building on the hegemonic tendencies of the state and its political apparatus that viewed Matabeleland as a place into which to re-locate government supporters. My fieldwork findings show that the people of Gwanda and Umzingwane had little interest in land for human settlement but preferred land for livestock grazing. A number of my informants alluded to this point when arguing that crop farming was not viable unless if done under irrigation.

Against this back-drop the consequences of implementing a land reform programme that does not address the livelihood activities of the local population relegates the whole concept of land reform to a utopian exercise. Scott (1998) demonstrates how large scale state engineered social initiatives have failed to stand the test of time. Scott (1998) refers to these state engineered initiatives as the *dramas of development* which range from forced villagisation in Tanzania to Soviet collectivization. Scott (1998) argues that for a state initiated development scheme to become a “drama” four elements are needed: The first is an ordering of society by the state in simplified schemes and structures, subordinate to more complicated local realities. In describing this process Scott (1998) uses the term *legibility*, a coercive practice of abstraction rendering the state’s subjects and domains more visible, and organized according to an administrative orderly aesthetics. The second element is what he calls high modern ideology, which he described as a muscle bound version of self confidence about scientific and technical progress... and, above all, the rational design of the social order

commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws (1998:4). According to Scott legibility plays an important role...projects did not much need to be efficient or modern, but had to look efficient and modern according to a legible structure (1998:4). The third element needed for total ineffective development schemes is an authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring high modernist schemes to practice (1998:5). Scott's last element focuses on civil society that is incapable of resisting these plans. When development is seen through the eyes of the state the consequences on the ground leave the would be beneficiaries worse off than before and at times they culminate in resistance. The arguments raised by Scott (1998) feature in many developing countries and Zimbabwe is no exception. In Zimbabwe land reforms have been introduced top-down leaving the local people with very little input in deciding what type of land distribution suites them. The problem of the top-down land distribution paradigm is that it relegates local people to bystanders in their own development and this has a negative impact on their livelihoods particularly agrarian livelihoods since the majority of the rural population depend on these livelihoods for survival. As I demonstrate later on in this chapter the people of Gwanda and Umzingwane in post independent Zimbabwe have suffered a great deal in craving for a land reform that would address their livelihoods, particularly livestock livelihoods. The problem with the Zimbabwean state is that it fails to take cognisance of the dangers of top down land reform programmes. For instance nationalisation of land in Tanzania through the Ujamaa concept did not improve the livelihoods of the locals as expected by Nyerere; instead conflicts raged on land ownership and this led to the collapse of Nyerere's vision of a green revolution. With the failures experienced in the Ujamaa era, the Zimbabwe state adopted a similar model thus leaving locals on the margins of decision making about land distribution patterns that would facilitate improved livelihoods. The creation of the A1 and A2 resettlement farm models after the introduction of the FTLRRP as a 'one size fits all' model without considering local needs is indicative of the negative consequences of state driven resettlement programmes. In southern Matabeleland for years people have been practising mixed farming⁶⁵, though much more attention has been placed on livestock rearing because of climatic conditions.

⁶⁵ According to Wolmer and Scoones (2000:575-76) the term 'mixed farming' describes a farm where both agriculture and livestock husbandry are practiced. Mixed farming is practiced throughout the country though Matabeleland region is better known for livestock farming than crop farming.

3:2 Land apportionment and use before the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme

In pre-colonial Africa land tenure systems were predominantly based on customary or traditional attachment to a particular piece of land. Biebuyck (1963), notes that before and during early colonization land was plentiful and exploitation of resources was generally extensive; land was essential for livelihoods but had little exchange value; land was vested in groups (chiefdoms, villages, lineages or other social groupings) represented by their chiefs, elders and/or councils. There was a close relationship between features of social and political organisation and principles of land tenure (Biebuyck, 1963:52-64). A mythical association between ancestors and land was often present in belief systems; Moore (2005) argues the same for the *Tangwena* people of Zimbabwe. The land belonged to the tribe as a whole, but was administered by the chief through his sub chiefs and headmen, who allocated it to private individuals (Shaw 1974:91). Homesteads and arable land remained in the possession of the head of the family as long as he lived there. He had a prescriptive right over his arable land, whether it was still uncleared, being cultivated or lying fallow. Heirs inherited the land when the head died (Cousins, 2005, Moore, 2005). Key features of African tenure systems included the right to access and use of shared resources such as grazing, water and a variety of natural resources such as grass for thatching, trees for building huts, fences, fuel wood, wild fruits, clay and sand (Cousins, 2005; Moore, 2005).

After harvest fields were temporarily converted to grazing commons and there was no need to herd livestock during that period. Although the regulation of common property resources often took place at higher levels of the system, the acquisition of rights to residential and arable land was highly decentralised; a man would ask his father for a space to build dwellings, and for fields to plough; if not available, he might try to acquire them from some relative or friend; if that did not succeed he would apply to the headman for some ward land held in reserve; and only if none was available would the headman take the applicant to the chief for an allocation (Schapera 1955:204). Channock concludes that in South Africa ‘an indigenous system of land tenure was completely destroyed under colonial conditions’, and that its ‘shadow’ was used to deny the establishment of freehold tenure for Africans in an increasingly capitalist economy; this also ‘distorted the rights recognizable and assertable in the customary one’ (1991:82). By the later means strong individual rights. Cheater (1989)

and (Ranger (1993) argue a similar case for Zimbabwe. Ranger (1993) argues that colonial conditions that existed in ‘Southern Rhodesia’ favoured the minority race who had demarcated the formerly communally owned land into commercial farms. This group according to Ranger were given title deeds to the farms and hence the emergence of private land ownership in the country.

In post colonial Africa land tenure systems varied from country to country. In Zimbabwe for example, the new government inherited an uneven land ownership pattern between the white settlers and the indigenous black people. Inequality was not only found in access to land or size of farm but in the type of land and soil available. At independence the Tribal Trust Lands to which the black population had been confined were also over used and no longer capable of being a productive resource. In an endeavour to address the colonial imbalances the state embarked on an ambitious land reform programme whose primary focus was to re-distribute white owned farm land to the landless blacks. The tenure system as inherited is depicted in the Table below:

Table 3:1: How land was apportioned in 1930

Category	Land area (acres)
Native reserves	21 594 957
Alienated to Europeans	31 033 050
Remainder available to Europeans	17 423 815
White run mission land	406 200
Urban areas (white controlled)	149 033
Native purchase areas	6 851 876
National parks and forests	894 000
Semi neutral areas	80 329
For future determination	17 793 300
Total	96 226 560

Source: Moyo, S.1995

For the first ten years of independence, the government was tied to the Lancaster House constitution that protected white commercial farmers from having their properties

expropriated (Barry 2004, Moyo 1995, Cousins 1992, Herbst 1990). Land redistribution was conducted on a willing seller willing buyer basis and according to DFID (1995) the British government provided over forty seven million pounds in support of land purchases for rural resettlement. The state changed tribal land or reserves to communal land under the jurisdiction of District Councils. Blacks with money were also free to purchase commercial farms. Moyo (2000) notes that the resettlement models adopted by the state were bound to cause a problem as most land acquired through the willing seller/willing buyer principle were in poor agro-ecological regions IV, and V, that were degraded and vulnerable to droughts and cyclones. In addition to the customary tenure system where local political institutions administered land issues, the state introduced four new resettlement models. Model A was a villagised type reminiscent of existing communal lands. Model B borrowed heavily on socialist philosophy of cooperative farming and the Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) was tasked by the state to impart sustainable crop farming skills to new irrigators. The irrigators worked collectively on the ARDA farms for pay and had separate plots on the estate for subsistence. In Matabeleland South model A, B and model D⁶⁶ were geared towards providing land for livestock ranching and intensive irrigation crop farming (Chatora 2003)⁶⁷.

3:3 Politics of Land distribution and unsettled land in Southern Matabeleland

The land tenure system in Matabeleland South province between 1980 and 2000 was no different from the rest of the country. There were communal areas, resettlement areas, irrigation schemes and white commercial farms. Commercial farms for both whites and blacks were regarded as private property whereas other models were regarded as state land. In an effort to address colonial imbalances and to be seen to be non-partisan, the state bought former commercial farms for re-distribution in Matabeleland. In 1980 and 1981 there were relatively few people in Matabeleland who moved from communal areas to the formerly European areas, reflecting a locally perceived shortage of grazing land and the dearth of abandoned ranches (Alexander, 1991:581). People in Matabeleland believed the village

⁶⁶ The model D case study by Robins (1994) in the Garanyemba area shows that villagisation collided with the exigencies of social and economic life in Matabeleland. The rectangular grids of the land use maps did not accommodate a semi-arid landscape in which key resources such as water points and browse are widely dispersed across both space and time.

⁶⁷ See also Robins 1994 in his analysis of model D in Garanyemba communal areas particularly in ward 8. Here Robins explains how people resisted to be settled in 'lines' and the failure of the ranching model spearheaded by ARDA.

resettlement model was not suitable for their livelihoods as they depended on livestock for a living, and therefore to justify their skepticism about the resettlement model they resisted government planned village settlements and demanded a resettlement model that would give preference to grazing land. The ZANUPF dominated government interpreted local demands as preventing the development of a patron-client relationship that was vital for the control of the region. In the later years there were often clashes between government and the people over the use of the land. Unlike Mashonaland where a large number of people had already settled on commercial farms as squatters, squatter occupation of commercial farms was rare in Matabeleland. Alexander concludes that Matabeleland as a cattle economy was not suitable for squatting; and in an endeavour to show discontent with the resettlement model communal cattle owners responded to the perceived shortage of grazing, rather than arable land by poach grazing on neighbouring farms (Alexander 1991:582). In most cases these neighbouring farms were either abandoned during the liberation war of the 1970s or recently bought by the Zimbabwe State. Poach grazing by communal dwellers was regarded as illegal by government officials and led to clashes with these officers. The officers were under instruction to implement a village based model that took cognizance of crop production as the main activity in these farms.

The resistance by residents of this region was dealt a blow by the drought during the 1980s as the latter left rural residents dependent on government food relief. The drought presented an opportunity for state officials to intensify their hegemony as those who did not follow their instructions to move to village resettlements were deprived of the much needed food. The drought also presented a strong argument for residents of this province as they demanded more grazing land to cushion their cattle from dwindling pastures in communal grazing areas. In response to their demands, government through a parastatal, Cold Storage Commission, launched Operation Cattle Rescue and purchased almost Z\$6m worth of cattle from communal areas between January and May 1982. This was devastating as communal farmers keep livestock for other purposes like manure, draught power and traditional ceremonies. Alexander(1991) observed that even the Deputy Minister of Lands and Resettlement, born in Umzingwane district, stressed that making land available for grazing would benefit people with cattle at the expense of the landless without cattle (Herald, 1982). The utterances by the Deputy Minister, received strong criticism from ZAPU District Councillors especially those from Gwanda district. One district Councillor after the other rose in one meeting to demand

that resettlement priorities be reversed to give priority to grazing land. One councillor quoted in the Herald October 1982, exclaimed in the meeting with the Deputy Minister of Lands and Resettlement: “Cattle raising is our life blood. We would rather stay crowded in communal areas and let the purchased farms be used for grazing.” One councillor responding to Mark Dube’s plea for cooperation and protection of resettlement officers from dissidents: “The intimidation of the resettlement officers is not our responsibility until we get grazing land for our cattle. Don’t talk to us about policing this area. We will do so as soon as we have been given more land for grazing” (Herald, 1982)

In many interviews I conducted in Umzingwane A1 resettlements findings also point to the need for more access to grazing as Alexander (1991) found out in her research in the Insiza district. For instance Mluleki Ndlovu of Kondwane resettlement area gave me a gloomy picture of the utilization of land in his area:

My brother to some especially those who have deserted the new plots, game meat was bait for land allocation. The moment game became depleted during the years 2003/4 they trekked back to their communal homes or urban centres... Government should consider re organizing acquired land and allocate deserving people. I am not saying those who do not have land to put up homesteads are not to be considered for resettlement but I am saying selected areas should be set aside for productive use of land rather than just human settlement. I did not give up my homestead in the communal area thus why I have a make-shift structure; my enticement to Kondwane was the vast tracks of grazing land for my livestock. Surely grazing land is most important to us here than putting up villages”. Even before this fast track programme we resisted to be resettled in villages and for sure in the nearby Irisvale Model A resettlement people who had no rural roots flocked into these schemes, of course some master farmers were allocated land in these schemes but did not abandon their communal homes (Mluleki Ndlovu 21/05/2006).

Ndlovu’s response was disturbing because land had been acquired (through the FTLRRP in 2000), and distributed but the fact that a set model had been prescribed to the occupants (village settlements) indicated that some people had gone in with hidden agendas such as poaching and left when game was depleted. Some like Ndlovu had make-shift structures in order to ‘shelter’ and ‘deceive’ the authorities; yet their goal was to access grazing land.

Yet before the Fast Track land distribution during which Ndlovu received land; unlike Mashonaland, land availability in Matabeleland was limited as there were fewer abandoned farms at independence let alone new ones bought by the State on a willing seller willing

buyer basis. Kriger, (1988), Alexander (1991), concluded that a lack of abandoned land, the pattern of squatting and the unpopularity of village resettlement models constrained land redistribution soon after independence in Matabeleland. Alexander (1991) shows that by 1981, the province accounted for only 10% of land acquired, as a result of a small number of abandoned farms compared, for example, with 583 acquired farms in Manicaland. This observation also demonstrates a discrepancy of the policy of willing seller/willing buyer since the majority of purchased land was abandoned and by implication occupied white commercial farms were safe if owners were not willing to sell. Because of the resistance by people from this region to move into village settlements on newly acquired farms, a majority of those settled in the acquired farms were drawn from the ranks of workers formally employed in abandoned farms and mines. In most cases these people were alien of either Malawian or Zambian origins and had no claim to communal land. My experiences as a Cooperative Development Officer in Matabeleland South reminds me of one man, Sivalo who declared in a land committee meeting in 1990 that those resettlements were for foreigners and those without communal area roots. In Sivalo's words he stated;

“Ama resettlement ngawabantu bezizweni abangala mpande emakhaya. Thina sifuna indawo yezifuyo zethu qha”. (Resettlements are for foreigners who do not have rural roots. What we want is land for our livestock).

Because of sentiments such as those echoed by Sivalo some people were directly recruited from provinces like Masvingo to occupy resettlements in this region to take away the association being made between foreigners and resettlement. The resettlement of former farm and mine workers and outsiders created animosity towards the schemes among communal area cattle owners and their clients who claimed the land on the basis of need and historical rights. The reaction by people of Matabeleland was further shown by the low numbers that applied for resettlement. For instance the ‘Herald, October 1982’ revealed that only 2, 7% of 88000 had responded to the circulation of resettlement forms in Matabeleland South. The low turnout was blamed on councillors whom the Ministry of Lands officials said hoarded the forms and chiefs who wanted to move as a group with their followers, and most importantly, that the people in Matabeleland did not agree that the resettlement scheme worked by the government would address their problems, mainly grazing. The same paper reported that the Government was having a second look (because) the agriculture oriented scheme, while suitable to regions in Mashonaland, might not be entirely satisfactory in the stock oriented Matabeleland (Herald, 1982). The argument is that in practice the state did not support its

rhetoric as it continued agitating for increased crop production. Hence very limited livestock support by the state ensured in the 1980s and the state rhetoric was viewed as a means to gain the support of the locals.

The years 1983 to 1987 were difficult for the people in Matabeleland. Government was engaged in a massive repression of the inhabitants of this province in the 'overt sphere' of weeding out dissidents. During this period, the repression of the civilian population and their local and national leaders effectively denied Matabeleland a voice in decisions concerning development and land distribution (cf, Kriger, 1988, 2006, Moore, 2005, Alexander 1991, Robin, 1994). The imposition of unpopular councillors by the government created further resistance to resettlement by a majority of the residents of the province. Although communal farmers were deprived of grazing land in the resettlement farms, the terrorization of resettled people, ranchers, and resettlement officers provided a relief to communal farmers as they could graze their livestock under the protection of dissidents. This resistance contributed to the risk of communal people of this region of being accused of being involved with dissidents. During this period, a number of farms in Matabeleland were put up for sale as the commercial farmers fled the dissident menace.⁶⁸ This was the beginning of the farm leasing scheme and my experience as a co-operative development officer during that time showed that there was no transparency in this whole leasing programme as the politics of patronage took centre-stage.

Some supporters of the state grabbed this opportunity to lease vast tracks of land that had been willingly sold by the fleeing commercial farmers. Most of these supporters were either new councillors or Members of Parliament elected on a ZANUPF ticket. Because of the persistent drought, as well as inadequate stock, these new supporters of the regime lease grazed some of their paddocks to communal livestock 'farmers'. One can conclude that the period 1980 to 1987, with the devastating drought, resistance to the village resettlement model and havoc caused by dissidents, provided an opportunity for communal farmers to intensify poach grazing in commercial farms. Even the state became supportive of lease grazing as it was difficult to control the activities of dissidents. In other words it can be concluded that dissidents played a key role in expressing communal objection to the

⁶⁸ During the era of dissidents a number of white commercial farmers were murdered, government property destroyed and because dissidents sided with communal people grazing in abandoned farms went on without state interference as soldiers were mainly concerned with curbing dissidents. During this period those who 'sold out' or voiced concern on poaching in private farms and abandoned state farms became targets of dissidents

resettlement models by attacking those in resettlement areas. With the resettlement, outsiders were brought in who tried to exclude communal cattle. In response, scheme fences were cut, its villages burnt and communal cattle driven on in a battle which continued up to 1986⁶⁹. Furthermore, the state used drought relief as a 'carrot and stick' tool to gain some form of compliance from communal farmers from Matabeleland. The carrot and stick scenario made it difficult for people from this region to withdraw from this domination. Isaacman (1989) argues that the partial autonomy of the peasantry, derived from their command over subsistence, partial control over their own labour and direct access to the instruments of production is a key to resistance to the claims of the state and appropriating classes.

The signing of the unity accord between ZAPU and ZANUPF in 1987 brought some form of peace and stability in the Matabeleland region. The signing of the agreement ushered in a new era in the development discourse of the region. With ZAPU councillors back at the helm of councils in the region, more pressure was put on the united party to plan based on the interests of the inhabitants of the province. In an attempt to appease the people of Matabeleland, especially senior politicians, the state leased out unsettled farms to politicians, civil servants and parastatals. In Gwanda and Insiza districts of the province vast tracks of land were leased to the Cold Storage Commission which acted as a breeding haven for restocking communal herds that had been depleted by the drought. The register of leased farms by 1995 indicated that of the civil servants who benefitted from the farm leasing programme, a significant number were not from Matabeleland and this did not augur well with communal cattle owners who reacted by vandalizing and stealing livestock to register their unhappiness. The difficulties arise when after the incorporation of ZAPU councillors into various land committees, the state did not listen to their demands but proceeded with the Model A resettlement scheme (villagisation), resulting in residents of southern Matabeleland not taking up allotments as expected. For instance, a Ministry of Lands report noted that by 1989, two years after the signing of the accord only 1878 families had been settled on 44% of the then 503,671ha purchased for resettlement. This is indicative that people of the region were not prepared to leave their areas and move to new farms.

As noted elsewhere in this chapter, people of Matabeleland are generally pastoralists and believe a workable resettlement model should decongest communal areas in terms of

⁶⁹ Personal experience

livestock not in terms of people or homesteads. Thus the delay in apportioning land for grazing to communal cattle owners created largesse for politicians and civil servants who were leasing out some of the state farms to cattle owners from communal areas.⁷⁰ This created problems as poorer cattle owners could not afford leasing fees charged, especially in the early 1990s when there was a devastating drought in the region. In an attempt to satisfy the wishes of the people of this region, government touted an alternative resettlement model to replace the contentious model A resettlement and dubbed it model D. Model D was cattle oriented and piloted in the dry parts of southern Gwanda district. In this model, ranches were to be used for rotational grazing while the beneficiary communal areas were reorganized into a complex of planned villages, demarcated arable areas and paddocked grazing land (Scoones, 1996:46; Cousins, 1992; Robins, 1994). However as Robins (1994) noted, the movement of 90% of villages was rejected by beneficiaries and this resulted in the cutting of paddock and demarcation fences. In Thuli 11km of fence was cut and 24km of fence in Doddieburn. The other setback of model D was the issue of destocking to match the land carrying capacity which was vehemently rejected by the intended beneficiaries. Destocking was viewed by people of this region as reminiscent of the colonial days when large numbers of livestock were culled.

It is not surprising that during the early 1990s some black farmers bought farms as a large number of white commercial farmers were scaling down operations in the aftermath of the expiry of the willing seller/willing buyer clause of the Lancaster House agreement of 1979. The other militating factor in the early 1990s was the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act (1992) and the rhetoric that Government might soon acquire land as it deemed suitable on a compulsory basis. Pre-occupied with the challenges of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the state did not vigorously pursue the land distribution programme until the year 2000, when it embarked on the FTLRRP. The 1990s decade had numerous challenges for the state ranging from massive retrenchments in urban factories and successive droughts, to highly charged mass action by trade unions and university students.⁷¹ War veterans also claimed recognition for their participation in the war of liberation in the 1970s and hence government was forced to commit Z\$50 000 each for an estimated 40000 war veterans and Z\$2000 monthly pensions in an unbudgeted expenditure⁷². This contributed to

⁷⁰ Interview with former resettlement officer May 2006

⁷¹ See Brian Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003).

⁷² See Chronicle, 28 November, 1997.

the depreciation of the Zimbabwe Dollar, resulting in untold suffering for the peasantry, workers and the unemployed. The government's involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of Laurent Kabila's government also taxed the already strained treasury.

As a way of legitimizing the compulsory acquisition of white commercial farms, the government drafted a constitution in 1999, with a clause calling for the compulsory acquisition of white owned farms with only compensation for improvements on the land, not the land itself. When the draft Constitution was put to a national referendum in February 2000, Zimbabweans voted 55% against the draft and 45% for the draft. The ZANUPF government accused the newly formed (MDC) and white commercial farmers of having influenced the outcome of the referendum. Thus two weeks after the results of the referendum, war veterans and ZANUPF youths invaded white owned farms and claimed that they were repossessing their ancestral land stolen by the grandparents of white farmers in the 19th and 20th centuries. By July 2000, the Government officially launched the much talked about FTLRRP (Murombedzi, 2005; Barry, 2004; Hammar and Raptopoulos, 2003)

3:4 Fast-track land distribution in Southern Matabeleland

The first phase of land reform in Zimbabwe was from 1980 to 1998 during which 3, 5 million hectares of large scale commercial farmland were acquired and 71000 indigenous families were settled on that land. The Inception Phase Framework Plan of 1998-1999 to acquire and distribute one million hectares of private commercial farmland was unsuccessful with only 0,17million being acquired and 4697 families resettled. In July 2000 Government embarked on a radical and accelerated land reform programme, the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase 11, dubbed the 'FTLRRP' which envisaged acquiring 5 million hectares and resettling new farmers on all acquired land. Ruswa and Sithole (2003:1) acknowledge that by February 2003, 9,9million hectares of land had been listed for compulsory acquisition and 4137 properties covering 8,9million hectares received eviction notices (section 8)⁷³The major objectives of the FTLRRP were decongestion of communal areas, indigenise/deracialise the large scale commercial farm sector, poverty reduction, promote sustainable utilisation of land, increase contribution of agricultural sector to Gross Domestic Product and create sustainable economic growth and social stability. Of course the

⁷³ See Justice for Agriculture, 2003:13.

attainments of these objectives have varied from area to area and in particular for this study, the people of Gwanda and Umzingwane did not benefit as they had expected when the programme was launched in July 2000.

John Hunt one of the few remaining white commercial farmers in Gwanda district was skeptical of the whole process of the FTLRRP. In one of the interviews I had with him on his last few hectares of what was the huge Georgia ranch; he had bad memories of the programme. He told me how he was first approached by a group of rowdy youths who claimed to be war veterans and who demanded that he vacate his farm and his farm house since they had taken over the farm:

“Yah, this whole land question must come to its finality, hey! We are Zimbabweans we deserve to be treated like all other citizens and our properties respected irrespective of race, tribe and political affiliation. Well, it was early morning end of February 2000 when a group of rowdy youths calling themselves war veterans demanded that I vacate my farm. I refused to listen to their demands telling them that I have title deeds to this farm and there was no way I can vacate this land without a court order. They then camped around my farm house and started constructing makeshift shelter. I went straight to Gwanda police headquarters to seek an eviction order as these rowdy boys were killing my cattle and wantonly cutting down trees to make their shelter. I was surprised when I was told by the officer in charge of police that they can’t do anything as they have been given a directive not to interfere with what was happening on the farms. I left dejected and consulted the provincial chairperson of the commercial farmers union on the way forward and he told me that they were trying all legal avenues to address the problem and assured me that within a matter of time they will solve the problem as they have engaged the ministry of agriculture and rural resettlement at the highest level... Within a month I had lost more than one hundred cattle to stock theft. The situation was getting worse every day and by then it was overt that the grabbing of white commercial farms was continuing unabated with the backing of government as time and again Robert Mugabe challenged us white farmers to accept the land reform on his terms as our forefathers never paid any cent for the land. When I realized that there was no going back on this disastrous programme I started selling my livestock to avoid total loss? By the end of 2002 I was in possession of only four paddocks and the rest of my farm was gazetted for compulsory acquisition... During legal processes and wrangles with the state, what was obtaining in the farms was pathetic. Some of my workers quickly joined in the fracas and stole several of my cattle and either sold to communal farmers or kept them. Even if I knew where my cattle were it was politically impossible for me to repossess them as the whole programme turned brutal as some of my colleagues were murdered by war veterans. In a nutshell this has been the worst experience of my whole ranching life. How can a government of the people not respect property rights...? I was on good terms with most people in Wenlock and Garanyemba areas as I supported their cattle off take every May when I sold close to five hundred heifers at a

reasonable price. I think the government should have pursued a more organized land distribution exercise than this chaos, but currently most of the paddocks have been turned to villages and a few have been given to communal farmers as grazing land. I tell you that land is quickly losing its potential as there is massive cutting down of trees; and gold panning activities along Thuli and Mtshabezi rivers have escalated at alarming levels... I have just lost another twenty cattle due to mercury poisoning as gold panners are having a free for all time without the harassment of police. Surely this programme has a negative impact to livestock ranching in this region. Yes, we white farmers are the major losers in this scenario but I tell you communal farmers will never again replenish their livestock" (John Hunt, 11/12/2005).

There are a large number of white commercial farmers who faced the same brutality and deprivation as John Hunt. The issue of property rights on land became a non issue to the state as land was being claimed on a historical basis. One of the new occupiers of the two paddocks formally part of the large Georgia farm was upbeat about the FTLRRP and accused the whites of depriving blacks their ancestral land during the colonial era. My interview with Nyathi one of the four A2 farms carved out of Georgia farm supported the programme, thus:

I have been a communal farmer for over thirty years and depended on the degraded pastures to keep my 60 cattle. Yes, during drought years, John Hunt allowed us to lease graze in some of his unutilized paddocks, but this was at a fee. I never thought that in my life time I will own such big land for my livestock. In fact when I was allocated this farm by the District Land committee I had about sixty or so cattle but currently I am a proud owner of well above two hundred herd of cattle. I am doing well though there is little support I receive from government, but I am quite happy to have this piece of land as my own for my livestock... Government should assist us to secure animal vaccines as this is the area we are failing and we are losing livestock through preventable diseases. White farmers like John Hunt had access to bank loans and other credit facilities but this is not happening with our banks today. The banks demand collateral and they do not consider an offer letter from the ministry as evidence of property ownership and thus where the problem lays... NGOs have not helped either. I use profits from my other retail business to support my farm activities and of late have sold 50 herds of cattle to abattoirs in Bulawayo. I have even bought water engines to irrigate some horticultural crops which I sell in Gwanda town (Nyathi A2 plot holder in the former Georgia farm, 18/04/06).

Yet another communal farmer in the adjacent village of Lushongwe was cross about the programme;

I am still stuck with my 40 herds of cattle in the communal grazing, and the few paddocks we were given by the land committee are not adequate for all our livestock. I am shocked that Modern was allocated an A2 plot yet he does not have any livestock if not only chickens. Of course we know he is a war veteran

but what has that to do with giving a person such vast land without livestock. People like Modern are busy leasing out their farms to desperate locals at exorbitant prices and our complaints to the ward councillor have fallen on deaf ears... This programme has been heavily politicized such that people like me who are not active in party politics are left to suffer. We need land for our livestock; we don't need these villages where people from urban areas have been settled adjacent to our communal area. This area is our grazing land. We are not congested in our area what is congested is livestock. Mind you we don't keep only cattle but we have also donkeys, goats and sheep that need grass to graze. I am very disappointed about the whole issue of land distribution as it stands at the moment" (Sobantu Sithole, 12/04/06).

The politicization of the land reform programme has seen property rights on land being violated as John Hunt explained to me during the interview quoted above. To people like Nyathi the land reform has opened up opportunities for massive investment in agricultural development. The stumbling block for people like Modern cited by Sithole is the lack of resources to buy livestock, but in my subsequent interviews with other household members in Lushongwe they revealed that some war veterans were given loans by the agricultural bank to purchase livestock, however to their surprise some of them like Modern spent the money on activities that had nothing to do with farming. For instance I was told by one of my informants that Modern, after receiving a sum of money equivalent to 5 cattle, booked two hotel rooms for his two girlfriends in Gwanda town for two weeks and with the rate of inflation prevalent in the country, the money was soon exhausted.

There are a number of events that led to the implementation of the FTLRRP in Zimbabwe in general. Chief among them was the need for the state to address colonial imbalances in land ownership patterns. As I stated earlier on, white commercial farms occupied a greater proportion of the Zimbabwean fertile landscape; and the government had largely been supported by rural masses, so equitable land redistribution was inevitable. Moyo (2000) argued that the land occupations by Svosve people in Mashonaland East province in early 1998 was indicative that rural people had lost patience with the slow pace in which the government was dealing with the land question. There are a number of acts that addressed the land question since the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 through the first and second decades of independence, leading to the inception of the FTLRRP. Table 2 below represents legislation relating to land acquisition from 1979 to 2006:

Table 3:2 Legislation relating to land acquisition

Year	Legislation	Provision
1979	Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979	-No property shall be compulsorily acquired -Introduces willing seller/willing buyer provision
1981-1984	Land Amendment Act no. 21. 1981	-Enforces constitutional provision to land for resettlement -Prompt payment of adequate fair compensation
1985-1990	Land Amendment Act, 1985	-Introduces certificate of no interest, or right for first refusal
1990	Constitutional Amendment Act no. 30, 1990	-Denies the power of the court to declare unconstitutionality on compensation decisions -Allows for compulsory land acquisition
1992-1993	Land Acquisition Act (Amendment to section 10 of Chapter 20. 1993	-Right of first refusal abolished -Designation provision introduced enabling addition of compulsory acquisition to willing seller/willing buyer
2000	Constitutional Amendment no. 16. Land Acquisition Act amended through Presidential Emergency Temporary Powers, 2000.	-Absolves government from paying compensation for land (compensation now for only improvements) -Elimination of dual designation route -Enables payment of compensation through payment of 3-5 year bonds - State can refuse to buy land deemed too

		expensive -Allows for time delay in actual acquisition
2005	Constitutional Amendment Act no. 17, 2005	-Compulsory acquisition of land and payment of improvements in local currency -Land issues shall not be contested in a court of law
2006	Consequential Provisions Act, 2006	-Forbids using or occupying gazetted land without lawful authority

Source Moyo 2001 and modified by author (2007).

The FTLRRP adopted by the State in 2000 changed the tenure system in the country. Currently Matabeleland South tenure system can be divided into 3 parts. ‘Medium’ scale farm land (A2)⁷⁴, communal land (including A1 model) and irrigation land. I refer to the A2 farm land as ‘Medium’ farms because they have been sub-divided into an average of 400ha in the ranching district of Gwanda to between 50-100ha in Umzingwane district; clearly losing their commercial value; for instance 400ha of grazing land is inappropriate for extensive cattle ranching as most A2 plot holders practice this type of farming⁷⁵. This has been one of the setbacks of the FTLRRP in Matabeleland since the province is predominantly livestock farming. Communal land⁷⁶ is still apportioned through traditional leaders (*usabhuku*) and kraal heads in consultation with village assemblies, local institutions comprised of elected representatives and local traditional leaders. In the A1 model land access, allocation and administration is the responsibility of the appointed land committees that are answerable to the DLC⁷⁷. These committees are dominated by war veterans, ruling party supporters and sympathizers. In actual fact my informants told me that these members acted as ‘brokers’ in land allocation, and besides party affiliation those who could pay bribes were assured of a

⁷⁴ Nyathi is one of the beneficiaries of this model

⁷⁵ Fieldwork observation showed that the demarcation of these farms did not consider the topographical features of the landscape. Some A2 farms in parts of Gwanda south had limited grazing land because of a rocky and sandy landscape. Technically the size of the farm should be bigger considering such physical obstacles.

⁷⁶ Communal land is divided into residential land, grazing land and arable land, but because of the congestion of livestock most of the grazing land has been over grazed and degraded

⁷⁷ Mluleki Ndlovu is one beneficiary of this model

piece of land whether they were on the waiting list or not. I deliberately bundled the A1 tenure system with communal land because the settlement pattern is the same though the latter is a product of land made available through expropriation of former commercial farm land.

Communal and A1 dwellers have permits of occupation that can be evoked anytime since systems allow the state overall jurisdiction of all land in these areas. Tenure security is questionable in this system. In the A2, a few have 99 year leases and the rest still hold on to offer letters from the Ministry of State Security, Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement.⁷⁸ As a dry region, the last system is that of irrigations which of late has been converted from community schemes to state sponsored entities (see chapter 5). An assessment done by the Provincial Land Committee in 2005 revealed that the uptake of A2 farms was about 30% and utilization was less than 20%⁷⁹. In A1 village settlements the uptake was higher, about 40% as a result of settlement by people from outside the province.

Looking at the village of Mtandawenema in Garanyemba communal area one can see the changes brought about by the FTLRRP. The village traditionally had limited grazing land compared to the number and type of livestock they keep. Goats normally graze close to the homesteads whereas cattle graze in common grazing land away from the fields. The inadequacy of grazing land prompted villagers like Alan Moyo to lease graze their livestock in the Shoka and other neighbouring commercial farms. This had been a prevalent practice prior to the FTLRRP. The FTLRRP changed land ownership of these farms from private property to state property. However the real utilisation of these farms by Mtandawenema villagers has been constrained because the state has settled people there depriving villagers of potential grazing land. During fieldwork I found that people were bitter about the conversion of these farms into village settlements. One resident reflected his dejection of the state's action in designating these farms as village settlements by noting that:

Oh, well life is all about power and authority. If you do not have power you are always marginalised. We actively participated in the occupation of Shoka and Timber farms during the early days of the fast track. As we demonstrated in these

⁷⁸ When the first 99 year leases were issued out in 2007 Umzingwane district received only 2; thus a negative in addressing tenure security issues. Nyathi one of the successful A2 farmers in Gwanda district was shocked when he failed to get a lease despite good appraisal by the land officer, the district and provincial land committees.

⁷⁹ Fieldwork notes and interviews with land officers of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts; 2005-2008).

farms our main aim was to show solidarity with a national cause of equal distribution of land. Our aim as veterans and a people of Garanyemba communal land was that if the dust settles down we will retreat back to our communal land and leave the farms for livestock keeping. That is why we did not build permanent structures because really the farms are more suitable for livestock grazing than human settlement. But as I have said those with power changed all our ambitions and converted these farms to village settlements. I am very worried because some of the people settled there get water from our community boreholes an indication of the drier nature of the farms. The truth is that we will never stop sending our cattle into their grazing areas because that is our land even if they complain. (Masala Mathobela, 21/12/06).

In one incident in the Mvana resettlement area I traced the movement of Dula's household to this area towards the end of year 2000, the first year of the FTLRRP.

Dula Ncube, a war veteran managed to secure a new plot at Mvana at the end of 2000. She moved onto the plot with her husband and they quickly constructed pole and dagga huts in their new found land. By the end of 2002 they had put up two huts and moved most of their livestock from Makwe to Mvana. They transferred their primary school going children to the 'new' resettlement school-a former farm manager's house. They left those still at secondary school at Makwe so as to attend at Lushongwe. By the time they arrived at Mvana the boreholes left by the former rancher were working well as well as drinking water for livestock and people were not a problem. The farm compound in adjacent Konongwe that houses the 'primary school' had piped water and electricity. By 2005 when I visited Mvana resettlement, the primary school had no water and pupils had to bring their own water to school. In the meantime, the windmill and borehole that had been sources of drinking water since 2000 had broken down and resettled households such as Dula's had to either get water from Thuli River (unprotected water) some ten kilometres away or alternatively from Gwanda town some 20 kilometres away. The fences that protected the Mvana villagers' livestock from straying away had been stolen. The District Development Fund (DDF) had promised to repair the windmill but had asked the villagers to raise money for petrol for the DDF truck and also to raise money for purchasing additional pipes and other implements to repair the borehole and the windmill. With the little two thousand dollars some of the residents in the area were earning as a war veteran pension and the majority with no income, they could not raise enough for the repair of the borehole and the windmill. By the end of 2005, Dula transferred her primary school going children to Makwe and also returned some of her livestock. Dula was now staying with her husband at Mvana and their children were

staying with their grandmother at Makwe. With the two thousand dollars she was earning she found it difficult to provide food for two households⁸⁰, one at Mvana and the other at Makwe, and this was strenuous bearing in mind that she had not harvested anything from her new fields at Mvana for the past three seasons of settlement. In mid 2006 Dula could not stand the situation in Mvana and she started staying for a day or two in Mvana and the rest of the time drifted back to her communal homestead at Makwe. By the end of 2006; Dula had literally abandoned her homestead at Mvana and settled permanently in her Makwe homestead. When I asked her in January 2007 why she had left Mvana although it had been her intention to start a new life in a resettlement area, she exclaimed,

I cannot live in a place without water, a place where the state is not keeping its promises to provide essential services like school for our children, clinic, and access roads. The place is really dry and I think we made a mistake by settling there we should have followed what Mr. Steward was doing, keeping cattle. I think from the hindsight that we should have turned the farm into a grazing area and probably could have made efficient use of this land. But really the farm as it is now is not suitable for human habitation. (Dula Ncube, 15/01/07).

When this resettlement was started in 2000, 23 plots were pegged by the (DLC). However, with war veterans at the helm of the land reform programme, as well as some people in Gwanda town and the nearby Freda mine plots increased to 40 households by 2004. However the number of households actually resident in the resettlement by (January 2007) was below ten. In most cases herd boys are resident in the settlement while the plot owners are either staying in Gwanda town or in Lushongwe and Makwe communal areas.

Yet in an interview I held with members of the DLC I was told that people who had resettled in areas like Mvana had exceeded the number of households allocated for the area, hence causing an overload on the borehole and the windmill, their only sources of water. Again the DLC blamed villagers for not taking care of the equipment and assets they had found on this farm. They accused the villagers of vandalising existing infrastructure they found when they moved there in 2000. On the suitability of the land for human settlement, the chairman of the land committee in his personal capacity agreed that the land was not suitable for human settlement but for livestock. He however pointed out that the decision to designate land as either A1 or A2 resettlement rests with the Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement and their

⁸⁰ By the time Dula was struggling to make ends meet, there was a critical shortage of basic commodities in the country as a whole and most commentators blamed these shortages on the disruption of commercial agriculture and the State's policy of price controls that fuelled inflation to 4 digits by 2005.

mandate was to see to it that A1 people are settled, they cannot challenge the authorities above. The DLC chairman agreed that if given a second chance, Mvana could be turned into a grazing scheme to cater for livestock in Lushongwe and Makwe as the paddocks they were allocated for grazing purposes in the former Georgia farm were not adequate as more and more livestock is still congested in communal areas.

Based on the preceding discussion of Dula's household and the responses from the DLC, what has FTLRRP brought to the people of these localities? Firstly the FTLRRP has opened up more land for both settlement and livestock than what was available previously. Although my fieldwork suggests that the majority of beneficiaries of the programme were people aligned to the ruling party, there is also evidence that those who were not necessarily ruling party supporters but could bribe the war veterans, could access land parcels. What is more worrying however is that land such as Mvana has been wasted as more and more households relocate back to their former communal areas (for those who have), whilst those who had drifted from urban areas and nearby mines leave behind herds boys to look after their livestock. This has created a situation where people are left to move from one piece of land to another and in the case of Dula voluntarily because of the unpalatable conditions in the new settlement. When people move from one piece of land to another the consequences are that one of the pieces of land remains underutilised. For instance in the case of Dula, she has left Mvana but she still claims she owns the land because she holds an 'offer letter' from the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Resettlement. There are many cases of resettled people abandoning land in resettlement areas especially in A1 resettlements indicating that in some cases people were caught up in the revolutionary storm (*The Third Chimurenga*) of grabbing land to correct colonial imbalances without really thinking deeply about land utilisation, capacity and the ability to maintain and productively utilise two land parcels. What is disturbing is that those people who need land for productive purposes as is the case with a majority of cattle owners in Lushongwe and Wenlock communal areas fail to claim the abandoned land as those who hold offer letters retain custody. As I have shown in the above case study, Dula left Mvana in 2005, and by 2007 when I conducted further fieldwork in this area about ten households with limited cattle (see chapter 4) were permanently staying in this resettlement, and yet the landless in communal areas of Lushongwe could not claim the land because of this 'offer letter' technicality.

However, in some cases the latter years of the FTLRRP saw a shift from cases of some resettled people abandoning their land to forced eviction of those resettled in the first years of the programme. One pertinent incident I want to put on record concerns people of Zimbili resettlement scheme in Umzingwane district.

Zimbili villagers were settled in this farm in 2000 at the inception of the FTLRRP. The farm is 40 kilometres from Bulawayo in the North West of Umzingwane district. I carried out a number of interviews and field visits in this settlement in April and May 2006. From ethnographic evidence most of the villagers or household heads are war veterans and retired soldiers. During the 2006 interviews, these villagers had a good harvest and most of them had great plans for their plots. In February 2007 I re-visited the area holding some repeat and at times spontaneous discussions with the villagers. To my surprise there was now a wrangle between the war veterans and a ZNA Major General. The Major General and his wife a Lieutenant Colonel had claimed ownership of the farm.

One of my informants noted that this couple came in November 2006 and that when they arrived they were quick to point out that the farm house was theirs.

“Thina sathi singena lapha satshintsha indlu eyayihlala ikhiwa sayenza isikolo kwathi eyinye le iyayihlala ufolomani sayilungisisa sayenza iklinika kodwa sesibikelwa ukubana sesithathelwe, kambe yikhona uhulumende ayesilethela khona kulindawo ukuthi amasotsha azafika enze santando.(Plazi,16/11/06)

Literally meaning that when they occupied this farm, they turned the farm main house into a school and renovated the former foreman’s house and turned it into a clinic; and now they are being told to move out by Government and then asks if that was the reason Government settled them there and then to let serving soldiers do as they please.

Another informant noted that they woke up one day in late November 2006 to a surprise as over a hundred cattle were brought into the farm in three army trucks. From that time there has been trouble between the Major General and the locals. The locals claim that the Major General refuses to let their cattle drink from water troughs near the farm house yet it is the only cattle watering point in the farm. Again they claim that they are the ones who provide the diesel that powers the water engines. They also claim that because of overstocking they are now afraid that their cattle will die of hunger and thirst. In one incident the locals had to

water their cattle at the farm house armed with knob-kerries to deal with any resistance from the Major General's workers.

These villagers further claimed that when the soldiers' cattle arrived they took their dipping chemicals and dipped their cattle on the understanding that they would be replaced but up to now they have received nothing. The villagers further noted that a Warrant Officer who is also in charge of 'operation Inala/Maguta' (command agriculture, chapter 5) is now the farm manager.

The headman of the area had this to say:

Abantu laba sebesididanise amakhanda hatshi mbijana. Khathesi abantu sebekelwa ukubana benganathisi inkomo zabo emaklebhini ngoba kuthiwa impahla yonke leyo isingeyabo Dube. Inkomo zethu sezinatha amanzi alodaka edamu, konke lokhu kwenzakala phezu kokubana amafutha okudonsa amanzi kuyithi esawathegayo(headman,07/11/06.)

Literally meaning that the occupation of this farm by this family and the appointment of a serving soldier as farm manager has confused them; again people are not allowed to water their cattle at the farm house troughs as it is said that all property belongs to the Dube family. Their cattle have to drink dirty water from the silted dam yet they are the ones who bought diesel to power the water engines.

Asked how the soldier came to this farm, the kraal head noted;

I can tell a lie but the truth is that the then Acting District Administrator came some time and gave this soldier part of our land which incorporated fields from six households including mine and we were informed that the area given to Major General Dube was to become an A2 farm, although people in this farm were settled under the A1 model. (headman,07/11/06).

The kraal head also cried foul at the takeover of the clinic as he noted:

"We had completed renovations of this building and what was left was to staff it and acquire medicines and drugs. It's a pity really."

This season soldiers spearheading operation Inala did not plough the fields as it was reported that that piece of land belongs to Dube, but DDF tractors were just parked at the soldiers' base. The kraal head further lamented, *"As I am talking now my crops were supposed to be uprooted."*

Asked to comment the District Administrator for Umzingwane professed ignorance of the whole issue and advised me to enquire from the ZANU PF Chairman for Matabeleland South. The Chairman noted that if there is such a thing as the ruling party they will not allow it to happen *“We will not accept such a dirty thing like that to happen in this province and I will ask the District Land Committee to explain this to me.”*

I did not manage to talk to the Major General as he was always in Harare, but some informants said that it was the same farm that the Provincial Governor had tried to take over in 2005 but that had failed to materialize.

The case study of Zimbili farm illustrates how ‘power’ has come to dominate the land reform process in southern Matabeleland. People were settled by the state as far back as 2000 and had made this place their home, but six years later they were forced out of the settlement to pave the way for a serving soldier who spends most of his time in the army headquarters in Harare. The area is in region IV and these locals practised mixed farming. By the time they were told to make way for this new land owner, the rains had come; they were supposed to plough their fields but could not. In addition they were dependent on DDF tractors to till the land, but DDF was instructed not to till the land by authorities at head office so as to force these poor people to abandon their settlement. This has created controversy as the majority of these locals are war veterans and ruling party supporters. With the economic situation melting down at alarming levels, and without agricultural support from the state these people’s livelihoods have been jeopardised. This brings me to the conclusion that ‘titling’ of land is an important indicator for tenure security. Without tenure security those in new resettlement schemes will always live in perpetual fear and uncertainty. Probably a policy shift should be adopted that would enable locals to have ‘valid’ permits to occupy the land or long leases that would be legally binding and hence protect those resettled from being moved from one piece of land to another. The scenario at Zimbili resettlement undermines the State’s objective of land reform facilitating the reduction of poverty.

From the evidence advanced above and particularly looking at the settlement pattern of Garanyemba and Wenlock communal areas I am tempted to agree with Robins (1994) that people do not believe in settlement that brings them close together (*Amaline*), linear settlement in rectangular boxes. The FTLRRP came as a surprise to many residents of Gwanda and Umzingwane and as I mentioned earlier on, people had been pressurising the

state to accept a resettlement model that would give preference to livestock livelihoods more than human settlement (see chapter 4). Interviews I conducted indicate that though land has been made available in large quantities, this has not benefitted most of the residents of southern Matabeleland. One will ask why this is the case and my findings show that the beneficiaries of the land reform have been selectively chosen and people who were supposed to benefit had their expectations not realised. Sithole and Ruswa (2003) points out that in Matabeleland South by 2003 a mere 15% of people had taken up resettlement in A1 land parcels an indication of their objections to the resettlement models brought top-down by the State.

This indicates that though some people welcome the new resettlements (especially those who previously had no land for homesteads and fields), the majority of people of this region are still not satisfied with the state resettlement models. As is debated later on in this study, the fast track land redistribution exercise has not increased the livelihoods of people; in fact in some instances well established livelihoods based on the land have been severely disrupted (see chapter 4 and 5). In the following section I give a comparative assessment of land reforms in Africa and draw some similarities and differences with the way it has been carried out in Zimbabwe with an emphasis on Southern Matabeleland.

3:5 Land Reforms: a comparative assessment

In the African context land reforms have been associated with political revolutions and liberation struggles against colonial rule. In pre-colonial Africa (Berry, 1993; Moore 2005), land reform had been a thorny issue that pitted ethnic groups against each other in a quest to control vast tracks of land. Although the traditional structures in African societies have existed for a long time the struggles for control and ownership of land as a livelihood resource; it can be argued, has persisted in contemporary independent African states. For instance in Zimbabwe, the introduction of the FTLRRP in 2000 is a manifestation of the connection between land ownership and socio- economic empowerment. Land reforms tend to be posited as a series of events in the sense that one event leads to the next. In Matabeleland South for instance land has changed hands from the San community, to the *Lozi/Rozvi*, the *Shona* people, the *Ndebele* and by the close of the 20th century vast tracks of productive land in this region were in the hands of white commercial farmers. Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000) note, that the struggle for land in Matabeleland is largely

historical and political. Like the Biblical crusades land struggles have often been violent and bloody in most African countries. In an effort to bring the peasants into the main agricultural economy independent African states have adopted cooperative agriculture as a way forward; but Hyden (2006) still argues that Africa's peasant producers remain uncaptured and that this phenomenon is a challenge for the region's economic development (2006:140).

Even the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes that sought to open up the closed markets in African countries has not brought the envisaged agricultural expansion. As early as the first decades of African Independence, the peasant contribution to state agricultural development had been lagging behind. For instance Schultz (1964), cited in Hyden, 2006 had argued earlier, that if provided with the right incentives, traditional smallholder farmers would constitute the basis for agricultural-and national-development but Hyden observed, the peasants remain uncaptured in the sense that they have failed to respond to new policies. Instead, they have acted rationally by diversifying their sources of income outside the farm. Off farm income has become more important to rural households than earnings from sales of agricultural produce (2006:140). The point raised by Hyden is true for Matabeleland as is argued later on in chapters 6 and 7, whereby illegal gold panning and remittances from household members in the Diaspora constitute a large portion of household income in southern Matabeleland.

African land reforms have included the distribution of excess land (Algeria, 1971); nationalization of all land (Ethiopia, 1974); and the abolition of all land titles to be replaced by rights of occupancy (Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria). Tanzania promoted farming collectives (Ujamaa) with limited success (Scott, J. 1998, Donham, 1999). Post colonial Africa has seen land or agrarian reforms taking place soon after the attainment of independence; nevertheless the issue of transparency and equity has remained a contested issue in present struggles for access to land. Land lordism in contemporary independent African states has changed from the colonial masters to a new crop of black elite who control access and utilization of most agricultural land. Where socialism has been tried like in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, land has largely been vested in the hands of the state. In Tanzania for instance soon after independence, President Julius Nyerere nationalized all land in a quest to promote equitable distribution of wealth through collective agricultural farming (Ujamaa). Scott (1998) noted that at first Nyerere pronounced that villagisation should not be a compulsory process, but later on in 1973 when there was resistance from communities to

join Ujamaa villages, Nyerere enforced compulsion. He noted in one pronouncement: “It maybe possible, and sometimes necessary to insist on all farmers in a given area growing a certain acreage of a particular crop until they realise that this brings them a more secure living, and then do not have to be forced to grow it. If the peasants cannot be persuaded to act in their own interests they might have to be coerced (1998:231)”. Although from a political perspective Ujamaa had the potential to rid Tanzania of class stratification; in reality Tanzania remained a stratified class society with the elite wielding power by owning private properties such as land holdings. The extensive political mobilization carried out by Chama Cha Mapinduzi youths was reminiscent of a vanguard party committed to a transparent and just society but this was not to be as the Ujamaa movement collapsed and collective members resigned or disappeared enmasse. In Ethiopia, Donham (1999) notes that when the Derg took over the reins of power after the 1974 revolution, the major task was to dismantle lordism. This they did by expropriating land from the landed gentry especially former allies and confidants of the deposed Emperor Haile Salassie. When Mengistu assumed power he nationalized all land, a move aimed at neutralizing supporters of the ousted emperor.

In countries like Zambia land reform has been less violent though attempts at addressing colonial imbalances in land ownership were done under the flagship of humanism a moderate form of an African brand of Socialism championed by the Kenneth Kaunda government. Because of its vast geographical territory coupled with a small population, Zambia under Kaunda did not pursue an aggressive land reform programme especially land re-distribution. In Zambia, there was little fight over land between British farmers and the new government (Berry, 1993). The major concern of the Kaunda government was the protection of individual rights to customary land; and successive Zambian governments have concentrated on tenure security rather than land redistribution.

In Kenya, extensive land titling began in the 1950s but the consequences of land titling have not been achieved to date. The Kenyatta and Moi governments parcelled out land to the elite and their clansmen and in some cases in areas outside their tribal boundaries (cf Fratkin, 1994, Galaty, 1999). In Mozambique at independence land reform took a radical form as the Frelimo government nationalized agricultural land in pursuit of its socialist objectives. The Land Law No. 6 of 1979 vested all land in the hands of the state earmarked areas for socialist-oriented enterprise and restricted rural families to certain areas to encourage agricultural cooperative development (Willy and Mbaya 2000). Land laws No. 6 of 1979 and

No. 1 of 1986 permitted individuals to title their land and established titles issued by government as the only mechanisms for foreigners to access land. Demand for land accelerated in the late 1980s as a result of successful negotiations between Renamo and the Frelimo government, and the introduction of the economic reconstruction programme (Willy and Mbaya 2000). In Angola land reform has been hampered by the protracted civil war pitting the ruling MPLA government against Unita bandits

In southern Africa where the last colonial yoke was dismantled in South Africa (1994) the governments have attempted land reforms to correct colonial imbalances. In South Africa and Namibia, land reform has proceeded gradually, taking on the principle of 'willing buyer, willing seller', resulting in greater frustration on the part of the landless but less decrease in agricultural production⁸¹ In Zimbabwe the abandonment of the willing buyer willing seller principle in the late 1990s has seen reduced agricultural output as the government went for an outright land expropriation from July 2000. Commentators on the Zimbabwe Land Reform model argue that the decline in food reserves and general economic crisis is a result of the FTLRRP. They argue that commercial agriculture has collapsed as a result of land transfer from white farmers to blacks who have little farming experience and inadequate equipment. Chitiga, Wisner and Toulmin (2005)'s analysis of the Fast Track Land Reform Process using the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model found that the reform process could have had the potential of generating substantial reductions in poverty and inequality in rural areas. Their conclusions from these results suggest that well planned and executed land reforms can still play an important role in reducing poverty and inequality. In Matabeleland South it can be assumed that had the land reform process focused more on livestock rearing, the province could probably have experienced a decrease in poverty and vulnerability levels. As observed in this study most ranching farms during the current land reform process were turned into village settlements, a scenario that is strongly condemned by residents and District Council officials.⁸² Furthermore, agricultural support from the state and NGOs has tended to be biased towards crop farming. This support has existed to a limited extent.

On comparative efficiency of land utilization between large and small scale farms, a recent study conducted by the Land Institute Foundation (in Thailand) confirms the theoretical underpinnings of the association between tenurial security and the higher level of utilization

⁸¹ See www.answers.com/topic/land-reform 10/16/2006.

⁸² Interviews with councillors, council officials and informants 2005-2008.

where land parcels with title deeds are more intensively utilized, that is, from 66% upwards. The survey data does not indicate any clear relationship between land concentration and the level of land utilization. There are variations in the type and intensity of land use among large landholdings ranging from 200 rai to 50,000 rai (DFID, 2003). The point to note here which is relevant to Southern Matabeleland is the correlation of title to land and utilization of the same. *'Title or tenure security guarantees investment on the land,'* said one of my informants at the former Essexvale farm now apportioned into 35 A2 plots.

Yet, no clear pattern can be established that large holdings are inefficient or that land concentration necessarily leads to underutilization in the case of Thailand. Rather, it is the types of economic activities that determine the size of landholding, which will ensure optimal scale of operation and returns from land. Nonetheless, DFID survey data suggests that regardless of size, there is underutilization of land resources. Intensity of land use for 70% of the landholdings is under 50% of full capacity. The level of intensity of some of these holdings is low while some others are left entirely unutilized. The underlying reasons for the low intensity of land use can be attributed to landholding for speculative purposes, poor management decisions of the landowners themselves which could well result from inadequate or distorted access to the factor markets including modern production technology.

What these findings suggest therefore is that there is room for increasing levels of output with better land management practices, just as there is scope for poverty alleviation through fostering better linkages between larger and smaller scale production units within areas already converted for agricultural production. In championing the concept of 'equity', one should not lose sight of the fact that empty stomachs can also be filled if the pie itself is bigger. After all, there is no inherent evil in supporting efficiency goals even if it means that social and economic groups other than the marginalized farmers will also share in the benefit. Moreover, a combination of land taxes based on the principle of progressive rates and land value taxation can be introduced as tools for ensuring greater intensity and efficiency in land use.

One key aspect of institutional failure in delivering a sound land reform programme is the excessive divisions and segmentation of responsibilities. The multi-dimensional nature of land resources such as the spatial, physical, social-cum-cultural economic and legal dimension has conjured up a multitude of laws and regulations and corresponding

bureaucratic institutional structures. The *ad hoc* approaches which characterize the dominant mode of conduct are clearly reflected in the number of committees, sub-committees, task forces, and working groups characterising the FTLRRP.

Current agricultural development policy in Thailand recognizes the dualistic feature of the agricultural sector, the small-scale producers and the larger scale commercialized producers. Both rely on the market for production and exchange of goods and services, but to varying degrees. What has not been adequately highlighted, but has become more apparent in recent land studies, is that in addition to being a productive asset, land is a social safety net, a source of food supply and therefore an insurance against hunger. It could be said that recognizing the multiple functions of land, land policy for smaller scale farmers should prioritize food security and the social needs function before the economic and profit motivated functions. The policy emphasis for the larger scale producers on the other hand, is geared towards increasing market competitiveness through promoting technological advances, yield and quality improvement.⁸³

Formal titling and land registration has always been recognized as instrumental to an effective land administration system. While speed had its merits, it is now acknowledged that there have been tradeoffs with social and economic consequences. Thus, it is not only the titling process, but the parallel accompaniments that are equally important such as land use classification, zoning for issuing legal documents for land allocated for economic uses, procedures for cross-examination of land rights and withdrawal of rights where legitimacy of claims becomes uncertain. Such are the measures deemed to be necessary instruments to eliminate uncertainty of rights (DFID, 2003) While the dominant ideology had always been in favour of granting security of tenure, there have been shortcomings in terms of accompanying measures to ensure ability of beneficiaries to generate income from land assets. For instance, large scale commercial farm land expropriated during the FTLRRP has not resulted in increased food production, real income to intended beneficiaries let alone reduced poverty. In the Zimbabwean context land use has not been as vivid as expected. Studies such as the farms assessment I participated in 2006 in Umzingwane district indicate that land utilization of acquired farms under the A2 resettlement model is at most 30%; and massive agricultural mechanization and issuance of 99 year leases alone cannot address these

⁸³ One of the objectives of the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe is to increase agricultural production in an effort to increase the country's GDP since the economy is largely agro-based.

shortcomings in contemporary agrarian transformation. Although the policy states that each sex should have equal opportunity to land access; in reality as evidenced in the study of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts, women still constitute a very small percentage of land parcels owners (case studies in Gwanda and Umzingwane 2005-2007).

One common feature is that in most countries land reform has been more state driven than people driven. Those wielding power tend to subject those who are powerless into submission and take control of the land and its resources. In Zimbabwe land reforms in the past have taken different forms. From a historical perspective land ownership and allotment has been the preserve of traditional or customary institutions. Moore (2005) argued that in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe land ownership and control was contested by two traditional institutions. The Tangwena chieftaincy claimed to be the rightful owners of vast tracks of land in what is referred to as Tangwena land. On the other side as Moore (2005) observed, the rainmaker of the highlands also claimed ownership. In Moore's assessment there seemed to be confusion between the owner of '*nyika*' and '*ivhu*' (country and land). Moore found out that the rainmaker believed he was superior to chief Tangwena since he controlled the land which is part of his country. There is a lot of spiritual attachment to the land and its resources in this part of Zimbabwe and the same can be said in other parts of the country. In Matabeleland the scenario is different since the current inhabitants are historically regarded as alien (chapter 2).

Land reforms have been viewed as vehicles for poverty reduction in most Third World countries. Ujamaa was viewed as a vehicle to increase crop output for families, as well as the domestic and export market. Unlike in Russia collectivization attempts in African countries were more on a voluntary basis and maybe that is why it failed to stand the test of time. Scholars like Hyden (1989) note that most African countries especially its citizens have not been subjected to pain and without economic subjugation intended economic results will take a longer time to bear fruits. The observation by Hyden is true in the Zimbabwean context where the FTLRRP presented land parcels to the ruling party supporters without much pain. This has resulted in a lack of commitment to commercial agriculture and this has led to chronic food shortages in the country once touted as the bread basket of Southern Africa. The people who lost out included former commercial farmers who were evicted by war veterans and ruling party youths. Studies have revealed that land as a natural resource, if properly apportioned and utilized can increase food security and improve people's livelihoods. Other

studies reveal that radical land reforms can turn a bread basket country into a basket case country like the current state of affairs in Zimbabwe. Arguments by proponents of a land revolution point out that land as a scarce and a non- renewable resource should be guarded jealously and properly used to cater for future generations.

Gudeman (2001) noted that land is the base of any economy and in most instances it is a common resource. After the introduction of the FTLRRP, the ruling party coined a popular slogan; '*Land is the economy and the economy is land*'. The great question of the day is who benefits from state initiated land reforms? Is it everyone or the chosen elite? These questions have been partly answered in most African countries; for instance in Kenya when the British farmers moved out the rich Kenyan elite took over the farms. In Zimbabwe when white commercial farmers were evicted the ruling party elite jostled to get the best out of the available and most productive farms. This can be said for Matabeleland South where senior party officials occupied more than one farm when the rural poor still languished in overcrowded and resource poor communal lands. There is a misconception by the state that land reform is re-distribution of cropping land. This misconception has resulted in some ranching land in Matabeleland South being allocated for crop farming and residential plots, a futile exercise considering the ecological and climatic conditions of the region. Some authors suggest that strong connections between political allegiance and land rights may have been an 'invented tradition' arising out of the changed circumstances of colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996). Those that are politically connected tend to benefit from state led land reform programmes, whilst those that are not connected languish in unproductive lands. This has manifested itself in African countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana and Zimbabwe (Berry 1993, Donham 1999, Scoones 2003, Cousins and Amin 1992).

3:6 Conclusion

Land reform in Zimbabwe as I have demonstrated has been of little benefit to the local people of southern Matabeleland. In my case study of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts, I have shown that even prior to the FTLRRP people did not benefit from state driven land reforms as they expected. The people of this region prefer a land re-distribution model that puts more emphasis on livestock livelihoods than on cropping livelihoods. Village settlements have been carved out of farms purchased by the state in the first two decades of independence. The introduction of the FTLRRP in July 2000 was viewed as an opportunity for residents of this

region to increase their grazing land; however the state imposed models that were in favour of village settlements against the wishes of the majority of locals in this region. In resettlement areas where people have accepted resettlement in villages, the state has failed to provide the requisite technical and financial support so as to effectively utilise the land. In fact some are being victimised by members of the elite as is the case at Zimbili. Although the land reform has been largely politicised, findings from this study indicate that even some ruling party supporters have questioned the sincerity of the government in rolling out a 'one size fits all' resettlement model negating their claims for a model that would avail more grazing land. With the resettlement of 'outsiders' in these schemes, the FTLRRP has created conflict among those resettled in what is believed by locals to be their grazing land and they are still congested with their livestock in adjacent communal areas. One notable conclusion is that though the majority of residents argue that they have been marginalised in decision making in the crafting of the resettlement models, some have actually benefitted from this programme. Those who have benefitted have largely been the top ranking state, ruling party, army officials (both from outside and within the region) and some chiefs, a scenario that has relegated the locals to bystanders on their land. The vandalism of farm fences and other equipment by communal residents can be viewed as their discontent with the settlement of politicians and state bureaucrats who have grossly under-utilised the acquired land. The abundance of idle land occupied by members of the elite and ruling party supporters has prompted the locals of Gwanda and Umzingwane to once more poach graze their livestock. People have lost access to lease grazing and also lost access to a suitable grazing model. Communal areas lack grazing land and for those who tried resettlement, the resources needed for success were not available.

Chapter 4

Living off the Land: Pastoral and Agrarian Livelihoods

4:1 Introduction

The people of Gwanda and Umzingwane increased their dependency on multiple livelihoods as a result of the state's implementation of the FTLRRP and the resultant economic crisis in Zimbabwe today. They now depend on both on-farm and off-farm activities to earn income to survive. Gold panning and migration are some of the off-farm activities that have become prominent as means of earning income. However the mainstay remains pastoralism and agrarian pursuits.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of these on-farm activities and the impact of the FTLRRP on pastoralism and crop farming in the communal and resettlement areas. The chapter affirms that despite the economic crisis and drought, rural resources remain fundamental to households. The chapter also seeks to establish and affirm the centrality of pastoralism. It suggests that southern Matabeleland is defined by a form of pastoralism which combines periodical farming with livestock keeping. It is also argued that this pattern is fairly sedentary in the sense that it is confined and contained by political units like villages and wards. It is argued that the viability of the system has been undermined since the 1980s by the increasingly constrained and controlled nature of grazing access in the communal areas. The FTLRRP has increased opportunity in theory, with new access options, but impediments continue to frustrate local livestock owners' aspirations. I argue that one of the failures of the current government approach is that it has not been able to revive the *lagisa* principle, which allowed livestock owners to access summer grazing beyond the immediate settlement boundaries.

The absence of clear development programmes to improve range management and livestock livelihoods is also a striking feature of the post-2000 landscape. Land transfer has appeared to be an end in itself and few structures and policies are put in place to strengthen livelihoods on

the land. In this chapter I also look at farming strategies, which have always and remain a second level priority in the area and are mainly used to supplement livestock keeping. In this regard I note that a majority of households, particularly those in communal areas have depended for their livelihoods on livestock as the climatic conditions have greatly changed with recurrent droughts and cyclones.

4:2 Conceptualising Pastoralism

Contemporary studies on pastoralists have been shaped by the work of Evans-Pritchard who conducted extensive ethnographic studies of the Nuer of southern Sudan. According to Evans Pritchard the Nuer were bound to their herds in an intimate symbiosis of survival, whereas cattle depended on human beings for protection and care; people depended on cattle as insurance against ecological hazards as well as being vital sources of milk, meat, leather and dung (cf, Hodgson,2000). Yet cattle were also valued far beyond their material contributions to human survival. One of the contributions of anthropology to the study of pastoral societies has been to demonstrate the social and cultural significance of cattle and their pivotal role as a principal means by which people create and affirm enduring social bonds amongst themselves as well as between themselves, their community and divinity. The work of scholars like Evans Prichard has gone a long way in deepening our understanding of these processes in an African context.

In southern Matabeleland cattle and other livestock have always played a central role in social and economic life in rural communities. It is the desire of most household heads in this region to own livestock. Even today more than 90% of households in this region own some livestock. Most of them have small herds comprised of a few cattle, goats and donkeys. The struggle to acquire access to land to graze livestock, to maintain cattle kraals close to the homestead, to secure family labour to look after livestock and ward off the dangers of stock theft and the depreciation of the herd remain a constant preoccupation for rural households. In the social economy of the region cattle have an economic and social significance similar to that described in Evans Prichard classic ethnography. Households continue to slaughter cattle and other livestock for significant family rituals and to appease the ancestors, while at the same time relying on cattle and other livestock as a source of daily sustenance and a store of wealth. However, as Hodgson (2000) has noted, pastoralism does not refer to the keeping of livestock only. Hodgson (2000) suggests that pastoralism is a diffuse term, which refers to

a diverse array of production systems dependent, to varying extents, on particular kinds of livestock (cattle, sheep, goats and/or camels) often mixed with other subsistence strategies (cultivation, hunting, gathering, fishing, wage labour etc). Herders usually depend on their livestock for food and trade, and must provide their animals with food, water and protection (2000:6). Hodgson's comments are valuable in the Matabeleland context where many of the households that maintain livestock are also periodically involved in some form of crop farming. It is also critical to recognise that most households depend to some extent on non-farm based sources of income for survival and that many of the livestock purchased are acquired from the proceeds of non-farm activities.

Little (1992; 2000) in his studies of pastoralists in north eastern Africa argues that livestock herders increasingly pursue non pastoral income strategies to meet consumption needs and to buttress their households against risky shocks caused by climatic change, animal disease, market failure and insecurity. He further argues that unlike crops, livestock is a source of subsistence and income, as well as a form of capital and savings that can yield annual returns (Little et al 2001:402). Indeed there is considerable evidence that income from non-pastoral activities, frequently is invested in livestock, while keeping animals off devalued markets by earning income from non-pastoral pursuits is also a means of preserving herd capital (Little, 1992). In other words Little argues that income diversification among pastoralists does not necessarily equate to diminished interest in livestock investment and production (2001:402). One of the striking differences between pastoralism in the context of northern and eastern Africa is that there is much less evidence in Matabeleland of herd-owners being able to move their livestock long distances on a seasonal basis in search of grazing. Colonial and post colonial land management and land regulation laws have ensured that herds are managed by households in the political boundaries of local villages, wards and districts. One of the consequences of FTLRRP has been to create opportunities for existing livestock owners to access new grazing land and exploit local resources in new ways.

Despite the increasing dependence of pastoralists on sources of cash income from non-farm activities for survival numerous scholars have noted that barriers have been created in these societies between cash and cattle (cf Ferguson, 1990, Little, 1992). In revisiting and updating the classic work of Evans- Prichard, Hutchison draws a schema on how the Nuer conceptualized cattle and money. She contends that in the Nuer case cattle could only become money in order to become cattle again and with the advent of wage labour, money

could also be turned into cattle. However she argues that the ‘cattle of girls’ was unlikely to be disposed of for money as the Nuer viewed such cattle as having special kinship significance. Shipton (1989) in his study of the Luo people of Kenya uses the term ‘bitter money’ to refer to the income that households earn from non-farm activities or commodity transaction outside of the cattle economy. Bitter money according to Shipton originated from the sale of specific resources such as land, tobacco, cannabis and gold. In my fieldwork a number of my informants had used proceeds from gold panning and migrant labour remittances to buy livestock.⁸⁴

In southern Africa, the question of the barrier between cash and cattle in rural communities has generally been raised in the context of the migrant labour system of the region. Scholars have noted that in communities where large numbers of men are absent for much of the year as migrant workers cattle, which is viewed as men’s property as opposed to pigs and chicken that are seen as woman’s property, are often invested with special symbolic significance as they come to represent the interest of the absent migrant in the rural community. John and Jean Comaroff (1993) argue that Tswana migrants in South Africa have historically built up a set of binary opposites, such as those between work and labour and cash and cattle that divides the world of *Setswana* from that of *Sekgoa*. Ferguson (1990; 1992) makes a similar argument in his work on Lesotho during the 1980s, where male migrants, in particular, made a fundamental distinction between cash and cattle and were adamant that their wives and children should not convert cattle to cash unless it was absolutely necessary. In Ferguson’s analysis, migrants resisted this conversion by creating a mystique around cattle where its conversion to cash was deemed socially and morally inappropriate. This impassioned defence of cattle by male migrants was influenced by their fear, on the one hand, that their wives and daughters might sell of their herds in their absence to defray household expenses and educate their children, while at same time fearing that the sale of cattle might leave them destitute in their retirement.

The arguments that the Comaroff’s (1993) and Ferguson (1990) make in relation to cattle and cash are significant in the Matabeleland context, where men were generally more reluctant to sell cattle than women, as will be seen below. However, my study area was never tightly integrated into the South Africa mining economy as the research areas of the above

⁸⁴ Alan Moyo is one of my informants who has bought over 30 herd of cattle as a migrant worker in South Africa.

mentioned scholars. One of the salient features of Matabeleland, especially over the past 20 years, has been the growing involvement of local women in livestock rearing and herd management. In her review of the literature on pastoralism in Africa, Hodgson (2000) contends that the 'myth of the patriarchal pastoralist' is still pervasive. "Firstly, it is commonly noted that men own and control cattle, and they play the primary roles in livestock production. Secondly, those pastoralist societies are gerontocracies, where elder men dominate the prestigious political sphere in which they make decisions and settle disputes. Pastoral women in turn are relegated to the less important domestic sphere. Thirdly the social features of these societies suggest that pastoralists are patrilineal and patrilocal. For all of the above reasons, it is often suggested that pastoralist men see themselves and are seen by others as the 'real' pastoralists, denigrating not only women's roles and responsibilities but also their identity as pastoralists" (Hodgson 2000:2).

Hodgson's (2000) work draws our attention to the reproduction of certain myths and assumptions about pastoralism which do not necessarily hold true in contemporary African societies, notwithstanding some of the comments and observations made by anthropologist about the existence and the construction of a male aura around cattle keeping. The work of Fairhead and Leach (1993) also provides a powerful critique of the common assumption that are adopted and projected within policy and scientific circles around the definition of certain kinds of landscapes, their appropriate economic use and potential. Drawing on these insights, Scoones (1989) argues that public policy on rangeland and livestock development in southern Africa remains informed by a particular understanding about range ecology and livestock management. He claims that the dominant view has been based on the science of ecological calamity, the damaging potentials of livestock grazing, the threats of degradation and desertification, and the need for control of livestock numbers in grazing environments. Scoones analysis of the colonial and post colonial Zimbabwe livestock and rangeland policy points out that this policy has largely been influenced by two main themes since the 1930s: the need for 'modernization' of the sector and the need to avoid environmental degradation.

In the debate on livestock policy, these two themes have been intimately linked, with the mainstream view arguing that the only route to the 'development' of the small scale livestock sector is through increasing the efficiency of beef production and the reduction of the damaging consequences of 'traditional' forms of livestock keeping. This, in turn, required a prescribed form of planned and ordered land use. Scoones (1989), notes that prior to

independence Matopos Research Station was established to improve livestock breeds and pastures, but focused mainly on the commercial farming sector and paid little attention to livestock production in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). According to Scoones (1989) this research station succeeded remarkably in increasing beef output under ranch conditions. However, little to no value was added in the communal areas where livestock farmers struggled to keep their livestock under harsh conditions. Even attempts by the Native Department of Agriculture to provide grade bulls in the reserves were stifled by the harsh environmental conditions and the scarcity of grazing land. Here the uptake of these grade bulls was limited. Scoones concludes that the state intervention package favoured commercial beef farmers at the expense of communal farmers in the so-called 'traditional sector'. Robins (1994) also argued that the representation of communal farming as ecologically destructive and unproductive continues to shape agricultural and resettlement policies in contemporary Zimbabwe (see Phimister, 1986, Ranger, 1985, Werbner, 1992). Robins (1994) found that by 1991 the 'lagisa principle' was blamed for environmental degradation by the Zimbabwe government. The lagisa system was a local system of livestock management used in the communal areas that involved the sending of herd to commonage land beyond the existing settlement boundaries (such as along the banks of the Shashe River) during the dry season to supplement grazing. The herds would be brought back to the villages when the rains fell. This added much viability to local pastoral livelihoods in the communal areas. Over time, the state shut down options for stock owners in the communal areas to access lagisa lands. The mobility patterns involved in the lagisa system were opposed by Ministers in the Zimbabwean government in the 1980s who stated that the 'lagisa' system borders on nomadism and could not be allowed in modern Zimbabwe. Robins (1994) argues that this modernizing ethic, which presented lagisa as pre-modern and traditional, is part of the development discourse that has devalued local knowledge and practices and deemed these traditionalists as unscientific (Robins, 1994:104).

In the 1990s the state tried to convince the people of Matabeleland that they would be expanding their livelihoods and strengthening their livestock practices by moving to model D settlements, which were created to expedite settlement in the communal areas. However, my informants viewed the model as a replica of the 'rectangular grid' of colonial administrators, which shifted people from their traditional settlements to "lines" or "*Amaline*." Although model D was more sympathetic to extending grazing access in the communal areas, one of its

limitations was that it failed to take into account the 'lagisa' system. Ranger (1985) and Alexander, (1991) found that model D paddock fences not only hindered livestock movement but were also a catalyst for struggles over pastures. Specifically, in Garanyemba communal area, communal farmers were granted access to grazing on the state owned Thuli ranch (10000ha) on condition that they participated in the spatial re-ordering of their villages bordering the ranch. This meant that beneficiaries had to agree to participate in villagisation and comply with the demarcation of their villages into residential, arable and grazing blocks, and adopt livestock limitation practices (destocking). The urgency with which this scheme was introduced reflected a growing desire from within the state to extend control over the rural population.

My interview with technocrats who worked on this model D scheme and my experience as a development worker in the area in the 1990s revealed that the implementation of model D was imposed without adequate consultation with the local people, and in spite of the social and economic dislocation it caused. Robins (1994) observed that opposition to the scheme after the unity agreement (see chapter 2) led to fence cutting and poach grazing among other reactions. Residents of Garanyemba argued that the model D scheme disturbed traditional practices such as '*amalima*' (team ploughing and harvesting), and '*ukusisa*' (loan cattle) and the rectangular grid meant people were moved away from their ancestral graves. One of my informants based in Buvume ward 12 acknowledged that the fact that people from Sengezane ward 8 some 60kms away could bring their cattle to Doddieburn farm to graze yet the favour was not reciprocated when they were only a stone's throw away. This was unacceptable and hence they reacted to this anomaly by leaving farm gates open so that cattle could stray and fall prey to cattle rustlers.

In the current period, this marginalization of communal livestock farmers has persisted under the FTLRRP. This is less the result of a coherent new set of policies which replicate the older pattern than a consequence of the absence of a clear policy framework for livestock management in the current period. In fact, the obsession of the Mugabe government with the redistribution of land as an end in itself rather than with the creation of viable rural livelihood options for rural people has led to a collapse of policy making in the rural sector, especially in relation to the pastoral economy. In the absence of new directives, older practices tend to replicate themselves at the local level.

4:3 Access to grazing land

This study covered three settlement patterns that accommodate livestock keeping. In communal areas livestock that are mostly kept by residents are cattle, goats, donkeys and sheep. Some 30% of the households I interviewed had only goats whereas 80% had cattle, goats and donkeys. Traditionally communal land is divided into residential land, arable land and grazing land. Communal grazing land in the two districts was found to be over grazed as a result of overstocking⁸⁵. Livestock such as cattle were usually taken to ‘emlageni’ during the drier months of the year as a relief grazing mechanism and also to rejuvenate communal grazing land. During this period small stock like goat and sheep grazed on communal grazing land. The hopes of the people of southern Matabeleland were that the FTLRRP would provide more grazing land so as to reduce livestock fatigue to far away ‘emlageni’ and deaths. The second settlement pattern is the A1 model brought about by the FTLRRP. The apportionment system is the same as communal areas; however it was found that most of the residents of these schemes have between 0 and 10 in terms of either cattle, goats sheep and donkeys. Therefore grazing land was in abundance. The A2 model in Umzingwane district has farms of a maximum of 100 hectares and most visited plots were engaged in mixed farming. The majority had between 20 and 100 herds of cattle and their major concern was inadequate grazing land. In Gwanda district A2 farms ranged from 400ha to 1200ha⁸⁶; this farm size does not take into account the physical features of the land. For instance I found that in one A2 farm owned by Nyathi, measuring 400ha, half of the land was covered by rocks and there was a small grazeable area and even smaller arable land. From the above scenario I therefore analyzed the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme with particular reference to livestock rearing.

My encounters with my informants and data availed to me from the Department of Veterinary services and Department of Agricultural Research and Extension showed that the mostly kept type of livestock in this region was cattle, followed by goats and donkeys. Donkeys are mostly kept for draught power in the fields and for pulling scotch carts carrying firewood, water, manure and are a mode of transport to clinics and other far away centres where there are social amenities. The following section analyses access to grazing land per settlement pattern

⁸⁵ Field observation 2005-2008

⁸⁶ See Enumerators’ handbook of the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme A2 Model

4:3:1 Communal areas

The following Table illustrates access to grazing land in 60 selected households interviewed in 2005/07 in communal areas of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts:

Table 4:1 where cattle graze in communal areas

Place where cattle graze	Number of responses	Percentage
1.Around the homestead	6	10%
2.Common grazing area	32	53%
3.Paddocks given by District Land Committee	10	17%
4.Anywhere there is grazing land	12	20%
Total	60	100%

Source: Fieldwork interviews 2005/7

Table 4:1 illustrates that 53% of cattle owners graze their stock in communal grazing land. This land I was told by the majority of my informants has been over grazed considering the pressure it had been subjected to through the 90 years of colonialism and subsequent years of post independence. Furthermore, this land I was told was insufficient for the large number of livestock kept by the communal farmers in the 60 households I interviewed during the course of my fieldwork in 2006/7. The majority of cattle owners indicated that they have been deprived of access to new grazing settlements as they were regarded as not supporting the ruling party. Some cited the unfair practice by land committee officials in selecting beneficiaries to new settlement schemes such as A1 and A2⁸⁷. Only 17% had access to paddocks afforded to the communal areas by the DLC⁸⁸. A notable number (20%) acknowledged that they grazed their cattle anywhere there was grazing, clearly showing their defiance in following the planned models⁸⁹. Interviews with informants show that almost all small stock is grazed around homesteads. The communal area farmers argued that this was

⁸⁷ Some interviewees stated that those who paid bribes also accessed land in the new settlements regardless of party affiliation. Bribes ranged from livestock such as goats, cattle and donkeys to cash in local and foreign currency (interview with Sithole, 2005).

⁸⁸ Lushongwe villagers are such an example (fieldwork notes 2005 to 2007).

⁸⁹ Villagers Lushongwe West allocated Sweet grass farm fall in this category (fieldwork notes 2005 to 2007)

necessary because of the vulnerability of small stock to thieves and predatory animals such as jackals⁹⁰. Martha Moyo whose husband died in 2002 related how difficult it was to convert cattle to money for household needs such as school fees and medication during the life of her husband

I have depended on our cattle and goats to send my children to school. In many instances I had to fight with my late husband when it came to selling cattle to pay boarding fees for my two children. My husband was not that kind of person who will just dispose of cattle. He will ask me to sell goats as they belonged to me not cattle. He would prefer to get a loan from his government employment than sell cattle. He loved his cattle and constantly reminded me that his late father always told him that cattle were not to be sold just like that, because they provided other essential resources such as milk, manure, kinship connectivity and above all 'status' among other villagers. He always boasted that he wanted to maintain his late father's legacy of being regarded as 'rich' because of a large herd... I remember in the 1992 drought we lost ten herds' of cattle as he always went against my suggestion that we sell and invest the money in case we need to replenish our herd in good years. He was adamant. He only slaughtered a cow when it was very old or when conducting 'umthethelo' (traditional ceremony); But now I am the head of this household and know the value of following good livestock rearing practices as we are taught by 'abalimisi' (agricultural extension workers). I sell cattle when I need money for my medication as you can see I am old and my two sons have both migrated to South Africa. I don't want to ask for money always from them because they have their own families to look after, but that does not mean they don't send me some... The point I am making here is that with inadequate grazing land it is useless to keep a large stock of cattle and again stock theft has increased, so is better to sell your cattle than let them be finished by these thieves. I know some villagers who have sent their cattle to 'emaplazini' (farms availed by the FTLRRP) but because of stock theft they have brought them back to the reserves in reduced numbers. You know some of these farms are too far from our village and young people who are supposed to herd them are into gold panning and some 'sebatshaya phansi' (have migrated) espousing them to these thieves" (Martha Moyo Swazi communal area, 17/12/07).

The sentiments raised by Martha show how men are attached to their livestock especially cattle. Men will not dispose of cattle as easily as women. Men like Martha's husband view cattle as symbols of social status and above all provide such essential livelihoods items such as milk, manure, draught power and meat. From this perspective, a pastoral woman such as Martha before her husband's death was on the periphery when it came to issues of cattle raising and disposal. Hodgson observed the same in her classical study of re-thinking pastoralism in Africa. Hodgson noted that pastoral women seem economically peripheral, politically subordinate, and socially and culturally marginal in their communities (2000:2).

⁹⁰ Fieldwork interviews in communal areas of Gwanda and Umzingwane (2005 to 2007)

She further stressed that because women care more for the welfare of their children than of their livestock, cattle belong to men and women depend on men as economic providers (ibid: 1). This is true as depicted by Martha who always fought with her husband for him to sell cattle to pay school fees. The way Martha has viewed livestock after her husband's death indicates that women are 'early adopters' of innovations and are utilitarian. This is shown by Martha's sense of understanding the livestock landscape and her buying into the idea of disposing of cattle whenever is necessary to generate means of other livelihoods. A large population of livestock is congested in inadequate communal grazing land despite large tracts of land having been acquired for resettlement in southern Matabeleland.

The land reform programmes in Matabeleland South have not addressed the main issue of grazing as envisaged by residents of this region. The FTLRRP was viewed as one such programme that could at least solve their grazing problems. I give an example of Wenlock communal area where communal residents were given three paddocks as grazing land by the FTLRRP. To tell the Wenlock story I choose to pick up a scenario at the former Georgia farm previously owned by Mr. John Hunt.

When Government took over part of John Hunt's farms, the people of Lushongwe agreed to allot themselves farms according to proximity; that is those in Lushongwe east were allocated Meeting Farm which has paddocks measuring about 5 000 hectares with five fairly fenced and maintained paddocks. Lushongwe west residents were given Sweet Grass farm and those in Lushongwe central were allocated Thuli Farm which also houses Lushongwe irrigation scheme. Although residents of these areas argued that grazing land was insufficient taking into account the large numbers of their livestock herd it was agreed that for the time being before additional grazing is found this arrangement would stand. So members of the respective farms were expected to manage their farms in a sustainable way by taking all the necessary precautions like repairing falling fences, fence strands and embark on controlled grazing. Residents of Lushongwe west drove their cattle to Sweet Grass farm and did not look after their farm properly. This resulted in thieves who according to the Meeting farm grazing committee chairman were locals stealing fences and this led to uncontrollable cattle grazing. The result was overgrazing and the subsequent demise of pastures. As I visited the farm during fieldwork, the farm was just a vast tract of land without paddocks leaving cattle and other livestock to roam freely all over the farm. With diminished pastures, these villagers then resorted to sneaking in their livestock at night to one of the paddocks on Meeting farm,

precisely paddock 29⁹¹. This generated a serious conflict and by the time I completed fieldwork in this area the case was being handled by the Chief Executive Officer of Gwanda Rural District Council.

According to the Meeting farm committee their constitution clearly stated that all households grazing their livestock in the farm should work on farm chores on a rotational basis and that anyone who did not partake in these activities is asked to pay a fine equivalent to Z\$10 000 per livestock in the farm. In addition they would contribute Z\$100 000 per month towards the grazing fund⁹². Meeting farm has 5 paddocks which are fairly maintained and the farmers practice strictly controlled grazing for the 310 cattle in this 5 000 hectares farm. Working on farm activities does not take into account the number of cattle one has but is purely on mutual understanding. For instance, the least has three cattle and the highest has 70. Mr. Mpofu the grazing committee chairman for Meeting farm had this to say:

We were all given farms that had paddock fences but people in the west stole their own fences and over grazed their farm and now they are troubling us. We will stop at nothing in impounding their cattle and if the Council and the police do not take action we will end up taking the law into our own hands. We cannot be deprived of the little grazing we have by lazy people who still believe others should work for them. If they are genuine that they value their livestock they should think twice and repair the damage they have caused to Sweet Grass farm. We will not allow them no matter what happens because they are not serious about looking after their cattle... We have taken up the issue with the CEO and we believe he will call a joint meeting with these deviants and knock sense in their heads. Livestock be it cattle, donkeys or goats is our source of survival as our area is prone to drought. We milk cows for our household needs, sell cattle to provide for our families in terms of food items and other essentials like paying school fees, buying uniforms and books for our children. We also to a lesser extent use cattle for ploughing our small fields when the rain falls, but mostly we use donkeys as draught power... Donkeys are also very useful to us in that in addition to being used as draught power there are a source of transport as they draw scotch carts to fetch firewood, water, to grinding mills, ferrying poles for the construction of our houses and any other transport requirements... We agree that the land we were given is not enough but it will be better off to jointly fight for more land rather than to fight among ourselves because of unorganized people, (Mpofu 12/09/06).

Livestock as highlighted in the preceding case by Mpofu is of paramount importance to residents of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The issue at hand is that land made available

⁹¹ Interview with Meeting farm grazing committee chairman (December 2006).

⁹² These fees were applicable in 2006 when I conducted fieldwork in Lushongwe communal area.

by the State is not adequate for the large herds of livestock. Yes, some villages had been negligent in looking after their paddock but the main setback is that grazing land is inadequate. For sure if 1000 cattle are to graze in one paddock the result will be over grazing taking into account that a beast scientifically grazes between 12 hectares and 15 hectares per year⁹³. As Alexander (1991) found in her study, people of this region prefer extensive livestock rearing and hence apportioning such small tracts of land for grazing is inappropriate. As one communal livestock owner exclaimed during a conversation in July 2007:

The problem is not the fences that have been stolen from Sweet Grass paddock but inadequate land is the main concern. We used to lease graze or even grazed our livestock freely during the dissidents' era in some of these farms like Mvana, Konongwe and Corner line but the state has settled people there. Where do they expect us to graze our livestock? Furthermore most of those resettled are strangers and own very few livestock (Nkomo, 18/07/07).

The sentiments echoed by these informants indicate that in most communal areas of southern Matabeleland the FTLRRP has not lived up to their expectations. They believe a sound resettlement programme should decongest communal areas in terms of livestock. It is against this backdrop that my informants and respondents imply that the FTLRRP has benefitted those closely aligned to the ruling party and those who do not rear cattle.⁹⁴ From this premise one can conclude that the land distribution exercise in this region has mainly been conducted on a patron-client relationship. Those who were prepared to pay back using their votes to retain the ruling party in power had ample opportunity to get a piece of land. This to me does not take into account the livestock numbers one has or the congestion in terms of livestock in the communal areas of southern Matabeleland. Southern Matabeleland is a live-stocking region therefore land for homesteads is not a priority; and inhabitants would prefer a modified version of the 'lagisa' system to be taken on board as a resettlement model in this region.

The Chief Executive officer of Gwanda RDC noted that they had never planned for new village settlements in his district; in fact they had muted the idea of reorganizing village settlements in communal areas in an endeavour to open up more land around homesteads for

⁹³ Interview with the District Agricultural Officer December, 2006-Gwanda district.

⁹⁴ Interviews with informants from communal areas and some in A1 resettlements schemes told me that a majority of A2 farms are owned by civil servants and ruling party elites, depriving the 'locals' of the much needed grazing land.

small stock grazing. The CEO noted in one interview that from the council's point of view the FTLRRP was brought top-down without consultation with RDCs as responsible authorities:

As council we had planned for a grazing land resettlement model in line with what our constituents want. As you know that Gwanda is a cattle district and many if not most people eke out a living from livestock rearing; we had planned such that any farms acquired for resettlement in this district should be set aside for livestock production. This did not happen as I said earlier on; the state came up with the village settlement and the small plot/farms models. Surely our constituents are not happy about these models and our plan has just been overtaken by events. In fact as council we have been marginalized by the District Land Committee in land allocation and administration issues especially in the acquired farms (CEO Gwanda RDC 31/10/05).

The sentiments raised by the Gwanda CEO were echoed by Umzingwane CEO who grudgingly exclaimed:

Our communal areas are not congested in terms of homesteads but are congested in terms of livestock. There is no way we can reverse the national decision but the truth is that people in my district would prefer a resettlement model that would open up more grazing land (Umzingwane CEO, 16/05/06).

The Sibanda household presents a sorry state of affairs on the congestion of livestock in communal areas of Gwanda. Sibanda had 40 head of cattle in 2000 when the FTLRRP was introduced. He applied for an A2 farm like all other people who wanted to venture into livestock rearing. Sibanda's name appeared on the Chronicle list of applicants who had been considered for A2 plots in Gwanda district. He was happy and was ready to take up the allotment. Some six months passed after the initial advertisement of the offer. He inquired from the land office time and again on his actual site but was moved from the office of the District Administrator, party offices to the DLC without success. In the meantime he was not allowed to take his cattle to the acquired farms without an offer letter. During that period (2000/01) there was drought and pastures in his communal grazing area had dwindled. Sibanda lost 5 cattle to drought in early 2001. With the delay and the danger of losing more cattle, Sibanda negotiated with Mr Mringa who had been allocated an A2 farm to let him lease graze his cattle to avert more deaths. Mringa who had only 5 cattle on his A2 farm agreed and Sibanda had to pay 4 heifers for the leasing for the next 12 months. Sibanda had no choice as he wanted to save his cattle. By 2005 it was clear to Sibanda that he would not get a farm as the DLC continuously made one excuse after another. By 2006 Sibanda had 50

cattle, half of them grazing in communal grazing at Lushongwe and the other half grazing on land he rents from Mringa who still maintains that for every 10 cattle he should pay a heifer annually. Sibanda has lost hope of ever getting a farm as the area for which he was earmarking (Corner line) has been turned into an A1 settlement.

Sibanda's case is one of the many cases I encountered in Gwanda and Umzingwane during my fieldwork. There is no transparency in land allocation especially for livestock farmers and this results in more cattle dying in communal areas because of dwindling pastures. Congestion of cattle in communal areas is also evidenced by the extent of losses in Matabeleland South by 2003 where the Department of Veterinary Services acknowledged that over 35000 cattle had succumbed to drought and lack of pastures. The question to ask is why this should be the case when vast tracks of land have been expropriated from former 'White Commercial Farmers'. One of my informants argued that the allocation of land was the preserve of the ruling party, and that one can lose his land if ever he falls out of favour with the ruling party elite. Even though Sibanda argued that he was a sympathiser of the ruling party he has spent seven years trying to secure land for his cattle but in vain.

It is against these sentiments that I argue that people who genuinely need land to decongest communal land in terms of livestock have been given a raw deal by the state apparatus and, the fact that decisions on land allocation lie with the elite, has compromised the equity basis for land reform. At the same time politicisation and political patronage has seen deserving people like Sibanda failing to secure land when the FTLRRP is viewed as having availed more land to the landless by the state apparatus. Certainly communal areas in southern Matabeleland are still congested in terms of livestock in spite of the State's objective of decongesting these areas.

4:3:2 A1 resettlement schemes

A1 resettlements are a creation of the FTLRRP. As indicated earlier on, these areas are no different from communal areas in terms of tenure patterns. In this study it was found that about 80% of those settled own less than 10 herds of livestock be it cattle, sheep, goat or donkeys. In one settlement at Kondwane in Umzingwane district I found that there was abundant grazing land but those resettled there would not allow communal area livestock owners to graze their livestock. In another area, Essexvale ranch, those resettled there were

actually encouraging people from ‘Sigola’ communal area to lease graze at a fee against the stated rules and regulations of the programme.

Table 4:2 where cattle graze in A1 Resettlements

Place where cattle graze	Number of Responses	Percentage
1.Around the homestead	0	0%
2.Common grazing land	10	33%
3.Paddocks given by land committee	20	67%
4.Anywhere there is grazing	0	0%
Total	30	100%

Source; Fieldwork interviews and observations 2005 to 2007

Unlike in communal areas, in A1 resettlements most of the cattle graze in paddocks allocated by the DLC. This is indicated by the 67% of respondents as depicted in Table 4:2 above. It can be concluded that grazing land in A1 settlements is apportioned by the land committee and respondents have no say in choosing grazing sites. The 10 respondents who said their cattle graze in common grazing land were actually referring to demarcated grazing land by the DLC. In terms of small stock like goats and sheep interviews showed that as in communal areas they graze around homesteads, an indication of their vulnerability to stock thieves if they are left to graze in common and/or paddocks allocated by the land committee. Fieldwork data showed that there were very few livestock kept by these farmers, and as indicated earlier on the numbers range from 0 to 10 per household.

However informants raised concern over the failure of the government to keep its promise of supporting their livestock husbandry needs. Banda was one of those resettled in Kondwane who raised concern over the failure of government to live up to its promises;

“We were promised loans to buy livestock when we moved into this farm in 2001. It is now over four years but not even a single resident in this farm of sixty households has managed to secure a loan from AGRIBANK. We do not have the resources to buy livestock and for sure I was a mere factory worker retrenched in 1999 without benefits, and thought it worthwhile to try a living in a rural set up. For sure if given money to buy cattle I think will have a new beginning, there is a lot of grazing land in this area” (Banda 14/05/06).

Banda represents a group of resettled people who do not have the resources to engage in livestock rearing. Lack of livestock support programmes have let down emergent farmers such as Banda. As indicated elsewhere in this thesis, the FTLRRP was implemented without proper planning. There was no systematic selection of beneficiaries to this newly acquired land. People from urban areas and those retrenched from closed mines were resettled. I argue that the FTLRRP could have increased the livelihoods of residents if it had been properly planned and executed. The A1 model has not benefitted those in serious need of grazing land but had benefited those active supporters of the state who wanted to fulfil the state's agenda of expropriating commercial farm land to gain political mileage. It is evident that some of these A1 farms are wasted land as those resettled do not fully utilize them.

If A1 resettlements have very few livestock amidst large tracts of land, why then does the state not do the same with livestock owners crowded with their livestock in communal areas. The regime uses the parcelling out of land lots to retain allegiance and secure the vote of the poor resettles. Evidence gathered in this study indicates that the majority (over 95%) of those allocated land in these settlements had to produce ruling party cards. In other ways to be legible for a site one had to be a current ruling party card carrying member. There are very few of my informants in this A1 model that did not align themselves to the ruling party; for instance Thambolenyoka told me that he bribed the army colonel who was in charge of the land committee in Umzingwane and was thus fortunate to get a piece of land for his cattle in Kondwane resettlement area. In fact he was quite frank that he had no intention of constructing permanent structures on this land because what he needed was land for livestock not residential or arable land.

Yet another interesting observation was recorded in Swathe village. Moyo the village head noted that people were leaving the resettlement scheme because of poor soil that was not suitable for crop cultivation. He also cited the critical shortage of water for both people and livestock. Although he contends that they have few livestock since the cattle loans they had been promised are not forthcoming; the few livestock they own have to contend with a distance of over five kilometres to the nearest water point during the dry months of the year. Moyo argues that grazing land is adequate for the time being provided people stick to the livestock numbers agreed upon with the Agricultural Extension Worker. Another Moyo from *Malilangwe* settlement was full of praise for the FTLRRP, citing the increase in his livestock

herd from 5 cattle in 2001 to 10 in 2007. However he was skeptical about the continued delay in the disbursement of cattle loan money and the expensive cattle medicines as he noted:

The soils in this place are not good for crops and surely the government should speed up the disbursement of loans for us to buy more livestock. We need money and we have applied for these loans four years ago, but nothing has come through. I am beginning to suspect that some people somewhere somehow are benefitting from these loans at our expense (Moyo, 17/01/07).

Moyo was angry that they heard on the news that a district resettled in Mashonaland have been given crop farming loans yet he has hardly heard of A1 livestock farmers being given anything in Matabeleland particularly in the Umzingwane district where he is settled. He also said that the Agricultural bank was biased towards A2 farmers of which most of those are ‘chefs’ (elites). Ironically one A1 farmer felt land was being wasted in A1 villages yet people in communal areas were short of grazing land.

I do not agree with the notion that Gwanda communal areas where I come from are congested in terms of homesteads; what is congested is livestock. I believe the better part of the land acquired by the state for resettlement should be set aside for livestock and irrigation. Our region is dry.” In fact some adjacent communal cattle owners are poach grazing in our grazing land and it’s not nice fighting them over unutilized land; but well the land committee would like us to (Ncube-Bayethe village, former Essexvale farm, (20/04/06).

The resettled are concerned by the lack of state support to survive on this land and basically argue that the vast tracts of land they now have access to for grazing is underutilized taking into account the low number of livestock they own. More than 80% of the interviewees had sold at least two oxen in the years 2003 to 2006 to support their households in mitigating the drought effects and the poor soils that have seen them harvesting one good crop in five years.

Poach grazing by communal cattle owners is indicative of the abundance of grazing land in these resettlements. In one resettlement scheme in Zimbili in Umzingwane district those resettled were at loggerheads with the District Land Committee as a large chunk of their grazing land has been clandestinely allocated to an army Major General on the understanding that the said paddocks be turned into an A2 farm. The case of Zimbili resettlement has cast doubt on the sincerity of the state to let the local resettles decide on how to use their land and is indicative of the haphazard nature of the FTLRRP. This according to the villagers interviewed makes them feel more insecure on the land they currently occupy as they noted

that there is nothing that can stop the land committee removing them from this land anytime they feel like doing as is the case with what has happened to their grazing land. The case of Zimbili is one of the many instances where people resettled or occupying commercial farms as early as 2000 have been moved from one farm to the other to pave way for the ‘chefs’ (elites). This also brings in the issue of tenure security as the resettles only have offer letters given by the Ministry of State Security, Land Reform and Resettlement. The offer letters do not guarantee the security of tenure as the ministry can revoke them as they please.

4:3:3 A2 Resettlement model

The A2 resettlement model is meant to give land to those that have the capacity to engage in commercial farming. In most of the Mashonaland provinces the A2 model is basically designed to empower black crop farmers. In Matabeleland, therefore the focus should be livestock farming as I have argued that crop farming in this area fairs better under irrigation (chapter 2). Yes livestock schemes have been widely publicized in the media, through government institutions and NGOs, but the actual access to these resources has not been transparent. Furthermore most of the ‘type’ of loan schemes on offer, and the extent to which government purchased equipment for agricultural mechanization, shows the marginal status accorded to livestock production. However, theoretically the state apparatus encouraged livestock farming in addition to crop farming⁹⁵. In Umzingwane district, areas around Esigodini town centre have the potential for irrigation farming especially horticulture, but the fact that people of the district prefer livestock farming, has seen the A2 farms in this area engaged in mixed farming. The result has been more livestock on a very small hectareage. For instance according to the District Land Officer the maximum hectareage for A2 farms in Umzingwane district is 100hectares. Because of their pastoral background, those resettled in these farms have brought in more livestock than the carrying capacity of the land. A good example is Mr. Ndlovu’s household:

Ndlovu occupies plot 1 lot 35 around Esigodini district centre. The previous commercial farmer was into horticulture and dairy farming. Ndlovu was allocated this farm by the DLC in 2003. He brought 10 cattle from his communal home at Sigola. By the time of fieldwork in 2006 his herd had grown to 35 with an additional 5 dairy cows. He cultivates only 7 hectares out of a possible 35 hectares irrigable land. Ndlovu mentioned that he was aware that the

⁹⁵ Interview with Agricultural Extension officers of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts 2005 to 2007

number of cattle he had was over the land carrying capacity but had no intention of destocking. In fact when I asked the question on the land carrying capacity and his large herd he responded thus:

My son I am an Ndebele man and an Ndebele man is a farmer if he has cattle. Yes the land is good for irrigation, but I cannot renege from our custom of keeping cattle. The problem with these farms is that they are small. What I need is a bigger farm that will allow me to keep more livestock. I do not trust crop farming alone because since I came here I have been struggling to fix boreholes to irrigate my crop, furthermore the rains are not falling. The little water I get from my boreholes could be better utilized by watering my cattle. The 7 hectares under vegetables really is a matter of following instructions from the land committee that these farms should be seen green by passerby's since I am near the main road. Otherwise I would turn this small farm into a ranch", and laughed loudly (Ndlovu, 12/05/ 2007).

From the narration by Ndlovu, it is evident that the land reform programme is based on designed programme to enhance the livelihoods of resettled farmers in Umzingwane. The reality is that people of this area believe in livestock farming; crop farming to them is a secondary activity. In Ndlovu's case the issue is limited hectares available and extensive hectares required. A2 resettlements are based on a particular model of agriculture. As we have seen in the case of Ndlovu's farm, the previous owner practised horticulture and dairy farming on the Essexvale farm that has been subdivided. Because of his socialization, Ndlovu cannot call himself a farmer without cattle. Cattle farming thus is an important activity for people of southern Matabeleland be they in communal areas, A1 or A2 farmers. My argument here is that the design of resettlement models at national level has failed to improve their livelihoods. Although livestock is one source of livelihood, it is clear from case study evidence that it occupies a high position in livelihood strategies. Livestock are clearly still part of their livelihood strategies, they have not had that taken away rather the land reform programme has not allowed them to improve or expand their livestock farming.

Yet another A2 farmer in the dry areas of southern Gwanda district shared his concerns about the viability of A2 the Model in this part of the country: Mr. Mpofu an active supporter of the ruling party had these strong words about his farm size:

My son I actively participate in the land committee meetings and have raised concern on the non-viability of 400-1000ha per A2 farmer in this region, but what we hear is that the hectarage was decided at National level and there is nothing the Land Officer can do to increase the hectarage. This is unacceptable

because surely one cannot graze 100 cattle on this hectarage without causing environment degradation. Traditionally we are extensive livestock keepers hence we need more than a mere 400 to 1000ha for us to benefit from this land programme; otherwise I see a lot of the new A2 farmers resorting once more to poach grazing like what we did during the era of white commercial farmers... There is plenty of idle land but the state is not forth-coming to alleviate our plight. We used to graze our cattle at 'emlageni' during the dry months and thought the land reform would spare us the burden of travelling long distances to graze our cattle at 'emlageni'. If this issue is not addressed immediately we will be left with no choice but to start over again the 'lagisa' system probably in these unoccupied farms (Mpofu, 12/08/05).

The above cases highlight a major policy deficiency toward land distribution in Southern Matabeleland. For decades people of southern Matabeleland have survived on livestock and had developed adaptive strategies in relation to livestock farming⁹⁶. Fieldwork revealed that these people have adaptive strategies such as multi-species livestock husbandry. This implies that southern Matabeleland residents keep livestock such as cattle, goats, donkeys and sheep. Small stock such as sheep and goat are normally disposed off easily to meet immediate livelihoods. In this case, communities exchange livestock such as goats and sheep for either cash or grain since the climate does not favour cropping. In some cases small stock could be used to acquire cattle through barter trade. In my personal experience as a development worker in the region, during the drought years people sold livestock to purchase essentials such as maize meal, sugar, soap and salt. In order to cushion their kinsmen some households loaned cattle to relatives so as to get milk, manure and draught power; however the kinsmen were /are not allowed to dispose of the livestock. In fact some households preferred to sell cattle kept by their kinsmen than those in their kraals.⁹⁷

In some households during the late 1980s and the 1990s, a significant number of women had taken over as head of households in rural areas probably due to the great number of spouses lost in the Gukurahundi massacres, a common aftermath of conflict (chapter, 2). With a large number of extension services at local level co-ordinated by ward community co-ordinators who were predominantly women, the participation of women in 'development' projects saw women participate to a larger extent in the formally male dominated livestock industry. Women became 'master farmers' in livestock in their own right and again as I have pointed out, those who were now heads of their households enjoyed that status. As is demonstrated in

⁹⁶ See also ENDA Zimbabwe 1995 survey.

⁹⁷ One of my informants Xolani Sibanda told me that he would rather sell 'inkomo zamasiso' (loan cattle) rather than those in his possession, i.e. kept at his kraal.

(chapter 7), wives whose husbands were migrant workers performed all the men's 'household tasks' including the herding, watering, vaccinating and at times disposal of livestock. In some of my informants' households, wives left behind by migrant workers could sell livestock with the consent of the husband, and consent could be sought through telephone calls or faxes.⁹⁸

Gender aside, in order to survive and manage their livestock southern Matabeleland residents traditionally practised a grazing system referred to as '*lagisa*' implying sending out cattle to common land along the Shashe and Thuli Rivers. As illustrated by Mpofu in the above case, people grazed their livestock as a unit and the management of that activity was the responsibility of every household head. The chief or headmen would decree that from July to November livestock could be sent to '*emlageni*' and that ruling was followed. The constraining factor was the long distance to '*emlageni*'. Mpofu's response and that of my other informants suggests that people did not mind being allocated 'common land' as an alternative model of land redistribution in this area. I therefore argue that the FTLRRP could have improved rural livelihoods of southern Matabeleland residents had it followed the '*lagisa*' principle rather than the current A2 resettlement model. The '*lagisa*' principle is accommodative and does not segregate on political affiliation. Yet bold measures need to be taken to curb stock theft as the '*lagisa*' principle will demand herdsmen/herd boys who of late have been pre-occupied with other off-farm activities to earn a living. This might be one of the weaknesses of the '*lagisa*' system as it would require the need to plan taking such issues into account. It is worth noting that livestock is a source of wealth and investment among residents of this region and therefore a programme that has not given the necessary grazing land to enhance their farming is futile.

"Stock theft is one of the major setbacks for a successful restocking exercise," were the words of Councillor *Mdaka* in 2006 when he narrated problems and challenges the Lushongwe community face.

Figure 4:1 Cattle Dip tank used as a loading bay by cattle rustlers

⁹⁸ Authors personal experience as a development worker in the region in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s.




Photo: Author 2005

The above photograph is of a disused dip tank in the Thuli farm close to Thuli River used by cattle rustlers to load stolen cattle at night. The dip tank is located on the banks of Thuli River. Here gold panners also ply their trade and some locals have indicated that some gold panners actually engage in stock theft.

4:4 Livestock problems and marketing

Stock theft is one of the many problems faced by livestock owners in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The following Table demonstrates the magnitude of some key livestock farming related problems

Table 4:3 Animal Related Problems



Source: World Food Programme Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment August 2006

Data presented in the above table indicates that lack of dipping chemicals is the most acute problem faced by livestock farmers followed by animal diseases as a result of none dipping. Although stock theft is ranked sixth in the hierarchy of animal related problems, fieldwork indicated that it is gradually increasing despite the launch of ‘Operation eradicate cattle rustling’ (interview with police officer May 2007). Some villagers revealed that gold buyers are also perpetrators of stock theft, a scenario that has seen rising animosity among gold panners, gold buyers and the local villagers. Shortage of grazing land’s fourth ranking can be explained by evidence given on the section on abundance of grazing land in A1 resettlements whereby a few resettleses have livestock. As spelt out, there is much unutilized land in these areas yet communal farmers’ livestock is overcrowded in a few acquired farms (former Georgia farm).

Fieldwork evidence indicates that cattle loan schemes have been used by both Government and NGOs but have not addressed the ‘real’ needs of the rural poor. My informants said the rich and well connected benefit from these schemes at the expense of the poor. Most of my informants acknowledged that they had given up applying for these loans since they seemed impossible to attain. They argue that they have been filling in form after form, moving from office to office but nothing materializes. One informant even noted the words of the late Vice

President Joshua Nkomo when he said that Matabeleland South is not even in region IV, but in 'region VII' suitable for farming livestock. This informant understood those words to mean that any governmental or non-governmental assistance to the people of Matabeleland South should focus on livestock rearing. The provincial traditional leadership has proposed to government the establishment of '*Isibaya senkosi*' the king's kraal as opposed to the national concept of '*isiphala senkosi*', the king's granary because of the high failure rate of crops in the province⁹⁹

Another institutional deficiency that has seen residents viewing the land reform programme as lacking in mitigating their plight, are the extension policies currently in place. In the first 14 years of independence animal health policy dictated that the Department of Veterinary Services provide animal medicines for free and later on at subsidized costs¹⁰⁰. Of course this created a dependency syndrome. With the policy shift to 100% purchase by cattle keepers, and the escalating costs of medicine, the majority of cattle owners have failed to dose their cattle as advised by extension workers. This has resulted in a number of livestock deaths¹⁰¹. My informants argue that if the State could provide seed packs as a mitigating measure in cropping regions, why not provide livestock medicines and inputs in a livestock region?

I find the argument above raised by residents of this region valid. Ferguson (1990) argued that the development apparatus failed to achieve the targets because of failure to identify the interests of the target group. Here the interests of people of this region are livestock husbandry more than cropping. One of my informants even suggested that the idea of 'private buyers' deciding on the price of livestock had resulted in many people not disposing of their livestock. This has been aggravated by buyers who are usually the same elite who hold vast tracts of land acquired through the FTLRRP and whose focus is to maximize wealth and exercise power. Those that sell cattle do so through well known 'brokers' who are usually locally based and are well known to the villagers. The villagers trust these 'brokers' and

⁹⁹ *Isibaya senkosi* is a new concept that has been raised by traditional leaders in Matabeleland region that will see the chief having kraal a(herd) of livestock contributed to it by well wishers to enable the chief to assist his vulnerable subjects in times of need. This concept is a modification or adaptation of the traditional concept *isiphala senkosi*, the king's granary that was a source of grain for the vulnerable in the king's or chief's area in traditional African society.

¹⁰⁰ See World Food Programme 2006 livestock report in Zimbabwe

¹⁰¹ The introduction of a dipping levy had seen a lot of communal areas livestock owners avoiding dipping their cattle as they cannot afford the fees charged. During fieldwork I found out that the Department of Veterinary Services was literally not running any dip tanks in the study area and had advised keen livestock keepers to buy dip sprays for their individual herds. Dip tanks were malfunctioning in most areas visited and major reason being the prohibitive costs of dipping chemicals.

usually negotiate their deals prior to meeting the potential buyers who are usually known butcher men in close by towns and service centres. These ‘brokers’ have contacts with the buyers and the cattle sellers and they earn commission for their services. Little (1992) also argued the same in East Africa where the ‘brokers’ were usually from the local area and knew the herders and the townsmen (buyers). In Little’s study area, ‘brokers’ do not actually buy cattle but match the buyer with a potential seller. As in my findings, in Little’s (1992) study the ‘brokers’ receive commission for their services. This also guards against the risk of buying stolen cattle. My informants argued that livestock is also kept for social ceremonies such as lobola and rituals; and are as well symbols of ancestral spirits. Therefore selling livestock, especially cattle by some of my informants is only done as a last option.

Ferguson found that the people of Thaba Tseka (Lesotho) would not sell cattle even if the buyer offered more money, the reason being that they value livestock more than money. One of Ferguson’s informants even noted that he would rather engage in some other activity to raise money than to sell his ox (Ferguson, 1990:146). He concluded that “it is clear, then, that the fundamental fact is not that livestock are very useful economic investments...or that they are greatly loved and valued for their symbolic connotations...but that livestock and cash are not freely interconvertible. There exists what one might call a one way barrier: cash can always be converted into cattle through purchase; cattle, however, cannot be converted to cash through sale, except under specific conditions, conditions usually specified as a great and serious need for money which cannot be raised in any other way, a situation arising from an emergency or from poverty” (Ferguson, 1990:146-147). In the case of southern Matabeleland cattle can be converted into cash in the event that a serious need has arisen; otherwise small stock like goats and sheep can be easily disposed of to meet everyday subsistence needs. Women pastoralists seem to be increasing as more men spend longer periods away from their households as migrant workers and women take over their livestock chores in a dramatic shift that has been encouraged by the state’s quota for women in the current land reform programme. Some cattle owners in Gwanda and Umzingwane sell their cattle at cattle sales organised by the Rural District Council and usually conducted quarterly. Here buyers bid for cattle in an auction format and the highest bidder secures the beast. However, individuals are free to sell their cattle to private buyers but they have to get police clearance as a way of curbing stock-theft. Private sale prices depend on mutual agreement

between the cattle owner and the buyer, and my informants noted that they usually sold to local butchers who paid better prices than the RDCs cattle auction sales.

4:5 Cropping livelihoods

Scoones (2009) argues that there is no single story of land reform in Zimbabwe: the story is mixed-by region, by type of scheme, by settler. Taking evidence from Masvingo province, Scoones acknowledges that on the so called A1 schemes (smallholder farming), where there is low capital investment and a reliance on local labour, settlers have done reasonably well, particularly in the wetter parts of the province. Households have cleared land, planted crops and invested in new assets, many hiring in labour from nearby communal areas (Scoones, 2009:1); which is a sign of kinship ties with those left in communal areas. Within these new resettlement areas, there has been a rapid socio-economic stratification-some do well while others struggle. Some have left, often because of misfortune, ill health...although overall attrition rates have been small (Scoones, 2009:1). Scoones further states that while no one denies the operation of political patronage in the allocation of land since 2000, particularly in the high value farms of the Highveld near Harare, the overall pattern is not simply one of elite capture. He gives evidence for example in Masvingo where about 60% of those in A1 plots were classified as 'ordinary farmers'. In Scoones' opinion, these were people who joined the land invasion from nearby communal areas, and had been allocated land by the District Land Committees under the FTLRRP; and he argues that these people were not a rich or politically connected elite but poor, rural people in need of land and keen to finally gain the fruits of independence.

In contrast, A2 farms were largely allocated on patron-client relationship (Scoones, 2009) as the model was viewed as more market oriented than the A1 model which was viewed as deliberately promoted to decongest communal areas, and also to enable access to more arable land for the resource poor farmers. However I found a different clientele in the case of southern Matabeleland. Masvingo had predominantly been a strong hold for the ruling ZANUPF party and the fact that such a large number of people were allocated A1 plots was not surprising¹⁰². In the case of Matabeleland where the politics of domination and marginalization was prevalent, A1 plots were predominantly allocated to the active, cohesive

¹⁰² The Presidential (2002) and parliamentary (2000, 2005) election results indicate overwhelming rural support for ZANUPF in Masvingo province, whereas the same results show a sharp decline in Matabeleland.

and passive supporters of the state. The same can be said of A2 farms whereby the active and cohesive supporters of the state got hold of expropriated farms irrespective of having the necessary resources to invest in commercial farming. I agree with Scoones' findings that a large proportion of those allocated A2 farms came from the ranks of civil servants, the army, police, business people and politicians. This is true in Matabeleland as the findings that follow illustrate. One major observation in the A2 farms is lack of investment by those who are not so resource rich such as civil servants, especially the low level extension workers.

Gudeman (2001) argues that a market economy is more concerned with trade and exchange of goods and services. Therefore are agricultural practices in the research area driven by community needs or the needs of the market or both? Do people in this region engage in farming for subsistence needs or for commercial reasons? Are those allocated A1 and A2 plots farming according to the 'designs' of the resettlement models, or are new goals and objectives set by the resettled? Are people of Gwanda and Umzingwane whether resettled or communal, engaging in sustainable agricultural development? Agrarian studies tend to view smallholder rural farmers as basically concerned with the politics of the belly, but recent studies have shown that the rural farmer is keen to enter the market economy, and given resources, would strive to produce both for subsistence and the market. Yet the development apparatus view the African countryside as twofold, as nothing but an ensemble of transactions in a market place, and as a collection of households enmeshed in a non-market milieu of kinship based relations (Mamdani, 1996).

4:5:1 Is it land for the sake of it?

Umzingwane falls mostly in natural region IV with an annual rainfall averaging 650 mm. A large area around Esigodini the district centre, has been a source of horticultural and dairy products for the district inhabitants and those in Bulawayo. During fieldwork I managed to interview twenty new settled farmers in this prime farming area. The findings revealed that horticultural production has gone down since the takeover of farms previously owned by whites. A good example is the *Ntshonalanga* farm which was allocated to the youth under the supervision of the Ministry of Youth Development. This farm was abandoned by the youth contrary to information given by the Provincial Youth Officer who cited a wrangle with the Governor on the ownership of this farm; the DLC alludes to the point that the youths

abandoned the farm¹⁰³. Yet another reason was cited that the majority of youth who took over the farm in the year 2000 did not come from the district. After selling what was left by the previous owner, a Mr. Coulson, they shared the proceeds and migrated to their respective homes and some joined gold panners. The farm storerooms were rented out by gold panners¹⁰⁴. Horticultural sheds and green houses are in a bad state as vital infrastructure had gone to waste. Asked about the way forward the DLC could not give a satisfactory explanation. There seems to be a political wrangle on how and who should work the farm. It is yet to be seen what will happen to this idle productive land.

There are a number of such farms in this farming area that have seen productive land gone to waste. Some of the new farmers like Bernard Ncube of plot number 26 Glenora park have failed to maintain production at previous levels on the farm though when I interviewed him in 2006, he acknowledged that his life had improved significantly as a result of this plot. But from observations and discussions with the DLC, Ncube has let the committee down as he has failed to keep the promise of engaging in intensive horticultural production. At most Ncube had only cultivated 3 hectares out of a gross arable average of 35 hectares and the homestead which was upmarket when he moved in has deteriorated in value at an alarming pace. When I was invited by the DLC to assist them evaluate some A2 farms for issuance of 99 year leases, it was overt that Ncube did not meet the required standard. Of course in November 2006 when the first batch of 99 year leases was issued by the president, he was not awarded that entitlement. This to me shows how some people employed 'big push' tactics to get A2 farms. It also demonstrates the lack of resources available to the individual and the government inability to provide resources at least in the initial stages of the resettlement. With the exception of a small number of farmers in the sampled A2 farms, most have turned commercial land to subsistence land use as it were. The findings reveal that these farmers are content with ploughing enough for subsistence yet the resettlement model demands them to be market oriented in their farming activities.

Nevertheless some farmers in the research area have shown great commitment and innovation in their farming endeavors. A good example in Umzingwane is Mr. and Mrs. Mafuwe who were allocated lot 1 Windmill in the same prime horticultural area around Esigodini. The

¹⁰³ Field interviews and observation at Ntshonalanga farm, 2006.

¹⁰⁴ A visit to the farm in January 2007 I discovered that the storerooms were deserted and was told that the gold panners had been driven off the farm by police under operation Chikorokoza Chapera

Mafuwes' were allocated this 81ha plot in 2002; during that time Mr. Mafuwe was a senior police officer in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The two spouses acknowledge that they are core- owners of this plot; the wife is the manager of the farm, but because of a lack of agricultural skills, a former foreman who used to work in this farm prior to the FTLRRP was recalled.

Mafuwe A2 plot

This couple employs 15 permanent workers and seasonally employs around 30 workers as casual labour depending on the types of crops in the fields. Although they have 24 cattle, their major activity is horticulture. When they took over the farm, they set out to maintain and improve existing infrastructure. Asked about what new developments they have made since they moved into this farm, Mrs. Mafuwe had this to say;

I think my life style has changed for the better since I took occupancy of this plot. I managed to buy a brand new car in 2005 and managed to send my children to top class schools. We managed to buy additional drippers and sprinklers for irrigating our horticultural crops. As I speak now we have over 12ha under irrigation. We have a variety of vegetables and also winter wheat. This was made possible by re-investing proceeds from our previous crop on borehole rehabilitation (Mafuwe, 15/11/06).

She further contends that there were four working boreholes when they occupied this farm and they managed to rehabilitate the fifth one. Mrs. Mafuwe also highlighted the fact that according to AREX Officers, they have at least 25 ha of irrigable land, so her future plans are to increase the hectareage under irrigation to at least 20 ha.

On problems encountered, she cited the unavailability of inputs and implements when they were needed urgently. She cites a shortage of fertilizer as an example. She also complained of high tariffs by Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) and Zimbabwe National Water Authority.

“These two bodies’ tariffs are exorbitant and if not regularized will keep us out of business”.

She also complained of inadequate land to engage in livestock rearing. Already livestock on this plot is above the required farm size and livestock occupancy ratio.

From observations, the Mafuwe's are capable farmers who deserve a 99 year lease so as to work the land securely. They are real full time farmers who probably deserve a larger farm. Mr. and Mrs. Mafuwe were given a 99 year lease by President Robert Mugabe in November 2006. The Mafuwe's are excited and have great plans for their new land. They agree that since they have secured tenure for this piece of land they believe they are now in a position to borrow more financial resources to boost their horticultural activities. They have however not yet applied for a farming loan using the 99 year lease as collateral. The Mafuwe case shows how some farmers have income from the farm and how committed they are to farming.

Canaan Ndlovu (Ngwenya)

In May 2006, I had the opportunity to conduct interviews in the A2 farms in Umzingwane district. The first of the 5 respondents in these farms was Canaan Ndlovu. Ndlovu occupies plot no 1 lot 35 in the surroundings of Esigodini town. His plot measures 100 ha and prior to his occupation, the previous owner used to do horticulture and dairy farming. Ndlovu also embarked on horticulture and dairy farming.

Ndlovu moved into this farm in 2003 after he was allocated the farm by Umzingwane District Land Committee. Ndlovu left his communal home at Sigola communal land to his eldest son who works in South Africa. He has 9 children; of whom one passed away in 2005. He has constructed a five roomed brick house on the plot and stays with his family in the farm. He grows maize, peas, vegetables, sorghum and sunflower on 7 ha of arable land. He also keeps 35 cattle of which 10 are dairy cows which he milks twice a day. These 10 cows produce an average of 84 litres of milk per day which he sells to a ready market at Esigodini town centre. When he moved into this farm in 2003, he brought in 20 head of cattle. Currently Ndlovu has 200 chicken and 5 sheep in addition to the 35 cattle.

When I asked him about the large number of livestock he has on the farm compared to the land carrying capacity, he contends;

"My son the land I currently hold is not enough to sustain the herd of livestock I hold. I need more land."

Asked to comment on the FTLRRP, its merits and demerits, Ndlovu was agreeable that the FTLRRP was a noble programme which needed a lot of individual commitment:

To continue politicizing the LRP will not benefit both the government and individual farm owners. We need to be focused and long term sighted, otherwise if we continue allocating and re allocating productive land to people who are not committed to a farming lifestyle we will end up without productive land for ourselves and future generations. For instance myself, I have benefited a lot from the LRP; even my way of life has changed tremendously (Ndlovu, 15/12/06)

He also mentioned that compared to Sigola his new settlement is better off. This farm has uplifted his living standard, and he is now capable of sending his four children to better schools; in fact three of them are at boarding schools. From the farm proceeds since 2003, he has managed to construct a five bedroomed house, bought additional irrigation pipes and resuscitated one borehole. He would prefer to embark on intensive horticulture production but two of the four boreholes are malfunctioning. He needs capital to resuscitate them.

From general observation, Ndlovu is a committed farmer who is keen to improve his plot. He currently employs three full-time farm workers, and seasonally or occasionally hires casual labourers. As I interviewed him, there were nine workers who were busy cultivating cabbages, peas and rape. The family members were busy shelling maize, approximately a gross harvest of 20 tons. Ndlovu sells his horticultural products to women traders in Esigodini market stalls and some come as far as Bulawayo for the greens. Unlike Bakkie farmers observed by Banairt (2000), Ndlovu is resident in his plot and manages the day to day operations on the plot. He is one of those who is not an urban entrepreneur who occupy most of the under-utilised farms in this prime farming area.

Ndlovu is one of the A2 farmers who were appraised by (DLC) in May 2006 for leasehold status. By the time of assessment he held an offer letter as proof of ownership of this plot. Ndlovu is one of the exemplary new black commercial farmers who if given a little more resources could effectively and productively use allocated land.

In February 2007 I visited Mr. Ndlovu on his plot; through observation and discussions the following issues have transpired:

Ndlovu was one of the lucky A2 farmers who were given the first batch of 99 year leases. As shown by his hard work as reported in interviews held in 2006, Ndlovu deserved some form of tenure security as he had proved beyond doubt that he was a capable and committed new farmer. Ndlovu has now embarked on a cattle fattening project to control grazing and sells his

stock either to Grills or the Cold Storage Company. He however complains of low cattle prices compared to the costs of cattle medications. The shortage of cattle drugs and doses has been problematic and at times he has to source foreign currency at the parallel market to purchase these medicines either in Botswana or South Africa.

From general observation, Ndlovu's way of life has improved tremendously and he has also effected many improvements on his plot. He had purchased more irrigation pipes and has rehabilitated the two malfunctioning boreholes when I visited his plot in 2006. He has also increased the hectarage under horticultural crops. He sells his produce in bulk to the Bulawayo independent market and also supplies big chain supermarkets like OK Zimbabwe and TM. Local vegetable vendors continue to order produce from his plot for re-sale at Esigodini District Centre.

From the farms researched under the A2 model, the above two cases are examples of black commercial farmers who have benefited and utilized the land as per the purpose of the model. As indicated earlier farms like that of Ntshonalanga and that of Bernard Ncube have not been successful, thus prejudicing potential revenue for the state and affordable horticultural produce for the local and urban market. This area prior to the FTLRP was one of the major suppliers of horticultural produce to the city of Bulawayo. Given support and tenure security and extra resources, I argue that emergent black commercial farmers like Mafuwe and Ndlovu can produce as much as the previous former white commercial farmers. However, this study has found that the majority of the A2 farmers in this prime farm land are either employed in Bulawayo or Harare or running other businesses in the cities¹⁰⁵. Literature on commercial agriculture indicates that commercial agriculture is a full time activity and requires hands on management. Most of the researched A2 farms that did not perform commercially were being run by absentee farmers and in most cases I found farm managers, who had neither the agricultural skills nor expertise to plan, implement and manage horticultural production. In a majority of cases relatives of the absentee farm owner were resident in the farm just practising subsistence farming. There is need for further investigation on why these discrepancies relate to success and lack of success in A2 farms.

The declining horticultural activity in the study area has seen vegetable vendors paying more to order for resale in some communal settlements dotted around the farming area. This has

¹⁰⁵ See Banairt 2000, "Bakkie farmers"

reduced consumption levels at local level and increased incidences of malnutrition and child mortality. Informants in surrounding resettlements and communal lands also echoed the problem of expensive vegetables which has resulted in some families resorting to a single meal per day.

4:6 Cropping livelihoods in the villages

In communal and A1 settlements most people engage in dry land farming for subsistence purposes. It is common in the communal and A1 settlements to find people reaping nothing for four consecutive years, due to drought as was the case in the years 2000 to 2007 in both Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The solution to the farming woes of communal and A1 inhabitants is to engage in irrigation farming as the rain pattern is erratic and unreliable.

It is worth noting that though people have different opinions on the land reform programme in both A1 and communal lands, the majority support the land re-distribution programme to correct colonial imbalances but have different opinion in the way the current programme was carried out. In the Ndebele tradition for instance grown up boys move out of their fathers' compounds to start their own homesteads. The boy does not just decide to go and settle of his own accord but has to follow custom. For instance, the father has to perform a ritual *Ukutshaya ihlahla*¹⁰⁶ In addition to *Ukutshaya ihlahla* the father or uncle arranges with a traditional doctor to perform a ritual called *Ukubethela umuzi*.¹⁰⁷ In one case during fieldwork a head man in a communal land noted that most of those who went to resettlements did not follow the custom of inhabiting a new place hence quite a number abandoned their plots because of perceptions of evil spirits in their new found land. Some even in the good 2005/06 farming season did not reap enough because they did not perform rituals to appease the spirits. According to one of my informants, an old aged resettled A1 headman acknowledged that people in resettlement areas are more concerned with the political aspects of life at the expense of tradition and hence he noted that without a proper cultural procedure to thank the

¹⁰⁶ *Ukutshaya ihlahla* is an Ndebele ritual which is performed by the father at the site of the son's new homestead and fields. It is believed that the ritual is set to inform the ancestors about a new home which needs to be protected against evil spirits and witches. See also field notes e.g. Mkhululi Dube, Jorum Moyo, Gogo Mansingo

¹⁰⁷ *Ukubethela umuzi* is an Ndebele ritual which is performed by a traditional doctor to strengthen the powers of the ancestral spirits to protect the household against any misfortunes.

ancestors for giving their leaders powers to take over white owned land, the land question will continue to haunt the nation.¹⁰⁸

Another phenomenon worth noting in crop cultivation in communal areas is the emphasis on crops grown in the study area. Although maize does not fare well under dry land farming, residents of both Gwanda and Umzingwane do not give up as its their staple food. Thick porridge *isitshwala* is the main diet of residents in these areas and my conversation with Phathisa Nyathi, (2007) a renowned historian he argued that prior to colonization people in this part of the country used to grow sorghum and millet. Sorghum was pounded to meal and used to make thick porridge but later on with the advent of colonization, the introduction of maize by the Portuguese (Moore 2005) and the insistence by colonialists to increase maize output for both export and livestock feed, the hectarage under these traditional crops began to shrink at an alarming pace. The introduction of grinding mills only capable of grinding maize also discouraged people from planting sorghum and millet in large hectarage as women were relieved from the taxing job of pounding millet or sorghum using stick and mortar. Millet was mainly grown for beer brewing during traditional ceremonies and other cultural activities. In the study area people still grow these seed varieties but to a lesser extent. With commercialization of traditional beer brewing and the subsequent packaging of traditional beer, it is now uncommon to find people brewing traditional beer for sale.

Yet this research has shown that locals continue growing maize even though it is not suitable under rain fed farming in the two districts because of erratic rains and droughts.¹⁰⁹ It is worthwhile to note that from 1995 to 2007, the study area only had two good crop farming seasons which casts doubt on the sustainability of crop farming in Gwanda and Umzingwane let alone Matabeleland South Province as an activity to address food security. Agriculturalists believe crop farming in this region, especially maize can only be grown sustainably through irrigation otherwise the solution to this region is livestock farming. May be more work by Agricultural extension workers to encourage people to increase the farming of sorghum and millet. This study also supports the sentiments raised by these agriculturalists as most

¹⁰⁸ I interviewed Jorum Moyo an 86 year old headman responsible for Kondwane A1 settlement-UMRDC-2006. Mwali is the traditional god believed to be resident at a shrine called Njelele in Matobo hills-Matobo district. See also Alexander et al (2000), One hundred years in the dark forests of Matabeleland

¹⁰⁹ Data collected show that in both communal areas and resettlements respondents and informants have been beneficiaries of government and NGOs seed and fertilizer handouts but the crop yield has hardly lasted some household through to the next season. Some respondents acknowledged selling seed and fertilizer to buy maize meal.

informants felt that if ever they are to be given aid by donors or government to improve their livelihoods; the programme should revolve around livestock rearing. One informant even responded by telling me that the community of Gwanda South could make a better living if more dams were built and more farms allocated for livestock ranching rather than settling people to practice crop farming in this dry region.

4:7 Conclusions

A notable observation by the Matabeleland South ten year development plan (2003) is that in Umzingwane district a large area, which was previously used for cattle ranching, has been turned into A1 plots of which dry land farming is the major farming activity casting doubt on the sustainability of downstream dams supplying the city of Bulawayo with water. Hence, the need for land reform to be closely linked to agrarian practices and not to agrarian reform in areas such as Matabeleland South. Land redistribution is a programme capable of enhancing rural livelihoods if the state identifies the interests of beneficiaries before deciding on the distribution model. Misreading the landscape and misrepresenting peoples' interests brings a danger of embarking on programmes and projects that are not sustainable. People of southern Matabeleland are pastoralists and therefore could enhance their livelihoods if more land is made available for grazing than for village settlements. The Zimbabwe state and its development apparatus' relationship and interaction with residents of southern Matabeleland in the past twenty eight years has been characterized by mistrust and the politics of domination, a scenario that has resulted in the region lagging behind in development terms compared to other regions of the country.

The lack of development and barriers to successful land reform in this region it can be concluded, is a result of the absence of clear policy on rangeland management and livestock support. The state tends to replicate old practices such as top-down development models and alliances, which keep vested interests in place, particularly the need to centralise development planning and decision making. Furthermore the failure of stock owners to significantly increase access to pastorage has impeded their ability to enhance their stock-based livelihoods, and this despite more land being available in southern Matabeleland. There is a real desire at the local level to make agrarian livelihoods work better but the states one size fits all land reform programme and that agrarian reform is crop production has impacted negatively on livestock production and other agrarian livelihoods. This has led to the state

imposing agricultural models such as command agriculture (chapter 5) that has further reduced the chances of locals benefitting from state initiated land reform initiatives. The political dominance and the tendency by the state to bring development initiatives top-down has forced many local people to engage in off-farm activities such as gold panning (chapter 6) and migration (chapter 7).

Chapter 5

Command agriculture and its dilemma

5:1 Introduction

Irrigation farming has been viewed by the people of Matabeleland as the most viable among crop farming activities. Even during the Rhodesian government, irrigation development was promoted in southern Matabeleland as a reaction to the arid climatic conditions of the region. Most of these schemes through to the post independence period have been regarded as ‘community schemes’, and successive governments for years provided extension services and markets. These schemes provided a livelihood to the irrigators, and also supplied towns and rural dwellers with horticultural produce. Crops such as maize and wheat were grown with the intention of supplying the market and for domestic consumption. The Grain Marketing Board was the major buyer of wheat and maize. These schemes operated through irrigation committees that received advice from Agricultural extension workers. This chapter provides the background to Makwe irrigation scheme and its operations. It also analyses how command agriculture ‘operation Maguta’ has changed the patterns of farming in the scheme. In fact command agriculture is viewed as little more than collectivisation of community irrigation farming. The interesting aspect of this case study is that irrigation development has been militarised and the locals’ encounters with the soldiers have revived memories of the days of the Gukurahundi. In addition to military involvement the implementation of the programme has seen delays in tillage services, input supplies and marketing of produce.

5:2 Why Command Agriculture?

Five years into the FTLRRP and as a reaction to what government claimed was the gross underutilization of irrigation schemes in the country, in 2005 they launched “Operation Maguta/Inala” to which I refer in this chapter as ‘command agriculture’. Command agriculture is an agrarian strategy adopted by the Zimbabwe government as one of several strategies in its broad land reform policy framework. It is said to be geared toward increasing cereal production to boost national food reserves. The army is implementing this programme. This agricultural model has targeted irrigation schemes nationwide. Command agriculture was planned and implemented without consultation with irrigation plot holders, in this study,

the Makwe community. The ‘command’ style in which the army arrived at Makwe caused some shocks and stresses to plot holders whose market gardening activities were destroyed by the army to pave way for cereal farming. The arrival of soldiers turned this lucrative venture and a source of livelihood for Makwe plot holders and villagers of Lushongwe and Wenlock, into a ‘collective’ whereby the former now ‘farm’ the irrigation rather than their individual plots in the irrigation scheme. I view command agriculture as one of those top down agrarian strategy that fail to recognize local knowledge in development planning, and in the process reduce people’s livelihoods.

In agricultural and development literature ‘command agriculture’ has been associated with the socialist mode of production (Verdery, 2003). Here agricultural collectivisation and the involvement of the state in the production process are regarded as the key to improved output. The socialist mode of production in the former Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold war era saw vast individual land parcels pulled together in an endeavour to promote collective and co-operative farming. By pulling land parcels together this mode of production was believed will be easier for the ‘producers’ to obtain state services such as inputs, extension services and centralised markets at low costs. However over the years that the reduced production levels and the relations of production that developed it can be argued convinced the authorities in countries such as the former Soviet Union and China to rethink ‘command agriculture’. By the late 1980s and early 1990s most former socialist countries had abandoned this type of agriculture in favour of family farms. It can be argued that dramatically decreasing levels of production on large state run farms convinced the authorities in these countries that state controlled farming enterprises can never be as efficient as private farms. However it is unfortunate that Zimbabwe is now learning the hard way what other countries had already learned.

The state rational for embarking on this ‘commandist’ form of irrigation farming it is argued has been necessitated by low levels of cereal production in the irrigation schemes, resettlement schemes (both A1 and A2) and in the communal areas. The following Figures indicate the decline in agricultural production particularly maize and other cereals between 2000 and 2005:




Figure 5.1 Zimbabwe Maize Production and Area Harvested for 2000-2005 Period

Source: World Food Programme, 2006.

The figure above shows a marked decline in the area harvested from 1,5million hectares in 2000 to just above a million hectares by 2005. Maize production also fell from above 2million metric tonnes to a low of 500000Mt by 2002 and picked up to about 900000Mt by 2005. The figure below shows the overall maize production in the first five years of the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme




Figure 5.2 Zimbabwe Overall Maize Production Estimates 2000-2005

Source: World Food Programme 2006

Wheat production as indicated in the figure below remained constant in the farming years 2000 and 2001, declined in 2002, picked up in 2003 and declined in subsequent years.




Figure 5.3 Zimbabwe Total Cereal Production 2000-2005 Period

Source: World Food Programme 2006

However, according to the WFP statistics of subsequent years,¹¹⁰ cereal production declined to lower levels leaving a large deficit for both domestic consumption and export. With these statistics at the government's disposal and in an endeavour to curb this rapid decline in cereal production and increase food security, the government embarked on what it termed 'operation Maguta', a land reform strategy aimed at increasing cereal production. The major targets of this land reform strategy were mostly community irrigation schemes and the main overseers of the whole process were the soldiers of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

From a national perspective, command agriculture was first announced by the reserve bank governor in May 2005 when he presented his quarterly monetary policy statement. Gideon Gono emphasised in this monetary policy statement that:

¹¹⁰ See for instance the WFP Vulnerability Assessment reports for Zimbabwe, 2006, 2007 and 2008.

*“Command agriculture seeks to optimize output by requiring a minimum input for food or export crops, and is central to agriculture as well as general economic recovery”.*¹¹¹

The Government’s command agriculture model intended to place 1,5million hectares under maize production in the 2005/06 farming season and produce 2,2million tonnes of maize.¹¹²

The Command Agriculture Joint Operation Command had projected a budget of Z\$15trillion (Z\$15billion revalued), but by November 2005, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, reported that Government had failed to raise the money; and hence command agriculture was referred to in the same Parliamentary Committee report as “noble on paper (but) a stillbirth in practise.”¹¹³

Operation Maguta is a national programme and hence different people view it differently. Literature reviewed reveals that it is now a norm in government circles to refer to any aggressive policy as an ‘operation’. There have been operation Murambatsvina (clean the filth or restore order¹¹⁴), operation Garikai/Hlani kuhle (reconstruction), operation Maguta, operation project Sunrise (see also Solidarity Peace Trust April 2006); and of course operation Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile (operation to end gold panning). Besides the adverse report by the parliamentary portfolio committee on Land, Land Reform and Resettlement most pro government elite and academics have painted a glorious picture of the whole operation. Gideon Gono the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe noted in the Bulawayo Chronicle that:

*“We applaud the Zimbabwe Defence Forces for taking up the challenge by strapping their guns on their backs and rolling up their sleeves to till the land under operation Maguta. Under this programme, no doubt a huge food gap will be closed, effectively saving foreign exchange to go towards other priority sectors of the economy”.*¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Zimbabwe Independent 18-24 November 2005; was citing Gono the Reserve Bank Governor when he presented his monetary policy statement in May 2005.

¹¹² Zimbabwe Independent, 18-24/11/2005; 60% of Agricultural funds disappear.

¹¹³ Zimbabwe Independent 18-24/11/2005

¹¹⁴ According to the UN Report by Anna Tibaijuka, UN envoy for Human settlements over 700000 households were displaced during the May/June operation. Most of them lost shelter and other livelihoods as the government went out full force to destroy what it termed as illegal structures in urban areas. The state argued that the police and the army were enforcing urban by-laws in an effort to prevent ‘urban slums’.

¹¹⁵ The Chronicle, 1 March 2006. “Grain imports gobble US\$131 million. Governor Gono addressing Zimbabwe Defence forces Joint Command staff course participants.

Gono's pronouncements emphasises the point that command agriculture was on the national agenda as a programme aimed at food security for the nation as well as preserving national identity.

In the Herald of 18 August, 2006, the Minister of State Security, Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement declared that resettled farmers were compelled to produce crops such as grain on a portion of their land. He told the Herald that it was in line with the issuance of 99 year leases. He emphasized the issue of growing strategic crops such as grain.

"This is important because it guarantees food security so that we do not suffer from hunger that we sometimes suffer from".¹¹⁶

In the case of dry regions like Matabeleland South the minister stated that A1 and A2 beneficiaries should sell a certain number of their herd to Government. Then Agriculture Minister Joseph Made, said personnel from the army, air force and police have been enlisted to take charge of food security by producing staple maize and other key grains while taking over the harvesting and distribution of key crops. Made noted that the armed forces in the farming season 2006/07 would plant 300 000 hectares of grain and noted that;

"Defence forces are not out there to cause problems."... "We want all (government) departments to cooperate and other civilians to pick skills and knowledge imparted by them. We want their brains and resources."¹¹⁷

In the mean time by that time the state controlled Grain Marketing Board headed by a retired colonel was struggling to collect maize from rural farmers. Another group of pro state command agriculture proponents the Zimbabwe Farmers Union through its president Silas Hungwe echoed the complimentary role the army was playing in an effort to resuscitate agriculture by noting that;

"This will not only guarantee food security but is also meant to consolidate the government's land reform programme" (Reuters, 2006).

As late as October 23, 2006, the Chief Executive of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce praised the Defence forces for the success of Operation Maguta as well as the President of the Confederation of Industries who said: *"we in the private sector, are solidly behind the operation and its success*

¹¹⁶ The Herald, 18 August, 2006; Minister Mutasa.

¹¹⁷ ABC Online quoting Made in the Herald, 26 September, 2006.

On the other hand, The Independent, on 18 August, 2006 carried a headline; ‘Operation Maguta suffers setback’. The content of the report revealed that agricultural production through operation Maguta was failing as the area under winter wheat continued to shrink. It went further to give statistics and noted that the army had managed to put only 20 000 hectares for winter wheat. The Vice President Joyce Mujuru quoted in the Herald of 2 November 2006 blamed beneficiaries of the Land Reform Programme for disgracing the government by failing to effectively utilize allocated land.

The rhetoric from left school of thought believed by engaging the army in agricultural development the notion of food security would be attained speedily. They feel the army can fill in the gap created by non producing land occupiers. While those from the right believe the involvement of the army is bound to destroy agricultural development, thus jeopardizing the attainment of food security goals. They believe the introduction of the army is to fill in the gap created by people with no farming skills and no motivation farm. As I have stated earlier command agriculture has been intensively implemented in irrigation schemes more than in resettlement areas and communal areas. The case of Makwe irrigation scheme presents a strong argument for the short comings of this land reform strategy (policy) and illustrates how this policy has seen well established agrarian livelihoods destroyed in southern Matabeleland.

5:3 Makwe irrigation scheme and its activities

Makwe irrigation scheme was established in 1968 under the drought recovery scheme known as the Tribal Trust Land Cooperation (TTLCO). The Rhodesian Government constructed Thuli-Makwe Dam, which locals’ call *Haliwulu* by damming Thuli River close to Freda Mine. The Rhodesian Government set up this irrigation scheme having observed the vulnerability of the surrounding communities of Wenlock and Lushongwe to drought. It was believed that this irrigation scheme would not only produce crops or food for the plot holders (both for market and subsistence), but surplus would be sold to the aforementioned areas at nominal prices. Chiefs were asked to identify ‘master farmers’ in their areas, who were then allocated plots and worked directly under the supervision and management of the (TTLCO). The TTLCO gave plot holders input, such as fertilizers, seeds, insecticides, and in the early days cleared their land. These inputs were in the form of a loan which was payable after harvest. According to Bango, a retired Agricultural Demonstrator who is also a current plot

holder, this system worked well for the farmers and assured them of inputs timeously for the next crop.¹¹⁸ Vegetable growing was not funded, so plot holders bought their own seeds and inputs for market gardening. (See also The Solidarity Peace Trust 2006; Command Agriculture: Its impact on rural communities in Matabeleland).

After independence in 1980, the same tenants remained in the scheme and additional plot holders were brought in when the irrigation scheme was extended to cover 202 hectares. This time chiefs, assisted by AGRITEX Extension Workers identified competent 'master farmers' in adjacent Wenlock and Lushongwe communal areas to join the scheme. According to the irrigation committee chairperson, each plot holder was allocated half a hectare in the scheme and there were about 360 active plot holders. In liaison with the District council and the District Administrator a plot holder was automatically guaranteed a homestead stand in Makwe village. It should be noted that the permits allowed descendants of the deceased plot holder to inherit the plot. However if the dependents failed to utilize the plot, the committee had the right to retrieve the plot and re- allocate it to another master farmer.¹¹⁹

Before the introduction of command agriculture, in terms of land preparation, it was the duty of each individual plot holder to organize one's own resources for farming; in most instances plot holders assisted each other with draught power, for instance rotating ox-spans on a daily basis among a selected group of individuals so as to meet the planting deadline. Some hired a tractor from Zwelitsha Nyathi a local building contractor and plot holder. Nyathi would at times allow those without cash to pay in kind after their harvest.

In the following section I trace the origins and activities of the scheme following the Ncube household before and into the launch of operation Maguta.

Ncube moved to Makwe irrigation scheme in 1975 from his communal area in Wenlock. He had been identified by the then agricultural demonstrator (Bhebhe) as a master farmer and had the blessing of the chief to move to the irrigation scheme. He however still maintained his communal homestead. At the irrigation scheme he was allocated a 0,5ha plot and for the first five years commuted from his communal homestead where the rest of the household members stayed, though at times he would sleep in a make shift hut for close monitoring of

¹¹⁸ Job Bango is a retired Agricultural demonstrator whom I interviewed at his home in Makwe village. He worked for DEVAG and then AGRITEX after independence. In all he worked in this scheme for over 30 years.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Nicholas Nkala irrigation Chairperson (20/12/2005).

his activities on the plot. During the years of UDI, the state administrators provided tilling services to the Ncube household and payment was made after the sale of produce. When the war escalated and funding for agricultural development was dwindled, a household such as Ncube's had to use their own draught power to till the land. With the advent of independence and the creation of district councils, Makwe irrigation plot holders were granted residential stands and were allowed by the District Council to build permanent homes.

In 1982, Ncube brought his family to Makwe to stay full time in the irrigation scheme. He had built a homestead and also brought his 10 herd of cattle and 20 goats. In the irrigation scheme a calendar of farming was provided by the Agricultural Extension workers, with the main routine being maize in August to December/January; sugar beans from February to April and winter wheat from May to July/August. In addition to these major crops, the Ncube household also grew horticultural crops such as vegetables, legumes and sunflower. Ncube and his family members worked on the family plot on most weekdays except Wednesday and Sundays as the former is regarded as 'Izilo' (a sacred day) and the latter a holy day (ilanga lesonto). Ncube, his wife and grown up children did the planting, cultivating/weeding and harvesting of crops on their plot. They also watered vegetables using irrigation canals and pipes which were the property of the scheme. In the 1980s and 1990s all his children went through secondary school and from the proceeds from the irrigation scheme. Ncube sold some of his green maize to private buyers from urban centres such as Bulawayo and Gwanda and also those from communal areas such as Lushongwe and Wenlock. After harvest he would sell part of his maize crop to the state Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and at times to milling companies. Wheat and beans were mainly bought by private dealers and to a lesser extent by the GMB. There was no rule to sell irrigation proceeds solely to the GMB. For his everyday needs Ncube also sold horticultural products to urban vendors, and usually used the local bus to transport fresh produce to the Independent Market in Bulawayo. Some vendors also came down to the irrigation scheme to buy fresh produce. One of the problems that has confronted the Ncube household in their farming practice has been the shortage of water due to the constant breakdown of water engines that pump the water from Thuli-Makwe dam to the irrigation reservoir. Another problem adversely affecting the irrigation output of late has been the unreliable electricity that powers the water engines. In the late 1990s, the irrigation scheme committee took over the responsibilities of paying for electricity and water from the Department of Agriculture, and Ncube concurred that it became much easier to operate since

they could collect money from their proceeds to foot the electricity and the water bills rather than wait for payment by the Department of Agriculture. With the gradual withdrawal of the State from irrigation management, and the takeover by the irrigation committee, farming in the irrigation scheme became more focussed and businesslike since their crops did not wilt because of non payment of electricity, as was the case when the scheme bills were wholly the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. Ncube's household were the masters of their destiny on their plot since they could decide what to sell, to whom, when and for how much. There were many middlemen from private companies who negotiated prices of produce and Ncube's household was happy with their offers. In fact Ncube and other irrigators through their irrigation committee determined the prices of produce with the advice of two agricultural extension workers stationed in the scheme. However, with the introduction of command agriculture in 2005 Ncube's household has lost the autonomy it had over the production and marketing processes of produce from their plot. By December 2006, I was told they had lost the right to grow horticultural crops and had been instructed by the army to grow only maize and wheat. The State now provided seeds, fertilisers, tillage services, but all these did not come on time and hence resulted in late planting and low yields. By December/January 2006, selling of green maize was banned by the army, and harvested maize was sold only to the GMB. Plot holders such as Ncube's household were only allowed 100kilogrammes of maize from their total harvest for their own consumption while the rest was sold to GMB at a pre-determined price. This amount of maize translated to a month's supply of mealie meal. By the time I concluded fieldwork in 2007, Ncube's household was struggling to meet their basic needs and some of his elder sons had migrated to South Africa while others went into gold panning.

Other households I interacted with during my years of fieldwork in Makwe irrigation scheme presented yet a similar story on how they managed to make a living from their irrigation plots. Ndlovu one of the household heads presented his story as follows:

Before soldiers came we helped each other in ploughing our plots (amasimu). We arranged ourselves in groups, purely on individual understanding to rotate our spans of oxen It was our own initiative as we had done this over the years. We are not the same in terms of draught power, some have oxen some do not have. Some have money to hire tractor from Nyathi some do not have. Izandla azilingani mtanami (fingers on a hand are not of the same length). But all in all no one failed to meet the planting deadline of any crop as given to us by (abalimisi) agricultural extension workers... Fertilizer and seed we bought on our

own as individuals, and at times the irrigation committee will organize for us so that we give them money and they buy from Bulawayo and just pay transport. This arrangement we have been doing for more than twenty five years since I started farming in this scheme. Abalimisi teach us how to plant, cultivate and manage all the crops and vegetables we grow here. They are very helpful and they understand us when we tell them that (kumele senze umkhuba nxa singakahlanyeli)¹²⁰ (Ndlovu 19/12/06.)

Makwe irrigation scheme has had two Agricultural Extension workers since independence who give technical advice on best farming practices. A committee of twenty which ran the affairs of the scheme planned crop rotation and liaised with farm input suppliers for bulk purchases of input such as maize seeds, wheat, horticultural seeds, pesticides and fertilizers. Plot holders paid for electricity and water quarterly to the relevant departments. Each member, over and above contributing to the electricity and water bills, paid one hundred dollars as a monthly subscription for being a plot holder. Before the arrival of soldiers, Makwe plot holders had a seasonal calendar for major crops; from February to April, they had sugar beans on the scheme, May to August winter wheat and September to December it was time for maize. During these periods as the chairperson of the irrigation scheme explained, plot holders could sell green beans and maize to supplement their income¹²¹. In addition to the main crops plot holders as stated by the Ncube household, planted a variety of horticultural crops which catered for the day to day consumption of households. Surplus horticultural produce was sold in markets in Bulawayo, and vegetable vendors from Gwanda town also came in large numbers to order for resale in their own market stalls. The flourishing horticultural business in this scheme also provided for the nutritional needs of villagers in nearby Lushongwe and Wenlock communal areas.

5:4 Operation Maguta in Makwe

In late November, 2005 the soldiers arrived at Makwe irrigation Scheme around ten o'clock in the morning. They called a spontaneous meeting with the community and explained their mission. The chairman narrated the story as follows:

They arrived around ten o'clock in the morning and came straight to my homestead but unfortunately I was busy in the plot, so they remained in the business centre and sent my wife to fetch me. When I arrived, they shouted at me

¹²⁰ Abalimisi are AREX Officers who understood when plot holders told them of rituals to be performed before planting any crops?

¹²¹ Interview with irrigation committee chairperson, 2005, 2006

*and said they are giving me 15 minutes to call a meeting for all irrigators. When the meeting finally took off, a colonel introduced himself and his team; if I am not mistaken there were about 20 soldiers. He told us that as from now on we will not be allowed to grow anything in this irrigation except maize and wheat. All what we were growing all along should be removed by the day they returned to launch operation 'Maguta'... The Colonel was a very serious bully and announced that by the time he comes back all existing structures in the scheme have to go as he will take charge of the operation himself. We were not given a chance to ask questions, though one of the soldiers who understood the Ndebele culture approached me later on at the business centre and entertained questions I posed to him. That was how the soldiers first came into Makwe.*¹²²

The next encounter with the soldiers was on the 14th December 2005, one month later and I was lucky to witness the whole event. It was around 12 o'clock midday when a Bedford truck full of soldiers descended on Makwe irrigation. As previously arranged, the soldiers had pencilled in a meeting for 9 o'clock in the morning but they only arrived at midday. The meeting started and the same colonel addressed it. He noted that people had not taken heed of what he had instructed them to do when he came in November, and boastfully asked the meeting what he had instructed them to do; when everybody kept quiet, he scolded the chairperson and told the meeting that the chairman was fired, calling him all sorts of bad names. He eventually told the meeting that tractors were on their way to prepare land for planting maize; *"I am telling you that the tractors are just about to arrive, and when they arrive everybody should run to meet them in the fields and more talk will be done there"*¹²³

¹²² Chairperson of Makwe irrigation scheme, explaining their first encounters with the soldiers...interviewed on 20 December 2005.

¹²³ ZNA Colonel on the 14th December 2005 when implementing the operation.



Figure 5:4 The Orchard section of Makwe community irrigation in December 2005

Photo: by the Author.

When the tractors finally arrived we all went to the fields, where people had planted a range of crops and unfortunately, destruction was on the agenda; men and women were forced to uproot Banana trees and some fruit trees. There was a huge crop of vegetables, cabbages, carrots, spinach, sweet potatoes, pepper, paprika, but all that was destroyed in a few hours. District Development Fund tractor drivers were commanded military style to commence ploughing the fields, and that was the end of market gardening in Makwe. The plot holders were advised by the same colonel “ *by tomorrow everybody must plant and finish his or her portion and if you are not through don’t go to sleep...do you get me*”; people just kept quiet and that was the end of the 14th December 2005. This incident marked the beginning of command agriculture in Makwe and my interaction with the local people and irrigators revealed a wide range of changes in the way of life of these people in the years 2006, 2007.

What did this situation mean to the plot holders in Makwe? Firstly when the soldiers came the plot holders had planted their maize section as usual, and by their seasonal calendar the maize was already ripening since they normally sold green maize during Christmas and New Year holidays and harvested in late January to early February so as to prepare for planting sugar beans from mid-February. With the inception of ‘operation Maguta’ plot holders were not allowed to take green maize for their domestic consumption without permission from the soldiers. Whenever permission was granted, the plot holder was supposed to inform the base commander of the number of family members and the plot holder was then allowed to take the exact number of combs, i.e. one per household member. I was informed that those who did not finish planting the area ploughed by DDF tractors as per the command of the army colonel were severely punished. In fact some irrigators revealed to me that many people who did not complete ploughing as per instruction were severely beaten and some had to be hospitalized. Nkala, the irrigation chairperson was summoned to the *Regional*, where soldiers had established their base to answer charges of questioning the wisdom of asking people to work at night since according to Ndebele culture, working in the fields at night is taboo and is equated with witchcraft. When the Chairperson arrived with four other members of his committee, they found soldiers enjoying uprooted sweet potatoes, and there was a heap of cabbages which they believed the soldiers were taking to Gwanda town. During the destruction of the market gardens, plot holders were not allowed to take anything from the irrigation area. The five irrigators were severely assaulted by soldiers and after a thorough beating were commanded to fetch water and fire wood for the soldiers.¹²⁴

The ex-agricultural extension worker, Bango, later in January 2006 said that, the way planting was done under the command of the soldiers would have a negative effect on the future fertility of the soil in the irrigation. He related a chronological way of farming in the irrigation:

Planting irrigable maize does not involve just ploughing and planting; you need to plough, prepare and level the field, prepare furrows, apply fertilizer and then plant your maize. This whole job cannot be done one day; you need two to three days to complete it. The soldiers also applied huge quantities of fertilizer, and by agronomy standards, that amount will render the soil infertile in the next season (Bango, 25/01/06).

¹²⁴ Interview with chairperson and informants, 1, 2, 3, and 4 17/01/06 Makwe village.

In Bango's opinion the soldiers had destroyed their source of livelihood, as well as their commons. The commons, as Gudeman (2000) notes, is a shared interest or value. It is the patrimony or legacy of a community and refers to anything that contributes to the material and social sustenance of a people with a shared identity: land, buildings, seed stock, knowledge and practices, a transportation network, an educational system, or rituals. Without a commons, there is no community; and without a community, there is no commons." In Makwe the irrigation soil fertility has been jeopardised by the unprofessional application of fertiliser rendering it infertile for future crops.

Meketsi Mdlongwa is one of the informants I interviewed after the introduction of command agriculture at the scheme, Meketsi explained his views on the whole programme:

This is the operation has destroyed our way of life in this village, we used to sell vegetables on a weekly basis to markets in Bulawayo but now there is nothing to sell. My wife Mankomo used to go to the market every Tuesday and she could bring about Z\$1m per every visit to the market. We used this money to buy school uniforms for our two children who learn here at Makwe primary school. School fees we paid from this money. I have relatives in Wenlock and as you know that there was drought for many years, I supported them from whatever I got from this small plot of mine... I am not formally employed and depend mostly on this irrigation plot which I inherited when my father passed away. I do not know how we will survive by growing maize and wheat alone. The soldiers told us that our crop will be bought by the Grain Marketing Board only and we were warned not to attempt to sell to outsiders or provide our relatives in the communal land. Before this 'Maguta', we did not sell everything to GMB; as individual farmers we decided on the quantity to sell and that for our consumption. Now everything has to go, in fact our maize has already gone, but we have not been paid. We hear from news that GMB will pay soon, but knowing GMB, we might end up getting our money in August and with the way things are going when we are eventually paid the money will buy nothing. (Meketsi 10/12/06).

Dube household used to grow cabbages, onions, peas and paprika before Maguta. As they sold this produce to markets the household was assured of a basic livelihood. After the introduction of command agriculture Dube's household is struggling to survive. They can only afford a decent meal once a day. Dube is now engaged in gold panning and his son has migrated to South Africa. His plot in the irrigation lies fallow because the water engines have collapsed. He regularly passes through his plot on his way home from his panning activity. He is unhappy about the state of the irrigation scheme.

Other respondents also echoed the same sentiments. It is apparent from the findings of this case study that the operation Maguta designed this way would have destroyed the irrigation scheme irrespective of who was in control of it. In this case the soldiers have brought untold suffering to the Makwe community. Income generating projects which were downstream activities of cash crops and market gardening are collapsing. One woman informant told me that they had suspended their money link club because of a lack of income. They used to give each other, there are ten of them, Z\$1 million dollars every two weeks from proceeds from horticultural produce from the scheme, on a rotational basis. This liquid cash assisted members' households in buying household goods and other non food items necessary for their survival..

5:4 Command agriculture and livelihoods of Makwe villagers

Nationalization of agricultural land can be viewed as a retrogressive policy. In Eastern Europe communist parties' nationalized land, but what befell them in 1989 is testimony to the implications of such an economy in contemporary society. Verdery (2003), acknowledged Proudhon's claim that 'Property is Theft'; and further argued that the greatest theft in history was the nationalization of assets in the Soviet Union, including all its land, which was turned into collectives and state farms. To Verdery (2003), for the builder of socialism, land in particular, was very valuable for several reasons. Socializing it would facilitate plans for rapid industrial growth by seeing a major means of production and transferring its surplus directly into industrialization; controlling the rural population, the supply of food and thereby determining the price of food and creating a proletariat for industrial work (2003:41-42).

By launching operation Maguta, is the government pushing a similar agenda as the failed communist/socialist states? Does the state want to control food for a particular agenda or is it trying to keep the soldiers occupied, since there are no more excursions into Democratic Republic of Congo?¹²⁵

However, for the Makwe community, command agriculture, has destroyed a source of financial capital for villagers as indicated in the case studies highlighted above. Ready income that has been trickling in to plot holders for over four decades has suddenly been cut

¹²⁵ . Critics of command agriculture believed that the State assigned soldiers to civilian activities like irrigation farming to keep them occupied since their withdrawal from the DRC (See Solidarity Peace Trust Report April 2006).

off. It is worth noting from primary data that the imposition of operation Maguta on Makwe has not only affected the market economy of the plot holders, but has ruined the structure of the community economy. Plot holders had their own structures, values and relationships as a community. For instance, in the Makwe community the chief had a strong say on some cultural practices, and on who is allotted a plot, and when a particular household decides to leave the scheme. Although of late the irrigation committee has played a leading role in identifying new beneficiaries' one striking feature which the soldiers have continued to ignore in this whole process is the norm in this village that every meeting or gathering must be opened and closed with a word of prayer. Even in the early days of their arrival, soldiers did not consult but instead instructed local structures on the Maguta way of farming in the irrigation scheme. They did not observe the community norms; they took it upon themselves to dictate what was to be done, how it was to be done, and when it was to be done, that is which crops to grow and how produce was to be apportioned. The long standing committee which had its own constitution was dismissed. From a political and social perspective the action of the soldiers reminded the irrigators of the doom days of the "Gukurahundi"; during this era soldiers closed the irrigation scheme, killed people and caused pandemonium in the village.

The introduction of operation Maguta also had a negative impact on businesses operating at Makwe business centre. Without a quick income from cash crops and market gardening, the buying power of plot holders was severely eroded. One businessman I interviewed confirmed that his business had sunk so low that he intended closing down. This has a negative impact on service provision in rural communities. Rural communities in adjacent areas of Lushongwe and Wenlock have been indirectly affected by the loss of affordable legumes and vegetables for their daily consumption. As stated by Meketsi earlier on in this chapter, most, if not all plot holders in Makwe have kinsmen in these areas and support them in times of drought or whenever is necessary. There is also a feeling by residents of the irrigation scheme and adjacent villages that Government has been unfair to them in recent years. The councillor who is a ruling party member (voted out in 2006), also complained about the operation, although she was not altogether against it, but was not happy about the uprooting of vegetables as she noted:

This is very unfair to us who have provided seeds, fertilizer and labour to make this irrigation a success story; my colleagues in council were also disturbed when

I told them that the orchard that had been visited by both local and international aid agencies as a model project was no more. I feel government should do something; otherwise we will get no votes from this village (councillor, 23/05/06).

She also reminded me of what she had told me before about the withdrawal of 23 three tier farms during the height of land redistribution.¹²⁶

Berry (1993) notes that, in rethinking African agrarian change, we need to begin with historical and anthropological literature which represents law as a social process, transactions as subject to multiple meanings, and exchange as open ended and multi-dimensional rather than single stranded and definitive. I therefore argue that if we are to bring about agrarian change, there must be synergy of power, economy and culture. In the Makwe case, soldiers wielded power and the economy of Makwe plot holders now rests with them. The chief as the custodian of their tradition was never consulted; hence cultural rituals, values and norms were overlooked by the soldiers. What does it mean to a Makwe villager working until 12 midnight in the fields? What does it mean to the poor plot holder to work the fields on Wednesday, their sacred day (*Izilo*)¹²⁷ What does it mean to the plot holder who has had the prerogative to choose what to sell to whom and what to keep for his/her family and kinsmen for years, to now have to beg soldiers to access 500 combs of maize? The answers to these questions indicate how shocked and deprived Makwe villagers feel about operation Maguta.

I further argue that failure to respect the cultural dynamics of a community leads to failure of any innovation one might want to introduce. In the Ndebele tradition, there are certain rituals to be performed before any new crops are planted; for instance maize seed is mixed with herbs only known to a chosen few in the village and then a specific day of planting is agreed upon by the elders who will plant just a few rows and then everyone is safe to plant. Without this ritual it is alleged that crops may be destroyed by wild animals.

Berry (1993), citing the World Bank (1989), contends that rural development programmes in Africa rarely work the way they are supposed to. Since independence, International agencies and African governments have initiated hundreds of programmes designed to accelerate

¹²⁶ Rachel "Dula" Ncube was the ward councilor of ward 8 which includes Makwe village and Wenlock communal land. Before the arrival of the soldiers, I had interviewed her on the LRP and alluded that 23 farms under the 3 tier resettlement model were taken away from them and given to residents of Matobo District. They used to graze their cattle in those farms prior to the Fast Track Programme

¹²⁷ Izilo is a Ndebele word which in this text refers to Wednesday as a sacred day whereby no one is allowed to work the fields. It is believed that if any member of the community works the fields on that day; traditional gods and spirits can cause misfortunes like drought or cyclones.

agricultural growth and/or raise rural living standards. With a few exceptions the achievements of rural development policies and projects have fallen short of expectations. Why? Berry further argued that development policies are economically inappropriate, because politicians are more concerned with staying in power than promoting economic growth (1993:44).

Makwe irrigation scheme as explained earlier on was run by the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension Services (AREX) prior to the inception of operation Maguta. The scheme has two full time Agricultural Extension Workers employed by the State. Government also provided them with accommodation in the irrigation scheme. This had been the situation since the days of TTCO. These two officers have been sidelined by the soldiers. They too have been accused by the soldiers of letting down the government by failing to instruct plot holders to produce food for the nation. As I highlighted in the previous section, the agricultural competency of the soldiers is questionable as evidenced by the excessive application of fertilizer to which the former agricultural demonstrator alluded.

The advent of operation Maguta has also created a situation of uncertainty among the plot holders. They used to plan for their inputs according to their seasonal calendar, that is; maize- by August; sugar beans by January; and by April they made sure that inputs for winter wheat were ready. These inputs were either sourced as a group through the irrigation committee or individually ¹²⁸However with the new policy; they are not certain whether the government will meet the target dates as evidenced by delays in supplying inputs for winter wheat in the 2006 planting season. Since the soldiers have been in the irrigation scheme for over 3 years now, they have created their own networks within Makwe village. As the saying goes, human beings are social animals; but the soldiers have now created divisions among irrigators. The power of the soldiers in the scheme has created enmity among villagers, as the data revealed that some plot holders are now receiving favours from the soldiers and hence corruption is now rampant in the scheme.

From evidence in my fieldwork, Makwe irrigation scheme is now underutilized. The argument is that the scheme now is utilized for a period of seven month as they now grow only two crops maize and winter wheat. Prior to the operation, the scheme had crops all the year round since they would in addition to cereals engage in market gardening. The same

¹²⁸ Information given by interviewed plot holders (December 2005- May 2006).

sentiment of underutilization of irrigation schemes was echoed by the Agricultural Extension Worker in Umzingwane district when I conducted research in Kondwane A2 farms in May 2006. The Extension Worker noted that,

*The purpose of community irrigation schemes from an agricultural point of view is not growing staple food only, but also growing cash crops that could earn fast income for the day to day welfare of the household. Irrigations should boost nutrition levels of household members.*¹²⁹

Command agriculture has moved the Makwe community closer to a socialist oriented agriculture whereby land is owned collectively. For instance in this new scenario plot holders, instead of planting their own half hectares are now commanded by soldiers to plant the irrigation scheme, not their individual plots. They are not allowed to buy farming inputs individually as this is the prerogative of 'operation Maguta'. In explaining the relationship between administration and use, Gluckman (cf. Verdery, 2003) distinguishes between estates of administration and estates of production. Superiors hold estates of administration, allocating rights downward, whereas those at the base holds estates of production, using the rights granted them to fructify collective assets. Gluckman's analysis can be equated with the state of affairs in Makwe where soldiers represent the estate of administration and the plot holders, the estate of production. The soldiers do not physically work the fields; they administer as it were, the production process.

As of now Makwe plot holders do not have plots of their own as the boundaries drawn over many years, are no more. As indicated earlier on, the plot holders are now working the irrigation scheme rather than their plots. From the analysis of the situation at Makwe, the irrigators are like share croppers for the government. The plot holders retain 100 kilograms of maize from their harvest while the rest is sold to the Grain Marketing Board, a state parastatal which determines the price of the produce at national level. It is worth noting that, producing irrigated maize is both capital and labour intensive rather than straight dry land farming widely practised by A1 and communal farmers. So do these different farmers deserve the same prices for a tonne of maize? Furthermore, the Makwe villagers have to buy back processed maize meal from (GMB), the price of which by rural standards is exorbitant and inhibitive. This is in contrast with the price that they are offered by this parastatal when it

¹²⁹ Interview with the AREX Worker and member of the District Land Committee Umzingwane District, May 2006.

buys their maize. From a social relationship point of view, plot holders are now unable to provide for their relatives in the drought prone communal areas of Lushongwe and Wenlock. What does this bring to the villagers and their kinsmen; the answer is food shortage, starvation, and malnutrition.

Verdery (2003:161) in her classical ethnography, *The Vanishing Hectare* cites Humphrey (1998:270): “Collectivization had completely transformed kinship patterns in rural areas, undermining the authority of elders. Wealth ceased to be primarily a matter of inheritance, and households’ patriarchs no longer organized the labour of their units- the collectives did that”. In this research the irrigation committee has been dissolved, individual time schedules for work apportionment at the plots and other social obligations has been affected by the command of soldiers. Soldiers as youngmen, no longer respect the elders who mostly in this scheme are as old as their fathers and mothers.

It is not surprising that the use of military personnel in the agricultural sector is increasing unabated. Sources acknowledge that the exercise known as Maguta phase three has now been extended to A1, and communal farmers. The way it is expanding confirms the militarization of agriculture as well as army interference in the production process in all rural areas. Notions echoed by the Solidarity Peace Trust hold water¹³⁰.

Donham (1999)’s study of the Maale people of Ethiopia revealed how the norms and customs of the Maale were changed during the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Although the Zemecha students had a revolutionary vision, violation of the Maale tradition and social relations that had existed from time immemorial resulted in one incident where the students were burned to death¹³¹. It is against this backdrop that I argue that militarization of community agriculture creates a sense of fear and when that fear is absorbed, it may lead to injury. A good example in Makwe is when one of the soldiers quarrelled with gold panners popularly known as *amakorokoza* or *otsheketsha* in the area, he was severely assaulted and had to be hospitalized.¹³² The point I am raising here is that people’s customs, the way they are

¹³⁰ Solidarity Peace Trust; the armed forces are now embedded deep in rural areas.

¹³¹ Donham (1999: 45-81) *Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Explores the arrival of the Zemecha students in Maale and their impact on cultural and social practices; ‘Revolution within a Revolution’.

¹³² Information gathered from informants at the business centre, January 2006.

organized, the way they relate to each other is fundamental if one wishes to introduce an innovation.

The year 2006 saw relations changing between the soldiers and some irrigators. The Gwanda Rural District Council elections provided a relief to the irrigators as they were now allowed to cultivate one bed of vegetables for domestic consumption. This happened because the ruling party candidate who was running for Council wanted the irrigators' votes and had to persuade the soldiers to let people have a small portion for their domestic use. She was defeated in the elections by an opposition candidate.

I had interviewed Meketsi in October 2005 and again in January 2006 at his homestead in Makwe on various issues pertaining to his livelihood portfolio. In January 2007 I had the opportunity to once more discuss some issues pertaining to operation Maguta and its effects on the livelihoods of his household and the local people and this is what he said:

We are now slaves in our irrigation scheme because we do what soldiers want us to do. We spent ten months to get our money from GMB, and surely how are we supposed to survive. This operation has to stop forthwith because it has brought untold suffering to us villagers in Makwe and our kinsmen in Wenlock. As individuals we have approached soldiers asking for just a piece of land to plant vegetables for consumption, I bought a few beers for the soldiers then I was allowed to cultivate one bed of rape. Surely there is no policy on this is now corruption through and through. My first born is starting secondary school this year; I have struggled to raise school fees, levies and money for uniforms” (Meketsi, 05/01/07).

This scenario as illustrated by Meketsi shows how their livelihood has been disrupted because of command agriculture. Soldiers are beginning to question the decisions of their superiors; they found the interaction at Zamanjalo bottle store distasteful, but had to follow orders. It is against this backdrop that soldiers have tended to relax their harassment of villagers. A Mr. Nyathi had this to say:

Babengaphetha ngani kuse Makwe lapha. Khathesi sebengathi bayazwisisa, thina sehlula I Gukurahundi yona eyayibulala manje laba abatshayayo kuphela babezancina ngani (Nyathi, 05/01/07)

Literally meaning that finally soldiers had to succumb to villagers' cunning tactics of befriending them as Makwe is well known for its intelligent and crafty residents when it comes to dealing with foreigners or outsiders. They never changed despite the Gukurahundi.

Nonetheless the operation is continuing unabated though the initial brutality by soldiers has stopped. What is worrying the irrigators is that irrigation engines are breaking down now and again. They have no way of repairing them as operation Maguta requires the Government to provide water to the scheme as their irrigation committee was dissolved. Having been deprived of their source of livelihood, the Makwe residents are now like communal farmers as they are forced to grow only maize and wheat. With the constant breakdown of engines, their maize crop has wilted because of lack of water and this was exacerbated by the drought that has hit the district and the province in the 2006/7 rainy season. This situation has forced a considerable number of the youth to border jump to South Africa and Botswana. The Government engineered operation *Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsha Sesiphelile*; literally meaning the end of gold panning has compounded the situation.

During the last days of my field work, I visited Makwe business centre I discussed with three soldiers at Zamanjalo bottle store:

“Don’t blame us, we are at work like any other civil servants and we follow instructions, but this does not mean we like seeing people as old as our parents suffering as you have hinted that people are complaining about the whole programme” said one soldier downing a castle lager beer.



Figure 5:5 Seating on the counter and bar stool, wearing caps, soldiers spearheading operation Maguta, quench their thirst at Zamanjalo Bottle store at Makwe business centre

Going back to the overall argument of the thesis that land reform in southern Matabeleland rather than increasing agrarian livelihoods, has seen effective, established sources of livelihoods reduced, I would like to point out some of the limitations of command agriculture (operation Maguta) to the whole process of irrigation development. My first point is that irrigations as I have illustrated serve not only subsistence needs but are also a business that increases livelihood coping strategies (horticultural produce sold to cater for day to day issues

of survival). Farming is the business of farmers. In the Makwe case, the soldiers might be good at managing large scale operations of a military nature, but they are not farmers. This is evidenced by the fact that most of the operations are carried out late and supplies are not delivered on time. The sole focus on maize and wheat is inappropriate and short sighted. While the shortage of bread and maize meal is real (during fieldwork) and requires urgent remedial action, it is not a good farming practice, in terms of crop rotation, to grow maize after wheat and wheat after maize. For healthy crop rotation, other crops such as sugar beans and legumes need to be included. Yet another important factor is the size of the farming plots. When irrigation plots are small, for instance 0,5ha in the case of Makwe irrigation scheme, high yielding vegetable crops requiring much labour, will give a much higher return than wheat and maize. While the country needs to grow more maize and wheat, as foreign currency is also in desperate short supply; high yielding export crops should therefore be part of the equation. Ultimately, foreign currency earned from export crops may buy more maize meal and wheat than would have been harvested directly from the same area.

The most compelling reason why command agriculture (operation Maguta) should be discontinued (at least in its present form) is that it sends the wrong message to emerging small farmers, particularly farmers engaged in small scale irrigation. Many developmental organisations including the FAO and government itself (through Give-A-Dam Campaign) are promoting the concept of farming as a 'business' for emerging small (irrigation) farmers or market gardeners; commercial partners such as input suppliers and banks can also assist with inputs, expertise and marketing. An essential part of this strategy is that the emerging small scale irrigators make their own choices in terms of the crops they want to grow as part of their own business plan. Operation Maguta on the other hand does not give (farmers/irrigators) a choice but commands them to grow specific crops (maize and wheat) and even provides tillage services and inputs not requested¹³³. In doing so Maguta promotes dependency and hinders development of independent family market gardening businesses that have proved to be the most effective way of producing crops in irrigation schemes.

¹³³ My visit and drive around the irrigation scheme in December 2007 presented a completely different Makwe of 2005 as the whole scheme had no crops. There was no electricity to power water engines and maize seeds from the army had not been delivered to these farmers even if it meant taking advantage of the good rains were pounding the scheme. According Maguta policy seeds are supplied by the operation not individual farmers in the scheme.

5:5 Conclusion

Makwe irrigators did not ask for government intervention in the production process. Government had already provided what they needed-technical and extension advice from the two extension workers. Command Agriculture (Operation Maguta) has deprived the plot holders of their major source of livelihood and completely destroyed safety nets (designed around proceeds from the scheme) for these villagers. The operation has also taken away the sense of ownership of the plots as the irrigators now farm the irrigation scheme rather than farming their allocated plots in the irrigation scheme. The old order, whereby irrigators with the advice of Agricultural Extension Workers had a seasonal plan for utilizing the irrigation no longer exists. The harassment by soldiers has led to the Makwe and surrounding villagers feeling that they are being punished by government. This has created a sense of fear and mistrust of the soldiers. Fieldwork showed that since 1980, these villagers' encounters with soldiers has never been a pleasant one.

Makwe plot holders' intra and inter social relationships and networks have been seriously affected. For instance, Lushongwe and Wenlock residents who are not just psychologically connected to the villagers in Makwe, but also deeply socially connected, are no longer benefiting from the only irrigation scheme in their communal land. Access to fresh and cheap horticultural produce from the scheme has been seriously affected by this operation. The irrigation land, a base for plot holders, has been affected by the excessive application of fertilizer by the soldiers, that has potentially destroyed its fertility. Command agriculture has brought shock and stress not only to Makwe irrigators, but to the whole community, business persons included, that used to benefit both directly and indirectly from activities carried out in this scheme. The well constructed 'Regional' headquarters of the scheme and other neighbouring schemes has been associated with torture rather than the agricultural function for which it was constructed.

Command agriculture can be viewed as forced modernization, whereby the irrigators have been deprived of their sources of livelihood and forced to practice agriculture the way the state feels will increase food security. The way command agriculture is designed at the moment shows that this agrarian policy or strategy is as a result of a government attempt to curb the economic crisis that has made the majority of rural households vulnerable. Food insecurity cannot be tamed by commandist policies of agricultural production.

I therefore conclude by noting that Command Agriculture ‘Operation Maguta’ should be redefined, re-designed and re-focused, and probably re-directed to underutilized land in A2 farms rather than disturbing organized irrigation schemes. Without irrigation schemes people of southern Matabeleland cannot grow crops and this is at odds with a state purporting to be representing everyone and promoting food self sufficiency. In fact command agriculture is still viewed as another form of political persecution in this region.

Chapter 6

Gold panning: An alternative livelihood strategy

6:1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters, we have seen that the rural people of Gwanda and Umzingwane have livelihoods based on livestock, limited rain-fed farming and irrigation. Of course a great number eke out a living from other off farm activities such as wage employment, wood carving, gathering of roots, amacimbi, remittances from migrants and gold panning. The natural capital, land which has been made available by the land reform programme, has ‘increased’ the land for livestock especially in Lushongwe, whereas in Garanyemba residents feel deprived as the farms they had earmarked for grazing purposes have been allocated to people from nearby urban centres shutting down their hopes of having ‘adequate’ grazing. With crop farming fairly sustainable through irrigation farming and the uncertainty of adequate grazing land, some residents who have not migrated to other countries have resorted to gold panning as a means of earning an income to meet household requirements. In this study, gold panning has emerged as one of the major non-farming activities for the residents of the two districts. During fieldwork I interviewed a cross-section of respondents and informants who are engaged in this activity. Although gold panning is a risky activity, case studies carried out during two years of fieldwork revealed that about 80% of the rural population in the research area are either directly or indirectly involved in this activity. In fact field studies have shown that this activity is quickly taking over from agrarian practices as a source of livelihood in some parts of the province. My argument in this chapter is that southern Matabeleland has been marginalized in terms of socio-economic development and hence this has accelerated the need for locals to concentrate on off farm activities as a way of cushioning them from the economic crisis and the patron-client relationships that have been used in allocation of land by the state.

6:2 Gold panning in Zimbabwe

The history of mining in Zimbabwe dates back to the days of the Monomotapa Kingdom.¹³⁴ In the 19th century representatives of Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company induced Lobhengula the Ndebele King to prospect for gold. The Rudd Concession signed by Lobhengula in 1888 stated: "complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated in my Kingdom, Principalities and Dominions, together with full powers to do all things that they (Concessionaires) may deem necessary to win and procure the same". When the agreement was read to Lobhengula it stated: "They will not bring more than ten men to work in your country, they will not dig anywhere near towns, and they will abide by the laws of your country, in fact be as your people."¹³⁵ Prior to independence most locals did not want to work in the mines as they regarded it as a job for immigrants (*Chibaro*)¹³⁶ from Malawi and Zambia (Raptopoulos and Phimister, 2000). Nyathi (2001) acknowledges that during the colonial era, some Ndebele men migrated to work in diamond and gold mines in South Africa voluntarily. With the gold boom in the 1900s and beyond in the Rand, the Rhodesian government entered into an agreement with the South African Government through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA)¹³⁷ to supply cheap labour through a scheme which became known locally as '*Wenela*'. Those who had experienced gold mining in the Rand after the end of their contracts joined local mines thus breaking the tradition of mine work as a preserve of Malawian and Zambian aliens.

In the early years of independence the state formed the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation as a way to enter the mostly foreign dominated sector. The Government further established the Zimbabwe Minerals and Marketing Corporation to regulate the marketing of minerals. All these efforts did not benefit the rank and file of the citizenry; hence disgruntled members of society who had worked in gold mines before and former combatants who knew

¹³⁴ Onselen (2001:11) notes that reef mining has been practiced in the area between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers at least for the past six centuries. Muslims traded with inhabitants of this region as early as 1000 AD. By 1505 Portuguese at Sofala were trading in gold with tribesmen, some of them the forefathers of the modern Shona speaking people.

¹³⁵ See Mudenge Stan in Mpunga et al 2001:47

¹³⁶ Chibaro- labourers rounded up by the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau, lived in conditions of 'prison-like perfection'. This included foreigners from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who were on their way to the Rand and also locals.

¹³⁷ See Raptopoulos and Ian Phimister 2000: Keep On Knocking; A history of the labour movement in Zimbabwe 1900-97:30-31.

the value of gold, lobbied Government to promote mining cooperatives as part of its socialist rhetoric. These entities were established in areas with precious minerals especially gold¹³⁸. This was the beginning of small scale mining with 'black' Zimbabweans taking the lead. Those who were not part of the cooperative movement resorted to panning along river and stream banks.

Matabeleland South basically mines gold, limestone and recently diamonds (Beitbridge). Limestone is mined at Colleen Bawn along the Bulawayo-Beitbridge road and has the largest cement manufacturing plant in the country. In the late 1990s, Colleen Bawn mine under its trade name United Portland Cement (Unicem) partnered with Pretoria Cement to form the current Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC). This resulted in a restructuring exercise. The exercise also involved the acquisition of modern machinery which made hundreds of workers redundant. Freda Mine, Blanket, Vumbachikwe, How mine and Epoch mine were the major gold mining concerns in Matabeleland South before 2000. However due to the effects of the structural adjustment programme and scarce foreign currency, mines like Freda (2000) and Epoch mine (1998) closed, while Blanket, How mine and Vumbachikwe mine retrenched some of their workers. Most of the retrenched workers had no other skills except mining and so their only option for those with financial capital was to secure gold claims while those without joined gold panners (*otsheketshe*).¹³⁹

Small scale and artisanal mining (river bed panning for gold), is wide spread in Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe in particular, the expansion of gold panning was most rapid after the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment programme of the early 1990s, which saw a significant decline in formal employment and the subsequent movement of labour into informal sectors in search of livelihoods (Murombedzi, 2005). In 1992 gold panning along the country's rivers and streams was legalized and actively encouraged, provided the panners obtained the necessary permits, and deposited their gold with the Reserve Bank or its agencies. The gold panners were also required to rehabilitate their operations by back-filling. During those years environment policing took place regularly. The then Minister of Mines, Chris Anderson said it was high time the panners were recognized as part of the informal

¹³⁸ Phansikwe model B mining cooperatives is one such cooperative established by the then Department of Cooperative Development in Matabeleland South province. By 1996 cooperators had deserted the scheme and joined gold panners along Insiza River: Unpublished evaluation report on cooperatives done by the author in 1997 for the Provincial Administrator Matabeleland South province.

¹³⁹ Fieldwork observations and interviews with small scale miners and gold panners, 2005-7

sector of the economy. Instead of criminalising them, he proposed that they be encouraged to sell their gold to the Reserve Bank. He even suggested that small scale miners should be paid a higher price than the market rate to prevent them from selling to the 'black market'¹⁴⁰, (Zimbabwe Forum, 2007).

With successive droughts affecting dry land crop farming, more and more rural villagers gradually gave up crop farming in favour of gold panning which by any rural standards was highly rewarding. With policing on these activities being lax, gold panners battled with former 'white' commercial farmers who were concerned about the destruction of the environment and eco-systems on their properties. Murombedzi (2005) contends that during the period 1999/2000, panners were encouraged by State bureaucrats to harass commercial farmers. With the implementation of the FTLRRP, gold panners intensified their activities and this led to conflicts with the newly resettled farmers. By 2003, some A1 small scale farmers, because of the drought, lack of agricultural resources and alternative sources of livelihood, joined panners in a bid to make a living. Although people in Gwanda and Umzingwane have resorted to gold panning to eke out a living, this activity has resulted in considerable damage to the environment¹⁴¹. Observations have shown that land as a natural resource cannot accommodate future generations if exploited in the current manner. What is interesting is that some of my informants engaged in gold panning invest 'gold money' in buying livestock such as goats and cattle depending on the amount realised. Most of these informants reside in communal areas and complain of lack of grazing land for their livestock. As illustrated in chapter 5, livestock is viewed by many of my informants as the mainstay of their livelihoods, and thus any extra cash realised from off-farm earnings is converted into livestock.

¹⁴⁰ Black market is the parallel economy championed by gold barons who buy gold from illegal panners and small-scale miners for resell outside the country

¹⁴¹ During fieldwork I found out that by destroying the environment as a result of activities such as gold panning poaching etc some respondents and informants were more concerned with the dwindling medicinal tree species and wildlife more than the landscape as viewed by natural resources officers and other technocrats.

6:3 Comparative studies on artisanal mining

Artisanal mining is not a new phenomenon in most developing countries. It has involved quite a number of minerals depending on the locality of the activity. In countries such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo artisanal miners have concentrated on diamond mining whereas countries such as Zimbabwe has seen artisanal miners concentrating on gold mining, although recently (2007), the discovery of diamonds in Marange attracted many artisanal miners. In countries such as Tanzania artisanal mining is usually referred to as small scale mining. Bryceson (2009) argues that small scale mining is one of the experimental rural livelihoods that have ‘taken off’ in a number of African countries since the 1980s (2009:251). Like farming, mining demands the hard labour of digging the soil, but the similarities stopped there. In Tanzania for instance miners’ first decision-the decision to move to their first mining site-was a livelihood decision based on restricted knowledge and unawareness. “The decision to migrate for gold mining contains multiple uncertainties of livelihood failure, family separation, accidents, physical attack, diseases and destitution. Miners must be willing to endure these risks in their endeavours to striking gold” (Bryceson, 2009:253). In other words miners’ lives can gyrate between rags and riches.

Artisanal mining cuts across the gender divide as both men and women engage in this activity at different levels of the process. For instance in artisanal mining, especially gold mining, the participation of women varies from region to region and culture to culture. In Zimbabwe for instance women can be gold diggers, gold ore carriers and processors (Dreschler, 2001). In some instances women engage in buying and selling of food stuffs and clothing, of which gold panners are the major customers.¹⁴² Some work as sex trade workers (ILO, 1999; Amutabi and Lutta-Mukhebi, 2001; Onuh, 2002). In the Philippines, women work shallow gold mines of family units, ‘pocket miners,’ typically involved in amalgam decomposition, sorting and milling (Murao et al, 2002). In Brazil they work in the reprocessing of tailings ‘pallaris’ to supplement their husbands’ earnings (Jerez, 2001). In Zambia, there is a cultural belief that if women engage in gemstone mining, the ancestral spirits will drive the gemstones deeper or make them completely disappear (Kaingu, 2003).

¹⁴² Fieldwork observations 2005-2007: Here women sell bread, fat cooks, soft drinks, opaque beer, brandy, jeans, gumboots, overalls etc; and prices at these sites are double those at retail shops in rural service centres.

De Boeck (1998) gives a classical account of diamond mining and digging in the Angolan province of Lunda Norte that attracted almost the whole of south-western Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). De Boeck (1998) found that upon their return diamond diggers spent their dollars in a very short space of time on women and on items such as beer, gold chains, clothes and transistor radios.¹⁴³ De Boeck contends however, that current DRC practices related to the accumulation and the consumption of diamonds and dollars in a globalised economy are underpinned and shaped by local rural modes, conceptions and social reproduction and well being which originate in (pre)colonial moral matrixes, attitudes, practices and beliefs, in particular in relation to hunting, ritual and the historical realities of the ivory, rubber and slave trades (De Boeck, 1998:779-80).

Richards (1996), notes that the mining of alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone (Gola Forest) requires little if any industrial equipment. Tributors dig gravel from swamps and stream beds during the dry season and then sieve the gravel before the rainy season flood overtakes makeshift workings. At times, a shovel, sieve and head pan will suffice, plus the equipment to camp in the bush. Licensed operators work the more accessible and better serviced sites (Richards, 1996:100). Richards further notes that normally the 'supporter'-the financial backer and licence-holder of a typical Sierra Leonean small-scale diamond mining operation-will be permanently resident in town (having a business to run, or official duties to discharge). The mining operation is left largely to the initiative of the Tributors (site foreman, plus a crew of young labourers). In many cases the supporter supplies Tributors with rice, tools, and sometimes, in addition, a shot-gun and cartridges to hunt for the pot. The digging crew generally split a two-fifths share of the local price for each season's haul of diamonds (Richards 1996:101).

De Boeck (1998) and Richards (1996) allude to the fact that most of the diamonds smuggled out of Angola, DRC and Sierra Leone find ready markets in Europe and the Middle East. For instance in the Angolan, DRC case (De Boeck) diamonds are sold in American dollars and no dealer or seller accepts local currencies because of inflation and speculation.

¹⁴³ De Boeck (1998: 779-80) in his thesis *Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: expenditure and sharing in Southwestern Zaire* argues against a one-sided interpretation of the diamond trade as destructive of local forms and logics of solidarity and reciprocity. Most of the diggers and traders in diamonds were men thus showing the masculinity of the activity.

In 2006 for example when diamonds were discovered in Marange district in Manicaland province (Zimbabwe); the rush by people was enormous such that government sent police officers to quarantine the area and because the police could not cope with the large influx of people, the army was deployed in the area. According to the Chronicle (15 August 2006) people came from all over the country to dig diamonds, and in a turn of irony the usually quiet Marange was suddenly a hive of activity attracting diamond dealers as far away as South Africa and the DRC who provided a ready market for the gemstone. In the same newspaper (Chronicle, 17 September 2007), it was reported that 17 police officers had been arrested for dealing in diamonds. My fieldwork experience in Gwanda and Umzingwane also indicates that police officers solicit bribes and at times demand a share of the gold from gold panners and dealers, a scenario that shows the power of the attraction of gold. This brings us back to the argument advanced by Scott (1998) whereby he argues that some illegal activities become legal as a result of changes in the way the State views of development activities and the way people respond to State policies. Instead of curtailing the extraction of diamonds in Marange, for example, the Zimbabwe Government, made it mandatory for anyone who wanted to pan for diamonds to be a resident of the area. In this way illegal diamond panning was legalized by the state; in other words an illegal activity becomes a legal activity in order to promote the livelihoods of the Marange 'locals'. In southern Matabeleland as in other parts of the country, police officers have stopped 'seeing' like a state as they now view gold panning from their 'own lens' of making a livelihood and hence accept bribes to let illegal gold panners continue with their new found source of living in a country experiencing an economic crisis.

6:4 The panning process

Let us now examine how the people of southern Matabeleland earn a living from gold panning and consider how this off farm activity has been accelerated by the FTLRRP. *Ukutsheketsha* (gold panning) is a local name for artisanal gold mining process. There are three types of gold panning practiced in Matabeleland by illegal gold panners (*otsheketsha*) and legal small scale miners. The first one involves getting into disused mines and following tunnels underground to dig for gold. The second one involves an open cast system, whereby gold panners dig on a virgin claim or along river banks. Thirdly there is the 'claim-open cast'

extraction. The third type is mostly practised by small scale miners¹⁴⁴ (who hire panners), and have permits for small claims dotted around former commercial farms. To illustrate the three processes, I present case studies conducted in Umzingwane and Gwanda panning sites in the years (2005-2007).

6:4:1 River/stream bank panning

Ashwell Ncube¹⁴⁵ is a man of thirty years of age and lives at Swazi village in the Umzingwane district. He is married and has one child. He has never had a formal job save for part-time handyman jobs loading and off-loading wholesale goods from delivery trucks in Gwanda town. With urban life increasingly difficult Ashwell in 2001 returned home to concentrate on gold panning as a means of securing money for his household.

During numerous interviews Ashwell noted that the first step into gold panning is to know the gold itself, secondly to be able to distinguish between gold and non gold sites. He contends that this cannot be done unless one is connected to those already in the trade. So an important issue here is identifying contacts and connections. For Ashwell it was not a difficult process as some of his 'home boys' were already seasoned gold panners. So he quickly joined them and established his base with relatives and homeboys on the banks of the Ncema River in the Malungwane area. The distance from his panning site to his rural homestead is around forty kilometres so he camped there and went home after a week or two when he had sold gold to black market dealers.

My interviews and interaction with gold panners such as Ashwell indicate that the actual extraction of gold from the river bank is a labour intensive activity. One has to sample the site and be assured that there is indeed gold. Then by using picks and shovels, dig and scoop (*istofu*) a mixture of soil and gold. Extracting the actual (*istofu*) to be worked on per day is laborious. When one has the right quantity for the day, the next process is (*ukusefa*), sieving the soil to further separate useless soil (*impara*) so as to leave the gold ore behind (*udaka*). The process now demands the use of water to clean the gold ore and Ashwell acknowledges

¹⁴⁴ Small scale miners are a group of artisanal gold miners who hold claim permits granted by the Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism. In November, 2006 when the state launched operation Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile/Chikorokoza Chapera had their permits suspended pending new mining policy and regulations

¹⁴⁵ Ashwell Ncube is one of the many gold panners engaged in river bank panning on the banks of Ncema River. I deliberately chose to explore this type of mining using the interviews and numerous encounters I had with him and his colleagues during fieldwork

that at times they have to travel upstream for about a kilometre from the panning site to wash out the gold ore and also to burn excess mercury.

Washing out gold ore is a joyous activity and less labour intensive according to Ashwell and his friends. Here they meet with other panners from other sites; and as they wash out the gold they discuss the price of a 'point' and 'grammes' among themselves so as to agree on a selling price. When all residues have been sieved (using a sieve or old blanket) and washed out, the process of getting the actual gold follows. *"You now need mercury (iacidi) to get gold (ukubamba umkute)"*, said Ashwell showing off his 250ml bottle of mercury.

When you have captured gold it will be in small granules, then you wash those granules again to remove any other impurities. Finally you burn your stuff to remove excess mercury and your gold is ready for the market. (Ashwell 22/12/06).

Ashwell acknowledged that in most cases during this final process gold buyer's mill around tossing their offers. It is really a hive of activity as women and young girls also come for different purposes. In most cases women will be selling food stuffs, Chinese clothing and also panning (see chapter 7). On the other hand some girls and women will be eyeing cash from those men in exchange for sex. Transactional sex is rife in the gold panning sites and the dangers of contracting the HIV/AIDS virus are high as women sleep around with different gold panners and have unprotected sex depending on how much cash they offer. Even Ashwell agreed that there are known women who have slept with almost every gold panner in their group depending on how much he offers on a particular day. Those who make more money (as they know how much each panner realised in gold terms) have the tendency to aim for those women regarded as most enticing, for instance Thokozani's wife (chapter 7).

Ashwell acknowledged that on a good week can realize ten grammes of gold that earned him approximately Z\$10m (2006). This is the money he uses to buy food and non food items for his household.

Ashwell told me that it was not always a rosy process because at times one can accumulate a large amount of *istofu* only to realize very little or nothing from it. He ascertained that it is a risky business but on a lucky day it pays handsomely compared to his former piece jobs in town. Police also conduct raids as the activity is regarded as illegal and hence they have to play hide and seek with the law enforcement agents. At times they bribe the police officers

and are left free to pan. Ashwell has moved out of his father's homestead and built his homestead close by. He has managed to buy ten goats and two heifers from his gold panning activities. Like other villagers at Swazi communal land the shortage of grazing land is hindering the growth of their livestock herds and he confirmed to me that they thought they would be allocated grazing land during the FTLRRP but this has been in vain since it has been over five years since the programme was launched and the farms they had earmarked for grazing have been turned into village settlements. To Ashwell and others at Swazi the majority of those settled in these former commercial farms come from outside their communal areas and some even come from other provinces such as Masvingo and the Midlands, a scenario that has created conflict between the Swazi villagers and these resettled people. They have reacted to what they call the unfair treatment by the State by poach grazing in the resettlement areas where those settled have few livestock versus large tracks of land (see chapter 4). He also confirmed that land has largely been distributed to those who support the ruling party irrespective of having livestock or not and this has led some villagers to label the whole FTLRRP as a political tool by the state and its active supporters to control resources in their rural areas.

6:4:2 Disused mines panning.

Panning in a disused mine is different from that on the river banks and interviewed gold panners acknowledged that though it is riskier than river bank panning, rewards from this type of panning are high. For this activity one has to be connected to friends who have experience of the underground geography of the mine as they sometimes go as far as a kilometre underground following the tunnels to extract gold. One needs pots and rations because they normally spend up to five days at a time underground. Furthermore, paraffin light is essential since it is dark underground. To get into the disused mine gold panners use ropes/or ladders to slide down into the tunnels and also use the same procedure to get out with *istofu*. Underground panning in my study areas usually involves the use of explosives; and hence gold panners buy these from black market dealers as they are not licensed to buy from retailers. At times they engage in contract panning by being sponsored by a buyer who then provides the explosives and recoups his expenses from the gold realised¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with gold panners engaged in disused mine panning in Gwanda and Umzingwane.

When underground, each team of five has members assigned to distinct roles each day.¹⁴⁷ One member is tasked with scouting and negotiating with other groups for sites to blast; another member is tasked with the actual blasting; two members collect *istofu* and the last member cooks and guard the collected *istofu*. They rotate these tasks until their time is up. My informants told me that in this type of panning, they have a strict roster governing who should be underground at a particular time and when blasting should be done. One, *Jabulani*, a gold panner acknowledged that there can be 200 people or more underground at a time.

There can be 200 or more otsheketsa underground at a time and so group members should maximize in terms of istofu quantity or else their time will elapse having realised a small quantity that will yield few grammes of gold (Jabulani 22/12/06).

When the group's time is up, they load the gold ore into cement bags and start the taxing job of taking it out of the tunnels. When they are out they either use iron and mortar (*ingiga*) to crush stones containing gold or send their *istofu* to the stamp mills. Manual crushing is cumbersome and labour intensive, because after that taxing job one has to find water to wash the ore so as to sieve gold and apply mercury to capture gold. Sending *istofu* to stamp mills also demands money for transport and transporters charge high fees as they regard their activity as illegal and risky¹⁴⁸. After being milled the gold mud (*udaka*), is put into cement bags again for final processing either at home or at certain strategic points. Using plastic dishes as water containers, they wash residues and apply mercury to tape the gold.

This type of panning is both labour and capital intensive and sometimes panners engage in some form of contract mining with buyers who sponsor them with explosives and food. The arrangement is such that when the end product is ready, the sponsor will deduct his expenses and also buy their gold. One gold panner noted:

This is better though at times our buyers cheat us, rather than looking for buyers who will demand to burn your gold first to determine whether is genuine, and during this process these traders reduce the mass and then pay us less Again I prefer panning in an old mine because chances of getting more gold are higher than in river bank panning. (Themba, 19/06/06)

¹⁴⁷ Gold panners interviewed indicated this group size is manageable in terms of work schedules underground and helps reduce tensions when sharing the proceeds from gold. They argued that larger groups usually fought when sharing the proceeds.

¹⁴⁸ Transporters' vehicles may be impounded by police if they are found ferrying *istofu* without permits.

Panning underground is hazardous because panners sometimes lose friends who are hit by rocks (*idwala*) or fall into a water reservoir (*empisini*)¹⁴⁹. Although my informants acknowledged the hazards associated with this type of panning, they noted that they would continue panning because crop farming was a riskier livelihood strategy in this area.

Money from gold is used to support families. Some gold panners use gold money to buy livestock such as cattle, goats and donkeys (see chapter 4), whilst some spend it on alcohol and prostitutes. Gold panners feel gold panning should be legalized as people have no livelihood alternatives. One interesting feature in this whole gold trading process is that the majority of the local buyers are fronts for buyers from urban centres and in a large number of cases these buyers are from Harare. One of the reasons advanced by local buyers was that people from Harare have the 'cash' unlike buyers from cities such as Bulawayo in Matabeleland. This can be viewed as a vicious cycle of resource extraction as a large chunk of the proceeds from this activity is invested in Harare and the Mashonaland provinces from where these elite hail. Reflecting on Bohmer's (1999) conceptualization of internal colonialism (see chapter I), one can argue that the low sources of income among the 'buyers' (who act as middle men) from Matabeleland and hence dependency on the financial muscle of 'buyers' (who are barons) from 'Harare' as a result of the economic hegemony of Mashonaland 'elite,' results in the extraction of Matabeleland resources to develop the centre at the expense of the periphery.

6:4:3 Small scale open cast panning

Small scale gold panning as stated in the introduction was legalised by Government as a way of reducing unemployment and promoting indigenization of the mining sector. These miners are granted mining permits by the Ministry of Mines. A prospective small scale miner approaches the ministry officials at provincial level for a prospector's licence.¹⁵⁰ When the person has identified a site, then he/she makes an application to the ministry. Ministry officials visit and peg the claim. In my study area most of these small mine claims are dotted

¹⁴⁹ A number of gold panners engaged in disused mining have been trapped underground and a during my many encounters with these panners I discovered that every month there is a case or two of gold panners who drown in pools of water in disused mines.

¹⁵⁰ Prospectors licence I was told by Mines officials allows would- be small scale miners to identify a claim in an area designated by the Ministry of Mines. However since the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in 2000 some small scale miners have been pegging claims without consulting the ministry officials. In some cases ministry officials have been issuing out permits without physically pegging claims.

around former large scale commercial farms that have been acquired for resettlement by the State.

One of the farm that have seen a mushrooming of small mines claims is that previously owned by John Hunt. Interviews I held with Ministry of Mines officers and those resettled in this farm indicated that although Ministry of Mines officials are supposed to peg the claims, people with prospectors' licences have taken it upon themselves to peg and hence there is no standard size of claim on the ground¹⁵¹. Some with financial capital have pegged vast tracks of land. Having a large claim demands more panners so as to work the claim effectively. Those with little savings and in some cases from illegal panning activities, employ between five and ten young men to dig for gold in the claim. They use picks, shovels and explosives to extract gold ore and then hire a lorry to ferry the ore to a ball- mill. Interviewed small scale miners claimed that they sent two to three loads of seven tons of gold ore for processing per month to formal mines such as Freda Mine in the Gwanda district located 2 kilometres from most of the claims dotted around the farm. When the Freda Mine ball-mill was closed at the end of 2004, small miners in this area had to take their *istofu* to a stamp mill near Gwanda town some twenty nine kilometres away (2005 to mid 2006).

My encounters with small scale miners revealed to me that in the majority of cases they were retrenched from formal mining companies affected by the structural adjustment programme. These mines had to scale down operations as a result of scarce foreign currency to purchase spare parts for machinery. Some small scale miners were made redundant when most mines like Freda mine were closed after the implementation of the FTLRRP and the threat of the same programme being extended to mining concerns. These people have mining experience and skills but they do not have the requisite machinery to exploit their claims profitably. In the process they hire school drop outs and unemployed youth as 'claim workers'.

In November, 2006 Government launched 'operation *Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsha Sesiphelile*', literally meaning the end of gold panning; though the operation was supposed to curb illegal gold panning, it went on to close small scale mines claiming that they were responsible for fuelling inflation by selling their gold to 'black market dealers'. In February 2007 one small scale miner affected had these sad words to say about the operation:

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Mines officers said that they lacked resources such as transport and equipment to carryout surveys and pegging of these small claims.

The government says that I should put fence around my claim, provide sanitation facilities, provide onsite accommodation, buy protective clothing for my employees and keep a record of all gold produced. All gold produced should be sold to Fidelity Printers. As an emerging miner I do not have such cash to meet all these requirements and again producing one gram of gold cost roughly Z\$28000, yet Fidelity Printers buys for Z\$16000 per gram (February, 2007). You cannot survive on that rate; surely we are in a fix. Its two months since I stopped working on this claim and this is affecting my family. I cannot even feed my family now because of this operation... Even gold ore that I had sent to the stamp mill has been confiscated by government and we hear that our ore will be milled and government will take thirty percent and we take seventy percent. Our seventy percent will be bought by the reserve bank at its own pre-determined price... From our association of small scale miners we were told that we should have an environmental Impact Assessment Report before one resumes mining. The cost of an EIA is five million and I cannot raise such kind of money when my claim is closed (Kumbulani, 15/05/07).

Yet a fundamental factor in the research area is that gold panning cuts across gender lines. For instance it is normal to find young and old women panning along rivers and streams in addition to selling their wares. It is a fact that in Lushongwe some middle aged women have taken to gold panning as an occupation in addition to their household chores.¹⁵² Some financially well off women have claims and hire energetic men to dig for gold. However in disused mines, panners are predominantly men. This is explained by the physical strength required, the dangers and risks associated with this type of panning. Furthermore my fieldwork data shows that within the community there are local buyers, who then sell gold to the barons/dealers from urban centres. However it is not all villagers who engage in gold panning. Those who have children in the diaspora depend on remittances courtesy of ‘omalayitsha’¹⁵³ that bring in rands, food and non food items from South Africa. In some instances, government frontline workers like teachers, agricultural extension workers, veterinary assistants, community development workers etc have either been involved as panners or local buyers, shunning their roles as development ‘brokers’ because of low remuneration.

Before I explain the implications of gold panning for rural livelihoods in southern Matabeleland let me demonstrate how Masilela’s household has survived on gold panning proceeds in the years between 2000 to 2006.

¹⁵² Eve Sithole an unmarried mother of ten children told me during fieldwork that while she attends the Vukani Women’s project on Wednesdays, the rest of the week pans along the Thuli River which is closer to her home.

¹⁵³ Omalayitsha are couriers who transport remittances in cash and kind from relatives working both legally and illegally in South Africa.

Masilela's household has 6 members with John Masilela (58) as the household head. Masibanda (54) is John's wife and their eldest son Themba who is 34 years works as a migrant worker in South Africa and is married to a South African woman and recently obtained South African Citizenship. He only comes home in December but remits home rarely through *omalayitsha*. Njabulo (29), Thabani (25) and Siphiwe (22) completed secondary education but could not get jobs in nearby towns. Sonangani the youngest is in form two in the local secondary school. After school Sonangani assists her mother with household chores and also partakes in the processing of her father's gold. The household had 15 cattle and twenty goats in 2000 but lost 5 cattle to the 2000/01 drought. They also lost 3 goats and sold 7 to cover household expenses. John decided to venture into gold panning as his peers were already engaged in the activity as a way of earning income for their households. Masibanda continues to work in her field despite the drought and helps her husband in the processing of gold ore (*ukusefa umkute*). In December 2000, Njabulo, Thabani and Siphiwe joined their father in the gold panning business. John does his panning along the Mtshabezi River while his three sons ply their trade in disused mine shafts near Vumbachikwe mine. John has managed to buy two more heifers from his gold proceeds and has managed to renovate his homestead by replacing the thatched roof with asbestos sheets. He has also bought seven goats and a scotch cart. The three sons have also built two roomed houses each in their fathers homestead and Njabulo has married and paid 'lobola' from gold proceeds during the first five years of his panning activity. However when the government launched *Chikorokoza Chapera* (2006), Masilela's household members who had been earning a living from gold panning, had their source of livelihood severely affected by the State policy. Nevertheless the Masilelas continue to dodge and bribe police officers in order to pursue their activity. John Masilela argued that if the Government does not provide alternative sources of a living he and his household members will continue panning to survive. He further argued that if government offered them more grazing land and livestock support he might decide to stop gold panning considering the taxing job involved in extracting gold and his age. By the close of my fieldwork, the four members in this household were still actively involved in gold panning and there was no indication that they would stop soon.

6:5 Implications to rural livelihoods

From the above case studies it is interesting to note that gold panning plays a significant role in contributing to the wellbeing of rural households in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts. The questions to ask are: How vulnerable are these people taking into account ownership of livelihood resources and existing institutional processes locally and nationally? What impact have these off farm activities had on agrarian transformation in the region?

The process of gold panning is not a one man affair as the case studies have revealed. To secure the final end product, which is gold for the market, gold panners organize themselves into groups of five or more so as to share the work load. We have seen how gold panners in a disused mine apportion their work in this activity. This creates strong social relations, more than the monetary gain as the end product. Those who are involved in gold panning share their proceeds with their households and their kinsmen. The work schedules devised underground for example in the case of disused mining, indicate that though the activity is illegal, panners have developed neatly bound social relations and accept the times set by the community underground. Networks manifest in the way gold panners are contracted by those with financial capital; the gold barons. Richards (1996) observed the same principle in diamond mining in Sierra Leone. These barons provide the 'poor' panners with explosives, food, and at times advance payment to meet household requirements among other financial requirements to run the activity. Panners decide on the price of a gramme of gold among themselves but the final price is pegged by black market dealers who buy the gold for external markets. In the research area gold is sold in local currency (ZimDollar) unlike in Angola, Congo-Zaire as De Boeck (1998) noted. However urban gold dealers are understood to smuggle the gold out to International dealers in South Africa and Botswana where they exchange it for foreign currency (American Dollars, Rand and Pula).¹⁵⁴ These dealers drive the latest car models; run liquor outlets in addition to owning small scale mines. They are regarded as 'the men' in Gwanda urban. According to Oliver they are well connected to politicians, the police and foreign buyers.

In the DRC in 1995 as De Boeck found the State unsuccessfully tried to introduce new rules for diamond buyers to fight the increasing dollarization of the economy, requiring that 50 percent of the traders' hard currency be lodged with the central bank, and that diamond deals

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Oliver a gold dealer in Gwanda town

take place in the New Zaire only. Dealers estimated that diamond purchases fell by as much as 70 per cent in October 1995 after new rules had been introduced. Since diamonds are one of the few sources of hard currency available, the Kengo Government was very quick to announce modifications to the new rules, allowing purchasers to buy diamonds in hard currency again (1998:787). In Zimbabwe for instance after the launch of *Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile*, the Bulawayo Chronicle (2006) reported that gold deposits to the Reserve Bank had been drastically reduced a clear indication of the level of contribution of small scale miners and gold panners to the central pool. Though small scale miners and gold dealers smuggled gold out of the country, at least they deposited some at the bank as a requirement for keeping one's licence.

Small scale miners are members of a small scale miners' association, a grouping struggling to sustainably run their mining operations as legal entities. The State laws, policies and regulations usually work against these miners as exemplified in the above case where stringent conditions have been set by the Ministry of Mines for one to maintain his/her mining permit.¹⁵⁵ From this premise, one is bound to argue that 'sustainable' livelihoods depend on how the local and national structures that formulate and regulate policy, impact on the access and use of natural resources by those in the periphery.

In this thesis, land has been made available in abundance to gold miners as the FTLRRP displaced commercial farmers. Some residents of Lushongwe took advantage of the programme to increase their livestock herds as more land was availed for grazing (official paddocks allocated by the land committee and poach grazing in A1 and A2 resettlements). Gold panners, both illegal and small scale, found solace in these acquired farms to intensify their activity. People like Kumbulani¹⁵⁶ even secured a claim and permit to legally pan for gold. Although Kumbulani has a claim, the land still belongs to the state and there is no way he can sell his claim to someone even though he has been affected by '*Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile*'. Land in this area is State land be it communal or newly acquired farms. For the illegal panners they work on this land illegally on the understanding that the land belongs to their ancestors and the Government's endeavour to curb their activity

¹⁵⁵ The Environment Management Agency a quasi government body has demanded that all small scale mines should have a detailed Environment Impact Assessment Report as a minimum requirement for operations to resume.

¹⁵⁶ Kumbulani is one of the small scale miners I interviewed on several occasions during the course of fieldwork at Lushongwe village in Gwanda district.

is tantamount to depriving them of the use of a common resource to eke out a living¹⁵⁷. Crop farming has proven to be unreliable in this part of the country as the rainfall pattern is erratic and unpredictable. The offer of some farms for livestock grazing is viewed as a positive step, hence some gold panners in this part of the country invest in livestock from their gold proceeds. De Boeck notes that some youngsters in Congo invest their money in more lasting things such as a parcel of land or some cattle, or construct a house for their parents (1998:769). Research carried out in this area indicates that not all gold panners invest their proceeds in livestock so as to increase their assets base and reduce vulnerability.¹⁵⁸ Again river bank panners and open cast gold diggers have not back-filled pits left behind after gold has been extracted thus destroying or depleting their natural resource base for themselves and future generations.

As non-agriculture based activity, gold panning does not enjoy the same privileges such as credit facilities or state support. For the panners to maintain their activity they depend on their rudimentary tools like picks, hoes and shovels to pan for gold. Even legal small scale miners do not receive state support and hence have no equipment to extract the amount of gold needed to sustain their activities. For instance some have been panning as legal small scale miners since 2001, but cannot save enough to buy just a drilling machine. The little they get they invest in livestock clearly showing their awareness of the need to diversify in case they are arrested by the police. Those who hire lorries to ferry their *istofu*, like for instance those practising ‘disused gold panning’ protests at the exorbitant transport costs which erode their profits. As a strategy gold panners enter into illegal contract panning with gold barons who provide them with explosives, food and even advance payment. The gold buyers also have the final say when determining the price of gold, clearly showing that the panners’ bargaining power is weak. Their financial capital is located outside their power as it were.

In the case studies it is evident that gold panning is a labour intensive activity which demands a healthy body. It is essential that when pursuing this laborious activity one has to be fit

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with gold panners indicate that they understand the land reform programme as empowering them to derive a living from their ancestral land that has been repossessed by the State on their behalf. They view all land as the ‘commons’ since the departure of former white farmers who were regarded as settlers on their ancestral land.

¹⁵⁸ Numerous encounters with gold panners and discussions with local business people show that gold panners are the highest spenders on alcohol and dating commercial sex workers (prostitutes). Their favourite music is rumba/kwasa kwasa. See also De Boeck (1998:793-796) for rumba songs by Congolese artist Pepe Kalle (*mwana Lunda*) and Koffi Olomide (*motete mosolo*) depicting the power of diamond dollars, alcohol and prostitutes.

physically and mentally. Scoones, 1998; Chambers and Conway, 1991 refer to human capital as the skills, knowledge, ability to labour, good health and physical capability important for the successful pursuit of different livelihood strategies. To the gold panners interviewed the ability to differentiate between gold and non-gold substances and sites is the first requirement to gainfully engage in this activity. The gold panners do not need to go to a formal workshop or course but rather learn from friends, relatives and connections engaged in the activity.¹⁵⁹ We have seen from the cases that physical strength is demanded and so is resilience when at the river bank or under a disused mine shaft. Under the disused mine shaft there is much blasting, cooking and dust exposing the panners to health hazards. These hazards manifest themselves as injuries and deaths when the shaft collapses or there is a rock fall. To the panners their health and safety comes second to getting at least a gramme of gold to provide for the household. Small scale miners enlist the services of knowledgeable gold panners in mining gold from their claims. Without these panners the activity will not reach fruition.

6:6 Institutional influences

As I have explained in the case studies, gold panning is an illegal activity that attracts law enforcement agents. In November 2006 Government launched operation *Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile*. This operation had negative consequences on the livelihoods of both illegal and small scale miners. The operation is indicative of how the state treats those in the margins. Instead of supporting those on the margins, the state, well aware that agrarian livelihoods especially crop farming is not viable in this semi-arid region, went ahead full force in an effort to stop this activity. However my fieldwork experience indicates that though the Government has launched this operation it does not have the human and financial resources to sustain it. What I mean here is that the police cannot be everywhere in this locality and hence gold panners play hide and seek with them. Some respondents acknowledged that they would continue dodging the police to pursue their only viable source of income in tough economic conditions that have also been exacerbated by the drought.

¹⁵⁹ Most people who had worked in the mines before are the ones who have taught others how to identify gold sites and gold. Currently in Southern Zimbabwe almost all residents now can distinguish between gold and non gold minerals.

Again police officers have been found on the wrong side of the law because as mentioned previously, they are open to bribery.¹⁶⁰ The action by police officers, I argue, is indicative that local processes have a bearing on state processes. As law enforcement agents they are supposed to implement state policies and regulations but their interaction, social relations, the processes that develop in panning sites, and the reality that indeed gold can change someone's life for the better, encourage acceptance of offers by gold panners and their barons. This to me shows that no matter how tight policing of gold panning is, people in this area place their hopes on gold panning as an income generating activity that can promote other livelihood coping strategies.

Scoones (1998), citing Richards (1989) asks the question-is one type of livelihood resource an essential precursor for gaining access to others? In this area the answer to this question is in the affirmative. With limited formal employment opportunities and limited 'formal' liquid cash in rural areas, rural businesses have prospered, and households have survived through the activities of gold panners. I argue that against all negative perceptions, gold panning has changed the financial landscape of the study area. People have bought livestock from gold proceeds, businesses in rural areas are thriving because of gold money and this has a bearing on the consumption levels of goods and services from urban areas. Good examples are women who order and sell food stuffs and clothing in these panning sites.¹⁶¹ Scoones (1998) further asks the questions-what are the trends in terms of availability of different types of livelihood resource? How are capital assets being depleted and accumulated, and by whom? What are the trends in terms of access? What new livelihood resources are being created through environmental, economic and social change? In a nutshell answers to these questions in this area reflect that gold panning with all the damage it might be causing to the environment viewed by State bureaucrats who have attempted to set rules and regulations to curb it, the people of Gwanda and Umzingwane it has improved their livelihood portfolio as has been debated in this section.

¹⁶⁰ Chronicle of 18 September, 2007 reported that 17 police officers were arrested in Chipinge for dealing in diamonds. Three of them were found with 30 pieces of diamonds and the rest had money ranging from Z\$144 000 to Z\$45,6m in their person of which Chief Superintendent Mandipaka strongly suspected that it was acquired through soliciting and bribery. Mandipaka noted that since the launch of Operation Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile small-scale miners and gold panners have been complaining that some police officers are enriching themselves by demanding bribes and stealing some minerals

¹⁶¹ Field observations and visits to gold panning sites

The extraction of gold has proven to be a better strategy than agrarian intensification as a sustainable livelihood outcome. Some people in the study area have forsaken agrarian activities especially crop farming because of climatic conditions and inadequate infrastructural developments such as dams and irrigation schemes to enable them to grow food sustainably. Gwanda and Umzingwane districts are drought prone and livestock rearing is more viable if properly managed than crop farming and hence some gold panners buy livestock from gold proceeds. Without State and donor support, people in these districts have not recovered from the devastating effects of the 1991/92 and 2000/01 droughts which saw thousands of livestock dying. It is therefore important to note that if a policy shift towards livestock intensification is not timeously adopted and implemented, people in this province will continue panning for gold illegally and the consequences on the environment cannot be overemphasized.

Migration of able bodied household members will also continue (if land based agrarian livelihoods continue dwindling), literally leaving rural areas inhabited by old aged people without the energy to fend for themselves. Married women will suffer most as they will have to perform their husbands home duties like herding cattle, repairing huts, attending village meetings, in addition to their usual household chores like cooking, fetching water and firewood amongst others. Respondents in Gwanda and Umzingwane have taken to gold panning as a livelihood pathway not as a result of a set of conscious choices but as a result of the unintended consequences of the land reform and climatic changes in recent years. The attempt by the State to control gold panning (*operation Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile*) and the subsequent reduction in gold deliveries to the Reserve Bank is indicative that gold panners are gaining centrality in national economic dynamics. I therefore conclude by re-asserting that gold panning although an illegal activity, is a strong source of income that increases the livelihood portfolio of some residents of Gwanda and Umzingwane districts.

6:7 Implications to those in the margins and the challenge of development change agents

There is a strong feeling by Government technocrats and RDCs that though gold panning helps people tackle issues of poverty, there is a need to protect the environment for future generations. One informant (Natural Resources Officer) had the following reservations on the impacts of the land reform and uncontrolled gold panning on the environment.

Mrs. Mlilo Natural Resources Officer

In my interview with Mrs. Mlilo in 2006 she noted that the districts (Gwanda and Umzingwane) were endowed with mineral resources especially gold, and as a result many small scale miners have been granted permits to prospect for gold in the newly acquired resettlement farms. She contended that nevertheless these small scale miners have brushed aside the government's policy of conducting an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) study before embarking on gold extraction in designated sites. This has led to widespread degradation of the catchment areas. In Mvana, Swazi and Garanyemba communal lands rivers have silted because of land degradation.

She further noted that newly resettled people cut down trees indiscriminately for firewood, hut construction, and for protecting fields etc. This to her was environmentally unfriendly and has led to loss of top soil, and to making the land vulnerable to degradation and erosion. She further noted that gold panning has resulted in many dams silting and drying up reducing downstream sources of livelihoods like irrigation schemes, nutrition gardens and cottage industries. In addition to siltation most rivers have been polluted by mercury deposits from the activities of gold panners as they wash their gold in rivers, thus threatening aquatic life. Mrs. Mlilo also suggested that resettled people overgraze their allocated farms/plots by lease grazing some livestock from communal farmers. For instance a cow is supposed to graze between 12 and 15 hectares per year, and most A2 plots or farms on average have a hectarage of 250ha, thus providing grazing of at least 20 head of cattle¹⁶². However field studies by livestock experts in the province have shown that self contained plot holders and A2 farm holders lease out part of their land and do not take cognizance of the land carrying capacity. This has resulted in overgrazing and damage to the environment. As an environmentalist Mrs. Mlilo contended that she has noticed that with the inception of the FTLRRP there has been friction between community and individual interests over who controls the land. There is now a tendency that individual control overrides community control of land.¹⁶³

The RDC relief farm at Doddieburn Manyoni and Chipitse has been invaded by illegal livestock grazers defeating the Councils' intentions to conserve the environment and supply

¹⁶² Briefing by livestock experts from the department of agriculture

¹⁶³ With the inception of the Fast Track Land Reform and Resettlement Programme new settled farmers believe they own the land and gold panners also believe the same and bureaucrats' endeavors for environment protection is a fallacy. Without traditional structures people in resettlements hold on to land for political reasons.

relief grazing to communal farmers during drought years and raising alarm on the 'need' for additional grazing land. Doddieburn farm has been invaded by poachers who hunt wild animals for consumption and for sale. Gold deposits within the farm has also increased the number of gold panners some of whom come from as far away as Masvingo province.

Poaching is destroying our natural heritage. If properly planned as was the case with the RDC prior to year 2000, wildlife farming is a lucrative venture for both the RDC and the local community. (Natural Resources Officer, 30/12/2006)

Stream bank cultivation has been heavily affected by river siltation depriving communities of a source of livelihood since some villagers had vegetable gardens at specific points of the river banks such as Mtshabezi, Thuli, Swazi and Ncema rivers. The Natural Resources Officer also told me that some resettled farmers have a bad attitude towards environment protection, for instance when conducting environment education sessions and extension work; newly settled plot holders challenge officers politically on the credibility of protecting the environment at the expense of people's livelihoods. They believe as party cadres they deserve the right to use the land as they see fit. Mrs. Mlilo believes that if political re-orientation and extension education is done on the advantages of environment protection for sustainable rural livelihoods, the FTLRRP will have a positive impact on poverty alleviation. With the inception of the Environment Management Act requiring that any major development project that has an impact on the environment should have an EIA document, she believed degraded farms could be rehabilitated.

"I however don't know how gold panning can be stopped because according to the mines and minerals act, is illegal, and hence an EIA cannot be done for such activities"; Explained Mrs. Mlilo.

When I interviewed Mrs. Mlilo again in 2007 she expressed gratitude to the Government's launch of *Chikorokoza Chapera/Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile* as the environment had been badly damaged by gold panning. She recommended that police should let those found illegally panning rehabilitate the environment as part of their sentence rather than sending them to prison for two years. She noted that since the launch of this operation a large number of small scale miners have flocked to her department for assistance in carrying out an EIA of their claims. She believes with all small scale miners now required by law to have a complete EIA

report before they resume their operations is a positive step towards conserving the already degraded landscape of most areas in the districts. She however objected that illegal gold panning was continuing in areas with gold deposits along the banks of major rivers like Thuli and Mtshabezi. This activity is continuing under the cover of darkness and in some cases police officers are bribed by the panners who are then left to continue degrading the environment

Asked on the way forward for her department, she noted that they have organised a number of community awareness workshops for resettled A1 and A2 farmers. She explained that the workshops will be held first at ward level moving on to village level so as to reach every community member. Veld fires are still a major threat to the environment as poachers continue setting fires to catch small wild life like bucks and hares. Dam siltation is still a major challenge for sustainable livelihoods for communities in Gwanda. *“Government should initiate an extensive dam rehabilitation programme that will see most dams scooped off silt so as to provide water for livestock, human beings and wild animals.”* Asked on how she views communities participating in these programmes, she believed if traditional leaders were mobilized and asked to resuscitate conservation committees, community participation would be enlisted.

Of course Mrs. Mlilo gave me her side of the story as a government bureaucrat. In other words as a ‘broker’ between the State and the community; she tended to be more concerned with the broad objectives of her institution and believed environment protection would increase the chances of sustainable livelihoods. But with dwindling rural livelihoods, especially agrarian livelihoods, my informants who eke out a living from gold panning had other thoughts about environment protection vis-a-viz fending for their households. For instance, Silambile, representing sentiments echoed by a number of gold panners I interacted with during the course of my fieldwork, refuted her department’s heavy handed stance on their activity:

We will not stop digging for gold because our families will starve. There is no need for government workers to teach us conservation measures yet we do not have food on the table to feed our families. They are better than us because they are assured of a salary at the end of the month but what about us who have no jobs, our children have no jobs and her department can’t employ them, in fact one of my sons who was employed as a game ranger by the department of natural resources has been retrenched and looked for a job in vain until he jumped the

border to South Africa to look for work. Of course he is doing menial jobs in Johannesburg and hardly sends money and groceries to us, but is better than rotting here. Ukutshketsha (gold panning) has really led to many households surviving these tough times. If it was not for this god given job, I don't know how many household would have lost lives. Maybe if the government gives us and our children alternative employment we will stop panning because for sure is a risky and laborious way of earning a living (Silambile, 14/02/06)

People living in the margins have been caught in a predicament as they struggle to earn a living from the environment. The uses of environment unfriendly methods of gold extraction for example, have seen much of the grazing land destroyed and rivers silted and polluted. To the environmentalists like Mrs. Mlilo, they need to be penalised or alternatively trained in best practices so as to save the environment. Traditionalists also bemoan the wanton destruction of indigenous medicinal tree species which were normally found in the then thick forests of former commercial farms. However to those who survive on the exploitation of the natural resource base, land, believe environment protection reduces their chances of escaping vulnerability. People have drifted away from traditional agrarian livelihoods as a result of climatic conditions and non-sustainability of these activities towards more unorthodox means of livelihood like gold panning and tree felling for firewood resale in urban centres. I argue that those in the periphery have no alternative as State policies do not create a conducive environment for them to earn a decent livelihood. While politicians, bureaucrats, civil society and even researchers attribute a marginalized status to gold panners, they are not simply passive recipients of this status. For example, in a study of a sapphire mining town in Madagascar, Walsh (2003:290) describes how artisanal miners' lives are plagued by crime, disease, and the high cost of living, but they are in a place they "claim [they] thrive, some likening themselves to outlaws, renegades or frontiersmen and their town to locales in an imaginary, anarchic, B-movie America." Walsh proceeds to argue that such men refuse the roles allotted to them by forces outside their control, choosing instead to 'live as active respondents to conditions of everyday life'. In this study as indicated earlier on I found that gold panners were high spenders on alcohol and prostitutes and it was common to find them fighting over prostitutes in business centres like Makwe, Lushongwe and Esigodini. These young men without a position for themselves in a rural agrarian society, find social esteem and respect through gold mining, violence and consumption of expensive brands of alcohol. For instance one gold panner even boasted that he could pay the salaries of all 20 teachers at Makwe primary school with a week's proceeds from his panning activity. Similarly, Richards

(1996, 2004) describes how in Sierra Leone, young men gain respect through diamond mining, violence and consumption of western consumer goods and imagery.

6:8 Conclusions

The argument in this chapter is that people have engaged in gold panning because of the uncertainty of agrarian livelihoods in southern Matabeleland. The fact that the land reform programme has not addressed the most pressing needs of residents of this region; that is grazing land and the construction of dams to promote irrigations, people have resorted to gold panning as a coping strategy to escape vulnerability. What should be noted however is that some of the people who engage in this activity invest in livestock, an indication that livestock livelihoods occupy a high position in livelihood rankings of people of southern Matabeleland. People of this region can convert cash into cattle if the cash is available. But the fact that gold is bought by gold barons who have the financial capital marginalises buyers from southern Matabeleland since very few have the financial capital to buy at higher prices and this has resulted in most of the gold from southern Matabeleland being bought by buyers from Harare.

The other issue here is that though the state views environmental protection as paramount for sustainable rural development, to gold panners the extraction of gold has proved to be a better strategy than agrarian intensification in order to realise temporary livelihood outcomes as a result of an inappropriate agrarian reform model for this area. People in the study area have forsaken some agrarian activities especially crop farming because of climatic conditions and a lack of infrastructural development such as dams and irrigation schemes to enable them to grow food. As I argued, Gwanda and Umzingwane districts are drought prone and livestock rearing is more viable if properly managed than crop farming.

In conclusion one can infer that maintenance of the environment is important provided those who derive their livelihood from it are well positioned, and assisted with capital resources to sustainably exploit their natural resource-land. The land reform programme has opened up corridors for hope of the rural poor but skewed State policies and processes have not supported this hope. Respondents in Gwanda and Umzingwane have taken to gold panning as a livelihood pathway, not as a result of set and conscious choices but as a result of the

unintended consequences of the land reform and obscure State policies towards Matabeleland as a region.

Chapter 7

Migration and land reform

7:1 Introduction

My argument in this chapter is that although people from southern Matabeleland have been working as migrant workers in South Africa for decades, the land reform programme has accelerated the rate of emigration in the study districts in pursuit of livelihoods in other countries notably South Africa. The impact of wider diaspora movement in response to lack of employment opportunities and economic crisis has increased migration. The fact that land redistribution in southern Matabeleland has been done on a client-patron basis has seen some people from this region migrating despite the fact that livestock livelihoods are their mainstay. The issue is that grazing land has not been availed to these pastoralists by the state and its state apparatus and hence this exodus. Nyathi (2001) contends that although the Rhodesian whites had, in a referendum in 1922, chosen 'Responsible Government' rather than become a province of the Union of South Africa, the link between the two countries was strong (2006:2). The links took various forms. Before colonization some Ndebele went to South Africa to work in diamond mines at Kimberly and also in the gold mines in the Witwatersrand. Rhodesian males went to South Africa in search of jobs. This was heightened in the period following the great depression of 1929. The other attraction was educational opportunities, both at secondary and university levels. Many of the returning Rhodesian students and workers alike brought South African wives, for example Herbert Chitepo and Masotsha Ndlovu. This further consolidated links between the two nations. At the same time, there were South Africans who came to Southern Rhodesia as part of the Evangelization crusade, for instance, Reverend Ramushu (Methodist Church); Bernard Mizeki (Anglican Church); Reverend Makgatho (African Methodist Episcopal). The trend continued and accelerated in the 1970s when large numbers of African men were recruited to work in gold mines under the scheme known as *Wenela* (chapter 6). In recent years, as Zimbabweans face economic hardships, more and more of them are seeking employment in South Africa, Botswana and further afield.

Sisulu and others in (Buhlungu, Daniel, Southall and Lutchman, 2007) argue that since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, there have been three waves of migration of

Zimbabweans to South Africa. The first consisted of white people who left Zimbabwe after ZANU-PF's victory in the 1980 elections. The ascendancy of the much feared guerrilla leader, Robert Mugabe, resulted in the emigration of large numbers of white people who were not prepared to co-exist with a former guerrilla government. Other white people were not prepared to live under a black government. During this period emigrating whites sold their properties in towns and the countryside and in many cases at give away prices. It was during this period that government with the assistance of the United Kingdom bought some former white owned commercial farms for resettlement. Most of those farms sold in region 1 were allocated to the ruling party elite¹⁶⁴

The second wave was made up of Ndebele refugees who fled the Gukurahundi massacres that took place in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the south-western areas of Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1987 (chapter 2). These refugees entered apartheid South Africa at the time illegally so there is little documentation of numbers. Their cultural and linguistic affinity with the Zulu community enabled them to settle largely unnoticed in South Africa and many took South African identities, some of them through unlawful means (Sisulu et al 2007:534). During this Gukurahundi era many young Ndebele professionals frustrated by nepotism and regionalism in employment opportunities also trekked down south to secure employment. Disgruntled former ZIPRA combatants deserted the national army and fearing charges of treason, jumped the border to South Africa. With the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s, a lot of professionals especially medical staff and scientists emigrated to South Africa in search of better paying jobs.

The third wave of migration in which this research has much interest is the current massive emigration by both professionals and non professionals who have left Zimbabwe since 2000 as a result of economic crisis and the FTLRRP. Although the study focused mainly on Matabeleland, the current wave as noted by Sisulu and others has embraced the whole country. Prior to the year 2000, Sisulu acknowledges that it was rare to hear of someone speaking *Shona* the dominant language in Zimbabwe in Hillbrow; but nowadays it is like one of South Africa's languages. There are also enterprising people who are actively engaged in cross border trading through normal channels. In Gwanda and Umzingwane Shona women (mostly from resettlement areas) and Ndebele women (both resettlement and communal)

¹⁶⁴ See Barry 2005

have actively practised this trade since the economic crisis accelerated after the implementation of the FTLRRP. Dwindling sources of livelihoods in the villages also forced even the not so enterprising people, irrespective of gender, to this trade. However most of these are women, and reviewed literature indicate that these women end up having second marriages in South Africa (Sisulu et al 2007) to boost their cash flow, an issue I address under women as informal cross border traders.

7:2 *Born again!*

Alan Moyo is one of the young men working in South Africa using documents obtained through unscrupulous means. He hails from Garanyemba communal area and I had the opportunity to interview him firstly in December 2005 and then in subsequent years during my fieldwork. Alan told me that he had tried all avenues to secure employment in Bulawayo but in vain and hence in 1997 decided to ‘border jump’ to South Africa. He contends that the driving force behind him engaging in such an activity was lack of employment opportunities; he needed to support himself and his family. He contends that when he went to South Africa for the first time he crossed the crocodile infested Limpopo River and had to walk as far as Makhado (Louis Trichardt) where he got a lift to Johannesburg. He had spent three days and nights in the bush evading South African security forces.

When he arrived in Johannesburg he was accommodated by a relative in Hillbrow for two months while the relative sorted out his papers. When the papers (identity document) came his new name was *Jabulani Khuzwayo* and he was warned to use the name Alan only in company of trustworthy homeboys. He was further drilled on the geography of rural Kwazulu Natal as he had to become familiar with the location of his ‘new rural home’ in case he was asked by the police. Having studied art and printing at Mzilikazi Art and Craft Centre in Bulawayo, he was a qualified printer and artist and fortunately was put in touch with a printing company by a friend. He started working as a general hand for a year until one day a white guy saw one of his drawings by chance; from then onwards he has been employed as a printer in a large firm in Johannesburg.

Armed with the rand and a new identity document, Alan secured a South African passport which has made his movements in and out of Zimbabwe and South Africa easy. Alan had these words to say when I interviewed him in December 2005:

“My brother as I have told you about my history to South Africa I would like to highlight the fact that I work there to support my family. Currently I am a proud owner of 30 herds of cattle which I bought from my wages in South Africa. As you know that in our area a person is said to be working and a real man if he owns livestock. If it was not for lack of employment opportunities here at home I would have stayed because Johannesburg is a dangerous city. I have managed to move out of my father’s homestead and built mine,” pointing at his well build six roomed brick under asbestos house in the middle of Mtandawenema village.

He continued;

I have managed to install solar panels and I can watch television when I am right here in the reserves. I remit to my wife and mother every month something like a thousand rand and of course plus groceries. During the drought I had to even send home maize meal, sugar and flour as these commodities were in short supplies here... But I am very disappointed by the current land reform programme because it has taken away the farms we had earmarked for grazing and settled people from urban areas. We thought the land reform will give us Shoka and Timber farms so as to graze our livestock; but to my surprise these farms have been given to outsiders. Even when these farms were still owned by whites we were able to lease graze during the dry season... Worse still the few paddocks we were given by the government have been overgrazed since all fences have been stolen. Now we are left in the cold and for sure a lot of young men from my village will border jump. I have already sorted out documents for my two young brothers and they will be joining me in Gauteng in January 2006 when I return to work (Alan Moyo, 23/12/05).

Alan’s household is one of the well off ones among poor villagers of Mtandawenema whose livelihood depends on remittances from his formal job in South Africa. Livestock, especially goats are slaughtered when relish runs dry and members are assured of three meals a day unlike households of people trying a livelihood without additional sources of livelihood. The runaway inflation and subsequent price increases in basic commodities has rendered many households in this village vulnerable. The ‘value’ of the rand as displayed by people in the research area like Alan (who drives a luxurious car, nice homestead etc) has enticed a lot of youngsters to migrate to South Africa.

In Makwe, every homestead has a daughter or son who is either working in South Africa or has once worked there. Meketsi is such a person who worked as a security guard for eight years in Johannesburg until he was deported for illegal entry in 1998.

As long the situation does not change in Zimbabwe young people will continue border jumping. How do you expect them to survive? We depended on the irrigation scheme but in 2005 operation Maguta destroyed our horticulture and we are now forced to grow maize and wheat only. There are no jobs in the country and young men had resorted to gold panning to survive but in November 2006 the police launched operation Chikorokoza Chapera; so young people will risk all the dangers associated with illegal entry into South Africa (Meketsi, 12/12/06).



Figure 7:1 Alan, on orange attire and his relatives in Gwanda town during Christmas holidays in 2006

Photo:-by the author

Diaspora wealth is normally displayed during Christmas holidays in the study area. On Christmas day of 2006, I observed this display in Makwe when '*injiva*' as those working in South Africa are referred to with their splashy spending and flashy cars. For instance on this day the Makwe business centre resembled a motor show room in Johannesburg when a fleet of the latest models like the Hammer H2s, BMWs and 4x4s Land Rover Discoveries graced the usually quiet centre. The centre vibrated all night long as the *Injiva* played the latest CDs from *Jozi* in their posh cars. Of interest is that all *injiva* car number plates had the suffix-GP, clearly indicating their origin-Gauteng Province. Some locals refer to the suffix as depicting 'Gun Point' thus associating the province with guns, murder and robberies. This scenario is common in growth points and business centres across Matabeleland during the festive season. This attraction and the high life style has enticed young men and women to leave rural Matabeleland to seek what they view as a better life in neighbouring South Africa, Botswana and even as far afield as the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The youth and generally the unemployed have tended to emigrate and believe crop farming is a waste of time considering the climatic conditions while working in South Africa will increase their financial capital so that they can buy livestock. It is a fact that lowly paid civil servants (extension workers) working in Gwanda and Umzingwane has of late joined the migration trail. The youth from the research areas and indeed across the region of Matabeleland have emigrated citing economic hardship in Zimbabwe since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1990s which has been further compounded by sanctions imposed on the country because of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.

While those working illegally in South Africa could not travel home for the festive season (like Thokozani), for among other reasons, fear of arrest at the Beitbridge border post for possession of fake documents, they send items home for their loved ones through couriers popularly known as '*omalayitsha*'. They also send the rand for exchange in the parallel market.¹⁶⁵ By December 2006, one hundred rands fetched thirty thousand Zimbabwe dollars on the black market, an attractive rate by any standards at that time. The couriers charge twenty percent of the value of groceries sent home as courier fees.¹⁶⁶ Thokozani's father had these words to say about his household and son;

¹⁶⁵ Recently the formal use of the rand and USA Dollar has not deterred those in the diaspora from sending money home.

¹⁶⁶ Fieldwork notes and observations, 2005, 2006 and 2007.

I am a poor man with 3 cattle and two donkeys. I use the donkeys for draught power if the rains fall. Most time of the year I depend on food handouts from World Vision. I have tried gold panning but I have never realised more than three grammes and this means that what I get I sell and buy food and there is nothing left to buy cattle though I envy having more cattle like Alan. Thokozani left for South Africa in 2003 after losing his job as a farm worker. He used to supplement my household income and also brought some meat and milk from his former employer, Mr. Steward who owned Konongwe farm... I bought a heifer from Mr. Steward in January in 1998 while Thokozani was still working there... Thokozani only sends groceries once a year in December and notes that he hardly gets much to sustain himself in South Africa. He hardly remits home during the course of the year... If government can give me a cattle loan I will be very happy. I do not believe that Thokozani will ever get a high paying job to support us and I blame all this on the land reform programme that has seen white commercial farmers who were supportive to my livelihood chased away. This has led to people like my son Thokozani venturing into the unknown and giving little support to my household requirements... The land reform has made my household even more vulnerable than it was before it as I also seasonally worked in Stewards farm harvesting potatoes to earn extra income. This is all gone; I am just surviving by the grace of god” (Moyo Thokozani’s father, 28/05/ 2006).

Migration to South Africa has accelerated in my study areas of Gwanda and Umzingwane. The major concern of the household members I interviewed was lack of employment opportunities and the desperate economic situation prevailing in the country. For instance, I traced Moyo’s household and how some of the household members have been forced to migrate to South Africa and also show how their remittances have contributed to the welfare of the Moyo household in Swazi in Umzingwane district. Moyo is a sixty seven year old man married to Mantombi who is sixty three years old. The elder son Bheki is 40 years old and was retrenched in 2005 from Vumbachikwe mine. He ventured into gold panning as an alternative since he could not find any other job. He had worked for 7 years as a miner and it was easy for him to engage in gold panning since he knew what was and was not gold. Bheki is married with two children but still stays at his parents homestead. He is regarded by his father as the ‘father’ of the household. Bheki and his family cook together with his parents and when I talked to him on the possibility of moving out of his father’s homestead he told me that he is there to inherit his father’s homestead as he is the first born. He uses his gold panning proceeds to support the Moyo’s household and has also bought cattle from gold panning earnings. Thabani and Sithembiso are Moyo’s other two children. Thabani 35 left Swazi in December, 2000 for South Africa after having been arrested several times for gold panning and he says that during that period he had no choice as some of his peers had crossed the Limpopo River illegally in 1998 and were sending remittances home through *omalayitsha*

and their families were surviving on these remittances. Thabani secured employment as a petrol attendant in Midrand, having secured a South African Identity Document through fraudulent means. From 2001 to 2006, Thabani has managed to remit money to his parents though not much compared to the cost of living in Zimbabwe (2006). In order to cushion his parents from exhausting the 300 rand (as most food items were sold at black market prices) he usually remitted money home every three months during his first two years of working in South Africa. More recently, Thabani sends mealie meal, sugar, potatoes, soap, and other groceries every two months through *omalayitsha* instead of cash. Moyo informed me that what Thabani sends home is not enough and at times he claims that he has sent money and groceries but those goods have not arrived. At times they arrive with a lot of food items missing and he blames *omalayitsha* as the culprits. Moyo also informed me that Thabani's remittances were regular in his first two years in South Africa but currently (2006), he has been making empty promises. Sithembile joined her brother in Gauteng in December, 2003. She also managed to secure a South African identity document and works at a supermarket in Thembisa. In 2004 Sithembile gave birth to a baby girl and the father of the child refused responsibility; she brought her back home and left her with her mother when she was six month old since she had no one to look after the child while she was at work. She returned to her job but of late has been remitting home irregularly. Moyo informed me that remittances by his two children working in South Africa do not meet his household needs and at times if Bheki fails to get gold, they encounter serious food shortages. He argues that he does not blame his children for irregular remittances as they also have to pay rent and buy food with their meager wages from their employment. Instead when the remittances do not come and Bheki fails to get gold he sells goats and at times cattle to buy food for the household.

Dube's household has seen a great improvement in their lifestyle as his three sons working in South Africa remit home regularly. Dube acknowledges that his two sons remit at least a thousand rands every two months for household food and non-food items. He noted that this money contributes about 50% of their household income. Every December since 2002 his sons have each given him two thousand rands to purchase cattle. He argues that if it was not for the implementation of the land grab from white commercial farmers, probably his children could have secured employment in nearby towns; but because of the land reform a lot of industries in towns such as Bulawayo and Gwanda were closed down as the white owners feared that they would be victimised by the Mugabe government as was the case with

white owned commercial farms. Dube informed me that he had not benefitted from the land reform programme because he like other villagers of Gwakwe in Wenlock communal land, still graze their livestock in the old 'reserve' common grazing land that has been overgrazed over the years. His twenty herds of cattle are thin because of lack of pastures. He told me that the distribution of land should have considered people who were removed from commercial farms such as Konongwe, Mvana, and Nyandeni during the colonial rule first in deciding on the use of the farms. In other words Dube favoured a land restitution resettlement model that would have provided him and his kinsmen with more land for livestock rearing. Dube argued that his sons gave him money to buy cattle but he has managed to buy three out of a possible ten since people rarely sell cattle in these days of hyper inflation (2006). He wanted to convert his sons' 'money' into cattle but could not since commercial farmers who sold heifers had vacated land and their livestock had been either killed, stolen or taken over by the new occupiers.

Working illegally in South Africa has its own disadvantages as the risk of deportation is high. The couriers are also involved in clandestine dealings and it is not uncommon to hear of young girls being raped on the understanding that they would be transported safely to South Africa by '*omalayitsha*'. These couriers also embezzle the rands sent home and at times claim that the money and goods were confiscated at Beitbridge border post.

7:3 Deportees: A vicious circle!

During my field work, I had the opportunity to visit the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) center in Beitbridge to assess issues happening at the centre. The IOM is a non-governmental organization which was introduced in Zimbabwe in 1985 to rehabilitate deportees and migrants. However, it seems the battle is far from over as the matter is turning out to be a vicious circle. A few metres from the centre I was overtaken by speeding South African trucks kicking up a cloud of dust before they parked next to a fence some 100 metres away. On the right hand side of the road there were at least ten (10) Toyota Venture vehicles parked in between small bushes where groups of young men were passing time playing cards. Another group suddenly crossed the road just ahead of me towards the fence, a short distance away from some wooden office structures and a huge tent inscribed World Food Programme.

As I prepared to park just behind the last truck, a South African police officer disembarked from the front passenger seat and went to the back of the South African trucks to open the heavy door. Out jumped more than 50 young men in single file. Some were empty handed, while some had a few pieces of luggage.

They all sheepishly followed another police officer and a plain clothed man into the premises of IOM where there were some makeshift buildings. Under another huge tent there were over 200 young men and women having a meal. Everyone was up and about and the place was a hive of activity with vehicles moving in and out of the premises.

Interviews with IOM staff revealed that about a thousand Zimbabweans are deported daily from South Africa and are received at the centre where they receive counseling and assistance to return to their original homes in hired buses. However evidence from the centre reveal that most of them shun the assistance, leave the centre and cross back to South Africa with the assistance of human traffickers known as *omalayitsha* who have virtually set up base just outside the IOM centre where they tout for clients in a shocking turn of irony.

To raise money for their return trips to South Africa, the deportees are in the habit of selling the food they are given at the centre and some women engage in prostitution. I witnessed some deportees flocking to *omalayitsha* vehicles soon after arrival at the centre. IOM staff contend that some people have been deported three or four times and seem to enjoy the trend because each time they reach the centre, they return easily to South Africa, courtesy of the human traffickers. Beitbridge police said the IOM centre should have been established further inland so that people could be rehabilitated properly and thus reduce the chances of the deportees returning easily.

“I feel the centre should have been put further inland away from the border so that chances of deportees skipping back to South Africa are reduced,” (Officer Commanding Beitbridge Police, 15/12/06).

Some deportees I interviewed said they will always return to South Africa as there were more employment opportunities there and the South African rand was more valuable.

“What do you expect me to do? I will go back because that’s the only way I can survive. There are no jobs, the few that are there in my area in Gwanda are given

to 'green bombers'¹⁶⁷, so I will rather die 'Egoli' trying to earn a living than remain at home. Some of my friends like Siphiwe and Thomas have been killed by crocodiles while crossing the Limpopo and hence I use 'omalayitsha' who are safer" (interview with one Youngman in his 20s from Garanyemba village in Gwanda, 17/12/06).

On the other hand by the end of May 2007 Abdiker Mohammed, chief of the Zimbabwe mission for the Geneva based International Organisation of Migration in a report in Washington noted with concern the increase in the number of Zimbabweans emigrating because of the land reform programme. He argued that most of the emigrants find sanctuary in South Africa where the reception is not always rosy or welcoming.¹⁶⁸

He argued that a new round of land seizures and a crackdown on political opposition are accelerating Zimbabwe's already-massive refugee crisis, and noted that constitutional changes approved by the government of President Robert Mugabe have meant more land seizures and more refugees, many of whom have fled to the country's neighbors in search of work (See Consequential Act 2006 in chapter 3).

"The government can take land at any time under the constitution, and that has a ripple effect," said Mr. Abdiker, who had been the migration agency's chief man in Zimbabwe for more than four years. *"Until the seizures stop, the refugee problem will continue."*

Mr. Abdiker said in a Washington briefing that the surging number of refugees fleeing Zimbabwe's economic crisis often face robbery, exploitation, rape and other hardships across the border in South Africa.

South Africa has sharply accelerated the forced return of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants, from 4,000 a month in 2004 to 15,000 a month (2007). Mr. Mugabe's Government has faced international condemnation for a series of property seizures since 2000, targeting first the country's most productive white commercial farmers and then residents of poor, largely black

¹⁶⁷ Green Bombers are those who undergo national service at the ten youth training centres across the country. In Gwanda district these youths are trained at Guyu a former army barrack and people's militia training base. This base also facilitated the atrocities committed by the Gukurahundi in the 1980s.

¹⁶⁸ See Washington Times of 23 May 2007.

urban slums.¹⁶⁹ Human rights' groups charge that top officials of Mr. Mugabe's Government have personally profited from the expropriations.

Zimbabwe under Mr. Mugabe has gone from being the region's breadbasket to an international economic basket case, with annual inflation topping 3,000 percent, massive food and power shortages, and unemployment estimated at 90 percent or higher. The Government in Harare blames much of its hardship on sanctions imposed by the United States and top European countries (The Washington Times, 23 May 2007).

Mr. Abdiker said Zimbabweans routinely report cases of abuse and exploitation when they travel illegally to South Africa, seeking work in the country's booming construction and agriculture businesses. Without passports or other documentation, they have no legal standing to protest their treatment.

In some cases, South African employers hire the refugees, work them for a month, and then turn them into the authorities the day before they are supposed to be paid. Young Zimbabwean girls have been lured to Johannesburg with promises of employment, only to be forced into prostitution. Some Zimbabwean women have been found working in brothels as far away as Egypt and Vietnam. The IOM official said his agency had received generally good cooperation from the Mugabe government in handling the return of illegal immigrants from South Africa and elsewhere. The agency provides counseling, health care, meals and a bus ride home for those forced to return from South Africa.

South Africa has been criticized for not challenging Mr. Mugabe's increasingly authoritarian rule and economic policies, although there is growing unhappiness in Pretoria with the flood of illegal immigrants coming from Zimbabwe. South African President Thabo Mbeki acknowledged in May 2007 that many of the returned refugees were back in South Africa within weeks.

While the IOM is nonpartisan, Mr. Abdiker said the only long-term solution to the problem was major economic and political reform inside Zimbabwe. *"There is no way you are going*

¹⁶⁹ United Nations under Secretary responsible for human settlement, Anna Kajimulo Tibaijuka, made a detailed report on 'operation Restore Order' Murambatsvina and its effects on human habitat and livelihoods in July 2005. The report revealed that the operation displaced over 700 000 people leaving them homeless and without means of a living.

to stop illegal immigration or internal migration until there is a major change in Zimbabwe itself," he said.

Migration has seen some of my informants being deported. I give an example of Tshuma who had been deported several times from South Africa. Tshuma lost his parents in 1984 during the Gukurahundi era and was left to look after his two brothers and a sister. Tshuma is 45 years old and married with two children aged 15 and 18. Masala his wife is a housewife and spends her time doing household chores and sometimes does gold panning in the nearby Ncema River. What Masala gets from sieving 'impara' left by other gold panners is little. Tshuma in 2001 illegally crossed the Limpopo and got a job on one of the farms near Musina. He worked for three months without pay and when he asked when he would be paid, he was surprised to learn from the farm owner a Mr. Voster that illegal immigrants can be paid when he feels they can be paid. He nevertheless was promised his payment at the end of the fourth month. Come the fourth month pay day, Mr Voster, instead of paying Tshuma brought in members of the South African Police Services who arrested Tshuma for illegal entry to South Africa. He was deported and returned home empty handed. He tried gold panning but was always unable to realise a reasonable amount of gold that could support his household. After six months, Tshuma returned to South Africa and got a job as a labourer at another farm owned by a Mr De Wet; he was paid regularly for the first six months of 2002 and could sneak back home by border jumping at Shashe and the Limpopo rivers' confluence. Although his farm wages of R600 per month was little to him, it was better than staying at home. He would change his rands on the 'black market' and use the millions of Zimbabwe dollars to buy food and non food items. The problem was that these items were very expensive and were only obtainable at 'black market' rates. In 2004 Tshuma was arrested again for illegal entry and was once more deported. He was caught shopping at Musina and was deported with only the clothes he was wearing but fortunately the police did not take away his R1200. When he was dropped off to the authorities on the Zimbabwean side he was made to pay R200 by police who threatened to arrest him for border jumping. He complied and was released. He boarded a taxi and returned home with only R900 after having spent three months without remitting home

So Tshuma's household has not benefitted as they expected from his working in South Africa. His two children dropped out of school due to lack of school fees and learning materials. Master, his first born also border jumped to South Africa in 2006, and Tshuma is

worried because he has not heard from him since then. He is not sure whether he survived the crocodile infested Limpopo or was arrested or was killed by ‘amagumaguma’¹⁷⁰. Tshuma told me that his household finds it difficult to make ends meet. He acknowledges that he is a poor and uneducated man but he has the brains to rear cattle if ever the cattle loan schemes were fairly given. He said people from Mashonaland have been given cattle loan schemes and some of them have bought cattle from his fellow villagers. He said they are also the ones who have been given farms taken over from white farmers. Tshuma was very disappointed by the whole land reform process as he noted that he has not benefitted anything; instead he has lost some seasonal job opportunities he used to get from commercial farmers. To him the land reform has worsened his life as he and his household are struggling to survive.

I blame the land grab of commercial farms by the Mugabe government for my plight. These new black so called farmers are not working the land as such they can't employ us seasonally as was the case before this Fast Track. Whites have migrated elsewhere and we are the ones who are suffering now. I really do not support this whole exercise because we are now poorer than before because of this land grab. I was trying to eke out a livelihood from farms in South Africa (since I have experience in farm work) but that did not work. At the moment (2006) I am struggling to look after my family and surely the government has let me down. I have even sold some of my goats to buy food and what kind of a rural dweller can I be without livestock? It is stressing me and at times I even contemplate suicide when I see my wife and 15 year old daughter eating tree roots to survive. It did not happen during the days of Stanton because I could ask for advance payment in maize meal and sugar so that my family can have something for the pot. If things remain like this I will try once more to cross to South Africa because I have to be man enough to look after my family,” he said wiping tears from his eyes (Tshuma 20/10/06).

Judging by the above cases, one is bound to argue that the Land Reform programme has exacerbated the migration of people from the research area. They do not leave their land because they do not like it but are forced by dwindling agrarian livelihoods at home. Those who settle in South Africa legally are not afraid of coming back home to remit to their loved ones. But those who are illegal residents use fake documents and in the process, they bribe South African Immigration officers to let them through so as to see their loved ones and probably invest their savings back home like Alan. Those who are not connected, especially those who illegally crossed to South Africa after the year 2000 depend on “omalayitsha” to remit groceries and the rand back home occasionally. However those who do not have the

¹⁷⁰ Amagumaguma is a local slang word meaning human traffickers. From stories and my personal experience ‘amagumaguma’ are very rough people and are not afraid of killing clients who do not pay for their services the correct amount. At times they take one’s money and dump the victim in the Limpopo River.

networks and connections are victims of abuse by white commercial farmers in South Africa, for instance the case of Tshuma. Again some are caught and deported and find themselves in a dilemma to pay the authorities and the police for their freedom because of illegal border jumping. From this evidence I argue that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has not only seen the majority of commercial farmers migrating to other countries but has also seen significant numbers of men and women from southern Matabeleland either seasonally migrating or permanently migrating to South Africa and other countries. The economic crisis nationally has worsened the plight of residents of southern Matabeleland bearing in mind the marginal status they have been accorded by the state and its development apparatus (see chapter 1 and 2). However as a coping strategy some men and women strive hard to get the required travel documents to South Africa and ply their trade occasionally as is illustrated in the next section on cross border trading.

7:4 Women as cross-border traders

From a historical perspective, migration to countries such as South Africa was largely practised by men. Yet the economic hardships that have been compounded by the Fast Track Land Reform have seen some women engaging in either permanent or circular migration. Some women do find work (different types) in South Africa and others pursue their careers, while a significant number of women have turned to informal cross border trading to cushion them from the economic crisis experienced in Zimbabwe during the fieldwork for this study. Though cross border trading had been dominated by urban women, of late rural women have joined the trade. Some rural women take goods such as curios and edible Mopani caterpillars (amacimbi) for sale in Johannesburg, and in the process purchase items such as sugar, cooking oil, washing soap for resale in their rural villages. In the study area most clients of these women are gold panners and hence their trade is concentrated in gold panning sites (chapter 6). A good example is Martha Sibanda:

Martha Sibanda Household

Martha Sibanda is a married woman aged 50 years who lives in Mtandawenema village in Garanyemba communal land. Her husband Joel Sibanda is employed as a semi-skilled electrician in Bulawayo and comes home every month end to their rural home. Including her husband, her household has five members who always reside there; Joel's mother is

unemployed and stays with them, Joel's brother's two sons have completed ordinary level and are unemployed and sometimes engage in gold panning to raise income. The other two relatives are Martha's younger sister's daughters who are at secondary school. Her younger sister is an illegal immigrant in South Africa. Martha's household has 10 cattle, 12 goats and a couple of chicken.

To supplement her husband income which of late cannot sustain the household, Martha has turned to cross border trading in neighbouring South Africa. She highlights her trade as follows:

I cannot just sit at home when other women are making a living out of cross border trading. In our area there are a lot of curious and we have been selling these curious 'ko Mapani' along the Beit-Bridge-Bulawayo road before the land reform programme. There are very few tourists now who pass through ko Mapani. I really supplemented my husbands' income from earnings obtained, but the demand suddenly collapsed as tourists were no longer coming in great numbers as they used to do before the land reform programme. So I and two other friends, Sibongile and Sithabile decided to ply our trade in South Africa. We have legal documents to enter South Africa but our visas are just visitors' ones so to bring in more goods we bribe customs officials at the border post... We normally spend at least two weeks selling our curious in Johannesburg and at times I leave some of my goods with my young sister who is working at a supermarket in Midrand. I used to make a lot of money by selling amacimbi but because of the drought and the wanton destruction of Mopani trees in former commercial farms, I now rarely harvest them... When I have made 'enough' rands in South Africa I buy sugar, washing soap, cooking oil and some tinned foods that I usually sell at gold panning sites along the Thuli River. With networks that I and my friends have created with bus drivers and officials at the border we can bring larger quantities and pay as little as possible in duty fees, but at times if one is unlucky her goods can be confiscated by officials, but really with a couple of rand to grease the hand of the customs officer our drivers get away with it; cross border trading accounts for at least 30% of my household income (Martha Sibanda 25/04/2007).

Peberdy (2002:36) notes that there are five categories of informal cross-border traders operating in the South African context. The first group comprises of those traders who travel to South Africa for short periods, less than a week, to buy goods that they take back to their home country to sell. These can be referred to as shoppers; they buy their goods mainly from formal retail shops, wholesale outlets and farms to sell in markets, on the street, to individuals and to formal retail outlets in their home country. The second group of traders consists of those traders who travel to South Africa for prolonged periods, one week to two months,

bringing with them goods to sell in informal and retail markets. Profits from these sales are then invested in buying goods to take back to their home countries and sell there. The third group of traders is very mobile; it consists of those traders who travel across three or more countries, including South Africa, buying and selling goods as they go. The fourth group is small and is made up of the traders who only bring goods from their home countries to sell in South Africa without taking goods to sell back in their countries. The last group of traders is that of South African traders who take goods to sell in other Southern African countries.

Drawing on Peberdy's categories, Martha, Sibongile, and Sithabile fall into the first category. They go to South Africa for short periods of time to buy basic goods like cooking oil, rice, sugar, soap, toothpaste, clothing, bedding and electric gadgets to sell in Zimbabwe. They also partly fall into the fourth category; they bring curios of animals, horns, eggs, openers, key holders, and salt and pepper shakers from Zimbabwe to sell in South Africa but unlike in Peberdy's fourth category they do take goods from South Africa to sell in Zimbabwe.

Sanelisiwe is a rural primary school teacher in her rural village of Mtandawenema and related her story thus:

I earn peanuts from my job at this school and cannot afford to feed my household unless I do what others are doing. I have been pushed into this trade because of the loss of value of our currency. My children are at boarding schools and my husband a teacher by profession is working as a construction worker in Johannesburg and does not earn much to cover his rents in South Africa and remit enough home, so I change my salary into rands and go to South Africa to buy goods for resell to gold panners because they are currently the only people who can buy at good prices... This trade is really lucrative because I have managed to sustain my household, and have even bought five goats from profits. I have no problem with obtaining an entry visa to South Africa on a monthly basis because as a civil servant I just use my pay slip to cross the border. I buy my goods from wholesalers and retail shops in Johannesburg and I have no problem of accommodation when in South Africa because I stay in my husband's lodgings... The problem is the duty one has to pay at the border, but I have created networks and with an offer of a few rands customs officials let me through. It's a tiring trade nevertheless and given a decent salary I would not engage in it because at times one has to sleep at the border because of congestion. I blame the Fast Track Land Reform Programme because it has created all these hardships for as I told you earlier on that my husband left his teaching job for menial work in Johannesburg (Sanelisiwe 17/12/2006.)

But there are also other sub-divisions amongst my informants; there are rich and poor traders, formally educated and less formally educated traders, wholesalers and retailers, and Shona

and Ndebele traders. Martha, Sithabile and Sibongile are examples of poorer traders; they trade mainly for their survival and that of their families. It has to be noted that they are poor in relation to their rich counterparts. In Zimbabwe, given the current situation, they are one of the few who can manage three meals a day and few luxuries.

Sanelisiwe is an example of a formally educated trader (Sanelisiwe is a formal school teacher, while the others are less formally educated. All of my traders are retailers of some sort; they sell their goods in small or individual lots for direct consumption by the purchasers. Their main customers are gold panners who have readily available disposable income and are prepared to buy at whatever cost.

Fieldwork in Gwanda and Umzingwane indicates that women cross border traders cut across tribal divide. There is a mixture of Shona and Ndebele traders but these traders present themselves as a united front when in South Africa. In a small settlement (made up of two bricks rooms, three shacks and a caravan) where Sithabile and Sibongile stay when in South Africa, the caravan is known as a home for the Ndebeles. These ethnic lines mark the traders' inner circles and although both ethnic groups know about this, they usually pretend not to and try to accommodate one another. The caravan has, for quite some time now, been rented to Ndebeles (the one who goes to pay rent is the leasee and her name is taken down by the leaser) and the Ndebeles intend to keep it that way. This, however, does not mean the Shonas cannot stay in the caravan. An interview with one of the women traders in Gwakwe village revealed to me that women traders put aside their tribal differences when plying their trade in South Africa as they are all regarded as *Makwerekwere* by the locals; and present a united front when creating networks with retailers and wholesalers. She also noted that the knowledge of Shona or being in the company of a Shona speaker is useful at the border post on the Zimbabwean side as most customs officials are Shona and like to extract bribes from traders through the use of 'Shona slang'. The way the Shona and Ndebele women from my study districts converge or present themselves as a unified group is an indication that because of the economic crisis, ethnic divide does not work while in South Africa. The Ndebele women have the advantage of language when selling their wares in South Africa and this benefits the Shona speaking women whereas at the border post on the Zimbabwean side, Shona women have the advantage as most customs and immigration officers are Shona speaking. The scenario at the Zimbabwean border post (staffing of key positions by Shonas) depicts what I have referred to as internal colonisation.

7:4:1 Why do they trade

Dwindling agrarian livelihoods are some of the major reasons why women in Gwanda and Umzingwane have embarked on cross-border trading. Women have been deprived of opportunities to work in the irrigation schemes as indicated in the chapter on command agriculture. Livestock livelihoods have been compromised and this has created a dilemma in rearing livestock both for consumption and exchange. Livestock livelihoods have been compromised in this way. Firstly grazing land is regarded as inadequate by the majority of informants and this has led to livestock deaths due to pasture shortage. Again, lack of breeding stock due to a massive depletion of former commercial herds has led to a very poor off-take and this has jeopardised livestock livelihoods in southern Matabeleland. Of course the drought has significantly contributed to dwindling agrarian livelihoods. As an alternative both men and women migrate to other countries in pursuit of a better livelihood whilst in some cases women are left with no choice but to engage in cross border trading. Women traders in southern Matabeleland mostly trade for survival, to educate their children, create wealth and for their economic independence. The situation in Zimbabwe has created an opportunity for some women to make money and gain economic independence. These women talk of their achievements with pride and consider their husbands lucky. Working in Zimbabwe, especially in the formal sector, a man would not be able to support a family and therefore those men who have wives and are informal cross-border traders, are cushioned by the income of their wives.

7:4:2 Challenges facing women traders

The main challenges facing women traders are transport related challenges, those relating to the relationship of these traders and the Zimbabwean government, and the high demand for curios and less supply. The latter has been compounded by the depletion of forests and commercial farms by new land occupiers. In addition to the interviews held with women cross border traders, I interviewed some stakeholders in this trade. These interviews help understand the context of informal cross-border traders at different stages or processes. The bus drivers interviewed revealed some of the challenges that the traders travelling with them face. The traders have to pay for the transportation of their goods in addition to their bus fares, customs duty fees and/or bribes. There is a limit on the size of goods a person can have on the bus. For example, in November 2007 a person was allowed to take a maximum of two

boxes of cooking oil and two boxes of washing soap. This disadvantages the traders who mainly buy and sell cooking oil, washing soap and other basic commodities that are scarce in Zimbabwe. This limit is not fixed as it may reduce further to one box of each per person when it gets busy like during public holidays.

Traders with their own transport have an advantage over those using public transport. This suggests that there is unequal competition between the poor traders who lack resources and the rich traders who have the necessary resources. Martha and her friends rely heavily on public transport and have to change their travelling dates (or cancel appointments) firstly when their supplier does not deliver curios on time, and secondly when the bus they use continuously breaks down. In addition, these women often have to hire cars when they need transport and this can be expensive depending on the number of women sharing the expense. On the other hand, the richer women traders, who are usually wives of gold barons, have the financial capacity and the flexibility their informal cross-border business requires. Better off household with more than one car maximise their time when husband and wife trade together which also increases the quantity of goods for better returns. The husband takes one car to do his business, while the wife uses the other car to source her goods. When they come together they load their cars and leave for Zimbabwe.

The other challenge noted is that of the relationship between the informal cross-border traders and the Zimbabwean government. This relationship is viewed as a struggle of equal power as both parties seek to benefit from the relationship. One aspect of the relationship is payment of customs and duty fees. The understanding of those working closely with the traders [drivers] is that before June 2006 traders made large profits because they would smuggle large amounts of goods into the country to avoid high tariff rates. The government relaxed the tariffs in June 2006 in attempt to collect revenue from these traders. Traders were then allowed duty free goods of up R2 500 and this reduced smuggling and encouraged traders to legally take their goods in and out of the country. This was good for the business of informal cross-border traders but the Government soon tightened the laws again. In November 2007 the traders paid sixty five percent of the total value of their goods and hundred percent for electronic gadgets. The Government also demanded that the traders pay customs duty fees in RSA rands making it more difficult for the traders. This then forced traders back to smuggling. It is evident in the account above that traders blame the government for some of

the challenges they face. The government is not supporting these small entrepreneurs but instead putting pressure on them to help the country collect the revenue it needs.

The curios trade is growing fast but the suppliers are failing to cope with demand. Women in this trade are faced with a challenge in this regard. A trader said:

It now takes long before we can get our orders. Sometimes we order and pay but because of the everyday devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar by the end of the week the value of the same goods would have almost doubled, forcing the suppliers to divert goods to those who will pay more for them. This inconveniences us and demands that we constantly put pressure on the suppliers or change travel dates. (Sibongile 15/12/07).

Due to hyper-inflation, traders have turned to barter trade. Martha, Sithabile and the other women involved in the trading of curios buy boxes of green washing bars of soap to take to Zimbabwe to exchange for curios.

The socio-economic divisions among traders have different experiences and yet every individual also has a different story to tell. While the challenges that these women face may be similar in many ways, their individual experiences differ depending on their backgrounds and pressure to make money. Most women believe their success depends on hard work and the wisdom to perform everyday miracles as they do business.

7:4:3 Coping strategies of women traders

Various coping strategies include sharing permits, dodging police, networking, barter trade and advanced ways of illegally smuggling goods across the border. To cope with the challenge of restrictive curio permits, traders have not only resorted to sharing permits, but have also developed tactics to make officials issue more permits. Martha gladly tells the story of how she lied to one official who was issuing permits in Pretoria and made him put horns instead of horn on her permit.

It looks like the success of the traders is partly dependent on their ability to tactfully dodge police, soldiers and state officials and also partly dependent on having good networks. Paying less bribes and buying cheaper goods means more money in the pockets of the traders. The tactics of dodging the police are essential since most of those who sell goods in South Africa do so illegally (as their visitors' visas do not permit them to do so).

Social networks play a very important part in these women's lives and they know people who can supply them with the different affordable goods they need and those who can supply them with different goods. Some of my informants buy chicken, eggs and toilet paper from their 'connections' to send home to their families. From what I understand the eggs and the chicken suppliers get these products at 'staff prices' and then sell to different individuals. The toilet paper supplier steals toilet paper from his workplace and sells to the traders. I witnessed one of these transactions as the traders tactfully gave their supplier money and the supplier disappeared into a storeroom and came out a few seconds later with a black waste bag, put it on the ground and then walked away. The traders then took the black plastic bag with toilet paper and went their way.

From these challenges and those discussed earlier under the notion of legality and illegality, traders have developed different coping strategies. Retaliating to the government's restrictive custom duty rates, the traders and those working with them have developed complicated ways of smuggling goods into the country. One way of smuggling goods in and out of Zimbabwe is through bribing state officials and the other is through using goods smuggling specialists (*amagumaguma*). These are people who specialise in smuggling goods using a bush road that has been created. Taxis take goods as far as the river where some men carry them across into other taxis. On the way they might have to pay bribes to both South African and Zimbabwean soldiers and policemen.

7:5 Livelihood contexts

Against this analysis, one can argue that remittances from those working outside the country and proceeds from women traders constitute a large percentage of livelihood resources for people in Gwanda and Umzingwane rural districts. As indicated earlier on, in Makwe and Garanyemba areas over fifty percent of households have one or two bread winners working as migrant workers in South Africa, Botswana and the United Kingdom. Though emigration in the early eighties and nineties was propelled by political persecution and nepotism, after the implementation of the FTLRRP it has tended to be due to declining livelihood coping strategies in these rural areas. Operation Maguta also frustrated a lot of youths in community irrigation schemes as the limited coping strategies were destroyed by this state programme. Without safety nets to cope with changing economic conditions, emigration became the only alternative especially for the youth, both male and female, middle aged professionals, middle

aged and low ranking public and private sector workers. This has also increased the number of rural women engaged in cross border trading, especially those selling curios and caterpillars (*amacimbi*). Men also engage in illegal gold dealings across the border as they perceive that their gold fetches much more in South Africa than Zimbabwe where gold is sold in hard currency to gold syndicates.

Sisulu et al (2007) also found that most professionals they interviewed categorically stated that the harsh economic hardships had propelled emigration more than the political crises in Zimbabwe today. They argue that since the days of 'black Thursday 1997', when war veterans were awarded unbudgeted pensions and the subsequent tumbling of the Zimbabwe dollar against major currencies their buying power has been eroded. For instance, a teacher in Zimbabwe by April 2007 was earning four hundred thousand Zimbabwe dollars per month, a mere one hundred rands on the black market.¹⁷¹ At the same time fuel was going for forty thousand dollars per litre, literally translating to 10 litres worth of fuel for a teacher with a car. Jabulani a young teacher who qualified in 2006 will not hesitate to cross the Limpopo as soon he obtains his teaching Diploma;

I need a certificate to try something in South Africa because I can't afford this tough life. I can't buy myself clothes let alone furniture as a young man and I don't see myself starting a family with the kind of remuneration I am getting from government. My friends have gone, I will follow them. Even if it means earning just three thousand rands is better (Teacher, 31/10/07).

Lack of jobs and viable income generating projects has led to youths seeking a better livelihood in neighbouring countries.

While in South Africa, Sisulu et al (2007) argued that these illegal immigrants find themselves between a rock and a hard place as they encounter harassments, arrests, detentions and deportations by South African authorities. Harassment, detention and the deportation of Zimbabweans are common place. As noted earlier on, by May 2007, South African authorities were deporting about 15 000 illegal Zimbabweans per month, clearly indicating the gravity of immigration. The process of arrests, detention and deportation of Zimbabweans by South African authorities has been challenged by civil society organizations as unlawful. Zimbabweans who are legal residents have also been arrested. Conditions at *Lindela* detention centre have also been criticised, resulting in Minister Nqakula establishing

¹⁷¹ Interview with a teacher from Swazi primary school in Umzingwane, 2nd April, 2007).

a commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths of Zimbabweans in detention (Sisulu et al 2007:563). Sisulu and others contend that xenophobia is another challenge that Zimbabweans face. In Johannesburg, for example, a number of Zimbabweans who are in possession of asylum-seeker permits, work permits or other forms of permits have been denied the right to rent accommodation in certain flats. Locals use slang terms such as '*Makwerekwere*' when referring to Zimbabweans and other foreigners (Sisulu et al 2007:563). However the general argument advanced by South African authorities for the hostile treatment of Zimbabweans is that they are economic migrants rather than political refugees. Thus South African authorities tend to be skeptical in granting Zimbabweans refugee status arguing that there is no war in Zimbabwe. They further argue that most Zimbabweans engage in criminal activities, especially armed robberies and cash in transit; hence allowing them to stay using refugee status would disturb the peace and economy of South Africa.¹⁷² However a point to note is that these people who migrate to South Africa have connections in the form of kinships, friends and homeboys who act as 'brokers' to secure the much needed identity documents and the subsequent connection to employers. In most instances 'employers' originate from Matabeleland and have been in South Africa for longer periods.

In Zimbabwe it is no longer just the poor, uneducated and vulnerable who operate informal cross-border trade but also the rich and the educated. It has become more than just a survival strategy; it is now a strategy of wealth creation for the rich. Women are involved in informal cross-border trade for survival, wealth creation and also to educate their children. There are various challenges facing these women and in response to them they have developed different coping strategies. They share trading permits, dodge police and smuggle goods across the border illegally in a sophisticated way. In response to hyperinflation and loss of trust in the currency of the country informal cross-border traders have turned to barter trade. In this whole process of cross border trading and migration I have come to the conclusion that government officials such as police, immigration, and customs officers relinquish some of their official roles as government (representatives) 'actors' and become 'brokers' to facilitate cross-border trading. In the process the cross-border traders and illegal immigrants pay bribes as reciprocity to these 'brokers'.

¹⁷² See 'State of the Nation' South Africa 2007. Edited by Sakhela Buhlungu; John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jessica Lutchman. See section on Zimbabwean Community in South Africa pages 552-573.

7:6 Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown how land reform has driven people out of the study area to seek livelihoods in neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa. It is important to note that this forced migration has affected both the white and the black population as has been argued in this chapter. White farmers lost their farms and had no choice but to leave the country and this also led to the closure of white owned industries as the Zimbabwe state threatened to take over white owned factories. Although outward migration is not a new phenomenon in southern Matabeleland, one can conclude that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has accelerated migration to other countries. People like Alan have settled well, unnoticed in Gauteng with fake documents because of their affinity with the Zulu language, along with social networks to acquire the necessary documentation and hence have created wealth for themselves and their households. Needless to say that, if community irrigation schemes were left to operate like before (with more state support) the introduction of operation Maguta/Inala, women might not have engaged in the taxing business of cross border trading.

Migration has created a lot of challenges as men leave their spouses and households for a long time and in some cases get carried away with the fast life in Gauteng and end up having second marriages there¹⁷³. Some of these marriages end up in tragedy when South African women discover that these men have spouses in Zimbabwe. Reading through the 'Daily Sun' (21 April, 2007) column 'Horror Affairs' referring to the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa, numerous South African women have failed to legally marry locally as they are constantly told by Home Affairs officials that they are already married to foreigners which may lead to further xenophobic attacks on foreigners.

Meanwhile, women spouses left behind for a long time by their husbands have resulted in extra-marital affairs. This is prevalent among women cross border traders who end up dating gold panners to raise enough rands for their deals in South Africa. One gold panner in Lushongwe even boasted that they can sleep with any beautiful woman whether married or not because of their financial capital. In my opinion this has led to the breakdown of

¹⁷³ Thabani Moyo is an example of a husband who has married a South African wife and hardly remits and comes home once a year in November, only to back in December to spend Christmas with his South African wife in Gauteng. On the other hand his wife in Makwe is regarded as one of the 'hot' ones by gold panners. Recently (2007) she tested HIV positive when she went to the antenatal clinic. She blames her husband Thabani for this mishap.

marriages as well as cultural values attached to the institution of marriage. With the HIV/AIDS pandemic ravaging the study area, there is a strong indication that women traders are at risk of contracting the disease as their main customers are gold panners who spend money especially on women. Interviews with some gold panners revealed to me that there is a tendency among gold panners who pay more for sex with traders, to decline to use condoms and this has seen many women traders' especially young women contracting the deadly virus. This has also been confirmed in other studies in areas where there are gold panners; the infection rate is increasing. It can be acknowledged that the problem of land distribution being facilitated by the state might be necessary, but the issue here is that the model adopted by the Zimbabwe state is problematic in its current form.

Concluding Remarks

In her path-breaking analysis of land restitution in Romania in Eastern Europe, the anthropologist Katherine Verdery (2003) describes the process by which families that were dispossessed of land during the socialist collectivization schemes in the 1940s were given the opportunity after the collapse of the socialist system to reclaim their land through state-supported restitution. One of the complications faced by many families was that they had disguised the true extent of their landholding from the socialist government in order to reduce compulsory surplus extraction. Verdery (2003) notes that, if some families had declared the full extent of their land, they would have been left hungry after state taxes and surplus was extracted. Her study provides a detailed account of the strategies and tactics adopted by Romanian peasant families to hide their hectares. Her book is appropriately entitled the *Vanishing Hectare* and explores the complex ways in which rural Romanians have manipulated the definition of land, land-use and land title over time to protect family and community property and interests. Her ethnography also powerfully reveals how, in the process of transformation to socialist agriculture, local farming families resisted external definitions of their land and livelihoods and continued to defend their local rights and resources against the attempts to erase practices and structures many of them with a historical background through enforced collectivization. Verdery's discovery of hidden or submerged social and cultural capital, re-in forces on a common theme in recent anthropological studies of rural transformation in post-socialist Eastern European settings. The work of Szelenyi (1988) on Hungary and Nagengast (1991) in Poland first documented how local family farming traditions and cultural orientations that were suppressed under socialist collectivization began to re-emerge since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both these authors focused specifically on the way in which middle peasant and kulak families, who had been responsive to market forces prior to collectivization were able to recover these entrepreneurial traditions after socialism. In Verdery's case, the challenge for families that had been dispossessed during socialist collectivization was to demonstrate to the restitution commission that they were, in fact, the rightful owners of land which never appeared in records to form part of their family property.

In this study which I have titled, *Visible Hectares, Vanishing Livelihoods*, we have seen a similar process, where in the context of far reaching social and economic change and the

failure of government-imposed agrarian modernization schemes, rural households are once again trying to rediscover older land use practices and resource utilization strategies to shore up their livelihoods. The great irony in the case of Zimbabwe is that, unlike many of the Eastern European examples, it has not been the scarcity of land, the so-called ‘vanishing hectare’, which has challenged local livelihoods but rather the inappropriate use, management and the politicization of visible hectares that has impaired livelihood opportunities. Over the past decade, the Mugabe government has expropriated more than 11 million hectares of land across the country, which is now technically available for use by former farm workers, war veterans and residents of communal areas. This represents a very significant resource for the reconstruction of the rural economy and development in Zimbabwe. Yet it appears that far from extending rural livelihoods many rural residents have seen their rural livelihoods slowly whittled away, receding before their eyes, in the context of a massive abundance of land. In fact, it is astonishing to learn that rural households in southern Matabeleland are more dependent today on off-farm income and resources than at any previous stage in the history of this region. The central argument advanced in thesis is that the ‘one size fits all’ land reform has reduced rural agrarian livelihoods in this region despite the availability of more land to increase these livelihoods.

In 2008, Mamdani (2008) suggests that the land reform programme has been a significant success, despite widespread suggestions to the contrary. He asserted that the land reform programme had created more equitable land distribution and provided a solid platform for rural development and for the growth of participatory democracy. He insisted that far from being a crazy despot bent on undermining the national economy and impoverish the people of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe had corrected colonial imbalances in the rural economy and extended democracy and popular participation in the society and the economy. The findings from this study dispute the position advanced by Mamdani (2008) by asserting that the FTLRRP has neither extended democracy nor significantly strengthened rural livelihoods. Scoones (2009) also argued that much has been achieved by the FTLRRP as more land had been available in rural communities and in some areas, such as Masvingo, rural people have produced reasonable crop yields in the new settlements created through this programme. However, Scoones (2009) does note that a pervasive undemocratic political culture of coercion, cronyism, corruption and incompetence has underpinned the land reform

programme and has made it difficult to present this programme as unproblematic, democratic and progressive.

In this study I have argued that in southern Matabeleland there is very little evidence to support a positive prognosis on the impact of fast track land reform. I suggest that there are deep-seated problems with rural development strategies in this region which date back to the colonial era and were exacerbated in the transition to socialism in Zimbabwe. In the early chapters of the thesis I argued that the adoption of a centralist model for rural development based on the modernization of agriculture (which was understood to mean the extension of crop farming) and the adoption of a resettlement model which compressed scattered communities into closer settlement villages had a profoundly negative effect in Matabeleland where regular drought and poor rainfall made rain-fed cropping difficult and where local residents required a certain level of mobility to move their herds around in a harsh environment. I have argued that the imposition of a national, one-size-fits-all crop based model of rural development in this region since the 1980s undermined the local pastoral economy and diminished the ability rural families to best utilize their local resources for rural livelihoods. In my analysis I have invoked the work of scholars, like Fairhead and Leach (1996), who demonstrate not only how misguided representation of the land can be constructed, but also the damage that the consistent misrepresentation of landscapes can do to local livelihoods. In this thesis it is argued that the post-colonial state has long failed to deliver a resettlement model that meets the requirements of people of southern Matabeleland. People of this region felt that the village settlement models were not workable in the region as more land was needed for livestock grazing than village settlements. This resistance to village settlements was viewed by the state apparatus as subversive and anti-development.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, I argued that NGOs were more attuned to local development needs than the state though had their problems too; they played a pivotal role in promoting rural development in this region. NGOs such as Christian Care, World Vision, and the Lutheran Development Services provided support to rural people in many ways that were sympathetic to the livelihoods strategies. Many of the NGOs showed little interest to work in the resettlement areas. They helped provide water points such as boreholes, deep wells and small dams to augment water sources outside of these settlements. These NGOs also provided community training on operation and maintenance of these facilities as a way of reducing maintenance costs and also as a way of empowering communities. Some NGOs, like the

Heifer International, reacted to the requests to promote livestock rearing when the state was not sympathetic to such requests and provided heifers to selected households in the communities on the 'pass a heifer scheme' (if a calf is born, the household passes on the cow to the next household). The scheme helped many livestock owners to rebuild their herds after the drought. The NGOs were therefore also politicising government policy and development. The state eventually banned development-oriented NGOs during the course of the FTLRRP. In fact, I have argued that from the mid-1990s, the agenda of NGOs and the Mugabe government were increasingly on a collision course. Faith-based NGOs like World Vision continued to focus on the needs of the poorest of the poor and on providing assistance in them *in situ*, while the Mugabe government wanted to intensify rural resettlement and restructuring through creating new village structures. Eventually he accused the NGOs of representing Western imperial interests and asked them to leave the country (cf. Bornstein 2005). While many NGOs do excellent work in areas such as poverty alleviation, it would be naïve not to recognise that development is political and that development NGOs are also political though to different degrees.

The research for this study has powerfully underlined the conclusion arrived at by Scoones (2009) that the land reform and restructuring programme in Zimbabwe has been undemocratic and corrupt. The whole FTLRRP in southern Matabeleland and the country in general has been marred by cronyism and corruption. People who were not aligned to the ruling party were not considered for resettlement on new land, especially to A2 farms that were viewed as promoting livestock rearing. It was also demonstrated how the DLCs accepted bribes in exchange of land. Moreover, it was found that certain political elite and active supporters of the ruling party acquired multiple tracts of land which they were unable to use themselves and thus started leasing out their land. The excessive misuse of land as a political tool, as a weapon against the opposition and as a means to retain power, entrenched opposition to ZANU PF in the region and ensured that all parliamentary seats in the region (with the exception of Beit-bridge, Gwanda South and Tsholotsho) were lost to the opposition MDC (2008). The evidence shows that political coercion cannot guarantee political support in this region. The case study also reveals the very significant role that ethnicity and ethnic conflict has placed in the way in which Matabeleland has been incorporated and managed as a development landscape in post-independence Zimbabwe.

In his analysis of the post-colonial state in Africa, Hyden (2006) concluded that, even though the nationalists fought colonialism as a united front, when they were at the gates of the state they separated along ethnic lines in an endeavour to access its resources. This study shows that ethnicity and political domination of southern Matabeleland has long been a feature of the state's agenda. The fact that when the Lancaster House agreement was signed in 1979, ZANU PF opted to participate in the elections outside the Patriotic Front was indicative that tribalism and ethnicity was at play. The fact that the other faction of the Patriotic Front, ZAPU was led by an Ndebele (though Kalanga by birth, chapter 2) and the fact that the Ndebele constituted only 20% of the black Zimbabwe population, ZANU PF employed ethnic divide to win the votes of the Shona who constitute about 77% of the population. As argued in chapter 2, the victory of a mostly Shona dominated party cemented the domination which they have always been craving for. The post independence era in southern Matabeleland has seen Shona speaking civil servants and other workers rapidly deployed in a quest to create a Shona culture in the region. Even McGregor, (2000), argued that the Shonalisation of Matabeleland has been placed on the agenda of the ZANU PF government as it moved in to even introduce Shona civil servants in positions that required local Ndebele speaking people so as to promote development. Ranger (1995) cites the LGPOs as the main drivers of the Shonalisation of Matabeleland. One issue that can be drawn from this political domination is that when the government introduced land reform in the first two decades of independence the beneficiaries were selected on a patron-client relationship. This meant that those that did not agree with the resettlement models set up by the government were sidelined. Even the resettlement models, especially the village settlements, were viewed as a way of settling more supporters of ZANU PF. This political domination has persisted even in the new dispensation when ZAPU PF and ZANUPF merged in 1987. The FTLRRP has thus cemented the domination of ZANU PF and its Shona ethnic group in the southern Matabeleland landscape.

The imposition of centralized state control over rural development in the post-2000 period in Matabeleland was probably most graphically demonstrated in the roll-out of command agriculture, a programme that has turned community irrigation schemes into state driven initiatives under the direction of the army in 2005. This study concludes that command agriculture did not benefit the state and the irrigators. In the case of Makwe (chapter 5), irrigators had their particular ways of farming the irrigation through advice from experienced

agriculturists, who blended scientific knowledge and local knowledge to help improve lives of the locals. The Makwe community since independence, particularly its interface with soldiers, has been that of intimidation and torture. This has brought a sense of dispossession, and now the irrigators no longer own their private plots in this irrigation scheme as it has been collectivized. The anticipated increased output from the scheme by the state has not been realised either. This scenario shows that command agriculture is nothing more than forced modernization, whereby the irrigators have been deprived of their sources of livelihood and forced to practise agriculture the way the state 'sees' will enhance national food security. Command agriculture is therefore one of those top down strategies that have seen failed development interventions across the Third World.

In terms of rural livelihoods, this study shows that the lagisa system of livestock husbandry is one of the most appropriate resettlement models that can promote the livelihoods of people of this region. As argued (chapter 4), I conclude that the lagisa principle if well applied and if scientifically managed is capable of solving the problems of grazing land in southern Matabeleland. Of course this study shows that there are more visible hectares in the region to promote livestock rearing but the fact that the lagisa principle has been viewed as anti-modern by the state, livestock livelihoods are vanishing. An important issue worth mentioning is the great loss of livestock in the region and country as a result of expropriation of commercial farm land. The white commercial farmers were the primary losers as they lost both land and livestock, but this study has shown that some people in Gwanda and Umzingwane have suffered more. Even if given land parcels they would struggle to rebuild their livestock herds without the support (livestock off-take stock), particularly government support. The worst losers are those people in communal areas adjacent to former commercial farms (e.g. Garanyemba, Lushongwe and Wenlock areas).

One conclusion worth noting is that men, women and the youth who were politically connected to the land committees and the ruling party had access to land in resettlement schemes. Some women did well (Mafuwe, chapter 4) and some like Dula (chapter 4) because of lack of resources and the ecological conditions of her new piece of land left after failing to earn a living from the farm. Some youths had an opportunity to prove their commitment to farming at Ntshonalanga farm, but left after harvesting the crop left by the former commercial farmer (Chapter 3). Women have engaged in cross border trading to cushion themselves from the effects of the FTLRRP and the economic crisis. In the process, proceeds

from their cross border trading have been invested in livestock especially small stock like goats an indication of their preference of livestock farming than crop farming.

Although people of this province had had multiple livelihoods strategies, the FTLRRP has forced more people to turn to off-farm activities as livelihood alternatives. In rethinking agrarian livelihoods and the consequences of de-agrarianisation, Bryceson (2000), in her analysis of the disappearing peasantries concludes that off-farm activities are taking over from agrarian livelihoods. In this study I found that the many rural residents of Gwanda and Umzingwane have concentrated more on off farm livelihoods such as gold panning, illegal/legal migration (chapters 6 and 7). Women have engaged in cross-border informal trading. But the sticking point is that the state has continued perpetuating poorly conceived planning and development models. Well established agrarian livelihoods and safety nets have been eroded by this state programme. This has seen the intensification of coping strategies such as gold panning (chapter 6). However not everyone is making living from these off farm activities. Those who are lucky to realise more resources from these activities re-invest the proceeds in livestock. However, to some it has been continued vulnerability as these activities have not changed their lives. With the intensification of off-farm activities as a means of making a living I am bound to question the very notion that there are any 'rural livelihoods' to talk about in contemporary Matabeleland; or are livelihoods of rural people in this province based outside agricultural realms? The arguments I advanced in this study point to the fact that people of this region have multiple livelihoods, an indication that land reform should be crafted in such a way that addresses the diversity of livelihoods and the socio-economic, cultural and political inclination of various regions in the country. 'One size fits all' might not be the best resettlement model to promote rural development in contemporary Zimbabwe.

Bibliography

Alexander, J. (1991), The Unsettled land: The politics of Land Redistribution in Matabeleland-1980-1990: *Journal of Southern African Studies* Vol. 17, No 4.

Alexander, J. McGregor, A. and Ranger T (2000), *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*, James Currey Oxford.

Alexander J, McGregor, A. and Ranger, T. *War, Hunger and Displacement: An Analysis, 2000- books. Google.com (Ethnicity and the politics of Conflict: the case of Matabeleland)*.

Amutabi, M. and Mukhebi L. M. (2001), Gender and Mining in Kenya. The case of Mukubira mines in the Vihiga district. Jenda. *Journal of culture and African Women Studies: Vol. No.2.23*.

Anderson, Sarah, Cavanagh and Lee, (2000), *Field Guide to the Global Economy*. New York: New York Press.

Anderson, B. (1983), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Appadurai, A. (1986), "Introduction: Commodities and the politics of value" in *social life of Things: Commodities in cultural perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Appadurai, A. (ed), (1996.), *The Cultural Life of Things*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bank, L. (1999) *No visible means of Subsistence: Rural Livelihoods, Gender and De-agrarianisation in the Eastern Cape*. Afrika-Studiecentrum Working Paper. Leiden.

Banton, M. (1993), *Racial and Ethnic Competition*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Barry, H. D. (2004), *The Past is the Future*. Harare: Weaver Press,
- Barrera, M. (1997), *Latinos and Education. A critical reader*: books.google.com.
- Bayart, J.F. (1993), *The State in Africa: the politics of the belly*. New York: Longman Publishing,
- Bayart, J.F. Ellis, S. and Hibou, (1999), *The Criminalization of the state in Africa (African Issues)*: Oxford. James Currey.
- Beach, D.N. (1980), *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900- 1850*.Gweru: Mambo press
- Beckman, B. (1977), "Peasants, Capital, and the State." *Review of African Political economy*, 10, 1-6.
- Beinart, W. (2000), 'African History and Environment History'. *African Affairs*, no. 99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beinart, W. (2001), *Twentieth Century South Africa* (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bernstein, H. (1981), "*Concepts for the analysis of Contemporary Peasantries*". In the Political Economy of Rural Development: Peasants, International Capital and the State (ed) by Galli R, 3-24. Albany State: University of New York Press.
- Biebuyck, D. (1963), 'Introduction', in: Daniel Biebuyck, (ed) *African agrarian systems*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Berry, S. (1989), 'Social Institutions and Access to Resources', in *Africa*, Vol. 59, No. 1.
- Berry, S. (1993), *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub Saharan Africa*. Madison. University of Wisconsin Press:

Bohmer, P (1999), African-Americans as an Internal colony: The Theory of Internal Colonialism in *Readings in Black Political Economy* (ed) Whitehead J and Harris K.H. Dobuque, Iowa. .

Bond, P. (2001), "CAMPFIRE and the incentives of Institutional Change", in Hulme, D. and Murphree, M. (eds), *African Wildlife and Livelihoods. The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation*, UK: Routledge.

Bond, P. and Manyanya, M. (2002), *Zimbabwe's plunge, Exhausted Nationalism and the search for Justice*. Harare: Weaver Press and UKZN Press.

Bornstein, E. (2005), *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Bhebhe, N. (1988), 'The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe and the War of Liberation, 1975-1980' in Carl Hallen-creutz and Andrew Moyo (eds) *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, Gweru: Mambo Press.

Bhebhe, N. (1995), in Ranger (ed) *Society in Zimbabwe Liberation War*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.

Bhebhe, N. (1995), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe Liberation War*. Vol.1. London: James Currey.

Bryceson, D.F. (1996), *Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A sectoral Perspective,* *World Development*. Washington DC: Howard University Press.

Bryceson, D.F. and Jamal, V. (1997), *Farewell to Farms; De-agrarianisation and Employment in Africa*. African Studies Centre, Ashgate

Bryceson, D.F. et al (2000), *Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London. Intermediate Technology Publications Southampton Row.

Buhlungu, S. Daniel, J. Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. (2007), (ed), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2007*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Camaroff, J. And J. Camaroff (1993), *Modernity and its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Post Colonial Africa*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice (1999), *Man in the Middle, Torture, Resettlement, Eviction and Civil War in Rhodesia*. Institute for International Relations.

Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice (1989), *Breaking the Silence. Building True Peace*. A Report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands.

Carswell, G (1997), *Agricultural Intensification and Rural Sustainable Livelihoods: A "Think Piece"*, IDS Working Paper, No. 64.

Cernea, M.M (1988), *NGOs and Local Development*, USA, World Bank

Chabal, Patrick and Daloz J.P. (1999), *Africa works: disorder as political instrument (African Issues)*. Oxford: James Currey.

Channock, M. (1991), 'Paradigms, Policies and Property. A review of the customary law of land tenure', in: Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds) 1994. *Searching For Land Tenure Security in Africa*, Portsmouth: NH: Heinemann Educational Books.

Chapman, J (1989), *French Power in Africa*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chatora, N. (2003), in Gonesse and Roth (2003), *Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Centre for Applied Social Sciences.

Chaumba J, Scoones I and Wolmer W (2003), *New politics, new livelihoods, agrarian change in Zimbabwe*. In *review of African Political economy* No 98.

Cousins B, Weiner D and Amin N (1992), *Social Differentiation in Communal lands in Zimbabwe*. In *review of the Political Economy* No 53.

Cousins et al (2009), Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani's 'lessons of Zimbabwe'
Jacobs, S. and Mundy, J. (2009), (eds), *Concerned African Scholars Bulletin No. 82, summer, 2009*.

Claassens, A. and Cousins, B. (2008), *Land, Power and Custom: Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal Lands Right Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press

Chambers, R. and Conway G.R. (1991), Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century (*IDS discussion paper 296*).

Chambers, R. (1983), Rural Development. *Putting the Last First*, UK: Longman Group.

Chambers, R. (1994), "The origins and Practice of PRA." *World Development*. Vol. 22. No.7.

Chambers, R. (1997), *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last*, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Cheater, A. (ed) (1999), *The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures*, UK, Routledge.

Chimhundu R, (1992), Early Missionaries and the ethno linguistic factor during the 'invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe: *Journal of African History* Vol. 33 (1992). Cambridge: University Press.

Chiwawa, H. (1993), *Environment Impacts of Cooperative Mining in Zimbabwe*, 4th Congress, Organisation of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, Zeit Ethiopia.

Chitiga, R. Wisner, B. and Toulmin, C. (eds) (2005), *Towards a new map of Africa*, London: Earthscan.

Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (eds) (2001), *Participation: The New Tyranny*, UK, Zed Books.

- Dahl, R. (1957), "The Concept of Power", *Behavioural Science*, vol 2.
- Dianeel, M.L. (1970), *The God of the Matopo Hills: an essay on the Mwari Cult in Rhodesia*, Mouton.
- De Boeck, F. (1998), Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Expenditure and Sharing in South-western Zaire (1984-1987) in *Development and Change Vol. 29*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- De Waal, V. (1990), *The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's first decade*. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press.
- De Wet, C.J. and Whisson, M. (eds). (1997), *From Reserve to Region: Apartheid and social change in the Keskammahoek of (former) Ciskei: 1950-1990*. Grahamstown: Rhodes University, Institute of Social and Economic Research Occasional paper No. 35,. Grahamstown: Grocott and Sherry.
- Dirks, N.B. (1992), "History as a Sign of the Modern." *Public Culture* 2, no. 1.
- Donham, D. (1990), *History, Power and Ideology: Central issues in Marxism and Anthropology*. Wisconsin: University of California Press.
- Donham, D. (1999), *Marxist Modern. An ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution*. Wisconsin: University of California Press.
- David S. (2008), Signs of the Times: Missionaries and Tribal Genesis in Southern Rhodesia. Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University cited from *Transforming Anthropology Vol. 9 issue 2*.
- Dreschler, B. (2001), *Small-Scale Mining and Sustainable Development within the SADC Region*, www.iied.org.
- Ellis, F. (2000), *Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries*: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eriksen, H. T. (2002), 2nd edition, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

Escobar, A. (1995), *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, USA: Princeton University Press.

Fairhead, J. (1993), *Representing knowledge, the new farmer in research fashions in practicing development* Social Science Perspectives Pottier J (ed), London and New York: Routledge.

Fairhead, J and Leach, M. (1996), *Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest- Savanna Mosaic*, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Fardon, R. (1996), The person, ethnicity and the problem of identity in West Africa, in I. Fowler and D. Zeitlyn (eds), *African Issues*.

Ferguson, J. (1990), *The Anti-Politics Machine: "development", depoliticization, and bureaucratic control in Lesotho*, Cambridge University Press.

Fratkin, E. (1994), "Pastoral land tenure in Kenya: Maasai, Sambura, Boran, and Rendile experiences, 1950-1990", *Nomadic Peoples*, vol. 34-35.

Galaty, J. G. (1999), "Grounding pastoralists: Law, politics and dispossessions in East Africa", *Nomadic Peoples*, vol. 3(NS), issue 2

Gardner, k. and Lewis, D. (1996), *Anthropology, Development and the Post Modern Challenge*, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Geschiere, et al. (2008), *Readings in Modernity in Africa*. London: The International African Institute:

Gibbon, D, Lake, A, and Stocking, M. (1995), "*Sustainable Development: A Challenge for Agriculture*", in Morse, S and Stocking, M (eds), *People and Environment*, UK: Duke University Press.

Gottlieb, R, et al (2005), *The next Los Angeles: The Struggle of a liveable city*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Global Mercury project: Removal of Cleaner Artisanal Mining and Extraction Technologies (*GMP*, n. 01 Jan 2003)

Gudeman, S. (2001), *The Anthropology of Economy: Community, Market and Culture*, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

Hall, R. (2007), *The impact of land restitution and land reform on livelihoods*. Cape Town: PLAAS.

Hammar, A. and Raftopoulos, B. (ed. 2003), *Zimbabwe's: Unfinished Business Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, Harare: Weaver Press.

Hansen, T.B. and Stepputat, F. (2001), *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Exploration of the Post Colonial State*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Hart, G. (1995), 'Gender and Household Dynamics: Recent Theories and Their Implications, in M. G. Quibria (ed), *Critical Issues in Asian Development: Theories, Experiences and Policies*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Henk, A.J. Moll, et al (ed. 2004), *Agrarian Institutions between Policies and Local Action: experiences from Zimbabwe*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Henkel, H and Stirrat, R.L. (2001), "Participation in Spiritual Duty; Empowerment as Secular Subjection," in Cooke, B. And Kothari, U (eds). *Participation, The New Tyranny?* UK: Zed Books.

Herbst, J. (1990), *State Politics in Zimbabwe*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Herbst, J. (2000), *States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Heyer, J. P. Roberts and G. Williams (ed). (1981), *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*. New York: St Martins Press.

Hobart, M. (ed), (1993), *An anthropological critique of development, The growth of ignorance*. London: Routledge.

Homewood, K.M. (2005), *Rural Resources & Local Livelihoods in Africa* Palgrave Macmillan, Oxford: James Currey.

Hodgson, D. L. ed, (2000), *Rethinking Pastoralism in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.

Humphrey, C. Et al (1998), Global warning: debating international development in new public financial management. *Journal of Financial Accounting and Management*, Aug/1999, Vol. 15. No. 3 and 4: UK.

Hunter et al (2000), Economic development and Women's blood pressure: Field evidence from Rural Mashonaland, Zimbabwe, *Social Science and Medicine* Vol, no.50.

Hutchinson, S. E. (1996), *Nuer Dilemmas: coping with money, war and the state*, London: University of California Press, Ltd.

Hussein, K. And Nelson, J. (1998), 'Sustainable Livelihoods and Livelihood Diversification', *IDS Working Paper*, No. 69.

Hyden, G. (1980), *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hyden, G. (1988), "Beyond Hunger in Africa-Breaking the Spell of Monoculture" in Ronald Cohen (ed), *Satisfying Africa's Food Needs*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hyden, G. (2006), *African Politics in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Isaacman, A.F. (1993), "Peasants and Rural Social Protest" in F. Cooper, A.F. Isaacman, F.E. Mallon, W. Roseberry, and S.J. Stern (ed) (1994), *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labour and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America*. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

ILO (1999): *Social and Labour issues in small scale mines*. ILO. Geneva.

Jacobs, S. and Mundy, J. (2009), (eds), Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani's 'lessons of Zimbabwe', *Concerned African Scholars Bulletin No. 82, summer, 2009*.

James, W. (1999), "Empowering Ambiguities", in Cheater, A. (ed): *The Anthropology of power in Changing Structures*, UK: Routledge.

Jenkins, R. (1987), *Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development: The Internalisation of Capital and the Third World*, New York: Methuen.

Jerez, D.B. (2001), *Regional/National Study on small scale and Artisanal mining in Bolivia*: Country study commissioned by MMSD.

Joseph, R. (1987). *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kaingu, N. (2003), Personal Communication: Zambia Beliefs about Women mining.

Katie, W. (2005), *Theories and Practice of Development*: New York, Routledge.

Kruger, N. (1988), "The Zimbabwe War of Liberation. Struggles with the Struggle" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 14.2 pp 304-322.

Kruger, N. (2006), "From Patriotic Memories to Patriotic History in Zimbabwe, 1990-2005. *Third World Quarterly* 27 (6).

Lan, D. (1985), *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Lappe, F. M. And J. Collins (1979), *Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity*, New York: Ballantine

Lappe, F. M. J. Collins and D. Kinley, (1980), *Aid as an Obstacle*. San Francisco: Institute of Food and Development Policy.

Leach, M. and Mearns R. (1996), *The Lie of the Land: Challenging received wisdom on the African environment (African issues)*, London: The International African Institute.

Leys, C. (ed), (1969), *Politics and Change in Developing countries*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Leys, C. (1959), *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D and D, Moss (2006), "Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in Development, in Lewis, D and D, Moss (eds) (2006), *Development Brokers and Translators: Ethnography of Aid and Agencies*, USA, Kumarian Press Inc.

Little, P.D et al (2001), Avoiding Disaster: Diversification and Risk Management among East African Herders: *Development Change* Vol 32 (2001), 401-433. Oxford. Institute of Social Studies: Blackwell Publishers.

Little, P.D. (1992), Traders, Brokers and Market 'Crisis' in Southern Somalia. *Africa Journal* Vol.62. (1992) No 1: Edinburgh University Press.

Little, P.D. (1996), Conflictive Trade, Contested Identity: The effects of Export Markets on Pastoralists of Southern Somalia. *African Studies Review* Vol. 39, No 1 (1996 pp 25-53), African Studies Association.

Long, N. and A. Long (eds) (1992), *Battlefields of Knowledge*. UK: Routledge.

Madzudzo, Elias and Dzingayi V.A. (1995), Comparative study of the Implications of Ethnicity on Campfire in Bulilimamangwe and Binga Districts of Zimbabwe: *Zambezia* Vol 22 No 1 pp 25-42.

Makambe, E. P. (1992), The mobilisation of African labour across the Zambezi for the Zimbabwean colonial period. *African Studies*, informationworld.com.

Mamdani Mahmood (1996), *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Mamdani, M. (2008), Re: Lessons of Zimbabwe: Mugabe in Context. Jacob, S. and Mundy, J. (ed), *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin* no. 82. (2009).

Manzungu E and Sithole E (1999), *Towards local management of mineral resources in Zimbabwe*: CASS Publications.

Mearns, R. (1995), Institutions and natural resource management: access to and control over woodfuel in East Africa; in T. Binns (ed). *People and Environment in Africa*, Wiley, Chichester.

Meagher, K. And Mustafa, A. R. (1997), 'Not by farming alone: the role of non-farm incomes in rural Hausaland', in Bryceson, D. F. And V. Jamal (eds), *Farewell to Farms: De-agrarianisation and Employment in Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Michael, S. (2004), Undermining development: The absence of power among local NGOs in Africa, (*African Issues*), Oxford: James Currey.

Milne G.R and Marongwe D.A. (1995), The cost and benefits of Gold Panning. In GR Mosse, D. (2005), *Cultivating Development: Ethnography of AID Policy and Practice*, UK: Pluto Press.

Moyana, H. and Sibanda M. (1999), *The African Heritage, Book 3*, Harare. Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Mitchell, T. (2002), *Rule of Experts. Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Moody Roger and Panos Media: briefing No. 19 1996: *The lure of Gold is the Future*. London.

Mosley, P. (1987), *Foreign Aid: Its defence and Reform*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Moyo S (1995), *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*. SAPES Books Harare

Moyo S and Skalnes (1990), *The Zimbabwe Land Reform Programme Development Strategy Autonomy, Class Bias and Economic Rationality*. Harare. Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies

Moyo, S, (1999), *Land and Democracy in Zimbabwe*, Harare, SAPES Books

Moyo, S. (2000), "The structure of NGOs, in *NGOs, the state and Politics in Zimbabwe*, Sam Moyo, John Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos (eds). Harare: SAPES Books.

Moyo, S, and Paris, Y, (2005), 'Land Occupations in Zimbabwe: Towards the National Democratic Revolution, In Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (ed), *Reclaiming the land. The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, London: ZED Books, Cape Town pp 163-205.

Moyo, S. and Paris, Y. (2009), Ten Years On, Results and Prospects. Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani's 'lessons of Zimbabwe', Jacobs, S. and Mundy, J. (2009), (eds), *Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin No. 82, summer, 2009*.

Mosse, D. (2005), *Cultivating Development: ethnography of aid policy and practice*, Archway Road, London: Pluto Press,

Moore, D. S. (2005), *Suffering for territory: race, place and power in Zimbabwe* USA: Duke University Press

Moore, Henrietta I. (1994), *Cutting down trees: gender, nutrition, and agricultural change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990/* Henrietta L Moore, Megan Vaughan, London: James Currey Ltd.

McGregor, J. (2002), 'The Politics of Destruction: War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe', *African Affairs*, 101.

Mpendazoe F.M.T. (1996), *Towards Sustainable Small Scale Mining in Tanzania: Proceedings of the First World Mining Environment Congress*: Balkenaa. Rotterdam.

Mpunga, S et al (ed) (2001), *Land: Facing the Millennium Challenges in Unity and Hope*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Munro, R, (1994): *Children and Women in Zimbabwe. Situational Analysis*; A UNICEF Update, Harare: Mazongororo Paper Converters.

Murombedzi, J. (2005), *Environment and Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe*: Harare: CASS Publications.

Murray, C. (1997), South African Land Reform: case studies in 'demand' and 'participation' in the Free State. *African Affairs*, no. 96.

Murray, C. (2004), *South Africa's troubled Royalty: traditional leaders after democracy*, Canberra: Federation Press in association with the Centre for International and Public Law, Australia National University (law and policy paper, no. 3.)

Nagengast, C, (1991), *Reluctant Socialists, Rural Entrepreneurs: Class, Culture and the Polish State*. Oxford: West View Press.

Nel, E. and Hill, T. B. (1996), Development from below in the 'New' South Africa. The case of Hertzog, Eastern Cape: *The Geographical Journal*, vol, 163, 1997.

Nkomo, J. (1984): *The story of my life*. Harare: SAPES

Ntsebeza, L. (2006), *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa*. Cape Town, HSRC Press.

Nyathi, P. (2001), *Traditional Ceremonies of Amandebele*: Gweru: Mambo Press

Onselen C.V (2001), *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933*. Braamfontein Johannesburg 2000: Ravan Press (Pty) Ltd.

Ottaway, M. (1999), *State failure, collapse and reconstruction*, (ed) Milliken Jennifer. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

Palmer, R. (1990), "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990". *African Affairs, Journal of the Royal African Society* 89.355 ..

Peberdy, S. (2000), *Border crossings: Small entrepreneurs and cross-border trade between South Africa and Mozambique*. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 91(4).

Peberdy S (2002), *Hurdles to trade? South Africa's immigration policy and informal sector cross-border trade in the SADC*. Paper presented at the SAMP/LHR/HSRC workshop on regional integration in Pretoria on 23 April 2002.

Peberdy S and Rogerson CM (2000), Transnationalism and non-South African entrepreneurs in South Africa's small, medium and micro-enterprise (SMME). *Canadian journal on African studies* 34(1).

Ranger, T.O. (1967), *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7*, London: Heinemann

Ranger, T.O (1985), *The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe*. Mambo Occasional papers.

Ranger, T.O. (1985), *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*: Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Ranger, T.O (1993), "The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The case of Colonial Africa". In T. Ranger and O. Vaughan, (eds), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa*. London: Palgrave.

Ranger, T.O. (1999), *Voices from the Rocks, nature, culture and history in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe*. Oxford: James Currey.

Ranger, T, (2009), Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani's 'lessons of Zimbabwe' in Jacobs, S. and Mundy, J. (2009), (eds), *Concerned African Scholars Bulletin No. 82, summer, 2009*.

Raftopoulos, B. and Phimister, I. (2004), "Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of Anti-Imperialism", *Review of African Political Economy*, 101.

Raftopoulos, B. and Phimister, I. (2004), 'Zimbabwe Now': The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion, *Historical Materialism*, No. 12. 4.

Richards, P. (1996), *Fighting for the rain forests: war, youth and resources in Sierra Leone*. London: Villiers Publications.

Richards, J. (ed. 1999), *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Richard, W. (1991), *The Tears of the dead: The Social Biography of an African Family*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Robins, S. (1989), “*The politics of Resettlement and Land Use in Matabeleland South: A new model with a familiar face?*” Harare, Centre for applied social sciences.

Robins, S. L. (1994), Contesting the Social Geometry of State Power: A case study of Land Use Planning in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, *Social Dynamics*, 20:2.

Robertson, A. F. (1984), *People and the state: an anthropology of planned development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roseberry, W. and O’Brien, J. (1991), Introduction to Jay O’Brien and William Roseberry (eds). *Golden Ages: Imagining the past in Anthropological History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ruswa, G. and Sithole, T. (2003), *The Zimbabwe Land Reform Programme. An audit of Public Perception*, Harare: Konrad Adeneuer Foundation.

Sahlins, M. (1972), *Stone Age Economics*. London: Travistock Publications.

Sachs, J. (2005), *The end of poverty: economic possibilities for our time*. New York, N.Y. Penguin books.

Scoones, I. (1996), ‘Range management science and policy politics, polemics and pastures in southern Africa’, in M. Leach and R. Mearns (eds), *The lie of the land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment*. London: James Currey and Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Scoones, I. (1998), Sustainable Livelihoods. A Framework for Analysis: *IDS Working Paper 72*.

Scoones, I. (1989), "Patch use by cattle in a Dry land Environment. Farmer Knowledge and Ecological Theory," In Ben Cousins (ed), *People, Land and Livestock*. Proceedings of a workshop on the Socio-Economic Dimensions of Livestock Production in Communal lands of Zimbabwe, Harare, GTZ and Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe.

Scoones, I. (2009), Reflections on Mahmood Mamdani's 'lessons of Zimbabwe' Jacobs, S. and Mundy, J. (2009), (eds), *Concerned African Scholars Bulletin No. 82, summer, 2009*.

Scott, J.C. (1998), *Seeing Like a State: How certain schemes to improve the Human Condition have failed*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Schech, S. and Haggis, J. (eds), (2002), *Development; A cultural studies reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Schech, S and Haggis, J. (2000), *Culture and Development. A critical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Shaw, M. (1974), 'Material Culture', in: Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (ed), *The Bantu speaking Peoples of Southern Africa*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

Sithole M. (2000), The salience of Ethnicity in African Politics. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol 20 No 3-4.

Sisulu, E et al (2007), The Zimbabwean Community in South Africa: *State of the Nation South Africa 2007*, (ed) by Buhlungu, S. Daniel, J. Southall, R. and Lutchman, J. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Solidarity Peace Trust (2006): Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe; its impact on rural communities in Matabeleland accessed on www.solidaritypeacetrust.org

Stoneman, C. And Cliffe, L. (1989), *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*: London: Printer Publishers.

Szelenyi, I. (1988), *Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Townsend, A. (1985), A sociological approach to measurement of poverty, *Journal of Oxford papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turton, A. R. (1997), Southern African Hydro-politics: Development trajectories of the Zambezi basin states and South Africa. *Memrew occasional paper no. 7*: Harare.

Twigg, J. (2001), *corporate social responsibility and disaster reduction. A Global view*. London: Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre, University College London.

Verdery, K. (2003), *The Vanishing Hectare. Property and Value in Post Socialist Transylvania*. London: Cornwell University Press.

Von Braun, J. et al (1991), *Commercialisation of Agriculture under Population Pressure: Effects on Production, Consumption and Nutrition in Rwanda*, Research Report No. 85, Washington, D.C. International Food Policy Research Institute.

Von Braun, J. and Pandya-Lorch (eds) (1991), 'Income sources and diversification strategies of the malnourished rural poor, *Quarterly Journal of Agriculture*, vol. 31, no. 1.

Walsh, J. P. And Margolis, J. D. (2003), Misery loves companies. Rethinking social initiatives by business, *Administrative Quarterly*, vol, 48, no. 2. Johnson Graduate School of Management: Cornwell University.

Watts, M. (1995), A new deal in emotions: theory and practice and the crisis of development. In Jonathan Crush (ed.) *Power of development*. London and New York: Routledge.

Werbner, R, (1992), *Tears of the Dead. The social biography of an African Family*; Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.

West, H.G. and Sanders, T. (ed. 2003), *Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the new world order*. London. Duke University Press.

Wily, L. A. and Mbaya, S. (2000), A study of land and forests. *The impact of property relations on community involvement*. New York: IUCN.

Wolmer, W. and Scoones, I. (2000), The Science of 'Civilised' Agriculture: The mixed Farming in Zimbabwe, *African Affairs* (2000), 99, 575-600.

Wood, E.M. (1999), *The Origin of Capitalism: a longer view*. London: Verso.

Whitehead, A. (2002), 'Tracking Livelihood Change: Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical Perspectives from North-East Ghana', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28 (3).

Whitehead, A. and Dodzi, T. (2003), 'Policy Discourses on Women's land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa; the implications of the return to the customary', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2.

York, B. and Ndengwa, S. (ed. 2000), *The uncertain Promise of Southern Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

<http://www.sadc-usa.net> reference/protocol/h/20 prot.html.

ZCTU (1997): *Keep on Knocking: History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe 1900-97* (eds) Raftopoulos & Phimister I. (2000), Harare: Baobab Books.

Unpublished Government and other Reports

Republic of Zimbabwe, (1982) First Five year National Development Plan, 1982/3-1984/85, Harare (unpublished).

ARDA, (1982): Communal Area Development Report NO. 3 Report for South Matabeleland, Gwanda Baseline Survey, Zimbabwe government publication (unpublished).

ARDA, (1990): Model D pilot Project: Implementation 1984-1989 and proposals for further Development, unpublished Report.

ARDA, (1989): Livestock Development Programme: Ward 8 Garanyemba South (unpublished Report).

ARDA, (1983): Communal Area Development Report NO. 6. South Matabeleland: Project proposal for Resettlement, Rural Development and Environment Rehabilitation: Gwanda District, south Matabeleland (unpublished)

Zimbabwe, (1991), Planning and Research section, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement, "Terms of Reference for the proposed Land Tenure Commission (unpublished).

Gwanda District Development Plan, (1989-1990), (unpublished).

Matabeleland South Annual Development Plan, 1989-1990 (unpublished).

Milne and Marongwe DA (ed.) small scale gold panning in Zimbabwe; Economic costs and benefits and Policy recommendations: unpublished report of the Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism, Zimbabwe.

DFID Zimbabwe country report, December, 1995

DFID Zimbabwe country report December, 2003.

DFID Thailand land Reform Report, 2005.

The Solidarity Peace Trust report April, 2006.

Justice for Agriculture report, December, 2003.

Matabeleland South Five-year Development Plan (1990-95).

United Nations, (2005), National Trends in population, resources, environment and development-country profiles. UN: www.un.org/esa/population/countrypopprofile.

World Bank, 1989, Africa's Adjustments and Growth in the 1980s, Washington DC: World Bank.

World Food Programme (2006), Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Report.

World Food Programme (2007), Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Report.

World Food Programme (2008), Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Report.

ENDA, Zimbabwe, 1995, Report on the Dryland Farming in Gwanda South, ward 19, Mlambapheli.

Zimbabwe Population census, 2002 report.

The Zimbabwe Forum report 2002.

The Zimbabwe Forum, 2007.

The Chronicle, 1 March, 2006.

The Chronicle, 5 October, 2006.

The Chronicle, 15 August, 2006.

The Chronicle, 17 September, 2007.

The Chronicle, 18 September, 2007

The Herald, 2 November, 2006.

The Herald, 15 October, 1982.

The Herald, 18 August, 2006

The Herald, 26 September, 2006.

The Zimbabwe Independent, 18-24 November, 2005.

The Daily Sun, 21 April, 2007.

The Washington Times, 23 May, 2007.

Acts

Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979

Communal land Right Act, 1981.

Land Amendment Act, no. 21, 1981.

Land Amendment Act of 1985.

Land Acquisition Act (Amendment to section 10 of chapter 20, 1993.

Constitutional Amendment Act no. 16, 2000. Land Acquisition Act amended through Presidential Emergency Temporary powers.

Constitutional Amendment Act no. 17, 12 September, 2005.

Consequential Provisions Act, 3 November, 2006.

Appendices

Land Reform, Livelihoods and Rural Development in Matabeleland South Province of Zimbabwe. A case study of Gwanda and Umzingwane Rural Districts.

Interview Questions: A guide for respondents in communal land and resettlements

Introduction

Self introduction and ask respondents to tell the story of their settlement in this place, (*Explore issues such as who allocate (d) homestead and fields, background and household composition, how they live and relate with others in this settlement*).

Guiding questions

1 Are you aware of the Land Reform Programme (**LRP**) undertaken by government in the past 5 years?

(*Explore issues of differences in land allocation in communal and resettlement areas, role of kraal heads and village development committees, land committees; also explore the issues of past, present and future expectations*)

2 Have you been allocated any land under the **LRP**?

(*Explore issues such as double ownership i.e. communal and resettlement, interests on the land reform*)

3 What is your opinion with regards to the **LRP**?

(*Explore issues such as addressing colonial imbalance, power, authority, revenge, increased/reduced sources of livelihoods etc*)

4 Some people have argued that the **LRP** has only benefited top politicians and their cronies, including civil servants; while others argue that the programme has benefited the deserving majority. What do you say?

(Explore issues such as access by women, youths, disabled and other vulnerable groups.)

5 What is your opinion that food shortages experienced in years 2000 to 2006 are a result of the **LRP**?

(Explore issues such as; drought, lack of seeds, fertilizer, draught power; livestock diseases, sanctions, departure of white commercial farmers, incapable black commercial farmers, unemployment, migration of able bodied household members etc)

6 Do you think the **LRP** has changed your way of life; if yes how; and if you think it has not, what do you think needs to be done?

(Explore levels of income per H/H, increased/decreased livelihood portfolio, safety nets, access to social/basic services and amenities)

7 What support do you receive from government and NGOs for the betterment of your household and /or community?

(Explore issues of the past, present and the future focusing on projects and programmes addressing sustainable livelihoods)

8 Comment on entitlements to:

Grazing land, crop farming land, energy sources i.e. firewood/electricity; income, food availability, sufficiency and accessibility, water and sanitation.

9 Give information on your livestock in terms of size and location,

(Explore issues of numbers of cattle, goats, donkeys etc and availability, adequacy and accessibility of grazing land: stock theft, water sources etc)

10 State and comment on your sources of livelihood including your abilities and capabilities

(Explore issues such as gold panning, livestock rearing, crop farming, cross-border trade, brick-moulding, irrigation, food handouts, pensions, remittances etc)

11 What general problems/challenges do you face in your community?

(Are they locally induced? Outside induced? Do solutions lay in or outside the community?)

12 How has the **LRP** changed the lives of women, children and the youth in your community?

(Explore issues of women access to land, equal leadership opportunities in local/community structures and organisations; children access to health and education facilities; cross border trading, social and recreational services)

13 Comment on the statement “resettlement farmers should surrender their communal plots”

Income and Coping strategies Appraisal Check list

A) Income

1:1 did anyone in your Household (H/H) earn income from sales of livestock between August and December 2005

1:2 did anyone in your H/H earn income from remittances and gifts during the period August to December 2005, including child maintenance pensions.

1:3 did anyone in your H/H earn income in kind such as groceries during the period August to December 2005

1:4 did anyone in your H/H earn income from Government Public Works (Food for work)

1:5 did anyone in your H/H earn income from Gold Panning during the period August to December 2005

1:6 did anyone earn income from cash crops during the period August to December 2005

1:7 did your H/H earn income from leasing out and how much was raised

1:8 did your H/H earn income through hiring out draught power during the period August to December 2005

B) Coping strategies

Explore consumption; expenditure; income and migration strategies.

B: 1 Consumption strategies

1:1 H/H borrowed food or money to buy food or bought food on credit

1:2 H/H relied on less preferred foods as substitutes for staple maize meal

1:3 H/H members skipped meals as a result of lack of food and/or money

1:4 H/H members regularly eaten meal of vegetables only

1:5 H/H restricted consumption for adults so that children can eat normally

1:6 H/H reduced quantity of meals normally consumed

B: 2 Expenditure strategies

2:1 H/H reduced healthcare spending so as to buy food

2:2 H/H reduced budget on education so as to buy food

2:3 H/H reduced trips to Gwanda and Bulawayo so as to buy food

2:4 H/H reduced spending on homestead renovations so as to buy food and other basic needs

B: 3 Income strategies

3:1 H/H sold goods to buy food

3:2 H/H gone into debt to finance food and other basic services

3:3 H/H members seeking work to get food and other services

3:4 H/H begged for money to buy food and other non-food items

3:5 H/H members engaged in gold panning to raise money for food and other basic needs

B: 4 Migration strategies

4:1 H/H sent children away to friends and relatives

4:2 H/H been forced to temporally or permanently migrate to find food for work

4:3 Some H/H members have migrated to South Africa and the diaspora so as to remit home

4:4 H/H thinks of relocating to urban, communal or resettlement area

