

ROBERT GODLONTON AS ARCHITECT  
OF FRONTIER OPINION, WITH  
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE  
POLITICS OF SEPARATISM,  
1850-57.

by

B. A. LE CORDEUR

Thesis presented for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
at  
Rhodes University

Rhodes University,  
February 1956.



## P R E F A C E.

The broad outlines of Cape frontier historiography have so far been sketched from a study of official despatches and, to a lesser extent, of contemporary newspapers. There are many lacunae to be filled and many questions to be answered; here, it is evident that private papers have an indispensable role to play. Yet, despite isolated attempts to collect or index such papers, (such as that of Miss Una Long, in her Index to Unofficial, Privately-Owned Manuscripts relating to the history of South Africa), much untapped material still remains in private possession both in South Africa and overseas. In this study of a leading Eastern Province personality, prominence has been given to this type of material, and much of what has been used, has clearly not previously been examined by historians.

The private papers of Robert Godlonton were dispersed after the death of his son, Benjamin D'Urban Godlonton. No effort has been spared in attempting to trace these papers, and considerable success has so far been achieved. A large collection is housed in the Gubbins Library, University of the Witwatersrand; these have been quoted in the text as the Godlonton Papers. Mr. D. B. Godlonton of Cape Town has very generously donated some letters and a private note-book of Robert Godlonton to the Cory Library, Rhodes University; these, together with another set donated by Mr. W. A. Godlonton, C.B.E., of Umtali, have been quoted as belonging to the Cory Collection. Finally, a collection of some eighty-one letters has been located in the Rhodes House Library, University of Oxford; these have been referred to as the Rhodes House Collection. My sincere thanks to the Rhodes House Librarian and to the Printer to the Bodleian for the microfilming of these letters, whose inventory was due to Mr. D. G. L. Cragg.

Mr. C. J. Mc Innes of the Scottish Record Office permitted the papers of Robert Graham, Civil Commissioner of Grahamstown during the second half of this period, to be microfilmed; unfortunately, the collection contains only one or two letters written during the fifties. The Atherstone Papers are in the Albany Museum, Grahamstown, but are not yet accessible to the public. An intensive search has been made for the diary of Godlonton's friend, Thomas Stringfellow, and it is now almost certain that the document is no longer in existence.

A large number of people have given information and assistance for this study. I am greatly indebted to the staff of the Rhodes University Library, and in particular to the Cory Librarian, Miss. B. M. A. Bee; to the staff of the Cape Archives, the Orange Free State Archives, the Office of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Master of the Supreme Court. I have also visited or been supplied with information by the South African Public Library, the Library of the Houses of Parliament, the Gubbins Library, the library of the University of Cape Town, the State Library, the local libraries of Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, Fort Beaufort and Kimberley, and the Museums at Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and Queenstown.

Mr. Maurice Godlonton and Sister Godlonton of Grahamstown gave me much valuable information on the Godlonton family, as did Miss M. Bell; and Miss M. Lister allowed me to see copies of a number of A. G. Bain's letters to Godlonton. Finally, I should like to thank Mrs M. D. Guye, Instructor in Shorthand and Typing at Rhodes University, for her skilled typing from an execrable manuscript during the summer vacation.



## C O N T E N T S.

I.	"MORAL BOB."	1
II.	"ANNEXATION" VERSUS "CONCESSION"	32
III.	"A TABLE MOUNTAIN PARLIAMENT"	129
IV.	" <u>THE</u> MEMBER FOR THE EASTERN PROVINCE"	206
V.	"ATHANASIUS CONTRA MUNDUM"	280
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	290

<u>APPENDIX I:</u>	"Limmer's" sketch of Godlonton.	299
<u>APPENDIX II:</u>	Comparative list of <u>Graham's Town</u> Journal agencies	299
<u>APPENDIX III:</u>	Return of votes for the Legislative Council elections, 1850	301
<u>APPENDIX IV.</u>	Members of the Legislative Council, 1854-57	303
<u>APPENDIX V:</u>	Analysis of the major divisions in the Legislative Council, 1854-57	304
<u>APPENDIX VI:</u>	Genealogical Table of the Godlonton Family	305



## CHAPTER I.

### "MORAL BOB"

It is paradoxical that while Robert Godlonton's writings have exercised so great an influence upon the historiography of the Cape frontier, his political and journalistic career has elicited so little attention from historians. It is also unfortunate. In the passing of time, much of the bitterness which characterised his relations with those whose opinions differed from his own, has been lost sight of, and historians have tried to reconstruct the outlines of the period in which he lived, without analysing the underlying antagonisms or the climate of public opinion in which Godlonton formulated his ideas and waged his prolonged pen and ink war. His private and business life, as well as his political career, have been entirely ignored by historians who, while using his writings to amass factual material, have been apt, quite uncritically, to transcribe his prejudices as well. It would seem that much frontier history may have to be re-assessed in the light of revealing evidence as to the professional, political and economic interests of Godlonton who, as acknowledged champion of settler interests, had an influence which invaded many of the nooks and crannies of an explosive and restless frontier, and whose pen was seldom idle.

Basically, his aspirations and sentiments were at one with that cross-section of his countrymen who, in 1820 had sailed from Britain to settle on the wild and combustible Eastern frontier of the Cape Colony.



Before his departure for the Cape, Godlonton had led a somewhat uneventful life.<sup>(1)</sup> Born in London on 24th September, 1794, he was already an orphan at the age of twelve; and, after being adopted and educated by a married sister, was apprenticed to a branch of the King's Printing Office at Shacklewell. But Godlonton's was a very enterprising spirit, and when, in 1819, Britain decided to make use of the Cape as an outlet for the pressure of her social and economic problems, he saw an opportunity for realising his ambitions. He and Thomas Stringfellow, a fellow printer, joined the Baillie party, Godlonton being accompanied by his wife, Mary Ann, and his four-year-old daughter, as well as by another member of the family, Alex William.<sup>(2)</sup>

---

1. For the details of Godlonton's life, I am especially indebted to the Graham's Town Journal, to the Cape of Good Hope Almanac and Annual Register, and to:-

1. L. H. Meurant: Sixty Years Ago. (pp 76-106 passim)
2. R. Godlonton: Memorials of the British Settlers;
3. Colin Campbell: British South Africa (pp 114-116);
4. Ralph Kilpin: Pioneers of Parliament;
5. Ralph Kilpin: When Downing Street Ruled;
6. D. B. Sole: The Separation Movement;
7. H. E. Hockly: The Story of the British Settlers of 1820 in South Africa, (pp 146-9 and passim).

2. There appears to be some error in the embarkation lists, as published in Hockly, op. cit. p. 273; Sheffield: The Story of the Settlement, p 254; Jeremiah Goldswain's Chronicle (ed Una Long) Vol II, p 203.

In all of these, Alex William (or Hex William) is stated to be seventeen years of age, yet Godlonton was himself only twenty-five. In the lists, he is grouped with Godlonton's "children" or "family". Hockly (op. cit. p. 273) senses some irregularity, for he places the four-year-old Mary Ann before Alex William; moreover, he includes under the heading of "family", "members of family, usually children but sometimes others, such as relations or servants" (op. cit. p. 257), though he makes no attempt to explain Alex William's relationship with the rest of the family. It seems very likely that he was a younger brother of Robert. What happened to him after arriving at the Cape has not been discovered.



The manager of the Printing Office at which Godlonton had been employed, Mr Rutt, presented the Godlontons with a wooden press on their departure, saying that they were to regard it as a gift unless they could make it pay,<sup>(1)</sup> but on their arrival at Cape Town in the "Chapman" on 17th March 1820<sup>(2)</sup>, "it soon became known," as Godlonton wrote many years afterwards, "that a printing press was among the emigrants' luggage, and the Government Printer, Mr Van der Sandt, was sent on board to make the inquiry. The result was a prohibition against its going any further, the Acting Governor (Lieutenant-General Donkin) remarking, as we were told, that to allow it to go forward would be equal to scattering firebrands along the Eastern Frontier."<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton could do nothing, the press was put ashore, and the purchase price remitted to Mr Rutt by the Government.

In his Memorials of the British Settlers, which he compiled over twenty years later as a record of the celebrations to commemorate the founding of the Settlement, Godlonton described the plight of the immigrants after their arrival on the frontier: "Well does the writer of this

- 
1. Kilpin: Pioneers of Parliament. Colin Campbell, in his British South Africa (p. 115) reports differently: "In the same ship with himself (i.e. Godlonton), and of the same party, was Dr Edward Roberts, who brought a printing press to be used by Godlonton under his control, in conjunction with Stringfellow and Mollett, who were also fellow emigrants in the same vessel ..... It was contemplated producing a newspaper as a means of communication between settlers and other inhabitants and friends at home" (my italics). Meurant seems to clear up the difficulty by reporting that Mr Rutt had given the press to Godlonton and Stringfellow "in conjunction with Dr Roberts ....." (Sixty Years Ago, p. 76 and pp. 88-9)
  2. The "Chapman" left Gravesend on 3rd December, 1819. For a record of its progress, see the scrap of paper in Godlonton's hand-writing, exhibited in the Albany Museum, Grahamstown.
  3. Quoted by Meurant: op. cit. p. 76.



remember the moment when the kind-hearted Dutch farmer - the owner of the wagon which conveyed him and his family to the spot intended for their future home - bade them in a tone of mingled compassion and surprise, farewell, - leaving them without the smallest shelter from the weather, with their luggage strowed upon the long grass, - themselves friendless, unknowing and unknown, - and with no other dependence, save upon their own exertions and upon the protection and guidance of HIM who had led them from their native land ..."(1) The prospects could hardly have seemed bleaker. After struggling for eighteen months to make a living out of the soil,(2) Godlonton, who was not really interested in agriculture and was anxious to obtain employment in town, applied for an appointment as a constable in Bathurst; and in a mere four years, he had succeeded so far as to be appointed Clerk to the Landdrost. By the end of 1831, he had risen to be Chief Clerk in the Civil Commissioner's Office in Grahamstown, in which position he enjoyed the complete confidence of Captain Duncan Campbell.

Despite his success, Godlonton had no intention of remaining a civil servant. Soon after L. H. Meurant had started the first newspaper in the Eastern Province under the name of the Graham's Town Journal, Godlonton contributed an article on his visit to the newly-formed Kat River Settlement.(3) He made use of the information obtained during his tax-collecting travels for the Civil Commissioner to write travel sketches for the Journal under the nom-de-plume of "A Traveller",<sup>(4)</sup> and, as these attracted a good deal of

- 
1. R. Godlonton: Memorials of the British Settlers. pp. xii-xiii.
  2. The Baillie party, of which Godlonton was a member, was located near the mouth of the Fish River. (See maps in Cory: Rise of South Africa, Vol. II at the end; and Hockly: op.cit., on the end-paper at the back of the book).
  3. In GTJ 8.6.32. (Vide Meurant: op.cit.-p. 91)
  4. Meurant: op.cit. p. 95.



attention, he was asked by Meurant early in 1834, to become Editor of the new paper and a partner in the general trading concern which he <sup>had</sup> founded. (1) Nothing could have been more to Godlonton's liking; he resigned from the civil service, and threw himself with renewed vigour into the only profession in which he was truly interested. (2) There was scope enough for his talents: not only was the Eastern Province disappointed at the refusal of the British Government to implement the scheme proposed by the 1823 Commissioners of Inquiry with regard to the administration of the Eastern Districts, but there was a general feeling among the settlers that they were considerably more sinned against than sinning, and that the constant and deliberate misrepresentation of their case by the philanthropists and by Fairbairn's South African Commercial Advertiser was little short of scandalous. Throughout the long period of his editorship of the Journal, extending from 1834 till 1866, Godlonton sought to combat this adverse publicity.

In the year in which Godlonton first occupied the editorial chair of the Journal, important constitutional changes took place at the Cape: for the first time colonists were nominated to the newly-created Legislative Council, and, as there was much reluctance in the Eastern Province to accept a seat, the Journal came to be regarded as the inevitable mouthpiece of political opinion on the frontier, and was thus able to exercise considerable influence. From the thirties, indeed, Godlonton began to command the confidence and respect of the settlers; his active participation

---

1. Godlonton's interest in the new paper was doubtless enhanced on sentimental grounds, for the Journal was printed on the press which he himself had brought to the country almost fourteen years before, and which Meurant, while on a shooting expedition in 1831, had purchased at Graaff-Reinet. (Vide Meurant: op.cit. pp. 90-91).

2. Vide, e.g. GTJ 1.12.36. p.4.



in the affairs of bodies such as the Wesleyan Auxiliary Missionary Society, the Wesleyan School of Industry and the Grahamstown Auxiliary Bible Society made him a familiar figure in all church affairs at a time when church-going was as much a social as a religious duty. During the next few years, he became one of the trustees of the Wesleyan Chapels in Grahamstown and also acted as General Visitor to the Wesleyan Sunday School Union. Lifelong friendships were founded with such eminent and influential leaders of the Church as William Shaw, John Ayliff, H. H. Dugmore and Henry Caldewood. In Municipal affairs, he was equally prominent, and though never elected a Municipal Commissioner, he always, as the municipal records show,<sup>(1)</sup> kept a watchful eye on civic proceedings. He was active at all town meetings, served on committees to reform the market regulations, and was consulted and respected as a citizen. As a business man, he supplied the municipality with stationery, at one moment suggesting the use of rate forms, and at the next tendering their supply. But if his work on church committees and in local affairs gave him a considerable local reputation, his business interests enlarged the circle of his acquaintances and drew within the net of his political influence men from the furthest corners of the Eastern Province. In Grahamstown, he was one of the "Managers in Committee" of the Branch Savings Bank; in 1852, at a meeting of shareholders, he was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of the newly-formed Frontier Fire Insurance Company,<sup>(2)</sup> and he also

---

1. Vide Municipal Records of the City of Grahamstown, in the Cory Library, Rhodes University.

2. GTJ 16.10.52.



became a Director of the Frontier Commercial and Agricultural Bank.<sup>(1)</sup> He was as active in civic defence as he was in defending the interests of the citizens. In the Kaffir Wars, he displayed laudable qualities of leadership, being a Captain in the infantry division of the "Grahamstown Volunteers" in 1835, and a Ward Captain in the wars of 1846 and 1850. It was the Journal, though, that played the most prominent rôle in advertising the name of Godlonton from Cape Town to King William's Town, and from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein. As early as June 1835, Godlonton had established his reputation sufficiently well to be elected by a Grahamstown public meeting as one of a deputation of four to present an address of congratulation to Sir Benjamin D'Urban on the conclusion of his peace treaty with Krelli.<sup>(2)</sup> In 1844, he was one of the leading organisers of the celebrations to commemorate the landing of the Settlers;<sup>(3)</sup> he was also a member of the committee appointed in 1847 to collect the necessary information on the question of separation for Sir Henry Young.

Godlonton's career as member of the Legislative Council began in 1850, when he was given a seat by the Governor, Sir Harry Smith. This he retained until the dissolution of the Council prior to the elections for a Representative Parliament in 1854. In that year, he was returned as one of the seven Eastern Province representatives in the Upper House, and figured as the champion of Settler opinion until his dramatic resignation with the other Eastern Province representatives in June 1857 brought another phase of his political career to a close.

- 
1. His business interests extended even as far as Natal. In September 1869, his nephew commented that Godlonton was "lucky to get out of the Marine Insurance Company at Natal with so little loss.." (Vide Cory Collection. MS. 6838. R. White to Godlonton, 3.9.69)
  2. R. Godlonton: A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-35, p. 189.
  3. R. Godlonton: Memorials of the British Settlers, p. xx.



In Grahamstown, he continued to take a keen interest in public affairs. In December 1850, he was elected by Ward 6 to command the area in the event of war with the Kaffirs,<sup>(1)</sup> and after the outbreak of the war, was nominated as a member of the Board of Defence to assist the Civil Commissioner of Albany.<sup>(2)</sup> By 1852, he had been appointed a Justice of the Peace for Albany and Fort Beaufort,<sup>(3)</sup> and in June of the following year, he was presented with an inkstand by the people of Cradock, in recognition of his services both as editor and as a member of the Legislative Council.<sup>(4)</sup> Grahamstown followed the example set by Cradock, and in September 1853, presented a magnificent silver candelabrum to him "as a Testimonial of approval of his services, both as a member of the Legislative Council, and as conductor of a Public Journal."<sup>(5)</sup> Meanwhile, he continued to agitate for a Town Hall, Library and Reading Room for Grahamstown, and in October 1855, was appointed to a committee with this end in view.<sup>(6)</sup> He was in addition admitted to the Grahamstown "Literary, Scientific and Medical Society" in June 1856,<sup>(7)</sup> and became a member of the Committee of the Albany Botanic Garden.<sup>(8)</sup>

---

1. GTJ. 21.12.50.

2. GTJ. Extra to 28.12.50. Published 31.12.50.

3. GTJ. 16.11.50.

4. GTJ. 2.7.53.

5. G.T.J. 24.9.53. This candelabrum is now in the Albany Museum, Grahamstown.

6. GTJ. 3.11.55.

7. GTJ. 1.7.56.

8. C. of G.M. Almanac and Annual Register, 1857, p. 202.



By this time, Godlonton was beginning to feel the strain of over-work, and in April 1858, he and his family departed on holiday for England. During the three years which he spent there, he continued to write articles on the subject of Separation for the Journal,<sup>(1)</sup> though in 1860 the movement received an unintentional spur from the actions of the Colonial Secretary who, in announcing the intention of the Government to tax wool, the staple industry of the Eastern Province, inevitably stimulated the movement for separation, as the Eastern Districts immediately sunk their differences and united to form a Separation League. By 1862, though, the success of the movement had again been sacrificed to disunity over the question of a capital, and Godlonton, returning to Grahamstown in that year, found a gigantic task ahead of him. He was again elected to the Legislative Council and continued the struggle against the introduction of Responsible Government, which he regarded as premature and as inimical to Eastern Province interests. In 1871, he was unanimously appointed Chairman of the Commission on Federal Devolution,<sup>(2)</sup> which recommended that the Colony should be split into three provinces with local legislatures subordinate to the Cape Parliament; but in the following year, the introduction of Responsible Government gave the coup de grâce to the cause of Separation. Godlonton retained his seat until the dissolution of Parliament in 1878, when at the age of eighty-four, he finally retired both from the Council and from public life.<sup>(3)</sup> Yet his prestige among the surviving

---

1. Sole: op. cit. p. 204.

2. Cp. also Rhodes House Collection. f. 498.

3. Robert White, writing to Godlonton from London in October 1878, said he had heard of his serious illness in Cape Town, and he thought that he was wise in giving up his seat in Parliament. (Vide Cory Collection MS. 6436. R. White to Godlonton, 31.10.78.)



settlers ensured that he should occupy the most honoured place at the time of the Jubilee Celebrations in 1870. He acted as Chairman of the Committee of the British Settlers' Jubilee,<sup>(1)</sup> and was accorded the high honour of being asked to lay the foundation-stone of the British Settlers' Jubilee Memorial Tower in Grahamstown.

The success of Godlonton's career as a newspaper magnate was equally impressive, for his initiative led him to exploit every possibility of extending the original business. By December 1839,<sup>(2)</sup> Meurant had withdrawn from the Journal, and Godlonton became sole proprietor, eventually admitting his nephew, Robert White, as a partner,<sup>(3)</sup> and changing the name of the firm to "Godlonton and White."<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton himself had a Widas-touch for business: both the bookshop and the newspaper flourished, and the latter was not only increased in size from time to time,<sup>(5)</sup> but, from the middle of 1856, was issued bi-weekly.<sup>(6)</sup> More important, however, was the founding of a number of newspapers in other parts of the country.

---

1. GTJ. 14.1.70.

2. The issue of 12th December 1839 of the Journal was the first to state that it was "Edited, Printed and Published by the Proprietor, R. GODLONTON....." Meurant: op. cit. p.101, says: " ..In July, 1839, the partnership having ceased by effluxion of time, the writer sold the whole-sale of the printing establishment, together with his share of the goodwill of the Journal, to his late partner, Mr Godlonton, who thenceforth continued the Journal as his own private property."

3. This was in January 1845. (Vide GTJ. 2.1.45)

4. In January 1847. (Vide GTJ. 9.1.47)

5. e.g. in 1853, when "one of the best PRINTING MACHINES that modern science has yet produced" was imported, and the paper was increased from 6 to 8 columns per page. GTJ. 9.4.53.

6. GTJ. 1.7.56.



In March 1850, Messrs Godlonton and White wrote to the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir Harry Smith,<sup>(1)</sup> stating that frequent appeals had been made to them to establish a printing-office at Bloemfontein and asking for permission to do so. Smith informed them of the terms under which the Government would allow this, and in April, these terms were accepted.<sup>(2)</sup> The first issue of The Friend of the Sovereignty and Bloem Fontein Gazette appeared in June 1850 under the editorship of Thomas White, another nephew of Godlonton. Major Warden, in a Government Notice in the paper, informed the Civil Commissioners and Resident Magistrates that the paper was to be regarded as the official Government organ. Although a general bookshop formed part of the new business, it was a very risky undertaking in so small a community, and in 1854, after the abandonment of the Sovereignty by Britain, Godlonton and White withdrew their support from the paper. The fact that Thomas White then took over the entire business, coupled with its subsequent success, seems to indicate that the venture had not been altogether unprofitable. The experiment was repeated:

- 
1. The original two letters of Godlonton and White to Smith, dated 16.3.50 and 1.4.50 are in the Orange Free State Archives, Bloemfontein. Photostatic copies are in the Cory Library, R.U. From the contents of a semi-official letter written by L. H. Meurant to Southey in March 1849, though, (Acc 611/2. Meurant to Southey, 24.3.49) it is clear that the suggestion did not originate from Godlonton, but from the Government. Meurant had applied to the Government for a post, and Southey suggested that he might establish a press in Bloemfontein. Meurant in the letter referred to, said that this was "entirely out of the question", and Sir Harry then instructed Southey to "write to Godlonton, give him every information you can .. receive from him a proposal and Prospectus of his proposition without delay..." (Acc 611/3. Smith to Southey 4.3.50)
  2. For a history of the establishment of the paper, vide Centenary Supplement to The Friend, 10.6.1950 and the letters of Thomas and Robert White to Godlonton.



in September 1853, the Journal announced that, as many Dutch farmers of the Eastern Province had urged the Editor and Proprietor to devote a portion of the Journal to news items in their own language, it had been decided to meet these demands by the publication of an entirely new paper to be called Het Grahamstads Register en Boeren-vriend.<sup>(1)</sup> In addition to this, an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish a branch of the firm at Fort Beaufort,<sup>(2)</sup> while branches were set up and newspapers founded at places as far afield as Kingwilliamstown,<sup>(3)</sup> Queenstown,<sup>(4)</sup> Uitenhage and Kimberley, though it seems likely that Godlonton's successors can claim more of the credit for the establishment of the latter two.<sup>(5)</sup> Moreover, by 1857 Godlonton and White had entered into partnership with George Impey and James Richards, who were to edit the Eastern Province Herald and manage the business in Port Elizabeth, which they had bought from Paterson.<sup>(6)</sup>

- 
1. GTJ. 3.9.53. (This is not included in the Union List of B.A. Newspapers)
  2. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 20.2.49: "I have started my step son W. Richards at Beaufort, in our name, and have sent up a press and types..." The scheme does not seem to have been at all profitable, for, in October of the same year, he wrote again to Southey saying: "...I learn from him (i.e. Van der Sandt) that Sir Harry has bought De Lima's press and types. Had I known of his need I would have sent to Cape Town a capital press and types at almost a moments notice; having just brought down our Printing Materials from Fort Beaufort, which since the withdrawal of the troops has gone to the dogs...." ACC. 611/2. 5.10.49.
  3. King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer. 14.8.56.
  4. Queenstown Free Press, 19.1.59. Cp. Rhodes House Collection, f. 295, f. 297. Robert White to Godlonton, 16.10.58; 14.11.58.
  5. Kilpin, in Pioneers of Parliament, does not mention either Uitenhage or Kimberley, but vide the Uitenhage Times, 5.6.84. which at the time of Godlonton's death, said it was "proud to number itself among those (i.e. newspapers) founded and nursed through infancy by his care....."
  6. GTJ. 17.10.57;  
EPH. 13.10.57.



Finally, the firm of Godlonton and White were the printers and publishers of the Eastern Province Monthly Magazine, advertised in the Journal<sup>(1)</sup> as "the only Literary Magazine published in the Eastern Province." By the sixties the businesses were flourishing,<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton seems to have attained not only wealth, but also prestige in the settler community<sup>(3)</sup> and his nephew, Robert White, told him that, even in London, he was regarded as the father of the settlers.<sup>(4)</sup> It is not surprising, then, that the name of Godlonton should have been familiar to all frontiersmen. His family connections were nearly all within the original <sup>Settler</sup> community: his first wife, Mary Ann, died at Fort Beaufort in March 1844,<sup>(5)</sup> and subsequently he married Mrs Sarah Richards, daughter of Richard Attwell, one of the 1820 Settlers.<sup>(6)</sup> From his first marriage, Godlonton had one son and three daughters, of whom only two daughters survived infancy; by his second wife, he had a son and a daughter, the former being the only male heir.<sup>(7)</sup>

- 
1. e.g. GTJ, 28.10. 56.
  2. Rhodes House Collection, f. 304. R. White to Godlonton, 15.2.59
  3. Robert White, writing from London in November, 1870, begged Godlonton not to "let the loss of a few thousands prey on your feelings", and expressed the opinion that there was not "a man at the Cape that carries one half the respect you do...." Robert White to Godlonton, November 30, 1870 and March 10, 1870. Cp. Rhodes House Collection, R. White to Godlonton f. 281. 15.1.58.
  4. Cory Collection MS. 6836. R. White to Godlonton, 31.10.78.
  5. GTJ 7.3.44
  6. Campbell: op.cit. p.192-3. Mrs Richards seems to have had a shop in Grahamstown: vide GTJ. 29.12.36. p1.
  7. Vide a photostatic copy of Godlonton's will in Cory Collection. MS. 7108 ; also Appendix VI.



Godlonton's second wife had had several children prior to her second marriage, one of whom, William Richards, was taken into the business;<sup>(1)</sup> and when in January 1866,<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton officially vacated the editorial chair of the Journal he had the satisfaction of being able to hand over the business to this stepson, to his own son, D'Urban, and to T. B. Glanville.

Besides the printing establishment, Godlonton possessed considerable landed property: at the time of his death, he owned not only a house in Grahamstown, but also two farms near Fort Beaufort<sup>(3)</sup> and an erf at Port Alfred.<sup>(4)</sup>

In his retirement, Godlonton remained almost as active as before: he continued to take an interest in the Journal<sup>(5)</sup> and to write for magazines and newspapers, and his nephew, writing from London in 1869, marvelled at his "activity both in mind and body considering your age."<sup>(6)</sup>

When Godlonton passed away in his sleep at Beaufort House, Grahamstown, on 30th May 1884, many were the tributes which flowed from the press and from the numerous organizations in whose activities he had participated. In these

- 
1. Probably in 1853. In an Extra to the GTJ of 29.11.53. the name of "Messrs Godlonton, White and Co." replaces "Messrs Godlonton and White", White departed in 1860, when the firm became "Godlonton and Richards" (vide GTJ. 1.5.60.)
  2. GTJ. 5.1.66. He seems to have contemplated retiring since about 1857: vide Godlonton Papers, W. Richards to Godlonton, 30.5.57; Rhodes House Collection. f. 265. R. White to Godlonton, 23.5.57.
  3. In the Fort Beaufort Museum there is an oil painting of one of these farms, "Hammonds", by the renowned Thomas Baines (1848).
  4. Vide Godlonton's will: Cory Collection. MS. 7108.
  5. Vide Cory Collection MS. <sup>6826.</sup> White to Godlonton, 10.11.74: "...However you had better not mention anything I have written in the paper till you see me. I shall be able to give you some useful hints that may be used in the Journal..."
  6. Vide Cory Collection. MS. 6827. R. White to Godlonton, 4.6.69.



the more exemplary aspects of his character were emphasised - his determination, his generosity and sincerity, his sense of duty and his truly Christian piety,<sup>(1)</sup> while the Rev. J. Walton, at the funeral, paid special tribute to "the constancy of his friendship" and "the purity of his private life."<sup>(2)</sup>

But there was one newspaper at least which saw him in a more accurate perspective, by placing him against a background of the main personalities of the period.

"ROBERT GODLONTON," it stated, "was not a genius, but he possessed good ordinary abilities, and turned his talents to the best possible account..."<sup>(3)</sup> It is from this that any appraisal of his character must start, for if he had many of the virtues of his generation, he was not without a fair share of its defects. The spirit of Victorianism coursed so strongly through his veins, that he lacked the imagination or broad-mindedness which would have enabled him to ridicule the foibles and the short-comings of his contemporaries. His complacency about contemporary British civilisation, his bourgeois outlook on life, and his dogmatic enunciation of his own views combined to stamp him as a typical representative of mid-Victorian arrogance and superciliousness. A solemn, almost funereal, disposition and a tendency to moralise earned for him the not ~~too~~ inappropriate nickname of "Moral Bob". In this respect, his journal<sup>(4)</sup> and his books and pamphlets provide very interesting mirrors of his personality. The entries in

---

1. Vide: Fort Beaufort Advocate and Adelaide Opinion, 6.6.84. and GTJ. 31.5.84.

2. GTJ. 3.6.84.

3. "In Memoriam" in The Friend. 5.6.84.

4. There is a transcript of his journal, for the period 30th August to 17th October 1850 in the Cory Library, Rhodes University. (Cory Collection. MS. 1147)  
The original document is now in the Mendelssohn Library, Cape Town.



the journal frequently drop to the depths of banality - on occasion he even records what he ate for dinner or the time he retired to bed at night<sup>(1)</sup> - and there are prudish remarks of disapproval upon behaviour which he felt to be undignified or unnecessarily light-hearted.<sup>(2)</sup> Nor is the moralising absent: he records, on September 30th, 1850, for instance, how he was led to contemplate on the theme "Give me neither poverty nor riches" through observing the discomfort of Lady Smith who, because of her official status had to meet her guests with a smile, although at the time she was suffering from "dropsy swollen feet and frequent numbness." Yet Godlonton's invincible self-righteousness made it inevitable that his journal, despite its solemnity, its intolerance<sup>(3)</sup> and its naivete should breathe a spirit of profound sincerity and frankness.<sup>(4)</sup>

Godlonton's books and pamphlets serve to emphasise the merits and limitations of his intellectual horizons. The first of these was his Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes written

- 
1. Vide, e.g; Godlonton's MS. Journal, 30.8.50: "Dined on mutton chops, green peas etc." "Bed at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 10."
  2. Vide, e.g., Godlonton's MS. Journal, 13.9.50; where, commenting upon a ball at Government House, Cape Town, he writes: "Sir John Wylde was among the dancers, quite as gay as the most juvenile person, and there were many other 'grave and venerable seigniors' employed the same way, that I could not help thinking might have been much better employed..."
  3. While in Cape Town for the 1850 Legislative Council session, he relates how he visited a Mr Wells: ".... found that he is a bit of a Radical and a rabid anti-convictite - His principles lower him materially in my estimation - and lead me to think that the Wesleyan Society here has much to answer for in fostering such notions, as I fear it has done...." (Vide Godlonton's MS. Journal 16.9.50).
  4. He relates on one occasion how he went to visit the Rev. B. Shaw at Rondebosch: "...Saw Hester Ayliff - grown a fine girl - drank tea there and stayed till 8 o'clock - heard Hester play and sing Sun bright cline..." and he comments: "... Never heard her sing or play worse..." (Vide Godlonton's MS. Journal, 21.9.50.)



in 1835-6, with the object of providing such information as would render his proposed narrative of the war more intelligible and also in order to "convey to those at a distance some idea of the frontier inhabitants, as well as of the causes which have led to a calamity so sudden and melancholy as that under which we are now labouring."<sup>(1)</sup> Part I, which appeared in 1835, dealt with the history of the settlement since its foundation, and, written as it was with the blood-curdling Kaffir war-cry in his ears and the smell of burning homesteads in his nostrils, it could hardly be expected to reflect a level-headed or unemotional approach to the events which are related.<sup>(2)</sup> From the outset, Godlonton fulminates against the misrepresentations of the position of the settlers by the philanthropists,<sup>(3)</sup> and censures the ineffectual and bungling measures of the Government on the frontier.<sup>(4)</sup> In part II, he deals with the frontier trade, stating in the "Advertisement" that the object of this part of the introduction is to "show distinctly the value of this section of the colony to the mother country."<sup>(5)</sup> He expatiates upon the economic

- 
1. "Advertisement" to the Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, A.D. 1834-35.
  2. Godlonton apologises for its lack of polish in the "Advertisement"; "It will suffice for any candid mind to know," he writes, "that it has been hurriedly written - amidst the scenes of distress and commotion to which it refers - at intervals snatched from a round of duties, contingent upon the inhabitants, flying to arms en masse for general defence, and other pressing and unavoidable avocations."
  3. Op. cit. p. 15; pp. 99-100; pp. 106-8; pp. 114-18 et passim.
  4. Ibid. pp. 7-8; pp. 14-15; pp. 32-3; p. 75; p. 112; et passim.
  5. Ibid. "Advertisement" to Part II.



potentialities of the frontier districts, especially with regard to wool,<sup>(1)</sup> and urges the Home Government not to allow its measures to be guided solely by the dictates of its purse.<sup>(2)</sup> Part III, published in 1836 at the same time as the preceding part, is entitled "Sketch of Kaffraria." Godlonton, in describing the geographical, ethnic and historical aspects of the area seizes the opportunity to repudiate the constant accusations that the colonists were continually encroaching upon the land of the Kaffirs.<sup>(3)</sup> Indeed, throughout this book and the ones that followed, Godlonton displayed a lamentable inability to come to an intelligent understanding of the true nature of the frontier problem. His deep-seated conviction that the colonists were always on the side of the angels blinded him to the fact that there are always at least two sides to a quarrel, and that sometimes both may be equally right - or equally wrong. But in attempting to exonerate the frontiersmen, it was necessary to blacken the character of their enemies; partly to serve this purpose, there is included in Part III a vivid and detailed account of the barbaric practices of the Kaffirs, and special emphasis is laid upon their superstitious nature as revealed in the rites of witchcraft.<sup>(4)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. p.189.

2. For example, the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor for the Eastern Province would materially assist the frontier to "rise from its ruins." (Ibid. p.200.)

3. Ibid. pp.204-5.

4. Ibid. p.219.



He praises the missionaries who have always been in the van in combating these superstitious practices,<sup>(1)</sup> and demands, in terms so general as to be almost meaningless, that in future "the predatory incursions of determined robbers" shall be prevented by the adoption of a policy<sup>(2)</sup> of "HONEST PRINCIPLE, GOOD ORDER AND SOCIAL GOVERNMENT."

His second publication was the Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, which was published in Grahamstown in 1836. Despite his professed intention of aiming at "nothing beyond a plain, unvarnished relation of facts,"<sup>(3)</sup> the narrative is told in a highly prejudiced manner. In the Preface, he expresses his obligation to Colonel Harry Smith "for the readiness with which he furnished him, from time to time, with such particulars as prevented, at the moment the possibility of a false impression being made on the public mind, either as to the extent of the danger to be apprehended, or of the character of the war in which the inhabitants found themselves so suddenly plunged."<sup>(4)</sup> In view of Smith's subsequent quarrels with the Stockenström party, this fact is very significant, for in the time of Smith's governorship, Godlonton was one of his most loyal supporters. Godlonton, in the Narrative, demands the adoption of "a more rational system" on the frontier<sup>(5)</sup> and depicts Hintza and the Kaffirs<sup>(6)</sup> in the most unfavourable light possible. He bitterly condemns the reversal of D'Urban's annexation of the Province of Queen Adelaide<sup>(8)</sup> as resulting from the influence of

---

1. Ibid. p.269.

2. Ibid. pp.269-70.

3. R. Godlonton: A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-35.

4. Ibid. p.vi.

5. Ibid. pp.19-20.

6. Ibid. p.170.

7. Ibid. p.170: "...Uncivilised and barbarous, we do not expect the Kafir to attain a high point in the scale of humanity..."

8. Ibid. p 187.



impractical theorists in the Western Province, and condones the excesses of the frontiersmen during "this trying period."<sup>(1)</sup> Once again, his conclusions about the causes of the war are quite unsympathetic to the case of the Kaffirs. No attempt is made to assess the underlying factors which impelled the Kaffirs to invade the colony - he does not hesitate to attribute the outbreak of war to the innate perfidy of Hintza and to the avaricious habits of the kaffirs. In so far as the frontiersmen were responsible, he is content to remark dogmatically that "it was a war of necessity, and not of choice; and waged - if ever war were waged - PRO ARIS ET FOCIS...", an opinion which simply evades the issue. Godlonton's argument is far too plausible to be true.

His next publication was of quite a different type; entitled Sketches of the Eastern Districts of the Cape of Good Hope, as they are in 1842, it was a cross between a Baedeker and a publicity pamphlet, for Godlonton insisted, throughout his life, that it was incumbent upon the British Government to encourage immigration to the Eastern Cape as a means of helping to settle the frontier problem. This was to be Godlonton's contribution towards publicising the resources and potentialities of the frontier districts, in the prosperity of which he himself had so immediate an interest. In typical fashion, he does not scruple to dwell upon political subjects such as vagrancy<sup>(2)</sup> or the overthrow of the D'Urban "system",<sup>(3)</sup> and, as far as he was concerned, the publication of the book afforded a not unwelcome opportunity for airing his political views.

Two years later, he compiled and edited a record of the 1844 celebrations held in Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Bathurst and Salem, to commemorate the landing the British

---

1. Ibid. p 229.

2. R. Godlonton: Sketches of the Eastern Districts of the Cape of Good Hope, as they are in 1842. p 113.

3. Ibid. p. 114.



Settlers. In the introduction to the Memorials of the British Settlers of South Africa, as the volume was called, he imagines himself in the guise of the historian of the early development of the settlement.<sup>(1)</sup> The booklet, like all Godlonton's writings, makes no claims to literary polish,<sup>(2)</sup> and is merely a straightforward account of the proceedings in the normal journalistic style. Yet it clearly reflects not only Godlonton's great pride in being a member of the settler community, but also the intense interest which he took in anything affecting the welfare of the settlers themselves.

The Case of the Colonists of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, in reference to the Kaffir Wars of 1835-36 and 1846, was first published in the year after the 1846 war, and was of a far more ambitious nature. Intended primarily to publicise such details "as should present to the judgement of a just, a generous, and a discerning British public, a clear and well-defined outline of the whole," it was an expression of the disillusionment and exasperation experienced by the settlers at the inability of the Home Government to provide them with greater security. Once again, Godlonton displays a lack of insight into the problems which beset the frontiersmen. "The Case of the Colonists," he writes, "is emphatically an ex parte one. THE AGGRESSION IS ALL ON ONE SIDE; the Colonists are entirely guiltless of having provoked offence."<sup>(4)</sup>

1. R. Godlonton: Memorials of the British Settlers of South Africa. See, for example, page ix, where he quotes Nathaniel Morton, "one of the PILGRIM FATHERS of America, and the historian of the first years of that Settlement" as performing "a similar task."
2. In the "Advertisement" to his first book, the Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, Godlonton had made it quite clear that "elegance of diction has not been the point aimed at..."
3. R. Godlonton: Case of the Colonists of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, in reference to the Kaffir Wars of 1835-36, and 1846. (p. ix)
4. Ibid. p. xi. (Preface to first edition). On page 11, he states that "The Government, by its own determined perseverance in error, has brought down upon them (i.e. the colonists) the calamities by which they are now surrounded..."



As in all his writing on the Kaffir Wars, he traces only the short-term causes of the conflicts, and fails to distinguish between what may be technically termed the "occasion", on the one hand, and the "true cause" on the other. By this time, he is determined to place the blame for the recurrent frontier wars squarely on the shoulders not only of the Kaffirs but also of the British Government: "The great evil under which this Colony has laboured," he writes, "has been the profound ignorance, both of the British public and Government, of the actual character, situation, and circumstances of its inhabitants. Had these been fully known, those disasters which have overtaken this Settlement never could have happened..."<sup>(1)</sup>

He expresses his complete lack of confidence in the chiefs as agents for preserving the peace of the frontier,<sup>(2)</sup> and labels Stockenstrom<sup>(3)</sup> and Dr Philip<sup>(4)</sup> as enemies of the settlers, who, he maintains, are the chief sufferers by the Government's "do-nothing system."<sup>(5)</sup> He traces the events leading up to the war of 1846, complaining repeatedly about the refusal of the Government to take precautionary measures till it was too late. He concludes with his usual strictures upon the motives of the Kaffirs. "It is very certain," he writes, "that the Kaffirs were determined on war, and that the moment had arrived when they resolved to test their strength with the Colony. But still they appear to have been resolved to goad the Colony into the first act of open national hostility..."<sup>(6)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. p. x. (Preface to first edition)

2. Ibid. p. 6.

3. Ibid. pp. 23-26.

4. Ibid. pp. 23-4.

5. Ibid. p. 141.

6. Ibid. pp. 160-161.



If Godlonton was sincere in his intentions, he was blatantly unscrupulous in his method. In 1848, Godlonton compiled The Eastern Province Directory and Almanac,<sup>(1)</sup> his avowed aim being "to bring out prominently, though not altogether exclusively, the actual conditions and resources of the Eastern Province, as contradistinguished from those of the Western..."<sup>(2)</sup> It contained the same kind of commercial and statistical information as the Annual Registers, and was a more elaborate and detailed version of his own Sketches of the Eastern Districts. He issued one in 1849 as well, though I have found no trace of any further editions.

During the fifties, Godlonton produced some of his most important works: the first was A Narrative of the Kaffir War of 1850-51, written jointly with Edward Irving and published in instalments from March 1851. In July 1851, he extracted in toto the chapter on the Hottentots and the Kat River Settlement, and published it as a pamphlet under the title of a Review of the Condition of the Frontier Hottentots from 1799 to 1851, stating that "A well understanding of the Hottentot question being indispensable to the satisfactory adjustment of our intra-colonial and border relations, the present pamphlet is put forward in a compendious form, under a hope that some of the abstrusities of this embarrassing subject may be thereby elucidated."<sup>(3)</sup> In 1855, appeared his political

- 
1. The Eastern Province Directory and Almanac for 1848, Forming a hand-book for travellers and visitors, and a companion for the farm, desk, or counting-house. 1848.
  2. Ibid: "To the Reader."
  3. R. Godlonton: Review of the Condition of the Frontier Hottentots from 1799 to 1851, and of the incipient stages of the rebellion of the latter year, "Advertisement."



pamphlet, Sunshine and Cloud,<sup>(1)</sup> which was a statement of Godlonton's views on Stockenstrom and the reversal of the D'Urban frontier system. While in England Godlonton wrote a pamphlet on the question of Separation. This comprised a brief history of the separatist agitation since the thirties, and concluded with some remarks on the case in favour of the movement. The final sentence sums up what was basically Godlonton's attitude throughout the history of the movement though the emphasis changed from time to time. "A separation of interests," it states is impossible but a separation of administration is essential to its future security, to the full development of its resources and to the adoption and carrying out of those measures which are essential to the maintenance of peace and the contentment and welfare of the whole community."<sup>(3)</sup>

On his return from England in 1862, Godlonton produced the last of his pamphlets: this was entitled A Brief Memoir of the Rev. John Ayliff, and was a re-print of a memoir, written at the time of Ayliff's death, for The South African Wesleyan. The tone is inevitably laudatory, but, while ostensibly recounting the details of Ayliff's life, Godlonton does not let slip the opportunity of

- 
1. R. Godlonton: Sunshine and Cloud, or Light thrown on a dark page of frontier history, of 1837; being an exposition of the Reversal of the D'Urban System, by Lieutenant-Governor, now the Hon. Sir Andreas Stockenstrom Bart., Cape Town. 1855.
  2. Notes on the Separation of the Eastern from the Western Province, and Concession to the former of its own local government. By a late member (for the Eastern Province) of the Legislative Council. 1860.
  3. Ibid. p. 28.



expressing his opinions on the settlement of the Fingoes under Ayliff in 1835,<sup>(1)</sup> or of emphasising the significance of the work done among the Kaffirs at Healdtown,<sup>(2)</sup> or even of paying a passing tribute to D'Urban and to Harry Smith.<sup>(3)</sup> The article is itself a tribute and not an evaluation.

For over a century, Godlonton's large literary output, both in the press and in his books and pamphlets, has been widely used as a basis for frontier historiography. The problem of arriving at an intelligible understanding of this segment of South African history has been further complicated by the fact that not even an important primary source, such as Jeremiah Goldswain's Chronicle, is altogether free from the Godlonton influence. Miss Una Long, in her introduction to the first volume of the Chronicle, states: "In relating events in the 1835 war outside his immediate experience, Goldswain has used the words of a professional writer and has turned to the Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, 1834-5, by Robert Godlonton..."<sup>(4)</sup> In Volume II, she remarks further that Goldswain made "copious extracts" from the Graham's Town Journal, and she comments: "One feels, that unconsciously, the paper moulded not only his style but his emotional responses."<sup>(5)</sup> From an examination of the Chronicle, it is evident that Goldswain harboured much the same grievances as did Godlonton,<sup>(6)</sup> and in 1850

---

1. R. Godlonton: A Brief Memoir of the Rev. John Ayliff. pp. 17-22.

2. Ibid. pp. 23-4.

3. Ibid. p. 17.

4. The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain Vol I, p. xix.

5. The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, Vol II, p. xxix.

6. Ibid. p. 45, where he blames Stockenström for the abandonment of the Province of Queen Adelaide.



he went so far as to acknowledge it as "that valuable Journal." <sup>(1)</sup> On the other hand, it may be argued quite plausibly from this that Godlonton's political views were shared with the settlers at large, and one of the problems to be investigated in a study of Godlonton is the question of whether he was the fons et origo or merely the mouthpiece of frontier opinion.

Of the two general histories of the later 19th century which deserve notice one agrees with the Godlonton case and one strives to remain neutral: <sup>(2)</sup>

J. C. Chase, in his Annals of the Cape of Good Hope of 1869, writes indignantly about the injustice which the settlers had suffered at the hands of Stockenström, Glenelg, the British Government and the missionaries. Like his friend <sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton, he was one of the original settlers of 1820, and a man who approached the frontier problems in an essentially practical manner: for example he seems, like Godlonton, to have approved of the foundation of the Kat River Settlement, though only until such time as its existence was shown to be quite incompatible with the security of the property of those who were settled in the vicinity. <sup>(4)</sup> He condemns the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty by Britain as "one of the most imprudent acts ever committed," <sup>(5)</sup> and, with

---

1. Ibid. p.122.

2. History of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope from its discovery to the year 1819 by A. Wilmot, Esq. From 1820 to 1868 by the Hon. John Centlivres Chase, M.L.C. Cape Town. 1869.

3. Vide, e.g; the intimate letter of Chase to Godlonton, in Godlonton Papers, 1.1.52.

4. Wilmot and Chase: op.cit. p.298. He speaks of the founding of "the celebrated but afterwards notorious Kat River Settlement."

5. Ibid. p.485.



regard to the constitutional struggle, he gives great prominence to the Eastern Province criticisms of the draft constitution. In his account of the Eastern Province agitation for resident government, Chases's sympathies are clearly on the side of the settlers.<sup>(1)</sup> Generally speaking, therefore, his Annals reflect no advance upon the views expressed by Godlonton.<sup>(2)</sup>

John Noble, Clerk of the House of Assembly, endeavours gallantly in his South Africa, Past and Present<sup>(3)</sup> of 1877 to preserve an objective attitude. As a consequence, his sympathies pursue a somewhat zig-zag course; at one moment we find him vindicating the actions of the Kaffirs,<sup>(4)</sup> at another remarking on the successful working of the Stockenstrom policy,<sup>(5)</sup> and at another sympathising with the plundered frontiersmen.<sup>(6)</sup> In his outline of the political wrangles over the constitution, though, he achieves a remarkable degree of impartiality,<sup>(7)</sup> and as such, his book has little more than a narrative interest.

It is to be more deeply regretted that historians such as George McCall Theal and Sir George Cory have

- 
1. See, for example, ibid. pp. 467. ; pp482-3; pp503-4. On p 467, he refers caustically to the "long-enjoyed and dearly cherished supremacy" of Cape Town.
  2. Urie: op.cit. p.18, for instance, shows how he merely accepted the myth about Stockenstrom's alleged volte-face before the Aborigines Committee.
  3. John Noble: South Africa Past and Present. A Short History of the European Settlement at the Cape. Cape Town. London. 1877.
  4. Ibid. p.57; p.63 etc.
  5. Ibid. p.63.
  6. Ibid. p.57.
  7. Ibid. pp.202-3.



accepted Godlonton's opinions so implicitly: their monumental general histories of South Africa have ex natura been influential in the writing and teaching of the history of this country. Theal<sup>(1)</sup> exposes his true sentiments in his critiques of the books he has read: he states that Godlonton's Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes "contains much authentic information",<sup>(2)</sup> while his Narrative of the 1835 war "is on the whole a trustworthy account of the war, being founded upon official reports and the author's personal knowledge of much that occurred at the time."<sup>(3)</sup> His Case of the Colonists "has been written carefully and with the most complete knowledge of the subject."<sup>(4)</sup> On the other hand, he charges Stockenström's Autobiography with not being "impartial" and with suppressing embarrassing evidence.<sup>(5)</sup> In fact the only faults which Theal seems to recognise in Godlonton's writings consist in spelling and typographical errors!<sup>(6)</sup>

Sir George Cory<sup>(7)</sup> seems to have tried to be as objective as possible; for example, he comments as follows on Stockenström's demand that a return of the numbers of votes sent in by the municipalities and road boards in 1850, should be laid on the table: "In fairness to Sir Andries, it should be stated that as far back as May 23rd, when asked by the people of Somerset East to allow himself to be nominated, he consented only reluctantly because, he said, the Governor has not explicitly pledged himself to the appointment of the five with the greatest

---

1. George McCall Theal: History of South Africa. London. 1908.

2. Ibid. Vol. III, p.406.

3. Ibid. Vol III, p.407.

4. Ibid. Vol. III. p.410.

5. Ibid. Vol III. p.419.

6. Ibid. Vol. III. p.407.

7. G. E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa. London. 1930. Vol. I



number of votes; should he not do so, it will in principle, still leave the members the nominees of the Executive and thus the election by popular representation will not have been achieved."<sup>(1)</sup> Yet the Godlonton version of events is everywhere evident in The Rise of South Africa, notably in the details of the war of 1850-3, for which he very clearly relied considerably upon Godlonton's narratives and upon the news-columns of the Journal. He takes the opposite view from Godlonton on the causes of the Kat River rebellion, though:"...It is not clear that any actions of the missionaries precipitated the rebellion," he writes, "and it is unthinkable that they should have deliberately done so. It is quite clear however, that as soon as they became aware of the state of affairs, they did all in their power - and took great risks - to stop it...."<sup>(2)</sup> Miss Urie shows, on the other hand, how elements of Godlonton's case have crept into Cory's history with regard to the crisis over Stockenström's evidence before the Aborigines Committee.<sup>(3)</sup> Excited by the stimulus of his own narrative, Cory seems to have relied on the adage "To travel hopefully is better than to arrive." For the most part he evaded controversy, and his rare decisions are usually on the side of the big battalions of the frontier journals. Like Theal and his other predecessors, he neglects to examine the validity of Godlonton's views,<sup>(4)</sup> and makes no attempt to assess his importance in the struggle for separation. No attempt is made to gauge the influence which the Journal had on

---

1. Ibid. p.247.

2. Ibid. V, 329.

3. Urie: op.cit. p. 30 et seq.

4. But vide, e.g., Cory: op.cit. p.362: "When the deeds of Godlontonian treachery are laid bare, Mr Renton will be found as spotless in character as he has shown himself resolute in action....."



the separatist cause, and nowhere do we find any analysis of Godlonton's concept of separation, which was often a good deal more constructive than the general histories of the period lead one to believe.

There are a number of theses on different aspects of this period. Both Sole<sup>(1)</sup> and Taylor<sup>(2)</sup> have written useful and interesting accounts of the separatist movement, but though they generally give Godlonton the prominence that was his due in the struggle, they do not analyse either his views or his aims. Nor do they always relate his demands for separation closely enough to other political events, such as the progress of the Kaffir War or of the struggle for representative government.

(3)

Grundlingh's study of the Legislative Council deals with its constitutional development and casts very little light upon the political conduct of Godlonton and the other members, while Du Plessis's survey of political parties<sup>(4)</sup> such as the Popular Party, the Separation Party and the Midlands Party, is based for the most part upon indiscriminate quotation from, and reference to, secondary sources such as R. W. Murray's Reminiscences. Consequently,

- 
1. D. B. Sole: The Separation Movement and the demand for Resident Government in the Eastern Province, 1854-78. Comprising a record of political opinion in the Province during the half century. M.A. thesis. Rhodes University College. 1939. 1828-78
  2. N. H. Taylor: The Separation Movement during the period of Representative Government at the Cape, 1854-72. M.A. thesis. U.C.T. 1938.
  3. N. A. S. Grundlingh: The Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-53. M.A. thesis. University of Stellenbosch. 1937.
  4. J.H.O. du Plessis: Die Ontstaan van politieke partye in die Kaap-Kolonie tot 1885. M.A. thesis. University of S.A. 1939.



the rôle of Godlonton in Cape politics is examined no further than to remark that he was "feitlik die ongekroonde koning van die Ooselike Provinsie"; political alignments, other than those dealt with in the general histories, are not mentioned, and no new light is shed upon the extra-Parliamentary political groupings of the day. Du Toit's thesis on native policy after 1847<sup>(1)</sup> is very comprehensive and generally reliable.

In spite of the increase in the number of monographs on this period, the riddles which spring to mind are still legion. It is clear that the Graham's Town Journal was the organ of a distinct political group in the Eastern Province, but so far, no serious attempt has been made to assess the extent of the paper's influence upon general public opinion or to analyse the composition of this party. No examination of Godlonton, as critic alike of the Colonial Office, the Cape Administration and the rival political groups in the Colony, has yet been undertaken, though his opinions have been widely and indiscriminately cited. That he had many opponents is wellknown, but his connections or friendships with important administrative officers such as Sir Harry Smith, John Montagu and Richard Southey have not been included in the reckoning.

Judging by the number of his correspondents,<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton was a prolific letter-writer;<sup>(3)</sup> his private papers illustrate the wide range of his contacts and a capacity for keeping old friends at least equal to his capacity for keeping to old views. Taken together, his journal, his newspapers, his books and his letters reveal a character which, whether he was right or wrong in his judgements, was remarkably apiece.

- 
1. A.E. du Toit: The Cape Frontier. A Study of Native Policy, 1847-66. D. Phil. Thesis. Univ. of Pretoria. 1949
  2. Vide Preface Supra.
  3. Cp. Copy of letter, A.G. Bain to Godlonton, in Bain Papers 12.11.58: "...You are the prince of correspondents..."



CHAPTER II:

"ANNEXATION" VERSUS "CONCESSION."

Godlonton's writings constituted in part a defence of the frontier system which he considered the most efficacious, and in part a defence against all attempts to supplant it by another system. He came not merely to bury, but also to praise. His writings, with their constructive as well as their destructive elements, embodied not only a conscious attempt to secure for the frontier the sympathy of its critics, but also a plea for a more material benefit - a form of administration which would conform to the requirements of its unique, and (as far as many were concerned) its unintelligible, position.

He was a shrewd journalist, perhaps because he was a progressive businessman; but though there was a marked tenacity in his views, their monotonous repetition was deceptive. With changing circumstances, he was constantly changing his approach, so that his writings form a mirror of a section of opinion which, over the years, changed its front but not its ground.

In examining Godlonton's opinions, it is instructive to remember the distinction which G. J. Renier draws between the direct traces of historical events found in bills or ledgers, and, the indirect traces found in contemporary narrative documents. "Narrative documents," he writes, "often contain traces ..of the atmosphere that accompanied these transactions," but these traces are "at one remove."<sup>(1)</sup> A professor's lecture notes are not simply a record of what he says in his lecture; they are the traces of what he intends to say. "They are also the traces of his knowledge and of his ignorance, of his opinion and prejudices; they may be the trace of

---

1. G. J. Renier: History, its Purpose and Method. p. 103.



the state of accepted history in his day, as reflected by his mind."<sup>(1)</sup> The Pyramids are the trace of a number of intricate, though connected, sequences of events.<sup>(2)</sup>

When viewed in this light, the significance of Godlonton's narratives is immeasurably enhanced. Though ostensibly relating the dramatic story of frontier wars, they in fact point towards a whole series of other sequences of events. Every statement he makes cries out for thorough investigation in relation to occurrences, as far away as Cape Town or even London, though these would often seem to have little connection with what was happening on the frontier. To a large extent, his writings were in the nature of propaganda. In his history of the Kaffir War of 1835, he criticised "the absurd ideas which had been entertained by the Home Government in reference to the military defences along the land boundary of this colony; ....the people themselves had been praying till their patience was exhausted for the adoption of a more rational system, and more adequate security to life and property."<sup>(3)</sup>

The Case of the Colonists aimed at dispelling some of the ignorance and prejudices of the British public and government with regard to the frontier,<sup>(4)</sup> while his Eastern Province Directory and Almanac, and his Sketches of the Eastern Districts<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. p.104.

2. Ibid. p.157.

3. R. Godlonton: Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, pp.19-20.

4. R. Godlonton: Case of the Colonists. pp.ix-x.

5. R. Godlonton: Sketches of the Eastern Districts. p viii "If, by the publication of these slight 'SKETCHES' this (i.e. inaccurate information) should be obviated in future, and if in the smallest degree they should give increased interest to this unquestionably fine and valuable province, the compiler will feel gratified, and will fully have attained his object."



had as their immediate aim the fostering of interest in the frontier districts, in order to encourage immigration from Britain and other European countries.

Yet Godlonton did not always express his intentions quite so lucidly. Over a number of years, he consciously strove, step by step, to mould and consolidate frontier opinion on certain issues which he regarded as fundamental to the safety and prosperity of the area. There were numerous obstacles to prevent such frontier opinion from securing a sympathetic recognition: the conservatism and vested interests of Cape Town, the determination of the Home Government to economise, the ignorance and prejudices of British public opinion, the propaganda of the philanthropists and the missionaries, the constant changing of Governors and the attendant growth of groups of colonists in favour of this or that native policy, and finally, as we shall see,<sup>(1)</sup> the economic rivalry and divergence of political opinion between the different parts of the Eastern Districts, which was exploited by the West to prove that the East did not know its own mind.

By 1850, Godlonton had been resident on the frontier for three decades, and had come to a firm decision as to how the Eastern Districts should be administered. That decision was not very different from what it had been in 1835. In his Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, which appeared in that year, he had dismissed the making of treaties with the chiefs as not merely ineffective but also unwise.<sup>(2)</sup> He had denounced the failure of the government to occupy the neutral territory, and defended the policy of extending the colonial boundary to the Keiskamma.<sup>(3)</sup> Native policy, he said, should be

---

1. Chapter III.

2. R. Godlonton: Intro. Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, p. 7.

3. Ibid. pp. 7-8.



"inflexible, prompt and decisive," for "according to Kafir interpretation, forbearance is weakness, indecision a want of courage, and liberality a defect of understanding."<sup>(1)</sup>

The way in which he considered such a policy could best be implemented was by placing sufficient power in the hands of a Lieutenant-Governor permanently resident on the Eastern Frontier. It was inevitable that his attitude to the actions of the British Government should be anything but favourable and he expostulated in no uncertain terms against the cancellation of Bourke's appointment as Lieutenant-Governor in 1828. "The course adopted in this instance," he wrote, "has been highly prejudicial to the interests of the Colony in a variety of ways; and if it cannot be said in strict propriety to have led to the existing distress, still it may be boldly affirmed that had that appointment been confirmed, - had a Lieutenant-Governor been on the frontier, directing in his own person the civil and military duties of the frontier, the present calamity could never have happened."<sup>(2)</sup> Again and again did he draw attention to the recommendation of the Commissioners of Inquiry that a resident authority was imperative for the security of the frontier; time and again did he criticise the way in which the Commissioner-Generalship had hardly been created when it was abolished.<sup>(3)</sup> After the 1846, war, he said that the Government still had not realised the folly of "not listening with respect to the representations of those who, being on the spot, were most competent to form correct opinions on matters within the range of their own observation, and in the issue of which are involved their own immediate and vital interests."<sup>(4)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. p. 32.

2. Ibid. p. 75.

3. Ibid. p. 112; p. 200.

4. R. Godlonton: Case of the Colonists, p. 151.



Such, in brief, were Godlonton's views on frontier administration. His ideas with regard to native policy were equally rigid after the war of 1835: in his Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Herdes of that year, he praised Sir Benjamin D'Urban's annexation of the Province of Queen Adelaide as a policy for the good of both sides, in that it would not only establish peace on the colonial boundary but also civilise the natives.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1842, he said that the D'Urban system tended "to neutralise the power of the several chiefs to do mischief, and to place upon them such checks as to make it clearly apparent to them, that 'honesty is the best policy...'"<sup>(2)</sup> As time went on, Godlonton's convictions did not change - they only became more deeply ingrained. In 1847, his remedy for the frontier difficulties was the same as it had been in 1835, for he had adopted the D'Urban system as his panacea. "If the intelligent student of Cape history," he wrote in The Case of the Colonists, "will refer back to the Governorship of Sir BENJAMIN D'URBAN, one of the most able, upright, and humane administrators the colony ever had - he may clearly trace all the subsequent commotions on the Eastern Frontier - the loss of life and waste of treasure, to the treatment that officer received, and to the utter disregard of his advice, culminating in the total abrogation of all his measures."<sup>(3)</sup>

By 1850, then, Godlonton's views on the D'Urban and Stockenström frontier systems were still the same as they had been in 1835, and his demands for resident government on the frontier were as loud as ever. He was still agitating when the Eighth Kaffir War broke out. His Narrative<sup>(4)</sup>

- 
1. R. Godlonton: Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Herdes, p. 187.
  2. R. Godlonton: Sketches of the Eastern Districts. p. 114.
  3. Case of the Colonists. p. xiii.
  4. Henceforth cited as "Kaffir War".



of the Kaffir War of 1850-51 and his comments on the war in the Journal must, therefore, be seen in direct relation not only to his remarks since 1835, but also to the simultaneous political wrangles within the colony. The book was pre-eminently a political pamphlet - even if not so in form. In the "Advertisement", Godlonton said that the book was intended as a vehicle for overcoming the "imperfect information" possessed by the British public on matters relating to the colony. He intended much more than that, for it was also to be a means of attacking those whom he regarded as the enemies of the frontier - not in order to gratify any personal political ambition, but in order to secure for the frontier both justice, security and good government.

Godlonton obviously set out with the object of justifying the administration of Sir Harry Smith. His defence of Smith, both in his book and in the Journal, was inspired partly by his belief that Sir Harry was the best possible man to settle the difficulties of the frontier, partly by the resultant need to shield him against the rapidly-growing body of criticism which filled the columns of the hostile press, and partly by motives of self-interest.<sup>(1)</sup> When Smith had arrived as Governor at the end of 1847,<sup>(2)</sup> he was joyfully welcomed by the frontiersmen as the popular military commander

---

1. Vide Chapter III. It is interesting, too, that Smith had always favoured the Wesleyans and had probably come strongly under Methodist influence in the D'Urban period. (Vide A.T.C. Sloc: Some Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1830 and 1844, pp. 56, 58) Also ibid pp. 72-3, for a quotation from "Justus": "It does not, therefore, seem possible to increase the intensity of love existing between the Governor and the Methodist preachers. The editor of the Graham's Town Journal is a methodist, and methodism in the colony 'rules the court, the camp the grave'..."



of the war of 1835 and as the administrator of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's short-lived Province of Queen Adelaide.<sup>(1)</sup> His physical vigour and his dramatic way of dealing with the chiefs impressed the colonists, who looked forward to a long period of much-needed peace.<sup>(2)</sup> Till 1850, the frontier enjoyed an unprecedented state of tranquillity, and both Smith<sup>(3)</sup> and Mackinnon received addresses of thanks from the colonists.<sup>(4)</sup> But trouble was soon brewing. Smith, eager to please the Secretary of State, reduced the military forces by sending home 1492 men, settling 247 in military villages, and keeping only 4703 officers and men in the pay of the British Government. The result was that, when the war suddenly broke out, Smith was caught off his guard by the Kaffirs and was unable, for several months, to carry out the decisive manoeuvres which would probably have ended the war in months instead of years. Moreover, there was an uninterrupted flow of natives into the colony from Kaffraria, with the concomitant problems of squatting and vagrancy. A constant stream of Fingos passed out of the colony for certain specified periods, and it soon became evident that they were the middle-men in smuggling gunpowder into Kaffirland and despite the enforcement of a pass system, Mackinnon was fully aware that the smuggling was continuing under his very nose.

There were other problems: Bowker, the Kat River Magistrate complained of the Kaffir squatters at Blinkwater, and the consequent clearing of Fuller's Hoek by Lieutenant Davies in June 1850<sup>(5)</sup> led to complications and bitterness among the

1. Vide Mitra: op.cit. p 97; also GTJ.2.10.47. Godlonton wrote in GTJ.15.1.48: "There is perhaps no one living who had such peculiar talents as His Excellency possesses for acquiring hold on the native mind. Persons ignorant of the peculiar cast of the native's ideas are apt to think lightly and even to ridicule the style adopted by ~~him~~ in addressing these people." H.E.
2. Vide Harriet Ward: Five Years in Kaffirland Vol.II, p.297; Mitra: Life and Letters of Sir John Hall, pp.212-3.
3. e.g. GTJ.9.2.50.
4. Vide A.E.du Toit: The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy, 1847-1866. p.86.
5. GTJ 13.7.50.



Ghonas, who were law-abiding and loyal. The Hottentots had been irritated at their treatment by Pottinger and Superintendent Cobbe, and the Tambookies were involved in a land dispute along the Klaas Smits river with the farmers,<sup>(1)</sup> while the advent of the prophet Umlanjani soon provided Sandile and the other discontented Gaika chiefs with an instrument for stirring up strife.<sup>(2)</sup>

Within the Colony, Smith's popularity was being whittled away by his enemies, for both the Governor and the Legislative Council had fallen out of favour by this time, and their opponents made political capital out of the agitation to discredit them and to force the resignation of the Councillors in July 1849.<sup>(3)</sup> At the same time, the colonial press urged men not to accept seats, so that the Council would cease to function and a Representative Assembly would be granted.<sup>(4)</sup> From the beginning, Smith had objected to Lord Grey's proposal to send the convicted Irish peasants to the Cape<sup>(5)</sup> and in May 1849 had begged him to revoke his decision. But in the same month the Anti-Convict Association pledged itself "to hold in abhorrence any person who may aid the exiles in landing, and may have any communication with them whatever," and the Governor became more and more unpopular when it appeared as though he was preparing to land the exiles.<sup>(6)</sup> He re-assured the people, by a proclamation on 17th July, that he would not allow the convicts to disembark until he had received a reply to his despatches from Grey. On the other hand, he obstinately refused to be bullied by the Anti-Convict Association, and

---

1. Vide P.F. 1851, xxviii (1334). passim

2. Bisset: Sport and War, p.128.

3. R. Kilpin: Romance of a Colonial Parliament, p.75.

4. M.A.S.Grundlingh: The Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-53 p.133.

5. Smith: Autobiography. p.611; Mitra: op.cit. p.253.

6. Smith: op.cit. p.611.



made it clear that he would never disobey the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Yet in the same month the powerful "pledge" of the Anti-Convict Association forced all but one of the unofficial members of the Council to resign, thereby completely overthrowing the Council. When the "Neptune" arrived with the convicts in September, it was the last straw. The Anti-Convict Association obtained complete control over the Cape Town mob.<sup>(1)</sup> The attacks on the Council became more and more attacks on Smith instead, and the outlying districts of the Colony tended to give the Association some valuable support. For Smith it was very discouraging, as, in 1848, he had been in complete agreement with most of Porter's recommendations as to the introduction of parliamentary institutions at the Cape, and ever since his arrival as Governor, had striven to reconcile the warring factions in the Council and to raise its prestige.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton, who had at first approved of the agitation against the introduction of convicts,<sup>(3)</sup> realised that its original principles had been prostituted by a political faction. The attitude of many in the Eastern Province changed from one of sympathy to one of hostility. The Rev. H.H. Dugmore, in a letter to Godlonton in August 1849, said that the "pledge" was being made "an engine of anarchy instead of conservatism" and added, in his ecclesiastical manner: "I have no notion of submitting to political popery any more than to ecclesiastical..<"<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton became indignant at the course of events in Cape Town,<sup>(5)</sup> but his strong condemnation of the agitation added

---

1. Mitra: op.cit. p. 258.

2. Kilpin: op.cit. p. 68.

3. GTJ 19.5.49.

4. Godlonton Papers: H.H. Dugmore to Godlonton, 27.8.49.

5. Vide, e.g., GTJ 19.1.50. Cp. ACC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 3.7.49: "...The clamour against Sir Harry is alike senseless and heartless. He has done all that mortal man could do to serve the Colonists - and as a climax they require him to betray his trust and renounce his allegiance to his Sovereign! At the risk of all I possess I will resist this movement - and you know if I see my path clear, I am not easily turned out of it..."



to his unpopularity and for a long time helped to freeze the party divisions within the colony.<sup>(1)</sup> Although Grey's despatch of 5th December 1849 had enabled Smith to send the Neptune away in February 1850, it was painfully evident to Godlonton that Smith's reputation and popularity had been irreparably scarred; he felt that Smith had been very unjustly treated by the Capetonians,<sup>(2)</sup> and determined to do what he could to restore the Governor's former prestige. But that task was becoming increasingly embarrassing. Smith's attempt to force the burghers to enrol for the protection of the colony had been so unfavourably received that it had had to be abandoned.<sup>(3)</sup> Beyond the Orange, as well as within the colony, Smith's popularity among the Boers had been rapidly on the wane since the Boomplaats campaign. The execution of Dreyer had made a very unfortunate impression upon all sections of opinion,<sup>(4)</sup> so much so that when, in August 1850, John Ayliff wrote to Godlonton, he expressed the opinion that Godlonton was going to have "a terrible fight in defending Sir H. Smith" in the Council, and advised

- 
1. Vide Godlonton Papers. Thomas Radmall to Godlonton, 20.6.50. Radmall complained that he was still a "Marked Man" four months after the "Neptune" had sailed.
  2. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 14.9.49: "I really feel for Sir Harry that after risking his reputation with the home government, he should be so vilely insulted as he has been by blackguards here, and that their black-guardism should meet with abettors..."
  3. J.P. Kent: Sir Harry Smith as High Commissioner, pp.16-17; ACC. 611/1. Godlonton to Southey, 25.12.48.
  4. Vide De Kiewiet: British Colonial Policy and the S.A. Republics, p.24.



him to be prepared to explain the Dreyer affair, Boomplaats and the Tambookie dispute.<sup>(1)</sup> On the Eastern Frontier, Smith seems to have become unpopular in certain circles before he had even ended the Seventh Kaffir War and made the final peace.<sup>(2)</sup> As early as April 1848, Godlonton confessed to Southey:

You have no idea what a desire there is here to keep up the War Cry and what sturdy opposition I meet in my endeavours to discharge my Editorial duty with faithfulness to all parties. No man's measures were ever viewed with more jealousy than are those of Sir Harry Smith's, and a false move will be the signal for a great clamour.<sup>(3)</sup>

And when the troops were withdrawn later in the year, Smith's popularity, as Godlonton clearly realised, decreased pari passu with the fall in the prices realised by the local merchants.<sup>(4)</sup>

1. Godlonton Papers. John Ayliff to Godlonton (received 3.8.50):  
"I fancy that there is war to the knife in prospect. You must furnish yourself with evidence to defend his measures.  
1. In reference to Boomplaats - and the death of Dreyer who as a rebel was shot. I understand that a ? has gone to Sir H. Smith containing such like sentiments 'The blood of Dreyer is yet warm, and calls for Vengeance!' 2. In reference to the Tambookies - some of the Boers have a document in Sir H. Smith's hand, authorising them to go and take possession of the Tambookie country. This is being made a handle of. Be prepared in council on the subject of Boomplaats; it is a point of great importance to the proper settlement of the minds of the Dutch, and 'tis in my opinion exceedingly wrong to moot a subject so calculated to excite feelings of dislike to our present Govt on the part of the Dutch."  
Orpen, in his Reminiscences of Life in South Africa, Vol I, p.58, records what may well have been the general feeling among the Boers: "Histories mention how Sir Harry caused a deserter and a young Boer named Dreyer, who were caught straggling (i.e. after the Battle of Boomplaats), to be court martialled and shot at Bloemfontein. This was to 'strike terror', it was said, but it was a very great pity. I heard that Dreyer was 'half simple', and the deserter was entangled in trying to return under pardon..."
2. A.E. du Toit: op.cit. p.95.
3. ACC. 611/1. Godlonton to Southey, 3.4.48.
4. ACC. 611/1. Godlonton to Southey, 11.11.48. "Business is horribly dull - some of our merchants quaking, and not a few of the smaller fry actually floored. All this is of course laid at the door of Sir Harry, who did not keep up the expenditure of half a million per annum. I am sorry to say our farmers are not much better off. Oat-hay from a dollar to 2/- per 100, and wool 6d are, it must be confessed, not very cheering prices." Ibid. Godlonton to Southey, 5.10.49.



Godlonton's defence of Smith was thus prompted to some degree by a sense of fair play; but it was also attributable very largely to his sincere belief that Smith's frontier system would save the farmers on the colonial boundary from utter ruin at the hands of the marauding Kaffirs. Calderwood, in his Caffres and Caffre Missions,<sup>(1)</sup> maintained that the colony had never been so well protected as under the system implemented by Smith, and Godlonton undoubtedly was of the same body of opinion - certainly until the outbreak of the Eighth Kaffir War.

In February 1850, he wrote as follows in the Journal:

After two years' experience of the Frontier System established by SIR HARRY SMITH, its perfect adaptation to the circumstances of the people and country is avouched by the broad seal of public approval...The fact is, that the author of the existing policy understood perfectly the character of the people with whom he had to deal.<sup>(2)</sup>

Throughout 1850, he continued to defend the measures adopted by Sir Harry,<sup>(3)</sup> and when his Kaffir War began to be published in regular instalments from March 1851, he had a dual organ of propaganda. He took pains to paint a highly-coloured picture of Smith's "admirable and just" policy on the frontier, illustrating how the iniquitous power of the chiefs had been broken by the appointment of ~~utilitarian~~ British Commissioners after the 1846 war,<sup>(4)</sup> and he satisfied his <sup>utilitarian</sup> conscience by showing that the system had functioned to the good not merely of the colonists, but also of the kaffirs: while the frontiersmen had benefitted by the remarkable falling off in the incidence of cattle-thieving, the kaffir people had had "equity and justice" meted out to them by the Commissioners, who prevented them from being "eaten up" by their avaricious chiefs.<sup>(5)</sup> To a

1. H. Calderwood: Caffres and Caffre Missions, p.57.
2. GTJ 9.2.50.
3. e.g. GTJ 2.2.50; 26.10.50; 7.12.50. In GTJ 13.4.50, he expressed his disapproval of Freeman's misguided opinions on the system, and in GTJ 17.8.50 he said that, on a recent tour through the frontier areas, he had been impressed by the "unprecedented tranquillity, not merely on the borders of the Colony, but as far East as the Umzimvooboo, and inland to the Quathlamba Mountains."
4. Kaffir War. pp.9-11.
5. Ibid. pp.9-11. passim.



great extent, Godlonton was sincere in his assessment of the Smith system: <sup>(1)</sup> this is proven by the concurrence of his opinions in his private correspondence with those expressed in the Journal and in the Kaffir War. Indeed, the only fault which he could find with Smith's dealings with the kaffirs, was his leniency and undue optimism. In a letter to his friend, Richard Southey, at the end of December 1850, he said that "Sir Harry is too sanguine, and thinks too little of the Kaffirs. He relies too much upon his influence over them - and fancies they are afraid when they are only laughing at him." <sup>(2)</sup> This opinion has been expressed in a somewhat different form in the Journal two days before, when Godlonton had repudiated a system of "concession" as detrimental and dangerous. <sup>(3)</sup> In July 1851, he criticised the Smith administration for being too confiding and too conciliatory in its attitude to the kaffirs, <sup>(4)</sup> and two months later, he replied indignantly to the speech of Molesworth in the British Parliament:

Sir William Molesworth and others of his school, seem to view Sir Harry Smith as an enormous tyrant, stepping in some kind of 'seven-league boots' from province to province, trampling rough shod upon the poor innocent natives, and committing other freaks to which there is no parallel save in the exploits, as recorded, of the renowned Munchausen...What the colonists complain of, and as we submit with great justice, is, that Sir Harry Smith has looked with too partial an eye upon the natives, that he reposed in them far too great confidence, and that in dealing with grave offences he has exercised an amount of forbearance and clemency which has seriously augmented his own <sup>(5)</sup> difficulties, and placed in great hazard the public security.

- 
1. He seems to have discarded outright the opinion of Colonel Montague Johnstone: "Sir Harry has been eminently successful - as much so as anyone could have been. But I fail to observe in his plans a true civilising process and until that is adopted the elements of much trouble will exist and I fear at no very distant day burst again on the colony..." Johnstone to Godlonton, 25.1.49. (Godlonton Papers).
  2. ACC 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 23.12.50
  3. GTJ. 21.12.50.
  4. GTJ. 19.7.51.
  5. GTJ. 13.9.51.



The attacks of the Frontier Times<sup>(1)</sup> and many of the other colonial newspapers spurred Godlonton on in his self-imposed task. The Frontier Times was especially vocal on the question of compensation for losses in the previous Kaffir war, and, while both Franklin and Godlonton published the Grahamstown memorial to Smith in their respective papers,<sup>(2)</sup> Franklin encouraged farmers to send in complaints for publication, while Godlonton attempted to side-track the issue. The Frontier Times of 23rd July 1850 contained a scathing editorial condemning Smith's apathy or reluctance to suggest a change of policy to the Colonial Office in connection with the disposal of Crown lands, and the paper continued to give great prominence to the dissatisfaction arising from the compensation question. Godlonton, on the other hand, tried to shield Smith by admitting into the columns of the Journal only so much criticism as should save him from any possible accusation of deliberate suppressio veri.<sup>(3)</sup> The two Grahamstown papers seem to have agreed on most practical issues: for example, the Frontier Times declared the necessity for enforcing the pass system and fines in order to prevent vagrancy,<sup>(4)</sup> and Godlonton was always printing letters from colonists condemning the evils which arose from the failure of the government

1. A Grahamstown newspaper, started in 1840 and edited at this time by J. G. Franklin. For his opposition to the Governor in 1849, William Southey described him as a "grumbler and never-satisfied fellow.." Vide ACC. 611/2. William to Richard Southey, 7.7.49
2. CFT 23.7.50; GTJ 20.7.50
3. It is interesting to compare, for instance, the detailed account (over two columns) which the Frontier Times gives of the speeches at the Grahamstown public meeting of 24th July on the subject of compensation, with the bare outline which Godlonton publishes - vide CFT 30.7.50 and GTJ 27.7.50. Throughout July and August, the Frontier Times editorials were pre-occupied with this question, yet the Journal took no more notice of it than to report the resolutions of meetings at Grahamstown, Bathurst etc. This is significant, as Godlonton did not leave Grahamstown for Cape Town till 24th August, and the Journal's silence cannot be explained as the negligence of Irving. Godlonton was, of course, a member of the Board of Claims for compensation, (vide ACC. 611/2, Godlonton to Southey, 13.3.49; 24.4.49; 96.49.) and had himself expressed impatience at the conduct of the Governor - but only in his private letters!
4. CFT 10.9.50.



to enforce stricter regulations with regard to the uncontrolled entry of kaffirs from Kaffraria.<sup>(1)</sup> Godlonton had, in May 1849, actually told Southey that the frontier needed a law against squatting.<sup>(2)</sup> On the whole, it would seem that, while Franklin blamed the government for not implementing such a law, Godlonton shifted the blame from the government by presenting it as a general and long-established problem. Both papers combined to attack Renton,<sup>(3)</sup> too, and on the dismissal of Bowker, both seem to have sympathised with him.<sup>(4)</sup>

As events on the frontier moved towards a crisis, a chorus of vituperation echoed from all parts of the colony. Among the frontiersmen, there was at first a feeling of annoyance and disappointment<sup>(5)</sup> changing, as time went on, to a lack of confidence in Smith<sup>(6)</sup> and many began to move off

1. e.g. GTJ. 12.1.50; 16.3.50; 6.4.50; 5.10.50.
2. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 8.5.49: "What we want is a law to prevent squatting..You may if you please discard the term Vagrancy altogether. Only let us have some law which shall protect property against the thefts of these people, which shall encourage industry and repress idleness and I care not a jot what you call it."
3. e.g. CFT. 17.2.52; GTJ. 12.4.51, 19.4.51, 22.4.51, 17.7.52 etc.
4. e.g. CFT. 1.10.50; GTJ. 31.8.50, 7.9.50, 28.9.50.
5. Vide, eg, Goldswain's Chronicle, II, pp.119: "...But the Authorities are misled by the Kaffers positive ashowing the Governor- or thouse that are imploid to inquire of the Kaffers- (that they do not want war?) as will be seen by Colonel Somerset's notice on the 11th of October (1850): ... We farmers that had seen and suffered in the last two wars is not to be decyed with all H Excellency Proclamations and promises for we know that if a Kaffer comes as a friend to warn you you may rely on them. I know what the Kaffers are; thear is some of them that is faithful to you and you can rely on them and before His Excellency had reached his destination the war had fully broken out."
6. J.M.Orpen: Reminiscences of Life in S.A., I, p.63.wrote that the war "commenced as others had done, near the sea, but it spread further inland than any previous war, and this rapidly. Sir Harry Smith had just before been on the frontier and had deposed the chief Sandile and assured all, that there was going to be no war..Little confidence was felt in Sir Harry's assurances..." (My italics). Cp. I.Staples: M.S. Narrative of the War of 1851 and 1853: "The colony was in a deplo- rably defenceless condition, owing to the gross carelessness of our Government, who would not take warning although urgently asked to prepare for an outbreak....." (Cory Collection. MS. 6737)



with their flocks and herds to places further from the colonial boundary.<sup>(1)</sup> But Smith continued to live in a fool's paradise and refused to believe that a war was imminent. At the end of October 1850, he reported to Grey:

Every Kaffir who possesses anything is a supporter of the present Government; and if the chiefs have endeavoured to excite their people, they have most signally failed in the attempt. I deeply regret to state that a panic has seized the inhabitants upon many parts of the colonial border, which has caused them to leave their farms, and drive off their flocks and herds, by which much loss has been occasioned. Confidence is, however, I trust, rapidly returning; and the plentiful fall of rain which has recently visited the country, after a drought of so many months, has cheered the hearts of the desponding throughout the land."<sup>(2)</sup>

The Journal continued to echo these sentiments:<sup>(3)</sup> it was not until the 7th December that it admitted that the colony was once again on the verge of a disastrous conflict between blacks and whites. There was perhaps some excuse for Godlonton on this occasion, as he had left the editorship of the paper in the hands of Edward Irving since his departure for the Legislative Council session in the latter part of August.<sup>(4)</sup> After the session, he had made a leisurely return journey, and had hardly arrived home when he was appointed Chairman of the Blinkwater Commission,<sup>(5)</sup> so that it was not till the 7th December that he finally returned to the Journal.<sup>(6)</sup> When the first instalment of the Kaffir War appeared in March of the following year, though, Godlonton made an unfortunate faux pas. As the book was appearing long after the events had actually happened, he ventured to divulge certain information which he had previously withheld. In a review of the book,<sup>(7)</sup> the Frontier Times took Godlonton to task for not having previously printed two of the letters

---

1. Vide, e.g. Peter S. Campbell: Reminiscences of the Kaffir Wars  
2. P.P. 1851, xxxvii (1334) Smith to Grey, 31.10.50. /p. 38.  
3. Vide, e.g. GTJ. 14.9.50. and 12.10.50.  
4. GTJ. 31.8.50.  
5. Cory: op.cit. p. 330.  
6. Vide GTJ. 7.12.50, in which Godlonton thanked his "young friend" who had deputised for him during his absence.  
7. CFT. 4.3.51.



one of which he had received at Swellendam in October, and the other in the first half of November.<sup>(1)</sup> Both of these had hinted at occurrences in Kaffirland which seemed to indicate that war was imminent. The Frontier Times maintained that, because Godlonton had not immediately published these letters, it was evident that he was attempting to lull the colonists into a false state of security and to discourage them from removing themselves and their property to a place of safety at a time when he knew that the chiefs were conspiring to attack the frontier. Godlonton's defence<sup>(2)</sup> of his actions was, as the Frontier Times said, feeble and unconvincing,<sup>(3)</sup> and when Franklin pressed the point in the next two editions of the Frontier Times,<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton discreetly withdrew from the contest.

In November and December 1850, then, matters were swiftly coming to a head. Though the Journal<sup>(5)</sup> and the Frontier Times<sup>(6)</sup> both remarked favourably on Smith's deposition of Sandile, not everyone on the frontier regarded it as a wise move. Bisset, who had had much experience in previous Kaffir Wars, maintained that it was a great mistake,<sup>(7)</sup> though this was after the war when everyone could be wise. Lord Grey seems to have seen the implications more clearly than most people, for, though approving of the deposition of a refractory chief, he thought that it would have been more prudent to have replaced him by another member of the tribe, rather than by a European government servant.<sup>(8)</sup>

Godlonton had no hesitation as to which side he was to take. In his Kaffir War, he wrote with confidence that:

---

1. Vide Kaffir War pp 14-15 and p 29.

2. GTJ 8.3.51

3. CFT 11.3.51

4. CFT 11.3.51; 18.3.51

5. GTJ 2.11.50

6. CFT 5.11.50 - "decidely a movement in the right direction..."

7. Bisset: Sport and War, p 130

8. P.P. 1851, xxxvii (1334). Grey to Smith, 11.1.51.



The leading frontier Journal, confident in the safeguard established by Sir Harry Smith's system,<sup>(1)</sup> the existence of a sea-port at the Buffalo, and a large garrison town and military posts in the heart of British Kaffraria, took up the peace side.<sup>(2)</sup>

Early in December, long before the sudden outbreak of the war, he had expressed his misgivings as to the safety of the frontier, in a private letter to Southey;<sup>(3)</sup> but he was determined not to allow his fears to find their way into the Journal. At this stage, the Frontier Times indulged in an interesting volte-face, by allying itself with the supporters of Smith.<sup>(4)</sup> This facilitated Godlonton's task for a few months, but in March 1851, the unpredictable Frontier Times suddenly changed sides again. In an editorial on the 18th March, Franklin declared:

When the war first broke out - when disasters came thick upon us - and when the danger of an overwhelming rush of savages was very imminent - we considered it a duty, which we owed to the community to abstain from all criticism of His Excellency's proceedings, lest we should weaken the public safety. But now that the whole colony is thoroughly roused to a sense of the impending danger, and that no apprehension

- 
1. Op. Rhodes House Collection. f.448. Col. Mackinnon to Godlonton, 31.8.52. This was written at the time of Mackinnon's departure from the Cape. He thanked Godlonton for his "disinterested and uniform support" and for "the favourable interpretation which you gave to all my measures.."
  2. Kaffir War. p.23.
  3. ACC. 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 9.12.50: "The commotion which now exists on both sides of the border is to me quite unaccountable. The farmers hereabouts are in a perfect panic - seized by a sort of monomania - the one idea being to get at a distance from the Kaffir border. I expect Sir Harry will be very speedily here. I don't see how he can avoid coming, as upon the movements made at this juncture will depend his own public character. There is no question whatever but the plotting with Sandilla and Kreili has been going on for the last eighteen months, and yet the Kaffirland authorities have either been ignorant of it or have shut their eyes to the fact, and gone on hoping against hope. All this has now to be remedied and if it be done cleverly and promptly it may effectively secure the frontier- but if not, then we on the frontier are ruined."
  4. Vide, e.g. OFT 28.1.51., in which the Observer is rapped on the knuckles for its harsh criticism of the Governor.



exists for the safety of His Excellency and Her Majesty's troops, it seems very desirable not to permit the sober voice of public opinion to be any longer drowned by the din and clatter of military operations, or to be any longer wrapped up in the deceptive garb and tustian phrase of military reports."<sup>(1)</sup>

The rest of the editorial was devoted to a critique of Smith's conduct of the war - the significant part played by the burghers and the correspondingly insignificant role of the British army, the amateurish methods of Colonel Mackinnon in his attacks on the natives, the ineffective patrol system, and the isolation of Major-General Somerset, the ablest soldier, from the most vital scenes of the war. Godlonton had a gigantic task ahead of him.

Fortunately the first part of the Kaffir War was now issuing from the press. Though it is not generally realised, most of the material used in the book - commentary as well as narrative - was transcribed mutatis mutandis from the columns of the Journal. This was the case even with his opening remarks, which were transferred verbatim from the weekly column entitled "State of the Frontier", in the issue of the Journal dated 11th January 1851.

Smith occupied a good deal of Godlonton's attention in the Kaffir War, for, as the months went by and the war seemed no nearer its end, it was inevitable that the Commander-in-Chief should become the victim of propagandists and gossips. The progressive unpopularity of the government party as a result of the constitutional agitation, only aggravated matters. In England, Lord Grey was baffled by the fact that Smith's despatches always reported the most startling successes of the troops, while, on the other hand, the kaffirs did not seem disposed to sue for peace.<sup>(2)</sup> Much the same impression

---

1. CFT 18.3.51.

2. Vide, e.g. P.P. 1851, xxxvii (1380) passim; P.P. xxxiii (1428) passim. In May 1851, Grey became so worried that he appointed Hogge and Owen as Assistant Commissioners to Smith. Vide P.P. 1851, xxxviii (1380), Grey to Smith, 13.5.51.



was obtained even by the newly-arrived Alfred Cole who, in his usual humorous but acutely observant way, remarked: "It is amusing enough to see how Sir Harry always gains a victory, and yet the Kafirs do not budge an inch."<sup>(1)</sup> The Frontier Times and Smith's other enemies applied fuel to the flames. In April 1851, Smith was soundly rated in an editorial by Franklin for over-emphasising the effects of his manoeuvres upon the Kaffirs. He was accused of having done the same in 1835, with the result that the British Government and public, aghast at the suffering to which they imagined the Kaffirs must have been subjected, had forced him to make peace before the Kaffirs had been properly defeated. The same calamity, declared Franklin, could re-occur now: Stockenström, with all his old prejudices, was leaving soon for England, and his recommendations of a return to the old border system, combined with Grey's conviction that the war had been won, would lead to the making of another "patched peace.... unless the inhabitants of the colony, who are independent of the Governor's influence, promptly exert themselves to avert so grievous a calamity."<sup>(2)</sup> In the months that followed, the tone of the Frontier Times became more impatient, and in July it declared bitterly: "We are now entering upon the seventh month of an unsuccessful war and an unsuppressed rebellion. The prospects of returning peace and security are as distant as when hostilities commenced."<sup>(3)</sup> As early as 1849, there had been rumours of the possible recall of Smith,<sup>(4)</sup> and from now on, the vigour of Franklin's agitation for the dismissal of Smith was watched only by Godlonton's determination to prevent it. In July, Franklin wrote a particularly spiteful editorial, declaring that the country

---

1. A.W.Cole: The Cape and the Kafirs. p 176

2. CFT. 1.4.51. This criticism was repeated, e.g. in CFT. 10.6.51, 20.1.52.

3. CFT. 1.7.51.

4. AGC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 8.5.49



had never been in such a deplorable state as it then was, and expressing the opinion that Sir Harry,

on leaving the colony, will carry with him the scorn of the native tribes, the hatred of the Dutch, and the contempt of the English inhabitants - with the exception of a few sycophants, whom his breath has uplifted."<sup>(1)</sup>

At the end of the same month, the Governor was harshly censured for commuting the death-sentence passed on forty-six rebel Hottentots,<sup>(2)</sup> and in August, the paper openly demanded the appointment of another Governor.<sup>(3)</sup> The cry for the recall of Smith became more insistent, and was accompanied, from time to time, by vehement strictures upon his campaigns.<sup>(4)</sup> In February 1852 he was sharply reproved for not passing a Burgher Law and for his injustice in calling solely upon the already long-suffering frontiersmen to join in a drive on the Amatola fastnesses.<sup>(5)</sup> In many ways, Smith was his own worst enemy, and his actions did not make his apologist's task any easier. In December 1850, he showed by his deeds, if not by his words,<sup>(6)</sup> that he no longer

---

1. CFT 22.7.51

2. CFT 29.7.51

3. CFT 5.8.51: "To the appointment of Sir Harry Smith to the Government of this colony, are clearly traceable the present miserable war, and the consequent ruin of thousands...Sir Harry Smith stands revealed before the world as a mere talker...Another Governor should at once be appointed for the Cape, who should be a civilian, and wholly unconnected with the party politics of the colony."

4. CFT 14.10.51.; CFT. 20.1.52

5. CFT. 24.2.52. Cp. Rhodes House Collection. f 233. R. White to Godlonton, 14.2.52.

6. In June 1851, Smith wrote, in a private letter: "I have succeeded in maintaining in peace and tranquillity nearly one-half of the population of British Kaffraria ..... This shows that my system cannot be oppressive, or I should have had no friendly Kaffirs, whereas the latter escort my waggons with supplies, slaughter cattle, carry my mails, assist me in every way in their power, which affords better argument in refutation of the Radical and garbled untruths, though founded in facts, of Sir W. Molesworth." Smith to Mrs Sargent, 18.6.51. Quoted by A. E. du Toit: The Cape Frontier, p 113



had complete faith in his own native policy, for, when he was cooped up at Fort Cox, he decided on a reversal of policy. He instructed Mackinnon and Maclean to assure the chiefs that in future their authority would be upheld and that Her Majesty's government would no longer interfere with native laws and customs. Maclean protested that the Kaffirs would regard this as a sign of weakness, but Smith was desperate and commented "Something must be done, for the Kaffirs of 1851 are not the Kaffirs of 1835!" Yet although Maclean informed the Ndhlambe chiefs of this decision, it was too late, as the Gaikas were already in full rebellion. (1)

Overseas the body of criticism was augmented by the publication, in March 1851, of the Rev. J.J. Freeman's pamphlet on the Kaffir war. (2) In this he asserted that the immediate cause of the war was Smith's deposition of Sandile, though the real cause was "the hatred of English aggression on Kaffir territory." The Kaffir Wars were nothing more than a struggle to recover their territory, he maintained.

It was in this mental atmosphere that Godlonton set out to vindicate Smith's policy and to excuse his mistakes. It is amusing to see the lengths to which he was sometimes prepared to go: for instance, he wrote in the following vein about Smith's policy in the weeks that preceded the outbreak of the war:

The Governor's policy was now to temporize for a while with the Kaffirs, in order to prevent a rush upon the colony, whereby several thousand acres of forage corn would have been destroyed, which by a delay of two or three weeks might be saved. His Excellency succeeded in this, and still kept his onward path of punishment towards Sandili, whom he proclaimed as an outlaw, offering £500 for his capture....." (3)

- 
1. Vide A.E. du Toit: op cit p 105
  2. J. J. Freeman: The Kaffir War: A Letter addressed to the Rt. Hon. Earl Grey, containing remarks on the causes of the present war, and the payment of its expenses; the means of prevention, etc.etc.etc.
  3. Kaffir War. p 45.



Probably in view of the experiences of the 1846 war, the question of forage did enter into discussion, but the decisive factor, which, Fortescue<sup>(1)</sup> points out, but which Godlonton suppressed, was that the military resources as a whole were quite inadequate.

Smith's premature and hasty reduction of the British garrisons in South Africa was to become a standard criticism of his administration,<sup>(2)</sup> and, though in May 1851 Godlonton was to level the same criticism at him,<sup>(3)</sup> at this stage he was still consciously striving to draw a veil over Smith's mistakes. Then again, Godlonton, when narrating the eventual rebellion of the Gaikas, stated that this occurred in spite of Smith's "extreme forbearance".<sup>(4)</sup> This, too, was a justifiable conclusion to draw, but Godlonton must have known as well as anyone else that Smith's patience derived, not so much from any particularly philanthropic motives, as from a realisation that his career and reputation ultimately depended upon his ability to prevent a rupture with the Kaffirs. That was what he had promised the British Government to do, and that was one of the reasons for his appointment as Governor.<sup>(5)</sup> But Godlonton was bent on portraying Smith as

1. Vide J.W. Fortescue: History of the British Army, XII pp. 523-4, who, though he follows Godlonton's interpretation fairly closely, adds: "The regular regiments at Harry Smith's disposal were the Sixth, Forty-fifth, Seventy-third, Ninety-first and Cape Mounted Rifles, besides four hundred Kaffir police. But all the battalions were weak and more than half of the Forty-fifth as well as many of the Cape Mounted Rifles, were in the Orange River Sovereignty and in Natal; and thus the entire force fit for the field, exclusive of the police did not amount to two thousand men." Moreover, a large proportion of these was absorbed by the forts for garrison duty.
2. Vide Calderwood: Kaffres and Kaffre Missions, p 58; Goldswain: op cit. II, pp 121-2.
3. STJ 17.5.51. When Godlonton mentioned the subject later in the Kaffir War (p 53), he maintained that Smith had had no option. He quoted the despatch of Grey which he said, "will shew that the reduction of the military in this colony was one of the earliest duties which devolved upon Sir Harry Smith..."
4. Kaffir War. p 46-7
5. J.M. Orpen: Reminiscences of Life in S.A. I, p23: "...His appointment was no doubt brought about by a paper he had drawn up entitled 'Notes on the Kaffir War.' These...were laid before the Duke of Wellington, and by him laid before Earl Grey, privately. In this he described the proper mode of military procedure to subdue the Kaffir tribes and said 'The enemy will be speedily subdued and for ever kept so, if firmly, decidedly and justly treated'..."



benevolent and well-meaning, and faced by difficulties which would have crushed a lesser man. Often Godlonton's defence was based merely upon a difference in emphasis, which he regarded as a necessary counterpoise to the wild and whirling words of Smith's accusers. Godlonton was not always wrong; he was often only biased.

These efforts to depict Smith as patient and well-meaning towards the Kaffirs received a rude check from Sir Harry himself. In January 1851, the Governor, in his usual vigorous and expressive style, issued a Government Notice,<sup>(1)</sup> in which he called upon the burghers to muster and help to "exterminate" the Kaffirs. Strong exception was taken to his language in certain parts of the colony<sup>(2)</sup> and, though Smith was defended by the Frontier Times, the Port Elizabeth News and the Cape Town Mail,<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton saw that public feeling had been so outraged that a refutation of the press attacks was demanded. In the Kaffir War he very adroitly passed off the blame from Smith to the colonists themselves! He wrote:

This notice reads harsh, and expresses more than it actually meant. To understand it aright it must be read in connection with the proceedings of several numerous public meetings within the colony, held a short time previously. The resolutions passed unanimously at the meetings gave expression to an opinion that the peace of the colony never would be secured until the Gaiqua tribes were expelled from the mountain fastnesses of the Amatola, and Sandilli and his tool Umlanjani, the reputed prophet, punished for their treachery. These points were insisted on as a sine qua non, the general feeling within the Colony

- 
1. Vide P.F. 1851, xxxviii (1334). Enclosure No 2. in Smith to Grey, 7.1.51.
  2. Cole: op.cit., p.195: "...as to the humanity of the matter, it is revolting to every Christian-like feeling to say, 'We will exterminate them;' and Sir Harry could only have used the expression in a fit of passion, to which he is constitutionally subject...."
  3. Godlonton quotes extracts from the two latter papers in defence of Smith. Vide Kaffir War pp.91-2.



being that the Governor, instead of acting with that stern severity which the occasion demanded, would avoid a rupture at the expense of what experienced men considered the future interests of the colony. A readiness too had been shewn to assist His Excellency, provided a bold and decisive course of policy were pursued; and hence, relying upon the assurances - and feeling that an absolute necessity was laid upon him to unsheath the sword - Sir Harry Smith entered upon his task with all the characteristic energy of his temper, and in terms of fiery indignation denounced the treacherous enemy, and called upon the colonists to aid him in the execution of the task to which he was about to address himself."<sup>(1)</sup>

As the campaign progressed, Godlonton, both in the Journal and in the Kaffir War, boosted Smith's generalship<sup>(2)</sup> and emphasised the difficulties under which he was labouring. Referring to the early part of 1851, he said that the shortage of troops had paralysed the army,<sup>(3)</sup> which was forced to rely upon a type of guerilla warfare waged on a system of patrols. On the other hand, he opined that the "English landowners and Dutch boers" should, in compliance with Smith's proclamation of 5th January, 1851, have come to the defence of the Colony. But, he added,

Many of the frontier inhabitants were utterly unable to comply with the call, and the major part of those of the settled districts were unwilling to do so. An insidious whisper was heard that it was Sir Harry Smith's war, and not that of the colony.<sup>(4)</sup>

Godlonton recorded every successful action of the troops, often suggesting, though not always stating, that Smith's military skill was alone responsible for the outcome: he related, for instance, how, while Smith was awaiting the enrolment of the burghers and the concentration of the troops in British Kaffraria, he was "necessarily inactive" till Seyclo "sent a challenge to the Europeans at King William's Town to march out and fight him. This was readily accepted, and being replied to by a well-selected force, resulted in

---

1. Kaffir War. pp 90-91

2. e.g. Kaffir War, p 45; "This small force was disposed in a manner which at once bespoke the General.."; ibid. p 240: "his talent as a military leader..."

3. e.g. Kaffir War. p 103; p 146.

4. Kaffir War. p 145.



the discomfiture of that chief, who is represented to have led his warriors in person..."<sup>(1)</sup> In the Journal, he pointed out that Smith had had to face almost unprecedented obstacles in his campaigns: the defection of the Kaffir Police, the rebellion in the Kat River Settlement, Hermanus's infidelity, and above all, disaffection within the colony itself.<sup>(2)</sup> There was indubitably good reason for Smith to feel that fate had not dealt justly with him, but his courage and perseverance were an inspiration to the men and a blow to his enemies.

Yet Godlonton must have been aware that things were not going as well as was reported by the Commander-in-Chief. Not only did his correspondents dwell upon the unpopularity and incompetence of Smith<sup>(3)</sup> but his partner in the firm reported that it was difficult to restrain the sub-editor who was "very inclined to lash the Governor."<sup>(4)</sup> Even as early as 1851, as a member of the Grahamstown Board of Defence, he had added his signature to the Board's memorandum to Smith on the unsatisfactory state of affairs. The Board expressed its alarm at the fact that the troops were occupied in Kaffirland while Somerset and other frontier areas were being consistently and violently invaded. It maintained (inter alia)

That it is evident that the enemy is rapidly extending his operations, while the frontier is receding westwards, so that Burgher camps, and laagers, which but a few weeks ago were regarded as occupying secure positions, are now merely outposts, and these too are one by one being abandoned as too weak to resist the tide of invasion.<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Kaffir War. p 234

2. GTJ 3.5.51

3. Rhodes House Collection. f 233. R.White to Godlonton, 14.2.52; ibid. f. 241. R.White to Godlonton, 25.2.52: "The Governor seems very chary of allowing the people forage, There is a very strong feeling against Sir H.Smith. Those in Graham's Town, who stuck out for him previously, now are most inveterate" Cory Collection.M.S. 7096. R.White to Godlonton, 13.3.52: "It is to be regretted the Governor did not take the steps he has now taken at the commencement of the war.."

4. Rhodes House Collection. f. 239. R. White to Godlonton, 22.2.52.

5. P.P. 1852, xxxiii (1428). Smith to Grey, 22.7.51.  
Enclosure No 4.



Moreover, Godlonton's farm "Hammonds", had been severely attacked during the first few months of the war, and by February 1851, his daughter and son-in-law, who farmed it, were preparing to move to the Graaff-Reinet district.<sup>(1)</sup> By the end of the year they had settled in that locality<sup>(2)</sup> and conditions had deteriorated so much that Godlonton had himself given up all idea of farming on the frontier. He seems to have been trying to obtain some government land in the Graaff-Reinet district or to have been contemplating to settle in Cape Town,<sup>(3)</sup> which had made a great impression upon him during his visit in 1850.<sup>(4)</sup> Despite this, he continued to praise Smith's defence of the colony,<sup>(5)</sup> and approved of Grey's hostility to the Stockenstrom party's frontier policy.<sup>(6)</sup> Moreover, he started quoting from other colonial newspapers, sometimes not very skilfully: in the Kaffir War, for example, he quoted the following lines from the Commercial Advertiser:

...The Governor's position, deeply disappointed as he must feel at the utter frustration of hopes with which he had so long flattered himself, must be an object of sympathy to all.<sup>(7)</sup>

Even out of its context, this appears to be an attempt to ridicule the Governor, rather than to pity him. In the Journal

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. W.C.Hobson to Godlonton, 5.2.51. But Cp ACC. 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 9.12.50: "...Had Booth not moved he would have been ate (sic) up by vagabonds..."
  2. Godlonton Papers. B. Booth to Godlonton, 28.12.51; Thomas White to Godlonton, 29.12.51
  3. Godlonton Papers. B.Booth to Godlonton, 28.12.51; B.M. Shepperson to Godlonton, 9.12.51.
  4. Vide Godlonton's M.S.Journal. passim
  5. GTJ 26.7.51
  6. GTJ 23.8.51; 30.8.51.
  7. Kaffir War p. 100



not long after the beginning of the war, he had condemned the way in which some of the Cape Town papers were encouraging the burghers not to turn out for the defence of the colony, and attributed this to their intention to undermine Smith's authority and power.<sup>(1)</sup> In the latter part of the Kaffir War, he once more inveighed against the disloyalty and factiousness of the Observer and the Commercial Advertiser which, he contended

had, by certain articles published in their columns, so far damped the loyal ardour which at the commencement of hostilities had been manifested, that the intended complement of levies was decreased by upwards of seven hundred men. Their partizans, as already shown, had prevented the assembling of the western burghers, and now tampered with the enrolment of the colored levies.<sup>(2)</sup>

Godlonton's attacks on the Cape press were all part of his publicity campaign in favour of Smith and in opposition to the Cape Town cabals, which were conspiring against the government party.

Finally, Godlonton allowed Smith to speak in his own defence by printing despatches and other official documents which outlined Smith's difficulties. In the Journal of 9th August 1851, there appeared Smith's reply to the Grahamstown Board of Defence's Memorandum, in which the Commander-in-Chief made it quite clear that the course which he had pursued in his conduct of the war was not only correct but unavoidable.<sup>(3)</sup>

---

1. GTJ 8.2.51: "...In coming to enquire into the reason of this withholding of the repellers of savage invasion, we find a secret influence at work. The overthrow of a high officer was sought, and to achieve this the lives and properties of Europeans were not of pristine importance - personal triumph rose paramount to public protection... This success is like crushing the viper, and is the secret of the malevolence of a portion of the Cape Town press..."

2. Kaffir War p 241.

3. GTJ 9.8.51.



But it was in vain. The criticism of Smith increased so steadily<sup>(1)</sup> that Smith was even forced, at the end of 1851, to crave the help of the Duke of Wellington in rescuing his reputation.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton became equally unpopular: he was accused of "fine writing" about the conduct of the war,<sup>(3)</sup> and of exaggerating the critical position in which the chiefs had been left as a result of Smith's campaign.<sup>(4)</sup> The anxiety of these papers at Godlonton's attitude is understandable when the occasional dependence of even the Secretary for the Colonies upon the Journal for information is realised.<sup>(5)</sup> And when Sir Harry was eventually recalled by Grey, Godlonton was indignant - so much so, that in May 1852, he declared that the Russell ministry had given up the seals of office solely in order to avoid having to furnish a satisfactory defence of the inopportune recall of Sir Harry.<sup>(6)</sup> Both in England and at the Cape, Grey's action was generally unpopular,<sup>(7)</sup> but

1. e.g. CTM 22.3.51; 2.12.51; EPN 5.4.51; 28.6.51, 15.11.51; GRC. 22.8.51, 26.9.51; CFF. 2.12.51; Br.Settler. 22.11.51; 6.12.51. Cp. Una Long: Index to Unofficial MSS. relating to S.A. p 75. Charles Brownlee to "My dear Mahoney", 1.11.51: "Our affairs, Civil as well as Military, are sadly mismanaged... The Governor seems quite unable to cope with his difficulties - treachery within and without, bad officers, bad health, numberless vexations and annoyances; it requires a man of great mind to cope with such difficulties..."
2. Vide, Cory Collection. MS. 617: Smith to the Duke of Wellington. He ended: "In your Grace's hands, I cheerfully resign the character under your Grace's education in war I have acquired."
3. Br. Settler. 10.1.52.
4. CTM. 31.1.52
5. Vide, e.g., P.P.1852, xxxiii (1428). Grey to Smith, 15.12.51: "By a Graham's Town newspaper, of four days' later than your last despatch (i.e. GTJ 25.1.51), a report has reached me, which I trust may be confirmed, that Major-General Somerset had obtained more unequivocal success in following up the operations of which you have described the commencement...."
6. GTJ 1.5.52
7. Vide, e.g. McKay: Reminiscences of the Last Kafir War. p 153.



there were still groups - such as the Frontier Times<sup>(1)</sup> which could be elated and triumphant at the news. When the appropriate Blue Books were eventually published, Godlonton took care to give due prominence to Smith's despatches in defence of his actions,<sup>(2)</sup> and for long afterwards, kept the colony informed of the activities of Sir Harry in England;<sup>(3)</sup> for, though his career in South Africa had ended not with a bang but a whimper, there was reason to believe that he had been on the very brink of success when he was superseded by Cathcart.<sup>(4)</sup>

But although Godlonton was mainly concerned with a defence of Smith, his propaganda campaign was aimed in other directions as well. The spearhead of his attack was undoubtedly directed at those influential men, such as Sir Andries Stockenström and John Fairbairn, whose political opinions were anathema to him. Fairbairn's relationship with Dr Philip and his well-known philanthropic views had made him unpopular on the frontier since the thirties, and Godlonton had as early as 1835, referred to him as "the <sup>accuser</sup> ~~accuser~~ of the colonists,"<sup>(5)</sup> while in a letter to Southey he described him as "a specious humbug, one, as I have always said of the Joseph Surface class".<sup>(6)</sup> Godlonton's

- 
1. CFT. 9.3.52: "No one will regret the recall of Sir Harry Smith excepting a few individuals who are personally interested in keeping him at the Cape. Nor will his recall excite any surprise. It has been the natural fruit of his gross and thorough incapacity as well in statesmanship and in generalship."
  2. e.g. GTJ. 3.7.52; 10.7.52; 31.7.52.
  3. e.g. GTJ. 3.8.52 (Smith's presentation to the Queen - "rather unusual for a disgraced officer" - and gentlemanly reconciliation with Grey); GTJ 9.10.52; GTJ.10.1.57 (Smith at a regimental dinner in England).
  4. Vide Fortescue: History of the British Army, XII, pp 554 - 6; Smith: Autobiography, Appendix VII B; McKay: op cit. p 153: "Sir Harry left the colony on the 17th April, much regretted by many of his brother soldiers, and had he continued in command three months longer the war would have been terminated, instead of dragging on for another long weary year..". Even the hostile Frontier Times had to admit this: vide CFT 9.3.52.
  5. R. Godlonton: Intro. Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption ... pp. 114-15; vide ibid. pp 50-51, 87; Cp. Mrs. Philip's reference to Grahamstown in 1835 as "the Lion's den.." in Una Long: op cit p 146; Mrs John Philip to her daughter, 5.12.38. Fairbairn also had "a marked antipathy for the Methodists" (A.T.C.Slee: <sup>p. cit</sup> p. 74.)
  6. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 28.7.49.



quarrel with Stockenstrom had also, by 1850, experienced a long and not altogether creditable history,<sup>(1)</sup> for, if the Baronet was decidedly persona non grata on many parts of the frontier, it was Godlonton who was largely to blame. The ill-feeling had arisen in 1835,<sup>(2)</sup> when the Journal, angry at the way in which Stockenstrom's evidence before the Aborigines Committee had reflected unfavourably upon the frontiersmen, accused him of deliberately expressing Exeter Hall sentiments in order to gratify his ambition for high office.<sup>(3)</sup> When Stockenstrom was appointed Lieutenant-Governor, the Journal was foremost in stating that because of his opinions and influence the frontiersmen might well despair of gaining any compensation for their losses in the war which had just ended.<sup>(4)</sup> The period of Stockenstrom's Lieutenant-Governorship was consequently characterised by bitter mutual recriminations, and, as Stockenstrom showed no signs of ever wanting to recant, Godlonton never missed an opportunity of blackening his name, both in his books and in the Journal. Even in a publicity pamphlet such as the Sketches of the Eastern Districts of 1842, Godlonton remarked spitefully and irrelevantly:

The whole of the country along this line of road abounds with objects of great interest. One of the most deserving of attention is the Kaga-Berg, or mountain, the property of SIR ANDRIES STOCKENSTROM, Bart., ex Lieutenant-Governor of the province, and which is perhaps the most valuable tract of land ever ceded to an individual in this colony...<sup>(5)</sup>

That Godlonton's opposition to Stockenstrom was not actuated solely by jealousy or by indignation at his remarks

- 
1. Vide J.W. Urie: A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries Stockenstrom before the Aborigines Committee in 1835, viewed in the light of his statements and policies before 1835. passim.
  2. Ibid. p 2: "Before the end of 1835, when he achieved notoriety through its (i.e. Journal's) pages, references to Stockenstrom are few and far between. But the inference to be drawn from them is, that although the Commissioner-Generalship was regarded as a useless sinecure, no stigma attached to Stockenstrom himself because of it."
  3. Urie: op cit. Chapter I.
  4. Ibid. p 9.
  5. R. Godlonton: Sketches of the Eastern Districts, p 38



on the frontiersmen, is evident from the Case of the Colonists of 1847; his attacks on Stockenstrom arose to a very great degree out of his conviction that the less the influence wielded by Sir Andries in the shaping of frontier policy, the better would it be for the colonists. According to Godlonton, Stockenstrom's policy was par excellence a policy of "concession",<sup>(1)</sup> and, as he had stressed in his narrative of the 1835 war, "according to Kafir interpretation, forbearance is weakness."<sup>(2)</sup> And there is little reason to doubt that Godlonton meant what he said, when he summed up Stockenstrom's Lieutenant-Governorship in these words:

The administration of Captain Stockenstrom, short as it has been, will ever be looked upon as the dark era in the history of this Province. To him will be attributed the fatal policy which has left the isolated Frontier farmers at the mercy of the neighbouring Kaffirs. To his impolitic and supercilious treatment of the farmers will be traced the spread of the emigrating mania; to his feeble working of his own system the frequent murders by the Kaffirs, the daily plundering of the Colonial farmers, and the insults offered by the native tribes to the British power.<sup>(3)</sup>

But Godlonton was always prepared to recognise Stockenstrom's personal merits. Meurant, in his Sixty Years Ago, stated that, though Godlonton disagreed with Stockenstrom, "he did not withhold from that gentleman the acknowledged merit to which he was justly entitled"<sup>(4)</sup>; and Harriet Ward quoted a passage from the Journal, on Stockenstrom's entry into Fort Beaufort in June 1846, which confirms this impression: Sir Andries, it read,

had an immediate interview with the Governor. This is a matter of congratulation; for, however widely we may have differed from this officer, and however uncompromising has been our opposition to his Kaffir policy now so fearfully exploded, we have always given him credit for possessing what is so much wanting at the present moment, namely, unsubduable energy and activity in carrying out his measures. He has, withal, great colonial experience, an ingredient greatly wanted at headquarters. With a change of views, Sir Andries may be the means of great good to the Colony; he has a fair and fine field

- 
1. Vide MS. Note-Book of Godlonton. (Cory Collection MS. 6819)
  2. R. Godlonton: Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, p 6.
  3. R. Godlonton: Case of the Colonists, pp 49-50
  4. Meurant: Sixty Years Ago. p 95



before him, and for his success in it, he has, malgre all differences of opinion, the best wishes of every good man and true throughout the Colony..."(1)

Although Stockenstrom was living in retirement<sup>(2)</sup> at the time of Smith's arrival in 1847 he was by no means inactive. From quite early in Smith's governorship, he began to write to Grey, pointing out the disadvantages of the frontier system then in force.<sup>(3)</sup> As these letters all had to pass through the Governor's hands before reaching the Secretary of State, Smith was fully aware of Stockenstrom's attacks on him, and there can be little doubt that Godlonton soon got to hear about them. It was well known that Stockenstrom was associating or communicating with people such as Andries Pretorius and Andries Botha, who were dissatisfied with the Smith regime; he was also writing regularly to papers such as the Commercial Advertiser, The Observer, the Frontier Times and the Eastern Province Herald. A letter which Godlonton wrote to Southey in September 1849 betrayed his underlying fear of the influence which Stockenstrom might exercise upon public opinion. He wrote:

I read Stockenstrom's letters with attention, and can think of no word but infamous which can be appropriately applied to them." In my opinion his object is to stir up the Colony to rebellion...He richly deserves prosecution - and would be prosecuted were he not in a position which enables him to defy the government with impunity. He knows he is backed by a good many disaffected Boers and by 2,000 Kat River vagabonds.<sup>(4)</sup>

Smith, in his despatches to Grey, blamed Stockenstrom for a good deal of the dissension among the colonists and indirectly even for the Hottentot rebellion, while Montagu maintained that the hostility of the Observer was due to the influence of Stockenstrom over its editor.

---

1. GTJ. 5.6.46. CP. Harriet Ward: Five Years in Kaffirland, I pp. 291-2.

2. Vide Stockenstrom: Autobiography, II, p 294: "When Sir H. Smith succeeded Sir H. Pottinger I was living retired, sick and exhausted..."

3. Vide A.E. du Toit: op.cit. p 95

4. AGO 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 14.9.49. In the margin of his copy of Paterson's pamphlet (A Dissertation on the Absolute Necessity for Resident Government in the E.P.) Godlonton wrote: "To whom is the Hottentot rebell(ion) traceable but to Sir A(ndries)." Godlonton's annotated copy is in the Cory Library}.



Godlonton made succinct comment, when, in December 1848, he told Southey that Maastrom, Stockenstrom's estate, was "a very hotbed of disaffection to Sir Harry Smith's government"<sup>(1)</sup>. So far as Godlonton was concerned, Stockenstrom was guilty of a two-fold sin: on the one hand, of advocating the implementation of a frontier system which would obviously be detrimental to the interests of the colonists, and on the other hand, of actively trying to undermine the authority and prestige of a man whose recall would be disastrous. It became Godlonton's formidable task to show the British Government that Stockenstrom was not what he seemed, that his concept of frontier policy was impractical and superficial, and that if his misguided views on the native question were heeded, the frontier might very well have to be abandoned.

By 1850, then, Godlonton's relations with Stockenstrom were severely strained. His attitude to the resignation of the "popular members" from the Legislative Council in September was one of scorn<sup>(2)</sup>, and, when the war broke out, he regarded their conduct as dangerous to the security of the colony. From December, Godlonton stressed, in one editorial after another, the need for the frontiersmen to act promptly and with determination,<sup>(3)</sup> for the government to take decisive measures,<sup>(4)</sup> and for the burghers to support Smith in order to bring the war to a speedy conclusion.<sup>(5)</sup> Yet the misrepresentations of the Cape Town papers as to Smith, the frontier and the war,<sup>(6)</sup> convinced him of the necessity to discredit Stockenstrom and Fairbairn. In the Journal, he defended Smith's actions<sup>(7)</sup> and attacked Stockenstrom in whatever way he could,<sup>(8)</sup>

---

1. AGO. 611/1. Godlonton to Southey, 25.12.48

2. GTJ. 5.10.50

3. GTJ. 7.12.50; 14.12.50; 28.12.50; 13.1.51; 8.2.51.

4. GTJ. 26.12.50; 4.1.51.

5. GTJ. 11.1.51.

6. Vide e.g. GTJ. 25.1.51.

7. GTJ. 8.2.51; 3.5.51.

8. GTJ. 22.3.51; 29.3.51; 5.4.51.



and, when his Kaffir War began to appear in the first quarter 1851, he lost no opportunity of exposing Stockenstrom's motives and objections. Stockenstrom was criticised for having been behind the attacks of the Cape press upon Smith's famous "extermination" notice, while his own remarks, as evidenced by one of his despatches in 1834, were the same.<sup>(1)</sup> Further on, Godlonton again set out to disprove some of the grievances which Stockenstrom had expressed against the government in his letters to the Observer. He began by condemning Stockenstrom for disloyalty in trying to stir up trouble at a time when the co-operation of the colonists was essential to their survival.

It was not enough for the Eastern Province, its residents and presiding authorities, to be thus combating open enemies in the field, wrestling against assassinations in the high-way - to be struggling against treachery in their homes and in the camp; but other throes were to be cast upon them, - their fair reputation, their good name was foully attacked through the medium of the Cape press, by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, who published in the Observer newspaper a 'voluminous correspondence', addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to the local colonial office, which set forth a budget of imaginary grievances, which it was attempted to show had been fastened upon the natives by the<sup>(2)</sup> settlers, and by the governorship of Sir Harry Smith....

In passages such as this, Godlonton skilfully played upon the feelings of the frontiersmen, striving to persuade them that Stockenstrom's attacks were directed straight at them. In fact, they were not. He enumerated Stockenstrom's grievances, and undertook to refute all his accusations. He dismissed Stockenstrom's accusation that Smith had given the Tambookies' land to the Albert Boers, with the comment that "their removal had become indispensable,"<sup>(3)</sup> and in reply to Stockenstrom's statement that the government had "crushed hundreds of natives into spaces fitted only for tens," he comforted his conscience with the already classic defence that there was about 3500 square miles of unoccupied land on the other side of Tambookieland. As his authority, he

---

1. Kaffir War. p 92.  
2. Kaffir War. p 290.  
3. Ibid. p 290.



was fortunate enough to be able to quote the Bishop of Cape Town.<sup>(1)</sup> Here, as always, Godlonton exhibited his superficial knowledge of human nature, for he was simply not prepared to face the facts. Stockenström was; and, though his attitude to the Kaffirs was very similar to that of Godlonton, his attempt to see their viewpoint gave him a far closer understanding of the frontier problem.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton similarly passed over Stockenström's objections to the imposition of illegal pound fees in the Blinkwater by turning the discussion upon Andries Botha, whom he described as a rebel as well as protégé of Stockenström;<sup>(3)</sup> and added that, it would not be necessary to refute the allegations that the Fuller's Hoek squatters had been ruthlessly expelled, as an account of these "banditti" had been given in Chapter III.<sup>(4)</sup> When Stockenström said that deputations of Kaffirs had implored him to help them against the oppressive measures imposed on them, Godlonton evaded the issue by commenting in a way that only he could:

It is difficult to conceive why the Kaffir deputations chose Sir Andries as their patron, unless they hoped he would again endeavour to pass over their robberies and crimes and use his influence to have those lands restored to them, from which by stern but unavoidable justice they had been expelled.<sup>(5)</sup>

It is very significant that Godlonton failed to make any attempt to rebut the final charge made by Stockenström. This was an accusation that a member of the Legislative Council had publicly stated that Sir Andries had been tampering with the Kaffirs, and that the authority for making that statement was His Excellency the Governor. When Godlonton had dealt in his summary manner, with all the other charges, he seems to have preferred to neglect the final one, and to

---

1. Ibid. p 292. Cp. GTJ. 25.2.51, from which the concluding passage is extracted verbatim.

2. Vide, e.g. Stockenström: Autobiography, I, p 79: "We had possessed ourselves of their lands; we wanted more of their land, together with their services." He denounced the evils of the reprisals system (I, p 105), which Godlonton's prejudice did not enable him to see at all; P.J. Smuts: The Lieutenant-Governorship of Andries Stockenström, pp 107-8: "For Stockenström the treaty system was merely the means of preparing the natives for the acceptance of British rule."

3. Kaffir War. pp 292-3

4. Ibid. p 293

5. Ibid. p 293.



enter instead upon an unnecessarily lengthy account of Stockenstrom's behaviour during the past few months. He wrote with venom:

Sir Andreas did himself and his adopted country much injury by this line of conduct. In January he had been memorialized by some of the inhabitants of Port Elizabeth to come forward with his influence to call out the Boers as a burgher force to operate against the Kaffirs. This Memorial he applied to political purposes, and busied himself in Cape Town squabbles instead of raising forces for the field. This aroused the resentment of the memorialists, 63 of whom signed a declaimer early in February, lamenting that they should have been so grossly disappointed in the opinion they had formed of the hon. baronet; and the original address having been put forth as having been unanimously adopted, stirred up another section of the community, 112 of whom, headed by the district chaplain and the civil commissioner, signed a document early in March, declaring that 'they did not possess unbounded confidence in Sir Andreas Stockenstrom,' and 'expressing the strongest reprehension at those of his acts and writings, which had tended to sow dissension in the colonial community, and to excite disaffection and rebellion'...(1)

Indeed, Godlonton adds, Sir Andries's position was rendered "very unenviable."

Stockenstrom's proposed visit to England had aroused considerable apprehension among the colonists as early as October, 1850. Mackinnon, in a report to Smith, said that it was difficult to say what had caused the greatest panic in Grahamstown - the fear of the Kaffirs, or of Stockenstrom's visit to England. (2)

His departure in March 1851 was thus fully related in the Kaffir War - once again, in a spiteful manner, for he was accused of having left the colony "at this moment of its greatest exigency" and after declining to take the field as commandant of the burghers. For the readers of Godlonton's writings, the very mention of the baronet must have begun to conjure up visions of Satanic wickedness. "The baronet's especial attention", wrote Godlonton,

would be directed, it was said, to the frontier policy, and his aim was to advocate a system which would undo all that the colonists' struggle had done, and wrest from them what their arms had justly won, by relinquishing to the Kaffirs that which the settlers now held as vantage ground. (3)

---

1. Ibid. p 293.

2. P.P. 1851, xxxvii (1334). Mackinnon to Smith, 10.10.50.

3. Kaffir War. pp 309-10.



It was fortunate, added Godlonton, that the mission failed. Godlonton's remarks on Stockenstrom's behaviour were sometimes characterised purely by petulance or spite: there were, for instance, his insinuations about Stockenstrom's suspicious immunity from attack by the Kaffirs: he described, first, the way in which the country in the neighbourhood of the Kaga was infested by the enemy, both Kaffirs and Hottentots, who had attacked the farm of Gert Mel. Lower down the page, he added:

Behind the Kaga (Maastrom, the seat of Sir A. Stockenstrom) the bushy valley of the Kowie was still infested by Rebel Hottentots...<sup>(1)</sup>

Meanwhile, Godlonton had not neglected to castigate Stockenstrom in the Journal. In March 1851,<sup>(2)</sup> he said that Stockenstrom was being unjust in blaming the war on Smith, and in May he quoted a Memorial of the Cape Town Municipality to the British Parliament, saying that Stockenstrom and Fairbairn be heard as representatives of political opinion in the colony. Godlonton immediately raised a hue and cry, as he was afraid of the harm that might be done if their views on the frontier were acted upon. He maintained that their opposition to the Smith frontier system was based upon their disapproval not only of the necessary punishment inflicted on native delinquents, but also of the way in which Smith had torn up Stockenstrom's treaties in the presence of the chiefs, and of the "atrocities" of depriving the kaffirs of land which had made them desperate and led to war. Godlonton went further: he quoted a passage from the Commercial Advertiser of three years before, in which Fairbairn had praised Smith's generous and benevolent deeds. When this passage was placed

- 
1. Ibid. Compare ACC 611/4, Godlonton to Southey, 25.1.51: "I am told that Maastrom is tabooed - a party of the enemy lying in the forests there with strict orders from Sandilla to protect the property...."
  2. GTJ. 8.3.51. Godlonton was quite unscrupulous. In GTJ. 5.4.51, for instance, he refers to Stockenstrom's activities at the time of the Slachter's Nek rebellion, which he says was "brought on by the present Sir Andreas Stockenstrom in despatching the Under Sheriff of Graaff-Reinet to seize a Boer named Bezuidenhout for contumacy..."



in juxtaposition with the then sentiments of Fairbairn, it was difficult to reconcile the two, said Godlonton.<sup>(1)</sup> The Journal was supported by the Frontier Times<sup>(2)</sup> which, three days later, criticised Stockenstrom for trying, in his correspondence with Young in 1847, "to make it appear that Governor Napier threw the whole country into confusion by introducing certain amendments into the old treaties, and thereby rendered war almost inevitable."<sup>(3)</sup> Though the sentiments of the Frontier Times were more delicately phrased than those of the Journal, they nevertheless betrayed intense dissatisfaction. Stockenstrom, the Times added, had "been consistent in his erroneous views of frontier policy since his appointment of Lt-Governor in 1835" and the war of 1846 had been occasioned "by the forbearance of the authorities during a period of years - commencing even under the administration of Sir A. Stockenstrom himself."<sup>(4)</sup>

That Godlonton sincerely believed that Stockenstrom's actions and policies were inimical to the best interests of the frontier, is conclusively proved by his entries in his private note-book and in his journal. In his scrap-book, for example, he gave a label to each of the frontier systems which had been enforced from time to time, and the epithets which he employed were illuminating: Napier's was called the "let alone system", Maitland's the "coaxing system", Hare's the "timid system", and D'Urban's the "annexation system". Stockenstrom's, on the other hand was contemptuously entitled "the concession system".<sup>(5)</sup> And in his journal, Godlonton expressed the reasons for the virulence of his attacks on the baronet. On 21st September, 1850, he recorded that he had been talking to Montagu, who had <sup>been</sup> told <sup>him</sup> that

---

1. GTJ 17.5.51

2. The Frontier Times had criticised Stockenstrom's frontier policy on a number of occasions: vide, e.g. CFT. 26.11.50; 3.12.50.

3. CFT. 20.5.51

4. CFT. 27.5.51

5. Vide MS Note-Book of Godlonton, (Cory Collection. MS. 6819)



Stockenström intended to go to England to solicit the support of the Colonial Reform Association. "His avowed object," wrote Godlonton,

is to bring charges against Sir Harry Smith, as Governor, and particularly to endeavour to show that his policy in respect to Kaffirland and of the northern Sovereignty, is an entire failure. This must be counteracted. (1) The Colony cannot have forgotten the misrepresentations of Captain Stockenström in 1836 before a Committee of the House of Commons - his endeavour to show the iniquities of the encroachments made by the colonists upon the unoffending natives - the murders and schemes of the border farmers for robbing them of their property. The Eastern Districts cannot have forgotten his supersession of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy; his placing the Kaffirs in the Fish River Bush; his abandonment of the frontier defences, and his adoption of a system which went in effect to give the Kaffirs a premium (2) on the robbery and spoliation of the Frontier Farmers....

Admittedly, the latter part of this passage was written for the public eye, (3) as it appeared in the Journal on 5th October 1850, but his statements follow so closely upon his relation of his private talk with Montagu, that they impress by their spontaneity and sincerity,

Throughout these years - indeed, right until the baronet's death - Godlonton's attacks continued. In the latter half of 1851, Stockenström was censured for proposing in his letters to Russell on representative government that Smith should be superseded, especially as Godlonton feared the dangers to which the frontier would be exposed if Russell took Stockenström's advice; (4) in October, the Journal re-printed a letter written to the Secretary of the Cape Town Municipality by Stockenström and Fairbairn, in which the Boers were praised for "not pushing forward to shoot Kaffirs, after they discover that it does not tend to gain any national advantage, to promote any desideration of humanity and civilisation, but merely to serve to the advantage of the elect and the enrichment of their supporters." (5)

1. My italics.
2. Vide, MS Journal of Godlonton, (Transcript in Cory Collection MS. 1147).
3. Godlonton wrote in the margin: "The passages marked with this line to be read by White with attention so as to worked (sic) up into the Journal."
4. CTJ. 9.8.51
5. CTJ. 4.10.51.



Stockenstrom, strong-willed and impetuous as he was, retaliated by writing to the Cape Town papers, and, by the end of 1851, while in London, he had published a pamphlet entitled Brief Notice of the Causes of the Kaffir War, in which he mocked Smith's "foot-kissing" policy and blamed the war of 1850 solely upon the policy of the government.<sup>(1)</sup> Godlonton's attacks became correspondingly more severe, and in October 1851, he went so far as to blame 'Stockenstrom himself for the failure of Smith's policy:

It may be urged, with some apparent show of reason - why, if the D'Urban system was so successful in 1836, has it proved a failure in 1850? We answer at once - Because Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom introduced into our border system the dangerous and destructive principle of concession. He abandoned the vantage ground the colony had gained; instead of the punishment the invaders so justly merited for their unprovoked aggression, they were rewarded for their treachery; their inroad upon a peaceful people was justified, and they were taught to believe that they had extorted from our fears what they had feared to obtain by their plunderings, duplicity and cunning.<sup>(2)</sup>

Finally, when Stockenstrom's evidence before the Select Committee on the Kaffir Tribes became available early in 1852, the Frontier Times joined with the Journal in finding fault with what he had said. The Frontier Times declared that it had never found fault with Smith's system, which had at least ensured an unprecedented absence of depredations.<sup>(3)</sup> The Journal unleashed its usual torrent of abuse.

Another prominent feature of Godlonton's writings was the pertinacity of his attacks upon the Kat River Settlement, the missionaries, and the Hottentots. His attitude is not difficult to understand, especially in view of his own private interests. After the Kat River Settlement had been established by Stockenstrom in 1829, Godlonton had for some

---

1. Sir Andries Stockenstrom: Brief Notice of the Causes of the Kaffir War, pp 5-6. Smith is blamed for having left the frontier in 1836 "in the most appalling state of anarchy and danger." (p 5); his so-called policy of "extermination" is shown to be basically unsound (pp8-9); and the Select Committee on the Kaffir Tribes of 1851 is criticised for not having given Stockenstrom sufficient opportunity to prove his case (pp 12-15).

2. GTJ 4.10.51.

3. GFT 24.2.52.



time been lavish in his praise of the scheme. He visited the settlement in 1832,<sup>(1)</sup> and later, in the Journal and in his books, continued to comment favourably on what he had seen.<sup>(2)</sup> But, by 1836, he was already beginning to feel not a little dubious as to the loyalty of the Hottentot settlers. In his Narrative of the Irruption, published in that year, he expressed the opinion that the minds of a large proportion of the Hottentots had been poisoned by unscrupulous colonists, and, becoming more specific, he ventured the opinion - though in a footnote - that

There is good ground for believing that in this settlement politics and religion have been far too intimately blended, for either to produce any desirable result...<sup>(3)</sup>

In 1842, there was still<sup>no</sup> positive indication of that hostility to the settlement which he was later to evince,<sup>(4)</sup> but by 1847 his attitude had undergone a striking metamorphosis. When Biddulph, the unpopular Civil Superintendent or Magistrate of the settlement, presented his obnoxious report on the conditions to Sir Henry Pottinger in October 1847, and concluded that the settlement was

the abode of idleness and imposture...the most transparent piece of humbug ever practised on the public

Godlonton backed him up.<sup>(5)</sup>

- 
1. Vide Macmillan: The Cape Colour Question, p 241; Marais: The Cape Coloured People, p 224: "R. Godlonton, a newspaper editor who was later to become one of the most powerful enemies of the settlement, wrote in 1832, after a visit to the Kat River, 'Hitherto great activity has been displayed; and the incipient marks of civilisation observable in every direction, clearly indicate that where no impediments oppress, they (the Hottentots) are capable of attaining a respectable station in the ranks of society.'..."
  2. e.g. Intro Remarks to Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, pp 12-14.
  3. Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, pp 46-7
  4. Vide, e.g. Sketches of the Eastern Districts, pp 17-19
  5. OTJ. 6.11.47; 4.12.47. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, p 234 "The Graham's Town Journal, the newspaper of the British Settlers, approved and defended a document which quite clearly stated that the Kat River Hottentots did not make good use of 'the best watered and most fertile district on the frontier.'" Godlonton had for long been a friend of Biddulph's - vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers, Biddulph to Godlonton, 15.1.52. Biddulph, after criticising the friendly attitude of the Friend of the Sovereignty to Mosheesh, adds: "...I wrote thus freely because you and I are old friends..."



In April of the following year, Godlonton wrote a significant letter to Southey from which it is only too clear that, in common with many another frontiersman, he had become personally interested in the fate of the settlement. He wrote:

...Thanks for your promise about the land across the Kat. You will observe I do not ask for any grant or any special favor; but merely for information of the probability of its sale - so as to guide me as to making a purchase of ground on this side the stream.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Fort Beaufort area comprised some of the finest pastoral country at the Cape, and, though it was inconveniently near the frontier<sup>(2)</sup> was always coveted by the settlers. In August 1850, Godlonton was actually granted a farm, "Hammonds", which was situated near Fort Beaufort and thus on the fringe of the Kat River Settlement itself.<sup>(3)</sup> From that time, he became deeply concerned about the constant depredations of the Hottentots upon the farms in the area. He told Southey, in the letter referred to, that his daughter and son-in-law, the Booths, would be going to Fort Beaufort "where they will place themselves as it were within the very jaws of the Kaffirs," and from 1849, Benjamin and Matilda Booth used to write to tell him about the farm.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton seems, therefore, to have been interested in Kat River affairs, more from the point of view of their influence upon the surrounding farmers, than from any inherent desire to interfere in the affairs of the settlement itself in order to secure a holding. Moreover he was not the only one interested in land in that area. His friend, Stringfellow, told him in July 1850 that he was certain that the Kat River Settlement was "about to be regenerated", and as he was shortly going up to investigate some

---

1. AGO.611/1. Godlonton to Southey, 3.4.48.

2. Cole: op cit. p 172.

3. Cory Collection. MS 6855.

4. Vide Godlonton Papers. Matilda Booth to Godlonton, 1.7.49. Benjamin Booth to Godlonton, 23.4.49, 24.8.49; In the latter, Booth informed Godlonton that the surveyors had "finished the Farm on Monday, and I hope it will be to your satisfaction...."



charges against the Field Cornet Botha, he would leave no stone unturned in his endeavours to "root out the system so long prevailed, by which this productive place has been the abode of sloth and disease and imposture." He added significantly: "Fuller's Hoek is to be sold as I have recommended. What a magnificent farm! I am to have it inspected when notice will be given of its sale."<sup>(1)</sup>

It was about this time, too, that Godlonton bought "Wardens, an adjoining farm, from Major Warden,"<sup>(2)</sup> though his severe stock losses during the war seem to have made him change his mind by the end of 1851, when he was trying to sell it back to its previous owner.<sup>(3)</sup>

In the years after 1847, the rumblings of dissatisfaction in the settlement had gathered volume: the unpopularity of Biddulph and then of Bowker,<sup>(4)</sup> the indiscriminate and callous eviction of loyal Hottentots with the squatters from the Fuller's Hoek area by Lieutenant Davies in June 1850, the memory of their arbitrary treatment by Pottinger, the unjust actions of Superintendent Cobbe at Tadmanton - here was material enough to inflame the Hottentots.<sup>(5)</sup> But by this time, Godlonton was drawing attention to the settlement as a nest of bandits, and the unfriendly attitude of the Journal and the frontiersmen added to the burden of the Hottentots' discontent. The Rev. Read, in 1851, said that the Journal was one of the newspapers read by the Hottentots,<sup>(6)</sup> and Marais,

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. T. Stringfellow to Godlonton, 23.7.50.
  2. Vide, Cory Collection. M3. 7994. R. White to Godlonton, 27.5.50; Godlonton Papers, Thomas White to Godlonton, 29.7.50; 5.8.50; 12.8.50; C.H. Huntley to Godlonton, 24.7.51.
  3. Godlonton Papers. Thomas White to Godlonton 29.12.51: "I do not think Major Warden will make much objection to cancel your bargain with him with regard to his farm - for I heard from Dr Fraser shortly after you purchased that Major W. was sorry he had sold it at such a low price."
  4. Vide e.g. Godlonton Papers. T. Stringfellow to Godlonton, 23.7.50; John Ayliff to Godlonton, N.D. (but "Recd. 3.8.50" noted by Godlonton.)
  5. A.E. du Toit: op cit. p 91.
  6. Rev. James Read: The Kat River Settlement in 1851, p 123



in his Cape Coloured People, says that the views of the British settlers and the Journal aroused strong resentment amongst them. (1)

In February 1850, Godlonton declared that "The Kat River Settlement soon became to the Colony what Ireland is to the United Kingdom - the great difficulty," (2) and in the months that followed his attacks on the settlement continued. (3) The Journal of 16th November reported the meeting which the deputations of landholders from Sidsbury, Fort Beaufort and other places, had had with the Governor. Godlonton was himself a member of the Fort Beaufort deputation which impressed upon the Governor the evils which had arisen from the prevalence of squatting in the Blinkwater. On the following day, Smith appointed the Blinkwater Commission, (4) of which Godlonton was Chairman. The frontiersmen were convinced that Hermanus and the Blinkwater inhabitants were responsible for the continual theft of cattle and sheep. (5)

1. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, p. Cp. Godlonton Papers, Stringfellow to Godlonton, 7.6.51., who speaks about "a crusade against everything English without why or wherefor..."
2. OTJ. 22.2.50. Cp. Kaffir War, p 111.
3. Vide e.g. OTJ 1.3.50; 12.4.50; 5.7.50.
4. OTJ 16.11.50.
5. Vide, e.g. Goldswain's Chronicle II, pp. 124-5: "There is living at Blinkwater a Kaffer named Hermanus and he allows Kaffers and Fingoes to come and live on his location and it is at this place were you may see the sheep - some of them with their ears cut off close to the head and others cut so that the marks cannot be seen to. When any of the farmers lose their sheep it is always from their best flocks. Well may they boast of giving such high prices for their wool in the Graham's Town Market. There is not a week or a day but there is some farmer or farmers but what his losing more or less of their flocks of sheep - some of them spoiled or traced by their foot marks very near to Hermanus's location - but they take care that the farmer shall not bring it quite home to them..." Godlonton recorded Goldswain's interview with Smith, in which the above sentiments were expressed (vide OTJ 16.11.50).



and the Commission, after inspecting Fuller's Hoek, echoed these sentiments by declaring that Hermanus's "present location is the worst he could possibly occupy," by stressing that the distinctive topographical features of the country provided every opportunity for successful cattle-rustling, and concluding with the significant remark that:

In bringing these particulars under the notice of His Excellency, the Commission deem it their duty to remark upon the danger to the Colony of leaving so large a tract of country, possessing such peculiar features, without any responsible or settled inhabitants.<sup>(1)</sup>

And in December, Godlonton commented briefly but caustically on a paragraph in the Cape Town Mail, in which it had been suggested that the findings of the Blinkwater Commission should have satisfied everyone that the accusations against the Settlement were ill-founded.<sup>(2)</sup>

When Hermanus and the Kat River Hottentots eventually broke out into rebellion, Godlonton's indignation knew no bounds. He spoke of the "Hydra-headed monster of rebellion", and maintained that, once the rebellion had been crushed, the Kaffir war would be brought to an end speedily and successfully.<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton's farm, "Hammonds" was among those sacked and pillaged, in the Fort Beaufort district, so that Godlonton's attitude to the Hottentots became even more adverse.<sup>(4)</sup> In February, he had quoted passages from the

---

1. GTJ 7.2.52

2. GTJ. 21.12.50. The Cape Town Mail had written: "FULLER'S HOEK - After all the dismal stories told in the frontier papers of the number of stolen cattle secreted in Fuller's Hoek, the commission appointed by Sir Harry Smith to inquire into the matter could only find three sheep in all that locality, and these were ascertained to be in the lawful possession of the party owning them". Godlonton commented "The writer of this ingenious paragraph should be sent to this frontier for a short time - and he would then perhaps learn that cattle and sheep are not exactly identical."

3. GTJ. 8.2.51.

4. Vide GTJ Extra. 14.1.51: "The country around Fort Beaufort, which has been lately ravaged by the Banditti under Hermanus is amongst the richest parts of the Frontier. Every establishment was on a very superior scale, and among them Mr W. Gilbert's was pre-eminent for arrangement and comfort. Messrs Godlonton and Booth's, Mr Ayton's and Major Blakeway's establishments were in a line with his, the whole extending from the Kromme to the Konap, and all have either been sacked or destroyed by the ravages of these Rebel bands." Cp. Kaffir War. pp.123-7.



report of the Blinkwater Commission, describing the field-cornetcy of Andries Botha as "an asylum for squatters, a place of concealment for cattle-lifters, and a harbour for vagabonds," and recommending that "it should be resumed by Government and otherwise appropriated."<sup>(1)</sup> By March, he was devoting a considerable number of his editorials to the rebellion: he deprecated the attempt of the Commercial Advertiser to blame the rebellion on "some mal-administration on the part of the government"<sup>(2)</sup> and pooh-poohed the suggestion that the fear of a vagrant law had instigated it.<sup>(3)</sup>

From an early stage, he re-iterated these sentiments in his Kaffir-War. In the first instalment, he described the notorious forays of Hermanus,<sup>(4)</sup> whom he characterised as "the Blinkwater freehunter."<sup>(5)</sup> The importance of the Settlement and the Blinkwater as vital links in the chain of frontier defence against the Kaffirs was emphasised,<sup>(6)</sup> and the ingratitude of the Hottentot rebels to the British, who had made them what they were, was impressed upon the minds of his readers.<sup>(7)</sup>

The Kat River Rebellion gave Goddard an opportunity to launch into a tirade against the

---

1. OTJ. 15.2.51.

2. OTJ. 15.2.51.

3. OTJ. 1.3.51.

4. Kaffir War. p 27.

5. Ibid. p 33

6. Ibid. p 75: "In this cordon the Kat River Settlement and Blink Water location were important parts; for although not strictly military, they were both founded with especial reference to defence of the Colony. Occupying, as they did, the main passes from the colony into the Amatola, and comprising many of the most impracticable bushy kloofs, as well as formidable mountains, bordering the Kaffir country, the inhabitants were the guardians, as it were, of the outlets from one country to the other. Had they proved faithful to their trust a Kaffir war might have been speedily terminated."

7. Ibid. pp. 108-9.



missionary and philanthropic interests.<sup>(1)</sup> There had never been very much love lost between Godlonton and the philanthropists, whom he had charged, as early as 1835, with making "sweeping and injurious charges" against the colonists;<sup>(2)</sup> and in 1847, he was still fulminating against Dr Philip for taking a Hottentot and a Kaffir to England to stir up feeling against the colonists.<sup>(3)</sup> When he came to explain the cause of the Hottentot rebellion, Godlonton was only too thankful to be able to pin a reasonable amount of the blame upon the now odious representatives of the London Missionary Society:

We cannot hesitate to believe that the Hottentots have had their minds seriously poisoned by itinerant politicians, disguised in the garb of philanthropic friends," he wrote in March 1851,<sup>(4)</sup> and in the next issue, he became even more explicit:

The results witnessed at the Kat River Settlement, and other Institutions, under the training of the London and Glasgow Missionaries, lead us to the disagreeable inference, that prayer is only the ostensible, while politics are the real employment of both the leaders and followers in those communities...<sup>(5)</sup>

In the middle of 1851, the contest seems to have raged most fiercely. The Rev. James Read, junior, presented the missionaries' case in a series of articles to the Commercial Advertiser between June and September, and these were eventually incorporated in 1852 in the book, The Kat River Settlement in 1851.<sup>(6)</sup> Read objected, in the first place,

1. The colonists were angry with the missionaries, whom they accused of poisoning the minds of the Hottentots against them. Thomas Stubbs, in his MS. Reminiscences, said that the Hottentots, after the arrival of the settlers, had been the principal source of labour: "At that time they were good servants, and would have remained so, had it not been for that abominable false Philanthropy, which made them free and ruined them, we should have had no Hottentot rebellion and they would still have been an industrious people..." Cp. I. Staples: MS. Narrative of the War of 1851 and 1853: He says that the colonists blame the missionaries for the Rebellion, "And I must say, that, while I do think the judgement of the colonists pretty much a correct one, I do not think that these ministers really intended to bring about this state of things..." (Cory Collection MS. 6737)
2. Intro. Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption, p 15.
3. Case of the Colonists, p 23 et seq.
4. GTJ 8.3.51.
5. GTJ 15.3.51.
6. Fairbairn Papers. J. Read to Fairbairn, 14.8.48, in which the former had emphasised the very real nature of the Hottentots' grievances.



to the composition of the Blinkwater Commission, and though he had nothing to say against Godlonton or Bovey, he contended that, as both Gilbert and Blakeway were cattle and sheep farmers in the district, their verdict could hardly be expected to be impartial.<sup>(1)</sup> He was at great pains to deny any suggestion that the missionaries had had the slightest connection with the rebellion: the missionaries, he stated, had known as little about the latent rebellion as the public or the Government,<sup>(2)</sup> and when the revolt broke out, he said that it had been "exceedingly painful and discouraging"<sup>(3)</sup> and had seemed to be the breaking down of the work of fifty years."<sup>(4)</sup> So far from encouraging the rebellion, he had himself denounced it to the Hottentots,<sup>(5)</sup> and had even received letters from Casper Olivier assuring him of his fidelity to the Government.<sup>(6)</sup> Again and again did he assert, and often point to the actions of the missionaries to prove, that they had not meddled in politics;<sup>(7)</sup> and in seeking to uncover the real cause of the trouble, his statements were usually in direct contrast to those of Godlonton. Andries Botha, he maintained, had been perfectly innocent of treason;<sup>(8)</sup> Philliption was not the focus of rebellion;<sup>(9)</sup> Wienand was

---

1. Read: Kat River Settlement in 1851, p 16. There was a great deal of truth in this: Gilbert owned the farm "Kluklu" near Fort Beaufort (vide GFJ, 9.11.50. p 2.) and Blakeway, according to Stockenström, (vide Legislative Council Debates, 10.8.54.) was one of those who, after the 1835 war, had been given a portion of land in the Kat River Settlement, which had originally been given to the Hottentots by the Governor Sir Lowry Cole. Godlonton already had at least one farm in the district. Bovey was Field Commandant for the Fort Beaufort District (vide Kaffir War, p.82)

2. Read: op cit. p 20

3. Ibid. p 36.

4. Ibid. p 23

5. Ibid. pp 25, 40

6. Ibid. p 28

7. Ibid. pp 2, 57, 62. On page 25 he said: "...we sympathise with the Quakers and high Tories in the doctrine of non-resistance to the powers that be ..."

8. Ibid. p 46, 52-3, 87.

9. Ibid. p 52.



"a just magistrate" but ineffectual;<sup>(1)</sup> the grievances of the Kat River people were mainly against their local government;<sup>(2)</sup> and in short the Settlement had served a very useful purpose.<sup>(3)</sup> Yet, if he denounced the rebellion as altogether unjustifiable,<sup>(4)</sup> he was by no means loath to lay a large portion of the blame at the door of the colonists for agitating against a low franchise and thereby leading the Hottentots to believe that the forthcoming representative institutions would deprive them of the little liberty they still possessed.<sup>(5)</sup> In summing up the reasons which had been adduced for the rebellion, he wrote:

The Godlontonians put the entire blame on the London Society's missionaries, from the venerable Van der Kemp to the youngest missionary alive, among whom are of course reckoned as the principal, the Philips and the Reads. The two 'Delegates' are also identified by them with the London Missionary Society's missions<sup>(6)</sup>

but he turned the tables on Godlonton by accusing him of trying to have the settlement broken up so that land would be available for the frontiersmen.<sup>(7)</sup> Moreover, he took delight in pointing out that the Mercury had stated that

it is as likely that the editorial persecutions of the Graham's Town Journal have goaded the Kat River section of malcontents into insurgency, as the politics of the missionaries, or the proceedings of the four members, or the example of the western democrats...<sup>(8)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. p 56

2. Ibid. p 119

3. Ibid. p 122

4. Ibid. p 111

5. Ibid. p 24, 27, 35, 114.

6. Ibid. p 110. Vide GTJ. 15.3.51, where Godlonton said that Stockenström's defence of Andries Botha was "a most perfect tissue of humbug." In the same issue, there was a letter from one William Hartley, saying that Stockenström was responsible for the trek in 1835 and demanding that men like Glenelg should accept the advice of practical men on frontier problems: "They teach colored men to look upon the white people as their oppressors, and stir up the worst passions of his savage nature against him - Is it the same wires that moved the Emigration and Rebellion?"

7. Ibid. p 124.

8. Ibid. p 110.



In the second half of 1851, the Rev. J. J. Freeman's Tour in South Africa was also published. Freeman had recently returned from an inspection of the London Missionary Society's stations in South Africa, and his opinions, in his capacity as Home Secretary of the Society, were likely to enjoy a wide publicity in England and at the Cape. His attitude to the Kat River Settlement was similar to that of Read, whom he had visited during his tour. It was inevitable that he should pay tribute to the labours of the missionaries<sup>(1)</sup> and praise the steady progress of the Hottentots under their guidance.<sup>(2)</sup> On the other hand, he enumerated some of the injuries done to the natives by the colonists, citing Stockenström as "a witness of the highest authority."<sup>(3)</sup> Biddulph was criticised for his extremely partial report to Pottinger,<sup>(4)</sup> Bowker was accused of being unjust in his decisions<sup>(5)</sup> and the Journal, described as "the leading journal of the prejudiced colonists",<sup>(6)</sup> was associated with "a powerful party (which) hates them (i.e. the Hottentots)..<sup>(7)</sup> "The advocates of brutal force in Albany," he wrote, "are tempted to take advantage of this crisis, to call for the suppression of Missionary Institutions."<sup>(8)</sup>

While, as an antidote to Godlonton's exaggerations, Read and Freeman were endeavouring to show that the missionaries were at most sheep in wolves' clothing, Godlonton was pressing forward with his campaign. In July 1851, he seems to have regarded his task as so important, that he extracted from his Kaffir War the chapter on the earlier history of the Hottentots and re-published it as a pamphlet entitled Review of the Condition of the Frontier Hottentots from 1799 to 1851,

---

1. Freeman: A Tour in South Africa, p 132, 137, 164-5.

2. Ibid p 133.

3. Ibid pp 135, 142

4. Ibid. p 158.

5. Ibid. p 174

6. Ibid. p 144

7. Ibid. p 141

8. Ibid. p 144.



(1)

and of the incipient stages of the rebellion of the latter year.

The rebellion occupied a prominent place in both the Journal and the Kaffir War after this. As always, Godlonton shuddered when he imagined what effect the depositions of the Hottentots to the missionaries would have upon British public opinion. Towards the end of March 1851, and with the approbation of an important settler such as Dods Pringle,<sup>(2)</sup> he stated, at a public meeting in Grahamstown, that if the depositions of Caspar Olivier and other Hottentots "went home without a strong counter statement, the country would be ruined - to avert which, as Englishmen and as Colonists they were bound to stand forth and repel the common danger."<sup>(3)</sup> To counter this adverse publicity, he seized every opportunity to cast aspersions upon the Kat River people: in May, he remarked that the murderers of Castings had originally come down from the Kat River,<sup>(4)</sup> and in June, he denied the insinuations of the Cape Town Mail that the reason for the Hottentots' rebellion was to be found in the opposition of the settlers to the low franchise.<sup>(5)</sup> In order to rouse the frontiersmen against the Hottentots, he commented in the following words on Read's letters:

....we refer to them for the sake of pointing to an important admission which is made by Mr Read; namely, that the primary and ultimate object of the Hottentots of the Kat River Settlement was to drive the English Settlers - or as these wretched creatures termed them, the scum of the sea - from the land which they had enriched and made valuable by thirty years of incessant toil....<sup>(6)</sup>

1. As his remarks in this pamphlet are taken verbatim from the Kaffir War, I shall confine my footnote - references to the latter.
2. Godlonton Papers. W.D. Pringle to Godlonton, 5.4.51: Pringle thanked him for his "many excellent remarks" about the depositions of "those rascally Hottentots."
3. GTJ. 22.3.51.
4. GTJ. 3.5.51.
5. GTJ. 28.6.51.
6. GTJ. 5.7.51.



In the Kaffir War, Godlonton quoted a passage written by Sir James Alexander, D'Urban's aide-de-camp, in which he said:

Thus among the Hottentots, Kaffirs and Fingoes, did this ambitious party strive to establish its influence, and sway the natives by a control altogether independent of the Colonial Government; the Kat River Settlement, instead of being a protection to the colony, became the centre from which the anti-colonial party disseminated their doctrines; and a great many of the Hottentots became disaffected to Government and bad subjects of the King."<sup>(1)</sup>

This was, in Godlonton's estimation, one of the worst faults of the Settlement, and he seldom failed to stress that the evil effects of its magnetic attraction for all types of ne'er-do-wells were surpassed only by the extent of its influence upon the surrounding districts. He did not hesitate to blame the defection of the Cape Mounted Rifles in March 1851<sup>(2)</sup> upon the ideas propagated at the Kat River,<sup>(3)</sup> and it is noteworthy that his denunciation of the whole Corps seems to have produced some disgust, for a writer to the Frontier Times asked why he had thought it necessary to condemn the whole Corps, when only sixty men had deserted.<sup>(4)</sup> Similarly, when the Theopolis Hottentots rebelled in May 1851, the Frontier Times blamed it upon Smith's leniency with the Hottentots,<sup>(5)</sup> but Godlonton again held that the

---

1. Kaffir War. p 112

2. Vide Smith: Autobiography, p 265

3. e.g. GTJ. 19.7.51. Kaffir War, p 283-4. Vide P.P. 1851, xxxviii (1380), where Smith in his despatch to Grey, noted: "I may here observe that the King William's Town detachment is composed principally of Kat River men; and that many of the deserters were of a peculiarly religious turn of mind, or, I ought to say, under the influence of a species of fanaticism."

4. CPT. 29.4.51: "The Cape Corps at Fort Hare are fit to take the field again. The loyalty of these men at Fort Hare is beyond a doubt. All they want is to be led against the deserters of the Corps - about 60. The Journal would induce any person who did not know the spirit of the Hottentots, to believe that these 60 men are able to overthrow the whole universe...How is it possible that these 60 despised men should cause so much alarm?..."

5. CPT. 3.6.51.



Kat River influence was at the bottom of the trouble. In the Kaffir War he re-printed a letter from Andries Lynx of Grahamstown to Keviet Piquer of Theopolis, which made it quite obvious that the Hottentots of Grahamstown were reading the newspapers and passing on the news to the Hottentots in other parts of the colony.<sup>(1)</sup> Amongst Godlonton's papers there is another letter from Lynx to Piquer, written in April 1850, and advising the latter about the settlers' petitions for separation. It ended with the puzzling remark:

I would also warn you that you must be cautious with regard to newcomers namely such as emancipated slaves (apprentices) for they are tale bearers, and so they will always be, and you may feel sure that an apprentice will never separate himself from the white man.<sup>(2)</sup>

Godlonton was incensed more particularly against the missionaries.<sup>(3)</sup> He related how Caspar Olivier, having plundered the Glen Lynden and Mancazana areas, was forced to restore his booty while on his way to the Kat River. He thereupon imposed upon the Kat River missionaries, who recorded his deposition and those of his followers. Godlonton wrote indignantly:

... 'We,' says the Rev. H. Renton, 'we went on with the depositions before the Magistrate,' - these depositions being intended to criminate one party of poor plundered colonists, at the very time the plunder of another party was in active progress...<sup>(4)</sup>

He commented unfavourably on the "Council of the Kat River Loyal Burgher Association" which was eventually "productive, as will appear in the sequel, of very serious mischief,"<sup>(5)</sup> and related how not only Uithaalder but also Sandile himself had paid them a visit:

---

1. Kaffir War, pp.156-7. Vide also GTJ.1.2.51. Vide also Stubbs's MS.Reminiscences: "I soon found out from the spoors, that the Hottentots at the location in Graham's Town kept up a regular communication with the Rebels, and reported it to the Commandant."

2. Godlonton Papers, Andries Lynx to Rev. K. Pekew, 15.4.50.

3. EPN. 8.2.51. censured Godlonton for his "unscrupulous and barefaced attempt to blast the reputation" of the Rev Smit of Theopolis.

4. Kaffir War. pp.180-1.

5. Ibid, p.183.



A council of war seems to have been held, and in this 'focus of rebellion' we see mingled together Uithaalder and his avowed rebel gang, Sandilli and his Kafir despoilers, the Missionaries and their quondam friends the equivocal Kat River Settlers, and the Fingoes, who seem to have been made the scapegoats of all parties.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was not surprising that, when Renton arrived in Grahamstown from the Kat River Settlement in April 1851, his reception should have been anything but warm.<sup>(2)</sup> Both the Frontier Times<sup>(3)</sup> and the Journal were angry at his interference in the Kat River, and Godlonton had already declared that "Mr Renton and his active coadjutors, have been busily engaged in getting up a case against the Colonists so as if possible to justify this Rebellion as the Kafir war was justified in 1835"<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton was apprehensive at the influence Renton would have on British public opinion when he returned home: thus he informed his readers that Renton had rendered himself obnoxious to the frontiersmen through his unwarranted interference with the rebels, from whom he obtained depositions "intended to palliate their own conduct and to criminate the colonists...."<sup>(5)</sup> The Frontier Times expressed the same fear.<sup>(6)</sup> Moreover, Godlonton wanted

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 187.

2. GTJ. 12.4.51; Cory: op.cit.; p. 361. Thomas Stubbs, in his MS. Reminiscences, wrote: "The Rev. Renton one of the London Missionary Society, who had been in the Kat River when the Hot entots rebelled, and who was put down by the Public to be one of the last who had preached the right of Man and the oppression of Whites on the Blacks, untill they excited them to rebellion - Well he made his appearance in Graham's Town just at a time there was great excitement, caused by some murders by Rebel Hottentots..." Cp. Una Long: op.cit. p. 74: Charles Brownlee to "My dear Mahoney," 6.10.51: "The suffering and loss of life on our side has been dreadful this war, but through the representations of Mr Freeman, Mr Renton, and Sir A. Stockenström, we are considered as cut throats, murderers, and aggressors....." but the time to make our own "statements" will come yet..."

3. GTJ. 25.2.51; 4.3.51; 11.3.51.

4. GTJ. 1.3.51.

5. GTJ. 12.4.51. Cp. Kaffir War. pp 484-5

6. GTJ. 4.3.51: "It is obvious that if the British government and the British public should be persuaded to believe that very great wrongs have been inflicted upon the Hottentots now in rebellion against us, - or that the Kafir nation has been goaded to desperation by a barbarous and oppressive military rule wantonly inflicted during a period of three years, - there will be very little hope of future safety for the unfortunate inhabitants of this country."



to know why the missionaries had not left the Chumie Station at the same time as J. M. Stevenson, as their failure to do so seemed to indicate that, for some unknown reason, they were not afraid of the rebels.<sup>(1)</sup> The Frontier Times criticised Renton for trying to evade answering the questions of the Grahamstown people,<sup>(2)</sup> and Godlonton asserted that he had "very adroitly shirked the real points at issue."<sup>(3)</sup> When, at the end of January 1851, the Hottentots of Shiloh had rebelled, Godlonton had blamed the revolt upon the influence exerted by the disaffected Kat River Hottentots;<sup>(4)</sup> but what was far more reprehensible was the part played by Renton and the "Council" in frustrating the operations of General Somerset against the Shiloh Hottentots. Godlonton said that the battles of Whittlesea were going in favour of the colonists when the missionaries intervened to obtain a cease-fire.

In the Kaffir War, he wrote:

It established a neutrality during which the rebels were enabled to convey from Shilo immense booty, and supplies to their confederates in the Blinkwater and Kat River at the same time disgusting the patriots of Whittlesea, who, despite their fewness had so heroically stood forth in defence of their lives, and the maintenance of British supremacy in the country.<sup>(5)</sup>

At the public meeting which Renton attended in Grahamstown, Godlonton again brought this charge against him, though, as Godlonton said, Renton elithered out of the difficulty by changing the subject.<sup>(6)</sup> Godlonton's annoyance at not succeeding in his attempt to force Renton publicly to condemn himself, is well reflected in a passage at the end of the Kaffir War:

---

1. GTJ. 19.4.51; Kaffir War, p 488.

2. GFT 22.4.51; 29.4.51: "It has been stated by the Graham's Town correspondent of the Observer that Mr Renton 'satisfactorily explained his conduct' to some gentlemen who called upon him. This piece of information we beg to assure the Observer's correspondent is quite new to us. We believe those gentlemen were satisfied as to one point- that is, that Mr Renton had been led to entertain an inveterate prejudice against the colonists, and a strong undue prepossession in favour of the native tribes and colored classes."

3. Kaffir War, p 486

4. Ibid. pp 150, 207.

5. Ibid., pp 223-4.

6. GTJ. Extra 22.4.51; Kaffir War, pp 485-6.



Mr Renton declined, however, any of these questions, (1) and expressed surprise that the Committee should presume to catechise him. The committee whose object was to allow the Rev. gentleman an opportunity of clearing himself from any reproach, were thus discourteously treated by one whom they had sought to serve, and who shortly afterwards sailed for England, where the most glaring misstatements were widely circulated by his agency through the Scottish press, by which the conduct of the Grahamstown committee was most unjustly impugned. The mischief that this disturber fomented whilst in the colony, and the attempts he made to slander the frontier colonists will always stamp his conduct with odium... (2)

And as if to clinch the matter and administer the coup de grace to Renton's bad publicity, he added the final touch:

The object aimed at by Mr Renton and his colleagues in propagating wanton misstatements of this nature, seemed to be that of exciting the Hottentot race to a more determined and steady defiance of the colonists... (3)

For months - even years - after his departure, the Journal could find little good to say about Renton, (4) and that Godlonton's remarks about the missionaries' conduct had not fallen on barren soil is clear from the remark of Colonel Armstrong's wife to Godlonton, that "I hope nothing will or can induce the Frontier people to relinquish the point of Investigation into the cause of the Hottentot Rebellion, that is quite distinct from the trial of the Rebels." (5)

During the remainder of 1851, Godlonton's attacks on the Kat River Hottentots continued. (6) In October, he printed a letter from Adam Kok to Major Warden, in which the former said that Uithaalder had made unsuccessful advances to him for assistance in the revolt; (7) and in December, he quoted from a pamphlet written by the Bishop of Cape Town on the subject of his tour in the Eastern Province:

The inhabitants of the Eastern Province are crying out for a commission to inquire into the cause of the Hottentot rebellion. It is laid very freely at the door of the missionaries of the London and Glasgow Societies. The whole subject is at present involved in much mystery; but I cannot for an instant believe that any missionaries would deliberately encourage rebellion, though I can easily understand that their whole system and teaching might lead to it. (8)

1. i.e. those posed by the Grahamstown Committee.

2. Kaffir War. p 490

3. Ibid. p 490

4. Vide, e.g. GTJ. 7.6.51; 28.6.51; 3.2.52; 17.7.52; 7.8.52;

5. Godlonton Papers. Mrs Armstrong to Godlonton, 1.4.51. Cp. also Godlonton Papers. S. Rowles to Godlonton, 26.5.51; W. Wright to Godlonton, 21.2.52.

6. Vide, e.g. GTJ. 31.5.51; 5.7.51; 16.8.51; 4.10.51; 15.11.51.

7. GTJ. 4.10.51.

8. GTJ. 27.12.51.



In a determined effort to convince the British tax-payer and government of the cankerous nature of the Kat River Settlement, Godlonton cunningly elaborated the inordinate expense it entailed upon the British Treasury:

In a subsequent despatch of 14th April, 1847, Sir Henry (i.e. Pottinger) terms this locality an 'ill-conducted and hitherto worse-understood Settlement,' and he goes on to acquaint the Colonial Minister that from a return which had been sent to him by Lieut. Metcalfe then Superintendent of the district, it was shewn that the actual expense to the government for rations alone to the people of the Settlement was £58:14 per diem, £1760 per mensem, and £21,296 per annum. His Excellency says in his dispatch, as well he might, that it was with mingled feelings of regret and astonishment that he acquainted the Colonial Minister of this extraordinary expenditure; at the time, however, adding that not content with this, a clamorous application had been made for clothing, and that not alone for the men actually doing military duty, but for the women and children also!(1)

He added that the Board of Commissioners for the relief of the indigent after the war of 1846, had spent £10,000 out of the total £25,000 on the Kat River Hottentots - "a fact in itself quite sufficient," he observed, "to shew that this Settlement, from its egregious mismanagement, has been a complete drag-chain upon the prosperity of the country, exhausting its resources, annoying the surrounding inhabitants, and embarrassing the government."(2)

The Kat River Settlement was originally planned as a measure for frontier defence and as a remedy for the prevalence of Hottentot vagrancy.(3) As such, Godlonton was in favour of the scheme. But, due to various circumstances, it had fallen on evil days and had disappointed the expectations of even Stockenström, its founder. Godlonton began to regard it as a liability instead of an asset, and with disillusionment came ~~contempt and~~ hostility. The rebellion of 1850 finally provided him not only with a capital excuse for agitating against it, but also with a welcome stalking-horse for an all-out attack upon his old enemies, the missionaries and philanthropists.

---

1. Kaffir War. pp.119-20.

2. Ibid. p.120.

3. Stockenström: Autobiography, II.p.357.



Indeed so violent and so consistent were his attacks on the missionaries that even his friend, the Rev. W. Shepstone, had to warn him "not to be too sweeping about missions."<sup>(1)</sup>

When the field-cornet, Andries Botha, was found guilty of high treason by a Cape Town jury in May 1852, Godlonton said he hoped that this would convince the Western Province that "in referring to the class of persons of whom Andries Botha is a type, the people of this frontier have not used any exaggeration in their complaints."<sup>(2)</sup> He summed up the significance of the trial in these words:

The case of "The Queen versus Andreas Botha" is in reality the case of 'The Colonists versus the Kat River Settlement'. The conviction of the accused is the triumph of truth over falsehood.<sup>(3)</sup>

This attitude was confirmed when, after all this, Godlonton said the East would be willing to join in an appeal for mercy for Botha, but only on the condition that "the offender be removed from the possibility of working further mischief, and that the settlement in which he exercised such mischievous influence, and which has worked so much mischief, be entirely broken up..."

Besides Godlonton's defence of Smith and his attacks on Stockenström, the missionaries and the Hottentots, there were other noteworthy prejudices in his writings. He was determined, among other things, to white-wash the frontiersmen vis-à-vis the Kaffirs. In his first book, he had taken Fairbairn severely to task for his hostile attitude to the colonists in the Commercial Advertiser, and had averred quite openly that many of the difficulties under which the frontiersmen had laboured were due directly to the constant misrepresentation of their case by their enemies, who drew a completely false and idyllic picture of the Kaffirs. As a result, the frontier inhabitants had lost the sympathy of both the British Government and the British public.<sup>(4)</sup> It became

---

1. Godlonton Papers. Rev. W. Shepstone to Godlonton, 23.4.51, and 2.6.51.

2. GTJ. 25.5.52

3. GTJ. 29.5.52

4. R. Godlonton: Intro. Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption, pp. 114-15.



Godlonton's prime duty to eradicate this impression; for though the age of telescopic philanthropy was rapidly passing, the influence of Exeter Hall upon public opinion in Britain was not to be despised. Coupled with Fairbairn's unfavourable remarks on the colonists were those of Stockenström at the Aborigines Committee,<sup>(1)</sup> and Godlonton now launched out upon a campaign to refute their allegations by showing that the very opposite was the case. He spoke scathingly about the "false and dangerous philanthropy"<sup>(2)</sup> and denied that the colonists were deliberately encroaching upon the lands of the Kaffirs.<sup>(3)</sup> On the other hand, he portrayed the Kaffir as "an inveterate thief and bush ranger" and, as if to assure those who had different opinions from his own that they were mis-informed and not evilly-disposed, he added:

Well-meaning persons, unacquainted with their true character, conclude, when they hear of disorders on this frontier, of the patrols of the military, or the commands of the farmers, that there must be some good cause at bottom for the restlessness of the natives; and they are ready enough to give credit to those false statements which have been put forth to the world of colonial encroachment or colonial cruelty; whereas the fact is, the true cause of all their aggressions is the fine and numerous flocks and herds of the frontier grazier... It may be confidently affirmed that there has never been a single misunderstanding between the colonists and Kaffirs which has not originated in some aggression on the part of the latter on the property of the colonial farmers...<sup>(4)</sup>

This remained Godlonton's opinion through out his life,<sup>(5)</sup> and there were many who agreed with his naïve and strongly-prejudiced interpretation of the frontier problem.<sup>(6)</sup> In the Case of the Colonists, he deplored the way in which the Government had inveigled the settlers into coming to the frontier and had thereafter paid no attention to their welfare<sup>(7)</sup> - in fact, its attitude to frontier affairs had made their new home completely unsafe, since the government

1. Vide Urie: op cit. p 15.

2. R. Godlonton: Intro. Remarks to Narrative of Irruption, p 200  
Cp. Ibid. p 15

3. Ibid. pp 204-5.

4. Intro. Remarks to Narrative of Irruption, pp 221-5.

5. Cp. e.g. Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes, p 170: "Uncivilised and barbarous, we do not expect the Kaffir to attain a high point in the scale of humanity."

6. Cp. e.g. W.C. Holden: Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p 350; Calderwood: Caffres and Caffre Missions, p.49, pp61-69; Napier, before Select Committee on Kaffir Tribes in 1851, p 202

7. Case of the Colonists, p 7.



persisted in supporting a frontier policy which was entirely inimical to their interests and security. The settlers' requests for an inquiry had been ignored, in the same way as their demands for compensation or protection.<sup>(1)</sup> He maintained, too, that the settlers had studiously avoided giving offence, and concluded with the severe accusation against the government:

They stand before their country with perfectly clean hands, without an accuser or the shadow of an accusation against them; they plead that the Government, by its own determined perseverance in error, has brought down upon them the calamities by which they are now surrounded.<sup>(2)</sup>

The colonists, he declared, were caught between two fires: on the one side, "the cupidity, craft and cruelty of the Kaffir," and, on the other, "the pusillanimity and feebleness of the Colonial authorities."<sup>(3)</sup> This was the basis upon which all Godlonton's attacks were made, for these were the colonists' enemies which perpetually haunted his mind.

In May 1850, Godlonton referred to the "plundered frontier farmer" in the Journal, and, in his editorial of 25th May, repeated what he had said in the Case of the Colonists as to the cause of the 1846 war. The Report of the Board of Claims for Compensation for losses in that war ( of which, incidentally, he had himself been a member) would, he assured the frontiersmen, throw "the blame where it in justice must rest, namely, with the Kaffirs on the one hand, for their continual infraction of their own treaties, and with the government on the other, for entering into treaties, which were in fact nothing less than incentives to continual aggression - a mere prelude to the war in which they resulted."<sup>(4)</sup>

In the Kaffir War, Godlonton strove gallantly to cast the blame for the outbreak upon the Kaffirs. The war was, in his opinion, "pre-eminently unprovoked and treacherous,"<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Case of the Colonists, pp.7-9.

2. Ibid. p.11.

3. Ibid. p.40.

4. GTJ. 25.5.50.

5. Kaffir War. "Advertisement."



for "the Kaffirs were always the first aggressors,"<sup>(1)</sup> while the commandos of burghers he defined as "nothing more than despoiled farmers united in a body to visit the haunts of the Kaffir robber, and compel him by legal force of arms to disgorge his plunder."<sup>(2)</sup> All through the book, his efforts to exonerate the colonists and blame the Kaffirs stand out in bold relief,<sup>(3)</sup> while the Smith system which Godlonton was convinced had provided both settlers and Kaffirs with a Utopia of peace, was defended to the hilt. He emphasised the importance of cattle in the economy of Kaffirland, and described how the temptation of the colonists' cattle was thus so strong.<sup>(4)</sup> He dwelt upon gory details of the war, pointing out how the Kaffirs were so savage that they even molested burying parties, so that the corpses usually had to be left to the mercy of the birds of prey, the wolves and the jackals.

"This is an enemy, too," he concluded in his notoriously pontifical style, "whom the people of England commiserate and aid, and believe to be civilised. Surely narrations of this nature must dispel the delusion!"<sup>(5)</sup>

When the war eventually broke out, the Kaffirs were saddled with the blame: "On the 24th of December (the day before Christmas) 1850" wrote Godlonton, "the first shot of this memorable warfare was fired in Kaffirland, and that shot was fired by the Kaffirs!"<sup>(6)</sup> And later, in relating the murder of the nineteen-year-old William Walker, he commented:

- 
1. Cp. Holden: The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p 350. Holden, however, was also biased, and probably painted the Kaffirs in this way so as to arouse an interest in their general welfare among philanthropists overseas.
  2. Kaffir War, p 5
  3. e.g. Ibid., p 6.
  4. Ibid., p 18.
  5. Ibid., p 61. Vide, too, ibid p 45, where Godlonton stressed that Jan Tzatzoe, at the meeting of the Chiefs with Smith on 15th December 1850, had himself admitted that very few Kaffirs could be trusted, and that all of them were liars."
  6. Kaffir War, p 48.



"Surely these things must dry up every fountain of sympathy for foes so murderous as the Kaffirs..."<sup>(1)</sup>

It is interesting, in this connection, to observe Godlonton's attitude to the British army. His attempts to depict the Kaffirs as deceitful, cunning and elusive were also in part a vindication of the often ineffectual nature of the military operations against them. On more than one occasion in the Kaffir War did Godlonton dwell upon the difficulties of fighting an enemy which could appear, as it were, out of the blue,<sup>(2)</sup> and which, by 1850 was adept in the use of fire-arms.<sup>(3)</sup> He praised the valour of the troops<sup>(4)</sup> and went to great, and sometimes unconvincing,<sup>(5)</sup> lengths even to defend the methods employed by the troops, for he was determined to allay any fears of either the colonists<sup>(6)</sup> or the British Government, that the British

- 
1. Ibid. p 246. Godlonton's remarks on the Kaffir character were endorsed by other writers: e.g. Cole, in his Cape and the Kaffirs, p 184; W.C.Holden: The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p 179.
  2. Kaffir War, p 101: "Picture the numerous hands that Sandilli can call into action in twenty-four hours! ..."
  3. Ibid. p 222. Holden in his Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, p 159 seems to have thought that the Kaffirs were not very skilful in the use of fire-arms but many of the Hottentots had been trained "and could use them with fatal effect."
  4. Kaffir War, pp 273-4
  5. Kaffir War, p 303: Referring to the burning of the homes and crops of the Kaffirs, he wrote: "Very false impressions are, however, received at a distance on this subject, by those who misunderstand the case, being led to think that this severity is not in aid of any military operations, fancying that a cluster of the fragile beehive wigwams of the natives are tantamount to an English village and that the Kaffirs who are at home in the bush everywhere suffer as much when thus punished as would Europeans if driven from their homes to brave the rigors of a northern clime. The cases are not at all parallel..."
  6. Vide e.g. Thomas Stubbs's MS Reminiscences in which Colonel Eyre is described "like most military men" as "conceited". Stubbs scoffs at Eyre's refusal to waylay the Kaffirs because it was both unSoldierlike and unEnglishmanlike." Vide also Goldswain's Chronicle, II, p 129: "The Soldier he must obey and if the Enemy should be seen their is aertin menovers that the soldier must go throe and often times the bugle must be bloon and this will not do with the Kaffers: you must meet them in there hone way.."; Cole: op cit. p 307; J.M.Bowker: Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers. p 267.



army was being trifled with by the Kaffirs. <sup>(1)</sup> In 1849, he had realised the deleterious economic effects of the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Beaufort, <sup>(2)</sup> while the intentions of Grey to reduce the military expenditure in South Africa had been notorious since the arrival of Smith in 1847, so that Godlonton was bent on assuring the British Government that, in view of the successes of the army, there were no adequate grounds of dissatisfaction or incompetence upon which the further withdrawal of troops could be based. Godlonton had the same fears with regard to the Sovereignty: at the end of November 1850, <sup>(3)</sup> he criticised the intention of Grey to withdraw the British forces from the colonies, and in July of the same year had censured, in the strongest terms, Grey's veto on the estimates for the military establishment at Bloemfontein. <sup>(4)</sup> Indeed, so extravagant was Godlonton's praise of the army that even in military circles was it despised: during the Berea campaign in 1852 for instance, one of Cathcart's colonels, whose request to lead the attack had been refused, retorted that he sought no "Graham's Town Journal honours." <sup>(5)</sup>

- 
1. Even General Orders issued in Blue Books emphasised the difficulties of the army in Kaffir warfare: vide, e.g. P.P. 1852, xxxiii (1428), 3.5.51: "No warfare requires so much activity, long marches, individual as well as collective gallantry, a knowledge of country, and cheerfulness under fatigue, as that of savage wars, and more especially in a mountainous country. The savage acknowledges neither front, flank, nor rear, assembles with peculiar rapidity, and disperses equally so; hence to assail him with success requires might and most fatiguing marches, and the character of such a war demands continued and well commanded patrols." P.S. Campbell: Reminiscences of the Kaffir Wars, p 47: "We were constantly scouring the kloofs, but as fast as we drove the Kaffirs out of one kloof they would go into another; A.W.Cole, in his Cape and the Kaffirs, p 169, writes: "A field-piece or two or a howitzer, might be of some service; for the Kaffirs have shown a remarkable distaste for cannon-balls; but any force of men who are not naked, greased all over, and able to creep along on their stomachs, are of little avail in bush-fighting with savages who have all the above qualifications..."
  2. Vide AGC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 5.10.49
  3. GTJ 30.11.50
  4. GTJ 2.7.50
  5. Ibid. p.250. Cp. ibid., p 247: "Such is life in Albany! during a Kaffir inroad!"



But Goddington aimed, at the same time, at securing sympathy for the colonists, whom he described as "guiltless."<sup>(1)</sup> It was completely fallacious, he maintained, to suppose, as was done in England, that the colonists had provoked the Kaffirs in order to find an excuse for robbing them of their cattle, or to settle upon their lands.<sup>(2)</sup> He praised the gallantry of the burghers at Shiloh and Whittlesea, for example,<sup>(3)</sup> while the colonists were held up to the admiration of the public for not committing any atrocities upon those Kaffirs who had fallen prisoner to them.<sup>(4)</sup>

With the arrival of General Cathcart in March 1852, came a perceptible change in the tone of Cape politics. The dying embers of the old antagonisms, which had been stirred up afresh by the appointment of Sir Harry Smith in 1847, died down once again, though, among men with long memories, they were not destined altogether to disappear for some years. To many, it was not the appointment of Cathcart, but the dismissal of Smith, that was important. Cathcart was unknown at the Cape, yet the announcement of his appointment was hailed with enthusiasm by a paper such as the Frontier Times, which did not hesitate immediately to point the contrast between the two men, - one of whom it hated and one of whom was completely unknown to it. Franklin wrote:

An extract of a notice of a late work by General Cathcart has been taken over from the Quarterly Review. It is satisfactory to know that the future Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief at the Cape can use a pen as well as a sword, and the colony is sincerely congratulated on the approaching termination of the reign of military bombast, buffoonery, and misrepresentation. Whenever General Cathcart may deem it necessary to publish for the 'information' of the public any statements on military affairs relative to the progress of the war we shall certainly expect that they will be truthful statements.<sup>(5)</sup>

1. Kaffir War, p 77.

2. Ibid. p 7.

3. Ibid. p 207.

4. McKay: Reminiscences of the last Kafir War. p 173. Cp. ibid. pp 72-3, 121.

5. CPT. 23.3.52. In CPT. 6.4.52, the opinion was expressed that all the reasons given by Grey for the recall of Smith were "most just and unanswerable."



Calderwood had recently drawn Godlonton's attention to the deleterious effects which were now being felt on the frontier as a result of the "ruinous misrepresentations" of not only Stockenström and Fairbairn, but also of Freeman, Renton and Niven, and he had suggested that the various missionary societies in South Africa should issue a combined refutation of these allegations.<sup>(1)</sup>

Godlonton was thus at first dismayed at the recall of Smith at such a critical juncture, and attributed Grey's action to political intrigue.<sup>(2)</sup> Yet as early as the 24th April, when the Smiths had hardly left Table Bay, he had accepted the fait accompli. His first comments on the new Governor were confined almost entirely to his supposed ability to secure the safety of the eastern frontier; yet the very self-assurance of his tone itself betrayed a wavering fear that his hopes were stronger than his convictions. He wrote:

Fortunately for all parties as well as for the interests of humanity, General Cathcart does not come hither to make concession to the savage invaders of the colony, or to offer an amnesty to rebels. His published manifestoes all go to show that British supremacy will be firmly established, that the Kaffir strongholds will be effectually cleared, and that such a line of policy will be carried out, as will give the colony a safe border...The land from which the enemy will be ejected is, we are assured, to be filled up; and with a class of immigrants that will add to the value of the soil by their productive exertions, as well as give security to a section of the border which has always been the most dangerous and vulnerable part of the colony.<sup>(3)</sup>

For some time, Cathcart was fortunate enough to be able to play his part in just the way his spectators had planned. He landed at Cape Town on March 31st, and within five days had embarked in the Styx for East London.<sup>(4)</sup> On the 10th April, he held a long conference with Smith at King William's Town,<sup>(5)</sup> and when Sir Harry had departed, he immediately set to work. His vigorous and common-sense approach to the frontier problem

---

1. Godlonton Papers, Calderwood to Godlonton, 30.1.52.

2. GTJ. 6.3.52

3. GTJ. 24.4.52

4. P.P. 1852-3. LXVI (1635). Cathcart to Grey, 20.4.52.

5. Ibid.



and the war soon impressed the colonists. On 12th April, he instructed Maclean, to assure the Ndhlanbe chiefs that they would not be attacked, so long as they remained loyal to Her Majesty's Government: <sup>(1)</sup> this they promised to do. Krelli was warned that he would be given a month in which to pay the fine of cattle levied on him by Smith, and on 17th April, Cathcart issued a proclamation that Sandile and the other rebel chiefs would be expelled across the Kei and never allowed to return. <sup>(2)</sup> Meanwhile, the Governor had undertaken an extensive tour of the Amatola region, where he selected sites for block houses. <sup>(3)</sup> In a short time a stone tower called "Castle Eyre" had been built in the Keiskamma Hoek, and Cathcart was able to report that Eyre and Michel were in complete control of the Amatolas. In May, he established his military head-quarters at Fort Beaufort, <sup>(4)</sup> so as to protect the colony and provide a base for his operations against Macomo in the Waterkloof. On 26th of that month, he paid his first and eagerly anticipated visit to Grahamstown, <sup>(5)</sup> and four days later, as a sample of the shape of things to come, he issued a proclamation imposing the death sentence upon anyone found guilty of selling ammunition to the Kaffirs. <sup>(6)</sup>

The Frontier Times was eager to comment favourably upon Cathcart's operations and did so from the beginning; but Godlonton thought it best not to be too lyrical, since this might easily be construed into a lack of confidence in Cathcart's predecessor. In April, he outlined the task which lay before Cathcart, <sup>(7)</sup> and in the following month, stressed that this task would be concerned in the main with the attainment of a satisfactory peace on the frontier. <sup>(8)</sup> The views of

- 
1. Ibid.
  2. Ibid., Enclosure No 2.
  3. Cory. V, p 453
  4. GTJ. Extra. 11.5.52
  5. GTJ. 29.5.52.
  6. GTJ. 5.6.52
  7. GTJ. 17.4.52
  8. GTJ. 13.5.52.



the Frontier Times and the Journal began to co-incide, and it is evident that they were bent on guiding the inexperienced Governor into a workable solution to the frontier problems. Franklin praised the establishment of the military headquarters at Fort Beaufort, and said that Cathcart had already inspired the frontiersmen with confidence in his ability;<sup>(1)</sup>

Godlonton wrote in similar laudatory terms:

The Governor's measures at present are rather of a defensive character than otherwise. His Excellency is acting with great caution, and is evidently feeling his way to sound conclusions in regard to ultimate measures. Two or three points of policy are made known as determinatively fixed. These are - I. The rebellious Gaika tribes are to be expelled from the Amatole and driven across the Kei; II. The vacated country is to be filled up with friends, instead of enemies and thieves as before, III. The Kat River and Blink Water will be settled upon such a plan, and by such a population, as may afford solid ground of hope that in future years that part of the border will be safe, instead of being, as for many years past, the most dangerous part of the whole frontier.<sup>(2)</sup>

In June, Lakeman's Volunteers reached the frontier,<sup>(3)</sup> and with this general infusion of new blood into the military establishment, the colonists seem to have been inspired with renewed hope. The Frontier Times, while praising the concern which Cathcart had shown for the safety of the colony, expressed disappointment at the inertia of some of his subordinates.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton was still all praise:

His Excellency is working quietly, and only seems to require time to mature his plans and work out his measures. What he demands is the hearty co-operation of the colonists themselves. The time for some degree of positive self-sacrifice has evidently arrived....<sup>(5)</sup>

In writing this passage, Godlonton was referring more particularly to the Governor's projected punitive expedition against the unreliable Krel. Smith's trans-Kei expedition in the previous December and January had achieved a purely transient success, largely because of the refusal of the burghers to turn out while the colonial boundary was

1. GFT. 25.5.52. CP. Godlonton Papers. John Ayliff to Godlonton 28.5.52: "I need not say that our town is now beginning to look up, all is bustle and activity and all parties in very good spirits..."
2. GTJ. 22.5.52
3. For an account of the campaigns of these volunteers in the Kaffir War, vide Lakeman: What I saw in Kaffir-land.
4. GFT. 22.6.52.
5. GTJ. 24.7.52.



undefended and while the districts of Fort Beaufort, Cradock and Somerset were still overrun by the Kaffirs; Cathcart's command that the burghers of the frontier districts were to assemble at the Imvani on 6th August<sup>(1)</sup> met with a far readier response - mainly because of the confidence of the frontiersmen in the Commander-in-Chief and because he had already taken steps to ensure the comparative safety of the frontier districts during their absence.<sup>(2)</sup> The Frontier Times, though at first doubtful as to the immunity of the frontier from attack,<sup>(3)</sup> soon changed its tune and said that once Kreli had been dealt with, the Kaffirs in the Waterkloof and the Amatolas would easily succumb to the combined movements against them.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton expressed complete confidence in the actions of Cathcart, and called upon the burghers to support him.<sup>(5)</sup> By August 1852, Kreli had been forced on his knees,<sup>(6)</sup> in October he sent presents to Maclean, and in February 1853, his messenger arrived at Fort Murray to make overtures for peace.<sup>(7)</sup> In the meantime, the Waterkloof and Amatolas had been cleared of Kaffirs, and Seyolo, the only Ndhlambe chief who had rebelled, had surrendered unconditionally. By November 1852, Cathcart was able to report the Gaikas had been expelled from the Amatolas and that

- 
1. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Enclosure in Darling to Pakington, 1.7.52.
  2. Vide, e.g. GTJ. 7.8.52: "We have reason to believe that the complaint made by our correspondent of the backwardness of the Somerset inhabitants to join the Kei Expedition arises from causes which lie far beyond their control. That district is said to be in a sad state of disorder, daily exposed to the incursions of the enemy, and the inhabitants crippled in their resources as well by previous inroads of the enemy, as by the cold of winter and the prevailing drought." The CPT. 28.12.52 stated that the military headquarters had been transferred to the colony, "the protection of which became a paramount consideration under the new order of things." In CPT. 20.1.52, Franklin had stated that he had never viewed an expedition across the Kei favourably, as "the defence of the colony from invasion was the first and paramount duty of the Governor."
  3. CPT. 27.7.52
  4. CPT. 3.8.52
  5. GTJ. 17.7.52
  6. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Cathcart to Pakington, 15.8.52
  7. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Enclosure in Cathcart to Secretary of State, 12.2.53.



Bithaelder's band of Hottentot rebels had been dispersed.<sup>(1)</sup>

On 14th February 1853, he proclaimed that peace had been restored with Kreli,<sup>(2)</sup> and at the beginning of March, he dictated his peace terms to the chiefs at King William's Town.<sup>(3)</sup> From then on, his attention was directed towards the implementation of his peace settlement on the frontier.

Cathcart's task was not facilitated by the frontier press which, since the latter part of 1852 had become more sparing in the praise it bestowed upon his measures. The apprehension of the press centred upon Cathcart's treatment of the Ndhlambe chiefs and of the Gaika people. In the latter part of 1852, many of the Gaikas, who had been expelled from the Amatolas as a result of Cathcart's skilful and relentless pressure, took refuge among the loyal Ndhlambes in southern Kaffraria. The colonists feared that until every Gaika had been expelled across the Kei, any peace settlement would be a mockery. In September, the Frontier Times referred to the "neutral allies" among the Kaffirs as "secret foes", and declared that if the fidelity of Pato and the other Ndhlambe chiefs could not be proved, they should forthwith be expelled across the Kei.<sup>(4)</sup> After Cathcart's meeting with the chiefs in October, the Times expressed its disgust at the Governor's failure to call upon the Ndhlambe chiefs to surrender the Gaika cattle driven into their territory:

According to the present policy, the Gaika people are to be pardoned, and not expelled from British Kaffraria; they are not even to be called upon to surrender their firearms, whilst the Slambies are thanked for at least a very doubtful neutrality. These appear to be the preliminaries to a peace after nearly two years of war and suffering.<sup>(5)</sup>

These remarks were repeated in the succeeding issues.<sup>(6)</sup>

Franklin declared that a Governor of the Cape would never

1. A.E. du Toit: op.cit. p.122.

2. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Enclosure in Darling to Pakington, 23.2.53.

3. Ibid. Darling to Secretary of State, 9.3.53.

4. GFT. 7.9.52.

5. GFT. 12.10.52.

6. Vide, e.g., GFT. 19.10.52; 26.10.52; 2.11.52.



again be in so favourable a position for demanding and enforcing the expulsion of these troublesome and marauding tribes from British Kaffraria.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Colonist, though it was prepared to defend Cathcart against the strictures of the overseas press,<sup>(2)</sup> expressed astonishment at his lenient treatment of Umhala, and advised him to act with determination and speed before he should be beguiled by a wily enemy.<sup>(3)</sup>

Before Cathcart's meeting with the chiefs, Godlonton continued to express complete confidence in his measures,<sup>(4)</sup> but after the meeting he too began to be a little sceptical about the effects of Cathcart's policy towards the refugee Gaiikas. He commented:

The good policy of the measure adopted by General Cathcart of permitting the Gaiika Kaffirs to interperse themselves among the friendly tribes has been very justly called in question. Men acquainted with the Kaffir people view this permission as a serious, not to say fatal error, involving as they think the germ of future disturbance, and that at no very distant day.<sup>(5)</sup>

Frontier opinion of Cathcart seems at this stage to have varied considerably; Captain Hall of the Styx, in his letters to Godlonton, said that he still had confidence in the Governor,<sup>(6)</sup> and was "much pleased at the way the General is doing things, and I think will manage well."<sup>(7)</sup> Captain Hall seems, though, to have been on friendly terms with Cathcart, as the Governor had a few months prior to this, come to the frontier in the ship which Hall commanded.

J. C. Warner probably had less reason to be biased in favour

---

1. GTJ. 2.11.52.

2. Colonist. 15.10.52.

3. Colonist. 23.10.52.

4. GTJ. 9.10.52: "We are no admirers of Kaffir palavers, and should have some misgivings as to this one, had we not strong security against evil in the sound discretion of General Cathcart, his firmness of purpose, and the practical character of his mind..."

5. GTJ. 20.11.52.

6. Godlonton Papers. Captain W. K. Hall to Godlonton, 4.7.52.

7. Godlonton Papers. W. K. Hall to Godlonton, 15.9.52.



of the Governor's policy, and his views were possibly more in agreement with those of the frontiersmen at large. He remarked to Godlonton:

Our affairs look to me darker than ever, and, I have seen enough of our present Ruler to cause me to fear that he is not the man to settle our Frontier question...I do not at all like the information published in your last 'Journal' from the Hismble Commissioner. If true then it shows that the Governor is conniving at their thus creeping in among the so-called friendly Kaffirs, and thus shows that he is anxious to patch up things. If false then it proves that these friendly chiefs are not to be depended on, for they must have some scheme in their heads thus to deceive us, and lull us into security.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was upon feelings such as these that Godlonton could play, in attempting to coerce the Governor into the formulation of a frontier system which would meet the demands of the colonists. The patience of the frontiersmen, who had suffered enough in three Kaffir wars, had almost reached the end of its tether, and there was nothing of which they had a greater dread than the conclusion of a peace which would provide no more than a temporary absence of depredations. Security both of life and of property had by now become an obsession with the settlers, who were determined to secure it by fair means or foul. In January 1852, no less than three of Godlonton's correspondents had expressed a fear that Sir Harry would conclude peace before the Kaffirs had been crushed: William Southey wrote:

I am seriously afraid the Kafirs wont continue the war now they find us too strong for them. Six months more will ruin them completely.<sup>(2)</sup>

John Ayliff was anxious to avoid "a too expeditious and consequently ephemeral a peace being concluded, while the real object to be desired, is not so much, to end this war as to prevent all future ones."<sup>(3)</sup>; and the Rev. Henry Calderwood urged Godlonton, "if it be not too late you should strain every nerve to prevent a hollow peace.... Any peace is a farce that leaves one Gaika Chief on this side the Kei

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. J.C. Warner to Gdolonton, 5.8.52.
  2. Godlonton Papers. W.Southey to Godlonton, 24.1.52.
  3. Godlonton Papers. J.Ayliff to Godlonton, 27.1.52. Ayliff had been Kaffir interpreter to the High Commissioner in King William's Town since 1849. Vide GTJ. 23.6.49.



or any large number of the people. It is the Amatola and Keiskamma range of mountains that give the Gaikas power..."<sup>(1)</sup>

And in the following month, Southey wrote in a postscript to one of his letters to Godlonton: "The Curries, Bowkers and all of us fear Sir Harry will make too hasty a peace." The fear had become so deep-rooted that Holden Bowker, added Southey, "mentions his intention of resigning his command at Whittlesea, for the express purpose of mastering a burgher force in the Colony - to finish the war, or rather to help to do it effectively."<sup>(2)</sup>

These fears had, it is true, been drowned by the wave of optimism created by the arrival of Cathcart,<sup>(3)</sup> but, linked as they were with a long-standing suspicion of the good faith of the neighbouring Ndhlabes, they could easily re-appear. Southey's letter of 5th February showed that the colonists had become suspicious of all professedly "friendly" tribes - and also of those who ventured to defend them as such. He quoted a sarcastic extract from a letter of Holden Bowker to his brother Octavius:

He says 'The Commando did not get many Tambookie cattle; most of them had been driven amongst the friendly tribes of Nonese and Faku!! I did not know we had any friendly Tribes in Tambookieland. Our Commando left the Bashee full of cattle because they could not drive any more, and were tired. The friendly Tambookies stole lots of horses out of our peoples camp (forty) amongst them Captn. Tyldens five, yet they passed off for friendly between Tylden, Somerset, and Mackinnon! These friendly chief dodges play the devil with us.'<sup>(4)</sup>

By the second half of 1852 - as evidenced by the letter of Warner and the editorials of Godlonton - this fear had returned. Godlonton gave an exposition of the general principles

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. H. Calderwood to Godlonton, 30.1.52.
  2. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 6.2.52.
  3. Throughout the war, the frontiersmen had expressed the hope that this would be a war to end war on the frontier, and that, above all, a "hollow" peace would be avoided: vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers, Calderwood to Godlonton, 2.1.51; P.R. Marillier to Godlonton, 19.5.51.
  4. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 6.2.52.



upon which a peace should be based:

They (i.e. the colonists) have no vindictive feelings to gratify; but they are nevertheless keenly alive to the importance of not closing the present contest until satisfactory securities are obtained that it shall not be renewed. No concession to the natives will conduce to this. They should be taught unmistakably that war is a stupendous evil, and they must be made to feel its scourge, in order to convince them that aggression on the colony places in jeopardy their own best interests. Any relaxation in the attainment of this object will frustrate the designs of the British government, and be ruinous to the future interests of the people of this province.<sup>(1)</sup>

Though the frontier papers continued to assure the Governor of their confidence in him,<sup>(2)</sup> Cathcart was very sensitive to any criticism. As early as June 1852, he had written, in a private letter from Fort Beaufort:

You will read all about me, and I will not waste time in repeating what you may see in print. If they abuse me, do not believe them; for I mean to do my best, and you know I am honest and well-meaning. I care not for public opinion<sup>(3)</sup> or popularity so long as I am satisfied with my own actions.

In writing this, Cathcart doubtless had in mind the severity of the press attacks upon his predecessor; towards the end of the year, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he seems to have thought it necessary to justify his policy. He declared that the conduct of the Ndhlambe chiefs continued to be entirely satisfactory, that Umhala was now above suspicion, and that he had every faith in the competence and experience of Maclean to deal with the fugitive Gaikas. He added:

It is necessary that I should dwell on this subject more than I should otherwise have done, because there are certain persons within the colony who maintain that I shall have done nothing effectually unless I root out, or hunt out, every member who formerly may have belonged to the Gaika tribe, but who may have found a temporary shelter with his relations in the T'Slambie districts. The people who advocate these impracticable notions I had hitherto considered to be confined to those who have largely gained by the war, and who would not be sorry if their sources of income should be extended by the commencement of another Kafir war, which the irritation occasioned by an attempt to hunt out these refugees among our present friends the T'Slambies would

---

1. GTJ 23.10.52.

2. Vide, eg. Colonist, 30.10.52; CFT, 12.10.52; GTJ, 6.11.52; EPH, 10.4.52.

3. Cathcart: Correspondence, pp. 339-40.



inevitably produce. I am not, however, easily diverted from the course which I consider the right one; and I will rather trust to the good faith of the T'Slambie chiefs, who have given me no cause to distrust them, who hold themselves responsible for all who live within their territories, than risk the commencement of a new war, in the pursuit of an object (1) which appears to me equally frivolous, unjust, and impracticable.

Not only Cathcart but also Maclean was angry at the propaganda of the frontier press in egging the Governor on to coerce the Ndhlambe chiefs into a show-down. In December 1852, Maclean wrote in a private letter to Southey:

Mr Godlonton and other sage authorities have for a length of time been goading His Excellency to go to war with Pato, but I trust I fully convinced His Excellency of the ruinous consequences of such a measure. Godlonton is an ass, if we punished Pato for a few outrages committed by Gaikas the Gunkwebi Tribe would devastate lower Albany in less than a month. (2)

Since the frontier press was unusually unanimous on this particular point, (3) it is significant that Maclean should have singled out Godlonton upon whom to vent his displeasure. Either it was that Godlonton was on bad terms with the administration, or that his influence as a journalist gave greater cause for alarm than did that of the other frontier editors.

The frontier papers were also afraid that Cathcart would not punish Kreli severely enough. Godlonton gave great prominence to the expedition by publishing lengthy reports of it, (4) but, like the Frontier Times, (5) he expressed his surprise at the rapidity with which the expedition returned and his disappointment that the recalcitrant Gaika chief had not been more thoroughly trounced. And in February 1853, when Kreli sued for peace, Godlonton was loath to be at all generous. He maintained that two serious mistakes had already been made in dealing with Kreli: the first was the abandonment

1. P.F. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Cathcart to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14.11.52.

3. Vide, e.g. CFT. 6.4.52: "...Umbala and his people should be expelled over the Kei, along with the openly hostile tribes.." GRH. 29.9.52.

2. GH. 8/23. Maclean to Southey, 11.12.52. I am indebted to Mr A.K. Fryer for drawing my attention to this passage.

4. GTJ. 31.8.52. etc.

5. CFT. 31.8.52.



of Butterworth by Sir Harry Smith at the very moment of victory, an action which had been followed by the destruction of the station and the addition of some seven thousand fugitive Fingoes to the already over-crowded locations on the colonial border; the second blunder was the non-enforcement of the demand of fifteen hundred head of cattle, and the absence of any demand for the handing over of the rebel Hottentots who had found shelter in the Galeka country. And Godlonton added, "with respect to the professions of Kreli, we at once state that we have no faith in them whatever."<sup>(1)</sup> The Frontier Times similarly expatiated upon the folly of Cathcart's leniency towards Kreli whom, it stated, had not been punished.<sup>(2)</sup> The frontiersmen had good cause to think that Kreli was the instigator of much of the trouble on the frontier, and they dreaded the prospect of another war which might well result from his once again escaping from their clutches.

Other aspects of Cathcart's policy also came under fire from the frontier press. In December 1852, the Frontier Times criticised Cathcart's peace with the Tambookies;<sup>(3)</sup> the Tambookies, declared Franklin, had made unprovoked attacks upon the colony, yet now when it was possible to exact a fine for their disloyalty, the Governor had given them peace instead:

"Such," he reflected bitterly, "has invariably been the unfortunate result of all our peace makings with the native tribes in this country. They have never yet been conquered..."<sup>(4)</sup>

The success of Cathcart's expedition against Moshesh in the last two months of 1852<sup>(5)</sup> was also the subject of much controversy. Moshesh had for long been a thorn in the flesh

---

1. GTJ. 19.2.53.

2. CFT. 22.2.53

3. GTJ. 27.11.52.

4. CFT. 6.12.52

5. Fortescue: History of the British Army, XII, p 557



(1) of the Cape Governors, and there can be little doubt that the colonists looked forward to his defeat and humiliation. Cathcart himself regarded a satisfactory agreement with the Basuto chief as a sine qua non for the maintenance of his frontier settlement. (2) Once again, he disappointed the colonists. Having obtained Moshesh's submission, he returned to the colony, in order to force a peace upon Kreli and the Gaikas. The Colonist stated that Moshesh had been well punished, and that Cathcart had wisely abstained from carrying aggression any further; (3) the Frontier Times (4) and the Journal, along with other frontier papers, (5) expressed their disapproval of the Governor's failure to fulfil their expectations. Godlonton wrote:

His Excellency the Governor, in his reply to the Smithfield address, has accounted for this on the plausible ground that a forward movement on his part would have involved the country in a fresh war, and ultimately have left the inhabitants in a worse position than that in which they now are. Well-informed men do not concur in this opinion, nor admit the force of the reasoning on which it is founded.... They hold, that having entered into a quarrel with the Basuto chief, every fraction of the penalty demanded of him should have been inflexibly enforced.... (6)

1. Vide, e.g., AOC. 611/4. Smith to Southey, 1.9.51: "Nor do the Missionaries state that Moshesh has been interfering with Kreli and Sandile encouraging Morosi and the Tambookies in war etc..."; Wilmot and Chase: History of the Cape Colony, p. 451: "Moshesh..was evidently watching the proverbial 'way the cat jumps' in the Colony, from whence he boasted, 'I receive my reports every week'..."
2. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1635). Cathcart to Pakington, 29.11.52: "The result of my settlement with Moshesh will materially influence the terms on which I can re-establish peace on this particular part of the border, and which I therefore necessarily defer till that is decided..."
3. Colonist. 8.1.53; 15.1.53.
4. CTJ. 18.1.53. Franklin declared that Cathcart's expedition would probably result in his recall and in the abandonment of the Sovereignty.
5. e.g. GRH. 12.1.53.
6. CTJ. 15.1.53. In the same month, Godlonton had written, in a letter to Southey: "That the Governor got the worst of it, all seem to be agreed. But the backing out is worse than the fight, though perhaps it was as well the hornet's nest should be stirred, or we should hardly have been aware of the extent of the danger at our very doors. Hitherto the Governor has treated the war with remarkable sang froid. He is now awakened from his dream - and you may depend on it found himself on awaking in such a fix as he never was in before in his life ... The whole affair is what may be called a Mess and excites a strong desire to be in Australia or anywhere else rather than in South Africa.." (Quoted by Du Toit: op.cit. p.134)



And by the end of January 1853, the Colonist had come round to the views of Godlonton and Franklin.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1853 Cathcart attempted to consolidate his achievements of the previous year, and to use them as a basis for his frontier settlement. His final settlement was somewhat different from what he had originally planned: on his arrival, he had intended to expel the rebellious tribes across the Kei, but he had soon found that this plan, as well as some of his others, was impracticable.<sup>(2)</sup> On March 2nd, 1853, the Royal mercy and pardon were extended to Sandile and the Gaikas, who had surrendered,<sup>and</sup> Cathcart informed them that they would never be allowed to re-occupy the Amatolas, which were now converted into a "Royal Reserve."<sup>(3)</sup> Fingoes would be allowed to settle in this territory under a Superintendent subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria, and Europeans could be granted erven in the neighbourhood of the villages, which were to act as military posts for preventing the Gaikas from re-entering the territory. The first of the new military villages was that at Keiskamma Hoek, where the allocation of erven was announced in February 1853.<sup>(4)</sup>

Uithaolder's band was dispersed,<sup>(5)</sup> and the rebellious Gaika chiefs were moved into the area between the Crown Reserve and the Kei. After the Battle of Berea, Cathcart was determined to bring an end to hostilities in South Africa, and thus did not carry out his original plan of expelling the Gaikas into Kreli's country across the Kei. Yet the Crown Reserve, as well as the loyal Ndhlabes under Toise, would serve as a barrier between them and the colony.<sup>(6)</sup> By the end

1. e.g. Colonist. 29.1.52. The Berea campaign, it stated, had not been so successful after all.

2. A.E. du Toit: op cit. p 126

3. Cory: op cit. p 487.

4. Du Toit: op cit. p 141.

5. Ibid. p 132.

6. Ibid. p 135. Vide Cathcart's Correspondence, p 291. Cathcart explained this change in his policy to Sir George Clerk: "Subsequent events and the policy which, on mature consideration and improved experience, appeared to me the only one to be adopted, viz. that the Gaikas, although dispossessed of their lands, had not been and could not be 'eaten up' and that some 30,000 vagrant souls expelled from their homes, if we desired peace, must be settled in some recognised location, and reduced to organisation and control."



of 1853, Cathcart had recognised and restored the authority of the Gaika chiefs among their tribes, as he had come to realise the strength of tribal attachment and allegiance to the chief.<sup>(1)</sup> As a further buffer against the Gaikas, the chiefs who had remained loyal and assisted the Government during the war were located along the east bank of the Keiskamma river; Kama and the Gunukwebis were settled in the vicinity of the present Middle Drift, while to the south, Simani and Umkye held all the land as far as the coast.<sup>(2)</sup> The friendly Pato and Umhala retained a strip of territory forty miles wide, lying between the Kei and Keiskamma.

The Tambookie country underwent the most far-reaching changes. In November 1852, Cathcart had proclaimed the forfeiture of the territory of the late Tambookie chief, Mapassa, and appointed a Land Commission to report on T. H. Bowker's 'Plan for the Settlement of the Waste Lands along the North-Eastern Frontier.' Cathcart then decided to grant farms on quitrent instead of auctioning the land, as he was determined to root out the notorious tactics of land-speculators who for so long had controlled large and uninhabited tracts of the frontier without the slightest intention of ever using the land.<sup>(3)</sup> Cathcart offered farms of 3000 acres on condition of personal occupation and of performing burgher military duties; and the applications poured in.<sup>(4)</sup> By April 1853, almost two hundred farms had been granted, and the village of Queenstown had been established in the new district.<sup>(5)</sup> By September of the same year, the new town already had a resident magistrate.<sup>(6)</sup>

The Kat River Settlement, as a missionary settlement, came to an end, and the Governor appointed a special Commission

---

1. Du Toit: op cit. p 146

2. Cory: op cit. pp 485-7

3. Vide, e.g. Cory: op cit. pp 488-9.

4. Cathcart: Correspondence, p 159

5. P.P. 1854-5 XXXVIII. Cathcart to Newcastle, 14.4.53.

6. GTJ. 10.9.53. For an account of the early development of Queenstown, vide P.J.Lombard: Die Stigting en Vroeë Geskiedenis van Queenstown (1853-1859).



to report on the practical measures to be adopted in the final settlement of the district. The Commission reported in May 1853 that, out of 509 erf-holders, 83 had left their erven before December, 1850, 159 had actually participated in the rebellion, but the rest were all apparently innocent of treason.<sup>(1)</sup> The lands of the rebels were confiscated and granted to Europeans who, in the course of time, were able to engross all the rest of the land as well.<sup>(2)</sup>

Finally, an important aspect of Cathcart's frontier settlement was the establishment of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police. In 1848, T. H. Bowker had suggested the formation of a Border Police, but Smith had rejected the idea till November 1850 when, on the recommendation of Thomas Stubbs,<sup>(3)</sup> a Rural Police Force had been established.<sup>(4)</sup> This had lapsed during the early stages of the war, but Cathcart had no sooner arrived in the colony than he had realised the necessity for a force of European mounted police for the defence of the frontier districts. He issued a General Order for the formation of a Rural Police of 500 men, and the force eventually became known as the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police. They were placed at the disposal of civil commissioners along the frontier to patrol roads, intercept marauders and protect property. During the war they were paid from Imperial funds, but from April 1853, they became a permanent local police force in the pay of the Colonial Government, and, judging by the improvement in the defence and safety of the frontier districts, seem to have been highly effective.<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Cory: op.cit. pp 489-90; Du Toit: op.cit. pp 136-7

2. Marais: Cape Coloured People, p 245.

3. Thomas Stubbs: MS Reminiscences. He recounts how he had suggested the formation of a Rural Police in a letter to Smith. The latter asked Godlonton to read the letter to those present, and, when all had agreed that it was a good plan, Godlonton had suggested Samuel Loxton as Superintendent, "For what reason I dont (sic) know, without it was, he was a good shaver, at all events he was appointed - and that was all, for I believe the fact was, no one would join him so the thing fell thru."

4. Du Toit: op.cit. p 60

5. Ibid. p 150.



Cathcart's military operations and his peace settlement met with a mixed reception in the colony. Throughout the period of frontier wars, the settlers were hardly given a chance of establishing themselves in their new homes because of the constant need for vigilance against bands of thieving Kaffirs. The striving for the attainment of security of life and property thus came to be the main pre-occupation of the frontiersmen, and it was generally believed that the further the colonial boundary was carried into the territory of the Kaffirs, the more effective would be the safeguards against attack. In November 1852, the Journal praised Cathcart's proposed settlement, especially those features comprised in the expulsion of the Gaikas from the Amatolas and the military nature of the occupation of Kaffraria. (1)

At the beginning of 1853, Godlonton's praise of Cathcart was still unstinted. In a review of the events of 1852, he wrote:

"General Cathcart assumed his high duties in April of the present year, and with singular tact and ability has mastered the details of his position, and applied himself to the task before him with a devotion and earnestness of purpose that give presage of the happiest results. The grand aim of His Excellency is to make this the last Kaffir war - not to apply a palliative to the disease, but to go to the seat of the evil and extirpate it root and branch... (2)

Yet in the same month, he emphasised the absolute necessity for dealing firmly with the Kaffirs, (3) and by March, when Cathcart was starting to put his system into effect, the Journal was beginning to exhibit signs of despair and disappointment. Because the Kaffirs had not been reduced to the abject condition it had been thought, Godlonton said:

We confess our hopes of a satisfactory enduring peace are not over sanguine....At this moment there is not a frontier man that is content, or who does not maintain whether right or wrong, that his interests have been sacrificed. To say, as some have said, and doubtless will say again, that the colonists have a craving for the Kaffir's land is an unfair averment. There may of course be exceptions,

- 
1. GTJ. 6.11.52.
  2. GTJ. 1.1.53
  3. GTJ. 15.1.53.



but what we contend for is, that a people who amidst the distractions of war have sent in one year to the English market six million lbs of fine wool, value £250,000, are not likely to regard any measure with satisfaction, which does not give to them immunity from those disturbances of their peaceful pursuits to which they have been latterly exposed. They claim therefore exemption from barbarian inroads, and having no voice in respect to affairs in British Kaffirland, they hold the government strictly responsible for the peace of that country, and for all the consequences which may accrue from proceedings in which they do not concur...

With his mind on the expected Constitution, he added significantly:

The defence of their own border may ere long depend on themselves, and with this in view, they protest against any measure which goes to make that defence impracticable. Place the disaffected Kaffirs close to the Amatolas, give the Fingoes the Blinkwater and other mountain strongholds, and you sow dragon's teeth, which will in due season spring up a formidable body of armed men. (1)

In his editorial for the same edition, Godlonton showed that his anxiety arose out of the fear that the Governor might propose a settlement which would make concessions to the Kaffirs. The colonists, he declared, regarded "concession" as a "dangerous principle, which they contend must utterly blast their hopes of future security." (2)

Yet, when the information about Cathcart's meeting with the chiefs at King William's Town in March 1853 arrived, Godlonton seems to have modified his opinions. It was evident, he stated, that His Excellency could have carried hostilities further, but without gaining a result any more satisfactory. With regard to the settlement of the Gaikas in Kaffraria, he commented:

An officer of more unyielding temper than General Cathcart would probably have never rested until every Gaika Chief with his followers had been driven across the Kye. But what then - could he have kept them there? ...It should be borne in mind too, that if the Governor has erred, it is on the side of mercy...The permitting, therefore, of these offenders to find a peaceful home under the aegis of the British flag, is an act of grace and favor which will show

---

1. GPJ. 5.3.53.

2. GPJ. 5.3.53. Calderwood had told Godlonton, right at the beginning of the war, that he had recommended that the Gaikas should be forever expelled from the Amatolas, and there is little doubt that Godlonton agreed with him. (Godlonton Papers. Calderwood to Godlonton, 8.1.51.)



better than a multitude of professions that no feeling of vindictiveness is indulged towards them....<sup>(1)</sup>

It is not easy to reconcile these views with Godlonton's earlier opinions on the necessity for the expulsion of the Gaikas beyond the Kei; it is possible, though, that he regarded their new location as far enough removed from the colonial boundary, and adequately guarded by the intervening tribes and the Crown Reserve. Godlonton praised Cathcart's announcement that no Hottentot would be allowed to reside in the Gaika territory without permission, and approved of the fact that a European village was to be formed at the Blinkwater.<sup>(2)</sup>

Cathcart's settlement of the Gaikas met with a far more hostile reception from the Colonist. In January, it had stated that many were only awaiting the announcement of Cathcart's proposed frontier settlement before deciding whether to remain on the frontier or to emigrate,<sup>(3)</sup> and in the following month, it had denounced the peace settlement as "a Downing-street peace" designed merely to relieve the constant drain upon the British Treasury.<sup>(4)</sup> Like the Journal, the Colonist maintained that it was imperative that the colonists should have some say in the peace settlement, as they would have to fend for themselves when once the Constitution had been introduced.<sup>(5)</sup> After Cathcart's meeting with the chiefs, the Colonist, unlike the Journal, expressed its painful disillusionment with a peace which it declared, would last only so long as the Kaffirs found it convenient to respect it.<sup>(6)</sup> The Frontier Times similarly denounced the peace as "hollow" and "treacherous",<sup>(7)</sup> and suggested that a Commission should be appointed to investigate the circumstances out of which Kaffir

- 
1. GTJ. Extra. 8.3.53.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Colonist. 29.1.53.
  4. Colonist. 26.2.53.
  5. Colonist. 5.3.53.
  6. Colonist. 12.3.52.
  7. OFT. 8.3.53.



(1)  
wars arose. The tone of these two papers contrasted markedly with that of the Journal.

Shortly after Cathcart's meeting with the Chiefs, Godlonton outlined the requisites for the maintenance of peace on the frontier: nothing was said about the Governor's decision as to the fate of the Gaikas, but emphasis was laid on the necessity for disallowing any exclusively coloured communities to settle on or near the frontier, or in the colony; the laws against squatting and the gunpowder trade should be stringent; kaffirs, Hottentots and Fingoes were to be prohibited from crossing the frontier in either direction without express permission, and traders were to obtain permits before entering Kaffirland. A police force should patrol the frontier regularly and systematically, and all able-bodied men were to be liable to be called out for service when needed. Finally, he declared that the Eastern Province should insist upon its own local government, which alone could cope with the requirements of interminable frontier warfare. (2)

It was probably the foundation of Queenstown and the conditions upon which land was granted in the new district north of the Amatolas that finally reconciled Godlonton to Cathcart's location of the Gaikas in Kaffraria. This was one of the most popular aspects of Cathcart's frontier settlement. The Colonist had supported the plan from the outset, (3) and had approved heartily of the Governor's plan for preventing the lands from falling into the clutches of land-jobbers, (4) while the Frontier Times listed this act as one of the factors which made the prospects of peace in 1853 far better than they had been at the end of either of the two previous wars. (5)

- 
1. CPT. 26.4.53. Contrast BPN 15.3.53; 26.4.53; 15.11.53 which defended Cathcart's settlement throughout.
  2. GTJ. 12.3.53.
  3. Colonist. 11.12.52.
  4. Colonist. 12.3.53.
  5. CPT. 27.12.53.



In March 1853, Godlonton said that the establishment of Queenstown as the nucleus of an armed and organised population along the north-eastern border would prove of "incalculable importance" in the defence of the colony.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the question of the fate of the Orange River Sovereignty, the frontier press was quite outspoken.<sup>(2)</sup> Major Hogge had, before his death in June 1852, advised the retention of the area, from which it would have been impossible for Britain to withdraw with safety or with honour;<sup>(3)</sup> but in March 1853, after Cathcart's Berea campaign, the British Government, influenced by a less sympathetic public opinion, determined to withdraw from the territory, and Sir George Clerk was sent out to effect the withdrawal.<sup>(4)</sup> When the frontiersmen eventually came to hear about this decision, they were beside themselves with rage. Godlonton was extremely concerned: he had always done his best to suppress any information reflecting unfavourably on the relations between blacks and whites in the area;<sup>(5)</sup> as early as December 1851, he had expressed his concern at the rumoured intention of Britain to abandon the Sovereignty,<sup>(6)</sup> and during 1852 had characterised any attempt by Britain to withdraw from her colonial commitments as a dishonourable motive on the part of the Mother Country.<sup>(7)</sup> In 1853, as the prospects of abandonment loomed larger, he maintained that Britain could not

---

1. GTJ. 26.3.53.

2. Br. Settlers. 27.12.51; GFT. 7.2.54; EPN. 5.7.53; GRC 27.8.53. GRH. 4.3.54.

3. Du Toit: op cit. p 122.

4. Du Toit: op cit. pp 124 and 136.

5. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers, Thomas White to Godlonton, 2.6.51 Referring to a letter in the Cape Town papers on the grievances of the native tribes in the Sovereignty, he added: "It is calculated to do a great deal of mischief to the Sovereignty if put in the hands of Stockenström and Rairbairn."

6. GTJ. 20.12.51. Cf. Godlonton Papers, Thomas White to Godlonton, 29.12.51, in which White dwells upon the concern of the landholders and traders at the possible abandonment.

7. GTJ. 31.7.52.



honourably abandon her colonial responsibilities,<sup>(1)</sup> and by the latter half of the year, he was devoting a considerable amount of his editorial space to the fatal effects of such a policy. In August, Newcastle's despatch to Cathcart about the intended withdrawal of the British forces from the Cape was printed, and in September, Godlonton wrote:

The British nation has a great mission in this country; an immense responsibility rests upon it, and this responsibility cannot be cast off or neglected, save at imminent hazard. It is absolute dishonour to shrink from it, nor can the attempt be made without entailing adequate punishment. The moral regeneration of the world must be accomplished, not by miracle, but by human agency, and we may be assured that those who put their hands to the plough and draw back, (2) will become obnoxious to the penalty of unfaithful Stewards.

Besides appealing to the pride of the British nation, Godlonton pointed out that it was in Britain's own interest to retain possession of the territory: if the troops were not stationed in Bloemfontein, he said, they would be in some other part of the Empire, so that the question of expense did not arise. It was equally futile to argue that the possession of the Sovereignty was expensive as a result of the conflicts with the Kaffirs, because these could not be avoided. Finally, he declared, the maintenance of the garrison in the Sovereignty not only stimulated the prosperity of that region, but increased the production of wool for Britain's own industries.<sup>(3)</sup> He called upon the colonists to demonstrate to the Home government the peril of the measure which it contemplated.<sup>(4)</sup>

In July 1853, Clerk left the frontier for the Sovereignty, and in February 1854, he signed the Bloemfontein Convention and abandoned the Sovereignty.<sup>(5)</sup> A spate of condemnatory articles issued from the frontier press. Godlonton complained that the proceedings of the Commissioners were "unconstitutional!"

---

1. GTJ. 23.4.53. Vide also GTJ. 30.7.53.

2. GTJ. 3.9.53.

3. Ibid.

4. Cp. also GTJ. 3.9.53; 10.9.53; 24.9.53; 1.10.53; 19.11.53; 11.2.54.

5. GTJ. 25.3.54.



The law has been set aside; property has been tampered with; private interests have been sacrificed; the Institutions of the country suppressed, and British territory has been ceded to men whose sole recommendation is their notorious disaffection to the British government. Well may the loyal men of Smithfield put forth their PROTEST against this monstrous act of folly and injustice, and well may the whole colony raise its voice against an act of despotic power, which, if not resisted, may serve as a precedent for their own undoing. If that act of abandonment should be ratified, then it is in fact the first blow at Monarchical government in the British realms, the first step towards splitting it into Republican States. If the abandonment of the Sovereignty be confirmed, then why may not the abandonment of the Eastern Province follow?."

The abandonment was he said, little less than "a gross political blunder."<sup>(1)</sup>

In the following issues, Godlonton drew attention to other sinister aspects of the abandonment: the desire for colonisation had become a passion among the French who might easily take possession of the territory if the British Government confirmed what Clerk had done.<sup>(2)</sup> Another argument against the abandonment was that it would cripple the <sup>re</sup>sources of South Africa, since the pastoral pursuits of the colonists made expansion necessary.<sup>(3)</sup> He again emphasised the value of the wool produced in the territory, which, he said, could provide for the employment of thousands of English artisans.<sup>(4)</sup> It was both commercially and politically a short-sighted policy.

Godlonton tried to rouse the frontiersmen to agitate against the abandonment: he re-printed the petition drawn up by Cape Town against the ratification of Clerk's action, and declared that it did the people of Cape Town great honour:

What, we ask, is Graham's Town doing to second this well-timed movement?<sup>(5)</sup>

Nothing seems to have come of his suggestion. Perhaps the average frontiersman did not feel quite so strongly on the subject as did Godlonton, who not only had a printing

---

1. GTJ. 11.3.54.

2. GTJ, 18.3.54.

3. GTJ. 18.3.54.

4. GTJ. 25.3.54. Vide also GTJ. 1.4.54; 29.4.54.

5. GTJ. 25.3.54.



establishment in Bloemfontein, but whose family, soon realising the value of the territory, <sup>(1)</sup> had also been taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the opening up of a new territory for land speculation. <sup>(2)</sup> So much did Godlonton fear the consequences of the abandonment of the Sovereignty that in 1854, he himself withdrew from the Friend of the Sovereignty which Godlonton and White with the help of Thomas White had established only four years before. <sup>(3)</sup>

The Frontier Times had criticised Lord Grey's suggestion about the withdrawal of Britain from the Sovereignty, as early as May 1852; <sup>(4)</sup> and in 1854, when Clerk had signed the Bloemfontein Convention, Franklin said that Britain's proceedings in the Sovereignty would always be regarded as a disgraceful chapter in British colonial history. <sup>(5)</sup> The Colonist likewise maintained that Britain had an obligation to the Sovereignty, <sup>(6)</sup> and censured the "disgraceful utilitarianism" of the London Times in saying that the Sovereignty should be abandoned because of the expense it entailed. <sup>(7)</sup>

1. Cory Collection. MS. 7089. Thomas White to R. White, 13.4.50: "This is a beautiful country - it only wants filling up with English farmers.."; ibid. MS. 7090. T. White to R. White, 18.4.50: "...landed property has risen three or four hundred p. cent in a twelve month; - And there are a great number of farmers coming here from the Colony.."; Godlonton Papers, C.B. Halse to Godlonton, 28.4.50.
2. Vide E.J. Barnard: 'n Lewensbeskrywing van Majoor Henry Douglas Warden, pp 354-5: "Ongelukkig was Thos. White, die bestuurder, sowel as die eienaars, hals oor kop in grond-spekulasies gewikkel. Bowendien het die koerant as 'n mond-stuk gedien van handelsbelange, wat heel dikwels met administratiewe aangeleenthede, wat deur Warden verteenwoordig is, gebots het.." No source is quoted, but ACC 611/3 Godlonton to Southey, 24.6.50: "My nephew is not yet down from Bloem F. but is expected. He has purchased some four or five of the Harrismith farms - What kind of country is this?.." Vide also Cory Collection. MS. 7094. R. White to Godlonton, 27.5.50: "...Do not mention the price of the Vaal River farms to anyone in Graham's Town, as most probably some of the merchants will be writing up to some parties to buy for them.." ibid MS. 7095. R. White to Godlonton, 3.6.50: "...P.S. I have just seen Bester (i.e. Magistrate of Harrismith), and have purchased the following farms... Bester says there are not finer farms in the colony..."
3. There was also the fact that the paper had fallen under the control of a Mr Grant, and had become unpopular with the authorities through its support of Moshesh and the disaffected Boers. (Godlonton Papers. T.J. Biddulph to Godlonton, 15.1.52)
4. CPT. 11.5.52.
5. CPT. 7.2.54.
6. Colonist. 30.4.53.
7. Colonist. 22.10.53.



Cathcart was very sensitive to the general criticism of his measures. In his correspondence, he railed against his critics as "a set of covetous profligate, unscrupulous land-jobbers of colonists" who had expected him "to use the Queen's troops, not in support of justice, but to aid and abet, and support them in injustice and rapacity."<sup>(1)</sup> In March 1853, he referred to the "abuse and ingratitude" of the Cape papers, and ascribed this to the fact that he had brought an end to the large profits which speculators had been used to making out of the wars. "I am heartily disgusted and sick of these mean, dishonest people;" he declared. "The Kaffir is much the finer race of the two."<sup>(2)</sup>

With regard to the frontier press, he wrote:

It has long been the custom here for newspaper scribes to run down their Governor, and prepare the most false and scurrilous articles for exportation at Cape Town, just in time for the departure of the packet, so that it may serve to gull the British public as 'the latest news from the Cape;' and as I am 700 miles from the point of departure, and know not when the packet may sail, they have much the start of me. There is a Latin saying, however, which consoles me -

'Magna est veritas et prevalebit;'

for although the true state of things is communicated by me to Ministers, the public do not seem to benefit.<sup>(3)</sup>

And with regard to the abandonment of the Sovereignty, he wrote:

You must not mind the open-mouthed clamour of the Cape press about giving up the Sovereignty. They are all interested; for the Sovereignty was to them - the English speculators - a great gaming-table, and, moreover, out of the reach of the police. Outlaws for debt in the colony are great land speculators in the Sovereignty; and the mortgagers in the colony, particularly at Cape Town, Graham's Town and Port Elizabeth, say they have £50,000 at stake. No doubt a slice of the desert is good security for a bad debt. The Dutchman has no newspaper, and has not had time to open his mouth yet; but he is not of the same way of thinking.<sup>(4)</sup>

The news of Cathcart's annoyance spread, and in November 1853, Godlonton stated that, because he had heard that the

---

1. Cathcart: Correspondence. p 347. Private letter, 10.2.53.

2. Ibid. p 349. Private letter, 14.3.53.

3. Ibid. p.366. Cathcart to Sir Charles Trevelyan, 14.4.53.

4. Ibid. p.376. Cathcart to Sir Charles Trevelyan, 18.9.53.



Governor was disappointed at the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Journal towards his frontier settlement, he would like to make known his conviction

....that Sir G. Cathcart has done more towards securing the safety of the Colony, and advancing the prosperity of this Province, than has ever been done by any of his predecessors. Acting upon his own convictions, he has set aside all ulterior considerations and has gone straight forward to the attainment of his object, whilst with a singleness of purpose, and on unwavering confidence in the honesty of his own intentions, he has laid down a system of border policy, which (1) cannot be too highly appreciated, or too decisively commended.

This eulogy must have been cynically accepted by Cathcart, for he continued to treat the colonists with aristocratic disdain. At the beginning of 1854, a resolution was adopted at a Grahamstown public meeting, thanking the Governor for the comprehensive measures he had adopted for the defence of the colony: (2) Cathcart enclosed a copy of this address in one of his private letters, with the remark:

These people have not been over civil to me at times; but you will see I do not coax them round, or let them think I value their opinion. (3)

And, in reply to a Grahamstown address, expressing appreciation of his good services to the Colony and regret at his departure, he remarked:

During the progress of events, I have not courted your praise, or been deterred from my conscientious line of conduct by occasional doubts or impatience; and we have not been much in the habit of complimenting each other. (4)

Perhaps the settlers felt that Cathcart's irritation was not altogether unwarranted. In 1856, when his correspondence was published, the Frontier Times, though deprecating Cathcart's severity towards the colonists and the frontier

---

1. GTJ. 12.11.53.

2. GTJ. 7.1.54.

3. Cathcart: Correspondence, p 357. Private letter, 15.1.54

4. Ibid. p 280. Vide Du Toit: op cit. pp 138-9, where he quotes a despatch of Cathcart to Newcastle in April 1853, lashing out at the "malignant agency arising chiefly from the undue influence of a depraved Press on an ignorant people." In a despatch of the following month, Cathcart spoke scathingly about the few Grahamstown newspapers which, though professing to represent the views of the Eastern Districts, actually expressed the sentiments only of a small faction.



press, did not altogether deny his accusations. With reference to Cathcart's remarks about the "lies" of the press Franklin wrote:

It is true that once, or twice perhaps (we only recollect on one occasion), some report was published on the strength of a private letter from the spot, which turned out not to be accurate, and it was afterwards contradicted. Everybody knows how difficult it is at a time of danger and alarm to separate fact from fiction; but we venture to say that there is no press in the whole world where more pains are taken to ascertain the truth of a report prior to its publication than by the Graham's Town press...(1)

Though Godlonton could not have regarded Cathcart's measures as in every way satisfactory, he seems to have supported them because they gave great promise of forming the basis of a constructive frontier policy. In December 1853, he praised the attitude of the Dutch towards the kaffirs. He wrote:

The Dutch inhabitants in the colony manage these matters better than the English; and the secret of their success is to be sought for in the simple fact that they discard everything like theory in their intercourse with the natives, and act firmly in their dealings with them on principle of common sense.(2)

Such principles could be seen in the working out of Cathcart's measures. He had dealt firmly with the Kaffirs, and that, in Godlonton's estimation, was sufficient enough a recommendation for any Governor. In particular, Godlonton had praised the boldness of Cathcart in setting aside the old government land regulations, as by doing so, "a living cordon of hardy practical frontier men" had been established.(3) His arrangements in the Kat River Settlement and on the Tambookie frontier earned Godlonton's hearty commendation: the former had for long been Godlonton's bugbear, while the latter was not only a necessary protection for the already flourishing wool farms of the Eastern Districts, but had the added advantages of commanding the line of communication down the Kei to the sea, of providing a link between Kaffraria and

---

1. OPT. 21.10.56  
2. GTJ. 3.12.53.  
3. GTJ. 12.11.53.



the prosperous districts of Albert and the Sovereignty, and of possessing the key to the fastnesses of the Kat and Amatola ranges. (1)

When at the end of 1854, Godlonton came to review the governorship of Cathcart, he could find only three faults: his refusal to prohibit the belligerent Gaikas from settling among the "friendly" tribes during the later stages of the war, the ineffectiveness of the Berea campaign, and the disastrous abandonment of the Sovereignty. (2) Of these, the third was for Godlonton undoubtedly the most serious, but that could quite easily be blamed upon the Colonial Office, to which he was always hostile. Newcastle's announcement in mid-1853 that Britain intended to reduce her military forces at the Cape to four thousand men, and that the posts in British Kaffraria would be delivered up to the colonial authorities at the end of 1854, (3) was greeted with scorn by Godlonton:

For the last twenty years, the Home government have been teaching the natives the art of war and arming them to wage it with success against the white inhabitants. The results of all this not being quite so satisfactory as was anticipated - the experiment having in fact proved a perfect failure - the responsibility is now proposed to be shifted to the shoulders of the Colonists, who are pleasantly enjoined to deal tenderly with their tormentors. (4)

In April 1854, he again criticised the Home Government for having to abandon the Sovereignty because it had turned a deaf ear to the suggestions of the more experienced colonists. (5) and in June, he deplored the deleterious consequences of the ill-advised removal of Cathcart before he had even had a chance to put his system into force. (6)

It was strange, as one editor said, that Godlonton should have lent his support to all of Cathcart's measures, for some, such as his regulations for the kraaling of the colonists'

---

1. Wilnot and Chase: History of Cape Colony, p 475.

2. GTJ. 30.12.54.

3. Vide. GTJ. 13.8.53.

4. GTJ. 20.8.53.

5. GTJ. 29.4.54.

6. GTJ. 3.6.54.



cattle, were the same as those advocated long ago by Stockenström and criticised so fiercely by Godlonton.<sup>(1)</sup>

Yet he regarded both the methods and the system of Cathcart as sound, and declared approvingly:

GENERAL CATHCART entered upon his duty with that single-ness of purpose for which he is distinguished. With an entire abnegation of self, he did not waste his time in Cape Town, but at once placed himself in the midst of the disturbed elements with which he had to deal, and he never quitted the spot until he had moulded them into something like order. Unostentatious, but firm, he pursued the even tenor of his way, overcame the difficulties which lay in his path, and constructed in outline such a scheme, as if carefully preserved, and the details efficiently filled in, cannot fail, ultimately of producing all those good effects which have been predicted of it.<sup>(2)</sup>

Godlonton's panegyrics continued for long after Cathcart had left the country<sup>(3)</sup> - which tends to suggest that he had recognised his scheme as of real value.

The Frontier Times, though it was more trenchant in its criticisms of Cathcart than was the Journal, expressed its approval of his system, and urged the colonists to give it their full support.<sup>(4)</sup> At the end of 1853, the Colonist asserted that the only bad feature of Cathcart's governorship was the abandonment of the Sovereignty,<sup>(5)</sup> and in May 1854, it joined with the Frontier Times in expressing disappointment at the departure of Cathcart,<sup>(6)</sup> and added that the only weak point it could discover in Cathcart's plan of border defence was that it required a larger population than was then available, in order to be really effective in the case of another outbreak.

Indeed, by the time Cathcart left the Cape, Godlonton and his other supporters seem to have been successful in whipping up a good deal of support for him. About the time

---

1. GRC. 21.5.53.

2. GTJ. 30.12.54.

3. e.g. GTJ. 30.12.54; 12.1.56.

4. CFT. 22.2.53.

5. Colonist. 31.12.53.

6. CFT. 18.4.54. The Colonist, 6.5.54. wrote: "Never perhaps, in the existence of the colony has there been a Governor who has won for himself such golden opinions from all classes as Sir George Cathcart during the brief period of his government."



of the Legislative Council elections at the beginning of 1854, Stringfellow informed Godlonton that "Things are looking better, and confidence is gaining strength, particularly among the Dutch, and these even if not philosophers, have good reasoning faculties, and sound common sense."<sup>(1)</sup>

Much the same could have been said of the frontiersmen generally: as farmers and business men, they had a practical and realistic approach to the frontier problem, and were quick to support the measures of a man who based his policy on principles of utility and common sense. The Colonist, in July 1853, said that Cathcart had changed the colonial boundary to one "more solid" and "natural",<sup>(2)</sup> and Captain Hall was probably not the only one to admire "the prompt way he does everything."<sup>(3)</sup> The people of Fort Beaufort were pleased at the revival of business when the town was made the military headquarters,<sup>(4)</sup> and at the time of his departure the Frontier Times paid a special tribute to his recommendations about the establishment of local institutions in the Eastern Province.<sup>(5)</sup>

Though mainly military and defensive in nature, Cathcart's system was constructive in that it paved the way for the introduction of the more comprehensive system of Sir George Grey. It is interesting to observe that, however unpopular his policy had been from time to time, the papers had always credited Cathcart with good intentions.<sup>(6)</sup> His conscientious approach to his duties, and his earnest and well-meaning disposition seem to have convinced the colonists of his determination to make the best of a bad job. Above all,

---

1. Godlonton Papers. T. Stringfellow to Godlonton. (Undated, but "1853" noted by Godlonton).

2. Colonist. 9.7.53

3. Godlonton Papers. W.K. Hall to Godlonton, 15.9.52.

4. Godlonton Papers. John Ayliff to Godlonton, 28.5.52.

5. CFT. 18.4.54.

6. Even the Frontier Times at its fiercest. Vide, e.g. CFT. 3.8.52; 19.10.52; 8.3.53.



they had come to believe that he had steered clear of the conclusion of a "hollow" peace. When, in the early months of 1854, the Secretary for the Colonies eventually complied with his repeated requests to be recalled,<sup>(1)</sup> he left the colony with the reputation of being the most popular Governor the colonists had yet known.

Godlonton's narrative of the 1850 war was never completed. In September 1852, the twelfth and final instalment was published,<sup>(2)</sup> taking the narrative only as far as April 1851, and thus not including any chapters on the Cathcart administration. By the time the last instalment appeared, though, the problems arising out of the war were changing. Since an early stage of the rebellion, Godlonton's correspondents had begged him to use his influence to effect unity among the colonists;<sup>(3)</sup> during the time of Smith, he had tried to do this by emphasising the strength of their common enemy, the Kaffirs, and by inspiring an interest in Smith's campaigns by exaggerating the Governor's achievements; but when Cathcart became so successful in his campaigns against the Kaffirs, it was prejudicial to Godlonton's case to continue to publicise the exaggerated reports of Smith as to the success of his operations, and it became necessary instead to warn the colonists not to pin too much faith in what the popular Cathcart had so far accomplished, as he seemed determined to bring the war to what Godlonton regarded as a dangerously premature conclusion. Thus, during the latter stages of the war, Godlonton was bent on stimulating a constant feeling of alarm on the frontier, and he resorted to the Journal as his medium.

---

1. Cathcart: Correspondence, pp. 350-359.

2. GTJ. 6.9.52.

3. e.g. Godlonton Papers. R. Calderwood to Godlonton, 8.1.51: "...Everything now depends upon the unity of the white men especially the English - The Caffres are doing their utmost to separate all classes from the English....I need not beg you to use the utmost of your powerful influence to effect unity among us just now..."; T. Stringfellow to Godlonton, 7.6.51.



Godlonton's writings on the Kaffir War are more significant, too, when studied in relation to the real aspirations of the settler community. Since 1823, the possibility of a resident government for the Eastern Districts had been held out to them; but, instead of its being granted, they had been continually maligned overseas and attacked at home by the Kaffirs. It was not surprising that the repeated frustration of their desperate demands had embittered them in proportion to the increasing violence of the Kaffirs' attacks.

One of the first steps to the attainment of their ideal of a resident government was the necessity for gaining the sympathy of the British Government, and this was to be done by denying the aspersions cast upon them by their enemies both overseas and in the Western Cape. Only in this way, it seemed, could the British Government be brought to see the need for giving the settlers a form of administration which would at last respond to the urgency of their requirements. The settlers were thus represented, in Godlonton's writings, as the victims of forces beyond their control, and the war of 1850 as a war aimed, directly at driving the British settlers from the land.<sup>(1)</sup> Another step towards the attainment of their goal was to prove that the present mode of government was inadequate. Both of these Godlonton strove to do, for he approached the problem, as always, from the strictly practical angle.

---

1. Vide, e.g., Kaffir War, p. 98, where Godlonton quotes John Boon: "Every individual issaying that this war differs from all former ones, and this is not very difficult to believe - the design being to exterminate the British inhabitants from the land....."; Ibid. p. 207: "...a deep-laid and extensive combination to drive the English inhabitants from the country, and overturn the authority of the British government...." Cp. I. Staples: MS. Narrative of the War of 1851 and 1853: "Shortly before the outbreak, the whole of the Dutch neighbours trekked away from the border to the surprise of the English, as at that time there were only rumours of war..." but they had been warned by the Hottentots to leave the frontier, as the latter had a grudge against the "satlers". (Gory Collection. MS. 6737)



Godlonton's writings, then, were designed primarily to focus not merely frontier opinion, but also British public opinion, upon the point which was to form the mainspring of his life's work - the attempt to secure for the Eastern Province a government which would protect as well as rule the settlers. Drawn from a wide variety of private and official sources, his narrative was generally accurate on points of detail,<sup>(1)</sup> but on the whole, it comprised a skillful editing of historical data for the purposes of political agitation.

- 
1. Cory has questioned the accuracy of certain details (vide Cory's annotated copy of the narrative in the Cory Library, pp. 173, 255 etc.) But such minor details do not affect the importance of Godlonton's generalisations; Cp also the statistics in Kaffir War, p. 233 with the official table in P.P. 1851, XXXVIII (1352), p. 14 - the two errors in Godlonton's book are unimportant, since the totals are all quite correct. Inaccurate reports did sometimes find their way into the Journal (Vide, e.g., Godlonton Papers, J. Carlisle to Godlonton, 6.5.51., where the Journal's account of an incident is queried), and Godlonton himself admitted this: vide, e.g. AOC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 16.10.49: "...I am annoyed that my correspondent Argus should have sent me such an exaggerated report. By doing so he has done me and himself harm...."



CHAPTER III:

"A TABLE MOUNTAIN PARLIAMENT."

The Eastern Province Separatist Movement represented a will-o'-the-wisp ideal, which alternately seduced and deluded its adherents. Dating from the twenties, it went through many phases in its chequered career. At times it was regarded as an infallible remedy for the problems which beset the Eastern Districts, but more often it suffered acutely from a lack of active and co-ordinated support. Godlonton came gradually to see it as the basis for a constructive and far-reaching reorganisation of the administration of the British territories in South Africa, but by the greater portion of the people of the East it was often regarded as little more than a useful instrument for agitating for concessions from the Western Province. Though there was undoubtedly a strongly-developed political consciousness among the British Settlers of Albany, the Dutch Platteland was apathetic or even hostile, and the farming section of the population was too widely-dispersed<sup>(1)</sup> and too concerned about the day-to-day business of farming on a turbulent frontier to lend the movement its indispensable support. Local jealousies, based upon economic interests, family ties or mutual fear and suspicion, were responsible, as much as any other factor, for undermining the movement. It became the unenviable task of Godlonton and the other separationists to keep the problem constantly in the public mind, and, in doing so, each tried to influence it in his own way.

---

1. Vide, e.g. Sheila van der Horst: Native Labour in S.A. p. 39. She says that even in 1865, three-quarters of the population was still engaged in farming.



There were a number of factors which motivated the agitation. On the immediate frontier, it would seem that the demand for security was the ever-present and dominating cry: in the first petition on the subject to the Home Government drawn up in 1823, dissatisfaction with the arbitrary actions of Lord Charles Somerset and the lack of sympathy of the Western Province was expressed, but it is significant that the memorialists stressed that "the most pressing and insupportable of their grievances arise from the constant depredations of the Caffres..."<sup>(1)</sup> The Commission of Inquiry, appointed in 1823 as a result of these representations, reiterated this opinion; although it maintained that friction between Albany and the Governor could be allayed only by the grant of separate government, it declared that a more powerful argument in favour of the proposal was the "pressure of the native tribes."<sup>(2)</sup> The separatist movement thus originated among the English settlers on the immediate frontier, and it was they who were throughout its most ardent advocates. This in itself was enough to doom it to failure, since, as time went on, the Dutch began to regard it as a movement to secure English supremacy over all the population of the Eastern Districts.

The Home Government soon recognised the difficulties under which the East was labouring, and in 1828 appointed a Commissioner-General for the Eastern Districts;<sup>(3)</sup> the experiment failed, because insufficient authority was delegated to the post. After the 1835 war, Sir Benjamin D'Urban earned the hearty approbation of the East by being the first official

---

1. Theal: Records of Cape Colony, XV, p. 309.

2. Quoted by D.B.Sole: The Separation Movement and the Demand for Resident Government in the Eastern Province, p. 18.

3. Sole: op.cit. p. 35.



to propound the necessity for the removal of the seat of government to the East as a definite policy to be kept in view by the Colonial Administration.<sup>(1)</sup> Instead, a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed; but the unpopularity of Sir Andries Stockenström and the ineffectual actions of his successor, Colonel Hare, rendered the post of little value. Under Sir Henry Young, the hopes of the frontier seemed to rise, as he not only pressed for an increase in the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor, but stimulated the separatist movement by collecting information on the subject from prominent Eastern Province men, and by publishing a blue-book containing all such information. By this time, Stockenström had also come to realise that the Lieutenant-Governorship was ineffectual, and Young agreed with him in thinking that a removal of the seat of government would be the best answer to the problem.<sup>(2)</sup>

Despite his enthusiasm, Young's efforts came to nought; for before the end of 1847, when he had not even been in the country a full year, he was transferred to the Lieutenant-Governorship of South Australia. A decisive blow to the separatist movement was dealt by the appointment of Sir Harry Smith as Governor at the end of the same year: he demanded a free hand in South Africa, and, since he was hostile to any tendency towards separatism,<sup>(3)</sup> he succeeded in his demand that the Lieutenant-Governorship should not be filled after Young departed.

The Kaffir Wars, especially since 1835, had provided Godlonton with much powerful ammunition for his attacks upon the attitude of the Western Province and of the British Government to the appeals of the Eastern Districts.<sup>(4)</sup> He

---

1. Sole: op.cit. p.46-7.

2. Sole: op.cit. pp.109-18.

3. Sole: op.cit. p.121.

4. Vide Chapter II.



consistently strove to emphasise the need for an independent Lieutenant-Governor in the frontier districts, and, when Young called for the opinion of the frontiersmen on the subject, Godlonton took a prominent part in the general agitation. At the Bathurst public meeting in August 1847, he drew attention to the constitution which had been granted to New Zealand, which provided for two Lieutenant-Governors with their respective Councils, as well as a Governor-General having a superintending power over the whole machinery.<sup>(1)</sup> He maintained that South Africa was admirably adapted to such a scheme.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton was also a member of the Grahamstown Committee which, with Committees appointed at other frontier towns, presented a report to Young in October 1847. This Committee declared itself against any removal of the seat of Government from Cape Town, not only because this would be "impolitic" but also because it was considered unjust to those who had invested their capital there in the belief that it would always be the administrative head-quarters of the colony. On the other hand, they concluded,

a separation of the Eastern from the Western Province is exempt from either of these objections. It leaves intact the old colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and it proposes to mould into an entirely separate colony a territory, which has already become far too unwieldy for government by an Executive in Cape Town; and which, moreover, is in circumstances to defray the expenses of its own government, and to maintain from its own resources those public institutions that, in the event of separation, it would be necessary to establish.<sup>(3)</sup>

In the forties, the separatist movement became more comprehensive. A period of prosperity had set in,<sup>(4)</sup> and

- 
1. This was true at the time when Godlonton made his speech, though, due to the representations of Governor Grey, the part of the letters patent relating to the introduction of self-governing institutions was subsequently suspended for five years, and the constitution of March 1848 was far less federal by nature, than had originally been planned: vide Camb. Hist. of the Br. Empire. Vol VII, part II. pp. 95-6.
  2. Documents relative to the question of a Separate Government for the Eastern Districts of the Cape Colony, p. 101.
  3. Ibid. p. 138.
  4. Sole: op. cit. p. 58.



grievances which had had to be overlooked in time of war became more and more galling to the settlers, imbued as they were with a spirit of progressiveness such as they had known in their homeland and re-inforced as were their difficulties by a steady stream of immigration. Among the farmers, the main grievance was still the lack of security: Bertram Bowker, in his journal, was indignant at the Kaffirs for plundering from the colonists, both in war and peace. He recorded that they had three times stolen his cattle and horses, that he had been called out on numerous occasions since 1827, and that he had been almost ruined four times in the Kaffir Wars. Yet he displayed a commendable tolerance towards the Kaffirs, and significantly blamed the missionaries and the Government for the Kaffir Wars - the latter not only because it made laws and never carried them out, but also because it treated the Kaffirs like children.<sup>(1)</sup> Thomas Stubbs, in his reminiscences, inveighed against the "numbbugging by the Government" and, in relating the jubilee celebrations of 1844, remarked:

For my part I could (see, not?) see that our family had any reason to rejoice at coming out to this Country. For we left a Comfortable Home in England, where my Father was very well to do - to come out here - to have my father murdered<sup>(2)</sup> and our whole Family robbed by the Caffres, and the Government, and thrown out into the world to sink or swim, the best way we could.<sup>(3)</sup>

If the farmers were concerned about the protection of the frontier, the merchants and traders were more concerned at the obstacles to profitable commercial enterprise. As a writer on the separatist movement from 1828 to 1878 has pointed out, the first political movement arose out of the comparative prosperity of the early forties, and was more or less confined to Grahamstown.<sup>(4)</sup> With the creation of the Central Road

---

1. Vide extracts from the diary of Bertram Bowker in Mitford-Barberton: The Bowkers of Tharfield, pp 207-246.

2. My italics.

3. Thomas Stubbs: MS Reminiscences.

4. Sole: op cit. p 58.



Board in 1843, had come added friction: the East resented the formation of a board at the other end of the colony, as by this time the hatred of any tendency towards centralisation had become general. Added to this was the unpopularity of Montagu's schemes for the employment of convicts on the Board's roads, as it was soon felt that the Western Province was profiting more from the scheme than was the East. As time went on, the grievances became more accentuated. It does not fall within the scope of this thesis to examine these in any detail, but some of the main grievances deserve mention, since they help to explain a lot of what happened during the fifties.

Sole maintains that the essence of the separatist movement was the demand for "justice" for the Eastern Province.<sup>(1)</sup> This took various forms - on the immediate frontier, as we have shown, the practical farming community was preoccupied with the problem of security; in the towns and ports, which were further removed from the scene of danger, the demand was rather for administrative reform.<sup>(2)</sup> We have referred to the discontent over the proceedings of the Central Road Board: this arose because of the supposed neglect of Eastern Province roads and the disproportionate allocation of funds to the two parts of the colony.<sup>(3)</sup> Although Montagu offered a reasonable explanation for this, and assured the East that its demands would be attended to,<sup>(4)</sup> the Eastern Province does not appear to have been satisfied with his explanation. The Eastern Districts were dissatisfied with the fact that local government institutions did not answer adequately to the needs

---

1. Sole: op.cit. p.2.

2. Vide Correspondence between Pottinger and Young respecting a Separation of the Eastern and Western Provinces; Documents relative to the question of a Separate Government.

3. e.g. OTJ. 10.8.50; 15.5.52; 28.8.52; 15.10.53; 11.8.55; EPN. 12.4.53; Colonist. 30.10.52.

4. Correspondence between Pottinger and Young, pp.6,7.



of a progressive community: there were always delays because the Civil Commissioners and Resident Magistrates were unable to cope with the volume of work which fell to them. In the Administration of justice, in particular, there was considerable dissatisfaction: the circuits of fifteen hundred miles had to be travelled twice a year, and as a result, good advocates were not always obtainable, trials were rushed because of pressure of time, and, very often, innocent prisoners were kept in custody for six months until the next circuit.<sup>(1)</sup> The want of a resident judge on the frontier was regarded as deplorable and there were cries for monthly courts of sessions, for Courts of Requests in district towns, and for the adoption of a system of trial by jury.<sup>(2)</sup> The demand for a Land Registry office was particularly urgent, as the necessity for referring all land measurements and transfers to Cape Town involved not only delay and expense, but at times utter confusion through the non-issue of title-deeds.<sup>(3)</sup> Similar inconvenience arose out of the absence of a Deeds Registry office.<sup>(4)</sup> Another grievance, which appears to have caused a great deal of bad feeling was the fact that Dr Innes, the Superintendent-General of Education, appeared to pay no attention to the Eastern Districts which he was supposed to visit annually. In 1847, it was stated that he had not been for three years. Moreover, it was claimed that the estimates for 1848 showed that the amount spent on educational facilities in the Western Province was far greater - even proportionally - than that allotted to the East.<sup>(5)</sup> A prominent grievance, especially in view of the perpetual labour shortage in the East, was that the Western Province always secured the pick

---

1. GTJ. 30.3.50; Sole: op cit., p 64.

2. GTJ. 5.10.50

3. GTJ. 30.3.50; 5.10.50.

4. N.H.Taylor: The Separation Movement during the period of Representative Government at the Cape, 1854-72. p 15.

5. Sole: op cit. pp 63, 111; also GTJ. 3.12.53; 8.12.55; 22.12.55.



of the immigrants, and that, by the time the ships reached Algoa Bay, only the most undesirable were left.<sup>(1)</sup> The less important, yet irritating grievances, were legion: the fact that the lower officials were severely underpaid,<sup>(2)</sup> that the government buildings in the East were in a ramshackle state,<sup>(3)</sup> that there was a shortage of jails and that the Auditor's Office was in Cape Town.<sup>(4)</sup> The passing of a Vagrant Law was regarded as vitally necessary, while numerous petty grievances ranged from the request for a reduction in the Auction Duty to a desire for the abolition of Ginger Beer Licences.<sup>(5)</sup>

It is noteworthy that the movement for separation tended, not to unite the Eastern Districts in opposition to the West, but to emphasise their disunity instead. There was a degree of unanimity on questions of general importance but local jealousies all too often neutralised such unifying effects. Much of the trouble arose out of economic rivalry. By 1850, the building of the road from Port Elizabeth over the Zuurberg which would give immediate access to the interior districts of Somerset, Graaff-Reinet, Cradock and Colesberg, was rapidly forging ahead. The commercial interests of Grahamstown viewed this progress with considerable misgiving, since the road would divert much of the traffic which normally went through Grahamstown<sup>(6)</sup> along other channels giving access more directly to a sea-port.<sup>(7)</sup> William Cock of Albany had been trying to construct a harbour at the mouth of the Kowie River (then Port Frances) since his arrival there in the late

---

1. GTJ. 25.5.50; 3.8.50.

2. Sole: *op.cit.* p. 62.

3. *Ibid.* p. 62.

4. GTJ. 5.10.50.

5. GTJ. 5.10.50.

6. Cole: *The Cape and the Kafirs*, p. 155; "Graham's Town is the key to the trade which is carried on with the interior of Southern Africa, beyond the colonial boundary. This trade is even now very lucrative - "

7. GTJ. 6.8.50. "Frontier" to Editor. Also news-item on progress of Zuurberg road.



thirties.<sup>(1)</sup> As an enterprising Grahamstown merchant<sup>(2)</sup> he had always realised the advantages to be derived from the establishment of a sea-port for Grahamstown, since the landing and storing facilities at Algoa Bay were far from adequate and the expense of transport was a perpetual problem. In 1847, in reply to Young's request for information on the desirability and possibility of separation, the Grahamstown Committee drew attention to the extensive and valuable coasting trade between Port Frances and the other ports along the coast. They pointed out that large quantities of merchandise had been landed at Port Frances, and that two vessels had been kept constantly employed between that port and Cape Town. Cock had spent huge sums upon improvements at the port, but they declared that it had become essential for the government to assist in the developments that were taking place.<sup>(3)</sup> In 1847 a Board of Commissioners was appointed, and in April 1849, Captain Pilkington, the Civil Engineer of the Colony, carried out an inspection of Port Frances. He was favourably impressed with its potentialities, and, in his report to the Harbour Commission, he pronounced the plan to be merely a matter of expense, and promised that he would waste no time in sending the plans and estimates through the proper channels.<sup>(4)</sup> Two months later, the Journal published a letter from Pilkington, saying that the scheme for the Kowie was likely to meet with the unqualified approval of the government, and that the work could be expected to commence shortly.<sup>(5)</sup> In July, the scheme received a rude check, for the Legislative Council was "extinguished in mud" by the Cape Town mob,<sup>(6)</sup> and the legislative

---

1. Vide Napier Devitt: People and Places. pp.36-7.

2. GTJ. 15.2.76.

3. Documents relative to the question of a Separate Government for the Eastern Districts of the Cape Colony. pp.143-4.

4. GTJ. 14.4.49.

5. GTJ. 16.6.49.

6. Kilpin: Romance of a Colonial Parliament, p.75.



machinery of the colony came to a standstill. Of the unofficial members, only Cock refused to resign, and his obstinacy, which was particularly annoying to the Anti-Convict Association, was explained in terms of self-interest in one of the Observer's celebrated lampoons:

Cock in council backs Smith with the weight of his talk; -  
Of Kowie-funds Smith is the giver -  
So the Hero shall be the Cock of the walk, (1)  
And the Senator, Cock of the river!

By the beginning of 1850, the scheme had still not been sanctioned by the Legislative Council, and the Journal continued to keep the scheme before the public.<sup>(2)</sup> In August of that year, the Board of Kowie Commissioners reminded Montagu the Secretary to Government that the Kowie scheme still claimed the attention of the Governor and the forthcoming Legislative Council, and Montagu assured him that the Governor would bring the matter to the consideration of the Councillors.<sup>(3)</sup> On 10th September 1850, Smith read a Minute to the Council on the business which he proposed to place before it. Among the items he listed were the improvements of the ports of Port Elizabeth and Mossel Bay, while the Kowie improvements were particularly recommended as "a work of vital importance to the best interests of the farmers of Albany."<sup>(4)</sup>

The break-up of the Council in 1850 once again prevented the passing of the scheme, and during 1851, Albany continued to agitate. In November, the people of Grahamstown sent a petition to the Council, urging it to press on with the scheme,<sup>(5)</sup> but it was not till April 1852 that the Kowie Harbour Improvement Bill was finally passed.<sup>(6)</sup> By the end of the year it had been approved by the Queen,<sup>(7)</sup> and in 1853,

---

1. Observer. 24.7.49. Cp. EPH. 15.9.49.

2. GTJ. 3.8.50. "E" to Editor; 10.8.50; 14.9.50.

3. GTJ. 14.9.50.

4. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362), p.23.

5. GTJ. 1.11.51.

6. GTJ. 8.5.52.

7. GTJ. 18.9.52.



the Kowie Harbour Improvement Company was floated in Grahamstown. Prominent settlers and merchants of Albany, such as George Wood, William Cock, H. Blaine, and R. Jarvis, constituted the Board of Directors.

The Kowie scheme made Grahamstown unpopular for two reasons. It seemed to the rest of the Eastern Districts - in fact, to the rest of the colony - that in 1850 especially Grahamstown was truckling to Smith and the detested Legislative Council in order to secure approval for the Kowie scheme. Even before 1849 the Legislative Council had become the most hated and despised body in the colony, but after the anti-convict crisis, the question of its reconstitution as a legislative organ was regarded as little less than detrimental to the interests of the colony and as a direct insult to the colonists.<sup>(1)</sup> In November 1850, John Ayliff told Godlonton that the all-round unpopularity of Smith was due not only to the Dreyer affair and the dismissal of Bowker from the Kat River Magistracy, but also to the fact that he wanted to grant £26,000 to Cock for the Kowie scheme.<sup>(2)</sup> As late as 1853, the Eastern Province News could still remind its readers that, when a Kowie scheme was projected, a Cape Town Legislative Council, "despised, distrusted, denounced, condemned" as it was, could find two men in Grahamstown only, who were ready to take part in it as a legislative, as distinct from a constituent,<sup>(3)</sup> body.<sup>(4)</sup>

The Kowie scheme was feared by Grahamstown's rivals even more because of its economic significance. Graaff-Reinet was the central point at which much of the wool produced in the

---

1. Observer. 16.1.49; 10.7.49. etc.

2. Godlonton Papers, John Ayliff to Godlonton, 11.11.50

3. Whatever may have been the motives of the "popular members" in attending the Legislative Council in 1850, they could always claim, on the evidence of their actions, that they had attended its sittings solely in order to secure a Representative Government for the colony.

4. EPN. 3.5.53.



midlands and in the Sovereignty was collected (and very often sold) before being transported to Algoa Bay for the overseas markets.<sup>(1)</sup> The merchants of Graaff-Reinet thus strove continuously to obtain more direct communication with Port Elizabeth, and the opening of the Zuurberg road was eagerly awaited. The Graaff-Reinet papers agitated for a direct postal route with the port,<sup>(2)</sup> and averred that a route which obviated the necessity of going via Grahamstown would benefit not only Graaff-Reinet, but also Richmond, Colesberg, Cradock, Burghersdorp and the Sovereignty. In 1848 this had been promised by the government, but it was not till 1853 that the Postmaster-General at last called for tenders for a direct post between the two towns.<sup>(3)</sup> The problem of bad roads was one of Graaff-Reinet's greatest grievances: in 1853 the condition of the Oudeberg Pass was so bad, through the neglect of the Central Road Board, that a number of leading landed proprietors held a public meeting and appointed a Committee to raise subscriptions for repairing it.<sup>(4)</sup> In the following year, J.J.Meintjes and other prominent Graaff-Reinettters, who had refused to pay their road rates because they claimed that, contrary to the ordinances, nothing had been spent on roads outside the Western Province, were sued by the Collector,<sup>(5)</sup> and when the case was taken to the Supreme Court, Meintjes won.<sup>(6)</sup> On the other hand, the Graaff-Reinet mercantile interests censured the Grahamstown Municipality for demanding repairs to the Howison's Poort road when the area was desolated and exposed to attack during the war;<sup>(7)</sup> and in 1854 jealousy of Grahamstown wishes led the Graaff-Reinet Herald to observe:

- 
1. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers, W. Knight to Godlonton, 4.4.51; GRC. 18.6.53
  2. GRC. 7.11.51; 21.11.51.
  3. GRC. 4.6.53.
  4. GRH. 19.1.53.
  5. GRH. 8.2.54.
  6. GRH. 8.8.55.
  7. GRH. 3.11.52.



The idea of obtaining a survey for a line of road that will admit of branches to Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet, will naturally find more favour with the Graaff-Reinetters than the proposal to make one grand trunk line from the Bay to Grahamstown. (1)

Graaff-Reinet was equally antagonistic to the Kowie scheme - probably because it would have preferred to see the grants for improvements at Port Frances transferred to Port Elizabeth, where there was a constant cry for harbour improvements, for, as Port Elizabeth claimed, Algoa Bay was in a "state of nature" as compared with Cape Town. (2) In December 1852, the Graaff-Reinet Herald ridiculed the Kowie scheme, and called for a scientific report on the scheme rather than "an inflated advertisement stuffed with promises not worth the paper they are printed on..." (3) More important was the fact that Graaff-Reinet had strong business connections with Port Elizabeth. Professor Schumann has described the relative maturity of the commercial structure of the Cape at the time of the discovery of diamonds; (4) a closer examination of the economic and social structure of the Cape suggests that, though a relapse into a linguistic-racial front was always possible, the operative lines of cleavage in politics in the fifties were dictated mainly by business interests. Firms such as Heugh and Fleming were established in not only Port Elizabeth but also Graaff-Reinet (5) and Uitenhage, (6) and probably had stores in the country districts as well. (7) Graaff-Reinet merchants wrote regularly to the Port Elizabeth newspapers, and Port Elizabeth firms often preferred salesmen with a knowledge of Dutch. (8)

Port Elizabeth's antagonism to Grahamstown was becoming

- 
1. GRH. 21.6.54
  2. EPH. 25.12.47
  3. GRH. 23.12.52
  4. C.G.W. Schumann: Structural Changes and Business Cycles in S.A. 1806-1936, passim.
  5. e.g. EPH. 1.12.49; 26.1.50. Letter from G. Southey.
  6. e.g. EPH. 27.11.47; 22.9.49.
  7. EPH. 3.6.48. They advertised for "A steady person to keep the books of a country store."
  8. e.g. EPH. 6.5.48. Advertisement of James Crawford, p 1; EPH. 22.1.48. Advertisement of G. Raubtfleisch, p 4.



more bitter, especially when the latter appeared to be attaining a certain degree of success in its agitation for the opening of the Kowie. The Eastern Province Herald, in August 1849, published a letter from a correspondent accusing Godlonton of toadying to Smith and reporting that Godlonton had maintained that "it would be folly to oppose the Government, as it would not then expend £30,000 on the Kowie."<sup>(1)</sup> And, at the height of the anti- convict agitation, another correspondent must have alarmed Grahamstown by informing it that Somerset, Cradock, Graaff-Reinet and Colesberg were seeking another market for their produce, as they would no longer have any dealings with men like Godlonton and Cock, who had supported Smith's convict policy.<sup>(2)</sup> Paterson, Editor of the Eastern Province Herald, and later of the Eastern Province News, was indefatigable in his attempts to make Port Elizabeth renowned for its facilities and its prosperity,<sup>(3)</sup> and, through the medium of his paper, he strove to dissuade Grahamstown, both by argument and by ridicule, from going forward with the Kowie scheme. In February 1850, he cited the case of a supply of goods which had reached Grahamstown from England in just over five months, and remarked that these could hardly have reached Grahamstown any sooner, even if the Kowie had been opened "at an expense of £30,000." Moreover, he took the opportunity to point out that the anticipated completion of the new road from Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown would soon be a great commercial asset.<sup>(4)</sup> Towards the end of 1851, he poked fun at Edward Irving, Assistant-Editor of the Graham's Town Journal, for enclosing a plan of the capabilities of the Kowie as a

---

1. EPH. 4.8.49. "A Patriot" to Editor.

2. EPH. 25.8.49. "X" to Editor

3. Vide Cory Collection. Cowen: MS Life of John Paterson.

4. EPH. 2.2.50. Cp. EPH. 9.3.50.



port with the Grahamstown petition for separation;<sup>(1)</sup> and in December of the same year, he described the arrangement whereby the sponsors of the Kowie scheme would get assistance from the Government only after they had collected the first £6000 themselves, as "entertaining beyond measure."<sup>(2)</sup> Yet his anxiety about the possible success of the scheme made him revert to it again and again. He magnanimously warned Grahamstown that the opening of the port would reduce her importance in the same way as the growth of Port Elizabeth had led to the decline of Uitenhage.<sup>(3)</sup> An anxious correspondent expressed the opinion that if a proper jetty and stores were built at the Bay, the senseless agitation for the opening of the Kowie would cease.<sup>(4)</sup> This did not deter Godlonton, who continued to agitate for the opening of the Kowie.<sup>(5)</sup> He seems to have taken advantage of Stephen Lakeman's letter of congratulation on his "fearless and talented" conduct during the constitutional discussions<sup>(6)</sup> to persuade Lakeman to bring pressure to bear upon the British Parliament when the latter returned to England towards the end of the war.<sup>(7)</sup> Indeed, he became so optimistic about the prospects of the eventual development of the Kowie that he himself invested in some land at the mouth,<sup>(8)</sup> and became a shareholder in the Kowie Harbour Improvement Company.<sup>(9)</sup> With regard to the

- 
1. EPN. 4.10.51.
  2. EPN. 27.12.51.
  3. EPN. 10.1.52. Vide also EPN. 31.1.52.
  4. EPN. 26.7.53. "Harbor-Works" to Editor. Vide also EPN. 8.11.53.
  5. GTJ. 26.3.53; 26.1.56;
  6. Godlonton Papers. S. Lakeman to Godlonton, 3.12.52.
  7. Godlonton Papers. S. Lakeman to Godlonton, 14.1.53: "...Since I left the Cape I have heard nothing about the Kowie Harbour. I hope it has not been abandoned. My father in my absence would be most happy to afford you any assistance in England, and if he were furnished with the particulars, I have no doubt but what he could render you essential parliamentary service if such should be required.."
  8. Vide, will of Robert Godlonton. (Cory Collection. MS. 7108). Cp. Godlonton Papers. W. Cannell to Godlonton, 4.9.56.
  9. Rhodes House Collection. f. 269. R. White to Godlonton, 1.6.57: "I passed our Bill for the first instalment in the Kowie Company....."



Zuurberg road, Paterson exposed the fallacy in Godlonton's arguments that the waggons of merchandise for Cradock proceeded via Grahamstown and not across the Zuurberg, by pointing out that that was a strong argument in favour of completing the road: it was unjust, he stated, to demand that the roads to Cradock and Somerset should deflect via Grahamstown. (1)

Port Elizabeth was as concerned about the trade-routes as was Grahamstown: in 1850, the Herald had announced that a Burghersdorp firm had imported three waggon-loads of goods through the newly-founded port at East London, and the editor took care to stress that, though the route was easier than was that to Algoa Bay, "East London is without a bay, and is little likely to be frequented by vessels." (2) Four years later, Paterson was still anxious. Referring to the necessity for a direct line between Port Elizabeth and the Sovereignty, he declared:

We should rejoice to see Port Elizabeth, Somerset, Cradock, Burghersdorp and Smithfield combine to convert the direct line into that magnificent highway, on which the gold fields we trust will soon repay any outlay.

On the other hand, he carefully emphasised that the road from Smithfield to East London was only about forty miles shorter than that to Port Elizabeth, but that this was negated by the far more important consideration that no line could be more direct than was the one to the Bay. (3)

The Port Elizabeth Telegraph also warned Grahamstown against the projected scheme, and adduced the very significant argument that the opening of the Kowie would actually be detrimental to Grahamstown, since the trade from Kaffirland would pass to the south-east of the town. (4) Meanwhile, Port Elizabeth, with the encouragement of Graaff-Reinet, was the scene of some improvements: in September 1852, the Graaff-Reinet Herald reported approvingly that a lighthouse was to be erected on

- 
1. BPH. 14.3.54.
  2. BPH. 1.6.50.
  3. BPH. 21.3.54
  4. Quoted in GTJ 24.8.50.



Bird Island in Algoa Bay, and stated that this was rendered necessary by the "growing importance of this port."<sup>(1)</sup> And, at the end of 1853, the Port Elizabeth Wharf Company was floated by the Port Elizabeth merchants, with the object of carrying out harbour improvements and of opening the Baakens River.<sup>(2)</sup> The Graaff-Reinet Courant hastened to congratulate the Bay on its progressiveness.<sup>(3)</sup>

Added to these major points of antagonism between the various towns and districts of the Eastern Province were numerous others. Port Elizabeth proclaimed triumphantly that all the leading merchants of Grahamstown had either already abandoned the self-styled "metropolis" for Port Elizabeth, or were at present making arrangements for their removal from the declining town to Port Elizabeth, which now claimed to be the second town of the colony.<sup>(4)</sup> Graaff-Reinet accused the Grahamstown dealers of supplying ammunition to the Kaffirs,<sup>(5)</sup> and Godlonton, on the other hand, censured the people of Graaff-Reinet for failing to pull their weight during the war.<sup>(6)</sup>

It was partly out of these economic jealousies, and partly also out of geographical differences and racial feeling,<sup>(7)</sup> that the parties of the Eastern Districts crystallised. Taylor, in his study of the separatist movement, draws a distinction between the frontier party, which was predominant in the districts of Albany, Victoria East, Port Beaufort, Cradock and Queenstown, and the midland party, which predominated in Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Richmond, Colesberg and Albert.

---

1. GRH. 15.9.52.

2. EPN. 29.11.53.

3. GRC. 26.11.53.

4. EPN. 31.5.51.

5. GRC. 15.8.51; 17.10.51.

6. GTS. 31.7.52.

7. The degree of racial feeling underlying the political antagonism is, I think, over-emphasised by Taylor in The Separation Movement during the period of Representative Government at the Cape, 1854-1872: Not only is there the fact that Port Elizabeth - which prided itself on being the most English community at the Cape - could work harmoniously with the Dutch of the Midlands, but the opposition of Grahamstown to the Cape Town Municipality was based upon its disapproval of its measures rather than of its members.



Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth he regards as neutral, sometimes inclining one way and sometimes another.<sup>(1)</sup> Basically, these divisions are satisfactory, but it is also evident that party divisions often cut across these demarcations.

The frontier party under Godlonton and Cock undoubtedly predominated on the immediate border. During the thirties the Graham's Town Journal had been the sole organ for the expression of Eastern Province opinion, and was regarded by everyone as the mouthpiece of Eastern opinion.<sup>(2)</sup> But the gradual emergence of rival organs and the jealousy with which Godlonton's friendship with Sir Harry Smith after 1847 was viewed, led to a gradual diminution in its influence. In August 1848, Read wrote to Fairbairn, expressing the hope that "Sir Harry and Godlonton will know the real character of the Boers,"<sup>(3)</sup> but it was during the anti-convict crisis, when Godlonton spurned the popular attack on the government, that his enemies vented their spleen by accusing him of allying with the government party for motives of self-interest. The violence and bitterness of Godlonton's enemies was well portrayed in another of the Observer's amusing lampoons, in the form of a despatch from Smith to Lord Grey on the Governor's difficulties during the anti-convict crisis:

I felt it my duty  
To gain o'er some scribbler, to write up the beauty  
OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE, to let the mob learn,  
That they right from wrong had no right to discern -  
That my 'heart was with them' - but to keep out of view  
That happen what might, my hand was with you.  
So, for Fairbairn I fished with my Waterloo Dinner,  
I tried very hard, yet - unfortunate sinner!  
I failed, but instead - and the thought makes me merry -  
I G-dl-nt-n hooked with a bottle of sherry!  
The grateful old dame still remember that droll day,  
(Refer to her Journal for last April fool's day.)  
When I, as becomes an Inkosi Inkulu,  
At Jock-pudding played for Sandile and Kluklu,  
And treated the world to that grand pantomime,  
Which G-dl-nt-n writes was a scene so sublime  
When she (for I couldn't admit her to dine  
With me,) at a side table swallowed her wine.  
Thus a bottle of sherry made Granny my friend,  
And I on her pen in return can depend.<sup>(4)</sup>

1. Taylor: *op.cit.* Vide map.

2. J.H.O. du Plessis: Die Ontstaan van politieke partye in die Kaap-Kolonie tot 1885. Ch. IX.

3. Fairbairn Papers. J. Read to Fairbairn, 14.8.48.

4. Observer. 30.10.49.



The incident to which reference is made, took place at the time of Smith's famous demonstration to the Kaffir chiefs after the 1846 war. The Editor of the Frontier Times wrote:

This meeting was attended by the editor of the 'Journal' for the purpose of taking notes of the proceedings, and it was upon this occasion that Sir Harry Smith, as a sort of substitute for not asking him to dinner, sent him as a present some bottles of sherry. This mark of attention was of course not lost upon the editor, and the advance thus made by Sir Harry soon ripened into confidential intercourse. (1)

Godlonton secured a number of favours and privileges as a result of his stand. The Governor himself wrote to him on occasion (2) - as he had done during the 1835 war (3) and doubtless supplied him with valuable information. Other officials also sent him information for use in the Journal, and Richard Southey, as Secretary to the High Commissioner, was able - sometimes via his brother, William (4) - to send Godlonton copies of important papers as well as official information with which to attack Godlonton's rivals and the enemies of the Government. (5) Moreover, in ~~1850~~<sup>1850</sup>, Sir Harry had, as we have seen, granted him a farm near Fort Beaufort, (6) and he was given the opportunity of becoming Government Printer in the Sovereignty. (7) Nor did he fail to exploit his privileged position: in August 1849, he asked Southey to try to persuade the Governor to renew the Journal's contract for government advertisements privately; unfortunately Southey bungled the affair, and Franklin was informed of his move via Meurant and Hudson. (8) Godlonton was always trying, too, to

1. OPT. 13.4.52

2. Vide, e.g. ACC 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 9.12.50; 23.12.50; P.P. 1851, XXXVIII (1334), Montagu to B.Hawes, 4.1.51.

3. Vide Godlonton: Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes p vi.

4. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers, Copy of letter from Smith to Richard Southey, 26.12.50. At the end are the words "R.Godlonton Esq, M.S." Vide also ACC. 611/2. W to R.Southey 27.2.49: "Godlonton and Mr Phillips, who is a sort of assistant Editor, wish you to send a copy of Sir B.D'Urban's last letter to Lord Glenelg."

5. ACC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 21.7.49; 4.8.49; 17.9.49; ACC 611/3, Godlonton to Southey, 29.1.50. Hargreaves (?) to Southey, 25.4.50. ACC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey: "...You will see that I made use of your remarks on the Stockenström letters for my last week's 'leader'..." CTM, 18.12.52; 18.1.53. "A Subscriber" to Editor.

6. Vide Chapter II, p. 74.

7. Vide Chapter I.

8. ACC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 4.8.49; 20.8.49; 25.8.49.



secure appointments or favours for his friends: in January 1850 he asked Southey to exert his influence with Smith, in order to obtain an appointment as Superintendent of the Tambookies for J. C. Warner;<sup>(1)</sup> and a number of people wrote to thank him for securing commissions or appointments for them.<sup>(2)</sup> Little wonder that Smith, in the early stages of the Eighth Kaffir War, could commend the Journal to the Secretary of State as "a most excellent and patriotic publication, which is the source from which I now derive my information."<sup>(3)</sup>

This frontier party was very strong in Albany and especially in its stronghold, Grahamstown; Even the hostile Eastern Province News had to admit that Godlonton was "largely supported" there.<sup>(4)</sup> At the Bathurst dinner, held in 1844 to commemorate the landing of the settlers, George Dyason paid special tribute to Godlonton as "the consistent and truth-telling Editor of the Graham's Town Journal".<sup>(5)</sup> Yet he seems also to have been staunchly supported by settlers who had migrated to districts further away from the frontier, for the settlers were proud of their Anglo-Saxon origins, and their race-consciousness welded them into a fairly homogeneous bloc. Sir John Kotze, in his Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, maintained that the Journal had a very wide circulation, and added significantly:

There was hardly a member of the Wesleyan community, even as far north as the then Transvaal, who did not read this Journal.<sup>(6)</sup> This opinion was confirmed by the Eastern Province News, which declared that Godlonton's election in Grahamstown in 1850 was largely due to the fact that "The Wesleyan body, who are in considerable majority in that quarter, came forward en masse.. (and) carried by a great majority the idol of their choice."<sup>(7)</sup>

1. AGC 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 29.1.50. Cp Godlonton Papers, J.C. Warner to Godlonton, 30.1.50. The illogical sequence of the dates is not over-significant.
2. Godlonton Papers, Don D. Robertson to Godlonton, 31.5.51; ? Onilton to Godlonton, 6.2.52. Cp. Godlonton's MS. Journal, 12.9.50.
3. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1380), Smith to Grey, 1.3.51. Cp. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362), Smith to Grey, 30.11.50: "...A single newspaper at Graham's Town was the only medium through which they (i.e. Stockenström and Fairbairn) could receive a reply.."
4. EPM. 17.5.51.
5. Memorials of the British Settlers, pp.97-8.
6. Sir John Kotze: Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, p.196-7.
7. EPM. 17.5.51.



The Godlonton party then was by no means confined to Albany: <sup>(1)</sup> wherever there were settlers or Wesleyans there would also be a few, often stray, adherents of the party. Even the Graaff-Reinet Herald realised the hold which the Journal had on the minds of the settlers: in January 1855 Godlonton gleefully reprinted a sketch from the Graaff-Reinet paper of the 3rd January, 1855, called "The British Settler of 1820":

Grahamstown is emphatically the 'Town of the Settler'. He is proud of its importance - he glories in its prosperity.. Here too is his Oracle, for, like the ancient Greek, the British Settler has his Oracle.. Take away the Journal and what would become of the Settler? <sup>(2)</sup>

With its comprehensive net-work of reporting agencies, <sup>(3)</sup> the Journal was undoubtedly always well-informed on the course of events in the furthest corners of the British territory in southern Africa, so that other frontier newspapers, not so well-established, were often forced to transfer large portions of the Journal into their own columns. The Eastern Province Herald, in its early days, relied very heavily upon the Journal, and the Port Elizabeth Telegraph was among those accused of copying whole columns without acknowledgement, and was forced to apologise and to admit that "In regard to Frontier news, we are on most occasions indebted to the Graham's Town Journal." <sup>(4)</sup>

The influence of Godlonton on settler opinion at this time was powerful: during the anti-convict crisis, when feeling was running particularly high, he was able to tell Southey that "the papers put forth in the Journal are telling powerfully on the minds of sensible men," <sup>(5)</sup> and, that this was no idle boast is shown by the testimony of one of Fairbairn's private correspondents, who, writing from Grahamstown at the end of 1849, told Fairbairn that

---

1. Cp. OTM. 2.8.51.

2. GTJ. 13.1.55.

3. Vide Appendix II infra.

4. GTJ. 28.2.52

5. ACC 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 4.8.49.



Mr Godlonton has a large portion of the community completely hoodwinked, and can lead them just as he pleases .. Unless you were on the spot you could not believe the influence the editor of the Journal possesses over a large number of people, whom I am sorry to say do not exercise their own judgement, but think just as he desires them. This may appear startling and ridiculous but I assure you it is correct.<sup>(1)</sup>

Judging from his private papers and the testimonials which were presented to him, it is evident that Godlonton's influence pervaded many parts of the country: Stephen Rowles, writing in May 1851 from Philippolis, said that it was necessary for settlers and their children, wherever they might be, to stand together against men like Renton and Freeman.<sup>(2)</sup>

A. M. MacGillewie of Alice and Godlonton's old friend Thomas Stringfellow of Fort Beaufort, wrote to congratulate him on his election to the Legislative Council in July 1850 and to remark on the general satisfaction this had caused.<sup>(3)</sup>

There seems to have been a particularly active section of the frontier party at Graaff-Reinet, as a large number of settlers, notably the Southneys and the Rubidges, had migrated there because of the devastations of the Kaffirs on the immediate frontier.<sup>(4)</sup> <sup>and because of the vast tracts of unoccupied land left by the trekkers.<sup>(4b)</sup></sup> In September 1849 for instance, came a letter from Graaff-Reinet to Godlonton, approving whole-heartedly of his actions during the anti-convict crisis.<sup>(5)</sup> William Southey was a regular correspondent to the Journal from Graaff-Reinet, and seems to have agreed with Godlonton, not only in his attitude to Smith, but also in his hostility to the Stockenström party.<sup>(6)</sup> The Hobsons of "Ebenezer" (near Graaff-Reinet), were also staunch supporters of Godlonton: in June 1850, W. C. Hobson said he was eagerly awaiting the attainment of separate government and he congratulated

1. Fairbairn Papers. 7 (from Grahamstown) to Fairbairn, 13.11.49.

2. Godlonton Papers. S. Rowles to Godlonton, 26.5.51.

3. Godlonton Papers. A.M. MacGillewie to Godlonton, 12.7.50; T. Stringfellow to Godlonton, 23.7.50.

4a. GRH. 25.8.52; Cole: The Cape and the Kaffirs, p 229.

5. GTJ. 22.12.49

6. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 17.5.51: "Stockenström ought to have been hung in 1837...."

4b. Vide, e.g., H.M. Robertson: The Cape of Good Hope and 'Systematic Colonisation', in S.A. Journal of Economics. Dec. 1937. p.375. n.



Godlonton on being at the head of the poll in the Grahamstown election for the Legislative Council. He asked:

Should you be elected will you? can you? serve? How can you leave the Journal? I will be happy to give you my vote or all of them as the case may be, and should you wish it, I could get you the willing support of nearly all the people about here.(1)

The relation of this party to Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet was summed up by William Southey who, referring to the agitation for the delay of the constitution in January 1852, wrote: "I wish the Grahamstown people had moved sooner in this matter, for our party are not very strong here, and our friends are scattered through the country."(2)

At the thriving little town of Cradock, there was quite a strong branch of the frontier party. Because of the presence of the military, there was a prominent English section (3) and thus a strong prejudice against anything from Graaff-Reinet. (4) Godlonton had a number of correspondents there: Charles Scanlen, an 1820 settler, (5) who generally approved entirely of Godlonton's actions, (6) and offered to help in the political crisis; John Walker, (7) the schoolmaster, (8) and James Collett who promised Godlonton, in 1853, that his friends were determined to secure his return to the Council. He boasted:

I have more than a few votes myself in reserve for a time of need,(9)

Moreover, Collett was one of those who arranged for Godlonton to be presented with a silver ink-stand in recognition of his services in the Legislative Council and of "his long-trying, efficient and successful services in the righteous cause"

---

1. Godlonton Papers. W.C.Hobson to Godlonton, 28.6.50. Vide also letter of 5.2.51.

2. Godlonton Papers. W.Southey to Godlonton, 24.1.52.

3. Cole: op.cit. p.212; Hattersley: A Victorian Lady at the Cape p.46.

4. GRH. 15.9.52. Because the Graaff-Reinet papers "are sure to be under the control of the anti-colonial party," wrote a Cradock correspondent to the Editor, Graaff-Reinet Herald.

5. Hattersley: op.cit. p.79.

6. Godlonton Papers. G.Scanlen to Godlonton, 27.12.51; 6.3.52.

7. Godlonton Papers. John Walker to Godlonton, 17.3.51; 29.12.51; 2.2.52.

8. Hattersley: op.cit. p.51.

9. Godlonton Papers. J.Collett to Godlonton, 21.10.53. EPH 25.8.49. said Collett was "the intelligent supporter" of the Journal.



of the colony, as Editor of a most influential and ably conducted Public Journal."<sup>(1)</sup>

The other main party of the Eastern Districts was the Midlands Party. Its headquarters were at Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet,<sup>(2)</sup> and it seems to have arisen very largely as a reaction against the violence and persistence of the Settler agitation of the Frontier party; for, though it was often in agreement with the main aims of the frontiersmen, its geographical relation to the Kaffir tribes, its economic rivalry and, in the case of Graaff-Reinet, its Boer traditions, frequently made its views accord with those of Cape Town rather than with those of Grahamstown.<sup>(3)</sup> Though the settlers of 1820 had all the traditional British arrogance towards members of other nations, their dealings with the Dutch were for a long time of the most cordial nature. Godlonton, in 1835, remarked with pleasure on the failure of attempts to create a rift between the Dutch and the English, and, though this might have savoured of a certain amount of wishful thinking, he seems to have been very tolerant towards the more conservative Dutch, and to have striven to represent them in a favourable light.<sup>(4)</sup> In 1848, when the leading officials of the colony were asked for their opinions on Representative Institutions by the Governor, both Montagu and Judge Menzies stressed that these would work harmoniously as Dutch and English were bound by ties of family, business and other interests.<sup>(5)</sup> What antagonisms there may have been seems insignificant by comparison with the state of feeling after the forties, and especially after 1848: the years 1848 and

---

1. GTJ. 2.7.53.

2. A Graaff-Reinet correspondent of the E.P.Herald said in EPH. 19.1.50. that the Herald was "more or less the official organ of Graaff-Reinet."

3. Vide, e.g. GTM. 20.1.52: "...It is of no use to say, for the hundredth time, that, what is ostentatiously paraded as 'the Eastern Province' means nothing more than Graham's Town..."

4. Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, pp.113-4.

5. Vide P.P. 1850, XXXVIII (1137).



1849 seem, indeed, to have been the turning point. Godlonton had antagonised the Dutch by his criticism of the Congella episode, and the Boers had been strongly alienated from all things British, not only by the treatment meted out to them in the 1846 war, but also by the Boomplaats campaign, the execution of Dreyer in 1848, the attempts of Smith to force a Commando Law upon the colony, and the suspicious conduct of Smith in the Tambookie frontier dispute. <sup>(1)</sup> Any illusion of the homogeneity of the Eastern Districts was rudely dispelled, and the Dutch in districts such as Graaff-Reinet, who had supported the movement for separation two years before, now came to regard it as a thinly-disguised manoeuvre of the settlers to obtain the political dominance of the English over the Dutch. <sup>(2)</sup> Moreover, the Dutch had strong family ties with the Western Province, and this, combined with their growing suspicion of the vigorous and aggressive tactics of the Frontier party in its attacks on the West, helped to draw them together into a rival party. <sup>(3)</sup> The agitation which was inspired by the prospect of securing Representative Institutions, and the crisis which developed in every corner of the colony as a result of the proposal to send convicts to the Cape, gave the coup de grâce to any attempt to restore mutual confidence among the parties of the Eastern Province. In March 1849, William Southey, writing to Fairbairn from Graaff-Reinet, said:

The people anxious for Separation are, I believe few in number, neither do the mass, or body, of the people, understand it. I much doubt if their leaders do, although very ambitious men... <sup>(4)</sup>

Port Elizabeth, though it was a powerful rival of

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. John Ayliff to Godlonton, N.D. ("Recd. 3.8.50.")
  2. Sole: op cit. pp. 8-9.
  3. Sole: op cit. p. 141.
  4. Fairbairn Papers. William Southey to Fairbairn, 25.3.49.



Cape Town for the wool trade of the interior during and after the forties, <sup>(1)</sup> was also hostile to Grahamstown. Like Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, it was further removed from the frontier and thus not exposed to the continual depredations of the Kaffirs, <sup>(2)</sup> and, as we have seen, it was a constant economic rival of Grahamstown. In 1847, when Young asked the people of Port Elizabeth for information on separation, the leading merchants explained the "chilling neglect" of the government towards the Eastern Province, and advocated resident government in the strongest terms. It is interesting to note that the attitude of Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown was as yet quite sympathetic - Fleming, for instance, made the strange demand for "the right to some influence in its own affairs of one district at least - that of Albany."<sup>(3)</sup> The real turning-point seems to have occurred from the latter part of 1848 onwards. It was <sup>just before</sup> then that John Paterson became Editor of the Eastern Province Herald, and in this capacity, and later as Editor of the Eastern Province News, <sup>(4)</sup> he attempted to guide the separatist movement along the lines which he regarded as most in the interests of Port Elizabeth. It was inevitable that his ideas should clash with those of Godlonton, and the attitude of Godlonton to the activities of the Anti-Convict Association of Cape Town seems to have brought about the final rupture. The Port Elizabeth newspapers became disgusted at Godlonton's advocacy of Smith's cause, and the Port Elizabeth Telegraph lamented:

The undignified attitude lately assumed by the Graham's Town Journal has, we fear, done incalculable injury to a cause which has ever been nearest our hearts. The establishment of an independent government is a measure which seems shelved for an indefinite period. Some of the warmest advocates

1. Cole: op cit. pp. 62.3; Taylor: op. cit. p. 19-20.

2. Cole: op. cit. p. 141.

3. Documents relative to the question of a Separate Government for the Eastern Districts, p. 55.

4. Cory Collection. Cowan: MS. Life of John Paterson.



and staunchest supporters of this indispensable change have been heard lately to declare that the conduct of certain parties in Graham's Town has placed the Separation question in quite a new light, and that they no longer have any heart in cordially co-operating with such persons for the attainment of what they once thought so desirable. (1)

Paterson wrote in similar vein:

The opinion is rapidly gaining ground in this quarter that one Representative Assembly for the whole colony should be in the first instance tried. SEPARATION is itself not repudiated by a single individual as far as we are aware, but, the idea of being tied up with the 'toady clique' of Grahamstown is dreaded by all. During the present agitation revelations have taken place in which it has been clearly disclosed that between the essential character of the collective inhabitants of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, there exists far more congeniality of nature, of sentiment, of pure opinion, than between the collective inhabitants of this place and Graham's Town. (2)

Thus, after 1848, while the strong Anti-Convict Association at Graaff-Reinet was in constant communication with the parent association of Cape Town, (3) and while the merchants of Port Elizabeth could contribute generously towards the expenses of Fairbairn in his case against Norden, (4) the unpopularity of the politics of the Graham's Town Journal increased. (5) The towns and districts of the midlands, and in particular Port Elizabeth, Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage, began to regard complete separation as a threat to their interests, and looked to a removal of the seat of government to Uitenhage as the obvious and most desirable remedy. (6)

Allied to the Midlands party was a clique within the very stronghold of the Frontier party. Sir John Hall, who spent some time in Grahamstown during 1847, said that Grahamstown was full of the scandal and gossip of a small town, and that the people were "radical in the broadest acceptance of the term." (7) Alfred Cole was surprised at the large number of religious denominations in the town,

---

1. Quoted by Observer. 21.8.49.

2. Ibid.

3. OTM. 19.1.50.

4. OTM. 19.1.50.

5. BPH. 5.1.50.

6. BPH. 23.9.48.

7. Mitra: Life and Letters of Sir John Hall, p. 183.



and reported that there was little love lost between the different sects: indeed, the "multitude of 'persuasions'" helped to engender "party feeling".<sup>(1)</sup> During the forties, then, a clique seems to have begun to group itself around Franklin and the Frontier Times.<sup>(2)</sup> Franklin was not one of the 1820 settlers, but had come to the frontier in the late thirties;<sup>(3)</sup> moreover, he had married Emily, daughter of Dr John Atherstone<sup>(4)</sup> who by the late forties was in league with the Stockenstromites.<sup>(5)</sup> After the 1846 war, Stockenstrom had become increasingly popular with the Dutch in the colony, and, though his pension prevented him from being too prominent in the political upheavals, it at least gave him considerable prestige. As a result, the conviction that he would bring a charge against the Governor for the execution of Dreyer, as well as his notorious personal animosity towards Smith secured him support, and his opposition to the government was not looked upon as unwarranted.<sup>(6)</sup> He became the natural ally for all critics of the government - from Fairbairn in Cape Town to Franklin in Grahamstown. The Frontier Times frequently disapproved of Stockenstrom's actions; but its criticism of him was generally far less harsh than

- 
1. Cole: The Cape and the Kaffirs. pp 154-5. The Journal's advocacy of the Kowie scheme was strongly disapproved of even among certain groups in Grahamstown: vide, e.g. Rhodes House Collection, f 239. R.White to Godlonton, 22.2.52.
  2. Cory Collection. MS 7099. R.White to Godlonton, 23.4.55. referred to Franklin as "that anti Colonial Editor."
  3. CFT. 4.3.51
  4. Campbell: British South Africa, p 190. Caroline, another daughter of Dr Atherstone, married Henry Hutton, aide-de-camp to Stockenstrom. (Vide Campbell: op cit. p 190); AGO 611/3. Godlonton to Southey 3.6.50.
  5. AGO 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 3.7.49: "...Dr Atherstone who is a warm partizan and assistant of Franklin's..."; ibid. 17.7.49: "Old Dr Atherstone and Franklin started for Maastrom (i.e. the estate of Stockenstrom) on Sunday morning - where I doubt not they will hatch mischief..."; ibid. 17.9.49: "...He (i.e. Dr Atherstone) is one of the Maastrom clique..." Op. Rhodes House Collection f 239. R.White to Godlonton, 22.2.52; Cory Collection MS 7097. R.White to Godlonton, 18.3.52.
  6. Monitor. 15.11.50. "A Landowner" to Editor.



was that of the Journal. Godlonton's support of Smith, his determined opposition to the behaviour of the Anti-Convict Association, and his tactlessness seem to have caused the final break. In July 1849, he told Southey that the attack on Smith for his attitude to the convict question had divided public opinion,<sup>(1)</sup> but in the following month, after Godlonton's attempt to obtain a private renewal of the contract for the printing of government advertisements,<sup>(2)</sup> the Franklin group prepared an attack on the Godlontonians. The ill-success which attended their attempt seems to indicate that the Godlonton party was still by far the more powerful in Grahamstown. Godlonton related the sequel to Southey:

The Anti-Convict Association here mastered strong last night, and as neither Hadley nor myself were there, had it pretty well their own way. Franklin had prepared a vote of censure upon the Journal, but had the grace to get Birkenruth, who is just hot from Cape Town, to propose it. This however was withdrawn - for a resolution that the Journal does not express the sentiments of the People. Even this would not do, and finally they dragged a resolution through that the Journal does not express the sentiments of that Association. Here is an anti climax with a vengeance...<sup>(3)</sup>

Godlonton's unwavering support of Smith also earned him the enmity of members of the Frontier party outside Grahamstown: Rice Smith of Sidbury was disgusted, and wrote to cancel his order of the Journal, as he maintained that Godlonton was injuring the frontier by praising Smith "up to the skies", when in fact Smith had done the frontier more injury than any other Governor during the last fifteen years.<sup>(4)</sup> The Uitenhage Library cancelled its subscription to the Journal because of Godlonton's stand on the convict issue.<sup>(5)</sup>

The Frontier Times, after this, seldom lost an opportunity of exposing the favours bestowed on Godlonton by the Governor: its correspondents drew attention to the fact that Edward Irving, a Clerk in the Magistrate's Office, had been

- 
1. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 3.7.49.
  2. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 4.8.49; 20.8.49.
  3. ACC. 611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 20.8.49.
  4. ACC. 622/2. Rice Smith to Godlonton, 9.2.49.
  5. EPH. 28.7.49.



allowed to edit the Journal during the absence of Godlonton at the 1850 session of the Council - A.W. Beck, in similar circumstances on a former occasion had been forced to resign his official post in compliance with a government regulation. (1) In November 1850 a public dinner was given to Godlonton by the people of Swellendam, and the Frontier Times and other hostile papers explained the laudatory address which was presented to him as an instance of official favour. A considerable correspondence ensued as to who had been present at the dinner. (2)

Hougham Hudson, Civil Commissioner of Albany, was also a Stockenströmian, (3) and during the first part of the Kaffir War of 1850-3, the Frontier Times complained that Sir Harry never sent public notices to Hudson or to the military commandant of Grahamstown for general publication in the colonial papers, but sent them only to "his friend and patron," Godlonton. (4) Whatever may have happened, the great publicity given to incidents such as these helps to shed light on the jealousy and animosity with which Godlonton's actions were viewed even in Grahamstown.

After 1848, the separatist movement became entangled in the movement for Representative Government. (5) At the end of 1846, Lord Grey had intimated that the British Government would give sympathetic consideration to any demand for representative institutions at the Cape, and in 1848 Smith had requested the leading officials of the colony for their

- 
1. CPT. 15.10.50. "Scrutor" to Editor; GTJ. 26.10.50; CPT. 29.10.50; 5.11.50. Cp. Godlonton Papers, W.A. Richards to Godlonton: 8.5.56. "Irving got a £100 a year from us for rendering partial aid..."
  2. CPT. 12.11.50; 10.12.50; GTJ. 16.11.50; 28.12.50.
  3. Vide, e.g. Wory Collection. MS. 934. W.F. Hertzog to Hudson, 24.11.43: "P.S. I had the pleasure of a visit of our friend Sir Andries - he is well and also his family..."; ibid. MS 854. H. Hudson to Stockenström: "...the Memorandum which you lately sent back to me..."
  4. CPT. 6.5.51.
  5. See: op. cit. pp. 123.



opinions on the matter. In their replies, all the officials had agreed with the Attorney-General in condemning any attempt to secure a separate legislature in the Eastern Districts. Smith was also hostile to separation, and after he had sent off the Attorney-General's draft, together with the memoranda upon which it was based, the agitation in the Eastern Province began. In September 1848, a Grahamstown public meeting agreed to form an association "for the purpose of procuring on the frontier an Independent Government with a representative assembly." In the following month, Smith, in reply to the Port Elizabeth declaration that even a Representative Assembly would not be suitable for the East, shocked the Eastern Province by announcing that he had himself been responsible for the abolition of the Lieutenant-Governorship; he dismissed both separation and removal as impracticable. While Porter's Draft was being considered by the Committee of the Board of Trade and Foreign Plantations of the Privy Council, there arose the violent political agitation over the proposal of Grey to send a ship-load of convicts to the Cape. It was not long after the "Neptune" had finally sailed for Van Diemen's Land that the Report of the Privy Council on the Draft Constitution arrived; and from the time of its arrival early in 1850, began a revival of the separatist agitation.

Godlonton had made up his mind on the course he would pursue: in May 1850, one of Southey's correspondents complained that the frontiersmen were "wedded to the Separation view of the case", <sup>(1)</sup> and at this stage, Godlonton certainly was. In one of his private letters at this time, he summed up his attitude:

I should be satisfied with Removal, but for my own part I think this is more unlikely than Separation. A great many arguments suggest themselves on both sides, but after weighing all that occurs to me the preponderance is in favour of

---

1. ACC. 611/3. Hargreaves (?) to Southey, 27.5.50.



Separation. I don't think an expensive government the best one, and, as a tailor would say, we must 'cut our coat according to our cloth.' At all events we must not consent to be ruled by a Cape Town mob! We have had enough of that and no sacrifice can be considered as too great which shall save us from such domination in future. (1)

At the end of 1849 and during the early months of 1850, the Journal bristled with abuse of the Cape Town Anti-Convict Association. (2) Godlonton expressed the opinion that the Eastern Districts would prefer the rule even of a Governor without a Council, to that of a Parliament assembled in Cape Town and composed of Cape men. (3) He shrewdly kept before the public the example of the successful agitation in the parallel case of Port Philip against Sydney, and pointed to the lessons which could be learnt from this agitation in Australia; (4) at the Cape, he maintained, there was even a stronger case against a policy of centralisation, for the colonisation of the interior had made effective government on the frontier vitally necessary. Indeed, the intensity of feeling on the frontier against a "TABLE MOUNTAIN PARLIAMENT" (5) was forcefully summed up by one of the Journal's correspondents, who declared that such a Parliament would be "little more acquainted with the true policy requisite to govern the frontier, than those redoubtable personages, the Emperor of China, or the King of the Cannibal Islands!" (6)

With a little stimulation from the Cape Town Mail, Godlonton's concept of separation was thus developing into one of a far-reaching scheme for combining all the British

1. ACC 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 18.5.50. Cp. ACC. 611/2 Godlonton to Southey, 20.8.49: "One result of this agitation is that Albany will never consent to be represented in an Assembly sitting in Cape Town. We will not trust the Fairbairnites, nor Ebdenites - and hence a Separation or the removal of the seat of government is inevitable."
2. GTJ. 24.11.49; 9.3.50; 16.3.50; 23.3.50; 30.3.50; 20.4.50.
3. GTJ. 16.3.50
4. GTJ. 19.1.50; 27.4.50.
5. GTJ. 20.4.50
6. GTJ. 16.3.50. "John Bull" to Editor.



colonies in South Africa into a federal union, in which the rights and independence of each province would receive adequate recognition. As we have seen, he had been in favour of this scheme in 1847,<sup>(1)</sup> and when, towards the end of 1849, the Cape Town Mail, inspired by the admirable report of the Board of Trade and Plantations recommending a federal government for the Australian colonies, had albeit prematurely revived the idea,<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton seized upon it with avidity. At this time, Port Elizabeth was in agreement with the two main towns of the colony: its hatred of the imperious Montagu,<sup>(3)</sup> who, it maintained, was "trading in appointments"<sup>(4)</sup>, was strong enough to drive it into the most strenuous opposition to any tendency towards centralisation, and the Herald declared itself in favour of the federal principle as well.<sup>(5)</sup> By April 1850, the Cape Town Mail could proclaim triumphantly that the Eastern Province papers were unanimous in demanding a federal union.<sup>(6)</sup> Public meetings in places such as Grahamstown, Uitenhage and Sidbury demanded resident government,<sup>(7)</sup> and Cape Town was split into the "centralists" and the "federalists," the former led by Fairbairn and the latter by the Cape Town Mail group under Buchanan.<sup>(8)</sup>

In May 1850, Smith, on the instructions of the Secretary of State, set about the task of reconstituting the Legislative Council which had been broken up the previous year. Because of his unfortunate experiences with unofficial members in 1849, he tried to secure the nomination of members who would have some popular support by inviting recommendations from the municipalities and Divisional Road Boards. At the same time he published the report of the Committee of the Board of Trade

- 
1. Vide p. 132 sqq.
  2. Sole: op. cit. p. 134 et seq. Cp. CTM. 23.3.50.
  3. EPH. 17.3.49.
  4. EPH. 24.3.49.
  5. EPH. 2.3.50.
  6. CTM. 13.4.50.
  7. CTJ. May 1850 passim.
  8. CTM. 27.4.50.



and Foreign Plantations to the Privy Council, which was to be used as the basis for the discussions of the Legislative Council on the proposed Representative Institutions for the Cape. Three fundamental conditions had been laid down: that the Legislature should consist of a Governor and two Houses, both of which were to be elective; that the Chief Justice should be ex officio president of the Legislative Council; and that the Governor should have the power to dissolve both Houses simultaneously or the Assembly alone. Godlonton at once criticised the fact that the West would predominate:

We have said enough, we trust, to arouse the inhabitants of this Division of the Colony to a sense of the great interest they have at stake in the discussions and settlement of this question. Fortunately a middle path has been pointed out, which may meet the case, if entered on in a proper spirit, and conduct both Provinces to a safe and satisfactory decision. We mean the adoption of the Federal principle; in other words, the formation in each Province of its own local Federal Union. To this the South African Settlements or Colonies must ultimately come. At this moment a strong tide of Emigration is setting in both at Natal and in the Northern Sovereignty, and it will be wise and politic for the old Cape Colony to take the initiative, and by an amicable division of its two Provinces, present an example which may be safely and advantageously followed by every other division, - showing that, though entirely independent of each other in local affairs, there still existed a common bond of union, consolidating their varied interests, and giving strength and symmetry to the whole of British South Africa.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was at this time that Godlonton urged the Easterners to send representatives to the Council to secure justice for the frontier in the proposed Representative Institutions.<sup>(2)</sup>

It is clear that Godlonton had little desire to become a member of the Council and was virtually appointed against his expressed wish. It is true that he accepted nomination as a candidate and came eleventh in the poll.<sup>(2b)</sup> But that was as far as Godlonton wanted to go. About a week before the election in Grahamstown, he informed Southey, who, as Secretary to the High Commissioner, had Smith's confidence, that he need have no fear with regard to Blaine, who was sure to be elected.<sup>(3)</sup>

1. GTJ. 11.5.50.

2a. GTJ. 11.5.50.

2b. Vide Appendix II infra.

3. Vide, GTJ. 31.8.50, in which "FAIR PLAY", writing to the Editor, says that, right till the end, Godlonton was publicly canvassing votes for Blaine or Moxon, and the writer was left with the impression that Godlonton "did not desire or seek for a seat."



"I cannot doubt but Sir Harry will select him," he added confidently.<sup>(1)</sup> On 27th May, nine days later, he informed Southey that some of his friends had suggested that he should himself go to the Council to "beard Fairbairn," but he laughingly passed it off and insisted that "Blaine is our man, and you must get Sir H. to select him let who will be named. He will do us credit in every respect, and a fitter man cannot be found."<sup>(2)</sup>

Then Godlonton's plans misfired. On 31st May, it was announced that he was at the top of the poll in the Grahamstown election, and on 3rd June, his letter to Southey expressed his concern at the turn of events:

You will see by the Journal the turn matters have taken in respect to the election. I dare say that you will be as surprised as I was at finding me at the head of the poll; and that without soliciting a single vote, or moving a finger to lead to such a result during any part of the contest.

Then in order to justify his actions and his intended withdrawal, he added:

You will see by my reply to the Commissioners here, that I step cautiously. My being in the field will embarrass the Baronet and Fairbairne, and hence I would not give a denial, much as my inclination prompted me to do so. The fact is I am too far advanced in life to have my ambition (?) aroused. What comports with my own inclination is quiet, and to this I look with a sort of yearning desire which I cannot well describe to you. Hence I want you to interfere as a personal favour, so that I may not be selected by Sir Harry. I may say here, that I had another motive for not giving a refusal, namely the opportunity it may probably afford to Sir H. of rejecting F. as well as myself on the ground that the sentiments of Editors of Newspapers may be known without being propounded in the Legislative Council....I could not go to the Cape but at the greatest inconvenience - and which I feel so sensibly that though I enlist you to save me from it, I intend to write to Sir H. myself on the same subject. My mind is directed towards Bloemfontein, where White I expect will have the "Friend of the Sovereignty" out today... All I want now is to escape with credit. It is generally thought that for this Province the Baronet and I shall be at the head of the poll, .... I am told, he says that if he has a sufficient number of votes he will take his seat - so that the Legislative Council promises to become a scene of high interest. I shall enjoy the exhibition provided I am not an actor, and which nothing will induce me to be, except I should be placed in such a fix as that I cannot extricate myself with credit, or without damaging the cause in which we have a common interest.<sup>(3)</sup>

---

1. AGO.611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 18.5.50

2. AGO.611/3 Godlonton to Southey, 27.5.50

3. AGO.611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 3.6.50.



A week later, Godlonton wrote again to Southey, and, as his remarks express the dilemma in which Smith found himself, it is well to quote them at some length. After detailing Stockenstrom's success at Graaff-Reinet, he observed:

At present, then, should Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage remain sulky and not vote - there are four names that must come under the notice of Sir Harry, out of which he will have to select two members for this province. These names are Sir A. Stockenstrom, Meintjes, Blaine and myself. Who will Sir H. choose? I am most repugnant to go - and I have let Sir H. know this - Stockenstrom is a determined opponent of Sir Harry's frontier policy, and has withall, as I conceive, grossly insulted him. Will he appoint him - or rather can he avoid appointing him, seeing that he is returned by an overwhelming majority in this Province, to say nothing of the other? I am most anxious to avoid going - but should Sir Harry appoint Stockenstrom and myself I should consider it imperative on me to accept, as my refusal to meet S. would be construed into an exhibition on my part of my moral cowardice. (1) I hope a middle path will be taken and that Sir Harry will consider himself justified in rejecting us both. By taking Meintjes and Blaine he will take a Separatist and one of opposite sentiments on this subject, while the Province will be represented by two Englishmen (including Cock) and one Africander. I think this is the most prudential arrangement Sir H. can make - and he may then exclude both Fairbairne and myself on the ground that Editors of Newspapers may be more useful to the public out of Council than in. I hope you will urge this upon Sir H... Blaine and Meintjes are the men Sir Harry ought to appoint, and whom he will appoint, if he wish to avoid altercation with the factious Baronet. (2)

Godlonton revealed in the bold phraseology of these letters, the true nature of his hostility to Stockenstrom and Fairbairn, and showed that both he and Sir Harry regarded the election of 1850 as a personal struggle between himself, on the one side and the Stockenstrom-Fairbairn clique, on the other. (3) And the fact that Smith eventually appointed Godlonton - despite Godlonton's private explanation of his reasons for accepting candidature <sup>and</sup> despite his re-iterated

1. William Southey saw the election in the same light. "If Stockenstrom be appointed, as most likely he will," he wrote, "then Sir Harry must nominate Godlonton to battle with him - as Mr G. had plenty of courage and principles too..." William Southey to Richard Southey, AOC.611/3, 14.6.50. (cf. 11.6.50.)
2. AOC.611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 10.6.50.
3. In October, 1850, he admitted to the people of Swellendam, at a public meeting given in his honour: "...It was well known that for many years I had differed widely on public matters with Sir Andreas Stockenstrom... This being the case, I determined should Sir Andreas be nominated that I would not shrink from meeting the Hon. Baronet and saying to his face, if occasion should call for it, what I had said of him when at a distance." GEJ. 26.10.50.



wish to withdraw - underlines the general impression that Smith was almost helpless and was depending upon Godlonton to defend him against his enemies in the Council as well as in the press. <sup>(1)</sup> By ignoring Meintjes, who was above Godlonton on the poll, and who could therefore legitimately claim precedence over him as the representative of Eastern Province interests, Smith was only expressing in a more positive way than he had done in refusing to allow Godlonton to withdraw, his open defiance and fear <sup>(2)</sup> of the Stockenstrom-Fairbairn party, since Meintjes was the Baronet's son-in-law. <sup>(3)</sup> Moreover,

1. Godlonton had written to Sir Harry, and was annoyed at his apparent refusal to understand his motives. On 24th June, he wrote to Southey: "I don't know whether I have written to you since I got a letter from Colonel Garvock in reply to mine enclosing a note to Sir Harry begging him to pass me over and appoint Blaine. Garvock writes rather ambiguously. He says Sir H. is pleased with my position in the poll; - but at the same time I gather from the tenor of his letter that he is disinclined to bear a single atom of responsibility that ought in right to rest on me. He asks if I don't wish to serve why I don't refuse? This is a very natural question - though I think it might have occurred to Sir H. that my not refusing tends to embarrass the enemy, and gives him much more freedom of action than he would have were I out of the question..." Smith seems deliberately to have evaded giving Godlonton a chance to withdraw, for Godlonton adds: "Sir H. invited me to write to him when he was in O. Town. I have only written him twice, and to neither have received a scrap in return. When I write a third I think I shall deserve his neglect." Vide ACC 611/3. Godlonton to Southey, 24.6.50.
2. Vide P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1334). Stockenstrom to Montagu, 1.7.50. In this letter Stockenstrom criticises Smith's handling of the quarrel between the Tambookies and the Boers in <sup>the</sup> Klaser Smits river area. He says that he told Zacharias Pretorius, in November 1849, that he disapproved "entirely" of the Governor's measures. He mocks the "foot-kissing" episode at the end of the last war, and contends that D'Urban, not Glenelg, reversed the previous system "by revoking martial law, which Lieut-Colonel Smith himself knew and declared to be the foundation upon which the whole fabric rested....." (My italics) It was with knowledge such as this that Stockenstrom was able to frighten Smith..... At the end of the same month, Smith appointed Godlonton to the Council!
3. Godlonton's acceptance was a great relief to the Governor's circle. Garvock wrote to Southey: "I am very glad Godlonton has accepted. I at one time very much doubted his doing so, and sincerely hope it will not materially embarrass his private affairs....." ACC.611/3. Garvock to Southey, 29.7.50.



it is clear that Stockenström was the bête noire of the official clique throughout this period.<sup>(1)</sup> Thus Godlonton attended the sittings of the Council primarily with the intention of securing constitutional recognition of the plea for resident government in the Eastern Cape. At the end of 1849, he had said that the successful working of Representative Government would be the "great question" of 1850,<sup>(2)</sup> and he had not failed to point to all the grievances which would justify the Eastern Districts in demanding their own separate government.<sup>(3)</sup> In June, he remarked that one of the strongest objections to separation had been the fear that the Eastern Province would be burdened with the affairs of Kaffirland; this, he pointed out, was no longer to be feared, as a separate government had already been created for Kaffirland by the Imperial Government.<sup>(4)</sup> The way, then was at last clear for the immediate recognition of Eastern Province needs by the Imperial Government and by the Western Province, and it was essential for the Eastern Districts not to allow the West to take all the initiative in the discussion on Representative Institutions. It was, as Godlonton said,<sup>(5)</sup> "a golden opportunity, which, if lost, may never be regained," and the Easterners had to make up their minds whether or not<sup>(6)</sup> they were to be "the passive creatures of a Cape Town majority." From the beginning of May till the meeting of the Council in September, Grahamstown was the scene of no less than three public meetings demanding local self-government, and Godlonton stimulated the agitation by criticising the injustice of

---

1. John Montagu wrote to Southey in January 1851: "I think with you that the appointment of Stockenström to any post connected with the war would be attended with much mischief - and I am glad you have written to Garvoek on the point." AGO 611/4. Montagu to Southey, Jan. 1851. Vide, Montagu's letter of 27.1.51 as well, and AGO 611/4, H.L. Maydwell to Southey, 21.1.51: "...I should like to see one A.S. indicted for high treason. This Kafir War is political I think, the colored classes being so generally mixed up with them..."

2. GTJ. 29.12.49.

3. GTJ. 5.1.50; 19.1.50; 18.5.50; 25.5.50; 1.6.50.

4. GTJ. 8.6.50

5. GTJ. 2.3.50; 9.3.50; 8.6.50;

6. GTJ. 8.6.50.



Porter's Draft, <sup>(1)</sup> by criticising the restricted powers of the Municipalities, <sup>(2)</sup> by praising the Grahamstown Municipality for demanding a separate government, <sup>(3)</sup> by stressing the injustice of the Western Province in securing all the best immigrants, <sup>(4)</sup> and by stressing the necessity for keeping a vigilant eye upon the despotic designs of Cape Town.

The four leaders of the party opposed to the government, Fairbairn, Stockenström, Reitz and Brand, had nominated Fleming of Port Elizabeth to the fifth seat on the council and the machinery of the Anti-Convict Association had been set in motion again, in order to secure the return of these five candidates. In Cape Town it was entirely successful, for all five were returned; <sup>(5)</sup> but Fleming had, in the meantime, declined candidature, <sup>(6)</sup> so that the unofficial group finally comprised three from the Western Province, and two from the Eastern, though Stockenström was so closely allied with the Fairbairn clique that Godlonton and Cock (who was a Government nominee) were in fact the only Eastern representatives.

The proceedings of the Council not only substantiated the tenacity of Godlonton's opinions, but also illustrated the interaction of politics and journalism. The Godlontonians had anticipated trouble <sup>(7)</sup>, and from the beginning, the proceedings of the council were animated: at the first meeting on 6th September, Fairbairn and Stockenström, who had all along been determined to oust Godlonton from the Council, <sup>(8)</sup> questioned the legality of his appointment, <sup>(9)</sup> and on the 10th, when Godlonton was present for the first time, further discussion ensued until Godlonton's threat to resign put an end to the

---

1. GTJ. 18.5.50

2. GTJ. 20.7.50

3. GTJ. 27.7.50

4. GTJ. 3.8.50 Cf. also GTJ. 13.7.50; 10.8.50; 24.8.50.

5. CTM. 25.5.50

6. Sole: op. cit. p.137.

7. e.g. Godlonton Papers, T.Stringfellow to Godlonton, 23.7.50; W.Southey to Godlonton, 9.8.50: "Mr Long tells me that Stockenströms party talk of a move to get you out! ..."

8. GTJ. 19.10.50, "P" to Editor.

9. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362). p 20.



discussion.<sup>(1)</sup> On the 18th, Stockenström presented the report of the committee on the election returns, and the Attorney-General's motion that the appointments had all been in conformity with the Government Notice of the 6th May, was carried against Stockenström, Fairbairn, Brand and Reitz.<sup>(2)</sup>

The two main bones of contention were the franchise and the qualification for membership of the Upper House. The British Government had made it clear that no constitution would be sanctioned which drew a distinction between the peoples of the Colony on the grounds of race or colour. What had to be decided was whether the franchise should be high or low, and in voting on this, members necessarily had the coloured classes in mind. On the 11th September, it was unanimously resolved to adopt the low £25 "occupation" franchise,<sup>(3)</sup> and on the same day, the Committee agreed that the qualification for membership of the House of Assembly should be the same as for the electors.<sup>(4)</sup> On the 13th, it was agreed that the qualifications for electors for the Legislative Council should be the same as for the Lower House,<sup>(5)</sup> but on the following day, when Stockenström moved that the qualification of electors of both Houses should be the same, Godlonton, with all the settler respect for class distinction, and bearing in mind the low franchise for the Assembly "which will hold the purse-strings, and in fact possess all the power", moved as an amendment that the qualification for electors of the Legislative Council should be the occupancy or ownership of property to the value of £100. Godlonton's amendment was lost, and the original motion carried by a majority of one.<sup>(6)</sup>

Closely linked with the franchise question, was the problem of membership of the Upper House. In view of the low

- 
1. Ibid. p 22
  2. Ibid. p 58
  3. Ibid. p 156
  4. Ibid. p 156
  5. Ibid. p 157
  6. Ibid. pp 157-8.



franchise adopted on the 11th September, Godlonton took a particular interest in this aspect of the debates. On the 13th the subject came up for discussion, and on the 14th, the Attorney-General presented a petition from certain landholders in Cape Town, praying for a property qualification of not less than £1000 unencumbered. Fairbairn opposed any property qualification at all, but his amendment was defeated much to the delight of Godlonton, who described Fairbairn's speech in his journal as "one of the most jesuitical speeches I ever heard or read" and added that Fairbairn was "a clever crafty theorist nothing more."<sup>(1)</sup> Godlonton summed up his attitude in the following words:

I have no confidence in the political common sense of the uneducated people. There are great masses of people in a transition state- Hottentots, and persons of that class, who will now enjoy the elective franchise, and I am persuaded that they could be turned in any way by a political adventurer. I think on that account we are bound to secure the rights of property, by providing that proper men be elected to make laws by which these rights will be protected.<sup>(2)</sup>

Finally, the Attorney-General's motion, seconded by Godlonton, was carried against Fairbairn, Stockenstrom, Brand and Reitz: it prescribed a qualification for members of the Legislative Council of unmortgaged immovable property to the value of £2000 or general property to the value of £4000.<sup>(3)</sup>

So far as the Eastern Districts were concerned, the all-important problem was again that of resident government. At the time of his departure for the Council, Godlonton had observed that "although the new Constitution has authority to administer the whole affairs of the Colony generally, it does not possess the privilege of sub-dividing staff. This will be a disappointment to many of our readers yet still their cause is not altogether beyond remedy."<sup>(4)</sup> At the first meeting

---

1. Godlonton's MS. Journal. 13.9.50.

2. F.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362) pp 48-55, Cp. Gash: Politics in the Age of Peel. passim.

3. Ibid. p.157.

4. GTJ. 31.8.50. Cp. GTJ. 7.9.50. "Publico" to Editor, says that the Eastern Province members have "pledged by published documents to advocate either a change in the seat of government to a more central position, or that the Eastern Province shall have separate local Institutions."



he attended, Cock did not hesitate to inform the committee that the frontiersmen would not "submit to one central government, in which they have not the control of their own affairs."

Stockenström immediately informed them that he had lately received information from Graaff-Reinet that nine out of ten of the inhabitants were opposed to immediate separation, and that consequently he would be unable to co-operate in any move in that direction. (1)

On the 14th, the Committee considered the mode of election to the Upper House. Godlonton saw that it was here that the interests of the East could be safeguarded, and in his private journal, he gave the following account of how he and Cock strove to obtain official recognition of the needs of the East:

The next question was the mode of election - the opposition party proposing that the whole Colony should constitute one large electoral district and that of the whole vote of the Colony the 15 candidates having the greatest number of votes, should form the Council. This Cock and myself strenuously resisted, shewing that by the proposed arrangement it would throw the whole power of the country into the hands of the Cape Town people. I was for dividing the colony into two great divisions, and giving to each the same number of votes. During the discussion Dr Innes who was present handed a memorandum to the Attorney-General suggesting that the divisions, 22 in number, as they now stand, should be taken as electoral districts - thus giving 11 to each province, and that those 15 candidates having the votes of the greatest number of divisions should form the Council. This course after a great deal of discussion was adopted; thus giving to each Province an equal amount of power, and destroying entirely that preponderance which Cape Town from the number of its inhabitants would otherwise have enjoyed. Sir Andreas Stockenström, Fairbairne, Brand and Reitz voted against this proposition, all the rest for it. (2)

On the 20th September, the four "popular" members resigned, ostensibly (3) because they did not agree with the Governor's proposal to lay the estimates and other general legislation before the Council, which, they claimed in their eleven "Reasons for Dissent", had been reconstituted solely for the

---

1. Ibid. p.26.

2. Godlonton's MS. Journal. 14.9.50.

3. That people did regard the reconstituted Council not merely as a constituent body is proved, e.g., by a private letter to Godlonton. Vide Godlonton Papers, A.M. MacGillewie to Godlonton, 12.7.50: "At this moment, in addition to the formation of our New Constitution, there are, I understand, several matters connected with the public service which will be brought before the Council...."



purpose of discussing the introduction of Representative institutions, and which "but partially enjoys the public confidence."<sup>(1)</sup> Godlonton and Cock, not to be out-done, sent to the Governor the following morning,<sup>(2)</sup> twelve "Reasons for Assent", stating that they had attended the Council "in good faith to act as Legislative Councillors" and that to resign "would be the abandonment of a solemn duty." The Eastern Province, they said, was clearly in favour of a temporary resuscitation of the Council, because of the urgent need for a vagrant law, for passing the estimates and for the continuance of public works.<sup>(3)</sup> But, after Sir Andries Stockenström had read his "Reasons for Dissent", he and the other "popular" members had resigned from the Council, which then adjourned <sup>(4)</sup>sine die.

On the 23rd September, Smith, as a way out of the impasse nominated the seven remaining members a Government Commission, and instructed them to continue with the discussions and to present their report to him.<sup>(5)</sup> Godlonton and Cock <sup>meekly</sup>~~weakly~~ accepted nomination<sup>s</sup> and the Commission presented its report on the 30th September.<sup>(6)</sup> In the meantime, Godlonton and Cock had not failed to express their dissatisfaction with the Constitution drafted by the Committee of the Privy Council. During September, the merchants and traders of Grahamstown had expressed in a petition to Smith,<sup>(7)</sup> their disappointment at the non-recognition of the Eastern desire for resident government and on the 27th, Godlonton recorded in his journal that "he had been employed in drawing up a list of thirty-one "Exceptions to having a Government to the Colony which does

- 
1. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362). pp.13-14.
  2. Godlonton's MS Journal. 20.9.50.
  3. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362). p.15.
  4. Ibid. p. 87.
  5. Ibid. p.18.
  6. Ibid. p.151.
  7. OTJ. 21.9.50.



not give to the Eastern Province its own local institutions."<sup>(1)</sup>  
 These were laid before the Council on 30th and, Godlonton  
 said, "were commented on in terms of approval."<sup>(2)</sup> The document  
 was a summary of the struggle for resident government since  
 1823, stressing the dangers to which the East was exposed  
 from the Kaffirs and the obstacles to its commercial pros-  
 perity which resulted from having a government six hundred  
 miles distant. The case of Port Philip in Australia was once  
 again cited, and the fact that the Eastern Province was well  
 able to afford a separate government was reiterated. They  
 emphasised that, because of the difficulties of distance and  
 communication, the Eastern Province would not be adequately  
 represented in the proposed Parliament, and also that a power-  
 ful government in situ was essential for the maintenance of  
 satisfactory relations with Kaffraria and the Sovereignty.<sup>(3)</sup>

Both in Cape Town and in the East, the proceedings of  
 the Council came under fire. The Cape Town Mail, which had  
 disapproved of the draft of the Privy Council because it  
 would reserve so much irresponsible power to the Colonial  
 Office and its nominees,<sup>(4)</sup> distrusted the official members  
 of the Council,<sup>(5)</sup> and though it praised Smith's Minute at the  
 opening of the session, it expressed surprise at his failure  
 to mention the questions of local institutions, the suffrage  
 or the civil list.<sup>(6)</sup> Its main source of concern was that the  
 official clique would try to retain its stranglehold on the  
 colony, and thus it greeted the low franchise adopted by the  
 Council as a measure tending to prevent "caste domination".<sup>(7)</sup>  
 It was not surprising that the Mail approved of the resig-  
 nation of the "popular" members, and attributed their action

1. Godlonton's MS Journal, 27.9.50

2. Ibid. 30th September, 1850.

3. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362). pp 159-62

4. CTM. 10.8.50; 31.8.50.

5. CTM. 2.2.50; 3.8.50.

6. CTM. 6.9.50.

7. CTM. 31.8.50; 21.9.50. Buchanan had continuously pressed for  
 an educational, rather than property, qualification:  
 CTM. 23.3.50; 4.5.50.



(1)

to the despotic designs of the officials.

In the East, opinion was divided. Port Elizabeth was more liberal than Grahamstown: in March 1850, Paterson said that one of the lessons which the colony had learnt from the behaviour of the Council during the Anti-Convict crisis had been the need for admitting the "popular element" to a greater share in the government. (2) Combined with this was a burning desire for decentralisation, (3) so that, while approving of the £25 franchise, he was dissatisfied with the high property qualification decided on for membership of the Council, for this would exclude intelligence in favour of property. (4) In Grahamstown, the Frontier Times criticised the attitude of Cock and Godlonton, inveighed against "the creation of a landed aristocracy", and demanded "an aristocracy of honor and intelligence" instead. (5) The Graham's Town Journal, on the other hand, echoed the sentiments expressed by Godlonton in the Council. There is little doubt that Godlonton, while in Cape Town, contributed considerably to the Journal, (6) and even when he did not, the views of his deputies were <sup>usually</sup> ~~exactly~~ in keeping with his own. In September, the Journal had expressed profound disappointment at the passing of the £25 franchise: it would be productive of bribery and corruption among those

1. CTM. 21.9.50.

2. EPA. 2.3.50.

3. EPA. 9.3.50; 11.5.50.

4. EPA. 26.9.50.

5. CTT. 24.9.50.

6. From a remark in one of Mrs Godlonton's letters to her husband, while he was in Cape Town for the session of 1852, ("We felt interested in your diary...": Godlonton Papers, 24.2.52) it is clear that he used to send his diary home in the form of letters. His MS. Journal had obviously been folded and addressed to his wife. The parts on his political activities seem to have been intended for the guidance of his deputies in the Journal office, for one section in his journal was marked off with a line in the margin, next to which are the words "The passage marked with this line to be used by White with attention so as to worked (sic) up into the Journal." (Compare the passage marked in the journal with a passage in GTJ. 5.10.50. page 2, column 3).



who would be "ready to lend their support, not to the ablest candidate, but to the best bidder." The innate respect for property and class distinction, indigenous in all ranks of contemporary British society, was epitomised in a paragraph which showed a distinct bias against the Kat River Settlement:

The forthcoming elections will present a novelty - the Merchants of Graham's Town and landed proprietors of Albany voting side by side with the Kat River Hottentots, and all equally eligible for Members of the Legislative. If the qualifications of the Lower Chamber alone had been fixed at £25 tenancy it might have been well, but to throw open the selection of the constituent materiel of the Upper House to everyone, is unquestionably very impolitic... Our only safeguard appeared to be a highly qualified Upper House - but it would argue that now, not only the voters, but also the Representatives are to have qualifications of a very mediocre class..."(1)

It was not surprising that the aggressive Settler attitude to the low franchise, as represented in the Journal, led the people of Philipton in the Kat River Settlement to address the Governor with expressions of alarm in October. (2)

The Frontier Times expressed itself against the federal principle, as it feared that the general assembly would still be under the influence of Cape Town, which would not provide the requisite funds for frontier defence: (3) this fear was heightened by the knowledge that the Home Government was claiming to reserve an annual amount of Cape money for the Governor's salary and for border defence, so that it was essential for the Eastern Districts to attain an independence which would be as unrestricted as possible. (4) The Midlands were by now afraid of separation (5) and Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth had spoken scornfully about each other's claims to take the lead in the separatist struggle, (6) for Port Elizabeth was jealous of the Kowie scheme which Cock and Godlonton were trying to foster. But in October, the Journal tried to re-

unite them by drawing attention to the satisfaction which a

1. GTJ. 21.9.50. Op.GTJ. 28.9.50: "...if a voter has hereditary property, or has acquired wealth and position by his own toil, either or both of these propositions are strongly presumptive that such a person is removed above the common herd, and therefore the suitability, the preference of an individual of this description to enjoy the exclusive rights of the franchise is strongly implied."

2. P.F. 1851, XXXVII (1362), p 138.

3. OFT. 6.8.50

4. OFT. 30.7.50; 20.8.50; 27.8.50.

5. CFM. 21.9.50.

6. RPH. 11.5.50; OFT. 27.8.50. "Grandmother, Graham's Town" to Editor. GTJ. 5.10.50. "Publicola" to Editor.



recent public meeting in Port Elizabeth had expressed at the "Thirty-One Exceptions" of Cock and Godlonton:

The general feeling, was that Messrs Cock and Godlonton were entitled to the thanks of the advocates of a Resident Eastern Government. Port Elizabeth, as a community, is prepared to drop all ill-feeling, and to go hand-in-hand with Graham's Town on the Resident Government quest.<sup>(1)</sup>

Paterson, on the same day, urged the Eastern Districts to sink their differences and to demand resident government at a time when the Western Province was divided against itself.<sup>(2)</sup>

The "popular" members, after their resignation on the 20th September, had turned to the Cape Town Municipality for their support. The struggle between the merchants, who had for long propped up the authority of the conservative Legislative Council, and the Municipality, which had been the core of the opposition to the reactionary "government party", flared up once again. Smith, in his despatches to the Secretary of State, discredited the electioneering tactics and the unpatriotic motives of the "Town House party" and emphasised the support he had always received from the principal mercantile establishments as proof of the factionalism of his opponents.<sup>(3)</sup> In the meantime, the "popular" members, with J. H. Wicht, had drawn up their own draft constitution at the request of the Cape Town Municipality: their draft was not very different from that of the Commission, but was evidently designed to reduce the power of the officials and of the more conservative sections of the population, for, though accepting a £25 franchise, it prescribed a £1000 property qualification for members of the Upper House,<sup>(4)</sup> denied the officials a vote in either House, and stipulated that the Governor should not be allowed to dissolve one House without dissolving the other.<sup>(5)</sup> At the same time, they angled for the support of

---

1. STJ. 12.10.50

2. EPN. 12.10.50.

3. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362), Smith to Grey, 2.10.50; 30.11.50.

4. Vide Newman: Memoir of John Montagu, p 380

5. Ibid. pp 90-1.



the Municipalities and road boards throughout the colony, and though Grahamstown, Albany and Port Elizabeth condemned their proceedings, petitions in favour of what they had done, poured in from all parts of the colony.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Governor had published the report of the Government Commission on 2nd October, and at the beginning of December, he called for an expression of public opinion on the constitution proposed by the Commission; in January 1851, the Attorney-General completed his final draft on the basis of the petitions which had been presented, the memoranda of the officials, and the report of the Commission.<sup>(2)</sup>

In the midst of the crisis, the eighth Kaffir War broke out. Smith was forced to hasten to the frontier, and the task of presiding over the discussions fell upon the dictatorial and unpopular Secretary to Government, Montagu. He had been disgusted at the behaviour of Stockenströmites, whom he blamed for inciting opposition to the authority of the government - even to the extent of encouraging the burghers not to enrol for service in the war - and, in a letter to Southey, late in January 1851, he expressed his attitude to the introduction of representative institutions in a colony torn by such jealousies:

One thing is quite clear, that the people are not fit for those liberal institutions proposed for them - and I believe they will not be ripe for them for many years to come.<sup>(3)</sup>

This was portentous. In his Minute of 14th January on the subject of Representative Government, Montagu had exploited the notoriety of the political struggles which had arisen as a result of the Anti-Convict agitation in order to lend support to his contention that the interests of the English colonists could only be effectually protected against the rising flood of anti-English feeling by a Legislative Council nominated by the

---

1. Ibid. pp 11-17

2. Ibid. pp 171-87

3. AGC 611/4. Montagu to Southey, 27.1.51.



Crown. Moreover, he stressed that it was in the interests of the colony to allow each of the principal officials to vote in one or other of the Houses of Parliament.<sup>(1)</sup> Smith, in sending the Attorney-General's draft to Lord Grey, summed up the conflict of opinion over the report of the Government Commission by saying that an elective Upper House would be anti-English and, ironically enough, would not protect the coloured races! Not only did he urge the adoption of the original suggestion for a nominated Upper House, but he also deprecated the proposal to exclude officials from Parliament, since it was essential for the Governor to have responsible members to sponsor Government measures.<sup>(2)</sup>

At the end of October 1850, Fairbairn had left for England, with the "popular" draft constitution in his pocket,<sup>(3)</sup> and in March 1851 Stockenström followed him.<sup>(4)</sup> Their mission, which aimed at persuading the Home Government to accept their version of the constitution rather than that of the Commission, was watched anxiously by the conflicting political groups in the colony: the Cape Town Mail urged the colonists to back up the constitution drafted by the "popular" members,<sup>(5)</sup> and declared that, despite its low franchise, it was popular even amongst the wealthiest Cape Town landowners.<sup>(6)</sup> Two things, it explained, were of particular importance: that the Legislature should represent "the whole resident population, without exclusion of any class," and that it should "have the entire control of the colonial revenues,"<sup>(7)</sup> since a reserved civil list would deprive the colonists of all control over their executive officers, and would "reduce the parliament to a mere engine of popular agitation against the predominant influence of irresponsible officials."<sup>(8)</sup> But the East, harassed by another Kaffir War, was growing impatient. Paterson, though disapproving of Smith's rumoured intention to remove the

---

1. P.P. 1851, XXXVII (1362) pp 162-5

2. Ibid. Smith to Grey, 21.1.51.

3. Cory. p 261

4. STJ. 5.4.51

5. CTM. 28.9.50; 2.11.50.

6. CTM. 29.3.51.

7. CTM. 8.3.51.

8. CTM. 6.5.51.



Government to Uitenhage because of the ill-favour with which he viewed the Council, <sup>(1)</sup> objected to the "popular" draft, which did not recognise the claims of the East to an equal representation in the Upper House - this, he maintained, could lead only to "a western domination". <sup>(2)</sup> The unsatisfactory outcome of Smith's fleeting visit to the frontier at the end of 1850 had only re-inforced the old argument for resident government in place of "Visitant Government." <sup>(3)</sup> The Frontier Times <sup>(4)</sup> approved of the resignation of the "popular" members - probably because Franklin took delight in praising Godlonton's enemies - but was disappointed at both the official and unofficial drafts of the constitution, since neither had made adequate provision for the representation of the Eastern Province in the Council. <sup>(5)</sup> The extreme views of the Journal, especially on the low franchise, had begun to alienate the Dutch, and the Frontier Times pointed out that, because the views of the Journal were regarded by them as representative of the general opinion of the frontier districts, the Dutch were now beginning to feel that it would be better to seek redress of their grievances from the colonial legislature, rather than to agitate for a distinct and separate government. <sup>(6)</sup> For this reason, Franklin maintained that the East should agitate for a removal of the seat of government instead of a complete separation. <sup>(7)</sup>

In London, the political scene was as exciting as in Cape Town: from May till July, 1851, Stockenström and Fairbairn corresponded with Lord John Russell in an attempt to secure the approval of the Home Government for the "people's draft." <sup>(8)</sup> They condemned the actions of Smith in selecting

- 
1. EPN. 5.10.50
  2. EPN. 19.10.50.
  3. EPN. 23.11.50.
  4. CPT. 1.10.50
  5. CPT. 15.10.50.
  6. CPT. 15.10.50.editorial, and "Homo" to Editor.
  7. CPT. 26.11.50.
  8. Vide Copies of Correspondence with Lord John Russell on Representative Government at the Cape of Good Hope.



Godlonton, they justified their resignation, they claimed to represent the opinion of nine-tenths of the population, and they ascribed the political upheavals in the colony to "despotic misrule." C. B. Adderley, a leading figure in the Colonial Reform Society, sponsored their cause in the House of Commons and published a pamphlet entitled A Statement of the Present Cape Case. He was strongly biased in favour of the "Town House" party, and not only described Fairbairn as "the mouthpiece of almost the whole community," but criticised the Government party which, he said, had become so unpopular that it had had to start its own newspaper, the Cape Monitor.<sup>(1)</sup> He analysed the divergences between these "Sixteen Articles" and the draft proposed by the Government Commissioners, and accounted for these by declaring that the "popular" party were determined to prevent any infusion of "crown influence" in the proposed constitution. Yet he advised that separate local institutions should be granted to the Eastern Province if it desired them. John Adamson, a professor at the South African College and who was representative of the conservative opinion of Cape Town, replied to this pamphlet in his Notes on Cape Affairs, written in London in July 1851. He denounced the reprehensible behaviour of the Anti-Convict Association in striving to bring the working of the Council to a standstill, he deplored the fact that Smith's ill-advised acceptance of the resignation of the "popular" party had led to the erection of the municipality into an opposing government more powerful than the Government itself, he warned against extending the franchise too liberally, and he expressed his "glowing and indignant shame" at being represented by the deputation then in London.

---

1. "Aquila" in EPN. 5.4.53. said that Godlonton and Cock had suggested the founding of this paper and that Godlonton had not only written articles for it, but also had an interest in it.



At the Cape, great interest was taken in these events. The Cape Town Mail expressed its approval of Adderley's pamphlet<sup>(1)</sup> and assured the opponents of the low franchise that they would not be swamped, as the £25 franchise was far from universal: on the other hand, it was essential as a safeguard against "class legislation."<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton, afraid that Stockenström and Fairbairn would bring severe charges against Smith while in England,<sup>(3)</sup> had poked fun at Fairbairn's hasty departure for London,<sup>(4)</sup> and had seized every opportunity to cast aspersions upon his and Stockenström's behaviour,<sup>(5)</sup> especially after the Baronet's denunciation of the Governor's policy in his letters to the Observer.

In March 1851, Godlonton declared testily that the object of their mission to England was

....not to give effect to the recommendations of the Commissioners of Inquiry, but to set them aside, to secure for Cape Town the government of the rest of the colony; to augment the political power of the servile classes, so as that they may stand in successful antagonism to those who possess property.<sup>(6)</sup>

Moreover, he strove to discredit Adderley's Statement of the Present Cape Case,<sup>(7)</sup> which had been sympathetic to the cause of the Stockenströmites, and in May, he attacked the deputation and quoted passages from the Commercial Advertiser to illustrate the inconsistency and unreliability of Fairbairn's attitude to the Governor, while Stockenström was accused of jealousy towards the man who had torn up his treaties in the presence of the Chiefs.<sup>(8)</sup> On the other hand, Godlonton praised the pamphlets of Adamson, and commended it to Adderley and the Reform Association as a lesson in colonial politics.<sup>(9)</sup>

- 
1. CTM. 29.4.51.
  2. CTM. 13.5.51; 21.6.51.
  3. GTJ. 29.3.51; 9.8.51.
  4. GTJ. 2.11.50.
  5. GTJ 26.10.50; 8.3.51; 22.3.51; 29.3.51; 5.4.51. Cp GTJ 8.2.51; Field Commandant W. Bowker to Civil Commissioner of Somerset: "It is a perfect mystery to me how (it is) that Sir Andreas' place stands like a gem in a wilderness, with only two Englishmen to protect it from hundreds of Hottentots and Kaffirs armed to the teeth and as full of the d --- as a --- itself."
  6. GTJ. 22.3.51.
  7. GTJ. 10.5.51.
  8. GTJ. 17.5.51.
  9. GTJ. 27.9.51.



While the outbreak of the war had been found useful by the Cape Town Mail for agitating for the immediate introduction of an elective legislature,<sup>(1)</sup> Godlonton had regarded it as a well-timed event in favour of his demand for a more conservative constitution. In London, the news had caused Lord Grey to wonder if a drastic change in policy would not be advisable, and at the beginning of March 1851, in a despatch to Smith, he broached the subject of a removal of the seat of government:

The recent occurrences in British Kaffraria and the effect which they have produced on the inhabitants within the frontier, tend to show that the almost constant presence of the Governor at no great distance from the frontier, is required for the maintenance of peace and good government; and when I consider at the same time the growing importance of Natal, of British Kaffraria, and of the Orange River territory, it appears to me that the time has come when the seat of government can no longer be kept in a position so far from control as Cape Town, without extreme inconvenience. I should wish you therefore to state whether you see any objection to its being removed to Graham's Town.<sup>(2)</sup>

The vested interests of Cape Town were aghast at this suggestion: Buchanan of the Cape Town Mail wrote several editorials in which he contended that Cape Town should oppose a removal of the seat of government, not only because Cape Town was superior to any other locality on account of its central position in relation to territories stretching from the Eastern Frontier to the "granary" of the colony on the Atlantic coast, but also because the majority of the colonists desired the supreme government to be situated in Cape Town. Four-fifths of the people, he maintained, were against the "selfish and narrow-minded movement" for a removal of the capital.<sup>(3)</sup>

Godlonton was delighted at the news of Grey's despatch. Though it had advocated removal rather than separation, he seems to have thought that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush, and though, at the public meeting in Grahamstown

---

1. CTM. 18.1.51; 1.3.51.

2. P.P. 1851, XXXVIII (1334), Grey to Smith, 5.3.51.

3. CTM. 20.5.51; 24.5.51; 31.5.51.



he tried to convince his audience of the superior advantages of separation over removal,<sup>(1)</sup> in the Journal he began to press for the removal which Grey had suggested. In reply to the Cape Town argument that removal to Grahamstown was undesirable because of the shortage of water, he said that both Uitenhage and Fort Beaufort, which were suitable for the seat of government, had an inexhaustible supply of water.<sup>(2)</sup> In June, he reported that there was a distinct possibility that the seat of government in Canada would be removed to Quebec, and in Ceylon a similar cry for the removal of the capital from Colombo to Kandy was opposed because of the prevalence of fever in the latter place. Godlonton commented triumphantly:

In this respect we have a most decided advantage - Graham's Town and the Eastern Frontier being unsurpassed for salubrity of climate by any part of the world.<sup>(3)</sup>

Further the impetus given to the separatist movement by Grey's suggestion was by no means confined to Grahamstown. Graaff-Reinet, where public opinion had been inarticulate or had had to find expression in the papers of Port Elizabeth or Cape Town, acquired its own newspaper in May 1851,<sup>(4)</sup> by which time it had begun to feel the necessity for airing its views on the questions of separation and representative institutions. Because of its ties with Cape Town the predominately Dutch speaking population of the area had always favoured a removal of the seat of government rather than the institution of a completely separate administration,<sup>(5)</sup> but by 1851, the Dutch flair for strong and independent local government<sup>(6)</sup> had led to the proposal of an alternative scheme whereby each district of the colony would have its own "Elected Board" charged with

---

1. GTJ. 31.5.51.

2. GTJ. 31.5.51.

3. GTJ. 14.6.51.

4. Vide Union List of S.A. Newspapers, p 42.

5. Vide, e.g. Documents relative to the question of a Separate Government (1847), pp. 125-6.

6. Grundlingh: op.cit. p.20; Kybers: Select Constitutional Documents illustrating S.A. History, 1795-1910. p.XVIII



the management of its own revenue, roads and resources, its land board, office of transfer and registration of deeds. This was another obstacle to the attainment of separation, and Godlonton spoke disparagingly of the scheme put forward by the Graaff-Reinet Courant<sup>(1)</sup> as too primitive and as likely to "split the colony into as many Separate Governments as there are districts."<sup>(2)</sup>

In Port Elizabeth, Paterson continued to agitate for resident government.<sup>(3)</sup> But while Graaff-Reinet regarded removal as unjust to the vested interests of Cape Town,<sup>(4)</sup> Paterson's suggestion of a removal to Uitenhage was almost as distasteful to Godlonton. In the Eastern Province News<sup>(5)</sup> and in his pamphlet, A Dissertation on the Absolute Necessity of Resident Government in the Eastern Province, Paterson urged that the claims of Uitenhage to be the capital of the colony were incontestable and he adduced some good arguments in favour of the superiority of its natural resources, the extent of its building area, and its geo-political situation. Paterson dwelt upon the grievances of the East as a result of having a despised, ignorant and remote government, and asked if the East was prepared to submit to an ignorant government when the introduction of Representative institutions would impose upon the colonists the liabilities of self-defence.<sup>(6)</sup> In urging that Uitenhage was "the site pointed out by nature herself for the seat of the supreme power in British South Africa," he inevitably regarded Grahamstown as a declining town that was already off the beaten track;<sup>(7)</sup> the great lines of trade communications between Port Elizabeth and the Sovereignty, he maintained, would in future go through Uitenhage rather than Grahamstown.<sup>(8)</sup> Godlonton was obviously discomforted,

---

1. GRC. 23.5.51.

2. GTJ. 31.5.51.

3. EPN. 15.3.51; 17.5.51.

4. GRC. 31.5.51. But contrast GRC. 6.6.51; "Homo" to Editor.

5. EPN. 31.5.51; 21.6.51.

6. Paterson: A Dissertation on the Absolute Necessity of Resident Government in the Eastern Province, p.23-4.

7. Ibid. p.32.

8. Ibid. p.42.



and when Paterson urged that one of the disabilities of the Eastern Province was the fact that a distant government could not over-awe the Kaffirs, Godlonton, in the margin of his private copy of the pamphlets, commented sarcastically:

Seat of govt in Uitenhage and no doubt these evils would disappear. <sup>(1)</sup>

The dilemma in which Smith found himself on the receipt of Grey's despatch was accurately summed up by the Graaff-Reinet Courant:

He may fairly argue that if he recommends no removal, he displeases Uitenhage and Albany, and a fair proportion of this province besides, and if the contrary, he has a far more influential and wealthy interest to oppose in the Cape and Stellenbosch and their neighbourhood while, should he recommend a removal to Graham's Town, he is not quite sure that Port Elizabeth will be with him, and if he chooses Uitenhage, he falls out with his friends of Albany and Fort Beaufort. <sup>(2)</sup>

In London, more trouble was brewing. After sending the Attorney-General's draft to Lord Grey in January, Smith had requested permission to carry on the ordinary legislative and administrative business of the colony with a Council consisting of the officials only. He explained that not only was it impossible for the remaining unofficial members, Cock and Godlonton, to leave the frontier at such a critical time, but it would be impossible to fill up the Council except with members of the English community, and this would aggravate the already widening rift between English and Dutch. The constitution, he added, could be enacted in England, but he hoped that the Home Government would refrain from introducing representative institutions during the present political and military upheaval. <sup>(3)</sup> Lord Grey saw no reason to disagree and, on 13th May sent out Additional Instructions which virtually legalised a Council composed of officials only and suspended the discussions on the constitution for the time being. <sup>(4)</sup> Stockenström and Fairbairn protested vehemently

1. Ibid. p 10. Godlonton's copy is in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, S.A. Pamphlets vol 26. Cp. his comments on pp13,14
2. Q.C. 31.5.51
3. P.P. 1851, XXXVII(1362) Smith to Grey, 19.2.51.
4. Ibid. Grey to Smith, 13.5.51.



against the move, as they maintained that the Colony would not submit to having its money voted away by a Council of officials, nor would it agree to the general legislative functions proposed to be entrusted to the Council. They sought legal advice from three eminent lawyers who declared that the Instructions were invalid.<sup>(1)</sup> Grey reluctantly agreed to instruct Smith to complete the Council, and proposed to save time and trouble by drafting Ordinances which the Council could enact.<sup>(2)</sup> In September 1851, the draft Ordinances, based largely upon Porter's draft Order-in-Council of January, were sent to Smith. The main contentious points were settled by stating that the Legislative Council should be elected by two great constituencies; that the £25 franchise would apply to electors for both Houses; that the property qualification for members of the Upper House should be £1000 unencumbered or £2000 if encumbered; and that the four leading officials should be allowed to debate, though not to vote, in either House. The draft Civil List Ordinance was intended to allow for certain permanent charges on the revenue - such as the salaries of officials, pensions, public worship and border defence - and to sanction certain expenditure already incurred.<sup>(3)</sup>

In the Colony, Grey's actions met with the usual stormy X reception: the Cape Town Mail, commenting on the Additional Instructions, said that the government of the Colony was now "a naked and undisguised despotism,"<sup>(4)</sup> and a Graaff-Reinet meeting deplored the fact that "political corruption and bureaucratic power" would be perpetuated. A protest was sent to the Cape Town Corresponding Committee with the request that it be forwarded along with that from the people of Cape Town.<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Vide Correspondence with Lord John Russell..

2. B.P. 1852 XXXIII (1427), Grey to Smith, 30.6.51.

3. Ibid. Grey to Smith, 15.9.51. p 73

4. CTM. 19.7.51

5. GRC. 8.8.51.



\* Montagu, on the other hand, informed the Colonial Office that the Additional Instructions had restored confidence among "the respectable and loyal partisans of the community."<sup>(1)</sup> But while the bureaucratic cautiousness of Montagu and the officials was making them daily more hated,<sup>(2)</sup> Smith received Grey's instructions to complete the Council, and in September he appointed four useful nonentities, Messrs. Arkoll, Christian, Hawkins and Moodie. This led to another protest from the colony, and the wave of criticism of the "Montagu Parliament" surged to a climax, since the members with whom he had completed the Council were correctly suspected of being "dummies"<sup>(3)</sup> of the dictatorial Secretary to Government.<sup>(4)</sup> The official members of the Council were accused of trying to delay the granting of the Constitution simply because they wanted to retain their extravagant salaries and their patronage: the term "conservatism", it was felt, was an ingenious invention of Montagu, under cover of which he and his supporters could pursue their evil designs against their opponents who were branded with the names of democrats, radicals and socialists.<sup>(5)</sup> The property qualification in the constitution came under fire even from Grahamstown; ~~the~~ the test of legislative fitness, declared Godlonton's rival, the newly-established Grahamstown paper, the British Settler, was "the highest mental faculties and not the largest bank account."<sup>(6)</sup> The restricted franchise, too, was criticized by this paper as leading to bribery and corruption,<sup>(7)</sup> while the stand taken only by Godlonton and the Case Monitor was scorned:

The agitation of the question of Representative government casts into the arena two Government newspapers<sup>(8)</sup> to advocate despotism, and split the people into parties; all the horrors of Mobocracy, of Hottentot stupidity, and Dutch tyranny have been shown up in such colours, as to have divided the people into parties of Conservatives and Democrats.

1. P.P. 1852, XXXIII(1427), Montagu to Hawes, 31.7.51.
2. GRC. 18.7.51; 18.51. RPN. 7.6.51. OPT. 17.6.51; 12.8.51.
3. GRC. 17.10.51.
4. GRC. 24.10.51.
5. British Settler. 26.8.51.
6. British Settler. 26.8.51.
7. British Settler. 18.10.51.
8. Cf. OPT. 6.5.51; 29.7.51.



This is what the Montagu party desired - 'split the power of the people, and we can hang round their necks a Government suited to our own views...' (1)

The people were advised not to believe the Journal's harsh criticism of Stockenstrom and Fairbairn, who, though their conduct was not impeccable, had at least exerted themselves to procure Representative institutions for the Colony. On the other hand, not one of the members of the Council could be regarded as a "representative of the people", for Godlonton and Cock were "submissive tools of the Governor."

The reconstituted Council thus met in October under the most inauspicious conditions. The East, whose cry for removal of the seat of government, had received an impetus from Grey's despatch in March, found a fresh incentive to renew its demands. Even in Grahamstown the cry was for removal rather than for separation, (2) while Graaff-Reinet continued to hope for the adoption of its cherished scheme of local self-government in each district, since it feared that a removal to Grahamstown or Uitenhage would do little more than transfer the seat of trouble from Cape Town to the East - (3) in which case the last state might well be worse than the first. Much of the hostility of Graaff-Reinet can be ascribed to the attitude of Godlonton: his persistent attacks upon Stockenstrom and his consistently abusive remarks about the failure of the Dutch burghers to enrol in the war, (4) combined with his unflagging support of the measures of the despised government, (5) earned him the disfavour of the Graaff-Reinettters, who became more firmly convinced than ever that, if a removal were mooted, they should prefer Uitenhage rather than Grahamstown as the capital. (6) And, while John Boon of Cradock urged Godlonton not to flinch from attacking the Cape Town "democracy", (7) a

1. British Settler. 16.9.51.

2. OPT. 29.4.51; 6.5.51; 27.5.51; 29.7.51; British Settler. 11.10.51

3. GRC. 22.8.51. Cf. GRC. 31.5.51.

4. GRC. 17.10.51.

5. GRC. 5.9.51.

6. GRC. 20.6.51; 27.6.51. "Quagga" to Editor.

7. Godlonton Papers. J. Boon to Godlonton, 31.3.51.



friend in Cape Town informed him that it was the general opinion there that a removal of the seat of government to Grahamstown would be "equally as Physical an impossibility as it would be to remove Table Mountain to Grahamstown."<sup>(1)</sup> The division of opinion in Graaff-Reinet was as usual fully reported by William Southey. He wrote to Godlonton in June 1851:

The English of Graaff-Reinet are rejoiced at the prospect of Graham's Town becoming the seat of Government for Southern Africa instead of Cape Town. But some of the Dutch of Stockenström's party don't much like the idea of a removal. They view the thing as a defeat of their party in Cape Town and the Western Districts. The removal will, I think, actually take place, and that very soon.<sup>(2)</sup>

Lord Grey had little sympathy with the Cape Town agitation against a removal of the capital, and Godlonton set to work to demolish the arguments against the move. He referred to the history of the separatist movement in Victoria, Australia,<sup>(3)</sup> censured the selfishness of Cape Town for being annoyed at Grey's proposal,<sup>(4)</sup> and commented that the Secretary of State had shown in his recent despatches that he approved of the Eastern Province attitude as against that of the Stockenströmites.<sup>(5)</sup> Godlonton had deplored the proposal to resuscitate the Council in Cape Town,<sup>(6)</sup> since the interests of the East would again be jeopardised, but in October he took the wiser view:

"Like wayward children," he asked, "are we to refuse <sup>(7)</sup> what we may obtain because we cannot have all that we wish?"

During 1851, as we saw in Chapter II, Godlonton had suffered so much personal loss, that he had begun seriously to contemplate going to live at the Cape, where, it was now rumoured, he was going to become editor of the government organ, the Monitor.<sup>(8)</sup> It was thus with some reluctance that

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. ? Castray to Godlonton, 31.5.51.
  2. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 2.6.51.  
Cf. OTT. 27.1.52.
  3. GTJ. 10.5.51. Cf. the general interest of the Cape press in constitutional issues outside South Africa.
  4. GTJ. 24.5.51.
  5. GTJ. 23.8.51; 30.8.51.
  6. GTJ. 11.4.51.
  7. GTJ. 18.10.51.
  8. British Settler. 29.11.51.



he contemplated the prospect of leaving his family to attend the meetings of the Council, but in October both the Grahamstown Municipality and a Grahamstown public meeting insisted that both he and Cock should take their seats. They left on 27th October, with instructions from Grahamstown "to dissent from any form of government that does not give to the Frontier districts a Resident Legislature."<sup>(1)</sup>

But, while many in Grahamstown hoped that the Kowie Harbour Improvement Bill would finally be passed, and the farmers eagerly anticipated the good effects of the proposed Rural Police Bill, the Removal of Squatters from Government Lands Bill and the Gunpowder and Arms Bill,<sup>(2)</sup> the unpopularity of Montagu and his satellites, and a suspicion that they were trying to "perpetrate a robbery of the Eastern province" led the British Settler to urge:

There is no hope of obtaining help at the hand of Mr Montagu. The people must now rise, and with one universal shout, not ask, but demand SEPARATION... We must have a Parliament in Graham's Town.<sup>(3)</sup>

Godlonton, when he reached Cape Town, said that he had come "to carry on the business of the country". Early in the session, he showed his anxiety to deal with the troubles which had arisen on the frontier since the outbreak of the war. He was particularly interested in the Squatters' Bill, and, probably in order to rake up information reflecting unfavourably on the Kat River Hottentots as useful ammunition for the discussions on the franchise, he moved that the report of the Blinkwater Commission of 1850 be laid on the table.<sup>(4)</sup> He also tried to persuade the Council to discuss the subject of frontier compensation as soon as possible,<sup>(5)</sup> and his solicitude about the devastated frontier and the possibility that the Home Government would withdraw its troops unless they were

---

1. GTJ. 25.10.51.

2. GTJ. 1.11.51.

3. British Settler. 25.10.51.

4. GTJ. 22.11.51.

5. GTJ. 6.12.51.



supported by the burghers led him to propose a Burgher  
 Commando Law, though the apathy of the rest of the Council  
 finally forced him to withdraw it.<sup>(1)</sup> The Arms and Gunpowder  
 Restriction Bill was passed, much to the relief of the frontier  
 farmers.<sup>(2)</sup> The Appropriation Ordinance for 1852 was passed,  
 as was the Kat River Inquiry Bill.<sup>(3)</sup> But Godlonton's proposal  
 to consider the raising of a loan from the British Government  
 to be lent on interest to the frontiersmen who, like himself  
 had suffered in the war, was defeated by the Council despite  
 the efforts of Godlonton, Cock and the Auditor-General.<sup>(4)</sup>  
 On 19th December, the Secretary to Government announced that  
 the Executive Council had decided to withdraw the Squatters'  
 Bill, since the Commission appointed by the Legislative Council  
 had reported that there was no ground for fearing a conspiracy  
 among the coloured people.<sup>(5)</sup>

At the end of November 1851, when the Council discussed  
 the date to be fixed for the second reading of the Constitution-  
 al Ordinance, Godlonton took the opportunity of reading the  
 resolutions passed at the recent Grahamstown meeting, and he  
 stated that, though Graaff-Reinet had changed its mind on the  
 subject, the frontier would never accept a constitution which  
 did not provide either for a separate government on the fron-  
 tier or for a removal of the capital.<sup>(6)</sup> On 26th December,  
 Godlonton arrived back in Grahamstown<sup>(7)</sup> the second reading of  
 the Constitutional Ordinance having been postponed so that  
 the opinion of the colony could be ascertained.

By this time, feeling against the incompetence of Smith  
 and the arbitrary conduct of Montagu - who it was rumoured  
 might become the next Civil Governor of the Colony<sup>(8)</sup> - had

- 
1. GTJ. 13.12.51; 20.12.51.
  2. GTJ. 17.11.51.
  3. GTJ. 3.1.52
  4. GTJ. 27.12.51; 3.1.52; 31.1.52
  5. GTJ. 3.1.52.
  6. GTJ. 20.12.51.
  7. GTJ. 27.12.51.
  8. GRC. 12.12.51.



reached fever pitch at the Cape:<sup>(1)</sup> the Eastern Districts were displeased with the Constitutional Ordinances, not only because, as Godlonton wrote in the Journal, no recognition of their demand for resident government had been made, but also because the proposed £25 franchise was a "universal franchise in all but name."<sup>(2)</sup> Scanlen, writing to Godlonton from Cradock, said that the low franchise would "ruin British interests" as it would "give the anti colonial party and democrats a decided majority against the truly loyal", while the passing of the Ordinances at that critical stage would cause an ebullition of ill-feeling and excitement.<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton's friend, J.C.Chase, informed him that a petition was being prepared in Uitenhage, begging for removal of the capital, denouncing the low franchise and the disfranchisement of officials in Parliament, and warning against the passing of the Constitution before peace had been restored.<sup>(4)</sup> As usual, though, the crisis threw into relief the divisions within the Eastern Province. Calderwood claimed that Alice should be the seat of government, because of its commanding position in relation to the Kaffirs;<sup>(5)</sup> in Graaff-Reinet the indefatigable William Southey drew up a memorial praying that the Council would not consider the Constitution till peace had been secured, but it is significant that Godlonton's desire for separation rather than removal had not found favour among his Graaff-Reinet supporters who believed that separation was almost an impossible ideal. On the other hand, even Southey had to admit that the "radical" party in Graaff-Reinet had obtained a

1. OTM. 15.11.51; 22.11.51; 29.11.51; EPN. 29.11.51; 3.1.52. GRC. 14.11.51; 12.12.51; British Settler. 8.11.51; 15.11.51; 2.11.51; 6.12.51. Scorn was poured upon the unofficial members; e.g. GRC. 12.12.51; "By the bye the honourable Mr Christian has at last spoken, and Capt. Arckoll has uttered these emphatic words - 'I second him'..." Cp. Rhodes House Collection. f 241. R.White to Godlonton, 25.2.52, in which he says that the Grahamstown merchants were little less than "violent" about Montagu's unsatisfactory postal arrangements.
2. GTJ. 6.12.51. Cp. GFT. 16.12.51.
3. Godlonton Papers. G.Scanlen to Godlonton, 27.12.51.
4. Godlonton Papers. J.C.Chase to Godlonton, 1.1.52.
5. Godlonton Papers. H. Calderwood to Godlonton, 30.1.52.



good many names to their petition to have the Constitution as it then was - though he did condemn the pressure which had been applied in many cases. <sup>(1)</sup>

The scheme outlined by T. J. Biddulph of Winburg must have tantalised Godlonton. Biddulph said that the proposal for annexation of the Sovereignty to the Colony was becoming popular. At the beginning of 1852 he wrote to Godlonton:

I should not advocate it if the Cape Government were to remain always the same, but I know one of two things must take place Removal, or Separation, and if the Sovereignty were annexed to the Colony, we would throw in our weight for Separation of the Provinces and then you would see how well we should progress under a Parliament sitting at Graham's Town. The increase in commerce will be immense and the whole Sovereignty is a fine wool bearing country, which we could <sup>(2)</sup> conveniently ship at what I always call my Port (the Buffalo)..

When the Council re-assembled for the final debates on the Constitutional Ordinances in February 1852, <sup>(3)</sup> the political atmosphere was charged with intrigue: the Cape Town Mail was incensed against the "selfish and malignant functionary clique" which, it said, was bribing the people to support it on the constitutional issue by introducing legislative measures in such a way as to appease the various classes, <sup>(4)</sup> and the people of Graaff-Reinet were demanding the immediate passing of the Ordinances. <sup>(5)</sup> Grahamstown was not only alarmed at the low franchise which, Godlonton maintained, would enable the Cape Town Municipality and its supporters to buy three-quarters of the votes for both provinces, <sup>(6)</sup> but also afraid that the introduction of the constitution as it then stood, was a sinister move by the Western Province finally to give the coup de grâce to the agitation for the removal of the capital. <sup>(7)</sup> The British Settler shrewdly divined

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 24.1.52.
  2. Godlonton Papers. T.J. Biddulph to Godlonton, 15.1.52.  
Cf. Thomas White to Godlonton, 29.12.51, on the value of the Sovereignty trade with the Cape via the Smouses etc.
  3. The first meeting had been postponed from 28th January till 6th February to allow Godlonton time to return: vide GTJ. 3.2.52.
  4. GTJ. 15.11.51; 22.11.51; 29.11.51.
  5. GRC. 12.12.51.
  6. GTJ. 10.1.52; Cp. GPT. 27.1.52.
  7. GTJ. 10.1.52.



another of Godlonton's motives:

The Monitor and Journal, the Montagu mouthpieces, advocate delay in considering the Ordinances, evidently for the purpose of disturbing the public mind upon the matter of the £25 franchise.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the 11th February, the Secretary to Government moved the second reading of the Constitutional Ordinance. He stated that three things had been definitely stipulated by the Home Government and could not be altered: that Parliament should consist of two Houses, that both Houses should be elective, and that the Chief Justice should be President of the Upper House. Apart from this, members could vote as they wished. Godlonton immediately proposed to move an amendment to defer the debates because, he said, the Western Districts were panic-stricken lest the coloured races, furious at the Squatters' Ordinance which had recently been proposed, and disappointed at the restricted nature of the concessions made to them in the draft ordinance, should suddenly rebel. This was a clever tactic, since the feeling against the coloureds in the Western Province had been particularly hostile at the end of 1851. Moreover, he pointed out that it was unfair to give the Hottentots political power which was being denied the faithful Fingoes, who, at a time when the Eastern Districts were in a ferment, would be dangerously antagonised if they were given less than the Hottentots.<sup>(2)</sup> The Attorney-General, Auditor-General and Collector of Customs were in favour of the low franchise and had, by this time, broken with Montagu, who, alone among the officials, advocated the deferment of the passing of the Constitutional Ordinances. Porter, who, because of his more liberal views, was the most popular of the officials,<sup>(3)</sup> harangued the Council for two hours, opposing the demand for delay in a speech which, commented the Journal,

---

1. British Settler. 13.12.51.

2. GTJ, 26.2.52.

3. British Settler. 8.11.51.



abounded "with passages which for brilliancy of style and irrelevancy of application were alike remarkable."<sup>(1)</sup> Montagu, with the excuse that as officials were divided against un-officials, he would not take upon himself to exercise his casting vote, proposed to refer the matter to the Governor himself.

Smith replied angrily that they were to proceed to the discussion of the ordinances without further delay, and on 1st March, Montagu again laid the ordinances before them for the second reading. Godlonton's motion to defer the consideration of the bill till after the war was defeated by the five officials against the four unofficials; for Cock, much to the annoyance of the East,<sup>(2)</sup> had not returned to the Council, but was pre-occupied with the affairs of the Kowie scheme.<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton immediately objected to the fact that the Constitutional Ordinance had made no provision for either removal or separation, though he admitted that his mind was relieved to some extent by the news that Her Majesty's Government had appointed a Lieutenant-Governor as well as a Governor for the Colony, which seemed to indicate that the chief Governor would reside on the frontier.<sup>(4)</sup>

In March, the Council, with the exception of the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General and the Collector of Customs,<sup>(5)</sup> substituted a £50 for the £25 franchise with a wage qualification of £50 per annum as an alternative, and altered the property qualification for membership of the Upper House to £2000 unencumbered or £4000 if encumbered. When Cathcart and Darling, the new Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, arrived to supercede Smith in March 1852, the Ordinances were

---

1. OTJ. 21.2.52.

2. Rhodes House Collection. f 235. R. White to Godlonton, 17.2.52; Godlonton Papers. H.H. Dugmore to Godlonton, 3.2.52; Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton, 17.2.52.

3. Godlonton Papers. W. Wright to Godlonton, 21.2.52.

4. OTJ. 20.3.52.

5. Who were praised by CTM. 23.3.52; 3.4.52.



re-enacted to avoid technical difficulties which might arise out of the change of Governor. Cock, who had subsequently arrived, recorded his reasons for dissent from the Appropriation Ordinance for ecclesiastical purposes, Moodie dissented from the Ordinance as a whole, and Godlonton and Cock presented their "Thirty-one Exceptions" once again. So far as Grahamstown was concerned, the session had not been unproductive for when it closed, the Kowie Harbour Improvement Bill had at last been passed.<sup>(1)</sup>

But while Godlonton's proceedings in Cape Town had found so much favour in Grahamstown<sup>(2)</sup> that there were rumours that he would be presented with a testimonial of appreciation,<sup>(3)</sup> and while his correspondents concurred with him in thinking that the introduction of the Constitution during the war would be to the advantage of their enemies, who would "inflamm<sup>(4)</sup> the minds of the col(oure)d population" against the English, and while the Cape awaited the ratification of the Constitution, political alignments in Cape Town were changing. Darling did not favour the merchants,<sup>(5)</sup> as Smith and Montagu had done, and came instead under the influence of the liberal Attorney-General, Porter. Yet while he was writing to England and commenting in adverse terms on the draft which had just been sent for ratification,<sup>(6)</sup> the agitation against the Legislative Council (which the Eastern Province News wittily described as "Mr Montagu and his tail"<sup>(7)</sup>) and against the £50 franchise was led by Cape Town,<sup>(8)</sup> and the Mail quoted from all the Eastern

1. CTJ. 8.5.52. Cp. Rhodes House Collection, f 245. R.White to Godlonton, 29.2.52: "...Cock starts tomorrow. I think your note to Irving with reference to parties in Cape Town taking shares in the Kowie, has moved him as previous to the arrival of the note he was talking of going up to Sir Harry..."
2. Rhodes House Collection. R.White to Godlonton, 7.3.52.
3. Rhodes House Collection. R.White to Godlonton, 25.3.52.
4. Godlonton Papers. G.Scanlen to Godlonton, 6(?) .3.52. Cf. Godlonton Papers. I. Faulkner Slater to Godlonton, 26.2.52: "...I consider the Colony in such a state now that I wish I had never come to it..."; A.G.Bain to Godlonton 3.3.52.
5. Murray: Reminiscences, p.4.
6. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1581), Darling to Pakington, 25.4.52.
7. Quoted by CTM. 1.4.52. Cf. CFT. 9.3.52; 16.3.52.
8. CTM. 13.3.52; 3.4.52; EPN. 6.3.52; 27.3.52.



Province papers to prove that the English of the East, with the solitary exception of the Journal, were not opposed to the £25 franchise.<sup>(1)</sup> Smith had left in April. In the following month, the departure of Montagu on leave for England brought to an end the violent agitation for the dismissal of the "evil genius"<sup>(2)</sup> of the colony,<sup>(3)</sup> and, though the Home government refused to dismiss him,<sup>(4)</sup> he never returned to the Cape. Godlonton alone paid tribute to Montagu, and in the Journal he gave a lengthy account of the Secretary's services to the colony.<sup>(5)</sup> Grahamstown sent an address of thanks to him for his "advocacy of the vital interests of the Eastern Province at the recent sitting of the Legislative Council,"<sup>(6)</sup> and Godlonton asserted that most of the signatures in the Cape Town petition against Montagu were attached simply because of his staunch advocacy of a Removal of the capital.<sup>(7)</sup>

In January 1852, the Eastern Province News had made it clear that Godlonton's cherished scheme for complete separation was no longer seriously entertained, but that removal of the capital and the recognition of the federal principle would be far more acceptable.<sup>(8)</sup> The Frontier Times remarked that the desire for removal had supplanted that for complete separation, both in Port Elizabeth and in Uitenhage,<sup>(9)</sup> while the Grahamstown public meeting in January had clearly expressed the same opinion.<sup>(10)</sup> This view Godlonton endorsed, for he believed that Grey's despatch of March 1851 implied Colonial Office support, and throughout 1852 he continued to point to the inadequacy of a Cape Town government and the necessity

- 
1. CTM. 1.5.52.
  2. EPN. 20.3.52.
  3. CTM. 4.5.52. Criticism of him continued for a long time: e.g. GRO. 23.7.53.
  4. GTJ. 9.10.52.
  5. GTJ. 1.5.52.
  6. GTJ. 22.5.52.
  7. GTJ. 8.5.52.
  8. EPN. 10.1.52; 17.1.52.
  9. OFT. 27.1.52.
  10. GTJ. Extra. 20.1.52.



for a removal to the frontier or the adoption of the federal principle.<sup>(1)</sup> Since there was general agreement in the East on this point, though,<sup>(2)</sup> he emphasised the claims of Grahamstown, as against those of Uitenhage or King William's Town to be the site of the capital.<sup>(3)</sup> This general separatist agitation was supported even by casual visitors to the Cape, who were of the opinion that Sir Harry Smith's duties had been too comprehensive for one man, and had blamed his military failures upon the absence of an independent government on the frontier.<sup>(4)</sup>

It was not surprising then that during the last few months of his governorship, Smith himself had changed his mind in favour of a completely separate government for the East, and the members of the Executive Council had also come to believe that some form of resident government was imperatively necessary, though they differed in their opinions as to the form it should take. When Cathcart arrived at the Cape, he was able to devote all his attention to the frontier, as Lord Grey had appointed Darling as Lieutenant-Governor, and, though both the Western and Eastern Province disapproved of the small amount of power conceded to the Lieutenant-Governor, the mutual jealousies over such matters as the franchise or the Kowie kept the various sections of the Eastern Province apart.<sup>(5)</sup> Meanwhile, the Russell Ministry had fallen, and the Derby Ministry, with Sir John Pakington as Secretary of State for the Colonies, had replaced it in February 1852. In September, Pakington informed Cathcart that the British Government was desirous of introducing representative institutions at the Cape as soon as possible, but the unrest caused by the war and the conflict of opinion over the franchise

---

1. GTJ. 27.3.52; 7.8.52; Cf. CFT. 9.3.52.

2. Even advertisements for the sale of property in Grahamstown had claimed, from 1851, that the value of property was enhanced because Grahamstown was the "future capital of the Colony." Vide, e.g. GTJ. 19.7.51; 8.5.52; 20.11.52.

3. GTJ. 3.4.52.

4. Lakeman: What I saw in Kaffirland, pp 15.16; Freeman: A Tour in South Africa, p 13; Cole: op cit., pp 252-3.

5. Cole: op cit. p 156.



made him decide to postpone the grant of the constitution pending further information on the subject. He asked for Cathcart's opinion on the perennial problem of resident government.<sup>(1)</sup> The West was furious and petulantly urged that complete separation should immediately be granted. Cathcart regarded separation as impracticable, but urged that what was really required was the establishment of administrative separation under a single undivided Legislative.

Pakington's despatch was applauded in Grahamstown, Uitenhage, Fort Beaufort and Burghersdorp, all of which towns demanded either separation or removal, though the latter seems to have been more generally favoured.<sup>(2)</sup> The Legislative Council met again during November, when Darling informed it of Pakington's reasons for delaying the Constitution. Very little was done,<sup>(3)</sup> and even less interest was aroused, for Darling disposed of matters in a very businesslike manner and, before the Council adjourned, he said that it would continue to act as a general legislative body till the Constitutional Ordinance had been promulgated.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton and Cock, who had not been present at this session, had an interview on the subject with the Governor in the Drostdy, Grahamstown, and Godlonton was satisfied that the Secretary of State had, like his predecessor, realised the necessity for resident government.<sup>(5)</sup>

At the end of 1852, however, the Aberdeen coalition took office, and the Duke of Newcastle, who went to the Colonial Office, determined to ratify the Constitutional Ordinance without delay. In March 1853, influenced largely by the evidence of the recent Select Committee on the Kaffir Tribes,<sup>(6)</sup> he sent the Ordinances to Cathcart.<sup>(7)</sup> But in the Colony, the actions of Darling were splitting public opinion. He had begun

---

1. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1581), Pakington to Cathcart, 4.9.52.

2. Q.T.J. 27.11.52; 14.12.52; 11.1.53.

3. Q.T.J. 14.12.52.

4. Q.T.J. 27.11.52.

5. Q.T.J. 6.11.52.

6. Sole: op.cit. pp.160-1.

7. P.P. 1852-3, LXVI (1636). Newcastle to Cathcart, 14.3.53.



a policy of retrenchment among Montagu's appointees in the Colonial Office,<sup>(1)</sup> and in January 1853, had suspended Richard Southey from the Acting Secretaryship to Government for sending copies of government despatches to Montagu who, while in England was suspected of bringing pressure to bear on the Colonial Office in order to delay the Constitution. Darling's action was cited by the Cape Town Mail, as an example of his laudable distrust of men who had basked in the glory of official favour during the previous governorship,<sup>(2)</sup> and it imputed motives of factionalism to the Lieutenant-Governor's critics.<sup>(3)</sup> His action was also approved of by the Frontier Times,<sup>(4)</sup> for it was well known that Southey had supplied the Journal with valuable official information during his official career. Godlonton not only wrote a lengthy defence of his friend, with an outline of his career, in the Journal,<sup>(5)</sup> but in a private letter to Southey, he comforted him with the reflection that Darling had always favoured the "radicals".<sup>(6)</sup> Southey, in reply, informed Godlonton that his suspension had been disallowed by the Secretary for the Colonies, but requested him not to make too much of it, as it was desirable for him "not to crow or make any fuss" about it.<sup>(7)</sup>

When the Constitution arrived in April 1853, the Colony was still involved in a political mêlée. Godlonton had continued to defend a higher franchise<sup>(8)</sup> and to remind his readers that no constitution should be regarded as satisfactory which did not recognise the principle of resident government.<sup>(9)</sup> Since the Constitution recognised neither of these - the £25 franchise having been restored, though with the Council's wage alternative - he began to agitate with all that dogged refusal to be beaten which had become so characteristic of

---

1. CTM. 11.12.52.

2. CTM. 18.1.53; 22.1.53; Cf. GRI. 19.1.53.

3. CTM. 8.3.53.

4. CFT. 1.2.53.

5. GTJ. 5.2.53.

6. ACC 611/4. Godlonton to R. Southey, 17.1.53.

7. Godlonton Papers, R. Southey to Godlonton, 12.5.53.

8. GTJ. 5.2.53.

9. GTJ. 12.3.53; 9.4.53.



him. The Grahamstown papers were unanimous in deploring the fact that the principle of resident government had not been recognised, for the war which ~~was~~ had only just ended had made the demand for resident government more real. The Frontier Times, referring to the ruined frontiersmen, said:

The principal question to them is, however, that of protection of life and property. They would submit to labour under inconveniences and disabilities in the transaction of their business. They would endure injustice and wrong under many forms. But they have resolved to struggle for peace and protection, without which life is worthless.<sup>(1)</sup>

But while the Frontier Times urged the Easterners to accept the constitution and wait for the meeting of Parliament to obtain redress of their grievances,<sup>(2)</sup> and the Colonist pressed for the adoption of the federative principle,<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton proclaimed that the vital interests of the East had been sacrificed,<sup>(4)</sup> and both in the Journal and at the Grahamstown public meeting he railed against the low franchise and the failure to concede any form of resident government to the East.<sup>(5)</sup> Port Elizabeth, suspicious of the motives of the Godlontonians in working with the Montagu party,<sup>(6)</sup> and jealous of the claims of "Grahamstown and the Kowie to particular consideration when removal of the seat of government is determined on",<sup>(7)</sup> looked to a federal union as the best solution to the constitutional problem,<sup>(8)</sup> while Graaff-Reinet was delighted at Newcastle's refusal to sanction either a removal or a separation, for the Dutch continued to hope for the adoption of a scheme for extending district self-government.<sup>(9)</sup>

On 1st July 1853, Cathcart declared the new Constitution to be in force, and preparations began for the elections to the first Cape Parliament. The most vital issues, so far as the East was concerned, were the questions of resident

---

1. OFT. 3.5.53. Cf. Colonist. 6.11.52 also stressed need for "security against future Kaffir incursions."

2. OFT. 10.5.53; 17.5.53; 31.5.53; 21.6.53.

3. Colonist. 11.6.53. Cf. Colonist. 20.11.52

4. OFTJ. 7.5.53.

5. OFTJ. 10.5.53; 17.5.53.

6. EPH. 15.2.53; 9.3.53. Even the Frontier Times in Grahamstown was agitating for the dismissal of Montagu: OFT. 16.9.52; 23.11.52.

7. BPR. 4.1.53.

8. EPH. 10.5.53.

9. ORG. 7.5.53; 14.5.53; 4.6.53.



government, the franchise, a Vagrant Law, a Militia Bill, the revision of the tariff and a bill regarding the sale of gun-powder and fire-arms. "Committees of Observation" had already been formed in various parts of the Colony, to ensure that the provisions of the new constitution were honoured, and Godlonton was a member of the Grahamstown Committee. In June 1853, a Committee was formed in Grahamstown to secure the return of Godlonton, Cock and George Wood to the Council, and in July, Godlonton, who had previously advised Grahamstown not to elect representatives,<sup>(1)</sup> accepted nomination.<sup>(2)</sup> His agitation against the low franchise and on the necessity for resident government, which had continued unabated,<sup>(3)</sup> was summed up in his reply to his requisitionists' demand for his views; on the franchise he repeated his former sentiments:

I view the universal suffrage in a Colony like this as a reckless and dangerous experiment, involving a great wrong to the European inhabitants, jeopardising property, and fraught with future mischief. I view it also as highly detrimental to the coloured classes, inasmuch as it tends to destroy that healthy stimulus to progression which, for their own sakes, is so highly desirable. Political antagonism between master and servant will produce that social animosity and insubordination, which cannot be too fervently deprecated. The natural order is, first educate and then give political power. We, or rather the government, have reversed this wholesome relation, have recklessly violated an important principle, and by so doing have placed at hazard the vital interests of this country.<sup>(4)</sup>

On the question of separation, he repeated the views he had expressed to Southey three years before:

I believe that a Removal of the seat of Government would be most advantageous to this Province, and is highly expedient, but that, should there exist insuperable difficulties to the measure, then a Separate and Independent government for the Eastern Province will be infinitely preferable to a Central government, having its Legislature and Executive in Cape Town, more than 600 miles distant.<sup>(5)</sup>

While the Colony was excited about the forthcoming elections, Cathcart had made suggestions to the Secretary of State, which, it was hoped would placate the East. When

---

1. GTJ. 9.4.53.

2. GTJ. 9.7.53. The Attorney-General, in a letter to Godlonton, had remarked that the "sounder view" was that taken by those who advocated the election of representatives: vide Godlonton Papers. W.Porter to Godlonton, 28.5.53.

3. GTJ. 30.4.53; 18.6.53; 25.6.53.

4. GTJ. 17.9.53. Cf. GTJ. 24.9.53.

5. GTJ. 17.9.53.



Cathcart had been sent out at the beginning of 1852, Lord Grey, convinced of the need for a Lieutenant-Governor "to carry on the civil government under the general direction of the Governor, while the latter is on the frontier",<sup>(1)</sup> had revoked the Letters Patent of 1836, by which the Eastern Districts were placed under a Lieutenant-Governor, and had appointed Charles Darling as Lieutenant-Governor of the whole colony. Godlonton had not hesitated to state outright that the conditions under which Darling was appointed, would give him far too little power, that he would always be subordinate to the Governor, and that Cathcart would do well to establish his residence permanently in Grahamstown.<sup>(2)</sup> But, because of Cathcart's frontier settlement, the question of a Lieutenant-Governorship in the Eastern Province had now become inseparably linked with the problem of the administration of British Kaffraria; Cathcart was convinced that the area should be maintained as a separate dependency,<sup>(3)</sup> and created the Kaffrarian Board to take care of the interests of the Europeans in the area, while the Kaffirs were once again placed under the authority of their chiefs.<sup>(4)</sup> In July 1853, he made some important proposals to the Secretary of State, with regard to administrative changes in South Africa. He suggested the appointment of Lieutenant-Governors in both British Kaffraria and in the Eastern Province, the appointment of a Solicitor-General and the establishment of a branch of the Surveyor-General's office and of the Registry of Deeds at Grahamstown, as well as the appointment of one or more circuit judges who were to be resident in the Eastern districts. In October, Newcastle informed Cathcart that all these proposals<sup>x</sup> had been accepted, and that Maclean would be appointed Lieutenant-Governor

---

1. Published in GTJ. 3.4.52.

2. GTJ. 3.4.52; 10.4.52.

3. Du Toit: The Cape Frontier. pp.129-140; GFT. 27.12.53.

4. Du Toit: op. cit. p.146.



(1)  
of the reconstituted British Kaffraria. The Kaffrarian Charter was sent out in March 1854, but Cathcart was unable to put it into effect before his departure.

When these concessions were announced, Godlonton immediately congratulated the people of Grahamstown, as he said that Newcastle's decision had been made, not only because of the representations of Cathcart, but also because of the Grahamstown petition, drawn up in May that year. At the same time, he warned the settlers against being too enthusiastic about the new measures until they had been more closely defined: it should be quite clearly understood, he said, that the frontiersmen would not be satisfied with a Lieutenant-Governor whose powers were as circumscribed as Colonel Hare's had been. The arguments for a supreme authority on the frontier were, he said irrefutable. (2) In his review of the year's events, he wrote:

What the inhabitants of the Eastern Province require is, a bona fide government to which they may look in times of exigency with unshaken confidence. They do not want a mere deputy to a Governor in Cape Town, but they require an Executive that can and will act promptly and decisively; that can deal with cases as they occur, and who is only amenable to the People, through the Parliament, or to the Crown, through its Ministers. Nothing short of this will, or ought to satisfy the people of this Province. (3)

He repeated this view in a motion which he moved at a public meeting in Grahamstown in January 1854, when he declared that a supreme, and not merely resident, government on the frontier was imperatively necessary. (4) Cathcart had gone even further, and, at the beginning of 1854, even advocated a division of the Central Road Board. (5)

Cathcart's proposals stirred up political feeling in the colony: Cape Town (6) sided with Graaff-Reinet (7) in demanding a federation of all the districts, each with a strong local

---

1. Du Toit; op cit. p 143  
2. GTJ. 10.12.53; 17.12.53.  
3. GTJ. 31.12.53  
4. GTJ. 7.1.54. Op. GTJ. 13.12.53.  
5. Sole; op cit. p 163.  
6. OTM. 4.6.53.  
7. GRC. 4.6.53; 5.11.53; 24.12.53.



government, for the Graaff-Reinnetters were afraid of Grahamstown's intentions,<sup>(1)</sup> while Port Elizabeth under Paterson and Fleming also disliked the idea of a Lieutenant-Governor's establishment at Grahamstown. They continued to attack the idea of absolute separation and to demand a federal union of the South African provinces instead.<sup>(2)</sup>

It was probably Cathcart's proposals that made Godlonton change his earlier opinion that the Eastern Province should not send representatives to Cape Town.<sup>(3)</sup> He tried to rally the forces of the East by emphasising their hopeless plight at the hands of the Western vested interests, for he was convinced that the Cape 'Town House party' would predominate in both Houses.<sup>(4)</sup> Because the Upper House was "the only conservative element" in the constitution, it was going to be "the great bulwark of the country," he said, though he was apprehensive at the scheme of voting whereby a voter for the Upper House could give all his votes to one person, as "a small village or Institution" of only a hundred people could return one of the fifteen members.<sup>(5)</sup> Graaff-Reinet, afraid of the Frontier party, determined to unite so as to be certain to secure the return of at least one or two representatives,<sup>(6)</sup> and meetings were held in the districts to decide on the apportionment of each elector's votes.<sup>(7)</sup> There was everywhere a strong feeling against voting along "party" lines, since parties were synonymous with factions; the contest was keen, and electors were urged to vote, not for parties, but for individuals whose principles were known.<sup>(8)</sup>

1. GRC. 25.6.53; 23.7.53; "An Inhabitant of the Eastern Province" to Editor.
2. EFN. 4.10.53; 11.4.54.
3. GTJ. 2.7.53.
4. GTJ. 11.8.53.
5. GTJ. 28.2.53; 8.4.54.
6. GRC. 18.6.53.
7. GRC. 5.11.53.
8. GRC. 23.7.53. The requisition to Stockenström from Graaff-Reinet revealed an appreciation of his personal qualities and principles; GTJ. 24.12.53: "...let them fling to the winds everything like party bias, and let them ...so use their suffrages as shall most likely ...to conduce to the public good.."; Adv. and Mail. 10.1.54; CFT. 10.1.54.



The elections for the Council were held at the beginning of 1854, and were, said Godlonton, satisfactorily conducted.<sup>(1)</sup> In March, Cathcart announced the results: Godlonton, Stockenstrom, Wood, Blaine Fleming, Metelerkamp and Joubert, were the successful candidates. Godlonton had received requisitions from Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort<sup>(2)</sup> to offer himself as a candidate, and his support had come mainly from the settler towns and districts of Albany, Somerset and Fort Beaufort,<sup>(3)</sup> in which he had lived or worked since the twenties. In these parts, his main rivals were Wood and Blaine, both of whom seem to have scored as a result of Godlonton's haughty behaviour before the elections,<sup>(4)</sup> as they defeated him by quite a substantial margin in Grahamstown itself, where Godlonton came only third. In Port Elizabeth, Fleming and Metelerkamp were well supported, and Godlonton came sixth, while Graaff-Reinet returned Stockenstrom at the head of the poll, followed by Meintjes and Fleming with Godlonton a poor fourth.

Spurred on by the gibe of the Frontier Times that he had thrice attended the Council without securing resident government,<sup>(5)</sup> Godlonton left for Cape Town with the intention of securing what he could for the East. The stage was set, and the expectation with which each part of the Colony looked forward to the meeting of Parliament to settle its grievances ensured that the session would be a lively one.<sup>(6)</sup>

---

1. GTJ. 21.1.54; 30.12.54.

2. GTJ. 16.7.53; 23.7.53.

3. Especially Sidbury, Bathurst, Salem, Bushman's River, Fort Peddie, Zwagers Hoek, Glen Lynden.

4. Vide. CFT. 27.9.53. "Anti-Humbug" to Editor. Godlonton ("Sir Oracle"), he said, was annoyed at being questioned as to his policy by his requisitionists, so that they did not know what he intended to do if he were elected.

5. CFT. 5.7.53.

6. e.g. CTM. 30.4.53; 17.5.53; 24.5.53; GRH. 31.5.54; CFT. 6.9.53.



CHAPTER IV:

"THE MEMBER FOR THE EASTERN PROVINCE"

When the first Cape Parliament was opened by Lieutenant-Governor Darling in Cape Town in July 1854, the colonists held their breath. For the West, the establishment of representative institutions spelt a triumph; for the Midlands, a hope; and for the frontier, a possibility. But, though the constitution had at last given legal recognition to the existence of two provinces, its introduction had brought the problems of separation and responsible government no nearer solution, and therefore they were soon to occupy the attention of the new Parliament. The members were not all new to legislative duties: Godlonton, Stockenstrom, Reitz and Ebdon had all been members of the old nominated Legislative Council, and though Montagu had died in England, Porter, Rivers and Hope had become ex officio members of Parliament. In the Assembly, the presence of Fairbairn\*, Brand\* and Cock provided a sturdy element of continuity from the old Legislative Council. From the beginning, the Council exercised its power, for its elective character undoubtedly enhanced its authority, as did the fact that it could increase as well as decrease expenditure or taxation; indeed, during the first decade of its existence it amended or rejected nearly half of the bills sent to it from the Assembly. Moreover, a conflict soon arose between the officials and the elected members, leading, in the first Parliament, to proposals for the introduction of responsible government.<sup>(1)</sup>

Among the elected members, too, grounds for argument were not wanting: Stockenstrom had obviously come with the intention of proposing inquiries which would help to vindicate

---

1. Kilpin: Romance of a Colonial Parliament, p. 83.



his earlier career. Godlonton, on the other hand, had come to assert the claims of the Eastern Province against a Parliament which, because it was sitting in Cape Town, was not unlikely to be "strongly tinctured with Cape Town influence" (1) and, which, under the tutelage of the West, would tend more and more towards a policy of centralisation. (2) Yet the Eastern representatives were as divided as were their interests, and it was soon clear that election by <sup>scrutin</sup> ~~scrutin~~ de liste, theoretically designed to cut across petty and local party lines, had failed of its purpose. Godlonton, Wood and Blaine were pre-eminently Grahamstown representatives, Metelerkamp and Fleming were from Port Elizabeth, Stockenström from Graaff-Reinet and Joubert from Colesberg. In these circumstances, while preserving a degree of unanimity on the urgency of the problem of frontier defence, they were disastrously opposed to one another on questions as vital as responsible government or as resident government for the East. And, while Godlonton, Wood and Blaine formed a pretty homogeneous body of opinion, even among them was there disagreement on a topic as important as the proposed Burgher Law. (3)

More important was the fact that the frontier party had not been as successful as Godlonton had hoped in the Council elections: the defeat of Cock and election of Joubert had caused surprise and concern among the Godlontonians who rightly began to fear that Godlonton would not be able to

---

1. GTJ. 21.5.53.

2. GTJ. 9.7.53.

3. Vide, e.g., GTJ. 17.9.53, replies of Godlonton, Wood and Blaine to requisitions. Wood had been opposed to it all along: cp. Rhodes House Collection. f. 233. R. White to Godlonton, 14.2.52: "...I hear Geo. Wood, as usual, is opposed to it - anything where it is likely to touch either his pocket or his children - he is sure to be opposed to. I expect it will end in a 'Volunteer Corps'....."



command enough support among the Easterners in the Council to counteract the influence of the West.<sup>(1)</sup>

The first session of Parliament displayed what a contemporary called "a most gigantic appetite for Papers."<sup>(2)</sup> It was inevitable that most of the session should be spent in determining the standing rules and orders upon which Parliament should function, and Godlonton was a member of the Select Committee appointed by the Legislative Council for this purpose. But a large amount of the remaining Parliamentary time was spent in calling for papers relating to a wide variety of subjects; the working of the Central Road Board, harbour works ecclesiastical grants, customs returns, the alienation of government land, statistics of pupils in government schools and especially the Fingoes, the Tambookies, and the Kat River Settlement - in which Stockenström, the founder, was particularly interested. Indeed, it was the unsettled state of the frontier after the recent war, as well as the old problem of resident government for the East that occupied most of the attention of Godlonton and the other frontier representatives during the session. In all, Godlonton, apostle of the cause, not disciple of the art of politics, had his mind made up in advance, and to all he made dogged contribution.

In his Opening Speech, Darling had said that the Executive was preparing the draft of a law for regulating the permanent settlement of the Fingoes in the frontier districts.<sup>(3)</sup> In 1848 and 1849 the Fingoes had been located in the new district of Victoria East from Alice along the border to the sea<sup>(4)</sup>

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. Benjamin Norden to Godlonton, 26.2.54: "P.S. The Frontier people have now in the Lower House an important battle to fight, for it is there, their interest will have to be argued, and if they stick together and return good and faithful men for the Eastern Districts, I have no doubt some of their staunch friends will be returned for the Western, and if so they will have a working majority. This you must perceive as far as the Eastern Districts is concerned, is of vital importance."
  2. Adv. and Mail. 24.3.55.
  3. L.C. Votes and Proceedings, 1854.
  4. Du Toit: The Cape Frontier. p.449.



and after the Umlanjani war, Fingoes were also located in the Crown Reserve with their Chiefs and a Superintendent.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1853, Cathcart's Native Improvement Board under Calderwood had recommended that the lands occupied by natives at the mission stations in Victoria should be vested in trustees such as the Board, and Cathcart had approved and ordered the Deputy Surveyor General to survey the districts involved.<sup>(2)</sup> When the first Cape Parliament met, Cathcart had already departed, but Darling urged Parliament to give the Bill for the better settlement of the Fingo Locations its attention. In view of this, Godlonton, on 17th July, moved that the Government be requested to furnish the returns relating to the Fingo population, as he said that the Fingoes were not adequately supervised and were frequently guilty of infraction of the law.<sup>(3)</sup> A week later, Blaine, seconded by Godlonton, asked the Lieutenant-Governor to give the Council a rough sketch of the colonial boundary, showing the locations of the Fingoes.<sup>(4)</sup> Before the end of the session, the unpopular<sup>(5)</sup> Fingo Location Bill was defeated,<sup>(6)</sup> and the Secretary to Government assured the Council that the Government would make every effort to pacify the Fingoes who might as a consequence be anxious about the security of their possession of their locations.<sup>(7)</sup> Godlonton's concern for the safety of the frontier led him also to move for statistics regarding the Tambookies, about twenty thousand of whom were said to be

---

1. Ibid. p.143.

2. Ibid. p.451.

3. L.C.Debates. 17.7.54. Cp. GFT. 2.1.55. "\*\*\*" to Editor. The correspondent said that the Kaffirs had resented Cathcart's placing the Fingoes in the Crown Reserve, and would even have preferred Europeans there. Sandile, it was claimed had evil designs against them, and "hence it may be assumed that the Fingoes are in jeopardy, and the peace and safety of this colony (are) as precarious as Sandilli is capricious...." Also GFT. 27.2.55.

4. L.C.Debates. 24.7.54.

5. Vide, e.g., GRH. 27.6.55; 18.7.55.

6. Du Toit: op.cit. p 451.

7. L.C.Debates. 7.9.54.



living lawlessly within the colony,<sup>(1)</sup> and finally at the end of July, he moved for the appointment of a Select Committee on the defence of the frontier.<sup>(2)</sup> This was carried, and Blaine was elected Chairman, with Godlonton, Stockenström, Joubert, Wood, Reitz, Edden and De Wet as members. Godlonton, both as a member of the Committee and as one of those examined, showed particular concern about the Fingoes and Tambookies. He was apprehensive at the rapidity with which the Fingoes were uniting into a nation under their chiefs, and suggested that the government should abolish the chieftainships and place the Fingoes under headmen owing allegiance to the colonial authorities. The Tambookies should be controlled by means of missionary influence, while a well-organised mounted police force was indispensable for the security of the frontier, and a burgher law, embracing the whole colony, was vitally necessary.<sup>(3)</sup> Shortly before the end of the session, the Committee presented a progress report in which they stated that they had collected much valuable information on the Fingo Locations, and also that their investigations had convinced them of the necessity for a Burgher Law. It was, unfortunately, too late in the session to initiate such a measure, which would be introduced in the ensuing session.<sup>(4)</sup> In the Council, a Burgher Force Bill was being opposed by Westerners such as Wicht and Vigne,<sup>(5)</sup> while Wicht objected to the provisions of the bill for giving the Government the sole rights for buying and selling gunpowder, since he declared that it was unfair to dealers in Cape Town.<sup>(6)</sup>

The cross-currents of political opinion, and the unsympathetic attitude of the West were, so far as Godlonton concerned, clearly indicated by the discussions on the bill

---

1. Ibid. 24.7.54.

2. Ibid. 26.7.54.

3. L.C.Votes and Proceedings, 1854. Report on Proceedings of Committee on Frontier Defence.

4. L.C.Debates. 20.9.54.

5. Ibid. 11.9.54.

6. Ibid. 11.9.54. Cp. W.E.G.Solomon: Saul Solomon, p.151.



which he introduced into the Legislative Council for constituting the division of Queenstown an electoral division. This district, said Godlonton in introducing the petition from Queenstown, had been annexed by Cathcart, and was populated by colonists and not merely immigrants; they had to defend the area and form a barrier for the protection of the colony, yet the colony denied them "a voice in ..(its) councils" (1) The bill proposed that Queenstown should elect two members for the House of Assembly and that the district should be added to the Eastern Districts. When Godlonton moved the second reading of the Bill, the opposition of the Council soon became apparent: the Attorney-General had already suggested that Queenstown should request to be joined to the division of Victoria, so that its inhabitants would be enfranchised without upsetting the balance of Eastern and Western representation in Parliament, (2) and other objections were now adduced. Wichty said that they should "not relieve the Home Government from the duty they owed to those parties to afford them adequate protection, and saddle the colony with the defence of the frontier." Stockenstrom as usual had strong personal convictions on the problem, and maintained that it was the duty of the British Parliament to make provision for the defence of these "lands which were acquired and disposed of at the will of Governors, in which the colony had no voice." Reitz was even less constructive - he declared that Parliament should wait and see what Sir George Grey intended to do. Stockenstrom and Joubert voted with the Western bloc (except Vigne) and the bill was defeated. (3)

An important measure was also the Divisional Councils Bill, which envisaged the establishment of what Reitz called "a system fundamentally similar to that of Landdrost and

---

1. Ibid. 17.7.54.

2. Ibid. 24.7.54.

3. Ibid. 21.8.54.



Heemraden" in local government. Had this move succeeded, it might have done something to lessen the antagonism of East against West, but because of opposition in the Council and the fact that the session was nearing a close, it was withdrawn.<sup>(1)</sup> Finally, the items for Judicial Establishment in the Eastern Province, as had been suggested originally by Cathcart and approved by the Home Government, were expunged by the Council. Their defeat was largely due to the defection of Joubert and Stockenström, the latter being of the opinion that the additions would benefit the West rather than the East, for as there was no court in the East, the two judges, for example, would be added to the Supreme Court in Cape Town and would help with circuit duties.<sup>(2)</sup>

In the East, men again began to wonder whether separation was not after all the only solution. Godlonton, at the first meeting of the Council, had opposed any recognition of the division of the members into Eastern and Western representatives, for he deprecated Blaine's proposal that the "three highest on the poll in the two provinces" should form a deputation to the Lieutenant-Governor, and proposed instead that the deputation should consist of the four members on the right and the left of the President.<sup>(3)</sup> He was soon disillusioned, for although individual members often deserted their territorial designations, there was generally a well-defined bloc on each side, the Easterners being fairly unanimous on important issues, with the conspicuous exception of Stockenström and Joubert, the latter of whom Calderwood described to Godlonton as a "silent vote" of the Baronet's.<sup>(4)</sup> In the Assembly there was a similar geographical division, and the Midlanders played off the Easterners against the West, in order to prevent either side from assuming too much power.<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. Ibid. 6.9.54.

2. Ibid. 31.8.54.

3. Ibid. 30.6.54.

4. Godlonton Papers. Calderwood to Godlonton, 29.8.55.

5. Sole: op.cit. p.166.



Fairbairn, Molteno and Solomon soon acquired considerable hold over the Executive, and thus the Assembly, where the West already had two more members than the East, was able for example, to prevent the establishment of a Solicitor-General's department in the East by refusing to pass the estimates. Godlonton tried to remedy this in the Council, but although he was able to have a motion carried, to the effect that the Council could restore items which had been removed from Appropriation Bills by the Assembly, provided they were recommended by the Governor,<sup>(1)</sup> the Council was not so agreeable on matters not touching its prestige vis-à-vis the Assembly. The result was the refusal to restore the estimates for the Judicial Establishment for the East.

The achievements and failure of the first session of Parliament were summed up by Darling in his speech at the prorogation. While congratulating the two Houses on the wide variety of subjects which had come under review, and excusing them for not initiating any measure for frontier defence, he expressed his disappointment not only at their failure to take steps for the adjustment and settlement of the Fingo locations, but also at the serious conflicts which had arisen between the two Houses on their respective rights regarding the discussion and passing of money bills.<sup>(2)</sup> When the session closed, Parliament had passed seven bills, most of which dealt with matters such as the rights of Parliament and the appropriations for 1854 and 1855. Only one, the bill to regulate the sale of gunpowder and fire-arms, had any direct relation to the most pressing frontier problems.<sup>(3)</sup>

If there was one question on which East and West were thoroughly in agreement, it was the belief that Parliament was not functioning adequately. But, as usual, they prescribed

---

1. L.C. Debates. 31.8.54.

2. L.C. Debates. 26.9.54.

3. Ibid. 26.9.54.



different remedies. Cape Town, which had demanded responsible government even in 1850,<sup>(1)</sup> regarded the Executive as the main obstacle to the smooth working of Parliament, and Fairbairn, who had by now become editor of the combined South African Advertiser and Mail, began a press campaign in favour of a responsible ministry. Port Elizabeth was equally disappointed: Darling had proposed that steps be taken for the defence of Table Bay and Simon's Bay, yet nothing had been said about Algoa Bay. The Eastern Province Herald complained that a Russian man-of-war could exact what it pleased from Port Elizabeth, because the Cape Town Executive was too ignorant of the Bay's needs.<sup>(2)</sup> In particular, Port Elizabeth was concerned at the seeming inability of Parliament to realise the importance of the question of frontier defence:<sup>(3)</sup> this was conclusive proof, it believed, that the West would give short shrift to the demands of the East, and the time had come to press once again for a removal of the seat of government.<sup>(4)</sup> Graaff-Reinet expressed similar dissatisfaction at the way in which Parliamentary time was frittered away,<sup>(5)</sup> and deplored the fact that Parliament had done so little on the vitally important subject of frontier defence.<sup>(6)</sup> It seemed futile for members even to attend Parliament:

Our income diminished, our outlay increased,  
With our Frontier defences uncared for -  
Imperial expenditure totally ceased! -  
All this do you think we're prepared for?<sup>(7)</sup>

In Grahamstown, the papers did not fail to express their disappointment at the failure of Parliament to increase the border police<sup>(8)</sup> or to provide for frontier defence,<sup>(9)</sup> and

- 
1. Vide CTM. 15.6.50: "The question now to be decided is simply, who are henceforth to govern in this colony, - the people of the colony, through their representatives, or the Colonial Office, through its deputies?" Cp. CTM 13.7.50; 20.7.50; 27.7.50; 3.8.50; 21.9.50; 5.10.50. ~~Vide also~~
  2. EPH. 11.7.54.
  3. EPE. 25.7.54.
  4. EPH. 19.9.54.
  5. GRH. 16.8.54; 4.10.54.
  6. GRH. 11.10.54.
  7. GRH. 27.9.54.
  8. CPT. 22.8.54.
  9. CPT. 5.9.54.



considerable dissatisfaction was evinced at the stilling of the proposed measure for the appointment of two judges for the Eastern Province,<sup>(1)</sup> which the Journal described as "the pure work of faction and jealousy" proving that the Colony was "little ripe for Representative Institutions."<sup>(2)</sup> Bitter disillusionment was expressed at the rejection of the Queenstown electoral bill, and particularly at the dangers which could arise because no measure of frontier defence had been passed.<sup>(3)</sup> Parliament itself had been responsible, wrote Godlonton, for the non-implementation of Cathcart's admirable frontier settlement, and the proceedings of the two Houses would

...show as clearly and decisively as anything can be shown, that a Parliament sitting in Cape Town is utterly inadequate to appreciate the requirements of this Frontier, and that its acts, instead of inspiring confidence, have done more to engender distrust and to cause anxiety than any public measures to which of late we are able to refer.<sup>(4)</sup>

But although, as the Journal had it, "the great experiment has been fairly tried, - and, as predicted, it has failed,"<sup>(5)</sup> and although there was once again talk of removal and separation in the East,<sup>(6)</sup> the agitation was as yet not very earnest; not only was Sir George Grey's arrival eagerly awaited, but there was a hope, even in Grahamstown, that Parliament would redeem itself in the second session.<sup>(7)</sup> Moreover, the colonists had enough to keep them occupied in the latter months of 1854 when, after a period of almost unprecedented inactivity in the colony,<sup>(8)</sup> a panic, caused by rumours of widespread Fingo rebelliousness and conspiracy with the Kaffirs,<sup>(9)</sup> overcame the frontiersmen.<sup>(10)</sup>

- 
1. CFT. 3.10.54.
  2. GTJ. 9.9.54.
  3. GTJ. 9.9.54.
  4. GTJ. 21.10.54.
  5. GTJ. 30.9.54; Cp. Colonist. 25.11.54: "Great things, perhaps too great, were expected from the new Constitution."
  6. GTJ. 9.9.54; EPH. 7.11.54; GRH. 15.11.54.
  7. CFT. 10.10.54.
  8. Vide, e.g. Colonist. 5.8.54: "were it not for Cape Town and the Assembly, the tone of conversation would be very dead indeed..."
  9. Vide, e.g. Graham of Fintry Papers. W.G. Atherstone to Graham(?), 26.10.54., re overtures to the Fingoes etc.
  10. CFT. 31.10.54; GRH. 15.11.54; Colonist. 21.10.54; 28.10.54; 4.11.54. Cp. Una Long: Index to Unofficial MSS. p 72. F. Becker to Charles Rubidge, 15.12.54.



The panic subsided during November,<sup>(1)</sup> but at the end of December came reports that Antahad taken possession of the Amatolas, and the farmers even began to form laagers in some areas. The confidence inspired by the actions of Jackson,<sup>(2)</sup> who had succeeded Cathcart as Commander-in-Chief earlier in the year, helped to allay much of the terror, but it was clear that the frontier would never be satisfied until the new Governor had come to investigate in person.<sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton, while stating in the Journal that he did not view the Fingo restlessness with much alarm, was obviously convinced that the unrest was yet another indication that the frontier problem had still not been tackled in a way which would ensure permanent security.<sup>(4)</sup> Together with George Wood, and other prominent frontiersmen he sent a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, in which attention was drawn to the alarm at the rumours of a combination between the Fingoes and the Kaffirs: the Colonial Secretary replied that the government had already taken steps to combat this, that Martial Law was still in force in the frontier districts and that there would be no objection to the proposal to form a Volunteer Corps. It is significant that, in conclusion, the Colonial Secretary added that Darling had noticed that the letter had been signed by two proprietors of newspapers in Grahamstown, and

His Honor feels confident that they will do justice to his motives, in urging upon them the incalculable importance of preventing the press under their control from circulating rumours, based upon any ground short of well authenticated facts.<sup>(5)</sup>

Godlonton thus looked to the new Governor for the implementation of a frontier system which would at least hold out some promise of protection for the colonists. Godlonton was thus relieved

1. EPH. 7.11.54; Colonist. 18.11.54. Cp. Graham of Finty Papers, David Davies to Graham(?), 20.10.54. He says that there is no need for alarm: the land is cultivated on the right bank of the Chumie and the Keiskamma to the sea.

2. EPH. 14.11.54.

3. GFT. 12.12.54; EPH. 26.12.54; GRH. 27.12.54. Cp. Una Long: op cit p 254. Rev. J.S. Thomas to his parents, 3.6.55: "just before last Christmas there was a great report of war..but for which there was no real ground whatever it being pretty evident that the whole affair originated in the schemes of one person in order to serve his own purposes.."

4. GTJ. 28.10.54.

5. Rhodes House Collection. f.452. Rawson W. Rawson to Godlonton, 7.11.54.



when Darling, who, though efficient, had shunned all unnecessary responsibility in the establishment of Parliamentary institutions, left the Colony<sup>(1)</sup> to become Governor of Newfoundland and Sir George Grey arrived early in December 1854. Ambitious and imbued with a sense of mission for the enlightenment of the backward races,<sup>(2)</sup> Grey was considered one of the most capable of all Imperial administrators. Not only had he obtained experience of the working of a Colonial Parliament in New Zealand, but it was well known that he had been appointed to the Cape Governorship because of his statesmanlike handling of the Maori problem, and there was considerable speculation as to the possibility of similar success in South Africa. There was a gigantic task ahead of him: the new Parliament did not command the respect of the colonists, and on the frontier, conditions were little less than chaotic. Godlonton had told the committee on frontier defence that

At this moment the two great wants of the Eastern Province are security and labour,<sup>(4)</sup>

and more than one Eastern Province newspaper was alarmed at the acceleration of the process of emigration from the Cape to Australia.<sup>(3)</sup> A Grahamstown paper said that the exodus of mechanics was likely to be followed by that of the farmers, since they had "all to lose and nothing to gain by Kafir wars."<sup>(5)</sup> The main grievance on the frontier was still the lack of protection:

What inducement could they have to continue in a country where there is so little security for life and property? where they are continually in dread of incursion of a wily and savage enemy, and know not the moment they may have to quit their homes in a state of utter destitution? A hard earned and scanty sustenance wherever it might be procured in peace and security would certainly seem preferable to affluence possessed on so precarious a tenure and amidst such dangers as are too often to be met with here.<sup>(6)</sup>

---

1. GTJ. 30.9.54.

2. Henderson: Sir George Grey. pp. 4, 268.

3. OPT. 5.12.54.

4. L.C. Votes and Proceedings, 1854. Report of Select Committee on Frontier Defence, p. 38.

5. Colonist. 18.11.54.

6. Colonist. 25.11.54.



The whole future of the colony, it seemed, would depend upon the policy of the new Governor, for Cathcart's settlement had been of a military nature and had already shown signs of breaking down.

While the atmosphere was charged with expectation there were some who doubted whether Grey's New Zealand "civilising" policy would be at all successful among the more barbarous Kaffirs of South Africa,<sup>(1)</sup> and the Eastern Province Herald said that it shuddered "before the thought of a Governor riding an imported hobby in these parts."<sup>(2)</sup> But the Colonist of Grahamstown probably summed up the general feeling by saying that "People look to His Excellency our new Governor, as the only harbinger of hope left to console them,"<sup>(3)</sup> and Godlonton was certainly prepared to give the new Governor his support. At the time of Grey's arrival, he wrote:

The colonists look hopefully to the officer whose assumption of the high office of Governor of this Colony may be daily expected. SIR GEORGE GREY ranks as one of the ablest Colonial Governors of the present day. We are familiar with his antecedents, and these give augury of high qualifications for the right discharge of the important duties which will devolve upon him.<sup>(4)</sup>

Grey did not disappoint him. In less than a month after his arrival at Cape Town and in the same month as the 73rd regiment left for the Eastern Province, he set out on his first visit to the frontier. In February 1855, after meeting the Municipal Commissioners of Grahamstown, he began an extensive tour of Kaffraria and the Kat River Settlement, taking with him the Commander of the troops, General Jackson, who only two months before, had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Districts.<sup>(5)</sup> In accordance with Cathcart's suggestions to Newcastle in mid-1853, the Secretary of State had instructed the new Governor to delegate such of his powers as he might think fit to the Lieutenant-Governor; but although

---

1. OPT. 9.9.54; 24.10.54; Colonist. 3.3.55.

2. EPH. 26.12.54.

3. Colonist. 20.1.55.

4. GTJ. 9.12.54.

5. Theal: History of South Africa. Vol. III. p 141; OPT. 9.1.55.



the Secretary of State had suggested that Jackson should be allotted a "general superintendence of that branch of the Executive Administration established on the Eastern Frontier, the offices of which should probably address their correspondence to the Lieutenant-Governor," Grey was determined to have as complete a control as possible over the affairs of the colony in which he intended to do so much, and Jackson was consequently granted very little authority or even discretion. He was given no control over the Midlands districts. Only the frontier districts of Albany, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown, Victoria, Somerset, Gradock and Albert were placed under his jurisdiction, <sup>(1)</sup> where Grey empowered him to perform on his behalf "all such executive acts as I myself could perform, reporting amply the same in order that they may be confirmed." Cathcart's proposals that the Lieutenant-Governor should control the administration of civil justice with the assistance of a Solicitor-General, and the distribution of lands with the assistance of a Deputy-Surveyor-General, and also that he should be assisted by an Advisory Council of these officials and a Secretary, were ignored. The Lieutenant-Governor's Secretary assumed a good deal of the initiative and authority, and Godlonton must have been delighted to observe, that his old friend, Richard Southey, was the first to occupy this post. <sup>(2)</sup> Indeed, it was not long before Southey's official influence was again enlisted in an attempt to secure favours, such as a government contract in 1857. <sup>(3)</sup>

---

1. GRH. 21.3.55.

2. Sole: op cit. p 172

3. Vide, e.g. Rhodes House Collection. f 267-8. R. White to Godlonton 28.5.57; ibid. f 271. R. White to Godlonton, 6.6.57: "...There seems to be some humbugging going on with Southey.....(but)....he says he will see the Lt. Govr. about it (i.e. the contract). I shall see him again on Monday...." ibid. f 275. R. White to Godlonton, 13.6.57: "...Southey has promised to settle the matter of our contract on Monday..." ; ibid. f 279. R. White to Godlonton, in which White reports that Southey is not going to take the Under-Secretaryship, as Rawson would get all the honour and remuneration!



At the moment, though, the colony was far more concerned about the policies that Grey was going to propose, and his visit to the frontier won the esteem of the Easterners. (1)

If Parliament had failed, and even the Frontier Times thought it had not yet really had a chance to prove itself, (2) it seemed as though the Governor might well do something to offset the apathy and hostility it had incited. The Graaff-Reinet Herald praised him for his "practical wisdom" and for the interest which he took in affairs in all the districts which he visited. It concluded:

If our Governor succeeds in permanently drawing out the spirit of self-helpfulness, he will do more for the material prosperity of this Colony than could be done by the most lavish Government expenditure upon roads, bridges, schools, or harbours. (3)

There was almost universal approval of Grey's proposals in the East, since many of his ideas coincided with those of the frontiersmen. He returned to Cape Town shortly before the opening of the second session of Parliament in March, 1855, (4) and his Opening Speech gave great satisfaction to both frontiersmen and members of Parliament, because of the promptitude with which he outlined the policy which he proposed to adopt towards the Kaffirs. During the past few months, Godlonton and the other editors of the East had continued to urge the initiation of an organised immigration policy as a remedy for the insecurity of the frontier and the shortage of labour, and Grey's proposals showed that he was of the same opinion. His speech which, for its smug, enlightened and utilitarian tone would have gladdened the heart of any contemporary, exhibited an appreciation of the wider views it had become necessary to take in their relations with the new Boer republics as well as with the Kaffir tribes. The principles which were to form the foundation of his policy towards the latter were epitomised in the following words:

- 
1. GRH. 3.1.55; 10.1.55; BPH. 10.1.55; 27.2.55; Colonist. 3.3.55.
  2. CPT. 30.1.55.
  3. GRH. 7.2.55.
  4. Cory: AYE. 1939. 1. p.9.



We should, I think, use our time of strength, when our generosity cannot be misunderstood, to instruct and civilise - to change inveterate enemies into friends, alike from interest increased knowledge - destroyers of our stock and produce into consumers of our goods and producers for our markets.(1)

During his visit to the frontier, he had been struck by three main problems: the dispersal of the troops in many small detachments, the large Fingo locations left in a state of neglect with unsatisfactory tenure of lands and vexatious interference by subordinate officials, and the fact that the Kaffirs had been left in a state of barbarism.(2) His experience in New Zealand and Australia had led him to formulate a different concept of the relations which should exist between the primitive peoples and the Europeans. After the outbreak of the Umlanjeni war, Sir Harry Smith and his successor had acknowledged the authority of the chiefs over their tribes, and had recognised native laws and customs, but Grey's policy, based upon his abhorrence of the "eating up" system and a realisation that two widely-divergent civilisations could never co-exist peaceably side by side until both had come to appreciate and honour their inter-dependence, aimed at a gradual diminution of the power of the chiefs in favour of the colonial authorities.(3) He determined to abandon Cathcart's system of military control and rigid segregation by adopting a positive policy designed to raise the natives to a higher level of civilisation and to convince them of the need for mutual respect.(4)

Grey's first speech to the Cape Parliament thus drew forth universal applause:(5) he dealt first of all with the importance of efficient frontier defence, saying that he hoped this would be improved by the introduction of English pensioners

---

1. L.C. Debates. 15.3.55.

2. Du Toit: op.cit. pp.161-2.

3. Vide Milne: The Romance of a Pro-Consul, p.133. He quotes Grey: "It was cheaper, and more effective, to give a bonus to a native chief than to keep a large standing army in Kaffraria."

4. Du Toit: op.cit. p.157; Vide also Milne: op.cit. p.128, who quotes Grey: "It was ever my endeavour to bind the natives to us by esteem, to convince them that British rule was the most desirable rule they could have."

5. EPH. 27.3.55.



who would relieve not only the problem of defence, but also the shortage of labour. He urged Parliament to assist by augmenting the mounted police force on the frontier and by the passing of a burgher law. With regard to the civilisation of the natives, he proposed "the encouragement of missions, connected with industrial schools, in which the natives may be trained in christian doctrines, and at the same time instructed in the arts of civilised life....; the establishment of hospitals, where the sick of the native race, as well as Europeans, may be carefully tended....; the employment of adult natives upon public works, which will, in fact, form also industrial schools, where they will be trained to perform operations of industry, and to use implements with which they are now almost entirely unacquainted."<sup>(1)</sup>

He said he had recommended to the Home Government that British Kaffraria should be retained separately from the Colony; he also informed Parliament that he had delegated certain powers to the Lieutenant-Governor of the East, and he drew attention to the necessity for a Judicial Establishment in the Eastern Districts. He referred to a number of other subjects: the improvement of the colony's harbours and of its roads, the possibility of the building of railways, the necessity for restoring steam communications with Britain, and the proposed measure for the augmentation of the powers of the resident magistrates. In particular, the colony approved of his step in advising the Home Government not to comply with the wishes of the petitioners from British Kaffraria who had prayed for the introduction of immigrants from the workhouses and of "free-labour convicts."

There was much in this speech to delight the East, and Godlonton, both as a frontiersman and as a Wesleyan, approved of the proposed Christianisation and civilisation of the natives.

---

1. L.O. Debates. 15.3.55.



The Wesleyans had always regarded the dissemination of the Gospel among the native tribes as an effective remedy for barbarism,<sup>(1)</sup> for, as a writer on settler Methodism has said:

There were two principal motives behind the educational activity of the Methodist missionaries. Schools were established as aids to successful evangelism and also as a means of substituting Western civilisation and Western techniques for Bantu tribal life.<sup>(2)</sup>

When the second session of Parliament opened in March 1855 the prospects for the Eastern Province seemed much brighter. Godlonton had advised the East to express its opinion on the policy it wanted to have pursued, before the opening of the session,<sup>(3)</sup> and the Eastern Province from Graaff-Reinet to Port Elizabeth and from Grahamstown to Uitenhage, hoped that something would be done to redeem the failure of Parliament in the first session.<sup>(4)</sup> A Graaff-Reinet paper warned the West against the supposition that Graaff-Reinet was out of sympathy with the rest of the East and that it would prefer an alliance with the West, for "nothing could be farther from the truth."<sup>(5)</sup> In the East, the attitude to Parliament was as yet one of apathy rather than hostility; three Eastern members had already resigned their seats,<sup>(6)</sup> and in Graaff-Reinet the election of a member in place of Muller, who had resigned, aroused even less interest than the election for a Municipal Commissioner.<sup>(7)</sup>

Almost every action of Parliament provoked a protest, now from one part of the Eastern Province, and now from another: the more Parliament ventured to do, the more it seemed to blunder. Godlonton was once again particularly interested in the Queenstown Electoral Bill which had been defeated in the previous year. Quite early in the session he presented a

---

1. Vide A.T.C.Slee: Some Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1820 and 1844, p.28; Godlonton: Case of the Colonists, pp.140-1.

2. Slee: op.cit. p 114.

3. GPJ. 3.3.55.

4. GRH. 3.1.55; EPH. 17.4.55.

5. GRH. 24.1.55.

6. GRH. 14.2.55.

7. GRH. 21.2.55.



petition from the people of Queenstown praying that Queenstown "might be constituted an electoral division"<sup>(1)</sup> and on 2nd April he was able to secure the appointment of a Select Committee to consider the petition.<sup>(2)</sup> When the Committee, of which Godlonton was Chairman, reported back later in the month, it declared itself unanimously in favour of re-introducing the bill,<sup>(3)</sup> and on the following day, the bill was read for the first time. There was the usual opposition, and the Attorney-General asserted that, as it would upset the balance of the Constitution in favour of the East, he would suggest that two members be elected from Namaqualand to represent the West. Godlonton was quite in agreement with this suggestion, and stated that all he wanted was to ensure that Queenstown was duly represented. When, in the following month, Godlonton moved the second reading of the bill, Stockenström opposed it as strongly as in the previous session: that part of Queenstown which was not in British Kaffraria, he said, belonged to Victoria and the people could consequently vote; Namaqualand should vote with Clanwilliam. But although Godlonton's motion was carried with the help of Ebdon, ~~and~~ Vigne and the casting vote of the President against Stockenström and the remaining Western members,<sup>(4)</sup> and although the bill passed the third reading in the Council,<sup>(5)</sup> it was rejected by the Assembly, where the midlands members, already annoyed at their inadequate representation, combined with the West to defeat it.<sup>(6)</sup> Queenstown was indignant, and one of Godlonton's correspondents, writing from there that the people were indebted to him for his "extraordinary exertions" on their behalf, declared:

There is a prejudice against the present Parliament and I am not surprised at it; indeed it's so strong that little will be needed to get up a representation to the Governor showing the necessity of dissolving it.<sup>(7)</sup>

---

1. L.C. Debates. 30.3.55.

2. Ibid. 2.4.55.

3. Ibid. 17.4.55.

4. Ibid. 2.5.55.

5. Ibid. 8.5.55.

6. Taylor: op.cit. p.35.

7. Godlonton Papers. E.R. Bell to Godlonton, 4.6.55.



By now Godlonton was far more concerned about the Kat River Compensation Bill and about the ever increasing cry for responsible government in the western press. The Kat River Settlement had for long engaged his particular attention since he had valuable interests in the Fort Beaufort district.<sup>(1)</sup> After the recent Kaffir War, the Government had appeased the settlers by agreeing to their demands to "break up the Hottentot exclusive settlement." Acting on the advice of the commission appointed by Cathcart, it confiscated a large number of erven which had belonged to rebels or which it declared to have fallen vacant, and allotted them to European settlers.<sup>(2)</sup> It was subsequently discovered that according to Roman Dutch Law it was illegal to confiscate land as a punishment for rebellion,<sup>(3)</sup> and in the first session of the new Parliament, Stockenström, who was chagrined at the treatment meted out to the settlement which he had founded, called for all correspondence on the Hottentot rebellion. Godlonton became deeply concerned for he claimed that Stockenström was by implication charging the settlers with incitement to rebellion, and, probably in order to emphasise the way in which the settlement had failed, he moved for the production of a copy of the unfavourable report of the 1850 Blinkwater Commission.<sup>(4)</sup> During the recess, he continued both to point out how the Settlement had failed, and to justify his change of attitude, for he was always being reminded that he had originally favoured the formation of the Settlement.<sup>(5)</sup> In the 1855 session, Godlonton called for the correspondence of the Resident Magistrate of the Kat River Settlement during the time of Cathcart and Grey,<sup>(6)</sup>

1. Vide supra. p. 74.

2. Settlers or friends of Godlonton, such as Robert Bovey, Thomas Gilbert and Benjamin Norden, obtained erven in the settlement: vide GTJ. 12.11.53.

3. Marais: Cape Coloured People, p. 245.

4. L.G. Debates. 3.8.54; 10.8.54.

5. GTJ. 11.11.54; 25.11.54: "It is after all a very clumsy expedient to endeavour to prop up the Kat River Settlement by opinions (sound enough at the time) of 22 years' standing, inasmuch as they only go to show that the favourable hopes which were indulged in the infancy of the settlement, have been most deplorably disappointed."

6. L.H. Meurant was appointed Magistrate in 1853: vide GTJ. 8.10.53.



especially regarding the titles of the owners to their lands. He moved also for the appointment of a committee to investigate the complaints against the conduct of the Resident Magistrate,<sup>(1)</sup> for, he said:

An endeavour was at the moment being made to eject the white inhabitants from the Kat River, and a claim had been put forth for the whole of that tract of country in favour of the Hottentots. He viewed this as a movement fraught with imminent danger to the colony.<sup>(2)</sup>

And when Rutherford moved the second reading of the Kat River Compensation Bill, by which it was proposed to grant compensation to certain erfholders who had, it was found, been unlawfully deprived of their lands by Cathcart for their part in the rebellion of 1851, Godlonton said that, though he would support it, so as to permit a thorough inquiry, he was convinced that

You may create Mounted Police Forces. You may make Burgher Laws, but he would tell the Council, if you persist in establishing the coloured locations in such dangerous positions the colony will never have peace.<sup>(3)</sup>

On the same day, the bill passed its third reading in the Council, and by the end of the session had been passed by the Assembly as well.

Godlonton and the other Eastern Province editors condemned the Act,<sup>(4)</sup> stating that Parliament should have declared legal the confiscation of the rebels' lands. As time went on, it became more and more certain that Godlonton would never cease agitating against Hottentot ownership in the settlement, for, towards the end of 1855, he purchased yet another farm, "Paapkuilsfontein", situated some ten miles from Fort Beaufort, and adjoining "Hammonds."<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. L. C. Debates. 27.4.55.

2. Ibid. 2.4.55. Godlonton had feared this in 1853, when it was reported that the Commissioners to inquire into the causes of the rebellion might try to re-establish the settlement: vide GTJ. 26.2.53.

3. Ibid. 8.5.55.

4. GTJ. 14.7.55. GFT. 10.7.55.

5. Vide will of Robert Godlonton, drawn up in 1882, in which he said that he had bought "Paapkuilsfontein" from "the widow Tildesley" (Cory Collection. M.S. 7408); Eliza Tildesley offered the farm for sale in October 1855 (GTJ 27.10.55 etc). Cp. also Rhodes House Collection. f.301. R. White to Godlonton, 14.1.59: "...I saw Mrs Tildesley the other day. She says a Dutchman came a short time since to buy her Farm wh, she sold to you..."



Similar to the Kat River problem was the case of a certain William Carpenter. Early in the session of 1855, Godlonton moved that the Governor be requested to lay on the Council table all official documents relating to the case of Carpenter, an English settler, whose property had been seized by Macomo in 1838 and who had subsequently been arrested for re-taking possession of his waggon in the streets of Fort Beaufort.<sup>(1)</sup> Stockenstrom, who seconded Godlonton's motion, declared that

When the land upon which Carpenter was living, and which Sir B. D'Urban never had the power to give him, was restored to the Kafirs, he, Carpenter, chose to remain in Kafirland, (2) knowing that he thereby rendered himself amenable to Kafir law.

The case involved controversial issues which led Godlonton to reply to Stockenstrom's statements (which the baronet had sent to the Frontier Times) by publishing a pamphlet entitled

Sunshine and Cloud; or Light thrown on a dark page of frontier history, of 1837; being an exposition of the Reversal of the D'Urban System, by Lieutenant-Governor, now the Honorable Sir Andreas Stockenstrom.

In this pamphlet, Godlonton referred to what he had said in the Council: two principles, he said, were involved:

1. Whether it was to be admitted or not, that lands granted by one Governor may be withdrawn by his successor, without any compensation to, or redress being given to, the ejected party?
2. Whether submission to wrong on the part of the Kafirs, or allowing the border inhabitants to be plundered with impunity, was good and sound policy; or whether it was not a policy fraught with great and inevitable future mischief?

In the conclusion to the introduction, Godlonton said that even if Stockenstrom had not provoked discussion of the subject again, there were good reasons for republishing those papers, as, when originally printed, they had aroused only a "limited and ephemeral" attention, and

the stirring events of the subsequent seven years have added greatly to their weight and importance; the territory given up has been again resumed, and, after an enormous expenditure of British money, a frightful loss of life, and intense wide-spread suffering by the unoffending colonists, the nominal boundary of British South Africa, in 1855, ~~is~~

---

1. L.C. Debates. 2.4.55.

2. L.C. Debates. 2.4.55.



is precisely where Sir Benjamin D'Urban fixed it twenty years ago. And yet, with all this dear-bought experience, there are those who would repeat the experiment, and again push back the colony from the vantage ground she now occupies.(1) Let those who can regard such designs with complacency, peruse with attention the following pages...

In the course of his remarks in the Council, too, Stockenström had challenged Godlonton to produce evidence that "he had restored to the Kaffirs the territory taken from them by Sir B. D'Urban, except as a subordinate, acting under that Governor's orders," and Godlonton, though remarking that this was not altogether relevant, thus published the pamphlet. It was to a large extent simply a reprint of his remarks from the Journal of 19th August 1848, in which he had defended "the perfect success" of D'Urban's policy and blamed Stockenström for a "breathless haste" in reversing it not merely without the authority of the Secretary of State and the Governor, but actually in defiance of their instructions.

On 18th May, Godlonton secured the appointment of a Select Committee to examine Carpenter's petition, and on 30th, the Committee, of which Godlonton had been elected Chairman, presented its report. It recommended that Carpenter should be compensated by the Government,<sup>(2)</sup> and the Council agreed to address the Governor and to send him the evidence taken by the Committee.<sup>(3)</sup> There were many who did not understand the case - and probably many more who had never even heard of William Carpenter; one of Godlonton's correspondents thanked him for explaining it and assured him that he had "completely done for the Baronet."<sup>(4)</sup> This phrase, in fact, probably summed up Godlonton's original intention, though his correspondent was clearly guilty of a degree of wishful thinking.

---

1. My italics.

2. L.C. Debates. 30.5.55. It is interesting to note that a William Carpenter had been granted a farm in the Kat River Settlement after the recent Kaffir War: vide QTJ. 12.11.53.

3. L.C. Debates. 31.5.55.

4. Godlonton Papers. H. Calderwood to Godlonton, 29.8.55. Calderwood was enthusiastic about the pamphlet's effect upon public opinion: "...Depend upon it after this his argument will limp sadly, for you have broken its legs. You have also given at the same time a black eye to my friend Str(etch)? That letter of his to Sir Benjamin is infamous after what I and others here have heard him express respecting Sir B. and his system.."



The responsible government issue probably caused more discontent than any other. Before the session, Fairbairn had conducted a vigorous and persistent press campaign in Cape Town, since, like other Westerners, he deplored the deadlock which had arisen between the Executive and Parliament. He pointed out that the Home Government had signified that it was prepared to grant responsible government when the Cape desired it, and he urged Parliament to take it into consideration early in the ensuing session.<sup>(1)</sup> Both in the Council and in the Assembly moves were soon made for the appointment of a Select Committee. Within a week of the meeting of Parliament, Wicht had proposed that a Select Committee of the Council be appointed to consider the expediency of introducing responsible government. He was seconded by Reitz; and both, with Stockenström, dwelt upon the necessity for members to be united in parties under leaders, so as to allow for constant criticism and to lead to the initiation of constructive measures - this had not been done by the present Executive. Godlonton declared the movement to be premature and dangerous, for responsible government, he said, was subject to more abuses than any other form of administration. Yet the motion was carried, and Godlonton himself agreed to be a member of the Committee, provided he was not necessarily believed to entertain the same views as might be expressed in the final report.<sup>(2)</sup>

In the Assembly, Paterson of Port Elizabeth was anxious to go further and made it clear that the hesitations of Grahamstown at the possibility of the withdrawal of the Imperial troops were not shared in Algoa Bay. He moved that the next session be held in the East,<sup>(3)</sup> and though this failed, his motion for the appointment of a Select Committee was carried by 23 votes to nine. He was supported by the Graaff-Reinet members,<sup>(4)</sup> for

---

1. Adv. and Mail. 4.1.55.

2. L.O. Debates. 26.3.55.

3. Sole: op cit. p 176.

4. Taylor: op cit. pp 32-3.



what might perhaps be considered the economic circuit of Port Elizabeth felt strong enough to take the risk of responsible government, and even to use it as the means par excellence to secure the interests of the Bay and the hinterland.

In other respects the session of 1855 would seem, so far as the frontier was concerned, to have been more successful. Bills were passed by both Houses, for example, for the organisation of the Armed and Mounted Police on the frontier, - this was particularly pleasing to the frontiermen <sup>(1)</sup> - for encouraging the importation of European labourers into the colony, for regulating the sale of gunpowder, for the better administration of justice and for the organisation of the burghers for internal defence, though the latter had been so modified that it was regarded by the East as almost useless. <sup>(2)</sup> One of the more important actions of Parliament had been to create Divisional Councils throughout the colony. This implied a measure of real administrative reform, as the new Councils were to undertake a wide variety of local duties, among which was the assumption of entire control of the public roads in their respective divisions, besides functioning as School Commissioners and assuming responsibility for the regulation of pounds and trespassing. <sup>(3)</sup> Godlonton regarded this as a constructive step towards solving some of the old grievances of the East, but on the whole the measure did not find much favour. <sup>(4)</sup> Moreover, an inquiry into the panic on the frontier had been instituted, and the Committee had urged a thorough investigation of the condition of the dissatisfied Fingoes. It is interesting, too, that it completely exonerated the frontier speculators from the charge that they had incited the alarm. <sup>(5)</sup> In the Council, Godlonton had taken particular interest in the bill to amend the Law relating to Aliens, and

---

1. CTJ. 1.1.56.

2. Boles: op.cit. p.175.

3. CTJ. 18.8.55.

4. CTJ. 15.9.55.

5. L.C. Debates. 21.5.55. Report of Select Committee on the Alarm and Panic.



in moving the second reading of the bill, he said that

He was glad to see that particular reference was made to the Fingees. He thought they should be amalgamated with the colony, and not kept apart as a distinct class, without the privileges of colonists. If to Hottentots are given certain rights and privileges, they could not be refused to a people whom we have brought into the colony, who have resided amongst us, and have fought our battles.<sup>(1)</sup>

And his opinions were given added significance by the reply of Stockenström who objected to the Fingoes' being naturalised en masse; it was quite acceptable, he said, in the case of those born in the colony, but not in the case of strangers.<sup>(2)</sup> The bill was eventually passed by both Houses.

In the East, the issues now given prominence in Parliament, and the reaction to them both in the Council and in the Assembly aroused some scepticism as to the effectiveness of Parliament as a political panacea: there were significant repercussions, upon the alignment of parties, some groups among which realised that the problems of the fifties were no longer as simple as those of even a decade earlier. Certainly there was no such thing as a solid phalanx of Eastern Province opinion. Old breaches were healed, but new fissures appeared. Frontier sentiment coalesced. But this was offset by the failure to attract the Port Elizabeth - Graaff-Reinet alignment. The constant demand of the Midlands for responsible government as a remedy for the unsatisfactory functioning of Parliament<sup>(3)</sup> was anathema to the frontier, where all shades of opinion combined to denounce the proposal as the manoeuvre of self-interested place-hunters<sup>(4)</sup> and an attempt to "fasten the yoke of Cape Town round their necks."<sup>(5)</sup> Increasing economic rivalry between the midlands and the frontier - for example, the demands of Graaff-Reinet for a railway direct to the Bay to capture even more of the trade which normally went through Grahamstown<sup>(6)</sup> - combined with the Grahamstown fear that the

---

1. L.C. Debates. 30.3.55.

2. Ibid. 11.4.55

3. GRH. 4.4.55; 25.4.55; 9.5.55.

4. CPT. 17.4.55; 1.5.55; 22.5.55.

5. CPT. 17.4.55; 16.10.55.

6. GRH. 5.7.54.



grant of responsible government would lead the British Government to discontinue its grants for frontier defence,<sup>(1)</sup> helped to aggravate the cleavage. The Frontier Times recognised that the Eastern Districts could hardly be regarded as united when many were "as wedded to Cape Town interests" as Cape Town itself.<sup>(2)</sup> and even Franklin now repudiated Stockenström's claim to be the representative of the settlers. Indeed, an English party vis-à-vis a Dutch party was in the fifties inconceivable; so too is it an over-simplification to read into the situation any schism between what might be called the attitude of the sea-ports and that of the platteland districts. Although, as we have seen<sup>(3)</sup> there might be an influential section of Stockenströmites in Grahamstown or a fairly large group of Godlontonians in Graaff-Reinet, it was a period of municipal politics, in which party issues, however grandiloquent the constitutional phraseology of their advocates, formed a new dimension of local politics,<sup>(4)</sup> and in which local opposition was drowned when issues of fundamental economic importance were involved. The Eastern Province Herald wrote:

Throughout the divisions of the Middle State, the liberal sentiment universally prevails, and that which is often heard as an alarm-cry in Graham's Town, viz: that the Dutch interest will overwhelm the English, is not only never heard or uttered in the most English of all our communities, viz. Port Elizabeth, but the contrary is the feeling expressed.<sup>(5)</sup>

Paterson said that the frontier party was predominant in Albany, Fort Beaufort, Victoria, Cradock "and perhaps Somerset", which were occupied mainly by British settlers or by "those who are too weak in numbers or in self-opinion to stand up against them", while Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet

1. OPT. 5.6.55. Cf. Adv. and Mail. 29.9.55: Cock agrees with a party on the Eastern frontier that the tendency of responsible government "will be to reduce Commissariat expenditure in that quarter, to make the Colonists more self-reliant, to check the progress of annexation of lands cleared of their inhabitants by British troops at British expense, and to make the Cape an ornament and element of grandeur to the Empire, instead of a burden and a drag."
2. OPT. 12.6.55.
3. Vide supra. pp. 145 *sqq.*
4. Cf., e.g. EPH. 8.7.48. in which the Editor takes up the suggestion made by Mr. Hutchinson at a meeting held to revive the Uitenhage and Albany Agricultural Society, that such organisations could take the lead in the agitation for local self-government.
5. EPH. 29.5.55.



constituted the head-quarters of the more liberal British party, the "newest comers." Indeed, if a separation of the provinces were effected, the midlands - though a segment of Graaff-Reinet wavered<sup>(1)</sup> would demand the right to form a middle state which would be independent of Albany.<sup>(2)</sup> Locally, Godlonton's task was facilitated for a time because of the disgust of the frontier at the constant agitation for responsible government. Sixteen acts, he said in summing up the achievements of the session, had received the attention of Parliament, yet there was a strong feeling that the Constitutional machine was not running smoothly. With regard to responsible government, he declared:

It appears then that the boasted Constitution, that was to give everything to everybody, fails in its promised end, and that the people are now called upon to take a much bolder step, and to risk an experiment, the failure of which would be the disorganisation of society, not to say entailment of irremediable public ruin. It is satisfactory to know that the people of this Province have no taste for, and will not submit to any such wild experiment.<sup>(3)</sup>

Port Elizabeth was inclined to give Parliament another chance,<sup>(4)</sup> but when at the end of the year, Godlonton reviewed its achievements, he had little good to say for it:

It has added to the taxation of the country, but has been totally inoperative in respect to the removal of any of those burthens, which are considered to press too heavily upon the industry of the Colony. It has given us, within the past year, a new Tariff of Customs, a Burgher Law, a Divisional Councils Act; but it may well be doubted whether any of these measures are adapted exactly to the wants of the community, or can claim, without material qualification, the popular favour.<sup>(5)</sup>

The attitude to the general legislation of Parliament had indeed been lukewarm in nearly all parts of the East,<sup>(6)</sup> and many turned once again to the expedient of resident government. The ~~irresponsible~~<sup>irrepressible</sup> Dr Tancred had said in the House of Assembly, with more wit than truth, that Godlonton desired removal because

he wanted to get the seat of Government removed from under<sup>(7)</sup> the Lion's Rump to be placed at Graham's Town under his own rump,

---

1. Op. GNH. 23.5.55; 20.10.55.

2. EPH. 22.5.55.

3. GTJ. 23.6.55.

4. EPH. 19.6.55.

5. GTJ. 29.12.55.

6. e.g. Colonist. 9.6.55 (on Burgher Law); CFT. 26.6.55 (on Burgher Law); 3.7.55; 24.7.55. (on Divisional Councils Bill)

7. CFT. 10.4.55.



but Godlonton seems to have given up all idea of removal, although Franklin suddenly demanded a removal of the capital - to Uitenhage!<sup>(1)</sup> On the frontier, there was a fear that, in the event of a total separation, the East would be saddled with the entire cost of frontier defence,<sup>(2)</sup> and thus the demand was rather for an increase in the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor,<sup>(3)</sup> though the midlands were opposed.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton was still intrigued with the idea of a federal union of the States of South Africa. At the end of the session, he had denounced the "centralising character" of Parliament and, after bestowing some very faint praise upon its actions, had referred bitterly to the failure of the petition of the people of Queenstown "praying that they, in common with the Hottentots of the Kat River, may be included within the category of the electoral franchise."<sup>(5)</sup> He wrote:

To meet the requirements of the country the whole system must be entirely changed. Each Province must have its own distinct government, Legislative as well as Executive, and until this be obtained expedient after expedient may be tried but all in the end will be found unavailing.<sup>(6)</sup>

Thus, concomitant with his campaign against the responsible government, so ardently desired by Cape Town<sup>(7)</sup> and the midlands, went his campaign in favour of federation as an alternative means of solving the constitutional dilemma. In October, he commented that the centralisation of government in the colony had always been disastrous: responsible government, which would promote this tendency, was consequently to be rejected outright. On the other hand, the division of the country into a number of distinct and entirely independent colonies would be "immeasurably more mischievous." He pointed

1. CPT. 30.10.55. The EPH 19.6.55. said it was glad that Godlonton had now pledged his support for federation, and remarked that the Frontier Times was now the only Eastern Province paper against federation.

2. CPT. 31.7.55.

3. CPT. 14.8.55.

4. Taylor: op.cit. p.35. Paterson and White opposed the grant of a further £1600 to the Lieutenant-Governor's establishment, because they maintained that the office was unnecessary and that the Lieutenant-Governor's jurisdiction extended only over the frontier districts.

5. GTS. 23.6.55.

6. GTS. 23.6.55.

7. Adv. and Mail. 2.1.55; 8.5.55;



with some ambiguity to the examples of the successful working of the federal principle in the United States of America, in New Zealand and in Australia;<sup>(1)</sup> he quoted from the Sydney Empire on the powers of the Governor-General in Australia, and commented that the despatch accompanying the commission appointing Sir Charles FitzRoy Australian Governor-General showed that the Imperial Government intended him to superintend the general management of the Australian colonies so as "to promote their common welfare and prosperity." He defined the concept in this way:

What is required to meet the public wants is, that each Colony should have the undisputed control, legislative and Executive, of its own local affairs - a paramount controlling power providing for the great interests which are common to all. This is what we mean by 'Federation' - or, in other words, that system of Union by which the Colonies of South Africa may enjoy that safety which is so desirable, and attain to that eminence to which with all their varied and vast resources, they may justly aspire.<sup>(2)</sup>

The efforts of Fort Elizabeth to ridicule Grahamstown's fight against responsible government<sup>(3)</sup> only stimulated Godlonton's innate obstinacy: he denied the claims of Cape Town that responsible government would work as effectively at the Cape as in Newfoundland, since the latter was not exposed to "Kaffir inroads",<sup>(4)</sup> and quoted the "judicious" remarks of the Natal Mercury on the subject of what he called "the absurd proposition to introduce Responsible Government into that Colony."<sup>(5)</sup> He also adopted the now familiar tactic of exploiting the readiness with which the term "party government" was equated in the public mind with "factionous opposition". Combining this with the Eastern suspicion of the Cape Town "factions" and with the unpopularity of Parliament, he wrote with alarm:

Take for instance the late proceedings in Parliament, and observe how many measures of the greatest importance to them

---

1. Australia was not, of course, federated until 1901; but Godlonton was no political precisionist, and his general point is clear.

2. GTJ. 20.10.55.

3. EPH. 24.4.55; 15.5.55.

4. GTJ. 8.9.55

5. GTJ. 8.12.55.



(i.e. Eastern Districts) were quashed by a Parliamentary majority. How was it that the Burgher Bill, the Supreme Court Extension Bill, the Queen's Town Enfranchisement Bill, and various other measures of little less importance were quashed in their passage through Parliament? The answer is, by the efforts of a Western Province majority - a distinct and significant proof that with Responsible government nothing would be obtained by the Eastern Province which the Western majority might not think proper to grant. This Province would be in fact entirely at its mercy...(1)

Fairbairn retorted that the anti-responsibles had always favoured "personal" government because they were afraid of the expense of frontier defence; their professions of loyalty to the Crown had been "too loud not to raise suspicion"; for, he added:

Ministers observed...that our Frontier loyalists, when most prone at Her Majesty's feet, were ever making the hardest pull at Her Majesty's pocket.(2)

It was thus inevitable that in the latter months of 1855, the election for a member in place of Joubert, who had resigned from the Council, should be regarded as a test to determine the strength of Eastern feeling on the subject of responsible government.(3) Cock of Albany, White of Port Elizabeth, and Meintjes of Graaff-Reinet, were the candidates, the latter being as strongly in favour of responsible government as Cock was against it. When it was announced that Cock had topped the poll, Godlonton flaunted his victory as the triumph of the anti-responsibles, and besides accusing Cock's opponents of unfair electioneering methods, he spitefully observed that while Cock's votes came from "the thinking, intelligent, independent Dutch and English inhabitants," Meintjes had obtained one-fourth of his from the "Hottentots at the Kat River, Hankey, and other Missionary institutions."(4)

The sins of Parliament were allayed by the general confidence in the Governor. The British Government had, in June 1855, given him a free hand in settling the native problem,(5)

---

1. GTJ. 3.11.55.

2. Adv. and Mail. 22.11.55.

3. GPT. 27.11.55; 1.1.56; Adv. and Mail. 29.9.55.

4. GTJ. 22.12.55.

5. Du Toit: op cit. pp 159-60.



and, after the Parliamentary session he paid his second visit to the frontier.<sup>(1)</sup> In October, he met the Gaika Chiefs at

Dohne and the Adhlambe at Fort Murray, and persuaded them to accept monthly allowances, on condition that they would accept the assistance of European magistrates in the administration of justice and also hand over all fines to the government.<sup>(2)</sup>

By the beginning of 1856, both Kama and Unkhala had accepted magistrates, and ~~Swani~~<sup>Siwani</sup>, Jalai, Tabai and Tzatzoe

had expressed their willingness to do so.<sup>(3)</sup> Moreover, Grey had begun the implementation of his policy of employing natives on public works, and the first of the industrial schools had been founded at Healdtown, where the Fingoes were placed under Ayliff. Not long after his arrival, too, he had announced that missionary institutions would be subsidised in return for training natives as interpreters, evangelists and school-masters among their own people, and during 1855 Bishop Gray was generously aided in establishing mission stations with schools in British Kaffraria.<sup>(4)</sup>

Shortly after Grey's arrival, Godlonton had censured the previous "see-saw policy" of Britain on the frontier,<sup>(5)</sup> and the measures of Grey now seemed both sound and constructive by contrast. In his private note-book, Godlonton equated Sir George Grey's "system" approvingly with "Progress - reduction of Kaffir power",<sup>(6)</sup> and at the end of 1855, when the Governor's policy had been partially implemented, Godlonton took stock of the position. In a sentence which summed up his attitude to the frontier problem, he declared:

In dealing with the natives there is evidently no middle path between civilisation and extermination.

And he added:

The exercise of mere brute force has been tried, and no one is satisfied with the result. We have been teaching the natives the art of war - it is high time, we submit, to teach

1. Ibid. p.163.

2. Ibid. p.170. Henderson: Sir George Grey, pp.131-2; Rees: Sir George Grey, p.229.

3. Henderson: op.cit. p.132.

4. Du Toit: op.cit. p.412.

5. GTJ. 30.12.54.

6. Godlonton's MS. Note-book. (Cory Collection. MS.6819).



them something better. SIR GEORGE GREY is fully sensible to this his policy is the very reverse of it and hence we find all his efforts are directed, not to excite them to war, but to lead them to, and instruct them in the arts of peace...(1)

The press of the Eastern Districts expressed its satisfaction at the energetic and far-reaching innovations of Grey. (2) The Frontier Times said that the frontiersmen were particularly pleased to observe that the subject of frontier defence had occupied such a prominent place in his speech at the opening of Parliament, (3) and praised the reorganisation and augmentation of the Armed and Mounted Police, (4) while the Colonist constantly referred to the general confidence in his rule, which, by the end of 1855, seems to have been firmly established. (5)

Godlonton was wholly in favour of Grey's scheme for educating the natives. Book education, he declared, was not sufficient for anyone, and he viewed Grey's industrial schools as an important step in the direction of subjecting the natives to European influence and of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number. He commented:

Sir George Grey's system of Industrial schools seems well adapted to the wants of the natives of this country; but at the same time it will require to be watched with never-ceasing vigilance. The drawing up of a report on the tabulation of returns will not be all that will be required of a Superintendent. The scholars must be watched over diligently; little things must not be overlooked, the mind must be carefully disciplined, and such habits of thought inculcated as will lead to the practical adoption of whatever is good and useful, both as respects themselves individually, and as will tend to the benefit of the community to which they belong. (6)

Thus, in December 1855, when Godlonton reviewed a recently

- 
1. GTJ. 1.12.55. Cp. L.C. Debates, 19.3.56. Godlonton said that "They had tried the force of the bayonet, they had experienced the horrors of war, but he maintained that they had never yet put into force those moral forces by which they might hope to turn them from their barbarism, and to convert them from savages..."
  2. GRH. 25.8.55; 20.10.55; CFT. 6.11.55; Colonist. 27.10.55.
  3. CFT. 27.3.55.
  4. CFT. 11.12.55; 18.12.55.
  5. Colonist. 3.2.55; 24.2.55; 3.3.55; 31.3.55; 27.10.55; 29.12.55 etc. EPH. 25.12.55; GRH. 12.1.56.
  6. GTJ. 6.10.55. Cp. CFT. 2.1.55 on the Industrial schools.



published blue-book of despatches from Grey to the Secretary of State, in which the Governor had outlined his policies, he remarked that the most prominent of Grey's proposals were the settlement of military pensioners on the frontier, the employment of natives on public works, and

The establishment of Industrial Schools in which the Natives may be trained to those active pursuits, and taught those useful arts which are best calculated to wean them from predatory habits, and convert them from vagrants and pilferers into good and useful neighbours.(1)

Godlonton was especially impressed with the Governor's fitness for the work he was performing, since he had, within the first year, made two tours through the colony, and had visited Kaffraria, the Free State and Natal.<sup>(2)</sup> He boasted the Governor, praised his policy,<sup>(3)</sup> and warned the colonists that Grey's frontier system would not function successfully without their co-operation. It was essential, he maintained, for the colonists to support Grey, and he had a right to expect this. In an attempt to bolster Grey's authority, he wrote:

The Colonists appreciate his character, they have confidence in his integrity, they greatly admire his zeal and ability, and they regard with much favor the measures which His Excellency has adopted for the future government of the Natives along and beyond our immediate border.(4)

Indeed, Godlonton's praise of Grey was at all times extravagant. In the Advertiser and Mail Fairbairn, in order to reinforce his arguments in favour of responsible government, attributed the success of Grey's policy on the frontier to the fact that "the fair and full Representation of the people in Parliament" had made it possible for him to do what he had done;<sup>(5)</sup> this probably convinced Godlonton of the necessity for lavishing all the praise he could on Grey, especially in view of his own attempts to belittle the achievements of representative institutions and, at all costs, to prevent the introduction of responsible government at that stage.

---

1. GTJ. 22.12.55

2. GTJ. 29.12.55.

3. e.g. GTJ. 7.7.55; 6.10.55; 1.12.55; 22.12.55; 29.12.55; 5.1.56; 12.1.56 etc.

4. GTJ. 22.12.55.

5. Adv and Mail. 16.10.55.



(1)  
Increasing prosperity, the popularity of the Governor,  
and the expectation that Parliament would not fail to take  
under consideration subjects such as immigration (2) and the  
re-opening of steam communications with Europe made men forget  
or forgive the mistakes of the past, (3) and hope that the ensuing  
session would be less disappointing. In the Council, Cock  
was to take the place of Joubert, so that it seemed as though  
the frontier would have more of its own way in Parliament in  
1856. Godlonton said he was sure that those in favour of  
responsible government would not even dare to propose it in  
the forthcoming session. (4)

The speech of the Governor at the opening of Parliament  
on 13th March 1856 was full of optimism. He remarked on the  
highly successful working of his native policy and assured the  
colony that, though the state of the frontier was still un-  
settled, there was no cause for alarm, since every precaution  
had been taken and his informants were convinced that there  
was no reason to believe that the chiefs were conspiring against  
the colony. He remarked, too, on the increasing prosperity of  
the colony, and informed them that steps had been taken to  
secure amicable relations with the Orange Free State and with  
the chiefs Moshesh, Moroko, Kreli, Faku and Panda. But un-  
doubtedly the most important part of his speech referred to  
the subject of immigration. He expressed his regret that his  
recommendations to the Home Government regarding the enrolment  
of pensioners for service in South Africa had not been imple-  
mented, but now he proposed the initiation of an immigration  
scheme sponsored by the government. The government was to  
raise the sum of £200,000 by the sale of debentures, and the  
immigrants were to be settled on the frontier where he had

---

1. GRH. 5.1.56; OPT. 1.1.56. Cp. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey  
to Godlonton, 2.5.57, on the thriving wool industry.

2. EPH. 4.3.56; GRH. 15.3.56.

3. e.g. GRH. 5.1.56 said re Parliament: "Alike in its commissions  
and in its omissions, all, all, have been conceived in  
error and fraught with mischief." Yet it was "hopeful for  
the future."

4. GTJ. 8.3.56.



sent an official to report upon the way in which the country was occupied by settlers bound by military service.<sup>(1)</sup> In view of the previous agitation on the subject of immigration,<sup>(2)</sup> it is not surprising that the scheme was hailed with unbounded enthusiasm in almost every part of the colony. Indeed, the apathetic manner in which the Burgher Law had been greeted during the last session was largely due to the conviction that, while the colonists could be expected to defend the colony in time of attack, the permanent defence of the colony and also the military campaigns against the Kaffirs should be entrusted only to a standing force paid by the colony as a whole.<sup>(3)</sup> Nothing could have pleased Godlonton more than Grey's proposal: he had for a long time considered the systematic introduction of European immigrants as an obvious and effective way of securing the peace of the border areas. His Sketches of the Eastern Districts of 1842, and his publication of an Eastern Province Directory and Almanac in 1848 and 1849 had aimed largely at arousing an interest in the Eastern Province as a field for immigration. In the Journal, he constantly referred to the benefits it would confer on the Eastern Province: in 1850 he appealed to the Cape Government to make immigration more attractive,<sup>(4)</sup> and even in his Kaffir War, did he echo the sense of injustice felt by the Eastern Province against Cape Town which always grasped the best immigrants when the ships arrived.<sup>(5)</sup> In April 1852, when it was rumoured that the British Government was enlisting fifteen hundred Swiss riflemen, who were to be located in the Amatolas with their families, Godlonton was elated. He wrote in high spirits:

If these rumours are correct, what gratitude must we owe to Lord Grey, and how thankful should we be that our case is now so correctly understood in high quarters! The deteriorating influence of amiable visionaries and of fireside theorists is on the wane, and commonsense and reason are actually beginning to triumph! <sup>(6)</sup>

1. L.C. Votes and Proceedings, 13.3.56.

2. e.g. EPH. 2.2.50; EPN. 6.9.51; 13.9.51; 29.6.52; 12.10.52; 24.5.53; 16.8.53; 17.1.54; GRC. 13.8.53; 17.9.53; Colonist 29.9.55. QFT. 14.11.54

3. Vide e.g., QFT. 26.6.55.

4. e.g. GTJ. 6.7.50; 13.7.50; 3.8.50.

5. Kaffir War. p 26

6. GTJ. 10.4.52.



In June 1852, he said that the distressed people of the Hebrides should be located on the Eastern frontier,<sup>(1)</sup> and he wrote significantly:

Ten thousand British immigrants of the right sort, would effectually secure the British government and the colony against Kaffir wars and Hottentot rebellions in time to come, and such an influx would be the best and cheapest remedy for existing evils.<sup>(2)</sup>

There was some divergence of opinion in the colony as to the value of encouraging immigration: the Graaff-Reinet Herald said that the immigration of trained artisans would create more difficulties than it would solve, as they were not the sort of immigrants who were required,<sup>(3)</sup> and the Stockenströmites stoutly resisted the importation of labourers who would in time compete with the colonists as landowners.<sup>(4)</sup> But the frontier was strongly in favour of immigration schemes,<sup>(5)</sup> especially since it was known that the promotion of such schemes was diverting immigrants to Natal.<sup>(6)</sup> Godlonton began to view the problem with feelings approaching alarm when it was discovered, as one of his correspondents said, that "The emigration to Australia has quite for a time floored this colony."<sup>(7)</sup> In the Journal, he went to considerable trouble to dissuade prospective emigrants from leaving the Cape: towards the end of 1852<sup>(8)</sup> he published quotations from a recent book by a Mr Moodie, formerly a settler in South Africa, which gave a vivid account of the terrible sufferings she and her husband had experienced since their emigration to the backwoods of Canada.

1. GTJ. 12.6.52.
2. GTJ. 19.6.52.
3. GRH. 22.2.54; 31.5.54; 13.12.54.
4. Godlonton Papers. William Southey to Godlonton, 2.5.57. "I have been speaking this morning to two or three leading men about another meeting in favour of Emigration. Our party would now beat the Stockenströmites on that point, more especially if our English Friends will take the trouble to come in from the country...."
5. CFT. 26.8.51; 14.11.54.
6. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers Samuel Young (of Canterbury) to Godlonton, 14.7.49: "The opening for settlers at Natal is exciting much interest in this country. Cp. John May to Godlonton, 18.2.50. Vide also Cory Collection. MS. 7092.R. White to Godlonton, 25.4.50: "Mr Phillipps has just heard from his son at Natal. He is enraptured with the country and writes for them all to join him."
7. Godlonton Papers. Capt. W. K. Hall to Godlonton, N. D. ("Recd 10th Jan. 1853.")
8. GTJ. 11.9.52; Cp. CFT. 7.9.52.



In December 1853, he quoted extensive passages from Australian newspapers, in which it was reported that many of the immigrants who had been lured into the hazardous game of gold-digging, had been forced to return as paupers to England. He concluded:

This extract is not made with any particular care, as scores of passages might have been found of a far more unfavourable character. It is, however, quite sufficient to show, that those who quit this colony for Australia enter upon a career of turmoil, the issue of which, to say the least must be extremely doubtful. They quit a country too that is in need of their services, that abounds with advantages, and that only requires population of the right sort to rank amongst the most favoured possessions of the British Crown.(1)

State-aided immigration to the Cape had taken place during the period 1846-8,<sup>(2)</sup> when some three thousand people were brought out; during the period 1857-61, close on a thousand people migrated from the United Kingdom, and in addition there were a number of Dutch juveniles, bringing the total to about twelve thousand people. Very few of these immigrants settled on the frontier, where Sir George Grey believed that they were urgently needed.<sup>(3)</sup> If his scheme in British Kaffraria was to succeed, the introduction of settlers in large numbers was vitally necessary: soon after his arrival he had suggested that a thousand pensioners should be settled in that part as military colonists as well as farmers. There was considerable approval of the plan in Britain and at the Cape:<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton criticised the Editor of the Spectator for disagreeing with Grey's scheme, and stated that, though there might be difficulties, these could not for a moment be compared with the advantages that would be obtained.<sup>(5)</sup> Unfortunately, the scheme failed, as the conditions had not been sufficiently attractive.

---

1. GTJ. 10.12.53. Vide also GTJ. 17.12.53; Cf. GRM. 25.8.52.

2. Vide H. M. Robertson: The Cape of Good Hope and 'Systematic Colonisation' in The S.A. Journal of Economics, Dec. 1937. for an account of immigration to the Cape.

3. E.L.G. Schnell: For Men Must Work. Ph.D. thesis. Published 1954.

4. Schnell: op cit. p 44.

5. GTJ. 4.8.55.



Godlonton commented that the failure of the scheme would be received with universal regret at the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup>

Grey persisted. In reviewing the history of the frontier since Britain had taken over the Cape, he must have noticed the emergence of a different attitude to the relations between black and white. On the frontier, it was patent that the settlement of Fingoes between the hostile Khosas and the colony had not given sufficient security; that the Hottentots could no longer be trusted; and that military settlements had been a dismal failure. The idea was arising of substituting for a policy of complete segregation one of interpersing European settlements among the Natives, not only for the sake of security and as a measure of colonisation, but also as a means of civilising the Kaffirs.<sup>(2)</sup> Cathcart's settlement in Kaffiraria had been based upon military control; Grey's was to be one of colonisation.<sup>(3)</sup> When his proposal for settling pensioners in Kaffiraria had failed by the end of 1855, he tried to obtain married militiamen; this scheme was also abortive.<sup>(4)</sup>

But in 1856 his chance had come. In March of that year Labouchere, the Colonial Secretary, wrote a confidential despatch requesting Grey's advice on the advisability of settling the Anglo-German Legion on the frontier. Grey was delighted, and sent a message to both Houses acquainting them with the scheme. The Legislative Council heartily approved, and the House of Assembly granted £40,000 for putting the scheme into effect; and expressed its gratitude to Her Majesty's Government.<sup>(5)</sup> In June, Major Grant and Captain Hoffmann, who had been sent by Lord Panmure to discuss the project with Grey, accompanied the Governor on a tour of the border.<sup>(6)</sup>

Since 1853-4, Godlonton had begun to devote even more attention to the subject of immigration,<sup>(7)</sup> and had even suggested

---

1. GTJ. 29.3.56.

2. Schnell: op cit. pp 40-41-

3. Ibid. p 39-41; Du Toit: op cit. p 142

4. Schnell: op cit. pp 45-6

5. Henderson: op cit. pp 175-6; Schnell: op cit. pp 53-55

6. Schnell: op cit. p 55

7. e.g. GTJ. 1-12.53; 17.12.53; 20.1.55; 23.2.56; 29.3.56; 28.6.56; 1.7.56.



(1)  
that boys might be obtained from British reformatories. In his Opening Speech to Parliament in March 1856, Grey, as we have seen, had proposed another immigration scheme, and Godlonton had commented:

The most important subject in Sir George Grey's speech is the proposition to raise £200,000 by the sale of debentures, for the purpose of promoting European immigration into this colony....(2)

In their letters, Godlonton's correspondents drew attention to the problem, too: Lieutenant White suggested that Grey should offer greater advantages to poor half-pay officers to settle in the Queenstown district, (3) and another correspondent referred in May 1857 to the appointment in England of emigration agents for the Eastern Province. (4)

Thus it was that, when the German immigration scheme was announced during the session of 1856, the Journal was loud in its praise. Godlonton enthused:

The whole province has hailed, with feelings of unmixed delight, the promised location of the German Legion on its border. Visions of long-continued industrial successes, under the influence of the security which their arrival promises; hopes of larger assistance in the shape of manual labour; anticipations of a growth in political importance commensurate with the sudden development in other respects, are among the blessings looked for from their arrival.

The location of the settlers in small plots on the frontier would help to solve the labour problem, he said. But they were important in another aspect:

"Nothing better than this," wrote Godlonton, "could be devised to meet our first great want: - security in the Province from the marauding propensities of our barbarous and restless neighbours."(5)

Godlonton continued nevertheless to help the subject of immigration before the public eye: in October, he expressed the opinion that what was needed was a steady, well-directed stream of immigration to all parts of the colony; (6) and in

---

1. GTJ. 1.7.56.

2. GTJ. 22.3.56; 29.3.56.

3. Godlonton Papers. Lieutenant R (?) White to Godlonton, 29.4.57.

4. Godlonton Papers. Dr. W. Way to Godlonton, 4.5.57.

5. GTJ. 8.7.56.

6. GTJ. 25.10.56.



November, he upbraided the Cape authorities for having failed to give any encouragement whatever to immigration to the Cape, so that it had flowed instead to Australia, Canada and the United States.<sup>(1)</sup> When the German Legion began to arrive in January 1857, the Journal's impressions were favourable, - the Legion had arrived during the climax of the cattle-killing - and Godlonton, in his editorial, welcomed them to the country.<sup>(2)</sup> Yet, even after their arrival, he continued to urge upon his readers the necessity for further immigration.<sup>(3)</sup> The Frontier Times<sup>(4)</sup> and the Colonist<sup>(5)</sup> had pressed also for immigration for a long time, and in April 1857, while Godlonton was in Cape Town, a meeting was held in Grahamstown, at which it was resolved to urge upon Parliament the necessity for putting the Governor's views on the subject into effect, not only because of the labour shortage in the colony, but also because of the pressing need for frontier peace.<sup>(6)</sup>

Despite Godlonton's enthusiasm, Grey was himself very disappointed with the Legion. Not only were there six times as many men as women, but the men were by no means the flower of the Legion, and in the following year, Grey seized the opportunity afforded by the Indian Mutiny to get rid of the worst element.<sup>(7)</sup> Godlonton was probably not so disappointed: if the legionnaires were not the best settlers, they at least added to the population of the East, which one day might secure a corresponding increase of influence in the Cape Parliament.

The session of 1856 was a busy one. Godlonton was once again primarily concerned with the state of the frontier. He moved for all the correspondence relating to Carpenter which had been entered into since the last session,<sup>(8)</sup> and secured

- 
1. GTJ. 29.11.56.
  2. GTJ. 24.1.57
  3. GTJ. 24.3.57; 11.4.57; 22.9.57; 13.10.57
  4. CFT. 5.12.54; 28.3.56; 8.7.56.
  5. Colonist. 25.11.54; 30.12.54; 10.2.55; 11.3.55; 31.3.55.
  6. GTJ. 28.4.57.
  7. Henderson: op cit. p 176
  8. L.C. Debates. 19.3.56.



(1)  
the re-appointment of the Committee to investigate his petition;  
Godlonton was again Chairman of this committee, whose recommendation that Carpenter should be compensated with a grant of land, was adopted by the Council. (2) He also presented the petition of his neighbour, William Gilbert a sheep-farmer of Fort Beaufort, praying for compensation for losses as a result of the Kat River rebellion, (3) though this was later deferred. (4)  
Moreover, he was appointed to the Committee on the Alarm and Panic in the Eastern Districts in place of Blaine, who was absent. (5)

Godlonton seems to have shown a special interest in the Hope Report. At the end of 1853, the Graaff-Reinet Courant had criticised Cathcart for appointing a Board of Commissioners for the settlement of land claims in the Eastern Province, which consisted entirely of men who were unknown outside Albany and who were "themselves extensively concerned in land speculations," (6) and during the 1855 session Stockenström had moved that the Governor be requested to lay on the table copies of the instructions and powers under which this Commission was acting, as well as the names of its members. (7) Towards the end of 1855, Grey, probably realising that the settlers as a whole were addicted to land speculation, (8) had sent Major Hope, the Auditor-General, as Special Commissioner to make sure before the title deeds were issued, that the intentions and instructions of the government had been carried out in the

---

1. Ibid. 31.3.56.

2. Ibid. 4.4.56; 7.4.56.

3. Ibid. 25.3.56.

4. Ibid. 26.5.56.

5. Ibid. 20.3.56.

6. GRC 5.11.53. The Commission consisted of M.R. Robinson, the Assistant-Surveyor-General; George Wood, N. Birkenruth and F. Carlisle of Grahamstown.

7. L.C. Debates. 22.3.55.

8. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 1.8.50: "...Mine (i.e. government land he had just bought at Alice) I may sell again at an advance of 1d per acre as I don't actually want the land..."; ibid. W. Southey to Godlonton, 26.4.51; 17.5.51.



Queenstown district by the Land Commissions of 1853,<sup>(1)</sup> Hope had carried out his investigations with the help of three military officers, Captains Rigaud, Field and Leach, each of whom was allocated a district to examine. Partly because of the illness of Hope, and partly due to the shortage of time before the Parliamentary session, the Report was not as thorough as many desired, and aroused considerable adverse criticism.<sup>(2)</sup> The Deputy-Surveyor-General, Robinson, who had played a prominent part in locating the settlers on the new farms,<sup>(3)</sup> took umbrage at many of the remarks in the Report, which seemed to reflect a degree of incompetence and partiality on his part and to blame him for not acting in collaboration with the rest of the Commission.<sup>(4)</sup> Robinson had been a member of the Land Commission charged with the allocation of land in the Fort Beaufort, Victoria and Kat River districts, as well as of the one for apportioning the forfeited land of the rebel Tambookies in North Victoria. Hope had recommended that some of the Queenstown farmers should not receive their title-deeds because of their failure to fulfil the stipulated conditions:<sup>(5)</sup> this had alarmed Godlonton, several of whose friends and acquaintances had received grants in Queenstown,<sup>(6)</sup>

---

1. Lombard: Die Stigting en Vroeë Geskiedenis van Queens Town. p. 97.

2. Ibid. pp. 97-8.

3. CFT. 20.5.56. said he was "well qualified" for the task, but had not had enough time or assistance; CFT. 9.9.56. deplored the "loose and imperfect manner" in which Hope had made his inquiry.

4. Lombard: op.cit. p.99.

5. Ibid. p.106. Including a certain William Knight. Godlonton, in 1851, seems to have employed a William Knight to take care of his stock: vide Godlonton Papers. W. Knight to Godlonton, 4.4.51. Cp. I. Staples: MS. Narrative of the War 1850-53: "...On the 24th of May, in each year a general muster of all the grantees, and their shots was held, and a curious lot many of them were, as there was no special condition as to the quality of the man who was to be supplied as a shot and so raw Kaffirs were often supplied to fill up the required number..." Isaiah Staples had himself been granted one of these farms by Cathcart: vide, GTJ. 30.4.53.

6. e.g. James Attwell, Samuel Loxton, George Coleridge, vide GTJ. 30.4.53. Vide, too, EPH. 8.1.56. "Memo" to Editor: "...it was to serve 'the Eastern Frontier'—to serve a purpose in which the safety of £400,000 worth of the most valuable lands in South Africa was at stake, and which certain money-lenders in Graham's Town had their interest in the job, for already 60 of those valuable farms have changed masters, to the tune of from £1200 to £1800 each, ("but under the rose")..."



while his son-in-law, Benjamin Booth, and other close relatives and friends had received grants from the Fort Beaufort and Victoria land commission in South Victoria. <sup>(1)</sup> It seemed to Godlonton not unlikely that the unfavourable report of Hope might be followed by similar ones on the work of the other commission, especially in view of the growing body of criticism of their work in the colonial press. <sup>(2)</sup> Moreover, as a correspondent to the Eastern Province Herald pointed out, the abuses in the Queenstown area provided an argument against the concession of electoral privileges to such people. <sup>(3)</sup> Robinson wrote a number of letters and a memorandum in defence of himself to the Colonial Secretary. <sup>(4)</sup> At the same time, he wrote to Godlonton, who was in Cape Town for the session:

My dear Mr Godlonton,  
I obtained a copy of Hope's report by yesterday's post. I was as you are aware prepared for much that was incorrect. It has however perhaps exceeded my expectations. I can hardly conceive, did I not believe the paper had a special object, <sup>(5)</sup> that so much that was false could have found place in a public document.

I fear the Parliament is too near the close to go into the matter this session but I have written to the C(olonial) S(ecretary) by this post pointing out the very grave errors in the report, referring to the paragraphs, and requesting that my letter may have the same publicity as Mr Hope's. Will you kindly ask if any communication has been received from me....<sup>(6)</sup>

When the Report was laid before the Legislative Council in the same month, Cock immediately moved that a Committee be appointed to examine the Report on the grants in Queenstown and Victoria, and Godlonton was elected a member of the Committee, <sup>(7)</sup> which later reported that nothing could be recommended till full information had become available. <sup>(8)</sup> In the same month, Godlonton moved that the Governor be requested

- 
1. GTJ. 12.11.53. Also A.W.Hoole, the Gilberts etc.
  2. e.g. CPT. 26.2.56 reprinted a letter from the EPH, in which the correspondent said that farms in the Queenstown district were being sold sub rosa, while there were abuses among the grantees on the Tyumie and Kat River as well and Barend Woest of Victoria had received a hundred acres of the finest forest in the world "without paying a farthing for it independently of a grant worth \$2000, on the bank of the Tyumie River.." cp. CPT. 13.5.56; EPH. 8.1.56. "Nemo" to Editor.
  3. EPH. 8.1.56. "Nemo" to Editor.
  4. Lombardi: op.cit. p.100.
  5. My italics.
  6. Godlonton Papers. M.R.Robinson to Godlonton, 13.5.56.
  7. L.G.Debates. 8.5.56.
  8. Ibid. 12.5.56.



to lay on the table any communications with regard to the Hope Report; <sup>(1)</sup> on the following day, this was done, <sup>(2)</sup> and at the end of the month, a copy of the instructions, which had been issued to Hope, was produced by the Colonial Secretary. <sup>(3)</sup>

In the Journal, the Report was also criticised: in May it said:

There are a number of persons implicated by this report, which we should be sorry to believe is even partially correct in many of its assertions. Officers of the highest standing and sterling worth upon the Frontier are made to feel the Auditor's lash, and we cannot, until confirmed by proof, receive as fact the bare assertions of the Auditor-General. <sup>(4)</sup>

But Godlonton was far more concerned about the agitation for responsible government. On 3rd April, Stockenström, seconded by Wicht, moved in the Council

That in the opinion of this House, there should be a Responsible Ministry to advise the Governor in the execution of the Powers and Authorities committed to him by Her Majesty's Commission for the administration of the affairs of this Colony.

After some discussion, the Council divided, and on this occasion, while Vigne voted with Godlonton, Wood and Cock, the western bloc was solidly arrayed against them, and was supported by all the midlands representatives, Stockenström, Metelerkamp and Fleming. <sup>(5)</sup> Although a similar motion was lost in the Assembly, <sup>(6)</sup> the frontier party realised that matters were coming to a head: on the 7th April, Godlonton gave notice of a motion

That although this Council has resolved that it is desirable that the Governor should be assisted by a Responsible Ministry it is of opinion nevertheless, that the actual or immediate introduction of Responsible Government should receive the public sanction, and be in accordance with public opinion:- That it would be, therefore, inexpedient, in the opinion of this Council, to make so important and fundamental a change in the Constitution of the Colony, until such sanction shall have been given, and the public opinion fully ascertained by the result of a general election, arising either from a dissolution of Parliament, or by lapse of time, as provided for in the Constitution Ordinance. <sup>(7)</sup>

- 
1. Ibid. 22.5.56.
  2. Ibid. 23.5.56.
  3. Ibid. 27.5.56. Vide infra. p.262.
  4. GLJ. 17.5.56.
  5. L.C.Debates. 3.4.56.
  6. Sole: op.cit. p.177.
  7. L.C.Debates. 7.4.56.



This motion, after being postponed several times, was finally withdrawn on the 14th April.

In the meantime, Godlonton had also given notice of a motion which, after several postponements, he moved on the 15th: it requested the Governor to lay on the table all documents on the subject of a removal of the seat of government or a separation of the provinces dating from the time of Sir Benjamin D'Urban; he asked also for official statistics on the revenue, expenditure, exports, road rates and employment of convicts in the Eastern Province, and for the production of the list drawn up in 1850 by Godlonton and Cock, of "Exceptions" to any Constitution which did not concede a separate government to the East.<sup>(1)</sup> When these were subsequently laid on the table,<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton secured the approval of the Council to his proposal that they should be printed and made available to members in time for the next session of Parliament.<sup>(3)</sup>

In the meantime, Godlonton had given notice of the following motions:

That it is the opinion of this Council that the Parliament as at present constituted, has failed to realise the just and reasonable expectations of the people. That measures of the most vital moment to the safety, progress, and good government of the Colony, and especially the Eastern Province, have been either vexatiously obstructed or entirely rejected by it; and that it is but just and proper, therefore, that the inhabitants at large should have an opportunity of offering an opinion thereon, which opinion, the Council submits, can only be fully, clearly, and effectively expressed by the result of a general election....<sup>(4)</sup>

On the day before Godlonton was due to move this resolution, the Governor sent a message to the Council, informing it of the conclusion of peace in Europe and conveying the unexpected suggestion of the Home Government that members of the British German Legion should be recruited for the nucleus of a system of military colonisation on the frontier. Immediately after these had been read, Wicht, proposed an address of

---

1. Ibid. 15.4.56.

2. Ibid. 23.5.56.

3. Ibid. 27.5.56.

4. Ibid. 26.5.56.



congratulation and thanks to the Queen, Godlonton proposed two addresses to the Governor on the same topics, and, more significantly, withdrew the above notice of motion.<sup>(1)</sup> Once again, the separatist movement had been temporarily checked, almost as if by the hand of fate; but Godlonton could not but regard the proposal about the German Legion as of inestimable importance to the frontier, and the frontiersmen looked forward to the almost certain realisation of their dreams. ✱

In the Assembly, Pote of Grahamstown had been far less successful: two days before this, he had introduced a motion calling for the severance of all political union between the two provinces and the erection of the East into a "separate and independent government." He claimed that Parliament had not given due attention and assistance to the requirements of the East, particularly in such matters as finance and justice. But Saul Solomon, in a brilliant speech, successfully demolished his arguments, and proved, by an analysis of the divisions in the Assembly, that the East was itself divided even on important questions such as the judicial establishment.<sup>(2)</sup> Only seven members voted against Solomon's amendment that whenever the people of the East should demand a distinct and separate government from that of the West, their demands should be acceded to.<sup>(3)</sup>

The 1856 session thus ended after the passing of twenty-eight bills, amongst which were the Queenstown Electoral Bill, the bill for amending the laws relating to the Resident Magistrate's Courts, a bill for securing the efficiency of the Armed and Mounted Police on the frontier, a bill for regulating the sale of gunpowder, and a bill to amend the Masters and Servants law. The Burgher Law of 1855, by which burghers were required to serve "within their respective divisions" was amended, because of the frontier's protests; and, in the

---

1. Ibid. 29.5.55.

2. It is interesting in this connection to notice that not even two months later, Pote publicly censured Godlonton for wilfully using fictitious statistics to prove that the East could support a separate government. (CPT. 15.7.56. Charles Pote to Editor.)

3. Sole: op cit. pp 177-80; W.E.G. Solomon: Saul Solomon, pp 43-45.



face of much criticism from Port Elizabeth at the fact that midlanders would be required to defend the frontier, the Governor was empowered to call up Easterners to serve in any division of the East.<sup>(1)</sup> Moreover, Parliament had granted £40,000 for the settling of the German Legion, though the Government's Immigration Bill was defeated in the Assembly.<sup>(2)</sup> This was largely due to the hostility of the midlands representatives, for, as Ziervogel said, he was afraid that

....soon every industrious newcomer would himself become a master<sup>(3)</sup>;

others were afraid that wages would fall or that there would be unemployment.<sup>(4)</sup>

Though expressing disappointment at the fact that Parliament had again "rather initiated than completed business,"<sup>(5)</sup> Paterson continued to advocate responsible government<sup>(6)</sup> and, though not altogether unfavourable to either removal or federation, he swung violently against separation.<sup>(7)</sup> In Graaff-Reinet, there was a strongly-marked division of opinion between the press and the midlands representatives,<sup>(8)</sup> for though the latter advocated responsible government, the former was against it,<sup>(9)</sup> saying that Grey's immigration policy would

1. Taylor: op.cit. p.35.

2. EPH. 3.6.56.

3. EPH. 3.6.56.

4. EPH. 15.7.56. A public meeting in Graaff-Reinet in May 1856 heartily approved of Grey's immigration scheme, though one of its opponents said that the immigrants "soon got richer than the boers", while another said that they could "snap their fingers at their masters" in two or three years. (Vide GRH. 3.5.56; 10.5.56).

5. EPH. 6.5.56; 10.6.56.

6. EPH. 22.4.56; 29.4.56; 9.12.56.

7. EPH. 1.7.56; 8.7.56.

8. Vide, e.g. GRH. 10.5.56. on the "mysterious" petition presented by Ziervogel to the House of Assembly.

~~9. EPH. 12.5.56; 19.5.56; 26.5.56. GRH. 21.6.56 said Ziervogel, in his views on immigration, has represented "the ignorance and prejudice of our District." For the Herald's disapproval of the attitude of the local representatives in Parliament, vide GRH. "The necessity for an extensive European immigration one would have supposed would have been perceived by our Representatives as readily as by their constituents; but we fear there are parties in both Houses who endeavour to hide their jealousy of English immigrants under such mean and paltry excuses as the fear of the introduction of parsons, of convicts, or of labourers worse than Hottentots! ...."~~  
Also GRH. 14.6.56; 21.6.56.

9. Vide, e.g., GRH. 5.4.56; 19.4.56; 17.5.56.



confer infinitely more benefit on the colony than would responsible government,<sup>(1)</sup> and that the conduct of the midlands representatives made it unlikely that their electors would be keen to confer even greater powers upon them.<sup>(2)</sup> Indeed, the Graaff-Reinet Herald, though disapproving of a complete separation, said that the contempt in which Parliament was held,<sup>(3)</sup> and the drag which it formed on the progress of the East, made either separation or removal "inevitable."<sup>(4)</sup>

Godlonton, though hopeful, still seemed determined to bring matters to a head. Supported by the Frontier Times,<sup>(5)</sup> he inveighed against the "factional minority" of the Assembly who had attempted "to keep back the prosperity of this Frontier" by defeating the government's immigration bill, and he added significantly:

...our abused Downing Street Government has shown solicitation in our behalf, and has determined to send several thousand German and Swiss immigrants to be settled in British Kaffraria. When this is carried into effect, that drag-chain, the Parliament, will soon be shaken off,<sup>(6)</sup> or else it will have to meet at some place where it can not overlook the important work which will then be in progress on the Frontier..<sup>(7)</sup>

Godlonton was still convinced that the East's "first great want" was "security in the Province from the marauding propensities of our barbarous and restless neighbours",<sup>(8)</sup> and from the time he returned to Grahamstown at the end of the session, he consistently urged upon his readers the necessity for unity among the people of the East. In the Council, he said, considerable attention had been paid to the subject of separate government, and the hostility of the Western members had been manifest throughout. In order to unite the East, he ascribed the ill-success which had attended the efforts of the

1. GRH. 5.4.56; 17.5.56.

2. GRH. 12.4.56.

3. GRH. "The country ..will not long consent to pay £15 an hour to show to the world so humiliating a spectacle."

4. GRH. 14.6.56.

5. CPT. 25.3.56; 28.3.56; 8.7.56: The immigration of the German Legion would be "the most fortunate event that ever occurred in the history of this colony."

6. *My italics.*

7. GTJ. 7.6.56.

8. GTJ. 8.7.56.



advocates of separation to lack of "union of purpose and action"; but in prescribing a remedy, he does not seem to have cared to be very specific as to the form it should take although the Frontier Times demanded a "total and complete" separation.<sup>(1)</sup> At this stage, perhaps, more support for the general principle of separation was rather to be aimed at. He wrote:

Of one thing we may be certain, that the Separation of the two Provinces must eventually be effected. We are not prepared to say that it may not be on the "Federal Principle", to which many are favourable, and which seems to embrace though not without alloy, many advantages that would not be otherwise secured. Let then the Eastern Province advocates of Separation take encouragement. Their cause is a good one, it will stand the test of examination, it courts the full blaze of broad open daylight, and it is obstructed only by those who dread what they are conscious must eventually come to pass.<sup>(2)</sup>

He continued to "throw out ... hints as subject matter for relection". In July, he wrote significantly:

The inhabitants of the Eastern Province should bear carefully in mind that the Parliamentary movement on the question of Separation originated in that of 'Responsible Government'. (3) Had the latter not been mooted in Council in the way it was, the former would have been left in abeyance and no action been taken upon it. It is very important that this should not be lost sight of, it being the political play or party manoeuvre just now, to raise a mighty clamour against those who look with favour on the question of Separation... There need be no hesitancy in asserting that this Province is not actually dependent on the other for a single necessary supply. If this be so, then how wretchedly poor in spirit must he be who is content to be kept in a sort of official bondage by Cape Town, which MR SOLOMON vauntingly tells us 'when it speaks, it speaks the sentiments of the whole Colony.'.....<sup>(4)</sup>

But the demand for responsible government as the panacea continued to divert men's attention away from the separatist struggle. The Frontier Times was violently opposed to it,<sup>(5)</sup>

---

1. CFT. 27.5.56; 5.8.56.

2. GTJ. 21.6.56. No evidence has yet been found of even an indirect correspondence between Godlonton and Grey, and Godlonton's interest in constitutional experiments elsewhere afford an explanation of this seeming anticipation of Grey's federation policy. Equally, it may be seen as an echo of the editorial policy of the Cape Town Mail etc. since at least 1850 (vide supra. p. 214.)

3. *My italics.*

4. GTJ. 12.7.56.

5. CFT. 12.2.56: the population was too small, and the government would fall into the hands of "a few aspiring place-seekers" and "men whose interests are those of Cape Town." Also CFT. 15.7.56; 4.11.56; 2.12.56.



and Godlonton skilfully exploited the unpopularity of the actions of parliamentary representatives in many parts of the colony<sup>(1)</sup> by suggesting that this lack of support was symptomatic of the inability of "the widely-dispersed population"<sup>(2)</sup> to control and influence their representatives and therefore as illustrating the political immaturity<sup>(3)</sup> of the colony. Consequently, he maintained that the Cape could hardly be expected to derive any benefit from responsible government,<sup>(4)</sup> and the East would, through lack of reliable representation, fall completely under the "disadvantageous influence of laws, flowing from the unrestrained desires and opinions of a particular and opposing party."<sup>(5)</sup> At the end of December, in reviewing the year's events, he commented that "we cannot boast largely of our legislative programme." The important work of the session, he said, had been done on the extension of the Magistrates' Jurisdiction Act, for which he had little good to say. He described the disallowance of the Governor's immigration scheme as "suicidal", while he condemned the way in which even the Lieutenant-Governor's establishment had been "pared down to inefficiency" because of the excessive tendency towards centralisation.<sup>(6)</sup>

From monotonous variations on the Parliamentary theme, Godlonton was soon to be diverted. In 1854, as we have seen, there had been much unrest on the frontier, and during 1855, there were those who had again anticipated an outbreak of war; there was a belief among the Kaffirs that Umlanjeni, the great prophet, had risen from the dead,<sup>(7)</sup> while the exaggerated reports of the losses of the British in the Crimean War were

---

1. Vide, e.g., CFT. 10.6.56; 29.7.56. 1.7.56. and supra p. 253.  
 2. GTJ. 8.11.56.  
 3. GTJ. 9.12.56.  
 4. GTJ. 8.11.56; 18.11.56.  
 5. GTJ. 18.11.56.  
 6. GTJ. 27.11.56.  
 7. Una Long: oneLit. p 253. Rev. J.S. Thomas to his parents, 3.6.55.



thought to be stimulating a warlike attitude among the Kaffirs.<sup>(1)</sup> During the Parliamentary session of 1856<sup>(2)</sup>, rumours of unrest in Kaffraria had grown, and Grahamstown was disturbed by an exodus of numbers of Kaffir servants. The movement in Kaffirland, which began in unrest at Grey's well-intentioned reforms, in suspicion of his hospital, resentment at the attempted proscription of witchcraft, and fear of new land settlement, was co-ordinated by the visions of Nonquase<sup>(3)</sup> and Nonkosi.<sup>(4)</sup> It may never be determined whether Ereli and Umklakaza began or merely intended to capitalise the ritual protest of the cattle-killing, with its concomitant promise of the intervention of the spirits of the ancient tribal chiefs and the promise of the expulsion of the white man into the sea, whence many believed he had sprung.<sup>(5)</sup> The sequel is beyond dispute.<sup>(6)</sup> In July, the slaughtering of the cattle began, and continued till the following February. On 18th February 1857, the crisis came. It was the Promised Day, yet the prophecies were not fulfilled. Thousands of Kaffirs poured into the colony, and the authorities were faced with the unenviable task of providing food and labour for them.

Du Toit says that Grey seems to have feared that there may have been some connection between his reforms and the suicidal movement among the natives.<sup>(7)</sup> This certainly is the

- 
1. Ibid. p 294. Rev. J.S. Thomas to his parents, 4.10.55.
  2. As early as January 1856, the Frontier Times had commented on the uneasiness as a result of the numbers of servants leaving the colony for Kaffirland: vide CFT. 15.1.56. Cp. Godlonton Papers. W.A. Richards to Godlonton, 8.5.56: "...I have heard nothing more of war rumours..."
  3. Theal: History of S.A. Vol. III p. 190.
  4. Cory: Archives Year Book I (1939) p. 30.
  5. The Bambada rebellion in Natal in 1906 offers many points of similarity to the position in Kaffraria in 1857. There were, says Bryant, ritual killings as far distant as Nyasaland, as was also the belief that the medicine men had discovered a charm to dissolve the white men's bullets into water (vide Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 201). Vide also J. Stuart: History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 117. New ground in the sociological significance of rituals of rebellion was broken recently by Max Gluckman in his Frazer Lecture, Rituals of Rebellion in S-E Africa.
  6. Wilmot and Chase: History of Cape Colony, p. 497.
  7. Du Toit: op. cit. p. 177.



impression made by his Opening Speech to Parliament in April 1857, in which he stated that the system of appointing magistrates to reside with the chiefs had only been in force for a few months before the chiefs had become restless and begun to form a combination against the whites.<sup>(1)</sup> Maclean also blamed the chiefs for stirring up the trouble in order to goad the Kaffirs into another war on the colony. Du Toit suggests that perhaps Grey and Maclean felt guilty at not having promulgated the Charter of British Kaffraria,<sup>(2)</sup> thereby withholding formal recognition of native law and custom; moreover, their constant emphasis upon Mosheesh's interest in Eastern Frontier affairs suggested that they were trying to side-step the real issue of their own responsibility for the so-called "National Suicide."<sup>(3)</sup>

Godlonton refused to credit any idea other than that the chiefs had evil, though palpable, designs on the authorities. He was convinced that Grey was right, not least because Grey's policy co-incided with his own views: in his bourgeois way, he believed that the natives' training should always be of a "practical or utilitarian character, all being built upon the broad foundation of moral right and religious duty."<sup>(4)</sup> Nettled at the criticism of Grey's actions<sup>(5)</sup> or of his policy in the colonial press, Godlonton continued to praise him to the hilt.<sup>(6)</sup> During the crisis, the Journal moved through stages one could almost anticipate: first, scepticism as to the facts;<sup>(7)</sup> next, the iniquity of the chiefs;<sup>(8)</sup> finally, all things work together for good.<sup>(9)</sup> The Governor was represented

- 
1. P.B. 1857, XXVIII (97) Grey to Labouchere, 8.4.57. Enclosure, Speech to Parliament, 7.4.57.
  2. This had been sent to Cathcart shortly before his departure.
  3. Du Toit: op.cit. p.178.
  4. GTJ. 13.12.56.
  5. e.g. CFT. 26.8.56, which criticised Grey for not having come to the Frontier at the commencement of the rumours about the discontent among the Kaffirs.
  6. e.g. GTJ. 5.7.56; 2.5.57.
  7. CFT. 16.8.56.
  8. GTJ. 2.9.56.
  9. GTJ. 21.11.56.



as striving manfully against an unpredictable and treacherous enemy, and Godlonton urged the colonists to continue to look to him to settle the problem.<sup>(1)</sup> As time went on, Godlonton came to see that the disaster which had befallen the Xosa could be turned to the advantage of both sides:

The great aim of the government, and of the public too, should be to turn if possible the existing calamity to profitable account - profitable as respects the Kaffirs themselves, as well as the Colony. The great question is - How may this be most effectually accomplished? - The direct answer to this would be, - 'break up the power of the chiefs, and destroy as far as possible that clanship, to which may be attributed all the evils that have accrued to the Colony from its contiguity with these people...'<sup>(2)</sup>

Godlonton's obvious anxiety to demonstrate the effectiveness of Grey's measures is clearly illustrated by the difference in the tone adopted by the Frontier Times. Though Franklin approved of Grey's policy even after the movement had ended,<sup>(3)</sup> and had moreover stated that he was confident a war would be averted,<sup>(4)</sup> he made no attempt to conceal his observation of the uneasiness in the frontier districts,<sup>(5)</sup> and in August 1856, he went so far as to state that Grey should have been on the spot at the commencement of the trouble, as he could then have taken the decisive measures which would alone have allayed the fears of the colonists.<sup>(6)</sup>

Even at the end of 1857, Maclean and Grey were afraid of the power of the chiefs,<sup>(7)</sup> and Grey dealt firmly with the ring-leaders, for he saw the advantage to which the disaster could be turned: Padanna and Quesha were captured, tried and convicted, Macomo was sent to prison, and in February 1858, Kreli was expelled across the Bashee by the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police.<sup>(8)</sup> It was the end of another chapter of frontier history; for, although Kreli was given a piece of

---

1. GTJ. 2.9.56.

2. GTJ. 5.9.57. Vide also GTJ. 10.10.57.

3. e.g. CFT. 24.3.57

4. e.g. CFT. 24.2.57; 17.3.57.

5. e.g. CFT. 19.2.56; 26.2.56; 5.8.56; 24.2.57.

6. CFT. 26.8.56.

7. Vide Du Toit: op cit. p 182

8. GTJ. 20.3.58; Henderson: op cit. pp 141-2.



land and allowed to return to his former territory in 1860, he gave no further trouble for a long time. On the frontier, the Grey system had come to stay:

Nor was Godlonton's advocacy of Grey unconnected with his hopes that the Parliamentary session of 1857 would favour the politics of the Grahamstown school. He never failed to "point a moral and adorn a tale", and his pet themes - the risks of responsible government,<sup>(1)</sup> the need for separation, and for immigration to re-inforce separation - were made to seem ever more vital in the light of the recent frontier crisis. Godlonton went to Cape Town for the fourth session, which opened on April 7th, with renewed confidence, in part created by his own vigorous press campaign in the months immediately preceding. He had castigated apathy,<sup>(2)</sup> drilled the electorate in his political catechism, and warned them above all to keep alert to the menace of <sup>the</sup> "Responsibles".<sup>(3)</sup> He had worked so well, that on April 4th, three days before the session opened, there was an impressive public meeting in Grahamstown.<sup>(4)</sup>

Yet though the Governor's Opening Speech was optimistic, events were to move to a climax of frustration. In his Opening Speech, Grey gave a favourable review and a bold lead, and though of course it was not designed to do so, the speech emphasised many of Godlonton's own convictions. Grey referred to the enormous increase in the colony's commercial prosperity, especially since 1855, and he recounted the events which had recently been enacted on the frontier - the discontent among the chiefs because of his native policy, their attempts to provoke a war with the colony, the Governor's

---

1. "...for which we must believe the Colony is hardly prepared, and for which it had better wait until it is. Come they probably will, but in the meantime, let it be our business to prepare and qualify for their reception.." (STJ. 27.1.57)

2. STJ. 31.1.57.

3. STJ. 14.2.57.

4. Vide infra. p.262.



personal efforts to combat their alarm, and the steps which had been taken by the Government to relieve the starving refugees who had fled into the colony after the delusion. He pointed out that this self-destruction of the Xosa could be turned to the benefit of the colony, for they could be converted from enemies into labourers and consumers. Among the first bills which he presented for the consideration of the Council was one for providing for the employment of destitute natives upon public works in the colony.

Among the other important subjects with which he dealt were railways and immigration. With regard to the former, he said that he had directed surveys and estimates to be prepared for two railroads - the first from Cape Town to Wellington, and the other from Port Elizabeth, via Uitenhage, to Grahamstown. He particularly recommended that, in order to assist the public works which he had proposed, Parliament should make provision for an extensive European immigration scheme, for the successful implementation of such a scheme would help materially to solve many of the colony's most pressing problems - railways, harbours, frontier defence. He was glad to be able to say that some 3000 Europeans had been added to the colonial population that year by the arrival of the German Legion.<sup>(1)</sup>

At first, all went well. Godlonton was able to secure the re-appointment of the Committee to examine Carpenter's petition;<sup>(2)</sup> later the Council agreed to his motion that the Governor be requested to lay on the table all correspondence relating to the case which had been entered into since the previous session.<sup>(3)</sup> When the committee, under the chairmanship of Godlonton, reported, it recommended that Carpenter

---

1. L.C. Debates. 7.4.57  
2. Ibid. 14.4.57  
3. Ibid. 24.4.57



should be given a grant of land as compensation for the land of which he had been deprived.<sup>(1)</sup> The Queenstown farmers were still anxious to see a full investigation of the accusations made against them by Hope,<sup>(2)</sup> and the Committee to investigate the report was re-appointed since the information which had not been available in the previous session had now been published and therefore made a full scale investigation possible.<sup>(3)</sup> The Committee, after remarking on the unfortunate consequences resulting from the publication of ex parte statements about the conduct of public officials, recommended that the Government should be left to deal with the cases individually.<sup>(4)</sup> Godlonton seconded Wood's motion that all the documents relating to the Report should be printed.<sup>(5)</sup>

Yet the most important subject of the session, so far as the East was concerned, was that of separation. Though the separatist cause had suffered as a result of the unprecedented prosperity of the colony during 1856,<sup>(6)</sup> Godlonton had gone to the session with a good deal of Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort<sup>(7)</sup> opinion in favour of separation. Three days before the session opened, a public meeting in Grahamstown had pledged itself to removal or separation: the Grahamstonians complained of the neglect of Eastern Province interests by Parliament, the refusal to appoint the necessary resident judges, the neglect of frontier roads, and the absence of bridges. They proposed that the East should be allowed to establish its own institutions, though as usual they were afraid of the expense of frontier defence, and resolved:

- 
1. Ibid. 12.6.57.
  2. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. E.R. Bell to Godlonton (Recd. 21.5.57.): "I am more anxious about the titles of granted farms than ought else - for it is the withholding titles which has retarded progression on the Eastern Frontier. Who can avail himself of the value of the grant if a Hope's report hangs over his head?...."
  3. L.O. Debates. 16.4.57.
  4. Lombard: op.cit. p.107.
  5. L.O. Debates.
  6. EPH. 30.12.56.
  7. Godlonton Papers. George W. Clark to Godlonton, 11.5.57.



That the inhabitants of the Eastern Districts are willing to bear the expenditure for the support of an Independent Government, and desire to seek from the Western Province a just apportionment of the outlay for Border protection, this they conceive by right they are entitled to, for as the Imperial Government is bound to protect the Colony as part of the Empire, so is the Western Province bound to aid in defending the only assailable line from which danger of an incursion into the Colony is to be apprehended.

They blamed the Kaffir wars upon the distance of the Executive Government from the frontier, and pledged themselves to agitate for a separate government and, if necessary, to submit their case to the Imperial Parliament. (1)

The deteriorating state of affairs in the Orange Free State (2) had further convinced Godlonton of the need for the East to demand independence. His correspondents continued to impress him with a description of the economic resources and potentialities of the area, (3) and he had never forgiven the British Government for abandoning the Sovereignty and for the consequent inconvenience and loss which he had suffered. There were a number of arguments in favour of Britain's re-taking possession of the area: Pretorius was threatening to oust the government of Boshof, and there was fear that if he did so, he would immediately "commence a war of extermination with the natives." (4) In the colony, it was feared that a Free State war against the Basuto would involve the colony as well. (5) Moreover, rumour had it that the Boshof government was determined to victimise British residents in the area: on the

- 
1. GTJ. 7.4.57. - public meeting on 4.4.57.
  2. Vide, e.g., Una Long: op.cit. p.254. Rev. J.B.Thomas to his parents, 4.10.55, in which he says that the Governor, on his way to Natal, had decided to travel via the Free State instead of via Kaffirland: was this a tour of "investigation"?
  3. e.g. Godlonton Papers. T.White (Bloemfontein) to Godlonton, 28.4.57: "...It is calculated that 8,000 bales of wool valued at £16 per bale, or £128,000 stg., will be sent out of this country during the present season, and there is scarcely any limit to the increase. We have only just made a commencement. Not one farm in twenty is yet stocked with sheep..."
  4. Godlonton Papers. T.White to Godlonton, 28.4.57.
  5. OFT. 14.10.56; GTJ. 17.1.57.



frontier, many believed that conclusive proof of this was provided by the execution of Charles Leo Cox in the latter half of 1856. Cox was an Englishman who had married the daughter of a Free State boer. His wife had poisoned herself, and Cox was accused by her parents of having murdered her. After a trial, he was sentenced to death and hanged by the Free State authorities.<sup>(1)</sup> The Frontier Times published the relevant documents and cited the case as an example of the disastrous consequences of the abandonment of the Sovereignty.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton wrote editorial after editorial in an attempt to save Cox, and after his death, to impress the Cape authorities and British Government with the need for re-annexing the area - preferably as part of a general South African federation, in which the Eastern Province would secure its much-desired separate local institutions. Godlonton deplored the judicial proceedings leading to the execution of Cox,<sup>(3)</sup> condemned the abandonment of the Sovereignty,<sup>(4)</sup> and expressed the opinion that the policy of the Dutch Republics was producing injurious repercussions upon the colony.<sup>(5)</sup> He said that Boshof (whom he described as "this Bomba of the Cape") was trying to suppress the liberty of the press and to deprive the English of their rights in the Sovereignty,<sup>(6)</sup> and soon after the fourth session of Parliament opened, he rose, and in a particularly violent speech, to which even the Attorney-General objected, he censured the abandonment of the Sovereignty, as the territory was "one of the most fertile in the world"; he maintained that Cox had been innocent, and that his trial had been "a mockery of justice"; and he stressed the necessity for maintaining order in the Free State since its interests were

---

1. Murray: Reminiscences, pp 5-6. Murray's account is strongly prejudiced. Cp. Collins: Free Statia: Reminiscences of a Life Time, p 102 ; vide S.A. Archival Records, O.F.S. No. 2, 1856-57 passim.

2. OTJ. 12.8.56.

3. GTJ. 15.11.56; 6.12.56.

4. GTJ. 3.1.57

5. GTJ. 13.1.57; 17.2.57

6. OTJ. 17.1.57



inseparable from those of the Cape. He moved for the production  
 of all correspondence relating to the case.<sup>(1)</sup> Indeed, Godlonton  
 regarded the case as of such importance that, for a time, he  
 intended to publish a pamphlet containing the speech which he  
 had delivered on the subject in the Council;<sup>(2)</sup> by the end of  
 the session, though, his partner seems to have convinced him  
 that there would not be a great demand for the pamphlet, as the  
 relevant documents had already appeared in full in the Journal,<sup>(3)</sup>  
 and the proposal was abandoned.<sup>(4)</sup> One of the British residents  
 in the Free State suggested to Godlonton that a British Consul  
 might be appointed at Bloemfontein,<sup>(5)</sup> and in different parts  
 of the colony, though opinion on Cox differed,<sup>(6)</sup> opinion in  
 favour of a general South African federation was growing.<sup>(7)</sup>

The news that the Governor was himself in favour of a  
 federation was becoming known,<sup>(8)</sup> but as he was determined to  
 be strictly impartial and not to interfere,<sup>(9)</sup> and as the col-  
 laboration of East and West in Parliament was tottering,  
 Godlonton lost patience. Within two weeks of the opening of  
 the session, he gave notice that he would move the following  
 motions:

- 
1. L.C. Debates. 21.4.57.
  2. Vide advertisements in GTJ. 9.6.57. etc.
  3. Rhodes House Collection. f. 275. R. White to Godlonton, 13.6.57.
  4. There are no further advertisements in the Journal after the end of June. There is no trace of any such pamphlet in the published indexes of the libraries of South Africa.
  5. Godlonton Papers. M.R. Every to Godlonton, 1.6.57. Op. Rhodes House Collection, f. 261. R. White to Godlonton, 16.5.57.
  6. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 2.5.57. Op. L.C. Debates, 14.5.57: "Mr Godlonton said Cox was no friend of his. He never had associated with him. Cox lived in the neighbourhood of Graham's Town, and was said to be an educated man..." Barry disputed this.
  7. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 2.5.57; Dr W. Waj to Godlonton, 4.5.57: "Federation seems the only scheme by which the colonies of South Africa can be properly governed and the time seems opportune for agitating it..." Vide also Bain Papers. Copy of letter from A.C. Bain to Godlonton, 12.11.58: "Without Federation or a change of the seat of Government I fear we will never have justice in the Eastern Province..."
  8. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 2.5.57.
  9. Taylor: op.cit. p.22.



1. That in the opinion of this Council it will be highly conducive to the general interest of this Colony that the Eastern and Western Provinces should be divided into two Separate Governments, each enjoying the entire and exclusive administration and control of its own Affairs.

2. That in the event of such separation, it will, in the opinion of this Council, be expedient and necessary to the public interests, that all questions of general concernment, such as General Defence, Customs' Dues, Light Houses, Postal Charges, Weights and Measures, Supreme Court of Appeal, and other cognate subjects, should be committed to a Central Authority, so constituted as may be ultimately determined.

3. That the large and rapidly growing increase in the Trade, Commerce, and Productions of the Eastern Province, - its augmenting Population, - and the amount of its Contributions to the Public Revenue, - claim for it and demand that it should have the administration of its own affairs.

4. That Local Self-Government being essential to the social and political welfare, as well as to the commercial growth and prosperity of every Free Country, - this Council is of opinion, that the division of the Colony into Federative Provinces for Local and Legislative purposes, will be of great public advantage, and cannot be withheld, if demanded by either Province, without manifest wrong and serious detriment to the general interests.

5. That Her Majesty's Government having recorded a strong opinion in favour of such Local Government - leaving it to the Parliament to determine in its own case - this Council is of opinion, that the time has arrived for careful consideration of the entire subject, in order that such action may be taken thereon as shall be best conducive to the more effectual administration of public affairs, and to the general interest of all classes.(1)

On 1st May, when this motion was on the order of the day, Godlonton, with the leave of the Council, postponed its introduction till the 8th. When he proposed the motion, there was a determined opposition. In a typically lengthy and meandering speech, he gave an account of the history of the separatist movement from the time of the 1823 Commission of Inquiry; he quoted extensive passages from speeches or official despatches of D'Urban, Pottinger, Young, Smith, Lord Grey and even Stockenström, all expressing themselves in favour of the movement; he cited the case of Port Philip, and he declared that there was no reason to doubt that the East could afford its own government. Moreover, he was certain that the Orange Free State and Transvaal would both ultimately be willing to join a federal union which he considered "the best for all." He

---

1. L.O.Votes and Proceedings. 21.4.57.



emphasised that the most important measures of the previous session had been passed when most of the Eastern members had already had to leave. He stressed the problem of defence even in spite of the devastations among the tribal system of the Xosa as a result of the cattle-killing, and he quoted statistics to prove that during 1851-55, the expenditure for the East had amounted to £313,851, while its revenue was £450,263. He assured the Council that, in bringing forward the motion, he was by no means antagonistic to the West, for he was convinced that a separation of the provinces would promote the interests of both sides. Yet, in his desperation, he warned the Council that if Parliament failed to give the Eastern Province what it wanted it would "assuredly call upon the Imperial Parliament to interfere, as it has done in other colonies."<sup>(1)</sup>

The departure of Stockenström during the previous session seems to have helped to produce a far greater degree of unanimity in the Council, and this had been evident since quite early in the session:<sup>(2)</sup> Fleming of Port Elizabeth seconded Godlonton's motion and expressed himself strongly in favour of a scheme of federative provinces. Reitz, on the other hand, adopted the typically Western tactic of disputing the weight which could be attached to the demands: he moved an amendment to the effect that, though agreeing that local self-government was essential to the interests of every "Free Country", the Council could not agree to the demand for separation until it had been made clear that it was "The clear<sup>and unequivocal expression of Opinion</sup> majority that separation was desirable. The Acting President, De Wet, also disputed Godlonton's claim to speak on behalf of the Eastern

---

1. L.C. Debates. 8.5.57.

2. Godlonton Papers. J. Collett to Godlonton, 27.4.57: "...I .. am happy to see the unanimity prevailing in the Council (Cock excepted). May noisy Stockenström never return to disturb your harmony. Cock's Exeter Hall nonsense about the equality of black and white will give offence to his frontier supporters. Something must be done to check vagrancy..."; W. Southey to Godlonton, 2.5.57: "...The Parliament seems getting on - the L. Council especially...."



Province as a whole, for he had himself admitted that some people in the Eastern Districts were averse to the proposal. When the debate was resumed in the evening, Wood proposed that, as the question was of such importance, and as petitions on the subject were expected from the Eastern Province, the question should stand adjourned for a few days. The voting in the Council on this issue was throughout along geographical lines. (1) Graaff-Reinet had no representatives, both Stockenström and Joubert having retired from the Council, but Port Elizabeth was represented by Fleming and Metelerkamp, (2) who voted with the rest of the Eastern representatives, Godlonton, Wood, Blaine and Cock, all of whom were from Albany. The seven westerners thus defeated the six Eastern representatives. (3) It was difficult for the Easterners to do anything after this: Wood presented a petition from Grahamstown on the subject of separation, (4) and Godlonton presented one from Port Beaufort. (5)

It was clear, then, that a crisis in the relations between the two provinces had indeed arrived. The tension was aggravated by the press: Godlonton was severely attacked by the Cape papers, (6) and at the beginning of May "Limner" published a spiteful sketch of him as a parliamentarian in the Cape Monitor. (7) These seem to have been too much even for Godlonton who had always snapped his fingers contemptuously

- 
1. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. W.A. Richards to Godlonton, 8.5.57: "...The line between East and West is daily more conspicuous, and after a time the only question that will be asked on important measures will be - Is it an Eastern question? If in the affirmative its doom will be sealed..."
  2. Taylor: op.cit. p. 36., says that Metelerkamp and Fleming were "both business men from Port Elizabeth with commercial interests in Grahamstown..."
  3. L.O. Debates. 8.5.57.
  4. Ibid. 11.5.57.
  5. Ibid. 19.5.57.
  6. Godlonton Papers. W.A. Richards to Godlonton, 8.5.57: "People here are very indignant about it, but, however, the more envious people get, and the more influence you obtain, of course the greater the abuse..."; A.G. Bain to Godlonton, 14.5.57.
  7. Cape Monitor. 2.5.57. Vide infra. Appendix 1.



in the face of public opinion: he became depressed,<sup>(1)</sup> and a feeling of frustration at being unable, as his step-son said, "to effect any permanent good",<sup>(2)</sup> at last overcame him, while his wife expressed growing concern at his pre-occupation with "worldly things",<sup>(3)</sup> On 23rd June, Godlonton gave notice in the Council that he would move on the following day:

That from the late period of the Session, and the absence of so many of the Eastern Province Members, it is not desirable that any measure for the construction of a Railroad from Cape Town to Wellington should be entertained; and that in the opinion of this Council it will be desirable, and is due to the Inhabitants at large, that such ample notice should be given on the subject of so large a measure, affecting so seriously the general Revenue, until the Colony at large has had an opportunity afforded of giving an opinion thereon.<sup>(4)</sup>

When Godlonton moved this on the following day, Barry moved an amendment to the effect that, as no measure relating to the construction of a railway was before the Council, it was premature to express an opinion on the subject, and Barry's amendment was carried by the Western members against the Eastern. Yet this seeming deadlock was in its way a triumph. For the first time the Eastern Province group had coalesced, Grey's ideas were strangely similar to those of Godlonton, and the maintenance of a deadlock, even if it put the East temporarily at a numerical disadvantage, would have made it possible to hope with more justification for some kind of federal devolution. Hitherto, considering that he was, though he would not have admitted it, a novice in political tactics, Godlonton had shown considerable political perspicacity. He now made the dramatic blunder of organising a concerted resignation. Curiously the political wisdom or unwisdom of the move was not debated: the main determinant seems to have been Godlonton's fatigue

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton, 12.5.57.
  2. Godlonton Papers. W.A. Richards to Godlonton, 14.5.57.
  3. Godlonton Papers. Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton, 12.5.57.
  4. L.O. Votes and Proceedings. 23.6.57.



and ill-health, for his mind was made up as early as May,<sup>(1)</sup>  
and by the beginning of June, his wife was expressing concern  
and disappointment at the delay in his departure from Cape  
Town.<sup>(2)</sup>

After Barry's amendment had been carried Godlonton  
rose dramatically from his seat and handed in the combined  
resignation of the Easterners.

On the following day, the list of twelve reasons for the  
resignation of the Eastern members was read in the Council.  
The resigning members said that they considered it essential  
for the welfare of the Eastern Province that it should be  
formed into a separate government, so that the people of the  
Eastern Districts would be able to control the administration  
of their own affairs. They maintained that the reasons which  
had led to the separation of Victoria from New South Wales  
were equally as applicable at the Cape, while the reasons which  
had induced the Commissioners of Inquiry to recommend separation  
in 1823 had only been confirmed by the events of the past  
thirty years, especially with regard to the colony's relations  
with the Kaffir tribes and the Boer republics, and with re-  
gard to the indisputable progress in the commercial prosperity  
of the Eastern Province. The Lieutenant-Governorship, insti-  
tuted by the Imperial Government, had failed because

...the principle of self-government, which separation  
involved, has not been considered in so comprehensive a light  
as to show that it would tend to promote the development of  
Provinces, under Local Governments, without severance from  
those relations, which should bind together all parts of this  
continent for general good.

They attributed the Kaffir wars to the distance of the Executive  
Government from the scene of action, and asserted that the  
same factor was responsible for the neglect and retardation of  
Eastern Province interests; the East, on the other hand, was

1. Rhodes House Collection. F 259. R.White to Godlonton, 12.5.57;  
Godlonton Papers. Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton, 12.5.57; W.A.  
Richards to Godlonton, 14.5.57. Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton,  
23.5.57: "I am glad to hear from Mr Whites letter you continue  
in the same mind to back out of public work. It is quite time.."  
W.A. Richards to Godlonton, 30.5.57. Cp. Rhodes House Collection.  
F 273. R.White to Godlonton, 11.6.57: "I have your letter, and  
was delighted to hear you were likely to resign in body.."
2. Godlonton Papers. Sarah Godlonton to Godlonton, 6.6.57. Cp. Sarah  
Godlonton to Godlonton, 26.5.57: "I am quite in spirits to hear  
your work is drawing to a close, and hope you will not visit  
Cape Town again on the same errand.."  
Cp. Rhodes House Collection  
F.269. R.White to Godlonton, 1.6.57: "I suppose we may begin to  
look for your return.."



quite capable of supporting its <sup>own</sup> government.

Finally, they expressed their dissatisfaction at the working of Parliament. They complained about the way in which Parliament conducted its business - especially with regard to the voting of supplies, which did not do justice to the requirements of the East, <sup>(1)</sup> and they were convinced that the distance of the seat of government from the East made the principle of representative government "unreal and illusory". They asserted that

....after attending four consecutive sessions of Parliament in Cape Town, we are of opinion that the inconveniences which are experienced by members from the Eastern Province, in having to leave their homes and pursuits for so long a period, are such as practically to debar the Eastern Province from that share in the proceedings of Parliament to which it is justly entitled, and because many of its residents, best qualified to represent the Province, are thereby excluded from taking any part in the consideration of measures which affect its interests.

They declared that their continued attendance in Parliament would give the false impression that they were satisfied with the Constitution as it then was, while, on the contrary, they deplored the fact that "measures of the greatest moment to the safety and progress of the Eastern Province" could be defeated because of the numerical inferiority of the Eastern Province members in both Houses. Thus, it could not be expected that the present Parliament would effect such changes in the constitution as were required by the East.

Godlonton did not get the sympathy from the Governor, upon which he had relied, <sup>(2)</sup> for Grey was determined to remain impartial; <sup>(3)</sup> but in the colony, the resignations created a stir. They had come sooner than most people expected <sup>(4)</sup> and at the moment when the Eastern representatives were standing foursquare on most of the main issues. The result, cleavage and acrimony, should have been foreseen. The conservative

1. L.C. Debates. 25.6.57. A month before, Godlonton had seconded Wood's motion that the practice of deferring consideration of the estimates till the latter part of the session was "extremely inconvenient to the Members from the Eastern Districts" (vide L.C. Debates. 27.5.57). These reasons were printed in OTJ 30.6.57.

2. Sole: op. cit. pp. 187-8.

3. Taylor: op. cit. p. 22.

4. Robert White had told Godlonton that the resignation would "astonish" the Colony: vide Rhodes House Collection. f. 273. R. White to Godlonton, 11.6.57.



papers of Cape Town expressed regret at the departure of the Eastern members, <sup>(1a)</sup> but in the East opinion was again divided. During the fifties, the expansion of trade in the colony had been phenomenal, <sup>(1b)</sup> and Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth were by now preoccupied with the question of railways: the Graaff-Reinet Herald attacked Godlonton in a way which annoyed even a prominent Graaff-Reinetter such as M.H. Benjamin, <sup>(2)</sup> and it deplored the opposition to the construction of railways which was implicit in the resignation itself as due to a "feeling of self-importance." <sup>(3)</sup> Graaff-Reinet was pressing for a railway direct to Port Elizabeth, <sup>(4)</sup> and Godlonton, who had at the beginning of the year enlarged upon the advantages to be derived from railways, <sup>(5)</sup> only alienated Graaff-Reinet feeling further by cautioning against the building of railways <sup>(6)</sup> - since the commercial interests of Grahamstown were afraid of the Graaff-Reinet demands - and by agitating for separation, which Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage now regarded as a destructive movement. <sup>(7)</sup> The Graaff-Reinet Herald showed that Graaff-Reinet had far too much to lose by lending its support to the separatists:

We assert that the introduction of Railroads into the Eastern Province will be productive of more prosperity than Separation could possibly produce. <sup>(8)</sup>

- 
- 1a. Sole: op.cit. p.188. 1b. Vide C.A.W. Schumann: op.cit. p.38 sqq.  
 2. Godlonton Papers. M.H. Benjamin to Godlonton, 12.10.57: "such writings are not approved of and neither the Editor nor his paper have the vast influence, his paper meets with little support, the Public having no confidence in his writings..."  
 3. GRH. 4.7.57: "If we have to wait for good roads, safe harbours, useful immigration, etc, until we get perfect legislative institutions, we shall find ourselves left hopelessly in the rear by the rest of the world." A public meeting at Richmond also regarded the resignation as "uncalled for": vide. GRH. 22.8.57.  
 4. GRH. 6.6.57; 4.7.57.  
 5. GTJ. 21.2.57.  
 6. GRH. 15.8.57; 22.8.57.  
 7. GRH. 8.8.57; 15.8.57.  
 8. GRH. 29.8.57.



Port Elizabeth was also hopeful that a railway would be built and that harbour improvements would be carried out.<sup>(1)</sup> Paterson had condemned the "grossest unfairness" of Parliament in its votes for the Graaff-Reinet roads and the Cape Town Library,<sup>(2)</sup> while the demands for the Port Elizabeth prison and harbour had been dealt with "in a manner utterly unworthy of Parliament and the Executive."<sup>(3)</sup> The Eastern Province Herald had expressed complete satisfaction with Grey's railway proposals at the opening of the session,<sup>(4)</sup> and by June it said that the public mind was "possessed" with the idea.<sup>(5)</sup> And, though Paterson condemned the resignation as an anti-progressive move and was inclined to think that, after the 1857 Session, Parliament could make "new claims to our confidence",<sup>(6)</sup> he<sup>(7)</sup> declared himself in favour of a federative union of the provinces, of which the midlands should be a distinct third province and eventually embracing Orange Free State and British Kaffraria.<sup>(8)</sup>

Paterson analysed the effect of the resignations by saying that they had split the East into four main groups: the "Parliamentarians" ("those satisfied with the present order of things") who were predominant in Graaff-Reinet, Colesberg and Albert; the "Removalists", who were strong in Uitenhage and Somerset; the "Federalists", who were to be found mainly in Port Elizabeth and the "Separatists", who hailed in the main from Grahamstown, Cradock and Fort Beaufort.<sup>(9)</sup> Indeed, the antagonism of the Frontier Times and the Journal to the Graaff-Reinet railway project roused the ire of both Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth.<sup>(10)</sup> The Eastern Province Herald

- 
1. EPR. 6.1.57; 13.1.57; 20.1.57; 27.1.57; 21.4.57; 16.6.57; 22.9.57.
  2. EPR. 23.6.57.
  3. EPR. 30.6.57.
  4. EPR. 14.4.57; 21.4.57.
  5. EPR. 16.6.57.
  6. EPR. 7.7.57.
  7. EPR. 14.7.57.
  8. EPR. 4.8.57.
  9. EPR. 4.8.57.
  10. EPR. 28.7.57.



(1)  
censured the resignations of Godlonton, Wood and Cock, whom it described as "illiberal, anti-progressive, exclusive", but said that the resignations would be to the benefit of the midlands, for the vacancies in the Council would probably be filled by midlands men,<sup>(2)</sup> and the Council, instead of being a "useless appendage"<sup>(3)</sup> and the scene of "fussy displays over a Carpenter's or a Cox's case, its Kat River farces..."<sup>(4)</sup> would cease to be obstructive.<sup>(5)</sup> Next to nothing was now heard of responsible government; the railways projects had seized hold of the imagination of the colonists.<sup>(6)</sup>

Against this hostility or apathy, Godlonton continued his struggle. In the Journal, he complained pathetically that the West was always offering the East separate government, but always refused when the East accepted the offer!<sup>(7)</sup> Meanwhile he reported from Cape Town during the session:

Everything in the legislative machine is rickety and out of joint, and the sooner it falls to pieces by its own ponderosity the better for all parties. The opinion is pretty general, I find, that however ill-constructed and cumbersome the Parliament may be, yet that there is a covert design in its being worked so badly. It is said, and with truth, that there need not be so much noise and friction, were it not the object in certain quarters to bring the thing to a deadlock, and by so doing force upon the country the darling scheme of a Cape Town clique, - I mean Responsible Government.<sup>(8)</sup>

In the Journal, the resignation was thus presented as a statesmanlike, unselfish and patriotic move: the Eastern members had been humiliatingly treated as "dummies" by the West, but after the separation debate they had come to recognise the futility of their gallant attempts to secure justice for the East, and had "decided that it would be a deception on their constituents to remain in so equivocal position, and a feeling of self-respect, no less than of justice to those

- 
1. BPH. 30.6.57.
  2. BPH. 8.9.57.
  3. BPH. 30.6.57.
  4. BPH. 18.8.57.
  5. BPH. 8.9.57.
  6. BPH. 16.9.56.
  7. GTJ. 19.5.57.
  8. GTJ. 16.6.57.



whom they represented, led them to the conclusion that they should best serve the public interests by resigning their seats. It was determined, however, that this step should not be taken so as to embarrass the country. The voting of the public supplies for the ensuing year was considered essential to the public administration of the country; but this done, it was thought that the members ought not to commit themselves to any great measure affecting injuriously the interests of the Eastern Province. The project of constructing a railway from Cape Town to Wellington, to the exclusion of any similar undertaking in the Eastern Province, was an objectionable case of this character, though it was resolved not to act upon it, unless driven to do so by an adverse majority..<sup>(1)</sup>

Much Grahamstown<sup>(2)</sup> and Cradock<sup>(3)</sup> opinion showed approval of the resignations, and the Journal gleefully recorded both the praise showered on the retiring members at the Grahamstown public meeting at the beginning of July, and the trenchant criticisms levelled at Parliament by the speakers: Olough said that the House of Assembly had voted the Speaker - a Westerner! - £800 for fifty days' work, and De Wet, despite his refusal to supply the government with food when it was in distress, had been granted a pension of £60 per annum. In the case of Carpenter, the Assembly had "thrown overboard" the £60 which had been placed on the estimates as compensation for him because he was an "Eastern Province man". So far as resident judges were concerned, Parliament had added another to the four already in the West, instead of giving him to the East. The East still had no Registry Office, and Parliament had cut some of the sums suggested for Eastern Province roads by the Government. The Museum, Library, Botanical Gardens and

---

1. GTJ. 30.6.57

2. GPT. 30.6.57.

3. GTJ. 18.7.57.



Institutes of the East had got only £100 from Parliament, while the Cape Town garden had received £300, and the museum and library £6000! Moreover, they were prepared to vote £500,000 for a Cape Town - Wellington railway, though they were not prepared to grant one to the East.<sup>(1)</sup>

The meeting expressed complete approval of the resignations, and declared that the action of the Eastern members would give a decided impetus to the separatist movement.<sup>(2)</sup> This was echoed in the Journal, where Godlonton urged the mid-lands and frontier to sink their differences, for, as he declared dramatically:

The struggle has at last fairly begun. The resignation of the members of Council for the Eastern Province is the first actual and practical movement which has been made by this Province in order to gain the long wished for power of <sup>(3)</sup> governing itself according to its own desires and requirements.

In Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, permanent committees were appointed to agitate for separation.<sup>(4)</sup> Alice<sup>(5)</sup> and Cradock<sup>(6)</sup> likewise pledged themselves to separation, and formed a committee for this purpose, while Whittlesea was also in favour.<sup>(7)</sup> Graaff-Reinet refused to join in the separatist agitation; one of the speakers at the public meeting which refused to send delegates to a conference on the steps to be taken by the East, maintained that only Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and Cradock were in favour of separation, and the majority of the Eastern Districts were opposed: He added:

Certainly we do not want the subject agitated now. We want railroads, and other general improvements; and we must beware how we support an agitation which might tend to sacrifice the objects we have before us.<sup>(8)</sup>

Godlonton was concerned about Port Elizabeth too: but his attempts to convince her that she was neglecting her own

---

1. GTJ. 4.7.57.

2. GTJ. 4.7.57.

3. GTJ. 7.7.57. Cp. GTJ. 4.7.57.

4. GTJ. 4.7.57; 7.7.57; Sole: op cit. p 188

5. GTJ. 4.8.57.

6. GTJ. 18.7.57;

7. GTJ. 25.8.57.

8. GTJ. 18.8.57.



interests by not uniting with Grahamstown<sup>(1)</sup> merely aroused the hostility of Port Elizabeth, who declared that the Journal's "vituperation" would not help it very much.<sup>(2)</sup> Godlonton received requisitions from Grahamstown, Fort Beaufort and the Winterberg to offer himself as a candidate for re-election, but with some satisfaction he replied that he could never do so while Parliamentary institutions remained as "unreal and illusory" as they then were. He concluded with an account of his objections to Parliament:

In arriving at this conclusion, which has only been after the most mature consideration, I may state further that I am influenced by the reflection, induced by past experience, that no Parliament sitting in Cape Town, and constituted, or rather worked as the existing Parliament is, can ever come up to the reasonable requirements of the Eastern Province - which from its rapidly growing importance, its relations with British Kaffraria and with the countries beyond its Eastern and North Eastern borders, can never remain, without serious hindrance and imminent danger, as an appendage to the Western Division, or submit to have its public finances controlled and appropriated by a Cape Town Legislative.<sup>(3)</sup>

The meeting of delegates failed dismally because Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet had remained openly hostile. In Grahamstown, there was so much support for the resignation of the Eastern Province members, that only nine people voted in the elections to replace them.<sup>(4)</sup> And since the elections posed the real question of the strength of separatist feeling in the East, Godlonton was able to exhaust his vocabulary of mockery and ridicule.

There was widespread dissatisfaction at the unhealthy state of Cape politics when Godlonton retired, disillusioned and exhausted, at the end of the first phase of his political career. Towards the end of 1857, he deplored the fact that the parties were still divided solely along geographical lines, and he persisted in seeing the conflict as a dual instead of a triangular struggle. He wrote:

1. e.g. GEJ. 24.10.57. Godlonton quoted Disraeli: "...Men suffer injustice, not only from the ignorance of those who injure them, but also from the neglect of their own interests."
2. EPH. 18.8.57.
3. GEJ. 29.8.57.
4. GEJ. 31.10.57. The GTA. 3.11.57. said that in Uitenhage only 33 out of 228 voted, and in Somerset, 8 out of 85.



The instincts of self-preservation on the one hand, and the desire for appropriation on the other, are the principles on which our political parties are formed.(1)

A correspondent from Graaff-Reinet made it clear that the political scene was far more complex than that, and that Midlands opinion had once again been badly alienated. He wrote to Godlonton:

Your end of the colony appears to have lost all the sympathy which was formerly evinced in this district in their political relations, and the resignation of the late members of council is looked upon as an unwise step, severing from each other at any rate for some time the two districts.(2)

The political scene was bleak, and in the new year, Godlonton escaped overseas for a well-earned holiday. But though his resignation was, in fact, a temporary admission of defeat, and he was the only victim of a despairing gesture, the session of 1857 had been not unsuccessful from his point of view: his popularity and his influence on frontier opinion which had been on the wane since 1849, had been bolstered,<sup>(3)</sup> especially as a result of his championship of the Cox case;<sup>(4)</sup> for this, like the case of Carpenter, had done not a little to explain his broader principles of politics to the ordinary man who grasps politics only in the instances of action. Had his paper been officially inspired, he could hardly have coincided in view more closely than he did, with the broad view of Sir George Grey. In Parliament, the majority of the Easterners had always relied upon him to take the lead,<sup>(5)</sup> and he had consistently borne the brunt of the opposition's attacks.<sup>(6)</sup>

1. GTJ. 7.11.57. Cp. GTJ. 8.12.57, where Godlonton denies that the West was divided into an English and a rampant Dutch party. The treatment of measures in Parliament, he said, had made it clear that there was nothing but a "determined opposition to the East on the part of the Western majority."
2. Godlonton Papers. M.R. Benjamin to Godlonton, 12.10.57.
3. Vide e.g. Rhodes House Collection. f.269 R.White to Godlonton 1.6.57: "...I feel certain that you are more popular than ever"
4. Vide e.g., Rhodes House Collection f.261. R.White to Godlonton, 16.5.57; ibid. f.267. R.White to Godlonton, 28.5.57.
5. Rhodes House Collection. f.264. R.White to Godlonton, 19.5.57.
6. Rhodes House Collection. f.271. R.White to Godlonton, 6.6.57.



Most important, then, was the fact that he had made Stockenström's resignation prelude to a short-lived but significant welding together of the six Eastern representatives. By 1857, there was some truth in his nephew's assertion that Godlonton could claim to be "the member for the Eastern Province."<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1862, when he returned from England, Godlonton was re-elected to Parliament, and retained his seat till the dissolution of Parliament in 1878, when he finally retired from public life. But it is doubtful whether, in the sixties and seventies, he ever attained the prominence he had done in the fifties.

- 
1. Rhodes House Collection f. 269. R. White to Godlonton, 1.6.57. Cp. ibid. f. 271. R. White to Godlonton, 6.6.57: "I only hope you may carry out what you hint at in your letter - that is - all resign - as you was (sic) the leader in the Separation question - you will be looked up to in this as you are on all frontier questions, as the head...."



CHAPTER V:

"ATHANASIUS CONTRA MUNDUM".

When, in February 1852, the Rev. H.H. Dugmore told Godlonton that he was Athanasius contra mundum,<sup>(1)</sup> there was probably more truth in his words than even he realised. A number of factors conspired to curb Godlonton's influence in the fifties. The structure of Cape politics, due chiefly to the vastness of the terrain, was characterised by a spirit of marked parochialism or localism,<sup>(2)</sup> fostered and extended by the radial development of lines of trade and communication. Issues were usually decided on their individual merits rather than upon a basis of principle, and principle was often used to trick out some particular plea. The small towns and villages of the colony tended to develop into closed communities in which economic and other pressure could, if necessary, be applied for political purposes,<sup>(3)</sup> but in which local and

- 
1. Godlonton Papers. H.H.Dugmore to Godlonton, 3.2.52.
  2. Vide, e.g. Documents relative to the question of Separate government for the Eastern Districts, p.4. Pottinger to Young, 23.6.47: "...My short experience has forced on me the conviction, that in no part of the world do local party feelings and prejudices prevail to a greater degree than in this Colony..."; C.B.Adderley: Statement of the Present Cape Case, p.12: "I much fear that on both sides, as is too often the case, minor, temporary, and local considerations have sway in a discussion of general and permanent importance...."; Eybers: Select Constitutional Documents illustrating S.A. History, p xxviii
  3. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. W. Southey to Godlonton, 24.1.52: "...A Wardmaster here in this village went round from house to house with it (i.e. a petition). This man, by name J. N. Dusing, I know called at Mr. J. L. Leeb. Mr Leeb, who is a merchant and a Justice of the Peace, refused at first to sign. 'Then,' said Dusing 'I must put your name down on a list of those who refuse to sign!' Afterwards Mr Leeb did (foolishly) sign!..." Compare also the preponderance of anonymous letters in the contemporary press.



(1)  
personal jealousies were also rife. It was consequently not easy for Godlonton to exert influence upon Port Elizabeth or Graaff-Reinet, except on issues which did not involve a direct threat to their interests; in the <sup>rural</sup> ~~rival~~ frontier areas he was more influential, especially since, himself a farmer, his appeals were generally on behalf of the scattered farming community of the frontier.

With the development of these rival centres with their own gravitational pull, had come inevitably the rapid growth of the colonial press. From 1834, when Godlonton had first occupied the editorial chair of the only frontier newspaper, the Graham's Town Journal, he had attempted constantly to keep a finger on the pulse of public opinion and to guide it along lines which he considered most advantageous to the Eastern Province. The paper, under his guidance, had become the focal point of public opinion, and for a time, its influence had assumed larger and larger dimensions, since it at least responded to the settlers' need for a medium of communication. (2)  
But during the forties and the fifties, the Journal's influence had begun to be challenged by the mushroom growth of the rival newspapers, which began to spring up in all parts of the Eastern Districts. By 1850, Grahamstown alone could boast of at least five newspapers. (3) Some of the papers were organs of the various churches, and others were primarily concerned with commerce or agriculture; but all tended to promote specific political views. The British Settler for instance, was founded in Grahamstown in 1851 so that the disfavour with which Grahamstown was viewed in the colony (4) as a result of Godlonton's accusations, could be counteracted. (5)

- 
1. Vide, e.g. C.C.Wiles: The Tale of a Library, 1827-1948, especially pp.12-13, 15-16.
  2. Vide Una Long: op.cit. pp.164-5; F.Rex to his father 16.1.35: "I shall write no more but refer you to the Graham's Town Journal..."; J.M.Bowker: Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers. pp.100-1; 263; 266.
  3. Union List of S.A. Newspapers, pp.43-4. This lists the Graham's Town Journal, the Cape Frontier Times, the Colonist, The Intellectual Reflector.
  4. CTM. 25.1.51. "A Relative of a Forced Burgher" to Editor.
  5. Br. Settler. 3.1.52.



Yet the Journal continued to increase both in size <sup>(1)</sup> and in circulation, <sup>(2)</sup> and, largely due to Godlonton himself, the business became increasingly prosperous. <sup>(3)</sup>

In many ways, Godlonton was his own worst enemy: his views, expressed invariably in strong and often tactless terms, secured as many enemies as friends for his cause. Many would have subscribed to the opinion of the Observer that:

In short, my dear Lord, for malice and lies,  
My Grandmother's Journal an equal defies...<sup>(4)</sup>

Captain Stretch was disgusted at Godlonton's unenlightened views, and wrote in his diary:

Col. Somerset, Col. Hare, Borchards, Napier, West, Maitland, Montagu, Pottinger, Hogg and many others, who had been instigated to oppress the Caffres because they were Caffres by the Grahamstown Journal have since appeared before Him who judgeth righteous judgement, but Mr Godlonton was the chief delinquent as a journalist.<sup>(5)</sup>

Dr. W. G. Atherstone of Grahamstown wrote much more severely in his scrap-book:

It were foolish indeed to despise the power of leading articles on acct. of the meanness or incongruity of their materials but if among things of this nature <sup>there were any worthy of decisive preference</sup> I should recommend the weekly lucubrations of that great wit and profound logician Mr. G ---. Never was there another instance of what power may be exercised over English understanding by all that the critic, the classical scholar, the philosopher, and even the man of tolerably refined common sense, pretend to despise, his logic that of a madman, who from wrong principles draws conclusions, not rightly deducible from them, or of the idiot who, however right his principles, has not energy of thought to reason rightly from them. His rhetoric reminds one of sour beer, and spoiled ox gall; never man exercised such imperious annihilating despotism over the rules of grammar since father Adam gave their proper names to the brutes. Not all the heroes of the Dunciad and all their successors together could exhibit a richer or more varied abundance of examples of the Bathos, than the pages of this periodical alone afford. I will even own that the pranks in geography and chronology exercise a power over time and space who not Homer nor Shakespeare ever knew. Nor shall I insist that ----- is not in comparison with him, a very Argus of early and correct intelligence, that ---

1. Rhodes House Collection. f.247. R.White to Godlonton, 2.3.52: "...The Mercury in Port Elizabeth, I see has enlarged its borders, to the size of the 'Journal'. We must take some steps to enlarge the Journal. I wrote to Figgins (?) respecting a printing machine..."
2. Cory Collection. MS. 7096. R.White to Godlonton, 13.3.52: "The circulation of the Journal is increasing every week..."
3. Rhodes House Collection. f.264. R.White to Godlonton, 21.5.57; ibid. f.289. R.White to Godlonton, 11.8.58: "Our business was never more prosperous..."
4. Observer. 30.10.49.
5. C. L. Stretch: Diary. p.344.



a miracle of sagacity and foresight. I even agree with his opponents that malice turns from poison to vapid filth - as it distils from his pen: his versatility of principle I shall not deny to be that of a weathercock. But, what of all this? his weekly papers are eagerly purchased by hundreds. They are praised, quoted and referred to by ---- etc. etc. Not that I wd expect you to read every number of this precious work. Who indeed does read it? To buy it - to pay for it - to cull from it some few flowers of Billingsgate abuse and some paradoxes of Gotham politics will be quite enough. (1)

Godlonton's blunt and ruthless expression of his opinions, (2)  
no less than his ascription of moral right to whatever cause he advocated, antagonised sections of opinion in all parts of the colony, (3) and there was hardly a newspaper which did not attack the Journal and its editor. His unscrupulousness became matter of history: a correspondent of the Frontier Times wrote in August 1851:

No one must presume to disagree with the editor of the Journal; if you do, you are sure to bring down upon you some of his venom; if he can't answer your arguments, he will abuse you - and say either that you are a bird of passage, or that you are not a respectable man, or that you have not been two miles from Graham's Town, or that you have not taken the field, or that you are a 'new comer'.... (4)

The Eastern Province Herald referred sarcastically to the Journal as "that mighty bulwark of the press", (5) and in 1857 the Graaff-Reinet Herald warned the Journal that it was only furthering the cleavage between the Eastern parties by "resorting to falsehood and invective". (6)

In 1835 even Colonel (later Sir) Harry Smith had told his wife "not to believe more than one-half of the alarming lies" of the Journal, (7) yet it was during his governorship that the Journal acquired such notoriety and unpopularity for its unflinching support of the government and of Godlonton's "patron",

1. W. G. Atherstone: MS. Note Book (Cory Collection. MS. 7083)

2. Vide, e.g. CFT. 22.10.50. "Beta" to Editor. The correspondent criticises Godlonton for suggesting that a certain frontiersman had "pervaricated" in the reasons which he had given for moving off his farm at the time of the Gaika unrest. Franklin commented in a footnote: "The attack made on the character of Mr Niland in the 'Extra' referred to is wholly unjustifiable, and has already excited general indignation."

3. Even in 1836. Vide e.g. Una Long: op. cit. p.255: J.H.Tredgold to Dr J. W. Fairbridge, saying that a new newspaper is needed in the Eastern Province "with an Editor of more liberal and consistent principles..."

4. CFT. 12.8.51: "No Humbug" to Editor.

5. EPH. 19.3.56.

6. GRH. 29.8.57.

7. Smith: Autobiography, p.343.



Sir Harry. The anti-convict agitation, the Kaffir War, the struggle for representative government - these all provided material for a great political crisis, and in the ensuing struggle, Godlonton took the side which earned him a certain amount of official praise, and a great deal of popular abuse. A suspicion that he was "toadying" to the administration out of motives of self-interest did his reputation little good,<sup>(1)</sup> and, at the time of the parliamentary elections, in 1853, it was his arrogance that was censured by his opponents.<sup>(2)</sup>

Finally, Godlonton's continued influence was incompatible with the growing popularity of Stockenstrom: Godlonton's influence had been steadily on the wane since 1849 and there is at least a suspicion that the presentation of the candelabrum to him by certain Grahamstonians before the elections of 1853 was intended to some extent to bolster his prestige; despite Cock's unpopularity at the time, there was some truth in the criticism of a correspondent of the Frontier Times that

It certainly is an undeserved public slight put upon Mr Cock, to give Mr Godlonton a candlestick without so much as giving even Mr Cock a pair of snuffers.<sup>(3)</sup>

And though, from the time of the meeting of Parliament, Godlonton's influence had increased with each succeeding session, the Stockenstromites were doubtless in a large majority in the Eastern Districts, and not merely, as Charles Brownlee said, in the Cape.<sup>(4)</sup>

Yet, even in spite of himself, Godlonton had achieved a great deal. The consistency and even pettiness<sup>(5)</sup> of the attacks upon him and the Journal indicates that his influence was genuinely feared throughout the period. Among the settlers

1. Br. Settler. 22.11.51; EPN. 8.2.51. said the Journal was "a very devoted government organ."; EPN. 15.2.53. "Calm Observer" to Editor.
2. CFT. 27.9.53. "Anti-Humbug" to Editor.
3. CFT. 27.9.53. "Anti-Humbug" to Editor.
4. Una Long; op cit. p 77. Charles Brownlee to "My dear Mahoney" 1.11.51.
5. e.g. Br. Settler, 1.11.51. Richard Rae to Editor; CFT 16.1.55. "The Infallible 'Journal'".



and their descendants,<sup>(1)</sup> there is little doubt that he had great influence and that they looked to him for leadership and advice: the Eastern Province News mocked them for taking "all as gospel that is published by the Honourable Robert Godlonton,"<sup>(2)</sup> and the Journal became known everywhere as the "Settlers' Bible."<sup>(3)</sup> Moreover, although he had but little influence in the Midlands,<sup>(4)</sup> even his opponents had to admit that the Journal had a "very large circulation"<sup>(5)</sup> and that the Frontier Times, for instance, could claim far less support from Grahamstown.<sup>(6)</sup> As we have seen,<sup>(7)</sup> Godlonton depended very largely upon the support of the Wesleyans, who comprised the majority of the settlers<sup>(8)</sup> and who relied on him, as a Wesleyan, to champion Wesleyan interests in Parliament.<sup>(9)</sup> Moreover, his denunciation of the missionaries was confined to the representatives of the London Missionary Society, while his advocacy of a firm policy in dealing with the Kaffirs was not incompatible with the views of the Wesleyan Church. It seems not unlikely, too, that he exercised some influence over the Municipal Commissioners of Grahamstown,<sup>(10)</sup> the majority of

1. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. S. Loxton to Godlonton, 20.12.57.
2. EPN. 28.12.52. "Observer" to Editor; 1.3.53. "Calm Observer" to Editor.
3. Campbell: British South Africa, p 116. Murray: Reminiscences p 14.
4. CTM. 19.4.53; GRC. 14.11.51. "Mimosa" to Editor: Godlonton and Cock are not "Members for the Eastern Province"; EPN. 22.11.51.
5. Br. Settlers. 1.11.51.
6. EPH. 4.8.57.
7. Vide Chapter III
8. Vide A.T.C. Snee: op cit. p 133: "...the colonists of Albany remained predominantly Methodist..."
9. Vide, e.g. Godlonton Papers. T. Langford to Godlonton, 28.4.57.
10. Br. Settler. 22.11.51. Cp. GRC. 7.11.51. which quotes the Br Settler "A rather numerous meeting of the friends of the Honble Robert Godlonton, was held on Thursday evening, at the Court House, summoned by the town bell-man, at the instance of the Municipality..." (My italics) Vide CFT. 5.7.53. "Junius Redivivus" to Editor: he says that it was Godlonton who persuaded the Grahamstown Municipal Board to hold an election in 1850. It is interesting, too, that Godlonton did not agree with the general denunciation of the functioning of the municipalities in the colony: vide GTJ. 15.10.53; 8.9.55, and cp. EPH. 20.4.50; GRH. 29.12.52; CFT. 31.3.57,



whom were generally Wesleyans. A correspondent to the Frontier Times remarked with disgust that the Journal should be called the "Wesleyan Journal."<sup>(1)</sup> This quasi-official recognition of the Journal as the mouthpiece of Wesleyan sentiment raises points of considerable interest: it would seem, from newspaper evidence, that the official attitude in the Church reflects, albeit in a different sphere, the dominant attitude of Jabez Bunting, "Pope of Methodism", to working-class movements in Britain, for the Wesleyan Conference was essentially Tory.<sup>(2)</sup>

Yet it would be wrong to judge Godlonton in terms of his "pulpit press", though as a pioneer journalist, he will always have a place in the history of South Africa. He was unusually well-informed, and, as his private note-book illustrates, methodical in his assembly of quotations and statistics. He had had little formal education and had none of the potential advantages of the modern politician. Yet he followed intelligently, all that was going on, not merely in South Africa, but in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, with studious care, he cultivated his friendships and burrowed his way into official favour as a means to an end. His numerous influential friends in the army were able to supply him with military and administrative information for his newspapers,<sup>(3)</sup> while his long-standing friendship with the talented and successful Richard Southey gave him private access to some of the higher civil officials. He had for long been favoured

---

1. CFT. 10.1.54. R. J. Painter to Editor.

2. Vide R. F. Wearmouth: Methodism and the Working Class Movements of Britain in the 19th Century, pp 189-92. et passim

3. e.g. Col. Montague Johnstone (vide letter to Godlonton in Godlonton Papers, 25.1.49); Col. Somerset (vide letter to Godlonton in Godlonton Papers, 5.1.51); Col. Wm. Sutton (vide letter to Godlonton in Godlonton Papers, 5.12.50); Mrs. Col. Armstrong (vide letters to Godlonton in Godlonton Papers, 1.4.51 and 11.6.57).



by Sir Benjamin D'Urban<sup>(1)</sup> and Sir Harry Smith, and was a friend of the Treasurer-General Harry Rivers:<sup>(2)</sup> during this period, he seems also to have taken pains to cultivate the friendship of the Chief Justice, Sir Hohn Wylde.<sup>(3)</sup> It was, thus strange that when, in 1847, Sir Henry Young requested the leading men of the East for their opinions on separation, Godlonton was not included in his list.

Though men like Smith and Southey<sup>often</sup> seem to have regarded Godlonton with amused indifference, if not with a degree of contempt at times, and though the best-laid plans of mice and men sometimes fail, his manoeuvring in high quarters had no doubt helped his cause, and Godlonton could certainly claim a good deal of the credit for what success the separatists had so far achieved. His task had been difficult: he was often torn between painting too unfavourable a picture of frontier conditions (in order to promote the cause of the separatists) and too rosy a picture (in order to stimulate immigration). By the time of his resignation in 1857, much had been done.<sup>(4)</sup> A Cape Mounted Police Bill had been passed,

- 
1. Vide, e.g. ACC.611/2. Godlonton to Southey, 10.7.49. Cp. L.C.Debates, 1.5.55. Godlonton said that he was opposed to "the principle of endowments to churches in this colony. He took the opportunity of explaining charges that had been made against him that he had supported the acts of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, because that Governor had given him land. He (Mr G.) came out in 1820 on the condition that he should receive a small grant of land. After some time, he continued to purchase three other grants. But finding four diagrams instead of one very inconvenient. Sir B. D'Urban, at his (Mr G's) request, gave him one diagram for the four pieces of land, and by some oversight this was called a grant. This came into a Cape Town paper, and he was charged with having supported Sir B. D'Urban from having received a grant of land from him...."
  2. Vide Godlonton's MS.Journal. 8.9.50; 12.9.50; 13.9.50; cp. Wilmot: The Life and Times of Sir Richard Southey, p. 91.
  3. Vide e.g., Godlonton Papers. Sir Hohn Wylde to Godlonton, 20.10.50.
  4. Vide Taylor: op.cit. p.46.sq. for this summary.



to assist in protection against the Kaffirs; a Burgher Militia Act had been carried; Parliament had voted huge sums for immigration; another puisne judge had been added to the Supreme Court and nine new magistracies created. Local government had been extended by the creation of Divisional Councils, and in 1855, Woodifield, the Assistant Colonial Engineer, had been stationed at Port Elizabeth, to supervise all public works in the East. Education had been decentralised by the election of educational boards in the villages and towns, and field-cornetcies had been legalised. In 1857 large sums had been voted for the building of new prisons throughout the colony and for the implementation of harbour improvements both in Table Bay and at the Kowie. The Eastern members had themselves been responsible for the failure of the East to secure a vote for railways, and while the Central Road Board report for the ten years preceding 1855 showed that the East had received about 25% more than it was entitled to receive, the Journal was itself forced to admit, in 1859, that the East's need of bridges had been met by 1856.<sup>(1)</sup> When Godlonton resigned in 1857, then, the separatist movement seemed to have lost its raison d'être, and the movement died down for a few years. But Godlonton was still not satisfied. The East, it is true, had obtained a Lieutenant-Governor and a resident Commander of the Forces, and the British Government had awoken to the urgency of the frontier problem which, after 1854, received a thorough-going investigation at the hands of Sir George Grey. In 1860, while Godlonton was in England, the movement revived, and Godlonton, in a pamphlet published in London, summed up what he still required. He wrote:

A separation of interests is impossible, but a separation of administration is essential to its future security, to the

---

1. Taylor: op.cit. pp.46-7.



full development of its resources, and to the adoption and carrying out of those measures which are essential to the maintenance of peace and the contentment and welfare of the whole community.(1)

Godlonton did not possess sufficient breadth of vision to be a statesman, and he lacked the imagination and understanding which might have made his personal contacts and, as a result, his political career, more fruitful. Yet, in a style worthy of a circumlocution office, he made up in fervour for what he lacked in originality. In many ways, he was typical of the self-made man of his generation. Unlike many, he created his own myth: the Graham's Town Journal has become the historian's quarry, and his writings have wielded a degree of influence which the scholar should regard with scepticism.

---

1. Notes on the Separation of the Eastern from the Western Province, and Concession to the former of its own local government, p. 28.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY.

### 1. Bibliographical Apparatus and Periodicals.

Adam, Ewing and Munro: Guide to the Principal Parliamentary Papers relating to the Dominions, 1812-1911. Edinburgh. 1913.

✓ Africana Notes and News. Index to, Vol. I-IX. Johannesburg. 1953.

Ford, P. and G: Select List of British Parliamentary Papers, 1833-99. Oxford. 1953.

Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports. I-XIX.

Kilgour, A.D: Sir George Grey, 1812-1898. A Bibliography. C.T. School of Lib. 1949.

Long, Una: An Index to Authors of Unofficial Privately-Owned Manuscripts relating to the History of South Africa, 1812-1920. 1947.

Mendelssohn, S: South African Bibliography. London. 1910.

Bulletin of the National Register of Archives. 1948-55.

Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Library.

Robinson, A.M.L: Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations accepted for Degrees by the South African Universities. Cape Town. 1943.

✓ Saul, C.D: South African Periodical Publications, 1800-75. C.T. School of Lib. 1949.

### 2. Manuscript.

Atherstone, W.G: Note Book. Cory Library. MS. 7083.

Bain, A.G: Copy of a letter to Godlonton, 12.11.58. By courtesy of Miss M. Lister.

Cory Collection. Cory Library, Rhodes University. This includes the letters of Robert White to Godlonton and also a MS Life of John Paterson by C. Cowen. MS. 6492 599.

Fairbairn Papers. Library of the Houses of Parliament, Cape Town.

Godlonton Papers. Microfilm in the Cory Library from the manuscripts in the Gubbins Collection, University of the Witwatersrand.

Godlonton, R: Papers in the Rhodes House Collection. Rhodes House, University of Oxford. Microfilm in private possession.

Godlonton, R: Note Book. Cory Library. MS. 6819.



Godlonton, R: Journal. 30.8.1850 - 17.10.1850. Library of the Houses of Parliament. Transcript in the Cory Library.

Godlonton, R: Last Will and Testament. Filed in the Office of the Master of the Supreme Court, Cape Town, No. 966. Photostatic copy in Cory Library. MS. 7108.

Godlonton, R: Scrap-Book of Testimonials presented to him. Albany Museum, Grahamstown.

Godlonton and White: Two letters to Sir Harry Smith. Photostatic copies of the originals in the Orange Free State Archives, Bloemfontein, are in the Cory Library.

X Graham of Fintry Papers. Scottish Record Office. Microfilm in private possession.

"Hammonds": Grant of, to Robert Godlonton, signed by Sir Harry Smith, 15.8.1850. Filed at the Office of the Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town, under "Fort Beaufort. Quitrents. Vol. I. Folio 34." Cory Library. MS. 6855.

Molteno Papers. South African Public Library, Cape Town. These unfortunately contained nothing of interest for this study.

Southey Papers. Cape Archives. ACC. 611/1-5 and 611/50.

Staples, Isaiah: A Narrative of the War of 1851 and 1853. n.a. n.d. Cory Library. MS. 6737.

X Stretch, C.L: Diary. Cape Archives. Microfilm in private possession.

Stubbs, Thomas: Reminiscences. By courtesy of A. Calvin Evens, Cathcart.

3. Printed Primary. (Official and quasi-official extracts therefrom).

A. Blue Books.

1. British Parliamentary Papers.

1846, xxix (400). Applications for Rep. Govt. within the last ten years.

1850, xxxviii (1137). Cape, Corresp. re establishment of a Rep. Assembly.

1850, xxxviii (1288). Papers re Kaffirs, 1848-50.

1851, xxxii (227). Estimate for Kaffir War.

1851, xiv (635). Report from Select Comm. on Kaffir Tribes

1851, xxxviii (1334), (1352), (1380). Correspondence re Kaffirs, 1850-1.

1851, xxxvii (1362). Cape, papers re proposed Rep. Assembly, 1850-1.

1851, xxxviii (424). Papers re Kaffirs, 1837-46.

1852, xxxiii, (1427). Cape, Papers re Rep. Assembly, 1851-2.

1852, xxxiii (1428). Correspondence re Kaffir Tribes, 1851-2.



1852-3, lxxvi (1635). Corresp. re Kaffir Tribes.  
1852-3, lxxvi (1581), (1636). S. Africa, Corresp. re  
Constitutional Ordinances, 1852-3.  
1852-3, lxxvi (1640). Corresp. re Constitutional  
Ordinances, 1853.

11. Cape of Good Hope Blue Books.

Correspondence between the Right Hon. Sir Henry  
Pottinger, His Honor Sir H.E.F. Young, and others,  
respecting a Separation of the Eastern and Western  
Provinces, and the establishment of a distinct and  
separate government in the Eastern Province.  
Cape Town. 1847.

Documents relative to the question of Separate  
Government for the Eastern Districts of the Cape  
Colony. Graham's Town. 1847.

B. Other official records.

Votes and Proceedings of the Cape Legislative Council,  
1854-57.

Debates of the Cape Legislative Council, 1854-57.

Cape of Good Hope Almanac and Annual Register.

Eybers, G.W: Select Constitutional Documents Illus-  
trating South African History, 1795-1910. London.  
1918.

South African Archival Records, Orange Free State.  
No.2. 1856-7. Cape Town. 1953.

Theal, G.Mc C: Records of Cape Colony. Vol.XV.  
London. 1903.

4. Newspapers and Pamphlets.

A. Newspapers.

The abbreviations used in the text are given in  
brackets.

The British Settler. (Br.Settler).

Cape Frontier Times: (CFT).

The Cape Monitor. (Cape Monitor). 2.5.57.

The Cape of Good Hope Observer. (Observer).

Cape Town Mail. (CTM).

The Colonist. (Colonist).

Eastern Province Herald. (EPH).

Eastern Province News. (EPN).

Fort Beaufort Advocate and Adelaide Opinion. 6.6.84.

The Friend. Special Centenary Supplement to, 10.6.1950.

Graaff-Reinet Courant. (GRC).

Graaff-Reinet Herald. (GRH).

Graham's Town Journal. (GTJ).

King William's Town Gazette and Border Intelligencer,  
14.8.56.

Queenstown Free Press. 19.1.59.

The South African Advertiser and Mail. (Adv.&Mail).

The South African Illustrated News. 14.6.84.

Uitenhage Times. 5.6.84.



B. Pamphlets and ad hoc editions of official correspondence

Adamson, J: Notes on Cape Affairs. London. 1851.

Adderley, C. B: Statement of the Present Cape Case. London. 1851.

Anon: The Case of the Cape of Good Hope and its Constitution. London. 1853.

Botha, Andries: Trial of, for High Treason. Cape Town. 1852.

Cathcart, Sir George: Correspondence relating to his military operations in Kaffraria. London. 1856.

Freeman, J. J: The Kaffir War: A Letter addressed to the Right Honourable Earl Grey...containing remarks on the causes of the present war, and the payment of its expences; the means of prevention, etc., etc. London. 1851.

Paterson, John: A dissertation on the Absolute necessity of Resident Government in the Eastern Province, Cape of Good Hope. And of the Eligibility of Uitenhage, as the site pointed out by nature herself for the Seat of the Supreme Power in British South Africa. Port Elizabeth. 1851.

Read, Rev James, jun.: The Kat River Settlement in 1851: described in a series of letters published in 'The South African Commercial Advertiser'. Cape Town. 1852.

Stockenstrom, Sir Andries: Brief Notice of the Causes of the Kaffir War. London. 1851.

Stockenstrom and Fairbairn: Copies of Correspondence with Lord John Russell on Representative Government at the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1851.

5. The Writings of Robert Godlonton.

Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope. A.D. 1834-35. Grahamstown. 1835-36.

A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope. 1834-35. Grahamstown. 1836.

Sketches of the Eastern Districts of the Cape of Good Hope as they are in 1842. Compiled by the Editor of the "Graham's Town Journal", with a view to assist the enquiries of the emigrant, and to serve as a handbook for travellers. Grahamstown. 1842.



Memoirs of the British Settlers of South Africa.  
Grahamstown. 1844.

Case of the Colonists of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, in reference to the Kaffir Wars of 1835-36 and 1846. Grahamstown. 1879. (First edition published in 1847).

The Eastern Province Directory and Almanac. Grahamstown. 1848. 1849.

With Edward Irving: A Narrative of the Kaffir War of 1850-51. London. Grahamstown. 1851.

Review of the Condition of the Frontier Hottentots from 1799 to 1851, and of the incipient stages of the rebellion of the latter year. Extracted from Godlonton and Irving's Narrative of the Kaffir War of 1850-51. Grahamstown. 1851.

Sunshine and Cloud; or, Light thrown on a dark page of frontier history, of 1837; being an exposition of the Reversal of the D'Urban System, by Lieut-Gov, now the Hon., Sir Andreas Stockenström, Bart.  
Cape Town. 1855.

Notes on the Separation of the Eastern from the Western Province, and Concession to the former of its own local government. London. 1860.

A Brief Memoir of the Rev. John Ayliff, Wesleyan Missionary. (Reprinted from The South African Wesleyan.) Grahamstown. 1862.

6. Miscellaneous Contemporary Sources and Reminiscences.

Bisset, J.J: Sport and War. London. 1875.  
Bowker, J.M: Speeches, Letters, and Selections from Important Papers. Grahamstown. 1864.  
Calderwood, Rev.H: Kaffres and Kaffre Missions. London. 1858.

Campbell, Peter Sanderson: Reminiscences of the Kafir Wars. London. N.D.

Cole, A.W: The Cape and the Kafirs. London. 1852.

Collins, W.W: Free Statia; Reminiscences of a Life Time in the Orange Free State. Bloemfontein. 1907.

Fleming, F: Kaffraria and its Inhabitants. London. 1854.

Holden, W.C: The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races. London. 1866.

King, Capt. W.R: Campaigning in Kaffirland. London. 1853.

Kotze, Sir John: Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences. Cape Town. N.D.

Lakeman, Sir Stephen: What I Saw in Kaffirland. London. 1853.



Lister, M.H: (editor). Journals of Andrew Geddes Bain.  
(Van Riebeeck Society). Cape Town. 1949.

Long, Una. (editor): The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain.  
(Van Riebeeck Society). Cape Town. 1946, 1949.

Mc Kay, James: Reminiscences of the Last Kafir War.  
Grahamstown. 1871.

Meurant, L.H: Sixty Years Ago; or, Reminiscences of  
the struggle for the freedom of the press in South  
Africa., and the establishment of the first newspaper  
in the Eastern Province. Cape Town. 1885.

Murray, R.W: South African Reminiscences. Cape Town. 1894.

Newman, W.A: Biographical Memoir of John Montagu.  
London. 1855.

Orpen, Joseph Millerd: Reminiscences of Life in South  
Africa from 1846 to the present day, with historical  
researches. Durban.

Stockenström, Sir Andries: Autobiography. (ed. C.W. Hutton).  
Cape Town. 1887.

Ward, Harriet: Five Years in Kaffirland. London. 1848.

## 7. Modern Works.

### A. General.

✓ + Arndt, E.H.D: Banking and Currency Development in South  
Africa, 1652-1927. Cape Town. 1928.

Bryant, A.T: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal. London.  
1929.

Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vols VII and  
VIII. Cambridge. 1936.

Campbell, C.T: British South Africa. London. 1897.

Cory, Sir George: The Rise of South Africa. London. 1930.

Cory, Sir George: The Rise of South Africa. Vol. VI.  
(Archives Year Book, 1939.)

Cutten, Theo. E.G: A History of the Press in South  
Africa. Nat. Union of S.A. Students. 1935.

Devitt, Napier: People and Places. Cape Town. 1945.

Fairbridge, D: A History of South Africa. Oxford. 1918.

Gie, S.F.N: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Stellenbosch.  
1939.

Fortescue, J.W.: A History of the British Army. Vol. XII.  
London. 1927.

Gluckman, Max: Rituals of Rebellion in South-East  
Africa. The Frazer Lecture, 1952.



- Hattersley, A.F: South Africa, 1652-1933. London. 1933.
- Hattersley, A.F: A Victorian Lady at the Cape, 1849-51. Cape Town. N.D.
- Henderson, G.C: Sir George Grey. Pioneer of Empire in Southern Lands. 1907. London.
- Hockly, H.E: The Story of the British Settlers of 1820 in South Africa. Cape Town and Johannesburg. 1948.
- Keppel-Jones, A: South Africa. A Short History. London. N.D.
- Kilpin, R: The Old Cape House. Cape Town. 1918.
- Kilpin, R: The Romance of a Colonial Parliament. London. 1930.
- Kilpin, R: Pioneers of Parliament. ( Cape Argus March 19 to April 23, 1921).
- Kilpin, R: When Downing Street Ruled. ( Cape Argus, Feb. 16 to May 17, 1924).
- Macmillan, W.M: The Cape Colour Question. London. 1927.
- Marais, J.S: The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937. London. 1939.
- Milne, J: The Romance of a Pro-Consul. London. 1899.
- Mitford-Barborton, I: The Barbers of the Peak. Oxford.
- Mitford-Barborton, I and R: The Bowkers of Tharfield. Oxford. 1952.
- + Mitra, S.M: The Life and Letters of Sir John Hall. London. 1911.
- Moore-Smith, G.C: (editor): The Autobiography of Lieut-General Sir Harry Smith. London. 1901.
- Noble, J: South Africa Past and Present. A Short History of the European Settlement at the Cape. Cape Town. London. 1877.
- Rees, W.L. and L: The Life and Times of Sir George Grey, K.C.B. London. N.D.
- Renier, G.J: History, its Purpose and Method. London. 1950.
- Robertson, H.M: The Cape of Good Hope and 'Systematic Colonisation', in the S.A. Journal of Economics. Vol. 5. No. 4. December 1937.
- ✓ Schumann, C.G.W: Structural Changes and Business Cycles in South Africa, 1806-1936. London. 1938.
- Sheffield, T: The Story of the Settlement. Grahamstown. 1912.
- Solomon, W.E.G: Saul Solomon. Oxford. 1948.
- Stuart, J: History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906. London. 1913.



Theal, G. Mc C: History of South Africa Since 1795.  
Vols. III and IV. London. 1908.

Van Biljon, P: Grensbakens tussen blank en swart in Suid-Afrika. Cape Town and Johannesburg. 1947.

Van der Horst, Sheila: Native Labour in South Africa. Oxford. 1942.

Van der Walt, Wiid en Geyer: Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Deel I en II. Cape Town. 1951.

Varley, D. H: A Short History of the Newspaper Press in South Africa, 1652-1952.

Walker, E. A: A History of South Africa. London. 1928.

Walker, E. A: The Frontier Tradition in South Africa. Oxford. 1930.

Wearmouth, R. F: Methodism and the Working Class Movements of Britain in the 19th Century. Epworth. 1937.

Wiles, C. C: The Tale of a Library, 1827-1948. Grahamstown. 1948.

Wilmot, Alex: The Life and Times of Sir Richard Southey. London. 1904.

Wilmot, A. and Chase, J. C: History of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope from its discovery to the year 1819 by A. Wilmot, Esq. From 1820 to 1868 by the Hon. John Centlivres Chase, M.L.C. Cape Town. 1869.

#### B. Theses.

Barnard, B. J: 'n Lewensbeskrywing van Majoor Henry Douglas Warden. M.A. (O.F.S.). (Published in the Archives Year Book, 1948).

Du Plessis, J. H. O: Die Ontstaan van politieke partye in die Kaap-Kolonie tot 1885. M.A. (University of South Africa). 1939.

Du Toit, A. E: The Cape Frontier: A Study of Native Policy, 1847-66. University of Pretoria, D.Phil. 1949. (Published in the Archives Year Book, 1954).

Gobrechts, J. F: Die Anti-Bandiets-Agitasie aan die Kaap. M.A. (Stellenbosch). 1937.

Gordon, B. C: East London: its foundation and early development as a port. M.A. (Rhodes University College). 1934.

Grundlingh, M. A. S: The Legislative Council of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-53. M.A. (Stellenbosch). 1937.

Kent, J. P: Sir Harry Smith as High Commissioner. M.A. (University of Cape Town). 1933.



Lombard, P.J: Die Stigting en vroeë geskiedenis van Queenstown, 1853-59. M.A. (Stellenbosch). (Published in the Archives Year Book, 1952).

Schnell, E.L.G: For Men Must Work. Ph.D. thesis (Rhodes University). Published Cape Town, 1954.

Slee, A.T.C: Some Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1830 and 1844. M.A. (University of South Africa). 1946.

Smuts, P.J: The Lieutenant-Governorship of Andries Stockenström. M.A. (University of Cape Town). 1940.

Sole, D.B: The Separation Movement and the Demand for Resident Government in the Eastern Province -- comprising a record of political opinion in the Province during the half century, 1828-78. M.A. (Rhodes University College). 1939.

Taylor, N.H: The Separation Movement during the period of Representative Government at the Cape, 1854-72. M.A. thesis. (University of Cape Town?). 1938.

Urie, J.M: A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries Stockenström before the Aborigines Committee in 1835, viewed in the light of his statements and policies before 1835. M.A. (Rhodes University). 1953.



APPENDIX I.

MR GODLONTON.

(From "Linnier's" series of Pen and Ink Sketches  
in Parliament. Published in the Cape Monitor  
on the 2nd May, 1857.)

The Honourable Robert Godlonton, is a man evidently on the shady side of fifty, he has a careworn face, and looks like one who has fought his way up in the world, but who in the course of the many buffetings he has received, has learned but imperfectly the great lesson of not thinking more highly of himself than he ought to think. Never having had the pleasure of meeting with Mr Godlonton in private life we cannot tell what he is "at home", but in Cape Town, and in the Legislative Council, he appears to wish us poor sinners of the West, to look upon him as a gentleman of the first water and a philanthropist to the very bottom. He always dresses with studious care, and faultless taste, but evidently lacks that ease of deportment, which invariably distinguishes a gentleman. His manner is stiff and formal, with a large dash of superciliousness, and in addressing the Council, his prominent idea seems to be that honourable gentlemen are under great obligation, to him for his condescension. He quotes "May" and talks of precedent, as one who is well up in all the minutia of Parliamentary practice; he is an inveterate speaker, and those best able to judge assert that not a single motion has been made in the Council, in Mr Godlonton's presence, but what he has spoken upon it. In addressing the Council Mr Godlonton is apt (perhaps sure would be the more appropriate term) to launch out far beyond the ken of the audience; his wandering in all directions -- from Sir Benjamin D'Urban to the Kat River Settlement, from the Kat River to the landing of the British Settlers, from the Settlers to a bridge over the Fish River, and from thence to Responsible Government, is nothing of a tour to the honourable gentleman when "rising to a point of order", or discussing the propriety of appointing a Select Committee, to report upon a petition which has been received. He is severe upon the London Missionary Society, and the bare mention of the name of Andries Botha, Klaas Speelman, or any of the rebel Hottentots, is enough at any time to put the honourable gentleman off his guard and on his legs. His dislike to Sir Andries Stockenström is matter of history, and it is somewhat amusing to see the honourable baronet and the no less honourable gentleman, sparring over the merits or demerits of the people of Graham's Town. In general Mr Godlonton is found voting on the side of the Executive to whose shortcomings he is at all times inclined to give a charitable construction, and may be considered as a supporter of constitutional Government, in opposition to the more reckless of the democratic party.

However good a case Mr Godlonton has in hand, he is pretty well sure to injure it by his manner of handling; his arguments although ever so good, and ever so forcible, are spread over such an immense expanse of verbiage, that their quality is not apparent, and their force is weakened



by division. He is not by any means a good general in debate, as he lacks the ability to bear down with all his force upon one point at a time, and after having demolished that to proceed to another, his attacks are so general and made so much at random, as to lose half their effect. His policy is too fine, and his schemes too deep, to secure support, and the result of his speeches is generally to involve the question in greater obscurity than ever. The important debate on Responsible Government last session is a case in point, the motion before the Council being an expression of opinion with regard to "the abstract principle." Mr Godlonton, as an amendment, moved "the previous question", whereas had the honourable gentleman worded his amendment so as to admit the value of the principle, but at the same time deprecating its application to the colony at the present time, (and which by the bye it is well known is Mr Godlonton's opinion), there is not the shadow of a doubt, but that he would have secured a majority, and the Responsibles been prevented from indulging in such hearty songs of triumph as they sung until a vote of the Assembly turned the tables.

On the other hand, Mr Godlonton has the welfare of the colony at heart, and never allows an opportunity of doing good to the land of his adoption, to escape him; he is distinguished by his loyalty to Her Majesty, and respect to Her authority. Years ago when the proceedings of a party then powerful, but now annihilated had plunged the colony into a state of the greatest confusion, and had well nigh brought about a civil war, Mr Godlonton, did not hesitate to obey the call of duty, and allow himself to be used as a butt for the envenomed darts, which were the portion of all who dared to stand up for liberty and good order. When we remember that Mr Godlonton supported the Government at a time when others who are now high in office pursued a different course, his failings sink into nothingness, and the only reflection which forces itself upon our notice is that of one, who had the courage to speak for Her Majesty, when the act was one surrounded with danger and loss.

ooo

## APPENDIX II.

### Comparative list of "Graham's Town Journal" Agencies.

In 1850, agents of the Graham's Town Journal could be found in the following places:

London; Cape Town; Swellendam; George; Uitenhage; Port Elizabeth; Graaff-Reinet; Somerset; Glen Lynden, Kaga Kowie (East) and Mancazana; Cradock; Colesberg; Burghersdorp; Bloemfontein; and King William's Town.

By the end of 1857, agencies had been established in the following towns and villages in addition to the above:

Middleburg; Aliwal; Smithfield; Fort Beaufort; Keiskamma Hoek; Alice; Eland's River; Post; Queenstown; and Whittlesea.

ooo



APPENDIX III.

TABULAR RETURN OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEMBERS OF  
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL RECEIVED FROM THE SEVERAL  
MUNICIPALITIES AND ROAD BOARDS THROUGHOUT THE COLONY.

MAY-JULY 1850.

( Ex Parliamentary Papers. 1851,xxxvii(1362),p.89)

KEY.

M . . . . Municipality  
R . . . . Road Board  
X. . . . does not count for a  
          vote in this return.

- - -



	Cape		Stellen- bosch		Pearl		Swellen- dam		Cale- don		George		Riversdale		Clanwilliam		Beau- fort		Grahamstown		Albany Graaff- Reinet		Somers- et		Coles- berg		Gladock		Burgersdorp		Malmesbury		Worcester		Fort Beaufort		TOTAL																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			
	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M	R



APPENDIX IV.

MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

1854 - 1857.

President: Sir John Wylde, 1854-56.  
J. De Wet, (Acting). 1856-7.

EASTERN MEMBERS.

Blaine, Henry . . . . .	1854-57.	(resigned).
Cock, William . . . . .	1856-57	(resigned).
Fleming, William . . . . .	1854-58	(resigned in
	1857 and	re-elected).
Godlonton, Robert. . . . .	1854-57	(resigned)
Joubert, Gideon Daniel . . . . .	1854-55	(leave of absence
		and resigned)
Metelerkamp, William Simon Gregorius.	1854-57	(resigned)
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. . . . .	1854-58	
Wood, George . . . . .	1854-57	(resigned)

WESTERN MEMBERS.

Barry, Joseph. . . . .	1854-64.
De Wet, Johannes . . . . .	1854-68.
Ebden, John Bardwell . . . . .	1854-58.
Reitz, Francis William. . . . .	1854-63.
Rutherfoord, Housen Edwards. . . . .	1854-58.
Van Breda, Dirk Gysbert. . . . .	1854-69.
Vigne, Henry Thomas. . . . .	1854-58.
Wicht, Johan Hendrik . . . . .	1854-66.



APPENDIX V

Analysis of the major divisions in the Legislative Council

1854 - 1857

EASTERN MEMBERS	<p>Wicht moves Queenstown Bill be read in 6 months 21/8/54</p> <p>Van Breda moves that £2000 for additional judges for E.P. be expunged from the estimates. 8/9/54</p> <p>That Queenstown Bill be read a third time 8/5/55</p> <p>Kat R. Compensation Bill be read in 6 months 8/5/55</p> <p>Burgher Bill 20/4/55</p> <p>That report on frontier alarm be adopted 7/4/56</p> <p>Responsible Government Division. 3/4/56</p> <p>Godlonton's motion on 8/5/57 for approval of Council to federative provinces</p> <p>Barry's amendment on Godlonton's motion on Cape Town-Wellington railway 24/6/57</p>								
GODLONTON	A	A	F	A	F	F	A	F	A
Wood	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A
Blaine	A	A	F	A	F	-	-	F	A
Metelerkamp	A	A	F	A	F	F	F	F	A
Fleming	A	-	F	A	F	F	F	F	-
Cock	-	-	-	-	-	F	A	F	A
Stockenstrom	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	-	-
Joubert	F	F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

WESTERN MEMBERS

Ebden	F	A	F	A	F	A	F	A	F
Vigne	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	F
Reitz	F	F	A	A	F	-	F	A	F
Van Breda	F	F	A	F	F	F	F	A	F
Barry	F	F	A	A	F	A	F	A	F
Rutherfoord	-	-	A	A	F	F	F	A	F
Wicht	F	F	-	-	-	F	F	A	-
De Wet	F	F	A	F	A	-	-	-	-

F denotes voted for a measure. A denotes voted against a measure. Godlonton's vote and those of the members who voted with him are printed in red.



