

THE DEVELOPMENT ASSUMPTIONS OF BOTSWANA
TELEVISION : AN ASSESSMENT

Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (Journalism and Media Studies)
of Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

by

Bishy Mmusi

January, 2002.

ABSTRACT

This study researched a project to set up a national television service for Botswana to find out whether the service could be used for rural development generally, and in particular to assist the Ministry of Health to implement its health projects in the rural areas and including the fight against the AIDS disease. It reviews conceptions of development and also analyses various communication models that usefully inform the conceptualisation of a TV service that can contribute to development.

The study was done by going through reports of feasibility studies on the project and through letters of official correspondence among officials of the Government of Botswana who debated the subject of whether or not the country should have a national TV service.

The reports and correspondence were supplemented with interviews of key people involved in the implementation of the project, as well as interviews of officials of the Ministry of Health.

The findings of the study are that the Botswana television service project started and ended on a footing that forgot about television, a medium that is dependent on professional and organisational capacity and purpose, and as a result the project did not take-off.

A qualitative method was used as the study required in-depth interviews during which new issues kept on emerging and nothing could be pre-determined because the study took place as the project was being implemented.

The study was completed in June 2000, at a point where the project should have been completed but it was discovered that the station could not go on air as a television service had not been conceptualised and there was no management structure in place and the Government of Botswana appealed to the British Government for the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation to come quickly to Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track, supposedly.

The study has concluded that the Botswana television service project became stillborn because there was a lack of professional and intellectual capacity to conceptualise the service, and instead there had been too much concentration on the construction of the TV building and acquisition of equipment.

ABSTRACT

This study researched a project to set up a national television service for Botswana to find out whether the service could be used for rural development generally, and in particular to assist the Ministry of Health to implement its health projects in the rural areas and including the fight against the AIDS disease. It reviews conceptions of development and also analyses various communication models that usefully inform the conceptualisation of a TV service that can contribute to development.

The study was done by going through reports of feasibility studies on the project and through letters of official correspondence among officials of the Government of Botswana who debated the subject of whether or not the country should have a national TV service.

The reports and correspondence were supplemented with interviews of key people involved in the implementation of the project, as well as interviews of officials of the Ministry of Health.

The findings of the study are that the Botswana television service project started and ended on a footing that forgot about television, a medium that is dependent on professional and organisational capacity and purpose, and as a result the project did not take-off.

A qualitative method was used as the study required in-depth interviews during which new issues kept on emerging and nothing could be pre-determined because the study took place as the project was being implemented.

The study was completed in June 2000, at a point where the project should have been completed but it was discovered that the station could not go on air as a television service had not been conceptualised and there was no management structure in place and the Government of Botswana appealed to the British Government for the staff of the British Broadcasting Corporation to come quickly to Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track, supposedly.

The study has concluded that the Botswana television service project became stillborn because there was a lack of professional and intellectual capacity to conceptualise the service, and instead there had been too much concentration on the construction of the TV building and acquisition of equipment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the director of the Department of Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene who without hesitation made available to me official correspondence about Botswana television; to the co-ordinator of the television project Kevin Hunt for granting me interviews, even on the eve of his departure for the UK after he had been dismissed from the project; to the Chief Broadcasting Engineer Habuji Sosome for explaining complicated digital TV broadcast technologies to me; and to the staff of the department for their moral support, particularly my old friend Moreri Gabakgore; to the Office of the President for granting me a permit to do the research; to officials of the Ministry of Health, especially Winnie Manyeneng for the interviews they granted me; and to my thesis supervisor and Head of the Department of Journalism and Media Studies Professor Guy Berger for challenging some of my assumptions and for the many lively debates we had together on media and development; the staff of his office and all his academic colleagues in the department for their support and encouragement.

Many thanks go to my Canadian friend John Clement of Dipolelo Video Arts in Botswana who made a lot of input when we discussed some of the problems and opportunities of training people for a television service in a country such as Botswana; to my colleagues in the M.A. programme at Rhodes University, namely Francis Chikunkhuzeni of Malawi and Angie Lazaro of South Africa who were great sources of inspiration to me; to the library staff of

Rhodes University especially Babalwa Sishuta for guiding me to useful databases of the library.

I would also like to thank the Executive Chairman of the Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) C.M. Lekaukau for granting me a study leave from my duties at the BTA to finish this thesis, and to his staff for cheering me up whenever I visited the office, and thus boosting my spirits!

Last but not least, lots of thanks to all my beautiful children for accepting that I should go for further studies after retiring from the Botswana civil service!

PREFACE

This study was carried out in Botswana and it is about the establishment of the country's national television service which was originally scheduled to go on air at the end of 1999 but due to implementation problems was delayed until the year 2000.

The aim of the research was to find out whether the TV service could be used for rural development, particularly for the battle against the AIDS disease.

Chapter 1 discusses the methodology of the research. As the research was on a TV station that did not exist but a project to set it up was being implemented, qualitative research became the most appropriate research method. This was so because the process of research involved in-depth interviews, description, analyses and interpretation of the collected data. The chapter also discusses problems that were encountered during the research, most of which were logistical in nature and arose mainly from the fact I was a fulltime student in South Africa but my research site was in Botswana and a lot of time was consumed by frequent travelling between the two countries.

The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the Office of the President in Botswana interfered with the research because toward the end of my research they refused me access to documents that could have assisted me in the evaluation of the TV project.

Chapter 2 gives a brief background to the broadcasting media in Botswana and attempts to explain why the country did not start a national television service at independence in 1966 until 1997 when

the decision to start it was made. The chapter also discusses the report of the International Telecommunication Union, which was possibly the first public evidence to show that debates were going in government circles about a television service for the country. Reports of subsequent consultancies are also discussed.

The conclusion reached in this chapter is that there was a lack of eloquence and clarity during the debates within the top echelons of the civil service to explain why Botswana should or should not have a television service and this continued for almost a decade, 1989 to 1997, the year in which the government took a decision for the establishment of the service. Perhaps it was this lack of clarity that led to the government taking this decision without explaining what the television service was needed for.

Chapter 3 discusses development theories and their impact on the countries of the Third World, particularly Africa, as well as the role of the media, if any, in the various theories and models.

The conclusion reached is that development is a problematic term and to be utilised meaningfully one should always explain its meaning in the context of the discussion. Another observation is that most of the development theories and models discussed have not worked in Africa, including Botswana, and that for any of the models to deliver the desired outcomes an appropriate social policy must first be carved and used as an instrument of intervention.

Chapter 4 focuses on media and development with the aim of searching for a communication model that is appropriate for Botswana television if it were to be used for development purposes, particularly for rural development. The chapter also discusses indigenous forms of

communication like oramedia, as well as conventional media theories like the "Uses and Gratification" theory. The role and importance of the Internet as a new communication force is also highlighted.

The conclusion reached is that many of the theories of communication have aged somewhat following the arrival of new communication technologies, particularly the Internet and broadcast satellites, and therefore should be discussed with great caution because their traditional impact on the audience has now been undermined by these technologies.

Chapter 5 discusses development in Botswana and the plans of the Ministry of Health. It gives a brief profile of Botswana and a short background of development since the country attained independence. It touches on the institutions of government, style of development, the model of development and AIDS, the new threat to the development of the country.

The chapter also discusses the government's new emphasis on human development.

The conclusion reached is that the Ministry of Health has an opportunity to use the new television service but it is likely to lose this opportunity because apparently it did not see it as such and therefore did not prepare for it.

Chapter 6 deals with the plans of Botswana television service as they were rolled out. It examines and discusses the content of letters that the management of the Department of Information and Broadcasting wrote to the Office of the President which is responsible for the media and some ministries seeking guidance on how they should implement the TV project. The scenario that was eventually

chosen and the co-ordinator who was recruited from the UK to implement the project are also discussed.

The conclusion reached is that a careful study of the written communication between the co-ordinator and the director of the department reveals that the co-ordinator persuaded the director to change the scope of the project and make it bigger, and when this happened none of the two understood the financial and manpower implications of the change in scope, and as a result the project went out of control and ran away with both of them.

Chapter 7 contains an assessment of the TV project and identifies the main reason why the government of Botswana postponed the starting of a television service for 31 years. The chapter also discusses an unforeseen development in the project implementation programme which was the dismissal of the project co-ordinator from his job.

The conclusion reached is that it is difficult to diagnose the real cause of the mismanagement of the project but it would appear that those who implemented it started and finished it on a footing that forgot all about television.

Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. The conclusion is that Botswana has missed an opportunity to have a television service that could be used to contribute to rural development. This has happened because there was a serious lack of professional and intellectual capacity to conceptualise the television service. There was too much concentration on the building and equipment and very little if any on the service itself.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY

The methodology that has been used for this thesis was dictated by the nature of the data that I wanted to get. Because the research was on a project that was not yet in existence but was in the process of being implemented, in order to know how the project had been conceptualised and what had been said about it before implementation began, I had to access reports of feasibility studies on the project, letters of correspondence among officials of the Government of Botswana who were involved in the project and interview some of them. Although the documents were an important source, one could not avoid being sensitive to the context in which they were written, the possible agendas and the audiences they were intended for. I also had to interview the project co-ordinator who had been recruited from the UK for the purpose. I concluded that the best method for extracting data from these sources would be the qualitative research approach, using in-depth interviews, and describing, analysing and interpreting documentation.

Although this was the chosen approach, one had to bear in mind that while it has its own strengths, it also has its own weaknesses. One of its strengths is its commitment to viewing events, actions, norms and values from the perspective of the people who are being studied (Alan Bryman, 1988). This approach gives some insight into human agency. But ideally, it needs to be complemented with more objective data to lessen its subjectivity, because as Silverman warns (1983:27),

data from a qualitative enquiry can still be manipulated even if it is generated from participants in their natural setting.

One of the weaknesses is that it can ignore the issue of the researcher's own perspective which can in turn affect how the perspective of the people is gathered and interpreted.

At a glance, interviewing can appear to be an easy task, but in practice it is a difficult one. This is so because it does not matter how carefully one crafts the wording of the questions, whether they are written or spoken, there is nearly always an element of ambiguity.

In the process of using interviewing in this research I was not unmindful of the fact that feminist studies have problematized interviewing by introducing the gender factor into it, and arguing that the gender of the interviewer does come into play and does influence the outcome of any interview (Gluck and Patai, 1991), and so does the issue of race (Stanfield, 1985). Another point that one had to keep in mind is the suggestion that interviewing is a masculine paradigm and embedded in a masculine culture (Oakley, 1981).

One also had to bear in mind that although interviewing can help establish rapport with the respondents, it could also create problems in situations where the researcher 'goes native', becoming a member and spokesperson of the group and in the process losing the academic role.

While one had to keep all these arguments and suggestions in focus, one had to attach a lot of importance to the consensus that has emerged between the schools of thoughts on types of research and interviews which can be grouped under the categories of qualitative

and quantitative research, a consensus that says different types of interviewing are suited to different situations.

A quantitative approach could also have been used together with the qualitative one if this was deemed advisable. However it was not brought in because it did not appear to be more appropriate at any point in the research. This was so mainly because the TV project was still being implemented and therefore unfolding, and no one was certain what was going to happen next. One could not freeze this process and study it using a quantitative approach.

Other formats of interviewing were not used either, like structured, semi-structured and group interviews. The reason was that in a structured interview for example, I would have to ask each respondent a series of pre-established questions with a limited set of response-categories, and would have to treat every interview in the same manner. It would have been difficult to catch up with the project as it continued to roll out. Similarly, a group interview, which could be done in different formats would not have been appropriate either because it would mean grouping together a number of top government executives who were involved in the TV project and asking them questions simultaneously in a formal or informal setting. One is aware here that this type of interviewing could be a useful tool that could provide another level of data gathering that would not be available through individual interviews of government officials. If it had been possible it would also have been less expensive and perhaps also stimulating to respondents as they interacted amongst themselves. One disadvantage could be that the group could be dominated by one

or two persons. Besides, this type of interviewing is not appropriate for researching sensitive topics, and the TV project was quite sensitive.

In summary, so far there is not what one can call a perfect type of interviewing. Each type entails assumptions in the questions asked and throughout the interview the researcher has to try to be clear about what her or she means.

The author has tried to take all the precautions mentioned above to minimise the weaknesses of interviewing as an instrument of data collection, without necessarily trying to pit one type of interviewing against another, because as Denzin and Lincoln have observed (1994:373):

Many scholars are now realizing that to pit one type of interviewing against another is a futile effort, a leftover from the paradigmatic quantitative/qualitative hostility of past generations.

Context of the research

The interest in doing this research arose from the fact that the Botswana government was shortly to introduce a national television service. The only electronic public medium was the radio and it was run as a government department. The aim of the study was to assess how useful the new TV medium was going to be to the majority of the people who live in the rural areas. The TV project was expected by government to assist its ministries that are crucial to the delivery of services in the rural areas, the ministries of health, agriculture and education. There were and still are debates about the use of media for

development. I wanted to see how these related to the Botswana television service. There are also debates about the definition and meaning of development and I wanted to look at how all these related to the official version of development in Botswana and what the role of television could be.

It was also my expectation that the study could contribute to knowledge on how some developing countries, particularly those in the region of southern Africa, could use television for rural development, should they so wish, after learning from the success or failure of the Botswana project because of the manner in which it was conceptualised.

It was also my intention to publish the study so that it could help students of the department of Journalism, Media Studies and Public Communication of the University of Botswana with their research work into the beginnings of a national television service in Botswana.

Problems encountered

One of the problems I faced in this research project was that of logistics, the fact that I attended Rhodes University in South Africa as a fulltime student while my research site was in Botswana. It was difficult to access material, which was mainly letters in government confidential files and reports of feasibility studies on the TV project. I had to travel to Botswana four times to do research on site.

Secondly, before I could be allowed to have access to any of the documents I had to apply to the Office of the President for a research permit. This is a requirement particularly if the researcher wants to use

information in government files. The process was too long and slow, and it took some three months before I got the permit. I had to wait for it in South Africa so that I could budget the research time properly.

Thirdly, South African universities had very little literature on the use of television for rural development, and the few books that were available were in the University of South Africa in Pretoria. But with the help of librarians at Rhodes University I managed to borrow those books, but again it was a very slow and costly process, and I could borrow them only for a limited time.

After doing the literature review I had to travel to Botswana so that I could be closer to the project, to the people who were implementing it, and to government files on the project.

The assumption that I had had all the time from the point when I decided on the Botswana TV project as my research topic up to the point where I thought the project was nearing completion was that the TV service, no matter how poorly conceptualised it might have been, would take off and actually go on air in 1999 as scheduled. But it did not. The commissioning date of the project kept on receding and moving further and further into the distance. It was postponed at least three times, almost delayed by a whole year. And just four months before it was due to go on air it got paralysed and could not take-off. In response the Government of Botswana appealed to Britain, to the British Broadcasting Corporation to quickly dispatch a team of BBC staff to Botswana to rescue the project and put it on track.

This had the effect of throwing my research out of balance because for some weeks I could not make sense of what was happening, as government officials who were involved in the project

did not want to explain anything. In the circumstances I decided to wait for the BBC team so I could make its arrival in Botswana and the terms of reference that they were given the cut-off point for my research.

Therefore the last two chapters of the thesis are an entirely new development, as I had to deal with the aftermath of the crash of the project. In other words those last chapters are a post-mortem of the TV project, the television service that never was.

The problem here was that, as things turned out, I was researching a turbulent project where new situations kept on emerging, to the surprise of both the implementation team and the Government of Botswana. I was not aware to the possibility that the TV service project may not materialise, even though I had spent almost two years trying to get the expected programme content of the station, its budget, management structure, running costs and training plans, without success.

I was not allowed the opportunity to study the report of the auditors that had been engaged by the government to probe what it called the mismanagement and misappropriation of the finances of the project because the permanent secretary in the Office of the President who was responsible for administration, Samuel Rathedi, would not let me have the report, saying that it was confidential, even though it was the same office that had given me a research permit to do my thesis on the project.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Introduction

This chapter gives a brief background and context to the broadcasting media in Botswana and also attempts to explain why the country did not start a national television service at independence in 1966 until in the year 2 000, assuming that it will go on air this year.

The chapter also discusses the report of the International Telecommunication Union, which was possibly the first public evidence that debates were going on in government circles on whether or not Botswana should start its own national television service. Reports of subsequent consultancies on the TV debates are also discussed, including the Croton Report and The Studio Hamburg Report, as well as an attempt by a South African private company, M-NET, to start a national pay-TV service for Botswana in partnership with the government.

Broadcasting Media Context

At present Botswana has no Information Act and no broadcasting policy. There is a draft broadcasting policy document, which was submitted to the Office of the President in July 1999 by a firm of broadcasting consultants in South Africa who had been engaged to draft it. There is a Broadcasting Act which was enacted in August 1998.

From independence in 1966, until May 1999, there was only one radio station, Radio Botswana, which broadcast on two channels, the general and the commercial service. The station is the broadcasting component of the government department of Information and Broadcasting which falls directly under the Office of the President.

The change in the broadcasting media situation happened in May 1999 when the country's first ever private commercial radio station, called YA RONA FM, was licensed. A second private commercial radio station, GABZ FM, was licensed in September 1999. The Botswana Telecommunications Authority licensed the two. The Authority has since handed over the responsibility of issuing broadcasting licences to a new organisation, the National Broadcasting Board, which has been set up under the Broadcasting Act of 1998 to issue broadcasting licences and to "exercise control over and to supervise broadcasting activities" (Broadcasting Act 1998, p. A.30)

Because the country had no Broadcasting Act or Policy for 32 years, the only guidelines that the managers of the Department of Information and Broadcasting followed all along were the contents of a report entitled "Report on the Information Functions of Government, Gaborone, March 1968". A certain A.J.Hughes who had been engaged by the government submitted it to the Government of Botswana. According to the terms of reference, Hughes had been assigned

To make a comprehensive summary of the present information functions within Government, including all Ministries and media;

to assess the impact that the information functions are making on the people and to make recommendations for the improvement, expansion and future orientation of information work, bearing in mind the need to make the most economical use of available resources (1968, p. 4).

About Radio Botswana specifically, Hughes said the rapid build up of the technical facilities and output of Radio Botswana over the previous few years had been a notable achievement, and then said “there is now a need to re-assess the role of radio and to give broadcasting a clear policy” (1968, p.29). He stated that radio was the most efficient means of communication for reaching the citizens of Botswana, and spelt out the role of Radio Botswana:

Radio Botswana is not a public service corporation like the BBC. It is a Government department and its job is to assist all other Ministries and departments in the execution of their various functions. Under no circumstances should it be used to embarrass, frustrate or oppose the Government of which it is part (1968, p.30).

About television in the newly independent Botswana Hughes said there was understandably considerable interest in its prospects, but from the information standpoint there would be little point in introducing it. He justified his decision by saying that most places in Botswana did not have electricity and transistorised radio receivers were not fully developed yet. He said the cost would be out of reach of all but a tiny handful of Botswana and transmission costs were not likely to be recouped in licence fees and advertising revenues, and he concluded: “I therefore advise against the introduction of television in Botswana” (1968, p.39).

The decision

On March 26 1997 the cabinet of the government of Botswana decided that the country should have its own national television service.

According to the letters of correspondence between the different ministries and departments of government the cabinet decision marked the culmination of a quiet but protracted argument that had been going on for almost ten years about a television service for Botswana, as will become evident as this thesis unfolds.

The argument involved all the ministries of government through what was called the TV Reference Group, which was composed of permanent secretaries of the different ministries of government and who would meet from time to time at the Office of the President to discuss the TV issue and later brief their respective ministers. The group argued about the wisdom or otherwise of Botswana having its own television service, and the argument centred on whether the project could eventually become financially self-sustaining.

The ITU Report

The first concrete outcome of these debates was the report of a feasibility study for the introduction of a national television service in Botswana, published in March 1988, carried out by the International Telecommunication Union, ITU, an agency of the United Nations.

The work of the team had been carried out in consultation with Radio Botswana, various ministries and departments of government and the University of Botswana.

In brief, according to the terms of reference of the report, the team had been assigned to determine the marketing, technical, financial, economic, social and political feasibility of a TV facility in Botswana and to advise the government on the best organisational structure suitable for the service (Studio Hamburg Report, Hamburg, October 1993).

The ITU team concluded that there were benefits that could be realised from such a project, but there were problems too. Some of the benefits of a TV service would be that it could foster a national identity, which would act as an educational tool to raise the standard of education; it would increase public awareness of the principles of health-care and modern farming methods suitable for Botswana agriculture, and it would promote Botswana's traditional culture.

The team also highlighted what it saw as social dangers that would come with television. Some of these were:

- the portrayal of violence, whether from real life or from fiction, which could be emulated,
- sexual permissiveness, a danger more serious in view of the world AIDS epidemic.
- the portrayal of affluent life styles which tends to promote dissatisfaction where there was none before,

- advertising that may promote trade but may also encourage overspending. The purchase of a TV set itself may, in many families, be an extravagance,
- too much television promotes the habit of passivity and is a time-waster.

The team noted that these dangers were greater where young people or unsophisticated people were concerned.

Despite the above list of disadvantages, the team concluded that Botswana's need was for a public service television, rather than a service run by a commercial company. They also said it was apparent that the income of such an operation, arising from advertising and programme sales would be well below its operating costs, even ignoring the substantial capital investment necessary. The consultants also said to bring TV to the remoter parts of the country "would be vastly expensive and should be regarded as a long term objective" (1993, p.4).

Response to the ITU Report

The most powerful ministry in the government of Botswana is the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, because it is the one that advises the government on whether or not a particular project is worth financing, and after studying the report the ministry responded: "The case for a television service in Botswana is extremely weak " (Letter: 28 April 1989).

Its argument was that only 1.5 percent of the population would be able to afford a TV set and the licence fee, because the cost of a

TV set alone was the same as the annual average income, and investment in the first four years would be 40 million US dollars (80 million Botswana Pula at the time, 1 U.S. dollar = 2 Pula). This translated into a 4 000 Pula subsidy per person of those capable of receiving Botswana TV. The recipients of this subsidy would mostly be the richest people in Botswana, and 20 percent of them would be expatriates. "This group of the population should not be a priority for large Government subsidies".

The finance ministry said the main argument in favour of a TV service was that people in Botswana watched South African TV with its in-built apartheid propaganda content. But the report also recommended that the government should not interfere with the reception of South African and BOP TV. This would have meant that Botswana TV would have to compete with these two broadcasters in a neighbouring country.

About the idea in the report of setting up Community TV-viewing Centres, the ministry said maintenance would be a problem in such a scheme, and concluded:

In conclusion, we are of the view that the TV service is an expensive proposition which cannot be given priority over other important national programmes that we have embarked upon or planning to undertake in the context of our national development plan.

The idea of a TV service was shot dead, almost, at least for the time being. The correspondence shows that there was a lull.

The debate was apparently picked up in 1990 when the Director of Information and Broadcasting, Ted Makgekgenene, revisited the 1988 ITU Report and wrote a letter to the Permanent Secretary to the President re-evaluating that report (Letter: 27 August 1990). In the letter he said the report “did not evaluate possible options” and had not taken into consideration the fact that technological developments had brought about a somewhat cheaper option of using satellite as opposed to terrestrial microwave programme distribution. He said it did not seem fair to say that one of the options that the government had was “to abandon the idea of a television service on the basis of costs involved” and recommended that the 1988 ITU report be updated in the light of new technological developments, and a financial cost estimate determined, clearly indicating government’s commitment for whatever option. He also warned: “If the recommendations are not carried out we might just as well forget about Botswana television”.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting is normally taken seriously by the government as its advisor on media matters, because every application to the Office of the President for anything that has to do with the media is first referred to that department for comment and advice. This is what also happened with the M-NET application (see below).

This was followed in 1990 by the commissioning of another feasibility study which would “review and update” the ITU report and provide fresh recommendations. While the ITU report had planned on a terrestrial microwave programme distribution system, the new study would explore the possibility of utilising satellite technology as a means of transmitting at national or regional level.

During the 1990 exercise to review the ITU report of 1988, the consultants that had produced it were called back. They spent a week in Gaborone helping government officials to review their own work.

The government was apparently not influenced by the outcome of the review meetings because it did not change its position following the review. Instead, government called for a new study in the light of new technological developments, an option that had earlier been recommended by the Department of Information and Broadcasting in the letter cited above.

Tenders were invited for the proposed new study.

The M-NET Application

In the interim, the Office of the President (OP) which is directly responsible for the media, continued to consider applications that they were receiving from foreign companies who wanted to set up some kind of TV service in Botswana. As usual, OP would rely heavily on advice from the Department of Information and Broadcasting. One such application came from M-NET of South Africa.

According to their proposal dated April 1991, M-NET wanted to establish a pay-television service for Botswana. Their TV signal would be beamed through satellite and re-transmitted on terrestrial transmitters in Botswana. The service would initially cover the capital city Gaborone and other towns like Francistown in the north, Selebi-Phikwe in the centre and Lobatse in the south, and eventually all the other major towns in the country. The signal would be transmitted mostly in encoded form, thereby requiring the viewer to have a

decoder. Broadcasting would start at 10.30 am till 1.30 am. There would be a two-hour 'window' during which Botswana could transmit its own national programmes.

The M-NET proposal was not accepted. In particular, the Department of Information and Broadcasting, in a letter to the Office of the President said:

It will be somewhat difficult for us to involve ourselves with a South African-based company in the introduction of TV services in this country at this stage when we have nothing of our own, knowing very well the power of the media. We would be seen by the rest of the world to be another S.A. M-NET TV satellite, to say the least. It is one thing to use their services, and quite another to belong to them (Letter: 8 December 1989).

The Croton Report

While tenders were still being awaited, the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, followed up on contacts that it had had earlier with some Botswana Government officials during which the subject of a television service for Botswana had come up. The BBC sent its Head of Training, Gordon Croton, on a fact-finding mission to Botswana.

According to his seven page report, dated March 1992, when he arrived in Botswana he was asked "to focus as sharply as possible" the relevant issues pertaining to the setting up of television, and do a "short and direct" report which would set out in broad-based terms the main arguments for and against setting up a television facility "so that the decision-making process could be assisted" (1992, p.1).

After visiting several parts of the country and talking to a short list of people he stated: "Almost everybody to whom I spoke felt that there should be a national TV". The reasons given were:

- to heighten and underline the sense of national identity,
- to disseminate news and local affairs,
- and to present public service information in areas such as education, agriculture and health (The Croton Report, Gaborone, March 1992).

Croton said the idea that there could be regular, in-depth programmes transmitted nationally on television in areas of public health and education, while attractive, "does not fit the facts of modern broadcasting and audience viewing patterns". He did not elaborate. Commenting on the ITU report and comparing it to his own report, Croton said:

This is a detailed, impressive document, which examines almost every aspect of the television service in Botswana. In all respects it must obviously be seen as a much more significant assessment of facts and analysis than this short report can be (1992:1).

In summary, he concluded that to pursue the lines of approach recommended by the ITU report of 1988 would involve "massive expatriate support" and the scale of the operation would be such that the real cost of sustaining it would be "very heavy indeed". His principal recommendation was that consideration should be given to the creation of "a carefully developed, properly financed Botswana

news and current affairs television service which would set out to provide a national and local news and, perhaps, also be the conduit for world news" (1992: 4). He also said attention should be given to the possibility of satellite broadcasting.

Tenders for yet another consultancy were still being awaited but the BBC itself was not going to compete for the tender because "the BBC in normal circumstances never tenders for consultancies" (Croton, 1992:1). The new consultants would be expected to give other scenarios besides what the BBC was suggesting.

The itinerary of Croton's visits in Botswana, which is attached to the report, shows that he held meetings with seven permanent secretaries, one cabinet minister in the Office of the President who was responsible for the media, and seven senior members of the staff of the Department of Information and Broadcasting. He also visited the small diamond-mining town of Jwaneng in western Botswana to see a small television facility that re-broadcast programmes of SABC television using a signal-booster transmitter.

What Croton was proposing was not a fully-fledged television station but the first stage of a modular development of television in Botswana. This is why it would have cost less than the one envisaged four years earlier by the ITU consultants. Regarding the people he talked to, they did not represent a cross section of any community, as it was only 15 civil servants and one politician. This is not to say that they were not pivotal in the decision-making process on the TV issue.

The Studio Hamburg Report

A German company, Studio Hamburg Media Consult International, won the long awaited tender. It was assigned to update previous studies done on the subject of television by different consultants at different times “and make recommendations in the light of available broadcasting technologies, including satellite technology”. They submitted the report of their consultancy to the government in October 1993, which put forward four scenarios for a TV service, and assumed that the service would start in 1997. The four scenarios of ownership of the TV service were:

- (a) Government Department
- (b) Parastatal Corporation
- (c) Joint Venture
- (d) Private Company

All scenarios assumed revenues from licence fees.

For their part, the consultants were of the view that the selection of the scenario would depend primarily on the Government of Botswana’s expectations concerning programme quality and its willingness to invest in a prestigious project.

Response to the Studio Hamburg Report

In their assessment of the report, the TV Reference Group of permanent secretaries concluded that the report had serious shortcomings in the technical and financial arguments presented. Besides, capital costs were “very high”. Initial investment for the Joint Venture scenario (Government and private company) would be 33 million Pula, Parastatal Corporation 57 million Pula, Government Department 70 million Pula, and Private Company 26 million Pula.

The view of the Department of Information and Broadcasting was that the parastatal scenario was more attractive. The TV Reference Group, in an attempt to look for another scenario that was not in the report, put forward the idea of a production house that could be constructed at Government expense to produce TV programmes that could be broadcast on “windows” provided by existing TV outfits. These outfits were receiving signals from the South African Broadcasting Corporation TV, which they boosted when they reached Botswana for better reception quality. In other words, these operations functioned like small TV stations. They operated on the basis of technical licences issued by the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation. Eight such stations operated: Gaborone, Lobatse, Jwaneng, Morupule, Serowe, Selebi-Phikwe, Francistown and Orapa. Some of them had small studios and transmitted their own local programmes in the evening.

But the Department of Information and Broadcasting argued that these small TV stations could not be presented as an alternative

option to any of the scenarios that had been presented by the Studio Hamburg Report because they were too small and inadequate to fulfil the requirements of public broadcasting, and therefore rejected the idea of a TV programme-production house that had been suggested by the TV Reference Group. The department also cautioned that whatever type of service would be decided on, it had to be borne in mind that a Botswana TV service was going to face serious competition from SABC TV and M-NET. These had long overcome their “teething problems” and Botswana viewers would have “very little patience to tolerate our own”. The department also advised that satellite programme distribution should be part of the initial capital outlay to afford the service flexibility and simplify acceptability to all parts of the country.

This did not mean no attention was given to the existing TV repeater stations. The department recommended that they should be left to “market forces”, although some legislation should be developed to guide their operations.

The TV Reference Group of permanent secretaries concluded that all the four scenarios that had been presented by Studio Hamburg had shown that the introduction of a television service would not be financially viable and they saw no basis for proceeding with the project, but then stated:

If Government decided to go ahead with this television project, the justification would have to be based on other considerations rather than economic viability
(Savigram, 19 June 1996).

The permanent secretaries recommended that the cabinet should advise the President to direct that the recommendations contained in the Studio Hamburg Report on the establishment of a fully fledged television service in Botswana “be rejected”, and instead have a small television facility established within the Department of Information and Broadcasting to produce and broadcast news and current affairs programmes at an initial capital cost of 10.5 million Pula. They also recommended to cabinet that the total recurrent budget of the Department of Information and Broadcasting should be increased by 15 percent “to cater for the television component”, and that the TV unit should be allowed to run and develop commercially so that it could be “self-liquidating in the future” (1996: 6)

It would appear that the government took time to study the implications of the recommendations, and after eight months, on March 26th 1997, the cabinet decided that Botswana should have its own television service and the project would be implemented by the Department of Information and Broadcasting. No debate was supplied by cabinet as to why the state scenario was the preferred model.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the approach that has been followed by the Government of Botswana regarding the role of broadcasting media in the country and radio in particular, and why a television service was not introduced in the last century until now.

The chapter has also revealed that the behaviour of the decision-makers within the top echelons of the civil service on the issue of introducing television was not consistent, and there was lack of detail to explain clearly why Botswana should have a television service. This lack of clarity and transparency applies to the cabinet itself, because every time a decision had to be made by government on reports of feasibility studies, there was no clear position, a statement saying what the position of government was. Also, the very decision that was taken in March 1997 to have a television service has no publicly recorded justification. In other words, there is no public reason why Botswana now has a TV station, and what the service, as a tool, is going to be used for.

However, it is clear that the report on the Information Functions of Government that was done by A.J. Hughes in 1968 became the government's media policy for a long time. This appears to be so because, even without referring to the report specifically, the argument against the introduction of television had for many years centred on the high cost of the service and the lack of electricity in rural households.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This thesis is assessing the Botswana television project in terms of its potential to contribute to the development of the country, particularly rural development, and specifically in the area of health. Before one can make any meaningful assessment, one has to place that assessment in the context of the model of development that is followed by Botswana, and that model itself has to be placed within the range of models of development that have been formulated up to this point in time.

The chapter will therefore discuss possible sources of insight on the part of some writers who formulated theories of development to see what their real aim was. The various development theories shall also be discussed in brief. There is also a general discussion on the impact of the various development models on the countries of the Third World, particularly Africa.

Some of the theories that have been formulated include those of growth, modernisation, dependency, institutionalist, Marxist, and global interdependence.

In approaching the topic of development one will have to discuss one's own definition and meaning of development. The meaning will then be used as a tool for assessing the models of development that are going to be discussed in this chapter.

Development is a problematic term and concept. It would appear that there is no one meaning for the term. It would also appear that there are as many meanings as there are users of the term, as will become evident as the chapter proceeds. Besides, a user of the term is obliged to re-define and update its meaning now and then by adding additional ingredients and elements in order to make the meaning more relevant to the times. In other words, the meaning of the term development some fifty years ago cannot be the same in the new millennium.

The author's own definition and meaning of development is that development must necessarily emphasise the development of the human person as the goal of development. Therefore the package of elements that the human person, as the subject of development should receive must be geared towards making the person effective in working his or her way out of poverty.

One's understanding and assumption here is that poverty is not inevitable, it is not impossible to eradicate, it must never be tolerated and there are prerequisites to its eradication. The key prerequisites are economic growth and a sound social policy. In the first place, growth is possible because the poor themselves are a pool of labour that can contribute to growth. In order for them to do that, a social policy must give them good health and education; they must have access to land,

to public transport, to health facilities, to the Internet and electronic mail, water, telephone, marketing infrastructure, radio and television.

The linkages between and among the above factors are that if people have land and produce their food they will improve their daily calorie intake. They do not have to depend on government handouts. Education equips them with skills, and good health gives them capacity to be more productive and contribute to economic growth, which in turn can sustain education and health if the social policy is geared towards doing that and towards equitable redistribution of the benefits of growth.

There is logic in investing funds in education at primary, high school and tertiary and making that education available to children of the poor as well, through subsidies, and not just to those of a small elite. A problem could be created if educational subsidies stop at primary school level because that could create a big population of young people with inadequate skills, which they cannot use for their own survival. As a result they would not be able to contribute to the required growth, and any growth shall in turn be slowed down, and the goal of human development would be undermined.

The importance of adequate skills was highlighted recently at a conference in Botswana, National Conference on Citizen Economic Empowerment, where a delegate representing Botswana's Rural Development Council, which is chaired by the Vice-President of the country, said the relatively slow reduction of poverty in rural areas is a result of the inability of rural dwellers to take advantage of the expanding economic development opportunities availed by the Government, and stated:

Undoubtedly, most Batswana lack not only capital to invest in business, but also the requisite skills to venture into business activities. Lack of entrepreneurial skills undermines effective participation in economic opportunities and also hampers successful business development for those who have endeavoured to participate.

(Citizen Economic Empowerment in the Context of Rural Development, Rural Development Council, Gaborone, July 5-7, 1999, p.4).

This statement was being made 33 years after Botswana's independence and there are many possible reasons for this state of affairs, including the possibility that there were no social policies put in place that were geared towards equipping people with such skills.

On the other hand, there are examples in some parts of the world, especially in East Asia, where governments have formulated policies directed at helping the poor. One such country is Malaysia which has demonstrated in a small way that investment in an appropriate type of education for a country can lift its poor population from abject poverty. Through education, the government increased the quality and quantity of the factors of production available to the poor, and created a professional, commercial and industrial class to enable the poor to uplift themselves from poverty and participate in all aspects of the economic life of the nation.

(Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, July 5-7, 1999)

As the discussion now focuses on theories of development, particular attention will be paid to the role of the media in each of the

development paradigms. The role of the media in development shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Growth Theory

One of the first theories was the Growth Theory, which is associated with the American economist Walt Rostow. It was expounded in the 1950s and continued into the 1960s (Siddle and Swindell, 1990). Rostow's analysis was based on data that was available for only 15 countries.

He said all societies could be located at some point along a development axis which was marked by five stages; that a traditional society should have pre-conditions for take-off, then actually take-off into self-sustaining growth, and drive itself to maturity until it reaches the age of high mass consumption.

This is too small a sample from which one can expound what can be called a world theory. Even in terms of Africa today, the number he used would be only the member countries of the Southern African Development Community, SADC, and they cannot seriously be used to expound a continental theory on anything.

One of the weaknesses of this model is that Rostow describes a macro-economic phenomenon and assumed growth, but does not say

what the goal of that growth should be and how citizens of the concerned country would benefit from that growth. His is a description of an automatic process, which is simplistic and unrealistic. One does not see in the theory any mechanism for delivering the “high mass consumption” which seems to be the goal of his mechanical process, nor the target population for what is to be consumed.

Therefore, for the masses, the high consumption would just be one of the pies in the sky.

The role of the media in this model would be to promote high consumption, which is not a developmental role in the context of development as defined above.

Modernization Theory

This theory follows on from the growth theory. It was influenced by the desire of the USA to combat the influence of the USSR in the Third World, during the Cold War. Basically, the authors of the theory wanted to offer the newly decolonised countries a supposedly easy and better path from the traditional to the modern world, so that in a short time they could acquire the status of developed economies and societies.

A prominent feature of the theory is that its proponents gathered a large body of aggregate data and used it to construct models of growth and assessment of economic performance. They postulated that change was going to be produced by the economic activities of elites in the cities, and their activities would result in some benefits ‘trickling down’ to the poor folks in the cities and ‘cascade’ down to the

urban hierarchy until they reach those in the smallest village in the country (Brohman, 1996).

But industrial development did not take that route. This produced anger from such authors as Frank (1971), who wrote about a new “clientship of neo-colonialization”. Others who wrote in the same vein included Rodney (1972), Fanon (1967), and Amin (1973). They seem to have been angered about the experience of underdevelopment of the Third World by the capitalist countries of the North.

The model is based on the hope that some benefits would ‘trickle down’ but does not articulate how that was supposed to come about. It does not even place any obligation, let alone duty, on those running the government of the newly decolonised country to guarantee that indeed some benefits do reach down to those on the ground. There is no re-distribution mechanism in the model. Like the growth theory, it does not say anything about human development, not even about the impact that the ‘trickles’ are expected to have on the people the day they reach down to them. It is essentially a model that would promote government handouts at best, an activity which does not equip people with skills to do anything for themselves.

One does not see any useful role for the media in this theory, a role that could promote people’s participation in their own self-development. Simply put, people do not feature anywhere in this theory. Like the growth theory, the media would simply promote high consumption by the elites and do nothing useful for the general population.

Institutionalist Theory

The theory was also born around 1950, and like the growth theory it also continued into the 1960s, a period when European colonial powers were formally withdrawing from the colonies in Africa south of the Sahara. Briefly, the theory is concerned with the project of reworking long-established colonial relationships so that over a period of time the elite in a colony who is articulating the ideas of nationalist development could safely be installed as a government (Preston, 1996). The understanding seems to be that, as the colonial power departed, the indigenous elite would, through their own institutions, work co-operatively with the institutions of the departed colonial power, and 'development' aid would flow smoothly to the former colony. The assumption seems to have been that this new relationship would work smoothly because it was underpinned and informed by the actual experience of the colonial episode, and a history of close relationships which were forged with the new ruling elite during the colonial period.

The definition of development embodied in this theory is, like others that have been discussed before it, based on the assumption that the political elite of a newly decolonised country, by working co-operatively with the ruling elite in the former 'mother' country, would reap some economic benefits like aid from that relationship, and that aid would somehow end up benefiting the population.

This model is weak because it does not explain how this was supposed to happen. It assumes an automatic process without any social policy designed to intervene and deliver the expected benefits to

the poor and to equip them to participate in the economy of their own country. The theory therefore has a 'trickle down' assumption, which has already failed.

There is nothing convincing in the development theories that have been discussed up to this point that they were designed to benefit the general citizenry of the developing countries. On the contrary, it would appear that the way that the economic models that are based on these theories function, that they were either meant to benefit the ruling elites in the 'mother' countries or those in the former colony, or both. This appears to be so because the economic models tend to connect both elites, and shut out the populations of both countries.

The media in a situation like this, especially radio and television, would be more likely to be state-owned and not allowed to criticise government as it is usually the case in many newly decolonised countries. The role of the media would therefore be defined by the government, very similar in a way to the role of radio in Botswana after independence in 1966 until 1999 when the first private radio station was licensed, a role that was spelt out in the report by A.J. Hughes on the Information Functions of Government which is discussed in Chapter 2.

Dependency Theory

This is one of the theories that emerged in the 1970s. It originated in Latin America. The theme of the theory is that peripheral countries are permanently condemned to structural underdevelopment through their subordinate role in the world capitalist system (Siddle and Swindel, 1990).

The theory says the transfer of surpluses from Third World countries by international capital through negative terms of trade and repatriation of profits and over-invoicing of imported goods, which were all reinforced by colonialism, were afterwards continued during the period of independence by the co-operation between “national bourgeoisie” and transnational corporations.

This theory has a conceptual relationship with the Institutionalism theory, because while it simply describes the nature of a neo-colonial trade relationship and decries it, without necessarily explaining why it happens, the Institutionalism Theory explains that this situation happens because as the colonial power departed, the indigenous elite work co-operatively with the institutions of the departed colonial power, so that ‘development’ aid can smoothly flow. So the balance sheet is that the aid flows from the funds that accumulate from over-invoiced goods exported to the former colony, while goods imported from the former colony, which would predominantly be raw material would be paid for by the elites in the former ‘mother’ country at prices dictated by them.

Since the situation described by the Dependency Theory is a post-colonial one, the broadcasting media would in most cases be state-owned and would therefore be expected to broadcast what the

government says it should. If there is a social policy in place that is geared towards making ordinary people in the rural areas participate in decision-making processes to uplift themselves from poverty, the media could be used to promote such a policy. However, the broadcasting activity, no matter how efficient the chosen communication model, could be a sterile activity if development is only about benefits that are expected to 'trickle down' and nothing more.

Global Interdependence

The modernization theory represented something of a consensus within "orthodox" development theory, but consensus "broke down" in the 1970s, and no new consensus developed thereafter (Preston, 1996).

The key idea represented in the 1970s was that of global interdependence. Among other things the perspective called for a new international economic order, or NIEO, as it was later commonly referred to. Its main concern was that there must be a transfer of resources from the rich industrialised countries to the poor developing countries to meet their basic needs in development. In addition it called for reforms in trade regimes, monetary reforms, debt relief and transfer of modern technology to upgrade the economies of the poor countries and integrate them as equal partners within the global economic system.

There is something innocent and naïve about this perspective. Those who formulated it seem to have assumed that there was a

desire and willingness on the part of the ruling regimes in the industrialised countries and their nations to see the poor countries of the Third World industrialised or developed to the level of their own. There appears to be some element of sadism which is highlighted by the explanation given above that if any benefits were to flow from the ruling elite in the former 'mother' country they would go directly to the ruling elite in the former colony, and definitely not to the population in general. The question at issue, even if it was not asked, was, at whose cost or expense was the NIEO going to be realised? Who was going to finance it? Obviously not the poor countries. It would therefore have to be at the cost of the industrialised countries. They could not agree to that, because that would alter, almost overnight, the colonial relationship that exists between the two blocks of countries. The theory was an economic non-starter.

Because the trade regimes were not reformed, nor any of the factors that would have led to economic integration of the poor countries with the developed ones, the hoped for marriage was not consummated simply because it did not happen. There would be no point therefore discussing the weakness or otherwise of the Global Interdependence theory or the role of the media in that development paradigm as that would be mere speculation. Again, there does not appear to be any valid economic argument that the wealthy countries need to uplift the poorer ones which does not have a moral perspective. If the argument does not have an obvious moral perspective then it is likely to have a covert plan to continue to enrich the wealthy countries, which amounts to the same thing.

Marxist Theory

Marxist theorists, using class as their instrument of analysis, concluded that in the developed capitalist countries, the state and the system of laws facilitated the systematic exploitation of the workers by capitalists. Using the metaphor of 'the base', the mode of production determined the 'superstructure', ideas, culture and the legal order, they also concluded that since the capitalist class dominated the mode of production in that system, its ideas and its laws would dominate the culture and the legal order. As a result, the laws that the state enacted and implemented were seen as tending to reproduce and strengthen the class relations of production, and necessarily that enhanced the power and privilege of those already on top of the heap (Seidman and Anang, 1992:255).

What underlies this view is that in a capitalist state the economic arrangements and the means of production are not meant to benefit the poor whose labour is used for production, but to benefit the owners of the means of production. Therefore that state of affairs could change only if the workers themselves could rise, overthrow the ruling capitalist class and seize the means of production, own them and earn all the fruits of their own labour.

The media in this type of state would still serve the capitalist class. It would not make any difference whether such media were state-owned or privately owned, or both.

Assessment of the Theories

Some of the theories of development that have been discussed earlier in this chapter assumed that the meaning of development and its goal were clear and simple and that development would be attained in practice. But some of the problems that should have been solved by the same models of development, problems like unemployment and poverty persisted and new ones cropped up. As a result, those people who were involved in development work began to look for new approaches to development.

Many writers, like Koda and Omari (1989), have criticised many of the old theorists who developed theories on the basis that their understanding of the meaning of development, particularly when applied to areas like Africa, was wrong because it had “conceptual blinkers” and “methodological strait-jackets”. Instead, the critics argue, there should be a broader, more flexible vision of development that is capable of addressing diverse Third World realities.

One of the views is that development must provide productive employment opportunities and an improved quality of life for all.

One of the fundamental problems of development in Africa, which is a big hindrance, is that the best land and infrastructure were allocated to export crops, like in Zimbabwe where the best land is allocated to tobacco production farms, and this practice marginalized small farmers, particularly women. This hindered expansion of

cultivation of food crops for the growing population and caused counter productive environment effects (Koda and Omari, 1989). Also, the lack of domestic capital left key sectors of the economy in the hands of foreign firms, and they, in collaboration with domestic firms, profited by selling cheap labour-intensive exports, crude agricultural and mineral products, and importing manufactured consumer goods and machinery which are used for producing luxury goods which are used for the high income groups, goods like beer and cigarettes (Mudenda, 1985).

Another hindrance in African efforts to introduce export-oriented manufacturing industry is that their products encounter problems as markets in industrialised countries narrow because of recessions and competition, thus making the terms of trade even worse. A case in point is the protracted argument that lasted the whole of 1998 and 1999 about the brand names and labels of some South African wines that were exported to European Union countries and had potential to compete with wines produced by some European countries.

Another argument is that the goal of development was expressed in terms of Eurocentrism, that is preference for projects reflecting the needs of the donors, and aid was wrongly focussed on infrastructure or tied to donors. There is also a suggestion of collusion and corruption in the whole development game, "such that the interests of the rich in the metropolises and the corrupt elites in the periphery are served at the expense of the poor" (Preston, 1996b: 151).

Lipton (1979) has also argued that people are discriminated against through the location of public services, industry, wages and depression of agricultural prices to serve the interest of the town's folk.

Perhaps the original cause of most of the problems of development is a tendency to worship theories that had been formulated in the West. Brohman (1996) seems to have a point when he says there is a tendency to pay homage to influential theories of the past rather than to construct new and more appropriate frameworks. Realities of the South should not be made to fit the theory. On the contrary, it is the theory that should be tested on the realities of the South.

Another problem of development that has been identified is that the theoreticians and practitioners of development seem to occupy different worlds and speak different languages, and theoretical models are “too formalistic and abstract to be relevant to the everyday world of their would-be beneficiaries (Brohman, 1996c: 326). People are treated as objects to be studied, rather than as subjects of development in their own right, whose knowledge and interpretations of the world might contribute to the findings and design of development work. Brohman emphasizes that if development is fundamentally about processes of human action than just about goods and services, then it is clear that development theory must deepen its understanding of what it is to be human.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed some development theories and models as well as possible sources of insight on the part of those who expounded such theories. The meaning of development was

discussed with a view to evaluating and assessing given theories and models of development.

The conclusion reached is that development is a problematic term and in order for it to make sense in any discussion one has to explain its meaning in the particular context of that discussion.

Most of the development theories discussed here have not worked for Africa, including Botswana, and one does not see how they can provide any meaningful development without effective social policy interventions designed to produce desired outcomes. Desired outcomes may not come automatically.

In the case of Botswana, the government perceives the state as the principal and leading participant in the development of the country and in the context of health which is an integral part of the topic of this thesis, Vision 2016, the government document that contains a long term vision for Botswana, says the number of doctors that are produced in Botswana is not enough and health facilities in many areas are understaffed. It says there must be an ambitious programme to catch up with the pace of infrastructural development, and continues: "For example, we must establish a medical school at the University of Botswana as a matter of urgency" (Vision 2016, p.51). There is also another promise: "We must develop and strengthen programmes specific to the health needs of women, in particular adolescents, menopausal and elderly women" (Vision 2016, p.51).

At this point this has not yet happened. For example, a medical school has not yet been established at the University of Botswana. Nevertheless it gives the impression that someone was thinking about

people, and a particular group of people for that matter, as the goal of development.

What is missing in the development theories that have been discussed above is that they do not emphasize the development of the human person as the goal of development. It is the view of this author that the human person must be the subject of and reason for development, and must receive a package of elements that are geared towards making the person effective in working his or her way out of poverty. In order for the person to do that, a social policy must give him or her good health and education, access to land, to public transport, to health facilities, to the Internet and its technologies, water, telephone, marketing infrastructure, radio and television. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the linkages between and among the above factors are many and important. For example, if people produce their own food they can improve their daily calorie intake. They do not have to depend on government hand-outs or on crumbs dropping from the high table, which are euphemistically referred to in some of the literature on development as the 'trickle down effect'. If the human person is not at the centre of development there is a real possibility that one could have a rich country that belongs to a poor people, simply because the people are not the goal of the country's development activity.

In addition there must be gender equality, popular participation in democracy and development activities, and the respect and protection for people's rights and freedoms.

CHAPTER 4

MEDIA AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to search for a communication model that could be appropriate for Botswana television if it were to be used to contribute to development, particularly rural development, and in the area of health, including campaigns against the AIDS pandemic. As will be evident in the chapter, there are assumptions that it shall be used for development.

In the search for an appropriate communication model, a general tour is made of current sites of debates in the African continent regarding the role of communication in development. The discussion brings in debates about the politics of Africa and the Information Superhighway. This is necessary because, in appraising the old and well known theories and models of communication, one has to bear in mind that when they were formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, the situation then was different from today's. For example, there was no Internet to reckon with, and there were no debates about the Information Superhighway. The theories, models and concepts in question are such as the two-step flow, multi-step flow, homophilly, heterophilly, knowledge-gap hypothesis, agenda setting, and knowledge-attitude-practice and convergence model.

In some sense most of these concepts were developed or formulated during times when the concept of nation-state was still

intact and when many people were consuming the media output of their own countries, irrespective of whether those media were government owned or privately owned. In most cases there were no cultural differences between the audience and the people who produced the media products, whether the products were news or general programmes.

The situations that obtained then have now been disturbed and the institution of nation state itself is under threat because of the phenomenon of globalisation and broadcast satellite technologies, and audiences inside their national boundaries are consuming media products produced in many different parts of the world. For example, a good number of people in the urban areas of Botswana watch South African, American and European television channels through satellite technology.

In the light of these developments, many of the old theories of communication that had become classic have now become inadequate and should be used with care, and some of them, like oramedia, development support communication, organisational communication, conversation and “uses and gratification” are going to be reviewed in this light.

Africa and the Information Superhighway

The whole debate about Africa and the information superhighway cannot be rolled out here, but, in brief, some of that debate is that the information highway has enhanced interpersonal, intergroup and international communication, using technologies like

cable TV, high definition TV, satellite antenna systems, VCR, teletext, fax, lasers, digital recording and electronic mail, but Africa is yet to experience the full blast of such technologies (Nyamnjoh, 1996).

Okigbo has a pessimistic view of the new communication technologies:

Far from changing the situation in favour of Africa, the new communication technologies have made it easier and faster to collect, process and distribute information that is injurious to the image of African nations (1995:112).

He also claims that if the new information technologies have strengthened Western societies, they have made Africa weaker. In many respects, when compared to the West, Africa has always been weaker, and the arrival of the new information technologies could not be expected to do miracles for the continent and strengthen it overnight. After all, the technologies were developed in the West for the benefit of the people of the West, and not those of Africa. If Africa wants to benefit it must understand that it must work hard and pay a huge price. For example, because Botswana TV uses satellite transmission, it pays the Pan American Satellite company some four million Pula every year for the space they have booked on the transponder. Even if they were to stop transmission for months they would still pay, so long as the space is still under their name.



Oramedia

Oramedia, or indigenous forms of communication, should have been used in many of the situations where communication was an important tool for facilitating development (Uboajah, 1985). The distinctive feature of these communications are “their capacity to speak to the common man” in his language and idioms when dealing with problems that are directly relevant to his situation. In this case, communication takes place in a “non-artificial milieu”. Gestures, body language, facial expressions, symbols and folklore are predominant in the communication. Song, drama, dance groups and the like can be used to promote campaigns against evils like alcoholism, AIDS, discrimination against women, outmoded taboos, advances in farming, health, nutrition and family welfare, national unity and integration. All these should be combined with mass media.

Oramedia communications are rarely used in Botswana, and according to Nyamnjoh, they are not in common use in many African countries, and he states:

In other parts of the world experiments have been conducted on how indigenous channels could be combined with the mass media for better effect. But in Africa the tendency is still for professional journalists, politicians and even researchers to overlook the indigenous channels of communication, and to

focus predominantly on the mass media, as vehicles of news, facts, ideas, and information in general (1996, p.11)

One can conclude that while Nyamnjoh is presenting a plausible argument, the problem is that these alternative forms of communication have not been researched well enough to be able to be formulated into models or theories of communication. This does not mean that they cannot be effective forms of communication until they are called theories, because it is true that the majority of people in Africa do receive messages through indigenous channels of communication, including those of Botswana. He also identifies other forms of communication, which though not necessarily indigenous, need to be studied, forms like festivals, soccer, churches, clinics, schools, beer-drinking halls, and rumour. Therefore, one sees oramedia as a form of communication that is full of potential in the use of television for development in Botswana.

Development Support Communication

This is a sub-set of development communication. It is specifically designed and implemented to support a particular development programme (Ngugi, 1995). It applies generally to micro or local entities. It is concerned with effects, it is goal oriented, it is time-bound, takes the form of campaigns, and is participatory and interactive.

The model is widely used by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and is being increasingly adopted by

governments. For this model to work, four basic components must be put in place:

- (a) The nature of the issue on which the campaign is to be based must be thrashed out properly,
- (b) The audience for whom the campaign is meant must be defined clearly,
- (c) The nature of the media to be used must be clarified, and
- (d) The socio-political and economic context within which the campaign is to be launched must be known.

This model can be used in Botswana, but it would need developing further. For instance, it is not clear what kind of variables should obtain on the ground in order for it to work, ideally. Some research must be done first among the target population before the model can be implemented, in order to know the audience. It could have high financial implementation costs. It can be used for special campaigns, provided money is allocated to do the research first. Another shortcoming is that the model is not sufficiently interactive. That can be added on, for example by having a respected member of the community where the target population lives sit among the audience to watch TV campaign broadcasts, after the person has been properly briefed on the campaigns, so that he or she can help the audience make sense of the programme after the broadcast. A respected member of the community is important for reasons of credibility.

Organizational Communication

The point of departure of this model is that the use of interpersonal, small groups and organizations has been ignored, because African development studies have focused on the use of mass media (Onwumechili, 1995). Mass media create awareness but not much knowledge. A case is quoted of a study done by Nyirenda (1986) in Zambia of children and women's vaccination, which demonstrated the limitations of mass media. He found significantly high awareness of mass media messages on immunization against diseases, but very little knowledge and actual practice.

Interpersonal practice is seen as providing the highest quality of communication, highly correlated to persuasive ability. Organisational communication provides context where members know each other relatively well to achieve quality communication, and the number of members is large enough to achieve an appreciable multiplication of influence.

The argument here again is that organizations, both at formal and informal levels, already exist in the rural areas. For example, there are women's organizations, local councils, youth organizations and co-operative societies. Mass media messages are seen as designed mainly for masses or large audiences that involve several differing groups, and in ethnically diverse African countries, mass media messages are couched in a "Western-style format" (Adesonaye, 1990) and are often delivered in the national "business language", English, French or Portuguese, in order to reach a national audience.

Although these channels of communication have not been developed in Botswana. They seem to make a lot of sense, except that generally speaking, the church as an organization is usually reluctant to transmit messages that have nothing to do with church activities.

Uses and Gratification Model

This is one of the models over which there have been considerable differences over what the media do to people or what people do to the media. The first conclusion from what used to be called “uses and gratification” research was that people were “a mass of monolithic, passive and gullible receptacles of any communication cue that came their way” (Emenyeonu, 1995). With more research in this area, new thinking came about which said it was not quite true to say that the media did things to people, on the contrary, it was the people who did something to the media. They bend the media to their needs more readily than the media overpower them (Katz, Gurevitch and Haas, 1973)

The general consensus seems to be that different people use the media for different reasons. For example, there are those who use the media for guidance, to solve problems, for decision - making and good management. Others use the media for the media’s own sake, without regard to content.

While these conclusions seem academically valid, it is not clear which media- TV, radio, print, and type of content- satisfy which categories of people.

Emenyeonu's contention is that programme choice is a rational action motivated by expectancy of gratification, that is, programme selection would be influenced by programme contents, which best satisfy specific needs and that individual choice is influenced by programme content. But when a family is viewing together, programme loyalty decreases. On the other hand, he argues that it is likely to be maintained when viewing with peers or mates.

A study done in Nigeria by Osadolor et al (1984) investigated media use among urban youths and showed that they preferred television to radio or newspapers, and they preferred current affairs, news and political debates to non-current affairs content.

Another study done by Nwuneli (1984) of media usage by the urban poor showed that income and education were associated with media exposure, but film viewing and education could not be associated with anything.

Yet another study done by Ogumodede (1988) explored the viewing habits of Nigerian adults and revealed that they viewed TV in order to know what other people think, obtaining up to date information, relaxation, fighting loneliness, passing time, and for having influence, in that order. The adults also sought programme variety on their TV sets by frequently moving the dials to other stations where they thought their needs would be better served.

Although these studies do not go beyond the results and into what the meaning is for media usage and planning, the model can be useful to people who are in positions of media management. It would be useful for instance for programme planners at Botswana television to always bear in mind that their viewers are not going to lap up the

whole content of a particular programme; that they will select what satisfies their particular needs, or switch off completely.

Conversation

One of the important issues in this thesis is to look for different ways through which people who live in the rural areas of Africa generally and Botswana in particular get their information on health matters. This is important because if combating diseases and educating the people of Botswana through the use of television is expected to be one of the priorities of the government, the use of television for this purpose can be enhanced if other sources of information are also known so that such sources can be integrated into the planning of information and education campaigns.

It has not been easy to find many such studies done in Africa. While studies done in Europe, America or China could also be useful; the African studies tend to provide quick relevance because of the cultural proximity of most African nations. Besides, most rural dwellers in Africa have a lot in common, that is poverty.

One case study on the sources of health information among rural dwellers of two Ghanaian villages is quite instructive. The study examined the use in primary health care (Bosompra 1987) of such information channels as conversation, the town crier, the market place, churches, schools, health officers, and the radio.

The findings were that conversation was the most popular but least trusted source of health information. Radio came second, both in terms of popularity and credibility, whereas the health officer was

ranked third in popularity but first in credibility. The study also revealed that the awareness level of the respondents was generally low and practical use of the knowledge acquired was minimal.

A similar study, undertaken by the School of Communication Studies of the University of Ghana in 1975 on sources of information about selected national affairs topics in Ghana, found that the most popular source of information was radio, followed by government officials, newspapers, and local authorities, in that order. The study was interested in how respondents obtained their information about cholera, AIDS, oral rehydration therapy, and treatment of water to make it safer to drink.

The results of both studies were contrary to the expectations of the researchers. They said that they had expected that in an indigenous communication system such as obtained in the rural areas of Ghana, the town-crier or gong-man would be frequently cited sources of information on most issues, including health.

Bosompra has observed that even though conversation came out as the most popular form of communication, the study did not give the exact circumstances under which the conversation should take place in order for it to become an effective and popular form of communication.

While this observation is valid academically, one cannot ignore the fact that in many life situations conversation is likely to be popular because it normally takes place in relaxed circumstances, with high levels of noise, interjections and heckling, and without any co-ordination. The fact that it came out as the least trusted source of information on health for example, could be that the participants in a

conversation do not know from where each one of them got the information that they are sharing with the group, thus creating a problem of credibility. On the other hand, radio, or the government health officer, are likely to be regarded as the voice of respected authority and therefore credible. In many rural situations these two sources of information could be treated as if it were the government itself speaking.

While these studies are instructive, they were done in rural areas where there was no television as one of the sources of information, and therefore the conclusions drawn from them, and from radio particularly, cannot be automatically transferred to television because TV, which is the subject of this thesis, is a unique and different medium, and the same principles may not apply. This is not to say that they are entirely worthless. If they are to be applied they should be applied with caution and monitored closely.

Community Viewing Centres (CVCs)

In the report of the first feasibility study for the establishment of a TV service in Botswana in 1988, the ITU consultants discussed Community Group Viewing Centres, or CVCs. They said even in countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria where TV signals "blanket" large portions of rural areas only "a tiny percentage" of rural people had access to TV sets, and in a number of African countries governments had made an effort to increase rural accessibility to television by developing group viewing of government –purchased

receivers. In areas without electricity rechargeable batteries, generators or solar energy would power the sets.

At the time of putting their report together in 1988, the consultants said there were 20 000 government TV receivers in Cote d'Ivoire, but many of them were broken because of inadequate maintenance. Senegal and Nigeria were experimenting with solar power. The government of Nigeria owned and maintained 2 000 receivers, and 75 percent of them were run on solar energy, and the rest on electricity. Niger had taken maintenance "very seriously" and a repairman visited each village with a receiver every 45 days.

According to the consultants, the advantage of group-viewing centres is that they become learning centres and a focal point for community discussions of the issues presented on TV. In their view:

To be truly effective as an educational tool, television needs to be complemented by people in the field who can explain, focus discussion and help people apply what they have learned to their own lives. Without this essential element, television has a tendency to pass over the heads of target audiences and be seen as an interesting diversion of little relevance to their everyday lives (ITU Report, 1988:322).

They recommended that the government of Botswana should establish community viewing centres at the rate of 250 a year or as many as it takes to provide rural Botswana with access to television.

The problem of maintenance of TV sets could one of the factors that could make the government of Botswana decide against setting up viewing centres. But it is a common problem which is not only peculiar to Africa. In India, for example, the problem that they had with

their TV viewing centres was one of maintenance of the sets (Rao, 1992).

Notwithstanding maintenance problems, other writers, like Des Wilson (1987) for example, have argued that organising a TV service for the rural areas, including Community Viewing Centres (CVCs), and in terms of communication content, could be effectively harnessed to meaningfully penetrate the rural areas. The whole process could be carried out beyond the level of CVCs to the level of VCCs, Village Communication Centres, and then to the households. A village is something bigger than a community.

What Wilson is proposing here is a four-step model that uses a combination of traditional and modern mass communication instruments. The four steps are: TV station, CVC, Gong-man, and Audience. The way it works is that a piece of communication is broadcast by the TV station, it is received by the TV viewing centre in the community where the Gong-man is part of the audience, and after the broadcast the Gong-man takes the message and delivers it to the people gathered at the village level.

While this model sounds academically valid and does take the CVC beyond the community level to the village level, the four-steps involved are too many and could attract a lot of distortion of the message. Before it can be applied on a wider scale it must be researched further, tried on a pilot project and monitored very closely.

Two-way approach model

This model examines the role that communication and education can play in the crusade against the spread of AIDS. It advocates the use of multiple but mutually reinforcing channels of communication that use mass media and interpersonal networks (Soola, 1991).

The model posits that communication and educational efforts against the spread of AIDS should be community-based, encourage active support and involve the participation of local communities. To be effective, there has to be a team effort approach involving communicators, designers of instructional material, health personal and the public at large.

One of the problems of communicating awareness and education about AIDS is that of communicating the meaning of the word AIDS itself accurately to people who are illiterate. But Soola suggests that there is no need to communicate technical information to each segment of the population because this is not realistic. There is need to de-mystify the disease and attack myths such as the one that says AIDS is an evil spirit that kills people who live in cities, and to be clear on how it is not transmitted.

The role of the Internet

Although Africa has not benefited much at this point from the new communication technologies, including the Internet, the benefits of these technologies are coming slowly to the continent, taking into consideration the fact that nearly all the capital cities of African countries have an Internet connection, and there are benefits from such connections. Therefore the Internet is becoming a force to reckon with in any discussion of communication approaches in Africa.

Some of the big beneficiaries of the Internet in Africa are universities. Researchers are collaborating internationally using the Internet, far more quickly and cheaply than they ever could before (Panos Briefing, April 1998, No. 28).

At present the Internet is being driven strongly by commercial forces and its sector in developing countries is becoming competitive. But perhaps it is too early to make conclusions about what is going to happen to Africa and the Internet. So far indications are that it is having a positive impact on areas like health in the rural areas of Africa as well. For instance, through HealthNet, a discussion forum for people in the medical profession and its associated mailing lists, users get access to a lot of people all over the world and discuss medical issues with them. For example:

- The Vanqa Hospital in Congo-Kinshasa use HealthNet to send regular dispatches to report on progress in treating trypanosomiasis to health organisations in the North,
- burn surgeons in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda use HealthNet to consult with one another on patient treatment and reconstructive surgery techniques, and
- in the Gambia health workers no longer need to travel 700 kilometres per week to collect data for a clinical trial because this information is now sent via email in seconds.

These are just a few examples of the sort of uses that the Internet can and is being put to. There are many more areas in which it is being put to good use. In the context of this thesis this is important because if an appropriate model could be selected to promote interactivity in some Botswana television broadcasts to rural areas, the agency that is responsible for the programme can get communication about the outcome of any discussions quickly if e-mail is connected to the viewing centre. The TV station can also collect information from the Internet, and with technological convergence, can even onward relay video from the Internet.

Conclusion

This chapter has made a general tour of some communication models with a view to selecting an existing model or building one from some models that have been discussed that could be deemed appropriate for Botswana.

The conclusion reached is that many of the models discussed have aged somewhat in the light of the new communication technologies, including those of the Internet and communication satellites. Therefore any discussion of the communication models must necessarily make it clear whether or not the Internet could affect the communication impact of such a model, and how. It would be perilous to ignore the Internet in this and similar contexts.

Regarding a suitable communication model that could be used by Botswana television, there are at least two, but both models can be effective only if the desired impact and outcomes have been researched and clarified first. One such model is the Development Support Communication, and before it can be used research must be done among the target population and ideally it should be used only where there is a need for a media blitz. But for regular television broadcasts, indigenous communication media, like Oramedia or Conversation, should be used, combined with mass media, with the support of facilities like Community Viewing Centres and electronic mail to promote interactivity and quick feedback.

CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA AND THE PLANS OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Introduction

This chapter gives a brief profile of Botswana and a short background of development since it attained independence. It touches on the institutions of government, style of development and the model of development. The new threats to development, HIV and AIDS, are also looked at in the context of how they impact on development plans. Finally the chapter focuses closely on the plans of the Ministry of Health, to see how the ministry wants to implement them and how the national TV service could be used to facilitate that implementation and improve the quality of delivery of services to rural communities. This is contrasted with what one official of the ministry said they would use the TV service for.

A BRIEF COUNTRY PROFILE

At independence in 1966, Botswana was among the 25 poorest and least developed countries in the world (Vision 2016, Towards Prosperity for All, 1997). Very few people had jobs in the formal sector. Some wealth or income was derived from traditional agriculture, particularly cattle farming and the earnings of migrant labourers who were recruited by South African mines. The country had very little social and physical infrastructure. The population was largely illiterate and very few people were able to fill professional and technical positions, either in the public or private sector. Independence came during a drought year, 1966, and drought has continued to recur throughout the 33 years since then. As a result, provision of drought relief packages to the hardest hit groups of the population has been a feature of government expenditure over the years. Some people still depend on government relief schemes for their survival. There are monthly destitute rations and a small monthly old age pension.

Independence saw the discovery and exploitation of diamonds at Orapa and Jwaneng, copper-nickel at Selebi-Phikwe, coal at Morupule, soda ash and salt at Sowa, and a number of minor mineral deposits in other parts of the country (Vision 2016, 1997)

The local diamond parastatal company, Debswana, negotiated an agreement with the De Beers transnational mining conglomerate over exploitation of diamond deposits and obtained what was and still is considered to be favourable terms for Botswana.

Concessions for the parastatal Botswana Meat Commission to export beef to the European Union led to an expansion of beef

production. There were also contributions from the international donor community.

Therefore the revenues from all the above economic activities “helped Botswana to emerge from a situation of abject poverty, and then enter a period of rapid growth and economic transformation” (Vision 2016, 1997:15).

The government was and still is the principal recipient of diamond revenues. The revenues were largely invested to improve the physical, social and economic infrastructure of the country. These revenues are also said to have also been responsible for the improvement and delivery of government services to the population, and conditions of investment in productive activities and employment creation. “As a result of this economic growth, Botswana has graduated out of the group of the poorest and the least developed countries, and has now moved into the group of middle income countries, in the World Bank classification” (Vision 2016,1997c:15).

Government

In the quest for better living conditions the government has, since independence, preached that its development philosophy was based on four national principles of self-reliance, unity, development, and democracy.

Development in Botswana is and has always been operated on the growth model of development, and since independence in 1966 to 1996 the average growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was nine percent, and it was regarded as being one of the highest in the world.

Although cattle farming was important during the early years, diamond mining gradually became the mainstay of the economy. Around 1994 and 1995 minerals accounted for 34 percent of the GDP and 81 percent of exports, while agriculture accounted for only four percent of GDP.

The assumption on the part of government has always been that growth would necessarily create employment throughout the whole economy and generally improve the living conditions of the people. But problems like employment and poverty have persisted in Botswana. In 1998, while the economy continued to record “an impressive growth rate”, unemployment was at 21 percent, and the Annual Economic Report (1998:17) which is produced by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning concluded that “the youth and the uneducated continue to be the most affected. Given that unemployment continues to be a problem, strategies to minimize it have to be formulated”. One strategy that the report recommended was to increase demand for labour through accelerated economic growth and “robust investment “. This recommendation goes back to emphasize the very growth which alone has not succeeded in solving the problem of unemployment. Another strategy that the report recommended was to slow down the rate of growth of the labour force by containing population growth. At the same time, the report admitted that population and development issues in Botswana are complex, arising primarily from the small but rapidly growing and sparsely distributed population, and rapidly transforming family and society, in combination with arid and fragile environments. In 1997 the population of Botswana was estimated at 1.5 million people.

The problems of population and employment in Botswana were highlighted again in the budget speech presented by the Minister of Finance to parliament in 1998: "Alleviation of poverty and job creation remain the major challenges in our rural development efforts".

Human Development

There appears to be a new attempt on the part of the government in its approaches to development in Botswana, an attempt to re-define development and search for new indicators of development. Increasingly, the term "human development" appears frequently in the government's development lexicon, and for the first time since independence in 1966 Botswana produced its own Human Development Report in 1997, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), an agency of the United Nations, and the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), a private economic research institute.

Previously, since 1990, Botswana used to be mentioned along with other countries in the annual global issues of the Human Development Report, which the UNDP has been producing since 1990. The annual UNDP global report tracks the performance of each country in summary form according to a common set of statistical indicators of human development and composes national rankings in relation to various composite indices of human development. The best known of these indices is the HDI, the human development index. The Botswana Human Development Report deals with Botswana in detail,

unlike in the global UNDP report. The general message of the reports is that “development is about people, not about things” (Botswana Human Development Report, 1997).

In the foreword to the Botswana Human Development Report (BHDR, 1997), the representative of the UNDP in Botswana says the concepts and measurements of human development have evolved over time. For a long time, income per capita or GNP per capita was generally accepted as a measure of standard of living in a country, despite its shortcomings. For example, GNP per capita does not take into account distribution of income, but the human development index measures income per capita, educational attainment and life expectancy.

After the introduction of annual UNDP human development reports or HDRs in 1990, there was potential for introducing HDRs within individual countries to examine the human development situations within each country in detail. The expectation was that national HDRs could adapt and localise the concept and measurement of sustainable human development to give prominence to those factors that are most important to the country concerned. The Botswana Human Development Report of 1997 was the first of its kind on the country. “The purpose of such reports is to introduce fresh thinking and empirical research on human development in Botswana, and in so doing, promote public interest and debate” (BHDR, 1997:4). Each BHDR is expected to examine a major theme of human development in Botswana and conduct an annual monitoring of progress in relation to a set of “disaggregated national development indicators”.

The theme of the 1997 BHDR is the challenges for sustainable human development in Botswana from a long-term perspective. The report talks about priorities, activities and targets that the government has established for the period 1997 to 2003 as contained in the National Development Plan No. 8, and the longer term national aims that have been identified by Vision 2016: A Long Term Vision for Botswana. The report describes the paradigm of sustainable human development, and develops conceptual tools for interpreting human development in the specific setting of Botswana. But there is no reference to the role that communication media can play in this concept of development.

One of the important contributions that Human Development Reports seem to have made to the development debate is that economic growth does not necessarily bring about progress in human development. In order for this to happen, the benefits of growth need to be widely shared among the population, particularly through the creation of jobs and through well-structured public expenditure on improved social infrastructure and services.

Other critical factors required for sustainable human development, which have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, include gender equality, popular participation in democracy and development activities and the respect and protection for people's rights and freedoms.

It would appear that although economic growth generally remained high in Botswana through the 33 years of independence at an average of nine percent, alleviation of poverty has eluded the government. A study done by the Botswana Institute of Development

Policy Analysis, BIDPA, in 1997 revealed that “poverty alleviation remains one of the major challenges for human development in Botswana. Poverty is generally associated with the lack of education, skills and other human capabilities” (BHDR, 1997:23).

Much of Botswana’s poverty is structural. It is generally rooted in Botswana’s narrow economic base and social disadvantages that are common among the poor. The poverty is concentrated in the rural areas and urban villages.

The above conclusion about the problems of poverty alleviation is corroborated by the National Population Policy document (1997:12) which says: “Despite the impressive growth in incomes resulting mainly from increases in mineral revenues, the persistence of poverty is a serious concern, especially in the face of high population growth rate”.

Rural poverty has driven a significant proportion of the rural poor to urban areas in search of non-existent job opportunities. In the case of those who end up getting some jobs, low wages often mean that they cannot escape from poverty, and “the task of bringing about improvements in their situation represents one of the major long term challenges for Botswana’s development” (BHDR, 1997d: 10).

While it is not easy to pinpoint a theory of development that explains Botswana’s approach to development, the country is nevertheless one of those peripheral African countries who are almost permanently condemned to structural underdevelopment through their

subordinate role in the world capitalist system. This description of the country places it under the dependency theory of development.

HIV and AIDS

This chapter deals with development in Botswana generally, but it also focuses on the plans of the Ministry of Health, particularly as they affect the AIDS pandemic. This ministry has been selected among others because the government, in its past and present national development plans and its annual budgets has always attached high priority to health and treats it as a precondition for development. For example, under health, the present national development plan (1997-2003) says:

The health of a country's citizens is one of the most important resources needed by a nation for the pursuit of national objectives. Health is important among the objectives and values of most individuals and they expect their governments to pursue policies that will afford them the opportunity to attain lives of optimum duration and quality (NDP 8:381)

The Ministry of Health is responsible for the control and cure of many diseases in Botswana through its different programmes, but none of the diseases has reached the level of seriousness that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has, and that is why this disease has been singled out for discussion in this thesis, the assumption being that the ministry will take advantage of the new television service to fight its spread, because the Ministry says "HIV/AIDS has become a national

emergency and its control has to be accorded the highest priority” (NDP 8:381).

This assumption is strengthened by what the Minister of Health at the time Chapson Butale said in 1998 at a consultative meeting for members of parliament on HIV/AIDS and Development held in Kasane, northern Botswana:

The primary purpose of this meeting is to create an opportunity for us as Members of Parliament to examine the implications of HIV/AIDS on the socio-economic development of our country. And to further deliberate on what could be done to lessen the impact of HIV/AIDS at all levels of our society” (Report of Consultative Meeting on HIV/AIDS, Kasane, 1998:36).

Further on the linkage between AIDS and development, when the Minister of Finance and Development presented the budget speech for the year 2 000 he said, “the HIV/AIDS pandemic has emerged as a serious challenge to the economic development of the country” (Budget Speech, February 2000).

The first case of AIDS in Botswana was diagnosed in 1985. Since then the disease has spread dramatically. A study done in 1995 estimated that about 23 percent of the population aged between 15 and 49 were HIV positive, that is about 180 000 people, up from 59 000 in 1992. It was also estimated that by the year 2000 some 332 000 people would be HIV positive, despite the problem of under-reporting. The highest rate of infection was recorded in the youth of ages 15 to 29 and in pregnant women. The disease is also growing among children aged 0 to 4 years.

The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in Botswana is linked to a number of factors that include:

- (a) multiple sexual partners and frequent change of partners;
- (b) high rate of urbanisation, leading to the erosion of traditional safeguards for controlling sexual and social behaviour;
- (c) poverty and gender biases which often disadvantage and subordinate the poor and females in sexual and social relations.

As a result:

HIV/AIDS is now the most serious threat to human development in Botswana. It is generally appreciated that the pandemic will provide a major setback, not only in terms of people's health and survival, but also for the economy, the country and human resource base, the family and the country's children (BHDR,1997e:39)

It is now expected that there is going to be a significant increase in infant mortality. The highest risk age group are young children aged five and younger, who are estimated to account for 25 to 35 percent of all AIDS victims. For some, it is due to transmission from infected mothers to their infants in the womb.

Another fear is that higher adult deaths will deplete the labour force and cause many households to lose one or two of their family providers. In short, one of the most devastating effects of AIDS is the number of children being left without parental care. It was estimated that by the year 2000 there would be some 65 000 AIDS orphans in Botswana, and this would place additional stress on communities as

young adults die and young and old people are left without support and care (BHDR,1997).

While in several pronouncements the government sounds like it is ready to battle the spread of HIV, in the Population Policy document it seems to acquiesce because it says: “the goal to achieve adequate health care for all is likely to be made more difficult by the prevailing high fertility and the attendant young structure of the population coupled with the recent surge in the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (1997:14). This is in sharp contrast to the optimism expressed in Vision 2016 (1997:9), which says by the year 2016 the spread of HIV will have been stopped, and there would be no new infections (if a cure would not have been found before then).

The above paragraph shows that to a large extent policy makers in Botswana seem to be overwhelmed by the incidence of HIV/AIDS, and therefore unsure about what to do in order to stop its rapid spread and to cushion its devastating impact on the lives of the people and the economy.

The pivotal government ministry is the Ministry of Health, and its development plans should be studied carefully with a view to finding out how the planners are going to try to use the new national TV service to fight health problems in the country, especially HIV/AIDS.

The Plans of the Ministry of Health

The Ministry of Health is charged with the responsibility of implementing health programmes throughout the whole of Botswana,

in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government when it comes to programmes that are meant for the rural districts.

The point of departure of the Ministry of Health on health programmes in the rural areas is the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 which was made at a conference in Russia that year at which the member countries of the World Health Organisation committed themselves to setting up development programmes to prevent ill-health and attain productive health through primary health care strategies (NDP 8, 1997-2003). The declaration sees health as a human right and a necessity if all citizens are to lead an economically and socially productive life. Naturally, improvement in health care will, to a large extent, depend on inputs from other sectors like education, water, sanitation, the community and the traditional health system.

The Ministry of Health is responsible for policy direction and for providing technical guidance. It also operates a network of 20 public hospitals around the country, and through its primary health care department collaborates with local authorities. It also runs a network of 209 clinics, 314 health posts and 687 mobile stops. The number of some of these facilities increases every year.

The strategy of the ministry emphasizes equity and intersectoral collaboration and community involvement in setting priorities for action, planning, organising and managing health care.

The national health policy was developed and approved by government in 1995, and it defines the roles and responsibilities of various providers of primary health care services.

Pattern of ill-health

According to the plans of the ministry (NDP 8, 1997-2003), the pattern of ill-health in Botswana shows a decline in the importance of childhood immunisable diseases and an increase in non-communicable diseases. Infectious diseases remain the main causes of ill-health and death. Non-communicable diseases, which are associated with changes in life-style from an agricultural economy to a cash economy, are also becoming more serious. They are related mainly to a change in diet and to a more sedentary life. They are diseases such as hypertension, stroke, and diabetes. There is also an observation that the gap in health status between the rich and the poor is growing.

Given the tasks that the ministry has to accomplish using both the financial and human resources at its disposal, it has an opportunity to make those tasks easier by using the new TV service to support their implementation. Some of the programmes that could be produced will be dealt with in the conclusion to this chapter.

Interview with Director of Primary Health Care:

Winnie Manyeneng

In 1998 the author interviewed the Director of Primary Health Care, Winnie Manyeneng, to check the state of readiness of her ministry to use TV service in the implementation of health programmes. She made the following points:

- she was not sure if TV was coming because if it was, the Department of Information and Broadcasting would have briefed them about it so that they could prepare themselves to use it, but that department had not done that.
- If TV was coming, then her ministry would not be ready with people who were trained in TV programme production.
- If they were to train people in 1999 in programme production it could happen only as an emergency because they did not have anything in their plans about television and no budget.
- She mentioned a short list of programme ideas that could be turned into TV programmes, but it was all hypothetical as there were no plans.

The assumption here is that the Health Ministry itself should actually deliver the programming, as opposed to commissioning it for example, as it is done in some countries, like in South Africa where the Education Department pays the SABC to do the education programming. There seemed to be no sign that she had considered other possible ways, beyond direct delivery, to use TV in her strategic tasks. In other words, the Ministry does not seem to have thought of other ways of sourcing programmes, nor of the context in which health workers and community viewing centres could be harnessed to make for impact of programmes.

Conclusion

The plans of the Ministry of Health show that it has tasks and programmes that can be translated into TV programmes as well as a

development communication model potential, but the state of readiness, or rather the lack of it, casts a serious doubt on whether the ministry is going to be in a position to utilise the TV service to implement its health assignments. There appears to be a wide communication gap between officials of the ministry and those of the TV project implementation team at the Department of Information and Broadcasting, concerning the TV project and how any ministry should prepare for it if it wants to utilise its services. Also problematic is how communication about the TV project was handled by the Minister of Health who was a member of the cabinet that decided in March 1997 that the country should have a national TV service. For almost two years after the decision was taken the ministry did not do anything to find out more about the TV service with a view to using it to support implementation of health plans. Similarly, there was no evidence that the department charged with the responsibility of implementing the TV project had at any time organised any briefing for the ministry on the TV service.

An analysis of the plans of the ministry as laid out in the National Development Plan (1997-2003) shows that there is television programme material in those plans. For example:

- (a) the ministry has identified that a more sedentary life-style could lead to cardio-vascular diseases. A TV programme could be produced showing the type of physical exercises that people could do to improve their health and lessen the chances of getting such diseases.

- (b) Village Health Committees or VHCs that have been set up throughout the country have organized various competitions in the past to promote good health and are well placed to make input into TV programmes so that such activities can be made into TV programmes. During the broadcast of such programmes some members of the committee could sit among the audience so that they can discuss the content of programmes at the end of the broadcast and generally help the audience to make sense of the broadcasts.
- (c) The health education unit of the ministry which collaborates with several NGOs to develop health-learning materials can demonstrate on TV how the materials should be used.
- (d) The safe childhood programme, which is promoted through schools, can be packaged into a series of TV programmes so that more schools can see it. The teachers at such schools would be better placed to discuss the programmes with the pupils at the end of the broadcasts. A similar approach could be used for materials that deal with immunisation.
- (e) The ministry admits that the level of contraceptive use has remained the same for the last decade, but “the causes of this levelling off are not known, but it is obvious that innovative ways of delivering family planning services have to be found in order to increase the levels of contraceptive usage” (NDP 8, 1997-2003:391).

This one requires a media blitz that includes intensive research that includes TV interviews and debates to find the cause.

- (f) From time to time the ministry runs in-service courses to train Family Welfare Educators to mobilise communities to use modern health care systems and improve their well being through health education. The costs of this training and implementation could be cut by giving some of the training to members of already existing Village Health Committees who live among the communities, then producing TV programmes for reception by the communities and those members of the Village Health Committees who have been given some training.
- (g) Immunization coverage for BCG and measles dropped during 1980s and the ministry has attributed this drop to problems of the long distances to vaccination sites, inadequate information and lack of motivation for mothers. TV could be used to step-up the flow of information and motivate mothers, again using Village Health Committees to promote interactivity.
- (h) The Ministry has trained AIDS counsellors, a voluntary counselling and testing centre, a home-based care programme and clinicians. Under information and communication the plan says “the challenge for NDP 8 is to intensify efforts to reduce risk taking attitudes” and this would be done through targeted messages based on audience analysis disseminated through “appropriate channels”. One of the channels must now be television, to deliver all that is in the plan to a national audience.

To a large extent, all that has been said above about the use of television shall depend on the level of preparedness and willingness of

the managers at the ministry to take advantage of the television service.

CHAPTER 6

TELEVISION PLANS AS ROLLED OUT

Introduction

This chapter discusses the plans of the television project as they unfolded. In particular, it examines and discusses the content of the correspondence that the Department of Information and Broadcasting wrote to the Office of the President and some ministries seeking guidance and clarification on how it should implement the TV project, and the content of a project memorandum that followed thereafter which describes the nature of the project. The process of setting up a team that was charged with the implementation of the project is also discussed. There is also the gist of an interview with the head of the implementation team who was recruited from the United Kingdom for the purpose.

The aim of all this is to examine the participants' thinking of the project to find out more about its conceptualisation. This should help throw some light onto the central question of the thesis: that is, whether the service was conceptualised to contribute to rural development, particularly in the area of health and in the light of the battle against the AIDS disease.

The Three Scenarios

Following the decision of the cabinet of March 1997 that Botswana should have its own television service, and that the project should be implemented by the government Department of Information and Broadcasting, the director of that department in response and apparently to clarify the nature of the assignment for himself and his department in general, wrote a letter to the permanent secretary to the President, under whose office the department falls, seeking guidance on how best to implement the project. The letter was also copied to the Director of Public Service Management who is responsible for allocating manpower to departments and ministries of government, and to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning whose ministry allocates funds for development projects as well as funds for the cost of running the projects once they have been completed.

The letter put forward three different scenarios that the department could use to implement the TV project and sought the opinion and advice of those ministries (Letter: 9 April 97)

The first scenario involved presenting a project memorandum to the funding ministry requesting funds to implement a project using its own manpower. The second was for government to engage consultants to implement the project and hand it to the department. The third and last scenario was that of setting up an implementation

unit “solely tasked with all aspects of the project”. This is the scenario that was preferred by the department. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and the Office of the President also preferred the same scenario, and it is the one that was finally approved by the government. No public justification was supplied as to why this was the preferred scenario.

The responsibilities of the project implementation team were going to be to introduce a TV service within the Department of Information and Broadcasting. The project entailed:

- building and developing a news and current affairs TV service that would be received countrywide;
- identifying other sources of affordable programmes that could complement news and current affairs;
- ensuring high quality standards for the service which should be set on a sound business plan and good operational concepts based on a sustainable vision;
- monitoring the project’s budget and cost control procedures;
- informing government about problems that may cause unnecessary delays and cost escalations;
- ensuring that the project is executed within budget and is on target, employing state of the art practices right from the inception of the project, and making sure that up to date satellite and computer technology “is extensively used”.

There is no notion whatsoever in the project memorandum that other departments of government had an interest in the project and should have been involved.

The implementation unit could use short-term consultants whenever necessary. Staff for the TV service would be recruited mainly from Botswana university graduates.

The Co-ordinator Arrives

A project co-ordinator, Kevin Hunt, was eventually recruited from the United Kingdom and arrived in Botswana to assume duties in October 1997. He had worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC. After being in post for a few weeks and after studying and making sense of the relevant documentation, including the cabinet decision that Botswana should have its own TV service, he interpreted the whole situation to himself and wrote to the director of Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene:

The nub of all of this is that it was agreed that the nation should invest in a television service, notwithstanding its fiscal unviability, because it is perceived as bringing great benefit to the nation as a whole- a point of view with which I agree (Internal Memo 5 March 1998).

He noted that the cost of providing the initial service, including a news studio, and administration block, one Outside Broadcasting van, satellite communications equipment, some limited transmitters, had been estimated at 25 million Pula or 32 million Rand. As co-ordinator,

Hunt apparently perceived this as a rather too small a project at too high a cost, and said:

It is very clear to me that, with a little more imagination and a somewhat increased expenditure, we can provide a much better long term infrastructure and initial service than has been envisaged.

The increased expenditure would make it possible for the service to offer such programming as education, sport, discussion, music and drama, all produced "at relatively little extra cost". This meant that the project was changing in scope. The cost was now going to go up, from 25 to 60 million Pula or 78 million Rand. The co-ordinator concluded:

In short, I am confident that what I have in mind and the resultant recommendations are well matched to the country's requirement and expectations for this long awaited project.

In line with what Hunt had in mind the Department of Information and Broadcasting submitted a project memorandum to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning for 72 million Pula. The memorandum describes the project as "a practical TV structure that is not too big or complex but which will be cost-effective in the long term and capable of accommodating future growth in programming". It further says the TV station will be capable of broadcasting other programmes from other sources to complement the initial news and current affairs concept and will be run and developed commercially, "carrying adverts, promotions and leasing studio and technical facilities to the market".

There is no explanation in the project memorandum as to why news and current affairs were deemed priorities as opposed to

education or documentaries for instance. No other programmes were mentioned specifically.

Regarding signal transmission, the memorandum says the department was planning to lease space on the Pan American Satellite Seven (Pan AmSat 7). Justifying the choice and preference for satellite over traditional terrestrial methods of signal transmission the department says in the memorandum:

- the entire country will be covered for both television and radio from day one, allowing direct reception to individual households throughout Botswana. Satellite receivers and antennae dishes are already available in the country for people to purchase.
- Satellite signal distribution is more flexible when compared to other modes of distribution, eg: microwave and fibre optic. Besides, “satellites are the state of the art in the broadcasting industry and to this end the majority of broadcasters in the region as well as worldwide are either already using or planning to use satellite communications” (Project Memo,1998:2)

On training, the project memorandum says training was critical and would have to run in parallel with the construction of the system and complex “if we are to meet the very tight deadline”. Training would be given in news and current affairs production techniques, equipment operation and maintenance, lighting, sound and others. The same staff would be expected over time to gain experience such that they would be able to produce other programmes of attraction to the viewers.

There was no hint on whether the programmes that were expected to be produced should have any bearing on development.

Expectations

The expectations of the Office of the President and that of the Department of Information and Broadcasting, as outlined in the project memorandum, are that TV coverage of local events, depicting Botswana's cultural background with a selection of international events "will hopefully fertilise the ground for growth of cultural institutions in the country, and as a result TV could facilitate national integration and unity and stimulate economic activity through advertising and promotions". It was also their expectation that improved transmission coverage via satellite would make it easier for viewers throughout the country to access good quality signals and as a result benefit from "valuable information" on national events and aspects related to the implementation of government policies and programmes carried over Botswana television and Radio Botswana. The idea was that radio would also be accessible through satellite but its existing terrestrial transmission infrastructure would continue as usual.

The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning agreed to the request to fund the project and gave the department 72 million Pula. This figure did not include the cost of training, and a few months later the department came back and requested funds for training a staff of 80 to 100 people. It was given 8 million Pula as requested.

Training would comprise a mixture of local foundation and assessment courses, spread over some four months in 1998, with a key overseas course lasting six months for 20 trainees, two or more from each key discipline, covering journalism, technical operations, editing, production, engineering, lighting, camera work, sound mixing, graphic design, library and media management. Additional training for the remaining recruits would take place in southern Africa.

Interview: Project Co-ordinator—Kevin Hunt

Kevin Hunt was asked to describe the kind of television service that he thought Botswana was going to have, and he said he hoped the country would get:

a very comprehensive television service, one that informs, educates and entertains. There will be only one channel. So I hope we'll provide a real mix of programming. It will be very much news-based to begin with, which is the brief which we have. There'll be a high education content. But it must be entertaining to attract the audience.

He said he had difficulty answering the question of who was going to watch Botswana television as he had been in the country for only six months. But he said he hoped anybody who had a satellite dish would be able to watch it as it would be direct-to-home, off the satellite. If one was in Gaborone city in the south or Francistown city in the north of the country, then it would be terrestrially transmitted on ordinary aerial as well, and they were looking into ways of re-transmitting from the satellite into large areas with a thousand people or more, perhaps using solar energy. He was not sure how people in those areas would

view the programmes though, saying perhaps some would use a car-battery for their power:

I think people will look for a way to watch television. But if we can provide a central point, perhaps in some communities, in the village hall or 'kgotla' or whatever, where people can watch television, perhaps that's an answer as well. There's lots of work to do on that one.

A 'kgotla' is a traditional meeting place in a village where issues of importance to the community, except party politics, are discussed, and anybody has a right to contribute to the discussion.

Hunt was not sure whether Botswana TV was the kind of service that could be used for rural development, but he said he hoped it could:

I would very much hope so. Obviously that is a major part of Botswana culture and way of life. One of the things that television is going to do is to change this radically. It has done that everywhere in the world and it's bound to do it here, especially if it is indigenous television, and not imported American television, nor South African television, nor British television, or whatever it is.

Initially, Botswana TV would be scheduled to broadcast for five hours each day, with additional hours of broadcast at weekends to accommodate sporting events.

Some people in Botswana have watched South African television for many years, both SABC and M-NET, and when BTV goes on air it would find nearly all these people still watching these channels. It would have to compete with those channels for the local national audience. It shall therefore to a large extent depend on the attractiveness of its programmes.

When asked to comment on how attractive he thought BTV programmes were going to be Hunt said:

Let's get this clear. We the team are not here to make programmes. We are here to facilitate Batswana making programmes. So what we will do is to help and encourage that they are made as professionally as possible, technically speaking, but how they will actually produce the programmes, how they write them, will be very much down to the local workforce. So at the end of the day the quality of programming will come from that process, and we will do everything we can. And I don't see why BTV should not be as good as any other TV in the world, as opposed to as bad as any other TV in the world.

On training, Hunt said his office had advertised widely throughout Botswana. They sent out 5 000 application forms and 2 000 people applied. They interviewed the applicants and everyone that they selected went through a four-week aptitude course. They wanted to end up with 80 to 100 people out of the 2 000. They expected one or two people to drop out. "We hope we have chosen the right people because we don't have time to lose people". The plan was that after the aptitude course trainees would go on a variety of other courses. Some would go on "a very expensive and intensive course, about 10 or 20 people, almost certainly in the UK". The others would be trained somewhere in the SADC region. Hunt's office formulated the courses and advertised for quotations to meet their specifications. The advertisements for prospective trainees said one should have a diploma, and it did not matter in which discipline, and he explained:

...unless you happen to want to be an engineer, then you need a technical background. But for any other job in television we are really looking for people who want to do it, with a creative input.

We hope they can take tuition and learn. We are looking for the very best people that Botswana can provide.

Conclusion

A careful study of the written communication that went back and forth between the director of the Department of Information and Broadcasting and the project co-ordinator suggests that the co-ordinator influenced the director to change the scope of the TV project and make it bigger than it was originally conceived and as was presented to the cabinet. It is difficult to say whether this was a good or a bad thing. What one can say is that the project definitely changed scope and its estimated total cost increased from 25 to 80 million Pula, an increase of 55 million Pula, which is almost three times the original figure. As a result, the TV station, at least the building, was obviously going to be a lot bigger than the news and current affairs outfit that it was originally meant to be. The manpower figures, 80 to 100 people, do also tell a story of a bigger project. About programme output, one should expect the same, that it should no longer be just news and current affairs.

But there is a real danger that this increased capacity is going to remain idle because the TV project co-ordinator has admitted that he and his implementation team had neither involved nor briefed other ministries and departments, nor the private sector in the TV project and how they were expected to fit in it so that they could prepare themselves for participation in programme production, or provision via

commissioned or sponsored material, or creative interventions in community viewing contexts.

Technically, and according to the broadcasting engineer of the department, Habuji Sosome, in an interview with the author, the station as conceived has technical capacity to broadcast 24 hours a day (Interview, 16th May 2000).

CHAPTER 7

ASSESSMENT OF THE TV PROJECT

Unlike governments in many independent African countries, the government of Botswana took many years, about 31, after independence from Britain in 1966, before it introduced a television service. There are not many reasons why this was so, except the one main reason that runs through the letters of official correspondence about a TV service for the country, which was that if it were to be introduced, only a few people would have had the financial capacity to afford a TV set and the majority in the rural areas would not be able to watch it at all as the rural areas had not yet been electrified.

Besides, in the light of the scanty resources that were available television was seen as a luxury, which the economy could not afford. But radio broadcasting was perceived as an important tool for development, and this perception was reinforced by the conclusions of the Hughes Report of 1968, which is discussed in Chapter 2.

But 31 years after independence, in 1997, the government decided on the introduction of television in Botswana. Although the reasons for not introducing it seemed strong, the reasons for introducing it did not seem equally strong.

It is not clear whether the government wanted Botswana to have a television service simply because it had become one of the only few countries remaining in Africa that did not have one, or whether because TV would help create Botswana's own heroes and heroines,

or any number of additional reasons. Since the liberation of South Africa in 1994 black South Africans who appeared on South African television which is viewed widely in Botswana had become household names and had in some sense become heroes and heroines of many people in Botswana. Such South Africans were often invited to Botswana, especially to the capital city Gaborone to launch or to officiate at national events. Another possibility is that the government wanted its ministers and senior officials to be seen on the TV screen because they were generally not known very much and instead it was the South African ones that were known better in Botswana. The last possibility is that perhaps the government thought television would create some employment and assist development by exhortation as people in one part of the country saw others on television applauded for their achievements in their rural development projects, they would envy them and work hard at their own projects so that they too could be applauded on television one day, and in this way contribute to rural development.

One has to say this because as the television project was nearing completion as regards the TV building, the reason for having a television service seemed to move away farther and farther into the distance. This is the point at which one was expecting to see at least a blueprint for a programme schedule. But there were none except rough ideas from the project co-ordinator, ideas that some programmes would be produced locally and others imported. He had no idea regarding the percentages of foreign as opposed to locally produced programmes.

When the decision was made by the Botswana cabinet in 1997 to have a TV service, it was simply said that the project would be implemented by the Department of Information and Broadcasting, without any stipulation regarding how this was going to be done, and there is no evidence to show that the decision-makers themselves understood the implications of what they were saying. But after several scenarios were suggested by the director of Information and Broadcasting regarding what he thought would be the appropriate implementation scenario, which was an implementation unit set up within his department, there was a problem of how to recruit the right staff for the task of implementation. This problem seems to have arisen because no one was sure what the different tasks for implementing such a project were. As a result everything was left to the project co-ordinator Kevin Hunt of the UK. Many of the problems that plagued the project later were blamed on him.

From the various criticisms made, it would appear that the main source of Hunt's problems was that he was not qualified for a project of that magnitude. He also admitted in the interview, which is discussed in Chapter 5 that he had never implemented a project of that type before. Besides, the Director of Information and Broadcasting, Ted Makgekgenene (Interview: 29 May 2000) admitted that Hunt was the wrong person for the project and he (Makgekgenene) had made this clear in a meeting with the panel that considered applications for that job and that his own objections were on record in the form of minutes of that meeting. Nonetheless, he was overruled by the Department of Public Service Management, the government's employment agency.

It was now up to the team leader to recruit the rest of the team. He did. But another team, the TV Reference Group of permanent secretaries that had been meeting for some four years in the Office of the President to discuss the politics and economics for and against the introduction of a TV service was no longer there. It had quietly either disbanded or fallen into abeyance without explanation or announcement for no apparent reason. This is the team that should have guided Hunt through the process of implementing the project and served as a support for his team.

One of the recommendations that the ITU consultants made in the report of their feasibility study on the introduction of a TV service in Botswana was that, if the government decided to establish a television service, one of its most important and urgent tasks would be to lay down strong and clear policy guidelines, because without such policy the development of the service would be hampered and the service would be unable to function as it should (p.295). This was not done.

Another document that would perhaps have helped Hunt is Vision 2016: Towards Prosperity for All, a document that contains a summary of the aspirations of the people of Botswana and would give anyone charged with the responsibility of implementing such and similar projects in Botswana, a rough idea of the direction the nation said it wanted to take. During one interview with the author (July 1998), Hunt said he had not been made aware of Vision 2016; he had not been briefed on the role that the TV service was meant to fulfil. He said he hoped Botswana TV could contribute to rural development, but the role of the media in development had not featured in any of the

discussions that he had had with government officials on the TV service that he had been recruited to set up.

One of the first steps that Hunt took when he arrived was to change the scope of the project.

The director of the Department of Information and Broadcasting would not explain why the scope of the project had been changed (Interview: July 1998). As a result the writer sent nine written questions to the Office of the President, including this one question, and the answer was:

With the arrival of the project team it became clear that the estimates provided earlier as well as facilities were too modest. More realistic estimates and detailed assessment of infrastructure were done through experienced staff in the team (June 25, 1999).

It is difficult to say what this meant. At best it could mean that permanent secretaries at the Office of the President and the director of Information and Broadcasting agreed to the change in the scope of the project because they assumed that “experienced staff in the team” knew what they were talking about and they had put all their faith in the team. At worst it could mean that “the original estimates” were not based on any criterion for calculating the cost of the project. There is no evidence of any debate having taken place on the wisdom or otherwise of changing the scope of the project.

This change in the scope of the project emerged as one of the sources of the problems of the project, because it meant the project took longer to implement than anticipated. Neither the project

implementers nor officials of the Office of the President fully understood the full import and ramifications of the change, both in financial and manpower terms. It meant that the total estimated cost of the project was going to go up and more people recruited for the running of the whole station.

The execution of the project had several problems including a labour strike at the construction site, which is not relevant to be discussed here. But the one problem that seem to have weakened the team was the departure of the senior project producer, a certain David Millard, who had also come from the UK and who left after four months in Botswana and returned to the UK, allegedly because of bitter disagreement with the project co-ordinator Hunt on the manner in which the TV project should be implemented. Millard was also said to have written a damning report to Botswana's Vice President Ian Khama raising serious doubts about Hunt's qualifications to head the TV project (The Botswana Guardian, 3 December 1999, p.1) This and other allegations and rumour caused concern among the people of Botswana generally and the private media, leading one journalist to comment in the same issue of the newspaper:

The myth that all is well at Botswana's multi-million Pula television may have been sustained on lies, lack of transparency and non-disclosure of true facts by senior government officials behind the project (p.1).

Later in March 2 000 after the TV service had failed to meet another commencing date, another Botswana weekly newspaper

commented: "Botswana TV will be a huge, wasteful and embarrassing project" (Mmegi Monitor, Vol.1 No.2, 7-13 March 2000, p.25).

There had been too much silence about what was going on with the TV project. Even when the budget meeting of parliament was on in February to April 2 000 very little was said about the project, except that some MPs complained that the expenditure on the TV project should not have been lumped together with that of the whole Department of Information and Broadcasting because they could not see what the TV project was costing, and one MP complained about what he called the recruitment of an expatriate co-ordinator for Botswana TV who had no experience for the job (Botswana Daily News, February 29, p.3). As the author of this study sat through the debate in parliament, he did not get the impression that MPs knew anything about the TV project because the few comments that were made amounted to anxiety about what the project was really about and when the station would go on air.

Hunt is dismissed

One surprising development that happened at the TV project was the dismissal of the project co-ordinator himself. The dismissal became front-page news in the local news media, including one article headlined: "Hunt sacked—but the future of Botswana TV continues to be shrouded in mystery" (The Botswana Gazette, Wednesday 29 March 2 000, p.1).

No one in government was ready to explain why the co-ordinator had been sacked. The director of Information and Broadcasting said

very little too (Interview, 2nd June 2 000). He said there had been complaints about Hunt's management of the TV implementation programme from the people that Hunt worked with and the dismissal was also connected with the contents of an audit report on the project that had been done by an accounting firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which had blamed Hunt for cost-overruns and general mismanagement of the project. He also said although the TV building was about to be completed there was no one to run the TV service as Hunt had not put any management structure in place. He said it had emerged that all the time Hunt had concentrated on the TV building, equipment and furniture, and had paid very little attention to the TV service itself.

As a result the Government of Botswana had decided to appeal to the management of the British Broadcasting Corporation in the UK to come quickly and rescue the project and "put it on track".

There were also problems with training. Some 65 people spent some four months at the Broadcast Centre of BOP TV in Mafikeng, South Africa, supposedly training for BTV, but no actual training took place. According to their trainer, Rob Gray, who had been recruited from South Africa for the purpose, it became impossible for him to train 65 people virtually alone in different TV skills and without facilities (Interview, 22 May 2 000). He said the BOP TV facility that had been rented for use by Botswana television trainees had no suitable equipment for the purpose. The trainees themselves say they spent most of their four months there idling, and they even wrote a letter of complaint to the director of the department back home in Botswana about what was happening to them. In one of their jointly signed letters

the trainees say they wanted to make him aware that “the training programme has been wrought with a lot of problems since it started”.

They also made the following points:

- the office of the TV project co-ordinator in Botswana did not do its homework regarding how the television crew should be trained, they employed a trainer with the expectation that he would do everything
- the mass hiring of people without taking into consideration their specific training needs created a problem of how to proceed with the training
- because of lack of a clear course outline it has been difficult to accommodate new trainees immediately into the training programme

After the trainees had returned to Botswana from Mafikeng in South Africa, they wrote a letter to their trainer this time, Rob Gray, who had now been designated Senior Project Producer about their impressions regarding his performance (Letter: 27 February 2 000), and they made the following observations:

- since we have had you as our trainer in Mafikeng and now as senior project producer, there is no single locally produced programme ready for broadcast when the station goes on air
- because of the confusion that is currently brewing in the production section we do not know where we stand; we are

appealing to you to resolve the situation as soon as possible so that we can get on with our work

- trainees in the graphic section had been promised that they would go for attachments in South Africa to work with a company there but things have been quiet regarding that issue
- there has been insufficient training of editors in areas such as basic theories and principles of editing.

According to the trainees, none of the letters were replied to in writing. There was only general and vague talk in some management meetings about some of the issues that they had raised and the questions that they had asked.

What is difficult to fathom is how in the first place the trainees were transported to South Africa for this training without a thorough assessment of the training facilities having been done first, as well as who was going to do the training and how. As the situation stands at BTV the staff have not been properly trained. The senior producer Rob Gray said “we take 20 hours to edit a 15-minute programme”.

Some two weeks after Kevin Hunt had been ejected from his job the writer interviewed him on the telephone on the eve of his departure for the UK about why he had been dismissed from the TV project (4th May 2 000). According to Hunt, his implementation team had created “a fantastic TV station. And as far as we know we got it right”. He explained that one of the problems that he had had when he arrived in Botswana to start his assignment was that for at least six months

nobody in government really supported the TV project, including the minister in the Office of the President who was responsible for the media, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, and he could not understand why that was. His team tried to implement the project with very little help and a lot of delays, "I would spent hours just trying to get a driver". Another problem was that he had heard of "a thing" called the TV Reference Group and that his team was going to be having regular meetings with to help and guide his team in the implementation of the project, "but we never had a single meeting with the TV Reference Group".

It is not clear why Hunt was dismissed from the project. He said he did not get any explanation apart from the allegations that were made in the audit report done by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which he said, was "completely fabricated". He said he was not called to any meeting to be told that he would have to go, even by his overall supervisor, the director of Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene: "Ted did not speak to me. He just gave me an envelope with a letter in it. There is no reason for pinning me to the wall and then getting the BBC to do what I have already done. You see, the problem is that there is no problem".

In May 2 000 Hunt presented part of his case in a short letter that was published in a Botswana weekly newspaper (Mmegi Monitor, 16-22 May, p.13). In the letter Hunt says after he had written to the Office of the President repudiating what he called "extremely serious allegations" against him that had been made in the audit report, "the Botswana Government, for reasons best known to itself decided to completely ignore my response, choosing instead, without any kind of dialogue or hearing, to arbitrarily terminate my contract".

Following his departure, or because of his departure rather, the Botswana television service project was back at the beginning. This fact is also demonstrated by the nature of the terms of reference that the Government of Botswana has given to the leader of the BBC team, Simon Higman, who has now been officially designated Acting General Manager of BTV. He was assigned “to undertake a wide-ranging review of BTV in terms of its strategy, finance, programming and operations”.

Some of the details listed under this broad mandate are:

- the legislative and regulatory framework for broadcasting (including employment issues)
- exploration of new channel vision and editorial policy
- hours of broadcasting
- management roles and responsibilities
- expectations of income from all sources, start-up funding and opportunities for generating further sources of income
- BTV’s cost-base and running costs
- operating business plan to deliver its editorial policy strategy
- proposed mix of locally produced and imported programmes
- possible alliances with other broadcasters to share news material
- recruitment and training needs of editorial and operational staff
- capacity of broadcasting plant, and
- long term support in terms of both local staffing and from the BBC.

Nearly all of these are things that should have been done long before the project was started in 1998, even before Hunt was recruited. It is

therefore difficult to believe that they were all precipitated by his departure when he had at least two immediate supervisors, the director of Information and Broadcasting and the permanent secretary in the Office of the President who is responsible for administration.

An interview with Higman by a local newspaper does underline the fact that Kevin Hunt concentrated only on the building and the equipment:

Hunt built a lot of technology without considering what he was going to do with it. And at times he brought in some of the technology which he does not even need. Our conclusion is that he was technology-driven, while my programme is editorially driven. All our work should depend on output and looking at history. Hunt's programme has not taken off. Yes, of course he came up with a building which I think is probably over specified. It is a nice building though, and everyone will die for it.

(Mmegi/The Reporter, 9-15 June 2000, p.6)

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this thesis is that Botswana has missed a great opportunity to have a television service that could be used to contribute to rural development, particularly in the area of health, a service that could have been used to battle the AIDS disease, among other things. Perhaps greater opportunities might have been there had resources gone into radio, school programmes, or other strategies to promote health development. However, inasmuch as a decision was made to spend money on TV, this represented a resource that could have been utilized.

Further research could be done in order to establish the actual situation.

The opportunity for Botswana to have an appropriate TV service was there because in the first place, the country decided to introduce a television service at a time when there already existed in the region already a lot of expertise in the setting up and running of a TV service and within the CBA, the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association of which Botswana is a member.

Those in government who had an idea of what a television service was about do not seem to have advised appropriately, and did not open up the debate and allow advice from those in the region who had run television stations to make a contribution. Advice was not sought from universities in the region who could also have contributed

to the debate and the conceptualisation of an ideal TV service for Botswana given its dilemma of high economic growth and serious problems of poverty. The argument here is that if advice had been actively sought, the present abyss into which the project has fallen could have been sidestepped. As a result the nation has lost money with nothing to show for it, and it is going to continue to lose money on this project but it is not aware. It is not aware because members of parliament, including those in the opposition, have not actively sought information on the TV project before it was started with a view to monitoring its implementation programme and problems.

The Ministry of Health, which is one of the ministries that could have benefited immensely and immediately from a TV service has missed a great opportunity because as the new Minister of Health Joy Phumaphi explained, management at the Department of Information and Broadcasting had made it very clear that they would not be in a position to assist her ministry regarding programme production for television (Interview, 12 May 2000). She said she had hoped that management at that department would brief them on the TV project and generally guide them on how they should fit into the planning of the service but this did not happen. In the absence of this assistance her ministry had decided to engage a private video-production company to do a documentary and advertisements on health problems in Botswana, and some of her ministry staff were working with the company with the hope that they would pick up some production skills and continue to produce similar television products for her ministry. The Educational Broadcasting Unit of the Ministry of Education had also sought similar assistance and they also got a similar

response. The project-co-ordinator had admitted that his team and the management of the department of Information and Broadcasting had not assisted any government ministry to prepare itself for the expected television service (Interview: July 1998).

The private sector, according to one senior producer at the TV station was “pestering” them everyday with questions about the cost of producing promotional material and advertisements for their businesses but they had no answers.

It has also become clear that even the overall supervisor of the TV project, the Director of Information and Broadcasting Ted Makgekgenene had all the time not known what was involved in the TV programme sales market. In an article he wrote for the government-owned Botswana Daily News he confessed:

It was not until I went to Sithenge- the Film TV programmes market in Cape Town, South Africa early this year that I learnt a bit more about television programme acquisition. This buying and selling of television programmes is a big business and Sithenge was an eye opener for me.

(Botswana Daily News, Feb.23, 2000 NO.36 p.4)

One would have expected this and similar articles in a national newspaper from someone in his position to have appeared during the debates on whether or not Botswana should have a national TV service and not a few months before the station was scheduled to go on air. It would be a completely different matter if he were not in a position to make final decisions on such matters as programme acquisition.

In the circumstances, one of the best options would be for public broadcasting in Botswana would be to break out of the political enclave and administrative strait-jacket of a civil service department, and become a parastatal at least, so that it can make business decisions with the urgency that business normally requires, and employ people because of their talent and not because of political considerations which is normally the case when it comes to high positions in government. Government civil service regulations will suffocate Botswana television, assuming that it can be resurrected.

The Botswana television service is stillborn. There has been an incredible lack of professional and intellectual capacity to conceptualise any television service at all, let alone a television service suitable for Botswana. What started in 1997 as a television service project ended up in 2000 only as a nice building, and what should have been a team of trained programme producers became good people still waiting to be trained.

Therefore the present TV station, or TV building rather, can be used only as a national video-cassette-player, whereby management can obtain videocassettes on any subject from any part of the world and play it for the nation, until such time that a real TV service for Botswana has been conceptualised and put in place.

The arrival in Botswana in May 2000 of the team from the British Broadcasting Corporation in London to rescue the television project should be seen as marking the beginning in earnest of the TV service project, now that the building has been completed and now that someone has remembered a television service. This assumes that the BBC team has capacity to do that.

The story of what happened or not happened to or about the project to set up a national television service for Botswana needs to be dug out, perhaps by a presidential commission of enquiry in order to find out what happened to the taxpayers' money, and why at the end of it all there was only a building full of equipment and many people on the payroll who were not being used, and no television service.

In this thesis I have looked at theories of development and models of media in development, the manner in which Botswana TV was conceptualised, and at the same time at Botswana's development needs and health situation. In measuring the development of Botswana against these possibilities, needs and potentials, I have observed that there was a regrettable shortfall. I have therefore concluded that to the extent that the Government of Botswana had assumptions that if Botswana were to have its own television service the service could contribute to development, the assumptions were not public and certainly not evident in the execution of the television project.

Bibliography

Books and Journals

Bosompra, Kwadwo (1987) "Sources of Health Information Among Rural Dwellers in Africa: A case study of two Ghanaian Villages" in Africa Media Review Vol.1 No.2

Brohman, John (1996) Popular Development: rethinking the Theory and Practice of Development. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Bryman, Alan. 1988. Quantity and Quality in Social research. London, UK: Unwin Hyman Ltd.

Burns, Tom. 1977. The BBC: Public Institution and private World. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Emenyeonu, Bernard (1995) "Media Uses and Gratifications: A Review" in Africa Media Review. Vol.9 No.3.

Hughes, A. J. (1968) Report on The Information Functions of Government. Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Katz, E., Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M (1974) "Uses and Gratifications Research" in Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 23: 389-398

Kevin, Watkins. 1998. Economic Growth with Equity. Oxford. Oxfam Publishing.

Ngugi, Muiru (1995) "Development Communication: A Clarification of Constructs" in Africa Media Review. Vol. 9 No.2.

Nwuneli, Onuora (1996) "Communication and Employment of Civil Society" in Africa Media Review. Vol. 10 No.3

Nyamnjoh, Francis (1996) "Africa and the Information Superhighway: Silent Majorities in Search of a Footpath" in Africa Media Review. Vol. 10 No.2.

Okigbo, Charles (1987) "American Communication Theories and African Communication Research: Need for a Philosophy of African Communication" in Africa Media Review. Vol. 1 No.2.

Oluyitan, Emmanuel Funso. 1980. Training for National Development –The Case of the Nigerian Television Authority. Michigan, USA: University Microfilms International.

Onwunechili, Chuka (1995) "Organisations: New directions for Development communication" in Africa Media Review. Vol.9 No.1

Pokharapurkar, Raja. 1993. Rural Development Through Community Television. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Preston, P.W. 1996. Development Theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Rao, B.B.S. 1992. Television for Rural Development. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Ray, Samirendra N. 1995. Communication in Rural Development: A Public Policy Perspective. Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies.

Seidman, A. and Anang, F. 1992. 21st Century Africa: Towards a new Vision of Self-sustainable Development. Trenton, New Jersey, USA: World Press Inc.

Soola, E.O. (1995) "De-mystifying the Development Process: The role of Communication in Community Participation for Sustainable Development" in Africa Media Review. Vol.9 No.2.

Rogers, E.M. and Kincaid, D.L. (1981) Communication Networks: Toward a New Paradigm for Research. The Free Press: New York.

Ugboajah, F.O., (1985) " 'Oramedia' in Africa" in F.O. Ugboajah (ed) Mass Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa. London, UK: Hans Zell Pub.

Wedell, George (ed.). 1986. Making Broadcasting Useful: The African Experience. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Welbeck, Paa-Bekoe. 1971. The Role of Ghana Television in Education and National Development: An Exploratory Study. PhD Thesis. Michigan State University: USA

Wilson, Des (1987) "Organising a Television Service for Rural Areas" in Africa Media Review. Vol.1 No.3.

REPORTS

Feasibility Study for the Introduction of National Television Service, March 1988. Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union.

Report on Visit to Botswana, 17-20th March 1992.
Gaborone, Botswana: Gordon Croton, BBC Television.

Report of the National Commission on Education, 1993.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Feasibility Study Botswana Television, Final Report: Studio Hamburg Media Consult International, Hamburg, Germany, 1993.

National Development Plan No. 8, 1997-2003.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Botswana Human Development Report: Challenges for Sustainable Human Development, 1997. Gaborone, Botswana: United Nations Development Programme and Government of Botswana.
Annual Report 1996/1997

Gaborone, Botswana: Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis.

Vision 2016: Towards Prosperity for All, September 1997.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

The Internet and Poverty, April 1998.
London, UK: Panos Institute

Report on Consultative Meeting on HIV/AIDS and Development for Members of Parliament, February 3-5, 1998.
Kasane, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Annual Economic Report, February 1998.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Citizen Economic Empowerment in the Context of Rural Development: Perceptions, Issues and Concerns, July 1999.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Eradication of Poverty and Economic Empowerment: The Malaysian Experience, July 1999. Gaborone, Botswana: Malaysian Institute of Economic Research.

Annual Economic Report, February 2 000.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Budget Speech, 1997.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Budget Speech, February 1998.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana

Budget Speech, February 2 000.
Gaborone, Botswana: Government of Botswana.

Letters

From: Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 28 April 1989.
Subject: Botswana cannot afford a TV service.
Ref. No.: FDP 80/4/47 1 (35)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 16 June 1989
Subject: Use of Satellite transmissions for BTV
Ref. No: IBS 1/5A 11 (5)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 8th December 1989.
Subject: Visit by M-NET
Ref.: IBS 1/5A 11 (16)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 6th August 1990
Subject: The Role of TV in Botswana
Ref. No. IBS 1/5a 11

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 27 August 1990
Subject: Feasibility study for introduction of TV
Ref. No. IBS 1/5A

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 15 April 1992
Subject: Feasibility Report by Gordon Croton of BBC TV
Ref. No. IBS 1/5A 11 (85)

From: Permanent Secretary to the President
To: Permanent Secretary, Finance and Development
Date: 28 June 1994
Subject: Feasibility Study for BTV by Studio Hamburg
Ref. No. OP 24/12 1V (36)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 9th November 1994
Subject: Report of Feasibility Study for BTV
Ref. No. IBS 1/5A 111(81)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary, Finance and Development
Date: 19 June 1996
Subject: Draft Cabinet Memorandum on BTV
Ref. No. IBS /1/5A 1V (5)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Permanent Secretary to the President
Date: 9th April 1997
Subject: Implementation of BTV Service Project
Ref. No. IBS 1/5A 1V (58)

From: Permanent Secretary, Finance and Development
To: Director, Information and Broadcasting
Date: 17th April 1997
Subject: Implementation of BTV Service Project
Ref. No. FDP 28/2/2 V11 (97) CE (P)

From: Director, Information and Broadcasting
To: Administrative Secretary, Office of the President
Date: 22 May 1997
Subject: Implementation of BTV Service Project
Ref. No. None

From: Tv. Project Co-ordinator (Internal Memo)
To: Director, Information and Broadcasting

Date: 5 March 1998
Subject: Budget for BTV Project
Ref. No. None

From: Director, Architectural and Building Services
To: Director, Information and Broadcasting
Date: 17 March 1998
Subject: Building for Botswana Television
Ref. No. DIB/GAB/11V(1) PA 2

