

# PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SECOND PERSON

INAUGURAL LECTURE

BY

DREYER KRUGER



RHODES UNIVERSITY

GRAHAMSTOWN

1976

PSYCHOLOGY  
IN THE SECOND PERSON

INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED  
AT RHODES UNIVERSITY  
ON 5th AUGUST, 1975

BY

DREYER KRUGER

RHODES UNIVERSITY  
GRAHAMSTOWN  
1976

# PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SECOND PERSON

In the short history and long past of psychology, historians of the science usually point to the founding of the first experimental laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig in 1879 as marking the inauguration of psychology as an independent discipline. Since it is now almost a hundred years since psychology has thus established itself, one may well ask to what extent psychology has fulfilled the high hopes held for it by its founders.

There can be no doubt that the early experimental psychologists anticipated that by using the natural scientific method which had recorded such resounding triumphs in the 19th and 20th centuries they would be able to achieve great progress so that psychology could take up its rightful place next to the established biological and physical sciences, in fact, itself become a biological science using the natural scientific method. Thus in 1890 one of the pioneers Theodor Ziehen<sup>1</sup> writes that this new psychology has banished metaphysics entirely. He says that it deserves the term physiological psychology in a double sense. Firstly because it uses the methods of physiology rather than those of philosophy and secondly, because it always looks at the physical parallels of what is experienced in consciousness. Moreover, he anticipates that through this new method the old contradiction between the material and the psychic can be overcome.

Two decades later, Watson<sup>2</sup> in his book called "Behaviour" promises that this natural science approach will cause philosophy to disappear and become the history of science, will enable the development of an experimental ethics (instead of a

speculative ethics based on religion); that it will replace psychoanalysis with scientific studies of child development and will, by controlling development, prevent the psychopathological breakdowns which now have to be treated in adult life. He was not alone in his hopefulness. A reviewer in the New York Tribune wrote at the time "Perhaps this is the most important book ever written. One stands for an instant blinded with a great hope"<sup>3</sup>.

The second last chapter of Skinner's<sup>4</sup> book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* is called 'designing a culture'. This is a very optimistic note in so far as psychology can hardly have said to have finalised its own design. The last chapter is called "What is man" and Skinner succeeds in demolishing the idealistic view of autonomous man and transferring his functions one by one to the environment and states his own view of man as a body which is a person in the sense that it (i.e. the body) displays a complex repertoire of behaviour. However he believes that this is an essential conceptual step to clear the deck for a fully scientific study of behaviour and hence for the reconstruction of man's life by positive reinforcement.

In 1930 Freud<sup>5</sup> contrasted the scientific *Weltanschauung*, of which he takes psychoanalysis to be an integral part, favourably with both western religion and Marxism. Pessimist that he was in all affairs concerning the future of civilization, he was nonetheless hoping that psychoanalysis would be accepted as scientific and that through science in general and psychoanalysis in particular, man will gradually achieve a better life.

This is only a sample of the high hopes that has been held out for psychology and perhaps we may now ask to what extent psychologists feel that these expectations have been realised. Let me say at once that a vast amount of research has been done and that Psychology has great achievements to its credit in both theoretical and applied fields. In its present state as a science and a profession, it has no special need of an advocate. What I want to talk about is something more basic namely to what extent psychology has succeeded in confronting its basic subject matter. In this connection, G. M. Allport<sup>6</sup> has remarked that in present day psychology specialization is in the saddle,

that theorizing on the grand scale is frowned out of court and that there are plenty of miniscule theories but scarcely any that are comprehensively human in their reference. Psychology is by no means a unified science. The Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle<sup>7</sup> has described it as "a partly fortuitous federation of enquiries and techniques". Psychology may at the moment, be characterised as a series of almost discrete disciplines, some having only tenuous ties with other ramifications of the science. Theories have ranges of convenience and different foci; different sets of prescriptions seem to apply depending on the field being investigated and the researcher's orientation. As regards Ziehen's promise to banish all metaphysics from psychology, an eminent American psychologist, Abraham Maslow<sup>8</sup> in the 1960's made a plea that we should refurbish our basis by turning back to philosophy, especially philosophical anthropology. Moreover, there seems to be a certain drift away from psychology towards other social sciences, also towards philosophy, literature and even theology, because these latter sciences in some of their ramifications seem to have come to grips more directly with what it means to be a man in the world in which we live, whilst some have criticized psychology for tending towards the devaluation and homogenization of man rather than its opposite.

Thorpe, an eminent clinical psychologist is so dissatisfied with what he calls anti-mentalistic, "nothing-but" and dehumanizing trends in American psychology departments that he calls for a unilateral declaration of independence for all applied psychology by demanding separate departments.<sup>9</sup>

A large proportion of psychologists are not unduly perturbed by psychology's present state. For instance the Chairman of the German Society of Psychologists, Theo Herrmann<sup>10</sup>, in a 1973 address on the state of Psychology sketched the satisfactory progress of the science in his country, did not see any reason to change its direction and, in regard to the call for a comprehensive model for the science," he said, "It is not possible to determine the range of objects of psychology or its unique methodology in such a manner that psychologists and possibly also non-psychologists can have consensus on this definition".

(Own translation). A paradigm or unified model would not in his opinion facilitate research programmes.

Furthermore, he called the argumentation in favour of having a central paradigm a scholastic illusion for a closed scientific system. Herrmann's position called forth a sharp reaction from Robert Kirchhoff<sup>11</sup> who agreed that while psychology has no paradigm at the moment, this is certainly not a desirable state of affairs. A somewhat depressing aspect of the controversy which continued for a while, was that it did not develop beyond the question of generally accepted "model or no model" to a consideration of possible models or paradigms. To me it seems clear that in spite of Herrmann's strict rejection of metapsychological theorising, he is in fact pleading for the status quo and the development of psychology along the loose lines which are generally accepted but which nearly always orient itself towards the model of the natural sciences. For me the strategic question is, if we do not have a preliminary paradigm which we can use and keep on refining towards an end paradigm, will our research theorising bear much fruit?

In contrast to the somewhat orthodox line taken by Theo Herrmann, Leona Tyler<sup>12</sup> in her 1973 invited address to the American Psychological Association made some statements which, from my point of view, are very encouraging but do not go far enough. She states amongst others that we should now recognise that psychological research and its professional applications are co-operative ventures. Furthermore, she emphasized the need for new models for research which are not just adapted from physics or biology but which have been created especially for the sciences in which scientist, subject and consumer of research all belong to the same species. Finally, she takes a critical look at determinism, and comes down solidly on the side of those who conceptualise man as a being who can make choices and that this should be incorporated into our model for research in psychology.

To restate:— Psychology lacking a generally accepted definition paradigm or model is not a unified science. In the U.S.A. where at least 60% of all psychologists (the majority of whom



call themselves eclecticists) live, the scene nevertheless is dominated by the two forces of Behaviourism and Psychoanalysis with the Gestalt school living a quiet, unassuming existence.

One way of understanding this bipartisan domination is in terms of Bakan's<sup>13</sup> mystery/mastery complex. Behaviourism respects the cultural taboo on the invasion of the private world and the unravelling of the mystery of the inner life by declaring itself uninterested in events going on inside the skin but transgresses the taboo on mastery by proposing that manipulation, control and prediction is both the way to study behaviour and to redesign lives. Psychoanalysis on the other hand, being an intrapsychic theory, transgresses the mystery taboo by delving into inner complexes, conflicts and repressed memories but upholds the taboo on mastery by declaring itself a postdictive science.

A second way of understanding is that both are able to elaborate valid profiles of behaviour. Psychoanalysis has given us a series of concepts for understanding personal histories, the individual, the meanings of his actions, symptoms and idiosyncracies. It is psychology of the "I", of the first person and tends to blot out the environment or at least to put it in brackets. Behaviourism on the other hand has given us a framework for looking at behaviour objectively, has devised ingenious ways to observe and has highlighted the determined, controlled and reflexive aspects of our lives. It is a psychology of he or she or perhaps even "it", but nevertheless a psychology in the third person. It tends to highlight the environment but to bracket the experiencing subject. However, a psychology in the second person has been in existence in Europe since the 1920's; has accepted neither Wundt's psychophysical parellism nor Watson's behaviourism, and declared its independence from Psychoanalysis, but has made its impact on the U.S.A. only since the late 1950's. There it has had increasing support, especially under the banner of humanistic psychology, some of its aspects being relatively independent of Europe, while in Europe it has the support of a long *Geisteswissenschaftliche* tradition. In South Africa it has made an impact on Psychology

Departments over the last few years as a direct European importation rather than as re-export from the U.S.A. but has not yet developed a vigorous growth.

Contemporary psychologists have tended to adhere to scientific methods established by and for the physical sciences rather than those phenomena which form their subject matter. They have forgotten that physics developed its method after deciding on the best way to study the phenomena they were interested in. Although Natural Scientists, whenever they investigate new phenomena, have, of necessity, to start with their own experience, psychologists seem somehow hesitant to do likewise in regard to the phenomenon of man. They have also forgotten that physics has shedded some of its values and foundations without fear of loosing its status as a science. In this regard I can only refer to Heisenberg who said of the changes brought about by the study of neuclear physics that with increasing accuracy its picture of nature becomes further and further removed from what may be called living nature, or nature as we know it in everyday life. It becomes more remote from the conception of classical physics of a mechanical material world which moved according to immutable laws. The fact that this machine and science itself was the product of human thought constructs appeared irrelevant at the time and not important for the understanding of nature. However, physical scientists, according to Heisenberg, no longer deal with the world as directly perceived by us but with its background as brought to light by experiments which means that the objective world of natural science is "a product of our active intervention and improved technique of observation"<sup>14</sup>.

The American psychiatrist, H. S. Sullivan, tried to show that observation in psychology is always participant observation. Participant observation means that that which one observes is not indifferent to the observation and that what is eventually observed is not the person as isolated entity, but the person relating to the person doing the observation or to the total situation. This insight, however, has not been assimilated into general and experimental psychology although nobody wishes to deny the validity of these observations. In spite of many clear



observations that the performance of humans and animals in experiments are affected by the attitude of the observer, the dominant trend in psychology remains the study of man as object in which the ideal of objective, non-participant, neutral and detached observation is the keystone. The fact that since Heisenberg's discovery of the indeterminacy principle in 1927 physics itself has been moving away from this attitude, has not had a sufficient impact in psychology.

In an article in the *American Psychologist* Boulding<sup>15</sup> writes "All sciences of themselves are part of the system which they study. All scientists are participant observers in their own systems. In the physical sciences, and to somewhat lesser extent in the biological sciences, it is possible for a time to maintain the myth of non-participation and to suppose that the scientist simply studies an empirical world which is not affected by the fact that he is studying it". This means that the approach that the scientist brings towards his science, will have an effect on what that science will turn out to be. In other words, truth, scientific truth is not independent of the attitude brought to it by the researcher i.e. by his approach. By approach in psychology is meant the fundamental viewpoint towards man and the world that the scientist brings to his work, whether this viewpoint is made explicit or not. Since however, natural science psychology has given precedence to fidelity to the method, it means that they must bring to the science of psychology a view of man which is compatible with natural scientific method, which means that they are forced to accept the view of man as being in the last instance object, intricate mechanism, or mere organism.

A psychology in the second person studies man as dialogue, as relatedness to fellow man, to the world and to himself as living body and life history or lived time. The approach is deeply grounded in philosophy — the attitude of *Verstehen* or understanding which goes back to Pascal's *esprit de finesse* and Dilthey's demarcation of *Geisteswissenschaft* from *Naturwissenschaft*. Another source goes back to Soren Kierkegaard in his studies of self and anxiety continued by the psychiatrist and philosopher Carl Jaspers who has deeply influenced modern

psychopathology. However, the main root derives from Edmund Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* published in 1900 who in turn owed much to Franz Brentano's Act psychology and his concept of intentionality. Husserl's phenomenology was taken up by psychologists and psychiatrists at a very early stage, but has had its strongest impact via his great pupil and successor at Freiburg, Martin Heidegger whose book *Sein und Zeit*, published in 1927 heralded phenomenological existentialism. Directly and also as a result of the work of Jean Paul Sartre, this philosophy has had a great influence on leading European psychologists and psychiatrists such as L. Binswanger, Erwin Straus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, E. Minkowski, Medard Boss, L. Buytendijk and J. H. Van den Berg to mention but a few. This psychology is not however, exclusively a phenomenological-existential one. The interpersonal or cultural psychoanalysts such as H. S. Sullivan, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm and other psychologists who I cannot name here have contributed substantially to its concepts. This trend, namely to see man as related to world, the individual as involved with fellowman is discernible not only in psychology and philosophy, but in other areas as well. The titles of Martin Buber's epochmaking work *Ich und Du*, Max Scheler's *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, and at least some of the work of Karl Barth reveals this trend. In literature the homeless generation in which the individual was seen as being isolated and out of communion became less characteristic whilst in the work of T. S. Eliot the individual is taken out of the narrow confines of the individualistic self and seen to realize himself in contact with fellowman. The importance of this is superbly expressed in *Cocktail Party* where Celia says,

"Do you know—

It no longer seems worthwhile to speak to any one." and later continues:

"... everyone is alone—or so it seems to me.

They make noises, and think they are talking to each other;

they make faces and think they understand each other.

And I'm sure they don't. Is that a delusion?"

However, the fact that this second person psychology (the term was first used by the French psychologist Paul Foulquie in 1951)<sup>16</sup> has had a venerable parentage and that it has made an impact, certainly does not mean that it has established itself as a viable alternative to behaviourism, psychoanalysis or even Gestalt psychology. It can only establish itself as a valid alternative approach in psychology if it can demonstrate that it has a method which holds the promise of being able to understand man behaving in his world in a better way than the other two or alternatively, if it is shown that it is a necessary supplement to these two established approaches. The fact that it has already deeply influenced contemporary psychotherapy and counselling is important. It is important in these fields because it has offered an understanding of man: not as man as "sick" or "normal" organism, it has clearly shown the differences between psychotherapy as a manipulative technique and psychotherapy or counselling as a venture into the exploration and hopefully confirmation of self and unique existence in relation to a fellow man called therapist or counsellor. Above all, it has clearly revealed that psychological observation is participant observation. However, it is clearly not enough because this is only a part of the total field and it will have to show its viability in a much bigger arena.

Allow me then to make a number of basic statements about how I see psychology in the second person:—

The world we live in is *Mitwelt*, a world which we share with others. I know and trust my experience. That we can know and understand the experience of others is a premise basic to the operation of our whole social world. We can communicate with each other. To say that we cannot understand a person is usually the same as saying that we cannot communicate with such a person. The *Mitwelt* is, moreover, a fundamental premise for psychology as a human science. It means that it is the task of the psychologist to investigate and make explicit the infinite variety of human experience in the infinite variations of his behaviour.

All psychology rests upon communication. The task of the psychologist is to understand people by making explicit what

people can communicate to him concerning their experience and behaviour. In order to make meaningful explications he will continually draw on his own experience which will have been built up out of his own dialogue with the world and fellowman. When I say psychology depends on communication, I do not deny that communication is often indirect and mostly imperfect. Neither do I mean that it depends exclusively on what man, the subject of investigation can verbalize. Through the intercourse between body and world, body and significant others, the child builds up a prereflective world, pregnant with meaning. What is meant through terms such as mother, at-home-ness, father, hard, soft, etc. is already part of our preverbal encounter with the world. For instance, I don't have to be taught (verbally) that a table is hard, I have built up an unmediated experience of its hardness in as much as I encountered it with my living body. It is also the task of psychology then to make these prereflective meanings communicated through the living body reflectively clear.

I have never met a psychologist or anyone else who experiences himself or herself as pure mechanism, thing or mere organism. If I do not experience myself as such, then I do not think one can build a meaningful psychology by starting with a premise of man as thing or organism. Although I deny neither the substantiality of my body, nor the fact that it has much in common with that of an animal, nor the materiality of the things around me, I am in a dialogue with my world and fellow man in the way that a thing or even an animal is not. Even while I was writing this paper, I was not experiencing myself as a being using my nervous system to think and my hands and fingers as instruments to make marks on paper. I did however, experience myself already in dialogue with the people who will listen (or perhaps not listen) to me. Will they agree, disagree or suffer in silence? This means that I must deny that materialistic philosophy offers an adequate basis for the science of psychology. It does not however, mean that I deny the substantial contributions that have been and still can be made by psychologists basing themselves on this premise.

At the same time I must reject the view of man emanating from idealist philosophy where man is seen as isolated subjectivity who can only perceive the world by taking it into himself (so to speak), who sees relating to the world in terms of a statement that reality has appearances in the mind or the brain etc. I am not a self sitting in my brain; on the contrary, to be man means to exist (with the emphasis on the ex) to be already out there, to be with others, interacting with the world. This means that I cannot isolate aspects of man's behaviour e.g. thinking, emotion and so on and study these in isolation from man's encounter with the world and fellowman. Behaviour must always be studied in context. In making this last statement, I find myself in substantial agreement with behaviourist learning theory which makes essentially the same statement, but then goes on to redefine and impoverish context as cues and settings i.e. stimuli or constellations of stimuli. This means that a psychology in the second person which is similar to behaviourism in that both oppose the intrapsychic model of man, parts company with behaviourism again in as much as the former does not objectify or reify context; on the contrary it tries to explicate context as lived encounter, as system of meanings experienced by the person in a specific situation. The environment is not perceived by us as mere neutral space filled by things with objective characteristics, but speak to us in character as physiognomy of the world<sup>17</sup>. Neither is the world of everyday action (Lebwelt) a private world; on the contrary it is from the very beginning an intersubjective cultural world because we live as humans among other humans whom we understand and by whom we are understood.

In as much as this psychology refuses to reify or objectify man or world it is clear that it will not emphasize psychology's contemporary goal to quantify its statements except for clearly defined and circumscribed purposes. It cannot agree with Thorstone's absolutization of the measurement position, (which states that everything that exists, exists to some degree and what exists to some degree can be measured), because it is clear that some processes are so pervasively disturbed by the act of measurement itself that it is forever eluding the observer.

The emphasis on quantification which has helped physical science to such great heights cannot be useful to psychology to the same extent because what is salient in man's encounter with fellowman and the things is not the quantity of experience and behaviour but its meaning i.e. how it is constituted qualitatively. Moreover, the emphasis on quantifiable hypotheses and statements in psychology has tended to exclude from investigation phenomena which show little promise of being measurable.

I certainly will not be able in the time allotted to explicate fully what is implied by a psychology in the second person. From what I have said already it should however be clear that in such an approach research activity will not endeavour to restrict itself to experimentation and will give up the myth of the independent observer in favour of participant observation. Because man as a subject behaves in a way which reflects his intentionality, his experience of an experiment should always be made part of the experiment. Instead of approaching our scientific task in the understanding of behaviour and experience in such a manner that we always aim at measurable quantities of experience and behaviour we will try to make unprejudiced faithful descriptions of what is experienced in terms of its meaning and qualities to individuals. In as much as man and contexts are ever changing it is impossible to do research on the basis of identical repetition but it is possible to get to know the phenomenon being researched through varied manifestations<sup>18</sup>.

A psychology of the second person does not deny the valuable contributions made by the dominant differential psychologies, but it does object to their reductionistic emphases namely to explain human behaviour on the basis that what moves man is in the final analysis, nothing but the vicissitudes of the libido (Freudian psychoanalysis) or contingencies of reinforcement (Skinnerian behaviourism). A psychology in the second person is pretentious enough to hope that by developing its view of man into an anthropological psychology it can reinterpret and integrate the findings of differ-



ential psychologies such as psychoanalysis, behaviourism, personalism, personal construct theory etc. into a more comprehensive and unified science.

An anthropological psychology, a psychology in the second person, a psychology of thee and me: this psychology must speak to us in a language that we can understand. It does not need to build up a special technical vocabulary but tries to speak of man in the language of his experience. Psychology is fundamentally a form of knowledge that is so bound up with man's capacity for insight into his life and actions that the comprehensibility of psychological interpretation may overlap quite extensively with its validity. This psychology must speak to us in the present and in the immediate future of those things which are salient now: of love, fear, achievement and apathy, feelings of being understood or rejected and so on. In short, it must investigate the meaningful phenomena which constitute our lives. It must do so now and in our immediate future. I cannot hope that this psychology will **always** be the psychology of man; not only the Zeitgeist but man himself changes demanding that he be explicated anew. On the other hand I prefer this to the accumulative fragmentalism which is third person psychology's undertaking eventually to give us a consistent explanation of all of man's behaviour.

There are many fields of application in psychology in which this approach is promising but I would specially like to mention that terribly intricate web of relationships, overt and covert struggles and conflicting ideologies which constitute the South African situation. Surely a psychology in the second person focussing on how people relate to each other and to their world, how people experience each other and the world in their respective reference groups and outside it; how not only different political ideologies but also different and conflicting cosmologies condition individual lives, can make some contribution to unravelling these complexities. Very useful transcultural and attitude studies have been done but what is needed for a deeper understanding is a method which would allow us to look at individuals from an in-

ternal framework i.e. to open up the landscape of their world. For instance, psychological studies of the indigenous diviner, a key figure in traditional ethnic groups, have not, up to now, enabled us to understand what is valid in his work and how it is valid and it is unlikely to do so unless we can explicate what terms like sickness, evil, virtue, dream, communication, body, spirit, plant, animal etc. mean to him. In other words to understand him we must explicate his world as a system of meanings as it presents itself to him<sup>19</sup>.

---

A second person psychology does not aspire to the elegant mathematical exactitude to which some differential psychologies hope to lead us. Neither can it hope for the excitement which psychoanalysis inspired in its systematic exposition of deep conflicts in the lives of our elders. In its exposition of man's subjectivity as realised in the physiognomy of the world; of the nearness and farness of things and persons trusted and not trusted, in the emphasis on starting with our primary experience it stays fairly close to everyday life and mostly uses the language of everyday life. It has been suggested that it tends to slip into a bourgeois *Gemütlichkeit*, but this need not necessarily be so. In psychotherapy for instance, one may, after working through and explicating one's everyday experiences and constructions come to grasp the horizons within which one constitutes one's unique life and thus to confront the cosmic backdrop of life just as N. P. van Wyk Louw in his poem, "Beeld van 'n jeug: duif en perd", uses the simple images of boyhood to show how these point beyond themselves to cosmologies and then back again to the horizons which contain one's vitality.

If an antidote to a comforting bonhomie is needed we need only heed the angry voices of the radical psychology movement which, in the wake of Marcuse's unsuccessful attempt to adapt Freud's constructs for his programme to achieve basic changes in our life form, is using the insights of a psychology in the second person to show how consciousness is conditioned by capitalist social structure, how

various behaviour patterns and deviations stem from power relations and so on. I have no illusions about the attractiveness of this approach to people who are deeply concerned about the manipulation of social reality and the politics of experience, neither would I deny the valuable insights which may be contributed in this way, but I must warn that in its onesided emphases and intense hostilities, it is in danger of becoming an "us and them" rather than a true second person psychology.

A psychology in the second person certainly does not avoid exploring the relationships between power structures, exploitation, consciousness and behaviour. It must, however, also speak of unrepeatable individual lives which are **constituted** (not only conditioned) in a specific culture or cultures. In the course of doing so, however, it also transgresses another taboo of contemporary life in that it speaks of sick-beds,<sup>29</sup> terminal illnesses and death, not indifferently as mere biological events nor hopefully as the portal to a new life nor escapistically as in the observation that men die and that it is bound to happen to us sometime, but experientially as distantiation from the trusted context of life, as parting, loneliness, anguish and the possible overcoming of these, above all as the final horizon of life in so far as psychology can speak of it and thus as decisive co-constitution of that unique, always varied, sad/joyful life which is the possession of thee and me.

It is clear that a psychology in the second person does not only refer to man in relation to fellowman, but to man as dialogue in the totality of world. Nonetheless, man as we know him, is inconceivable apart from his community of fellowman and to understand him, we must put the "I" back into the "Thou" as Dilthey has phrased it. This does not mean that a psychology in the second person will set up one's closeness and involvement with fellowman as an absolute standard of being fully human. Relating to other people can take place at various levels of closeness or distantiation, directness or obliqueness and at present in our other-directedness, in our emphasis on human need and *Mitmenschlichkeit*, many people experience fellowman

as being too close. The emergence of a profusion of new Christian and other religious approaches, including the new importance of meditation, should by no means be seen as a way of not relating or as a flight into a new "I"-ness, but rather as a strategy to attain an optimal distance from fellowman and thus (perhaps paradoxically) to deepen relationship.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, in conclusion—a personal note. When I exchanged a crowded professional life for academia about ten years ago, part of the reason was that I felt that the approaches in which I had been schooled and had schooled myself, did not enable me adequately to understand the life forms of those whom I saw in a variety of situations. First at Fort Hare and now at Rhodes I have had the opportunity to come to a constructive renewal and reintegration of views which I sincerely hope has been and will be of some use to students of psychology with some of whom, especially in 1975 postgraduate classes, I have had an involvement which, I hope, has been mutually gratifying. For this privilege as well as for the cordial and stimulating relations with members of my Department, with other colleagues, with the Administration and with you personally, I record my grateful thanks.

## REFERENCES

1. Ziehen, Theodor (1890), **Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie**, Jena, Gustav Fischer. (I consulted the 12th edition which appeared in 1924).
2. See Woodworth, R. S. (1931), **Contemporary Schools of Psychology**, Methuen & Co., London, p. 96.
3. See Woodworth op. cit. p. 97.
4. Skinner, B. F. (1973), **Beyond Freedom and Dignity**, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
5. S. Freud (1972), **Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse**, Gesammelte Schriften, XV, S. Fischer Verlag.
6. Allport, G. M. (1968), **The person in psychology**, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 4.
7. As quoted by Thompson, Robert (1968), **The Pelican History of Psychology**, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, p. 393.
8. Maslow, A. (1961), **Existential Psychology, What's in it for us**, in May, R. (ed.), **Existential Psychology**, New York, Random House. Although Maslow is not uncritical of existentialist philosophy, he states (p. 54) that logical positivism has been a failure, that the basic philosophical presuppositions will have to be considered anew and that psychologists should stop relying on "unconscious, unexamined philosophies that they picked up as children".
9. Thorpe, Frederick (1975), **Unabhängigkeitserklärung der klinischen psychologie**, Zeitschr. Klin. Psychol. Psychother. 23, Heft 1, s. 3-5.
10. Hermann, Theo. (1973), **Zur Lage der Psychologie**, Psychologische Rundschau, XXIV/1, s. 1-19.
11. Kirchhoff, R. (1973), **Gegenstandslose Theorie?** Ztschr. Klin. Psychol. Psychother. 21, 3 s. 210-217.  
In the next issue No. 4, 1973) Herrmann asks, "Braucht die Psychologie eine Gegenstandbestimmung?", whilst Kirchhoff (1974, 22/1, s. 18-36) tries to show "Warum auch die Psychologie einen bestimmten Gegenstand braucht".
12. Tyler, Leona (1973), **Design for a hopeful psychology**, American Psychologist 28, p. 1 024.
13. Bakan, David (1968), **On method**, Josey-Bass Inc., San Francisco, p. 38.
14. Heisenberg, W. (1952), **Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science** quoted by Giorgi, A. (1969), **Psychology: A human Science**, Soc. Res., 36, p. 415. In Heisenberg's **Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik**, Hamburg, 1958, p. 18, the interdependence of observer and that which is observed is brought out even more clearly: "Auch in der Naturwissenschaft ist also der Gegenstand der Forschung nicht mehr die Natur an sich, sondern die der menschliche Fragestellung ausgesetzte Natur, und insofern begegnet der Mensch auch hier wieder sich selbst".
15. Boulding, K. E. (1967), **Dare we take the social sciences seriously?** Amer. Psychol. XXII, p. 879-887, cited by Giorgi, A. (1969), op. cit. p. 415-416.

16. As quoted by Van den Berg, J. H. (1973), **Kroniek der Psychologie**, C. F. Callenbach, Nijkerk, p. 123. I am deeply indebted to this author not only for his brief history of psychology, but also for his historical metabletic approach to man explicated in his works, such as **Leven in meervoud, Het menselijk lichaam (2 Vols), Metabletika, Metabletika der Materie** and **Dieptepsychologie** all published by C. F. Callenbach, Nijkerk. In his **De Psychiatrische Patient**, Callenbach (1964), he uses a hypothetical neurotic as an example for a brilliant exposition of man's being in the world. I have also been deeply influenced by the pioneering work of L. Binswanger, especially his epochmaking case studies in **Schizophrenie**, Verlag Gunther Neske (1957) and his phenomenology of love which is the main theme of his **Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins**, Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, München, 1962; furthermore by Medard Boss, **Psychoanalyse und Daseinsanalytik**, Verlag Hans Huber, 1957, and **Der Traum und seine Auslegung**, München, Kindler Verlag, 1974.  
Other European psychiatrists, psychologists and philosophers who cannot be mentioned now, have deeply impressed me. Other influences stem from the Duquesne group in the U.S.A., e.g. A. van Kaam (**Existential Foundations of Psychology**) and A. Giorgi (1971), **Duquesne studies in phenomenological Psychology** Vol. I, Duquesne Univer. Press; also from Rollo May and other American existential and humanistic psychologists. In South Africa, A. C. N. Preller has been an active protagonist of this point of view—see for instance: **Is die psigologie 'n wetenskap**, Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe, Jun. 1974, 14/2, p. 79-88, and **Kulturele veranderinge en die aard die psigoterapeutiese verhouding**, S.A. Sielkundige, 1974, 4/1, p. 1-9.
17. The world as meaning, character and physiognomy, as lived, toned and oriented space is the theme of the book by Kruse, L. (1974), **Räumliche Umwelt**, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.
18. Giorgi, A. (1971), **Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology II**, in Giorgi, A., Fischer, W. F., and Eckartsberg, R. von, **Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology**, Duquesne University Press, p. 17-29.
19. Kruger, Dreyer (1974), **Xhosa divining and contemporary Psychotherapy—a reciprocal perspective**, Fort Hare Papers, 6/1, p. 37-46.
20. A psychology of being sick-in-bed as changed form of existence is the theme of J. H. Van den Berg (1970), **Psychologie van het Ziekbed**, C. F. Callenbach, Nijkerk.