- Title
- Work in Progress Issue no.61 - Defiance a measure of expectations
- Creator
- Work in progress (WIP)
- Subject
- WIP
- Date Issued
- Oct 1989
- Date
- Oct 1989
- Type
- text
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056
- Identifier
- vital:33543
- Description
- This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
- Format
- 54 pages
- Format
- Publisher
- Work in Progress (WIP)
- Language
- English
- Rights
- Work in Progress (WIP)
- Rights
- No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission from the publisher
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