- Title
- An evaluation of the constitutionality of the common law crime of criminal defamation
- Creator
- Fischer, Carl Frederich
- Subject
- Libel and slander -- South Africa
- Subject
- Common law -- Evaluation
- Subject
- Criminal law -- South Africa
- Subject
- Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Date Issued
- 2008
- Date
- 2008
- Type
- Thesis
- Type
- Masters
- Type
- LLM
- Identifier
- vital:10171
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/10948/749
- Identifier
- Libel and slander -- South Africa
- Identifier
- Common law -- Evaluation
- Identifier
- Criminal law -- South Africa
- Identifier
- Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Description
- The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.
- Format
- vi, 81 leaves
- Format
- Publisher
- Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
- Publisher
- Faculty of Law
- Language
- English
- Rights
- Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
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NMMU Department of Criminal and Procedural Law
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