Work in Progress Issue no.59 - Roads to congress
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: July 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112078 , vital:33545
- Description: South Africa is moving into its fourth year of continuous emergency rule. And with the exception of a few months during 1986, some areas are entering their fifth year under these conditions. The effects of permanent emergency rule have been traumatic and wide ranging. Under emergency rule, a fundamentally anti-democratic state has been able to impose itself on an unwilling people without being subject to scrutiny, discussion or legal opposition. And while South Africa pre-emergency had almost none of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy, the last few years have stripped society of the last vestiges of rule by consent. The nature of the emergency has changed. It began as an aggressive attack on the mass democratic movement and the situation of 'ungovernability' that popular insurrection created. It has changed to become an all-encompassing political strategy, a last defence against ideas which refuse to die. For while organisations have been smashed, the ideas and aspirations which grew from the turbulent early 1980s are showing signs of re-emerging. In this context it may well be true that this government cannot rule without recourse to emergency powers of enormous magnitude. It may also be true that suppression of information, debate and opposition, and unrestrained powers for security forces, are a necessary precondition for an apartheid government to rule a subject people. Government sources have often argued that emergency powers are designed to create a stable context for 'reform'. But what reforms of substance have been offered since the first emergency was declared in July 1985? Looking nervously over a shoulder at far-right interests threatened by the most superficial aspects of deracialisation is hardly an indication of reform. Proposals for a consultative council incorporating Africans are not only tired and bankrupt. Their uncomfortable similarities to the 'toy telephone' Native Representative Council of the 1940s ensures that even the most moderate of black interests will spurn such ideas. Only the discredited, the opportunistic, or those with no following or power base can contemplate participation. Emergency rule - like so many of the preconditions for maintaining apartheid - has created further disease and distortion in society. When the state's institutions of repression - notably police and military - have the free reign granted by emergency powers, it is no surprise that death squads operate seemingly without reprisals. When members of the 'security forces' have the power to incarcerate apartheid's opponents indefinitely, it is no surprise that assassinations, abductions and 'dirty tricks' departments flourish as additional means to remove organised opposition and resistence. It is six weeks since David Webster's death swelled the growing record of political assassinations, assaults and abductions. Over 12 years of publishing, David was a good friend to Work In Progress, writing for, distributing and supporting the publication. Fie was guest speaker at WIP's tenth anniversary celebration. And while police seem unable to find those specifically responsible for his murder, those who have created the atmosphere of emergency rule are the real culprits. It is but one small step from exercising legal powers to detain, ban and suppress, to the extra-legal actions of assassination and terror. Emergency rule will presumably continue until at least after the September general election. The National Party is keen to stay as far from the international spotlight as possible until after these elections. In particular, the new American administration, while clearly right wing, may have new and unpleasant approaches to sanctions and international pressure on South Africa. Internally, the opposition which can be generated in the election - be it from the far right or from those committed to democracy - clearly worries a government based on such shaky foundations. Government planners will still recall the organised resistance to the election of Indian and coloured houses which made such a mockery of the tricameral constitutional initiative. When a government, bankrupt in ideas and initiative's bent on holding power for its own sake - and has means like the state of emergency to enforce is rule - the prospects for any constructive negotiated change are indeed bleak.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: July 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: July 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112078 , vital:33545
- Description: South Africa is moving into its fourth year of continuous emergency rule. And with the exception of a few months during 1986, some areas are entering their fifth year under these conditions. The effects of permanent emergency rule have been traumatic and wide ranging. Under emergency rule, a fundamentally anti-democratic state has been able to impose itself on an unwilling people without being subject to scrutiny, discussion or legal opposition. And while South Africa pre-emergency had almost none of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy, the last few years have stripped society of the last vestiges of rule by consent. The nature of the emergency has changed. It began as an aggressive attack on the mass democratic movement and the situation of 'ungovernability' that popular insurrection created. It has changed to become an all-encompassing political strategy, a last defence against ideas which refuse to die. For while organisations have been smashed, the ideas and aspirations which grew from the turbulent early 1980s are showing signs of re-emerging. In this context it may well be true that this government cannot rule without recourse to emergency powers of enormous magnitude. It may also be true that suppression of information, debate and opposition, and unrestrained powers for security forces, are a necessary precondition for an apartheid government to rule a subject people. Government sources have often argued that emergency powers are designed to create a stable context for 'reform'. But what reforms of substance have been offered since the first emergency was declared in July 1985? Looking nervously over a shoulder at far-right interests threatened by the most superficial aspects of deracialisation is hardly an indication of reform. Proposals for a consultative council incorporating Africans are not only tired and bankrupt. Their uncomfortable similarities to the 'toy telephone' Native Representative Council of the 1940s ensures that even the most moderate of black interests will spurn such ideas. Only the discredited, the opportunistic, or those with no following or power base can contemplate participation. Emergency rule - like so many of the preconditions for maintaining apartheid - has created further disease and distortion in society. When the state's institutions of repression - notably police and military - have the free reign granted by emergency powers, it is no surprise that death squads operate seemingly without reprisals. When members of the 'security forces' have the power to incarcerate apartheid's opponents indefinitely, it is no surprise that assassinations, abductions and 'dirty tricks' departments flourish as additional means to remove organised opposition and resistence. It is six weeks since David Webster's death swelled the growing record of political assassinations, assaults and abductions. Over 12 years of publishing, David was a good friend to Work In Progress, writing for, distributing and supporting the publication. Fie was guest speaker at WIP's tenth anniversary celebration. And while police seem unable to find those specifically responsible for his murder, those who have created the atmosphere of emergency rule are the real culprits. It is but one small step from exercising legal powers to detain, ban and suppress, to the extra-legal actions of assassination and terror. Emergency rule will presumably continue until at least after the September general election. The National Party is keen to stay as far from the international spotlight as possible until after these elections. In particular, the new American administration, while clearly right wing, may have new and unpleasant approaches to sanctions and international pressure on South Africa. Internally, the opposition which can be generated in the election - be it from the far right or from those committed to democracy - clearly worries a government based on such shaky foundations. Government planners will still recall the organised resistance to the election of Indian and coloured houses which made such a mockery of the tricameral constitutional initiative. When a government, bankrupt in ideas and initiative's bent on holding power for its own sake - and has means like the state of emergency to enforce is rule - the prospects for any constructive negotiated change are indeed bleak.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: July 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.60 - Negotiations, another site of struggle
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.61 - Defiance a measure of expectations
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056 , vital:33543
- Description: This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056 , vital:33543
- Description: This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1989
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