Work in Progress Issue no.59 - Roads to congress
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: July 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112078 , vital:33545
- Description: South Africa is moving into its fourth year of continuous emergency rule. And with the exception of a few months during 1986, some areas are entering their fifth year under these conditions. The effects of permanent emergency rule have been traumatic and wide ranging. Under emergency rule, a fundamentally anti-democratic state has been able to impose itself on an unwilling people without being subject to scrutiny, discussion or legal opposition. And while South Africa pre-emergency had almost none of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy, the last few years have stripped society of the last vestiges of rule by consent. The nature of the emergency has changed. It began as an aggressive attack on the mass democratic movement and the situation of 'ungovernability' that popular insurrection created. It has changed to become an all-encompassing political strategy, a last defence against ideas which refuse to die. For while organisations have been smashed, the ideas and aspirations which grew from the turbulent early 1980s are showing signs of re-emerging. In this context it may well be true that this government cannot rule without recourse to emergency powers of enormous magnitude. It may also be true that suppression of information, debate and opposition, and unrestrained powers for security forces, are a necessary precondition for an apartheid government to rule a subject people. Government sources have often argued that emergency powers are designed to create a stable context for 'reform'. But what reforms of substance have been offered since the first emergency was declared in July 1985? Looking nervously over a shoulder at far-right interests threatened by the most superficial aspects of deracialisation is hardly an indication of reform. Proposals for a consultative council incorporating Africans are not only tired and bankrupt. Their uncomfortable similarities to the 'toy telephone' Native Representative Council of the 1940s ensures that even the most moderate of black interests will spurn such ideas. Only the discredited, the opportunistic, or those with no following or power base can contemplate participation. Emergency rule - like so many of the preconditions for maintaining apartheid - has created further disease and distortion in society. When the state's institutions of repression - notably police and military - have the free reign granted by emergency powers, it is no surprise that death squads operate seemingly without reprisals. When members of the 'security forces' have the power to incarcerate apartheid's opponents indefinitely, it is no surprise that assassinations, abductions and 'dirty tricks' departments flourish as additional means to remove organised opposition and resistence. It is six weeks since David Webster's death swelled the growing record of political assassinations, assaults and abductions. Over 12 years of publishing, David was a good friend to Work In Progress, writing for, distributing and supporting the publication. Fie was guest speaker at WIP's tenth anniversary celebration. And while police seem unable to find those specifically responsible for his murder, those who have created the atmosphere of emergency rule are the real culprits. It is but one small step from exercising legal powers to detain, ban and suppress, to the extra-legal actions of assassination and terror. Emergency rule will presumably continue until at least after the September general election. The National Party is keen to stay as far from the international spotlight as possible until after these elections. In particular, the new American administration, while clearly right wing, may have new and unpleasant approaches to sanctions and international pressure on South Africa. Internally, the opposition which can be generated in the election - be it from the far right or from those committed to democracy - clearly worries a government based on such shaky foundations. Government planners will still recall the organised resistance to the election of Indian and coloured houses which made such a mockery of the tricameral constitutional initiative. When a government, bankrupt in ideas and initiative's bent on holding power for its own sake - and has means like the state of emergency to enforce is rule - the prospects for any constructive negotiated change are indeed bleak.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: July 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: July 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112078 , vital:33545
- Description: South Africa is moving into its fourth year of continuous emergency rule. And with the exception of a few months during 1986, some areas are entering their fifth year under these conditions. The effects of permanent emergency rule have been traumatic and wide ranging. Under emergency rule, a fundamentally anti-democratic state has been able to impose itself on an unwilling people without being subject to scrutiny, discussion or legal opposition. And while South Africa pre-emergency had almost none of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy, the last few years have stripped society of the last vestiges of rule by consent. The nature of the emergency has changed. It began as an aggressive attack on the mass democratic movement and the situation of 'ungovernability' that popular insurrection created. It has changed to become an all-encompassing political strategy, a last defence against ideas which refuse to die. For while organisations have been smashed, the ideas and aspirations which grew from the turbulent early 1980s are showing signs of re-emerging. In this context it may well be true that this government cannot rule without recourse to emergency powers of enormous magnitude. It may also be true that suppression of information, debate and opposition, and unrestrained powers for security forces, are a necessary precondition for an apartheid government to rule a subject people. Government sources have often argued that emergency powers are designed to create a stable context for 'reform'. But what reforms of substance have been offered since the first emergency was declared in July 1985? Looking nervously over a shoulder at far-right interests threatened by the most superficial aspects of deracialisation is hardly an indication of reform. Proposals for a consultative council incorporating Africans are not only tired and bankrupt. Their uncomfortable similarities to the 'toy telephone' Native Representative Council of the 1940s ensures that even the most moderate of black interests will spurn such ideas. Only the discredited, the opportunistic, or those with no following or power base can contemplate participation. Emergency rule - like so many of the preconditions for maintaining apartheid - has created further disease and distortion in society. When the state's institutions of repression - notably police and military - have the free reign granted by emergency powers, it is no surprise that death squads operate seemingly without reprisals. When members of the 'security forces' have the power to incarcerate apartheid's opponents indefinitely, it is no surprise that assassinations, abductions and 'dirty tricks' departments flourish as additional means to remove organised opposition and resistence. It is six weeks since David Webster's death swelled the growing record of political assassinations, assaults and abductions. Over 12 years of publishing, David was a good friend to Work In Progress, writing for, distributing and supporting the publication. Fie was guest speaker at WIP's tenth anniversary celebration. And while police seem unable to find those specifically responsible for his murder, those who have created the atmosphere of emergency rule are the real culprits. It is but one small step from exercising legal powers to detain, ban and suppress, to the extra-legal actions of assassination and terror. Emergency rule will presumably continue until at least after the September general election. The National Party is keen to stay as far from the international spotlight as possible until after these elections. In particular, the new American administration, while clearly right wing, may have new and unpleasant approaches to sanctions and international pressure on South Africa. Internally, the opposition which can be generated in the election - be it from the far right or from those committed to democracy - clearly worries a government based on such shaky foundations. Government planners will still recall the organised resistance to the election of Indian and coloured houses which made such a mockery of the tricameral constitutional initiative. When a government, bankrupt in ideas and initiative's bent on holding power for its own sake - and has means like the state of emergency to enforce is rule - the prospects for any constructive negotiated change are indeed bleak.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: July 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.60 - Negotiations, another site of struggle
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.61 - Defiance a measure of expectations
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056 , vital:33543
- Description: This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056 , vital:33543
- Description: This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.43 - Crossroads, The destruction of a symbol
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Aug 1986
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111293 , vital:33430
- Description: During May and June of this year, one of the most brutal forced removals of squatter communities took place in the Cape Peninsula. In two separate, but related, para-military operations, 'wit- doeke' from Old Crossroads and nearby Site C in Khayelitsha, allegedly with SADF and SAP support, rid the area of the four most coherent and resistant squatter communities in the Peninsula - Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension, Portland Cement and KTC. Along with their destruction went the image of Crossroads as a symbol of defiance and resistance to state strategies of removal; and the dream of progressives to incorporate Crossroads into their political movement. What follows provides background to the recent conflict in the Crossroads complex and aims to stimulate debate on broader political issues confronting the progressive movement in the Cape Peninsula. For political opponents of apartheid, the recent removals and pivotal role of 'wit-doeke' have been both a military and political defeat. Valuable lessons for future political practice and involvement in squatter struggles may be learned in the process of reflection and debate.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Aug 1986
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Aug 1986
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111293 , vital:33430
- Description: During May and June of this year, one of the most brutal forced removals of squatter communities took place in the Cape Peninsula. In two separate, but related, para-military operations, 'wit- doeke' from Old Crossroads and nearby Site C in Khayelitsha, allegedly with SADF and SAP support, rid the area of the four most coherent and resistant squatter communities in the Peninsula - Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension, Portland Cement and KTC. Along with their destruction went the image of Crossroads as a symbol of defiance and resistance to state strategies of removal; and the dream of progressives to incorporate Crossroads into their political movement. What follows provides background to the recent conflict in the Crossroads complex and aims to stimulate debate on broader political issues confronting the progressive movement in the Cape Peninsula. For political opponents of apartheid, the recent removals and pivotal role of 'wit-doeke' have been both a military and political defeat. Valuable lessons for future political practice and involvement in squatter struggles may be learned in the process of reflection and debate.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Aug 1986
Work in Progress Issue no.44 - Rent boycott councils retaliate
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1986
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/118611 , vital:34651
- Description: The themes of victory and defeat dominate this issue of Work In Progress. Despite the state of emergency, there have been some important recent popular victories. Popular pressure and massive resistance blocked proposed 'independence' for the KwaNdebele bantustan. The efforts needed to dissuade KwaNdebele Chief Minister Simon Skosana and his followers from accepting Pretoria-style independence were enormous. So were the costs: vigilante violence and torture, death and destruction, necklaces and burnings. Nonetheless, the blocking of KwaNdebele independence is a popular victory. Never before has pressure from below halted bantustan independence - not in the Transkei or Ciskei, Venda or Bophuthatswana. The massive wave of rent boycotts which began in the Vaal during 1984 have also involved some notable popular victories. In many townships the organisation necessary to sustain prolonged withdrawal of rent payments has strengthened and developed the structures of popular mobilisation. And the boycotts have totally destroyed the financial base of the discredited and rejected black local authorities, be they in the form of community or town councils. On the trade union front, many of the established industrial unions have shown remarkable strength under pressure. With leadership detained or in hiding, some unions have been able to carry on their task of organising the working class in a disciplined and democratic manner. But there have been defeats too. Undisciplined comrades, often acting with no organisational basis or mandate, have divided communities, setting workers against the unemployed, children against parents, trade unions against community groups. Some of the rent boycotts have been enforced with a high degree of anti-democratic authoritarianism. The youth has often acted without the necessary support from other townships groups, without the organisational structures necessary for democratic decision-making, and without adequate mandate or consultation. Recourse to 'discipline', - necklacings, beatings and other punishments - has come too easily to a group which often lacks a mandate to act on behalf of any major constituency. To claim success is a neccessary part of any broad progressive movement working to change society. But to admit defeat is as important. For it is the sign of a maturing politics which can learn from mistakes, and come back stronger from every failure. Defeat is as much part of political struggle as victory. Those who claim every activity, every campaign, every initiative as a victory do the progressive cause no good. Realistic assessments of strength and weakness, analysis and debate on failure, are part of the very process of building any powerful mass movement.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1986
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Oct 1986
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/118611 , vital:34651
- Description: The themes of victory and defeat dominate this issue of Work In Progress. Despite the state of emergency, there have been some important recent popular victories. Popular pressure and massive resistance blocked proposed 'independence' for the KwaNdebele bantustan. The efforts needed to dissuade KwaNdebele Chief Minister Simon Skosana and his followers from accepting Pretoria-style independence were enormous. So were the costs: vigilante violence and torture, death and destruction, necklaces and burnings. Nonetheless, the blocking of KwaNdebele independence is a popular victory. Never before has pressure from below halted bantustan independence - not in the Transkei or Ciskei, Venda or Bophuthatswana. The massive wave of rent boycotts which began in the Vaal during 1984 have also involved some notable popular victories. In many townships the organisation necessary to sustain prolonged withdrawal of rent payments has strengthened and developed the structures of popular mobilisation. And the boycotts have totally destroyed the financial base of the discredited and rejected black local authorities, be they in the form of community or town councils. On the trade union front, many of the established industrial unions have shown remarkable strength under pressure. With leadership detained or in hiding, some unions have been able to carry on their task of organising the working class in a disciplined and democratic manner. But there have been defeats too. Undisciplined comrades, often acting with no organisational basis or mandate, have divided communities, setting workers against the unemployed, children against parents, trade unions against community groups. Some of the rent boycotts have been enforced with a high degree of anti-democratic authoritarianism. The youth has often acted without the necessary support from other townships groups, without the organisational structures necessary for democratic decision-making, and without adequate mandate or consultation. Recourse to 'discipline', - necklacings, beatings and other punishments - has come too easily to a group which often lacks a mandate to act on behalf of any major constituency. To claim success is a neccessary part of any broad progressive movement working to change society. But to admit defeat is as important. For it is the sign of a maturing politics which can learn from mistakes, and come back stronger from every failure. Defeat is as much part of political struggle as victory. Those who claim every activity, every campaign, every initiative as a victory do the progressive cause no good. Realistic assessments of strength and weakness, analysis and debate on failure, are part of the very process of building any powerful mass movement.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Oct 1986
Work in Progress Issue no.4 - The Swaziland connection
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: April 1978
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111282 , vital:33428
- Description: This is the 4th issue of Work in Progress, and the editors would like to bring a few matters to the attention of readers and contributors. Language: We have received a number of critical comments, suggesting that some of the language used in WIP articles is unnecessarily complex and specialised. Unfortunately, these criticisms do not always refer to the same articles, and this suggests that what may be comprehensible and useful to one group, appears as academic jargon to another. This does not, however, absolve the editors or contributors from the responsibility of writing clearly and concisely, and avoiding unnecessarily technical terms. It should also be noted, however, that some of the issues WIP deals with are complex, and oversimplification would not allow one to do justice to that complexity. Contributors have a duty to explain the concepts and ideas they use, and to write lucidly; readers have a reciprocal duty to make the efforts to situate the language used within the debates and analysis offered. If readers who are worried about language used in WIP articles could contribute specific criticisms, this would assist greatly in the production of a more readable publication. Finances: WIP has no source of income, other than money returned from the distribution of issues. Thus far, the 4 issues produced have been paid for by individuals, and the amount recouped has been considerably less than the initial outlay. We do ask that, when you receive your copy, you contribute an amount of 50 cents to the person distributing, which would then be passed on to the editors. We also appeal to those individuals who are salary earners to consider becoming donor members of WIP. This entails contributing a minimum of R3 per month to the publication. In return the donor will receive a copy of every WIP produced. This will allow us to build up a secure financial footing for the production of future issues. Contributions can be sent to the editorial address below. Contributions: In this issue we carry an article on Swaziland. This is a small contribution to what we hope will become a growing debate on the nature and consequences of intensified conflict in southern Africa. We appeal for contributions, especially on issues like southern Africa, the state, security trials and other regular features in WIP. The nature of the publication, its sub-divisions and format, make it very easy to contribute, and we insist that there are many people with ideas and information worth sharing who are not doing so. Contributions and correspondence should be sent to the address which appears below. Distribution: We want WIP to reach a large range of groups involved in divergent forms of activity. If you have access to a group of people - who may be your close friends, or an organisation - and feel willing to distribute a certain number of each issue of WIP, please contact the editors, and this can be arranged. We do ask, however, that if this is done, you attempt to recover 50 cents an issue from those who can afford it.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: April 1978
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: April 1978
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111282 , vital:33428
- Description: This is the 4th issue of Work in Progress, and the editors would like to bring a few matters to the attention of readers and contributors. Language: We have received a number of critical comments, suggesting that some of the language used in WIP articles is unnecessarily complex and specialised. Unfortunately, these criticisms do not always refer to the same articles, and this suggests that what may be comprehensible and useful to one group, appears as academic jargon to another. This does not, however, absolve the editors or contributors from the responsibility of writing clearly and concisely, and avoiding unnecessarily technical terms. It should also be noted, however, that some of the issues WIP deals with are complex, and oversimplification would not allow one to do justice to that complexity. Contributors have a duty to explain the concepts and ideas they use, and to write lucidly; readers have a reciprocal duty to make the efforts to situate the language used within the debates and analysis offered. If readers who are worried about language used in WIP articles could contribute specific criticisms, this would assist greatly in the production of a more readable publication. Finances: WIP has no source of income, other than money returned from the distribution of issues. Thus far, the 4 issues produced have been paid for by individuals, and the amount recouped has been considerably less than the initial outlay. We do ask that, when you receive your copy, you contribute an amount of 50 cents to the person distributing, which would then be passed on to the editors. We also appeal to those individuals who are salary earners to consider becoming donor members of WIP. This entails contributing a minimum of R3 per month to the publication. In return the donor will receive a copy of every WIP produced. This will allow us to build up a secure financial footing for the production of future issues. Contributions can be sent to the editorial address below. Contributions: In this issue we carry an article on Swaziland. This is a small contribution to what we hope will become a growing debate on the nature and consequences of intensified conflict in southern Africa. We appeal for contributions, especially on issues like southern Africa, the state, security trials and other regular features in WIP. The nature of the publication, its sub-divisions and format, make it very easy to contribute, and we insist that there are many people with ideas and information worth sharing who are not doing so. Contributions and correspondence should be sent to the address which appears below. Distribution: We want WIP to reach a large range of groups involved in divergent forms of activity. If you have access to a group of people - who may be your close friends, or an organisation - and feel willing to distribute a certain number of each issue of WIP, please contact the editors, and this can be arranged. We do ask, however, that if this is done, you attempt to recover 50 cents an issue from those who can afford it.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: April 1978
Work in Progress Issue no.5 - Strike - Isithebe
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: June 1978
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111322 , vital:33436
- Description: EARLY IN 1973 industrial unrest broke out in Natal, mainly in the Durban—Pinetown—New Germany industrial complex. Approximately 80 000 black, mainly African, workers went out on strike for higher wages, paralysing industry and commerce in Natal and introducing urgency into debate on possible incorporationist strategy towards the working class - insofar as this is possible in South Africa. Although strikes have been a regular feature of struggle in the years since then, the numbers of workers involved in strikes have declined. Figures are extremely dubious because of the various definitions given to strike action and the number of unreported occurrences, but some idea of the decrease may be gained from official statistics: 1973 - 246 strikes (African workers only), 1974 - 194 strikes involving 38 961 workers, 1975 - 123 strikes involving 12 451 workers, 1976 113 strikes involving 16 170 workers. Since 1973, however, conflict has increasingly moved into the political/military and ideological fields and has taken place around many issues unconnected with directly economic demands. That many of these issues can be fairly easily traced, at least in part, to the economic crisis in South Africa is not being denied. These issues have included Black Consciousness demonstrations — the Biko and Sobukwe funerals — ; Bantu Education — June 1976 and its aftermath - ; rent and bus protests; bomb attacks and political assassinations; armed incursions from across the borders by black South Africans; squatter protests; etc.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: June 1978
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: June 1978
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111322 , vital:33436
- Description: EARLY IN 1973 industrial unrest broke out in Natal, mainly in the Durban—Pinetown—New Germany industrial complex. Approximately 80 000 black, mainly African, workers went out on strike for higher wages, paralysing industry and commerce in Natal and introducing urgency into debate on possible incorporationist strategy towards the working class - insofar as this is possible in South Africa. Although strikes have been a regular feature of struggle in the years since then, the numbers of workers involved in strikes have declined. Figures are extremely dubious because of the various definitions given to strike action and the number of unreported occurrences, but some idea of the decrease may be gained from official statistics: 1973 - 246 strikes (African workers only), 1974 - 194 strikes involving 38 961 workers, 1975 - 123 strikes involving 12 451 workers, 1976 113 strikes involving 16 170 workers. Since 1973, however, conflict has increasingly moved into the political/military and ideological fields and has taken place around many issues unconnected with directly economic demands. That many of these issues can be fairly easily traced, at least in part, to the economic crisis in South Africa is not being denied. These issues have included Black Consciousness demonstrations — the Biko and Sobukwe funerals — ; Bantu Education — June 1976 and its aftermath - ; rent and bus protests; bomb attacks and political assassinations; armed incursions from across the borders by black South Africans; squatter protests; etc.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: June 1978
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »