Newsletter of COSATU and UDF Natal regions - Peace meeting in jeopardy
- Authors: COSATU, UDF
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: COSATU, UDF
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/135425 , vital:37265
- Description: COSATU and UDF say, A climate for creating peace is slowly being established. But at the same time, a number of anti-peace forces are working to undermine our efforts. For years the police have been fanning the violence in Natal. In 1987 when peace talks with Inkatha were taking place they detained our leaders - thus sabotaging the peace talks. Throughout South Africa, the state has created and supported vigilante groups aimed at destroying progressive organisations. Now, after all the harm they have caused, they are trying to take credit for the peace that has recently been established in Tshongweni. In Mpumalanga, members of the Special Branch are attempting to hold peace talks with members of our organisations. We say that the police cannot be the agent of lasting peace. Peace will only come about when the organisations which are most affected come together and decide how peace can be enforced. The recent police shootings at Natal University, Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg and other areas remind us thgt the police are prepared to kill to save apartheid.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: COSATU, UDF
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: COSATU, UDF
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/135425 , vital:37265
- Description: COSATU and UDF say, A climate for creating peace is slowly being established. But at the same time, a number of anti-peace forces are working to undermine our efforts. For years the police have been fanning the violence in Natal. In 1987 when peace talks with Inkatha were taking place they detained our leaders - thus sabotaging the peace talks. Throughout South Africa, the state has created and supported vigilante groups aimed at destroying progressive organisations. Now, after all the harm they have caused, they are trying to take credit for the peace that has recently been established in Tshongweni. In Mpumalanga, members of the Special Branch are attempting to hold peace talks with members of our organisations. We say that the police cannot be the agent of lasting peace. Peace will only come about when the organisations which are most affected come together and decide how peace can be enforced. The recent police shootings at Natal University, Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg and other areas remind us thgt the police are prepared to kill to save apartheid.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
NUMSA National Auto Shop Stewards Council Update
- NUMSA
- Authors: NUMSA
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: NUMSA
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/114126 , vital:33927
- Description: During July and August this year, the united mass action of 25 OOO auto workers forced the bosses to negotiate nationally. Large demonstrations of workers demanding national negotiations marched and toyi-toyied through the plants. But auto workers also gave their bosses another strong message. United and strong, marching with large banners and replica AKs, workers were unbanning the ANC and flying high the red flag. Workers demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners. They said all hangings and political trials must stop. Workers demonstrated against the LRA and all other apartheid laws. Workers wanted their bosses to be clear. The bosses must know that the mass defiance campaign in the factory is part i of the struggle of the oppressed and exploited masses. When we are demanding better working conditions today, when we are unbanning our organisations through mass action today, we are demanding at one and the same time, control over every aspect of our lives in the factory and in the townships where we live. Our struggle for freedom is one struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: NUMSA
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: NUMSA
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/114126 , vital:33927
- Description: During July and August this year, the united mass action of 25 OOO auto workers forced the bosses to negotiate nationally. Large demonstrations of workers demanding national negotiations marched and toyi-toyied through the plants. But auto workers also gave their bosses another strong message. United and strong, marching with large banners and replica AKs, workers were unbanning the ANC and flying high the red flag. Workers demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners. They said all hangings and political trials must stop. Workers demonstrated against the LRA and all other apartheid laws. Workers wanted their bosses to be clear. The bosses must know that the mass defiance campaign in the factory is part i of the struggle of the oppressed and exploited masses. When we are demanding better working conditions today, when we are unbanning our organisations through mass action today, we are demanding at one and the same time, control over every aspect of our lives in the factory and in the townships where we live. Our struggle for freedom is one struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
Report of NUMSA research groups to the national campaign committee
- NUMSA
- Authors: NUMSA
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: NUMSA
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/117452 , vital:34516
- Description: The idea of developing Research Groups in NUMSA was agreed to within the Education Programme for 1989. The areas of research emerged from the organising sectors of the union. This link between research, education and organisation was seen to be very important. The experiment has been very successful and could point the way to a successful research method for many other projects. The research groups have effectively combined academic researchers, service organisations and worker leaders. This has proved a powerful combination. The basic idea was that a small group of between 10-15 people from within NUMSA would work with outside researchers on certain key areas. The task of the group was to identify problems and a framework of proposals for how NUMSA could deal with the issues. These recommendations then went to the organisational structures for discussion and endorsement. Once endorsed it became the task of: organisational structures to carry out the implementation of the proposals through collective bargaining and campaigns. Education to educate and train people within the unions on these issues. Education would work with the research groups in doing this. the research groups to continue research if necessary. It is also our aim to link these research groups to study tours to other countries so that we can make comparisons.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: NUMSA
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: NUMSA
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/117452 , vital:34516
- Description: The idea of developing Research Groups in NUMSA was agreed to within the Education Programme for 1989. The areas of research emerged from the organising sectors of the union. This link between research, education and organisation was seen to be very important. The experiment has been very successful and could point the way to a successful research method for many other projects. The research groups have effectively combined academic researchers, service organisations and worker leaders. This has proved a powerful combination. The basic idea was that a small group of between 10-15 people from within NUMSA would work with outside researchers on certain key areas. The task of the group was to identify problems and a framework of proposals for how NUMSA could deal with the issues. These recommendations then went to the organisational structures for discussion and endorsement. Once endorsed it became the task of: organisational structures to carry out the implementation of the proposals through collective bargaining and campaigns. Education to educate and train people within the unions on these issues. Education would work with the research groups in doing this. the research groups to continue research if necessary. It is also our aim to link these research groups to study tours to other countries so that we can make comparisons.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.60 - Negotiations, another site of struggle
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
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