Work in Progress Issue no.60 - Negotiations, another site of struggle
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
- Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
- Date: Sep 1989
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
- Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: Sep 1989
Work in Progress Issue no.37 - Unions & Community Organisations in Conflict
- WIP
- Authors: WIP
- Date: 1985
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111442 , vital:33457
- Description: South African politics is experiencing rapid realignments. Old and emerging alliances face severe tests in the present climate of recession and revolt. This is as obvious in the realm of popular and trade union politics as it is in the efforts of the extreme right wing to rebuild a power base. It is too easy to see areas of intense social conflict like the Eastern Cape in television-like images of death and street clashes. It is also too easy to attribute control and authority over events to local organisations. This issue of Work In Progress begins with a careful discussion of events surrounding the March stayaway in Port Elizabeth, tracing the organisational conflicts that are now being so bitterly fought out. In the intense stress of that crucible, divisions between trade union, political and community organisations have been carried to an extreme. Whether resolution of these competing organisational interests is possible remains unclear. But it does seem clear that few organisations are in control of members and supporters in the Eastern Cape - and this may be the result of an over-emphasis on political mobilisation, with a consequent neglect of the structures of political organisation. This over-emphasis on mobilisation has sometimes led to a search for simple answers to complex issues. For example, the rising tide of media and government hysteria about effective foreign disinvestment should not conceal the need for South African organisations to evaluate critically the effects of such campaigns at home. As at least some trade unions have found, a progressive policy on disinvestment is more complicated than it at first seems. As the 'Courts' feature in this WIP indicates, there are more treason trials underway in South Africa at present than at any previous time in history. Precisely why the state has chosen this moment to charge 16 UDF leaders in a trial which, on the face of it, deals with activities that were public and above-ground, is not clear. But from other treason trials before the courts, it seems that the ANC's armed struggle continues despite the Nkomati Accord and other similar agreements with Southern African governments. Of particular interest are state allegations that the ANC is training cadres inside South Africa, and that its military campaign includes township supporters who have not undergone specialised training outside South Africa.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1985
- Authors: WIP
- Date: 1985
- Subjects: WIP
- Language: English
- Type: text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111442 , vital:33457
- Description: South African politics is experiencing rapid realignments. Old and emerging alliances face severe tests in the present climate of recession and revolt. This is as obvious in the realm of popular and trade union politics as it is in the efforts of the extreme right wing to rebuild a power base. It is too easy to see areas of intense social conflict like the Eastern Cape in television-like images of death and street clashes. It is also too easy to attribute control and authority over events to local organisations. This issue of Work In Progress begins with a careful discussion of events surrounding the March stayaway in Port Elizabeth, tracing the organisational conflicts that are now being so bitterly fought out. In the intense stress of that crucible, divisions between trade union, political and community organisations have been carried to an extreme. Whether resolution of these competing organisational interests is possible remains unclear. But it does seem clear that few organisations are in control of members and supporters in the Eastern Cape - and this may be the result of an over-emphasis on political mobilisation, with a consequent neglect of the structures of political organisation. This over-emphasis on mobilisation has sometimes led to a search for simple answers to complex issues. For example, the rising tide of media and government hysteria about effective foreign disinvestment should not conceal the need for South African organisations to evaluate critically the effects of such campaigns at home. As at least some trade unions have found, a progressive policy on disinvestment is more complicated than it at first seems. As the 'Courts' feature in this WIP indicates, there are more treason trials underway in South Africa at present than at any previous time in history. Precisely why the state has chosen this moment to charge 16 UDF leaders in a trial which, on the face of it, deals with activities that were public and above-ground, is not clear. But from other treason trials before the courts, it seems that the ANC's armed struggle continues despite the Nkomati Accord and other similar agreements with Southern African governments. Of particular interest are state allegations that the ANC is training cadres inside South Africa, and that its military campaign includes township supporters who have not undergone specialised training outside South Africa.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1985
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