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Work in Progress Issue no.58 - The teenagers of Tumahole

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: April 1989
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111464 , vital:33462
  • Description: On January 11, South Africa's minister of home affairs and of communications, Stoffel Botha, warned Work In Progress that an examination of the publication was underway in terms of state of emergency regulations. Over a year before, Botha had warned W/P that unless it ceased 'systematic publication of subversive propaganda', he would act against it. The January 11 warning involved possible closure of W/P for up to six months, or imposing a pre-publication censor - a state official with powers to censor the contents of the publication. Over the next weeks, enormous support was expressed for W/P and its publishing policy. This came from editors of mainstream newspapers, trade unions, political organisations, religious bodies and a host of other interests and organisations. The Congress of South African Trade Unions noted that 'censorship of WIP is a direct attempt to stifle free and open debate, and to prevent the flow of information so vital to the building of democracy'. The National Union of Mineworkers said that 'every issue of W/P that does not come out will be a loss to our members', while the National Council of Trade Unions referred to the publication's 'intelligent and fearless analysis of the political, social and labour trends in our country'. From within the media world, Business Day editor Ken Owen spoke of W/P as a 'reliable, intelligent and ethically impeccable publication', while Tertius Myburgh of the Sunday Times called W/P 'an invaluable source of information which deserves to be heard by all who are interested in serious affairs in South Africa'. Representatives of foreign governments strongly condemned proposed action against W/P and other publications, and a number made direct representations to the South African government. Two weeks after Botha's warning, WIP responded to his threat of closure in a 40-page memorandum dealing with the emergency regulations in general, and the nature of the publication in particular. Botha turned down a suggestion that he meet with a delegation from the publication - and then a blanket of silence descended. By mid-February, two publications warned at the same time as W/P had been suspended for three months, and W/P began pushing Botha to respond to the representations made. Finally, on March 2, Botha's office informed WIP's publishers that no action was being contemplated in terms of the media emergency regulations. It is not for W/P to speculate on why the minister has chosen to act against some publications, and not others. The media emergency regulations involve arbitrary decisions and personal opinion. There is little point in seeking logic within arbitrariness. But it is worthwhile re-stating WIP's position on publishing: that not only do all South Africans have the right to be fully and accurately informed by a wide range of opinions, debates and analyses and reporting. In addition, freedom of speech of its nature guarantees the right of publication - and the right of readers to be exposed to diversity and contradiction. WIP has always been happy to allow readers to make their own choices on the basis of a wide range of information and views. This is the opposite of propaganda, which seeks to impose one view while suppressing others. In this battle for survival with the ministry of home affairs W/P has no doubt which side supports the publication of systematic propaganda. This edition of WIP is unavoidably late - held back until the outcome of the threatened closure had been finalised. No action is currently contemplated against the publication in terms of media emergency regulations at present - although the state still has much in its arsenal. But WIP intends surviving - and sees a long-term future for its publishing programme. One part of this future is financial stability - a crucial component of independent publishing. Ensuring financial stability, together with ever-increasing costs in paper, printing, reproduction and postage have forced W/P to raise its rates. But these increases are modest - way below rates of inflation - and in some cases are the first for over three years. The editors thank all those who supported W/P in its most-recent battle for survival - and look forward to ongoing and increasing support from the most important component of any publication: its readers.
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: April 1989

Work in Progress Issue no.59 - Roads to congress

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: July 1989
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112078 , vital:33545
  • Description: South Africa is moving into its fourth year of continuous emergency rule. And with the exception of a few months during 1986, some areas are entering their fifth year under these conditions. The effects of permanent emergency rule have been traumatic and wide ranging. Under emergency rule, a fundamentally anti-democratic state has been able to impose itself on an unwilling people without being subject to scrutiny, discussion or legal opposition. And while South Africa pre-emergency had almost none of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy, the last few years have stripped society of the last vestiges of rule by consent. The nature of the emergency has changed. It began as an aggressive attack on the mass democratic movement and the situation of 'ungovernability' that popular insurrection created. It has changed to become an all-encompassing political strategy, a last defence against ideas which refuse to die. For while organisations have been smashed, the ideas and aspirations which grew from the turbulent early 1980s are showing signs of re-emerging. In this context it may well be true that this government cannot rule without recourse to emergency powers of enormous magnitude. It may also be true that suppression of information, debate and opposition, and unrestrained powers for security forces, are a necessary precondition for an apartheid government to rule a subject people. Government sources have often argued that emergency powers are designed to create a stable context for 'reform'. But what reforms of substance have been offered since the first emergency was declared in July 1985? Looking nervously over a shoulder at far-right interests threatened by the most superficial aspects of deracialisation is hardly an indication of reform. Proposals for a consultative council incorporating Africans are not only tired and bankrupt. Their uncomfortable similarities to the 'toy telephone' Native Representative Council of the 1940s ensures that even the most moderate of black interests will spurn such ideas. Only the discredited, the opportunistic, or those with no following or power base can contemplate participation. Emergency rule - like so many of the preconditions for maintaining apartheid - has created further disease and distortion in society. When the state's institutions of repression - notably police and military - have the free reign granted by emergency powers, it is no surprise that death squads operate seemingly without reprisals. When members of the 'security forces' have the power to incarcerate apartheid's opponents indefinitely, it is no surprise that assassinations, abductions and 'dirty tricks' departments flourish as additional means to remove organised opposition and resistence. It is six weeks since David Webster's death swelled the growing record of political assassinations, assaults and abductions. Over 12 years of publishing, David was a good friend to Work In Progress, writing for, distributing and supporting the publication. Fie was guest speaker at WIP's tenth anniversary celebration. And while police seem unable to find those specifically responsible for his murder, those who have created the atmosphere of emergency rule are the real culprits. It is but one small step from exercising legal powers to detain, ban and suppress, to the extra-legal actions of assassination and terror. Emergency rule will presumably continue until at least after the September general election. The National Party is keen to stay as far from the international spotlight as possible until after these elections. In particular, the new American administration, while clearly right wing, may have new and unpleasant approaches to sanctions and international pressure on South Africa. Internally, the opposition which can be generated in the election - be it from the far right or from those committed to democracy - clearly worries a government based on such shaky foundations. Government planners will still recall the organised resistance to the election of Indian and coloured houses which made such a mockery of the tricameral constitutional initiative. When a government, bankrupt in ideas and initiative's bent on holding power for its own sake - and has means like the state of emergency to enforce is rule - the prospects for any constructive negotiated change are indeed bleak.
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  • Date Issued: July 1989

Work in Progress Issue no.60 - Negotiations, another site of struggle

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: Sep 1989
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112067 , vital:33544
  • Description: The air is thick with talk about negotiating South Africa's future. From the government of FW de Klerk and PW Botha to the rulers of England, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and West Germany; from the National and Democratic Parties to the ANC and SACP; from the 'mass democratic movement' to Inkatha, the Reserve Bank and those financial, commercial and industrial interests which make up South Africa's capitalist class: all have raised the vision of a negotiated settlement to the conflict over apartheid and South Africa's future. But matters are never that simple - especially in a conflict between interests which may be fundamentally opposed. Some years back, the ANC drew a distinction between 'talks' and 'negotiations' - a distinction which many commentators on South Africa seem unable to grasp. Additionally, serious analysts have noted that the idea and process of negotiation is itself an arena of struggle and contestation. This is true not only for opposition and anti-apartheid forces, but for the South African government itself. There is nothing predetermined or linear about a negotiation process - even if most parties are in agreement that, in principle, negotiated settlements are preferable to a 'fight to the death'. Negotiation is but one weapon in the arsenal of struggle-for all parties. Other weapons may-at various times - include armed force and military action, sanctions and international pressure, diplomacy and lobbying, destabilisation and disruption, mass politics and mobilisation, detentions, assassinations and vigilante activity. Many of these can be the tactics of struggle for the interests involved in the South African conflict: not only for the South African government, but also the Soviets, Americans or British; not only for the ANC and SACP, but also for Inkatha and the South African state's security apparatuses. And agreement in principle to negotiate is a long way from sitting across a table discussing the dismantling of apartheid and a postapartheid dispensation. Neither does a commitment to negotiations exclude the use of all tactics to create a climate most conducive to specific interests represented - be they the interests of white supremacy, imperialism, democracy, conservatism, capitalism or socialism. All the major actors involved in talking about negotiations know that well: it is only those who comment on and analyse their actions who often miss the point. For the ANC, then, there is no necessary contradiction between exploring negotiations and an armed struggle; For the SACP, working-class organisation, insurrectionary potentials and socialism are not contradicted by an agreement - at a particular point - to negotiate the dismantling of apartheid; For FW de Klerk, there is no conflict between the language of negotiation, a racial election and a state of emergency; For governments of other countries involved in the conflict, sanctions and international pressure on both the South African state and its anti-apartheid opponents do not run counter to a strategy of negotiations; And for Inkatha and its supporters, negotiations about peace in Natal seem compatible with a strategy of repressing all who fall outside their camp. These are the issues raised in a number of contributions to this edition of Work In Progress. All parties to the 'negotiation option' have contradictions to manage, suppress or overcome within their own ranks; all parties have the intention to create a climate most conducive to their interests and agendas; and all parties will, within the limits imposed by other forces operating on them, attempt to structure any negotiation process in favour of the interests they represent and champion. In this, they will utilise methods and tactics of struggle which appear to contradict a commitment to a negotiated settlement of South Africa's racial issues. There is nothing surprising in this: for negotiations themselves are a site of struggle, influencing and influenced by rhythms and developments in other areas and tactics of political struggle.
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  • Date Issued: Sep 1989

Work in Progress Issue no.61 - Defiance a measure of expectations

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: Oct 1989
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112056 , vital:33543
  • Description: This is not the first time a South African government has reached a maize of crossroads. But this time, no matter which direction is taken, the path can only swing back to a single destination, signposted: give up power to the majority. This demand is made - with different degrees of intensity - from almost every sector of influence: internal political organisations, international superpowers, local and international capital, the frontline states, even the Democratic Party within its own parliament. The taste of liberal democracy implied by police non-intervention in some of the largest demonstrations yet seen in South African history raises difficult questions for De Klerk's government. Will it send in troops next time round, and if so, at what cost? Or will the government, faced with few choices and even less room to manoeuvre, allow more and more demonstrations from a majority implacably opposed to National Party rule. The answer must depend on the extent to which the government is willing to ignore international economic and political pressure. The nature of current resistance and defiance suggests that those with allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement believe they have the government in a corner. There is no sign that action based on this belief will stop, and the sense of achievement generated by the 'Pretoria spring' of the mid-September marches will fuel this. The state's lack of options is compounded by the space these recent concessions may give popular political organisations to build spontaneous mass mobilisation into directed and thoughtful political programmes - precisely what years of emergency rule were designed to avoid. This could yet lead to an intensified period of repression. Popular resistance and expectations are fuelled by an increasingly politicised labour movement integrated into political organisations in a way they never were in the turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s. This 'unity in action' will ensure that the push to end minority rule occurs on the factory floor as well, sending ripples through the ranks of a capitalist class trapped between its employees and a state increasingly unable to guarantee capitalist interests. The ANC, in lobbying international forums to get its basic conditions for negotiation with Pretoria accepted, has succeeded in tapping into international desires to see resolution of the South African problem. In a changing international climate, the ANC is increasingly viewed as an organisation responsibly and thoughtfully representing the interests of the majority of South Africans. Against this, repression of those who demand basic human rights looks indefensible. The major powers involved in the 'negotiation push' are keen to rid South Africa of its 'apartheid problem'. Their major commitment is to a stable, majority government, with some form of capitalist economy. And while international governments' attitudes to sanctions vary, this pressure is growing. Sanctions will not bring down the economy or the government. But they will continue to limit the South African government's options in its strategies for holding power. Namibia, on the eve of independence, adds impetus to the feel ing that transfer of power in South Africa - possibly peaceful - may be attainable. The National Party programme of 'reform' demonstrates the impossibility of holding onto power while moving away from apartheid and minority rule. The minimum demands of the majority of South Africans remain more than the current government can consider. At every turn, the Nationalist government demonstrates that its tactics are born of reaction rather than a thoughtful strategy. It puts out the fires of resistance as and when they arise, and with little consistency in tactics. Sometimes guns are used and police are allowed free reign, while at other times there are attempts at containment. De Klerk's government may well be able to manage a holding operation, governing in the sense of maintaining partial control of society. But in the longer term, it has few real options. For at core, meeting the minimum demands of those creating the pressure - be they international powers or popular resistance forces - means relinquishing political power. Those who currently hold state power can react to mounting pressures in varying ways. But they do not have the space or options to act decisively in structuring the society to which they are responding. What remains unclear is the precise point at which the costs, in terms of political resistance, international pressure and economic decline, will become overwhelming. And equally unclear is how great these costs will be in bringing the government to that point.
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  • Date Issued: Oct 1989

Work in Progress Issue no.62/63 - Paths to Power, South Africa and Namibia face the future

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: Dec 1989
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112045 , vital:33541
  • Description: The political map of Southern Africa is being radically redrawn. The most vivid examples of this are the pre- independence elections in Namibia, giving the Namibian people their first opportunity to exercise control over their destiny, and in South Africa the release of the seven jailed ANC leaders by a president whose predecessor swore to let them rot in jail. Even in Angola major shifts are taking place below the surface while the war drags on. Savimbi’s fighters still receive weaponry from their traditional allies, but their Western support is no longer a certainty. Establishment American voices have, for the first time, been raised against his brutal tactics. The East-West, capitalist-communist rivalries that have fostered the 14-year Angolan war are everywhere crumbling. This has been graphically symbolised by the breaching of the Berlin Wall. And as the bricks fall at the Brandenburg Gate, they take with them decades of conventional wisdoms on both sides of the Wall. In Eastern Europe, the idea that socialist economics are an adequate alternative to political democracy has been destroyed, probably permanently. For socialists, the challenge now is to demonstrate that democracy is not, as their foes maintain, the exclusive preserve of capitalist economics. The massive changes in Eastern Europe have not left the West unaffected. And they have for the first time wrought a convergence of United States and Soviet opinion on South Africa that has impacted powerfully on Pretoria. Under FW de Klerk the National Party is now hard at work attempting to restructure both the material conditions under which the process of change takes place and the economics of the society its successors will inherit. Facing a reviving and increasingly confident opposition, the National Party is now led by politicians who recognise that no minority has ever successfully held on to power without facing a revolution. Its attempts at social engineering continue both in the bantustans and in the urban areas, where concessions on group areas serve to reinforce rather than eradicate the physical separation of communities of different races - strengthening De Klerk’s own thrust for a post-apartheid society rooted in'groups' and racial separation. Economically, too, reinforcement of the existing order is underway. Deregulation and privatisation are designed not so much to 'free' the economy, but to weaken the trade union movement in the short term and, in the long term, to entrench capitalist interests so deeply that whoever inherits political power is capable of no more real a transformation than changing the colour of parliament. Nor has De Klerk abandoned his government's traditional policy of divide and rule. Today he is seeking to force a divison between between the military formations of the ANC and what he hopes will become a 'political' ANC, ideally coalesced around the released seven and Nelson Mandela. Within the opposition, however, a significant momentum is developing towards greater rather than lesser unity - both between the ANC and its internal allies and more generally, among the majority of antiapartheid and democratic forces. Despite this, the democratic movement would be foolhardy to ignore the lessons of Namibia. The first of these is that the simple assertion by the popular movements of their representivity is not in itself a guarantee of overwhelming support. Secondly - and this is a message De Klerk’s strategists will have received and understood - that, through the DTA, Pretoria has for the first time succeeded in creating an organisation capable of winning sufficient legitimacy to gain the votes of almost one in three Namibians. * A steady increase in inflation has forced us, reluctantly, to increase the price of WIP - an increase so far limited to subscriptions. Full details are published on the inside back cover of this edition. For this new annual rate, however, subscribers will be getting eight editions rather than the current six - a first step, we hope, to WIP becoming a monthly journal.
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  • Date Issued: Dec 1989

Work in Progress Issue no.54 - COSATU Congress

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: July 1988
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111453 , vital:33460
  • Description: If Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha did not have so much power, his comments on the media would be funny. A man who seriously suggests that South Africa's progressive media, already restricted in what it may publish by some 100 statutes and reams of often unintelligible emergency restrictions, furthers 'fear, hatred, intimidation, murder, mutilation and other similar evils' is difficult to take seriously.But his powers to close publications are serious. His notion of 'media terrorists' - 'people who are in a position to provide publicity for the revolutionaries' - is easier to understand. For Stoffel Botha is a leader of a political party which has, for 40 years, systematically undermined the most elementary aspects of democracy. He is not really expected to know much about the media's duty and right to inform its readership. Work In Progress remains under threat from state sources which believe that publication of information they do not like is 'media terrorism'. But if its political survival is to some extent out of WIP's hands, its publishers can at least secure its economic future. Readers will have noticed that Work In Progress is being printed on a lighter paper than before. This makes the publication somewhat thinner, although a changed design format allows for more copy per page. Work In Progress has not raised its selling price since January 1985. Indeed, the cost for some categories of readers has actually dropped. Subscriptions were last increased at the end of 1986 - and then only marginally. Inflation has hit all facets of publishing - paper, printing and distribution costs have all jumped each year. Only WIP's ever-growing circulation has enabled its cover price to remain constant. Recently, however, something had to change. Rather than increasing cover price or subscription costs, the publishers decided to print on a cheaper and thinner paper, while upgrading cover quality. Hence a slimmer Work In Progress - but no price increase. Also new in this edition is the inclusion of a number of short briefs. This is a section the editors hope to expand and improve in the future - Stoffel Botha and his 'media hit-men' notwithstanding!
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  • Date Issued: July 1988

Work in Progress Issue no.46 - Striking OK Workers in Class War

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: Feb 1987
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/112034 , vital:33540
  • Description: The current state of emergency is into its ninth month. If anything, regulations promulgated during December and January make it more restrictive than before, and recent statements from government ministers suggest that there is no intention of ending emergency conditions at present. With a whites-only election scheduled for 6 May, opposition political parties have protested that the terms of the emergency favour the National Party in the election campaign, and seriously hinder other party efforts. And there is no indication that some of the most repressive aspects of emergency life - long-term detention, comprehensive media censorship, and a blanket ban on all sources of information concerning security force activities unless sanctioned by government - are softening. Government is clearly using emergency powers to undermine and attack serious challenges to its power - the ANC, the trade union movement, popular political organisations, and the embryonic structures of 'people's power' that developed in townships after 1985. But it is important to recognise that the state of emergency is not only being used to attack: it also functions to support and promote some interests and organisations at the expense of others. Organisations like Inkatha and its trade union wing, UWUSA, are benefitting from repression suffered by progressive organisations in Natal. The detention of all leading COSATU trade unionists in Northern Natal, for example, created a space for UWUSA in that area. In East London, government is attempting to create a basis of legitimacy for Duncan Village's newly constituted town council. But this could only happen after the UDF-affiliated Duncan Village Residents Association was severely weakened by police raids and detentions. Strikers involved in the OK Bazaars dispute have been so badly harassed by police that OK management approached government on this question. And government's attempts to silence discussion on the ANC within South Africa, and at the same time wage a propaganda war against that organisation, are greatly helped by emergency provisions. The blanket ban on advertisements calling for the unbanning of the ANC is just one example of this trend. Importantly, then, progressives must not only look at which organisations and interests are being undermined by the state of emergency. They must also ask who benefits. For government and its allies are not just involved in a battle against progressive opposition forces. They are also intervening in an attempt to create, support and direct structures and organisations which are more sympathetic to government's view of the future than any progressive groups will be.
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  • Date Issued: Feb 1987

Work in Progress Issue no.43 - Crossroads, The destruction of a symbol

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: Aug 1986
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111293 , vital:33430
  • Description: During May and June of this year, one of the most brutal forced removals of squatter communities took place in the Cape Peninsula. In two separate, but related, para-military operations, 'wit- doeke' from Old Crossroads and nearby Site C in Khayelitsha, allegedly with SADF and SAP support, rid the area of the four most coherent and resistant squatter communities in the Peninsula - Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension, Portland Cement and KTC. Along with their destruction went the image of Crossroads as a symbol of defiance and resistance to state strategies of removal; and the dream of progressives to incorporate Crossroads into their political movement. What follows provides background to the recent conflict in the Crossroads complex and aims to stimulate debate on broader political issues confronting the progressive movement in the Cape Peninsula. For political opponents of apartheid, the recent removals and pivotal role of 'wit-doeke' have been both a military and political defeat. Valuable lessons for future political practice and involvement in squatter struggles may be learned in the process of reflection and debate.
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  • Date Issued: Aug 1986

Work in Progress Issue no.44 - Rent boycott councils retaliate

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: Oct 1986
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/118611 , vital:34651
  • Description: The themes of victory and defeat dominate this issue of Work In Progress. Despite the state of emergency, there have been some important recent popular victories. Popular pressure and massive resistance blocked proposed 'independence' for the KwaNdebele bantustan. The efforts needed to dissuade KwaNdebele Chief Minister Simon Skosana and his followers from accepting Pretoria-style independence were enormous. So were the costs: vigilante violence and torture, death and destruction, necklaces and burnings. Nonetheless, the blocking of KwaNdebele independence is a popular victory. Never before has pressure from below halted bantustan independence - not in the Transkei or Ciskei, Venda or Bophuthatswana. The massive wave of rent boycotts which began in the Vaal during 1984 have also involved some notable popular victories. In many townships the organisation necessary to sustain prolonged withdrawal of rent payments has strengthened and developed the structures of popular mobilisation. And the boycotts have totally destroyed the financial base of the discredited and rejected black local authorities, be they in the form of community or town councils. On the trade union front, many of the established industrial unions have shown remarkable strength under pressure. With leadership detained or in hiding, some unions have been able to carry on their task of organising the working class in a disciplined and democratic manner. But there have been defeats too. Undisciplined comrades, often acting with no organisational basis or mandate, have divided communities, setting workers against the unemployed, children against parents, trade unions against community groups. Some of the rent boycotts have been enforced with a high degree of anti-democratic authoritarianism. The youth has often acted without the necessary support from other townships groups, without the organisational structures necessary for democratic decision-making, and without adequate mandate or consultation. Recourse to 'discipline', - necklacings, beatings and other punishments - has come too easily to a group which often lacks a mandate to act on behalf of any major constituency. To claim success is a neccessary part of any broad progressive movement working to change society. But to admit defeat is as important. For it is the sign of a maturing politics which can learn from mistakes, and come back stronger from every failure. Defeat is as much part of political struggle as victory. Those who claim every activity, every campaign, every initiative as a victory do the progressive cause no good. Realistic assessments of strength and weakness, analysis and debate on failure, are part of the very process of building any powerful mass movement.
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  • Date Issued: Oct 1986

Work in Progress Issue no.36

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: April 1985
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111431 , vital:33453
  • Description: Police shootings in Uitenhage's Langa township have deepened an already serious crisis of township rule. In rural and urban areas alike, black townships look more like war zones than residential areas. With police and army occupation, and a legal ban on gatherings in areas most affected, the claim of civil war is not far-fetched. Under pressure from organised capital and conservative Western interests, government lurches from blunder to crisis in an attempt to give substance to its 'new deal'. Increasing pressure from a surprisingly united disinvestment lobby in the USA and elsewhere, is matched by a growing international belief that the Botha government cannot deliver even limited reforms. Moderate and conservative Western interests have at last realised that change South African government-style does not necessarily involve progress. While the rebellion of the townships involves attacks on the symbols of political power - police, local authority or community council representatives - the underlying basis of rebellion is increasingly economic. Millions are unemployed. More and more school leavers and boycotting pupils know that they will never be employed. Retrenched workers experience a desperate situation as one-time family breadwinners - with little or no social security, savings, or prospects of employment. Sustained economic recovery seems unlikely without transforming the very nature of the economy. And any containment of the ever-growing township crisis is dependent on high economic growth. Neither world economic trends, nor government's monetarist policies, seem likely to pull the economy out of its fatal combination of high inflation and stagnation. If recession is to be a permanent feature of the next few years, then an increasingly ungovernable crisis-ridden society is a real prospect.
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  • Date Issued: April 1985

Work in Progress Issue no.37 - Unions & Community Organisations in Conflict

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: 1985
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111442 , vital:33457
  • Description: South African politics is experiencing rapid realignments. Old and emerging alliances face severe tests in the present climate of recession and revolt. This is as obvious in the realm of popular and trade union politics as it is in the efforts of the extreme right wing to rebuild a power base. It is too easy to see areas of intense social conflict like the Eastern Cape in television-like images of death and street clashes. It is also too easy to attribute control and authority over events to local organisations. This issue of Work In Progress begins with a careful discussion of events surrounding the March stayaway in Port Elizabeth, tracing the organisational conflicts that are now being so bitterly fought out. In the intense stress of that crucible, divisions between trade union, political and community organisations have been carried to an extreme. Whether resolution of these competing organisational interests is possible remains unclear. But it does seem clear that few organisations are in control of members and supporters in the Eastern Cape - and this may be the result of an over-emphasis on political mobilisation, with a consequent neglect of the structures of political organisation. This over-emphasis on mobilisation has sometimes led to a search for simple answers to complex issues. For example, the rising tide of media and government hysteria about effective foreign disinvestment should not conceal the need for South African organisations to evaluate critically the effects of such campaigns at home. As at least some trade unions have found, a progressive policy on disinvestment is more complicated than it at first seems. As the 'Courts' feature in this WIP indicates, there are more treason trials underway in South Africa at present than at any previous time in history. Precisely why the state has chosen this moment to charge 16 UDF leaders in a trial which, on the face of it, deals with activities that were public and above-ground, is not clear. But from other treason trials before the courts, it seems that the ANC's armed struggle continues despite the Nkomati Accord and other similar agreements with Southern African governments. Of particular interest are state allegations that the ANC is training cadres inside South Africa, and that its military campaign includes township supporters who have not undergone specialised training outside South Africa.
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  • Date Issued: 1985

Work in Progress Issue no.29 - Caught in the crossfire

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: July 1983
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111411 , vital:33449
  • Description: During July 1983? the Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC) announced that it intended increasing bus fares on certain routes. A committee representing commuters objected to the proposed increases, arguing that commuters could not afford them, given the recent price rise in the cost of basic foodstuffs. The CTC - partly owned by the Ciskei government - dismissed these objections, and the committee duly called a boycott of all buses owned by the company. On 19 July the boycott began. The following day the press reported an 80% drop in the use of CTC buses. From this point on, police, the army, and a private army of vigilantes were used by the Ciskei administration to force commuters to use buses. In the past two months, Ciskeian authorities have indicated their willingness to use any official and unofficial, legal and extra-legal forms of violence to break the boycott. Violence has escalated, and the conflict has now become a test of strength between bantustan rulers and their unwilling subjects. The first concerted attempt to break the boycott was directed at private car owners and taxi drivers. Police established road blocks on routes in and out of Mdantsane. From then on, vigilantes under the control of police harassed car passengers, car drivers and taxi drivers. Police manhandled car passengers, using sjamboks on some occasions. Cars have been confiscated, and passengers forced to alight and return to bus stops. The brunt of the tactics used to break the bus boycott have been borne by train commuters. As with vehicle commuters, the means used to prevent them from catching trains appear to know no bounds. Civilians have been attacked, assaulted and fired on by police and vigilante groups under police control. Residents of Mdantsane put the death toll at over 60. By September, at least 67 people - most of them trade unionists - had been detained under Ciskei security legislation. In addition, over 1 000 commuters have been detained for technical offences such as curfew breaking. In September, the South African Allied Workers' Union was banned by the Sebe administration. On 4 August, the Ciskei's minister of justice declared a state of emergency. No person may be on the streets without permission between 22h00 and 04h00. No more than four people may congregate together in houses or on the streets. There have been numerous reports of assaults and torture of detainees held in the Ciskei, and a number of detainees have been admitted to hospital at various stages of their detention. As disturbing as are the number of people hospitalised are reports of the failure to hospitalise or treat other detainees injured in assaults. This is the context in which SARS, in conjunction with the Development Studies Group, is publishing a detailed report on the Ciskei. Produced by Nicholas Haysom, a research officer at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the report covers the political history of the Ciskei, security legislation, torture and repression in the past years, background to the current bus boycott, and methods used by the Ciskei administration to crush the boycott. There is also a section on the current schools boycott in the Ciskei, the involvement of South African security police and firms in the Ciskei crisis, and the response of people resident in the area. Subscribers to SARS publications will receive this report as part of their subscription. Copies will also be available at bookshops stocking Work In Progress, or directly from SARS
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: July 1983

Work in Progress Issue no.20

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: Oct 1981
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111400 , vital:33448
  • Description: THE WAGE BOARD attracts frequent criticism. TUCSA has in the past adopted resolutions attacking it for taking the side of employers and for 'showing little concern for the workers' case'. The recent Wage Board investigation into the work conditions of nightwatchmen and other employees in the security services industry has attracted a certain amount of publicity. This article will recount the process of the investigation and, hopefully, illustrate a number of features of the Wage Board's operation. THE WAGE BOARD THE official version of the Wage Board's function is that it investigates an industry and then makes recommendations to the hon. the Minister who in turn makes a determination. The Wage Board attempts to recommend fair wages and other conditions of service, taking into account ‘the industry's ability to pay and the cost of living in the area concerned. What occurs is that in industries where no form of collective bargaining exists, the Minister of Manpower requests the Wage Board to investigate working conditions in that industry. The Board invites all interested parties to submit evidence, and may hold hearings at which oral evidence may be presented. As a result of the investigation the Board makes recommendations to the Minister as to what the minimum wages and working conditions in the industry should be. If the Minister accepts the recommendations, they are published in the Government Gazette as a Wage Determination.
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: Oct 1981

Work in Progress no.8 - Total War

  • Authors: WIP
  • Date: May 1979
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111333 , vital:33438
  • Description: What is apartheid/separate development - the policy followed by the National Party government and enforced through the state apparatuses since 1948? It is a specific option adopted by capitalism to structure production and reproduction in South Africa, Why was this option taken? Because it reflected certain political and economic power relationships during the mid 1940's, namely an alliance between an aspirant Afrikaner bourgeoisie, a privileged white working class, and an agricultural sector moving from semi-feudal relations to capitalist production. But this alliance and its actions in shaping the future of South Africa was in turn acting within an historical reality of dependent development within an international capitalist context, reliance on mining and agriculture for economic strength, racial division of the working class (in economic, political and ideological terms), geographical division of races, etc. What are the main characteristics of the apartheid option? The most important point to make is that it is capitalist - despite all the cries of "creeping socialism"; state "interference"; free market foundations and the Sunday Times business editor* Apartheid is an intense form of labour allocation, control and repression of the working class, It relies primarily on directly regressive measures to ensure the reproduction and maintenance of the capitalist way of producing. The apartheid option has institutionalised divisions in a range of areas — divisions which are once more essential for the reproduction and maintenance of society in its present form. These divisive tactics manipulate existing antagonisms and create new ones in the society - anatgonisms which revolve around ethnicity, nationalism, class conflict, urban-rural divisions, etc. While this process of reproducing the society in its present form has been (and remains) a largely repressive process, it is now taking on an increasingly ideological form. To repeat: the point is that apartheid is not antagonistic to capitalism; it is not, fundamentally, antagonistic to the demands of foreign capital investment and of modern imperialism, despite soms political disagreements, And the latest moves in the fields of industrial relations , living conditions and commercial opportunities for blacks have made the policy more easy to sell to those who want to believe in the moral correctness of exploitation of the working class in South Africa,
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: May 1979

Work in Progress Issue no.4 - The Swaziland connection

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: April 1978
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111282 , vital:33428
  • Description: This is the 4th issue of Work in Progress, and the editors would like to bring a few matters to the attention of readers and contributors. Language: We have received a number of critical comments, suggesting that some of the language used in WIP articles is unnecessarily complex and specialised. Unfortunately, these criticisms do not always refer to the same articles, and this suggests that what may be comprehensible and useful to one group, appears as academic jargon to another. This does not, however, absolve the editors or contributors from the responsibility of writing clearly and concisely, and avoiding unnecessarily technical terms. It should also be noted, however, that some of the issues WIP deals with are complex, and oversimplification would not allow one to do justice to that complexity. Contributors have a duty to explain the concepts and ideas they use, and to write lucidly; readers have a reciprocal duty to make the efforts to situate the language used within the debates and analysis offered. If readers who are worried about language used in WIP articles could contribute specific criticisms, this would assist greatly in the production of a more readable publication. Finances: WIP has no source of income, other than money returned from the distribution of issues. Thus far, the 4 issues produced have been paid for by individuals, and the amount recouped has been considerably less than the initial outlay. We do ask that, when you receive your copy, you contribute an amount of 50 cents to the person distributing, which would then be passed on to the editors. We also appeal to those individuals who are salary earners to consider becoming donor members of WIP. This entails contributing a minimum of R3 per month to the publication. In return the donor will receive a copy of every WIP produced. This will allow us to build up a secure financial footing for the production of future issues. Contributions can be sent to the editorial address below. Contributions: In this issue we carry an article on Swaziland. This is a small contribution to what we hope will become a growing debate on the nature and consequences of intensified conflict in southern Africa. We appeal for contributions, especially on issues like southern Africa, the state, security trials and other regular features in WIP. The nature of the publication, its sub-divisions and format, make it very easy to contribute, and we insist that there are many people with ideas and information worth sharing who are not doing so. Contributions and correspondence should be sent to the address which appears below. Distribution: We want WIP to reach a large range of groups involved in divergent forms of activity. If you have access to a group of people - who may be your close friends, or an organisation - and feel willing to distribute a certain number of each issue of WIP, please contact the editors, and this can be arranged. We do ask, however, that if this is done, you attempt to recover 50 cents an issue from those who can afford it.
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: April 1978

Work in Progress Issue no.5 - Strike - Isithebe

  • Authors: Work in progress (WIP)
  • Date: June 1978
  • Subjects: WIP
  • Language: English
  • Type: text
  • Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/111322 , vital:33436
  • Description: EARLY IN 1973 industrial unrest broke out in Natal, mainly in the Durban—Pinetown—New Germany industrial complex. Approximately 80 000 black, mainly African, workers went out on strike for higher wages, paralysing industry and commerce in Natal and introducing urgency into debate on possible incorporationist strategy towards the working class - insofar as this is possible in South Africa. Although strikes have been a regular feature of struggle in the years since then, the numbers of workers involved in strikes have declined. Figures are extremely dubious because of the various definitions given to strike action and the number of unreported occurrences, but some idea of the decrease may be gained from official statistics: 1973 - 246 strikes (African workers only), 1974 - 194 strikes involving 38 961 workers, 1975 - 123 strikes involving 12 451 workers, 1976 113 strikes involving 16 170 workers. Since 1973, however, conflict has increasingly moved into the political/military and ideological fields and has taken place around many issues unconnected with directly economic demands. That many of these issues can be fairly easily traced, at least in part, to the economic crisis in South Africa is not being denied. These issues have included Black Consciousness demonstrations — the Biko and Sobukwe funerals — ; Bantu Education — June 1976 and its aftermath - ; rent and bus protests; bomb attacks and political assassinations; armed incursions from across the borders by black South Africans; squatter protests; etc.
  • Full Text:
  • Date Issued: June 1978
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