A comparative study of CERBER, MAKTUB and LOCKY Ransomware using a Hybridised-Malware analysis
- Authors: Schmitt, Veronica
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Microsoft Windows (Computer file) , Data protection , Computer crimes -- Prevention , Computer security , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computers -- Access control , Malware (Computer software)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92313 , vital:30702
- Description: There has been a significant increase in the prevalence of Ransomware attacks in the preceding four years to date. This indicates that the battle has not yet been won defending against this class of malware. This research proposes that by identifying the similarities within the operational framework of Ransomware strains, a better overall understanding of their operation and function can be achieved. This, in turn, will aid in a quicker response to future attacks. With the average Ransomware attack taking two hours to be identified, it shows that there is not yet a clear understanding as to why these attacks are so successful. Research into Ransomware is limited by what is currently known on the topic. Due to the limitations of the research the decision was taken to only examined three samples of Ransomware from different families. This was decided due to the complexities and comprehensive nature of the research. The in depth nature of the research and the time constraints associated with it did not allow for proof of concept of this framework to be tested on more than three families, but the exploratory work was promising and should be further explored in future research. The aim of the research is to follow the Hybrid-Malware analysis framework which consists of both static and the dynamic analysis phases, in addition to the digital forensic examination of the infected system. This allows for signature-based findings, along with behavioural and forensic findings all in one. This information allows for a better understanding of how this malware is designed and how it infects and remains persistent on a system. The operating system which has been chosen is the Microsoft Window 7 operating system which is still utilised by a significant proportion of Windows users especially in the corporate environment. The experiment process was designed to enable the researcher the ability to collect information regarding the Ransomware and every aspect of its behaviour and communication on a target system. The results can be compared across the three strains to identify the commonalities. The initial hypothesis was that Ransomware variants are all much like an instant cake box consists of specific building blocks which remain the same with the flavouring of the cake mix being the unique feature.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
- Authors: Schmitt, Veronica
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Microsoft Windows (Computer file) , Data protection , Computer crimes -- Prevention , Computer security , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computers -- Access control , Malware (Computer software)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92313 , vital:30702
- Description: There has been a significant increase in the prevalence of Ransomware attacks in the preceding four years to date. This indicates that the battle has not yet been won defending against this class of malware. This research proposes that by identifying the similarities within the operational framework of Ransomware strains, a better overall understanding of their operation and function can be achieved. This, in turn, will aid in a quicker response to future attacks. With the average Ransomware attack taking two hours to be identified, it shows that there is not yet a clear understanding as to why these attacks are so successful. Research into Ransomware is limited by what is currently known on the topic. Due to the limitations of the research the decision was taken to only examined three samples of Ransomware from different families. This was decided due to the complexities and comprehensive nature of the research. The in depth nature of the research and the time constraints associated with it did not allow for proof of concept of this framework to be tested on more than three families, but the exploratory work was promising and should be further explored in future research. The aim of the research is to follow the Hybrid-Malware analysis framework which consists of both static and the dynamic analysis phases, in addition to the digital forensic examination of the infected system. This allows for signature-based findings, along with behavioural and forensic findings all in one. This information allows for a better understanding of how this malware is designed and how it infects and remains persistent on a system. The operating system which has been chosen is the Microsoft Window 7 operating system which is still utilised by a significant proportion of Windows users especially in the corporate environment. The experiment process was designed to enable the researcher the ability to collect information regarding the Ransomware and every aspect of its behaviour and communication on a target system. The results can be compared across the three strains to identify the commonalities. The initial hypothesis was that Ransomware variants are all much like an instant cake box consists of specific building blocks which remain the same with the flavouring of the cake mix being the unique feature.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
A study of malicious software on the macOS operating system
- Authors: Regensberg, Mark Alan
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer security , Computer viruses , Mac OS
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92302 , vital:30701
- Description: Much of the published malware research begins with a common refrain: the cost, quantum and complexity of threats are increasing, and research and practice should prioritise efforts to automate and reduce times to detect and prevent malware, while improving the consistency of categories and taxonomies applied to modern malware. Existing work related to malware targeting Apple's macOS platform has not been spared this approach, although limited research has been conducted on the true nature of threats faced by users of the operating system. While macOS focused research available consistently notes an increase in macOS users, devices and ultimately in threats, an opportunity exists to understand the real nature of threats faced by macOS users and suggest potential avenues for future work. This research provides a view of the current state of macOS malware by analysing and exploring a dataset of malware detections on macOS endpoints captured over a period of eleven months by an anti-malware software vendor. The dataset is augmented with malware information provided by the widely used Virus. Total service, as well as the application of prior automated malware categorisation work, AVClass to categorise and SSDeep to cluster and report on observed data. With Windows and Android platforms frequently in the spotlight as targets for highly disruptive malware like botnets, ransomware and cryptominers, research and intuition seem to suggest the threat of malware on this increasingly popular platform should be growing and evolving accordingly. Findings suggests that the direction and nature of growth and evolution may not be entirely as clear as industry reports suggest. Adware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) make up the vast majority of the detected threats, with remote access trojans (RATs), ransomware and cryptocurrency miners comprising a relatively small proportion of the detected malware. This provides a number of avenues for potential future work to compare and contrast with research on other platforms, as well as identification of key factors that may influence its growth in the future.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
- Authors: Regensberg, Mark Alan
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer security , Computer viruses , Mac OS
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92302 , vital:30701
- Description: Much of the published malware research begins with a common refrain: the cost, quantum and complexity of threats are increasing, and research and practice should prioritise efforts to automate and reduce times to detect and prevent malware, while improving the consistency of categories and taxonomies applied to modern malware. Existing work related to malware targeting Apple's macOS platform has not been spared this approach, although limited research has been conducted on the true nature of threats faced by users of the operating system. While macOS focused research available consistently notes an increase in macOS users, devices and ultimately in threats, an opportunity exists to understand the real nature of threats faced by macOS users and suggest potential avenues for future work. This research provides a view of the current state of macOS malware by analysing and exploring a dataset of malware detections on macOS endpoints captured over a period of eleven months by an anti-malware software vendor. The dataset is augmented with malware information provided by the widely used Virus. Total service, as well as the application of prior automated malware categorisation work, AVClass to categorise and SSDeep to cluster and report on observed data. With Windows and Android platforms frequently in the spotlight as targets for highly disruptive malware like botnets, ransomware and cryptominers, research and intuition seem to suggest the threat of malware on this increasingly popular platform should be growing and evolving accordingly. Findings suggests that the direction and nature of growth and evolution may not be entirely as clear as industry reports suggest. Adware and Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) make up the vast majority of the detected threats, with remote access trojans (RATs), ransomware and cryptocurrency miners comprising a relatively small proportion of the detected malware. This provides a number of avenues for potential future work to compare and contrast with research on other platforms, as well as identification of key factors that may influence its growth in the future.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
Towards understanding and mitigating attacks leveraging zero-day exploits
- Authors: Smit, Liam
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Computer crimes -- Prevention , Data protection , Hacking , Computer security , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computers -- Access control , Malware (Computer software)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/115718 , vital:34218
- Description: Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown and therefore not addressed with the result that they can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised system access. In order to understand and mitigate against attacks leveraging zero-days or unknown techniques, it is necessary to study the vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks that make use of them. In recent years there have been a number of leaks publishing such attacks using various methods to exploit vulnerabilities. This research seeks to understand what types of vulnerabilities exist, why and how these are exploited, and how to defend against such attacks by either mitigating the vulnerabilities or the method / process of exploiting them. By moving beyond merely remedying the vulnerabilities to defences that are able to prevent or detect the actions taken by attackers, the security of the information system will be better positioned to deal with future unknown threats. An interesting finding is how attackers exploit moving beyond the observable bounds to circumvent security defences, for example, compromising syslog servers, or going down to lower system rings to gain access. However, defenders can counter this by employing defences that are external to the system preventing attackers from disabling them or removing collected evidence after gaining system access. Attackers are able to defeat air-gaps via the leakage of electromagnetic radiation as well as misdirect attribution by planting false artefacts for forensic analysis and attacking from third party information systems. They analyse the methods of other attackers to learn new techniques. An example of this is the Umbrage project whereby malware is analysed to decide whether it should be implemented as a proof of concept. Another important finding is that attackers respect defence mechanisms such as: remote syslog (e.g. firewall), core dump files, database auditing, and Tripwire (e.g. SlyHeretic). These defences all have the potential to result in the attacker being discovered. Attackers must either negate the defence mechanism or find unprotected targets. Defenders can use technologies such as encryption to defend against interception and man-in-the-middle attacks. They can also employ honeytokens and honeypots to alarm misdirect, slow down and learn from attackers. By employing various tactics defenders are able to increase their chance of detecting and time to react to attacks, even those exploiting hitherto unknown vulnerabilities. To summarize the information presented in this thesis and to show the practical importance thereof, an examination is presented of the NSA's network intrusion of the SWIFT organisation. It shows that the firewalls were exploited with remote code execution zerodays. This attack has a striking parallel in the approach used in the recent VPNFilter malware. If nothing else, the leaks provide information to other actors on how to attack and what to avoid. However, by studying state actors, we can gain insight into what other actors with fewer resources can do in the future.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
- Authors: Smit, Liam
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Computer crimes -- Prevention , Data protection , Hacking , Computer security , Computer networks -- Security measures , Computers -- Access control , Malware (Computer software)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/115718 , vital:34218
- Description: Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown and therefore not addressed with the result that they can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised system access. In order to understand and mitigate against attacks leveraging zero-days or unknown techniques, it is necessary to study the vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks that make use of them. In recent years there have been a number of leaks publishing such attacks using various methods to exploit vulnerabilities. This research seeks to understand what types of vulnerabilities exist, why and how these are exploited, and how to defend against such attacks by either mitigating the vulnerabilities or the method / process of exploiting them. By moving beyond merely remedying the vulnerabilities to defences that are able to prevent or detect the actions taken by attackers, the security of the information system will be better positioned to deal with future unknown threats. An interesting finding is how attackers exploit moving beyond the observable bounds to circumvent security defences, for example, compromising syslog servers, or going down to lower system rings to gain access. However, defenders can counter this by employing defences that are external to the system preventing attackers from disabling them or removing collected evidence after gaining system access. Attackers are able to defeat air-gaps via the leakage of electromagnetic radiation as well as misdirect attribution by planting false artefacts for forensic analysis and attacking from third party information systems. They analyse the methods of other attackers to learn new techniques. An example of this is the Umbrage project whereby malware is analysed to decide whether it should be implemented as a proof of concept. Another important finding is that attackers respect defence mechanisms such as: remote syslog (e.g. firewall), core dump files, database auditing, and Tripwire (e.g. SlyHeretic). These defences all have the potential to result in the attacker being discovered. Attackers must either negate the defence mechanism or find unprotected targets. Defenders can use technologies such as encryption to defend against interception and man-in-the-middle attacks. They can also employ honeytokens and honeypots to alarm misdirect, slow down and learn from attackers. By employing various tactics defenders are able to increase their chance of detecting and time to react to attacks, even those exploiting hitherto unknown vulnerabilities. To summarize the information presented in this thesis and to show the practical importance thereof, an examination is presented of the NSA's network intrusion of the SWIFT organisation. It shows that the firewalls were exploited with remote code execution zerodays. This attack has a striking parallel in the approach used in the recent VPNFilter malware. If nothing else, the leaks provide information to other actors on how to attack and what to avoid. However, by studying state actors, we can gain insight into what other actors with fewer resources can do in the future.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
NetwIOC: a framework for the automated generation of network-based IOCS for malware information sharing and defence
- Authors: Rudman, Lauren Lynne
- Date: 2018
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer networks Security measures , Computer security , Python (Computer program language)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/60639 , vital:27809
- Description: With the substantial number of new malware variants found each day, it is useful to have an efficient way to retrieve Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from the malware in a format suitable for sharing and detection. In the past, these indicators were manually created after inspection of binary samples and network traffic. The Cuckoo Sandbox, is an existing dynamic malware analysis system which meets the requirements for the proposed framework and was extended by adding a few custom modules. This research explored a way to automate the generation of detailed network-based IOCs in a popular format which can be used for sharing. This was done through careful filtering and analysis of the PCAP hie generated by the sandbox, and placing these values into the correct type of STIX objects using Python, Through several evaluations, analysis of what type of network traffic can be expected for the creation of IOCs was conducted, including a brief ease study that examined the effect of analysis time on the number of IOCs created. Using the automatically generated IOCs to create defence and detection mechanisms for the network was evaluated and proved successful, A proof of concept sharing platform developed for the STIX IOCs is showcased at the end of the research.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2018
- Authors: Rudman, Lauren Lynne
- Date: 2018
- Subjects: Malware (Computer software) , Computer networks Security measures , Computer security , Python (Computer program language)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MSc
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/60639 , vital:27809
- Description: With the substantial number of new malware variants found each day, it is useful to have an efficient way to retrieve Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from the malware in a format suitable for sharing and detection. In the past, these indicators were manually created after inspection of binary samples and network traffic. The Cuckoo Sandbox, is an existing dynamic malware analysis system which meets the requirements for the proposed framework and was extended by adding a few custom modules. This research explored a way to automate the generation of detailed network-based IOCs in a popular format which can be used for sharing. This was done through careful filtering and analysis of the PCAP hie generated by the sandbox, and placing these values into the correct type of STIX objects using Python, Through several evaluations, analysis of what type of network traffic can be expected for the creation of IOCs was conducted, including a brief ease study that examined the effect of analysis time on the number of IOCs created. Using the automatically generated IOCs to create defence and detection mechanisms for the network was evaluated and proved successful, A proof of concept sharing platform developed for the STIX IOCs is showcased at the end of the research.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2018
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