Practicing conciliation: Towards a practical application of the Equal Weight View
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Intellectual achievement in pursuit of true belief
- Authors: Shapiro, Lucy Deborah
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2735 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005955 , Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Description: The practice of inquiry, in which we seek and pursue true beliefs by forming justified beliefs, is important to us. This thesis will address two questions concerning the significance of this practice. These are the question of what explains our preference for this particular belief-forming practice, and whether this value can be explained by the value of true belief alone. To answer these questions I will examme a variety of our intuitive commitments to particular values, assuming their general accuracy. I will use an inference from the goal of a practice to the value of a practice, an inference based on the assumption that when we pursue something it is valuable. I will discuss our intuitive commitments to the value of justification. I will also rely on the implications of the presence of pride and admiration in relation to the outcome of an inquiry (especially in situations where a belief is difficult to form). By using this methodology, I will argue for three sources of value that explain the unique significance of the value of inquiry. The first is the value of its unique role in our being able to form reliably true beliefs. Second, I will argue for Wayne D. Riggs' account of epistemic credit; Riggs defends the value of our being responsible for true beliefs, they are our achievements. Third, I will argue for an additional the value of delivering a skilful epistemic performance, another kind of achievement. I will show that although the value of true belief plays a role in explaining some of the values, the third value for inquiry is independent of the value of true belief. This means that there are intellectual rewards, which can be gained from this practice, that extend beyond the value of true belief. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
- Authors: Shapiro, Lucy Deborah
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2735 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005955 , Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Description: The practice of inquiry, in which we seek and pursue true beliefs by forming justified beliefs, is important to us. This thesis will address two questions concerning the significance of this practice. These are the question of what explains our preference for this particular belief-forming practice, and whether this value can be explained by the value of true belief alone. To answer these questions I will examme a variety of our intuitive commitments to particular values, assuming their general accuracy. I will use an inference from the goal of a practice to the value of a practice, an inference based on the assumption that when we pursue something it is valuable. I will discuss our intuitive commitments to the value of justification. I will also rely on the implications of the presence of pride and admiration in relation to the outcome of an inquiry (especially in situations where a belief is difficult to form). By using this methodology, I will argue for three sources of value that explain the unique significance of the value of inquiry. The first is the value of its unique role in our being able to form reliably true beliefs. Second, I will argue for Wayne D. Riggs' account of epistemic credit; Riggs defends the value of our being responsible for true beliefs, they are our achievements. Third, I will argue for an additional the value of delivering a skilful epistemic performance, another kind of achievement. I will show that although the value of true belief plays a role in explaining some of the values, the third value for inquiry is independent of the value of true belief. This means that there are intellectual rewards, which can be gained from this practice, that extend beyond the value of true belief. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
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