Emotions, Social Transformation and Education

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Abstract
This thesis addresses the topic of the education of the emotions in the context of a rapidly transforming South African society. It attempts to reconfigure the conceptual landscape in terms of which we think about rationality, social transformation and education, and contests the intellectual and instrumental prejudice in the currently dominant ways of thinking about education. It reclaims a sense of what it would be to think of education in terms of cultivating humanity, as a key to the profound transformation of the South African society. It argues that the emotions should be relocated in our conception of transformation and education, because without it, education will fail to assist South African society to transform into a society where most people are able to live improved quality lives.

The thesis comprises three distinct parts. The first part consists of an account of a particular cognitive theory of the emotions, as developed by Martha Nussbaum in her book, *Upheavals of thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001). This theory is then applied in Part 2 to examine the complexities of social transformation in South Africa at the more profound, personal level. This investigation is presented as a narrative and comprises the perspectives of the author, who is a white Afrikaner female, who grew up in South Africa in the heyday of Apartheid. In the final part, the concept of ‘education for transformation’ is discussed. It is argued that, in order for education to enhance the social transformation of South Africa, social transformation should be conceived according to a fundamental aspect of Rousseau’s political philosophy, namely that the ideal society comprises two reciprocally related spheres, the political and the personal sphere. Part 3 argues that ‘education for transformation’ should be conceived according to a conception of transformation, which acknowledges this double-layered texture. It further argues that ‘education for transformation’ should primarily be concerned with transformation at the personal level, since, according to Rousseau’s philosophy, this dimension is fundamental to ensuring the stability and legitimacy of the political order. However, built on the main insights of Part 2, this thesis also argues that personal transformation is only possible within a framework of rationality, which acknowledges the emotions as constitutive elements of rationality itself.

Essentially, this thesis is about the conception of human being, which should be esteemed as the most fundamental and crucial element of successful social transformation.
**Key concepts**
Social transformation
Martha Nussbaum
Emotions
South Africa
Afrikaner
Education
Rationality
Values
Early development
Music
Declaration
I, Aletta Catherina Delport, hereby declare that the thesis *Emotions, Social Transformation and Education*, submitted to the University of Port Elizabeth for the degree of Doctor Educationis, is my own work, that it has not previously been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Aletta Catherina Delport
23 January 2004
Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

South Africa is currently engaged in a process of radical political and social change. The new democratic South Africa is envisaged as a country of peace and prosperity, where all South African citizens will be able to live a quality life. This thesis is primarily about the conception of human being, and thus human well-being, which should be valued as the most fundamental and indispensable element of successful social transformation.

1.1 Aim of this study

Political and social transformation in South Africa has as its ultimate goal the improvement of the quality of life of all its residents. Ultimately education should also be conceived as an improvement of the quality of life of individuals and societies and the development of total human beings. In this regard, education is often seen as ‘the repository of hope’ for the country. However, there is reason to suspect that

1. Political and social transformation in South African is mainly conceived in strategic terms, assuming that observable and measurable organisational changes are all there is to transformation.
2. The contribution of education in South African, especially with regards to social transformation, is thought of mainly in cognitive terms. The assumption is that education is essentially concerned with cognitive development and its defining purpose is instrumental.

This thesis will challenge these two assumptions. It attempts to reconfigure the conceptual landscape in terms of which we think about rationality, social transformation and education. It aims to counteract the intellectual and instrumental bias in the currently dominant ways of thinking about education and to retrieve a sense of what it would be to think of education in terms of cultivating humanity, as a key to the profound transformation of our society. It intends to relocate the emotions in our conception of transformation and education, because without it, education will fail to assist South African society to transform into a society where most people are able to live improved quality lives.
1.3 Theoretical framework

Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions, appraising emotions as “… intelligent responses to the perception of value” (UT¹, 1) has large consequences for the theory of practical reason. Her theory assists us to grasp the relationship between emotions and various conceptions of the human good. Her view suggests that without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity will be lacking. Promotion of the conditions of emotional well-being in a political culture should therefore be regarded as crucial for the stability and flourishing of society.

Martha Nussbaum advocates a cognitive theory of the emotions, arguing that emotions are components of our logic itself (UT, 3). Contrary to historical and even some contemporary stances, which negate the emotions as mere chemical reactions that trigger physiological responses, thus interfering with rational decision, Nussbaum (UT, 27–29) claims that emotions are cognitive judgements. Emotions are not meagre additions to knowledge or crutches for intelligence. They are the basis of profound perception and understanding, since they include judgments about things that are important to us, things that we regard as significant to our personal well-being. Emotions monitor reality from a person’s own perspective, plotting events onto the person’s own sense of importance or value. Nussbaum therefore regards emotions as evaluative-cognitive judgements. They are our ways of registering how things are with respect to uncontrollable external items.

Nussbaum’s theory has important consequence for the way we conceive rationality and therefore education. Specifically significant for education is her theory that each individual’s emotional life has a history with its origins in childhood. She holds that adult emotions cannot be understood without comprehending their childhood history and argues, “… in a deep sense all human emotions are in part about the past, and bear the traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed and idiosyncratic” (UT, 177). The specific childhood history subsequently affects the responsiveness of the emotions, namely “… their appropriateness to the life of an incomplete creature in a world of significant accidents, their connections to the development of practical reason and a sense of self” (UT, 178). Although Nussbaum acknowledges the significantly important role of the family circle in the development

¹ The following book has been used as the central source for this study: Nussbaum, M. 2001. *Upheavals of thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Throughout the thesis, references to this book will be indicated as (UT), followed by the relevant page number.)
of early emotional life, she stresses that people cultivate their emotions during their socialisation with others. Schools form a substantial part of the ‘facilitating environment’ and the nurturing of a healthy emotional life should be prioritised, especially in the early school years.

1.4 Strategy
I believe that Nussbaum’s theoretical account provides a framework for our deliberations when we consider what we mean when we talk of the social transformation of South Africa, and how education might support it. In this thesis I therefore intend to discuss some selected aspects of social transformation and education from the point of view of Nussbaum’s theory, as meticulously developed in her comprehensive book, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001).

Part 1 of the thesis provides a critical account of Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions. This account is developed through five consecutive chapters. This theory will subsequently provide the framework for Part 2, in which the implications of social transformation at personal level will be traced out. By applying my own narrative in Part 2 I have tried to illustrate the intensity and extent of this inner, personal turmoil, brought about by the social and political transformation of this country. Part 3 of the thesis will look at the implications of social transformation for education. It will also examine the possible role education can and should play in assisting the South African society to transform. In the last part of this thesis I will focus on the importance of adequate conceptions of social transformation and rationality when we consider education’s potential to enhance the social transformation of South African society.

The decision to focus on the theory of a single author is justified as follows: Martha Nussbaum is a renowned classicist and contemporary philosopher. She is thoroughly immersed in a wide range of disciplines such as political philosophy, psychology, anthropology, literary and religious studies, and music. She engages with recent research in these respective fields in her book, *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001). In this book she draws on her wide scholarship to argue that emotions are not simply decorations or disruptions of knowledge, but that they lie at the very heart of our self-knowledge in our connections with other human beings. In this thesis, Nussbaum’s comprehensive theory of the emotions is therefore chosen as the framework for thinking about social transformation and education.
Conclusion

The future citizens of South Africa will be educated in our schools. Becoming an educated South African does indeed imply the acquisition of knowledge and skills required for adult life. However, especially in a transforming society, becoming an educated South African citizen also implies learning how to be a human being, capable of much-needed understanding, love and compassion. Unless teachers conceive education correctly, schools are likely to produce future citizens who have difficulty understanding people different from themselves, and whose circles of concern will be restricted to their own confined setting. Such a society will be engaged in an ever-lasting struggle to transform itself.
A cognitive theory of the emotions:
Martha Nussbaum
Chapter 2: Emotions and judgements of value

2.1 Introduction
Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions should be seen as a constituent part of the system of reasoning. She bases this belief on her conviction that “Emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanisms of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself” (UT, 3). Emotions are discriminating responses to perceptions of value and are permeated with intelligence. Once we acknowledge that emotions entail true or false judgements and appraisals that serve as guides to ethical choice, we cannot ignore them in accounts of ethical judgement. She argues that the development of an adequate theory of the emotions should take their cultural origins, their childhood past, and their operations in daily human life into consideration.

In the first part of her book she develops a theory of the emotions using Marcel Proust’s description (1982) in his *Remembrance of Things Past*, namely that emotions are “geological upheavals of thought” (UT, 1). She suggests that the varied experiences of our emotional life are well explained by a view that has its genesis in the ideas of the ancient Greek Stoics. They held that emotions are forms of evaluative judgement. We share the world with other external objects (things and persons) and we judge these objects according to their importance to our own flourishing. However, since these objects are external and since we cannot control all the external objects, the judgement will also include an acknowledgement of one’s own vulnerability to the particular object in particular, and to the outer world in general.

2.2 Need and Recognition
A meticulous analysis of the variety of her emotional reactions to her mother’s unexpected death made Nussbaum realise that the Stoics’ account of cognition should be expanded. She thus proposes an explanatory theory of the emotions in which she argues that an emotion always includes an appraisal or a judgement. In the case of emotions, the thought of an object is always in combination with a thought of the object’s importance to one’s own well-being. Emotions should thus be regarded as cognitive-evaluative (UT, 23).

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2 Throughout Part 1, the sub-headings will be according to Nussbaum’s text in *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions* (2001).
Nussbaum holds that the term ‘cognitive’ simply refers to “… processing and receiving information”. The appraisal of the object is a spontaneous, immediate cognitive reaction or thought, which may include a correct or incorrect judgement. She distinguishes between emotions and bodily appetites, such as hunger and thirst, and objectless moods such as irritability and endogenous depression. This broad distinction seems to be accepted not only in everyday life, but also in Western and non-Western philosophies (UT, 24).

2.3 The ‘adversary’: intentionality, belief and evaluation

Throughout the development of her theory of the emotions, Nussbaum responds to possible counterarguments raised from an adversary’s point of view. In doing this, she manages to substantiate her claims by offering elaborated arguments, which emphasise distinctive characteristics of her theory. The view that emotions should be regarded as forceful, stupid, non-reasoning, unthinking, unintelligent, visionless, feral bodily energies and movements is widely held (UT, 24, 25). Nussbaum does not deny the physical component of emotions, but she argues that their intentional and cognitive components should also be acknowledged. If emotions were non-intentional forces as described above, they would have been experienced as non-self invasions. We would have been entirely submissive to them. To oppose this restricted view, she proposes three distinct components of an emotion, namely its ‘object’, ‘belief’ and ‘self’ components:

- The ‘object’ component of an emotion

Emotions are always about something. If that object is removed, the thought related to that object will also disappear, and the emotion will be reduced to a mere physical reaction, like a trembling of the hands, or a rapid heart beat. The distinct thought about the object provides an emotion with its unique identity such as fear, love, or grief. This distinct thought also enables one to distinguish between different emotions. A purely bodily conception of the emotions cannot account for distinctions between emotions (UT, 27,28). Nussbaum’s analyses of the variety of emotions she experienced during and after her mother’s death, lead her to conclude that emotions are also concerned with value. The particular person experiencing the emotion perceives the object of the emotion as valuable and important to him/her. In this sense, she regards emotions as localised. Although the perceived value is of a specific nature and referring to the flourishing of that particular person, this does not mean that the object has only instrumental value. Objects may also have intrinsic worth (UT, 30, 31).
• The ‘belief’ component of an emotion

In this regard, Nussbaum refers to Aristotle, who, in his *Rhetoric*, regarded a belief or a series of beliefs as an essential component of an emotion. In order to experience anger, for instance, there must be a belief that damage has been done to somebody or something precious to oneself. Implied in this belief are also the beliefs that this damage was not insignificant, and that it was probably done intentionally by somebody. Should the beliefs change, the emotion will change accordingly. Once again, a purely bodily sensation will not enable one to identify the emotion. It will be only once one analyses one’s thoughts that one will be able to distinguish the particular emotion (UT, 29).

• The ‘self’ component of an emotion

Emotions are about intentional objects. The objects of emotions are as perceived by the agent. An emotion implies an internal connection to a particular object. The self is actively involved, interpreting the object, correctly or incorrectly, in terms of the perceived flourishing of the self (UT, 28). This leads her to argue that emotions are eudemonistic. According to ancient Greek eudemonistic ethical theories, the conception of eudemonia includes “… all to which the agent ascribes intrinsic value” (UT, 32). She warns, however, against two wrong perceptions, namely that eudemonia refers to some instrumental relation that the valued object carries to the agent’s satisfaction, and that eudemonia simply be regarded as happiness, thus implying that the end goal is merely a state of pleasure or contentment (UT, 32). An individual’s eudemonia can have several constituent parts, including for instance, honourable actions, shared relations of personal love, friendship and so on. But crucial to the eudemonia of a person’s life is its individualistic character. These essential parts constitute a unique person’s eudemonia, not somebody else’s.

At this point, Nussbaum’s theory explains why emotions have such a relentless impact on a person. They are essentially concerned with the self – its plans, goals, and what is important for the self to flourish. “Emotions look at the world from the subject’s own viewpoint, mapping events on to the subject’s own sense of personal importance or value” (UT, 33).

2.4 Necessity and constituent parthood

Nussbaum continues to develop her theory on the emotions by arguing that a particular belief constitutes the identity of the emotion. In her arguments she
concentrates on the relation between a particular belief and the identity of the emotion, and she focuses on three aspects in this regard, namely the necessity, sufficiency, and constituency of the belief.

Beliefs form an essential part of the identity of the emotion. Without its belief component, an emotion will be unidentified. The identity of the beliefs enables one to distinguish between one emotion and another. A belief should therefore be regarded as an essential prerequisite for an emotion’s identity. Nussbaum admits that a belief underlying an emotion can sometimes become transformed, while the emotion remains unchanged. This is often the case with an evaluative belief with intense attachments such as fear, and which has been established in childhood. The mind has an intricate archaeology, and false beliefs are difficult to change. It may take a lifetime (UT, 36). Nussbaum further argues that a belief is sufficient to make an emotion distinguishable. A distinctive feeling or a distinctive mode of conduct alone is not sufficient to enable us to identify emotions such as envy, hope, grief, pity and jealousy. On the other hand, a belief will be sufficient for identification of an emotion. Nussbaum also argues that an emotion is constituted by an evaluative belief, either completely or partially. This belief is either necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient to comprise the emotion.

2.5 Judging and acknowledging and sufficient conditions

Nussbaum uses the ancient Stoics’ notion of the emotions as her point of departure, but argues that it requires several modifications to become more adequate. She postulates that the final theory, which she calls the neo-Stoic view, will be subtler than the classical Stoic view. The neo-Stoic view will have an independent character and will stress the similarities between humans and other animals, the role of social norms, and the intricacies of an individual human history (UT, 4).

The ancient Stoics held that a judgement is not an external cause for an emotion, but a sufficient constituent part of the emotion itself. It is an assent to an appearance, and involves a process, which has two phases: The first phase is an awareness of the appearance of the object. It occurs to me that this or that is the case, but I have not yet accepted it. Then follows the second phase, namely the act or response. There are three possible reactions: I can judge that what I see is right, and accept it, or I can judge that what I see is incorrect and reject it. It is also possible that I won’t have any belief or judgement about the matter, and don’t commit myself in either way. In this regard it is important to note that the ancient Stoics did not see the
appearance itself, but the act of appearance, the assent, as the judgement (UT, 37). Assenting to an appearance in any way requires thought, and discriminating thought in particular. “Reason itself reaches out and takes that appearance to itself” (UT, 38).

According to Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic view, an appearance has propositional content (“as it occurs to me, as it seems to me, as it appears to me”). Reflecting on her reactions to the news of her mother’s death, she infers that the content of that particular appearance was both eudemonistic and evaluative, because it affected important goals and ends in her life. Thoughts of importance were combined with thoughts of loss (UT, 41). But once she was with her mother’s dead body, she accepted the appearance.

The neo-Stoics argue that when a person accepts such an appearance, which includes the particular set of propositions with all their evaluative judgements, emotional composure is impossible. In this regard, the ancient Stoics believed that all judgements that are linked with emotions are concerned with objects in relation to which the agent sees him or herself as vulnerable. These are the person’s ‘external goods’ (UT, 42). The ancient Stoics even held that when one’s mind takes a controllable element of one’s life as its intentional object, the result would not be an emotion. Nussbaum does not agree with this dogmatic view, proposing, “Many of the specific emotions have vulnerability to reversal built into their own characteristic definitions” (UT, 43). The propositional content of emotions, for instance hope, pity, fear, anger, jealousy and others affirm that there is change or that change is a possibility. Usually emotions connect us to items that we consider as important for our own well-being, but do not fully control. The sense of vulnerability and inadequate control is recorded by the emotion. In accepting these propositions, we acknowledge our submissiveness before the world. At this point, Nussbaum argues that we can now conclude that judgements (as described above) are not only constituent parts of the emotion, but they are also sufficient constituent parts of the emotion. If the judgement is not fully there, the emotion will not be there (UT, 44).

This brings her to an investigation of another important characteristic of an emotion, namely its kinetic component. This component, for instance the fluttering in the stomach, or the trembling of the hands, may appear not to be a judgement or even part of a judgement. The adversary will probably now also argue that, although we accept that the judgement is a constituent part of the emotion and also a sufficient cause of the non-thinking movements and feelings, one should perhaps insist that
the kinetic element is part of the judgement (UT, 44). In her response to this view, Nussbaum argues that judging should be conceived of as dynamic and able to accommodate disorderly motions. According to her view, reason “... moves, embraces, refuses; it can move rapidly or slowly, it can move directly or with hesitation” (UT, 45). There is a close connection between the recognition of the thought and physical reaction. Once again, she reflects on her physical response when she ran to her mother’s body once she had learned of her death. She argues that the movements of her thoughts towards her mother were in actual fact transformed into kinetic movements. In this regard she also stresses that the thought or thoughts have to be about something and there has to be some sort of recognition. This recognition is not a subsequent, but a simultaneous upheaval, which stems from the cognition. The judgement is therefore not a temporary event that precedes the emotion. The real acknowledgement of the particular incident, the act of assent to the appearance, is the upheaval, and this act can be repeated again and again. “Knowing can be violent, given the truths there are to be known” (UT, 45).

At this point she addresses another important aspect, namely whether the emotion itself is the act of assenting, or whether the emotion is simply a resulted condition from the act. She therefore examines the life of an emotion, stating that it has a dual character. First there is the initial acknowledgement of the proposition, also referred to as the assent. This is then followed by the existence of the emotion. Very often we tend to deny the appearance initially and have to go through the process of continuously acknowledging and accepting the claim, until it finally settles in and becomes “… part of our cognitive make-up” (UT, 46).

Nussbaum subsequently attends to another aspect of her developing view, namely the accuracy or inaccuracy of an emotion. She holds that, “The fact of having an emotion depends on what the person’s beliefs are, not on whether they are true or false” (UT, 46). Since emotions are part of a person’s view of the world, they are responsive to changes in belief in the same way that other beliefs are. And beliefs can be false if a person is mistaken about the evaluative aspects of the judgement. In this regard, Chrysippus held that an emotion, such as grief, does not only include a judgement that an important part of that person’s life is gone, but also that it is correct to be upset about it. It makes a truth claim about its own evaluations, asserting the value and importance of that object (UT, 47). In this sense, emotions can be true or false. Yet, since we often try to avoid implying that statements about emotions are true or false, we normally refer to them as ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’.
Nussbaum points out that there is a generally accepted distinction between emotions and beliefs. This view holds that when one has a particular belief, it implies that one attempts to fit one’s mental attitude to the world. When one has a particular emotion, it implies the opposite, namely that one tries to make the world fit one’s mental attitude. Nussbaum contests this view and offers two arguments: Emotions attempt to fit the world. They do this by taking in the events that really do take place. They then respond to them “… to get an appropriate view of what matters or has value” (UT, 48). Furthermore, emotions do not try to get the world to fit them. This idea seems to suggest that the world already does not fit the emotion, and this is definitely not the case for an emotion such as fear. If one evades or removes the object of the fear from the world, one is not trying to get the world to fit the emotion, but rather to change to world to a place where the emotion will no longer be relevant. Emotions are responding to the way the world already is (UT, 48,49).

2.6 Eudemonism, intensity and the personal point of view

Nussbaum argues that judgements are sufficient for emotions, provided that they have the requisite eudemonistic evaluative content. In her arguments she focuses on various aspects of the neo-Stoics’ idea of eudemonism, since it features prominently in her theory of the emotions.

Emotions view the world from a personal point of view. A personal scheme of goals and ends consists of a conception of what it is for that particular individual to live well, and will include the things to which that person attaches value. When a particular goal is freely chosen, one can expect that goal to be appraised as something of value or significance and to become more important to the person who chose the goal. This does not mean that what is of value to one person will also be of value to others. In this regard the neo-Stoic view emphasises the limitations of the ancient eudemonistic notion, especially regarding the strong emphasis on structure and order in most people’s schemes of goals and ends. Aristotle believed that the search for value is a general search for what is good for a human being. These goals and ends form part of a system. He considered a human being as an agent of this system, who will convey the system to others. Nussbaum disagrees, arguing that, although there are certain general goals that are good for all human beings, such as friendship, parental love, civic responsibility and so on, an individual will inevitably consider more concrete, situational and contextualised conditions of these general laudable goals (UT, 50). Some of these items will not necessarily be commendable to all other
human beings. It may also be possible that a person values something without essentially regarding it as good, such as love for a person or a house, simply because it is his or hers. Thoughts about the good can become enmeshed with thoughts about what one has lived with through habit and time. These entangled thoughts are difficult to separate (UT, 50). Another important shortcoming of the ancient view is the exclusion of unconditionality. Nussbaum argues that there are instances, especially where the relationships are not selected, for example, love for a child, when it is essential not to reflect on the goodness of an object. In cases like these, “ … the good points need to take a back seat” (UT, 51). The ancient eudemonistic view thus provides a good framework for thinking about the emotional life, however, we need to keep in mind that people’s ideas of what is important and valuable are often muddled and disorganized, and do not necessarily represent their ethical beliefs.

The most crucial aspect of an emotion is the reference to the self. Essentially the emotion looks at the world and evaluates the world from the person’s own point of view. Reflecting again on her grief about her mother, she explains that she bestowed her mother with three roles, namely as a person with inherent value in her own right, as a mother, but above all as her mother and an important constituent of the plans and goals of her life. She thus argues that the self-element structures and localises the emotion. However, this does not imply that the emotion will necessarily be egoistic (UT, 53). She subsequently agrees with Foot’s account (1988) that a person’s scheme of values also contains general interests that are interwoven with the personal interests (UT, 52). People’s emotions will have different combinations of self-referential and non-self-referential concerns, and the mixture will also vary in different emotions. There are indeed emotions, such as wonder and awe, which do not contain a strong self-referential component. In this case, Nussbaum argues, the emotions will react to the attraction, or the ‘pull’ of the object. The awareness will be focused on the value of the object and not so much on the relation to one’s significant goals and projects. The valuable object will rather be contemplated than reacted towards although she believes that wonder can assist to move remote objects into the sphere of one’s ends (UT, 54). She argues that love and compassion do not fall in this category of non-eudemonistic emotions. In these cases the object is essentially seen as a part of one’s own scheme of ends. For the emotion to happen, a eudemonistic judgement has to be formed.
Nussbaum argues that the variety in the intensity of emotions experienced by a person can be ascribed to the varying degrees of significance of objects in that person’s scheme of goals and projects. If the object’s importance is below a particular margin there will be no emotion. However, if it is beyond that margin, the differences in intensity of the emotion will be affected by the differences in eudemonistic evaluation (UT, 55). The intensity of the emotion frequently does not match its object. Nussbaum ascribes this to the nature of the eudemonistic evaluation of the object. If an object is evaluated as less or more important than it really is, the result will be a distorted view of the particular object, and the intensity of the emotion will be out of line.

### 2.7 Are there necessary non-cognitive elements?

Nussbaum argues that the cognitive component forms the only constituent part of an emotion. She admits that all human experiences, hereby including human emotions, are embodied and thus carried out in some kind of material process (UT, 58). She also grants that the presence of some form of bodily process or feeling is probably a necessary condition for an emotion. However, the issue is whether bodily processes, which do not involve judgements of any sort, are necessary parts of the emotion’s internal conditions of identity. One can also ask whether absence of these elements will prevent one from identifying an emotion. She argues that although an emotion usually involves physical sensations and transformations such as changes in blood pressure, these physical manifestations will not be sufficient to identify a particular emotion (UT, 57). She is therefore sceptical about the use of sophisticated brain activity measuring devices to determine a person’s emotional state accurately. A particular brain state cannot be regarded as conclusive of a particular emotional state if it is contradicted by the presence or absence of other elements related to that particular emotion. Since emotions are associated with physiological effects, it is extremely difficult to determine which of these effects are consequences and which are probably part of the emotion itself. In this regard she refers to Seligman’s research (1975), which indicates that a particular cognitive condition may trigger further physiological conditions that are sometimes incorrectly identified with emotions (UT, 58).

Nussbaum also refers the regularity of these bodily states or processes, arguing that one can only regard them as constituent parts of a given emotion-type, once they are continually associated with the experiences of that particular emotion. And in this regard biological research evidence of the adaptability, flexibility and versatility of the
human body, and especially the human brain, contradicts this assumption. She therefore infers that due to the unique and versatile design of the human organism, bodily processes cannot be accommodated in our explanation of an emotion (UT, 59). She does not deny that certain feelings characterise certain emotions. We normally associate a boiling feeling with anger, trembling with fear, and so on. Non-intentional pain, such as dull aches, is also commonly associated with pity or grief. She nevertheless argues that due to the adaptability and variability of human beings, the feeling element cannot be regarded as a necessary constituent part of an emotion. People have different circumstances, cultures and personalities. There is too much variation among persons, across the same person, and even within one culture for that to be right (UT, 62). She does admit that some feelings, for instance the feeling of emptiness after the death of a beloved person, consists of such rich intentional content that one may be tempted to accommodate them in the definition of an emotion such as grief. But then she points out that this ‘feeling’ of emptiness should rather be seen as a perception or judgement with kinetic properties attached to it (UT, 60). Pleasure should also not be seen as a feeling, but rather as a certain way of thinking. The emotion or experience of pleasure is due to unimpeded thinking (UT, 63).

We therefore need to acknowledge that human emotions are always embodied and will often correlate with feelings of turmoil or arousal, of which some will be of a more type-specific kind. However, human emotions cannot be defined in terms of bodily feelings. They should be defined in terms of evaluative judgements only.

2.8 Are there other cognitive elements? Imagine the object

Nussbaum holds that in addition to the eudemonistic-evaluative thought content of the emotion, the experience of the emotion usually contains another cognitive element or elements (UT, 65). She argues that human emotions are shaped by the fact that people are perceiving creatures. Emotions therefore also include rich and dense perceptions of the object. These acts of perception imply deeper focusing on the object than would be required by the propositional content and can be distinguished from other more abstract judgemental states (UT, 66). She further believes that concrete, detailed and highly particular events, such as memories, are pictured in the imagination. In this regard she argues that the imagination acts as a vehicle to make eudemonistic connections with the object, especially where the object is of particular significance. In such cases the imagination's contribution is more that of the eudemonistic thoughts (UT, 65). Often the tiny details of the
imagined picture symbolise the object and become the central focus of the emotion. Imagined detail is then inseparable from the emotion. An emotion such as compassion relies essentially on one’s ability to imagine or picture the dilemma of the other person. The imagination now acts as a bridge to bring the other person into one’s sphere of goals and ends.

She grants that this will not be the case with all people, since people differ and some tend to rely more on sensory cues than others. She also believes that the act of imagining will only be present at particular points in the history of the emotion and does not occur continuously. Some emotions also tend to have closer connections to the sensory imagination than others (UT, 67). We can therefore conclude that in its focus on the object, an emotional experience will often involve a salient component of imaginative picturing or sensory attention.

2.9 Background and situational, general and concrete
Nussbaum argues that emotions are multi-layered. This implies distinctions between general and concrete evaluative judgements, and also between background and situational judgements (UT, 67).

Regarding the generality of the evaluative judgements, she once again reflects on her grief about her mother’s death. She notes that a number of entangled, but also distinctive evaluative judgements were at work during that particular episode in her life (UT, 68). These judgements included more general ones, for instance that certain external things or persons were important components of her own flourishing, or that some people with particular characteristics had such importance. She explains that in cases like these, the object of the grief can be very vague, elusive and general, such as “my past”. But her grief also involved more concrete judgements, for example that the important person who had died was a particular woman, whose life was entwined with hers, and that this important person was her own mother. She subsequently holds that only analyses of the actions and patterns of judgement will enable us to determine which of these judgements are most salient and thus probably the real object of the emotion (UT, 69).

Nussbaum draws a clear distinction between evaluative judgements that continue through various kinds of situations, which she refers to as ‘background’ judgements, and judgements, which are more context specific, or ‘situational’ judgements. She argues that background emotions emphasise attachments to unstable and
uncontrollable things that are included in one’s idea of own flourishing. They are incessant judgements that recognise the enormous worth of these things in one’s life. In this regard she disagrees with Wollheim’s distinction (1999) between states and dispositions, emphasising that her distinction between background and situational emotions is less dichotomous. Implicit in her description is the presence of a continuum. Background emotions are ongoing and persist through situations of different kinds, compared to Wollheim’s dispositional emotions, which are never experienced directly. She emphasises that her distinction between background and situational emotions does not imply a conscious/non-conscious distinction. One may have a situational or episodic emotion, for instance anger with somebody, without being conscious of it. Background judgements, for instance about the importance of one’s own health, the susceptibility of one’s own life, or a persisting love may be brought to consciousness by certain circumstances. Because background emotions are prolonged conditions, which are frequently unobserved because of their commonness, they often tend to be non-conscious. Many of our common and ordinary beliefs, such as beliefs about where things are, beliefs about cause and effect, and so on, are non-conscious beliefs. Since these emotions lack imaginative and phenomenological characteristics, they are not so easily identifiable. In this regard they are not quite comparable with her account of the emotions, but Nussbaum argues this would have been a problem if these non-conscious beliefs were central or ever-present, or if they were such that people could seldom recognise their existence and acknowledge the role they play in their own experience (UT, 71). She points out that although these general and familiar beliefs direct our actions, we do not deliberately focus on them every time we apply them.

We are repositories of an indefinite number of such beliefs and we rely on them in our actions. Indeed, if we weren’t like this, if we could use only those beliefs on which we were consciously focusing, we couldn’t possibly survive (UT, 72).

She also stresses the possibility that certain emotion-beliefs are deliberately avoided. This is probably because confrontation of these emotions will be painful and will force the person to admit his or her vulnerability. Nussbaum further emphasises that the background/situational distinction is logically independent of the general/concrete distinction. A general emotion, for instance an emotion related to political justice, or emotions attached to wonder at the beauty of the world, will often be in the background, but it can also be situational. Likewise, a concrete emotion, such as fear of one’s own death, can often become situational, but it may also continuously linger in the background. The difference between background and situational emotions is
also logically independent of the distinction between the self-referential and non-self-referential elements in an emotion. A background emotion such as the fear of death involves both. The general, non-self-referential belief holds that death is a bad thing, while the self-referential belief will refer to the personal element, namely that death is a bad thing for me, or for my family. She emphasises that general emotions are not automatically less eudemonistic than concrete emotions. A general belief, for example that parental love is important for all human beings, will also be part of one’s own eudemonism or scheme of goals and ends (UT, 73). A situational emotion occurs when a background judgement merges with a particular judgement that positions the object of the emotion in a concrete form in some real or imagined past or future context (UT, 73). She explains that a background fear may become situational when it is combined with a particular event in which a person’s vulnerability becomes evident. A situational emotion can also at some point become a background emotion, for instance grief due to a beloved’s death. Nussbaum argues that the generality and concreteness of emotions are interwoven with background and situational emotions in many intricate ways. Love for a parent, for instance, is a background, but highly concrete emotion. The central form of a background emotion will always be eudemonistic, such as love or attachment to some thing or person regarded as very important for one’s own flourishing. But this background emotion will be combined with some general belief to the effect that this thing or person is not fully under one’s own control (UT, 74).

This brings us to the role of chance in one’s life, and it is important to note how one’s general conception of value moulds one’s emotional life and prepares one for the contributions of chance. In this regard we need to take cognisance of her notion of a ‘conception’. She sees it as an inner evaluative grammar that any person has at some level. This inner grammar refers to some set of attachments or evaluative preferences and may sometimes be difficult to articulate (UT, 74). Nussbaum argues that the background emotion acknowledges the dependence on some uncontrollable element in the world. A situational emotion, on the other hand, responds to the way in which the world meets or does not meet one’s needs. In this regard the ancient Stoics explained that the background emotion is the wound, whereas the situational emotion is the knife that enters the wound (UT, 75). However, we need to remember that needs are based on beliefs and can sometimes be false.

Returning to her mother’s death, she equates her grief with the following judgement: “My mother, an enormously valuable person and important part of my life, is dead”
Still focusing on the conception of value, she now examines some of the types of judgements that were at work at that time: The *background* judgements included judgements that her mother was enormously important, and that their shared history and relationship had significant value. More *general* judgements referred to the importance of parents, parental love and that loved ones are mortal. The *concrete* judgements involved a range of judgements, including for instance the judgement that she had occasionally neglected or mistreated her mother by being inattentive or angry with her. She also notes that both background and situational judgements had *self-referential* and non-self-referential components. In reality we therefore do not have a single judgement, but a plurality of judgements, a complex network of judgements, at work. These judgements occur at many levels of generality and specificity. Some will remain in the background while others tend to surface and be more situational. A particular instance of an emotion, such as grief, combines a background judgement of value with an observation of the way the world is with what one values. One’s ongoing goals and attachments are now coalesced (combined) with the perceived reality (UT, 76).

In response to the above claim, the adversary may claim that the symmetry between thoughts and feelings has now been restored. They will probably argue that no particular proposition in this complex network is necessary for an emotion such as grief. What is in actual fact required is that a certain *number* of these judgements should be in place. It is this ‘family resemblance’ to other episodes of grieving, and not the sufficient and necessary conditions that enable one to identify the emotion. The adversary will subsequently argue that the same principle can be applied to non-cognitive and non-intentional feelings and sensations: There is no specific feeling required for grief, but rather some feelings within a given family. Nussbaum does not agree, arguing that the asymmetry between sensation and thought still holds, because the focus is on type-identities and not token-identities. She notes that during different episodes of her grief she experienced contrasting feelings and sensations. These feelings were actually “… feelings with rich intentional content” and should rather be regarded as “… thoughts under another description”. Apart from the gross and general judgement, namely “An enormously valuable part of my life is gone” (UT, 77), she also had many concrete judgements. These concrete judgements nonetheless entailed the above-mentioned general judgement and it was this general judgement in terms of which she identified and defined her grief. Without the general judgement she would probably not have had grief. Conversely there is no general description of a non-intentional feeling or sensation that alludes to a necessary
condition for grieving. There is therefore no symmetry between thought and feelings (UT, 77).

Nussbaum subsequently returns to the original experiential reservations of the first adversary. She holds that it should now be clear how her view of the emotions responds to these reservations. Emotions have heat and urgency because they concern our most important goals and projects, “… the most urgent transactions we have with our world” (UT, 77). As pointed out earlier, the judgements are evaluative and eudemonistic. The structure of the emotion accommodates thoughts about well-being. It is therefore the emotion itself, and not some additional reaction that has the urgency and heat. In this regard, Nussbaum argues that the objects of our emotions are things and persons in whom we have invested a good amount of our own well-being, but the activities and well-being of these objects are outside our own control. In emotions we therefore become aware of our own passivity before the uncontrolled events of life. Emotions can be seen as “ … our hostages to fortune” (UT, 78). According to the adversary, the physical sensations associated with emotions are drives or affective forces without intentional evaluative content. Nussbaum disagrees, arguing that no view can ignore the powerful way with which “… the world enters the self in the emotion” (UT, 78). And the self becomes part of the emotion through perceptions and beliefs about what matters, therefore cognitively. She admits that emotions may sometimes be experienced as outside energies, not related to existing ways of valuing or judging. But she explains that when an emotion stems from one’s past, it contains valuable emotional material that originated from early object relations. Sometimes it may be difficult to determine the content of that particular emotion. However, even in these cases, we need to acknowledge the way in which emotions continuously motivate us. She concludes that emotions should be described as “… value-laden intentional attitudes towards objects” (UT, 79). In this regard we also need to note that the intentionality of emotions will vary regarding sophistication and explicitness. Even some adult emotions may still store old, unclear and perhaps preverbal views of objects from childhood (UT, 79).

2.10 “Freshness” and the diminution of grief

The ancient Stoics held that a judgement may only be regarded as equivalent to an emotion if it is still ‘fresh’, and no corrosion has set in. In this regard Nussbaum argues that the difference between her violent emotional state immediately after the death of her mother, and her calm state seven years later, was still a cognitive difference. Despite the gradual decrease in the intensity of her grief over a period of
time, the original propositions, namely that she accepted that her mother, an enormously wonderful and valuable person, was dead, were still intact. However, she admits that there were differences in intensity, arguing that these were cognitive differences in different ways. Despite the continuation of an emotion such as grief, the quality and character will gradually change. As time proceeds, the emotion will become less noticed as disturbing. Fewer concrete situations will call it to mind. As the emotion subsequently evolves it will probably become a background emotion (UT, 80). Although the thoughts about the object remain, their relationship to other thoughts will change. She emphasises that this does not imply an emotional change, because emotions are defined by their content and the content remains the same. In her developing theory, she focuses on a person’s complete cognitive organisation. Reflecting again on her grief, she notes how the initial thoughts impacted on the structure of her expectations, hopes and plans that she had built around her mother. Yet, after a period of time, she has managed to make adjustments by rearranging her other present and future beliefs accordingly. “Indeed, the experience of mourning is in great part an experience of repeatedly encountering cognitive frustrations and reweaving one’s cognitive fabric in consequence” (UT, 80). In this regard she provides an explanation for the different emotional ways in which people may respond to the same situation. This also explains the variations between people in the tempo at which the emotion wanes.

Nussbaum now makes a significant statement, arguing that “The life of a person who has made many cognitive adjustments has less cognitive dissonance, less surprise, less frustration …” (UT, 81), although this does not imply that the particular emotion in question is less. “Mourning is in part a process of removing cognitive dissonance, but it is also a process of managing and to some extent reducing the burden of grief” (UT, 81). Once again she argues that the external object of the emotion is evaluated as important from the viewpoint of one’s own scheme of goals and projects. The acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of that particular object is inseparable from the judgement that one’s life will be incomplete without it. If there is for instance a perceived decrease in the value of the object, the emotion will also diminish accordingly.

To substantiate these arguments she once again proceeds with an analysis of her own grief, compared to that of her sister. She argues that the eudemonistic element, as well as the eudemonistic aspect of her belief, has shifted (UT, 82). She judges that her mother is still an important part of her current life, but she also acknowledges
that she is no longer an active, ongoing partner in her present life. Now she is more inclined to accept that this person was an important part of her life. She therefore has to put the object (her mother) into a different place in her life, one that correlates with the altered judgement. In this regard she notes that a pathological mourner tends to keep the deceased in the centre of his/her life, and in doing so, paralyses his/her own life. This also explains why her sister’s grief differed from hers regarding its nature and duration. Although they love their mother equally, she has played a more significant role in her sister’s daily structure of goals and ends.

Nussbaum also points out that shifting the eudemonistic content of one’s beliefs has other implications for the self. As the thoughts around which one has defined one’s aims and desires change, one in effect becomes a different person. To this extent it implies a loss of self, and that explains why the change is often so difficult (UT, 83). An emotion typically focuses on the object in perceptual imagination. It may concentrate on irrelevant detail or concretise the object in a way not encapsulated by the propositional content (UT, 84). However, when the intentional object is no longer there, the imagination tends to fade. The emotion’s content will subsequently shift. Nussbaum again emphasises that this is a cognitive shift, because the imagination itself is a highly discriminating cognitive faculty. It is therefore clear that emotional change is a result of a shift of propositional content. This shift is caused by cognitive activities external to the propositional content (UT, 84).

Nussbaum also addresses another aspect regarding the fading of emotions. This relates to the contribution of sensuous perceptions in the reinforcement of an emotion. She grants that vivid perceptual reminders can recall an emotion and that the emotion will also lose its liveliness once the perception is curbed. However, she argues that one should first determine the relationship of these sensuous perceptions to the judgement of importance. Which is first - the evaluative judgement (that her mother is an important element in her life, and now she intensely notices her mother’s gown), or the perceptual object (her mother’s gown which reminds her of her mother’s importance)? In this regard she holds that although both statements are correct, the first one is more accurate. The eudemonistic choice leads to the focusing (UT, 85). She also agrees with Proust (1982), who assumes a correlation between need and sensory focusing. Her mother’s gown symbolizes comfort and support. As the need for comfort and support fades, the sensory memory will fade too. Any triggering perception will then not only remind her of her mother, but also of the comfort and support which is no longer there, throwing her back into the state of a
person who still needs to attend a particular hole in her life (UT, 85). Diminution therefore has a cognitive dimension that is to some degree independent of the thought content. Perceptual change is largely a result of the rearranging of one’s needs, goals and projects.

2.11 Emotional conflict
Nussbaum focuses on two types of emotional conflicts, namely conflicts between emotions and other judgements, and conflicts between emotions themselves. Her main claim is that emotional conflict is not a battle between unthinking forces, but a debate between different thoughts. With regard to conflicts between emotions and other judgements, she once again addresses the adversary’s expected response to emotional conflict and in doing so describes the neo-Stoics’ view. To illuminate her view she returns to her grief and describes an imaginary situation. Say at some point she tried to read Seneca, assuming that this will enable her to distance herself from her grief, because to a good Stoic virtue is sufficient for happiness (UT, 86). The adversary’s explanation for this will probably be that while her reason is trying to hold back the grief, her ‘mindless’ emotional part will continue with the grieving. To this interpretation the neo-Stoic responds by explaining that the above action rather demonstrates a cognitive debate between the recognition and denial of the significance of the loss. Various thoughts dispute the issue. We need to keep in mind that judgements are evaluative. Reason is continuously reflecting on the real world, grappling with itself about how to perceive life. This view then explains the rhythmic upheavals of acceptance and rejection and the irregular exchange of vision (UT, 86).

With regard to conflicts between emotions themselves, she also believes that the adversary’s idea of ‘... battles of unthinking forces’ (UT, 87) is not sufficient to explain the conflicts between, for example fear and hope, grief and joy, and so on. She argues that her previous arguments, namely that emotions are evaluative judgements, are applicable in these cases as well. When, for instance, joy conquers grief, it is on grounds of a particular judgement. At her mother’s funeral, she also experienced joy, due to the judgement that in certain crucial aspects her mother was still around in the world. Although emotions like hope and fear share certain characteristics such as uncertainty and likelihood of good or bad outcomes, they do vary regarding the judgement of the prospects and in what they consider to be salient in the perceived expectations (UT, 87).
Nussbaum again insists that emotions ought to be grouped together as a class. Despite the fact that emotions share certain characteristics, they also have a dynamic relationship with one another. This is due to an emotion’s intense attachment to an outside uncontrollable object. When the particular object is close by, one will have joy; when somebody else fosters it, one will have gratitude; when it is threatened, one will experience fear; when somebody harms the object, one will be angry, and when the object is hit by disaster, one will grieve. It will be difficult to accept some of these emotions, while rejecting others. “In short, once she has hostages to fortune, she lets herself in for the entire gamut of the emotions” (UT, 87). Nussbaum therefore infers that one has no control over the migration from one emotion to the other. We are “… in the hands of the world” (UT, 87). The reasons for emotions are “… supplied by life” (UT, 88).

2.12 Conclusion
Nussbaum concludes by highlighting two salient features of the geography of emotional world: their uncontrollable movement and their differences in depth and height. She refers again to Proust’s description of Charlus. Before falling in love, the landscape of his self-sufficient world was like a “uniform plane” where no idea featured as urgent or important and no judgement protruded another. One might say that his world was not yet humanised by the “… earthquakes of human love and limitation”. However, after falling in love, his world changed to a differentiated “… landscape full of mountains and valleys” (UT, 88). It seemed as if this landscape was produced by “… geological upheavals of thought”. His world became more agitated and alive, but also enriched by the agitation itself. Now, Nussbaum argues, “… we are beginning to have some idea of what it is to understand emotion as a certain sort of vision or recognition, as value-laden ways of understanding the world” (UT, 88). Emotions are judgements in which people acknowledge the great importance for their own flourishing of things they do not fully control. They also acknowledge their neediness before the world and its events. The neo-Stoic view is explicated in terms of the Stoic idea of judgement as an assent to an appearance, which is value-laden and which has propositional content. The judgement is concerned with what people regard as their most important goals and projects. A lot is therefore at stake in this assenting.
Chapter 3: Humans and other animals: The neo-Stoic view revised

3.1 Introduction

Nussbaum believes that her view, as outlined in the previous chapter, is still too narrow to accommodate everything that a theory of emotions should include. She bases her argument on the propositional content of the appearance, arguing that at this point, it may seem as if the person or subject who has the emotion, should be able to formulate or translate the appearance in linguistic terms. This implies that a satisfactory explanation of the emotional development of infants and young children, as well as the emotions of animals will not be possible. In this regard she argues that although the basic outlines of her developing theory can also be defended in the light of evidence concerning animals, the existing theory needs to undergo some major modifications to make it more adequate for a theory that will include both human and animal emotions. She envisages a philosophical and humanistic account of the emotions which is not reductionist, unscientific or insensitive to scientific evidence and which accommodates the complex object-directed intentionality of emotions.

3.2 Animals grieving

She investigates the topic of animal emotions from two corresponding angles, namely a reflection on current experimental work in cognitive psychology, which is closely connected to evolutionary biology, complemented by a narrative account of experiences of interaction between a human being and animals, in this case George Pitcher (1995), and his two dogs, Lupa and Remus.

3.3 The decline of reductionist theories of emotion

Nussbaum believes that experimental work necessitates modifications to her existing theory. We need to understand what the impact of the experimental work on the theory is, and how the theory should be modified, without making compromises to reductionism. During the first half of the twentieth century and in the heyday of behaviourism, the inner world of experience was frequently regarded as a fuzzy and invisible phenomenon, which should preferably disappear from the scientific scene (UT, 93). Recently however, a notably growing interest in the emotions has emerged, not only among psychologists, but also in other disciplines. Most of these people admit that emotions “… are richly cognitive phenomena, closely connected with an animal’s way of perceiving and interpreting the world” (UT, 94). The ‘new’ view ironically, corresponds with Aristotle’s idea as expressed in his Rhetoric. This ancient view held that intentionality should be regarded as an important part of any good
theory of emotions. More recently, Schachter and Singer (1962) with their well-known set of experiments confirmed Aristotle’s claim. They proved scientifically that a subject’s emotional state is a result of the subject’s evaluative appraisals of its situation. They also proved that these judgements are central to the identification of the emotion and essential to the discrimination between emotions. People will for instance, identify their emotion as anger when they are placed in a situation where they have reason to be angry, or identify their emotion as happiness when they have reason to think that ‘the world is great’. Nussbaum points out,

This is the familiar philosophical thesis of the irreducibility of the intentional, a thesis that has been advanced again and again in philosophy, not in a way that is hostile to scientific explanation, but in order to indicate what an adequate scientific explanation would have to include (UT, 98).

However, the significance of the Schachter-Singer experiment was the momentum it gave to a new generation of researchers to release their commitment to a uncomplicated type of physiological reductionism. Many psychologists subsequently abandoned the pursuit for physiological definitions of emotional state (UT, 99).

3.4 The resurgence of intentionality: Seligman, Lazarus, Ortony, Oatley
In order to modify her present theory, Nussbaum consults established scientific findings about the emotional life of humans and animals. She investigates theories developed by recent non-reductionists, such as Seligman (1975), Lazarus (1980, 1984, 1991, 1994), Ortony (1988) and Oatley (1985, 1987, 1992), but she also considers the prevailing reductionist view of Zajonc (1980, 1984).

In his Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death (1975), Seligman addresses general aspects about emotion and cognition, as well as some substantive aspects regarding the relation between depression and action. He argues that a depressive emotion involves complex evaluative appraisals and is thus cognitive. He proved that a belief about one’s own helplessness and inability to control one’s environment causes a depressive emotion in humans as well as animals. This depressive emotion has intricate and disturbing behavioural effects (UT, 101). Nussbaum emphasises that the results of Seligman’s experiments (1975) stress the importance of the subject’s interpretation, especially regarding failure of control. There seems to be a significant difference between cases where the subject believes that with more effort the reason for the failure to control can be amended, and incidents where the subject feels truly helpless to do anything about the problem. This leads Seligman (1990) to argue, “ ... an attitude of optimism about one’s
possibilities of attaining important goals is an important part of maintaining successful agency” (UT, 103). In this regard Nussbaum points out that these views are increasingly being applied to account for various learning differences between humans, for example between males and females, disadvantaged and advantaged children, racial minorities and dominant racial groups, and so on. Although Seligman’s work (1975) is not specifically directed at emotions or definitions of emotions, his work supports Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative view. Of particular significance are also the strong suggestions that an animal’s behaviour cannot be explained without assigning to it a rich cognitive life (UT, 106).

Lazarus (1991, 1994) and Ortony (1988) managed to develop important theories on emotions in cognitive psychology, which correlate significantly with the neo-Stoic view. Lazarus sees emotions as ‘appraisals’. A subject (an animal or a human being) identifies something of importance for its own goals in the environment. These ‘appraisals’ are urgent ‘transactions’ between the subject and its world, in which ‘news’ about the world is taken in. This can be elucidated as follows: Animals and human beings are organised systems that live in an environment to which they have to adapt. They need things from this world, and therefore have to attend narrowly to the events in the environment, and how they affect their goals. Emotions can be regarded as “... forms of intense attention and engagement, in which the world is appraised in its relation to the self”(UT, 106). Taxonomy of emotions should be seen as taxonomy of the subject’s goals in relation to locations and events in the environment. In this regard, she holds that the taxonomy of human and animal emotions, developed by Ortony (1988), proves to be very useful. It is also very similar to ancient Stoic taxonomies.

Ortony believes that emotions should be classified by temporal differences (the state of affairs, or event, or action, past, present or future), by self-other distinction (the appraisals of events as good or bad for self or others), and by good-bad distinction. The good-bad distinction relates to congratulatory and empathetically joyful emotions, namely seeing an event that is good for the other as a good thing. Good-bad distinctions also refer to envious and resentful emotions, for instance seeing an event that is good for the other as a bad thing, pity or compassion, meaning seeing an event that is bad for the other as a bad thing, as well as spite and gloating, by seeing an event that is bad for the other as a good thing.
Lazarus (1984, 1991) points out that these appraisals can be seen as subjective evaluations. They are cognitive appraisals, made from the subject’s own point of view and based on information to its disposal (UT, 108). In this regard, emotions are very revealing. They not only reveal the world to the subject, but they also disclose the subject’s inner goals to him/herself and they also expose all of this to the perceptive spectator. Lazarus subsequently argues that emotions have significance regarding adaptation. “Given their urgency, their connection with important goals, and their keenness of perception, emotions explain, more than do other types of cognition, how creatures decide to move from one environment to another, and/or to modify their goals to fit the environment” (UT, 108). Nussbaum regards Lazarus’s theory (1991) as essentially equivalent to her eudemonistic view of the emotions, since he too regards emotions as normally associated with a substantial degree of fixed sensory awareness of the object, thus explaining its motivational and adaptive impact.

Oatley’s analysis (1992) of the emotions focuses centrally on the aspects of ‘conflict’, ‘interruption’ and ‘appraisal’. He supports Lazarus’s notion (1991) that emotions are appraisals of the environment with respect to the subject’s goals, but he also stresses the aspect of interruption or intervention. According to Oatley (1992), an emotion involves “… an awareness of a change in the probability of progress toward some important goal” (UT, 110). Nussbaum argues, however, that this view has two flaws, namely his failure to explain some positive emotions and the absence of an account for persisting background emotions. She concludes that these theories are all intentionally-based, indicating that a focus on interpretation and experience is an irremovable component of an adequate scientific account of the emotions. In general then it seems that the above scientific accounts correlate with her developing philosophical account.

R.B. Zajonc (1980, 1984), on the other hand, is a strong proponent of the only influential reductionist program still prevalent in psychology. This program tends to reduce emotions to non-cognitive and non-intentional subjective feeling-states. After a thorough analysis of Zajonc’s contentions, Nussbaum concludes that his view does not really differ from those of Lazarus (1991) and Ortony (1988), and that their scholarly debate is mainly due to misunderstanding. However, Zajonc’s theory calls attention to a potential weakness in her own theory, and she admits that she has to develop a more supple account of intentionality and cognition - one that does not concentrate entirely on language.
3.5 Non-reductionist physiological accounts: LeDoux, Damasio

Nussbaum explains that behaviourism and reductionism are no longer the bases of accounts of the physiological foundations of emotions. Current physiological explanations tend to draw a parallel to the focus on intentionality. In this regard she argues that theories from renowned neuroscientists, for instance LeDoux (1993, 1994, 1996) and Damasio (1994), can illuminate our understanding of the emotions.

Joseph LeDoux (1993, 1994, 1996) has done significant work on memory and emotional learning. He has proved that various discrete parts of the brain are involved in the establishing of an emotional habit. Central in this process are the amygdala, thalamus and auditory cortex. This clearly indicates that his theory has a cognitive base (UT, 115). In his famous book, *Descartes’ Error* (1994), Antonio Damasio contends that the emotion/reason split is erroneous and ambiguous. He regards emotions as forms of intelligent awareness and argues that they provide the subject with crucial components of practical reason. Emotions act as internal guides in the connection between the subject and its circumstances. Damasio (1994) also argues that emotional operations are linked with specific centres in the brain. He bases his theory on first-hand experience with two patients who suffered brain damage to certain sections of the frontal lobes. Both these patients retained most of their cognitive functions, but their emotional life changed dramatically. It appears as if their emotions have lost their eudemonistic element. Damasio (1994) therefore infers that emotions, like all other cognitive processes, are rooted in brain activity. As such, they assist us in figuring out the connection between the world and ourselves. His view correlates with Lazarus (1991), Oatley (1992) and Ortony’s accounts (1988), namely that “… emotions provide the subject with a sense of how the world relates to its own set of goals and projects” (UT, 117).

3.6 Animal emotion in narrative form: Pitcher

Nussbaum holds that experimental work, like that of Lazarus (1991) and Seligman (1975) has to be assessed for its compliance with the rich data of particular animal lives. She therefore also focuses on an account of the emotional lives of animals, based on sensitive and imaginative observation during prolonged interaction between George Pitcher and his two dogs.

Pitcher is a philosopher with a keen interest in the intentionality of emotions. His book, *The Dogs Who Came to Stay* (1995), is an animal biography of the lives of his
two dogs, Lupa and Remus. Nussbaum believes that this particular narrative is adequate for the purposes of conformity with experimental accounts, because Pitcher exhibits fine observational power that is familiar with good theoretical ends in philosophical work (UT, 120). Throughout the book, Pitcher continues to be intensely aware that the two dogs are nonverbal animals with particular capacities. However, his descriptions of several incidents of the dogs’ behaviour confirm Lazarus’ theory (1991) that animal emotions have definite propositional content, which is linked with important goals. Pitcher also shows that the eudemonistic nature of the dogs’ emotions was not merely instrumental. The dogs clearly indicated a strong attachment to Pitcher and his friend, which was not purely survival-driven (UT, 123).

Nussbaum allows for scepticism about ascriptions of emotions and intelligence to animals, but she reminds us that in one’s ascription of emotions to another human being, there is always an element of projection that goes beyond the factual evidence. She regards Pitcher’s narrative as supportive of the experimental psychological accounts of people like Lazarus (1991) and Seligman (1975), which conclude that animals are emotional creatures whose emotions are appraisals of the world as it relates to their well-being. According to Pitcher’s account, dogs are also capable of causal thinking, positional thinking and non-instrumental love.

3.7 Revising the neo-Stoic account
Although the neo-Stoic view, namely that emotions are cognitive, evaluative and eudemonistic, correlates with evidence on animal behaviour, Nussbaum holds that it now needs to be revised. She subsequently attends to particular modifications to her evolving theory. In order to substantiate her modifications she provides a brief précis of her existing theory, focusing in particular on the issues of combination or predication.

She argues that an evaluative appraisal of the world will always imply some type of combination or predication (UT, 125). The object of appraisal, which is a thing or a person, is generally combined with an assumption of salience, urgency or importance. This assumption is consequently merged with an evaluation of the object’s or goal’s progress and position in the world. By means of these evaluative judgements, the subject who is having the emotion is invaded by the world (UT, 126). Nussbaum now believes that certain aspects of the neo-Stoic view need to be reviewed for potential modification.
With regards to background emotions, she holds that not all cognitive judgements are necessarily matters of reflexive self-consciousness. Although most animals are consciously aware of some things in the world, and although their behaviour can be explained by their intentional viewing of the world, this does not imply that they reflect on their own awareness. Even human beings do not always use their capacity of self-reflection. Without premeditated scrutiny or clear formulation, we are nevertheless frequently able to distinguish between threat and non-threat, and so on (UT, 126). In cases of background emotions or routine, she argues that the emotion will usually not reach consciousness, probably because nothing in the situation has instigated the registering of the emotion. The emotion is nonetheless still there, explaining our actions. The question now is whether this is applicable to nonhuman animals as well. She believes that due to the lack of self-report confirmation, it will be problematic to assume that in the case of nonhuman animals, the emotion will reach the same degree of awareness. This makes the distinction between background and situational emotions in nonhuman animals tricky, because in our ascriptions of emotions to animals, we tend to apply our imagination empathetically, and combine it with speculative reasons for their behaviour. Nussbaum nevertheless argues that nonhuman animals do have background emotions such as fear, love and anger, and that at least to some extent these emotions affect their behaviour. She therefore concludes that regarding background emotions, no modification to the neo-Stoic view seems to be required.

With regards to language, she argues that to some extent, we are able to formulate the cognitive judgements of animal emotions linguistically. This is because we typify the cognitive content by applying the likeliest verbal formula (UT, 127). However, we need to keep in mind that although our characterisations can probably be correct, there may be distortions of many kinds. These distortions can have many possible causes, for instance, that the emotion’s content does not use linguistic symbolism. The distortion may be due to an incorrect translation from one medium to another. In this regard she mentions graphic, musical and kinetic imaginings. Not all envisioning is translatable into linguistic symbolism. The mere attempt to translate the emotion in linguistic terms may bring about misrepresentation, for instance, distortions caused when certain levels of definiteness are attributed to an emotion, which it has not achieved (UT, 128). Nussbaum further warns that the supposition that the linguistic mode is the most refined or fundamental mode should be avoided at all costs. The central issue should still be whether the emotion consists of eudemonistic evaluation.
and whether predication or combination is present. Given the above, Nussbaum infers that we now require a multifaceted perception of cognitive interpretation.

She also argues that we need a suppler idea of intentionality. Lazarus’s work (1991) once again emphasises the crucial, though not necessary, involvement of concentrated perceptual focusing on the object. Although Nussbaum has developed this argument before, it seems that another dimension should be added to it, namely that the intentionality provides an explanation for the emotions’ adaptive significance (UT, 129). Nussbaum subsequently warns that annoyance with the pretentious claims of reductionism should not prompt us to ignore emerging biological theories on the emotions. We need to remain receptive to these.

3.8 Appetites, moods, desires for action
Still in the process of investigating the commonalities between animal and human emotions, Nussbaum now continues by comparing emotions with bodily appetites, moods and action.

She argues that the differences between emotions and appetites revolve around intentionality. Appetites are fixated on the object, but indifferent to value. The appetite itself does not include any thought of the value of the object (UT, 130). Emotions on the other hand, are object-flexible and value-suffused. A judgement about the object’s value or importance is internal to the emotion. Nussbaum also regards a bodily appetite as a ‘push’, because it originates relatively independently from the world and is a result of a bodily condition. On the other hand, an emotion is seen as a ‘pull’ towards an object. She also notes differences relating to the adaptivity and flexibility of emotions and appetites. Because appetites are value-independent ‘pushes’, they do not disappear in the absence of an object. Emotions, on the other hand, will disappear when the appraisal of the object changes and the ‘pulling’ subsides. She also argues that due to the object-fixation of appetites, the objects cannot be substituted. Food, for example, cannot replace water if the appetite is based on thirst. Emotions are more flexible. One can to some extent substitute one’s object of love, but in this regard, she admits that changing the object of the emotion will probably imply a change in the emotion’s texture as well. She also acknowledges that since appetites can be modified by teaching and habit, they do contain some focused intentionality and value-selective features which make them similar to emotions. Another common characteristic is bodily neediness. The nature of these
needs affects our emotional life. Appetites are also indicators of bodily needs and it is quite possible that we will have emotions about the objects of those needs (UT, 132).

According to Nussbaum, the distinction here revolves around the notion of an object. She argues that emotions always involve an object that is perceived as meaningful and important. Implied in the object are accepted beliefs about the object. These features are not present in moods such as irritability, melancholy, euphoria and equability. In this regard we need to grant that it is often difficult to differentiate between a mood and an emotion with a vague, hidden or general object. She admits that the distinction between moods and emotions with very vague objects can be problematic, but argues that we should not be too rigid or dogmatic. Another complex problem relates to the fact that objects are often hidden away to such an extent that they cannot be retrieved. “A generalised emotion may masquerade as a mere mood, and yet have a very definite object” (p133). In this regard she mentions depression in particular. Some cases of depression, such as endogenous depression has no intentional object and are caused by chemistry. They can be regarded as moods. However, in many cases, the depression is about an important object in the person’s life, which he or she cannot control. Interesting in this regard is Graham’s distinction (1990) between depression with intentionality and depression without intentionality (UT, 134).

Although emotions are furthermore closely linked to action, it would be wrong to equate them with desires for action. Surely emotions direct us towards important components of our well-being, and often this acknowledgement of value will motivate us to act, but we need to keep in mind that not all emotions suggest the particular course one should follow. Emotions are not lifeless evaluative judgements and they are thus intimately linked to motivation. But this does not mean that an emotion will produce a clear plan of action, and in this regard they differ from desires.

3.9 Non-emotional animals

Nussbaum concludes her account of animal emotions by highlighting an important distinction between humans and animals.

This is, to put it in my own terms, that human beings appear to be the only mortal finite beings who wish to transcend their finitude. Thus they are the only emotional beings who wish not to be emotional, who wish to be withhold these acknowledgements of neediness and to design for themselves a life in which these acknowledgements have not place (UT, 137).
She holds that characteristically, human beings are proud creatures with a strong yearning for self-sufficiency. They are often inclined to reject their vulnerability, and their neediness is frequently a fundamental source of shame. Non-human animals, on the other hand, never reach the point “… of putting their emotions in the deep freeze” (UT, 137).

In part 2 of this thesis I shall discuss the complexities involved in the social transformation of South Africa, especially with regards to transformation at the inner, personal level. Nussbaum’s reference to Pitcher’s assertion that “… human pride frequently blocks the achievement of unconditional love”, resulting in a “… crippling inability to feel and express genuine affection or tenderness” (UT, 138), is a relevant example of the profundity of such a transformational process. Pitcher’s answer to overcome his personal struggle was to follow the example of his dog: “… to let mistrust give way to trust and self-protectiveness to devotion” (UT, 138).
Chapter 4: Emotions and human societies

4.1 Introduction
Nussbaum continues to develop her neo-Stoic theory of the emotions by arguing that individual history \textit{and} social norms shape a person’s emotional life. In South Africa, with its rich cultural and complex historical past, this aspect of her theory is of particular significance. Schools form part of the facilitating environment, and in this regard, her theory will prove to be of great value.

4.2 Grief and social norms
She proceeds by giving descriptions of three individual emotional responses to the death of beloveds. The bereaved in these cases come from different social backgrounds. The Ifaluk people, for instance, believe that those who do not “cry big” at a death will become ill afterwards (UT, 139). For a substantial amount of time, the sounds of men and women crying and moaning vehemently are thus heard. In direct contrast to this expressive response to death, the Balinese people believe that sad feelings are a hazard to one’s health. They thus cheerfully distract themselves by focussing on happy events (UT, 141). Reflecting on her own grief, she realises that it was affected not only by the attachment to her mother, but also by social norms, such as “the proper way to mourn the loss of a parent” (UT, 140). This caused an inner conflict: At times she felt guilty when she neglected her work because she was grieving, but she also felt guilty towards her mother when she attended to her work and did not grieve. These experiences lead her to address another issue in her developing theory. She now needs to determine the extent to which emotional repertoires vary, as well as the degree to which these variations are the result of societal, rather than individual differences (UT, 141).

Up till now she has focused on the universal aspects of some human emotions, such as the fundamental vulnerabilities and attachments that everyone has. She has also attended to the common biological basis of human beings. However, this does not imply that emotions are shaped in a similar way by diverse societies. In this regard language should also be considered. Although linguistic expression is common to all, languages of different societies vary. These variations are not only in the structure and semantics of the different languages, but in their expressive scope. We can use the cognitive-evaluative view of emotions to see how a society can indeed affect the emotional repertoire of its members.
Central to the emotions are the beliefs about what is important and valuable. These beliefs can be influentially shaped by social norms. “Changing social norms can change emotional life” (UT, 142). Of interest here is the ancient Stoics’ belief that the cognitive/evaluative view of emotions can assist societies to get rid of destructive forms of envy, fear and anger. If we believe that certain emotions are socially harmful also in our present society, the cognitive/evaluative view still applies. Then social diversity has major implications. In this regard, she responds to two perspectives pertaining to the social variability of emotions, namely the psychoanalytic and the anthropological view. The psychoanalytic view treats the emotional life as universal in all aspects and ignores any influence of society. This view is customary among psychoanalytic theorists, who are “… usually practitioners with a culturally narrow sphere of reference” and who struggle to distinguish the “… universal from the global” (UT, 143). The opposite view is evident among anthropologists, who seem to believe that the emotional inventory of a cultural group is almost completely created by society, and that biology or accident has almost no effect. Cultures are studied as emotion systems and normally described in general terms, with almost no reference to the individuality of its members. She infers that the ideal account of the social variability of emotions should neither overstress, nor ignore cultural differences.

4.3 Human-animal differences: Time, Language, Norms

Nussbaum argues that society conveys practices of emotion classification and normative evaluation, which become part of the members’ emotional repertoire. ‘Social construction’ implies that these practices affect the emotional repertoire of a particular society.

Unlike nonhuman animals, human beings are capable of temporal thinking. People orientate themselves according to time. Through time, a person gets a sense of being a continuous self and of having a history. As members of a specific group, they also share a specific history with others. These characteristics of human beings (as social creatures) enable them to form thoughts that affect their emotional and moral life (UT, 145). Unlike nonhuman animals, human beings also have the ability to imagine what it is like to be another person. This type of perspectival thinking is an essential element in human emotional and moral life. A sophisticated perception of positionality and self-other relatedness is for instance fundamental to the capacity for compassion and love (UT, 146). Another difference between nonhuman animals and human beings is the ability to develop theories of the world, such as science, philosophy, religion and metaphysics. These are all human phenomena, which have
significant influence on the emotional life. Not only are additional objects, such as God and Nature added to the emotional repertoire, but these theories also provide human beings with a framework of understanding, which is necessary for causal and temporal thinking. Emotions will be shaped by the nature of this framework.

The above-mentioned differences between human beings and nonhuman animals are all cognitive differences, effecting variations in self-concepts, as well as self-other concepts of people.

The way we see ourselves depends upon on our innate cognitive and perceptual and integrative capacities, but also on our specific conceptions of temporality, of causality; on our conceptions of species and nation and family; on ideas of god, spirits, and the universe. It depends upon the degree to which we grasp our distinctiveness from others, and also on the degree to which we consider ourselves members of categories along with others (UT, 147).

Since the eudemonistic character of emotions is founded in a sense of the self, its goals and its projects, it implies that self-conceptions of people will vary. A human conception of the self and its goals tends to be fairly organised and comprehensive. The goals, which may include persons or things, constitute a type of network. Moreover, human beings are extremely flexible regarding their pursued goals.

Human emotions moreover contain logic. They are subject to revision and reflection of one’s goals and projects. When a person forms incoherent goals and has consequent emotions, the awareness of this inconsistency can give rise to self-criticism, deliberation and even anxiety. Very often, however, the judgements exemplified by these emotions are deeply seated in the personality and may be fixed components of the self-concept. These judgements are nevertheless available for reflection (or ‘therapy’). Generally these deliberations are initiated by interactions with other people, and are largely performed in the context of these relations. The sociability of human emotions also influences the range of possible emotions. The object of the emotion can also be a collection or a group, for instance, the nation or the country. Some social and interactive emotions also involve complex forms of reciprocity, such as mutual love, anger, and so on. Another unique characteristic of human beings that influences their range of emotions is their capability of aloneness. Without the presence of a companion, a person is able to experience the exhilaration of solitary contemplation, or be in awe before the silence of nature, or be horrified by gloomy darkness. According to Nussbaum this ability of humans to experience emotions on their own can be ascribed to their social nature. She then concludes by
arguing that since human beings are ethical and social/political creatures, their emotions will also be ethical and social/political (UT, 149).

Although emotions can also be based on other forms of symbolic representation, she believes that language has the ability to change an emotion (UT, 149). She argues that when we label an emotion, we are actually engaging in a process of organising. We separate things from other things, or we sharpen previously unclear distinctions. Subsequently, these new descriptions guide the experience of the emotion.

We can now assume that a person who is not familiar with a society’s emotional language or ‘grammar’, will not have the same emotional life as one who knows the particular emotional ‘grammar’ of that society. “To be able to articulate one’s emotions is eo ipso to have a different emotional life” (UT, 149). Nussbaum contends that, compared to nonhuman emotions, the above unique features of human emotions confirm the important contribution of society in the construction of emotions.

4.4 Sources of social variation

Nussbaum claims that the world in which we live dictates certain immutable characteristics of human life. This would imply that certain dissimilarities between societies would invoke inter-societal variations in emotional life (UT, 152). In this section she identifies physical conditions, specific beliefs, practice, language and social norms as significantly diverse features of diverse communities, affecting variations in their respective emotional lives.

The emotional repertoire of a community will develop according to its preoccupations. Societies function within a specific physical environment. Some communities, for instance, experience earthquakes or tornados more frequently than others and their emotional repertoire develops in response to this particular preoccupation. Other communities who have to depend on one another to survive cannot afford hostility. Their particular physical conditions will affect their emotional inventory (UT, 152). Societies furthermore vary regarding their beliefs about religion, metaphysics and cosmology and these beliefs affect variations of emotions. A Christian, who believes in the afterlife, will experience grief related to the death of a person differently from an Ifaluk, who believes that any death endangers the safety of the community. Practices that are closely linked to physical conditions and metaphysical beliefs also shape emotional life. Communities have different weaning practices, views of child
rearing, family life, communication styles, and so on. Although language differences possibly affect the emotional life, Nussbaum holds that the role of language in this regard is often overrated. A common mistake is to assume that the absence of a particular emotion word implies absence of that particular emotion. It is also incorrect to assume that words that are alike in different communities will have similar emotion connotations. Nussbaum then postulates that social norms are probably the most important element of society’s influence on emotional life. Since we regard emotions as evaluative appraisals it goes without saying that a culture’s views about what is valuable will have a direct effect on the emotional lives of its members. Societies differ on normative issues such as the importance of bodily beauty, honour, political power, friendship and so on. They educate their members accordingly, and one can therefore expect variety amongst communities regarding emotions such as anger, envy, fear, love and grief (UT, 157).

4.5 Types and levels of variation
Nussbaum argues that a society teaches its members about the appropriate behaviour regarding certain emotions, such as fear or anger. Although these manifestations will vary remarkably, it is possible that, despite considerable differences in behavioural manifestation of a particular emotion, the experience of that emotion will be similar. But it is also possible that some society’s behavioural rules may change the experience itself.

Social variations in judgements about the worth of an entire emotion category cause differences in emotional life. These differences will shape the experience itself. For Utku people for instance, being angry will be linked up with feelings of shame, whereas the ancient Romans associated anger with feelings of pride. A society’s emotion taxonomy indicates how normative judgements influence emotion categories. Differences in normative judgements can be ascribed to different sources of emotional variation, namely physical conditions, metaphysical beliefs, practices, language and social norms. A cultural idea about an emotion may indeed colour many facets of the emotional life and shape the emotion’s foundations. She explains that societies convey different ideas about suitable objects for an emotion. These differences may be between various societies, but they may also be within a particular society. Imparted views shape the emotional experiences, as well as behaviour. Nussbaum stresses that the major emotion-types such as love, fear, jealousy, anger, envy and compassion are generic categories in all known societies. However, societies have different taxonomies of emotion, and the elements that
distinguish one emotion from another are organised differently. Perfect correspondence of an emotion across cultures is therefore highly unlikely.

4.6 Culture and understanding

Nussbaum argues that culture has a significant influence on an individual’s emotions and partly explains a person’s emotional reactions. In this regard, she questions the ambitious claims of several social constructionists who argue that cultural forces leave no room for individual variety and liberty. For them the details of personal history are insignificant. Cultural forces create worlds that are equally inaccessible. Nussbaum disagrees, arguing that it is doubtful whether the emotional repertoires of two societies will be completely obscure to one another. She expects that, due to the effects of biology and common circumstances, the focus of cross-cultural communications will be on generic experiences. However, some forms of life, such as medieval courtly love, will always be unavailable to us. Through application of our existing concepts, we can only imagine ourselves in that world at a very general and narrow-minded level.

By the same token, some present-day emotion-concepts may also be unavailable to us, since we cannot really imagine what it would be like to have these concepts. But Nussbaum argues that once we understand the logic behind another culture’s emotions, this will not be a big problem. Davidson’s idea (1984), that “… communication presupposes something like a common rationality”, meaning that in the act of interpretation one assumes that things make sense, seems convincing (UT, 170). Although personal history or habit will normally prevent us from adopting a diverse set of emotion-concepts, these concepts will not be unimaginably alien or uninhabitable (UT, 171). Nussbaum further argues that a culture itself has a descriptive role to play in the construction of emotions. A generally endorsed cultural norm explains something about that culture. In this regard she focuses on three aspects, namely individual histories, ethical deliberation and influential people.

Although she is very sceptical about some social constructionist views of individual freedom, she does agree with Winnicott’s claim (1965) that culture only exists in the histories of individuals. Because individuals vary significantly, the existence of different personal patterns allows spaces for variety within the culture itself (UT, 171). Within these spaces an individual has at least a little space to move around. With regards to ethical deliberation, she reminds us that according to the cognitive/evaluative view, an emotion has eudemonistic content. Emotions can thus
be seen as part of a person’s search for their own well-being. And because people also deliberate about ethical ways to live, emotions can also be seen as an essential part of ethical deliberation. She also emphasises the important role of other influential people, reminding us that emotions are shaped by their intentional content. People are not only able to shape their own content, but also the content of other people’s emotions. In this regard we should note the potential opportunity to shape the emerging emotions of children. By means of their actions, cues, instructions and so on, parents contribute to the social constructions of their children’s emotions long before the larger society forms the child (UT, 173). Parents teach their children about various emotion-related aspects, such as reasonable objects of fear, when anger is inappropriate, and so on. According to the cognitive/evaluative theory, particular emotions are due to certain perceptions of salience. Racial hatred, for instance, will be based on the evaluative judgement that people with a different skin colour are dangerous or evil. In this regard, Nussbaum believes that social conventions such as these can be challenged if we can shape children’s view of the relevant intentional objects (UT, 173).

Social construction of emotions therefore implies acknowledgement of space and freedom, rather than suppression of emotions. In this regard the cognitive/evaluative view of emotions enables us to identify where societies and individuals have the freedom to make improvements. This brings her to the issue of evaluation of societies, and she argues, “… if we recognise the element of evaluation in the emotion, we also see that they can themselves be evaluated – and in some ways altered, if they fail to survive criticism” (UT, 172, 173). Nussbaum concludes that the acknowledgement of the social construction of emotions implies that we acknowledge that our emotions contain elements, which we have not made ourselves. Many of these elements are of a specific type. They are “… intelligent pieces of human normative activity” and can to some extent be altered by more intelligent human activity. In this regard she argues that a credible theory of social construction should be able to accommodate human freedom and cross-cultural intelligibility.

A credible theory of the social construction of emotions should also acknowledge the narrative history of individual personality, because unique emotional characteristics are embedded by means of early interaction with parents, caretakers and other

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3 Italics according to original text.
siblings. These people are not isolated from their own particular cultures, and their cultures will inevitably be reflected by their actions. But we need to remember that an infant has a separate body and a separate history that are deeply and intensely entwined with other individuals in a deep and intense history.

4.7 Conclusion
Nussbaum’s reference to Winnicott’s claim (1965) that the ‘psychology of the individual’, embedded in a particular social and cultural context, should be regarded as the key to social and group psychology (UT, 173), is of vital significance to the South African context. It elucidates the deep complexities involved in a mature individual’s attempts to transform, and stresses the important role schools should play in this regard.
Chapter 5: Emotions and infancy

5.1 Introduction
Nussbaum claims that an individual’s present emotions are coloured by his or her past. “Emotions, in short, have a history” (UT, 175). The individual pasts of most South Africans have been very diverse and very complex. Understanding the fundamental role of infant history will not only assist South Africans to harmonise, but will also help teachers in schools to comprehend and guide learners’ holistic development.

5.2 The shadow of the object
Reflecting once again on her grief experiences at the death of her mother, Nussbaum recognises crucial links to emotions experienced in her past, especially during infancy. She believes that these infant emotions are still loitering in the background. They provide her current emotions with particular content and cognitive particularity. She thus holds that a new object of an emotion carries traces of previous objects.

For new objects of love and anger and fear bear the traces of earlier objects; one’s emotions towards them are frequently therefore also, in both intensity and configuration, emotions toward one’s own past (UT, 175).

All human emotions carry evidence about a past history. This history is simultaneously individual, socially constructed and generally human. In this section, she focuses on human development, since she argues that once we understand emotions developmentally, we will be able to complete the description of the neo-Stoic view. She also believes that once we understand emotions developmentally, we will be better equipped to comprehend the validity of some arguments against the cognitive view of emotions. If we integrate the developmental account with her neo-Stoic theory, we will consequently be able to oppose these anti-cognitive arguments.

She argues that in order to understand adult emotions, we need to understand their history in infancy and childhood (UT, 178). Then we will be able to understand the responsiveness of the emotions, as well as their recurrent lack of responsiveness. The responsiveness of emotions refers to the appropriateness of the emotions to the life of an imperfect being in a world where there are major accidents. It also refers to the relation of the emotions to the development of practical reason and a sense of self. The frequent lack of responsiveness refers to the inflexibility of the emotions before current objects, as they cast past images upon them. These features of emotions lead her to argue that, if one plans to evaluate the emotions normatively,
the developmental dimension needs to be investigated. In doing so, one will have ask
the following three questions: Firstly, which features of a normal child’s history make
his or her emotions inherently problematic from the ethical point of view, and the
point of view of practical rationality? Secondly, are there other features of standard
emotional development that provide support to ethics? And thirdly, how and to what
degree is it possible to promote developmental patterns that do not undermine ethical
norms? Nussbaum explains that the cognitive content of an emotion is rooted in a
multifaceted narrative history. Without this history it is often impossible to provide an
account of the complete particularities of the emotions themselves. An investigation
into the origins of emotions in infancy and childhood will assist us to analyse the
histories of specific emotions and comprehend their diversity.

Her account is a philosophical account, illuminated by literature and psychology. She
consults Marcel Proust (1954, 1982), Donald Winnicot (1965, 1986), John Bowlby
her neo-Stoic view, she subsequently constructs a narrative that focuses on themes
of ambivalence and omnipotence. She believes that this will enable us to understand
how thinking about child development assists us to compile a more subtle and
complex view of the emotions than we often find in other cognitive/evaluative
theories. She also argues that the idea of using her cognitive account as point of
departure provides us with a more revealing perspective of some of the traditional
concerns of developmental psychology and psychoanalysis.

5.3 The Golden Age: helplessness, omnipotence, basic needs

Nussbaum reminds us that human beings are born into a world, which they have not
made and do not control. They enter the world completely needy and helpless. She
holds that this extended helplessness characterises the history of a human infant,
and “… the early drama of its infancy is the drama of helplessness before a world of
objects” (UT, 182). In this regard Lucretius remarked that an infant’s central
perception of itself is that it is a very weak and helpless being. It is powerless towards
things of the greatest importance. However, the infants’ needs are attended to by
other agencies in the world. They provide what the infant cannot provide for itself. For
the child, these agencies are enormously important in its awareness of the world. Its
connection to these agencies is based upon the anxious desire to protect its own
comfort, nourishment and safety. She focuses on three distinct aspects of the infant’s
neediness, as described by Lucretius, namely the needs for life-sustaining
assistance, comfort (soulagement), and cognitive mastery. She stresses that central to these needs is the infant’s relationship to external objects of high importance.

The need for assistance refers to the fundamental physical need for nourishment and care. Both Lucretius and modern psychologists describe this need as “… a felt need for the removal of painful or invasive stimuli, and for the restoration of blissful or undisturbed condition” (UT, 183). In this regard Nussbaum highlights the important relation between restoration and survival. She believes that this is significant for the evolutionary account of the child’s development and of its developing emotions. However, we need to note that the connection between restoration and survival is not part of the infant’s own subjective awareness. Initially, in its own ‘object world’, the infant is unable to observe definite objects. The felt needs at this stage prioritise those objects that he/she perceives to be the agents of the restoration process. She also holds that the ‘restorative’ agency (a mother, father, nurse, caretaker) will initially be experienced as a process and not as a distinct object. The process will be transformational, since the infant’s own state of being will be changed. But the infant has almost no control over the advent of the transformational process. In this regard she agrees with Fairbairn’s notion (1952) of ‘infantile dependence’. The world does not provide everything mechanically and transformations are experienced as risky, uncertain and dangerous. This emphasises the infant’s helplessness and creates a life of uncertainty, anxiety and anger, thus generating a need for comfort and reassurance that cannot be reduced to basic physical needs.

Nussbaum emphasises that the need for comfort, and specifically holding, is not related to the previous need for nourishment. She argues that the urge to be protected against the agonizing and disturbing stimuli of a foreign world is in some ways more powerful than the need for nourishment. It is through comfort in the form of holding that the infant develops an eagerness to live in the world, and gets the assurance that despite its hazards, the world is fairly kind and supportive. The awareness that one is not totally helpless and that the environment will in some way react to one’s requirements, forms a crucial basis for all learning. Experiencing comfort eliminates the initial sense of helplessness, especially in early infancy. In this regard, Nussbaum accepts Bollas’s notion of caretakers as ‘transformational objects’ (1987), since this adds light on the fact that these objects make the world “… worth living in” (UT, 187). Even very young infants display a remarkable ability to recognise a specific caretaker and to develop a strong and special attachment with that particular person. She also refers to Sarah Hrdy’s research (1999) that indicates
that these secure attachments may be nurtured in various ways and that caretakers may be a single mother or multiple caretakers. However, Nussbaum draws our attention to a crucial element in the attachment. Stern (1977) refers to this element as the ‘dance’ (UT, 188). This implies that the caretaker must display sensitivity to the child’s unique rhythm and individual style. According to Kurtz (1992), excessive invasion and over-stimulation can also be very harmful to the relationship. If the caretaker does not succeed in balancing attention and giving space, or intrusiveness and indifference, the child will be unable to trust that person. In this regard Winnicott (1986) believes that a good caretaker will be one with a vivid imagination and who has the ability to identify with the child in fantasy (UT, 188).

Lucretius introduced the third aspect of an infant’s experience as *in luminis oras*, meaning that the world into which the child enters is wonderful and beaming. This world asserts the infant’s interest as an object of significance and happiness. Long ago, Aristotle claimed that at the beginning of their lives children display interest in cognitive mastery. Stern (1985, 1990), reflecting on more recent experimental results, also emphasises infants’ strong interest in cognitive stimulation. He notes, in particular, their amazingly premature ability to make distinctions. Nussbaum also refers to Winnicott’s claim (1965) that children find creative and imaginative activities extremely exciting. In doing so, they begin to sort out their world (UT, 189). However, Nussbaum argues that if we want to elucidate why infants get going and follow their own projects in the world, we need to put forward a different need for cognitive distinction making. We need an additional explanation for children’s unique delight in sorting out the vague world, and the reason for this is not solely for self-protection. They do not simply invest a positive interest in objects purely for their instrumental value. If we want to explain human beings’ initiative and curiosity, we need to realise that curiosity, cognitive interest, and wonder are independent from the need for sheer self-protection.

5.4 Early emotions: “Holding”, love, primitive shame
Nussbaum argues that the subsequent issue to address at this point is where emotions are to be found. In this regard she believes that infant emotions arise out of the child’s growing awareness of its own helplessness and vulnerability. The infant has no understandable sense of boundaries of the self and others. Transformations are vague experiences with no reference to clear external sources. The child has only a blurred idea that very important processes over which he/she has no control, are taking place. This, she argues, is the foundation of infant emotions. Emotions are
“… recognitions of that importance coupled with that lack of full control” (UT, 190). Emotions develop slowly but surely as the child grows in awareness of the significance of the transformations to its own being. Once the infant is able to trace these to a specific agency outside the self, the emotions will have an object. The earliest emotions will include fear, anxiety, joy and hope — all related to the transformation processes. Nussbaum believes that love at this stage is only an elementary type of love, which is linked to gratitude and the awareness that others assist in the infant’s struggle to survive. The infant does not have a clear idea that external objects are continuous wholes. Nor does it have a sense of itself as an individual whole and persisting body. Its thoughts about itself and others are indistinct. The object of the emotions is still a part or even a stage of the caretaker, and not the caretaker as a total person. Nussbaum also holds that the underlying aspect of the infant’s developing emotions is its needy appetitive nature. The baby’s own appetites provide him or her with the first intense information about the new world. In this regard she explains that an infant can hardly distinguish between hunger and anxiety.

Another vital necessity is the need for protection and comfort. As the child becomes aware of sources of consolation, the distinctness between the need for food and the need for comfort will increase. The need for appetitive gratification should also be distinguished from the quest for cognitive mastery. The pursuit of this need will eventually supply the infant’s inner life with emotions and a structure for other emotions. Nussbaum further explains that the infant will often direct anger and love at the same object. In this regard Spinoza (1982, 1985) emphasises that an infant who has to rely on others agencies for its own well-being is likely to aim both love and anger towards those agencies unknowingly. In reality, the vague boundaries of self and others obscure the source of frustration. The infant also has an unclear idea that the good and bad agencies are to some degree parts of its own self. Its exceptional blend of physical incapacity and intellectual capacity generates a unique emotional complexity (UT, 192). Anger, incidentally, should not be seen as an inborn destructive impulse, but as a reaction to circumstances. In this regard, she asserts that incidents of frustration and distress are important in the developmental process of the child, because without these, the child “... would never try out its own projects of control” (UT, 192).

At this point the child’s behaviour is that of infantile self-importance. The whole world revolves around its needs and failure to address its wants will generate reactive
anger. She explains that the child experiences a crisis at this stage, because it is utterly vulnerable, dependent and reliant on others, but at the same time also inherently egocentric.

Winnicott (1986) refers to the importance of ‘holding’ and argues that if caretakers are able to meet the child’s omnipotence in a stable and responsible way, a framework for trust and interdependence will be created. Once the child realises that it will not be left utterly helpless and that it can rely on others, it will progressively become less omnipotent. However, she argues that a child that does not experience sufficient ‘holding’, will hang on to its omnipotence in later life, demanding perfection in object relations and in the inner self. This will also be the case if the child experiences excessive controlling and intrusion by the caretaker, and does not have the space to relax into a relationship of trust (UT, 193). Winnicott (1986) further maintains that the nature of very early parental care influences the child’s outlook on its own human neediness. If a child does not get the sense that his neediness is suitable, a feeling of rejection will be hovering in the background, which can eventually generate anger. The child’s creativity, which should develop in a context of trust and holding, will also not develop. Finally, the child will also not experience subtle interplay, which Winnicott (1986) regards as a crucial element in love and affectionate relationships.

According to Nussbaum, shame implies an awareness of inadequacy and weakness. In this regard, she holds that infant omnipotence is linked to vulnerability. Once the child grasps its reliance on others, it will probably develop elementary shame. This form of rudimentary shame will be coupled with anger at its own helplessness, and is not related to a downgrading of the self. She believes that once a child learns to enjoy the creative subtle interplay with its caretaker, it will slowly but surely learn to trust, become less ashamed of its own dependence, and become a less self-centred human being (UT, 196). Nussbaum describes primitive shame as a specific type of shame, which is closely connected to narcissism or infantile omnipotence. She defines it as, “… the demand for perfection and the consequent inability to tolerate any lack of control or imperfection”, and concurs that ‘primitive shame’ at one’s own helplessness and incompetence is possibly a critical and universal aspect of the emotional life (UT, 198). She argues that the human body can be experienced as the base of our powerlessness to control the world. Our bodies are limited, and cognition cannot dismiss this awareness. One may therefore infer that the human body generates some shame (UT, 199). Nussbaum concludes that infant emotions stem
from the child’s growing awareness of lack of omnipotence and from its doubt about the good. Infant emotions are not formal acceptances of propositions, but unclear and tentative cognitive appraisals (UT, 200).

5.5 Disgust and the borders of the body

Nussbaum believes that disgust does not normally manifest before the age of three. She postulates that an investigation into this emotion will thus surpass the current focus of her developing theory, but she believes that due to the strong links of this emotion to shame (both shame and disgust have bodily insufficiency at their core), we need to address it now. According to Nussbaum, disgust is an intuitive emotion. It entails intense bodily reactions, such as vomiting to certain stimuli, which often also have bodily features. However, she argues that Paul Rozin’s research (1987) clearly indicates that disgust has intricate cognitive content. It focuses on the daunting prospects of assimilation of an offensive object. Nussbaum further points out that disgust is stimulated by specific ideas about the particular type and history of the object. She believes that reactions of disgust are often irrational. An object is frequently identified at the wrong level of generality or related to other objects from which it is significantly different. But Nussbaum maintains that an overly general separation of the self from disgusting items serves the purpose of steering one away from dangerous items. In the process one is reaffirming one’s own toughness and solidity (UT, 204). This is probably why disgust frequently spreads so freely. Parents and society teach the child about disgust.

Rozin (1984) sees disgust as a potent vehicle of social teaching. Specific approaches towards animality, morality, gender and sexuality are conveyed in a potentially powerful and influential way. Although all societies share certain general primary objects of disgust such as faeces and bodily fluids, they vary regarding reactions to other objects. Many objects become disgust objects purely due to specific social teaching. Objects of disgust therefore vary noticeably across cultures, although all express a refusal to consume and as such become polluted by the powerful reminder of one’s own animality and mortality (UT, 205). Nussbaum finally argues that one’s ambiguous perceptions of one’s body, its powerlessness and association with decay and mortality, have a potent influence on the emotions of the growing child’s social life, inducing potential future moral and social problems (UT, 206).
5.6 Playing alone, the ambivalence crisis, and the moral defence

Nussbaum continues to develop her theory of the emotions by arguing that a developing child's emotions direct him or her to locate the bad or the good things of this world. Through its emotions the child will be able to recognise the externality of these bad or good things. In doing so, it will discover the limits of its own secure control. She holds that emotions such as fear, love, joy and anger define the world and plot the self in the world. The child's first appraisals are induced by its own internal need for safety and well-being. These appraisals, especially regarding the child's own attempts to control and manipulate, gradually get more refined. By means of these controlling and manipulating efforts, the child then learns which of these bad or good things are under its own control and which are not. The child also discovers which of these external things (good or bad) have their own agency and which are static (UT, 206, 207). A child, who does not get acquainted with fear for instance, is at risk. The emotional demarcation is therefore important for adaptation, since it teaches the child the consequences of its own boundaries, and releases the child from a feeling of helplessness and submissiveness before the world. Nussbaum reminds us that the infant's initial awareness of the self as that of diverse transforming processes and that of other people as parts or agents of these processes. The child's emotions develop at the same time as its own active attempts to control.

The image of a significant self subsequently develops as that of a “… container with boundaries, fortified against but also seeking the aid of the external world “ (UT, 207). Nussbaum believes that the picture of the self as a stable thing in a relatively friendly world should be instilled. This is crucial for the child's developing ability to think and to act. The child needs the self-confidence that it can accomplish things on its own. She mentions Winnicott's (1965) emphasis on the child's need to be alone at times and to engage in its own projects. This should occur within a sense of safe environment. The child will then get the opportunity to discover its inner self and develop the ability to be physically alone. However, she emphasises Winnicott's caution (1965) that physical aloneness is not the same as the ability to be alone, since the latter implies the presence of trust, confidence, as well as the skill to be busy with one's own thoughts and inner life. Nussbaum maintains that this form of aloneness is always intrinsically relational, because someone else will always be there, although not necessarily by means of physical presence. Creative aloneness obtains its richness from “… the shadow of the early holding object” (UT, 208). Winnicott (1965) claims that many of these experiences of imaginative aloneness
provide the foundation for a life of realism rather than a life of worthlessness (UT, 208). Winnicott (1965) also points out that sometimes a child has the capacity to provide its own comfort. Often children use blankets or stuffed animals to temper the need for reassurance, without looking for a parent’s presence. In this regard we need to note that the imagination plays a vital role in the concepts of both transitional object and playing alone. In the absence of evident sources of security, the child now imagines itself as its own consolation.

Nussbaum believes that in a stable environment, the child will be able to develop emotions such as joy, love, wonder and gratitude. But she points out that the child in actual fact occupies a world that is also risky and unstable. There will be times when the child will not be able to rely on caretakers and will experience emotions such as fear. Nussbaum holds that fluctuating care and security is a crucial component in the development of the child’s living skills. The child will gradually realise that, although it relies on its caretakers, they are not controllable. She argues that this will lead to painful conflicts, since the child will now experience that same source as the victim of both love and hatred. Nussbaum sees this as a crucial stage in the development of the child’s emotions. Its love for its caretakers is marked by an intense ambivalence, because the child now also experiences frustration due to its separation from its caretakers. The anger is no longer a tentative annoyance aimed at processes, but focused on an object. The person becomes the culpable agent of the harm. At the same time, however, the child also experiences love, since it wishes to acquire and integrate this object. The anger may now be utilised as a controlling tool.

This leads to the genesis of another emotion, namely jealousy. Nussbaum describes jealousy as “… the wish to possess the good object more completely by getting rid of competing influences, the judgement that it is very bad that there should be these competing influences and that it would be good for them to vanish from the earth” (UT, 210). Since the object of the jealousy is now the caretaker, she holds that envy will be the subsequent emotion. In this case the object will be the competing force, which assumingly deprives the child of the caretaker’s attention. Nussbaum believes that envy implies that the child ascertains that displacement of the competing objects from their favoured sites will improve its own position. Nussbaum infers that at this early age, most of the child’s emotions relate to a desire to possess and control, reflecting its failure to relinquish omnipotence. The child’s early ‘emotional drama’ therefore revolves around the need for nourishment, safety, and love, as well as its refusal to acknowledge its separation from the source of these goods. Additionally
the child also experiences primitive shame at its own neediness and incompetence. She argues that the most dominant element in this phase of the child’s development is ambivalent love/anger, supported by shame and envy. At this point the child acknowledges that its dependence on the other person or persons is not reciprocal, and awareness of this lop-sided need generates anger and jealousy. Primitive shame, on the other hand, stems from the child’s awareness of its own lack of omnipotent control of the object. Primitive shame assumes that anything short of perfection is dreadful and this means that a life in which the child has to share the good object with competing forces is deplorable. In this regard, Nussbaum infers that shame and envy are closely linked. The only way to relinquish envy is to accept a world where the good object is shared with others. This is not possible if the child sees its incompleteness as appalling and regards perfect control as the only acceptable option. However, mature love will allow the subtle interplay to permit the other to be independent, and as such renounce envy. A child, who is overwhelmingly obsessed with perfection, will refuse subtle interplay, since the only way to stave off its shame, is by entire manipulation of the object (UT, 212). Nussbaum believes that the child has already acquired some resources that will enable him or her to meet this crisis, because nascent love and gratitude, directed at the object, will at this stage already be present. Aspects of trust and keen self-exposure are also implied in the developing subtle interplay with the object. The child also displays inquisitiveness about the world, linked to wonder and love at what is observed. By now the child has a promising ability to imagine. This is due to its ability to be alone and to play with transitional objects, as well as the subtle interplay with the caretaker. She argues that the child is particularly able to imagine the suffering of the good object. She also believes that the development of the imagination has the potential to neutralize primitive shame, an emotion that according to her “… paralyses play and cultivates rigidity” (UT, 213).

Returning to the crisis itself, Nussbaum asserts that the child experiences this crisis as painful and terrifying. The pain is caused by the frustrated need and the corrosiveness of the additional anger. However, since the child realises that the object of its anger is the same as the object of its love, guilt now emerges as a new and unfamiliar emotion. The subsequent realisation, namely that its own emotion of love was coloured with evil, leads the child to acknowledge the co-presence of good and bad in itself. This intricate situation, according to Klein (1984, 1985) gives rise to grief. The child has a true sense of deep loss of many aspects. It has lost the entirety of its blissful world. It has also lost the untainted goodness of the object of its love. It
has lost the sole interest and love of that object, and it has lost its own complete goodness and decency (UT, 214). Nussbaum thus concludes, “Danger is now seated at the heart of love, and of oneself” (UT, 214). She believes, however, that by now the child has the capability to handle this crisis. The child has already acquired gratitude, love, wonder, curiosity and above all the ability to imagine the pain of the object. These capacities will give rise to a specific strategy of justice and compensation where good things, such as loving acts, will be implemented to annihilate the bad things. The child realises that other people apart from the self also have justifiable demands, and as such learns to accept the limits of own demands.

This leads Nussbaum to argue that the ambivalence of human love can also be a crucial source of the creativity and passion of human love. The horrific discovery of one’s own imperfection can activate an external move towards the acknowledgement of other’s needs (UT, 215). Nussbaum explains that Fairbairn (1952) sees this awareness as a very basic moral notion. The child realises that it can compensate for the bad by supplying the good, and this comes as a vast relief. Morality, therefore, limits the child’s badness and protects the child from being overwhelmed by it (UT, 216). It provides the child with a sense of shelter and allows the child to abandon the desire to control the object completely.

Nussbaum argues that this is a turning point in the child’s emotional development, because from this point onwards, the child accepts a world where its own demands have limits and other people also have valid needs. The child now gets introduced to moral demands: If it transgresses its boundaries, a penalty will have to be paid. But Nussbaum argues that these moral demands are acceptable, since they liberate the child from feelings of despair and hopelessness. Moral guilt matches the hopefulness about one’s own projects and can be regarded as a noble emotion. Nussbaum therefore concludes that morality provides the child with an embracing structure and a feeling of security (UT, 216). In this regard, morality itself gets a specific character. It protects a person’s inherent worth and dignity from potential harm caused by inner aggression. It is furthermore not egocentric, since it focuses on the intrinsic value of external objects. Morality establishes boundaries to self-interest and commands respect for valid projects of others. It is also filled with love and wonder. And we need to note that this morality is not a dictatorial type of morality. In this regard, morality thus ‘holds’ the child in its incompleteness (UT, 217). She subsequently proposes a benevolent morality cycle that illuminates the notion of ‘moral defence’. Due to the supporting and caring nature of morality, the child realises that the world is merciful,
forgiving and accepting. The child therefore learns not to be ashamed of its own incompleteness. It will subsequently not have reason to be jealous or envious, since these are expressions of its desire to have exclusive control of the good sources in the world (UT, 217). On the other hand, a child who grows up without the perception that human love is merciful and understanding, will experience its own imperfection as unforgivable. Its ambivalent feelings will subsequently give rise to agonizing anxiety.

Nussbaum also stresses the importance of guilt and shame in her account of morality. She indicates that guilt has creative potential, because it is linked to reparation. It also recognises the boundaries of aggression. She admits, however, that it can sometimes be extreme, domineering, harmful and self-pestering. Although shame can sometimes be constructive, Nussbaum argues that due to its close link to self-importance, shame puts morality and creative inner life at risk. She infers that shame poses a greater danger to the child’s emotional development than guilt. One of the most important developmental tasks of the child is to abandon infantile self-importance and accept that it shares the world with other objects. In this regard, Nussbaum mentions Winnicott’s significant reference (1965) to religious systems. He holds that some of the major religions focus on mercy and flexibility, while others stress perfect obedience. He argues,

… religious systems of morality harm development if their central focus is on original sin rather on goodness, and if they neglect the human conditions for the growth of trust and “believe in,” which include a central role for love and holding (UT, 218).

Nussbaum warns that too strong an emphasis on the badness of human imperfection will lead to excessive primitive shame. This may aggravate the child’s moral dilemma to such an extent that ‘moral death’ is generated (UT, 219). However, a parent who recognises his or her own imperfection will enjoy assisting the child with its efforts to temper its aggression with reparative actions. She also refers to Nancy Chodorow’s views (1978) that the developmental history of males in most cultures indicates a “… demand not to be a child” (UT, 219). A boy often develops shame about his dependence on his mother or his lack of self-sufficiency and seldom experiences ‘subtle interplay’. As a result, males often hide their need for others and ignore their inner world to the detriment of their emotional development. Nussbaum warns that this can become a vicious cycle, since unexamined and undeveloped emotions now remain infantile, resulting in even more reason for shame. This correlates with Winnicott’s notion of a ‘false self’ (1965) and Bollas’s idea of a ‘normotic personality’
They hold that such a person will be able to hide their neediness by applying intellectual skills up to a point. But these needy emotions are still dormant, requiring love and encouragement. Further feelings of helplessness will subsequently develop, which can eventually lead to depression.

Nussbaum further argues that both disgust and primitive shame can be of potential danger to morality, since both focus on aspects of imperfection and lack of control. However, whereas the focus of shame is on the self, the focus of disgust is on aspects of the self only after they leave the body. Disgust wishes to banish these from the self’s sphere. In the process a device is often developed to protect the boundaries between the self and aspects of own animality and morality. Disgust is then projected onto others and in this regard Nussbaum argues that these victims will typically be people who are different and who can be circumvented. Such a form of disgust can cause harm within a so-called moral system, because the idea of equality and dignity of people is now also threatened. Nussbaum concludes that the root of disgust is primitive shame. It is rooted in the reluctance to be a “needy animal” (UT, 221). It is now apparent that, on the one hand, emotions pose some problems to morality, but on the other hand, provide morality with rich resources. We can infer that morality relies on the emotions for its existence as well as for its sustainability. Nussbaum argues that a moral system that encourages primitive shame or suppresses subtle interplay deserves to be viewed with scepticism. Aspects of the human being that require support and nourishment will be harmed by such a deficient system.

However, a moral system that entails mercy and flexible judgements will support the child in its ambivalence crisis. If the moral system reinforces the child’s assumption that, despite its own incompleteness, the world is still worth living in, that a particular moral view seems plausible. Such a system will have trans-generational stability and will generate people who will be kind, merciful and supportive towards weaker aspects of the personality. Such a system will not allow singling out some people as disgusting ones, since it will emphasize equality of all human beings. As such it will not tell lies and force its inhabitants to live lives of self-deception.⁴

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⁴ This particular point will become a key issue in Part 2 and Part 3 of this thesis.
5.7 “Mature interdependence” and the facilitating environment

Nussbaum describes the final condition of infant emotional development. She refers to a ‘norm of health’ described by both Winnicott (1965) and Fairbairn (1952) in this regard, and bases her notion of ‘mature interdependence’ on Fairbairn’s term of ‘mature dependence’.

‘Mature interdependence’ implies that the child has the ability to recognize that its loved ones are detached people. It also realises that those who are needed to attend to its desires, are not simply instruments of its will. This leads the child to renounce its omnipotence and to accept its dependence. But Nussbaum argues that by the same token the child also allows the others to depend upon it (UT, 224). She holds that the child’s ‘story of maturity’ is never without repeated attempts to monopolise, coupled with incidents of anger, jealousy, or envy. However, since gratitude and kindness have now also developed, the child will be able to reject unwanted emotions. The child is subsequently able to start a relationship based on mutuality and equivalence. It realises its sustained need for love and security, but acknowledges the redundancy of covetous attempts to possess and control (UT, 225). Fairbairn (1952) regards this as the achievement of mature love, since mature love acknowledges the separateness of the object, as well as the ideal to secure the separateness. But Nussbaum believes that an incessant tussle against a wish to remove the competing object and to be at the centre of the world is lurking even in ‘normal’ mature love. “The ambivalence crisis is never completely resolved, and reparation remains a lifelong task” (UT, 225).

Nussbaum also argues that, in addition to the family circle, larger social and political groupings also form part of the child’s environment in which emotional development takes place. It is in these broader circles where the child learns suitable types of imagination and empathy. She points out that political institutions, systems of law and schools are also part of this facilitating environment. She believes that there is a ‘fit’ between a particular set of institutions and a particular account of the personality. The idea of this ‘fit’ will illuminate aspects of stability, because it will indicate that some types of institutions manage to duplicate themselves via the personality, while others are not successful. She argues that love and reparation are some of the ‘primary goods’ that any moral political system should endorse. She alleges that preferred institutions are those that encourage individuals to cultivate these aptitudes (UT, 226). She also refers to Fairbairn’s description (1952) of the political view suggested by his idea of ‘mature dependence’. He sees ‘mature dependence’ as an
acknowledgement of the parent’s separateness and freedom, coupled with the recognition that others also have a right to the parents, as well as to other good things in life. He then argues that since communism is an onslaught on liberty, it should be rejected, but by the same token certain extremely nationalistic or ethnocentric democracies should also be condemned. Absolute acknowledgement of human interdependence should steer away from local, tribal, or religious particularism and be directed at a form of international humanism (UT, 227).

Nussbaum expands this argument with the addition of another dimension of ‘mature interdependence’. She argues that it should also recognise the imperfection of the human body and its needs for material goods. ‘Mature interdependence’ acquires the renouncement of the envious desire to monopolise these sources of the good. She subsequently infers that ‘mature interdependence’ implies not only the recognition that all members of society are inclined to freedom and basic needed materials, but also the determination to fulfil these needs. All members of society have the right to be imperfect and needy. Respect for their humanity will include the establishment of a politically facilitating environment and a ‘holding’ of these needs.

One can thus argue that a norm of psychological maturity also implies a norm for public life. Such a view of political organisation is suitable to replicate itself over time in a stable manner, because its principal ideas encourage “… the formation of personalities that are likely to be intensely concerned with the needs of others” (UT, 227). It is now clear that customs, institutions and laws also create facilitating environments. Institutions, for instance, may convey the notion of the existence of a faultless patriarch who can deny the child its right to be alone. It can also convey the idea that need is an indication of appalling failure, or that our aggressions cannot be redeemed. On the other hand, institutions can also express the notion that all people are equal with regards to creativity and initiative. It can convey the notion that need is normal, and also that we can indeed repair our aggressions. She thus believes that in assessing an institution, the focus should be on the capacities of the personality that the particular institution supports (UT, 228).

Nussbaum also addresses the issue of punishment and argues that the purpose of punishment should be to encourage the child’s reparative abilities. Punishment should not reinforce primitive shame, especially at its own imperfection. She believes

\[\text{5 In Part 3 of this thesis, I will use the main thrust of this argument in my discussion of certain key aspects of education in South Africa.}\]
that punishment should encourage feelings of guilt, since guilt is a moral emotion and appropriate to what the child has done. However, the child should be treated with dignity and the method of punishment should support the child’s confidence in its own reparative capabilities. Public punishment on the other hand, should be aimed at combating the crime and protecting the society. In this regard, she criticises the use of ‘shaming penalties’ to mock wrongdoers. She believes that these reinforce primitive shame, give rise to a potential personal moral shutdown and in general lead to an extremely rigid and merciless society. Society should rather act as a parent who ‘holds’ the child in spite of its deficiencies, and allows the wrongdoer to demonstrate their reparative capacity. Nussbaum concludes that most people have excessive shame. This can easily lead to aggressive and persecutory conduct towards others. We all therefore need to develop confidence in our own reparative capabilities (UT, 229).

5.8 The neo-Stoic view revised again
At this point Nussbaum revisits her developing theory. She argues that adult emotions are shaped by the emotions of infancy. She strongly holds that any cognitive or even non-cognitive view of the emotions that excludes this fact, fails to explain why adult emotions bear traces of early objects. She further reminds us that the cognitive component is still at the root of her theory and subsequently proceeds with an elaboration of this claim.

There are times when adult emotions appear from nowhere and do not seem to correspond with the current value of the object. She postulates that a person that maintains some type of false self-defence will have these experiences more often than a person who is in touch with their true self and who is acquainted with their emotions of neediness, dependence, anger and aggression. In this regard she also reminds us of Winnicott’s (1965) remark that the concept of a ‘false self’ is a matter of degree, since all people mask deeper emotions to some degree. Yet, for many people these deeper emotions are not only concealed from the outside world, but from the person him- or herself. When these emotions then appear, they will be utterly confusing, since their cognitive content will be unknown. And even if the content is known, they may have an ancient and infantile form and may be irrelevant to current evaluative judgements about the particular object. These emotions may then be experienced as alien forces or non-cognitive energies, shoving the personality around and forcing the person into impulsive actions. A more healthy personality on the other hand may have discovered reparative action to redeem its
aggression and may be able to allow the presence of some primary emotions. However, even this person may still be unaware that some anger and guilt towards infant objects, such as parents, still exist and form crucial parts of the strong urge to repair. To such a person these emotions may also feel like alien forces, because the true nature of the intentional object has not been identified. She also holds that a person who takes pride in self-sufficiency may have a sustained and intense need for 'holding', but may refuse to identify these needs, due to shame. When these needs then appear, they will be regarded as invading and imperceptive forces with no apparent relevance to the person’s view of the object. Nussbaum argues that the intentionality of early object relations is a crucial factor in the explanation of such a person’s actions. The person’s love does indeed have an early object, but unfortunately the emotion’s intentionality has stayed at an archaic level, due to the absence of further ‘subtle interplay’ and creative imagining.

Nussbaum agrees that the adversary’s view is tempting, because it manages to describe the discord between intended emotions and sudden unexpected manifestations of emotions, feelings that “… the past wells up in us, in ways that surprise the deliberately intending self” (UT, 232). However, once we manage to recognise the reason for the adrenalin rush to be the past, we also realise that understanding the emotion will imply identifying the true intentional object. Nussbaum thus infers that “A cognitive view will be obtuse if it does not make room for such archaic and infantile cognitions and for their present force” (UT, 232)6.

She subsequently argues that the inclusion of the developmental dimension in her cognitive view accommodates the perplexing and uncontrolled aspects of emotional life. This has implications for her view of the ‘picture of character’, since all cognitive views of the emotions imply that emotions can be altered by a change in the way the objects are evaluated. She therefore believes that virtue should not be understood as a matter of control or strength where the will simply restrains the rough impulsive aspects of the personality. Reason should rather be construed as “… extending all the way down into the personality, enlightening it through and through” (UT, 232). To a person who conceals misogynistic wrath and hatred, a change in thought can thus lead to a change in behaviour, as well as a change in emotion.

6 Part 2 of this thesis consists of an example of the implications of past experiences on the emotional lives of people. This feature of emotions has particular significance in a country like South Africa, where the past experiences of people are very diverse.
She claims that this view has propositions for moral education, especially regarding emotions towards members of other races and religions. Suppression of innate aggression is no longer the only option. However, she grants that emotional change is a difficult task. She holds that although some emotions may alter with new versions of the facts, others may not. It seems as if emotion-thoughts entail a stronger kind of investment, because they are related to elements of our conception of well-being. She explains that the ancient Stoics as well as Iris Murdoch (1970) argued that because these matters are habitual and so significant to us, change would be very difficult. But Nussbaum extends this view. She argues that the reason for the reluctance to change the views is because too much is invested in these views. One’s life has been organised around them and any alteration will cause major upheaval. One’s character itself will thus resist the change. She argues that we are not dealing with a benevolent picture, since the foundations of anger, hatred and disgust are very deep in the structure of human life. The idea of aligning the emotions to what reason prescribes, or to the person’s ideals should be discarded as too cruel and too simplistic. To impose an unattainable norm of perfection can cause emotional chaos. She mentions an incident when Aristotle instructed an aspiring orator to get rid of his anger by presenting the object of anger in a new light. According to Aristotle a good person can and should demand emotional control by itself. But Nussbaum argues that this view is tyrannical, because it demands more than is humanly possible. Her rejection of Aristotle’s view is supported by Paul Grice. He argued that Aristotle was the one who had “a Prussian view”, and not Kant. Aristotle scrutinised every aspect of life, whereas Kant was willing to release the passions, on condition that they do not interfere with the will (UT, 235). Grice held that the sheer wish to do something not for a particular reason, as well as the rejection of self-interrogation about the appropriateness of one’s motives and passions, were not present in the Aristotelian view. Nussbaum concludes that her view also deviates from normative ethics, because in her neo-Stoic view, the emotions are provided with a history. In this regard she condemns such normative approaches, arguing that they are “ ... excessively violent toward human complexity and frailty” (UT, 235).

5.9 Imagination and narrative
Nussbaum finally argues that emotions have a narrative structure, and that in order to understand an emotion we need to grasp their narrative structure. She believes that the arts play a vital role in human self-understanding, “ ... for narrative artworks of various kinds (whether musical or visual or literary) give us information about these
emotions-histories what we could not easily get otherwise” (UT, 236). She refers again to Proust (1982), who argues that certain truths about emotions can be best expressed by a narrative work of art, because only art can truthfully show the interrelated sequential structure of emotional ‘thoughts’. She adds the following motivations for their importance: Narrative art works provide the person who wants to understand the emotional life with valuable insights. Narrative art works are also important for what they do in the emotional life. In this regard she argues that they are not simply representations of an emotion’s history, but they enter into the emotion.

She further explains that a child’s inner world and sense of own aloneness are cultivated by narrative play and storytelling. This is supplemented by the ability to imagine the object’s presence even in its absence, as well as the ability to play at presence and absence using toys, which serve as ‘transitional objects’ (UT, 236). Gradually the child’s inner world then deepens. It turns into a place for individual creative attempts where the self is separated from the world. This is why Winnicott (Rudnytsky, 1993) sees an artistic activity as sacred, or as a type of ‘potential space’ (UT, 236). Nussbaum subsequently argues that the artistic activity acts as a mediator “... between baby and mother, between child and family, between individual and society” (UT, 236). In this regard Nussbaum notes that it is due to the mother’s cultivation of her own ‘potential space’ that she is able to imagine the child’s experiences and attend to its needs. The imagination should therefore be regarded as a vital component of the reproduction of a healthy character, and thus of a society’s trans-generational stability. Playing with narratives and images mediates the ‘subtle interplay’ between parent and infant, since this enables the child to imagine somebody else’s experience.

5.10 Conclusion
Nussbaum concludes her discussion of emotions in infancy with a summary of the advantages of narrative play. She emphasises its importance, especially during the ambivalence crisis. Narrative play assists the child to become acquainted with the painful implications of its destructive wishes on others. It strengthens the child’s reparative attempts, since it encourages curiosity, wonder and delight. The child develops the ability to see others in non-instrumental ways and as objects of wonder in their own right. Narrative play also enables the child to relate to its ambivalent psychology. Instead of running away or concealing it, the child becomes interested in living in a world where it is imperfect and does not fully control. This will combat
depression and feelings of helplessness. Narrative play moreover adorns imperfection in a delightful and playful shape and demeans primitive shame. This assists the child to tolerate the imperfection of human beings. Narrative play also provides the child with the ‘potential space’ in which to explore life’s possibilities. The characters in rhymes, stories, pictures and songs serve the same purpose as the ‘transitional objects’ with which the child has learnt to comfort itself in the absence of its mother. They become the objects that the child can manipulate as subjects of the objects in real life that matter most to the child. She refers again to Winnicott’s claim (Rudnytsky, 1993) that the child’s play with its transitional objects should be regarded as its first artistic and creative activities. Nussbaum subsequently argues that there is a tight interweaving between the symbolic physical object and the symbolic aesthetic object.

Through symbolic activity, the child cultivates her ability to imagine what others experience, and she explores the possibilities of human life in a safe and pleasing manner. At the same time, she cultivates her ability to be alone, and deepens her own inner world (UT, 238)

She therefore assumes a strong link between narrative play and the acquisition of compassion⁷.

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⁷ Central to Nussbaum’s argument is the presupposition that such development will occur within stable conditions. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case in South Africa. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12.
Chapter 6: Compassion

6.1 Introduction
At this point Nussbaum believes that according to her account, emotions pose three problems. Firstly, insofar as they involve acknowledgement of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency, they reveal us as vulnerable to events that we do not control; and one might hold that including a large measure of uncontrol in one's conception of a good life compromises too deeply the dignity of one's own agency. Secondly, emotions focus on our goals and they represent the world from the point of view of those goals and projects, rather than from a strictly impartial viewpoint. Emotions thus seem to be partial or unbalanced, and one might suppose that we could do better with the guidance of more detached forms of reasoning. We need to attend to this issue, since we do want to provide a basis for respect for the dignity of agency and for concern about human need. Thirdly, emotions seem to be characterised by ambivalence towards their objects. There lurks a morally subversive combination of love and resentment, which springs directly from the thought that we need others to survive and flourish, but do not at all control their movements. This notion may give us some reason not to trust the emotions in the moral life, but rather the more impersonal guidance of rules of duty. She thus believes that at this point, the role of the emotions in the good ethical life remains unclear. She therefore sets out to discuss two emotions, which she regards as pertinent in crafting a reply, namely compassion and love. She sees compassion as “… an emotion that has often been relied on to hook our imagination to the good of others and to make them the object of our intense care” (UT, 13). Since this thesis primarily studies the emotions within the framework of social transformation and education in South Africa, I have decided to conclude the first part with a synopsis of Nussbaum’s analysis of the structure of compassion and its prospect and problems with regards to morality.

6.2 Emotions and ethical norms
The emotions the child has developed thus far, will affect its actions in the world. We need to note that the child’s dependency can bring about a paralysing shame and destructive resentment, which can jeopardize future ethical development and distort perceptions of other objects. The above actions are all related to our view that emotions are evaluative judgements, but we need to determine the extent to which these emotions are rational in a normative sense. We should also consider the suitability of these emotions regarding proper adult deliberation. Although the link between emotional well-being and a normative ethical view, which emphasises
imagination, cooperation, kindness and elasticity is commonly accepted, Nussbaum believes that a proper normative ethical view requires autonomous defence. The questions that she thus intends to pursue are the following: What positive contributions do emotions make to public and personal ethical deliberation? Why should we rely on people’s emotions to obey rules, instead of on their will and their ability? And why should a social order nurture and rely on emotions, instead of mere implementation of a set of rules and systems to ensure obedience? She anticipates that her theory will provide answers to these questions and again she intends to use the Stoics’ normative ethical theory, despite their negative regard of the emotions. They believed that normative reasoning about the emotions is impossible without an account of the emotions. Their normative ethical theory relies heavily on their view of emotions as value judgements (UT, 298).

She chose compassion, since this emotion is viewed with approval, and often regarded as a good base for rational deliberation and suitable action in private and public life. She intends to analyse the cognitive structure of compassion, and will investigate the accounts of Aristotle, Adam Smith (1976) and Rousseau (1979). The focus of these investigations will be on the resources for the good, contained in this emotion, and some barriers to its benevolent action. She subsequently proposes to recreate the well-known philosophical debate about the proper role of compassion in public life, and she will focus on views of Plato, Smith (1976), Rousseau (1979), Kant (1980, 1981, 1983), Schopenhauer (1969, 1995), and Nietzsche (1954, 1966, 1968, 1974, 1976). Finally, she also intends to give a description of some ways in which a society that pursues justice may rely on and develop compassion in a justifiable way. She will also offer suggestions on how to deal with the impediments to compassion, caused by shame, resentment, envy and disgust.

In order to understand the structure of her following argument, we should first consider the structure of the self and its concerns, not forgetting that emotions are eudemonistic judgements. She therefore sees the self as made up by its evaluative encounters with parts of world external to the self. In this regard, she postulates a bifurcation in the emotions, because, some emotions will see the self as strongly attached to independent things and persons. These emotions, such as love and grief, expand the boundaries of the self. Compassion pushes these boundaries even further, and in this regard she defines it as “… a painful emotion occasioned by the
awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune (UT, 301). Other emotions, such as disgust and shame, draw distinct boundaries around the self. They isolate and protect the self from contamination by external objects. The question to be answered is whether ethical agents can indeed live with the reality of their own interdependence and imperfection. She intends to investigate whether it is possible to embark on a venture into the world and connect with it, despite the danger of being stifled by shame, disgust and anger. The ancient Stoics’ solution to this dilemma was a condition without emotions, called apatheia, and the challenge will be to produce a convincing theory for ethics, which will involve a positive role for the guidance of the emotions (UT, 301).

6.3 The cognitive structure of compassion

Nussbaum follows Aristotle’s account of compassion (eleos) and assesses it in the light of the subsequent tradition. She also criticises it in view of her own developing argument. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle claimed that compassion is a painful emotion, directed at another person’s suffering of hardship (UT, 306). He believed that the pain itself is initiated by the beliefs, and removal of the beliefs will remove the pain. Compassion requires three cognitive elements, which are jointly sufficient. These cognitive beliefs, according to Aristotle, are a belief about the seriousness of the suffering, a belief that the sufferer does not deserve to suffer and a belief that the possibilities of the person who has the emotion (the onlooker) are similar to those of the suffering person(s).

Compassion is concerned with value, because it acknowledges the significance of the situation for the well-being of the sufferer. Aristotle also refers to the ‘size’ of the valuable object. But the issue of ‘size’ brings us to another aspect, namely whose point of view is considered when the person having the compassion, determines the ‘size’ of the misfortune? It seems as if the onlooker’s point of view will be the dominant one, however, quite often, and particularly in instances of suffering and deprivation, people’s appraisals of situations are not always correct. They may for instance, have adaptive reactions, by denying the importance of the misery. This usually happens in cases where the deprivation is linked to oppression or hierarchy.

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8 She distinguishes between compassion and empathy, seeing empathy as “… an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience” (UT, 302). The experience can be happy, sad, pleasant, and so on. The difference between sympathy and compassion is that compassion is more intense and suggests a greater degree of suffering, both on the part of the afflicted person and the one who has the emotion. Both sympathy and compassion judge that the other person’s distress is bad. Empathy not. You can have empathy with somebody and still find pleasure in his distress (UT, 302).
as well as in cases where religious or cultural practices deemed the deprivation to be proper. People may also attach importance to matters, which may seem trivial to others. Nevertheless, compassion,

... takes up the onlooker’s point of view, making the best judgement the onlooker can make about what is really happening to the person, even when that may differ from the judgement of the person herself (UT, 309).

Smith (1976) shares the above notion, using the example of a person who has lost his reason. To onlookers, this will be a significant object of compassion, however, the person affected will not regard it as bad.

This brings us to another aspect, namely that implicit in the onlooker’s emotion itself is his or her perception of human well-being, and what should be regarded as the most important dilemmas of human life. This again confirms the presence of an intentional object in the emotion. She points out that it is therefore possible for the person with the compassion to make a wrong judgement about the suffering of the other person. This may be due to inattentiveness, insensitivity, false theories about human life, or bad social teaching. The presence or absence of compassion, as well as the reliability thereof, relate to the onlooker’s judgements about well-being and the onlooker’s general moral stance. However, in this regard, Nussbaum emphasises that the onlooker’s judgement may differ from the judgement of the sufferer regarding the ‘size’ of the loss, but the onlooker may still conclude that the sufferer is right to deem the loss as significant (UT, 311). The onlooker will then judge that “... the other person’s estimate of “size” is the one I shall go by” (UT, 311). In some cases, for instance where we judge that the suffering is due to the person’s own fault, we will have compassion only if we believe that the distress is out of proportion to the blunder, or that the person is not to blame. In this regard Aristotle maintained that eleos sees its object as not deserving (anaxios) the suffering and he related this to our sense of injustice. He also noted that we tend to apply this mainly to people whom we regard as good. If one believes that a person is bad, one will rarely have compassion, since one will be inclined to think that he or she deserves the suffering. There are cases, however, where one will have compassion with a bad person, since the reason for the ‘fault’ will be seen as a product of forces beyond their control. Nussbaum further argues that in instances where the suffering is not due to the person’s own fault, the compassion does not need a foregoing convincing argument, but if there is a possibility of disagreement about blameworthiness, the appeal to compassion will be connected to an allegation of innocence (UT, 312).
Compassion also requires blamelessness on the part of the onlooker, since it will be hypocritical to cry over something caused by oneself. Central to compassion then is the belief that the tragedy has come from outside. This implies that compassion is highly unlikely if there is a belief that either the onlooker, or the sufferer has caused the suffering.

Clark’s studies (1997) of present-day American attitudes revealed that people only felt sympathy when ‘bad luck’ or ‘forces beyond the person’s own control’ cause the suffering. Nussbaum infers that opinions like these are strongly influenced by prevailing social stances. It thus seems that compassion is pliable. So-called ‘sympathy entrepreneurs’ like politicians and journalists can influence public emotion. Often we have compassion for people whom we believe created their own quandary. In this regard, she mentions compassion for predicament of teenagers, and argues that in these cases, one is making a two-stage judgement. Firstly, that it is the child's own fault, and secondly, that it is due to adolescence, which is not the child’s fault. However, although one will have compassion for a teenager who drinks too much on a specific occasion, one will not excuse a teenager who torments an animal, since the latter is not due to external causes. It seems then that compassion entails a notion of responsibility and blame, as well as the belief that serious bad things from ‘outside’ can happen to people. Additionally, one accepts that some important things in the world are not always safely under one’s control. Aristotle also believed that compassion involves a judgement that the onlooker or his or her loved ones may encounter similar hardships. This will only happen when the onlooker has also experienced some suffering and accepts that he or she is also vulnerable to suffering.

Rousseau (1979) addresses the same issue in Émile. “Not inexperienced in suffering, I learn how to bring aid to the wretched” (UT, 315). He thus agrees with Aristotle in arguing that in order to have pitié one needs to acknowledge one’s own vulnerability and weakness, which can be similar to those of the sufferer. This connects compassion to fear.

One makes sense of the suffering by recognising that one might oneself encounter such a reversal; one estimates its meaning in part by thinking what it would mean to encounter that oneself; and one sees oneself, in the process, as one to whom such things might in fact happen” (UT, 316).

Yet, in this regard, Nussbaum has a reservation: The judgement about similar possibilities requires a demarcation. One needs to decide which creatures are
included in the idea of sharing possibilities. Once again social and domestic teachings will be influential and mistakes can be made. One will tend to consider those people whom society has marked as similar to oneself or one’s loved ones. Rousseau (1979) declared that many people disunite themselves from the possibilities of the lower class. Nussbaum agrees by maintaining that even in present-day society, all kinds of social barriers (class, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation) obstruct the imagination and hinder compassion.

She then continues to consider the importance of similar possibilities, and asks whether this is a necessary constituent part of compassion, or whether it is only a useful epistemological tool. Both Aristotle and Rousseau (1979) believed that one needs to recognise the existence of a kinship between the other and oneself. I need to understand what it might be for me to have such suffering. The pain of the other person will thus be an object of my concern and will affect my own well-being. Without this sense of community, I will react out of curiosity and not with a sincere intention to relieve the suffering. Nussbaum argues that the core of the issue should actually be the eudemonistic character of compassion. The onlooker must view the suffering of the other person as a noticeable component of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. The suffering of the other person will impinge on his or her own flourishing. One is actually making oneself vulnerable in the person of the other. In this regard, she argues that it is not the similar possibilities, but rather the eudemonistic judgement that should be regarded as a necessary constituent part of compassion. Yet, it is not necessary to concentrate on the sufferer’s relation to the onlooker in order to make the judgement.

A truly omniscient deity ought to know the significance of human suffering without thinking of its own risks or bad prospects, and a truly loving deity will be intensely concerned for the ills befalling mortals without having to think of more personal loss or risk (UT, 319).

But unfortunately humans find it difficult to attach themselves to other people, unless they perceive something of concern to them. And in this regard she differs from Aristotle, because she believes that one’s own eudemonistic imagination is extended by the imagination of one’s own similar possibilities. The real issue remains the eudemonistic judgement. The acknowledgement of one’s own vulnerability is a vital epistemological requirement for compassion in human beings, and will move other people into one’s own sphere of concern. In this regard she notes that people who sometimes want to withhold compassion normally portray the sufferers as dissimilar.
Once the seriousness of the suffering is recognised, however, the subsequent compassion will also lead to shame and confusion.

At this point Nussbaum summarises her developing argument as follows: The judgement of similar possibility forms the link between the child’s existing goals on the one hand, and the eudemonistic judgement (that other people are also essential components of one’s own scheme of goals and ends) on the other. This is because the onlooker now has a good general conception of human well-being. He or she becomes aware of a wide range of human suffering in the world (hunger, disability, slavery, abuse, disease) which is not due to the sufferer’s own fault. The onlooker also admits uncertainty about his or her current safe and stable position and this leads to an outward quest towards society’s general provision of goods and resources so that the deprived people can be provided for as well. In this regard she infers that, “Self-interest itself, via thought about shared vulnerabilities, promotes the selection of principles that raise society’s floor” (UT, 321). This is why compassion is often associated with giving. According to her view compassion thus has the following three cognitive elements, namely a judgement of size (that a serious or bad event has happened to someone), a judgement of non-desert (that this person is not responsible for his or her own suffering) and an eudemonistic judgement (that this particular creature - person or animal – is a crucial element in my scheme of goals and projects). In this regard, she thus differs from Aristotle and regards his judgement of similar possibilities as an epistemological aid to form the eudemonistic judgement.

A valid question to ask at this point is whether one could have all the judgements without having compassion. Although we admit that these judgements are necessary for the emotion, we need to determine if they are sufficient for the emotion. A judgement will fail if a psychological connection with the sufferer has not been made, and the onlooker is not truly concerned about the fate of the sufferer and if the judgement lacks maturity. It is possible to have a judgement on authority, without comprehending its significance. Rousseau (1979) argued, “To see it without feeling it, is not to know it” (UT, 323). The suffering has to become part of the onlooker’s cognitive repertoire to such an extent that it will affect his conduct, motives and expectations.

Nussbaum therefore has to provide convincing arguments to prove that the eudemonistic judgement has been made, and to prove that the judgement of size is
understood and not just mimicked. Returning to the Aristotle’s belief about similar possibilities, she stresses that in her account, compassion does not involve personal vulnerability, although the recognition of personal vulnerability is crucial in getting incomplete human beings to have compassion for another person’s suffering. Compassion, according to her account, is also not connected to personal fear. She believes that one may have compassion for somebody else without having to fear anything for oneself (UT, 324). Yet, it may now appear as if the above non-fearful and non-vulnerable person is not having compassion, but a distanced attitude of humane concern. It thus seems as if Nussbaum’s three judgements constitute and are sufficient for this detached stance, but not for the upheaval of compassion itself. Nussbaum disagrees, arguing that such a self-sufficient person does not share her three judgements, since he or she denies that the vicissitudes of fortune have ‘size’. She explains that one will console a child who has lost a toy without estimating the loss of the toy as a serious matter. On the other hand, such a self-sufficient person may indeed care deeply about the vicissitudes of fortune and appraise it as substantial in ‘size’ (e.g. Christian images of God). In such a case, Nussbaum postulates, the three judgements will be sufficient not only for humane concern, but for the upheaval of compassion. “Such a being, though not vulnerable to upset personally, has become vulnerable to upset in the person of the other” (UT, 325).

It now appears as of the cognitive elements are sufficient for compassion and are also constituent parts of it. The next question to answer is whether there are other necessary parts of compassion, and if so, what will these parts be? Although the relation between an emotion and a specific physiological state has been ruled out previously, Nussbaum nevertheless argues that we need to address this issue, since compassion is usually associated with pain. Aristotle regarded compassions as “... a particular type of pain” (UT, 325). In order to provide an answer to this question, we first need to determine the nature of the pain. Is it possible that the pain is imagined only as a knot in the stomach or a lump in the throat and therefore only contingently connected to the thoughts? If so, it seems wrong to regard the presence such a pain as a requirement for compassion. People vary in the way they experience emotions physically. It may also be possible that a person may have compassion without being aware of it. Another possibility is that the pain is so intensely attached to the thought that we may refer to it as the affective aspect of the thought. In these cases what we refer to as pain, is actually something more organic to the thoughts. The character of the pain cannot be described unless the intentionality embodied in the emotion is assigned to it. Such a pain seems to be caused by the thought and does not have
causal independence. Nussbaum describes this pain as “… a mental pain directed toward the victim … seeing the victim’s distress with concern, as a terrible thing” (UT, 326). Nussbaum thus infers that pain should not be seen as a further necessary element for compassion.

6.4 Empathy and compassion

Nussbaum distinguishes between empathy and compassion. She argues that empathy involves an imaginative rebuilding of the sufferer’s experience. When one has empathy, one is ‘acting out’ the situation of the sufferer, but with the clear understanding that it is not oneself who is suffering. This awareness of the separateness is crucial if empathy is to be associated with compassion, because one feels compassion for another person, and not oneself. It seems then that empathy requires dual attention. Firstly, one imagines what it is like to be in the sufferer’s shoes, and secondly, one maintains the ‘safe’ awareness that one is not in that position. This account indicates that empathy can sometimes be mistaken. Empathetic people may for instance reconstruct the mental experience of the other person too bluntly, or project themselves too adamantly into the mind of the other. She argues that empathy is not sufficient for compassion. It is for instance possible to have empathy with a pleasant experience without having compassion, since compassion requires the object of the emotion to be in a dire condition. It is also possible that one regards the suffering as serious, but not necessarily bad. A torturer who regards the pain of the sufferer as a good thing will not have compassion for the sufferer. One may also withhold compassion due to the sufferer’s fault, for instance in the case of criminals. And finally one may not have compassion, because one holds back the eudemonistic judgement, since the sufferer is not part of one’s scheme of goals and projects. Empathy is furthermore not necessary for compassion. We frequently have compassion for animals or human beings from other racial or cultural groups, although we can barely reconstruct their experiences. It is also possible that we have compassion merely on grounds of another source of authority. We can then act compassionately, without imagining or enacting the person or creature’s dilemma.

Nussbaum believes that empathy is a psychologically very important, because it draws our attention to the predicament of the other person. It guides us to be sensitive and responsive and assists us to make sense of another person’s predicament. Through empathy we become concerned and find a connection to the other person. In the process both the eudemonistic judgement as well as the judgement of size are endorsed. Reconstructing the other person’s dilemma may
also lead to seeing the prospects as similar to my own, and Nussbaum thus infers that empathy produces concern by provoking the judgement of similar possibilities. Psychoanalytic and experimental literature confirms the link between empathy and compassion. Heinz Kohut (1981b) emphasises that empathy serves as a useful guide to appropriate action, not necessarily in an ethical sense, but in the sense of matching the person’s ideals, whether these are favourable or not. Kohut insists, however, that empathy is restricted, frail and value-neutral. Batson and Shaw’s experimental work (1991) indicates a strong connection between compassion and helping behaviour and shows that empathy plays a considerable role in generating compassion. Even if empathy is not clearly necessary for compassion, it provides direction to it.

This brings us to another issue, namely whether empathy would play a crucial role in compassion when the object of compassion is very dissimilar and difficult to comprehend. Nussbaum feels that it would be intrusive to assume that one can have a precise empathetic understanding of another object’s predicament in these cases, although she acknowledges that without empathetic attempts appropriate compassion and actions will be highly unlikely. But because physical pain of animals, for instance, can through intense effort be reconstructed, it is possible to have appropriate compassion for them in this regard. She thus infers that empathy is “… a mental ability highly relevant to compassion, although it is itself both fallible and morally neutral” (UT, 333).

Nussbaum now addresses the issue of ethics, arguing that empathy without compassion cannot bring about anything of ethical importance. An empathetic torturer remains evil, although he or she recognises at a very basic level, another world of experience, and to that extent, empathy is not altogether neutral.

If I allow my mind to be formed into the shape of your experience, even in a playful way and even without concern for you, I am still in a very basic way acknowledging your reality and humanity (UT, 333).

There is something more dreadful, relating to the “… utter failure to recognise humanity” (UT, 333). Kohut (1981a) claims that the presence of empathy, even if it is used for destructive purposes, still implies “… an admixture of something positive”, but an empathy-less environment such as the Nazi camps, was ‘the worst’, because it completely ignored the humanity of the victims (UT, 333,334). Nussbaum thus argues that the malevolence of sheer dehumanisation, namely the treatment of other people as simple objects whose experiences are irrelevant, is more profound than
the torture of an empathetic villain who at least recognises his victim’s humanity. It seems then that empathy to those for whom we have it, does indeed protect us from a type of ultimately horrible evil, because

The habits of mind involved in this exercise of imagination make it difficult to turn around and deny humanity to the very people with whose experiences one has been encouraged to have empathy (UT, 334).

The Nazis invented devices to display the Jews as pests and lifeless objects. This obstructed not only the judgement of similar possibilities but also blocked empathy, preventing subsequent compassion. But when empathy then unexpectedly came the mental mechanisms that upheld the moral rejection collapsed. Nussbaum infers that many Germans led double lives. Their imagination and empathy towards those whom they regarded as human was cultivated, but they ignored the humanity of those whom they tortured and killed.

6.5 Compassion and altruism
Nussbaum argues that compassion is often linked to some kind of helping action to address the suffering. This is likely if there are three beliefs or judgements, namely that the sufferings of others are serious, that they did not bring the misfortune upon themselves, and that these people are part of one’s own scheme of goals and ends. The issue is whether this beneficent action is some type of self-interested reasoning, or whether it is really altruistic. It may be possible that I help a person simply because I believe that someday I may be in a similar position. Nussbaum disagrees with this notion, because there is a clear distinction between one’s own life and that of the sufferer. Central to the emotion is the acknowledgement that the pain is somebody else’s pain, and that a bad thing is happening to another life. A compassionate person will subsequently try to find the good for the other person, whom is part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends (UT, 335, 336). It may now appear that if there is a concern for others, there will also be a motivation to act out of concern. It thus seems as if only the eudemonistic judgement, and no other extra element, is at work. Nussbaum objects to this view, arguing that apart from the eudemonistic judgement, the other two beliefs are also necessary to proceed with the motivation to help. One will not be willing to help if one believes that the suffering of the other is minor, or if one believes that the sufferer is responsible for his or her own pain. It thus seems as of all three these judgements are sufficient for compassion, and although a kind of pain is usually also involved, it does not appear to be necessary for beneficent motivation.
Another issue to address is whether compassion already entails a significant quasi-ethical attainment. It seems as if compassion involves valuing somebody else as part of one’s own sphere of concern. And since this evaluation will not always be consistent, it may appear as if compassion cannot be closely connected to a good ethical theory. In this regard Nussbaum argues that it is the emotion itself that values the other person in a way that is related to morality. The judgement of similar possibilities, the exercise of empathy, and the vague element of wonder at human life assisted in connecting ethics to compassion, but Nussbaum holds that her account of an infant’s emotions indicates that a person is not completely egoistic from the beginning. A young child has indeed concern about items in the world which are not entirely egoistic, for example in their wonder and curiosity about their environment, their interest in their caretakers, and in their need for attachment. Nussbaum thus argues that the problem is not how to link other things and persons to an essentially egoistic system. It is instead how to expand, educate and steady existing elements of concern, and in particular how to cultivate a stable and genuinely ethical interest in other people who are not necessarily directly linked to the self. Compassion does not appear out of the blue but is a result of existing proto-ethical elements in responding (UT, 337). She cautiously refers to recent work on the evolutionary foundation of compassion in this regard. Research conducted by De Waal (1996) and Sober and Wilson (1998) indicate that people have psychological mechanisms that cause empathy to lead to compassion, if duly activated by cues.

In order to find out whether compassion motivates altruistic behaviour, she consults the rigorous empirical work of Batson, et al (1997). He succeeded in separating true altruism from subtle forms of egoism, for instance the wish to shun unpleasant events, or the aspiration to feel good about oneself. He concludes that people who attend to the distress of others have sincere motives to assist that person. Nussbaum concludes this section with a summary of the link between compassion and altruism, arguing that a compassionate person sees the other person as an object of concern and makes thought attend to certain human facts. A compassionate person is furthermore concerned with a wish to make the plight of the sufferer as well as it can be. This concern is often motivated by the thought that one may someday be in a similar position.

### 6.6 Impediments to compassion: shame, envy, disgust

Nussbaum now returns to her developmental account. She wants to know whether this account will obstruct the ethical development of concern on some way. She also
needs to know if her developmental account may provide some rich resources in this regard. She focuses on the eudemonistic judgement, namely the judgement (understanding) that others are part of my circle of concern. Again she stresses that psychological mechanisms of empathy and thought about similar possibilities helps to broaden the circle of concern to include distant others. The move towards compassion is via the imagination, and Nussbaum argues that this progress can be obstructed in several ways. One important impediment is due to social dissimilarities such as distinctions of gender, religion, race and ethnicity. This links with Rousseau’s argument (1979) that sharp distinctions of class and rank block compassion, especially in hierarchical social systems that classify and separate people from one another. The advantaged group now regards itself as significantly superior to the inferiors and cannot see their own possibilities in the sufferings of the other. The superiors may even reach a stage of regarding themselves as invulnerable. It seems clear then, that social institutions shape compassion. Compassion normally responds to general sufferings such as hunger, poverty, loss of loved ones, illness and so on. Rousseau (1979) holds that these sufferings are the general plight of all humans, regardless of ranking. He thus argues that in these cases a judgement of similar possibilities implies truth. Should anybody then deny the suffering of another, that person is in effect deceiving himself and telling lies to the outside world. However, human beings have the ability to imagine the sufferings of another in a vivid way. The imagination can become the tool to defeat the deception. Rousseau (1979) claimed that the man who thinks will not be aware of any distinctions (UT, 343).

To continue with her argument, Nussbaum investigates the origin and reason for the construction of these groups that not only obstruct compassion, but also promote self-deceptive thinking about own possibilities. She refers to the ambivalence of early object relations, and especially to instances where the child experiences extraordinary pressure to be perfect. Such a child will be paralysed by shame and in this regard, Nussbaum believes that the shame forms a barrier to compassion. Neither does the child have the opportunity to get outside the self, nor to play imaginatively. To this child, other people do not really exist. Otto Kerberg (1985) refers to these people as ‘pathologically narcissistic’, since all the person’s attention is focused on “… a paralysing sense that one had better shore up one’s own system of control” (UT, 344). Kerberg further explains that such a person’s emotional life is shallow, and he describes the person as “… a hungry, enraged, empty self, full of impotent anger at being frustrated, and fearful of a world, which seems as hateful and revengeful as the patient himself” (UT, 344). These people cannot tolerate the
idea that somebody else has something, which they don’t have. They then experience intense envy, to such an extent that the other person’s existence becomes a threat to their control. They simply cannot stand the idea of rivals for control of the world. Such a person cannot have compassion, because empathy and the judgement of similar possibilities are refused. Although Nussbaum admits that the above description may refer to extreme cases, she nevertheless argues that many normally functioning people, and especially males, have these features. Many recent studies of misogyny link it to a narcissistic denial of something different to oneself. In this regard, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl (1996) also argues that narcissism is also closely connected to sexism, due to the failure to tolerate the existence of the mother as separate and not subject to the child’s control. Klaus Theweleit (1989) and Andrea Dworkin (1987) hold that this refusal often entails a refusal of one’s own vulnerable and embodied self. They link pathological narcissism to common facts of childhood. The child who aspires for omnipotence does not accept the “soft, fleshy, fluid” facts of himself. These are metaphors of the female body; indications of weakness and mortality that should be violently renounced from the self by means of differentiation and subordination.

Nussbaum believes that disgust distances us from our own animality and morality. This can easily happen when other people or groups represent that which one tries to deny in oneself. Nussbaum argues that our urge to exclude ourselves from our animality is so forceful, that we often need a group of humans to bounce ourselves against. They will form the boundary wall between the genuinely human and distastefully animal. We are inclined to do this, because, “If those quasi-animals stand between us and our own animality, then we are one step further away from being animal and mortal ourselves” (UT, 347). In this regard one needs to notice that through the ages, the disgusting properties of the human body (stench, filth, decay, tackiness) have been projected onto people and groups whom advantaged groups seek to delineate to reinforce their superior standing. Nussbaum believes that all these examples (German Jews, females, homosexuals) relate to the intolerance of humanity in oneself (UT, 350).

A decent society requires citizens with a broad compassion for fellow citizens. In order for a society to teach compassion then, the underlying mechanisms of shame and disgust should be tackled. People should be encouraged to live with their own humanity, regardless of how difficult this task will be. This was probably what Rousseau (1979) also meant when he said that we should learn that “… from our
6.7 Compassion and tragedy

Nussbaum argues that despite compassion’s seemingly fragile foundation, our account also stresses resources from which the personality can draw to address these problems. Through the child’s relationship with its parents love, concern and guilt also develop. This will generate external concern and provide the child with a desire to help. The child also develops the ability to mourn a loss. This enables the child to recognise its own mortality and promotes the development of concern for others. Nussbaum further concludes that the child’s complete emotional life implies the recognition of its lack of omnipotence. This means that together, the emotions contribute to morality. They undercut the narcissistic desires, which are profoundly connected to prejudice and aggression. The ability to take the view of another person generates other-directed concern and emotion.

Nussbaum believes that the arts can play a significant contributing role in promoting compassion. Narratives of tragic predicaments in particular construct the constituent judgement of compassion, the judgement of seriousness, as well as the judgement of non-desert. They also normally revolve around issues with ‘size’, and they assist our developing appraisals of ‘size’. Tragedies also reveal the boundaries of human control over, and responsibility for the disasters that bring good people low. They furthermore develop concern for somebody different from oneself. Finally, tragedies also provide us with the opportunity to contemplate our mortality and vulnerability to the worst disasters in life. Nietzsche (1976) believed that art helps people to embrace their lives. Nussbaum claims that art helps us to embrace the lives of others (UT, 353).

6.8 Compassion and reason

For ages, compassion has been a controversial topic. Some people regard it as the core of ethical life, while others view compassion as irrational and misleading proper action. The controversy regarding compassion centres on the assumed contrast between emotion and reason, and the ‘irrationality’ of emotions in particular. Nussbaum responds by pointing out that ‘irrational’ emotions may imply two different ideas, namely that emotions do not involve thoughts, and that emotions do involve thoughts, but that these thoughts are in some way bad or inadequate. It is for this reason that we need to study the philosophical debate more closely, and evaluate it.
according to our developing theory of compassion. Nussbaum further points out that one frequently finds that reason and rationality are contrasted with empathy and sympathy in public debates, e.g. law, and that the latter is normally on the defence. ‘Rationality’ claims to have normative connotations, and it appears as if … there are certain elements of the personality that do not clarify or enrich the understanding, that are in and of themselves pretty unreliable and substandard (UT, 355).

Nussbaum argues that this debate fails to address the tough conflict between compassion and reason. Again she points out that the claim that compassion is irrational may suggest that compassion is a non-cognitive drive that is not related to any kind of thought or reasoning, or that the thought on which the compassion is based is in some normative way misleading or bad. A more accurate analysis of the emotion and the historical debate about its normative role can pave the way to a more appropriate approach.

6.9 Three classic objections

According to the advocates of compassion, many people are undeservingly harmed due to bad luck. However, ages ago, Socrates believed that a good person cannot be harmed. He regarded compassion as “… a moral sentiment unworthy of the dignity of both giver and recipient, and based on false beliefs about the value of external goods” (UT, 356). The Greek and Roman Stoic traditions were strongly influenced by the Socratic view. They regarded one’s own reason and will, or one’s ‘moral purpose’ (prophairesis) as the most important thing in life. Moral purpose, or moral choice, belongs to everybody. Each person has control over its righteous use, regardless of circumstantial differences between people. Reason and will are more dignified and valuable than anything else and sufficient for a flourishing life. It is only when one makes bad choices that a flourishing life gets harmed, and in such cases the appropriate response should be blame and not compassion. Blame does not regard people as victims or subsidiaries, but respects them as dignified agents. The Greeks and Roman Stoics thus opposed compassion due to its assumed false cognitive/evaluative structure. What is regarded as important by compassion is not really important. Additionally, compassion also affronts the dignity of the sufferer, since it implies that this person is needy of the things of the world – and no honourable person should have such needs.

This idea is echoed by Kant (Ellington, 1983) who regards compassion as an “… insulting kind of beneficence” (UT, 357). The sense of moral purpose belongs to
everybody, and should be seen as a source of equal human importance. In this regard compassion implies disrespect for the equality of people. Kant further argues that according to the judgement of similar possibilities, compassion also affronts the dignity of the compassionate person, because it is an acknowledgement of the vulnerability of one’s own prospects.

Nietzsche (1968) adds another dimension, arguing that compassion intensifies the suffering in the world, because it makes two people suffer instead of one. Plato (Nussbaum, 1991) had the same idea in his attack on tragedy in the Republic. He viewed the good person as one who does not need other people and one who is “...sufficient to himself for flourishing living” (UT, 358). The Stoics, who adored Socrates for his low estimation of worldly goods and his composed, independent bearing in hardship, argued that tragic heroes should be regarded with disrespect, since they are people who have made wrong evaluative judgements. Epictetus, for instance, viewed a tragedy as the result of chance events, which happen to fools. Influential exponents of this tradition are Spinoza (1982, 1985), Smith (1976), Descartes (1989), Kant (1980, 1981, 1983) and Nietzsche (1954, 1966, 1968, 1974, 1976).

Nussbaum points out that the Stoic repudiation of compassion appears to be callous and repressive, but at its core, it expresses a concern about the dignity of humanity. The fundamental motivation in the anti-compassion tradition is based on a concern about egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism. This is the same underlying principle of the Rousseauian pro-compassion tradition, which, interestingly enough, is regarded as the campaigner of egalitarian-democratic ideas. That tradition uses compassion to justify a more equal sharing of basic resources, whereas the anti-compassion tradition claims that their view has the immeasurable worth of human dignity as its source and therefore respects human equality more appropriately. The pro-compassion activists believe that differences in class and rank generate differences in the value or achievements of the people’s lives. To this the anti-compassion tradition responds by arguing that the above assumption seems to accept that the world and its morally irrelevant events can in effect fake different categories and conditions of humanity. This is unacceptable to a person who believes in equal human worth, because this implies that basic human endowments are unequally distributed.

To suggest that there is anything we could add to a human being’s moral faculties that would either augment or diminish their value is to suggest that people are not truly equal in value” (UT, 359).
The Stoics were also indifferent to grief about the death of loved ones, but Nussbaum points out that we should view this in connection with their egalitarian cosmopolitanism. All human beings are equal in worth and fundamentally we all belong to the *kosmopolitai* – the ‘city-state of the universe’. We should have the same concern for everybody. The Greek Stoics even held that families endanger proper concern and children should be raised jointly (UT, 360). Apart from accusing compassion of inaccuracy in judgement, the classic attacks had two further reservations, namely that compassion is ‘partial’ and ‘narrow’, and that compassion is linked to anger and revenge. The first stance was originally introduced by the Stoics and later carried forward by Adam Smith (1976). This view holds that compassion unites us with our own direct sphere of life and to what we regard as affecting us. Imagination plays a vital role and as a result compassion is exposed to distortion, due to the unreliability of the imagination. It is therefore possible for compassion to create an unbalanced perception of the world, eliminating the distinctiveness of every human life and its equal need for resources and help in times of distress. In this regard, Smith (1976) argues that the notion that compassion, or ‘pity’, is a social motive and will cause unbalanced and inconsistent results. Although we may extend the emotion through education, compassion will continue to be narrow and unreliable, because it only focuses on what we are able to see or imagine. Its psychology is restricted to the limitations of sensory imagination. Smith believes that empathy is crucial to generate compassion. If empathy for the same or close people is simpler, it implies that compassion will also be unequal. Smith therefore argues that compassion is a deficient and even dangerous moral and social motive.

The classic attack also investigates the link between compassion and the origins of other detestable emotions. They believe that the person who has compassion recognizes certain contentious evaluative judgements regarding the place of external goods in human thriving. This means that tragic predicaments can hit people through no fault of their own. It also implies that the losses of the suffering people are important. In this regard children, spouses, nationality and other external goods are important for human flourishing. Therefore, to acknowledge that one is vulnerable to fortune means that one will also have the basic ingredients for other emotions such as fear, grief, anxiety, anger and a retributive outlook, as well. This tradition therefore claims, “… the soft soul of the compassionate can be invaded by the serpents of resentment and hatred” (UT, 362). Seneca, for instance, argued that cruelty is not the reverse of compassion. They are actually closely related and the only difference is due to fortune.
Nietzsche develops this idea when he argues that one needs a certain type of ‘hardness’ towards the inconsistencies of fortune if one intends to avoid the desire for revenge. Because pity implies that one also considers one’s own inner possibilities, recognising one’s own vulnerability and inadequacy, compassion can become a basis for hatred. This hatred is not only aimed at a world responsible for the suffering of people, but also directed against those self-respecting and self-commanding people who do not suffer (UT, 362). Nietzsche (1968) continues to argue that punishment is a form of exchange. The injured party is paid back for his pain and suffering by the enjoyment of imposing suffering on the original offender, and by the further satisfaction of being allowed to loathe and abuse the person who has previously controlled him. This often leads to cruelty, since the one who has been insulted by the felony celebrates the opportunity to insult the wrongdoer. However, Nietzsche (1968) agrees that the desire to take revenge is a weakness, because the extreme reliance on other people and on the goods of the world is indicative of a weak human being or society. The problem with this view is that if we regard compassion to be closely related to revenge, it may seem as if, instead of cultivating compassion in its citizens, society needs to eradicate compassion.

6.10 Mercy without compassion

Nussbaum continues to discuss the responses to the misfortune of others from the viewpoints of both the pro-, as well as the anti-compassion traditions. She points out that the compassion debate creates two visions of political community and of the good citizen and the judge within it. I shall express this in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision A: Pro-compassion</th>
<th>Vision B: Anti-compassion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on emotions</td>
<td>Demands the removal of emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The human being is hopeful and vulnerable, worthy and insecure</td>
<td>Focuses entirely on the dignity of human beings. Reason is of infinite and everlasting worth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main duty of the community is to provide support for basic needs.</td>
<td>The community is a kingdom of liberated responsible beings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human beings are united by the thought of their shared weakness and risk.</td>
<td>They are united by the admiration that they have for the worth of reason in one another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It creates a moral emotion, which is capable of supporting attempts to</td>
<td>The purpose of their alliance is to aid the moral development of everyone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assist the worst off. by judgements decontaminated of passion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>• It pursues equality and freedom aimed at equal support for basic needs. It thus hopes to promote equal opportunities for free choice and self-realisation.</th>
<th>• It also pursues equality and freedom by starting from the given fact of internal freedom. This internal freedom is the source of political equality.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Freedom of choice is something that needs to be built up for people through worldly arrangements.</td>
<td>• Freedom is an unchallengeable given and independent of all material arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It aims to overcome the selfish and greedy passions through the imagination of the suffering and a steady expansion of concern.</td>
<td>• It aims to remove the passions completely, overcoming retribution with self-command and mercy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It attempts to achieve compassion through soft-heartedness.</td>
<td>• Soft-heartedness should not at all be present amongst human beings (Kant).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is the fragility of the human beings that makes them sociable.</td>
<td>• Weakness is an obstruction to community. The only truly self-sufficient person can be a true friend.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

According to Nussbaum, the ‘wise person of the anti-compassion tradition’ is not always ‘hard’. The Stoics believed that serious harms are caused only by the foolishness and wrongdoing of the sufferers themselves. They also believed that it is very difficult to be good. They are therefore concerned about the development and well-being of most human beings. The good Stoic will consider appropriate corrections and instruction, and even punishment to improve not only the life of the wrongdoer, but also society as a whole. In this regard Seneca argued that the correct way to overcome the retributive approach would be to rise above the problems that support it. The reprimand of the wise person will not be harsh and cruel, but will be merciful. Mercy is thus defined as “… the inclination of the judgement toward leniency in selecting penalties” (UT, 365). A good and merciful judge, for instance, will bend or waive the punishment for several reasons, inter alia, it will express his own strength and dignity, indicating that he does not need to cause pain to be a complete person. It will also display understanding that human life is difficult and mistakes are inevitable and that mercy is socially useful because it promotes trust and common goodwill, instead of fear and antagonism.
Nussbaum now points out that the above stance reflects a translation of the cognitive structure of compassion into terms, which are acceptable to the anti-compassion’s tradition of the self-sufficiency of virtue (UT, 366). Senecan mercy, as well as compassion, recognises the complexities and struggles specific to human life, for instance the struggle to refine one’s own moral purpose. It also recognises the fact that one is oneself a fellow human being of the one who receives the mercy. However, since compassion focuses on chance events, which were not due to the person’s own fault and which are not controlled by virtue, the Stoics believed that compassion is dishonest by ascribing importance to what is not really important. Occasions of grief are either due to the person’s own fault, or are not real grief at all. Mercy, on the other hand, focuses on the mounting struggle to be good and to perfect one’s own moral purpose, although it accepts that it is difficult to live well, and that it is highly likely that a good person will also come to grief at some point. It ascribes importance to what is really important and focuses on fault. Mercy will also not let a wrongdoer off the hook and is not a verdict of innocence, but alleviation of sentencing. Mercy thus says,

I don’t need to hurt you; and you were probably having a tough time being good, since it is very hard to be good. So, like a good doctor or parent, I am going to tell you firmly that you are bad, but punish you lightly (UT, 366)

This “… lofty, affectionately parental attitude – combined with a deep respect for the dignity of humanity in each person” (UT, 366), will hold society together far better than compassion. From the above it is clear that the debate between the friends and enemies of compassion is not a debate regarding the thought process or the type of faculty that should control choice in public life. It is also not a debate between supporters of reason and partisans of some pointless non-cognitive force. Essentially this debate is about ethical value.

6.11 Valuing external goods
The anti-compassion tradition has been the central tradition in the history of Western philosophy for centuries. In the case of Spinoza (1982, 1985) and the Stoics, for instance, compassion, as well as all other emotions, was considered to be irrational in the normative sense. But although they drew a sharp distinction between reason and emotion, they did not deny that emotions are full of thought. To them the problem was that emotions are based on false beliefs such as inadequate evidence, cultural prejudice, false premises and bad arguments. They believed that good arguments and true premises can correct the false beliefs and they regarded philosophy as having the potential to free human beings from the burden of emotion. We need to
realise that many modern opponents of emotion, who also oppose emotion to reason, do not distinguish clearly between the Stoics’ view of the irrationality of emotions and the non-cognitive view.

Compassion is accused of falsity, because it “... ascribes to chance misfortunes an importance they do not really possess, insulting, in the process, the dignity of both its receiver and its giver”. It should therefore be substituted by “... respect for the indestructible dignity of the sufferer’s humanity” (UT, 370). Nussbaum responds by arguing that this allegation is too blunt, due to all-or-nothing distinctions. She objects to the ‘either-or’ distinction between having compassion for a suffering person and having respect for that person’s dignity. It is possible to make distinctions by having compassion with the wrongs luck has brought the person’s way, and simultaneously respecting and admiring the person for the way in which he or she carries this badness with strength. A person’s moral humanity does not negate the loss in order to respect humanity. We also do not need to say that the good use of our moral senses is sufficient for human flourishing in order to admire and respect excellence. She believes that the worth of humanity should induce respect. The good use of a person’s human abilities should elicit admiration, notwithstanding the circumstances. In this regard, she points out that the Stoic ideal of equal humanity (primary to Enlightenment political thought) restrains proper compassion, since it tells us that the accidents of life do not deserve unjustified significance in our dealings with others. Differences of material circumstances should not be interpreted as negating a fundamental human similarity. But Nussbaum argues that compassion supports respect. Compassion itself includes the thought of common humanity, because it is linked to the judgement of similar possibilities. Because we respect the equal humanity of others, we are deeply concerned about their material happiness.

The fact that a certain individual is a bearer of human capacities gives that person a claim on our material concern, so that these capacities may receive appropriate support (UT, 371).

If we ignore the needs these people have for resources or if we reject the idea that suffering and deprivation can deprive a person of flourishing, we do not have proper respect for such a person. We also need to grant that the lack of external support can influence a person’s capacity for virtue and choice, especially if it happens early in life or happens over an extended period of time. In this regard, the Stoics held that we are never victims of worldly vulnerability, and that this is our dignity. Modern followers also argue that once we regard certain people as victims, we do not respect their agency. In this regard, Nussbaum argues that we need to admit that to some
extent we are all at the world’s mercy. That does not mean that we have to deny that our basic capacities and our agency deserve respect and dignity. Once we realise that these faculties require support from the material world and when we notice how this happens (thus putting forth a claim against our own comfort and effort), we will suitably have respected them.

The attack on compassion is also too blunt, because it assumes that either compassion is omnipresent or completely absent. Nussbaum responds by pointing out that there are times when the onlooker may judge that compassion is not deserved, since it is based upon false evaluations. We need to remember that compassion takes up the point of view of the onlooker, and not the sufferer. Compassion’s normative appropriateness will depend on whether the person uses a valid theory of value and whether he or she makes the right appraisals. She stresses that the pro-compassion tradition, like Aristotle and Rousseau (1979), strives towards a correct theory of value - one that does not regard money, status or pleasure as inappropriately important. This tradition, as in the case of Nietzsche, also holds that people should not moan over every loss, but should instead rely on their own inner resources and make the best of what life brings their way (UT, 372). However, she points out that there are some losses that deserve grief, and she objects against the Stoics’ narcissistic picture of a person who seems to be unable to respect others, solely as a result of his or her own infinite neediness and self-centeredness.

Regarding the Stoics’ position on external goods, she points out that an ethical theory is hardly possible without value being attached to external goods, because morality is concerned with their appropriate distribution. Virtues like courage, justice and moderation deal with our need for external goods, (UT, 370). If the Stoics have anything to say about these virtues, it has to be because they consider something valuable. But in this regard Nussbaum points out that the Stoics often went beyond their theory towards valuing the external. Seneca, for instance, objected to cruelty by the slave-owner against the slave, but he did not object to the institution of slavery itself. In response to the Stoics’ inconsistency, Nussbaum argues that compassion can provide a good theory of value. Normal occasions for compassion include losses of basic goods such as life, loved ones, liberty, nourishment, bodily integrity, mobility, shelter and citizenship. Compassion does not require sophisticated training and seems to be a reliable and ever-present guide to the presence of real value. (UT, 374). Nussbaum holds that due to compassion’s intimate link to a true, core theory of value, it frequently undermines ambitious false theories of value, as so eloquently
described in W. H. Auden’s touching poem. Although this poem was written to
describe the world of the 1930s, the central theme is deeply rooted:

*Intellectual disgrace*
*Stares from every face,*
*And the seas of pity lie*
*Locked and frozen in each eye.*

She draws our attention to the two failures portrayed in this poem: Intellectual
stupidity is intimately linked with the immobilization of the imagination, whereas pity is
linked with a potentially precise vision of value.

The anti-compassion view moreover suggests that the compassionate person
encourages people to be needy and prefers people who are extremely vulnerable.
However, Nussbaum points out that the compassionate person does not regard
every type of human hardship and dependency as appropriate, since some of these
may be the result of incorrect evaluations. Nonetheless, differences in class, gender,
wealth, and power affect the degree to which people experience helplessness in their
daily lives and in this regard the compassionate person will not consider this type of
vulnerability to be a good thing. In order then to make appropriate distinctions,
compassion will have to be linked with an adequate theory of the fundamental human
goods. Regarding the assumed focus by compassionate people on the vulnerability
of people, Nussbaum also addresses the issue of gender. Women appear to be more
emotional and compassionate than men. There are two reasons for this. The first
relates to a difference in appraisal. Nussbaum believes that the moral education of
women in most societies nurtures personal relationships, love and care more than
the moral education of men. Men are normally encouraged to be more self-sufficient
and separate. Nussbaum believes that one simply has to ask what the correct theory
of value should be, when we address this issue. The second reason relates to control
and helplessness. In many countries the lives of women are socially and materially
shaped so that they have less power and are more helpless. Nussbaum feels that in
cases of unequal access to food, political power, medical treatment and so on, these
people deserve compassion.

The anti-compassion tradition also believes that societies will generate more
energetic citizens if they leave them to look after themselves. Nussbaum does not
deny that this is an important point but she thinks that this is far too crude. A bad
society will attend to all the demands and extensively discourage any development of
own attempt, but that does not mean that society should not be concerned about the
provision of the necessary conditions for meaningful functioning. There are many needs and vulnerabilities that do nobody any good. When a society expresses concern for the active development of its citizens’ higher faculties, it will provide the basic goods and support nutrition, health and education. It thus seems that we need a multifaceted examination of human flourishing, its material and social conditions. We need to know what things are important and to what extent they can be secured to people. Due to the anti-compassion person’s dogmatic view regarding the insignificance of all these things, as well as his inability to sense the interdependence of human beings and their natural world, it now appears as if the pro-compassion person will be best able to conduct the inquiry into the conditions for human flourishing.

Nussbaum argues that, although the anti-compassion tradition is not indifferent to benevolence, they struggle to discern benevolence. The Stoics believed that benevolence could be promoted by minimising the competitive grasping for goods. People will then not define themselves in terms of money and status and will be willing to give to others. Seneca also distinguished between the arrogant reason-governed benevolence of the Stoics and the soft, needy giving characteristic of compassion. Spinoza (1982, 1985) stressed that the removal of emotional need will reduce destructive competition. Kant regarded pity as an insulting type of benevolence and argued that we need to consider the needs of others with a rational benevolence. We should strive to understand the situation of the other (humanitas practica, or Teilnehmende Empfindung), but should avoid the tender commiseration (pity) of compassion (Mitleid, Barmherzigkeit). Nussbaum responds to these Stoic-affiliated viewpoints by asking what sense should then made of the need for benevolence, given the fact that the Stoics regard the dignity of reason to be complete in itself. Although she admits that by reducing competitiveness, Stoicism facilitates benevolence, it is in actual fact stripping benevolence of its point. If it is indeed possible for a person to apply his or her most important abilities without material support, the need and importance of the support is reduced.

Further writings of Kant (for instance, his Doctrine of Virtue) expose the tensions in the anti-compassion stance. Although Kant was strongly influenced by the Stoics and Spinoza, he does not provide analyses or definitions of the passions and regards their origin as pre-rational, non-cognitive and fundamentally impulsive. He therefore does not understand virtue in the same way as Aristotle, who believed that virtue involves a reasonable shaping of the passions. Kant argues that virtue presupposes
apathy and he sees it in an oppressive and oppositional way, since it should involve the mastery of emotions and other sensuous tendencies. He further holds that compassion is a “motive fortunately planted in us by nature”. It should produce what the representation of duty might not. It is our duty to place ourselves in circumstances that will awaken this emotional motive. Compassion therefore becomes a prerequisite of duty, and Nussbaum notes that Kant sees compassion as “… just an internally unintelligent indicator, a bell that goes off in the presence of suffering, conditioning us to recognise suffering as a morally relevant feature of a situation “(UT, 382). Nussbaum argues that this view is too crude. If the passion wants to solve the problem of moral judgment, it has to be selective and intelligent to be able to tell the onlooker what is happening and why it is happening. For this, Kant requires the intentional content of the emotion and its complex evaluations. Nussbaum therefore argues that Kant should accept the cognitive view of the emotion. The onlooker needs compassion’s judgements of the worth of external goods for humans, or else he will be like an extraterrestrial onlooker who will only intervene as a result of some external instruction.

On the one hand Kant’s view originates from his general non-cognitive view of the emotions, however, his stance has another more cognitive origin. He sincerely believes that a recipient of compassion experiences humiliation. Respect and self - respect calls for distance and limited caring and concern. In this regard Nussbaum believes that this notion of our relation to one another creates problems for the cognitions associated with benevolent compassion, since we may affront the other person’s agency if we step too close. However, she points out that compassion can coexist with respect for agency.

Indeed, it is only when we see to what extent need for external goods is involved in the development of agency itself that we have the deepest possible basis for respecting and promoting human freedom (UT, 383).

Nietzsche adopts a more extreme position. He maintains that there is a complete unity between our physical and spiritual natures. He rejects the idea that humans need worldly goods to function. Physical suffering will ennoble and strengthen the spirit and the absence of external goods is an improving test for the spirit. But Nussbaum points out that Nietzsche did not always understand that if our abilities are physical abilities, they require physical conditions. He therefore did not grasp what Rousseau (1979) was trying to do. Rousseau and the pro-compassion tradition developed modern democratic-egalitarian thinking on the basis of compassion’s thought about external goods. Nietzsche (1968), citing Epictetus, Spinoza and Kant,
then has the boldness to proceed without caring how people live from day to day or where they get their food. Nussbaum rejects his stance due to his disrespect for the needs of the embodied human being.

6.12 Partiality and concern

Nussbaum now addresses another objection to compassion, namely the objection about partiality. Because this stance does not question the importance of compassion’s basic evaluative judgements, we need to consider it carefully. Apart from the Stoic and Kantian tradition, this objection is also held by the Utilitarian tradition (they regard human suffering as of primary importance) and even some pro-compassion members as well. Adam Smith (1976), for instance, recognises the value of compassion and its basis in true beliefs, but he stresses that each of compassion’s judgements require a correct ethical theory. (For instance, a correct theory of the value of external goods is necessary for the judgement of seriousness, a correct ethical theory of social responsibility is required for the judgement of non-desert, and the eudemonistic judgement requires a correct theory of proper concern). This problem is serious and complex. Apart from the fact that societies often teach incorrect theories in this regard, the real danger lies in compassion’s psychological mechanisms, namely empathy and the judgement of similar possibilities. People normally come to compassion via their senses and imagination and Smith (1976) believes that this makes compassion narrow and irregular. We often find these uneven and sometimes arbitrary results where approaches to social welfare depend on individual philanthropy. This is even more evident with regards to people of other nations. They are normally unfamiliar to us and their sufferings do not interest us for very long. Nussbaum believes that our own observations about shame and disgust strengthen this claim. It is quite possible that a person learns compassion under in-group and out-group conditions, where people are separated according to hierarchies. These partitions create boundaries to compassion and cannot easily be abolished, since they have been produced by deep-rooted and innate emotional factors. If we therefore rely on compassion, we run the risk of strengthening the rank-orders of class, race and gender.

Nussbaum reminds us that this objection does not encourage people to refrain from compassion. It is not aimed at compassion itself, but it stresses the importance of an adequate education based on a correct theory of concern. It also questions the reliability of compassion, since people tend to apply their compassion unevenly and inappropriately. She further believes that we are frequently even more unreliable
regarding human beings and we therefore also need a correct view of people. She warns that common humanity can often become disrupted by indigenous (local) loyalties, ignorance and even hatred. These are caused by other closely related emotions and also the psychological mechanisms that form the emotion. Nussbaum further argues that this argument requires two important acknowledgments. Firstly, when we design an education in appropriate compassion, we need to take cognisance of the above problems. Secondly, we should rely more on properly informed political institutions than on the inconsistency of personal emotion. This brings us to important questions, namely whether we should indeed rely on the emotion, instead of consulting the proper principles and institutions directly, and whether we should not simply request people to follow proper rules, rather than call on their compassion at all.

Nussbaum answers these questions as follows: She has already explained that human beings do not become altruistic if they do not experience the powerful and specific attachments of childhood. They need to build these relationships through guilt and gratitude, and they need to broaden their concern through the imagination, because,

Compassion is our species’ way of hooking the good of others to the fundamentally eudemonistic (though not egoistic) structure of our imaginations and our most intense cares. The good of others means nothing to us in the abstract or antecedently (UT, 388).

We will only understand once we relate it to that which we already know, such as love for parents and urgent need for solace and security. In this regard she stresses that because the imagination of similar possibilities (a crucial mechanism in human compassion) extends the margins of what we are able to imagine, it does important moral work: “…only when we can imagine the good or ill of another can we fully and reliably extend to that our moral concern” (UT, 388). Nussbaum further explains the duty of moral development by drawing on Hierocles’s metaphor of concentric circles. He compares our individual lives to concentric circles where the closest circle resembles one’s own body and the furthest circle the complete universe of human beings. Moral development should aim to get all the circles gradually closer to the centre. One’s parents should become like oneself, one’s relatives should become like one’s parents, one’s friends should become like one’s relatives, and so on.

However, to expect equality right from the outset is unachievable and unrealistic. Aristotle warned that if we do not build on familiar meanings, equality will lack
urgency and we will be left with a weak and ‘diluted’ concern for others (UT, 389). In this regard Fairbairn’s idea (1952) of ‘mature dependence’ also requires steady outward movement from the severe dependence of childhood. Nussbaum argues that the psychological mechanisms of compassion, e.g. imagination of similar possibilities, encourage this progress. She then refers to Dickens’s description (1969) of people brought up according to the Utilitarian tradition. They are completely unable to understand the needs and external goods of distant people. The ideal of developing a balanced mature personality, who is able to reflect and has an enthusiastic concern for others, is denigrated by inhibiting early emotions. In this regard, Nussbaum also warns that these stunted emotions may later return in a dangerous and unbalanced form.

Their minds and hearts become thoroughly listless, lacking in any motivational energy for good; and one political proposal seems very much like another, since they have no ability to imagine or feel what is at stake (UT, 389).

Reflecting on the morality of Nazism, she notes that a fundamental type of compassion for the suffering of people may sometimes breach ideology and rationalism, especially when the potential sufferer is physically present or if the victim resembles a loved one. This type of compassion has its roots in meanings obtained in childhood and she argues that these elementary emotions seem to be the ‘most reliable part of the personality’, especially when theory has been distorted. Rousseau (1979) also argues that the inclination to have compassion for nearby sufferers is quasi-natural. It seems as if all humans are in some way directed towards at least some truly moral connections. Conversely, an abstract moral theory, which is not associated with imagination and sympathy, can easily be used for bad purposes, because its human meaning is blurred. Glover (1999) indicates that some Nazis believed that they were obeying the principles of a Kantian morality of duty.

Certainly a rule-based morality, unanimated by the resources of the imagination, can too easily become confused with a submissiveness to cultural rules, or to rules handed down by authority (UT, 390).

Nussbaum substantiates the above argument by referring to another literary example. Using Theodor Fontane’s novel *Effi Briest* (Annas, 1984), she uses his description the civil servant, *Insetten*, to argue that when people are brought up to live by rules alone, instead of a combination of rules, love and imagination, they struggle to allow distinct instincts of love and forgiveness to emerge. Although we have to admit that imagination without some moral code is useless, we need to emphasise that compassion serves as a true guide towards the core of morality.
Without it, any moral judgement will be ‘a ghastly simulacrum’, in other words, a horrible phantom. She concludes that although compassion does not provide us with a complete morality, we have reason to believe that it is a truthful guide to something at the core of morality.

6.13 Revenge and mercy

Regarding the issue of anger and revenge, Nussbaum suggests that this topic troubles many members of the pro-compassion tradition. We cannot defend the form of reasoning that we value, without recognising that these alarming attitudes are also involved. In this regard she reminds us that not every misfortune should be regarded as a good reason for compassion. Likewise, any damage, affront or insult should not be regarded as a reason for retributive anger, especially since the defender of compassion does not regard the majority of social evils that instigate revenge (such as damages to wealth, status, reputation and power) as significantly important.

Nussbaum also argues that anger is sometimes justified and an appropriate reaction to injustice and serious transgression. If we extirpate anger, we will also remove a vital force for social justice. If we are concerned that anger may be extended to inappropriate objects or result in personal revenge, we should focus on the particular problem and not extirpate anger overall. Nussbaum also holds that the anti-compassion’s notion of symmetry between compassion and retributive anger is incorrect. She explains that a requirement for anger is the thought that the harm was readily imposed by somebody who acted inappropriately. Normally compassion does not require this thought. Although there are cases, for instance, accidents, famines and natural disasters where one will feel anger as well as compassion, the anger will simply relate to the thought that these calamities should have been prevented. We will perhaps be inclined to anger nevertheless, but it will be temporary and due to our attempts to take control over a situation in which we feel totally helpless. In this regard, she stresses that when anger has no credible blameworthy object, it will be transitory. She also warns that we should be very critical of any anger that is based on false beliefs about agency. Interesting in this regard is Spinoza’s claim (1982, 1985) about the ambivalence of emotion, when he argues that

… the very view of the world that makes a conceptual space for compassion includes, by definition, strong attachments to external objects and therefore leaves a conceptual space for revenge (UT, 394).

But Nussbaum feels that we can adopt a less radical theory. We need to argue that the conceptual connection between compassion and revenge is not adequate to demand the removal of the attachments leading to compassion. Instead, we should
concentrate on directing emotional development towards a more inclusive, mature and less hesitant type of love. And Nussbaum believes that compassion has a powerful role to play in this regard, since it extends the agent’s concern to people on whom he or she is not dependent.

Referring again to Hierocles’s metaphor of concentric circles, she postulates that if we move the outer circles closer to the self, our tendency towards revenge will probably decrease, because we will become more concerned about others and view damages to them as damages to ourselves. In cases of justifiable anger, we will then be less inclined to destruction. In short – we will think twice before we carry out acts of revenge. She argues,

... compassion cuts through the dehumanising strategies that are frequently enlisted in the service of cruelty of many kinds. It thus qualifies the motive to take revenge and forges an alliance among all human beings (UT, 395).

Nussbaum also points out that some relationships are more brittle in times of enmity and thus more prone to a dehumanising type of violence. This is when relationships are mediated simply by rule and not by empathy. Literature on brutality has shown that a person, who has deficient empathy and lacks the ability to include the other in the imagination, is potentially dangerous. Initiators of genocide are often authoritarian persons, who are rule abiding and rigid.

Conversely, a person with a ‘liberal’ personality has the ability to “ ... allow the self to be entered by the reality of another person’s life” (UT, 396). Nussbaum does not deny that it is likely that one will have more empathy for one person than for another, but she holds that a normal empathetic person will not be inclined towards brutality. Regarding the role of the law, she feels that the compassionate person will reject private revenge, since it normally leads to a perpetual exchange of damages and the poisoning of the social climate. The compassionate person will instead support a balanced and contained penalty and be interested in the legal codification of offences and punishments. In this regard, compassion and revenge are related: Compassion acknowledges the importance of the crime, as well as the victim’s suffering. She furthermore explains that the anti-compassion tradition proudly claims that they are merciful regarding their punishments. They ascribe this to their rational thinking about the good of society and the good of the offender, which connect their capability to be kind-hearted with a haughty detachment from the ills of human life. To this tradition the detachment is crucial, because without it, “ ... one will have the unseemly spectacle of weak and anxious people tearing one another limb from limb” (UT, 397).
But Nussbaum argues that things are more complicated. Mercy differs from compassion, because it assumes that the wrongdoer has transgressed and should be punished in some way. Mercy does not claim that the transgression was due to no fault of the offender. It accepts the deliberate wrong, but it also acknowledges that the person did not get to that point all by his or her own (UT, 397). Mercy thus relates to compassion because it focuses on apparent insurmountable obstacles to flourishing, such as social, natural and familial features of the transgressor’s life, which provide some explanation for the mistake. Mercy then adopts a narrative approach by sympathetically scrutinising the offender’s complete history in detail to look for extenuating traits. Nussbaum thus concludes that mercy is not the exclusive possession of the anti-compassion tradition, but fits in very well with the pro-compassion stance. She warns, however, that we should not adopt the view that people are never to blame for any of the mistakes they make, and that harmful things are simply due to bad luck. She also argues that mercy best belongs to the pro-compassion tradition, since compassion encourages the close narrative scrutiny of culpable lives in cases where there is the possibility of extenuating circumstances.

Due to pressure of the anti-compassion tradition, compassion now has to qualify its position as a valuable social motive in many ways: It has to be equipped with an adequate theory of the worth of basic goods. It also has to be equipped with an adequate understanding of agency and fault. Furthermore, it has to be equipped with a broad account of the people who should be the object of an agent’s concern (distant as well as close). These judgements should also be engendered through a developmental process.

But compassion is also connected to morality and without it morality will be dangerously rootless and empty. Compassion exemplifies correct evaluations and leads us towards concern for all fellow human beings. This is already learnt in childhood connections and these relationships are crucial in making morality discriminating rather than insensitive. It forms the bridge from the child’s constricted and self-directed concerns to a broader moral world. Compassion also complements respect and without respect, benevolence will lack energy. Aristotle, who believed that moral emotions could be cultivated and made part of a good character, held that “… an action is morally virtuous only when it is done with the correct motives” (UT, 400). Nussbaum thus supports the Kantian warning that we should guard against self-indulgent and self-congratulatory behaviour without any sincere attempts and
even painful sacrifices to assist in relieving the suffering. A mere experience of compassion is not sufficient. On the other hand, a grudging performance to help the distressed will also be morally incomplete. She concludes with the following sentence: “The freezing of the “seas of pity” is, after all, a precursor of “intellectual” – and hence moral – “disgrace” (UT, 400).

6.14 Compassion and institutions

Nussbaum now turns to the cultivation of compassion. Two questions need to be answered, namely, how appropriate compassion can be cultivated by the public culture of a liberal democracy, and to what extent liberal democracy should rely on this fallible and imperfect motive. She intends to address this issue according to compassion’s role regarding the type of constitutional and legal structure that should be sanctioned by a wide range of citizens with various religious and secular views. She will thus examine compassion within the political liberalism framework, a form of contemporary philosophy, which she defines as

… a political conception that attempts to win an overlapping consensus among citizens of many different kinds, respecting the spaces within which they elaborate and pursue their different reasonable conceptions of the good (UT, 401).

She holds that any political idea should relate to its citizens’ motivations. This is to ensure that the idea is realistic and does not demand too much of human psychology. It will also ensure that it stands a good chance of prolonged stability, by being general enough to gain wide approval, however also definite enough to assure us that it is not defective from the point of view of human motivation. She then asks the following questions: How is it possible to advance appropriate compassion in a pluralistic democracy? What should the appearance of a compassionate society be? And, since we have reason to believe that compassion provides public morality with crucial elements of public vision, without which any public culture will be drifting and worthless, how can we then make compassion effective in liberal and democratic institutions (UT, 403)? She also holds that since we have admitted that compassion can be undependable and biased, we need to address the issue of compassion at two levels, namely the level of individual psychology, and the level of institutional design, because the insights of proper compassion may be represented in the structure of fair institutions, hence reliance on perfectly compassionate citizens will not be required. She further argues that the insights of the compassionate imagination may be embodied in laws and institutions in many ways and at various levels. They may be involved in the basic structure of society and the choice of its
most basic distribution principles, and also in legislation at a more concrete level, for instance, the creation of the tax code, the welfare system, levels of offence and punishment in the criminal law, democratic deliberation about human equality, and the duties of affluent nations towards poorer nations in promoting political and economic well-being.

Nussbaum claims that compassion can provide nothing concrete unless it is linked to a view of basic goods. We therefore need a definite conception of basic goods, although in general we can say that compassionate institutions are intensely concerned with tragic predicaments and their prevention (UT, 403). In this regard Kant questions the need for moral virtues if their role is simply to rectify a bad state of affairs by means of laws. To this Nussbaum replies, that even if we have the opportunity to live under perfect and excellent institutions – which is highly unlikely – compassionate people are required to keep institutions stable. “Political systems are human, and they are only good if they are alive in a human way” (UT, 404). Authority-focused and rule abiding citizens cannot ensure the stability of even the most excellent social welfare system. The goal of a political society, namely to search for the good life in their own way, will be impossible. She argues that “… politics is not just for the sake of politics, but for the sake of the good life” (UT, 404). Even the most perfect society cannot prevent sufferings to which compassion reacts, such as loss of love, deaths, accidents and so on. We can thus infer that compassion will be continuously required as a proper response and motive to attend to the destitutions of fellow citizens. Old age and death of loved ones cannot be prevented, but the needs of the elderly or bereaved relatives can be addressed. There are also many civil servants, such as judges and jurors, who require proper discretion skills. But she warns that in order for this to happen, we need to cultivate in our citizens a compassionate understanding of the burden and meaning of these predicaments.

To that extent we will continue to need compassion as an appropriate response and as a motive to attend with concern to the needs of our fellows, a motive that needs recognition in the design of the political conception and in the education of citizens\(^9\) (UT, 405).

Such a rapport between compassion and social institutions should be mutual. Compassionate people build institutions representing what they imagine, while institutions, in turn, shape and cultivate the compassion in the individual. Institutions teach its citizens specific conceptions of basic goods, responsibility and proper concern and thereby inform the compassion the people learn. According to

\(^9\) My own italics. This theme will be taken up again in Part 3.
Rousseau (1979), empathy and the judgement of similar possibilities are deeply influenced by the ways in which the institutions place people in relation to one another. Regarding the specific emotions that impede appropriate compassion, namely shame, envy and disgust, she believes that it is up to society to promote or discourage them.

6.15 Victims and agents

Nussbaum addresses the apparent confusion in public deliberation about the civic role of compassion. It may be argued that compassion treats human beings as victims and erodes their agency and dignity (UT, 405).

In this regard she believes that compassion accepts that a person possesses basic human dignity and that the person has been badly injured by life. It includes the judgement that the harm done to that person was not due to his or her own fault. Nussbaum stresses that this is an anti-Stoic and typically classic Sophoclean view, since compassion holds that dignity and neediness are both interactively present in human beings. The basic worth of a human being will not disappear once the person has been hit by misfortune. The Stoics, on the other hand, argued that the mere recognition that a person can be affected by misfortune is a negation of that person’s dignity. More recent societal debates, especially regarding social welfare, centre on the same objection, namely, that to provide people with social support, may indicate that these people are seen as victims instead of agents who can take responsibility for their own destiny. Some feminists thus argue that to assume that women require protection against ill treatment is to treat them as victims and thus undercut their dignity. But Nussbaum argues that legal guarantees do not corrode agency. Instead, they provide a framework within which people have the opportunity to develop and practise agency. However, what we should actually be concerned about are the reasons why some people, such as females, poor people, racial minorities and so forth, are being singled out. We need to determine why some see compassion to these people as insulting. What is there about their conditions that imply that assistance is seen as patronising? In this regard, she believes that it is only once we see people as victims, that we identify the truth about human beings and life. Referring to the example of Philoctetes, she argues that every single human being can be harmed, despite the best preventative measures. Philoctetes believed that once we react compassionately to disasters we realise that we too are vulnerable and not distinct from the afflicted people’s fate. We realise that we have reason to
fear the same disaster. This awareness provides people of good will with the incentives to respond with attempts to relieve the distressed.

The notion to see the distressed people as passive victims does not imply that we don’t regard them as active agents, as well. In the case of Philoctetes, for instance, we are led to see him as the victim of loneliness, poverty and illness – conditions that he did not bring onto himself. But we also witness his ability to be an active agent and to confront the misfortunes that inundate him. He has a strong reasoning ability and is committed to justice and friendship. This leads us to adore his dignity and his desire for full activity, despite his severe misery. We cannot place all our dignity on our agency and reject passivity. It is precisely the refusal to accept passivity that lies at the root of pathological narcissists. This phenomenon is incidentally very common in societies that excessively honour manly strength and imperviousness. Nussbaum argues that Philoctetes’s dignity lies both in his ability to be an active agent, as well as his ability to be passive and needy, and she believes that it is this particular combination of humanity and disaster that inspires compassion. It is because we respect the human agency and passivity in somebody that we reject the forces responsible for his misery. Such a person is capable of the human use of his faculties.

Nussbaum thus holds that tragedies reveal that disasters do not cause minor discomfort. They hit the heart of human action and obstruct mobility, planning, citizenship and finally, life itself. Because we do not want humanity to be heartlessly jostled around, we feel a sense of tragic compassion. But we need to be cautious, since our recognition that disasters hit deep, should not allow disasters to remove humanity. The capability of being a good human being should prevail, even if everything else has been removed. John Steinbeck uses the same theme in his *Grapes of Wrath*, when he shows that the world of the poor is still rich in life, friendship and spirituality. Ethical values of care and love can endure the worst of circumstances. One may argue that, since both Sophocles and Steinbeck focus on good characters with good intentions, they are oversimplifying the issue. In this regard Nussbaum refers to Justice Thomas’s distinction between the desert and the non-desert. In cases where people commit crimes with hostile intentions, it will be disdainful not to hold them responsible. But Nussbaum argues that this distinction is not simple. She points out that Steinbeck repeatedly shows us that many illegal deeds are sometimes merely the most reasonable responses to tragic predicaments. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle also urges us to be forgiving to people who misbehave,
because one may easily make wrong decisions in difficult circumstances. Again, Nussbaum argues that this is not so simple either. Although Steinbeck seems to claim that oppression, such as deprivation, improve the personality, Nussbaum believes that suffering is not usually ennobling. Instead, it can distort and deform the personality. In his novel, *Native Son*, Richard Wright (1993), describes how economic deprivation and social hierarchy deform hope, aspiration and emotion. Wright reminds us about the potential consequences for an innocent child who is at the expense of external factors, such as stigma, poverty and inequality. Nussbaum therefore advocates a compassionate reaction to the unwanted personality of the offender by society. To some extent, society also has also contributed to the depriving circumstances of the deprived.

Although Nussbaum accepts that direct relief is not always the best way to enhance people’s lives, she denies that financial assistance directed at the provision of the basics for a meaningful human life dehumanises people or turns them into victims. Very often people suggest that by curtailing basic social support, one is actually stimulating agency and improving the character of the sufferers. She argues, however, that if we respect the dignity of these people, we owe them the opportunity to develop and thrive. Taking away support will instead stunt or stifle their agency. The late judge Brennan established an important link between fortune and welfare in a 1970 judgement:

> Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community (UT, 413).

Nussbaum finally argues that it is possible to treat a criminal with compassion, while still holding him responsible for his deeds. It is only once we acknowledge that many crimes are caused by criminals who have experienced misfortunes in their past, that we accept the full price of social hierarchy and economic deprivation. We have to realise that injustice can affect the personality and produce anger, resentment and even a bad character. This should motivate us to give each child the material and social support required for human dignity.

A compassionate society … is one that takes the full measure of the harms that can befall citizens beyond their own doing; compassion thus provides a motive to secure all the basic support that will undergird and protect human dignity (UT, 414).
6.16 Getting the judgements right

Nussbaum claims that a compassionate society is not necessarily a just society. People may for instance, be selective in their concern by ignoring the plight of the poorer people, or even blame these people for their plight but ignore those who exploit them. Nussbaum thus argues that we need a specific type of compassion, one within the limits of reason and connected to a sensible ethical theory. Her compassionate society therefore needs a definite set of judgements, especially in the three areas where judgements can go wrong. These three areas are the judgement of seriousness, the judgement of responsibility and the eudemonistic judgement. We also need to ask how the ideal society, namely a constitutional liberal democracy, might advance appropriate judgements, and consequently, appropriate compassion.

Regarding the judgement of seriousness, she explains that according to Rousseau (1979), people have innate psychological mechanisms and tend to be concerned about standard tragic predicaments such as death, loss of loved ones, illness, loneliness and political oppression. However, Clark’s study (1997) of modern Americans reveals that in an affluent and secure society, trivial issues, such as traffic jams, ruined holidays and boredom are often also regarded as plights and worthy of sympathy. This alarming phenomenon urges us to clarify the value of various external goods. We need to determine which ones are really significant and at what level. In this regard Nussbaum believes that a pluralistic liberal society should not promote a complete view of the good. Citizens will have different secular and religious views about the importance of money, love, even health and so on, and therefore the answering will have to be done by these various views. But it is also important that a society reaches agreement on the importance of certain basic goods, and to inform its citizens of these goods. She thus argues for a good constitution that will guarantee basic rights and liberties and stipulate the basic social minimum that should be accessible to all citizens. She prefers to refer to the basic rights in terms of a set of capabilities (or opportunities for functioning). The list of capabilities corresponds with her developing theory and is closely related to the Sophoclean and Aristotelian lists of tragic predicaments.

### The Central Human Capabilities

| 1. LIFE | • To be able to live to the end of a human life of normal length.  
         | • Not to die prematurely or before one’s life is so reduced that it is no longer worth living. |
| 2. BODILY HEALTH | • To be able to have good health (also |

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| 3. BODILY INTEGRITY | - To be able to move freely from place to place.  
- To be secure against violent assault (also sexual and domestic violence).  
- To have opportunities for sexual satisfaction.  
- To have choice in matters of reproduction. |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4. SENSES, IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT | - To be able to use the senses, to imagine, to think and to reason.  
- To do this in a truly human way – by being informed and cultivated by adequate education (including *but not limited to* literacy, maths and scientific training).  
- To use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical and so on.  
- To be able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression (political and artistic speech, religious exercise).  
- To be able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain. |
| 5. EMOTIONS | - To be able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves.  
- To be able to love those who love and care for us.  
- To be able to grieve at their absence.  
- To be able – in general – to love, grieve, experience longing, gratitude and justified anger.  
- Not to be blighted by fear and anxiety. |
| 6. PRACTICAL REASON | - To be able to form a conception of the good.  
- To be able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life (protection of the liberty of conscience and religious observance). |
| 7. AFFILIATION | - To be able to live with and towards others.  
- To recognise and show concern for others.  
- To engage in various forms of social interaction.  
- To be able to imagine the situation of the other. |
| 8. OTHER SPECIES | To be treated as a dignified human being whose worth is equal to those of others (provision of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, natural origin). |
| 9. PLAY | To be able to play, laugh and enjoy recreational activities. |
| 10. CONTROL OVER ONE’S ENVIRONMENT | **POLITICAL:** To be able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life. To have the right of political participation, protection and freedom of speech. **MATERIAL:** To be able to hold property (land and movable goods). To have property rights on equal basis with others. To have the right to seek employment on equal basis with others. To have the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. To be able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. |

Nussbaum strongly believes that citizens should be taught, at a very early age, that certain entitlements are central to human life and that deprivation of these rights is a tragic matter. It thus seems clear that institutions (together with the warranties they can provide) should teach the judgement of seriousness. Although this list is not complete (even in most supportive societies people will still die, get ill, and so on), the list shapes *the judgement of seriousness* in two ways. Firstly, it tells people that certain misfortunes are particularly bad, and secondly, it tells people that certain misfortunes are wrong and unjust. Such a list therefore tells citizens that no person should suffer these disasters, and that each citizen has a basic right not to suffer them. Nussbaum further points out that public institutions and laws, for better or for worse, shape the *judgement of seriousness* in various ways. Excluding a particular item on the list, for instance, may suggest that some losses are trivial.
Regarding the judgement of responsibility, she believes that this judgement is also shaped by laws and institutions. Civil and criminal law represent intricate standards of own responsibility for various types of quandaries. Public policies towards a group’s quandary also influence the perception of the group’s role in the deserving the predicament. Clark’s study (1997) for instance, reveals that Americans tend to be very naïve and crude in this regard and often see economic suffering as deserved, since it is due to failure or lack of effort. Although public policy during the Depression treated the calamity as something people were not to be blamed for, Nussbaum expresses her concern that current deliberation about welfare may once again see poverty as a failure of will (UT, 420). There are other examples where changes in laws effect changes in judgements, too. These include for instance laws on the sexual harassment of women and laws on rape. It seems clear that to a large extent, and for better or worse, laws and institutions affect the judgement of responsibility.

However, she believes that the judgement that most frequently - and dramatically - goes wrong is the judgement of the proper boundaries of concern, or the eudemonistic judgement. There seems to be general agreement that citizens are normally too restricted in their sympathies. In this regard, Adam Smith’s argument (1976) that compassion is unreliable appears to be correct (UT, 420). The majority of widely accepted ethical views, religious and secular, encourage people to broaden their circles of concern and to cross boundaries of race, class, gender and nationality. However, unfortunately these views often also urge people to limit their concerns by focusing on members of their own ethnic or religious group – and to reject and avoid others.

Nussbaum prefers a sensible set of judgements in this area, which would extend the boundaries of aspects like equal respect and equal concern so that people of other classes, races, sexes and nationalities are also included. In this regard she expresses her specific concern about the apparent lack of involvement and interest in happenings outside national boundaries. Many people seem to be untouched by the plights of people in distant parts of the world. This, Nussbaum argues, is a moral failure, from the point of view of the public political conception. Again, she stresses that law and public policy shape the eudemonistic judgements of a society. Rousseau (1979) demanded that all people should be equal before the law and entitled to certain basic rights, because he believed that this would get compassion to extend its boundaries outwards (UT, 421). If a government brings people physically
closer to one another, they will become aware of one another’s plight. Affirmative measures to empower previously disadvantaged groups can become useful devices to break down previous barriers. But she also points out that in many cases, for instance in India, it may take years of strict measures to change habitual contempt. Often it is only when the previously oppressed people have managed to establish themselves in the normal walks of life that they enter the spheres of concern. In this regard, Nussbaum blames ineffective institutional structures for people’s uneven and unreliable compassion.

Institutions also shape those emotions that are powerful impediments to compassion, such as disgust, shame and envy. Once again, Nussbaum believes that the way a society cares for its dependent citizens, such as the elderly and physically and mentally handicapped, communicates a particular view towards human weakness and its link to human dignity. A society that supports care for these people and respects their dignity has no shame or disgust for weakness and frailty.

6.17 Implementing rational compassion: moral and civic education
Nussbaum now focuses on the ways society can cultivate the judgements required for proper compassion. She also addresses ways to strengthen the psychological mechanisms that support the extension of concern, namely empathy and the judgement of similar possibilities. Although this education should primarily take place within the family circle, every society should employ and teach the ideals of citizenship and good civic judgement. She proceeds with her claim by offering some concrete and practical strategies for a proper education in compassion.

Nussbaum emphasises that the ability to imagine the experiences of other people, and the will to participate in their suffering, should be cultivated at every level. Our learners need to see the human meaning of facts that might otherwise have seemed remote. In this regard she holds that the humanities and arts should form a substantial part of education, from elementary school onwards. Learners will then master more and more of the appropriate judgements and be able to extend their empathy not only to more people, but to other types of people, as well. She expresses her concern about the fact that the humanities and arts are continuously being sidelined in education, because, apart from contributing to the formation of good citizens, they also enrich human life and understanding. We should therefore insist that they make an indispensable contribution to citizenship. Without it, we will
probably have an insensitive and emotionally dead society, which will be exposed to the aggressive behaviour of people who do not regard others.

Cutting the arts is a recipe for the production of pathological narcissism, of citizens who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of the issues at stake (UT, 426).

Nussbaum stresses the importance of fantasy ("fancy"), especially since early songs, rhymes and stories enable the child to imagine the inner world of other creatures. The child learns to endow strange forms with life and need, and with the singing of a familiar songs such as *Twinkle, twinkle little star*, for instance, the child has the opportunity to experience a sense of mystery that mingles curiosity with awe. The child learns to ascribe life, emotion and thought to forms whose inner lives are concealed. Nussbaum further explains that as the child grows older, more stories about animals and humans interact with the child’s attempts to explain its own world and its actions in this world. Sometimes, however, the child simply shuts these ‘person-like shapes’ from its world and shows no interest about what might be behind that shape. Unfortunately many people go through life in this way, and the result is often a paralysing demand for omnipotence and control. Pathological narcissists refuse to ascribe reality to others, and Nussbaum postulates that these people almost never understand narrative literature. However, a child who has been equipped by early experiences of wonder and whose imagination has been cultivated will be capable of concern about people outside the self. Such a person will form the habit of empathy and conjecture. Such a person will always try to determine what the other person is thinking or feeling, and will improve in the ability to decode ways in which different circumstances shape them. This person will also experience appropriate excitement or disturbance over the other person’s fortune or predicament.

Nussbaum urges teachers to attend to the requirements for such training, namely the omnipresence of love, accompanied by continuous curbing of aggressive wishes. Gradually then, the child will master the rudiments of society’s emotion vocabulary, and will be ready to be exposed to more direct portrayals of the vulnerabilities of human life. Now the child can be confronted with human calamities such as illness, death, slavery, rape, war, betrayal and loss of country. Nussbaum stresses that the child should become familiar with these misfortunes through stories that emphasise the importance of these tragedies. The stories should enlist the child’s participation, since stories that merely consist of recitals of facts will not have the same effect. She refers to the significant educational value of the Sophoclean tragedy, and argues that
not only children, but mature people, too, need to continually broaden their experience and reinforce their notion of central ethical truths. Tragedy is specifically useful to teach compassion to the young and future citizens, because it introduces them to the possible misfortunes of life, long before life itself does so, bringing about concern for others who are suffering something that they have not yet suffered. Due to the nature of tragic dramas the suffering is made very clear. These poetic, musical and visual aspects thus get moral weight. Nussbaum points out that the literary language and music furthermore have the capacity to invade inattention and promote intense concern and acknowledgement (UT, 429).

However, Nussbaum argues that the most critical progress beyond early learning comes in the apprehension of a common humanity, because tragic dramas tend to focus intensely on the description of the possibilities and weaknesses of human life. Tragedies are also concerned with the causes of the basic human problems and question the roles of necessity and weakness in the construction of human plights. A tragedy encourages the spectators to have empathy with the sufferings of people whose lot might be theirs, but also with those whose lot could never be theirs. Rousseau (1979) however warns that, although the young person should be exposed to the fate and miseries of his fellows, he should not witness it too often and run the risk of becoming hardened by the sight of suffering. Nussbaum nevertheless believes that we should construct exercises to extend the imagination of our citizens, taking into account that some groups are likely to understand more easily than others. She warns that the imagination faces obstacles wherever society has created distinctions, such as ‘some groups are different’. These obstacles are difficult to surmount simply by stories of universal humanity.

Again she holds that works of art have the potential to promote empathy across specific social barriers, since they present these barriers and their meaning in a very concrete way. The realist social novel, for instance, links the reader to the highly concrete circumstances of another person. The reader now “… exercises the muscle of his imagination” (UT, 431) and by taking up the viewpoint of an outsider, becomes the inhabitant of both oppressed and privileged groups. She also believes that music can often be a powerful source of compassionate imagining. For instance, although blues music expresses general perceptions about misfortune and survival, it also serves to educate Americans about the experiences of African-Americans in particular. It is furthermore apparent that an education for compassionate citizenship should essentially be multicultural. Our learners should be encouraged to appreciate
the variety of conditions in which human beings strive for flourishing. A proper multicultural education will not just focus on introducing facts about classes, races and nationalities alone. It will aim at drawing the learners into the lives and struggles of the others by becoming participants. In this regard, the study of political, social and economic history, as well as engagement with works of art and literature are very important.

However, Nussbaum warns that such an education should not commit itself to cultural relativism, namely to the idea that every culture is equally good and should not be criticised. A compassionate person will always compare the observations with his or her own developing idea of the good. Again, she emphasises that the empathetic imagination is a very valuable device to the formation of adequate judgements and responses (UT, 432). Nussbaum also warns against so-called ‘high art’ which encourages elitism, conceit or disdain for the ordinary. These forms of art often discourage compassion and promote smugness and prejudice. What we want from art is empathy and the broadening of concern, and in this regard, she disagrees with Tolstoy’s idea (1962) that a compassionate citizen should avoid art that has educational prerequisites, which makes it inaccessible to some members of society. She explains that Sophoclean tragedies demonstrate that it is precisely the poetic and artistic excellence that conveys the compassion to the onlooker. There is a correlation between the artistic merit and the ability to engage the personality at a deep level. “It is not so easy for just anyone to construct a story that will move the heart” (UT, 433). Nussbaum infers that the arts serve a crucial political function, because they cultivate the imaginative abilities that are central to political life and produce independent and passionate citizens. This gives us special reasons to promote the arts and to protect artistic expression against repression.

If the sort of citizen we want participating in public deliberation has the robust and independent imagination of the lover of art, then we will need to protect the independence of the arts themselves from the interference of moralisms, both religious and secular, that have always borne down on them (UT, 433).

6.18 The role of the media

Nussbaum argues that, apart from education in schools, citizens are also educated by mass media. Television and so on have the potential to cultivate the ability to imagine and have empathy, especially by focusing on the arts and humanities. She holds that television has enormous power to shape empathy and the judgement of similar possibilities with regards to minority groups as well as people in other countries. The specific ways in which news stories, images, advertisements and
Dramas are presented to manipulate the moral capabilities of citizens for better or worse. The way that the media handle the dignity of people, or portray some human disasters as grave and others as minor, powerfully influences the public’s judgements of seriousness, blame and the extent of the concern. She argues that the demands of a reasonable and respectable public life should influence the way in which these are portrayed and communicated.

She further argues that the media also serve as a deliberative instrument because they may – and ought to – promote proper deliberation about particular conceptions we want to adopt (UT, 434). Teaching compassion through the media is different to teaching it in schools. This is due to the vulnerability of especially television and the printed media to market pressures. She believes that if these media are held prisoner to market standards, and if the people involved are reluctant to allow financial losses for public good, it is difficult for these media to accomplish any of their important social purposes. Nussbaum infers that public pressure has the potential to improve the situation regarding portrayals of national minorities, but she is sceptical whether, for instance the American people’s “… deplorable ignorance” about other nations will improve the compassion they have for these people. She postulates that only independent and well-financed public media can address this problem. She urges us to pursue our thinking about empathy and compassion in this regard.

6.19 Political leaders

Nussbaum argues that we should insist on political leaders who demonstrate sound and proper compassion. Not only should such leaders be well informed of the significant facts about their society and its history, but they should also be able to imagine the lives of the many diverse people they are supposed to lead.

More than a century ago, Walt Whitman (1963 – 4) claimed that laws and institutions cannot hold society together. We need political leaders, whose “… eye and soul and tongue … “ are powerful enough, and who are emotionally eager enough “ … to pierce into all the lives in the world, and to chronicle their joy and their suffering, the fruitfulness of well-being and the barrenness of exclusion” (UT, 436). In this regard she calls for the development of the artistic imagination in the education of its citizens, as well as suitably compassionate leadership. She supports Whitman’s view that Abraham Lincoln (1992) had these traits. He showed how compassion could illuminate the conduct of public life. Lincoln was the prototype of a leader who displayed the intricate relationships between compassion and righteous annoyance,
and compassion and mercy. He had the ability to imagine the situations of the
slaves, whose lives he regarded as equal to that of their oppressors. But although he
had righteous anger against the oppressors, he renounced hatred or punitive action.
This was because his compassionate imagination led to a generous view of the
offender (UT, 438). Lincoln managed to see common human interests and sufferings
across sharp divisions. Referring again to Candace Clark’s study (1997), Nussbaum
notes that so-called “sympathy entrepreneurs” (journalists, civic awareness groups,
artists and musicians), but above all, political leaders, very often define for Americans
what the public norms of appropriate compassion should be. These people’s opinions
and recommendations regarding for instance race, welfare and so on, unavoidably
contribute to the shaping of compassion’s assumed boundaries.

6.20 Economic thought: welfare and development
Nussbaum argues that compassion’s imagination can provide information crucial to
economic planning. This information should be taken into account when formal
economic models are established. She notes for instance that previously the well-
being of a country was measured by development agencies and the trend was to list
GNP per capita. She argues, however, that what economists really should be
interested in is the extent to which the economic resources of a nation are supporting
human functioning, and how it can be improved. The important question to ask is
what the economy does for people of various kinds and in different areas of their
lives. The economy should not be a separate entity. She refers to Amartya Sen’s
view (1984) that welfare and development economics should not focus merely on the
 provision of resources, but on the role of resources in supporting the capabilities of
human beings to function in important ways. Development is a human matter, and
Sen argues that we can only have adequate information of how the resources are
working, once we see them at work in the context of human functioning. We need to “
... imagine the whole picture of a life” (UT, 440). Sen (1982) also stresses the
importance of compassion for a complete economic notion of rationality, although he
holds that this does not imply discarding the goal to model human action
scientifically. But it does mean that science must respond to facts of human
psychology, because without this component, rationality in the normative sense will
be deficient. “Presumably economics wants not only simplicity, but also, and above
all, the truth” (UT, 441).
6.21 Legal rationality: equality, criminal sentencing

Nussbaum acknowledges the imperfection of compassion but argues that this should not persuade us to exclude it entirely from legal deliberation. She argues that compassion should not be regarded as irrational in the sense that it is impulsive or lacks thought (UT, 441).

Since lawyers and judges are products of a public education system, they require a high degree of the particular virtues of civic rationality, which that system nurtures. She argues that since these people are concerned with issues of human welfare they also require an accurate type of deliberative rationality. They need to be able to enter the lives of other people with empathy and imagination, and should be able to see the human meaning of the issues at stake. She thus holds that it is important that education at law schools addresses the issues of equality and inequality, as well as the judgements of criminal defendants. Nussbaum believes that if a democracy attempts to create equality out of laws and institutions alone, without an “education of the heart and the imagination”, such a regime will be fragile (UT, 443). People need to be able to apply their imagination in an attempt to understand the human being and the impact of the particular laws. They will then become aware of the social realities of the cases and not approach them from a lofty distance. True neutrality requires a probing examination of these realities with imaginative participation. She notes that the design of judicial institutions should allow leeway for flexibility and individual interpretive and normative reasoning, because without it the law will be banefully rigid. Given this latitude, we thus need judges who display rationality. According to her theory, this means that we need judges who are suitably emotionally educated (UT, 446).

She reminds us that compassion as such is neither good nor bad. It is only once compassion is connected to one of the three judgements, namely of seriousness, responsibility, and the extent of the concern that it can adjust the understanding of a specific situation. The good compassionate judge will realise that all human beings are imperfect and that criminal behaviour is often the result of social and parental factors. This judge will adopt a merciful narrative attitude and acknowledge the humanity of the wrongdoer. On the other hand, the judge who distances himself/herself from the criminal will not be able to understand the diversity of weaknesses, which have probably caused the transgressions. Nussbaum stresses, however, that not all appeals to compassion are justified. The type of appropriate compassion in the law that we promote is based on reasonable judgements. She
further strongly objects to attempts to encourage judges or jurors to view the defendants with disgust. Disgust creates boundaries and tells us that evil is alien and has nothing to do with us, it is an impediment to proper public choice and appropriate compassion. Nussbaum notes that compassion is not the entirety of public rationality, but it plays a valuable role in many aspects of civic life, because it informs people’s understanding of the human meaning of many types of calamities. But all emotions are not equal and disgust and shame for instance, make no positive contribution towards public deliberation. She argues that her cognitive theory enables us to explain why all emotions are not equal. The cognitive theory can investigate the specific content of an emotion by asking questions regarding its reliability and its link with various possibilities of self-avoidance and self-deception. The cognitive theory will also remind us that before we endorse any specific occurrence of emotion, we need to know the specific judgements it involves. Although there are many appropriate occasions, there are also many instances in which the judgements are false. However, we need to accept that some emotions are at least likely to support rational deliberation.

6.22 Conclusion
Essentially South Africans need to transform into compassionate citizens, sharing a mutual interest in one another and displaying a mutual willingness to engage attempts to improve sufferers’ predicaments. However, due to South Africa’s segregated past, most citizen’s circles of concern are still very small. For most people the judgment of similar possibilities still needs to be nurtured and the ability to imagine the other’s predicaments still needs to be cultivated. Without these there is reason to suspect that the social transformation process will not endure. The potential contribution of education to instil in learners compassionate caring for fellow citizens is evident.

10 This theme is taken up in Part 3.
Intermezzo: Music and emotion

Nussbaum concludes her theory of the emotions by focusing on music in particular. She has chosen music since she believes that the topic is of great intrinsic interest and provides her with an opportunity to display the merit of the account of the emotions that she has been developing. She further believes that by focusing on music, she is in a better position to solve some problems that other accounts of the emotions cannot solve. The focus on music will also enable her to make additional refinements to her account. And finally she explains that although the topic of music and emotion is nowadays more often discussed than previously, it is still a relatively neglected topic in aesthetic theory (UT, 238, 239). The topic of music is also still marginalized in education, and since the last part of this thesis will examine education’s potential role in the fostering of emotions, I have decided to include Nussbaum’s convincing arguments in this thesis.

She contends that music has profound links with the emotional life. And yet, it seems as if it is difficult to describe the nature of these links. She believes that this might be due to deficiencies in previous theories of the emotions and postulates that her theory may help to elucidate issues that have proved complicated in the past. She holds that when one thinks about the topic of ‘Music and Emotion’, two apparently diverse issues emerge, namely the emotions of the listener, and the expressive qualities of the music per se. Although Nussbaum believes that these two questions cannot be answered in isolation, she intends to discuss these two issues separately, uniting them eventually.

Regarding the emotions of the listener, several questions immediately appear, for instance, are the emotions we have when we listen to music ‘real’ emotions? What emotions are these? Whose emotions are these? What is the intentional object of the emotion? What is the content of the emotion? With regards to people’s ascriptions of emotions to the music itself, she believes that people often make judgements about the expressive properties of the music by describing the music as joyful, peaceful, and so on. But she argues that the real question to be asked is whether they are in fact saying something significant about the music itself when they make these judgements. She believes that a convincing account of the emotional properties ascribed to music should always refer to the way in which the listener experiences the music with reference to his/her emotional life. She subsequently warns that we should be cautious not to adopt a simplistic view for example as expressed by
Tolstoy (1962) in *What is Art?* This view holds that the expressive properties of an artwork are simply those that the artwork induces in any coincidental viewer or listener, without any consideration of the person’s interest or expertise (UT, 251). A proper analysis of the expressive goods of music should instead base itself in the exclusively musical properties of the work. Expression cannot simply be ascribed to music according to the general listener’s response. Such an analysis will be unreliable.

Nussbaum believes that music is intensely connected to our emotional life, even more than the other arts. “It digs into our depths and expresses hidden movements of love and fear and joy that are inside us” (UT, 254). Music has the ability to uncover our inner weaknesses and expose our souls to ourselves; she refers to Mahler’s description (Cooke, 1988) of music’s ability to go “… to the bottom of things” She explores a link between the above views of music and her theory of the emotions. This link emphasises the notion of urgent needs and vulnerabilities, often concealed in daily life. But music does not usually have obvious representative or narrative structures and since these structures are typical objects of concrete emotions in life, it is difficult to understand how the emotions provoked by music can be real emotions with distinct intentional content. The essence of the problem is that music is not always translatable into words. Mahler (Cooke, 1988), for instance, explains that he has no need to express himself musically when he can still express himself in words. He declares that his musical expression starts “… at the point where the dark feelings hold sway” (UT, 255). Nussbaum agrees with Mahler’s assertion that music can relate to our inner world without being translatable into words. However, she stresses that many people regard the idea that emotions can be expressed through other symbolic forms as unnatural and mysterious. She thus argues that it seems paradoxical to emphasize the ‘aboutness’ of music, while denying that it contains a describable subject or story.

Nussbaum outlines the long-lasting theoretical debate on this topic. This deliberation is characterised by conflicting positions, which she characterises in terms of responses to the following argument:

1. Music does not embody or cause cognitive attitudes that can be linguistically formulated.
2. Cognitive attitudes that can be linguistically formulated are necessary constituents of emotions.
3. Therefore, music cannot embody or cause emotions.
She explains that *Position A* accepts premises 1 and 2, and therefore the conclusion. This was the position of the ancient Stoics, and more recently defended by Eduard Hanslick (1986). *Position B* denies the conclusion and rejects premise 2. It adopts a non-cognitive view of the emotions to explain how music can have emotions. In ancient times, this was the position of the Stoic Posidonius. More recently it is the opinion of Arthur Schopenhauer (1969), Suzanne Langer (1951, 1953) and Jerrold Levinson (1990). *Position C* also denies the conclusion, but rejects premise 1. It maintains that music has a language-like structure out of which propositions can be formed. This position therefore maintains a propositional-cognitive view of the emotions while rebutting the conclusion. Deryck Cooke (1959) defends this position.

**Position A**

Examining the view of the Greek Stoics in more detail, Nussbaum argues that they also regarded music as a major source of emotional experience. However, the music in their time was mainly textual and it was the lyrics that contained the cognitive structures sufficient to accommodate the emotions. Modern theorists of this position however, are challenged to ascribe the emotional properties to purely instrumental music. In this regard Hanslick (1986) holds that emotions are based upon beliefs and individuated according to the beliefs. And beliefs must have a cognitive structure. He argues,

> ... music can only express the various accompanying adjectives and never the substantive, e.g. love itself. A specific feeling (a passion, say, or an affect) never exists as such without an actual historical content, which can only be precisely set forth in concepts (UT, 257).

He then concludes that the expressive properties of music are actually metaphors for structures that are noticeably musical. Music is music and nothing else, and its structures are different from linguistic structures. Calling music ‘sad’ or ‘joyful’ is a metaphorical way of characterising these distinctive forms. Hanslick (1986) further sees the listener’s emotions as based on personal psychological factors and not attached to the analysis of the musical work itself. Music’s beauty is self-contained and consists purely of tones and their artistic combination. It does not require any external content. Hanslick (1986) thus asserts that musical structures are not translatable into linguistic structures (UT, 258, 259).

Nussbaum agrees with Hanslick’s notion (1986) that musical structures cannot be translated into linguistic structures. She also agrees with his conception of emotion,
but she argues that his view has two major shortcomings. Firstly, he fails to explain why most composers and listeners agree that music does indeed address the inner world, and that the ascriptions are not simply metaphorical. Secondly, he is unable to explain why some metaphorical ascriptions are appropriate while others are not. She emphasises that these ascriptions are not merely eccentric states of mind. They originate in the music itself (UT, 259).

**Position B**

This view is rooted in the apparent expressiveness of music. It adopts a view of emotion, which enables the emotion to be *in* the music. The Greek Stoic Posidonius regarded emotions as ‘unreasoning movements’ that are completely separated from cognition. Because these movements fluctuate in rhythm and speed, they can represent various different qualities. Music has similar capacities and can therefore also contain emotion. Arthur Schopenhauer (1969) also argues that music is uniquely attached to the ‘Will’, which can be regarded as “… the force of erotic striving that propels us on into life and manifests itself in various emotions” (UT, 259). Music embodies the rising and falling of this inner force. This explains why the effect of music is more instantaneous and intense than the other arts. He further believes that music represents emotions in an abstract and general way, and in doing so he attends to the assumed absence of the situational beliefs from the music.

However, Nussbaum believes that, due to his conception of the ‘Will’, he is unable to give a satisfactory account of the belief content and the object-directed intentionality of the emotion. The ‘Will’ has no intentionality, awareness or selectivity. If music represents the ‘Will’, it cannot represent intentionality. Nussbaum nevertheless agrees with Schopenhauer’s notion (1969) that music is deeply attached to our deepest motivations and strongest emotions. She also agrees that the objects of the music are more general and less distinguished than the daily objects of situational emotions. She points out that both Suzanne Langer (1953) and Jerrold Levinson (1990) hold the same idea. Langer believes that human feeling is an internal activity whose form can be understood without reference to intentionality. Music has forms that symbolise the dynamic patterns of human feeling. Levinson (1990) agrees that a belief is necessary for an emotion. He refers to the ‘affective part’ as an essential part of the emotion as a whole, which is causally independent of belief or judgement and sufficient to identify the emotion (without the belief or judgement). Levinson (1990) thus argues that music cannot represent or cause the complete emotion. It can, however, represent or cause the kinetic and affective side of the emotion.
Considering these views, Nussbaum argues that Hanslick’s view (1986) is correct. An emotion requires a judgement or a similar intentional activity. The characteristic cognitive/intentional content makes it possible to individuate between emotions (UT, 261). In this regard Langer’s (1951, 1953) omission of intentionality makes her theory unconvincing, since in her theory emotions appear to be equated with sensations. Considering the problems encountered with Positions A and B, Nussbaum argues that a denial of premise 1 seems to be a plausible solution, bearing that music can in fact cause and have beliefs. However, what needs to be added now is a convincing argument to show that these beliefs can be formulated in something similar to a language.

Position C
Deryck Cooke attempted to produce an account similar to Position C in his book The Language of Music (1959). He invented a musical lexicon to denote the emotional meaning of the basic elements of Western music and attempted to indicate that particular sound patterns have universal emotional implications. He argues for instance that a major fifth resembles joy, and so on. Nussbaum argues that Cooke’s project has major deficiencies, because the ‘lexicon’ has only semantic items and does not contain rules for their arrangement into larger expressions. Moreover, the cultural and historical conditions of the music are not taken into account. If one wants to comprehend the expressive properties of the music, one has to include the historical context, specific genre, and oeuvre of the composer in the listening experience. In response to Cooke’s notion, Nussbaum argues that music can only be universal up to a point. People from diverse languages and cultures can learn to like similar music, but this does not mean that their responses will automatically be the same. In this regard Tolstoy (1962) argues, quite plausibly, that the simplistic expressiveness of folk songs make them more accessible than complex symphonic works. It is also evident that some complicated symphonic compositions are easier to enjoy than others. Nussbaum thus infers, “But the fact that certain works are relatively easily decoded does not imply that there is no learning required, or that the code is universal” (UT, 263).

By rejecting Position C, Nussbaum maintains that we are not forced to choose between Position A and Position B. We know by now that certain forms of cognitive/intentional activity, which embody ideas of salience and urgency, are non-linguistic. In this regard we first need to consider the general significant shift in psychology from the behaviourist view of emotion to the cognitivist view. The same
shift occurred in music, where ‘musical behaviourism’ was replaced by ‘musical cognitivism’. ‘Musical behaviourism’ holds that music learning and music activity can be explained by appeal to stimuli and responses, without mention of cognitive activity. ‘Musical cognitivism’ on the other hand, sees music acquisition and musical functioning as involving intricate cognitive functions. These functions are at a level of complexity that increases with development (UT, 263). Mary Louise Serafine, in her book *Music as Cognition: The Development of Thought in Sound* (1988), proves that complex forms of cognitive functioning are necessary components in children’s attainment of musical abilities. Interpreters of music are also nowadays investigating how particularly musical forms express multifaceted views of the world. Their research indicates that a cognitive analysis of musical content does not overlook the formal and musical properties of the music. A certain emotional idea will require a specific musical form. When more profound and complex aspects of the emotional life become an issue for music, the form of the music and the way it is made, will evolve accordingly (UT, 264). Nussbaum warns that two facts are often overlooked. Firstly, language is a mode of representation. Once an emotion is converted into words, thoughts that did not originate as verbal forms have already been translated to some extent. Various degrees of distortions will inevitably occur. And secondly, although music is not language, it is indeed a form of symbolic representation. It therefore does not have to renounce all complexity and sophistication to language. Nussbaum therefore questions the assumption that it is easier to express an emotion’s content linguistically than musically. She postulates that this is so “... because we live in a culture that is verbally adept but (on the whole) relatively unsophisticated musically” (UT, 264).

Unfortunately we are so used to thinking in linguistic terms, that it may now appear as if a choice between translating music into language, and accepting the notion of ‘non-reasoning movements’ is inevitable. Nussbaum argues that this is a wrong assumption. We should instead consider the possibility that another symbolic structure may also have the ability to contain rich expressive capacities. And in this regard, all three positions failed. Once we accept an inclusive view of cognitive appraisal, we may be able to escape the deadlock caused by the inadequate disjunction. She concludes this section with several requirements for a proper account. It should reject the notion that music is simply a way to an extra-musical cognition. It should also maintain the cognitive and symbolic complexity of musical experience. A proper account must acknowledge that music has a close relationship with our emotional profundities, and it has to indicate how the emotional material is
contained in uniquely musical forms. Such an account should enable us to differentiate between the responses from the implied listener and the expressive properties of the musical work and enable us to link these two. And finally, a proper account has to respect the historical and cultural variety of musical expression.

**Music’s access to the emotions**

Nussbaum now returns to Gustav Mahler’s claim (1979) that the expressive world of his symphonic writing commences once the narrative capacity of words disappears, namely “… at the door which leads to the ‘other world’ (UT, 265)”. She also refers to his reference to his own listening experience, which he describes as, “A burning pain crystallizes” (UT, 265). She argues that both these phrases deal with the core of our issue, because they claim that intense and concentrated emotions are embodied both in the music itself as well as in the listener’ experience, provided that the listener adheres to the music’s demands. She subsequently claims that these emotions are not present in “… the daylight world of distinct physical objects” and do not have obviously understandable narrative structures (UT, 265). She argues that Mahler’s claims (1979) suggest that, due music’s uniqueness, its access to the profundity of our emotions is more direct and potent. She emphasises that music is not more indistinct than language, even although it does not signify objects or tell stories in the same way as literature. In literature, our emotions are related to the actions and events of characters that also live in a daily world, whereas our emotional responses to music are more general forms of emotions. Music has emotional energy and the capacity to surpass external manifestations to reach “… the bottom of things” (UT, 266).

She explains that these characteristics encouraged many writers, such as Proust (1982), Mahler (1979) and Hindemith (1961), to compare music’s emotions with the experience we have in dreams. Proust suggests that without the existence of language, music could have been the channel of “… communication between souls” (UT, 266). Hindemith believes that musical emotions do not have the everyday narrative coherence of our daily emotions, or the emotions we experience when we read literature. They have the features of “… compression, multiple reference, illogical order, displacement, and rapidity we associate with our experience of dreaming” (UT, 266, 267). Unfortunately Hindemith’s additional views (1961) differ from Nussbaum’s view, since he does not regard emotional reactions as embedded in the musical form itself. He argues that musical form must be apprehended by the intellect alone. He therefore does no connect emotions with the intellect. He regards
these ‘dreamlike’ emotions as belonging to the real-life listener and not the implied listener. This is not contained in the work itself. His view of the intellect is restricted to the analysis of form and he does not link it with evaluative judgements about our own urgent concerns. Nussbaum incidentally believes that this view is reflected in his music, which tends to be “… boggled down in an obsessive intellectualism” (UT, 267).

Nussbaum believes that Proust also disconnects the expressive elements of the music from its cognitively comprehensible structure. Both he and Hindemith (1961) focus on contingent different patterns of association, which cause diverse listeners to experience diverse emotions. She holds that we now need to retain the notion of musical emotion as a dream, while addressing the deficiency of the above view. We need to maintain that it is the form of the music itself that represents the dream material. Mahler (Bauer-Lechner, 1980) confirms this idea, stating that form and content are “… indissolubly blended” (UT, 268). The “pain and sorrow of life” is actually in an untranslatable form and in the music itself. The ‘aboutness’ of the work corresponds with its formal complexity, and Mahler (Bauer-Lechner, 1980) considers the composing of a symphony as the construction of a world, with the assistance of all the technical aids available.

Nussbaum correctly asserts that music is not the general ordinary language used as daily form of symbolic representation. If we want to express a feeling linguistically we have to make use of language as medium. This medium, however, has been dulled by our persistent use of particular words, because we operate in a world of narration and verbal representation. She acknowledges that language is a functional tool of communication, and is thus a mode of exchange, but she argues that language cannot completely evade the intellectual defences we have developed in our attempts to deal with the world. Language therefore struggles to get access to emotion in its most delicate and extreme form. Language will also find it difficult to encapsulate the primitive emotions of childhood without distorting them, because these emotions are deeply hidden in an ancient and incomplete schematic form. But she argues that music, or the inner world expressed by music, is not archaic or primitive. It does not lack intentionality or content. We thus need to take cognisance of Schopenhauer’s claim (1969) that music is exceptionally appropriate to express parts of the personality that are concealed from conscious self-understanding. Music has the potential to circumvent habit, function, and intellectualising in such a way, “… that its symbolic structures seem to pierce like a painful ray of light directly into the
most vulnerable parts of the personality” (UT, 269). Since music does not have the normal narrative and objective structures of language, it is often more sympathetic to the archaic, vague and powerful emotions of infancy. Music provides these emotions with a sharper exactness or ‘crystallisation’, which they did not have previously.

One enters the “dark world,” in which language and daily structures of time and causality no longer reign supreme; and one finds the music giving form to the dim shapes of that darkness (UT, 269).

Nussbaum explains that music manages to sidestep our self-defensive tools and our controlling and manipulative *modus operandi*. Its ‘indefiniteness’, compared to the propositional use of language, provides it with an advanced definiteness in sorting out our insides. Nussbaum thus asserts that the link between musical experience and the lack of intellectual control or manipulation suggests that the implied listener’s encounter is both active and passive, or as Mahler (La Grange, 1973) describes it, simultaneously “… feminine and feminising” (UT, 270).

However, she warns that one should avoid assuming that it is possible to identify the music’s expressed emotions without a musical training and cultural education. She refers to Aaron Ridley’s arguments (1995). Although Ridley rejects Cooke’s ideas (1959) about the universality of music, he claims that the expressive elements of music are as communicative as behavioural and vocal gestures. The issue of cultural variety, however, does not feature in his account. She therefore infers that it seems as if he either overestimates the cross-cultural expressive opaqueness of voice and bodily movement, or that he misjudges the opacity of music to someone unfamiliar with a particular musical culture. In her response to Ridley’s claim, Nussbaum stresses that formally composed music is more analogous to poetry than to daily movements. The emotional power of such music cannot be separated from a formally complex use of the media of expression. Those ignorant of a particular poetic tradition will be restricted to a very superficial emotional understanding. We need to acknowledge that as in poetry, emotion can also be expressed in specifically musical and cultural ways. The expressive content is provided by its imminent tradition.

Nussbaum finally refers to Scruton’s distinction (1997) between a musical work’s general atmosphere and its expressed emotions. He claims that an expressive musical work does not simply have a certain atmosphere; it also possesses a meditated content, which is articulated in a specific form. Nussbaum now refers to her previous suggestion that literary works act as ‘transitional objects’. She holds that these objects symbolise other objects and events to which we attach rich emotions.
Pity towards a hero, for instance, implies that we explore similar personal vulnerabilities and possibilities. She subsequently argues that music contains symbolic structures of salience and urgency.

Musical works are somehow able – and, after all, this “somehow” is no more and no less mysterious than the comparable symbolic ability of language – to embody the idea of our urgent control, in a tremendous variety of forms (UT, 272).

This particular ability of music can be ascribed to compound cultural traditions, and Nussbaum believes that education in a specific cultural history is necessary if we want to be amenable to the music, and “… take up the position of vulnerability” (UT, 272). But even if one is educated in a specific cultural tradition, the onus is still on the listener to recognise and accept the intricate symbolic structures presented by the music. She further holds that with the exception of songs, operas and some programmatic compositions, musical works do not have narratives to grant the listeners access to their expressive potential. She therefore infers that the majority of the listener’s emotions will be emotions directed at general human possibilities, as suggested by the music. These emotions will be combined with emotions that relate to the listener’s own life and potential. In this regard, the previous reference to music as a dream, suggesting the idea of a condensed reference to a person’s own life prospects, seems appropriate. But listeners will also experience the exhilarated awareness that one is experiencing personal growth.

Nussbaum believes that this awareness of discovering more about life and about oneself is one of the major reasons why “… we seek out painful musical experiences” (UT, 274). Nussbaum also agrees with Ridley’s idea (1995) that a listener’s emotion can be anchored by similarities to human movements and the sounds of the human voice. However, she argues that the major component of embodied emotions is created by the organization of expressive conventions, and this the listener will have to learn. Although general and superficial remarks about the emotional content of a musical work will probably be possible, a listener’s convincing analysis will have to focus on the music in detail and within its context. The listener should therefore be acquainted with the musical history of the work and attend to salient musical forms. This means that the listener engages with the constructed viewpoint of the music, and will then be able to pursue and share the music’s emotional developmental path. At times the listener will perhaps also distance him/herself and reflect on the intentional objects of his/her own emotions.
Nussbaum continues her argument by analysing the intentional objects of the listener’s emotions. Sometimes, the felt emotions will be towards characters portrayed in the music. In these cases, the object of intention will be the musical structure, and Nussbaum points out that this will often be the case in program music, where the music has particular narrative definiteness. When the listener has emotions of the second type, she holds that the musical forms will suggest some general human facts and possibilities. These general human possibilities will now be taken as objects, but at varying levels of generality and specificity. Nussbaum believes that the listener will be called upon to move between sympathetic and empathetic viewpoints. The music may even possess the sympathetic viewpoint by itself; Scruton (1997) mentions Wagner’s clarification that the music “… stands proxy for the listener himself, expressing not the emotions of the characters, so much as a sympathetic response to them” (UT, 275).

Nussbaum therefore argues that the listener has complex and diverse emotions towards the patterns of salience in a musical work. She agrees that the emotional content of music will be more general than the content of literary works, where the emotions are concretely situated and linked to specifics. However, she believes that besides truly objectless moods often found in music, many music emotions have general or vague objects, such as fear of unidentified things or hope for anything good. Despite the absence of concrete narrative elements, music can even be more accurately attached to the vague matter of the inner world. These emotions, too, will be indistinct and not easily identifiable, although this does not imply that the content will be vacuous. Despite the absence of a concrete narrative or a highly general emotional trajectory, the emotional content of music can be highly specific (UT, 276, 277). She argues that although the absence of designated particulars causes some type of generality, music can at the same time express a certain particularity “… that words would try to capture in vain” (UT, 277). In some ways, music can be more precise and make an emotion exact and clear-cut in a way that text fails to do. Walton (1988) argues that music has even more potential than the other arts. This is why two different composers can set the same poem to music and produce two diversely expressive songs.

Nussbaum argues that the listener is at the same time also interpreting his or her own inner self in the music. This is easily attainable, because the music does not interfere with imaginary distractions or habitual language, which insinuate an ordinary and trivial experience. She emphasises that the listener’s focus on his or her
personal life does not involve the mere exploitation of music for personal means. The listener has the opportunity to be flexible and creative and may therefore experience emotions at various levels of generality and specificity (UT, 277). Finally, the listener will also experience wonder and delight. The intentional object of these emotions is the musical work itself, and the music is now appraised for its own sake. A work of art, in particular, can provoke these non-eudemonistic emotions and subsequently provide the listener or spectator with a medium of self-discovery. Nussbaum believes that “... they make a process that would otherwise be painful wonderful and delightful” (UT, 278).

One may now come to the conclusion that a listener or spectator has real and complex emotions. Some emotions will be empathetic and will relate to the points of view symbolized in the work, while other sympathetic emotions will react to the presence of these structures. There will also be emotions linked to human life in general and emotions about the listener’s possibilities in particular. And finally the emotions of delight and wonder will take as their intentional object, the artwork itself.

Nussbaum admits, however, that not all musical works will arouse deep emotion. Some may be experienced as mere fun or may provoke interest because of certain structural aspects. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these works have no emotional content. A person, who is willing to take up the position of ‘implied listener’, may indeed have emotional responses in such cases.

Nussbaum’s final, concluding theory of the emotions is a more complicated version of her initial view. She has incorporated non-linguistic cognitions, social norms, and individual history. She has argued that diverse social norms construct a society’s emotional repertoire. She has showed how variations in norms entail variations in emotion. She has also argued that early experiences shape the mature emotional life and that the adult experiences of emotion involve foundations laid down much earlier in life. Her account of childhood emotions focused on the role of the imagination in promoting a good outcome to early emotional crises. She has developed this insight by focusing on the role of the arts in the cultivation of emotions, and finally, she has chosen music since music is an especially rich source of emotional experiences. This theory will subsequently constitute the conceptual framework to address the two key focuses of the remainder of this thesis: social transformation and education in South Africa.
Part 2
Social transformation in South Africa:
a narrative
Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like the “geological upheavals” a traveller might discover in a landscape where recently only a flat plane could be seen, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain, and prone to reversal (UT, 1).

Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic account of the emotions has significant implications for social and political transformation in South Africa. Her theory, acclaiming emotions as evaluative judgements, emphasises and elucidates one of the most crucial prerequisites for the successful transformation of the South African society. Because essential to the successful or unsuccessful adjustment by individual South Africans to all the changes in society, are the ways these uncontrollable external objects are appraised and evaluated with reference to each person’s perception of own well-being. Nussbaum sees emotions as evaluative-cognitive judgments. They are our ways of registering how things are with respect to uncontrollable external items.

The peculiar depth and the potentially terrifying character of the human emotion derives from the especially complicated thoughts that humans are likely to form about their own need for objects, and about their imperfect control over them (UT, 16).

At the core of social and political transformations in South Africa then, are its impacts on our emotional lives and the above précis provides an illuminating elucidation of my own rebirth as a ‘new South African’ - a slow, sometimes painful and often confusing process which started some years ago, and will continue for years to come. Painful and confusing, because at the nucleus of my inner, personal self are several deeply embedded appraisals which were formed in my childhood and strongly cultivated by the particular society in which I had grown up. These evaluative judgements, aimed at very specific perceptions of objects, which were often also culturally predetermined, have constituted my personal and cultural identity. They have become who I am. Expecting me to alter my judgements, perceptions of objects and ideas of own flourishing means tampering with who I am, with my identity. Transformation then becomes a daunting and complex undertaking, because it urges me to depart from the security of the known and venture into the vastness of the unknown.

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11 I have decided to use this term to indicate the progression from one part of my thesis to the next. Since music is highly linked to the emotions, I have decided to use music terminology. In musical terms this means moving from one key to another.
According to Dent, Rousseau’s political philosophy is based on a conception of the ideal society as comprising two mutually reciprocal dimensions, namely the political and the pre-political, or personal dimension. Rousseau believed that, although these two dimensions are interrelated, the personal level is more fundamental than the political level. In order for the superstructural dimension to be stable and legitimate, it has to rely on the personal, infrastructural dimension (1988, 9-13). Regarding social transformation, this means that, unless South African citizens have transformed at the inner, personal level, the new, transformed society will lack stability and legitimacy. In essence, this means that South Africans need to make certain crucial ‘mind-shifts’. In this part of the thesis I intend to examine the process of transformation of the inner, personal self within the context of the changing South African political landscape. As a female white Afrikaner, who grew up in the heyday of Apartheid, I will also try to illuminate the complexity of such inner, personal developments and conversions by reflecting on some personal ‘emotional’ migrations. I will discuss this with reference to the three distinct cognitive elements of emotion as asserted by Nussbaum, namely its object-intentionality, evaluative belief component, and its reference to the perception of personal well-being (UT, 27 – 29).

By adding to the thesis short narrative accounts of my personal travel through the changing landscape of a transforming South Africa, I am hoping to capture and articulate some aspects of the journey, some upheavals on the previously flat plane. These developments and conversions are not unique to me as Afrikaner. They may resemble similar, yet at the same time distinctly different experiences of other South Africans who are also struggling to come to terms with a transforming society. My approach corresponds with Nussbaum’s view that a plausible theory of the social construction of emotions should also recognize the narrative history of an individual, since specific emotional characteristics are embedded by means of early interaction with others. People cannot be isolated from their own particular cultures, and their cultures will inevitably be reflected in their actions (UT, 173).

The fundamental elements of her theory will therefore be applied, firstly, to interpret my own conversion processes, and to unpack the profound depth of personal transformation. The consequences of social transformation on the emotional lives of South Africans in general will also be examined.

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11 See Chapter 10 for a description of Dent’s account.
In the third part of the thesis, the crucial role of education to facilitate such a process of social transformation, especially with regards to personal transformation, will be discussed.
Chapter 7: The personal trek: Transforming the object

Emotions are not about their objects merely in the sense of being pointed at them and let go, the way an arrow is released towards its target. Their aboutness is more internal, and embodies a way of seeing (UT, 27).

7.1 Introduction
Transformation implies transforming elements of the past into new, transformed ones. In this chapter, I shall contend that the transformation of a society from one political dispensation to another necessitates two distinct, although intimately connected types of modifications. Externally, the way society is organised and managed should be altered to establish and operationalise the fundamental principles on which the new envisaged society is to be built. But unless these external changes are complemented by personal changes in people’s attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and subsequent behaviour, the external transformations will be inauthentic and hollow, because they will not truly represent the society’s inner soul, and will therefore possibly stand a chance of failure. Social transformation needs to be accepted and assimilated into the very essence of each citizen’s personal being. People need to change.

In this chapter I will maintain that central to these deep transformations required of South African citizens, are changes affecting constitutive elements of their emotions. In this regard, the object-intentionality feature of Nussbaum’s theory emphasises a fundamental key to our comprehension of the implications of such inner, personal transformations. I will subsequently argue that in order to ensure deep, personal transformation of South African people, the objects of their emotions need to be addressed.

Emotions, according the neo-Stoic theory, are always about something. They have objects\(^{12}\) (UT, 27). These objects are objects of thought, constructed in our perceiving and thinking. The objects can be highly particular and concrete, such as

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\(^{12}\) The term ‘objects’ will be used frequently in this part of the thesis. It will be applied in a particular sense, referring to the formal focus of the emotions such as persons, events, situations and so forth.
persons, things, events and places, but also more vague or general, such as my past or my country. Emotional or attitudinal transformation will then imply the possible modification of certain existing objects, the disposal of certain past objects, and the acquisition of some new objects. But what exactly does the inner, personal process entail? Is this process indeed possible in a country with such a complex assemblage of people and personal histories like South Africa? If so, how easily and quickly can this be done? Should education play a role in this regard, and if so, what should education do to promote this change and to ensure a smooth and genuine transition? In this chapter I intend to investigate these issues.

7.2 Objects and anthologies

Past loves shadow present attachments, and take up residence within them. This in turn suggests that in order to talk well about them we will need to turn to texts that contain a narrative dimension, thus deepening and refining our grasp of ourselves as beings with a complicated temporal history (UT, 2,3).

The South African community comprises an exceptionally rich diversity of people. This fact has important consequences when we consider the nature of the emotion anthologies of South African citizens. Firstly, a collective South African anthology of emotion objects will be vast. This is not only due to the total number of people comprising the population, but because the inhabitants are culturally and socially distinctly diverse, ranging from the most deprived and poor, whose lives are in a constant struggle for sheer survival, to the most cultivated and prosperous. It ranges from people in remote rural areas or crowded shack settlements, living according to very basic cultural traditions, many of which have already been disrupted by colonialism, to people living according to sophisticated first world standards. Apart from the comprehensive collection of objects, then, will be the wide variety of objects. Although certain general objects will probably overlap, the perceptions and saliency of these mutual objects may still vary across cultures and social structures. The variety of individual objects can be explained as follows: According to the neo-Stoic theory, emotions originate in childhood and are strongly shaped by the culture and the type of society in which the person grows up. Given the diverse social and cultural assemblage of the South African society, as well as its rich and violent political history, it goes without saying that the total collection of emotion objects of the South African citizens will be mammoth and significantly diverse. This argument now leads to another relevant aspect, namely the saliency or significance of the objects.
An individual or a group of people’s emotional reactions are often misinterpreted. These misconceptions evoke subsequent negative responses, generating a destructive vicious cycle. Unsuitable responses, which are incidentally quite prevalent in South Africa, can normally be ascribed to a profound misunderstanding of the nature and saliency of the object of the other’s emotion. Let me explain by sharing a personal experience.

I can remember very well how surprised I was when political unrest broke out in 1976. Being a naïve, cocooned second year student at one of the cradle universities of Afrikaner academia, I was totally taken aback and even indignant by the anger of the black learners of Soweto. These youths protested violently against the fact that they had to learn Afrikaans at school. (Only later did I learn that the real reason for the protests – which quickly spread all over the country – was not a mere curriculum frustration, but related to the much deeper and comprehensive frustration about the harmful and unjust political policy of Apartheid). I was surprised and puzzled by their conduct, because emotionally, we were proverbially ‘poles apart’. I could not comprehend their emotions, because the objects of their emotions were completely unfamiliar to me. I have never experienced the frustration and humiliation of being denied in my own country, on ground of the colour of my skin, certain fundamental human rights. My conceptions of basic human rights and democracy were dramatically different to theirs, and the objects of their emotions therefore not part of my personal anthology. I could neither understand, nor respond appropriately, because I could not draw on any references from my own anthology. I was not acquainted with their emotion objects. So I could not sympathise. The reasons for their emotional reactions were therefore obscure to me.

Let me now return to the cyclical nature of emotions in society. I, among many other white people, was suddenly and unexpectedly kicked from the security of my former comfort zone. The violent emotional expressions of these people soon evoked a variety of subsequent strong emotions from me, piercing numerous new objects into my personal anthology. Suddenly, political stability and personal safety became a very important issue. This was supplemented by another newly acquired emotion object, the uncontrollable, threatening ‘black’ mass. The very same objects also initiated a variety of responses. I feared ‘them’, because they could harm me. I condemned them, because they were applying an improper strategy. I even despised

\[13\] I will use the term ‘black’ to refer to all ‘non-white’ South Africans.
them, because they had destabilised my life. I became intensely aware of my vulnerability towards these uncontrollable external objects. I had no compassion, because I had no comprehension. Their emotion objects did not exist in my anthology, because I had never acquired them, not in my childhood or via the society in which I grew up. It was only much later, after an extended period of exposure to and confrontation with the emotion objects of these people that my own anthology began to transform. I had to convince myself that some historical objects had to be discarded and new ones added. Other objects had to be changed or chafed before they could go back into a radically reshaped and transformed personal anthology. This was an intensely dramatic and perhaps traumatic task, because it implied vivid impacts on my personal and cultural identity. I had to abandon who I was, without knowing who I was to become. Fundamentally, I had to be transformed if I intended to accept and assimilate the political and social aspects of the new South Africa.

Although my personal transformation process had a kick start in 1976, it has not yet come to a final closure. Transforming previous objects and anthologies is a slow-moving process, requiring repeated incidents of reflection. Too many perceptions of objects had been shaped and cultivated during infant and childhood years, which in my case happened to be at the heyday of Apartheid. These perceptions and beliefs had been strongly and deliberately reinforced by the social machinery of the National Party. Neither the church, schools, cultural societies, youth movements, nor the public media actively encouraged me to consider or engage with the objects of black and coloured people’s emotions. My personal anthology simply did not make room for most of their salient objects, perhaps because I was subtly indoctrinated to exclude them from my deliberations. I honestly ‘did not know’. 

With this narrative I am hoping to illuminate a fundamental element of social transformation at a more profound level, namely a reconfiguring of the objects of the emotions. I need to add, however, that emotion objects related to political issues are not the only aspects relevant to personal transformation of South African citizens. Various other types of social changes at global and national level involve object transformations. People need to adapt to a post-modern world where former structures, concepts, beliefs, religious systems and so forth are increasingly being questioned, criticised and often discarded. Technological and scientific developments, political interventions and catastrophes in nature, such as HIV and AIDS, generate new and unique variants of emotion types, each with their inimitable objects. Transforming the South African society involves a rearrangement and re-
evaluation of emotion objects and object anthologies at an individual level. This is an individual task. It simply cannot be externally enforced by means of strategic, legislative and structural changes. On the contrary, many of the external mechanisms to impose social transformation frequently ricochet. Racial hatred is often incited by policies of affirmative action. However, I do believe that this process can be facilitated, for instance by education, but I will return to this argument later.

I want to return to the emotion’s object-feature of externality and uncontrollability. The riots in 1976 affected me emotionally, because fundamentally, my lack of control was emphasised. These objects were external and I could do nothing to change them or make them disappear. I was extremely vulnerable and passive before them. In order to obtain some form of emotional equanimity and to proceed with my life, I had to accept my defencelessness. And it was only once I had reached this point, once my guard was down, once I was no longer opposing the presence of these new, unfamiliar and daunting objects, that I regained a form of emotional stability. This stability, although often very labile, was possible because I have made certain cognitive adjustments. I have accepted these objects into my anthology. I had to declare myself open. I no longer resisted them and they became part of my life. And once I had admitted them, I had the time to get to know them - analyse them, look at them, listen to them, discuss them, study them, to the point where their images started to transform into acceptable ones. They became part of who I am. They constituted my own transformed South African identity.

This personal transformation process entailed another course of action. Reshaping my anthology also implied reflecting on my existing objects, obtained in childhood and shaped by the society in which I had grown up. These objects too, had to be examined, studied, discussed and analysed. Until eventually I had to conclude that some had to be modified. Others simply no longer fitted the transforming identity of my anthology. They had to be thrust aside. It implied that I had to detach myself from my social and cultural past. Whether these disconnections would be permanent or temporary I did not know. And this was not only a courageous task; it was extremely daunting, causing profound inner confusion. I was tormented by different images of the very same object. Past images (black people as inferior, incompetent creatures) and present images (black people as human beings, just as I am) interchanged and competed against one another, until the past images of objects gradually faded whilst new perceptions became more distinct and lucid.
What did this transformation process entail? Fundamentally I had to travel along a complex road of unreservedly honest reflection, stringently and rigorously attending to definite signposts requesting me to take specific pathways: I firstly had to admit to myself that my anthology of emotion objects was alarmingly small. Secondly, I needed a willingness to open the anthology to accept objects previously unknown and perhaps even threatening to me. Thirdly, I had deliberately to reach out to other people to acquaint myself with the nature and saliency of their emotion objects. I also had to assimilate their objects into my own inner, personal anthology. But perhaps the most traumatic transformational task was to reconsider the nature and saliency, as well as the taxonomy, of many of the previous objects of my emotions.

It quickly turned out that not all Afrikaner people were willing, prepared or competent to transform. They struggled to admit that their anthologies were incomplete, that some objects were inappropriate whilst others had to be changed. To justify their conviction, they retreated into the known territory, desperately reaching out to strengthen cultural ties with allies. In-group identification was assumed to provide the remedy. In order to reinforce or protect the boundaries of the object anthologies, new objects or new reshaped images of past objects had to be kept out. New objects had to be criticised and presented with deformed images, whilst own objects, obtained in the past, had to be idolised, elevated and exalted. There may be three explanations for this reaction. Firstly, this kind of response provides some form of control over the object. It diminishes the overriding and daunting awareness of vulnerability. Transformation of society fundamentally implies changing external objects or changing the nature of external objects. When this happens, some kind of reorientation is required and personal control over objects is severely affected. The quickest way to stabilise and to reduce the susceptibility is to get a grip on crutches. But these crutches have to be reliable and only those familiar can be trusted. Secondly, we need to remember that the political history of the Afrikaner is marked by a strong emphasis on commitment, firmness and decisiveness. Political heroes were regarded as those people who refused to capitulate or succumb to other hostile forces, even if they had to sacrifice their lives. Historically, Afrikaners regarded themselves as strong, steadfast and unwavering people. This was what they had been taught to believe since early childhood and this became their identity. To compromise, according to the psyche of the Afrikaner, will therefore mean to give in, to become submissive and to admit your weakness. Opening the boundaries of your personal anthology to allow new objects, discarding or tampering with previous ones, in reality means forsaking your identity.
But perhaps the most significant complication related to the transformation of objects is the departure into unknown territory. The security and comfort of the known has to be left behind. A wilderness of unfamiliar objects needs to be explored and a new home has to be built with new objects. And this is a very intimidating task, especially for those whose former dwellings had been built years ago with objects shaped according to past specifications. Transformation requires an adventurous attitude, fuelled by physical and mental energy. Every newly encountered object needs to be addressed. It cannot be ignored or kicked aside, but needs to be picked up, examined and finally evaluated. Because without this venture into the previously unknown territory of the real South African object anthology, social and political transformation will remain a mere image of the promised land – forever inaccessible.

As mentioned earlier, we need to remember that objects originate in infancy and are transmitted and shaped by society. This means that an individual’s emotion objects will to a large extent be determined by the nature of the environment and the conditions in which a person lives and functions. If these remain unchanged, the objects will remain the same and no dramatic modification will be required. However, when the environment changes dramatically, past objects are no longer relevant in their current form. They need to be adjusted to fit the new environment. This awareness emphasises one’s vulnerability, because it implies a loss of control. In some cases, it may be possible to change external conditions to fit past objects, but in cases of dramatic political and social transformation as is the case in South Africa, this strategy is unrealistic. Another possibility will be to ignore the external changes and retreat into an imaginary world, suited to fit familiar objects. But again, large-scale political and social changes at national level will soon intervene in the comfort of the fictitious world, forcing the inhabitant to face the new reality.

I want to return to the analogy of the venture into the unknown wilderness and equate it with a journey through the Baviaans Kloof. This Kloof connects the dry, barren landscape of the Karoo with the fertile and lush Gamtoos Valley. There is no highway and in order to reach the other side, one simply has to take the narrow, often dangerous, at times almost impassable winding dirt road. Travelling through the Kloof, which is just 120 kilometres long, is a sluggishly slow journey during which one becomes acutely aware of a gradually transforming landscape. Objects of nature along the route change. Some disappear, some undergo certain alterations, and some remain the same. Gradually, almost unnoticed, one gets used to the
transformation, until eventually, when one reaches the other side of the Kloof, the new landscape is neither a surprise nor alien. In order to get accustomed to the new environment and not be taken by surprise by all the unfamiliar objects of the destined place, one simply has to undertake this preparatory journey.

I believe that the only real way to be transformed into a new South African is to embark on such a slow and intense trek towards a destination comprising new or transformed objects. The journey will involve periods of exploration, acquaintance and evaluation of objects, during which some objects will be accepted and others rejected. However, in order to be willing to embark on this unknown venture, people need to be encouraged to do so. Travelling through the Baviaans Kloof can be uncomfortable and unpleasant if one is not convinced that getting to the other side and experiencing the ups and the downs of trek will be worthwhile. Above all, South Africans need to be convinced that the unfamiliar and often potholed road of social and political transformation will indeed lead to a better South Africa. They need the reassurance that the new South Africa guarantees improved quality of life. To be forced into such trek by means of external and statutory strategies will probably rebound, because it will not represent a sincere acquiescence to change inherently. An enforced journey will probably lead to unfamiliar objects on the road being disregarded and discarded as alien, unwanted, inferior and hazardous. Joining the trek therefore needs to be a voluntary act, based on personal conviction.

Progress through the Baviaans Kloof also has to be cautiously slow, due to many obstructions along the road. The trekkers, as well as the people expecting them at the end of the journey, require patience. At intervals, travellers need to halt to rest and refresh. Objects need to be noted, picked up and analysed before a final assessment regarding their appropriateness can be made. Some of these objects will resemble familiar ones. These also need to be analysed and juxtaposed to known ones. Differences need to be examined and unpacked. Trekking at a moderate speed will thus allow people to explore the transformations of objects and to be prepared for a destination comprising new objects. This journey is also an explorative journey.

Travelling is always risky. A trekker can get lost. One may lose the way in this wilderness of objects, misinterpret signposts, and eventually reach a wrong destination. The most daunting possibility will be to go completely astray, to get totally lost in a maze of trails, leading nowhere, exposing one to various intimidating
shapes and sizes of new objects. To avoid such a predicament, one should preferably not travel alone, but be able to nestle in the comforting security provided by the reassuring leadership of a competent guide. A good guide is trustworthy and compassionate, comprehending the uncertainty, hesitance, doubt, and perhaps even anxiety of his followers. S/he knows their personal histories. S/he is aware that behind ostensible willingness are reservations and suspicions. The company of fellow trekkers will furthermore make such an expedition more meaningful and tolerable. At crucial times they can encourage and assist one another to overcome hindrances. They share and discuss their surveillances, observations, expectations, frustrations and disillusionments, preparing themselves for the transformed destiny at the end of the trek.

With the above analogy I have tried to illuminate the complexity of social transformation at a deep and personal level. The South African trek towards a transformed society is not a quick and effortless voyage along a highway. The changes required to redress the historical injustice and transform the South African society are radical. South Africans who have opted to stay in this country simply need to embark on this journey and for most of us the final destination is still an indistinct image, comprising vague and unknown objects. But what emerges from the above analogy is that an inner, personal trek towards a new dwelling in a transformed society implies a few provisos.

Firstly, a person needs to be willing to embark on this venture. He or she needs to be convinced that this trek towards a new, transformed society is inevitable and imperative, because the objects comprising the current dwelling, in this case the ‘old’ South Africa, are no longer suitable. They are outdated, insufficient and cannot serve the needs of all its inhabitants. In order to pay justice to all the people, a journey towards a honourable and improved society simply has to be undertaken, regardless of possible hazards along the road, because this is an extensive and explorative journey, marked by constant confrontation with new and unknown objects. Should a traveller, however, be enforced on this journey, the process will be traumatic, causing severe and prolonged stress.

Secondly, I have emphasised that this journey needs to be done cautiously and at moderate speed. Too fast a tempo will cause some trekkers to fall behind because they have not been prepared, physically as well as mentally, for the intensity of the journey. They will become exhausted, despondent and even depressed because
they simply cannot keep pace with the rapid progress. Unfortunately they may then retard the journey to such an extent that the others become impatient and intolerant. Slow and unfit trekkers may even decide to return to the security of their original abodes.

Others may perhaps be able to adhere to the required pace, but omit to attend to the gradually changing environment. On arrival at the new destiny they will then unpack objects, some of which were appropriate for their original dwellings, but not suitable for the new environment. To these people, the new residing will be experienced as alien, hostile and unaccommodating. They are outsiders. They don’t belong, because their objects don’t belong. Despite their apparent initial eagerness to reach the destination, they realise on arrival that they are ill equipped, because their baggage still contains untransformed objects. This discovery may encourage some to re-examine their original objects, whilst others may refuse and remain alien, frustrated and dissatisfied. Regarding social transformation then, another issue is clearly at stake, namely the set pace.

Social transformation implies trekking. It implies leaving the safety and security of a dwelling comprising familiar objects to embark on a daunting journey leading towards to an unknown society comprising mysterious objects. Although such a trek has been desired by the progressive ones this journey involves severe and traumatic impacts on the lives of the trekkers. Because fundamentally this transformational trek affects the ‘aboutness’ of their emotions, the objects of their thoughts, the nature of their anthologies and ultimately their identity. People should therefore preferably be devoted and committed to transforming the content of their object-anthologies. They need to come to a point, as I have tried to explain by using my own narrative, when they realise that the society in which they have grown up, the society that they incorrectly regarded as sufficiently democratic, has become irrelevant and inappropriate. A new and transformed society is where they want to be. Because unless people are convinced that social transformation is essential, they will not acknowledge and assimilate the objects of the new South Africa, neither will they regard themselves as constitutive members of such a transformed society.

The journey should therefore be envisaged as a thorough and rigorous journey, gathering new objects and meticulously and even cautiously attending to the changing conditions, indicating images of the new mysterious destiny. Slowly but surely the nature and image of the personal anthology will transform to the point
where its contents resemble and fit the transformed environment. This means that, fundamentally, identities will also transform.

As pointed out earlier in our analogy, trekking on one’s own can become a traumatic and daunting experience. The journey towards a transformed South African society should preferably be a joint expedition, during which we should support, assist and encourage one another. In this regard I believe that various forms of conversations, dialogues, discussions, debates, and arguments, both in private as well as in public circles, should assist people to come to terms with the effects of transformation on their personal lives. Implications of social transformation at a deep, personal level should become part of the discourse of the day. People need to converse, also to those who have joined the trek along the road, coming from different dwellings. Only through this kind of discourse, will all the diverse South African travellers on the road to social transformation become acquainted with one another’s objects. Only then will people realise that others are also struggling to progress on the potholed road towards the final destiny.

Let me explain by sharing such an encounter: For several years, I had been aware that my initial ‘uneasiness’ with the previous system of Apartheid, implemented by ‘my’ people, was gradually being replaced by stronger feelings of annoyance and resentment. I was no longer merely embarrassed and perturbed about past misdemeanour; I was becoming very, very angry. Yet, the object of my resentment remained vague, causing severe inner confusion at times. I simply could not trace the real object of my emotions. I knew I was aggravated – but with precisely with whom or at what? All I knew was that my annoyance related to a very general object, called ‘my past’. This indefiniteness in turn caused frustration, confusion and uncertainty. It was only on one particular Monday morning in May 2000, when Chris Louw’s open letter appeared in the public media, that the up till then indistinguishable intentional object of my emotions materialized and suddenly surfaced in a brilliant and distinct shape: The object of my anger were those people who collectively contributed to my cultural upbringing as Afrikaner! Yet, this illuminating and liberating discovery had been initiated by somebody else. A fellow traveller, coming from the same Afrikaner

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14 Chris Louw is an Afrikaner journalist. Like myself, he grew up in the hey-day of Apartheid and, like all other young white men, was called up for National Service in the South African Defence Force to protect his country against terrorist insurgence on the borders of Namibia. In May 2000, more or less twenty-five years later, he wrote an open letter in the Afrikaans press in which he voiced his strong disillusionment and anger about the manipulation and exploitation by the previous government of former Afrikaner youths.
homestead, carrying similar objects in his anthology-baggage, stumbling along the
same bumpy road towards a transformed South African society, assisted me to
identify the true object of my emotions.

To explain this particular incident of my personal transformation, I need to take one
step back and provide a sketch of Louw’s and my joint Afrikaner homestead. This
Afrikaner ‘fortress’ had been built by objects that belonged to the Afrikaner anthology,
but these building blocks also constituted my anthology of emotion objects.
Fundamentally they shaped my cultural identity. But according to Du Toit
(1997,87,88), cultural identity can become a powerful political tool and is often
abused, because it may force members into submission by weighing them down with
traditions and historical tales. Language, religion and ethnicity in particular, have
been characteristic objects of the Afrikaner identity and these three aspects were
very usefully applied to develop a group consciousness. The anthology of the
Afrikaners, the cultural identity of Louw and myself, consisted mainly of objects
related to these highly sentimental and emotional issues. Because during the
Apartheid years, elitist role players in Afrikaans-speaking society deliberately and
manipulatively attempted to enforce a collective and predefined Afrikaner identity
upon many Afrikaners, including the Afrikaans-speaking white youth – Louw and me.
Apartheid, and ‘Die Afrikanersaak’ (the Case of the Afrikaner) were even justified by
theologians of the prominent and influential Afrikaans churches. In the process the
young Afrikaners, like Louw and myself, have been denied the opportunity
spontaneously and authentically to reinvent and renegotiate our own authentic
Afrikaner identity. In May 2000 then, Louw wrote his open letter called, “Boetman is
die bliksem in”15 in the Afrikaans press. In his letter, he abusively blamed the
‘conspirators of the past’ for misleading and exploiting the Afrikaner youth. His letter
initiated a hot-spirited debate and although not everybody agreed with Louw, I soon
realised that numerous others had also been struggling to come to terms with vague,
yet severely intense anger emotions. The majority of the ‘forty-something’ generation
appeared to seriously question their own Afrikaner identity. They were conspicuously
intensely annoyed, frustrated and embarrassed with the contents of their Afrikaner
object anthologies.

The above incident provides an illustration of the mutual benefits of honest sincerity
and perhaps even blatant and banal openness. Louw’s ability meticulously to pinpoint

15 ‘Boetman’ – a nickname for young Afrikaner boys - is furious.
the objects of his anger and to articulate it publicly assisted not only me but also several other middle-aged Afrikaners to progress on the road of personal transformation. Thanks to Louw’s articulated outburst, we managed to identify the real and concrete objects of our vague emotions. Now we could unpack them, analyse them, assess them and determine their final fate. And we have the freedom to collect new objects, objects previously unknown to us, because our segregated upbringing prevented us from exposure and acquaintance with others’ anthologies. Although we could previously in sincere honesty admit that we ‘did not know’, we now had the opportunity and the freedom to ‘get to know’.

But in order to ‘get to know’, objects should be revealed, especially to those from dissimilar cultural backgrounds and those who suffered due to the Apartheid policy implemented by the Afrikaner government. We need transparent boundaries of cultural anthologies. Yet, ideally, these objects should also be exhibited, examined, explained and discussed. I remember clearly how astonished a black colleague was when I explained the reason for the public polemics amongst Afrikaners, following Louw’s letter. “So in a sense you have also been deprived!” was her astounded exclamation. A few months later, we had a similar discussion when I informed her about the dreadfulness of the Anglo Boer War\textsuperscript{16} concentration camps, where thousands of Afrikaner women and children died in captivity due to deprivation, deliberately instigated by the British soldiers. “Shame! Now I understand why so many Afrikaners currently behave in such a paranoid manner!” Her acquaintance with the objects of Afrikaner emotions triggered a tolerant understanding, untangled her stereotyping and even generated compassion.

South Africa has a relatively short, yet remarkably rich history. Particularly significant is the fact that the very same historical incidents affected inhabitants of this country in very diverse ways, generating a wide variety of emotion objects. Some of these objects are strongly contrasting, even opposing one another. Currently these conflicting objects form part of the collective anthology of South African emotion objects. Yet, living ‘together in harmony in the new transformed South Africa’ ideally suggests absence of discords. In musical terms, dissonance is created when certain musical tones clash, because they are in conflict with each other. In order to restore harmony, the particular tone or tones, causing the distortion should be eliminated.

\textsuperscript{16} Also known as the Vryheidsoorlog – the War for Freedom.
South Africans striving to establish a transformed society need to compose harmonious chords with pitch tones that are distinctly different, yet once combined with others, acknowledged as constitutive elements of consonant chords. Objects causing dissonance in our collective anthology should be identified and preferably removed. Like the diverse pitch tones of a harmonious chord, we all need to contribute our distinct objects that reflect our own historical and cultural experiences. But unsuitable objects, those that will distort the peaceful harmony of a new transformed society, need to be discarded. Each individual needs to be aware of the others’ causal tones in order to assess the fittingness of his or her own input to comprise the final harmony. And in order to have this knowledge, we need to be able to know. We should be able to enter one another’s anthology. Some may decide to demolish the boundaries of their anthologies, allowing a free flow of object transactions. Past cultural and personal identities will then disappear in a diffluent stream of objects and new identities will emerge as new objects assemble. Others may be less courageous, allowing access to their anthologies by merely opening some portholes through which cautious object transactions can take place. In their case, personal anthologies will probably maintain their basic identity, although modified.

7.3 Conclusion
In short, social transformation in South Africa, intensely affects the object anthologies of each individual citizen’s emotions, because in order to harmonize with the changed melody of the South African society, individual objects also need to fit the collective harmonies of the transformed society.

At this point I need to address possible objections to the developing argument. From the above it seems clear that inner, personal transformation is a complex and multifaceted process. Some may argue that to alter matured anthologies will prove to be impossible, because the constitutive objects are rock-solid. They have been there since childhood years and repeatedly reinforced by the concrete of society. A common response from older citizens confronted with social transformation, is simply, “I’m too old”. According to our theory we can assume that they refuse to empty their anthologies and compile new ones. Because emptying an anthology implies abandoning your identity and establishing a new one – a daunting task when physical and mental energies are waning.
Yet, external manifestations of social transformation will increasingly be waxing. And unless such a person opts for abstinent reclusion, ‘adaptation’ to the various facets of a transforming society will simply be inevitable. But sheer external manifestations of so-called adaptations will be faked. They will lack commitment and sincerity, causing a constant inner, personal conflict. “I do not want to do this, yet I do it because I have no other alternative”. Forced adaptation implies incessant confrontation with undesired external objects, generating an increasing repertoire of negative emotions. A person whose ‘transformation’ entails a mere external and reluctant adaptation to changing conditions will become a discontented citizen whose quality of life will eventually dwindle. In actual fact, the object-anthology in such a case will indeed transform, because increasingly negative objects will be gathered. Whereas those who have been transformed internally will view the implementation of strategies to redress historically imbalances as positive objects, the same external objects will generate negative images to those resisting the transformation. The very same external object can therefore have diverse images. What one sees will depend on one’s belief about the object, but to this aspect I will return in a subsequent chapter.

It now seems clear that there is actually no way to escape internal transformation. External changes to one’s conditions induce some form of internal transformation, either degenerative or generative. Should one opt for a life of contentment, deliberate decisions need to be taken to view inevitable objects positively as far as possible – to find the proverbial silver lining of the cloud. Exploring the object in order discover other images will prove to be a worthwhile exercise. Regarding social transformation, this implies a cognitive decision to take a step towards personal transformation and an acknowledgement that change is imperative. The step is deliberately taken and not enforced, because pushing a person beyond that with which s/he can cope with at a particular point in time, will prove to be ineffective. Anxiety and insecurity will force such a person to retreat into the hermitage of the known. Each individual will have to work hard, exercising regularly to sustain the progress. Constant fuelling and encouragement from fellows will reduce the hesitance.

With the above I have tried to argue that external social transformation imperatively instigates some kind of personal transformation. Alterations to anthologies are inevitable. The more rigid and fixed the anthology, the more difficult it will be to transform towards an acceptance and assimilation of new objects and in this regard, we need to comprehend and accommodate elderly people’s struggles and anxiety. By the same token, those whose anthologies consist of objects dramatically different
from those envisaged for the new South Africa will wrestle even more and probably resist the social transformation forcefully. Alterations to the anthologies of the younger generation may assumingly be less dramatic, however, according to Nussbaum, vital emotion objects have already been established and shaped during early infant years. Given the vast array of cultures and conditions in which South African learners' anthologies are being shaped, it would be naïve to assume that the process of social transformation will not affect children personally, too. In the third part of this thesis I intend to discuss the role that education can play to enhance the compilation of individual object anthologies that will be congruent with a harmonious South African omnibus of object emotions.
Chapter 8: The personal trek: Transforming the belief

Seeing the emotions as forms of evaluative thought shows us that the question about their role in a good human life is part and parcel of a general inquiry into the good human life (UT, 11).

8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I have argued that social transformation in South Africa requires modifications to the emotion objects of South African citizens. Individual, as well as collective anthologies need to change to fit the transformed nature of the new society. Yet, according to the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, an object does not constitute the emotion all by itself. Since the object is external, a link to the self is required. This connection between the object and the self is the particular thought or belief the self has about the object. The thought thus serves as a connecting cable communicating particularities regarding the object to the self. Without this cognitive action (the thought), there will be no emotion. Together with the object, the particular thought determines the identity of the emotion.

But this thought is also in the form of a belief or a judgement, assenting instinctively or involuntary to an appearance of the object. The thought serves to assess the value of the object in relation to the self. The process of assent itself involves two phases. First, there is the mere awareness of the appearance of the object, and then follows the second phase during which the appearance of the object can be accepted, repudiated or ignored (UT, 37). Should this thought assess that the object is insignificant or irrelevant, the object will be discarded, with no subsequent emotion. However, should the thought recognise the object as significant to the self, it will make a particular judgement that will relate the self to the object in a very specific way. In this sense, the thought can also be seen as a judgement or a belief.

In this chapter, ‘thought’, ‘judgement’ and ‘belief’ will be used interchangeably. I intend to examine the implications of this constitutive component of an emotion with regards to deep transformation in South Africa. I have argued that dramatic social transformation implies radical changes to objects. Radical changes to objects in turn...
demand urgent changes to former thoughts, judgements and beliefs. Deep transformation of the South African society demands that we cautiously and rigorously attend to ‘a chain of thoughts’.

8.2 Acquisition of beliefs

We have been put together by the many places you have claimed for us, gathered together from all the memories you have maintained for us (Krog, 2003, 365).

When a complete society is engaged in a process of political transformation, no citizen can escape the turbulence caused by the transformation of external objects. Every individual is compelled to reconsider his or her set beliefs about these objects. In this regard, Nussbaum argues,

Habit, attachment, and the sheer weight of events may frequently extract assent from us; it is not be imagined as an act that we always deliberately perform (UT, 38).

I now want to return to my personal experience of such an ‘extracted’ assent, namely the political unrests that started on 16 June 1976. Up till then, blacks as objects did ‘extract’ judgements beyond those that I had been brought up with. I complied with the particular beliefs I had about them, and did not bother to reflect on them. My beliefs included unquestioned judgements about their assumed needs, competences, role in society, and so forth. To me they had a very definite identity, which was fundamentally different to my own. Reflecting on these beliefs, years later, I now experience feelings of embarrassment, guilt and remorse. Despite extenuating arguments, such as juvenile innocence and political indoctrination, the awareness of my own inability to make correct judgements about The Other is still haunting me.

But perhaps I do have a defence. Because to a large extent these thoughts had not been my own inventions. They had been strongly transmitted to me since childhood and continually reinforced by the society in which I had grown up – the school, the church, the media, political leaders and so on. Because due to the very effective political machinery of the Afrikaner government, beliefs that could contradict these acquired thoughts about blacks in particular, had been smothered and mostly eliminated before they could reach me. Should a belief perhaps escape the security net of indoctrinatory mechanisms, it had immediately been attended to by means of fierce counter-beliefs. In general, I only received belief-messages regarded as appropriate to fit my unique and predetermined Afrikaner identity. In other words, the cables that connected me to these objects (the blacks) had been tampered with. My beliefs about blacks had been deliberately fabricated and managed to shape my
identity. I had been manipulated to embrace pro-Apartheid beliefs. And my subsequent emotions corresponded with these thoughts.

I now want to return to the incident that triggered the first, although very faint, short-circuiting in my acquired system of belief-cables. On 16 June 1976, when the first unrests broke out, the particular belief-cables between these external objects (the blacks) and me had already been well established, because over a period of time they had been serviced and reinforced at regular intervals by an orchestrated team of operators. I had no reason to question their quality. The cables were firm and provided me with my security. They warranted my prideful being as an Afrikaner in South Africa. So, although my initial assent to the black protesting objects was to reject their appearance, I soon realised that these events were indeed ‘weighty’, extracting very specific thoughts from me. The thoughts I had about the objects judged that they were misbehaving; so my subsequent emotions were that of anger and annoyance.

However, that does not mean that my judgements had been correct. I irrefutably responded emotionally, although not necessarily appropriately. It was only much later that I realised that my specific emotions at that particular point in time were inappropriate, since they were based on false beliefs. At that point I had no reason to question the suitability of my emotions, since it was clear that they conformed to emotions experienced by almost everybody (the whites) around me. I did not realise at that stage that these images of the objects had been distorted, neither did I suspect that my judgements about the objects were incorrect.

8.3 False beliefs

[T]he mind has a complex archaeology, and false beliefs, especially about matters of value, are difficult to shake (UT, 36).

But let us return to 16 June 1976. Many black people, and especially school children, died on that day and during subsequent confrontations with security forces. Hector Peterson was the first. I knew about his killing, because the photograph of his limp body, being carried by Nbuyisa Mukhubu, a horrified bystander who accompanied his traumatised sister, made headlines in local and international media. Hector Peterson has since become an icon, representing the black youth of those years who had been so terribly dissatisfied with their enforced suppression that they were prepared to sacrifice their own lives. The particular disturbing photograph of Hector Peterson’s lifeless body has since become a well-known historical emblem, imprinted into my
memory as a South African. And yet, no matter how hard I now try to detect traces of possible empathy with Hector and his relatives *at that time*, I have to confess to my utter dismay that I cannot recall any.

Today I am still intrigued by those wrong judgements and distorted images of objects. Where did they originate and why did they take so many years to transform? Nussbaum’s theory, emphasising the crucial formative influence of society on the emotional repertoire of people elucidates my inappropriate emotional responses. In the previous chapter I have argued that the specific composition of my individual object anthology had mainly been established and determined by these factors. The cognitive theory of the emotions now provides me with an even better understanding of my inappropriate emotions, because it also explains the falsity of my judgements.

Apart from the false beliefs about *blacks as objects* of my emotions, my belief system also included very distinct judgements about myself as Afrikaner, transmitted to me since childhood and continually endorsed by society. These judgements included the belief that we, as Afrikaners, were the icons of civilisation. Our forefathers had been aristocratic and noble people from Europe, who had been brought to dark Africa by an act of God. Our pious mission was to save Africa from destroying itself. The only way to accomplish this God-given task was to civilise Africa for the Africans. They needed us. We were therefore the superior and they the inferior - we, the masters and they the slaves, we the assertive and they the subservient. Above all, I was also led to believe that most of them acknowledged this state of affairs. They appreciated our presence and interference, because they acknowledged their dependence on us. They were grateful to us for rescuing them and ‘lifting them from the muddy doldrums of Africa’. So there was nothing improper about Afrikaans as compulsory school subject, the assumed cause of the unrest. Competencies in the language of the superior will in actual fact empower them and allow them to elevate themselves above their circumstances.

These were the well-established judgements that informed my emotions during the 1976 riots. Reflecting on these judgements now I am perturbed by the numerous examples of contradicting beliefs and subsequent hypocritical behaviour. Because Afrikaners’ roots were supposedly anchored in the noble principles of Christian Nationalism. Love for Christ and love for the God-given country presumptuously provided sufficient raw materials with which the firm fabric of the Afrikaner’s cultural identity could be woven. This fabric was assumingly guaranteed against evil external
onslaughters, because its ingredients were noble and dignified. My evaluative judgments of external objects were accordingly guided by these two directive principles: As long as my beliefs corresponded with ‘a love for God and a love for my country’, they were noble.

The fact that predominant Afrikaans churches sanctioned these ‘dignified principles’ furthermore confirmed Afrikaners’ beliefs that their vision was legitimate. At some stage, adversaries quite aptly nicknamed the NG Kerk17 (Dutch Reformed Church), ‘the National Party at prayer’. Church and state had been integrated to such an extent that political beliefs infiltrated church dogma. Reflecting on it now, it seems as if the strategy to sketch God as supporting the Afrikaner was deliberately applied to silence objections to its political policy. As PW Botha, former president, once said, “An Afrikaner does not go on his knees before people, he does it before God” (Krog, 1999, 403). I am tempted to infer that the Afrikaner ‘captured’ God and made Him an Afrikaner. So despite the fact that the Afrikaans churches propagated the biblical ‘Love thy neighbour’, the concept of neighbour had been subtly manipulated and ideologized to such an extent that almost no questions were raised about blacks’ absence at Afrikaans church activities. Blacks-as-neighbours, according to the Afrikaner interpretation of God’s command, were apparently merely implied in a paternalistic way. There was nothing improper about prohibiting their presence in classrooms, churches, cinemas, post offices, parks, public toilets, benches, beaches, hotels and other recreational places, which had been reserved for whites. This was how God had meant it to be. Disconcerting Afrikaner voices were furthermore quickly silenced, mainly by means of the shrewd, yet effective strategy of stigmatisation. These people were ‘going astray’. They were ‘kafferboeties’18 and ‘traitors’. The most effective and victorious strategy, however, was ultimately to label them as Communists, who were trying to brainwash the Afrikanders towards accepting the principles of Communism - at that particular time in history regarded as the major threat to international stability.

Reflecting on these ideological beliefs now, I realise that the Afrikaner National Party government equated nationalism with ethnicity. ‘Love your country’ equalled ‘love the Afrikaner nation’. This reminds me of Anderson’s definition of a ‘nation’ (1983,15) as “… an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. Gellner’s claim (Anderson, 1983,15), that nationalism is not the “…

17 The major Afrikaans church
18 The term ‘kaffir’ refers to blacks in disparaging terms. ‘Kafferboetie’ means, brother of the blacks.
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it \textit{invents} nations where they do not exist", is also applicable. According to Anderson (1983, 129), people need a sense of nationality. They yearn for "... the personal and cultural feeling of belonging to a nation". Cultural products of nationalism, such as poetry, prose, fiction, music, and visual arts express this love very distinctly. Anderson also refers to the essential role of language in this regard. "Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined and futures dreamed" (1983, 140).

Anderson aptly equates the intimate relationship between a lover and his eye, with the intimate relationship between a patriot and his mother-tongue. People experience the external world in their own language. They create their thoughts in that particular language, and they shape their beliefs and their judgements in the same language. Bornman (1999b, 423), argues that, specifically for Afrikaners, ethnic identification and cultural symbols, such as language, were significantly closely tied together. Language in particular, was very important for their self-identification. Essentially it was their language that distinguished the white Afrikaner from the white Dutchman and the white Englishman. Language became a functional tool to demarcate the Afrikaners' boundaries and indicate their membership.

Cultural products therefore come to represent a unique cultural identity. Hence, cultural products can also be 'managed' and clandestinely applied to cultivate, kindle and even enforce a particular identity. Once these cultural products furthermore comprise the entirety of one's frame of reference, one's belief system gets a very distinct shape. Given Anderson, Gellner and Bornman's arguments, I now realise that Afrikaner nationalism had hijacked cultural products, the concepts of patriotism and loyalty to one's fatherland. This realisation leaves me with the disturbing awareness that my cultural identity, and my subsequent belief system as Afrikaner had been manipulated and was thus probably inauthentic.

The above illuminates the origin and specific nature of my profoundly well-established system of beliefs as white Afrikaner at the time when the riots broke out. These beliefs determined the nature of the connecting cables between the blacks, as objects of my thoughts, and myself. And these cables were firm cables, because they had been deliberately invented, manufactured, and continually serviced and reinforced by a coordinated Afrikaner force with a very focused agenda. The significantly violent nature of the blacks' riots in 1976 therefore merely supported the
former beliefs I had about them - that they were barbaric, uncivilised and ungrateful. My subsequent emotional responses towards those events corresponded with former beliefs. There was apparently no reason to question their validity and justifiability. According to Nussbaum, “The fact of having an emotion depends on what the person’s beliefs are, not on whether they are true or false” (UT, 46). It was okay to be angry, disgusted and judgemental.

However, as the riots continued, snowballing through the country, novel thoughts evolved. New cables emerged, connecting me to these objects that had by then undoubtedly entered my personal sphere of concern. These new thoughts entailed judgements about the objects’ apparent prolonged presence and infinite residence in my anthology. Assenting to the objects furthermore implied admitting that these objects held a potential threat to my well-being. The assent to the appearance was no longer a mere awareness of the objects. It included a deliberate acknowledgement of the objects’ existence. It was no longer possible to repudiate the appearance of the objects, judging that they were irrelevant. Nor was it possible to be uninterested and blasé as I had been so often in the past, having no significant belief or judgement about the issue. I had no option but to embrace the presence of the new objects and assimilate them into my anthology, judging that they deserved my serious attention. ‘These objects now concern me. My own well-being is at stake. I am extremely vulnerable.’ In that sense, the objects and their associated judgements became part of who I was. And I knew that they were here to stay.

Fundamentally, the objects and beliefs that had formerly constituted my identity were beginning to transform. Because the admission of new objects into my anthology and the attention to novel, albeit vague thoughts about these objects, provided me with the opportunity to get to know them. For the first time, I hesitantly permitted myself the liberty of cautiously investigating these objects. Yet, this time, adamantly independently and critically. I put previous beliefs on hold and attended with interest to faint traces of new judgement-connections between the objects and me. Gradually I began to untie the knots in previous cables that had seemingly distorted former proper communication in the past. I subsequently discovered that some historical cables simply had to be slashed to release the free flow of my own newly-discovered liberated and independent judgement.
Essentially, my process of personal transformation required a re-evaluation of those particular belief-cables that had previously connected me to external objects and provided me with my false security as Afrikaner.

8.4 Assessing and transforming beliefs

The goal is not to avoid pain or reality, but to deal with the never-ending quest of self-definition and negotiation required to transform differences into assets (Krog, 1999, 449).

I have already argued that Afrikaners, in particular, experienced a high degree of ethnocentrism. According to the social identity theory, such a group will demonstrate more negative attitudes towards social change (Smith & Stones, 1999, 26). In South Africa, personal transformation requires the disconnection of those beliefs that had formerly constituted my cultural identity as Afrikaner.

But releasing belief-cables is a risky task, because the stakes are high. It involves abandoning the security of inner stability and the daunting prospects of collapsing into a rudderless and uncertain being. Disconnecting holds the risk of becoming alienated from one’s support system, because the cables between other members of the in-group and the self may now communicate conflicting beliefs. On the other hand, to cling onto false and inadequate belief-cables also poses a danger. Inadequate cables may unravel eventually, causing severe harm to the self. The only long-term proposal will thus be to first examine and assess the true quality of existing beliefs and abandon the mere parroting of others’ fallible and potentially false beliefs.

Personal transformation implies adjustments to belief networks at individual level. These acts of adjustment are sometimes performed unawares. There are also incidents when such modifications are deliberately performed, triggered by inner, personal conviction and motivation. However, profoundly fixed beliefs may frequently be experienced as armatures, paralysing the self and preventing significant progressive action. In this regard I have reason to believe that the process of transforming the personal beliefs South Africans have about one another will be prolonged and painful. From either side of the racial spectrum, for instance, one still hears, “I am not a racist, but … ”. The trek towards transformed beliefs will be a long, stumbling one. And to elaborate on the reservation regarding the hesitant and reluctant adjustment of beliefs, I now want to refer to another significant moment in South African history.
27 April 1994 symbolized a radical change in the South African society, because everybody knew that after that particular day, society would never revert back to its original nature. Afrikaners, in particular were acutely aware of this daunting prospect. Because we knew that the new South Africa would imply not only an external transformation. There would undoubtedly be consequences affecting us at the profundity of our being. We suspected that our anthologies of emotions would have to be rearranged and our belief-cables readjusted. Essentially our emotional lives would be affected.

So on the evening of 26 April, we allowed ourselves, for the very last time, the comforting pleasure of snoozing in our Afrikaner heritage. We nostalgically indulged in our Afrikaner identity, which was probably hovering on the edge of the melting pot where it was about to dissolve into new all-South African decoction. With fellow Afrikaner friends we therefore celebrated the historical departure from the old South Africa and the arrival of the new own by means of a farewell party to ‘The Old South Africa’. The invitation to the function was an eloquent, yet ironic parody on a patriotic Afrikaner song, so familiar to all of us:

En hoor jy die lastige dreuning
Oor die veld kom dit wyd gesweef
Die lied van ’n volk se ontnugtering
Wat broeke laat bibber en beef.
Van Ooskaap tot doer in die Volkstaat
Smag burgers na tye van oordaad,
Dit is die groet van ou Suid-Afrika!19

We decorated the house in orange, white and blue colours, resembling the colours of the former national flag. We arranged Proteas20 in copper vases and displayed National Party banners and photographs of former National Party leaders against the walls. Recordings of Mimi Coertse and Gert Potgieter, passionately singing Boereseun and O, Boereplaas sounded in the background. A tongue in the cheek note on the entrance door read Whites only, and the bathroom was restricted to Europeans only. Our guests, all dressed up in clothes representing ‘The Old South Africa’, ranging from safaripakke to volkspele dresses, enjoyed the geelrys en rosyne, bobotie, sousbone and gestoofde perskes, and had koeksisters, melktert and moerkoffie21 for dessert. We commemorated our cultural heritage as Afrikaners, knowing that these external symbols would no longer represent our identity, which

19 This song can be roughly translated as follows: “Do you hear the annoying rumble, approaching over the veld? It is a song of a volk’s disillusionment, causing the shakes. From the Eastern Cape to the Volkstaat, people are yearning for times of abundance. This is saying farewell to the old South Africa!”
20 The national flower of South Africa
21 Food, clothes, songs associated with the Afrikaner culture.
was about to transform. We were to become not only new South Africans, but also new Afrikaners. Of course we were melancholic, yet were already aware of an uneasiness about our identity as Afrikaners. Because this process of reflection and self-examination had its hesitant genesis in 1976. The party was perhaps a last mischievous snuggle in the residue of the formerly secure shell provided by past objects and beliefs, yet, at the same time an official confession that they belonged to the past, to the old South Africa. We had no option but to face our fate with compliant acquiescence.

With the above I have tried to shed some light on the daunting complexity of belief changes implied in Afrikaners’ personal transformation processes. However, South African society comprises a multiplicity of diverse cultures. Not only individuals, but cultural entities had been affected by the segregation policies of the previous political system. All these people’s emotional lives had been affected by a variety of beliefs about objects. Given the multiplicity of cultures in South Africa, we have reason to assume that the current range of emotion-beliefs is still vast and very diverse.

It is now almost ten years since the official birth of the new South Africa on 27 April 1994. Several external and tangible modifications confirm the ongoing transformation process of society. However, numerous alarming incidents at personal level raise questions about the true authenticity of these external indications of political transformation. Suspicion, intolerance and stereotyping still prevail. Increasingly more indications of revived racism are coming to the fore.

Hence, before previously established beliefs can be transformed, one needs to be convinced that these beliefs have been incorrect, invalid and are no longer applicable. To transform beliefs that no longer correspond with their objects is accomplishable, however, once former beliefs are repeatedly confirmed and reinforced by specific current experiences, denial and subsequent rejection of these beliefs will prove to be unfeasible. *It is simply humanly impossible to convince myself that sugar tastes bitter if I taste its sweetness everyday.* Continual external proof of former beliefs, confirming their validity, need to disappear. Because as long as whites talk down to blacks, blacks’ beliefs that whites regard them as inferior and submissive will thrive. And as long as blacks mismanage local governments, whites will regard them as incompetent. In these cases, former beliefs will nevertheless then prevail, resulting in no significant inner, personal change. Regarding the evaluative judgements of South African citizens, there currently seems to be reason for concern,
since according to Nussbaum’s theory, judgements fundamentally determine the nature of emotional conduct in society.

8.5 Congruent beliefs

There remains before us the building of a new land ... a synthesis of the rich cultural strains which we have inherited ... It will not necessarily be all black, but it will be African (Luthuli in Krog, 1999, 167).

Transforming beliefs is in itself an intricate process, but aligning diverse beliefs to serve the benefits of a harmonious and peaceful society is even more problematical. Beliefs most Afrikaner whites previously had (and some still have) about blacks directly contradicted beliefs most blacks had about whites (and some still have). Beliefs in this country are poles apart, or as Sachs (Goboda-Madikizela, 2003, vii) remarks, “Right from the other end of the moral and cultural landscape”. Sachs’s description of the meeting between Eugene de Kock and Pumla Goboda-Madikizela summarises the extremity of the two poles.

He [De Kock] was the embodiment of hundreds of years of conquest, the hitherto sacrosanct aggressor acting in the name of a higher power, even a Higher Power. And now he was disgraced. He stood for every white man with a whip or a torch or a gun, the dispossession incarnate of the African people. And now he was defeated. He evoked memories of naked power, of a frontier violence that was cheered on and rewarded as part of what was called a civilising mission. And now he was abandoned. And to add to it all, he was the epitome of a hard male masculinity that had borne down indiscriminately on generations of African women. (2003, vii, viii).

Sachs then asks the crucial question, fundamental to the successful healing of our society, “Can these two people … cease to be black and white, female and male, and simply be humans?” (2003, ix).

In order to align beliefs and to direct them towards a universally shared vision, South Africans need to release their grip on generalised beliefs about one another. Because unless acquired inclinations towards suspicion, intolerance and stereotyping are deliberately addressed and contradicted, these may become momentous stumbling blocks on South Africans’ road to reconciliation. Prolonged stereotyping, for instance, is one of the most harmful inheritances of a segregated political past, because it implies continuation of an uncritical confidence in former beliefs. It also

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22 Goboda-Madikizela is a clinical psychologist who served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Eugene de Kock was commanding officer of Apartheid death squads.
implies an apathetic languor, a blasé lethargy, and even a blatant unwillingness to acquaint oneself with the other. Without a deliberate effort to familiarise oneself with the formerly unfamiliar other in order to discover his or her true inner being, former beliefs will prevail. In the attempts to conceptualise the other, an unfamiliar outsider has no alternative but to revert to paramount impressions and acquired perceptions. The only way for South Africans to start transforming their beliefs about one another will be to reach out to the other and adopt an inclusive attitude.

However, exclusiveness, rather than inclusiveness, was previously considered and appraised as the solution for Afrikaner survival. Heaven, Stones, Simbayi and Le Roux (2000, 71) noted in their research that Afrikaners still have more exclusive identities, compared with black South Africans, who, due to the new political dispensation, can currently afford to be more inclusive in their identities. They also reported that Afrikaners have much more restricted identities, and that these narrowly focused nationalisms assist greater in-group identification during current times of political, social and ideological transformation. The reality that the Afrikaner is but one of many South African cultures, is still a daunting and threatening idea to some. According to Heaven, et al., (2000, 71) it is well established that when a group’s identity is under threat, the group members will respond by emphasising their group’s uniqueness. In their research, they concluded that, specifically Afrikaners currently tend to emphasise their own uniqueness and cultural exclusivity. They argue that the comparative concept that the individual forms of the group(s) to which he or she belongs, contributes to some vital aspects of the definition of the self, or the social identity. The processes that trigger the ways in which the group compares itself with others, are crucial to the manner in which the members define the group. Heaven, et al., (2000, 71), found that, in the face of the present social and political changes, Afrikaners are currently attempting to maintain their identities, especially by emphasising their unique cultural symbols. By accentuating their distinctiveness from other groups, they thus demonstrate evidence of positive in-group evaluation and hegemony. They cling desperately to cultural symbols on order to boost in-group identification and cohesion. In Orania23, conservative females erect a koesister24 statue. Male members of the Boeremag25 have long beards, wear khaki gear, ride on horses and solemnly sing the Ou Transvaalse Volkslied26.

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23 Afrikaner settlement
24 Delicacy developed by Afrikaner women
25 Unofficial ‘Boere Army’
26 Old Transvaal anthem, dating back to the early 1900s.
Yet, Hendriks (2000, 293), in his research found that, due to factors like the deprivation of political power since 1994, and the consequent disillusionment regarding their pious image, many Afrikaners are also withdrawing themselves from the formal efforts to maintain their culture. He subsequently expresses his concern that such a withdrawal from cultural involvement may result in an identity vacuum. One may argue that such a withdrawal indicates the general modern trend towards individualism. Such responses should also raise concern. In order to constructively engage in an exchange and negotiation of beliefs with the other, South Africans, and Afrikaners in particular, cannot afford to adopt a laissez-faire attitude or retreat into their cocoons. Reconciliation implies active involvement by all South Africans in the collective effort to align beliefs towards a harmonious blend.

However, beliefs can only be modified to blend into consonant harmony once they are identified and fastidiously scrutinised. South Africans, especially those from either side of Sachs’s “moral and cultural landscape”, first and foremost, have to engage with their own beliefs. These beliefs, many of which are background beliefs, so deeply entrenched that they had become part of our cognitive make up, need to be brought to the surface and examined. And although painful, they will have to be shared with the other. Because transforming the South African society above all means vacuuming the reciprocal communication cables to exterminate any traces of suspicion, a dense sediment still obstructing reciprocal trust. Sachs subsequently pleads for a constant search for understanding, “… the objective being always to find the foundations, even if slender, for repair and moving forward” (Goboda-Madikizela, 2003, viii, ix). Firm mutual foundations of the transformed South Africa society will have to be constructed with the best quality materials, contributed by all interested parties. In a joint search for apposite building bricks, South Africans will succeed in restoring the deterioration of its past shaky foundations – the damage caused by wrong beliefs.

8.6 Conclusion: Acquiescent beliefs
Will I always be a prisoner of my past with normal vices and virtues – always with this kind of instinctive, guilty obsequiousness? (Krog, 1999, 19).

I wish I could wipe the old South Africa out of everyone’s past (Krog, 1999, 223).

Martin (1999, 194) refers to ‘a continuum’ on which narratives slide between two opposed conceptions of cultural identity, namely the ‘open and peaceful’ and the ‘exclusive and aggressive’. Krog’s fervent wish to ‘wipe out the past’ echoes a surge
of remorseful regret, increasingly evident amongst those Afrikaners, who find themselves 'sliding' towards the 'open and peaceful'. Yet, they are bowed down by the heavy and uncomfortable burden of their historical and cultural past, because they carry with them the grave knowledge of former false beliefs. I am one of this group of Afrikaners, and like Krog (1999), I am in constant conflict with

... the knowledge that I am white, that I have to reacquaint myself with this land, that my language carries violence as a voice, that I can do nothing about it, that after so many years I still feel uneasy with what is mine, with what is me (328).

Like Krog (1999, 361), I also wish to come to terms with “... the fact that all the words used to humiliate, all the orders given to kill, belonged to the language of my heart”. This group of Afrikaners is grappling with new exponential beliefs, generated by former beliefs. Although inconsistent and sometimes erratic, these beliefs eventually converge into the very distinct judgement: I was part of the single most significant false belief in South African history.

Nussbaum believes that a person, who has made cognitive adjustments, has less cognitive dissonance (UT, 81). Emotional change is a result of a shift of propositional content. (UT,84). To become a truly transformed South African, I, like Krog and many others, will have to adjust the thoughts I have about my past. On my own trajectory I will have to reach the point where the above disturbing and paralysing judgement transforms itself into the acquiescent judgement that former false beliefs cannot be reversed. I am a product of my past, but I do not have to be its prisoner. I need to embrace the judgement that my former beliefs had indeed been false. And once I have done this, I will no longer be harassed by my own masochistic judgements. The renegotiation process of my cultural and personal identity will no longer be sabotaged by conflicting judgements about myself. I will acquiesce and reach the resting-place of emotional equanimity on my own trajectory.
Emotions, I shall argue, involve judgements about important things, judgements in which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do not fully control (UT, 19).

Chapter 9: The personal trek: Transforming the self
The value perceived in the object appears to be of a particular sort. It appears to make reference to the person's own flourishing … Another way of putting this point … is that the emotions appear to be eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with the person's flourishing (UT, 31).

9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have argued that inner, personal transformation implies a modification to the intentional objects of South Africans’ emotions. I have also argued that the associated beliefs about these objects need to change. But an emotion also has a self-referential element. Central to these personal conversions stands the self as the agent of its own transformation process. The self’s external world consists of a cosmic array of objects and the internal connection between the self and these objects are the thoughts about the objects. Only those objects evaluated as significant, due to their relevance to the self’s own well-being, are attended to. The thoughts about the objects are therefore discriminating judgements, appraising the external world of objects in its relation to the self. Lazarus thus sees an emotion as a continuous affair between the self and the outside world,

… having a bearing on personal goals, which are brought to the encounter and with respect to which the environmental conditions are relevant. The person must decide whether what is going on is relevant to important values or goals. Does it impugn one’s identity? Does it highlight one’s inadequacy? Does it pose a danger to one’s social status? Does it result in an important loss? Or is it a source of happiness and pride? (UT, 107).

The social transformation of South Africa needs to occur at two reciprocal levels. In addition to the external, structural changes in political order, the inner core of society also needs to transform27. And the inner core cannot transform if we don’t know what it was or what it is. Especially during times of social transformation people have entangled thoughts about themselves. Their ideas about what they regard as important and valuable are often muddled and disorganised. They tend to question the validity and authenticity of their identities, and of their former notion of ‘the good’. During times of transformation, these concepts need to be redefined. Before we can begin to transform, we need to know who we are. In this chapter I intend to pursue the examination of my own personal conversion process, my own migratory flight

27 For a more elaborated account of this claim, see Chapter 10.
towards emotional emancipation as Afrikaner. I will argue that in order to transform into a new South African, I first need to find out who I really am, whereafter I need to depart from the cosy comfort of my homogeneous Afrikaner nest, spread my wings and explore the inclusive South African tree, which I only recently realised is a communal tree, belonging also to other occupants. I will have to meet my fellow denizens and subsequently acquaint myself with their needs and aspirations and with their unique perceptions of personal well-being.

9.2 Understanding the self

Ek was neentien jaar oud en Hector was dertien
Ek was veilig verskans teen die skreeuende waarheid
In die naam van die Heer en die swakheid van vaders
Wat niks aan die sirkus van waarheid wou doen

We have self-consciousness but do not always exercise it (UT, 126).

My initial apathy about the death of Hector Peterson in 1976 still puzzles, and even haunts me. Is there perhaps a justifiable defence for my lack of compassion? Why was I so indifferent to the distress of The Other? Is it possible, that to me, Hector Peterson was “… about as important as a branch on a tree next to my house” (UT, 30)?

By now I have found an explanation for my deplorable ignorance about the real life conditions of black people prior to 1976, and to a certain extent one may argue that such ignorance is excusable. Because according to the neo-Stoic theory, my emotions had been shaped by social norms (UT, 140). We, the young and naive Afrikaner birdies, safe and secure in our snug nests, fed with the apparent nutritious ingredients of Apartheid ideology, had been totally oblivious of the well-beings of the other inhabitants of the same tree, especially those in the dilapidated nests on the shady side. We had been possessively protected against external influences by our paranoid caretakers. Swanepoel (1997, 7) accordingly confesses,

Al wat ek van Soweto geweet het, was ‘n artikel in die Huisgenoot oor die naglewe van die plek. Oor die swart mense in Suid-Afrika het ek baie mooi en duidelijk geweet Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling – in hoofletters – is die oplossing vir Suid-Afrika. John Vorster was my held.

28 This song was written by Amanda Strydom, a well-known Afrikaner singer. The song can be translated as follows: I was nineteen and Hector was thirteen. I was safely secured against the shrieking truth. In the name of the Lord and the weakness of fathers, who refused to respond to the circus of truth.

29 All that I knew of Soweto was an article in the Huisgenoot about its night-life. Regarding the black people in South Africa, I knew very clearly, Separate Development – in capital letters – is the solution for South Africa. John Vorster was my hero.
We honestly did not know much about our communal tree, apart from the sunny, cosy inside of our Afrikaner nest. Because the imposed policy of ‘Separate Development’ preserved our ignorance. There was no reason to get acquainted with distant objects beyond the boundaries of our nest. This tree was our God-given property. Hector Peterson was indeed just another leaf on an insignificant branch. My evaluative judgement therefore did not appraise Peterson as significant for my own eudemonism. I excluded him from the tenderness of my sphere of concern. And I was not the only one. Apparently the ghastly death of black activist, Steve Biko, triggered no significant emotional response from Jimmy Kruger, former Minister of Justice. “Dit laat my koud”\(^{30}\), he said. At that point, neither Biko, nor Peterson, as potential emotion objects, had been evaluated by the collective Afrikaner selves as meaningful and important for their own flourishing. Because according to the clarion call of D.F. Malan, Afrikaners had to adhere to only three commandments, “Glo in jou God, glo jou Volk en glo in Jouself”\(^{31}\). Apartheid limited my world of significant objects to a world consisting only of those exclusive objects to be found inside the Afrikaner nest - a nest, whose boundaries had been densely woven with twigs of unquestioned rhetorical clichés. Verwoerd’s assassination in the sixties was therefore regarded as a national tragedy, participating in the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Republic of South Africa in 1971 was a privilege and to shake Vorster’s hand in my matric year was an honour. Sir De Villiers Graaff\(^{32}\) was ‘die kluts kwyt’\(^{33}\) and Breyten Breytenbach\(^{34}\) was a dangerous Communist. I sang Die Stem\(^{35}\) at the top of my voice with cold shivers running down my spine. It was great to be an Afrikaner. My evaluative judgements appraised the objects of my Afrikaner anthology as valuable and sufficiently significant for my own flourishing. Only later did I discover that this venerated nest had indeed been built on an isolated branch of a public South African tree.

Reflecting on the above I now realise that my experiences of cultural exclusivity were not merely restricted to a minority group of smug Afrikaners at the southern point of Africa. My Afrikaner past was characteristic of a general modernist trend to enclose a culture within rigid boundaries that both benefit and exclude around the criteria of

\(^{30}\) It leaves me cold.
\(^{31}\) Believe in God, your ‘volk’ or cultural group, and yourself. In this regard, I need to mention that I am hesitant to translate ‘volk’ in terms of ‘nation’, since I see ‘volk’ as more limited to the own group.
\(^{32}\) Leader of the major opposition party, the United Party. A person who supported this political party was referred to as a ‘Sap’, as opposed to a ‘Nat’ who supported the National Party.
\(^{33}\) To be ‘at sea’, to be disconcerted.
\(^{34}\) Prominent and renowned Afrikaner poet, who protested against Apartheid.
\(^{35}\) The national anthem of the former Republic of South African
race and ethnicity. Furthermore, my Afrikaner past merely represented an Afrikaner hybrid of what Giroux (1992, 40) calls, “... patriarchy parading as universal reason” and “... the imperiousness of grand narratives that stress control and mastery”. At the time when Hector Peterson died, the concept of culture had been successfully manipulated and exploited by senior Afrikaner leaders as an organising principle to construct borders. These borders generated relations of domination, subordination and inequality. The dense boundaries built around the Afrikaner nest did not allow its inhabitants the possibility experiencing and positioning the Afrikaner within a productive exchange of narratives. On the contrary, it erected boundaries framed in the language of universals and oppositions. My experiences as exclusive Afrikaner furthermore echoes Anderson’s argument (1983) that nations are communities, which are imagined as limited.

No nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation (16).

Anderson subsequently argues that a nation is conceived as “… a deep horizontal comradeship” (1983, 16). In natural ties, such as skin-colour and birth-era, one senses “… the ‘beauty of gemeinschaft’. To put it another way, precisely because such ties are not chosen, they have about them a halo of distinctness” (Anderson, 1983, 131). I now understand why I respected fellow white male students at the University of Stellenbosch who voluntary joined the security forces in 1976 to keep the rioting blacks at bay. The fact that white male soldier friends were prepared to kill and even to die for my country on the borders of Angola, can thus be ascribed to what Anderson calls an “imagined fraternity” (1983, 131).

In this regard, I believe that the 1976 perception of my own cultural identity could also be regarded as a ‘legitimised identity’, since it had been introduced by the dominant Afrikaner institutions of society to extend and rationalise their domination (Castells 2004, 8).

9.3 Reconciling the self

In this rhythm of embrace and denial, this uneven intermittence of vision, we have a story of reason’s urgent struggles with itself concerning nothing less than how to imagine life (UT, 86).

I soon realised that the initial riots of learners in 1976 were merely the small beginnings of a major political revolution that the formerly smug regime would be unable to control. It was indeed a ‘Total Onslaught’ that affected my well-being and
toppled my scheme of goals. It highlighted my inadequacy and it endangered my social status. But the most disconcerting and impugning evaluative judgement accused my identity of being fraudulent (UT, 107). My personal self-examination process to detect the cause of my very limited sphere of concern in 1976 is painfully revealing, moreover also confusing and disturbing, ripping my formerly self-sufficient condition. Nussbaum is indeed correct when she argues, “Knowing can be violent, given the truths that there are to be known” (UT, 45). How can I live with the brutal facts of my own fallibility and venture into the process of personal transformation with this shameful and disgusting albatross around my neck? I thus share Krog’s passionate wish to “wipe the old South Africa out of everyone’s past” (1999, 223). I wish I could depart into the new South Africa with a blank consciousness, my past wiped away by a severe attack of amnesia. Do I really know who I am? Because it seems as if I am still engaged in a constant search for my true identity, migrating between footholds in order to find the authentic one from which to depart on my explorative voyage into the new South African society.

In this regard, Nussbaum’s theory provides me with consolation and also direction. I should not strive to detach myself from my memory, since such a disconnection would be a total loss of myself.

Certainly we can and must combat the sinful urges that are fed by a certain sort of memory. But memory is also crucial to a person’s sense of identity and continuity in time (UT, 538).

Centuries ago, Augustine also appraised the importance of memory, when he argued, “I cannot comprehend the power of my memory, since I cannot even call myself myself apart from it” (UT, 538). Human beings are temporal beings, and “[T]ime is a background grid on which the self orients itself, and without which it cannot experience itself as a continuous self” (UT, 144). Taylor also argues, “[T]he background that explained what people recognised as important to themselves was to a great extent determined by their place in society and whatever roles or activities attached to this position” (Taylor, 1994, 31).

In order to liberate myself, I need to release the masochistic chains of self-accusation. And the keys to unlock these constraints, I believe, lie in comprehending the origin of the cultural identity of the Afrikaner. In this regard, Castells’s notion (2004, 8,9) of a resistance identity is illuminating. Given the political history of the Afrikaners, and their continuous battle against suppression, Castells’ explanation of the forming of a resistance identity seems applicable. He argues that such an identity
is created by people who operate in conditions that are devalued and stigmatised by dominant others. The oppressed then build boundaries of opposition and endurance on the basis of principles different from, and opposed to, those pervading in society. Such an identity generates the formation of communities.

It constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance (Castells, 2004, 9).

Castells furthermore explains that ethnically based nationalisms often originate from a sense of estrangement and anger at unreasonable political, economic or social exclusion. He thus refers to the phenomenon of nationalist self-affirmation (which had been typical of the Afrikaner), as “... the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded”36 (2004, 9). In the process, a defensive identity in relation to dominant institutions and ideologies is constructed, rescinding the value judgement while at the same time strengthening the borderlines. Castells further explains that the building materials of these constructed identities come from history, geography, biology, collective memory and even personal fantasies. He argues that the constructors of such a collective identity to a large extent establish the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for those who identify with it (2004, 7).

I grew up with numerous historical tales that honoured the Afrikaners’ adventurous courage. Our national heroes were mostly those people who excelled with their daredevilry and audacious resistance against oppression. But above all, I grew up with the sombre knowledge of the consequences of Kitchener’s ‘Scorched Earth’ Boer War strategy, when thousands of Afrikaner women and children starved to death in British concentration camps. The Anglo Boer War was indeed a “Vryheidsoorlog”37 against British Imperialism, against Rhodes’s “... big idea which makes England dominant in Africa, in fact gives England the Africa continent”38 (Pakenham, 1979, 1). No matter how uneasy I feel about the horrific consequences of the Afrikaners’ political policy of Apartheid, I nevertheless honour many aspects of my former cultural and political past. I cannot truly abandon my cultural history. I feel attached to my ancestors who sacrificed their lives for my political freedom. And I take pride in the Afrikaners’ bold endeavours to rise from the ashes of the Anglo Boer War and 1930 Depression and re-erect themselves in the first half of the twentieth

36 Italics according to original text.
37 ‘Freedom’ War
38 Secret letter from Cecil Rhodes to Alfred Beit in August 1895
century. Moreover, knowing that racism was not restricted to Afrikaners and that racial segregation and social engineering policies had already been implemented in Natal in the late 1800s, provide some consolation. David Welsh, in his study, *The Roots of segregation: native policy in colonial Natal, 1845 – 1910*, concludes, “It is a myth that Apartheid is the exclusive product of Afrikaner nationalism: its antecedents are to be found in Natal rather than in any of the other provinces” (Swanepoel, 1997, 98).

My cultural identity thus seems to be ambivalent. I experience an inner dividedness. One part does indeed revere my honourable Afrikaner roots, whilst the other wishes to reject any identification with the smug, prideful and self-centred Afrikaners of the Apartheid era, also discarding images of myself as an ignorant and uninterested youth in 1976. And the only way to assimilate these two parts of my identity into a single authentic unity will be to transform past embarrassing images of myself into acceptable ones, into images of someone who truly cares and comprehends. Nussbaum appositely explains, “For as one reweaves the fabric of one’s life after a loss, and as the thoughts around which one has defined one’s aims and aspirations change tense, one becomes to that extent a different person” (UT, 83). In essence, I need to engage in a process of reconstruction. And this transformation process, Taylor believes, cannot be socially obtained, but must be inwardly generated.

There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s. But this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me (Taylor, 1994, 30).39

9.4 Reconstructing the self
Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself (Taylor, 1994, 31).

In order to proceed with the narrative of the reconstruction of my own identity, I want to return to the neo-Stoic theory of the emotions and its relevance to the current process of social transformation in South Africa. According to Nussbaum, reference to the self is the most important component of an emotion, since an emotion evaluates the world from the self’s own point of view. She argues that, “... emotions look at the world from the subject’s own viewpoint, mapping events unto the subject’s own sense of personal importance or value” (UT, 33). The self-element structures and localises the emotion. A person’s scheme of values contains general interests

39 Italics according to original text.
that are interwoven with personal interests (UT, 52). People’s emotions will have different combinations of self-referential and non-self-referential concerns, and the mixture will also vary in different emotions. She also stresses that human emotions contain logic, and are subject to reconsideration and reflection of one’s goals and projects. When a person forms incoherent goals and has consequent emotions, the awareness of this inconsistency will give rise to self-criticism, deliberation and even anxiety (UT, 146, 147). Reflecting again on Peterson’s death, I realise that neither he, nor blacks in general, belonged to my own scheme of goals and ends at that particular time. And this is a disturbing discovery. In essence, I feel ashamed and guilty about my lack of humanity and compassion. I feel as if I have contributed to the Afrikaners’ collective construction of South Africa’s immoral and dismal past. Hence, indirectly, I have also hurt thousands of other South Africans.

In this regard, Nussbaum’s account of the vital roles of both shame and guilt in the emotional life of human beings is relevant. She rejects shame as a potential threat to morality and neighbourhood and to an imaginative inner life. She argues that shame … is far from requiring diminished self-regard. In a sense, it requires self-regard as its essential backdrop. It is only because one expects oneself to have worth or even perfection that one will shrink from or cover the evidence of one’s nonworth or imperfection (UT, 196).

Moral guilt, on the other hand, is seen as a noble emotion and attuned to optimism about one’s own projections (UT, 216). “[M]orality involves the use of reparation capacities, respect for the humanity of another person, and regard for the others’ neediness” (UT, 218). Morality is thus not self-centred but extends its focus to the intrinsic worth of objects outside the self, dismantling the dense boundaries of self-interest. In this sense, moral guilt protects people’s inner worth and their dignity (UT, 217). My feelings of guilt therefore urge me to create and utilise opportunities to heal wounds and restore the dignity of those harmed by the previous dispensation. I now realise that in South Africa’s current process of social transformation I have endless prospects to replace past negative perceptions of indifference and ignorance about the other’s well-being with positive perceptions of compassion and interest. But, in doing so, I will have to open my boundaries of eudemonism and include the welfare of distant others as an element of value in my own scheme of goals and ends. And the potential capacity for compassion is there, because, according to Nussbaum, we, as human beings have an unsurpassed elasticity in the goals we pursue. We have a fairly structured and wide-ranging conception of our goals and ourselves, and we are likely to include distant persons and things, either spatially or temporally in this
flexible eudemonistic scheme (UT, 147). All normal human beings have the capability to imagine what it is like to be in another’s shoes. This ability to think perspective is fundamental to emotional and moral life.

However, this does not mean that all human beings are humane and compassionate creatures. A person’s aptitude for compassion and love will depend on the extent to which he or she exercises this ability (UT, 146). As long as the boundaries of my own dwelling are inflexible, distant fellow South Africans will not be allowed in my scheme of goals and ends. And as long as I suppress the human capacity to imagine the other’s situations, I will be unable to have compassion with their predicaments, because, “[c]ompassion is an emotion that has often been relied on to hook our imaginations to the good of others and to make them the object of our intense care. (UT, 13). Without this condition of pitié, we are doomed to what Rousseau long ago referred to as “… an arrogant harshness” (UT, 315).

As a South African, I need to dismantle the boundary walls of my exclusive Afrikaner dwelling. My new cultural identity will have to be reconstructed in conjunction with others. Taylor (1994, 34) argues that one’s identity crucially relies on one’s dialogical rapport with others. Nussbaum (UT, 147) believes that the way I see myself not only depends upon my inherent cognitive, perceptual and integrative capabilities, but also on my conception of temporality and causality, and to the extent to which I see myself along with others.

9.5 Conclusion
New Patriots are confident enough to understand that, in addition to national identities, they also have ethnic identities and global identities. And because they see themselves as complex fusions of the local, the regional, the national and the global, they understand, with no difficulty, that their neighbours are such complex fusions, too (Asmal, 2002, 9).

The South African tree does indeed belong to me, but it also belongs to distant others. In order to transform the social order of this tree, we need to depart from our secluded and exclusive nests and acquaint ourselves with the other legitimate owners of the same tree. We need to share our individual perceptions of well-being and our expectations of our new society. Collectively we should then strive to establish a society in which a common scheme of goals applies, a common agreement of what it means to live well for all South Africans.

Castells explains that people construct a project identity
... when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by doing so seek the transformation of overall social structure (2004, 8).

I believe that central to the social and political transformation of our country should be the construction of such a collective project identity. And I believe that such a collective identity will constitute my own personal identity, because according to Taylor (1991, 40) one cannot define one’s identity by disregarding history, society, the yearning for camaraderie and everything that matters in one’s own life.

Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial (Taylor, 1991, 40, 41).

And I can rest assured that such an identity will still be authentic, because “Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands” (Taylor, 1991, 41). I can only discover my role in the transformed South Africa through my relationship with other South Africans. I need to adopt the ubuntu principle: I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am (Krog, 1999, 166).
Part 3

Education for transformation
Second modulation

There is a need for us to take a long and hard look at our society. We see in South Africa a degree of materialism, anger and callousness that finds expression in many forms and is to be found in many spheres of our society including our schools. We see also the meanness, fear, indifference and cruelty of some members of our society jealously guarding their privileges. Our schools as an integral part of society have not been spared from the consequences of our unfortunate past. (Zuma, 2001, 50).

The new democratic South Africa, supposedly reflecting a transformed society, will celebrate its tenth birthday soon. Yet, increasingly more and more pointers emerge, indicating a growing impatience and dissatisfaction with the nature and tempo at which the South African society is transforming. Amongst many previously disadvantaged people, unfulfilled expectations give rise to disillusionments, potentially resulting in an impatient reluctance to continue the personal journey of transformation. Conversely, evident amongst many previously advantaged whites, is a reluctance to depart from the previous social order. These tendencies are unfortunately supported by first-hand experiences of some of the current consequences of the new social dispensation, generating profound feelings of negativity, pessimism, resistance and revived racism. Recent political and social disintegrations in neighbouring countries add to scepticism and reluctance to embark on the intense personal voyage to a transformed society.

In part two of this thesis I have used my own narrative to illustrate the multifaceted implications of social transformation at the more profound, personal level. I furthermore believe that this narrative has reinforced Nussbaum’s conception of rationality, by highlighting the intense involvement of the emotions as cognitive guides in the process of personal transformation. I believe that transformation of South Africans at the personal level is not only necessary, but also possible, provided that social transformation is conceived not only in superstructural terms, but also as including the equally crucial aspect of personal transformation. Society should thus not only allow for, but also try to reinforce such transformation. Schools are one of the key sites where social transformation can and should occur. However, the success or failure of education’s contribution to the social transformation of South Africa will fundamentally be determined by the conceptual frameworks of those people involved in education. In the last part of this thesis I will focus on the importance of adequate conceptions of social transformation and rationality when we consider education’s potential to enhance the social transformation of South African society.
Chapter 10: Conceiving social transformation

[T]he terms of political life are inherent to the constitutive active principles of the individual (Dent, 1988, 11).

10.1 Introduction

In recent years, South Africa has been through a process of political transition. This process was (and still is) indeed remarkable, since it was brought about mainly by means of dialogues, negotiations, compromises and mutual agreements between the various political parties involved. Due to immense international and local political pressures, the majority of former oppressive legislations associated with the Apartheid regime, had already been abandoned before 1994. Yet, it was only with the first democratic elections on 27 April 1994, that this country, for the first time in its history, achieved a legitimate democratic government.

The exclusionary and oppressive nature of previous policies demanded radical rectifications or rationalisations to amend the social and political arrangement. The new political order had to be reflected and established by means of new legislations, strategies and so forth. Terms like ‘affirmative action’, ‘redress’, and ‘historical imbalances’ became the rhetoric of the day and subsequent implementation policies literally forced many whites from their former ‘pound seats’. Many blacks, on the other hand, found themselves in positions of authority, with those people whom they were used to address as ‘Baas40’ only a year or two previously, as their subordinates. These were (and still continue to be) drastic, dramatic and even traumatic changes, clearly implying, apart from the external, tangible changes, also severe and intense impacts on the emotional lives of South African citizens.

In Part 2 I have tried to illustrate the intensity and extent of this inner, personal turmoil, brought about by the social and political transformation of this country. Although I have described my catharsis from the point of view of an Afrikaner, who above all, expresses a willingness to transform and adhere to the superstructural aspects, there is reason to believe that my own personal turbulent transformation process merely reflects a general phenomenon: Although the nature and the extent may vary, one can assume that most South Africans are currently engaged in processes of personal transformation.

40 In Afrikaans, this term means ‘boss’. Previously, blacks were supposed to address white men as ‘baas’ and white women as ‘Miesies’ to indicate their subordination to whites.
10.2 ‘Political’ and ‘personal’ transformation

There is a general tendency, especially amongst politicians, to conceive social transformation in political terms. For many people, social transformation implies merely attending to structural aspects, neglecting and marginalizing the equally important aspect of personal transformation. Yet, in our conception of social transformation, the crucial role of personal transformation cannot be overlooked, because political transformation and personal transformation are intimately and reciprocally linked. Each needs the other, and should a transformation process fail to attend to both dimensions and also fail to recognise their interrelatedness, it will fail to be a truly legitimate and enduring process. I base this claim on a particular stance about social transformation, which according to Dent, can be ascribed to Rousseau.

According to Dent (1988, 9 – 13), the Rousseauean system is underpinned by the reciprocal interrelatedness between the political and the personal spheres. Dent believes that Rousseau’s political philosophy is often misinterpreted, mainly because people often fail to recognise the deep and urgent issue that Rousseau has managed to highlight – an issue that he (Rousseau) considers to be “… a preliminary to any further questions regarding the internal life of an established civil whole” (Dent, 1988, 6). Dent explains,

> His political proposals are intended, I believe, only to make sense in the light of the foundational claims he argues for with regard to the psychological needs and possibilities of the individual person (Dent, 1988, 10).

Dent then claims that the ideas, as expressed in The Social Contract do not encompass the main focus and conclusion of Rousseau’s intellectual and moral endeavour. Neither should other works like Émile and A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality be seen as merely introductory to or part of his political philosophy. In Dent’s view, Rousseau’s political philosophy should not essentially be understood as the extension and elaboration of a body of ideas and themes that arises from questions and problems about the nature and grounds of civil society.

Essentially, Rousseau’s primary interest was in the psychological and moral development of the individual, which he regarded as having a key-determining role in relation to the rest (Dent, 1988, 13). According to Rousseau’s political philosophy, the infrastructure is more fundamental than the superstructure. Dent highlights the significant importance of this distinction in one’s understanding of Rousseau’s

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41 As in original text.

42 I will explain the terms infrastructure and superstructure in paragraph 10.4.
political views, stressing that there is a considerable difference between conceiving the nature of political order as the original issue, and interpreting issues regarding individual human needs and human happiness accordingly, or, conversely, starting with

... ideas about life, development, relations of individual persons, in contexts other than that of their standing in political community with others, and approaching the instigation (or legitimation) of the terms and conditions of political life as a problem or issue to be contended with from this prior ground (Dent, 1988, 10).

Dent furthermore argues that, although Rousseau was concerned about the development and character of the individual, it is incorrect to interpret Rousseau as seeing individual integrity and happiness only to be achievable once a person is isolated and uninvolved with others. Rousseau did not see the development of the individual atomistically, but constituted in large part in relationship with others. He recognised the significant influence of other people on the content of an individual’s motives, desires, attitudes and also on the individual’s perception of the self.

In many cases, characterizing the dispositions of any one individual necessarily includes characterization of his assessment of and involvement with others, which are inherent in the nature of those dispositions. For example, it is inherent in compassion that one assess another as suffering and as needing help (Dent, 1988, 11).

Rousseau realised that the ‘structures and configurations’ of the individual mind go through many transformations, which correspond with the nature of the person’s engagement with others.

Dent thus claims that central to Rousseau’s political philosophy was the belief that the stability – the legitimacy and sustaining – of the superstructure depends on some features of the infrastructure, in other words, that “… the super-ordinate rule of the state must conserve and sustain some salient elements from the pre-political order, or else it will be illegitimate” (Dent, 1988, 9). The particular form and nature of the political life should not be regarded as governing the rest.

Yet, this does not mean that the political order will not generate noticeable transformations in the individual. Rousseau was

... committed to holding that the terms of political life are inherent to the constitutive active principles of the individual; he also assigns to the quality of

43 As in original text.
political experience a central causal role in forming (or deforming) the developed nature of the individual (Dent, 1988, 11).

Dent thus argues that Rousseau assigned “… at least equal place to the character of political existence in accounting for the nature, dispositions and potential of the individual” (Dent, 1988, 11).

Reflecting again on my own experiences of the social transformation in South Africa, I now realise that to me, the essence of this process lay, and still lies in its more profound dimensions. That is where my real conversions took place, are still taking place, and still have to take place. However, I also realise that to some extent, superstructural changes did affect, and are still affecting my infrastructural conversion. I have no doubt in my mind that essentially it was initial superstructural alterations that triggered my first tentative steps towards personal transformation. But the sincerity and truthfulness of my acceptance of and adjustment to these changes will essentially be determined by the nature and state of my own personal transformation (which cannot happen uninvolved and independent of others).

10.3 Compassionate citizenship

Rousseau’s stance about the reciprocal relationship between state and individual corresponds to Nussbaum’s claim that a political structure that stands the best chance of being legitimate and to last is that which concerns itself

… with citizens’ motivations, both in order to ensure that the conception is feasible in the first place – does not impose impossible strains on human psychology – and also in order to ensure that it has a decent chance of being stable over time (UT, 401, 402).

Essentially, it is persons that keep institutions stable, and central to Nussbaum’s argument in this regard, is the need for compassionate citizens. She thus describes the relationship between compassion and social institutions as a “… two-way street: compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine; and institutions, in turn, influence the development of compassion in individuals” (UT, 405). Yet, according to Nussbaum’s theory, a person’s emotions (including compassion) are shaped by his or her interaction with others; and according to Rousseau, compassion is not possible if a person develops atomistically and

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44 As in original text.
45 See Chapter 6.14. I will also discuss the need to educate compassionate South Africans in Chapter 12.
46 See Chapter 4.
independently of others (Dent, 1988, 11). One can thus conclude that in order for the superstructure to be stable, society needs to cultivate compassionate citizens. And should one then attend to another feature of Nussbaum’s theory, namely that emotions originate in early childhood\textsuperscript{47}, the crucial role of education is evident. Schools are first and foremost social institutions, where learners develop also by means of their interaction with others – thus not atomistically. But schools are also institutions concerned with the development of human beings in their early, formative years. One can thus conclude that education in general, and schools in particular, are indispensable constituents of a firm infrastructural foundation that will ensure a stable and legitimate superstructure.

10.4 ‘Superstructural’ and ‘infrastructural’ transformation
Since the above double-layered texture of social transformation will underpin my further discussions pertaining to social transformation, it now seems necessary to establish technical terms in order to discriminate between these two levels or dimensions of transformation. I will continue by referring to the political dimension of transformation as ‘superstructural’, and the personal dimension as ‘infrastructural’, since these two terms seem to describe the core essence of their distinction.

According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990), the term ‘superstructure’ means (1) the part of a building above its foundations, (2) a structure built on top of something else, and (3) a concept or ideas based on others. And ‘infrastructure’ means (1a) the basic structural foundations of a society or enterprise; a substructure or foundation, (1b) roads, bridges, sewers, and so on, regarded as a country’s economic foundation, and (2) permanent installations as a basis for military, etc. operations.

Although using the terms ‘superstructure’ and ‘infrastructure’ might appear artificial, it does have the advantage, from the point of view of this thesis, of avoiding misinterpretations of the main claims I make. More commonly used words – such as ‘political’ and ‘personal’ carry implications from long-standing debates, and, for clarity, I will prefer to use my technical terminology.

10.5 Conceiving social transformation in South Africa
Although neither Rousseau, nor Nussbaum, directly refers to social transformation as such, to both, the reciprocal interrelatedness between these two dimensions or

\textsuperscript{47} See Chapter 5.
levels, namely the infrastructural and the superstructural, is fundamental to their views of the ideal and ‘legitimate’ political system.

In more concrete terms, one can use the analogy of a boat crossing a wide river. Successfully to manoeuvre the boat across the river towards its new destination, one needs strong oarsmen at both sides, who row equally hard. The two sides need to balance and cooperate in harmony with each other. When one side fails to keep up with the other, the boat will eventually end up moving in circles, never reaching its destination. A lop-sided social transformational process, occurring mainly at superstructural level, may similarly result in a whirlpool of vacillating and irresolute attempts to promote the process while sinking deeper and deeper into the vortex of disillusionment, frustration, dissatisfaction, annoyance and aggravation, until it eventually capsizes. Although these two levels function in a reciprocal relationship, each relying on the other, we need to note that social transformation of the superstructural level is the easier part to accomplish. New legislations, policies, organisational structures and so on can be relatively easily promulgated by the political power of the government of the day. However, for these strategies to be assimilated and adhered to, transformation at the infrastructural level needs to be in place. In this regard one may argue that infrastructural transformation is indispensable in order for superstructural transformation to be authentic and to survive, because mere obedience to laws and rules does not guarantee citizens’ true adoption of real social transformation into their personal lives. Unlike superstructural transformation, infrastructural transformation cannot be enforced from outside and needs to be nurtured and cultivated.

There is reason to suspect that the social transformation process in South Africa is currently struggling. Although transformation is evidently happening at the political level (such as new legislations, policies, and so forth), the indispensable and concurrent level of infrastructural transformation is lagging behind. It seems as if the South African transformation boat is caught up in the potentially irresolute attempts to transform as described above, and I believe that the only way to prevent it from tipping over will first and foremost be to balance the steering mechanisms and conscientiously attend to the concomitant aspect of infrastructural social transformation.
10.6 Conclusion

In order to enhance enduring social transformation, transformation at the personal, infrastructural level needs to be attended to. Above all, the nurturing of compassionate South African citizens should be prioritised, since compassionate citizens will ensure the type of infrastructure, which will not only generate a humane superstructure, but will also be able to provide the superstructure with legitimacy and stability.

In Part 2 I have illustrated the multifaceted nature of such a transformation process (at the infrastructural level) by arguing that, fundamentally, South Africans need to attend to the constitutive elements of their emotions: they have to review their former objects anthologies, evaluative judgements and perceptions of themselves and their well-being. However, these elements are only to be found within a framework of rationality that appraises the emotions as constitutive components of rationality itself – a framework that regards emotions as cognitive-evaluative judgments and indispensable guides towards the identification of real value (UT, 374). In the next chapter I will discuss the relationship between social transformation and conceptions of rationality.
Chapter 11: Conceiving rationality in a transforming society
To see it without feeling it is not to know it (UT, 323).

11.1 Introduction
Since the first democratic elections in 1994, South African society has been subjected to ongoing social and political transformations. A new Constitution has been introduced, from which a whole series of new legislation flowed to usher the South African society towards transformation. Education in particular, had to be restructured and re-organized (at the superstructural level) in order to redress historical imbalances caused by the policies of the previous political dispensation. However, education is also regarded to be in the vanguard in helping to shape the ideal transformed South Africa, because, as Jacob Zuma, currently Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, appropriately reminds educators, they are entrusted with “… our children, the future of our country” (NDE48, 2001, 51). During this period of social and political upheaval, education is thus challenged to help the country to transform, while itself requiring urgent transformation.

I believe, however, that the notion of ‘education for transformation’ can easily become entangled in particular misconceptions. These fallacies are rooted in confusions about the concepts of social transformation (as explained in the previous chapter), rationality and subsequently, education for transformation. The central thrust of this part of my thesis is that ‘education for transformation’ should be conceived according to a view of transformation that encompasses both superstructural and infrastructural aspects. But education is fundamentally and conceptually linked to rationality, because, essentially, the conception of rationality forms the basis of the core conception of what education is all about. One can thus argue that, since a conception of rationality provides the ground rules for education, this particular conception will also be the key foundation on which the concept of ‘education for transformation’ is built.

In this chapter I will argue that education will only be able to enhance social transformation if it is underpinned by a framework of rationality, which regards the emotions as cognitive and part of rationality itself. Conversely, if we concede the field of rationality to certain adversarial conceptions, the prospects of ‘education for transformation’ will be weakened, because these restricted conceptions of rationality

48 National Department of Education.
will tend to focus mainly on superstructural aspects, thereby marginalizing vital infrastructural components. In this sense, one can argue that conceptions of rationality fundamentally affect (and eventually effect) social transformation. Because, these restricted adversarial conceptions can in actual fact become significant impediments to ‘education for transformation’, since they will fail to appreciate - and subsequently promote - the foundational role of infrastructural transformation.

On the other hand, should a cognitive theory of the emotions form the foundation of educators’ conception of rationality, thereby underpinning their conception of education, there is reason to be optimistic about education’s prospects to enhance infrastructural transformation. And I believe that only then can education rightfully be regarded as a ‘main artery’ in the true transformation process of this country.

As mentioned earlier, educators, amongst others, conceive education within their particular frameworks of rationality. Yet, I believe that two predominant emphases evident in present-day education should be viewed with suspicion. These two outlooks suggest roots in a particular narrow idea of rationality, which omits acknowledgement that emotions are constitutive elements of rationality itself. Should these stances determine the trajectory of South African education, there is reason to be seriously alarmed about its prospects to fulfil its crucial role pertaining to social transformation. In the following paragraphs I will examine these views.

11.2 Conceptions of rationality
Unlike a conception of rationality, which acknowledges emotions as constituent elements of rationality itself, conceptions of rationality, which should be regarded as a barrier to social transformation, are still tied to the historical view that the attainment of ‘rational’ knowledge is esteemed as the vital component to ensure the survival of mankind. The clout of such ‘rational’ knowledge is very much based on the accuracy with which facts can be analytically described and labelled, and on the postulation that things in the world can be assigned to mutually exclusive categories. Evident in ancient Greek and Roman deliberation, this dogma has also dominated Western thought since the Enlightenment and during the Modern Era. The trend during this period was (and in some cases continues to be) to deem emotions independent of, and subordinate to the intellect. This belief, embodied in Rene Descartes’ famous Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), holds that reason is the quintessence of human functioning, emphasizing a split between reason and
passion. Emotions are regarded as messy and cluttered complications for a pure intellect, to be avoided and excluded since they interfere with wise or rational decisions.\textsuperscript{49}

This conception of rationality inevitably also influences the dichotomist’s stance towards social transformation, because social transformation is conceived merely in superstructural terms. Since the dichotomist will fail to attend to Nussbaum’s belief that “… any political conception needs to concern itself with citizens’ motivations” (UT, 402) or adhere to Rousseau’s claim that “… the super-ordinate rule of the state must conserve and sustain some\textsuperscript{50} salient elements of the pre-political order” (Dent, 1988, 9), the more fundamental, infrastructural aspects of transformation will be overlooked. We may indeed find the dichotomist actively and enthusiastically rowing the South African transformation boat, albeit as an energetic member of the superstructure team. The dichotomist oarsman will unfortunately fail to appreciate and acknowledge the emotions as invaluable internal and above all, rational guides on the turbulent voyage towards legitimate and lasting social transformation.

Contrary to such a restricted conception, Nussbaum’s conception provides us with a much more reliable and comprehensive framework of rationality. This framework not only leaves room for social transformation at the personal, infrastructural level (as described in Part 2), but will also ensure that education is conceived in a way that attends to the true holistic development of learners, and assists them to cope with the demands of everyday life. Moreover, should this framework underpin the conception of education, the development of compassionate future citizens will be conceived as central to education’s contribution to society. And, as argued in the previous chapter, a compassionate infrastructure is furthermore likely to sustain and ensure a stable superstructure.

But before I discuss the significance of Nussbaum’s conception of rationality in this regard, I will briefly discuss some other stances\textsuperscript{51}, which defy a dichotomy between reason and emotion.

\textsuperscript{49} I will refer to a proponent of this view as a ‘dichotomist’.
\textsuperscript{50} As in original text.
\textsuperscript{51} Although the theoretical assumptions and terminology of these writers may vary, their roots are similar: All are committed to oppose a conception that denies the mutual interdependence between reason and emotion and maintains a dichotomy between the two.
11.3 Rationality and everyday life

If his existence in the world disturbs his being in ways that fragment him and render his relationships in the world emotionally confused or even meaningless, then he is ill-adapted, and no amount of intellectual grasp of logical or factual relationship will change that (Witkin, 1977,1).

Our learners grow up in a world dominated by first-hand experiences of human suffering caused by poor interpersonal relationships, crime, wars, diseases and natural disasters. Bennett Reimer, renowned musicologist, emphasizes that the assumed triumphs of ‘pure reasoning’ (in other words, excluding any ‘emotional interferences’) are contradicted by the realities affecting the quality of human beings’ everyday lives. He believes that the rapid escalation of ‘rational’ knowledge, guided by the application of ‘pure reason’, has failed, and will continue to be insufficient in its attempts to achieve a more rational, peaceful, equitable, just, secure, liberated and humane world (Reimer, 2003,17,18) The ability to function in everyday life does not simply reside in pure reasoning, but also in the quintessence of our humanity that defines our attitude to life, namely our emotions. Adaptation to the outer world does not only imply the ability to comprehend logical sequences or to relate one fact to another. It also involves the individual’s ability to interact within this world. A logical scheme based on exact and analytic assumptions simply does not capture the reality of human experience, especially with regards to fundamental human concerns, such as interpersonal relationships.

In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argues that pure reason is unable to address the very important common concerns of human beings, such as death, faith, way of living, meaning of life and work, and so on (Honderich, 1995, 914-915). Csikszentmihalyi (1993, 41, 42) raises another interesting point in arguing that reason functions in closed systems determined by accepted rules and predictable outcomes (for instance constructing a bridge or playing chess). Conversely, intuition, empathy, wisdom and creativity are elements of the human evolutionary process. We need to remember that with each generation the conditions that affect human consciousness change in subtle, hence significant, ways. As events change with time, these elements and our understanding of them, will also change. Logic, on the other hand, “... can be programmed into a computer because its rules cannot easily change with time” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, 42).
Sen (Ryan, 2003, 43) raises another aspect pertaining to ‘emotionless’ rationality in everyday life. He warns against the narrowness of such a conception, tending to focus merely on the competence to choose proficient means to what are alleged to be selfish ends. This view is especially evident amongst economists, who are not interested in these pursued ends or how they have been adopted. According to Sen, human beings should rather be conceived in ways that acknowledge the intricacy of their values and beliefs. Rationality should be defined with due consideration of the justifiability of the agent’s beliefs and the justifiability of the ends being sought. Sen argues that rationality and freedom intersect, because a person who has no more control over his or her aims and beliefs “… than a computer has over running its software” cannot be regarded as rational. Such a person is in actual fact “… a slave to a program” (Ryan, 2003, 44). Humanity should thus repossess “… the ground that has been taken from it by various arbitrarily narrow formulations of the demands of rationality” (Ryan, 2003, 43). If a person’s conduct is guided by high principle, a passion for justice or freedom, simple compassion for the badly off, or whatever else, there is nothing to be said for theories that represent ‘rationality’ as the single-minded pursuit of self-interest defined in the narrowest possible terms (Ryan, 2003, 44).

As active agents in the post-modern global village and as local citizens in a transforming South Africa, our learners require more than pure reason to flourish. Because essentially, any human being’s future cannot be confined to rules and knowable outcomes. South Africans, amongst all world citizens, need … intuition to anticipate changes before they occur; empathy to understand that which cannot be clearly expressed; wisdom to see the connection between apparently unrelated events; and creativity to discover new ways of defining problems, new rules that will make it possible to adapt to the unexpected” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, 42).

Indeed, our learners, as future citizens, will need to grasp the complex system of the causes and effects of their actions, but concurrently, they will require the ability to respond appropriately to the effects of those actions (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, 275).

Although the focuses of the above views may vary, the central thrust corresponds with Nussbaum’s conception of rationality: Essentially, rationality should be conceived as encompassing both reason and emotion.
11.4 Conceiving education

The importance of conceiving education as underpinned by a broader and more comprehensive notion of rationality is thus evident. Ryle (1972), however, warns that education is still often built upon a compartmentalized idea of human beings.

In our abstract theorizing about human nature we are still in the archaic habit of treating ourselves and all other human beings as animated department stores, in which the intellect is one department, the will is another and the feelings a third department ... So we take it for granted that as the intellect is notoriously the one department into which lessons go, our wills and feelings are not themselves teachable. They cannot know anything; they cannot be more or less cultured or cultivated ... Somehow or other our intellect can indeed harness, drive, steer, flog, coax, goad and curb our wills and our feelings; but in themselves these two brainless faculties are in the civilized man just what they are in the savage; there is no schooling of them (Ryle, 1972, 442).

Ryle's view alerts us to a tendency of thinking that education is limited to the development of only one ‘department’ and that the development of the other ‘departments’ belongs to other institutions outside of education, such as the home, the family and the church.

Smith (1992) also pleads for a notion of multiplicities of knowing in our conceptions of human understanding, learning, and subsequently education. He argues that “… there are realms of meaning, ways of knowing, types of intelligence” (1992, 52). His view corresponds with Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences theory (1993, 1999), which outlines eight potential areas for the development of intelligence. These are the logical-mathematical, linguistic, naturalistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, musical, bodily-kinaesthetic and the spatial intelligences (1999, 41–52). Of particular significance for schooling in a transforming South Africa is, amongst others, Gardner’s identification of the personal intelligences, which he regards as “… forms of knowledge [that] are of tremendous importance in many, if not all, societies in the world” (Gardner, 1993, 242). He defines interpersonal intelligence as the ability to discriminate among other persons and to detect their feelings, intentions and desires (1993, 240; 1999, 43). Linked to this aptitude is the intrapersonal intelligence, which enables one to enter one’s own emotional life and to discriminate between one’s own feelings. Gardner esteems a developed sense of self as “… the highest achievement of human beings, a crowning capacity which supersedes and presides over other more mundane and partial forms of intelligence” (1993, 243). The ability to know oneself and to know others is an irrefutable part of the human condition (1993, 244; 1999, 43). Gardner furthermore concludes that past negligence of these two
intelligences has produced a very limited view of education (1993, 242). Of particular significance for a multicultural society like South Africa, is Gardner’s belief that this restricted conceptualisation had complicated the understanding of the aspirations of many cultures and the ways in which these aspirations are accomplished (1993, 242; 1999, 109, 110). Gardner thus advocates the inclusion of the personal intelligences in the ‘human intellectual repertoire’ (1993, 244).

Goleman’s concept of *Emotional Intelligence* (1996) expands Gardner’s concept of personal intelligences (Pool, 1997, 12). Goleman defines emotional intelligence as “… knowing what one’s feelings are and using that knowledge to make good decisions” (1996, 9). He further argues that a person’s IQ predicts only a small part of success in life. Emotional intelligence, on the other hand, provides one with important personal skills to cope with the demands of modern life, such as motivation, self-awareness and self-discipline (1996, 87 – 90). Emotional intelligence furthermore assists a person to operate as a well-adjusted social being, since it involves important social competences such as compassion and self-control (1996, 96 – 110). Goleman asserts that educators need to abandon the reliance on the classic ‘sorting machinery’ of current IQ testing with its strong dependence on linguistic and quantitative abilities as the determinants of ‘intelligence’.

The importance of conceiving education according to a more comprehensive conception of rationality is thus evident. Overlooking the emotions as constitutive elements of rationality will consequently effect a narrow conception of education. Such an education will not only fail to prepare South Africans for the demanding challenges of the new millennium, but its prospects to enhance social transformation will be weak. Such an education will tend to marginalize the infrastructural aspects, which are strongly linked to the emotional dimensions of rationality, as illustrated by my own personal transformation, described in Part 2.

In a previous paragraph I have referred to particular conceptions, evident in current education, which should be regarded as causes of concern, due to their firm roots in the narrow conception of rationality (as described above) and their subsequent imperialistic claims. These views are rivals to what I believe the ideal conception of ‘education for transforming’ should be. Although these two outlooks sometimes

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52 Intelligence quotient.
53 See paragraph 11.1.
harness each other, they are nonetheless analytically distinct. In the next paragraphs, these views\textsuperscript{54} will be discussed.

- **Instrumental rationality**

According to a partisan of an instrumental conception of rationality, the exercise of rationality is confined to deciding on ‘means’, with ‘ends’ cast as ‘irrational’. A core instigator influencing this person’s stance towards education can be found in monetary considerations and market-oriented sentiments subsequently reducing the conception of education to mere instrumental outcomes, clearly not founded in an adequate epistemological view. The value of education is basically collapsed into utility and function. Financial figures and ‘profits and losses’ are the ultimate criteria to measure the ‘value’ of education, since these criteria are understood as universal, value-free and neutral. This narrow view impoverishes not only our conception of education, but also our general conception of human life, and thus of social transformation, because it infiltrates every component of our private and public lives, encouraging us to regard everything in terms of its instrumental value. There is reason to assume that instrumental rationality has already become a social ontology, determining the scaffold for social policies, such as education.

One of its symptoms is rampant consumerism and an obsession with measuring the value of anything, from art to sport and entertainment in terms of money. But a more fruitful way of characterising it would be to say that, at the root of instrumental rationality, stands the assumption that the appropriate way to analyse all actions is as the means to some end (Morrow, 2002, 21).

The instrumentalist’s conception of education is reinforced by the fact that contemporary education subsists not only in a local but also in the worldwide arena of global economic and scientific interdependence. This particular conception of education is especially evident in the strong emphasis on competences and skills and in the teaching of ‘numbers and letters’ as highly instrumental means – because the competitive nature of today’s world dictates the specific knowledge and skills required to work and compete in the international arena.

A developing country, like South Africa, is exceptionally prone to be subjected to such a narrow and instrumentalist view. Powell (2001, 69), for instance argues, “…countries that are more economically disadvantaged, like South Africa, would have to learn new skills to compete in the ever-changing global market”. Schools are

\textsuperscript{54} I will refer to these views as expressed by two distinct \textit{personas}, namely the ‘instrumentalist’ and the ‘taxonomist’.
generally perceived as providing access to the work force and economic progression. The current predominant concern with economic empowerment furthermore tends to prioritise vocational skills. ‘Better schools mean better jobs’. This message has already been converted into an instrumental conception of education, namely that language skills, combined with competence in the mathematics and sciences are fundamental to finding employment in a highly technological market place, because a work force equipped in this way is essential to a healthy economy.

A concurrent assumption is the general belief that the survival of South Africa in the global knowledge economy will depend on a conscious and determined will to invest strongly in education. Currently in South Africa, a substantial proportion of the national budget is spent on education and the government is pressurized for accountability. Taxpayers require a report of their financial contributions to the government of the day and are thought to be entitled to ask ‘Is this worth paying for?’ The subsequent result is a strong emphasis on accountability, predictability and control. In other words, the instrumentalist’s conception of education is reinforced by the assumption that if learners’ achievements can be measured, it will be possible to determine what they actually know, understand and are able to do, thereby providing ‘hard’ evidence that education is doing its job. If these accomplishments are seen as leading to employment, spending money on education can boldly be justified, in that it contributes to the reduction of unemployment and the thriving of the economy. And in this sense, education is seen as contributing to the social transformation of this country.

Comment
An education system does not exist merely to serve the market, important as that may be for economic growth, material prosperity and (superstructural) transformation. Such an instrumental model of education, which is based on economic aspirations, ties schooling to jobs, resulting in a distorted curriculum. Because, when we place education at the core of our economy, the humanities, social sciences and arts - subjects which Nussbaum regards as fundamental to the cultivation of humanity, and especially compassion - are quickly marginalized, subordinating the cultivation of the whole person to technical and vocational education.

A society that needs to transform, should above all conceive education in accordance with a conception of transformation that also acknowledges the fundamental
importance of infrastructural transformation. Yet, for the instrumentalist, efficient financial management becomes the ultimate key to ‘successful’ social transformation, and education is valued merely for its promising contributing role according to this criterion. An instrumental conception of rationality, and its associated conception of education, will not be able to enhance the profound and complex infrastructural aspects of transformation, as described in Part 2. In this sense, one can argue that an instrumental conception of education will fail to support legitimate and sustainable social transformation. Education’s fundamental purpose must be to enrich the individual and the broader society. Because education can, and should, contribute in a more profound way by developing mature citizens with the kinds of personal attributes, moral values, emotional competences and so forth, which make future South Africans more than merely technically productive employees. A society driven by competition seeks knowledge and skills to increase advantage and employability, whereas a society encouraging personal freedom, self-esteem, and introspective living will embrace quality-of-life thinking. And such thinking resides within a broader framework of rationality.

- ‘Degrees’ of rationality

The other predominant conception of education operates from a hierarchical approach, assuming ‘degrees’ of rationality. This conception classifies school subjects according to taxonomy. The categories used by the taxonomist range from the ‘rational’ via the ‘less rational’ to the ‘non-rational’. Due to strong roots in the dichotomist’s framework of rationality, the taxonomist presumptuously appraises the more ‘rational’ subjects, such as mathematics and physical science, to represent the epitome of intelligence. Such subjects accordingly deserve to be at the core of the curriculum and should also be prioritised in terms of resource allocations. Social sciences, humanities and arts, due to their assumed minor claim on rationality, are devalued as ‘subordinate’, thereby shifted to the periphery of the curriculum, with less entitlement to the provision of resources. Goodlad (1992, 195) even accuses taxonomists of applying ‘sexist’ criteria in their categorisations. ‘Less rational’ subjects, such as the arts are classified as ‘soft’ and better suited for females. Conversely, mathematics and physical sciences are regarded as belonging to the more tough and ‘masculine’ world of schooling. Furthermore, since subjects like the arts are largely tactile, there is also a tendency to typify them as “… more of the hand than the head” and thus ‘less rational’ (Goodlad, 1992, 195).
Taxonomists nevertheless often acknowledge and value ‘subordinate’ subjects, albeit merely in terms of their peripheral and supplementary support to the top-ranked, ‘rational’ subjects. Grandin, Peterson and Shaw (Reimer, 1999, 248 – 250), for instance, argue that music should be presented in schools to support the development of learners’ spatial-temporal capabilities, since this competence is crucial for maths and science learning.

Taxonomists still hold on to the ideal that pure reason can save the world and ensure society’s advancement. With regards to social transformation, taxonomists accordingly conceive education’s role primarily in terms of superstructural transformation, assuming that problems pertaining to social transformation can and should be solved by applying skills and knowledge deriving from well-developed reasoning capacities. The belief moreover is that a strong cadre of properly trained scientists, technologists and economists has the ability to advance social transformation, since they will contribute to the country’s prosperity. A ‘transformed South African society’ is envisaged as a prosperous and scientifically advanced society, capable of dealing with and solving all its problems.

Comment
I believe that the taxonomist’s arrogant proprietary claim on rationality, and subsequent demand for the prioritisation of so-called ‘rational’ subjects in education, pose a serious threat to true social transformation. This view overlooks the fact that social transformation comprises two mutually reciprocal dimensions, and that to a large degree the superstructure depends on the infrastructure for its legitimacy and stability. This view furthermore fails to acknowledge that infrastructural aspects of transformation are more fundamental than superstructural aspects. I do not deny the urgency to implement strategies to ‘bridge the digital divide’ and accelerate ‘maths, science and technology education’. However, unfortunately, overconfident taxonomists often overlook the potential of ‘less rational’ subjects to improve our profound understanding of society, and moreover, to nurture compassionate citizens, a crucial requirement for a stable superstructure and a fundamental characteristic of the ideal society.\textsuperscript{55}

Categorizing subjects according to their assumed claim on rationality thus directly impacts on education’s contribution to true social transformation. Such a stance fails to see these subjects’

\textsuperscript{55} See Chapter 6.14 and Chapter 10.3.
... vital and irreplaceable contribution to citizenship, without which we will very likely have an obtuse and emotionally dead citizenry, prey to the aggressive wishes that so often accompany an inner world dead to the images of others (UT, 426).

The taxonomist’s inclination to sideline subjects like the arts and humanities in education, may subsequently become, as Nussbaum appropriately warns,

... a recipe for the production of pathological narcissism, of citizens who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of the issues at stake (UT, 426).

Furthermore, at the core of my personal transformation, as described in Part 2, was my personal struggle to ‘come to terms with history’. Ndebele fittingly cautions,

The study of history is especially urgent as it helps to prevent amnesia, checks triumphalism, opposes the manipulative or instrumental use of the past, and provides an educational buffer against the ‘dumbing down’ of our citizens (NDE, 2000, 6).

Should the taxonomist strive to enhance the transformation of the South African society, a conception of rationality, which also acknowledges the emotions as cognitive judgements, should be embraced.

11.5 Conclusion: A perspective based on Nussbaum’s theory

Although clearly insufficient, the above views of both adversaries nevertheless need to be acknowledged and respected. Both stances reflect a concerning interest in the development and potential prosperity of South Africa, which they believe will benefit the social transformation of the country. Both views also recognise the crucial contribution of education in this regard. The instrumentalist, on the one hand, realises that South Africa’s financial status in the world economy needs to improve urgently and dramatically, should this country wish to avoid the daunting examples of some neighbouring African countries. It is common knowledge that the majority of South Africans live beneath the bread margin. Such sectors of our population try merely to survive under appalling poverty conditions. Statistics furthermore indicate that the unemployment rate is unacceptably high with little if any hope for improvement in the near future. Very often basic survival instincts, such as sheer hunger, force people, including young children, to resort to criminal activities, such as stealing or robbing. Additionally, and along with the fast growing increase in fatalities caused by HIV and AIDS related illnesses, conditions of destitution generate various kinds of diseases. In short, the results of insufficient pecuniary resources are already devastating and particularly harmful to a society involved in a prolonged transformation process. A flourishing economy does indeed have the promising potential to decelerate the
vicious cycle caused by fiscal difficulties and turn it around to the benefit of all South African citizens. Hence, nobody can deny the vital role of education to enhance this process. Should the percentage of unschooled, unskilled and unqualified citizens be reduced, a turn in the unemployment rate is undeniably possible. Consequently, as soon as more people are ensured of sufficient income to provide in basic requirements for decent living, expectations of a substantial decrease in the unacceptably high incidence of crime is not improbable. The instrumentalist’s faith in the promising potential of education deserves to be recognised, albeit a very narrow conception of the real purpose and value of education – and a simplistic conception of social transformation.

The taxonomist’s conception of education also has merit. In the global society of the third millennium, a country’s scientific and technological progress is closely linked to its economic disposition and the subsequent circumstances of life of its citizens. Moreover, a country that fails to keep up with the astonishing tempo of technological development worldwide will be marginalized and probably devalued alongside with some other countries as a ‘developing third world country’, with little if any claim to international stature. Given South Africa’s historical and current social and political complexities as well as its location in Africa, the urgent need for quality scientists, technologists, doctors, engineers, mathematicians and so forth, cannot be denied. Add here the so-called ‘brain-drain’56 phenomenon, and the pressure to supply the critical demand for properly qualified people in these subject areas seems even more urgent. In general, a serious and dedicated attempt to enhance the development of people’s ‘intellectual’ capacities will indeed prove to generate outcomes of benefit to the whole of society. Scientists, doctors, technologists and engineers can contribute to the improvement of South Africans’ life conditions. The taxonomist’s claim to the enhancement of the social transformation of South Africa is thus understandable and acceptable.

However, should these two stances infiltrate the predominant conceptions of both education and social transformation, I believe that we have ample reason for serious apprehension. As explained earlier in this chapter, my main concern relates to both these stances’ obvious foundations in the ancient Stoic and subsequent Enlightenment conception of rationality. The failure to acknowledge and attend to the emotions as integral parts of rationality is evident. Neither the instrumentalist, nor the

56 The ‘brain-drain’ refers to the emigration of highly qualified people to affluent first-world countries.
taxonomist regard the emotions as intelligent guides and potential mechanisms to address the complex issues pertaining to social transformation. Such stances cannot guarantee improved social interaction between citizens - a central thrust of both Nussbaum and Rousseau’s stances. Because there is no reason for optimism about the possibility that people will be more considerate and compassionate, and less intolerant, sexist and racist, or refrain from stereotyping, injustice and blatant exploitation once they live in more affluent or technologically advanced conditions.

Moreover, examples in recent history reveal that some highly intellectual people have committed the most horrendous atrocities in the history of mankind. The German holocaust, Nagasaki and Hiroshima atom bombs, chemical weaponry of the Vietnam War, and 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre are disastrous evidence of the products of mankind’s ingenious intellect. The war against Iraq provides a further example of a disjunction between intellect and compassion. In our own country, Dr. Wouter Basson, a highly intelligent medical researcher employed during the 1980s by the South African Defence Force, managed to establish a chemical and biological warfare capacity for the Apartheid government.

These examples suggest that neither the instrumentalist, nor the taxonomist’s proposals to ‘solve the problems of the world’, and more locally, enhance the social transformation of this country, especially via education, will ensure legitimate and enduring transformation. Because, due to their conception of rationality, these stances fail to recognise a fundamental constituent element of rationality itself. These stances fail to appreciate emotions as cognitive judgements, which direct people’s rational thinking towards appropriate decisions and adequate behaviour. Hence, these stances will fail to address the crucial issues pertaining to infrastructural transformation.

Reflecting again on my own personal transformation process, it is evident that the prime instigator and driving force was my emotions, and not my ‘well-developed’ reasoning capacities. In Part 2 I have analysed my personal transformation within the framework provided by the three constitutive elements of Nussbaum’s ‘intelligent emotions’ and illustrated how profoundly this particular framework of rationality relates to the complex aspects of infrastructural transformation. One can thus argue that central to infrastructural transformation are the emotions as object-intentional, evaluative judgements.
Any conception of rationality that excludes this crucial aspect fails to comprehend real social transformation, because it fails to recognise its double-layered texture, thereby overlooking the infrastructural dimension. Should such a restricted conception then underpin the conception of ‘education for transformation’, one can assume that it refers merely to ‘education for superstructural transformation’.
Chapter 12: Education for transformation

Political systems are human, and they are only good if they are alive in a human way. If we produced an excellent social welfare system and yet dead, obedient, authority-focused citizens, that would not prove stable; nor would it accomplish the goal of political society, which is to enable citizens to search for the good life (both in and outside of the political sphere) in their own way (UT, 404).

12.1 Introduction

In Chapter 10, I have argued that a true, legitimate transformation process implies transformation at two reciprocal levels or dimensions, which I have called the infrastructural and the superstructural level. The superstructure refers to the political sphere and this dimension of transformation is evident in external, structural changes in society. Conversely, the infrastructure refers to the personal sphere, implying the pre-political dispositions, relations and so forth of the individual. At the core of the infrastructure are individuals’ needs and happiness, their relationships and their ideas about life and development. At the core of infrastructural transformation then, are the conversions pertaining to these aspects and in Part 2 I have tried to illustrate the complex array and intensity of these profound, personal conversions. I have also argued that the infrastructure is more fundamental to social transformation than the superstructure, because to a large extent, the legitimacy and sustaining of the superstructure depends on the infrastructure. This does not mean, however, that the infrastructure precedes the superstructure, or vice versa. These two dimensions have a mutual, reciprocal influence on one another.

My personal conversions at infrastructural level did not happen voluntarily and unaided, but were fundamentally generated and shaped by my social interaction and relationships with other people. This aspect confirms a fundamental aspect of Nussbaum’s theory, namely that society influences and shapes an individual’s emotional life. Furthermore, my infrastructural transformation was also reinforced by certain (albeit small-scale at that stage), external, superstructural changes in society. One can thus argue that although infrastructural transformation is primarily concerned with the “… development and character of the particular individual” (Dent, 1988, 13), it is constituted, in large part, in relationships with others – and affected by changes pertaining to superstructural aspects.

The analysis of my own infrastructural transformation has also revealed that this dimension of transformation primarily involves emotional transformation. In

57 See Chapter 4.
accordance with Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic theory of emotions, I have demonstrated that such a personal transformation fits within such a structure of the emotions, since my personal, infrastructural conversions above all implied a revision of my existing object anthologies, evaluative beliefs and finally self-identity. It also involved the replacement of these elements by more appropriate anthologies, evaluative judgements and perceptions of the self. Essentially, this infrastructural transformation process occurred within this conception of rationality and I believe that a more restricted conception of rationality would not have been able to accommodate the intimate and subtle, yet also highly intense nuances of such a process. One can then argue that such restricted conceptions of rationality fail to comprehend the profound complexities of personal transformation, and will tend to marginalize infrastructural transformation.

In Chapter 11, I have subsequently argued that restricted conceptions of rationality, which do not acknowledge the emotions as constitutive elements of rationality itself, should be regarded as impediments to social transformation, because they are impediments to a proper appreciation of the complexities of infrastructural transformation. Should such narrow conceptions furthermore underpin conceptions of education, the concept of ‘education for transformation’ is built on shaky foundations and will fail to enhance the true and legitimate (double-layered) transformation of this country.

In this chapter I intend to examine the prospects of ‘education for transformation’. I will do this from the following premises with regard to social transformation and education:

- **Social transformation** has two reciprocal dimensions, namely the superstructure (or ‘political’) and the infrastructure (or ‘personal’).
  - Although these two levels are reciprocal, the legitimacy and sustaining of the superstructure depends on certain aspects of the infrastructure.
  - The infrastructure is thus more fundamental than the superstructure, but is not a prerequisite for superstructural transformation.
  - Central to the ideal society are compassionate citizens who will be able to ensure the stability and legitimacy of the superstructure.

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58 See Chapter 7.
59 See Chapter 8.
60 See Chapter 9.
• **Education** is (and should be) primarily concerned with ‘personal’ development, and operates primarily within the ‘personal’ sphere.
  o ‘Education for transformation’ should thus be conceived as attending to transformations of an infrastructural (‘personal’) nature, especially in order to foster compassion as a fundamental characteristic of the ideal citizen.
  o But narrow conceptions of rationality tend to marginalize infrastructural transformation.
  o ‘Education for transformation’ should thus be conceived in accordance with a framework of rationality that acknowledges the emotions as cognitive and part of rationality itself.

12.2 Foundations for ‘education for transformation’

The *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (Act 108 of 1996) provides the foundation for the new, democratic South African society. Regarding education, the Constitution subsequently “… provides the basis for curriculum transformation and development in contemporary South Africa” (NDE, 2002, 6). The core outcomes of the *Revised National Curriculum Statement* are thus “… derived from the Constitution [and] describe the kind of citizen the education and training system should aim to create” in the new, transformed society (NDE, 2002, 11).

But the Constitution is also seen to assist social transformation by articulating the values that should bind South Africans together in their new, transformed society. These Constitutional values are generally appraised as “… the common currency that make life meaningful, and the normative principles that ensure ease of life lived in common” (Ministry of Education, 2001, iv). Asmal and James refer to the need for Constitutional values in a transforming society by holding that “… South Africa would be a far more successful, dynamic and pleasant country if its present and future inhabitants were more careful about core human values, endorsed and promoted by our Constitution” (Asmal and James, 2002, xii). Ndebele (Asmal and James, 2002, 13) also refers to the link between Constitutional values and social transformation by arguing that these values will assist South Africans in defining their new collective identity. Mandela esteems the Constitution as “… the highest expression of the values of nation building (Asmal and James, 2002, ix). He subsequently refers to education’s role in this regard by stressing the fundamental link between the Constitution and education. He thus challenges education to promote and

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61 The national school curriculum of the Republic of South Africa.
consolidate these *Constitutional* values (Asmal and James, 2002, x). Mandela’s appraisal of education’s potential to endorse and reinforce the core human values, as expressed in the *Constitution*, is echoed by Asmal⁶², who sees education as “… an essential part of meeting the challenges” of social transformation (Ministry of Education, 2001, i).

The primarily foundational role of the *Constitution* in South African education is evident. One can conclude that it is generally accepted that education in South Africa is underpinned by the *Constitution*, not only with regard to the fundamental principles of the national curriculum but also with regard to the ‘core human values’ that should be fostered through education.

Yet, with regard to the transformation process in the country, there is enough public evidence to support cynicism about its progress, especially with regards to the personal sphere – of infrastructural transformation. There are still numerous manifestations in society of racism, intolerance, stereotyping and so forth. But perhaps even more alarming is the general consensus of evident moral decline, indicating a need for South Africans to be “… more careful about core human values, endorsed and promoted by our *Constitution*, [and] to embrace the notion of reciprocal human caring” (Asmal and James, 2002, xii).

In order to address this particular societal problem, the Ministry of Education has initiated a project to assist learners, as future South African citizens, to “… embrace the spirit of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa” (Ministry of Education, 2001, ii). The motivation to implement such a project in schools is based on the assertion that those values acquired and reinforced by social institutions, such as schools, are more significant and permanent than those values learnt otherwise. Asmal and James thus argue, that for these values “… to have real meaning for ordinary people in their everyday lives, they must be actively taught” (2002, xiii). Ten fundamental human values, rooted in the *Constitution* have accordingly been identified and described in the *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* (Ministry of Education, 2001). These ten values are, democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-racism and non-sexism, *ubuntu* (human dignity), an open society, accountability, the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation⁶³. These

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⁶² Prof. Kader Asmal is currently national Minister of Education in the Republic of South Africa.

⁶³ The *Manifesto* explains the ten *Constitutional* values’ place in education. For a brief synopsis, please refer to the Appendix.
Constitutional values should be instilled by means of specific strategies or approaches, “… in the belief that they will germinate in time, become rooted, and flourish” (Ministry of Education, 2001, 21). Sixteen appropriate strategies have been identified to promote these values of the Constitution “… through the educational system” (Ministry of Education, 2001, 21).

Comment
Despite the noble intentions of the Ministry to reverse South African society’s moral decline and to enhance social transformation by encouraging people involved in education to ‘embrace the spirit’ of a democratic South Africa, this project however, generates the following questions:

- Why did the Ministry perceive it necessary to initiate an additional, separate project to stimulate the fostering of values in schools?
- Why did the Ministry resort to the Constitution as its main source for the identification of the ten ‘fundamental human values’?

I want to address these two issues from one of the premises suggested at the beginning of this chapter. An abridged version of this premise would be to say that, primarily, ‘education for transformation should imply education for infrastructural transformation, which occurs mainly within a framework of rationality that acknowledges the emotions as cognitive elements of rationality itself.

Let us now attend to my first reservation: Why did the Ministry regard it necessary to initiate a separate, loose-standing project to instil values in education? Are values not inherent to education itself? Are values not implied in the concept of ‘education’? And since the national curriculum is founded in the Constitution, are these values then not implied in the Revised National Curriculum Statement?

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64 These are, “… nurturing a culture of communication and participation in schools; role-modelling: promoting commitment and competence among educators; ensuring that every South African is able to read, write, count and think; infusing the classroom with a culture of human rights; making arts and culture part of the curriculum; putting history back into the curriculum; introducing religion education into schools; making multilingualism happen; using sport to shape social bonds and nurture nation building at schools; ensuring equal access to education; promoting anti-racism in schools; freeing the potential of girls and boys; dealing with HIV/AIDS and nurturing of sexual and social responsibility; making schools safe to learn and teach in and ensuring the rule of law; ethics and the environment; and nurturing the new patriotism, or affirming our common citizenship” (Ministry of Education, 2001, 23 – 78).
‘Imported’ values

One may suspect that such a move suggests the notion that values belong to an external, separate component, which is not inherent to education but has to be added to education, hence, imported from outside. Should one adopt this explanation, there is furthermore reason to suspect that education is conceived in very narrow terms, as if education is primarily understood as the acquisition of competences and knowledge as conceived by the dichotomist, and his progenies, the instrumentalist and the taxonomist. One may now argue that I am assuming that these narrow conceptions exclude the concept of ‘value’ completely from their frameworks of rationality. What I am saying is that infrastructural transformation requires a specific kind of value, and I believe that this kind of value is to be found within the realm of the emotions. Because, according to Nussbaum’s framework, emotions are evaluative judgements – they are judgements of value. They are “… judicious responses to perceptions of value and are infused with intelligence” (UT,19). According to this conception of rationality then, the concept of ‘value’ is inherent to an emotion, and one can subsequently argue that, since emotions are cognitive, they have the ‘ability’ to discriminate and identify value. And once we acknowledge that emotions entail true or false judgements and appraisals that serve as guides to ethical choice, we cannot ignore them in accounts of ethical judgement. We need our emotions as intelligent and reliable guides to determine real value (UT, 374). As Nussbaum explains,

Seeing the emotions as forms of evaluative thought shows us that the question about their role in a good human life is part and parcel of a general inquiry into the good human life (UT, 11).

The point that I am making is that the mere fact that a separate project has to supplement education in South Africa in order to instil values, to ‘embrace the spirit’ of the new South Africa and establish the ‘good human life’, suggests a concern by the Ministry that the general conception of education amongst the majority of people involved in education is still based on narrow conceptions of rationality and subsequently education – as described in chapter 11. We need to remember that educational policies, the national school curriculum, and even textbooks, are still open to interpretation and need to be contextualized. In the final instance, it will be the teacher’s interpretative framework that will determine the implementation and application thereof.

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65 See Chapter 11.
66 See Chapter 2.
If the ‘Values in Education’ project is aimed then to enhance the ‘good, human life’ and promote social transformation by encouraging young South Africans to ‘embrace the spirit’ of the new nation, we should first and foremost ensure that everybody involved in education conceives rationality according to a broader framework of rationality, since such a (true) conception will fundamentally establish these people’s conceptions of education, and eventually determine education’s contribution to social transformation.

- ‘Instrumental’ (political) values

My additional reservation relates to the fact that this project resorts to the Constitution as its main source for the identification of ‘fundamental human values’. In addition to my previous argument, namely that human values should primarily be implied in the concept of education itself and should not be imported from some other source, is a concern that this project’s strong connection with the Constitution may suggest deeper-lying instrumental intentions. However, in this case, the instrumental intentions relate to political, and not (directly) to economic aspirations.

Education can indeed enhance social transformation. Yet the premise of this part of the thesis is that social transformation has an infrastructural as well as a superstructural dimension. An additional premise is that although these two dimensions are in a reciprocal relationship, the infrastructure is more fundamental than the superstructure, and the superstructure depends on some aspects of the infrastructure in order to be legitimate and to endure.

Let me now return to the Value project’s roots in the Constitution as the ‘articulation’ of ‘core, human values’. Will it be implausible to suspect an instrumental application of education to merely reinforce superstructural transformation? Because, looking at these ten ‘core human values’, I have serious reservations about the particular assortment. Whether democracy, social justice, equity, an open society and rule of law, for instance, can be classified as true ‘core human values’ can be contested. Because, reflecting again on my personal wrestling-combat with profound feelings of guilt as described in Part 2, it has now become apparent to me that many of the so-called ‘values’ endorsed by Christian National Education during the Apartheid years, were applied merely for instrumental purposes — to enforce an ideology and (attempting) to keep the superstructure stable. However, since the superstructure was not founded in a legitimate infrastructure, it eventually collapsed. This suggests
that the previous regime’s infrastructure was fragile and unstable, constructed with flawed building bricks. Flawed ‘values’, perhaps? I say, flawed, because they had been conceived outside a broad framework (which appraises emotions as ‘ethical guides’) and furthermore obtained in cultural and political isolation, independent and uninvolved with ‘others’. Because according to both Nussbaum and Rousseau, interaction with others is of fundamental importance in the development of the individual. For Nussbaum, this social interaction shapes the particular emotional repertoire of the individual. And for Rousseau, involvements with others, “... comprise an essential component of part of the form and content of (many of) the individual’s own constitutive principles and dispositions” (Dent, 1988, 13). Due to the social segregation of the Apartheid policy, the infrastructure of the previous regime was essentially incomplete, because it did not allow free relationships and interaction amongst citizens. It therefore did not allow for the development of (true) compassionate citizenship, where people could extend their circles of concern also to include ‘the other’.

This particular insight now illuminates the contradiction of the previous dispensation: Before 1994 most Afrikaners (ignorantly) regarded their government as a ‘democracy’ and National Party politicians also endorsed the ‘values’ of accountability, open society, rule of law, respect and so forth. However, due to the rootlessness of these ‘values’ there was no fundamental guiding principle, and most Afrikaners thus managed to rationalise their oppressive performance, while at the same time considering themselves as ‘living out Christian values’. It thus seems as if a possible answer to so many Afrikaners’ current troubled question, “Why didn’t I care?” can be found in a ubiquitous deficient conception of rationality, as well as restricted involvement with others, caused by social segregation. Many Afrikaners’ societal ‘values’, despite their assumed noble intentions, lacked particular ‘judgements of value’.

I want to return to my concern about the aspect of Constitutional values. I believe that, since it is generally accepted that the Constitution was drafted primarily to establish and sustain a new political order, one may assume that the Constitution primarily belongs to the political sphere. By saying this I nonetheless acknowledge the reciprocal interrelatedness between the (political) superstructure and the (personal) infrastructure. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the categorisation of concepts

67 See Chapter 4.
68 As in original text.
such as reconciliation, openness, accountability and so forth as ‘core human values’ does seem to be suspiciously instrumental for political reasons.

Moreover, their descriptions and applications\textsuperscript{69} for education seem to be suspiciously far removed, and even detached from a comprehensive framework of rationality. Social justice, for instance, refers to aspects like ‘the right to proper housing, healthcare services’, and so on (Ministry of Education, 2001, 14). Non-racism and non-sexism should be applied to ‘redress historical imbalances and ensure equal access to education’ (Ministry of Education, 2001,15). An open society is conceived as a society that ‘allows dialogue and discussion’, and so forth (Ministry of Education, 2001,16). Although the descriptions of these ‘values’, especially with regards to their relevance for education, do in some cases suggest references to more comprehensive conceptions of both rationality and social transformation, the above explanations indicate ‘shallow’ and simplistic conceptions. In this regard, I want to propose that they should rather be conceived as principles, which should indeed prevail not only in South African classrooms, but also in the broader society

However, these principles still require indispensable fundamental \textit{values} to fill them with human substance, should ‘education for transformation’ be conceived also as enhancing infrastructural transformation. This ‘human substance’, I believe, can only be found within a conception of rationality, which acknowledges the emotions as intelligent, rational \textit{judgements of value} and indispensable parts “... of our reasoning capacity as political creatures” (UT, 3). Nussbaum’s prioritising of compassion\textsuperscript{70}, for its strong links to “... the political structure of a state that is both democratic and liberal”\textsuperscript{71} (UT, 401), leads me to argue that this particular emotion, as an intelligent element of rationality itself, should be at the core of our conception of ‘values in education’. In this sense, one can thus argue that compassion is not only a human emotion, but should also be regarded as a fundamental human value.

Therefore, primary to the principles as formulated in the \textit{Manifesto}, education should first and foremost aim to foster compassion, not only in learners but also in the broader society. Once compassion becomes part of people’s interpretative framework, education will be able to enhance true social transformation. Because at

\textsuperscript{69} See Appendix.

\textsuperscript{70} In Chapter 6.2, I have discussed the difference between compassion and empathy. Empathy, unlike compassion, is morally neutral.

\textsuperscript{71} See Chapter 6.14.
the core of the infrastructure will be compassionate individuals who care for one another and who are willing to extend their circles of concern to include others. Such an infrastructure will consequently provide a firm foundation for a stable and legitimate superstructure.

12.5 Conclusion: Education for transformation

We will continue to need compassion as an appropriate response and as a motive to attend with concern to the needs of our fellows, a motive that needs recognition in the design of the political conception and in the education of citizens (UT, 405).

According to Nussbaum’s theory, one of the key features of an emotion is its origin in infancy. In part one I have provided an account of the pivotal influence of childhood on the mature emotional life of any person. Nussbaum also points out that preferably, a child’s emotions should develop in an environment that is relatively stable (UT, 209). This, she believes “… will and should be done privately, within families” (UT, 426). However, given the ubiquitous realities of local conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, this assumption needs to be treated with some sceptical reservation.

According to Fukuyama’s ‘Great Disruption’ theory, nuclear families had started to break up in the 1960s, due to the occurrence of cultural, economic and technological changes (Ziehl, 2003, 215). Although Fukuyama’s theory is mainly based on research done in First World countries, his claim that the crumbling of nuclear family life, (a family form mainly associated with Western societies), obstructs “… the chances that values and norms emphasising honesty, responsibility and reciprocity will be passed on to the younger generation” is also relevant to our context (Ziehl, 2003, 216). Additionally, research done by Amoateng and Richter (2003, 247, 263) on the predominantly extended family form of indigenous South African populations, reveals severe disruptions caused by colonialism and Apartheid’s political and economic policies, (such as influx control, migrant labour, the freezing of family housing, and transport and labour regulations).

But perhaps the most serious concern relates to the HIV and AIDS pandemic that is currently sweeping through Sub-Saharan Africa with devastating consequences. According to the global summary of UNAIDS, prevalence rates in some African countries are already between 35% and 40%. Especially relevant for education, is the report’s prediction that the total number of maternal and two-parent orphans for

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72 See Chapter 5.
73 An organisation of the United Nations.
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is expected to increase from 9.85 million in 2001 to 18.67 million in 2010. Even more alarming is the forecast that by that time, in worst affected countries, 30% to 40% of all children are expected to be orphans. Without parents to attend not only to the physical and material well-being, but also to the emotional development of their children, the future of society seems to be shaky, unless schools adopt a more nurturing role, attending not only to intellectual and skill development but also the emotional development of children in their care.

South Africans are thus urged to revisit their conception, not only of rationality, education and social transformation, but also of the role of schools in the nurturing of future citizens’ healthy emotional life.

In conclusion, then: In order for the South African society to transform in such a way that the transformation will be legitimate and sustained, transformation should be conceived as comprising two dimensions, linked to one another through mutual reciprocity. The personal, infrastructural dimension is more profound and fundamental than the superstructural or ‘political’ dimension. In order to endure and to be legitimate, the superstructure depends on some aspects of the infrastructure. Yet, the infrastructure is primarily concerned with individual needs and human good, because inherent to the infrastructure are people’s ideas about life, development and interpersonal relations. In order then for a person to transform, his or her ideas about life, other people, and so forth, also need to transform.

But, as Part 2 has demonstrated, these personal transformations happen in the emotional life of the individual, because, primarily, these personal transformations involve revisions of object anthologies, evaluative beliefs and perceptions of the self, which are all components of a cognitive theory of the emotions. In order for transformation of the infrastructure to happen, the emotions should thus be regarded as constitutive components of rationality itself – which is the main claim of Nussbaum’s theory. Since education is regarded as a main artery for the enhancement of social transformation in South Africa, education should be built on such a conception. But according to this framework of rationality, a person’s emotional life is primarily constituted in early childhood and within the family circle. And in South Africa at present, the lack of strong, nuclear family groups, as well as the dismantling of extended families, as well as the predicted increase in ‘AIDS orphans’ mean that schools should take on board an even stronger role in respect to emotional development.
Coda

Introduction
In the previous chapters of Part 3 I have argued that the social transformation of this country should be conceived in terms of having a double-layered texture. These two dimensions are reciprocally interrelated. Superstructural transformation refers to the visible, structural changes in the political order, brought about by new legislations, laws, rules and so forth. Infrastructural transformation refers to the equally important aspect of personal transformation of South African citizens. Reflecting on my own personal transformation, as described in Part 2, I have argued that, for a social transformation process to be legitimate and be sustained, South African citizens primarily need to transform at the infrastructural level. I have also inferred that should education be conceived as one of the key sites where social transformation can be facilitated, it is important that education conscientiously attend to aspects of infrastructural transformation. This can only happen if education is conceived within a framework of rationality that acknowledges the emotions as intelligent, constitutive components of rationality itself. I have subsequently warned against two ubiquitous adversarial stances in education, both rooted in a conceptual framework that excludes the emotions as integral components of rationality. These stances will subsequently obstruct true transformation. I have furthermore argued that an additional project of the Ministry to instil values in education is also suspect due to its apparent misconception of transformation and education. I have finally concluded that, especially in a transforming country that is above all challenged by the dismantling of family structures and the ominous prospects of exorbitant HIV and AIDS infection rates and subsequent fatalities, schools should accept that they have an increased responsibility with regards to the emotional development of learners.

Emotions and music
Although a variety of strategies can and should be applied to foster learners’ emotional lives, I will add to this thesis a brief motivation pertaining to music education’s potential in this regard. I base my claim not only on Nussbaum’s appraisal of music and the other arts as a means to enhance emotional development, but also on other theorists’ appraisal of the profound link between music and emotion.

74 A coda is the final section of a musical piece, which normally adds extra dramatic energy to the work as a whole. The term is also used to refer to an additional section at the end of a text that is not necessary to its structure but gives additional information.
Dewey, for instance, regards music as “… both the lowest and the highest of the arts” (1934, 238) and refers to the dramatic and intense impact of the sounds of music on any person.

Sounds come from outside the body, but sound itself is near, intimate; it is an excitation of the organism … What is seen stirs emotion indirectly… but sounds have the power of direct emotional expression. A sound is itself threatening, whining, soothing, depressing, fierce, tender, soporific, in its own quality (1934, 237-238).

My primary justification for this particular focus however, relates to Nussbaum’s assertion that “[m]usic has deep connections to our emotional lives” (UT, 249) and that music is “… the means of communication between souls” (UT, 266). Additionally, my own experience as musician and music educator supports my claim that music education can and should contribute profoundly, not only to the emotional development of South African learners, but also to the social transformation of this country, especially at the infrastructural level.

Emotions, music and language
Nussbaum’s strong appraisal of music’s ability to cultivate learners’ emotional life is based on her claim that music has the ability to go beyond the inadequacies of language. When people communicate, they normally do this linguistically. Moreover, when they share their feelings, this is also done by means of language. We need to remember however, that language is only one medium of expression. People frequently misunderstand one another, as a result of linguistic distortions. When we express the content of an emotion in words, we are already, in many cases, performing a translation of thoughts that did not originally take an explicitly verbal form (UT, 264). Language simply cannot enter an emotion in its most subtle form, because certain forms of cognitive activity, which represent ideas of salience and urgency, are non-linguistic (UT, 263).

Music, on the other hand, can relate to the inner world without being translatable into words. Nussbaum argues that music has the ability to elude mere habit, usage and intellectualising and express parts of the personality that are masked from conscious self-understanding. Its admittance to the profundity of emotions is much more direct and influential than words.

Another way of expressing the point is that music seems to elude our self-protective devices, our techniques of manipulation and control, in such a way that it seems to write directly into our blood (UT, 269).
Of particular significance for schooling is Nussbaum’s conviction that music is more sympathetic to the ancient and indistinct emotions of childhood, because music does not have the normal narrative and objective structures of language, affording emotions with sharper precision (UT, 269). Her views are strongly endorsed by the views of Bennett Reimer, esteemed philosopher of music education, who warns that a major part of human reality, “… the way life feels as it is lived” cannot be fully elucidated or refined in our experience solely through the use of ordinary language, and will remain forever closed off. “This is not because no one has taken the time to think up enough words to name all possible ways of feeling; it is because the nature of feeling is ineffable in essence” (Reimer, 2003, 85,86). Dunlop also concurs that,

Attempts to describe experience thus always ‘leave something out’, and subtly distort what is conveyed … In any case we only really know our feelings in finding an expressive medium for them (1984, 92, 93).

Sheer accounts of emotion and feeling are always insufficient, because at the level of feeling-awareness, where the meanings of the world are directly borne in upon us, experience is qualitative and unrepeatable. Furthermore, feelings are often so profound, exceptional and unique that we struggle to find words for them. Music then accomplishes what language cannot do. It names the feelings for us, only in sounds instead of words (Bernstein in Reimer, 2003,85).

**Emotions, music and social transformation**

In the South African multilingual society encompassing eleven official languages, insufficient communication, due to language barriers, can be regarded as one of the major causes for misunderstanding, misinterpretation, stereotyping, intolerance, frustration and above all, lack of knowledge about the other. Unfortunately, many South Africans’ attitudes towards their fellow citizens, especially those from another cultural group, are still based on incorrect perceptions, mainly due to misinformation and ignorance about one another, caused by past segregation political policies. To many South Africans, the physical and emotional well-being of people outside the immediate family and cultural circle was, and still is of no significant importance. Many people’s circles of concern are still alarmingly small and merely focused on those belonging to their own cultural group. Many South Africans are still alarmingly indifferent and apathetic to human predicaments such as poverty and HIV and AIDS related traumas.

In Part 2 I have argued that personal transformation fundamentally implies a revisiting of one’s object anthology, beliefs and perceptions. In order to generate
personal, infrastructural transformation, such a process of introspection should result in the enlargement of one’s circle of concern – in the flourishing of one’s own compassion. However, in order to become acquainted with one another, one needs to find a means to connect with the other. The success or failure of such a reconnoitring exploration will thus be facilitated by adequate means of communication. In this regard, music’s indispensable value is clear. Not only has music the ability to reach deeper, it is also universally shareable.

Reimer, for instance proclaims music as a “panhuman constant”, since it is essentially trans-cultural and trans-personal (1993, 24). He points out that all humans all through history and in every culture have had some sort of music. It always uses sounds and the sounds are always organized in some way or other by human choices. This organization of sounds is always experienced as meaningful, significant, compelling, and important. The sounds always intensify human experience. They capture a sense of human knowing at a level including inner subjectivities; that is, musical sounds always engage human feelings. They also always engage the human imagination, both in creating those sounds and in responding imaginatively to the musical sounds created by others (Reimer, 1993, 24, 25).

For traditional African cultures in particular, music echoes and expresses their understanding of the world as portrayed to them by the distinctiveness of their past, their surroundings, their social order, habits, principles, ways of living, dying, marrying, and playing – all closely linked to the larger ecosystem of their environment on which they have to rely for physical survival and cultural identity. Their music is a manifestation of their inner lives. It is specific to the conditions of their lives, expressing that which they have uniquely experienced as they have lived in their unique environment (Hopton-Jones 1995, 26,27). Although a specific culture gives a distinct character to its music, music will always surpass the constraints of that particular character because it also possesses collective, musically determined assets, independent of the particular culture. Studies done by ethnomusicologists indicate that all music, despite the various cultural origins, shares many universal aspects, such as clear beginnings and endings, repetition, contrast, balance, rhythmic, textural and melodic elements (Goodkin, 1994, 42; Hopton-Jones, 1995, 26; McCarthy & Goble, 2002, 2; Reimer, 2003, 185-189). Harwood (Reimer, 2003, 187) also argues that music represents basic human cognitive and social processes at work in interpreting and adjusting to the real world. According to Nettl, ethnomusicologists have concluded, that “… music is a cultural universal of humans” (1994,139). Although not all human cultures would agree on the concept of music,
Nettl believes that it is true that “… all societies have something that sounds to us, broad-minded, musical Americans and Europeans, like music” (1994,139). All people, no matter the location, their race, gender, or age, respond to it, find meaning in it, and treasure music for its intrinsic power to enhance and intensify their lived experience.

It then seems that, due to its own internal constructive characteristics, music can be shared by all humans, and that this sharing goes beyond the cultural manifestations of these unique characteristics. In this regard one can assume that music education has the potential, not only to develop the emotional lives of learners, but also to enhance infrastructural transformation.

For years, music educators have been engaged in endless struggles to defend the inclusion of music in school curricula. In their endeavours, they often rely on inadequate justifications, thereby degrading music in instrumental terms and subordinating it to so-called ‘intellectual’ subjects, such as mathematics and physical science. Yet, understood within a comprehensive framework of rationality, the importance of conceiving music as part of mainstream education to the benefit not only of each individual, but also to society at large is indisputably clear.

**Conclusion**

Due to some prevailing and influential conceptual frameworks, emotions are easily overlooked in our deliberations about South African education. Emotions need to be incorporated into our paradigm of rationality and seen as integral components of cognition. This belief should inform and direct our idea of what it means to educate the whole child and what it means for education to contribute to social transformation. Strategies should be implemented to cultivate the emotions, and especially compassion in schools. I have concluded that due to music’s profound link to emotions, it can make a powerful contribution to transformation. An education programme beneficial to the cultivation of emotions should therefore strongly emphasize and cater for music, as expressed in a variety of cultures. Only then will it be possible to nurture each individual learner’s emotional life, facilitate the social transformation of this country and thereby ultimately enhance the quality of life of South African citizens.
(Please note: The following book has been used as the central source for this study: Nussbaum, M. 2001. *Upheavals of thought. The Intelligence of Emotions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Throughout the thesis, references to this book will be indicated as (UT), followed by the relevant page number).

**Bibliography A (Works cited and referred to in Part 2 and Part 3 of this thesis)**


Appendix

Synopsis of *The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy*

In the *Manifesto*, the ten *Constitutional* values’ place in education is explained as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>The <em>Manifesto</em> defines democracy as “… a society’s means to engage critically with itself” (2001,13). It acknowledges that democracy implies an ‘immense responsibility’ and regards education as the key, because, “… it empowers us to exercise our democratic rights, and shape our destiny, by giving us the tools to participate in public life, to think critically, and to act responsibly” (2001,13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice and equity</td>
<td>Social justice has to be implemented to rectify the injustices of the past. The <em>Constitution</em> sees the right to proper housing, health-care services, sufficient food and water, social security and basic education as unchallengeable rights. Additionally, all children under the age of eighteen have the absolute right to be protected from ill-treatment, desertion, abuse or humiliation. According to these aspects of the <em>Constitution</em>, all South African learners should have admission to schools, and in their mother tongue if they wish to (2001, 14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>The <em>Constitution</em> indisputably regards every person as equal before the law. Every form of discrimination is rejected. This means that all learners should get equal education and equal opportunities to develop their full potential. The state is compelled to supply all schools with same access to resources and staff. This clause in the <em>Constitution</em> also rejects any form of discrimination between individuals. Teachers are not allowed to discriminate against learners, just as learners are not allowed to discriminate against teachers. From this clause the values of tolerance and respect originate (2001,14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-racism and non-sexism</td>
<td>People should not only be regarded as equal, but they should also be treated as equal. In the past many people have been discriminated against on grounds of race or gender. The <em>Manifesto</em> endorses practices striving to redress these imbalances, such as ensuring equal access of learners to education, equal attainment of black and female learners and teachers, and so on. No harassment should be allowed and all places of learning should be safe (2001, 15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu</td>
<td>The values of <em>ubuntu</em> (‘I am human because you are human’) and human dignity emphasise the need for compassion, kindness, altruism and respect. If these are at the core of education, schools will become places where the culture of teaching and learning thrive. Schools will then become “… dynamic hubs of industry and achievement rather than places of conflict and pain” (2001,16). <em>Ubuntu</em> embodies the concept of mutual understanding and the active appreciation of the value of human difference. It requires that one knows others if one is to know oneself, and if one is to understand one’s place – and the others’ place – within a multicultural environment. Ultimately, <em>ubuntu</em> requires one to respect others if one is to respect oneself (2001, 15, 16).</td>
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<td>Section</td>
<td>Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>An open society</td>
<td>In an open and democratic society government is based on the will of the people. In this sense, democracy and openness are interchangeable and interdependent values. The Constitution provides us with the route to an open society: We have the ‘right’ to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, the press, artistic creativity, academic freedom, freedom of scientific research, assembly and association. But these rights come with certain responsibilities. The rights to openness may not be exercised if they intend to incite violence, propagate war or advocate hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion. Democratic citizenship implies participation rather than observation. It means that people should talk, listen and assess continuously. To be able to do this, people need to be empowered to read, think and create artistically. Learners should get access to a wide range of information and obtain the tools to process the information critically and intelligently. For this reason, a culture of dialogue and debate should be encouraged. Values and priorities should be discussed, evaluated and constantly readressed. In educational terms, this value is found at the core of the curriculum, which treasures debate, discussion, and critical thought. It is assumed that a society that knows how to talk and how to listen does not need to rely on violence (2001, 16,17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability (responsibility)</td>
<td>Through voting, some people get the power to make decisions on behalf of others. But the powerful have to be held accountable. The Constitution thereby declares that public administration, including the public school system, should be governed by the values and principles of professionalism, efficiency, equity, transparency, representivity and accountability. All citizens in society are stakeholders in education in one or another way, and in this regard communities should take responsibility for them. “Accountability in the education system means institutionalising this responsibility according to codes of conduct and the meeting of formal expectations”(2001, 18). Teachers are responsible for learners during school hours. They are accountable to school governing bodies and educational authorities, which are accountable to the broader community and to the citizens of the democratic society. “Accountability means that we are all responsible for the advancement of our nation through education and through our schools and that we are all responsible, too, to others in our society, for our individual behaviour. There can be no rights without responsibilities” (2001, 18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law</td>
<td>South Africa is founded on the value of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. This means that the law is supreme and there is a consensus of rules and regulations we must obey. We also understand that if we do not obey the law, the State may punish us. In schools, the rule of law holds us all to a common code of appropriate conduct. This rule of law helps us to know that if we don’t obey it, we will be disciplined by those to whom we are accountable. Everybody involved in education is subject to the law of the country. Fraud, abuse, illegal possession of narcotics, weapons and so on are not allowed. Teachers may not be intimidated. Custodians of the rule of law should apply it even-handedly, fairly and proportionally. If not – they are also in contravention of the rule of law (2001, 18,19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>Respect, in addition to intelligence or wit, can probably be regarded as the essential quality that symbolises enlightened humanity. Although respect is not explicitly defined in the Constitution, it is implicit in the way the Bill of Rights governs relationships. The Manifesto regards respect as an essential precondition for communication, teamwork and productivity. Schools can only function properly when there is mutual respect between educators and parents and educators and learners. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, South Africa internationally declares “...education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom” (2001, 19). The Convention of the Rights of the Child requests education to be steered towards strengthening the development of respect for the child’s parents, cultural identity, languages, values and the national values of the child’s country (2001, 19, 20).</td>
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</tbody>
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To heal and reconcile past differences in South Africa is not an easy task. It also requires redressing in material ways such as social justice. In the pursuit of peace, national unity and well-being of all South African citizens, the focus will have to be on reconciliation between people and reconstruction of society. We all need to accept one another through learning about interacting with each other – and studying how we have interacted with each other in the past. Reconciliation means that we accept that South Africa is made up of people and communities with very different cultures and traditions, and with very different experiences of what it means to be a South African. Reconciliation will only be possible if we acknowledge and understand the rich and complex, although difficult history. From reconciliation, the conditions of peace, well-being and unity will naturally flow. This will adhere to a common identity and a common notion of South Africanness. But in South Africa there can be no reconciliation without transformation (2001, 20).

(Ministry of Education, 2001, 11 – 20)