CHAPTER I

REGIME POLITICS AND SERVICE PROVISION
IN THE CAPE TOWN UNICITY COUNCIL

Introduction

This study examines the conflicts that are taking place among the political parties (notably the African National Congress [ANC], the Democratic Alliance [DA] and the Independent Democrats [ID]) in the Cape Town Unicity Council in South Africa’s Western Cape Province. These conflicts take the form of shifting political alliances, stemming largely from political floor crossing\(^1\), differing political agendas, territorial rivalries and race-based politics. It explains the implications of these disputes and the recent local regime changes on service delivery in Cape Town. Using urban regime theory, it attempts to explain how the communities of Parkwood Estate and Ottery in the Cape Town Unicity Council are governed and how these governing arrangements have operated with respect to ANC and DA control over the area. The focus on Cape Town sets the context for understanding the broader social, economic and political dynamics within which these areas are located. Different political parties and political alliances have shuffled in and

\(^1\)In 2002 Parliament enacted legislation to enable a member of national and provincial legislature or a municipal council to change party membership without losing membership of that legislature or council as well as allowing an existing party to merge with another party. Legislation was introduced in April 2008 to repeal floor crossing.
out of municipal government in Cape Town and there have been far-reaching consequences for communities and service delivery. It is in this context that this study hopes to uncover the implications of party disputes for service delivery provision in two local communities namely, Parkwood Estate and Ottery, within a metropolitan area that has been destabilized not only by apartheid but also by the constant change in the dominant party in the post apartheid period up to 2008. This study is significant given what Schrire (2001) stated that the complex relationships between political parties will do much to determine the quality and the stability of the political order. Significantly too, the local state cannot be separated from national forces and economic and political processes that affect the actions of the local state and the nature of development policies. The conceptual framework of urban regime theory provides the backdrop to the study. The political world is complex, thus it is the task of urban regime theory to understand the political arena.

Urban Regime Theory

The state and urban politics provides the background for the study. The urban regime framework offers an understanding of the structure of governing regimes and focuses on the processes of local coalition building for the purposes of promoting local economic development. It draws historically on the work of several authors who have documented the importance of urban regime theory in the study of the city and in critically analyzing the way cities
are governed (Dahl, 1961; Mollenkopf, 1994; Stone, 2005). Therefore, it
reflects some of the key components from earlier writers. There are several
core elements of urban regime theory according to Stone (2005): firstly, it
involves an understanding of how particular regimes come into being, that is,
the historical details; secondly, that governing coalitions are formed around
important issues; it also offers an understanding of how local communities are
governed; fourthly, that urban politics is linked to social and economic
inequalities; and finally, it offers a model of how governing arrangements
operate (the agenda, key actors and resource adequacy).

Mollenkopf (1994), writing on urban power, recognized that political actors are
responsible for shaping the urban political arena. In addition, they also form
political coalitions with other groups such as private and public sector elites in
an attempt to foster economic development and growth. Stone supported the
idea that political and issue-oriented coalitions are formed between different
political actors. However, these coalitions are unstable and realigned as
issues shifted with changing times and conditions (Harvey, 1985, in Seethal
1993; Stone, 2005). The nature of the agenda determines the groups that
come together to form these governing coalitions. Therefore, the governing
coalition must be able to draw together the resources appropriate for its policy
coherence” as a product of the class relations between capital and labour.
This tendency towards a structured coherence gives a material base to
alliance formation within urban regions (Seethal, 1993).
Critical also to urban regime theory is the relationship between social inequality and political power. Not surprisingly, Stone asserted that social problems are deeply embedded in a system of stratified inequality. Consequently, urban regime analysis is also about what it would take to build a priority agenda that is aimed at improving social problems. Dahl (1961) notably argued that the distribution of resources and the ways in which they are, or are not used constitute an important source of both political change and stability.

The nature of governing coalitions also opens up the space for policy conflicts. Dahl noted that there is usually some conflict in the political stratum between intellectuals, experts and others who formulate issues and the party politicians themselves, as the first group demands attention to issues in which the politicians see no profit and even electoral damage. Shefter (1985) acknowledged that city officials have an incentive to reach compromises with their opponents and reduce conflicts occurring within the institution of the state. For Stone (Stone 1980, cited in Davies 2002), systemic power (power available to certain interests because of their position in the socio-economic structure) resulted in an indirect conflict between favoured and disfavoured groups. The favoured are normally those concerned with economic growth, while the disfavoured are interested in redistribution.

There are linkages that exist between the local state and national forces. Several authors noted the link between urban politics and wider economic and
political forces as well as the economic restructuring which has led to the shift from local government to local governance (Clarke and Gaile, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Hamnett, 1998; Jessop, Peck and Tickell 1999; Sassen, 1991; Short, 1989, in LeGates and Stout, 2003). They recognized that formal government at a local level operated alongside a range of other actors from the private and non-profit sectors. In addition, a new urban politics is emerging which is characterized by the shift away from the local provision of welfare services towards policies promoting economic growth and development.

Harvey (1989) referred to the phenomenon of the shift towards economic growth and development as the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Entrepreneurialism has as its centerpiece, the notion of a public-private partnership in which a traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of local state powers to attract external sources of funding and new direct investments. Significantly, Harvey (1989) showed that hardly any large scale development occurred without the local state (or the broader coalition of forces constituting local governance) offering a substantial package of aid and assistance as incentives. He affirmed that in the 1980s a general consensus emerged in the advanced capitalist world about the positive benefits of cities taking an entrepreneurial stance towards economic development. Furthermore, this consensus was held across national boundaries and even across political parties.
Shefter (1985) argued that cities cannot protect themselves from various national and international developments that have important implications for the interests of city residents. Significantly, he stated that there is a two-way flow of political ideas across their boundaries, just as there is a flow of people, commodities and capital. Similarly, there are vertical political linkages that exist between the national and local state. Local areas are neither autonomous, nor isolated from wider state structures, political processes and economic links. Therefore, the institutions of the elected local state are subject to a national framework of regulations and standards. Likewise, local political agents do possess agency, but they also occupy positions within networks, structures and systems that constrain their range of feasible actions and the longer-term consequences of the choices that they make. Consequently, cities are components of a broader political regime (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999; Shefter, 1985).

Finally, the role of local communities cannot be excluded from the study of urban politics. An important question is whether the political stratum can be easily penetrated by those seeking to give voice to their concerns and issues concerning their communities. According to Stone (2005), for groups with a history of political, social and economic marginality, having political impact called for becoming part of a locality’s governing arrangements. However, no group is confined to a position of permanent political exclusion. As the literature review shows, in South Africa, civil society has actively engaged the local state on various issues, most notably, service delivery.
Several authors in South Africa shared similar views about politics in the urban environment (Habib and Taylor, 2001; Oldfield, 2002; Seethal, 1993; Southall, 2001; Turok, 2001). Exploring the social and political relationships produced through processes of reconstruction in Elsies River in Cape Town, Oldfield argued that analyses of the elements of the state disregard political and social context, the state’s social relations, and its intersections with specific sectors and groupings in society that facilitate its operation and the achievement of its goals. Furthermore, theories of the state needed to take cognisance of the state’s relationship - its embedded autonomy - with society and the ways in which state institutions embody race, class and gender stratifications. Seethal (1993) examined the role of civic organizations in transforming the local state and noted that the relations with political parties have consequences for local state politics. He also highlighted the importance of the politics of place and resistance to the exploitation and repression of the apartheid state. Coalition politics is an inevitable practice in any political environment. There are coalitions based on a common set of goals, whereby parties agree to pool their resources together for achieving a common goal (Strom, 1995 cited in Olaleye, 2003). However, Habib and Nadvi (2002) stated that unprincipled political alliances at all spheres of government are not new to post-apartheid South Africa and that the political opportunism of both the ruling and opposition parties has compromised post-apartheid politics. The complexities of alliance politics was highlighted in the
Cape Times: the ANC easily co-habits with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) when it is convenient; the IFP with the DA; and the DA agreed with Cosatu’s stance on the Basic Income Grant and on HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, the DA supported the ANC’s macro-economic policy which Cosatu abhored (Seepe, *Cape Times*, 19 February 2007).

Opposition politics has been underscored as an important component of democratic consolidation in South Africa (Habib and Nadvi, 2002; Habib and Taylor, 1999; Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Schrire, 2001; Southall, 1998; 2001). However, South Africa’s political environment, marred by the legacy of the apartheid regime, situated the opposition in a complex position. Major opposition parties, because of their historical legacy are seen as articulating the interests of particular racial and ethnic groups by developing strategies that appeal to narrow sections of the electorate (Habib and Taylor, 1999; 2001; Mattes and Piombo, 2001; Nijzink, 2001). However, at the local level, the opposition appeared to be growing in strength, although the ANC was ambivalent to opposition at all levels of government. All this situates the position of conflict within the state as different groups battled for control of the state. As Schrire (2001) stated, politics in all contexts involves a struggle for power between competing groups and interests over the issue of control over the instruments of power. In the modern world the state thus becomes the site of social and political struggle (Schrire, 2001; Jessop, 1990, cited in Oldfield, 2002) and an agent in social and political transformation. However, the consequences of this struggle are shaped significantly by the role the
state plays, and the complex relationship between political parties does much to determine the quality and the stability of the political order. It is important also to understand that political vertical linkages exist between the local state and the provincial and national government in South Africa. Although the local state in South Africa is relatively autonomous, local authorities, as the provinces, are subject to financial rules and regulations of the national state and operate within strict national financial and political constraints (Lodge, 2003; McDonald and Smith, 2004; Pillay, 2004; Southall, 1998).

The Local State and Development

Given that political coalitions are partly responsible for shaping the urban environment, it is important to understand how social inequality is linked to power, that is, how local politicians and policy-makers effectively impede or enhance social and economic development. This also includes how local communities organize themselves around issues important to them and form their own alliances and organizations to counter unfavourable local state policies. Maharaj (1996) affirmed that the political exclusion of blacks in South Africa from effective participation in government at all spheres under apartheid influenced the rise of social movements which mobilised civil society around a wide range of politicised causes such as housing, basic services, transport, development and culture. Therefore, communities mobilised themselves around various issues to ensure community empowerment and development.
Examining community empowerment strategies in the United States, Dreier (1996) advocated the idea that “community development” is an umbrella term that encompassed three distinct strategies: community organizing, community-based development and community-based service provision. Cashdan (2001), Oldfield (2002) and Turok (2001), observing local government and poverty in South Africa, described development as incorporating integrated development planning, service delivery, local economic development (LED) and democratization. It can be addressed through the actions of the local state, primarily those aimed at increasing responsiveness and efficiency, and especially through partnerships with civil society. They also asserted that poverty is a condition which resulted from past policies and that post apartheid local state structures are grounded in apartheid’s uneven social and spatial development. Rogerson (1999) stated that in several policy documents and statements, national government attached considerable significance to the role of LED in contributing towards reaching the objectives of reconstruction and development in post apartheid South Africa. There was consensus that among its core elements, LED would include sets of initiatives designed both to promote growing local economies as well as to address poverty alleviation (Rogerson, 1999). However, in South Africa, LED has been interpreted in different ways often resulting in policy confusion. Nel and Rogerson (2007) affirmed that to avoid reducing the development gap between large and small centres in South Africa and preventing economic collapse, LED policy needed to take a specific focus on the needs of smaller centres.
The restructuring of the local state was a key priority of the incoming ANC national government. From 1994, it introduced a number of laws designed to enhance local government so that it could carry out the mandate for developmental local government (Binns and Nel, 2002). This involved the need to work together with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives by strengthening grassroots participation (Binns and Nel, 2002; Cashdan, 2001). Despite these changes, urban poverty still remains one of the biggest challenges facing the South African government and local municipalities around the country, and the overtly developmental commitments of the government have not yet had the desired impact in creating sustained growth or redistribution (Cashdan, 2001; Parnell, 2004).

In line with this, Oldfield (2002) stated that the local state’s policies and projects for urban reconstruction in South Africa proved problematic in practice because projects for development got wrapped up in local agendas and interests that are geographically specific and that reflected old apartheid divisions. Shatkin (2000), studying local politics and civil society in the Philippines, contended that a variety of actors had an interest in decentralization of urban governance and attempted to shape the outcome of reforms to their economic agendas, with negative consequences for civil society participation. Thus, the pursuit of pro poor municipal governance would require new measures to address these imbalances within civil society through new political alliances among the poor and marginalized, aimed at
restructuring the state (Dreier, 1996; Oldfield, 2002).

Oldfield asserted that through housing delivery, community-based structures and residents in Cape Town have challenged the local state through obstruction, confrontation and noncooperation. These actions have been informed by the internal organization of communities, their links and external connections, and their political character. These ideas of community organizing overlapped largely with the concepts of the politics of exclusion and the politics of inclusion as espoused by Soja and Hooper (2002) and Ley and Mills (2002). Soja and Hooper contended that postmodernist politics constituted a new politics of difference and identity, and strategic alliances that move towards empowering a multiplicity of resistances against all forms of subordination (cited in Seethal, 2005, p. 142).

Using postmodernist theory, Seethal (2005) drew on the work of Ley and Mills (2002) and Soja and Hooper (2002). He focused on the politics of reaction, resistance, difference and identity that characterized the Stellenbosch municipality after regime change. The study also demonstrated the coalescence of different groups in the pursuit of common objectives within the politics of reaction and the politics of resistance at the municipal sphere (Seethal, 2005). However, for those in the lower sections of the system of social stratification, gaining meaningful political influence was a long and difficult journey. For Dreier (1996), community organizations that engaged in successful mobilization efforts sometimes branched out into community
development and/or the provision of social services. He added that the emergence of community-based organizations as significant political actors was a major development in recent urban political history.

Several scholars writing on civil society organizations (CSOs) in South Africa, (Barchiesi, 2004; Bezuidenhout and Mautjane, 2004; Binns and Nel, 2002; Desai, 2000; Habib, 2003; Jensen, 2004; Maharaj, 1996; McDonald and Smith, 2004; Pieterse, 2002; Pillay, 2004; Seethal, 1993) highlighted the growth of these organizations, which have become a decisive force in shaping the political agendas and strategies of the local state in South Africa. The formation of local forums and community movements such as the Anti-Eviction Campaign in Cape Town, the Anti-Privatization Forum in Johannesburg and the Concerned Citizens Group in Durban, pointed to growing dissatisfaction with local government reforms and a resurgence of local government politics. These organizations however, faced obstacles which hindered their participation in the development process, such as the political nature of consultations with local authorities, lack of funding and tensions between these CSOs and elected councillors. Desai (2000) documented the rise of a mass-based community struggle against evictions and relocation in the Indian township of Chatsworth in Durban.

In terms of links with the private sector, Cashdan (2001) contended that South African business has asserted its rightful place in civil society locally, nationally and internationally, and consequently built alliances in support of its
agenda. At the local sphere, business has called for a ‘multi-class growth coalition’ in support of a pro-growth agenda. Lodge (2003) affirmed that contracting out municipal services was one of a number of ways in which national government proposed to change the way cities and rural communities should be governed and administered. By March 2000, nearly 10 percent of South Africa’s local governments ran their services in conjunction with private companies (Lodge, 2003).

McDonald and Smith (2004), documenting privatization in Cape Town, pointed to the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism which they asserted served to suppress effective policy debate and meaningful public participation. They stated that the fact that alternative policy choices were not made served to reinforce the argument that the same ideological impulses that transformed the central state permeated down to the local level. Mosoetsa (2005) established that members of the Mpumalanga Township in Durban became sceptical of local government’s cost recovery measures, and community groups were established to challenge neoliberal policies that encouraged the privatization of water and electricity. Similarly, Narsiah (2002; 2008) contended that privatization has serious implications for the delivery of services at the local level. He also stated that the entry of the private sector into services delivery led to disconnection on a massive scale and large-scale debt in certain municipalities.

The rapid changes in the formation and dissolution of political alliances at the
local level, the consequences of these for local service delivery and
development and the local community responses to these have not been
sufficiently explored. While the politics of opposition between political parties
at the local and national spheres in South Africa has received much attention,
the impact on development and service delivery has not received equal
consideration. Therefore, the content of urban political studies should move
beyond a narrow focus on electoral politics to a range of much broader
issues. Mollenkopf (1994) stated that perspectives on how dominant political
coalitions shape development politics and budget policy remain incomplete.
Seethal (2005) adopted a postmodern perspective to study how regime
change affected development, with an emphasis on the politics of resistance
and reaction. This study will use a different approach namely, urban regime
theory, to address and add to issues not discussed in his work.

Williams (2000) has stated that it will be necessary to investigate the way in
which wider economic forces set the context for strategic decision-making at
the local level. Similarly, Pillay (2004) contended that there was no serious
analysis of local level politics and the state, and the transformation of the
‘local’ is viewed as an effect of economic forces independent of the state and
local, national and international political influences. This study addresses
these gaps by focusing on the effect of regime change on service delivery in
Cape Town in the post-2000 period.
In this study, urban regime theory was applied to the study of local governance in Cape Town. The area has been characterized by changing political regimes over the past decade, particularly since the first local government elections in 1995/6. Therefore, there is a need for an understanding of the inception and governing structures of these regimes/dominant political coalitions and the reasons for their successes and demise in the Cape Town. Political coalitions have also been formed amongst various political parties to drive political and local issues in the area. Therefore, it was critical to evaluate the nature of these coalitions and to establish the political interests in place which drove the formulation of policies with each successive political regime and their impact on service delivery.

**Aim and Objectives of Study**

The research statement is that interparty conflicts stemming largely from shifting political alliances, and the local state regime changes of the recent past (1996 to 2008), have impacted significantly on service delivery in Cape Town. Therefore, political actors have the power to shape the urban environment through the alliances they make, the policies they implement and through their linkages with national forces. Although opposition politics is crucial to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa, the view is held that a possible over-emphasis on party politics (by local politicians) rather than development has destabilized service delivery and the development of marginalized and disadvantaged communities. Consequently, the aim of the
study is to establish how interparty conflicts, stemming from shifting political alliances and the local government regime changes from 1996 to 2008 have impacted on service delivery in Cape Town. The objectives are to:

1. Study the nature of the conflicts between the political parties and coalitions in the Cape Town Unicity Council;
2. Explain how these conflicts impact on service delivery;
3. Establish the budget policy and focus of service delivery with successive dominating regimes;
4. Explain if and how disadvantaged groups in the city are actively involved in the development and service delivery process and how this has changed with respect to the ANC and DA dominating coalitions.

The objectives of the study determine the methodology that was adopted. To achieve the objectives of the study, an in depth qualitative case study was chosen.

Research Methodology

The research methodology chosen for this study is the intensive case-study design with a focus on qualitative analysis. Qualitative research was chosen for this study because it is descriptive and stresses the importance of context, setting and participants’ frames of reference. Qualitative researchers rely on four techniques for gathering information: (i) analyzing documents and
material culture, (ii) observing directly, (iii) participating in the setting, and (iv) interviewing in depth. All four techniques were utilized in this research. In qualitative analysis, several secondary and specialized techniques of data collection supplement these techniques to overcome the disadvantages of any one method (Clifford and Valentine, 2003; Flowerdew and Martin, 2005; Phillip, 1998).

Observation is a fundamental method in all qualitative inquiry. It is used to discover complex interactions in natural social settings. Participant observation is both an overall approach to inquiry and a data-gathering method. It involves first hand involvement in the social world chosen for the study (Creswell, 2003; Marshall and Rossman, 2006). In keeping with qualitative analysis, the triangulation approach was used to allow for multiple perspectives from several techniques. The use of informants was also adopted and this involved speaking to people who are well informed about the topic being researched. This sets off the snowballing technique in which a key informant advises the researcher on the best possible individuals from which to gain information.

This is a case study of two predominantly coloured communities in Cape Town, namely, Parkwood Estate and Ottery. Case studies are valuable in programme evaluation, so the evaluation needs to be attentive and capture individual differences among participants and diverse experiences of the programme. A case can be a person, an event, a programme, an
organization or a community. A qualitative case study seeks to describe that unit in depth and detail, holistically, and in context (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).

Preliminary research began with the analysis of documentary material, newspaper articles, journals and books. Fieldwork was conducted in the two communities to facilitate interviews (based on the snowballing technique of selection) with residents of two selected neighborhoods, politicians, councillors, individuals from small business enterprises, civic association leaders and individuals involved in community organizing. A total of 42 people were interviewed. In Ottery, residents in 12 flats were chosen for interviews. Two community associations, three small businesses and a ward councillor were also interviewed. In Parkwood Estate, residents in 12 flats were chosen for interviews and two ward councillors and four community association members were interviewed. Also interviewed were the Chairperson of sub-council 18 (of which Parkwood Estate and Ottery are a part), two members of the DA Executive Mayoral Committee, a former ANC activist, former special adviser to the Premier of the Western Cape and a DA constituency head. The researcher attempted to interview various councillors from the other political parties (ANC and ID), however, they did not respond. The research techniques used assisted in establishing in-depth views on the nature of conflicts between the major political parties within Council and the interaction of the communities with the local state and their views on service delivery.
Although the researcher’s entry to the communities was relatively unproblematic, some respondents were guarded about providing information of a political nature as politics is often a contentious topic. Some interviews were difficult to initiate because some individuals did not want to disclose information that was political and potentially damaging to the image of certain groups or parties. Safety was an important issue. I was warned about entering certain flats because they were inhabited by gangsters or were drug houses. It was therefore easier to gain interviews with people through several informants.

**Research Location and Study Areas**

The research location is the city of Cape Town, the largest city in South Africa’s Western Cape Province (see Figure 1). The metropolitan area has a population of approximately 3,27 million (City of Cape Town, 2007a) and a demographic profile that differs from that of any other city in the country. The location was chosen for this reason. The coloured (mixed race) population makes up almost half of the population. The specificity of Cape Town is largely rooted in this difference, particularly because the coloured community tends to be politically conservative and its working class in particular has voted consistently for previous white parties that were protagonists of the apartheid system (Pieterse, 2002). In addition, Cape Town is a politically complex city that has seen frequent changes in the governing regime in the post-1994 period.
Although the African National Congress (ANC) is the governing party at national level, it is the formal opposition party in the multi-party Cape Town Metropolitan Council (2006 to 2008). These political dynamics impact profoundly on the intergovernmental relations, local governance and political
interactions. Therefore, Cape Town is highly contested as different political parties compete for control of the area. The implementation of political floor crossing at the local level in 2002 was accompanied by the formation of political coalitions. It also led to a change in leadership from a DA administration to an ANC/NNP governing regime in 2002. Political floor crossing has caused tensions between political parties in Cape Town as councillors and MPs changed party membership; therefore, there are significant conflicts between the parties.

The Cape Town Unicity is the only metropolitan area in South Africa that has experienced successive regime change since 1996 to 2008. Between 2006 and September 2007, the ANC made approximately nine attempts to unseat the DA-led regime in Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2007b). Subsequently, local politics in Cape Town has received international attention as the ruling political coalition has accused the ANC of trying to subvert democracy in South Africa. In the March 2006 municipal elections, 62 percent of Capetonians voted for opposition parties (Thamm, Mail and Guardian, 25 August 2006). This is a clear indication that the opposition in Cape Town has grown in strength and this has opened up the space for political conflicts. It was for the above-mentioned reasons that the study location was chosen.
Parkwood Estate and Ottery

The two neighborhoods chosen for the study are Parkwood Estate and Ottery, two predominantly coloured communities located in the city of Cape Town (see Figure 1). Council houses were built in Parkwood Estate and Ottery to accommodate families forcibly removed under the Group Areas Act. Furthermore, these areas received few social services, leaving the coloured townships with meagre resources to grapple with social problems such as gangsterism, alcohol abuse and crime.

Parkwood Estate, previously known as Cook’s Bush, was established in 1969. Its occupants were forcibly moved into this area from areas such as Southfield and Constantia during the apartheid era. Parkwood Estate falls under the jurisdiction of ward 65 in sub-council 18 (see Figure 2) and the sub structure of the South Peninsula Municipality. To the north of Parkwood is the community of Fairways, a more affluent coloured community. Fairways and Parkwood are divided by a road called Hyde road. Parkwood is a very poor area with most people living in Council houses and flats, some of them in a bad state of repair. The Parkwood community can be classified as very poor to middle class, with the more privileged section of the community residing in Goolhurst Estate. The total population of the area as at June 2007 was 19 576. Of these, the number of coloured residents was at 19 169, Indian 33, black 111, white nine and 254 others.
The Council housing consists of both double and triple storey flats which were built when the area was established (see Figure 3). All homes had the Electricity Dispenser installed in 1998 (Parkwood community profile, 2007). There are privately owned houses in Parkwood in Goolhurst Estate. Thirty-four starter houses were established in 1992 on a vacant plot next to the community health center. The area also boasts a large number of shacks, Wendy houses (made of wood) and caravans are found in the backyards of
most flats. These were created due to the shortage of housing. In 1984 spontaneous settlements were scattered across the area. In 1989 evictions (558 for rent arrears in Parkwood), long waiting lists and attempts to share the rent burden led to gross overcrowding and to more than one household occupying a property (Cook, 1991).

Unemployment, poverty, overcrowding and drug abuse are some of the serious issues facing the Parkwood community. The number of drug dealers in Parkwood is on the rise and there are 29 drug houses and 26 known illegal shebeens in the area (Parkwood community profile, 2007). Financial difficulties create an increase in crime (theft and burglaries) and a relatively new drug, methamphetamine (commonly known as ‘tik’), is used by an increasingly large number of youth and adults. A third of the community is
unemployed. A large number of men from the community are serving prison terms, leaving female-headed households to struggle with the high cost of living. The high level of unemployment has been attributed to retrenchments and drug and alcohol addiction. Most employed residents work as factory workers, child minders, shop assistants, gardeners, nurses, taxi drivers and police officers. There are also self-employed people working as hawkers, shop owners, “smokkelaars” (illegal shebeen owners) and tailors. A third of the community obtains its income through old age pensions and disability and maintenance grants. The working population earns an average of R2 800 per month (Parkwood community profile, 2007). A dire situation faces the community as most residents are barely able to feed their families. The community of Ottery faces a similar predicament.

The first group areas proclamations for Cape Town were made in 1957 but most areas were not zoned until 1961. Although Ottery was zoned a white area it never became completely white. Occasionally, efforts were made for coloured and Indian people in ‘good’ social and economic positions to remain in white areas but many were moved to Mitchells Plain and Lotus River between 1957 and 1961 (Cook, 1991). Some coloured families rented or bought houses in close corporation property deals and in June 1990 the Wetton/Ottery border was declared a free settlement area (Cook, 1991).

Ottery is a predominantly coloured community in Cape Town. It falls under the jurisdiction of ward 65 in sub-council 18 and the sub structure of the South
Peninsula Municipality. Ottery is classified as a poor and middle class area, with a population of 14 662. Of this, 72 percent are classified as coloured, with whites making up 18.93 percent of the population, black 4.29 percent, and Indian/Asian 4.61 percent (City of Cape Town, 2001c). Thirty percent of the population is in the age group of 18-34, which is characteristic of a youthful population. The poorer section of the community live in Ottery East, an area which houses various blocks of Council flats, backyard settlements and older rental stock houses (see Figures 4 and 5). Of the economically active population, eight percent are unemployed. There are various forms of informal activity in the area and most of the labour force work as craft and related trades workers, technicians and shop and market sales workers. There is one community centre in the area housed in the Bruce Road Ottery civic centre. There are no clinics in the area. The majority of the economically active earn between R1 600 – R6 400 per month. Most people live in blocks of Council flats or a house or brick structure. A number of tenants in Ottery have private ownership of houses, however, most people have not paid them off.

The two areas were chosen because they provide a good example of politically conscious communities in Cape Town. It is important to ascertain the level of community participation in social structures and the level of engagement that these communities have, and have had, with local ward councillors. It is also imperative to establish how each dominating regime in
the city has dealt with service delivery and the housing issue in these communities.

Figure 4. Council flats in Ottery

Figure 5. Backyard dwelling in Ottery
Significance of Proposed Research

The proposed research accounts for the changing political coalitions in Cape Town and the structures of the governing regimes in Cape Town from 2000 to 2008. With the use of urban regime theory, it attempts to enhance existing knowledge about urban politics and governing structures and to contribute, from a South African perspective, to existing theoretical knowledge. The impact of changing political coalitions on service delivery at the municipal level in South Africa has not been critically analyzed. In light of this, the study therefore contributes to an understanding of how dominating political regimes impacted on development and service delivery in Cape Town and how local regime changes destabilize service delivery initiatives. Literature on urban regime theory has focused little on political parties and their influence on the local political climate.

The study also explains the consequence of local state conflicts for effective community participation and development. It informs a more productive and integrated approach to local development and management in the area. It also adds to existing literature on regime politics and examines aspects of urban politics that other scholars have not addressed. The study illustrates that urban regime theory can be applied across different political environments and that political issues cross many boundaries. Although a western-based theory, it also applies to societies in the South. The study of regime politics, local development and service provision in Cape Town will
thus contribute and enhance knowledge in the field of urban regime theory.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter one constitutes an introduction to the research topic. It presents the conceptual framework, the literature review, the gaps arising from the literature and the aim and objectives of the study. The chapter also consists of the research methodology, the reasons for the chosen research locations and the significance of the study. The chapter also introduces the two study locations chosen.

Chapter two is the contextual chapter of the study area and provides background information about Cape Town such as its history, demographics, socio-economic conditions and economic profile. It also focuses on prevalent development issues in the study location such as housing backlogs, unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS, and their effects on social development in the area.

Chapter three provides the context for the study topic and is a review of local government in Cape Town since the inception of a local state system in the 1800s. It traces local government in Cape Town through a look at the implementation of apartheid legislation (1950s), the consequent introduction of separate local government structures in Cape Town and the introduction of developmental local government with the local government restructuring
period in 1996.

Chapter four examines local state politics in Cape Town in the post-2000 period. This includes an analysis of the effect of political floor crossing and regime change on local government in Cape Town between 2000 and 2005. In addition, the role of the provincial and central state in local state politics in Cape Town is examined. The chapter also evaluates the budget policies and development track records of the major governing regimes (ANC/NNP coalition and DA) in the period from 2000 to 2006.

Chapter five includes the discussion of the research findings and analysis of data.

Chapter six is the Conclusion and suggests new research agendas.
CHAPTER II

THE CAPE TOWN UNICITY AREA

Introduction

This chapter presents a contextual overview of the broader study area, the Western Cape, with particular reference to Cape Town. The chapter will focus on the socio-economic and demographic profiles of Cape Town and development issues such as poverty, unemployment, crime and the growing housing backlog. These issues are widespread, particularly within the poorer sections of the metropolitan area and will undoubtedly affect future prospects for social and economic development if not dealt with effectively. Accordingly, there is need for a multi level approach (local, regional and central state and civil society organizations) and participation from all spheres of society to successfully combat these development concerns. In this study, Cape Town refers to the city and the Cape Town Unicity refers to the metropolitan body governing the city.

Cape Town is the largest city in the Western Cape Province of South Africa and is inhabited by over 3,27 million people. The city is located at the southwestern tip of Africa and covers a geographical area of 2 479 square kilometers (City of Cape Town, 2006b). It is the parliamentary capital of South Africa and represents three and a half centuries of urban development. It has a diversified economy. It also accommodates a culturally and
linguistically diverse population (Wilkinson, 2000). The city remains strongly spatially divided on the basis of race and, although there are indications that the level of integration has increased, significant levels of integration are confined to only a few suburbs in Cape Town (Smith, 2005). The Cape Town Unicity Council previously consisted of the six metropolitan local councils (MLCs) of Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality and the South Peninsula Municipality (Figure 6), which became a Unicity in 2000 following the local government elections.

Environment and Natural Setting

The Western Cape covers a total area of 129 462 square kilometers. It is the country’s fourth largest province by area, taking up 10.6 percent of South Africa’s land area and with a mid-2006 population of 4.7 million people (www.southafrica.info). Cape Town’s natural environment is one of the strongest assets that drives tourism and attracts skilled workers to the city. However, growing consumption and pollution are threatening the rich, yet highly vulnerable biodiversity of this region (Integrated Development Plan, 2007/8, City of Cape Town). Cape Town falls within the Cape Floristic Region, which is rich in biodiversity and is considered as one of the six floristic Kingdoms on Earth (State of Environment, 2000). Fynbos, the main vegetation type, comprises over 9 000 plant species and 70 percent of them are indigenous to the Cape (go2africa.com/southafrica).
Figure 6. Cape Metropolitan Area showing the six Metropolitan Local Councils (1996)

Source: Adapted from State of the Environment Report for the Cape Metropolitan Area, Year Two (1 September 2000).
Surrounded by the Indian and Atlantic oceans and the Table Mountain chain and beaches, the area is a popular tourist destination. At Cape Point, the Atlantic and Indian oceans meet. The area boasts some of the country’s top tourist attractions and draws 52 percent of all international visitors to South Africa (State of Environment, 2000). The majority of the population speaks Afrikaans, with isiXhosa and English being the other main languages.

**Population Profile of Cape Town**

In relation to other major South African cities, Cape Town’s population growth is not exceptionally fast (City of Cape Town, 2006b). The population of Cape Town increased by 1.6 percent annually from 2,994 million to 3,239 million people (65 percent of the Western Cape population) in the period 2001 to 2006. This differs markedly from the growth rate which stood at 2.6 percent between 1996 and 2001, and growth rates are projected to reduce from 1.6 percent per annum to 0.2 percent by 2021 (City of Cape Town, 2003a; 2006b). The city’s population is expected to slow over the next 15 years with an expected growth of 300,000 people between 2006 and 2021 (Romanovsky, 2006) and a growing proportion of the aged relative to the total population (City of Cape Town, 2006a). This is mainly due to reduced fertility, the impact of HIV/AIDS and reduced migration to the city, particularly from the surrounding rural areas and the Eastern Cape Province.
The population of Cape Town is culturally diverse with the coloured population making up the majority. The most recent census data (2001) shows that between 1996 and 2001, coloureds as a proportion of the Cape Town population dropped to below 50 percent (City of Cape Town, 2001a). The African population increased from 26.1 percent to 31.69 percent with the white population declining from 22 percent to 18.75 percent (see Table 1). These trends are expected to continue due to declining fertility rates among whites relative to the other population groups (Smith, 2005) and the increase in the numbers of Africans migrating from the Eastern Cape.

Based on population projections for 2006, about 46 percent of Cape Town’s population is classified as coloured, African (34 percent), white (18 percent) and Asian (2 percent) (City of Cape Town, 2006b). This differs distinctly from other parts of the country, where Africans are invariably a large majority of the population and coloureds constitute what is usually only a small minority (Pieterse, 2002). This has clearly affected local social and political dynamics (Wilkinson, 2000).

Migration

Migration into Cape Town was high in 2001 and the succeeding years, with a migration rate of 0.75 percent per annum in 2006 (Romanovsky, 2006). However, the general trend indicates a steady decline up to 2025. This suggests that migration has already peaked and no large influx is expected in
the near future (City of Cape Town, 2006b). In Cape Town, the highest net migration for the period 2001-2006 was in the African population group, while there was relatively low migration for other population groups (City of Cape Town, 2006b; Smith, 2005). This trend can be attributed to the fact that in post apartheid South Africa the movement of African people to the city and to

Table 1. Demographic Profile of Cape Town – 2001 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City of Cape Town</th>
<th>Total (2001)</th>
<th>1996 Percentage (%)</th>
<th>2001 Percentage (%)</th>
<th>2006 Percentage (%) (projected)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>916,725</td>
<td>26,10</td>
<td>31,69</td>
<td>34,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1,392,435</td>
<td>50,30</td>
<td>48,13</td>
<td>46,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian/Asian</td>
<td>41,474</td>
<td>1,60</td>
<td>1,43</td>
<td>2,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>542,612</td>
<td>22,00</td>
<td>18,75</td>
<td>18,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,893,246</td>
<td>100,00</td>
<td>100,00</td>
<td>100,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the Western Cape is no longer restricted. This has consequently resulted in a search for employment and basic services in the city.

Most of the in-migration to the Cape Town is from the Eastern Cape, which has experienced high out-migration over the last two decades, resulting in a loss of adults in the economically active age group of 25 years and above (Romanovsky, 2006). The State of Cape Town Report (2006a) stated that more than half of all movement to Cape Town originates from the Eastern Cape and Gauteng. The patterns of migration from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town and the Western Cape point to the increased growth in the number of poor people in the Eastern Cape. They migrate to these areas because of social ties and the perceived lower cost of living (Turok, 2001). This pattern can also be attributed to political reasons as migration increases the political support of certain political parties. This undoubtedly also impacts on political relations between the majority parties. Between 1997 and 2001, 50 percent of white migrants originated from Gauteng while more than 80 percent of African migrants came from the Eastern Cape (Smith, 2005). The inflow of rural migrants to Cape Town increases the competition for land, jobs and shelter, which are already limited resources.
Socio-Economic Conditions in Cape Town

Cape Town is faced with immense human and social development issues due to decades of distorted development and highly uneven distribution of income and wealth. Some of the key challenges facing the City are poverty and unemployment, housing backlogs, growing HIV/AIDS prevalence and crime. In addition, the expansion of informal settlements and backyard shacks highlights the shortage of low cost housing, and the housing backlog for 2006 was estimated at 265,000 units (City of Cape Town, 2006a; 2006b).

Cape Town is a severely divided city and wealthy suburbs contrast with overcrowded, impoverished dormitory settlements on the periphery (Turok, 2001). In the past, Africans without government permission to live in the city occupied informal settlements or ‘squatter camps’ that emerged in the south-east sector, such as Crossroads. These townships\(^2\) were also built to accommodate the African labour force that the city’s growing economy required. Employment opportunities were focused on the centre and central periphery of the city and almost all the working-class population lived more than 15 kilometres out of town. Thus, the long journey to work became associated with low income status (Cook, 1991), further contributing to poverty and inequality.

\(^2\) They included Gugulethu and Nyanga, built for Africans in the 1950s and 1960s and Mitchells Plain, Blue Downs and Delft, built for the expanding coloured population in the 1970s and 1980s (Turok, 2001).
Poverty and Inequality

The State of Cape Town report (2006a) asserted that one measure of poverty is the household subsistence level, below which households are unable to meet their basic needs for clothing, food and transport. It was calculated to be R20 000 per annum in 2001 (Smith, 2005). Pieterse and Parnell (1999) defined poverty as more than a lack of income. They asserted that it exists when an individual’s or household’s access to income, jobs or infrastructure is inadequate or sufficiently unequal to prohibit full access to opportunities. In Cape Town, the prevalence of poverty is evident in that 36 percent of households (approximately 1,2 million people) were living in poverty in 2005 (City of Cape Town, 2006a). This number is believed to have risen since then. Approximately 30 percent of households (almost one million people) in Cape Town live in inadequate housing and miserable physical environments, including informal settlements (City of Cape Town, 2006a).

Of the economically active population in Cape Town, 29 percent are unemployed (City of Cape Town, 2007a). There is also unequal distribution of income across racial groups. In 2001, about 13 percent of households had no income at all and nine percent of these were African compared to whites (1,1 percent), Indian/Asian (0,1 percent) and coloureds (2,9 percent) (City of Cape Town, 2006b). The high level of unemployment is a major contributor to poverty in the area and unemployment can be linked to poverty and inequality (Smith, 2005). High unemployment and poverty also lead to competition for
limited resources such as land and shelter (Turok, 2001). A number of people who are employed do not earn enough to escape poverty, and are termed ‘the working poor’. Statistics from 2002 showed that 20 percent of the population lived below the subsistence level of R1 070 per month, and another 50 percent hover just above this figure (Pieterse, 2002).

Data for 2005 showed that on the Cape Flats, a predominantly black African residential area, 70 percent of people had problems feeding their children and unemployment was 32 percent for males and 53 percent for females. Hundreds of people still use the bucket sewage system and in some areas refuse has not been collected for years (Williams, 2005). Wilkinson (2000) showed that deepening levels of unemployment and poverty within particular sectors of the metropolitan population since 1992 have been linked to a sharp increase in criminal activity, including a highly organized illegal drug economy. Pieterse (2002) established that most poor coloured communities are characterized by high levels of gangsterism, domestic violence and abuse. In addition, violent crimes per capita are the highest in Cape Town compared to other South African cities, with drug-related crime rising from 249.8 to 511.8 (per 100 000 people) between 2001/2 and 2004/5 (City of Cape Town, 2006b). Given that crime is a potential constraint to investment flows into the Unicity, it is predictable that high crime in Cape Town will have consequences for economic growth and social development.
The Cape Town Housing Crisis

Housing shortages in Cape Town extend back to the 1980s, during which the apartheid system laid the foundation for the current housing shortages in the metropolitan area. In the 1950s and 1960s, the state built most township houses but because it could not maintain relatively low rents, there was a revolt pertaining to the cost and shortages of housing (Hendler, 1991). Consequently, the boycott of rent payments to the Black Local Authorities (hereafter BLAs), was a response to this housing crisis. It was also a manifestation of poverty and meager financial resources (Hendler; Oldfield, 2002).

Various studies attested to the housing scarcity during the 1970s and 1980s which resulted in land occupations and the construction and increase of informal housing (Cook, 1991; Hendler, 1991; Saff 1996; Visser, 2003). During the 1960s and 1970s the local state constructed virtually no housing for blacks in Cape Town\(^3\). There was a subsequent increase in overcrowding in the African townships and the establishment of squatter settlements. Another effect of this was the expansion of informal settlements onto land zoned for occupation by other race groups. These became sites of struggle as property owners in the adjacent areas resisted the encroachment and creation of low-income informal settlements on their boundaries (Saff, 1996).

\(^3\) This was due to the fact that the apartheid state regarded the Western Cape as a coloured labour preferential area. The non-building of houses for blacks was designed to restrict black migration to the Western Cape.
Housing has been the priority for many public and community organizations in Cape Town because of the serious shortage of accommodation in the city (Turok, 2001). However, there have been reservations about the location, quality and sustainability of low-income housing projects in the city and it is generally acknowledged that progress on housing delivery is relatively slow (Turok, 2001). This has been associated with the local state reorganization (1993) which caused difficulties in identifying and releasing suitable land. It has also been stated that the rate of construction of subsidized housing has been inadequate to respond to the need for housing and the demands of new households that are forming as a result of in-migration and population growth. Consequently, the number of informal shacks in Cape Town have grown significantly, increasing from 28 300 in 1993, to 59 854 in 1996, and to more than 100 000 in 2004 (Mammon, 2005).

Estimates of housing shortages (in 2000) for the Cape Town metropolitan area totalled 109 300 units, while 190 000 households required either rehousing (102 500) or upgrading (87 500). Williams (2005) asserted that while there was a huge housing backlog in the city, the Cape Town Housing Department underspent by about R100 million in the 2001/2002 Financial Year. The housing backlog in 2005 was estimated at 265 000 and growing, with the highest figures in informal settlements (see Figure 7) (City of Cape Town, 2006b).
One of these settlements is Happy Valley. It is a “temporary relocation area” housing some of Cape Town’s homeless people. The former ANC/NNP council (2002) decided to use it as a “reception” area for destitute people facing court eviction or living in illegal shacks in the city. It is home to about 2 400 families and 80 percent of the adults are unemployed (Joubert, Mail and Guardian, 16 March 2007). Although it is supposed to be a short-term reception area, some families there have been on a housing list for more than 10 years. In Imizamo Yethu informal settlement in Hout Bay, overcrowding has been escalating. The ANC city manager, Wallace Mqoqi declared a suspension on shack demolitions there in 2003. However, no alternative
solution was found and the situation deteriorated daily (Zille, Mail and Guardian, 2 March 2007).

Wilkinson (2000) confirmed that estimates have suggested that as much as 83 percent of the metropolitan population live in “formal” housing other than hostel accommodation provided for migrant workers. Approximately 14 percent of all housing in the city is classified as informal housing (City of Cape Town, 2006a). It should be noted, however, that much of the public housing provided in the Cape Flats townships would be regarded as extremely overcrowded and inadequate by accepted international standards (Wilkinson, 2000). In 2008 the City had approximately 300 000 registered applicants on its waiting list for houses, and it was estimated that the total demand is in the order of 400 000 houses because there were more than 100 000 people living in informal settlements who were not registered on the housing database (City of Cape Town, 2008).

The new DA-led council's response to these problems is critical, as its success in the next local government elections in 2009, in part depends on it, and on its response to other pressing issues affecting poor communities. With migration to the poor south-east area of the city increasing, there is no doubt that existing communities and social infrastructure would be put under more pressure and that the local state would need to provide more suitable shelter to a growing population. However, this is a complicated problem as
the ANC majority Western Cape provincial government has responsibility for housing funding and provision.

**Economic Profile of Cape Town**

The local economy of Cape Town is relatively well-developed and the city is largely regarded as the economic heartland of the Western Cape Province. In 2002, its economy was the second largest in the country after that of Johannesburg, with growth rates having exceeded the national average throughout the 1990s (Jenkins and Wilkinson, 2002). This is also evident in the large contribution it makes to the Western Cape’s annual Gross Domestic Product by Region\(^4\) (GDPR) accounting for 76.5 percent of the Western Cape’s GDP in 2004 (City of Cape Town, 2006b). In general, formal economic activity in the city is carried out by a diverse array of enterprises or bodies in both the private and the public sectors. The Western Cape economy contributes roughly 14.5 percent to South Africa’s GDP (2008). After Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, the Province is the third largest contributor to the national manufacturing sector ([www.southafrica.info](http://www.southafrica.info)).

\(^4\) Gross Domestic Product by Region – The GDPR of a particular area amounts to the total income or payment received by the production factors (land, labour and capital).
Sectors Contributing to the Economy

In Cape Town two distinct economies are evident, although they are inextricably linked. The first economy is characterized by a well structured environment catering for the affluent segment of the population, while the second economy (the informal sector) is characterized by underdevelopment, operating in the midst of poverty (City of Cape Town, 2006b). It should be noted that this second economy is also a significant contributor to economic development. It is an important part of Cape Town’s economy and contributes to job creation. It is estimated that this sector produces about 12 percent of the economic output and employs 18 percent of the economically active in the City. In 2005, Cape Town’s economy contributed about R 11 247 billion to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While there are some very large employers in the local economy – notably in the local government and financial services sectors – there are also many small and medium-sized operations, which undoubtedly constitute the great bulk of formal sector activity (Jenkins and Wilkinson, 2002). The main drivers of economic growth are finance and business services, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade sectors. However, the manufacturing and government services sectors both declined as a percentage of total employment between 1995 and 2004. A large number of financial head offices are located in the City, and as a result the finance and business services sector grew consistently for the period 1995-2004 (City of Cape Town, 2006b).
The finance and business services sector contributed 31.7 percent to the City's GDP for 2004, while wholesale and retail trade (17.3 percent) and manufacturing (17.9 percent) were also important contributors (see Figure 8). The manufacturing (1.7 percent) and agriculture (1.8 percent) sectors experienced low growth between 1995 and 2004 while mining experienced a decline averaging 11.5 percent per annum (City of Cape Town, 2006b).

In Cape Town an estimated 18 percent of the labour force (some 244,000 people) was categorized as engaged in informal economic activity in 1996, and the number is likely to have grown substantially since then. The bulk of this activity probably occurs in the “townships” and in informal settlements generally occupied by poorer coloured and African households, as do more overtly illegal activities linked particularly to the drug economy and other forms of crime. Much informal economic activity takes the form of small-scale retail and service activities, although small-scale manufacturing and repair activities are also present, but in relatively smaller numbers.

The main challenge to the city’s economy is the creation of productive employment opportunities and the reduction of poverty (City of Cape Town, 2006a). The plight of the clothing and textiles industry is of particular concern given its contribution to job creation and economic growth. This sector has been in constant decline and this has been exacerbated by the decline in trade tariffs (Pieterse, 2002). The major concern is the competitiveness of local products and the Department of Trade and Industry recently introduced
The City's local economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent between 1995 and 2004. Considering the city’s economic growth rate of 4.5 percent between 2000 and 2004, it becomes apparent that the local economy’s growth dynamics improved significantly during this period. The

quotas in the short term on Chinese manufactured products (City of Cape Town, 2006a).
City witnessed a number of economic growth-enhancing developments recently, including: the introduction of the International Convention Centre, a property investment boom in the Central Business District (CBD) and the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront area, marketing initiatives aimed at expanding the already buoyant tourism sector, and participation in a number of national development programmes such as the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) and Urban Renewal Programme (URP).

The rural hinterland of Cape Town and the Western Cape, more generally, is entirely occupied by commercial agriculture, as opposed to peasant or subsistence agriculture based on “traditional” systems of land tenure. Some small-scale informal stock farming occurs within the metropolitan area, and some subsistence cropping or market gardening is undertaken in and around the townships and informal settlements, but none of this activity currently occurs on any significant scale (Jenkins and Wilkinson, 2002).

Conclusion

It is evident that urban fragmentation with regard to service provision in Cape Town has increased the concentration of poverty within the city. The challenges facing Cape Town are numerous and the socio-economic trends for the City indicate the need for strategies to address these challenges (City of Cape Town, 2006a). In this regard, the City faces the challenge of strengthening the economic base of the poorer sections through activities that
will generate additional income and employment (Turok, 2001). As Cashdan (2001) noted, basic services enhance the quality of life of citizens and increases their social and economic opportunities by promoting health and safety and facilitating access to work, education and recreation.

Leadership in the city needs to be expanded to include a greater role for civil society. A central focus of urban regime theory is on the processes of local coalition building for the purposes of promoting local economic development. The promotion of human development should also be considered and political and other coalitions between local state actors and civil society, in particular, need to be formed around important issues such as social and economic inequalities, as these affect the metropolitan area. The next chapter explores local government in Cape Town as a basis to understanding current political dynamics and regime politics in the City.
CHAPTER III

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CAPE TOWN (1800 – 2007)

Introduction

This chapter provides the contextual background for local governance in Cape Town since the inception of a local state system in the 1800s. It begins with an overview of the local state system that was in place prior to the introduction of apartheid in Cape Town. It also examines the establishment of apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act and the Pass Laws. In addition, it highlights how the introduction of separate local government structures (such as the White Local Authorities and Black Local Authorities) resulted in a fragmented metropolitan area with the majority of the poorer coloured and black communities located in areas with few public amenities and basic services. Consequently, in the post-apartheid period, there was a need for new governing structures to be put in place through a local government restructuring phase, in order to ensure redistribution and a more effective and cohesive local state. The chapter concludes with a look at the new post-apartheid Cape Town Unicity Council and its role in the redistribution of resources across Cape Town in the post-apartheid period.
A formal system of local government has existed in Cape Town since 1840, when a qualified non-racial municipal franchise was established for the city under the British colonial government of the time. This remained in place in one form or another until as late as 1970, despite continual efforts by successive national and provincial governments to remove it during the Twentieth Century. The inauguration of a Legislative Assembly for the Cape Colony took place in 1854, followed in 1872 by the granting of “responsible government”. Despite resistance from the Eastern Province, Cape Town was established as the colony’s capital (Wilkinson, 2000).

In 1865, the population of Cape Town municipality – established by the colonial government in 1840 – had reached 28,400, of whom 15,100 were classified as “white”, 12,400 as “other”, and the remainder as “Hottentots” or “Kaffirs” (Wilkinson, 2000). In the 1890s the Council committed itself to a programme of “municipal improvements” and by 1899 Cape Town acquired many of the amenities of a modern city, including a professional system of government and an adequate water supply and efficient drainage (Wilkinson, 2000).

The Act of Union in 1910 linked the former Boer republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State with the British colonies in the Cape and Natal, laying the foundations of a unitary and highly centralised state in South Africa with
Cape Town designated its legislative capital (the seat of parliament) and Pretoria its administrative capital. The South African government of 1910 passed the 1913 Land Act that prohibited African or ‘native’ residency outside of selected reserves (Oldfield, 2004). By 1923 a British Empire-aligned white South African state was organizing laws of urban segregation for black Africans, together with the Pass Laws which restricted black internal migration to authorized work-seeking at specified urban destinations. However, most blacks were not in formally segregated zones, but rented in the poorer housing areas (Western, 2002). Thus, native locations, which were precursors to today’s townships, were established after the passage of the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (Oldfield, 2004). Under the Act, local authorities gained power to restrict most Africans to townships and compounds. However, these powers remained limited and many urban areas remained or became more racially integrated (Mabin, 1992).

In the late 1920s the Cape Town municipality began to develop public housing estates specifically designated for “coloured” working class families on an area called the Cape Flats. The wealthier suburbs remained segregated by prejudice as much as by market forces. The majority of the city's population however, continued to live in mixed residential areas, some of them in informal shack settlements established during the depression (Wilkinson, 2000). By the end of the 1920s, Cape Town municipality had become the largest of the local authorities in an emerging metropolitan area, having incorporated all of the originally independent municipalities of the Atlantic
seaboard and the southern suburbs (Wilkinson, 2000). By 1936, 32 percent of whites and 34 percent of coloured people in Cape Town had their homes in mixed residential areas (Cook, 1991) though, the new predominantly coloured settlements developed along the Cape Flats and the Council had laid out garden villages at Brooklyn, Epping and Maitland in Cape Town to house people in the lowest income groups (Cook, 1991).

**Racial Zoning in Cape Town**

When the National Party came to power in May 1948, it did so on the basis of a policy which made clear the party's commitment to compulsory urban racial segregation (Mabin, 1992). Therefore, as Figure 9 shows, the Group Areas Act of 1950 required strict segregation, within distinct areas, of four groups recognized in terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950 (coloured, black, white and Asian). Within towns and cities, separate residential and commercial districts were demarcated, and ownership and occupation of property was restricted to members of the race group to whom the district had been assigned (McCarthy, 1992). Besides separating whites, blacks and coloureds, specific areas in Cape Town were set aside for homes for Malays, Chinese and Indians (Cook, 1991). The first group areas declarations for Cape Town were made on 5 July 1957 but most areas were not zoned until 1961, and parts of the city center and District Six were only proclaimed in 1965 and 1966, respectively (Cook).
In Cape Town, the implementation of the Group Areas Act created a racially and spatially fragmented city in which the vast majority of both coloureds and blacks were relocated to the Cape Flats and in the south-east sector (see Figure 9) in areas with few public amenities (Saff, 1996; Turok, 2001). These difficult socio-economic conditions were exacerbated by the location of the townships on the periphery of the urban core in an area that is vulnerable to flooding in winter and sand storms in summer (Smith and Hanson, 2003). One such area is District Six.

District Six was one of the original wards of the city and home to a primarily coloured community. The destruction of the inner city area of District Six, identified as a “slum” in the 1940s and declared a “White Group Area” in 1966, was the most prominent of a series of such evictions and removals (Wilkinson, 2000). District Six became a focus of protest and a symbol of group area removals (Cook, 1991) and in 1989 a part of District Six became one of the first Free Settlement Areas to be proclaimed (Cook, 1991). Out of a population of more than a million, at least 200 000 people in Cape Town were forcibly moved by the time the programme was retracted (Western, 2002).
Prior to the implementation of the Group Areas Act, Cape Town was the least segregated city in South Africa (Saff, 1996; Turok, 2001) and many people lived in mixed-race residential areas (Cook, 1991; Turok; Western, 2002). The implementation of the Act was most severe in Cape Town, a city which had enjoyed 300 years of racial mixing. The forced removals led to growing
popular hostility, which were, in part, expressed in the Soweto uprising of June 1976 and the Cape Town and national uprising which followed shortly after, and the increasing protest for a nonracial democracy (Western, 2002).

Influx control legislation (The Pass Laws) had been harsher in the Western Cape than anywhere else (Western, 2002) and a deliberate policy of exclusion and harassment of Cape Town residents was implemented (Cook, 1992). The Cape became a Coloured Labour Preference Area in 1954, under the Coloured Labour Preference policy. It was legislated that jobs would be racially reserved for not only whites, but also for coloureds; therefore most black African labour was excluded (Oldfield, 2004; Visser, 2003; Western, 2001; 2002). For more than thirty years, the Coloured Labour Preference policy gave automatic preference to coloured work seekers in the western portion of the Cape Province (Western, 2001). Not only did the apartheid regime limit black employment opportunities in the Cape, it also ensured that virtually no housing was constructed for blacks during this time. The existing black townships - Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga – became overcrowded, resulting in the establishment of informal housing. In the long run, the situation (lack of housing construction for blacks) proved flawed both economically and politically and the city’s African population continued to grow. This is in keeping with perspectives within regime theory that social inequality is linked to political power and that the system of social stratification is a source of social and economic inequalities. These in turn work against an open and penetrable form of politics.
In the early 1980s, security force action in African townships in Cape Town increased due to escalating levels of violence caused by rent and consumer boycotts. Maharaj (1997) and Seethal (1993) stated that although rent boycotts started as protest movements, they soon provided the catalyst for civic organizations to explore alternative local government structures which would transform the apartheid city. In addition, the apartheid state set out to eradicate the sprawling informal settlements, which were bulldozed and their inhabitants dispersed (Western 2001). The destruction of the Crossroads township was the biggest single forced removal in the decade from the 1970s to the 1980s (Platzky, 1987) and was a result of the central state’s determination to reduce the numbers of informal settlers on the site. However, the overall strategy of the central state was to crush popular organizations, particularly the emerging street committees and civic structures and to promote community councils or black local authorities (Kruss, 1987). The state was striving for greater credibility by implementing “upgrading” programmes under the control of these bodies (Kruss). Mollenkopf (1994) affirmed that racial succession is problematic for the urban political order as it might change the previously observed “normal” patterns.

By 1983, violent struggles between the state and the informal settlers resulted in a new township, Khayelitsha, on the south-eastern edge of the city (Saff, 1996; Visser, 2003). In 1984, when the Coloured Labour Preference policy was scrapped, competition for jobs at the lower levels grew. This had serious implications for housing as more people flocked to the metropolitan area in
search of employment. With the repeal of the Pass Laws in 1986, black urban migration to Cape Town accelerated leading to an equally rapid increase in the number of informal settlements within the black townships (Saff, 1996; Western, 2002).

Western (2002) asserted that profound poverty in the Eastern Cape versus perceived opportunities in the Cape Town metropolis propelled black South Africans westward towards the Cape. In 1993, the Cape Provincial Administration counted over 42 separate informal settlements in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area (Saff, 1996). It is evident that the expansion of these settlements not only resulted in the increase of unserviced sites due to a growing black population, but represented a contradiction to the state's notion of residential segregation as informal settlements were established within the boundaries of more affluent (white) areas. These informal settlements included Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay, Inthabeni/Site 5 in Noordhoek and the Marconi Beam site in Milnerton.

In the late 1980s, a metropolitan-type authority called Regional Services Councils (RSCs) existed in most urban areas in South Africa. They were established in 1985 with the proclamation of the RSC Act. These structures were service delivery bodies that concentrated on the provision of bulk services that were best delivered on a metropolitan-wide basis (Pieterse, 2002). In Cape Town a number of RSC municipal authorities existed.
In 1986, the Western Cape Regional Services Council was established in Cape Town. It was a supramunicipal body authorized to raise revenue through levies on local businesses and to use it – “redistributively” – to accelerate the upgrading or provision of basic services in African and coloured areas (Wilkinson, 2000). As a result, major low-cost housing projects were initiated in the south-eastern sector of the metropolitan area with the establishment of Khayelitsha (for Africans), and Blue Downs and Delft (for coloureds), the development of which was significantly supported by subsidies from central state agencies (Wilkinson, 2000). In the Western Cape, certain other remaining administrative controls regarding employer sanctions and housing were no longer enforced, and in 1988, the Coloured Labour Preference policy was abolished (Western, 2001). The extent to which the Group Areas Act (and related apartheid legislation) divided the city is evident in the fact that it became one of the most segregated major city in the country (Western, 1981, cited in Saff, 1996).

Segregated Local Governance:
Race-based Local Authorities in Cape Town

The pre-1994 local government system in South Africa was effectively established in the early 1920s with periodic reforms in an attempt to make the racially discriminatory system more acceptable (Nyalunga, 2006). Racially integrated local authorities were contrary to the Nationalist Party policy of having separate local government structures for different racial groups
(Cameron, 1991). Consequently, the local state in South Africa during apartheid was structured to facilitate and regulate the agenda of racial segregation and exclusion, and made provisions for race-based municipal authorities (Cameron, 2003; Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002) through the implementation of the Group Areas Act and influx controls (EPolitics SA, 2006).

Each racial group was provided its own type of local government and the different types coincided spatially with the formal segregation of races in terms of the Native Areas Act (1923) and later, the Group Areas Act (Pieterse, 2002). It meant that the four designated racial groups, whites, coloured, Indians and Africans, had their own version of local government but with very different capacities and powers (Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002). This clearly made strategic planning across Cape Town exceptionally difficult. White areas were governed and administered by White Local Authorities (WLAs) that were fully-fledged municipal institutions with a political council and an administration to carry out the functions of the councils, including taxation powers (Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002). Management Boards and Local Affairs Committees (LACs) governed the coloured and Indian areas. Both of these institutions relied on the administrations of WLAs and/or Provincial Administrations to provide services on their behalf (Cameron, 1991; Cameron and Sewell, 2003; Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002; Seethal, 1993). These Management Committees and LACs were established through elections characterized by very low levels of voter participation and were
generally regarded as illegitimate, and as puppet structures controlled by the (white) National Party (Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002). African communities fell under the jurisdiction of Black Local Authorities (BLAs). The BLAs were introduced in 1982 to govern black areas and represented a significant, but insufficient improvement in the forms of local government for the African communities in the urban townships (Seethal, 1993; Shubane, 1991). These BLAs fell outside the white interpretation of the city and were thus forced into being independent management units (Visser, 2003). They were ineffective due to their poor tax base and partly because they were seen as politically illegitimate (Cameron, 2003). It should be understood that although they offered a measure of control to African urban townships, these BLAs were introduced within the framework of apartheid; therefore, many civic associations and political parties were formed in response to the introduction of BLAs (Shubane, 1991) and began mobilizing people in opposition to the introduction of the BLAs. Significantly, a tenet of regime analysis is that having political impact calls for more than becoming active around a few issues. It also calls for becoming part of a locality’s governing arrangements.

After the 1988 municipal elections, there were 19 WLAs in Cape Town, each with its own administration. Five BLAs covered the African group areas although they were totally dependent on the RSCs and some of the WLAs to provide services on their behalf. Only one Management Board in the coloured areas had municipal status out of a total of 29 Coloured Local Affairs committees. The Management Board secured services from the WLAs and
the RSC. A number of ‘non-status’ areas existed in Cape Town, mainly informal settlements, and were serviced in part by the Provincial Administration (Pieterse, 2002). The largest WLA was the City of Cape Town, which had a staff complement in excess of 16 000 and fulfilled a metropolitan-wide service delivery role with respect to certain services (Pieterse, 2002). It was responsible for transport planning given that the central business district fell within its jurisdiction. It also provided bulk services such as waste, waste water treatment and electricity on a metropolitan scale. The other significant actor in Cape Town was the RSC. This body was the largest of its kind in South Africa in terms of its staff complement (around 6 000) and the scale of service provision it performed. It rendered services to almost all of the coloured and Indian Local Affairs Committees. Even though the RSC was a metropolitan level municipal structure, it refrained from any metropolitan level policy formulation or planning functions (Pieterse, 2002).

In 1997, in the early post apartheid period, the Cape Town and Tygerberg administrations were restructured to incorporate the bulk of BLA territories and were tasked with the role of redistribution of services in Cape Town. The two administrations were the wealthiest and had the most skilled human resources. With 66 percent of the metropolitan area population, the two administrations became responsible for extending and improving services to the rapidly growing former BLA areas (Smith and Hanson, 2003).
The Cape Town and Tygerberg administrations took different approaches to service redistribution despite facing similar challenges in the task of integrating the BLAs (Smith and Hanson, 2003). The Cape Town administration adopted a centralized approach, with the aim of equalizing service delivery across the city, upgrading collapsing infrastructure in BLA areas and extending services to rapidly growing township areas (Smith and Hanson, 2003). In contrast, Tygerberg moved to an area based management model by disaggregating previously racially defined municipalities into six multiracial administrative areas. The decentralized service delivery in Tygerberg enabled better coordination of resources within a given management area, but in the interests of white residents it weakened Tygerberg’s ability to redistribute resources across different areas within the municipality (Smith and Hanson, 2003).

The challenges facing the Cape Town and Tygerberg administrations in integrating the BLA areas were similar to those facing the entire city. One of these challenges was the rapid migration of people to the townships and people’s acquisition of housing through informal transactions. This made it difficult for local authorities to register, update and keep correct records for a large proportion of properties in these areas. Secondly, in the city, local government had experienced large cuts in funds from the central state for infrastructure provision, with intergovernmental transfers reduced by 85 per cent between 1991 and 1997 (Smith and Hanson, 2003). In Cape Town alone, these funds were cut by 55 per cent from 1997 to 2000 (McDonald and
Smith, 2004). This was a result of the GEAR policy introduced in 1996 which resulted in significant decreases in intergovernmental transfers from national to local governments in the name of fiscal restraint (McDonald and Smith, 2004). Thirdly, local authorities had to deal with operational inefficiencies stemming from a bloated local apartheid system. Therefore, Cape Town faced the enormous challenge of recovering from the historical legacy of apartheid (Cameron and Sewell, 2003).

The Local State Restructuring Period (1993 - 2000)

The crisis in local government was a major force leading to the national reform process that began in 1990 (Nyalunga, 2006). The central state was forced to acknowledge that BLAs were not financially viable and unable to govern black urban areas (Maharaj, 1997; Seethal, 1993). Therefore, new local state alternatives had to be considered. Starting in 1990 and in the midst national negotiation, inclusive local state structures were simultaneously negotiated (Visser, 2003).

In 1993, a national level Local Government Negotiations Forum (LGNF) was established to reach agreement on the future of the local government system and the transition mechanisms and procedures (Maharaj, 1997; Pieterse, 2002). It was a body comprising of existing local authorities, political parties, civic organizations and other interested parties (Maharaj, 1997). The product of the LGNF was Chapter 10 in the Interim Constitution, which dealt with local
state affairs. The provisions were formally promulgated on 2 February 1994, which signaled the start of the pre-interim phase of the local government democratization process.

The local government deracialisation and democratization was divided into three phases: (i) Pre-interim, which commenced with the passing of the Local Government Transition Act\textsuperscript{5} until the first local government elections (1995/6); (ii) interim phase, which stretched between the first and second democratic elections (1995/6 – 1999/2000); and (iii) the final phase that commenced when the final constitutional model was implemented with the second local government elections in December 2000 (Cameron, 2003; Nyalunga, 2006; Pieterse, 2002). The pre-interim phase involved the creation of local forums.

Forums had to be established on a 50-50 basis between statutory and non-statutory organizations. The statutory side consisted of members of the existing apartheid government bodies and the non-statutory side comprised of those who were not part of a statutory forum in the political restructuring of local government, most notably the ANC (Cameron, 2003). The major function of the forums was to establish transitional local councils until the first local government elections could be organized. The pre-interim forums introduced party politics into local government. Both the forums and

\footnote{The Local Government Transition Act (RSA, 1993) set out the procedure by which local government would change from exclusive apartheid structures to new inclusive democratic structures.}
transitional local councils were dominated by political parties and organizations, most notably the NP, the ANC and the smaller liberal Democratic Party (DP) (Cameron, 2003).

The main outcome of the LGNF was the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) (Visser, 2003). The LGTA made provisions, inter alia for the creation of metropolitan authorities for the pre-interim and interim phases and for a clearly defined transition process (Cameron, 2003; Nyalunga, 2006). The LGTA also made provisions for a Local Government Demarcation Board in each of the nine provinces (Cameron, 2003), whose responsibility it was to redraw municipal boundaries throughout the country (Binns and Nel, 2002). In metropolitan areas, a two-tier system was created consisting of Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) and Transitional Metropolitan Substructures (TMSs) (subsequently Metropolitan Local Councils). In urban areas separate Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) were created and District Councils were created in rural areas (Cameron). The TMSs constituted the primary local authorities and held the main responsibility for reconstructing the post-apartheid metropolitan area (Visser, 2003).

The 1996 local government ‘interim phase’ elections saw the establishment of a two-tier metropolitan government system. The Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum (CMNF) had the task of establishing the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC), a weak policy coordinating metropolitan authority, and its six
autonomous Transitional Metropolitan Substructures (TMSs). The Western Cape Demarcation Board (WCDB) oversaw political redistricting in consultation with public and private proposals (Visser, 2003). In conjunction with the LGTA, the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) and the Demarcation Act steered the local government transition. The Demarcation Act allowed for the reconsideration of the geographical areas of jurisdiction of local governments (Nyalunga, 2006) and the DFA introduced the term ‘developmental local government’ to indicate a break with the past. Local governments were tasked to take a developmental approach to governance, which meant creating the right conditions for development to thrive, and included planning, land administration, local economy and environmental management (Faull, 2006). Developmental local government can thus be defined as local government that has a constitutional mandate to foster development (Nyalunga, 2006).

Parallel with the reorganization of local government and in line with developmental local government, two significant changes took place in the local planning system during the transition period. The first was the adoption of “integrated development planning”. The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) embodies the core purpose of local government and guides all aspects

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6 These were Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality and South Peninsula Municipality.

7 The IDP process in Cape Town was initiated during July 2001 with the ANC City Council’s approval of the IDP process plan.
of revenue raising and service delivery activities, as well as local state interaction with the public (Visser, 2003). It also partly fulfills the task of developmental local government. Nyalunga (2006) asserted that the IDP empowers local authorities to prioritize and strategically focus their activities and resources according to people’s needs. Local authorities are now mandated to prepare five-year IDPs in terms of national and provincial legislation. In addition, Local Economic Development (LED) is a key dimension of integrated development planning, and municipalities are required (under the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000) to ensure that LED is firmly positioned on the development agenda of local authorities (Nel and Rogerson, 2007), as it was considered an important growth strategy for post-apartheid economic reconstruction (Maharaj and Ramball, 1998). In addition to the IDP, the second major development was the Cape Metropolitan Council’s (CMC) attempt to replace the discredited metropolitan “guide plans” – whose primary mandate, arguably, was to maintain the segregation of different population groups – with a comprehensive “metropolitan spatial development framework” (MSDF) (Wilkinson, 2000). The main objectives of the MSDF were to provide an overarching concept plan for the spatial restructuring needed to reintegrate the fragmented urban system inherited from the apartheid era and to direct the city’s future growth along a more socially equitable and environmentally sustainable path (Wilkinson, 2000).

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8 The Western Cape Economic Development Forum initiated the process of formulating the ideas incorporated in the MSDF in 1991, early in the period of post-apartheid transition.
The New City of Cape Town Metropolitan Council

In 1996, apartheid and Bantustan municipal structures in South Africa were integrated into 887 Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) (Faull, 2006). After the local government ‘interim phase’ elections in 1996, the ANC emerged as the ruling party in the Cape Town municipality. The municipality was the best resourced of the seven councils (1 metropolitan Council and 6 transitional metropolitan sub structure (TMSs)) within Cape Town (Cameron and Sewell, 2003). On 6 December 2000 a new Council came into being - the Cape Town Metropolitan Council.

The Unicity Commission was a legislative body charged with the responsibility of preparing detailed recommendations for the incoming Metropolitan Council to ensure a smooth transition process from seven distinct municipalities to one municipality for Cape Town. It was agreed that the Unicity Commission would not only restrict itself to preparing transition plans to ensure uninterrupted provision of services, but would also develop a five-year service delivery plan (IDP) to ensure that the new council took off as quickly as possible (Pieterse, 2002).

In Cape Town it effectively meant that between 1988 and 2000, the area moved from having more than 50 different types of municipal authorities that were racially based to just one metropolitan authority - the Unicity Council (see Table 2). The legislative framework for metropolitan government in the
The final phase of the transition (post-December 2000 elections) is set out by the South African Constitution and the Municipal Structures Act (Pieterse, 2002).

Table 2. Evolution of local government in Cape Town (1988-2000)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number &amp; types of local authorities in Cape Town</td>
<td>19 White Local Authorities 29 Management Committees 5 Black Local Authorities 1 Regional Services Council Non-status areas serviced by Provincial authority</td>
<td>40 elected Councils, each comprised of 50% statutory councillors and 50% non-statutory councillors</td>
<td>1 Metropolitan Council (weak powers) 6 sub-councils (own policy-making and fiscal powers)</td>
<td>1 Unicity Council 23 sub-councils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The City of Cape Town Metropolitan Council is a newly formed Metropolitan, Category-A Municipality. It is an amalgamation of the former municipalities of Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality, and South Peninsula Municipality (which includes Fish Hoek, Simsonstown and Muizenberg). The political intent behind the creation of a single-tier metropolitan government (Unicity Council) was to facilitate economic competitiveness and effective redistribution across the metropolitan region (Cameron, 2003; Pieterse, 2002). Another objective was to establish high profile city leaders, who would act decisively and accelerate the much needed metropolitan wide institutional and political transformation (Pieterse). This in effect displays tendencies towards establishing an urban regime.

The new Cape Town Unicity Council was tasked with the role of redistribution of resources in the post apartheid period to correct the injustices wrought by the apartheid past and to ensure the promotion of equity. To assist the Unicity Council achieve this goal, the central and provincial spheres offered transfers for development called intergovernmental grants (IGGs). The IGGs are intended to fund the shortfall between the resources that local government has been able to generate through its own revenue-raising capabilities and the resource requirements for carrying out its responsibilities. However, because the pool of resources for funding the shortfalls – nationally collected

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9 A category A Municipality has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 7, Section155 (1a)).
revenue – is limited, it was subject to competition among spheres (Whelan, 2003).

The resource limitations implied that resources should only be allocated where they were most needed. This allocation was carried out through “needs-based” grants. These were based on criteria that measure relative service delivery need by focusing on two dimensions of need, service backlogs, and the capacity of the municipalities to address the backlog (Whelan, 2003). Intergovernmental transfers were therefore directed to a significant extent to areas with high rates of poverty and there has been some concern that greater attention needed to be paid to the role that wealthier municipalities play in the economy (Fast).

This means that the Unicity Council was not solely responsible for driving development in Cape Town. The national and provincial spheres of government and funding agencies also contributed to infrastructure development in the area. However, the onus was also on the Unicity Council to ensure that utilization of these transfers were aligned with the development objectives of the national and provincial governments and that of the IDP.

**Conclusion**

In terms of Cape Town’s history of urban segregation and the segregation of local governance, Wilkinson (2000) stated that it remains to be seen whether
Cape Town will be able to develop a system of urban governance which overcomes what appears to be a deepening division between sectors of its population. Achieving this would enable it to negotiate successfully the dual challenge of meeting all its inhabitants' basic needs while positioning itself to compete effectively in the global economy. It was also essential that other spheres of government and civil society actively participate in giving direction to the development priorities in Cape Town. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, these development priorities have been undermined by the frequent changes in political administration. The next chapter explores the past and present development priorities of the political parties that have governed Cape Town by analyzing their IDPs and budgets and the extent of central and provincial state assistance to development in the area.
CHAPTER IV

LOCAL STATE POLITICS IN CAPE TOWN:
THE POST APARTHEID PERIOD

Introduction

The new post-apartheid Unicity Council was faced with the enormous task of correcting the injustices of past policies. It did this by attempting to overcome the socio-economic challenges that Cape Town faces at present. Overcoming these challenges depend on the Council’s ability to promote both sustainable economic growth and job creation. However, as this chapter illustrates, there were obstacles to effective governance as contests for control of the metropolitan area in the post-apartheid period occurred within the local state, and between the local state and the other spheres of government. These contests have resulted from shifting political alliances stemming largely from political floor crossing, differing political agendas and race-based politics. Therefore, local state politics in Cape Town have been significantly unstable as different political parties have shifted in and out of power since the first local government elections in 1995/6.

This chapter is used as a point of departure for the local state conflicts and regime changes that characterize the city. Of importance also were the past development and budget policies (2000-2005) of the two major opposing political parties in Cape Town namely, the ANC and the DA. An analysis of
the past budgets and IDPs as decided upon by the dominating parties, determined their development priorities and the planned allocation of resources. The role of the provincial and central state in service delivery in Cape Town was also reviewed. This chapter puts forward a critique of the track record of the two dominating political parties in Cape Town since 2000, taking into account the legacy of apartheid and its impact on the service and infrastructure backlogs that the city experienced. It is suggested that the politics of Cape Town has been shaped by the politics of race and that political actors shaped the urban political environment through the policies they implemented, the coalitions they formed and by their relationship with the different spheres of government.

Party Politics and the Local State in Cape Town

The Western Cape acquired a politically conservative reputation because of voting patterns in the 1994 and 1999 general elections that were largely based on race (Hendricks, 2004). It also remained a highly contested area and, in the run-up to the 2004 general election, the ANC announced that it was going all out to secure the two “renegade” provinces, the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal (EISA). The same was true for Cape Town and Wilkinson (2000) noted that despite the transition to democratic local government, the form of local politics in Cape Town seemed to remain partially entwined in patterns shaped by the impact of apartheid. He further
stated that this translated into a tendency for voting at the local level to follow the national trend of a large majority of the white and coloured populations voting for opposition parties while an overwhelming majority of the African population supported the African National Congress (ANC). However, the presence of a large and unpredictable coloured electorate in Cape Town changed these dynamics and local government election outcomes were often changeable due to the changing allegiances of the coloured electorate. This group made up more than half of the population; therefore, the acquisition of the coloured vote was critical for political parties in Cape Town. This partially accounted for the conflicting political interactions between the parties as they competed for control of the area and for the coloured vote.

In the first three years of its existence (2000-2003), the Unicity government had three mayors, which was the result of changes in the ruling bloc in Council. Consequently, each new leader and his/her executive committee had some influence on regime politics and service delivery in Cape Town, and influenced the policy direction of the Unicity government (Jolobe, 2007; Zaaiman, 2007). Furthermore, amidst the shifting of power, negative political undercurrents prevailed among members of Council, firstly from the political floor crossing opportunity which resulted in a political change in the Western Cape provincial government and subsequently in Cape Town, and secondly, from the ANC/NNP coalition which required two parties with different orientations to work together (Zaaiman, 2007). The next sections discuss these events and the effects they had on governance in the Unicity.
In December 2000, the first nonracial, fully democratic local government election was held throughout South Africa for the newly demarcated municipalities. In Cape Town, the campaign for control of the area was not without political conflict and the contest for the working-class coloured vote became the key electoral battle amongst the parties. The Democratic Alliance was formed in June 2000, when the then Democratic Party and the New National Party signed an outline agreement that established the party as a more effective challenge to the ANC at the local government level and paved way for the merger of the parties at provincial and national level (Cameron, 2003; Jolobe, 2007). This supports Stone’s (2005) statement that issue-oriented coalitions are formed among political parties. In the run up to the elections, the DA’s campaign was geared towards attacking the ANC’s record, and negative campaigning was deemed to have been more conspicuous in the Western Cape than anywhere else in the country (Lodge, 2003).

The ANC accused the DA, among other things, of expecting poor coloured neighborhoods to subsidize property rates in affluent white areas. The DA however managed to mobilize their supporters in higher numbers than the ANC and took control of the area with a majority of 107 out of 200 councillors (Faull, 2006). Alderman Pieter Marais (DA) ascended to the position of mayor in December 2000. The DA also secured a majority of the vote in the
coloured suburbs and townships by focusing on local issues (Faull, 2004). Faull (2004) notes that in contrast to the DA’s targeted campaign, the ANC had focused on issues of local government in the abstract and failed to produce election materials specific to the areas they campaigned in.

The DA alliance was unstable and a series of events unfolded, throwing Cape Town’s political system into turmoil. Although the DA existed legally at the local sphere, at the provincial and national spheres, the DP and NNP remained separate parties. Within a year of coming to power in the Western Cape, the alliance fractured (in 2001), with the party leaders publicly slandering each other (Habib and Nadvi, 2002). Marais was expelled from the party (DA) in December 2001 on the basis of alleged malpractice during the process of the renaming of streets.

In May 2001, Marais designed a proposal to change the street names of Adderley and Wale Streets in the Cape Town central business district to Mandela and De Klerk Avenue respectively (Cameron, 2003; Jolobe, 2007). The Mayor publicly announced that there was overwhelming support for the plan, however, there was large-scale opposition to this street-naming process as expressed by the public in the media (Cameron, 2003). The controversy arose when it was claimed that there were several lists of alleged forged signatures in favour of the Mayor’s plan. Jolobe asserted that the street-naming scandal demonstrated the damaging effect of lack of internal conflict resolution structures in political coalitions. As a senior NNP figure, Marais’
expulsion was strongly opposed by ex-NNP members of the DA. This was followed by allegations of corruption, which erupted between the NNP and DP wings of the DA (Western, 2001). The NNP leader, Martinus van Schalkwyk’s response was to reconstitute the NNP, by taking the party into a coalition with the ANC at all spheres of government.

In December 2001 following the removal of Marais, the DA majority elected Gerald Morkel as Mayor of Cape Town. His term was short-lived because of his involvement with a German fraudster, Jurgen Harksen, and the change in the political composition of the Council in October 2002 during the floor crossing period (Zaaiman, 2007). His term ended following the crossing of DA members to other parties that resulted in an ANC/NNP coalition majority and the subsequent breakdown of the DA. In 2002, the ANC local politician, Nomaindia Mfeketo was elected as the new mayor of Cape Town. During the ANC/NNP term, constant political restructuring10 within the administration slowed down decision-making processes and the administration became less effective and less focused (Zaaiman, 2007). Also, the local government was not devoid of the typical coalition politics of tension and negotiation. The impact of these changes on the administration is discussed in subsequent sections.

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10 In November 2002, Deputy Mayor Cllr Erleigh (ANC) resigned and was replaced by Cllr Uys (NNP). In November 2002, the ANC terminated City manager Mr. Maydon’s contract. In March 2003, Mr. Wallace Mgoqi was appointed as the new City manager by the ANC/NNP coalition (Zaaiman, 2007).
Political Floor Crossing
and the ANC-NNP Alliance in Cape Town

After the formalisation of the Constitution in 1996, floor crossing was forbidden by the existence of an anti-defection clause embedded in the Constitution (Faull, 2004). Due to the Constitutional anti-defection clause, parties could not legally merge between elections. Thus, the DA negotiations of 2000 were pushed through in order for the two parties to be able to contest the December elections as one organization (Faull, 2004; Jolobe, 2007). A bid to allow for floor crossing was started as a DA backed initiative in 2001 to allow for more ‘fluid’ politics in South Africa. At this stage, the measure did not find favour with the ANC, as the initiative was perceived as the congealing of a race and class based political opposition. However, the plan fell more favourably for the ANC when the NNP withdrew from the DA in 2001 (Faull, 2004).

The outcome of the ANC/NNP alliance was the promulgation of legislation and constitutional amendments that would enable national and provincial legislators and local councillors to cross the floor and join other parties without losing their seats. It was widely acknowledged that the alliance did this strategically to win control of the Western Cape and Cape Town in the wake of anticipated massive defections from the DA (Sylvester, Cape Argus, 20 June 2002). This would thus allow councillors elected on a DA ticket to shift their allegiance to the NNP, thereby allowing political change in the
dominating regime in the Western Cape provincial government (Habib and Nadvi, 2002). It is also important to note the 10 percent clause in the legislation pertaining to floor crossing.\textsuperscript{11}

The ANC’s objective was achieved when in 2002, political leadership in Cape Town changed hands in favour of the ANC/NNP coalition following the floor crossing legislation which Parliament enacted for the national, provincial and local government spheres. In June 2002 three legislative amendments and one bill were tabled in Parliament to facilitate floor-crossing, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002 (the Constitution Amendment Act); the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002 (the Municipal Structures Amendment Act); the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 21 of 2002 (the Constitution Second Amendment Act); and the Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002 (the Membership Act) (Faull, 2004).

Subsequently, in Cape Town, 27 DA councillors defected to the NNP and the DA lost all its seats on the City’s executive committee and retained only 71 seats from 107 in 2000 (see Table 3). This began a process that saw NNP councillors using the floor crossing window period in 2004 to cross to the

\textsuperscript{11} The implementation of the 10\% clause effectively protected larger parties from piece meal defection, as the threshold required a relatively large number of councillors to defect before the window was closed. Smaller parties, on the other hand, could reach the 10\% defection clause even if a single member chose to cross the floor (Faull, 2004).
ANC, and the final dissolution of the NNP in the 2006 local government elections (Jolobe, 2007).

Table 3. Cape Town Metropolitan Council – Council Seats (2000 and 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party – Party Alliance (December 2000)</th>
<th>Number of seats in Council (December 2000) before Floor Crossing</th>
<th>Number of seats in Council (October 2002) after Floor Crossing</th>
<th>Number of seats in Council (March 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49**</td>
<td>38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The other parties included the African Christian Democratic Party, the United Democratic Movement, the African Muslim Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Middle Party and the Pan Africanist Congress, with 8, 3, 2, 1, 1, and 1 seats respectively.

** This included the NNP, which had a total of 32 seats.

*** This included the Independent Democrats with 22 seats. Other smaller parties took a total of 16 seats.

The Independent Democrats (ID) was formed in 2003 out of a floor crossing initiative. In its first local elections, the Party won 10.54 percent of the overall support in the Western Cape, making it the third largest party in the Province, after the DA and the ANC. Observers argued that the party held the balance of power within the Council. In the March 2006 local government elections, the DA won 91 seats of the 210-member council. The ANC took 81, and the ID 22. With 16 seats, the ACDP and other parties joined the DA to form a fragile ruling alliance (South Africa Travel Forum and Bulletin Board, 2008). The DA maintained its majority support among voters, but did not get the controlling majority it did in 2001. For a single party to assume executive power and form a government, it needed to win 106 or more seats. No single party won a controlling majority, therefore, the council was hung, and required the formation of a ruling coalition (Jolobe, 2007). The coalition that materialized was DA-led with six smaller parties in Council. These were the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), the African Muslim Party (AMP), the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the United Independent Front (UIF) and the United Party (UP).

Following the 2006 elections, the ID rejected an offer to join the DA-led multi-party government due to dissimilar policies and principles between the two parties. The ID also sought to change the executive mayor system to the collective executive committee system with the support of the ANC. However, in January 2007, the ID joined the DA-led multi-party coalition in Cape Town, stating that it did so to put an end to the instability that has plagued local
politics in the city over the past several years (South African Press Association, 17 January 2007). The ID leader, Patricia de Lille, subsequently vowed that her party fought against certain policies of the DA in the City of Cape Town and stated that her party was not in a coalition with the DA. This clearly highlights the shifting nature of coalitions around important issues at the local state sphere, as the ID mobilized its supporters across different constituencies to support an electoral majority.

In September 2007, the third floor crossing period took place for all spheres of government. After the two week window period, the Independent Electoral Commission confirmed changes in the distribution of seats among political parties in the Council and the City of Cape Town Council was reconstituted. The DA had 95 seats, the ID 16 seats, the United Democratic Movement 1 and the AMP 2 (City of Cape Town, 2008). Two new parties were also created during the process; the Social Democrats with 1 seat and the National People’s Party with 4.

During the weeks leading up to the floor crossing period, former AMP councillor Badih Chabaan was implicated in bribery and corruption in exchange for seats in order to topple the multi-party government and replace it with an ANC-National People’s Party (NPP) led alliance (City of Cape Town, 2008). This was the tenth attempt to topple the DA government since March 2006 (Joubert, Mail and Guardian, 2 November 2007). If the ANC-NPP plan had been successful, it would have led to a complete shift in the City’s policy.
direction once more. In January 2007, Chabaan and two other African Muslim Party (AMP) councillors were expelled from the DA multi-party coalition after it was discovered that they had been conducting talks with the ANC about forming a new coalition (SAPA, 17 January 2007).

Despite the ANC’s preference to have the floor crossing legislation retained, in April 2008, Cabinet approved two draft bills, the Constitution of South Africa Seventeenth and Eighteenth Amendment bills, which effectively saw the end of floor crossing as a parliamentary practice in South Africa (Sabinet Government Information, 2008).

The Struggle for Power in the Cape Town Unicity

The struggle for power in Cape Town did not escape the reach of the provincial and national spheres of government. Between 2006 and September 2007, the ANC-led provincial government made nine attempts to change the balance of power in the Unicity Council. In South Africa, Unicity Councils have a choice of two types of executive systems, the executive mayoral system and the collective executive committee system (www.southafrica.info).

The executive mayoral system allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor, who is assisted by a mayoral executive committee. The collective executive system (mayoral committee system)
allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive committee in which the executive leadership of the municipality is collectively vested. Provision is made for a mayor, although he/she is one member of the collective executive (Cameron, 2003). Representation on the collective executive system is proportional to the number of councillors per political party in the City Council. In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, every municipality must delegate executive powers to a person (mayor, or chairperson of council) or a collective (executive committee), but can decide against an Executive Mayor in favour of an Executive Council, which is then enacted by the relevant Provincial Minister (as required by law) (Pieterse, 2002). The Provincial Minister also has the final authority to decide on the form of Council. The Cape Town Metropolitan Council is currently governed through the executive mayoral system.

In September 2006, the ANC Western Cape MEC Richard Dyantyi sent Cape Town Mayor Helen Zille a letter, announcing that he was considering scrapping the executive mayoral system, and replacing it with a mayoral committee system (Van Gass, Business Day, 20 September 2006). This was the ANC’s fifth attempt to seize the powers of the Mayor and the change would have meant that the ANC and the ID would have had a majority in the 10-member executive committee, where the DA and its allies held all the seats. The Mayor declared that the plan also had the support of the highest levels of the ANC and was discussed at a meeting of the ANC’s Western
Cape provincial leadership, which was attended by President Mbeki (Van Gass, Business Day, 20 September 2006).

It is worth noting that the ANC had introduced and supported the executive mayoral system for Cape Town under former mayor ANC Nomaindia Mfeketo and continued to support the system in all cities under ANC control. The plan to oust Helen Zille of her executive powers was dropped in October 2006 following the intervention of ANC Provincial and Local Government Minister, Sydney Mufamadi. In December 2007, the Erasmus Commission was set up when the former Western Cape Premier Ebrahim Rasool ordered an inquiry into alleged spying activities of the DA city administration. It was alleged that Zille’s administration illegally spied on former AMP councillor Chabaan to determine whether he had bribed DA councillors to cross the floor. The DA declared the Commission to be an illegal and unconstitutional move set up by the ANC to wrest control of Cape Town from the DA and its alliance partners and vowed to challenge the Commission’s appointment at the Constitutional Court (Pressly, Business Report, 4 May 2008).

Race based politics and tensions ensued between the ANC and DA when in December 2007, DA councillor Frank Martin encouraged backyard dwellers to occupy government funded housing in Delft. The councillor had accused the ANC of allowing black people to receive preferential treatment over coloureds on government housing waiting lists, thereby dealing with the plight of only a certain race group. Following this, state-owned housing developer Thubelisha
had confirmed that it intended suing councillor Martin for R20-million, the cost of repairing damage to the homes and the ANC subsequently accused the DA of using Delft as a political tool. Thus, the conflicts between the parties in Council since 2000 have been various. These tensions between the parties have also had an impact on the management of Council.

The Administrative Impact of Regime Change in Cape Town

Frequent changes in the political regime of Cape Town since 2000 have impacted on local governance and service delivery. The frequent changing of the political guard also happened in parallel to structural changes as the area consolidated from 35 municipalities to seven administrations and to a single centralized Unicity over the past decade (Edmunds, Mail and Guardian, 2 November 2006). National policy, including affirmative action, overlaid municipal transformation. Each majority political party in power wanted its own people in senior management, thus as the ANC and DA have shuffled in and out of power, a trend of hiring and recalling of council officials has destabilized service delivery and governance. Zaaiman (2007) asserted that when the DA came into power in 2000, it made Cape Town its flagship in local government because this was the only large city in which it was the dominant party. Senior officials from the previous dispensation were therefore immediately removed when the DA took office – something which the ANC/NNP coalition repeated when it came to power in 2002. Under the ANC/NNP alliance, a new team of ten executive managers was established.
However they had little experience in local government (Edmunds, *Mail and Guardian*, 2 November 2006). The team started the Unicity’s first formal process of organizational design, which failed, and moved to a second cheaper version.

When the ANC/NNP coalition ascended to power in Cape Town in 2002, the Executive Committee was disestablished and new portfolios were approved and new members elected. The new city manager, Wallace Mgoqi, oversaw two more restructuring processes to facilitate transformation. It seemed that replacing white managers with blacks was the guiding principle of the transformation plan (Edmunds, *Mail and Guardian*, 2 November 2006). The political restructuring in the Council at the end of 2002 was followed by comprehensive strategic restructuring in 2003. A new sub-council by-law was adopted in May 2003 which increased the number of sub-councils from 16 to 20, with new boundaries (Zaaiman, 2007). The ANC/NNP coalition was in the majority in each of them. An Executive Mayoral system was established in June 2003 and it was decided that ward committees would be established in 2003 (Zaaiman, 2007).

In May 2005, under the ANC administration, the Ikhwezi management team of nine executive directors was appointed to run the key administrative functions of the City. However, when the DA-led Council assumed office in May 2006, it suffered a setback as a result of the mass departure of the Ikhwezi executive directors appointed under the former ANC-led administration.
These directors invoked a condition of service which enabled them to terminate their contracts within 60 days of the first council meeting without losing their payouts (Powell, *Independent Online*, 12 May 2006). This meant that the City’s key administrative positions were left vacant. In addition, staff shortages compromised the delivery of basic services in key areas that were set aside as levers for growth and development (i.e., libraries and engineering services) (City of Cape Town, 2006b). This supports the argument that political instability at the local state sphere has negative consequences for policy implementation, good governance and service delivery. Therefore, policy implementation in part determined the level of service delivery. The next section explores this.

**Budget and Development Policies**


**DA City Development Priorities**

When the DA ascended to power in Cape Town in 2000, its manifesto made clear what it wanted to establish in the City. The Executive Committee held a strategic planning workshop in January 2001 to discuss the priorities on which it wanted to focus. These were safety and security, job creation especially through tourism, combatting HIV/AIDS and the provision of free basic services (City of Cape Town 2002b). The DA successfully launched the Mess Action campaign which removed 62 000 tons of illegally dumped waste in its attempt
to create a “zero waste city” (Council Minutes, 28 March 2001, City of Cape Town). In urban renewal the DA did not follow the National Urban Renewal Project’s guidelines but instituted an urban renewal project which centered on safety and security. In consequence, it could not get support and funding from the national government for this version of urban renewal.

In its attempt to fight crime, the DA initiated a comprehensive crime strategy (City of Cape Town, 2002b). The training of 500 community police officers began in 2001 and a process was started to consider the expansion of CCTV surveillance cameras in the city. The Council also became the first to offer free lifeline services (water and electricity). In terms of housing, the Council recognized the challenge of housing provision but highlighted in its 2001 budget the need to upgrade the city’s existing housing stock, to identify land for housing development and the improvement and management of informal settlements. Although Mayor Marais stated in 2001 that Council had a policy to help the poor, no policy was submitted in his term and it was not clear that the budget was pro-poor (Zaaiman). The DA also used evictions to ensure debt control and no indigent policies with regard to evictions and land invasions were initiated.

In terms of the IDP, the Municipal Systems Act prescribes municipalities to develop an IDP by means of a participatory process. However, Zaaiman notes that the 2001/2002 IDP did not conform to this requirement and the Mayor of Cape Town at a Council meeting in 2001 told council that the IDP
was not community-driven due to time constraints. Similarly in March 2002, then Mayor of Cape Town, Gerald Morkel, reported to Council that the IDP process had failed (Zaaiman, 2007). The needs of various sub-councils had not been addressed, public participation was limited and the IDP was not driving the budget.

On the issue of privatizing municipal services (as well as corporatising and outsourcing) the DA took a very explicit and neo-liberal position (McDonald and Smith, 2004). In a Council meeting on 28 March 2001, the DA put forward a motion to corporatise water and sanitation, electricity and solid waste disposal. However, this did not find favour with the ANC who stated that it was aimed at cutting costs for the wealthy at the expense of the poor (Council minutes, 28 March 2001, City of Cape Town). The DA’s manifesto during the 2000 local government elections stated that virtually every service that municipalities were responsible lent themselves to variants of commercialization and privatisation (McDonald and Smith). This was a clear support for an increased role for private sector service delivery at the sphere of local government on the part of the DA.

Some priority themes as stated in the DA’s 2002/2003 IDP were the need for stronger alliances with business, introduction of private sector practices to run the organization and enhanced liaison with the province and central government. Job creation through tourism was one of the DA’s priorities and in 2002, Mayor Morkel stated in a speech to Council, “tourism is the single
most powerful engine by which we will bring jobs and prosperity to our community and the City of Cape Town; this Council will continue to create an environment which enables the sector [tourism] to flourish” (Council Minutes, 5 March 2002, City of Cape Town, p.6).

Zaaiman stated that during this term (2002/2003), the city administration failed to maintain good, cooperative relationships with the provincial and national spheres. However, the Council built partnerships with the business sector and the International Convention Center went under construction. In addition, the city saw the establishment of the City Improvement Districts in partnership with business. Many contracts were also awarded during this term. Therefore, during its term in office (2000-2002), the DA created a regime similar to that espoused by Stone (2005) in which coalitions develop between local governments and the private sector to influence key policy areas in cities.

The DA did not ensure public participation and relationship with the province deteriorated, particularly because of the change in provincial government control from the DA to an ANC/NNP alliance in 2002. Partnerships with business were built and Zaaiman noted that the DA’s term was about high level issues such as regenerating the inner-city center (to promote tourism) rather than a focus on grassroots problems, and few real initiatives were taken with regard to poverty.
ANC/NNP City Development Priorities (2002-2005)

Constant political and strategic restructuring in the administration characterized the ANC/NNP coalition’s first year in office (2002). In March 2003 a new city manager, Mgoqi, replaced the former DA city manager, Robert Maydon. Maydon’s departure had a negative impact on the city’s financial management capacity as well as on the ANC/NNP coalition’s 2003 budget process (Zaaiman, 2007). The ANC’s values and priorities differed from those of the DA. Zaaiman noted that the ANC was able to fast track political change because it had the support of the national and provincial governments.

The ANC’s main development priority when it took control of the city in October 2002 was to address the issue of poverty, and Mayor Mfeketo stated “…our Integrated Development Plan is firmly focused on the actions we must take to reduce poverty in our city” (Integrated Development Plan 2005/2006, City of Cape Town, p. 5). The first and most notable policy on indigence was its moratorium on evictions. The Executive Committee approved a motion to institute a six month moratorium on evictions and water disconnections with effect from 1 November 2002. Although the intention was that the moratorium would be applicable to the renters of municipal houses, many residents who had difficulty with their municipal bills also stopped paying. The result was that payment of municipal bills declined further in the six months following the announcement (Zaaiman, 2007). The 20kWh free electricity for households...
was raised to 300kWh, however the R20 grant to households was terminated. McDonald and Smith (2004) that although the number of water and electricity cut-offs appeared to have decreased when the ANC came back into power in 2002, service disconnections and household evictions continued in the city on a daily basis.

The administration adopted a Mayoral Listening campaign to engage with the public on the strategic vision of the IDP (Integrated Development Plan, 2003/2004, City of Cape Town). Over 12 000 people participated in the review process. To inform the process, comments were received from individuals, representatives for wards, NGOs, community development groups and civil organisations on the issues Cape Town faced. Twenty meetings were held across the city. From an analysis of the comments raised at these meetings, a number of priority issues were identified such as provision of housing, jobs, high crime rates, the need for an improved health service and the maintenance of council housing. The city administration used the information to compile the IDP, and plan and budget for the 2003/2004 Financial Year.

The 2003/2004 budget was thus developed within the context of service delivery backlogs and the developmental needs as set out in the IDP. The IDP strongly informed the budget and the Mayor called it a pro-poor budget. However, it became clear at the end of 2003 that there were huge
The ANC tapped into the National Urban Renewal Project because of political similarities at the national, provincial and local spheres after floor crossing. The national government also assisted in securing resources for a pilot project to prepare sites for resettlement in District Six and Wingfield. The ANC/NNP coalition was not negative about private sector involvement in local government. It supported partnerships to assist development and the poor, but in these partnerships the city was the dominant partner. However the coalition was not as involved with business as the DA was, although it did not encourage privatisation.

The post 2006 DA-led regime focused its attention on three top priorities - job creation, housing and safety and security. It envisaged sustainable job creation through effective service delivery, well maintained infrastructure and the promotion of business investment (IDP, 2007/8-2011/12, City of Cape Town, 2007a). It also applied to the Provincial government to become an accredited housing delivery agency. The regime’s main goal was thus infrastructure-led economic growth to promote job creation and its ability to provide the critical infrastructure and ensure enhanced delivery was at the core of this five-year plan. To this end, the city’s IDP centered on seven focus areas: shared economic growth and development, sustainable urban infrastructure and services, public transport systems, integrated human
settlements, safety and security, health, social and human capital development, and good governance and regulatory reform. The new five-year IDP for the City was implemented on 1 July 2007.

Conclusion

The ANC/NNP coalition’s focus was based largely on improving the lives of the poor and disadvantaged communities in Cape Town and upgrading informal settlements. It was important for the coalition to invest in these areas because its voting support came mostly from them. However, during its term in office, the political leadership and top management of the ANC needed to focus on the delivery challenges which residents expected them to meet, rather than be preoccupied with internal restructuring, micro-design organizational systems and processes.

In contrast to the ANC/NNP coalition’s focus, important aspects of the DA’s approach to city government included business partnerships, corporatisation and indigent grants. The controversy which the two mayors (Morkel and Marais) had to deal with and the shortness of both their terms in office impacted on the DA’s ability to implement its strategy for the city. The controversy also impacted on their level of engagement with the other spheres of government, and was not particularly positive. These further constrained intergovernmental relations. This chapter has demonstrated that the political and administrative changes in the Unicity, the relationship with the
national and provincial spheres of government and party politics have had an impact on the formation and implementation of development policies in Cape Town under the ANC and the DA dominating party coalitions.
CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

The findings of this study explain the consequences of regime change and inter party political conflicts for service delivery in the predominantly coloured neighbourhoods of Ottery and Parkwood Estate in Cape Town. It shows that regime change has resulted in the decline of service provision in these communities. In addition, the local residents’ misinterpretation of provincial legislation and local state responsibility meant that council-community interactions were strained. Consequently, these communities increasingly relied on community organisations and NGOs to address the prevalent socio-economic ills in their communities. However, these organisations have declined in recent times and those in operation face several constraints to community development. This meant that in the contemporary period, the increasing levels of poverty, crime and unemployment in Parkwood Estate and Ottery led to a general lack of faith in politicians, and conflicts between community residents and the local state around issues of service delivery and political accountability. In terms of inter party political conflicts, while tensions were still rife between the ANC and the DA alliance at an intergovernmental level, a more cooperative relationship seemed to exist between political parties in the study areas.
The political tussles for the control of Cape Town brought about constant political regime changes within the Unicity administration from 2000 to 2008. Thus, the past eight years have seen the operation of different administrations and the subsequent shifting of local state policies and plans. In addition, with the provincial and local spheres of government being ideologically different at times, conflicts around policy have ensued. For this study, respondents were asked to share their views on the changes in service delivery in Cape Town since 2000, the impact of regime change on service delivery in Parkwood Estate and Ottery, councillor-community interactions and the role of community organisations in the communities. The respondents included members of the Executive Mayoral Committee, local councillors and community members in the study locations, small business people and individuals representing various community associations.

A former Special Adviser to the Premier of the Western Cape stated that through floor crossing provisions and the amalgamation and dismantling of coalitions since 2000 (when the metropolitan authority was in effect), there was very little follow through on policy, and every time there was a change in the ruling political coalition a new policy cycle started again (Personal communication, June 26, 2008). A local PR councillor in the Parkwood area described the regime changes and political conflicts in Cape Town over the
last eight years as a disaster. He further stated that political actors in the political arena were often driven by individual agendas and not necessarily a party’s policy (Personal communication, J.B., June 24, 2008). He supported the view that political rumblings at the local sphere unfortunately affect individuals at the grassroots level. A local ward councillor in Ottery believed that the political changes have not affected local councillors in Cape Town and their ability to deliver to their respective communities. However, he acknowledged that the MEC for Local Government in the Western Cape, Richard Dyantyi, attempted to make it difficult for the DA coalition to operate smoothly [when, in 2006, he tried to change the type of mayoral system in Cape Town] (Personal communication, M.O., June 26, 2008). He believed that the ANC could have made service delivery easier.

A former ANC activist and founding member of the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) stated that the ANC had good policies and vision but doubted that they (the ANC) were able to achieve those. He also stated that in terms of service delivery in Cape Town, there has not been much improvement from the DA.

A person like Helen Zille is a good person but I think the politics at this point in time are such that there is too much fighting between the two parties [ANC and DA] and that definitely negatively impacts on service delivery. Those people pushed out under a new administration couldn’t have
stayed in that position because their mindset and the way they looked at things were totally different. (Personal communication, J.J., September 23, 2008)

A former ANC activist and chairperson of Ward 72 in Cape Town affirmed that the ANC’s policies were always politically driven:

One [policy] was to write off the arrears and that was one of the gripes that we had because there is preference given to communities based on their history. The ANC’s [policy] was politically driven in terms of where they would write off debts and arrears. In the last election it was quite a big thing with people saying we are not getting the same thing - people that were in the struggle or participated for the same cause of liberation are not getting that same justice now. (Personal communication, D.J., September 19, 2008)

In contrast, the chairperson of the ANC branch in Parkwood argued that the ANC has good policies and was doing something good for the country, although there will always be resistance to those policies. He further stated that it has been a learning process for the ANC to make sure that the community at grassroots level is given the opportunity to put structures and procedures in place to meet certain criteria for development (Personal communication, W.A., September 20, 2008).
The political conflicts that occurred in the Unicity are of an intergovernmental nature and were often between the ANC-led provincial government and the current dominating DA party Unicity Council. These conflicts sometimes resulted in lack of cooperation between both spheres of government.

Although the Council in 2007 applied to the Provincial Government to become an accredited housing delivery agency, the Province did not grant housing accreditation to the Council. Having housing accreditation meant that the period taken to establish housing projects would be reduced and the delivery of housing, which is a major need of Cape Town residents, would be improved. The DA Mayoral Committee member for Finance states:

The way that they [conflicts] affect us is that they divert our time and effort away from what we should really be focusing on, but I don’t think it has really affected the outcomes. We might have gotten further on some things if we hadn’t spent so much time fighting with the Province. We know that if we have a proper housing accreditation - which we are entitled to in terms of the law … and all it requires is for the MEC to sign and say he give us the accreditation - we could cut down that 18-month period [to initiate housing projects] very dramatically. So in a sense it’s not the fact that there’s fighting and political fluff in the papers and the commissions of enquiry where everyone is shouting at each other - that on its own doesn’t affect us - it’s the actual decisions where they
won’t give it to you for whatever reasons they might have – they don’t grant the cooperation that should be there. That’s where there’s an impact. (Personal communication, I.N., June 26, 2008)

The Western Cape Province’s attempt to remove the Mayor of Cape Town (Zille) in 2006 also affected the coordination of plans within Council. In December 2005, an intergovernmental task team was established to set up a joint committee amongst the three spheres of government to establish a policy approach to address the failure of economic planning and coordination in Cape Town. The plan was put through as a 12-point “Plan of Action” document which the provincial cabinet and the mayoral committee of Cape Town endorsed. However, when in 2006 there was a political attempt to remove Mayor Zille, the whole process collapsed and the Council essentially pulled out of all the technical coordination processes at that point. This meant that the city struggled to revive an alignment in terms of economic development planning.

Another point of contestation between Council and the Province was the conflict over the ANC provincial government’s alleged racial allocation of housing in 2007. It began when a DA councillor Frank Martin, allegedly instigated the illegal occupation of government houses in Delft and accused the ANC provincial government of racial allocation of housing. The DA Mayoral Committee member for Housing disagreed with Martin’s sentiments.
He believed that the allocation of housing in the city was not racially motivated, although he thought that it was flawed. He further stated:

Looking at Joe Slovo [informal settlement], how is it possible that those houses were supposed to be built for the destitute? How can poor people afford rental of up to R900 or R1000 a month when their income is less than R900 a month? In Delft, the coloured and African people were evicted - jointly they have stood by saying, “we Africans and coloureds have been on the housing waiting list for 15 or 20 years yet African people are housed - where are those African people coming from? How do you justify them getting a house so quickly in Cape Town - not even 2 or 3 years on the housing waiting list, while there is another African family - 10 years in Cape Town - for a long period on the housing waiting list - they can’t get it. That is an injustice. (Personal communication, D.P., June 19, 2008).

Such beliefs have caused unrest among communities against political regimes and accentuated the racial tensions in these areas. In addition to the Council-Provience conflicts, another impediment to the effectiveness of the DA Council was the skills shortage – in particular, those of skilled professionals - to provide services within the city. This, as the next section shows, impacted negatively on the provision of services in Cape Town.
One of the negative impacts that the regime changes had on service delivery was the skills shortage in the Unicity Council. With each political administration that left, there was a departure of skilled Council employees. In 2007, the Mayor of Cape Town stated that despite inadequate infrastructure budgets, the Council was unable to spend its full capital budget for years. The DA-led Council’s biggest difficulty in this regard was with the Roads Department where there was lack of adequate technical skills. There were not enough engineers and project managers to drive the expenditure. In 2006, when the DA took office, the previous ANC administration had abandoned a whole range of housing projects as no one was available to drive them. This consequently deferred expenditure on housing projects and meant that the current Council fell behind on its provision of bulk infrastructure.

The DA Mayoral Committee member for Finance pointed this to the inability of the previous ANC/NNP administration to manage things within Council.

When the ANC ran this city, they got rid of a big layer of experienced staff because their skin colour was wrong, so we lost - in 2005 particularly - a massive ability to deliver. We’ve been slowly trying to establish that, but it’s difficult to go out there and find project managers with the right skills. We can
to some extent bring in new graduates and start training them but you can’t train them if you don’t have some senior experienced guys to do the mentoring, so you’ve got to do both. So it takes time to find all those [skilled people], but we’ve managed to find a few. (Personal communication, I.N., June 26, 2008)

A former District manager who worked for the City of Cape Town for 31 years affirmed that a lot of staff with experience were and are still leaving Council; however, new people were not being employed to replace those that left, causing a skills shortage (Personal communication, B.A., September 22, 2008). The secretary of the Fairways Residents Civic Association (Fresca) which also operates in Parkwood similarly alluded to the effect of the skills shortage on service delivery in his neighbourhood:

As you know since 1994, many changes have been taking place, many Council employees from the labourers right up to people who held specific portfolios have left Council. Sometimes when you phone regarding a certain matter, we get a response that they don’t have staff but “right now we are going to give you a reference number”. (Personal communication, A.R., September 23, 2008)
This clearly demonstrated how the shedding of Council employees over the years as a result of regime change impacted on the service delivery, causing a backlog in communities such as Parkwood Estate and Ottery.

**Service Delivery and Political Accountability:**

**Community-Council Conflicts**

Service delivery refers to the provision of municipal services to citizens and businesses directly or indirectly through external service providers, both public and private. Services which are the responsibility of local government are: water and electricity services, refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal, local sports facilities and recreation. In Parkwood Estate and Ottery, many residents’ disappointment with the Council stemmed from three major things: the poor structure of Council housing; the shortage of services such as libraries, clinics and recreational facilities; and unaffordable rents. Most residents in both areas were content with the provision of water and electricity however, some flat residents in Ottery complained that they do not have hot water in their flats. Illegal dumping in Parkwood was a major issue. However, the Council has curbed the problem through major cleanup projects and, most residents agreed that dumping was no longer a major concern.

Parkwood Estate is one of the smaller coloured communities in Cape Town with meagre access to services such as schools, clinics and recreational facilities. Most services were accessed from nearby communities such as
Grassy Park and Lotus River. There were four day care centres in the community. There was one health clinic for children, and adults visited hospitals or clinics in the surrounding areas of Grassy Park, Retreat and Plumstead. The Parkwood clinic is a tuberculosis (TB) clinic for children and employed six staff members. Although the Council’s norm is to have a clinic within 2 ½ kilometres of every citizen in the city, most adults in Parkwood use public transport or walk a distance of four kilometres to visit the Day Hospital in Grassy Park. Many residents complained about the shortage of staff at the clinic and the long waiting hours. Another day hospital in Grassy Park was five kilometres away. Without alternative means of transport, many residents use taxis or walk. A pensioner in Parkwood stated that the distance was too far for most people, especially the elderly, to walk (Personal communication, K.S., October 21, 2008).

Health services in Ottery were just as inadequate. There was no clinic in Ottery, therefore residents visited the clinics in Lotus River and Grassy Park. The civic centre in Ottery housed a Council library which was used by school children in the community. There was a clinic in the civic centre, however it was closed down supposedly as a result of the gang fights which were considered to be dangerous for the nurses. A pensioner who ran an old age group disagreed with this. She argued that there were possibly no staff to run the clinic:
Ten years back we had a lot - I mean a lot - of gang fights and shooting but they never touched the civic or shot or threw stones here and no windows were broken. That is why I don’t know why they say it was dangerous for the nurses. If things happened, it never happened here. The gangs respected that the civic [centre] belongs to them and that the facilities are for them. (Personal communication, Mrs. V., October 29, 2008)

The community health centre in Parkwood housed a library and crèche, Angela’s day care centre. Many residents felt that both the library and the crèche offer children a safe environment to play and learn. The crèche, which has been running for five years, employed ten women from Parkwood and took care of about 120 children. The crèche charged each child R45 a week, and provided them with breakfast and lunch. The library was used by children after school and a council truck delivered books once a week. Although it was a Council library, it was run voluntarily by Mr. Majiet, a pastor in the area. A plan was put through to close down both services and they have been ordered to leave the premises. The plan by the local ID councillor to use the hall as office space was opposed by many residents. A supporter of the library believed that the plan was fuelled by political agendas:

It is the community that should benefit not any other agendas or ideas, so some people in my opinion are very short sighted. He didn’t win the ward for the DA [Mr. Majiet] - the ID party guy
won that ward and we had endless battles. (Personal communication, D.J., September 19, 2008)

The caretaker of the day care centre was disillusioned by what she perceived as the Council’s indifferent attitude towards social development:

They have given us eviction letters to leave this building without making alternative plans for us, and yet on their boards they say “the city works for you” but they are not working for this crèche because we have to find premises by ourselves. I have had meetings with lots of people in the city (Council) and the doors are just closing. There is space - why must they treat us like that when they want our votes? We are only charging R45 per week per child and we give them breakfast and lunch, we don’t get help from anybody. Councillor March [ID councillor in Parkwood] signed the letter with the city [Council] that we must be out because they want the office here. The caretaker’s office is empty and we can use that! They want the whole centre to themselves. (Personal communication, Angela, October 29, 2008)

These circumstances raised concerns amongst residents about the priorities of the local state and the local councillors that have been elected to serve them. In addition, a lack of understanding on the part of community members
about the responsibilities of local government increases conflicts between community residents and councillors. The ID ward councillor for Parkwood and Ottery believed that some directorates within Council do not deliver services promptly and that councillors, if they had the funds, could do a much better job. A ward councillor in Fairways explained that there can be more community participation. He stated that although local government made it easy for people to participate through structures such as the ward forum, they often complained about local government.

Irrespective of the political party in power, local residents expected local government to provide services on a non-partisan basis and to focus on the immediate social and economic issues at hand. Although some residents felt that the previous ANC administration focused more on community development, many felt that little has changed in the way of service delivery since the election of the current DA-led city Council. Consequently, many people are apathetic about voting during local government elections. This sentiment was also advanced among residents in both Ottery and Parkwood that there was increased service delivery only when local government elections occur. A Parkwood flat resident expressed the view of many other residents with regard to the Council and service delivery:

In winter the water runs here [from the roof into her house] and it’s been two years and the water still runs. They put gutters but they don’t fix them well and the water runs into the
house. People in Parkwood complain but they don’t do anything. They tell me they want to do it next year, but every time it’s next year. They always talk but they do nothing for us. I don’t want to criticise them but we in Parkwood, all we got is God, it’s just me and God. It is a little area but they can’t do anything for us. (Personal communication, M.S., October 21, 2008)

This statement was representative of the views of every resident the interviewer questioned. Thus although individuals raised political issues and articulated demands for local state action, this action occurred rarely. Therefore, residents’ histories of neglect and frustration stood as barriers to active participation in local state structures. Many residents in Parkwood and Ottery were in arrears of over R11 000 and were still unable to pay their rents. In some instances frustration with Council over poor service delivery and unaccountability translated to residents refusing to pay their rents and encouraging their neighbours not to pay. Although local Council meetings were held monthly to discuss Council plans with residents, many residents did not attend. Some residents of Ottery stated that councillors have refused to attend to their needs because they (residents) do not attend meetings.

In 2002, the ANC/NNP alliance moved a motion for a six-month moratorium on evictions and water cut-offs in response to the needs of the people of Cape Town and to efficiently deliver affordable services to all (Council Minutes,
October 29, 2002, City of Cape Town). This impacted negatively on the city’s income from services and the Council had rates and services arrears of R2,753 billion as at 30 September 2008. Despite this, in 2007 the DA-led Council wrote off R1,5 billion of arrears to assist those owing Council and the indigent grant for very poor residents was increased. The DA Mayoral Committee member for Housing believed that Council still deals with the effect of the ANC’s moratorium.

Lots of people moved illegally into Council houses, Council’s scheme houses and Council flats. Drug dealers and big buyers moved in, no one could touch them, people complained. There was a moratorium, no one could touch them and we are busy with the cleaning up process in that regard. [People thought] “We support a government, we don’t have to pay white people and other people who work and earn big salaries, they pay for us” - that attitude spread like wildfire - people are in arrears now - R15 000, R20 000. They will never in their lifetime be able to pay that amount … the moratorium on evictions and moratorium payment of service charges left the city limping financially. (Personal communication, D.P., June 19, 2008)

This showed how the policy decisions of political regimes impacted on service delivery. It was also the view of some residents that local councillors attend to
every aspect of their material conditions. A worker in an Ottery crèche is one such resident:

The first councillor that was here, if you needed rent money he would always see to it, and that there was food in the house. But now you can’t go to Mr. March and say “the Council is going to put me on the street can you help with my rent, you can’t do that! They come every month [members of Council]. They talk with us about upgrading the place. They talk a lot and do nothing. In winter most of the roofs of the houses blew off. The Council is supposed to make it right but they didn’t do it. For two weeks there were holes in the roofs of the flats. There’s a lot they can do because when it rains, it rains into the house. I don’t attend [the Council meetings] because I don’t see any good reason. If they can give me a good reason then I’ll go. (Personal communication, S.S., September 25, 2008)

In this regard, the DA Mayoral Committee member for Finance believed that there was a need for people to understand the scope of local government delivery and what the different spheres of government provided to avoid them asking for services that local government was unable to deliver. Therefore, the Council’s ambit for social and economic development was restricted by legislation which communities do not understand. Clinics are the
responsibility of local government and hospitals are the responsibility of the Province. The provision of housing is a provincial government responsibility. The Unicity Council received nearly its entire budget from the national government Department of Housing. It was filtered through to the Province which dispersed it to the local government. For housing development to take place in the city an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required, however, this takes about 18 months to be approved. The Executive Mayoral Committee member for Housing in the Unicity stated that the legislation for housing developments was one of the biggest stumbling blocks with regard to housing delivery and communities did not understand this (Personal communication, D.P., June 19, 2008). The DA Chair of Ward 72 in Cape Town saw it differently:

When there are two spheres of government with different parties, there are clashes on everything, houses and even libraries and it’s not good for the community - those things must be dealt with. Even with housing, Council needs accreditation from the province to build houses. (Personal communication, D.J., September 19, 2008)

The DA Mayoral Committee member for Housing believed otherwise. He stated that the ANC provincial government often approved housing development plans because they were aware that large portions of the Cape
Town community are supporters of the ANC and it was in their best interest to see to it that they approved the City of Cape Town’s housing initiatives.

In terms of the upgrading of Council flats in Ottery, Abdul a tyre salesman in Ottery, vehemently asserted his opinion on service delivery by Council:

They upgrade them [Council flats] with their mouths. Everyone is the same - the ANC, the ID, and the DA. They are filling their own coffers with money – they don’t care about you or me. They come during election time and have small talk and look like they are trying to do the right thing but when you place them in power they don’t deliver. (Personal communication, Abdul, October 20, 2008).

Similarly, many residents in both Parkwood Estate and Ottery were angered by the poor state of their Council flats and the extensive time lags in upgrading them. Parkwood was built as a sub-economic low-cost housing estate in 1969 for people/tenants who could not buy houses. When the Group Areas Act was implemented many people moved out of Parkwood and there were a few who could buy property. Double and triple storey flats were erected during this time. The shortage of housing in the area was evident from the shacks and caravans at the back of most flats. Zilleraine Heights, an informal settlement in the Parkwood area, was established in May 2006 when the Executive Mayor of Cape Town, Helen Zille, moved settlers onto land in
the area after they had invaded another piece of land in Grassy Park. After being moved onto the land, the Council served the residents with an interdict stating that no further people were allowed to settle there. Despite this, additional families disregarded the interdict and made the settlement their home.

In recent years, the ageing housing stock has been subjected to increasing maintenance problems. There was water penetration in walls and floors, and plumbing and rainwater disposal systems no longer worked properly. The flats were very compact as front doors of top storeys are about a half-a-meter apart, facing each other, and most residents agreed that the flats were damp and cold, especially in winter. After 1981, the local authority only maintained the outside of the flats. Broken doors were the responsibility of the Housing Department, however the interior was the responsibility of the tenants. The Cape Town Housing Department painted the dwellings once every five years, however, most residents complained about the infrequency of this. An Ottery resident stated:

There is still leaking in my house. I have complained about it. Even the roof fell down and they didn’t come and repair it. The leaking has been going on from the time of the previous council. I used to attend meetings but I don’t want to attend meetings anymore because they do nothing! (Personal communication, F.D., September 25, 2008)
Significantly, in July 2008 the DA-led City Council announced its plan for a R300-million revamp of over 7 700 of its rental units in Cape Town. Included in this upgrade plan were the Marble flats in Ottery. The project, funded by the City’s annual housing subsidy allocation, is part of a national Community Residential Units (CRU) upgrade programme.

The opening of shebeens was another point of contestation between the Council and residents in the study areas. Prospective shebeen owners often avoided Council and applied to the Province to open shebeens. This often raised concerns among residents and community organisations that were not consulted. Ideally, the application should be made to Council, a consultation process then occurs and if the community is content, it goes to the Province. However, because of the two spheres and the two-fold application process, it is confusing for communities. Abdul, a tyre salesman, in Ottery has been trying to open a shebeen but to no avail:

At the end of the day it’s the rich that profit and benefit from all these laws and by-laws. The problem is with the legislation, the red tape. I’m in the process of trying to legalise my shebeen also. The whole issue has been taken up at the Wynberg Magistrate Court now. Then at the end of the month it comes back to our police station, it goes to the designated officer. The officer-in-charge at the police station was here and he told me ‘You won’t get the license’. I have been trying
to get the licence forever. The policeman told me I can’t get a licence and I said, “Okay, then I’ll sell drugs! “ He wants me to kill the community. You see I’m trying something positive and they are making me lose faith at the end of the day.

(Personal communication, Abdul, October 20, 2008)

The Role of Community Organisations

In Parkwood Estate and Otterly, community organisations such as churches respond to the community’s social and material survival issues but also served as sources of emotional and spiritual support for many community members. In these areas, incidences of alcohol and drug abuse and domestic violence were a common feature of most households living in the flats. High levels of unemployment and crime also characterized these neighbourhoods. Organisations and associations (youth, sports and church groups) have thus been formed in an attempt to address issues such as crime, HIV/AIDS, drug and alcohol abuse, and gangsterism. However, the demise of some of these organisations and the lack of effectiveness of others arose from issues such as insufficient funding, conflicts with the local Council and vandalism and theft of property. These in turn threatened the effectiveness of community–level initiatives and the communities’ ability to organize themselves as cohesive units. The former special adviser to the Premier of the Western Cape emphasized that there was a structural weakness among many civil society organizations in that they either focused
just on protest, or just on community-based projects and have not quite figured out how to combine the two, which are part of the continuum of political engagement (Personal communication, E.P., June 26, 2008).

Community Associations in Parkwood Estate

There were few community organisations in place in Parkwood Estate. With the shortage of these organisations, many families supported each other when communal issues arose. A drug rehabilitation centre, a sports Association, churches and a civic association are some organisations involved in the social upliftment of the community. With the recent uproar from the Parkwood community concerning the drug epidemic, an NGO, Foundation for Positive Change, has done its bit to better the situation. The Parkwood based organisation was established in 2006, with the motto, “Crime doesn’t pay”. Its founder, Rashaad Allen, a former prisoner, spent 16 years of his life, at various stages, behind bars. He felt there was a need to work with the youth to uplift and motivate them as well as to help rehabilitate them. His home in Parkwood was used as a rehabilitation centre. However, Allen has spent the past year looking for a suitable building for his rehabilitation centre. He employed five people on a voluntary basis and complained about the lack of funding. Without this or proper facilities, his task of rehabilitating the youth was difficult and the centre faced the possibility of closing down.
Sports were an important part of the Parkwood community and an avenue through which the community tried to control the rising incidence of drug abuse among the youth. The Chairperson of the Sports Association stated that irrespective of political affiliations, sports was a way of bringing the community together and taking the youth away from drugs. The Parkwood community at large and local ward councillors were actively involved in supporting organized games.

The youth either go to discos or nightclubs or the different shebeens and the drug dens and they operate in syndicates and it’s very difficult to stop them from doing drugs. What we do is we have things we do to make the community aware (that sports is better than doing drugs); we have the churches involved, the different sporting codes and organisations in our area and we have a march through the area with banners so that people can actually see the bad effect drugs have on our youth. The children are told that they can have a career in sports and that sports are important. It also keeps them busy during the school holidays. (Personal communication, W.A., September 20, 2008)

In 2006, land in the area was earmarked for the development of a sports complex. The development was put on hold after residents moved there from Grassy Park. Although it was under construction for a sports complex,
informal settlers still occupied the land. The complex was funded by the DA City Council and R10.6 million was allocated for its construction. People from the area who were previously unemployed were employed to work on the project with the construction company. The facility was expected to be in use by 2009. The Chairperson of the Association believed that the engagement of community members in the construction of the complex ensured that they felt and took pride in it.

Crime was a serious problem in Parkwood and usually took the form of house breakings and vandalism of facilities. In addition, a police report stated that there were nine houses that were selling drugs in Parkwood and 26 illegal shebeens (Personal communication, C.A., September 23, 2008). Despite this, there were no street committees and policing forums in Parkwood and the police were called in from Grassy Park to attend to community crises. A Parkwood-Fairways police forum was in the process of being established. Parkwood did not have a civic association. Residents felt that in order to minimize the increasing crime rate, regular day and night policing should still be in place. A resident stated that it was dangerous to belong to a policing forum or committee as criminals target such individuals:

If you’ve been connected and you attend a lot of police forum meetings and you want to raise your concerns, you need to be very careful because people will attend these meetings and they will spy so people are afraid to speak up because
they know something can happen to them because they are giving information. (Personal communication, Parkwood resident\textsuperscript{12}, September 20, 2008)

Another community member believed that although there was sometimes a police presence in the area, the community solved some problems. A resident stated that when a fight broke out, they talked as a community and listened to each other because they were a close community (M.S., October 21, 2008).

The Fairways Residents’ Civic Association (Fresca) was a residents’ association in the community of Fairways. The Association also served the Parkwood community on every issue concerning civil society; however, a lot of Parkwood residents were unaware of this. Alec Rich, a former sergeant in the police force and the Secretary of the Association stated that many neighbourhood watch associations existed in the past but have since become dysfunctional. The Chairperson of the Association stated that Fairways, being a more well-off community, was often the target of criminals and drug dealers. The churches in Parkwood also played a major role in social upliftment. Father Cliffie Felix, Rector of the Simon of Cyrene Anglican Church in Parkwood, worked on projects aimed at keeping the youth off the streets. He also organized a 30 day Anti-drug campaign in June 2007. During the campaign, the community came together with religious leaders from various

\textsuperscript{12} Where “Parkwood resident” or “Ottery resident” is used, the interviewee refused to give his/her name.
denominations and faiths and walked through the streets of Parkwood encouraging the people, especially the youth. He also planned to launch a religious youth forum. Some residents believed that for many years the church was doing the work of the government and carried out the responsibility of looking after the poor, attending to social needs, providing grants and aid and food parcels. Another full time minister in Parkwood was involved with helping the youth. She believed that most organisations in Parkwood have disbanded due to lack of financial resources. Also, most organisations were unregistered and operated without assistance (Personal communication, Parkwood resident, October 21, 2008). Angela, a Parkwood resident who ran a crèche, stated that many associations got caught up politically and then collapsed.

Ottery

In Ottery, drug abuse was a severe social problem, especially among the youth. The Marble flats were a block of Council flats in Ottery. The Magro gang inhabited one section of the flats and the Eurocats gang inhabited another. In the past, fighting between the two gangs was frequent, however in the last couple of years the gang violence has subsided. A sports association, Break-Thru Sports, was established in 2005 and operated as an independent unit since then. It was also in the process of becoming a registered NGO. A member of the Association stated that the Association’s aim was to educate the youth, to keep them occupied in the afternoons after
school and get them involved in something constructive other than using drugs and alcohol. The Association used the Ottery civic centre as a venue to run tournaments and practices. The Association has also introduced sports that the children and youth are not familiar with to get them more interested in participating. However, the Association faced problems of finding a permanent indoor facility in which to conduct their activities, lack of funding and the theft of sports equipment.

We’re starting off with volleyball and netball and badminton. We need to do something (sports) that our kids don’t know. The minute we come up with something new, you find that all the children are coming around there. Even the youth, although they’re into drugs and alcohol, also come around because they want to see what it’s all about ... We had one of the goal posts for the soccer field stolen. The wiring of the flood lights on the field were also stolen and they (the children doing tik) go and sell it. They even break down the fence and steal anything they can steal. (Personal communication, C.V.L, October 22, 2008)

Konek, a non-profit community organisation in Ottery, has been operating in the area since 2005 through a partnership with the City’s Sport, Recreation and Amenities Department. However, in November 2007, the Organisation did not receive funding from the City. In August (2008), the Organisation
received notice of the termination of the contract from the City. Konek’s mandate was to, in conjunction with the City, manage major events, contribute to sport and recreation and improve the quality of life of the community, especially the poor and marginalised (Petersen, October 21, 2008). The local ward councillor and the sub council chairperson of the area believed that very little has happened to promote recreational activities. A resident of Ottery also believed that the Organisation has done little in terms of community development.

They have been here for three years but they have not done anything substantial within the community. People do not want to hear about them. They have been told that they have got to vacate the premises by the end of the month. (Personal communication, Ottery resident, October 21, 2008)

Despite the community structures in place, many residents felt that more can be done. A resident living in the flats believed that more community organising needed to be in place in Ottery. A former ANC activist stated that there was a lot of community work with churches and NGOs in the past and they were more communal than they are now. He stated that people were involved in what was happening in the community but that has since decreased. He stated:
There is a very strong top-down approach where people up there decide for the community what is good for them and there is very little community involvement and if there is community involvement, it’s a kind of political show, just to create the impression that we believe in participatory management or leadership but it is not actually being taken seriously - I would say this is the case with most communities and it is being orchestrated by the ANC. (Personal communication, J.J., September 23, 2008)

Community organisations should, despite these constraints, make an impact by combining very effective organization of people affected by particular interests or issues, into structures that combine practical service or support to the residents. Thus the process should be linked to political socialization that underscores why the system is not delivering results. Moreover, people involved in home-based care, for example, must get involved in activism and march against the Minister who is unresponsive or irresponsible (Personal communication, E.P, 26 June 2008). The next section explores the different regimes’ focus on service delivery in the study areas.
It is crucial to understand policies of the political parties in the study areas over the past eight years (2000-2008) to determine their focus on local development and service delivery, given that parties often have distinct spatial programmes. The DA-led Council’s housing policy - in line with Council’s budget - was geared towards providing formal low cost housing to ensure that people on the housing list occupied a formal brick and mortar structure. The DA Council also supported the informal settlement master plan which focused on informal settlement and *in situ* upgrades. In addition, cleaning up of the communities was an important priority. Funds for development projects were allocated through the sub-councils. In Parkwood and Ottery, ward councillors received R20 000 in operational and R30 000 capital as ward allocations. These were spent on certain capital projects in the ward and based on the needs of the community. The plans and projects for development thus arose out of the councillor’s allocation. Last year, sub-council 18, overseeing Ottery and Parkwood, budgeted R50 000 for a clean-up programme for a period of one month. In 2008, the Metropolitan Council budgeted for a three-year contract for a cleanup project and phase one of the first year was implemented (Personal communication, B.L., October 21, 2008). In Parkwood R1,5 million was allocated to clean-up canals and to educate people on how to keep the area clean.
In July 2008 the Council put forward a R300-million project to improve the flats and houses that the City rents out to tenants. The funding has received conditional approval under the Community Residential Units Housing Programme. Marble flats in Ottery will be one of a number of council flats to be upgraded as part of phase one of the project. The first phase will include a detailed assessment of the block of flats to find out what type of repair and upgrading work needs to be done. Phase one is scheduled for completion in June 2011. The ward councillor in Fairways stated that careful consideration should go into establishing new buildings and new amenities while maintaining old ones.

The Mayoral Committee member for Housing asserted that with the current DA-led Council, the business and private sector do not really influence the policy agenda although he would like to see more involvement (Personal communication, D.P., June 19, 2008). He stated that the GAP housing was Council’s only agreement with the private sector. The Executive Mayor and the Councillor, on 1 November 2007, hosted a ceremonial handover of well located housing sites to ABSA, Nedbank and Standard Bank for the development of affordable housing in Cape Town. The primary intent of this public/private partnership was to build and develop affordable homes for households earning more than R3 500 per month with a special focus on those earning R3 500 - R7 000 per month. More than 2 500 affordable housing units will be initially built in places like Wallacedene, Maitland, Ottery, ...
Southfield, Thornton and Elsies River. The selection of the land parcels supported the principles of the integration of the City.

During the ANC period in office (2002 – 2005), local development initiatives - often in conjunction with the private sector - were also implemented in Parkwood and Ottery, especially in the area of youth development. In March 2004, a partnership between the City and the Western Cape Department of Education was established to provide improved sports fields for both the community of Parkwood and learners of the Fairmount Senior Secondary School in Parkwood. It was identified that the community of Parkwood urgently required improved sports fields. At present, the fields were in low-lying areas which were regularly flooded in winter. Following this, a partnership agreement was established between the City, school, community and the Parkwood Sports Council. The project boasted a budget of R940 000. The then National Minister of Education, Professor Asmal, officiated at a sod-turning ceremony in March 2004 to launch Phase One of the project.

In August 2005, the City of Cape Town in partnership with Vukani Gaming Corporation launched an intervention programme entitled “Connecting the Unconnected”. The aim was to engage a substantial number of youth who do not participate in structured sport and recreational activities in the greater Parkwood area. However, only approximately 17 percent of youth actively participated in structured sport and recreation programmes. The City then
devised a strategy to engage more youth in sport and recreation activities and a twelve month sport and recreation intervention programme was developed for implementation at the Ottery Sport and Recreation Centre.

In retrospect, both past and present governing regimes have done much in the way of local community development in Parkwood Estate and Otter. However, frequent regime changes in the broader Cape Town area have negatively impacted on service delivery in the communities of Parkwood Estate and Otter. Active engagement with the local state in these communities is absent and a lack of community organising around the issues of poor service delivery has meant that community/local state relations have deteriorated, creating a general lack of confidence in local politicians and that conditions in these communities will improve.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The study illustrated that in the Cape Town Unicity Council, the frequent regime changes (2000-2008) and conflictual nature of local state politics between the ANC and the DA, had a negative effect on service delivery in the study areas of Parkwood Estate and Ottery. Regime politics advances that the complex relationship between political parties determines the quality and stability of the political order, and political actors are responsible for shaping the urban political arena. In addition, political coalitions are often unstable and realign with changing times and conditions. In the Cape Town Unicity Council, the changes in regime meant that each new administration introduced a new set of policies which saw the rejection of certain development projects and their replacement with others. This lack of follow through on policies meant that the city administration was destabilised, and the loss of skilled employees slowed down service delivery. The consequences of this were evident in Parkwood Estate and Ottery.

The conflicts between the ANC and the DA often occurred between the ANC-controlled Province and the DA-led Unicity Council around issues of policy and the struggle for control of the city. Although a more cooperative relationship existed between local councillors at the ward level, the effect of conflictual politics on service delivery cannot be ignored. This meant that the disapproval of certain policies and plans by the Province's (e.g. housing)
delayed the implementation of certain plans at the local level. The extent and form of cooperation among the spheres of government clearly varied across space and according to different regimes, just as political dynamics differ across national state system. Thus, the relationship between the spheres of government became more complex and contested. The findings in Parkwood Estate and Ottery reflected the effects of regime change and political conflicts in Cape Town. However, in 2008, the high crime, poverty and unemployment rates in Parkwood Estate and Ottery showed that residents have grown increasingly disillusioned with local ward councillors and the local state in general. Citizens in these areas were usually aware of problems and difficulties in their neighborhood but, were unable to effect a political solution or formulate a political demand.

Conflicts between community residents and the local state are formed around issues of service delivery and political accountability. Regime politics purports the notion that the local state cannot be separated from wider political linkages with the provincial and national spheres of government. In Cape Town, it was evident that the local state’s ambit for development was restricted by conflicts with the provincial and national spheres of government. Many residents are oblivious to this and it often translated into non-cooperation with the local state such as the refusal to pay rents or vote during local elections. This demonstrated that although local politicians possessed agency, they occupied positions within structures and systems that constrained their range of feasible actions and choices. In addition, for many
issues such as improved academic achievement at schools, counteracting youth violence and reducing crime, grassroots engagement was necessary but often hard to achieve. In this regard, regime theory advocates that histories of past neglect and frustration, alienation, and lack of confidence that conditions can be improved and opportunities realized may stand as huge barriers. Consequently, small initiatives unaccompanied by a concerted effort to enlist the hearts and minds of the target population are not likely to overcome these barriers. The same can be said of Parkwood Estate and Ottery.

The role of community organisations has become increasingly important in contributing towards the social and economic upliftment of residents in Parkwood Estate and Ottery. However, these organisations faced several constraints to local development which hindered their ability to become part of the communities’ local governing arrangements, proving that the political structures are not easily penetrated by those seeking to give voice to socio-economic issues concerning their communities. In addition, regime theory demonstrates that small efforts cannot change the socio-political context enough to overcome deeply rooted alienation. Thus, significant resources invested into community development and community organisation are needed as a first step towards political inclusion.

Given that South Africa’s apartheid governing structures and legislation marginalized black and coloured communities, there is a link between the
governing regimes and structures in place and poverty and economic inequality in these communities. Parkwood Estate and Ottery are communities that have been historically subjected to meagre services, thus the political and historical experiences of many residents demonstrated that their lack of trust in local politicians emanated from their prior experiences in the political environment and from a history of poor service delivery. This, in turn, hindered effective participation. In terms of service delivery in Parkwood Estate and Ottery, not much has changed with the reversal in ANC and DA political regimes in the Cape Town Unicity area. Some community residents took an apolitical stance toward service delivery and most individuals wanted accelerated development in their communities irrespective of the political parties in power. The political environment in Cape Town has been in a constant state of flux, therefore many residents contended that service delivery has stagnated since the inception of the Unicity government in 2000. There needed to be a broader scope for civil society interaction with the local state in Parkwood Estate and Ottery to ensure that community participation has greater impact and that socio-economic issues are actively addressed. Local leaders needed to be more prominent and active and motivate people to participate.

Regime theory rightly recognises that the composition of the governing regime varies from city to city and that political actors are responsible for shaping the political arena. It also showed, as illustrated in Parkwood and Ottery, that voting blocs can be reliable and engaged, or volatile and subject to change.
Similarly, local state personnel, elected and appointed, may play wide and leading roles in community development. Intergovernmental channels of communication were significant for the ruling regime and also depended on the issues and the place. However, regime theory’s perspective on the dominance of business in governing regimes was not entirely applicable in this study. While business was not an insignificant force in local politics in Cape Town, it did not feature overtly as a prominent member of the governing coalition in the present DA-led coalition around issues of local development and service provision in the study areas.

Urban regime theory is directed toward effective forms of problem solving. However, it should also encompass different types of regimes. Its scope should be broadened to include the analysis of civil society-local state relations as these significantly shape the urban political environment. Therefore, the significance of community groups in actively opposing governing structures should not be downplayed.

The subject of unstable governing regimes at the local state level and the consequences of these for local service delivery should be further explored. It would be important to assess the responses of other communities within the city to regime changes. A significant gap in the study which should be examined is the extent to which political regimes promote community organisations and various forms of civil society engagement, as this is an important component of local development. Although political conflicts are
inevitable, it is important for the Unicity Council to maintain stability over the next few years to ensure continuity in development plans and policies and the building and expansion of infrastructure across the city. Provincial government, because of its constitutional mandate has resources to deal with social development investments. It also has a responsibility for a broader development strategy. This needs to be done through engagement with local government, thus intergovernmental alignment is very critical. Consequently, the nature of intergovernmental relations and its consequence for stable and effective governance at the local level should also be examined.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS
(PARKWOOD ESTATE AND OTTERY)

1. Before 1994, civic associations in Cape Town/South Africa challenged apartheid-era City councils on evictions and unaffordable rent increases. Similarly, Civil Society Organisations’ contact with local government was focused on bringing about a change of government. How have you redefined your role in the post-2000 period?

2. What are the main socio-economic issues that affect flat dwellers/homeowners in Parkwood/Ottery?

3. In what ways are community members involved with the association? Do the homeowners engage with you more than flat dwellers?

4. Has this involvement changed with the Cape Town local government changes over the years (i.e., was it different when the past ANC Council was in office?)

5. How interactive were you with the former ANC Council in 2002 – 2005? What is your current relationship with the present Council? (DA regime)

6. Do you work closely with local councillors in this area?

7. Parkwood/Ottery has a middle class and township component. Do flat dwellers and homeowners interact on a community organizational level?

8. How do you engage with Council to address the community’s concerns and to ensure that the community engages with Council politically through activism/protest and community based projects?
9. Have the changes in local government in Cape Town since 2000 impacted on your level of participation with council?

10. What obstacles do you face which hinder your full participation in the development process?

11. During the ANC/NNP term (2002-2005), what were the main issues that the local community campaigned for?

12. Are there any street committees and community policing forums in your community?

13. Do you often attend focus group meetings with other associations in Cape Town? What major issues are highlighted at these meetings?
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COUNCILLORS
(PARKWOOD AND OTTERY)

1. How many years have you been a ward councillor in this area?
2. Have you been a ward councillor in any other area in the Cape Town council area?
3. Did you serve office as a councillor in this area while the ANC-alliance was the dominating regime in Cape Town?
4. What were the focal development and service provision issues in your constituency during the ANC dominating regime? How effective was the ANC-dominating regime in implementing its programmes in your area?
5. How has the focus on development and service provision issues in your constituency changed under the DA dominating regime? Why has the focus changed from that of the previous ANC ruling alliance?
6. How successful is the DA majority regime in attaining its objectives in this community?
7. What are the major challenges facing your community? How are you planning to address these?
8. Do you have feedback reports from Council with your constituency? When was the last such meeting held? What issues did the community discuss with you? How are you planning to address these?
9. Has the current council budgeted or set aside any funds for specific development projects and activities in Parkwood? If yes, what were the projects?

10. In recent years (2002 – 2008) the Metro Council has adopted a ‘pro-poor policy’ for indigent residents in Cape Town, in which they are exempt from paying for certain services. How do feel this policy was applied under the ANC and is it different from how the DA council is applying it?
APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE MAYORAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR HOUSING

1. In the early post-2000 period, service delivery and the provision of housing was impeded by the constant restructuring of the administration. Under the new administration, what is the single most difficult impediment to housing provision?

2. The Western Cape Provincial Government is responsible for addressing housing needs in Cape Town. To implement housing projects, the Council needs provincial approval. What are the main areas of contestation between provincial housing policy and Council housing policy?

3. There have been several attempts by the provincial ANC government to unseat the multiparty coalition. There have also been inter party conflicts resulting from the 2007 floor crossing period. The Erasmus Commission is also probing alleged spying activities in Council. How have these conflicts affected the coordination of Council policies/plans?

4. Does the Housing Department or Council actively engage with community organizations in Cape Town to address the housing shortage? What are the political barriers to this interaction?

5. The previous ANC-led coalition government had different views on housing policy. How did this affect the current situation of housing in Cape Town?
6. In March 2007, the DA outlined its strategy, policies and objectives in a “revisioning” process which involved all party structures. What is the party’s policy towards housing?

7. How much of the budget (2007/8) has been allocated to housing and social infrastructure developments? How is it being spent?

8. In 2006, the Council entered a partnership with three banks to promote the development of affordable housing and to facilitate access to funds for social housing projects. These GAP houses stand to benefit those who earn between R3500 and R7500 per month. How have the poor who earn below this range been considered in such plans?

9. You have stated in the press that a central IDP objective is to implement the Informal Settlements Upgrade Master Plan. What does this plan hope to achieve for the indigent in the city?

10. Conflicts between the Province and Council were intensified when Councillor Frank Martin was accused of encouraging the illegal occupation of government housing in Delft. The issue became a racial one and Councillor Martin accused the ANC provincial government of being racist and providing housing to black families. What are your opinions regarding these sentiments?
APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE MAYORAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR FINANCE

1. What revenue-raising measures (other than the collection of property and tax rates) has the Council implemented to propel development initiatives?

2. What kind of loans has the Council applied for from funding agencies? What kind of development initiatives have these loans been geared towards?

3. What kinds of central state transfers have been allocated to Council for development infrastructure?

4. What percentage of the Council’s budget (2008) has been allocated to wards within the city? What criteria are these allocations based on?

5. To what extent is the budgeting process dependent on national and provincial standards and policies?

6. What is the total operating and capital budget for the current financial year?

7. The Mayor, Helen Zille, stated in May 2007 that despite the inadequate infrastructure budgets of the past, the Council has been unable to spend its full capital budget for years. What was the reason for this?
APPENDIX E

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS
(PARKWOOD AND OTTERY)

1. How long have you been living in this neighbourhood?
2. Where did you live previously?
3. Are you settled in this neighbourhood? If yes, what are the factors that led to your decision? If no, what factors contributed to your decision?
4. What job do you do?
5. Have you ever lost a job? What reasons were you given for this?
6. Do you or any member of your household belong to any of the community organizations in your neighbourhood? If yes, which organization do you belong to?
7. Why did you join this organization?
8. How does such an organization play a role in improving conditions in the neighbourhood/what community issues does your organization focus on?
9. If no, why have you not joined any community organization?
10. What are the most important problems facing the community?
11. Did the local councillor or members of the Cape Town Metro Council hold meetings in your area to discuss your community’s needs?
12. If yes, did you attend any of these meetings? If yes, what issues did the community raise at the meeting? If no, why did you not attend any meetings?
13. If members of your community took up an issue with your local ward councillor, do you think the issue will be addressed adequately?

14. Do you know of any community issue that the Council has addressed in your area? What was this issue? Do you think that the current Council has addressed this issue adequately?

15. Do you think that the previous Council would have addressed this particular issue in a better way? Please explain your viewpoint.

16. Homeowners in Parkwood have been complaining about illegal dumping in the area by backyard dwellers for the past five years. How and when has the issue been taken up with Council? How did it respond?

17. Do you think the past Council would have addressed this matter differently?

18. Has your Council home been upgraded in the last 8 years? If so, when?

19. Do you think the Council is focusing more on development rather than service delivery in your neighbourhood?

20. Do you think this drive is more intensified under the DA than under the ANC?

21. Do you think the present Council is focusing more on community issues than the past ANC council?
APPENDIX F

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR

SUB-COUNCIL 18 CHAIRPERSON

1. How long have you been chairperson of sub-council 18?
2. What areas fall under your constituency?
3. What is the role of the sub-council?
4. It is said that sub-councils have a political, community and service interface, what is the role of each component?
5. Focussing specifically on Parkwood and Ottery, what are the main requests and concerns of ratepayers in these areas?
6. How has the sub-council dealt with these concerns?
7. How much was budgeted for this sub-council for the current financial year?
8. Are there any Council-funded development projects in Ottery and Parkwood at present?
9. Have these projects been implemented? If not, why?
10. How often are sub-council meetings or workshops held with the wards in your area and during these meetings does the community get the opportunity to submit project proposals to be considered for funding from the local ward or sub-council budget?
11. Would you say that the communities actively participate in these meetings? If not, why?
12. Illegal dumping is a concern in Parkwood? Has the community taken this issue up with this sub-council?

13. Have you been a councillor in any other area in Cape Town?

14. In recent years (2002-2008) the Metro Council has adopted a ‘pro-poor policy’ for indigent residents in Cape Town, in which they are exempt from paying for certain services. How do you feel this policy was applied under the ANC and is it different from how the DA Council is applying it?

15. Did you serve office as a councillor in this area while the ANC-alliance was the dominating party in Cape Town?

16. What were the focal development and service provision issues in your constituency during the ANC dominating regime? How effective was the ANC-dominating regime in implementing its programmes in your area?

17. Have the changes in local government in Cape Town since 2000 impacted on your level of participation with Council?
APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE
FORMER SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PREMIER OF
THE WESTERN CAPE

1. How long did you serve as special adviser to the Premier?

2. What was the Premier’s Department’s vision for local government in Cape Town at this time?

3. In 2006, the Western Cape Provincial government set up the iKapa Elihlumayo strategies that drive the vision of economic growth and development in the Province. What sort of development driven partnerships did the Department have with local government and civil society in Cape Town?

4. By 2006, the city had seen frequent changes in regime at the local state sphere. How did the Premier’s Department respond to the changing political landscape?

5. The Department of the Premier is responsible for handling intergovernmental relations. What were the critical issues pertaining to intergovernmental relations that the Department sought to address?

6. In 2006, the IDP task team report stated that the plans for economic growth and development in the Province do not constitute a powerful and coherent government agenda for Cape Town and that they point to weak intergovernmental planning in key sectors. What were the limitations to coherent and effective intergovernmental planning?
7. It has been stated that the many ways of local government communication with civil society, such as ward committees and NGOs, are insufficient to generate the kind of participation necessary to influence decision-making. What other avenues of political impact exist in Cape Town for local communities seeking to penetrate the political stratum?

8. In the press, a division between two ANC factions in the Province has been talked about. You stated in 2006 that the way parties work influences agendas and what gets done. Because local government is not completely independent of provincial influences, how do you think these divisions influenced local state policy and development initiatives?

9. In 2006, the ANC-controlled provincial government attempted to change the system of government in Cape Town to put the ANC in control. The Mayor stated that the plan had the support of the highest levels of the ANC’s Western Cape Provincial leadership. As the political head and executive authority of the Province, what was the Premier’s role in the ANC’s decision?
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