AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICANNESS

The Conditions and Fantasies of a Post-Apartheid Festival

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By Ross Truscott

Supervisor: Prof. Gary Minkley
Co-supervisor: Dr Henriette Gunkel
Author statement

I, Ross Brian Truscott, affirm that the work presented here has not been accepted for the award of a degree at any other university and that, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no material published by another person, except where due reference has been made.

Signed
CONTENTS

List of figures .............................................................................................................................................. 6
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................... 7
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
Notes on style ............................................................................................................................................... 12

INTRODUCTION

AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF SOUTH AFRICANNESS

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 14
The problem of white South Africanness ........................................................................................................ 14
An archaeology of the conditions and fantasies of a ‘South African’ festival .................................................. 20
'South Africanness’ as a problem of knowledge production .............................................................................. 20
'South Africanness’ as an identificatory and a phantasmatic accomplishment .................................................. 22
The bad politics of good white South Africans ................................................................................................ 26
Outline of chapters .......................................................................................................................................... 29

1

POST-APARTHEID ADMITTANCE

THE STAIN OF WHITENESS AND THE WORK OF SOUTH AFRICANNESS

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 33
Privilege as the stain of whiteness ................................................................................................................... 33
Oppikoppi: ‘a kind of holy land, a Mecca’ ....................................................................................................... 41

Freud and Foucault on festivals ........................................................................................................................ 45
Festivals, forbidden wishes and the work of their disguise .............................................................................. 45
The festival as a heterotopia ............................................................................................................................... 53
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 63
## A POST-APARTHEID HETEROTOPIA

SELF-DESTRUCTION, NATION BUILDING AND THE PLATTELAND AS THE BROKEN KETTLE OF THE FESTIVAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Hemel op die Platteland”</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterotopic space</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discordant space and psychic discord</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical remarks on the notion of heterotopias</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism, oppositionality and post-apartheid nationalism</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppikoppi as unofficial national monument</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism as a condition of post-apartheid national identity within recent history</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppikoppi as an ‘(anti)establishment’</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions of the site of the festival</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The platteland as the broken kettle of the festival</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The self-destructive South African subject</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## “THE HOME OF SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC”

THE EXHIBITIONARY COMPLEX, THE FESTIVAL AND THE PLACE PREPARED FOR POST-APARTHEID DESIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging musical diversity</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The exhibitionary complex</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennett and museum exhibition</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating conduct</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘re-education of desire’</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault, discourse and the place prepared for desire</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoanalysis, fantasy, desire, identification</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The indissolubility and vulgarity of apartheid sexuality</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................202

6

AFRIKANER SELF-PARODY

POST-APARTHEID MELANCHOLIA

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................204

Afrikaner self-parody .....................................................................................................................204

Melancholia ...................................................................................................................................213

Freud’s concept of melancholia and loss .....................................................................................213

Melancholic self-beratement and self-parody .............................................................................215

‘The Republic of Oppikoppi’ ........................................................................................................217

The ethics of melancholia ..............................................................................................................225

The unconsciousness and self-interest of melancholia ..............................................................225

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................239

CONCLUSION

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL REMAINS OF APARTHEID

The conditions and fantasies of South Africanness .................................................................241

References ......................................................................................................................................250
List of figures

4.1. Oppikoppi ‘Smoorverlief’ festival map

4.2 “In die begin dit was woes en leeg [In the beginning it was wild and empty]”

4.3. “Die Vuilste Vuilgat Fokkers [The Filthiest Filthy Fuckers]”

4.4. Remapping the land

4.5 The festival gates: “Kom in! Kom in! Ons Vriende [Come in! Come in! Our Friends]”

4.6 Nation building by ‘killing your petty paranoid self’ (photograph Liam Lynch)

5.1 View from the koppie (photograph John Hogg)

5.2 Arno Carstens (photograph Gilad Hockman)

6.1 Presidential candidate Twakkie, as he appeared on the official poster for Oppikoppi (Not-Quite) Easter 2009
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For Michelle
Abstract

It has become commonplace in academic studies, particularly those with a critical bent, to view nations as being historical constructs, as being without essence, though not without effects of exclusion and inclusion, of the constitution of the ‘authentic’ national subject and the ‘other of the nation.’ The critical impetus at work here is to show how a nation is constructed in order to bring into view the knowledge and power relations this construction entails, to show whose interests the construction serves, and whose it does not. This study examines the discursive production, the performative enactment and the spatial emplacement of post-apartheid ‘South Africanness’ through a case study of Oppikoppi music festival. Oppikoppi is an annual event that emerged in 1994, on the threshold of the ‘new South Africa.’ The festival is attended predominantly by young white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and is held on a farm in the northernmost province of Limpopo, South Africa, an area notoriously conservative in its racial politics. Yet, curiously, Oppikoppi has been repeatedly referred to, and refers to itself with an almost obsessive regularity and repetitiveness, as a ‘truly South African’ event. Indeed, the festival has been promoted, since 1998, as ‘The Home of South African Music,’ and in 2009 the site of the festival was unofficially declared a ‘national monument.’

Through the employment of concepts drawn from the writings of French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault – particularly his earlier archaeological works – and from Sigmund Freud – particularly his metapsychological works – this study has posed two broad sets of questions. Firstly, from a Foucauldian perspective, what have been the conditions for the production of ‘South Africanness’ at this festival? What have been the requirements, the discursive ‘rules of the game’ for whiteness and Afrikanerness to become ‘South African’? To what extent does this constitution of the festival as a ‘South African’ event preserve older lines of division, difference and oppression? To what extent does this bring about meaningful social change? Secondly, from a psychoanalytic perspective, what are the fantasies constellated in the discourse of the festival as a ‘South African’ event? Who, in these fantasies, is constituted as the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation’? How has fantasy provided a kind of ‘hallucinatory gratification,’ a phantasmatic compensation for, and a means of conserving, the losses of privilege in the new nation? And how has fantasy oriented the festival towards post-apartheid sociality, soliciting identifications with the post-apartheid nation?
The overarching argument proposed is that anti-apartheid post-apartheid nation building has cultivated a melancholic loss of apartheid for whites in general and Afrikaners in particular, a loss that cannot be grieved – indeed, a loss that should not be grieved – and, as such, a grief that takes on an unconscious afterlife. Apartheid and the life it enabled – not only racialised privilege, but also a structure of identification and idealisation, of being and having – becomes a loss that is buried in, and by, the injunctions issued to post-apartheid memory and conduct. Without the discursive resources with which to symbolise this loss, disguised repetitions of the past, a neurotic refinding of the lost objects of apartheid, and melancholia are the likely outcomes, each of which engender a set of exclusions and enjoyments that run along old and new lines.

**Key words:** post-apartheid South Africa, nationalism, whiteness, Afrikanerness, Oppikoppi music festival, archaeology, psychoanalysis, Freud, discourse analysis, Foucault, wildness, multiculturalism, melancholia, parody, heterotopia, exhibitionary complex
Notes on style

Before proceeding, a few notes on the writing style adopted here may be useful. Firstly, when a text has been cited and certain words appear italicised, this is the emphasis in the original text, unless otherwise indicated. I have not, in other words, stated *emphasis in original*, only *emphasis added*. I have also used United Kingdom spelling, but where cited authors have used other spelling, most often United States spelling, this has been left as is.

Secondly, I have used inverted commas to designate those places in the text where the discursive construction of an ‘object’ is explicitly in focus. *Of course*, race, nation, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and so on, are taken to be social or historical constructions. Indeed, to follow through with the assumptions of the approach adopted here, ‘everything’ would be in inverted commas; but there would be something a little too disenabling and interruptive in writing this way. As such, in those instances where inverted commas have not been used, it does not indicate the giveness of any of these terms.

And thirdly, the text is footnote heavy in places, at least for a study written from the discipline of psychology. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, I have used footnotes and intext referencing to designate the difference between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. When a text is footnoted, it is being used as a primary source, and the full reference details of primary texts are provided in the footnotes. Secondary sources have been given an intext reference, the full details of which appear in the reference list. There is, to an extent, a clarifying function served here, and the intention has been to mark the analysed texts from those more theoretical texts with which they have been read. The division, however, becomes somewhat arbitrary in places; indeed, in the conversation between ‘secondary’ and ‘primary’ texts, it is hoped that this explicit division draws out precisely that arbitrariness. On the other hand, footnotes have also been used, in a more conventional way, to elaborate on a point that would interrupt the flow of the text, even if the finer details of it provide an anchor for the argument being suggested, or take it further. In these instances, secondary texts appear in the footnotes, but only as if they were being cited intext; here, too, the full reference details are provided in the reference list.
We, the people of South Africa,
Recognize the injustices of our past;
Honour those who suffered for justice
and freedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build
and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all
who live in it, united in our diversity

Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must be first called into question – and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired (Nietzsche, 1887, p. 456).
INTRODUCTION

An archaeology of South Africanness

In negotiating the contours of the rainbow nation, the prevailing question has remained, ‘Who properly qualifies, and who does not?’ (Goldberg, 2009, p. 311)

It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological (Foucault, 1970, p. xi).

It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects. At any rate the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object-choices (Freud, 1923, p. 29).

Introduction

The problem of white South Africanness

Since 1994, the cohesion of ‘the people of South Africa’ has been promoted, on the one hand, by attempting to level longstanding racialised economic inequalities; quite unsuccessfully it should be said. On the other hand, and with far more vigour, the task of uniting a historically divided and unequal population – and frequently in the face of the failure to produce and unite ‘the people’ through “the salarization of society” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 75) or through the redistribution of land as “an idiom for the citizenship once denied to South Africa’s black majority” (James, 2007, p. 10) – has come from the promotion of a South African national identity.

In response to the ‘prevailing question’ of who ‘properly qualifies’ as South African, it has been suggested that, while those groups of people oppressed by apartheid have qualified legally but not economically or socially, white South Africans, the perpetrators and beneficiaries of apartheid, have qualified all too easily: they are no less ‘properly South African’ than they were during apartheid (Goldberg, 2009). This study considers the
question – and we could, and perhaps also should, call it the problem – of white post-apartheid ‘South Africanness.’ More specifically, it looks at white Afrikaner South Africanness through an examination of Oppikoppi music festival.

Oppikoppi (op die koppie, on the small hill) is an annual event – although until 2009 it was held twice a year, in April and then August – that takes place on a 150 hectare game-farm called Nooitgedacht (never would have thought), three hours from the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria, minutes from the rural town of Northam, in the northernmost province of Limpopo, South Africa. It is attended predominantly by white Afrikaners, and it has been repeatedly referred to as “an authentically South African festival,” as one music website put it, “Oppikoppi is all about being South African, supporting South African music, supporting South African fans, supporting South Africa.”¹ This sort of declaration has become a regular feature in the representation of the festival: “It’s a truly magical thing, Oppikoppi. And we reckon if you haven’t been to at least one, you shouldn’t qualify for a South African passport.”² The festival organisers, it should be noted, have been far from passive in this regard, not only referring to the event as “The Home of South African Music,”³ but also going as far as to declare the site of the festival an unofficial national monument in August 2009.

There may at first sight seem nothing remarkable about this, about a music festival that is seen and spoken about, that sees and speaks of itself, as South African; it is an event, after all, that takes place within the geographic borders of South Africa, that stages mostly local – that is, South African – musicians. Would this not make the event South African by definition? Not exactly, not if we consider ‘South Africanness’ since the end of apartheid. And in doing so, let us, to invoke the Friedrich Nietzsche of The Genealogy of Morals, consider also the ‘conditions and circumstances’ in which the moral values of ‘South Africanness’ grew, under which they have ‘evolved and changed’ since 1994.

One of the salient features of post-apartheid nation building – insofar as the nation has been negatively constructed, against that which is alien to the nation – has been the constitution

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³ This was printed on a flyer for the August, 1997 festival.
of the nation through a break with its own past, “the inversion, the turning inside out, of apartheid’s absolutizing of identity politics” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 318). The post-apartheid South African nation is not what it was, forging itself in a relation of differentiation from its own past. As Richard Wilson (2001) writes, “The most significant site of otherness for the new South Africa has not been other nations, it has been itself” (p. 16). The nation has been constituted – in the sense of being constructed, or imagined, in Benedict Anderson’s (1983) often cited terms, but also, quite literally, constituted in its founding document, *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996* – as a nation against its own past. This is neatly put in the opening lines of the preamble to the constitution, which is exemplary of how identifications with the nation have been solicited, at least officially:

We, the people of South Africa,  
Recognize the injustices of our past;  
Honour those who suffered for justice  
and freedom in our land;  
Respect those who have worked to build  
and develop our country; and  
Believe that South Africa belongs to all  
who live in it, united in our diversity.

The corollary here is that an individual becomes one of ‘the people of South Africa’ precisely through the recognition of the ‘injustices of our past’ (see Mbembe, 2008a; Steyn, 2005).

Indeed, it is only through this recognition of injustice that the past becomes ‘our past,’ a past common to us all. The effect of the constitution, specifically the preamble, is the instalment of the conscience of the ideal post-apartheid national subject, who understands the history of injustice that informs the government of the nation (Fagan, 1998). This has affected,  

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4 As Steyn (2005) notes, the “former apartheid supporter has become an extinct species” (p. 129): ‘South African’ and ‘apartheid supporter’ are a contradiction in terms, and all ‘South Africans’ are able to find the smallest oppositional act to amplify, confirming that they were always actually against apartheid.  
For Mbembe (2008a), it is, at least in part, from white denialism that a “culture of mutual ressentiment” is produced, and it is this relation of ressentiment between black and white that forecloses, for whites, a “sense of truly belonging to this place and this nation” (p. 5). To deny the atrocities of apartheid is to forfeit belonging and it is this failure of recognition that prevents whites from being South African (Mbembe, 2008a).  
5 Not only does the constitution regulate governmental conduct, but when its interpreter is the governed national subject, the preamble provides the conditions according to which one becomes a subject of the post-apartheid nation. As Edward Fagan (1998) argues, while constitutions are designed to regulate and limit the conduct of government
profoundly, “the production of interiority” (Ahmed, 2000, pp. 98-99), not only the cartographic interior, the creation of borders between itself and other nations, but the ‘psychic interiority’ of subjects of the nation, and this holds particular importance for white ‘South Africans’ who, as Ivor Chipkin (2007) notes in his book, Do South Africans Exist?, “are not easily ‘Africans’” (p. 101), becoming so not only on the recognition of the past as an injustice, but also through “being able to understand the racist power at work in apartheid and colonial taxonomies” (p. 102). It is this gaze towards the past of injustice and its legacy, from the ‘liberated’ position of the present, that is “the mark of authenticity” (p. 102; see also Sanders, 2007). 6

The constitution of the nation negatively, against the apartheid past, has produced the ‘other of the nation,’ the threat to its cohesion, as any figure in whom the past is repeated. Thus, a further condition of belonging is disentanglement from the past, indeed a relinquishment of the past. Being South African, as Leon de Kock (2004) writes, “has meant no longer fully being something else” (p. 272). 7 One can be a South African and continue to identify as an Afrikaner, for instance, but national belonging requires aspects of cultural and racial identity to be given up, in particular those aspects too strongly associated with the apartheid past. When taken together, the conditions of belonging are that the injustices of the past must be recognised; but in one’s conduct and speech, thought and desire, this past must not be recognisable. The two demands of this interpellation are not altogether contradictory; they have, though, engendered notable psychic conflicts and disguised repetitions of the past. Indeed, the violence of the past, as we will see in the chapters to come, is frequently repeated in the very psychic conflicts produced out of this constitutional interpellation.

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6 Mark Sanders (2007) takes this a step further, arguing that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, it is not simply recognition of the past as an injustice, but “mourning and condolence” that are the conditions of being a part of “the same social formation” (p. 57). Indeed, for Sanders, the inability to mourn certain lives is what defined apartheid, “apartheid was a proscription on mourning, particularly of the other” (p. 35). Redefining the South African nation, for Sanders, has been dependent on reconstituting the parameters of mourning and condolence. Again, the implication here for white South Africans, as Sanders argues convincingly, is that a failure to mourn, or a refusal of permission to participate in the mourning that was previously denied, represents a failure or a refusal to be a part of post-apartheid national community.

7 We see here how, in the preamble to the constitution, multiculturalism (where we are ‘united in our diversity’) and an anti-apartheid disposition (where ‘we, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of the past’) flow easily into each other, and are, effectively, welded to each other. As Goldberg (2009) puts it, “Multicultural movements of the 1980s and 1990s accordingly are to be understood, at least, as the at once irreducible supplement to anti-apartheid antiracisms” (p. 15).
The construction of the South African nation has also entailed a constitutionally enshrined acknowledgement of difference and diversity, as the preamble makes clear in the final line cited above. In light of South Africa’s long history of state sanctioned racial and ethnic difference and division, a homogeneous, monocultural nation was completely untenable in the 1994 transition – there simply were no positive features, however defined, that ‘South Africans’ shared (Chipkin, 2007).\(^8\) As such, the post-apartheid nation was constituted as a ‘multicultural nation.’\(^9\) It is precisely our ‘diversity’ that South Africans are encouraged to identify with, this identification becoming the shared mark that unites ‘the people.’ We can think of this dynamic in terms of what de Kock (2004) has called “the seam,” which as he formulates it is a site where difference is disavowed, that is, at once affirmed and denied, inasmuch as it “foregrounds the representational suture, the attempt to close the gap and to bring the incommensurate into alignment by the substitution, in the place of difference, of a myth, a motif, a figure, or a trope” (p. 276). We are ‘united in our diversity’ inasmuch as the myth of our unity conjures difference persistently so as to solicit a common identification with it, and thereby erase this difference – in the words of Chris Roper (2011), South Africa is a “hyper-racial non-racial society” (p. 31). And no matter the seam constructed to disavow difference, it always returns – indeed, \textit{difference must return} as it is identification with this difference that constitutes ‘the South African’ (de Kock, 2004, p. 284). As Goldberg (2009) formulates this, quite simply, “The non-racial could be heralded only insofar as it took its leave from the racial, but in doing so has kept the ghostly terms of race ironically alive as implicit yardstick” (pp. 310-311); indeed, the same can be said of ethnicity (Minkley, 2008).\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Chipkin (2007) approaches the problem, schematically, as follows: A and B are admissible to C on the grounds of X; which is to say that citizen A and citizen B are admissible to the nation on the grounds of X. Thus X is the factor according to which a national identity is assumed. And we can substitute any number of factors for X. The danger of using any factor derived from the populace has been well established – race, as in the case of apartheid (Chipkin, 2007).

\(^9\) In speaking of a multicultural nation, it is useful to look at how the term multiculturalism has been developed in other contexts, most notably in the United Kingdom. Stuart Hall (2000), for instance, distinguishes between “multicultural societies” – culturally heterogeneous communities living together – and “multiculturalism” – the attempts to “govern and manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity” (p. 209). To questions of how we live together, multiculturalism is a response, both practical and theoretical, that has taken the form of activism, policy and writing to ensure cultural minorities are protected (Hall, 2000). There is a correspondence here to what is frequently referred to as “descriptive multiculturalism” and “normative multiculturalism” (see Goldberg, 2004, pp. 1-2). Put simply, while descriptive multiculturalism resentfully acknowledges the heterogeneity of a nation, normative multiculturalism seeks to advance the rights of cultural minorities (Goldberg, 2004).

\(^10\) Looking at the post-apartheid deployment of ‘indigeneity’ as a marker of anti-colonial/anti-apartheid ‘authentic Africanness,’ on the one hand, and apartheid’s reinforcement – if not production – of ethnic difference that served a ‘divide and rule’ agenda, on the other, Gary Minkley (2008) draws attention to how they are in fact conjoined,
We are now in a position to return to Oppikoppi’s declarations of South Africanness. If we consider that, on the one hand, the post-apartheid nation has been constituted against its own past – specifically, as I discuss in more detail in chapter two, against the apartheid past, as an anti-apartheid nation – and, on the other hand, that apartheid was carried out under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism, then the ‘South Africanness’ of a festival defined in part by its Afrikanerness is far from a settled issue. Indeed, the near obsessive repetitiveness of Oppikoppi’s declarations of ‘South Africanness’ is not only, when viewed in this light, an indication of the certainty of its place within the nation, but perhaps also the very opposite of this, the contingency of the place it occupies.

From a certain perspective – and this was my thinking particularly in the early stages of the research – the festival has been examined as what Alfred Lopez (2005) has referred to as “postcolonial whiteness struggling to come into being” (p. 6), whiteness adapting to postcolonial losses of racialised power and authority, reconsidering and renegotiating a relation to those formerly oppressed by apartheid, now fellow South Africans. I was drawn to thinking about Oppikoppi because there seemed something hopeful about this festival, hopeful in the sense that social change appeared to be happening here. It needs to be stated from the outset, though, that the changes in post-apartheid whiteness and Afrikanerness discerned here have amounted to little more than stubborn repetitions of the past, improvisations on an all too familiar, all too homely, racial order. Indeed, the post-apartheid nation, more generally, remains a racially divided and unequal society, although not in precisely the same ways as it was before the end of apartheid. The arguments I propose about this particular festival, always with this wider context in mind, circle this terrain of repetition, on the one hand, and this ‘little more’ that these repetitions have amounted to, on the other. In the sections below I want to briefly introduce the two ways in which I have worked, tracking post-apartheid social and psychic change, doing two different kinds of archaeological analysis of ‘South Africanness.’

Despite being portrayed as being diametrically opposed. As he puts it, the instantiations of ‘authentic Africanness’ as ‘indigeneity’ in the heritage sector “do not mark the transcendence of the basics of apartheid separate development, but rather reproduce them in new ways” (p. 34). Putting this in no uncertain terms a little further on, Minkley states that “tradition as re-conceptualized and re-invoked through heritage here actually serves to maintain and reproduce the dichotomies of apartheid and its racially modern relations and basis of difference” (p. 36). Although a slightly different argument to Goldberg’s, Minkley’s point is that the anti-apartheid ‘heritage complex’ serves to keep the ‘ghostly terms’ of the apartheid past alive.
An archaeology of the conditions and fantasies of a ‘South African’ festival

‘South Africanness’ as a problem of knowledge production

‘South Africanness’ has been approached, firstly, as a matter of discourse and as a problem of knowledge production, employing Michel Foucault’s earlier, archaeological writings as a guide. Foucault developed his archaeological approach as a means of analysing scientific discourse and he sought to uncover the ‘conditions of possibility’ that grounded the production of scientific knowledge across a range of domains. In The Order of Things, for instance, Foucault (1970) sought to reveal the “archaeological system” (p. xi) that was common to statements made in the fields of economics, natural history and philosophy in the Classical and Modern periods. What discursive regularities were there, he asked, between these seemingly unrelated domains of knowledge? It was these regularities that constituted, for Foucault, an archaeological level of knowledge, or the “positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse” (p. xi), the “rules of formation which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study” (p. xi).

Crucial to this archaeological frame is the notion of discourse; indeed, discourse analysis, at least as it is practiced by social psychologists as I discuss in chapter three, owes much to Foucault’s (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault (1972) defined discourse, in a frequently cited passage, as “practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak” (p. 54), emphasising the productivity of discourse, its constitutive function, the way discourse is not thought to discover the truth of the objects of which it speaks – however well, poorly or approximately – but is thought to bring its objects into being, to form them through the knowledge that is produced about them. In analysing discourse Foucault was interested, at least in part, in the internal workings of discourse, “the rules and practices that produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical periods” (Hall, 1997, p. 72), the “‘is’s’ and ‘oughts,’ ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’; ‘cans’ and ‘cannots,’ ‘thou shalt’ and ‘thou shalt nots’” (Goldberg, 1987, p. 60) of a discursive formation. An archaeological analysis proceeds, in this regard – that of the internal workings of discourse – by looking at the ways in which the

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11 The term ‘conditions of possibility’ reveals the debt to Immanuel Kant that Foucault’s archaeological approach owes; indeed, Kant was the first to use the term ‘philosophical archaeology’ (Agamben, 2009).
discursive practices which form objects are constrained; in other words, if these practices systematically form the objects of which they speak, what are the never fully articulated regularities of that systematic formation? Discourse is not simply taken to be the statements that compose the discourse, then; rather, it is the unarticulated system that gives to these statements their regularity. It is precisely this constraint by a set of conditions – discourse as the unwritten rules and regulations of knowledge production – that an archaeological analysis brings into critical focus.

Discursive practices produce the objects of which they speak; but they produce, also, knowing and known subjects as a special category of object (Parker, 1992), or, rather, properly speaking, subject positions that bear particular enunciative modalities. As an example, Foucault’s (1964) Madness and Civilization was concerned not only with the production of madness as an object of knowledge – an object that could be diagnosed and treated, that could be contained and either separated from, or integrated into, society, an object that was thought to either speak a mysterious truth or present a threat to, and at the same time a support for, reason – but also with the various subject positions that were brought into being and mobilised around madness as an object of knowledge, the positions of the patient and the physician, the various positions of mad and reasonable subjects.

This offers a useful perspective for the analysis of the festival as a ‘South African’ event and its production of ‘authentically South African’ subjects, or subject positions – and, if we recall an earlier quote about the festival (‘if you haven’t been to at least one, you shouldn’t qualify for a South African passport’), the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation,’ too. A Foucauldian archaeology of South Africanness has enabled me to methodically consider, on the one hand, how Oppikoppi as a cultural institution has participated in the production of ‘South Africanness’ and ‘un-South Africanness’ and, on the other, how Oppikoppi has itself emerged as an object of knowledge, as an event that can be spoken about, celebrated as ‘truly South African’ or problematised as ‘un-South African.’ The questions I pose in the coming chapters concern the conditions that have constrained, but also enabled, Oppikoppi to speak of itself, and be spoken of, as being ‘truly South African’; they concern the conditions of its failure to do so, and those according to which it has been problematised as ‘un-South African,’ as well as the never fully stated criteria according to which the festival, as a cultural institution, has designated the ‘un-South African.’ In chapters one and three I elaborate of the Foucauldian frame I have used,
adding to it a crucial dimension of power – this discourse of ‘South Africanness’ also positions people, includes and excludes, centres and marginalises, designates ways of speaking and ways of seeing, while closing off others. For the moment, though, let me turn to a second kind of archaeology, a psychoanalytic archaeology of identification and of fantasy.

‘South Africanness’ as an identificatory and a phantasmatic accomplishment

The place of whiteness in post-apartheid South Africa has been, as alluded to above, contingent upon certain losses of unquestioned positions of privilege – indeed, losses of various kinds may be implicated in the interpellation of all post-apartheid South Africans (Olivier, 2007). Melissa Steyn (2001) makes this point well in “Whiteness Just Isn’t What It Used to Be,” the first book length study of post-apartheid South African whiteness. As her title makes clear, the story she tells is one “about displacement, about the subjective experience of dispossession” (p. 153). There have been, Steyn argues, losses of a sense of home, of autonomy and control, of guaranteed legitimacy, honour and face. And it is precisely this – the world as it has been known, not only racialised privilege, but also a structure of having and being, of identification and idealisation, into which apartheid and colonialism inducted white South Africans – that must be relinquished. Loss, in other words, has been an issue central to the constitution of the post-apartheid white subject.

Loss is also central to psychoanalytic conceptions of identification and fantasy, and it is with these two notions that I have been able, from a psychoanalytic perspective, to think through the issue of how white Afrikaners have become ‘South African,’ how identifications with the post-apartheid nation have been solicited. In psychoanalytic theory, it is loss or separation that is constitutive of the ego. In *The Ego and the Id*, Sigmund Freud (1923) remarks, in this regard, that “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object choices” (p. 29). Commenting on this passage, Judith Butler (1997) has stated, in a succinct formulation, that the character of the ego, formed through identification

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12 Bert Olivier (2007) puts this well in his psychoanalytic conceptualisation of violence in post-apartheid South Africa: “Collectively, South Africans have experienced two successive traumas. First there was the imposition of apartheid on black people, something that was manifested in a symbolic framework of its own, no matter how morally deplorable it may have been. Then, in 1994, South Africans had to face another ‘trauma’ in the sense of an inescapable transition to a radically different socio-political symbolic framework, in the guise of a democratic constitution. This required of citizens to leave the old ‘order’ of apartheid behind and henceforth to think and act in terms of the newly sanctioned democratic symbolic order” (p. 47).
as a process of incorporating lost objects – introjection in psychoanalytic parlance – is no more than “the sedimentation of objects loved and lost, the archaeological remainder, as it were, of unresolved grief” (p. 133, emphasis added). Loss, in this sense, ‘inaugurates’ the subject, is the founding condition of psychic life (Butler, 1997).13

While Foucault treats archaeology as a practice of uncovering the regularities of discursive practices, Freudian archaeology – or what can be given this name, as Freud never referred to his analyses as archaeological – treats identifications as always bearing the trace of a lost object (see also Agamben, 2009; Ricoeur, 1970).14 A psychoanalytic archaeology of ‘South Africanness’ as I have employed it in the context of Oppikoppi music festival has examined declarations of South Africanness as instances of identification, and it has given to the analysis a metaphor of an excavation that seeks to discern the histories of the lost objects entailed in identifications with the nation. As Opposed to Foucault’s archaeology, a Freudian ‘archaeology of unresolved grief,’ then, is concerned far more with the archaic, with the past in the present and with the afterlife of lost objects. As Paul Ricoeur (1970) puts it,

Insofar as ideals and illusions are the analogues of dreams and neurotic symptoms, it is evident that any psychoanalytic interpretation of culture is an archaeology. The genius of Freudianism is to have unmasked the strategy of the pleasure principle, the archaic form of the human, under its rationalizations, its idealizations, its sublimations. Here the function of analysis is to reduce apparent novelty by showing that it is actually a revival of the old: substitute satisfaction, restoration of the lost archaic object, derivatives from early fantasies – these are but various names to designate the restoration of the old in the features of the new (p. 446, emphasis added).15

Ricoeur speaks here of ‘ideals and illusions’ as ‘the analogues of dreams and neurotic symptoms,’ and in chapter one I elaborate on this; it is worth saying a few words here, though, about fantasy and its place in the analysis of the festival. Fantasy in psychoanalytic theory always entails some kind of loss. Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis (1973) provide the following

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13 The paradox here, of course, is that there is no ego who endures separation or loss prior to the losses into which a given society inducts it.
14 I draw here not only on Butler, but on Giorgio Agamben (2009) and Paul Ricoeur’s (1970) work. Ricoeur has developed Freud’s metapsychological writings into what he called an ‘archaeology of the subject’ and Agamben (2009) has drawn on Freud in developing a ‘philosophical archaeology.’ In due course I turn to both Ricoeur and Agamben.
15 Of course, Ricoeur is not simply championing psychoanalysis here, and also marks out the limits of what an ‘archaeology of the subject’ can do, of what it is designed to do, which is read the archaic in the supposedly novel.
definition of fantasy: “Imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfillment of a wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or lesser extent by defensive processes” (p. 281). In the face of a loss, fantasy is deployed in order to refind the lost object; in its most basic or ‘primitive’ form, by hallucinating the object. However, fantasy entails not simply unreal, wishful wanderings from reality and the conjuring of lost or impossible objects, but also an orientation towards the realities of the social world of which the subject is a part. At a basic level, fantasies are treated in psychoanalysis as wishful distortions of reality, but ones that are produced on the model of previous gratifications. As Laplanche and Pontalis (1968) argue in their essay, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,’

The origin of fantasy would lie in the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire; in the absence of a real object, the infant reproduces the experience of the original satisfaction in a hallucinated form. In this view the most fundamental fantasies would be those which tend to recover the hallucinated objects linked with the very earliest experiences of the rise and resolution of desire (p. 15).

It is the absence of an object that initiates fantasy, initiates, that is, the hallucination of the object; but fantasy, in this formulation, also provides a means of mediating the pursuit of substitute objects and future satisfactions – an idea put well by Jacqueline Rose (1998) in States of Fantasy, “Never completely losing its grip, fantasy is always heading towards the world it only appears to have left behind” (p. 3). Fantasy thus orients the subject towards an external reality, making possible the recovery of the objects associated with ‘the very earliest experiences of the rise and resolution of desire,’ refinding lost objects.16 We can, thus, from the start, situate the discussion of fantasy within an archaeological frame, that is, within a frame alert to the persistence of the past in the present, to the persistence of the archaic.

Fantasy is taken, then, as directed towards the ‘external real world,’ rather than simply what the subject does in private, outside the grip of the social and its law (Rose, 1998), proceeding out of a separation from an object, as a means of compromising for this separation by hallucinating the object, and as a template for pursuing a substitute object. In this regard, Slavoj Žižek (1997) has argued that, in response to the question of what, within a given context, is

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16 Emphasis needs to be placed on the associational link between the objects recovered in the external world, with the assistance of fantasy, and the first objects of satisfaction. A refinding of the object, as Freud put it in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, is impossible, or possible only in substitute objects. See also Freud’s (1925) essay, ‘On Negation.’
wanted from a subject, and in the face of the impossibility of really knowing ones expected role, “fantasy provides an answer to this enigma: at its most fundamental, fantasy tells me what I am to my others” (p. 9). White post-apartheid belonging, we might say, has been dependent upon “being prepared to take up the burden of reparation and moral rejuvenation” (Vice, 2010, p. 332). But what, precisely, this means for white South Africans is at once clear and obscure, and we can think of fantasy as not only the means for the preservation of lost objects, for the hallucinatory gratification of what is now forbidden under the new dispensation, but also as an attempt to decipher this riddle and, as I discuss in chapter three, as enabling of identifications with the ideals of the post-apartheid nation. In this study I have tried to discern the fantasies constellated in the festival discourse, fantasies that circle this enigma of what is expected in the ‘new South Africa’ of whiteness and Afrikanerness. More broadly, this study proceeds on the assumption that, as a nation, our relations to each other are not only regulated by discourse, but are set in place by fantasies – of the nation, of what we ought to be, of ‘the other’ of the nation and, in a related sense, of the past of the nation. In this regard, Žižek (1997) suggests, “Fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its coordinates; that is, it literally ‘teaches us how to desire’” (p. 7). We could say that fantasy has informed the festival how it ought to assemble itself and represent itself to post-apartheid sociality.

This provides a brief sketch of how, through the work of Foucault and Freud – Foucault, who sought to uncover the regularities of discursive practices, to reveal objectifying and enunciative regularities, and Freud, who saw identifications as always bearing the trace of a lost object – that I have done an archaeology of South Africanness. The compatibility of Foucauldian archaeology and Freudian psychoanalysis as a kind of archaeology, as I have employed them here, lies in their common constructionist assumptions and their mutual emphasis on the contingency of subjectivity (see Bersani, 2010; Ricoeur, 1970).17 The subject, for Foucault, does

17 In making this point, Leo Bersani (2010) focuses on how Foucault argued for sex “as the myth required to support a historical construct named sexuality” (p. 136); he then shows how, in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud does precisely the same thing: he grapples towards a conception of sexuality, of the phases through which a subject must pass on their way towards ‘normative’ sexuality; but then, in the end, concludes that he has been inadequate to the task, that all he has done is produce a working construct for analysts working with their analysands.

“An instinct, in its biological being, Freud tells us, is unknowable; the only way it can enter into the psychical field is by means of its ideational representative; thanks to this psychical sign, the body is ‘represented in the soul’” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 429). I would argue that this bears a strong resemblance to Foucault’s (1977) thinking about the body: it exists in and of itself, but we can only know it through discourse. For Foucault, ‘the soul’ “is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference to a certain type of knowledge, the
not in any knowable way pre-exist discourse; rather, the subject is an effect of discourse, a position offered up in discourse. In the psychoanalytic approach used here, the particular prohibitions of a given society are thought to occasion the losses whereby the character of the ego is formed and shaped – this in opposition to ego psychology, where the ego is thought to simply adapt to the conditions of the social world. There is, then, in psychoanalysis and discourse analysis alike, a basic assumption that the subject is formed by the society of which it is a part, rather than preconstituted, and there are some common assumptions regarding the subject of discourse and the psychoanalytic subject of loss, even if there are also some marked differences, to which I turn later.

The bad politics of good white South Africans

It is worth pointing out that while this study is not an analysis of my own fantasies of ‘South Africanness’ and the conditions to which this national identity is subject, I do not exclude myself from the situation being analysed here. However cynical one may be about nationalism in general and South African nationalism in particular, however much one rolls one’s eyes at its spectacles and its propaganda – from rousing public holiday Presidential speeches, to masculinist sporting events, sentimental television commercials, nation building soap operas and the evening news – there is no getting away from or outside of it. Indeed, if we follow Žižek’s (1997) logic, this cynical distance, “far from signalling the limitation of the ideological machine, functions as its positive condition of possibility” (p. 27). In other words, being cynical about nationalism is potentially precisely what makes one a good nationalist subject, able to carry out the injunctions of the nationalist program without feeling completely within the grip of its ideology. South African anti-apartheid nationalism is what, at once, delivered us from a colonial and apartheid Afrikaner nationalist past, and what binds us to the present moment; it is what constrains our self-understandings and mediates our relations to each other, our anxieties, our hopes, and the possibility of ‘ethical’ conduct post apartheid. And one cannot pretend to be somehow outside of

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machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power” (p. 29). The ‘soul,’ in other words, is what seizes the body, makes it a knowledgeable entity and subject to power, rather than the immaterial being that inhabits the body. And it is the correlate of the Freudian ‘ideational representative of an instinct.’ There is not an equivalence here between Freud and Foucault, but certainly there is some common ground. The crucial point at which Foucault and psychoanalysis part, though, is on the ‘afterlife’ of that which cannot be admitted to, or represented by, discourse: for Foucault there is no pre-discursive or extra-discursive surplus, while for psychoanalysis this constitutes desire.

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the situation being analysed – I am, as the researcher here, located in it and am, as they say, thought and spoken by it, and must, to use Quadri Ismail’s (2005) phrase, abide by it.18

I would not like this to turn into one of those pained whiteness studies confessional introductions – which is not to say that I didn’t make several quite time consuming attempts at writing one (it never felt quite right, though, always seemed to be doing something more than confessing, performing something). But if one of the most powerful ideas to have come from whiteness studies is that the voice of whiteness is spoken from nowhere and yet everywhere, as if objectively and neutrally, assuming a “magic-like quality by its presentation as seemingly permanent, unchanging, without history or social context” (Ratele & Laubscher, 2011, p. 84), then it is perhaps necessary to at least mark the place and time from which I have analysed the festival discourse. (And as an aside here, it is not a bad place to point out that the title of this study, An Archaeology of South Africanness is of no mere incidental importance: it is in fact a study of how South Africanness is constructed around a festival attended predominantly by white South Africans; to have called it An Archaeology of White South Africanness, though, would miss this).

I am a white male English-speaking South African who grew up during apartheid – to be precise, on starting this study I had lived more than half my life during apartheid, and, on completing it, only a little less than half – in a white English-speaking middle-class home. I do feel a certain distance from Oppikoppi; but while I may not closely approximate the typical subject of the festival discourse, it is not for me an ‘other culture’ in the anthropological sense. It is an event that, at least in certain respects, I can identify with – that I do identify with – and that I first attended not because I was studying it, but because I wanted to be there. And even long after I knew I would be doing my doctoral study on it, I had a lot of fun there. At certain times I may have half-jokingly portrayed this as a kind of ‘deep hanging out,’ as the anthropologists say, of ‘running myself through the festival machine,’ trying to get a sense of how it feels; but that isn’t exactly accurate: I was there with friends, and it was good to be there, and I think to create a picture where this part of the process is excluded would be, if not dishonest then something like it.

18 Ismail’s Abiding by Sri Lanka, much in the spirit of Said’s Orientalism, reads the ways in which Sri Lanka has been produced as an object by the discipline of anthropology, and made legible to the West through this objectification. Although quite different in context and focus to this study, Ismail’s notion of ‘abiding by Sri Lanka’ has been influential here. We cannot, as Ismail notes drawing on Spivak, walk out on the scripts that produce us – they still determine, and create the possibility for, our ‘ethics.’
Personal psychology and immediate family background surely contribute to one’s positionality in a research setting like this. In the home in which I grew up, talk of the ‘Boere’ (Afrikaners, farmers) was usually derogatory, and always critical. If there was a reflex cultivated in me it was to criticise ‘the Afrikaners.’ And there is a long history of white English-speaking South African liberal criticism, indeed judgement, of Afrikanerdom and its politics. This kind of criticism was at a certain point necessary and useful, and it may still be in certain instances; but there are also some secondary gains that accrue from it that need to be problematised. It has become, for one thing, an act that moves with the grain of anti-apartheid post-apartheid nationalism; specifically, it has become an idiosyncratic post-apartheid white liberal gesture, a kind of *self righteousness*, a *diversion* – and perhaps it has always been, even during apartheid bar some exceptions where true risks were taken, self righteous and not much more than a diversion of attention – through which one’s post-apartheid ‘South Africanness’ can be affirmed.

The risk of this study, then, was for it to become a kind of anti-apartheid performative that runs with the grain of post-apartheid nationalism, and there has been a fine line between *conjuring this grain* of post-apartheid ‘South Africanness’ so as to see it more clearly, to hold a gaze on it, to know its effects – those intended and unintended – and running with it.

While it is certainly the case that the Oppikoppi festival discourse is littered with hyperboles – Afrikaans musician, Koos Kombuis’ suggestion that the organisers “*is besig om berge te versit in die kultuur landskap van die Nuwe Suid-Afrika* [are moving mountains in the cultural landscape of the new South Africa],” as an example – the event has done something worthy of serious and considered critique. At the very least, it has ‘amplified’ the dream of a transformed ‘white Afrikaans post-apartheid South Africanness.’ My personal interest in this festival, then, has been less to forge a relatively ethical position for myself, a position of ‘political sanity,’ by criticising and judging Afrikaners, but, rather, to consider an event that has attempted to find a place for itself in post-apartheid South Africa, to show how this has occurred, and draw out some of the limitations and effects of this attempt.

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Outline of chapters

There are four main objectives in the next chapter. One is to provide a more detailed background to Oppikoppi music festival. Another is to discuss what Freud and Foucault have written about festivals. Both Freud and Foucault are unlikely theoreticians of the festival; indeed, their references to festivals are few and far between. But when these are read alongside some of their other works and in relation to the writings of some of their interlocutors, what Freud (1921) called “excesses provided by the law” (p. 81) and Foucault (1986) called heterotopias, each with reference to festivals, leads us into the very heart of the problem with which this study is concerned: the conditions and fantasies of white post-apartheid South Africanness. Before turning to either Oppikoppi or to Freud and Foucault’s texts, though, I develop the problem of white post-apartheid belonging more fully. In doing so I build on some of the points raised here, most notably the issue of white privilege, and I frame the problem of white South Africanness as one of ‘admission’ (Chow, 199). This discussion of white privilege enables me to situate both Oppikoppi and Freud and Foucault’s writings on festivals within some of the most charged debates on South African racial and national politics.

Chapter two stands as a review of the literature. Here I build on the theme of white national belonging, focussing on South African nation building and on how South Africans, white Afrikaners in particular, have been interpellated as subjects of the post-apartheid nation through a relation to a national past. In the first part of this chapter I look at how the anti-apartheid nation has been forged through the production of the apartheid past; that is, ‘the apartheid past’ is treated as a discursive object towards which ‘the people’ are to face, acknowledging it as an injustice. In the second part of this chapter I discuss some of the different white responses to the call to be South African, particularly those to have emerged in a cultural sphere from Afrikaners. It has been said that in a South African context “attempts to investigate the cultural imagination of whiteness through art, music, literature and popular media is largely unchartered terrain” (Baines, 2008, p. 100). Although there may be some truth in this – a great many studies of whiteness have opted for analyses of interviews with white people talking about their own whiteness – there is a growing body of literature of precisely this sort. Many of the responses noted by different authors resonate with those discerned at Oppikoppi. South Africanness, these studies suggest, entails the elevation of ‘multiculturalism’ (e.g. Steyn & Foster, 2008; Steyn, 2004), and I engage some of the literature relevant to Oppikoppi in this
regard; ‘wildness’ has also emerged as being strategically important to white post-apartheid South Africanaess (de Kock, 2010; Gardiner, 2010); and so too has an ironic or parodic relation to the apartheid past (e.g. Garb, 2011; Truscott, 2011a, 2011b; Nuttall, 2008; Bezuidenhout, 2007; Laubscher, 2005; Barnard, 2004; Grundlingh, 2004). These are the three themes – multicultural alliances, ‘wildness’ and parody – taken up in the analysis chapters that follow, and this chapter provides a base of existing research for the analysis.

The research reviewed in chapter two assists in thinking through the constitution of the ‘South Africanaess’ of Oppikoppi music festival, as well as its production of ‘South African’ subjects. However, these studies come from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, draw on different theoretical perspectives all with different philosophical underpinnings, employ various assumptions on the status of the subject, and look at different kinds of source materials. Building on the theory already introduced in the introduction and in chapter one, chapter three is concerned with the methodology employed in this study, and entails a detailed look at the work of Foucault and the discourse analytic methodologies that have emerged in the wake of his archaeological writings, as well as that of Freud and some of the social psychoanalytic approaches developed on his inspiration. There are some fairly obvious tensions between Foucauldian and psychoanalytic theory and critical practice, and I discuss in further detail how I have employed these two approaches to pose different sorts of questions about Oppikoppi. The objective here is to show how theory has informed the more pragmatic aspects of the study, those concerning the method of analysis employed and the selection and collection of source materials.

Chapters four, five and six are concerned with different strategies of Oppikoppi’s ‘South Africanaess,’ each utilising in different ways the notions of fantasy and identification, and ‘conditions of possibility’ to think through this attainment of ‘South Africanaess.’ Chapter four is primarily concerned with issues of land and the discursive constitution of the site of Oppikoppi, employing Foucault’s (1986) concept of heterotopic space. Here the declaration of the festival site as a national monument in 2009 is brought into critical view. To the question of what has been done to, and done with, the land on which Oppikoppi takes place in order to declare it a ‘national monument,’ we get at least two answers: it has been constructed, on the one hand, as a ‘wild and empty’ space, accompanied by a ‘wild’ mode of conduct, most notably drunkenness; on the other, it has been constituted as a place differentiated from the apartheid past, enabling a subject position opposed to this past. While these two constructions of the land
have condensed into one, they are, on closer inspection, not only separable but also at odds with each other, producing as an effect two positions of subjectivity, and two identifications, equally in conflict. Here psychoanalysis is employed to discern some of the strategies that have come into play in managing this internal conflict of the festival discourse and its psychic registration.

Chapter five takes up the festival’s portrayal of itself as a ‘multicultural’ event. I employ Tony Bennett’s (2002, 1995, 1988) Foucault-inspired concept of the “exhibitionary complex.” Bennett, as we will see in chapter one where I introduce his work, was concerned primarily with the instrumentation of conduct and perception, and he examined the exhibitionary practices of museums as pedagogical technologies through which the lessons of good citizenship have been taught to, and learned by, a problematised sector of society; that is, the museum was proposed by Bennett (1995) as a kind of heterotopic space in the formation of a new kind of society. Bennett’s work has been useful in enabling an analysis of how the lessons of good citizenship have been taught and learned in the context of the festival, particularly with regards to the correct and proper relation of white subjects to musical difference as an object of knowledge staged. I have, however, in putting Bennett’s concept to work in the context of festival, shifted and widened the focus. Taking seriously Bennett’s (1988) argument that the exhibitionary complex is a nationalising and modernising technology of the imagination of a society, I have looked not only at the instrumentation of conduct and perception, but also at how the festival’s exhibition of ‘musical diversity’ has worked to educate the desire of the festival crowd. The exhibitionary complex is paired here with a psychoanalytically informed notion of fantasy; this, as noted above, being precisely one function ascribed to fantasy in psychoanalytic theory, the education of desire.

Chapter six engages Freud’s (1923, 1921, 1917) concept of melancholia as well as his (1914) distinction between remembering, repeating and working-through in order to think through Oppikoppi’s relation to the apartheid past. Here the ironic self-parody that has become a regular feature of the festival is brought into critical focus and read as a form of melancholic self-beratement that has its aetiology in the loss of apartheid. And here too there are preoccupations with South Africanness. As we will see, while parody is most frequently taken to be deconstructive, carnivalesque or, at least, subversive, there is a strategy of conservation at work here, too. One of the key questions I address in this chapter is whether or not this self-
parody, as a form of melancholia, enables a working-through of the past, or amounts simply to a “form of involuntary, blind identification with the dead” (Rose, 2003, p. 75).

There is, in this division of chapters, a loose periodisation, with chapter four primarily concerned with the early days of the event, chapter five with the late-1990s, and chapter six with more recent developments. While it would be a mistake to be too rigid in framing this as a sequential development – all of the themes discussed have, from the start, been at work in the discourse of the festival, and each continues, however faintly, to exert a force over the meaning given to the event by the organisers, its critics, its supporters, musicians, bloggers, journalists, and the people who attend it – this periodisation is also crucial. We are not dealing here with the same festival over 17 years. What the festival was in the 1990s is not what it is in 2011, even though it bears the same name, and takes place on the same site. Oppikoppi, in other words, has changed, and this division of the chapters draws out some of the event’s transformations.
1

POST-APARTHEID ADMITTANCE

The stain of whiteness and the work of South Africanness

Introduction

Privilege as the stain of whiteness

I noted above the work of Goldberg (2009), who suggests that white South Africans’ sense of belonging in, and to, the South African nation has not yet, or not sufficiently, been put into question. Indeed, Goldberg compellingly argues that apartheid has not disappeared since 1994, that it has mutated from a race apartheid into a neoliberal class apartheid, enabling white South Africans to maintain the privileged lifestyles afforded by the apartheid regime, living out their days in luxury and political amnesia. Yet, is it not precisely this illegitimate racialised privilege that comes to disqualify white people as ‘South Africans’? Is it not this privilege that produces the internal contradiction and psychic conflict – if not the impossibility – of ‘white post-apartheid South Africanness’? To invoke, and twist slightly, the anti-apartheid utopian writings of Rick Turner (1980), does white privilege not still constitute ‘the eye of the needle’ through which it must pass in becoming ‘properly South African’?

The problem of white privilege reared its head in a recent debate that centred on an academic article written by Rhodes University (RU) philosopher, Samantha Vice (2010), titled, ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ Vice’s article – or, rather, summaries of it, accompanied by comment and criticism – inadvertently found its way into the pages of two national weekly newspapers. And it caused an outrage; it was greeted with hostility and, in certain instances, with violence, sending people into tirades, inviting her to commit suicide, attacking her character and professional competence. In the wake of the public reaction, a special issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy (SAJP) was devoted entirely to a discussion of her paper. I outline the broad strokes of her argument below as

20 It was Eusebius McKaiser who first brought Vice’s work into the public when he wrote articles about it the Mail & Guardian and Beeld.
well as some of the responses to her ideas as the issues raised in the debate resonate strongly with the central concerns of this study.

Vice explored the moral quandaries of living as a white South African in a place ‘strange’ in that it is, as one commentator in the SAJP put it, “formally post-apartheid, but still profoundly shaped by the legacy of white domination, both in its enduring socio-economic structures and in its citizens’ typical moral psychologies” (Mills, 2011, p. 428). A key node of focus in her paper, and in the debate that followed it, was this relation between ‘enduring socio-economic structures’ and the ‘psychic life of whiteness,’ the extent to which the latter is determined by the former, and the potential for change in both spheres. In this context, Vice asked the questions, “What is the morally appropriate reaction to one’s situation of privilege? Is it possible to live well?” (p. 323)

Her answer to her second question – ‘Is it possible to live well?’ – at least one answer, is that the only ethical choice for white South Africans is to acknowledge that they are not, and could never have been, ethical; by virtue of structural inequalities, a long history of racial oppression and one’s placement within a social world that not only favours, but continues to normalise the particularities of whiteness – these norms working as the taken for granted, invisible assumptions through which one is given unearned privileges – an ethical life has been, and continues to be, an impossibility. Thus, to acknowledge this impossibility of being ethical is, paradoxically, the ethical choice, and “one’s best moral response is to recognize and feel one’s ongoing complicity with wrong” (Vice, 2010, p. 333).

In these moments of her paper, Vice homogenises whiteness, denying attempts at white exceptionalism (see also Truscott & Marx, 2011; Hook, 2010; Biko, 1978 on the homogenisation of whiteness) – whether in distinctions between oppressor and beneficiary (cf. Mills, 2011; Hurst, 2011), between English and Afrikaans-speaking South African whiteness or any other distinguishing factor (e.g. sincerity, having one’s heart in the right place, being ‘politically progressive’ and so on). And she does so precisely because “whites still have economic and social power, which infects every encounter” (Vice, 2010, p. 338). This offended and frustrated at least a good few white South Africans invested in occupying the moral high ground of a virtuous, ethical whiteness – and here I am referring specifically to the newspaper readers who, for the most part, didn’t read the original article.

But Vice suggested, furthermore, that this paradox ought to be psychically registered in shame; that is, ongoing complicity should be ‘recognised and felt’ as shameful. As Vice put it,
on account of ongoing inequality and white privilege, “it is unlikely that a white South African will be in a situation in which shame is not called for” (p. 332). The white subject, Vice argued, is structurally determined by a history of inequality, and so too are its ethical dilemmas. The position in which white people find themselves may not be of their choosing, and they may not agree with the effects of the system in which they live – indeed, she is concerned primarily with those who explicitly disagree with racial inequalities – but shame is, nonetheless, what one ought to feel. As Vice stated, “The continuing insistence that it is, if not impossible, an unfair or perhaps supererogatory position to be in, depends on not taking seriously enough how one’s sense of self can be infected by one’s recognition of continuing privilege” (p. 328).

It was not, however, strictly speaking, privilege that Vice problematised. In a term she borrowed from Paul Taylor and Marilyn Frye, it was ‘whiteliness,’ Vice argued, for which white people should feel shame; in recognising privilege, one recognises, also, one’s whiteliness: the habituated psychic and somatic patterns of response, modes of perception, feeling and thinking into which one has been inducted by privilege. Taking this a step further, Vice suggested that white people should not only feel shame for their bad whitely habits, they ought to withdraw from public, political spaces, be more silent and cultivate an attitude of humility.

Our thoughts are heavy with whitely assumptions, and so they would be morally risky, at best, to utter publicly in as racially charged a space as South Africa. Given the necessary self-vigilance and double thinking imposed by knowledge of whiteliness, being careful in this context does not seem cowardly or disengaged. Rather, the care stems from a recognition of the moral complexities and potential for mistakes, which would entrench the very habits from which one is trying to become disentangled (Vice, 2010, p. 334).

This withdrawal from public, Vice suggested, a withdrawal into silence to reflect and work on one’s whitely habits, on one’s white self, which is to be taken as a problem, is aimed at “liberating it, improving it or restraining it” (p. 339).

For white South Africans, work on the self, done in humility and silence, might indicate the recognition that any voice in the public sphere would inevitably be tainted by the vicious features of whiteliness. It might also be one way of saying that I am not merely a product of what is worst about me and a refusal, finally, to be fully defined by it (Vice, 2010, p. 340).
This withdrawal offers, Vice stated, a way for whites “to make themselves invisible and unheard, concentrating rather on those damaged selves” (p. 335). As Alison Bailey (2011) observed, Vice takes seriously here Steve Biko’s (1978) assertion – made during apartheid, though it remains relevant – that the real problem with South Africa is white racism, and that before meddling with the business of blacks, whites ought to address their own house. We see here, too, how her argument changes tack quite radically: the white subject is not structurally determined, is not merely a ‘damaged product’ of an unjust society, but is capable of changing itself.\(^2\) She thus also argued that the possibility of ‘living well’ lies not only in admitting that one cannot live well; one can actually change and become virtuous, but this change requires intense work. Privilege and the whiteliness it has engendered is what, for Vice, ‘stains’ whiteness – in his commentary on Vice’s article, Bruce Janz (2011) frames it as an ‘original sin’ in South African whiteness – and it is shame, withdrawal, silence and invisibility that Vice proposes as the ethically appropriate response to this ‘contamination’ of, and damage to, one’s self. And it is on these things – shame, withdrawal, silence and invisibility – that Vice hangs white salvation, its redemption from the past and its legacy.

Her argument received respectful scholarly consideration and criticism, but it also, as noted above, wound up on the sharp end of a public outcry. For a large portion of white South Africa, shame or guilt over the past are not features of their experience, at least not at a manifest or ‘conscious’ level; the time for shame and guilt, they say – and they say loudly – is over. “You will never get an apology from me,” they say, “I matriculated in 1994 and that wasn’t because P.W. Botha made it easy for me. It was because my parents instilled values and a work ethic in me.”\(^2\) In light of the ongoing economic inequalities of post-apartheid South Africa, of vast disparities that continue to run along racial lines (see Terreblanche, 2002, though this ubiquitous fact hardly requires motivation) – and notwithstanding the narcissistic secondary gains accrued in post-apartheid spectacles of ‘promiscuous white shame’ (Straker 2011) and ‘mimed affect’

\(^2\) She preserves here an “essentially private self, some core, which it is the very concern of all political and social philosophies to protect” (p. 339). In my view this weakens her argument regarding the recognition of privilege and whiteliness, opening the door for white exceptionalism, and for virtuous whiteness.

(Hook, 2011) – Vice is perhaps correct in lamenting the absence of white shame, an absence that must surely require a massive effort of disavowal in order not to acknowledge the legacy of the apartheid and colonial pasts.

Vice has, no doubt, “touched a nerve,” as she put it in a response article in the *Mail & Guardian* (Vice, 2011); she has set off white South Africans’ defences. But her argument is not itself undefensive, or without its blind spots. One of the main criticisms of her suggestions was that her shame, silence, withdrawal and invisibility, while part of a project of disentangling oneself from whitely habits, may potentially be perceived as a characteristically whitely thing to do. Bailey (2011) notes, “Humility and silence are introduced both as non-whitely responses to collective white shame and as restraints on white solipsism, but her account of how white selves should animate these virtues strikes me as solitary, non-relational, and perhaps whitely” (p. 477; cf. Vice, 2010, p. 336). Likewise, Andrea Hurst (2011) refers to Vice’s suggested withdrawal as a “whites only” affair (p. 488), a kind of re-enactment of the past she wants to get untangled from (see also McKaiser, 2011).

The project of shame, withdrawal and silence, to reiterate the point, is instrumental for Vice in declaring “I am *not* merely a product of what is worst about me and a refusal, finally, to be fully defined by it” (Vice, 2010, p. 340, emphasis added). Picking up on these negative assertions, Derek Hook (2011) suggested, drawing on Freud’s (1925) notion of negation, that, as in the proverbial case of a young man who insists ‘I am nothing like my father,’ an analyst is justified in suspecting that such negated identifications indicate that an identification is in fact still firmly in place, and that it will persist, its tenacity proportionate to the energy with which it is denied (p. 500).

Indeed, if, as Freud (1925) put it, “A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression” (p. 438), do these negations of whiteness not sustain an ‘unconscious’ identification with it? Hook suggests that this may in fact be the case, proposing another

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23 While McKaiser (2011) acknowledged that it is an *active* silence Vice has promoted, a way of living reflexively, aware of unearned privileges, that it is a way of listening and letting others speak, rather than drowning out other voices, he finds it difficult to draw the line on what constitutes a ‘political space’ from which whites should withdraw. Are the home and the university not also racialised spaces, he asks, and should whites withdraw from these spaces, too? There are no ‘pre-political spaces’ in South Africa, McKaiser argues; apartheid has saturated all places, and whites should be prepared to make mistakes, to reveal their prejudices, in *a relation to, and with, other South Africans*, as carefully as they can (McKaiser, 2011).
route might be taken, that of ‘over-identification,’ to fully acknowledge the extent to which the white subject is determined and damaged by an unjust society, “to ‘go all the way,’” to embrace it fully, to accept that it lies at the very heart of one’s subjectivity, that it is foundational to who one is,” thereby enabling one to “lessen the stranglehold of this influence,” and work-through the past (p. 500).

The issues raised in ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ and the debate around it – withdrawal, withdrawal in order to correct the bad perceptual, cognitive, affective and behavioural habits of whiteness, shame and guilt, their configuration and absence in post-apartheid whiteness, the negation of whiteness in order to disentangle the white subject from the past, and an over-identification with what is most problematic about South African whiteness in order to achieve the same effect – all of these things appear in the discourse of Oppikoppi music festival, and will be taken up in chapters four, five and six.

It needs to be emphasised, though, that the debate raised by Vice is by no means only a recent issue in post-apartheid South Africa; since 1994, and then with intensity from 1996 onwards – the time of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – whiteness and its privileges in South Africa have been un-settled.24 Most critics of post-apartheid racial politics would argue it has not been un-settled enough. We can say, though, with little doubt, that white South Africans have not been – to borrow a term Rey Chow (1999) has proposed in the context of postcolonial community formation – ‘admitted’ to the post-apartheid national community unconditionally. Indeed, Chow’s essay, ‘The Politics of Admittance,’ frames the problem here well, differentiating between three levels of admittance: firstly, “admittance in the most physical sense of letting enter,” bringing to the fore issues of spatial mobility; secondly, admittance “closely connected with recognition and acknowledgement,” that is, in the more abstract sense of a validation; and thirdly, “admittance in the sense of a confession – such as the admittance of a crime,” entailing a reconciliatory submission to the rules of society or an acknowledgement of the law (p. 35).

There have been no significant physical restrictions on white post-apartheid admittance; the negotiated settlement out of which the post-apartheid nation was formed ensured this, although many white South Africans have, despite this lack of physical restriction, emigrated or

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24 As the references to Biko (1978) and Turner (1980) make clear, whiteness was unsettled even during apartheid. In later chapters, specifically chapter two, I look at other movements that assumed an oppositional stance against the apartheid government.
otherwise withdrawn into privatised enclaves (Durrheim, 2005; Ballard, 2004; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Steyn, 2001), as I discuss in chapter two. At the latter, related two levels, though, there have been certain requirements, and this is particularly true for Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa. As Mads Vestergaard (2001) has suggested, for Afrikaners “there is a requirement that they prove their loyalty to the new South Africa” (p. 39). From the discussion thus far we might say that this ‘proof of loyalty to the new South Africa’ consists of a recognition of the injustices of the past, as well as a disentanglement from the past; we might also say that the conflict engendered here is that to recognise the past as an injustice, as an Afrikaner, is to recognise oneself as stained by history.

It was Afrikaans author, poet and journalist, Antje Krog (1998) who first got into the tensions of this conflict – between Afrikanerness and post-apartheid South Africanness – when she asked in her account of the TRC, Country of My Skull, “How do I live with the fact that all the words used to humiliate, all the orders given to kill, belonged to the language of my heart?” (p. 238). To continue to identify as an Afrikaner in post-apartheid South Africa is to be located in a language of domination; but to vacate an Afrikaner identity amounts to an alienation from the world as it has been known and the loss of a coherent sense of self. Krog explored this conflict in the context of the TRC through her intimacy and complicity with the men who were on trial, the Afrikaner perpetrators. “They are as familiar,” Krog stated, “as my brothers, cousins and school friends. Between us all distance is erased. Was there perhaps never a distance except the one I have built up with great effort within myself over the years” (p. 96). She wrote angrily against the unrepentant leader of the National Party at the time, identifying, rather, with those who testified before the TRC, even if for horrific things. “We are so utterly sorry. We are deeply ashamed and gripped with remorse. But hear us, we are from here. We will live it right – here – with you, for you” (p. 99).

In her commentary on Krog’s book, in an essay titled, ‘Secrets and Lies,’ Sarah Nuttall (2009) argues that the negotiated settlement out which the post-apartheid nation emerged has produced forms of narration “embedded in an epistemology of truth, lies and confession, shaped in large part in relation to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation commission, but also extending backwards in time” (p. 82) – indeed, Jeremy Wanderer (2011) views Vice’s ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ as a piece of confessional writing. Nuttall notes how in Krog’s narrative the conditions of her belonging in, and to,
post-apartheid South Africa are presented in an “economy of looking and watching” (p. 60). The conditions of Krog’s belonging are constructed, Nuttall suggests, as being dependent on the gaze of black South Africans; as she puts it, “the activity of self disclosure takes place in terms of another, in relation to others, even to an Other” (p. 72). It is by black South Africans that she will be granted admission to the post-apartheid nation, and, as Nuttall words it, “Until it is given, she faces the possibility of privilege without belonging” (p. 68).

Far more than Vice, Krog’s belonging entails a dimension of relationality, indeed of relatedness, without which there is no possibility of belonging. For Krog, “Privilege is something that has to be paid for, and is also something, in its structural white form, which will end” (Nuttall, 2009, p. 69). It is on this ending, on the recognition of its illegitimacy, which undoes the white subject, changes who they have been, that belonging depends (Nuttall, 2009). This is what Nuttall designates an “epistemological tactic of the self” (p. 72), the form in which the white self presents itself as an object of knowledge – to itself, to others and to an Other – and it is in this form, at least in this specific text, that the white self belonging in, and to, the post-apartheid nation is both problematised and admitted.

Nuttall concludes her reading of various autobiographical narratives by pointing out that “those who have been afforded privilege and power, including those who want to forgo the latter, have found themselves inhabiting a realm of secret life, which is at times manifest, but often latent, in their self representations” (p. 74). The circuit of gazes – whites watching blacks watching whites, as Nuttall has it – cannot capture fully all complicity with, and benefit from, apartheid that is confessed, producing, as an excess, “secrets and lies” (p. 58), which themselves become shameful – the skin rash Krog developed during the TRC, for example, as Nuttall suggests – and offer a kind of ‘symptomatic confession.’ Nuttall’s work is usefully put into conversation with the lack of shame Vice criticises. Indeed, it is quite possible that Vice is only right in part about an absence of shame, and it is, as Nuttall suggests, an absence, rather, of manifest shame, of shame as shame.

25 In the passage on which Nuttall (2009) focuses, Krog (1998) is most concerned with Winnie Mandela’s appearance before the commission, the meaning of her failure to show sincere remorse before the commission and what Winnie Mandela’s testimony might mean, more generally, for all post-apartheid South Africans. This is the passage Nuttall is concerned with: “This hearing is about my country, I am thinking. And whether there is space for all of us. And the conditions of this space. I also have a distinct feeling that for now this hearing has nothing to do with me, with whites. Blacks are deciding amongst themselves what they regard as right or wrong. They are making that decision here, today” (Krog, 1998, p. 258).
Krog and Vice have each offered ways of living ethically as post-apartheid white ‘South Africans,’ both deeply personal, both entailing shame and admittance in the third confessional sense Chow (1999) outlines, both of which have, in different ways, captured public attention and provoked comment. Krog and Vice, however, are not alone; there have been various ways proposed for white South Africans to be admitted to the post-apartheid national community, to become ‘South African.’ And to these other ways we could pose the same and similar questions regarding privilege, recognition of the injustices of the past, shame, guilt and withdrawal. Let me now turn to Oppikoppi music festival, which itself has proposed, in however an under-coordinated way, a means for white South Africans to become ‘South African.’

**Oppikoppi: ‘a kind of holy land, a Mecca’**

Originally intended as a “vakansie oord” [holiday resort], the farm on which the festival is held was bought by the Bornmann family in 1992 “om weg van alles te kry [to get away from everything],” at a moment when the country was on the brink of drastic and inevitable political change. Although there were quite fundamental departures from this original intention for the farm in the years that followed, the early festivals conjured a withdrawal into the platteland (rural areas, countryside, farmlands) – “absolute escapism,” as festival organiser, Carel Hoffman, has put it in reflecting on the early events on the farm. The festival began at the time of the end of official apartheid; as such, it is as old as the post-apartheid nation; but it was also born during the burial of the apartheid past, which haunts it, as it haunts the post-apartheid nation. The festival was initially a predominantly rock music festival; and although it has, from 1998 onwards, hosted multiple genres of music at each event, from hip hop, blues, jazz, folk, to various kinds of electronic music and metal, and is now attended by an increasingly diverse

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26 Boors Bornmann put it this way sitting discussing the festival when interviewed October 2009 at the farm.
28 Official apartheid was near its end and, while talks towards a negotiated settlement had already begun in Kempton Park in late 1991, the all-white referendum in March 1992 saw an overwhelming majority vote for the government to continue with talks, and the second round of negotiations began in May 1992.
crowd of young South Africans, it continues to attract young Afrikaner followers of rock music. Indeed, the crowd is still predominantly white and Afrikaans-speaking.\(^{30}\)

The first official festival was held from the 4\(^{th}\) to the 6\(^{th}\) of August 1995. This first festival was preceded, though, by several semi-private events, ‘band weekends,’ as they came to be known. In late 1993, Afrikaans musician, Koos Kombuis – then famous for being part of the anti-apartheid Voëlvry movement, to which I turn in more detail in chapters two, four and six – and his manager, Dagga-Dirk Uys were in the nearby town of Thabazimbi at the local rugby club, where Kombuis had just played a poorly attended show. While packing up, Uys received a telephone call from Tes Bornmann, asking if they would be willing to meet on their way back to Johannesburg to discuss a performance at their guesthouse, Oppikoppi. Kombuis and Uys were sceptical about the possibility of anything good coming out of the meeting.\(^{31}\) But they met the Bornmanns and took an instant liking to them, and they fell in love with the place. The first band weekend was held on 21 May 1994, less than a month after South Africa’s first democratic election, with Kombuis and Valiant Swart performing for a crowd of roughly 150 people, mostly students from the University of Pretoria (UP) and a few of the district locals.\(^{32}\)

The following year attendance swelled to around 2000 people, and 27 South African bands played; the year after that to 6000, to 10 000 in 1997 and 14 000 in 1998 (Saayman & Kohrs, 2006). As Kombuis has stated, “Vir ons het Oppikoppi alte gou ‘n sort heiligdom geword, ‘n Mekka [For us Oppikoppi all too quickly became a kind of holy land, a Mecca].”\(^{33}\) Despite this rapid growth, the trope of a withdrawal from everyday life continued to give shape to the festival, in Kombuis’ words, “Dit was vir ons ‘n wegkomskans van die stad af, niks anders nie [It was for us a place to get away from the city, nothing more],” “‘n wegruipplek vir eks-Alternatiewe Afrikaanse jongmense [a hiding place for the ex-Alternative Afrikaner youth].”\(^{34}\)

Although it has been said that “there is nothing spectacular about the location – just dusty roads

\(^{30}\) In a study by Saayman & Kohrs (2006), they determined that approximately 62 percent of the people who attended the festival were Afrikaans speaking, while the previous year, approximately 82 percent were Afrikaans speaking. In a more recent study, 72 percent of festival goers who participated in Kruger and Saayman’s (2009) study of Oppikoppi were Afrikaans-speaking. It was presumed in these studies that there is a negligible number of ‘non-whites’ who attend Oppikoppi.


\(^{32}\) Ibid.


\(^{34}\) Ibid.
and thorn trees as far as the eye can see” — it is precisely this, its desolate beauty, that forms a part of the allure of the farm to which thousands of young, predominantly white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans have made an annual pilgrimage a “soul cleansing hajj” into the platteland. And the link here to the stain of whiteliness, and the withdrawal in order to cleanse it that Vice has proposed, should not be lost, and will be picked up in the chapters that follow, particularly in chapter five.

After the festival in August, 2000, ‘Trek 2000,’ held on the farm outside Northam, the festival was moved to Fountains Valley for the 2001 and 2002 events, to a campsite on the outskirts of Pretoria, beneath the Voortrekker Monument, about which more will be said in chapter two. The events at Fountains Valley were aimed at attracting a wider and more diverse audience. After two years of successful festivals at this site — successful in terms of attendance — it was decided, after an online vote, that Oppikoppi would return to the farm for good. In 2004, with considerable corporate sponsorship, permanent stages were erected and the infrastructure on the farm improved. As in the 1990s, the festival withdrew to the platteland once more in 2003, but this time as a self-conscious re-enactment of the 1990s withdrawal.

I have already pointed in the direction of my questioning in this study, and in the chapters that follow I pose more specific questions about this festival, but it is worth asking a quite simple one at this point. Why does this ‘South African’ festival take place on a farm? Or, rather, how can it? If Afrikaans is, for some, the ‘language of their heart,’ as Krog put it, the farm is for many Afrikaners a heartland, a place of passionate attachment. However, the farm, as Allen Feldman (2003) has shown, also has strong historical associations with not only the pastoral power of colonialism and apartheid, of black labour being paternalistically ruled over and violently disciplined, but also with the apartheid-era interrogation, torture and execution of suspected anti-apartheid terrorists – interrogation, torture and execution frequently accompanied

34 ‘Thousands to play it by ear at Oppikoppi music fest’, Cape Argus 29 July, 1999. Carel Hoffmann was interviewed for this article. Hoffmann has referred to it this way several times, but this is the first time he is on record using this description of the festival.
37 Despite the unanimous vote in favour of a return to the farm, attendance at the August 2003 festival slumped to 8000, from 12 000 the previous year when held in Fountains Valley, Pretoria.
38 The year of its 10th anniversary, 2004, 15 000 attended, the following year 12 000 and in 2006 10 000 attended (Saayman & Kohrs, 2006). Since 2006, it has slowly increased its numbers until, in August 2010, for the first time, the festival reached capacity and sold out.
by a *braai* (barbeque) as part of an animalisation and dehumanisation of the victim. While the trace of colonialism and apartheid has been left in all spaces of South Africa, the farm is particularly blood stained: “A sick place of this type is embedded with its own memories, affective residues of excessive violence and negativity that have occurred there. Consequently, until they are healed, such sites exist outside of historical time” (p. 258). That this would be the site of the ritual – we might even say compulsive – return for the festival seems significant. Why the farm, of all places? Can the farm, a place loaded with historical trauma, be made to mean differently? Can it be healed? Feldman is not altogether optimistic: “There can be no new beginnings at such locations, no reorigination of identity and purpose, since only the violent past circulates there” (p. 258). The festival, as noted above, has been represented by its organisers as a ‘soul cleansing *hajj*’ and we might ask here, in Feldman’s terms, to what extent the festival enables a ‘reorigination of identity and purpose’?

There is very little academic research on Oppikoppi with which to begin responding to this question. There has, however, been much media commentary on the event. If we consider how the festival grew into an annual withdrawal from everyday life, we gain some indication of the possible strategic use of the festival in providing relief, for a particular sector of the white Afrikaner population, from a rapidly transforming South Africa, from the unsettling changes that were taking place. This is a line of criticism that has been picked up in debates on the festival’s politics, which have circled two related issues. Firstly, that it is a racially separatist event – “*wit mense net waar jy kyk* [white people wherever you look],” as journalist, Pieter Redelinghuys put it. And secondly, the fact that the festival takes place on a farm in the *platteland* – a space in the post-apartheid imaginary that has not only a violent past, but is retrospective and regressive – is an issue that is problematised. But while Oppikoppi has been criticised, it has also, as noted in the introduction to this study, been celebrated as a ‘truly South African’ event. A central concern here, as discussed above, has been how this festival has managed to assume this place, as well as the effects – social and psychic – of this place it occupies.

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39 Indeed, as Feldman argues, the two cannot be understood separately as the ritual torture involving the *braai* “was combined with overt rituals of labour service and structural nostalgia in which the prisoners prepared the *braai* that would later be used for their own torture” (p. 251).
40 There are two studies on Oppikoppi (Kruger & Saayman, 2009; Saayman & Kohrs, 2006) conducted from the discipline of tourism studies. They have been written with vastly different assumptions and objectives to this study and they are of little relevance to the questions posed here.
41 Pieter Redelinghuys, ‘*Dit Ruk Dat Dit Rol,*’ *Insig,* September 1999.
Let me now turn to a discussion of Freud and Foucault’s writing on festivals which have helped to take up the themes raised thus far.

**Freud and Foucault on festivals**

**Festivals, forbidden wishes and the work of their disguise**

If, in their most basic forms, fantasies are wishful distortions, how can this formulation be linked to a theory of festivals and their psychosocial function? In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud (1921) wrote of festivals when he noted,

> In all renunciations and limitations imposed upon the ego a periodical infringement of the prohibition is the rule; this indeed is shown by the institution of festivals, which in origin are nothing less nor more than *excesses provided by law* and which owe their cheerful character to the release which they bring. The Saturnalia of the Romans and our modern carnival agree in this essential feature with the festivals of primitive people, which usually end in debaucheries of every kind and the transgression of what are at other times the most sacred commandments. But the ego ideal comprises the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has to acquiesce, and for that reason the abrogation of the ideal would necessarily be a magnificent festival for the ego, which might then once again feel satisfied with itself (p. 81, emphasis added).

Festivals enable momentary respite from the commandments of society, Freud argued, and this takes place under a socially sanctioned relaxation of the law at festivals; that is, festivals are ‘excesses provided by the law.’ In this regard, Michael Billig (2005) has suggested, with reference to Freud’s (1913) *Totem and Taboo*, that “During the festive time, prohibitions that are strictly enforced for the rest of the year are lifted. Authorities are mocked, rules flouted and social conventions are broken – and all this is done in obedience with the social imperatives of the festival” (p. 155). Here Billig, it should be noted, was concerned primarily with Freud’s writing on jokes and, through jokes, dreams, which he links to festivals; as Billig suggests, jokes work like a “mini-festival, lifting customary restrictions for a very brief moment during the course of social interaction” (p. 155).

Two points Billig raises are useful here. Firstly, he refers to jokes as a “mirror image of a culture’s sense of morality” (p. 154). Relating this to festivals, the excesses one sees are only

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42 Freud’s reference here to ‘primitive people’ makes this a passage difficult not to dismiss out of hand. I don’t think any amount of rationalising ‘the language of time’ is in order.
that, *excessive*, in relation to the commandments of society; what one is able to read in a festival discourse is not anomy, then, but the conditions of social belonging, inverted during the temporary respite they provide; one can discern in them, in other words, what is forbidden in a given society, what can only be done outside the ‘real world,’ what can only be joked about or dreamt of; at least that is the idea, that festivals are a repository for the wishes of a rebellious unconscious (Billig, 2005). Secondly, and complicating this first point – because, lets face it, if festivals ever did work like this they certainly don’t anymore – Billig notes that, just as Freud (1900) spoke of dream-work in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, work whereby forbidden wishes are disguised, he also spoke of joke-work in *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905), whose mechanisms of condensation and displacement are comparable to that of dream-work. And this has implications for an analysis of a festival discourse: simply put, while festivals permit social transgression, that transgression requires disguise; festivals, in other words, are not sites of unbridled forbidden wish fulfilment. Let me explore this idea in a little more detail.

Freud’s (1900) central argument is that a dream is a kind of wish fulfilment. In dreams, residual thoughts from the previous day, together with old memories quite accessible to consciousness, are “forced out of consciousness, drawn into the unconscious – that is, submitted to the laws of the primary process” (Žižek, 1989, p. 4). It is precisely the banality of these residual thoughts and memories that makes them an inconspicuous surrogate in which to lodge a forbidden wish and escape censorship. That is to say, the dream-work transforms a forbidden thought into the more agreeable manifest-content of a dream. It does this work, primarily, through the processes of “condensation” (Freud, 1900, pp. 122-136) and “displacement” (pp. 137-158).

Regarding condensation, Freud notes how dream-content is “meagre, paltry and laconic in comparison with the range and copiousness of the dream-thoughts” (p. 122). From this difference he concludes that “the disproportion between dream-content and dream-thoughts justifies the conclusion that a considerable condensation of psychic material occurs in the formation of dreams” (p. 123). That is, various dream-thoughts converge in a single feature of a dream, amongst these not only banal thoughts from the previous day, but also one or more forbidden dream-thoughts. Condensation, then, is a kind of distortion, a cover for a forbidden dream-thought. Under the force of displacement, dream-thoughts are lodged, inconspicuously, in various, frequently minor elements of the manifest-content of a dream, thus disguising a
forbidden wish. Displacement occurs on the grounds of similarity and contiguity; that is, a dream-thought can be dispersed to a peripheral element of the dream, provided that that element is associatively linked by similarity or proximity. Displacement works by substituting an element acceptable to psychic censorship for one which is unacceptable; that is, it replaces an element which stands for the memory of an unacceptable wish or its gratification, with one which is harmless according to social and cultural norms, and it treats the replacement as the original, as being identical with it.

Translating condensation into the terms of semiology, Kaja Silverman (1983) states, “Each manifest signifier refers to a group of latent signifieds” (p. 90), with various lines of signification being compressed into a single figure of the manifest-content of a text. A similar notion can be set to work in reading the displacements that occur in a text, paying attention to the form of statements. The unconscious, in this sense, lies in the possibility of a latent signification – either embedded in a cluster of condensed significatory possibilities, or displaced to some seemingly insignificant element of a statement – becoming, retroactively, libidinalised. It needs to be emphasised here that, in the tradition I have employed psychoanalysis, the unconscious is located not in the minds of subjects, but in the overdetermination of language. A return to Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* and their link to Freud’s writing on festivals, provides a useful methodological resource in setting to work the notion of the overdetermination of texts in their condensations and displacements, thereby being able to conduct a reading that deciphers the symptomatic distortions of cultural texts.

This discussion of festivals in *Group Psychology*, however, takes place – as the second part of Freud’s title suggests – within the context of his analysis of the ego. The section in which the festival appears begins by picking up a problem, Freud states, he was unable to solve elsewhere, in his paper, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (Freud, 1917). Freud puts the problem into the terms of his second topography – the ego, the id and the super-ego – in that what he is concerned with here are the conflicts the ego faces between these different psychic agencies, within the libidinal structure of the group. Within a group each ego is bound together inasmuch

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43 As an example Freud (1921) uses, if one is scolded in a dream, and if it appears that there could not possibly be the gratification of a wish, one may in fact derive a kind of satisfaction from assuming the place of someone who has done something so forbidden that it deserves this harsh punishment. In this way, the wish to act in a particular way is displaced into the punishment for it, enabling the fulfillment of a forbidden wish.

44 The Lacanian position here would be to posit a correspondence between condensation and displacement, on the one hand, and metaphor and metonymy on the other (Jacobson’s development of Saussurian combination and selection) (see Thom, 2003). I have not followed this approach here, though it is worth noting.
as the same ego ideal has been taken; that is, inasmuch as there has taken place a common identification with an ideal (Freud, 1921). Thus, group life requires a close approximation of each ego with the ideal, which becomes the measure of the ego; too great a separation of the ego from the ego ideal produces a conflict of guilt and a feeling of inferiority, while a close and strict approximation frustrates the id (Freud, 1921). Freud puts this in terms of his first topography – the unconscious (\(U_{cs}\)), pre-conscious (\(P_{cs}\)) and conscious (\(C_{s}\)) systems – highlighting another aspect, that identification with a common ego ideal imposes certain limitations, makes necessary certain renunciations, which become the conditions of group belonging, producing an unconscious afterlife for what is forbidden. And, as Freud puts it, “In dreams and in neuroses what is thus excluded knocks for admission at the gates, guarded though they are by resistances” (p. 80, emphasis added). We might say here, too, that what is forbidden, what must be given up, ‘knocks for admission’ at the gates of festivals. Under the relaxation of the law at festivals precisely what must be relinquished as the condition of group belonging can be admitted, providing a temporary and sanctioned separation of the ego from the ideal.

As noted above, though, the expression of forbidden wishes – wishes forbidden by post-apartheid admission, for instance – allowed as ‘excesses provided by the law,’ still require the work of disguise. Whether or not it is justified in building on the ideas of dream-work and joke-work to speak of festival-work is not exactly the point here; rather, Freud’s writing on festivals, and the relating of festivals to jokes, and through jokes to dreams, puts centre stage the notions of forbidden wishes and the work by which they are disguised. Indeed, as Ricoeur (1970) has suggested, the psychoanalysis of culture is a “submodel of wish-fulfillment” (p. 154), and what one reads in a psychoanalytic archaeology is the forbidden wishes ‘buried’ in a set of condensations and displacements. To situate Freud’s thinking on festivals within this wider theoretical context is enabling of the analysis, but it also marks certain limits of the knowledge produced here. As Ricoeur puts it, psychoanalysis “knows cultural phenomena only as analogues of the wish fulfillment illustrated by dreams” (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 154, emphasis added).

If we consider the formulation of jokes proposed above, they are not simply the means for a happy release of tension, but are taken to be a site of conflict between social law and its disguised transgression (Billig, 2005; Freud, 1905). And the festival can be framed in a similar

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\(^{45}\) Attesting to this tension of jokes, Freud (1905) states, “If one has occasion to make the acquaintance of one of those people who, though not remarkable in other ways, are well known in their circles as jokers and originators of
way. As the chapters that follow argue, there has been, in the relation between the festival and everyday post-apartheid life, and between the demarcated time and place of the festival and its constitutive outsides, both transgression of, and submission to, the new norms and ideals of the post-apartheid nation – transgressions and submissions that find their correlates in the notions of forbidden wishes and the work of their disguise, respectively. Indeed, Oppikoppi does not simply afford an ‘abrogation of the ideal’ and is not simply a space where societal regulations can be defied; rather, it is a site of multiple conflicts. The situation is further complicated when we consider that it is not only the norms and ideals of the post-apartheid nation that are transgressed at this festival; it is, after all, only 17 years since the end of apartheid and a salient feature of this festival is its transgression of the ideals of the old nation, a kind of transgression that does not in the least conflict with its submission to the ideals of the new nation; indeed, it is a kind of neurotic servitude to the anti-apartheid nation.

We should not lose sight of Freud’s starting point in *Group Psychology* in his discussion of festivals, that of ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ and its central concern with loss. While both mourning and melancholia arise out of a situation of loss, Freud (1921) links festivals with melancholia. As he puts it, “It is not so obvious, but very probable, that the misery of the melancholic is the expression of a sharp conflict between the two agencies of his ego, a conflict in which the ideal, in an excess of sensitiveness, relentlessly exhibits its condemnation of the ego in delusions of inferiority and in self-deprecation. The only question is whether we are to look for the causes of these altered relations between the ego and the ego ideal in the periodic rebellions, which we have postulated above, against the new institution, or whether we are to make other circumstances responsible for them” (Freud, 1921, p. 83).

49 As he puts it, “It is not so obvious, but very probable, that the misery of the melancholic is the expression of a sharp conflict between the two agencies of his ego, a conflict in which the ideal, in an excess of sensitiveness, relentlessly exhibits its condemnation of the ego in delusions of inferiority and in self-deprecation. The only question is whether we are to look for the causes of these altered relations between the ego and the ego ideal in the periodic rebellions, which we have postulated above, against the new institution, or whether we are to make other circumstances responsible for them” (Freud, 1921, p. 83).
was is further complicated as “learning to leave home,” which is a kind of unlearning, of acknowledging the inevitability of the loss of privilege, often produced feelings of betrayal towards parental figures, guilt and fears of ostracism in her respondents. Indeed, it is not a loss clearly articulated by Steyn’s respondents; rather, it is one she reads in the anxieties of their narratives. In the context of the festival – and I explore this in detail in chapter six – it is a loss articulated no more clearly, and one that is figured in the characteristic self-beratement of melancholia, rather than in the grief of mourning.

It should be noted here that the ego Freud had in mind in discussing these ‘periodic rebellions’ was not only the melancholic ego, which he referred to elsewhere as a psycho-neurotic ego (Freud, 1924), an ego that cannot endure the loss of an object, or which endures the loss of an ungrievable object; he also had in mind the neurotically structured ego, indeed, he mentions the place of psychosis in his formulation as well (Freud, 1921, p. 79). Although developed in the clinic and intended for the psychoanalytic treatment of individuals, these categories of psychic structure – neurotic, psychotic, psycho-neurotic – are frequently deployed in analyses of social and cultural phenomena, outside the clinic, enabling a psychic dimension of power to be brought into view through the language of psychoanalysis. Let me provide two illustrative examples in a South African context.

In his essay ‘The Mind of Apartheid,’ J.M. Coetzee (1991) employed a Freudian metaphors of obsessional neurosis to read the texts of Geoffrey Cronjé, the exemplary apartheid ideologue plagued by fears of racial mixing and the contamination of white racial purity. As Coetzee states, “Freud's own analysis of obsessional neurosis provides a framework, even if only a framework of metaphors, within which to conceptualize Cronjé’s horror of blood-mixing” (p. 20). Coetzee begins by pointing out a gap in orthodox historiographical explanations of why apartheid took hold. The standard argument at the time, he notes, was “that apartheid legislation was a by no means irrational response to social developments which threatened the expectations of Afrikaners and the privilege of white South Africans in general” (p. 1). Coetzee proposes that this is exactly what apartheid was: an irrational, indeed, mad project. Coetzee does not deny that apartheid was in large part motivated by a material gain: “It did indeed flower out of self-interest and greed,” he states, “but it also flowered out of desire and out of the hatred of desire” (p. 2, emphasis added). As Hook (2008a) notes in an essay on ‘The Mind of Apartheid’
and its significance for analyses of race and racism post apartheid, “the transactions of reward involved were not only conscious, but also, crucially, unconscious in nature” (p. 21).

In this ‘framework of Freudian metaphors,’ Cronjé’s madness resides, as Coetzee argues, in his “fascination with and reactive horror of the mixed, of the breaking-down of boundaries, the dissolution of difference” (pp. 21-22). Fascination here is crucial for Coetzee’s conceptualisation. In psychoanalytic theory, the characteristic feature of obsessional neurosis is a reaction formation, the turning around of a forbidden wish into its opposite, from which a compromised form of gratification is derived. As Freud (1926) argued, an obsessional symptom is truly successful when it can combine the prohibition of desire with its satisfaction, “and in order to achieve this end it will often make us of the most ingenious associative paths (p. 112, emphasis added). Cronjé’s obsessions with racial purity, with strict prohibitions on racial mixing, in effect conjure precisely this forbidden desire; which is to say that Cronjé is fascinated with precisely what he forbids: mixing, contamination, miscegenation, a “mishmash (mengelmoes) of races” (Cronjé cited in Coetzee, 1991, p. 9). This last part of Freud’s (1926) formulation, italicised above, is exactly what Coetzee focuses on in his reading of Cronjé’s texts: he traces the ‘ingenious associative paths’ of apartheid desire, its condensations and displacements, its metaphoric and metonymic movements, the way Cronjé’s texts are “continually bursting at the seams and leaking” (p. 20) with precisely what is so vehemently denied: desire for the dissolution of difference and “desire of black for white and white for black” (p. 11).

Coetzee’s reading points in a direction of analysis crucial in addressing the ‘persistence of apartheid,’ as Hook (2008a) puts it: if desire was as important as Coetzee argues it was for the establishment of apartheid, it remains equally necessary to understand desire’s displaced routes post apartheid. More recently, Achille Mbembe (2008a) has written of a kind of neurotic architecture, “the architecture of hysteria in contemporary South Africa” (p. 62). Indeed, Mbembe’s use of a clinical category of psychic structure to read the power relations of Johannesburg’s cityscape is not only – like Coetzee’s reading – methodologically instructive; his argument, what he makes of this appropriation, is also of relevance. “It is an architecture,” Mbembe suggests, “characterized by the attachment to a lost object that used to provide comfort. A magic mirror and a specular moment, it allows the white subject to hallucinate the presence of what has been irretrievably lost” (p. 62). While Mbembe views the lost object of the racial city being hysterically refound in the city’s architecture, the irretrievably lost objects of the past are,
in the context of the festival, differently refound and conjured, in different variants of social neurosis and psycho-neurosis. It is worthwhile dwelling here, then, on the difference between neuroses, psychoses, and psycho-neuroses, and the different conflicts each psychic structure entails.

While ‘neurotics,’ ‘psychotics’ and ‘psycho-neurotics’ all face a loss – and all three employ fantasy in different ways – Freud (1924) suggested in his essay, ‘The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis,’ that the psychotic characteristically refuses reality, seeking to reconstruct the external world, deriving ‘hallucinatory gratification’ from this reconstruction. The neurotic, by contrast, acknowledges external reality, indeed submits in servitude to it, only to ‘steal back’ forbidden enjoyment in momentarily ignoring the law (Žižek, 1997) or through symptom formation, from which a compromised form of satisfaction is derived. While the psycho-neuroses occupy the middle ground between neurosis and psychosis. To put this classification into the terms of Freud’s second topography, neurosis is thought to be a conflict between the ego and the id, wherein the ego has submitted to the dictates of the external world, has renounced what is required by the ego-ideal; psychosis is thought to be a conflict between the ego and the external world, faithful to the demands of the id; and psycho-neuroses are thought to entail a conflict between the ego and the super-ego – the super-ego as the psychic representative of the external world, its institutions and its authorities – wherein, although the reality of the external world is refused, frequently the reality of a loss, this reality is not psychotically reconstructed, but, rather, the lost object is installed in the ego through an identification with it.

With these above distinctions in mind, and in using them to think about Oppikoppi, we could ask whether the fantasies constellated in the festival discourse bear a characteristically neurotic, psychotic or psycho-neurotic structure and orientation to the ‘external reality’ of post-apartheid society, and to objects lost in and through the post-apartheid conditions of admittance. While the distinction – neurotic, psychotic, psycho-neurotic – is only useful to a

47 I am aware that neurotic and psycho-neurotic are frequently used interchangeably in psychoanalytic literature; I see it as worthwhile retaining a distinction here, though.

48 Although ‘neurotic,’ ‘psycho-neurotic’ and ‘psychotic’ have a psychopathologising ring, this is not the sense in which I employ these terms. I am more concerned with a qualitative difference in orientation towards social law, and these psychoanalytic categories provide the scaffolding for this sort of analysis.

We could also add to these three categories a fourth, that of ‘the pervert,’ wherein enjoyment is derived precisely from the act of giving up forbidden objects, that is, by conjuring eroticised scenes of prohibition or castration. On the perverted attitude to prohibition and the social law, Žižek (1997) suggests, ‘Here the theoretical
degree outside the clinic in analyses of cultural phenomena, it has provided a degree of structure
to the archaeological analysis of the fantasies of the festival discourse, in distinguishing those
fantasies with an overriding obedience to the social law of the post-apartheid nation, and those
that bear a stubborn faithfulness to the lost objects of the past, despite minimal submission to the
conditions of post-apartheid belonging. The approach I have used here, then, has read not only
the forbidden wishes and the work of distortion they have entailed; it has also been a
symptomatic reading of the festival discourse, discerning the characteristic structure of that wish,
its distortion, and the means of satisfaction it offers, developed out of different relations to the
‘external reality’ of the post-apartheid nation. Let me now turn to Foucault’s writing on
heterotopias.

The festival as a heterotopia
Foucault first used the term heterotopias in the preface to The Order of Things, referring to those
texts that “desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at
its source” (p. xviii). He then proposed heterotopias in a 1966 radio broadcast on the theme of
utopia. Finally, he discussed it in more detail in a 1967 lecture in Paris to a group of architects,
translated into English and published as Of Other Spaces (1986), which is the reference point for
most writing employing the concept. On these two later occasions, Foucault was less concerned
with language and more with space and place, its formalisation and organisation and the
disruption of its ordering principles, of its spatial grammar.

Heterotopias were defined by Foucault (1986) as spaces relationally differentiated from
the rest of the real places in the social world of which they are a part, both mirroring and
concept of masochism as perversion touches the common notion of a masochist who ‘enjoys being tortured by the
Law’: a masochist locates enjoyment in the very agency of the law which prohibits the access to enjoyment” (p. 47).
Although the festival discourse entails practices many might consider, at a descriptive level, perverted or obscene,
there is not a pronounced perverted orientation towards post-apartheid social law in the festival discourse. As the
focus here is on a ‘South African’ festival, we can from the start rule out a psychotic relation; clearly the ‘external
reality’ of the post-apartheid nation has not been altogether refused, a new reality hallucinated or reconstructed.

The ideal here, the ‘non-pathological’ state, would be what Freud called in The Ego and the Id (1923) and
Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), sublimation. Here there would be a harmony between the ego, the id and the
super-ego, with a sexual object substituted for some non-sexual object, the sexual drive deployed in the service of
non-sexual, loftier aims – and in this regard Freud was most concerned with art, literature and intellectual pursuits.
Freud, however, left sublimation in a notably under-theorised state (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973), perhaps because
he was more concerned with the conflicts of psychic life than its states of harmony. For this reason the analysis is
offered more incisive analytic instruments elsewhere. It can also be said, with some certainty, that festivals were not
what Freud had in mind with sublimation – they would be too vulgar, too crude, for this “‘finer and ‘higher’” mode
of satisfaction, accessible only to those ‘gifted’ and ‘special’ individuals (Freud, 1930, p. 30).
contesting their surroundings. In this regard, festivals are only one kind of heterotopia – vacation villages, prisons, museums, libraries, brothels, gardens and cemeteries are some of the others. In Foucault’s definition, heterotopias are imaginary, utopic spaces – in his radio broadcast he refers to the make believe games children play – “outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality” (p. 3, emphasis added). This last statement, italicised above, is significant because, as Foucault suggests, heterotopias are to be differentiated not only from the rest of the real places in a society, but also from the unreality of utopias: heterotopias are real sites, “places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of a society – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia” (p. 3).

There are two principle representational modes of ordering Foucault (1970) alludes to in his notion of heterotopias: ordering through resemblance and through similitude, the latter characterising heterotopias. Ordering through resemblance is hardened by familiarity; a signifier refers to an assumed and expected signified. Similitude, by contrast, orders “through a juxtaposition of signs that culturally are seen as not going together, either because their relationship is new or because it is unexpected” (Hetherington, 1997, p. 9). There is in Foucault’s description of heterotopias a constant sliding between the density of a concrete place and the immateriality of abstract space, between the tangibility of an actual site and phantasmatic dream-like space, and it is precisely this slippage that is characteristic of heterotopias. A telling example here is the ship, “the heterotopia par excellence,” which, for Foucault (1986) was “a place without a place,” simultaneously a locatable place that exists and a space that has stood, for centuries, as “the greatest reserve of imagination” (p. 7).49

Heterotopias, as the examples Foucault uses makes plain, may work more to stabilise a given society and contain its deviance, than drive it in a new direction. What makes a discrete place heterotopic, then, is not so much its subversive politics, but, as noted above, its relational differentiation from the spaces in the rest of the society in which it is located. Foucault distinguished between two general categories of heterotopias. The first kind, heterotopias of crisis, are what he referred to as “privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for

49 Foucault also wrote of colonies as heterotopic spaces. Indeed, as Coetzee (1988) has shown in White Writing, the African land was, for European settlers, an ‘other space,’ exotic, empty and enigmatic to a European imagination. We can add to the list of real and imaginary places Foucault refers to as heterotopias, in a South African context, the farm, a set of real locatable places and an imaginary, mythologised space, one with a literary genre of its own, the plaasroman (farm novel), containing the figures and tropes with which a history of the domestication and occupation of the land imagined as ‘wild and empty’ by European settlers in Africa has been written and reflected upon.
individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis” (p. 4). Heterotopias of deviance, on the other hand, tend to be “those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed” (p. 4).

The point here has not been to ask whether this particular festival is a heterotopia of crisis or deviance, as if such a thing really exists; rather, framing this festival as a heterotopic space has enabled a way to think about its relation to the post-apartheid nation, to the places immediately surrounding the farm, to the rest of the everyday spaces of post-apartheid South African life, providing a “particular way to look at space, place or text” (Hook, 2007, p. 186). The differentiation of the heterotopia of crisis and deviance is relevant for this study when we consider the strict regulation of life under apartheid for Afrikaner children. As Jonathan Jansen (2009) describes the legacy of this strict regulation in the Afrikaner students who attended the University of Pretoria (UP), where he was Dean of Education: “Behind the classroom door, the Afrikaner child is exposed to an intense, disciplined and well-managed educational environment that few South African children experience. Every minute is accounted for. Teachers are highly disciplined and work as a team. Timetables are sacred and the workday is efficiently managed” (p. 105). And home life, extramural cultural and sporting activities, and church are no less regulated (Jansen, 2009). Oppikoppi, emerging as it did at the threshold of the ‘new South Africa,’ may well have mirrored precisely this regulation, but also, more generally, a part of the disciplinary order of apartheid – white men and women conforming to strict expectations of correct conduct, propriety and restraint. As Hoffmann has stated of the early festivals, “It was an absolutely surreal world in which only the tunes were important and not many of the grown-up rules applied. Even gravity came under severe scrutiny and was often found superfluous and of little use.”

Several questions emerge here, then. How has the festival contested the political dream of apartheid through its representational practices? How has it ordered the space of the festival through similitude – jumbling, rearranging and juxtaposing discourses of apartheid, of the representation of the farm and the platteland, as imaginary spaces, of what the farm and the platteland have been and ought to be – in emplacing the utopic vision of a post-apartheid society, if in fact it has? How, with the problematisation of white South Africans as ‘proper South

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Africans,’ has the festival provided a space within which this crisis could be worked through? How has it provided a space of deviance from the apartheid past, but also a space where young Afrikaners, the ‘deviants of the new South Africa,’ have placed themselves?

Useful in utilising and developing the concept of heterotopias here has been Bennett’s concept of the exhibitionary complex, developed apropos of nineteenth century museum practices. On the one hand, Bennett (1995) takes Foucault’s lead in framing the museum as a specific kind of heterotopic space. On the other, he builds his concept of the exhibitionary complex on, against and as an adjunct to, Foucault’s (1977) thesis that the spectacle of power in the public ceremony of the scaffold – an occasional procedure educative in its display of sovereign power, helping people remember how to conduct themselves through the ritual torture of criminals, a festival of torture, as Foucault put it – slowly came to be supplanted in the nineteenth century by the carceral system, entailing techniques of training and repetition, invisible surveillance and a resultant self-surveillance that produced the disciplinary modern society. Taking this break postulated by Foucault as his starting point, Bennett (1988) proposed the exhibitionary complex as a modality through which relations of institutional power and knowledge have operated, one that incorporated the strategies of both the spectacle of the scaffold – in that museums are spectacular spaces of display – and the invisible surveillance of disciplinary power – in that a the museumgoer’s habits of perception and conduct are acted upon by the museum – into its operation. While museum visits are not of the order of persistent, everyday correction and training, it is plain to see how Bennett argues that the exhibitionary complex incorporated disciplinarity into its operation: as an institution with specialised knowledge – that is, expertise in how to properly look at objects on display, a practice which stands in for, and is an index of, the virtues of citizenship – museums aim at transforming a society’s modes of perception and thought, exerting an almost psychiatric responsibility for the rehabilitation and discipline of the citizenry.

Bennett (1988) argues – building on the notion that heterotopias are sites ‘formed in the very founding of a society’ – that museums need to be understood as being instrumental in the establishment of new modes of conduct, particularly in the context of an emerging national community. That is, museums are a modernising, but also a nationalising technology. According to Bennett, in addition to instrumenting the perception
and conduct of museum goers, the exhibitionary complex worked by joining the idea of progress to the projects of nationalism and imperialism by displaying, on the one hand, the past out of which the nation had emerged, exhibiting instances prior to its own magnificent present and, on the other, the artefacts of societies not yet at the ‘mature developmental stage’ of the nation. In Bennett’s conception of the exhibitionary complex, there is a continuum constituted by the objects displayed – the history of the nation’s emergence out of a past, a struggle to ascend to its current state – along which the visitor is situated, “at the very pinnacle of the exhibitionary order of things they constructed” (p. 95). There is thus not only the nation being constituted, but an ‘archaic past’ out of which the nation emerged. Through the workings of the exhibitionary complex, a national community could be consolidated, rallied around a common idea of progress.

In chapter five I propose an analogy between museums and their display of objects of knowledge and this festival and its staging of music as an object of knowledge. The festival, in this sense, is framed as a kind of disciplinary institution, instrumenting the conduct and modes of perception of an emerging national community, specifically those of a problematised sector of the population – and here the connection to a withdrawal in order to work on those aspects of whiteness problematic in the post-apartheid nation, raised by Vice, should be clear. In Bennett’s (1988) writing about museums, though, festivals occupy a specific place in his formulation; the exhibitionary complex entailed the formation of a new public through a new mode of knowledge production and display, and this entailed the destruction of fairs and festivals, “owing to their association with riot, carnival, and, in their sideshows, the display of monstrosities and curiosities which, no longer enjoying elite patronage, were now perceived as impediments to the rationalizing influence of the restructured exhibitionary complex” (p. 86). In the analogy between museums and festivals, then, what should not be overlooked is the specificity of festivals as a mode of knowledge production and display. In this sense, the festival form is itself an affront to European ‘rationality,’ ‘civility’ and ‘propriety,’ an appropriation of a practice that was gradually, if unsuccessfully, ‘repressed’ in Europe (see also Stallybrass & White, 1993).51

51 As Stallybrass and White write in ‘Bourgeois Hysteria and the Carnivalesque,’ describing the ‘repression’ of festivals, “Certainly, in the long-term history from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, as we have seen above, there were literally thousands of acts of legislation introduced which attempted to eliminate carnival and popular festivity from European life. In different areas of Europe the pace varied, depending upon religious, class and economic factors. But everywhere, against the periodic revival of local festivity and occasional reversals, a
Bennett (1988) does, however, note that fairs were drawn into the project of producing a ‘civilised’ public out of the working-class; the routines and rituals of festival were deployed for disciplinary ends and, “by the end of the century, fairs were to be actively promoted as an aid rather than a threat to public order” (p. 36). Certainly, Afrikaner festivals during apartheid-era South Africa were put in service of a conservative nation building agenda (Witz, 2003), for which there is a post-apartheid legacy worth considering.52

Many critics see the host of post-apartheid Afrikaans festivals as conservative. Jansen (2009), for example, thinking about the continued affective bond with the past many young white Afrikaners retain, set about responding to the question: “What are these encircling influences that enable such powerful lines of knowledge transmission across generations, and in this case to the first generation of Afrikaner children born after apartheid?” (p. 71). The domains which he highlighted as being instrumental to this transmission were family, church, sport, school and cultural networks and peers (pp. 71-80). Regarding cultural networks, Jansen states, “Afrikaans music, poetry and politics mix freely in a very assertive though not uncontested display of racial and cultural power” (p. 77). While Jansen places festivals and their mode of knowledge transmission – and he groups Oppikoppi amongst these Afrikaans-speaking festivals – alongside and separate from other traditional cultural institutions, the location of these festivals, on farms, on the outskirts of small rural towns, consolidates, for him, the “mythology of Afrikanerdom” (p. 78). Even if minor ruptures in the monolith of apartheid are brought about, the integrity of the knowledge is, more or less, retained in the transfer (Jansen, 2009).

Jansen is not alone in drawing these conclusions. Afrikaans festivals have been portrayed as mechanisms for warding off threats to Afrikanerdom, as a means of preserving Afrikaans language and culture from the “triple threat of potential Americanisation, Anglicisation and Africanisation” (Hauptfleisch, 2007, p. 84). However insular these events may be, though, in “most cases the shared element,” as Temple Hauptfleisch (2007) argues of the 2001 Klein Karoo Nationale Kunstefees (KKNK) in Oudtshoorn, “was an awareness of memory and history – with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the ‘un-manning’ of the white male, the Anglo-Boer fundamental ritual order of Western culture came under attack – its feasting, violence, drinking, processions, fairs, wakes, rowdy spectacle and outrageous clamour were subject to surveillance and repressive control” (p. 385). 52 Leslie Witz (2003) has shown in great detail how the 1952 Van Riebeek Festival, the tercentenary celebration of the arrival of Jan Van Riebeek at the Cape in 1652, was used to construct a common past for white Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking South Africans shortly after the 1948 National Party victory. The festival thus reinforced a white front, which – together with a divide and rule strategy for the black population – aided the consolidation of apartheid.
war, and the re-defining of the notion of Afrikaner as *leitmotifs*” (p. 85). Similarly, Rebecca Davies (2009) notes that, while attendance at these festivals is “resolutely white and mainly Afrikaans,” while they are “overwhelmingly middle class,” they do also show signs of “the beginning of a genuine sea change in cultural identifications” (p. 121). Davies’ ambivalence over the ‘festivilisation of Afrikanerdom’ relates as much to the contradictions of each different event as to the heterogeneity of Afrikaans festivals. On the one hand, they represent, for Davies, an “assertion of ‘ethnic nesting’ where ‘time is in suspension’ and Afrikaans speakers can ‘step outside their everyday rituals’” 53 and, on the other, she sees them as spaces where “unprecedented exotic, local and African tinge is colouring expressions of Afrikanerness,” as spaces in which “Afrikaans speakers are proving adept at conversing with the historical Other” (p. 128).

From this ambivalent characterisation, we could say that Afrikaans festivals can be seen as both heterotopias of crisis and of deviation, spaces of withdrawal where the order of apartheid can be preserved, if only for the duration of the event, *and* where an old order is contested and a new dream of ‘multiculturalism’ can be enacted and emplaced. The distinction, though, is not that easily made. Wary of uncritically celebrating the presence of black artists – ‘the historical Other,’ in Davies’ terms – at arts festivals, and primarily concerned with the fates of black Afrikaans speaking hip hop groups such as Brasse Vannie Kaap (BVK) and Prophets of da City (POC) at these events, Adam Haupt (2006a, 2006b) problematises the notion that the presence of black artists at Afrikaans festivals is a sign of change in itself. Is it not a means of conserving a position of historical privilege, window dressed with multicultural difference, of staying the same precisely by changing, he asks? The conclusions Haupt draws in his research are particularly relevant for this study. His central argument is that festivals like Oppikoppi have put distance between themselves and apartheid through interest in, and association with, musicians from different social and musical backgrounds. However, while the diversity of artists hosted at Afrikaans festivals is utilised to celebrate the ‘South Africanness’ of these events, it is a strategy that needs to be challenged in its “attempt to purchase legitimacy for the continued prominence of Afrikaner culture on the South African cultural scene, particularly when the process of racial reconciliation is thought to be uneven” (Haupt, 2006b, p. 1).

53 These terms are footnoted by Davies (2009), indicating that they emerged from an interview with academic, Albert Grundlingh.
In employing the concept of the exhibitionary complex here, it is necessary to note Bennett’s (2002) warning regarding the limits of its application to contemporary exhibitionary spaces, which speaks to some of Haupt’s concerns:

The challenge now is to reinvent the museum as an institution that can orchestrate new relations and perceptions of difference which both break free from the hierarchically organized forms of stigmatic othering which characterized the exhibitionary complex and provide more socially invigorating and, from a civic perspective, more beneficial interfaces between different cultures (p. 19).

One means of achieving this objective, of facing this challenge, as Bennett sees it, has entailed fashioning the museums into a “differencing machine” (p. 19) that operates within a framework of multiculturalism. One problem Bennett identifies with this – and this would apply to the range of Afrikaans festivals that have been eager to celebrate increasing inter-mixing of race and culture – is that an array of difference is exhibited but held together by a white centre, which gives the ensemble coherence and cohesion, making difference legible as difference and as diversity by its distance from whiteness, as well as a ‘virtuous white centre’ that has embraced ‘difference’ – an embrace that entails capture, ownership and consumption, at times ravenously, of difference – that does not escape the pitfalls of a fetishising relation. One needs, in other words, to be alert to this shift and its politics of representation.

What emerges here – from Foucault’s writing on heterotopias, from Bennett’s use of the concept and his writing on the exhibitionary complex, and from a brief sketch of Afrikaans festivals – is a problematised figure, whose admittance to a national community is in question. In Bennett’s notion of the exhibitionary complex that figure is a “not fully civilised” working-class citizen-subject; in a post-apartheid South African context, the figure is a “not fully South Africanised” white Afrikaner national subject. There is need, however, to look further back in

54 The notion of the fetish has been employed variously in critical scholarship, but is understood here as that object that is able to cover over difference while fixing that difference within an overarching vision of sameness. Freud (1969) famously noted, citing the childhood memories of his neurotic patients, that the fetish object “consists in attributing to everyone, including females, the possession of a penis, such as the boy knows from his own body” (p. 215). In this way, women are understood as underdeveloped men. The same schema, which at once reduces all to a common category and fixes difference within these terms, worked very effectively in the establishment of the colonial state: the wildness of Africa – here the fetish object that covers over difference while fixing difference within a vision of sameness – was constituted as the same as Europe, except ‘not quite,’ or not quite yet (Bhabha, 1994). I use fetish in this psychoanalytic sense throughout this study unless otherwise indicated.
history to frame the process of the post-apartheid South Africanisation of whiteness and Afrikanerness.

In *Race and the Education of Desire*, Ann Laura Stoler (1995) builds on Foucault’s work on disciplinarity as well as his 1975-1976 College de France lectures, *Society Must be Defended* (Foucault, 2003). Inverting Clausewitz’s famous assertion—politics is war continued by other means. The constitution of the modern nation-state entailed a war not—or not only or primarily—against external threats, but against its ‘internal enemies,’ with the explicit objective of ‘purification.’ While this war has taken varied forms, it signalled, for Foucault, the emergence of state racism. Developing this idea, Stoler points out its relevance for colonial contexts, where an ‘internal enemy’ of great concern was the ‘white racial degenerate,’ which posed a threat to whiteness and Europeaness.

Indeed, Stoler suggests that it was not only the colonised that mimicked European ideals of civility, and were taken as ‘white, but not quite,’ in Bhabha’s (1994) famous phrase; the colonisers themselves were problematised as ‘not yet European,’ as requiring performative evidence of Europeaness (see also Seshadri-Crooks, 1997). But, as Stoler notes—and here we can begin to build on Coetzee’s (1991) thesis in ‘The Mind of Apartheid’—this ‘becoming European’ in the colonies, specifically for ‘Europeans,’ coalesced around the notion of ‘degeneracy,’ of sliding back down the slope of European civility; it was, more accurately, then, not only a matter of being ‘not yet European,’ but being ‘no longer European,’ degenerated from Europeaness.

The figure of the ‘poor white’ became one such ‘internal enemy of whiteness,’ and along with this came the “equation of whiteness with middle class sensibilities” (Stoler, 1995, p. 106). In a South African context, the ‘poor white problem’ arose, as Herman Giliomee (2003) notes, out of a “late and often traumatic urbanization” (p. xv) of the Afrikaners. The ‘poor white problem’ emerged in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century and remained of major concern until the 1940s (Giliomee, 2003). Indeed, degeneration was a central concern in the forging of apartheid South Africa. As Giliomee has highlighted, concerns about descent into what D.F. Malan, the first State President after the National Party victory in 1948, called “semi-barbarism,” calling for “a return to the Voortrekker spirit and a return to the volk, church and

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55 Although it might seem like the dates don’t tally here, Stoler read these lectures in French before they were translated into English in 2003.
The problematisation of the ‘poor white’ was not only economic, but also the constitution of a moral problem entailing the ‘degeneration’ of the white ‘civilised’ population into a slothful unproductive state and the contamination of the ‘purity’ of the white race through racial mixing, socially, but, feared most of all, through miscegenation.\footnote{As Giliomee (2003) notes, at the time of the 1948 National Party victory over the United Party headed by Jan Smuts, “Slightly more than a million Afrikaners of a total 1.5 million now lived in towns and cities, where they bunched together in the lower income categories of the white population. There were now very few Afrikaners now considered to be poor whites or were unskilled, but the profile of urban Afrikaners was predominantly working-class. Some 40 per cent of Afrikaners were blue-collar and other manual occupations, only 27 per cent had white collar jobs and the rest were in farming. \textit{It was this profile of the Afrikaners that the NP had in mind when it introduced the apartheid system}” (p. 489, emphasis added).}

This is of great significance to music culture in South Africa, during and after apartheid. As Laura Allen (2008) argues, for the 1950s white audiences of black \textit{kwela} music, particularly those that congregated at Zoo Lake in Johannesburg, it was the “fear of miscegenation that fuelled the most virulent public outcry against white youngsters enjoying \textit{kwela} music” (p. 86). The issue, as Allen notes, though, was not that straightforward; echoing some of Haupt’s concerns in a post-apartheid context, Allen draws attention to how it was not only rebellious white youths who enjoyed ‘black music,’ it was a frequent occurrence, in fact, for Johannesburg black street musicians to be dragged off to police stations and forced to perform for police officers. Indeed, these musicians were on occasion made to perform at private parties for police officers, and it was an enjoyment of black music wherein the threat of the dissolution of difference was warded off, for them, due to the extraction of this music through force, as Allen argues.

The figures of the ‘poor white’ and the ‘racial degenerate’ occupy an ambiguous place in post-apartheid cultural politics. On the one hand, this was precisely who apartheid was for. As Mbembe (2008b) has written, “Here, racism has always played an important role in maintaining...
the self-esteem of the poor whites. Very often, the white working class has thought of itself and its interests as predominantly white. As a result, it has been unable to contemplate a struggle of united white and black labor against the exploiters” (p. 14). Without formal structures to advance their cause on the grounds of race, and without the will to forge a class allegiance with black South Africans, they cling to the symbolic currency of race. As Mbembe puts it, “Consumed by nostalgia and melancholia, they cannot imagine what it means to be white in Africa without the paraphernalia of apartheid” (p. 14). On the other hand, the ‘poor white degenerate’ was the very ‘internal enemy’ apartheid fought. These “lifestyles indicated,” as Stoler (1995) puts it, “not always a failed effort to live up to the standards of bourgeois civility but sometimes an outright rejection of them” (p. 107, emphasis added). This has opened up for post-apartheid appropriation the figures of the ‘poor white’ and the ‘racial degenerate,’ not necessarily as an economic position, but as a symbolic one, the ‘internal enemy’ of apartheid. To be the ‘poor white’ is to be, if only through an associative link, against apartheid, and therefore – this would at least be the claim – ‘truly South African’ in a post-apartheid anti-apartheid context.

**Conclusion**

Several related themes have been taken up or expanded upon in this chapter. One is *admittance* to the post-apartheid nation (admittance as admission or letting enter; as recognition; as confession). Another is *privilege* and the obstacle, if not the impossibility, this presents for white admittance, as well as the loss of positions of historical privilege as a condition of admission. Privilege is, in this sense, the *stain of history* on whiteness, a stain the farm bears perhaps more starkly than any other place. A final theme is the *work* necessary for the white subject to be admitted – work on the stain of whiteness, including negation of, and over-identification with, the past, withdrawal, shame and guilt.

The impossibilities of white post-apartheid admittance (those presented by persistent structural inequalities and those by an entanglement with a history of domination and violence) should have already alerted us to the role of fantasy, to ‘South Africanness’ as a phantasmatic identificatory accomplishment, and a discussion of Freud’s writing on festivals, read alongside some of his other metapsychological writings, lead us to a conception of festivals as a space in which the forbidden can be admitted, provided this is worked on. The notion of work, specifically work on whiteness that takes place within a discrete place of withdrawal was also
expanded on from a Foucauldian perspective, where the figure of the ‘poor white’ and the ‘racial degenerate’ emerged as problematised figures during apartheid, but also as recoverable symbolic positions post apartheid. We are returned here to the issue with which this chapter began, that of privilege as the stain on white post-apartheid South Africanness.

This leaves us with a few questions that will be taken up in chapter four, five and six. How is the ‘racial degenerate’ and the ‘poor white’ figured in the discourse of the festival as a post-apartheid ‘South African’ event, specifically considering festival and its historical associations with degeneration, and debauchery? And how, in the disciplinary role the festival plays as a cultural institution, is a discourse of ‘racial degeneracy’ deployed in the South Africanisation of its crowd, if it is at all? To what extent do post-apartheid appropriations of a ‘racial degeneracy’ discourse enable a recognition of the past as an injustice? To what extent do they enable recognition of the positions of ‘other South Africans’? And to what extent are these appropriations recognised as ‘South African’?
WE GOOD SOUTH AFRICANS
The South African nation, its past and post-apartheid whiteness

Introduction
The production of the apartheid past and its effects

It was noted in the introductory chapter that post-apartheid nationalism has taken shape as anti-apartheid nationalism, where the founding condition of belonging, of being one of ‘the people of South Africa,’ is the recognition of a national past as an injustice. In order to constitute the post-apartheid national community, though, it was necessary to have a common past towards which ‘the people’ could face, recognise as an injustice, and thereby become ‘South African.’ The past, that is to say, needed to be produced, bent into the shape of an injustice. That the South African past was an injustice is not, of course, in question here and as a qualification for this assertion one is tempted to say that it hasn’t taken all that much work to accomplish this bent shape – *we good South Africans recognise our past as an injustice* – but it has taken work, which has shaped and contoured the past that has been presented for subjects of the nation to recognise.

In this regard, Deborah Posel (2002) has argued that the TRC, the first official project aimed at producing a national past for South Africans to recognise, needs to be understood as a technology of knowledge production. And if we consider that the emergence of a phenomenon is always, simultaneously, objective and subjective, “never the emergence of the fact without at the same time being the emergence of the knowing subject itself” (Agamben, 2009, p. 89), the TRC must be taken as being not only instrumental in producing the past that subjects of the post-apartheid nation must acknowledge, the object of knowledge, but also in producing post-apartheid subjects. Here it helps to briefly take up the two Foucauldian-type questions Posel (2002) asks: what kind of past, and what kind of truth did the TRC produce?

While the commission was resourced to undertake a detailed exposition of the horrors of the previous three decades, insofar as its nation building function was concerned it was not necessary to be exhaustive. Rather, as Posel (2002) has put it, it aimed to “produce enough truth
to demonstrate and exemplify the inequities of the past” (p. 151). The truth about the past was already decided and needed only verification and a sufficient density of representative examples (Posel, 2002). Indeed, Posel has commented on the TRC final report that, “With little explanatory or analytical power, the report reads less as a history, more as a moral narrative of the fact of wrongdoing across the political spectrum, spawned by the overriding evil of the apartheid system” (p. 148).

The TRC, it should be clear, then, was not an unveiling of a self evident, transparent past, but was a set of practices that produced knowledge of the past conditioned and constrained by the context in which it emerged, by its assumptions and its processes of inquiry (Sanders, 2007; Feldman, 2003; Alexander, 2002; Posel, 2002; Norval, 1999; Minkley & Rassool, 1998). The TRC emerged within the context of an immediate need to pacify political tensions and promote social cohesion and reconciliation. It was conceived during the multiparty talks begun in 1990 that lead to the negotiated political settlement and an interim constitution. Conceivably, without this constraint a quite different narrative of the past would have emerged.

It should be said, too, that the TRC addressed gross human rights violations that took place from March 1960, the month of the Sharpeville Massacre, to 5 December 1993, later extended to 10 May 1994, the date Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as President of South Africa. It was thus only the recent past, rather than a longer colonial history, that the TRC took as its object of knowledge. If the commandment of the post-apartheid nation is to live against, be affectively opposed to, the injustices of the past, this time period fundamentally shaped not only the past as an object of knowledge, but the character and conscience of the ideal South African subject: it is an anti-apartheid conscience upon which post-apartheid admittance is dependent, the ‘mark of authenticity,’ to use Chipkin’s (2007) phrase. A further consequence of the focus on the recent

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58 The date was extended in order to encourage the participation of white right wing factions in the democratic process. The Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB), under the leadership of the late Eugene Terre Blanch disrupted multi-party negotiations in Kempton Park by driving their cars through the glass doors of the convention centre. This act fell outside of the cut-off date, but an amnesty application was made for these actions on condition that they participate in the democratic process (see Swart, 2001; see also Krog, 1998 for a description of the scene where Terre Blanch appears before the commission).

59 While this is to speak of individual conscience, at a collective level this has produced, also, a ‘national biopolitics of the heart,’ where collective feelings of revulsion towards this particular past indexes the nation’s moral wellbeing, its deficiency in these collective feelings indexing its ‘political sickness’ as a nation. De Kock’s (2004) work, too, provides a broader context for this assertion, as he tries to establish what it is that defines South African literature, what unities there are in the body of literature labelled South African – it should be noted, though, that the scope of his analysis extends beyond the literary, to a more general “crisis of representation” (p. 284), to the impossibilities of representing ‘the South African’ in “everyday acts of identity formation” (p. 286). De Kock notes that in the 1970s,
apartheid past is that a history of colonial violation of human rights was outside the scope of the commission. The conduct of Afrikaners was utilised to produce a past of injustice, making Afrikanerdom bear the burden of a 350 year long injustice, turning Afrikaners into the scapegoats of the nation building project.

Furthermore, by focusing on *individuals* who committed and suffered *gross* human rights violations that had clear *political* intent, the TRC ignored three related aspects of apartheid. Firstly, the everyday humiliations in which South Africans participated during apartheid. Secondly, the focus on human rights violations that had a clear political motive, in the provocative words of Posel and Graeme Simpson (2002), “arguably did more to mask than to reveal the most deeply rooted and sustained patterns of social conflict under apartheid” (p. 10; see also Feldman, 2003). One of the effects of this Neville Alexander (2002) identifies is the way white South Africans who were complicit with apartheid escape moral debt for their benefit from a corrupt system. Thirdly, the *system* of apartheid, the ideological warrant that enabled mundane violations to be precisely that, mundane and depoliticised, was not addressed. As Goldberg (2009) notes in this regard,

A sociality so taken up with the temporality of revolutionary transformation, with transforming itself into the new, breaking with the heavy hold of tradition, is likely to forget remembering, to bury its memories in the foundation of the forward looking, to refuse the pain of the past. The TRC, for all its importance, thrust the society towards the future. Only to have its exhumations haunt it in facing the future yet to come (p. 315).

Goldberg’s point here is instructive: the project of purifying the post-apartheid nation of apartheid racial thinking by isolating a handful of ‘political lunatics’ – that is, *individuals* who committed *gross* human rights violations with a clear *political* intent – has left in place what

despite vast differences in the South African literary field, a characteristic feature of this generation of South African writers was that they were *anti-apartheid*. Because of its “status as a global allegory for the struggle against racial injustice” (p. 270), this provided the conditions according to which ‘the South African’ was represented to the world, a world eager to perceive these writers as “witnesses to one of the final, most embattled scenes of a global struggle against neocolonialism” (p. 286). De Kock, however, does not make a straightforward argument that the anti-apartheid stands as a condition of ‘the South African.’ While noting that the end of official apartheid deflated the pressure of political struggle as a cohesive force, he is hesitant over whether anti-apartheid doctrine continues to provide the script for contemporary performances of South Africanness. Nonetheless, while there may not be the same urgency in the struggle against apartheid – indeed, the expiration date of resistance politics has long been up (Nuttall, 2006) – desire organised against apartheid does construct a national seam. The problem with this, or at least the contradiction implicit to it, is that we rely for our existence as South Africans on what we collectively oppose and wish to disappear.
Žižek (1997) might call ‘the materiality of apartheid ideology,’ thereby “failing to address the institutionalized technologies of the state apparatus that cemented apartheid bureaucratically in place” (Goldberg, 2009, p. 315). Goldberg suggests that this situation has lead to post-apartheid amnesia about the past, as well as a guiltless post-apartheid white population. In a way, Goldberg suggests, those who testified at the TRC remembered for everybody else, and the process itself recognised the injustices of the past on our behalf.

Similarly, Alexander (2002) argues that at the TRC, through the history of injustice it produced, “dragon’s teeth were being sewn” (p. 126). As he continues, “The sense of humiliation induced by this procedure will at some point in the future find expression in cyclical violence or some other conflictual reaction” (p. 126). Alexander is referring here not only to those who testified, but to a more generalised humiliation absorbed by Afrikaner men. The TRC has indeed had lasting effects, having produced violence of various kinds, not only the repetitions of the past in relations between white and black, to which Alexander points – and this was precisely what the TRC was designed to counter – but also various kinds of ‘conflictual reactions.’ While cognisant of the violent nature of post-apartheid South African life (see, for example, Olivier, 2007), what I am interested in here is the ‘intrapsychic’ violence carried out by the kind of conscience the TRC installed in the post-apartheid South African subject. With this in mind – on the one hand, the conflict the TRC has produced and, on the other, the amnesia it has allowed – I explore below some research and academic writing on the ways in which white South Africans, particularly Afrikaners, have responded to these conditions of being a subject of the post-apartheid nation.

**South African Whiteness**

**Whiteness, Afrikanerness and multiculturalism**

Whiteness studies emerged in the US in the early 1990s. It is an offshoot of critical race studies, which emerged in the 1970s when it became clear that the promises of the civil rights movement were not going to fully materialise (Delgado & Stefancic, 1997). It has since spread to various

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60 Olivier (2007) has proposed a somewhat different take on the constitution of the post-apartheid nation and the “the virtually incomprehensibly violent nature of crime in South Africa since 1994” (p. 47). Olivier’s psychoanalytic reading here is instructive as he draws attention to the way the abovementioned discussion of the production of a South African commonality may overstate its success, even if this has been framed above as a contingent accomplishment. Indeed, for Olivier, it is the very failure of the post-apartheid nation to secure an “inclusive symbolic sphere,” over and above an exclusive economic sphere, that has produced the conditions for “the present slaughter” (p. 48), the conditions, that is, under which we cannot recognise in each other a common humanity.
parts of the world, including South Africa, and has become a multidisciplinary affair, with work coming from scholars from just about every social science or humanities department. As such, it covers a range of issues in a number of different ways – the essays in Delgado and Stefancic’s (1997) *Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror*, if not the most complete then certainly the longest edited collection of essays on whiteness, range from how whites imagine others and how they imagine themselves, to the historical, cultural and legal discourses through which whiteness has been constructed, to white privilege and racial passing. Furthermore, various questions have become gathering points for whiteness scholars, perhaps most centrally, what to do about whiteness? For which there has been a range of responses, from calls for race traitorship (Ignatiev, 1997), to exposing “whiteness masquerading as universal” (Frankenberg, 1997, p. 3), to particularising whiteness, that is, “making whiteness strange” (Dyer, 1997, p. 4), to countering racism (Goldberg, 1997). Before turning to analyses of South African whiteness, it is useful to look at the work of a few of the key whiteness studies scholars.

Roedigger’s (1991) *The Wages of Whiteness* is frequently taken as the founding text of whiteness studies, though Roedigger himself credits black writers like W.E.B. DuBois and James Baldwin with drawing attention to the fact that the race problem is the problem with whiteness – so while Delgado and Stefancic may be correct that whiteness studies as it took shape through the work of legal scholars may have a critical race studies lineage, historians may see things otherwise. Drawing politics, aesthetics, language and popular culture into his analysis, Roedigger highlighted the ways in which the US white working-class contributed to the making of whiteness. Without diminishing the importance of the US labour history Roedigger wrote and the specificity of that story, I want to point out two important contributions of this work, at least for those working outside a US and labour history context. Firstly, it showed whiteness to be a social construct. While race may have been referred to as such before, *The Wages of Whiteness* provided a detailed and, as Roedigger himself points out, well timed study with which to preface the assertion, or with which to back it up. Secondly, Roediger argued that one might do well to look at “not only how racial identity leads some whites to deal out misery to others but also how it leads them to accept misery for themselves” (p. 15). Indeed, this second point encourages an

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61 Indeed, *The Wages of Whiteness* takes its title from Du Bois’ notion of a social and psychological ‘wage’ of whiteness – along the lines of the deference, respect, courtesy, recognition and so on that one can expect to be given as a white person – that would not be relinquished and that prevented 19th century US poor whites from forming coalitions with black plantation workers, despite sharing common class interests.
analysis of not only the ways in which white South Africans are damaging – certainly they were damaging and, as Vice has argued, continue to be damaging – but also of the ways in which they have been damaged, psychically damaged, by whiteness as a discourse.  

Toni Morrison’s (1992) *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* examined the way Africanism was deployed in the literary production of American whiteness; more accurately, she examined the objectification of darkness as the savagery against which the American dream emerged in American literature. In doing so, Morrison stressed the need to “avert the critical gaze from the racial object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the describers and imaginers; from the serving to the served” (p. 90). By focussing only on the ‘racial object,’ Morrison argued, the invisibility of whiteness is perpetuated – in this instance whiteness is simply the unraced ‘American dream’ (see also Sexton, 2003). Although their approaches are quite different, and so too are their contexts, Morrison’s study of American literature shares much with Ruth Frankenberg’s (1993) influential *White Women, Race Matters*. The women Frankenberg interviewed saw themselves as being unraced, normal, their whiteness invisible, to them in any case. The invisibility and neutrality of whiteness is perpetuated not only because it supplies the norms against which all other groups are measured, but because whiteness supplies the very context for meaning making. Thus, in Frankenberg’s (1997) terms, whiteness is a position of structural privilege, and the objective of much of whiteness studies has been to show the various means by which whiteness works as an “unmarked marker” (p. 9) on which the privileges of being a white person are predicated.

Richard Dyer’s (1997) *White* has become a key text and perhaps also the most frequently cited one amongst whiteness studies scholars – and he is the exception here in that he was not primarily concerned with, or working from, a US perspective. Dyer looked at images from mainstream Western culture, considering “the general frameworks through which we see, think and feel about white people” (p. xiii), that is, our ‘senses of whiteness’ in both its cerebral and sensuous senses. If the most prominent theme in whiteness studies is the normative status of whiteness – ‘whites’ are spoken of as being ‘just people,’ as being without racial markers,

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62 Note that this is quite different to proposing that whites are now ‘victims’ of postcolonial or post-apartheid politics. Although this “comes perilously close to a ‘me too,’ ‘we’re oppressed,’ ‘poor us’ position that seems to equalise suffering, to ignore the active role of whites in promulgating inequality and suffering” (Dyer, 1997, p. 208), it is not the same as developing such a position.

63 As Jarred Sexton (2003) formulates this, “there is ‘no concept of whiteness which is calm, present and self-referential; there are no positive qualities to whiteness, only differences between whiteness and its racialized others (particularly, though not exclusively, blackness)” (p. 245).
whereas it is ‘non-whites’ who have race, are ‘different’ – Dyer sought to render whiteness visible, as racially marked, and the argument Dyer makes concerns whiteness, aesthetics and visuality: the white body has been a point of reference for our senses of beauty, a silent and unspoken – indeed, in most instances, an unknown – reference point.

While this overlooks a range of highly influential studies of whiteness, it raises what are arguably the main themes with which whiteness scholars have been preoccupied: the constructedness of race, including whiteness, the way in which whiteness has assumed a normative status, and the inequality that stems from this. These themes have already been touched on in chapter one through the discussion of Vice’s ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ and we can see that many of the issues raised by whiteness studies have relevance for a South African context; there are also, however, a few South African peculiarities.

What has made studies of whiteness different in South Africa, when compared to much of the research done in the US, is that in South Africa whiteness has been exerted from a minority position, its characteristic feature “its brazen exhibitionist openness” (Ndebele, 1991, p. 38). South African whiteness is thus “more obvious in its potency: self conscious rather than deliberately obscured, and accepted, rather than veiled as a site of privilege” (Steyn, 2001, p. 93). However, in South Africa, while whiteness has not been, as in the US and Europe, an invisible site of privilege, it has been the right to privilege and the justification of privilege which has been veiled and has been invisible to whites (Steyn, 2001).

Steyn’s work on whiteness is significant for this study, not only because she is, arguably, the foremost scholar on post-apartheid South African whiteness, but also because she analyses, on the one hand, discourses of English-speaking and Afrikaner whiteness, insisting that these two forms of whiteness need to be understood in their “co-construction,” in their differentiation from one another, but also in the alliances that have been forged between them (Steyn, 2004, p. 70). On the other, she looks at the discursive boundaries set up against, and the alliances forged with, coloured and black South Africans. Both of these features appear prominently in the festival discourse and, for these reasons, I discuss Steyn’s work in detail below.

Steyn (2004) identifies six strategies at work in the discursive elaboration of Afrikaner whiteness. The first is “Quarantine ‘whiteness’ (‘Boers’)” (p. 71-72), a conservative strategy that attempts to disavow any linguistic, social, psychological or political difference within Afrikaner whiteness, any contamination of ‘God’s chosen people,’ the Afrikaner Volk. By posing the
question, “where will such an anxious project find a safe haven?” (p. 72), the issue at hand for Steyn is not so much where indeed it could find a place, but rather that there is no place within a post-apartheid discursive regime for it. The only locations available to such a reactionary project is outside the borders of the post-apartheid nation, spatially, in a Volkstaat, an independent Afrikaner state, or temporally, in the present as a “mere repetition of the past” (p. 71).

This leads thematically into the second strategy Steyn identifies, “Repatriotise ‘whiteness’ (‘AngloBoere/Pomfikaners’)” (pp. 72-75). While “Quarantine ‘whiteness’” refuses to adapt to the conditions of the post-apartheid nation, nor vacate it, and thus faces an irresolvable conflict, “Repatriotise ‘whiteness’” similarly refuses to be integrated and assimilated into a country under black rule, but here there is an “activation of the exile trope” (p. 74). Afrikaners retrace the passage of their ancestors from Europe to Africa, in a flight from an environment perceived as hostile to them. In response to the conflict of what to do with values incompatible with the post-apartheid nation, “Repatriotise ‘whiteness’” takes these values and ideals to London, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the United States (see also Singer, 2004).64 Steyn notes how, from a foreign land, Afrikaners look back nostalgically to a time when they were appreciated, angrily at the loss and trauma of having to leave their homeland.

A third strategy Steyn identifies is what she terms “bolster ‘whiteness’ (‘White South Africans’)” (pp. 75-77). English-speaking whiteness has frequently been used to differentiate Afrikaners, culturally, as an autochthonic people of South Africa, as opposed to English-speaking whites who retain strong cultural ties to Europe – hence the Afrikaans expression, souties, or sout piele.65 However, in the adaptation of Afrikaner identities to post-apartheid conditions, there are also strands of Afrikaner discourse that strategically align itself, at least politically, with English-speaking whiteness to form a racial front against a black majority. Despite the long history of antagonism between English-speaking and Afrikaner whiteness, there is also a long history of allegiance between these two groups (Witz, 2003; Witz, Minkley & Rassool, 1999). As Steyn (2004) puts it, “The psychological path is well worn; the tropes that bind English and Afrikaans into a common front of privileged ‘whites’ are well rehearsed” (p. 64).

While Afrikaners make up only five percent of the South African population, almost half of the 20 000 to 30 000 South Africans who emigrate each year are Afrikaners (Singer, 2004).

The expression comes from Afrikaners depicting English-speaking South Africans, perhaps correctly, as having one foot on African soil, the other in England, with their penises (piele) dangling in the sea, getting salty (sout piele). While English-speaking whiteness may be thought to represent its own historically located, culturally specific values as universal, Afrikaner whiteness here plays off the construction of English-speaking whiteness and its links to Europe, to forge an affinity with what Steyn (2004) refers to as “subaltern ‘whiteness’” (p. 70).

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White English-speaking South Africans are perceived to have a less shameful political past; thus, a united white opposition against the sheer numbers of black South Africans can be forged, all the while denying the racist strategy according to which this discourse is elaborated.

Here a brief detour into Steyn’s (2008) article with psychologist, Don Foster is useful in understanding this allegiance. Writing on whiteness more generally as it is represented in the media, Steyn and Foster discern what they term, “White Talk,” a form of whiteness resistant to the destabilisation of white privilege. “White talk” is an ambivalent form of self-presentation entailing, on the one hand, “New South Africa Speak (NSAS)” (pp. 28-34) and, on the other, “White Ululation (WU)” (p. 35-45). White Talk brings into contact the benefits of older discourses of white supremacy and newer post-apartheid speak, which provides justification for a retreat from post-apartheid society, while NSAS entails the mobilisation of the values revered in post-apartheid South Africa and setting these to work to maintain a position of historical dominance, twisting these frequently vague ideals to suit whiteness (Steyn & Foster, 2008; Mbembe, 2008a). As Steyn and Foster (2008) argue, “Drawing on this repertoire, ‘White Talk’ can help to secure the position of privilege for those who have not given up their faith in white superiority, but do not want their commitment to democracy, or their opposition to apartheid in the past, to be called into question” (p. 34). One strategy in which Afrikaner whiteness displays NSAS is where it attempts to “Launder ‘whiteness’ (‘Afrikaners’)” (Steyn, 2004, pp. 78-80). Here the apartheid ideology of separate ethnic groupings, which allowed a consolidated white South Africa to divide and rule the black population, is appropriated and rehabilitated to suit the

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66 As Steyn and Foster (2008) note, this could take the form, for example, of a morally superior position being veiled in an espousal of the values of democracy, the universalisation and centring of whiteness by exhibiting an attitude of non-racialism, or a deflection of the critique of ongoing racial privilege through a display of outraged concern over poverty For Mbembe (2008a), there is a frequent displacement of ‘the dirty little secret of racial prejudice’ into discourses either seemingly more urgent than race – e.g. poverty, corruption rape, crime – or those able to pass as more trivial and seemingly harmless – e.g. sport.

67 As Steyn and Foster explain it, while NSAS and WU are not mutually exclusive, the employment of WU in White Talk is, by contrast, more overtly resistant to the social changes being instituted in post-apartheid South Africa. Rather than appropriating the values of the post-apartheid nation and reinterpreting these to maintain and extend white privilege, WU depicts social transformation as a descent into chaos (Steyn & Foster, 2008). Most frequently WU does so, not through strategic arguments, but in an aggressive recruitment of examples of such decline in standards, the stacking up and accumulation of instances of corruption, nepotism, of a failing education system and a lack of order and political vision, as verification of this state of chaos (Steyn & Foster, 2008). That there are, in fact, such instances of such corruption and mismanagement of state funds that confirm this fantasy enables White Talk employing WU to hold up these instances as exemplars of the ruin towards which post-apartheid transformation is heading, of precisely how unappreciated white South Africans are in the new dispensation and how much poorer it will be for their systematic exclusion.

68 Steyn is here citing a term coined by Zoe Wicomb (1998), the laundering of whiteness, which is a form of rehabilitating apartheid whiteness to suit post-apartheid ideology.
post-apartheid context. This strategy is able to pose as representing the interests of all ‘indigenous’ groups who were oppressed by British imperialism. But this does not imply the collapsing of difference between ethnic minorities, only their common pursuit of the right to ethnic self-determination.

By contrast, there is a strategy of uniting with Afrikaans-speaking coloured South Africans to form a larger, more inclusive Afrikaner nation. Steyn (2004) calls this, “Embrace semi-whiteness (‘Afrikaanses’)” (pp. 77-78). This strategy bears some formal similarities with that of “Bolstering ‘whiteness,’” but here Afrikanerdom is united around a common language, rather than race, this alliance aimed at the survival of Afrikaans. Like its strategic coalition with English-speaking whiteness, it is a compromise, the benefit of which is not only a bolstering of numbers, but also of political legitimacy – like English-speaking whiteness is seen to be less tarnished by apartheid, an alliance with the interests of coloured South African identity claims holds a certain cultural respectability.

The most politically ‘progressive’ of these resistant forms of whiteness Steyn (2004) describes is the attempt to “Melanize ‘whiteness’ (‘Afrikaan’)” (pp. 80-82). As the scene in which she witnesses its unfolding, Steyn uses the split between the New National Party and the Democratic Alliance, and the New National Party alliance with the ruling African National Congress. Here Afrikaner whiteness seeks to forge an identity that is of Africa by reshaping tropes of Afrikanerdom according to an African nationalist project.

Steyn’s (2004) astute observation on all of these varied discursive elaborations of Afrikaner whiteness, when viewed together, is that apartheid ideology is “the ‘other’ of the ‘new’ South African vision” (p. 82). In different strategic manoeuvres, these post-apartheid versions of Afrikaner whiteness all anxiously circle the remains of apartheid ideology, a now obscene mode of thinking lodged in Afrikanerdom, and attempt to disguise, expel or neutralise its secretions into the discourse on the place of Afrikaners in the post-apartheid nation.

One means of doing so that runs through the discourses Steyn (2004) analyses is the “creolization” (p. 70) of Afrikaner whiteness, either politically, socially, linguistically or psychically. That is, the survival of Afrikaner whiteness is dependent upon strategic proximity and transformative contact with either English-speaking whiteness, Afrikaans-speaking coloured South Africans or black South Africans. In the context of Oppikoppi there is, indeed, recourse to

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69 Here Steyn is once more drawing on the work of Wicomb (1998).
proximity with black and coloured South Africans in legitimising the event’s claim to South Africanness. Likewise, the festival is now no longer defined as an Afrikaans festival, even if it retains elements of Afrikanerness – in that it is held on a farm in the *platteiland*, in that much of the music staged is played by young Afrikaner musicians reclaiming an Afrikaner identity, in that many of the cultural references are to a history of Afrikaans culture.

These transformations to Afrikaner whiteness noted above can be understood as part of the discursive management of an always problematised past. This changes how South African whiteness can and should be approached analytically post apartheid. In applications of critical theory to a racialised post-apartheid South African context, the ‘racial other’ of whiteness has frequently been thought of as being disavowed in order to preserve a coherent sense of white subjectivity, as that which, in white subjectivity, is abject. In many instances this is accurate (see Hook, 2005 on racism as abjection) and remains a useful formulation – certainly this is the case with what Steyn calls “Quarantine ‘whiteness’” and “Bolstering ‘whiteness.’” However, in light of Steyn’s (2004) analysis, we see that a history of apartheid ideology, with which discourses of Afrikaner whiteness are entangled, is also managed through complex processes of anxious disavowal, projecting this abject past onto competing versions of Afrikaner whiteness. What can be drawn from Steyn’s analysis is a fundamental ambivalence over the past and a highly conflicted relation to the history of Afrikanerdom.

**Whiteness, space and ‘going wild’**

The racialisation of space was among the most effective instruments utilised by the apartheid regime. And apartheid spatiality remains a feature of its legacy most recalcitrant to post-apartheid change (Dixon & Tredoux, 2006).\(^70\) Indeed, apartheid was, by definition, a spatial project (Christopher, 1994) – an apartheid, racialised separateness – that entailed, as Jennifer Robinson (1992) has put it, “a coherent policy of racial segregation, closely linked to the creation of *differential citizenship* for each defined racial group” (p. 293, emphasis added). The Population Registration Act of 1950 broke up and classified people according to race and

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\(^70\) As John Dixon and Colin Tredoux (2006) note in their comments to a response article to a special focus edition of *The South African Journal of Psychology* on what was called the “micro-ecology of racial division” (Dixon, Tredoux & Clack 2005) or the “micro-ecology of racial contact” (Foster, 2005): “Although it no longer assumes the monolithic formations of apartheid, segregation remains present and pervasive in South Africa. It continues to shape the lives of all citizens (and many non-citizens). It operates across a range of scales and contexts, and remains entrenched within the morphology of urban and rural life. It estranges people from one another and sustains relations of advantage, exclusion and discrimination” (Dixon & Tredoux, 2006, p. 462).

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ethnicity and the Group Areas Act of 1950 distributed people into racially and ethnically
designated places of residence; and apartheid spatiality, with these administrative and
distributive policies as its instruments, contributed to the production of the racialised superiority
and inferiority complexes of apartheid by locating white bodies in the city centres and leafy
suburbs, marginalising black bodies to degraded townships, on the outskirts of cities.
Contestations over the land in post-apartheid South Africa are, then, not separable from the
subjectivities produced and enabled on the grounds of the arrangements of space and place (see
Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Rather, these arrangements provide what Kopano Ratele (2005) has
called the “the external coordinates of inner life” (p. 562), creating the conditions for the
production of particular orders of feeling, relating and being.72

Apartheid spatiality did not, however, simply emerge in 1948 when the Nationalist Party
came into power. Apartheid spatial policies were predated by the Natives Land Act (1913), the
Natives Urban Areas Act (1923) and the Native Trust and Land Act (1936) which were amended
and put to work in the service of the apartheid state (Christopher, 1994). To understand apartheid
spatiality – and to understand its legacy – it is necessary to review the long standing myth of the
African land as an unpopulated empty wilderness. Not only because it is upon this myth that
colonial and apartheid spatiality took form, but because it has experienced a post-apartheid
revival, amongst other places at Oppikoppi music festival.

Before turning to a discussion of this myth, it is important to note that issues of space are
central to white South Africans’ negotiation of a sense of post-apartheid belonging, of forging a
place within the nation. In research on race and space, white withdrawal, on the one hand –
“withdrawal into private business, into pockets of white suburbia, into anomie and apathy, and
into the ultimate withdrawal, emigration to countries where whiteness is more secure” (Steyn,
2005, p. 128) – and integration – figuring “new, reverse, patterns of racial movement”
(Durrheim, 2005, p. 457), on the other, each come to index the regressive and progressive
politics of whiteness, respectively; although it is certainly possible to complicate this
characterisation, this is generally how the spatial politics of whiteness is seen and studied in a

71 Dixon and Durrheim (2000) have done some impressive research on space and identity, speaking of “the grounds
of identity in a double sense: first, as a sense of belonging to places; and second as a rhetorical warrant through
which particular social practices and relations are legitimated” (p. 33).
72 Ratele (2005) means here those arrangements that “circumscribe how people get to know and relate to others as
well as themselves; part of the economic, cultural and political structures that define and track people’s personal
lives” (p. 562), a part of which are spatial arrangements.
post-apartheid context. Steyn (2004), for example, argues that the prevalence of white South African emigration since 1994 is illustrative of a widespread refusal to adapt to a changing country (see also Gray, Delaney & Durrheim, 2005; Ballantine, 2004). Indeed, this is a prominent theme in writing on South African whiteness, problematising ‘white fright’ and escape from the sociopolitical changes, for example, in schools (Dolby, 2001) and – in a seemingly contradictory way – withdrawal into the insulation provided by schools (Fritz, Henning and Swart, 2008); withdrawal to behind the walls of gated communities (Hook, 2007; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002) and ‘white flight’ from city centres (Mbembe, 2008a) and from public beaches (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003).

Upon these assumptions – baldly put, segregation and insularity are bad, desegregation and integration are good, a notion which itself has a long academic history, particularly among urban geographers and sociologists – a social psychologist like Kevin Durrheim (2005), who has specialised in issues of race and space, can conclude that “psychological transformation is predicated upon the transformation of the spatial practices, and ultimately of the spaces of privilege and disadvantage that continue to characterize the landscape of the new South Africa.”

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73 In certain instances, as Gray, Delaney and Durrheim (2005) show, emigration comes to not only be perceived as unpatriotic, but tantamount to racism and expressive of an undeclared attachment to apartheid. As they put it in reflecting on their analysis of the talk of South Africans considering permanently leaving the country and newspaper articles discussing emigration, “The stereotype of emigrants was one of (mainly white) privileged South Africans who had benefited under apartheid and were now fleeing, depriving the country of much needed skills” (p. 135). This is not, then, the view of the authors, but one they discern in the discourse of emigration.

An interesting concept to have emerged from this research is ‘semigration,’ what Richard Ballard (2004) defines as an alternative to emigration, one taken by many whites uncomfortable in increasingly racially integrated cities and suburbs; fortified residential areas in which many white South Africans live provide sanctuaries apart from the bustling city, representing an assertion of independence from the state and of systematic racial exclusion, serving to re-establish the divides of the past (Ballard, 2004). “Semigration” offers, as Ballard puts it, “some of the effects of emigration without actually leaving the borders of the country” (p. 52).

74 See also Graham (2009) for an analysis of post-apartheid literature and its preoccupation and anxiety over the land, including the question of vacating the land. Graham pays particular attention to the controversial passage in Coetzee’s (1999) novel, Disgrace, where, after David Lurie’s daughter has been raped on her Eastern Cape farm, is pregnant with her rapist’s child, and is forced to give up her land and live as a bywoner, a sharecropper, a position historically occupied by black people in South Africa. As Graham points out, this passage raises questions regarding the conditions of individual white salvation in the face of a national history of dispossession: what are the responsibilities of an individual, if he or she is not to leave the land altogether? What compromises and concessions must be met? Certainly Coetzee’s suggestion – or rather David Lurie’s suggestion – that becoming a victim, in a reversal of the roles of history, is what is necessary has been offensive to many. Graham’s analysis of the resolution of this problem offered in Disgrace is nuanced and complex, but it should suffice to point out that the pastoral, a return to a state of pre-industrial, peasant owned land, is both proposed and problematised in the final arrangement of characters – of course, Coetzee is not promoting the pastoral (see Coetzee, 1988) and the novel is, in a certain sense, anti-pastoral, figuring an anachronistic longing for a time before the corruption of a relation to the land (Graham, 2009). As Graham points out, “small scale peasant farming” (p. 145), one of the solutions proposed in Disgrace – precisely in order to problematise it – is quite in line with the ANC government’s vision of land reform; i.e. Graham reads Disgrace as a critique of post-apartheid solutions to the land question.
Crucial to Durrheim’s notion of ‘progressive spatial politics’ – and there is an implied notion of ‘regressive spatial politics’ at work here too – is “spaces of (racial) degradation” (p. 457), which need to be made into more desirable places to be. His injunction to white South Africans is that they not only transform their spatial practices within historically white or privileged spaces – beaches and historically white universities, as examples, but we might also include farms here – but that those spaces are also to be moved from and the transformation of historically black spaces of degradation participated in.

What Durrheim recommends is certainly not a ‘going wild’ discourse; his vision of social and psychological transformation is more along the lines of equitable desegregation, and what he has frequently focussed on are instances of supposed desegregation, showing how, when one examines the embodied practices of the space in question, there are in fact racialised exclusions at work. Yet there is some common ground shared, so to speak, between post-apartheid ‘new, reverse, patterns of racial movement,’ movement by whites into historically black spaces, and post-apartheid appropriations of the relatively old discourse of ‘going wild.’ In discussing this ‘going wild’ discourse, I build on the notion, introduced in chapter one, that the figure of the ‘poor white’ has become an appropriable symbolic position in declarations of white ‘South Africanness’ post apartheid; but the node of focus here is the spatial dimension of this appropriation. Indeed, if we return to Coetzee’s (1991) argument in ‘The Mind of Apartheid,’ we see that space was quite central to the problem he took up: the ‘poor white’ who lived in close proximity with ‘racial others’ presented to apartheid whiteness not only the threat of a loss of racialised material advantage, but also the disintegration of racial distinction. As Cronjé put it, “Unconsciously a gradual process of feeling equal (gelykvoeling) begins to take place in them,” and pretty soon “a single South African mishmash-society” emerges (cited in Coetzee, 1991, p. 11). This, of course, horrified Cronjé and intensified his obsessions with segregation; but as Coetzee points out, Cronjé, seemed wholly unaware of how his writings may be used as an argument for a political project of a diametrically opposed kind. As noted above, post-apartheid national belonging has been dependent upon the recognition of the apartheid past as an injustice, and, accordingly, the transgression of apartheid spatiality has been one way of declaring white post-apartheid South Africanness. But while Cronjé, in his rantings about racial purity, may have been more right than he knew – indeed, he may have been prophetic in his obsessional madness, inadvertently signalling the way towards a post-apartheid spatial politics – such a simplistic
‘progressive-politics-by-numbers’ (whatever the likes of Cronjé advocated, whatever apartheid policy stated, just do the opposite) cannot but employ the same kind of apartheid thinking, cannot but occupy, even in its transgression, the same phantasmatic terrain as apartheid spatiality. Let us examine these issues a little more closely.

In an article titled, ‘The Call of the Wild: Speculations on a White Counterlife in South Africa’ de Kock (2010) depicts the historical emergence of whiteness and Europeaness in South Africa against and in relation to wildness; wildness, de Kock argues, has been the constitutive outside of whiteness and Europeaness:

To be white in this staging of Africa as the foundation of a reconstituted European modernity was to carry the burden of moral rectitude – translating into a decidedly Protestant code of behaviour, a strict regime of dualistically conceived behavioural expectations. To be wild, to be of the wilderness, to step outside of the light, was to be aligned with blackness, both literal and religious-symbolic darkness. To be white, then, in a sense, was to disavow the shadow of wildness (pp. 16-17).

In the colonial and apartheid scene de Kock describes, there is a fetishisation of wildness at work. This bound black people to a course of ‘becoming civilised,’ and was constraining in the worst kind of way – civility could never be quite attained, would always be a kind of mimicry (Bhabha, 1994). But de Kock is interested not only in how this was constraining for black subjects, but also for “whites caught in its coercive co-ordinates” (p. 16). Under such conditions, de Kock argues, there were “people who ‘went native,’ so to speak, went ‘bos’ [bush] in modern parlance, people who wanted to cross over to a place, which we may want to call the ‘wild,’ where the rupture of orthodoxy could be defiantly celebrated” (p. 16). In a post-apartheid context, white people who ‘went wild’ or ‘went bos’ have become prototypical South Africans on which to fashion a kind of respectable political subjectivity (de Kock, 2010).

In considering the post-apartheid appropriation of this discourse of ‘going wild,’ de Kock considers an article by Michael Gardiner (2000) wherein the legacy of the late poet, Wopko Jensma is critically engaged. In the article, Gardiner refers to several instances where Jensma is referred to as a ‘truly South African’ figure – he is referred to as the “first integrated South African” (Roberts cited in Gardiner, 2000); or, in more florid language, “This is the clue to Jensma. He stays together, in shape, alchemically combining enormously diverse cultures and experiences. He is a terrifying, new sort of human. He is the first South African” (Wilhelm cited
These declarations of South Africanness are of obvious importance for this study, particularly as de Kock foregrounds the role of ‘wildness’ in such claims – it is precisely because he stepped outside of whiteness, and because of the ‘wild’ place from which Jensma was able to speak as a not-white person, that he is hailed a ‘prototypical South African.’

De Kock summarises this desire for wildness mobilised around the figure of Jensma – a romanticised, discursively constructed ‘Wopko Jensma,’ the white poet who ‘went wild’ and thereby became ‘South African’ – in white South Africans well, and it is worth quoting him at length:

It is noteworthy that one here sees white critics, who show a distinct inclination to embrace and construct an alternative to whiteness, actively heralding Jensma for his South African centrality, and that such centrality consists in his being other than white, in his unusual, indeed extraordinary purchase on blackness, or Africanness, his access to a way of being that presented itself as near-mythical to many whites who felt it to be inaccessible, constrained as they were by ethnicity, race and cultural-linguistic formation. Jensma, for them, is a white anti-hero. He embodies the anti-myth of whiteness to which they implicitly aspire (p. 31).

The wildness mobilised here revolves predominantly around Jensma’s poetry, its unconventionality, and his schizophrenic language – as de Kock puts it, it was “influenced by Dada, syntactically nonlinear, semantically chaotic and diffuse” (p. 31) – and his chosen way of life – “disabling schizophrenia, destruction of his immediate family life, becoming a tramp, followed by disappearance and early presumed death” (p. 31). But this post-apartheid celebration of wildness implies, also, a spatial dimension. As Gardiner’s article on Jensma notes, the poet was born an Afrikaner in the Cape in 1939, but claims – and for this he is depicted as having an incorporative “multiple personality” (Gardiner, 2000) – that he was born in four places simultaneously, Ventersdorp, Sophiatown, District Six and Welkom.76

75 Indeed, there are several assertions of this kind cited in Gardiner’s article: “It is now time to assert clearly that Wopko Jensma is as important a creative artist as anyone produced by South Africa. His book is not only a collection: it is a phenomenon. It stands at the centre of South African life” (Gray cited in Gardiner, 2000); another stated, “At a time when people are more than ever aware of their colour, even in the arts, Wopko Jensma is the only South African artist in any medium who has transcended the barriers. His work is neither English nor Afrikaans, Black nor White” (Abrahams cited in Gardiner, 2000). It needs to be emphasised that Gardiner does not subscribe to these views, but uses them to engage with the poet’s legacy.

76 It was predominantly coloured people who lived in District Six in Cape Town and who were violently removed from their homes and out to the Cape Flats in the late 1960s. In Sophiatown it was black people who were removed
We see here a distinctly post-apartheid recuperation of white lives “living beyond the pale of whiteness” (de Kock, 2010, p. 31); but it is also an appropriation and an inversion of an older myth of an empty African wilderness. This myth of the land produces a characteristically European, colonial vision of Africa, as an ‘other world’ removed from civilisation, and we can isolate at least three uses to which this has been put. Firstly, John Comaroff (1998) has shown that the emptiness of the African land was crucial to the establishment of the colonial state in South Africa, as it enabled the seizure of the land. Comaroff thus posits the operation of the myth of an empty wilderness in active terms, as an emptying of the land. Once emptied, the land could then be ordered, which required a fetishised difference, that is to say, difference perceived within the terms of Western European sameness (see also Coetzee, 1988). Thus, to declare the land empty was to clear it for occupation, and the myth of an empty African wilderness has an implicit teleology as it not only actively empties the land, but constitutes a primordial substance which can be developed in the image of the colonists, a wildness that can be ‘civilised’ or ‘saved.’ And here the depiction of the ‘benevolence’ of this development represses, as Damien Riggs (2005) argues in an Australian context, the violence of colonial occupation. A second perspective is offered by Coetzee (1988) when he writes that “the wilderness is a world where the law of nature reigns, a world over which the first act of culture, Adam’s act of naming, has not been performed” (p. 51). Of course, it is not Adam’s act, but rather colonial naming and mapping of Africa that is of concern here. To return to “African Eden” (Coetzee, 1988, p. 74) is to imagine the land before this naming, mapping and seizing, to return to an imaginary time before the fall into the ‘sin of colonialism.’ To return to the wilderness is, in this sense, to return to original innocence. (It is, thus, at one and the same time, a colonial vision of the land and its telos, and a distinctly post-colonial white wish for deliverance from the ‘sins of the past.’) In a third and related sense, but one that remains within a thematics of sin and regression, ‘Africa as wilderness’ has also conjured a descent into a wild and empty scene in which the white man is undone. It is a scene away from civilisation – exemplary of which is the vision of Africa Joseph Conrad created in Heart of Darkness for Mr. Kurtz undoing – a place away from the security of lunatic asylums, whispering neighbours and policeman; a place without other people – blacks are not fully human beings within this vision – to keep one within the limits of civility, an African

from their homes when it was changed to Triomph, an all white suburb built on the ruins of Sophiatown. Ventersdorp and Welkom are, at least stereotypically, conservative white areas.
“anti-garden, a garden ruled over by the serpent, where the wilderness takes root once again in men’s hearts” (Coetzee, 1988, p. 3).

To bring this imperial myth into focus in Afrikaner history, Anne McClintock (1995) has highlighted its centrality in the work that went into creating a united Afrikanerdom, which, prior to the 20th century, had not yet been forged. As she has argued, “In the voluminous Afrikaner historiography, the history of the volk is organized around a male national narrative figured as an imperial journey into empty lands” (p. 369). Emblematic here, for McClintock, is the Tweede Trek, the 1938 centenary celebration and re-enactment of the Great Trek, where two parties of ox-wagons creaked their way from the Cape into the north of the country, towards Pretoria. It was through this performance that the national community could be imagined (McClintock, 1995; c.f. O’Meara, 1997). As a part of this nation building spectacle, on the 16th of December (the date of the Battle of Blood River) the cornerstone of a massive new monument to the Voortrekkers was laid at an event attended by over 100 000 people (Giliomee, 2003) – and it will be recalled from chapter one that it was to a site beneath the Voortrekker monument, Fountains Valley, that the festival moved for two years before returning to the farm in Limpopo.

The emptiness of the land, though, was certainly contested in the Tweede Trek, but also in the case of the Voortrekkers 100 years earlier. In fact, before the Voortrekkers even departed, there were concerns that the ‘indigenous population’ would be forced into confrontations or that the Voortrekkers themselves would be obliterated. In other words, contact was inevitable and the construction of a ‘wild and empty’ land was, from the start, confronted by its own fabrication (Mostert, 1992). The falsity of this myth confronted 19th century Voortrekkers moving from the British-ruled Cape Colony, just as it confronted the “distorted historical claim” of those working to create a unified Afrikaner nation, 100 years later (Mostert, 1992, p. 807) – and, as we will see in chapter four, it has confronted the festival, too.

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**Notes:**

77 As a part of this nation building spectacle, on the 16th of December, the date of the Battle of Blood River, the cornerstone of a massive new monument to the Voortrekkers was laid at an event attended by over 100 000 people (Giliomee, 2003). While the cornerstone for the monument was laid on the 16th of December 1938, the inauguration of the monument took place only in 1949 (Coombes, 2003).

78 It should be noted that while the cornerstone for the monument was laid on the 16th of December 1938, the inauguration of the monument took place only in 1949 (Coombes, 2003).

79 As Noël Mostert (1992) has argued, “All of it had been populated in pre-mfecane times, but the mfecane had so shattered the occupation of the country into which the trekkers were now moving that their initial impression, which was to become a distorted historical claim by their descendents, could easily be that they were moving into and across a virgin, empty land. But they were well aware that it was an emptiness crowded with ghosts, among whom they continually established camp” (p. 807).
A contemporary revival of this myth is provided with support not only from the injunction to transgress the past, but also from politically legitimating post-apartheid notions of pre-colonial splendour or an African Renaissance (see Klopper, 2000). But in what ways is its revival problematic? In post-apartheid adaptations – and in most instances, inversions – of it, does it remain a suspect colonial fantasy of a ‘primordial landscape’ and of a ‘primitive subjectivity’ against which European civility can be constituted, that the European subject might develop in its image, or towards which it might regress? And can it be reinvented and be made to serve a politically redeeming and respectable function? Apart from de Kock’s work, there is very little writing on post-apartheid appropriation of a ‘going wild’ discourse, though if we look further afield we are assisted in beginning to respond to these questions.

Sarah Ahmed (2000) offers a good discussion of ‘becoming other’ “as a fantasy that is increasingly offered to the Western subject” (p. 119) in reworkings of the classical nineteenth century narrative of ‘going native’ – Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* would once again be a good example here and, closer to home, Rider Haggard’s *King Solomon’s Mines*. The example Ahmed analyses is the film, *Dances with Wolves* (1990), where the white subject, Dunbar, played by Kevin Costner, abandons his post on the frontier “where civilization and wilderness meet” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 120). The white hero of the film is initially alone on this frontier, he is defined against the wilderness and against the Sioux tribe he begins to encounter; but slowly, through proximity with a wolf and with the Sioux, he becomes animal and becomes Indian, the distinctions differentiating him from the other breaking down.

This ‘becoming’ entails fantasy at two levels, Ahmed argues. First, a fantasy of who the other is, a fantasy of the other with whom the white subject is fascinated, and with whom a relation is entered in ‘becoming other’ – in the case of Dunbar, it is a fantasy “of who the Sioux tribe already are” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 122, emphasis added). Here Ahmed argues that the fantasy is fetishistic, as the other stands in for what is lacking in the white male subject (p. 123). And second, it entails fantasy at a “structural level” (p. 122), where the other, instead of being the enemy who is heroically defeated in battle, is the other who is befriended in a journey of personal growth and expansion of worldview. As Ahmed argues, in this story of “the white man

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80 Sandra Klopper (2000) has stated, “Mbeki’s attempt at invoking a usable African past has proved to be quite problematic, mainly because it has spawned numerous commercial ventures aimed at marketing various products and tourist destinations (both to local and international customers) by appealing to the idea of Africa as a place of mythic primitivity” (p. 217).
overcoming himself” (p. 123), the other is still at the disposal of white masculine heroism. Because the narrative is structured around a white male subject who heroically redefines himself, the fantasy of ‘becoming other’ consolidates white male subjectivity, rather than deconstructs it, reproduces the dominant subject, whose gift to the other is his transformation, his “going strange, going native,” reinvesting this subject with generosity and, thus, agency (Ahmed, 2000, p. 124). The short answer, then, is that this myth cannot be revived and rehabilitated, at least not in the instances Ahmed analyses (see also Riggs, 2005 for the problems of white Australians ‘becoming other’).  

As noted above, these appropriations of colonial spatiality are brought into critical focus in chapter four by looking at how the festival has been constructed as a journey into the interior, an “annual pilgrimage to the dusty farm in the middle of just about nowhere,” a place “three hundred kilometres from civilization,” in Hoffmann’s words. The construction of the site of the festival as a ‘primordial space’ enables subjects of the festival discourse to ‘regress’ or ‘degenerate’ in ways very similar to those described and criticised by de Kock and Ahmed. Indeed, “trekking to this little universe of hedonistic musical revelling,” as it is so often referred to, in many respects resembles Conrad’s narrative and its politics of representation, and there are frequent instances in which versions of this vision are invoked, “Apocalypse Now Now,” a reference to Francis Ford Coppola’s (1979) Apocalypse Now, a Vietnam wartime remake of Heart of Darkness, perhaps the most direct of these. And, as we will see, the same criticisms of Conrad’s vision of Africa are relevant in a post-apartheid context. But, as we will see, a longing for a time of innocence before the fall into the ‘sins of the past’ is also embedded

81 Ahmed problematises the much celebrated notion of ‘becoming other’ proffered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their influential book, A Thousand Plateaus. As Ahmed argues, this fantasy does more to “reconstitute than transgress the Western subject who becomes” (p. 119). It should be noted, though, that her polemic emerged in the wake of Deleuze and Guattari’s book and she overlooks the potentially useful ways in which their work has opened up politically enabling possibilities, which a reading of different narratives or images may have afforded. Indeed, what Ahmed analyses bears very little resemblance to what Deleuze and Guattari propose as ‘becoming other,’ though it may be a relevant critique of poorer applications of their work.


83 These are festival organiser, Carel Hoffmann’s words, commenting on the event in August 2011. To watch the youtube video on the Oppikoppi facebook wall see http://www.facebook.com/oppikoppifestival?sk=wall


in the festival discourse as a kind of “soul cleansing hajj.” And if we recall Feldman’s (2003) observations on the historical associations of ‘the farm’ in South Africa – the farm in this instance a place of both withdrawal and of ‘wildness’ – this is no straightforward matter.

**Obsessions with the past**

What I want to pick up in this final section of this chapter, and develop in a somewhat different direction, is a theme raised in the discussion of Steyn’s writing on whiteness: the ambivalence over the past felt by many Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa, an ambivalence over a past loved but which should not be loved. Ratele and Laubscher (2011) capture this ambivalence well in their work on the Apartheid Archive project. Likening the white subject who lives with knowledge of complicity with racial oppression – and, almost without exception, the white subject is an unwitting beneficiary of apartheid policies – to “the incest victim who is silenced,” Ratele and Laubscher write, “It is not, we propose, just that the violence is silenced because it was overwhelming and unfair, from the perspective of the victim, so to speak, but also because of the perpetrator, of who wields violence – one’s kin, one’s kind” (p. 95). Out of this ambivalence in whiteness – love for one’s neighbour or grandfather, to cite two examples Ratele and Laubscher analyse, but also hate for these beloved men who have perpetrated violence of varying kinds and degrees, against others – they speak of a kind of “violence that turns on itself, a woundedness from within whiteness, an autoimmune disease of sorts” (p. 98). It is research that takes as its object, directly or indirectly, this ambivalent relation to the past that I want to discuss here.

In an essay titled, ‘Puritanism Transformed: Afrikaner Masculinities in the Apartheid and Post-apartheid Period,’ Kobus du Pisani (2001) outlines the attributes of apartheid-era white Afrikaner masculinity, a mode of being a man that now no longer enjoys the same state sanctioned support and is regularly problematised as reactionary: overt heterosexuality; rural traditionalism; Christian Protestant Puritanism and an ethic of hard work; a dominant patriarchal position within the nuclear family; an unambiguous support for Christian nationalism that

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80 Hoffmann as cited in ‘Thousands to play it by ear at Oppikoppi music fest’, *Cape Argus* 29 July, 1999. Hoffmann has referred to it this way several times, but this is the first time he is on record using this description of the festival.

87 The Apartheid Archive is a research project run by a group of researchers, predominantly psychologists with ties to the University of the Witwatersrand. Ratele and Laubscher are not strictly concerned with Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans, but rather with “those neglected dynamics of whiteness” (p. 95) in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa more generally, examining narratives of apartheid racism recounted from the perspective of post-apartheid South Africa.
entailed a conservative vision of racial dominance as ‘Gods chosen people’ (cf. Gunkel, 2010). It is possible, in other words, to identify what was, during apartheid, a regularity to Afrikaner masculinity, and in this regard du Pisani (2001) stresses “its essential puritan character” (p. 157), a consistency in religious, political and social outlook in Afrikaner masculinity that has been carried into the post-apartheid nation (see also Goldberg, 2009). To use Natasha Distiller and Steyn’s (2004) phrase, this is the “cultural baggage strapped to its horse” (p. 2) as it rode into the new South Africa.

However, while the mobilisation of Afrikaner nationalism, a project authorised by the Afrikaner churches, did much to cement Afrikaner masculinity, it cannot be understood as either homogeneous or static, nor can the baggage of post-apartheid Afrikaners be understood as such. Afrikaner masculinities have been changing, not only since the end of apartheid, but during and prior to apartheid, too. The traditional Afrikaner masculinities that have been problematised under the post-apartheid dispensation bear histories of social change, breaks and resistances to the knowledge of what an Afrikaner man was and should be. Despite notions that “the Afrikaner National Party froze South African society in the 1950s” (Morrell, 2001, p. 16), of unchanging traditional Afrikaner values, and despite the fact that South Africa was sealed off from the international media during apartheid, Afrikaner masculinities were shaped profoundly by changes within the social, political and economic landscape, within the country and abroad, by a modernising world and by a range of international cultural icons (du Pisani, 2001; Morrell, 2001).

During the 1960s, for example, a schism between an older and a younger generation of Afrikaner men opened up and “hegemonic masculinity became more contested than ever before” (du Pisani, 2001, p. 163). However, this transformation was not a new indifference to the ideals of puritan Afrikanerdom, or their replacement with new values; rather, puritan Afrikaner masculinity...
masculinity remained hegemonic, governing over the conduct of Afrikaner men, whether in authoritarian enforcement of these ideals, in conservative obedience to them or in rebellious defiance of them (Grundlingh, 2008; cf. Morrell, 2001). The fragmentation of Afrikaner masculinity into Afrikaner masculinities was provided with its very terms of engagement by traditional Afrikanerdom and the pursuit of forbidden pleasure was to transgress precisely these values.

A good example du Pisani (2001) provides is the Afrikaans jokes in circulation at the time, which became increasingly sexual in content, frequently involving stories of drunkenness, reflecting a new permissiveness that unsettled puritan Afrikanerdom. But the coordinates of this enjoyment in lewdness and hedonism, evident in the jokes and other forms of escapism of the time, were derived from a hegemonic puritanical Afrikaner masculinity. Thus, the tension running through du Pisani’s argument is that there were various transformations in Afrikaner masculinity – and he emphasises the increasing liberalisation of Afrikanerdom, the battle between “the verkramptes (arch-conservatives) and verligtes (enlightened or open minded ones) in the late 1960s” (p. 168), which saw the verligtes ascending and taking hold of the morality of Afrikaners from the 1970s onwards – into Afrikaner masculinities, but these fractured masculinities remained firmly in the grip of old-fashioned puritan traditional Afrikaner ideals, a point both du Pisani (2001) and Morrell (2001) make, but underemphasise. Within the range of Afrikaner deviant masculinities – from the more verligte reformers to the outright antagonists, to homosexual Afrikaner men who lived against what traditional Afrikanerdom saw as God’s Natural Law – all were elaborated according to an internalisation of the conservative ideals of piety, rather than as a break with these ideals.

91 Morrell (2001) refers to various media images, to changes in the economy and the emergence of affluent and influential Afrikaner figures that “shifted the centre of hegemonic Afrikaner masculinity” (p. 23). While in certain instances this may have been true, there is also a marked poverty of new symbols of Afrikaner masculinity, a recirculation of trusted tropes and heroic figures in these supposed “shifted” centres. As Albert Grundlingh (2008) notes, “To the well worn epic tale of farmers who tamed the ‘wild’ interior, was added a new dimension of ‘Voortrekkers as business entrepreneurs’ in the Transvaal and Free State” (p. 146). The point here is that even deviations from traditional notions of Afrikanerdom were represented in older terms.

92 Admittedly, this may be in line with Morrell and du Pisani’s attempts to denaturalise gender difference, to break away from notions of essential Afrikaner and African masculinities. My point, though, is not about an essential core to Afrikaner masculinity, but about the limitations of the transformations in Afrikaner masculinities, the scarcity of new forms, even if they masqueraded as new, particularly when these took form as defiance of the old traditional modes of Afrikaner masculinity.

93 Regarding the rebellious figure of journalist, Max du Preez (former editor of the famous apartheid-era anti-apartheid newspaper, Vrye Weekblad), “the epitome of non-conservative Afrikaner masculinity,” du Pisani (2001) says, “despite his unorthodox tendencies something in him reminds one of puritanism” (p. 171).
In concluding his analysis, du Pisani states, “It is not easy to determine the exact nature of contemporary Afrikaner hegemonic masculinity and its direction” (p. 172). Indeed, it remains to be seen to what degree Afrikaner puritanism remains the matrix according to which post-apartheid Afrikaner masculinities are articulated. To what extent and in what ways are anti-apartheid post-apartheid Afrikaner identity claims still in the grip of an internalised puritan conservatism that is rebelled against? Are the identity claims of young Afrikaner men still grounded by the terms of traditional Afrikanerdom? Have the post-apartheid Afrikaner youth been seeking the same inverted approval of Afrikanerdom, addressing their identity claims to an Afrikaner patriarch, asking not for his approval, but for his condemnation?

We hear echoes of du Pisani’s argument in the way Vestergaard (2001) places Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa into two broad, but mutually constitutive categories: “Heterodox Afrikaners welcome the new challenges and champion the opening of the social field, while the orthodox resist change and cling to established values” (p. 20). Vestergaard’s categorisation is interesting in that Afrikanerdom has remained a site of subject formation. Apartheid monuments, which served as symbolic support for Afrikanerdom, as Vestergaard points out, are exemplary in this regard: for some, these monuments nostalgically hark back to the days of Afrikaner nationalism (the orthodox, conservative position), for others they are symbolically significant as points at which to direct derision (the heterodox position); but for neither category is there indifference towards these monuments.

An example Vestergaard uses of heterodox Afrikaner identity is the Bitterkomix series, the satirical comic magazine started in 1992 by Anton Kannemeyer and Conrad Botes. Bitterkomix is explicit – it borders on the pornographic – and political in content and has, over the years, been controversial. As Vestergaard notes, “One finds everything from explicit sex to violence and blasphemy in its irreverent pages, as its creators consciously play with the taboos of Christian nationalism, deconstruct historical myths, and ridicule the stereotypes of the Afrikaners” (p. 35). Whilst orthodox Afrikaners are obsessed with the myths of Afrikanerdom, so too are heterodox Afrikaners (see also Marais, 2010).

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94 They are mutually constitutive in that each requires the other: heterodox Afrikaners define themselves against conservative orthodox Afrikaners, who view heterodox Afrikaners as contaminating the purity of Afrikanerdom (Vestergaard, 2001).
95 On Bitterkomix, Danie Marais (2010) writes in a postscript to a more recent collection by Kannemeyer, Papa in Afrika, that “The publication had the paternalistic sins, bigotry and racist attitudes of our Afrikaner nationalist fathers in its sights” (p. 91).
The dragon’s teeth, to return to Alexander’s (2002) phrase, that grew into the conflicts played out in the pages of *Bitterkomix* – the “seething moral indignation and self-loathing” (Marais, 2010, p. 91) – were sewn before the time of the TRC, but whatever was planted during the commission found fertile soil in Kannemeyer and Botes’ work. Indeed, it has been suggested that *Bitterkomix* continued the work of the TRC in the sphere of popular culture (Barnard, 2004). As Rita Barnard (2004), puts it, “*Bitterkomix* re-examines the legacy of apartheid on behalf of their target readership: disaffected young Afrikaners, who despise the old South Africa but are confused and anxious about their place in the new one” (p. 720). Clearly, though, this widens the scope of the TRC, whose focus was on gross human rights violations with political intent; *Bitterkomix*, by contrast, takes on the everyday, domestic violations and private obscenities of Afrikaner nationalism: “Strip after strip satirizes the hypocrisy, venality, and outright perversion of parents, teachers, dominees and politicians” (p. 722).

As a criticism of this kind of satire, in her recent book, *Afrikaners in the New South Africa*, Davies (2009) notes of the apartheid-era dissident Afrikaners that, “What is most evident is that this relentless barrage of ridicule, disillusionment, malaise and creativity was, and in many respects continues to be, virtually an entirely internal affair, part and parcel of the grouping’s broad cultural pantheism” (p. 109). The point Davies is making here is that, on the one hand, their critique did not go to great lengths in recognising the tribulations of others outside Afrikanerdom and, on the other, critical of tradition as these Afrikaners were, a tradition of dissident Afrikanerdom was “embraced in part by the very establishment they derided” (p. 109).

Contemporary younger Afrikaners frequently invoke the dissident Afrikaners who opposed the National Party during apartheid, lending their defence of Afrikaans language and culture legitimacy, pursued “on a basis of opposition to Afrikaner nationalism and white privilege” (Nash, 2000, p. 348).96 For a younger generation of Afrikaners seeking to establish a post-apartheid South African identity, a set of discursive resources has been provided by the anti-apartheid dissident Afrikaners, itself a heterogeneous set of movements. In the context of the festival, this is particularly true of the Voëlvry movement of the late 1980s.

The Voëlvry movement reached its highpoint in a 1989 nationwide tour, during which tour manager, Dagga-Dirk Uys and musicians, Koos Kombuis (formerly Andre du Toit, then Andre

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96 Nash (2000) does, however, also note that this appropriation “brushes aside a theme which was essential to their critique: that the need for Afrikaners to demonstrate their solidarity with the majority of the oppressed South Africans by upholding common principles and values” (p. 348).
Letoit) – Kombuis, it will be recalled, was the first musician to perform on the farm at the Oppikoppi band weekends in 1994 – Bernoldus Niemand (James Phillips), Johannes Kerkorrel (Ralph Rabie), Piet Pers (Gary Herselman), Hannepoort van Tonder (Jannie van Tonder), Karla Krimpalien (Tonia Selley) and Willem Moller played to packed audiences of mostly young white Afrikaners at university campuses and town halls, preaching against the insanity of apartheid. With sponsorship from the Vrye Weekblad, the then newly launched anti-establishment weekly newspaper, and from Shifty Records, an independent South African recording company, and armed with music, irony, alcohol, dagga (marijuana) and intense frustration at the suffocation of life under apartheid, the musicians became a scathing satire of the ideals, institutions, idiosyncrasies and monuments of Afrikaner Nationalism.

Laubscher (2005) argues that in the Voëlvry generation there was, for many white Afrikaner men, a sense of not being able to locate themselves, see themselves reflected, in the symbolic world of apartheid, in its familial relations, its social networks and its institutional injunctions to be a particular kind of man. There was, as Laubscher puts it, “an inability to find oneself in the father” (p. 324). Yet there was, at that point, no other language within which to live. In this regard we can refer to the parodic name changes the musicians assumed, which mark a renunciation of the father’s name, quite literally; but it is a renunciation and a vacation that, as Laubscher notes, cannot but continue to “dwell in its grammar and logic” (p. 324). Indeed, the musicians, as their stage names indicate, became the parodic doubles of precisely what they were criticising.97

Debate on whether Voëlvry actually brought about any substantial sociopolitical change during apartheid has tended to conclude that it contributed little to the downfall of the regime. As Grundlingh (2004) states, “It was mainly a middle class movement which in the eighties sought to redefine elements of Afrikaner ethnicity without fully rejecting it” (p. 22). Likewise, Andries Bezuidenhout (2007) suggests Voëlvry was “a critique of what apartheid did to the ‘self,’ not the ‘other’” (p. 10). The point also needs to be raised that the late 1980s, although significant as one of the most militant stretches in apartheid history and thus a tumultuous period in which to be

97 Grundlingh (2004) has drawn attention to the appropriative tactics that underpinned the successes of the tour. Most notably, he cites the military experience Dagga-Dirk Uys had gained in the South African Defence Force (SADF), which, as manager of the tour, he utilised in organising a set of events under police surveillance. Another example he refers to is Johannes Kerkorrel’s song ‘Sit Dit Af’ (Turn it Off) which turned President P.W. Botha’s proclamation of the evils of television, as something that should be turned off, against the apartheid regime. In the case of the latter, as Grundlingh observes, Kerkorrel ironically used the culture of obedience inculcated in Afrikaner youth to tell them what to do: shout, in unison, what they thought should be done about apartheid.
standing up to the government, was quite an overdue joining of the struggle, meaning that this oppositional stance can be understood as being as much about adaptation to change, as about political resistance (see Truscott, 2011b).

In this regard, Grundlingh (2004) presents an interesting, but provisional argument on the continued significance of Voëlvry in post-apartheid South Africa: that it “represented a dimension of Afrikaner culture untainted by apartheid” (p. 21). As such, Grundlingh proposes that Voëlvry provides a past “compatible with post-apartheid society” (p. 21), a politically respectable past giving this younger generation a sense of continuity with the history of South Africa. Grundlingh is no doubt correct in his assessment; what I want to develop, though, is how Voëlvry has provided a mode of relating to the history of Afrikanerdom, an orientation to the past, rather than simply a past that is compatible with the conditions of being a subject of the post-apartheid nation. To what extent does a parodic relation to history align with strategies that seek to bring about a collective gathering against a history of racial oppression? Does such a relation to the past attain, for white South Africans, the status of being South African? And what effects does this orientation engender in terms of recognising the past as an injustice, specifically in the context of Oppikoppi and its identification with the Voëlvry movement? To what extent and in what ways is it recognised as South African, and in what ways does it recognise other South Africans?

What I have discussed above are not isolated instances of the parody of the apartheid past. In her contribution to the book, Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis, Nuttall (2008) analyses forms of representation that recirculate images of the past, but in ways that undo, confound or change the meanings they have historically held. As she puts it, these texts are “quite different from before, even as they cite or acknowledge a past, a deeper history, which is, they assert, gone but not entirely to be discarded” (p. 92). The surface of these forms of representation, as Nuttall argues, recalls the apartheid past, which is reworked.98

Of particular interest here is Nuttall’s consideration of two advertisements for K-Swiss shoes that, she argues, reimagine race in post-apartheid South Africa, producing a commoditised

98 In the Foucauldian approach Nuttall adopts, the images of the past are taken to be technologies of subjectivity – now disinvested of their forceful grasp on individual subjects – which are elaborated as technologies of the self, in self-stylisations. As Foucault (1988) outlines the concept, technologies of self offer subjects a means of acting on their own “bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (p. 18). The important point here is that technologies of the self are enacted by individuals themselves, sometimes in relations with others.
image of difference that parodies well known scenes from South Africa’s apartheid past. The first advertisement pictures three onlookers, all dressed in white, including the shoes being advertised, standing beneath a “whites only” sign, while a man dressed in non-white colours is loaded into a police van. The second advertisement pictures a urinal scene, where three men are urinating beneath “whites only” signs and, again, the men are dressed in white, wearing white K-Swiss shoes, while a man in non-white clothes mops the floor. The first advertisement recalls scenes of pass laws arrests of black South Africans during the 1970s, while the second invokes the petty apartheid of segregated micro-spaces, separate ablutions, park benches, eating utensils and so on, “which functioned,” as Nuttall notes, “as key loci for the staging of humiliation” (p. 109), which are here parodically and ironically recast to stage an arrest of style illegality or illegitimacy premised on rules other than those racial infringements recalled by the image.

Nuttall’s analysis of these advertisements raises a relevant question for this study. Why would the recitation of some of the most disagreeable – and, indeed, humiliating – aspects of life under apartheid attain such a commodity value? The answer Nuttall provides concerns what she calls “the psychic life of things” (p. 111), entailing questions of the “desires they organize” and the “fantasies they provoke” (p. 111). These images, Nuttall argues, act as a circuit through which the desire to transcend race can be produced and circulated; that is to say, they mobilise a fantasy of a non-racial society (Nuttall, 2008). This is what makes them a commodity, able to close the gap instituted by apartheid history, producing an image of a society moving ever away from a racialised past, which is why the past must be referenced. It is in this sense that Nuttall writes, “For while the commodity seems to eliminate the gap, it must constantly reopen it in order to propel new desires – to sell itself” (p. 113).

There are strong resonances in Nuttall’s (2008) work with de Kock’s notion of the seam, noted in chapter one – the seam must constantly conjure difference in order to erase it – both of which raise the issue, once more, of how Afrikaners in particular, but also white South Africans in general, are to approach a problematised past in post-apartheid public culture. Particularly relevant in this regard is Annie Coombe’s (2003) *History After Apartheid*, where an aspect of her analysis looks at the Voortrekker monument, a structure that, perhaps more than any other in South Africa, has come to symbolise a discredited Afrikaner nationalist past. What, Coombes asks, are the possibilities for its rehabilitation and reinvention? Rather than destroying or removing this monument, as occurred in former Eastern bloc countries, Coombes argues that
“the monument has become a staging post for self-fashioning for both white and black constituents across the political spectrum” (p. 25).

As an example of this “self-fashioning,” Coombes looks at a 1995 photo shoot for Loslyf, an Afrikaans language pornographic magazine, where a female descendent of the voortrekkers, “Dina – Loslyf’s indigenous flower of the month” (Loslyf, June 1995 cited in Coombes, 2003, p. 40), was photographed on the grounds of the monument, scantily clad, wearing leopard print shorts, frolicking in the wild thickets of grass around the monument. On one level, Coombes reads this as a transgressive set of images, as “one kind of slap in the face for the Calvinist puritanism of Afrikaner nationalists” (p. 40). Indeed, a theme of most of the examples Coombes looks at is the defilement of the monument; but, in the case of the Loslyf shoot, it is also a complex form of violating Afrikaner nationalist mythology, as Dina, portrayed here as a “child of the South African wilderness” recirculates a trope used “to enhance the Trekker’s claim to the land through demonstrating a special affinity with the rugged natural environment” (Coombes, 2003, p. 40).

The potentia
tional recuperation of this problematic claim to the land is hedged by the fact that it is represented in the pages of Loslyf by a figure who, although flesh and blood of the Afrikaners, is not the ideal volksmoeder – subservient, pure and concerned with procreation and homemaking. Dina as Amazon, as Coombes argues, unsettles the gendered positions within Afrikaner mythology. One consequence of this, for Coombes, is the possibility Loslyf offered sections of the Afrikaner community disaffected with Afrikanerdom and its conservatism an opportunity for disidentification with, and differentiation from, a discredited Afrikaner tradition – she also, however, emphasises that this was not necessarily a politically progressive move. Coombes concludes by suggesting that, rather than falling into obscurity and unimportance since 1994, the Voortrekker monument has assumed perhaps more significance than it did during apartheid precisely because it offers the opportunity for transgression. In this way the symbolism of the myth of Afrikaner nationalism has been retained as a stage for performative post-apartheid transgressions.

This emerging self-consciousness figured in irony and parody is, it should be emphasised, a kind of post-apartheid South African self-consciousness, rather than a strictly white South African or Afrikaner one – it can also be seen, for example, in the work of contemporary South African photographers. In ‘Figures and Fictions: South African Photography in the Perfect
Tense,’ Tamara Garb (2011) notes how a colonial and apartheid photographic past – in specific, an ethnographic and an anthropological gaze – is referenced in the work of contemporary South African photographers. Garb writes of the ways in which “it is the visual culture of the past that provides the material for poetic and parodic subversion” (p. 17) and she does so with reference to a range of contemporary South African photographers, from different backgrounds, all of whom, in different ways, parody its conventions of picturing subjects, disrupt its vocabularies of seeing and undermine its taxonomic effects, its production of alterity.

The significance of research on negative memory – in particular, a parodic relation to the history of South Africa – comes into focus in chapter six. As I show there, this kind of transgression of the past reveals not only desires to transcend the past, as so many have argued, but also precisely its opposite: a means of retaining an attachment to it. In certain instances, negative memory figures, I will argue, a failure to mourn fully the colonial and apartheid past; indeed, an unconscious desire for it. Although the transgression of the past is the most pronounced condition of national belonging, this does not necessarily mean that the past is conjured in order to transcend it. It is also conjured because, under conditions where the founding commandment is not to desire the past – or desire according to it – the past has been eroticised, charged with forbidden libidinal allure, haunting the ethical conduct of the past-apartheid nation with a return – as ‘only a joke,’ as the meaning of a discursive act that exceeds intention; indeed haunting the conduct of ‘good South Africans’ with a return as transgression itself.

Conclusion
The literature reviewed in this chapter circles the issue of the constitution of the post-apartheid South African subject, paying particular attention to the white Afrikaner subject. The first part of this chapter looked at the past that was produced during the TRC, a past towards which ‘South Africans’ must, as the condition of their belonging in and to the post-apartheid nation, face and

99Perhaps most relevant of the works she discusses is Roelof van Wyk’s collection of photographs titled, ‘Young Afrikaner – A Self-Portrait.’ As Garb points out, the images utilise the grammar and form of earlier anthropometric photographers, turning this “mode of looking associated with the colonial gaze of Fritsch and Duggan-Cronin onto his own community” (Garb, 2011, p. 31). Thus, while an older mode of looking is appropriated, it is also undermined: the very purpose of the photography of Alfred Martin Duggan-Cronin was to exemplify racial type, fix and idealise difference for the European gaze, whereas in van Wyk’s images, it is the historical looker who is looked at: the Afrikaner becomes another ‘tribe,’ one that could be added to Duggan-Cronin’s extensive compendium, The Bantu Tribes of South Africa.
recognise as an injustice. The chapter then took up three themes that were read within this context.

Firstly, the *multicultural alliances of post-apartheid Afrikaner South Africanness*: while there appear to be marked anxieties over their place within the anti-apartheid ‘multicultural’ nation, Afrikaners have forged various strategic alliances with other white, black and coloured South Africans. This has produced not only a set of competing versions of Afrikanerness, but also, as will become significant in the analysis of the Oppikoppi festival discourse, the figure of the unreformed Afrikaner subject. As we will see, it is against this figure that the ‘good post-apartheid white subject’ can frequently recuperate the very privilege that is to be relinquished as the condition of post-apartheid belonging.

Secondly, the discourse of ‘going wild’: many white South Africans, particularly Afrikaners, have experienced an unsettled relation to the land, as well as a sense of psychic dislocation since the end of apartheid. In reaction to this, there have been withdrawals of various kinds into enclaves, setting whites perhaps as apart – if not more so – than they were during apartheid. In this context, ‘going wild’ has offered one way of assuming an anti-apartheid position, of recognising the conservativism of this kind of racialised insularity. However, this ‘going wild’ remains firmly within the old and familiar imaginary of the ‘racial other.’

Indeed, the third theme taken up, the *parody of the past* that has become a more and more prominent feature of post-apartheid popular culture, particularly amongst Afrikaners, could, likewise, be said to transgress the past while remaining within its ‘grammar and logic,’ as Laubscher (2005) has put it. In the literature reviewed under these three headings, the place of Afrikaners in contemporary South Africa, whether explicitly or implicitly, entails a negotiation of a relation to the past, a past with which Afrikanerness is entangled, and against which the post-apartheid nation has constituted itself. As we will see in the analysis chapters, this has produced a set of conflicts in the constitution of the white Afrikaner South African subject, but a set of conflicts that have, nonetheless, been managed. Let me now turn to the methodology chapter where I outline more fully how I have approached these issues.
THEORY AND METHOD

Discourse, fantasy and the subject

Introduction

Discourse analysis and psychoanalysis

When speaking of discourse analysis as a research method, there is no one form of which to speak; there are various kinds. And if we concede that discourse analysis has become something of a “growth industry” (Hook, 2001, p. 521), we might say that there are various brands of discourse analysis on the marketplace of social psychological research (e.g. Billig, 1997; Fairclough, 1995; Parker, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). One cannot, however, speak of discourse analysis, at least discourse analysis as it is done by social psychologists, without reference to Foucault. Although the term discourse has a long history and was in usage long before Foucault, and although it has been used by other thinkers, Barthes and Lacan, as examples, for most social psychologists it was out of Foucault’s writings, particularly his earlier archaeological works, that the notion of discourse emerged, and from which these different forms of analysis derive their assumptions, even if they deviate from and improvise upon them.¹⁰⁰

Foucault’s archaeological works, *Madness and Civilization* (1964), *The Order of Things* (1970) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973) contained very little in the way of “methodological signposting” (Foucault, 1972, p. 18). It was only in two later texts that he provided anything in the way of a guide to the employment of the notion of discourse. Firstly, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), where he reflected back on his previous works, defining and outlining his approach which, up to that point, had not been fully articulated. And secondly ‘The Order of Discourse,’ Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970 (Foucault, 1981), where he reflected on his previous works, but also looked forward, outlining the studies he would in time undertake, supplementing his archaeological approach, bringing to it an at that

¹⁰⁰ From this point on other usages of discourse will be ignored, but it is perhaps worth noting that most definitions of discourse are “influenced by the thesis that language, and symbolic systems in general, is not an expression of subjectivity, but rather the agency that produces subjectivity by positioning human beings as subjects” (Macey, 2001, p. 100). And this would be true of Foucault’s approach, too.
point under-theorised dimension of power. It is primarily to these two works that I have turned in developing my approach, which focuses on the constitutive function of discourse, the way discourse produces and constrains objects and subjects of knowledge and their possible relations. In this sense my approach is more archaeological than genealogical, but incorporates certain of Foucault’s later insights on knowledge and power.

Likewise, there is no unified version of psychoanalysis to speak of, let alone an accepted technique of analysis for phenomena outside of the clinic. Freud’s writings have been variously appropriated and adapted in different locations by scholars from a range of academic disciplines. This move, from the clinic into social spheres of everyday life – although made by Freud as early as 1900 in The Interpretation of Dreams, followed up in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), and in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) – was in large part enabled by the reformulations of Freud’s ideas, in light of structural linguistics, by French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan. And one can no longer read Freud without at least taking seriously these reformulations, even if one does not follow them, and their development in different disciplines.  

Graham Hayes (2002) has stated in his consideration of whether psychoanalysis has anything to offer in a post-apartheid sociopolitical context, “I don’t think that psychoanalysis is a social theory, but I certainly do think that it can be part of social theory” (p. 16). Most frequently psychoanalysis has been paired with Marxism. A crucial point to emphasise here, in employing Freud with Foucault, and utilising psychoanalysis with discourse analysis, is that – as noted in chapter one but it bears repetition here – the unconscious is not taken here to lie in the hidden interior depths of the mind, but, rather, in the overdetermination of the language that

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101 Nor can one read Freud without taking note of the development of his ideas in film studies (e.g. Mulvey, 1989; Metz, 1982), literary studies (e.g. Rose, 2003) and philosophy (e.g. Žižek, 1989), without consideration of the feminist critiques and appropriations (e.g. Butler, 1990, 1997; de Lauretis, 2008, 1998) of psychoanalysis – indeed, separating feminist critiques from literary studies and film studies developments would be a mistake, as some of the best critiques have come from feminist scholars who do not necessarily want to do away with psychoanalysis. Nor should one read Freud without at least noting the various occasions a “crisis of psychoanalysis” has been declared (e.g. Fromm, 1970) – indeed, because of its founding principle, the unconscious, it should be perpetually undoing itself, in a state of crisis (Rose, 2003; see also Parker, 2008, pp. 155-157) – and without paying attention to the resurgence of interest in Freud in postcolonial studies, particularly Freud read through Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks.

102 Not only in the work of the Frankfurt School (e.g. Fromm, 1970; Marcuse, 1966) and in Fanon’s (1986) Black Skins, White Mask, which itself inspired a range of postcolonial critiques that followed in the path it broke with Freud and a Marxist-inspired notion of alienation, but also in the work of Žižek (1989) on the concept of the symptom, and that of film scholar, Laura Mulvey (1996), who looks at Freud and Marx’s different conceptualisations of the fetish. Certainly thinking with Freud and Marx, together, would have much to offer a psychosocial critique of the post-apartheid situation.
precedes the subject, in the “nets of the signifier” in which the subject is caught and out of which it is produced (Thom, 2003, p. 34).

What we can now call ‘psychoanalytic discourse analysis’ – and as I have hopefully made plain, this is not my approach here – is by no means a novel methodological approach. But in bringing together these two modes of analysis, these two modes of knowledge production, even if as two distinct types of archaeological analysis, it needs to be noted that Foucault was consistently uncomfortable with the givenness of ‘the psychological,’ with the ways in which the psy-complex, of which psychoanalysis is a part, produces the psychic realities of which they speak, with this production moving under the name of discovery. Foucault was also consistently sceptical of the emphasis frequently placed on constraint, particularly when this was conceived of as repression, as this presumes a preconstituted subject, whose full desire is thought to be alienated from the circuit of discourse, a subject, as he put it, “endowed with a consciousness that power seized upon” (Foucault, 1981, p. 58). If the subject is wholly a discursive effect, then how is it that the desire of this same subject, which does not pre-exist its discursive constitution, can be repressed?

Foucault (1981) responds to this question by outlining three divisions in the field of knowledge, three divisions that are, for Foucault, effectively forms of constraint. These three divisions are exclusions imposed from the outside of discourse – in the examples Foucault uses, the division into forbidden and permissible speech, the division between reason and madness, and the division between truth and falsehood. Here we see how Foucault (1981) conceives of constraint: discourse does in fact ‘repress’ particular forms of desire, but it does so by producing this desire, by marking it out from the very start, as a form of forbidden desire, as “a particular vacant place that may in fact be filled by various individuals” (Foucault, 1972, p. 107). Thus, Foucault (1981, 1972) treats discourse as a terrain where desire might locate itself, where it can be captured and recognised, where it can attain existence at all. This is to say, he conceives of the constraint of desire as the production of a limited number of enunciative modalities. Thus, even

103 Several scholars have proposed the pairing of psychoanalysis and discourse analysis; at least, there has been, in the work of several scholars, a mutual affinity for a Foucauldian approach and a Freudian (e.g. Bersani, 2010; Agamben, 2009; de Lauretis, 2008; Billig, 1999; Butler, 1997) or Lacanian approach (e.g. Parker, 2005, 1997; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009; Hook, 2008a); not to overlook the Kleinian variant of this pairing (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).

104 It was particularly in part three of chapter four in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 that Foucault (1978) wrote against Freud’s theory of the drives.
those excluded or unlived potentialities of a discourse, desires designated forbidden, exist as a discursive positivity, as already inscribed in discourse itself.

Even in his early work, then, Foucault troubled the assumptions of psychoanalysis. However, psychoanalysis did represent, for him, a theory of the subject that escapes some of the trappings of humanism he was so eager to avoid (Foucault, 1970). Indeed, discourse analytic work that, in different ways, utilises psychoanalysis has generated some politically incisive and theoretically astute analyses. In its best moments, this union shows how power operates at a capillary level, how it is relayed through forms of subjectivity. A qualification such an approach requires, though, is that the critical potential to historicise a form of subjectivity may be compromised when certain psychological operations are conceded “as psychological operations” (Hook, 2007, p. 60). The researcher is required, in other words, to adopt a “double ontology” (Hook, 2007, p. 60), examining, on the one hand, the historical and cultural production of psychic realities and, on the other, employing select psychoanalytic concepts as explanatory mechanisms (see, for example, McClintock, 1995).

Bringing discourse analysis and psychoanalysis together has enabled, then, two levels of analysis. What a discourse analysis draws attention to is the historical and cultural production and constraint of objects of discourse and subjects of discourse, highlighting the limited number of things that can be said, that are in fact said, and the rules that govern the speech and conduct of subjects of discourse. It has helped draw attention, in other words, to the inscription of the normative coordinates of the social in the psychic life of subjects of the post-apartheid nation. Discourse analysis, at least in early Foucault, is not, however, concerned with subjectivity as such, but with the designation of subject positions. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is able to draw attention to the psychic registration of this inscription; it is, in other words, more suited to questions of subjectivity.

Exemplary of this approach is Anne McClintock’s (1995) writing on fetishism in Imperial Leather, where the fetish is treated as both an explanatory concept and a “Western discourse on fetishism” (p. 185), a discourse with a long genealogy McClintock traces back to medieval Europe and the clash between the clergy and witchcraft, and the subsequent encounters between “radically heterogeneous worlds” (p. 186) in the colonies, centuries before psychoanalysis reframed the fetish as a sexual phenomenon. That is, while fetishism is utilised by McClintock to provide an aetiological account of particular situations, it is not universalised. Retaining some of the explanatory power of the fetish as a concept, McClintock opens its telos of desire to radical question, while writing a history of fetishism in a dialogue between psychoanalysis and social history.

This is not to suggest that some of Foucault’s later work would not have been adequate to the task of thinking about subjectivity, as opposed to subject positions. Most notably, his distinction between technologies of subjectivity and technologies of self may have been one approach to use. Likewise, a psychoanalytic approach employing a
There are many models of analysis available to contemporary social psychologists; indeed, there are many modes of critique available outside this discipline that may have been usefully employed here. I hope that I have made a case for the employment of Freud and Foucault here, but it is worth saying a few words about other approaches I did not employ directly, but have been influential. Concerned as I have been with ‘the post-apartheid’ and with ‘whiteness,’ much postcolonial critique, coming predominantly from literary studies, may have offered a useful approach to the situation analysed here. Beginning with Edward Said’s (1978) *Orientalism* and followed up by several key texts – from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1985) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?,’ the numerous works published in the *Subaltern Studies* volumes dealing with the subaltern subject and their relation to both colonialism and elite postcolonial nationalisms, to Homi Bhabha’s (1994) collection of essays, *The Location of Culture* – postcolonial critique has shown, powerfully, how the centered place occupied by Europeaness and whiteness always requires a periphery, without which it cannot exist. That is to say, without ‘Africa’ (and thus without its ‘savagery’ and ‘barbarism’), and without the ‘Orient’ (and thus without this ‘mysterious’ and ‘sinister’ other), Europeaness could not constitute itself as rational, restrained, civilised and so on (see also Ismail, 2005; Chatarjee, 1989). While postcolonial theory does not form the backbone of the critique offered here, the works of different postcolonial theorists have been introduced at opportune moments of the analysis. Furthermore, certain postcolonial theorists have been influential here, even if their work has not been cited very frequently. One such silent influence informing the analysis has been the work of Frantz Fanon, particularly in developing the two levelled model of analysis noted above.

Although there are few references to the work of Fanon in the chapters that follow, a good deal of inspiration has been drawn from a Fanonian tradition of critique, specifically those analyses that take Fanon’s (1986) *Black Skin, White Masks* as their starting point. There are two Lacanian distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic may have enabled these two levels of analysis to proceed without recourse to a Foucauldian analytics (see Parker, 2007).

107 Out of Partha Chatarjee’s work, this paper. ‘Colonialism, Nationalism, and Colonialized Women: The Contest in India’ is perhaps most relevant here. Chatarjee draws attention to the way “colonialist critics invariably repeated a long list of atrocities perpetrated on Indian women” by the ‘degenerate and barbaric’ social customs of the Indian people, which thereby justified British ‘intervention’ (p. 622) – there is thus some common ground here between Chatarjee’s analysis of nationalism’s response to ‘the women’s question’ and Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ However, Chatarjee also highlights parody as a key instrument of Indian nationalism: women who too strongly assumed the characteristics of the West were parodied in an attempt to retain a private domain of Indian spirituality untainted by the West, an ‘essence’ carried by Indian women. Parody and its relation to nationalism, as this study develops, will also become important, although in a quite different way. Particularly instructive here is Chatarjee’s view of parody as an instrument of discipline rather than as a carnivalesque jumbling of meaning.

107
specific aspects of Fanonian critique on which I have drawn here. On the one hand, the explicit ‘politicisation of the psychological’: in this regard, the ‘psychopathological conditions’ of the colonial situation were framed by Fanon as being the products of violently unequal economic, historical and social conditions, as being produced from an “internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority” (Fanon, 1986, p. xv). In other words, Fanon politicised and historicised ‘the psychological’ – and here, bearing in mind Roediger’s (1991) assertion noted in the previous chapter regarding the misery whites accept for themselves, we might say that certain ‘psychological complexes’ have also emerged out of an internalisation of a position of historical dominance. What, Fanon’s ‘politicisation of the psychological’ allows us to ask, are the social, historical and economic conditions of ‘white post-apartheid South Africanness’?

But Fanon’s ‘psycho-politics’ also strategically employed select psychoanalytic concepts in colonial situations, which “help to dramatise the logic and working of such forms of power” (Hook, 2004a, p. 115) – indeed, Fanon showed the relevance of psychoanalysis to the colonial situation, and to formations of race more generally, which has been furthered by various postcolonial scholars, most notably Bhabha (1994), who incidentally also demonstrated the utility of Foucault for postcolonial critique. While much of the analysis in this study has a historicising and politicising aim, pursued through the use of a Foucauldian frame, I have also set to work various psychoanalytic concepts with the intention, in the precise Fanonian sense, of ‘dramatising’ the power relations of post-apartheid racial politics as they play out in a cultural sphere. There is, then, in these two aspects, both a bringing of history and politics into ‘the psychological’ and the use of psychoanalytic concepts to critique ‘the political’ (see Hook, 2012, 2004a, 2004b).

However much postcolonial theory has been influential, though, the Derridean deconstruction that has been so central to postcolonial critique has been overlooked here, or even extracted. No doubt a deconstruction of post-apartheid whiteness would have unsettled it in different ways to an archaeology – in the Foucauldian and Freudian senses of archaeology. What Derrida would not have been able to resolve, though, and what has been a tremendous challenge for this study, is the task of using, and doing, theory from the South. To the question of
whose theories we should use, I don’t believe any but the most radical, and perhaps foolhardy, would argue for ignoring Western scholars completely.

My use of Freud and Foucault – particularly Freud – stands open to a critique from at least two camps: the more orthodox, clinically oriented Freudians would likely charge me with taking Freudian theory too far from its clinical context; postcolonial scholars may charge me with too strong a fidelity to Freud and Foucault, for not unsettling their theories sufficiently, for not accounting for how they are coterminous with Western domination. Other questions may be – and I have thought about these a great deal – why not only Fanon, or at least more Fanon? Why Freud rather than Lacan? Why Foucault’s earlier work rather than his more popular genealogical approach? And why Foucault rather than Marx? One cannot please everyone, and I have used Freud and Foucault in ways that seemed fit to make a political critique of the post-apartheid situation – for whatever reason, it was consistently Foucault’s archaeological writings and Freud’s metapsychological works (read in light of postcolonial and feminist developments and critiques) that seemed to open up the festival discourse in useful ways. As for unsettling psychoanalytic and Foucauldian theory, that was not my primary objective in this study.

In the section below I turn to a more thorough definition of discourse, outlining the way it has been utilised in analysing the discourse of, and on, Oppikoppi music festival. Following this, I turn to a set of psychoanalytic texts that have helped in thinking through the psychic registration of the discursive constraints according to which the festival has formed itself. And in the final section of this chapter I look at the source materials that I have analysed in chapters four, five and six.

**Discourse and discourse analysis**

In his archaeological studies and in his two works where he outlined his methodological approach to the analysis of discourse, Foucault, it has already been noted, was concerned with analysing *scientific* discourse. Of course, I have not been dealing with different scientific fields of knowledge here, or with the work of scientists, but with various discursive statements, made by different people – journalists, festival organisers, festival goers, musicians, cultural critics and bloggers – who have produced knowledge about a particular ‘South African’ festival. Indeed, Foucault (1972) anticipated just such a transplantation of his archaeological frame. To the questions “Is archaeology concerned only with sciences? Is it always an analysis of scientific
discourse?” Foucault (1972) responds: “What archaeology tries to describe is not the specific structure of science, but the very different domain of knowledge” (p. 215). Under the heading of “Other Archaeologies” (p. 212), Foucault provided some thoughts on how an analysis of various kinds of discourse might proceed (see also Fairclough, 1995).

Regarding an analysis of art, Foucault opposed his archaeological approach to the usual analytic objective of uncovering the latent discourse of the artist, “the murmur of his intentions” (p. 213), wherein an analysis would be aimed at the discovery of the secret meaning of the work of art. An archaeological analysis, by contrast, shows how the details of the work of art, its dimensions and its proportions, its colours and its themes, the techniques used, even the gestures of the artist, are, from the start, elaborated as a part of a discursive practice (Foucault, 1972). The question is thus not what art expresses, but how it is produced and constrained by the discursive practices of which it is an elaboration. Building on this proposition, Foucault suggested that the political behaviour of a society could be analysed in a similar manner, where the behaviour of a particular class, group or society is shown to be “shot through with a particular describable discursive practice” (p. 214). The objective in such an analysis is to “define the element in politics that can become an object of enunciation, the forms this enunciation may take, the concepts that are employed in it, and the strategic choices that are made in it” (p. 214). It is on these notions that I focus below – object of discourse, forms of enunciation, concepts and strategies – highlighting the questions they raise for Oppikoppi.

The formation of objects
Foucault (1972) outlines three elements to the formation of objects. The first element is “the first surfaces of their emergence” (p. 45), the point at which an object of discourse makes its appearance as an object of discourse. As Foucault (1964) states in his preface to Madness and Civilization, “We must try to return in history to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of division itself” (p. xi). His question was, thus, at what point did madness emerge as a differentiated object to be studied, as an object to be examined, diagnosed and treated?

\[^109\] As Fairclough (1995) argues, a Foucauldian approach to discourse “can be extended beyond formally organised disciplines or sciences to the entities recognised in ordinary life” (p. 41) – not only ‘madness’ or ‘criminality’ as objects, but also to “the constitution of ‘nation’ and ‘race,’ or ‘freedom’ and ‘enterprise’” (p. 41).
The second element to the formation of objects Foucault (1972) outlines is the “authorities of delimitation” (p. 46), the institutions able to speak of an object authoritatively. Continuing with the example of madness, Foucault (1964) focussed his analysis on the medical profession and its institutions, which assumed a position of authority in speaking of madness as an object. In addition, he looked at the law and religious institutions that assumed the right to differentiate the supernatural from the insane, as well as art and literary criticism.

Thirdly, Foucault (1972) notes the “grids of specification” (p. 46) according to which a discourse classifies, groups, categorises or specifies an object, for instance, the diagnostic criteria according to which madness is recognised, differentiated and treated.

The focus in the analysis is thus discursive objects, rather than the objects in themselves. As Foucault puts it,

To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance. To write a history of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of primal soil, but deploys the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersion (p. 53).

Two things are highlighted in this above quote. Firstly, the productivity of discourse, the way discourse forms objects, rather than refers to or names them. And secondly, the rules of formation according to which objects are discursively produced. At a basic level, then, a Foucauldian discourse analysis proceeds by describing the formation of objects according to these three elements: the first surfaces of emergence, the authorities of delimitation and the grids of specification. Of central importance here are the relations between different domains of discursive action, and their interdependency in forming objects of discourse, as Fairclough (1995) puts it, “the totality of discursive practices within an institution or society, and the relationships between them” (p. 43).110

I have already noted in the introductory chapter that I have been concerned with Oppikoppi as an object of knowledge that can be declared, and can declare itself, ‘South African’ or be problematised as ‘un-South African,’ as well as with the festival as a knowledge producing

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110 While most discursive psychologists emphasise the situated nature of discursive action (e.g. Potter & Edwards, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), this widens the scope of that situation, beyond the micro-context of discursive action, to a broader inter-textual set of relations within which the rules of formation exert their force.
institution. Certainly when the festival began informally in 1994 it was not this sort of discursive object; nor, for that matter, did post-apartheid ‘South Africanness’ exist as a describable entity. At what point, we should ask, was it possible to declare the South Africanness of the festival? What were the never fully formulated ‘grids of specification’ according to which such a declaration could be made? Indeed, what were the conditions according to which a division between ‘the South African’ and ‘the un-South African’ could be made? And who was able to make such a declaration? This provides a set of preliminary questions that enable a description of the archaeological level of the knowledge produced on ‘South Africanness’ in the context of the festival, but we need to take this further with regards to how this objectification produces subjects of this discourse.

**Formation of enunciative modalities**

Foucault (1972) outlines three areas of focus regarding “the formation of enunciative modalities” (p. 55). The first is the position of the speaking subject in discourse; that is, the *subject positions* of a discourse. Foucault asks,

> Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (*langage*)? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse? (p. 55)

The second area of enquiry Foucault highlights is the institutional sites at which a discourse invests in subjects certain positions of authority, their warrants of speaking in particular ways, their status as a particular kind of speaking subject. As Foucault puts it, an analysis should focus on the sites “from which this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and points of application)” (p. 56).

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111 The South African nation and its ‘essence,’ *South Africanness,* are taken here as objects systematically constructed through a set of discursive practices. This study, however, has not traced the *emergence* of ‘South Africanness,’ as there has for a long time been such an object of knowledge – as Saul Dubow (2006) has shown in his book on what he calls South Africanism, *A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility and White South Africa 1820-2000* – but there has been a major shift since the end of apartheid in what constitutes ‘South Africanness,’ and this is the object with which I have been concerned: ‘post-apartheid South Africanness.’
The third area of focus regarding the enunciative modalities of a discourse Foucault highlights is how subjects are positioned, within the institutional site at which a discourse is applied, in relation to the objects formed by a discourse. In Foucault’s exact words, “The positions of the subject are also defined by the situation that it is possible for him to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects” (pp. 57-58). The analysis thus proceeds by describing the perceptual field, the *relation between subjects and objects of discourse*, the ways of seeing and saying mobilised and enabled by a discourse.

The relation between these three elements of a discourse (the subject positions and the status with which they are invested, the institutional sites of application of a discourse and the arrangement of the perceptual field between subjects and the objects of discourse) is constitutive of the enunciative modalities of a discourse (Foucault, 1972). That is, it is this relation between these three elements, rather than “the unifying function of a subject” (p. 61) that is taken to provide the coherence for the enunciative modalities of a discourse. An individual can speak a certain language, employ a particular vocabulary, occupy a position in relation to the objects of discourse not because this enunciative modality emanates from and expresses the depths of a “thinking, knowing, speaking subject” (p. 60), a pre-discursive subject, but because it has been determined by a relation between the various elements of a discourse.\footnote{In this sense, the subject who makes a statement does not exist “outside of and independently of discourse, as the *source* of the statement” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 43, emphasis added). We have here the classic post-structuralist formulation that a subject does not speak a discourse into being or express it, but is spoken by it. According to this formulation, a subject is required to assume the characteristics and attributes of an author of the statement it has made, in order to become its author. In other words, it is the statement that pre-exists and forms the subject, rather than the other way around. The subject is an effect of the discourse, of which the statement is an elaboration.}

What is sought in a discourse analysis is a “field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity” (Foucault, 1972, p. 60). The statements that compose a discourse find their regularity neither in the objects themselves, nor in a transcendental subject, precisely because a discourse forms the objects of which it speaks, and produces the subjects of a discourse, designating a set of possible relations between objects and subjects. At a basic level, a statement is the “atom of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 90), the building block of a discourse. This, however, is not quite right, despite the fact that Foucault frequently used the term in this sense. In different moments, a statement “is not in itself a unit, but a *function* that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space” (p. 98, emphasis added). Statements necessarily entail a “material existence” (p. 112), as
Foucault puts it, “a statement must have a substance, a support, a place and a date. And when these requisites change, it too changes identity” (p. 113). Thus, a statement is defined by its context:

there is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it is always a part of a network of statements, in which it has a role, however minimal it may be, to play (Foucault, 1972, p. 111).

By “role,” Foucault means the enunciative function of a statement. When considering a statement, it is not only the subject positions available within the statement that are of concern, but also the “enunciative network that extends beyond it” (p. 112), a field of statements of which it is a part, by which it is supported, which it invokes, repeats, opposes, affirms, and so on. A statement, then, is not simply a unit of discourse; rather, a statement is characterised by a function that produces sets of relations between subjects and objects: statements assign positions to subjects, subject positions in relation to objects – this is the enunciative function of a statement. Furthermore, a statement implies a certain truth status, and the analysis of statements begins by questioning this status and the rules it has followed in acquiring it, in defining its objects and subjects, in wielding force over their possible relations to one another.

The notion of enunciative modalities has enabled me to pose a series of questions about Oppikoppi. In chapter four, I look at how the site of the festival has been formed as an object of discourse. What is the relation between the site of the festival as an object, and the festival itself as an object of knowledge? What are possible relations between the site of the festival and subjects of this discourse? If places of withdrawal have come, for white South Africans, to be equated with political regression, how, then, has this dusty farm, to which thousands have withdrawn each year since South Africa became a democracy, become an unofficial national monument? And how has it produced ‘South African’ subjects? In chapter five, I look at a discourse on the music of the festival, examining how it has become an object of knowledge. What is the relation between music as an object staged and the festival as an object? What are the possible – and proper – relations between the music of the festival and the ‘authentically South African’ subject of the festival discourse? In chapter six, what is brought into critical relief is a national past as an object of discourse. But it is a history that is not necessarily always recounted
in narrative, but a past acted out as an ironic double of itself, a past parodied. What is the relation between this discursively produced parodic double of the past and the festival as a ‘South African’ or ‘un-South African’ object or discourse? In short, the notion of enunciative modalities has enabled me to ask: what are subjects of the festival discourse able to say, to see, desire and do in relation to the objects of this discourse of Oppikoppi as a ‘South African’ event? How, we can ask drawing on these notions, does the festival enable the assumption of a position as a ‘South African’ subject? What are the constraints on speech and conduct, thought and desire, as a proper subject of the nation? What are the positions assigned to the ‘un-South African’ subject, the abnormal subject against whom the normative national subjects constitutes itself?

The formation of concepts
Foucault’s argument in outlining the processes by which objects and enunciative modalities are formed is that the coherence and unity of a discourse cannot be attributed to the objects themselves or to a transcendental subject. In describing the formation of concepts his aims are similar. As he puts it, “Rather than wishing to replace concepts in a virtual deductive edifice, one would have to describe the organization of the field of statements where they appeared and circulated” (Foucault, 1972, p. 62). This description entails, firstly, discerning the rules according to which statements are related to one another, the schemata employed in combining statements, in placing statements in succession.

Secondly, dealing specifically with the organisation of the enunciative field, Foucault highlights a “field of presence,” a “field of concomitance” and a “field of memory” (p. 64). A field of presence refers to the full range of statements made on a topic that are taken to be well argued, truthful, as having employed appropriate kinds of reasoning and, as such, can be readily invoked at any point. In referring to a field of presence Foucault suggests attention also be given to those statements that are frequently discussed and criticised in discourse, as well as those that are discussed and rejected. A field of concomitance, for Foucault, entails those statements that belong to different domains of objects, to different discourses, but which are operative in the discourse being studied, either as a reference point, as a premise or as a transferrable model. By a field of memory, Foucault has in mind statements that are no longer taken to be valid or true and no longer actively circulate within a discourse, but nevertheless come to structure understandings of affiliation, continuity and discontinuity.
Questions that emerge for the analysis here concern, as Parker (1992) puts it, how a “discourse refers to other discourses” (p. 12) or, as Gillian Rose (2007) notes, referring to the use of visual images in discourse analysis, “the web of intertextuality in which any individual image is embedded” (p. 169). A single discourse, in other words, opposes and overlaps other discourses, constitutes the same object with different emphases (Fairclough, 1995). Indeed, any single statement only assumes its meaning in relation to other texts. Foucault’s (1972) notions of a field of presence, a field of concomitance and a field of memory provide a structured approach for discerning the intertextual relations between any given statement and those other statements to which it is related. What, we are able to ask, is the temporal and geographic horizon of the statements recited in the discourse on the festival, their reach across historical periods, geographical borders and the category of statement that are invoked? And what are the horizons of the statements to which they refer? What is the relation between these different statements? How, in the discourse on the festival, have other discourses been recruited for the realisation of its objects and the production of its subjects?

As we will see in the coming chapters, the music of the festival is formed as an object of the festival discourse by recirculating relatively recent ideas on ‘multiculturalism,’ completing without ever directly referencing the founding texts of the post-apartheid nation; its horizon stretches not only a short distance backwards, though geographically the discourse it invokes extends broadly. The site of the festival, by contrast, emerges as an object through an invocation, indeed an inversion, of an older colonial myth of the African landscape as ‘wild and empty.’ And the horizons of statements that form the parodic double of the South African past occupy the middle ground of the apartheid period. By what strategies does a single location, a single event, discursively manage such a range of temporalities? What are the psychic effects for subjects of such a discordant place, such a disjunctive event? Furthermore, according to what rules can these other discourses (colonial myths of the wilderness, discourses on multiculturalism and on the apartheid past) be appropriated and set to work in the context of the festival, and related to one another? What are the procedures and stylistic requirements – in short, the ‘rules of the game’ – internal to the functioning of a discourse, which “constitutes a sort of anonymous system at the

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113 As Fairclough (1995) sums up the Foucauldian notion of concepts, it provides a “basis for the systematic investigation of relations within and between texts and types of discourse” (p. 47).
disposal of anyone who wants to or is able to use it, without their meaning or validity being linked to the one who happened to be their inventor” (Foucault, 1981, p. 59).

The formation of strategies
The formation of objects, of enunciative modalities and of concepts, together and in relation to one another, form variable themes in a discourse, which Foucault (1972) referred to as strategies. By his own admission, Foucault was somewhat vague on strategies in The Archaeology of Knowledge – perhaps because, as Deleuze (1988) points out, Foucault only properly began his analyses of strategies from Discipline and Punish, his first genealogical work, onwards – but he means by strategies the range of possible “theoretical choices” (p. 75) in a discourse, those actually pursued, as well as those which exist only as potential directions of discursive elaboration. Strategies refer to the possible ways of relating objects, of organising enunciative modalities, of arranging concepts.

The first objective in elucidating the formation of strategies is to describe the “points of diffraction of discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 73). Foucault had several meanings of diffraction in mind here, the first being “points of incompatibility: two objects, two enunciative modalities, or two concepts may appear, in the same discursive formation, without being able to enter – under pain of manifest contradiction or inconsequence – the same series of statements” (p. 73). He then characterises points of diffraction as “points of equivalence: the two incompatible elements are formed in the same way and on the basis of the same rules; the conditions of their appearance are identical; they are situated at the same level; and instead of constituting a mere defect of coherence, they form an alternative” (p. 73). Foucault brings into relief here the way in which two seemingly incongruent elements of discourse, two contradictory statements, can sit side by side, juxtaposed. Finally, he characterises points of diffraction as “link points of systematization: on the basis of each of these equivalent but incompatible elements, a coherent series of objects, forms of statement, and concepts has been derived (with, in each series, possible new points of incompatibility)” (p. 73). As with the previous three elements of discourse – objects, subjects, concepts – intertextuality, the relation between different statements within a discourse, and between different discursive formations, is of central importance.

The second objective in describing the formation of strategies concerns the “economy of the discursive constellation” (Foucault, 1972, p. 73) to which a discourse belongs. If describing
the “points of diffraction” of a discourse highlights the contradictory elements of a discourse and, in a related sense, the privileging of certain elements over others, describing the ‘economy of the discursive constellation’ brings into focus the principles of exclusion that allow elements of a discourse to present themselves as possibilities – as an object, an enunciative modality, as a concept and as a theme that is formed out of a relation between these elements.

The third objective in describing the theoretical choices of a discourse entails “the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices” (Foucault, 1972, p. 75). The strategies of a discourse are dependent on the authority of this function. Extending this notion, Foucault highlights “the rules and processes of appropriation of discourse” (p. 75) as a node of analysis: if the choices of a discourse are constrained by the function this discourse is made to serve in a field of non-discursive practices, it is necessary to describe the rules according to which this discourse can be appropriated and applied.

Furthermore, “this authority,” as Foucault states – the authority of the function that discourse is made to serve, a function out of which the relations between the objects, enunciative modalities and concepts are derived and, thus, from which the strategies of a discourse are formed – “is characterized by the possible positions of desire in relation to discourse: discourse may in fact be a place for phantasmatic representation, an element of symbolization, a form of the forbidden, an instrument of derived satisfaction” (p. 76).

Here, regarding the formation of strategies, Foucault provides a means of approaching the questions raised under the heading of the formation of concepts. Two or more seemingly contradictory statements, each forming an object of discourse in different ways, each forming subject positions in different ways, may exist within a discourse precisely because, even if their effects are different, they have been produced out of the same historical conditions, and derive their primary function from this same set of conditions. The objective in the analysis has been to describe these conditions that enable different sorts of frequently contradictory statements to hang together, coexist within the discursive formation under study.

When Foucault wrote of a system of formation, it is to these four elements of discourse (objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies), their relation to one another and their interdependencies, that he referred to as the archaeological level of knowledge. It is these rules that govern discursive practice, that have been analysed, rather than anything prior to discourse, whether an object itself, a transcendental subject, ideal knowledge or a project of progress.
Together, they constitute the conditions of knowledge production, but also a set of conditions according to which knowledge can be appropriated, deployed and operated within a given context. Let me now turn to a discussion of the psychoanalytic approach I have employed here.

**Psychoanalysis, fantasy, identification**

**Fantasy and desire**

In Laplanche and Pontalis’ (1973) definition referred to in the introductory chapter, fantasy necessarily entails prohibitions, which produce limits to desire, desire that can be satisfied only in fantasy. In a sense, it is prohibition, taken in the widest sense of the term – one form or another of disallowance or impossibility – that is the condition of fantasy, what produces the need for fantasy. As Butler (1990) puts it, “The effort to enforce a limit on fantasy can only and always fail, in part because limits are, in a sense, what fantasy loves most, what it incessantly thematizes and subordinates to its own aims” (p. 112). Limits, in Butler’s view, lead to the “eroticization of prohibition” (p. 122) and the proliferation of fantasy.

In fantasy – where there is not only the “simultaneity of prohibition and desire” (Butler, 1990, p. 112), but a co-dependence between them – defensive operations, too, are present in the scene conjured. Fantasy, while opposed to reality, is not a scene of unbridled wish fulfillment – recall in chapter one how festivals were discussed in similar terms apropos of dreams and jokes. Indeed, it is only through defensive operations, disguising prohibited desire – in the reversal into opposites, in negation of the desired object, in treating one’s own ego as the object, as Laplanche and Pontalis (1968) note – that desire can be articulated in fantasy. As Laplanche and Pontalis put it, fantasy is “a setting for desire, insofar as desire itself originates as prohibition” (p. 17, emphasis added). Thus, prohibition and defence, as much as desire for a prohibited object, are a part of the fantasy scene or setting.

Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), however, complicate their definition, particularly concerning the notion that the subject is always and only the protagonist in a fantasy, pursuing an object of desire: “It is not an object that the subject imagines and aims at, so to speak, but rather a sequence in which the subject has his own part to play and in which permutations of roles and attributions are possible” (p. 284). Certainly the inter-changeability of positions can be understood as a part of a circumlocutory articulation of prohibited desire, as a form of defensive operation, as a means of displacing forbidden desire. But Laplanche and Pontalis offer another
formulation: it is not only that the subject may assume any one of the roles within a fantasy, but that the fantasy, taken as a whole, conjures the scene of a wish and its gratification, including the obstacles to satisfaction and the defensive operations necessary for circumventing prohibition. As Laplanche and Pontalis (1968) make this point more strongly in the earlier essay, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,’

In fantasy the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught up himself in the sequence of images. He forms no representation of the desired object, but is himself represented as participating in the scene although, in the earliest forms of fantasy, he cannot be assigned any fixed place in it (hence the danger, in treatment, of interpretations which claim to do so). As a result, the subject, although always present in the fantasy, may be so in a desubjectivized form, that is to say, in the very syntax of the sequence in question (p. 17).

Butler (1990), commenting on this passage, states, “According to Laplanche and Pontalis, fantasy does not entail an identification with a single position within the fantasy: identification is distributed amongst the various elements in the scene” (p. 110). There is a difference, however, between Laplanche and Pontalis’ formulation of fantasy – where they assume that, even if the subject cannot be located in any one position, the fantasy is the setting of the desire of that subject, that is, fantasy is produced on the model of the previous gratifications of the subject to whom the fantasy belongs – and Butler’s Foucauldian take on fantasy. Regarding the notion that the subject may appear desubjectivised, as written into the organisation and syntax of the scene, rather than only as the protagonist Butler states,

There is, then, strictly speaking, no subject who has the fantasy, but only fantasy as the scene of the subject’s fragmentation and dissimulation; fantasy enacts a splitting or, perhaps better put, a multiplication or proliferation of identifications that puts the very locatability of identity in question (p. 111, emphasis added).

Butler’s commentary raises several related questions. To whom do fantasies belong? Where does one attribute agency? Are fantasies produced by imaginative subjects, that is, are they a product of pre-constituted subjects? Is fantasy a function of discourse, that is, what discourse excludes? Or is fantasy something akin to discourse, inasmuch as it serves an interpellating function? Whereas Laplanche and Pontalis (1968) seem to indicate that desubjectivisation is the case only
“in the earliest forms of fantasy” (p. 17), Butler radicalises this, proposing that we need not think of fantasy as being the sole inventions of individual subjects, opening the way for thinking of social imaginaries that *solicit identifications* from subjects, in intended ways, but also in ways that exceed the intended purpose of the discourse (see also Frosh, 2003). ¹¹⁴ Let me now turn to a discussion of the relationship between fantasy and identification in psychoanalytic theory.

**Fantasy and identification**

From the discussion above, fantasy is taken to be, at once, produced out of an exclusion of certain forms of desire from the circuit of discourse, and what, in a seemingly contradictory way, enables desire to be oriented towards the reality from which it is excluded, providing “the possibility of existing as a desiring subject” at all (de Lauretis, 2008, p. 36). That is, fantasy is a domain of desire that can exist only *as fantasy*, as not real, and at the same time it mediates a relation to objects in the external world. And it does so via the mechanism of identification, implied, in different ways, by Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 1968) and Butler (1990). What is missing here, though, is a clear definition of identification. Both Laplanche and Pontalis, and Butler use identification with little qualification; but what is the precise relation between fantasy and identification? And what is identification actually?

In *The Psychic Life of Power*, Butler (1997) states that “identifications formed from unfinished grief are the modes in which the lost object is incorporated and phantasmatically preserved in and as the ego” (p. 132). A vital point Butler raises here is that in psychoanalytic theory – and Butler is working from a Freudian perspective here – both fantasy and identification are predicated on loss, are activated by a loss, and both preserve lost objects. Identifications, as Butler puts it in very precise terms, phantasmatically preserves the lost object ‘in and as the ego,’ and this is what she referred to as ‘the archaeological remainder of unresolved grief.’ There are, then, similar conditions out of which identifications and fantasy emerge, and we can take these conditions as a starting point for understanding their relation.

Freud (1921) summarises identification in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* as follows:

¹¹⁴ In a similar way to Butler, Stephen Frosh (2003) has argued that “fantasy is not ‘just’ something that occupies an internal space as a kind of mediation of reality, but that it also has material effects, directing the activities of people and investing the social world with meaning” (p. 1554). Indeed, Frosh argues, “The psychoanalytic concept of fantasy is perhaps the most potent theoretical expression of the interpellation of the subjective into the social” (p. 1553).
First, identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way, it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-tie, as it were, by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct (p. 50).

Freud’s first form of identification concerns those prior to the Oedipus complex. Regarding this primary identification, Freud states, “A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place every where” (p. 46). Primary identification, as Freud notes, is cannibalistic in form, the loved object incorporated: “It behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase, of the organization of libido, in which the object we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such” (p. 47). It is also thus an ambivalent form of identification: tender, as the boy, to continue with this example, takes his father as his model of pursuing a loved object – the mother in this case, but also substitutes for the mother – and hostile, as the boy seeks to replace the father and, in his incorporative identification there is figured, also, a cannibalistic annihilation.

The Freudian notion of identification always entails idealisation, identification and idealisation being two distinct but inseparable forms of love bound in a libidinal arrangement. For Freud (1921), these two ways of loving correspond with love as being the object, where an ambivalent sameness – or at least movement towards taking the place of the one whom one is like or will be like – is established (identification), and love as having the object, where a difference from the object is constituted, a difference one has (idealisation). An important point here is that while identification and idealisation are separable, both having and being, as forms of love, are mutually constitutive: for the boy child, for instance, loving his mother as different from him is a means establishing likeness with his father, of taking the object his father desires as his own, and vice versa.115

The second form of identification Freud characterises as regressive, as it occurs once the Oedipus complex is already under way. In situations where an object-tie is complicated or otherwise prohibited, the object is introjected, that is, identified with as a kind of compromise:

115 Freud is only using the boy as an example, and does look at how this may play itself out in the case of a little girl, in her identifications. The father is the model on which the boy pursues the mother, on which the boy can have the mother by being like the father. Freud does, however, note that the father, too, can be taken as the object pursued, establishing “an object-tie to the father” (p. 47, emphasis added).
“identification has appeared instead of object-choice, and that object-choice has regressed to identification” (Freud, 1921, p. 48). The compromise is being the object instead of having it, “object choice is turned back into identification – the ego assumes the characteristics of the object” (pp. 48-49). Two important points that must be emphasised here are that, firstly, identification occurs under conditions of a renunciation of an object, that is, identification always entails a loss (cf. Elliot, 2004). Secondly, this attachment to an object is transformed into an identification with it, frequently figured as an oral or cannibalistic incorporation. Whereas Freud had initially seen this incorporation of a lost love object as pathological in ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ as a refusal to mourn it, by the time of writing Group Psychology (1921) and The Ego and the Id (1923), he had generalised this process, taking it as a condition of giving up lost objects, of the development of identifications, and of psychic life in general.

Freud’s third form of identification is that which binds members of a group together. Here group cohesion is a product of a collective identification with a leader or an ideal. In other words, it is this common identification, the common installation of an ego ideal – and I raised this in chapter one regarding Freud’s writing on festivals – which binds each individual to the other individuals in a group (Freud, 1921). The individual is thus libidinally bound in two directions. Firstly, by a vertical relation, between the individual and a leader or an ideal. And secondly, by the horizontal bonds which are produced out of this common identification. A question emerges here regarding the role of loss and renunciation in this third form of group identification. Are loss and renunciation implicit in all forms of identification, including group identifications?

We are provided with one answer to this question when we consider that what binds members of a group together is a common desire to have love returned by the figure of the leader, or to have love returned in identifying with the ideal that has been commonly installed as the ego ideal. Furthermore, Freud (1921) notes, “The individual feels incomplete if he is alone” (p. 64). From this, he concludes, “Opposition to the herd is as good as separation from it, and it is therefore anxiously avoided” (p. 64). Therefore, in securing returned love and in being a part

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116 As Anthony Elliot (2004) argues, identification does not require loss as such, but, as he puts it, “an elementary gap between self and other, a gap which is the very condition for the arising of the subject” (p. 81).
117 It should be stated that Freud (1921) was pessimistic about group psychology. At best, he was uncomfortable with, and suspicious of, the imitative regularity they engendered. Freud asserts that although the individual might become moral within a group, it is always an imitative morality: the mass wants to be ruled and dominated, a mass shows a lack of initiative and, most dangerously, unrestrained emotion, coupled with a diminished capacity to think
of the group, certain renunciations are required. The individual in the group would like to be special, to have love returned to it alone and in abundance. Claims to special treatment, however, threaten the individual with isolation, and with a withdrawal of love. As do hostile feelings towards others also identified with the leader.\textsuperscript{118} It would seem, then, that loss and renunciation are implied in collective identifications with a leader or with an ideal, but in a way that is different to regressive identification. It is not the case, in Freud’s (1921) conception of group identification, that the ideal collectively installed is lost, as in regressive identification, but that this identification requires certain renunciations, which may have, as an effect of these losses, certain regressive identifications, that is, certain incorporations of lost objects (\textit{cf.} Sanders, 2007).\textsuperscript{119} A crucial point here, at least for this study, is that when the limitations of group membership entail the renunciation of a loved object and where “the object is given up because it has shown itself unworthy of love” (Freud, 1921, p. 83), melancholia may ensue if in attempts to preserve the lost object it is “set up again inside the ego, by means of identification, and severely condemned by the ego-ideal” (p. 83) – in chapter six I explore in greater detail this splitting of the ego that arises out of an identification with the leader or ideal collectively installed as an ego ideal.

Ahmed’s (2004) writing on the different kinds of love that sustain multiculturalism, binding together the multicultural nation, is helpful here in taking this a step further, highlighting the role of loss and fantasy in identifications with the nation. For Ahmed, following Freud’s (1921) formulation of group identification, his third mode of identification in \textit{Group Psychology}, identification with the ideals of multiculturalism is the primary form of identification, with bonds between individuals being a secondary effect. As she puts it, “Difference becomes an ideal by being represented as a form of likeness; it becomes a new consensus that binds us together” (p.

\footnote{critically (Freud, 1921). There is perhaps something ‘anti-revolutionary’ in this wariness about groups, particularly when one considers how it might be applied to a South African situation where mass action contributed greatly to the breakdown of the apartheid state. However, it should also be noted that Freud’s pessimism also bears the stamp of the rise of fascism at the time of writing.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{118} It was in this sense that Freud (1921) argued that the demand for equality emerges out of a condition of envy, turned into a reaction formation. Furthermore, Freud notes, hostile aggressive feelings are transformed into conscience, which aggressively polices special demands for love.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{119} Freud (1921) gives little attention to the object of collective identifications being lost. Yet, as Mark Sanders (2007) has pointed out, when \textit{Group Psychology} is brought into dialogue with Freud’s thesis in \textit{Totem and Taboo}, this is precisely what collective identification with a leader or ideal entails. In \textit{Totem and Taboo}, it is the \textit{murder of the primal father} that leads to the formation of the social. In this sense the object of identification is lost, not prior to the identification, but rather identification (taking the place of) is ‘murderous,’ and it is identification that leads to loss. The primal father is then incorporated in being devoured by the sons.}
The cohesion of the multi-cultural nation – at a descriptive level, a diverse population – is made possible on the grounds of being able to imagine a common wish to have love returned for approximating the ideals of multiculturalism.

Ahmed provides a compelling argument on the role of fantasy and loss in collective identification by picking up Freud’s comments in *Group Psychology* that “the herd turns away from anything that is new and unusual” (p. 64) as well as his passing comments on the figure of the “stranger” (p. 66). It is with these underexplored comments on repudiation that Ahmed highlights the role of fantasy and loss in collective identification. Ahmed makes the point that, although the nation is not necessarily an object of loss, the nation, in soliciting identifications upon which group cohesion is dependent, requires a *threat to the ideal*. Ahmed shows that multicultural Britain requires the other of the nation, and it is the very ethnic other, who the nation supposedly welcomes in multiculturalism, that occupies the place of this threat. Furthermore, this threatening other must be phantasmatically conjured if identifications with the nation are to be sustained.

To tentatively apply this to contemporary South Africa, it is not the ethnic other, per se, who threatens the ideal of the post-apartheid nation, but the ethnic and racial other of the *apartheid past*. The post-apartheid national community is not only imagined and stabilised by identification with a common ideal of nation, but relies for its existence on a fantasy of potential loss, as well as the threat by which this loss is posed. In chapter four, five and six I look closely at these processes, where fantasies of the unreformed Afrikaner are produced in aiding the festival in constituting itself as a ‘South African’ event through the repudiation of the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation.’ Particularly in chapters four and five, this is brought into stark relief, where apartheid is imagined as the ‘dark ages’ out of which the post-apartheid nation has emerged, and against which the festival, as a ‘progressive’ event, has established itself.

Žižek (1993) asks a series of provocative questions on the function of fantasies of the other in nationalism, which usefully open up the discourses analysed in this study.

What are fantasies about the Other's special, excessive enjoyment – about the black's superior sexual potency and appetite, about the Jew’s or Japanese’s special relationship toward money and work – if not precisely *so many ways, for us, to organize our own enjoyment?* Do we not find enjoyment precisely in fantasizing about the Other's enjoyment, in this ambivalent attitude toward it? Do we not obtain satisfaction by means of the very supposition that the Other enjoys in a way inaccessible to us?
Does not the Other's enjoyment exert such a powerful fascination because in it we represent to ourselves our own innermost relationship toward enjoyment? (pp. 112-113)

What might these questions mean in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, particularly in the context of the festival, which is surrounded by rural towns, where the other is an unreformed Afrikaner, a phantasmatically conjured residue from the past, rather than – or, perhaps, in addition to – the racial other? What is the function of the fantasies emerging within the context of the festival of these towns and the Afrikaner people in them? If, as Žižek (1993) argues, “The hatred of the Other is the hatred of our own excess of enjoyment” (p. 113), how do these fantasies of the post-apartheid other provide an image of the enjoyment encumbered at the festival, and the enjoyment from which it is prohibited? In Žižek’s formulation, these phantasmatic others would be the threat to enjoyment which stabilises the nation, and this opens up an avenue of analysis along the same lines as that proposed by Ahmed (2004); but what is the relationship between the construction of these others as hated, and the enjoyment the festival, as a South African event, cannot sanction?

Fantasies of what the festival is, as much as fantasies of the other of the nation and of the festival – the figure of the other who enjoys himself improperly, who refuses to relinquish improper forms of enjoyment, imagined as the threat to the cohesion of the nation – form two nodal points in the analysis of the discourses of, and on, the festival.

Archaeological regression

Although the Foucauldian notion of discourse and the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy have been pursued as discrete conceptual apparatuses with which to think through the festival and its place within the post-apartheid nation, Agamben’s (2009) recent work, The Signature of All Things provides a means of providing a linkage between these two approaches.

Agamben (2009) provides a twist to the Foucauldian archaeological project of uncovering the conditions of possibility of a particular phenomenon, by tracing “its emergence, its moment of arising” (Foucault, 1998 cited in Agamben, 2009, p. 83). As in a Foucauldian archaeological framework, it is not experience that Agamben is primarily concerned with, but its conditions of possibility, that which comes to make a particular type of experience possible, that which grounds experience, provides it with its basic coordinates. As Agamben (2009) puts it, “it is
above all the unexperienced, rather than just the experienced, that gives shape and consistency to the fabric of psychic personality and historical tradition and ensures their continuity and consistency” (p. 101, emphasis added). This remains within the ambit of a standard archaeological frame; but it is in Agamben’s explanation of his notion of conditions of possibility qua the unexperienced, that his provocation emerges, and with which we can move towards a linkage between a Foucauldian and a psychoanalytic archaeology.

When we perceive something, we simultaneously remember and forget it. Every present thus contains a part of non-lived experience. Indeed, it is, at the limit, what remains unlived in everyday life, that which, for its traumatic character or its excessive proximity remains unexperienced in every experience (Agamben, 2009, p. 100)

In invoking the ‘excessive proximity’ of the unexperienced, Agamben has in mind, in one sense, the discursive rules according to which we live – Foucault’s (1970) “historical a priori” of knowledge production (p. xxiv) or the “positive unconscious of knowledge” (p. xi). Thus, this ‘excessive proximity’ becomes the object of focus in an archaeological study, discerning the discursive rules to which we submit ourselves in living in the present, that which supports the reality, the giveness, of the present.

However, Agamben also emphasises the ‘traumatic character’ of the unexperienced. Not only are the conditions of the present excessively near, hidden on the surface of the present, and therefore no longer thought of; the unexperienced is also ‘unconscious’ precisely due to its traumatic unthinkable. It helps here, in outlining how Agamben formulates the traumatic unexperienced as always co-present with, and structuring of, experience, to follow him through his comparison of archaeology with psychoanalysis on which he builds and from which, in the end, he differentiates his approach.

In psychoanalysis, past traumas, long forgotten, are thought to be contemporaneous with lived experience, as symptoms. Events in the past, now repressed, are unexperienced, yet they come to exert a structuring force on experience. Agamben (2009) states that the unexperienced structures experience “in the form of phantasms, desires, and obsessive drives” (p. 104). And, like symptoms, they “ceaselessly push at the threshold of consciousness (whether individual or collective)” (p. 104). The important differentiation between Agamben’s “philosophical archaeology” and Freudian psychoanalysis is that this push at the threshold of consciousness
comes from the present. As Agamben (2009) puts it, the archaeologist “retreats, so to speak, toward the present” (p. 95). To properly grasp this analytical move of a regression to the present, Freud’s notion of the retroactivation of trauma is crucial. Freud posits two stages of trauma, an initial ‘pre-traumatic trauma,’ a trauma that is not experienced as traumatic as such, but which is triggered by later events; it is this second stage, itself only traumatic insofar it is associatively linked to the initial ‘trauma,’ that an effect more traumatic than the actual event is produced. That is to say, it is through the memory of a ‘trauma’ that the trauma is activated (see, for example, Freud, 1920; see also Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968). A retreat to the present, for Agamben, then, is a retreat to this level of as yet unactivated trauma. It is worth quoting Agamben at length in this regard, both to get his precise meaning and to gain a sense of his differentiation of archaeology from psychoanalysis, but also to see how he draws from it.

Archaeological regression, going back to the hither side of the dividing line between the conscious and the unconscious, also reaches the fault line where memory and forgetting, lived and non-lived experience both communicate with and separate from each other. It is not, however, a matter of realizing, as in the dream, the ‘indestructible desire’ of an infantile scene, nor, as in the pessimistic vision of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of infinitely repeating an original trauma. Nor, as in a successful analytical therapy, of bringing back to consciousness all the content that had been repressed in the unconscious. On the contrary, it is a matter of conjuring up its phantasm, through meticulous genealogical enquiry, in order to work on it, deconstruct it, and detail it to the point where it gradually erodes, losing its originary status (Agamben, 2009, p. 102-103, emphasis added).

Several points can be highlighted in this dense, but instructive passage. Firstly, that Agamben associates the phantasm of the present with an originary status. Agamben borrows from psychoanalysis and proposes that archaeology entails a regression to the point at which a certain discursive formation splits into its conscious and unconscious elements, a move by which the unexperienced phantasmatic structure of a discourse can be discerned. If archaeology is concerned with the conditions of possibility according to which a phenomenon has emerged – and ultimately with dispelling the myths of origin (Foucault, 1970) – here, in this above passage, the conditions of emergence are located by Agamben at the point of the split between conscious and unconscious. The phantasm of the present, that which is near and traumatic but unexperienced, provides the very conditions of existence in the present – in this instance, for experience as a subject of the post-apartheid South African nation. That is, the phantasm of the
present is what makes desire possible at all. Thus, what an archaeological regression reveals is not unconscious material from personal pasts, the repressed dirty secrets or forbidden wishes that can exist only in fantasy. Rather, what is revealed, in conjuring the phantasm of the present, is the unthinkability of desire outside of the terms of the scene made possible, outside of the oppositions within the scene, outside of the designation of forbidden and ideal conduct, thought and desire. Archaeological regression is not, for Agamben (2009), a return to the past in order to see how past experience, now repressed, has shaped the present, as in Freudian psychoanalysis. The notion of a regression to the present, a regression to the level of the unexperienced that structures experience, enables the analysis to discern how the trauma of the unexperienced present is an unactivated, but always possible threat to meaning – and not simply a threat to intended meaning, but to the very grounds of possibility for meaning.

It is a level of discourse I have accessed in the analysis in the overdetermination of the texts that have formed Oppikoppi as a South African event. But, as I have tried to stress in the above discussion, an archaeological regression has been less a journey backwards in time, than a probing at the condensations and displacements of texts that threaten white post-apartheid South African subjectivity with its own contingency. This brings us back to the way in which fantasy is not the wandering of the imagination from reality, but that which orientates the subject towards the reality of the present. My questions have circled the issue of how fantasy has orientated the festival towards the reality of the post-apartheid nation, providing scaffolding for desire, indeed providing its pedagogical injunctions.

With the notion of an archaeological regression we can extend the discussion of Freud’s writing on festivals here – and the link that was made to his writing on dreams, jokes and their work. *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* has been proposed as particularly relevant for analyses of whiteness. Taking as her starting point the sometimes abused critical assumption that race is a social construction, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (1997) has argued in an essay titled, ‘The Comedy of Domination’ that whiteness is made, indeed performed, but also threatened with its unmaking, according to the structure of a joke in Freudian theory. For Seshadri-Crooks, an identification with whiteness in racial discourse entails the abjection of a racial difference. It is this abjection of difference that enables the white subject to approximate the norms of whiteness; indeed, following Butler (1993) – whose argument is taken up in chapter five of this study – Seshadri-Crooks views identification with whiteness as a phantasmatic accomplishment,
entailing an identification, also, with racial difference, a kind of identification psychically registered as repudiation. The “elaborate conceits” of whiteness as a racialised and sexualised norm – a norm that relies on the repudiation of racial difference – are returned to it in the condensations and displacements of racial discourse, in much the same way as jokes, in Freudian theory, rely for their working on condensations and displacements (Seshadri-Crooks, 1997, p. 35). In this way, whiteness is both reproduced and threatened with the “exposure” of its constructedness, its performativity, along the lines of Freudian joke-work (p. 360). For Seshadri-Crooks, though, the joke is never fully articulated; we might say that in order to access its work, an archaeological regression is required.

What, then, is the unspeakable joke in identifications with whiteness? Analysing the latent, but always threatening “white joke” in George Orwell’s (1935) *Shooting an Elephant*, Seshadri-Crooks draws attention to how white anxieties over the dissolution of difference are figured in the condensations and displacements of his text. As Seshadri-Crooks puts it, “the irrepressible threat of laughter in this essay powerfully implies the circulation of an unspeakable joke in the text, whose narration and sharing might potentially dismember Orwell’s white identification” (p. 361). The threat of the joke is “the possibility of becoming like the other: The loss of difference here is the loss not only of whiteness and authority but of his humanity” (p. 372). Here Seshadri-Crooks is concerned specifically with those condensations and displacements in Orwell’s text that “aggregate around the elephant,” not only the elephant as a prop in his performance of whiteness, but his own aggressivity becoming displaced in the figure of the rampaging elephant, as well as the Burmese crowd and the elephant becoming condensed into a single vague threat to his humanity: on the one hand, he will be trampled by the elephant, and by difference, and laughed at for his failure to shoot the elephant and perform his whiteness; on the other, he will trample as the aggressive elephant, figuring a “hatred of the British empire and thequotidian hatred of the Burmese who jeer at him” (p. 373), losing the civilised restraint of whiteness, or exposing a lack of it in his failed performance of whiteness.

There are, of course, some significant differences in context here, historically, geographically, in terms of the specificity of Orwell’s ‘Europeaness’ and the ‘otherness’ of the Burmese, and South African ‘whiteness’ and its ‘otherness.’ But Seshadri-Crooks’ argument does present incisive questions for this festival: if to identify with whiteness in the colony is to identify, also, with ‘difference’ and with the figure of the ‘degenerate’ – identifications
psychically registered as the repudiation of ‘difference’ and ‘degeneracy’ – and if this identification entails “one long struggle not to be laughed at” (Orwell, 1935, cited in Seshadri-Crooks, 1997, p. 367) in order to attain humanness, which is equated with whiteness, then in the postcolonial situation, specifically in post-apartheid South Africa, how do identifications with whiteness entail ongoing repudiations of difference and racial degeneracy? If the joke could not be spoken in colonial situations, if it was always only threatening, does the ‘authentication’ of the postcoloniality of whiteness not require the unspoken white joke to be spoken? Which is to ask, do identifications with whiteness and the post-apartheid nation, simultaneously, not require an explicit joke, a joke that undoes whiteness? Does whiteness – here specifically thinking about instances of its post-apartheid authentication as ‘South African’ – entail ‘one long struggle to be laughed at,’ laughter obtained through failed performances of whiteness, through the willed exposure of its constructedness?

These issues have already been prompted in the previous chapter in the discussion of the discourse of ‘going wild’ and, as we will see in the discourse of the festival, ‘degeneration’ and ‘the struggle to be laughed at’ are a part of the picture of this festival’s claims to post-apartheid South Africanness. Here, however, in the joke whereby ‘authentically’ post-apartheid whiteness becomes articulated, it is not only racial difference that becomes condensed and displaced. Indeed, the revealing of the inauthenticity of whiteness in order to authenticate ‘South Africanness,’ to performatively enact ‘South Africanness,’ is the punch line of the joke of post-apartheid whiteness. While ‘difference’ and ‘degeneracy’ in the joke of post-apartheid whiteness returns in the overdetermination of its articulation, a new latent threat to its meaning emerges: the disavowed past of colonial violence.

Useful in framing this point is Riggs’ (2005) psychoanalytic study on Australian whiteness. Riggs’ central argument is that white belonging in ‘postcolonial’ Australia is dependent upon the repression of a history of colonial violence; the repression, though, is never fully successful and complicity with this history can never completely be disavowed. As Riggs argues, this history returns constantly, even in moments of supposed benevolence toward the ‘indigenous others’ of Australia. The post-apartheid requirement of the recognition of the injustices of the past, upon which national belonging is dependent, would make a straightforward mapping of Riggs’ formulation onto a South African situation a mistake; however, if colonial violence, as Riggs suggests, is the ‘primal scene of white postcolonial psychic life,’ then this
seems no less true of white post-apartheid psychic life: the injustices of the apartheid and colonial pasts are what structures the present of white subjectivities, that which must be, simultaneously, acknowledged and disavowed, that which must be recognised and which haunts the good conduct of white ‘South Africans’ with its unmaking. Agamben’s notion of an archaeological regression provides one means of discerning the ‘primal scene of colonial and apartheid violence’ that inheres articulations of post-apartheid whiteness and returns in the overdetermination of the texts that have formed Oppikoppi as a ‘South African’ event.

**Source materials**

In the discussion thus far, both discourse and fantasy have both been referred to as elements accessible in texts, as elements that can be discerned in texts. Within the discourse analysis literature, particularly within the discipline of social psychology, there is no shortage of guidelines, many of which have served as a resource in selecting and analysing source materials. On the other, there is a long tradition of psychoanalytic critique of literature, visual images, whether film, photography, paintings or advertisements. I provide below a more detailed discussion of the selection of source materials and the rationale behind these selections, as well as how these materials have been approached from a discourse analytic and psychoanalytic approach.

In discussing their model of discursive psychology, David Edwards and Jonathon Potter (1992) state, “Our hope is that this model can provide a fertile scheme for interpreting and making sense of a wide range of types of psychological talk (p. 1, emphasis added), arguing for attention being paid to “the fine detail of talk and text” (p. 2, emphasis added). Setting up their approach in contrast to many of the cognitivist assumptions of traditional psychology and their narrow experimental designs, they argue that language is frequently ignored in social psychological studies, they assert that they “question the idea that talk and text can be directly mapped onto underlying representations of knowledge and reasoning” (p. 15). While I do not share their need to differentiate my methodology from US based experimental or cognitivist psychology, their examination of a wide range of texts and their emphasis on the fine detail of texts has been of use in this study.

The work of Ian Parker (1992) has helped to operationalise the Foucauldian notions discussed above. Parker’s (1992) definition of discourse is “a system of statements that define an
object” (p. 5). In line with his definition, Parker proposes that the analysis assume that “discourse is realized in texts” (p. 6, emphasis added). If the emphasis for Foucault (1972) was not only on the defining of a set of discursive objects, but also the production of objects, Parker sees the realisation of objects as taking place through texts. Parker also advocates the use of various sources of text in a discourse analysis (see also Rose, 2007, pp. 148-155), so long as a relation between these can be established in that they mutually construct a common object. It should be pointed out here, though, that texts are defined by Parker (1992), quite loosely, certainly more so than Potter and Edwards (1992), as “delimited tissues of meaning reproduced in any form that can be given an interpretive gloss” (Parker, 1992, p. 6). Indeed, Parker draws inspiration not only from Foucault, but also follows the Derridean maxim, “There is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1976, cited in Parker, 1992, p. 7).

The procedure Parker (1992) suggests here adheres, quite closely, to Foucault’s (1972) hypothesis that “statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the same object” (p. 35). Foucault, however, provides a word of caution, as this common object, variously constructed through different statements, is not thought to possess an essence that is being grasped at from different directions in different texts. Thus, a range of texts is selected on the basis that they contain statements which construct a common object; but, as the object itself cannot be the point of unity for the various texts that realise the object, produce it, a key task of the analysis is to describe precisely this unity that lies outside of the object itself.

Far more than Potter and Edwards, Parker’s methodological guidelines regarding the selection of texts de-emphasises the authors and creators of the texts. Rather than viewing the text as having emanated from a given author, it is more useful, from both a Foucauldian and a psychoanalytic perspective, to view a text as enabling a number of subject positions, enabling identificatory possibilities, one of which is the privileged position of the author (Parker, 1992). That the various forms of text analysed are produced by different authors, at different times and in different locations are not methodological limitations, but, on the contrary, constitutes a theoretical assertion.

Similarly, psychoanalytic readings of texts are seldom concerned with their originators (Ricoeur, 1970); rather, a select few psychoanalytic concepts are chosen, looking for their articulation in the text, looking for how this figuration solicits identifications (Rose, 2007), reading for those aspects of texts – whether written or visual images, live performances or spatial
arrangements – that entail some element of libidinal excess. There is, thus, a dual focus in a psychoanalytic reading of texts: on the one hand, the ways in which a given text is ‘disciplined’ (what we might call its manifest level, entailing its condensations and displacements) and, on the other, the way an image may exceed its own regularity (what we might call its latent level).

Thus, for Parker (1992), and for the psychoanalytic approach discussed above, there is a de-emphasis of individual intention and agency. By contrast, in many if not most forms of discursive psychology – here including Potter and Edwards (1992) – a significant amount of attention is granted to individual agency, being more interested in the rhetorical strategies employed within a given moment of social interaction, privileging a person’s deployment of discourse, over their formation as a subject of discourse; that is to say, it is usually a matter of how a subject is shaped and positioned, rather than produced by, discourse. Certainly Foucault does present a picture of a structurally determined field of discursive action, where social change is a rare occurrence, and there may be reasons for countering this vision, all the while strategically utilising the notion of discourse (Fairclough, 1995). But there are certain inevitable compromises in doing so. The first being a reinstallation of precisely the trans-historical subject a Foucauldian analytics is able to reveal as being constituted, rather than pre-existent. Furthermore, by focussing on the level of individual agency, the risk is that one narrows the analysis of discursive action down to the immediate situation within which a statement has been made, potentially overlooking an historical dimension (Hook, 2007, 2001). It risks producing, as Hook (2007) puts it, “an analysis insulated within the sociopolitical discursive context in which it was produced” (p. 132). What is required, then, is a consideration of history in a fine grained analysis of texts as they occur within a micro-context, the festival say, historically contextualising situated statements (Hook, 2007, 2001; Billig, 1991).

Foucault’s (1972) emphasis of the materiality of statements may also be lost in many forms of discursive psychological approaches. In light of this, particularly in the case of Fairclough’s influential model of textually based discourse analysis, is there not a further risk of failing to grasp discourse in its material dimension? Indeed, Hook (2001), in contrast to Fairclough (1995) and, to an extent, Parker (1992) as well, warns against discourse being taken to be a narrowly linguistic domain. As he puts it, “Power in no uncertain terms, cannot be fixed

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120 Potter and Wetherell (1987) would be a good example here: although constructionist in general orientation, they tend to emphasise what they call ‘situated language use’ over longer historical analysis or placing talk and text within larger social structures.
or apprehended in the meanings and significations of text, but must be grasped and traced through the tactical and material relations of force” (Hook, 2001, p. 50). Hook’s methodological injunctions (focus on discourse with the broader historical context, in its materiality and in relation to the underwriting, epistemic conditions of knowledge production and deployment), drawn from a close reading of Foucault (1981), have informed not only the selection, but also the mode of analysis with which I have approached the festival. Critical as he is of the above approaches to discourse analysis, however, there are aspects to their work that have been drawn on in this study, particularly related to the selection of source materials.

In the initial stage of the study, the objective was to select a range of texts that have, as their point of focus, the common object of Oppikoppi music festival, particularly instances where its ‘South Africanness’ was in question. My aim in this regard was to work with a set of texts that represent the festival as a post-apartheid South African event, and then to begin to discern the discursive rules to which such declarations were subject. It has also helped, in this regard, to draw on Parker’s (1992) notion that there are two levels of discourse, one at which discourse is, in a sense, performed, done, and another reflexive level at which it folds around to examine its own terms of engagement, acknowledging and reflecting on how things are done. To apply this to the festival meant looking at how the event was assembled as a discursively constituted event within which people act or perform, as well as looking at how this enactment of the discourse of the festival was written about, photographed, reflected upon, as well as the relation between these two levels. As the analysis proceeded, I began to look to other texts to which these declarations referred, that they invoked or on which they depended for their meaningfulness, their truth status. Thus, while some texts I analysed were directly related to the question of the festival’s ‘South Africanness,’ others were not, although they were significant in grasping the intertextuality of the discourse.

In focussing on the materiality of discourse, I have paid close attention to discursive practices and to the spatial arrangements in the context of the festival. I attended the festival four times from 2008 to 2011 (August 2008, April 2009, August 2009 and August 2011) and kept detailed notes on these two elements of the discursive construction of the festival – for instance, the interior design of the bar, an incident in the campsites, the way the site of the festival is transformed from a farm into a festival ground, the way the street signs at the festival grounds look on a map and the different way they have come to look from the ground.
Over the course of this study, I conducted many interviews. These were primarily utilised to facilitate access to found texts concerned with the festival, and to gain background information on the festival, its organisational structure, its early history and the functioning of the farm outside of festival time. Although there are references to these interviews in the analysis chapters that follow, I have not, for the most part, analysed these discussions as texts. In this particular regard, I have focused on found texts; that is, if discourse can be located in “the general domain of the production and circulation of rule-governed statements” (Mills, 1997, p. 9), I have focused on texts already produced and in circulation, rather than on producing new texts, either through interviews or by taking my own photographs – although, again, I did take many of my own photographs. In this regard, there were many written texts already in circulation that constructed the festival, almost always accompanied by photographs, and this was sufficient to enable the analysis. Many of the people I interviewed have also written about the festival in magazines, newspapers, in festival booklets or online, and I have focussed on these written accounts, intended for an audience, in my analysis.

By far the most frequently analysed form of text was written texts. Since beginning this study, I have collected newspaper, magazine and online articles on the festival, either reporting on the event or written in anticipation of an upcoming festival. I focussed, in this selection, on articles that either declared the festival a South African event, or problematised it as un-South African. In terms of newspaper articles, the major national English (Sunday Times, Mail & Guardian) and Afrikaans (Rapport) weekly newspapers have usually run a pre-festival article the

121 A good example here would be the interviews with farm owners, Boors and Tess Bornmann in October 2009 when I stayed on the farm for three days; during this time they gave me access to an archive of press clippings they had collected over the years, to old photograph albums, festival posters and flyers, stickers, pamphlets, booklets and I was also able to walk around the farm outside of festival time, spend time taking notes on details about the place, details about the farm it is not always easy to see when the festival is assembled and in full swing.

122 Some of these interviews were recorded with a digital recorder, some were conducted over the phone, some by email. People I interviewed had, in various ways, been intimately involved with the festival and its organisation, and had something to say about Oppikoppi. I interviewed Rita Hoffmann during my stay on the farm, as well as Ben Vorster, who is married to another of the Bornmann daughters and has been involved in the security at the festival since its early days in the 1990s. I interviewed Toast Coetzer in Cape Town during August 2009; Coetzer was involved in the festival radio station run by different university students in the 1990s, and edited the collection of essays and stories about the festival, Oppikoppi/10.doc. I interviewed Lanie van der Walt, who wrote a story for Oppikoppi/10.doc, and was at the very first events on the farm and continues to be a prominent figure in the South African rock music scene. I interviewed Gilad Hockman, whose photograph of Arno Carstens appeared in Oppikoppi/10.doc., which I analyse in chapter five. I have been in email contact with festival organiser, Carel Hoffmann several times and he has very generously answered my questions in great detail. I have interviewed employees of Oppikoppi, from people in more senior managerial positions, to security and cleaning staff. In June 2009 I interviewed DJ Bob, who was instrumental in setting up an electronic music stage at the festival, broadening its musical horizons beyond rock music. I have also had countless informal discussions with people at the festival.
week before, using a festival press release, followed up with an article reviewing the event on the following weekend. Regional newspapers in Gauteng (Citizen, Beeld, Centurion Record, Ster, Sunday Independent, Boksburg Advertiser, Pretoria News Weekend), North West (North West Record) the Western Cape (Cape Times, Cape Argus, Burger), KwaZulu-Natal (Natal Witness, Daily News, Mercury), Northern Cape (Diamond Fields Advertiser), Free State (Volkblad), Easter Cape (Eastern Province Herald, Grocott’s Mail), as well as local papers have tended to do the same. These articles, together with frequently longer magazine articles (De Kat, Insig, Student Life, FHM) and publications brought out specifically for the festival, have been analysed as texts.

A particularly rich text published to mark the 10th anniversary of the festival which I have analysed is a booklet titled Oppikoppi/10.doc: '95-’04 Photos, Interviews, Twakpraat. It was edited by Afrikaans author, poet, musician and journalist, Toast Coetzer, and produced by the festival organisers, together with the social satire company, Laugh It Off Media (LIO). It contains a collection of essays and stories written by key figures in the history of the event, by musicians, festival organisers and radio personalities who have, for different reasons, attained a status of authority in speaking about the festival; it also contains photographs that have become iconic in the representation of the event. I have found myself returning to Oppikoppi/10.doc. time and again – indeed, in interviewing people about the festival, people who have been involved with the festival for some time, I was frequently referred to this text. I have also looked at another publication edited by Coetzer and published with Oppikoppi, Das Kapital: A Book about Dassies, a small book brought out for the Way of the Dassie Oppikoppi festival in August 2007.

The official Oppikoppi website (www.oppikoppi.co.za) was also a useful resource of written texts. Here, the festival organisers issue press releases, promote or advertise upcoming festivals and the theme for each event, provide maps of the festival grounds which are updated each year, and maps for the route to the farm from Johannesburg or Pretoria; they reflect on past events, and generally communicate with the interested public, who are able to respond on their facebook page. I have utilised this official website, as well as the festival’s facebook page, as a source of written texts. There have also been a range of websites I have looked at, most notably Watkykfy (what are you looking at) (www.watkykfy.co.za) a website devoted to zef Afrikaner culture (see chapter six for a discussion of the phenomenon of zef), influential Afrikaans
literature and culture forum, Litnet (www.litnet.co.za), but also others such as www.dontparty.co.za, www.levis.co.za, www.channel24.co.za and www.mahala.co.za. The people who write for these websites attend the festival, write about upcoming festivals and review it after each event.

**Conclusion**

The analysis of these sources of data noted above has aimed to draw attention to the historical and cultural production of *objects of discourse* and *subjects of discourse*. They have been used, in other words, to draw attention to the inscription of the normative coordinates of the social in the psychic life of subjects. Psychoanalysis has been utilised to discern the fantasies of nation and of the other of the nation at work in these texts, focusing, also, on the overdetermination of the language, of the images and of their relation to one another, to the condensations and displacements in the texts. The subject of the post-apartheid nation has, thus, been approached at two levels of analysis. With recourse to discourse analysis, the production of a normative post-apartheid national subject has been approached, that is, the designation of a set of subject positions entailing, also, the abnormal, the other of the nation and the threat to it. And, with recourse to psychoanalysis, the registration of this inscription of discourse has been approached, an inscription that is registered as identification and as repudiation (of the abnormal and the other), both of which are mediated by fantasy.

There are, to be sure, moments of synergy between discourse analysis and psychoanalysis in the chapters that follow. One of these moments is enabled by Butler’s (1990) notion that fantasies are not the inventions of individual fantasising subjects. Another is made possible by Agamben’s (2009) notion of an archaeological regression to the present. But, for the most part, they have been employed to pose different sorts of questions, and in order to work in two different registers of analysis. There are, then, some tensions that arise, tensions that, I think, do not undermine the arguments I propose, but are productive and enable different aspects of this ‘South African’ festival to be thought through. Let me now turn to the first analysis chapter, where I look at the formation of the site of the festival as an object of discourse, and the subjectivities this construction has produced.
4

A POST-APARTHEID HETEROTOPIA

Self-destruction, nation building and the *platteland* as the broken kettle of the festival

“In die begin was dit woes en leeg
[In the beginning it was wild and empty]”

Introduction

*“Hemel op die Platteland”*

In chapter one, attention was drawn to the annual withdrawal to the *platteland* (farmlands, rural areas) Oppikoppi has enabled, and I also noted the problematisation this withdrawal has received in writing on the festival. This criticism – directed not only at Oppikoppi, but at Afrikaans festivals that take place in small rural towns in general – is in many ways compelling. However, depicting Oppikoppi as a nostalgic return to the order of apartheid does not capture fully the complexity of the festival’s politics. In appropriating this farm and using it to create a place of withdrawal, we see figured a particular kind of ambivalence over the *platteland* and all it has come to signify, an ambivalence well put by festival co-organiser, Misha Loots: “*Oppikoppi is basies soos Fokofpolisiekar sing, ‘Hemel op die Platteland’* [Oppikoppi is basically like Fokofpolisiekar sing, ‘Heaven in the farmlands’].”

The song he is referring to by Afrikaans rock band, Fokofpolisiekar (fuck off police car), is a far cry from a romantic invocation of rural Afrikanerdom: “Reguleer my, routineer my. Sit my in ’n box en merk dit veilig. Stuur my dan waarheen al die dose gaan. Stuur my Hemel toe, ek dink dis in die platteland. Dis Hemel op die platteland” [Regulate me, give me routines. Put me in a box and mark it safe. Then send me to where all the boxes/cunts go. Send me to Heaven, I think it’s in the farmlands. It’s Heaven in the

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Playing on the ambiguity of ‘dose,’ the song captures the ambivalence over traditional Afrikanerdom that the festival has been able to bind in a retreat to a heavenly place much loved – the return to the farm in 2003 is exemplary of this love – but a place also, in a reflexive move, depicted as where all the boxed, stereotypical Afrikaners go: the platteland, “waarheen al die dose gaan.” On the one hand associations to the farm and to the platteland have been ‘amplified’ in order to constitute the festival as an escape from everyday life. On the other and in the process, many of these associations to the farm as a heavenly place – to this farm as a particular place and to the farm as an imaginary space – have been, if not undermined, then certainly turned against. This withdrawal, then, even if it has retained an Afrikaner identity of place, has also been a withdrawal from traditional Afrikanerdom and the festival has been formed as a place differentiated from an old order.

There is a pronounced history of heavy drinking at the festival, and it is frequently this intoxication that gives to the withdrawal its difference from the unambiguously conservative enclaves into which white South Africans have withdrawn since the end of apartheid. The intoxication of the festival has been there from the very start, as Carel Hoffman has put it in describing the early days of the event,

Most definitely there were no big plans or long-term intentions. Rather, there was a strong collective pursuit of undiluted rock n roll hedonism which fired the late-night engine room of the little bar in the middle of nowhere. We had no idea where the good ship Oppikoppi was going, but the ride felt good and as long as everyone gave a hand in trying to keep the band members upright, the party could literally be kept going for days.

In this particular regard, the festival has “become a bigger beast than when it started,” as journalist, Nechama Brodie put it, “the organizers do a magnificent job of containing the wildness, putting on the shows that they do, creating a space where people can get fucked up

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126 I referred to this line from this song in an article (Truscott, 2011a) and some months later received an angry email from an Afrikaans-speaking young man proclaiming that I had interpreted the song incorrectly; indeed, my interpretation caused him great offence. This is, of course, not the only possible reading.
without really getting fucked up.”

Most music festivals around the world – the many festivals that take place during the UK summer, Reading and Glastonbury, for instance – entail excesses of this sort; but not of this intensity. As actor, producer and comedian, Rob van Vuuren, better known as Twakkie from *The Most Amazing Show* wrote after the August 2011 festival, people get a “very special kind of drunk,” which he associates with the wildness of the dusty site of the festival “deep in the thorny hinterland near Thabazimbi,” as is so often done in the representation of Oppikoppi. One node on which I focus in this chapter is this relation between the discursive construction of the site of the festival as a wild place, and the drunkenness that characterises this festival. A second node on which I focus here is the unlikely relation between drunkenness and the constitution of the festival as a ‘South African’ event. We find a clear articulation of drunkenness as a condition of the festival’s ‘South Africanness’ in the following statement by the online editor of FHM, where he wrote, shortly after the August 2009 festival,

> I honestly believe that attendance at least once in your life should be mandatory on passport applications. It is a truly South African, truly beautiful thing. And, if you look at it from that perspective, it actually means that once a year, not getting molared off your face can be legitimately seen as unpatriotic.

With no explanation for this assertion, it begs a few questions on how excessive drinking has come to be associated with ‘South Africanness,’ at least in the context of this festival. And this is far from an isolated assertion; indeed, it bears a curious regularity in the festival discourse.

In chapter two, I discussed how spatiality was instrumental in the establishment of the colonial state in South Africa, how apartheid was built on colonial spatiality, as well as how the spatial legacy of apartheid in post-apartheid South Africa is central to the issue of social and psychological change. Cognisant of this, I pursue in this chapter the link between these three elements, the *discursive construction of the site of the festival, excessive drinking* and *South Africanness*. I do so by describing, firstly, what has been done to, and done with, the land on which Oppikoppi festival takes place. In this regard I have posed questions on how the site of the

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festival has been formed as an object of discourse. And secondly, I have tried to discern the subject positions of the discursive constructions of the site of the festival, the vacant places within this discursive landscape that can be filled by subjects, locations with particular enunciative modalities.

In the section directly below, I elaborate briefly on the concept I have employed in thinking through the spatiality of the festival, Foucault’s (1986) notion of heterotopic space, introduced in chapter one. Following this, I turn to the declaration of the festival site as an unofficial national monument in August 2009, an event wherein two predominant relations to a history of colonial and apartheid spatiality are figured, and it is here that the relations between the constructions of the site of the festival and heavy drinking, and between heavy drinking and South Africanness, come into view. As the chapter develops, two contradictory constructions of the festival site emerge, two constructions that offer subject positions of the ‘good South African’; but they are two positions of subjectivity that are in conflict with each other, that, in their fusion, contain an internal contradiction. That is to say, as the contradictions in the construction of the site of the festival begin to emerge, open up, it splits the subject of this place.

Although only a few reference are made to his work here, this chapter revisits de Kock’s (2010) argument that ‘going wild,’ or ‘going native’ has offered to white South Africans a set of strategies for becoming ‘post-apartheid South Africans’; here the backdrop is the discussion of the ‘racial degenerate’ in chapter one, picked up again at the end of chapter three. In this regard, Ahmed’s (2000) cautioning against the limitations of white postcolonial ‘going strange,’ as a fetishistic operation, forms a critical backdrop to this chapter, too.

**Heterotopic space**

Discordant space and psychic discord

In chapter one it was noted that Foucault’s notion of heterotopic space oscillates between a description of real material places and imaginary spaces. It should be pointed out that, as phantasmatic and imaginary spaces, heterotopias do not entail, for Foucault, the interiority of psychic space. Foucault is concerned, rather, particularly in *Of Other Spaces*, with a space of exteriority and – if he is concerned with subjectivity at all – his interest is in how this space of the exterior is constitutive of psychic life. To put this differently, and into the form of a question, if in *Madness and Civilization* he showed how the space of the asylum
and a psychiatric discourse on psychopathology produced rather than discovered the mad subject, and if in *Discipline and Punish* he showed how the prison, the carceral system and a discourse on criminality produced the deviant criminal, then who is the subject produced within the confines of heterotopic space?

Foucault (1986) provides some idea of an answer to this question when he describes a heterotopia as a heterogeneous space “which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time, and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us” (p. 3). If the subject is an effect of discourse, then the discordance of heterotopic space, its representation through similitude, produces a correlative ‘psychic’ discordance (Foucault, 1986). Understood slightly differently, in a heterotopology we have a frame within which to register spatial discordance and its ‘psychic’ effects. The discordance of heterotopic space – its *relational differentiation* from the rest of the society of which it is a part, that may, at one time, run in opposite directions, its *heterochroneity*, its “absolute break with traditional time” (p. 5), whose lines, likewise, may crisscross each other, its *juxtaposition of places*, of “several sites that are in themselves incompatible” within a single real place (p. 5) – produces subjects that are, equally, discordant and differentiated from themselves. In this sense, heterotopias are spaces in which the subject is undone.

That people consistently say that they go to this festival in order to ‘lose themselves’ resonates with this formulation of heterotopic space as one ‘which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time, and our history occurs.’ That this ‘loss of oneself’ often amounts to little more than getting “zombie apocalypse” drunk, as I show here, is not without its psychological and, indeed, historical and political significance. In the very orality of drinking, in what is ‘taken in’ and, in that process, introjected, drinking becomes an act of identification, indeed a psycho-political act in which, to borrow a phrase from Billig (1991), the echoes of history can be heard – in this case, due to the overdetermination of ‘wildness,’ the condensation of different meanings of ‘wildness,’ different histories are echoed all at once.

But there is a wider and different implication of this undoing of the subject. Outside of festival time – in other words, for the entire year, except for a few days – the bar on the

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hill, the place where the festival first began, one of the most sacred sites in the mythology of the festival, as well as one of the sites at which a national monument plaque was hammered in, is occupied by white miners because the farm has a contract with the nearby Angloplat mine at Swartklip. The chalets on the farm and another guest house in Northam owned by the family accommodate white and black employees of the mine, respectively – white miners on the farm, black miners in the guest house in Northam, apart. As farm owner, Boors Bornmann rationalised the separation, black employees would prefer to stay in town in Northam, in “their comfort zone,” not on the farm, while white miners “prefer the farm.” This all changes during festival time – the miners move off, the festival crowd moves in – marking a spatial and temporal break, not only with the surrounding areas, with the past and its legacy in the present, but also a differentiation of itself from itself as it exists through the year.

What will become important as this chapter develops is that this is not a relational differentiation – of the site of the festival from its surrounding areas, of the fleeting present of the festival from the past, and of itself from itself – that erases this difference; while things on the farm change during festival time, there is, as will be shown, an excess that will not be reconstituted, an indivisible remainder in the conversion of the farm, as an apartheid space, into a post-apartheid festival. Nuttall (2008) and de Kock (2004), among others, have argued, each in their own way, that the difference of the past cannot be erased, indeed, that its persistence is what enables its negation and, thereby the ‘South Africanness’ of the negation. What emerges here, in building on their formulations, is the psychic registration of this negation in a self-destructive dynamic that is both misrecognising of ‘other South Africans’ and misrecognised as ‘South African.’

Critical remarks on the notion of heterotopias
Before proceeding, a note of caution on the concept of heterotopias is necessary. While Of Other Spaces does provide provocative ideas on social change, spatiality and subjectivity, it is a provisional and somewhat imprecise text; in this sense, heterotopias can be seen as an underdeveloped, incomplete concept, one on which Foucault was resistant to publish, a concept, perhaps, that we ought to abandon, as Foucault abandoned it. One could argue, though, that the

132 Interview with Boor Bornman October 2009 at the farm.
theme of other spaces and places obsessed Foucault for his entire career, meaning that he only really abandoned the term heterotopia, but not the idea (Casarino, 2002). In this sense, whatever methodological scaffolding is required in employing the concept can be obtained from his entire oeuvre. The position taken here, in this chapter, is that, having been developed specifically during Foucault’s archaeological period (cf. Saldanha, 2008), the concept of heterotopia finds methodological support and signposting in this particular portion of his work is. This is not to say that there are not other ways of utilising the concept – indeed, in the next chapter the notion of heterotopic space is taken up, via the work of Bennett, with an explicit focus on its disciplinary function.

Despite the criticism it has received (e.g. Saldanha, 2008; Harvey, 2007; Genocchio, 1995; Massey, 1994), the concept of heterotopia has provided a useful lens for scholarship looking at the emergence of spaces of modernity (e.g. Casarino, 2002; Hetherington, 1997). If we return to Foucault’s (1986) definition of heterotopias as “places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of a society” – which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia” (p. 3, emphasis added), heterotopia stands as a useful concept with which to think through the formation of new post-apartheid spaces and places that have been forged from the old imaginary spaces and real places of apartheid. It is a concept useful as an aid, that is, in discerning how the utopian vision of a post-apartheid nation has been imperfectly emplaced. Cautions of its limitations, I have employed the concept precisely because of the speculative questions it provides in the task of understanding how the legacy of colonial and apartheid spatiality has been discursively managed within the context of this festival, a festival seeking to find a place for itself within the post-apartheid nation; in the task of understanding, that is, the production of the festival as a discrete discursive space whose history runs parallel to, and is entangled with, the history of the post-apartheid nation.

In a barbed piece of critique, Arun Saldanha (2008) argues that Of Other Spaces was written during Foucault’s “year of structuralism” (p. 2), 1967. The conclusion Saldanha reaches is that the paper “repeats the flaws of structuralism,” and, as such, should be discarded. I have read this lecture differently and don’t agree, specifically because Foucault had been thinking through the concept while writing Le Mots et les choses, which was only published in 1966.
Hedonism, oppositionality and post-apartheid nationalism

Oppikoppi as unofficial national monument

On the 9th of August 2009, at a little after eight in the evening, during a festival aptly named Smoorverlief,134 the two main stages and the bar on the hill of the farm, where the event first began, were declared a national monument by the festival organisers and its sponsors. As a press release shortly before the festival announced it,

More than just a music festival, Oppikoppi has become one of Mzansi’s most respected cultural institutions. And, as musicians, fans and party animals all over the country get ready to celebrate the 15th year of this wild phenomenon, its organizers are proud to announce that Oppikoppi is going to be declared a national monument. That’s right, the (anti)establishment that was born in the red dust of a farm just outside Northam will soon become an official legacy. Countless South Africans regard it as an essential part of their musical development – all fans need to make at least one sacred pilgrimage to Northam. This year’s festival will be closing with an official ceremony on the 9th of August where the monumental announcement will be made. But as we all know, National Monument or not, Oppikoppi is already a South African treasure. And it always will be.135

Although the festival only went ahead with the declaration of the site as a national monument in 2009, as early as 1998, Hoffmann was quoted as saying, “Ons wag egter nog vir die mense om daai monument-plaatjie to kom vaslaan [We’re waiting for those people to come and knock in that monument plaque].”136 There has, over the years, been some government involvement with the festival, but, briefly put, the festival is endorsed and frequently mentioned, but is no longer financially backed by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC).137

134 Smoorverlief is an Afrikaans word that doesn’t translate easily into English. Verlief means to be in love, to have love or to feel love. Smoor, though, is less straightforward. It is more or less synonymous with the English words smother, strangle, throttle or choke. And the name is fitting as, although over the years the festival has changed, one thing has remained constant: it has been a place of intense passionate attachment to the land and what has been allowed to take place.

135 Almost all articles prior to the festival in August 2009, and many following it, simply repeated this word for word. (See, for example, ‘Oppikoppi Declared a National Monument,’ A Thousand Guitars, 9 October, 2009. Retrieved online from http://www.athousandguitars.com/2009/10/oppikoppi-delcared-national-monument.html 10 October 2009)


137 For example, in Oppikoppi/10.doc the DAC sponsored a page where they wished the festival happy 10th birthday: “Congratulations on 10 years of support of music, musicians and the people of South Africa” (p. 14). A website link to www.oppikoppi.co.za is also provided on a DAC section of the government’s website as an
With this institutional relationship, or lack thereof, as the backdrop, the festival site was declared a national monument without the DAC and the National Heritage Resources Authority (NHRA). That is, it became an unofficial, self-declared national monument. As Hoffmann, put it, “We’re declaring ourselves a monument. If we were to wait for any authority to do so we’d be very old men before that happened.” This did not hinder the spectacle, though; plaques were hammered down, ceremonial speeches were made, newspaper articles were written and this patch of land was recognised, its legacy legitimised, though not officially.

What is notable about the declaration of the site of the festival as a national monument is that the site was declared a national monument at all – and this stands only as an intensification and formalisation of this claim, which has been made widely. In positioning itself as a South African event worthy of being declared a national monument, two related features were emphasised by the festival organisers: that it is a ‘wild phenomenon,’ a place of hedonism and drunkenness, and that it is an ‘(anti)establishment,’ though precisely what the festival is against is, here, only vaguely articulated. As has been pointed out, the festival has set itself apart from the more conservative sectors of the Afrikaans-speaking white community and against the legacy of apartheid, against “the bad –isms,” racism and sexism. Although this is clearly not all that is intended by ‘(anti)establishment,’ as a press release issued by the festival organizers in August, 2009, shortly before Oppikoppi Smoorverlief stated,
Non-conformist, left-of-centre, underground – call it what you will, the fact is that there’s an openmindedness here that is sorely lacking in today’s sausage-factory entertainment world. Oppikoppi knows that music brings people together, and has worked tirelessly to represent the beautifully broad spectrum of South African styles. Like a 3-day therapy session, Oppikoppi is a temporary autonomous zone, a space to let loose, let rip and get caught up in the complete madness of festival fun.\textsuperscript{140}

While staging ‘the beautifully broad spectrum of South African styles’ may not automatically qualify the farm as a national monument, it is quite in line with official government policy on arts and culture. In chapter five, on the music of the festival, I look in detail at the adoption of this strategy. In this chapter, though, on the site of festival, I concentrate on these three features of the festival – its status as a ‘South African’ event, its ‘hedonism’ and its ‘oppositionality’ – that have been consistently repeated by festival organisers, the media and those who attend the event. It is no straightforward process officially declaring a national monument and there is a lengthy application process to which such declarations are subject.\textsuperscript{141} While confronting the establishment holds a special political importance, a monumental importance we could say, in South Africa’s past, fusing such an ‘(anti)establishment’ disposition with hedonism is, indeed, a wild strategy for being declared a national monument, a strategy outside of the officially recognised. We could say that this strategy and the unofficial declaration of the festival site as a national monument stand in a heterotopic relation to the official criteria and the processes by which sites are declared national monuments, both mirroring and contesting these official conditions and the sites that have been declared national monuments. Being a ‘wild phenomenon’ and an ‘(anti)establishment,’ together, is not something that could likely be written in a DAC Annual Report on the state of national identity. Yet, at this festival, it is the

\textsuperscript{140} This is from the same press release cited above (see, for example, ‘Oppikoppi Declared a National Monument,’ \textit{A Thousand Guitars}, 9 October, 2009, retrieved online from \url{http://www.athousandguitars.com/2009/10/oppickoppi-declared-national-monument.html} 10 October 2009)

\textsuperscript{141} “SAHRA [South African Heritage Resources Authority] must identify those places with qualities so exceptional that they are of special national significance in terms of the heritage assessment criteria set out in section 3(2) and prescribed under section 6(1) and (2), and must investigate the desirability of their declaration as national heritage sites. (2) A provincial heritage resources authority must identify those places which have special qualities which make them significant in the context of the province or a region in terms of the heritage assessment criteria set out in section 3(2) and prescribed under section 6 (1) and (2) and must investigate the desirability of their declaration as provincial heritage sites” (National Heritage Resources Act, 1999, Section 27).
state of things, and they are two conditions of South Africanness in which people believe, even if they are unofficial.\textsuperscript{142}

If these are the conditions of the festival site being declared a national monument, these two features have emerged, in a more general sense, as two conditions of the festival being constituted as a South African event. By extension, they have emerged as two conditions of being a ‘good South African’ subject of the post-apartheid nation, at least within the context of the festival. It is this particular issue that interests me here, rather than doing a comparison between the festival site and other official national monuments, though this would in its own way enable an interesting critique. Let me examine these two conditions of the declaration of the site as a South African monument more closely.

Hedonism as a condition of post-apartheid national identity within recent history

We gain a fuller understanding of the relation between hedonism, oppositionality and South Africanness when we consider that, particularly in the early days of the festival, the event caused outrage amongst the Afrikaner district locals, the white mining community and the white townsfolk from nearby Northam, Swartklip and Thabazimbi. The children at the Thabazimbi School, for instance, are said to have been warned about the festival and attendance was prohibited.\textsuperscript{143} Rumours circulated about cat-skinning satanic rituals and, although the rumours were untrue, the antagonism from the local Afrikaans community was not wholly disagreeable to festival organisers and the people who attended it.\textsuperscript{144} It was in fact utilised to accentuate the contrast between the festival and its surroundings. And it was hedonism in general, and heavy drinking in particular, that did the work of shocking and defying an older generation and a more conservative sector of the white population, constituting the festival as a site that exists within

\textsuperscript{142} It is not only from attending the festival, participating and observing, not only from interviews, from articles on the event that this has been deduced. There is also support for it in the very limited amount of academic research that has been conducted on Oppikoppi. In their study on the tourism potential of Oppikoppi, Saayman and Kohrs (2006) report in their findings that a motivation for attending Oppikoppi, in over 70% of their respondents, was that, at the festival, they needn’t care if people thought their behaviour was “wild” (p. 12). There is, however, a difference between not caring about, and actively promoting, ‘wildness.’

\textsuperscript{143} Retha Hoffmann, wife of Carel Hoffmann and daughter of the Bornmann’s, explained this in an interview in October, 2009.

\textsuperscript{144} As Riaan Wolmeraans has written, “The locals are fascinated with the influx of musical tourists to their region twice a year. Surely an event so horrifying and so sinful that the police need to maintain a 24-hour roadblock for days on end must mean, at least, virgins being sacrificed and good, Christian children being led astray by Satanic high priestesses” (Wolmeraans, R. (2004), Dope on Tap? In T. Coetzer (ED.) Oppikoppi/10.doc: ’95-’04 Photos, Interviews, Twakpraat. Laugh It Off Media: Cape Town, p. 28.)
“onbetwiste AWB-territory [uncontested AWB–territory],” but which is completely different from it. Thus, drunkenness establishes not only an antagonistic relation to a politically conservative sector of the white Afrikaans community, but it also severs ties with this community seen to be contaminated by the apartheid past, a community that comes to stand in for the apartheid past. In this sense, the festival is purified of the apartheid past by alcohol.

There is, then, an unlikely association between hedonism and status as an authentic post-apartheid event and, by extension, being an authentically post-apartheid subject. It is useful, in this regard, to look at how the farm has been mapped (figure 4.1). The map of the festival grounds below, provided in a media release prior to the festival in August 2009, Smoorverlief, indicates the attempts to constitute the festival as an anti-apartheid place. There are several strategies at work here, but the appropriation of Voëlvry serves as perhaps the most prominent of these (see chapter two for a discussion of Voëlvry). If we look at the festival map, there is the James Phillips Main Stage, James Phillips Drive and Herselman Rd. Indeed, the incorporation of Voëlvry into the site of the festival, the use of Voëlvry to map the land, has been vital to the constitution of the festival as an “(anti)establishment,” a place different from the past. These musicians made contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle, but their hedonism plays a role of some importance here, too. As one reviewer of the festival commented on the role of the Voëlvry musicians in helping to found the spirit of the festival,

Koos Kombuis (mysteriously absent from the lineup this year), who was part of a group ostentatious and belligerent alternative Afrikaans rockers of the Voëlvry era, is one of the pioneers of the festival. Operating with a no-holds-barred approach, these dudes were the liberators of Afrikaners from the stigmas of the Apartheid mindset and Afrikaner traditionalism. But those who assume that the festival is “white and Afrikaans,” as one Mahala gentleman did recently, are sorely missing the point. This is a stigma which conjures up associations with the Kurt Darrens and Steve Hofmeyers of our time – musicians who have taken music right back to the days of Bles Bridges. And this is not what Koos and his buddies pioneered back in the 90s. And so it is that Oppikoppi has emancipated South African

145 Kombuis, K. (2009). Short Drive to Freedom: A Personal Perspective on the Afrikaans Rock Rebellion. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, p. 207. The Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging is a far right political organisation, formerly headed by the late Eugene Terre Blanche. The irony here is that Terre Blanche was reputedly also an alcoholic
146 The inscription of the farm with Voëlvry names marks a change of the land. However, an examination of the mapping of the festival site over the years shows several changes here, too and some of the street names have been changed. For instance, Voortrekker Straat, Smitstraat, Lieplapper Straat, Brannewyn Baan and Fender Freeway have been changed.
147 There have also been tributes to Voëlvry and to Phillips in particular, at the festival. We might note here, too, the giant poster of James Phillips in the bar, the exhibition area of the festival site.
youth from the past structures of an authoritarian, patriarchal culture and produced instead a counter culture that celebrates all things laterally creative and eccentric. One does throw caution to the wind when launching for Oppikoppi, as every year brings new challenges and surprises to this schizophrenic festival. There may not be enough wood. They may run out of pizza dough. It may be as cold or as hot as hell. You may forget your braai tongs, or worse – your torch. But one would be a fool for not trekking to this little universe of hedonistic musical revelling. Oppikoppi is an unpretentious enigma. Who would think that a patch of ground in the thorny unforgiving bush could breed such creativity in culture, love between festinos and nights of insane chaotic pleasurable abandon? 

Figure 4.1 Oppikoppi ‘Smoorverlief’ August 2009 festival map

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Here these two features – drinking and oppositionality – are weaved into a single, somewhat imprecise but affectively loaded narrative of the festival as a progressive place, as a place that leads from the old and problematic to the new and celebrated. The festival’s identity is defined through its association with Voëlvry, as an anti-apartheid post-apartheid national event (“belligerent alternative Afrikaans rockers,” “the liberators of Afrikaners from stigmas of the Apartheid mindset and Afrikaner traditionalism,” “emancipated South African youth from the past structures”). These are features of the Voëlvry movement, to be sure, but they are borrowed in establishing the identity of the festival; that is, in the true psychoanalytic sense, there is an identification of the festival with Voëlvry, a taking in of Voëlvry which enables a pattern of ‘being like,’ one which entails not only taking signifiers of Voëlvry into the site of the festival as in the map of the festival grounds (figure 4.1), or putting up a giant poster of Phillips in the bar on the hill, but an incorporation figured, also, in alcoholic ‘intake’ (“hedonistic musical revelling,” “schizophrenic festival,” “insane chaotic pleasurable abandon”), a regularity of oral ingestion that enables the festival to identify with this anti-apartheid movement, to be like it.

In short, hedonism has become synonymous with being against apartheid, at least for “die eks-Alternatiewe Afrikaanse jongmense [the ex-Alternative Afrikaner youth]” who withdrew to Oppikoppi. To reiterate the point here, the creation of a national monumental space on the grounds of hedonism constitutes the festival site as heterotopic space in relation to official post-apartheid monumental space, but also as a space other to apartheid places. This, however, is to treat this relation between hedonism and post-apartheid monumentality, between hedonism and post-apartheid national identity, as having emerged within the short period of a single generation, in a relation of opposition to recent apartheid history. This relation can and should be understood within a broader historical context. Hence, in the section that follows, I situate this relation within a wider colonial history as it is a mythologised colonial past that is invoked in the constitution of the festival site as a ‘wild phenomenon.’

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“In die begin was dit woes en leeg”

The site of the festival is depicted in the first pages of Oppikoppi/10.doc, published in August, 2004, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the festival (see chapter three for a more detailed discussion of this text). On the first page are two photographs, one at the top of the page, one at the bottom – I examine the top photograph later in this chapter (figure 4.5) – with a poem between them. The bottom photograph pictures the northern end of the farm Nooitgedacht (figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 “In die begin was dit woes en leeg [In the beginning it was wild and empty]”

The caption for the photograph reads, “In die begin was dit woes en leeg [In the beginning it was wild and empty].” In the foreground of the photograph is what has become one of the stage areas, beyond which lies the camping ground for the festival and, in the distance, the surrounding game farms and hunting lodges. Though the photograph is not credited to anyone and it is not clear when exactly it was taken, it portrays the farm, ‘wild and empty,’ before the time of the festival.

To revisit the literature reviewed in chapter two on the ‘African wilderness,’ it was shown there that to declare the land ‘wild and empty’ is to clear it for occupation. It was also shown
that, while it is a colonial vision of the land, there is also at work a distinctly post-colonial white
wish for deliverance from ‘the sins of the past,’ to return to “African Eden” (Coetzee, 1988, p. 74) by imagining the land before colonial naming, mapping and seizing, to return to an
imaginary time ‘before the fall.’ According to this fetishising discourse, the constitution of the
wilderness as an African ‘anti-garden’ also enables a kind of regression to ‘the first ages of man,’
from which the ‘civilised European’ has been alienated. There is thus proposed a common origin
from which all have ascended – some further than others – to which all can descend. It is perhaps
for this reason, as de Kock (2010) has argued, that wildness has been instrumental in white post-
apartheid claims for South African belonging. Let me examine a few instances where these
different visions of the African land have been used to constitute the site of the festival.

We can discern a discourse on the festival site whereby the colonial and apartheid
inscriptions of the land are imagined as erased, this mapping reversed, leaving behind a pre-
colonial, pre-apartheid wilderness, a wilderness and emptiness beneath the surface, an ahistorical
“place of raw, earthly, primitive, spiritual bliss, a remote bosveld sanctuary,” as the 1998 festival
flyer advertised the event, a place outside of history. Put rather floridly in one review of the
festival,

The mirage of a city of excess takes solid form in the veld’s stark landscape, free from big brother
interventions of society, cordoned off from the real world, and then dissipates into thin air again four
days later, evicting 12 000 people from its tent-town streets and sending them trudging back to the
routines and demands of a Protestant work ethic.150

Here, in this un-mapped and emptied African land, “The atmosphere allows everybody to be
their most natural self.”151 This constitution of a ‘wild and empty’ festival site has been utilised
in ways akin to Conrad’s vision of Africa, already discussed in chapter two with reference to the
work of Ahmed (2000) and the discourse of whiteness ‘going strange.’ As one reviewer of the
August 2008 festival put it, “No man can survive here without surrendering himself entirely to

151 These are Selaeolo Selota’s words, and appear above a page full of pictures of black musicians performing at
Oppikoppi accompanying an article by Toast Coetzer (Toast Coetzer, ‘Vusi Mahlasela: On Touring America, the
State of Music and the Ignorance of the Youth,’ In T. Coetzer (ED.) Oppikoppi/10.doc: 95-‘04 Photos, Interviews,
the primitive and the primordial.” Which is to say that, in this discourse, there is a correspondence between the festival site – where the ‘emptiness and wildness’ of the farm is restored, leaving a temporary escape where one can “forget the trappings of civilization for a few days” – and the subject of this discourse, a correspondence between the construction of the site of the festival as ‘primordial’ and a ‘wild’ mode of conduct. And in this correspondence, there is an always implied ‘regression’: as the sedimentary layers of the land are erased, so one regresses nearer and nearer to a ‘natural’ version of oneself. Articles on the festival state, almost as a matter of course, that ‘going bos’ (going bush, but also going wild, going ‘primitive’) – not needing to shower for the duration of the festival, for example – is a part of the attraction of the event. But ‘going bos’ also produces a particular kind of regression, one that takes the form, in no insignificant way, of the drunken and the hedonistic conduct that has defined Oppikoppi as a ‘wild phenomenon.’

To provide an example that is somewhat extreme, but in no way isolated, the influential website Watkykjy (www.watkykjy.co.za) – partly responsible for the rise of zef culture, to which I turn in chapter six – featured a photograph of two young males in August 2009, after Oppikoppi Smoorverlief (figure 4.3). The editor of the website provided this short description:

‘n Kleinerige persentasie van die Oppikoppi skare kan jaarliks vervang word deur real-life brandsiek ape wat broeke dra en op mekaar pis. Die hele tyd. Hier is byvoorbeeld twee candidate. Ek twyfel sterk of enige iemand smoorverlief kan wees op hierdie twee karakters. Tensy hulle natuurlik smoorverlief op mekaar is en die crotch area op hulle broeke ’n aanduiding is van die graad van verliefdheid [A smallish percentage of the Oppikoppi crowd can be replaced each year by real-life mangy apes that wear pants and piss on each other. The whole time. Here are, for example, two candidates. I strongly doubt anyone could be smoorverlief over these two characters. Unless they are

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152 Kavish Chetty, ‘Beasts and Barbarians: Oppikoppi... K. Chetty is Burning,’ 19 August, 2008, accessed online from www.levis.co.za 28 August 2009. Recall also how Nechama Brodie titled her article on Oppikoppi in 2010, ‘Apocalypse Now Now,’ (Sunday Time, Lifestyle, 22 August, 2010, pp. 6-7). The issue here is how, in the representation of the festival, a title like this ‘makes sense,’ how it is accepted that the rules of society are, in fact, suspended in the ‘wild bushveld.’ While this may frequently be an ‘unreferenced citation’ in the festival’s performativity and its representation, there is a strong correspondence between Conradian ‘degeneration’ and the festival’s ‘wild’ behaviour.

of course smoorverlief over each other, and the crotch area on their pants indicates the degree of the love for each other).\textsuperscript{154}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure43.jpg}
\end{center}

Figure 4.3 “\textit{Die Vuilste Vuilgat Fokkers [The Filthiest Filthy Fuckers]}”

One comment on this photograph stated, sympathetically, “\textit{Dit is tog immers oppikoppi, mens het maar die geneigheid om jou ‘ware’ kant te unleash} [That is indeed Oppikoppi, people have the tendency to unleash your ‘true’ side].”\textsuperscript{155} The young man on the left of the photograph replied, in a comment on the \textit{Watkyk\jy} website,

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ons het na jack parow se show net besluit op poes zef dronk te raak sonder enige geld. Die rede hoekom ons so vuil was is omdat ons dirtangels by die ATM gemaak het vir dop of donasies, en daai nat vleke, wel vokit kan entgieets gewees het. Ek was so Dronk ek sou my piel uitgehaal het om te kmakop daai stadium. Oppikoppi was en is nie net n jol nie. Dis n Leefstyl. Vrede} \textsuperscript{[We decided after Jack Parow’s show to just get cunt zef drunk without any money. The reason we were so dirty was because we made dirt angels at the ATM in order to get donations or drink. And those wet streaks,}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
As McClintock (1995) has noted in her analysis of Rider Haggard’s *King Solomon’s Mines*, a journey into the wild interior is almost always “figured as a journey forward in space and backwards in time” (p. 242) – in this particular example above, it figures a regression backwards not only to a form of ‘primitivism,’ but a regression to ‘infantilism.’ This is, to emphasise the point, not an isolated example, and it is one that, while raising eyebrows, is also, if ironically, endorsed – “*Goeie werk, Jason* [Good work, Jason],” as the *Watkykjy* editor commented. But it is at the limit of this discourse – people do not go much more ‘natural’ than this. To provide another example that adds to this discourse quite another layer, in response to an article by Dave Durbach, one young man wrote,

I was there and I’m black. The one thing I noticed was that 10 minutes after camp was set up, everybody was too fucked up to notice who was black and who wasn’t. I spent two thirds of Oppi at Afrikaner campsites with people I didn’t even know, going back to my campsite to stock up on Carlings. Maybe, instead of trying to alter the line up, we should leave Koppi as a rock festival and just encourage other black folk to go. Its an experience like no other that is based on the simple fact that people like to get fucked up, and people like rock music, and when everybody is out to have fun, we don’t really give a shit about what differences we have between us. Three and a half days of live music, dust and booze (and drugs for all the crazy white people), who cares about race?

This statement would have us believe that, at the core of each person, beneath their white or black skins – whose meanings have been produced by a colonial and apartheid apparatus that worked, in no insignificant way, through spatiality – all “people like to get fucked up.” This statement stops short of calling this a natural drive, yet this is the implication. True, this would be a human drive, rather than a feature of a truly South African subject, yet the non-racialism of his assertion has the ring of a longing that is distinctly South African – and one should recall here

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157 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
that it was precisely this feature of hedonism that was emphasised in declaring the festival site a national monument. That he is black only reinforces the point, gives it the weight of political legitimacy, and in the representation of the festival, more generally, the words are of black speakers are elevated, standing as a glittering emblem of the truth of its South Africanness.\footnote{As a good example, straight after the online comment that stated that all people like to get “fucked up,” this one followed, endorsing his words: “Bantu R, I love you, brother! People always get their panties in a knot when it comes to race at festivals. Ja, it’s a whitey fest, but a good one. The line-up was bloody fantastic and that’s why the tickets were sold out at 12h00 Friday. Over 18 years the Oppikoppi fest grew like no other in SA and it swings with the tides. But it kept its soul and that is why people go for more. Face it, it’s a lekker place to unwind and forget about everyday crap we have to deal with. Cut loose!” (Dave Durbach, Jocks of the Bushveld, Mahala, 11 August, 2010, accessed online from \url{http://www.mahala.co.za/music/jocks-of-the-bushveld/} 27 August 2011).
}

There is here, I want to argue, a performative recitation of the Conradian myth of the African wilderness. The degeneracy implied in this recitation needs to be understood here as a normalising discourse that disciplined the white colonial subject, as well as a biopolitical technology that regulated white colonial collectivities (Stoler, 1995). As Stoler (1995) puts it, “Degeneracy characterized those who were seen to veer off bourgeois course in their choice of language, domestic arrangement, and cultural affiliation. Notions of degeneracy registered dissonance among Europeans and basic uncertainties about who would be granted that privileged status” (p. 32). We can add to this list of deviations from the norms and ideals of restrained whiteness, the excesses of alcohol abuse, a deviation that constituted an ‘internal enemy,’ associated with the ‘poor white problem’ that threatened to unsettle the image of civilised whiteness, and its ‘external enemy,’ the so-called uncivilised, ‘degenerate races’ drinking to excess in the townships, in mining compounds and in the winelands (Stoler, 1995; see also Mager, 2010 for an account of the politics of excessive drinking in South Africa).

The degeneration that is a part of this recitation of a Conradian myth is taken, in this discourse on the festival site, as an affront to the regulatory power of these norms of restraint; that is, \textit{as a refusal of them}, establishing, within the depths of this wilderness, a horizontal relation between people who have similarly regressed to a place and a time outside colonial and apartheid history, a “placeless place” (Foucault, 1986, p. 7). To put this into heterotopic terms, at stake here is the constitution of a place differentiated from the ideals of colonialism and apartheid, a place precisely the opposite of these ideals, where whiteness has an inverted mirror image of itself returned. Thus, in this discourse that takes as its object the site of a post-apartheid festival, \textit{there are no new ordering principles being advanced}, as the terms of this affront are
derived from colonialism itself: the racist discourse of degeneracy is appropriated and inverted, turned against itself, enabling the acquisition of freedom from the ‘sins of the past’ by aligning oneself with the ‘internal enemy’ of colonialism. This discourse thus borrows from the myth of a return to the wilderness, to the garden, its purpose: the retrieval of original innocence, figured as a pilgrimage to an imaginary time and place before, constituting a deep connection to the continent, to the African earth. It should be noted, however, that this is posited as a regression that is equally available to all South Africans, whereas it is a distinctly white South African male homosocial activity to go out into the bush and get drunk.

There is an interesting link here to Voëlvry involving the story of Piet Pers (Gary Herselman) becoming a dog during the 1989 tour. The story was related by Herselman in a documentary film made by Lloyd Ross (2006) titled Voëlvry: The Movie, but also referred to in a book by Pat Hopkins (2006), titled Voëlvry: The Movement that Rocked South Africa. Herselman, apparently driven to it by the whiskey drinking excesses of the tour, took to barking at the audience during performances, biting people around the ankles at bars and howling at the moon. Thus began a legend of the dog Piet Pers became for the duration of the tour. What the story highlights, in one respect, is the hedonistic escapism that links Voëlvry with Oppikoppi, and forms the basis of Oppikoppi’s introjection of Voëlvry; but it also highlights the paradox of what is taken to be progressive politics in the degeneration to animalism, which has led both the tour and the festival to receive religious condemnation and a portrayal by religious communities as being an evil abomination (Kombuis, 2009; Hopkins, 2006). The important point, though, is that the church legitimised apartheid and to oppose or be opposed by the church was an anti-apartheid position. As Mads Vestergaard (2001) formulates this inversely, “Opposing apartheid meant opposing not only ones own people, but also, ultimately, the will of God” (p. 21).

Animalism during apartheid was an anti-apartheid position and stands as a both hedonistic and anti-authoritarian position in post-apartheid South Africa.161

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161 Indeed, this religious aspect should not be underplayed. The discourse of ‘degeneracy’ was not only a political discourse, but also – and perhaps even primarily – a Christian doctrine on race and civility. Traditional Afrikaner homes, in which many of the young Afrikaners who attend the festival have grown up, are staunchly religious. Considering these two points together – the inseparability of apartheid, colonialism and religion, on the one hand, and the religious background of many who attend the festival, on the other – this discursive strategy noted above stands, also, as an appropriation and manipulation of a diagram of pastoral power. In its appropriation of the ‘degeneracy’ discourse, a new and inverted teleological line of progress is constructed, from a racist past to a non-racial future, as opposed to a teleology moving towards ‘civilisation’ as racial purity. Here salvation is offered in the ‘civilisation of rural backwardness,’ but in a move that inverts historical roles: the ‘politically backward,’ traditional Afrikaner communities become the ‘degenerates’ and it is the festival, which sets itself up in opposition to this
Not only does alcohol purify the festival of the apartheid past, then, by severing ties with a ‘contaminated’ sector of the white community, but in this fantasy world, alcohol transports one to the time before the fall, to ‘lawless Nature,’ before which all are equal and equally ‘savage.’ It is, to be sure, a wish-fulfilling fantasy, in the Freudian (1900) sense, figuring a longing for the status of being an authentic South African subject – the obvious contradiction here is that, in this time before the fall, there was no post-apartheid South Africa, which is retroactively imagined.

If the conversion of land into farm has historically been equated with the conversion of nature into culture (Wicomb, 1998), the un-mapping of a farm, the erasure of its markings, stands, rhetorically, as a return to Nature. Useful here is Johan Geertsema’s (2006) analysis of the sublime and the South African landscape, which he takes as pertinent insofar as “questions of white identity are concerned” (p. 106) in a post-apartheid context. Using the Afrikaner writer, Dan Roodt – a “deeply problematic figure in contemporary South Africa” (Geertsema, 2006, p. 103) – as a focus point in his analysis, Geertsema problematises the deployment of the sublime to represent the landscape of the platteland, specifically Roodt’s twisting of the Deleuzian notion of the nomad to suit identity claims of Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa. More to the point, he problematises its use in constituting the unrepresentability of the land, which renders all equal before the land. This means, in effect, that

in the face of the sublime landscape, as in the face of death, he seems to be arguing, ‘we’ are all the same, and no one has a stronger claim to the land than anybody else. The political effect is to deny the primacy of any claim to it and by default to naturalise the place of white Afrikaners in Africa, albeit such naturalisation comes at the cost of the potential annihilation of Afrikaners too (Geertsema, 2006, p. 113).

It is, as Geertsema describes it, a peculiar kind of sour grapes strategy whereby, instead of the grapes out of reach being declared, in any case, sour and unwanted, they are pronounced as being of such awesomeness that they are quite out of the imaginative and practical reach of anyone and everyone. While there is a collective relation to the land in Roodt’s deployment of the sublime, a mutual incomprehension at its vastness, this move covers over of a history of domination, so that phantasmatic image of the past in the present represented by these ‘backward’ communities, that attains, for the adherents of this evangelical doctrine of the festival, ‘cleansed post-apartheid souls,’ cleansed precisely through ‘degeneration.’
we all stand before the *platteland*, speechless, mutually unable to lay claim to it in language or by more practical means. Roodt’s deployment of the sublime is not identical with the constitution of festival site as a ‘wild and empty’ place that enables a ‘wild phenomenon,’ to which all might regress. What is drawn out in their comparison, though, is a similar disavowal of ‘the primal scene of colonial violence’ (Riggs, 2005), in the case of the festival, this violence as the mapping of the land.

Oppikoppi as an ‘(anti)establishment’

What I describe below is, rather than an *un*-mapping of the land, as above, but a *re*-mapping of the land in a discourse on the festival as ‘(anti)establishment.’ Emphasis is placed on *emptiness* in the statement, “In the beginning it was wild and empty,” and this emptiness is rendered analogous to the country before, the country in the beginning, which is constituted as a wasteland, a moral emptiness and a culturally arid place of backwardness. While above we see how the ‘wild phenomenon’ has been enabled by imagining an ‘archaic land,’ celebrating this enduring wildness and emptiness from before, recovered as a primordial, sublime landscape beneath colonial and apartheid inscriptions of the land, here we begin to see the ‘(anti)establishment’ of Oppikoppi being, so to speak, established by constituting apartheid as a discredited past against which the festival has turned, a desolate cultural landscape prior to the festival, an emptiness which has been filled with memories and music.

It is along these lines that Kombuis (2004) has written, in a piece titled, ‘Sonder Oppikoppi was daar niks [Without Oppikoppi there would be nothing]’

*Sonder Oppikoppi sou die Voëlvry-beweging in die laat tagtigs doodgeloop het en Niemand sou dit onthou nie. Sonder Oppikoppi sou daar dalk nie vandag ‘n kultuur van volksfeeste en jeugsamekomste in Suid Afrika gewees het nie. Sonder Oppikoppi sou die Afrikanerkultuur oorhees gewees het deur nors baarde en Voortrekkermonument-bestekopnames. [Without Oppikoppi the Voëlvry-movement in the late eighties would have died out and nobody would remember it. Without Oppikoppi there wouldn’t be a culture of festivals and youth gatherings in South Africa. Without Oppikoppi Afrikaner culture would be overrun by bleak beards and Voortrekker-monument bestekopnames].

Figure 4.4 Remapping the land

The map of the festival site (figure 4.1) brings this point across well. The festival site was, in part, declared a national monument to celebrate particular apartheid-era musicians who opposed the state through their music, particularly the Voëlvry musicians, to the channels of resistance these anti-apartheid musicians opened up for the emergence of the festival, to the passage “the
good ship Oppikoppi\textsuperscript{163} has travelled into a new country and to the battles it has fought for South African music. To use the names of these musicians to write over the farm, to inscribe their names – names that brought much displeasure to the apartheid state and its supporters – into the dusty streets of the farm that has been turned into a festival site, is to re-map an apartheid landscape.

We see this construction of a moral emptiness filled, which is also a barren apartheid cultural landscape written over, figured in Oppikoppi/10.doc where photographs from the 1995, 1996 and 1997 festivals have been superimposed onto a Transvaal map, an apartheid territorialisation of the land (figure 4.4). Interestingly, in this image a new South African map was not used – the publication in which it appeared, Oppikoppi/10.doc, came out 10 years after the end of apartheid – precisely because effects of contrast can be visually created between the festival and the past, as well as the past as it endures in the surrounding areas.

To return to the first page of Oppikoppi/10.doc, we find an early version of this ‘(anti)establishment’ discourse wherein a relation of contrast is established between the festival and its surrounding areas, as well as the past. The top photograph, which appears above the image of the land before it became a festival site (figure 4.2), pictures a handwritten signboard welcoming festival goers to one of the first events at the festival gates (figure 4.5). The words on the sign read,

\begin{quote}
Deurmekaar bos hare [A bushy head of hair] 
Vuis vol silwer snare [A fist full of silver strings] 
Los stel heupe met wille hart [A loose set of hips with a wild heart] 
Die hunkering na minder smart [The longing for less despair] 
Vergete gewete met gelerige oë wat lag [A forgotten conscience with eyes that laugh] 
Kom in! Kom in! Ons vriende [Come in! Come in! Our friends] 
Ons het lank vir julle gewag [We’ve waited a long time for you]
\end{quote}

Several observations can be made regarding the way this photograph functions. Firstly, the words “Come in! Come in! Our friends” enhance the effect of an inside and an outside of the festival, an effect already activated, visually, by picturing the festival gates, its entrance. On the outside of which, there is despair (“The longing for less despair”) and there is conscience, which is eased within the festival (“A forgotten conscience”). There is the barren, voidic emptiness of despair filled and the moral emptiness of regressive politics negated: the crossing of this boundary, from the outside to the inside, from despair to happiness (“eyes that laugh”) and freedom (“A loose set of hips with a wild heart”) constructs a temporal threshold between a before and an after (“We’ve waited a long time for you”), with the sign board marking a re-territorialisation of the land, a point at which the apartheid past, behind the viewer of the image, is written over, the old farm gates, regulating entrance to the site, replaced with festival fencing.

This set of oppositions in the photograph brings into relief the relational constitution of the site of the festival. Indeed, the relation between the site of the festival and the area in which it is located emerges, in the festival discourse circulated by the festival organisers, in the reportage and commentary on the festival, as an opposition where the towns surrounding the site of the festival are repeatedly portrayed as politically unchanging, while the festival is depicted as a space of progression. The simplistic and exaggerated depiction of the farm’s surrounding areas
as conservative is a frequent feature of writing on the festival, as one newspaper article put it, “The Oppikoppi festival has been held over the past 14 years on a farm in the Far Northern Province (Transvaal still to local whites), a few hours north of Sun City”\textsuperscript{164} – a relation of exaggerated differentiation figured, also, in the image of the Transvaal map overlaid with pictures of drinking, smoking, laughing people (figure 4.4). To cite a recent example, one reviewer of the August 2010 festival wrote in his blog,

If you have ever driven through to Northam in the Limpopo Province, you will be aware of the fact that very little changes in that side of the country. People still think P.W Botha is President of South Africa and that Nelson Mandela is a terrorist and working hard behind bars on Robben Island.\textsuperscript{165}

That there is a material situation of racialised inequality – indeed, of overt racism – in rural \textit{platteland} towns should, of course, be acknowledged. Though it does not change the operation of this fantasy of the other of the post-apartheid nation – and the fact that it is a fantasy – which provides structure for the image of the festival that is promoted in a relation of differentiation from the rural backwardness of the \textit{platteland}, where nothing changes. The relation the festival has developed to its surrounding areas has been essential to the place it has assumed within the country as a whole, as a post-apartheid South African event. The festival site, in fact, cannot be an ‘(anti)establishment,’ a place where the moral emptiness of apartheid has been filled with music and progress, except in relation to the surrounding towns of Swartklip, Northam and Thabazimbi.

\textbf{Contradictions of the site of the festival}

\textit{The platteland} as the broken kettle of the festival

Let me review the ground that has been covered up to this point. The statement, “In the beginning it was wild and empty” provides the foundation for two constructions of the site of the festival, which is to say that at least two meanings are condensed into the statement, “In the beginning it was wild and empty.” On the one hand, an ahistorical emptiness and wildness that is enabling, that is celebrated and romanticised. On the other, a wildness and emptiness that has

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{164}] Sean Jacobs, \textit{Sunday World}, 15 August, 1999.
\end{footnotes}
been replaced by the festival, that is a problematised feature of the platteland which has been negated by the festival, an impermanent wildness and emptiness, analogous to the desert of apartheid, which ceased with the onset of the festival, as well as the end of apartheid.

To separate these two discourses – hedonism and an anti-apartheid disposition, the ‘wild phenomenon’ and the ‘(anti)establishment’ – is a purely analytical move. If they do appear as separate in the festival discourse, they are juxtaposed, superimposed or entangled with one another. A good example of this juxtaposition appears in the map of the festival grounds (figure 4.2), where alongside markers of anti-apartheid resistance, such as the names of the Voëlvry musicians, are also those that inscribe the site of the festival as a ‘wild phenomenon.’ Here, Dionysus Drive intersects with Freedom Avenue, on the map but also in the real dusty streets of the camping area.

The photograph examined above (figure 4.5), while representing a break with the past and a negative relation to the area surrounding the festival, also represents a boundary which marks a break from work schedules, from the demands and responsibilities of everyday post-apartheid life, enabling, as Foucault (1986) has said of heterotopias, the crowd to “arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time” (p. 6), enabling “time in the mode of the festival” (p. 6). As one writer for an influential Afrikaans website has described the feeling of crossing this threshold, “hier kan jy so onherroeplik vergeet van die liederlike feit dat jy as plebejer ie wers in 'n kantoor moet werk om jou rekeninge te kan betaal nie. Hier vermoor jy jou benepe, paranoïese self [here you can forget, irrevocably, about the nasty fact that you have to work like a pleb in an office to pay your bills. Here you kill your petty, paranoid self].” Within this unreal place, one can have unkempt hair (“a bushy head of hair,” as the poem at the festival gates put it), which stands in for a general relaxation of the regimes of hygiene and propriety to which people are normally subject in the city, enabling freedom from regulation. As Foucault (1986) states, the function of a heterotopia can be to “create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory” (p. 7). The festival is not real life, it is “an absolutely surreal world,” it is relief from everyday life; yet it is more real than real life, than the places that surround it, but also the rest of the places of


everyday post-apartheid South African life. Compacted into this image (figure 4.5), then, are both discourses examined above, that of the festival site as a ‘wild phenomenon,’ where festival goers are able to be their most ‘natural selves,’ as well the festival as an ‘(anti)establishment,’ where subjects can stand opposed to the apartheid past and its legacy.

There is, then, at once, a pleasure in being on the farm, enjoyment in withdrawing to the Platteland as this enables the ‘wild phenomenon’ and freedom from Afrikaner traditionalism and allows the festival to claim its status as an unofficial ‘South African’ monumental place. But, if the description of the farm outside of festival time is recalled here, this withdrawal is also a confrontation with an old and dying society, a differentiation of itself, as an ‘(anti)establishment,’ from precisely that to which a pleasurable withdrawal takes place. These two strategies have emerged as fused features of the construction of the site of the festival, but much work has had to go into concealing their difference. For if they are different, contradictory strategies, the corollary is that the celebrated, enabling wildness turns out to be precisely the same wildness and emptiness that is negated; in other words, the wildness and emptiness prior to the festival, the political regressiveness of apartheid, is really the very same wildness and emptiness that gives rise to the regressive hedonistic event that has been declared an unofficial national monument. Inversely, negating an arid apartheid landscape, re-mapping the land in a reflexive post-apartheid manoeuvre, turns out to be, also, a re-mapping of the primordial land, a distinctly colonial assertion of power and dominance over the land. And the more the land is negated in order to authenticate the post-apartheid status of the festival, because of the overdetermination of the manoeuvre, the more the conquering ghost of the colonial and apartheid past is conjured.

This can be put into a discourse analytic framework with reference to Foucault’s (1972) notion of the “points of diffraction of discourse” (p. 73). As cited in chapter two, though it bears repetition here, Foucault has several meanings of diffraction in mind, the first being “points of incompatibility: two objects, two enunciative modalities, or two concepts may appear, in the same discursive formation, without being able to enter – under pain of manifest contradiction or inconsequence – the same series of statements” (p. 73). He then characterises points of diffraction as “points of equivalence: the two incompatible elements are formed in the same way and on the basis of the same rules; the conditions of their appearance are identical; they are situated at the same level; and instead of constituting a mere defect of coherence, they form an
alternative” (p. 73). Foucault brings into critical focus here the way in which two seemingly incongruent elements of discourse can sit side by side, juxtaposed, as two elements of a discourse that have emerged out of the same discursive conditions of possibility. Though these two strategies contradict each other, they find their point of cohesion, and of fusion, in the fact that they have been formed according to the same discursive regime of post-apartheid nationalism, and they serve the same function, although in different ways.

The fusion of these discourses – the celebration and the negation of wildness and emptiness – produces a subject able to take up a place within a post-apartheid regime of truth, as an authentic post-apartheid South African. In the case of the former, as a regressed subject of the wilderness, assuming a position of the ‘internal enemy’ of colonialism, the ‘white degenerate.’ In the case of the latter, as a white anti-apartheid subject, differentiated from the white apartheid subject, just as the land is inscribed in ways that differentiate it from apartheid inscriptions of the land. How, then, is the intersection of these two contradictory discourses, designating two distinct subject positions, each with their own enunciative modalities that fuse into one, registered psychically?

The fusion of these two discursive strategies covers over the conflict they present by employing what Freud (1900) called borrowed kettle logic, where he describes the defence offered by a man who was accused by his neighbour of having returned a kettle in a damaged condition.

In the first place, he said, he had returned the kettle undamaged; in the second place it already had holes in it when he borrowed it; and in the third place, he had never borrowed it at all. A complicated defence, but so much the better; if only one of these three lines of defence is recognized as valid, the man must be acquitted (Freud, 1900, p. 21).

In both instances, what is being defended against and what the festival is acquitted of is entanglement with apartheid and colonialism; in other words, they both fulfil the wish for recognition of the authentically South African. Emptiness and wildness are invoked, at once, as that which is erased, as well as that which enables us to be free from apartheid. It is as if to say, in the first instance, we are against the plateland and the farm and their associations with the past and, in the second instance, the plateland and the farm are what get us free of apartheid. In this sense, the plateland is the broken kettle of this ‘truly South African’ festival.
The self-destructive South African subject

What I want to propose below is that the subject of these two contradictory constructions of the site of the festival is split, in conflict with itself. If we recall here that the emptying of the land is a distinctly colonial act, what the festival negates in being an ‘(anti)establishment’ is in part the festival as ‘wild phenomenon,’ producing self-negation as a characteristic feature of this discourse; thus, in the form this wildness takes in heavy drinking, the subject of these two discourses is also self-destructive. The latency of the colonial and apartheid past, the ‘traumatic nearness’ (Agamben, 2009) of the ‘primal scene of colonial violence’ (Riggs, 2005) as a mapping that enables a particular kind of subjectivity, is figured starkly in the photograph below (figure 4.6), taken by photographer, Liam Lynch outside the bar on the hill – and it should be recalled that it was here that one of the national monument plaques was hammered in – late at night.

It is an image of a drunken individual outside the bar, and with it we can draw out this notion of nation building in self-destruction and self-negation. It pictures the subject positions the two constructions of the site of the festival have enabled. If this is an authentically post-apartheid South African subject, he may well be differentiated spatially and temporally from traditional Afrikanerdom, which is located outside the festival gates looking disapprovingly in, and from apartheid from before the festival began; but the limitations of this elaboration of the nation building project are glaring. In Lynch’s image the festival employee, a black member of the festival security team, is looking away, both from the camera and from the young man lying in the gutter, and there is, literally and figuratively, no horizontal relation of fraternity established, signalling the failure of the strategies of the discourses described above, that of creating a hedonistic space for mutual regression and that of creating a space of anti-apartheid spectacle.
If we consider here the observations made above regarding the functioning of the farm outside of festival time and, moreover, the fact that farm owner, Boors Bornmann was a “bees Boer [cattle farmer]”¹⁶⁸ from Northam before Oppikoppi started and, likewise, that many of the people involved in the organisation of the festival grew up in the district, were socialised there – in other words, that Oppikoppi, as a heterotopic space, is differentiated not only from its surrounding areas and from the apartheid past that these areas come to stand in for, but is *a space differentiated from itself as it exists for the duration of the year* – then the man sitting in Lynch’s photograph can be seen as a stain the reconstitution of the farm, as a hedonistic place or as an anti-apartheid place, cannot remove, an indivisible remainder in the conversion of the farm into festival place, haunting the fullness of this post-apartheid South African event.

It is a remainder that haunts the reconstitution of the farm that can be discerned in

¹⁶⁸ These are Boors Bornmann’s words from a discussion I had with him at his farm in October 2009.
the fact that labour for the event is provided cheaply from the surrounding areas, from poor black communities in Swartklip and Northam; in the fact that that, while there was a R500 entry fee to the festival in 2009 – and much more than that was, on average, spent per person on alcohol – cleaners and security staff at the festival earned in the region of R270 for three days of work. The total spending by people attending the festival in August 2006 was R11,185,000 (Saayman & Kohrs, 2006). The job creation here should not be overlooked in a post-apartheid context where the alleviation of poverty is a government priority. But nor should the fact that these people, the cleaners and security staff who work around the clock for low pay, deal with drunk people for days on end, keep toilets unblocked, fires going and rubbish in the bins with South African flags painted across them, receive very little of this money spent. While their hands and sweat are necessary for the festival, they are the invisible non-festivalgoers at the event, forming a different category of person very much the effect of the farm as colonial and apartheid space.

Chinua Achebe’s (1978) sharp criticism of the vision of Africa created in Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* is useful here. It portrays, as Achebe notes, “Africa as setting and backdrop which eliminates the African as a human factor. Africa as a metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity, into which the wandering European enters at his own peril” (p. 9). For Achebe, the problem is not only fetishisation, but also disavowal. Africa is constructed as the same as Europe, but a primordial undeveloped version, a construction of the African wilderness utilised to put the heroic European subject on a spiritual quest in which the history of European civilisation can be rehearsed, disavowing African humanity. This is a criticism that stands, equally, against nation building through self-destruction, which spiritually purifies the white male subject of what must be excluded in himself to be a post-apartheid South African, but goes only a very short distance in terms of recognising other South Africans.

While this discourse of mutual regression and self-destruction may have its euphoric moments, where it is able to constitute a horizontal relation between black and white subjects of the post-apartheid nation – however few and far between these may be – as an elaboration of the nation building project it reaches its limit insofar as class is concerned. Not only does this

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169 In August, 2009 I spoke with some of the cleaning and security staff at the festival. In their study on Oppikoppi as a tourist destination, Saayman and Kohrs (2006) present a similar picture of the festival in 2006, where the entrance fee was R300 and the average expenditure on alcohol was R332, bringing the average total expenditure over the whole weekend, including food and petrol, to R1118 (R1700 in 2005).
performance not recognise other South Africans, *it is itself misrecognised*, the sacrifice of anti-
apartheid self-destruction laid before the alter of an unofficial national monument, a sacrifice
which might provide absolution from the ‘sins of the past,’ is not registered as such, but is
legible as only a repetition of a history of racial domination and marginalisation that can hardly
be looked at.

This point is vital and it has two consequences. The first is that, if we consider that access
to heterotopias is always regulated and conditional (Foucault, 1986), as a form of nation
building, which is really a form of white male homosociality, one requires access to not only the
hard cash necessary for excessive drinking, nor only the masculinist social currency to engage in
this form of male bonding, but also to scripts of distinctly colonial myths of the wilderness: this
is the order on which one must improvise in participating. It is having these at ones disposal that
regulates entry into this heterotopic, new national space, which makes its exclusions at the level
of race, gender and class.

**Conclusion**

One of the themes to have emerged in this chapter is that the two inseparable discourses
examined – indeed, it is one discourse – where the festival is formed as a ‘wild phenomenon’ and
as an ‘anti-establishment,’ which stand as the conditions according to which the festival site has
been constituted as an unofficial national monument, are heterotopic in relation to the official
post-apartheid conditions of becoming a monumental place and the monuments these processes
have officially declared. But if the festival site is differentiated from post-apartheid monumental
spaces, mirroring and contesting them through similitude, it is also heterotopic in relation to the
places that immediately surround it, to the *platteland*, mirroring and contesting them, inverting
their tropes, and the way they have been historically ordered. On the one hand, the festival has
provided a retreat from post-apartheid social change and, on the other, it has enabled a break
with the apartheid past or, at least, with traditional Afrikaner communities which stand in for the
apartheid past. The festival site has been, for as long as South Africa has been a democratic
nation, a refuge for Afrikaners who hate Afrikanerdom and the old country, for Afrikaners who
have rejected being inducted into traditional Afrikaner identity, but nevertheless remain
Afrikaners. There is thus a continued investment in, and attachment to, the rural nostalgia of
Afrikaner identity, as well as a defilement of various signifiers of the *platteland*. The result of which is self-destruction as a form of unofficial post-apartheid nation building.

I want to exercise some caution here, though, in proposing that Oppikoppi has established itself as a kind of heterotopic space, where a utopic vision of a new post-apartheid nation has been emplaced; rather, I want to propose heterotopias in the way Premesh Lalu (2007) treats Mahmood Mamdani’s notion of ‘the rural in the urban.’ For Lalu, it is not that the rural is heterotopic, but that the phrase “recalls the concept of heterotopias” (Lalu, 2007, p. 196). In order to be urban, an always implied other rural space is required, and here, heterotopia “delineates the ways in which the rural functions as a silent referent in the discourse of the urban” (p. 195). In the same way, we can speak of *the past in the present*. It is in this sense the Lyn Meskell (2007) writes of post-apartheid negative heritage

The present has become highly politicised as the moment that is not the past, but is constantly situating itself in relation to history. South Africans are making and living history in the now, reflexively understood in opposition to the past – but always in some form of dialogue with it (p. 167).

It is this dialogue, between the present and the past, that we find configured in the discourses analysed in this chapter, *recalling*, as Lalu (2007) puts it, the concept of heterotopias. Furthermore, even if the spatiality of the festival mirrors and contests post-apartheid and apartheid spatiality, what we see figured in the two discourses examined in this chapter is not the shattering of meaning or the founding of a new order of discourse. The discordance in the construction of the festival site – on the one hand, its heterochroneity, its reaching forward to the future of a new nation and its simultaneous reaching back to a ‘primordial’ past, and the juxtaposition of several sites within a real locatable site, where the festival site is constituted as a post-apartheid South African place which, at the same time, results in a repetition compulsion in which a mythical past will not be relinquished – is what would usually, in a heterotopology, qualify this space as heterotopic, enable it to be recognised as heterotopic (Foucault, 1986). Yet it is precisely in this discordance that the dialectic of these fused discourses is stuck, in a recirculation of old tropes, simultaneously clinging to them and defiling them, at once acknowledging the loss of the farm and denying it; and it is in this sense that there is a disavowal at work between these two discourses, a disavowal of the loss of the *platteland*. 
Coetzee’s (1998) words are once again telling, this time from Boyhood, the first in his three part memoir,

He must go to the farm because there is no place on earth he loves more or can imagine loving more. Everything that is complicated in his love for his mother is uncomplicated in his love for the farm. Yet since as far back as he can remember this love has had an edge of pain. He may visit the farm but he will never live there. The farm is not his home; he will never be more than a guest, an uneasy guest. Even now, day by day, the farm and he are travelling different roads, separating, growing not closer but further apart. One day the farm will be wholly gone, wholly lost; already he is grieving that loss.

(pp. 79-80)

The farm, because it occupies such a problematised place in the post-apartheid South African imaginary, is unavailable as a site of subject formation – at least, when the project is explicitly aimed at declaring a national monument and creating a characteristically post-apartheid South African place. Yet, it is precisely by turning against itself that it is rendered appropriable. That Coetzee raises loss of the farm here is especially relevant. In a sense, described in this chapter has been a failed – or at least, only partial – mourning of the farm, and I pick up this theme of loss, coupled with self-destruction, in chapter six through Freud’s (1923, 1921, 1917) concept of melancholia.

In the next chapter, I look at a discourse on the music of the festival, examining how it has emerged as an object of discourse. If this chapter has described an unofficial strategy for being declared a national monument, in chapter five I describe the strategies adopted by the festival that are more in line with the official government policies on art and culture, and the promotion of social cohesion and national identity. And if this chapter has described an incomplete severance from the old, a failed mourning of colonial and apartheid spatiality and the subjectivities they enable, in chapter five I describe how deviance has been disciplined in entering the new nation, in authenticating itself as a part of the post-apartheid nation. Here I extend the analysis of the festival’s differentiation of itself and the constitution of its boundaries, between the ‘un-South African’ and itself, the ‘Home of South African Music.’
“THE HOME OF SOUTH AFRICAN MUSIC”

The exhibitionary complex, the festival and the place prepared for post-apartheid desire

“Waar’s die Springbok Nude Girls? Hierdie is kaffir musiek
[Where are the Springbok Nude Girls? This is kaffir music]”\textsuperscript{170}

Introduction

Staging musical diversity

In the previous chapter the festival site was characterised as a heterotopic space; in this chapter I take this characterisation – with emphasis being placed on heterotopias as “places that do exist and that are \textit{formed in the very founding of a society}” (Foucault, 1986, p. 3, emphasis added) – in a somewhat different direction, that of its functioning, as Bennett (2002) has stated of the museum as a kind of heterotopic space, “as a civic technology in which the virtues of citizenship are acquired in the context of civic rituals, as a matter of routine and habit rather than of intellectual conversion” (p. 27). Festivals, this particular one anyway, can be thought of in terms of Bennett’s conceptualisation of museums and their exhibitionary practices; that is to say, there is an analogy proposed here between the display of objects in museums, and the staging of music at this festival. What I bring into critical focus in this chapter, with recourse to Bennett’s (1988) notion of the exhibitionary complex, are the discursive rules of according to which the festival has staged and represented its music, on the one hand, and, on the other, the correct and proper relation to this staged object of knowledge, into which the festival has inducted festival goers.

An incorrect and improper relation to music as an object staged at post-apartheid Afrikaans festivals is exemplified in the much publicised incident at the 1997 KKNK in Oudtshoorn, where the late Miriam Makeba, \textit{Ma Africa}, had beer cans thrown at her during her performance. The incident is not cited frequently in the representation of Oppikoppi, but makes up a part of what Foucault (1972) called its field of memory’ (see chapter two); indeed, the

incident scarred and determined the future of Afrikaans festivals in post-apartheid South Africa, and it figures, starkly, a failure to have learned the virtues of post-apartheid citizenship, in Bennett’s terms, the failure, that is, to act according to the new norms of post-apartheid society. As the incident was reported by journalist, Dror Eyal,

‘Kaffirs wil alles oorneem; kyk hoe lank speel hulle!’ [Blacks want to take over everything; look how long they play!]’ screams a man to my right. Short brown hair, clean shaven, T-shirt, shorts, Metlife Kaktus op die Vlaktes stick-on tattoo on his cheek. ‘Waar's die Springbok Nude Girls? Hierdie is kaffir musiek’ [Where are the Springbok Nude Girls? This is kaffir music], ‘comes from three sweetly dressed teenage girls behind me. Minutes later, beer cans start flying towards the stage. The first one narrowly misses one of the backing singers. As the second one flies through the air, people start catching on to the night's main event: beer-can tossing. Before long Miriam Makeba is dodging missiles while people around me start screaming, ‘Kyk daai hoere!’ [Look at those whores!]’ at Makeba's dancers. Others, visibly disillusioned with a culture they don't understand chant for the Nude Girls, Battery 9 – anything young, male and white.171

By throwing beer cans at Makeba, with cries of ‘Waar's die Springbok Nude Girls? Hierdie is kaffir musiek,’ the audience at KKNK stepped wildly over the post-apartheid limits of acceptability and received resounding condemnation, including in the article quoted above. By removing Makeba from the stage, they, in a sense, forfeited their place within the post-apartheid nation.

By contrast, Oppikoppi was during this time beginning to constitute itself as a ‘truly South African’ event. Certainly the festival has been criticised and problematised for being a racially separatist drunken escape into the bush – and was criticised as such during this time – but it has also been able to declare itself a national monument, as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, it has been able to represent itself as the ‘Home of South African music,’ the onset of which is marked by the intersection of two features of the festival. From the very first official Oppikoppi festival in 1995, supporting South African music was emphasised in the promotion of the event,172 but it was not until August 1997 that the festival began to refer to itself as a

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171 Ibid.
172 A flyer for Oppikoppi ‘Festival of Rock’ in 1995, for example, urged people to “support local music;” a flyer for Oppikoppi ‘Festival of Rock II’ in 1996 stated, “Get addicted to South African music, not drugs.”
“national music celebration.” And it was at this event that Oppikoppi began broadening its musical horizons beyond being “111% Rock,” and began to include an increasingly diverse lineup of music, including a jazz and blues stage and an electronic music stage. As Hoffmann has stated,

Once the festival got rolling and had a fixed audience, we really had the opportunity to expand the horizons of the festival by bringing new tunes to the ears of the mainly rock-loving audience. This constantly expanding sphere and openness to anything new has lead to some of the most interesting and memorable moments the festival (and probably South African culture) has ever seen – irrespective of the legendary cult-like fans.

Before Oppikoppi “embraced almost all the music styles in South Africa,” it was simply a ‘Festival of Rock,’ as the events in 1995 and 1996 were called. This kind of assertion about the festival gained momentum in 1998 and began to proliferate from the time of the August 1999 festival, appropriately named, in light of the inclusion of a diversity of music, Oppikoppi ‘InFESTation.’ And there has been, from that point until the present, a multiplication of the

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173 Emma O’Shaunessy & DJ Bob, ‘All Things Braaied and Beautiful,’ The Brubru: Oppikoppi 30 August to September 2002, p. 12. This was a festival programme that included several articles on Oppikoppi and South African music more generally.

174 This was printed on the festival flyer for the August, 1996 event, Festival of Rock II.

175 For the event in August 1997 Oppikoppi teamed up with Bassline, a Johannesburg club specialising in jazz and ‘world music,’ to organise the jazz stage at the festival. Not only was this new stage created, the festival hosted, on the main stage, black musicians, including Sankomoto, Louis Mhlanga and Vusi Mahlasela. What is more, the organisers had been travelling to Johannesburg to scout bands to play at the festival, particularly to the club, 206 Live on 206 Louis Botha Avenue, and DJ Bob played at the festival for the first time in 1997 between performances and after the last band had finished each night at the top bar, the jazz stage. 206 was owned by DJ Bob and was opened in 1993 under the name Mojo’s, an exclusively live blues and jazz venue, which in 1995 became 206 Live, until its demise in 2001. When asked about the reception he received at the festival in 1997, DJ Bob explained that the rock crowd was “responsive, musically responsive, because of rock, to the harder beats, to the jungle popular then. We played a lot of drum ’n bass, old-school funk and so kind of nudged it in there with them and people were into it” (interview with DJ Bob, 7 November, 2009).


178 The message issued by the festival organisers, from 1999 onwards, was that the event had a “uniquely diverse appeal” (this is a press release that was printed verbatim in articles prior to the event in August 1999, see, for examples, Anton Maartens, ‘Oppikoppi to Rock the Bushveld,’ Eastern Pretoria Record, 23 July, 1999; ‘Oppikoppi is Almost Here,’ Grocotts Mail, 13 July, 1999). As Carel Hoffman put it that same year, “Dit gaan nie skielek verseker dat die fees die diversiteit van ons land se bevolking weerspieël nie. Niemand kan sê Oppikoppi se musiek verteenwoordig nie ’n groot deel van die bevolking nie. [It can’t be denied that the festival reflects the diversity of our country’s people. Nobody can say Oppikoppi doesn’t represent a big portion of the population]”(Hoffmann cited in Pieter Redelinghuys, ‘Dit ruk dat dit rol Oppikoppi,’ Insig, September, 1999).
sources repeating the idea “That the festival is able to successfully integrate so many different musical styles, affording rock fans the opportunity to experience jazz and vice versa, is perhaps its most important function.”

That Oppikoppi is a ‘South African’ event is an assertion endorsed by several black musicians, lending it the weight of political legitimacy – and in this regard there is a resonance with some of the observations made in the previous chapter, but also with some of Steyn’s (2004) critical remarks on the strategic allegiances forged between Afrikaners and ‘other’ South Africans. Typical of this assistance is Sipho ‘Hotstix’ Mabuse’s statement that

Oppikoppi is the one festival that is broadly representative of who we are – in all genres. The only way we can begin to deal with the scourge of racism in this country is by interacting in the arts and music. Then we’ll begin to see the African renaissance movement. I’m so pleased that I’m part of this movement to ensure that South Africans listen to each other.

It is this particular discourse on the music of the festival – a discourse characterised by a combination of two kinds of assertions, firstly, that Oppikoppi is, through the music it stages, ‘broadly representative of who we are’ and, secondly, that this diversity is instrumental in addressing ‘the scourge of racism in this country,’ and constitutes an event that can ‘ensure that South Africans listen to each other’ – on which I have focussed in this chapter. This is perhaps most clearly articulated by Brodie in her review of the August 2011 festival, Oppikoppi, Unknown Brother:

There’s a remarkable alchemy that happens on that farm outside Northam, something that makes Oppikoppi work. I wrote about this last year, for the Sunday Times – the mix of musicians, how integration happens on stage, first, and then filters through to the audience. This year there were noticeably more black people. I hate how white liberal that sounds but it’s true, and it’s important.

179 Craig Caravan, ‘Oppikoppi Violence Free InFESTation,’ Diamond Fields Advertiser, 11 August, 1999. Caravan, of course, overstates the extent to which jazz fans came to experience rock, or even the extent to which jazz fans, who were not also already rock fans, attended the event. Here musical genres are coded racially: rock music is associated with whiteness, jazz music with blackness; and to like jazz as a white person is to ‘cross over.’

Because they didn’t just come to see stupid white kids getting off their tits. They came for the music. 

And to get off their tits.  

181

In this discourse, the music of the festival is formed as an object that is to be exhibited, in all its ‘representative diversity,’ and the crowd is to assume a correct relation to this object. It is an object-relation entailing, on the one hand, proper forms of conduct in relation to the music and, on the other, proper forms of desire for it. And these have been the two basic conditions in establishing this festival as ‘The home of South African music.’

Describing this – the assemblage of a diverse range of music and the instrumentation of the conduct and the desire of the crowd – forms one point of focus in this chapter. In this regard, I have used not only Bennett’s notion of the exhibitionary complex, but also a psychoanalytically informed conception of fantasy and identification in thinking through the lines of desire that enable the festival to constitute itself as a ‘truly South African’ event. However, when Bennett writes of the acquisition of civic virtues, he has in mind a complex of operations that work according a particular construction of the nation, a vision of its present and an imagined past out of which it has emerged. A second node on which I focus here, then, is this phantasmatic structure according to which the festival has formed itself as a post-apartheid South African event.

In the section below, I elaborate on the exhibitionary complex, introduced and discussed in chapter one; following this, I return to the discourse on the music of the festival. It should be made clear that this is not an analysis of the music staged at the festival – although that would be an interesting, if difficult and specialised form of analysis – but, rather, an analysis of what has been done to, done with, and said about the music of the festival. It is an analysis of the constraints within which a discourse on the music of the festival emerged, a discourse wherein the festival began to declare itself a South African event.

The exhibitionary complex

Bennett and museum exhibition

It was noted in chapter one that, through the workings of the exhibitionary complex and its fantasies of the nation and its past, a national community could be consolidated, rallied around a common idea of progress. This point regarding fantasy and the exhibitionary complex – the imaginary past constructed, the present it enables and the future that is projected out of it – is crucial for how I have employed the concept here, in the context of a post-apartheid festival as it is the operation of this fantasy that enables the constitution of this festival as a post-apartheid event. Here fantasy should not be thought of as a mere psychological supplement to the shortcomings of the festival in rallying a community around a common idea of nation, imaginatively filling in the gaps, but, rather, as a condition of possibility for soliciting identifications with the post-apartheid nation.

As the exhibitionary complex was developed by Bennett as an account of nineteenth century museum practices, a word of caution is necessary, before proceeding, on the risk of overextending this concept beyond its explanatory reach, on the risk of harbouring statements made about musical performances in the context of post-apartheid South Africa within the logic of a concept conceived for a set of European exhibitionary practices, missing what is particular and peculiar about festivals in general, and this music festival in particular.

The issue of employing a concept conceived in the context of museum practice is easily overcome and the examination of festivals through the lens of museum studies is neither novel nor controversial. As Ivan Karp (1991) has put it, commenting on studies of festivals (Bauman & Sawin, 1991; Kurin, 1991, Hinsley, 1991; Tanen, 1991) that draw from precisely this body of museum literature in the collection, *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, “issues of culture and representation emerge not only within the confines of the museum, but also in those often self-conscious, anti-museum settings called fairs and festivals” (p. 279). Furthermore, festivals have been shown to be instrumental in forging both a national past and a national community in a South African context, as noted in chapter one (Witz, 2003).

The exhibitionary complex has, however, been employed here taking seriously Bennett’s (2002) suggestion that, in postcolonial situations and in situations where multiculturalism is an ideal, the exhibitionary complex tends to operate as a ‘differencing machine.’ As the previous chapter has discussed, the post-apartheid moment has engendered, at least at this festival, a shift
in – indeed, an inversion of – how an ‘archaic,’ ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbaric’ past comes to be represented. And there are clear implications here for how the festival has instrumented the conduct, perception and desire of the festival crowd, bringing it into line with post-apartheid notions of political progress.

The festival as a ‘differencing machine’ bears some of the limitations Bennett cautions against regarding the multicultural exhibitionary complex. As noted above, the festival began, officially, in 1995 as a rock festival, and rock music, which has historically been white music in a South African context, remains central to the annual event. Exemplary of the ‘laundering’ of rock music, to use Wicomb’s (1998) phrase, by placing it within a diversity of music, in very concrete terms, is the James Phillips Main Stage, where rock acts tend to perform, right in the centre of the festival grounds, beneath the hill – although with the expansion of the festival infrastructure since 2003, there are now at least two stages where rock acts perform. The Sipho Gumede stage on other side of the hill, by contrast, hosts “diverse lineups, including live Jazz and Hip-Hop, Breaks, Funk, Electronica, House and Jungle, and everything in between.”

Frequently this is where black musicians tend to perform, affecting the crowd. It is this particular organisation of music at the festival, where rock is surrounded by a diversity of South African music, that makes the festival “Proudly South African,” carving out a place for rock music amongst this diversity, and a place for the festival within the diverse post-apartheid nation, a dynamic that is replicated in various spaces in which the music of the festival is represented.

183 As one journalist wrote in a review of Oppikoppi 2010, “There’s an invisible apartheid of sorts between the sides of the koppie: white Afrikaans-speaking students hanging out by the main stage, integrated indie-rockers tripping out to the beats on the other side” (Brodie, 2010, p. 6).
185 Another clear example of this can be found in the little bar on top of the hill on the farm where the festival first began. It is a kind of museum that exhibits the music that has passed across the stages of the festival and the memorable moments from years gone by. Photographs of performances cover the walls of the bar: there are photographs of musician, Johnny Fourie playing in 2000, one of David Kramer performing in 1998, there is a large photograph taken by John Hogg of Madala Kunene, performing a set at dusk in 1998 and there is a massive poster of James Phillips. There is a Beeld newspaper headline, “Hotstix Kook Op ‘Koppi [Hotstix cooks at ‘koppi].’” Amongst the names and band names painted onto the walls are those of Pops Mohammed, Paul Hanmer, McCoy Mrubata, Lithium, Springbok Nude Girls, Dorp, Blues Broers, Gito Baloi, Valiant Swart, Koos Kombuis, Urban Creep, Gert Vlok Nel, Wendy Oldfield, Tannanas, Not My Dog, Die Warmblankes, Die Naaimasjiene, Mathew van der Want, Brasse Vannie Kaap, David Kramer, DJ Bob, Fuzigish, Vusi Mahlasela, Louis Mhlanga, Albert Frost – the names of Jazz musicians side by side with those of rock bands, hip hop artists and blues guitarists, the names of English-speaking ska bands next to Afrikaans death metal bands and multiracial string bands, the names of white and black
The KKNK incident provides a good sense of an incorrect relation to the musical diversity staged in a post-apartheid context, but what is the correct relation of ‘truly South African’ subjects? And how has the festival induced this correct relation?

Regulating conduct

After describing some of the events of Oppikoppi 1999, ‘InFESTation’ – how “wit en swart (hoewel nog in die minderheid) saam-boogie op die maat van reggae of Mahube se Afro-jazz [white and black (although, still in the minority) boogie together to the beat of reggae or Mahube’s Afro-jazz]” – journalist, Kobus Burger asked the rhetorical question, “waar anders in Suid Afrika swel jou bors só van trots [where else in South Africa does your chest swell with such pride]?” Reviews of the festival, such as this one, that refer to the event in an uncritical and celebratory way, as “‘n stukkie geskiedenis in die bosveld [a piece of history in the bush],” “a piece of musical history,” conceal the work required to attain the two basic conditions of being a South African event noted above, a diversity of music and a proper relation to it.

The KKNK incident in 1997 did give the Oppikoppi festival organisers good reason to be concerned, and their concern filtered through the ranks of the festival. Although there had not been anything in the wild and hedonistic conduct of the festival approaching the explosiveness of beer cans being thrown at performers, the festival, at that point only officially in its third year, had not been free of racism. Old South African flags are said to have been strung up in the trees in the festival camping grounds, and during the four day new year’s eve party in 1995, a member of the audience shouted at black musician, Jo Blue, who was performing onstage, “Haai, kom soen my, jou kaffir [Hey, come kiss me, you kaffir].” Disciplining this sort of conduct out of the festival, this way of watching and listening to black musicians perform, was

South African musicians adorning the wall in no particular order. We can say here that the condition of these white musicians’ place on the wall of fame of South African music is that they are accompanied by black musicians.

188 Evan Milton, ‘Cape hip hop’s battle of the year,’ Cape Argus Tonight, 12 August, 1999.
189 Farm owners, Tes and Boors Bornmann recounted in an interview in October, 2009, the story of watching, from their veranda, these flags being hung in the trees in the campsites. Sean Jacobs has also written, “I am reminded of a trip I took with three other friends (two black and one white American) to the Oppikoppi music festival in the North West Province a few years back (this was after 2000). We were settling in at the camp ground when a car with the flag of the 19th century white Afrikaner republic drove past our camping spot and the occupants, looking in our direction, gestured: ‘Wat maak die kaffirs hier?’ (Literally translated: ‘What are the niggers doing here?’)’ (Sean Jacobs, ‘South Africa’s Ugly Present,’ The Guardian Online, 28 February, 2008, accessed online from http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/28/southafricasuglypresent 6 February 2009).
190 The musician disarmingly replied, “I’m too busy screwing your sister” (Beeld, 3 January 1996, p. 11).
clearly a priority if the festival was to establish an image of itself as a politically progressive event.

The problematisation of racist conduct at the festival does not only mark the first events during the 1990s; it is evident even at the most recent Oppikoppi festivals. What is more, the “fear and loathing in the bosveld,” the hedonism that has come to define the event analysed in chapter four, on the one hand, and the staging of a diverse lineup of music, on the other, are frequently at odds with one another as strategies for constituting the festival as a South African event, always at risk of cancelling each other out. It has been both racist and sexist conduct, each fuelled by alcohol, that the festival has needed to regulate in the relation between the crowd and the music – and musicians – of the festival.

Bennett (1988) has argued that, by incorporating disciplinarity and, along with it, the principle of panopticism, the exhibitionary complex turns the spectator into an object of surveillance: while there are objects on display, it is the crowd, according to Bennett, that is the ultimate spectacle.

To see and be seen, to survey yet always be under surveillance, the object of an unknown but controlling look: in these ways, as micro-worlds rendered constantly visible to themselves, expositions realized some of the ideals of panopticism in transforming the crowd into a constantly surveyed, self-watching, self-regulating, and, as the historical record suggests, consistently orderly public – a society watching over itself (p. 81).

Although this discourse on the festival as ‘The home of South African music’ takes the music of the festival as its object, just as museums take the past of the nation as their object, the real object of knowledge, as in the exhibitionary complex of the museum, is the crowd, who must

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191 As a “Do’s and Don’ts” list that accompanied the marketing of the August 2011 festival states, “Don’t be a doos: no sexist, racist, new federal, old federal or general bigotry is part of our family. If you don’t like certain people/animals, stay at home. Or go to Secunda” (http://www.oppikoppi.co.za/pdf/do's%20%20don'ts.pdf).
193 As Journalist Lloyd Gedye observed the unhappy coexistence of these two features of Oppikoppi – and what Gedye raises here as well is that the problematisation of the crowd’s conduct takes on not only a racialised, but also a gendered dimension: “The result is that although a band like Trike plough through their minimalist dark folk songs, their singer Esmé Evakwaad has to be subjected to moronic infantile behaviour along the lines of: ‘Show us your tits.’ I have to agree with her partner in crime, Drikus Barnard, whose response was: ‘Hoe fucked up is jy?’ It was a pertinent and relevant question that the IQ-deficient youth probably couldn't answer” (Lloyd Gedye, ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes,’ Mail & Guardian Online, 2 May 2008, accessed online from http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/2008-05-02-the-emperors-new-clothes 2 May 2008).
assume a correct relation to the music of the festival. Indeed, one sees just such a concern with regulating the conduct of the crowd at the festival, bringing it into line with the new norms of conduct appropriate in post-apartheid South Africa. The festival shares, too, this feature of infrequent – in the case of Oppikoppi, annual – spectacles which, by regulating the way music is related to by an audience, inducts the audience into the norms of an emerging national community. As Sipho ‘Hotstix’ Mabuse, quoted earlier, intimates, by reconfiguring the way music is listened to, the festival is able to “ensure that South Africans listen to each other” and there is a proposed generalisation of the lessons learned. Indeed, the Oppikoppi official website goes as far as referring to festival as a “ritual cleansing and de-cleansing of the senses,” as a “near religious experience for most of the tune zealots who migrate hundreds of kilometres to the three day celebration.”

How has this been operationalised?

Figure 5.1 View from the koppie (photograph John Hogg)

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196 Ibid.
In the first pages of *Oppikoppi/10.doc*, there appears a photograph taken by John Hogg\(^{197}\) (figure 5.1) of the festival in August 1997 – the book, however, was published in 2004 – an image that invites a reading as a figuration of a panoptic gaze upon festival goers, who internalise the norms of a new nation by imagining the place from which they are under surveillance, internalising this gaze upon them. One cannot see any musicians here, they are not the focus of attention; the blue dome shaped stage faces away from the photographer and in viewing the image, one occupies a position behind the dome, facing the crowd, who are gathered around the music being staged. It is they who are being watched.

Taken from the second *koppie* on the farm, when “the last soft light of the day hangs in the air, mingling with the dust and the music” (Hogg, 2004, p. 17), it is a nostalgic image of the festival. Nostalgic not only in the sense that it recalls the festival as it was, in the early days, but inasmuch as it recalls, also, a more distant past, a Voortrekker scene, an encampment in the ‘empty wilderness,’ cradled by the mountains in the distance, with smoke from campers’ fires and bushveld dust rising from the laager of cars, which are parked in between the Highveld thorn trees – all of which verges on the conservative and, in a post-apartheid context of social transformation, the politically problematic. What is interesting about this image, though, is that it is Louis Mhlanga’s words that are pasted across the left hand corner of photograph: “For me it’s like stepping into another world where the music is explored and people explore happiness and freedom. There’s so much space, and that space is taken up by music, there’s just music and happiness and bumping.”\(^{198}\) It is, in this instance, a black musician, the ‘historical other,’ who is installed in this virtual place from which an image of the propriety of festival conduct is returned to the crowd. There is something obscene in a post-apartheid South African context about such an encampment, an isolated and racially separatist gathering on a farm – a kind of temporary *volkstaat* (independent Afrikaner state) – an obscenity that recedes and remains silent enough for

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\(^{197}\) Hogg is a professional photographer who has taken many pictures at Oppikoppi. It is predominantly through his images that the early festivals of the 1990s are remembered and are represented. Many of his photographs portray the festival in a highly romantic way. It should be stated, though, that Hogg has also worked with performance artist Stephen Cohen, who, as Liese van der Watt (2004) puts it, “sets out to challenge and disrupt ideas about heteronormative masculinity as it intersects with ‘race,’ ethnicity and class” (p. 120). This is an understatement. Cohen’s work is – and I mean this without judgment – obscene; he appears wearing dildos strapped to his waist and face, wearing a prosthetic limb in order to play with the notion of white masculinity ‘Limping into the African Renaissance,’ as one of his works is titled. Whether Cohen does or does not disrupt anything is besides the point here. I mention all this to provide some background to Hogg’s work and his critical sensibilities.

the viewer of this image with the reassurance from Mhlanga that what is happening down below is good. Here Nuttall’s (2009) observations, discussed in chapter one, regarding the circuit of gazes – whites watching blacks watching whites – within which the conditions of white post-apartheid belonging emerge, are of obvious importance. One gains a sense, from this image, of who is able to occupy this place from which the crowd sees itself becoming a spectacle and, in this way, becoming South African; that is, we gain a sense of the epistemology of white post-apartheid South Africanness, of whiteness as an object of knowledge (Nuttall, 2009). But only a vague sense of what, in the conduct of the crowd, is being endorsed as good and problematised as bad – all one is told is that music is filling this otherworldly space, and that this music, along with freedom, is being explored.

What helps to discern this – the injunctions regarding conduct – is the increasing formalisation of the rules at the more recent festivals. Here the “Rules of Endassiement” that appeared in a festival program, in the pre-festival press releases, as well as in a booklet titled, Das Kapital: A Book about Dassies, published by Oppikoppi for the August 2006 festival, ‘Way of the Dassie,’ are a good example:

Rules of Endassiement

Our beloved comrades, comprehending the true meaning of the Dassie Fellowship will leave you whole, unbroken en definitely not eaten. Since there is each year a new litter of Dassies on the farm we have compiled a few extra survival tips especially for them (this also applies to a few dowwe dassies who do not have ears). Please do familiarize yourselves with them so long:

De la Das, De la Das… nobody wants to hear that in the camp site. Or Boney Das or Das Leopard. Think about the campsite around you when you are playing tunes.
Don’t be an idiot or irritate people: this rule also helps when away from the festival.
You are not sexy when you are drunk and probably not that clever either.
Don’t be sexist.
Don’t be racist.
Don’t be an idiot.
The festival gives you freedom. Use it sparingly. If you don’t know what to do with it, go home and toil for another year.
These rules are not actually necessary for the initiated, but each year there are new pseudo-Koppi fans which creep into the campsite and do not yet understand the community of trust.  

Produced through this text is a group of already non-racist, non-sexist subjects (“beloved comrades,” “the Dassie Fellowship,” “the initiated,” “the community of trust”); that is, South African subjects, at the politically mature, morally developed end of the spectrum, much as is the case with the exhibitionary complex as Bennett outlines it. Opposed to this group already inducted into the virtues of South African citizenship is a problematised group of people, associated with the past out of which the new nation has emerged, displaying the problematic modes of conduct against which post-apartheid civility defines itself (“a new litter of Dassies on the farm,” “dowwe dassies,” “pseudo-Koppi fans”). And one notices quickly the role of music in their problematisation; in particular, choice of, and ways of watching and listening to, music. There is an equivalence posited between politically problematic behaviour and listening to certain kinds of music, such as the controversial song, De la Rey (“De la Das, De la Das”) by Bok van Blerk, Boney M (“Boney Das”) and Def Leopard (“Das Leopard”). Or, rather, listening to particular kinds of music, music too strongly associated with the apartheid past, is constituted as a politically problematic form of conduct, the objective being to exclude certain kinds of music.

More than just promoting a diversity of music, then, there is a further implication here: the past is problematised in the audience as that which, on the one hand, has not been fully worked through and, on the other, as that to which the crowd might regress, turning the crowd into the real spectacle, which becomes, in the writing on the festival, a focus

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199 Das Kapital: A Book about Dassies, Toast Coetzer (Ed.), Oppikoppi Productions: Pretoria. Musician Watkin “Waddy” Jones (aka Max Normal, aka Ninja from zef rap group, Die Antwoord), it should be noted, was behind the festival theme for Way of the Dassie, writing his own ‘Rules of Endassieme,” helping to edit Das Kapital and writing songs about The Way of the Dassie that he performed at the festival and elsewhere.

200 The ‘Survival Tips’ that appeared on the 2008 festival flyer support this equivalence, in the festival discourse, between politically problematic behaviour and certain kinds of music. “Oppikoppi does not like or want: xenophobes, racists, sexists, narrow minded laaities, know-it all laaities, zink moerers or peddlers. If you have zef tunes you want to play, don’t do it right next door to other semi-together brothers and sisters. You will have lots of time for Modern Talking medleys on the banks of the lower Vaal River some other time.” In this instance, it is Modern Talking, the soundtrack to holidays “on the banks of the lower Vaal River,” from which the festival distinguishes itself.

201 The use of the word spectacle here has some resonance with Guy Debord’s (1967) Society of the Spectacle. Indeed, following Debord, it could be suggested that the experience of the festival, of being at the festival, is secondary to the creation of images of having been there; it may in fact be that what people enjoy most about
of attention, celebrating the good conduct of the crowd, its lack of violence, its responsiveness to the performers, on the one hand, or the barbaric, drunken conduct of the crowd, on the other, declaring the event contaminated by the past in the most acerbic moments of this reportage, otherwise simply not making the claim that the festival is a South African event.\textsuperscript{202} One can see here the similarity between the museum’s function of correcting perceptual bad habits – with these habits being taken as an index of a more general civic defect, on the one hand, and \textit{as a civic defect} to be corrected, on the other – and the festival’s function of correcting the crowd’s relation to music, particularly music that is not rock.

The ‘re-education of desire’\textsuperscript{203}

If we return to the festival in 1999, it is Miles Keylock’s article on InFESTation that is exemplary of the reportage that proclaimed the festival a South African event; not because he emphatically states that this is the case, but because there are certain presumptions at work in his writing. In reflecting on the performances of hip hop groups, Brasse Vannie Kaap (BVK) and Prophets of the City (POC), Keylock stated,

The festival was taken to new heights when Cape Town’s hip hop contingent arrived to woo the Oppikoppi crowd. No one could’ve anticipated just how much they would blow people away. Brasse Vannie Kaap’s set on the Black Label Fleapit Stage hinted at the start of the euphoria with an unrelentingly funky, entertaining hour of rapping delight. And the white kids simply loved it, responding immediately to BVK’s prevailing sense of humour.

Oppikoppi is looking at photographs of themselves there, photographs that not only wind up in newspaper reports on the event, but also posted on thousands of facebook profile pages, and then commented on through the year until the next festival. One could argue that this is the real enjoyment of the event. I use the term spectacle, however, in the precise Foucauldian sense in which Bennett uses it.\textsuperscript{202} By examining a textual example from the 2006 festival, I have chosen an instance only in which these proscriptions and prescriptions on the music of the festival had become formalised. If we trace back to InFESTation in 1999, we can find moments in the reportage on the event that display similar concerns. One journalist, for example, wrote of the hip hop stage at the festival: “People who think that this is where animal loving folks can dump their pooches have obviously been passing the time with needle-point and The Best of Patricia Lewis. This stage is not for the faint hearted and has become famous for its kick in the teeth approach” (Nanieve Groenewald ‘Avatar @ Oppikoppi,’ \textit{Star}, 26-30 July, 1999). Possession of Patricia Lewis albums is, here, constituted as one of the “musical sins of the past.”\textsuperscript{203} This section title is taken from Stoler’s (1995) book, \textit{Race and the Education of Desire} (see chapters one and two for a discussion of aspects of Stoler’s book).
When Prophets of Da City hit the main stage mid-evening, the revolution had begun. DJ extraordinaire Ready D, lyrical main men Shahid and Devious and the rest of their brasse provided that special something that Oppikoppi's predominantly white audience had so desperately been craving. POC are hip hop. Their music is, above all else, uplifting. Their message is simple: we're all South Africans.

C'mon. Let's listen to the music, let the music bring us together. The wonderfully emotional reaction from the Oppikoppi crowd was quite simply beautiful. A moment never to be forgotten! Oppikoppi were finally listening to the music.204

We see here in Keylock’s article, and in the other reviews of the festival that proclaimed Oppikoppi a ‘truly South African’ event that year, that, as stated above, diversity alone has not activated the truth of the claim – and this is also to leave aside the issue that the diversity of the lineup at Oppikoppi in August 1999, or any other year for that matter, is not representative of ‘the people’ of South Africa. It is the gestures of reconciliation on the part of the ‘non-white’ musicians, their message that ‘we’re all South Africans,’ on the one hand – and simply performing at the festival is on its own a gesture of this sort – and the ‘wonderfully emotional reaction from the Oppikoppi crowd,’ the fact that ‘the white kids simply loved’ this diversity of music, a diversity ‘Oppikoppi’s predominantly white audience had so desperately been craving,’ on the other, that galvanises the claim. This is to say that the truth of the claim that ‘InFESTation’ was a ‘truly South African’ festival is dependent upon the incorporation of these two positions into the narrative accounts of the event. And we find this dynamic intensified in the staging of collaborative performances between musicians from different musical and social backgrounds.

Many performances and crowd responses at the festival deviate from Keylock’s account of the 1999 festival, but it nonetheless stands as a regularity in the lines of desire that run through the festival discourse. In particular, I am concerned here with “die volk se dors aan oorsproenklike musiek [the people’s thirst for original music],”205 that is, desire for a diverse range of South African music, a regularity that forms the basis for the festival ascending to the status of a South African event. Here we can approach desire in two distinct ways, firstly, from a

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205 Carel Hoffmann, as cited in Dirk Jordaan, ‘Doer in die Bosveld Kry Jy Oppikoppi,’ Navweek Beeld, 31 July, 1999;
Foucauldian perspective and, secondly from a psychoanalytic perspective. Although in chapter three I have touched on the differences between Foucauldian and psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject, here I want to add to this by turning directly to the issue of desire.

**Foucault, discourse and the place prepared for desire**

In *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault (1981) outlines the relation between desire and discourse, where discourse is thought to not only give shape to desire, limiting and canalising it, but also *producing* desire within these constraints: discourse “provides ritualized forms for [desires], as if to make them more easily recognisable from a distance” (p. 51). Foucault illustrates his point on the discursive production and constraint of desire through a poetic dialogue between desire and an institution, where desire wants, in its ambivalence, to be realised, but also to resist being captured by discourse, regularised and fixed. The institution, for its part, coaxes desire into discourse, saying that “a place has been made ready for it, a place which honours it but disarms it” (p. 52). The important point here is that Foucault sets up his conception of desire in opposition to a psychoanalytic one. If the point of psychoanalytic practice, to put it in somewhat crude terms, is to liberate repressed desire, Foucault argues that psychoanalysis does not liberate anything, only provides, like the institution he refers to, a discursive place for it, in talk rather than in symptoms (see, for further discussion of this issue, Stoler, 1995, p. 165-177; Butler, 1987, p. 217-229). For Foucault, there is no original desire from which we are alienated. Deleuze puts this well in his book on Foucault when he states, “Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no ‘savage experience’: there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge” (p. 109). There is, in other words, only that which is already inscribed in discourse and desire does not, in any knowable way, pre-exist discourse.

The corollary here is that the discourse on the music of the festival on which I have focussed in this chapter marks out subject positions for the crowd at this exhibition of musical diversity, positions bearing their own enunciative modalities, which are also modalities of political desire. In the discourse examined thus far, we find both ‘prohibitive’ and ‘liberatory’ modes of regulating desire at work. The festival’s prohibition of racism – the consistent ‘no racism’ in the festival ‘Survival Tips’ issued before each event – is a good example of a

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206 “That everything is always said in every age is perhaps Foucault’s greatest historical principle: behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the more important each time to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing either behind or beneath it” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 54).
prohibitive mode of constraint. If we reformulate this following Foucault, this law in fact produces forbidden desire as that which is disallowed, and this prohibition is its mode of being produced. Indeed, it may even eroticise racist desire, as Butler (1987) suggests, “Desire is created by the repressive law itself, and has no other meaning than that which an historically specific form of juridical power inadvertently produces” (p. 218). That it may in fact have been practically necessary to enforce a ‘no racism’ law, to reprimand or even physically remove certain individuals for this type of behaviour is beside the point.\footnote{In an interview with Ben Vorster, who has been responsible for festival security for all but a few of the events, he reported that in the early years it was in fact necessary to reprimand people for wearing politically inappropriate shirts. Racism, in his view, has been a problem that has necessitated intervention from the festival organisers (interview with Ben Vorster October 2009).} The festival has a vested interest in producing racist desire as that which is disallowed, as without this the problem of its authenticity as a South African event cannot be posed – in fact, it is not so much the absence of racism that is held up as a sign of its ‘South Africanness,’ but its regulation and prohibition of racism. In this sense, the wildness in festival behaviour analysed in the previous chapter and the staging of a diverse range of music in this one are in fact not at odds with each other, but, rather, lock perfectly together inasmuch as the festival produces its own prohibited forms of conduct precisely in order to discipline them.

There is also a ‘liberatory’ model of desire at work in the festival discourse, wherein a South African essence is projected into the pre-history of the post-apartheid nation, retrospectively constituting the murmur of a post-apartheid mode of desiring, a stifled and alienated murmur, an essence of the nation that has been waiting to be manifested, waiting, that is, in the wings of history to actualise itself and is now being ushered into the light of day and given a voice, that is, enabled by the festival. The critical issue here is that, as Butler (1987) puts it, these emancipatory practices “result in a restriction of the political imagination” (p. 219). This is because, Butler argues with reference to Foucault, there is no pre-discursive ‘real’ desire to be liberated. Indeed, what we find in this ‘liberatory’ aspect to the discourse on the festival as a South African event is a straightforward inversion of an apartheid discourse on political desire, one that requires, to gain traction, difference, particularly racial difference. Indeed, in the writing on the 1999 InFESTation festival, the presence of black musicians and the collaborations between racially different musicians becomes a point of focus. This is not to say that this is an apartheid discourse, but we do well to ask from where this discourse derives its injunctions, to
probe at the rules according to which this discourse operates, according to which it has assembled its objects and subjects.

We can begin to discern the rules of formation that have given shape to this discourse with recourse to Foucault’s (1981) notion of “commentary” (p. 56). Foucault defined commentary as the recitation of texts that are foundational for a society, “things said once and preserved because it is suspected that behind them there is a secret or a treasure” (p. 56). He has in mind here the major religious, literary, juridical and scientific texts of a society. Commentary, as Foucault (1981) put it, “allows us to say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is this text itself which is said, and in a sense completed” (p. 58). Recitation of the founding texts of a society is thus posited as a condition according to which knowledge can be produced, a rule according to which an object of knowledge, and the knowing subject, can emerge (see also Ricoeur, 2004).

If we follow Foucault’s thinking here, for the festival to constitute itself as a South African event and for it to be considered true that the festival is an event that should make South Africans proud – and for it to be an event that, in a sense, makes South Africans – the discursive acts that form the festival must recite the founding texts of post-apartheid South Africa. And it would be in statements that directly or indirectly invoke the founding texts that a place for desire as a South African subject would be prepared. This is to suggest that the exhibitionary complex of the festival, according to which the festival disciplines its crowd into new modes of desire, derives its injunctions from the founding texts of post-apartheid South Africa.

Indeed, what we find recited in this discourse – a discourse in which the music of the festival is constructed as an object that, by virtue of its diversity, is progressive in what it

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208 Paul Ricoeur (2004) offers an insightful perspective on the recitation of founding texts and there is a strong resonance in Ricoeur’s notion of ‘learning by heart’ and Foucault’s notion of commentary. What Ricoeur highlights, though, is that commentary and the recitation of, and improvisation on, the founding texts of society are not only conditions of knowledge production, but are constitutive of the social bond, the contract by which subjects are recognised as members of a community, in this case, of a nation. As he puts it, “Now, before unleashing our critique of the abuses of learning ‘by heart,’ we must first recall the justification for its beneficial use. Within the framework of teaching, which, as we will soon see, is only one part of paideia, recitation has long constituted the preferred mode of transmission, under the direction of educators, of texts considered, if not as founding works of the culture of instruction, at least as prestigious, in the sense of texts that are authoritative. For it is indeed authority that is at issue in the final analysis, more precisely enunciative authority, to distinguish it from institutional authority. Here, we reach a political concept in the most fundamental sense, concerning the establishment of the social bond” (p. 90, emphasis added).
promises, signalling “the dawn of a new era in South African music festivals”209 – is that it is commentary on the post-apartheid nation’s founding text, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Specifically, it figures, in the relation between its elements, between its objects and subjects, the notion that we are ‘united in our diversity,’ as the preamble to the constitution states. As such, the temporal structure of this discourse, insofar as the civic virtues towards which the exhibitionary complex of the festival aims to move the crowd are concerned, is derived from the constitutional imperative of moving ever towards a state of as yet unrealised national unity, providing the trajectory of this discourse.

We can begin to understand here why collaborations between artists from different musical and social backgrounds have been central to the constitution of Oppikoppi as a ‘truly South African’ event. In the writing on collaborations, including the promotional material issued by festival organisers and reportage on the event, the two positions at which subjects might locate themselves, which await subjects in this discourse – the reconciliatory gesture of the black musician and the position of the desiring white crowd members – together, are a kind of performative re-enactment of the formation of the post-apartheid nation, the story of the emergence of the post-apartheid nation recited and writ small. This is to say that this form of performance is scripted as an improvisation on the founding text of post-apartheid South Africa.

If the teleology of the discourse is movement towards national unity, if this is the promise it holds out, then these collaborations stand as a symbolic completion of this promise. It is only when it can be demonstrated that this founding text has not only been ‘learned by heart,’ but can be performed intuitively, “under the appearance of a happy improvisation” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 61) that one can declare, as Keylock did, that ‘the revolution had begun.’ It is under these conditions that this discourse on the music of the festival prepares a place for desire, in Foucault’s terms, a place for the desire of ‘real South Africans,’ which stands, in a kind of circular logic, as the proof of the claim that this is a ‘truly South African’ event, this desire at once an effect of, and a piece of evidence in, the claim being made.

To shift the emphasis slightly here, what are the conditions, not of the festival becoming a South African event, but of the speaking, desiring subject of this discourse becoming an authentic subject of the nation? To stay with the 1999 Oppikoppi ‘InFESTation’ reportage, Pieter

Redelinghuys, after raising some difficult questions in his article concerning the nearly all-white audience, resolved the problem by cauterising the site of his critique (“Maar genoeg oor politiek [But enough about politics],” and concluded that

“My gevolgtrekking ná vier dae tussen waansinnige drinkebroers and susters, na vier dae te midde van Suid Afrika se ongelooflikste musiektalent? Ek kan net beam wat Barney Simon, 5FM platejoggie, gesê het: ‘Dis oomblikke soos die wat my trots maak om ‘n Suid-Afrikaner te wees.’ En as ek en my juigkomando moet opsaal, is dië my laaste woorde: ‘Viva Oppikoppi, viva! Long live Suid-Afrikanse musiek!’ [My conclusion after four days among insane drunken brothers and sisters, after four days of South Africa’s most unbelievable music talent? I can only concur with what Barney Simon, 5FM disc jockey has said, ‘Its moments like these that make me proud to be South African.’ And if me and my exaltant commando must saddle up, these are my last words, ‘Viva Oppikoppi! Long live South African music!’]"

Useful once again is the notion that white post-apartheid belonging is structured around the confessional, an epistemology derived from the TRC (Nuttall, 2009). Indeed, at a more general level of the festival discourse, there is a portrayal of the event as being able to “symbolically cleanse visitors of their musical sins of the past,” in a sense, articulating the festival on the model of the TRC, and continuing its work on a micro level in a cultural sphere, enabling the confession of, and reparation for, one’s ‘musical violations’ committed in the past. Indeed, for Redelinghuys, it was not simply a matter of getting politics out of the way – as he put it, “Maar kom ons kry eers die politieke knelpunte by Oppikoppi uit die weg [But let us first get the political problem areas out of the way]” – before declaring himself “proud to be South African,” but rather that this problematisation is a condition to be satisfied before he can do so. He draws attention to the racial separatism of the event: “Die fees is wit. Dis grotendeels ‘n wit gehoor, wat kom luister na oorwegend (wit) rock musiek [The festival is white. It is predominantly a white audience that comes to listen to predominantly (white) rock music].”

This confession invokes the constitutional imperative to ‘recognise the injustices of the past,’ a recognition that is a condition of being South African, as discussed in detail in chapter

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211 The August 1997 festival ticket read, “Bring all your CDs and this will be used to fuel the sacred fire of creativity, which will serve to symbolically cleanse visitors of their musical sins of the past.”
213 Ibid.
two. Although it is not a full recognition of the injustices of the past, nor of the legacy of these injustices, and although it is far less than a performative completion of the constitution, it can nonetheless be read as an act that derives its form from this text as a necessary step in declaring, not only the festival a South African event, but in claiming the status of a ‘proudly South African’ subject. This is a point reinforced by the regularity of this structure in the reportage on the event; that is, the sequence of problematisation, then negotiation and consideration, then declaration of ‘South Africanness.’ This is to argue that while there are many desires one may have regarding music, there are not an infinite number of ways to desire the music of the festival, and that this constraint of the discursive field, the constraint over the limited number of ways of desiring music, are brought to bear by the necessity of reciting the founding texts of post-apartheid South Africa.

I want to now consider Redelinghuys’ narrative from a psychoanalytic perspective. Firstly, because the moment of Redelinghuys’ declaration of himself as a ‘proudly South African’ subject is one of identification: it is Barney Simon’s words he uses, words which he takes as his own, in finding a place from which to declare himself a ‘South African,’ identifying himself with Simon. Identification, from a psychoanalytic perspective, always entails some degree of fantasy, and this opens up a discussion on the fantasies according to which the exhibitionary complex of the festival operates. It is fantasy, in psychoanalytic theory, that is also central to the understanding of desire; this, then, brings the analysis back to this theme as it plays out in the context of the festival. Indeed, that the festival declared itself a national monument, but did not submit an application to any existing organisation, and that it was not an official declaration, should already alert us to the operation of fantasy. Who, we might ask, was this declaration addressed to, if not to any real person or organisation? And what is the phantasmatic structure of the declaration of South Africanness?

Secondly, if, for Foucault, there is no original desire, there is also no repressed desire that returns. Yet, doing a ‘symptomatic reading’ of this discourse, one not afforded by a Foucauldian approach, reveals the ways in which the education of desire not only produces new ways of desiring as a South African subject, and, along with this, produces forbidden ways of desiring as

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214 This notion that identification is always to some degree a phantasmatic process can be complicated in light of Lacan’s distinction between symbolic and imaginary identification. Ian Parker (2007) offers useful discussions of the differences between these two modes of identifications. I have, however, followed a classical psychoanalytic formulation of identification (see chapter two).
a discursive positivity, but can also be thought to forbid certain forms of desire from the festival discourse, which return, taking on a disguised form (cf. Stoler, 1995; Young, 1981). What, psychoanalysis enables us to ask, is the afterlife of forbidden desire at the festival?

**Psychoanalysis, fantasy, desire, identification**

As noted in chapter three, that the festival is a kind of fantasy is an opinion that circulates widely within the discourse of the festival, specifically at the level of commentary on the festival, rather than at that of festival practice. The vision of the nation the festival creates is, in this sense, depicted as a fantasy. This observation is not wrong inasmuch as it alerts us to the fact that there is something ‘unreal’ about how the festival represents itself, particularly regarding the extent to which social transformation at this event is exaggerated, concealing ongoing material inequalities the legacy of the apartheid past. But this ‘unreality’ should in no way diminish our estimation of the pedagogical function of the festival as a fantasy – the festival is no less ‘real’ than a museum and the vision of the world into which museum goers are inducted. Furthermore, the festival as a fantasy can be thought of in heterotopic terms, as differentiated from the rest of the society of which it is a part, as at once real and unreal, and instrumental in the formation of a new society (Foucault, 1986). In a sense, this is precisely what fantasy does regarding desire; as noted in the introductory chapter, fantasy *educates desire* (Žižek, 1997). A detailed discussion of fantasy and identification has already been provided in chapter three, and I want to return to Redelinghuys’ declaration of the South Africanness of the festival and his own South Africanness with these notions of fantasy and identification.

A simple point with which to proceed here, with regards to Redelinghuys’ narrative, is that he not only identifies with Barney Simon and the position he occupies within this scene – or, in different moments in his narrative, with Carel Hoffmann and the position he occupies – but that Redelinghuys is identified with the grammar and syntax of this fantasy scene as a whole (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968; Butler, 1990); that is, he is identified with this scene of consumption of difference, with whiteness and rock music in proximity with musical difference, which secures the place of rock within the festival, and the place of the festival within the nation, and with the necessity of confessing and problematising racial separatism. This raises several

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215 Stoler (1995) argues that a Foucauldian conception of desire is not entirely antithetical to a psychoanalytic one. Young (1981), too, argues that Foucault’s (1981) dialogue between desire and the institution, referred to above, is reminiscent of Freud’s formulation of the ego and the id.
questions for the analysis of the discourse on the music of the festival. If the festival takes the form of what is frequently depicted as a fantasy, out of what loss has this fantasy been produced? How is a lost object refound in the fantasy scene? What are the imagined obstacles in the way of gratification? And how are these defensively circumvented?

Ahmed (2004) helps us to take this formulation of fantasy and identification – that is, fantasy as educative, teaching the subject to desire under conditions of loss and change – a step further. She has convincingly argued that, while multicultural love is a love of difference, it is a form of love that reproduces sameness and fixes the difference that is desired. As will be recalled from chapter three, Ahmed uses the Freudian distinction between identification, on the one hand, and idealisation, on the other, as two distinct kinds of love, to make her argument. Using this distinction between being and having, as kinds of love, Ahmed argues that heterosexual love – entailing identification (the establishment of sameness) and idealisation (the constitution of difference) – underwrites discourses of the multicultural nation. As Ahmed puts it, “The ideal constructed by multicultural love also involves the transformation of heterosexuality into good citizenship” (p. 136). That is, multicultural love ‘refinds’ a lost heterosexual love object. In the multicultural nation, difference is idealised in the way the mother is idealised as being unlike the male heterosexual subject, as being an object of desire, and love for this difference, which is the ideal in the discourse of multiculturalism, becomes a variant on the theme of heterosexual desire for difference. At an implicit level, then, multicultural desire is structured according to a heterosexual logic. Thus, while normative heterosexuality and multiculturalism are structured around desire for difference, their effects work in the direction of reproducing sameness (Ahmed, 2004). As Ahmed argues, it is in being bound together in difference that the heterosexual couple participates in the reproductive “fantasy of ‘making likeness’” (p. 128) and, for multiculturalism, securing the future for the next generation, thus “confirming the role of heterosexuality in the reproduction of the national ideal” (p. 137).

What are the implications here for a reading of Redelinghuys’ narrative of love for multicultural difference? Certainly he takes Simon’s and Hoffmann’s object of desire, musical difference, as his own. But how does this relate to heterosexual desire? And, if both identification and fantasy always entail loss, if they provide a means of circling a never fully graspable lost object, and stand as an attempt to refind a lost object, what loss does the festival as a fantasy circle?
Redelinghuys introduces the festival in his article by stating, “Die Bosveld is g’n speletjies nie. Dis ‘n plek waar die manne nog steeds manne is, dis hier waar ‘n vrou nog haar plek ken [The bushveld is no game. It’s a place where men are still men, it is here that a woman still knows her place].” Here we have heteronormative economy of desire in its most politically regressive form, inscribed in the institution of the family, which was, during apartheid, instrumental in the reproduction of the white race, forbidding not only homosexuality – as this stood as an obstacle in the path of the reproduction of whiteness – but also racial mixing, as this risked the ‘contamination’ of the ‘purity’ of the whiteness, biologically but also socially (see Gunkel, 2010; McClintock, 1995). Redelinghuys problematises this gendered configuration, associating it with the racial separatism of the festival, and he sets up the desire for musical difference in opposition to this conservative gender relation, which is also implicitly a racial relation.

Through his problematisation of anachronistic gender and race relations, we could say that this is lost for Redelinghuys, the woman who ‘knows her place,’ as well as his own place as a ‘man who is a man’ – here, we can think of the fantasy of the festival having emerged, at least partially, out of this loss, out of the impossibility of this structure of desire existing without transformation. Ahmed’s (2004) argument would suggest that this desire for multicultural difference is articulated along the same lines of heterosexual desire for sexual difference – the same desire, it should be noted, that underwrote apartheid. Does his identification with Simon, a man who loves musical difference, ‘refind’ this lost object or, rather object-relation? Is there a substitution, where musical difference, always implying racial difference – here the object he has – is in some sense a substitute for a lost object of sexual difference, enabling him to be a ‘man who is a man’? By having musical difference can he ‘refind’ the ‘woman who knows her place,’ and thereby be a ‘man who is a man’?

Redelinghuys’ narrative suggests that through his identification with Simon (being like him), and through his love of musical difference (what he has), by the end of his narrative, this is precisely what is recovered – he is, indeed, able to ride off, saddled up with his “juigkomando [exaltant commando],” the position of a ‘man who is a man,’ if ever there was one. This would suggest that, rather than being opposed to a problematised gendered organisation, Redelinghuys’

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217 Ibid.
multicultural love of difference represents not an opposition to, but a redeployment of, heterosexual love of sexual difference.

Because the subject is able to “be itself in or through what it has” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 128), there are two important consequences Ahmed highlights for multiculturalism. Firstly, desire for an idealised object of difference – that is, love for what one is not – serves as an affirmation of the ideality of the desiring subject; that is to say, the idealised object of desire, while different, reflects the ideality of the desiring subject (Ahmed, 2004). The idealisation of difference, *desire for difference*, frequently has very little to do with those who are culturally different, and far more to do with the affirmation of the desiring subject – as open minded, as politically progressive (see Hook, 2010; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009; Ahmed, 2000).

This affirmation of whiteness, to which Ahmed draws attention, would suggest that, in the work of the exhibitionary complex of the festival, in its re-education of desire, heterosexual desire – according to which apartheid was consolidated – can be understood as being transformed into multicultural desire for difference. This need not be ‘pathologised’; indeed, we could think of this substitution, wherein a sexual object is displaced by a non-sexual one, as a kind of sublimation. As Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) define the Freudian notion of sublimation, “The instinct is said to be sublimated in so far as it is diverted towards a new, non-sexual aim and in so far as its objects are socially valued ones” (p. 384). Certainly multicultural spectacles are ‘socially valued’ in this context. However, we can and should ask whether, in this transformation of desire, which is also a redeployment of desire, there is not, once more, a kind

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218 In *Strange Encounters*, Ahmed (2000) makes a similar point with regard to what she calls “the consumption of strangeness” (p. 115), arguing that agency is offered differently to the consumed and the consuming: while the consumer can become different through proximity with strangeness, through an incorporation of difference which is at the disposal of the consuming subject, as an acquired repertoire of subjectivity, the consumed is fixed as permanently strange, as other. The agency of the consuming subject is thus wide ranging, porous and mobile, while the agency of the consumed subject is limited to exotic strangeness, “fixed in the ‘beyond’ of the commodity form” (p. 118).

In *Ethnicity Inc.*, Comaroff and Comaroff offer a similar psychoanalytic interpretation of this type of scene of commoditised consumption of diversity, that is, fetishised difference: the difference consumed by a white subject is a “stand-in for their own lack of cultural authenticity and fullness of being, their exile from the untainted affect of natural life in the world” (pp. 25-26), where it is a modern “sense of exile from ‘authentic’ being that seeks to requite itself in encounters with ‘authentic’ otherness – albeit in consumable form” (p. 140).

In his article, ‘Retrieving Biko: A Black Consciousness Critique of Post-apartheid Whiteness,’ Hook problematises particular forms of anti-racism used by whites in post-apartheid South Africa. In specific, he identifies four forms of related anti-racism: ‘fetishistic,’ ‘ostentatious,’ ‘heroic’ and ‘charitable’ anti-racism, all of which narcissistically incorporate blackness in order to present a favourable image of the white subject. What he proposes is a post-apartheid anti-racism stripped of its narcissistic yield, a more “meaningful anti-racism” (Hook, 2010; see also Truscott & Marx, 2011 for more detailed commentary on this article).
of indivisible remainder, some aspect of apartheid sexuality that will not be transformed, or remains at some level latent? As much is suggested by Redelinghuys’ article, and the broader festival discourse on musical difference indicates a similar dynamic. 219 This raises the question of whether this transformation of heterosexual desire into multicultural desire does not keep the other as other, as different, in much the same way as heterosexual desire enables ‘men to be men’ and ‘women to know their place.’ The never fully stated implication, it would seem – and this is potentially the excess of the transformation or its archaeological remains, that which won’t be transformed – is that the bushveld, the place of this multicultural festival, is ‘a place where [whites] are still [whites], it is here that a [black] still knows [his or] her place.’

What I want to do below is draw out this particular dynamic of a remainder in the transformation of a problematised form of heterosexual desire into multicultural desire brought about by the festival, with reference to a photograph (figure 5.2) that appeared in Oppikoppi/10.doc.

The indissolubility and vulgarity of apartheid sexuality

The image below (figure 5.2) was taken in August 1997 by Gilad Hockman, 220 of Stellenbosch rock band, Springbok Nude Girls singer, Arno Carstens – at that point in time “far and away the biggest star on the scene” 221 – standing enigmatically onstage. The accompanying article, on the page opposite the photograph, reflects on the phenomenon of “groupies,” 222 providing the context within which, and the kinds of associations with which, the reader is invited to look at the photograph. But even without this encouragement, the photograph, taken from the stage

219 Oppikoppi 1999, ‘InFESTation,’ the event to which Redelinghuys refers, hosted five stages and in the enthusiastic reviews of the festival, proclaiming Oppikoppi as an event about which South Africans can be proud, it was the performances on the hip hop stage by Cape Town musicians, BVK and POC that were emphasised, referring to 1999 as the year “Cape hip hop entered the national consciousness” (Evan Milton, ‘Cape hip hop’s battle of the year,’ Cape Argus Tonight, 12 August, 1999), “the year hip hop bands were introduced to 13 000 rockers” (Theresa Owen, ‘Out of this world at Oppikoppi,’ Daily News Tonight, 12 August, 1999). This immediately calls to mind Bennett’s criticism of the functioning of the exhibitionary complex within contexts of multiculturalism, such as South Africa: there is an equivalence posited here between ‘13 000 rockers’ and a ‘national consciousness,’ with the white subject standing as the norm, around which difference and diversity are organised, a virtuous centre. This affirmation of whiteness seems, once more, to show itself as a kind of remainder in the re-education of desire.

220 Hockman is the bassist of the critically acclaimed Afrikaans band, The Buckfever Underground, fronted by poet, Toast Coetzer. For several years, Hockman also owned The Independent Armchair Theatre, a live music venue of considerable significance in the growth of a South African live music scene. At the time he was a journalism student at Rhodes University (RU), and worked in the campus radio station operating at the festival.

221 Interview with Gilad Hockman, 20 July 2010.

floor, offers a perspective that elevates the musician—looking at the image one inhabits a position below Carstens, “the head of the pride, lost in thought.” The genre of the photograph is clear enough. In Hockman’s words, “I wanted to be rock photographer and I was really influenced by that classic sixties black and white rock photography. In that photo I think I managed to capture something of that sort of iconography.”

Figure 5.2 Arno Carstens (photograph Gilad Hockman)

223 Interview with Gilad Hockman, 20 July 2010.
224 Ibid.
The “stadium” of the photograph, in Roland Barthes’ (1981) terminology, its effect that “derives from an average affect, almost from a certain training” (p. 26), compels one to see it as a part of a whole discursive field of iconic images, all bearing the same markings of the mythical rock star. Its allure, its call to be looked at, consonant with the “photographer’s intentions” (Barthes, 1981, p. 26), plays on a kind of perceptual familiarity developed through repetitive exposure to these kinds of images. In other words, a storehouse of iconic images is called up, images seen many times before, and, in this familiar place, the cool face of South African rock in 1997 – young, virile, white – is inserted. As Hockman put it, the objective was to “capture local musicians in classic images.”

It should be sufficient to note the relevance of Bennett’s notion that the exhibitionary complex is aimed, in part, at correcting the perceptual bad habits of a problematised sector of an emerging national community. In understanding the function of this image as a site of identification – an image that enables one to “replicate, or create, the world I wanted to be living in,” an image that provides “sense of belonging and purpose,” as Hockman put it – it needs to be emphasised that the photograph did not stand alone in this collection of photographs, interviews and articles published in order to celebrate, as the DAC advertisement in Oppikoppi/10.doc. put it, “10 years of support of music and the people of South Africa.” That is, the site of the image’s display is characterised by the same musical diversity that coincided with the festival establishing itself as a ‘South African’ event. Hockman’s photograph appeared in Oppikoppi/10.doc amongst, but also after many other images depicting black and white musicians, playing a range of musical styles, often collaborating onstage. It is a photograph with which we can discern the central place of white rock music within the festival, surrounded by a diversity of music, but also the place the festival has sought to assume within the post-apartheid nation, as ‘The home of South African music.’ There is, then, a homology between the photograph of Carstens as it appears in the context of Oppikoppi/10.doc., and the organisation of the stages noted earlier. Each is a representational space different in form; but each displays an arrangement wherein rock is surrounded, indeed must be surrounded, by a diversity of music.

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225 Interview with Gilad Hockman, 20 July 2010.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
Underpinning this image is a heteronormative economy of desire, on the one hand, and, on the other, a multicultural desire for difference that guarantees its place within the representational space of Oppikoppi/10.doc and, by analogy, the nation. Is this a mere coincidence of heterosexual desire and multicultural desire? Or can this image be read along the lines of Ahmed’s argument outlined above? That is to ask, is what we see figured the co-presence of two sorts of desires? Or has there taken place a redeployment of desire for sexual difference, elaborated as desire for multicultural difference? Is the desire for cultural difference here the condition of being like Carstens, that is, identifying with his place? And if this is the case, does this being like, this identification offered, enable a mode of having that exceeds the limits of the norms and ideals of post-apartheid South Africa? Finally, is this not to ask of an image too much, as it is a photograph typical and intuitive in its mode of representing the music of the festival? Can such questions be asked of such a ‘normal’ – in its heteronormativity and its implication of multicultural desire for difference – image?

Here we can respond to these questions with recourse to Butler’s (1993) writing on phantasmatic identifications, where she builds on Foucault’s notion of commentary, adding to it an imaginary dimension. Butler suggests that performatives, like any discursive act, cannot produce its referent with total freedom. Performativity, as a discursive practice, is constrained by the necessity of citing, repeating and reiterating preexistent and authorised articulations of norms; in other words, it is not here foundational texts, as in Foucault’s notion of commentary, that need to be cited, but social norms.229 It is the citation of norms, for Butler, the practice of citing, that produces, as an effect, the very norm that is the constitutive constraint of performativity.230 Here there is the paradox of a norm being cited that both does and does not exist prior to its citation, a norm that is produced only in its iteration. As Butler outlines this notion of citational practice, it is an imaginary process, both in the attempt to properly approximate a given norm, and in the imagined threat that such a norm comes to wield. It is here

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229 The constraint of commentary is, as discussed above, the condition which enables desire, prepares a place for desire, in Foucault’s (1981) terms, a place from which it will be recognisable. As Butler (1993) puts it, “No ‘act’ apart from a regularized and sanctioned practice can wield the power to produce that which it declares” (p. 107).

230 Performatives, as Butler notes (1993), are not to be confused with performance. Performatives are discursive practices which work to produce the objects to which they refer. Butler emphasises the productivity of discursive practices. Echoing Foucault’s (1981) well known line, “discourses are practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak” (p. 67), and reinterpreting this idea for performatives as discursive practices, Butler (1993) states, “Discursive performativity appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make” (p. 107).
that Butler fleshes out what she means by “political constraints registered psychically” (p. 94), suggesting that the correct and proper citation of norms entails the repudiation of abject figures in order to complete that citation.\textsuperscript{231} This raises at least two useful points for the analysis of this photograph here.

Firstly, if a given norm requires the abnormal, if it can only come to be constructed as normal through difference, then repudiation, for Butler, is a psychic correlate of this differentiation; that is, repudiation is one way in which political constraint is registered psychically. It should suffice to say I am concerned here with the citation of the norms of an emerging post-apartheid South Africa, norms that do not exist prior to their iteration, and must be constantly reiterated. If reciting these norms is an imaginary process of approximation, what, then, in the articulation of post-apartheid South African norms, figured in this instance by Arno Carstens surrounded by a diversity of music, is repudiated? How is the difference between this norm and the ‘un-South African’ registered, psychically, as repudiation?

While racialised – and, indeed, racist – abjection cannot be overlooked in a post-apartheid context (see Hook, 2005 on abjection and race in South Africa), one such figure of abject repudiation in the articulation of South Africaness – specifically if we consider once more that, as Steyn (2004) has put it, apartheid ideology is “the ‘other’ of the ‘new’ South African vision” (p. 82) – is the unreformed white Afrikaner racist. Here we can bring the discussion of repudiation back to the exhibitionary complex and a brief detour is useful and justified in getting to grips with the libidinal economy of this image.

Bennett (1988) argues that crucial to the operation of the exhibitionary complex is the construction and display of an archaic past out of which the nation has emerged, where the crowd is situated, in relation to the display, at the pinnacle of the developmental curve being exhibited, as civilised. In this sense, it is the past that is repudiated, in the operation of the exhibitionary complex, a point that fits well in the context of post-apartheid South Africa where the apartheid past is repudiated in the constitution of the nation. In demonstrating this exhibition of the past characteristic of the exhibitionary complex, as it occurs at the scene of Oppikoppi festival, it helps to note here – in the seeming absence of such an exhibition of the past – to recall the relation between the festival and its surrounding areas. Usually, or at least in the case of

\textsuperscript{231} In her writing on gender norms, Butler (1993) is particularly concerned with the “feminized fag and the phallicized dyke” as “figures of abject homosexuality” (p. 96).
many festivals – and we might consider here KKNK and the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown, as two prominent examples – the relationship is one where a remote rural town comes alive for a few days of the year, where the town receives economic investment and where the townsfolk participate in various ways. This is not so with Oppikoppi, where the surrounding community is, at least symbolically, estranged from the event. The surrounding communities, however, particularly the white Afrikaner communities, are absolutely vital to the constitution of the festival, but in an unusual way that brings to light Bennett’s point described above: they assist the festival by providing a phantasmatic image of a backward past, of a people unchanged by the demise of apartheid, and they do so simply by being there for observation, the living curiosities of a national past, the fossils of apartheid. This past, then, is both conveniently displayed, but also kept spatially and symbolically outside the festival, the abject other of the festival.

As noted above, racism and apartheid is frequently repudiated in the representation of the festival as a South African event. This is a feature of the festival that is prominent across the history of the event, and, we can say, with some certainty, that this, too, is what is repudiated in the image of Carstens as it appears in the context of Oppikoppi/10.doc: apartheid, that is, apart-heid, separateness. Multicultural togetherness becomes the norm; and apart-heid is repudiated.

This provides one response to the first point that emerges from Butler’s (1993) work: apartheid is repudiated. A second point Butler’s work raises for the analysis here is that the citation of a norm requires “the possibility of its own failure” (p. 108). As Butler notes, this failure is what mobilises the forced repetition of norms and is the consequence of its improper citation. I have already noted, in the introductory section of this chapter, one highly publicised instance of a failed recitation of post-apartheid South African norm, the incident at the KKNK. For Butler, though, this possibility of improper citation, of a failed citation, is invoked in the very act of repudiation, through the instability of what is repudiated and its potential to return in a repetition that exceeds its intended meaning. Butler refers to this excess of meaning and its exploitation as the “erotic redeployment of prohibitions” (p. 110). How, we might ask, in the context of the festival, and with particular reference to the image of Carstens, does what is repudiated threaten the image with an excess of meaning? Which is to ask, how is the archaeological remainder of the repudiated figured in the image?
If the condition of this photograph’s place is that it is surrounded by a representative diversity of music, then it is through the analytical move of reversing this condition and isolating it, tearing it from its context amongst other musicians, that we can begin to understand the force of the threat of a failed citation at work in this image. This reversal of its conditions of possibility effects what was discussed in chapter three as an archaeological regression to the present (Agamben, 2009), to the ‘traumatic and excessively near’ present which is unexperienced yet comes to structure experience, the originary fantasy of the post-apartheid nation. It is worth revisiting once more Riggs’ (2005) notion of the primal scene of colonial violence and its significance for the construction of postcolonial whiteness. If the scene of Miriam Makeba’s violent removal from the stage at KKNK in a shower of beer cans, where young girls shouted, ‘Waar's die Springbok Nude Girls? Hierdie is kaffir musiek’ was a repetition of this primal scene of colonial violence, an acting out of this past that is not remembered, in Freud’s (1914) terms, then how does this ‘primal scene’ inhere the image of Carstens onstage at Oppikoppi? How does it haunt this image as an unremembered, indeed unactivated, but excessively near trauma? And how is this as yet unactivated trauma latent in the overdetermination of the image?

In the context of its isolation, what is repudiated by the image of Carstens amongst other musicians – produced, that is, as the abject of the image in order to install a difference between itself and the other of the post-apartheid nation – begins to take on a different and excessive form. When viewed in its isolation, and when viewed in relation to the KKNK incident, the abject other of this image begins to unsettle it, returning in an unintended way. Indeed, the composition of the image begins to shift, and a latent meaning rises out of the background, as if it was always there but had been silent so long as it was accompanied by other South African musicians. One begins to notice the off-centre tilt of the frame that makes the image open out from the right to the left, in a fan that takes as its top edge the neck of the guitar and as its bottom edge the platform on which the speaker is standing, an effect reinforced by the singer’s pose, leaning back slightly. The speaker forms the centre point of the photograph, and the dominant vertical, horizontal and diagonal lines of the image emanate from this point, from the speaker and from the waist of the singer standing in front of it. The musician standing in the background tuning his instrument is Springbok Nude Girls bassist, Arno Blumer; his guitar rises up at a 45 degree angle from behind the singer’s waist. It is this detail – what was at first sight a part of the allure of the photograph, a part of its force as an image able to solicit identifications of post-
apartheid white South Africans – to which the abject attaches, and now appears in all its vulgarity, unsublimated, like a guitar-length phallus that, in the arrangement of bodies, objects and instruments, presents itself attached to the waist of the youthful rock star. Indeed, Arno Carstens and Arno Blumer overlap each other, and in a moment of homosocial bonding, stand as a single figure, with the guitar as the mechanised prosthetic phallus of white rock music.

However, a different reading is also possible. In the image, Blumer is wearing all black and, in the overdetermination of this detail, can be taken here as ‘the black man.’ We see figured, then, not only homosocial bonding between two white men, but also a moment of homosocial bonding between a white man and a black man, a black man who is the support for the phallus the white man has. That is, the black other is a support and a prop for this spectacle. Again this is disrupted, though, as one begins to notice Carstens’ mouth, slightly open, his tongue licking his bottom lip – before only adding to the confidence and ease of the scene depicted – which now signifies something different, that is, effort. One notices the singer’s fingers pressing against his arm, not hard, but firmly enough to see the indentations, firmly enough, again, to denote effort. Indeed, Carstens biting his lip and his fingers pressing into his arm are disruptive of the image particularly when one sees the phallus he has not only being held up in a moment of homosocial bonding by Arno Blumer, but, rather, that Blumer, with his back to the camera and dressed in all black is penetrated from behind by the phallus, which is protruding out of his front. If, as Henriette Gunkel (2010) has argued, the post-apartheid nation has been articulated along the very same heteronormative and homophobic lines that were crucial to the establishment of the apartheid nation, here we see the repudiated of the national norm eroticised, that is, slipping from the homosociality of nation building into precisely the homoeroticism that must be repudiated in the work of nation building as male bonding.

My thanks to John Mowitt for pointing this out during a very useful discussion of this image at the colloquium between the University of Fort Hare Chair for Social Change, the University of Minnesota and the University of the Western Cape Centre for Humanities Studies at Chintsa in the Eastern Cape in July 2011.

An argument that runs throughout Gunkel’s book, *The Cultural Politics of Female Sexuality in South Africa* is that it is the same heterosexual and homophobic matrix – dominant father, subservient mother, obedient children who love gender difference but reproduce racial sameness – at the heart of colonial and post-colonial African nationalism. Having shown how homophobia was crucial to the racism of colonialism and apartheid, to its reproduction of whiteness and the substantiation of racial difference, Gunkel reveals the traces of this history in post-colonial homophobia by linking it to the violent xenophobic attacks that rocked South Africa in May 2008, attacks that were not truly xenophobic, but, as she argues with reference to Andile Mngxitama (2008), “negrophobic violence” (Mngxitama cited in Gunkel, 2010, p 139). Gunkel argues that gays and lesbians have come to occupy the place of the other of the post-apartheid nation, representing a kind of biopolitical threat to the nation’s health and well being; specifically, she makes the point that black lesbian or gay bodies become the un-African other in the
It is in the context of its isolation, and in relation to a scene of, not the celebration and idealisation of other South African music, but of the violent removal of this music, what Barthes (1981) called the “punctum” of the image, that which disturbs the stadium – and here we can add that the punctum disrupts it as an image that can provide “some sense of belonging and purpose”234 in post-apartheid South Africa – that which “rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (p. 26), begins to show itself; in other words, in its place amongst a diversity of other musicians, the photograph has no punctum or, rather, its punctum is a trace that this regime of representation, according to which the festival has assembled itself, conceals. At the manifest level of this photograph, at the level of its intended meaning, it is an image of the place of rock amongst a diversity of South African music, and of the place of whiteness amongst a diverse South Africa. This is not to say that, at the latent level of the photograph, at the level of its traces that are recognisable under the conditions of its isolation – that is, at a level of meaning that exceeds what is intended, a meaning induced in a reversal of its conditions of possibility – we see what this image is really about. Rather, this trace of the vulgarity of apartheid, and of the primal scene of colonial violence, survives in the image as that which it cannot be, as that which it should never be, haunting the tenuous place of whiteness in post-apartheid South Africa.

As Butler (1993) outlines the notion of phantasmatic identification, it is not necessarily the case that, if the subject is identified with the repudiated that they are precisely what they declare they are not – although there is this possibility, as in Freud’s (1925) formulation of negation – but, rather, that imaginary approximations of norms entail differentiations and repudiations, and that the subject is identified with repudiation, indeed, requires the repudiated in order to approximate the norm performatively.235 What is repudiated is then always capable of

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post-colonial, particularly post-apartheid South African imagination. In this way, the view that “homosexuality is un-African” is posited by Gunkel as an instance where colonial history is inadvertently reproduced, even as it is proffered as an anti-colonial gesture, one which unwittingly repeats a colonial history in its decolonizing project, reproducing precisely what it negates: racism, or, at least, an “internalized racism stemming from the colonial situation” (Gunkel 2010, p. 143). Indeed, she argues that the subject of post-apartheid nationalism has been constituted, despite a progressive constitution, as heterosexual.234 Interview with Gilad Hockman, 20 July 2010. 235 For Butler, when a norm has been cited and repudiation has accompanied that citation in order to instantiate a difference – a border and a limit to the norm – we can say that, at some level, identification with what has been repudiated has taken place. What brings this point across powerfully – that there is an identification with what has been repudiated – is Butler’s reference to fantasy and identification: if this approximation of a norm through citation is an imaginary process, entailing fantasy, then crucial to Butler’s formulation here is fantasy as “the staging and dispersion of the subject into a variety of identificatory positions” (p. 267, n., emphasis added); that is, identification, as noted above, is offered to the subject in fantasy in positions distributed throughout the fantasy scene; not only in the position of the subject of desire, or the object of desire, or as the very prohibitions that have
being reinvested with meaning; that is, the abject always haunts the forced repetition of norms as that which may return not as an articulation of what is prohibited, but in a subversive resignification made possible by the eroticisation of what is forbidden. Repudiated here is racism and sexism, repudiations which threaten the articulation of post-apartheid multicultural norms with a return as that which enables ‘a place where [whites] are still [whites],’ the threat that ‘a [black] still knows [his or] her place,’ and is not only feminised, but, at least at an imaginary level, sodomised.

This is what I have aimed to induce in the image, its excess of meaning. This photograph within its context in Oppikoppi/10.doc. not only figures the central place of rock music within the festival – here it appears towards the back of the book, which is really a displaced centre, an off-centre centre – and the festival within the post-apartheid nation, but also their impending losses should they become isolated, and the covering over of this always possible traumatic return of the repudiated, evoked with each assertion of its South African status. What must be repudiated each time this diverse range of music is mobilised, what the conduct of the crowd and their desire for this diversity must repudiate, is the wish for apart-heid – ‘Waar's die Springbok Nude Girls? Hierdie is kaffir musiek,’ the vulgar desiring economy of ‘anything young, male and white,’ that is, the return of apart-heid that threatens and haunts this post-apartheid event.

Conclusion
This chapter has approached the question of how Oppikoppi has constituted itself as a South African event through the staging of music as an object of knowledge. In doing so, Bennett’s notion of the exhibitionary complex has been useful in thinking through the conditions of declarations of this sort. If in nineteenth century museum practice it is the correction of the perceptual bad habits and modes of conduct of the working class that was instrumental in producing the modern civilised citizen-subject, here, in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, this particular festival functions as a technology, not only of conduct and perception, but also of desire. In a reversal of cause and effect, proper desire for music as a staged object of

produced the necessity of fantasy, but also – important in highlighting Butler’s point regarding repudiation – as the threat to the correct and complete citation of the norm. That is to say, if political constraint – the necessity of reiterating norms – is issued with the force of a threat, the subject is identified, in some way, with this threat, and not only with the norm that is cited.
knowledge comes to stand as the evidence and the emblem of the festival’s declarations of South Africanness – that is, this kind of desire is the mark of its authenticity.

A place for ‘authentically South African’ desire is prepared in discursive acts that, whether directly or indirectly, invoke the founding texts of the post-apartheid nation. Furthermore, articulating the festival according to the norms of the post-apartheid nation entails the repudiation of the ‘abnormal’ – and one begins to understand, in this context, the urgency of the recruitment of musical diversity at the festival in order, not to preserve Afrikaner nationalism, as Haupt (2006a, 2006b) has suggested, but to build an event according to the conditions on which post-apartheid social existence depend. By drawing attention to several exemplary instances of the festival’s declarations of itself as a ‘South African’ event, I have shown that the iterations of the norms of post-apartheid South Africa – multicultural desire for difference, anti-racism, anti-sexism, as salient features displayed in the discourse on the music of the festival – always entails the repudiation of its opposite, the ‘abnormal’ – a desire for apartheid, for the fixing of sexual and racial difference.

What I have drawn attention to as well is that post-apartheid nationalism, at least in its multicultural moments at the festival, is a heteronormative and homosocial affair – affair being an intentionally loaded term, as that which occurs outside of sanctioned relations, connoting a neurotic structure to this fantasy of the festival, the social law being obediently submitted to, only for forbidden enjoyment to be stolen back. This situation is, however, complicated by the notion that the repudiation necessary for the iteration of norms is an unstable process, always threatened by a return of the repudiated, which contains an eroticisable excess of signifier possibility that can potentially disrupt the imaginary approximation of norms. Desire for musical difference – which stands in for racialised difference – can be thought to ‘refind’ the lost object of apartheid in the multicultural other. That is to say, desire for gender difference that reproduces racial sameness, upon which apartheid was consolidated, finds a compatible surrogate in multicultural musical difference.
6

AFRIKANER SELF-PARODY

Post-apartheid melancholia

“I believe in you if you couldn’t believe in me. Yes, you couldn’t.”

Introduction

Afrikaner self-parody

Thus far, in taking up the problematic of post-apartheid admittance in the context of Oppikoppi music festival, a pronounced gendered dimension to the conditions and fantasies of ‘South Africanness’ has presented itself. In both chapters four and five, the discursive rules according to which the festival has been able to constitute itself as a ‘South African’ event, and the required ‘proof of South Africanness’ (Vestergaard, 2001) for the people who attend the festival, have coalesced around the figure of the white Afrikaner male. In this chapter, Afrikaner masculinity is brought into explicit focus, thinking of Alexander’s (2002) argument that “dragon’s teeth” were sewn at the TRC, specifically his suggestion that “the humiliation induced by this procedure will at some point in the future find expression in cyclical violence or some other conflictual reaction” (p. 126, emphasis added). The focus here, in this chapter, is just such a ‘conflictual reaction’ and ‘the return of the violence of the past’ as they have become figured in the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-parody, a regularity in the festival discourse that will return us to the issue with which this study began, that of post-apartheid white shame and guilt for the colonial and apartheid pasts, their absence and their symptomatic presence.

Afrikaner parody is not a new phenomenon. Jokes about Afrikaners were widespread during apartheid. ‘Van der Merwe jokes,’ for example – ‘van der Merwe’ was the stereotypical Afrikaner, oblivious or maladjusted to international social norms, frequently making faux pas while on vacation abroad, misunderstanding or mispronouncing English words to the Queen, Prince Charles or some other figure of Britishness – circulated widely during apartheid, particularly amongst English-speaking South Africans. It was, however, only once real cracks in the apartheid edifice began to appear that parody of Afrikaners was taken up by Afrikaners. In

236 Election slogan on the official vote Twakkie t-shirt for Oppikoppi ‘Strictly Come Twakkie’ April 2009.
this regard, the Voëlvry tour in 1989 is the exemplar, not only its mocking of the authority figures, monuments, sacred artefacts and idiosyncrasies of Afrikaner nationalism, but also its parodic doubling of Afrikanerdom in the alter-ego’s of the musicians (cf. Baines, 2008). By the time official apartheid ended, parody of Afrikanerdom had become lodged in the South African national sense of humour, a permanent feature, and it came increasingly from Afrikaners. From Marlene van Niekerk’s critically acclaimed, parodic – but no less tragic – novel, Triomph, published the same year as South Africa became a democracy, to Bitterkomix, as discussed in chapter two, and, more recently, to films like Neill Blomkamp’s District 9 and its Afrikaans-speaking anti-hero, Drikus van der Merwe, parody of Afrikanerdom is widespread.

Oppikoppi has, over the years, become a convergence point for Afrikaner self-parody. Of course, not the only place it is found, but one where it is concentrated. It may not define Oppikoppi, but each event attains a kind of generalised parodic and ironic intensity. The parodic double of stereotypical Afrikanerness is given form at various levels, ranging from an organisational one, with festivals being themed as an ironic repetition of a problematised Afrikaner motif, with corresponding festival flyers, press releases and onstage performances, to a less formalised offstage performative repertoire of ironic appropriation and repetition.

The conflicts of self-parody, and the return of the violence of the past, with which this chapter is concerned, are neatly figured in a performance by the band, Dorp – itself an ironic name, meaning small rural town – who, during the course of one of the early festivals in the late 1990s, staged a mock fight, complete with gloves and fake blood, “to take the piss out of the aggressive minority of South African men,” as Dorp band member, Pieter Bezuidenhout put it. While the performance may well have been intended as a parodic laugh of the institutions of apartheid that inducted young white men into a culture of physical force – a good example here would be the South African Defence Force (SADF) and its conscription of all white men during

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237 One thinks, also, of the Eugene Terre Blanche jokes that circulated after the leader of the AWB fell off his horse at a political rally in the early 1990s (see Swart, 2001); and Leon Schuster’s early films, particularly Oh Shucks... Its Schuster, which came out the same year as the Voëlery tour, where, amongst other candid camera style practical jokes, he dressed up as a senior traffic officer and made a group of new recruits pretend to be motor cycles, having these grown Afrikaner men ride each other around a parking lot making engine noises.

Baines (2008) has written about the music of David Kramer, music that, during late apartheid, began to “satirise whites from within the laager” (p. 105). Although, as Baines points out, Kramer gained a significant following among white Afrikaner conservatives – largely due to the familiar style of his music – his satire was highly critical both Afrikaans and English-speaking whiteness and of apartheid ideology.

apartheid – it levelled much of its laughter at the products of this induction, at men who continue to resolve their differences with physical force.

Fighting has more or less given way at the festival, it is actively policed by security and is generally looked down upon, but in the early days of the festival, drunken fights were a frequent occurrence. Dorp’s parodic act, which made fun of this kind of now problematised behaviour, didn’t run quite as smoothly as anticipated, though. During the course of the performance, someone landed a blow perhaps more squarely than he might have intended to and, before long, these parodic doubles were being occupied rather seriously. Their own identification with this mode of being was, evidently, underestimated. The consequences of this were minimal, little more than a bit of real blood. The point that can be derived from this example, though, is that this parody – where one sees an amplification, to the point of absurdity, of problematised features of apartheid-era white South African masculinity, particularly, though not exclusively, Afrikaner masculinity – lapsed self-parody, and oscillated between parody of the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation,’ and self-parody. As Bezuidenhout put it, it was “all in good ‘aggressive minority’ fun.”

The argument I want to propose here is that it is in self-parody that the violence of the past returns, not simply in the violent content of these performances – in the example above, that it was a parodic fight that shed blood – but also in the parodic form, in what we can refer to as the super-egoic violence of self-parody. We can begin to discern the conflicts and the return of the violent past more clearly in the obscene self-parody of zef culture, and the debate that has followed in its wake. The term zef is derived from the Ford Zephyr, a model of car popular with working-class Afrikaners during the late 1950s and 1960s. Zef is commonly associated with ‘poor white’ Afrikaner culture, with a ‘white-trash’ aesthetic, though necessarily implying an ironic distance from what it appropriates and repeats. Although there is no clear definition of zef, the website, Watkykji, devoted to zef culture – I referred to this site in chapter four, regarding the ‘wildness’ of the festival – has a zef dictionary, which does not define zef, but is itself a kind of elaborate definition, listing hundreds of crude Afrikaans words and figures of speech for fighting, sex, masturbation, friends and drinking. A good example of the characteristic obscenity of zef is provided by a collaborative performance between rap groups, Die Antwoord and Jack

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239 Ibid.

The performance starts with an organ playing a foreboding introduction. The song then explodes as the other instruments join in, the line, “Party, party, party, party. Hos ja, Jurre, maar ek’s in my poes in [Party, party, party, party. Awesome yes, God, but I’m in my cunt],” shouted by everyone onstage. Ninja of Die Antwoord is wearing khaki shorts, long socks and is shirtless, the weekend uniform of a stereotypical apartheid-era Afrikaner. Jack Parow has on his signature long-peak cap and a handlebar moustache, synonymous with the apartheid authority figure par excellence, the policeman. The song continues, the performers spouting one profanity after the next about drinking and getting wasted, until the chorus, “Doosdronk, stomp rond skop my hond. Poes jou inne mond en val oppie grond. Doos dronk God waar is my hond? Le in my kots en vrotinnie tronk [Cunt drunk, stomp around kick my dog. Hit you in the mouth and fall on the ground. Cunt drunk God where’s my dog? Lie in my vomit and rot in jail].” There comes a point in the act when Ninja and Yolandi of Die Antwoord have a drunken fight. At this point, Jack Parow tries to intervene, to no avail. After some words, Ninja turns to Yolandi and beats her to the ground. Jack Parow then assumes the role of the law in the performance; a siren sounds, “Dis die polisie, meneer staan weg van die meisie [This is the police, sir stand away from the girl].” Yolandi shouts at Ninja from the floor, “Kyk vir jou nou, jy’s n fokken sissie man [Look at you now, you’re a fucking sissie man],” at which point everyone, in unison, shouts, “Ag, Fokofpolisiekar! [Ag, fuck off police car!],” and the song ends in a climactic chorus.240

It is certainly worth noting that, once again, as in the case of the staged fight, there is violent content to this parody of Afrikanerdom – Yolandi, a white Afrikaans woman, is beaten to the ground by Ninja, not just once, but over and over again, each time the song is performed. But this violent content, set apart from its parodic form, only goes so far in accounting for this spectacle of what is most obscene about Afrikaner masculinity, missing something of the psychical violence of zef.

Many critics have been eager to celebrate zef as a hopeful sign of the deconstruction and disruption of apartheid identity categories. Sonja Smit (2011), for instance, notes in her analysis of the music of Zander Tyler, or Jack Parow as he’s more commonly known:

240 They first performed this song together in 2009 at Ramfest, another South African music festival. Since this debut collaboration they have sparked intense debate about Afrikaner identity, about post-apartheid cultural politics and, of course, about the meaning of zef.
Tyler’s performance of Jack Parow is heightened through his kitsch outfits that reference certain elements of style associated white Afrikaans masculinity. His 1980s moustache and shorts (rather than slacks) are examples of this. The 1980s moustache recalls the politically fraught period before the end of Apartheid. The look is unfashionably connected to images of the white Afrikaans male as conservative, Calvinist and nationalist with an ingrained sense of racial superiority (p. 3).

For Smit, Parow’s conjuring of the apartheid past works to “undermine the masculinity set up by signs such as the moustache and the shorts” (p. 4). While she notes that “Parow embodies stereotypical and reified constructions of identity,” she emphasises how this “also questions and subverts their logic by unsettling signification and thereby enacting a subjective revolt” (p. 6). For Smit, zef figures not simply a revolting subject, but a subject in revolt against the apartheid past (see also Bezuidenhout, 2007). But is this optimism justified? Is it really only ironic distance from the past that is created here?

In the heated commentary that has followed the fame of Die Antwoord, some have been disappointed to discover that it is in fact a parody, that the performers are not really working-class Afrikaners and, in the case of Ninja – formerly Watkin ‘Waddy’ Jones from Max Normal and Max Normal TV fame, and an accomplished musician before starting Die Antwoord – even first language Afrikaans-speaking. And many who acknowledged the parodic status of the act have criticised Die Antwoord for making fun of a marginalised, under-educated, poor group of people. In response to this sentiment in an online seminar Deon Maas (2010) argued that zef is in fact not mocking another marginalised group, listing various aspects of everyday Afrikaner life, of which zef consists, concluding that, “Die Antwoord en Jack Parow se toe-eiening van die

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241 Similarly, Bezuidenhout (2007) has argued that, while both the De la Rey phenomenon and Afrikaans rock music – he uses the example of Fokofpolisiekar and, thus, has a particular type of rock music in mind – appropriate the symbols of Afrikaner nationalism, the former, de la Rey, lacks the irony of the Voëlvry movement. In this way, Afrikaans rock, in its irony, does not allow for mobilisation along racial and ethnic lines. Bezuidenhout, it needs to be noted, is far more cautious than Smit in celebrating this irony because, as with Voëlvry, it does not go beyond the “politics of the ‘self’” (p. 13).

242 Indeed, these questions may have further reaching relevance. The literature on negative memory reviewed in chapter two suggests that in post-apartheid South Africa – across a range of domains, from popular culture (Nuttall, 2008; Grundlingh, 2004; du Pisani, 2001; Vestergaard, 2001) and literature (Barnard, 2004; de Kock, 2004) to photography (Garb, 2011) and pornography (Coombes, 2004) – the past is incessantly conjured precisely in order to transcend and, thereby, transcend it. At the same time, though, the apartheid past has become hyper-cathected, as an erasure of this past would undo the fragile present of the post-apartheid nation, in which a semblance of commonality can only be recognised in our mutual negations of the past (de Kock, 2004). And in Afrikaner self-parody there appears a similar citation of the past in order to move beyond it.
term zef is maar net 'n manier om eienaarskap te vat van 'n benaming wat ons almal lankal weet is deel van ons, maar net te bang was om te erken [Die Antwoord and Jack Parow’s appropriation of the term zef is just a way to take ownership of a label that we have for a long time known is part of us, but which we have been too afraid to acknowledge].” Maas’ point is that apartheid and the National Party, Calvinism and the institution of the family during apartheid, all worked to rid Afrikaners of zef. As Maas put it, now that apartheid is over, “het ons weer die geleentheid om na ons ware self terug te keer [we have the freedom to return to our true selves].” As a part of the same seminar, Deborah Steinmar (2010) made a similar point when she stated, “Dus is daar diep binne elkeen van ons ten minste sellulêre herinnerings van ‘n blinkgepoleerde, gevleuelde kar, motoronderdele op die kweekgras, ‘n kunsblomrangskikking en porseleinhonde in die voorhuis [Thus, deep inside of each of us there are at least cellular memories of winged cars, motor parts on the overgrown grass, artificial flower arrangements and porcelain dogs in the lounge].” To the question of whether zef creates distance from the past, the answer suggested here is that this is not the case. And although these commentators were speaking of a recent appropriation of zef, the origins of which, Maas argues, the appropriators, Jack Parow and Die Antwoord, may not fully understand, it appears as if, for a younger generation of Afrikaners, zef has the same homely feel of ‘inner truth’ and familiarity. As Jack Parow declared in an interview, when asked whether he was making fun of another group or making a statement about a group with which he identifies,

Well, the zef image is me, its how I grew up and how I have been classified my entire life, being from behind the boerewors curtain. So yes, I am making a statement to say that we aren’t as bad as everyone makes us out to be. But at the same time I’m also ripping off my friends and myself because we are dysfunctional and rough as fuck.243

And this has found support in zef’s audience, as a comment stated in a forum discussing Die Antwoord, “The amazing thing is it’s so liberating to be zef, even if you're just pretending.”244

On the one hand, then, zef has been framed as a dramatization of stereotypical apartheid-era Afrikanerness, a parodic ‘subversion’ that draws attention to its performative, inessential

‘nature’ (Smit, 2011). This view of parody certainly has some merit – later in this chapter I look at some of Butler’s writing on gender parodies, which may in fact support Smit’s reading of zef – and at the very least an important distinction should be made between an ironic and a serious repetition of the past. On the other, we have a view that emphasises its connotative nearness to an ‘essence of Afrikanerness,’ an enigmatic ‘true self’ from which apartheid alienated Afrikaners (Maas, 2010), recalled in the ‘cellular memories’ it conjures (Steinmar, 2010). While seemingly contradictory, both of these views take zef as enabling the emergence of something anti-apartheid in Afrikanerness.

Certainly Maas and Steinmar are correct in framing zef within a thematics of loss and memory. Likewise, Smit’s observation that there is something ‘subversive’ in zef is not incorrect. The argument proposed below, however, bringing aspects of these two views together, is that the parodic doubling and de-gradation of the social world in which one has lived entails a loss of precisely that which is ‘subverted,’ a loss under-acknowledged in both the performances and the commentary on them. What is focussed on here is the loss of apartheid, a loss that cannot be eulogised and thereby mourned, but a loss that is nonetheless symptomatically declared in Afrikaner self-parody – this rather than a loss brought about by apartheid, which constitutes Afrikaners as victims of the past, as Maas and Steinmar seem to suggest.

As in the discourses analysed in chapters four and five, there are, in the presentation of this phenomenon, marked preoccupations with ‘South Africanness.’ As Ninja from Die Antwoord put it in an interview, leaning ironically into the camera with his underpants showing through the bottom of his shorts, adjusting his early 1990s era sports sunglasses, “Zef means a lifestyle, where you find full flex in the style. It’s a South African style and Die Antwoord is, like, fucking zef... its not really something you can explain, its something you experience.”

We are also returned here to some of the issues raised in chapter one apropos of Vice’s article, ‘How Do I Live in this Strange Place?’ We have already seen in chapters four and five how negations of the past may work to conserve what is negated, as Hook (2011) suggested in his response to Vice, and this remains relevant to the themes of this chapter; but here we also have what might be construed as an ‘over-identification’ with the past, which Hook proposed as a potentially more ethical relation to a forbidden past than negation, a means, as he puts it, “to

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‘go all the way,’ to embrace it fully, to accept that it lies at the very heart of one’s subjectivity, that it is foundational to who one is,” thereby enabling one to work-through the past, “lessen the stranglehold of this influence” (p. 500; see also Žižek, 1994).246

To rigorously pose the question of whether this kind of self-parody enables any form of working-through the past it has been useful to read these performances alongside and in relation to Freud’s (1914) essay, ‘Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through.’ Primarily concerned with the management of the clinical encounter, specifically the transference relationship, the central argument of this essay is that a repetition of the past in the transference relationship between analyst and analysand is, at once, a form of remembering and of resistance to remembering; that is, a repetition of the past in the transference is a kind of memory acted out, as Freud put is, “the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (p. 150). Thus, it is through remembering that Freud saw his patients being able to stop acting out the past.

This essay is useful for two related reasons. Firstly, Freud referred to the transference as a kind of intermediate region between fantasy and ‘external reality,’ as a kind of play-space within which the past can be first acted out and then worked through, that is, remembered. It will be recalled from chapter four that in the declaration of the festival site as a national monument it was stated in the festival’s promotional material that, “Like a 3-day therapy session, Oppikoppi is a temporary autonomous zone, a space to let loose, let rip and get caught up in the complete madness of festival fun.”247 We might ask, then, taking seriously the light hearted assertion that Oppikoppi has its therapeutic effects, whether these performances entail an element of working-through the past. Secondly, if we consider that the commandment of the post-apartheid nation is to recognise the past as an injustice, as the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) interpellates post-apartheid subjects, issuing the conditions of national belonging, then the ethics of the parodic double are framed well by Freud’s essay on transference. Indeed, the injunction to recognise the past as an injustice – to remember so as not to repeat, as a kind of working-through, a ‘talking cure’ – is precisely the ideational ground upon which the post-

246 In an online article Žižek (1994) has written about the “over-identification” at work in the creations of the Laibach artists who, in the wake of the dissolution of socialism in Slovenia “staged an aggressive inconsistent mixture of Stalinism, Nazism, and Blut und Boden ideology.”
apartheid nation has been constituted (Olivier, 2007), and this was also one of the guiding principles of the TRC (Feldman, 2003, p. 239). Does Afrikaner self-parody, then, constitute a form of recollecting the past in the service of a working-through? Or is it as a repetition of a haunting past, a past acted out rather than remembered? Does an ironic appropriation of apartheid stereotypes and the parody of the past signal a relation to a thoroughly discredited national past that could be thought of as a recognition of the injustices of the past? And considering that there is a playfulness to Afrikaner self-parody, particularly in zef and its reworking of the past, does it provide something along the lines of a ‘transference space’ within which the past can be worked through?

In the next section, I provide an outline of the Freudian concept of melancholia, briefly introduced in chapters one and three as a psycho-neurotic condition, with which I have thought through this phenomenon of Afrikaner self-parody, likening the self-beratement of the melancholic to self-parody, putting them into conversation. With the Freudian conception of melancholia, Afrikaner self-parody can be thought of as an ambivalent reaction to the loss of apartheid or, in Agamben’s (1993) terms, a set of “operations in which desire simultaneously denies and affirms its object, and thus succeeds in entering into relation with something that otherwise it would have been unable to appropriate or enjoy” (pp. xvii-xviii). Over the years, melancholia has received much attention in critical scholarship, across a range of disciplines and social and cultural contexts.248 Much of this writing and research, however, has dealt with losses of a different political sort to that of apartheid, and the particularity of the object or ideal lost here, over which I argue there has been a melancholic reaction, requires some careful consideration. Following this discussion of melancholia, I examine a case of Afrikaner self-parody that played itself out in April 2009, an example that brings into relief the loss of the farm, raised in chapter four, a detail of no incidental importance, loss being central to the aetiology of melancholia, but also the ‘South Africanness’ of post-apartheid whiteness. The question remains,

248 Rose (2003) refers to ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ as Freud’s most cited paper. Indeed, it has been developed in light of a Kleinian psychoanalytic perspective (e.g. Sánchez-Pardo, 2003), it has been given a Lacanian rereading (e.g. Leader, 2003), Julia Kristeva (1987) has inflected it with her own brand of psychoanalysis, as has Žižek (2000), it has been applied to modernist literature (e.g. Flatley, 2008; Rae, 2007), post-Hitler Germany (e.g. Postone & Santner, 2003; Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1975), post-communist melancholia (e.g. Scribner, 2003), post-colonial melancholia (e.g. Gilroy, 2001) to racial and ethnic melancholia (e.g. Cheng, 2000; Eng & Han, 2003; Riggs, 2005), to gender melancholia (Butler, 1997) and to a post-apartheid context, focusing, in particular, on Griqua land claims (Johnson, 2003) and the vicissitudes of identifications with whiteness (Straker, 2011) and white Afrikaner masculinities (Truscott, 2011a).
though, once the argument has been made that Afrikaner self-parody can be likened to the self-beratement of the melancholic that has lost an object that it cannot mourn, whether it amounts to a form of working-through the loss of this past. Thus, in the final section of this chapter, I consider the ethics of self-parody and melancholia, as well as the possibilities for mourning the loss of apartheid and working-through this loss.

**Melancholia**

*Freud’s concept of melancholia and loss*

In his essay, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ Freud (1917) proposed melancholia, in contradistinction to mourning, as a kind of refusal to accept the “verdict of reality” (p. 255), to acknowledge the loss of an object, whether a loved person, an ideal or one’s country. By this move, Freud brought loss centre stage in the understanding of melancholia. In the face of an object-cathexis that is no longer possible, and in order to prolong psychically an attachment to this lost object, it is withdrawn into the ego, establishing “an identification of the ego with the abandoned object” (Freud, 1917, p. 249). The symptomatic compromise of melancholia, in this sense, is being the lost object, rather than having it. Particularly in situations where a loss is brought about through prohibition, this identification with the lost object produces the conflict between two parts of the ego, as the object bears the trace of its problematised social status and is incorporated as such, becoming a problematic feature of the ego.

While the pain of mourning takes the form of grief for the lost object, the pain of melancholia is discernable in this conflicted relation with oneself, and the psychic conflict that ensues is the conscious form of melancholic loss. Melancholia, that is to say, is an unconscious loss, a loss not experienced as loss, but, rather, as a conflict between the ego and the super-ego, the psychic representative of the external world that has rendered the object lost or unavailable. As Freud (1917) put it, speaking of the unconsciousness of melancholic loss, “This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him” (p. 245).

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249 Freud wrote the paper in 1915. Even though his ideas on loss are evident in his earlier writing, and the theory of melancholia is attributed to Freud, as his invention, particularly its aetiology in loss, Karl Abraham and Sandor Ferenzi’s contributions to the development of these ideas are frequently overlooked. See Sanchez Pádro (2003) for a good discussion of the emergence of the ideas on melancholia between Freud, Abraham and Ferenzi.
The dynamic of melancholia is put succinctly by Butler (1997), paraphrasing Freud (1917), “Melancholia is a rebellion that has been put down, crushed” (p. 190). That is, an ambivalent relation to a lost object is figured as a crushed rebellion: identification with the lost object fulfils the loving portion of the ambivalent relation – longing for the object’s return – and the incorporation of the object is a rebellion against the reality of a loss, a rebellion that is put down by conscience, which fulfils the hateful portion – rage at its departure, hate at having been abandoned. This produces the characteristic melancholic symptom of self-beratement, the attacks on the ego by its own critical agency, allowing a relation to a lost object to live on as an intra-psychic conflict, providing a compromise and a substitution: the self-castigation is a disguised address to the lost object that has been incorporated and identified with. Indeed, the central tenet of Freud’s (1917) argument is that “the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego” (p. 248):

If one listens patiently to a melancholic’s many and various self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves or has loved or should love (p. 248).

The emergence of Afrikaner self-parody does coincide with sweeping political changes. The hypothesis of loss being an aetiological factor in Afrikaner self-parody is justified here, then, and there is good reason to examine the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-parody as a form of melancholia. What requires attention here, in proposing self-parody as a form of melancholia, is melancholia’s “satisfaction in self exposure” (Freud, 1917, p. 247), the ways in which the melancholic continually draws attention to its own problematic features and, in so doing, conserves an object-cathexis no longer available in reality. Certainly there is in Afrikaner self-parody, specifically in the obscenity of zef culture, this feature of self-exposure. The question, however, is whether self-parody does, in fact, function along the same conservative lines as melancholic self-beratement. In the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-parody, is there a stubborn and conservative clinging to the apartheid past in the morbid preoccupation with creating a spectacle of certain features of apartheid-era whiteness, particularly Afrikaner masculinity? This identification would ensure an afterlife for the lost object, a continued proximity with the object as a berated part of the Afrikaner male subject.
Melancholic self-beratement and self-parody

It needs to be noted that a reading of Freud’s later writing on melancholia both changes and enriches his initial formulation. Whereas Freud (1917) had initially seen this introjection of a lost love object as pathological identification, by the time of writing *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) and *The Ego and the Id* (1923), he had generalised melancholic or regressive identification, positing it as the very condition of giving up lost objects, but also, more radically, of psychic life in general. Freud’s reconceptions allow us to understand melancholia as a precursor to, and condition of possibility for, mourning, and it is necessary to keep this in mind in considering how Afrikaner self-parody may constitute a kind of working-through of the past.

As noted in chapters one, Freud’s later works also enable a more properly psychosocial formulation, foregrounding the relation between the social and the psychic. As stated there, the particular prohibitions of a given society are thought to occasion the losses whereby the character of the ego is formed and shaped through identification. Thus, if this is a ‘diagnosis’ of Afrikaner self-parody as being melancholic, Freud’s later writing (1923, 1921) also enables, indeed *insists upon*, a socio-diagnostics of the environment out of which this pattern of identification has been produced.

Melancholia is thought to develop under conditions where an object has been given up “because it has shown itself unworthy of love” (Freud, 1921, p. 83), where a loss is not, in Butler’s (1997) terms, grievable, or where there are not, as Leader (2003) has suggested, the discursive resources with which to symbolise a loss. It is possible to formulate the post-apartheid nation’s break with its own past, which has provided the conditions of post-apartheid belonging, as a constitutionally entrenched cultivation of post-apartheid melancholia precisely because, with the injunction not to repeat the past and to remember a national past *as an injustice*, apartheid becomes unmournable. In lamenting the loss of apartheid, one becomes the ‘other from the past’ against which the post-apartheid nation has constituted itself. Apartheid and the life it enabled becomes a loss that is buried in, and by, the injunctions issued to post-apartheid memory. We can say, with some certainty, that, for Afrikaners with interests in being admitted as ‘authentic post-apartheid South Africans’ – and this would be true for many key figures of Afrikaner self-parody, certainly Jack Parow, Die Antwoord and Fokofpolisiekar, as well as their audiences that model themselves on their ‘ironic Afrikanerdom’ – apartheid cannot be anything but an
unconscious loss: how, indeed, does one eulogise the loss of what has been officially declared a crime against humanity? This is, of course, not to say that apartheid was not an injustice, though it is to suggest that one can mourn the loss of apartheid only with great difficulty, and at the risk of a certain ‘political insanity.’

The melancholia cultivated within this situation is evident in various post-apartheid Afrikaner subcultural movements, all of which entail an element of self-parody, which can be likened to melancholic self-beratement. The ‘diagnosis’ of melancholia is supported by the fact that it is precisely the features of apartheid-era white masculinity – those problematised in post-apartheid South Africa, this problematisation rendering them lost as models on which to fashion oneself, lost, that is, as the narcissistic support for white Afrikaner masculinities – that are ridiculed in the parodic performances. The self-parody that characterises these articulations of contemporary Afrikaner culture can, then, be read as a means for retaining a relation to a problematised past. That is to say, instead of mourning those aspects of Afrikaner culture ‘contaminated’ by the apartheid past, these same aspects are identified with and turned against. In this abasement of what one is – in Parow’s words cited above, ‘how I grew up and how I have been classified my entire life’ – there is the rebellion of an identification with a lost object, but this identification is put down by parody, relegating the lost or forbidden object identified with to the status of either a joke or ‘dysfunctional and rough as fuck,’ ensuring an ironic afterlife for a lost object that cannot be mourned, but one that is better than the devastation of a total loss.

Butler (1997) provides an insightful Hegelian rendering of this idea of a self-accusation disguising a complaint against what has been lost when she writes that, in melancholia, “Instead of breaking with the object, or transforming the object through mourning, this Aufhebung – this active, negating, and transformative movement – is taken into the ego” (p. 176). Thus, self-beratement – or in this case self-parody – does the work of preserving the lost object as a problematic feature of oneself, and the force of the social world, which has declared it a loss over which grief is not authorised – an unavowable loss over which even ambivalence is forbidden – is taken over by the ego “as its own destructiveness” (Butler, 1997, p. 176). In proposing that this is the dynamic of self-parody, I build on the arguments of chapters four and five. The withdrawal to the heterotopic space of the festival, an at once real and imaginary space that produces the

250 Freud (1917) suggested that the preconditions for melancholia are an existing ambivalence towards the object that has been lost, and that the loss be of a narcissistic sort, both of which seem to fit the situation being considered here.
self-destructive white male ‘South African’ subject, as outlined in chapter four, and the constitutive loss of apartheid which enables the representation of the festival as an authentically post-apartheid ‘South African’ event, as outlined in chapter five, are central to the argument I propose here. Indeed, the self-parody I examine here can be taken as a form of self-destruction carried out by other means. And the aetiology of this self-destructive pattern of subjectivity is attributed to the loss implicit in the formation of the post-apartheid nation, the as-yet-unsymbolised loss of apartheid, a loss that is “unspeakable, impossible to declare” (Butler, 1997, p. 196).

‘The Republic of Oppikoppi’
The April 2009 festival, Oppikoppi Strictly Come Twakkie, fell one day after the national election in which Jacob Zuma became the fourth democratically elected President of South Africa. The event was themed as a campaign to garner support for Twakkie – who together with fellow comedian, Cornè are The Most Amazing Show – to become the next president of the country (Fig. 6.1). Twakkie is played by actor, producer and comedian Rob van Vuuren – incidentally, van Vuuren grew up on a farm in rural Eastern Cape. He had recently won the television competition, Strictly Come Dancing, hence the 2009 festival name, Strictly Come Twakkie. The Most Amazing Show is characterised by an appropriation of fragments of speech patterns and styles from the apartheid past and a presentation of the ridiculous as the real and legitimate. They are a much lauded and laughed at mirror ball of white South Africa, of fragments of post-apartheid South African life. They bring into their performances several distorted reflections of the country: their moustaches join the national chorus of Afrikaner parody, a part of our national sense of humour, and their accents are recognisably those of Afrikaners trying to speak English, but not quite, as they are also those of white English-speaking South Africans imitating Afrikaners trying to speak English. They are a parody of a parody, of which the moustache, as much as the ridiculous accent, is a part. The act ridicules traditional Afrikanerdom, but also self-consciously makes fun of those who ridicule backward Afrikaners.
Figure 6.1, Presidential candidate Twakkie, as he appeared on the official poster for Oppikoppi (Not-Quite) Easter 2009

The party line for the three day festival, as it appeared on the official Vote Twakkie t-shirt, was, “I believe in you if you couldn’t believe in me. Yes, you couldn’t.” The intentionally ironic question posed through the appropriation of Barrack Obama’s election slogan – with intentional grammatical mistakes – was: could South Africans live to see a white president? And on the Friday night during the proceedings, Twakkie was named President of the ‘Republic of Oppikoppi,’ which in that moment became a kind of parodic volkstaat, a pseudo-separatist independent Afrikaner music-state. As one commentator noted, “The fact that no one else was running was precisely the point; Twakkie would be president, just like Jacob Zuma. And whether this helped people deal with this fact, or get more upset, was completely up to the individual to decide.”

The opposite number of the ironic ‘Republic of Oppikoppi,’ its serious counterpart that it degraded and inverted, would be another farm, strangely enough also bearing the name Nooitgedacht, which makes up the larger part of Orania, the separatist Afrikaner volkstaat in the Northern Cape – although, officially, Orania does not enjoy the status of a volkstaat either and falls within the Republic of South Africa. In Orania they celebrate, for example, some of the old South African public holidays; they have an annual H.F. Verwoerd memorial lecture, where the contribution of the architect of apartheid is explored (De Beer, 2006) and there is a statue of the

former President in the centre of the town. Such a serious and open display of nostalgia for apartheid – ‘restorative nostalgia,’ as opposed to ‘reflective nostalgia,’ in Svetlana Boym’s (2001) terms – would not be tolerated in the post-apartheid nation. And this is precisely what the performance and its reception at the festival over the three days ridiculed.

Effects of contrast were thus created between itself and this other problematic farm. What should be kept in mind, though, in understanding this as a purely distancing and differentiating move, is the functioning of the farm outside of festival time, as described in chapter four – this is, as with the examples detailed in the introduction to this chapter, also a form of self-parody. Both farms – the serious farm (Orania’s Nooitgedacht) and the parodic one (Oppikoppi’s Nooitgedacht) – have thus enjoyed an identification with problematised elements of apartheid. There is, of course, a crucial difference: Orania preserves its identification by locating it outside the post-apartheid nation – Oranians go as far as speaking of exportation to South Africa (Vestergaard, 2001), while the festival has retained its identification by repeating it as an ironic double of itself, by pairing this identification with its own parodic negation, by being that which is negated. In this instance, that of the parodic farm, the ironic volkstaat, it is a problematised identification, an identification you can believe in, “Yes, you couldn’t,” as the party slogan for the event went. In a sense, Twakkie, the President of ‘The Republic of Oppikoppi’ gives his blessing to those who believe in him and cancel out this belief, to those who identify with him and find that identification problematic. Laughter lights up, galvanises, the circuit whereby an identificatory rebellion is launched and put down in a single move – put down, that is, by the form it is given, parody – banishing the spectacle to the status of a joke, a domain that is outside of serious, ‘real life.’

This parodic identification and negation, together, nevertheless provide a compromised quantity of satisfaction: in parodically negating itself, continued proximity with a problematised constellation of relations between people, a forbidden libidinal organisation, is enabled. In other words, it is prohibition that, in its own way, offers a form of enjoyment. Butler (1997) again offers a useful line of approach here. Discussing the way Nietzsche and Freud approach conscience, she states,

Prohibition reproduces the prohibited desire and becomes intensified through the renunciations it effects. The ‘afterlife’ of prohibited desire takes place through the prohibition itself, where the prohibition not only sustains, but is sustained by the desire that it forces into renunciation (p. 81).
Butler’s point is that to participate in the prohibition of forbidden desire is not only to retain a renunciative relation to this forbidden desire, as a sort of compromise, but also that this prohibition is “nourished precisely by the aggression it forbids” (p. 70). 252 In ‘The Republic of Oppikoppi’ we see the prohibition of desire enacted through parodic negation of such desire, through the instantiation of an ironic distance from what one is allowed to seriously be. Here parody can be thought to function as an instrument of conscience, putting down the regressive identificatory rebellion and, in this way, what is forbidden is retained in its negation as prohibited desire.

It is fair to say, also, that Afrikaner self-parody has offered young Afrikaners not only a way of being what has been lost – melancholia is, first and foremost, a kind of identification with the lost object – but also a way of being ‘South African,’ precisely by turning against the past. But this opposition to the past is given a new dimension here. There are certainly clearer ways to turn against apartheid, but these do not offer, in the same full sense, an enactment and performative occupation of the past, which self-parody does afford. This point is illustrated well by the set of guidelines issued by the festival organisers, prohibiting racism and sexism, but stated in a self-parodic mode: “These rules are not actually necessary for the initiated but each year there are new pseudo-Koppi fans which kreeps into the camp site and does not yet understand the community of trust.” 253 While this certainly shows how the statement functions as a problematisation of identifications with apartheid, the subtle mistakes in the text, made on purpose as those typically made by Afrikaners trying to speak English, allow a fuller inhabitation of Afrikanerdom than simply pointing to its problematic features, to banning the flying of the old flag, to shaming the use of politically disgraceful language and so on. Put differently, enjoyment is fuller in this parodic form than in a straightforward prohibition. We see this same strategy of parodic negation at work in the mistakes made in the party slogan, “I belief in you if you

252 In Nietzsche’s third essay in The Genealogy of Morals, he deals with the meaning of ascetic ideals, the meaning, that is, of the renunciation of sensuality. Here, he argues that this denial of sensuality, of life lived sensuously, is what enables, for the ascetic, life: in the ascetic prohibition, “life wrestles in it and through it with death and against death; the ascetic ideal is an artifice for the preservation of life” (p. 556). It is not simply negation Nietzsche raises here, but self-destruction. As Nietzsche goes on to argue in this essay (particularly in section 13), the life of the ascetic courses through a circuit of self-destruction; for the ascetic, “the very wound itself afterward compels him to live.” (p. 557).

253 These words were quoted in chapter five as having appeared in Das Kapital: A book about Dassies, but this is how they appeared, subtly changed, on the festival program.
couldn’t believe in me. Yes, you couldn’t.” What is being self-consciously problematised is not only the ‘other of the nation,’ old fashioned racists, but the very place from which one speaks. In this way, one can speak like an Afrikaner – and thereby identify with the lost object – and at the same time create distance from Afrikanerdom as it was during apartheid – here the formulation would be that the super-ego turns against the introjected object – all the while having the possibility of denying this occupation as being just a joke.

This point can be reinforced by pointing to the fact that, in the parodic presidential election party, there was a double joke at work. It was not only Afrikaners who were mocked, there were also several references to newly elected President Zuma, his bothersome rape case which was brought against him and his much publicised sexual forays. In the festival’s Party Manifesto, for instance, it was stated, “I believe that no matter how many times you shower it won’t take the stupid away.” This, of course, refers to when Zuma stated in court that he showered to protect himself from contracting HIV after he had had sexual intercourse with – and allegedly raped – an HIV positive woman very much younger than himself. It makes fun of Zuma, but at the same time is a parody of the anti-Zuma paranoia that gripped a significant portion of white South Africa. Onstage, Twakkie wore tiny running shorts, pulled high up around his waist, while Cornè donned his usual enormous fake penis protruding through a pair of loud pants difficult to take seriously. There is perhaps no better image with which to bring across a display of dominant Afrikaner masculinity that parodies itself: an outrageous virility “you can believe in, yes, you couldn’t.” By doing so, the logic of Afrikanerdom is doubled: it is allowed to make sense as a position that stands opposed to Zuma’s sexual forays, only to have that sense dramatised to the point of absurdity. What is ridiculed, at one level, is the black man, but at the same time, and at another level, the racial superiority complex and the authoritarianism of Afrikaner men that mocks, is also mocked.

What one cannot seriously remain attached to, as a subject of this discourse, is the idea that the white Afrikaner man should be dominant, and what the parody effectively does is make the occupation of a position where the white man overpowers the black man, where he reduces him to a stupid, dangerous, sexually rapacious black body, less inhabitable, or inhabitable only as a joke. But in doing so, in parodically negating this form of racialised masculinity, he can stand in the very place of that problematised figure from the past. That is, an identification with this position is made possible, even if only melancholically.
As noted in chapter one, Jansen (2009) has stated that, at festivals like Oppikoppi, “Afrikaans music, poetry and politics mix freely in a very assertive though not uncontested display of racial and cultural power” (p. 77, emphasis added). Jansen is not, if we consider the argument above, incorrect. But what is missed, what is misrecognised here, is a crucial dynamic to the ‘display of racial and cultural power’ and its contestation from within: that the ironic double is taken as indistinguishable from its ‘original,’ is misrecognised by Jansen, just as ‘wildness’ is misrecognised as a kind of ‘South Africanness.’

Let me re-examine these two lines of forbidden enjoyment, each attained through a circuitous and, we might say, symptomatic route, identified above – that of negation and that of being the very object that is negated – in light of an example raised earlier, the collaborative performance of ‘Doos Dronk’ at Oppikoppi on Women’s Day, extending the argument.

The defining feature of melancholia, in contradistinction to mourning, is that the melancholic sees itself as “worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable,” that is, there is a “delusion of (mainly) moral inferiority” (Freud, 1917, p. 245). And rather than shame for this, there is, as Freud puts it, an “insistent communicativeness that finds satisfaction in self-exposure” (p. 246). Although Freud provides only a provisional and unconvincing rationale for it, he asserts that a fear of poverty is also a regular feature in the presentation of melancholia. It is curious, in this regard, how Afrikaner self-parody has gathered around the figure of the ‘poor white’ and clothed itself in a zef ‘white trash’ aesthetic. An explanation, however, can be found in the notion, noted above, that in melancholia “the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it onto the patient’s own ego” (p. 248): what could reproach the parents of these children, and an older generation of Afrikaners more generally – the lost models on which to have and to be, with which to identify and idealise – than to be the ‘poor white’ whose fate living amongst ‘racial others’ was almost certain ‘racial degeneracy,’ becoming the ‘internal enemy’ apartheid of whiteness?

If we take Ninja’s introduction of Die Antwoord to the Oppikoppi crowd – and we shouldn’t overlook his thick Afrikaans here – we find precisely such an association between ‘racial degeneracy’ and ‘South Africanness’:

I represent South African culture. In this place, you get a lot of different things – blacks, whites, coloureds, English, Xhosa, Zulu, watookal [what have you]. I’m like all of these different things, all of these different people... fucked into one person.
Chapter four has already established this link, but we can take this a step further here. This statement can be formulated as an ongoing dialogue with the lost object: this is the true addressee of this declaration of who he is. It also tells us that there is shame in the melancholia of Afrikaner self-parody, but it is shame displaced, and it is an older generation that is made to feel it, evident in the many letters to the Afrikaans newspapers decrying zef culture as shameful to Afrikanerdom. As Freud (1917) put it, “They [melancholics] are not ashamed and do not hide themselves. Since everything derogatory they say about themselves is at bottom said about someone else” (p. 248). This ambivalent symptomatic address to the lost object does, then – through the circuitous route of regressive identification (love for the object) and self-reproach (hate at being abandoned or, perhaps in this case, horribly misled into a new dispensation) – reach its destination, continuing a correspondence with the lost object, at least insofar as the effects of zef, its ramifications, are concerned.

In the performance of ‘Doos Dronk,’ this shaming of an older generation by drawing attention to the most wretched features of Afrikanerdom is enacted through the role of Jack Parow as the policeman and, from a different position, by Yolandi shouting from the ground, once she has been beaten, “Fok jou, hond, jou vuil fokkin hond. Wie's jy? Niks. Jy's niks [Fuck you, you filthy fucking dog. Who are you? Nothing. You’re nothing].” These stand as two negative positions in the performance. But, as in the example of the parodic volkstaat above, it is also enacted through the parodic form of the performance, by assuming the position of precisely that which is problematised, the ‘filthy fucking dog’ that is ‘nothing’ anymore. And here we once more detect the workings of a melancholic strategy, which is revealed when we probe the potential benefits of this ‘self exposure’ and ‘self-beratement,’ this drawing attention to one’s own wretchedness in self-parody.

Here, in this performance, it is not simply a disguised attachment to an object lost through prohibition in the circuitry of identification and conscience, as I have described above, but also a performance which uses its own problematised features – a racial, gendered and ethnicised

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254 I don’t think I am overstating the obscenity of the performance. As Ninja had said this, Yolandi shouted, “Vok jou, julle naaiers [Fuck you, you fuckers],” and the rest of the show was one profanity after the next, ending in a remix with the Wedding DJ’s of Enya’s ‘Orinoco Flow’ (“Sail away, mother fuckers, sail away” ringing in everyone ears the next day).
position of historical dominance – in carrying out the injunctions of the post-apartheid nation, and it is here that we can begin to extend the argument somewhat: melancholic identification, even as it preserves its lost object, transforms through beratement that which is introjected. This transformation is a kind of psychic-work, analogous to Freud’s (1900) dream-work, disguising and distorting what is forbidden according to the conditions of a post-apartheid morality. This distorting and disguising – we might even say here, noting Yolandi’s words, mutilating – what is forbidden according to an anti-apartheid post-apartheid morality is carried out by the technique of self-parody, which requires a problematised past as its raw material. The past is incorporated, identified with and turned against, and it is precisely this turning against that offers a new kind of narcissistic yield within a new sociopolitical context that values turning against the past.

The loss of apartheid as an ideal, for Afrikaners, was more than anything a narcissistic blow. In this context, we can begin to understand Afrikaner self-parody as the emergence of a new aesthetic form and a new parodic pattern of subjectivity structured on the ethical imperatives of the post-apartheid nation. This stylisation of the self authenticates Afrikaners as post-apartheid South Africans precisely because self-parody functions as a spectacular technique that not only preserves through identification, but also participates in the denigration and transformation of the past in a perverse staging of its submission to the nation’s conditions of admittance. If we understand self-parody to be a form of reflexivity that acts on the elements of the ego that are, according to social norms, problematised, then the curious inflation of self-regard accompanying this kind of parody stands to reason: it is motivated by the proscriptions advocated by the norms and ideals of post-apartheid South Africa, which compel the repudiation of apartheid. The force of the social world, which has declared apartheid an unavowable loss, is taken over by the ego “as its own destructiveness” (Butler, 1997, p. 176). We have already seen how this self-destruction is carried out as a form of unofficial nation-building through excessive drinking and hedonism. Following Butler’s line of thought the masochism of this parodic spectacle, its self-exposure and self-ridicule, can be understood as the dissimulated force of post-apartheid nation building. We gain a sense from this dissimulated force how, in melancholia and self-parody alike, the “ego can consent to its own destruction” (Freud, 1917, p. 252): it can do so as “it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object” (p. 252), in this case the object against which the post-apartheid nation has constituted itself.
The corollary is that negative affective investment in the figure of the ironic double, as a reflexive move, accretes moral value and, as a result, is able to represent itself as ‘authentically South African.’ The parodic double is a highly marketable product and thus also accrues cultural capital. And therein lies the motivation for self-exposure and the real melancholic strategy of conservation at work in Afrikaner self-parody: it ‘profits’ from apartheid, preserved as a denigrated feature of oneself, thus retaining a dominant position, a version of the subject enabled by apartheid in the first place, albeit in a new form. As Hook (2010) argues in his critique of post-apartheid whiteness, the narcissistic gains of anti-racism, its secondary benefits, depend on a position of racialised privilege: it is precisely this position which is confessed or given up, it is the structural racism on which this position was built that is acknowledged, and it is complicity with racist ideology which is apologised for. For the anti-racist whiteness Hook problematises, racialised privilege is not eroded or dismantled, but is converted into anti-racism. Melancholic incorporation, coupled with parodic negation of the identified with object, suggests one process whereby this conversion takes place. We might say that the apartheid past, too, is not deconstructed by parody, as Smit (2011) and others have argued, but is converted and displaced, worked on and restored.

Love for Afrikanerdom as it existed during apartheid, and love structured according to an apartheid libidinal organisation, gains a compatible surrogate in post-apartheid South Africa in the form of self-parody, not only because one can ironically continue to be precisely that which is problematised, that is, identify with the lost object, or because this technique provides a compromised form of satisfaction through prohibitive proximity with forbidden desire, renouncing it as forbidden, but also because this self-exposure, which is at bottom an address to the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation,’ authenticates one’s post-apartheid national status by sufficiently crushing the identificatory rebellion. It is not simply by self-destruction that Afrikaners are admitted, this admittance misrecognised, but also through the masochism of self-exposure, which is itself only occasionally recognised.

**The ethics of melancholia**

**The unconsciousness and self-interest of melancholia**

There are, then, some narcissistic gains – or, at least, recuperations – to Afrikaner self-parody. In effect, we find a lost past incorporated and turned against to narcissistically buoy a cultural
formation that has experienced a socio-political situation as narcissistically wounding. There is
good reason, then, to problematise this dynamic. But is this problematisation not too hasty? Does
it not figure a kind of working-through? Were self-parody and melancholia not just discussed as
forms of reflexivity, and would this not constitute a kind of ethics? If melancholia is, at least in
part, self-punishing, is this not precisely the law of post-apartheid society registered psychically?
Is the injunction to recognise the past as an injustice not taken up here as a parodic negation of
the apartheid past? Do these things – reflexivity, self-punishment, negation of the past – not
amount to an acceptance of being marooned in a new symbolic order? Furthermore, and in quite
a different sense, several critics have, as noted earlier in this chapter, celebrated melancholia as a
politically ethical attitude (cf. Forter, 2007 for a critique of this celebration). Is it not possible to
frame Afrikaner self-parody in a similar way?

First, let us consider the celebration of melancholia as an ethical position. We do well to
note, in this regard, the differences between the loss of apartheid and the melancholia it has
cultivated, and the various other kinds of political loss with which these celebrations have been
concerned. In these various deployments of melancholia, many have drawn on Butler’s
outstanding work on melancholia and a brief discussion of her writing will lead us through the
process of sketching out these differences. Indeed, Butler’s writing on melancholia is directly
related to parody, and so we won’t stray too far from the themes of this chapter.

It was Butler’s (1990) influential analysis of drag – of its imitative exaggeration of gender
roles and of the political, social and psychic function of hyperbolic gender – that put parody on
the critical theory map. Butler (2004, 1997, 1990) highlighted the way gender parodies reveal the
need for gender to be constantly reaffirmed, performatively re-enacted. As Butler (2004) puts it,
“the ostensible copy is not explained through reference to an origin, but the origin is understood
to be as performative as the copy” (p. 209, emphasis added). In passing as a women, for instance,
in intentionally unsuccessful performances of femininity, drag shows that we are always, in some
way, passing, assuming a gender position – a norm, an ideal, a fantasy – that we can only ever
approximate (cf. Ahmed, 2000, pp. 126-133 for a discussion of racial passing). Gender parodies,
in other words, de-grade what are otherwise taken to be ‘natural’ categories.

Of central importance in this conceptualisation, at least insofar as melancholia is
concerned, is Butler’s (1997) argument that the assumption of heterosexuality entails a
foreclosure of same sex desire, constituting homosexuality as both an unlivable life and an
ungrievable loss. In the case of a young boy, his love for his father is melancholically transformed into an identification with him, and this identification is what becomes of a lost love that never was, that is disavowed (Butler, 1997). Thus, in taking on a gendered identity and assuming a place within a heterosexual matrix, within a heteronormative society, there is, in this melancholic conversion of a love attachment to the father into an identification with him, an always present but never fully experienced loss of homosexual desire, a loss that cannot be mourned or can be mourned only with great difficulty. On this basis, Butler (1997) argues that gender is fundamentally melancholic, figuring a loss of desire prohibited by the norm of heterosexuality. And it is precisely this loss that gender parodies allegorise.

Following Butler, and picking up on – and, it should be said, distorting – Freud’s (1917) comment that melancholia is issued from a “mental constellation of revolt” (p. 248), there has emerged a political impulse to make melancholia an appropriate political stance. In the case of gender melancholia, this would make same sex desire more liveable and homosexual lives more grievable (e.g. Muñoz, 1999; see also Eng & Han, 2003; Cheng, 2000 for a discussion of racial and ethnic melancholia brought about by national assimilation). In the case of post-apartheid melancholia, however, which here entails the loss of those aspects of Afrikanerdom too entangled with apartheid, such a project of retrieval, of militant resistance to the death of apartheid, is clearly misplaced. While both homosexuality and apartheid exist as forms of forbidden desire, desire proscribed by social norms – by heteronormativity in the case of the former, by post-apartheid nationalism, amongst other disciplinary forces, in the case of the latter – unlike same-sex desire, apartheid is not a libidinal organisation that should be restored or made more liveable. Melancholia, then, cannot be taken as an end in itself, much less as ethical relation to the South African past.

Second, regarding whether self-parody, as a kind of melancholia, recognises the past as an injustice, it is crucial to reiterate here the unconsciousness of melancholic loss – and this may also be an implicit questioning of whether or not melancholia ought to ever be a sociopolitical or cultural end in itself. It has been said above that melancholia entails a psycho-neurotic relation to the reality of a loss, a refusal of a loss that presents itself in a conflicted relation between the ego and the super-ego. But Freud (1917) argued, too, that in melancholia there is a blockage between two systems (Ucs. and Cs), an inability to transform an unconscious thing representation into a word representation (see also Leader, 2003). Much depends on this unconsciousness of
melancholia, upon which Freud was insistent. Is the loss really unconscious here? It would seem that the only way for the end of apartheid to be denied would be an outright psychotic refusal, and a phantasmatic reconstruction of this fallen order. That is, in a post-apartheid context, it is undeniable that official apartheid is over, even if its legacy haunts us. How, then, can this be proposed as an unconscious loss? And does Afrikaner self-parody not register the reality of this loss precisely in its relegation of the apartheid past to the status of a joke, of something that cannot ever be seriously repeated? And does this not, in some sense, lay the past to rest, to paraphrase Darian Leader (2003), by gathering up representations of the past into a set, separating these off as no longer part of the ‘real world’?

At least with regards to the performances under consideration here, the unconsciousness of melancholic loss may be the product of disavowal – a simultaneous acknowledgement and denial, the holding of two incompatible views at once – a defence generally associated with psychosis rather than the repression of neurosis, but also not quite the complete psychotic turning away from reality. This would be a relation to a loss structured by an “I know well, but all the same…” as the title of Octave Mannoni’s (1969) famous essay on disavowal put it. Indeed, we can think of self-parody as being produced out of a disavowed loss of the apartheid past, and out of a disavowed loss of an authoritative position within the nation. The under-remembered but frequently recalled relationship between Afrikaner men and their moustaches bears this point out. Although seemingly trivial, we should take the moustache and its emblematic place amongst the assemblage of recycled and ridiculed apartheid-era artefacts in Afrikaner self-parody seriously as it is clearly a signifier that has become hyper-cathected, and one through which a melancholic dynamic plays out.

During the apartheid years, the moustache occupied pride of place, part of the banal uniform of nationalist pride and masculine status, and the *snor* (moustache), in South Africa anyway, has come to be forever associated with Afrikaner patriarchal, but also racial, authority. We might say that the moustache in a post-apartheid context works as a “single trait” identified with (Freud, 1921, p. 49), with which the trauma of the loss of a historical

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255 This history of self-styling and Afrikaner masculine authority began to fold back on itself, perhaps for the first time publicly with Vöëlvry musician, James Phillips’ (1984) song, ‘Snor City,’ a searing satire of the prevalence of the moustache in the apartheid capital city, Pretoria – Phillips performing as his alter-ego, Bernoldus Niemand, on his album *Wie Is Bernoldus Niemand*?

256 In *Group Psychology* it is the cough of the mother or father, taken on as a ‘single trait’ by the child, which allows them to ‘have’ or ‘be’ the parent, at least “insofar as [their] sufferings are concerned” (Freud, 1921, p. 48).
position of dominance is simultaneously denied (by continuing to grow one) and acknowledged (by wearing it only ironically, as only a joke), a ‘single trait’ substituted for a whole way of having and being from which Afrikaners have been torn under the post-apartheid dispensation, or may yet be torn? The loss, that is to say, can be disavowed through this ‘single trait,’ symptomatically declaring an ambivalence over the loss. In this sense, the sequence of melancholia (identification and self beratement) could be neatly fitted into Mannoni’s (1969) schema, although they would be reversed: identification with the object (‘but all the same I want to keep the object’), the turning against it in self-parody (‘I know very well the object is lost’). This may not account for all instances of Afrikaner parody, but it does go some way in formulating how this can be proposed as an ‘unconscious’ loss.

This can be substantiated by a return to the psychic tension discussed in chapter one, outlined with reference to Krog’s (1998) writing on the TRC. As noted there, to continue to identify as an Afrikaner in post-apartheid South Africa is to be stained by history, to be located in a language of domination, but to vacate an Afrikaner identity amounts to an alienation from the world as it has been known and the loss of a coherent sense of self. The difference between Krog’s narrative and the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-parody is that while both she and the subjects of Afrikaner self-parody identify with the apartheid past – as will be remembered from chapter one, she chose to identify with the perpetrators who came before the commission – there is not the same unconsciousness to the ambivalence over the loss of apartheid as it is figured in self-parody. Krog says of the perpetrators, that is, she says in words, “They are as familiar as my brothers, cousins and school friends. Between us all distance is erased. Was there perhaps never a distance except the one I have built up with great effort within myself over the years” (p. 96). By contrast, in Afrikaner self-parody, this ambivalence is ‘spoken,’ symptomatically, as the two

257 Indeed, another means of formulating the loss of the farm would be to follow Agamben (1993) who has argued – and this is perhaps his most original contribution to the theory of melancholia – that melancholia does not only refer to an already lost object, but that it is anticipatory as well (see also Žižek, 2000; cf. Sanchez-Párdo, 2003). In anticipating the inevitability of loss, in melancholia the object is imagined as always already, at some later point, lost. As Agamben puts it, it is “an imaginary loss that so obsessively occupies the melancholic tendency” (p. 25). This is also a complex issue, entailing the difference between anxiety and depression. Esther Sanchez-Párdo (2003) deals with precisely this issue in her reading of Melanie Klein’s work on melancholia and manic depression, particularly in relation to early psychoanalytic thinking on these states, including Abraham and Ferenzi’s thinking that in certain respects contradicted Freud’s. While I have not followed Agamben’s formulation, it would certainly be worthwhile noting that the farm has not, from a certain perspective, been lost, but may well be lost, and for this reason is melancholically identified with. That there is already a discourse of land redistribution in South Africa, and that many farmers are anxious over the seizure of farms, would certainly support this reading. From another perspective, though, it is a relation to the farm, and who one can be on ‘the farm,’ that has been lost.
aspects of melancholia: love becomes identification with the object, and hate the beratement of it. We might say, on the one hand, that Krog has managed to produce a word representation, while self-parody remains a melancholic thing representation; on the other, it is Krog who manages something that approximates the over-identification Hook (2011) proposes, while Afrikaner self-parody fails to fully grasp precisely how determined it is by the past.258

This is perhaps a good point to turn to Freud’s essay, ‘Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through,’ taking this a step further. Ricoeur’s (2004) insight into the relationship between ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ and ‘Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through’ is useful – and it is a relationship Freud did not himself establish. Ricoeur’s formulation, in this regard, is fairly straightforward: “instead of remembering, acting out; instead of mourning, melancholia” (p. 72), by which he suggests that melancholia is a kind of acting out of a past that is not remembered. In light of Ricoeur’s suggestion, Afrikaner self-parody is not a form of working-through, and can be taken as a repetition of the past; not directly, of course, but in an acting out that entails a substitution and displacement that disguises the apartheid past being recollected without being remembered, the loss of which is unconscious. Here the violence of the past is displaced and acted out as superegoic violence, violence against the lost object lodged in the ego. Rather than being remembered, lost love for the object is represented formally, in an introjection of the object.

The key point here is that nothing is remembered; there are only “cellular memories of winged cars, motor parts on the overgrown grass, artificial flower arrangements and porcelain dogs in the lounge” (Steinmar, 2010, emphasis added). It is a past acted out between two parts of the ego – indeed, melancholic self-beratement can be understood as a peculiar kind of transference relationship, a relation between the ego and the lost object transferred to another relation, one between the ego and itself – and without this remembering that can serve the work of mourning, melancholia and a stubborn repetition of the past are likely, even if in dissimulated

258 Some may want to argue that to reflect in words on their ‘next level’ performance art zef musicians would in some sense weaken what it is that they are ‘saying.’ Yet compare Die Antwoord and Jack Parow’s refusal to be interviewed out of character – and this is particularly true of Die Antwoord – and the “terrorist drag” (Muñoz, 1997, p. 83) of parodist, Vaginal Creme Davis that José Esteban Muñoz analyses in ‘The White to be Angry’ – the parodic tactics of which are openly discussed by Davis, taking nothing away from the subversive effects of her drag performances – and zef comes into view more and more as a kind of acting out. See for, example, Davis performing with the post-punk band Pedro, in a new incarnation, Clarence, a straight white male who has been ‘cured’ of his homosexuality (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQvmPq_naw4). Incidentally, Clarence is Davis’ birth name, though it is intended to create white supremacist associations here (Muñoz, 1997).
forms. To qualify this, what Freud (1914) had in mind with the transference as a ‘transitional space’ where an unremembered past could be first acted out and then worked-through was a neurotic relation to reality, while melancholia entails a psycho-neurotic refusal of reality or, as indicted above, a disavowal of the reality of a loss. The potential for a working-through of the past is impeded by the melancholic’s repetition of the past wherein “the ego debases itself and rages against itself” (Freud, 1917, p. 257, emphasis added). As Freud (1917) put it, “The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathetic energies – which in the transference neuroses we have called ‘anticathexes’ – from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished” (p. 253). It is in this sense that in melancholia the ‘transference’ is with the ego itself; the melancholic love and hates itself, is interested in itself. Whether or not this entirely precludes a ‘working-through’ is certainly open for debate, though it would take place between two parts of the ego. If we are to take Freud’s (1917) pessimistic view of things here, the resolution of this condition lies in it simply exhausting itself, with occasional lapses into mania, rather than a working-through.

Third, let us look at the potential for parody to work as a means of laying the past to rest through the instantiation of a limit, gathering these representations into a set in the sense Leader (2003) has in mind. Indeed, this is precisely what irony can do, and if we look further afield, for instance to the phenomenon of Ostalgie, East German nostalgia for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which frequently, though not always, wraps its objects and artefacts from a lost past in irony, it has been argued that this “is not a real longing for the GDR, but the enactment of a real parting from it, the acquiring of a distance, detraumatization” (Žižek, 2008, p. 64; see also Truscott & Brock, forthcoming). To a degree this is operative in post-apartheid Afrikaner self-parody, but here it is less clear cut. There is, as noted in the introduction, an ironic distance from what is appropriated and repeated in Afrikaner self-parody, and questions about whether or not zef is in fact a parody are the exception rather than the rule, at least in South African audiences. This irony can be understood as a ‘frame or a border,’ in Leader’s (2003) terms, the gathering of these representations into a discrete and differentiated set. But that distance is complicated, if not erased in self-parody as a kind of melancholia because the repository into which lost objects have been put to rest is the ego itself: the past has been lost, and with it loved objects, which have been identified with. It is this that Freud saw as the threat of suicide in melancholia: the only way to be truly rid of the lost object is to kill oneself. What is required, then, is the
impossible task of “killing the dead” (Leader, 2003, p. 26), with whom one has regressively identified, without killing oneself.

In the face of the ungrievable loss of apartheid, Afrikaner self-parody enables the continued occupation of a problematised position of racial, gendered and ethnicised dominance. That this is ironic does not serve the project of laying the lost object to rest; rather, that it is only a joke is simultaneously acknowledged and denied, just as the end of apartheid is disavowed in the sequence of melancholia. Indeed, self-parody represents one way in which this position, lost in post-apartheid South Africa, can be preserved. Whatever grief one has over these losses must be concealed, melancholia being one such disguise. Post-apartheid South Africa is, at least in this respect, comparable to post-Hitler Germany. Although ‘ironic Afrikanerdom’ differs markedly from the symptomatic presentation of the Germans in the Federal Republic during the 1960s and 70s Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich (1975) wrote about in The Inability to Mourn, the overall problem seems similar (see Truscott, 2011a). In making this comparison I am fully aware of the vast differences between the holocaust and apartheid; I am aware, also, of the thin ice on which this comparison skates. The comparison here, however, is between post-Hitler Germany and post-apartheid South Africa, and the way in which neither Nazi Germany, nor apartheid South Africa should be grievable. The deadlock one comes to, though, is that without the discursive resources with which to symbolise the loss of apartheid, so long as apartheid is ungrievable, melancholia and the dissimulated repetition of the violence of past is likely to proliferate.

If Afrikaner self-parody entails neither mourning nor remembering – and if it entails remembering, specifically recognising the past as an injustice, then it is only memory acted out – what, then, might working-through look like?

Particularly useful here is Leader’s (2003) Lacanian rereading of ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ where he argues that mourning, for Lacan, “supposes the subject’s abandoning of a part of himself” (p. 22, emphasis added). From this perspective, it is not so much that, in mourning, the object is relinquished, freeing the subject to make new connections; rather, it is who one was able to be in relation to the lost object that must be relinquished. And therein lies an essential aspect of the conservatism of the melancholic attitude: it is not so much that the

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259 The reaction to Sylvia Plath’s poem, ‘Daddy’ is perhaps the best example of how a comparison between the holocaust and anything else is not possible (see Rose, 2003).
object will not be relinquished, with a new object taken by the same subject, but that the ego refuses to model itself on a new object relation, forcing itself back to the same site of gratification. In melancholia, an object-cathexis no longer available in reality is stubbornly clung to and transformed into an intra-psychic ‘hallucinatory’ form of gratification derived from self-beratement, conjuring the presence of the object-relation. The self-beratement formed on the model of the lost object-cathexis is preferable to the melancholic, as one can still be, in a sense, the person one was. At issue here, then, is the preservation of a coherent sense of self.

This, I want to argue, is preferable to a Freudian model of mourning in post-apartheid South Africa. While the foreclosure of grief over apartheid may produce melancholias of various sorts, the idea of making apartheid a grievable ideal is something that should not be sanctioned; but this is something quite different to whites mourning who they were able to be. Indeed, there is a link here to Vice’s (2010) argument outlined in chapter one of this study, that white South African’s ought to acknowledge that they are not, and could never have been, ethical. Before examining one instance of this sort of process below, it should be noted that, for Leader (2003) and the Lacanian variation on mourning he develops, working-through might be offered, not in mourning, but in expressions of the impossibility of mourning, as that which attests to this impossibility, to a hole in the symbolic that, to twist the words of Nelson Mandela’s (1994) inaugural statement as President, can “never, never and never again” be filled, to see it as ‘allegorizing a loss that cannot be declared’ (Butler, 1997). This retains Freud’s emphasis on word representations over thing representations, and on memory over acting out, but it shifts the emphasis in a working-through of the past.

There is nothing in the festival discourse that contains such working-through; we do, however, find a narrative of mourning in Koos Kombuis’ recent memoir, playfully titled Short Drive to Freedom. As Kombuis was the first musician to play on the farm, and he has had a long and involved relation to the festival, it is appropriate to be concluding with him. Although Kombuis recounts events prior to and following the development of Voëlvry, it is Voëlvry to which his narrative constantly returns. Kombuis takes his cue from the supposed exclusion of Voëlvry from official Afrikaner history, but he is more concerned with why he himself overlooked these events in his autobiography, Seks & Drugs & Boeremusiek, published nearly a

decade earlier. As he puts it, “Of course, I’ve known all along – at least subliminally – that I have been suppressing facts from a certain era. If that part of history is so important, if so many other writers have written about it and researched it, why was it almost completely excluded from my autobiography?” Kombuis frames *Short Drive to Freedom* as being primarily a therapeutic engagement, a book that he *had to write*, a trauma he had to face, his objective being to “take note of this history and to spend some time contemplating it, in order to properly integrate it into the present.” What I want to suggest here is that there is, in Kombuis’ retrieval of certain forgotten elements of the past, a kind of mourning at work, a form of remembering which not only serves to integrate memories of Voëlvry into the present, but expand the set of meanings that have to this point been attached to this movement, a project that considers this set of events in ways which free it from its anti-apartheid protest one-dimensionality. Indeed, this remembering also serves the festival, which has also, by utilising Voëlvry to represent itself as a post-apartheid South Africa event, taken on a one-dimensional oppositionality, at least at a manifest level.

This is perhaps why certain elements of Voëlvry have been excluded: as an emblem of oppositionality, Voëlvry has not necessarily permitted a nuanced engagement with the complexity of South Africa’s transition. If we were to discern the conditions that have constrained the retrieval of these hidden aspects of Voëlvry, we might say that the perceived need for nation building, the call to unite a still fragmented nation, has issued those conditions. While Voëlvry may have assisted many Afrikaners in disassociating from apartheid – much as the festival has served this purpose – in *Short Drive to Freedom* Kombuis confronts the messiness and incompleteness of these processes. There is also, in this sequence lived out by Kombuis, or at least in the autobiographical representation of his life – first the parodic negation of apartheid during Voëlvry, becoming its parodic double, as he was, before he became Koos Kombuis, Andre du Toit, then Andre Letoit, and only later ‘Koos Kombuis,’ the double, then remembering forgotten aspects of the past – something that approximates the resolution of melancholia through mourning.

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263 Ibid
Kombuis concludes his book, in an italicised passage, as follows: “At last the Kombi has come to a standstill. There is a deathly silence except for the tinkling of tiny pieces of glass falling from the shattered place where the windscreen used to be. I look out through the shattered window. Outside the street is upside down. I crawl out through the gap, and the world rights itself.” The allusion the windscreen provides is to his ways of seeing the world being shattered, and the trauma of that shattering. Useful here is a Lacanian perspective on mourning, which entails “the effort to restore a link to the lost object” (Leader, 2003, p. 21). Here, as Leader points out, Lacan deviates from Freud’s (1917) exposition on mourning, where the objective is the relinquishment of the object, a separation from it; as opposed to this, Lacan sees mourning “as an attempt to restore the place of the object, which supposes the subject’s abandoning of a part of himself” (Leader, 2003, p. 22). The object is not relinquished; rather a link with it, as a hole in the symbolic, as an absence, is restored. It is this that constitutes the ‘impossible’ work of mourning (Leader, 2003). There is, in Kombuis’ narrative, we might say in Lacanian terms, a hole in the symbolic, “a shattered place where the windscreen used to be.”

The reader, though, is at first not entirely sure of what it is that has been shattered and, one imagines, neither was Kombuis before embarking on the writing of the book. The therapy of the book then becomes discerning what it is that has been lost. Certainly something. We are assured of this when Kombuis says to his wife, after she has asked what Voëltyr meant to him, “It damaged me. It caused me a lot of harm. It just about ruined me.”

The obvious shattering Kombuis addresses is the ideological distortion of his view of the world, into which apartheid inducted him, a worldview “preordained through Calvinism, sponsored by Sanlam, and protected, with God’s help, by the iron-fisted powers of the Police and the Defence Force.” This, in a sense, is what the Voëltyr tour strove to shatter; it is what Voëltyr, according to Kombuis, did help to shatter, but almost killed him in the process.

At another level, it is his disillusionment with the struggle against apartheid and the ways in which he had responded to its call that are shattered. As he describes this loss of faith in his introductory passage, to which the car crash passage is linked, “I felt my optimism and idealism evaporate. I realized that, while I had always imagined myself as a kind of freedom fighter, a...”

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264 Ibid., p. 254.
265 Ibid., p. 254.
266 Ibid., p. 250.
267 Ibid., p. 35.
Che Guevara, the most important part of my adult life had been spent doing one thing: rolling and lighting up dagga joints.” 268 This is the second kind of loss and shattering he depicts, which become an absence that used to be filled with phallic illusions of being a freedom fighter. Indeed, it is here that a Lacanian notion of mourning as a process of symbolising an absent place of the subject one was able to be under apartheid – for Kombuis, this was a freedom fighter – and Vice’s work unite, compelling white South Africans to recognise the impossibility of being a ‘good post-apartheid South African.’

There is, however, quite another kind of loss Kombuis addresses, one seldom mentioned, particularly by those deeply invested in the political importance of Voëlvry: the loss of apartheid as an ideal or, at least, life lived according to apartheid as an ideal, a form of loss completely incompatible with the anti-apartheid struggle. This loss turns out to be the underside of the first kind, the shattering of apartheid. It is the discovery that one has participated in the death of something hated, of a form of life constraining in the worst kind of way, but also, in part, of that to which, at the same time, one remains, even if unconsciously, attached. What Voëlvry has meant up to this point was that it was an anti-apartheid movement, one that assisted in breaking down apartheid. But very seldom has the democratisation of South Africa, for which Voëlvry supposedly helped fight, been discussed as something analogous to a car accident. The changes instituted – the righting of an “upside down conscience,” to use the words of Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1975, p. 40) in the context of post-Hitler Germany – was for Kombuis a kind of trauma. To restate Kombuis’ words, “Outside the street is upside down. I crawl out through the gap, and the world rights itself.” 269

Kombuis elaborates on this theme when he recalls how, before a gig during the Voëlvry tour, he walked through the streets of Potchefstroom:

During this stroll, I realized to my amazement that Potchefstroom is actually a pretty place. The old buildings and houses seemed to gleam in the slanting rays of the late sun. I felt as if I was witnessing the end of the colonial era. I wondered how long it would be before these churches and majestic buildings would become museum pieces of the past, relics of Nationalism. I could not understand why this made me sad. 270

268 Ibid., p. 13.
269 Ibid., p. 254.
270 Ibid., p. 138.
What he brings across, in this moment – and his therapeutic narrative begins to look here distinctly Freudian in its mourning – is his ambivalence over the death of an era, a death he was, along with others, willing. When he says, describing his walk through Potchefstroom, “I felt a profound sense of irretrievable loss, which I could not explain,” we could say that he can, now, experience the loss it was not possible to experience then. Indeed, one could not explain it, *one was not permitted to explain it*, and the only option was the confusion of a melancholic relation to the past that one must hate, yet also loved. The struggle against apartheid allowed very little ambivalence and it is only the withdrawal of investment into resistance politics, the end of resistance politics, that offers the occasion for the mourning of apartheid and investment in a new future. What Kombuis’ narrative raises, implicitly, is how addressing the recalcitrance of apartheid requires the difficult consideration of the extent to which South Africans, despite protestations to the contrary – in fact, often at moments of vehement protestation, as Freud (1925) reminds us – remain attached to some aspect of apartheid, even if it is merely its familiarity, or the familiar face of an enemy and who that enemy allowed one to be – in Kombuis’ case, a kind of ‘freedom fighter.’

Voëlvry has functioned as an emblem, for certain white South Africans, of being an authentic anti-apartheid, post-apartheid South African – an emblem Oppikoppi has worn on its sleeve, inscribed into its site, staged for all to see. It has opened up one more space for an Afrikaner anti-apartheid position within the South African imaginary. As such, it has provided a location of subject formation for Afrikaners compatible with the post-apartheid nation (Grundlingh, 2004) and it has offered Afrikaners one means, one amongst several, of authenticating themselves as South Africans. But this emblematic post-apartheid afterlife of Voëlvry has not offered a younger generation of Afrikaners a means of mourning the past, much less a vantage point from which the victims of this injustice can be recognised in reparative processes.

Indeed, what has been missing up to this point in the analysis of Afrikaner self-parody and of Kombuis’ memoir, specifically in considering whether or not they enable a form of working-through, and whether or not they offer the possibility of recognising the injustices of the past, is a focus on ‘the other.’ In this regard, Ricoeur’s (2004) reading of Freud is again useful:

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271 Ibid., p. 138.
If the work of melancholia occupies a strategic position in the present essay ['Mourning and Melancholia] parallel to that occupied by the compulsion to repeat in the previous one ['Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through'], this suggests that it is as a work of remembering that the work of mourning proves to be liberating, although at a certain cost, and that this relation is reciprocal. The work of mourning is the cost of the work of remembering, but the work of remembering is the benefit of the work of mourning (p. 72).

The implication that emerges here is that melancholia is treated by Ricoeur as a kind of repetition of a particular type: just as a repetition does not recognise the memory it acts out, the melancholic is not aware of what has been lost. The path out of melancholia, in other words, is paved by recovered memories, the cost of which is mourning. In this counterintuitive sense, remembering apartheid, rather than forgetting it, would be precisely what would enable a working-through (Ricoeur, 2004; see also Forter, 2007, p. 241). But not just any memory: against the excesses of memory and forgetting, Ricoeur argues for “a measured use of remembering (rememoration) – under the heading of a just memory” (p. 68). It is memory faithful to the idea of justice that is able, according to Ricoeur, to reinstate the reality principle for the melancholic. How, then, is the duty of memory, framed as a civic duty, related to the work of mourning? Ricoeur (2004) answers as follows:

Extracting the exemplary value from traumatic memories, it is justice that turns memory into a project; and it is this same project of justice that gives the form of the future and of the imperative to the duty of memory. We can then suggest that the duty of memory considered as the imperative of justice is projected as a third term onto the point of intersection of the work of mourning and the work of memory. In return, the imperative receives from the work of memory and the work of mourning the impetus that integrates it into an economy of drives. (p. 88).

It is to justice that remembering and mourning are accountable, justice necessarily oriented towards an other, and towards a victim, but always the victim who is other than oneself (Ricoeur, 2004) – a set of conditions that make justice a third point towards which remembering and mourning must face. Read against this, Afrikaner self-parody and Kombuis’ trajectory from the parodic double to the mourner of apartheid each continue to fall short, certainly when compared with Krog’s (1998) narrative. To be clear, what has been suggested above is not making
apartheid mournable, at least not in the Freudian sense. And is this not the risk of Kombuis’ memoir? He treads most ethically, I want to suggest, where he acknowledges his failure to have been ethical, having spent the liberation struggle ‘doing one thing: rolling and lighting up dagga joints.’ It is this gesture that not only marks an absent place of the heroic white subject, but also offers the greatest possibility for recognising the victims of the past, the victim who is other than oneself.

**Conclusion**

The effects of Afrikaner self-parody, as a performative technique that authenticates post-apartheid national status are ambiguous. It is not entirely a form of adaptation to the conditions of the post-apartheid nation, a submission to these conditions; nor is it completely a form of resistance to the injunctions of the new nation. It is both of these simultaneously, an ambivalent form of adaptation and defiance, a spectacular technique that, at once, psychically preserves, denigrates and transforms a problematised past in its ironic repetition as parody. Afrikaner self-parody, as a pattern of melancholic subjectivity, both transgresses – through identification with problematised features of Afrikanerdom – and fulfils – by parodically drawing attention to these problematised features – the injunctions of the post-apartheid nation. It figures, in other words, a form of post-apartheid melancholia, a form of melancholia cultivated in Afrikaner subjects by the post-apartheid nation. Neither the complete and compliant surrender of a forbidden object nor the total rebellion of its preservation, it is the inhabitable, ambivalent symptom of a loss – a symptom not without its secondary gains – that cannot be declared, yet is spoken, formally, in a conversion of a problematised position of historical dominance into the currency of an anti-apartheid post-apartheid disposition. It figures, in other words, a submission to the conditions of the post-apartheid nation, which at the same time is a form of resistance to the mourning of apartheid and the loss of a fallen order.

In the association of melancholia with sadness there seems something quite saddening about only being able to feel a part of a national community by making fun of oneself; indeed, admittance is gained here through, to revisit Seshadri-Crooks’ (1997) writing on colonial whiteness, ‘one long struggle to be laughed at,’ which is at the same time the assumption of the position of the ‘internal enemy of whiteness,’ the ‘racial degenerate.’ But whiteness is not undone here; far from it. Despite its creativity, social change is stuck in the flourishing – we
might even say, in a seemingly paradoxical way, *happy* and *inflated* – melancholia of Afrikaner self-parody. And while it shows a strangely ethical relation to the history of South Africa, even if this relation is acted out rather than given words, and while there is an impressive artfulness to its conjuring of the spectre of apartheid and the ‘work of parody’ that goes into its denigration – certainly it is far more interesting than much of white English-speaking South African popular culture and the lack of inventiveness in its repetitions – it is also stuck in the past that it cannot but repeat, and that it is not permitted to mourn.
CONCLUSION
The archaeological remains of apartheid

The conditions and fantasies of South Africanness
The problem taken up in this study, post-apartheid admittance and white South Africanness, specifically Afrikaner South Africanness, can be situated at a split in the field of post-apartheid knowledge, knowledge production and its power relations. Just as Foucault (1981) drew attention to the arbitrary divisions imposed from without the discursive field between ‘madness’ and ‘reason,’ between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity,’ and ‘the forbidden’ and ‘the permissible,’ there is a division in post-apartheid South African national and racial politics into ‘the South African’ and ‘the un-South African.’ This study has been particularly concerned with what has constituted post-apartheid ‘South Africanness.’ Oppikoppi music festival has been taken as both an object of knowledge, as well as a cultural institution that participates in the production of ‘the South African’ and ‘the un-South African.’ The first general questions posed were: according to what discursive rules can such a distinction be made and deployed? And what have been the conditions of the festival’s ‘expression’ of the ‘essence’ of the nation, ‘South Africanness’?

The nationalism under which South Africans currently live is, due to no small contribution from the TRC, as discussed in chapter two, an anti-apartheid nationalism. Thus, the ‘truly South African’ is, put simply, whatever is contra-apartheid. A shift in what since the end of official apartheid has constituted ‘the South African’ has been more of an inversion than a true and radical re-ordering of the field of knowledge. If what Dubow (2006) has called ‘South Africanism’ was synonymous with the bringing of ‘civilisation’ to Africa, ‘post-apartheid South Africanness’ is precisely not this, the opposite of this. One hardly needs to point out the failure of imagination in the constitution of the post-apartheid nation: the life of ‘the good South African’ must be lived perpetually against the past, bound for ones ‘political sanity’ to negations of the past. Perhaps a disclaimer is necessary: this may not be true for all South Africans – certainly many white South Africans, particularly those who have been able to bury their heads in the sand for the past 17 years, still see themselves as the ‘bearers of civilisation,’ as the only ones who can do things properly – but these conditions for becoming ‘South African’ have informed the discursive ‘rules of the game’ according to which Oppikoppi music festival has
been able to constitute itself as a ‘truly South African’ event. Accordingly, the festival’s assemblage of itself has required, as its constitutive outside, ‘the un-South African,’ the ‘madness’ of the apartheid past and its legacy in the present. Indeed, it has been Oppikoppi’s capacity to provide a mirror image of apartheid and colonial South Africanism that has helped constitute its post-apartheid ‘South Africanness.’

In the face of the enigma of what being contra-apartheid has meant for white South Africans, the fantasies that have oriented the festival towards post-apartheid sociality, that have stabilised its discursive production of ‘South Africanness,’ have been primarily negative fantasies, fantasies of the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation,’ fantasies of ‘un-South Africanness,’ fantasies given substance, flesh and bones, by the communities immediately surrounding the festival site, but fantasies, also, that have haunted the festival as that to which its crowd could ‘regress,’ or from which it may not fully have ‘civilised’ itself.

In chapter four, with recourse to Foucault’s (1986) concept of heterotopic space, ‘wildness,’ that is, being the very ‘degenerate’ that was a problem to the colonial and apartheid states – their ‘internal other,’ as Stoler (1995) put it in her Foucauldian reading of the colonial situation – emerged as a condition of admittance to the post-apartheid nation; as did, predictably, being rebellious against the apartheid past. But these two conditions – each performatively fulfilled through drunkenness, and through an identification with the ‘wildness’ of the Voëlvry movement, as well as its opposition to the apartheid state – emerged as two condensed conditions of post-apartheid ‘South Africanness.’ That is to say, drunkenness fulfils both conditions, ‘wildness’ and ‘oppositionality,’ which are equated with each other.

The ‘wildness’ of the festival and its ‘oppositionality’ – each in their own way instrumental in the festival declaring itself a national monument – were inscribed into the discursive construction of the site of the festival, through the ways in which the festival site has been differentiated, spatially and temporally, from its surrounding areas. Indeed, ‘wildness’ and ‘oppositionality’ have been enabled as enunciative modalities by two contradictory constructions of the platteland, condensed into one. As noted in the introductory chapter and in chapter one, identifying as an Afrikaner and, concomitantly, as a South African, has produced a conflict. Here we find one such tension produced as an effect of the disjuncture between these two constructions of the land, making the platteland the ‘broken kettle of the festival,’ to put it in Freud’s (1900) terms: what the festival is both against and what it is for, simultaneously; the
*platteland* is what makes the ‘truly South African’ ‘degeneracy’ of the festival possible, and what enables the festival to differentiate itself from the old country, from the *platteland*, which stands in for the past against which the post-apartheid nation has constituted itself. The psychic effect of these two condensed constructions is a self-negating, self-destructive Afrikaner subject of the post-apartheid nation; that is to say, this is one means of admittance: self-destruction. The limitations of this as a mode of admittance – admittance as letting enter, as recognition, as confession (Chow, 1999) – are fairly obvious: firstly, it is exclusionary along lines of gender, race and class; secondly, and in a related sense, self-destruction not only does not recognise ‘other South Africans,’ it is not a gesture in which the commonalities of ‘South Africaness’ can be recognised; and thirdly, the ‘primal scene of colonial violence’ – with the mapping of the land as one kind of violence – is altogether disavowed in the way the festival takes place.

This conflict is not without its secondary gains, then. What we see here is a neurotic attitude to the conditions of post-apartheid admittance. On the one hand, there is an obedient submission to post-apartheid condition of opposition to apartheid; while on the other, in the slippage between the *platteland* as what the festival is against and what the festival is for, and thus between ‘oppositionality’ and ‘wildness,’ there is figured a neurotic strategy of ‘stealing back,’ in Žižek’s (1997) terms, the sort of enjoyment that post-apartheid admittance forbids: the sort of racialised homosociality that took place – in this instance the place taken is a farm – during apartheid.

Employing Bennett’s (1988) notion of the exhibitionary complex, together with a psychoanalytic conception of fantasy in chapter five, the ‘education of desire’ at the festival was brought into critical view. Here ‘desire for difference’ emerged as a condition of post-apartheid belonging, a desire whose place is prepared in recitations of the founding texts of the post-apartheid nation. In a reversal of cause and effect, this kind of desire stands as a mark of ‘affective authenticity,’ and a mark of the festival’s ‘South Africanness.’

But in this re-education, prohibited desire haunts the declarations of the festival as a ‘truly South African’ event. Indeed, this love of musical difference – difference constituted by its distance from whiteness, and from rock music associated with whiteness – was formulated as a redeployment of heterosexual love for sexual difference, precisely the form of love that underwrote apartheid in that it reproduced racial sameness (Gunkel, 2010). The desire for difference into which the festival inducts festivalgoers was proposed as a means for re-finding
the lost objects of forbidden desire, and the festival, in its ‘multicultural’ moments, was proposed as a heteronormative and homosocial affair. The term affair here connotes the neurotic structure of the fantasy according to which this discourse is elaborated. If displacement, as I outlined in chapter one with reference to Freud’s writing on dreams, jokes and festivals, replaces one object for another, one which stands for the memory of an unacceptable wish or its gratification, and this substituted object is treated as the original, chapter five charts an instance of post-apartheid displacement, whereby multicultural desire for difference is substituted for heterosexual desire for difference.

While this aspect of the festival, its multiculturalism, has been loudly celebrated as a post-apartheid triumph – to put this in psychoanalytic parlance, as a sublimation, as the binding of sexual libido into a socially valuable enterprise – the vulgar trace of apartheid sexuality is the latent ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 1981) of this multicultural image of the festival. In Nuttall’s terms, the circuit of gazes – here not only ‘whites’ watching ‘blacks’ watching ‘whites,’ as she observes with reference to Krog, but also ‘whites’ watching ‘blacks’ watching ‘whites’ desire ‘musical difference’ – has an excess that can barely be contained. And yet it is contained – this needs to be emphasised – it is contained, and whatever the limitations, this is perhaps Oppikoppi’s most successful strategy of becoming a ‘truly post-apartheid South African’ festival, enabling some of the most memorable and commemorated moments in the festival’s history. Indeed, the late-1990s, during which this staging of musical difference was most prominent, was the festival’s ‘golden period,’ and what it did during this time is still held up as a part of its claim to its ‘South Africanness.’

In chapter six, Afrikaner self-parody, a discursive regularity of the festival, but also of certain strands post-apartheid Afrikaner youth culture more generally, was likened to melancholic self-beratement. Here the aetiology of Afrikaner self-parody as a kind of melancholia was sought in the ungrievable loss of apartheid. The sequence to this form of admittance is, then: loss → melancholic identification with the lost object → beratement of the object embedded in and inseparable from the ego. And it is a sequence that has several secondary effects.

Firstly, self-parody offers a way of being precisely what is socially problematised – melancholia is a kind of regressive identification, being the object instead of having it. Secondly, a regularity of Afrikaner self-parody is the way constant attention is drawn to what is most
worthless in Afrikanerdom – worthless in the sense of this phenomenon taking on a ‘white trash’ aesthetic, but also in the sense that what is most wretched in Afrikanerdom is elevated and amplified. This can be thought of as a psycho-neurotic refusal of the loss of apartheid, as this self-beratement works as an unconscious address to the lost object, offering a kind of ‘hallucinatory gratification,’ conjuring its presence as the worst aspect of the ego itself. This kind of self-beratement returns us to the issue of shame raised in chapter one via Vice (2010) and Krog’s (1998) work. While Vice has lamented the absence of shame in post-apartheid whiteness, here we see just such an ‘absence’ of shame. A symptomatic reading, however, suggests that shame may in fact be present, but in displaced and dissimulated forms. Indeed, the self-beratement of zef, framed as an address to objects lost through their association with the apartheid past, brings shame upon the ‘other of the post-apartheid nation,’ precisely those entangled with this past. Thirdly, and building on the second point, this shaming of the other stained by the past is not only a self-mutilating address to the other, a prolongation of a forbidden set of relations, it also trades on the forbidden past and there is, through its denigration of the introjected lost object, a recuperation of the narcissistic losses to Afrikanerdom and whiteness occasioned by the transition to the post-apartheid nation. In Afrikaner self-parody, a problematic past, in other words, is converted into anti-apartheid post-apartheid currency. The ethics of this conversion are limited by the fact that it is an unconscious process: the past is not remembered here, let alone remembered justly, the lost object is not mourned, and it is the symptom of melancholic self-parody that confesses and that recognises the injustices of the past. There is, in other words, only a half confession, a symptomatic confession or admittance.

In the final section of chapter six, the possibility of mourning the loss of apartheid was considered through a reading Koos Kombuis’ recent memoir, Short Drive to Freedom. If melancholia was depicted as an always ethically problematic relation to the apartheid past, this ‘diagnosis’ was widened to include the national situation out of which this ‘psychic condition’ has been produced. The post-apartheid nation, in other words, has cultivated a melancholic relation to the past. In such a situation, the risk of Kombuis’ narrative, where he remembers the apartheid past fondly, as something he is sad to lose, is a certain ‘political madness.’ While it should be noted that his narrative may not be sufficiently oriented towards a notion of justice – towards an other who is the victim of the past, in Ricoeur’s (2004) terms – it does contain the seeds of a process of moving on, of letting go, of mourning.
As a limit placed on the quite strong assertions made in this chapter that self-parody is a kind of post-apartheid melancholia and that melancholia has been cultivated by anti-apartheid nationalism – and this is a culmination of chapters four and five – it needs to be noted that Afrikaner self-parody is not an exact approximation of clinical melancholia. It also needs to be conceded that the attempt to grapple with the enigma of this condition, melancholia, has a long history that stretches far beyond Freud’s (1917) celebrated essay on the topic. Freud’s intervention into this body of literature should not be seen as a solution to the mysteries of melancholia, a correction of previous theories, or as containing something more recent theories miss. In light of the genealogies of melancholia that have been written – showing its points of emergence and production, its merging with other fields of enquiry, its gathering density, its shifts in direction – it cannot be taken as a universal psychic process, much less one that psychoanalysis has solved or is able to solve if applied right. The risk of framing melancholia as a universalised process is guarded against by positing it, instead, as a mode of relating to the past. In this way, we can say that, since psychoanalysis joined melancholia to loss, melancholia acts as a ‘discourse’ that internalises the subject, produces the interiority of psychic life. And in this hollow, melancholia places the objects that are, at once, unobtainable and cannot be mourned, providing a ‘discursive resource’ where there are no discursive resources for mourning a loss. Where social admittance – indeed, salvation – demands certain renunciations, melancholia has been offered as an ‘enunciative modality’ in which forbidden desire for a lost object might locate itself, a trope with which subjects find a form of response to the loss of an object that a given society deems undeclarable.272

But melancholia also provides a form of speech with which undeclarable losses can be understood and apprehended – indeed ‘diagnosed’ – forming two discourses: one of the

272 As much has already been suggested by Esther Sanchez-Párdro (2003) in her Kleinian theorisation of melancholia, where she refers to a “melancholic apparatus” (p. 395). For Sanchez-Párdro it is the Oedipus complex that constitutes the melancholic apparatus par excellence. While I did not follow her Kleinian rendering of a melancholic apparatus, in the Althusserian sense in which she intends this term – though this does bring into relief an interpellative function of melancholia – her approach was influential in framing melancholia as a discourse constitutive of subjectivity. Influential also was been Jonathan Flatley’s (2008) engagement with melancholia as a discourse that provides what he calls an “affective map” to subjects. Flatley thus frames melancholia less as a feeling than a way of feeling, a structure of feeling, in the sense Raymond Williams used the term – in several instances Sanchez-Párdro (2003) also treats melancholia as structure of feeling. As Flatley avers, reflecting on Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholia, “The word Burton uses here, melancholize, long since out of use, suggests that melancholy might not just be a mood state into which one falls, or which descends on one like bad weather. Instead, melancholizing is something one does: longing for lost loves, brooding over absent objects and changed environments, reflecting on unmet desires, and lingering on events from the past. It is a practice that might, in fact, produce its own kind of knowledge” (p. 2).
melancholic, the other on melancholia. Produced as corresponding objects of knowledge are, on the one hand, *unmournable losses* and, on the other, the *subjects of these losses*; an aesthetic form, a way of being, on the one hand, and a philosophical, scientific discourse, on the other. In Agamben’s (2003) terms, a “model of signifying” (p. xviii) and a “model of knowledge” (p. xvii). In this sense, chapter six can be read as a dialogue between Afrikaner self-parody as a ‘model of signifying,’ and Freud’s concept of melancholia as a ‘model of knowledge.’

Concerning the problem of shame and guilt that is not yet and no longer shame or guilt, and how it can and should be thought through, Agamben’s (2009) philosophical archaeology – which draws on both Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and Freud’s archaeology of unconscious wishes and unresolved grief – suggests, when put into dialogue with the discourses of the festival analysed here, one way that this shame and guilt for the violence of the apartheid and colonial pasts might be understood. We might say, along the lines of Agamben’s thinking, that shame and guilt for the past have an “excessive proximity” and a “traumatic character,” despite that they are a part of “non-lived experience” (p. 100). But however unexperienced they are, colonialism and apartheid comes to structure the psychic life of post-apartheid whiteness. There is, in the different discourses of the festival, or in the different elements of the festival discourse, an archaeological remainder of the colonial and apartheid pasts, particularly the apartheid past, whether as knowledge appropriated and inverted, as in chapter four, as the significatory excess of the repudiated past or as the trace of apartheid sexuality in new desexualised objects of desire, as in chapter five, or as a set of forbidden relations psychically prolonged in the spectacle of self-parody, as in chapter six. Apartheid is there; it inheres all that is said, done and desired, the ‘primal scene’ at the origin of these neurotic and psychoneurotic disorders of ‘white South Africanness;’ unexperienced, overdetermined, and yet traumatically near.

The arguments presented here require a final methodological reflection. And in this regard it assists to point to a few of the deadlocks of whiteness studies in South Africa, and possibly whiteness studies more generally. No doubt whiteness studies aided the analysis here, presented useful lines of critique; but as the study wore on, I grew increasingly wary of what it can do. What is most notable about analyses of post-apartheid South African whiteness is its damning tone, its impatience with the talk of white South Africans that either will not change, or changes only in ways that conserve the benefits of colonial and apartheid forms of white subjectivity.
What it cannot escape, though, is that this form of judgment is a position that is not without its own strategic gains, producing narcissistically inflated and politically buoyant white subjectivities, which are precisely what the critique is aimed at. There is, of course, an urgent need to criticise whiteness, to draw attention to its covert preservation of racialised privilege; but it is a problematisation of the strategies of whiteness that succumbs to the very same pitfalls criticised, propping up one’s political credibility against a more conservative version of whiteness. The issue this raises is that there is an excess of white privilege that will not be metabolised, a form of racialised privilege that does not fully dissolve under critique; indeed, it is frequently reproduced in, and by, critique.

This is not only about the narcissism of whiteness, though. If apartheid thinking was, on the one hand, obsession (obsessed, that is, with racial purity, specifically the purity of the white race), as Coetzee (1991) argued in ‘The Mind of Apartheid,’ does this form of thought not find a new home, an afterlife, in the diagnosis of apartheid and its legacy as madness? Does the diagnosis of the archaeological remainder of apartheid produce not only forms of racialised expertise and privilege, positions beyond criticism, positions no longer in need of further unsettling because we already know just who the political lunatics are, but also reproduce a kind of obsession thought? Which is also to ask, in diagnosing the madness of the past as it lives on into the present, does one not become obsessive in the pursuit of cleanliness and decontamination from the past? Do we not remain within an ‘apartheid metaphors of

273 As Steyn (2005) noted in a paper, citing an ‘insane’ white South African: “‘Africa will fall further and further behind. The gap between the have and have-nots globally is just widening all the time. Then this idiot of a president talks about an African Renaissance. We should be differentiating ourselves from the rest of this basket case of Africa. See when Nelson Mandela dies how the Rand will plummet.’ The person next to me on the airplane continues to suffocate me’ (p. 131, emphasis added). And a little further on: “‘There is no future for a white man in this country, I am further edified during the flight’” (p. 131, emphasis added). Certainly it is highly problematic to say, as this person sitting next to Steyn on the plane did, that whites “are now in the ‘the same’ position now as black people were in the past under apartheid” (p. 131). But we also need to ask where the diagnostician is positioned in the presentation of this as problematic. We need to ask what this criticism does when it remains within a metaphors of contamination – because no doubt she was not ‘suffocated’ or ‘edified,’ but, at least in the re-presentation of the event, rendered ‘politically sane.’ Steyn is certainly not alone in this regard and I single her out only because she has published on whiteness so prolifically. It would also be unnecessary to emphasise that I have found Steyn’s work useful.

274 Indeed, this may not only apply to psychoanalytic readings of racism, but to other kinds too, including analyses of discourse through a Foucauldian frame. As Foucault (1981) put it, “the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role it is to avert its powers and dangers, to cope with its chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality” (p. 52, emphasis added). If it is the analysts objective to discern how discourse constrains or closes down the messiness of a ‘ponderous, awesome materiality,’ then an all-knowing set of conclusions cannot but do the same thing in new ways. Although Foucault would likely have been hesitant to label it as such, we could say that there would be
purification’ (Coetzee, 1991), that is, of keeping the white social body clean, of wiping from it the ‘excremental’ trace? Does one not become morbidly horrified and at the same time fascinated at the undifferentiation of the past and the present, anxiously trying to separate, to excercise, to cleanse, to reconstruct boundaries, driven by what Sándor Ferenczi (1925) called “sphincter morality” (p. 267)? More disturbingly yet, in looking for the remains of a mad political system, might we not be satisfying some desire for precisely what we denounce as madness? Which is to ask, does denunciation and satisfaction somehow coincide here, as it coincided for Geoffrey Cronjé? And does the ‘black other’ not remain a “function of the white subject” (Dyer, 1997, p. 13), unrecognised other than as a prop in the theatrics of political sanity and national identity?

I do not have answers; these are, for me, quite unsettling questions and may constitute a whole study in their own right, perhaps the next one. Although that – another study – will not settle the matter. Indeed, settling this is never fully possible, and nor should it be. To paraphrase Hook (2010), the paradoxes of the critique of whiteness should not be resolved; rather the deadlocks of the whole enterprise should be rendered explicit, the narcissism of critique – here a different kind of ‘phantasmatic reward’ Coetzee (1991) was concerned with, and perhaps also a new kind of ‘wage of whiteness’ Roedigger (1991) wrote of – deflated.

As a final concluding point, it should be said that it may very well be the case that the thing I have been looking for – the archaeological remains of apartheid, whether as a form knowledge or as a lost object – may also reside, displaced, in the very practice of looking for it. If this sounds like rather a paranoid note on which to draw the curtain, then it should only reinforce the point that I hope to have made here: that in the constitution of the political sanity of the white subject of the post-apartheid nation there resides a kernel of apartheid madness anxiously – and in many instances furiously – disavowed.

something a little ‘obsessional’ in this kind of cleaning up the messiness of what Said (1978) called a “brute reality” (p. 5).
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2 September 2011

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