EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF MARONDERA MUNICIPALITY IN MASHONALAND EAST OF ZIMBABWE

BY

MAXWELL SEAGENT SABILIKA
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SUPERVISOR: PROF. E.O.C. IJEOMA

OCTOBER 2012
DECLARATION

I, Maxwell Seagent Sabilika, hereby declare that this Research paper submitted to the University of Fort Hare for the Masters Degree in Public Administration has never been previously submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university, that this is my own work in design and execution and that all material contained therein has been duly acknowledged.

Signed………………………………… Date 26/10/2012
DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, the late Mrs. Faustin Karuwo, whose courage, determination and support remains my source of inspiration forever.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to the following people for their outstanding support, contribution, guidance and encouragement:

- The Lord Almighty for granting me the will, perseverance and strength to complete this study;

- Prof EOC Ijeoma, my supervisor, for his continual support, guidance and assistance throughout the study;

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- My family, particularly my wife Patience and my only daughter Melody, for the love, strength, motivation and support; and

- The participants, for their respect and support, as well as their determination and willingness to participate in this study.
Anti-corruption measures are put forward as a panacea to effective procurement system, among other things, which ultimately improve service delivery. Corruption has demonstrated remarkable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-economic systems with the conception of a corruption-free economy in reality, is hardly possible. Given this background, this study sought to evaluate the efficacy of the already implemented anti-corruption measures in the procurement processes of Marondera Municipality. To understand their effectiveness, relevant literature was reviewed. Different scholars point against the ineffectiveness of these measures, with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from previous research showing devastating results in Zimbabwean local institutions. A further discussion of corruption conception, different anti-corruption measures and legal frameworks gave a greater understanding of the area under study.

In this study, a sample of 80 respondents was identified and data collected from them using both snow ball and purposive sampling methods. Thirty-five of them were female respondents and forty-five were male respondents from Marondera Municipal community, with different demographical characteristics which was used for comparison of responses. Questionnaires and interviews were used as research instruments. Both the Quantitative and the Qualitative research methods were used in the analysis of the data, to increase validity and reliability of the findings.

After data analysis and presentation, the researcher came up with conclusions and out of those conclusions some recommendations were made. A thematic analysis was employed and the study revealed that corruption is not decreasing even in the face of anti-corruption measures. Causes, manifestations and challenges in the fight against corruption in Marondera Municipality were also identified in the findings. Thus the study recommended a combination of automated and traditional measures, transparency and accountability, a proactive approach versus a reactive one, improve personnel policies, professionalising procurement versus politicising it and using the centralised hotline system. It would be advisable that the Zimbabwean government and especially Marondera municipality take cognizance of the results and concerns in an effort to ensure corruption is reduced to reasonable levels.
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<td>ACA</td>
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<td>AG</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GCPI</td>
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<td>OGE</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1. INTRODUCTION
Public administration is a discipline which is compounded by ethical standards of behaviours that promote efficient service delivery. Ethical standards act as yardsticks against which unethical behaviour is identified. They are the backbone on which, strategic measures to reduce unethical behaviours are improvised. Anti-corruption measures reduce all forms of corruption. Corruption is seen as unethical behaviours which demand measures to reduce such acts especially in procurement system of any public institution. Hence, anti-corruption measures are put in place to promoted ethical, efficient and effective provision of goods and services in the field of public administration.

The study seeks to reflect an introduction and background to anti-corruption measures, in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe. To evaluate the efficacy of already introduced anti-corruption measures. But this chapter addresses the background of the study, research problem, significance of the study, objectives of the study and delimitation of the study.

1.2. BACKGROUND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH
Public administration is a distinctive field of activity which consists of functions undertaken by officials in public institutions to provide communities with public services and goods (Cloete, 1985:1). In terms of its focus, the traditional approach posits that the body of knowledge on Public administration also comprises of public institutions and their functions. Local Authorities are the most critical institutions that play a leading role in terms of providing, facilitating, coordinating and monitoring service delivery in their area of jurisdiction. They ensure that service standards are met through different measures and mechanisms. One criterion that judges the effectiveness of local government institution is the level of corruption, which falls under public ethics in the domain of public administration (Moyana, 1996:16). Anti-corruption strategic measures
are put in place to promote effective service in the procurement system, among others. Procurement entails the action or process of acquiring or obtaining materials, goods or services at the operational level through purchasing, contracting, and negotiating directly with the source of supply. This therefore exposes procurement processes to corrupt activities.

Corruption is among the multitudes of problems that contemporary Zimbabwean Local Authorities (ZLA) are faced with and combating it has drawn international attention to the extent that some international donors have demanded effective anti-corruption measures as one of the criterion against which financial assistance must be offered to need communities. This is compounded by the fact that billons of financial resources are circumvented by greedy officials at the expense of the public and many cases of bribery, fraud, favoritism, embezzlement, extortion, conflict of interest and abuse of discretion are being exposed through national and international research and the media. Further to this, Klitgaard (1991:201) concluded from his study of corruption, which was guided by the central question of how to control it, that a lot more research is needed of anti-corruption measures in different localities. Zimbabwe, in this study is identified as such locality. The main drivers that will fuel this research are the ever worsening trend of corruption that are constantly being revealed by socio-economic indicators in developing countries, increasing cognizance of the deleterious effects of corruption and rigorous research that have measured the impact of corruption and left the gap for anti-corruption movements unfilled, with just indication of possible anti-corruption measures.

In compliance with the international conventions and anti-corruption bodies, Berner & Phillips (2005: 116) states that the Zimbabwean government has implemented a mixture of preventative, crimination and assets recovery measures. Prevention measures include policies aimed at preventing corruption. Berner & Phillips (2005: 118) goes further to state that the Zimbabwean government has introduced criminal and other offences to cover a wide range of acts of corruption. This addressed not only the basic forms of corruption, such as bribery and embezzlement of public funds, but also acts carried out in support of corruption. Finally, the Zimbabwean government introduced the
return of assets as an anti-corruption measure also known as assets confistication. Other anti-corruption measures introduced with particular reference to the Zimbabwean municipalities are the Anti-corruption Commission (ACCZ) units, in 2005 under the Constitution of Zimbabwe (amendment 108A), the Attorney-General’s office and audit units at local level, the state and municipal procurement bodies, and the code of conduct initiated by the Zimbabwean Public Service Commission. Hence the Zimbabwean government has implemented four categories of anti-corruption reforms, namely; accountability or transparency enhancement measures, democratic enhancement measures, market or economic measures and lastly bureaucratic or administrative measures. Thus, it is therefore, against this background that an evaluation of their effectiveness is imperative.

Fundamental to the Zimbabwean Local government system is the established legislative framework on which corruption is discouraged in its procurement activities. Mostly considered, in terms of fighting against corruption is the Procurement Act, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Urban and Rural District Council Act. Despite the existence of such measures that discourages corruption, public entities are reported as not respecting the integrity of such systems through corrupt activities (Abramo, 2007:34). Ackerman (2004:453) also argued that public procurement system in Zimbabwe’s institutions is corrupt. This calls for a need to combat such practices, in order to promote an efficient and effective procurement system. It is also against the background that corruption has also demonstrated remarkable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-economic systems and the conception of a corruption-free economy in reality seems hardly possible.

Despite the above stated government efforts, scholars have also argues that corruption in Zimbabwe is still rampant, to the extent of debilitating its economy (Arenstein, 2004:77). This is further supported by the Transparency International of Zimbabwe’s report which indicate that Zimbabwe scored 2, 4 out of 10 up from 2, 1 in terms of the Global Corruption Perceptions Index released in 2010. Based on the fact that, any country that scores between 0 and 5 is perceived to be highly corrupt, Zimbabwe is one
of them. Hence, it was ranked 134 out of the 178 countries studied in term of corruption levels (Arenstein, 2011:25). Further to this, former Judge Smith (2011:03) also noted the unlimited client – patron relationship, patronage composition of municipal procurement boards and the absence of meritocracy in hiring of biding companies as some of the roots causing corruption in the Zimbabwean local authorities. In his report on devastating effects of corruption, the former judge made reference to the Makwavarara led Harare municipality, which was characterized by poor service delivery, resulting from corrupt dealings in the face of regulated anti-corruption measures. While his report was compiled, as far back, in 2006, one wonders why nothing has been done about the findings of the Smith Commission (Smith 2011:03).

Corruption, describe by Moyana (1996:16) as failure take action in a way that benefit individuals at the expense of the public, is evident in Marondera municipality. Preliminary literature review on its audit reports found that, the former town clerk failed to allocate accommodation to his finance director, who had been appointed to the post since February 2005, to benefit from kickbacks of fuel allocations and travelling allowances. He was being allocated extra fuel resources though he stayed in the local community on similar occasions with the finance director. If the town clerk had allocated a house to his director, from the identified three idle houses in Marondera municipal area, fuel and travel cost were not going to be incurred. Hence a monthly cost of U$ 1306-00 was recorded as unnecessary and benefiting individuals, including the former town clerk, who had the readily available anti corruption measures to curb such costs (Chiundura, 2005:3).

Among other irregularities in the procurement system of Zimbabwe local authorities, the Anti Corruption Commission revealed after a decade, the procurement of refuse trucks and machinery which was done in Marondera municipality without following due tendering processes. The Municipality made a payment of $1 690 000-00 to Black brew Investments, without considering the tendering process which incorporates measures to reduce corruption. In one of its sections, the ACCZ indicated that Black brew Investments brought the refuse trucks to council for viewing before the tender was floated and the council resolved to purchase the refuse trucks, acting against section
211 sub section 2a and b of the Urban Councils Act chapter 29:11. Hence dubious arrangements and underhand dealings were cited, though mechanisms to curb such activities were in place.

In 2009, 11% of the Zimbabwean National Budget amounting to 80 million was channelled towards Public Sector Investment Programmes (PSIP), with 3% allocated to municipal investment projects. Ever since then, this amount has tremendously increased, coupled with an increase in the number of private-public contacts and contracts. Consequently, the temptation of corruption increased. Because public procurement is one of the key areas where the private and the public sector interact financially, it is a prime candidate for corrupt activity. Hence an evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is imperative to reduce corruption under such proneness environment (Rose Ackerman, 2011:4). These scenarios discourage Donors from investing in this country’s economy which current needs financial assistance from the international community. Hence, it is in this regard that the researcher will focus on the effectiveness of the identified anti-corruption strategies implemented by the Zimbabwean government at local institutions, to identify loopholes in the measures themselves, in a way that promote effectiveness particularly to their procurement system.

1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The anti-corruption measures have been put forward as a panacea to effective procurement system, which ultimately enhance service delivery. However, despite these measures, different scholar argued that public institutions in Zimbabwe are corrupt. On top of this, Transparent international ranked Zimbabwe’s institutions on number 134 out of the 178 studied countries in 2010 and local authorities were bracketed as more corrupt in their procurement systems (Arenstein, 2011:25). Mashonaland East Municipalities are among the other local authorities that have implemented such anti-corruption measures in line with international standards. This study therefore seeks to establish; how effective is the anti-corruption measures employed in the
procurement system of Marondera Municipality in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe?

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions posed, underlies the study:

- What are the forms, nature and causes of corruption in the procurement system?
- What are the perception regarding the extent of corruption in Marondera Municipality?
- What are the perceptions regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures that are used to curb corruption when procuring goods and services?
- What are the initiatives and concrete steps that need to be taken on lesser and greater scales in Marondera municipality, as part of reducing corruption?

1.5. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Owing to the existence of the anti-corruption measures in the procurement system of the Zimbabwean Local Authorities, the study seeks:

- To assess the perception on corruption in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality.
- To evaluate the extent to which the anti-corruption measures effectively curb corruption in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality.
- To provide possible ways and means of improving how the anti-corruption measures can be implemented to reduce corruption.

1.6. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
The study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategic measures as the instrument that is used to promote efficient and effective service delivery in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality. Particular attention, in this study, will be on the extent to which the identified measures reduce corruption, given the fact that there are reports of high level of corruption in these municipalities. It will be based on the observation that a number of anti-corruption measures have been implemented by the Zimbabwean municipalities as a solution to on going cases of corruption in their
procurement system. Among them include, accountability or transparency measures, administrative / bureaucratic measures, democratic enhancement measures and economic / market reforms. Hence, an evaluation of such measures is imperative in order to identify their effectiveness. Based on preliminary literature review it is expected that attitudes will vary with demographical data and the perceived quality of service provided to different communities of the municipality. Given also the fact that corruption have indicated reasonable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-economic situations, the study needs to identify problems in the implementation of such measures and give recommendations thereto, with a hope of reducing the level of corruption and add to the body of knowledge. Hence, the research project sought to answer, among others, the question: which reform strategies are perceived to be most effective in combating corruption in Marondera Municipality, from the above named categories?

1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The intended contribution of this research study is not that of knowledge for knowledge sake (pure research). It comprises applied research committed to making a difference, by putting knowledge into action. Considering the current Zimbabwean political dispensation, the researcher belief that the research will be able to:

- Influence Zimbabwe’s public policy particularly the countries constitutional laws and its implementation in the fight against corruption and there by save financial, material and human resources and align them into their optimal use, by recommending viable anti-corruption mechanisms.
- Assist Marondera Municipality in promoting effective procurement system with anti-corruption measures that serve as a guide to all departments in the municipality, thereby leading to effective service delivery and sustainable development.
- Assist the management officials to identify and rectify weaknesses in the procurement system.
- The outcome of this study may also assist in terms of understanding institutional challenges confronting procurement units in other municipalities.
• Provide some precautionary lessons for other African countries such as South Africa. Lessons from Zimbabwean Local Authority would be more relevant as they might easily be customized by other African countries who share the same continental history and colonial experience.

1.8. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The purpose of demarcating a study is to make it more manageable and focused. As per the selected area of study, Zimbabwe is a unitary state divided into ten administrative provinces, except for Harare and Bulawayo metropolitan provinces; they are a mixture of rural and urban areas. The provinces are each divided into districts which are further divided into council areas made up of several wards. Councils are run by a combination of elected and appointed councillors. Due to the logistical constraints of covering municipalities within the entire Mashonaland East Province, the study is confined to Marondera Municipality, which has twenty-one wards. The focus will be on assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the procurement system of the municipality and the strategies behind such measures.

1.9. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
Chapter 1: This is the introductory chapter. It gives the background to the whole study. Chapter 2: In chapter 2, it reviews theory of anti-corruption and public procurement underpinning the study. Chapter 3: Chapter three outlines the research design and methodology informing the empirical research. Chapter 4: This chapter deals with the data presentation and analysis of findings. Chapter 5: in this chapter, conclusions and recommendations are drawn.

1.10. CONCLUSION
This chapter has briefly outlined the introduction, the background of the study and has presented the significance for undertaking the study. The objectives, purpose, problem statement and the research questions have been described. Anti-corruption measures have been identified as a panacea to an effective procurement system. The following chapter provides a detailed discussion on literature review which seeks to explain the
rationale behind carrying out the study. It provides a theoretical framework for anti-corruption and the procurement system. The legislative framework on anti-corruption measures with particular reference to a given locality will also be provided.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION
The first chapter introduced the study, its background and context, the research problem, the research questions, research objectives and the significance of evaluating the efficacy of anti-corruption measures in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality. Chapter one concluded by delimiting the study and outlining the proceeding chapters.

In this chapter, the literature on anti-corruption movements stemming from corruption and the procurement system is reviewed. Aitchson (1998: 58) defines literature review as a systematic search of published work to find out what is already known about the intended research topic and its purpose is to establish the need for research. It also serves the purpose of familiarizing the researcher with the latest developments in the area of study and thereby attempts to close the existing gaps. De Vos, Strydom, Founche and Delport (2005:123) argue that a review of literature is aimed at contributing towards a clearer understanding of the nature and meaning of the problem that has been identified. Thus the above will be met in this chapter. The Chapter will also react to critical issues raised.

2.2. CORRUPTION: A CONCEPTUAL ISSUE
In daily parlance, corruption is such a common word that few people are worried about its concrete meaning and subtleties. But for policy makers and implementers it is of such concern that ongoing research is necessary, for its clarity and tangible understanding and, in order to concretely address the problem. Some try to clarify all misconduct as corrupt behaviour, but if this were the case, corruption will be indistinguishable and include everything that is not ethical. A vague notion of the concept will not enable the anti-corruption measures to have a sharp cutting edge in terms of reducing corruption to reasonable levels. Therefore, to wedge an effect crusade against corruption, clarity of the target (corruption) and operational definition is
very important (Roux, Brynard, & Fourie, 1997:112). Thus, the conception of corruption needs to be brought into focus in order to effectively curb it.

Dictionaries define corruption as an act of dishonest, illegal behaviour by people in positions of authority or power to attain personal gain, or as an act of bribing an official or a political figure (Nye, 1967:217). For example Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary of English language (Doig, & Riley, 1998:19) defines corruption as Guilty of dishonest practices such as bribery, without integrity, debased in character, depraved, perverted, crooked, wicked, evil, decayed, putrid and tainted behaviour.

Etymologically, the word corruption comes from the Latin verb corruptus which literally means to break or destroy (United Nations on Drugs and Corruption, 2005:3). This implies that a law or legal rule is broken. Conceptually, corruption is a form of behaviour, which departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtues (United Nations on Drugs and Crime, 2005:7). It symbolize any conduct of behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for themselves or for others (Klitgaard, 1991:39). Conversely, Wraith & Simkins (1998:13) views corruption as a pervasive cancer which infests both the private and public sector of a society. Moreover, corruption refers, for example to the abuse of public resources for private gain, through a hidden transaction that involves the violation of some standards of behaviour (Doig, & Marquette, 2005:16), illicit gain of money (Hope, & Chiculo, 2000: 26), and also the extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of bureaucracy (Leff, cited in Moyana, 1996:16).

According to the classical legal perspective, corruption involves two parties, that is the corrupted and the corrupter (Galtung, 1998:109). However, Klitgaard (1991:43) contributed the most interesting analysis of corruption by departing from the notion of two parties (corrupted and corrupter), and pointing out that there are always three actors involved in any corrupt transaction, a principal (P), an agent (A) and a client (C). He elaborates the relationship as follows. The principal creates rules directed at
assigning tasks to the agent. These are intended to regulate exchange with the client. Such exchange relates to payments made in provisioning of licenses, goods and services or the awarding of tenders. However, a conflict of interests arises between principal and agent when each of the two actors is maximizing utility. A client adds another dimension because he can trespasses on the rules set up by the principal to his own benefit. It can be in the form of a bribe that is hidden to the principal. The aim of a bribe is to loosen loyalty between agent and principal and induces the agent to bend the rules in favour of the client.

Another variant of the principal-agent model emerges when a supervisor is introduced who is supposed to monitor the agent and report truthfully to the principal, so as to alleviate the informational asymmetries faced by the principal. But if a supervisor can collude with the agent, he can be induced to falsify his reports. Supervisors are often engaged to monitor and assess whether agents provide the contracted quality. If they take bribes instead of reporting malfeasance, agents can get away with poor quality work (Klitgaard, 1991:43).

In another conception analysis, corruption is seen as the abuse of public power for private gains in violation of rules (Manion 2004:44). It is also seen as illegal actions undertaken by government officials to enrich them (Geddes and Neto 1999:24). Though quite popular, this is often seen as a narrow, legalist and public-office centered definition of corruption, for it does not take into account all forms of corruption. As opposed to the view above, some scholars advanced what is known as the market-centered view of corruption. They regard corruption when a civil servant perceives his office as a business seeking to maximize his income from it (Tilman, 1999:151). There is yet another perspective, the public interest centered view about corruption. According to this view, corruption is a violation of public interests and it includes actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to public and its interests (Friedlich, 1996:33). It is obvious from the definitions above that corruption involves actions on part of officials that are regarded as improper and unlawful in which they seek to promote private benefits at the expense of the public interests. It is seen as
a deviant behaviour associated with a specific motivation namely that of private gains at public cost.

While the legal approach advocates strategies like tougher sanctions against corrupt activity alongside audit and oversight, those who support the market strategy are of the view that the most effective way to curb corruption is to remove government control in service provision thereby allowing market forces to operate in a competitive environment. The social approach emphasizes ethical norms, education and public vigilance. The political strategies for eliminating corruption would require broadening of public access to decision making process, enhanced transparency and administrative reforms, among others (Tilman, 1999:151).

Caiden (1981:4) adds to this section by distinguishing between corruption as a fact of life and corruption as a way of life. For him, in a country where cases of corruption are exceptions rather than rule, then the corruption is a fact of life. But if corruption is rampant and becomes the norm rather than exception then corruption is a way of life. Others draw a distinction between grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to corruption by political leaders and senior bureaucrats and normally involves large amounts. Petty corruption, on the other hand, is practiced by junior officials who demand bribes to task and render services (Stapenhurst and Langseth 1997:12). Types of corruption will further be elaborated below.

2.3. TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION

Although there are numerous ways to broadly conceive corruption, Khan and Gray (2005:10) agree on at least two kinds of corruption. The first is grand corruption which tends to erode the procurement system while the second kind of corruption is referred to as petty corruption, and it is usually practiced by bureaucrats who threaten the efficacy of governing institutions by relying upon individual transactions that manifest private advantage at the public expense. In addition to this, Bose (2004:12) indicated the prevalence of speed corruption in less developed countries, which involves the capacity to harass, delay, or withhold decisions handed down by, among other procurement
officials unless a bribe is given. Where present, this suggests that potential suppliers not only have opportunities for collusion among bidders for a government contract, but these vendors may be in a unique position to make exaggerated claims about the effectiveness or success of the services that will be provided.

Depending on the origin, Caiden cited in Khan (1998:46) has identified four categories, namely foreign-sponsored, institutionalized, outcome of political scandal and administrative malfeasance. Under foreign-sponsored, the main actors are public officials, politicians, representatives of donors and recipient countries. Transparency International (2005:63) indicates that the government of a developed country may influence a developing country through offers of arms or aid to make sure that a company from the developed country is awarded a project, even if it is not the cheapest or best option. Corruption becomes institutionalized as a result of the support provided by bureaucratic elites, politicians, businessmen and white-collar workers. Where petty officials and interested individuals play major role, it is regarded as administrative malfeasance, and the bureaucratic elites, politicians, businessmen and middlemen are responsible for political scandals (Transparency International, 2005:63).

Depending on the motive, corruption can be categorized into three types, namely collusive, coercive and non-conjunctive. Under collusive, Arora cited in Khan (1998:47) states that corrupters can be willing and be active participants in the process and use corruption as an instrument for inducing wrong action or inaction on the part of authorities, deriving benefit greater than the costs of corruption on their part. Corruption can also be forced upon the corrupter by those in position of power or authority. Non-conjunctive benefits as a type of corruption are a benefit obtained at someone else’s cost and the victims are unaware of their victimization (Khan, 1998:47).

Corruption can also be categorized based on its magnitude. The Human Rights of Southern Africa (2001:15), in distinguishing the different levels of corruption, emphasizes the types and magnitudes of corruption as petty and grand. Shah and
Schacter (2004:41) also add a third type, which is the state capture. The three types of corruption commonly identified are:

- Petty corruption (administrative or bureaucratic) which is related to commission or kickbacks that are usually demanded by junior officers in the public sector from the public in exchange for official services to be rendered. Bureaucratic corruption takes place in public administration, at the implementation end of policies, where the public meets with public officials (Human Rights of Southern Africa, 2001:15).

- Similarly, grand corruption (in the political realm) is as a result of the behaviour of elected officials, including politicians, taking bribes to award contracts, paying bribes to influence elections and using their position to provide patronage (Osborne, 1997:10). Castells (2000:146) describes the personal business interest of political personnel as a constant of politics in recorded history. It often involves prominent persons in both the private and public sector who exercise discretionary powers with regards to large public contracts. Large sums of money and other remuneration are involved in return for decisions made in one’s favour. In 1784, for example, Thomas Jefferson (the third US president) noted that the public money and liberty will be discovered as the source of wealth and dominion to those who hold them (Basalt, 2004:1).

- State captured or influence peddling is regarded as the collusion between private agents and public officials, a situation where the private sector captures the state apparatus, which is the legislative, executive and judiciary (Shah and Schacter, 2004:65).

Corruption can also be categorized on the basis of its pervasiveness. Robinson (1998:3), for example, categorizes it into three main forms:

- Incidental (individual): instances of malfeasance on the part of individual politicians or public officials, which are episodic rather than systemic. According to Riley (1998:140), it occurs on a small scale, involves individual and very junior
public officials such as policemen, customs and tax officials, it brings little macro-economic cost but profound public alienation and often hard to curb.

- Institutional: corruption pervades particular institutions or sectors of activity. Riley (1998:140) categories this as systematic and argues that it has large developmental impact and can affect most or all of a government department or a parastatal such as procurement agency or marketing board. It can have substantial impact upon government revenues and trade diversion and needs a sustained reform effort rather than individualized response.

- Systemic (societal): corruption pervades the entire society and the process becomes routinized and accepted as a means of conducting everyday transactions. This is entrenched corruption which affects institutions and influences individual behavior at all levels of a political and socio-economic system, and tends to be monopolistic, organized and difficult to avoid. Riley (1998:140) sees this kind of regime as a wholly corrupt system (kleptocracy) or government by theft.

Observations and input from political theory have led to another analytical important classification of corruption. Depending on the usage of the collected resources through corruption, distinction between private and collective forms of corruption can be identified. If corruption holds some private benefits for corrupt actors, his family or close friends it is categorized as private corruption. On the other hand, if corruption develops into larger networks, political parties, entire administrative bureau and national government, it is a collective form of corruption (Amundsen, 1999:89).

Finally, corruption can be either redistributive or extractive that is from below versus from above. It is generally observed that the relationship of mutual exchange (extractive corruption, or corruption from below). According to the theory of redistributive corruption, the state is the weaker part in the state-society relationship. In this situation, among other, politically strong and organized groups will be able to challenge state authority from below through corruption for example to buy under-priced national resources and to get tax exemptions. On the other hand, the theory of extractive
corruption states that the state is the stronger part in the state-society relationship and it or its agents (officials) benefit the most from corruption, while the corrupter is a more or less passive player (Amundsen, 1999:89).

2.4. MANIFESTATIONS AND ELEMENTS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption manifests itself as a by-product of low political competition, low and uneven economic growth, a weak civil society and the absence of institutional mechanisms (Robinson, 1998:4). He goes further to include perversion of justice, treason, kleptocracy, undeserved pardon and remission, intimidation, blackmailing, false evidence, non-performance of duty, misuse of inside knowledge, manipulation of regulations and conflict of interest as other manifestations of corruption. In contrast, those societies which are relatively free of corruption are characterized by respect for civil liberties, accountability of government, a wide range of economic opportunities and structured political competition (Johnson, 1994:36).

Similarly, Langseth (2000:105) indicated the manifestations of corruption which include bribery (offer and receipt of a benefit); embezzlement (theft of resources by persons entrusted with authority and control) and fraud (actions and behavior that entice others into providing a benefit). He also included extortion (coercing a person or entity to provide a benefit through threats); abuse of power (using one’s position to improperly benefit by diverting public resources to one’s personal use) and conflict of interest (awarding tenders to companies where the perpetrator has vested interests). Other aspects of corruption according to Langseth (2000:105) include deals with insider trading (abuse of privileged information by providing unfair advantage to persons); favouritism (provision of resources or services to personal affiliations ethnic, religious, political colleague) and nepotism (awarding tenders to family members even when there are better candidates).

The set of behaviours designated as corrupt are not homogenous and in some cases they are country or culturally specific. Some culture classifies the acceptance of gifts from an individual as moral but to others it is a corrupt offence. Hence, however, there
are many elements of corruption. According to Osborn (1997:10) people pay bribes to receive a service. They want the recipient to do them a favour, perhaps awarding a contract unfairly or waiving a fine they ought to pay. Or they demand gifts in order to respond quickly to the recipient’s needs.

Corrupt behaviour ranges from minor examples, such as giving a small gift for a secretary to influence an arrangement for appointment with the procurement boss, to presumptuously extensive ones, such as securing exceptional conditions for individual contract (Baai, 1999:174). UNPAN (2002:3) list corrupt activities ranging from grand to petty corruption in the form of kick-backs and expensive gifts. It went on to indicate nepotism, cronyism, collection of unauthorized fees, falsification or destruction of records and circumventing established regulations as corruption.

The examples given above are by no means exhaustive as corrupt behaviours are dynamic and take different form in response to and for dodging anti-corruption strategies. Any act of corruption manifests itself in different forms of behaviours and comprises of at least two parties (corrupted and corrupter). With specific reference to procurement, it involves the misuse of authority in the award of tenders, offer and acceptance of inducements from biding organisations, an attempt to solicit an offer of inducement or reward as benefit for the performance of an official act.

2.5. CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
The economic and political aspects stand out as the most comprehensive causes of corruption. This is essential because they avoid the particularity of cultural explanations which give excuses to some corrupt activities on the basis of culture (Amundsen, 1999:135). The political causes emphasizes that corruption is a function of political issues such as monopoly of power, more discretion in decision making, less transparency, weak accountability, deinstitutionalisation, weak control and bad governance in general. Scott cited in Ekpo (1979:4), cogently presents the political causes of corruption. He argues that bureaucratic corruption is an informal means to exert influence at the enforcement stage of the political process and corruption will be
prevalent when channels to influence policy outcome, at the input stage of the political process, for some reasons are unavailable. On top of political corruption, if poverty, low levels of living standards and unemployment are the only lifestyles people perennially encounter, any means of making life better— including corruption—are worthy of taking risk (Ghazanafar and May, 2000:96). They, thus also argue that these economic conditions in many countries are often ripe for corruption.

Hassan (2004:3) points out that developing countries are increasingly influenced by corruption, which undermines their capacity to make the right policy choices and to provide overall good governance. Kaufmann (2000:13) also state that developing countries are more prone to be affected by corruption for a variety of reasons, namely:

- the widespread poverty and low level of public sector salaries;
- lack of any risk spreading mechanisms such as insurance and a well-developed market;
- opportunities presented by complex, poorly-defined, constantly changing and inadequate rules and regulations;
- lack of properly established laws and principles, or code of conduct applicable to public officials and lack of institutions to enforce them;
- Lack of watchdog agencies (Kaufmann, 2000:13).

Hope and Chiculo (2000:57) add that the considerable lack of exemplary ethical leadership exhibited by politicians and senior public officials is the cause of corruption. The lack of ethical leadership can be attributed in most African countries to the fact that personal and private interests take precedence over national interests (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:34). When the top political leaders do not provide the right example, either because they engage in acts of corruption or, as is more often the case, because they condone such acts on the part of relatives, friends, political associates, it cannot be expected that the employees in the public administration will behave differently (Tanzi, 1998:475). When former President Mobutu Sese-Seko of then Zaire left office in 1996, he had a vast personal fortune virtually stolen from the nation that he had ruled for about 30 years. It was reported that he diverted between US$50 million and US$70
million a year from the bank of Zaire to personal accounts in Europe. Estimates of his personal fortune run over US$6 billion (Ghazanafar and May, 2000).

In addition to political reasons, Hope and Chiculo (2000) present socio-cultural norms as a factor driving corruption. In Africa, the existence of personalism results in significant loyalties toward one’s family, tribe, and friends. Such loyalties are advanced at the expense of the state regulations (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:29). David Apter, the author of Ghana in Transition, argues that nepotism is considered a grave offence in western bureaucratic practices yet in African countries, providing jobs for one’s family members is socially compulsory (Kupendeh, 1995:9). Any successful civil servant or politician is expected to provide gainful employment for his relatives and neglecting one’s family is considered a much worse offence (Kupendeh, 1995:9). Furthermore, many African countries are experiencing multiple dimensions of change: economically, socially and politically (Olowu, 1999:51). Olowu argues that it is becoming increasingly evident that the process of change itself could provide an environment that gives additional impetus to corrupt practices.

To add on to the above, when resources are scarce (naturally or artificially) people tend to compete for a greater share and look for a favorable treatment from those who control the resources. Why corruption occurs can be explained in terms of scarcity and or the relationship between demand and supply (Ekpo, 1979:4). To the economist, for example, corruption essentially is a function of scarcity. Those who adopt the economic causes discuss corruption in terms of demand and supply. They argue that, because the demand for goods (values or commodities) dispensed by the government is greater than the supply, there is a tendency for the market price of these to rise over and above their official price. If this happens, individuals who desire these scarce values will impelled to them at their market price if they cannot obtain all they want at the official rate (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:10). Since resources are scare, human beings are desperate to acquire them by whatever means, depending on the intensity of their need. Scarce resources like various permits and licenses are also frequent sources of payoffs and patronage with bribes (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:11).
needs are not meet, people will do their utmost and be susceptible to corruption to ensure better life (Caiden et al., 2001:4). In most developing countries, salaries of public officials are low, both in absolute and in relative terms, which drives them to demand bribes to make up their income. On the other hand, their counterparts in the developed countries in which incentive bribes, payoffs and extortion happens to be rare, are well paid.

Computation made by transparency International cited in Amundsen (1999:16) indicates that there is a strong relation between the level of income and corruption that is the higher income the lower level of corruption. However, Amundsen further argues that we cannot establish the causality between the two variables. It is unclear whether income increases because the level of corruption goes down, or whether corruption goes down because income increases. Similarly, Kasper (2006:5) argues that, the association between income levels and corruption levels does not tell us anything about causation, but it seems plausible that there is circular interaction. This might mean that countries are poor because their rulers are highly corrupt or poor living standards invite corruption.

Based on research, Gould and Amaro-Reyes cited in Khan (1998:26) give details of five sets of conditions, the interplay of which is conducive to bureaucratic corruption in developing countries, namely:

- Functional role of government in the development process, that is the extent to which the government intervenes in the domestic economy can provide for corruption to occur. Mauro (1997:4) holds similar views and states that much public corruption can be traced to government intervention in the economy. Thus policies aimed at liberalization, stabilization, deregulation and privatization can sharply reduce the opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour and corruption.

- The nature of the political system and its leadership, including its stability and degree of responsiveness to competing public demands, also has some bearing on the incidence of corruption. Relative instability contributes to insecurity of tenure. Public servants therefore are impelled to seek opportunities for self-
enrichment rather than to make a long term commitment to promote and safeguard public goods.

- Certain socioeconomic factors, for example, conditions of poverty and inequity operate in the external environment but impinge directly upon public bureaucracies and the behavior of their administrators. Wraith and Simpkins (1963:57) points out that a shortage of any political, social or economic commodity influence individuals’ lust for power, wealth and status.

- Society’s cultural norms and practices such as kinship loyalty, which form an integral part of the informal organizations, shape the public’s perception of government and its bureaucratic apparatus and, to a greater or lesser degree, influence the behavior of administrators.

- Organisational factors such as structural arrangements and decision-making processes, personnel management practices and administrative control and accountability systems, form still another set of conditions (Khan, 1998:26).

There are also cultural explanations why corruption occurs. In some cultures there are proverbs that encourage corruption. For example, in Eritrea and Ethiopia there is a saying that “leader regrets when they step down from benefiting (being corrupt) while in office”. In South Africa, they say “take you chance”. This happens whenever people induce someone to be corrupt and take advantage of their position while in office. In India also there was an underlying belief among officials about making hay while the sun of British Raj shone (Khan, 1998:34).

Thus, it is clear from above that in order to respond to the challenges posed by corruption requires also an understanding of its causes. From an institutional perspective, corruption was evident to arise where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives. Responses to the above causes of corruption, therefore, include institutional reforms to limit authority, improve accountability and change incentives, as well as societal reforms to change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions. Within these two broad categories, the list of potential responses is extensive. Hence, a comprehensive
discussion of these will be done under anti-corruption approaches and strategic measures.

2.6. CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION
According to Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983:25) corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and good governance by subverting formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and representation in policymaking. Corruption in the judiciary suspends the rule of law and corruption in public administration results in the unequal provision of services. More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and officials or companies are hired or promoted without regard to performance. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance. Corruption also undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Although some claim corruption reduces costs by cutting red tape, an emerging consensus holds that the availability of bribes induces officials to contrive new rules and delays. Where corruption inflates the cost of business, it also distorts the playing field, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient firms (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983:25).

Mauro (1997:72) also state that corruption generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment away from education and development into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal such dealings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, environmental or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure and increases budgetary pressures on government. These distortions deter investment and reduce economic growth. In quantitative terms, Mauro's analysis
of 94 countries suggests that a reduction in corruption of 2.38 points on his 10-point scale would increase a country's annual investment by 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and would increase annual growth of GDP per capita by 0.5 percent (Mauro 1997:72). The World Bank's state in a Changing World (World Development Report, 1997:5) further refines this relationship between corruption and investment by distinguishing between the level of corruption and the predictability of payments and outcomes. It suggests that investment drops off most in countries where corruption levels are high but the predictability of payments and outcomes is nonetheless low.

Hope and Chiculo (2000:48) argue that rent seeking activities tend to have the effect of inflating the cost of doing business. Hope and Chiculo point out that kickbacks and illegal commissions which have to be paid to public officials are simply added to the final costs of contracts, equipment, supplies and so on. The immediate consequence of such a situation is that entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs withdraw from engaging in investment and the affected economy loses the multiplier benefits that would have been forthcoming with those investments (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:48). Thus, corruption reduces investment and, as a consequence, reduces the rate of growth. Such reduction in investment is assumed to be caused by the higher costs and the uncertainty that corruption creates. The first investigation of the impact of corruption on investment in cross-sectional study of countries found that corruption negatively impacts on the rate of investment on GDP (Mauro, 1998:44).

Corruption acts as arbitrary tax due to its unpredictable nature, creates high excess burdens resulting from the cost of searching for those to whom the bribe must be paid and the cost of negotiating and paying the bribe (Tanzi, 1998:34). Corruption reduces or distorts the fundamental role of government in such areas as enforcement of contracts and protection of property right. When a citizen can buy his or her way out of a commitment or out of a contractual obligation, or when one is prevented from exercising one’s property rights because of corruption, this fundamental role of the government is distorted and growth may be negatively affected (Tanzi, 1998:34).
On the other hand, UNPAN (2002:5) points out that other researchers have joined in the debate which consider that cost and benefits of corruption. For example Klitgaard introduced the idea of economic, political and managerial utilities of corruption, which refer to the benefits from specific corrupt acts. Mankiw cited in Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983:25) similarly sees corruption as a helpful inducement for re-establishing market efficiency particularly in the case of cumbersome regulation, excessive bureaucracy or market restrictions. Furthermore, classical debates states that both actors will better off as long as corruption takes place voluntarily, making it difficult to argue that public welfare suffers (Lambsdorff, 2001:55). According to Amundsen (1999:13), some researchers and many practitioners have argued that corruption may be a good thing because it may ease the squeaky wheel of state bureaucracy, unlock doors, enable private entrepreneurship and promote businesses. In some countries the growth rate does not seem to suffer and has been kept at a high level for years despite the existence of systemic corruption. This mainly is the case in some Southeast Asian countries. High levels of corruption in Indonesia, Japan and South Korea allegedly have not stunted short-term economic growth there and in other countries (Osborne, 1997:19). Amundsen (1999:61), however, argues that the economic effects of corruption are dependent on the type of corruption in each country.

2.7. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION
The field of public procurement has been a battleground for corruption fighters. It is in public procurement that most of the ‘grand corruption’ occurs with much of the damage visibly inflicted upon the development process in poorer countries and countries in transition (Lambsdorff, 2007:105). It all starts when the government is mandated to undertake a huge amount of work to realize its policies effectively and efficiently. However, since it is impossible for any government to complete all necessary work by itself and might in fact be a possible waste of resources, it is inevitable that certain projects will be led by non-governmental, private sector organizations. Such projects are arranged through contracts for business, if this results in the reduction of cost, while maintaining the necessary standards of quality (Lambsdorff, 2007:105). For these reasons we have a public procurement system.
The public procurement regulations provide for various procurement methods namely competitive bidding, domestic canvassing, direct shopping, and direct contracting. The selection of the applicable method depends on the value of the acquired goods or services. Competitive bidding is mandatory for the purchase of most goods, services or works. Urgent need or procurement after natural disasters, however, justifies resorting to non-competitive procurement methods such as international shopping or direct contracting. In these cases, direct contracting is permitted regardless of the value of the contract. No explicit mechanism exists to prevent the arbitrary creation of situations justifying direct contracting to create opportunities for corruption (Lambsdorff, 2007:106).

Although different countries enacted laws and rules which stipulate comprehensive and well-regulated systems in public procurement and violations of those laws and rules are criminalized, the systems has not necessarily been functioning (Klitgaard, 1992:43). There are many cases where the public procurement system has been ignored and the possibilities for ineffective or incompetent practices in public procurement have also created and provided a multitude of opportunities for corruption. Typical projects which are completed using these systems may include the construction of hydraulic power plants, high-speed railway networks, provision of specific goods or services and high standard road bridges in a municipal jurisdiction. Public works contracts are often big business in every country. From large-scale infrastructure projects to continuous equipment purchases, each government spends a tremendous amount of money on the acquisition of goods and projects and the provision of public services (Klitgaard, 1992:44).

Since most budget resources come from the taxes, tariffs and surcharges imposed on citizens or from financial assistance from donor countries or international organizations, expenditure should be as prudent, economical and effective as possible. The purpose of establishing an effective public procurement system is to gain high quality but low cost services through contracts with private or non-governmental organizations. Therefore, the rules and procedures of public procurement should be carefully established, leading
to transparent and proper processes and ensuring free and fair competition. Violation of such regulations must be strictly prohibited and in general, criminalized (Klitgaard, R. 1992:44).

Although public procurement processes are fairly complex and can be implemented differently in various jurisdictions, Klitgaard (1992:12) mentioned the three main phases of the public procurement process which are vulnerable to corruption. These are;
1. Procurement planning and budgeting;
2. Procurement solicitation;

2.7.1. How Corruption Operates In Public Procurement?
According to Klitgaard (1992:102) corruption can arise in various forms in each of the phases of the procurement process. In the procurement planning and budgeting phase, the government entity needs to determine what good or service it would like to buy (the requirement) and how much it would like to spend (the budget). In both of these cases, there are opportunities for corruption. In determining the requirement, reports could be prepared that falsely report damaged equipment in order to create an excess supply that could be used for corrupt purposes. The procurement requirements could also be written to favour a particular supplier or contractor. Budgets could be set artificially high so that excess allocations can be stolen or diverted. In addition, programmatic budgets could be devised in such a way that there are overlapping budgetary allocations among separate organizations or departments that could likewise be applied in a corrupt manner (Klitgaard, 1992:102).

In the procurement solicitation phase, the main tasks are compiling the request for proposals or tender documents and conducting the evaluation. The evaluation criteria in the request for proposals or tender documents could be drafted to favour a particular supplier or service provider or likewise could be drafted to emphasize weaknesses of a particular competitor (Klitgaard, 1992:103). Similarly, Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) states that the evaluation criteria could be drafted in a subjective way or even not clearly
stated in tender documents, leaving room for manipulation and biased assessments and having no grounds to justify the decision. Later during the evaluation of the proposals or tenders, Titsworth (2007:35) states that the evaluation criteria could be misapplied or otherwise further defined or amended after proposal or tender receipt. During this phase it is also possible that advance information could be provided to a particular favoured supplier or contractor. Other techniques such as failing to solicit proposals or tenders from the competitors of a favoured supplier, wrongfully restricting the tender pool, soliciting offers known to be inferior to a favoured supplier, simply misaddressing tender documents, accepting late proposals or rejecting legitimate proposals are techniques that can be utilized to corrupt the procurement process (Titsworth, 2007:35).

According to Klitgaard (1992:103) corruption opportunities also abound at the contract award and performance phase of the procurement process. For example, a bidder could propose an unrealistically low offer in the hopes that after the contract is awarded procurement officials will allow amendments to increase costs. Likewise, a firm could offer exceptionally high caliber products or less qualified personnel to meet a particular requirement and then upon contract award substitute quality product and personnel with inferior products or personnel. It is also possible to corruptly require sub-contractual relationships with favoured suppliers. Furthermore, Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) states that after the evaluation is complete, it is possible to award a contract that materially differs from the terms of the solicitation in terms of specifications, quantity, or delivery schedule. Oversight and reporting requirements may also be minimized and in some cases cost overruns can be corruptly explained away or falsely justified. Finally, supporting documentation could be intentionally lost or destroyed making detection and prosecution of corruption offenses difficult (Klitgaard, 1992:103).

In support of the above, Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) state that in public procurement, private individuals or firms give bribes to public officials to be qualified as bidders, to convince public officials to formulate favourable specifications, to get inside information from public officials, to be selected as the winning contractor or upon winning the contract, to skimp on quality or inflate prices. Bribes which include money, travel, meals,
entertainment, gifts, favours, discounts or anything of value induce public officials to get into procedural lapses, violations or revisions of rules, conflict of interest situations, or lapses in codes of conduct in return. The offer is usually made to government officials who exercise discretionary powers (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:71).

Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) further categorized procurement corruption into pre-contract and post-contract corruption. Under pre-contract corruption, Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) indicate that the bid specification committee, who are also public officials, can tailor specifications to favour particular suppliers who in turn would ensure that a kickback is received. In this context, there may be breaches in the confidentiality of the bids in order for the supplier to know and quote the preferred prices, in order to be selected. Thereafter, on securing the contract, prices may be adjusted up on grounds of changes in specifications or increases in materials used. Similarly, contracts maybe awarded to suppliers who are directly or indirectly linked to an influential member of the panel, who plays a pivotal role for the selection and appointment of suppliers. Even though, the views of all the panel members must be sought and approved, all too often, this influential member may exert a certain amount of pressure on the selection process. More often than not, associates, proxies or family members of the influential panelist, may hold positions in the company that has been awarded the contract (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:72).

Again, hope and Chiculo (2000:74) says that the bid award committee can claim “urgency” as a ground to award the contract to a single contractor without having to go through the process of opening the tender process and allowing competitive pricing. This is called direct negotiations and is often open to abuse. Justifying direct negotiations based on different claims that do not exist, is usually found to be a way to cover-up corruption. Another area of crucial concern is the acceptance of gifts. Though it takes different shapes, the risk is that out of this obligation the government official concerned may decide to award the contract, or compromise on professionalism when the contract is awarded to the supplier concerned. These gifts do not necessarily stop at the higher positioned officials. All too often, the subordinates will also have to be
'humored'. This again is with the tacit approval of the superiors to ensure that everyone's cooperation is secured in the award or execution of the contract. Such unhealthy practices lead to a 'culture' within the department concerned that perpetuates indefinitely, despite changes in the management (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:72).

In the same vain, Hope and Chiculo (2000:72) states that the most costly and serious form of corruption occurs after the award of the contract, during the performance phase. According to them, it is the government, as purchasers of the contract that may fail to enforce quality or quantity standards in the contract by suppliers who are in turn, aided and abetted by government officials. Here, suppliers who may have bribed in order to get the award may embark on cost-cutting measures to recoup their losses. Substitution of inferior material with that originally agreed upon is commonly practiced here. Once again, this practice is made possible by the active cooperation or complicity of other parties, government officials included. Moreover, the procurement committees which are set up by the government and to act as custodians of the government, to oversee and verify quality and standard certificates, tend to work hand in hand with unscrupulous suppliers when it comes to verifying standards and works done. This gives rise to shoddy performances of the contract, where invariably, the health and safety of the public is jeopardized (Hope and Chiculo, 2000:72). Klitgaard (1992:103) also added that the falsification of invoices for purpose of payments by suppliers who are invariably abetted by government officials and appointment of sub-contractors who tend to have inferior quality, are categorised as corrupt practices.

In reaction to the above, Hope and Chiculo (2000:71) states that transparency and fairness are essential preconditions for containing corruption in public procurement. Transparency renders abuse difficult and increases the likelihood of detection. Also, as bidders must trust in the fairness of the process to participate in a tender, the perception of transparency is crucial in attracting the largest possible number of tenderers and increasing competition. A transparent and fair procurement process requires legislative and administrative measures in four dimensions namely, transparency of the proceedings, protection against corruption-induced manipulation of the procurement
method, fair prequalification procedures and transparent and fair selection of the winning tenderer. Ample participation also protects against bribery, favoritism, nepotism, and collusion.

2.8. APPROACHES TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

Historical evidence indicates that attempts to curb corruption are about as old as corruption itself (Riley, cited Andvig et al., 2001:101). Corruption has demonstrated remarkable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-political systems up to now, and the conception of a corruption free society in reality seem hardly possible. Up to the 1990s it was taboo to speak about corruption itself in international forums and even to discuss and assess strategies against corruption. It was after the realization of corruption as the reflection of democracy, human rights and governance deficit that negatively impact poverty and human security. The gestation period for the universal condemnation of corruption appears to be less long, as efforts to harmonize national and international standards are on the horizon and are fast approaching. This indicates that anti-corruption coalition is gathering momentum at both the national and international level (Carver, 2003:119).

Despite this encouraging trend, the literature on anti-corruption approaches lacks specific models that can sustainably suppress corruption to the lowest possible level in any procurement system, let alone a universally applicable recipe. According to Cuadrado and Arce (2005:35) even though many empirical and theoretical studies from diverse disciplines have analysed the issue, indicated disagreements about its definitions, causes, consequences, policy remedies persist. Nevertheless, existing literature on anti-corruption identifies different approaches to minimize corruption.

The approaches themselves depend on the magnitude of the hatred of corruption and vary from place to place and time to time. As the reflection of this hatred, people began to respond spontaneous and with the accumulation of experience, systematically. This response, which reflects man’s endeavor to create a corruption free administration, did not emerge in its current form, but have evolved through many stages, as evidenced by
the American example of the anti-corruption efforts (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996:18). They indicate that in America the currently prevailing anti-corruption project is a product of several generations of reform ideas and reform efforts. This history of anti-corruption reforms in public administration can be conceptualized in terms of four visions of corruption control, namely anti-patronage, progressive, scientific administration and panoptic (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996:18).

Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996:18) further elaborate the evolution of the anti-corruption movement as follows;

a) The Anti-patronage vision of corruption (1870-1900) assumed that patronage, cronyism and graft had the moral fiber of government and this situation could be reversed if public officials were virtuous and motivated by public interest.

b) The Progressive vision of corruption control (1900-1933) went further to point that a complete reform of the political system was the remedy to corruption. For governments to be efficient, effective and accountable, corruption must be rooted out as a prerequisite. The complete separation of public administration from party politics was also in the agenda of this vision.

c) The Scientific administration vision of corruption control (1933-1970) evolved as the next to supplanted the above-mentioned vision, which proved incapable to address corruption as was required. Scientific administration saw corruption as a problem in the structural design of organisations and not as a malady in politics of ethics. Hence, it advocated improving government by applying principles of economy and efficiency through controlling the behaviour of public officials. Supporters of this view sees waste and mismanagement as features of corruption that be remedied through hierarchy, standard operating procedures and adequate supervision, placing emphasis on bureaucratic control over political reforms.

d) The Panoptic vision (1970-present) emphasizes comprehensive observation, surveillance and monitoring, including accounting, auditing and layers of oversight to control corruption. Foucault cited in Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996:24) argues that these control measures were paradigmatic of a 19th
century vision of a disciplinary society that could easily detect deviance. In contrast to the dominant anti-bureaucratic philosophy of public administration which emphasizes systems, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996:28) conclude that panoptic corruption control focuses on people, investigations, multiple layers of monitoring and masses of rules and regulations. This view is shared by Pope (2000:101) when he states that continuous monitoring of the assets, income, liabilities and lifestyles of public decision makers and public service authorities enhances prevention of corruption. As a matter to increase accountability, public servants should be required by law to disclose their assets and revenue and must be open to verification (Bailey, 2000:42).

From other perspectives, Gillespie and Okruhlik cited in Mbaku (1996:343) identify societal, legal, market and political approaches to corruption control.

a) Societal approaches focus on educating society to develop high moral standards and be vigilant concerning corrupt behaviour.
b) Legal approach adheres to investigation and punishment.
c) Market-related perspectives favour free market structures within existing rules. However, this is not an effective strategy, as Bayley, Rose-Ackerman and Tilman cited in Mbaku (1996:344) argue that, without reforms in the socio-political life of a country, market reforms per se cannot minimize corruption.
d) Political approaches advocate the concentration of public power, facilitation of more access to institutions and public participation in governance.

Doig and Riley (1998:55) also point out that approaches to comprehend corruption and anti-corruption strategies are based on economic analyses, mass public opinion or civic culture perspectives and institutional view points.

a) An economic analysis, which represents Klitgaard’s view build its anti-corruption measures on the assumption that corruption is manifested by the principal agent interaction regarding economic issues.
b) Mass public opinion or civic culture perspectives analyses corruption as a socio-cultural product and proposes public awareness-raising campaigns to deter its
occurrences. Societal reform is an important ingredient to stimulate demand for change and to fight against corruption. Unless forced by the public, it is improbable that the government and the private sector will support anti-corruption initiatives.

c) The institutional viewpoint advocates the building and empowering of institutions, like the auditor general or anti-corruption agencies and improving administrative techniques as a way to curb corruption. Pope (2000:17) also argues that the offices of the auditor-General and the office of the Ombudsman, which play the role of introducing administrative accountability and efficiency, must be independent and professionally strengthened.

Moreover, from other perspectives, the Open Society Institute (2002:27-31) categories the approaches to anti-corruption policies into five groups:

a) The criminal and administrative control approach is based on the assumption that people in authority are driven by utility maximization and are best controlled by law and strong public administration structures.

b) The small government has a similar perspective to the criminal and administrative control perspective regarding the behaviour of officials and says corruption results from the deficiency of principals in controlling agents. In addition, since this approach views government itself as corrupt, it proposes a reduced role of the state with fewer regulations.

c) The political economic perspective focuses on public sector reform and building a more transparent and accountable government in order to restrict the principal agent problems and the failure of principals to monitor agents as a condition leading to increased corruption also informs this approach.

d) The Multi-pronged strategy or National Integrity System perspective incorporates restricting lobbying to tolerable limits that is to the extent that it is transparent and official, demanding more accountability from politicians, increasing government capacity, and ensuring the involvement of civil society. Pope (2000:37) notes that the National Integrity System (NIS) approach unlocks a new form of diagnosis and potential cure for corruption. Instead of looking at separate institutions, for
example the judiciary or separate rules and practices, for example the criminal law and then focusing on stand-alone reform programs, the NIS start to look at inter-relationships, inter-dependence and combined effectiveness in a holistic approach.

e) Public integrity-based approaches, contrary to the four approaches presented above, which stress making the price of corruption more than the profit to be achieved, it is based on the belief that officials can act ethically, not only because of fear of punishment but more in response to positive incentives. That is, it emphasis on the motive to act with integrity, based on education, is a better deterrent to corruption (Open Society Institute, 2002:30).

The more recent theoretical approaches to anti-corruption programmes put forward by Michael (2004:1083) are the universalistic, the state-centric, the society-centric and the critical schools of practice.

a) The universalistic approach views corruption as a business between state and non-state agents and assumes that the tools to fight corruption are applicable and replicable universally. Based on this approach, Pope (2000:19) puts forward national integrity system as effective anti-corruption tools to cut across all walks of political, economic and social life of society. The establishment of an anti-corruption agency is also in the universalistic approach agenda. The basic assumption is that there is the presence of social laws and the implementation of powers, their attention is on the legal and society level and highlight cross-country similarity. This gives rise to the application of rules and regulations as exemplified by various international and regional conventions (Piragoff and Biallas, cited in Michael, 2004:1069).

Doig and Riley (1998:45) observe that many are in favour of a universal strategy to tackle the problem of corruption. Universal strategies to fight corruption have been promoted by international institutions, such as the World Bank. But, as cases from Africa Demonstrate, these Universalist solutions have not been feasible (World Bank, cited in Doig and Riley, 1998:46).
b) The state-centric approach views the state actors as the prime movers of corruption and hence the focus of anti-corruption campaigns. Unlike with the Universalist approach, it argues that the best way to fight corruption is an indirect approach that is by enhancing transparency and accountability in government operations. This approach also advocate for substantial public sector reforms involving politics, economics, finance, administration and law.

c) The societal-centric approach focuses on civil society although it does not exclude power relations in its analysis. This school of thought contends that corruption is not intrinsic but socially constructed, as the consequence of an interaction between different social actors for and against corruption. Their anti-corruption projects tend towards uplifting the responsibility of civil society. According to Bailey (2000:72), civil society organisations, including religious, business and professional organisations are increasingly exhorting their members and political leaders to refrain from and fight against corruption.

d) The protagonists of the critical approach also reject the existential nature of occupation and say it is only given meaning by institutions. The critical school has no confidence in any anti-corruption strategy, arguing that the rhetorical nature of the campaigns is merely aimed at silencing political opponents to gain legitimacy and misappropriate the funds allocated for such programmes. Moreover, it argue that the need for increased monitoring of corruption requires greater state involvement, leading to the expansion of government and hence to further fomentation of corruption (Mauro, 1995:66).

Michael (2004:1071) argues that all four approaches avoid a systematic approach to anti-corruption. Systems cannot be understood through simple cause-and-effect relationships. All the schools of practice mentioned above argue that a certain set of causes leads to a certain set of results. In universalistic theories, better functional fit between stakeholders produces less corruption. In state-centric and society-centric schools of practice, fixing state or social mechanisms reduces corruption. In the critical approach, anti-corruption helps propagate the notion and practice of corruption. The theoretical consequence of such approaches is to look at its effect
on investment, government behaviour, economic growth and most importantly and particularly to this study, social indicators.

Michael (2004:1068) summarized the four approaches as shown in table 2.1;

**Table 2.1: Anti-corruption schools of practice.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Universalistic</th>
<th>State-centric</th>
<th>Society-centric</th>
<th>critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What</td>
<td>Mechanistic programmes</td>
<td>Government reform</td>
<td>Social reproduction</td>
<td>Epistemic contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where</td>
<td>In all stakeholder groups</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Outside the state</td>
<td>In discursive practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why</td>
<td>Social rules dictate change</td>
<td>State machine broken</td>
<td>People know what is best</td>
<td>Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Integrity systems</td>
<td>Civil service reform, budget reform, administrative reform</td>
<td>Media, schools, NGOs, cultural institutions</td>
<td>Critiques of international organisations and governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some practitioners</td>
<td>World Bank institute, transparency International</td>
<td>World Bank’s PREM, SIGMA, private sector contractors</td>
<td>Private sector contractors, NGOs, universities</td>
<td>Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country examples</td>
<td>Albania, Latvia, Poland</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Hungary</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Everywhere and nowhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.9. ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIC MEASURES

Based on the approaches reviewed in the previous section, several anti-corruption measures will be discussed in this section, with particular emphasis on their pros and cons.

2.9.1. Law Enforcement and Punishment

There are counterarguments concerning the effectiveness of law enforcement and punishment as anti-corruption measures. Pope (2000:31) warns that, “while corruption might at least in theory be tamed in an autocratic and dictatorial manner using big stick, the inexorable decline into corruption and other abuses of power on the part of totalitarian administrations suggests that this can only be temporary”. Galtung (1998:105) similarly argues that law is widely flouted in a country where there is endemic corruption. He went on to say that in such context, criminal sanctions against people involved in corruption are hardly imposed and put it clear that law and punishment tend to be directed against ordinary citizen rather than prominent individuals.

However, Klitgaard (1997:501) cogently emphasise that human beings are susceptible to corruption and hence appropriate mechanisms must be in place. Klitgaard's emphasis is that monopolies must be reduced and carefully regulated, official discretion must be clarified, accountability must be enhanced and most importantly the probability of being caught for corruption must increase, and the penalties for that must rise. Becker cited in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999:151) also adds that the severity of punishment is a viable deterrent to keep corrupt officials from behaving illegally. Thus, according to them, impunity and corruption are compatible and enforcement strategies to reverse the latter are needed. However, Mbaku (1996:45) adds that, “to be relatively readily enforceable, rules must be formulated in such a way that they do not provide more incentives for malfeasance. If the corrupt relationships are more lucrative than honest legal ways, rent-seeking behaviour will ensue”. Thus, in its effort to fight corruption, governments have to put laws in place and enforce and this can be accomplished through coercion (the threat of the stick) and incentives.
Bailey (2000:73) likewise, conversely argues that, though it is necessary to bring about credibility to public institutions, enforcement alone to so called big fish, do not totally solve the underlying problem of corruption. Rose-Ackerman cited in Johnston (1998:93) similarly raises concern that, in such a situation, there in no guarantee that the corrupt system will not revert to its undesirable state. Even severe punishment including death penalty is not a sustainable solution to corruption, as this has failed in countries like Vietnam and China. This type of crackdown has often been used to silence political opponents rather than being a genuine step to solve the corruption problem, according to Robinson (1998:10). And also in the absence of the rule of law, the judiciary and police are not reliable tools in law enforcement for deterring corruption (Mbaku, 1996:51).

2.9.2. Social Empowerment and Capacity Building
Though social empowerment is a long-term anti-corruption strategy that helps to build social and legal values and strengthen civil society to vitally interact with the state Johnson (1998:85) argues that an empowered citizen in a position to be well informed and cognizant of their rights to the extent that they are ready to complain without fear of reprisal. Johnson also cited in Robinson (1998:8) further say that citizens must organize themselves along a range of economic and political issues so that they can be empowered to fight corruption. Eigen (1998:87) similarly argues that, unless anti-corruption initiatives are based upon broad public participation and committed political leadership at the highest level, the potential for their success is thwarted. She further adds that, civil society organisations including professional, religious, business and ad hoc groups are dynamic forces in eliciting active public participation through campaigns to raise awareness and build capacity.

In the same vein, Jayawickram (2001:287) and Eizenstat (1998:8) argue that the mobilization of the private sector and the strengthening of civil society through public education, civic awareness and capacity building programmes are essential to
corruption control. There must be a meaningful threat outside government that demands accountability and transparency from state officials. Civil society can be such a force to check the conduct of people in public power (Johnston, 1998:94). In addition, the active participation of government and parliament is essential, civil society alone cannot change systems (Jayawickram, 2001:288-292). However, Johnson (1998:92) warns that empowering civil society must be supported by strengthening state institutions, and vice versa. Thus, the consequence of an imbalance in the relationship will be even more corruption. Where civil society is weaker, it will be vulnerable to corrupt officials, and where the state is poorly institutionalized and weaker, it will be open to state capture by strong and influential individuals in the civil society. If the two are in balance, it is more difficult for either side to exploit the other. To fully play a role, people must be empowered and their skills capacitated (Johnson, 1998:92).

Pope (2000:78) supports the trend towards New Public Management, where governments are devolving power to local levels. This can be welcomed as a remedy to corruption as it removes an important element from the corruption equation that is monopoly of power. But, he also warns that, the paradox of corruption will even flourish if responsibilities are shifted from central bureaucracies to regional or local levels which do not have the capacity to curb it. Thus, various actors are closer at local levels and this also paves the way for more favouritism and nepotism. To counter this, Pope (2000:78) states that, decentralisation must be accompanied by capacity building anti-corruption awareness, and a broad anti-corruption coalition of all stakeholders down to the lowest levels. However, Lansing (2000:183) notes that even an immune system also lack centralized control and can settle into a permanent, fix structure, instead it must be able to adapt to unknown invader. Hence, it is more effective to fight corruption by starting at the local level. Public awareness programmes must start from primary schools up to politicians without exceptions (O’ Keefe, 2000:23). If there is an attempt to curb corruption at the recruitment level of the workforce, it must also be fought at the entry level to society by educating children at home and schools.
Robinson (1998:9) warns, however, that involving civil society organisations is not a solution per se. Despite their potency to check corruption, there may be groups within the organisation that benefit from corruption and hinder the anti-corruption process. Pope (2000:78) agrees on this and elaborates that civil society is also part of the problem. In fact, it is at the point of intersection between the public and private sectors that corruption thrives. There are some organisations in the garb of civil society who operate contrary to transparency and accountability principles and are corrupt themselves. Nevertheless, Pope (2000:78) continues, while developing anti-corruption strategies are coming up, we cannot do away without civil society as it is the most powerful tool in the campaign. But it can be concluded that, to play a decisive role, civil society organisations have to base their struggle in solid institutional arrangement (Robinson, 1998:9).

2.9.3. Institutional Reform

Institutional reform is discussed in terms of limiting authority and realigning incentives. Heymans and Lipietz (1999:25) argue that, authority can be limited by decreasing the extent of resources controlled by public authorities and materialized by strategies such as privatization, liberalization and deregulation and competitive procurement. Robinson (1998:8) similarly adds that, institutional reforms to fight corruption also include incentives to promote ethical behaviour in public service. Such incentives feature active human resources management to develop a professional, committed work force.

Atwood (1998:14) is of the opinion that, personnel systems can eliminate unnecessary positions and reduce the number of employees through hiring freezes and attrition, retirement packages, dismissals, and removal of ghost workers from payrolls, as a first step to institutional reform. He goes further to state that, compensation systems must then provide a living wage, but also ensure sufficient remuneration to attract and retain qualified personnel. In some cases, salary increases can be financed through reductions in force (Heymans and Lipietz, 1999:25). In addition, performance-based incentives can bolster morale, professionalism, and productivity.
Atwood (1998:15) also state that systems can link performance to compensation or to such non-monetary rewards as more challenging tasks, influential assignments, public recognition, and professional awards. Regular performance assessments become necessary components of an incentive system. For example, in the 1980s, Ghana introduced institutional reforms in tax and customs administration (O’Keefe, 2000:23). The government dismissed or retired the most corrupt officials, improved wages and working conditions, and offered performance incentives for individuals and for the National Revenue Service as a whole. Revenue targets were established, and the National Revenue Service was given a bonus of 3.5 percent of tax revenue and 2.5 percent of customs revenue. As a result, tax and customs revenue rose from 6.6 percent to 12.3 percent of GDP between 1984 and 1988 (O’Keefe, 2000:23). However, O’Keefe (2000:23) warns that, institutional reforms must be coupled with staff motivation strategy.

2.9.4. Good Governance: Promoting Transparency and Accountability

According to Johnston (1998:101) and Eizenstat (1998:9), good governance, which might include open and healthy political and economic competition, vibrant civil society, and secured civil liberties and rights of property and contract, can reduce corruption. However, Eizenstat (1998:9) warns that, though it does not mean that improving governance will eradicate corruption, it is worth tackling the problem by dismantling bad governance, which does provide an environment conducive to corruption (Wolf and Gurgen, 2000:3). In the same vein, Kaufmann (2004:2) argues that fighting corruption cannot be done by merely adding anti-corruption offices or incessant drafting and redrafting of laws. Instead, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader governance context such as rule of law, protection of property rights, freedom of the press, political competition, transparent campaign financing and others that in turn affect corruption and need to be addressed head on (Kaufmann, 2004:2).

Dia, cited in Osborne (1997:20) is of the opinion that, corruption and governance are closely related and factors that affect corruption for example, accountability and transparency also have a direct relation with governance. Since accountability and
transparency are the pillars of good governance, their strategic impact on anti-corruption efforts is very particular (Osborne, 1997:20). Brautigam cited in Johnston (1998:101) similarly notes that, accountability, transparency, predictability and the rule of law as the main dimensions of governance. There is wide consensus between Osborne and Johnston, that fostering increased accountability and transparency are effective weapons in the fight against corruption. It is further believed that more discretion and monopoly in decision making creates opportunities for corruption. The relationship between these concepts is stated by Dia, in the form of the following equation;

\[ \text{Corruption} = \text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability} - \text{Transparency} - \text{Integrity} \]

(Dia, cited in Osborne, 1997:20).

However, proponents of the public integrity approach argue that curtailing the discretion of officials may disallow the leverage required to make decision that can be to the interest of the public. They consider limiting discretion as a cost to society (Open Society institute, 2002:31). The UNDP source book on accountability, transparency and integrity further states that corruption mainly is a failure of governance. By manipulating the variables in these equation one can make a visible difference between good and bad governance and, hence, levels of corruption (UNDP, 2004:9).

Improving efficiency, accountability and transparency in the delivery and administration of public services often close the loopholes for corruption (UNDP, 2004:9). Without accountability, no system works to the interest of the people. Even the press, though free, must be accountable to a Press Council and ultimately to the courts. The court in turn, though independent, must be answerable to a system of appeals and parliament or a judicial service commission and this body ultimately must be accountable to the people through the ballot box. In this way, the strands of accountability reinforce each other (Pope, 2000:32).

Bailey (2000:78) warns that, to enhance accountability, there is a need to improve detection (more accountability and oversight), promote self-regulation (codes of ethics
and managerial leadership) and apply sanctions against corrupt acts (by means of administrative and criminal laws. Hence, an effective anti-corruption strategy focuses on corrupt systems, not just corrupt individuals. Thus, instead of thinking about corruption in terms of an immoral individual breaking the law and violating a trust, one thinks about system that are more and less susceptible to various illicit activities (Klitgaard, 1997:501). Pope (2000:35) argues similarly that, as corruption is a systemic failure, the primary focus of anti-corruption success is on reforming systems rather than on blaming individuals. According to Bailey (2000:78) there is a need to fix the system, to avoid witch hunts and attacking people. In the same vein, Shah and Schacter (2004:42) point out that the less anti-corruption strategy should include tactics that are narrowly targeted at corrupt behaviour and the more it should focus on the broad underlying features of the government environment. Along this line of argumentation, Bhatnagar (2003:26) also concludes that there must look beyond individual instances of corrupt behaviour for viable anti-corruption programmes and target the structural factors of institutions that allow corruption to develop. Hence the whole effort would be to rectify the corrupt system and not t just reacts to incidents of corruption whenever they appear.

2.9.5. Promotion of Ethical Principles
The UNDP (2001:3) states that when the limitation of the enforcement of such laws became apparent, there is a call for improved ethics. Cuadrado and Arce (2005:36) also strongly believe that ethical principles can provide guidelines for successful interdisciplinary studies about corruption. Monitoring and enforcing anti-corruption laws are expensive and the compliance process must be supplemented by code of conduct from trade and professional associations (O'Keefe, 2000:23). As Zekos (2004:639) put it, the consequences of ignoring ethics are costlier still, in terms of foregone opportunities as well as economic inefficiency. The development of codes of conduct can control the acceptance of gift and misuse of public property. They also prevent activities that lead to conflict of interest. A nation has to strive to produce responsible citizens by sensitizing future generation to key principles of democratic governance and the negative consequences of corrupt behaviour. It is also important to instill in young people a culture of positive engagement and respect and skill for constructive and
investigative debate on the quality of governance and its impact on people’s lives (UNDP, 2004:10).

Beneath the surface of cultures are fundamental human needs, characteristics, and qualities that humankind can morally satisfy only with universal virtues (Garofalo et al, 2001:162). Hoffman cited in Ali and Gibbs (1998:1556) supports this view by stating that as the real ethical solid building blocks or principles of most cultures are the same. Similarly, Zekos (2004:631) argues that international society due to globalisation has to develop and establish common ethical principles of behaviour in social life taking into account religion and world civilization. The basic values of humans and life as creation have to be identical all over the world, which means that human behaviour should be similar all over the world. So similar action should be ethical or unethical similar all over the world and principles established by different kinds of societies should not alter the basic of values of life and humanity.

Contrary to other authors who hold otherwise views, Garofaro, et al., (2001:163) indicate that various anti-corruption initiatives are not sufficient unless coupled with ethical theory to fight corruption. This means that, among the multiple approaches and strategic measures to fight corruption, there is a need to add the ethical dimension. Hence, after identification of the current positive behavioural habits that promote the desired moral climate, and the negative ones that encourage corruption, a comprehensive training for ethical goals in order to shape behaviour is important (Garofaro, et al., 2001:163).

2.9.6. Changing Attitudes and Mobilizing Political Will
In addition to institutional reforms Osborne (1997:11) state that, efforts to fight corruption include societal reforms to change attitudes toward formal political processes and to mobilize political will for change. Societal reforms generate new information about the costs and causes of corruption to stimulate demand for change and provide guidance on what to change. Societal reforms also foster structures to facilitate monitoring and advocacy by civil society. Ali and Gibbs (1998:1563) argue that without
the mobilization of civil society, governments are unlikely to follow through on anti-corruption reforms once they enter politically difficult terrain.

Osborne (1997:11) further state that surveys work to change attitudes and mobilize political will by defining the problem and focusing efforts to address it. Surveys can address the issue of corruption directly (for example, corruption perception surveys) or approach it indirectly in politically sensitive situations (for example, service delivery surveys). Corruption perception surveys ask individuals or businesses for their perception or experience of corrupt practices, often generating comparisons across branches and levels of government for national surveys, or across countries for international surveys (Osborne, 1997:11). In its annual Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International draws upon seven international surveys of business people, political analysts, and the general public to rate approximately 50 countries on perceived levels of corruption. Service delivery surveys, by contrast, ask public service users about their satisfaction with specific services, such as utilities, housing, health, or education. While they may ask the total cost, waiting time, and negotiating time for service, these surveys do not ask for an appraisal of the level of corruption (UNDP, 2004:10).

Similarly, Braibanti (1979:11) indicates that public relations campaigns work to increase understanding about the harm done by corruption and the ways to fight it. Using the mass media, community activities, or school programs, they highlight the link between corruption and poorer public services, lower investment, smaller growth rates, and more inequality. They also emphasize citizens' rights to services and demonstrate that corrupt officials are stealing the public's money. At the same time, these campaigns articulate procedures for reporting corrupt practices and advocating for reform. Once people feel they have a stake in eliminating corruption and the means to do something about it, they can demand more action from their representatives and strengthen political will. Notable sponsors of public relations campaigns include Poder Ciudadano, an Argentine NGO that developed imaginative television and radio spots denouncing corruption and sponsored an anti-corruption poster contest for school children; and Hong Kong's
Independent Commission Against Corruption which has used press releases, public information announcements, interviews, documentaries, posters, information leaflets, meetings, public speaking, and work on school and university curricula to convey an anti-corruption message to the public (Braibanti, 1979:11).

The UNDP (2004:12) agrees to the fact that pressure from foreign governments and international organizations can mobilize and sustain domestic efforts to fight corruption. Bilateral diplomacy at the highest levels or through embassies, exhortations from international bodies such as the United Nations, and strong recommendations or conditionality from development assistance agencies can push reluctant reformers to address corruption issues. For example, World Bank president James Wolfensohn has effectively used his position to prod governments into action. International or regional treaties against corruption, such as the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, can also contribute to increasing official resolve to tackle the issues and initiate positive change (Zekos, 2004:639).

2.9.7. Anti-Corruption Agencies

Establishing anti-corruption agencies has been one of the alternative routes taken by many governments despite their recorded success and failures in those localities. This, according to Heilbrunn (2004:1), may be an effort to satisfy international donors and placate domestic calls for reform. The World Bank cited in Meagher (2005:70) describes an anti-corruption agency as a body that reviews and verifies official asset-declarations, carried out investigations of possible corruption, and pursues civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions in the appropriate forums. Based on their function and the branch of government to which they are accountable, Meagher (2005:71) categories anti-corruption agencies into single and multiple-agency models. In a more elaborative way Heilbrunn (2004:3) distinguishes four types of anti-corruption agencies; the universal model, the investigative model, the parliamentary model and the multi-agency model as discussed below.
It is important to remark arguments made by other scholars on anti-corruption agencies. For example, Meagher (2005:86) argues that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA) are vulnerable to misuse by politicians and in fact become tools of corruption. According to Pope (2000:104), except in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong, anti-corruption agencies have proven failures. In these countries the committed political leadership, vast popular support, sufficient research capabilities, focus on investigation and prevention through education methods are believed to have contributed to their relative successes (Olowu, 1999:611-612).

2.10. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES OF ZIMBABWE
Among other countries, Zimbabwean local government have anti-corruption measures in their procurement system, namely administrative/bureaucratic, accountability/transparency enhancing, economic/market reforms and democratic enhancing measures. A comprehensive discussion of these will be done below;

2.10.1. Accountability/transparency enhancing measures
Improving accountability and transparency in the delivery and administration of public services often close the loopholes for corruption. Accountability and transparency enhancing measures are enforced in Zimbabwean local institutions by oversight bodies which are the parliament, the Auditor General’s office, Anti-corruption commission, the attorney general’s office and municipal council. In broader sense and in the Zimbabwean context, accountability and transparency measures include independent oversight boards which have been put in place to fight corruption in procumbent activities, among others. These will be discussed below.

The Anti-Corruption Commission was created in terms of Section 108a of the Zimbabwe Constitution of 1996. Its functions are to monitor and examine the practices, systems and procurement procedures of public and private institutions, to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption in society, to educate the public on the dangers of corruption in society, to instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or institution in the elimination or minimization of corruption. The commission also receives and
investigates any complaints alleging any form of corruption; investigates any conduct of any person whom the Commission has reason to believe is connected with activities involving corruption. However, given such constitutional measures obligated to an independent commission, the Transparency international of Zimbabwe views this commission as corrupt. Hence one wonders how effective this measure is.

The office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General was also created in terms of Section 105 of the Zimbabwe Constitution of 1996. The functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are to examine and audit public accounts, make provision for the management and control of public moneys, state property, protect and make the necessary recovery thereof, regulate and control the expenditures of certain statutory bodies and statutory funds. The functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, act as a pillar in the reduction of corruption in public enterprises. However, the Zimbabwean Cabinet disallowed a corruption survey sponsored by the World Bank on these institutions, causing an unrated integrity of such institutions.

2.10.2. Administrative/bureaucratic measures
Administrative or bureaucratic measures were introduced in the form of education on the code of ethics, clear procedures, and salaries scales for public officials and disciplinary action against misconduct of officials, among others. All these strategic measures are enforced by the Zimbabwean Public service commission as enshrined in its constitution. The Constitution of Zimbabwe mandates the Public Service Commission to promote sound values and principles applicable to public administration. The Commission has working guidelines that are supposed to be followed by public officers. It has regulations in place that are aimed at preventing unethical business conduct by public officials in the discharge of their duties and their interaction with the private and not for profit organizations among others (Public Service Act 17 of 2002:10). Officials are for example mandated to disclose their assets and interest to the council before being involved in any tendering process. However, the Anti-Corruption commission (2005-7:6) highlights that the efficiency of any Zimbabwean commission is hindered by lack of resources and unsanctioned recommendations of auditing reports.
Further to the above, the State Procurement Board has the following functions which are important in controlling Zimbabwean local authorities conduct with regard to the procurement of goods and services. The board conducts procurement on behalf of procuring entities, where the procurement is of a class prescribed in procurement regulations; supervise procurement proceedings conducted by procuring entities in order to ensure proper compliance with the requirements of the Act, initiate investigations in terms of its powers and take action pursuant thereon in terms of its powers. The board, however, has no legal powers to arrest but refer all acts of corrupt activities in public enterprises to the Police or Anti-Corruption Commission for investigations. Further to this, the hierarchical nature of the relationship between central and local government also allows central government to supervise local government with a view to bringing it into harmony with national policies. This kind of supervision is intended to enable the supervising authorities to prevent the unlawful use of the funds and other property of local authorities, to prevent corruption and to improve the performance of local authorities, among other things.

2.10.3. Democratic enhancing measures

Democratic enhancing measures include political competition, Civic participation, respect for the rule of law and visible political commitment by leaders to fight corruption. In line with this, local government associations of Zimbabwe namely, Urban Council Associations and Rural District Council Associations play a pivotal role in sanctioning corrupt officials. They demand accountability and make recommendations to the judicial system. Furthermore, the participation of civil society organizations and Non-governmental organizations is one of the anti-corruption measures visible in Zimbabwean local authorities. Ward Development Committees (WDCO), Ward Assemblies, Village Development Committees (VIDCO) and assemblies, Rural District Development committees (RDDC) and Provincial Development Committees (PDC) promote sound local governance and thereby fighting corruption. Non-governmental watchdogs such as transparency international, Zimbabwean charter, act as democratic institutions which demands accountability, efficient and integrity approach to curb
corruption. Hence, Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ) has been frantically trying to form coalitions with the government, civic organizations and other NGOs. It has organized various seminars, workshops and conferences with the aim of ensuring that the Zimbabwean national integrity system is one of openness, fairness and accountability.

2.10.4. Economic/market reforms measures
Market reforms were introduced by Zimbabweans, in the form of privatization of certain services to rip the benefits of competition, prohibition of corrupt businesses and individuals and examining the eligibility of suppliers before awarding any tender. The state and municipal procurement board is central to the market reforms which are based on a fair, economic and efficient process of acquiring services from the private sector. The local authorities in Zimbabwe are required to use competitive bidding system to acquire goods and services, based on procurement regulations. However, as Lambsdorff (2007:106) sees it, that there is no explicit mechanism that exist in Zimbabwe that prevent the arbitrary creation of situations justifying opportunities which result in corruption. And Klitgaard (1992:43) similarly state that, there are many cases where the Zimbabwean public procurement system has been ignored and the possibilities for ineffective or incompetent practices in public procurement have also created and provided a multitude of opportunities for corruption.

However, despite the given measures research evident that corruption is rampant in Zimbabwean procurement system. Hence it against this background, that an assessment of the anti-corruption measures in terms of their effectiveness, will go a long way in improving service delivery in the procurement system, also given the fact that the country is current undergoing political transition.

2.11 LEGAL FRAMEWORK GUIDING ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES OF ZIMBABWE
In support of the above, there are legal texts which discourage corruption in the Local government procurement system. These are the Constitution of Zimbabwe (amendment
17 of 2005), the Procurement Act 2 of 1999 and its regulations, the Urban Council Act 56 of 1995, the Prevention of Corruption Act 34 of 1985 (as amended in 2002), the Anti-corruption Commission Act 13 of 2004 and the Rural District Council Act 8 of 1988. Section 108A of the Zimbabwean Constitution allows for the establishment of the Anti-corruption Commission, which must combat corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improprieties in the conduct of affairs, in both the public and private sectors. This provision is broadened by the Anti-corruption Commission Act which explicitly explains the function and composition of the anti-corruption units in different spheres of government. In line with the SADC Protocol against Corruption, section 13 of this Act allows for the investigation, prosecution and the recovery of assets in both public and private sector by the Anti-corruption Commission through the approval of the Attorney-General’s office. Further to this, the Prevention of Corruption Act provides for the prevention of corruption and the investigation of claims arising from dishonesty or corruption.

In addition to the above, the Procurement Act discourages corruption by describing the rules governing the State Procurement Board, which is established in terms of section 4 of this Act, and also provides for the procedural guideline that are used in procuring goods and services. As the Zimbabwe’s central body whose function is to approve and procure certain services on behalf of government, the Procurement Board ensures compliance with the procurement laws by other procuring entities. Section 15 of this Act also allows for each State part to take the necessary steps in establishing appropriate system of procurement based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision making, that are effective in preventing corruption. Further to this the Rural and Urban Councils Act provides guidelines, among others, for the calling of tenders by municipalities. Basically, this Act places the responsibility of procuring local goods and services to the Municipal Procurement Board which must disease away from corrupt activities.

On top of the procurement Act, there are procurement regulations which prescribe a standardized procedure for public bidding, monitoring and awarding of tenders. These
prescriptions are supposed to be followed by the bids and awards committee of all procurement entities, since it is corruption free. Among other regulations prescribed by the public procurement regulations, corruption is being hindered through the following measures:

- An invitation to bid is being advertised by posting in the premises of the procuring entity, in newspapers of general circulation, the government electronic procurement system and the website of the procuring entity, in line with the principles of transparency and competitiveness.
- The bids and awards committee determines the qualifications of prospective bidders based on the eligibility requirements. The eligibility requirements are provided for, as a fair and equal access to all prospective bidders.
- In the submission and receipt of bids, the technical and financial components of the bid are submitted separately, though simultaneously. The envelopes containing the bid are not opened before the designated date and time. A bidder may modify or withdraw his bid only before the deadline for receipt of bids.
- Bid Security serves as a guarantee that the winning bidder shall enter into a contract with the procuring entity.
- The bids and awards committee publicly open all bids at a time, place and date specified in the bidding documents.
- Upon recommendation of the bids and awards committee, the lowest calculated responsive bid or the highest rated responsive bid will be awarded the contract by the head of the procuring entity who shall likewise issue the notice to proceed.
- Prior to the signing of the contract, the winning bidder shall, as a measure of guarantee for the faithful performance and compliance of his obligations, be required to post a performance security. While public bidding is the preferred mode of public procurement, there are alternative methods provided by law, in order to promote economy and efficiency and provided that the most advantageous price for the government is obtained.

The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) sets out corrupt activities for which a person may be prosecuted. Section 3(1) of the PCA spells out corrupt practices by private
persons for which they can be prosecuted. For public officials it is an offence if, in the course of their employment they (a) do anything that is contrary to or inconsistent with their duties as public officers; or (b) they omit to do anything which it is their duty as public officers to do. These acts or omissions must be done for the purpose of showing favour or disfavour to any person. Hence, at local government level in Zimbabwe, section 4 of this Act allows the Minister of local government to suspend any councillor who is reasonably suspected of contravening any provision of the PCA.

In terms of the Urban and Rural District Council’s Act, one means by which the central government supervises local government is monitoring. Monitoring relates to the establishment of mechanisms aimed at continuously looking into the general performance of local government and to see whether there is compliance with the relevant legislation. It is an ongoing exercise done by national government, through the Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development, to test, now and again, local government compliance with legislation and national government policies. In addition, the central government engages in intervention, often issuing ministerial directives, making or adopting by-laws on behalf of councils, overturning council resolutions and decisions and dismissing councillors. Hence, the national government has a say in local government procurement system, especially on issues the encourage conformity to the national law.

2.12. CONCLUSIONS
An extensive survey of literature on the conceptions, causes and consequences of corruption provided the background to this chapter and various anti-corruption approaches and strategic measures, at global level, were explored on the basis of this. Then the focus shifted to the local government anti-corruption mechanisms implemented by the Zimbabwean procurement system. The chapter concluded by providing the supporting legal framework in place to reduce corruption. Literature review gave a clear understanding of the research topic under review through published work. The next chapter provides an account of how the research design and methodology were carried out in the study.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION
The first chapter introduced the study, its background and context, the research problem, the research question, research objectives and the significance of evaluating the efficacy of anti-corruption measures in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality in Mashonaland East of Zimbabwe. It concluded by delimiting the study. Chapter two provided literature review on anti-corruption strategic measures and the procurement system stemming from corruption.

This chapter outlines the research design and methodology used in the study. This chapter outlines the case design and mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) as specific systematic and orderly approach taken towards the collection of data in Marondera municipal area. The reasons for the choice of the case study designs are also detailed. The research subjects, or the population of the study, the sampling and the sampling process, the research instruments, the data collection procedure and the data presentation and analysis procedure are discussed in this chapter as well. The chapter concludes by outlining how the collected data will analysed and by pointing out what will be covered in the subsequent chapter.

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
Research design is a systematic strategy and plan for selecting, rationalizing, and organizing the sequence of procedures for collecting and handling the evidence on the basis of the research questions or the research problem which are to be answered or solved (Shumba 2004:4). Mouton (1996:107) defines a research design as a set of guidelines and instructions to be followed in addressing the research problem; it is the guide that enables the researcher to anticipate appropriate research decisions so as to maximize the validity of the eventual results. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2000:30), a research design is a plan, structure and strategy of investigating so
conceived as to obtain answers to research questions or research problems. This plan is the complete scheme or programme of the research and it includes an outline which an investigator will carry out from writing the hypothesis or questions and their operational implications to the final analysis of data. The researcher chose the case study Design in this study because the nature of this design suited the problem under study. The design chosen was aimed at evaluating the efficacy of anti-corruption strategic measures in Marondera municipality.

According to Babbie (2008:326) a case study involves an in-depth examination of a single instance of some social phenomenon and in this case, Marondera municipality. The choice of a case study is based on the researcher’s knowledge of the subject under study, existing theoretical knowledge on the subject matter and experience of the researcher (Collins et al. 2000:100). In a case study research design, use is made of logical and or analytical induction - in other words, the researcher studies one case/event or specific number of cases/events regarding a specific subject and then analyses the information obtained in detail. Geoffrey, David and David (2005:148) citing Yin (1994) state that a case study design must have five components which are the research questions, its propositions, its unit(s) of analysis, determination of how the data are linked to the propositions and criteria to interpret the findings.

A case study approach focuses on the element that is typical, and rather unique. The subjects of a case study are selected with circumspection so that the unit that is studied is a typical one. With a case study approach, data may be collected by means of various techniques such as questionnaires, observation of physical characteristics, social qualities and data reported in specific documents (Collins et al. 2000:99). According to Mouton (2001:149) a case study research design is usually qualitative in nature and, its aim is to provide an in-depth description of a small number of cases. It is suitable for studying organizations/events over a period.
3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
On the other hand, the most important consideration in choosing the research methodology for this study was the demands of most of the research questions. Strauss and Corbin (2000:1) write that research methodology is a scientific process that seeks to provide answers to questions through a systematic approach with the support of credible data. It serves as guide to a researcher on the procedure to be followed when interacting with the participants. The specific methodology should assist the researcher to be ethical and sensitive to the issues when conducting a particular study as well. It is a way to systematically value the research problem. Hence, according to Strauss and Corbin (2000:1) methodology is a way of thinking about and studying social reality. As such, methodology is therefore a system of methods and procedures followed to collect data and information pertinent to the study. Various approaches are found, for example the qualitative and quantitative approaches. This study thus, used a mixed method approach.

The purpose, nature and information sought of this research can equally flow under a mixed approach which considers both qualitative and quantitative methods. Hence, a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods was possible in this research project. The study adopted a mixed methods approach in order to evaluate the efficacy of anti-corruption strategies in the procurement process of Marondera Municipality. The mixed methods research is defined as the class of research where the researcher combines both quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, concepts and language into a single study (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:20). Under the mixed approach, the researcher utilised interview and filling in questionnaires, as data collecting instruments.

According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 12) mixed method research involves qualitative and quantitative projects being mixed in more than one stage of the study (questions, research methods, data collection and data analysis, as well as the interpretation or inference process). This can be made possible, for example, when a researcher conducts surveys with a large group of individuals, while concurrently
conducting in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of those individuals. In taking this dual approach the researcher seeks to find general trends in the target population and also aims to provide greater detail regarding any unexpected findings that may arise. Mixed method research involves collecting or analyzing quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003: 696). The data is collected concurrently or sequentially and only the data is integrated at one or more stages during the research process. This mixing is often referred to as triangulation in social science research.

3.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of the study provides the conceptual, time and area on which the research was conducted. The study for this dissertation was conducted in Zimbabwe (Marondera Municipality of Mashonaland East Province). Marondera Municipality is situated 74km from the capital city of Zimbabwe (Harare). It was established in 1890 as a resting place along Harare-Mutare railway and named after Marondera the Sub chief of the Mbire tribe who lived in the Nyameni hills. In 1913 a village management board was formed, in 1943 a town management board was formed, in 1968 a town council was formed and subsequently a municipal status was achieved in 1974. It attained a milestone achievement in 1984 when Marondera was declared the provincial capital of Mashonaland east, which implied a service to the entire province (see annexure C for map).

In line with the time scope for the study, the researcher will focus on the period Marondera municipality attained its provincial status (1974) up to the current constitutional processes (2010). This is because the researcher believes a new political dispensation is set to come with new anti-corruption reforms. Hence, an assessment of the previous employed measures act as a basis for changing, the promising, and constitutional laws.

Reasons attached to the chosen area of the study were that the researcher is a citizen and a permanent resident of Zimbabwe. This was an advantage to empirical data collection since it required fewer resources (time and money). Secondly, corruption is high in Zimbabwe, as evident by other scholars. This made the research setting
appropriate. Thirdly, reports of rampant corruption and weak anti-corruption measures proved to be pointing against Zimbabwe, hence an empirical study added to that body of knowledge and triangulated the already made hypothesis. As a developing African country, lessons drawn from the study was intended to be customized to other African countries since they already have close interactions.

Corruption in general is discussed to contextualise literature but the main focus was on evaluating the efficacy of anti-corruption strategic measures already implemented in Zimbabwean local procurement processes. This demanded preliminary visits by the researcher to the Ministry of Local Government, where an overall picture of the anti-corruption measures implemented in the procurement system of local authorities was obtained. Then visits were made to Marondera Municipality and communities. Major departments that build up the Municipality are:

1. Chamber Secretary (Central administration department)
2. Finance Department
3. Department of Housing and Community Services
4. Department of Engineering

For purposes of triangulation the researcher surveyed departments of the Municipality at their head office and in all their distribution centers. It also surveyed the council representatives (councilors) and communities where citizens reside. For the purpose of focusing the research and easy accessibility, the main units of study were the Chamber Secretary (central administration department) and the Departments of Finance were procurement (purchasing and supply) was done. (See Marondera Municipality Organogram in annexure D).

3.5 POPULATION AND SAMPLING METHODS/DESIGN

According to Mouton (1996:34) a population refers to a collection of objects, events or individuals having some common characteristics that the researcher is interested in studying. In line with the above view, Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:87) defines a target population as a set of elements that the researcher focuses upon and to which results
obtained by testing the sample should be generalized. Babbie (2004:110) writes that a target population is that group, usually people, from which the researchers is required to draw conclusions. In this study, the target population consisted of the municipal management officials, senior managers in the procurement process including those from private companies that offer services on behalf of the municipality, Councilors, and the citizens within the community. It mostly targeted the current 374 permanent, 128 causal municipal workers, Councilors from the 21 wards in the Municipality and senior management employees selected from four departments, particularly from finance, works, central administration and housing and community services. This is because they are directly affected by corruption activities that usually generate from the procurement system. It was not possible to collect data from everyone in the categories that was researched. Hence, the research was based on a portion of the target population. Thus, sampling was an efficient and effective method for studying a population.

3.5.1 Sampling Design

The available common sampling designs are probability (simple random, systematic, stratified, and cluster), and non-probability (convenience sampling, purposive sampling and quota sampling) (O'Sullivan and Rassel, 1989:106-141). Given the nature of this dissertation, it was found to be more appropriate to use a non-probability sampling method. Although non-probability samples generally are considered to be more accurate and rigorous, there may be circumstances where it is not feasible, practical or theoretically sensible to consider them in applied social research. Having had a plan in mind and a defined group of respondents, the researcher approached the sampling problem with a purposive/judgmental and snowball sampling methods. Accordingly, the researcher identified a group of persons who met the criteria for inclusion in the study and asked the particular persons to recommend others who might meet the criteria. Baker (1988:159) writes that Snowball involves approaching a single case that is involved in the phenomenon being investigated in order to gain information on other similar cases which makes a sample. In this study the researcher is a subject that is not directly involved in the implementation of anti-corruption measures in the procurement
system of Marondera municipality, so it was possible to use snowball sampling as some important participants were identified as the research ensued.

In the same vein, purposive sampling does not use random selection but was based on the judgments of the researcher. Warwick and Linenger (1975:74) write that in purposive sampling, sample elements are chosen by the researchers using their own discretion about which informants are typical or representative. Nel (2001:345) clarifies this point by arguing that, sampling procedures must be designed so that samples of the actual population are collected accurately and consistently and reflect the concentrations of the population at the place and time of research. Thus, the objective of choosing this sampling procedure was to select a sample that was representative of the population. The researcher also used purposive sampling because the selected respondents gave direction on where to collect data. This is in line with, Polit and Hungler (1991:40) who suggest that the logic and power behind purposive selection is on information richness. The companies which offer services on behalf of the municipality and relevant respondents in the central administration and finance department were identified through this process.

The sample for the study composed of the 11 municipal and private companies’ management officials, 23 administrative officers and employees within the procurement unit and 40 community members and 6 Councilors.
Table 3.1. Summary of respondents sampled from the targeted population (N=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Male(s)</th>
<th>Female(s)</th>
<th>Sample(N)</th>
<th>Male(s)</th>
<th>Female(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TC(MM)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GME</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC(X)</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>700 000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 000 542</td>
<td>300 034</td>
<td>700 238</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TC: Town Clerk (Municipal Manager)
MSM: Municipal Senior Managers
MO: Management Officials from the municipality and municipal service providers
MAO: Municipal Administration Official and Employees within the Procurement Unit
GME: General Municipal Employees
C: Councillors
MC(X): Municipal Citizens (Approximate figure)

Careful sampling was also done in this study for the following reasons: Sampling enabled the researcher to study a relatively small section of the population and still was able to gather data representative of the whole population, gathering data on a sample was less time consuming and less costly for the researcher, hence the sample produced more accurate data economically and was feasible to use a sample because a complete coverage of the total population was seldom possible and all members of the population could not be reached.

3.6 DATA COLLECTION METHOD AND PROCEDURES

Data collection is a form of collecting information from various sources. This can be done through a number of instruments. In this study, two sources of data were used,
that is, primary and secondary source. Literature from unpublished and published articles, journals and newspapers was regarded as secondary sources of data, whereas information derived from the population targeted in the research became primary data. Layder (1993:54) identifies a number of instruments that can be used to gather data; among these are interviews, intakes forms, questionnaires surveys and attendance records. In this study, questionnaires and interviews were used to gather and triangulate data from the respondents.

According to Kumar (2005:126) a questionnaire is an instrument used for collecting data by means of written questions which calls for responses on the part of the respondent. In this study structured self-administered questionnaires were designed by the researcher and completed by the respondents from Marondera Municipality. They consisted of both open-ended and closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions enabled respondents to fully express their views freely and to give detailed and precise information. De Vos et al (2005:175) write that closed-ended questions enable the respondents to understand the meaning of the questions better, questions are answered within the same framework and responses can consequently be compared with one another. Ultimately, this was achieved. Open-ended and closed-ended questions gave accurate and adequate information about the situation on the ground in terms of the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Marondera municipality. Questionnaires were deemed appropriate because according to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:38-39) they allowed the collection of a lamp sum of data to many respondents in a given period of time.

The choice of the questionnaire was also informed by the following advantages: they were less expensive and required much less skill to administer, they were used to reach a large number of people simultaneously, they gave respondents greater confidence in their anonymity so they gave out information freely especially on the views they fear might be disapproved or might get them into trouble; and generally questionnaires gave respondents ample time to fill them out hence each answer was considered carefully, this reduced mistakes and respondents’ inconveniences.
However, the researcher was aware of the following disadvantages of questionnaires: the respondents might have provided responses they thought would please the researcher and this might not reflect their true perceptions and attitudes, thus distorting the facts. Some respondents might have chosen not to answer all questions and no reasons might be given for the omission and valuable information might have been lost as the answers would be usually brief especially in close-ended questions (Kumar, 2005:130). This was overcome by increasing the size of the sample.

In the same vein, an interview is a conversation between two or more people where questions are asked to obtain information from the interviewee. Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:98) explain that the interview is a method in which the interviewer obtains responses from a subject in a face-to-face encounter or through a telephone call or electronic means. Face to face and telephonic interviews were used in this study. The researcher made use of structured interviews with planned and detailed questions. According to Brink (1996:158-159) structured interviews are formalized so that all respondents hear the same questions in the same order and in the same manner. The structured interview with the councillors, town clerk and procurement officers was designed, mostly to provide qualitative information. The researcher was able to discuss with respondents in their vernacular and in a social manner they understood and felt free to express their views.

The researcher commenced the field work with a post-modern view of reality. The data gathered were interpreted to reflect the usefulness and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures to procurement system, and the perceived level of corruption in Marondera Municipality. Subjectivity in the data that reflect the views, perceptions and opinions of the respondents was obviously available. These personal opinions measure, among others, the main causes of corruption in procurement processes, and the effectiveness of, already identified four categories of anti-corruption measures with particular reference to the strategy behind the implemented measure.
The selected respondents were chosen mainly because they were able to give their assessment of the effectiveness of identified anti-corruption measures. However, reluctance to cooperate in this survey was suspected, due to the sensitivity nature of the topic and consequently a generic questionnaire was formulated. Most of the questions were open-ended though superficial to elicit the required information.

The constructivist paradigm was followed during the interview process. Although the researcher had ready-made questions, he mostly relied on responses for the next question, therefore using a response-guide approach. In this strategy, the interviewer begins with a prepared question, and then spontaneously creates follow-up queries, logically extending the previous question (Thomas, 2003:64). The face-to-face interviews were chosen, among other reasons, because they provide greater flexibility and personal control than do questionnaires. The interviews were conducted by the researcher himself, and most of them lasted between thirty minutes to an hour. Some respondents didn’t want to be audio-taped, as they feared victimization when luscious information was provided and in some cases the audio-taping was perceived to be too inhibiting and was abandoned in favour of manual note-taking. This kind of change in direction is accepted in the constructivist paradigm, as a researcher has to keep on learning about what is required in the process. When issues of which he had not been aware were presented, the researcher had to conduct some unstructured and informal interviews. Some interviewee requested a written copy of the research, and this accordingly was promised to be supplied by email once completed. In-depth interviews were conducted with 5 senior municipal employees and 2 councilors. The respondents were from the black African race and both genders. Interestingly, there were no visible differences in type and quality of responses along gender lines.

Secondary data was also collected from municipal books, academic journals, earlier research, media reports (which could not be taken as reliable when such reports lacked rigorousness and objectivity), and the archival collections of the institution concerned. These sources were easily accessible because the research was directly involved with
the municipality and other sources. The literature reviews spanned the period from the 1960s to the present.

3.7 MEASUREMENTS, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

Measurements, as stated by Kumar (2005:153), is the process observing and recording the observations that are collected as part of a research effort. Based on Kumar’s view the researcher used the interviews and questionnaires as the measurements for the study. Kumar (2005:154) further state that, there are two major issues that will be considered here, validity and reliability of measurements. Kumar (2005:153) views validity as the ability of an instrument to measure what it is designed to measure. Smith (1991) as cited in Kumar (2005:153) confers that, ‘validity is the degree to which the researcher has measured what he or she has set out to measure’. Hence validity is associated with providing answers to whether are we measuring what we think we are measuring? It avoids scenarios whereby an n instrument such as a research questionnaire or interview diverts form the intended goal and end-up measuring totally deferent phenomena. As a result, validity endeavours to ensure that there is a cordial linkage between the research hypothesis or the research questions and the item in a measuring instrument. Kumar (2005:154) postulates that, validity can be categorised into three main classes, namely; face and content validity, construct validity as well as concurrent and predictive validity. In this study the research sought expert advice on how to ensure that all the types of validity are attained and sustained in the data collection instruments used in the study.

Reliability can be seen as the extent to which a questionnaire, test, observation or any measurement procedure is able to produce the same results on repeated trials. Succinctly, it is the stability or consistency of scores over time or across raters. For Kumar (2005: 456) reliability seeks to check the consistency and stability as well as the predictability and accuracy of a measurement tool. Hence a more consistent scale will be classified as a more reliable one. Researchers should design measurement scales which have got a great deal of precision to ensure that the results can be trusted and
adopted by various stakeholders in any given study. The wording of questions, physical setting, respondent’s mood and the nature of interaction as well as the regression effect of an instrument are the main factors affecting the reliability of a research instrument (Kumar, 2005: 157). The researcher consulted the questionnaires and interview samples and guides from other reputable researcher and organization such as the United Nations Organization (UNO) to act as benchmarks for the construction of the data collection tools used in the study. Thus the study was quite conscious of the need to ensure validity and reliability of the measurement instruments as the building blocks to a valid and reliable study. Such validity and reliability assurance made it possible for the various stakeholders identified under the significance of the study in chapter one to consider adopting and implementing some of the recommendations which the researcher made at the end of the study in chapter five.

3.8 DATA ANALYSIS
This is a process of interpreting and making sense of what respondents would have said about the topic under investigation. Data analysis is also the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data. Mouton (1996:108) describes data analysis as involving ‘breaking up’ the data into manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships. As already indicated earlier, the research utilised both quantitative and qualitative techniques of data analysis. Babbie and Mouton (2001:50) define quantitative analysis as the numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect. On the other hand qualitative analysis is a non numerical representation of data. The data collected was coded and categorized in themes using computer software in order to see their patterns and interrelatedness as this allowed for a comprehensive analysis, interpretation and discussion of collected data. The themes then ground the arguments that were presented in the discussion of chapter four. Questionnaire items were categorized into themes and then coded so as to reduce the amount of data to manageable and understandable texts.
Data display techniques was also used in this study. Kumar (2005:248) contends that the main purpose of using data-display techniques is to make the findings clear and easily understood. In the analysis of data sets, typical techniques included tabulations, and the use of statistical graphs (bar and pie charts) for more visual presentations (Mouton 2001:153). The computer software that was used in the study was Microsoft excel and Microsoft Word which enabled the production of graphs among other things possible. Data presentation, analysis and discussion were arranged according to research study questions as outlined in the introductory chapter of the study.

3.9 ETHICAL ISSUES

According to Welman (2005: 181) ethical consideration come in play at three stages, that is when participants are recruited, during intervention and in the release of results. According to Bak (2004:28) any research that involves people must show an awareness of the ethical considerations and an agreement to conduct the research in accordance with ethical procedures. Ethical guidelines serve as standards and as basis on which the researcher ought to evaluate his own conduct. In this study, ethical issues such as permission to collect data were first sought, confidentiality, informed consent, and voluntary participation was strictly observed and adhered to, for the purpose of avoiding misunderstanding with the respondents and authorities concerned. Permission was sought from the municipal authorities before the questionnaires were distributed and before the interviews were conducted (see letter of permission attached). All respondents were assured that whatever information that was collected from them through the questionnaire and interview surveys was to be used for academic purposes only.

The informed consent allowed the researcher to obtain permission from the respondent, after they have been thoroughly and truthfully informed about the purpose of investigation. The respondents involved were fully informed about the study and how the intended data would be collected. An explanation was provided on what the information was to be used for, and how it was to be handled on the cover page of every questionnaire. The respondents were also assured of confidentiality in the
treatment of data collected. Hence the study first informed participants about the purpose and activities involved in the study before individuals could actually participate in the study.

The right to privacy, which according to Welman et al (2005: 181) include the assurance given to respondents, that certain information will not to be disclosed, especially which is unrelated to the study, such as the names of respondents. This study did not disclose the names of participants or even their addresses, hence confidentiality was observed. And lastly, the respondents were given assurance that the research will not cause any harm in particular emotional harm in terms of the procedures taken and research results produced. This assurance was based on the word of mouth, particularly about the importance of the research study.

3.10 CONCLUSION
This chapter alluded to the various methods applied to gather data. The researcher had to collect data by himself. Questionnaire filling and interviews were used to collect data from the municipal employees, service providers, councilors and communities. The response rate experienced was very high. Snowball and purposive sampling techniques were used to identify respondents. A sample of municipal management employees, councilors, administrative employees from both the central and finance department and private service providers participated in this study. The researcher is of the opinion that the methodology used to collect data provides a true reflection of the information required. The next chapter addresses the findings of the study.
CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an analysis of the findings from the data collected after the interaction with the respondents. Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods were used to give the readers in-depth understanding of the results and the opinions of the community and individuals in Marondera Municipality. It is important to note that nowhere in the analysis are the names of the respondents mentioned, basically to protect their anonymity. The data was analyzed and interpreted concurrently to address the research questions given under Chapter One and in some instances made reference to Literature Review under Chapter Two. In this study the coding procedure was used to reduce the information into different data themes, on which the frequency of these themes were presented graphically and analysed. To that end, the purpose of this chapter is to present, analyze, and interpret the data collected from the respondents sampled.

4.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

Chapter 3 indicated that self administered questionnaires were distributed and interviews were conducted to the respondents in Marondera Municipal area. The selected respondents were used by the researcher to represent the larger population. Interviews were conducted as planned. Face to face interviews were in some cases substituted with telephonic interviews. Thus, seventeen interviews (100% response rate) were conducted with Councilors, the Town clerk and management employees. Not all distributed questionnaires were received as planned by the researcher. Sixty-three out of Eighty-three respondents completed and returned their questionnaires. Thirty-five municipal citizens, twelve administration employees and sixteen General municipal employees returned their questionnaires. This gave a total response rate of 80%. In line with this, Bailey (1982:165) is of the view that, a response figure of at least fifty percent (50%) should be sufficient for analysis of the data, a figure of sixty percent
(60%) can be seen as “good” and a figure of seventy percent (70%) can be seen as “very good”. Hence this study had a very good response rate which is acceptable for analysis.

**4.2.1 Demographic Details of the Respondents**
The following pie charts show the gender, age, marital status, level of education and ethnic group of the respondents. This data was used to correlate specific responses on the efficacy of anti-corruption strategies in the procurement processes of Marondera municipality with the demographic details.

**4.2.1.1 Gender**
The respondents used by the researcher consisted of both males and females. Within the respondents seventeen (17) were interviewed and sixty-six (63) returned their filled questionnaires. A great gender disparity was observed in that only thirty-five (35) respondents were females out of eighty (80) respondents. This shows that forty-five (45) respondents were males. This then translates to fifty-six percent (56%) of male respondents and forty-four percent (44%) of female respondents within the municipality.

The community members consisted of sixteen (16) females and nineteen (19) males. This shows that forty-six percent (46%) of females represented the community respondents and fifty-four percent (54%) represented male community respondents. On top of this, municipal employees were (19) females and seven (24) males. This then translates to forty-four percent (44%) females and fifty-six percent (56%) males. A slight male dominance in local authorities was identified. Hence, it is clear from the above that the municipality still needs to address the issue of gender equity, when addressing corruption issues. It was important to identify the gender of respondents in order to make the sample representative. The combined gender disparity for both the staff within the municipality and the residents within the community can be represented graphically as shown in figure 4.2.1.1:
Figure, 4.2.1.1 Gender Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.2.1.2 Age Distribution**

The age of the respondents indicated that they were all mature with the highest age range being 50+ and 21-29 being the lowest age range in the age groups. 28%, that is twenty-two (22) of the respondents had ages that ranged from 21-29, 33% ranged from 30-39 (26 respondents) while 22 % (18 respondents) had ages ranging from 40-49. Only 17% (14 respondents) were above 50 years. Maturity in terms of age was identified by the researcher as a source that will validate the responses given. Hence, all responses come from mature respondents. The figure 4.2.1.2 shows the age group distribution of the respondents.
4.2.1.3 Ethnic Groups

Though, a majority of respondents indicated that they were black African, a surprising response came from 18 questionnaire respondents who preferred not to say their ethnic group. This can be interpreted that some respondents from minority ethnic groups feared victimization, as they felt minor to the whole population. Thus, discrimination was sensed in the systems of Zimbabwean local authorities. Hence, 62 respondents indicated that they were from the black ethnic group. This is translated to 78% of the respondents. There were no whites and coloured respondents, hence resulted of this study will be black dominated.
4.2.1.4 Marital Status

The majority of respondents are married. This was proved by the evidence of 71% (57 respondents) of the respondents who indicated that they were married. 4% (3 respondents) of the respondents were single. 15% (12 respondents) of the respondents were divorced whereas 10% (8 respondents) were widowed. Thus, different social realities of respondents also validated similar responses. This can further be related to the characteristic and social reality of the respondents, hence their responds to the effectiveness of anti-corruption is equated to their social reality.
4.2.1.5 Educational Qualifications

Most of the municipality citizens had access to Primary and Ordinary Level education. 41% (33 respondents) of the respondents were in possession of a Professional certificate or Diploma. 24% (19 respondents) had obtained a general degree. 5% (4 respondents) of the respondents had a master's degree. Although the researcher could not get hold of anyone with a Doctorate degree (PhD), it was clear that the majority of respondents had access to tertiary institutions. The literacy level of respondents is very high. This meant that most of these respondents were professionals, who were acquainted with professional and community ethics.
4.2.2 Evaluating Corruption and Anti-corruption measures in the Procurement Process of Marondera Municipality

This section answers most of the research questions and fulfill the main objective of this study in chapter one, hence a separate data presentation of bar graph was use by the research to differentiate from the previously used pie charts.

4.2.2.1 Importance of corruption in the Procurement process

To get a feel for the general perception of respondents regarding corruption, the following question was asked in both interviews and fill-in questionnaires: ‘how important do you think the issue of corruption is in Marondera Municipality?’ Out of the 17 interview respondents plus the 63 fill-in questionnaire respondents, who also answered the open ended questions, 91% (73 respondents) of them think that the issue of corruption in Marondera Municipality is very important. As the question asked was in open-ended format, they took time to explain why corruption is important. Another related open-ended question was: ‘how much emphasis should be given to fight corruption in procurement process?’ This question was asked as a follow up question.
An overwhelming majority of 95% of respondents (76 respondents) who think that high emphasis should be given to fight corruption. Reasons attached to that will be discussed on the qualitative analysis section. However, this indicated that little was done in terms of effective measures to curb corruption.

Figure, 4.2.2.1 Importance of corruption

4.2.2.2 The extent of corruption in the Procurement Process
The respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption in Marondera Municipality using the terms, ‘corruption is a fact of life or a way of life.’ Based on literature review in chapter two, corruption was already evident to exist in Marondera Municipality. The two responses were meant to identify the prevalent of corruption. Hence, those respondents who indicate that corruption is a way of life in Marondera Municipality meant that it was extremely prevalent and those who mentioned that it is a fact of life meant that it was moderately prevalent. The perceptions are divided into two groups: those who perceive low (moderate) level of corruption and those who perceptive extreme (high) levels. 86% (69) of the respondents do not believe that corruption is non-existent, but it is moderately prevalent as compared to 11 (14%) respondents. This meant that most of the respondents supports that Marondera Municipality enjoys low levels of corruption in relation to other Municipalities. Further analysis was conducted on the perception of the
level of corruption to determine if there was variation based on other independent variables such as gender, age group, education qualification, ethnic group or social status in the Municipality. No significant patterns of differences were detected from these variables.

**Figure, 4.2.2.2 the extent (Level) of corruption**

![The Extent of Corruption graph]

- **86%** believe corruption as a fact of life.
- **14%** believe corruption as a way of life.

### 4.2.2.3 Corruption Loopholes in the Procurement Process

46% (23) of the respondents believe that those involved in the awarding of tenders and those who actual deliver the services on behalf of Marondera municipality are more corrupt than those who plan, budget and solicits for tenders. Thus, 17% (11) believe that corruption is more prevalent in the procurement system when the relevant authorities are compiling the request for proposals or tender documents and conducting the pre-evaluation, and 37% (29 respondents) believe that corruption is prevalent when relevant entities determine what goods or services it likes to buy (the requirement) and how much it would like to spend (the budget).
4.2.2.3 Corruption Loopholes in the Procurement Process

![Corruption Loopholes in the Procurement Process](image)

4.2.2.4 Causes of Corruption Stemming from Ineffective Anti-Corruption Strategies in the Procurement System

Most of the respondent indicated that administrative strategies to curb corruption were ineffective. These were 29 respondents translated to 41% of the total number of respondents who had this believe. This, as reviewed by literature in chapter two, automatically suggest the type of corruption as being incidental than in cases were it is extremely caused by lack of democratic factors. When administrative / bureaucratic measures to curb corruption are ineffective, literature reviewed indicate that corruption is moderate. Hence, the procurement process in Marondera municipality has moderate, incidental type of corruption. Others estimations indicates that 25% (16) respondents believing that market reforms to curb corruption are ineffective. This, then means that private sector participation in the fight against corruption is limited in the procurement processes.
4.2.2.5 Category of measures that need to be implemented effectively

The researcher wanted the respondents to recommend effective anti-corruption measures from the categories of four already implemented measures, and to correlate the recommendations with the already indicated causes of corruption (Figure, 4.2.2.4). Evidence shows that an improvement in the implementation of administrative measures reduces corruption. Hence, 35% (22) of the respondents believe that administrative reforms need to be effectively implemented. This is similarly indicated by the 41% (29) of respondents who believe that corruption in procurement of Marondera municipality is partially caused by ineffective administrative measures. Others indicated the democratic enhancing measures (9 translated to 14%), whilst 37% (23) and 14% (9) indicated that market reforms and transparency measures respectively.
4.2.2.6 Overall Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the Procurement process to fight corruption

85% (68) of the respondents are not satisfied with the overall effectiveness of anti-corruption measures implemented in the procurement system. Only 4% (3) and 11% (9) indicated that these measures are more effective and effective, respectively. A further analysis of the satisfaction levels, on the basis gender, educational qualification, marital status and the ward communities’ proximity to the municipal head office was also correlated. These variables did not provide significant changes in responses. Thus, all respondents believe that the anti-corruption measures are less effective.
Figure, 4.2.2.6 Overall Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the Procurement process to fight corruption

**Overall Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the Procurement process to fight corruption**

4.3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The qualitative approach stems from the interpretative approach, it is ideographic and thus holistic in nature, and aims mainly to understand social life and the meaning that people attach to everyday life. In its broad sense it refers to research that elicits participant accounts of meaning, experiences or perceptions. De vos et al (2005:33) writes that the purpose of conducting a qualitative study is to produce findings. Patton (2002:432) further states that qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. This involves reducing the volume of raw information, sifting significance from trivia, identifying significant patterns and constructing a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveals. Hence, De Vos et al (2005:33) views qualitative data analysis as a search for general statements about relationships among categories of data.

This section of the analysis outlines the views captured by both open-ended questionnaires and interviews on the types, manifestations, causes, challenges and suggested solution to the corruption cases found in procurement processes. The
respondents had the same set of questions and their responses were coded and
categorized into themes.

4.3.1 Types, Causes and Manifestations of Corruption in Marondera municipality
Procurement System

According to the respondents the main types of corruption in the procurement system of
Marondera Municipality are; incidental, speed, petty and redistributive in nature, though
grand and state captured type were also indicated.

The clearest finding is that the weaknesses in the municipal personnel system are
viewed as the most important causes of corruption. Lack and non-payment of adequate
salaries and lack of meritocratic policies were indicated as forcing official to find means
to ends meet. Similarly, respondents indicated that municipal salaries had not been
revised since 2009 and they were below the poverty datum line, leading to the
researcher speculating that inadequate pay may contribute to petty corruption. This is
supported by Pope (1998:45) who argues that there is little doubt that inadequate pay
contributes to corruption, at least at petty level if not throughout the system. As many
local Authorities in developing countries are simply not in a financial position to pay high
salaries, official are caught in a vicious, self-perpetuating spiral. Literature review in
chapter two also supported these views by stating that; low pay leads to bribery (offer
and receipt of a benefit), embezzlement (theft of resources by persons entrusted with
authority and control) and fraud (action and behaviour that entice others into providing a
benefit). However, low salaries were attributed by municipal management to
overstaffing (claims by respondents of over 500 employees who got compounded to
Marondera Municipality in 2009 after cabinet directive to transfer water and sewer
deliverables from ZINWA to local authorities) and closure of municipal income
generating projects. Unenforced meritocratic policies which manifested in the form of
politically motivated hiring of contractors, patronage and lack of clear rules on hiring
contractors were also indicated as some of the forms of procurement corruption.
Respondents also claim that bureaucratic mechanisms to curb corruption are not effectively enforced. Reference was made to cases that were experienced by the municipality. Examples included the tender processes which were not followed according to section 211 of the Urban Councils Act chapter 29:15 subsection 2(a) and (b). One particular incident indicated included Blackbrew investment which was alleged to have brought the refuse truck to council for viewing before the tender was floated and this resulted in council resolving to purchase a refuse truck. It is in the researchers views that such a case is not fair to other bidders who did not have the chance to show their products before the tender was floated. Further analysis was conducted on the perceptions of respondents on the cases of corruption. A majority perception on lack of transparency was evident from the responses given.

Another indication of economic hardships generally experienced by Zimbabwean citizens was clearly evident as the cause of corruption. Zimbabwean economy started dilapidating in year 2000, characterized by closure of manufacturing business, galloping inflation and general poverty. This has forced the Zimbabweans to adopt a rent-seeking and self-serving attitude, as indicated by some of the interview respondents. Other incidents of corruption claimed to prevail in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality included those caused by conflict of interest (awarding contracts to companies where perpetrators have vested interests), greed (intense and selfish desire for wealth), nepotism (awarding tenders to family members even when there are better bidders), weak internal accountability and transparency mechanisms and lack of exemplary ethical leaders.

It is clear from above, that the leading factors that are contributing to corruption in Marondera municipality are lack of transparency and accountability in the larger political processes, weakness in pay and in personnel system, lack of corruption reporting system, and deficiencies in individual attitudes and values. The first applies to the political system as a whole, the second and third deal with municipal organizational systems (thus, scholars suggest that attractive financial incentive, support regulation, detections of corruption and punishment can reduce corruption in this scenario), the last
factor deals with individual shortcomings. A comparison of those who believe corruption is moderate or minimal and those who feel it is high or extreme with respect to the causes of corruption did not reveal any significant differences. However, each potential cause of corruption was consistently rated higher by those who believe corruption is high than those who believe moderate in terms of absolute value given to each cause of corruption while the ranking or ordering remained virtually the same.

4.3.2 Challenges Faced in the Fight against Corruption

The researcher wanted to identify the problems faced in the implementation of the traditional four categories of anti-corruption measures and other strategies in the procurement system of Marondera municipality to fight corruption. It was surprising to note that most of the causes of corruption were also claimed by respondents to be challenges faced in the implementation of anti-corruption measures in the procurement system. However, other respondents claim that the municipality is current in a dire financial position which resulted from lack of sustainable income generating projects, mismanagement and outstanding debts. Interview respondents also claim that the council is already spending 80% of its revenue on salaries and wages, instead of the prescription by the Urban Councils Act which provides that Municipalities must use the ratio of 30/70 for staff costs and service provision, respectively. Some of the respondents claim that many offenders are not brought before justice through disciplinary process when they are found to be corrupt. Hence there is lack of enforcement of the anti-corruption measures.

Moreover, respondents claim that; there is role conflict in the municipality springing from top management, politicians and other influential employees bully and victimise those who wants to blow the whistle, political involvement in daily administrative activities is affecting professional administration, misconception of corruption with professional business connections is promoting more corruption, inadequate remuneration promotion kick-backs, procurement committee also failing to declare their vested interest in certain tenders, general economic hardships resulting in corruption being a means to survival
and councilors were also indicated as unwilling and unprofessional enough to push the anti-corruption agenda in the tendering system.

### 4.3.3 Suggested Solutions to the Challenges of Corruption

Extracted from literature review, the researcher was aware of the area specific of the forms, causes and manifestations of corruption which automatically affects the solutions from one place, compared to another with distinctive characteristics. Hence the researcher gave a platform to respondents, to suggest their own solutions to the problems identified in the implementation of anticorruption measure. As a result of this, most municipal citizens felt that constant consultation and involvement in municipal projects reduce under-dealings. Some even proposed for continuous ward meetings which also involve the participation of municipal management.

Some municipal employees claim that the introduction of code of ethics particularly for procurement purposes must be prioritized whilst other believe that the general code of conduct in the municipality is sufficient enough if it is effectively followed and enforced. Those who claim that corruption is caused by individual attitudes and values believe that severe punishment must be given to such individuals without any prejudice or fear, through the judicial system and internal disciplinary measures. However, other claim that punishment without anti-corruption campaigns, training and empowerment programmes, is not a convincing solution.

An analysis was also made, to identify whether there was a correlation between the suggested solutions and the believed challenges and causes of corruption in the procurement system. However, there was not much difference but evident showed that the majority of respondents supported administrative reform measures and political accountability and transparency measures. Other solutions indicated included the resuscitation of the Zimbabwean economy, education, training and development of all stakeholders, capacity building and sourcing of resources, effective external and internal audit and limited political interference in municipal management.
4.4 CONCLUSION

The foregoing chapter presented and analysed the data that was collected from municipal citizens, employees, councillors and contractors of Marondera municipality. The study used both quantitative and qualitative data. Coding enabled data to be reduced into different thematic areas. The data was presented graphically using Microsoft excel computer programme. The researcher thus made use of a technique called graphical analysis for purposes of displaying numerical data and narrative cross-thematic analysis for qualitative data. The main objective of this was to present data in a way that was easy to understand and interpret. The results suggested that all respondents, both those who perceive low corruption rate in Marondera municipality as well as those who perceive higher corruption rate, are united in the position that combating corruption should be a high priority of the municipality. The research evidence also indicates that if the emergence of corruption at a grand or petty scale is to be reduced, a variety of economic, administrative, transparency, accountability and political reforms needs to be effectively undertaken. However, the urgency of effectively implementing administrative (personnel policies) as well as transparency and accountability reforms is perceived to be much greater than the rest of remedies available for combating corruption. The next chapter provides the summary and concluding remarks for the study and recommendations that Marondera municipality may need to consider in their quest to reduce corruption effectively.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Four, the data was presented and analysed. This study, focused on evaluating the efficacy of anti-corruption measures in the procurement system of Marondera municipality, is aimed at reducing the level of corruption in local government institutions. In this chapter, general conclusions are drawn and recommendations made based on the critical issues revealed by the major findings of this empirical study. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to summarize the study, draw conclusions and suggest recommendations on critical issues raised in Marondera Municipality.

5.2 CONCLUDING ISSUES
The research paper consists of five chapters.

Chapter one dealt with the introduction to and orientation of the study. The undesirable durability of corruption in Zimbabwean local government institutions as evident by socio economic indicators has provided for the objectives of this study. The objectives of the study were to evaluate the extent to which anti-corruption measures effectively curb corruption, to assess the perception on corruption in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality and to provide possible ways and means of improving how the anti-corruption measures can be implemented to reduce corruption. The study therefore sought to investigate how effective is the anti-corruption measures employed in the procurement system of Marondera Municipality in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe.

In chapter two relevant scholarships were reviewed. In line with its conception, corruption, is being evident as a complex and wicked phenomenon which demand numerous attempts to define it with a hope of bring clarity and tangible understanding thereof. Evidence showed that, it is hardly any single definition that is sufficiently spacious yet discriminating, to be accepted to universal satisfaction. It is also clear
from above that there is no unanimity on the definition of it as yet, although the need for such a definition is widely recognized (Welch & Peters, 1977:446; Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983:2; Atkinson & Mancuso, 1985:463; Williams, 1999:23). It has different meaning and connotation in different localities to the extent that its impressions has diluted the efforts to curb it and blunted the edge of the movement for corruption free administration in procurement activities, among others.

How corruption was defined depended on the perspective from which scholars sees it. Hence, it meant different things to different scholars, as it manifests in various forms which can coexist in any environment. In defining corruption, no approach was without a shortcoming, neither was it wrong? They all complement one another and assist the general understanding of its intrinsic nature, which has become a basis for international coalition. Regardless of the origin, motive or magnitude, corruption was discovered as the abuse of entrusted power for private (group or individual) gain, whether in the public or in the private sphere.

Manifestation of corruption emanated from causes, including low political competition, low and uneven economic growth, a weak civil society and the absence of institutional mechanisms, perversion of justice, undeserved pardon and remission, intimidation, blackmailing, false evidence, non-performance of duty, misuse of inside knowledge, manipulation of regulations and conflict of interest. However, there was general consensus that the basic causes develop from economic, political, anthropological and social situations and their interaction in complex ways, which give rise to many forms of corruption. Although the impact of corruption was not the same in all spheres of life, there was also a general consensus that corruption is not merely immoral: it is highly destructive of economic and human development and leads directly to insecurity and conflict.

As evident in this chapter, the global focus of anti-corruption success is on reforming systems rather than on blaming individuals. Hence corruption was viewed within a broader governance context and efforts were geared towards dismantling bad
governance, which facilitates an environment that is conducive to corruption. From different theories it was thus, discovered that successful anti-corruption initiatives must aim to avoid a monopoly of resources, must limit discretion in decision making, and promote accountability, transparency and integrity (as was shown by the formula); 

\[ \text{Corruption} = \text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability} - \text{Transparency} - \text{Integrity}. \]

However, in this chapter it was also indicated that, before designing any anti-corruption strategy, an individual is required to assess the level, form and causes of corruption in any given context. Points to be considered when developing anti-corruption strategies included; identification of the most damaging types and levels of corruption, cultural sensitivity as well as socio-economic development of the locality in question and the relative political and financial strength of those involved in corruption. Further to this, other scholars indicated that anti-corruption strategies can be designed depending on the type and extent of corruption, which agencies are involved, who the beneficiaries and losers are, and the factors that create an environment conducive to corrupt transactions. These conditions created room for empirical findings after collecting data in chapter three.

Chapter three provided an account of the methodology used in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used. The chapter further described the sampling procedures used to select the respondents and to ensure representativeness, dependability and relevance of the data obtained from the target group. Interviews were conducted and questionnaires were distributed to collect data for analysis. Confidentiality and consent were observed as ethical issues amongst others.

Chapter four looked at the presentation, interpretation and analysis of the data gathered from the respondents. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis methods were used. The coding procedure was used to reduce the data into different themes. In the analysis process the researcher made use of a technique called graphical analysis for the purpose of displaying numerical data. The main objective of graphical analysis was to
present data in a way that was easy to understand and interpret. The results revealed that anti-corruption measures implemented in Marondera Municipality are less effective.

**5.3 FINDINGS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY**

The key findings from the empirical study are based on respondents’ perceptions that emerged during the interviews and questionnaire responses. This can be summarised as follows:

- There is no public driven procurement system, and the public does not have a mechanism to monitor procurement processes. Procurement is political administered by Municipal councilors who, according to some respondents, have vested interests. Hence the municipal procurement system is not professionally driven. All stages of the procurement system were identified as prone to corruption. Control mechanisms in some departments were also identified as not fully automated. For example the finance department is partially manual. Furthermore, Marondera municipality which was evident to be characterised by weak personnel management practices (unpaid salaries, etc.), inadequate administrative control (limited auditing) and accountability systems is conducive for corruption.

- Traditional mechanisms of corruption control are dominant in Marondera Municipality’s anti-corruption efforts. They comprise, among others, the criminal justice system, anti-corruption agencies and oversight bodies, and codes of conduct. Lack of coordination between the criminal justice system and anti-corruption institutions are persistent problems adversely affecting the efficacy of anti-corruption measures. The impact of codes of conduct and ethical education has not been satisfactory.

- None of the respondents believed that corruption is decreasing in general, particularly in Marondera Municipality as a result of the anti-corruption measures implemented. During the interviews, a set of alternatives were further discussed after discovering problems such as political interference, insufficient accountability to oversight bodies, unclear mandates, inefficient criminal justice
system, insufficient ICT application, shortage of financial resources and skilled personnel. Political interference, inefficient criminal justice system and corruption within the anti-corruption bodies, among other things were found to be continuing problems in the Marondera municipality.

- In addition to the above, the researcher found in Marondera municipality that the Zimbabwean government’s focus in combating corruption is skewed. That is, most sectors, management levels and lower government levels are not given due attention in proportion to the magnitude of corruption that is present. Thus, evident show that private sector, civil society and local governments do not get the attention they require by National government efforts and mechanisms, despite corruption being rife in these entities. Most measures are introduced without the necessary material resources. This was evident to be coupled by inadequate features that lead to transparency and accountability, for example e-government infrastructure is not adequately utilised. Thus, access to information and tracking of decisions and actions by public officials is inadequate. Whistle blowing is also hampered due to the inadequacy of the protection of law when reports of corruption have occurred. Similar cases of corruption if reported are not treated equally.

- The researcher concluded that the anti-corruption measures implemented by Zimbabwean local government, particularly Marondera municipality, have limitations when it comes to effectively fight corruption. Since corruption is evident, to be deeply rooted in cultural, social, economic and political situations, it cannot be easily uprooted by traditional anti-corruption measures. These measures are easily manipulated by specialists’ staff who have access to resources, by management and politicians who have great influence. However, the researcher also believes that if these measures are effectively implemented they can reduce the current levels of corruption.
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Though it is futile to fight for the absolute demise of corruption, it is worth striving to bring it down to a minimal level at best and prevent it from becoming a durable way of life, at worst. There are instances of once extremely corrupt countries having turned around to be the cleanest (Sweden, Singapore and Hong Kong, among others) as indicated in literature review.

Based on critical issues raised from the empirical findings, the following recommendations are suggested to be implemented in Marondera municipality’s procurement system and in general.

- Comprehensive legislation for public procurement is a central pre-condition of clear, transparent, and fair public procurement. To strengthen trust in the fairness of public procurement, public procurement legislation should be unambiguous and reliable over time, core regulations should be passed as parliamentary laws for this purpose, not at by-law level (municipal council). Once the laws are unambiguous, political will has to come in, to enforce these legal statutes. Municipal councilors as the political figures must spearhead the fight against corruption and implement these measures effectively. They must also lead by example, thus showing what is required to reduce corruption than to be corrupt themselves. An example includes declaring their interests and assets. This will also ensure accountability to the electorate. Further to this, the criminal justice system must be fully resourced to assure effective control of such parliamentary laws.

- All steps in the procurement system were evident as corrupt despite the existence of the traditional anti-corruption measures. Hence, an additional ICT based anti-corruption system must be fully implemented to prevent corruption from taking place, starting from tendering processes. Survey findings indicated that the traditional corruption control components cannot cope with the magnitude and speed of the current municipal activities and global changes. However, traditional anti-corruption measures are not null and void; they are only insufficient, hence not effectively reducing corruption in Marondera Municipality.
ICT based anti-corruption measure is also not sufficient to combat corruption on its own; both mechanisms must work in tandem to complement each other's shortcomings. Though the potential of ICT to control corruption is considerable, it does not work in isolation. In addition, there has to be mechanisms through which the public monitor the whole process on the internet. The internet is instrumental in this regard. For example in Peru, citizens can track how government funds are spent through a website called Public Widow. Hence e-procurement is important in Marondera Municipality.

- Politics dominated procurement system is always biased towards a certain direction. Marondera Municipality, which has a council of one political party (MDC), is also responsible for making critical decisions of the procurement. Hence, an effort to increase professionalism and integrity is enormously important in this municipality to avoid biases. Ethical behaviour has to be inculcated in these councilors to create self-similarity to the national government vision, which places the responsibility of fighting corruption on all the parts of the system. Similarly, as society is the source of these councilors, it is necessary to instill ethical behaviour in the whole range of society, starting from the family to the school and filtered at the election stage. Unless the national government and anti-corruption actors, in general, focus more on the supply side, efforts at a later stage will be too late and more costly. In fact, the overall interest in well resourced ethics education is one of the drivers in anti-corruption initiatives (see chapter two).

- Sanctioning legal persons is often considered particularly dissuasive, particularly in areas such as procurement, where companies rather than individuals try to gain undue advantage through corruption. Marondera municipality must therefore introduce the possibility of temporarily or permanently debarring from public procurement a company found guilty of corruption. As debarment mechanisms can be abused, however, it is also encouraged to ensure that the conditions for applying debarment are precisely and explicitly defined.
- Control mechanisms must not be partially automated and partially manual (evident in the finance department) as this leaves gaps at the point of intersection. Automation must encompass the whole range of similar activities within a system. The parts of the system have to interact through internal feedback loops in order to create an environment conducive to self-organisation and emergences. There must not be partially but complete and self contained processes of each anti-corruption mechanism. Hence, standardized, clear, and concise procedures and easily accessible, comprehensive documentation must be implemented in the municipality. This also contributes in an important ways to transparency in public procurement.

- The imbalance of focus by National government creates an environment of instability in the anti-corruption system. As literature has revealed three parties in a corrupt relationship, that is the principal, agent and client. The National government’s measures are evident to be focused only on public sector, which means it controls the demand side (inducement by public officials of corruption). To balance the equation, the supply side (private sector and civil society) also much be effectively controlled. A possible measure which can carter for these is the hotline system which allows everyone to report corruption activities to responsible authorities who must take action, without considering the characters involved. This is important for equal handling of issues, economies of scale, coordination, monitoring and assessment of actions taken, at a centralized point.

- Anti-corruption measures should take a proactive approach since there will be always changes in the behaviour and tactics of corrupt agents. Accordingly, anti-corruption mechanisms have to be able to proactively devise efficient and effective tools to combat corruption. They do not have to be only responsive in the sense that their role is restricted to putting out fires. In this case, anti-corruption forces must not be complacent by once creating appealing anti-corruption strategies. Corrupt actors are quick to devise new tactics and go in the direction one has not predicted. Corruption fighters must also have sufficient information of corrupt agents, so that they transcend the fast changing behaviour. Information is real muscle to the people and prerequisite for accountability and if
it is stifled in terms of access, citizens will also be in a weaker state for fighting corruption. Furthermore, if there are even small flaw in the anti-corruption design, corrupter can capitalize on these resulting in less effective of such measures. Hence, extensive care and monitoring must also be present at the commencement stage of anti-corruption approach.
LIST OF REFERENCES


University of Fort Hare
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Office of the Chair & Head of Department:
Professor Edwin Ijeoma
Bsc (Hons) Lagos, MBA, Howard USA, PhD (Pret.)
Professor of Policy & Public Sector Economics
P.O. Box X1153, King William’s Town, 5601, RSA
Tel: +27 (0)40 608-3403 • Fax: +27 (0)40 608-3408

13 April 2012

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: REQUEST FOR CONDUCTING AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH

PROGRAMME: MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (MPA)

NAME: Mr M. Sabilika
STUDENT NUMBER: 200705974

The above named is a registered student of the university of Forte Hare. As part of the requirements for completing his MPA degree, the student is expected to conduct a research and submit its findings accordingly.

We hereby request you to allow the student conduct a research in your institution and to interact with relevant selected office-bearers and officials. We have instructed the student to observe professionalism and ethical considerations by maintaining anonymity of the participants concerned. The student has also been advised to maintain strict confidentiality in his interactions with respondents.

Once the research is completed, it may be availed to your institution on request. We hope that the findings of the research will benefit your institution in particular and South Africa in general.

Please extend every assistance he stands in need.

Regards

EOC Ijeoma
MUNICIPALITY OF MARONDERA

MUNICIPAL OFFICES 24/41/2/3, 21801-8
FAX 24944, TELEX 81032
DOMBOTOMBO OFFICES 23106, 24166
NYAMENI OFFICES 24530
All communications to be addressed to the Town Clerk

Your Ref

Our Ref

8th May 2012

University of Fort Hare

Department of Public Administration

Attention: PROFESSOR EOC LIEOMA

RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH STUDY ON EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF MARONDERA TOWN COUNCIL, MASHONALAND EAST – ZIMBABWE

Your letter dated 13th April 2012 refers,

This letter serves to confirm that we have granted Mr. M.S Sahilika (student number – 200705974) to carryout his research survey on the above topic. This organization fully supports the academic endeavor and hope to benefit from the findings of the research. Please be advised that Marondera Municipality is ready to consider the recommendation of the research towards improving service delivery. The necessary support will be granted.

Yours faithfully,

M. SVISVA

ASSISTANT CHAMBER SECRETARY

FOR: TOWN CLERK/ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
ANNEXURE C: LOCATION OF MARONDERA MUNICIPALITY

Source: (www.lged.co.zw).
ANNEXURE D: ORGANOGRAM OF MARONDERA MUNICIPALITY

Municipality of Marondera Structure

Mayor and municipal council (Political Body)

Town Clerk

Audit

Housing & community services Department

Engineering services department

Finance department

Chamber secretary

Housing administration

Sewer blockages

Workshop

Accounts

Revenue

Public health

Human Resource

Clinics

Libraries

Plumbing services

Water treatment

Projects

Information Technology

Stores

Fire & ambulance

Markets

Roads

Electrical

Billing

Bus levy

Cemeteries

Estate management

Parks & gardens

Source: Marondera Municipality Organogram
ANNEXURE E: QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT AND COMMERCE
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Evaluation tool
Questionnaire Guide for:
Municipal Citizens, Administrative officers, General employees and employees within the procurement unit of Marondera municipality

Overview
The study sought to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategic measures as the instruments that are used to promote efficient and effective service delivery in the procurement system of Marondera municipality. Particular attention, in this study, is on the extent to which the identified measures reduce corruption, given the fact that there are reports of high level of corruption in Zimbabwean municipalities. It will be based on the observation that a number of anti-corruption measures have been implemented by the Zimbabwean municipalities as a solution to ongoing cases of corruption in their procurement system, among others. Hence, an assessment of such measures is imperative in order to identify their effectiveness. Given also the fact that corruption have indicated reasonable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-economic situations, the study needs to identify problems in the implementation of such measures and give recommendations thereto, with a hope of reducing the level of corruption and add to the body of knowledge.

Respondents
This Questionnaire guide has been prepared for the participation of Municipal Citizens, Administrative officers, General employees and employees within the procurement unit of Marondera municipality.

Guidelines
Please note that the information gathered during this research will be handled in a responsible manner within the confines of research ethics.

Process
The researcher will administer the questionnaire guide based on the direct engagement with respondents.

Communication
The researcher will engage the respondents in English and Shona, and all responses will be captured in English.

Disclaimer
This questionnaire guide has been prepared for a research project undertaken to fulfill the requirements of Masters of Administration Degree in Public Administration at the University of Fort Hare.

Your participation will be greatly appreciated

© M.S. Sabilika, University of Fort Hare, 2012

QUESTIONNAIRE: Municipal Citizens, Administrative officers, General employees and employees within the procurement unit of Marondera municipality

PART 1

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Please tick with the letter X in the appropriate box

1.1. Gender

Male [X] Female

1.2. Age


1.3. To which ethnic origin group do you most closely belong?


1.4. Marital status


1.5. Highest qualifications obtained


1.6. Status in the community or Municipality……………………………………………………………………………
**PART 2**

**EVALUATION THE EFFICACY (EFFECTIVENESS AND FEACIBILITY) OF ANTI-CORRUPTION STEMMING FROM CORRUPTION**

2.1 How important do you think the issue of corruption is, in Marondera Municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less important</th>
<th>Moderately important</th>
<th>Highly important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.2 How much emphasis should be given to prevent or combat corruption?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less emphasis</th>
<th>More emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.3 In your opinion, what are the causes, nature and type of corruption in Marondera Municipality?

**(A). Ineffective or lack of market reforms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lack or Ineffective Competition for services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack or Ineffective Deregulation and privatization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**(B). Ineffective or lack of Administrative or Bureaucratic measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lack or Ineffective Code of ethics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack or Ineffective Public procurement system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack or Ineffective Meritocratic personnel policy (Nepotism, favoritism, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unimproved salaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack or Ineffective Administrative efficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lack or Ineffective Decentralization of decision making
Ineffective Financial management system
Lack or Ineffective Heavy penalties for corrupt behaviour

(C). Ineffective or lack of Accountability and Transparency enhancing measures

Ineffective Auditor General office
Lack or Ineffective Anti-corruption legislation
Ineffective Anti-corruption commission
Lack or Ineffective independent or free media
Lack or Ineffective Municipal laws to protect whistle blowers on corruption
Lack or Ineffective Assets and income disclosure

(D). Ineffective or lack of Democratic enhancing measures

Lack or Ineffective Political competition
Lack or Ineffective Visible commitment by leadership to fight corruption
Lack or Ineffective Respect for rule of law

2.3.1 From the above 4 categories of measures which one is highly effective to curb corruption?  A)…..  B)…..  C)…..  D)…..

2.3.2 What is absolute value given to each causes of corruption?


115
2.4 Is corruption in your municipality “a fact of life or a way of life?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fact of life</th>
<th>Way of life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.5 What is your view on the anti-corruption measures implemented to curb corruption in Marondera municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Less effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.3.1 If less effective, explain why?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………

2.3 In your own view, which part of the procurement process in Marondera municipality mostly affected by corruption?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement planning and budgeting</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procurement solicitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract award and performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.1 Explain why you say so………………………………………………………………………………………………………

2.4 In support of the National policy frameworks on anti-corruption, are there Municipal by-law to fight corruption effective especially in the procurement process?
2.4.1 If yes, explain……………………………………………………………………………………………

2.5 Are you satisfied with the anti-corruption measures implemented especially in the procurement system of your Municipality?

Yes
No
Not sure

2.5.1 If no, what in your own view do you think must be done to improve its implementation?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………

2.6 Are you involved in the fight against corruption in your municipality?

Yes
No

Who are the other players in the fight against corruption?………………………………………

2.7 To what extent does the procurement process able to promote effective and efficient services which are corruption free in your municipality?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
PART 3

CHALLENGES FACED WHEN IMPLEMENTING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM.

3.1. What challenges do you experience when implementing the anti-corruption measure in Marondera municipality?

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........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

3.2. To what extent have these challenges affected the level and nature of corruption in Marondera municipality?

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3.3. In your own view, how can these challenges be resolved or minimized to improve the corruption situation in the Municipality?

........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

PART 4

4. GENERAL COMMENT.

4.1. Any other comment you would like to make regarding the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in your municipality.
4.2 In your own view, can you in general, explain what are the critical issues affecting the implementation of the anti-corruption measures and what measures needs to be taken to promote a procurement process which is corruption free?

Once more, I thank you for your co-operation
Overview
The study sought to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures as the instruments that are used to promote efficient and effective service delivery in the procurement system of Marondera municipality. Particular attention, in this study, is on the extent to which the identified measures reduce corruption, given the fact that there are reports of high level of corruption in Zimbabwean municipalities. It will be based on the observation that a number of anti-corruption measures have been implemented by the Zimbabwean municipalities as a solution to on going cases of corruption in their procurement system, among others. Hence, an assessment of such measures is imperative in order to identify their effectiveness. Given also the fact that corruption have indicated reasonable durability and flexibility to survive in all socio-economic situations, the study needs to identify problems in the implementation of such measures and give recommendations thereto, with a hope of reducing the level of corruption and add to the body of knowledge.

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Your participation will be greatly appreciated
© M.S. Sabilika, University of Fort Hare, 2012

SPECIFICS

Questions

1. Indicate your position in Marondera Municipality and what are your responsibilities?
2. How important do you think the issue of corruption is, in the context of Marondera Municipality?
3. Is corruption in Marondera municipality “a fact of life or a way of life?”
4. How much emphasis should be given to prevent or fight corruption?
5. In your opinion, what is the nature and type of corruption in Marondera Municipality? E.g. political- fraud, favouritism, etc.
6. In your opinion, what are the causes and consequences of corruption in Marondera town procurement system?
7. What is your view on the anti-corruption measures implemented to curb corruption in Marondera municipality?
8. In your own view, which part of the procurement process in Marondera municipality mostly affected by corruption?
9. Are you satisfied with the anti-corruption measures implemented especially in the procurement system of your Municipality?
10. To what extent does the procurement process able to promote effective and efficient services which are corruption free in your municipality?
11. What challenges do you experience when implementing the anti-corruption measure in Marondera municipality?
12. In your own view, how can these challenges be resolved or minimized to improve the corruption situation in the Municipality?
13. Any other comment you would like to make regarding the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in your municipality.
14. In your own view, can you in general, explain what are the critical issues affecting the implementation of the anti-corruption measures and what measures needs to be taken to promote a procurement process which is corruption free?