An analysis of Wesleyan missionary strategy in the Eastern Districts of the Cape Colony and "Caffreland" between 1823 and 1838, and an attempt to determine how far it reacted to Government policies in the Cape.

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in Divinity in the Department of Ecclesiastical History in Rhodes University.
PREFAE.

Prof. P.B. Hinchliff in his inaugural lecture maintained that "there is no such separate study as ecclesiastical history; there is only history."(1) His words aptly sum up the problem which was involved in attempting this thesis. Ecclesiastical history is, if Prof. Hinchliff's thoughts may be continued to be borrowed, a hybrid subject. It is a discipline which must have some relevance on the one hand to religious principles, and on the other be a part of 'ordinary' history. Like the economic historian or the social historian, the ecclesiastical historian has to take into account the same facts, though the direction of study may be very different. The ecclesiastical historian's specialisation is one of purpose, rather than content.

The purpose of this thesis has been to trace and examine the development of Wesleyan attitudes, and the actions which resulted therefrom, towards the task of the evangelisation of the eastern districts of the Cape Colony and "Caffreland". These attitudes were conditioned throughout by the fact that they held certain religious principles as paramount. It is an attempt to clarify what was involved on the ecclesiastical side in this period of Wesleyan and

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South African history.

A considerable amount of attention has been given, by various writers, to the history of the south-eastern area of South Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century. Some works have either been concerned with the more general history of the time or with the position of all the missionaries within the total political sphere. Others have concentrated on the Wesleyans particularly, either in a very general sense or in relation to one particular event, or the later decades of this half century.

The period 1823 to 1833 was chosen because it covers the period of the origin of Wesleyan strategy and its first distinct phases. Whereafter it may be considered to have reached full maturity and become the basis of all future action in the succeeding decades. Wesleyan strategy was, to a large extent, a reaction to government policies and requires, throughout, such a consideration.

The Wesleyan Missionary Society was chosen, not because on any denominational affiliations, but because of the part which it played in these areas during that time and has since played in the annals of Eastern Cape history.
The approach has been to present the relevant documents in chronological order. This was done to emphasise the development over the years. Chapters have consequently been divided according to the stages or phases of this development. It has meant that subsidiary questions which arise from this development have not been dealt with separately, but simply referred to as they occur.

One point remains. Wesleyan correspondence from the Eastern Cape between 1837 and 1857 has disappeared from the Archives of the Methodist Missionary Society in London. All attempts to trace these letters have proved futile. Consequently, it was necessary to reproduce a couple of quotes from letters contained in this correspondence which is referred to by D. Williams and C. Roxborough who had access to this material.
THANKS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

My thanks are extended to the Rev. F. Ellingworth, the Archivist of the Methodist Missionary Society, and Mr. W. Berning, the Cory Librarian at Rhodes University. Also Prof. A.F. Madden for permission to read his thesis: Mr Davey, Xhosa Language Department, Rhodes University, for the modern Xhosa forms of chiefs and tribes.

This thesis was made possible by an Ernest Oppenheimer Post-Graduate Memorial Trust Fellowship, without which I would never have been able to attempt this task.

I owe a great deal to my supervisor, Prof. P.H. Hinchliff, not only for his advice and encouragement while writing this thesis, but for all my years at Rhodes University.

I am also much indebted to Miss Arleen Graham for her constant encouragement and for typing this manuscript.
### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>A.M.M.S.</td>
<td>Archives of the Methodist Missionary Society.</td>
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<td>D.U. Corres.</td>
<td>Correspondence of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Province of Queen Adelaide.</td>
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<td>IBB</td>
<td>Imperial Blue Book</td>
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<td>NSAA</td>
<td>W. Boyce, <em>Notes on South African Affairs</em>.</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>C. M. Theal, <em>Records of the Cape Colony</em>.</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Select Committee on Aborigines.</td>
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<td>Contemporary.</td>
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CHAPTER I.

The Beginning.

On July 12th, 1819, the last day of that session of the British Parliament, the Rt. Hon. Nicholas Vansittart, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed, in the House of Commons,

a grant for the purpose of enabling his majesty's government to assist unemployed workmen of this country in removing to one of our colonies ...... [and] .... considering the inconvenience of which these persons would be subject on their arrival in America, [the government] had selected the Cape of Good Hope as the colony to which emigration might be advantageously directed. (1)

After a short debate the motion was carried with the House voting a sum of £50,000 to finance the scheme. The motives of the British House of Commons for voting in favour of this proposal require no attention here. (2) Nevertheless, many hundreds sought to avail themselves of this financial assistance. The result being that within a short time, the Colonial Office was inundated with urgent applications and requests for detailed information of


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the conditions governing the proposed immigration. (1) In answer to these inquiries a printed circular was issued, which specified these conditions. One of these was:

It is further proposed that in any case in which one hundred families proceed together and apply for leave to carry out with them a minister of their own persuasion, Government will, upon their being actually located, assign a salary to the minister whom they may have selected to accompany them, if he shall be approved by the Secretary of State. (2)

From this provision the origins of Wesleyanism in the south-eastern area of South Africa sprung. The numerical strength of most of the parties intending immigrants was not sufficient for them to avail themselves of this condition. But it was taken up by the Sephton party who elected to request that a Wesleyan minister accompany them. (3) This appointment of a Wesleyan minister to the

(3) Archives of the Methodist Missionary Society, "C/ South Africa; F.T.O."
Sephton party was made under the auspices of the Missionary Committee of the Wesleyan Church. (1)

The man who accepted this appointment was the Rev. William Shaw. He was born of parents who were members of the Established Church, on the 8th December, 1796. His father had envisaged a military career for his son, but, at an early age, William Shaw underwent a conversion to Wesleyanism. Deciding to forego his prospects of a military concession, he entered the teaching profession, and ran his own school with remarkable financial and considerable academic success. It was at this time that he became an ordained member of the Wesleyan Church. (2)

William Shaw, in offering himself to accompany the Sephton party stipulated that his position entailed, too, that of missionary obligation.

1 ... ultimately offered to accompany them, provided they would consent to receive me in the capacity of a Wesleyan Missionary, appointed by, and in connection with, the

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(2) W.B. Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. William Shaw, pp 1-3. Hereafter abbreviated M.B.

P. 2 (3), continued; Cape and Albany, Box 1, File 1819. Hereafter abbreviated, A.M.M.S.
Missionary Committee and Methodist Conference in England. (1)

The nature of this appointment was that the minister of the party's choice proceeded to accompany them under certain conditions. He was to be chaplain to the Settler party, but responsible to the Wesleyan Missionary Committee. A responsibility which implied a natural duty to minister, where and when opportunity allowed, to the native peoples of the eastern area of the Colony. There was inherent, within the opportunity presented, in Wesleyan logic, that preconception of obligations both to the European colonists and to the native tribes of the country.

The details of the establishment and subsequent development of Wesleyanism among the European settlers, and the part played by Shaw in its conception and growth, have been adequately and well narrated elsewhere. (2) The concern here is with the strategy the Wesleyans employed.

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(1) Shaw, SBEA, p. 5. Also, Boyce, MS, p. 10.
N.A., M.U.L., MS 15,004, R. Shaw, Journal, 1816 - 1819. (Pages unnumbered.) 10th February, 1817; "At present I feel a determination to offer myself but still am afraid I shall not be accepted." 16th June, 1817, note on having written to the Secretary, Mr Marden, asking him to inform the Committee that he was prepared to offer himself as a missionary. L.K. Newson, An introduction to South African Methodists, p. 20, quotes a letter of Shaw's dated 1816: "For more than a year it has been powerfully impressed upon my mind that I ought to go out as a missionary."
Initially the main task of Wesleyan strategy was the development of a sound and solid church among the Settlers to serve their spiritual needs. From his arrival in the Albany area in June, 1820 (1), Shaw concentrated on the establishment of a relatively stable Wesleyan community. He was fortunate in that the structural organisation of the Wesleyan Church in England, lent itself to a rapid consolidation of those whom he had accompanied. (2) Hence, within a short time he was able to turn his attention to the even greater task of missionary work amongst the native tribes.

Wesleyan strategy, in these formative years, while considering its first responsibility to the colonists, (3) never lost sight of the idea, that its task among the Settlers was also the formation


(2) A.T.C. Slee, Some Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1823 to 1844, pp. 26-23, has well-illustrated this fact.

(3) Shaw, IHSEA, pp. 67, 95.

P.4 (1) continued: Shaw's intention to be a missionary was not merely a result of this opportunity.

(2) Shaw, IHSEA. J. Whiteside, History of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa. M. Cveleigh, The Settlers and Methodism. Boyce, H.C.
and consolidation of a base for future operations among the trans-frontier tribes. A strong and virile community was of paramount importance. Societies in the Colony had to be strong enough to be able to act as a support for mission stations without the Colony. (1)

They were to act as a spring-board for future missionary activities across the Fish river. (2)

From the first days of his arrival in South Africa, Mr Shaw, had cherished a purpose to carry the Gospel into Kaffraria, but like the wise man he was, he first devoted his energies to the work among the white people, since at that time their claims were paramount, and he recognised plainly enough the need of a good base of operations for an advance beyond the frontier. (3)

His initial task, being considerably advanced, Shaw turned towards the east. (4) His ideal was the establishment of mission


(2) H. Calderwood, Caffres and Caffre Missions, p. 17. "They the Wesleyans have throughout the Colony, especially in the Eastern Province, a large number of European members, who take a deep interest in the mission of the heathen. They contribute largely to it.....A basis is thus being laid down, whence the work may be carried on and extended among the heathen."


(4) Shaw, SWSEA, p. 315. "My eye was constantly fixed on Kaffraria, as a great field for future missions. I thought about it, talked about it, read every scrap of intelligence I could obtain concerning it."
stations along the entire length of the south-eastern coastal area. (1)
On November 13th, 1823, Shaw, John Shepstone, their wives and children, left Grahamstown for the country of Phatho, the chief of the (2) Gqunukwebe tribe. John Shepstone arrived in South Africa as a settler in the border party. He assisted as a lay agent and builder and in 1827 was ordained as a minister. His eldest son, Theophilus, was responsible for the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. (3)
Shaw’s exit from the Colony marked the crossing of the threshold of his design for Wesleyan missionary endeavours,

to establish a "chain of stations" stretching from Salem along the coast country of Saffaria to Natal and Delagoa Bay. (4)

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(1) A branch Missionary Society had already been formed in the Albany area by April, 1822. Wesleyan Missionary Notices. No. 84, p. 370, Shaw to Secretaries, 12th July, 1822.
"There is not a single missionary station between the place of Salem and the Northern extremity of the Red Sea.....Here is a wide field - the whole eastern coast of the continent of Africa." Shaw, Wesleyan Missionary Notices, No. 61, p. 22. Shaw’s emphasis.

(2) Shaw, MSBHR, p. 351.

(3) C. Sedler, Never a Young Man, NOTES, pp. 183, 185.

This crossing of the Keiskamma river, the eastern boundary of the neutral territory, was the terminus a quo for a gradual change in Wesleyan strategy. It was the beginning of a dual responsibility for the Wesleyans. A responsibility which forced, and meant, an evaluation and appreciation of the points of view on either side of the frontier. A fact which did not make it difficult for them to be made tools of political faction. (1)

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(1) A.T.C. Sloe, op. cit., p. 16, expressed the direct opposite: "The dual role of the Methodists made it difficult for them to be made tools of political faction, for they were able to appreciate both the European and the Natives' point of view. As far as possible they avoided participation in political controversies regarding the treatment of the natives and their influence was usually exercised in favour of moderation." That appreciation of both points of view was not so easy to attain and their position of dual responsibility drew them into many political factions. Shaw's, A Defence of Wesleyan Missionaries in South Africa, was a direct result of the Wesleyans having been made tools of political factions. Their strategy at first did not have to concern itself much with political issues, i.e. issues involving the welfare of the European colonists and the natives. With their obligation of dual responsibility, the Wesleyans unwittingly found their names and name being dragged into the political arena. S.K. Seton, Wesleyan Missionaries and the 6th Frontier War, 1834-1835, p. 387, views Boyce as actively entering the political arena. As concerns the question of moderation: a close scrutiny of letters emanating from Wesleyan pens between 1834 and 1836, especially Shrewsbury's letter of the 16th January, 1835, places a great deal of emphasis on Sloe's use of "usually" in his statement on moderation.
Until Shaw crossed the Keiskamma, his strategy had had to take little cognisance of government policy at the Cape. But with the intention of Christianising the trans-frontier tribes, Wesleyanism came into direct contact with government policy. It was in fact only due to the good favour of the administration that Shaw did cross the Keiskamma. Here in this entrance into Saffirland, the question of Wesleyan reaction to government policy, first attains significant prominence.

Up to 1817 Lieutenant-General Lord Charles Somerset, the Governor of the Cape Colony, had entertained grave doubts, and expressed a dubiousness, as to the desirability of the establishment of missions, whether within, or without, the colonial boundaries. (1) Those without were, he maintained to the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, Earl Bathurst, particularly objectionable. They resulted in the encouragement of deserters from the Colony. (2) However, Somerset found himself in the unenviable position of being almost unable to refuse missionaries access to the interior. He

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(1) Theal, NCC, Vol. XLI, p. 246. Somerset to Bathurst, 30th June, 1819.

(2) Ibid., Vol. XI, pp. 254-255. Somerset to Bathurst, 23rd January, 1817. "The Colony has suffered materially from these establishments which have been set on foot beyond what are deemed the limits of this Settlement."
had to bear in mind the weight of evangelical pressure in England, which at this time was decidedly strong. (1) Many societies were getting up steam and increasing their missionary activities: (2) the Baptist Missionary Society, established 1792; the Glasgow Missionary Society, established 1795. The reduction of the military garrison at Grahamstown was too an urgent demand. An equally un-inviting thought to the Governor, as it would threaten the destruction of the defence system, which he had so recently devised. (3)

It was, at this time, that Somerset decided on a revision of his frontier policy. He hoped that by allowing the admission of missionaries into trans-frontier territory, a design might be created which would aid in controlling the frontier in its varying moods and tempers. A design too, which would satisfy the clamourous pressure of the evangelicals.

His [Somerset's] greatest hope in permitting a missionary establishment to pass into Caffraria, contrary to the policy antecedently adopted, has been with the view of ensuring its co-operation in putting a stop to that system of plunder which has kept the frontier so long in a state


II.

of ferment. (1)

If missionaries could point out specific instances of depre-
dations by the Affairs, which would leave them a marginal space to
deny charges which might be brought against their actions, there
existed, hoped Somerset, the possibility of habitual reform. But,
any missionary, who was thus granted permission to cross the Eiss-
kamma river, did so under an obligation. They were to communicate
frequently with the authorities on committed Affairs crimes, or in
connection with complaints which the native chiefs might harbour
against their white neighbours in the Colony. (2)

Somerset's plan for increasing the European population of the
frontier through immigration was also to supplement the insufficiency
of military forces. (3) Civilization of the frontier was to be the
factor to bring about stability: a civilization best promoted through
the agency of missionaries and the use of Christianity. (4) The

\[1\] D. Williams, *Missionaries in the Eastern Frontier of the Cape
C.O. 4838, p 475. Colonial Secretary to Head, 23rd August, 1816.
Attempts by the Keeper, P.R.O., to identify this document, under
this reference number, were not successful. C.O. 48/38, 48/31,
48/32, were searched.

\[2\] Ibid.


May, 1817.
missionary was to induce civilization through his religious tenets. (1) He was also to perform the task of informer, passing on details of the movement and organisation of the tribes. Such information, the authorities argued, would enable them to construct an accurate picture of trans-frontier circumstances, thus enabling the Colony to successfully repel any further hostilities against it.

Shaw had arrived in South Africa in the capacity of Wesleyan chaplain to a party of immigrants, (2) not primarily as a missionary to trans-frontier tribes. His entrance into Afferland was not due to his clerical status in the Albany area. It was owed entirely to the good favour of the administration. Even though Afferland was an independent territory and missionary activity east of the frontier did not fall directly under the surveillance of the colonial authorities.

The design of Wesleyan strategy, to enter Afferland, ripened to fruition only because it was then the policy of the British Government's representative in the Cape to permit the establishment of mission stations in Afferland. Shaw's motive for entering into

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(1) Ibid., Vol. III, p. 83. Colonial Secretary to Baird, 4th December, 1818. Also Ibid.

the country of the Gqunukwesi tribe was not due to any influence being exerted upon his mind by the administration to undertake such a task. The Wesleyans believed it was their duty to evangelise the tribes, but a duty to an authority other than the administration. It was, however, only undertaken at the authority's pleasure. Though the administration did not influence Wesleyan strategy, it did, neverthe less, influence the implementation of that strategy. It so happened that Wesleyan strategy and the then policy of the administration concurred or overlapped.

Wesleyan strategy was convinced that,

the only possible means of civilising rude and barbarous people is through the influence of Christianity (1) ..... [and that] ..... Christianity (2) is the parent of civilisation, and ... true civilisation cannot be produced without it. (2)

It maintained that moral and material progress were not synonymous, though a simultaneous advancement was possible.

[Conflict improvement and education] is owed to the native and necessary for our own peace and quiet to civilise them. (3)

(1) Imperial Blue Book, V&J, 578, p.124. Hereafter abbreviated IBB.
(2) Ibid., p.523.
(3) Ibid., p.525.
The opinion of myself [Shaw] and most of my brethren has ever been, that while Christianity alone can give us influence with the natives, and excite in them a desire for improvement, yet we ought to connect with the inculcation of its principles every judicious plan we can possibly bring to bear on their case, so as to raise them to an improved condition. (1)

Wesleyan strategy considered that it was impossible for peace on the frontier to be,

...long ... maintained between the Caffres and the Borderers, unless the savage habits arising from ignorance and paganism be erased and removed. (2)

It was Wesleyan strategy to Christianise the Tribes; it was government policy to attempt to civilise them - through Christianity.

The Wesleyan entrance into Kaffirland, at the pleasure of the Governor, gave the Governor some claim of co-operation from the missionaries. It was in that period peak of Wesleyan establishment in Kaffirland, between 1823 and 1830, that the foundation was laid of what the authorities maintained, constituted a pre-emptive right over missionary activity in Kaffirland. Shaw's request to proceed

(1) Ibid., p. 125.
(2) Ibid., p. 57.
15.

to Kaffirland was granted with the reservation that he be subservient to Thomson of the Glasgow Missionary Society. (1) He was to forward information, and to return to the Colony if the authorities should see fit to enforce such a requirement. (2)

These requirements were seen by Shaw not to be in conflict with his ministerial duties, or the terms of the instructions to the Wesleyan Missionaries (3) His acquiescence to the administration's demands, as a pre-condition to any admission into Kaffirland, was definitely a bowing to the influence of the administration. But at the same time it did not in any way reduce his effectiveness as a Wesleyan missionary, or make Wesleyan strategy a tool of the authorities. He drew a salary from the government, but this was because he was a member of the clerical establishment, not a government agent. (4) He received remuneration as a clergyman and saw himself first and foremost as such.

Wesleyan strategy was, from the beginning, in character both bold and definite. (5) Their entrance into the mission field of

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(1) Hereafter abbreviated CMS.
(2) Theal, MSS, Vol. VI, pp. 52-53. Colonial Secretary to Shaw, 6th June, 1823.
(3) See Appendix A.
(4) Supra, p. 2.
(5) du Flessia, Op cit., p 258. "No society made anything like the progress that the Wesleyan Society made."
Kaffirland was a premeditated move. (1) The Church which John Wesley had founded was, by implication, to be missionary in character: the world being conceived by John Wesley as his parish. (2) Wesleyanism remained within the confines of Lord Charles Somerset's pursued policy of non-intercourse across the frontier, until that prevention was removed. A fact indicative of Wesleyan strategy: not to antagonise the authorities unnecessarily, but to comply, within the bounds of justice, with their desires, in as far as their reasonableness was evident. The Wesleyans both acknowledged and respected the binding force of the sovereignty of their King's administration (3). But they were soon to find that, whatever the binding force of the administration which they acknowledged, their religious principles were equally as binding.

(1) Shaw, SCOTT, Part I, Chapter V. Supra. pp. 3 - 6.


(3) Appendix A, Section 1, Paragraph V.
CHAPTER II.

"Caffreland".

Dr. Johannes Vanderkemp, of the London Missionary Society, had, in 1797, attempted the establishment of a mission station in Caffreland among the Nqika, but was forced to abandon it the following year. In 1816 the Rev. J. Williams of the same society endeavoured to continue this work among the Nqika. Though he died two years later, the Rev. J. Boweries followed after in 1820. (1) Because of this, Shaw consequently turned his attention to the coast tribes, the Cisela, the Ndlambe and the Qunu-Mhwebe. It was to the latter tribe under their chief Phatho, that Shaw went, and there established a mission station which he named Wesleyville. (2)

Once the entrance into Caffreland had been made in 1823, the strategy which the Wesleyans were to employ in the next few years began gradually to emerge. Shortly after Shaw's arrival in the country of Phatho, an assembly of chiefs was requested by the former;

that I might confer with them on some matters of great importance to their welfare. (3)

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(2) Ibid., p.179. Boyce, MWS, p.123.
(3) Shaw, SHABA, p. 364. See also, IBS, VII. 528, p.53.
At this assembly, Shaw addressed them on the desirability of preventing any further plundering and stealing in the Colony. He was not only executing the Governor's ideas, but it was also the beginning of the realisation that the spiritual welfare of his new community was inextricably interwoven with their temporal behaviour and status. Wesleyan strategy, with respect to the evangelisation of the native tribes, was already developing and beginning to assume a definite and concrete form.

The prime interest of Wesleyan strategy, to evangelise the trans-frontier, involved them in all the complexities of the frontier situation. If this intention was to meet with any success, it depended on the maintenance of peace and security on the frontier. Wesleyan attempts to Christianise had, inherent within them, a direct concern with morality. For the Wesleys, any successful evangelisation of the native tribes would result, as a natural consequence, in the adoption by them of a Christian code of morals. The moral conduct of the tribes, as it existed, was for the Wesleys coloured by highly immoral tendencies. Wesley concern with the moral code of the tribes was not a concern with the complete absence of morality, but with the promotion of a Christian morality. Because their moral conduct resulted in acts of plunder and murder, the morality of the tribes had a direct bearing on frontier peace. The
morality of the tribes was far from acceptable to the European colonists. If the Wesleyans could Christianise the tribes, they would conversely get them to accept a morality recognised by the colonists as honest and just. A situation which would, they hoped, lead to the establishment of a better understanding between the two frontier populations. Hence in their attempts to Christianise the tribes and promote their moral conduct, their strategy became, through this interrelation, directly concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the frontier. A problem which was the main concern of government policy.

This was driven home even further, when, relatively soon after his arrival, Shaw received a communication from Major Henry Somerset, stating the government's intention of establishing a good understanding with the coastal tribes. Shaw was requested to organise a conference of both parties for this purpose, which he managed to do. (1) The result of this conference had a marked effect on Wesleyan strategy. For, Shaw maintained,

it [the conference] introduced a great change in the system of intercourse between the government and them [the native tribes], and was followed by a period of almost unexampled

(1) Shaw, ___1934__, pp. 365-375.
peace and tranquility on the lower part of the Kaffir border. (1)

For the Wesleyans it was a duty, according to their religious principles, to act as mediators in the interests of just and peace. This was especially so when the welfare of either or both sides of the frontier was involved. A welfare which was dependent on both sides having a good understanding of each other. It was not just an obligation to assist the government which prompted this kind of action, but the realisation that such action was intimately related and beneficial to their missionary aims.

This incident spot-lighted, within a few months of the Wesleyan entrance into Kaffirland, that question which was later to involve them in so much controversy. The question of what constituted political involvement. Shaw, in considering his part in the arrangement of the above conference, had written, that,

Not wishing to be mixed up with the political arrangements of the country, I strove to avoid this; but it was in vain that I sought to be excused. (2)

Whether or not Shaw's action, or that of his fellow Wesleyan

(1) Ibid., p. 375.
(2) Ibid., p. 367.
missionaries who followed him into Kaffirland, constituted political involvement or not, the fact is that the Wesleyan missionaries did become involved in frontier questions.(1) Their endeavours to promote their religious aims could not succeed in an atmosphere clouded and charged with enmity and hostility. Neither could peace and stability on the frontier prevail in such an atmosphere. What is evident, is that their very position dictated the Wesleyans' strategy. This fact is stressed, for unless it is grasped, the failure to do so can lead to an incorrect appreciation and misunderstanding of all that was involved on the ecclesiastical side.

The Wesleyans, from the outset of their missionary activities in Kaffirland, were committed to a particular and specific strategy; although at the time somewhat subconsciously. A strategy determined and occasioned by their geographical position and their position as Wesleyan missionaries. Their relationship with the white colonists was predetermined. Their relationship too, with the native tribes

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(1) A.F. Madden, The Attitude of the Evangelicals to the Empire and Imperial Problems, 1820 - 1850, p.621.
"Coming late into the mission field there, than the L.M.S., they [the Wesleyans] had not been called upon to play a part in the struggle for Hottentot rights and in conscious distinction from their fellow missionaries ... they avoided political action."
as predetermined. The two together, the Wesleyans' dual responsibility, predetermined their whole relationship to the frontier. Consequently their relationship and reaction to the policy of the government was predetermined. The foundation of these relationships was predetermined by the demands of the frontier. The strategy of the Wesleyans and the policy of the government were both reactions to these demands.

Wesleyanism found itself concerned, firstly with the colonists' welfare, and then later including that of the trans-frontier tribes. They were forced to stand with a foot in either camp. As a result Wesleyan strategy was occasioned, determined and directed by this dual responsibility. The Wesleyan desire to Christianise and their concern and interest for both populations, more than any other factors, are to be seen as the origins of Wesleyan strategy.(1)

This dual role of the Wesleyans placed them in an extremely difficult position when it came to an issue whose solution was vital to both sides of the frontier. They discovered themselves

(1) du Flessis, Op. cit., p. 294. "In the reports of the Wesleyan Missions, ..... no distinction is drawn between work on behalf of the natives and work on behalf of Europeans."
to be sitting uncomfortably on a frontier "fence". Forced to share the incompatible views of two totally different societies. Their dual responsibility placed on them an arduous task which required the exercising of a shrewd and tactful judgment.

As the years progressed the Wesleyans found their strategy being forced to take cognisance of yet another factor which was to considerably enlarge the range of their strategy and determined to a very great extent their reaction to government policy. The Wesleyans felt it their duty to attempt, at all times, to remove any dissatisfaction that might exist amongst the tribes.(1) This dissatisfaction was, in the main, grievances which evolved round the question of land ownership.

After the 1819 war, Lord Somerset had decided to pursue a policy of non-intercourse along the eastern colonial boundary. In the agreement which was reached, the chief of the Nqgika was recognised as the paramount chief, though the Ndlambe had the better claim and greater power. The Nqgika verbally consented to the formation of a neutral belt between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers. This

(1) IBE. VII, 538, p.52. Shaw before the Select Committee on Aborigines, 7th August, 1835. Hereafter abbreviated 3CA.
zone extended from the Winterberg in the north, to the coast. In this no-man's land, neither European nor native might settle, though in fact the Nqika were allowed to remain in the Chumie Valley.(1)

This agreement had in fact deprived the Gqunukhwebe of their territory between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers. They maintained that the Nqika had no right whatsoever over these lands and resented the fact that they had not been consulted on the agreement.(2) Shaw having acquainted himself with the facts, made representations to the administration on the question, in August 1825, on behalf of the Gqunukhwebe chiefs, Phatho and Cengo. He requested that the right of these chiefs to possess a portion of the neutral territory be given every consideration. His action was bitterly resented by the authorities. But due to Shaw's intervention they were forced to admit the justice of the claim and agreed to the return of the Gqunukhwebe to the area in question, to graze their cattle on the stipulation that their behaviour continued to be good.(3)

(2) Ibid., p. 52.
(3) Ibid., p. 53.
These events are indicative of the frontier milieu. For on both sides of the frontier,

were people who to a greater of lesser degree were agriculturists, both wasteful of land and both relying mainly on their cattle. And cattle all over the world demand water and wide pastures. (1)

By the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, the south-eastern area of South Africa had become a definite struggle for land. (Where - as before it may be interpreted to some extent in terms of rival cattle cultures.) This struggle for land was accentuated by the more settled land development within the Colony and the contrasting tribal structures beyond the frontier. On one side of the frontier a society, multi-racial in character, in the process of stable agricultural and commercial development. On the other, a uni-racial complex of native tribes, divided amongst themselves and uncertain in their reactions and relations to the Colony.

The strategy of the Wesleyans had to be based on the serving of two totally different societies; the one, civilised and based on private property, and the other, barbarous and based on tribal

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C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 50: "A universal competition for land, grass, and water was a fact of South African Bantu life before the colonists had passed beyond its fringes."
custom. With the two living in a juxtaposition, their peaceful co-existence was to the advantage of both. An existence dependent on the interrelation of their positions and the economics of trade and labour. (1)

Between 1826 and 1830, government policy was characterised by two facts: the extension of administrative controls on the frontier within the Colony and the attempt to establish and hold a boundary as a barrier between the Colony and the trans-frontier tribes. After 1826 there was a closer settlement in the eastern districts of the Colony. Trade, both legal and illicit, across the colonial border increased. There was also the first ex-colonial demonstration of force when Somerset ordered out a commando which mistakenly destroyed the "Fetcani" (2) for Tshaka, near Umtata in 1829. (3)

From 1823 to 1830, there was an extensive expansion of Wesleyan


(2) "Fetcani" is a corruption of African. The word was used in contemporary accounts: usually to describe any refugee group or tribe.


missionary activity beyond the Keiskamma. (1) In 1830, when Shaw returned from Wesleyville to Grahamstown as Superintendent of the Grahamstown circuit and Chairman of the Albany District (2), there had, besides the establishment of new societies within the Colony, been the formation of new circuits in Kaffraria. (3) Each mission station was the centre of a circuit. In Kaffraria there were circuits based upon the mission stations, at Wesleyville among the Gqunokhwebe, Mount Coke among the Adlambi, Butterworth among the Gcalekas, Clarkebury among the Theabas, and the nucleus of circuits at Morley among the Bovana and Buntingville among the Apondo. (4) The Church in the Albany area had proved to be a solid base from which had grown an ever-increasing chain of stations. By the early 'thirties Wesleyan strategy had made a good deal of headway in its intention to Christianise the native tribes.


(2) Shaw, EAGSA, p. 127.
G. Sadler, Never a Young Man, p. 80.


(4) Minute Book of the Albany District, 1830. Hereafter abbreviated N.B.A.D. Sles, Op. cit., p. 25 The N.B.A.D. up to 1839 are not in the N.A., E.U.I. and attempts to trace their whereabouts have been unsuccessful.
However, during this period, the frontier situation began to alter from one of relative calm to one in which the atmosphere became increasingly charged with greed, enmity and tension.

A neutral belt sounded well enough in dispatches to England. It was nevertheless a tantalising device which increased the tension between the colonists and the tribesmen. Empty land was too great a temptation for the land-hungry frontier. The affairs were crowded into areas which steadily grew less able to maintain them. ... The evidence which is available indicates that the Eastern frontier suffered severe pressure from both front and rear. (1)

The Wesleyans throughout this period were becoming consciously aware of these facts. The realisation had slowly grown and impressed itself on Wesleyan thinking, that if the intention of Wesleyan strategy was to Christianise the native tribes, it had to concern itself with the attendant frontier problems which accompanied this intention. Moral improvement of the native tribes, which would assist to a better chance of maintaining frontier peace and security, was but one of the problems. The question of land dissatisfaction

was another. This had during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, developed into a question of serious proportions. The Wesleyans had had an early taste of this problem soon after their initial entry into Kaffirland. Wesleyan strategy gradually realised that the question of frontier peace and security ran deeper than Christianisation or the promotion of Christian morality; that as regarded the native tribes, the question of land, also actively affected frontier stability; that the question of land was also a question of the survival of the native tribes. Wesleyan strategy was, consequently, expanded to embrace these issues. But it was not an overnight development.

The establishment of mission stations in Kaffirland inextricably involved the Wesleyans in frontier issues. (1) The longer the

(1) Barnabas Shaw, whose missionary activity was on the north-eastern frontier, assessed their position well. Memorials of South Africa, p. 100, "Some have thought that missionaries should take no concern in the temporal affairs of the people among they labour, but that they should be exclusively employed in promoting their spiritual welfare. This is correct, as it regards nations already in a state of civilisation, but will not apply to the commencement of a mission among savages."
Wesleyans' establishment in Kaffirland continued, so in proportion, their involvement, of necessity, increased. By the early 'thirties, Somerset's envisaged plan of rigid control towards the native tribes and the missionaries, had collapsed and crumbled. The latter were, however, still expected to fit into the framework of the administration. This the Wesleyans continued to do. But they crept into Wesleyan strategy a new note. The Wesleyans were realising that they could not remain silent forever. There was, by this time, a strong sense of obligation to endeavour to influence government policies with regard to the frontier. For the resulting positive attempt to influence the administration, the term "advocacy" is used. In respect to this frontier administration, the Wesleyans came gradually to the realisation that, if their primary aim was to meet with any decided success, and peace be maintained, certain measures had to be enacted by the authorities. These measures ultimately concerned the question of land and native survival: that there existed a basic threat inherent in the authorities' administration of the frontier, in respect to peace and security. Consequently the Wesleyans began to increasingly concern themselves with the circumstances of the frontier situation, especially with
the question of the conservation of the natives' rights in the soil. A question which was directly related to their moral conduct, and hence with the Wesleyan intention to Christianise. Shaw's comment clearly echoes this.

If we deprive them [the native tribes] of the soil we deprive them of the means of sustenance and we compel them to become robbers. (1)

I am decidedly hostile, on grounds of both just and good policy, to any plan of colonisation which deprives the natives of all right in the soil. (2)

The Christianising of the native tribes, moral improvement, the land question, the conservation of the territorial rights of the natives and their survival, were all related factors. Wesleyanism saw it as a duty to Christianise the native tribes. Hence they also came to regard it as their duty to advocate measures for the alleviation and solution of the frontier problems. Problems which were, because of their initial duty, Wesleyan problems as well.

(1) IHR VII 538, p. 57.
(2) Shaw, SMSEA, p. 143.
The concern and advocacy of Wesleyan strategy was well-founded. In the late 'twenties and early 'thirties there was much to increase this concern and strengthen this advocacy.

The native chief Mqomo had been allowed to return to the Kat River area in 1821, by the settlement at Fredericksburg. This readmission of the Ngqika was followed by certain other tribes under permission granted by Major-General Bourke, Governor of the Cape Colony from 1826 to 1828. During the Governorship of his successor, Lieutenant-Governor Sir Lowry Cole (1828-1833), a great deal of unrest arose among the tribes in this area due to internal pressures.(1) As a result, Cole drove out Mqomo and settled Hottentots in the Kat River Settlement on lands which had previously been held by Mqomo.(2) This action by the administration drew some sharp comments from the Wesleyans. Strong criticism came from the Rev. William Boyce, who had been responsible for founding the station at Buntingville in 1830 (3) and was later to become one of the chief Wesleyan spokesmen.

Boyce saw,

The whole affair, ... as resulting from a determination on the part of the Commissioner-General to embrace the first fair pretext of stripping Makompo of a most desirable and extensive portion of territory for the purpose of forming a Hottentot settlement there. (1)

The fairness of Boyce's reaction as a valid criticism is not challenged. But, this outburst is symptomatic of the question which was beginning to cause the Wesleyans a great deal of concern. The question of the conservation of the territorial rights of the tribes.

Further comment came from the Rev. Stephen Kay. He had been appointed to help the Rev. J. Broadbent at Makeassie which was not far from the present-day Klipksdorp. (2) The postponement of that mission saw the arrival of Kay in the Albany area, where he took charge of work at Grahamstown. (3) Kay commented thus, in 1833, on the Hottentot settlement.

That the benevolent measures of a Government relative to one class of aborigines should thus have involved

(1) W. Boyce, Notes on South African Affairs, p. 9. Hereafter abbreviated NSA.


others of a far different character, cannot but be regarded as cause of deepest regret; especially when it is recollected, that the territory in question is not ours in equity and that our right to dispose of it is therefore a matter of very grave dispute. (1)

The Wesleyans at this stage were still mainly concerned with their every-day task of firmly establishing their mission stations. The interrelation of this aim with the frontier problems arose gradually in their minds. Naqomo's expulsion served to heighten and speed up their thoughts. By the early 'thirties, evidence clearly indicates that the questions raised by the frontier milieu had begun to occupy the minds of Wesleyan strategists to a considerable extent.

Kay argued further that the actions of the authorities in the case of Naqomo, and similar actions in the future could only do harm to frontier relations. Such actions did not make for a better understanding between the tribes and the authorities and the maintenance of frontier security and peace. For the Wesleyans it

(1) S. Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.494.
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was imperative,

that such measures be adopted as shall in future protect and prevent all further encroachment upon them [the natives' lands]. (1)

Measures which would do far more,

than a hundred military stations ever did. (2)

And if we wish to extend our friendly relations, and promote good faith amongst the tribes, the sooner the territorial question is decided and the better. (3) We have not as yet by any means extended to them [the tribes] that protection which they reasonably demand at our hands and which our increased intercourse renders absolutely necessary. (4)

These two quotes sum up the whole basis of Wesleyan advocacy, which became an integral part of Wesleyan strategy in the 'thirties. It was a slow process. There was no hasty evolution of ideas. The

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(1) Ibid., p. 498.
(2) Ibid., p. 498.
(3) Ibid., p. 497.
(4) Ibid., p. 498.
Wesleyans came to believe that the protection, which was necessary, was that protection of British law and control. Wesleyan strategy advocated the extension of British control as the only solution for the preservation of the tribes' rights in the soil. The advocacy of this extension was not merely the result of the 1834-1835 frontier war. It was an advocacy which had its origins in Wesleyan thought at the beginning of the 'thirties. In the extension of British law and control, they saw not only a solution to the question of the conservation of territorial rights, but the only effectual measure for the maintenance of peace and security on the frontier. Such an extension would therefore be an assistance to the propagation of Christianity amongst the native tribes. Land was the foundation of the frontier milieu and if dissatisfaction continued to arise, and there was no guarantee for the tribes that their rights would be respected, there could only be one result. (1)

This advocacy, which was developing as a major tenent of

(1) MacMillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p. 26. "At last, in the 'thirties, the stage was fairly set for the inevitable trial of strength between European colonists and their Bantu rivals for possession of the land, and in the twenty years that followed all other questions seemed to take second place." Hereafter abbreviated BBB.
Wesleyan strategy, resulted too from an awareness that within government policy, there existed an inability, or a refusal, to accept full frontier responsibilities. The vacillation and ineffectiveness of the Colonial Executive led to the encouragement of the temptation on the part of the natives to plunder and murder. (1)

In 1833 a hottentot family, with a colonial pass, on their way to Wesleyville were way-laid and brutally murdered by members of Nqeno's tribe. (2) Shortly afterwards in 1834, an English trader was murdered in Mntsa territory. In both cases the authorities allowed the matter to drop and no redress was demanded. (3) The Wesleyans saw the fault of this situation in government policy. It was,


(3) The principles of action, which Wesleyan strategy advocated with regard to such cases, are clearly seen in Boyce's recommendations to D'Urban, 31st March, 1834, paragraph 2. *Infra* pp. 43-50. "The maintaining of the present salutory impression of the superior power of the colonial government, by the prompt and severe punishment of wrongs inflicted on the Colony, or the colonists in Caffreland. See also, Shaw to the Earl of Aberdeen, 7th April, 1835. *Infra*, p. 69."
the peremptory instructions of the Home Government [which] compelled the Colonial Government to exhibit such a weakness and vacillation in the policy pursued towards them [the native chiefs]. It seduced them into the fatal belief, that they could indulge the utmost licence of wickedness, and disregard of the rights of others, with impunity. (1)

There was no sense in the authorities turning a blind eye to native depredations. (2) It was of no good or kindness to the Kaffir people.

It emboldened them to commit the most daring depredations, while blind to the fearful reaction against them. (3)

By 1834, the advocacy of a detailed and thoroughly thought out plan, as to the above questions, became a decided and indisputable part of Wesleyan strategy. It was the result of concern and thoughts which had been within Wesleyan minds for some years previous. Inherent within this advocacy was too, a turning to the authorities, as an instrument for assistance in the primary aim of their strategy.

(1) Shaw, [missing text], p. 179.
(2) See Appendix G, 2nd, (e)
(3) Ibid., p. 179.
D'Urban's Arrival.

Against a background of frontier dissatisfaction and flux, January 10th, 1834, saw a new Governor, Major-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban take up the reins of the administration at the Cape. He arrived with instructions which, as far as the frontier was concerned, ordered him to attempt a stabilisation of relations with the trans-frontier tribes on a basis of treaties and presents. For in a Colonial Office despatch of November 27th, 1833, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Edward Stanley, had written thus to D'Urban:

It will of course be incumbent upon you to devise such other measures as may appear to you calculated to protect the colonists against unprovoked aggressions on the part of their uncivilised neighbours. (1)

Lord Stanley stressed the propriety of,

cultivating an intercourse with the Chiefs of the Caffre tribes by stationing prudent and intelligent men among them as agents of your government. (2)

The Colonial Secretary continued by expressing the view that,

many, if not all, of the Chiefs might be gradually

(1) IBB. AXXX. 252. p. 64
(2) Ibid., p. 65.
induced, in return for small annual presents, to become responsible for the peaceful conduct of their clans. (1)

For this purpose D'Urban was,

empowered to devote £600 to the payment of "prudent and intelligent men" who should act as agents to the most suitable border chiefs. (2)

The "other measures" which D'Urban was to devise meant that he was under an official obligation to find and implement a substitute for the commando system. (3) It was a system with which,


(2) Walker, Op.cit., p.183. Madden, Op.cit., p.424, suggests that Stanley's instructions to D'Urban were a result of suggestions by Dr Philip. For Dr Philip's ideas, see IBR.VII.538, p.667.

according to Shaw, the Wesleyans had always been at variance, and its abolition a part of Wesleyan advocacy. (1)

[The Wesleyans] always strongly condemned it and in every published document wherein we have expressed our opinion of the subject we have invariably recommended that reprisals should not be made by farmers, even under the control of a military officer. (2)

Reprisals should only be carried out according to the practice and customs of the native law.

In terms of these instructions, D'Urban engaged the personal service of Dr Philip to examine the situation which existed on the eastern frontier. Philip, after what might be termed a "lightning tour", bluntly warned that the situation was far from tranquil: that in fact a dangerous and explosive situation existed. He

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(1) Though the Wesleyans disagreed with the manner in which the campaign against the Fetscani in 1828 had been accomplished, (as, Op. cit.,), Boyce defended that commando as necessary not for what that Hk tribe had done, but what it might have done to the Colony. He further saw it as saving the immediate frontier tribes from possible destruction by the Fetscani. Cory, Op. cit., Vol II, p.364, Footnote. However, this did not affect his hostile attitude to the usual commandos. See also Boyce to D'Urban, 31st March, 1834. Infra. p. 43.

(2) W. Shaw, A Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries in South Africa, p.28. Hereafter abbreviated DWM.
attempted to pacify the dissatisfaction of the tribes by promising that the Governor himself would soon visit the area. (1) D'Urban was consequently urged to undertake this proposed trip as soon as possible, but before D'Urban could free, or wanted to free, himself from the more general executive troubles which occupied him in Cape Town, war broke out in December 1834. It lasted, as a major conflict, until May 1835.

It was from the time of D'Urban's term of office that the Wesleyans and their strategy came, by virtue of several interrelated factors, to occupy a particular prominence in frontier issues. This involved them, more than ever before, as unofficial advocates of measures that the government should adopt in connection with the handling of the frontier. At the time of D'Urban's arrival, their missionary activities were of greater magnitude (in Kaffirland) than either those of the G.H.S., the L.M.S. or the Moravians. Their efforts among two of three immediate border tribes, the Gqunukhwebe and Ndlambe, and their several societies among the Albany colonists, had caused them to have an especially vital concern in all that pertained to the frontier.

(1) Macmillan, EBB, p. 240.
Less than two months after D'Urban's arrival at the Cape, the Rev. William Boyce, on his way home to England, passed through Cape Town. At D'Urban's request he committed to writing his ideas on the best means of preserving the peace on the eastern frontier. It is with this address that Wesleyan strategy can be definitely labelled as entering a new sphere. A strategy which involved a particular advocacy as to the frontier and such measures as should be part of government policy to ensure frontier peace and security. This address did in fact have a marked influence on the administration's policy in the next two years.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. (a)

In the month of March 1834, being at Cape Town, on my way to England, I received a note from Sir Benjamin D'Urban, requesting me to call upon him. "Then I waited upon him, he asked me many questions about Caffraria, &c., and concluded by desiring me to commit the substance of what I had said in writing. This I did, and the following pages is (sic) a copy of what I wrote to him, which copy I kept, that the Secretaries and Committee of the Wesleyan Missionary Society might be aware of the extent of my intermeddling in Colonial politics and the occasion which compelled me to give my opinion.

REMARKS on the best means of preserving the peace of the Colonial Frontier, bordering on Caffraria; in a letter addressed to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, written at his Excellency's request March 31st 1834, by William B. Boyce, Wesleyan Missionary.

(a) This text is that which is in the A.W.M. and is compared throughout with the text as it exists in the IBB.
The following remarks on the best means(b) of preserving the peace of the Eastern Frontier of the Colony are respectfully submitted to your Excellency's consideration.

1. Settlement of the Colonial Boundary.

Although the boundary line of the colony has been defined(a) by proclamations of preceding governors, the Caffres are to this day ignorant of the extent of the claims of the colonial government upon their territory. Part of the ceded territory between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers is inhabited by several Caffre tribes, who fully expect to hold possession according to promises of former governors, so long as they do not disturb the peace of the colony. The recent expulsion of a portion of Ngem's and Tyali's people from the northern portion of the ceded territory, has created a feeling of jealousy among the Caffres, as to the intentions of the colonial government, which can only be removed by a formal official declaration, pointing out a line beyond which it is not the intention of the colonial government to permit the advance of the colonists. By this(d) means the Caffres would be satisfied, that beyond this line their lands were their own, free from any claims on the part of the colony. It would be extremely unjust and impolitic, to drive the Caffres out of that portion of the ceded territory which they now possess, at the same time it is desirable, as a check upon their future conduct that they should continue to hold these lands as colonial fiefs (the nature of which they well understand), and be prevented from exceeding the limits at present assigned to them.

Let the chiefs now residing within the limits claimed by the colony, be informed of the nature of the tenure by which they will be permitted to (e) hold their present possessions and to prevent further encroachments upon the colonial lands, let them be immediately settled by colonial subjects (I mean the unsettled portion of the ceded territory not inhabited by the Caffres). By thus making the colonists and Caffres near neighbours, they would be very much checked, as the chance of discovery would be very much increased.

(b) 188 - 'mode' for 'means'.
(c) 188 - 'fixed' for 'defined'.
(d) 188 - 'these' for 'this'.
(e) 188 - 'by which they hold.'
2. The maintaining the present salutary impression of the superior power of the colonial government, by the prompt and severe (f) punishment of wrongs inflicted on the colony, or on colonists in Caffreland.

In the discussions which have taken place respecting the policy of the colonial frontier, party-feeling has led on the one hand to an undue estimation of the Caffre character, and on the other to an unjust depreciation of it. The Caffres have all the vices and all the virtues incidental to a semi-barbarous state of society. Among the former we may mention a love of predatory warfare, among the latter hospitality, kindness to strangers, fidelity to their employers, but certainly not (g) a scrupulous regard to the rights of property possessed by their neighbours. No Caffre deems it wrong to steal from another tribe or from the colony, and the chiefs are only restrained from plundering each other and the colony by a fear of consequences. This salutary fear it is necessary to maintain, and it can only be obtained by the prompt and severe, yet just punishment of wrong committed upon the colony or upon colonists in Caffreland. I am aware that many humane individuals, averse to the use of coercive measures, think that trifling acts of theft or oppression to individuals should be overlooked. On the contrary, it is my decided impression that, the prompt and severe, yet just infliction of punishment upon guilty individuals(h) is productive of a moral influence, extremely beneficial to the continuance of our friendly relationships with the Caffres, the extent and value of which can only be estimated by persons residing in Caffreland. It will be found that mistaken lenity or remissness on the part of the colonial authorities in the prompt punishment of thefts, &c. is the greatest cruelty, as such conduct being by the Caffres attributed to a want of power, will encourage them in their thefts and aggressions, and these in the end will provoke severe and exemplary punishment, and bring upon the Caffre tribes the

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(f) BBB - No emphasis. Throughout BBB there is no emphasis.

(g) BBB - inserts 'with'.

(h) BBB - omits 'upon guilty individuals'.
usual fate of all semi-barbarous nations bordering on European settlements. Whatever treaties the colonial government may enter into with the Caffre chiefs, the necessity of a military force on the frontier will remain for the present, until some decided change takes place in the habits and feelings of the frontier tribes. If from any reliance upon the schemes of benevolent speculative men, some of whom never saw a Caffre, or from any hope of economising the expenditure, the colonial government makes any reductions seriously affecting the efficiency of the present military force on the eastern frontier, it will soon be found that neither the views of the philanthropist or (sic) of the economist have been served by such an apparently feasible yet absurd policy.

3. Treaties may be entered into with the Caffre chiefs -

ist. As to thefts from the colony.

It would be desirable for the commandant of the frontier to enter into agreements with the chiefs separately, not collectively, as to the punishment of thieves, and the best means(1) of detecting them. If the chiefs were informed that in accordance with their own customs, the government would hold them responsible for cattle stolen from the colony, the spur of which was traced to their country, they would soon find the thieves. Not a single head of cattle can be stolen from the (j) colony without the knowledge of all who reside near the thief, and the fact is soon brought to the chief's ear: but unless compelled by a sense of his own responsibility to punish the thief, he will not do it, as such a voluntary strictness in the administration of justice would deprive him of his popularity; but if made responsible by the colonial government, then his people would not blame him for detecting and punishing theft, and every man would feel that his own interest and the interest of his tribe were concerned in the furtherance of this object. The chief should be allowed the assistance of a patrol, if he require it, as the thieves may perhaps be supported by influential men, with whom the chief would be too weak to contend without a formal gathering of the military force of his tribe, which would occasion a delay favourable to the escape of the thief, and the loss of the property stolen. In such cases a patrol would

(1) IBB - 'mode' for 'means'.

(j) IBB - 'out of the' for 'from the'. 
prevent bloodshed. If the person of the thief were claimed, and the claim insisted upon, or in the event of having made his escape, the person of the master of his kraal (without whose knowledge he could not have committed the theft), very few thefts would be committed. In all cases the legal fine, varying from four to ten head for one, should be levied upon the kraal where the thief resided, and this fine should be divided among the chief and those who assisted in tracing the spur of the lost cattle. It would not be politic to allow any part of this fine to go to the colonist whose cattle have been stolen, as it might encourage unprincipled men to be careless of their property, if assured of its restoration and a recompense besides. I am aware that to many persons unacquainted with the laws of Caffrela nd, and the state of society there, which fully justifies the strictness of the law respecting thefts, the above measures will (k) appear harsh and unjust. There can however be no harshness in dealing with Caffres according to their own laws, founded on their own views of international justice; and if it be considered that at present the Caffres owe their very existence to the generous interference of the colonial government in 1823, by which they were saved from extermination by the Fetcani (sic); that every thief assists in destroying the good feeling which subsists between the Caffres and the colonists, their natural protectors against the powerful and more barbarous tribes beyond them, and that all the authority of Britain and of the colonial government cannot save them eventually from the common fate, which has hitherto been the lot of all savage tribes bordering on European settlements, if they provoke the enmity of the colonists; then it will appear evident to the most humane, that no regulations can be too harsh and severe, which have for their objects the prevention of those continued thefts from the colony, which would ultimately lead to the loss of the independence and property of the Caffre tribes, and to their final extinction.

2nd. As to protection to traders residing in Caffreland.

Many Europeans with their Hottentot servants are occupying temporary residences in Caffreland near the kraals, or in populous neighbourhoods for the convenience of trade. Most of them so far as I have observed, conduct themselves with great propriety and moderation, but yet some of them, either from ignorance of native customs, or from natural ill-temper, behave in a very overbearing manner. The ill-will which the conduct of a few produces, extends to others who have not merited it, and recently

(k) IBE - 'may' for 'will'.

many of the traders have (1) suffered many personal insults and
much loss of property taken from their trading places, and from
their waggons while travelling on the road. As the colonial
government has not as yet taken any notice of the complaints
of the traders, the Caffre chiefs imagine them to be beyond all
colonial protection, and therefore feel no anxiety to redress
their injuries. The importance of Caffre trade to the colony
in a pecuniary point of view, and its utility as the means of
promoting a good feeling between the colonists and Caffres by
convincing both parties of a community of interests, render it
highly desirable that the Caffre chiefs should be made clearly
to understand that British subjects are under British protec-
tion, and that complaints from the chiefs affecting (m) the
conduct of British subjects would be attended to by the colo-
nial authorities. The appointment of consular agents to the
native chiefs has been recommended to the colonial government,
and if the services of suitable persons could be commanded, the
scheme would perhaps succeed, but even then the probability is,
that collision of sentiment between the civil agents, and the
military commandant of the frontier upon whose ability after all
the main dependence is to be placed, would more than counter-
balance the good which might result from such appointments.
However, as the colonial government cannot command the services
of suitable persons, the scheme is not likely to be tried.
None but missionaries who have resided some time in Caffrelan
d would be qualified for such offices (n), and no missionary
ought to be as employed, as the duties of this office would
completely secularise his character, and deprive him of the
influence which, as a teacher of religion and as a peace maker
he already possesses. However defective the present system of
governing the colonial frontier through the medium of a military
commandant may be, it is the best which circumstances will ad-
mit. The abuse of power on the part of the commandant is al-
most impossible, checked as he is by the presence of so many
missionaries interested in the welfare of the Caffre tribes, and
of so many other Europeans employed in trade. The fact of the
responsibility of the peace of the whole colonial frontier
resting with the commandant is one of the strongest securities
for the right discharge of the duties of his important office,

(a) L88 = 'respecting' for 'affecting'
(b) L88 = 'purposes' for 'offices'
(1) L88 = 'here' for 'have'.
whereas a divided responsibility would give rise to endless disputes, the probable (o) sacrifice of the peace of the frontier.

4. The maintaining a regular communication with the principal chiefs of Caffreland, on this side of the Umsalwubu.

Besides the chiefs on the frontier with whom the commandant is in constant contact, there are several other powerful chiefs who are not merely chiefs of distant clans, but a sort of feudal sovereigns over a collection of clans: McInta, the supreme chief of the Amaxe or Xalus, Vodama of the Amatambi (p) or Xambookies, and Paku of the Amatambi or Xambookies; with these it is desirable that the commandant of the frontier should preserve a regular communication. If an officer were sent once or twice a year with an escort of a dozen soldiers (for the sake of form) to visit these chiefs with a message and a few presents, not only would a kindly feeling be kept up, but the officer would have an opportunity of observing the conduct of Europeans in Caffreland, and of checking and oppressions on the part of the natives; he might receive complaints, and demand redress, and in no just case of complaint would he receive a refusal. He would also have an opportunity of recommending the chiefs to remain at peace with each other, and in this respect his influence would be very great. A periodical visit of this kind would act as a salutary check both upon Europeans and natives, and the chiefs of the frontier clans would be intimidated when they observed a regular communication kept up between the distant chiefs and the commandant of the frontier.

5. The prevention of improper and dangerous persons from settling in Caffreland.

The frontier tribes are inundated by troops of idle Rotten-tots from Albany and from the Kat River settlement, whose presence in Caffreland is most injurious to the good understanding which at present subsists between the Caffres and the colonists. Many of them possess guns, which they sell to the Caffres, and some of them are discharged soldiers, who are induced by the petty chiefs to settle with them, and act as interpreters; these men are without exception the greatest rascals in the whole country. They are considered by the chiefs

(o) IEB - 'possible' for 'probable'
(p) IEB - 'Amatambi' for 'Amatambo'
as possessing a thorough knowledge of the plans and designs of
the colonial government. They impose upon the credulity of the
chief, by misrepresenting every act of the colonial government
and thus raising unfounded jealousies. It is highly desirable
that all these should be sent out of Caffreland, and that in
future, no man, European or coloured, should be allowed to
enter Caffreland without a pass. This regulation would be no
inconvenience to the respectable European or coloured person,
while it would materially check the idle migratory habits of
a very considerable portion of the inhabitants of the Eer-
River settlement. (1)

These views of Boyce, it is important to note, were expressed some
months before the outbreak of hostilities which began at the end of
1834. (2)

(1) A.M.M.S., Box VII - Albany, File 1834. All reference numbers
of documents in the A.M.M.S., which follow, are given according
to, Calendar of Cape Missionary Correspondence 1830 - 1850,
by P.B. Hinrichs. National Council for Social Research Publica-
tion, Series No. 27. See also, IHR. VII. 528, pp. 179-182.
Handed in by T. Phillips as evidence before the Select Committee
on Aborigines, 31st August, 1835.
1858, M.MXI. 272 pp. 45-47, appears to be a precise of this.
1834, 19th June, 1835, Enclosure 15, in No. 3.
See Appendix B.

(2) Saton, Op. cit., p. 387, Footnote(1), and p. 368, footnote(1) has
incorrectly dated this letter. His statements that, "Boyce had
expressed his views at an early stage in the way;" and "Boyce
mistakenly gives the year of his 'Remarks' as 1834," are in-
correct. Both sources, see above, are clearly dated 1834, not
1835.
Part of the substance of his introductory remarks are worthy of notice, for they indicate the position in which the Wesleyans found themselves. A position on the one hand against which they had been cautioned and warned, and on the other a position in which they could not remain silent. Boyce kept a copy of the address so that his superiors, at 77 Hatton Gardens, might know the extent of his meddling in political issues in the Colony, and why he expressed his opinion, and advocated the measures which he did. He acceded to D'Urban's request on the grounds of colonial defence; the welfare of the European colonists; the survival of the native tribes and the equitable execution of justice. It was a clear indication of the direction in which Wesleyan strategy was advancing, but it was an advancement into an area which the Wesleyan Missionary Society did not encourage.

Without doubt, as the evidence which follows demonstrates, the Wesleyans did enter into the political arena, particularly between 1834 and 1836. However, this entrance was not prompted by political considerations. Rather it was the result of a deep concern for the frontier, the issues that arose, and the desire to see the promotion of the evangelisation and the welfare of both the European colonist and, particularly, the native tribes. Wesleyan strategy was inexorably forced and directed along the path of such activity by the nature of the Wesleyans' calling, the character of
the frontier, and the trends which they perceived as inherent within the administration of the Cape Colony.

The Wesleyans were theoretically governed by the Instructions to the Wesleyan Missionaries. (1) An analysis of Wesleyan correspondence between South Africa and England indicates a frequent reference to these instructions. These Instructions were considered as standing rules of conduct (2) and afford an insight into what was involved in Wesleyan strategy with regard to this advocacy. They were categorically warned,

against meddling with political parties, or secular disputes. You are teachers of religion ... a part of your duty, as Ministers, is to enforce, by precept and example a cheerful obedience to lawful authority. (3)

(1) Appendix A.

(2) A.M.M.S. Resolution passed by the Committee at the Wesleyan Mission-house, Hatton Garden, London, December 18, 1817. With regard to these Instructions it was further resolved, "2. That a copy of these Instructions, signed by the Secretaries for the time being, shall be furnished to every missionary who now is, or hereafter shall be, employed in any of our Foreign Stations. 3. That the said instructions shall be read over annually, at the meeting of every District Committee, by the Chairman; who is to inquire whether they have been observed on the part of the Brethren; and the same shall be reported in the District Minutes regularly, and with them transmitted to the Committee in London." As the M.H.A.D. for the period in question have disappeared - see p. 27, footnote(4) - it has not been possible to establish if the procedure in 3. was actually followed.

(3) Ibid., Clause V.
They were to obtain the protection of the local government and, the Committee hoped, their,

subsequent good behaviour towards Governors, and all who are in authority, will be such as shall secure to you the enjoyment of liberty to instruct and promote the salvation of those to whom you are sent. (1) .... The Committee cautions you against engaging in any of the merely civil disputes or local politics of the colony ... either verbally or by correspondence with any persons at home, or in the Colonies. (2)

Shaw stated that his Society had maintained

the inexpediency of Missionary interference in questions of a purely political nature. (3)

Throughout, the Wesleyans’s loyalty to those in authority was emphasised. They were to guard against entering into political issues, but also to promote the salvation of those to whom they were sent. Consequently the Wesleyans discovered themselves to be on the horns of a dilemma. For that very salvation which they were called to promote, had become inexorably connected with frontier issues, which, by nature, had some political connections. This dilemma in which the

(1) Ibid., Clause VI. Instructions’ emphasis.
(2) Ibid., Clause VII. Paragraph 9.
(3) Shaw, EMUSA, p.62.
Wesleyan missionaries found themselves, invoked in the most trying decisions, especially as the war wore on. Roughly a year after the cessation of hostilities, Boyce wrote to his superiors, that,

As Missionaries we have been called upon to express opinions of a comparatively political nature which but for this occurrence we should probably never have meddled with ... in reference to our affairs ... the committee ... must either approve or condemn us. (1)

The Rev. E. Maddy, who founded the Clarkebury station in 1830, and in 1853 was appointed to the Bathurst and Port Frances circuit(2), justified his expressions on the political condition of the Colony thus:

I should not make these observations on what may be considered political subjects were we not as Missionaries so seriously affected by them; and did they not involve the present destinies of our Missions and directly influence our own peculiar work.(3)

But it was left to Shaw once again to articulate the principle at work within Wesleyan minds. In 1837 he wrote,

(1) A.M.N.S., Box VII, File 1836 & 1837, Boyce to Secretaries, 8th September, 1836.


(3) A.M.N.S., Box VII, File 1836 & 1837, Maddy to Secretaries, 14th October, 1836.
I will pay all due and proper respect to the King's representative in this Colony but I will never be a party man. (1)

The Wesleyans firmly believed it was their duty to speak out and to advocate the measures they did. But in doing so Wesleyan strategy did not identify itself with any one particular political opinion which was expressed in regard to frontier issues. It always identified itself with what it believed to be just, to the welfare of both sides and to the advancement of Christianity. For the Wesleyans the questions were not purely political. They were religious as well. Their dilemma was: would it be more expedient to remain silent; to ignore their consciences; to deny that ultimate authority which they claimed to acknowledge; to watch what progress they had made in evangelising the south-eastern area of South Africa become null and void; to watch the slow, but in their opinion, eventual, destruction perhaps extermination of the native tribes; or to speak out with boldness, frankness and courage in the name of justice and love which they served. In such terms must Wesleyan strategy be judged. Not

(1) C. Roxborough, Colonial Policy in the Northern and Eastern frontiers of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834 - 1845. A.M.M.S., Shaw to Secretaries, 21st April, 1837. Shaw's emphasis.
merely whether the measures they advocated did ultimately succeed or fail in the furtherance of those ideals which they proclaimed and supported.

The situation on the frontier deteriorated rapidly. Tension increased. The pressure, like that of an enormous bubble, mounted as that humanity beyond the frontier smouldered in its dissatisfaction and envy. The bubble just had to burst.

Somerset [the ex-Governor's son in command of the frontier militia] anxious to recover outstanding cattle before D'Urban's arrival, whipped up his patrols. Scuffles ensued; royal blood was shed; Nacoma and Iyali, possibly thinking that they were beyond the pale, called up their warriors to leave their gardens and, at the head of 12,000 men poured into the Colony. (1)

The causes and events of the ensuing frontier war of 1834-1835 have been well detailed elsewhere. (2) They are the concern of this thesis only in so far as they assisted the direction and content of Wesleyan strategy. The war particularly illustrated and heightened the difficult position in which the Wesleyans found themselves. Hostilities on this scale were a new experience to the Wesleyans: the last frontier war had been in 1819. It is therefore not surprising.

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Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.VIII.
sing, in view of the extremity of the situation which had arisen and the position in which the Wesleyans found themselves, that the Rev. W. Shrewsbury (1) wrote to the new commander of the frontier, Colonel Harry Smith, shortly after the commencement of hostilities. Shrewsbury, who was responsible for the commencement of the Butterworth mission (2) and succeeded Shaw at Grahamstown in 1832, expressed, on the latter's request, his thoughts on the principles of action which should be adopted towards the native tribes.

Sir, Graham's Town, 16 Jan. 1835.

In accordance with your wishes I respectfully present for your consideration a few thoughts on the principles to be adopted in reference to the Caffre tribes.

Article 1. The chiefs who have invaded the colony to forfeit their country, their arms and their property. This end accomplished, the righteousness of British law, and the equity of British judges, may decide the rest.

Article 2. Deserters from the British government who may have taught the Caffres the use of arms, to be punished with rigour.

Article 3. The actual murderers of British subjects to be everywhere demanded, and, when obtained, executed on the spot; that the Caffres may see that murder with Britons is an unpardonable crime. Every chieftain to be informed that if he substitute innocent persons for the really guilty, the chieftain himself will forfeit his own life, as being himself the friend of murderers, and the cause of the shedding of innocent blood, under the

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(1) He had previously been a missionary in the West Indies. Wesleyan Missionary Notices, No. 81, December, 1832, p. 374. Also, Badler, Op. cit., NOTES, p.164.

colour of law and justice.

Article 4. The chiefs who profess friendship towards the colony to be informed that, if they allow our enemies shelter in their territories, or convalidate the concealment of colonial cattle or property, they will at once be considered enemies, and dealt with accordingly.

Article 5. In conducting the war, the advice of the Dutch, and of well-informed British civilian settlers, will be of great advantage, and superior to a strict observance of military tactics as observed in European warfare. In thickets and ravines caution must be used to avoid falling into ambuscades, &c.

Article 6. Calculating on the ultimate success of our arms, since ours is the righteous cause, on the termination of the war:

1. The neutral country to be occupied by the British, to prevent the Caffres from lurking in the Fish River bush.

2. Caffre offenders whose lives may be spared, to be employed in making highroads in every part of Caffreland, if necessary, even to Natal; their labour as convicts being a visible proof of the punishments mercifully inflicted on those who might have lost their lives, &c.

3. A universal registration of Caffres to be effected; every man bearing on his neck a thin plate of tin, containing his name, the name of his chief, which will be to him a passport of peace, and the absence of it a token of enmity. This will both serve to identify offenders, and enable the British government at once to know the number and strength of the frontier tribes.

4. British agents to reside in Caffreland to carry this registration into effect, and otherwise subserv the great principles of justice and mercy which benefits all people who are indirectly controlled by the government and laws of Britain.

(signed) W.J. Shrewsbury. (1)

(1) I.B.S. XXIX. 279. p. 44. D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19th June, 1833. Enclosure 14, in No. 3.
Also M.A., N.U.I., MS 15,382.
In writing this letter Shrewsbury was not wilfully and intentionally entering the political arena, but was, as a loyal subject to the Crown, offering to those in authority that information which he felt was vital to the general interests of both frontier populations. In so doing he was stating what a Wesleyan thought. The use of the indefinite article is emphasised because in this period, as throughout the whole period being analysed, the historian is dealing very much with individuals rather than corporate statements of opinion.

Shrewsbury's letter which advocated harsh measures against the native tribes, harsher in fact than any others previously advocated by any other missionaries, was included by D'Urban in his June, 1835, despatch to Glenelg. D'Urban's motives for this action would appear to be to offer some justification for that policy which he had decided to adopt in May 1835.(1) If the 'colonial secretary thought that his measures were harsh, then, here were measures advocated by a missionary which might be seen as even harsher.(2) It was too, most probably an

(1) Appendix F. May Proclamation.

"And here it may not be irrelevant to cite the opinion of a most benevolent humane clergyman, Mr. Shrewsbury ... I think my measures are not quite so severe as those which he, in his conscience, considers necessary and openly recommends."
attempt to shift some of the responsibility for his actions on to
other shoulders. The inclusion of Boyce's address (1), in the same
enclosure immediately following on Shrewsbury's letter, is evidence
indicative of this. (2)

Whatever D'Urban's real intention for the enclosure of Shrews-
bury's letter, it certainly raised eye-brows in the Colonial Office,
particularly those of the under-secretary, James Stephen. He took

(1) Boyce's address was not included in its original form. D'Urban
enclosed a precise which tends to heighten the severity of
Boyce's ideas. Its inclusion in this enclosure, particularly
in a precise form, supports the argument that D'Urban's motive
for enclosing Shrewsbury's letter was a case of justification
of his Ray policy. See II.B.XXIX.279, pp.45-47, Appendix E,
and supra, pp. 43-50.

(2) Boyce, II.BA., p. 109. "... the maxims of expediency adopted by
his [a Governor's] predecessor, are of necessity his [a new
Governor's] guide in the beginning of his administration; and
the same maxims are continued as principles of action, even
when his experience proves their fallacy, because he considers
that towards the close of his official career, it would be
absurd to hazard untried schemes, involving himself in respon-
sibilities in the adoption of plans, the carrying out of which
must be left to his successor. His object is therefore to
finish his term quietly."
up the contents with the Committee of the Wesleyan Missionary Society. Shrewsbury was severely reprimanded by the Committee (1) even though he delivered a lengthy explanation in his defence to his superiors. (2) This decision was conveyed to the Colonial Office (3). Shrewsbury was taken to task both for the character of the measures which he had suggested and for having made these recommendations. (4)

The Committee's action might well have been merely to placate an enraged public upon whose benevolence they were dependent for financial contributions, and because of the name of the Society, which was in principle an embodiment of the principles of humanitarianism.

(1) _IBB.XXII._279, p.120. Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, held December 30th, 1835.

(2) Appendix C. A.K.M.S.,Box VII, File 1834-36. Also _IBB.XXIV._279, pp.120-122.


(4) Shrewsbury at this time was the chief Wesleyan missionary in the eastern colony. _IBB.XXII._279, p.20. D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19th June, 1835. Shaw was in England. No other Wesleyan missionaries who gave utterance to their opinion in this period were censured by the Wesleyan Committee. Shrewsbury wrote his letter to Colonel Smith shortly after the commencement of hostilities. The air was obviously charged with a great deal of tension. The Wesleyans had just seen most of their labours over the past eleven years go up in smoke. Some allowance should therefore be made for the conditions under which Shrewsbury was writing. Hence, for an accurate and true picture of Shrewsbury's opinions, his "defence", Appendix C, should rather be consulted.
Principles which at that time, were so near and dear to English hearts. The lack of any censorship of later Wesleyan utterances can be put down to the fact that the Committee was realising and grasping, at least to some extent, that the eastern frontier was the meeting ground of two vastly differently orientated cultures: that once involved in a day-to-day association with the people, their missionaries had, of necessity, to interest themselves in their relation to other social groups. As arbitrators in the daily affairs of both the colonists and the native tribes, the Wesleyans could not escape becoming their spokesmen and advisors in the other spheres of their lives. The Committee perhaps realised that it was the interplay of these factors, coupled with the desire to Christianise the tribes, which led to the advocacy which had become a part of Wesleyan reaction.

The Wesleyans entrance into Kaffirland had been on the basis of a reciprocal contract with the administration. Permission was granted under the implication of being obliged to assist the government in almost every sphere. (1) When Shrewsbury and Boyce committed their thoughts to writing, they were at the least, fulfilling a duty which they felt was obligatory. Their addressed written at the

(1) Thesal, ECC, Vol.XVI, pp.52-53. Colonial Secretary to Shaw, 6th June, 1823.
request of those who formed the hierarchy of the Cape administration. They were, however, also coming under the influence of an accentuated trend in the administration: that of making greater use of, and paying more attention to, the usefulness of the Wesleyans' opinions and persons, in furthering the instructions of the new Governor. The dealings of the administration with the Wesleyans were based on the private opinions of those who held colonial executive positions. These opinions, as far as the Wesleyans were concerned, were based upon the latter's worth in the frontier milieu. Hence it was at this time that Boyce's opinion came to outweigh others of other Societies. D'Urban turned ever increasingly to the Wesleyans for information and assistance for the implementation of his instructions.
CHAPTER IV.

The War and the Wesleyans.

Major hostilities ceased in Kaffirland in May 1835, when Hintsia, the chief of the Galaka, was defeated and taken captive. (1) He was later shot by an officer, George Southey, in self-defence while attempting to escape. (2) Feelings were running high. The eastern districts of the Colony were in a state of disorder and accusations were flying thick and fast. The first communication from the Wesleyans to their superiors in London was written at the end of January, 1835. The Wesleyans made no bones about pointing an accusing finger to the native tribes as the aggressors.

Honoured Fathers and Brethren,

Graham's Town, 31st January 1835

You will doubtless be greatly surprised to hear of the difficulties and dangers in which we are placed by a sudden invasion of the Caffres upon the Colony, throughout the entire line of our frontier. A more wanton aggression upon a peaceable people, who were desirous of promoting their best interests, has never been committed; and the effects resulting from it are so disastrous, that the colony must be brought to the verge of ruin. The hordes of Caffres are murdering, robbing them of their property and taking their flocks and herds of cattle without any resistance, the inhabitants counting themselves happy if they can only escape with their lives to Graham's Town. Village after village


(3) IRR. VII. 538. pp. 182-183.
is forsaken, our military posts are most of them evacuated, and all are concentrating in Graham's Town, awaiting with considerable anxiety the termination of this critical posture of our affairs. Our chief hope lies in the righteousness of our cause; for, although not a few have accused the colonists of cruelty towards the Caffres, from a thorough knowledge of most transactions connected with Albany, we are bold to maintain that such accusations are unjust. To a great extent true philanthropy prevails amongst the people here, without that ostentatious boast thereof which is found in some who excel therein more in word than in deed. It is a mysterious Providence that within one short month after our celebrating the abolition of slavery in so devout and appropriate manner, these things have been permitted to befall us; and we must calmly wait the end, trusting in God that this systematic, extensive and most pernicious war upon the colony will be overruled by the Almighty Governor of the world for the general welfare of all parties concerned.

Bathurst is forsaken, and many of the places round about are desolated. The greater part of the inhabitants of Salem have likewise escaped to Graham's Town, and the two brethren who resided at these places are now here, and affix their signatures to this hasty letter.

Brother Shepstone is yet safe, though in much danger, at Wesleyville; and Brother Bugmore is as yet uninjured, at Mount Coke, but of the distant stations we hear no tidings.

Commanding ourselves to the care of God, and begging an interest in your fervent prayers, we are, honoured fathers and brethren, your obedient servants,

(signed) W. J. Shrewsbury.

S. Young.

R. Haddy.

To the Secretaries of the London Wesleyan Missionary Society.

(1)

It was, for the Governor, an exceedingly difficult atmosphere in which to attempt to work out a solution. No clear instructions reached D'Urban from the Colonial Office until March 1836 when Clenegl

(1) JEB XI, 538, pp.182-183.
despatch of December 1835 reached Grahamstown. (1) D'Urban, up to that point had an indisputable free hand in whatever measures he proposed to adopt. Between May and September, 1835, D'Urban advanced two successive solutions. The first of these was the May Proclamation. (2) In this plan the Governor proposed that the ceded territory of 1819 be annexed and opened for European settlement. The area between the Keiskamma and the Kei was to be annexed to the Crown and proclaimed the Province of Queen Adelaide. It was to be cleared entirely of hostile native tribes. New military headquarters were also to be established at Kingwilliamstown under the command of Colonel Harry Smith. (3) The question of the Pingo settlement between the Fish and the Keiskamma is dealt with separately in a later chapter.

Against this background the Wesleyans were not inactive. There was now no hesitation in the stating of their views. A general analysis of Shrewsbury's letter and that from Shrewsbury, Young and Haddy, would appear to indicate that the Wesleyans could discover, within the actions of the native tribes, no justification for their violent intrusion into the Colony: that although certain of the European colonists' actions could be faulted, the native tribes were undoubtedly to

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(1) D'Urban had left Cape Town for Grahamstown in January, 1835.

(2) Appendix F.

blame for the state of affairs. The Wesleyans were at this time very much involved in frontier issues. Having been forced to retire from their missions to the safety of Grahamstown, they were no doubt highly susceptible to anti-native sentiments. Black-white tensions were at a zenith. Strict impartiality in the centre of these hostilities was not always successful. (1)

The Wesleyan missionaries who were in South Africa at the time, made the error of condemning the native invasion without expressing adequate statements of the natives' grievances. In so doing, they appeared to align themselves almost entirely alongside the colonists. Shrewsbury's mistake was the failure to present the other angle of the frontier. He was unaware of the wide circulation his letter was later to receive. He did not realise that his letter would not only be taken as an expression of his personal views, but as an official pronouncement by the Wesleyans representing their total attitude to the war. For it was written by a missionary who at the time was the Society's chief local officer. (2) This lack of representation more than any other single factor led to the British public conceiving, rather naturally, that the Wesleyans had a complete lack of understanding with regard to the native tribes and Kaffirland. An extreme and

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(1) Comparison of these letters to that of Shaw to Aberdeen, 7th April, 1835, while in England. [Ref.]. 252. pp. 137 - 142. Infra p. 69 and Appendix D.
(2) 259. p. 29, J. Urban to Aberdeen, 9th June, 1835.
false conception which the Wesleyans were later at great pains to dis- 
courage and from which to disassociate themselves.(1)

The fact that in this period the emphasis is, more often than not, 
with individualness rather than official policy, has already been stress-
ed, but it must of necessity again be done, for some two months later, 
when news of the outbreak of hostilities reached England, Shaw, also 
stated his views on the situation. He argued that though some of the 
blame could be laid at the feet of the colonists' attitudes and actions 
one of the main causes was the moral condition of the tribes. However 
at the ultimate finger of accusation was not to be pointed/either of these 
facts, but rather at the vacillating policies of the Colonial Office 
and the Governors, in respect to the frontier. His address to the 
Colonial Secretary on this matter was of considerable length. The 
broad issues of frontier dispute rather than the detailed causes of the 
1834-35 war, are the concern. Hence the document is only partially 
reproduced.

(1) A.M.R.S., Box VII, File 1836 and 1837. Enclosure by Shaw to 
Secretaries, June 9th, 1837. Also Shaw, BMRA, Appendix No.1, 
pp. 61-65. For copy see, Appendix E. Also see witness Boyce's 
book, BMRA, and Shaw's BMRA.
Leeds, 7 April 1835.

My Lord,

The recent painful intelligence from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, relative to the irruption of the Caffres into the British settlement of Albany, and to the disastrous consequences connected therewith, has excited much surprise and sympathy in this country. No doubt your Lordship's attention, as His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, has already been turned to the subject; and I am persuaded your Lordship will receive, with your accustomed courtesy, any information which may assist in devising means for preventing the recurrence of so serious an evil.

That your Lordship may at once perceive I am not an officious meddler with a subject on which I have no claim to be heard, I beg leave to state, that I left this country in 1829 in the capacity of Wesleyan minister to the largest party of British settlers which emigrated to Algoa Bay in that year; that I remained 13 years in Africa, during the whole of which period I resided in Albany or in the Caffre country, my time being almost equally employed in the discharge of my duties as a minister to the settlers and my labour as a missionary to the Caffres. From the situation which I held I was on terms of friendly intercourse with all classes of the settlers, and I acquired the confidence of several of the border chiefs in a high degree. I had also the honour to be consulted by the colonial authorities on several important points connected with the border policy. These circumstances afforded me opportunities for acquiring information on the subject on which I now address your Lordship, which very few British subjects have enjoyed in an equal degree.

I admit that it is possible that acts of flagrant injustice exercised by individual settlers towards the Caffres may have taken place; nay I believe that some such cases have actually occurred; but it is manifestly unjust to charge upon a whole body the faults of individuals. The ready co-operation of a very large and influential body of the settlers in every religious and benevolent institution established by the missionaries of various denominations, with a view to the propagation of the Gospel, and the general improvement of the native tribes, ought in justice to be taken in full evidence of their friendly feeling towards the aborigines, and of their being incapable of the cruel conduct which has been so thoughtlessly and unfairly imputed to them.
That our border policy, if such a designation can be given to the most changeful and contradictory course of proceeding ever adopted by any civilized government, has been full of errors and has sometimes placed those who have had to execute its arrangements in the painful situation of appearing the champions of injustice and cruelty, are truths that cannot be denied; but I do not sympathise with those who charge the evils now deplored upon the military officers on whom the duty of enforcing the border policy devolved; nor upon the settlers, who have for years suffered the mischiefs resulting from it, and who have long called for the substitution of a more just and efficient system.

Let me not, however, be misunderstood: the Caffres have not been exclusively to blame. Our border policy is extremely bad; and by this means we have often excited the cupidity and exasperated the feelings of the people, who, though naturally prone to make inroads upon their neighbours, were during the last few years, beginning to cherish the opinion that it would be their interest to cultivate peace with the colony. It is but recently that attempts to improve their moral state by the diffusion of Christianity have been encouraged by the colonial Government; and long before the missionaries established themselves in the colony, various deadly feuds betwixt the Caffres and the Dutch farmers had been engendered, the effects of which could hardly be expected to be speedily obliterated.

Not only has our Government pursued no efficient measures for the improvement of the Caffre tribes, but the plan adopted for the regulation of the affairs of the frontier has been extremely injudicious. Instead of a regular system, well defined and properly adapted to the local circumstances of the country, and steadily acted upon, there has been nothing like a system at all. Sometimes the mode of treatment has been harsh and severe, at other times mild and conciliatory. Occasionally the Caffres were almost frightened into the belief that we intended their destruction, and at other times they were suffered to carry on their depredations with such impunity as to tempt them into the opinion that we were afraid of them; threatenings were occasionally denounced, which were never intended to be executed, and promises have been made which were never fulfilled. The effects of this contradictory mode of proceeding upon an untutored but warlike race, strong from their number, may be easily imagined.
Thus your Lordship will perceive that I attribute the present perturbed state of the Caffre border not to any cruelties perpetrated by the British settlers upon the Caffres, not to any want of humanity by the British officers as to their treatment of the native tribes, or of seaf and activity in the protection of British lives and property, but to the moral state and predatory habits of the Caffres, the evil tendencies of which have been aggravated by the exceedingly mischievous tendency of our border policy. .......... 

The course which I beg leave most respectfully to suggest as desirable to be pursued at this crisis by the British Government may be considered as referring, first, to the past, and secondly, to the future. .......... 

I would respectfully make the following suggestions: Declare the Keiskamma River to be the boundary of the colony, thus including the whole neutral territory within its limits; let this form one of the articles of the written treaty of peace to be signed by all the principal border chiefs, and thereby confirm the rights acquired by British, Dutch and Hottentot settlers in the neighbourhood of Fort Beaufort and the Kat River. 

2dly. Offer to the Amagunawbagia tribe under Pato, Kama, Cobus, &c. their entire ancient territory within the neutral ground, on condition that they place themselves under the protection of the British Government, and become responsible to the colony for all stolen cattle actually traced into their district; in capturing which they should be assisted, when they require it by a British force from one of the military posts in the neighbourhood.

3dly. Offer other portions of the neutral ground to any other friendly clans who will comply with the same conditions, and thus fill up the unoccupied part of the neutral ground with friendly natives, who will form a good barrier betwixt the other tribes and the Albany settlement.

4thly. Let a separate treaty be made with the chiefs to whom portions of the neutral territory are granted, distinctly stating what the colonial Government expects them to do; reserving a right of interference by the Government in their internal affairs in certain specified cases; and also providing, that such of their people as commit aggressions upon the persons of property of British subjects shall be amenable to the colonial courts of law. Let these treaties be written in the Caffre language, and copies be given to the chiefs.

5thly. Let a Government agent be appointed to reside in some part of Caffraria, or on the immediate border. This officer should be duly authorised: 1st, as the medium of communication,
in all ordinary cases, between the Caffre chiefs and the colonial government; 2ndly, as the protector of British subjects who pass the boundary for the purposes of trade or otherwise, under the sanction of proper passports; 3rdly, as a magistrate, with full power to arrest and send into the colony for trial any British subject who may commit aggressions upon the persons or property of the natives beyond the boundary of the colony.

6thly. Let an officer with powers analogous to those exercised by the late slave protector be appointed to reside in Albany, who shall be regarded as the protector of the native tribes; let him act as counsel in the courts of law on behalf of the natives, in all cases where the subjects of the native chiefs are parties concerned; let this officer be placed in an independent situation as respects the local Government, and let him report his proceedings regularly and directly to the British Government.

7thly. Let the jurisdiction of the local courts be extended so as to admit of the trial of offences committed by the British subjects beyond the boundaries; or otherwise establish a court, under proper regulations, especially for such purposes.

8thly. Let a lieutenant-governor be immediately appointed for the eastern province of the colony, which includes the border districts; let him be assisted in the management of the government by a legislative council; let the residence of the lieutenant-governor, and consequently the seat of government, be fixed at Graham's Town, which is admirably situated with reference to the Caffre border, and is also sufficiently central for the convenience of the other districts included within the limits of the eastern province, as defined by the late Commission of Inquiry.

9thly. Let the local government be instructed to aid the missionaries of the various denominations in their attempts to promote the conversion, moral improvement and education of the Caffre tribes. The missionaries could greatly extend their usefulness by the establishment of schools, if they had the means of employing more schoolmasters; therefore let annual grants be made to the various missionary societies in that country, and let the sums so granted be distributed in fair proportions, with reference to the number of schools established, and of natives educated by each society. .........
To the Right hon.
the Earl of Aberdeen, E.C.B., &c.,
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have, etc.,
(signed) William Shaw.

A close scrutiny of Shaw's address and Boyce's letter of the 31st March, 1834, admit to a general concensus among the Wesleyans as to the policy to be adopted by the government in the future to ensure that peace and security were again restored to the frontier. (2) This concensus of opinion is well illustrated in a comparison of the measures they respectively recommended.


(2) The Rev. T. Philipps in giving evidence before the SCA handed in a copy of Boyce's letter of 31st March, 1834, as evidence, IBB. VII, 328, pp. 179 - 182. When questioned about its context, he expressed the view that he fully agreed with Boyce's address though since the war certain minor alterations were necessary. IBB. VII, 339, p. 134.
Shaw.

Declare frontier boundary clearly.
Keiskamma river - annexation of neutral territory.

Portions of neutral territory to be given to native tribes - to hold these on condition of good behaviour.

Rights of Europeans and Hottentots in north of neutral territory to be confirmed.

This to act as a defensive measure for the Colony.

Written treaty to be made with all the chiefs.

Treaties to be also in Caffre language and chiefs to have copies.

Chiefs to be held responsible for cattle traced into their districts.

Chiefs to be assisted by a military force if necessary.

Boyea.

Clear definition of eastern boundary of the Colony.

Natives to hold their land only on good conduct.

Closer settlement of neutral territory by various races.

These measures to be a defence against Caffre intrusions.

Written treaties to be entered into with individual chiefs.

Prompt, severe and just action to be taken by the authorities against the offenders.

Chiefs to be responsible for cattle traced, according to native customs, into their neighbourhood.

Military assistance to be rendered to chiefs in this context if necessary.

On apprehension fine to be levied. This to be given to the chief who assisted in the detection.

Suitable agents to be appointed as spokesmen, advisers to the native tribes. Also to commercial development.

Government agents to be appointed to act as advisors, spokesmen and to protect traders.
These agents to be responsible for arresting and bringing to court of offenders who are British subjects. Offences committed beyond the boundary by British subjects be also within jurisdiction of courts.

Appointment of an officer to act as protector of native rights.

Appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor to be assisted by a legislative council.

Local government to assist missionary endeavours to Christianise in all spheres.

Conduct of British subjects in Caffreland to be subject to the colonial courts.

Colonial frontier to be governed through a military commander.

No movement over the frontier without a pass.

Commander of the frontier to have both civil and military power.

Their suggested measures regarding the ceded territory revolved around annexation. Those resident in that area would therefore automatically be British subjects and hence these measures would be directed more to those east of the colonial boundary. Shaw had been

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(1) A comparison of this summary and Shrewsbury's 'defence' to the Wesleyan Missionary Committee, Appendix C, indicates that the advocacy of these measures was not limited to these two missionaries. There is too, a large area of common ground with the views of the Secretary, John Beecham, expressed before the S.C.A. I.B., VII, 538.
particularly severe on the failure of government policy to provide an effective system for administering the frontier. The Wesleyans, particularly Shaw, had by this time had nearly ten years in Kaffraria. The policies adopted by the government were seen as not only unjust, but of no real value to the maintenance of peace and security. The Wesleyans were particularly at one in their condemnation of the commando measure of those policies. It was a system whose complete abolition they desired and advocated. (1)

The fulfilment of the primary aim of the Wesleyan strategy was dependent on a frontier situation characterised by peace, stability and understanding. (2) The war, and the failure of government policies

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(1) Supra. Letters of Boyce and Shaw. Philippa before the SCA, LXXI. VII. 538, p.179, 31st August 1835. Question 1640: "It is your opinion that it would conduce peace and security of the settlers bordering on the Caffres if the system of commando, as hitherto executed, was suspended? - Yes, it is, most undoubtedly. I know that it is also the opinion of many of the military; the present system of commandoes is one which they themselves are heartily tired of."

(2) Madden, Op.cit., "The Wesleyans supported D'Urban as one who sought to establish some system - even 'a complete and effectual reformation' - in dealing with the frontier tribes." The words Madden quotes are from LXXI. III. 593. p.44, D'Urban to Colonial Secretary, 28th October, 1834.
to create and maintain such a situation, presented both the opportunity and the justification for Wesleyan strategy to assume the role of advocacy which it had already, before the war, begun to do. The Wesleyans saw only one way to ensure frontier peace, the natives' survival and the chance to Christianise them. This was for governmental policy to adopt certain measures. Consequently their strategy became moulded in the direction of advocacy which they hoped would ensure this. Wesleyan strategy at this time developed into a distinct and direct reaction to government policies. D'Urban, who until this stage had lent an ear to the advocacy of Dr. Philip, inclined now towards the Wesleyans, particularly Boyce, who succeeded Philip as the Governor's adviser. (1)

By May Ntintsa had been defeated. (2) The Mfengu were on their way to their new settlement. (3) D'Urban thus turned his attention to the other tribes. On May 10th, he issued a proclamation. The most

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(1) MacMillan, MBD, p. 126, views D'Urban as listening to "his new advisers in the Wesleyan Missionaries."
(2) Cory, MBD, Vol III, pp. 137-144. Also, M.A.M.S.I., MS 15,292.
(3) Ayliff, Scrap Book containing accounts of frontier history from 1820: Notes on Flingo History. Pages not numbered throughout.

(5) Infra. Chapter VI.
important section of which was:

I now, therefore, in the name and behalf of His Britannic Majesty, and by virtue of the power vested in me as His Majesty’s representative,

Do hereby proclaim and declare, that the eastern boundary of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is, henceforward, extended eastward to the right bank of the Nye River; its new boundary, affected by this extension, being henceforth a line commencing at the source of the Nye River in the Stormberg Mountains, thence following its course along the right (or western) bank through the White Nye into the Great Nye, and thence to the mouth of the latter.

From the aforesaid country, which they have lost by the operation of the war which they had so wantonly provoked, and which they have justly forfeited, the above-mentioned chiefs, namely, Tyali, Nacomo, Eno, Botua, T’Slamba, Busamie, etc. with their tribes, are forever expelled, and will be treated as enemies if they be found therein. (1)

D’Urban justified his May annexation policy as providing military security. (2) Part of this security to be provided by the expulsion of the warring tribes from the annexed territory. This expulsion

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(1) Ibb. XXXIX, 272, p. 41. For complete Proclamation see, Appendix F also, Cory, Ibb. Vol. II, pp. 146-147, footnote.

(2) Ibb. XXXIX, 272, p. 19. D’Urban to Aberdeen, 19th June, 1835. There would appear to be, in spirit, much similarity between the May Proclamation and the ideas of Shrewsbury to Colonel Smith, 16th January, 1835. Supra, p. 59, footnote (2) and p. 60, footnote (1).
measure drew considerable and strong objections from the Wesleyans.

However, there exists certain evidence after May, 1835, which on a superficial examination would appear to admit to Wesleyan support for D'Urban's May Proclamation and all that it involved. (1) The first is a letter signed by Shrewsbury and Boyce, who had arrived back in the Eastern Cape in February 1835 (2), to D'Urban written on the 2nd June, 1835. (3)

(1) IBR. VII. 536. p.495, Beecham before the SCA: "I know that our missionaries have been understood to approve of all the governor's plans in the management of the war, even of his proposal to banish hostile chiefs across the River Ese."

(2) K.R.S., Box VII - Albany File 1834, Boyce to Secretaries, 13th February, 1835.

(3) IBR. XXXII. 279. pp. 56-57. D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19th June, 1835, Enclosure 21, in No. 3. This letter was the opinion of the Wesleyan missionaries as a whole. IBR. XXXII. 593. p. 61. D'Urban to Glenelg, 9th June, 1836; "... these two clergymen signed in their respective capacity of chairman and secretary of the meeting ... but that it was for, and in the name of, the whole Wesleyan body on the frontier, seven of whom, all in fact who had been recently employed in Caffreland and on the colonial border; viz. Mr Shrewsbury, Mr Boyce, Mr Sugmore, Mr Palmer, Mr Davies, Mr Shepstone and Mr Haddy, were present and concerned in the address, and of whom, therefore, it was the joint opinion? Also Appendix E. Enclosure by Shaw to Secretaries, June 9th, 1837.
TO his Excellency Major-general Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Knight, Commander of the Bath, of Hanover, &c., Major-general of His Majesty's Army, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, and its Dependencies, and Vice-Admiral of the same, and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in South Africa.

May it please your Excellency,

1. We, the Wesleyan Missionaries of Albany and Caffrland, assembled in Graham's Town this 2d day of June 1835, to deliberate on the concerns of the Wesleyan missions in Caffraria, feel it our duty, as Christian ministers, to acknowledge the numerous instances of your Excellency's kindness towards us, for which our unanimous thanks are hereby tendered to your Excellency.

2. Lamentable and distressing as the events of the Caffre war have been, as well towards the Caffres themselves as the colonists, we are yet conscious with the reflection that, so far as the Colonial Government is concerned, it has been conducted in accordance with the principles of justice and mercy. We know, in common with our countrymen, that the Caffres were themselves the aggressors; and that they most wantonly, cruelly and ungratefully commenced this war, with a people who sought and desired their welfare and prosperity; yet, to deny the righteousness of God in our public calamities would be equivalent to a renunciation of the Christianity we profess; while, to trace the correspondence between those calamities and our sins, is unquestionably a sound application of its holy principles to their legitimate purpose. When a considerable portion of the public revenue is drawn from licensed houses, where intemperance is encouraged, and where multitudes amongst the people greedily avail themselves of that encouragement, to indulge without restraint a thirst for ardent spirits, in places where poison is legally sold, it cannot be considered unjust in the Almighty to waste such a revenue in an expensive war, ob to cause such a people, in various ways, to feel the miseries resulting from the irruption of hostile tribes on their borders. We crave your Excellency's indulgence for venturing on the above mentioned remark; and beg leave most respectfully to assure your Excellency, that it proceeds not from that wild spirit of dissatisfaction which is, in the present day, so clamorously expressed in various parts of the British Empire, but from the honest plainness of Englishmen and Christians, who love their constitution and their country, and ardently desire its universal prosperity.
3. To your Excellency's fatherly care some of us are mainly indebted for the preservation of our lives; and the arrangements your Excellency made for our safety and comfort in the camp, and in travelling to the colony, which arrangements were humanely carried into effect by all who were under your Excellency's command; the considerate attention of your Excellency to the necessities of the natives associated with us in our distress, and the condescension which has marked your Excellency's intercourse with us, whenever circumstances have rendered an interview with your Excellency necessary or desirable, all lay us under a lasting debt of gratitude which we feel cannot be easily repaid. May the God whom we serve reward your Excellency with his eternal love and favour!

4. Sensible that we can most effectually discharge our duties of our high and holy calling, as well as best serve our revered Sovereign, and promote the interests of our country, by steadily pursuing our own work in our proper sphere, we should not have obstructed ourselves on your Excellency's notice by the formal presentation of an address, had we not felt that the omission thereof might be justly deemed a dereliction of our public duty; and now, having performed this duty, we return to our retirement, with high sentiments of respect, esteem and affection for your Excellency, and with hearty wishes for the health, long life and happiness both of your Excellency, and of your Excellency's family.

Signed, in behalf of the meeting,

M.J. Shrewsbury, Chairman.

M.B. Hayes, (sic), Secretary. (1)

This letter might well have gathered dust in some official file, but Sir Urban, ever eager for justification of his May Proclamation (2), included it in his June 19th, 1835, despatch to Lord Glenelg. The

(1) Supra. p. 79, footnote (3)

(2) Supra. p. 59, footnote (2) and p. 60, footnote (1).
latter viewed it in terms of D'Urban's accompanying comment. It also helped towards enraging the humanitarian conscience of the British public. (1) However, the purpose of the address was never that which D'Urban interpreted it to be (2) and his interpretation was in no way a reflection on Wesleyan thought and sentiment as (3) regards the May Proclamation. In the light of their later explanation of the letter, it cannot be construed as evidence to support the argument that the Wesleyans whole-heartedly agreed and approved of D'Urban's May expulsion measure.

From the above passage in the Governor's dispatch it has been inferred that the Wesleyan missionaries committed themselves by their Address, in a public and official approval of the extension of the Colony to the Yze River, and of every other measure adopted by His Excellency up to that period. The undersigned feel convinced that the language of their address warrants no such interpretation ... The Address was intended principally to express their grateful sense of His Excellency's general kindness, and to acknowledge the important services he had rendered in providing for the safety of four missionaries with their families and their return through a country involved in war from beyond the Yze River to the Colony ... We made no allusion in our address to the frontier system pursued previous

(1) Supra, pp. 59-62.
(2) See Appendix B. This address of gratitude, 2nd June 1855, was similar to ones which D'Urban received from the inhabitants of Grahamstown, Albany, Uitenhage, Somerset, George, Caledon and Worcester. 188, 451, 501.
(3) See Shaw, MSWA, pp. 153 - 156.
to the war, either by way of approval or the contrary; neither did we in the slightest degree allude to the plans of His Excellency for the future; subjects entirely irrelevant to the main purpose of our address, and upon the latter of which at that time it would have been quite premature to hazard an opinion. (1)

The second is a letter from Ayliff written shortly afterwards to D'Urban on the extension of the colonial boundary to the Kei and the expulsion of the hostile tribes.

May it please your Excellency, Graham's Town, 19 June 1835.

HAVING read in the newspaper, called the Commercial Advertiser, some remarks reproaching the measures of your Excellency in extending the boundary line to the Kye River, and particularly on the ground that it was driving the Caffres into a corner of their ancient possessions; on this I beg to inform your Excellency, first that the country of Mintza is sufficiently extensive to receive all the hostile tribes merely in filling up the vacant lands within the present boundary of that tribe, and particularly now, so much land being vacated by the removal of the Fingoos. And if the said hostile tribes were willing to remove into the country north of Mintza's and the Tamboois' tribes, there is there country of the finest pasturage, of an unlimited extent, and totally unoccupied. The former inhabitants having been destroyed by the marauding chief, Matuwana. Secondly, Mintza fully expected that the hostile tribes would have been driven from the country they formerly possessed, and made provision for their reception within the limits of his tribe. Before I left Butterworth, two messengers came from Mintza, with an express order from that chief to the part of his tribe residing in the country about Butterworth,

(1) A.M.N.J., Box VII, File 1836 and 1837, Enclosed by Shaw to Secretaries, 9th June, 1837. For full text see Appendix E.
saying, "The English are fighting with the Amakakabi. The Amakakabi are our relations; some of their women and children are now among us; and as they will be driven before the English, they must have a country; therefore let the whole of the lower country be vacated immediately for them, and let the whole of the tribe now occupying the lower country come up to me at the Amavar."

I have, &c.,
(signed) John Ayliff, Wesleyan Missionary.

(1)

Ayliff, it would appear, supported D'Urban's expulsion measure. However, Ayliff expressed his views only because he believed that Hintsa's orders had been carried out. They may well have been: unfortunately there is no way of checking. But whether the vacated area could accommodate all the native population of the ceded territory, which were due to be expelled, under the terms of the May Proclamation, is doubtful. It is likely that Ayliff, in penning this letter, was somewhat carried away by the passions prevailing at the time. (2) and perhaps excited over the other tenet of the Proclamation, which would see the extension of British protection and British law and control. A measure which his fellow Wesleyan missionaries were advocating.

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(1) IBB. XLIII.533. pp. 230-231. D'Urban to Glenelg, 9th June 1836. Enclosure 12, in No.3

(2) Ayliff's signature appears on the explanatory letter enclosed by Shaw to the Secretaries, 9th June, 1837. See appendix E.
Although the Wesleyans may have agreed with the extension of British law and control over the ceded territory by the May Proclamation, they, nevertheless, did not agree with the expulsion measure which formed part of that extension. Within a short period D'Urban found urgent voices raised against his May Proclamation. Particularly the clause which referred to the expulsion of the natives living in the ceded territory. The Wesleyans were decidedly antagonistic towards this intention of D'Urban. Boyce had in fact objected to such a measure even before the war.

It would be extremely unjust and impolitic to drive the Caffres out of that portion of the ceded territory which they now possess. (1)

For the Wesleyans its enforcement would have seen a continuation of the war and have led to the eventual extermination of those whom it was proposed to expel. Other evidence indicative of Wesleyan objection to this measure was that given by John Beecham, one of the Secretaries of the Society. This was given before the SCA before whom he

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(1) A fact which Seton, Op.cit., p. 329, has overlooked: "the Wesleyan missionaries gave immediate support to the September policy, even as they had done to the proclamation in May". A fact which virtually affects his subsequent arguments. He did however, incorrectly date Boyce's March 31st letter as 1835. Supra. p. 50 (2)His statement as to the September policy is not disputed. Infra. p. 93.
he appeared in June 1836. He argued that Boyce had expressed thoughts as to the policy being "objectionable" and liable to misrepresentation. (1)

(1) Seton, Op. cit., p. 386, in footnote (1), maintains that Beecham was, "ignoring the unqualified welcome initially given to D'Urban's May and September treaties, and basing his judgment on his missionaries' later criticisms of the Governor's land policies." This is not strictly true with regard to the May Proclamation. Though the Hesleys may have agreed with the annexation clause, they did not agree to the expulsion of the hostile tribes. Boyce— who had objected to such a measure in March 1834— along with his fellow missionaries did object to this policy between May and the end of July; (when the missionaries offered to assist a negotiated settlement.) Once the terms of the May Proclamation became known the Hesleys obviously took some time considering its contents. By the beginning of June, when they penned their address of gratitude to D'Urban, they still considered that "at that time it would have been quite premature to hazard an opinion." A.R.M.S., Box VII, File 1836 and 1837, Enclosure by Shaw to Secretaries, 9th June, 1837. See Appendix A. Hence Hesleyan objection to D'Urban's expulsion measure may accurately be pin-pointed as arising between the beginning of June and the end of July; before that time they had expressed no opinion and their 2nd June 1835, address being no reflection on their attitude to the actual Proclamation. Beecham's evidence as to the views of Hesley, (see text above following), as to the May Proclamation, are based on a letter from him dated August 1st, 1835. I.B.B. VII, 538, p. 495. In this letter Hesley gave an account of an interview which he had had with the Governor, a few days before, in which he had clearly"expressed his opinion on the painful state of things resulting from the continuance of the Caffre war." A continuation which would exist if the Governor pursued the expulsion measure of his May Proclamation (See text above following). Beecham continued that as a result of this conversation, Hesley "offered his services to undertake a journey into Caffreland, for the purpose of attempting to induce the hostile chiefs to enter into a negotiation for the termination of hostilities." Hesley, in his letter of June 28th, 1835 to D'Urban, I.B.B. XXXIX, 272, p.253, Stated, in the last paragraph
Not only was the measure "impossible", but it would result in the expulsion of some 50,000 people by the militia. This would ultimately result in their extermination; if not by military force, then by famine or at the hands of Krell's (Hintsa's son) Gcaleka warriors. The concentration too of so many natives beyond the Kei, with the knowledge of an exasperated Colony, and gathering in strength so close to a weak and vulnerable frontier, would prove to be serious enemies and a potential threat to colonial peace and security. However, if taken under colonial protection and British law and checked by British influence and watched by a judicious resident, they

Page 86, footnote (1), continued. That, "I have thought it better to write a few lines to your Excellency Rather than to seek another interview." The interview referred to by Boyce, in his letter of August 1st, is this interview. As a result of this interview Boyce wrote and offered the services of the Wesleyans. It is evident that Boyce objected to D'Urban's May Proclamation before July 28th. Boyce's plan was well thought out. Hence the interview can be dated at about the 20th. Boyce's action was without doubt the result of strong objection to the Governor's intended measure.
might not only have their active enmity neutralised, but be converted into our good friends. (1)

Boyce warned D'Urban as well on the effect that the expulsion measure would have on the British public. (2)

The standpoint of Wesleyan strategy was unequivocally stated.

The Wesleyan missionaries deemed it their duty to state their views as to the impolicy of renewing the war for the purpose of effecting a measure, which, if possible to effect, was of a very questionable nature, and would, at all events, be accompanied by a vast addition of human suffering. (3)

It was not the question of annexation, but the question of the expulsion measure. Shaw, in England, writing to the Secretaries, held the same opinion.

I cannot easily bring mind to the total disinheriting of 80,000 people of the lands which belong to them— including a territory of 7,000 square miles— without lifting up my voice against so

(1) ISP. VII. 538. pp. 495, 496. Also Boyce, WSA, Appendix II, pp. XVI. - XVII.

(2) ISP. VII. 538. pp 496. Knapland, Op. cit., p. 131, "The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed such religious activity in both Britain and the colonies."

(3) Boyce, WSA, p. 32.
sweeping a measure. (1)

He testified before the SGA on the 7th August, 1835, that

If we deprive them [the tribes] of the soil we deprive them of the means of sustenance and we compel them to become robbers and this war must be perpetuated till we have extricated them. (2)

He continued that amongst the native tribes an extremely high value was placed on land and that they regarded it as a great evil to lose it. (3) The colonial government must preserve the natives in their rights to the soil.

[The May Proclamation] struck me as being a very injudicious and disadvantageous measure; but ... the declaration ... has been made so formally, and in the presence of leading chiefs whether cancelling a measure of that kind now would be wise is another question. (4)

(1) C.Roxborough, Op. cit., p. 129, Shaw to Beeham, 7th August 1835, Shaw did not favour the annexation if it was to be dependent upon the expulsion measure.

(2) 188. VII. 538. p. 57.

(3) 188. VII. 538. p. 126.

(4) 188. VII. 538. p. 65.
There were others too who perceived the danger and injustice of enforcing D'Urban's expulsion measure. (1) Much of the credit for altering D'Urban's May policy belongs to Wesleyan strategy. The facts illustrate that the Wesleyans played a considerable and significant part. (2) Boyce offered the services of the Wesleyans to D'Urban with the idea of establishing contact with the chiefs, still opposing the Colony, and to attempt to end the war by negotiation. The actions of Boyce reveal just how concerned the Wesleyans were about the situation on the frontier and exactly how much they objected to D'Urban's expulsion measure. Only a few months before Boyce had written,

(2) "was never intended to imply the expulsion of the native inhabitants as were willing to abide in the old territory in peaceable submission to British laws." (Boyce's emphasis). This statement, NSAA, p. 30, has been construed as evidence of support for D'Urban's May expulsion measure. However, D'Urban in "Memorandum for the guidance of Major Cox," May 12th, 1835, IED, XXXIX.279, p. 47, (Also, C.M. Theal, the Kaffir war of 1835, p.155), specifies that the expulsion measure pertained only to the warring tribes mentioned in the Proclamation of May 10th. He ordered Cox to provide for the native tribes who were friendly disposed towards the colony, and that they be taken under British protection within the Province of Queen Adelaide. See also, Boyce, NSAA, pp. 31, 32.

(2) Boyce, NSAA, Appendix II, p. XXIV.
He (Shaw) is much wanted, as from his local influence . . he is the man and the only man, by whom, humanly speaking, a settlement of native and colonial disturbances can be brought about. (1)

Boyce's letter of the 26th July 1835, is a definite indication of Wesleyan strategy in this period. Wesleyan strategy at this time, was, without dispute that of non-neutrality. But non-neutrality in the sense of being actively concerned and desirous of assisting a settlement of the grave issues which confronted the frontier. For the Wesleyans, the propagation of the Christian gospel, the continued possession by the natives of their lands, the actual survival of the tribes and the maintenance of frontier peace and security would not be possible unless the war was speedily terminated and unless there was a decided change in the measures of government policy. Neither could the root evils of the moral conduct of the tribes and their dissatisfaction and enmity be removed by Christianity if the present state continued. The Wesleyans could not effect this alone however much they tried. Assistance was needed; they viewed this assistance as being inherent within the extension of British law and control. But not an extension which included the expulsion of the native tribes beyond the Kei. They objected to this measure, but at the same time

offered to actively assist the authorities in bringing the war to a negotiated settlement which would not necessitate the expulsion of the native tribes. Their actions were not intended as an entrance into the political arena, though the very nature of the issues involved caused it to be such. They did not choose any particular sides in the disputes, neither the Europeans' nor the natives'. Their actions were a fulfilment of that dual responsibility which their position and entrance in the south-eastern areas of South Africa had caused. It was a further attempt to continue to serve both communities. In this sense they remained neutral. In this period the Wesleyans, by a strategy of non-neutrality, advocacy and active co-operation, hoped and attempted to neutralise the forces of enmity and hate on both sides of the frontier and do justice to both populations. And thus too, remove the enemies of peace and security which was so necessary and vital if Christianity was to make any marked advance and effect in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony and Caffreland.
CHAPTER V.

The September Settlement and Wesleyan Co-operation.

D'Urban's September policy which excluded the expulsion measure of his May Proclamation, was the result of Wesleyan initiative. (1) This can be dated from Boyce's letter to D'Urban of the 28th July, 1835. (2)

Graham's Town,
28th July 1835, Tuesday evening.

May it please your Excellency,

This afternoon I consulted with my brethren on the best means of communicating with the chiefs in the Amatola Mountains secretly, so as to excite no suspicions, and at the same time to send such a message as would answer the desired end without in the least committing your Excellency.

If the following plan be approved of, we think of leaving Graham's Town on Monday for Caffredrift Post, on our way to visit Kama and Kye, and from them to procure women to carry our message. First, Kama's wife and Pato's last wife are sisters of Macomo; we think that they personally, one or both of them, will undertake to convey a message to Macomo and Tyalie in the Amatola Mountains. Some of Kye's women will easily be found to carry a message to Umhala, Letu, &c., who are probably in some part of the country between the Goonoobre and the Kay Rivers.

Secondly, To prevent the necessity of using your Excellency's name, which might possibly lead the chiefs to form extravagant hopes as to the terms they might expect to obtain, we purpose to act as follows:-

1. Mr Shepstone will send to Macomo and Tyalie, thanking them for their orders to spare his life, and by way of recompensing


(2) MacMillan, JBB, p. 126, maintains that D'Urban's change of attitude dates from before the 26th July 1835. See Supra, pp. 86-87, footnote (1).
them for this kindness, will commiserate their present distressed condition, and as their friend who wishes them well, and as a missionary whose duty it is to seek the establishment of peace, will advise them strongly to send to your Excellency to ask for mercy, stating, as a matter of private opinion, that in such case their expulsion beyond the bay would perhaps be avoided, and other conditions, less destructive to them be imposed, such as the giving up of stolen cattle, horses, guns, murderers, &c.; and further asking them to ask from your Excellency a place to sit in, i.e. a country, there to live under English law. This advice will be enforced by the intelligence sent them at the same time of the determination of your Excellency to carry on war with increased vigor as soon as the ploughing season is over in the colony, and the consequent certainty of their speedy destruction.

2. I shall send a similar message to Umbala and Zetu, the sons of Slambie, backed with the additional authority of my character as the missionary of their father's tribe, reminding them of the last advice of Slambie to his sons, viz. that in all cases of difficulty the advice of the missionary was to be followed.

3. We can also state to these chiefs, that although their conduct has made us ashamed of them for a long time past, yet that now, in their distress, and in the certainty of their destruction if peace be delayed until the boors return from ploughing, we will venture to intercede for them, provided they send first to ask for mercy from your Excellency, and thus embolden us to speak in their behalf before they are completely ruined.

By this means we shall avoid using your Excellency's name, and thus prevent the chiefs from imagining that the colonists are tired of the war. Should the chiefs send to ask for mercy, then your Excellency can negotiate unfettered by any promises, &c., and can impose such terms as the circumstances at the time may render desirable. If the chiefs remain obstinate, then the colonial government cannot be charged with inhumanity, as your Excellency will have made every effort to save them from impending ruin. But we are almost certain that at least some of the chiefs will gladly embrace the opportunity of throwing themselves upon your Excellency's mercy, and that immediately, as the Caflirfe time for cultivation is quickly approaching, and they will be anxious to obtain a place in which to settle in peace previous to its commencement; otherwise, even if the sword spare them this year, they must die of famine the next.
I have thought it better to write a few lines to your Excellency rather than to seek another interview. If your Excellency would prefer giving me a verbal approval or disapproval rather than write, I can wait on your Excellency at any time that may be appointed.

Trusting your Excellency will excuse the hasty scrawl at this late hour,

I remain, &c.,
(signed) William S. Boyce.

Aware of mounting opposition to his proposed expulsion of the native tribes, D'Urban agreed to Wesleyan proposals, and to try their plan. Boyce, Shepstone and Palmer, accompanied by a military escort, duly left Grahamstown for the Amatola Mountains where the chiefs were believed to be encamped. At considerable risk, they eventually succeeded in having a message relayed to the chiefs, Maqomo and Tyali. They advised the belligerent chiefs, in view of the proposed British onslaught in force upon their stronghold, that the wisest course would be to plead for peace, a residence to the west of the Kei within the new province, and acceptance as British subjects. They gave their word that, should the chiefs agree to the expediency of their advice,


they would continue to intercede on their behalf with the Governor. (1) The chiefs affirmed to these Wesleyan recommendations. On 17th September, 1835, the peace terms were drawn up at Fort Millishere.

Due to Wesleyan influence D'Urban's Proclamation of May did not become operative. It is doubtful whether D'Urban had sufficient military strength at his disposal to effect such an expulsion measure. It would too, have entailed increased expenditure which would have even less endeared D'Urban to the Colonial Secretary's heart. As a result of Wesleyan efforts the leading chiefs came to the conference table on September 17th and agreed to become British subjects. While retaining their own laws and customs, they came under the control of British law. Briefly, D'Urban's treaty with the Nqika and Ndlambe, proposed the annexation of the land up to the Sei as the Province of Queen Adelaide; the extension of royal sovereignty in the exercise of control and power; the location and settlement of native tribes in the ceded territory; the chiefs to acknowledge British sovereignty and

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(1) *JBB. XLIII*, 503, pp. 254-255. Journals of Messrs. William Shepstone, Samuel Palmer and William S. Boyce, during a short visit to the kraals of Phatho and Ayre, on this side of the Keiskamma river. Also, Boyce, *N.S.A.A.* Appendix II, pp. xx - xxi. Theal, *The Kaffir War of 1835.* The part played by Boyce in the organisation and execution of this plan is indicative of his objection to the expulsion measure; and of Wesleyan co-operation in this period. In brief, indicative of their strategy.
to accept government agents in their midst, there was to be some European settlement in occupied areas of the ceded territory. Martial law was proclaimed throughout the territory and was to remain in force until its abolition was deemed in the interests of all. The Wesleyans saw D'Urban's September plan as the most effectual means of preventing future collision and of securing to the native tribes the protection of British law, which the Wesleyans believed was necessary for the former. (1) The terms of this September treaty admit to a marked basic similarity with those suggested by Boyce in his address to D'Urban on 31st March, 1834.

This was a far more satisfying and satisfactory solution than the expulsion of the tribes over the new boundary line. By this arrangement approximately 72,000 Bantu came under European rule. The Governor proceeded to appoint an Agent-General and tribal agents to supervise the subject tribes. (2)

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It was a valuable first step towards bringing the tribes under the tutelage of competent officials. But before the Governor could give effect to his peace settlement it was destroyed by the displeasure of the Colonial Office. (1)

D'Urban's despatch to the Colonial Secretary describing the events of the war and the measures he proposed to adopt, were penned in June 1835. The colonial Office waited in vain for further news of events on the eastern frontier. The Colonial Secretary was totally ignorant of the fact that D'Urban had been forced by circumstances to realise that his proposed measures required alteration and that he in fact, had done so. But D'Urban's September was, to use Madden's phrase, "still-born." (2) For in London other decisions were being taken.

Glenelg, still apparently in ignorance of D'Urban's September policy which would have the Kossie in Queen Adelaide as British subjects, ... wrote his well-known despatch of December 1835, excusing the blaffers for their attack in the light of their past wrongs, warning D'Urban that a Lieutenant-Governor was coming and bidding him prepare the public mind for the abandonment of the new province. (3)

Glenelg's despatch hinged on three main tenets: the colonists

were to blame for the war; the devastation which D'Urban envisaged was contrary to the civilised rules of war; territory should not be appropriated on such a scale. Retrocession was favoured, though Glenelg would reconsider his statement if D'Urban, the man-on-the-spot, could advance good reason against them. (1) Glenelg's dispatch reached Grahamstown in March 1836. But D'Urban made no attempt to defend his September plan.

It is hard to understand why he did not write some sort of defence of his policy till June 1836, nor post it till the following December. (2)

Lord Glenelg introduced no new policy. His instructions to D'Urban were in fact those which he had been given by Glenelg's predecessor. (3)

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(1) *IBB.* XXXIX. 279, pp. 59-61.


(3) In terms of these instructions D'Urban had concluded a treaty with the Griqua, Andries Waterboer, on 11th December, 1834. Glenelg had on record Aberdeen's comment: "I not only approve in the fullest manner of the object and the terms of this agreement, but I am desirous of expressing the high satisfaction which it afforded to His Majesty's government to learn that you have, even in one instance, succeeded so completely to realise the view which it becomes this country to observe ... in regard to the native tribes." Aberdeen to D'Urban, 11th April, 1835. *IBB.* XXXIX. 252, p. 115.
Glenelg's decision in 1836 was a decision to allow the sores of the frontier to fester for another season till another outbreak. (1)

In July 1836, Andries Stockenstrom arrived as Lieutenant-Governor of the eastern area of the Colony. In August D'Urban abolished martial law. Glenelg, still ignorant of D'Urban's actions, wrote again expressing the expediency of withdrawal. This was done in December 1836. (2) The chiefs were released from their allegiance and individual treaties were made with them.

But what of the Wesleyans during these eighteen months? Since their successful attempts to bring the warring chiefs to negotiate, they had not been inactive. The settlement which D'Urban had concluded with the native chiefs in September 1835, was undoubtedly after the Wesleyan's hearts - especially that of Boyce. They saw the administration adopting measures which they themselves had advocated. With the Wesleyan expedition to the Anatholas in August 1835, there was ushered in a new period for the Wesleyans, which saw them co-operating with the administration far more than before. The Wesleyans saw the September extension of British jurisdiction as involving no loss of territory by the natives. The native system of government was for them

(2) L.R. XLIII, 592. p.44.
unfavourable to the continuation of frontier peace. But the treaty would favourably affect, to the advantage of frontier security and peace, the exercising of independent sovereignty by the chiefs. It would help check the predatory excursions of a pastoral community in the close vicinity of a more civilized neighbour. The settlement recognised the signing of treaties with the natives as an independent people, as an objectionable practice. It was also a policy which did not continue the injurious practice of the territorial extension of the colony by the removal of the native tribes even further east. (1)

While hostilities continued only those circuits north of the Bashee river had been unaffected. In the interim the Wesleyan missionaries had devoted themselves to the needs of the colonial societies. But once hostilities were ended in Kaffirland, they urgently desired to return to their former charges and recommence their work. Both D'Urban and Colonel Smith were prepared to assist the Wesleyans' speedy return. For, wrote Smith,

Allow me, Your Excellency, to say: prevent no clergyman from returning .. he .. is more injurious absent than present. (2)

(1) Boyce, MSAA, pp. 48-55.
A scrutiny of Wesleyan correspondence in the first months of 1835 and of the various Minute Books of the Albany District for this period, with the respective reports of the circuits on the colonial frontier and in Kaffirland, provides an insight into destruction which was wrought in the war. (1) Conversely also the rebuilding, both literally and figuratively, which faced the Wesleyans at this time, (2) facts which underline their desire to arrange an early return to their previous charges. The war and its settlement acted as a stimulus to the Wesleyans. It had too opened up prospective new areas of activity and influence and the opportunity for the possible establishment of new mission stations.

The Wesleyans favoured the annexation and co-operated to assist the implementation of that policy. They expressed general approval

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(2) A.M.H.S., Box VII, File 1834-36. Shepstone to Secretaries, 3rd April, 1835. A.M.H.S., Box VII, File 1834-36, Ayliff to Secretaries, 29th June 1835. "A painful change has taken place in our circumstances ... our mission stations which were flourishing with improving schools and crowded Chapels, are now desolate."
of D'Urban's September settlement and the administration's handling of its imposition. (1) Early in 1836 Colonel Smith, D'Urban's commander of the new province, had proposed the dispatch of a military embassy into Kaffraria, to the north of the Bashee. (2) Its purpose was to show the flag and impress those chiefs who had not taken part in the recent hostilities, to dissuade from ever harbouring warlike intentions towards the Colony. Boyce accompanied the party. (3) The administration's motives in this respect were entirely political. (4), but it gave the Wesleyans a chance to acquaint themselves with the prevailing situation in that territory and an important insight into those areas where the establishment of their missions was most earnestly required. The idea of an annual embassy was the resultant. (5) Colonel Smith saw it as,

of vital importance to the great cause of civilisation and the dissemination of the Divine Truth. (6)

The Wesleyans saw it too as a chance to establish further and promote the spread of Christianity. But it was also part of that larger co-

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(3) Ibid., Vol 1, pp. 353, 354. Smith to D'Urban, 3rd January, 1836.
(4) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
operation with the Colonial administration which had become a distinct factor of Wesleyan strategy at this time. Especially since those measures advocated by the Wesleyans had become an integral part of the policy which the administration was executing.

Colonel Smith approved of the Wesleyans mainly because he saw in them a means to fulfilling and implementing D'Urban's system in which he firmly believed. The Wesleyans were extremely valuable with their intimate knowledge of the tribes, their customs and outlook. Boyce, Smith favoured above all the other Wesleyans, because he was a great supporter of the D'Urban system.(1) But whatever the actions of the Wesleyans were, their primary interest was, first and foremost, the re-establishment of their mission stations. Smith was most annoyed when he realised these were their intentions and not primarily the implementation of his superior's measures.(2)

The measures of D'Urban's policy depended on the rate at which normal relations on the frontier and in Kaffirland could be re-established. It was the missionary who could accomplish this best and fastest. The Wesleyans realised that the signing of an agreement between the parties involved in the war did not solve the frontier

problems overnight, the character of the tribes would not undergo an
instantaneous change though the settlement did much for the creation
of a better understanding. (1) D'Urban requested the Wesleyans to re-
establish themselves where he considered that their presence would be
most beneficial politically. (2) During the war the majority of those
chiefs, who had been under Wesleyan influence at some stage or other,
had remained neutral, particularly the Cqunukhwebe. If these tribes
of Phatho and Khama could be induced to remain friendly towards the
Colony, they would act as a barrier to any further Caffre advance. A
situation which was worth several infantry battalions to the frontier
commander. (3)

D'Urban was greatly indebted to the Wesleyans for their assistance
in bringing an early end to the hostilities.

I am bound .. to state my unqualified belief, that they have
done more for the cause of religion and humanity in this
colony, especially in regard to the native tribes .. than
all the other missionaries put together ... In a further
part of this despatch, I shall have occasion to show your
Lordship how efficient these Wesleyan missionaries were...

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(1) Ibid., Vol II, p 376. Smith to D'Urban, 10th January 1836.
Smith, 15th January, 1836.
(3) Boyce, NSAA, Appendix p. xxviii.
in enabling me to effect my purpose, so often attempted and so often foiled of at length bringing the savages of the Amatolas to negotiation and consequent peace. (1)

Besides this assistance in war, they were now in peace time likewise viewed by the administration as being of immense practical value.

The clergyman and the statesman must go hand in hand: the one cannot ever succeed without the other. (2)

Smith had obviously not read much history, but in this case it was, to an extent, true that the clergyman was dependent on the statesman. Certainly, the statesman was leaning heavily on the clergyman. There was in fact a marked affinity between Smith's ideas on the civilisation of the tribes, and those of the Wesleyans. A comparison of Shaw's ideas (3) with those of Smith(4) reveals this. The Wesleyans played an important role in D'Urban's September settlement. A role which they approached with obvious enthusiasm. The Wesleyans were useful to

(1) IBB. XLIII. 503. p.61, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9th June 1836.
(2) D.U.Corres., Vol.II, p.646. Smith to D'Urban, 10th April 1836.
(3) Shaw, SHSEA, Also, H. Books & D.
the authorities, and the Wesleyans, in so far as their religious activities were not curtailed, made themselves useful to the administration. The affinity which existed between the administration and the Wesleyans at this time was due to the fact that neither could afford to take sides on frontier issues. They both had a dual responsibility: though the administration often ignored its. Both were intimately involved, and concerned with the Europeans and the native tribes. They were forced by their respective, but related, positions to acquire an understanding of both sides' point of view. Consequently, there was more chance and opportunity of the Wesleyans and the administration concurring in their ideas than missionaries of any other society labouring in the eastern district of the Cape Colony and Caffreland. However, whatever measure of co-operation did exist in this period between the Wesleyans and the administration (1), the Wesleyans were primary concerned with their missionary duties. As is well illustrated in the question of Ayliff and the Nfengu.

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CHAPTER VI.

The Mfengu and Wesleyan Co-operation.

Until the 1834-1835 war, the Mfengu lived very much as semi-slaves north of the Kei, in the land which fell under the authority of Hintsa, the Gcaleka chief. They were the remnant of the Fetcani; who had been defeated north of the Bashee in 1828 by a commando from the Colony which was under the impression that they were Zulus. Tshaka the Zulu chief, subsequently raided Pondoland and they suffered even further. As a result the Fetcani

became Fingos, 'the dogs' of the Zoulus. (1)

Wesleyan activity in this area began in 1827 when Butterworth was established as a third station in the Wesleyan's 'chain of stations' into Kaffraria. (2) The Rev. John Ayliff, a minister who was a Settler recruit, was given charge of this station among the Gcalekas and the Mfengu at the beginning of the thirties. (3) He had previously been

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Ayliff: Scrap Book containing accounts of frontier history from 1820: Notes on Fingo history. The reference to the Fingos as 'digs' was originally Hintsa's analogy.
stationed at Somerset. (1) However, the numerical strength of the society there had failed to increase sufficiently to warrant his continual presence. With the appointment of a Dutch Reformed Church minister to the community, he was withdrawn. (2)

Hintsa, together with the chiefs Naqomo and Tyali, had been one of the main agitators for native hostilities against the Colony. Butterworth, before the actual commencement of the war, had been threatened by Hintsa's aggressiveness. (3) Ayliff was however warned of Hintsa's actual assault on the mission station - which was completely destroyed - and managed to make good his escape. He fled to Clarkebury to the north west where the other Kaffirland missionaries were. They were then rescued by British military forces. (4)

When Hintsa and his son, Areli, were captured by the British, the Mfengu appealed to Sir Benjamin D'Urban for protection. Hintsa, on hearing of this appeal, secretly dispatched runners carrying orders whose implementation resulted in an immediate beginning of the extermination of the Mfengu by the Cdalekas. When informed of these instructions

(2) Shaw, SSEA, p. 281.
D'Urban immediately summoned Hintsa and Areli to his presence. Under the threat of hanging them on the spot, he ordered the chief to issue further orders which would prevent any more bloodshed. A demand with which Hintsa unhappily complied. (1)

It was obvious to D'Urban that the mfengus' survival could not be guaranteed if they continued to remain within the domains of the Gcaleka. Thus removal to another area was an urgent requirement. D'Urban saw within such a move the possibility of killing two birds with one stone. At the same time as ensuring the mfengu security, he could do something to assist the Colony.

When it became necessary to make war upon Hintsa and his people, finding the people called the Fingos living among them in a state of the most grievous bondage, and seeing them anxious to be delivered, I at once declared them a free people and subjects of the king of England; and it is now my intention to place them in the country on the east bank of the Great Fish River, in order to protect the bush country from the entrance of the Kaffirs; and also that, by bringing a large population into the Colony, the colonists

(1) Cory, RSA, pp. 142-143. Doubtless such action on the part of D'Urban, if he had carried out his threat, would have received many an indignant exclamation of "extreme harshness" and "injustice" in England. Yet D'Urban's threat was a language of power, law and control which Hintsa well understood. It augurs much for Boyce's idea of prompt and severe punishment of such crimes; besides being a clear indication of what the native character could be. Supra, pp. 43-50, Boyce to D'Urban, 31st March, 1854.
may supply themselves with free labourers. (1)

It was a plan of deliverance for the Mfengu, protection and free, as against slave, labour for the Colony. Sweeping and bold, it was in fact begun on the 9th May 1835, the day before D'Urban's May Proclamation, which extended the eastern boundary of the Colony to the Kei River. (2) Shaw gives the number of Mfengu moved into their new area as 16,000. (3) The 'official' figure mentioned in despatches was 10,000 (4). But whatever the exact number, D'Urban expected this transplant population to effect the impossible.

If they [the Mfengu] be settled in the present uninhabited and worse than useless district between the Fish and the Lower Keiskamma, they will soon convert it into a country abounding in cattle and corn. (5)

D'Urban conveniently overlooked the fact that the 'uninhabited and worse than useless district' was part of the Neutral Territory from which the
Ngqika and Ndlambe tribes considered themselves to have been unjustly expelled. An area which they still coveted and desired to return to it one day.

Ayliff in the meanwhile, had been staying at Clarkebury, which was under military protection. The defeat and capture of Hintsia had removed the chance of another major flare-up in that part of Kaffirland. The May Proclamation had been issued and preparations were underway for his return to Grahamstown with the troops. (1) The resettlement of the Mfengu was seen by the Wesleyans as a necessary measure for frontier peace. They were well aware of the situation which had existed between the Mfengu and the Gcalekas in their former abode. (2) Consequently they did all within their power to assist the administration in the implementation of this measure. The Wesleyans out of charity for the Mfengu and assistance to J'Urban in the implementation of this settlement, allowed Ayliff to remain with the Mfengu. The other Wesleyan missionaries from the area north of the Adi, returned to Grahamstown. The situation in Kaffirland at this time was still dangerous and uncertain. The authorities were against allowing the Wesleyans to return to their former missions. Hence, Ayliff was not required elsewhere.

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(2) A.M.R.S., Box VII, File 1834-36. Ayliff to Secretaries, 29th June, 1835.
There was too already a suffice of Wesleyan missionaries within the Colony due to their evacuation from Kaffirland.

The success of the resettlement of the Mfengu depended largely on Wesleyan assistance coupled with the influence of Christian teaching. The Wesleyans approved of Ayliff's acceptance of a commissionership to the Mfengu (1), as they did too of Shepstone's acceptance of a similar commission. (2) Due to Shaw's efforts, arrangements were begun for a regular mission station to be established on the banks of the Gausie River.

While the settlement was attempting to find its feet, events in the rest of the frontier area were moving apace. The Wesleyans managed to bring the remaining warring chiefs to a negotiated settlement in September. This September agreement of D'Urban's leaned heavily on Wesleyan assistance for success. It was a settlement which the Wesleyans had both initiated and advocated. Commissioners were assigned to each tribe to serve as spokesmen and advisers, and to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the September agreement. The Wesleyans accepted these civil responsibilities only because the tribes themselves desired it.


(2) Ibid., D'Urban to Shepstone, p. 259, 14th July, 1835.
At the special request of the Chiefs, the Missionaries with whom they had been previously connected, were placed on this Commission, the details of which would have been difficult to carry into effect without their assistance. (1)

By November 1835, with a more settled atmosphere prevailing in Affirland, the Wesleyans were decidedly anxious to recommence their missionary activities. Both the administration and the chief, Krei, were keen for the missionaries to return to their Butterworth station among the Ccalekas (2). Colonel Smith urged Ayliff to return to his former charge. (3) However, D'Urban wished him to remain among the Mfengu. The motives of both Smith and D'Urban were without doubt, political. They cared only for Wesleyan missionary activity in so far as it fitted in with their political measures.

Ayliff's personal feelings led him to obtain permission for returning. The Wesleyans were prepared to allow his return on condition that some other suitable arrangements were made which would ensure that the Mfengu's spiritual needs continued to be served. This was done by

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(1) Boyce, MSAd, p. 33.
(3) Ibid., Vol 1, p. 237. Smith to D'Urban, 17th November, 1835.
"... his Fingoing is of much less importance."
extending the duties of Shepstone, on the new Beka station, to include the Mfengu. An arrangement which was ratified in April 1836. (1)

Ayliff's departure brought the administration's wrath down about his head. On a superficial examination this would appear to be probably due to the fact the Ayliff permitted some two or three dozen Mfengu to accompany him back to Butterworth. The presence of the Mfengu once again in the territory of the Gcalekas, could have had untold repercussions on frontier peace and security. A spark which could have resulted in another conflagration and wreaked havoc with D'Urban's September treaty.

However, the administration's wrath went much deeper than this. D'Urban's main concern was the success or failure of his policy. It suited his political motives that Ayliff remain on the Clusie station. Like the Wesleyans, he wanted the recommencement of missionary activity. But he wanted it according to his design. Though the Wesleyans agreed with his September measures, they were not agreeable to their missionary activities taking second place to it. The question of Ayliff's return was also part of a larger question: the curtailment of their

religious responsibilities by civil duties which their acceptance of commissionerships was creating. The Wesleyans realised that while Ayliff was on the Clusie station, he was in danger of having his missionary activities overburdened with heavy civil duties which the resettlement was entailing. The civil duties which he was performing could easily be accomplished by government agents. The opportunity presented itself to reopen the Butterworth station. Ayliff was best suited for this task. Arrangements could be made for continuing to serve the Afengus. Ayliff appeared to be saddled with too many civil responsibilities which were affecting his religious duties. Consequently, his return to Butterworth was favoured.

This incident is a clear indication of Wesleyan strategy. A strategy which at all times affirmed its independence both in thought and action. The Wesleyans and the policy of the government concurred in certain measures regarding the frontier. A concurrence which was due, in the most part, to Wesleyan influence. When government policy and the measures advocated by the Wesleyans, in respect to the frontier and its issues, were in agreement, the latter did not hesitate to cooperate with the administration. But this co-operation was not allowed to affect their aim of evangelising the native tribes. Their first task was that of missionary activity. Their's was a strategy which they could not, and did not, allow to be dictated to or hindered by purely political motivations. They organised their manpower and resources
within the dictates of religious needs and in terms of a successful performance of their ministry.

D'Urban's reaction to Gyliff's removal back to Butterworth was governed by the fact that from 1815 to 1854, the Cape was governed by military men. They owed their appointment primarily to the nature of the eastern frontier. These appointments were often considered the graveyard of reputations. Hence the Governor's personal concern was the possible effect to his reputation of a failure to control the frontier. The immediate needs of military security overruled evangelical sentiment. The Wesleyans' support was warmly received if it coincided with the intended line of action of the administration.

The annexation of the Province of Queen Adelaide meant that the Wesleyans fell directly under the jurisdiction of the colonial authorities. Even though the Province was abandoned roughly a year after its annexation, the measure had confirmed for the authorities that right over missionary activity which they claimed. Hence the administration's dealings with the Wesleyans were based on the latter's political worth.

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(1) P. Knaplund, Op. cit., p. 45. "After 1815 the governorship (of the Colonies) were often used as a means for taking care of high ranking half-pay military and naval officers. Colonies exposed to danger within or without usually had military men as governors. The most conspicuous example of this is the Cape of Good Hope, then always exposed to Kaffir inroads." E.A. Walker, Op. cit., p. xviii, for list of governors.
CHAPTER VII.

Retrospection, Stockenstrom and the treaty system.

The extent of co-operation and assistance of Wesleyan strategy which was given to D'Urban was not limited only to the actual implementation of his September policy. There was some attempt to assist him in the defence of those measures as well. This is evidenced in an address of October, 12th, 1835 from Boyce, entitled: Skeleton of a Plan for the arrangement of Facts calculated to exhibit the true state of Colonial affairs to uninformed and prejudiced persons in England. The presentation of this address is not surprising in view of the origin of D'Urban's measures. The document is not reproduced here (1) as much of its contents is akin to previous letters of Boyce which have already been included. (2) The letter which was drafted under three headings: Causes of the Kaffir Irruption, The war and Future Arrangements to prevent war. Boyce's listing of the causes of the war demonstrates conspicuously many of the frontier issues which led to that advocacy which became such an integral part of Wesleyan strategy and hence, too, its reaction to government policies. The


(2) See Appendix G for full copy. There is close affinity between Causes of the Kaffir Irruption and Boyce's letter of March 31st 1834, to D'Urban. supra, pp. 44 - 50.
Wesleyans reaction to D'Urban's policy was quite definite. For the alternative to D'Urban's policy, as the Wesleyans saw it were,

(a) Either the present plan adopted by Sir B. D'Urban must be carried on, or

(b) otherwise there must be an exterminating war and where will you stop, at the Kay (sic)? at the Bashee? at Natal?

(c) Or, on the other hand, Albany must be given up and where will the Kaffirs stop? at Uitenhage? at George? No, not until they reach the Cape.

In respect of the rest of the letter, some digression is necessary on the question of European settlement. (2) D'Urban envisaged some white settlement in the annexed area. His motives for this were entirely for political support from the colonists. The Wesleyans' motives were not. One of the main tenets of Wesleyan strategy was the conservation of the territorial rights of the natives in the soil. Their advocacy of some European settlement among the native tribes (3) was no denial of this principle. Some European settlement they viewed as a necessary measure to improve the moral condition of the natives: on the basis of an interwringling of colonial towns and native reserves

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(1) Appendix G.

(2) Ibid., "The lands between the Keiskamma river and the Kye river reserved for European settlers ..."

which would assist the latter's development. (1) A closer contact would produce a better understanding and greater security to both races. It was never the intention of the Wesleyans to advocate or idly witness the natives' dispossession of their land with the sole intention of European settlement (2). This attitude was clearly stated by John Beecham before the SCA on the 6th June, 1836. He maintained the the Wesleyans,

would never be consenting parties to any other plan than one which would give back the lands [as opposed to a dispossession for white settlement] beyond the Fish river (the former boundary of the Colony) to the Caffre tribes, and those who, like the Fingos had become incorporated with them. (3)

Any policy which did not safeguard the natives' possession of their land was regarded by the Wesleyans as,

very defective and injurious. (4)

whatever faith the Wesleyans might have had in the British government agreeing to D'Urban's plan, they were within a few months, to

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(1) Shaw, Ibid., pp. 147, 148. Also IBB. VII. 538, pp 94, 95.
(2) Boyce, MSAAA, p. 48.
(3) IBB. VII. 538, p. 497.
(4) Ibid., pp. 508, 509. Beecham maintained that, IBB. VII 538, p. 516, "In our national character by legislation acts we have wronged the aborigines of our colonies; injustice requires that we make reparation in the character in which we inflicted the wrong; and I therefore give it as my deliberate and fixed opinion, that we are required to make, out of our national funds, a suitable provision for promoting their religious instruction." It is doubtful whether native tribes would have welcomed Beecham's conception of P.T.O.
witness the introduction of another 'order of things'. While they were busy about the task of re-establishing their mission stations, the air became permeated with rumours that the abandonment of the newly annexed province was imminent. By April 1836, Lord Glenelg's December 1835 despatch must have been fairly current coin in the Colony, and certainly by June in Kaffirland. Both the European colonists and the natives had then to sit back and wait. Wait while D'Urban vacillated: while he delayed defending his policy to his superiors. The Wesleyans hoped for the best, but began to fear the worst. Once again it was Boyce who articulated their feelings:

My dear Sir, Wesleyville, 23 July 1836.

SHOULD the abandonment of the new province be really determined upon, you would do me a great favour if you would give me timely information, as in that case I must make some inquiries as to whom I am to look for the protection of this place, which is exposed to the enmity of the large portion of Slambie's tribe concerned in this war. Our position is rather peculiar, as our stations this side of the Rye were considered by the insurgent chiefs as decidedly and actively opposed to their cause; and there are now residing here several individuals who, should the province be given up, must seek personal safety and security of property within the boundaries of the colony. You know well that the power of Fato, Umkya and Nonube, even if their people

Page 120, footnote (4), continued, suitable compensation. He would appear to be concerned more with the mission stations than the aborigines. But whatever the suitability of his idea, the preservation of the natives' rights in the soil was one of the main tenents of Wesleyan strategy.
were unanimous, would be no defence when opposed to the superior chiefs, even of the Slambie tribe only. Though I have no fears for myself personally, yet as I do fear for some of the people here, I wish to have the opportunity of sending them away before the troops withdraw; for I anticipate great evils to the well-meaning and quiet portion of the population of this country when that event takes place.

The moral effect of the measure will be most disastrous, both to Caffreland and the colony. What confidence can any well-disposed Caffre chief feel at any future period in the promises of the colonial government, and who will fear its threats? Explain the matter as you may, you will only make bad worse, by confirming the suspicions already entertained by some of the chiefs, that the colonial government does not possess the confidence of its superiors in England; and if this notion should be fully believed what control can the colonial government exercise over them, and how can it effectually protect the colony?

The injury inflicted upon the Caffres by the contemplated measure will be equally great. At present violence is unknown this side of the Kye, and every man is beginning to feel security of person and property. Even the chiefs, though they may naturally feel at times sore when they see the abuses of their power corrected, yet dread the withdrawal of the British troops, as then they know that old jealousies would revive amongst themselves and the petty contests be renewed, which would produce no small degree of distress, at this time especially, when they have not recovered from the wasteful consumption and enormous loss of cattle by sickness, &c. during the war with the colony.

As a question of humanity there can be but one opinion. The retention of the new province is the only measure which can prevent the extinction of the Caffre race, because it is the only human means which can raise them in the scale of being. They must become a civilized people, or else share the fate of all semi-barbarous races. They are exposed to more powerful tribes beyond them, who never wait for just causes of war, and to the colonists, whom they are sure to furnish with just reasons for punishing them, as no chief can restrain his people from plundering the colony, unless supported by the colonial government.

Once the Caffres have been saved from their Fetsani enemies by the colonial government, in 1828; and once they have been spared the infliction of the vengeance their unprovoked attack upon the colony deserved, but will the colonial government ever interfere
again to preserve a people so ungrateful? And will there be no bounds to its forbearance, a forbearance exercised at the expense of the suffering colonists, and only justified by the reasonable prospect which the new arrangements held forth of future security? I know nothing of the humanity which would screen irremediable rogues for a season at the expense of the community at large, who in the end must suffer the natural consequences of a taste for predatory excursions into the colony. I have no sympathy for the lawless prerogatives of Caffre chiefs, and care not how soon they are reduced to the condition of private gentlemen. But I do feel for the people who under the protection of British law would rapidly improve and become a barrier to the colony against the tribes beyond; but who, if thrown back to suffer under the evils of their political and social system, are sure, a few years hence, to be only known as a people once powerful, but gradually wasting away.

I am aware that Christianity would do something to prevent these anticipated evils; but its present influence is confined to a few individuals, and before it has a fair chance of bearing upon the community at large, that community will, I fear, cease to exist. God works on human instrumentality, and the protection of British law would afford Christianity an opportunity of exercising its influence to a degree and extent which, under any other circumstances, it will not possess.

Now I must conclude, and with many thanks for past kindnesses, I remain, &c.

(signed) M. R. Boyce,
Missionary with the tribe of T'Slambie.

Wesleyan strategy continued in its advocacy. The abandonment of the new province would, for the Wesleyans, increase the possibility of further hostilities from the native tribes east of the Kei. It would spell an end to the very measures which they had advocated and which

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§1) IHR. KLIII. 503, pp. 267-268, Boyce to Smith, 23rd July 1836.
Enclosure No. 4, in 24. N'Urban to Glenelg, 3 November, 1836.
they believed would best maintain the peace of the frontier, and a successful advancement of Christianity. Ayliff put the Wesleyans' attitude in a nut-shell when he later wrote;

the greatest calamity which ever befell this frontier was the sudden revision of the System of Sir B. D'Urban. (1)

From the other missionaries to Colonel Smith, the Wesleyans were not alone in their support for the retention of the new Province.

Ayliff, of the G.M.S., also saw only bad arising from a retrocession.

The Rev. John Ayliff, Glasgow Missionary to the Chief Crieli, to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, dated Butterworth, 4th July 1836.

I HAVE to tender you my best thanks for the last you sent me, and am thankful for the manifest improvement of the new province. It offers a fine field for missionary labour, and happy should I be to labour in any part of the new province, did not Providence direct me to this as my post of duty.

My opinion is, that should the Home Government not confirm the measures of our Governor in the retention of the new province, that whatever other plans they may adopt, things will revert back to their old state of insecurity in the colony; the inhabitants of the new province will be thrown into a state of the greatest possible confusion, and the progress of civilization and Christianity greatly retarded. Yes, I moreover believe, that if the new province is not retained, that Albany, for what its worth would be, might be given up to the Caffres.

As a missionary I should be willing to stand the chances of labouring among the Caffres, should such a calamitous circumstance take place; but as a father of a large family I should feel in justice bound to them to seek some other country for their future settlement.

(signed) John Ayliff. (2)


Meanwhile Colonel Smith had written to D'Urban on the same topic.

But what, now I ask is the position of the Colony? One of comparative ease, freedom and security. Are all such judicious achievements in so short a time to be abolished, to the utter and irretrievable ruin of the whole Colony ... If it rests upon your Excellency's responsibility to withdraw or retain the Province, boldly preserve.

Later, D'Urban to Glenelg:

I cannot conclude this Despatch without repeating the opinion I have laid before your Lordship ... of the great benefits which would have resulted, as well as to the native tribes as to the colony, by a confirmation of the policy which I had adopted, and of the evil consequences to both, which cannot, I apprehend, fail to follow its abandonment.

The details of the political wrangling which followed between August and December in 1836, are well detailed elsewhere. Stockenstrom arrived from England and left for the frontier, and the next day D'Urban abolished martial law in the new Province. Relations between the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor deteriorated. Frontier matters went from bad to worse. The Wesleyans' concern over the situation continued to increase.

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(1) D.U.Corres.,Vol.2, pp. 797-798, Smith to D'Urban, 4th June 1836. Smith's emphasis.

(2) IBB, XLI, 503, p. 29, D'Urban to Glenelg, 19th September 1836.

Since the departure of Colonel Smith, the Kaffirs in my neighbour- 
hood have appeared much unsettled and excited by rumours of 
changes in the system hitherto pursued ... It is currently 
reported and believed that Colonel Smith has been sent away 
for killing Hintea, that it is illegal to shoot a Kaffir under 
any circumstances, or to prevent them going into any part of the 
Colony, armed and in parties of any number. (1)

However the course which the administration was to follow was 
beyond the control of the Wesleyans. A diplomatic D'Urban, ultimat- 
ely decided to bow to his superiors' earlier instructions. He proceeded 
with arrangements for the retrocession of the Province,(2) which was 
concluded on the 5th December 1836, at Kingwilliamstown. The Wesley- 
ans obviously had much about which to be alarmed. It was at this time 
that the Report of the 3CA was published. Wesleyan evidence had made 
little impression. For them a great deal of ignorance as to the con- 
ditions on the frontier obviously still prevailed in higher circles. 
The report recommended that trans-frontier relations be governed by a 
treaty system. It was abundantly clear that the British government 
was still going to pursue a policy which basically attempted to evade 
its full frontier responsibilities.(3) But the Report spoke with

(1) Soyes to Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom, 18 October 1836. 

(2) [36].XIII.503. p.44. D'Urban to Glenelg, 2nd December 1836.

a "double voice." (1) It maintained the inexpediency of treaties with the natives (2) and that relations between the Europeans and the natives should be diminished rather than multiplied. But it then went on, to state that,

It may be concluded that the territory called Adelaide has in fact been surrendered to the Caffres and that the Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom is proceeding to execute Lord Glenelg's instructions. (3)

Instructions which were to sign treaties with the native tribes, of which the Report had just expressed as inexpedient. The terms of those treaties the Report then transcribed. (4)

From the Wesleyans point of view there was obviously much, both in Kaffirland and in England, over which to be alarmed. Stockenstrom was in fact executing what the Report recommended (5). He signed treaties with the chief Umsilikasi in 1836, with the Thembus in 1837 and the Gqunukhwebe in 1838 (6). The Wesleyans continued to assist

(2) J.B.VII.427. p. 80. Suggestions. No VIII.
(3) Ibid., p. 81. Cape of Good Hope.
(4) Ibid., pp. 81-82.
the administration and co-operated with Stockenstrom. There was much within the treaty system which (1) the Wesleyans had themselves advocated. The appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor had in fact been one of Shaw's recommendations to the Earl of Aberdeen. (2) Though the Wesleyans saw the new treaty system as an impoverished substitute for the full assumption by the government of frontier responsibility, they still viewed it as containing many just and reasonable clauses. But these were neutralised by others which were not reasonable. Boyce claimed that the content of the treaties were,

based, in principle, and in some cases in detail upon the recommendations contained in my letter of March 1834, addressed to Sir Benjamin D'Urban. (3)

A comparison would appear to validate Boyce's claim (4). But he saw also many primary defects which were of no assistance to the furtherance of frontier peace and security (5). Measures which reduced what good

(2) Appendix D. Supra, pp. 71-72.
(3) Boyce, NEA, p. 76. Boyce's emphasis.
(5) Ibid., pp. 80-95.
he saw in the treaties. The Wesleyans realised that there was no hope of changing back to D’Urban’s policy. The new treaty system had been ratified by the British Government and that system, as far as they could see, was there for an indefinite stay. There was no alternative but to operate within the framework of that system. Their attempt to advocate and see the implementation of those measures which they conceived as being the best measures to settle the frontier issues, had not met with complete success. But, on the other hand, neither had their strategy met with complete failure. Their strategy therefore, in respect to the present policy of the government, revolved around the problem of,

How can the present system be rendered more efficient? How can we preserve inviolate the principles of the treaties, and at the same time obviate their many and serious defects in detail. (1)

The Wesleyans advocated that the office of the Lieutenant-Governor be invested with both civil and military command on the frontier. The Gqunukwebe tribe to be received as British subjects, on the same lines as D’Urban’s plans. Any system, they maintained, for the management of the frontier, required, as a basic essential, the support of a large military force. (2) The pursuit of stolen cattle was still one of the thorniest difficulties facing the frontier. (3) Their advocacy

(1) Ibid., p. 107. Boyce’s emphasis.
(2) Ibid., pp. 107-118.
(3) A. Keppel-Jones, South Africa, p. 58.
was still basically aimed at ignorance of frontier conditions and the
measures in which that ignorance resulted. Whatever Wesleyan reaction
to government policy was after January 1837, their strategy remained
hinged on their primary intention - the evangelisation of the native
tribes. The first concern and goal after the 1834-35 war was the speedy
re-establishment of their mission stations and to extend that 'chain',
to which the war had called a premature halt, even further. The de-
cline in the number of letters to the authorities from the Wesleyans
after January 1837 is perhaps evidence of their preoccupation with
their missionary activities. But it is also indicative of their
realisation that their attempts to persuade the authorities to adopt
certain measures in respect to the frontier had reached a stalemate.
The report of the SCA and the arrival of Major-General Sir George
Napier illustrated to them only too well the extent of their influence.

In August 1837, D'Urban had written to Glenelg of renewed violence
on the frontier, (1) placing the blame entirely at the feet of the
treaty system.

The Affairs ... cannot appreciate the principle which your Lord-
ship professes to be the basis of the measures recently adopted ...
They regard us ... as a people, alike incapable of defending

(1) BIB. XXVIII.244, p.15, D'Urban to Glenelg, 12th August 1837.
our friends or of punishing our enemies ... Hence, the Lieutenant Governor's treaties are ... little better, if they be not worse than waste paper. (1)

This must have been the last straw for Glenelg as regards D'Urban's governorship, for at the end of the year he was dismissed and Napier took over. The latter arrived with the avowed intention to maintain Glenelg's policy and to support Stockenstrom.(2) His attitude probably explains Wesleyan silence. They no doubt realised that the views which they advocated would receive no sympathetic hearing from the Governor. Though Napier's views did later alter.

However, the silence in the Wesleyan ranks did not last all that long. Both Boyce and Shaw were no doubt busy on their manuscripts for their intended publications (3), with Shaw involved in a length correspondence with Dr Philip.(4) The Wesleyans did not hesitate to offer constructive criticism of the problems which Glenelg's reversal had only shelved. Within the context of disagreement with, and warning against, the present policy, their advocacy went on in 1838.

Boyce who had never agreed whole-heartedly with the treaty system right from the time of its inception (5) became, as time wore on, even

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(1) IBB. XXXVIII, 424, p. 16.
(3) Eoyce, NSAA, and Shaw, DWNSA.
(4) See, Shaw, DWNSA.
(5) Boyce, NSAA, p.77.
more antagonistic towards it.

The present policy is such as the worst enemies of the Kaffirs
would choose to be adopted, as it perpetuated the enmity of the
Colonists by constant irritation arising from daily attacks upon
their property, it enables the Kaffirs to form a wrong estimate
of their strength and of the motives of our forbearance, and
unless the system be changed it is perfectly useless for Missy.
Societies to be spending their thousand annually for the benefit
of a people, whom the cruel mercies of their hypocritical friends
are devoting to ultimate destruction.

Boyce's argument of it being the worst policy soon received a further
example (2). It arose from the question of war losses. The incident
was the chief, Ngqeno's war claims in November 1836. One of the necessary
prerequisites for the retrocession of the Province of Queen Adelaide

(1) B. Williams, Op. cit., p. 525. A.H.R.S., Boyce to Secretaries,
9th September 1837. Correspondence between 1837-1857 from the
eastern Cape is missing from the A.H.R.S. Attempts to trace it
have not been successful. P.E. Hinchliff, Op. cit., p.255, "NOTE
There appears to be no collection of papers from the Eastern Cape
after 1857 (Box VII-Supra) until the Queenstown Series starts in
1857."
The Journal of the Methodist History Society of South Africa,
October 1960, Vol. III, No 4, refers to "correspondence from Albany
Natal and Bechuana Districts for the period 1837-1857 which is
missing from the archives of the Methodist Missionary Society.
Hence the necessity of quoting from Williams.

(2) Violence had already broken out between the tribes in March
1837. "A serious feud betwixt Fato's tribe and those(?) of
Makomo has been engendered, because the former refused to join in
the war on the Colony." A.H.R.S., Box VII, File 1836 & 1837.
Chaw to Secretaries, 4th March, 1837.
had been for Stockenstrom to attempt to persuade the natives to sink their differences. Especially those which had arisen from the late war.

During the war Phatho had lost cattle to Ngqeno. The former re-compensed himself by appropriating not only Ngqeno's cattle, but also cattle which the latter had got from the colony. (1) After the war Phatho was allowed to keep these cattle by D'Urban. The matter, having apparently been amically settled, was allowed to drop by Stockenstrom. Ngqeno had then later created the impression with the government agent that the cattle in question had only been given to Phatho for safe-keeping. (2) Under pressure Stockenstrom eventually demanded Phatho's return of the cattle. This event nearly developed into another *casus belli*. For the Wesleyans, what, the merits of either side, it was again clear evidence of the ineffectiveness of the treaty system. The incident resulted in the further flowing of Wesleyan ink. They maintained, that if the government allowed the question of war claims to be continually reopened,


there will be no end to the strife which will be thereby engendered and one question after another may be expected to arise, till it shall at length be found, that the Treaties which were to have settled everything have settled nothing ... that if Colonial Government does not prevent war, by a declaration of its firm purpose to maintain the existing treaties, and of its refusal to open any questions of dispute arising out of the late war, or previously to December 1836, all the border tribes will be most probably involved in confusion, and the results both to them and the Colony must be disastrous.

For the Wesleyans the problems of the frontier were still those of the early thirties. Their advocacy was the same.

To prevent their [the native tribes] predatory habits on the one side and to secure their rights in the soil on the other, is the only method that can be devised to save the aborigines from ultimate annihilation.

Annexation was the best and most likely measure to present a solution.

For,

The protection of British law would afford Christianity an opportunity of exercising its influence to a degree and extent which, under any other circumstances, it would not possess.

The conserving of the territorial rights of the natives, and placing them under British protection as opportunity affords, is the only

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means of preserving their independent existence. (1)

These two passages form the basis of Wesleyan advocacy with regard to the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and Kaffirland between 1823 and 1838. That advocacy was a product of their primary aim of the evangelisation of the heathen in these areas. Their reaction to government policy was determined within this framework. This continued to be the basis of Wesleyan missionary strategy and their reaction to government policy in the next decades. (2) Their advocacy continued though there was,

a disinclination to intervene except where the interest more particularly Wesleyan seemed to be endangered. (3)

In the ten years between 1828 and 1838, there is the development of a distinct strategy. For the Wesleyans the propagation of the Christian gospel was inextricably intertwined with any improvement in frontier relations. A successful advancement of Christianity was dependent upon a situation of peace and security existing on the frontier. This in turn was directly related to the moral improvement of


(3) Ibid., p. 235.
the native tribes, which was a primary concern of their programme of evangelisation. The wesleyans saw the extension of British law and control as the best and only method to ensure the propagation of Christianity and also to solve the frontier's problems. But it was not for them, however, a control which would eventually only lead to ultimate colonisation and further white encroachment of native territory.
CHAPTER VIII.

Conclusion.

The method of a detailed presentation of events, in chronological order, with the crucial documents given in full, has led to a certain amount of overlapping and may tend to obscure the general outline of events and argument. It would therefore, appear worthwhile, in conclusion, to summarize what was involved in these events. The focussing of attention on the forest as a whole, rather than on particular trees, may more clearly indicate and demonstrate the emergence of Wesleyan missionary strategy and its reaction to government policies.

The origin of Wesleyanism, present day Methodism, in the eastern district of the Cape Colony, is to be found from 1823, when William Shaw arrived as chaplain to a group of British settlers. This clergyman's task was to serve the needs of those Europeans whom he had accompanied. But within his appointment by the Wesleyan Missionary Committee, there was inherent the obligation to minister to the heathen as well.

Wesleyan strategy began with Shaw. For almost the next ten years this name and that strategy were practically synonymous. Wesleyan strategy at the outset was concerned with the establishment of a virile and healthy religious community in the Albany area. Simultaneously
though, it was also to be the establishment of a strong base for future wesleyan missionary activity among the trans-frontier tribes. The undertaking of such operations could commence only when the initial task was sufficiently advanced to warrant the acceptance of those responsibilities. The religious tenets of wesleyanism were such that an attempt to evangelise the native tribes was a natural duty.

Nevertheless, the task was only undertaken at the pleasure of the administration. It had been government policy to prohibit the admission of missionaries into kaffirland for some years previous. However, the early 'twenties witnessed an about-face in government policy. The entrance of missionaries into kaffirland was actively encouraged. Government policy, was, in the 'twenties resolved on a solution to frontier problems by the encouragement of civilization amongst the native people. A civilization which the authorities envisaged would be cultivated by, and through the agency and insculcation of Christianity. Shaw's entrance into kaffirland was not the product of government policy, but of his religious principles. However, his entrance into Kaffirland was conditioned by the requirement of the authorities' consent.

Wesleyanism made its debut in Kaffirland in 1825. Its resultant missionary activities were the consequence of a deliberate and preconceived
strategy which owed all to Shaw's imagination. Initial Wesleyan strategy, in respect to Kaffirland, was the establishment of a chain of mission stations, stretched along the breadth of the south-eastern coastal land from Albany to the northern reaches of Natal. From 1825 Wesleyan strategy was determined and directed by what had become a dual responsibility: a responsibility both to the Europeans and to the native tribes.

Within a relatively short period of the commencement of Wesleyan activity in Kaffirland, it was brought to the realisation that its intentions were no simple matter. Their desire to Christianise automatically involved its devotees in a complex situation. The very nature of the milieu in which they laboured determined their strategy over the succeeding years.

The success of the endeavours of Wesleyan strategy to evangelise the heathen inhabitants of Kaffirland lent heavily on a situation of peace and security prevailing. Wesleyanims gradually perceived that this was inextricably interwoven with its missionary aims.

Evangelisation carried with it the concern for morality. Amongst the native tribes, morality, as conceived in the Christian sense, was non-existent. There was a basic tendency to moral corruption.
In terms of its evangelising intentions, the elevation of the moral conduct of the tribes to a higher code of ethics, developed as an integral part of Wesleyan strategy. At the same time an awareness amongst the Wesleyans was born, that the amoral behaviour of the natives was largely the cause of much frontier unrest. The result being that, in so far as the evangelisation of the tribes was dependent on favourable peaceful circumstances, and, in so far as the moral condition of the tribes was a direct concern of evangelisation and one of the paramount influences to the prevalence of peaceful circumstances, Wesleyan strategy was thereby also concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the frontier.

As these factors had a mutual dependence, so the question of the natives' moral condition was directly related to the question of land. Tribal society was firmly founded on the value of land and its pastoral potential. It was the question of land possession which gave rise to most of the natives' behaviour. Consequently the problem of moral improvement was unlikely to succeed unless cognisance was taken of the fact that it was intimately connected with the preservation of the natives' territorial rights. Thus, in this circumspect manner, the strategy of the Wesleyans was forced to take account of this problem as well. A combination of these problems, coupled with the Wesleyan
desire to Christianise, occasioned and determined Wesleyan reaction to government policy in regard to the eastern frontier.

Any Wesleyan expansion in Kaffirland, in consequence, involved them proportionately in an even greater concern for a ready solution of the territory's problems. By the late 'twenties and early 'thirties a marked deterioration in human relations began to occur. Slowly the Wesleyans came to understand that the strategy which they had to adopt, was one which was far broader than a mere propagation of the Christian gospel. As the initial situation of thousands of heathen had demanded a bold and definite approach in regard to their evangelisation, so the situation in this period demanded of the Wesleyans an equally bold and definite approach if the frontier problems were not to destroy their labours and their aims as to the future.

As their knowledge of Kaffirland and its inhabitants increased, so their strategy was modified. It was a modification which saw them accepting, with conviction, as a duty, the demand that their strategy include the advocacy of certain measures with regard to frontier administration. Measures whose adoption they believed were essential, not only to the propagation of Christianity, the very survival of those to whom they ministered but to the whole of frontier peace and security.
This approach, and the approach to frontier problems by the authorities which they advocated, brought the Wealeyans into direct contact with government policy. Their advocacy was, however, something more than just that. It was a realisation that alone they could not solve the frontier's problems. If Christianity was to have any real effect, it required the assistance of the authorities.

Government policies in the period from 1820 to 1833 were characterised by certain broad trends. The British Government attempted to govern, through the Colonial Office, by a series of broad instructions to the Cape Governors. These instructions left the Governors with little, if any, room for manoeuvring or personal initiative. Government policy in this period was a floundering and vacillating one. It found itself in a cul-de-sac, in which no simple answer presented itself, except the employment of advance and withdraw defensive tactics *ad infinitum*. Frontier responsibilities beyond the eastern colonial boundary were renounced. It was a policy conditioned more by financial considerations than anything else.

The eastern frontier, which government policy attempted to control rather than govern, was an area characterised by competition for land and the attempt to establish a secure existence. The attendant problems of government increased as a more stabilised colonial way of life, and an ever increasing consciousness on the part of the native tribes of themselves as a distinct entity, developed. The situation was further
complicated by an economic interdependence.

Against this background, Wesleyan strategy viewed the answer to all the frontier problems as lying in a more efficient administration and the extension of British law and control over Kaffirland. If their knowledge of government policy was as good as their knowledge of Kaffirland, they must have realised it an almost impossible hope. But they did not deny their responsibility and the opportunity to present their views soon arose.

The year 1834, saw both the arrival of a new Governor, with fresh instructions, and the establishment by the British Parliament of a Select Committee on Aborigines. Wesleyan advocacy as to the management of the frontier can be clearly dated from this time. However, it was not a sudden overnight development. It was something which had matured over the preceding years with a gradual but ever-growing understanding and momentum. Before long their convictions received a further boost by the outbreak of the 1834-35 frontier war. The time had come when the Wesleyan consciences could no longer remain silent and the advocacy of definite measures to be adopted by the government became an integral part of Wesleyan strategy.

This advocacy was not in the strict sense an official policy. The
period between 1833 and 1836, as between 1823 and 1833, is characterised rather by individual action and expressions of opinion. Wesleyan reaction was individual rather than corporate. It is the basic similarity of this individual thought and action which together constituted Wesleyan strategy and validates the use of such a qualification. Throughout, the hallmarks of Wesleyan strategy remained their religious principles. Justice and charity were the factors that enlightened and governed their vision.

The outbreak of the war was for them a decided justification of their strategy of advocacy which involved them irrevocably in the political arena. It was an involvement which they tried to avoid, but the circumstances of Kaffirland and their consciences, forced them along this course. Their advocacy and subsequent actions were viewed, not as an attempt to enter into politics, but were seen as a distinct honouring of their dual responsibility. They were men who were repeatedly forewarned and cautioned on the inadvisability of such involvement but they were men who owed allegiance to an authority which meant they could do no other.

D'Urban's May Proclamation heralded, for the Wesleyans, the beginning of a new phase of direct assistance to, and co-operation with, the administration. The intended policy of the administration
as conceived in May 1835, came under heavy fire from the Wesleyans. They succeeded in winning the Governor's ear and as evidence of the integrity of their intentions, succeeded in assisting the war to a negotiated settlement. Wesleyan strategy was governed by a realisation that the intended expulsion of the tribes would lead, not to peace, but to a continuation of the war; and if such a measure, to whose impossibility to effect they adhered, could be implemented, it could lead only to the formation of a strong, dissatisfied populace on the colonial border. A situation which would ultimately solve nothing and merely result in further hostilities.

Their advocacy met with such success that they had the pleasure of seeing the administration in the Colony adopt the very measures which they had been advocating; namely, the extension of British law and control over Kaffirland. A policy which the war had served to convince the Wesleyans was the only just and reasonable one. Once hostilities had been ended their primary aim was the re-establishment and further development of their mission stations. But, they continued to actively assist and co-operate with the authorities in the implementation of that policy which they had advocated. In so far as those civil duties, which such action entailed, were not a curtailment of, and to the detriment of, their religious responsibilities. Whatever the extent of
co-operation by the Wesleyans in these years, it was never their strategy to "win the smiles of Colonial Governors,"(1) or to be "servile instruments of an odious government"(2). But within a few months rumour began to circulate that a retrocession of the newly annexed province was imminent. Their warnings of its consequences were to little avail, as D'Urban's hand was forced by the Colonial Office.

Glanelg's reversal and the contents of the Report of the SCA represented, for the Wesleyans' advocacy, something of a double failure. The ineffectiveness of the new treaty system was pointed out by the Wesleyans at an early stage, even though it did contain much which they had advocated. They continued to co-operate with the authorities in the maintenance of peace: in which they had a vital interest. But continued to warn of the corrupt nature of the Kaffir political system: that the new treaty system would not solve what only the extension of British law and control could do.

The failure to see this extension maintained, did not deter the Wesleyans. With an increase of violence, dissatisfaction and disorder gradually mounting on the frontier, they began to object violently to

(1) Shaw, DH RSA, Introduction. p.x.
(2) Ibid., p. xv, Shaw quoting the writer Justus.
the new treaty system, to indicate its inherent weaknesses and to try
and get the authorities to adopt detailed measures to rectify it. They
continued to warn of imminent dangers in the future and that the govern-
ment had still not accepted its full responsibility on the frontier.
The end of D'Urban's term of office, the beginning of 1823, saw the
Wesleyans realising that the success of their missionary endeavours
were being seriously hindered by the inability of the government to
control the frontier, and that the treaty system had solved nothing.
They realised that there was little, if any, chance of dissuading the
authorities from their policy. The best they could do was to channel
their energies into the missionary activities and warned of conditions
which would eventually have only one result. For the Wesleyans the
measures of government policy – except the brief months of D'Urban's
September policy – were neither just in their nature, nor wise in their
application.(1)

The pattern of Wesleyan strategy, in the succeeding decades, was
that which had evolved between 1823 and 1838; particularly the last
five years of that period. By this stage there had been a definite
crystallisation of their attitudes and opinions as to the frontier and

(1) Boyce, NSAA, pp. 4-5.
148.

hence too, to what government policy should be. Wesleyan strategy can perhaps be qualified by Shaw's words,

Justice to the Kaffirs, Security to the Colony. (1)

The publication of Shaw's book, *A Defence of Wesleyan Missionaries in South Africa*, and Boyce's *Notes on South Africa Affairs*, in 1839, is indicative of the extent to which Wesleyan strategy had developed and been worked out. Their strategy resulted in the Wesleyans playing an undeniably large and vital role in the history of the frontier in these years. Their actions and reactions must be judged firstly within the framework of their primary intention: that of the evangelisation of the native tribes. It was this factor, above all else, which occasioned, determined and directed their strategy. The Wesleyans' deep interest in the frontier caused them to be vitally concerned about government policy. Their primary interest, coupled with the factors of the frontier milieu, determined their reaction to government policy and caused them to advocate what that policy should be. It was these factors as well, which determined their co-operation with the authorities and which led them to seek the assistance of the authorities in the implementation of their missionary aims. As long as the ignorance of the

true circumstances of Aaffirland prevailed, as long as the natives' rights in the soil were not safeguarded and there were no decisive measures for the defence of life and property, then Christianity would be but of little effect in the maintenance of peace.

In so far as government policy during the whole period may be described as a fumbling and a vacillation, Wesleyan strategy was bold and definite. After 1834 there was an attempt by the government to implement a far more definite system, but it was still characterised by a fatal indecisiveness: an attempt to control rather than govern, and an attempt to evade its full responsibilities. Wesleyan strategy on the other hand, continued to be characterised by boldness, a definiteness and a vital awareness of its responsibilities which it fully accepted. Wesleyan strategy throughout those years never forgot that it had a dual responsibility: a responsibility to both the European colonists and the native tribes. It was this dual responsibility which at all times was at the heart of Wesleyan strategy.
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APPENDIX A.

Instructions to the Wesleyan Missionaries. (1)

I. We recommend to you in the first place and above all things, to pay due attention to your personal piety; which, by prayer, self-denial, holy diligence, and active faith in Him who loved you and gave himself for you, must be kept in a lively, vigorous, and growing state. Set before you constantly the example of the holy Apostle: "This one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." (Phil. iii. 13, 14.) Amidst all your reading, studies, journeyings, preaching, and other labours, let the prosperity of your own souls in the Divine life be carefully cultivated; and then a spirit of piety will dispose you to the proper performance of your ministerial duties; and, by a holy re-action, such a discharge of duty will increase your personal religion.

II. We wish to impress on your minds the absolute necessity of using every means of mental improvement with an express view to your great work as Christian Ministers. You are furnished with useful books, the works of men of distinguished learning and piety. We recommend to you to acquire an increase of that general knowledge which, if the handmaid of piety, will increase your qualifications for extensive usefulness. But, more especially, we press upon you the absolute necessity of studying Christian Divinity, the doctrines of salvation by the cross of Christ, "which things the angels desire to look into." They exercise their minds, which excel in strength, in the contemplation of those precious truths which you are called to explain and illustrate. Let all your reading and studies have a reference to this. You are to teach religion; you must, therefore understand religion well. You are to disseminate the knowledge of Christianity, in order to the salvation of men; let the Bible, then, be YOUR BOOK; and let all other books be read only in order to obtain a better acquaintance with the holy Scriptures, and a

(1) A.M.W.S. Resolution of a Committee Meeting, 16th December, 1817.
greater facility in explaining, illustrating, and applying their important contents. We particularly recommend you to read and digest the writings of 
WESLEY and FLETCHER, and the useful commentaries with which you are furnished, which are designed and calculated to increase your knowledge of the Sacred Volume. Like the Baptist, you must be "burning and shining lights;" and, therefore, recollect every day, that, whilst you endeavour by reading, meditation, and conversation, to increase your stock of useful knowledge, it is necessary for you to acquire a proportionate increase of holy fervour.

III. We exhort you, brethren, to unity of affection, which will not fail to produce unity of action. Let your love be without dissimulation. In honour prefer one another. On this subject we beseech you to pay a practical regard to the advice of the venerable Founder of our Society, the REV. JOHN WESLEY. With his characteristic brevity, he inquires, "What can be done in order to a closer union of our Preachers with each other?"—Ans. 1. Let them be deeply convinced of the absolute necessity of it. 2. Let them pray for an earnest desire of union. 3. Let them speak freely to each other. 4. When they meet, let them never part without prayer. 5. Let them be aware of how they despise each other's gifts. 6. Let them never speak slightingly of each other in any kind. 7. Let them defend one another's character in everything, to the utmost of their power. And, 8. Let them labour in honour to prefer each the other before himself."

IV. REMEMBER always, dear Brethren, that you are by choice, and on conviction, Wesleyan-METHODIST PREACHERS; and, therefore, it is expected and required of you, to act in all things in a way consistent with that character. In your manner of preaching, and of administering the various ordinances of God's house, keep closely to the model exhibited by your Brethren at home. Indeed, you have solemnly pledged yourselves so to do. You have promised to preach, in the most explicit terms, the doxologies held as scriptural, and therefore sacred, in the connexion to which you belong. We advise, however, in so doing, that you avoid all appearance of controversy, in your mode of stating and enforcing
divine truths. While you firmly maintain that ground which we, as a body, have seen it right to take, cultivate a catholic spirit towards all your fellow-labourers in the work of evangelizing the Heathen; and aid them to the utmost of your power in their benevolent exertions. You have engaged, also, to pay a conscientious regard to our discipline. We need not tell you, that all the parts of that discipline are of importance; and that, taken together, they form a body of rules and usages, which appear to meet all the wants of individuals who are seeking the salvation of their souls; and, under the divine influence and blessing, to promote the prosperity of every society. We also particularly press upon your constant attention and observance Mr. Wesley's Twelve Rules of a Helper.

V. We cannot omit, without neglecting our duty, to warn you against meddling with political parties, or secular disputes. You are teachers of religion; and that alone should be kept in view. It is, however, a part of your duty, as Ministers, to enforce, by precept and example, a cheerful obedience to lawful authority. You know that the venerable Wesley was always distinguished by his love to his country, by his conscientious loyalty, and by his attachment to illustrious family which has so long filled the throne of Great Britain. You know that your Brethren at home are actuated by the same principles, and walk by the same rule; and we have confidence in you that you will preserve the same character of religious regard to good order and submission "to the powers that be" - in which we glory. Our motto is, "FEAR GOD, AND HONOUR THE KING;" and we recollect who has said, "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey Magistrates, to be ready to every good work."

VI. You will, on a foreign station, find yourselves in circumstances very different from those in which you are at home, with regard to those who are in authority under our gracious Sovereign. It is probable that you will frequently come under their immediate notice and observation. We are, however, persuaded that, while you demean yourselves as you ought, you will be generally favoured with their protection. On your arrival at your stations, you will be instructed
what steps to take in order to obtain the protection of the Local Governments: and we trust that your subsequent good behaviour towards Governors, and all who are in authority, will be such as shall secure to you the enjoyment of liberty to instruct and promote the salvation of those to whom you are sent.

VII. THOSE of you who are appointed to the West-Indian Colonies, being placed in stations of considerable delicacy, and which still require, notwithstanding the great and happy changes which recent legislation has effected in the state of society there, a peculiar circumspection and prudence on the one hand, and much of zeal, diligence, and patient perseverance, on the other; you are required to attend to the following directions, as specially applicable to your Mission there:

1. Your particular designation is to endeavour the religious instruction and conversion of the ignorant, pagan, and neglected black and coloured population of the island, or station, to which you may be appointed, and of all others who may be willing to hear you.

2. Where Societies are already formed, you are required to watch over them with the fidelity of those who must give up their account to Him who hath purchased them with his blood, and in whose Providence they are placed under your care. Your labours must be constantly directed to improve them in the knowledge of Christianity, and to enforce upon them the experience and practice of its doctrines and duties, without intermingleing doubtful controversies in your administrations, being mainly anxious, that those over whom you have pastoral care should clearly understand the principal doctrines of the Scriptures, feel their renovating influence upon their hearts, and become "holy in all manner of conversation and godliness." And, in order to this, we recommend that your sermons should consist chiefly of clear expositions of the most important truths of Holy Writ, enforced with affection and fervour on the consciences and conduct of them that hear you; that you frequently and familiarly explain portions of the Scriptures; and that, as extensively as you possibly can, you introduce the method of teaching children, and the
less-instructed of the adults, by the excellent Catechisms with which you are furnished.

3. It is enjoined upon you, that you continue no person as a member of your Societies, "whose conversation is not as becometh the Gospel of Christ." That any member of your Society who may relapse into his former habits, and become a polygamist, or an adulterer; who shall be idle and disorderly; disobedient to lawful authority; who shall steal, or be in any other way immoral or irreligious, shall be put away, after due admonition, and proper attempts to reclaim him from the "error of his way."

4. Before you receive any person into Society, you shall be satisfied with his desire to become acquainted with the religion of Christ, and to obey it; and if he has not previously been under Christian instruction, nor baptized, you are, before his admission as a member, diligently to teach him the Christian faith, and the obligations which he takes upon himself by baptism; so as to be assured of his having obtained such knowledge of the principles of religion, and such belief of them, as to warrant you to administer to him that ordinance. Besides this, no person is to be admitted into Society, without being placed first on trial, for such time as shall be sufficient to prove whether his conduct has been reformed, and that he has wholly renounced all those vices to which he may have been addicted.

5. You are to consider the children of the negroes and coloured people of your Societies and Congregations as a part of your charge; and it is recommended to you, wherever it is practicable and prudent, to establish Sunday Schools, Week-day Schools, and Infant Schools, for their instruction. It is to be considered by you as a very important part of your duty as a Missionary, to catechise them as often as you conveniently can, at stated periods; and to give your utmost aid to their being brought up in Christian knowledge, and in industrious and moral habits.

6. As in most of the Colonies in which you are called to labour, a great proportion of the inhabitants, though happily emancipated from their former state of slavery, are yet placed by law in certain peculiar relations, as
apprenticed labourers, the Committee most strongly call to your recollection, what was so fully stated to you when you were accepted as a Missionary to the West Indies, that your only business is to promote the moral and religious improvement of the persons to whom you may have access, without, in the least degree, in public or private, interfering with their civil condition. On all persons, in the state of servants, you are diligently and implicitly to enforce the same exhortations which the Apostles of our Lord administered to the servants of ancient nations; when, by their ministry, they embraced Christianity. "Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of heart, as unto Christ; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." (Eph. vi. 5-8.) "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh: not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever you do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men knowing, that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance: for ye serve the Lord Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." (Col. iii. 22-25.)

7. You are directed to avail yourselves of every opportunity to extend your labours among the Negroes of the islands where you may be stationed, and respectfully to seek, for that purpose, the permission of the Owner, or Manager to visit the plantations in the country, taking care, however, that the times which you may appoint for their religious services shall not interfere with their proper hours of work; nor are you to suffer any protracted meetings in the evening, not even at negro burials, on any account whatever. In all these cases, you are to meet even unreasonable prejudices, and to attempt to disarm suspicions, however groundless, so far as you can do it consistently with your duties as faithful and laborious Ministers of the Gospel.

8. As many of the negroes live in a state of polygamy,
The Directions to the West India Missionaries are also to be considered as strictly obligatory on all others, as far as they are applicable to the circumstances of their respective stations.
VIII. It is peremptorily required of every Missionary in our Connexion to keep a Journal, and to send home frequently such copious abstracts of it as may give a full and particular account of his labours, success, and prospects. He is also required to give such details of a religious kind as may be generally interesting to the friends of Missions at home; particularly, accounts of conversions. Only, we recommend to you, not to allow yourselves, under the influence of religious joy, to give any high colouring of facts; but always write such accounts as you would not object to see return in print to the place where the facts reported may have occurred.

IX. It is a positive rule amongst the Wesleyan Methodists, that no Travelling Preacher shall "fellow-trade." You are to consider this rule as binding upon you, and all Foreign Missionaries in our Connexion. We wish you to be at the remotest distance from all temptation to a secular or mercenary temper. "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life, that he may please him who hath called him to be a soldier." Independently of the moral and religious considerations which enforce this principle, we here take occasion to remind you, that all your time and energies should be the more sacredly devoted to the duties of your Mission, because the Committee feel themselves fully pledged to pay an affectionate attention to all your wants, and to afford them every reasonable and necessary supply. And this pledge, they doubt not, the generosity of the friends of Missions will, from time to time, enable them to redeem, so long as you continue to regulate your expenses by as much of conscientious regard to economy, as may be found to consist with your health and comfort, and with the real demands of the work of God.

And now, Brethren, we commend you to God, and the word of his grace. We unite with tens of thousands in fervent prayer to God for you. May he open to you a great door and effectual; and make you, immediately or remotely, the instruments of the salvation of myriads! We shall incessantly pray, that "you may go out with joy, and be led forth with peace; that instead of the thorn may come up the fir-tree, and instead of the brier the myrtle-tree; and it shall be to the LORD for
a name, for an everlasting sign that shall not be cut off." "Blessed be the LORD GOD, the God of Israel, who only doeth wondrous things; and blessed be his glorious name forever, and let the whole earth be filled with his glory. Amen and Amen.”

Signed, by order of the Committee,

JABEZ BUNTING,
JOHN BEECHAM,
ROBERT ADLER.

General Secretaries.

WESLEYAN MISSION-HOUSE,
77 HATTON-GARDEN,
September 30th, 1834.
APPENDIX II.

MISCELLANEOUS Remarks on the State of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, by W.B. Rene, Wesleyan Missionary. (1)

1. UNSETTLED state of the Colonial Boundary. — This is a source of jealousy to the border Caffres; if they were informed officially that beyond a certain line it was not the intention of the colonial government to permit the advance of the colonists, and that they might rest assured that their lands were not an object of desire, then their suspicions of the ulterior views of the colonial government would be removed. For several years several Caffre tribes have been allowed to inhabit part of the ceded territory, and they fully expect that, according to promises made to them by former Governors, they will be allowed to remain there so long as their conduct gives no just ground for complaint. Any attempt to expel the Caffres from this country would completely destroy the good feeling which at present subsists between the Caffres and the colonists. Yet I do not think it desirable that this country should be given to the Caffres as their own absolute possession, but that they should continue to hold possession during good behavior. To prevent the encroachments of the Caffres beyond their present limits, nothing would prove so effectual as the settlement of the remaining portion of the ceded territory by European colonists from Albany. If the Caffres and the colonists were near neighbours, without any vacant country between them, thefts would be very much checked, as the chance of discovery would be much increased. The uninhabited country between the colony and Caffreland affords abundant facilities for theft from the colony, as the thieves can easily hide themselves in the thickets during the day, and travel by circuitous routes in the night, free from all danger of observation, which would not be the case if this vacant country were inhabited.

2. Necessity of maintaining the salutary impression of the colonial superiority, by the prompt and severe punishment of wrongs inflicted on the colony, or on the colonists trading in Caffreland.

Unfortunately for the cause of truth, the subject of Caffre policy has become a party question, and has been discussed on both sides with the usual disregard for truth and common sense which ever distinguishes the contentions of political parties. A few tourists who have spent a few days among the Caffres near the colony, and have been pleased with the safety and good-natured reception experienced while travelling, have hastily taken up opinions by far too favourable as to the native character. In describing them as a noble-minded and strictly just people, they evidence their ignorance of human nature; especially when in a semi-barbarous state. The other party, anxious to depreciate the native character, represents the Caffres as a nation only to be governed by commandos, and as quite insensible to reason. The fact is, that the Caffres are like all other men, governed by their sense of the best method of serving their own interests. A Caffre chief knows of no restraint upon his desire for the property of his neighbours, except that which the want of power to seize and retain imposes upon him. He is restrained from plundering the colonists only by a fear of the consequences. This is the dark side of his character; but then he has sense enough to understand his true interests; or, if the chief has not this sense, his influential men have. If the colonial government, by the prompt and severe punishment of the few occasional aggressions upon the property of the colonists, which will occur so long as human nature remains the same, convinces the Caffre chiefs that nothing is to be gained by violence or cunning; and, at the same time, by a strict regard to justice in all its dealings with them, convinces them that much may be gained by orderly and honest conduct; there can be no doubt but that the Caffres will soon become most valuable neighbours to the colonists. The moral influence of one just, prompt and severe infliction of punishment upon guilty individuals, can only be estimated by those who have resided in Caffreland. Persons unacquainted with Caffres, are apt to think that trifling thefts, or minor cases of oppression of traders, should be overlooked, forgetting that, in most instances, these trifling thefts or insults are mere experiments, which the sagacious
Caffre is making upon the forbearance of the colonists, to judge how far he may go without risk of punishment. This mistaken lenity to the Caffres is the greatest cruelty, as it encourages theft and aggression upon the peace and safety of the colony, which, if persisted in, will provoke severe and exemplary punishments, and, eventually, bring on the Caffre tribes the usual fate of all savage nations bordering on European settlements. Whatever treaties the colonial government may enter into with the Caffre chiefs, the necessity of a respectable military force on the frontier will remain the same, until some decided change takes place in the habits and feelings of the frontier tribes. If, from any reliance on the schemes of benevolent speculative men, some of whom never saw a Caffre, or if, from any expectations of economizing the colonial expenditure, the colonial government should make a serious reduction in the military force on the frontier, the consequences would be disastrous both to the Caffres and Europeans.

3. Treaties may be entered into with the Caffre chiefs.

1st. As to thefts from the colony.—It would be desirable for the military governor of the frontier to enter into written agreements with the chiefs separately, as to the punishment and detection of thieves. If the chiefs were assured that, in accordance with Caffre customs, they and their people would be held responsible, in cases where the speer of the cattle was traced to their neighbourhood, they would soon find out the thieves, and use means to prevent any thieving on the part of their people. To persons ignorant of Caffre manners, this imposition of responsibility upon the chiefs for their people appears unjust; but when we consider that no beast can be stolen from the colony without the knowledge of the kraal or village to which the thieves belong, and of those residing near them, and that the fact soon comes to the ears of the chief, who, unless compelled by a sense of his own responsibility, will take no notice of the theft, for no Caffre deems it criminal to steal from the colony or from Europeans or from other tribes; and the chief would lose his popularity and be deserted by his people, if he were gratuitously to be active in punishing such thefts. If, however, it were well known that the colonial government held the chiefs responsible for thefts committed by their people, then the
people would not blame their chiefs for detecting and punishing thefts, but would feel themselves interested in giving every assistance. The chief should be allowed the assistance of a patrol when circumstances rendered it necessary, as thieves are sometimes supported by influential men, with whom the chief would be too weak to contend, in which case a patrol would prevent bloodshed. If the colonial government, would claim the person of the thief, or, in the event of his escape, the person of the master of the kraal where he resided, and who, in all cases, is privy to the theft, and the concealment of the thief, then few thefts would be committed. In all cases the legal fine, varying from four to ten for one, should be taken from the kraal where the thief resides, and this fine should be divided between the chief and those who have been active in detecting the theft. It would be impolitic to allow any part of this fine to go to the colonists, as it might encourage unprincipled men to be careless of their property, if assured of its restoration, and a recompense besides. The present mode adopted by the military patrols, of simply taking from the thieves the property stolen, without any fine, is childish; it is an encouragement to theft, and causes the colonists to become the laughing-stocks of the frontier Caffres. (The mode adopted in former periods of sending out commandos to plunder certain tribes, by way of punishment of thefts, ensured the punishment of the innocent as well as of the guilty, and produced much distress and irritation. It was as unwise and impolitic as it was unjust.)

I am aware that my views will be deemed harsh toward the Caffre tribes; but if it be considered that at present the Caffres owe their very existence to the generous interference of the colony in their defence against the Pitsani in 1828; that all the authority of Britain and the colonial government cannot eventually save them from the common lot of all native tribes bordering on European colonies if they provoke the animosity of the colonists; that every thief assists in destroying the good understanding which at present subsists between the Caffres and the colonists, their natural protectors against the barbarous and powerful tribes beyond them, then it will appear that no punishment can be too severe which has for its object the prevention of thefts, and which would ultimately lead to the loss of the independence and property of the
of the Caffre tribes, and prepare the way for their final extinction.

24. As to protection afforded traders residing in Caffreland.

Several of the traders residing in Caffreland have latterly suffered such loss of property taken by natives from their trading places, or from their wagons. As yet no redress has been demanded by the colonial government, and the Caffre chiefs are beginning to imagine that traders are beyond all colonial protection. The importance of this trade, in a pecuniary point of view, and its use as a means of promoting a good feeling between the colonists and Caffres, by convincing both parties of a community of interest, renders it highly desirable that the Caffre chiefs should be made to understand that British subjects are under British protection, so long as they do not violate the laws of the country in which they reside; and, on the other hand, that complaints respecting the conduct of British subjects, if substantiated, would meet with redress from the colonial authorities. The appointment of agents, resembling commercial consuls, to the various principal chiefs, has been recommended, and if the colonial government could command the services of such able persons, perhaps some good would result from the residence of a few able men who would act as accredited agents between the Caffre chiefs and the colony; but even then the probability is, that difference of opinion between the civil agents and the commandant of the frontier would more than neutralize the good resulting from such appointments. However defective the present system of managing the frontier Caffres, through the agency of a military commandant may be, I am persuaded that it is the best which circumstances will admit of. The abuse of power on the part of the commandant is almost impossible, checked as he is by the presence of so many missionaries interested in the welfare of the Caffres, and feeling particularly sensitive with respect to any act of injustice committed towards them; and also by so many European traders interested in the maintaining of a good understanding between Europeans and Caffres. To me it appears that the fact of the whole responsibility of the peace of the frontier resting upon the discretion of the commandant, is one of the strongest securities for the right discharge of the duties of this important office, whereas a divided
responsibility would give rise to endless bickerings, and these would be very dangerous to the peace of the frontier.

4. (sic) A regular communication should be kept up at convenient intervals between the colonial government and the principal chiefs of Caffraeland.

Besides the chiefs on the frontier with whom the commandant is in constant contact, there are three principal, who are the supreme chiefs of the three great branches of the Caffre nation: Hintza is the supreme chief of the Caffres; or Amakosa; Vadanna of the Tembookies; or Anatomba; and Fada is the supreme chief of the Ampondas, sometimes called the Wambookies. With these three, and perhaps one or two others, it is desirable that the commandant of the frontier should persevere a regular communication. If once or twice a year an officer, with about a dozen soldiers, were sent to visit each of these chiefs, with a few presents, not only would a good feeling be kept up, but this anticipated visit from an official character would operate as a check both upon Europeans and Caffres in their dealings with each other.

5. No one should be allowed to enter Caffraeland without a pass from the commandant or his agent, at the post on the frontier.

Among the former tribes a number of idle Hottentots, from Albany and the Kat River settlement, are found settled for a time, whose presence is highly injurious to the colony. Many of them possess guns, which they dispose to the Caffres; some of them are old soldiers, who recommended themselves to the petty chiefs by affecting to undervalue the power of the colony, and insinuating jealousies of the designs of the colonial government. It is absolutely necessary for the future peace of the frontier that all such should be ordered out of Caffraeland by the commandant, and that in future no man should be allowed to enter Caffraeland without a pass. This regulation would be no injury to industrious respectable persons, whether Europeans or coloured people, while it would operate as a check upon the idle migratory habits of the colonial Hottentots.
APPENDIX C.

To the Members of the Wesleyan Missionary Committee,
77, Hatton-garden, London. (1)

Gentlemen,

FINDING that a paper which I presented to Lieutenant-colonel Smith at Graham’s Town on 16th January, 1835, for his consideration, in answer to his request to me for information, has been interpreted in a manner I never intended, I take the earliest opportunity of offering the following explanations:

"Article 1. The chiefs who have invaded the colony to forfeit their chieftainship, and the people to forfeit their country, their arms and their property. This accomplished, the righteousness of British law and the equity of British judges may decide the rest."

The object of this article was not to suggest exclusion from the country, but forfeiture of it; (2) that the territory of the hostile chiefs should be added to the British possessions, and the people brought under the influence of British laws, without their assent if the people never go out to plunder; to deprive them of those arms would have been an effectual method of bringing their predatory habits to an end. Being incorporated with British subjects, they would not need them for defence. It seemed just also that "their property," or cattle, should be taken, that restitution should be made to those who had robbed and spoiled. When subjected, however, the application of these general principles was to be left, as is here expressed, "to the righteousness of British law and to the equity of British Judges."

"Article 2. Deserters from the British Government, who may have taught the Caffres the use of arms, to be punished with rigor."

It is a fact well known in the colony that the Caffres were trained and led on in this war by two or three deserters from the British Army, who were the main cause of the great destruction of life and property that

(1) A.K., W.S., Box VII, File 1834-36. TBB, XXXIX, 279. pp. 120-122.

(2) A.K., W.S. text compared throughout with TBB text. No emphasis throughout TBB text.
occurred; and as at that critical juncture many fears were entertained that a considerable portion of the Cape Corps, which constituted the chief defence of the frontier, would follow their example, an avowed determination to punish with rigour those who were wanting in fidelity appeared to be necessary, both to ensure the safety of the colonists and to prevent in the end a still greater effusion of blood.

"Article 3. The actual murderers of British subjects to be everywhere demanded, and when obtained, executed on the spot, that the Caffres may see that murder with Britons is an unpardonable crime. Every chieftain to be informed that if he substitute innocent persons for the really guilty, the chieftain himself will forfeit his own life, as being himself the friend of murderers, and the cause of the shedding of innocent blood, under the colour of law and justice."

By "actual murderers" were never intended those who engaged in war, however, unjust on their part, but those who in time of peace, previous to the war, had coolly put British subjects to death. In this manner William Purcell had been killed in Mintza's country, David Monkey and his wife by Eno's people, and Mr. Warren dragged out of the missionary's house by Macono's councillors, and stabbed before his door. The words "executed on the spot" were not intended, of course, to dispense with the solemnities of a trial, without which the actual "guilt" mentioned in the beginning could not be ascertained; they referred not to time, but place.

In 1826, General Bourke pursued a similar course towards the murderers of William Threlfall and Jacob Links; after trial they were taken to the spot where those good men fell, and there suffered, which produced a very salutary effect on the minds of those natives who witnessed it. Had the same course been promptly adopted in these latter instances in Caffreland, it is probable no war would have occurred; but the impunity with which these murderers escaped induced a belief among the Caffres that the British either would not, or dare not, any longer punish the perpetrators of such atrocious deeds. The known power and propensity of the chiefs to substitute an innocent person for a guilty favourite, appeared to render the suggestion in the latter part of the article necessary, the only object of which was to secure the innocent from suffering for the really guilty.
"Article 4. The chiefs who profess friendship towards the colony to be informed, that if they allow our enemies shelter in their territory, or connive at the concealment of colonial cattle or property, they will at once be considered as enemies, and dealt with accordingly."

It is impossible to judge of this article without taking into account the thorough duplicity of character of the Caffre chiefs. Their conduct was at that time very dubious. Hintza, in particular, while professing attachment to the colony, and repeatedly acknowledging that he owed the salvation of himself and his people to colonial friendship and succour, was at the same time receiving and concealing in his country immense herds of cattle, plundered from the colony; and though I had not much faith in his character, yet I thought it probable that, if they were timely and firmly warned upon this subject, it would prevent them from being involved in the calamities of the war, as well as contribute much to the safety of the colony. With the same intent I personally sent messages to Hintza and other chiefs, in which I expressed to them, in strong terms, the ill consequences that would result from their duplicity, in order that their ruin might be prevented. Had Hintza hearkened(sic) to my counsel, he might have been living at this day.

"Article 5. In conducting the war, the advice of the Dutch, and of well-informed British civilian settlers, will be of great advantage, and superior to a strict observance of military tactics, as observed in European warfare. In thickets and ravines caution must be used to avoid falling into ambuscades." So.

It must be all along considered that neither this nor any of the other suggestions related to a contemplated war that might be averted, but that, without any intention or expectation of it, the colonists were suddenly involved in the most extensive distress, by the irruption of their neighbours, with whom they were at peace. At this time the frontier had but a handful of men; it was the crisis of our danger, when we were hourly expecting to be overwhelmed by many thousands of barbarous people, who were near us, and surrounding us on every side. In these perilous circumstances, any false step, from unacquaintedness with the localities of the country, and from an unwillingness to be advised by those who did know them, might have involved the whole community in one common ruin. With a view to prevent
that calamity the above suggestion was made.

"Article 6. Calculating on the ultimate success of our arms, since ours is the righteous cause, on the termination of the war," &c.

Before noticing the subdivisions of which this article consists, I observe that, whatever may be the opinions of others, I, who was present, and saw the progress of the whole affair, believe that I am fully justified in saying that in this instance the British had a righteous cause; I therefore pass on to the first branch:

"1st. The neutral country to be occupied by the British to prevent the Caffres from lurking in the Fish River Bush."

The "Bush", as it is here called, is an immense forest of low wood, many miles in extent, on each side of the Fish River. The neutral territory is a strip of the high (1)land on the Fish River heights, which, if occupied by English villagers, would both contribute to the peace of the colony, and cut off one powerful temptation from Caffre plunderers, by depriving them of a secure retreat and concealment in their marauding excursions.

"2d. Caffre offenders whose lives may be spared to be employed in making high-roads in every part of Caffre-land; if necessary, even to Natal; their labour, as convicts, being a visible proof of punishment mercifully inflicted on those who might have lost their lives, &c.

The word "offenders" was not intended to apply to those merely engaged in war, but to those who, upon trial, should be convicted of any particular acts of cruelty or perfidy; and the punishment suggested was intended as a merciful commutation for that transportation to Robin Island which had been inflicted on the ringleaders of a former Caffre war. Instead of being severed from their friends and countrymen, they would have been employed in labour for a while; the example would have been beneficial to others, and afterwards they might have been released altogether.

"3d. A universal registration of Caffres to be effect-
ed; every man wearing on his own neck a thin plate of tin, containing his name and the name of his chief, which will be to him a token of peace, and the absence of it a token of enmity. This will serve both to

(1) IBB - omits, 'the high'.
identify offenders, and enable the British Government
at once to know the number and strength of the frontier
tribes."

Previous to the war every Caffre entering the colony
was required to be furnished with a written passport,
bearing his name and the name of his chief; and this
was thought necessary, that in case of offence an indi-
vidual might not implicate any other chieftain, to
screen his own chief and people. A medal, instead of
a written paper, and corresponding to the registration,
was suggested as being a simpler and better measure.

"4th. British agents to reside in Caffreland, to
carry this registration into effect, and otherwise
subserve the great principles of justice and mercy,
which benefit all people who are indirectly controlled
by the Government and laws of Britain."

Under the supposition that the conquered people and
their country were to be added to the British territory,
-- a measure undoubtedly beneficial to themselves as
well as giving security to the colony, -- there appears
to be nothing objectionable in this item. Taken togeth-
ern with all the other particulars under this article,
it contemplates the peaceful settlement of the country,
the establishment of good government and laws, and the
due administration of justice to all. A distinct
recognition of chiefs and their people is supposed as
existing when the war was terminated, and clearly proves,
that by no emigration was never thought of for a
moment, but subjection to government, under the supre-
mcy of British laws,

On reviewing the whole subject I come to two conclu-
sions:

First, as an Englishman, had I only read this paper
at home, without being in the midst of the late wars
and surrounded with perils on either hand, and without
being intimately acquainted with the character and hab-
its of the people occupying Caffreland, I should have
thought the suggestions harsh and severe, and perhaps
should have condemned them in strong language, especi-
ally as coming from a missionary.

Secondly, looking back at the entire series of facts
as they occurred, the combination of circumstances in
which I was placed, and the need which those in author-
ity had of being assisted in the perplexities which
puzzled them by any suggestions I might be able to
offer, I thought that, although it was stepping out of
my usual course, I owed it to my King and country, when requested so to do, to express my views on the then state of public affairs. When a country is on the verge of ruin, the King has a right to demand the opinion of any of his subjects, and under such an impression I withheld not mine. I mention not, on the opposite side, the steps I took to benefit the Caffres; but nothing, next to the Gospel will so much benefit them as submission, in common with the colonists, to our government and laws.

(signed) W.L. Shrewsbury.


P.S. To show that in writing the above paper I was not influenced by any unchristian feeling against the Kafir Tribes, I here insert a ....... (1)

(1) BBB - the 'P.S.' is omitted. The letter ends in this form.
APPENDIX D.

Letter from the Rev. William Shaw to the Right Hon. the Earl of Aberdeen. (1)

Leeds, 7 April 1835.

My Lord,

The recent painful intelligence from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, relative to the irruption of the Caffres into the British settlement of Albany, and to the disastrous consequences connected therewith, has excited much surprise and sympathy in this country. No doubt your Lordship's attention, as His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, has already been turned to this subject; and I am persuaded your Lordship will receive, with your accustomed courtesy, any information which may assist in devising means for preventing the recurrence of so serious an evil.

That your Lordship may at once perceive I am not an officious meddler with a subject on which I have no claim to be heard, I beg Leave to state, that I left this country in 1820 in the capacity of Wesleyan minister to the largest party of British settlers which emigrated to Algoa Bay in that year; that I remained 13 years in Africa, during the whole of which period I resided in Albany or in the Caffre country, my time being almost equally employed in the discharge of my duties as a minister to the settlers, and my labours as a missionary to the Caffres. From the situation which I held I was on terms of friendly intercourse with all classes of the settlers, and I acquired the confidence of several of the border chiefs in a high degree. I had also the honour to be consulted by the colonial authorities on several important points connected with the border policy. These circumstances afforded me opportunities for acquiring information on the subject on which I now address your Lordship, which very few British subjects have enjoyed in an equal degree.

Having made these prefatory remarks, it will be unnecessary for me to dwell on the principal facts connected with the recent irruption of the Caffres.

The distressing intelligence is confirmed beyond doubt, that the Caffres have carried desolation through the Albany district, destroying the insulated farms, carrying off tens of thousands of cattle, murdering many of the settlers, and compelling the remainder, reduced to destitution and distress, to seek refuge for their lives in Graham's Town. Thus has a most flourishing and important British settlement been brought to the verge of ruin, and unless some plan can be devised for preventing similar disasters in the future, it must necessarily be abandoned.

Every one asks, "What has been the cause of this ruthless attack by the Caffres?" Doubtless your Lordship, would be glad to obtain a satisfactory answer to this question, I will endeavour to give it. But before I do so, permit me to perform an act of justice to the British settlers of Albany. Some of the public prints, in reporting these occurrences, have charged the settlers with exercising cruelty and injustice towards the native tribes, and have more than insinuated that the Caffres have been thereby goaded into retaliation.

Now, my Lord, I wish most distinctly to state, that I believe this to be an unfortunate calumny. I profess myself, and am very well known to be, a devoted friend to the native tribes; but I will not be a party in the advocacy of their rights on principles which involve an aggression on the character and claims of others. "Pat justitia, ruin coelum;" I cannot perceive that true philanthropy requires me to blacken my white friends for the purpose of making my black friends white.

I admit that it is possible that acts of flagrant injustice exercised by individual settlers towards the Caffres may have taken place; may I believe that some such cases have actually occurred; but it is manifestly unjust to charge upon a whole body the faults of individuals. The ready co-operation of a very large and influential body of the settlers in every religious and benevolent institution established by the missionaries of various denominations, with a view to the propagation of the Gospel, and the general improvement of the native tribes, ought in justice to be taken in full evidence of their friendly feeling towards the aborigines, and of their being incapable of the cruel conduct which has been so thoughtlessly and unfairly
imputed to them.

That our border policy, if such a designation can be given to the most changeable and contradictory course of proceeding evaporated by any civilised government, has been full of errors, and has sometimes placed those who have had to execute its arrangements in the painful situation of appearing the champions of injustice and cruelty, are truths that cannot be denied; but I do sympathise with those who charge the evils now deplored upon the military officers on whom the duty of enforcing the border policy devolved; nor upon the settlers, who have for years suffered the mischiefs resulting from it, and who have longed called for the substitution of a more just and efficient system.

I am the more anxious to disabuse your Lordship of the unfavourable opinion which may have been induced by the statements contained in various publications on the subject, because they are likely to deprive the settlers of that sympathy and help which British subjects have a right to expect from their own countrymen and Government when they are, as in this instance, suddenly and without any fault of their own, plunged into distress and trouble; and I have good reasons for believing that in defending the settlers from the gross imputations which have been cast upon them, I am expressing the sentiments of my brethren the missionaries, and also of the highly respectable clergymen of the episcopal church now resident in that country.

In most inquiries as to the cause of these frequent collisions between the Caffres and the colonists which have gradually produced the late terrible catastrophe, it appears to me that the principal source of the evil has been almost, if not altogether, overlooked by many persons, who have otherwise very distinctly pointed out various concurrent circumstances which have tended to give it greatly augmented force; I refer to the moral state and habits of the Caffre tribes. From the days of Vaillant, it has been the custom of various writers to give such glowing descriptions of the noble and generous minded Caffres, that many persons, after reading their publications, find it difficult to believe that a Caffre chief would degrade himself by sanctioning robbery and murder. Nothing can be more misleading than statements which produce this impression. That there exists in the minds of many of the chiefs a proud self-respect, which sometimes produces a noble bearing and magnanimous conduct, I do not deny, and that it is
a quality which might be turned to advantage by a skilful agent of Government; but they have very indistinct notions of the rights of property, and they are fearfully reckless of the destruction of human life.

They are not wholly ignorant of the science and duties of the form of government, but that which has been established time immemorial, is something like the ancient feudal system of Europe, a form of government which unhappily is very favourable to the doctrine that "might gives right." All nomadic tribes are robbers, unless the propensity be checked by religion, or by circumstances which they cannot control. Within these limitations the Caffres may be regarded as coming under the general rule, for while the chiefs protect in a considerable degree the rights of property among their own vessels, the tribes have ever been addicted to engage in war with each other for the purpose of carrying off the cattle of their neighbours. The frequent robberies committed by them within the colony ought not, therefore, to be attributed wholly to any aggressions of the colonists, but many in a great degree be ascribed to their own imperfect moral perceptions, deeply-rooted habits, and defective mode of government.

Let us not, however, be misunderstood; the Caffres have not been exclusively to blame. Our border policy is extremely bad; and by this means we have often excited the cupidities and exasperated the feelings of a people, who, though naturally prone to make inroads upon their neighbours, were during the last few years beginning to cherish the opinion that it would be their interest to cultivate peace with the colony. It is but recently that attempts to improve their moral state by the diffusion of Christianity have been encouraged by the colonial Government; and long before the missionaries established themselves in the colony, various deadly feuds between the Caffres and the Dutch farmers had been engendered, the effects of which could hardly be expected to be speedily obliterated.

Not only has our Government pursued no efficient measures for the improvement of the Caffre tribes, but the plan adopted for the regulation of the affairs of the frontier has been extremely injudicious. Instead of a regular system, well defined and properly adapted to the local circumstances of the country, and steadily acted upon, there has been nothing like a system at all. Sometimes the mode of treatment has been harsh and severe, at other times mild and
Occasionally the Caffres were almost frightened into the belief that we intended their destruction, and at other times they were suffered to carry on their depredations with such impunity as to tempt them into the opinion that we were afraid of them; threatenings were occasionally denounced, which were never intended to be executed, and promises have been made which were never fulfilled. The effects of this contradictory mode of proceeding upon an untutored but warlike race, strong from their number, may be easily imagined.

I cannot, within the limits I have prescribed to myself, enter into details in proof of these statements; indeed they need no proof, the facts are notorious, and they have for years formed the subject of complaint by the missionaries, by the settlers of all classes, and of every variety of opinion on other points, and even by not a few of the officers of Government, civil and military, who have found themselves embarrassed and thwarted in their zealous efforts to promote the peace of the frontier, by the contradictory and inappropriate regulations which have been from time to time prescribed to them.

In consequence of certain difficulties and scruples respecting international law (the absurdity of applying the strict rules of which in the intercourse between a civil and barbarous people I shall now stop to prove), no direct and official communication betwixt the chiefs and the colonial authorities has yet been established. There does not exist a single written treaty to which, after due consideration, the Caffres have become contracting parties. I beg leave to furnish the following statement as an illustration of the evils arising from this source, with Gaika.

A kind of agreement was made, in 1819, by which our Government understood that he ceded the lands now called the "Neutral Territory"; but the chiefs of the Amagama-Kwayzie tribe, Pato, Kama, Cobus, &c., affirm that they were not parties to that treaty, although they lost by it the whole of their ancient territory, and that by the usages of the Caffre nation Gaika, the chief of another tribe, had no right to dispose of their lands without their consent. Some time afterwards Makono, the son of the late Gaika, re-established his claim on a certain tract of the Neutral Territory, by the concurrence of the colonial Government. At length, however, this land, a very fine and beautiful tract, was wanted for forming a Hottentot settlement; and Makono, whose people were charged with committing various depredations
on the colony, was warned to remove with his clan from the lands in question; but he refused, alleging that they had never been ceded by his father, and entering into a dispute as to the boundaries fixed in 1819 (which he maintained preserved a portion of the Kat River mountains as Caffre territory). The colonial Government, however, notwithstanding the mediation of some of the missionaries, persisted in its claim, and the Caffres were forcibly expelled by our troops, their huts being burnt to prevent their returning to re-occupy the lands.

I have the more especially detailed this proceeding, because I believe it to have a very close connexion with the causes of the late insurrections into Albany. The Caffres may have been chafed by foolish, not to say unjust, practice of pursuing stolen cattle beyond the boundary, and making reprisals not always upon the guilty parties, but frequently upon those who had no connexion with the transaction, nor any means of preventing it; they may have been vexed in this way, but I am persuaded that "the sore place in the heart," as they themselves would phrase it, was occasioned by the forcible seizure of their lands. Residing in Caffresia at the time, I had opportunities of observing how greatly the Caffres were exasperated; and if Makone could have persuaded the other chiefs to unite with him, I have no doubt but disasters similar to those we now deplore would have happened long ago.

It was undoubtedly every way just and expedient that land should be granted to the deserving and industrious part of the Hottentots at the period to which I have alluded; but it always appeared to me, and to many other persons, that the friends of that race placed themselves in a false position when they concurred in the acceptance by the Hottentots of lands, the title to which, to say the least, was of a very equivocal nature; for, assuming that Makone and his chiefs were mistaken as to the question of boundaries, still the ground had been ceded as neutral territory, and we certainly could have no right to occupy the country with British subjects without the consent of at least the chiefs who had been parties in the original arrangement of 1819.

In making these statements, I beg leave to disclaim the slightest intention of imputing blame to any individual. These border affairs were originally rendered obscure and difficult to understand by the want of system; and as no regular method of conducting them has even yet been introduced, they have at least become so completely entangled, that no Governor of the colony
residing at Cape Town, and constantly receiving from
the frontier the most conflicting statements, how great
soever his talent and taste for business, can possibly
decide a thorough acquaintance with them. If, there-
fore, serious errors have been committed, instead of
imputing them to highly distinguished persons who have
held the reins of government at the Cape, I would ac-
count for them by referring to the impracticable nature
of their duties, so far as concerns our border policy,
occasioned principally by the great distance of the
seat of government (600 or 700 miles) from the bound-
aries of the colony.

Thus your Lordship will perceive that I attribute
the present perturbed state of the Caffre border not
to any cruelties perpetrated by the British settlers
upon the Caffres, not to any want of humanity by the
British officers as to their treatment of the native
tribes, or of zeal and activity in the protection of
British lives and property, but to the moral state and
predatory habits of the Caffres, the evil tendencies of
which have been aggravated by the exceedingly mischie-
vous tendency of our border policy.

But is there no remedy for these evils? Must that
fine and lately flourishing settlement be abandoned?
These are weighty questions; but I conceive that,
whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the
cause of the present state of affairs in Albany, there
will be found much unanimity as to the principal remed-
dial measures proper to be adopted. I pretend not to
an acquaintance with the science of government, but I
am persuaded your Lordship will not disdain to take into
serious consideration any practical suggestions that
are offered by an individual, who, although of humble
rank in society, nevertheless solicits your attention
on the ground of possessing local knowledge, and of
being wholly destitute of the spirit of party.

The course which I beg leave most respectfully to
suggest as desirable to be pursued at this crisis by
the British Government may be considered as referring,
first, to the past, and secondly, to the future.

1st. As to the past:

I have no doubt that the military have from
succeeded in driving the invading Caffres out of the
colony; if so, there will be great danger, in the
excitement produced by the late events, that a war of
retaliation will be carried into the Caffre country;
this, however, would cause humanity to shudder, and
Christianity and sound policy alike forbid it. It is
not for me to say that the Caffres ought not to be chastised; but, whatever offensive measures are adopt-ed, they ought to be regulated with a view of inflicting a just and salutary measure of punishment only, and not of wreaking an ungovernable and undistinguishing vengeance. The earliest favourable opportunity should be taken of obtaining a conference with the chiefs, and of re-establishing peace. The cattle-account should then be fairly adjusted; an indemnity of a fixed number of cattle should be demanded of the tribes who commenced the war, and it should be clearly understood that upon payment of the indemnity all hostilities should cease.

2dly. As to the future:—

I would respectfully make the following suggestions: Declare the Keiskamma River to be the boundary of the colony, thus including the whole neutral territory within its limits; let this form one of the articles of the written treaty of peace to be signed by all the principal border chiefs, and thereby confirm the rights acquired by British, Dutch and Hottentot settlers in the neighbourhood of Fort Beaufort and the Kat River.

2dly. Offer to the Anagonakwaybie under Pato, Kama, Cebus, &c., their entire ancient territory within the neutral ground, on condition that they place themselves under the protection of the British Government, and become responsible to the colony for all stolen cattle actually traced into their district; in recapturing which they should be assisted, when they require it, by a British force from one of the military posts in the neighbourhood.

2dly. Offer other portions of the neutral ground to any other friendly clan who will comply with the same conditions, and thus fill up the unoccupied part of the neutral ground with friendly natives, who will form a good barrier betwixt the other tribes and the Albany settlement.

4thly. Let a separate written treaty be made with the chiefs to whom portions of the neutral territory are granted, distinctly stating what the colonial Government expects them to do; reserving a right of interference by Government in their internal affairs in certain specified cases; and also providing, that such of their people as commit aggressions upon the persons or property of British subjects shall be amenable to the colonial courts of law. Let these treaties be written in the Caffre language, and copies be given to the chiefs.
5thly, Let a Government agent be appointed to reside in some part of Caffraria, or on the immediate border. This officer should be duly authorised: 1st, as the medium of communication, in all ordinary cases, between the Caffre chiefs and the colonial Government; 2dly, as the protector of British subjects who pass the boundary for the purposes of trade or otherwise, under the sanction of proper passports; 3rdly, as a magistrate, with full power to arrest and send into the colony for trial any British subject who may commit aggressions upon the persons or property of the natives beyond the boundary of the colony.

6thly. Let an officer with powers analogous to those exercised by the late slave protector be appointed to reside in Albany, who shall be regarded as the protector of the native tribes; let him act as counsel in the colonial courts of law on behalf of the natives, in all cases where the subjects of the native chiefs are parties concerned: let this officer be placed in an independent situation as respects the local government, and let him report his proceedings regularly and directly to the British Government.

7thly. Let the jurisdiction of the local courts be extended so as to admit of the trial of offences committed by British subjects beyond the boundaries; or otherwise establish a court, under proper regulations, especially for such purpose.

8thly. Let a lieutenant-governor be immediately appointed for the eastern province of the colony, which includes the border districts; let him be assisted in the management of the government by a legislative council; let the residence of the lieutenant-governor, and consequently the seat of government, be fixed at Graham's Town, which is admirably situated with reference to the Caffre border, and is also sufficiently central for the convenience of the other districts included within the limits of the eastern province, as defined by the late Commissioners of Inquiry.

9thly. Let the local government be instructed to aid the missionaries of the various denominations in their attempts to promote conversion, moral improvement and education of the Caffre tribes. The missionaries could greatly extend their usefulness by the establishment of schools, if they had the means of employing more schoolmasters; therefore let annual grants be made to the various missionary societies in that country, and let the sums so granted be distributed in fair proportions, with reference to the number of schools established, and of natives educated by each society.

I have not ventured to offer any suggestions as to
the plan which should be hereafter adopted for the
better defence of the frontier, and for recapturing
from time to time the cattle that may be stolen by
the Caffres. Details of this kind it would be desir-
able to leave to the lieutenant-governor and council
residing on the spot, aided as they of course would be
by the long experience of the present commandant of the
frontier.

Several of the points suggested in the above outline
have already been recommended to the British Government
by the Commissioners of Inquiry who visited the frontier
districts in 1824. The principal objections to these
proposals will arise from the increase of the public
expenditure which would be occasioned by their adap-
tion. With proper arrangements, however, the addition-
al charge to the colony need not be very great, and as
trade between Albany and Caffraria has already become
valuable, and promises to create a rapidly-increasing
demand for the manufactures of this country; as this
settlement may also, under proper management, become
the instrument of promoting the civilization of a large
portion of South-east Africa; it is hoped that the
British Parliament may be induced, at least for a
limited time, to make grants in aid of the establishment
of good government, without which the colonists will
be ruined, our settlement will become a scourge to
the surrounding tribes, and its history will constitute
a blot upon the fair character of the British nation.

That the Caffres are susceptible of moral improve-
ment, and that a judicious policy will powerfully aid
Christianity in checking their marauding propensity,
are statements which do not rest upon mere theory;
happily I can furnish facts in proof of them, I resided
as a missionary with the chief's father, Nana, &c., more
than six years. The truths of the Christian religion
made a deep impression on many of their people; the
chief regularly attended divine worship; some of their
own children learned to read and write, Nana and his
wife, a daughter of the late Caika, embraced the Chris-
tian faith, and were baptized; and my successors have
favourably reported since of the continued progress of
Christianity among that tribe. Before the establish-
ment of this mission (Wesleyville) the tribe had been
notorious for its predatory habits; but after I took
up my abode in the country, I speedily discovered that
the chiefs were dissatisfied with the loss of their
lands, as explained in a former part of this letter;
and I therefore promised if they would stop all marauding
in the colony by their people, that I would represent
their case to the colonial Government. They did so,
and I kept my promise, and ultimately the colonial Government, with the sanction of Earl Bathurst, allowed them to re-occupy about one half of their lands in the neutral territory, only, however, upon the precarious tenure of their good behaviour. Your Lordship will doubtless be desirous of knowing the result of this measure, and I have great satisfaction in stating that a good understanding was thus obtained with these chiefs; that they have prohibited their people from plundering in the colony for nearly 10 years past; that I possess and can produce documentary evidence which proves that they have frequently recaptured and returned to the colony cattle stolen by other tribes; and that during the late irruption they have manifested a strong disinclination to join the aggressive tribes.

On this last point I beg to quote the statement of the Graham's Town Journal of the 2nd of January:—

"It appears that the chiefs Pato, Cobus and Kama, have not as yet declared against the colony, but, on the contrary, have expressed a strong desire to continue with it on terms of amity. They have shown the sincerity of their professions by undeviating kindness to all the Europeans within their territory, and by invariably affording them protection whenever it was claimed. It seems that many of their people are dissatisfied with this line of conduct, and ardently desire to share in the plunder of the colonists. These refractory persons are daily deserting their chiefs and joining the ranks of the enemy; and Pato, who exercises the supreme power, is extremely anxious and apprehensive of being deserted by his subjects, and thus left exposed to the vengeance of the confederated chiefs. It is affirmed confidently, that if some little aid was afforded to these chiefs from the colony, they would not hesitate to fall immediately upon the enemy's rear, and thus completely check their further progress. On the other hand, one word from these chiefs, and the whole of these tribes immediately (sic) enter the colony and join in the general plunder and massacre. No one not fully acquainted with the customs of the Caffres can form an opinion of the power which the several chiefs exercise over their vassals. An instance of this has just occurred in the case of Mr Roberts, a trader residing in the Beke. This man was deservedly respected by the Caffres in the neighbourhood, but when about to fly to the colony from the impending danger, he was immediately surrounded by the very people with whom he had been living on terms of friendly intercourse; their assegais were uplifted to dispatch
him, and he would in a moment have been put to death had he not urged that Pato had pledged himself for his security. Execution was accordingly stayed until this point had been ascertained; and the answer returned was that the lives of the aggressors should be the penalty of any infraction of his promise thus given to the individual in question. So sooner had his will been delivered than the very persons so ready to act as ministers of vengeance were at once changed to warm and zealous friends and protectors, and actually escorted him safely within the colonial boundary."

I will not trespass further on your Lordship's time and attention; indeed I am aware that an apology is due for the freedom of my observations; and I am not insensible that, as a minister of religion, I may be accused as having travelled beyond the limits usually assigned to men of my profession, in reproaching our border policy, and presuming to sketch the outline of an improved system. I rely, however, upon your Lordship's candour, which, I trust, will discover, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, a full vindication of the course I have pursued. I am not, I never was, and I hope I never shall be, an officious intermeddler with the politics of this world. I have a higher calling, the duties of which I greatly prefer; but in this extraordinary case I felt that I owed a debt of justice and of kindness, both to the British settlers and the Caffres, which I have striven to discharge by placing my testimony upon record, and thus conscientiously endeavouring to promote at once the cause of religion and humanity, and the interests of my country.

I have, &c.

(signed) William Shaw.

To the Right hon. the Earl of Aberdeen, K.C.B., &c.,
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Postscript. Having just received the "Graham's Town Journal" of January 23, I copy from it the following letter:

"Sir,

"In your 156th number, and the 4th column of your leading article on the chiefs Pato, Zama, and Cobus, you observe, 'that it was supposed they might be induced to declare in favour of the colony if security were afforded.' Are you aware that, previous to any serious rupture, or before they knew its extent, they sent a manifesto to the commandant, declaring their views to be the same, and their determination equally
firm as in October 1833? Are you aware that Pato
reinforced the Cualana post, at the call of that offi-
cier, with 200 men; that he remained in the service
of the English until that post was vacated; that
since then these three brothers have been employed
night and day, and many of their men, sending messe-
gers to every part of Caffr'eland; that they have pat-
rolled their own boundary, taken cattle and horses
from marauding parties, and seized all such cattle
among their own people, some of whom (I believe chief-
ly of one branch of the tribe) have broken loose
from the very formal declaration of the chief, and have
plundered? On these no punishment has as yet been
inflicted, but I believe the chiefs only wait to know
from the British Government how they wish them to act
toward such, and they are ready to comply. I will add,
I have witnessed the conduct of these chiefs; they
have stood without wavering, surrounded by threats of
the hostile tribes in every direction; they have pro-
tected every Englishman within their power; and I
believe no colonist has been more anxious to see the
British cause prosper than they have been, and still
are.

"I am, &c.
(signed) "W. Shenstone."

"Wesleyville, 13 January 1835."
APPENDIX E.

Enclosure by W. Shaw to Secretaries. June 9th, 1837. (1)

The undersigned Wesleyan Missionaries, who were present at the meeting in which an address to His Excellency, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, was agreed upon, and officially signed, "W. J. Shrewsbury, Chairman, and W. P. Boyce, Secretary, 2nd June 1835; (2) deem it necessary to place on record their explanation of the opinions which that document was intended to convey, and which they believe it does clearly and unequivocally express; when fairly interpreted, apart from party influences and prepossessions.

They are impelled to this step from the unfair advantage which has been taken of the evident misconception of their meaning which appears in the following paragraph, extracted from a dispatch of Sir B. D'Urban dated 19 June 1835, addressed to Lord Glenfinn, and now for the first time brought under their notice.

His Excellency says:—"I am not aware that I can usefully add anything in the way of detail of what has passed; as however I have reason to believe that the important measure of extension will be assailed by Dr Phillips, and of course by the London Mission, on the ground of injustice in itself, and very probably since it is a party peculiarly liable to exaggeration in statement, where an object or theory is to be supported of severity in its execution, I think it may be right to enclose an address (that otherwise I should not have done) which I have received from the whole body of the Wesleyan Mission here, seven in number, all well versed in the subject by long residence in Kaffirland, and all intimately acquainted with the passing events of the period, since they were residing in various parts of it, or on the immediate frontier, when the Kaffir coalition attacked the Colony, and have continued so ever since, and I consider the unqualified opinion which this address gives on the subject of no little value, since, collectively and individually, the

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(2) DNB, XXXIX, 272, pp. 56-57.
characters, doctrines and proceedings of this missionary body, will bear the strictest scrutiny, and since their information is derived from close and personal observation.

"That opinion your Lordship will perceive, states, their conviction of the wantonness, cruelty, and ingratitude of the Kaffir aggression; and of the consequent justice of the course which it has been my indispensable duty to avenge and that this duty has been discharged in accordance with the principles of mercy."

From the above passages in the Governor’s dispatch, it has been inferred that the Wesleyan Missionaries, committed themselves by their address, in a public and official approval of the extension of the Colony to the Kye river, and of every other measure, adopted by His Excellency up to that period.

The undersigned feel convinced that the language of their address warrants no such interpretation, than which nothing was more distant from their intentions, or more opposed to their well known views, of the inexpediency of Missionary interference in questions of a purely political nature.

The Address was intended principally to express their grateful sense of His Excellency’s general kindness, and to acknowledge the important services he had rendered in providing for the safety of four Missionaries with their families, and their return through a country involved in war from beyond the Kye river to the Colony, and would of course be communicated to our native country, respecting the origin of the war, and the manner in which it had been conducted by the forces under the command of His Excellency; and as, under the influence of such false impressions, the character of a large number of the members of the Societies under our pastoral care, had been publicly and violently assailed, and consequently our Ministerial fidelity impugned; We felt it to be our bounden duty in justice to all parties concerned, to the Governor, to the public at home and in the Colony, to our Societies, and to ourselves, to state; not as a matter of doubtful opinion, but from our certain knowledge that the Kaffers were in this war the aggressors, and that the war was just, on the part of the Colony, because a war of self-defence and of absolute necessity; and further that this war was carried out by His Excellency in strict
accordance with the principles of justice and mercy.

Our competence from local knowledge to form a correct opinion on this subject cannot be questioned; and not to plead that the same opinions have been expressed in much stronger language than we ever used, by some of the Scottish Missionaries of the Glasgow Society in speeches at a public meeting, a report of which was furnished by themselves to the Editor of a Colonial Journal; yet we may remark, that our natural prejudices in favour of a people among whom we trust to spend no small portion of our lives, together with our complete independence of Colonial support and control, are sufficient guarantees to all impartial persons, that we could be under no temptation of yielding to the influences of local prejudices or temporary excitement. Connected as we are with England, and fully aware of the generous impulses of popular feeling, (although in this case misdirected); the temptation, if any, was calculated to bias us, on the side, which in our native country is deemed to be exclusively that of justice and humanity.

The facts of the case, obliged us to contradict prejudices and impressions, some of which have been long standing, others of more recent origin, and all of them heightened and enlivened by ex parte statements, made by respectable and influential individuals residing far from the scene of action, and quite ignorant of the real state of affairs. We counted the cost of what in a worldly point of view may be deemed our "imprudent" honesty, and are content to suffer for a while in the opinion of the great and good, the elite of our native land, being confident of this that a full investigation, and careful consideration of the case in all its bearings, will assuredly convince those who for a time have blamed us; that men who have been willing to sacrifice on the shrine of truth, that which to such a class of men must be dearer than life itself; the sympathies and the attachment of the religious public; may be depended upon as men who under no circumstances will lend themselves to misrepresent or deceive.

We made no allusion in our Address to the frontier system pursued previous to the war, either by way of approval or the contrary; neither did we in the slightest degree allude to the plans of His Excellency for the future; subjects entirely irrelevant to the
main purpose of our Address, and upon the latter of
which at that time it would have been quite premature
to have hazarded an opinion.

The undersigned claim to be judged from their recor-
ded sentiments, and not from the erroneous deductions
of others; from their actions, and not from ex parte
statements of misinformed persons. In appealing to
this certain text, by which they desired to be tried,
they refer to two documents contained in the Parlia-
mentary evidence published by the Aborigines Committee;
the first is a letter addressed by W. Boyce, March
1834, to Sir B. D'Urban (1) illustrative of their well
known views on the subject of the old border policy;
the second, is the evidence of the Rev. John Beecham,
in which is detailed, the conduct pursued by them in
July 1835 when in endeavouring to save the Kaffers
from the certain ruin which must have followed the
prosecution of the war, they successfully pleaded with
his Excellency, the Governor, to forego his original
condition of expatriation of the hostile tribes, beyond
the Rye river, and obtained permission to communicate
with the Chiefs, then at war with the Colony, with a
view to the restoration of peace. In the furtherance
of this object, some of their numbers risked their lives,
and thus gave a practical proof of their devotion to
the real interests of the Kaffir tribes.

In conclusion the undersigned appeal to the fact of
their resumption of their original stations in Kaffer-
land with the full consent and at the earnest and special
requests of the Chiefs and people, as a proof that the
parties mainly interested and best able to judge, deem
the line of conduct passed by them, to have been calcu-
lated to serve their best interests.

After a full consideration of the opinions which
they have avowed they see no reason for retraction or

(1) Handled in as evidence by the Rev. T. Philipps
before the ECA, 31st August 1836. J.B.VII.538.
pp. 179-182.
regret. Believing that much of the clamour which has been excited in England against them, has originated in a misapprehension of their sentiments they now submit the foregoing statement to the consideration of candid and dispassionate persons, and trust that all further explanation will be deemed unnecessary.

          Wm. J. Davis.
          Wm. Shopstone.

The above document copied from the original in my profession (sic), was drawn up by REV. W.E. BOYCE and having been attentively considered by the Missionaries present at a Special District Meeting held at Morley, Kaffraria, 13th May 1837, was signed by all the parties concerned, who were present at the Meeting. As Witness my hand.

W. Shaw.  Chairman.
APPENDIX E.

PROCLAMATION. (1)

By His Excellency Major-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban,
Knight Commander of the Bath, of Hanover, &c.; Major-
General in His Majesty’s Army, Governor of the Cape
of Good Hope and its Dependencies, and Vice-Admiral of
the same, and Commander-in-chief of His Majesty’s Forces
in South Africa,

(signed) E. D'Urban, Major-General.

WHEREAS in the months of December and January last
past, the Caffre chiefs and their tribes inhabiting the
country along the eastern frontier of His Britannic
Majesty’s colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and between
that line and the Kya river, viz. 'Tyali, Maccmo, &c.,
Botma, T'Slambie, Dushanie, and others, their connec-
tions and dependants, with the concurrence and couter-
ance of Minta, chief of the country between the Kya
and the Bashee, and paramount chief of Caffreland, during
a period of established peace and amity between the
colony and these chiefs, without provocation, or any
previous notice or declaration of war, suddenly and
unexpectedly broke into the colonial frontier along its
whole extent, at the same time laid waste all the
country with fire and sword, savagely murdered the
unprepared and defenceless inhabitants of the farms,
plundered and burnt their houses, carried off horses,
cattle, sheep, &c., leaving these districts a desert.

And whereas, with the troops of the King my master,
I have defeated, chastised and dispersed these chiefs
and tribes, and overthrown and conquered their country,
and thence penetrated into that of Minta, compelling
him to sue for peace and to accept the terms of it
which I had offered, and which he has ratified. And
whereas it is absolutely necessary to provide for the
future security of the colony against unprovoked
aggressions, which can only be done by removing these
treacheryous and irreclaimable savages to a safer
distance.

I now, therefore, in the name and behalf of His
Britannic Majesty, and virtue of the power vested in
me as His Majesty’s representative,

Do hereby proclaim and declare, that the eastern

(1) JBA. XXXIX. 378. p. 41. D’Urban to Aberdeen, 19
June 1837, Enclosures in Enclosure 12. (A).
boundary of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is, henceforward, extended eastward to the right bank of the Kye River; its new boundary, effected by this extension, being henceforth a line commencing at the source of the Kye River in the Stormberg Mountains, thence following its course along the right (or western) bank through the White Kye into the Great Kye, and thence to the mouth of the latter.

From the aforesaid country, which they have lost by the operations of the war which they had so wantonly provoked, and which they have justly forfeited, the above-mentioned chiefs, namely, 'Tyali, Makomo, Enco, Botma, T'Slambie, Dushanie, &c., with their tribes, are for ever expelled, and will be treated as enemies if they be found therein.

God save the King!

By his Excellency's command,

(signed) H.C. Smith, Colonel,
Chief of the Staff.

Head Quarters on the Kye.

Given under my hand and seal, this 10th day of May 1835.
APPENDIX C.

Skeleton of a Plan for the arrangement of Facts calculated to exhibit the true state of Colonial Affairs to uninformed and prejudiced persons in England, addressed to His Excellency, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Governor of the Cape. (1)

I. Causes of the Kaffir Irruption.

Prosperity of the Frontier end of 1834: Sudden change of affairs by the Kaffir invasion: Statement in figures of the loss of life, houses, cattle, waggons, sheep, etc.

Causes of the war.
1st. Unsettled state of the boundary line and the defects of the line usually held.
   (a) Lands lent to Kaffir chiefs which they always hoped to retain.
   (b) Lands lent resumed, which led to great irritation, even when permission to graze was justly forfeited, as in the case of Wagomo.
   (c) Neutral and unoccupied lands between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers which was truly "worse than useless," as they were a bush for thieves.

2nd. Unregulated state of our relationships with the Kaffir tribes.
   (a) The Commandant of the Frontier commanding the Military and responsible for the peace of the frontier, checked and hampered in the exercise of his duty by the interference of the civil power, with the head officer of which, at Graham's Town, the Commandant was well known to be at variance.
   (b) Necessity of waiting for directions from Cape Town in all cases of importance before the Military power could act; by which delay, in most cases, Kaffir depredations would remain unpunished and the Kaffirs encouraged in their thefts.
   (c) When cattle stolen from the colony were traced to a kraal, the Officer was only allowed to take the number stolen, a most ridiculous regulation by which in all cases the Kaffirs gained, even when discovered, and incurred no loss in stealing; this is also contrary to Kaffir law, which

(1) D'Urban Corres., Vol. I, pp. 82-89.
levies fines of 10 for one in such cases, and caused
the Kaffirs to laugh at the folly of "stupid English-
men."

(d) No treaties or engagements with the Kaffir chiefs
respecting the terms on which English subjects should
reside in Kaffirland, or Kaffirs enter the Colony; a
most unaccountable neglect on the part of the Colonial
Government.

(e) Yet Colonial Traders were licensed to live and
trade in Kaffirland, subject to no law, as at first Kaffirs
were too much afraid of them to treat them, when trans-
gressors, as they would have done Kaffirs; after a while
when this feeling subsided, the traders were most genera-
ally oppressed by the Kaffirs in all law suits: the case
of Hanger, at trader at the Kay (sic) in 1830, is a
specimen of the extreme of Kaffir respect for Europeans,
and the case of Purcell and many others in which Brit-
ish subjects were most unjustly treated by the Kaffirs,
is a proof that this feeling of respect soon subsided,
as soon as the Kaffirs found out that the Colonial
Government never interfered with the concerns of its
subjects beyond the frontier. Had one example of a
Kaffir criminal been made, by claiming the person of
the thief, or by insisting upon full restitution and a
fine, the Kaffir war might have been prevented; but the
inattention of the Colonial Government being attributed
to weakness emboldened all Kaffirland to join against
the colony first (sic) opportunity. The affair of the
murder of a Hottentot family on British ground by the
chief Eno in 1833, is another instance in which the
imbecility of the Colonial Government was the means of
making every Englishman in Kaffirland a laughing-stock
to the natives.

3rd. The Frontier line ill chosen and much exposed to
the attacks which its defenceless condition invited.

(a) Five or Six posts defended by 400 to 800 men were
all that were allowed to defend a frontier of 400 miles
against a warlike people.

(b) Communications between the posts easily cut off
in time of war; and with so small a force, not suffici-
ent to defend the posts, much less to keep up an open
road between them, there were no soldiers to spare to
make a vigorous attack upon the enemy which might rise
up. Had there been a few hundred men to spare when
this war broke out, and ready to act upon any given
point, the war would have been confined to Gaika's
country and would soon have been ended.

(c) The frontier cannot be defended by any other than
a regular military force against the Kaffirs, as no militia can possibly be efficient, owing to the nature of the country, which is only calculated to support a scattered population chiefly dependent on grazing.

4th. Ignorance on the part of the Colonial Government of the real state of Kaffirland and the power of the Kaffirs, in consequence of which no precautions in the least degree adequate were taken to meet an emergency which was not anticipated by the Authorities.

(a) Colonial Authorities completely in the dark respecting Kaffirland; its extent inward, its tribes and their relative strength, and what is of some importance, their internal politics; when the war commenced information respecting roads, rivers, etc., had to be collected from persons possessing local knowledge; it is to be hoped that now the Colonial Government is well acquainted with the roads, etc., and will take the opportunity of making a thorough survey of the country, so far as is necessary for military purposes.

(b) Influence of certain representations made by well meaning men as to the comparative mildness of the Kaffir character, which were founded on a very partial view of Kaffir society, and evidenced great ignorance of Human Nature, especially Human Nature unrestrained by Christianity.

(c) Economy in Expenditure carried to a "penny wise and pound foolish" extreme, in consequence of the supposed non-necessity of guarding against the Kaffirs.

5th. From the general principles which actuate Human Nature in its present state, the war might have been anticipated, by all acquainted with the circumstances of the Colonial frontier.

(a) On the one hand a rich, unprotected colony, tempting plunderers.

(b) On the other hand a warlike people, inured to predatory warfare.

(c) A favourable opportunity occurred of reusing the Kaffir population when one of Gafka's family was wounded, and this was eagerly embraced by many of the principal men who had long viewed with jealousy the extension of British and Missionary influence.

6th. Immediate causes of the War.

(a) Injudicious tampering of certain individuals with Kaffir chiefs, which although there was no evil intention, there was no small want of judgment. If necessary call upon Rev. W.J. Shrewsbury and Rev. S. Young to state what took place at Wesleyville and Mount Coke between Mr Fairbairn and the chiefs in 1830.
Also a true report of addresses delivered by Dr Philip to the Hottentots at Kat River in 1832, as reported to me by a Mr Robson, a trader there, now residing in Graham's Town. It is the duty of those who believe the natives to be oppressed to fight their battles with the Colonial Government or the English Government, and not to add fuel to the flame by encouraging, however indirectly, any supposition of the sort in the minds of the Natives.

(b) Expectations on the part of the Kaffirs that the Hottentot would join them. This arose probably from the known connection of the Gona Hottentots with Kaffir families, and a supposition that they would join them. It was also well known that the Boers were very disaffected on account of the Slave act, and the Kaffirs expected that the Boers would not fight against them.

II. The War.

1st. Object of the war.
(a) Future security of the Colony.
(b) Reparation for Colonial losses.

2nd. Conduct of the war.
(a) Humane orders of the Government to spare corn, etc.
(b) Forbearance towards Hintsza.
(c) Continued offers of mercy made to the chiefs.
(d) Humane treatment of women and children by the army by Colonel Smith.

3rd. On the expense and difficulty of carrying on war in Kaffirland.
(a) From the nature of the country particularly favourable to guerrilla warfare.
(b) Difficulty of carrying supplies to the troops, loss of oxen, etc.
(c) All advantages on the side of the Kaffirs, who need no Commissariat.
(d) Serious loss to the Colony in the absence of the farmers, etc., from home, obliging their families in many cases to leave their homes and property exposed to predatory companies of Kaffirs.
(e) Hence the desirableness of making peace even if the terms were not as strict justice to the Colonists required.

Nature of the peace as it affected Colonial Interests.
(a) Kaffirs left in possession of all the Colonial cattle, except the few taken from them amounting to as appears from the returns made by the Commissioner for the sale of captured cattle.
(b) Reason of this lenity: It would have required an expenditure of ten times the value of the cattle in money, and also a loss of life on both sides most painful to contemplate, together with a prolongation of bad feeling which might have been confirmed as a habit or prejudice on both sides, and thus opposed an obstacle to any project of union at any future period.

(c) The possible and probable ill consequences of this lenity are not concealed from the Colonial Government, but of two evils, that which was the most humane and Christian was chosen. It must be the business of the Colonial Government to guard the frontier population from the possibility of this lenity being abused by the Kaffirs to their further injury.

(d) A strong claim upon the justice of the British Government for compensation for Colonial losses, arises out of the treaty itself, which leaves Colonial property in the hands of the enemy in order to save the funds of the British Treasury.

(e) Property available to meet in part the expense of the war, i.e. the captured cattle produced £

The lands between the Keiskamma and Kay (sic) River reserved for English settlers amount to about acres, worth about 1/- or 1/6 an acre, and will realise this in a few years if peace continue.

III. Future Arrangements to Prevent War
and to save the Kaffir Tribes from eventual destruction.

1st. The treaty must be viewed as a measure designed more for the future than the present: it contemplates the introduction of an entire new order of things, and in time a complete change in the state of Kaffir Society.

2nd. The only effectual defence of the Colony is a barrier of Kaffirs brought under the influence of British law, and attached to the Colony by their having a common interest and a common feeling with British subjects.

3rd. The necessity of doing all that Authority can do to assist the civilization of Kaffirland.

(a) To provide a secure boundary for the Colony.

(b) To save the Kaffirs from sharing the fate of all semi-barbarous tribes, which when they come in contact with civilized nations must dwindle away unless their habits and modes of living are changed. Neither the Colonial Government nor the British Government can protect the Kaffirs from the superior skill and enter-
prise of their Colonial neighbours except by doing all that a Government can do, to give fair play to plans calculated to raise the Kaffirs to something of an equality with their neighbours.

4th. Detail of the measures adopted.
(a) Those aimed at the destruction of glanship. All judicial power of the Chiefs in important cases taken away. Division of the country into Field Commandant-ships. Appointment of Government agents.
(b) Those calculated for the protection of the Colonists and the prevention of future quarrels. Trading only permitted at the Ports or posts and at each Mission station. Non-introduction of Spirituous liquors.
(c) Those calculated directly to serve the best interests of the Kaffirs, temporal and spiritual. Security of life and property by British law. Disallowance of punishments for witchcraft. Reserve lands for Mission Stations, Schools, etc.

5th. Alternatives proposed.
(a) Either the present plan adopted by Sir B. D'Urban must be carried on, or
(b) otherwise there must be an exterminating war, and where will you stop, at the Key? (sic) at the Bashee? at Natal?
(c) Or on the other hand, Albany must be given up, and where will the Kaffirs stop? at Uitenhage? at George? No, not until they reach the Cape.

Graham's Town, 12th October 1835.

(Signed) William B. Boyce, Wesleyan Missionary.
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