A REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED TO INFORM CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR SUSTAINABLE NATURE-BASED TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION FUNDED “SUPPORT TO THE WILD COAST SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE PILOT PROGRAMME”

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ABSTRACT

This case-study establishes the influences of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building for sustainability in the European Union Funded ‘Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme’ (EU Programme). It aims to capture the lessons learned for capacity-building to support nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast. The EU Programme aimed to achieve economic and social development of previously disadvantaged communities through nature-based tourism enterprises, and to develop capacity of local authorities and communities to support environmental management. The study discusses common trends in thematic categories emerging from the research data, and contextualises research findings in a broader development landscape.

This study indicates that power-knowledge relations were reflected in the EU Programme’s development ideology by an exclusionary development approach, which lacked a participatory ethos. This exclusionary approach did not support an enabling environment for capacity-building. This development approach, guiding the programme conceptualization, design and implementation processes, resulted in a programme with unrealistic objectives, time-frames and resource allocations; a programme resisted by provincial and local government. The study provides a causal link between participation, programme relevance, programme ownership, commitment of stakeholders, effective management and capacity-building for sustainable programme implementation.

The study argues that the underlying motivation for the exclusionary EU development ideology in the programme is driven by a risk management strategy. This approach allows the EU to hold power in the development process, whereas, an inclusionary participative development methodology would require a more in-depth negotiation with stakeholders, thereby requiring the EU to relinquish existing levels of power and control. This may increase the risk of an unexpected programme design outcome and associated exposure to financial risk. It may also have a significant financial effect on donor countries’ consultancies and consultants currently driving the development industry.

This study recommends an interactive-participative methodology for programme design and implementation, if an enabling environment for capacity-building is to be created. In addition, all programme stakeholders must share contractual accountability for programme outcomes. This requires a paradigm shift in the EU development ideology to an inclusionary methodology. However, this research suggests that the current EU development approach will not voluntarily change. I, therefore, argue that South Africa needs to develop a legislative framework that will guide donor-funded development programme methodology, to support an enabling environment for capacity-building.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>DEAT</td>
<td>Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism (National)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAET</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs, Economics and Tourism (Provincial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Finance Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Funding Institutions</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development Plan</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MTO</td>
<td>Multilateral Trade Organization</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Midterm Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualification Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>PondoCROP (Pondo Community Resource Optimization Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Previously Disadvantaged Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDO</td>
<td>Programme Development Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Replication Study</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Assistance</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Spatial Development Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTO</td>
<td>Triple Trust Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States of America donor Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCSDIP</td>
<td>Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the research context including geographic location, socio-economic characteristics, development constraints and the regional economic development strategies within which it is positioned. The chapter introduces the research subject: the EU Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme (to be referred to as the EU Programme) and provides a brief explanation of the programme's aims and objectives, logical framework, value and duration, design and structure and stakeholder profile. My role within the EU Programme is clearly articulated, providing the reader with an orientation of my position and experience within the research subject. The research aims and goals are introduced together with an overview of the chapters. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research limitations.

1.2 The Wild Coast
The Wild Coast refers to the coastline of the formerly named “Transkei” area of the Eastern Cape, lying between the Umntamvuna River in the north and the Great Kei River in the south. The coastline between the two rivers is 280 kilometres long; with the coastline experiencing a subtropical climate. The land area covers 42,240 square kilometres, the population is estimated at 1.4 million people, calculated at a population density of 96 people per km² (PondoCROP closure report 2005).

The Wild Coast remains largely underdeveloped and is considered to be one of the poorest regions in South Africa, displaying the following socio-economic characteristics (PondoCROP closure report 2005):

- Widespread illiteracy and poverty,
- High unemployment rates,
- Low levels of education,
- Poor infrastructure, and
- Degraded biophysical environment.

The following constraints exist within the context of the Wild Coast (PondoCROP closure report 2005):

- Tension over roles and responsibilities between traditional local leaders and elected local government officials,
- Tension over division of responsibilities and resources between national and provincial government departments, and
- Tension over land and resource ownership, management rights and responsibilities between communities and local/provincial government.
The Wild Coast is a particularly underdeveloped region within South Africa. The government was mandated to increase development and associated economic opportunities in the region. In light of this mandate, a broad based Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) was launched by national government in 1996; it aimed to serve as a vehicle to unlock development in the region, with tourism and agriculture being identified as key economic sectors (Midterm Review 2003, Finance Agreement 1999). The existing tourism industry has traditionally targeted the domestic and budget market, however, the largely undeveloped tourism potential of the area has long been recognized as a development opportunity (PondoCROP closure report 2005).

1.3 The Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme

This research is located in the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme (EU Programme). The EU Programme was designed and funded by the European Union Commission (EU) in support of the broader Wild Coast SDI aims and objectives (Background Document 2001). In addition, the objectives of the EU Programme drew on the principles from the White Paper on Tourism (1996/97) and those of Tourism in GEAR (1998) (Background Document 2001).

1.3.1 EU Programme Aims and Objectives

The aims and objectives of the EU Programme were outlined in the programme Finance Agreement (1999). The aim of the EU Programme was to achieve a tangible economic and social development of Previously Disadvantaged Communities (PDC's) in the programme target area, both in terms of job creation and income generation through business opportunities in the tourism sector. Furthermore, the EU Programme aimed to establish a sustainable framework of co-operation between communities, private and public sectors in five programme identified development nodes on the Wild Coast. The EU Programme was envisaged as a pilot initiative to inform the drawing up of guidelines for a national programme (Finance Agreement 1999). The programme identification number assigned by the EU Commission is SA/99/B7-3200/8019.

The objective of the EU Programme was to address the lack of community support structures for participation in the local economy. This included addressing the lack of community skills, know-how, information and awareness of tourism business opportunities and the lack of community/private-sector partnership. A central tenet of the EU Programme was the capacity development of both authorities and communities, to support sustainable management of the natural resource base on which the programme was orientated (Finance Agreement 1999). In this regard, capacity building focussed on: resource management; environmental conservation and environmental awareness (see Table 1.1).

The EU Programme planned to achieve its primary objective, through the establishment of 300 Previously Disadvantaged Community (PDC) businesses in the tourism sector - spread over the five programme development nodes (Finance Agreement 1999) (see Table 1.1). The Finance Agreement (1999) however, provided no guidelines for defining PDC businesses or how they should be positioned in the tourism sector. As a result, the development of PDC businesses was driven by three key factors: severely limited tourism infrastructure; land tenure issues
involving government and a high-value natural environment. These three factors combined resulted in the PDC businesses being orientated around the nature-based tourism sector, which places a higher value on natural environment than infrastructure. Furthermore, it was envisaged that nature-based tourism's low volume, low impact approach would support the programme objectives of sustainable resource management.

Although not specified in the Finance Agreement (1999), the EU Programme required the facilitation and registration of community trusts to take ownership of programme-delivered business assets. The community trust concept and functioning are described below.

**Trust Concept:**
A trust is a legal mechanism which formally organises individuals into legally recognised bodies. In the EU Programme, the trusts are viewed as a vehicle through which communities will be able to develop and manage their business enterprises (nature-based tourism), in a legally recognised and regulated manner.

The trust consists of individual trustees (members of the community), who have been democratically elected to their positions by the community and who represent the community. The trustees are governed by the constitution of the trust, referred to as the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed sets out the rules, regulations and accountabilities of the trust and trustees. In addition, the Trust Deed sets out the objectives of the trust, managerial principles, land-use principles, conflict resolution procedures etc. Furthermore, the trust protects trustees and members from direct legal liability; i.e. the trust has a legal personality separate from its members.

**Primary Function:**
The primary function of the trust is to enter into legitimate business relationships with third parties such as government, investors, other legal entities etc. The trust provides additional security to those with whom they share business relationships, as trustees are governed by prescribed rules and regulations in terms of both the Trust Deed and general law.

Income generated through community businesses is channelled through the trust, and ultimately distributed to its members (community). The trustees are required to ensure that moneys are properly managed and distributed fairly on behalf of the members, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Trust Deed (What is a Trust? 2002).
1.3.2 EU Programme Logical Framework

The EU Programme logical framework presented in the Finance Agreement served as the guide for programme implementation. The logical framework specified seven result areas:

Table 1.1: EU Programme Logical Framework (Finance Agreement 1999)

<table>
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<th>Programme Result Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<td>Result 1</td>
<td>Support structures for community development established in five anchor areas of the Wild Coast</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result 2</td>
<td>Community members trained in business skills</td>
<td>2700</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Adults trained in business skills</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Adults trained in specialist business skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Youth training in entrepreneurial skills</td>
<td>16920</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result 3</td>
<td>Community members trained in natural resources management</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Tourism and environmental awareness (workshop participation)</td>
<td>300</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Local authorities and traditional leaders trained in environmental management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 4</td>
<td>Community &amp; private-sector partnerships established</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Private-sector learner-ships for target communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 5</td>
<td>New community business activities identified and implemented</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Community development projects implemented</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Result 6</td>
<td>Community &amp; state co-management established in four natural reserves</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community environment interpretation/multi-use centres established</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result 7</td>
<td>Policy/Institutional support to government (national/provincial)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Capacity for community development established at DEAT</td>
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<td>2. Capacity to implement responsible tourism established at provincial level</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3. Tourism and environmental policies finalised and implemented at provincial level</td>
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<td>4. Code for responsible tourism established and in place</td>
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<td>5. Marketing and promotion effectively implemented</td>
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1.3.3 Value and Duration

The EU Programme was designed with a four year life-cycle, commencing in March of 2000 and ending in March of 2003. Prior to the completion date in March of 2003 the programme was extended to November 2005 by the EU Commission.
The total contribution of the EU was 12.8 million Euro equating to 83% of the total programme value with the South African Government contributing 1.8 million Euro through the Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). Calculated at R6.50 to the Euro, the EU Programme contribution totalled R83 million. This combined with DEAT’s contribution of R11.7 million brought the total programme value to approximately R95 million (Midterm Review 2003).

1.3.4 Design and Structure

The EU Programme was designed by EU contracted consultants. The final programme design culminated in the Finance Agreement, which structured the contractual agreement with DEAT and provided the logical framework to guide the implementation strategy. DEAT was appointed as the lead implementation agent, driving the implementation through a Project Steering Committee (PSC). Three Non Governmental Organizations (NGO’s): PondoCROP, Triple Trust Organization and World Wide Fund for Nature were contracted by DEAT, but appointed by the EU to implement the programme. The Programme Management Unit (PMU) was appointed by the EU through an international tender process (Midterm Review 2003).

1.3.5 EU Programme Organogram

Figure 1.1: EU Programme Organogram (Midterm Review 2003)
1.3.6 Roles and Responsibilities of the Programme Implementation Organizations

Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT): Contractually responsible for the implementation of the Finance Agreement, for all financial aspects detailed in the Financing Agreement, for effective programme implementation, for all financial aspects thereof and for the competence and qualifications of the personnel involved in its implementation. Furthermore, it was responsible for reporting technical and financial programme progress to the EU Commission (Midterm Review 2003).

Programme Steering Committee (PSC): Chaired by DEAT and was responsible for driving the programme implementation. The committee included representatives from national and provincial government, the local tourism industry and local communities (Midterm Review 2003).

Programme Management Unit (PMU): Tasked with ensuring efficient and effective project implementation; although they were not contractually accountable, this was DEAT’s responsibility. Contractually they played a monitoring and co-ordination role (Midterm Review 2003).

Non Governmental Organizations (NGO’s): Execution of the project and reporting via implementation schedule to DEAT through the PMU on annual work plans and through regular reports (Midterm Review 2003).

PondoCROP (PC): Primarily responsible for the community business development component of the programme. This involves the identification and selection of business projects; the implementation of and the ongoing support to these projects (Background document 2001). The PondoCROP budget calculated at R6.50 to the Euro for the four year programme duration amounted to approximately R17 million (Finance Agreement 1999).

Triple Trust Organization (TTO): Its activities were primarily focused on business and skills training (Background Document 2001). TTO’s budget calculated at R6.50 to the Euro for the four year programme duration amounted to approximately R15 million (Finance Agreement 1999).

1.3.7 Amadiba Adventures

Amadiba Adventures is a community-based tourism initiative. All facilities and services are entirely owned and operated by local people in the form of micro enterprises. Part of the proceeds from the trails is invested in a Community Trust Fund (ACCODA) for the improvement of health, education and infrastructure in the area. For the local people, it creates an opportunity to participate in all aspects of tourism, from planning and implementation to operation and management. It presents an alternative to large-scale investor-driven development, where large resorts monopolise the benefits from the influx of tourists to their region. The Initiative was started in 1997 in consultation with the Amadiba people and local government structures, and with the support of Ntsika Enterprise Promotions Agency. The view was to introduce a particular type of tourist to the region – someone who was genuinely interested in meeting the people and learning from them, in coming to understand the environment and history of the region, and in leaving spiritually and culturally enriched. Amadiba has been identified by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Fair Trade in Tourism Initiative, as one of the role models for the region, embodying their principles of fair share, transparency, sustainability and reliability. In an audit conducted by the Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism the Amadiba project was judged the most significant operating community tourism project in South Africa. In December 2000 Amadiba Adventures also won the CPPP (Community Public Private Partnership) Presidential award (Company Profile, no date).

Although extending over only 25 of the 280 kilometre programme area, ACCODA Trust and Amadiba Adventures (development node 1) is the most experienced community trust and business in the EU programme. For this reason community respondents have been selected from this trust area to inform the research.

1.4 My Role in the EU Programme

I was employed in April 2003 by PondoCROP (EU Programme implementing agent) as a business development manager in development node 3. Although having some contact with Amadiba Adventures and the community respondents in this study from node 1, I was assigned to node 3 some 70 kilometres further south. Prior to being appointed to this position, I had not formally worked within a social development programme, nor within a donor-funded initiative. My formal training was in marketing management and work experience grounded in manufacturing and the adventure tourism industry.

A career change was motivated by a return to South Africa after five years abroad and spurred by a developing awareness of environmental challenges facing South Africa. I completed the Rhodes University Goldfields Environmental Education certificate in 2002 which provided for a
deeper understanding of environmental challenges. During 2002 I volunteered on natural resource management initiatives located in rural coastal environments.

Although being employed as a business manager to support community business development, the majority of my time was allocated to coordinating the establishment of community institutional structures (community trusts) and building capacity within these structures. Execution of these tasks required engaging with the implementing NGO’s, training service-providers, the Programme Management Unit (PMU), local government and the local tourism private-sector. From this broad-based experience of working with all key EU Programme stakeholders and attempting to deliver on the programme’s objectives, emerged the focus of this research and subsequent research question and goals. I viewed this study as an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of ‘capacity development’ in the EU Programme.

1.5 Research Question and Goals
The research question: What lessons can be learned from the EU Wild Coast programme to inform capacity-building for sustainable nature-based tourism in the Wild Coast context?

An interpretive case study approach is used (see Chapter 3) to explore the following goals which guided the research:

- Clarify principles for sustainable nature-based tourism in the context of the Wild Coast.
- Identify, if any, power-knowledge relations (and how these are deployed) within the EU Programme and how they have influenced capacity development.

1.6 Overview of Chapters
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the socio-economic development landscape to provide a context for locating the case-study. In addition, this chapter assists in informing data analysis and critical comment in Chapter 5. The chapter defines development in the context of this research; it explores theory relevant to power-knowledge relationships, discusses interpretations of capacity-building and the key components of the development aid and nature-based tourism industries. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to provide an insight into ‘participation’ within development initiatives and an overview of development programme design, management and evaluation processes.

Chapter 3 presents the methodological framework that guided the research. It describes the rationale of the research decision-making process in selecting an interpretive orientation to the research and for approaching the research as a case-study. The chapter identifies and explains the use of four principles which guided the research design and discusses the research process. A description of the data generation techniques, data management and data analysis processes are provided together with an explanation of why these specific techniques were selected for this research. The chapter describes research validity and trustworthiness considerations that guide the research and the ethical orientation to the research process - critical factors as a result of my closeness to the research subject and research respondents.
Chapter 4 explains the reasoning guiding selection of the individual research respondents from community, programme management, NGO’s and the private-sector. A research framework orientated around the research questions guided the capture and organizing of raw data while providing space for themes to emerge through the inductive analysis process. Themes and sub-themes which emerged from the raw data through the initial analysis process are presented and discussed from the individual respondents’ and programme documentation perspectives. The concluding summary presents the chapters’ findings in a table format, which serves as the focus for further analysis and critical comment in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 addresses the research goals. It draws on Chapter 2 to locate Chapter 4’s research findings in the broader development landscape. Principles for sustainability in nature-based tourism development programmes on the Wild Coast are discussed. The chapter analyses the EU Programme’s approach to participation and the link to programme structural design flaws. The EU development ideology informing the programme design and implementation is critically discussed, and a ‘fuzzy proposition’ (Bassey 1999) for the EU motivations guiding the development ideology proposed, as these factors have been identified in the research as having a significant effect on creating a capacity-building environment. The chapter concludes with recommendations for capacity-building to support nature-based tourism development initiatives on the Wild Coast.

1.7 Limitations of the Research
As this research is bounded by the limitations of a half thesis, it has not been an exhaustive study of the research questions; rather the objective has been to open up the field of donor-funded nature-based tourism initiatives for further research.

There are levels of differentiation between the official programme reports commissioned by the EU Commission detailing accounts of programme processes and outcomes, and that of research respondents’ experiences who were actively involved in the programme implementation. This differentiation is particularly evident in accounts of the programme development process.

Although drawing on the programme documentation, this research study is orientated around the interpretation of perceptions and understandings of those involved with the programme implementation, with a particular emphasis on capacity-building. The research focus, therefore, is to capture the outcomes of the implementation experience from research respondents directly involved with the programme implementation, with the objective of informing an understanding of the underlying power-knowledge relationships that shape ideologies responsible for creating an enabling environment for supporting capacity-building.
2. CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE

2.1 Introduction
The term ‘development’ has many interpretations which are subject to context, purpose and agenda. These diverse interpretations of development are given meaning by individuals, interest groups and organizations, from both civil society and government. These individuals, interest groups and organizations are very often stakeholders in development programmes and projects, and their diverse views of development may affect the way that the programmes unfold. Development programmes span a wide range of categories including large-scale infrastructure developments, such as the new Coega International Development Zone in the Eastern Cape, fiscal adjustment programmes and capacity-building projects within civil society organizations and for individuals. For the purpose of this research, development is interpreted as socio-economic development in the context of international donor-funded development programmes. Socio-economic development programmes, as a category, can vary dramatically in size and scope, from small initiatives (working within a specific segment of a localised community) to large multi-million rand programmes (such as the EU Wild Coast Programme stretching along the entire 280 kilometres of the Wild Coast in South Africa). As noted in Chapter 1, the EU Wild Coast Programme forms the focus of this research.

This chapter presents an overview of the socio-economic development landscape (henceforth referred to as development) to provide a broader context for locating the case-study. Key aspects of this landscape are discussed in relation to the research question. It is, however, noted at the outset that the scope of this development landscape is wide, and within the limitations of a half-thesis it is not possible to provide an exhaustive review of this landscape. This chapter therefore simply aims to capture some of the dominant themes within the development landscape. It does not provide for a presentation of the divergent perspectives on each of these themes, as this would fall outside of the scope of this study.

Martinussen (2004:41) describes the notion of development as a process that builds a societies abilities and capacity “… to make decisions and implement them effectively”. In his view, the objective of development programmes, therefore, is to build capacity through the process of doing. Reid (1999:36) concurs with this view, and notes development is aimed at “… forging the communities’ capacity to facilitate lasting community autonomy and strength”. Based on these perspectives, development programmes need to encourage and build community self-reliance and confidence to take control of their own destiny. However, Reid (1999:36) notes that all too frequently, the objective for the programme planners is the programme itself, with community involvement becoming the method for achieving the objective. Sogge (2002) describes development programmes as being primarily driven by donor development agencies, through a process of programme conceptualization, design and implementation, funded by free market principles, utilizing global and country of origin tender processes for securing contracts. Through these (often powerful) procedures, the broader objectives of development programmes as
articulated by Martinussen (2004) and Reid (1999) often tend to change form and shape (Sogge, 2002).

2.2 Power-knowledge Relationships

As indicated above, development programmes often involve divergent views. In the development process itself there are also different interests at play, which reflect different power-knowledge relationships. This section will seek to open up some perspectives on power-knowledge relationships, as these are central to the research question. This conceptual background will serve as a guiding framework for data analysis and critical comment in Chapter 5. The approach to understanding power-knowledge relationships in this research is orientated around Foucault’s supposition of power, described by Blacker (1998:356) as power that “… operates at every level of the social body and has deeper implications than often is realised, for anyone interested in charting a variable course for social change”. As indicated in Chapter 1, this research seeks to explore power-knowledge relationships and the deployment of power in the context of a donor-funded capacity-building programme, and power-knowledge relationships are therefore of critical interest to this study.

International donor-funded programmes, aimed primarily at southern developing countries, generally emanate from the economically powerful Northern countries, and often bring programme designs, social processes and management structures that may not be relevant, or programme objectives that are not achievable within the programme time frame and resource allocation. Rew (1997:103) supports this statement, noting that in a review of 113 international development aid programme evaluation reports, available in the UK, the programme benefits for the most part failed to reach the intended beneficiaries, “… who were, on the whole, left outside of the project”. The final outcome of this review illuminated two key reasons for failure: the programme aims and objectives were unrealistic from the start and the programmes failed to work out or implement institutional mechanisms to attain this goal. “In 90% of the reports management was cited as either a problem, a shortcoming or as inefficient” (ibid).

Ferguson (1997: 228-229) provides a detailed analysis of a development programme in Lesotho, which is congruent with the UK research findings (Reid 1997). He reports on a World Bank funded agricultural development programme in Lesotho, and notes that the power relations existing between the World Bank needing to spend money, and the Lesotho Government’s need for development-funding to increase its political support, resulted in the failed Thaba Teska agricultural project (Ferguson, 1997). He points out the complexities of these relationships when he notes that the programme planners saw the failure to be as a result of government’s inability to understand the plan, or to use the right organisational structure. Ferguson (ibid) provides a different perspective on this issue, and points out that the failure of the project was due to programme planners’ inabilities to view the programme as a “… political fact, or means by which certain classes and interests attempted to control the behaviour and choices of others”. Power-knowledge relationships often lead to what Popkewitz and Brennan (1998:19) refer to as “… the effects of power”. They (ibid) note that the effects of power are often “… found in the production of desire and in dispositions and sensitivities of individuals”. In
the Lesotho case, Ferguson (ibid) points to the effects of power in donor-funded development aid programmes, pointing to the often “... hidden politics” of development aid, and how this comes to shape development initiatives. Similarly, Foucault (cited in Popkewitz and Brennan 1998:19) argues that “Power is embedded in the governing systems of order, appropriation, and exclusion, by which subjectives are constructed and social life is formed”. Within the development context, this statement explains how programmes can redefine and reconstruct the social frameworks of beneficiaries into a form that the programme donor dictates. An example of this would be programme impositions of ‘new’ community institutional structures grounded in programme ideology to manage implementation, rather than for example, working through existing community structures. Popkewitz and Brennan (1998:18) suggest a further component of power: “... the idea of the deployment of power gives focus to how the subject is disciplined through the rules of knowledge per se”. This provides further insight into the concept of programme-imposed community institutional structures introduced above. To follow through this illustrative example, the programme-imposed institutional structures (introduced by the programme ideology) may then provide the conduit for deploying power according to the programme rules of knowledge that guided the programme logic. These rules of knowledge may then begin to guide social interactions within the programme-imposed structures in community contexts, and begin to focus on how subjects (i.e. community members) are ‘disciplined’ through these structures. Communities then begin to participate in these ‘new’ community institutional structures in ‘new’ ways, which are framed by the rules of knowledge and institutional structures introduced by the development programme.

Lash (2002:xii) offers further insight into power relationships by suggesting two types of rules for power deployment: constitutive rules, similar to that of constitutional law, providing the rules by which to play the game, and regulative rules, which are more prescriptive. Lash (2002:xii) argues that in the information age, “... power and inequality operate less through exploitation than exclusion, with exclusion a result of constitutive rules”. He suggests that the key institutions of the information age are those governing exclusion. For example, development aid institutions, with easy access to information technologies, funding and movement (commodities of globalization), are able to ‘govern exclusion’ (i.e. make decisions as to who is included or excluded in development initiatives).

Popkewitz and Brennan (1998:19) provide an approach to addressing these issues by arguing that, “... the productive elements of power move from focusing on controlling actors to the systems of ideas that normalise and construct the rules, through which intent and purpose in the world are organized”. This approach allows for a vantage point to identify the ‘systems of ideas’ that shape development projects, and how these ‘normalise and construct the rules’ of development projects. This approach draws attention to the ways in which development programmes draw on developmental ‘experts’ to conceptualise and design programmes. It raises questions as to how the ‘intent and purpose’ of the programmes are / are not established around the relevant context and the needs, and the system of ideas that circulates amongst the beneficiary groups.
It is important to note that power relations extend beyond the relationships between donors and beneficiary governments in development programmes. They are constantly at play at all levels of programme relationships, and are especially evident in socially complex rural community contexts. Power-knowledge relationships draw in all stakeholders associated or linked with programmes, including the private-sector. Jones (2001:17) suggests that in the context of community tourism, private-sector tourism can play an important and positive role “... provided the power relations between the two can be equalised as far as possible”.

Babikwa’s (2004) research indicates that the power-knowledge relationship is a complex process. He shares lessons learned, orientated around power-knowledge relationships and empowerment, emanating from research on a donor-funded agricultural development programme in Uganda. Although the programme had an emancipatory intent, the first phase of the programme was designed and implemented with a technocratic approach. The emphasis on the training was on the provision of technical facts about sustainable agriculture, ignoring the social and environmental context. Programme developers and implementation extension workers saw themselves as holding the required knowledge, and their role was to impart it to the beneficiaries. This approach resulted in dependent learners undermining the emancipatory intent. Babikwa (2004), however, argues that power is fluid and constantly changing hands. The communities, by choosing not to support the programme initially, expressed their power over the implementing NGO’s. Babikwa (ibid) argues that instead of aiming to level power gradients from a technicist viewpoint of empowerment (which reflects a sovereign view of power – see Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998), one should engage in a process of mutual empowerment from all angles, and enable all role players to increase knowledge of and about each other. This reflects Foucault’s productive view of power as deployment, which focuses on “... the concrete practices through which power circulates and is productive in daily life” (Popkewitz & Brennan 1998:20). This concept of power provides lenses for interpreting power-knowledge relationships within the EU Programme and thus informs the review of related capacity-building processes.

This discussion now raises the role of the ‘individual theoretician’, as referred to by Blacker (1998) (or development practitioner, as in the context of this research), within power-knowledge relationships. In this discussion, Blacker (1998:356) draws on Foucault’s statement, “One can, of course theorize, provided one is ever mindful of the ‘tyranny of globalizing discourses, with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde”. Blacker suggests that the “… theoretician, while still important, no longer represents a privileged site for articulating emancipatory discourse”, thus reflecting Babikwa’s point (cited above), about the need for processes of mutual empowerment for all angles. Blacker (1998:357) provides further comment on the role of the oppositional intellectual, in suggesting that rather than “… espousing the ‘truth’, the primary role of the oppositional intellectual should be to combat the way it (truth) is arbitrarily mass manufactured and disseminated. This process is a precondition of, and is therefore indispensable to, the functioning of hegemonic power … The battle lines are to be drawn around society’s ‘politics of truth”’. Foucault in Blacker (1998:358) provides an insight into the idea of a ‘politics of truth’ by arguing that “… the problem is not changing people’s
consciousness – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth’. This discussion draws attention to the ‘politics of truth’ in development programmes, and how ‘truth’ in these contexts is produced.

Smart in Blacker (1998:358) supports this position, adding a further insight and suggesting that we need to critically examine the various ways in which we have come to “… govern ourselves and others, through the articulation of a distinction between truth and falsity”. From my experience, working within the EU Programme, Foucault's (in Blacker 1998:359) statement seems particularly relevant and pertinent to programme management: “People know what they do; they frequently know why they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know, is what they do does”, i.e. often they are not conscious of the effects of power associated with their work.

Given the above, the role of the ‘intellectual theoretician’ (or development practitioner), within power-knowledge relationships, needs to be navigated by honesty, reflexivity and ethical substance. Blacker (1998:359) describes honesty has having two essential components: “… attentiveness and effort … Attentiveness means paying attention to the consequences of one’s theoretical practice; more specifically, this entails an awareness of how the results of one’s efforts are used … Effort is simply the persistent good faith and vigilance required to sustain such awareness”. Honesty does not mean the drive towards self-knowledge… “Rather, it concerns the implications of one’s search for truth – not self-absorption, but attentiveness to how one’s actions get absorbed by the power/knowledge regime”. In discussing the nature of ethical substance, Blacker (1998:361) draws on Foucault, describing it as “… the material that gets ‘worked on’ by ethics: that dimension of the self that provides the target of concern or what, for the individual, constitutes ‘this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct”.

In concluding this discussion on the ‘intellectual theoretician’, it is necessary to highlight the critical area of individual impact and reflexivity. Blacker (1998:361) argues that the individual needs to “… strive to become a master of the consequences of one’s actions … This represents a new type of self-realization … a necessary politicized ‘will to power’ ”. Blacker (1998:361), drawing on Foucault, argues that “… the mode of subjection: the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice” is referred to as “ ‘harmonization’ - that is bringing one’s “… words and acts into harmony with one’s ‘sphere of influence’”. And, finally, Blacker (1998:365) suggests that, most importantly, “Self-overcoming must never fear to look where it is so often hardest to: right under its very nose, at the forces and relations of its own production and renewal”.

This discussion on power-knowledge relationships in development argues for a reflexive practitioner aware of power and the effects of power of his/her own presence, the system of ideas of which he/she is part, and how the rules are constructed. As indicated by Babikwa’s (2004) research, power-knowledge relationships are integral to capacity-building processes,
which I now discuss in more detail, given their significance to this research and the EU Programme activities.

2.3 Capacity-building

This section will provide a discussion of various definitions, interpretations and insights into capacity-building. The interpretations of capacity-building appear to be driven by contextual requirements, rather than a common ideological approach. Eade and Williams, cited in Eade (1997:23), defines capacity-building, in the context of development, as a process that is “… strengthening people’s capacity to determine their own values and priorities, and to organize themselves to act on these”. Simpson (2002:11) notes that the definition of capacity-building is broad: it is a holistic enterprise that encompasses a range of activities, “… it means building abilities, relationships and values that will enable organisations, groups and individuals to improve their performance and achieve their development objectives”. Oxfam, cited in Eade (1997:3), takes an even broader view, as they consider capacity-building to be an approach to development, rather than a set of discreet pre-packaged interventions that is context specific and supportive of social justice principles working towards a long-term strategic vision. Simpson (2002:11) suggests that it encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organisational, institutional and resource capabilities. It is a process of developing human ability to utilise up-to-date information, knowledge, tools and skills to actively address and respond to various issues.

In light of the multiple interpretations and intangibility of capacity development, Moore (cited in Eade 1997:1) cautions against using the broad term ‘capacity-building’, and rather suggests using language and terms that have identifiable and precise meanings, that are contextually relevant. In addition, Roche (cited in Eade 1997:v) suggests that, “The concept and practice of capacity-building has to be tested against whether or not it can contribute to creating synergy between different actors, which can confront and challenge existing imbalances of power”. CDRA (cited in Eade 1997:1) raises the concern that the lack of adequate capacity-building theory is reducing capacity to engage in meaningful practice.

Kaplan (2001:322) argues that the first prerequisite for capacity-building, on which all other capacity is developed, is the organization’s internal capacity and its “… conceptual framework that reflects the organization’s understanding of the world”. This frame of reference provides a set of concepts that allows the organization to locate itself, and to make decisions in relation to it. This framework needs to be a robust concept, open to critique, that allows the organization to conceptually keep pace with developments and the challenges facing the organization. Organizational attitudes need to reflect a belief in their own ability to affect change, to develop a sense of purpose, be resilient to challenges and responsive to change. Organizational structures, roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined, with clear channels of communication. Decision-making processes need to be transparent and functional. Very importantly, individual skills within the organization need to match the required task (ibid). These perspectives are of particular importance to the study, as it seeks to focus on capacity-building within the EU Programme. Eade (1997:2) provides further insight into organizational approaches to capacity-building, in commenting on research conducted into both Northern and
Southern NGO’s, where capacity-building is described as their core activity. These organizations are placed in the challenging position of strengthening civil society organizations, in order to foster democratization and build strong, effective and accountable institutions of government.

Eade (1997:1) suggests further that capacity-building needs to be viewed as an essential element if “… development is to be sustainable and centred in people”. This is supported by the World Bank view, as cited in Eade (1997:2), where it is stated that “The building of social capital and the emergence of a strong civil society are essential ingredients in achieving long-term, sustainable development at the national level”. It further places specific emphasis on indigenous NGO capacity development to generate development impact. Simpson (2002:10) provides additional support for this argument by stating that, “… capacity-building is central to the quest for sustainable development and for society to achieve the objectives of Agenda 21”.

Of significance to this study is the view that capacity-building cannot be viewed or undertaken in isolation as it is “… deeply embedded in the social, economic and political environment” (Eade 1997:3). Understanding these components of environment would seem to be critical in evaluating existing capacities of both intervention organizations and beneficiaries. The failure to adequately assess these capacities may lead to interventions that waste resources, undermine beneficiaries and leave people more vulnerable than before. Capacity-building initiatives also need to take into account the “… different (and potentially negative) ways their impact will be felt by individuals and social groups” (ibid). She continues to argue that capacity-building interventions need to be flexible, responding to changing environments. And finally, capacity-building “… requires a long-term investment in people and organizations, and a commitment to the various processes through which they can better the forces that affect their lives”. Eade’s argument is particularly relevant to this study on the EU Programme, given its time-frames and its commitment to capacity-building. However, to develop an in-depth understanding of the context in which the EU Programme capacity-building objectives played out, it may be necessary to understand the history and some of the issues associated with development aid more broadly, which I discuss in the next section.

2.4 Development Aid
2.4.1 History of Development Aid

This section will provide an historical overview of development from the 1950’s to current initiatives. It will review ideological shifts in the development debate, in light of fluctuating international economic trends. The origin of modern ‘development’ can be traced back to the end of the Second World War, with two significant concepts: a new Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Marshall Plan, which was designed to support the European economy and provide the American production capacity with the market for post war conversion (Rist, 1999). In 1948, President Truman of the United States in his inaugural speech presented his four-point policy plan. Point four of his speech referred to technical support to be given to ‘underdeveloped’ countries, which became a synonym for ‘economically backward’ areas. The
concept of underdevelopment suggested one dominant force acting on another to create change towards a predetermined state (Rist 1999:69).

During the 1970’s the development discourse seemed to shift into a growth of ‘power’ in the South. A more critical intellectual climate led to the mobilizing of support in industrialised countries for Third World demands, whose discourse was built around the principle: “It is necessary to act upon the causes of ‘underdevelopment’, not just mitigate its effects, or, in other words; it is not a question of giving more but of taking less” (Rist 1999:140-141). Debate centred on trans-national companies, whose exorbitant profits testified to exploitation in the South, with the United Nations setting up a working group to examine the role of this new economic order (ibid). On the back of this debate a ‘basic needs’ development strategy was proposed. This approach focused on income generation through employment and attempted to include all members of society in assisting to find creative solutions. The emphasis of this policy placed the onus on structural management to provide for basic needs. This strategy, however, was not readily accepted. Concerns included limitations imposed by rigid and bureaucratic planning structures and the issue that the focus of a basic needs policy would require acceptance by developing countries, who were essentially unequal partners in the debate of a new economic order (Van der Hoeven 1997). Given the relationship between resources and development, environmental discourse was increasingly linked to development discourse.

In 1972, the United Nations held a conference in Stockholm on ‘human environment’, which, for the first time, drew attention to growing environmental issues of pollution, exhaustion of natural resources and the link between poverty and destruction of the environment. The conference led to the establishment of United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), with the objective of closely monitoring environmental issues and safeguarding the future environment (Middleton et al 1993:15). In 1975, the Hammarskjold Foundation and UNEP released a report that broke ground in the propositions it put forward. Rist (1999:155-156) comments that the report highlighted four strategic areas. Firstly, ‘development’, rather than just being seen as an economic process, should be reconsidered as a “complex whole”, needing to “rise endogenously” from deep within each society, and thus there was no “universal formula” for development. Secondly, that development needs to be orientated around meeting the essential needs of the poor, who need to “… rely mainly on their own forces”. Thirdly, “… the present situation is bound up with structures of exploitation which, though originating in the North”, have been relayed to the South. Fourthly, “… development should take account of the ecological limits associated with social and technological systems”. These ideas for development, however, were not really taken up and UNESCO, failing to draw on the Hammarskjold report, simply proposed to make development human-centred.

In the 1970’s, a sharp increase in the oil price by the Organization of Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) resulted in the banks being flooded by vast sums of ‘petro-dollars’. This in turn required the banks to find additional loan markets. This led to low interest rates and excessive lending to developing countries. A significant portion of this ‘borrowed’ money was utilised by developing countries’ governments to entrench political power and repressive
regimes, as well as for personal enrichment. Very often this occurred with the ‘silent approval’ of First World governments and the banks (Ransom 1999:8).

In the early 1980’s interest rates rose to an all-time high as a result of Northern Hemisphere economic policy introducing a downturn in the world economy. The increase in debt servicing for over-borrowed developing countries led to financial crisis. The IMF exacerbated the situation by instructing cash-strapped developing countries to promote commodity exports all at the same time. This, in turn, led to the price crash of commodities. Policies from the North to the South orientated around ‘structural adjustment’, the argument being for structural adjustment before development (Ransom 1999; van der Hoeven 1997). These adjustments were supposed to be aimed at restoring equilibrium, especially at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for the harmony of the international system. This required the “… economies to be ‘adjusted’ and trade balances ‘corrected’" in which “… well-being had to be adjusted downward to the imperatives of the market economy” (Rist 1999:171). The social impacts of this adjustment were high, with increasing unemployment, falling wages and a decline in social provisions. This dramatically impacted on the level and quality of social infrastructure provision and accelerated environmental degradation (van der Hoeven 1997:80-81, Ransom 1999). Ransom (1999:9) cites a 1998 Oxfam paper in which it is reported that African governments as a whole transfer four times more to Northern countries in debt repayments, than they spend on health and education for their citizens.

Ransom (1999:8) argues that this structural adjustment process gave the World Bank and the IMF “… a degree of control that even the most despotic of colonial regimes rarely achieved”, with the situation essentially unchanged from colonial times. With economic development strategy focused on “… necessary stabilization and adjustment programmes”, attention to the basic needs policies of the 1970’s fell away (van der Hoeven 1997:81). Initiatives to find trading solutions to address the basic needs were replaced by “… monetarism, whole-sale deregulation and an international credit economy… The laws of the market now served as a universal doctrine, and ‘development’ issues were reduced to the humanitarian initiatives of UNICEF and the NGO’s” (Rist1999: 174). Rist (1999:171) argues further that, as a result of structural adjustment strategies, development theory and practice “marked time” in the 1980’s.

Meanwhile, the problems facing the South had increased in the 1980’s. In 1988 the Brundtland report, commissioned by the United Nations, was released with the title *Our Common Future*. This exhaustive report documented environmental and social challenges facing the planet. The report brought government’s attention to the undeniable link between environment and ‘development’, making the point that as long as there is acute poverty, there will be environmental degradation. It focused on ways in which both rich and poor societies damaged the environment for different reasons. It also identified unequal development as the root cause of environmental issues, calling for basic needs to be met, with a reorientation to population stabilization, resource enhancement and conservation and technology to be explored. The report, however, failed to address the cause of these issues and did not provide adequate mechanisms to address the issues raised (Middleton *et al* 1993, Rist 1999). The commission
proposed the concept of ‘sustainable development’ to address the need to respect nature while considering social justice. Unfortunately, it failed to adequately clarify the concept (Middleton et al 1993:16). Rist (1999:183) argues that, although the report had good intentions, “… the positions it tries to argue are so vague that – despite a number of valuable statistical contributions – it hardly offers a new way of looking at the problem”. It does not answer the question of how to address these challenges. Rist (1999:180) further argues that the main contradiction in the report is that “The growth policy supposed to reduce poverty and stabilise the ecosystem hardly differs at all from the policy which historically opened the gulf between rich and poor and placed the environment in danger”. Middleton et al (1993:6) support this argument, commenting that the report failed to address the cause of these issues and did not provide an adequate mechanism for addressing these same issues. Middleton et al (1993:14) further comments that the international response to the report was limited with the Commission being disbanded shortly after the publication of a second paper, Common Crisis.

The Earth Summit of 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, was organized by the United Nations, based on a recommendation of the Brundtland Report. The focus of the Summit, with over 150 Heads of State attending, was to reconcile environment with ‘development’, paying attention to development disparities and poverty. Five documents emerged from within the official UNCED: The Rio Declaration, The Convention on Climate Change, The Convention on Biodiversity, A Declaration on the Forests and Agenda 21, the key document outlining recommendations for sustainable development. There were no real binding agreements associated to these documents. The Northern countries expressed reservations for additional aid to the South to support the ‘right to development’. The South argued that over 125 billion dollars are spent a year on environmental protection and only 60 billion on human development (Middleton et al 1993; Rist 1999,). In order to address this issue, it was decided that the World Bank Global Environment Facility (in collaboration with the UNDP and UNEP) utilizing a flexible formula, would be responsible for making up the deficit, “… it was a pragmatic way of entrusting ‘sustainable development’ to an institution”, which by and large is controlled by the North (Rist 1999:193).

In 1987 The Prime Minster of Malaysia commissioned a report for the South, similar to that of the Brundtland Report. Chaired by Julius Nyerere, and consisting of experts from both the South and North, the objective was to produce a ‘development plan’ for the South.

The report defined ‘development’ as “… a process, which enables human beings to realise their potential, build-self confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is a process that frees people from fear of want and exploitation. It is a movement away from political, economic, or social oppression … And it is a process of growth, a movement essentially springing from within the society that is developing … Development must be within its own resources … Development has therefore to be an effort of, by and for the people. True development has to be people centred” (Rist 1999:202).

Rist argues further that the goal is noble and impossible to criticize, however, it should be noted that this is not a definition, “… because no such phenomenon can be observed anywhere in the world – not even, of course, in the ‘developed’ countries” (ibid). This is also indicative of the plan
itself, as it failed to outline a new path for changing courses or a ‘how’ to reach the objectives. In addition to this, the report admits to not dealing with international political issues, when this was precisely one of the main issues at stake.

The 1990’s saw a resurgence in attention being given to human development issues, driven primarily by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The debate questioned what ‘development’ was, if not human centred. The human development orientated strategy of the 1990’s placed the emphasis on sustainable economic growth, although acknowledging that economic growth alone will not address the issues of inequality. To define the development performance of countries in the South, a new Human Development Indicator (HDI) was developed. This indicator consisted of four components: income, life expectancy, level of education and human liberty. “The objective was to break out of the economist rut to define the ‘development performance’ of the countries of the South in a different way” (Rist 1999:206). This approach provided new hope: it proposed that increased incomes be considered a means rather than an end. The HDI took account of total income and how it was distributed. Although having areas of weakness, this HDI broke new ground, providing a world table for development performance “… by no longer confusing per capita income with overall excellence” (Rist 1999:206).

Annual HDI reporting provides a rigorous managerial framework for evaluating and allocating funds at national budget level and guiding official development assistance. This framework assists donor countries in better evaluating their action, measured in a ‘priority development aid ratio’. This approach provides for a more effective and efficient allocation of budgets and spending, to meet human development needs. Although falling short in a number of areas, the Human Development reports did “… suggest real tools for highlighting facts that have never before been systematically presented or subjected to such precise international comparison” (Rist 1999:209). These reports also helped to further place development issues on the international agenda. In responding to the plight of the poor, the UN sponsored the Millennium Summit in September 2000. A global compact known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) was agreed to by 147 of the world leaders. Lotz-Sisitka (2004:23) argues that the MDG was “… probably one of the most significant international inter-governmental initiatives established in recent years to respond to issues of poverty, environmental degradation and health”. Further support was pledged by the G8 in June of 2003 to support the MDG. However, the 2003 Human Development Report (UNDP 2003 cited by Lotz-Sisitka 2004:25) notes that “Of the 54 countries with declining incomes, 20 are from Sub-Saharan Africa … the education goal is central to meeting the other goals … compounding the problem is the decline in donor support for education. In the 1990’s such support fell 30% in real terms (ibid 3-10)”. Lotz-Sisitka (2004:23) cites Bissio (2002) who provides a more critical comment on the MDG, noting that “No other cause or campaign has ever enjoyed such strong moral support … and so few actual results”.

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) took place in Johannesburg in 2002. The UN General Assembly convened the WSSD with the objective of reviewing development since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. This was the largest ever gathering of world leaders, with
20,000 participants from 191 governmental, numerous intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the private-sectors and scientific community (IISD 2002). Tibury (2003 cited by Lotz-Sisitka 2004:15) notes that the “… shifting of commitments towards socio-development issues were seen as a key success of the summit”, with other notable achievements being the recommitment to the MDG and the development of a WSSD implementation plan. The notion of sustainable development, has however been subject to vigorous debate, with Bond and Guliwe (2003 cited by Lotz-Sisitka 2004:20) arguing that the WSSD was orientated around “… excessive neo-liberal policies, based on the market”, with the WSSD linking globalization and governance as the solution to sustainability. Bond and Guliwe (2003) further argue that the “… difference in interpretation of sustainable development lies at the core of anti-globalisation and eco-justice movement actions”. This is driven by the belief that globalization with free market economics at its core is deepening the inequalities between the have-nots and the have-nots, and fuelling the growth of poverty everywhere (Hertz in Labonte et al 2004; Alonso 2001; Rist 1999; Lotz-Sisitka 2004). In further critique of the WSSD, Lotz-Sisitka (2004:21 cites Bond et al 2002) stating that the WSSD was criticized by civil society movements everywhere as the “… global elite’s last attempt – and failure – to address a world careering out of control”.

Africa’s response to sustainable development has been The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Lotz-Sisitka (2004:27) describes NEPAD as a “… strategic framework and vision for Africa’s renewal”, that seeks to address the socio-economic and socio-ecological challenges facing Africa and the continued marginalization of Africa in the global economy. NEPAD has served as the framework for African governments to commit themselves to the MDG. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) formally adopted NEPAD in June of 2001. Lotz-Sisitka (2004:27) notes that NEPAD “… aims to establish the conditions for sustainable development through a number of strategies, including capacity-building, regional co-operation and integration, democracy and peace and security”. There are, however, growing voices of concern surrounding NEPAD. Lotz-Sisitka (2004:30) argues that although the MDG, NEPAD and its action plan provide strategic and political responses to challenges in Africa today, they fail to “… challenge the fundamental framework of ‘progress’ and neo-liberal orthodoxy on which they both are based, and out of which they arise”. She (ibid) further argues that a number of activist writers are calling for a ‘new economic framework’ that is not grounded in globalization and the power of multinational corporations. It seems ironic that neo-liberal economic frameworks that underpin NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals are, in fact, contributing to poverty (UNDP, 2003; Lotz-Sisitka 2004).

Middleton et al. (1993) argue that the current state of the earth presents a gloomy picture in which both the socio and biophysical environments are substantially worse than they were 30 years ago, “… with common ground and common sense yet to be found” (Middleton et al 1993:212). The heart of the problem lies at the ‘free market’, comprising a set of carefully crafted trade agreements: WTO (World Trade Organization), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association), GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and MTO (Multilateral Trade Organization) which are designed to deliver and protect profitability of industrialised
countries. These trade agreements carry increasing global authority. This, coupled with the crippling burden of debt, presents serious challenges to developing countries in addressing human and environmental needs. This broader political economy influences capacity-building initiatives run by donor aid agencies such as the EU Programme, and as such, it is discussed in the next section.

2.4.2 Politics of Aid

With the growth of international attention to development (as outlined above), a number of agencies have been established to manage the allocation; distribution and use of funding for underdevelopment. These groups are colloquially known as ‘donor aid agencies’. Sogge (2002: 114) argues that the doctrines of donor funders are “deeply political” and have for decades been camouflaged as “technical benevolence”, serving both the donors and recipients. There are agencies who now accept that it is “… naïve and self-defeating to keep pretending that politics is not at the heart of aid”, with the real issue being “… politics on whose terms?” Power is integral to politics and an understanding of these forms of power, within global affairs, is essential in establishing how it is utilised in the aid industry. Given the focus on power-knowledge relationships in this study, these are briefly discussed.

Strange (1996 as cited in Sogge 2002:115), identifies two types of power in global affairs: “… relationship power, which tends to be coercive, direct, and consciously applied and structural power, which tends to be indirect and even unconscious” (my emphasis). Most donor aid writing falls within relationship power incorporating “… conditional aid and international arm twisting”, aimed at controlling behaviour (ibid). Coercion within the development industry raises questions associated with development impact. In light of this concern, Labonte et al (2004:133) comments that despite the need for overseas development agencies and the potential value of such aid, both the donor countries and beneficiaries are beginning to question whether the conditions associated with donor funding do more long-term harm than good, in poorer countries. This raises the question as to who is strategically driving aid, and for what purpose? Dallaire (2001 cited in Labonte et al 2004), sheds light on these questions, contending that development discourse is now being reflected in trade agreements of the WTO (World Trade Organization), with the aim of changing developing nations to meet the needs of the integrated global market place.

White and Killick (2001:18, cited in Labonte et al 2004) further add that “Econometric analysis of aid shows that ‘donor interest variables’, capturing commercial and political considerations, are a major determining factor for bilateral aid allocations.” Sogge (2002:12) supports this statement, by claiming, “… aid’s multiple roles have served a wide range of political, military, financial, commercial and psychological interests – often at the same time. These interest coalitions help account for aid’s remarkable ability to survive, but also for its ability to accumulate and decorate itself with many goals and purposes”. Sogge (2002:40) furthers the argument, adding that “Aid is a system of power doing its work in the wider realm of international politics”, and describes aid as having clusters of commonly located motives: strategic-political, mercantile, humanitarian and ethical. Alesina and Dollar (1998 cited in Sogge
2002) provide additional support to this thinking by arguing that aid is primarily politically and strategically driven, rather than being primarily for fulfilling beneficiaries’ needs. Furthermore, colonial pasts and political alliances dramatically affect the level of foreign aid support. In the conclusion of his book, Sogge (2002:13) observes that foreign aid is about power and not beneficence.

Of the International Funding Institutions (IFI’s), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the most powerful, and together with the World Bank (with whom they share a relationship) are probably the most powerful, unchecked institutions of any kind in the world. A country that is not approved by the IMF will not be eligible for most World Bank lending, or credit from a host of multilateral lending institutions. This gives the IMF power to greatly influence macroeconomic policies for countries applying for funding (Weisbrot 2000 cited by Sogge 2002; Ransom 1999). Sogge (2002:51) describes the IMF as a powerful bank with policing and ideological powers that is formally owned by 183 state shareholders representing the wealthy creditor countries. Power within the bank is directly proportional to shareholding and associated voting power, therefore the power to set agendas and guide policy rests with a small minority on the bank’s board. The IMF is therefore “... not very representative, transparent, nor accountable ... Yet it regularly acts as lawmaker, judge and sheriff when it comes to the openness and public legitimacy of borrowing countries’ governance” (Sogge 2002:51). Schattschneider (1961 cited in Sogge 2002:141), provides an ideological perspective of the IMF’s approach:

Ideology has long been at the heart of foreign aid. Producing and transmitting policies and discourse, and filtering out and de-legitimizing others, are essential vocations of aid’s most powerful players. It is not by caprice that the World Bank is positioning itself as the world’s mightiest think-tank. As the leading producer of doctrine and knowledge about how the planet should develop, it aims to achieve the supreme instrument of power – power to define alternatives.

Korten (1999:7) provides some insight into resolving the aid crisis, by suggesting that civil societies need to mobilise, to reclaim the power that corporations and global financial markets have usurped. Korten (1997) further argues that our best hope for the future lies with locally owned and managed economies that rely predominantly on local resources to meet the livelihood needs of their members, in ways that maintain a balance with the earth. Such a shift in institutional structures and priorities may open the way to eliminating deprivation and extreme inequality from the human experience, instituting true citizen democracy and releasing presently unrealised potential for individual and collective growth and creativity.

2.4.3 Aid Chains

Sogge (2002:65) describes “aid chains” as systems of power consisting of lines of command that run from donor to beneficiaries. The opening up of this process through a literature search has offered limited information. Hilhorst (2003:193) provides insight as to why this is the case, by suggesting that the general focus of research in the development context has been on unravelling the complexities of NGO’s, rather than on funding agencies. Funding agencies seem to have escaped ethnographic scrutiny altogether. This, combined with Hilhorst’s comment that publishers are generally not open to publishing ethnographic studies that are not within the
ambit of ‘market demands’ (comparative case studies), may account for the lack of available literature to support a critical discussion of aid chains. Hilhorst (2003:193) calls for research into donor agencies with the objective of “… lifting of the veils of their representations, revealing the dynamics underneath, and looking at the practices of donor actors, with a view to defining the meaning of their organizations and modes of legitimacy”. Biggs and Neame (1999:31) support Hilhorst (2003), suggesting that a debate on accountability is required within the development industry on how to open up the negotiation process of donor funding to “greater popular scrutiny”, in such a way as to challenge the perceptions of all role players. In considering the power-knowledge relationship in the EU donor programme, I have found it necessary to probe this process.

As a result of limited available research, this section will draw primarily on one author, Sogge, supported by my personal experience, working in the EU Programme. Sogge (2002:65) argues that “… aid chains reconstitute formal policy into ‘really existing policies’”, with the final outcome of the programme often quite different from what was intended from the top. Most chains have at least four segments beyond the original donor: “… typically first an aid agency or bank, second an operator in the public or private-sectors, third a national or local authority, fourth local collaborating bodies in the public or private-sectors. At each level there are hangers-on: advisers, suppliers, media, auditors and evaluators”. Generally, those at the top frame the questions and also provide the answers. “All the way down the chain, participants have to account upwards, rarely downwards to the ultimate beneficiaries”. The result of this is, rather than building and dispersing power among citizens at the receiving end, “Aid chains tend to claim and gather power upwards and concentrate it at ever-higher levels”. However, when aid fails, very often it is those at the lower levels that commonly end up paying the bills, and getting the blame. “Poverty and powerlessness may loom large in places where aid has been most intense, but those at the upper ends of aid chains are meanwhile assured of a job. Empowerment above; disempowerment below: the tendency is clear” (ibid:65-66).

Sogge (2002:87) further argues that information is the basis of accountability. In most aid chains, participants account upwards, towards funding authorities. The question is, how valid is this information going back up the chain? Very often, in the development context, it can hide more than it reveals. Those, whose “… livelihoods and careers depend on continued funding defend themselves by filtering and colouring information going up the chain”. The ultimate objective of aid is supposed to foster self-reliance, and if aid management was doing the required job, it should effectively work its way out of the job. Sogge (ibid) has a more critical and cynical view, when he argues that when exit strategies are discussed, tones tend to be low and non-committal. “Among the development banks, agencies, project units, companies, non-profit organizations and consultants, dependence on aid has grown. These make up aid’s hardcore political constituency: coalitions with incentives to keep things rolling, keep things quiet (if not secret), keep united fronts in the face of criticism and keep postponing their farewells” (Sogge 2002:87).
Sogge (2002:89) continues arguing that “... if aid chains have one law of motion, it is: Move the Money. The prosperity of aid institutions and the careers of people who run them depend on making funds flow”. Aid managers are incentivised for spending or lending large amounts in limited time periods. Their continual incentivised search for partners and activities with which to spend donor funds often leads to distorted views of problems and local capacities, often resulting in “… bloated and bankrupting initiatives”. Sogge (2002:90), to support his statement, cites Cooksey (1999), where it is argued that very often in over funded programmes with donors needing to ‘spend', they “… ignore warning signs of lack of capacity, quality or integrity among recipients. Donors have no incentive to look for proof of corruption when they are themselves force-feeding the beneficiaries, who may receive large grants on the basis of mediocre or negative track records”. In-field implementation is usually subcontracted out to a range of profit, non-profit and government institutions on a free-market tendering basis, with delivery often falling short. Often ‘know-who’ overwhelms ‘know-how’, directly impacting on implementation, quality and success. Top-down programme conceptualization and implementation very often also results in the donors having the tables turned by local elites, with agencies being pressurized into appointing preferential service-providers (ibid).

Sogge (2002:79) cites the findings of a five-year study of bilateral aid to Tanzania from USAID (United Sates of America International Development) and SIDA (Swedish International Development Assistance). This study of development aid concludes that, “... top-down ideologically driven donor coordination does not promote more effective aid, as recipients have no control and, therefore, feel no commitment to the programme”.

2.4.4 Non Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) and Development Aid

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the EU Programme was implemented by three NGO’s. In many development aid programmes NGO’s are generally the development programme implementing agents and serve at the interface between donor management structures and beneficiaries. The purpose, roles, accountability and capacity of NGO’s within the development industry are contested issues. The dominant discourse currently draws heavily on NGO’s to provide the donor beneficiary link. The scope of this research does not allow for a full exploration of this issue, rather it will focus on current power relations within the donor-NGO relationship. Hilhorst (2003:192) describes the power relationship between NGO’s and donors as being in constant flux. Hilhorst argues that identifying where the power lies between the donor and the NGO is up for debate, but points out that the majority of authors suggest it lies with the donor, as the donor generally imposes operational practices in order to release funding. Biggs and Neame (1999:31) suggest that the terms on which negotiations are conducted between the NGO and donor are defined by parameters of power relationships that exist in international development aid (as discussed in Section 2.4.2 & 2.4.3).

Hilhorst (2003:192) suggests further that the relationship is primarily dictated by the strength of the NGO’s to initially “… negotiate the terms of financing, reporting, and accountability in order to define the terms of relationship with the funding agent”. He (ibid) notes that while there is some room for the Southern NGO’s to manoeuvre, there is generally a “… process of
convergence towards donors among southern NGO’s, that results in increasing upward accountability” rather than accountability to the beneficiary. Biggs and Neame (1999:31) argue that this process is underpinned by a generally dominant donor-development ideology, in which the donor determines what ‘development’ is and what development and future interventions are required.

2.4.5 Impact of Development Aid

A wide review of the impact of ‘development’ literature reveals a generally held view that ‘development’ is not achieving its purported objectives of social development. Paradoxically, the well-supported development discourse, guiding wealthy donor nations on the whole, does not appear to be aware of the possibility that it may actually be exacerbating problems. Rew (1997:103) comments that the results of a major survey of social development practice in development programmes drawn from 113 programmes, raised concerns. The survey indicated a relative lack of impact, as a result of no clear methodological approach. However, variable impact on differing sectors continues to be a “... tactical and strategic issue and has considerable importance for the careers of social development professionals”. Rew (1997) draws on Griffin (1991), who expresses a strong and longstanding criticism of foreign aid, arguing that long-term financial aid to alleviating poverty through economic development has failed. The sentiment expressed poses serious questions around the extensive industry of development experts and consultants and their role in the future.

Rist (1999:239) states that, “All the texts on ‘development’ are unanimous in concluding that the gap between North and South (but also between rich and poor) is continually widening”. Sogge (2002:8) adds that, “Development itself, far from bridging the ritually deplored gap, continues to widen it”. He argues that on many occasions evidence indicated that “… foreign aid has been a problem posing as a solution”. He (ibid:185) believes that aid has not been a prime candidate to promote collective self-esteem. “It tends to locate the problem in the incapacities (underdeveloped, backwardness, and so on) of the people it is supposed to help. Their shortcomings demonstrate the need for aid and even trusteeship”. These approaches risk patronizing people, boosting the prestige of the outsider’s solutions and belittling local solutions. In crude and subtle ways, the “… aid encounter exposes differences in wealth, status and power, fostering feelings of humiliation and powerlessness” (ibid), resulting in dire social consequences. As such, Rist (1999:1) asks why the ‘development’ discourse has the power to seduce in every sense of the word, but “… also to abuse, to turn away from the truth, to deceive; what is the origin of this collective task which, though constantly criticized for its lack of success, appears to be justified beyond all dispute?” Rist (1999:1) further asks how one explains this phenomenon that raises the hopes of millions and mobilises sizeable financial resources, “… while appearing to recede like the horizon just as you think you are approaching it?” As noted above in Section 2.4.2, Sogge (2002:13) may provide some insight into answering this question, when he argues that foreign aid is primarily about power and not beneficence.

Sogge (2002:196-197) insists that, although the existing aid system has not been a great success, it does “... represent a large and versatile constellation of money, expertise and
networks that make and transmit ideas about how societies, politics and economics can be shaped and steered”. Aid may not have delivered as hoped, but it still has value. Sogge (ibid), further advocates a “… straight-talking, non-manipulative communication approach” for the future.

Van der Hoeven (1997:83) argues that the main thrust of human development strategy requires a climate of sustainable and steady growth, although this alone cannot achieve human development requirements. Achieving human and economic growth together will require, for most countries, structural change in economic and social frameworks, both at international and national level. In addition, Rist (1999:220) raises two issues that need clarification before ‘development’ can meet expectations: “Development organizations have to face re-conversion, to meet the changing needs of environment and the consequences of the gradual absorption of ‘development’ by the globalization process”.

Describing an emerging alternative approach to the politics of development, emanating from experiences in India, Sheth (1997:330) argues that this approach should not be “… derived deductively from a received theory, not even the theory based on the global alternative critiques of development”. Instead, it should emerge from within the concrete struggles of the people themselves. The emphasis is, therefore, placed on decision-making, not only concerning the process, but also in defining development goals, with a social justice orientation. Further to the argument, “… development is increasingly being viewed in political terms, engaging the movements in the larger issues of democratization” – not only in policy of state, but also in economic organizations and social organizations (ibid). Thus, while redefining development in light of gender, ecological, cultural and human sensitivities, it must be accepted that “… concrete struggles are political in nature; they are primarily about confronting the hegemonic structures of power – locally, nationally and globally” (ibid).

Also writing from a critical stance, Rahnema (1997:391) proposes an approach to the post-development era which is orientated around individual truth. The end of development should not be seen as the end of the search for new possibilities of change:

... it should represent a call to the ‘good people’ everywhere to think and work together. It should prompt everyone to begin the genuine work of self-knowledge and ‘self polishing’, an exercise that enables us to listen more carefully to others, in particular to friends who are ready to do the same thing. It could be the beginning of a long process, aiming at replacing the present ‘disorder’ by an ‘aesthetic order’, based on respect for differences and the uniqueness of every single person and culture.

In order to achieve this, Rahnema (1997:392) suggests that, firstly, we need to look at things the way they are, not the way we want them to be, to overcome our fears of the unknown and to confront our own illusions before considering some else’s perceived needs. He (ibid: 394-401) further notes that the post-development period needs to bring out the “… good, the compassionate and the authoritative”, and when the question of intervention arrives, we need to ask, “Who are we? – Who am I? – to intervene in other people’s lives, when we know so little about any life, including our own?”
Providing a closing thought on the post development era, he *(ibid:401)* suggests that the post-development era should not focus on merely operational or strategic plans. Rather, it needs to be “… in harmony with the existential need of all the ‘good’ people of the world to live differently, to witness their truth, and to cultivate friendship. And this can come about only if we all begin with ourselves, and learn to face our Truth and live with it as an artist does with the object of his or her creation”.

The review of politics and current debates surrounding development aid provides a ‘backdrop’ for an in-depth analysis of the EU Programme capacity-building component. A further dimension of this programme is its focus on nature-based tourism, as this is the context in which the programme ‘played out’. I now turn to a review of this aspect of the programme context.

2.5 Nature-based Tourism (Ecotourism)

2.5.1 Defining Nature-based Tourism (NBT)

There appears to be no clear consensus for the definition of nature-based tourism, or ecotourism, as it is also known. The United Nations Environmental Protection Programme (UNEP) (2002), in supporting the year of ecotourism, suggests the following principles: observation and appreciation of nature while respecting traditional cultures; educational; generally small volume locally owned businesses minimizing impact on the natural and socio-cultural environment; and support for the protection of natural areas. Natural areas are protected by creating economic benefits to host communities and conservation organizations; providing alternative income opportunities for local communities and increasing awareness of natural and cultural assets, among both locals and tourists. Reid (1999:29) provides an additional interpretation of principles, noting that nature-based tourism is a sincere attempt to understand the situations that confront the human community and to introduce principles of environmental conservation to tourism. Mowforth and Munt (1998:102) argue that there is a plethora of terms being used to define ‘new tourism’ (ecotourism and nature-based tourism fall within this definition), which are more environmentally, economically and socio-culturally aware of the impacts of tourism, and with varying degrees express concern for participation by local communities.

Nature-based tourism is considered to fall within the ambit of responsible tourism. The White Paper on Tourism (1996:19) outlines the principles for responsible tourism as a “… proactive approach by tourism industry partners to develop, market and manage the tourism industry in a responsible manner, so as to create a profit”. Responsible tourism implies responsibility to the environment through sustainable resource usage, with a focus on environmentally based activities. Responsible tourism requires both the government and private-sector to develop meaningful economic linkages with local community: to respect and invest in local cultures and protect them from commercial over exploitation. It further states that local communities have a responsibility to become actively involved, practise sustainable development and provide a safe and secure environment for tourists. NGO’s are to play a vital role, particularly in environmental and community-based fields, with key roles relevant to this study being: policies and tourism
planning; sourcing donor funding for support of community-based tourism initiatives; developing linkages with the private sector; and delivering capacity-building programmes to communities.

2.5.2 Nature-based Tourism and Risks

In line with the openings provided in this chapter above, this discussion is contextualised in the discourse of donor-funded nature-based tourism initiatives. It highlights key risks in relation to the scope of this research and cannot be considered an exhaustive discussion. The social implications of ‘tourism’ are broad-based and complex, requiring further research. Cricks (1989) comments that the conclusions drawn from a wide-ranging study of social science literature suggests that there is inadequate representation of the social complexities of tourism. This research acknowledges the potential risk of nature-based tourism on environmental integrity however this discussion focuses on social risk.

Very often nature-based tourism, with its sustainability principles, is a precursor to mass tourism and its documented impacts. Cater (1999:73) refers to Belize as a prime example of this evolution, where it is argued that inflationary pressure on local economies is largely a result of tourism, where foreign involvement is driving the prices of land, property and even local produce relentlessly higher – by 1992, 90% of coastal land in Belize was foreign owned. A further example of a tourism development cycle beginning with low volume, low impact nature-based tourism and developing into primarily a mass market orientation, is that of the Hawaiian Islands. In this discussion I will draw on comment by Patterson, a pastor on the island of Kauai, Hawaii, as cited in Mowforth and Munt (1998), supported by my personal experience of living in the region for four years. The dominant impact of this tourism cycle has been that of increasing land values and raising costs of living to the second highest level in the USA. The impact of these factors has been compounded by mean household incomes at the second lowest level of all American states. This situation, combined with a complex mix of socio-cultural and economic factors, has resulted in serious challenges for the endogenous people, particularly for the youth to remain on their islands of birth. This has had a significant impact on social cohesion. A manifestation of this impact is the growing number of indigenous peoples ‘squatting’ on the beaches outside of the tourist areas. A further example is the high level of animosity shown by the general endogenous peoples towards the ‘haolies’ (outsiders). Patterson sums up the endogenous people’s experience of tourism on the islands, “I have seen the oppression and the exploitation of an ‘out-of-control’ global industry that has no understanding of limits or responsibility or concern for the host people of a land … or the land … All is not well in paradise” (Mowforth & Munt 1998).

In regions with a developing nature-based tourism industry, there is a concerning economic shift from a traditional pattern of subsistence and sustainable agriculture practices to a dependency on a fickle tourism industry. This pattern generally corresponds with less developed countries, susceptible to local and regional insecurities. Lea (1995) supports this statement in discussing a case study of Fiji. Prior to the development of the tourism industry, Fiji was primarily an agricultural and subsistence-based economy. Tourism is now Fiji’s leading industry. Following a coup in early 1987, tourism figures plummeted to half the anticipated visitor numbers. This, in turn, had a devastating trickle-down effect throughout all socio-economic levels. By September
1987, 80% of hospitality staff had been retrenched and public servants had taken a 15% cut in salaries. Reid et al. (1999:59) raises an additional concern associated with the shift from an agricultural to tourism-based economy. This concern arises particularly in African countries, where large scale organizations i.e. national governments or private-sector, plan and develop tourism destinations which are orientated around the same resource base that communities’ economies depend on for survival. This increased demand overtaxes the resource. They conclude that, “What begins as a resource sharing becomes a competition with the ‘success’ of tourism development” (ibid).

Mowforth and Munt (1998:237) argue that over the last thirty years Third World countries have received limited benefit from tourism. This is primarily as a result of limited control over the way the industry is developed and lack of financial resources to compete with external investors. They continue to argue that seldom do local people’s benefits, derived from tourism, outweigh the overall costs to the communities receiving tourism. Olindo (1999) provides an example of this statement, commenting that Kenya is the world’s foremost nature-based tourism attraction, with approximately 650 thousand people visiting Kenya’s parks, spending $350 million annually. This financial success, however, hides a multitude of social and environmental problems. The challenge, therefore, as argued by Mowforth and Munt (1998) lies in developing the capacity to empower local government and community to take control of tourism development, through informed and responsible decision-making. With specific reference to the dynamics of local community tourism initiatives, Mowforth and Munt (1998:259) observe that the local elites can very often have a significant effect on outcomes. It, therefore, needs to be acknowledged that communities themselves are susceptible to internal divisions, driven very often by power relationships.

### 2.5.3 Sustainability in Nature-based Tourism

Freeman and Ndyebo (2002) describe the broad definition of sustainable development as being a contested issue. However, they suggest the Brundtland’s definition in the “Our Common Future” report as a broad departure point: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs”. Mowforth and Munt (1998:105) claim there to be no absolute true nature of sustainability. Rather, it is only definable in terms of the “… context, control and position of those who are defining it”. Daly (1996 cited in Lotz-Sisitka 2004:20) attempts to provide a more refined definition, by suggesting that sustainable development is “… development without growth beyond the environmental carrying capacity, where development means qualitative improvement and growth means quantitative increase”. Daly further advocates the approach to sustainability as being that of “… striving for sufficient per capita wealth - efficiently maintained and allocated and equitably distributed – for the maximum number of people that can be sustained over time under these conditions”. Rist (1999:192) describes an ecological interpretation of sustainability to be the ability of an ecosystem to continue levels of production borne by the system over a long period of time. However, he argues that the dominant interpretation is to keep up development i.e. economic growth.
Hattingh (2002:5) provides an additional perspective, by arguing that the “… meaning and implementation of sustainable development are still informed by various philosophical and ethical interpretations”. Hattingh further suggests that this perspective is “… strongly associated with a moral imperative that apparently no one can ignore or reject, without having to provide very good reason for dissent”. However, Hattingh (2002:14) further argues that there appears to be little consensus about the “… content, the interpretation and the implementation of this moral imperative”. He raises the concern that this lack of consensus can have the effect of “… establishing, justifying or maintaining relationships of domination and exploitation”. This, in turn, promotes dominant group self-interest, by utilizing varying interpretations of moral agendas for sustainability, to create different models for accountability. Mowforth and Munt (1998:84) elaborate on this thinking by suggesting that sustainability has developed as an essential ideology for the New World Order. Associated with this movement is a new ideology whose ally is consumerism. This association has given mass consumption a more acceptable justification, for those who can afford it. This reasoning is supported by Rist (1999:193), who claims that sustainable development is not orientated around the “… survival of the ecosystem which sets the limits of ‘development, but ‘development’ which determines the survival of societies”.

The discussion above has attempted to provide a broad overview of the sustainable development debate. The notion of sustainable tourism lies within this diverse and complex debate. It is not within the scope of this study to attempt to argue for, or against, sustainability concepts of tourism. Instead, this discussion will open up key power-knowledge relationships that guide the pursuit of ‘sustainable’ nature-based tourism in developing countries.

Mowforth and Munt (1998:186) argue that environmentalism and environmental issues are key issues in exploring new types of tourism that do not have the level of impact of mass tourism. This debate, in turn, is central to the notions of sustainability and sustainable development. The challenge of this process is that it is, to a large degree, being hegemonically driven by global capitalist investments. Mowforth and Munt (1998:4), suggest that critical understanding of the tourism industry can be further explored through lenses that place “… relationships of power at the heart of enquiry”. This includes a wide range of relationships incorporating First World investments in Third World destinations, international donors (such as the EU Programme) and local elite. Mowforth and Munt (1998) further argue that power in the tourism industry manifests itself as three concepts: ideology, discourse and hegemony. Ideology “… is about the way relationships of power are inexorably interwoven in the production and representation of meaning, which serves the interest of a particular social group”. Foucault, as cited in Mowforth and Munt (1998:40), suggests that “… discourse is how facts can be conveyed in different ways and how the language used to convey these facts can interfere with our ability to decide what is true and what is false”. And finally, “… hegemony is primarily about the power of persuasion” (Mowforth & Munt 1998:41).

The notion of ‘sustainability’ has, at times, been hijacked and manipulated by sections of the tourism industry, governments, funding agents and local communities, in order to provide moral rectitude for tourist activities (Mowforth & Munt 1998:85). They (ibid:324) continue to argue that
these same role players, excluding local community, use their interpretation of the 'sustainable tourism' ideology to enhance their power base – “Sustainability and sustainable tourism reflect a discourse that is contested and through which power circulates”. As a result, the notion of sustainability is now being subjected to the same distortions as freedom and democracy (Mowforth & Munt 1998:122). They (ibid:42), therefore, suggest a number of approaches to address the current interpretations of sustainable development within the tourism industry: “... it needs to be dynamic in its application and concept as it responds to changing influences and interests”; we need to question how sustainability should be taken beyond its current interpretation to a “… substantial, tangible and unequivocal meaning” (ibid:122); the differing visions of government-inspired mega-projects and community-inspired local projects need to be reconciled. Furthermore, it is argued that it is not only important for community to have control of tourism development (inspiring commitment and accountability), but assistance and support are essential to help establish and coordinate ideas and projects (ibid:257).

### 2.5.4 Needs-assessment in Nature-based Tourism Development Initiatives

Mowforth and Munt (1998:246) argue that, “... while techniques of local needs analysis are well-intentioned by those who lead and conduct them, the critical questions, concerning the balance of power, are who leads them and to what ends”. In most cases, needs analysis are conducted by outside consultants over a short time period that generally does not allow the time to appreciate or develop the insight into understanding the challenges, let alone solving the problems experienced by local communities. They further argue that this collaboration is not necessarily undesirable. What it does require is to redress the existing imbalance of power, so the outcome represents the best interests and values of the community, and not the outsider.

An understanding of existing institutional structures and power relationships is critical to the needs-assessment process. Mowforth and Munt (1998:261) discuss a case study in Belize, where a series of villages in the South formed the Toledo Ecotourism Association (TEA). The objective was to play a more active role in the existing tourism industry that was primarily benefiting foreigners and a small number of wealthy Belizeans. The initiative was to establish a series of guesthouses in the villages affiliated to TEA. Once the programme was up and running, two development agencies USAID and Belize Enterprise for Sustainable Technology (BEST) established a competing community guesthouse initiative. The result is likely to divide community, and possibly lead to the creation of local elite, especially as the USAID and BEST are not providing funding to TEA.

The initial needs-assessment process lies at the very core of development programmes. It provides the opportunity for community to take ownership of the programme, responsibility for programme implementation and accountability for sustainability. The process sets the parameters for power-knowledge relationships and the deployment of power, a critical component in forging relationships that will have a significant effect on the programme’s future success and sustainability. If needs-assessment together with beneficiary capacity is incorrectly assessed, it may create unachievable expectations, with an increased possibility of further dependency on outside assistance.
This discussion, together with the broader discussion on development in section 2.4, raises the issue of participation in development initiatives, which I now discuss, given the EU Programme objectives for capacity-building.

### 2.5.5 Participation in Development Initiatives

The concept of participation first appeared in the late 1950’s after most failures within the development industry were blamed on a lack of participation of beneficiaries in the processes of programme design, formulation and implementation. Both donor and recipient national governments were aware that billions spent on development programmes had failed to produce the expected results, and in some cases added new problems to the old (Rahnema 1992). Martinussen (2004:41) suggests that within the debate for participation there are two distinct concepts: “… one sees participation as a means to promote development goals fixed from above or from outside the community concerned, and another that views people’s participation as an end in itself”.

Rahnema (1992:121) comments that participation was initially promoted as a key element in creating a human-centred development approach, with an intention to perform four functions: a cognitive, a social, an instrumental and a political one. In cognitive terms, it had challenged development discourse and its practices to take a new approach to understanding the realities to be addressed and to accept that the ethnocentric perception of reality specific to industrialised countries was not relevant. Participation had to carve out a new meaning for developments “… based on different forms of interaction and a common search for this new popular knowledge”. Socially, participation gave development discourse new hope that institutions, groups and individuals involved in development would rally around the new construct, with the hope that this new approach would enable development to meet everyone’s basic needs. Politically, it was meant to empower the powerless and voiceless. It was instrumental in “… providing the ‘re-empowered’ actors of development with new answers to the failure of conventional strategies, and to proposing new alternatives”. Rahnema (1992:122) comments that although well intentioned, this approach provides insufficient evidence to indicate that new knowledge did emerge from the process “… in such a way that the dominated, underdeveloped societies can articulate their own socio-political position on the basis of their own values and capacities”. Pretty (1995:4-5) discusses varying forms of participation captured in the table below.
Table 2.1: Forms of Participation (Pretty 1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation Type</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manipulative Participation</td>
<td>Participation is simply a pretence - beneficiary group representatives are appointed and not elected and have no power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Participation</td>
<td>People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by administration or project management, with any information being shared belonging only to external professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by Consultation</td>
<td>People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents defined problems and information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any decision-making and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people’s views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation for Material Incentives</td>
<td>People participate by contributing resources, for example labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. They are involved in neither the experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very often common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when the incentives end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Participation</td>
<td>Participation is seen by the external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially at reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already being made by external agents. At worst, local people may be co-opted to serve external goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive Participation</td>
<td>People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just as a means to achieve the programme objectives. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-mobilization</td>
<td>People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resource and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if governments and NGO’s provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in Section 2.5.4 above, Mowforth and Munt (1998:238) argue that local communities, who are an essential component of the sustainability debate, are often left out of the “… planning, decision-making and operations of tourism schemes”. However, an increasing number of studies of development projects indicate that ‘participation’ is essential to the success of projects. In addition, Mowforth and Munt (ibid:240) argue that although development proposals are often commendable in their intent, the push for local participation (that is meant to break the existing patterns of power and unequal development participation) comes from a position of First World power. Mowforth and Munt (ibid:240), therefore, argue that only forms of participation that originate from within the local communities themselves may level the power
gradient. Rahnema (1992:126) provides further insight into this reasoning, commenting that the dilemma facing the participatory processes is how to reconcile two facts: "... the fact that no form of social interaction or participation can ever be meaningful and liberating, unless the participating individuals act as free and un-biased human-beings; and the second fact that all societies hitherto have developed commonly accepted creeds which, in turn, condition and help produce inwardly un-free and biased persons".

Mowforth and Munt (1998:240) suggests that it would be easy to make the prescriptive assumption that the greater the degree of local participation in a project the better, however, those who are bringing the ‘development’ - development agencies, governments and private-sector - may very well disagree. They (ibid:242) argue further that in these situations fewer types of participation may be considered preferable. This point emphasizes the influence of power relations and deployment of power in the fabric of participation.

Sogge (2002:96) argues that participation is supposed to enhance the power of beneficiaries, however, in practice, participation can often amount to little more than swinging a shovel and following somebody else’s plan, with control and not self-determination, being the purpose of the programme. An example of this is identified in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project in Gambia, where project managers were encouraged to produce the specific products for which they would be held accountable, rather than the process and systems that would need to sustain the programme once the funding stopped (Sogge 2002: 96). However, Mowforth and Munt (1998:278) caution against the assumption that the greater the degree of local control and participation, the higher the probability of programme sustainability and the wider spread of benefits to community. Williams (1997:165) provides insight from a case study of a participative rural project in Sierra Leone where he concludes that, as attractive as the ideals of community participation and self-help may seem, "... transforming theory to a sustainable long-term reality is not a modest task, and will require serious intent and commitment at community, donor agency and national governments levels".

Rahnema (1992:117) notes that it was found that "... whenever people were locally involved and actively participating in the projects much more was achieved with much less, even in sheer financial terms". This comment is supported by Mowforth and Munt (1998:278), where they argue that a number of case studies indicate that "... only where the impetus for tourism development comes from within local community is the prevailing inequality of development likely to be challenged". Rahnema (1992:126) argues that "... to understand the many dimensions of participation, one needs to enquire seriously into all its roots and ramifications, these going deep into the heart of human relationships and the socio-cultural realities conditioning them". For this change to happen, the following is required: an "... open-ended quest and interaction of free and questioning persons for the understanding of reality" (ibid:128). In addition, this approach requires "... genuine processes of dialogue and interaction" that should "... replace the present subject-object relationships between interveners and the intervened, thereby enabling the oppressed to act as the free subjects of their own destiny" (ibid:121).
As indicated here, participation is an important aspect of development aid, and also impacts on programme management, design and mentoring, which I now discuss in more detail.

2.6 Programme Design, Management and Evaluation

The EU Programme design process was primarily driven by international consultants (see Chapter 1). The outcome of the programme design process was a logical framework (see Section 1.3.2), which identified seven result areas guiding the programme implementation. The logical framework was supported with a programme organogram (see Section 1.3.5), which detailed the programme’s management structure. The discussion above suggests that participation has a significant role to play in the programme design process. As the research question in this study aims to establish the influence of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building for sustainable nature-based tourism initiatives, the discussion to follow will provide a broad review of existing approaches to donor-funded programme design, to contextualise the critical review of research data in Chapter 5.

2.6.1 Programme Design

O’Donovan (1997:115-116) describes the ‘traditional’ or ‘blue-print’ development project as similar to that of a plan for an engineering project. “There are clear objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, costs and time frames”. This approach centres on a donor-dominated planning process and skills to meet predetermined deliverables against a timeframe; the recipients’ willingness to participate in the project at designated points and to absorb the required skills. This approach involves project ownership and control by the donor, with the imperative of meeting donor countries’ expectations. What is clearly lacking are “… relationship elements, such as ownership and commitment, willingness to collaborate, share information and cooperate in outcomes”. In addition, Franks (1997:127) argues that the blueprint approach often results in inadequate understanding of the capacities and capabilities of programme beneficiaries, resulting in frequent poor programme performance.

O’Donovan (1997:116) discusses the process approach to projects, outlining the following elements: a set of programme activities within a

... boundary that is permeable. Ownership and commitment from stakeholders is essential to project success and therefore all stakeholders should be involved from inception; the project process must be a joint learning process between stakeholders; the process is expected to build capacity and contribute to sustainability; learning implies the ability to reflect on current practices within a project and, if necessary, change procedures and approaches.

This process approach, through participation and learning, seeks to encourage stakeholders to feel a sense of ownership and commitment, which will facilitate the building of capacity and sustainability for programme outcomes. Franks (1997:128) further adds that the process approach orientates programme activities towards assisting beneficiaries to implement their own strategy. The understanding supporting this approach is that people know what they want, but require the technical assistance to achieve their objectives. O’Donovan (1997:114) notes that the success of this approach is dependant on the building of relationships between all
stakeholders, requiring learning experiences from both top and bottom structures. This approach requires programme role players to be continually aware of the content level of the programme, the ‘what’ of the plan and, at the process level, the ‘how’ of the plan.

O’Donovan (1997:114) questions the validity of either approach and suggests a balance be found between the two approaches, with the emphasis on key contractual relationships: on clarity and roles of relationships. This requires ways of maintaining specificity in programme documentation and the need to demonstrate responsibility to needs and learning experience.

Development programme designs are generally presented in the form of a logical framework matrix. Bakewell (no date:17) describes a ‘logical framework’ as a “… hierarchy of objectives presented in a project matrix”, summarising logic and explaining how project activities are expected to contribute to the overall project goal. Cracknell (2000:107) elaborates, commenting that the logical framework breaks the project down into a number of components, namely: “… inputs resulting in activities, outputs, immediate objectives (or project purpose) and wider objectives (or project goals), together with the risks and assumptions involved, and indicators of progress towards the achievement of objectives”. Cracknell (ibid) identifies the three main functions of the logical framework as: ensuring a clear statement of objectives, introducing indicators of performance and focussing attention on the assumptions and risks.

Bakewell (no date:17) claims that most donors require a logical framework as a prerequisite for considering the funding of a project, with the key advantages of the logical framework being:

- It ensures that the project plan works out how activities will support the objective of the project,
- It requires the plan to evaluate how project progress and its success or failure will be demonstrated, and
- It provides a list of assumptions and risks that takes into account external factors outside the control of the project that may impact on its success.

Key disadvantages of the logical framework (Bakewell, no date:17):

- It often becomes an exercise of ‘filling in boxes’ to follow protocol and keep donors happy,
- It is a rigid framework, with predetermined goals unable to respond to new challenges or learned experience,
- Emphasis is usually placed on quantitative measures for progress monitoring and evaluation, making it difficult to track qualitative measures of capacity-building, social change and impact,
- It can ignore unexpected consequences and results of projects, and
- It is a weak tool for assessing the actual impacts of the project, as this is often not included within the logical framework.

Bakewell (no date:17) argues that the disadvantages can be minimised with a participatory approach to project planning, drawing all stakeholders into the development of the logical
framework and ensuring that it is regularly revised through participative reviews. Cracknell (2000:106) notes that the logical framework approach is the project management process most commonly utilised by donors throughout the world. Although acknowledging this approach does have merit and is vitally important for evaluators, Cracknell (2000:106) questions its compatibility with the increasing use of participative development processes. Lotz-Sisitka (2004:1) describes programme logical frameworks (logframes) as:

… reflecting particular narratives and assumptions of change. Inherent in logical planning frameworks are pre-defined development goals, with activities and instrumentalist funding frameworks that are deployed to achieve the particular goals derived through rationalist approaches to project planning. These frameworks have been critiqued for being based on a particular instrumentalist rationality, developmentalist logic and a deficit model of change.

O'Donovan (1997:114), in commenting on the findings of programme evaluations drawn from a number of studies in a range of countries, highlights the following concerns:

- Project appraisals have been too optimistic in relation to project cost,
- The desire to engage in policy has rushed sectoral and project preparation period,
- Projects were schedule driven, impeding the learning processes,
- Consultants sometimes get too involved in project development, and
- Evaluation has tended to be an internal process excluding major stakeholders.

O'Donovan’s (1997) study identified general project process and, particularly evaluation processes, as key areas of concern. Drawing on the findings of this study, O'Donovan (1997) suggests that a strategy needs to be adopted to improve qualitative aid delivery. The advocated strategy includes a process approach to projects, encouragement of a team-based analysis to project requirements, a participative approach that includes all role players and a clear definition of the programme’s purpose and structure.

### 2.6.2 Programme Management

Development programme management plays a critical role in the implementation of the programme and the performance of the programme against the logical framework. Power-knowledge relationships at management level appear to have a significant influence on the creation of an environment supportive to capacity-building for all stakeholders in development programmes. The discussion to follow will explore management approaches within the parameters of existing development aid programme management literature, rather than the broader interpretation of project management. Analoui (1997:137) identifies two broad categories of managerial approach. The first is a “… traditionalist positivist approach, who shows concern for objectivity and order by operating within the intellectual realm of functionalism” (Langford cited in Analoui 1997:137). The second approach, as described by Willcocks in Analoui (ibid:137), subscribes to the “… intellectual paradigm, which places emphasis on the actors as social agents and the need for understanding and considering their (the managers’) own viewpoints, motivations and self-awareness”. This approach views values as being open to interpretation, with “… social agreements including the subjective analysis and understanding of the individual managers involved.”
Analoui (1997:137-138) describes the outcomes of a study conducted into managerial effectiveness in organisational structures in India and Zimbabwe. Analoui’s (ibid) study identifies the following approaches supportive of effective programme management: “... a pluralistic view which considers the subjective views, personal interests and objectives, and allows for greater realization and understanding of what the managerial job is about” and how to improve effectiveness; interaction with others and an awareness for the key areas of effectiveness; improvement not only for the individual in knowledge of organizational constraints, but an awareness for key stakeholders who impact on this effectiveness and, finally, an “… awareness of the skills and knowledge needed to satisfy wider social needs” (ibid:137-138).

Chambers, (1992 cited in Rew 1997:108), “… blames a tyranny of professionals and outsiders for failure to appreciate the need for new lessons”, arguing that professional outsiders have a monopoly on powers of analysis. Chambers notes that development programme managers’ beliefs, demeanour, behaviour and attitudes have been self-validating – with perceived limitations of beneficiary communities becoming real limitations, irrespective of original capacities. Analoui (1997:137) supports this statement arguing that managerial effectiveness has not received the same level of critique as managerial roles and function, and suggests that this may be as a result of the ambiguity surrounding “… what is effectiveness?” and “… who is an effective manager?” (Brodie & Bennett cited in Analoui 1997:137). It is argued that managerial effectiveness is subjective, personalised and difficult to quantify. Rew (1997:97) argues that project managers need an understanding of influence and context to better mitigate “… against the impact of hard-to-predict outcomes”.

2.6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

A key tool for supporting effective programme management is that of monitoring and evaluation. These processes are often specified in the programme design. The discussion to follow will seek to provide a broad landscape within which to locate the EU Programme monitoring and evaluation processes and to support critical comment in Chapter 5 on how power-knowledge relationships within these processes influence capacity-building.

Bakewell et al (no date:6) defines monitoring as a “… systematic and continuous assessment of the progress of a piece of work over time, which checks that things are ‘going to plan’ and enables adjustments to be made in a methodological way”. Bakewell et al (ibid) further describes evaluation as the “… periodic assessment of the relevance, performance, efficiency and impact of a piece of work with respect to its shared objectives”, and is usually carried out at predetermined significant points in a programme. Bakewell et al (no date:5-6) identifies the following key reasons for programme monitoring and evaluation: accountability to both donors and project beneficiaries; improvement of stakeholder performance; improved learning through capturing learned experiences and improved communication between stakeholders through engagement and exposure to other’s perspectives. Molund and Schill (2004:11) elaborate on these broad definitions commenting that, in the development field, monitoring and evaluation are considered different processes and disciplines. Monitoring is a more superficial process...
than evaluation, recording results and activities against plans and budgets, providing an indication of possible problem areas. Evaluation is a far deeper process: it attempts to understand why a particular problem has arisen or expected outcome not achieved. It provides a tool for understanding how the programme is situated in the social context within which it is operating. Whereas monitoring is primarily capturing up-to-date information on activities and processes, evaluation challenges processes, establishes outcomes and impacts. However, “… if an intervention has not been properly monitored from the start, it may not be possible to subsequently evaluate satisfactorily” (ibid).

Cracknell (2003:48), in discussing current trends in programme evaluation, suggests that the emphasis in many development programmes is moving to a capacity-building focus, which is intrinsically more difficult to evaluate. This has required a shift towards a new concept of partnerships with the “… donor working alongside developing countries committed to pursing sensible development policies”. This has required the enhancing of evaluation capacities within participating developing countries. With the focus moving towards a partnership and participatory approach to evaluations with beneficiary countries, it does, however, raise the concern for accountability of evaluations. To counteract this concern Cracknell argues that a new approach of blending participatory approach to evaluations, combined with “… the proven advantages of the logical framework approach” is required. Pawson and Tilley (1997:23), however, suggest that evaluations should begin with the “… expectation that there will be disparity in knowledge of, and control over, any programme, and that this will be a permanent position”. They further argue that in order for evaluators to make informed observations, the evaluator is required to “… generate some means of making independent judgments about institutional structures and power relations within the programme”.

Rew (1997:105) states that, on reflection, after reviewing 123 social development programme reports available in the UK, SIDA development agency was identified as having the most thorough socio-cultural evaluation process. On the strength of this statement, the SIDA evaluation manual (Molund & Schill 2004) has provided the main content for the balance of this discussion. They (ibid:9) define evaluation as a “… careful and systematic and retrospective assessment of the design, implementation, and results of development activities”. Evaluation is an ongoing assessment of completed activities and needs, to be conducted throughout the lifespan of a project. Evaluation needs to meet specified quality standards: it “… must be carried out systematically and with due concern for factual accuracy and impartiality”. Evaluation is a reality test, providing feedback of performance against prior objectives and expected outcomes to inform future decision-making against further planning. Evaluation is also utilised to probe the realism of programme plans and expected outcomes. Evaluation needs to be systematic and thorough, utilizing “… sound and transparent methods of observation and analysis” (ibid:10).

Molund and Schill (2004) describe different phases of programme evaluation: interim evaluation conducted during the course of the programme; end-of-programme evaluation at the completion of the official end of the programme and ex-post evaluation conducted at a future stage after the official end of the programme. Evaluation can be divided into two categories: process evaluation
and impact evaluation. Process evaluation primarily deals with the planning and implementation processes, including interim results, and is generally associated with interim evaluation. Impact evaluation captures the outcomes and impacts within the programme environment and is primarily associated with end-of-programme evaluation (ibid:9-10; Cracknell 2000).

In development co-operation with a principle partner in the form of a donor, and an agent in the form of an NGO, evaluation serves two purposes: accountability and learning. Accountability evaluations have two orientations: financial and performance, with financial accountability as the allocation, disbursement and utilizations of funds, and performance as programme results (Molund & Schill 2004, Bakewell et al, no date).

In performance accountability, the objective of the evaluation is to establish if the agent has done the best job possible under the circumstances. It will attempt to establish the degree to which the intervention has achieved the programme objectives/results, as generally defined in the programme logframe, within which the context of implementation took place. The evaluation will also include an assessment of the planning and implementation processes. Learning orientated evaluations are “… expected to produce substantive ideas on how to improve the reviewed activity for similar activities. Although learning itself may be regarded as valuable, its real importance lies in the translation of new knowledge into practices”. Evaluations orientated towards contributing to learning are referred to as formative evaluations, whereas evaluations for accountability are described as summative evaluations (Molund & Schill 2004:13; Pawson & Tilley 1997).

Evaluations are generally based on three broad principles: impartiality, transparency and open discussion. It is important to note that these principles do run the risk of being subverted, as the implications for stakeholder reputations, resources and careers can be significant. With regards to the latter statement, evaluations can be used for tactical purposes. It is therefore essential that the purpose of the evaluation is clearly and transparently defined as the first step in planning and conducting an evaluation. For this reason, partnerships and other stakeholder participation is important for promoting transparency. Partnerships in evaluation assist in developing a sense of ownership of the programme by the beneficiaries, and improving the relationship between all stakeholders. It also assists in challenging recipient countries’ often-held perceptions that evaluations are seen as instruments of control (Molund & Schill 2004:14-15; Pawson & Tilley 1997).

There are three primary types of evaluation: external, internal and participatory. External evaluation is considered independent when “… evaluations are based on a clear and categorical line of demarcation between those who conduct the evaluation and those who are the object of evaluation” (Molund & Schill 2004:18, Cracknell 2000). In internal evaluations the evaluators are organizationally involved within the programme. Although this approach can provide a deeper insight into the programme within context, it is subject to bias and is not generally considered as credible as independent evaluation. Participation provides a further dimension to internal evaluation, where the distinction between experts and other stakeholders
is “… de-emphasised and refined” (Molund & Schill 2004:19; Cracknell 2000). The expert takes on a more facilitatory role, while putting the beneficiaries of the project first. Participation can be an end itself, mobilizing local knowledge and making developments more relevant to those on whom it has the greatest impact (Molund & Schill 2004:20).

2.7 Concluding Summary

This chapter has identified development programmes as been primarily driven by donor agencies funded by free market tender protocols, with power-knowledge relationships having a significant influence on programme conceptualization, design and implementation processes. The history of development has been traced from the 1950’s through to current national initiatives, identifying possible links between economic trends and developmental ideology. The internal workings of the development ‘industry’ have been discussed, including the politics of aid, globalization and ‘aid chains’, describing how power influences the structuring and accountability of programme delivery. The International Monetary Fund has been identified as the most significant global entity in development, setting policy and providing funding for broader development initiatives. NGO’s are acknowledged as being the interface between donors and programme beneficiaries, with relationships between NGO’s and donors briefly probed. The impact of development methodologies is discussed, with possibilities for future development approaches proposed.

The definition and history of nature-based tourism is described, with case studies highlighting possible issues of risks to developing environments emanating from the nature-based tourism industry. The idea of sustainability is probed at a broader level to contextualise the sustainability discussion within the nature-based tourism debate. This, in turn, is linked to ‘needs’ assessment processes within the programme design approach, to support sustainable programme outcomes. This discussion opens the debate on participation within the development programme methodology.

The two dominant approaches to programme design are discussed within the donor-funded programme context. The first is described as a ‘traditional’ approach, with donor control as the central tenet, utilizing a technist positivist approach to programme management. The second design process focuses on beneficiary ownership and commitment from stakeholders, supported by reflexive management processes and relationship building with beneficiaries. Within both approaches, monitoring and evaluation are identified as critical to effective programme management and further probed.

In addition to providing a description of the development landscape to contextualise the study, the discussion presented in this chapter will serve as a framework to inform the data analysis and guide critical comment in Chapter 5. Furthermore, this framework will serve to locate research findings and inform recommendations.
3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN DECISIONS

3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a methodological framework for guiding the research process. It describes the reasoning for the selection of an interpretive case-study approach in addressing the research aims and goals. It clarifies my role as the researcher in the research process. The chapter identifies four principles guiding the research design and provides a discussion on the research process. It explains why the specific data generation and analysis techniques were selected and how they were utilised in light of research validity and ethical considerations.

3.2 Research Design and Methodology
3.2.1 An Interpretive Orientation
Neuman (2000:63) describes research methodology as that which makes social science scientific, with social researchers choosing from alternative approaches to science, using their own philosophical assumptions, principles and approaches to research. Kaplan (cited in Cohen et al 2000:45) reminds the researcher that the “… main aim of methodology is to help us to understand, in the broadest possible terms, not the products of scientific research inquiry but the process itself”.

In seeking to achieve the research goals of this study (see Section 1.5), I have drawn on the interpretive approach which Terre Blanche and Kelly (1999:123) describe as a process of trying to “… harness and extend the power of ordinary language to help us better understand the social world we live in”. Connole (1998) provides further comment by suggesting that the interpretive perspective places primary emphasis on understanding. The interpretative approach will, therefore, be employed to clarify power-knowledge relationships associated with capacity-building in the context of the EU Programme, together with lessons learned to inform capacity-building requirements for supporting similar initiatives.

Neuman (2000) argues that the case-study is well suited to an interpretive approach that utilises social research techniques that are sensitive to context, and that draws on qualitative research methods. During the research process I have drawn on the use of various qualitative research methods (see Section 3.3) in seeking to understand how respondents in this research study see the world. I was particularly concerned with “… achieving an emphatic understanding” of respondents’ views of the EU Programme orientated around the research questions, rather than that of testing laws of human behaviour (Neuman 2000:75). In order to achieve these research objectives, Terre Blanche and Kelly (1999:123) argue that the researcher needs to “…assume that people’s subjective experiences are real and should be taken seriously (ontology), we can understand others’ experiences by interacting and listening to them (epistemology) with qualitative research methods best suited to the task”.

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Neuman (2000:72) provides further insight into ontological understanding, by suggesting that social life is based on “... social interactions and socially constructed meaning systems”, with people possessing an “... internally experienced sense of reality”. This is particularly relevant to this research, as the research respondents draw on significantly different socially constructed meaning systems, while working towards what the EU Programme design indicates as a common goal. Connole (1998:20) suggests that for the researcher to achieve the research objective requires “... not detachment but active involvement in the process of negotiating meaning”. This active involvement requires researchers to make first-hand accounts that describe findings in engaging language (Terre Blanche and Kelly 1999). Neuman (2000:72) cautions the researcher when making observations by arguing that “... external behaviour is an indirect and often obscure indicator of true social meaning”.

Neuman (2000:70-71) comments further, that interpretive social science is closely related to hermeneutics, which emphasises a detailed examination of texts. These texts include conversation, written or graphical representation. The examinations of texts within this case-study included EU Programme documentation, interviews and a focus-group discussion/interview, with the objective of discovering the meaning embedded within the texts (see Chapter 4 and 5). To do this, Neuman (2000:70-71) argues that the researcher needs to “... absorb or get inside the viewpoint” of the text as a whole, and then to “... develop a deep understanding of how its parts relate to the whole”. To do this, I spent a significant amount of time working with the data through an analysis process (see Section 3.4.). During this process, I was aware that very often the meaning within the text is not obvious, requiring contemplation of the many messages to seek the connections amongst the research parts (Neuman 2000:70-71).

In seeking to answer the research question (see Section 1.5), I was guided during data gathering and data-analysis processes by two important approaches, as described by Neuman (2000:72): What do people believe to be true and what do they hold to be relevant? Furthermore, as a result of Neuman’s (2000:72) argument that it makes “... little sense to try to deduce social life from abstract, logical theories that may not relate to the feelings and experiences of ordinary people”, I have used an inductive approach to reasoning in this research. Van der Merwe (1996) describes this approach as moving from specific experiences to general truths: from facts to theory.

Building on the interpretive approach of understanding what is going on and why, a second, more critical, lens will be applied to the interpretation, to provide a socially critical comment on the findings of the data analysis (see Chapter 5). Potter (1999) argues that a critical orientation is about challenging the status quo. In the case of this research, it included questioning donor ideologies towards development programme-design processes and management, with a focus on existing power-knowledge relations within the EU Programme, and how these relationships influenced capacity-building. The critical approach allows for the “... analysis of the causes and consequences of problems encompassed in questions and can illuminate a range of possible solutions” (Gibson 1986:2). These are presented in Chapter 5.
I have also orientated the research approach on what O'Leary (2004:11) describes as researcher reflexivity. This approach requires the researcher to “… stand outside the research process and critically reflect on the process. Research, as a ‘reflexive’ thinking process, involves constant consideration of the researcher, the researched, and the integrity of the process”. I have paid considerable attention to researcher reflexivity during the course of the research process, primarily due to a concern for researcher bias emanating from my close involvement with both the EU Programme and some of the individual respondents in this research.

3.2.2 Case-study

As indicated above, the orientation of this study will be an interpretative case-study with critical intent. O'Leary (2004:116) suggests that a case study is well suited to studying and analysing social phenomena in a single case or situation. This fits in well with my research context and goals (see Section 1.5). Patton (2002:447) provides further insight into case studies, arguing that the purpose of a case study is to gather “… comprehensive, systematic and in-depth information about each case of interest” and further suggests that well constructed case studies should be holistic and context sensitive.

Yin (2003:5) describes three key types of case study: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. This study will fall within both the descriptive and explanatory types, with a descriptive orientation presenting a description of capacity-building requirements in context to support sustainable nature-based tourism (see Chapter 4), and an explanatory orientation, presenting data bearing on power-knowledge relationships and how they have influenced capacity development in the EU Programme (see Chapter 5). Cohen et al (2000:181), in support of Yin’s case-study description, adds that “… case studies can establish cause and effect, indeed one of their strengths is that they observe affects in real contexts, recognizing that context is a powerful determinant of both cause and effects”.

This case-study is orientated to what Bassey (1999:58) refers to as a theory-seeking case study, aiming to lead to “fuzzy propositions”, with propositions resulting from “cause and effect relationships”. The ‘fuzzy proposition’ developed in this study, acknowledges possible uncertainty and fallibility. Through the data analysis and critical review in Chapter 5, this research seeks to capture these cause-and-effect relationships impacting on capacity-building requirements to support sustainability.
3.2.3 Research Design

Durrheim (1999:29-32) describes the research design as a “… strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between research question and the execution or implementation of the research... to ensure sound conclusions are reached”. In developing the research design, I have drawn on Durrheim’s (1999:29-32) design framework, consisting of four dimensions:

- Purpose of the research (see Chapter 1),
- The theoretical paradigm informing the research (see Section 3.2),
- Context within which the research is to be carried out (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), and
- The research techniques employed to collect and analyse data (see Section 3.3 and 3.4.).

Cohen et al (2000:73) note that a research plan, for which I used the above four dimensions for designing this study, needs to be workable and coherent: i.e. the “… resolution between idealism and reality, between what could be done and what would actually work”. I have taken careful note of this argument in my research design, as the research questions cover a broad spectrum and if not soundly designed and managed, the research process may become unworkable and fail to deliver on the research goals.

Drawing on Bassey (1999), Van der Merwe (1996) and Mouton (1996), the research process has evolved into the following steps/stages to support the exploration of interesting and significant features of a case study:

- Selection of research topic: this has evolved through my working experience on the EU Programme,
- Statement of research problem: this is reflected in my research questions, informed by my working experience (see Section 1.5),
- Research design: a guiding framework to be followed in addressing the research problem with the rationale of optimising the validity of findings (see Chapter 3),
- Research conceptualization: referring to the clarification and the analysis of the key concepts in a study and establishing the way in which the research is integrated into the body of existing theory and research (see Chapters 2 & 5),
- Ethical considerations: considering my role as a researcher and the impacts of the research process and outcomes (see Section 1.4 & 3.5),
- Research operationalisation: linking the key concepts in the problem statement to the phenomena to be studied. This is usually achieved by developing a measuring instrument: in the case of this research I have utilised document analysis, interviews and a focus-group discussion/interview (see Section 3.3),
- Sampling: ensuring the sample adequately represents the phenomena to be studied (see Section 3.3),
• Data collection and management: relevant to the research question, with data effectively managed for ease of retrieval (see Section 3.3 & 3.4),
• Data analysis: summarising data into themes, sub-themes and generating analytical statements (see Chapter 4 & 5, Appendix C, D, H, I), and
• Interpreting the analytical statements and theory generation (see Chapter 5).

3.3 Data Generation
3.3.1 Data Generation Process

O’Leary (2004:150) argues that the first step to creditable data generation is to negotiate access to the source. To achieve this, I have negotiated accesses to source data through the acceptance of the research process by individuals and organisations relevant to this research (Cohen et al. 2000). In addition to accessing data, I have also negotiated the ownership and release of this data (Cohen et al. 2000).

Due to the wide scope of the research question, it required that preliminary data categories be determined to manage the boundaries of the research process. The initial preliminary categories selected (see Appendix C) were based on personal experience within the EU Programme, together with input from community members and programme management on key categories relevant to capacity development.
Table 3.1: Data Generation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: EU Programme Document Analysis</th>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Analytic Memo (AM)</th>
<th>Date of Interview/Document Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance Agreement</td>
<td>EU Commission</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>11/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replication Study</td>
<td>EU Commission</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>11/2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 2: Interviews</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Programme manager</td>
<td>Programme Management Unit</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>14/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Training manager</td>
<td>Programme Management Unit</td>
<td>PTM</td>
<td>14/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Training evaluation consultant</td>
<td>Only evaluated sections of the WWF delivered training</td>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>13/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Business manager</td>
<td>Amadiba Adventures (beneficiary community)</td>
<td>BM</td>
<td>15/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Camp manager</td>
<td>Amadiba Adventures (beneficiary community)</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>16/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ufudu Experience</td>
<td>Private tourism</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>17/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Manager (electronic interview)</td>
<td>Ex PondoCROP (NGO)/ Programme Management Unit</td>
<td>NG1</td>
<td>07/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ex Human resource manager (electronic interview)</td>
<td>PondoCROP</td>
<td>NG2</td>
<td>14/01/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ex EU Programme coordinator (electronic interview)</td>
<td>WWF (NGO)</td>
<td>NG3</td>
<td>11/01/2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 3: Focus Group Discussion/Interview</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business manager</td>
<td>Amadiba Adventures (beneficiary community)</td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>17/12/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp manager</td>
<td>Amadiba Adventures (beneficiary community)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>ACCODA (beneficiary community)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The transcription codes were utilised for practical working purposes and derived from a simplification of the respective data source e.g. Finance Agreement was simplified to FA.

Kelly (1999) advises three stages of data generation: choosing a sampling strategy; selecting data-gathering methods and assessing the quantity of data required. In selecting a sampling strategy, this research has utilised Neuman’s (2000:198) concept of “purposive sampling”, described as sampling for special situations using the judgement of an expert in a special case. My knowledge of the EU Programme has allowed an informed identification of ‘generally’
accepted decision makers across the different stakeholder groups as research participants. In addition, informal discussions were held with stakeholder groups to ensure credibility of selected respondents. Furthermore, the validity of this research may have a significant effect on my professional career therefore, I have been acutely aware throughout all phases of the research process of possible bias on my behalf.

The research has utilised three primary sources for qualitative data generation: programme document analysis, interviews and a focus group (Merriam 2002; see Table 3.1 above). With regard to the quantity of data required, Morse (cited in Neuman 2000:418) suggests that adequate data has been generated when “… data saturation occurs”. In the scope of this half thesis study and in relation to the research question, data saturation did not occur. However, I believe the quantity of data gathered and analyzed captures the dominant themes in relation to the research questions. These dominant themes could be further tested with additional research.

Phase One (see Table 3.1) consisted of document analysis which took place during November 2004. Three key programme documents were selected: the EU Programme Financing Agreement; Midterm Review and the Replication Study. These documents were analysed against the research goals, coded to identify themes, thereby, informing the generation of analytic memos (AM) (see Table 3.1 and Section 3.2). The analytic memos, together with input from the literature review, were utilised to refine the interview schedule. The analytic memos were allocated a reference number and electronically filed (see Table 3.1).

Phase Two (see Table 3.1) consisted of interview with key decision makers within the different stakeholder groups, including the EU Programme Management Unit (PMU), the implementing NGO’s, community businesses and trusts, private consultants and private tourism sector. These stakeholders were interviewed during the course of December 2004 and January 2005. These interviews took place in Grahamstown, East London and at Mtentu Marine Reserve on the Wild Coast. Each interview was transcribed, coded into themes, an analytic memo generated and a reference number allocated and electronically filed. A transcribed interview was forwarded to each respondent for additions and validation (see Appendix A).

Unfortunately, due to the current sensitivity of the EU Programme with government, it was not possible to interview an informed government official, however, I have drawn on minutes of a meeting held with the Mayor of Port St Johns (see Appendix B) to support statements made by research respondents, regarding local government’s perceptions of the EU Programme. The only other key stakeholder that I was unable to interview was that of the Triple Trust Organization, the NGO contracted to provide the business skills training. An effort was made to contact the management responsible for the EU Programme training interventions however, all efforts went unanswered.

Phase Three (see Table 3.1) involved interviews with two key community members representing Amadiba Adventures, with their responses analysed to inform a focus group
discussion/interview. The focus group consisted of the same two community members interviewed together with a third community member representing ACCODA Community Trust. Unfortunately, it was not possible to interview the third community representative before the focus group, however, he was given first response opportunity to questions raised in the focus group. The focus group was held on the 17th December 2004 and was used to validate and augment responses from the individual interviews. The focus group recording was transcribed, coded into themes, and an analytic memo was generated and electronically filed. A copy of the transcription was forwarded to all focus group participants for validation (see Appendix E).

A total of six in-depth interviews (averaging one and a quarter hours each) were conducted and one group discussion/interview (one and a half hours). In addition, a further three interview schedules were emailed to selected individuals (see Table 3.1). A more detailed account of each data collection method follows.

### 3.3.2 Document Analysis

Hitchcock and Hughes (1995) describe documents as being mainly texts which relate to aspects of the social world. Patton (2002:293) identifies a document as a “… particularly rich source of information about organisations and programmes”, which provides information that cannot be observed. O’Leary (2004:177) describes document analysis as a “… collection, review, interrogation, and analysis” of various forms of pre-produced text, serving as primary sources of research data, with the role of the researcher “… limited to gathering, reviewing and interrogating a relevant document”. Merriam (2002:13), comments that a major strength of existing documentation is that they already exist in a situation, “… they do not intrude upon or alter the setting in ways that the presences of the investigator might”. This is of specific importance for this research, in-light of my personal involvement with the EU Programme. I have selected three relevant EU Programme documents for analysis:

- **The original programme Financing Agreement (1999):** The Finance Agreement details the contractual obligations between the European Union Commission and DEAT, the implementing agent accountable for programme delivery. The document serves as the guiding framework for programme implementation, containing the logical framework detailing programme deliverables, time-frames and budgets,

- **The Midterm Review (2003):** The Midterm Review’s objective was to assess the relevance, impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the EU Programme against the expected results, on the basis of the indicators formulated in the programme logical framework. This report was commissioned six months after the programme design specified – research into reasons for this delay with the PMU suggested bureaucratic procedural problems, and

- **Replication Study (2004):** The main objective of the Replication Study was the development of guidelines for replicating the EU Programme in other provinces of the country. This report is currently in its final draft, however, has recently been put on hold by the programme manager and is awaiting further EU Programme developments before final completion.
Analysis of these documents (see Table 3.2) provided an insight into programme processes and how they came into being (Patton 2002). Utilising the research questions as a starting point for analysis, the documents were studied, coded into themes, and analytic memos were generated (example: see Appendix F). This process assisted in refining the interview questionnaire, and later in the research process, guiding data analysis and informing the critical review presented in Chapter 5. The analytic memos acted as a stimulus for paths of enquiry that were pursued through the interview and focus-group process (Patton 2002).

### 3.3.3 Interviews

Patton (2002:341) argues that the purpose of interviews is to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective – to find what is in and on some else’s mind, with the quality of the information obtained during an interview largely dependant on the interviewer. I chose a guided, semi-structured interview method. Patton (2000:349) suggests that this approach “… increases the comprehensiveness of the data and makes data collection somewhat systematic for each respondent”. In addition, this approach anticipates possible logical gaps in the data. The interview questionnaire (see Appendix G) was partially informed by the literature review and programme document analysis analytic memos. These contributions, together with a review of the research goals, provided a clear idea of what information was required to access through the interview process. This process led to the subsequent finalisation of the interview schedule (Berg 1989).

The semi-structured interview included structured questions, to probe interpretations of definitions, and guiding questions, to explore further issues around capacity-building (Merriam 2002). The interview schedule served to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each respondent interviewed (Patton 2002). Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:128) claim that interviewing is a natural form of interacting with people and, therefore, fits in well with the interpretative approach to research, allowing researchers to understand how people think and feel.

Patton (1990:89) suggests that there is a “… very practical side to qualitative research methods that simply involves asking open-ended questions of people and observing matters of interest in real-world settings in order to solve problems”. However, Arksey and Knight (1999:1) argue that “…Interviewing is a family of research approaches that demands method more than common sense”, with these approaches to interviewing informed by the purpose of the research and assumptions of social science. During the interviewing process, I used my own judgement to guide the interview, not always following the sequence of questions, rather allowing the interview to flow with the discussion and, in most cases, improvising follow-up questions (Arksey & Knight 1999). In most interviews, the respondents had a tendency to favour certain questions relating to their interests or experience. I worked with this tendency, drawing out additional information through improvised questioning, while still being conscious not to guide the response to what I wanted to hear.
At the beginning of the interview process, all respondents were given adequate time to read through a personal copy of the interview questionnaire detailing the purpose and the goals of the research. It was explained that a copy of the transcribed interview would be forwarded to the relevant respondent for validation. As some of the information requested may have been considered sensitive, the respondents were offered a research pseudonym to encourage volunteering of information. A pseudonym was not requested by any of the respondents. In most cases, I had an established relationship with the respondent, which assisted in neutralising possible mistrust (Mouton 1996). For this reason, I have decided to withhold names of the research respondents, as research data is often sensitive in nature, thus providing additional protection to the respondents. I was conscious of the fact that these relationships had the potential to result in the respondent providing the information they perceived I wanted to hear. To mitigate against this concern, I clearly stressed that this was an opportunity to share their understandings of the questions being asked, informed by their personal experience.

3.3.4 Focus Group Discussions/Interviews

Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999) describe a focus group as a general term used for research that is conducted with a group sharing a similar type of experience and characteristic. Berg (1989:100-101) comments that the focus group consists of a small number of participants, with the researcher drawing out information relevant to the topic, with the informal group discussion atmosphere encouraging participants to “… speak freely and completely about behaviours, attitudes and opinions”. Berg (ibid) further comments that the interactions between participants responding to each others’ comments leads to a dynamic referred to as a “… synergistic group effort”. Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999), claim that when working in groups, people develop intersubjective experience. As a researcher, I sought to understand these intersubjective experiences.

Berg (1989:114-115) states that, in most cases, “… ensuring confidentiality with participants is critical if the researcher expects to get truthful and free flowing discussion in focus groups”. In light of this statement, participants were assured that a transcription of the focus group would be forwarded for validation and authorisation of data release. In addition, the participants would have the option of a pseudonym in the research data if required. Due to a previous incident involving one of the focus group participants being miss-quoted by a journalist in the press, this reassurance was of particular importance for quality data generation. It was clearly articulated at the beginning of the focus group what the purpose and the process of the focus group was. It was also explained that the focus group interview discussion did not seek a consensus, but rather it was an opportunity to share perceptions and points of view (Krueger & Casey 2000). The group consisted of specifically invited participants with the objective of validating and augmenting data gathered in the in-depth interview process (Arksey & Knight 1999). Patton (1999) advises that the focus group is first and foremost an interview, and not a problem solving session or decision-making group. Participants got to hear other people’s opinions and had the opportunity to add further comments over and above their original responses. The objective was to get high quality data in a social context, where respondents can consider their views in the context of others (Patton 1999).
While facilitating the focus group, I was aware that dominant individuals may obliterate alternative points of view, however, this was not a factor during this focus group conducted at Mtentu Reserve. I was also aware not to test out how I thought it ought to be, rather, I used the opportunity to validate findings from the interview process, to see how my interpretation fitted with the respondents’ understanding. This approach allowed me to “… seek explanations of unexpected findings and to clarify details” (Arksey & Knight 1999:77).

3.4 Data Management and Analysis
3.4.1 Data Management

This research has considered data management an integral part of data analysis (Poggenpoel 1998). During the course of the study, research activities were aimed at achieving a “… systematic, coherent manner of data collection, storage and retrieval” (Poggenpoel 1998:334-335). For this reason a structured data collection strategy was developed (see Table 3.1 and Section 3.3) detailing the process of data collection, but also remaining flexible to respond to changing research needs.

The interview questionnaire was structured in such a way that it attempted to capture data according to preliminary categories (see Appendix C) of data, while still being open to emerging issues. These preliminary categories also guided an initial review of the documents (as discussed in section 3.3.2).

The interview data was also coded according to these preliminary categories, while allowing space for emerging issues. Cohen et al (2000:281) notes that the interview transcription is a crucial step, with the potential for “… data loss, distortion and reduction of complexity”, with the transcript being abstracted and decontextualised from the social world and to be viewed as “… already interpreted data”. In light of this statement, I aimed to transcribe the original audio recording as comprehensively as possible. When the transcription was complete each category was coded into themes “… recognising persistent words, and phrases” and concepts (see Appendices D & A) (Maxwell 1996:79). Drawing on the thematic coding, an analytic memo was developed and attached to the interview transcripts (example: see Appendix D). Maxwell (1996:79) describes an analytic memo as a note that captures and facilitates “… analytical thinking about your data, stimulating analytical insights”. Maxwell (1996:79) further notes that qualitative coding is “… developed in interaction with, and is tailored to the understanding of, the particular data being analyzed”. The transcripts and attached analytic memo’s were numbered and filed electronically for efficient retrieval. The audio tapes were catalogued according to respondent, date and venue and safely stored for possible future reference (see Table 3.1). The analysis of programme documentation followed the same process of categorizing, identifying themes through coding and developing of an analytic memo, numbered and filed electronically.

Through a refining process of categorizing data into themes, and sub-themes (see Appendix D, H, I), I was able to impose order on the data, reducing the raw data into a manageable size (see Chapters 4 & 5) (Neuman 2000).
3.4.2 Data Analysis

Neuman (2000:420) notes that “… qualitative researchers form new concepts or refine concepts that are grounded in the data”, with concept formation being an integral part of data analysis. Neuman (ibid), further notes that concepts are formed as the researcher reads through the data, asking critical questions. This approach was prevalent throughout the research data generation and analysis process Levels 1 through to 3 (see Table 3.2), with data analysis a continual process of capturing concepts and themes in analytic memos and informing the next level of data generation (see Appendices C, D, H, I) (Maxwell 1996). This simultaneous process of data analysis and collection allowed the research to be responsive to the research context and supported an inductive research process, through searching for common patterns captured by analytic memos (Merriam 2002).
Table 3.2: Data Analysis Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Analysis Process</th>
<th>Research Level 1</th>
<th>Research Level 2 (Chapter 4)</th>
<th>Research Level 3 (Chapter 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Generation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>Critical Interpretation and Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong></td>
<td>EU Programme document Analysis</td>
<td>Develop a preliminary framework of research categories in order to sort data (see Appendix C)</td>
<td>Discussion on refined themes and sub-themes together with socially critical comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 2</strong></td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Repeated reviewing and refining of analytic memos (example: see Appendix D) to establish emerging themes and sub-themes (see Appendix H)</td>
<td>Draws data analysis and socially critical comment together presenting the studies findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 3</strong></td>
<td>Focus group discussion/interview</td>
<td>Refining of themes and sub-themes to inform critical interpretation and comment in Chapter 5 (see Appendix I)</td>
<td>Provides recommendations based on the study findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Analysis Approach</strong></td>
<td>A simultaneous process of data analysis and collection through the data generation phases informed by analytic memo’s</td>
<td>Stay close to the data, asking critical questions in seeking to understand ‘what is going on’ while critically retracing the research path to ensure validity</td>
<td>Draw on relevant theory, the literature review (Chapter 2) and personal experience to understand the ‘why’ of what is emerging in the data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In analysing the data, I was aware that ‘facts’ are context specific and social situations ambiguous, resulting in multiple interpretations of data. During the analysis, I was therefore looking for reassuring clues that would allow me to make sense of the data, to “… know what’s going on” (Neuman 2000:74-75). To assist in this process, I drew on Geertz, cited in Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:139), who suggests providing a “thick description”. This includes a description of all components of, and the context of the research, including the researcher’s role in constructing this description (see Section 1.4). As I have been working within the EU Programme, Geertz’s argument is critical to the interpretation of the data and its trustworthiness. To support this approach I have stayed close to the data, interpreting it from a position of emphatic understanding (Terre Blanche & Kelly 1999).

Terre Blanche and Kelly (1999:424) caution the researcher against “… embarking on a self-fulfilling quest” - finding out what you want to find out and convincing others on route. They further argue that it is only when we “… consciously set out to disprove our interpretive
accounts that we can start to talk about accuracy”. To monitor validity the researcher needs to “backward arc” - this involves looking back on progress and critically retracing the research path. O’Leary (2004:11) further expands on this idea, arguing that the quality of research relies not only on the ability of the researcher to analyse and write-up, but on the ability to think through the process of analysis, communicating the findings to the audience.

3.4.3 Validity and Trustworthiness

Terre Blanche and Kelly (1999:140), in discussing the outcome of interpretive research, suggest that in the end the research needs to present a “… compelling account of the phenomenon being studied – close enough to the context so that people familiar with the context would recognise it as true, but far enough away so that it would help them to see the phenomenon in a new perspective”. This approach has been a central focus of the research.

Merriam (2002) suggests the use of triangulation to support validity in qualitative research. Cohen et al (2000:113), citing Denzin, describes methodological triangulation as “… using the same method on different occasions or different methods of the same object of study”. This study has utilised document analysis of programme reports, interviews and a focus group discussion for “… gathering data and identifying convergent evidence from the data gathered” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999:430-431). Denzin (cited in Maxwell 1996:75) suggests that triangulation reduces the risk of findings reflecting systematic biases or limitations of a specific method, and “… allows for a better assessment of the validity and generality of the explanations” developed.

Merriam (2002) argues that the quality of qualitative research relies on validity and reliability. This theory seeking case study aims to lead to “fuzzy propositions”, established from cause and effect relationships, and as such relies on internal validity (Bassey 1999:58). Cohen et al (2000) describes internal validity as a process that seeks to demonstrate that the explanation the research provides can actually be sustained by the data. However, Merriam (2002:25) argues that qualitative enquiry assumes there are “… multiple realities with individuals having their own unique interpretation”. It is therefore necessary to understand the perspectives of those involved and the complexities, and then to present a holistic interpretation of what is going on. Chapter 4 data presentation and Chapter 5 data analysis with critical comment are dedicated to this process. Merriam (2002:72) describes reliability in qualitative research as the degree to which the results are consistent with the data collected. Bassey (1999) poses an additional approach to reliability, suggesting the concept of trustworthiness, illuminating the ethic of respect for truth in case study research.

I have considered a number of validities to support this qualitative research. In terms of external validity, this research has attempted to provide a clear, detailed and in-depth description of context and findings so others, particularly those involved in the EU Programme can decide the extent to which findings are generalisable (Cohen et al 2000:109). For content validity, the research has attempted to demonstrate that through the programme documents selected for analysis and the sampling process of respondents, that the research “… fairly and
comprehensively covers the domain or items that it purports to cover” (Cohen et al 2000:109). To ensure face validity, full transcripts of the interviews were forwarded to respondents to validate and augment responses before being utilised as a research data source (Lather 1986).

3.5 Research Ethics

Neuman (2000:90) defines ethics as “… that which is, or is not legitimate to do, or what ‘moral’ research procedure involves”. Ethical considerations during the research were guided by arguments from Bassey, and Terre Blanche and Durrheim. Bassey (1999) suggests that research ethics have three broad areas: respect for democracy; respect for truth and respect for persons. Freedom for democracy is subjected to responsibilities imposed by the ethics of respect for the truth and persons. In respect of truth, researchers should not intentionally deceive others or themselves in all aspects of the research. Respect for persons, requires that researchers respect respondents as fellow human beings, who are entitled to dignity and privacy (Bassey 1999). In addition, Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999:66) suggest three ethical guiding principles to research design: “… autonomy – to respect all autonomy of those participating in the research, nonmaleficence – should not harm any persons and a beneficence – it will be of benefit”.

Throughout this research process, I have orientated research ethics around Strydom’s (1998:24) statement that “… ethical principles should be internalised in the personality of a researcher to the extent that ethically guided decision-making becomes part of his total lifestyle”. Neuman (2000:90) also guided my thinking in suggesting that the “… researcher’s personal moral code is the best defence against unethical behaviour”.

As a researcher, I was acutely aware of my position of power in the research process, with the potential to abuse participants’ responses and/or the research process itself. I therefore ensured that in engaging with community respondents, programme management and all other participants that I followed official channels. I clearly explained the purpose and process of the research, taking the opportunity to build on existing relationships. I ensured that all data gathered and then transcribed was validated by the relevant respondents while encouraging additional comment. Finally, I have agreed to present the research findings to Amadiba Adventures and will submit electronic copies of this research to all participants who have requested it (O’Leary 2004).

3.6 Concluding Summary

Although this study seeks to lead to “fuzzy propositions” established from cause and effect relationships (Bassey 1999:58), the methodological focus was on the research process itself and not the scientific products (Kaplan cited in Cohen et al 2000:45). In support of a methodological focus, an interpretive case-study was selected to provide the guiding theoretical framework. This framework is well suited to achieving an emphatic understanding of respondents’ views of the EU Programme orientated around the research aims and goals, with qualitative research methods identified as the most suited to interpretive case-study research (Neuman 2000:75).
The research design drew on Durrheim’s (1999) four research design principles. These principles informed the development of the research process (Bassey 1999, Van der Merwe 1996, Mouton 1996) with the objective of exploring interesting and significant features of the EU Programme case-study.

To support data generation, access to primary data sources was negotiated prior to commencement of the research process (O’Leary 2004). In addition, the three stages of data generation: sampling; selecting data-gathering methods and assessing the quantity of data required, were guided by Kelly (1999). In terms of sampling, a purposive sampling strategy was utilised (Neuman 2000). The data-gathering focused on three primary sources: programme document analysis, interviews and a focus group discussion/interview (Merriam 2002). Three levels of data generation are represented in Tables 3.1. Data generation and analysis processes were informed by a constant refinement process including data sorting, coding into preliminary categories, themes and sub-themes, generating of analytic memos and electronic filing for easy access (see Table 3.2) (Maxwell 1996). These processes, in turn, informed the development and refinement of research concepts through asking critical questions of the data and the ongoing analysis (see Appendices D, H, I) (Neuman 2000). It is acknowledged that during the data generation process, data saturation did not occur, however it is my belief that sufficient data was gathered to identify dominant themes relevant to the research goals (Morse cited in Neuman 2000:418). Once the data was analyzed and concepts refined, a second critical interpretive lens was applied to provide a socially critical comment on the data analysis (see Chapter 5) (Potter 1999).

In considering research validity, I was cautious to not embark on a self-fulfilling quest. Instead, I focussed on presenting a compelling account of the case-study (Terre Blanche & Kelly 1999). As I have been closely involved in the research subject through my working experience, this orientation to validity is of critical importance. To further support research validity, I have drawn on methodological triangulation, described by Denzin in Cohen et al (2000:113) as “… using the same method on different occasions or different methods of the same object of study”. Furthermore, I have discussed external and internal validity as described by Cohen et al (2000:109) and face validity as described by Lather (1986).

Ethical considerations during my research were guided by Bassey (1999), who suggests that research ethics have three broad areas: respect for democracy; respect for truth and respect for persons. To achieve this, I internalised ethical principles focussing on a personal moral code to guard against unethical behaviour (Strydom 1998, Neuman 2000).
4. CHAPTER 4: THE EU PROGRAMME AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

4.1 Introduction

The data represented in this chapter seeks to capture the experiences of the EU Programme from individual respondents representing community, programme management, NGO’s, a consultant responsible for training evaluation and a private tourism respondent (joint venture partner for Amadiba Adventures). The selection criteria (see Section 3.3.1) for research respondents were based on experience in the EU Programme, position held in their respective groups and level of influence. However, it must be noted that these are individual views and cannot necessarily be generalised to represent their group stand-points.

The preliminary categories for capturing the data represented in this chapter were identified by myself, drawing on personal experience in working on the programme, and informed by community, NGO and programme management input (see Section 3.3.1 and Appendix C). These categories served only as a guiding framework for capturing and organizing raw data, whilst providing space for additional categories and themes to emerge through the inductive analysis process. Research data represented in categories and themes, as outlined in this chapter, are not mutually exclusive, rather interdependent, resulting in an overlap of discussion.

Individual community respondents, who were part of the EU Programme beneficiary group, will for practical purposes be referred to as ‘community’ respondents. This research acknowledges that the beneficiary group is not a homogenous entity, but rather exists as a collection of individuals with independent values and perspectives.

There is a history of sensitivities surrounding the EU Programme. Community respondents and programme management have previously been misrepresented and quoted out of context in the media. This factor accentuated the critical importance of accurate research data presentation. I have attempted, in synthesizing the research data, not to lose the sentiment or context in which the data was captured. To guard against this, interview transcripts were forwarded to each respondent for additions and validation (see Section 3.4.3).

The terms “nature-based tourism” and “eco-tourism” will be use interchangeably depending on the respondent’s choice. For the purposes of this study, it is accepted that these two terms share a common meaning. The same applies to the terms “local government” and “local municipality”.

The themes discussed below emerged from the preliminary research categories, through a refinement process guided by analytic memos (see Appendices C, D, H, I). During this refinement process, I constantly referred back to the research question to ensure relevance.
Themes to be discussed in this chapter:

- Principles of nature-based tourism (Section 4.2),
- Capacity-building (Section 4.3),
- Communication (Section 4.4),
- Needs-assessment (Section 4.5),
- Programme ownership (Section 4.6),
- Engaging provincial and local government (Section 4.7),
- Programme design (Section 4.8),
- Programme management (Section 4.9),
- Institutional structures (Section 4.10),
- Training (Section 4.11),
- Monitoring and evaluation (Section 4.12), and
- Programme sustainability (Section 4.13).

4.2 Principles of Sustainable Nature-based Tourism

As a socio-economic development programme, principles of sustainability would need to be a central focus of the design and implementation processes. With nature-based tourism being utilised as the vehicle for socio-economic development, this theme explores the stakeholders perceptions of sustainability, to inform capacity-building needs aimed at supporting sustainable nature-based tourism.

Neither, the programme Finance Agreement (FA) - that provides the logical framework outlining programme result areas and objectives - nor the Midterm Review (MTR), nor Replication Study (RS) provide any guiding principles for nature-based tourism, responsible tourism or sustainability. The Finance Agreement states that the EU Programme was designed to support the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative, with the objective of achieving tangible and economic and social development of previously disadvantaged communities (PDCs), both in terms of job creation and income generation.

Respondents from both community and stakeholder organizations believe that socio-economic returns from tourism need to be linked to sustainable natural resource usage and management. The community respondents placed significant emphasis on the social orientation and benefits from sustainable tourism and environmental management. The sense was that tourism needs to be based on community needs and bring benefits to the community, while managing the environment in the long run. Community respondent 2 emphasized the importance of community support, if programmes are to be sustainable by stating that, "... if it is not acceptable to community it is not sustainable". This was reflected by the training manager citing a tension within the EU Programme management ideology, noting that the EU Programme approach suggested that environmentalists knew "... how to conserve nature, however, when environmentalists were not involved the communities managed the environments, and therefore must be included in management strategies ... community involvement and education is the only way to ensure sustainable community nature-based tourism". This statement raises the
contentious issue of a top down approach to programme design, with the possible implication of negating local knowledge, alienating and sidelining the very communities it is supposed to support.

Respondents from all stakeholder groups made reference to the important role of the private tourism sector in ensuring financially sustainability. Amadiba Adventures is currently negotiating a concession agreement with a private-sector partner to assist in subsidizing the horse and hiking trails (their tourism product), until they are operating at improved profitability levels. The Replication Study advocates moving the emphasis from community owned and managed tourism ventures competing in the privates sector, to private-sector operating in the community area, with strong linkages to increase the spread of benefits. This sentiment is supported by the programme manager, who advocates private-sector driven initiatives guided by an integrated development plan, with strong linkages to local community. There appears to be some support from the NGO respondents for this statement, with PondoCROP respondent 2 stating that, “...we all agree that the private-sector has a role to play”. The question of what role the private-sector should play is closely linked to the programme design and participative processes (see Section 4.8). Programme management, NGO’s, the training evaluation consultants (to be referred to as the evaluation consultants) and the private tourism respondent, were in general agreement on the principle of economic empowerment of resident communities through the sustainable utilization of the natural capital for tourism purposes.

A significant issue raised by the evaluation consultant, with regards to principles of sustainable tourism initiatives, was the importance of the programme ‘form’ to be compatible with communities’ capacity to manage sustainably. This raises the issues of needs-assessment and the participative role of community in the needs-assessment processes, to guide programme design in order to support capacity-building requirements.

4.2.1 Section Summary
The programme documentation provides no guiding principles for nature-based tourism, responsible tourism or sustainability. The community respondents believe that sustainable nature-based tourism needs to be based on community needs, and bring benefits to community, while managing the environment for the long run. All other respondents agree on the principle of economic empowerment of resident communities through the sustainable utilization of the natural capital for tourism purposes. All respondents acknowledge the important role of the private-sector in community tourism, with the question being: what role should they play? This question needs to be linked to the programme design and approaches to capacity-building.

4.3 Capacity-building
None of the EU Programme documents analysed provided guiding principles for capacity-building, although the Finance Agreement does provide a logical framework that outlines seven result areas requiring capacity development for achieving the anticipated results. These seven result areas are:
• Result 1: support structures for community development, established in five anchor areas of the Wild Coast,
• Result 2: community members trained in business skills and enterprise development,
• Result 3: community members trained in natural resources management (NRM); community multi-use/interpretation centre established,
• Result 4: community and private-sector partnerships established,
• Result 5: new community business activities identified and implemented,
• Result 6: community and state co-management established in six nature reserves, and
• Result 7: policy/institutional support to government (national, provincial, local) established.

Although all seven result areas required varying forms of capacity development, reference is only made to training requirements specified in quantitative objectives, e.g. 2730 adults trained in business skills (Finance Agreement 1999). No reference is made to qualitative standards or qualitative evaluation for training/capacity development interventions.

All respondents were unanimous in saying that the formal training, as ‘delivered’ by the EU Programme against the logical framework does not, on its own, constitute capacity-building. The common theme running through the community respondents’ responses was that capacity-building should not mean “… just book training” (community respondent 3); it should mean hands-on practical skills to be able to do the job. A further theme expressed by the community respondents is that of “… building skills to understand the development plans and actively engage in the programme” (community respondent 3). The challenges faced by Amadiba Adventures require that people are capacitated with “… skills and knowledge on how to run a business … we need capacity to run the business” (community respondent 2). Community respondent 1 raised the idea that capacity is about “… moving people to a new level”. This includes training, but also goes beyond just training, including the sharing of ideas and exposure to new experiences.

The evaluation consultant offered an interesting perspective, noting that it is critical to develop the capacity of all key stakeholders within the programmes, including management, NGO’s, traditional leaders and government departments. It needs to be remembered that development programmes, consultants and NGO’s come and go, however, government does not. Therefore, capacity-building within relevant government departments is absolutely critical for programme sustainability.

The WWF respondent, drawing on her experience within the EU Programme established community nature-based tourism businesses, notes that the community was used as “… window-dressers with minimum hands-on participation especially in managing the ventures”. She believes this is a result of no real participation in the EU Programme and lack of commitment by the programme to capacity development.
4.3.1 Willingness of Donors to Support Capacity-building Initiatives

The programme manager stated that real capacity-building is about helping communities to build up the confidence to take control of their own lives. The programme manager and the private tourism respondent were emphatic that capacity-building is a time-consuming process, difficult to accelerate and requires long-term intervention. The programme manager indicates that the long-term interventions required to build capacity are considered “too risky” by the donors. For this reason they do not want to get involved in long-term development programmes. The private tourism respondent, in reflecting on the programme’s five-year implementation period, suggested that “… this is a 20 year project to develop the capacity required to achieve the programme objectives. For a community of rural farmers to operate a sophisticated ecotourism business in five years – can not do, will not do, never in that timeframe”.

4.3.2 Questioning Capacity of the ‘Capacity Developers’

The programme manager believes that there is a general lack of capacity all round including government, donors, and the private-sector, with insufficient understanding of the “… dynamics in trans-boundary economics and social systems between developed and developing socio-economic environments”. He, therefore, argues that capacity development of the beneficiary group is seriously questionable, when those supposedly responsible for capacity-building do not have the capacity-building ability, or the understanding of the requirements for capacity-building within the context of the Wild Coast. Lack of capacity has been reflected at all levels in the programme, from implementing NGO’s and consultants to the DEAT. In light of this evolving development environment, both the evaluation consultant and community respondent 2, called for the idea of constantly developing new ideas to enable capacity-building to respond to changing circumstances.

4.3.3 False Perceptions of Capacity

The private tourism respondent raised a concern relating to capacity of those responsible for community capacity development. The private tourism respondent believes that “outsiders”, referring to those involved with the EU Programme but outside of community, have been responsible for creating a false perception within community, of their ability to run the businesses established by the EU Programme, independently and within the programme timeframe. The situation may have been exacerbated by the EU Programme’s approach to business development, including capital expenditure, technical expertise and marketing support, which was not in keeping with the level of community business activity and not sustainable. This approach may have resulted in a lack of community understanding of the business requirements and capacity required to compete in the free market. This scenario has the potential to be destructive of community cohesion and dignity, and may negatively impact on future community development opportunities at the end of the EU Programme.

4.3.4 Section Summary

None of the EU Programme documents analyzed provides guiding principles for capacity-building or qualitative assessment of training. The Finance Agreement does, however, provide a
logical framework that outlines seven result areas requiring training. All respondents were in agreement that formal training on its own does not constitute capacity-building; the focus needs to be on developing skills to do the ‘job’. It was highlighted that it is essential to develop all stakeholder capacities, especially those of government. Capacity-building is described as requiring a long-term intervention, however, there appears to be a lack of willingness of donors to support long-term interventions, considering them “too risky”. It is argued that there was a general lack of capacity of those tasked with building community capacity. This includes donors, NGO’s, and government. It was also expressed that this lack of ‘capacity’ of capacity builders may have led to the creation of a false sense of capacity within community, and a false understanding of the business environment.

Communication has emerged as a dominant theme throughout the data. Communication issues appear to have had a significant influence on capacity-building. This relationship is explored in the discussion to follow.

4.4 Communication

4.4.1 Programme Challenges

Neither the Finance Agreement, nor the Midterm Review or the Replication Study make any specific reference to principles or protocols for communication between the stakeholders, or lessons learned from the programme in this regard. However, the programme training manager, community respondents, the NGO’s and the evaluation consultant identify communication as one of the “… big problems” with the EU Programme. Community respondent 1 closely links communication and local government capacity-building, as essential for a successful programme implementation (see Section 4.7). Community respondent 1 describes capacity-building as being a “… long process - all role players must know what is happening from the beginning, if the project is to be sustainable”. The same respondent notes that communication very often comes down to people listening “… only to what they want to hear”, with the reason behind this very often being a reflection of the programme approach to meaningful participation and programme ownership (see Section 4.7).

The evaluation consultant believes that communication in the EU Programme was very superficial. He further comments that, “Communication in these big diffuse programmes is always problematic and always an issue, as individuals and the system do not like to communicate”. He suggests that effective communication is linked to motivation: people need to want to work in a communicative way; communication needs to be viewed as the “… social glue that holds the whole process together”. The whole relational dynamic relies on communication. Communication needs to start at the very beginning, with collaborative programme design and engagement (ibid) (see Section 4.7).

4.4.2 Programme and Stakeholder-organizations Communication

The Finance Agreement lists contractual reporting and financial auditing obligations for the NGO’s and DEAT, however, there are no guiding principles for inter-organizational
communication. The Midterm Review describes how the organisational structure resulted in a lack of functional and operational responsibilities and in ineffective communication channels between all stakeholders. This was exacerbated by DEAT’s lack of capacity and time constraints. The programme manager states that the “… programme design made communication too difficult”, with too many layers of people (see Figure 1.1), who were not properly accountable. This led to situations where budgets for capacity-building were based on ill-informed decisions and were “… forced upon implementing agencies opposed to the decision” (PondoCROP respondent 1). The Midterm Review clearly states that there was a “… lack of programme integration between all role-players – EU Programme and government and other initiatives”. The WWF respondent, PondoCROP respondent 1, community respondents and the private tourism respondent stated that the organizational structures created a situation where too many personal agendas were playing out, that were not in line with the programme objectives.

4.4.3 Programme Management Unit (PMU) and Government Communication

The Midterm Review describes how the EU Programme was perceived to have been “parachuted” in from national government, resulting in it never being embedded at provincial level, and creating operational tensions that diminished ownership and acceptance. Problems that the EU Programme has encountered within communities include strained relationships with ward councillors, who have expressed frustration that they received little information on the programme and felt that it has been “imposed” upon them, despite their participation on community trusts (Midterm Review 2003). These concerns, combined with the Mayor of Port St Johns opinion (the only significant coastal town in the programme area), that the programme was designed by Europeans, for the benefits of whites, raises questions regarding the PMU’s efforts to build relationships with local government to adequately explore and address these issues (see Appendix B). It is acknowledged by the community respondents, programme training manager and WWF respondent that communication was resisted by local government, as a result of the programme design process and implementation strategy. Community respondent 1 suggests that the situation was exacerbated by provincial and local government not talking to each other, with the result that the community got caught between the two. This has resulted in local government providing limited support to the community businesses, as they did not form part of the Integrated Development Plans (see Section 4.7).

Community respondent 1 argues that there is not enough understanding of the Wild Coast - the tourism product - and what it can offer as a tourism destination. Community respondent 1 notes that this has been a “… big problem with the black politicians within local government, not having an understanding of tourism, especially the horse and hiking trail which is seen as a ‘thing’ not a business”. Amadiba Adventures has made an effort to bring local government down to the camps. However, there appears to be a resistance to wanting to know, or to find out anything more about the business. This appears to be linked to the lack of EU Programme ownership and the imposition of the programme on government, with subsequent capacity development of specific communities that are now seen as challenging local government capacity.
4.4.4 Programme Management Unit (PMU) and Community

All community respondents were dissatisfied with the current PMU communication approach with the community. The respondents did not want to communicate through consultants; instead they wanted direct communication with the PMU. Community respondent 2 stated that “... whenever there is a decision between the PMU and the trust, there needs to be a member of the community present ... they [PMU] used to take decisions without the community and then the consultant would come down and implement the decision - it is still happening even now”. Community respondent 3 provides a specific example, explaining that ACCODA (the community trust owners of Amadiba Adventures) were only notified of the programme’s closure a few weeks prior to the original closure date in March 2004. The programme manager, in reflecting on the communication issue, acknowledges it is a serious problem. He explains that it is a very difficult situation in that the EU Programme’s available resources are sufficient to meet the communities' expectations raised prior to his tenure as programme manager; as a result of this situation it is extremely difficult to engage directly with community. The PMU, with limited resources and within the remaining programme timeframe, is aiming to maximise the return to the community through a strategy orientated around private-sector linkages for supporting community business in long-term sustainability (see Section 4.13).

4.4.5 Section Summary

Communication issues arising from the PMU-community interface, between the PMU and government and between organizational stakeholders, are complex and not clearly defined. However, the research data suggests that the common underlying factor related to a majority of the cited programme communication issues is that of programme design. A second issue suggests a degree of tension between provincial and local government, and a general lack of government capacity to support large scale donor-funded development initiatives such as the EU Programme.

The data indicates that communication issues have resulted in a programme design with questionable relevance and implementation strategies lacking sufficient resources. This raises the issue of needs-assessment at programme conceptualization and implementation phases. The discussion to follow will explore needs-assessment within the EU Programme.

4.5 Needs-assessment

4.5.1 Needs-assessment and Programme Conceptualization

The Finance Agreement provides no specific guiding framework or principles for needs-assessments to meet programme capacity-building objectives. The Midterm Review states that the log-frame designers did not fully appreciate the underlying challenges facing the EU Programme, and suggests that this was a result of insufficient needs-assessment. In addition, the Midterm Review argues that the capacity of the implementing NGO’s was not evaluated. It is interesting to note that the Replication Study provides no guidelines for needs-assessment, either at programme conceptualizing stage, or for the ‘targeted community’ training requirements to support programme objectives. In addition, the EU Programme was over
ambitious and its purpose was never adequately analysed to determine whether it was achievable (Midterm Review 2003).

A significant factor in the selection of the Wild Coast SDI for the launching of an EU initiative for community tourism development was the existence of a small community tourism project, operational along the northern 25 kilometres of the Wild Coast. During the process of engagement with PondoCROP, an EU consultant proposed an extensive programme dividing the coastline (280 kilometres) into five development nodes, each with an implementing agent. The EU then requested a business plan from PondoCROP, for potential projects associated with the Mzamba and Amadiba ‘Anchor Project Area’ (Node 1 – northern 25 kilometres) and the Horse and Hiking Trail concept (PondoCROP EU Programme co-ordinator, 2005 pers.comm & PondoCROP closure report 2005).

During a meeting with the EU consultants in Cape Town (mid 1999), PondoCROP questioned why the DEAT was not part of the planning process. The EU responded that DEAT would be consulted at a later point in the planning process (PondoCROP EU Programme coordinator, 2005 pers.comm). When the idea was proposed by the EU consultants that PondoCROP be responsible for overseeing the implementation in all five nodes, it was clearly stated by PondoCROP that PondoCROP did not have the capacity to deliver on such an extensive programme (PondoCROP EU Programme coordinator, 2005 pers.comm). In addition, PondoCROP questioned the capacity of Triple Trust Organization (TTO), who was proposed by the EU consultants as the business and tourism skills training service provider, when their experience lay in leather work and sewing training (ibid). Furthermore, PondoCROP questioned the EU thinking on having the World Wildlife Fund for nature providing the environmental training, as they were not considered implementing agents. The EU failed to address these concerns and contracted all three NGO’s (ibid). The Midterm Review notes that some objectives in the logical framework were imposed on the implementing NGO’s, even though they warned the consultants of the difficulties that would arise in implementation. It appears that the programme development process was driven by the EU consultants, who were reluctant to engage with DEAT on the programme design process (ibid). It appears that neither provincial, nor local government, nor community were sufficiently engaged by the EU consultants during the programme development process (community respondents, training manager).

There is limited available documentation detailing the above account. This account, therefore, draws on communication with the PondoCROP EU Programme coordinator. He was a lead figure in the original community tourism initiative (Amadiba Adventures) prior to the EU Programme. He represented PondoCROP in the negotiations with the EU (as described above) and was appointed PondoCROP EU Programme coordinator once PondoCROP was contracted to the programme. The programme manager explains that the EU Programme was structured by consultants who were “... part of the EU travelling circus that goes around the world designing programmes”. If a comprehensive participative needs-assessment for both the local government and community had been conducted, together with a participative evaluation of existing capacities, it is highly probable that the programme aims, objectives and structures
would have been very differently structured. The programme manager noted that “… outsiders have in the past, and still continue to determine the development approach”.

This lack of adequate attention to initial planning is reflected by PondoCROP respondent 1, who raised a crucial issue: a Strategic Environmental Assessment was never conducted to address the broader social and environmental issues of the target area. This, together with the fact that an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) had not been developed for the Wild Coast, raised additional issues, associated with implementing an externally designed and driven plan, in a context in which a strategic needs-assessment of the broader environment had not been completed. This statement is supported by the Midterm Review.

The EU Programme development process, described in the Midterm Review, suggests that a more substantial participation process unfolded during the programme design process. This included several meetings with DEAT, provincial government and the NGO’s. The Midterm Review suggests that the EU approach married a top-down and bottom-up approach in the programme design process. This research, however, focuses on the outcomes of the design processes, as expressed by those who were involved with the programme implementation.

The programme methodological approach to needs-assessment for informing the original programme conceptualisation and subsequent programme design was not accepted by community or local government. Community respondent 2 describes how the programme should have been embedded at local municipal level, as this is the “… gate to get to the community … if you don't have municipal support you have a problem”. Amadiba Adventures are currently facing this issue, as a result of the EU Programme approach. The programme manager for training stresses that the non-involvement of provincial and local government in the programme needs-assessment and design process has led to conflict between the stakeholders, with provincial and local government resisting the programme. This sentiment is shared by all respondents interviewed. The programme manager accepts this has been a serious issue. He notes that he has addressed the issue in his tenure as programme manager, and as a result, positive signs of support are emerging from some local municipal structures.

The common call from all respondents is to blend external economic concepts, such as that of nature-based tourism, with an in-depth evaluation of community needs and capacities. It has been noted by community respondents that new economic concepts and opportunities are of critical importance to the community, however, a participative methodological approach, drawing in all stakeholders (community, government, implementing agents and the private tourism sector), is essential for the success of the programme (see Section 4.8).

The programme manager for training suggests focusing on two key principles in needs-assessment. This suggestion was also made by community respondent 1:

- Need to assess what is there already that can be built on,
- The assessment must focus on working within existing economic, social and political environments.
4.5.2 Needs-assessment and Programme Implementation

Neither, at the programme design phase, nor during implementation were communities’ needs competently assessed in terms of capacity-building requirements, or environmental requirements to inform training in support of the programme objectives (PondoCROP respondent 1). Furthermore, a study was not completed before the programme design, or during implementation, to establish the dynamics of the Wild Coast, including capacity levels of local government and community (training manager). The needs-assessment that did take place during the programme was orientated around the programme needs to meet the logical framework requirements. In reflecting on this approach, community respondent 1 stated that, it is very difficult to “… come up with the right needs-assessment if the programme is imposed”. Furthermore, needs-assessments “must not be conducted for programme implementers and management to meet their objectives”, as has happened in the programme. This imposed approach results in a lack of community commitment to the programme, stemming from an alienation from programme objectives and a lack of ‘feeling of ownership’. The evaluation consultant criticised the programme approach to needs-assessment, stating that it has been “… too narrowly focussed on technical competencies” reflected in the logical framework.

A crucial issue arising from the data is the capacity of the implementing agents to build sufficient community capacity, to support the programme objectives. There is general acknowledgement that the implementing agents did not have the capacity. The training manager argues that the implementing agents’ capacities were never assessed to establish if they had the ability to provide ‘on the ground’ capacity-building of community, in order to achieve programme objectives. TTO (training NGO) was not an accredited training provider and did not have the capacity to deliver the required training. PondoCROP (responsible for business conceptualisation and mentoring) did not have the capacity to mentor business training and community service-providers as required. PondoCROP respondent 1 states that “… the design of the programme was way beyond the competency of the implementing agencies”. This statement is supported by the training manager.

4.5.3 Section Summary

An underlying theme emerging from the data suggests that needs-assessment requires meaningful participation by the beneficiary group and government, specifically that of local government. This appears to be critical for establishing programme relevance, developing a sense of programme ownership and commitment to the programme, essential for sustainability. It appears that the EU Programme conceptualization was driven by the EU consultants, while being reluctant to engage with government and community. Furthermore, implementing NGO’s, with questionable capacities relevant to the EU Programme objectives, were contracted by the EU.

4.6 Programme Ownership
The Midterm Review notes that insufficient steps in the design process were included to ensure local government institutions and beneficiaries take “ownership” of the project. Community respondent 2, with support from community respondent 1 and community respondent 3, argues that the programme had “… no proper involvement (see Section 4.8.1), local government was not approached (see Section 4.7) and consultation with community was passive (see Section 4.8.5), with people being told what they were to do”. Community respondent 2 notes that this approach resulted in a lack of ownership and commitment, “… people have just sat, watched, listened and showed no ‘passion’ for the programme … there are people involved with this ecotourism who are just interested in the money because they don’t have passion as the ideas they had were not used, they are just doing what was said … they feel that they are not involved … It’s like spoon-feeding people, they cannot do it themselves”. It is further argued that “… even now we don’t have influence on this business - the PMU influences the business. That is why the people do not feel as though it is their business, because there are people outside who think they can drive this business. We don’t feel like it is for the community”. An additional implication of the programme approach has been the lack of local government support for further business opportunities that should have emerged from the programme.

4.7 Engaging Provincial and Local Government

The Midterm Review explains that provincial authorities, district municipalities and local municipalities highlighted inadequate coordination with provincial initiatives. Furthermore, the EU Programme was ‘parachuted’ into the province from national DEAT directly into communities. This resulted in operational tensions that diminished provincial ownership and acceptance. The Replication Study suggests that the EU Programme should have fully engaged with provincial government - the programme should have been well-embedded within provincial and local government and should have worked within the existing political structures.

The training manager suggests that ‘operational tensions and diminished ownership’ between the programme and provincial and local government have strong linkages to lack of participation in the programme design, and its imposition at provincial and local government level. He suggests that the programme design should have been developed together with local municipality and integrated into the Local Economic Development Plan (LDP). In addition, the communities’ institutional structures should have had representation at both provincial and local government levels.

Community respondent 2 believes that if there is going to be local government support for the programme, then the programme needs to be initiated at local government level, as this is the “… gate to get to community”. He argues that local government is ignoring the community trust's requests and delaying the development process as a result of the EU Programme approach. Community respondent 1 argues that there is a resentment of the “… capacity coming out of community” challenging government power structures. They feel threatened by these kinds of developments.
The programme manager highlights the challenges in engaging with provincial and local governments regarding development programmes. He argues that it is necessary to be aware of issues surrounding ‘capacity’ within provincial and local government, and identified the following areas:

- Historical, there is lack of development support structures,
- Young government structures are in place,
- Existing conflict between government structures and traditional leadership,
- Divergent development agendas e.g. the N2 toll road has been on the table since 1981, however there is still no consensus,
- The dominant human resource skill base in government departments results in a focus on conservation issues. Three key reasons are identified for this orientation:
  - You need to look at top officials, asking where they come from, how they were trained, where they get their experience from?
  - There is a philosophy in the Eastern Cape that government delivers everything,
  - Government has not had enough experience with private-sector: they don’t trust the private-sector; they fear for their jobs; they want to have total control. They don’t want to be just facilitators. This approach “creates great opportunity for fraud and corruption, the further you go outside your traditional areas of government, and it has almost become an endemic problem: it’s a little industry on its own”.
- Little ability to see across the broad development issues,
- Lack of understanding of the tourism industry and exposure to the private-sector,
- The Eastern Cape lacks the resources to attract people with skills,
- There has been marginal progress in tourism development since the programme manager’s involvement with Umtata municipal tourism planning in early 1984, where he was responsible for developing “The Transkei Coastal Management Control Plan”, and
- Tourism development lacks a development model and approach.

In addition to the factors listed above, the programme manager describes the historical factors impacting on development in the Eastern Cape Province as a whole:

- Government and the general population have been deeply underexposed to the concept of ‘development’,
- The project area has suffered for decades from under-development,
- The provincial and local government’s philosophical development approach is 10 years behind the rest of the country, explaining that this was evident at a programme driven development workshop in Umtata (2004),
- The ‘homeland’ system had a huge impact on capacity development,
- Provincial and local government has had no experience in engagement with private-sector, as all development initiatives in the previous ‘homelands’ were delivered indirectly by the South African Government and the Development Bank of SA; this development approach has had a profound effect,
- There has been no economic base to provide exposure to ‘development’,

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• There has not been a sustained effort to change past approaches to development, resulting in the Eastern Cape continually falling behind other provinces.
• There has been a general lack of commitment to long-term programmes,
• The Eastern Cape attracts a wide spectrum of NGO’s and development individuals from liberal to ultra conservative approaches, all influencing development ideology. The result has been that the Eastern Cape has, as yet, not developed a ‘development’ maturity or identity, and
• Government structures are beginning to find their way, however capacity is lacking.

Community respondent 1 supports elements of the programme manager’s statements. He explains that although “We talk of integrated development and cooperative governance, in reality, none of those exists ... national, provincial and local government were not talking to each other, with the result that the community got caught in between - receiving no support”. He argues that “… provincial and local government must know each other, must talk before a donor can come into an area with a development plan … the donor must first approach provincial and local government before engaging with community”.

4.7.1 Section Summary

It was expressed that government resistance to the EU Programme resulted from a lack of participation by provincial and local government in the programme development process, and was exacerbated by not working within existing political structures or planning initiatives. However, it is argued that provincial and national government are lacking in essential human resource capacity to support this development initiative. This suggests that a major factor in the success of donor development programmes may rest with engaging government in the programme design process. The discussion highlights the importance of thorough needs-assessment processes, to both inform the relevance of programme concept, and capacity-building requirements of all stakeholders, to successfully deliver on the programme objectives. An in-depth discussion of the EU Programme design process follows in the next section.

4.8 Programme Design

4.8.1 Programme Design Ideologies

Of critical importance to establishing the influence of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building, for sustainable nature-based initiatives, is that of the development ideologies driving programme design processes and programme structures. This issue emerged as a key theme, as discussed above (see Section 4.7). The discussion to follow will explore this issue from the various stakeholder positions.

The Midterm Review states that “Divergent ideological approaches of implementing agents resulted in a lack of coordinated strategic direction for the programme”. In addition, the project was over-ambitious and its purpose was never adequately analysed, to determine whether it was achievable. The Replication Study refers to research from case studies, where it indicates that “Tourism-related development planning processes are not easily accomplished within quick
time frameworks – they are time consuming and require participation from affected communities”. It is equally clear from the outcomes of the EU Programme that rural tourism development programmes cannot be driven exclusively by working with communities, but must incorporate a major input from the private-sector (Midterm Review 2003).

The programme manager believes there are serious questions to be asked of donor funding, specifically those of, “… what they get away with, what they are concerned about”. He explains that that there is a second economy in the donor funding industry - “… people live off it, people thrive off it, it is well known … no one will admit that a percentage of donor funds allocated to programmes are attached to overseas consultants that sustain a significant industry”. This statement raises questions regarding motivations for donor development programmes in developing countries and the commitment to the programme development processes. In support of this statement, both PondoCROP respondent 1 and WWF respondent 1 believe the programme was designed to suit the funding requirements, needs and ideas of the donors, and was not informed by realities on the ground.

The programme manager believes that the programme tried to tackle too big an issue and “… was very unsuccessful, created massive expectations and delivered next to nothing”. Community leaders have tended to hide as this has been such a disaster: no benefits flowing, no jobs being created, large debt being incurred, money has disappeared and in the programme manager’s words, “… it has been a terrible experience” (ibid). The programme manager recounts a discussion with community respondent 1, where the respondent stated that he could “… so easily walk away … it has been more of a problem than it has been a benefit, delivery has been too complicated … it has turned the community upside down with conflict”. The programme manager argues that this discussion raises a complex development debate, with the question being asked, “Is an investment-led approach appropriate for a deeply rural incapacitated population, or should it be about micro agricultural programmes?” This question is closely linked to participative needs-assessment (see Section 4.5) and programme design process (see Section 4.8).

The evaluation consultant argues for a new radical approach to change the current paradigm - “These programmes can, and very often do, seriously disadvantage people”. He believes there is a need to focus on what really needs to be achieved i.e. “… improving livelihoods, their quality of life which draws in environmental issues”. He suggests a collective, participative process of conceptualising the programme design and establishing required competencies and responsibilities. This participative approach allows for real assessment of capacities, gap identification and reduces the level of assumptions. This, in turn, ensures that “… all stakeholders absolutely understand, right from the beginning what the programme is about and what their roles are to be”.

All community respondents called for an ideological change to development programmes. Firstly, there needs to be a change in approach from the communities’ perspective and secondly, there needs to be a change in approach from the donors themselves. They argue that
the community needs to change their current practice of waiting for the funders to come to them; “... listening to the funders and being driven by the funders and not by us driving the funding”. The trusts need their own development plan that falls within the broader Local Economic Development Plan (LED) and Integrated Development Plan’s (IDP), as the communities' problems cannot be solved by just one programme. “The trusts need to approach other funders to support their development plans working with the local municipality”. They call for the “Trust to be honest, as local leaders … sometimes we do what pleases the funders when they come, letting them control and manage the programmes as they have the money”. They call for community to have a strong voice in the development process, sitting down discussing ideas and opinions on development ideas, and most importantly being actively involved in the decision-making – “... not just being told what is going to happen in a development programme”.

4.8.2 **A Shared Vision**

The programme manager states that there was no shared vision for the programme - he believes that a shared vision is essential for programme success. He further explains that this lack of common vision is not only pertinent to the programme, but also the Eastern Cape Provincial Government. He explains that none of the Eastern Cape strategic initiatives, such as the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy, have been capable of addressing the development problem. They have resulted in “… multiple visions/agendas and conflict, with the consequence of wrong development, in the wrong position for the wrong reasons - inappropriate development with a lack of empowerment” (see Section 4.7). He argues for a carefully structured investor mobilisation process – “… rather than the existing reactive strategy, turn it around, do the proper long-term planning, take solidly based decisions that will allow for meaningful contribution from the community where they can have some say”.

The evaluation consultant, WWF respondent and the private tourism respondent believed that very few of the community members actually knew what was going on with the EU Programme as a whole, with the programme never working with a shared vision or ideology.

4.8.3 **Assumptions**

The Midterm Review notes that critical assumptions for creating an enabling environment for the programme are not listed in the Finance Agreement logical framework, with the programme designers assuming that this complex programme could be implemented by agents with differing ideologies and little experience in managing a project of this magnitude. The WWF respondent argues that key assumptions underpinning the EU Programme were taken as fact, without evaluating what was feasible before actually implementing on the ground. The Replication Study suggests that “Donors and project managers often assume that it saves time to group people together because of the simplicity of ‘working with’ fewer groups”. The Replication Study cites research findings suggesting the opposite: “If the groupings within a community and the differences between groups are not well understood and taken into account, then conflicts emerge which are difficult to heal”. 
The evaluation consultant argues that not paying adequate attention to assumptions in the programme design can lead to fatal flaws e.g. "... there was an assumption in the programme that local government was weak, so why was it only at the end of the programme that emphasis was placed on improving capacity at local government level and not at the beginning?"

4.8.4 Flexibility and Time-frames

The Midterm Review identifies the inability of the programme to adapt to changing circumstances as the most significant failure. This raises the issues surrounding inflexible logical frameworks, as specified in the Finance Agreement, to drive the programme implementation objectives and deliverables. The Replication Study notes that tourism-related development planning processes are not easily accomplished within quick time frameworks – they are time-consuming and require participation from affected communities.

The programme manager, programme training manager, PondoCROP respondent 1 and 2, the evaluation consultant and private tourism respondent agreed that the programme had unrealistic time frames to achieve programme objectives (see Section 4.8.1). The community respondent estimated the time required to properly implement the programme at a maximum of 15 years, with the private tourism respondent placing it at 20 years (the original programme cycle was 4 years).

4.8.5 Engaging the Community

To provide further insight into the influence of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building, the programme design process will be viewed from the different stakeholder perspectives. The different perspectives illuminate how the EU-driven design process structures capacity-building around their perceived capacity-building requirements. However, the programme beneficiaries share a different vision of the design process and capacity-building requirements.

The Replication Study proposes the following conceptual development programme for engaging with community, based on lessons from the EU Programme and other case studies:

- Conduct feasibility study or framework plan, including sound assessment of the socio-economic realities, and clear definition of the most appropriate investment/development approach to be pursued,
- Submission of the output of the feasibility study to various interested parties for comment and consideration, and
- Consensus on development initiatives.

Once some consensus on the proposed development initiatives has been achieved, the following steps need to be taken in parallel with the programme design (Replication Study 2004):
• Assess the viability of what has been proposed, in order to avoid discussion (with communities) of proposals which are not likely to succeed,
• Identification of target communities and structures, focussing effort on receptive communities, initially, and then inviting other communities for interaction,
• Where there are no community structures, these need to be put in place, but empowerment of local communities and local government institutions must be carefully managed to ensure that one is not developed at the expense of the other,
• Once this has been achieved, the proposals must be submitted to the community structures for discussion,
• It is critical that these proposals are not presented as “cast in stone”. There must be room for incorporating ideas from the community, but the expectations of communities must be carefully managed and not over-raised at the beginning,
• Once acceptance and approval for proposals has been obtained from the community structures, it is necessary to identify a business structure that is most likely to lead to success,
• Establish legal entities for the community; it will be necessary to establish registered trusts in almost all cases where a contract has to be entered into with the broader community,
• Locate and approve a suitable entrepreneur. Lessons from the Wild Coast Pilot programme indicate that there is need to actively engage the private-sector and that this needs to happen from the very beginning, commencing at the tourism potential assessment process, and
• Enter into agreement with the selected partner. There is need for communities to strike the most appropriate balance between equity and income benefits.

Once the business plan has been approved, the process of implementation can commence. A detailed process for implementation must be defined and agreed upon and also needs to be communicated to beneficiary communities, again taking care not to unduly raise community expectations (Replication Study 2004). This statement suggests that the beneficiary community have no active part in developing the implementation plan.

Community respondent 1, supported by community respondent 2, states that the proposed process for engaging community should only commence once the correct political protocol has been followed with provincial and local government departments, thereafter, the engagement process needs to follow local community protocols and systems (see Section 4.8).

The community respondent proposed the following programme development process:
• A programme-steering committee will need to be established, comprising provincial and local government and the donor representation,
• The programme concept will need to fall within the Local Economic Development Plan and Integrated Development Plan,
• Need to assess the situation on the ground, establishing what is there by speaking to the local officials,
• Establish what infrastructure is already in place,
• Speak to people who have been involved with previous donor programmes in the area,
• Establish existing leadership structures without talking directly to these structures,
• Once the information has been gathered, analyse it, asking the questions: Is the proposed programme concept relevant? Is there a need for the programme and can the programme work in the proposed environment?
• Clarify the guiding principles of the proposed programme,
• Once the concept has been presented and authorised by the steering committee, it must be presented to the ward councillor, ward committee and all relevant stakeholders,
• People need to be given the parameters of this programme and the chance to think it through,
• The people then need to have a significant input and influence on developing the programme concept into the final programme plan. Ideas and needs emerging from the ground must be included in the programme plan, if it is going to be successful. The perspective of the people on the ground and what they are thinking is very important. “Don’t focus on the idea that was brought to the people; try to put all the aspects that the people raised into the discussion. It may change your mind, because the people must be happy about what you are doing…Don’t push what you have been thinking about - that is the bottom line” (community respondent 2),
• Together with the people involved, you then need to establish which community structures are going to be used to drive the programme,
• Discuss opportunities, roles, risks, advantages and disadvantages with the people involved,
• The community institutional structures must be in place prior to the implementation of the programme, and
• Establish and build the capacity of the community institutional structures, identify training needs and training to support the programme implementation on the ground. This is likely to be at least a four year programme (see Section 4.8.5).

Community respondent 1, strongly supported by community respondent 2 and 3, argues that future programmes will not work in the project area, unless they follow the proposed project-design process above. The belief is that, if the EU Programme had followed the suggested process, there is a possibility that Amadiba Adventures may not have existed. However, if it had, it would have been better-structured and supported by local government, which is critical for sustainability. As a result of the EU Programme design and implementation approach, local government has been alienated. This alienation is making it difficult for Amadiba Adventures to discuss wider issues threatening business sustainability, such as the proposed coastal mining, with government.

The evaluation consultant argues that the two key factors for programme success are programme management and design. He argues that the current structure of the programme will always present major problems. The design process is essential to addressing these issues, from the very beginning of the programme development process. The evaluation consultant
describes how the programme design process itself is a capacity-building process, and strongly linked to the notion of ownership.

4.8.6 Section Summary

The discussion on programme design ideologies raises questions regarding donor motivations towards development and their commitment to the development process itself. This is reflected in the programme design process and the previous management’s lack of commitment to draw in stakeholders, to work towards a common vision. The question must be asked of EU development aid: why, after substantial experience in ‘development’ programmes, are issues such as programme inflexibility, unrealistic time-frames, lack of commitment to addressing assumptions and meaningful community participation still being so fervently raised?

The Midterm Review, although noting that participation of all stakeholders is fundamental to programme sustainability, provides no guiding principles for participation. The Replication Study essentially proposes a top-down design process, engaging municipal structures at the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) level, with community brought into the process, once the programme concept has been developed. The community respondents, however, believe that future programmes will not work in the project area, unless they follow a more participatory project design process (as outlined above). This process is firmly embedded in local government structures and local development plans, follows local protocols in engaging community and has a strong emphasis on participative processes, ensuring that the community has a significant influence in programme development. Although the Replication Study seeks to capture experience gained within the EU Programme development process, there appears to be a difference in approach between the programme developers’ approach and that of the beneficiary community respondents to programme development and associated capacity development requirements. Programme management has been identified in this section as a key component to the programme implementation success and will, therefore, be discussed in more detail in the section to follow.

4.9 Programme Management

4.9.1 Leadership

The Midterm Review notes that the programme “... fell short in terms of strategic vision, political and operational leadership and effective overall project management”. The programme manager explains that, in the past, the PMU did not get involved in decision-making in ‘development’ - they did not try to pull things together, “When I arrived in July 2003 it was a mess ... I had nothing other than criticism” from all stakeholders. He states that this experience raised serious questions about the programme’s “... past glowing annual reports”.

The programme training manager comments that there was no leadership amongst the NGO’s in the programme, leading to uncoordinated effort and very often inappropriate interventions. He describes how the PMU in the past cited inadequate contractual agreements between the
NGO's and DEAT as reasons for not being able to effectively manage the programme, however, he believes that the PMU should have managed around this limitation.

The private tourism respondent was adamant that “The EU Programme never got to grips with what was required”. He cites an example “The Head of the EU donor delegation stayed with us at Mtentu Camp and insisted that the PMU get hold of us. We followed up for six months and had one meeting with the PMU. They never followed up and we never heard from them again”. He believes that the PMU were so busy trying to deliver against the original plan (logical framework) that “… there was no time for distraction”.

The Midterm Review notes that DEAT, the leading implementing agent, failed to provide adequate leadership. The Finance Agreement identifies DEAT as the leading implementing agent, who would manage the programme through a Programme Steering Committee, which it would chair. This committee only materialised in the latter part of the programme. In addition, there was a high turnover of DEAT assigned programme managers, all of whom had an extremely limited time allocation to the programme.

4.9.2 Intended Programme Management Structure

The Finance Agreement indicates the following programme management structures:

- DEAT, as the implementation agent, will manage the programme through a programme Steering Committee, which it will chair. The committee will have relevant administrative representation at National and Provincial levels, local tourism business and local community representation,
- A PMU, contracted directly to the EU, will be established at the Eastern Cape Tourism Board (government to provide office space) and will work closely with Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) team,
- The PMU will assist DEAT in executing responsibilities under the programme, and to that end, co-ordinate and monitor the operations of the key NGO’s and act as the secretariat to the programme Steering Committee,
- In each of the five anchor areas, a community co-ordinator, chosen from and agreed to by local populations, will be appointed by DEAT, on proposal of the PMU to liaise with community and NGO’s and PMU, and
- The NGO’s will be contracted directly to DEAT and will agree to work closely with each other to reinforce each others’ capabilities and to strengthen the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the programme.

4.9.3 Management Issues

The Midterm Review provided the following comments on the actual programme management structures:

- Clear roles and responsibilities for implementing agents were not defined,
• Complex and ineffective contractual agreements between the implementing NGO’s, PMU and DEAT have led to poor project management and an uncoordinated effort that has undermined strategic thinking regarding programme purpose and direction,
• The contractual agreements, having the NGO’s contracted directly to DEAT, resulted in an unmanageable structure,
• The four independently contracted implementing agents (three NGO’s and the PMU) resulted in a situation wherein four separate projects emerge rather than a focussed programme,
• Although the project called for a specific steering committee chaired by DEAT to drive this project, this committee did not materialise. Added to which were the direct contractual arrangements between DEAT and the NGO’s, while the PMU was contracted to the EU. It is not surprising, therefore, that project management was inadequate and this was attributed to weak project design, and
• The project commenced five months before the contracted PMU was in place.

The Replication Study provides no specific guiding framework or principles on programme management. It does however, to some extent, cover management in the programme design.

PondoCROP respondent 1 notes that the project management, administration and reporting structures were flawed, with the managing authorities and the implementing agencies, who were lacking in field experience, not performing sufficient pre-planning exercises. However, he notes that the programme was a pilot programme initiated to test the relevance and possibilities of community-based tourism.

The programme training manager, supported by the community respondents, raised another management issue – he argued that programme management did not understand the beneficiary community, “The programme was dominated by white people, for the development of black people … they did not know how to go about this development … the black voices in the programme were not heard, not listened to … they [the black people] had a better understanding of their communities”. The same sentiment was expressed by the Mayor of Port St Johns (see Appendix B). The WWF respondent provides a further perspective on this issue. She believes that the PMU not only lacked managerial experience, but lacked knowledge and experience in the project area. This resulted in a “… very poor working relationship between the programme activities and the stakeholders in the region, because of the perceived lack of respect for the regional way of doing things, lack of respect for the culture and protocols and lack of understanding of local politics and dynamics”.

The private tourism respondent has a particularly strong opinion of the programme management, suggesting that the “… the EU Programme has created a monster, that’s what I think”. He reasons that the programme management and consultants consistently talk to a specific group of people, who make decisions based on that information and influence people whether they like or not. “The EU management does not speak to the man on the street and find out what he wants … it is a top down thing all the time”. The private tourism respondent argues
that the programme came into existing structures, established by PondoCROP, with their own plan and timeframe, and that they began to dictate their plan to the community. This resulted in the taking of rash decisions for which people may not have been ready.

The WWF respondent believes that programme facilitators very often had vested interest in the tourism businesses and, therefore, only selected stakeholders that were easy to deal with and to manipulate, with the result that critical stakeholders were deliberately left out of the process.

The evaluation consultant believes that poor early PMU management resulted in tension between the PMU and the NGO’s, when later on in the programme, the PMU attempted to wrest control from the NGO’s. He argues that the NGO’s had too much autonomy, with nobody playing a managing or coordinating role. The result was that the NGO’s appeared to focus on what they were doing, and not on being part of the bigger programme process and objective.

Community respondent 1, supported by community respondent 2 and 3, highlights two key management issues: direction and communication (see Section 4.9.1). He argues that the PMU provided no direction; the programme had no driver, with “… people not talking with the same voice but working on the same programme”. There was ineffective spending of money as a result of programme management’s perceptions developed in a boardroom and not based on what people were saying. This has led to unfulfilled expectations and is specifically relevant to the training interventions. The PMU was not adequately represented on the ground, and when issues were raised with the PMU, they “… blamed other people and other stuff” for poor delivery, particularly the NGO’s. Poor management of the main stakeholders, by the PMU, negatively affected the way the programme was rolled out. The PMU did not provide a breakdown to communities of budgets and expenditure. Community respondent 3 notes that this has caused mistrust, as the level of initial programme funding cannot be substantiated by what has been delivered. Community respondent 1 believes there should have been direct discussion between the Department of Land Affairs and the trust, regarding the land issues.

Community respondent 1, supported by community respondent 2 and 3, describes the role of the implementation facilitator as a difficult one. “The person in this role is not there to take decisions for people, but rather to provide the direction, information and support for the people to take their own decisions”. The community respondents all agreed that they could not see any other implementation agents other than NGO’s playing this role, as they have the flexibility and experience in working with communities, but they need real skills relevant to the programme needs, not just ideas.

4.9.4 Section Summary

The data suggests that DEAT was not able to fulfil its contractual obligation. The general consensus of all respondents is that the PMU failed to adequately manage the programme - primarily in the first three years. They did not provide the leadership or communication the programme required, particularly with the NGO’s, and ascribed responsibility for poor delivery elsewhere. The underlying theme suggests that the ineffective programme management by
DEAT and the PMU can be directly attributed to the programme design process, which resulted in unworkable contractual agreements and ill-defined institutional/organizational structures. The role of programme institutional/organizational structures will be discussed further in the next section.

4.10 Institutional Structures and Functioning
4.10.1 Programme Management Unit (PMU) and NGO’s
PondoCROP respondent 1 (supported by PondoCROP respondent 2, WWF respondent and the training manager) notes that the inadequate programme organizational structure resulted in poor communication. The inadequate organizational structure, combined with poor communication, resulted in situations where the various stakeholders could avoid responsibility and accountability. PondoCROP 1 respondent argues that capacity-building should have first focussed on institutional capacity development (see Section 4.4.4).

4.10.2 Community Trusts
The Replication Study, in referring to legal institutional community structures (community Trusts), argues for extensive capacity-building and education of community leaders, if some degree of sustainability it to be achieved. This argument is supported by the private tourism respondent, who has had a working relationship with the ACCODA Trust for a number of years. The private tourism respondent, in citing specific examples, describes how they have seen tension rising between community members and the ACCODA Trust. The tension is ascribed to financial issues relating to disbursement of trust funds. In addition, concerns have also been raised about particular trustees’ motivations and agendas. Community respondent 1, supported by community respondent 2 and 3, acknowledges that there are various forms of community institutional structures. However, he notes that for this type of programme, the trust structure works well. What is important is the relationship between the trust and the business. The business needs to be separated from the trust, with the roles of both entities being clearly defined. The trusts need to serve as a community representation body responsible for policy making, trust fund dispersal and bringing more business opportunities to the area. Ownership of individual business is dependant on the scale of the business. The trust’s development plan must allow for individual ownership of businesses. Larger businesses need to form the catalyst for additional smaller support-businesses to develop. Community respondent 2 makes specific reference to local government being the ‘watchdog’ for the trust and notes that the trusts need to guard against losing ownership of community assets to the private-sector. Community respondent 3, supported by community respondent 1 raised the issue of local government currently seeing the trust as a threat. The trusts have the ability to organize themselves into a political movement to challenge local government and leaders (see Section 4.7).

4.10.3 Section Summary
Inadequate institutional structures emanating from the programme design, combined with poor communication, resulted in various stakeholders avoiding responsibility and accountability.
Strong and capacitated community institutional structures appear to be essential in supporting programme sustainability.

4.11 Training

4.11.1 Focus of Training

The Finance Agreement states that training requirements are listed in the programme logical framework, however, no mention is made of training methodology or qualitative outcomes of the training process. The focus is on quantitative training output and not qualitative monitoring and evaluation.

The private tourism respondent argues that their experience has shown that training emphasis needs to be placed on the individual with aptitude. A further issue arising around the training is the perceived level of capacity gained through training based on duration and certification, and not on real ability to do the job. This approach creates expectations that are difficult to manage.

Drawing on the programme experience, the community respondents propose the following considerations and process for training programmes:

- Community must be involved at all levels of decision-making, including identification of training needs,
- The first step is to identify actual positions and relevant skills e.g. guides, camp managers to marketing and financial management etc,
- The selected individuals need to work in the identified role, to be evaluated for suitability and to self evaluate suitability before costly formal training commences. The recommended evaluation period of 18 months may be carried out in a similar business on a learnership basis, or on a mentorship within the business – this process in itself is a capacity-building experience,
- Trainers need to be in the field for at least two months observing the programme environment; effectively being a tourist, to inform the evaluation of training needs and to better understand the training conditions,
- Training should be supported with substantial practical activities, and
- Training preferably needs to be provided on site, as this provides for more relevant training and makes it easier for people to attend.

4.11.2 Training and Programme Objectives

The Replication Study argues that the empowerment of local communities and local government institutions must be carefully managed, to ensure that one is not developed at the expense of the other (see Section 4.7). The Replication Study notes that it is predicted that the nature-based tourism industry is destined to become the largest employer of rural labour in many regions of South and southern Africa, especially in many of the former homelands, where much of the nature-based tourism potential is to be found. The ability to keep these revenues within the rural areas revolves around training of local residents to take up a variety of skilled and senior posts.
The programme manager (supported by the training manager) states that the training was not connected to the programme enterprise objectives - it set precedents, created expectation and was extremely costly. Furthermore, he argues that training needs to work off a practical base; “… you cannot train in a vacuum and then leave trainees”. The evaluation consultant supports these perspectives in commenting that the training methodologies did not fit the context. Training is something that needs to be immediately applied – training has to be linked to doing. He further notes that the capacity that has been developed on the programme “… came at an enormous cost”.

The evaluation consultant believes that “The programme design, management, and training did not fit the context of the Wild Coast”. He argues strongly for a participative programme design process, which allows assessment of “… what training is really needed, how we are going to fit it in, so it is an integral part of what we doing in the development of this programme … not something just bolted onto the side”.

All community respondents were in agreement with the following argument. They believed that the idea of training was a correct one, however, the implementation was disorganised and the scope of training too narrow. The belief is that the programme did not adequately research the training requirements with the result that:

- People were trained for the sake of training (see Section 4.11),
- Too many people were trained for limited opportunities in the business,
- Training provided only basic skills, which are important, but the idea was to train people so they could run the business without external assistance,
- Sufficient training was not provided to support important business functions such as administration, business management, financial management etc.,
- There has not been sufficient training to “… help the people in ‘development’ and understand the environment” (community respondent 2), and
- “When local people have the knowledge of the business, they can influence other local people about the benefits of the business” (community respondent 2).

4.11.3 Role and Capacity of Training Service-Providers

The programme training manager argues that the training service-providers need to evaluate training needs. He recommends that service-providers first need to be short-listed, and thereafter do a substantial in-field evaluation of training needs. This would inform the development of the training approach, including an implementation strategy that would be presented to PMU. The programme management would then select a service provider on the basis of these presentations by service-providers. The programme approach was to have the NGO’s draw up the terms of reference for their perceived community training requirements (see Section 4.9). This approach very often led to service-providers finding different training needs and training environments in the field than those specified in the terms of reference, with the result that training was frequently inappropriate and ineffective. The training manager identifies
in-field mentorship as a critical component of training. He notes a concern that most of the training did not meet National Qualification Framework (NQF) requirements – “… it did not allow trainees to build on their qualification”. This view was contested by PondoCROP respondent 2 who believes that the focus on NQF training was very often ineffective and inappropriate for the context.

Both the programme manager and the evaluation consultant believe the NGO’s lacked the capacity and in some cases commitment to do the job. The evaluation consultant points out that, in some cases, serious issues arose, with some service-providers using the programme to provide training experience for their inexperienced trainers.

PondoCROP respondent 2 argued that the Triple Trust Organization was “… totally useless … couldn’t write a decent terms-of-reference or even run an efficient meeting, let alone develop an effective training strategy and manage its implementation”. And on WWF “… they were often left off the radar” and not effectively drawn into the programme training needs. PondoCROP respondent 1 acknowledges that PondoCROP’s lack of tourism expertise impacted to some degree on their effectiveness in the programme.

4.11.4 Quality of Training

The Midterm Review notes that poor co-ordination between NGO’s, lack of relevant learner selection and lack of capacity within training NGO’s resulted in questionable capacity development in some training fields. It identifies that indicators for training are target-driven (mainly quantitative), therefore making it difficult to evaluate effectiveness. However, analysis of training interventions in adult and specialist training needs suggested that training has not been effective (Midterm Review 2003). In addition, the training of trustees, to a level of capacity of competence to run community-based enterprises within the timeframe of the programme, is questionable. The Midterm Review (2003) notes that the business training NGO, Triple Trust Organization, was not an accredited training organization and lacked the required capacity to deliver the specified tourism training. The training manager states that the programme did training for the sake of training, in order to meet logical framework requirements. This resulted in substantially more people being trained than are actually working. He notes that previous programme management perceived capacity-building as training, not the implementation of what they have been trained to do.
PondoCROP respondent 2 proposes some key principles for training, drawn from experience on the programme:

- Selection of training candidates is critical: there must be an attempt to identify if the person proposed for training is suited for the position before capacity-building commences,
- Most effective training: long-term mentorship, very practical, well adapted to situational requirements (e.g. low literacy, particular environmental concerns), lots of repetition and regular, structured follow up over at least 12 months, and
- If off-site modules are organised, trainees need to be located in a learning environment where they are exposed to the service standards they are required to develop. “Let them see people similar to themselves carrying out their roles as they will be expected to do, and let them have lots of interaction with these informal mentors”.

The WWF respondent believes that for training to be effective, it needs to be followed up. She explains that training provided on the programme suffered from “… disintegration caused by egos and hunger for getting credit. This had a negative impact on the outcomes of training provided”. She explains that WWF-trained environmental educators were not absorbed into the programme, neither did the programme attempt to link them with other programmes. As a result, the only department that is trying hard to utilise these skills is Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), through working partnerships created by WWF-SA while in the programme. The WWF respondent explains that four of the environmental educators have been employed in permanent positions so far. Seven have been absorbed by the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) as interns. “What is sad is that these educators are now employed to work outside of the Wild Coast region”.

4.11.5 Section Summary

The emerging theme indicates that the training requirements identified in the logical framework, together with the programme methodologies to achieve these objectives, did not fit the context or the actual training needs. The data calls for a participative programme design process, to jointly assess what training is needed in context. Furthermore, this assessment itself is considered to be an integral part of the programme development and capacity-building processes. With the discussion raising issues of training relevance, training quality and learner selection processes, EU Programme approaches to monitoring and evaluation will be explored in the following section to provide insight into these issues.

4.12 Monitoring and Evaluation

4.12.1 Guidance for Monitoring and Evaluation

The Finance Agreement provides the following clauses relating to monitoring and evaluation:

- The COMMISSION shall monitor the execution of the programme and may request any explanation. Where necessary, with the written consent of both parties, a new programme orientation may be agreed to better adapt to the objectives in view,
• The COMMISSION and the European Court of Auditors shall have the right to send its own agents or duly authorized representatives to carry out any technical or financial mission or audit that it considers necessary to monitor the execution of the programme,
• The performance of the project will be monitored by DEAT,
• Annual budgets and work programmes will form the basis for the monitoring process and the project management will deliver quarterly reports on expenditures and achievements to the Steering Committee. Furthermore, the programme will be phased with monitoring activities carried out regularly (e.g. annual monitoring of community projects), and
• The explanatory section shall contain a complete record of all aspects of the completed PROJECT. It shall be drawn up in such a way as to enable a comparison to be made between the results achieved, the methods adopted and the means employed and, respectively, the operational objectives pursued, the methods and means proposed as specified in the application for financing relating to the Agreement.

It is interesting to note the monitoring and evaluation clauses have a strong quantitative orientation, with no reference to qualitative indicators or capacity-building audits.

The evaluation consultant, drawing on experience in the development field, proposed the following guiding principles for programme monitoring and evaluation:
• Ideally, the whole premise of design and implementation is an ongoing critical reflexive approach,
• In terms of technical issues, there is a need to have a strong management of monitoring and evaluation feedback, especially of implementing agents,
• The programme needs to respond to monitoring feedback,
• Evaluation reports have to be properly presented and acted upon,
• The programme management needs to be much more aware of evaluation as a management tool, and engage with it much more thoroughly. They need to be involved in it as a reflexive management tool - they need to be much more critical, much tougher in response, and
• Having flexibility in programme design and accepting that things are not going to always work out how they were planned, makes responding to monitoring less of a problem.

The PondoCROP respondent 2 bases her suggestions for monitoring and evaluation on the assumption that a future initiative will involve some form of private tourism partnership. She sees the private tourism partner as providing the insight into what expertise is required, and the level of service required for meeting market demands. This understanding will inform the capacity development required to meet service standards. With this knowledge, the community trusts, together with private-sector operators, should be actively monitoring capacity-building efforts, to ensure training is developing the required capacities. It is further suggested that realistic capacity-building goals need to be set with trainees and a process of self-evaluation be facilitated. She notes that these processes require substantial facilitation and external evaluation.
The WWF respondent argues for maximizing stakeholder participation, particularly that of local government. She advocates reporting of monitoring and evaluation to local government, arguing that their subsequent monitoring of programme implementation activities will lead inevitably to programme ownership. She argues that the failure of the programme management to adequately externally monitor the programme resulted in implementation ‘gaps’ not being identified and addressed.

All community respondents believe that local government needs to be involved in monitoring and evaluation. They need to serve as a “... watch dog for training - not just evaluating documents but, real happenings on the ground”. Community respondent 1 believes that monitoring of training should be conducted on an on-going basis by a team consisting of product owners, service-providers, programme management and representation from the programme steering committee. Evaluation needs to be conducted by an external entity on a six monthly basis, to assess training effectiveness in order to inform follow up training requirements.

4.12.2 Monitoring and Evaluation and Programme Management

The programme manager refers to (in general) the monitoring and evaluation as being “… very poor, but it always is … I’ve yet to come across a programme that has proper monitoring and evaluation”. He further explains that you “… cannot manage programmes if its monitoring and evaluation is not built in”. In addition, monitoring and evaluation is never seen as integral to the programme, rather it is “… viewed at the end result, it’s tagged on”. He concludes that the programme monitoring and evaluation “… was very poor” - it was not reflecting on what was going on, “What’s in the quarterly reports bears absolutely no resemblance to reality – it’s extraordinary. You can’t say it was just a lack of information, it’s actually just the system, responding to the needs of the system”. He acknowledges that the PMU does not have full knowledge of what is currently happening in the programme, but states that “… we know a lot more than we have ever known in the past”, and notes that external evaluation has to be done in the future.

4.12.3 Monitoring and Evaluation and Programme Implementation and Change

The programme manager states that the original three NGO’s have been financially audited. However, he explains that this auditing is not viewed in a developmental context i.e. measuring expense against qualitative output (capacity-building). He states that this form of evaluation will be completed as a separate process. He further explains that the Replication Study has been suspended in its final draft, as it was not fulfilling the replication objective, citing the evaluation component as an example (refer section 4.12.4). The completion of the study will be informed by future programme developments in 2005.

The implementation of the programme’s extension has been restructured around consortiums of expertise (consultants). The programme manager explains that as a result of the PMU being thin on the ground, the monitoring and evaluation have been built into the contracted
consortiums’ deliverables. To support this approach he notes that the PMU “Programme Development Officers (PDO), who are constantly in the field, provide good feedback on the consortiums’ performance”. He further elaborates on the consortiums, explaining that it has been clearly discussed with them that they are taking on a lot of management responsibilities, with the PMU regarding this process as a “… huge part of our empowerment process … the principles of the consortiums, in all cases, are that of empowerment groups. They take responsibility to deliver the programme and the management reports every month”. He explains that there are a lot of Eastern Cape players involved in the consortiums, based close to the PMU in East London, allowing for consistent interpersonal communication, in order to respond to changing needs and ensuring successful programme delivery.

4.12.4 Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation

The Midterm Review makes the following programme monitoring and evaluation observations:

- A lack of effective monitoring and evaluation has militated against effective management and not captured knowledge gained in the programme,
- The effectiveness of youth training in relation to programme goals is questionable – there was no monitoring or evaluation with targets being numbers-driven, and
- The Midterm Review commenced three quarters of the way through the programme, reducing its impact.

It is quite surprising, that in light of the Midterm Review recognising that ‘monitoring and evaluation has militated against effective management’, that no recommendations were proposed for addressing this issue during the remainder of the programme life-cycle. What is even more surprising is that the Replication Study, albeit a draft, makes no reference to guiding principles for monitoring and evaluation.

The training manager argues, that other than nominal evaluation provided by WWF (this statement is supported by WWF respondent), training evaluation did not take place. He states that evaluation should, “… measure the difference in performance before and after training”. However, he argues that the programme, “… did training for the sake of training”, with substantially more people trained than are actually working, making it difficult to evaluate training performance.

Community respondent 2 believes the training plan was good, but the execution poor, with little monitoring. “There were no people coming to us to ask about the training quality”. In reflecting on his personal experience of the training process, he describes the training service-providers as not having the capacity, and in some cases, neither the capacity nor the commitment to provide effective training. Community respondent 3 believes the PMU should have been responsible for monitoring the training, to ensure that it was appropriate and effective.

The evaluation consultant believes that monitoring and evaluation are generally misunderstood processes in development programmes. Monitoring and evaluation have been viewed as almost entirely external to the main programme role-players, and have been considered as a “… formal
technical component of the programme”. He explains that in the programme, there was “… very little monitoring carried out by service-providers: that which was, appeared to be more tokenism, than anything else”. He argues that, generally, there is very little rigour in monitoring and evaluation. He explains that fixed programme designs, with predetermined objectives, are not conducive to responding to monitoring and evaluation, “… in fact, they are often seen by management as obstacles to achieving predetermined programme objectives”. In concluding his comments, he argues that there was “… no development of the idea of reflexive thinking about what they were doing, learning from past experience and sharing knowledge”.

4.12.5 Section Summary

There appears to be a causal link between poor qualitative monitoring and evaluation in the programme and lack of specific requirements for these processes in the Finance Agreement. This may be linked to the ideology informing the programme design (see Section 4.8.1). The data indicates that monitoring and evaluation are important tools for effective programme management, requiring a reflexive thinking approach and a participation ethos.

4.13 Programme Sustainability

4.13.1 Sustainability

The Finance Agreement makes no reference to any form of sustainability.

The programme manager notes that programme sustainability is a “big worry”, with solutions to the sustainability issue a long way off. Negotiations are underway, in an attempt to secure further funding to support the programme. He explains that civil society (NGO's) is no longer playing an active role in the development arena. Government agencies have been set up to play this role, e.g. Eastern Cape Development Corporation. However, he believes they are not performing adequately, with “deep problems” emerging. As part of the solution, the programme has “… gone to the private-sector to secure good investors, with good solid credentials and a track record”.

4.13.2 Short-term issues

The Midterm Review argues that, unless strong linkages are established at the provincial and local government level, there is a good chance that the programme will flounder. The importance of embedding the programme at the provincial level cannot, therefore, be under-estimated.

The programme training manager believes that, if the programme had come to an end in March 2004, as originally designed, the programme would have completely “… failed and folded”. He believes the core reason for this has been the lack of needs assessment and the NGO’s lack of capacity. He cites the examples of an unrealistic number of potential business enterprises identified by PondoCROP (PondoCROP was fulfilling the programme logical framework requirements) that did not draw the community into the process (see Section 4.5) and inappropriate selection of learners and training (see Section 4.11).
The programme manager believes that a few more substantial investments are required, with a linkage programme to local service providers, with the developments being firmly embedded in the local economy. Although acknowledging that the private sector cannot carry the entire burden, he explains that it does provide part of the solution, in providing mentorship to the community businesses. The programme manager believes that each area within the broader project boundaries has different requirements. On the strength of this, there will be different models for mentorship and partnerships with the private-sector.

4.13.3 Longer-term Sustainability

The Midterm Review argues that programme sustainability in the longer-term will rest on the capacity of the community-based tourism ventures to expand and grow, while at the same time retaining the wilderness characteristics of the Wild Coast. Equally important, will be the soundness of the beneficiary institutions. In essence, this is an institutional project. If these fail in the medium term, then all will be lost in the longer-term.

Community respondent 1, supported by community respondent 2 and 3, describes the current status of Amadiba Adventures as “... not going forward; it is going sideways”, acknowledging that “… the business has to make money”. It is explained that, when the programme comes to an end next year, “… it will be the beginning of Amadiba - when Amadiba stands on its own”. Community respondent 1 notes that, at present, if the business has a problem, “… I can still twist the programme manager’s arm” - until the programme ends, there will always be support from the PMU. Amadiba Adventures has started to plan for the end of the programme. “We should have been developing the Ufudu model (existing private-sector partner) earlier and putting away money for growing Amadiba Adventures. One of the mistakes we made was not to plan around the business. We do have the Wilderness Safaris (new private-sector concessionaire) income and hope to use part of this for supporting Amadiba Adventures until the numbers of tourists increase”.

Community respondent 2 argues strongly for Amadiba Adventures’ ownership to be opened to the broader Amadiba community. He explains that Amadiba Adventures has not marketed itself effectively to the broader community and, therefore, little is known about the business. He believes there are those from the area who have the capacity to successfully manage the business. To address this issue, he advocates that a general meeting should be arranged by the Tribal Authority, calling on all the people of the region, who have the skills to come forward, to see what they can offer to the business.

4.13.4 Factors Affecting Sustainability

The following key factors for programme sustainability are identified by the Midterm Review:

- A common vision for all stakeholders is critical to the success of the programme,
- The sustainability of the programme rests in the balance. Of the two different business models being pursued – community-driven model and private-sector model – only the
former has been developed. However, without ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes, it is difficult to define whether this initiative is sustainable or replicable,

- The 4-year life cycle of the programme is probably too short to achieve all its objectives,
- Achievements have been at far too high a cost. Only a small fraction of the targets for employment and income generation have been realised, and
- Adequate capacity development of trustees to run community-based enterprises is essential for sustainability.

The Replication Study describes land tenure issues as being critical on communal land, and should be resolved before any substantial enterprise development. The programme seemingly tried to by-pass land issues (hoping they would be resolved), thus ignoring a key issue for communities, and failing to resolve a key source of uncertainty and risk for investors. Local capacity needs to be developed to take over and fund ongoing operations; to enhance community awareness, skills and know how; and to raise community trustees to a level where they will be competent to manage community-based enterprises. The mere presence of private-sector operators is not a guarantee of sustainability; the businesses must also be profitable.

The WWF respondent notes that, as a ratio of cost to delivery, very little delivery has taken place, with capacity lacking for the hand-over of the programme to beneficiaries to be sustainable. She highlights a lack of: partnership building, co-operation, coordination, communication, consultation and stakeholder involvement, with more promises having been made than delivered, directly affecting the poor.

PondoCROP respondent 2 believes that the end result of the programme is that service-providers and the trustees have received virtually no capacity-building of any real use, other than the experiences they gained in actually setting up and doing the work. “The bottom line is that most community-service-providers are not at all confident about their abilities to carry out their required functions, there’s no long-term support or plan for skills development … this is going to enormously undermine the viability of the enterprises”.

Community respondent 1 notes that “It has become clear that the programme is not going to solve all the problems”. It has also drawn attention to government’s role in land reform, as most of the problems have surrounded land issues. The government could not release land to the community. Perceptions exist that the government was more lenient towards the private-sector than to the community. These perceptions reflect a belief that it was easier for government to negotiate with private-sector when they were to receive revenues, than with the community when the community was to receive the revenue. According to community respondents’ government used the excuse of no existing legislation for not issuing leases to community, however, government appeared to be able to negotiate with the private-sector on the same issue - “… it shows that government is not ready to help communities” (community respondent 1).
Over and above the issues already raised by the community respondents and discussed at length in this chapter, the following additional principles are proposed for programme sustainability: programmes require a long-term commitment from the donors; the steering committee and project manager need to work with the NGO’s to develop community capacity over time and need to assist in setting objectives and developing strategies. “The programme must be structured so that it makes money” (community respondent 2). It was noted that the stronger and more capacitated the trusts, the higher the chances of the programme and business success.

The evaluation consultant believes that the meta-management function and coordination between the different players did not happen. He argues that the existing programme design will never allow for sustainability. He explains that sustainability and this type of programme development cannot be put together – “… it does not actually fit, the fundamental fault lines are too deep … there is a mismatch of ideas and the real context”. He suggests that what is required is communication and mediation between the different parties. This needs highly skilled facilitators to bring parties together to identify early rifts and work through them before they become serious issues. This process needs consistency, a long-term reflective approach and consistent work with everybody involved.

4.13.5 Section Summary

The research data suggests that the programme design did not take account of or allow for sustainability, as the logical framework objectives appear to be incongruent with the real context. In addition, the programme design is primarily responsible for a lack of stakeholder participation, consultation and coordination. This, in turn, resulted in a lack of ownership and commitment to the programme, which impacted on capacity-building for sustainability.

4.14 Concluding Summary

With reference to the research question, the data suggests that power-knowledge relationships had a significant influence on capacity-building in the EU Programme. The data identified that the programme design did not provide an enabling environment for capacity-building. It has been established that the programme design process is primarily dependant on the development ideology (power-knowledge complex) held by the donor who funds and drives the design process. The data indicates that the programme design process was driven by international consultants, with the design process lacking an ethos of stakeholder participation. This development approach resulted in a programme design which met with substantial resistance from provincial and local government. Furthermore, the programmes relevance, objectives and time-frames have been questioned by the beneficiary community and other stakeholder groups.

The research data indicates a clear link between participation, programme relevance, programme ownership, commitment of stakeholders, effective management and capacity-building for sustainable programme implementation. The data highlights the critical importance of provincial and local government participation for successful programme implementation and
illuminates the importance of capacity-building within these departments, to provide meaningful support to development programmes.

The data suggests that varying degrees of capacity-building have been achieved by the programme, however, the cost/capacity-building ratio was seen to be unacceptably high and not viable for replication (see Table 4.1).
### Table 4.1: Chapter 4 Data Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Ideology/Ethos</th>
<th>Programme Design Process</th>
<th>The Finance Agreement (guiding implementation framework)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Questionable programme development process</td>
<td>• Externally driven by 'outside consultants’</td>
<td>• Makes no reference to nature-based tourism, sustainability or responsible tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Questionable commitment to programme implementation</td>
<td>• Based on broad SDI objectives and needs</td>
<td>• Training requirements are pre planned and quantitatively defined with no qualitative indicators stipulated</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Did not cultivate a shared ‘vision’</td>
<td>• Limited provincial and local government participation or consultation</td>
<td>• No training methodologies are proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Questionable reliability of programme performance reports over the first three years by PMU</td>
<td>• Did not work within existing political or social structures/systems</td>
<td>• Monitoring and evaluation requirements are primarily orientated around fiscal and quantitative processes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Limited community participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• No meaningful community participation in needs-assessment or capacity assessment during programme conceptualization process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Did not follow community communication protocols</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Poor planning:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• No Strategic Environmental Assessment</td>
<td>• Resistance to later programme attempts to address local government capacity issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• No Integrated Development Plan in place</td>
<td>• Limited integration of training initiatives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Did not work within local government economic development planning initiatives</td>
<td>• High levels of inappropriate training</td>
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<td>• Makes no reference to nature-based tourism, sustainability or responsible tourism</td>
<td>• High levels of ineffective training</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Training requirements are pre planned and quantitatively defined with no qualitative indicators stipulated</td>
<td>• High levels of inadequate training</td>
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<td>• No training methodologies are proposed</td>
<td>• Lack of in field mentoring and experiential training</td>
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<td>• Monitoring and evaluation requirements are primarily orientated around fiscal and quantitative processes</td>
<td>• Focus on formal training not contextually relevant skill development</td>
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<td>• Resistance to later programme attempts to address local government capacity issues</td>
<td>• Limited flexibility to respond to emerging capacity-building requirements</td>
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<td>• Under capacitated NGO’s</td>
<td>• Limited community capacity severely impacts on programme sustainability</td>
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<td>• Unrealistic programme objectives</td>
<td>• Future community development programmes potentially jeopardized by EU Programme experience</td>
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<td>• Unrealistic programme time-frames</td>
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<td>• Unrealistic resource allocation to meet programme objectives</td>
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<td>• Ineffectual monitoring and evaluation</td>
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### Programme Design Consequences

- The imposed programme ‘parachuted’ into provincial and local government met with resistance
- Unworkable management structures and contractual agreements
- Lack of participative processes and involvement for all stakeholder groups resulting in:
  - Poor communication, coordination and commitment
  - Lack of responsibility and accountability
- Under capacitated NGO’s
- Unrealistic programme objectives
- Unrealistic programme time-frames
- Unrealistic resource allocation to meet programme objectives
- Ineffectual monitoring and evaluation

### Programme Design Consequences For Capacity-building

- Resistance to later programme attempts to address local government capacity issues
- Limited integration of training initiatives
- High levels of inappropriate training
- High levels of ineffective training
- High levels of inadequate training
- Lack of in field mentoring and experiential training
- Focus on formal training not contextually relevant skill development
- Limited flexibility to respond to emerging capacity-building requirements

### Programme Implementation: Consequences for Community

- No sense of ownership of ‘their’ programme
- Limited commitment to the programme
- Generated internal community conflict
- Lack of institutional, business skill and environmental capacity development
- Alienation of community trust by local government
  - Trust seen as a political threat
  - Trust linked to ‘colonialist’ programme agendas
- Limited community capacity severely impacts on programme sustainability
- Future community development programmes potentially jeopardized by EU Programme experience

### Consequences of Limited Capacity for Community

- Limited community capacity severely impacts on programme sustainability
- Future community development programmes potentially jeopardized by EU Programme experience
5. CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL COMMENT

5.1 Introduction
This chapter will address the following three research goals (as outlined in Chapter 1):

- Clarify principles for sustainable nature-based tourism development initiatives in the context of the Wild Coast,
- Identify, if any, power-knowledge relations (and how these are deployed) within the EU Programme and how they have influenced capacity development, and
- Capture lessons learned in the EU Programme to inform capacity-building requirements for nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast.

In order to address the research goals, I will draw on Chapters 2 (Literature Review) and 4 (Research Data). The discussion in this chapter is presented in the following sections:

Section 5.2: Presents a critical discussion of the principles of sustainable nature-based tourism in development initiatives, drawing on the data and literature review.

Section 5.3: Analyses the EU approach to participation and explores the role of this approach in the emergence of four programme structural design flaws. The consequences of these design flaws, emerging during implementation, are discussed and an overview of the EU development ideology (power-knowledge complex) driving the development process is proposed.

Section 5.4: Provides a critical analysis of section 5.3, drawing on relevant power-knowledge theory to unlock complex relationships between the EU, EU Programme stakeholders and the development ideology, with the objective of revealing possible underlying motivations for the EU Programme development approach, as these motivations appear to have had a significant impact on creating an enabling environment for supporting capacity-building.

Section 5.5: The concluding argument draws the data analysis and critical comment together, presenting the study’s findings. Furthermore, through inductive reasoning, a ‘fuzzy’ proposition (Bassey 1999) for the underlying motivations, informing the EU development ideology which guided the EU Programme, is proposed, together with the implications that this development approach has had on capacity-building.

Section 5.6: Orientated around the research question, this section provides recommendations for future nature-based tourism development initiatives.

The emerging theme of participation, as a critical component of capacity-building, is discussed across a range of research themes and sub-themes, in both the programme design and implementation phases. This discussion results in some duplication. However, I have found this necessary to support the argument for a ‘fuzzy proposition’ proposed in the concluding argument.
5.2 Principles for Sustainable Nature-based Tourism Development Initiatives

5.2.1 Definition of Nature-based Tourism

As discussed in Chapter 2, nature-based tourism has been gathering momentum in popularity and support over the past decade. In the developing world, it is generally located in areas of high natural beauty with low population densities of endogenous peoples, with the Wild Coast being a typical example of such an area. It is generally considered to be low-volume, low-impact tourism. There are a number of definitions describing nature-based tourism, however, it should be noted that very often these definitions are informed by the industry itself, to ensure operational validity and sustainability (see Section 2.5.3). Commonly recognized definitions include an ideological approach embedded in responsibility for, and the awareness of impacts both on the biophysical and socio-cultural environments (see Section 2.5.1). It is therefore, of concern that a programme of the magnitude of the EU Programme failed to define the programme’s interpretation of tourism, or provide guiding principles for product development (see Section 4.2). The omission of these factors raises questions relating to the EU’s commitment to the programme concept and objectives (see Section 4.8). The discussion in Chapter 1 (see Section 2.4) suggests that this is not an isolated case - a broad literature review of donor-funded development programmes suggests questionable donor commitment to development programmes (see Section 2.4).

The nature-based tourist is increasingly aware of socio-cultural issues within nature-based tourism areas, and is calling on operators to address endogenous people empowerment as part of the ‘tourist’ experience. In addition, the White Paper on Tourism (1996) calls for local communities to be actively involved in the nature-based tourism industry. It has been my experience on the Wild Coast that the interpretation of economic empowerment and how it needs to unfold varies dramatically between the programme stakeholders, tour operators and tourists.

5.2.2 Impacts of the Nature-based Tourism Growth Cycle

Extensive literature captures the impacts of what generally begins as low volume nature-based tourism and evolves through a growth cycle into a high-volume industry. This is a complex emotive debate that presents many valid benefits, as well as negative impacts of tourism (see Section 2.5.2 & 2.5.3). For the most part, developing countries have received limited real benefit from tourism over the last 30 years. Furthermore, for those who have received financial benefit, it has very often been at a high social cost to endogenous communities and environments. This is reflected in the operational area of Amadiba Adventures, where economic benefits of tourism have resulted in community conflict and division (see Section 4.10.2 & 4.8.1). The reason for this lack of benefit can be attributed to a lack of control over the industry (usually driven by foreign investment) by local authorities and communities (see Section 2.5.2 & 2.5.3). Two case studies, Belize and the Hawaiian Islands, illustrate this tourism cycle, beginning with nature-based tourism and evolving into mass tourism. Although the Hawaiian Islands are now considered a ‘developed’ environment, tourism began as a low-volume nature-based
experience located in areas inhabited by endogenous peoples. In both cases, tourism drove land values and the cost of living upwards, significantly impacting on local communities’ land security, economic opportunities, social cohesion and environment (see Section 2.5.2). With the impacts of the tourism cycle in developing environments widely known, the fact that the EU consultants developing the programme failed to work within existing government development frameworks raises further questions of EU’s ability to effectively situate the development initiative in local context, as required by the programme objectives (see Section 4.7 & 4.8).

5.2.3 Risk in Nature-based Tourism

The case studies discussed above and in section 2.5.2, open up the important issue of risk to socio-cultural, economic and biophysical environments associated with tourism in developing areas. Within the research data, socio-cultural and socio-economic issues have emerged as concerns expressed by community respondents and other stakeholders (see Section 4.10.2 & 4.8.1). For these reasons, I believe that an understanding of broader tourism development issues, specifically that of risk, to be a critical component of capacity-building. Knowledge of risk is essential for developing an understanding of the other ways of knowing, in order to support informed decision-making about tourism development opportunities. It is important to note that the issue of risk, in light of the history of tourism development in developing countries, was not addressed by the programme designers, even though a key programme objective indicated in the Finance Agreement was that of social development (Finance Agreement 1999).

The case studies in section 2.5.2 identify freehold land tenureship as the destabilizing catalyst in tourism development. In the case of the EU Programme, a delayed process of securing land tenure has severely impacted on programme delivery. On the Wild Coast, the vast majority of land is communally held and not freehold, however, new legislation is being formulated that may impact on the current system. There is a move towards increasing land tenure security, with the Eastern Cape government initiating a process of concessioning a number of public nature reserves to the private tourism sector. In addition, increasing pressure is being applied by both local communities and the tourism sector to address land tenure issues in order to support further tourism development in the region. An article in the Daily Despatch (January 25 2005 p1) reports that a government legotla (government meeting of strategic importance) was recently held, with the aim of unlocking the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative. The article further notes that a focus has been placed on SMME development in the tourism sector, construction of roads, establishment of a National Park and other initiatives. The sense is that increased tourism development is coming to the Wild Coast.

5.2.4 Capacity-building of Government and Community Representative Organizations

The discussion of risk in tourism (see Section 5.2.3) together with the growing pressure for tourism development on the Wild Coast (the Wild Coat SDI identified tourism as the key economic driver of the region) highlights the importance of developing capacity in provincial government, local government and community representative organizations, to take control of
tourism development through informed and responsible decision-making (see Section 2.5). This would include planning initiatives from regional Strategic Environmental Assessment to Local Economic Development plans (some of this planning is currently being conducted).

5.2.5 Local Government Ownership of the Programme Development Process

The research data highlights provincial and local government’s resistance to externally designed programmes, developed without consideration of local planning initiatives, political and social protocols (see Section 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.13, 4.8.5, 4.10.2). In the case of the EU Programme, this resulted in alienation of beneficiary communities by local government, thereby negatively impacting on programme sustainability (see Section 4.8 & 4.7). In addition, the research highlights the importance of local government capacity to support development programmes if they are to be sustainable (see Section 4.8.5 & 4.13).

The literature review indicates that donor programmes are strongly linked to political agendas for both the donor and beneficiary countries (see Section 2.4.2). This was particularly evident in the EU Programme at local government level, where the perception was held that the programme was attempting to undermine local political structures (see Section 4.7 & 4.4.3). For this reason, the data suggests that government, particularly local government, has to take ownership of the programme development process if it is to be implementable, supported by local government and sustainable.

Development programmes need to be located in the broader Local Economic Development (LED) planning framework, as individual programmes will not address all the socio economic challenges and, therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation (see Section 4.13). Local government’s ownership of the development process needs to be affected through a steering committee, with all stakeholders represented (see Section 2.6, 4.7, 4.8.5). This approach relies on adequate local government capacity or capacity to be developed during the programme to support informed decision-making. If capacity cannot be realistically achieved within the programme cycle, the programme needs to be jointly re-evaluated with the authorities, to ensure it does meet with available capacities.

To evaluate capacity-building processes, it is necessary to explore the relationships between the capacity developers and those whose capacity is being developed and the motivations driving the process. A discussion on these relationships, centred on power gradients and participation, follows in the next section.

5.2.6 Power Gradients and Participation

In the context of tourism development in developing countries, Mowforth and Munt (1998) draw attention to the importance of ethical deliberations in addressing the disparities of financial power between investors and endogenous peoples, and how this relationship develops in an uneven power gradient. The research data indicates that there has been a lack of meaningful participation and involvement of all stakeholders in the EU Programme, particularly that of
community participation. This scenario has resulted from a top-down programme management approach (see Section 4.8). An example of relationships within this unequal power gradient is provided by a community respondent who commented that it is not the community making strategic decisions for the community business but the PMU who is still controlling the process. He cites two examples: firstly, in the recent negotiations with private tourism the community has not been meaningfully involved in the negotiations and is feeling alienated from the process (see Section 4.6). Secondly, the programme management is not talking directly to community, instead they are communicating through consultants, making it difficult for real engagement with programme management (see Section 4.4.4). This data suggests that within the programme structures there remains an unequal power gradient that is impacting on capacity development, and thereby directly impacting on programme sustainability (see Section 4.13 & 4.3).

The next section will seek to define sustainability in nature-based tourism and explore the role of capacity-building in supporting sustainability in the context of the EU Programme.

5.2.7 Defining of Sustainability in Nature-base Tourism

There appears to be no definitive term to describe sustainability, rather it appears very often to emerge from the context within which the proponents are placed and influenced by the lifestyle and personal agendas of the proponents (Mowforth & Munt 1998). This presents a controversial ethical issue, as those groups with power often have significant influence in the defining of sustainability. Very often, these influential groups emanate from the developed world, with lifestyle choices that in many cases, represent the very antithesis of sustainability. This can lead to the promotion of personal agendas and indicators of accountability to suit the empowered, and not necessarily in the best interest of contextually sustainability, and very often at the expense of the developing environments (see Section 2.5.3 & 2.2). The research data suggests that the EU Programme design and capacity-building interventions did not support the concept of sustainability (see Section 4.8, 4.13, 4.11).

Drawing on Rahnema (1997), I believe the notion of sustainability needs to be personalised. This means taking responsibility for your impact and not delegating it to the system. It is about personal choices, improving quality of life and managing the level of consumption so that it does not out-strip the integrity of the biophysical environment to regenerate (Freeman and Ndyebo 2002, Mowforth & Munt 1998, Lotz-Sisitka 2004, Hattingh 2002). However, the more common interpretation of sustainability is to continually keep economic growth going. This idea is phrased succinctly by Rist (1999:193), who claims that sustainable development is not orientated around the “… survival of the ecosystem which sets the limits of ‘development, but ‘development’ which determines the survival of societies”. This has become evident in the EU Programme, where sustainability is almost exclusively discussed in terms of the financial sustainability, with little reference to environmental sustainability, and even less reference to socio-cultural issues. The focus on programme sustainability is on securing private-sector partners for the community businesses through an investor mobilization process (see Section 4.13).
The research data suggests that community orientated nature-based tourism business, within the scope of those supported by the EU Programme, requires a 15 to 20 year development commitment to support long-term sustainability (see Section 4.8.4). This is a substantial commitment in development terms. For this reason, the research data suggests an increasing focus on developing partnerships between communities and private-sector tourism to support sustainable socio-economic programmes and environmental practices (see Section 4.13).

5.2.8 Insights for Capacity ‘Builders’ for Capacity-building in Nature-based Tourism

In light of the programme shift to involving private-sector tourism in the programme, with the objective of increasing the probability of ‘sustainability’, there is a need to be critically aware of the power differentials between the investors and local communities (see Section 2.5.3). Based on the discussion in Chapter 4, particularly that pertaining to programme design (see Section 4.8) and engaging local and provincial government (see Section 4.7), it is my opinion that a commitment to levelling the power gradient is essential for the building of trusting relationships between communities and the private-sector, with these relationships underpinning both socio-economic and environmental sustainability. It is, therefore, particularly pertinent to those supporting capacity-building within this scenario, that they seek to gain a deeper understanding of tourism through “… placing relationships of power at the heart of enquiry” and to recognize that those in power can utilise the ideology of ‘sustainable tourism’ to enhance their own power base (Mowforth & Munt 1998:186) (see Section 2.5.3). This process of seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the industry includes all stakeholder relationships: investors, donors, local governments, community and local elites. It is through this deeper understanding of the way that power is circulating in the relationships between these different stakeholders, that capacity builders can empower themselves, to in turn provide capacity-building support to others (see Section 2.5.3).

5.3 Analysis of the EU Programme Development Approach

5.3.1 Capacity Development

5.3.2 EU Development Approach to Capacity-building

In the realm of development programmes, capacity-building is very often driven by those from the ‘developed world’ with the assumed power and knowledge, to those in the ‘developing world’ who do not have the assumed power or knowledge, with the objective of those who do not (the developing) emulating those who do (the developed) (see Section 2.6, 2.2, 2.4.2, 2.4.1). This statement requires further explanation. Firstly, power in development programmes is generally defined by the level of financial resources that the donor brings to these programmes. The assumption of knowledge in development is closely liked to the provision of these financial resources, with the donor and to an extent the beneficiary group often regarding these financial resources as testimony to superior knowledge, with the donor dictating how things should be done (see Section 2.4.4 & 4.8.1). This approach was reflected in the EU Programme, where capacity-building was primarily orientated around pre-planned formal training interventions as represented in the Finance Agreements logical framework. Training
requirements were quantitatively represented, with no reference made to qualitative evaluation indicators (see Section 4.11 & 4.12).

The ideology driving the training was that of a one-way transfer of skills from those who knew to those who did not know, in order to achieve the programme objectives addressing the perceived community needs and quantitative training targets identified in the logical framework (see Section 4.11 & 4.12). It has been acknowledged by community respondents that, in the past, community members have succumbed to this donor driven approach. However, there is evidence in this study that community members are beginning to call for a new approach, where the community drives or at least participates more fully in the development initiatives (see Section 4.8.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3).

5.3.2.1 Capacity-building During Implementation
The analysis of programme capacity-building process needs to be viewed in the context of the programme objectives that were considered to be unrealistic (see Section 4.8 & 4.8.4). During implementation, the concept of nature-based tourism was introduced to selected communities over 280 kilometres of coastline. For the large majority of these communities, nature-based tourism was a foreign concept embedded in the ‘not knowing’ and thereby highlighting capacity weaknesses. As a result, the communities lacked capacity to meaningfully contribute to the implementation process. It can be argued that this approach undermines beneficiary peoples, impacts on self-esteem and can leave people more vulnerable than before (Sogge 2002, Eade 1997).

Capacity-building requirements to meet the programme aims and objectives during implementation were assessed through a superficial participation process (see Section 4.5). Whether these assessments of capacity-building requirements informed intervention processes is unclear. However, capacity-building processes were generally considered to be inappropriate, ineffective and inadequate (see Section 4.11, 4.10.1, 4.13). The data identifies the failure of the Finance Agreement in not providing clear management structures and/or qualitative monitoring and evaluation requirements of training processes, as factors influencing a lack of effective capacity-building in beneficiary community (see Section 4.12, 4.11, 4.10.1). These factors appear to be a prevalent in a wide range of donor funded development programmes (see Section 2.7.2).

Had the EU Programme capacity-building processes for the beneficiary community been more effective during the initial phase of programme delivery, it may have been possible for the beneficiary community and programme management to jointly identify programme design weaknesses - thereafter, to inform a more relevant implementation strategy within the programme financial and human resources limitations and time-frames. However, this was not the case. Instead, there is still a lack of community understanding of the EU Programme’s resources, limitations and time-frames. This has resulted in community respondent consternation surrounding the programme value of approximately 80 million Rand and the level of programme delivery. Failure of the PMU to address this issue has further compounded
community resentment towards the programme concept, processes and management (see Section 4.8.1, 4.13, 4.6, 4.4.4).

5.3.2.2 Capacity-building and Programme Time-frames
Community capacity will not be sufficiently developed to support sustainable business practices by the end of the programme (see Section 4.13). As a result, the programme management has turned to the private tourism sector to support the lack of community business capacity. Drawing on personal experience, the unfortunate perception has been created that the communities could not do it 'on their own'. What seems to fade into the background, is the reality that the level of capacity-building required to support the programme aims and objectives appears to be a 15 to 20 year process, however, the programme design allocated four years. The Midterm Review notes that the programme was over-ambitious and was not adequately analyzed to determine it was achievable (see Section 4.8.4, 4.8.1, 4.5). These same findings were reflected in an international study of 113 development programmes (see Section 2.2). Poor programme management and design leads to self-validating reductionist views of community capacity.

5.3.3 Participation
5.3.3.1 Participation in the EU Programme
The data indicates that in the research themes of needs-assessment (see Section 4.5), programme design process (see Section 4.8), programme management (see Section 4.9), training (see Section 4.11) and monitoring and evaluation (see Section 4.12), a lack of meaningful participation by government and the beneficiary community severely impacted on the programme relevance and outcome (see Section 4.13). In the context of this study, meaningful participation can be defined by what Pretty (1995:4-5) terms 'interactive participation', described as participation that is a right, not just a means to achieve programme goals; participants take control over local decision-making with a significant stake in programme structures and practices. The actual participation processes which took place in the EU Programme can be defined as 'passive participation', described by Pretty (1995:4-5) as participation where people participate by being told what has already been decided or happened. It involves unilateral announcements by administrators or programme management without listening to people's responses, and control of the information flow by the same agents (see Section 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9).

5.3.3.2 Participation and Capacity-building – A Causal Link
The data further illuminates a causal link between participation and capacity-building as discussed above (see Section 2.6, 2.5.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8.1). The research data indicates that the cumulative effect of these factors resulted in a programme that lacked relevance and ownership, with the subsequent lack of commitment severely impacting on the programme's sustainability (see Section 4.6 & 4.13). These programme findings are of concern, in light of a lack of participation first being cited in the late 1950’s as the reason for most development
programmes' poor performances. Since then, billions have been spent with expected results not produced (Rahnema 1992, Rew 1997, Sogge 2002, Rist 1999).

5.3.3 Participation and Sustainability
The community respondents' perspectives (and to varying degrees from the other stakeholder respondents) reflect a belief that interactive participation is critical for the success of development programmes (see Section 4.8.1, 4.5, 4.8). The data suggests participation goes beyond the key research categories indicated above: it needs to be present throughout the programme's multi components, and at every level of these components - an ethos of participation needs to be firmly entrenched in the programme ideology (Rhanema 1992, Rew 1997, Mowforth & Munt 1998).

5.3.4 Emergence of the EU Programme Structural Design Flaws

5.3.4.1 Identification of Structural Design Flaws
The data summary table in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.1) suggests that there were four structural design flaws present in the programme. In addition, the data indicates that the underlying reason for all four design flaws emanated from a lack of interactive participation by government departments and community through the programme conceptualization and design process (see Section 5.3.3, 5.3.2, 4.8.1).

The design flaws have been identified as (see Section 4.14):

1. The EU Programme methodology did not allow for community ownership of the programme (see Section 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 4.11, 4.13),
2. Essential provincial and local government support for programme implementation and sustainability was lacking (see Section 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.13, 4.10.2, 4.8.5),
3. The EU Programme's aims and objectives were unachievable in a four year time-frame (see Section 4.8.4, 4.8.1, 4.3.1, 4.8), and
4. Contractual agreements (designed by the EU) resulted in unworkable management structures, with no clear lines of responsibility and accountability for programme implementation NGO's (see Section 4.9, 4.4, 4.10). These factors were exacerbated by poor monitoring and evaluation (see Section 4.12).

The four design flaws identified in this study are concurrent with the two separate international studies on donor development programmes discussed in Chapter 2 (O'Donovan 1997, Rew 1997). These flaws represent a complex milieu of issues that cumulatively made the programme unworkable as a result of the programme conceptualization, design process and logical framework aims and objectives being inappropriate for the context.

5.3.4.2 Design Flaw 1: Community Ownership of the EU Programme
The programme's aims and objectives were based on those of the broad Spatial Development Initiatives, without consultation with community to establish needs or assessment of existing
capacities relevant to the programme aims and objectives. In addition, the programme was
designed externally of local systems of social protocol (see Section 4.5, 4.4.3, 4.8.5).
Furthermore, the EU consultants designed the programme on the back of the Spatial
Development Initiative, when it was common knowledge that after four years the SDI had failed
to create the enabling environment that the programme required for successful implementation
(PondoCROP Closure Report 2005). The programme conceptualization and design process
never engendered a sense of community ownership of the programme, rather the programme
was considered to belong to the EU and not to community. The result was a lack of commitment
to the programme, which negatively impacted on programme sustainability (see Section 4.8.1).

5.3.4.3 Design Flaw 2: Government Support of the EU Programme
The research data indicates that neither DEAT, nor provincial government, nor local
government were meaningfully involved in the programme conceptualizing or design processes
(see Section 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.13, 4.10.2, 4.8.5). Over 50 years of experience in donor-funded
development programmes in the developing world has revealed that political motivations from
both the donor governments and beneficiary governments underpin development programmes
(see Section 2.6 & 2.4.2). It is, therefore, well documented that the role of government,
especially that of local government who are closest to beneficiary community (their electorate) is
critical for the programme sustainability. Development programmes need to be viewed by the
beneficiary community as coming from, or through, local government and not by-passing them.
Any attempts to access beneficiary community directly is seen as undermining the local
government power base, especially when local governments are struggling to provide
development opportunities (see Section 4.4.3, 4.7, 4.8.1). Furthermore, the merging of
democratic government structures and tribal authorities creates a complex set of political and
social systems with associated protocols (Sogge 2002, Alesina & Dollar 1998 cited in Sogge
2002). Yet, with the link between aid and politics - specifically that of local politics, being
common knowledge, it appears that the EU did not meaningfully engage with these essential
stakeholders.

The research data notes that the success of programmes is linked to the process of working
through existing political structures; to by-pass these systems, or delegate the responsibility to
national government when there is a lack of capacity, appears to naïve and shows either an
inability to, or a lack of commitment to address real development needs (see Section 2.4.2). As
a result of a lack of meaningful participation, combined with a top-down approach to the
programme conceptualization and design processes, provincial and local government have not
taken ownership of the programme, rather the programme has been perceived as being
imposed or ‘parachuted’ in from national government and resisted by provincial and local
government (see Section 5.3.3.3). In the case of the EU programme, this appears to have been
exacerbated by capacity issues at local government level.

Insufficient attention was paid by the programme development consultants to a legislative
enabling environment for supporting the programme. It was suggested by the midterm review
that the design consultants may have ‘skirted’ this issue (PondoCROP closure report 2005).
There was no integrated development plan or legislation in place for the Wild Coast that allowed provincial government to locate the programme. This lack of legislation for enabling critical decision-making on land issues created conflict between provincial government and programme stakeholders (PondoCROP closure report 2005). Local government saw the programme as a threat to their political base, with the registration of Administrative Area Trusts and not Ward Trusts linked to existing political structures. The programme was perceived as a European concept with colonialist agendas attempting to undermine local government’s role (see Appendix B & Section 4.7). This resulted in both provincial and local government resisting the programme, making it extremely difficult to implement in the field.

5.3.4.4 Design Flaw 3: Time-frames
The programme objective of establishing 300 viable community tourism related enterprises over 280 kilometres of coastline in four years (see Finance Agreement) appears to have been unrealistic (see Section 5.3.3.4). It is estimated that the programme objective outlined in the logical framework would require a 15-20 year development programme commitment. The programme manager provided insight into this unachievable timeframe, suggesting that donors considered the long-term intervention as required by this programme as being ‘too risky’ and were, therefore, adverse to supporting programmes longer than 4 year cycles.

5.3.4.5 Design Flaw 4: Contractual Arrangements
DEAT was contractually accountable for programme implementation (see Finance Agreement). The programme steering committee, chaired by DEAT, was tasked with driving the programme and addressing issues of coordination between government’s departments. However, the steering committee failed to materialise in the first part of the programme, and when it did, DEAT lacked commitment and capacity, with its potential effectiveness marginalised by unworkable contractual agreements that were structured by the EU Programme design consultants (see Section 4.10.1). The implementing NGO’s with known differing ideological orientations and questionable capacities were appointed by the EU (see Section 4.5.1), but were contracted directly to DEAT with no contractual obligation or system to integrate efforts. As a result they worked independently of each other (see Section 4.9 & 4.10.1). Yet the Finance Agreement calls for an integrated NGO effort but the contractual agreements structured by the EU (see Finance Agreement) do not support this call.

This lack of integrated effort and effective management structure of the NGO’s had a significant effect on capacity-building. Training was generally considered to be ineffective, inappropriate and inadequate (see Section 4.11 & 4.13). In addition, the Finance Agreement failed to provide guidelines for evaluating NGO’s capacity to deliver on the programme’s aims and objectives. If these guidelines had been specified and creditable and capacitated NGO’s contracted, current levels of capacity would have been higher. However, the time-frames still made the programme aims and objectives unachievable (see Section 4.8.4).

A further issue arising from the contractual arrangements was the lack of timely terms of reference for training interventions’ tenders being launched. This was the result of poor NGO
management and communication. In addition, training terms of reference were drawn up by the 
NGO’s on their perceived requirements for community training, whereas it is argued that the 
training service-providers themselves should have evaluated training capacity-building 
requirements in field, and then proposed a plan and implementation strategy for capacity-
building interventions (see Section 4.11). However, even if timeous procedures were followed 
for contracting training service-providers, it is improbable that creditable training service-
providers would have tendered, as the logical framework training requirements, budgets and 
time-frames could not support the programme’s aims and objectives (see Section 4.8.4). In 
addition, the programme design did not respond to changing capacity-building requirements, as 
the logical framework did not allow this level of flexibility.

5.3.5 Consequence of Programme Design Flaws during Implementation

Once the programme implementation process began, the four programme flaws merged to 
effectively strangle the programme delivery (to be substantiated in the following discussion). 
The research data and personal experience suggest that in most cases an attempt was made 
by stakeholder organizations to isolate the specific cause of the problematic issue. Once the 
issue was identified, measures were taken within the programme design to mitigate the 
problem. As mitigation measures were applied to the issue, so the nature of the issue usually 
morphed to appear in another form. The result was an endless cycle of problem diagnosis and 
mitigation of essentially the same issues; created by the programme design flaws and made 
irresolvable by the programme flaws. The discussion to follow will provide a narration of how 
these flaws played out during implementation with a specific emphasis on capacity-building.

5.3.5.1 Participation in the Implementation Phase

The lack of community ownership of the programme engendered in the conceptualization and 
design phase was further exacerbated in the programme implementation phase the by 
community’s ‘passive’ participation (Pretty 1995). Pretty describes passive participation as 
people participating by being told what has been decided. It involves unilateral announcements 
by those in power, without acting on community’s responses and with the information being 
shared belonging to those in power (see Section 2.6 & 5.3.4.2).

During the implementation phase, increasing pressure from the community saw passive 
participation evolve into what Pretty (1995) terms ‘participation consultation’. This type of 
participation is described as being consultative, or answering questions with parameters defined 
by those in power who control the analysis of this contribution, who do not concede any share in 
decision-making, and are under no obligation to respond to people’s responses. These 
participative processes reinforced the lack of community programme ownership, impacting on 
programme commitment as the community could not act on their ideas to guide programme 
relevance and associated capacity-building requirements (see Section 5.3.3.2).

The question needs to be asked: Why commit to a programme that is not yours, lacks 
relevance, is embedded in an area of capacity weakness and engenders dependency by having 
to rely on outsiders to make it work their way? Both the ‘passive’ and ‘consultative’ participation
processes described by Pretty, negatively impacted on some community attitudes towards formal training interventions (see Section 4.11 & 4.6). Quite often, the situation was further compounded by some training service-providers (contracted by NGO’s), who, lacking capacity and commitment to the training process, resulted in the community questioning some implementing NGO’s commitment to the programme (see Section 4.11 & 4.6).

5.3.5.2 Programme Example of Capacity-building Challenges

The programme design flaws had varying degrees of influence on those tasked with capacity-building. Personal experience suggests that the programme design could not provide the capacity-building required to sustain community businesses. It is my experience that there was a vast difference in commitment to capacity-building between individuals and groups working for the NGO’s, and the NGO’s themselves. The contractual agreements (see Finance Agreement) provided an escape for NGO’s to avoid responsibility and accountability in delivery, as shown in the example below (see Section 4.10.1).
To provide an example of this situation, a committed contingent of three fieldstaff and I, spent eight months facilitating the democratic election of approximately 100 Trustees representing 8 Trusts. The trust areas stretched between Port St Johns and Coffee Bay, a distance of 70 kilometres of coastline and extending approximately 8 kilometres inland. The population density is calculated at 96 people per square kilometre (Midterm Review 2003) which represents approximately 50 000 people. The election of each set of trustees was a lengthy capacity-building process, facilitated over four main community workshops and supported by a number of smaller village workshops. At the end of the selection process, a full list of names and contact details was forwarded to the NGO tasked with the training of trustees. This training was to support institutional capacity development. The training was to consist of five one-week modules. The costs associated with this training are substantial, particularly that of accommodation, food and transportation for 100 people for five weeks. The NGO tasked with the trustee training, created confusion amongst trainees through issuing fuzzy training details and in some cases they did not inform trusts of the training at all. The context of the Wild Coast makes communication and travel extremely difficult and costly, so any confusion as to arrangements has a significant effect on community support. This is a well known fact to all those working in the area (see Appendix J). This confusion would ordinarily lead to a poor trainee turn out resulting in a substantial saving in costs to the NGO. For the first training session, the NGO made provision for only 30 of the scheduled 100 trustees for training. Only after the discovery of these confusing training details three days prior to the first training session and attempts to get clarification on the details was the training subsequently postponed. The training commenced three weeks later. As a result of clear and informative communication, trainee attendance was over 80%. The NGO coordinating this training was allocated an eight million rand budget for the programme cycle (Midterm Review 2003).

The research data suggests that the above example of a training intervention is not an isolated case, rather, it may form part of a general pattern of training provided in the EU Programme (see Section 4.11).

Over an 18 month period working within the EU Programme, similar types of management and accountability issues presented endless delivery hurdles. It is my personal opinion that these factors, combined with frequent budget cuts, created an unsustainable working environment for programme staff. The combination of these factors further impacted on beneficiary community capacity development. This scenario, I believe to be a direct result of the four programme design flaws.
5.3.5.3 Accountability

The experience discussed above (see Section 5.3.4.2), together with programme design issues (see Section 4.8) discussed in Chapter 4, raises the question of accountability. Who is the programme accountable to? The Finance Agreement links monitoring to accountability, providing for an upward process of accountability from the NGO’s to DEAT, through the submission of annual work plans and quarterly reports, with DEAT in turn reporting to the EU Commission through its delegation in South Africa (see Finance Agreement). The primary importance of these reports is placed on financial aspects, procedural protocols and performance against the logical framework. Sogge (2002:65) describes this reporting structure as an ‘aid chain’, imposed by the donor to ensure participants accounting upwards to the donor. He notes that very rarely is the accountability downwards to beneficiaries.

Accountability appears to be a common unresolved issue in donor funding with Biggs and Neame (1999) arguing for an opening up of donor funding and accountability to greater scrutiny. The ethos within the programme was not that of accountability to the beneficiary community, rather, it was my experience that the programme was constantly being restructured on the ground to meet changing requirements of the NGO and PMU management, to fulfil reporting requirements to DEAT and in turn to the EU Delegation (see Section 4.6, 4.8, 4.10.1). It appeared that as the programme progressed, the emphasis on programme delivery moved to the reporting process, with the structure of reporting very often taking precedent over content. In support of this perception, the Programme Manager raised a significant issue, stating that past ‘glowing’ annual reports submitted by the PMU to DEAT and the EU Delegation clearly did not reflect the reality of failing delivery on the ground. Sogge (2002) suggests that this is often practiced in development programmes, with those whose livelihoods and careers depend on continued funding filtering and colouring information in the reporting processes.

5.3.5.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

Qualitative monitoring and evaluation processes for capacity-building were not specified or incorporated into the programme design. As a result, it was sporadic and ineffectual (see Section 4.12). The monitoring that was specified in the Finance Agreement was quantitative in orientation, targeting financial and procedural protocols. It is noted by the programme manager that it is not possible to manage a programme without effective monitoring and evaluation, however, he argues that monitoring and evaluation in his experience is not generally integrated into development programme designs. In support of this statement, Molund and Schill (2004:9) argue that monitoring and evaluation processes are critical to the success of the programme and need to be conducted throughout the lifespan of the programme. The reports generated from the limited monitoring and evaluation that was conducted on WWF training interventions were not adequately responded to (evaluation consultant).

There was an awareness within the PMU and some of the other stakeholder groups, that a lack of qualitative monitoring of training interventions were resulting in poor standards of capacity development (see Section 4.11 & 4.12). The data suggests that the PMU lacked commitment to
addressing the issue and this was only resolved once the implementing NGO’s contracts expired (see Section 4.12).

5.3.6 Donor Development Ideology and Ethos

The discussion above raises questions surrounding the EU’s development ideology driving the programme design processes and implementation. The literature review provides a possible insight into development ideology by identifying three key motivations for donor funding in developing countries: a need for donor countries to have a strategic presence in selected beneficiary countries, to support political leverage within donor countries and to support a political economy of international development consultants working within the developmental industry. Furthermore, it is suggested that these factors are often considered a higher priority than fulfilling beneficiary countries’ needs (see Section 2.4.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.2, 2.2)

The Oxford Wordfinder defines ideology as a system of ideas at the basis of an economic or political theory (this representing a particular power-knowledge complex). On the strength of this definition the programme ideology would pertain to the system of ideas (see Section 2.2) that drove programme conceptualization, the design process and the implementation approach. The programme ideology combined with ethos, defined by the Oxford Wordfinder as a spirit or attitudes of a community, people or system, laid the programme foundation that would largely dictate what was possible to deliver and how. It is my belief that the donor ideology and ethos are the most critical components in determining the outcome of development programmes. In support of this statement, Sogge (2002) argues that ideology is essentially at the heart of foreign aid. For this reason, the discussion to follow seeks to explore and critically comment on the EU Programme development ideology and ethos.

5.3.6.1 EU Programme Development Ideology and Ethos of Participation

The top down approach to the EU Programme conceptualization, design and implementation lacked a meaningful participative ideology (see Section 4.5.1, 4.7, 4.8). This was evident in the way that the EU consultants appear to have limited consultation with government and community in the programme development process. There is a high probability that the EU development ideology has negatively impacted on the programme implementation (see Section 4.5.1 & 2.4.2). This was exacerbated by the PMU’s approach to participation and communication during implementation, which appeared to have lacked commitment (during the tenureship of the first programme manager) and direct engagement with community. The outcome of the EU Programme’s approach to participatory methodologies appears to have received similar critical commentary in other donor programmes as described by Sogge (2002), where it is argued that a top-down donor ideology in development programmes does not support effective programmes, as beneficiaries have no control and, therefore, feel no commitment to the programme, raising questions surrounding effectiveness and/or commitment to development (Dallaire 2001, cited in Labonte et al 2001 & see Section 5.3.3.1).
5.3.6.2 EU Programme Development Ideology and Ethos to Capacity-building

Capacity-building is viewed in the programme design as one component of achieving the predetermined objectives, rather than the programme itself being viewed as a capacity-building process (Sogge 2002, Finance Agreement, see Section 4.11). The programme design tasked stakeholders with delivering on predetermined components of the programme against a timeframe (see Finance Agreement). The design failed to provide an ethos of capacity-building to underpin the programme implementation efforts. Rather, the delivery of the training modules, for example were seen as the objective and not the outcomes (Finance Agreement, see Section 4.11).

The EU appeared to have appointed the implementing NGO’s without sufficient consultation with DEAT. Furthermore, the NGO’s were appointed by the EU after it had been expressed by the leading NGO PondoCROP to the EU consultants that neither PondoCROP, TTO or WWF had the capacity to implement the programme (PondoCROP Closure Report 2005, see Section 4.5.1).

The failure of the programme design to: recognise the critical importance of engendering an ethos of capacity-building and select sufficiently capacitated implementing NGO’s to deliver on the programmes objectives, combined with no specified qualitative indicators for monitoring and evaluation of training interventions, raises further questions of the EU Programme effectiveness and/or commitment to the capacity-building process.

It is interesting to note that the Midterm Review identifies divergent ideological approaches of the implementation agents as resulting in a lack of coordinated and strategic direction of the programme, but does not question the ideological approach of the programme as a whole which laid the very foundation for these divergent ideologies to manifest.

5.3.6.3 EU Programme Ideological Approach to Accountability

The EU Programme design consultants structured contractual agreements in the programme through the Finance Agreement. In the Finance Agreement the PMU, the EU Commissions representation in the programme, were not contractually accountable for programme delivery. The PMU’s main responsibility was to ensure that fiscal and procedural protocols were followed according to EU policy and regulations. The system was designed by the EU to account upwards to the donors, with no reference made to accountability to beneficiary community. The accountability for programme implementation rested with DEAT. The EU consultants appear to have designed the programme according to their knowledge, needs and contractual requirements, while limiting DEAT’s involvement in the programme conceptualization and design processes (see Section 4.5.1). This resulted in DEAT being contractually responsible for the implementation of a programme, whose design it had limited influence on, while the designers - the EU - had no accountability for its implementation (see Finance Agreement). Furthermore, the programme had been running for six months before the EU Commission put the PMU in place (Midterm Review 2003).
5.3.6.4 EU Programme Ideology Approach to Programme Sustainability and Risk
Sustainability is the key principle underpinning development programmes, yet the EU Programme documentation makes no mention of sustainability (see Section 4.13). In addition, no reference is made to risk, an essential component of capacity-building to support informed decision-making and sustainable practices. This issue is of particular significance in light of well documented case studies of tourism’s negative impact on socio-economic and biophysical environments in developing areas (see Section 2.5.2).

5.3.6.5 The PMU’s Ideological Approach to Programme Implementation
Although the EU Programme design limited the PMU’s influence in the programme, there are a number of key issues that illuminate the attitude of the PMU to the programme. These factors primarily relate the PMU’s approach in the first three years under the tenureship of the first programme manager. The effect of these early approaches on stakeholders had a significant long-term influence on perceptions and attitudes towards the PMU.

Issues illuminating the PMU approach to the programme:

- The Finance Agreement required that the PMU be based in the Eastern Cape. However, for the first three years it was based in KwaZulu Natal (Durban), with the first programme manager seldom in the field. This had a significant negative impact on provincial and local government relations, severely impacting on the creation of an enabling working environment on the ground (Midterm Review, PDO’s 2004 pers.comm.),
- The EU Programme lacked commitment to engage provincial and local government, when it was clearly evident that a lack of engagement was severely affecting delivery on the ground (Midterm Review, personal experience),
- The PMU submitted ‘glowing’ annual reports that did not represent the reality on the ground (programme manager),
- The PMU in the first three years of the programme lacked the ‘will’ to work around contractual challenges (programme training manager, see Section 4.9.1),
- There was no effort made to engender a ‘shared vision’ amongst stakeholders (programme manager, see Section 4.9.1),
- The first programme manager’s approach was only to administratively manage the programme, with an emphasis on learning the technicalities of EU policies and procedures (PondoCROP closure report 2005),
- The drafting of the 1st Annual Work Plan was focussed on technical aspects and requirements, rather than developing realistic, integrated and coordinated plans (PondoCROP closure report 2005), and
- A communication strategy that seeks to reduce direct engagement with the beneficiary community (see Section 4.4).

The PMU’s approach to EU Programme implementation suggests a lack of commitment to qualitative programme outcomes.
5.3.6.6 The Donor Political Economy
In discussing donor ideology and motivations, the programme manager suggested that there are questions to be asked of donor funding, specifically those of, “... what they get away with, what they are concerned about”. He opens up the idea of a political economy being a significant factor in the development industry. He explains that there is a second economy in the donor funding industry “… people live off it, people thrive off it, it is well known … no one will admit that a percentage of donor funds allocated to programmes are attached to oversees consultants that sustain a significant industry”. Respondents from both NGO’s believe that the programme was designed to suit the EU funding parameters, administrative requirements and development ideas of the donors, and was not informed by realities on the ground. It is well documented that the donor industry supports a sizeable ‘secondary’ or political economy of international consultants (see Section 2.4.2 & 2.4.3).

5.4 Underlying Motivations Informing the EU Programme Development Ideology
5.4.1 Orientation to Data Analysis
During the data analysis, I was ever mindful of the implications of power operating at every level of relationships, systems and processes (Foucault in Blacker 1998). Furthermore, the analysis was specifically orientated around the idea of the deployment of power and how those impacted by this deployment are “… governed by the rules of knowledge per se” (Foucalt in Popkewitz & Brennan 1998:18). In terms of this study, this idea relates to how the EU Programme was designed, the implications of its implementation and how those involved with the programme were governed by rules of the programmes systems, i.e. management structures, procedural protocols etc.

5.4.2 Contextualizing the EU Programme for Programme Design Analysis
Analysis of the EU Programme design flaw origins and implementation consequences requires the programme to be contextualised in a “… system of ideas that normalise and construct the rules” (Foucalt in Popkewitz & Brennan 1998:19). An understanding of the system of ideas that orientated the EU Programme design process and conceptual rules that governed the programmes structure is necessary to provide a framework to understand how and why these four programme flaws emerged. The following discussion will contextualise the EU Programme in the wider development landscape.

The first formal reference to the notion of ‘under-development,’ primarily defined by economic status, was first presented in President Truman’s Marshall Plan in 1948. The emphasis was placed on economic development as a tool for addressing socio-economic issues in under-developed countries. Since then, billions have been spent on strategies and developmental initiatives to address socio-economic challenges in the developing world (see Section 2.4.1). Foreign funded donor programmes play a central role in delivering these developmental initiatives. However, it is recognized that donor aid is strongly aligned to political, strategic and economic interest of the developed countries funding these initiatives (see Section 2.4.2).
The political economy created by donor-funded initiatives supports a substantial economy of consultancies, consultants and experts (see Section 2.4.3 & 4.8.1). The prosperity of these organizations and individual careers depend on making donor funding flow. This appears to often result in distorted views of problems and capacities in developing countries, frequently resulting in bloated and unsustainable initiatives (see Section 2.4.3 & Chapter 4). To support ongoing efforts to address the socio-economic development challenges in the developing world, Britain is proposing a plan to meet the millennium development goals, by increasing donor aid to developing countries through doubling the current 0.2% of combined national income, to 0.4% immediately with a timetable to build it to 0.7% (Boyle, Sunday Times p5, 23 January 2005).

In light of the significant financial value of developed countries’ ‘contribution’ to addressing under-development in the developing world, and the fact that a large percentage of this ‘contribution’, is allocated to development contracts awarded to free market orientated consultancies/organizations and individuals, through a competitive international tender process (as was the case in the EU Programme), I argue that these developmental agents are working within a competitive commercial industry and are, therefore, subject to issues of financial risk and financial sustainability (see Section 2.1).

5.4.3 Defining Risk in the Context of the Global Market Place

Valsamakis et al (1999:33) defines risk “… as the variation of the actual outcome from the expected outcome”. The majority of large to medium size organizations view risk management as a strategic component of any organization’s survival and development (Waring 1998:3). Valsamakis (1999:18-30) argues that the objective of risk management is to control exposure to risk and the financing of risk consequences against assets and earning capacity. This requires the ability to quantify risk to facilitate decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. He further argues that legal liability plays an essential part in risk management. Essentially, a risk management strategy seeks to inform decision-making to reduce the exposure to an unexpected outcome, in order to ensure organizational sustainability.

It is interesting to note that Valsamakis (1999:12) suggests that the ability to manage risk is probably the most distinguishing feature between developed and developing countries, with developed countries better able to control risk and deploy its resources toward economic and social advancement.

The following section will explore EU Programme links between risk management strategies, EU Programme development methodology and the emergence of the programme design flaws.

5.4.4 Retracing the EU Programme Design Methodology

The Wild Coast SDI was selected by the EU as a target area for launching a tourism development programme. As mentioned previously the programme conceptualization and design process were driven by the EU consultants (see Section 4.5.1, 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.8.5). The
EU’s approach to the programme development process, with its apparent lack of meaningful participation, can be described as a characteristic of politics in the information age where, “Power and inequality operate less through exploitation than exclusion, with exclusion a result of constitutive rules” (Lash 2002:xii).

With government and community not actively informing the programme conceptualization and design processes, the risk for the EU consultants of encountering an unexpected programme design outcome was reduced (Valsamakis et al 1999).

In seeking to explore the EU’s methodology driving the programme development process further, I draw on Foucault’s argument that the “… elements of power move from focusing on controlling actors to the systems of ideas that normalise and construct the rules, through which intent and purpose in the world are organized” (Foucalt in Popkewitz and Brennan 1998:19). In contextualizing this argument, the EU consultants (and the EU) moved the emphasis from themselves, the controlling actors, into a system of ideas - that of the programme structure and systems that they engineered. This programme structure and associated systems normalised and constructed the rules, forcing the beneficiary community and stakeholders to conform to the programme structures and systems.

It is my reasoning that, based on data, the methodological approach to designing and establishing the EU Programme structures and system was to limit government and beneficiary involvement in the design processes and, in so doing, to control the design outcomes. Thereafter, it was to implement the EU designed programme structures and systems through EU constructed contractual agreements, that limited the EU Commission and the EU contracted programme management consultancy to risk. This reasoning will be substantiated in the following discussions.

5.4.5 The EU Programme Development Methodology: A Risk Management Strategy

It is my interpretation of the data, that the EU approach to the development of the EU Programme was orientated around a risk management strategy. If the EU were to enter into “interactive participation” (Petty 1995:4-5) with stakeholders on programme conceptualization and design (including management structures), it becomes a negotiation process. Churchman (1995:1) notes that negotiation becomes possible when common needs motivate parties to settle specific differences. In reviewing the research data, specific differences emerge between government and community needs, and that of the EU. Government and community are calling for an empowered role in programme development and management (see Section 4.8.1, 4.8.5, 4.13), while the EU approach, represented by the EU Programme development methodology (discussed above), with associated systems and contractual agreements appear to be entrenching their control (see Section 4.5.1, 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.8.5). The question needs to be asked: Why would the EU negotiate their current methodological approach to development, which would in all probability require the relinquishing of current levels of power and control, and
negatively impact on a substantial secondary economy of international development agents (their electorate)?

The notion of negotiation requires compromise, which translates into increased risk, linked to defining of unexpected outcomes (Churchman 1995). The most significant factors not negotiated or compromised by the EU in the programme design were the budget, timeframe and accountability - all contractually captured in the Finance Agreement. Pretty’s (1995) concept of ‘interactive participation’, with associated compromise through negotiation, has a significant impact on the ‘developmental industry’. Negotiation means relinquishing absolute power and control to manage exposure to risk through the increased probability of an unexpected outcome (Valsamakis et al 1999). The EU approach to developing the programme, therefore, enabled control of the three high risk areas: budget, timeframe and accountability for programme delivery.

Negotiating means compromising on the ‘system of ideas that normalises and constructs the rules’, with the systems of ideas enforced in legally binding contracts - in the case of the EU Programme, the Finance Agreement (Foucault in Popkewitz & Brennan 1998). This effectively relates to three key programme components: procedural systems, programme management structures and, most significantly, accountability. In the current programme design, the EU dictated these factors, with the procedural systems orientated around fiscal processes accounting upwards to the donor and monitored by the PMU. However, the EU delegated the most critical component for the success of the programme, that of accountability for actual programme delivery to DEAT, through the contractual management agreements (see Finance Agreement).

To negotiate would open the debate on management structures and accountabilities. The Finance Agreement places no accountability on the EU for programme delivery. The EU in this case had the power to enforce an unworkable programme structure and design through the Finance Agreement that placed their representation in the programme, the PMU, outside of actual programme delivery accountability (see Section 4.9, 4.4, 4.10).

It is interesting to note that the EU Programme’s contractual responsibilities were significantly restructured in the extension. The original implementing NGO’s were not re-contracted and the PMU was tasked with some degree of accountability for programme delivery. These changes were supported by the programme manager, but resisted by the international consultancy, which contracts him (Programme Manager, 2004 pers.comm.). This EU-based consultancy was appointed by the EU Commission to manage the programme after competing in an international tender process (Programme Manager, 2004 pers.comm.).

5.4.6 Imposition of External Systems on Local Systems

The EU approach to both developing and implementing this programme had a significant impact on local political and social systems (see Section 4.7, 4.4.3, 4.8.1). To assist in revealing a further layer of power-knowledge relationship and how this impacted on local systems, I will
draw on Foucault’s argument that “Power is embedded in the governing systems of order, appropriation, and exclusion, by which subjectives are constructed and social life is formed” (Foucault in Popkewitz & Brennan 1998:19).

The EU Programme design process embedded power in the programme systems through establishing contractual relationships and operational procedure (see Finance Agreement). In doing this, it appropriated conceptual programme ideas from an existing NGO (see Section 4.8.1), appeared to have excluded local political protocols, local development planning initiatives and social protocols for addressing development issues with the community (see Section 4.7 & 4.4.3). Through these contractual relationships and associated accountabilities, the EU attempted to impose its programme system on local systems and ways of doing. This imposition was exacerbated by DEAT signing the Finance Agreement, which held them accountable for the EU Programme delivery. This validated the programme development process and design, which ran contrary to local political, development and social systems. To some extent this imposed programme system, with a degree of credibility as the result of DEAT’s contractual obligations, appeared designed to become the new reference point against which the local development initiatives were required to reconstruct their systems. This resulted in tensions and conflict between programme stakeholders (see Section 4.7, 4.8.1, 4.10.2).

5.5 Concluding Argument

It has been established in the research that an enabling capacity-building environment requires participation (see Section 5.3.1 & 5.3.2). The EU Programme development process appeared to limit participation with government and beneficiary community during EU Programme conceptualization and design processes (see Section 5.4.4). This appears to have resulted in the emergence of four design flaws representing a complex milieu of issues that cumulatively made the programme unworkable and unimplementable (see Section 5.3.3).

The research suggests that the EU Programmes design process was structured to meet the development parameters and administrative requirements of the EU. This was evident by:

• Programme accountability that is financially orientated upwards to the donor, with no reference to accountability to beneficiary community (see Finance Agreement),

• Unrealistic time-frames aligned with EU funding cycles (see Section 5.3.3.4), and

• Non-negotiated programme development methodology (see Section 5.4.4).

The research suggests that the EU either lacked competence to effectively design the development programme, or lacked commitment to the programme design and implementation processes. This is evident by:

• Contractual agreements which eliminated the EU from programme implementation accountability (the programme they designed) (see Finance Agreement),

• Monitoring and evaluation was structured around fiscal and procedural systems, with no reference to qualitative capacity-building indicators (see Finance Agreement),

• The EU consultants appeared to have worked around local economic planning systems, political and social structures (see Section 5.4.4),
• No ethos of participation (see Section 5.4.4),
• Did not work towards a common vision (see Section 5.3.5.5 & 5.4.4),
• No reference to sustainability, the central focus of development programmes (see Finance Agreement, see Section 2.5.3),
• No reference to risk, in light of well documented ramifications of programme concept (see Finance Agreement, see Section 2.5.2),
• Appointing of insufficiently capacitated NGO’s for programme implementation (see Section 5.3.3.5),
• The PMU was only put in place six months after the programme was initiated (see Section 5.3.5.3), and
• The PMU lacked commitment to the programme’s qualitative outcomes in the first three years of the programme cycle (see Section 5.3.5.5).

It is my argument, that the motivation driving the EU development ideology of the programme, i.e. of not engaging in interactive participation, was driven by a risk management strategy (see Section 5.4.5). In the case of this programme, the EU’s development approach essentially allowed them total control of the design process, thereby establishing the programme’s structures, systems and accountabilities according to their requirements (see Section 5.3.5.4 & 5.4.4). These programme structures, systems and accountabilities were then enforced through contractual relationships the EU designed (see Finance Agreement). However, if the EU was to enter into an interactive participation with government and beneficiary communities in programme conceptualization and design, it would require the relinquishing of existing levels of power and control, as interactive participation would require negotiation (see Section 5.3.5.4 & 5.4.4).

This negotiation would open the debate on management structures, programme systems and accountabilities significantly increasing the EU risk to an unexpected outcome in the programme conceptualization and design process. This, in all likelihood, would challenge EU development programme policies, particularly that of issues surrounding accountability in programme delivery (see Section 5.4.3, 5.4.4). The EU would then no longer have total control over programme budgets, time-frames and management structures, thereby increasing financial risk (see Section 5.4.3). This raises the possibility of shared accountability for programme implementation with the associated issue of financial liability in the event of poor programme performance (see Section 5.4.3). In addition, a shift in the existing methodology to an interactive approach would have a significant financial effect on a substantial political economy of development consultancies, consultants and experts that derive an income from the current top-down exclusionary development approach (see Section 5.3.5.6 & 5.4.4).

Although not mutually exclusive, there are two groupings of outcomes in this research: those orientated around the four programme design flaws (see Section 5.3.3.1), the other the PMU performance (see Section 5.3.5.5). Failures in both these categories to achieve expected programme results are commonly reflected in international case-study reports of donor programmes and have been reported on for 50 years (see Section 2.4.5, 2.6, 2.4.1).
Significant blame for the poor EU Programme performance has been attributed to the PMU, with some blame in turn apportioned to the EU Programme contractual agreements and lack of participatory methodologies (Midterm Review, Replication Study). There is, however, only superficial discussion in the programme documentation exploring the underlying reasons why the programme was structured the way it was (with an unmanageable/unworkable structure) and how this relates to the programme outcomes. The PMU performance, therefore, has received far more critical attention than the deeply rooted programme structural reasons negating programme expected outcomes. The PMU performance is essentially the ‘tip’ of the iceberg of factors responsible for the EU Programme’s lack of delivery.

The EU Programme development methodology appears to have failed to produce expected capacity-building outcomes. The development approach does not appear to have provided an enabling environment for capacity-building supported by reflexive learning methodologies. In addition, the EU Programme achieved only a small proportion of its objectives at too high a cost (see Section 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.2, 4.13, 4.14). This argument suggest that the EU Programme could not and did not support capacity-building for sustainability, with the power-knowledge complex relating to the EU programme development ideology being the overriding factor (see Finance Agreement, see Section 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5).

### 5.6 Recommendations

The data (see Chapter 5 above) suggests that power-knowledge relationships in the EU Programme have had a substantial impact on capacity-building for sustainable nature-based tourism. This is manifested in the EU development ideology driving the EU Programme design and implementation, which the study has identified as the most significant factor in creating an enabling environment to support capacity-building. This statement needs to be qualified in the context of the EU Programme. To explain further, the EU Programme was envisioned as a pilot programme to explore various tourism models. However, the community-led approach was the primary focus and so these recommendations are orientated around this outcome. It is, though, a recommendation of this study that further research into models for nature-based tourism, located in rural areas, be conducted.

Based on the research data and discussion presented in this chapter, I argue that the EU development methodology driving the EU Programme needs more than adjustment or restructuring - it needs a paradigm shift to interactive participatory methodologies for programme conceptualization, design and implementation phases, if an enabling environment for capacity-building is to be developed. In addition, an interactive participatory approach is also required for programme management, with all key stakeholders sharing accountabilities for programme implementation outcomes. This statement is discussed in more detail below, focusing on developmental ideologies (in key programme components as identified by this study) required, to support capacity-building for sustainability in the studies context.
5.6.1 Principles for Sustainability

The principles for guiding sustainability are succinctly described by Daly (1996 cited in Lotz-Sisitka 2004:20): “… development without growth beyond the environmental carrying capacity, where development means qualitative improvement and growth means quantitative increase”. A key component of this approach, in the context of the EU Programme, lies in the building of long-term mutually beneficial relationships between government, communities and the private-tourism sector while respecting the integrity of the biophysical environment.

5.6.2 Participative Development Ideology

The research data provides a clear link between participation, programme relevance, programme ownership, commitment of stakeholders, effective management and capacity-building for sustainable programme implementation. An ethos of participation needs to be firmly entrenched in the programme ideology (Rhanema 1992, Rew 1997, Mowforth & Munt 1998).

An interactive approach to participation is proposed. This is described by Pretty (1995) as a right, rather than just a means to achieving programme objectives. In this approach, people participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation and/or strengthening of local institutions. Furthermore, participants take control over local decision-making with a significant stake in programme structures and practices.

5.6.3 Communication

An ethos of communication must be embedded in all phases and components of the programme. Communication needs to be viewed as the social glue that holds the development process together (training evaluation consultant).

5.6.4 Capacity-building

The process of capacity-building needs to be driven by the beneficiary community – you cannot mechanically ‘do’ capacity-building guided by a programme logical framework, if it is not what the beneficiary community want, hence, the critical importance of interactive participation in programme needs assessment, conceptualization, design and implementation.

Capacity-building is essentially an ethos of working together, of mutual respect, to jointly develop the skills and confidence to take informed decisions. The heart of capacity-building lies in mutual empowerment - this requires the building of trusting relationships between all stakeholders to facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in the development process, and to jointly negotiate a programme design and implementation plan (Rahnema 1997, Babikwa 2004). This approach requires a commitment from all programme stakeholders to levelling the power gradient.

An understanding of the broader tourism development issues specifically that of risk, is a critical component of capacity-building to support informed decision-making. In addition, the importance of developing capacity in provincial government, local government and community
institutions, to take control of tourism development through informed and responsible decision-making, cannot be underestimated (Midterm Review & Mowforth & Munt 1998).

5.6.5 Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity of all programme stakeholders including government, community and implementing agents is critical to the success of the programme. Institutional capacity must be sufficient enough to support the programme concept and design, or be adequately developed during the course of the programme. If this cannot be achieved, then the programme needs to be scaled down to suit the contextual realities.

5.6.6 Government and Community Programme Ownership

No government ownership of the programme results in no support for the programme (possibly even resistance) severely impacting on sustainability. No community ownership of the programme, results in no commitment which negatively impacts no sustainability. It is essential that government, particularly local government takes ownership of the programme development process if it is to be implementable and sustainable, and if capacity building is to be effective. The programme must be well-embedded within provincial and local government and work within the existing political structures (Rew 1997 & Midterm Review). The programme needs to be viewed by the beneficiary community as ‘their’ programme, relevant to their needs and informed by their ‘ideas’ (community respondents).

5.6.7 Programme Design Process

An interactive participative approach to needs-assessment; programme conceptualization and design, the establishing of required competencies to support the programme and clear understanding of responsibilities and accountabilities is proposed. This approach to programme design allows for the assessment of capacities, skills-gap identification and reduces the level of assumptions. This, in turn, ensures that all stakeholders clearly understand, right from the beginning, what the programme’s purpose, objectives and structures are, together with roles and accountabilities of all stakeholders groups (training evaluation consultant & Franks 1997). It is recommended that the programme conceptualization and design focus on what is already there and what can be built upon i.e. a more contextually situated approach to programme design.

5.6.8 Engaging Community

Programme developers need to follow the correct political protocol through provincial and local government departments, prior to engaging with community. Thereafter, the community engagement process needs to work through local systems.

5.6.9 Time-frames and Programme Flexibility

Time-frames need to be congruent with programme objectives, resource allocation and capacity-building requirements. It needs to be accepted that capacity-building is a time-
consuming process, difficult to accelerate and requires long-term intervention. In addition, the programme needs to be flexible, responding with new capacity-building idea for changing needs (training evaluation consultant).

5.6.10 Programme Management
The programme management’s development ideology is the catalyst for programme success or failure. Central to management’s role, is the ability to create a common vision for all stakeholders, to provide leadership and ensure open communication channels between stakeholders (community respondents). Management needs to set the precedent for stakeholders, by taking personal responsibility for decision-making and not delegating it to ‘the system’.

5.6.11 Contractual Agreements – Accountability and Responsibility
The programme design must clearly define management structures, communication protocols, operating procedure, stakeholder roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, with the programme management unit sufficiently empowered to take the decisive action in the event of poor stakeholder performance. In addition, the programme management unit must share accountability for the programme outcome. Programme structures, roles and accountabilities need to be defined by legally binding contracts. Programme deliverables and timeframes must be clearly defined through an interactive, participative programme development process. Quantitative programme deliverables need to be tightly woven in qualitative criteria.

5.6.12 Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation processes are critical to programme success, and need to be conducted throughout the lifespan of the programme (Molund & Schill 2004). A programme cannot be managed without effective monitoring and evaluation (programme manager). Monitoring and evaluation processes need to be designed as integral to all components and phases of the programme. In addition, they need to be clearly specified in the programme design with a specific focus on qualitative indicators.

5.6.13 Capacities of Implementing Agents
A critical review of potential implementation agents’ capacities, development ideologies and track record relevant to the programme objectives is essential prior to contracting.

It is through a deeper understanding of the way that power is circulating in the relationships between different programme stakeholders that capacity builders can empower themselves to, in turn, provide capacity-building support to others.

5.6.14 Training
An interactive, participative approach is proposed for assessing training needs, establishing the trainee selection processes and criteria, and deciding on the training methodology to be
adopted. Furthermore, training must be structured as an integral part of the programme’s purpose and objectives. This approach requires communication and mediation between the different stakeholders. It needs highly skilled facilitators to bring parties together to identify early rifts and work through them before they become serious issues. This process needs consistency, a long-term reflective approach and consistent work with all stakeholders involved (training evaluation consultant).

5.6.15 Concluding Statement

South Africa needs to effectively utilise donor assistance in addressing the two inextricably linked challenges of socio-economic development and environmental management for sustainability. In the case of the EU Programme, I do not believe that this has been the case (see Section 4.14).

The recommendations point to the need for a paradigm shift in the EU Programme development ideology. However, there appears to be no reason for the EU to change their development methodology - that would result in increased exposure to unexpected outcomes and associated financial risk. Furthermore, it could jeopardize the financial viability of a substantial political economy of donor-country consultancies, consultants and experts working in the development industry. This argument, combined with the fact that donor-funding is considered to be primarily driven by strategic political and economic interest of donor countries, may provide some insight into how an ‘industry’ can under-perform for so long and still sustain itself, and why capacity-building in this context is more complex than would appear at surface level (see Section 2.4.5, 2.4.2, 2.4.1).

It is my belief that the donor industry will not move out of the existing comfort zone of exclusionary development ideologies unless forced to do so. I, therefore, propose the following: South Africa needs to develop a legislative framework for guiding development aid programmes such as the EU Programme. This legislative framework needs to be based on South African systems of power and knowledge. Programmes need to be coordinated within existing government planning processes, such as the Integrated Development Plans and the Local Economic Development plans. Programme development processes need to be guided by community identified needs. The development process must result in relevant programmes, with objectives supported by realistic time-frames and adequate resource allocation. Programme ownership must lie with the beneficiary community, while accountability for the programme outcome must be shared between all stakeholders, including the donor.

A possible concern that this proposal may lead to a ‘drying-up’ of donor-funding in South Africa, I believe would be unfounded. It is widely documented that donor-funding is primarily driven by strategic political reasons (see Section 2.4). In light of this statement, South Africa’s strategic importance as a catalyst for broader development on the African continent needs to be considered. South Africa, together with Nigeria, has played a leading role in the development of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). In addition, South Africa played a significant role in the establishment of the African Union (AU), whose headquarters are
now hosted by South Africa. The AU drive for development assistance from the developed countries, specifically that of the G8 has been spearheaded by the principles of NEPAD. In turn, at a summit of the G8 nations at Gleneagles in Scotland during July of 2005 (attended by President Mbeki on a special invitation), NEPAD was identified by the G8 as the vehicle for guiding development assistance in support of the Millennium Development Goals. South Africa, therefore, has had a strategic role to play in the G8’s commitment to support the AU through NEPAD and will, in all probability, continue to do so. In light of this discussion, South Africa has an obligation to lead from the front, in developing a legislative framework that will guide donor-funded development programme methodology to support an enabling environment for capacity-building. Furthermore, development programmes need to be effectively coordinated and efficiently managed by government, if they are to assist in realising the Millennium Development Goals, and these programmes need to show a real commitment to contextually situating their initiatives, and to meaningful capacity building that is sustainable.
REFERENCES


International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2002). *Earth negotiations bulletin; special summit coverage*. Winnipeg: IISD.


Lotz-Sisitka, H. (2004). Positioning Southern African environmental education in a changing political, economic, social, natural and epistemological (environment) landscape. Discussion paper commissioned by the SADC REES, for the purpose of informing the Danida-funded ‘Futures Research’ Murray & Roberts Chair of Environmental education, Rhodes University, South Africa.


Programme Documentation


What is a Trust? (2002). Support to the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme.

Personal communication


Appendix A: EU Programme Manager (Programme Management Unit) Interview Transcription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview number</th>
<th>Interview 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>14th December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Eastern Cape Tourism Board offices, East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder group:</td>
<td>Project Management Unit (contracted directly to the EU Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent:</td>
<td>EU Programme Manager (PM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History with the EU Programme:</td>
<td>Joined EU programme in July 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. What do you believe the key principle[s] of sustainable nature-based tourism to be?
   - It incorporates a range of issues including: biodiversity, recipient community, economics, markets
   - An integrated term that includes all areas in the development environment

Eastern Cape (EC) governmental issues impacting on sustainable development:
- Historical lack of development support structures
- Young government structures
- Conflict between government structures and traditional leadership
- Divergent agendas e.g. toll road being on the table since 81’ - still no consensus
- Focus on government departments across the board on one issue: Conservation, as this is the dominant skill-base in the EC
- Three key reasons for current situation in EC:
  - Need to look at top officials: Where did they come from? How were they trained? Where did they get their experience?
  - There is a philosophy in the EC that government delivers everything
  - Not had enough experience with private sector; do not trust the private sector: they fear for their jobs; they want to have total control (they don’t want to just be facilitators). This approach “creates great opportunity for fraud and corruption the further you go outside your traditional areas of government, and it has almost become an endemic problem. It’s a little industry on its own”
- Little ability to see across the broad issues
- Lack of understanding of tourism industry and exposure to the private sector
- EC lacks resources to attract human resources skills
- Little progress in tourism development since PM involvement with Umtata Municipal tourism-planning in early 1984 – “The Transkei Coastal Management Control Plan”
- Tourism development lacks model and approach

Spatial Development Initiative (SDI):
  - Aimed at areas of under-development
• Designed to be a short-term intervention
• Aimed at cutting through bureaucracy
• but failed

Highlighted issues for lack of development in EC:
• Poor government structures
• Narrow skill-base
• Development approach/model

Suggestions:
• Government needs to play facilitation and regulation role

EC government’s approach to tourism:
• Government is still coming from the position that they will own and run tourism e.g. Dwesa Nature Reserve, where government took a twenty-year lease to run the facility. The result has been a deterioration of asset. The question is: Who is marketing? Who is bringing the tourist? The ECTB, who has apparently been tasked with this job, has been rudderless for three years. Although the community owns the land and assets, they have not seen an adequate return. “It has been an absolute disaster”
• Government has crowded out the private-sector
• The counter argument is: find a good operator with financial strength, who does the marketing, brings the tourists, brings the management, engages the community, empowers the community to take it on into the future.

2. **What is your understanding of “capacity-building”?**
• Encompasses many skills: life skills, experience and exposure
• Formal training courses on their own is not capacity-building
• It is about helping community to build up confidence to take control of their own lives

Comments specific to EC:
• Government (and general population) deeply under-exposed to the concept of ‘development’
• Suffered for decades from under-development
• Philosophical development approach, 10 years behind the rest of the country – evident at workshop in Umtata 2004
• ‘Home-land’ system had a huge impact on capacity-development – need to review history of system
• No experience in engagement with private-sector – all development initiatives were delivered indirectly by SA government and the Development Bank of SA. This has had a profound effect
• No economic base to provide exposure to ‘development’
• Has not been a sustained effort to change past approaches and continue to fall behind other provinces
• Lack of commitment of substantial programmes for the long-haul
• EC attracts a wide spectrum of NGO’s and development individuals from liberal to ultra conservative approaches, all influencing development ideology. The EC has, as yet, not developed a development maturity or identity
• Government structures are beginning to find their way, however, capacity is lacking

Methodology for development approaches:
• Institute of Californias at the University of California – 25-year study of cross-border development is only now beginning to understand dynamics in trans-boundary economics and social systems between developed and developing socio-economic environments
• Locally we lack knowledge to challenge problem
• Suggestion would be a parallel process:
  o Delivery of policy and legislations
  o Delivery of actual working programme/projects on the ground

On donor-funded programmes:
• Do not want to get involved in long-term interventions – too risky, resulting in most programmes being of a four-year duration or less. In light of this reality, the question is where best to spend the money and allocate resources

On the EU programme:
• Tried to tackle too bigger issues. “Was very unsuccessful … created massive expectation and delivered next to nothing”
• EU programme should have focussed on enterprise development

EU programme facilitated Mboyti community camp site initiative highlights development and capacity-building issues:
• Was successful in delivering real economic benefit in a short time-frame, however, changed community dynamic - created conflict
• This approach needs long-term support, not just money or as decision makers for community, but skills to support beneficiary decision makers. It is about developing relationships
• It is a complex debate: the question – “Is an investment led approach appropriate for deeply rural incapacitated population appropriate, or should it be about micro-agricultural programmes/projects?”
• Tourism will not provide all the answers

3. In your experience, what are the key lessons learned in the EU programme, to inform capacity-building requirements for future nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast in the following areas?
3.1 Needs assessment?

- Needs to be linked to programme needs, however, it is often orientated around who is driving the programme
- Outsiders have in the past, and still continue to determine the development approach

On the needs assessment of the EU programme:

- SDI approached the EU for support - the WCSDI programme was subsequently born
- The programme was structure by a consultant, “part of the EU travelling circus that goes around the world” designing programmes
- The programme was structured around the broader SDI objectives/needs, rather than targeted beneficiary community established needs
- Programme structured around the three NGO’s who were in the field six months before the PMU was contracted
- SDI disappeared soon after the EU programme was initiated, resulting in the EU programme being “rudderless”, driven by individual opinions. No clarity on where the programme was going, how it was going and why

3.2 Participation of and communication with stakeholders?

- Programme design made communication too difficult
- Too many layers of people that are not accountable
- No communication between province and local government
- In the past, the PMU did not get involved in decision-making in ‘development’; did not try to pull things together; “when I came in July it was a mess. I had nothing other than criticism” from all stakeholder/role-players. This highlights the issues of past glowing annual reports
- Thereafter, greater effort was made to engage with all stakeholders from community to national government.
- Provincial government resisted initial engagement
- Community leaders have tended to hide, as this has been such a disaster:
  - No real benefits for community
  - No jobs being created
  - Large debt being incurred
  - Money has disappeared
  - PM: “It has been a terrible experience”
  - Business Manager (Amadiba Adventures) in discussion with the PM:
    - So easily walk away, it has been more of a problem than it has been a benefit
    - Too complicated; no delivery
    - Turned community upside down with conflict
  - Need to demonstrate returns
  - It is about helping community to build up confidence to take control of their own lives
### 3.3 Programme design and management?

**On donor approaches:**
- Serious question around donor-funding: “What they get away with; what they are concerned about”
- The feeling is that there is greater concern about “… things other than results”
- Second economy in the donor-funding industry “People live off it; people thrive off it; it is well-known”
- “No-one will admit that a percentage of donor funds allocated to programmes is attached to oversees consultants that sustain a significant industry”

**SA National Government approach to addressing donor-funded programmes:**
- Created centralised system in the ministry of finance “… which is not big: only one or two people” for administrative coordination
- SA Government lacks the ability to influence philosophical approaches
- Possible solution is to develop legislation jointly between both sides – donor will probably resist at certain levels – maybe some key principles

**EU programme:**
- Deep issues without having the resources within the programme to address the issues
- “How does the programme respond in a limited time period to a big issue that is part of greater societal change? Are we going to make the right decision?”
- No vision in EU programme - essential to have a shared vision
- None of the strategic initiatives, such as the provincial growth and development strategy, have been capable of addressing the problem, resulting in multiple visions/agendas and conflict with the consequence of wrong development, in the wrong position, for the wrong reasons - inappropriate development with a lack of empowerment
- Need a carefully-structured investor-mobilisation process, rather than the existing reactive strategy - turn it around, do the proper long-term planning, take solidly-based decisions that will allow for meaningful contribution for community, where they can have some say

### 3.4 Training?
- The training was not connected to the programme enterprise objectives
- It set precedents and created expectation
- Extremely costly
- Need to work off a practical base, cannot train in a vacuum and then leave trainees. This is the case for three or four thousand people on the Wild Coast. To their credit, some people have managed to move on without the help of the programme and secure employment. However, this is not what training is about. There was a dislocation between the programme objectives and the training.
- Number of original enterprises to be created, as detailed in the log-frame, was unrealistic
• What was needed was to “… go the route of a couple of more substantial investments, and then a linkage programme” - would have been more sustainable – need depth to the investment, including upstream and downstream benefits. The developments must be firmly embedded in the local economy

3.5 Monitoring and evaluation?
• “Very poor, but it always is. I’ve yet to come across a programme that has a proper monitoring and evaluation”
• Monitoring and evaluation is always at the very end – viewed as the end result, it is tagged on.
• It is never seen as an integral part
• “…cannot manage programmes if it is not built in, but it’s just the way people are …”
• EU Programme’s monitoring and evaluation was very poor
• Monitoring and evaluation were not reflecting what was going on, rather “it was as if they were from two different worlds … what’s in the quarterly reports bears absolutely no resemblance to reality – it’s extraordinary. You can’t say it was just a lack of information, it’s actually just the system responding to the needs of the system”
• Even now we do not know everything, but we do know a lot more than we have ever known in the past
• External evaluation has to be done.
• The original three NGO’s have been financially audited, however, this is not viewed in a developmental context – measuring expense against qualitative output. This will be done in a separate process.
• The replication study is useless. It was done because it was going, it was then stopped. In March and November next year we will revisit this study with external evaluation. The replication will pick up the evaluation.
• Monitoring: PMU is thin on the ground. It has, therefore, been built into the contracted consortiums’ deliverables. The consortiums have been contracted to fulfil the roles of the original three NGO’s – primarily around implementation and operationalisation.
• PMU Programme Development Officers (PDO) who are constantly in the field, provide good feed- back on the consortiums’ performance
• No external monitoring of the consortiums’ reporting, however, the replication study (previously mentioned) will go back and verify monitoring reports.
• It has been clearly discussed with the consortiums that they are taking on a lot of management responsibilities. We “regard this as a huge part of our empowerment process … the principles of the consortiums, in all cases, are that of empowerment groups. They take responsibility to deliver the programme and the management reports every month”. There are a lot of EC players involved in the consortiums, based close to the PMU in East London. This allows for consistent interpersonal communication, in order to respond to changing needs, ensuring successful programme delivery.
3.6 Programme sustainability?

- It is a big worry
- Gone to the private sector to secure good investors, with good solid credentials and track record
- Each area is different, with different requirements
- Private sector cannot carry the entire burden
- Civil society (NGO’s) no longer playing an active role – government agencies set up to play this role, ECDC, Intinga are not performing adequately. There are deep problems
- The margin for error is small on the programme, with not much time left
- Negotiations are underway in an attempt to secure further funding to support the programme
- Part of the solutions is how we develop mentorship with the private sector
- There will be a couple of different models for mentorship and partnerships with private sector
- We are a long way off from finding the solution to the sustainability issue

1. Have there been power relationships at play in the EU programme? If so, how have they influenced capacity development?

- Answer to the above question been captured in the text above
Appendix B: Meeting Minutes (Port St Johns Municipality)

Requested by: PondoCROP  
Venue: Port St Johns Municipality - Mayoral Officers  
Date: 12 February 2004

Attendees: Mayor, Town Manger, VJ, NT, GZ, BW (PondoCROP representatives)

Meeting Objectives:  
1. Improve local government relations with the EU Programme  
2. Secure Mayoral approval for progressing with the Gomolo Trust registration process

PondoCROP arrived at 10h00 for a pre-arranged meeting with the Mayor and Town Manager – the meeting commenced at 12h00.

Critical Issues Raised by the Mayor and Town Manager:

• I was criticised for not being able to speak isiXhosa (or any other black language) and, therefore, could have no idea what the local community requirements are.
• It was strongly stated that the PSJ municipality have never been adequately engaged by the EU Programme.
• The perception is that the EU Programme was conceptualised outside of South Africa and aimed at:
  o Further improving white ownership in the tourism industry,
  o Continuing to suppress black economic advancement, by establishing trusts that do not “put real money in individuals’ pockets”,
  o The trust system itself reveals that white Europeans believe that “Africans are still like animals and cannot run their own businesses”,
  o The EU Programme has no idea what the requirements are for black economic empowerment,
  o All funds should be channelled through existing municipal structures, i.e. PSJ Tourism Office, and fall within the LED Tourism Plan and be distributed as a grant against a business plan.
• In South Africa, transformation has been negligible in the tourism industry, since the new regime came into power. This is even more pronounced on the Wild Coast - cited Unmgazi River Bungalows as an example.
• Perceptions of the trusts:
  o PondoCROP known to the mayor as ‘Pondo Trust’ is setting up the trust to channel moneys into its own account “… otherwise, why would it be doing this work?”
  o The trust structures are creating conflict within the communities – The Town Manager cited Manteku as an example, but did not elaborate on the details,
  o Trusts suppress black economic advancement, by not allowing real ownership through share-holding,
  o The trust system is a socialist system and the country has a capitalist ideology,
o The mayor sees the tribal structures, especially the chiefs, as “pawns of those with white skins”. The chiefs hold the belief that “whites’ ideas are superior to those of fellow blacks”. The trusts are furthering the influence of the chiefs.

• GZ stated that the trust structures are not only being established as a development requirement by DLA for development along the Wild Coast, but that government requires community trusts to be in place for inland development projects, currently underway:
  o Mayor’s response: There are great differentiations between cultures in government: Xhosa, Zulu, Coloured etc, with different needs. Government is making decisions at the top without consulting regional and local needs. They are taking a top-down approach that is not meeting local requirements

• On how the mayor sees development taking place within community environments:
  o Interested members within a community need to be identified and provided with the capital and mentoring to develop capacity to run their own businesses for personal benefit,
  o The Town Manager cited a successful agricultural development project in Mnguzana where interested individuals were funded (intimated by the PSJ municipality) to start their own project that is now very successful and putting real profits in their pockets. This intern creates further employment opportunities.

• When asked how an organisation, like PondoCROP, selects community members for the above approach:
  o Mayor: The community will select themselves

Meeting Outcomes:

• It was agreed that there is an essential need to develop black ownership in the tourism industry.

• The mayor repeatedly requested that I report back to my managers on the issues raised in the meeting.

• The mayor gave the go-ahead to register the Gomolo Trust. Town Manager is to call Councillor Qikane to notify him of the mayor’s decision:
  o Assets should belong to the individual and not the trusts
  o The trust should be seen as an ‘association’ e.g. NAFKOK, where the businesses are associated to, but are not controlled by the trust.
## Appendix C: Preliminary Research Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preliminary Research Categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Participative processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Needs and skills assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Project management structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Financial structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Communication and competence</td>
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<td>6. Project design processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>9. Sustainability requirements</td>
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### Appendix D: Analytic Memo (Community Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes (refined from focus group discussion/interview and interview analytic memos)</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The role of community participation is identified as a common trend in all themes and is further explored in sub-themes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Capacity-building | • Donor ideology  
• Capacity of ‘capacity developers’ | Focus group (FG) AM; Business Manager (BM) AM; Camp Manager (CM) AM |
| Communication | • Stakeholder group  
• PMU and government  
• PMU and community | |
| Needs-assessment | • Programme conceptualization  
• Programme implementation | |
| Programme Design | • Development ideologies  
• Shared vision  
• Assumptions  
• Flexibility and time-frames  
• Engaging community | |
| Programme Management | • Leadership  
• Management structures | |
| Institutional Structures | • PMU and NGO’s  
• Community trusts | |
| Training | • Training and programme objectives  
• Role and capacity of service-providers  
• Quality of training | |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | • Framework  
• Monitoring and evaluation and the PMU  
• Programme implementation and change  
• Quality | |
| Programme Sustainability | • Short-term issues  
• Long-term sustainability  
• Factors affecting sustainability | |
| Programme Ownership | • No sub-themes | |
| Engaging Government | • No sub-themes | |
Appendix E: Focus Discussion/Interview Group (Community Respondents)

Interview Transcription

Date: 17th December 2004
Location: Mtentu Marine Reserve, Wild Coast Eastern Cape
Stakeholder group: Beneficiary community

Questions:

1. What do you believe the key principle[s] of sustainable nature-based tourism to be?
CT:
• Wilderness must stay wilderness; there must be no over-development
• Must control the number of tourists as too many will damage the area
• If the area is damaged, the tourist will not come back
CM:
• Must be socially acceptable and environmentally friendly
• It is not only about looking at the environment, but the people, as well and the balance with natural resources
BM: nothing to add from the personal interview

2. What is your understanding of “capacity-building”?
CT:
• Training is one part
• People must not only be trained on books, as some people can’t do it this way. There must be practical on-the-job training
BM:
• People must be evaluated for training suitability
• It must go beyond training, its about the ability to do the job
• It is an ongoing process
CM:
• A strategy has to be developed to identify the people who the training will be suitable for

3. In your experience, what are the key lessons learned in the EU programme, to inform capacity-building requirements for future nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast, in the following areas?

3.1. Participation of stakeholders?
CT:
• Development in the Amadiba area must involve ACCODA trust
• The PMU need to work closer with ACCODA - there is not enough communication coming from the PMU. Example: ACCODA was only notified a few weeks before the programme’s original closure date in March 2004 that the programme was coming to a close
• We need a member of the ACCODA on the PMU to ensure information gets to the trust and ideas get back to the PMU

BM:
• We need to change the current thinking of waiting on the funders and listening to the funders and being driven by the funders and not us driving the funding
• The trust needs their own development plan that falls within the broader LED and IDP’s
• The problems cannot be solved by just one programme
• The trust needs to approach other funders to support their development plans working with the local municipality
• We need to be honest as local leaders, sometimes we do what pleases the funders when they come, letting them control and manage the programmes
• We need skills to be developed to support business development
• “At the end of the day it is about being honest and knowing what you want to achieve”

CM:
• The donor must utilise a bottom-up approach; people have to be involved directly, not indirectly
• The donor can present the concept of the plan as a start, but then let the people have an influence in the plan, so the input of the people from the ground can be used to develop the plan. At the moment people just follow those who have the money in these development programmes and this is where the problem lies
• The community and community ideas must be involved in the plan if it is going to work

The trust and ownership:

BM: Before the EU programme, the business was running as it is now - nothing is new, except that there was a steering committee and not a trust. The original idea was for individuals to own secondary business or aspects of the business. There are different community institutional structures, such as CPA’s and associations, however, for this type of programme the trust structure works well. What is important is the relationship between the trust and the business. The business needs to be separated from the trust, with the roles of both entities being clearly defined. The Trusts need to serve as a broader community representation body, responsible for policy-making, trust-fund dispersal and adding more business to the area. Ownership of individual business is dependant on the scale of the business. The trust development plan must allow for individual ownership of businesses. Larger business need to form the catalyst for other smaller support business.

CT: The trust is a good idea. Before the trust was the RDP and the Steering Committee, but these structures were not registered. The trust is a strong institution for owning the business. It is a good idea that there is individual ownership, but it must be under the trust structure, with the business paying a ‘rent’ to the trust. Each village has a sub-committee with the chairperson
meeting a member of the trust, to relay information back to the village committees and general community.

CM: The trust is a good idea, as every person is represented. The problem is that the trust comprises members of the community, chief, headman and local councillor, who are not always available to discuss issues. Individual ownership of businesses needs to be provided for, with these businesses paying a percentage back to the trusts for broader community benefit. Need to be cautious of losing community ownership of assets to the private sector.

3.2 Communication?
BM:
• Community should be represented at quarterly meetings of the programme steering committee
• The quarterly meeting should be held in the project area
CM:
• There is also a need for the donor to sit directly with the community to find out how things are going on the ground
• The community needs to report on the programme implementation agent’ work directly to the donors, to make sure everything is running properly
CT:
• Agrees with all that has been said and has nothing more to add

3.3 Needs-assessment, programme-design and management?
CM:
• The first thing to be done is to go to local municipality to present the idea
• Then presentation to local authority
• Local authority will then call a meeting of all stakeholders in the area who have an influence on development, including the trust
• Local people need to be employed by the implementing agent. They are responsible for organising and consulting the local people
• The people need to be actively involved in decision-making from the beginning of the process
BM:
• The programme steering committee will comprise provincial and local government and donor representation
• First step is to assess the situation, establishing what is there by, speaking to the local officials
• Establish what infrastructure is already there
• Speak to people who have been involved with donor programmes in the area before
• Establish existing leadership structures without talking direct to these structures
Once the information has been gathered, analyse it and understand it, making sure of what you are going to say, because confidence is important. It must be a programme that can work - check whether there is a need for this programme.

Once presented and authorised by the steering committee, it must be presented to the ward councillor and ward committee and all relevant stakeholders.

People need to be given the parameters of this programme and the chance to think about it.

Together with the people involved, you then need to establish what community structures are going to be used to drive this programme forward.

Need to discuss opportunities, roles, risks, advantages and disadvantages.

The community institutional structures should be in place prior to the implementation of the programme.

Establishing the programme is at least a four-year programme:
- Introducing the community structures and training e.g. trust concept and trustees.
- People need to be trained prior to the implementation of the programme on the ground.
- The implementation facilitator is a difficult position, as the person is not there to take decisions, but rather to provide the direction, information and support for the people to take their own decisions.

CT:
- Agrees with everything that has been said so far.
- It is very important to approach local government at the beginning of the programme.
- The perspective of the people on the ground and what they are thinking is very important.
- The ideas of the people need to be followed.
- We heard that there was going to be a lot of money for development, but we were not consulted. The EU just brought the programme to us – community were not part of the planning process. It was their plan, with none of the members of the PMU respecting the people.
- They never asked the people what they want, what they would like to be.
- There are people who want to know where all the money went – what we have seen in the camps is nothing in terms of the amount of money (programme funding).
- The PMU never respected the ideas of the people.

3.4 **Training?**

CT:
- Training should happen in the area, so people can participate.

CM:
- The idea of bringing the training was good, but the implementation was not good.
- Most of the local people were only trained on the basic skills: they are important, but the idea was to train people so they could run the business. The required business skills training was never given.
- There was the need for advanced training to meet the needs of the business.
• When local people have the knowledge of the business, they can influence other local people about the benefits of the business

BM:
• Agrees with all that has been said and has nothing further to add to his first interview

3.5 Monitoring and evaluation?

CT:
• PMU should have been responsible for monitoring the training to ensure everything goes well
• People lost money out of their pockets for transport to and from training not being paid by the training service-provider

CM:
• Answered in the personal interview with nothing more to add

BM:
• Answered in the personal interview with nothing more to add

3.6 Programme sustainability?

CT:
• The implementing NGO’s need few people to manage the implementation. Not so many whites and few blacks, just use the right number. The problem was that there were too many people involved, who could not even manage the money. “Look at the camps: you can’t see the money there”. The NGO’s were paying too many people.
• There was no breakdown of the budget and explanation to the people
• Nobody can tell us how the money was spent and where it went
• There was a lot of promises from the NGO’s, but little delivery

BM:
• The Amadiba is not going forward, it is going sideways
• The business has to make money
• When the programme comes to an end next year it will be the beginning of Amadiba - when Amadiba stands on its own. “If we have a problem now, I can still twist Dave Arkwright’s arm”; until the programme ends there will always be support from the PMU
• Amadiba has started to plan for the end of the programme. We should have been developing the Ufudu model and putting away money for growing Amadiba. So one of the mistakes we made was not to plan around the business. We do have Wilderness income and hope to use part of this for supporting and complimenting Amadiba. This cash flow will help to support Amadiba until the number of tourists increase in Amadiba
• It has become clear that the EU programme is not going to solve all the problems. It has also exposed government, as most of the problems have surrounded land issues. The government would not release land to community. It appears that the government was more lenient towards private sector than to community. It was easier for government to negotiate with private sector when they were to receive revenues, than with community
when the community were to receive revenue from private sector. Government used the excuse of “no legislation” for not issuing leases to community. This shows that government is not ready to help communities. Because of the EU programme, we have discovered that government is not ready to help local communities as they are saying – in reality they are not talking about this issue

- The local municipality has not understood the concept of trusts. They see the trust as a threat. We can, if we want, have some kind of ACCODA association standing for election

3.7 Have there been power relationships at play in the EU programme? If so, how have they influenced capacity development?

- Answer to the above question been captured in the text above
Appendix F: Analytic Memo Midterm Review

Participation of stakeholders
- Lack of programme integration between all role-players
- Key role-players at all three tiers of government have not been effectively integrated into the project management process
- Lack of real political will from all three tiers of government to take ownership of the programme
- Divergent ideological approaches of implementing agents resulted in a lack of coordinated strategic direction for the programme
- Collective buy-in of stakeholders is lacking

Needs assessment
- Assessment of on ground requirement not adequate
- Timeframe to meet programme objectives not adequate
- The log-frame designers did not fully appreciate the underlying issues of the programme stemming directly from insufficient needs assessment
- Capacities of organisations to deliver programme where not evaluated

Programme management
- The programme fell short in terms of strategic vision, political and operational leadership and effective overall project management
- Clear roles and responsibilities for implementing agents were not defined
- Complex and ineffective contractual agreements between the implementing NGO’s, PMU and DEAT has lead to poor project management and uncoordinated effort that has undermined strategic thinking regarding programme purpose and direction
- The contractual agreement structure having the NGO’s contracted directly to DEAET resulted in an unmanageable structure
- The four independently contracted implementing agents (three NGO’s and the PMU) resulted in four separate projects
- Although the project called for a specific steering committee chaired by DEAT to drive this project, this committee did not materialise
- Direct contractual arrangements between DEAT and the NGO, DEAT and EU and the PMU resulted in inadequate project management - accentuated by weak project design

Communication
- Organisational structure resulted in a lack of functional and operational responsibilities and resulted in ineffective communication channels between itself, DEAT and the NGOs
- DEAT’s lack of capacity and time constraints further exacerbated the problem
- Lack of coordination between tiers of government
- Programme “parachuted” into the province from national DEAT directly into communities
- Strained relationships with ward councilors – programme imposed from outside
- Racial undertones of programme benefiting ‘

**Programme design**
- Significant failure – lack of flexibility
- Insufficient steps in the design process to ensure local government institutions and beneficiaries take “ownership” of the project.
- The project was over ambitious
- Programme designers neglected importance of political will - tainted from the start.
- Design process creating operational tensions with government, diminish ownership and acceptance.
- The programme is not integrated into provincial planning initiatives
- The project commenced five months before the contracted PMU was in place
- The programme was rushed with a hastily developed log-frame with questionable relevance
- The Financing Agreement log-frame contains fundamental differences from that which appears in the PMU and implementing NGO’s contracts - the PMU and implementing agencies were in effect working to different log-frames
- It was assumed that this complex project could be implemented by agents with differing ideologies and little experience in managing a project of this magnitude
- No reference to responsible tourism or sustainable development in the log-frame
- PMU contracted on international tender

**Training**
- Poor coordination between NGO’s, lack of relevant learner selection and lack of capacity within training NGO’s adult skills and business skills led to questionable capacity development.
- The business training NGO (TTO) were not an accredited training organisation and lacked the required capacity to deliver the required tourism training
- Indicators of training are target driven therefore making it difficult to evaluate effectiveness, however analysis of training intervention in adult and specialist training needs suggest that it has not being effective
- Training of trustees to a level of capacity to be competent to run community-based enterprises within the time frame of the programme is questionable

**Monitoring and evaluation**
- A lack of effective monitoring and evaluation has mitigated against effective management and not captured knowledge gained in the programme
- The effectiveness of youth training in relation to programme goals is questionable – there was no monitoring or evaluation with targets being numbers driven
- The Midterm Review commenced thee quarters of the way through the programme reducing its impact
Programme sustainability

- Ownership of the project must be embedded at a provincial level and recognised by all levels of government
- Sustainability of the project rests on the capacity of the community-based tourism ventures to expand and grow while at the same time retaining the wilderness characteristics of the Wild Coast
- Soundness of the beneficiary institutions – in essence this is an institutional project. If these fail, project fails
- Need a common vision for all stakeholders
- Unless strong linkages are established at the Provincial, District and Local government level, there is a good chance that this Programme will flounder. The importance of embedding the Programme at the Provincial level cannot be under-estimated.
- The 4-year life cycle of this Programme is too short to achieve all its objectives
- Achievements have been at far too high a cost. Only a small fraction of the targets for employment and income generation have been achieved
- Adequate capacity development of trustees to run community-based enterprises is essential for sustainability
Appendix G: Interview Questionnaire

Provisional Research Title:
A review of lessons learned to inform capacity-building for sustainable nature-based tourism development in the EU funded Support to the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme.

Research goals:
- Clarify principles for sustainable nature-based tourism in the context of the Wild Coast.
- Capture lessons learned in key programme facets to inform capacity-building requirements for nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast.
- Identify, if any, power-knowledge relations (and how these are deployed) within the WCSDIP Programme and how they have influenced capacity development.

Purpose of interview:
The purpose of this interview is to support my research into lessons learned from the WCSDIP EU Programme to inform capacity-building requirements for future sustainable nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast.

There are no right or wrong answers to this research, as the interpretations of “sustainability” and “capacity-building” are wide and varied. This interview seeks to identify the varied interpretations of these concepts and draw on combined experience to inform future initiatives.

Questions:
1. What do you believe the key principle[s] of sustainable nature-based tourism to be?
2. What is your understanding of “capacity-building”?
3. In your experience, what are the key lessons learned in the EU Programme, to inform capacity-building requirements for future nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast in the following areas?
   - Needs-assessment
   - Participation of stakeholders
   - Communication
   - Programme design
   - Programme management
   - Training
   - Monitoring and evaluation
   - Programme sustainability
4. Have there been power relationships at play in the EU programme? If so, how have they influenced capacity development?
Thank you for your valued input. I will be forwarding you a transcribed copy of our interview for validation. It will be at your discretion whether this information can be utilised in my research, and if approved, whether you require a pseudonym or not.
### Appendix H: Analytic Memo (Informing Chapter 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
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| Capacity-building       | • Donor commitment  
                         | • Stakeholder capacities  
                         | • Community skills-development relevant to programme objectives |
| Needs-assessment        | • Integration into programme  
                         | • Commitment of programme management  
                         | • Government involvement  
                         | • Community participation |
| Participation of        | • Linked to communication – lack of community participation major issue  
                         | • Community representation critical at all levels of programme  
                         | • Need to change donor and programme management ideology |
| Stakeholders            |                                                                             |
| Communication           | • Major challenge  
                         | • Clarity of programme objectives  
                         | • Conflict with government |
| Programme-design        | • Change of community and donor ideology to programme design processes  
                         | • Community ownership  
                         | • Communication  
                         | • Community participation  
                         | • Programme relevance  
                         | • Engaging government  
                         | • Community protocols  
                         | • Conflict |
| Programme Management    | • Leadership of programme management  
                         | • Communication  
                         | • Community participation |
| Training                | • Quality of training  
                         | • Community participation to inform relevance of training interventions  
                         | • Capacities of service training providers  
                         | • Define training process |
| Monitoring and          | • Community participation  
                         | • Government involvement  
                         | • Consistency and follow up |
| Evaluation              |                                                                             |
| Programme Sustainability| • Long-term donor commitment  
                         | • Realistic time-frames  
                         | • Capacitated community structures  
                         | • Community ownership  
                         | • Government involvement |
### Appendix I: Analytic Memo (Informing Chapter 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
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</thead>
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| **Donor Ideology/Ethos**        | • Questionable programme development process  
• Questionable commitment to the programme implementation  
• Did not cultivate a shared vision  
• Questionable reliability of programme performance reports over the first three years by PMU |
| **Programme Design Process**    | • Externally driven by ‘outside consultants’  
• Limited provincial and local government participation or consultation  
• Limited community participation  
• Poor planning |
| **The Finance Agreement (guiding implementation framework)** | • Makes no reference to nature-based tourism, sustainability or responsible tourism  
• Training requirements are pre-planned and quantitatively defined with no qualitative indicators stipulated  
• No training methodologies are proposed  
• Monitoring and evaluation requirements are primarily orientated around fiscal and quantitative processes |
| **Programme Design Consequences** | • The imposed programme ‘parachuted’ into provincial and local government met with resistance  
• Unworkable management structures and contractual agreements  
• Lack of participative processes and involvement for all stakeholder groups  
• Under capacitated NGO’s  
• Unrealistic programme objectives  
• Unrealistic programme time-frames  
• Unrealistic resource allocation to meet programme objectives  
• Ineffectual monitoring and evaluation |
| **Programme design Consequences for Capacity-building** | • Resistance to later programme attempts to address local government capacity issues  
• Limited integration of training initiatives  
• High levels of inappropriate training  
• High levels of ineffective training  
• High levels of inadequate training  
• Lack of in-field mentoring and experiential training  
• Focus on formal training not contextually relevant skill development  
• Limited flexibility to respond to emerging capacity-building requirements |
| **Programme Implementation: Consequences for Community** | • No sense of ownership of ‘their’ programme  
• Limited commitment to the programme  
• Generated internal community conflict  
• Lack of institutional, business skill and environmental capacity-development  
• Alienation of community trust by local government  
• Trust seen as a political threat  
Trust linked to ‘colonialist’ programme agendas |
| **Consequences of Limited Capacity for Community** | • Limited community capacity severely impacts on programme sustainability  
• Future community development programmes potentially jeopardized by EU programme experience |
Appendix J: Trustee Training

Node Three: Trustee Training Report 20th June 2004

There is serious concern about the organisation/co-ordination and community notification process for the first phase of trust training to have commenced on the 21st June 04.

Sequence of Events:

• The facilitation of trustee election orientated around Administrative Areas has been an intensive, time-consuming and thorough process. Great effort has been taken in ensuring representivity of all villages. Furthermore, communities have been workshoped on the importance of the trust and need to elect the most suitable candidates to the position. All trusts now have legitimate and representative trustees elected. Communities have been notified at a trust forum meeting on the 30th March 04 that the PMU will provide first and second phase training to all trusts in Node Three. Dates were to be confirmed.

• In February, PondoCROP (PC) approached the PMU, highlighting the critical importance of trust training for all Node Three trusts.

• April 04 – PMU Programme Manager and the PMU Programme Training Manager advised that additional budget had been allocated to allow for training for all Node Three trusts.

• PC was in contact with Triple Training Organisation (TTO) supplying a provisional list of trustees:
  o Advising that the trustee election process was still being facilitated, however, all trusts would be ready for training by June,
  o A list was submitted to TTO that included a list of trustees representing all eight trusts,
  o The total number of trustees to attend training was 110,
  o It was suggested for logistical reasons by PC that Node Three trust training be split into two areas: training venues in PSJ and Coffee Bay,
  o PC offered full support in assisting to co-ordinate training arrangements,
  o PC highlighted the need to provide timely notice and details of trust training to trustees.

• PC was invited to attend a briefing with the service-provider on the 2nd June. Unfortunately, due to tick-bite fever, the business manager for PC was not able to attend. However, he did phone ahead of time to try and reschedule the meeting for a later date. This was not possible. A request was made to TTO to forward all relevant documentation – nothing was received.

• On Friday the 18th June, while at a meeting with Mankosi Trust, a question was asked surrounding the confusion of trust training dates, arrangements and venues.

• An extensive series of calls were made from the field, trying to establish training arrangements and which trusts had been notified. This process revealed that:
  o Only five of the seven trusts had been notified,
  o These trusts had been notified only 10 days prior to the training,
  o Given no firm commencement date,
  o No explanation that the training was to be for a full three weeks away from home,
  o No venue was given,
- No clear explanation about transport cost or arrangements – a sensitive issue for community members,
- The understanding of training details were fuzzy with confusion prevailing.

- The trust training service-provider representative from TTO stated that there were only 70 trustees to be trained. He new that the training was to commence on the 21st in Coffee Bay but was unclear on other organisation details.
- The following details were provided by TTO management:
  - There was to be only one workshop for first-phase training of three weeks, instead of the recommended two,
  - This training was to commence on the 21st of June in Coffee Bay,
  - The decision not two train the two trusts of Hlamvana and Gomolo had been taken in conjunction with the PMU training manager and based on the premise that they were not active – he could not explain how it was determined that the trusts were not active. He stated that a written motivation would be required to include these two trusts in the training and would need to be discussed with the training manager,
  - Only 70 trustees had been provided for, based on response from Node Two trust training.
- The TTO’s fieldworker, tasked with organisation arrangements and notifying community, stated that the reason for not notifying Hlamvana and Gomolo Trusts was that further Phase One training was to be scheduled for July – this was refuted by his own line manager in TTO.
- This investigation, in attempting to establish training details, commenced at approximately 09h00 on Friday the 18th June; by 13h00 it still was not possible to establish accurate details of training to start on Monday the 21st June.
- By 14h00 on the 18th June the training, scheduled to commence on the 21st June, had been postponed to the 28th June with no explanation.
- The PMU training manager on Saturday the 19th June, in a telephonic conversation, refuted that he had been party to the decision by TTO management to remove Hlamvana and Gomolo from the training schedule. He, in fact, stated that he had instructed TTO management that all trusts in Node Three, except Umanyano, who had received prior training, were to be trained.

Trustees are generally the most influential members of community, with commitments that require notification to be adequately planned around.

It is totally unacceptable to confirm dates and venue details, without explaining all relevant training details on the last working day before the training is to commence.

TTO did not notify the PC field-manager, who co-ordinated the trustee selection as to training details after repeated requests.
TTO has ignored PC’s offer to assist with notification of community regarding trust training details.

It is my opinion, based on the above facts that TTO has purposefully created confusion and uncertainty amongst the trusts regarding the training details. In addition, TTO simply did not notify Hlamvana and Gomolo of the scheduled training. The result of this strategy would have been a low trustee attendance.

**Recommendations:**

- The current proposed training schedule of three consecutive weeks for the first phase and two consecutive weeks for the second phase is not practical and will lead to a low attendance level and high drop-out rate.
- Training needs to be conducted on a one-week-on, one-week-off basis, in so doing maximising attendance and capacity-building benefit from the course.
- Training details include: commencement date, venue, duration and structure of training, course outline, accommodation facilities and food, transportation arrangements and costs to be incurred if any, etc. These need to be communicated in writing a minimum of three weeks prior to training.
  - These details are critical to attendance levels
  - With a history of poor co-ordination of training interventions and past problems, especially with transport costs, community is extremely sensitive to these issues.
- Distance and logistics make it extremely difficult for community over this extensive trust area to train in one venue. For this reason both Coffee Bay and Port St Johns need to be utilised as training venues.
  - Coffee Bay:
    - Mankosi Trust
    - Qumrhu Trust
    - Mamolweni Trust
    - Lucingweni Trust
  - Port St Johns:
    - Gingqi Trust
    - Gomolo Trust
    - Hlamvana Trust
    - And those from the Coffee Bay area who could not attend training
  - A tentative date would need to be established by the service-provider, then discussed with the trusts prior to confirmation.
- PC will facilitate all communications with the trusts around trust training arrangements - informed by a written instruction from TTO detailing all arrangements. This document will be circulated and workshopped with all trusts.