Demobilisation and the civilian reintegration of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa:

The aftermath of transnational guerrilla girls, combative mothers and in-betweeners in the shadows of a late twentieth-century war

By

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the state assisted demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The study is based on life history interviews conducted with 36 women who fought for Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) and Amabutho Self-Defence Unit. There is agreement across the literature that the armed struggle against apartheid falls within the category of guerilla warfare, fought in multiple terrains, that blur conventional distinctions of civilian and combatant, homefront and battlefront, as well as the domestic and transnational. Located within feminist International Relations theory, the study argues that the formal process that led to the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces to form the South African National Defence Force, which facilitated the demobilisation process, was framed in ways that did not reflect the unconventional nature of the armed struggle against apartheid. The few women who participated in this process were the transnationally trained combatants of MK and APLA. The majority of women who participated in the multiple and overlapping sites of the domestic and international apartheid battlefront were left out of this process. It is argued that women’s roles in the armed struggle were shaped by various factors, such as age, space and period of struggle. Three categories, guerilla girls, combative mothers and the in-betweeners, are introduced in order to demonstrate the different spaces from within which women fought, and the methods they used, all of which were central to the success of the People’s War strategy. In this regard, the venerated transnationally trained woman combatant, like their male counterpart, is argued to be an exception, as the majority of women were thrust into the armed struggle without military training. Furthermore, it is argued that conservative feminist readings of black women’s relationship with nationalism in the anti-apartheid struggle have misrecognised and undermined women’s combatant contributions, by inscribing their forms of resistance as maternal, and outside the war effort. The study shows that the majority of women combatants have transitioned to civilian life without formal state recognition and assistance. The erasure of women’s role as combatants also means that they are excluded from the current legislative framework facilitated by the Department of Military Veterans to support the welfare of former combatants. As such, the study builds on Jacklyn Cock’s (1991) pioneering study on war and gender in South Africa; it
is the first study that exclusively focuses on women ex-combatants’ experiences in post-apartheid South Africa.

DEDICATION

For my mother, Zodwa, and my aunts, Nozuko and Nomavo
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC – African National Congress
AZANLA - Azanian National Liberation Army
APLA - Azanian People’s Liberation Army
AZAPO - Azanian People’s Organisation
AZASO - Azanian Students Organisation
AZASCO - Azanian Student Convention
AFRO - Anti-Collaborationist Front Group
BCM - Black Consciousness Movement
BCP - Black People’s Convention
BMATT - British Military Training Team
BOSS - Bureau of State Security
COSAS - Congress of South African Students
COSATU - Congress of South Africa Trade Unions
CPR - Certified Personal Register
CCR - Centre for Conflict Resolution
DMV - Department of Military Veterans
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EPLF - Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
FEDSAW - Federation of South African Women
FRELIMO - Mozambique Liberation Front
FARC-EP - Fueraz Armadas Revolucionarios Colombianos – Ejercito del Pueblo
GoS - Government of Sudan
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
IR – International Relations
KZN - Kwa-Zulu Natal
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
MK - Umkhonto we Sizwe
MKMVA - Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans Association
NP – National Party
NEC- National Executive Committee
OAG - Other Armed Groups
PAC - Pan-Africanist Congress
PLAN - People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
PEBCO - Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation
PEWO - Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation
PEYCO - Port Elizabeth Youth Congress
SACP – South African Communist Party
SADF – South African Defence Force
SANDF – South African National Defence Force
SDU – Self Defence Unit
SACCAWU - South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union
SASO - South African Student Organisation
SASCO - South African Students Congress
SSDF - South Sudan Defence Forces
SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army
SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organisation
SWAPOL - South West African Police
SWATF - South West African Territorial Force
TBVC - Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TEC - Transitional Executive Council
TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF - United Democratic Front
US - United States
VOW - Voice of Women
WWI - World War I
WWII - World War II
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The Sharpeville massacre that took place on 21 March 1960, led by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), where 69 protesters against the imposition of pass laws were killed, was followed by the imposition of the state of emergency on 30 March 1960, and the banning of the PAC and African National Congress (ANC), marked a turning point in the fight against apartheid. Stephen Ellis (1998: 264) argues that “many inquirers, including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, regard the Sharpeville massacre...as the true beginning of hostilities.” It is the aftermath of Sharpeville that is often marked as the turn to the armed struggle by the liberation movements, who saw themselves as engaged in a protracted guerilla war against the apartheid state (Lodge, 1986; Cock 1989; Barrell, 1991; Cock, 1991; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Kondlo, 2009; Cherry, 2011; Ellis, 2012; Macmillan, 2013, Dlamini, 2015; Simpson, 2016). With key leaders in jail, the liberation movements were left with the option of continuing the highly risky work of fighting from either the underground, or from outside the country, and by galvanising the international community to recognise apartheid as a crime against humanity. The three decades stretching from 1960-1990 that marked the armed struggle thrust women into the centre of the all-encompassing transnational anti-apartheid battlefront. This study examines the lives of women who were combatants in the aftermath of the armed struggle against apartheid.

Although the violence of apartheid and its character was mostly felt inside the country, the anti-apartheid struggle became internationalised, because the liberation movements appealed to the international community to delegitimise the sovereignty of the minority white apartheid state in various ways, be it the campaign to release political prisoners, or the fact that the training of guerilla combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) was done outside the country by sympathetic foreign governments, among others. Even though, as Ellis and Sechaba (1992) have pointed out, “the war for South Africa was only one phase in a much longer contest, which long pre-dated the foundation of Umkhonto we Sizwe and
the declaration of the armed struggle for justice and freedom in South Africa” (p. 175), the
transnationally trained combatant women and men became an important symbol of the
internationalisation of the anti-apartheid struggle, which made this South African war a subject
for both International Relations (IR) theory and practice. In the book, *The Lusaka Years: The

> the increasing popularity of the ANC inside South Africa in the course of the
> 1980s did derive in part from a few spectacular military operations, but its
> ultimate success was the result of its achievements in establishing itself
> internationally as the most legitimate voice of the voiceless people of South
> Africa. This was due not so much to its military activities as to a wide variety of
> efforts in the field of diplomacy, propaganda and culture, which led its
> recognition as the gatekeeper for the external funding and validation of internal
> movements (p. 12).

The internationalisation of the armed struggle and the reliance by the liberation
movements on instruments of diplomacy, amongst others, followed IR’s disciplinary script
which is premised on the demarcation between the domestic and the international in its
preoccupation with matters of war and peace (Tickner, 1992; Sjoberg, 2011). From its founding,
the study of IR has been pre-occupied with questions of war and peace and at its core have been
the relations between states (Carr, 2001). The early preoccupation of the study of IR, following
the First World War, was “marked by a passionate desire to prevent another war” (Tickner,
1992: 9). In approaches to IR theory, political realism dominated the discipline in part as a
reaction to the perceived failure of liberalism to offer sustainable answers to the question of war
in the aftermath of World War I. As E.H Carr argues, in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-193: An
Introduction to the Study of International Relations* published shortly before World War II, the
liberal idealism that influenced early writing in the discipline after World War I, did not take
seriously the role of power in relations between states in international relations practice. Pointing
to the failure of the League of Nations, Carr (2001: 97 – 98) argued that the core mistake of the
“utopian writers” was that they “seriously believed that the establishment of the League of
Nations meant the elimination of power from international relations”. He argued that “power is
an indispensable instrument of government” which means that “to internationalise government in

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any real sense means to internationalize (sic) power, and international government is, in effect, government by that state which supplies the power necessary for the purpose of governing” (Carr, 2001: 100). His argument was that the unpredictability of relations between states was such that no one state would be sufficiently interested or able to use their power to ensure and monitor peaceful relations between states. The decision by the United States (US) Congress for the country to not join the League of Nations is used as an example that shows the constraints of achieving peace in a world that is dominated by sovereign states, and that the US recognised that, in the absence of a global government of states, each state must look after its own interests and security. The dominant thinking of other realists in the Second World War and Cold War eras, such as Hans Morgenthau, who argued that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (cited in Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 86), contributed to the pervasive idea that the day to day IR practice was a state’s ability to prepare “for self defence and/or seeking security-enhancing alliances with others” (Sorenson, 2011: 108) In this regard, Lauren Wilcox (2014) argues that “realism draws a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics, and maintains that states must be able to use or threaten violence in order to maintain the state’s status and survival in the world.” (p. 18).

The retreat by the ANC, PAC and SACP to neighbouring countries following their banning, allowed the National Party government to frame the challenge to its authority by the national liberation movements as an attack on its sovereignty by foreign communist outsiders. As Tim Murithi (2014) points out, “Africa, like the rest of the world, was caught up in the proxy battles that were fought during the Cold War…whether it was through overt or covert support, governments and armed resistance movements could always find willing supporters from the Soviet or US geopolitical strategic camps” (p. 3). As Edlmann (2014:1) argues, the apartheid state’s “total onslaught” ideology “ensured that the National Party government worked at drawing every white South African into its efforts to counteract the perceived threats of communism and African nationalism”. Furthermore, the conventional military operations and the counter-insurgency methods used by the National Party in the “Border Wars” in Namibia and Angola were “fought against the perceived communist threat to the apartheid state” (Edlmann, 2014: 3). In fighting for its survival, the apartheid state cast the black majority outside of its domestic realm in order to justify its violent responses in ways that were palatable and
rationalised by a Cold War international context that encouraged each state to do whatever is necessary to protect their claimed sovereignty.

This casting of the national liberation movements outside the domestic realm in the context of the Cold War, contributed to the view and the glorification of the transnationally trained guerilla combatant in South Africa, who is understood to be the archetypal combatant of the armed struggle and of liberation. The privileging of the externally trained combatants has overshadowed the contributions of those who fought inside the country, the majority of whom were women. This thesis will show that women played a foundational role in the articulation of the armed struggle, understood as a ‘People’s War’. It will be shown that in spite of the international posture of the armed struggle, it was a domestic struggle in which women formed the basis of the domestic front in ways that became obscured by the military integration process that operated parallel to the political negotiations between the National Party government and the liberation movements at end of the war. It is argued that women’s struggle cum war efforts have been delegated into the private and communal sphere, which, in mainstream IR theory, is assumed to exist outside of the war effort, even though it is undeniable that the epicentre of the armed struggle was in the homes and communities of black people in South Africa. Using feminist IR theory, it will be shown that the privileging of the transnational aspect of the armed struggle, and the minimal recognition that has been given to those who fought in its domestic battlefront, who have been relegated to this private realm, has contributed to the reality that the majority of women combatants have transitioned to democratic South Africa without formal demobilisation, and state assisted civilian reintegration.

The end of the Cold War allowed for the emergence of other security issues, the reemergence of liberalism and new theoretical openings that challenged mainstream IR theories. As Alexander Wendt (1999: 4) notes, the collapse of the Soviet Union “caught scholars on all sides of guard but left orthodoxies looking particularly exposed”. Realists were particularly critiqued for having failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War, the peace that followed US unipolar dominance and the shift from inter-state war to intra-state warfare in Africa and Eastern Europe (Tickner, 2008; Hendricks, 2011; Kaldor, 2012). The emergence of feminist approaches to IR theory and social constructivism, for example, allowed scholars in IR to revisit some fundamental assumptions about processes of war and the accepted assumption in the discipline
that the absence of a global government results in a state of anarchy that is characterised by pervasive insecurity. Wendt’s (1999) pioneering work on social constructivism argues that the post-Cold War spread of liberal democracy and the decline of wars between states show that the achievement of peace is not premised on the presence of centralised power. Rather, when states share similar norms, such as those of the respect for sovereignty, it is possible to settle disputes peacefully. This then frees states from the perpetual fear of a possible attack by other states and allows them to focus their agendas on other priorities beyond security concerns of survival.

The end of the Cold War also broadened the number of actors that participate in international and transnational relations, the empirical activities between states and non-state actors that speak to engagements across state borders and the various approaches to IR. The increased economic interdependence between states and regions, has forced IR scholars to take seriously the roles of multinational corporations, for example, and their influence in the stability of the global international economy. As Joseph Nye (2003: 75) argues, “never have so many different nonstate actors competed for the authority and influence that once belonged to the state alone”. Until the emergence of feminist and social constructivist approaches to IR, the liberal approach was the main theory that included non-state actors in its analysis of transnational relations, especially in their analysis of the consequences of global interdependence in economic terms and developments in technology and transportation that are blurring the lines between the domestic and the international (Nye, 1976; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Nye, 2003). Joseph Nye’s (2003) concept of “soft power” shows the ways in which, in an interdependent world with multiple actors, economic and cultural resources are more important than the “hard power” of military resources in enabling states to achieve their individual interests and their ability to collectively resolve broader questions of global governance, from addressing the rise of transnational armed non-state actors, such Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, to climate change and the transnational spread of diseases, among others. This sustained work by Nye and Keohane, for example, which broadens the scope of actors that are analysed in the discipline, has not provided a gendered analysis of these global transformations in the context of war or globalisation. The role of women, specifically, in these discourses has been undertheorised.

As noted by Tickner (2008: 264), “feminist perspectives entered the International Relations discipline at the end of the 1980s, at about the same time as the end of the cold war.
This was no coincidence. While this new era allowed social constructivists to reexamine ideas of the concept of anarchy, for example, this period gave room for feminists to interrogate the discipline’s ideas about how and where war takes place. Feminists argued that the focus on war as the instrument that is used by states to attain and protect their sovereignty, erases the role of the individual in war and the ways in which war leads to the transformation of social relations and, in the main, war contributes to more insecurity than the achievement of individual security. Feminists argue that the erasure of the individual in IR’s discourses of war “means that IR is not addressing one of the key elements of war: its actual mission of injuring human bodies and destroying normal patterns of social relations. Neglecting the human elements for strategic and interest politics renders the injurious nature of war a consequence rather than the focal point of war” (Sylvester, 2012: 484). As Sylvester (2012: 484) argues further, feminists have thus argued that “to study war as experience requires that human bodies come into focus as units that have war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms”. As with feminisms in other disciplines, feminists in IR are preoccupied with making visible the varied roles of women in the multiple processes of everyday international life, and exposing how these processes, including war, continue to render women powerless, invisible and insecure. They argue specifically that international relations practice is dominated by “men, dressed as states, statesmen, soldiers, decision makers, terrorists, despots and other characters with more powerful positions than women” (Sylvester, 1994: 4). They argue that the erasure of women’s experiences in international relations practice is reflected in the masculinist nature of IR theory in that many “concepts central to international relations theory and practice, such as power, sovereignty, and security have been framed in terms that we associate with masculinity” (Tickner, 1992: 18).

There are various approaches to feminist IR theory. These IR feminisms, such as liberal feminism, feminist poststructuralism, standpoint feminism, feminist social constructivism, postcolonial feminism and feminist critical theory, among others, examine women’s roles, and gender more broadly, from various vantage points that emphasise particular aspects of women’s lives in their examination of their position in international relations practice and IR theory, including war. Some of these differences include a focus by some feminists on women’s equal participation to institutions of the state, including the military, in the case of liberal feminism (Hudson, 2006; Tickner, 2008; Hendricks, 2011), to the standpoint feminists who believe that dominant theories have failed to account for the “standpoint, activities and experiences of
women” and therefore need “to identify a set of experiences, activities as well as patterns of thinking, feeling and acting which can be characterized (sic) as female” (Vincent cited in Hendricks, 2011: 15). Sara Ruddick’s (1989) concept of “maternal peace” (discussed in Chapter Two) forms part of a standpoint feminism that argues that there are certain socially constructed practices, such as those of mothering, that place pressure on women to adopt practices of non-violence that states can learn from in their quest for the achievement of global peace. Postcolonial feminists, for example, build on the work of postcolonial theorists who argue that “colonial relations of domination and subordination, established under European imperialism…persist, and that they are built into the way Western knowledge portrays people and countries in the South today” (Tickner, 2008: 267). Postcolonial feminists “make similar claims about the way Western feminism has constructed knowledge about non-Western women”, and argues that “just as feminists in general have criticized Western knowledge for being knowledge constructed mainly in men’s lives, postcolonial feminists see similar problems arising from feminist knowledge that is largely based on the experiences of relatively privileged Western women” (Tickner, 2008: 267). The discussion in Chapter Two that examines continuing tensions between feminists in the Global South and North, with regards to the theorisation of women’s roles in guerilla war in the Global South, draws on the contributions of postcolonial feminists. Similarly, the discussion about how white and black feminists have differed in theorising black women’s role in the national liberation movements in South Africa, also draws on postcolonial feminism. Thus, the reference to “IR feminism” or “feminists in IR” that is made throughout this thesis refers to themes and debates that come out of these different bodies of feminist thought and feminisms.

One of the ways in which feminists have challenged accepted conceptualisation and categories of war is through examining the distinction that is made between the homefront and the battlefront. Feminists in IR critique the discipline’s focus on rigid definitions of combat, which are premised on a narrow conceptualisation of the demarcation between battlefront and the homefront, in which women are assumed to be located in non-combatant roles in the homefront. One of the ways in which feminists have located women’s varied roles in wars has been to focus on the transformation of war itself, specifically the blurring of roles between combatants and non-combatants. In Women and War (1987), Elshtain argues that historically in the Euro-American imagination, men and women have occupied distinct roles in the activity of
war, where women as “non-combatants” and men as “warriors”. In these roles, men pick up arms
as “avatars of a nation’s sanctioned violence” and women as “home keepers [sic] and designated
weepers over war’s inevitable tragedies” (Elshtain, 1987: 3-4). As she argues in the essay in the
volume *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)visions of International Relations Theory* (1992), edited
by V.Spike Peterson, “images of being ‘at home’, of a homeland, of being homeward bound are visions of safety, enclosure, special and particular ties” (p. 148). In this demarcation, “male soldiers ‘man’ the battlefronts and female parents keep the home front”. Therefore, while “sovereign may bear a masculinised face but the nation itself is feminised” (Elshtain, 1992: 149). Her work shows that these demarcated roles for women and men do not reflect the realities of war. Elshtain (1987: 9) argues that the principles of “just war theory” based on the principle of *jus in bello*, stipulate that, “where, how and whom soldiers can kill in a war-fighting situation” operate in a significantly changed context with technological innovations in war that make abiding by these rules difficult. The experience of two World Wars in the twentieth century has dramatically changed the perception of war and the demarcation of the combatant and civilian. Sjoberg (2011), offering a feminist critique of Kenneth Waltz’s “Man, the State, and War” (1959), argues that feminists in IR are suspicious of the realist focus on anarchy, which is presumed to exist outside the protected boundaries of the nation state, where the threat to state’s security is presented as located outside of the borders. Sjoberg (2011) argues that anarchy, which is presented as providing the distinction between the domestic and the external, can also be understood as demarcating the private and the public: “the boundary between a public domestic place protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law, and the private space of the family where, in many cases, no such legal protection exists” (Tickner in Sjoberg, 2011: 122). As Sjoberg (2011) importantly points out:

Feminists in IR have consistently argued that both women’s lives are not just lived in global politics, but of global politics, and that the discrimination women experience is interlinked with the existence and causes of structural and physical violence in the international arena. Particularly, feminists have argued that patriarchal social organization in global politics is a principal cause not only of women’s subordination, but also empire-building and globalization [sic], among other international processes. These approaches see that the gendering of women’s lives cannot be separated from the gendering of ‘man, the state and
war’, generally or in terms of the meanings and causes of war specifically (p. 111 emphasis original).

Eleanor O’Gorman (2011), in her case study of women in Chiweshe in the Zimbabwean liberation war, warns against the neat categorisation of women’s role in war which is reducible to neither the radical nor the maternally defined private domain. In the Zimbabwean case, she challenges the tendency of the liberation war literature that denies women revolutionary subjectivity, because women negotiate war roles together with their everyday roles as mothers. O’Gorman (2011) makes visible the fact that women’s complex war roles challenge neat categories that frame most discourses of war, because:

[w]omen’s own stories of revolution challenge the assumptions of peasant and revolutionary subjectivity and provide rich insights into the differentiated, personalised and conflicted nature of their participation in revolution. Through the looking glass of women’s perceptions and responses to the various demands placed upon them, we can understand the collapse of neat categorisations of women as a coherent, collective and mobilised group of revolutionary supporters. In their place, there is daily engagement with risk. In a grounded interpretation of resistance by women, even in war, where the radicalization of internal struggle is tempered by an understanding of resistance that is localized and embedded in the impetus for survival (p. 41).

It will also be shown that the interpretation of African women’s role in the national liberation movements as primarily based on a “mode of maternalism”, which suggests that women participated in the liberation movements “on behalf of their husbands and children” (Hassim, 2014: 29; see also Wells, 1991 and Walker, 1995); has undermined women’s combatant contributions in the armed struggle. It is argued that this reading of women’s relationship to nationalism reinforces the narrow conception of spaces that are understood to be ‘women’s spaces’, such as the home and family, as outside of the battlefront, despite the fact that the home and family is where apartheid violence was mostly felt and resisted. In this regard, this research takes seriously the ways in which the reconfiguration of space into an all-encompassing
battlefront against apartheid “structured [women’s] lives and how this exerted a profound influence on their chosen methods of activism as well as on the ways in which they perceived their experiences” (Magubane, 2010: 996). This is to show how the war against apartheid destabilised “fixed categories of war and peace, home and front, combatant and civilian” and that “implicit in the destabilization [sic] of these fixed categories is the destabilization [sic] of the spaces in which war is fought” (Bonnin, 1997: 29). The thesis will show, as Kentridge (1990) argues, that during apartheid,

[t]he war zone [was] everywhere. Every road, ditch, yard, river, house and hillside [was] a war zone. Buses, taxis, privately owned cars, police vehicles – all these constitute arenas of battle. More than that, each person carry[ed] the war around with himself or herself…There [was] no escaping this war, it occupie[d] no defined space or time (p. 17-18).

As Bonnin (1997) further argues, apartheid “violence redefined the meaning of dangerous space and safe space, and ultimately women’s spaces and men’s spaces”, thereby producing multiple combatants, many of whom, it must be underscored, were women (p. 29).

The colliding of multiple significant anniversaries in South Africa in 2016, such as the 20th anniversaries of the first TRC hearings and adoption of the Constitution, the 40th year anniversary of the 1976 student uprisings against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, the 60th anniversary of the women’s march to the Union Buildings against the extension of pass laws to women, and the 55th anniversary of the founding of Poqo and MK, have laid bare the enduring legacies of the past on the present in a time when the country finds itself at a social, political and economic crossroads. They serve to show that history cannot be read as a timeline and that its continuities shift and are “returned to us with new implications” (Gqola, 2007: 113).

The establishment of the Department of Military Veterans in 2009 by the Jacob Zuma administration, and the subsequent adoption of the Military Veterans Act No. 18 of 2011, signalled a reemergence of the combatant as a legislative category, and as a category for debate in South African public culture concerning the legacies of the armed struggle. The reemergence of the combatant revives questions about the nature of the war that was fought between the
apartheid state, under the National Party government, and the various liberation movements. Importantly, it revives questions about the combatants who fought in that war and the forms of recognition and benefits owed to them in the aftermath. As Mashike (2008) notes, “there is no universally accepted definition of a combatant in South Africa” (p. 442). The literature on the process of reintegration of statutory and non-statutory forces that combined to form the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the demobilisation that followed reintegration, reflects the compromises of South Africa’s negotiated peace settlement (Motumi and Hudson, 1995; Motumi and McKenzie 1998; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009). Susan Cook (2006:40) argues that part of the delay that South Africa has faced in addressing issues of ex-combatants is due to resistance by the political elite who have “invested considerable energy in portraying the change [from apartheid] as a seamless and peaceful one”. The country’s “attempts to downplay the violent nature of the conflict, and to ignore the messy and not easily narrativised experiences of the various armed factions, South Africa’s former combatants remain essentially invisible” (Cook, 2006: 40-44). Mashike (2008) also places the weakness of the initial integration, demobilisation and civilian reintegration processes on the compromises of negotiated peace. He argues that the ANC’s emphasis on reconciliation and the creation of the rainbow nation has meant that it “was unlikely to tamper with one of the remaining cornerstones of white power, the military (the economy being the other)”, which is why the party has “never treated former guerilla combatants as a special social group” (p. 452). It is important then to recognise that discourses on combatants, in general, have been silenced in post-apartheid South African discourses, and specifically so with regards to women combatants, many of whom were formally excluded in the initial state-led demobilisation process.

Therefore, this study’s focus on the demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women ex-combatants is situated within broader contestations regarding the definition of who belongs into the combatant/military veteran category in South Africa. The study shows that the broadening of combatant status will determine how many former women combatants are recognised and supported by the state in rebuilding their lives after apartheid. This is because the study shows (in Chapter Three and Six) that the majority of women, who participated in the multiple and overlapping sites of the apartheid battlefront, were left out of the process that was led by the Sub-Council on Defence under the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), tasked with
overseeing the “military transition process at the political level”, by planning and outlining the “integration of all armed formations represented at the negotiations” with a view to designing a “military for South Africa that would be affordable, effective and legitimate” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 113).

While all reintegration and demobilisation processes take place within complex post-war contexts, feminists argue that these processes are also highly gendered, because they affect men and women in gendered ways. Feminist critiques of demobilisation in conventional IR theories and practice build on a sustained challenge by feminists in the discipline, that often presents the thinking and practice of war as a male domain, that war reconfigures all spaces of social life, and that women’s contributions to the war economy are central to both its conceptualisation and achievement (Elshtain, 1987; Enloe, 1983; Tickner, 1992; Hendricks, 2011; Mama and Okazawa-Rey, 2012). As shown in Chapter Three, feminist critiques of demobilisation processes challenge the disregard of women’s war contributions that take place in the private, domestic realm, especially in the context of intra-state war. As it will be shown, various cases of liberation wars and postcolonial wars, especially in Africa, collapse the separation of the private and public, and homefront and battlefront in ways that have fundamentally reconfigured the demobilisation processes and added more participants beyond militarily trained combatants.

Furthermore, feminist take seriously the extent to which “the demobilisation of women [forms] an integral part of post-war transformation”, because women’s inclusion in state-assisted demobilisation reflects the way in which the state and society recognise women’s war contributions, and their status in a post-war society (Enloe, 1983: 160). Lastly, feminist literature on demobilisation also makes visible the fact that even when women participate in orthodox and unorthodox combat, there is pressure of being “re-inscribed in more domestic roles in order to be accepted by society”, in the aftermath of the war (Lyons, 2004: xxiii). This study examines the state-assisted demobilisation and civilian reintegration of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa.

1.2 Research questions and objectives

The main question that guides this study is: how have women ex-combatants been integrated into democratic South Africa? The sub-questions leading from this main question are as follows:
• what processes has the state put in place for ex-combatants and what criteria are used to determine combatant recognition and access?
• what are the experiences of all women ex-combatants in state-led processes of integration?
• what are women ex-combatant experiences in integration beyond the procedures provided by the state?

The objectives of the study are therefore to:
• evaluate what the state has done for ex-combatants as a group, and to what extent women ex-combatants as a category, are present and absent in these processes;
• examine the experiences of all women ex-combatants concerning the challenges and successes in terms of demobilisation and reintegration;
• examine the narratives of all women ex-combatants concerning their integration beyond the state and military, whether socially, economically, politically or symbolically; and
• examine how the above may be used to inform the governance and condition women ex-combatants in South Africa.

As a consequence of these goals, the thesis seeks to contribute to a broad appreciation of the terrain of the armed struggle, and as such, to a greater appreciation of a feminist interpretation of IR theory.

1.3 Thesis outline

The thesis is organised into eight chapters. This introductory chapter outlined the context and aims of this research, that is, to examine the state-led demobilisation and civilian reintegration process of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter provided a brief context of the armed struggle and the ways in which it assumed an international posture that has made it a subject of analysis in IR theories. The internationalisation of the armed struggle has contributed to the privileging of the transnationally trained combatants in ways that obscure the role of those combatants inside the country who played a foundational role in the conceptualisation and methods of combat; many of whom were women. The chapter located this
study within feminist IR theory, which challenges disciplinary assumptions about the distinctions between the internal/external, combatant/civilian, public/private, which tend to undermine women’s war efforts by relegating them into the internal, civilian and private domain. In showing this, it will be made evident that the armed struggle was fought primarily in domains that IR theories often do not recognise and legitimate. The chapter shows that the discussion about ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa ought to be understood within broader discourses about combatant recognition and the marginalisation of ex-combatants in public generally, and women’s marginalisation in particular.

Chapter Two provides an extensive account of the contours of the armed struggle, in order to argue that women of different ages and in different spaces and eras of struggle, played a foundational role in the war against apartheid. To develop the argument that women were foundational to the anti-apartheid war, the chapter mobilises extant literature on violence in the townships and the Bantustan homelands to show that it was in these intimate spaces of home and community where apartheid brutality was most expressly felt, as well as resisted. The anti-apartheid struggle, which was waged along many fronts that include the sites of township uprisings, the rural sites of revolts, and stretching across Frontline States in Southern Africa and beyond, constituted an extensive terrain of battle. It is argued that women are not seen as combatants where war is cast in conventional terms, despite the fact that both the national liberation movements and the response by apartheid state were unorthodox in nature. The chapter shows that the rigid nature of roles as understood in conventional narratives of warfare, as understood in IR theories, do not capture the foundational role played by women in this war, both inside and outside the country. Rather, it can be defined as guerrilla war, which is indeed how the national liberation movements defined the war. The chapter also shows that while the concept of guerilla war opens up room for the appreciation of women’s varied roles in war, both national liberation and feminist accounts of women’s roles mainly reduce women’s contributions to auxiliary roles, even though these actions formed the central pillar of combat under conditions of guerilla warfare.

Chapter Three examines the demobilisation and reintegration process undergone by statutory and non-statutory forces, following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990. The chapter argues that the negotiations that led to the formation of the SANDF and to
demobilisation was a top-down process dominated by representatives of MK and the SADF. The chapter forwards the argument that when it comes to female participation in this SANDF led process, it is the transnationally trained combatant women who took part in this process to the exclusion of the majority of women who participated on the domestic battlefront. The emphasis in the process by the newly integrated SANDF leadership on a narrow distinction between combatants and civilians meant that those who participated in the armed struggle outside of the formal non-statutory forces, most of them who are women, did not qualify to participate in the process and therefore were obliged to self-demobilise. More broadly, the chapter shows that the place of the former combatant in both policy and public imagination is complex, where the recurrent theme about military veterans is that they are viewed as special citizens who have paid the ultimate price by putting their bodies on the line, for the protection of the state in the countries in the Global North, while in the Global South, the combatant is revered for their sacrifice in the achievement of national liberation. Yet, these heroified citizens also represent a political dilemma in the eyes of the state, where, if the state fails to support the post-war settlement, the former combatants are viewed as a security threat to it. It is shown that that what is unique about the cases from Africa is the inclusion of the non-conventional combatant into process of demobilisation and reintegration, and that the available literature on the challenges of the formally and informally demobilised combatants in South Africa has largely focused on the experiences of the male combatants in both statutory and non-statutory forces. Such studies offer limited detail about the wellbeing of the demobilised female combatant.

Chapter Four accounts for the use of the life histories interview method in the data collection process of this research. It demonstrates the ways in which a life history approach has is suitable for accounting for women’s experiences in qualitative research. It contextualises life history method within the narrative approach, and demonstrates the ways in which narrative approaches are useful for feminist researchers. It also locates qualitative research that privileges women’s experiences of war as an important methodological tool in feminist IR. Further to this, the argument is made in this chapter that dominant social science methods analysing the anti-apartheid struggle have excluded women in their data sampling and analysis. The chapter argues that taking women’s contexts seriously implies that the research does not merely seek to ‘prove’ accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but rather offers a space to expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thus creating a space for new
categories to emerge. The chapter then focuses on the design of the study with regards to sampling techniques and the interview process, and locates the positionality of researcher of this study. It concludes by discussing thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this research.

Chapter Five, relying on the accounts of experiences narrated by women who participated in this study, this chapter thematically delineates the spaces in which women were affected by apartheid violence, and the different methods they used to push back against such violence. The respective categories of ‘guerrilla girls’, ‘combative mothers’ and ‘in-betweeners’ are introduced in order to emphasise the importance of space/location and age that shaped the methods that women used in participating in apartheid combat. In this regard, the chapter argues that there is a particular kind of woman who would be likely to participate in the armed struggle as a trained guerilla, due to specific kinds of spacial conditions that made such participation possible. The chapter shows that the transnationally trained guerilla girl does not represent the dominant mode of women’s participation in the armed struggle. It is argued that taking space seriously opens room to ask questions about other spaces in which the majority of women entered into anti-apartheid combat, and allows us to appreciate the various ways in which the majority of women participated. It is argued that the creation of multiple, and overlapping, categories is also useful for our understanding of women’s roles that go beyond the current binary representation of the trained combatant versus the maternal mother that is present in both the literature on the anti-apartheid struggle, and feminist discourses on women’s participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. This task of naming women as combatants is important amidst the current preoccupation with developing state assistance programmes that aim to support those who risked their lives in order to end apartheid.

Chapter Six examines the demobilisation and reintegration of women combatants at two levels: 1) at the level of state structures, where the state recognises services and benefits; and 2) at the personal level, where personal, family, social, political, psychological and spiritual dimensions converge. The chapter first addresses the experiences of the formally demobilised women combatants. These are delineated into different themes from: the women’s return from exile under continued precarious security circumstances in the country; the DDR process; the reasons they chose not to integrate; and demobilisation benefits. The chapter then examines the trajectories of women combatants who were not demobilised. In the main, the chapter shows that
the majority of the internally-based combatants have received no form of support from the state, whether financial or otherwise. At a personal level, the chapter shows that women have had to reinvent themselves for a post-apartheid reality, in ways economic, social, political and psychological. The chapter concludes by examining the different ways in which women are navigating civilian life and how they deal with enduring memories of the past, and its persistent wounds.

Chapter Seven examines recent the legislative framework that guides the work of the Department of Military Veterans. It is shown in this chapter that the reemergence of a military veterans discourse has been imbued with the similar political tensions as those of the initial demobilisation process, in terms of contestation about the definition of the military veteran, since many who perceive themselves as having been combatants continue to be excluded from this framework and the material benefits that it offers. The chapter shows that the DMV’s policies and practices reveal a neutralising approach to gender that treats the challenges that women and men veterans as the same. The reports and statements from the DMV are assessed in terms of the way in which they do not demonstrate attentiveness to the ways that – although female and male veterans are both marginalised in contemporary South Africa – their material and psychological marginality is not experienced in the same way. It is argued that in specific ways, the attention of the Department seems to predominantly respond to the anxieties of destitute male veterans.

Chapter Eight provides a discussion and summary of the major findings of this study. In accounting for the major findings, it will be argued that this thesis has demonstrated that the recognition of women for participation in demobilisation process is based on an intricate intersection of binaries that together deligitimise women’s combatant roles such as combatant/civilian, internal/external, rural/urban, public/private, older/younger. This thesis shows that the historic exclusion of women in demobilisation processes was also coupled with compromises of South Africa’s political negotiations, which generally undermined the demobilisation process for broader political ends.

The conclusion of this thesis is that most women ex-combatants have not participated in state-led demobilisation process, and are, as a result, struggling to build their lives in a post-apartheid South Africa that fails to acknowledge the true extent of either their roles or needs.
CHAPTER TWO:
WOMEN IN THE TIME OF ‘THE PEOPLE’S WAR’

2.1 Introduction

This chapter locates women as foundational to the war against apartheid. To develop the argument that women were foundational to the anti-apartheid war, I use the literature on violence in the townships and the Bantustan homelands to show that it was in these intimate spaces of home and community where apartheid brutality was predominantly expressed, felt, and resisted. The chapter shows the force of apartheid violence across multiple planes of battle was greatest in the “home and community, [where it reached] into a sphere in which women have particular responsibility and which they feel particularly obliged to defend” (Beall et al., cited in Cherry, 2007: 301). The township and the homeland placed women at the center of apartheid violence (in multiple ways) that shatters the pervasive myth that women retreat to the private sphere to escape war. It focuses on the nature of the war, to establish that women are not understood as combatants since apartheid, because the armed struggle is broadly cast in conventional terms. It shows that the rigid nature of conventional warfare roles, as understood in IR theories, fails to capture the foundational role played by women in this war, both inside and outside the country, whereas, it is understood more accurately as a guerrilla war, in keeping with the way in which national liberation movements have understood it. Certainly, it shares several characteristics with guerilla warfare, whose unorthodox nature allows for a better understanding of women as combatants. Yet, the unconventional nature of this war, which consumed Southern Africa as an entire region, is often underplayed. Instead, the unconventional nature of the war has been associated with a kind of guerilla warfare, whose protagonist is often reduced to the transnational (male) guerilla fighter. This thesis seeks to extend the scope of our understanding of the various other national and transnational protagonists of this war, many of whom were women.

As noted in Chapter One, feminists in IR argue that the rigid distinctions made between private and public and civil and the military have historically contributed to obscuring women’s
varied participation in wars. As Brown (2006) notes, the “European state system” today was, as recently as 1945, in a condition of near total collapse” (p. 128) meaning that the evolution of the Westphalian state system since 1648 has been a turbulent and violent process because states have often not adhered to the principles of sovereignty which protects the territorial integrity of each state. It is unsurprising then that the focus of the discipline and war strategists has been to device ways for states to ensure their survival from the constant threat of outside invasion. In an international context that is understood by realists as a “struggle for power”, where the “core national interest” is survival, it is unsurprising that threat is understood to be imposed from outside on a protected and safe domestic sphere (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 86). Within this context, war is understood to take place between soldiers of warring states on behalf of their civilian populations. Feminist critiques of realist discourses of war have made visible that war unravels the distinction between the civil and the military and home front and battlefront.

The chapter locates women’s participation in this particular war within its expansive battlefield, which in fact blurred conventional definitions of ‘combat’ that has conventionally been understood according to the separation of the civil sphere and the military sphere in the discipline. It shows that, like other unconventional wars of liberation in Africa, South America and Asia, the anti-apartheid struggle challenges the dominant disciplinary demarcation of “battlefront” and “homefront”, along with the sharp distinction between civil and military spheres, where the civilian and the combatant are central to process of demarcating spaces of warfare. In the apartheid case, the blurring of these categories is particularly evident in both the violent and non-violent transnational methods employed by the anti-apartheid movement, as well as the defensive measures used by the apartheid state, which traversed international borders. It is argued here that the anti-apartheid struggle ought to be understood as the combination of different forms of struggle, which, in their articulation, subverted conventional categories of “combatant” and “civilian”, “battlefront” and “home front”, and “local” and “global”. What became known in South Africa as “The People’s War” against apartheid, called attention into the all-encompassing nature of apartheid violence against black people. Therefore, if we take seriously the ways in which the call by the liberation movements to render the country ungovernable, it becomes possible to locate women in the different frontlines that permeated the war in a way in which they are not already recognised.
In this regard, the chapter shows that the majority of women who participated in the armed struggle are not perceived as combatants for the following reasons: 1) they fought apartheid from their homes and community; 2) The transnationally trained combatant, who fought apartheid outside the country, is understood to be the exemplar combatant; 3) in this light, apartheid is cast as a conventional transnational battle site fought by a military-trained state and non-statutory forces, when it was indeed not; 4) the feminist literature on women’s roles in the anti-apartheid struggle more broadly, and the armed struggle more specifically, characterises women’s contribution as motherist, and therefore neither feminist, nor involved at the frontlines of the war.

This terrain of the struggle forms the backdrop to the demobilisation process. The all-encompassing nature of the struggle against apartheid makes it possible to examine the extent to which the demobilisation process resembled the context of the war, where it is argued that in spite of a visible consensus in the literature about the unconventional nature of the war, the post-apartheid demobilisation process is a dissimilar, conventional and state-centric process. Due to the state-centric nature of this process, many of the women protagonists who participated in the anti-apartheid battlefront have simply not been accounted for, or taken into account.

2.2 The contours of a transnational “late twentieth century” war

According to Ellis (2012: 291), “what South Africa experienced in the late twentieth century, was a civil war, fought among the people.” This war “resembled many other violent conflicts in the late twentieth century…the point was not so much to destroy the enemy as to win political support” (Ellis, 2012: 278). There is consensus in the literature that the South African experience of war is to be located in the tradition of guerilla warfare, which is distinct from ‘orthodox’ war that is associated with the work of Clausewitz (2009) (This is discussed later in the chapter). This section demonstrates the details of South Africa’s guerilla war, which stretched throughout the region and beyond.

As noted in Chapter One, the Sharpeville massacre marked a turning point in the fight against apartheid. As illustrated later in the chapter, both the PAC and the ANC had for a time in
the early 1960s tried to operate underground, attacking the state through sabotage campaigns until the arrest of top ANC and SACP leaders in a farm in Rivonia, Liliesleaf, the then-main leadership base for MK activities, on 11 July 1963 (Ellis, 1998). On 12 May 1962, the government published “John Vorster’s long-promised anti-sabotage legislation” known as the General Law Amendment Bill, a bill which made “sabotage subject to the same penalties as treason: namely death, imprisonment, property confiscation and banishment” (Simpson, 2016: 49). On 24 June 1964, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Denis Goldberg, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoeledi and Ahmed Kathrada were sentenced to life imprisonment in Robben Island for 221 charges of sabotage for the “purpose of a violent revolution,” marking another turning point in the anti-apartheid struggle. It is during the three decades of liberation movements (from 1963 to 1990), that saw the ANC, PAC and SACP operated across Southern Africa and beyond, that reconfigured the forms of struggle used to challenge the state and its response to the challenge. While the liberation movements used the ‘international’ as the site from which to attack the state, inside the country the violence moved ever-nearer to the inside of homes, and the communities of those who remained in the country (during a period that stretched from the repression of the 1960s to the uprisings of 1976 and included the state of emergencies of the 1980s). The literature on the township as a site of apartheid violence where “spaces of everyday life were to be reterritorialized [sic] and new spaces and boundaries within the township recreated” (Bonnin, 2000: 307), shows that that the escalation of violence in the township propelled liberation movements to escalate their transnational efforts to call the international community’s attention to the brutality of apartheid.

2.2.1 Wars in the township

*Khawuleza* is a South African song. It comes from the townships, locations, reservations, whichever, near the cities of South Africa, where all the black South Africans live. The children shout from the streets as they see police cars coming to raid their homes for one thing or another. They say "Khawuleza, Mama!" which simply means "Hurry up, Mama! Please, please don't let them catch you!"

(Miriam Makeba, 1966)
The 1960s, following the banning of the liberation movements by the National Party government, are understood to be the ‘golden age’ of apartheid, because the state seemed to have successfully silenced the majority black population from challenging the legitimacy of a minority government. As Saleem Badat (2012: 159) explains,

savage state repression, state authoritarianism and the decline of internal political resistance enabled new conditions for capitalist growth and accumulation. Between 1963 and 1972 there was a sustained economic boom, the South African economy experienced a rate of expansion second only to that of Japan, and the rate of return on invested capital once again became among the highest in the world. For white South Africans the 1960s was generally a time of political calm, rising living standards, prosperity and a share in the sustained economic boom of that period.

It was only in the 1970s that the power dynamics shifted dramatically from the re-emergence of the workers’ movement, amongst these was the March 1973 Durban strikes that involved over a 100,000 black workers, who challenged the horrid conditions of migrant labour, the pass laws and the general inhumane conditions under racist labour conditions. This decade also saw the re-emergence of youth politics that were predicated on the formation of the South African Student Organisation (SASO), formed in 1968, under the leadership of Steve Biko, which grew its influence under the banner of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in the 1970s. But the township, as a site of contestation between black residents and the state, come to be the centre of the attacks between the state and black people that escalates to its highest levels of brutality with the state of emergencies of 1984 and 1985. These “township centered studies” (Motsemme, 2011) reveal that the wrath of apartheid violence inside South Africa could be felt in all areas of black life in the township. For Cock (1989: 14), “during 1984-1986 black South African townships were reconstituted as ‘zones of terror’…within these areas relationships were structured around violence and fear”, by a state bent on silencing the challenge to its legitimacy.

In 1983, the ANC adopted the document “Planning for People’s War” at its conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. The implication this “people’s war” is that the “liberation army [became] rooted amongst the people who were to progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily” (Cock, 1989: 2). According to Ellis, the ANC realised that MK
“could not hope to defeat the SADF on conventional battlefield, the key to the struggle was to induce the mass population to either accept or resist continued government by the National Party” (Ellis, 1998: 265). Ellis further notes that the ANC “came to consider the black urban proletariat as the important constituency and to believe that its own armed struggle could spark a general insurrection or ‘people’s war’ (Ellis, 1998: 265).

For Cock (1989:2), the “ANC’s “People War” strategy highlights the problem of a clear differentiation between combatants, and non-combatants that rests on a precise demarcation of the battlefield” (Cock, 1989: 2). This is complicated by the fact that the apartheid state did not acknowledge itself as engaged in a war. The apartheid state in the late 1970s saw itself as engaged in a “Total Onslaught”, preferring to refer to its “enemy” as terrorists rather than declaring an outright war. According to Cock and Nathan (1989), the choice for the apartheid state to define the conflict as unrest or terrorism as opposed to war implied that liberation movement fighters were denied the prisoner of war status granted by the Geneva Conventions to those engaged in war against colonial powers. According to Dlamini (2014: 105; see also Dale, 1993), the apartheid’s state’s notion of ‘total strategy’ was based on the writing of a French general and military strategist, André Beaufre, a Second World War veteran, who had fought in Indochina and Algeria, and commanded the French forces during the 1956 Suez crisis. Thula Simpson (2016) notes that as far back 10 December 1959, the New Age newspaper reported that Defence minister Frans Erasmus declared “his intention to reorganise the Defence Force along the lines of the French in Algeria, to maintain ‘internal’ security” (p. 18). Dale (1993: 13) also points out that Beaufre was the most influential military strategist amongst SADF circles, along with American military writer, John J. McCuen, who believed that “the solution to the problem of defeating revolutionary warfare is the application of its strategy and principles in reverse” (quoted in Ellis, 1998: 265). According to Dlamini (2014: 105),

Beaufre’s idea, simply put, was that militaries needed to think of their battlefronts in total terms, meaning there should be no distinction between the civil and the military spheres. In other words, the military’s ambit must extend beyond the traditional battlefront to all aspects of society: hence the need for a total strategy.

Theresa Edlmann’s PhD dissertation on post-apartheid psycho-social legacies of conscription into the SADF (2014:1), argues that in this context, the compulsory conscription of
all school-leaving white males from 1968-1993, “formed part of a broader social, political and ideological system of which every white South African was a part in one way or another” (Edlmann, 2014: 1). As Cock argues, “one of the defining features of South Africa as a country engaged in war is that the battlefield comprehends the entire society” (Cock, 1989: 2).

The literature on the violence in townships reveals the extent to which the battlefield engulfed the entire society of the township.

Belinda Bozzoli (2004: 7-11), writing about the “Six Day War” between residents and police in Alexandra township in Johannesburg in February, 1986, argues that the township as a space was “enclosed by law, memory, culture and physical boundaries, as well as by the bodily boundaries of racial identification”. Similarly, Bonnin (2000: 307), writing about the transformation of space during the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal between ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), argues that “spaces of everyday life were to be reterritorialised and new spaces and boundaries within the township recreated”.

Ruth Mompati writes about her arrest, after the March 1960 State of Emergency was lifted in August, while in town with her then two-year old son:

I was arrested after the State of Emergency was lifted. I took my son to town; my second baby who was born in 1958…He didn’t have shoes, so I took him to town early in the morning by taxi …I went to the ANC office for a meeting. When I came out, the Special Branch was on my trail. I walked towards a shoe shop in Commissioner Street, not far from the office of Mandela and Tambo and the ANC. Just as I passed Orient House, a Coloured policeman, Sharpe, came up to me and said: “Ruth Mompati, you are under arrest.” I said: “where is your warrant of arrest?” I just walked to the shoe shop because I realised that they might grab me and I didn’t want my child to go to prison. At the shoe shop I asked for a phone and called Pitje’s office. He was not there. I called somebody else and told them: “I think I’m going to be arrested and I’ve a child with me. Could you come and collect him?” Then I decided: “this is not right; I must get out of here and go back home. These people will really arrest me with the child.” As we came out of
the store, however, Sharpe and other policemen immediately grabbed me. I was holding my child’s hand. They just threw me in the back of the car. My child followed me because I held on to him (Mompati, 2008: 314).

In her article about women detainees in the anti-apartheid struggle, Kalpana Hiralal (2015) notes that throughout anti-apartheid struggle, “thousands of women were arrested, subjected to naked body searches, physical torture, verbal abuse and sexual harassment” (p. 36). She notes that parallel to the Rivonia trial, political activist Dorothy Nyembe was sentenced to 10 years in imprisonment in Kroonstad. Yet,

during this time the Rivonia trials received world attention and together with the struggles of inmates on Robben Island it subsequently led to improved conditions on the Island. Dorothy’s imprisonment on the other hand, received scant attention; even her family did not support her since it was regarded as unacceptable for a woman to be in prison (p. 35).

In her autobiography, Emma Mashinini, founder and Secretary General of the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), describes the bizarre nature of the morning of her arrest in her home in Soweto:

...I was completely unprepared when, on the morning of 27 November 1981, I woke, very early to hear loud bangs and knocks at the door of our house. My husband opened the curtains to look out, and saw a string of cars, police and soldiers. He opened up to let them in and they swarmed into our bedroom to find me still in my nightclothes. My husband and children were all ordered out of the house, in their nighties and pyjamas, and locked outside for more than an hour. They said to me, ‘Emma Mashinini, we are detaining you under Section 22’ (Mashinini, 2012: 57).

Mashinini was arrested and detained at John Vorster Square prison without charges for six months in 1981–82. In this regard, Bonnin writes:

Everyday routines and tasks, such as washing clothes or sweeping the yard, were altered. But it was not only daily routines that were affected by the violence; the
rituals that marked other life cycles were also disrupted. Birthday parties, weddings, coming-of-age ceremonies were all indefinitely suspended as surviving the violence became all-consuming preoccupation (2000: 310).

Beall et al. (cited in Cherry, 2007: 301) point to the unique context in which women were participating in the anti-apartheid struggle, and in particular, to women’s roles in the uprisings in Durban. The authors argue that:

the home is traditionally regarded as the women’s domain, and the care of children is ‘women’s work’ … Such tactics forced women to take positions in the front line of the battle and allowed them to assume leadership roles, laying the basis for the transformation of a women’s role and position in struggle: they are drawn in to defend their terrain, but in so doing, are forced to move beyond narrowly conceived notions of their roles (cited in Cherry, 2007: 301).

Writing about women’s role in securing their communities in the violence in KZN, Bonnin (1997), cites a female participant, who articulated that women were “in the front not because each one is looking after her own child, but all children. It does not matter whose child, a woman assists a child no matter whose child it is” (Bonnin, 1997: 39).

Pamela Reynolds’s War in Worcester (2013), an ethnography of young men from the township of Zwelethemba in the Western Cape who participated in the anti-apartheid struggle the 1980s, argues that

in Zwelethemba, the young stirred conflict and were arrested in their community, held in police cells and prisons in the town, often released without charge, and returned to their community. Ground was not gained, battles neither won nor lost: at the beginning of the 1980s, most of them believed that they would defeat the apartheid regime within a few years, but it was only at the end of the decade that signs of change became palpable in Worcester (Reynolds, 2013: 31).

Making a point about the nature of the confrontation between the security forces of the regime and the youth in Worcester, she argues that the urban nature of the violence in the
townships makes it a “different from the kind of guerilla warfare, in which surprise attacks could be launched in the countryside” (Reynolds, 2013: 31-32). Furthermore, on the character of the war, those who participated against the state, “there was no security in identification by uniform, badge, or base with the protection that in formal wars, as recognized [sic] by the Geneva conventions, are supposed to be accorded a soldier” (Reynolds, 2013: 32). Cock (1989) estimates that in the 1980s, about 10 000 people were detained without trial by the security forces. The act of detention without trial made lawful in the 1960s, merely escalated.

Similarly, Matthew Kentridge in his book, *An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg* (1990), defines the killing of two thousand residences in the Natal Midlands between 1987 and 1990 as a war. He notes that while members of the UDF and Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) who were allies in the conflict with Inkatha offered different accounts of the causes of the war, all three described the violence as a war. He further notes that in the townships where this war took place

> the people who actually have to live through it all talk with natural ease about ‘being at war’. They have no political or ideological brief – they use the word because it fits their experience... The people here have adapted their lives to the demands of the war (Kentridge, 1990: 17)

In her doctoral thesis on the township of KwaZakhele in Port Elizabeth, Janet Cherry (2001) argues that while most townships had been contained by the state by late 1977 following the Soweto 1976 uprising, to emerge again after the formation of the UDF in 1983, in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage townships, there was the emergence of civic organisations such as the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO), formed in 1979, and its allied organisations, Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation (PEWO), Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) and Congress of South African Students (COSAS). Cherry (2001) argues that “when the township revolt began in September 1984, residents of KwaZakhele were ready to play their part in the historic drama that was about to unfold” (Cherry, 2001: 90).

Meanwhile, in her case study of Diepkloof, Soweto, Monique Marks (2001) points to the fact that schools became a terrain between young people and the state. She notes that:
Most township youth who joined political organisations in the ’80s, were at school, and many of the leaders of these organisations were still at school. This was a nation-wide phenomenon...schools provided a base for a common experience and also a geographical space for meeting and organising (Marks, 2001: 49).

Marks (2001) notes further the period from 1984 to 1989 came with high levels of state repression. She notes that “people in townships who joined political organisations during this time were aware of the severe consequences associated with this decisions” (Marks, 2001: 49). The residents knew that “they risked detention, arrests, harassment and even death” (Marks, 2001: 49).

In her article about political widowhood in South Africa, Mamphela Ramphele (1996) writes about how funerals became sites of political contestation that were used to show the international community the gravity of apartheid brutality. She makes an interesting point regarding the use of English at the funerals where the mourners were largely illiterate. Making an example of a mass funeral in the township of Gugulethu, Cape Town, in 1985, she argues that

[the political theatre of mass funerals was not primarily intended for the audience in physical attendance, but for national and international audiences. The latter audience assumed greater importance in the message being communicated, because of the potential action they could mobilise in support of the cause. The bereaved families became an incidental part of the audience to this political theatre (Ramphele, 1996: 107).

In her doctoral work about lived and embodied suffering of mothers and daughters in Chesterville township in KZN, Nthabiseng Motsemme (2011) argues that studies on the violence in townships in the 1980s and 1990s are “conceived and characterised as largely public-political”, in the sense that the violence is theorised as “wholly political in nature” and it is often populated by predominately hollow male political and protesting subjects, who appear as though they are without cultures and souls” (Motsemme, 2011: 2). In this sense, township-centred studies situate the township resident as primarily a political subject, engaged in the public sphere,
which in this case is the site of the protest or the march (Motsemme, 2011). She argues that what these studies hide in their portrayal of township life under apartheid, as inherently public-political, is that apartheid’s “effects on families, and in particular women and children, was simply ignored” (Motsemme, 2011:9). In Chapter Four, I extend the discussion on some of the methodological limitations of these township-centered studies. The point to be made here though is that the violence contaminated everyday life for black township residents. While it is important to also discuss the ways in which black residents found strategies of survival under repression, as Motsemme (2011) urges, the point of these studies is to show the extent to which township residents, country-wide, did not have a choice but to opt out of the violence from a state that perceived itself to be under threat.

Bonnin terms the violence in KZN as a “post-modern war”, which destabilised “fixed categories of war and peace, home and front, combatant and civilian” (Bonnin, 1997: 29), articulating the composite nature of the anti-apartheid struggle, which produced multiple protagonists, many of whom were women and young people.

What is examined below are the forms of resistance that residents in the rural countryside used to contest apartheid and the methods, such as banishment, that the state used to silence activists in the countryside. It is shown that Poqo, the PAC’s armed wing, found most of its support in rural areas.

2.2.2 Poqo and revolts in the countryside

*Wena Matanzima, usisigebengu uthengisa ngabantwana base Afrika... ubulala abantwana base Transkei*” [You, Matanzima, are a criminal. You are selling out the children of Africa... you are killing the children of Transkei]

(Mayibuye Choir, n.d.)

In his book about banishment under apartheid, Saleem Badat (2012) correctly notes that the archive on the anti-apartheid struggle tends to be centered on the violence in the urban setting
and the forms of resistance used by the national liberation movements. In this regard, “the iconic and celebrated figures of the national liberation struggle have tended to be political activists who had cities as their theatres of action and struggle” (Badat, 2012: xxi). Luli Callinicos (2007) argues similarly that “scholars in the 1980s – with few exceptions – tended to focus on the urban challenge and to discuss the potential and relative merits of the liberation and labour movements” (p. 154). Badat (2012) notes further that “it is not so much that the rural militants, and their activities and courageous struggle against oppression, exploitation and injustice, have been by and large forgotten. In large part, they are still to be fully written about and to enter popular consciousness” (p. xxii).

In *The Peasants’ Revolts* (1964), Govan Mbeki describes the “Bantu homelands”, which consisted of “260 small and separate areas scattered throughout the country”, as

> South Africa’s backwaters, primitive rural slums, soil-eroded and underdeveloped, lacking power resources and without developed communication systems. They have no cities, no industries, and few sources of employment. They are congested and permanently distressed areas where the inhabitants live on a narrow ledge of starvation, where a drought, as experienced recently in the northern areas, leads inevitably to famine. They are areas drained of their menfolk, for their chief export is labour, and while the men work on white-owned farms and in mines and industry, their women-folk and old people pursue a primitive agriculture incapable of providing even subsistence. The ‘homelands’ are mere reserves of labour, with a population not even self-sustaining, supplying no more than a supplement to the low wages paid on the mines and farms (Mbeki, 1964: 13).

As Badat (2012: 36) notes, rural residents did not passively submit to the encroachment of the state in their lives, as many resisted as the “existence of anti-dipping movements and the role played by independent church and chieftaincy movements in reserve-based resistance” against betterment schemes and other forms of state control on land and rural life, well before the formal introduction of apartheid in 1948. The introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was the first legislation introduced by the National Party in its attempts to implement its policy of separate development. Under the Act, the Minister of Bantu Affairs appointed Chiefs and
Headmen as the new Tribal Authorities, which the Minister could remove any time according to his discretion (Mbeki, 1964). The Chiefs and Headman became responsible for the “allocation of land, the welfare and pension system and development” (South African History Online, 2016: n.d). The Act robbed rural residents of any opportunity to participate in the appointment of authorities who ruled over them as the “Minister and his officials had strict control over the membership of the Authorities; and members of the general public could be excluded from their meetings” (Mbeki, 1964: 45). As Mbeki (1964) argues, apartheid only exacerbated life for black people in the countryside:

…for all the years after the Nationalist government came to power, it had brought only hardship to the African people: the tightening up of the pass laws, the introduction of inferior education, the 44 banning and banishing of political leaders; the growing ferocity of the police. The people were becoming increasingly bitter and hostile (Mbeki, 1964: 43-43).

The rising “hostility” of rural residents was articulated in the various revolts of the 1950s and 1960s, such as in 1957 in the Northern Transvaal and Witzieshoek opposition of the introduction of pass to women, the uprisings in Sekhukhuneland in 1958, in Thembuland in the late 1950s and on the Natal south coast and in Mpondoland in the 1960s (Badat, 2012: 37).

The “banishing” that Mbeki (1964) refers to is a method of punishment used by the state that was “directed specifically at opponents of the state” (Badat, 2012), who were all exclusively African. Banishment involved the uprooting of political activists from a particular locale and their expulsion to specifically designated areas, usually completely foreign to them, within the national boundaries” (Badat, 2012: 33). According to Badat (2012), banishment had its roots from the Natal Code of Native Law of 1891, which gave the governor the power to remove any “native” from one part of the colony to another. The Administration Amendment Act of 1956, under the National Party, allowed the state to banish a person without prior notice (Badat, 2012: 31).

According to Badat (2012), the total number of banished people between 1948 and 1982 (the last year of legal banishment), is 160. Banishment was highest in the 1950s, at the height of “peasant revolts”. The largest number of banished people, 23 (eighteen men and five women)
came from GaMatlala, a rural town then known as Pietersburg (currently Polokwane). The residents of GaMatlala militantly resisted “betterment, Bantu Authorities, Bantu education and passes for women, and the state’s attempt to impose unpopular, pliant chiefs” (Badat, 2012: 38).

One of the key figures that Badat profiles is Makwena Matlala, an acting chieftainess of GaMatlala, who directly opposed the government when the location was declared a betterment area without consent. In 1950, Matlala was banished to Hammanskraal by the Department of Native Affairs in Pietersburg, because her presence in GaMatlala was “inimical to the peace, order and good government of the Natives” (Badat, 2012: 42). After refusing banishment, and a brief stay in Atteridgeville in Pretoria, in 1951 she was eventually forcibly banished to Zwelitsha Township in King Williams Town in the Eastern Cape, far away from her family and supporters in GaMatlala and Atterdgeville, in a place where she did not even speak or understand the local language. Helen Joseph visited Matlala in King Williams’s Town in 1962, and observed that although Matlala was a chieftainness, because she was “a black woman she could be insulted, slapped and stripped. From that humiliation she had gone to her banishment” (Badat, 2012: 45). Her banishment order was only withdrawn in February 1966.

Banished people were not only separated from their communities of support, they were often sent to remote areas that plunged their lives into extreme economic and social depravity (Badat, 2012). As Badat’s work shows, banishment was a forceful tool to silence rural activists. It was then extended as a method of suppression to activists in townships in the 1970s, the most well documented banishments being those of Winnie Madikizela Mandela, banished from Soweto to the North West town of Brandfort, and Mamphela Ramphela, who was banished from King Williams Town to Lenyenye location in Tzaneen, both in 1977 (Badat, 2012).

In terms of organised resistance, the PAC’s military wing had its strongest support among rural residents, who were frustrated by the state and traditional authority. Following the Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the PAC and ANC, the PAC was the first to adopt armed strategy with the formation of the para-military Africanist Task Force, which was the followed by the formation of the party’s official military wing, Poqo (used interchangeable with APLA, although APLA came into being in 1968), in February 1960. As noted by Lodge (1983), the word poqo in isiXhosa can be translated as alone, or pure. It is said that “the word was used sometime in the Western Cape in 1960 by PAC spokesman to describe the character of their
organisation in contrast to the multiracial dimension of the Congress alliance” (Lodge, 1983: 241). In his book that details the history of the PAC, Kwandiwe Kondlo (2009) argues that Poqo was formed “on the idea that the armed struggle was a necessity in order to mobilise the rural poor who the PAC regarded as the peasantry, into a conscious political force which could not only overthrow the government but also seize and mold the country’s political economy to meet their own ends” (p. 237). He argues that the military objectives of the PAC differed from those of the ANC, where the “armed struggle was a tactical bargaining stance and was thrust upon the organisation, [a] political solution remained the preferred route”; whereas for the PAC, “the armed struggle was an indispensable condition for liberation”, because the “PAC believed that they could not achieve objectives without war” (p. 237-238).

According to Lodge (1983: 241), Poqo’s PAC was “considerably more violent and involved rather greater numbers” than did MK’s sabotage campaign. Poqo relied on strategies that were defined as “indigenous methods of fighting” (Lodge, 1983: 241). Kondlo (2009) cites an address by the PAC’s Administrative Secretary, Joe Mkhwanazi, addressing the International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa in Arusha, Tanzania in 1985, where he Mkhwanazi traces the decision about the armed struggle and the weapons that the PAC chose to use. Mkhwanazi noted that

in 1961, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania took up the thread of armed struggle left behind by our great forebears. We took the decision to challenge the regime militarily. Necessity dictated that we should start with what we could afford. Thus emerged a weapon known as the panga. The nearest meaning attached to it by white liberals is that it is a butcher’s knife. But it is not (p. 233, emphasis added).

Kondlo (2009) also cites another PAC member, who noted that “Poqo warriors, we decided to fight the Boers because we inherited the fight from our ancestors” (p. 233). The most notable support for Poqo was in the Western Cape, from male migrants from the Eastern Cape. This contributed to a large PAC/Poqo following in the Eastern Cape. Lodge categorises PAC/Poqo violence during 1962-3 as targeted to different actors, which included the “defensive murders of suspected informers and policemen in Langa and Paarl”, targeted killing of white people, as well as assassination attempts “mounted on the lives of Transkeian chiefs and their
supporters”, and failed attempts at a general uprising in places such as Paarl, King Williamstown and East London, until most of the party leadership was either arrested or escaped the country to operate in exile.

Kondlo (2009) makes an interesting comparison between Poqo and the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, which occurred in 1952, nine years before the formation of Poqo. He notes that even though it is not clear whether Poqo consciously drew from the Mau Mau experience, “the two movements shared common aspects with respect to organisation and strategy” (p. 238). For Kondlo (2009), when it came to the Mau Mau and Poqo:

- both movements operated underground and drew their support from the rural areas…Members of both movements were bound by an oath of secrecy and their targets were similar, i.e. black collaborators, the police, as well as white civilians (p. 238).

Included among the women interviewed for this research, are women who participated in Poqo campaigns to take back the land in Jixeni village of Mqanduli in the former Transkei, in 1963. The next section examines the ways in which the liberation movements mobilised outside of South Africa to attack from outside and to galvanise the international community to sanction and make the apartheid regime a pariah state. It also demonstrates how the state pushed back the challenge of its power through overt and covert cross-border attacks that proliferated throughout Southern Africa and beyond.

2.2.3 The international front

2.2.3.1 The liberation movements

In terms of policy, the ANC defined its battle against the apartheid state in terms of “four pillars” at the 1969 consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. These four pillars constituted: mass mobilisation; the establishment of underground structures; the armed struggle; and the mobilisation of the international community to support the struggle of the South African people and to isolate the apartheid state.
According to Barrell (1991: 69), the ANC and its ally, the SACP “were influenced by a number of revolutionary struggles – among those in Algeria, China, Greece, Vietnam and Yugoslavia. But none seems to have been quite as influential as the Cuban revolution.” The founding document of MK reports that a “general uprising leading to direct military struggles” against the South African “white state” was “unlikely”. Instead, the founders of MK noted that “rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organized [sic] and well prepared guerilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be drawn and armed” (Operation Mayibuye, 11 July 1963).

For Legassick (2002:12), it was both Cuba and Algeria who were “the model[s] for armed struggle in Southern Africa”. Algeria was so because the success of the FLN at the time, “was the only African example of guerilla movement that had won independence” and led to the acceleration of the independence of French colonised countries in Africa (Legassick, 2002: 12). Legassick (2002) argues that the taking up of armed struggle in South Africa was followed by similar decisions by the FNLA and MPLA in Angola (1962–63), by SWAPO in 1962, by FRELIMO in Mozambique (1963–64), and by Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1964. Thus, this “southward thrust of decolonization [sic] through West and East Africa, and to Zambia and Malawi had reached its limits by the means of non-violent mass struggle” (Legassick, 2002: 11). Hence, Legassick insists that by 1967, it was possible to describe a guerilla front across Southern Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlanti… the ‘Unholy Alliance’ of [Ian] Smith, [John] Vorster and [Antonio] Salazar…has been forced to draw its battle-lines roughly along the Zambezi: the whole of Southern Africa has now become a single theatre of struggle (Legassick, 2002: 11).

The first operation from outside South Africa by MK was a formal military alliance with Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) under their guerilla army, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which culminated into the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 1967-68 (Cherry, 2011). The objective of the campaigns was “to create a passage through Rhodesia into South Africa by fighting with ZIPRA against combined (Edlmann, 2014) Rhodesian and South African forces” (Cherry, 2011:37). As Cherry (2011)
notes of this, due to the high number of casualties and combatants who were captured by Rhodesian forces, it became clear that infiltrating combatants into South Africa was going to be very difficult. In the 1970s, one of the modes of infiltration adopted by MK was to establish “forward areas” in Swaziland, Lesotho, along South African borders from which “MK units entered the country, setting up underground networks and laying the basis for military operations (Cherry, 2011: 49). The likes of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were placed in the Swaziland “forward area”.

2.2.3.2 “The forward areas” and the underground

Thula Simpson (2009:105) notes that “Swaziland and Mozambique were part of what the ANC described as the ‘Eastern Front’ of the liberation struggle”. According to Simpson (2009), the Eastern Front extended into South Africa, including areas such as KwaZulu-Natal, present-day Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. Within the ANC, Maputo was given the code name “Harbour”, while Swaziland was coded the “Bay”, and South Africa the “Ocean” (Simpson, 2009: 105). In terms of the distribution of responsibilities, Simpson notes that Maputo “served as the Eastern Front’s planning centre for operations. These Mozambique-based units in turn established sub-units in Swaziland to implement policy” (Simpson, 2009: 105). The sub-units in Swaziland were responsible for overseeing political and military work in rural and urban areas in Natal and eastern Transvaal (Simpson, 2009).

Barry Gilder, who served in the ANC’s underground unit in Botswana and was a member of the party’s Regional Political Military Committee (RPMC) there, notes that

[e]ach of the forward areas had responsibility for sectors of the country at home, although this was relatively elastic. Botswana had responsibility for the western half of the country, including Western Transvaal, Northern Cape, Orange Free State, and Western Cape. We all shared responsibility for the urban conglomeration that was then called PWV – Johannesburg, Pretoria and the many towns and townships that surrounded them (Gilder, 2012: 169-170).

Timothy Gibbs (2011) examines the kinship networks in the Transkei that Chris Hani exploited while heading the MK underground unit from Lesotho, which entered the country through the Transkei. The forward area of Lesotho was responsible for attacks in the Cape
region. Gibbs (2011) argues that Hani’s main contacts were young men and women who, like him, went to elite missionary schools such as Lovedale College, and St. Johns College in Umthatha. He further points to a tension that existed within the ANC/MK camps, with some accusing Hani of privileging elites from the Transkei (Gibbs, 2011). Some notable recruits who came from this network include Pumzile Mayaphi, who admitted guilt to the April 1986 bombing of the Wild Coast Sun Casino in Mzamba, Transkei, as well as Oyama Mabandla, who worked under Hani in Maseru, later co-writing the book “Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile” (1992), under the alias of Tshepo Sechaba, with Stephen Ellis. Gibbs (2011: 689) further notes that the coup by General Bantu Holomisa which saw him take over the Transkei from Prime Minister George Matanzima, provided a “liberated zone for the ANC”. Following the unbanning of the national liberation movements,

Transkei provided a transit point for ANC exiles repatriating to South Africa. It was a sanctuary for the ‘high risk’ cadres, such as Chris Hani, who were briefly refused return by the apartheid government, and it was a refuge for victims of political violence in neighboring Natal. Members of Self Defence Units came to Transkei from all over South Africa for training... De Klerk’s government went further, saying that MK was using Transkei as a springboard from which to attack Natal. The South African Police claimed that 22,000 tons of weaponry had been moved from Angola to Namibia and Transkei (Gibbs, 2011: 689).

Elias Masilela in Number 43 Trelawney Park: kwa Magogo: Untold Stories of Ordinary People Caught Up in the Struggle Against Apartheid (2007) chronicles the involvement of Solomon Buthongo Masilela and Rebecca Makgomo “Magogo” Masilela’s family in the activities of the ANC and the PAC at their home in Number 43, Trelawney Park in Manzini, Swaziland. Masilela argues that “almost every ANC and PAC activist who went through Swaziland used the Number 43 in one way or another in carrying out their various activities...it was the principal base launching the armed struggle against South Africa, particularly in the period after 1982, when King Sobhuza II died” (2007: xx). Amongst those who used the Masilela house to hide and for military strategising were John Nkadimeng, who served both in the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) and Revolutionary Council, Sphiwe “Gebuza”
Nyanda, Jabu Shoke, Welile ‘Satane’ Nhlapo, Xolani Humphrey Mkhwanazi, Theophilus Sidima ‘Viva’ Dlodlo, and Glory ‘September’ Sedibe. Mkhwanazi and Sedibe were arrested by Swazi police on 12 August 1986, while staying at Number 43. Two days later, under the command of Eugene de Kock, Sedibe was kidnapped by South African security forces from the Swazi police station. He was severely tortured by the apartheid security officers to disclose information about ANC military activities, leading to his defection from ANC and MK to become an apartheid state agent. In 1988, he served as the key state witness in the trial against Ebrahim Ishmael “Chota” Ebrahim, Simon Dladla and Mandla Acton Maseko, his former MK counterparts (Dlamini, 2014).

Amongst the key military activities that were “finalized [sic], launched, received and celebrated from Number 43” included the “gunning down of the notorious police officer, Hlubi, in Soweto (1978), the Venda police station attack (1981), the Vootrekker army base attack (1981), the Tonga army base operation (1982), the Hectorspruit fuel depot operation (1982), the Pretoria Church street bomb blast (1983) – and many more” (Masilela, 2007: xxi).

Emphasising the importance of house Number 43, Masilela quotes Nyanda, who stated that “Number 43 was a haven mainly for people operating in the eastern front, like similar houses in Botswana and Zambia. It was the centre of the ANC’s military operations” (Masilela, 2007: 105). Masilela goes further, to compare the significance of Number 43 to that of Liliesleaf Farm in Johannesburg. The farm, as previously mentioned, was the underground headquarters of the South African Communist Party, the safe house and a central meeting point for key figures of the ANC, and the MK High Command. In post-apartheid South Africa, Liliesleaf Farm has been recognised as a heritage site, due to its significance to the ANC and SACP. Masilela argues that “while Liliesleaf housed the high command of the ANC of that time, Number 43 was the de facto operational base of the ANC high command in Swaziland” (Masilela, 2007: 18). He argues therefore that “while Liliesleaf Farm had political significance, Number 43 had a major practical significance, owing to the number of military operations launched from there” (Masilela, 2007:18).

Masilela’s narrative of his parents’ home as the center stage for MK military activity following the banning of the ANC, SACP, PAC and other national liberation movements, demonstrates the nuances of what Mao Tse-tung defines as “guerilla warfare” in the ways in
which all categories central to conventional warfare are blurred. To define both house Number 43 and Liliesleaf Farm as important sites of military strategy goes against conventional logic of what constitute a battleground versus civilian ground. The narrative also underscores the transnational nature of the armed struggle, which engulfed countries and homes in Southern Africa and beyond.

Conny Braam’s account of her role as the then-chairperson of the Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland [Anti-Apartheid Movement Netherlands] is important for understanding the various strategies the liberation movements mobilised beyond Southern Africa, and how they relied on the human and material support of individuals across the globe. This conversation between herself and Ronnie Kasrils in Lusaka, Zambia in 1986, is useful in illustrating these different strategies that liberation movements had to utilize to access South Africa:

‘We need your help,’ he began. ‘We’re very pressed now. It’s getting more and more difficult to operate from the front-line states. The Boers are trying to drive us further north, so contact with our people inside South Africa is becoming almost impossible...It’s been especially hard recently for people like Chota and me; and we need friends who can provide safe hiding places, who are prepared to operate as fronts for us...And we need them urgently,” Ronnie continued, “people who can organize [sic] safe houses – a house where a comrade can live inconspicuously, a safe place we can work from...It has to be someone prepared to take a job in one of the front-line states, and to live as normal a life as possible there, with friends, hobbies, everything. Most importantly, this person of ours must always be able to justify being where he is, with a good cover story, be prepared for any question (Braam, 2004: 25-26).

In the conversation above, Kasrils is requesting Braam to assist in the ANC’s Operation Vula, the last military operation by MK. At the time, Kasrils was the Head of Intelligence for MK. Also present during this conversation is “Chota”, real name Ebrahim Ishmael Ebrahim, another senior MK member. Just months after this conversation in Lusaka, Ebrahim was kidnapped by the South African security forces in Swaziland in December of 1986, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Braam’s book, *Operation Vula* (2004), chronicles the strategies
that she used to approach and convince several Dutch nationals, including a Belgian couple, to suspend their lives in the Netherlands, to move to various countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, so that they could acquire jobs and live believable livelihoods that would enable them to be seen as legitimate expatriates, who would be able to secretly harbour MK combatants there, without drawing suspicion. In addition to this function, these individuals also hid MK weaponry, and some of them infiltrated weapons, money, passports, and computer disks inside South Africa. In order to ensure that all actors played their parts properly, without being caught by the South African security forces, Braam worked closely with Kasrils, Mac Maharaj, Ivan Pillay and Siphiwe “Gebuza” Nyanda, all of whom were senior members of MK. In his memoir, Ronnie Kasrils (2004) notes that it became clear that MK could not operate in overt ways in the Frontline States, but rather in an “undercover manner”, which relied on utilising “a score of safe houses [rather] than base camps” (p. 146).

It was Maharaj who would explain to Braam, in her home in Amsterdam late in 1986, that “a decision was taken some time ago that the ANC leadership should go into South Africa, underground, to unite the resistance and give political leadership” (Braam, 2004: 37). Maharaj further explains that the implications of such a mission would entail known figures of the ANC/MK, including himself, to disguise their appearance and “not just a quick change of moustache, but a thorough disguise to change him completely, and which he would be able to use for a long time – years maybe – with no danger of being recognised” (Braam, 2004: 37). Maharaj explained that “the South Africa security services have a certain image of an ANC guerilla…A smart businessman doesn’t fit their impression of a dangerous terrorist” (Braam, 2004: 40). From 1986 to 1990, Braam’s key duties for the MK leadership was secondly to host various MK members in her home in Amsterdam, who would be disguised by professional make-up artists in order to completely alter their appearance. Amongst those intricately disguised were Nyanda, Catherine Dipua “Minor” Mvelase, and Totsi Memela-Khambule. It was Memela-Khambule, dressed as a Swazi woman, who successfully infiltrated Maharaj and Nyanda, who were dressed as farm labourers, into South Africa from Swaziland in 1988 (Braam, 2004: 147-152).

Operation Vula became public knowledge in 1990, following the arrest of Nyanda, Mvelase, Raymond Lalla and others. Amongst the formally accused for participating in
Operation Vula when its protagonists were put on trial on 29 October 1990, were Maharaj, Nyanda, Lala, Mvelase, Susan Tshabalala, Pravin Gordham, Ivan Pillay, Marten Vis – a Dutch national recruited by Braam and the Belgian couple, Daniel and Sylviane (surnames not stated in public accounts).

Both Braam and Masilela’s narratives illustrate the extent to which the struggle against apartheid was a highly transnational process. The case of the Masilela family is but one example of the multitude of families and individuals across the region that supported the South African liberation movements, putting themselves at the risk of being attacked by the apartheid security forces. The fight against apartheid and the response by the apartheid state thus troubles the category intra-state war, as many of the casualties of apartheid violence can be found across Southern Africa and beyond, where the response by the apartheid state in turn traversed national boundaries. Raymond Suttner has also argued regarding the ANC, that there were no “stark and sharp” differences “between various decades and forms of struggle” because there was “substantial continuity within ruptures [and] ruptures within continuities and blurring of periods” (2008:165).

2.2.3.4 The apartheid state response

I’ve been in all of these wars. The only thing I haven’t been involved in is conventional warfare. I mean, I was close to it as you can get, but I can tell you that the dirtiest war you can ever get is the one fought in the shadows. And I was there in the middle of it. There are no rules except to win, there are no lines drawn to mark where you cannot cross. So you can go very low – I mean very low – and it still doesn’t hit you.

(Eugene de Kock to Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003: 20)

The quote above is an exchange between former TRC Commissioner and Psychologist, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Eugene de Kock, the former head of the apartheid counter-insurgency unit, Vlakplaas. This conversation is from Gobodo-Madikizela’s book, “A Human Being Died That Night: Forgiving Apartheid’s Chief Killer” (2003). In 1996, De Kock was sentenced to two
life sentences and 212 years for murder, culpable homicide, kidnapping, assault and corruption, amongst many charges. He was granted parole in March 2015 after serving 20 years in prison.

In this conversation with Gobodo-Madikizela, Eugene de Kock describes himself as a “cross-border machine” for the National Party government (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003: 54). De Kock, who joined the police in 1968, served an estimated ten to eleven tours in Rhodesia between 1968 and 1972 (Ellis, 1998). In 1979, co-founded Koevoet in Oshakati, Namibia, a murderous counter-insurgency unit tasked to attack South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003). Ellis (1998) argues that the impact of the South African police officers who participated in the wars in Rhodesia and Namibia influenced the nature of the counter-insurgency unit inside South Africa. De Kock founded Koevet with Hans Dreyer, who had also served in Rhodesia (Ellis, 1998). While Theunis Swanepoel, who led the violent suppression of the 1976 student uprisings, “had taken part in the first counter-insurgency operations against SWAPO in northern Namibia ten years earlier” (Ellis, 1998: 269). Terence Ranger argues similarly that “South African police officers returned home after an instructive period of service in Rhodesia, where they learnt how to ‘turn’ guerrillas into reliable instruments of state terror... the Rhodesian war provided them with a laboratory for learning and experiment” (Ranger, 1992: 700).

Ellis (1998: 266) notes that Minister of Justice and Police, B.J. Voster, who took over in 1961, “transformed the Police by equipping them with extensive powers to detain and virtual immunity from prosecution. He points to this in order to bring attention to the fact that the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which was established in 1969, was dominated by “officers transferred from the Security Branch of the Police” (Ellis, 1998: 266). In this regard, while the conventional jurisdiction of the police is usually limited to the domestic, the National Party subverted this logic and relied on both the SADF and a high-powered police security branch, whose ambit went well beyond its national borders in its defense of the perceived threat of African nationalism (Ellis, 1998). De Kock was moved from Namibia to head a unit that was headquartered 20 kilometres from Pretoria in a farm called Vlakplaas. Although there are no exact figures regarding the budget that was allocated to the Vlakplaas unit, Gobodo-Madikizela (2003: 31) argues that millions of unaccounted for Rands were used “to pay off local and international informants and assassins and to pay for weapons, cover-up operations, and overseas
cross-border trips”. The main methods of the unit involved kidnapping, poisoning, assassination and execution. This unit was notorious for raiding alleged ANC units in Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia. In his memoir of life as an MK soldier, James Ngculu (2009) notes that in the May 1990 meeting between members of MK, SADF and Citizen Force in Lusaka, Zambia, one of the participants argued that “the conflict had been between MK and the SAP [South African Police]” therefore suggesting that discussions about a ceasefire at the time ought to be between MK and SAP (p. 210). This further illustrates the central role of the SAP played in the armed struggle well beyond its domestic ambit.

One of its main strategies was to infiltrate the ANC and PAC by using Askaris. Askaris are former members of the liberation movements who were captured by this unit, and often tortured to the point of agreeing to work for the state under duress. Glory Sedibe, whom Masilela writes about and is the subject of Jacob Dlamini’s book, Askari (2014), is but one example of person who had been part of a liberation movement, but then ended up working for the Vlaakplaas death squad. Sedibe is linked to several deaths of ANC members in Swaziland (Dlamini, 2014; Masilela, 2007). Bischoff (1988: 470) recounts a number of the incursions by SADF into Swaziland, which escalated in the mid-1980s, forcing the Swazi government to publically condemn Pretoria’s destabilisation, despite a largely “accomodationist” foreign policy framework towards Pretoria. Stephen Ellis (2012) and Paul Trewhela (2009) also discuss the levels of infiltration and the paranoia that the apartheid state caused within the liberation movements, including SWAPO in Namibia.

By 1974, the SADF was physically present in Namibia instead of supporting the colonial South West African Police (SWAPOL) fight against SWAPO’s People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) (Dale, 1993). Also in 1974, the SADF intensified its presence southeastern Angola following a coup in Portugal that left the apartheid state unable to rely on Portuguese support in Angola (Dale, 1993). The SADF wanted to prevent SWAPO’s entry through the Angolan border to Ovamboland, and had established a joint command with the Portuguese in Cuito Cuanavale, which they used for troop support and reconnaissance (Dale, 1993). The “roughly 600 000” men conscripted into the SANDF mostly participated in combat in Namibia and Angola, as well as Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Edlmann, 2014: 3). These were the so-called “Border Wars”,

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“fought against the perceived communist threat to the apartheid state, and consist[ing] of both conventional and counter-insurgency measures” (Edlmann, 2014: 3).

South Africa’s violent presence in the region is referred to as “destabilization” (sic) (Cock, 1991). According to Cock (1991: 22)

This policy of destabilization (sic) has wrought havoc, destroying social and economic life, and causing widespread death and social dislocation. It is estimated that about 1.5 million people have died as a direct or indirect result of Pretoria’s undeclared wars of destabilization against neighbouring states. While the damage inflicted on the economics of region states between 1980 and 1988 is estimated to be not less that R90 billion.

The Vlakplaas unit, together with other units such as the Special Forces, and auxiliary units such as the 32 Battalion, “became specialists in covert or clandestine warfare” (Ellis, 1998: 270). Ellis (1998) argues that it was these specialists units, which hunted the national liberation movements across Southern Africa, forming the core basis for what became known as the Third Force, which was responsible for engineering state violence inside South Africa in the 1990s during the period of transition, almost plunging the country into a full-blown war.

Below, it is shown that this complex canvas of the anti-apartheid struggle falls into the tradition of guerilla warfare. This is not only because the national liberation movements described it as such, but also because the military objectives constituted one aspect of the anti-apartheid struggle in the combination of multiple methods of struggle. In this regard, a combination of violent and non-violent struggles led to the defeat of the apartheid state. There was a recognition similar to guerilla wars elsewhere that armed confrontation although important, “alone [was] incapable of producing the decision” towards victory (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 50). It is this recognition of the nature of guerilla war that is it defined as unconventional war.

2.3 An unconventional war

The definition of war is at issue because it determines who is recognized as a legitimate fighter... The nature of the fight was amourphous, one might
say organic, in its origins, growth and spread. It was multipronged, and it was difficult to designate which efforts contributed significantly to the final achievement of its goal (Reynolds, 2013: 9).

In the text, *On War*, Clausewitz (2009: 24) defines war as a “real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means”. For Clausewitz (2009), power lies in the conception of combat, which directs the destruction of the enemy. Clausewitz’s conception of war confines the activity of war as that which takes place between two or more states, who seek to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty from an outside threat. In this context, “combat” is defined as the “activity of armed military engagement with the enemy” (Gear, 2002: 2). This conception of military activity creates sharp distinction between the soldier and civilian. While a key distinguishing factor of “late twentieth century” wars has been the blurring of the distinctions between the combatant and civilian, as Gear (2002: 2) points out, in these wars “combat is not a homogeneous experience” as it includes “those who are not in the frontline” (Gear, 2002: 2).

Ellis (1998), in defining the war in South Africa, evokes Thomas Hobbes’ definition of war in that, as Hobbes argued, “warre, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known...” (p. 264). He makes this argument in order to point out that those who were at the center of the contestation between the state and the liberation movements “did not doubt that South Africa was indeed at war between early 1960s and the early 1990s” (Ellis, 1998: 264). Booth and Vale (1995) define South Africa’s actions in Southern Africa as emblematic of a realist discourse “that left more than a million of the region’s people dead” (p. 286). Within the binary logic of the Cold War discourse of the time, the apartheid state represented itself as the “bastion of Western civilization” within the region and continent, and legitimised the plunder of the majority people within its borders, as well as outside (Booth and Vale, 1995). The authors argue that the all-encompassing nature of the war was such that even academic institutions that should have involved in research dealing with conceptual logic of the war, such as the University of Pretoria’s Institute for Strategic Studies, could not be relied upon to provide such intellectual work, as they “enjoyed a close relationship with the apartheid regime” (Booth and Vale, 1995: 289). This was also in context in which the would-be independent think-tank Institute for
Defence Policy (currently the Institute for Security Studies), was staffed by former officers of the apartheid security forces (Booth and Vale, 1995).

Even though the state used the Total Strategy to articulate its counter-insurgency while the liberation movements called for a People’s War, there is little contestation on both sides of the fact that the nature of the fight was unorthodox, erasing lines that may ordinarily be drawn between the civil and military spheres. The ANC and the SACP explicitly termed the anti-apartheid struggle a guerilla war.

What has been defined as guerilla warfare – in contrast to what Mao Tse-tung terms “orthodox war” – should be understood as “a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation” (1961: 42). Mao Tse-tung, who was writing in the context of Chinese colonisation by the Japanese (with a superior military and resources), argues that “there is in guerilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that characterizes [sic] orthodox war” (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 52). Moreover, Mao Tse-tung argues that guerilla strategy constitutes “one aspect of the entire war” which, although important, “alone [is] incapable of producing the decision” (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 50). In these terms, it means that the success of war relies on the combination of other forms of struggle acting in concert. This is because guerilla warfare is “revolutionary in character”, meaning that military strategy is used towards a political end and not for purposes of proving military superiority. Guerilla warfare should, hence, be understood as “military strength organized [sic] by the active people and inseparable from them” (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 50).

According to Simpson (2016), Mao Tse-tung was also acutely aware that guerilla strategies must depend on a specific context. He notes a December 1961 meeting between Mao and representatives of the ANC, Joe Gqabi, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Abel Mthembu and Nandha Naidoo. After a briefing on the South African situation by Raymond Mhlaba, Simpson (2016) notes that Mao’s comment was that “everything changes, including Marxism and communism. The South Africans’ policies should be based on a study and understanding of their own situation” (p. 46).
Similarly, with reference to the Cuban revolution, Che Guevara (1997: 52) argued that the “combatant in guerilla warfare” comes against a “group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well-armed and disciplined” while the “guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people”. Guerilla warfare “was adopted in Africa as elsewhere as the most effective means of defeating the highly organized [sic] and heavily armed, but also cumbersome and alien armies of the major industrial powers and their local allies”, where in many ways, this form of warfare “may be regarded as the normal form of warfare in societies without powerful states” (Clapham, 1998: 2).

As shown in the sections above, although MK and the APLA did involve official military training, the lines of combat were obscured by the fact that military operations depended on an intimate cooperation with the civilian population inside and outside South Africa. Joe Slovo, quoted in Legassick (2002: 11), argued that “…the guerilla fighter is a political fighter, a member of an organized revolutionary force, who uses the struggle itself, the actual physical conflict, as an instrument of agitation and mobilization. He aims to raise the level of popular participation to the point at which revolutionary aims become general” (sic).

As Macmillan (2013: 12) argues, ultimately, the destruction of apartheid “was due not so much to its military activities as to a wide variety of efforts in the field of diplomacy, propaganda and culture”. Cherry also argues that,

[...] the ‘struggle’ was conducted by millions of ordinary South Africans, without weapons or military, who joined trade unions, refused to carry passes, boycotted their local councillors, refused to vote in apartheid elections and, in a myriad of ways, undermined the apartheid system and made it unworkable. It was not military operations that caused apartheid to implode (Cherry, 2011: 142).

It is in this context, that the armed struggle ought to be understood within the ‘tradition’ of unorthodox warfare, which blurred the lines, not only in terms of inter-state borders, between violent and non-violent strategy by both liberation movements and the apartheid state. If this complex context is taken seriously, it makes it possible to discuss women’s roles in combat in a more nuanced manner that helps us to depart from the narrower conceptions of the term combatant. In doing so, examining women’s participation in the demobilisation process implies
paying attention to the ways in which that process accounts for the women and men who participated at the centre of “struggle” in conventional and unconventional ways that were both local and transnational.

2.4 Women and guerilla warfare

‘If I were to ask you what the single most important thing to know is to best understand this country, what would you say?’ I asked Mia, a nurse in Kuito, Angola, in November 2001. ‘You need to understand death,’ she said. ‘Everyone here is on intimate terms with death; everyone has lost someone they love to the war – death walks everywhere with people’.


Enloe (1983) argues that the link between soldiering and masculinity is embedded in the fact that the definition of state security is largely determined by the ability of the state to be a protector. Enloe (1983) argues that “the military, even more than other patriarchal institutions is a male preserve, run by men and for men according to masculine ideas and relying solely on manpower” (p. 7). For states, the “protection myth” has been critical in their ability to recruit men into the military as they play on men’s social construction as protectors of the vulnerable (particularly women and children). This in turn is used to legitimise the need for states to use aggression to attain this national security and is usually expressed through excessive militarism (see Enloe, 1983, 1989, and Tickner, 1992, 1997).

The literature on the use of women and feminism to legitimize the war in Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies is the latest example of the “protection myth” (Khan, 2008; Rostami-Povey, 2007; Maira, 2009; Allison, 2013). As Elaheh Rostami-Povey (2007) argues in the case of Afghanistan, “women in Afghanistan have long been portrayed as passive victims awaiting liberation. Following the attacks on New York on 11 September, Washington, supported by London, used this as partial justification for a bombing campaign against Afghanistan” (Rostami-Povey, 2007: 1). Decontextualised images of veiled Afghan women were used to construct a justification for war (Khan, 2008). Maira (2009) argues that “the logic of the War on Terror is embedded in the gendered politics of colonialism, nationalism, and liberalism” (p. 632). She argues that “the ‘Muslim Woman’, especially the veiled woman, is a foundational
trope for Orientalism and colonialism” (p. 632). The literature on women and the war on terror also show that feminists in the Global North can also collude with the patriarchal manipulation of feminism when white feminists perceive their form of liberation as universal while disregarding the contexts and preferences of women in the Global South. These “imperial feminisms”, as Maira (2009) terms them, “assumes that it is the United States or Western culture that must bring ‘freedom’ to certain areas in the world, even if paradoxically via a military force another case of white men (and white women) trying to save brown women from brown men” with “little sympathy for the Afghan (and now Pakistani) women and children bombed by the US and US backed forces, for girls who were raped and murdered by US soldiers in Iraq, or for Palestinian women who live under an illegal occupation funded and supported by the United States” (p. 641 – 642).

According to Mama (1998: 4), the relationship between militarism and hegemonic masculinity is that “the military man exemplifies the masculine ideal”. This is because “through combat, the man affirms his role as protector and defender” hence the exclusion of women is “essential for maintaining the ideological structure of patriarchy” (Cock, 1991: 192). Bayard de Volo (2012: 415) has argued as follows in this regard:

Feminist theorists of war advocate a methodology that makes us both alert to and suspicious of the familiar binary divisions of militarization [sic]: strength/weakness, toughness/tenderness, protector/protected, action/passivity, independence/dependence, and masculinity/femininity…The first component of each pair draws on an ideal type of masculinity. These particular qualities vary across time and culture, but they have the effect of reinforcing gender inequality. They also reinforce the power of dominant groups more generally, as subordinate classes and racial groups are often represented as lacking the idealized [sic] masculine qualities.

In this context, women’s access to combat has been a central aspect of women’s struggles to attaining full citizenship rights. Yuval-Davis (1997:20) argues that women’s access to combat is important, because it is linked to women’s capacity to access citizenship, where it is believed that “once women share with men the ultimate citizen’s duty – to die for one’s country, they
would also be able to gain equal citizenship rights to those of men”. As noted by Pettman (1996: 147), this liberal-feminist argument states that “women’s continued exclusion from the right and responsibility to risk their lives for their country [has] reduced them to the status of second-class citizens” and seeks women’s “equal admission to the state and an end to the male monopoly on legitimate violence”. Feminists have argued that IR theories and practice is “encoded as masculine territory”, where “the soldier, the citizen, the political subject, and the state are gendered male” (Pettman, 1996: viii). Therefore, war offers a “site for rudimentary change in relations between women and men” (Enloe, 1983:70).

As argued in Chapter One, some of the ways in which feminists have located women’s varied roles in wars has been to focus on the transformation of war itself, specifically the blurring of roles between combatants and non-combatants. This is due to shifts in the number of civilian casualties. For instance, in World War I, soldiers constituted 80 percent of the casualties, in World War II, 50%; while the war in Vietnam, civilians constituted an egregious 80% of the casualties, and in most contemporary wars since, civilians have constituted up to 90% of war casualties (Pettman, 1996: 89). For such reasons, feminists move beyond the effort to locate women in spaces of combat, broadening attention to how war dramatically reconfigures all spaces of social life in ways that affect men and women gender-specifically, both during and after wartime. In this fashion, feminists have argued that war is gendered, and peace is gendered (Hendricks, 2011). Enloe’s work, in particular, that looks at the different roles of women from women in combat to military wives, to the role of prostitution during wartime, expands the discourse beyond access to conventional combat in order to reveal the ways in which war ultimately reconfigures all aspects of social life in gendered ways. The landmark, and unanimous, adoption of UN Resolution 1325 is in 2000 represents a significant triumph for feminist scholars and activists who have long called attention to women’s varied roles in wartime and in the aftermath. As Carol Cohn (2004: 2) argues, UN1325 “not only recognizes that women have been active in peace-building and conflict prevention, it also recognizes women’s right to participate as decision-makers at all levels – in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building processes.”

In the context of guerilla warfare, women in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been thrust into battle on the side of national movements fighting against colonial occupation. This is unlike women in Europe and United States, who battled for access into combat within state
forces. For women in the Euro-American sphere, access to combat has been read as claiming equal citizenship with men, first and foremost. For women in the Global South, their claim to combat has often prioritised national self-determination for the colonised people, as well as claiming equal rights to bear arms with male counterparts. Nationalism, in anti-colonial struggles and in the aftermath, has been argued to have contributed to the continued construction of women’s identity as that of “bearers of the nation” who are “denied any direct relation to national agency”, which constrains the extent to which they can make claims as citizens to the state (McClintock, 1993: 63). The perception that women in the Global South have prioritised aims of nationalism than those of achieving gender equality, has led to bitter and complex contestations between feminists across the Global South and North. I want to argue here that these conceptual tensions have shaped the ways in which women’s roles in guerilla warfare are understood.

Alison (2003) writes about the involvement of women as combatants in the Sri Lankan organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), arguing that the LTTE women she interviewed “referred to ideas of freedom for the Tamil nation, self-determination, land and rights of Tamils as part of or as the main reason for them joining the movement” (Alison, 2003: 39-40). She argues that Western dominated feminist discourse needs to take seriously that women involved in nationalist struggles make visible the reality that a “commitment to the perceived needs of one’s perceived nation or ethnic group is viewed as just as important, or more so, than one’s needs ‘as a woman’” (Alison, 2003: 52). Pointedly, Alison (2003) goes on to argue that “nationalist sentiment” that underscores the ideological foundation for women to join guerilla war should be seen as

A sort of meta-reason for enlisting; [because] beneath this ideological motivation there also more specific, more personal factors operating. One such factor, intertwined with nationalist ideology, is the communal perception of suffering, oppression and injustice. Sometimes this is related to personal experience; in other cases it has been received as part of the Tamil narrative of oppression and suffering, made tangible by witnessing the experience of friends and neighbor [sic] (2003: 40).
In the case of women’s participation in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) for independence from Ethiopia, Bernal (2000) points out the EPLF “advocated for gender equality and regarded the advancement of women in its own ranks and in the liberated areas of the country as a significant achievement”, where the third of the party members is composed of women, who participated with men in all capacities except the top ranks of leadership (Bernal, 2000: 61). Unlike many nationalist movements, the EPLF is seen to have been “extremely successful in mobilizing [sic] women politically for the nationalist cause”, emblematic in the movement’s image of the woman fighter with the gun and the baby on her back (Berdal, 2000: 66).

Bernal, however, critiques the EPLF for interpreting gender equality as the erasure of the social constructed notions of femininity, which was contingent on women “being able to behave as if they were men”, particularly while “there was no comparable erasure of masculinity” (Bernal, 2000: 67). Similarly, with regards to women combatants in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) in Colombia, for women to succeed in senior commanding positions, they had to “out-perform men to be taken seriously” (Herrera and Porch, 2008: 618).

In her work on the representation of Palestinian female self-martyrs (shahidas), Caron Gentry (2009) shows that they are often represented as “driven to kill themselves and others because their dreams for marriage and children have been destroyed” and “very little mention is made of the women’s political reasoning – instead their actions tend to be defined by their expected gender role as mother” (p. 232). Gentry (2009) defines this as a “twisted” use of maternalism that is imposed on women’s actions that use violence to deal with their supposed failure to achieve socially accepted roles as mothers, even though “in martyrdom videos, in interviews with the media or in statements by families, women who trained to become shahidas have political reasons that do not highlight any maternalist disappointments or humiliations” (p. 247 emphasis original).

In the case of Nicaragua, Molyneaux argues that this imagery of the armed mother, which is related to, and in opposition to the dominant image of the ‘moral mother’, is symbolic of the “combative motherhood” of the female guerilla fighter (Pettman, 1996: 133). Enloe (1983) has stated that the representation of the female guerilla in ways that demonstrate her willingness to
die for the nation, while also evoking her role as a mother, points to the precarious role of the female guerilla in the aftermath of the war. More explicitly, Enloe says that it is not a coincidence that the female guerilla is presented within the frame of motherhood, even as she carries her rifle, because in the aftermath, it is expected that “as soon as the ‘war is over’ [that] the woman in the picture will put down the rifle and keep the baby” (Enloe, 1983: 165). She asks, “where is the picture of the male guerilla holding the rifle and the baby?” (p. 170). In this regard, Enloe (1983) argues that “women’s efforts to make the liberation war itself a site of rudimentary change in relations between women and men will be aided or undermined by the structural transformations that occur during the liberation war itself” (p. 170). Accordingly, despite the vast numbers of women participating in the liberation struggle, “‘peace’ often seems to see enormous pressure on those women to return ‘home’” (Pettman, 1996: 137).

Overall, the literature shows that the masculinist character of national liberation movements has contributed to the invisibility of female ex-combatants in the aftermath of war. Meintjies, Pillay and Turshen (2001) argue that this is because “gender roles brought about by the upheaval attendant on conflict are dramatic, but that the impulse to women’s social transformation and autonomy is circumscribed by the nationalist project, which constructs women as purveyors of community’s accepted and acceptable cultural identity” and therefore “the return to peace is invariably conceptualized [sic] as a return to the gender status quo, irrespective of the nontraditional roles assumed by women during conflict” (p. 9).

Below, I argue that the South African case is also illustrative of the bitter contestations between nationalist objectives and feminist orientations – with South African women seen as playing a predominately maternal role within national liberation movements. Even though the literature gestures towards capturing the varied roles of women in wartime, it continues to place emphasis on the narratives of the trained guerilla, where women are judged on their ability to compete in the domain of combat with their male counterparts, in both conventional and unconventional war. It is argued that the danger with this emphasis is that it risks obscuring the ways in which most women participated in armed struggles, particularly in the ways that were central to the specific conditions of guerilla combat (which require different skills to those of “orthodox” combat).

It is suggested here that a feminist framework, although not uncomplicated, is useful for analysing the South African case of women’s roles in the armed struggle, because it allows for
an examination of ways in which the context of a war of national liberation allowed women to participate in “conventional” combat preparation and execution. More importantly, a feminist framework allows one to pay attention to the wide-ranging ways in which women participated in violent forms of struggle, in both terms that include those with, and those without military training. Therefore, it is argued that framework expands and complicates the category of “combatant” beyond the criteria of military training, and makes visible the ways in which physical location, time and age allowed women to participate in the armed struggle in varied ways.

2.5 Women and the national liberation movements in South Africa

2.5.1 Motherism versus feminism: “I’m a guerilla because I’m a mother”

It was only in 1943, thirty-one years after the formation of the ANC, that women were officially recognised as full members of the party, with the ability to vote and stand for office. Though women participated in the organisation, it was the 1913 women’s march against passes in Bloemfontein that led to the formation of the Bantu Women’s League of the ANC in 1918 which preceded the Women’s League (which was formed much later in 1943). On the other side, the PAC, which was formed in 1959 by members who broke away from the ANC, came to form the PAC’s African Women’s Organisation only in 1986.

McClintock (1993) argues that “from the outset, women’s organized [sic] participation in African nationalism stemmed less from the invitation of men, than from their own politicization [sic] in resisting the violence of state decree” (p.74) and as a result, “even under [a] State of Emergency, women have everywhere enlarged their militancy, insisting not only on their right to political agency, but also on their right of access to the technologies of violence” (p. 75). In this fashion, it can be said that “black women’s relation to nationalism has thus undergone significant historical changes over the years” which eventually led to the recognition of the need for women’s liberation and destruction of patriarchy as something that cannot just be conflated with

1 Thandi Modise (cited in Cock, 1991: 153)
national liberation, but as a goal on its own (McClintock, 1993: 75-76). Shireen Hassim argues that although the ANC Women’s League claimed its autonomy from the main body:

The place of the league was clear within the nationalist movement. The Congress was a political family and it replicated the hierarchical form of a patriarchal institution, with the exclusively male National Executive Committee acting as the paternal head of the movement, the Women’s League playing the lesser, maternal role and the Youth League treated as a space of radical militancy needing the guidance of the parents. Women’s political roles were to be defined through the mode of maternalism, acting on behalf of their husbands and children (Hassim, 2014: 29).

There has been a long and contested debate within South African feminist discourse regarding the participation of women in the anti-apartheid struggle in the capacity of motherhood. Like Hassim, scholars such as Wells (1991) and Walker (1995) have argued that women did not participate as autonomous citizens in the national liberation movements, but did so under this guise. The source of contention in this debate lies in ascertaining whether the maternal role that women occupied in the liberation movement had transformative feminist ends. One of the oft-cited interventions on the tensions between motherism and transformative feminist discourse is the work of historian Julia Wells. In Maternal Politics in organising black South African women: The historical lessons (1991), Wells analyses the resistance of black women to pass laws in May 1913 in Bloemfontein, which led to scores of women arrested, and the 9 August March of 1956 by the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), as examples of “motherist” movements where women “are not fighting for their own personal rights as women but [rather] for custodial rights as mothers” (p. 253). Wells notes with regards to motherist movements that they:

(1) …arise in situations in which women perceive their roles as mothers – ensure on the survival of their children – to be threatened by socially illegitimate force, often government actions.

(2) They bring women into the public sphere in a way which is highly unusual for the particular place and time; conventional roles as homemakers are
temporarily abandoned as women take part in demonstrations or other forms of collective action.

(3) They challenge government policies on the moral grounds that their capacity to function as good mothers has been jeopardized.

Wells’s (1991: 253) primary argument is that “maternal politics are clearly not to be confused with feminism”. Wells insists that even though women are able to gain political clout by using their maternal roles to make political claims, she concludes that “these movements must be recognised as limited in scope, duration, and success in achieving their goals and, above all, should not be mistaken for political maturity”. Walker (1995) similarly argues to Wells that due to black women’s organising around their identity as mothers in the national liberation movements, “the formal commitment to women’s emancipation was overshadowed by practices and ideas that could only be described as patriarchal.”

Kimble and Unterhalter (1982) argue that it is important to realise the manner in which both family and motherhood are conceived differently in the West and in Africa. They argue that “whereas women in the West have identified the family as a site of women’s oppression, women in South Africa point to the destruction of ‘normal family life’ as one of the most grievous crimes of apartheid” (p. 13). They argue that in order to understand the ways in which women participate in struggles it is important to ask: what are the conditions necessary for women to organise and defend their interests, as they define them, in relation to the broader struggles in their society?” Furthermore, they argue that “whereas in the case of Afrikaner nationalism, motherhood has been conceived of as home-centred and as essentially [a] passive activity, within the African National Congress motherhood has been conceptualised and mobilised as a militant liberatory force – ‘a dynamic force for change’” (p. 422). In similar vein, Magubane (2010) suggests that:

[r]ather than dismiss these women as being hopelessly deluded by their own collusion with the patriarchs of the national liberation struggle, as other scholars have done, we should instead try to understand how the women in question conceptualise the multitude of issues and challenges they are facing. Given their material circumstances, how did they define the relationship between women’s
emancipation and national liberation?...Oftentimes when black South African women appeared to be rejecting feminism or North American and/or European theoretical models, their choice on the grounds that it was ‘white’ or ‘western’, rather than reflecting their careful analysis of the different political, social and economic situations faced by women in Europe and America versus those faced by women in South Africa (p. 982).

For example, Emma Mashinini (2012) describes the multiple ways in which black women workers faced different challenges to white workers in general, and to white women specifically. She posits that:

It is all the menial jobs, all the lowest jobs in the workplace that are the jobs of the black workers. And as a black worker, if I speak about a transport problem I am speaking about a different transport problem anything the white worker will have to suffer. We have these very long distances to travel, and we have the poorest possible transport facilities, and our problems concern the pass laws and schooling, and hospitals, exhaustion and poor diet. And while whiter mothers have problems of their own, such as having to see one of their boys leave to fight on the border, we can understand them, because we also must lose our children – to the security forces, or to fight against apartheid. But what white mothers in this country do not have to suffer over what we call breadline problems. There is no other word for them. Breadline problems are questions of who will care for the children when the grandmother or friend cannot come one day and the mother must stay home, even though she is not paid enough to be able to afford to lose that one day’s money? Who will pay when she has to spend a day at the hospital waiting for an appointment? No. Our problems are not the same (Mashinini, 2012: 45).

Miller (2009: 70) has also argued that in the context of apartheid South Africa, the...iconography of militarised motherhood offers a different vision of what it meant to be a political mother. Rather than reinforce the more narrow understandings of motherhood that were previously described, these
representations suggest a more nuanced political role for women. They depict women as mothers, who are concurrently active participants in a revolutionary struggle, and who are concerned not only with the welfare of their children, but also with widespread social change.

Gasa (2007: 214) also argues that the reduction of black women’s activism to maternal politics creates a “Berlin Wall between blackness and liberation struggle on the one hand and feminism on the other”, binaries that are “completely unnecessary and do not make sense of black women’s experiences”. More poignantly, Gasa (2007: 214) challenges Wells, Walker and Hassim by asking

“[w]hy is the defence of the family seen as deeply conservative? Is this taking the context into account? Young children of school-going age, who were harassed and raided for resident permits, were these women’s children. How does feminism clash with the protection of one’s children? Does it have to?”

In her work on women and the TRC process, Fiona Ross (2003) points out how the women who came to testify about gross violations of human rights often testified about violence against their husbands and children, instead of the violence that happened to them personally. Showing how women articulated the effect of the violence within the intimacy of their homes, she notes how

[m]any women testified about their losses using metaphors drawn from their domestic roles. It seems that women used domesticity, a space over which women usually have more control than other spheres, to map the interpolations of violence in their lives (Ross, 2003: 42).

Patricia Hill-Collins (2000) argues similarly that “this type of thinking sets up a hierarchy of feminisms” by assigning the political work of black women “a secondary status, and fails to recognize [sic] motherhood as a symbol of power. Instead, the activist mothering associated with Black women’s community work becomes portrayed as a ‘politically immature’ vehicle claimed by women who fail to develop a so-called radical analysis of the family as the site of oppression similar to that advanced within Western feminism” (p. 209). As Oyewumi (2002) also argues, for women in the Global South, feminist discussions “have focused on the necessity of paying
attention to imperialism, colonization [sic], and other local and global forms of stratification, which lend weight to the assertion that gender cannot be abstracted from the social context and systems of hierarchy” (p. 1-2).

The debates on maternal politics and feminism need to be understood within a broader debates on women and peace, particularly the argument that is forwarded by Sara Ruddick in her text, *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace* (1989). At the core of Ruddick’s claims is that mothering, which is “work” done by both men and women, is a commitment to non-violence. Ruddick (1989) argues that states can learn key lessons on strategies of non-violence by taking seriously “maternal practice” as serious political work. Thus, although the conduct maternal work is structured by differences in geography, race, ethnicity, class, culture and sexual orientation, *all* maternal work is committed to the “preservation of life, nurturing and social training”, which fundamentally rely on a commitment to non-violence. Writing elsewhere about the use of motherhood by the women who supported the counter-revolutionary forces known as the Contras in Nicaragua in 1980, Cupples (2006: 86) argues that in contexts of revolution and counter-revolution, that women are forced to “negotiate both gender and political identities” which complicates “the notion of female subjectivity”, which should be seen as at best “fluid, partial, and always in process”. Cupples (2006: 96) concludes that the “political manipulation of motherhood in Nicaragua means that gender and political identities are mutually constituted and cannot be easily be separated”. Writing about the hunger strikes and protests of Kikuyu women whose sons were imprisoned under Daniel Arap Moi’s Kenyan African National Union, Tibbetts (1994: 45) argues “the Mamas expressed concerns in the language of loving and caring relationships and articulate concrete demands, but the mothers also made rights-oriented arguments and exhibited concern for abstract principles such as justice and freedom”.

2.5.2 Women and the multiple battlefronts

Men are not born, but made fighters, and women can perform, but not own fighter status.

(Weber, 2011: 363)
When MK was formed in 1961, there was no representation of women in the MK High Command. Lodge (1983: 233) notes that Mandela’s testimony during the Rivonia Trial “suggested that the founding of this organisation [MK] was the work of ANC men alone”. This occurred in a context where there is evidence that women were involved in the early sabotage campaigns by MK inside the country, even if they were not officially informed that they were participating in MK activity. One of the participants in this study, for example, worked closely with Govan Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba as a courier in Port Elizabeth in 1961, and thus, while not directly in “combat”, still played a critical role in the daily operation of MK activity.

Cock’s study of women in MK and SADF, Colonels and Cadres: war and gender in South Africa (1991) remains the only work entirely focused on women’s formal participation in statutory and non-statutory forces. It examines the experiences of women in MK camps outside South Africa, in comparison to those of white women who were soldiers in the SADF. The numbers of women in MK in exile changed throughout the different periods, peaking in the 1980s, and yet not much is written about women’s presence in the 1960s and their role in the first campaigns from outside South Africa (specifically in the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns). The numbers of women increased after the 1976 student uprisings in Soweto, where by 1991, women are said to have constituted 20% of MK membership (Cock, 1991; Hassim, 2014).

Cock’s study (1991) reveals that women were under-represented in positions of leadership and authority in MK. James Ngculu (2009) also argues that “the ANC was patriarchal in its outlook and approach” (p. 149). This under-representation of women was also visible in ANC leadership structures more broadly. This can be seen where “until 1991 there were only three women on the National Executive Committee and only one woman in a formally acknowledged leadership position within MK - the head of communications, Jacqueline Molefe, appointed in 1983 when her husband, Joe Modise became commander of the new MK headquarters” (Cock, 1991). Comparing MK to white women’s roles in the SADF, Cock argued that “most of the women in the SADF are confined to subordinate positions which reflect the sexual division of labour in the wider society. They are involved in telecommunications and signals, logistic, finance, administration, cartography, medical and welfare work, and instructional activity.” This is while women in MK were mostly deployed in intelligence, communications, transport, medical services and logistics. She points out that both women in the
SADF and MK were excluded from “direct combat”, although women in MK emphasised the fact that they received the same military training as their male counterparts, while the women in SADF received training separately from the men. With that said, Cock (1991) also acknowledges that the notion of “combat” is problematic in a context of guerilla warfare, because “the boundaries between “front” and “rear” cannot be sharply demarcated.”

Suttner (2003), too, has argued against this emphasis on women’s exclusion from “direct combat”. He argues that “it is important that we do not fetishise a narrow conception of combat as meaning direct physical fighting” (Suttner, 2007: 243). In the publically available transcript of his interview with Totsie Memela-Khambule, who was responsible for infiltrating top ANC/MK leadership inside South Africa, such as Maharaj and Nyanda, this work is often not seen as critical part of warfare. Suttner uses Memela-Khambule’s reconnaissance work to argue that “everything that is part of achieving a military goal is part of a military action” (Suttner, 2003).

In the chapter on Women in the ANC-led underground (2007), Suttner argues that Totsie Memela’s work in reconnaissance, which may be the type of activity described as less ‘glorious’, appears to have been just as dangerous as the actual infiltration of the Vula group for which she prepared, having to ensure that every point at which they entered, every place where they would stay, was safe. In so doing, she tested the danger or otherwise of the various elements of the enterprise before the entered (p. 244).

Hassim (2014: 62) also notes that women in MK challenged MK leadership to send more women for underground activities by arguing that “it has been proven that the chances of survival in the underground for women are greater than for men.” Cock (1991) provides a compelling example of this by pointing to how Thandi Modise was called the “knitting needles guerilla”, because while she was operating underground “reconnoitering potential military targets, she tried to look as ordinary as possible” (p. 151).

While Cock’s (1991) study makes an important contribution, it does have its limitations that risks obscuring women’s contributions. There is a continuous tension in Cock’s (1991) argument about whether women’s contribution in MK should be seen as direct or indirect combat. While she recognises women’s role as couriers, surveillance and reconnaissance, she
Labels this work as women contributing “indirectly” to combat (p. 165). While in the very same page, she then argues that “if ‘combat’ is redefined to mean direct exposure to danger, then the acts of arson and sabotage performed by women MK cadres are part of ‘combat’” (p. 165). Ngculu’s (2009) chapter on women in the ANC and MK in his memoir also demonstrates a tension with how to define women’s combat contributions. While Ngculu (2009) praises women MK members for “being especially courageous” for enduring the difficulties of camp life, being subjected to the same training as their male counterparts who often patronised women combatants, he nevertheless puts into question women’s combat activities. He argues that few women were deployed in the front, like Modise, while others transferred weapons, ammunition and explosives. Although he acknowledges that many women were deployed as couriers and assisted in safe houses across the region, Ngculu (2009), like Cock (1991), does not qualify these roles as forming part of combat. I argue that this indecision over how to position women’s combat roles in the context of guerilla war contributes to the obscuring of women’s contributions. While it is clear that Cock (1991) and Ngculu (2009) aim to disrupt the dominant rigid definition of combat and battlefront, they nevertheless fall into the same trap, as they demand that women combatants perform battle tasks that hardly resemble the realities of the war being fought.

Kongko Makau’s (2009) dissertation on the experiences of ten MK women, meanwhile argues that “most of the people who joined MK were young, either attending secondary school or university, whose ages fell between 14 and 22 years. Only a few women over the age of 25 joined MK” (p. 30). He argues that someone like Thenjiwe Mthintso, who joined MK at the age of 29, “was older than the average entrant when she joined in 1979” (p. 30). Ngculu (2009) argues in similar vein that most of the women who were part of the 1976 Detachment that he was a member of “were women in their late teens or early twenties” (p. 148). Makau (2009) notes that most of these young women were members of student organisations, such as South African Students Congress (SASCO), Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO), Azanian Student Convention (AZASCO), and COSAS; and that the heightened state behaviour after 1976 prompted them to risk their lives “by crossing into Angola, to receive military training, and then return to South Africa to fight fire with fire” (p. 9). The discussion on “guerilla girls” in Chapter Five, builds on the importance of age and space in understanding women’s participation in MK. It takes the empirical realities of MK seriously in arguing that it was young women of girlhood
age who participated as trained guerillas, while the majority of older and younger women inside the country did so without formal training.

In terms of the culture within MK, Hassim (2014: 58) argues that the presence of women “acted as a destabilizing [sic] factor in the most masculine of the ANC substructures”. Hassim further argues that the presence of women in the armed wing of the party “shaped the ways in which they responded to other more conservative forces within the ANC” (p. 58). Cock also argued that the participation of women in military training, which led to a “breakdown of normal male-female roles encouraged many women to discover new capacities within themselves”, resulting in the image of the female MK guerilla becoming “a popular mass image of the strong, liberated woman” (cited in Hassim, 2014: 59). Ngculu (2009) argues that the generation of women in MK who joined in the late 1980s helped to “revolutionalise the ANC and put the issue of gender on the agenda” (p. 149). Mentioning the names of women such as Thenjiwe Mthintso, Zou Kota, Nosiviwe Mapisa [Nqakula] and Miranda Ngculu, he argues that their previous roles in the Black Consciousness Movement and the Mass Democratic Movement inside the country meant that these women “accustomed to being vocal and assertive” (p. 149).

At the same time, there have been efforts to document the different risks that men and women experienced due to their gender, such as the sexual violence often at the hands of male superiors in the military camps, as well as the sexual violence that women faced at the hands of the South African police (Cock, 1991; Suttner, 2008; Van der Merwe, 2009). Even prominent women like Thandi Modise, Thenjiwe Mthintso and Mavis Nhlapo, have spoken out about the persistent sexual harassment in ANC camps in Angola, where men went unpunished by MK leadership for harassing women (Modise and Curnow, 2000: 39; Hassim, 2014). Other issues included the sterilisation of women headed off to “combat” training, while there were no similar attempts to manage male fertility. The women who became pregnant were removed from the camps in Angola to Tanzania. Ngculu (2009) also observes that the removal of pregnant women from camps “was generally viewed as a form of punishment for getting pregnant” (p. 152). MK women protested that during pregnancies “women were left with the responsibility to look after children, while male cadres either got on with their revolutionary work free of obligations, or became involved with new partners and had other children” (Hassim, 2014: 45; Ngculu, 2009). In cases of women who chose to abort their pregnancies, Ngculu (2009) notes that these women were “seen to have committed a punishable offence” (p. 152). This can be observed even in the
post-apartheid context, where similarly, Tsampiras (2012) argues that while the ANC more broadly was concerned with managing unplanned pregnancies and the spread of HIV/AIDS in exile, she argues that “while the physical results of womyn’s sexual practices in terms of pregnancy often required the ANC to address the consequences of those sexual practices directly, there is little evidence to suggest that men’s sexual practices were similarly addressed” (p. 656).

Cherry’s paper on the role of women in the 1980s township uprising in the Eastern Cape unpacks the gender dynamics of the work of internal civic movements under the UDF as well as the role of the SDUs that are noted above. Cherry (2007) contends that “in the mid-1980s, the mass movement came increasingly into a violent confrontation with the apartheid state [in] what came to be described as the ‘township uprising’ [that] engulfed black communities in the period from 1984 to 1989” (p. 262). Cherry (2007: 262) states that in the vast literature on the ‘uprising’ of the mid-1980s, “there is scarcely a word written about the role played by women in this decisive period of struggle”. Instead, gender-blind categories as ‘the people’, ‘youth’, ‘community’, ‘residents’ and ‘masses’ are used. When the gender dynamics of the time are made visible, it becomes clear that it is young males in the townships who are perceived as having taken “control of public space, while women were expected to provide shelter and guard their private space. Representations in writing, film and photography of the ‘young lions’ almost always portrays the aggressive and macho young men confronting the state” (Cherry, 2007: 291). Bonnin (2000: 309) further argues that in this period, “the street became reconstructed as a site of masculine power”. The image of this male youth is often juxtaposed with that of the older women whose role was to cook, provide safe houses, organise funerals, visit detained youth in jail bringing food and clothing, and so forth. As Bonnin (2000: 309) argues:

Women, in turn, extended their role of mother to incorporate these boys: a role extension that had two implications. First, ‘mother’ became socially rather than biologically defined, since, in situations of conflict, any boy became the son of any woman. Second, mothering happened across different sites, the street as well as domestic space. Mothering would include feeding and caring for the youth, accosting police who might be harassing them in the street, hunting for them at the police stations, supporting them in court appearances and finally, if the worst happened, burying them.
While older women did play this role under organisations such as the PEWO, which was part of the PEBCO, little mention has been made about the role of young women at this time beyond also caring for the male youth as “little sisters” (Bonnin, 2000: 309).

Cherry (2007) notes that the role of young women who were members of the COSAS and PEYCO played a crucial in bridging the gap between parents and the youth. As Seekings (1991: 81) argues, “younger women were motivated to join student and or youth organizations [sic] because of their specific concerns and experiences” such as conditions in school, while “these organizations [sic] did not have the same attraction to slightly older women who had left school”. Yet, beyond these specific needs, young women also laboured hard to bridge the gap between the young and old. They “would try to convince the ‘mothers’ about the importance of school boycotts, trying to explain the need for political organisation and resistance, and support for their children in the pursuance of political objectives” (Cherry, 2007: 285). With regards to increased state violence in the township from 1984 onwards, Cherry (2007: 300) argues that women are represented either as:

...the passive or innocent victims of male violence, or defenders of home and children. The reality of women’s experiences was more complex and varied than this, however. While it can be said that the response of the older township women to the escalating violence was primarily defensive...young women were in certain situations able to play the roles normally assigned only to men – of aggressors or combatants. In addition, there were strategies adopted which blurred the line between offensive and defensive action, and introduced women to leadership roles as the conflict escalated.

The informal structures known as the amabutho in the Eastern Cape “played the role both of confronting security forces and coercing residents in support of campaigns.” Additionally, as Cherry (2007: 308) notes amabutho were also known for taking “brutal action against those deemed to be spies or collaborators” with the apartheid government. It is true however that fewer women than men participated in amabutho violence, “those few who did participate, adopted the
male identity of young warriors. They were teenage girls, often high school students and COSAS members, and they had not yet begun to identify themselves as ‘mothers’ or in a nurturing or supportive role. Instead, they saw themselves as combatants, and were willing to adopt masculine identities and images to play an active role in the unfolding struggle” (Cherry, 2007: 308 emphasis added). As Seekings (1991: 87) argues, “gender ideologies are highly contingent and fluid, and different roles for men and women will be sanctioned as political and social context changes”, because for Seekings (1991: 87), women participated “along different, more gendered structured lines… at different points of these processes”. The introduction of the category of “in-betweeners” in Chapter Five shines light into the actions and motivations of young women, many of them of girlhood age, who, unlike the guerilla girls, remained in the townships during the height of the call to make the country ungovernable.

As the findings of this thesis will show, the ways in which women participated in the struggle for national liberation, both violent and non-violent, were shaped by the different periods of struggle, and their physical location, whether inside and outside South Africa, which determined their ability to attain formal military training. It is argued that physical location, period of struggle and age, affected the choice of activism available to women.

2.6 Conclusion

The aim of the chapter was to show that the anti-apartheid struggle was waged along many fronts in the whole of Southern Africa and beyond. The chapter challenges the conventional framing of the armed struggle by demonstrating that the war against apartheid war produced unconventional combatants, who found themselves at the center of apartheid terror. Women, as combatants, fought the apartheid state from various spaces, but mostly from the community, home, schools, churches, prisons, work places and many others across the urban and rural spaces inside the country and across Southern Africa, where the violence was mostly felt and resisted. The chapter demonstrates that the subject of the trained, transnational female guerilla does not fully encapsulate the complex ways in which women were in fact thrust into and ensconced in combat. By locating the women in these different spaces, it may be possible to examine whether the state’s present commitment to supporting those who participated in combat, pays attention to the unconventional nature of the apartheid battlefront, in which what was at stake for these women might receive due attention. The discussion demonstrates that it is not only women’s contribution
to fight for national liberation that is at stake in this new veterans framework, but rather, as shown Chapter Three, that there is a misrecognition of many others who risked their lives to fight back against apartheid violence in ways that may today not be recognised as legitimate.
CHAPTER THREE:
HEROES AND MISFITS: WOMEN AND DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the demobilisation and reintegration process undergone by statutory and non-statutory forces following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990. It is this process that led to the formation of the new SANDF and the Demobilisation Act of 1996, which framed the duties of the state in assisting individuals who would not become members of the SANDF, but who were instead going to be demobilised as military personnel and be reintegrated into civilian life. The chapter argues that the negotiations that led to the formation of the SANDF and the demobilisation was a top-down process, dominated by representatives of the MK and SADF. Few women participated in the process, and its design was such that most women could not participate. Only transnationally trained guerilla combatants were allowed to participate in the integration and demobilisation process, to the exclusion of the internally based combatants. The emphasis in the process on a narrow understanding based on the distinction between combatants and civilians meant that those who participated in the armed struggle outside of the formal non-statutory forces, most of them women, could not stand to participate in the process, and were therefore required to self-demobilise.

Firstly, this chapter locates debates on demobilisation and reintegration within a historical context. It is in the aftermath of World War II that the reintegration of soldiers becomes an important issue of social and security policy. Although states have historically taken responsibility for supporting the demobilisation of combatants into civilian life through access to pension, financial support for education, healthcare, housing, as well the access to psychological support for post-traumatic stress, it is after WWII that reintegration occupies priority in the reconstruction of society after war. The chapter draws largely on the experiences of the United States, and other cases from Europe, to make visible the ways in which veterans policies have evolved over time in terms of the public perception of the unique place occupied by former soldiers in post-war societies. The perception of former combatants as both heroes and potential
threats runs through this discourse, and is also visible in the discourse on demobilisation in both national liberation wars and post-colonial wars in Africa. The chapter demonstrates that what is unique about the cases from Africa is the inclusion of the non-conventional combatant into the process of demobilisation and reintegration. Importantly, the chapter shows that women, as historical non-combatants, have been rendered invisible in processes of demobilisation. Women have largely been represented in the roles of supportive wives and partners for returning soldiers, especially in the US context. When women participate in demobilisation and reintegration processes, feminists have argued that the transition from military life to civilian life offers unique challenges to men and women, thus it is important for state assistance to reflect the needs of the demobilised combatant in gendered ways. The liberation wars and the post-colonial intra-state wars in Africa, such as those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, offer detailed insight into the different economic, political and social challenges that men and women face as they transition from military life to civilian life. It is argued that the literature on the challenges of the formally and informally demobilised combatants in South Africa has largely focused on the experiences of the male combatants in both statutory and non-statutory forces. These studies offer limited detail about the well-being of the demobilised female combatant.

3.2 ‘Do something for these soldier boys’: experiences from the United States

Mashike (2007: 3) notes that post-war civilian “reintegration refers to the process of facilitating the transition of former combatants to civilian life, which allows them to adapt economically and socially to productive civilian life”. State-assisted reintegration is “meant to provide an enabling environment for transition to civilian life” by offering them a “new identity that is compatible with peaceful development and sustainable growth” (Mashike, 2007: 3; Farr, 2003: 27). The experiences of post-war demobilisation in the United States, which has an extensive legislative framework for veterans, demonstrate a recurrent theme in terms of how former combatants are viewed by states, firstly as special citizens who have paid the ultimate price by putting their bodies in the line of fire for the protection of the state. In this sense, these ‘heroes’ are understood as ‘ultimate citizens’. Yet, secondly, these citizen-cum-heroes present another dilemma in the eyes of the state, where, if the state fails to support a post-war settlement, the former combatants are viewed as a security threat to the state whose sovereignty they protected.
Due to their military training, the “returning” soldier presents a moral dilemma, where the state is obligated to pay dues to the heroes in the aftermath of war, while also recognising that if the dues are not paid, the heroes may undermine the integrity of the state with their access to tools of violence. Mettler unpacks this “double-edged sword” as follows:

veteran status has been crucial to the definition of citizenship status and stratification in the polity. Interestingly, its power operates as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it has served to delineate who is included and who is excluded as honored and rights bearing citizens; on the other hand, it has provided a powerful tool for expanding the bounds of the citizenry (Mettler, 2012: xii).

Mettler (2012) writes about the evolution of state policies in the United States from individuals who participated in various wars, including the civil war in America of 1861 to 1865, the two World Wars, to those who participated in more recent wars. As Mettler (2012:xii) notes, “in the democratic ideals central to the nation’s identity, military service represented a central obligation of masculine citizenship, and the protection of the nation by ordinary citizens rather than standing army was regarded as essential for self-governance”. As she argues further, the citizen who is willing to offer their body in defense of the state, is in turn recognised as an honourable citizen. Respect and honour take particular forms in terms of policies, followed by the formation of “institutions, resources and political affiliations” that shape the direction of state-assisted support for those making the transition from military life to civilian life (Mettler, 2012: xiii). In this regard, the citizen-soldier carries a particular civic identity, writing of the American context, Mettler states that:

the common person who served this nation became endowed with status and was viewed as the legitimate bearer of claims on his government, and acquired a political identity that was a source of collective action and mobilization [sic]. Such dynamics raised the resources for channeling benefits for veterans. In every era from the post-Revolutionary period down to the present, the question of how the nation should fulfill its obligations to its veterans has assumed a central role in American politics (Mettler, 2012: xii).
Skocpol (1992: 142) argues that it is important to recognise that the “U.S Civil War pensions (and other forms of public help for veterans and dependants) were not conceptualised in socioeconomic terms at all”, instead, “they were understood in political and moral terms”. By this, Skocpol (1992: 149) posits that state assistance of veterans saw the Civil War pension as “justly due to the righteous core of a generation of men (and survivors of dead men) – a group that ought to be generously and constantly repaid by the nation for their sacrifices”. This sentiment was reflected in the declaration by the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, in September 1943, referring to World War II returning soldiers: “we are going to have to do something for these soldier boys when they come back...They’re fighting this war for us, and we’re not going to put them on the street corners selling apples when they get back here” (Young, 2012: 199).

World War I presented the greatest challenge to the state’s ability to offer public goods to returning veterans as “the demobilisation of some four million American soldiers at the end of World War I occurred simultaneously with widespread social unrest, rising unemployment, and economic hardship characterised by frequent labor strikes”, amongst others (Ford, 2012: 119). Theodore Roosevelt, speaking to the vast challenges of assisting soldiers transition into civilian life after the First World War, noted that the difference at that time was that “after the Civil War we still had a frontier. We absorbed a great many of the restless people of the frontier. We have no frontier now” (Ford, 2012: 122). According to Ford (2012), for the returning WWI soldiers, the US War Department played a crucial role in the drafting of reemployment strategies for returning soldiers, which included specialised employment services, creative publicity campaigns, citation awards, and public works projects. In order to propel the resettlement of returning soldiers forward, the War Department went to great lengths to encourage businesses to “put fighting blood” in their business by employing returning soldiers. Media campaigns painted soldiers as more disciplined than “civilian” employees. As a reward, “patriotic” employers who “took back former workers seeking reemployment after being discharged from the military received a ‘War and Navy Department Citation’” (Ford, 2012: 132).

Another central motivation to assist returning soldiers included the fear of Bolshevism, in which state-assisted integration was seen as “the key to locking out radicalism” (Ford, 2012: 125). As the chapter will demonstrate, beyond the “moral” reason for the state assistance of veterans for their perceived sacrifice, a key motivation for states to support veterans is connected
to a fear that returning soldiers may pose a security threat to the state, should they find themselves marginalised economically and otherwise. Ford (2012: 125) quotes a US General who defined returning soldiers as “potential reds”, because many of them “sick, physically and mentally, and waiting with nothing to do and finding on every hand radical orators only too willing to sow seeds of discontentment”. In this regard, state support for former soldiers, the General noted further, meant “industrial peace to our country” (Ford, 2012: 131). The view was that “former soldiers – low in rank, poorly educated, and accustomed to obeying orders – some argued, had lost the capacity to think for themselves” (Gerber, 1994: 547). Putting pressure for support for WWII veterans, Eleanor Roosevelt warned that marginalised veterans represented a potential “dangerous pressure in our midst” (cited in Elder, 1987: 460). Writing about the civilian integration of disabled veterans after WWII, Gerber (1994: 546) argues similarly that there is a “divided consciousness” in the public perception of veterans:

on the one hand, the veteran’s heroism and sacrifices are celebrated and memorialised and debts of gratitude, both symbolic and material, are paid to him. On the other hand, the veteran also inspires anxiety and fear and is seen as a threat to social order and political stability. The second, less officially acknowledged response is based on a plausible, though greatly exaggerated projection: remove young men from the restraining influences of educational institutions, employment, and family; provide them with advanced weapons training, and send them off on a violent adventure; expose their minds and bodies to horrific injuries; and then attempt to return them speedily to the life they had previously known, and you have a prescription for individual and social chaos.

It is the perception that that “a significant portion of the early Nazi cohort” was formed by “bitter, unreflective men”, who fought for Germany in WWI (Gerber, 1994: 547). Bessell (1988: 29) contests this claim about the German ex-soldiers, arguing that employers in Germany “made great efforts to comply with demobilisation decrees stipulating that ex-soldiers be offered their old jobs back. And it appears that most of the returning veterans were able to find work rather quickly”.

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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (informally known as the G.I. Bill), represents the most extensive state policy in US veteran policy history. The G.I. Bill was directed towards the needs of returning sixteen million veterans from World War II and their dependants. The Bill’s definition of a veteran was a “person who served in the active military, naval, or air services, and who was discharged or released therefore under conditions other than dishonorable [sic]” (Moulta-Ali, 2014: 2). It is also important to note that in the US, the veteran “does not have to have served in an actual combat zone, but during the specified periods of war serving ninety consecutive days, of which one day occurred during a period designated as war time” (Moulta-Ali, 2014: 2). Amongst the varied benefits for veterans, the G.I. Bill covered education benefits which included full tuition and living expenses, low-cost mortgages, loans to start businesses, and one-year unemployment compensation payment (Boulton, 2012). Boulton (2012: 244) argues that the 1944 G.I. Bill “made World War II veterans among the most rewarded of any sent into the field”.

Both Skocpol (1992) and Mettler (2012) point to the fact that the public support for war veterans has also played a unique role in American history in the ways in which early veterans policies that were implemented at the height of institutionalised social division in terms of race and gender, played a unique role of extending these benefits to groups with limited civil rights, such as African American veterans. In this regard, African American “veteran status served as an opening wedge for rights, helping to give momentum to the civil rights movement” (Mettler, 2012: xii). Writing about African American WWI veterans, Keene (2012) demonstrates that although these veterans were meant to benefit, like their white counterparts, in the economic and social programs due to ex-soldiers, they did face difficulty in accessing the benefits such as fair treatment in hospitals where veterans could access healthcare for free, access to colleges, vocational training, and more importantly, being able to secure employment, where businesses that were willing to follow the pressure of the War Department to employ veterans were often unwilling to employ African Americans. Keene (2012: 150) points to the extent to which the state, under pressure from civil rights groups, was pushed to address issues faced by African American veterans in accessing benefits in a highly segregated society, “with the number of black veterans mounting, federal employment agencies contacted thousands of firms with letters, telephone calls, and personal visits urging them to employ black ex-servicemen.” In this context, Keene (2012: 166) concludes that “rather than viewing [black veterans] as a special group with
unique problems to overcome, the civil rights movement linked the disabled veteran struggle to the obstacles that every person of color [sic] faced in the United States’. It is in this regard that Mettler (2012) argues that policy provisions made for veterans in the United States provided an opening to challenge the state to expand citizenship rights in terms of race, class, gender, and more recently, sexuality, with the 2011 repeal of the so-called ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy, devised as a formal denial of homosexuality amongst members of the military. In this regard, the evolution of veteran’s discourses is shaped by context. The cases from several African countries demonstrate unique demobilisation processes that resemble the local contexts of war. This thesis argues that the South African demobilisation process ought to have reflected its context in determining the criteria of those who could participate in the process.

It is also important to note that the treatment of veterans in US history is also informed by the public perception of each war, in terms of it being seen as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ war, respectively. Boulton (2012: 242) notes that while the G.I. Bill of 1944 received much public support, and was “revered as a fitting tribute from a grateful public to the nation’s men who had gallantly set off the dark forces of European fascism and Japanese militarism”, the G.I. Bill of 1966, which aimed to address the needs of the veterans of the Vietnam War, was not as enthusiastically supported or generous in the benefits it offered to veterans. Seen as a ‘bad war’, the G.I. Bill of 1966, “provided scant reward for soldiers sent to fight in a cause that many American people – and some of the soldiers themselves – had come to question by the early 1970s” (Boulton, 2012: 242). A key point of protest against the 1966 Bill was the equal treatment of soldiers who had served in combat, to those who had served at home during the war, as well as the lowering of educational benefits compared to those of the 1944 Bill.

In *Rats and Resentment: the Demobilization of the Red Army in Postwar Leningrad, 1945 – 50*, Dale (2010: 115) points out that the demobilisation of “eight and a half million soldiers by end of 1948” in Russia was fraught with tensions connected to the public perception that veterans were “a privileged stratum of society”. The return of soldiers to a Leningrad that had been severely destroyed by the war, made it difficult to frame the needs of the ex-soldiers as much more important than those of other citizens whose livehoods had been destroyed during the war. Dale (2010: 122) argues that although Soviet propaganda went to great lengths to portray the civilian integration as successful, many former soldiers “were deeply resentful of the
treatment during and after demobilisation”. For one thing, many soldiers had to wait months and sometimes years in military units before being released. Furthermore, upon integration, the veterans found navigating the bureaucracy required in order to access “work, housing, food, clothing pensions and healthcare required seemingly endless form-filling” (Dale, 2010: 124).

The section below shows that post-war demobilisation in Africa differs markedly from the US, and some European experiences, as the participants in the process include both conventional and unconventional combatants. Muggah and O’Donnell’s (2015) first wave, second generation and next generation DDR have been highly influenced by African cases of demobilisation, which now has important implications for future demobilisation processes in countries such as Syria and Libya.

3.3 DDR in Africa

The conception of demobilisation processes in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa is shaped by the above-mentioned global debates about the place of veterans in postwar societies, in particular the periods following the two world wars of the twentieth century. The civil war cases largely seen in Africa and Latin America reshape the conception of demobilisation in dramatic ways, because the majority of the fighting forces belong within the same state that had opposed each other in the war. This stands in contrast to the cases of inter-state war, where the soldiers that are demobilised fought on opposing sides. In the context of intra-state conflict, the process of disarming, demobilising and integrating combatants into either civilian society or security institutions such as the military or police, “forms part of peace negotiations” as part of “a wider peace settlement” (Cilliers, 1995:4). The discourse on the civilian integration of former combatants in Africa is similar to experiences in Europe and North America, where there seems to be a general “agreement that ex-combatants are a key target group for preferential state assistance to facilitate their reintegration into sustainable civilian post-war livelihoods” (Dzinesa, 2009). As Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) have recently noted, “no fewer than 60 separate DDR initiatives were fielded around the world since the late 1980s” (p. 2). They note further that these programmes “are not reserved to Sub-Saharan Africa alone, but span the Americas, North Africa and the Middle East, South and Eastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific” (p. 2). And indeed,
Most of these programs [sic] were originally designed and implemented in the wake of violent international and civil wars. These armed conflicts tended to end following the definitive victory of one of the parties, or as part of an internationally mandated peace support operation. By the late 1990s, DDR assumed a kind of orthodoxy in the peace, security and development communities, especially amongst representatives of the United Nations agencies, the World Bank and a number of bilateral aid agencies (Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015: 2).

The 1993 seven-country case study by the World Bank (encompassing Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, Chad, and one non-African country, Nicaragua) was amongst the earliest studies exposing the potential security dangers of not assisting ex-combatants into civilian life, especially those with limited education and professional skills. The study concluded that “the success of demobilisation and reintegration programmes appears to be tightly linked to the specific political, economic and security climate faced by each of the countries studied” (World Bank, 1995: 24). Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) argue that even though this study emphasised the importance of context, the “modus operandi” of these processes was “comparatively straightforward” in the sense that “whether soldiers or rebels, it was generally clear who was eligible for reinsertion and reintegration assistance (and who was not)” (p. 2).

In the case of Zimbabwe, Musemwa (1995) argues that a neglected vulnerable sector of veterans can easily become a serious political problem. The increasing militant protests of Zimbabwe’s veterans, noted since the early 1990s, and further illustrated by their violent participation in the land reform programme, the 2000 parliamentary elections and presidential elections have been noted by a number of authors to have greatly contributed to Zimbabwe’s economic and political collapse (as noted in Sachikonye 2002; Rupiya 2003; Dzinesa 2007; Chitiyo 2009). In the case of Namibia, Metsola (2006:1120) notes that “ex-combatants have been seen as both as heroes and as a threat”. The making of the nation’s People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) following Namibia’s independence from South Africa included fighting forces from the SWAPO estimated at 50 000 including returnees, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) estimated at 25 000 and a paramilitary police unit, Koevoet, SWATF and Koevoet
(both had been creations of the South African apartheid state security forces who fought against SWAPO) (Metsola, 2006). The new army and police absorbed 10,000 ex-combatants, while the rest were to be integrated into civilian life. As in the cases outlined above, Metsola (2006: 1123) argues that in Namibia, too, that state assisted integration has been framed as a “moral issue at the centre of the nation’s historical identity”. As elsewhere, Metsola (2006: 1123 - 1124) sees the nationalist rhetoric on veterans as both “a form of recognition and containment” in the sense that the recognition also limits the agency of ex-combatants because, in the end, “the only form of agency that ex-combatants have is that of potential social disruption if left on their own”.

Metsola (2006) also discusses how the category of “veteran” has expanded from “only those who had actually been waging war” to also include “all unemployed former exiles” as beneficiaries. This expansion of veteran benefits “brought more gender balance to reintegration, as the exile division of labour placed women mainly in supportive functions and not in actual combat” (Metsola, 2006: 1129). As noted in the previous chapter, the Namibian 2008 Veterans Act (cited in Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013: 33) defines veteran as “any person who was a member of the liberation forces who consistently and persistently participated or engaged in any political, diplomatic or underground activity in furtherance of the liberation struggle, or was arrested for such activities.” Moreover, the author argues that the framing of veterans as rights bearing citizens with special claims to the state, in a context of pervasive poverty, ‘veterans issues’ have become “objects of competition and a means of securing political influence”, which plays itself out in the interplay between “personalized [sic] and bureaucratic power” seen in the convergence between state capacity and patronage politics (Metsola, 2006: 1130). In the end, this form of inclusion and exclusion has broader consequences for those excluded from accessing public goods due to a lack of a particular claim to liberation history.

Grouped together with El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique, South Africa is placed amongst the “first wave” of DDR experiments by Muggah and O’Donnell (2015: 3). At the bare minimum, they argue that the processes “contributed to preventing the recurrence of armed conflict” (p. 3).

The cases of Liberia and South Sudan fit into the category that Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) describe as “second wave generation DDR” (p. 3). The point is that DDR processes have evolved from being a peacekeeping component with short term goals, to forming an instrumental
part of a peace building process, explicit in the UN’s 2006 Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) framework. As Munive (2013) points out, “DDR is, in fact, the largest intervention in nearly all of the UN’s on-going large-scale peacekeeping missions and it is ascribed key importance as the area in which peace building makes a direct contribution to restoring public security, law and order” (p. 587). Muggah and O’Donnell (2015) argue that by the late 1990s to early 2000s:

The second wave of DDR programs [sic] were especially common following the wars in West and Central Africa, the Balkans and Southeast Asia. Many of these settings were experiencing rolling internal conflicts, where soldiers, rebels and civilians were conflated during wars, but also in their aftermath. The lines between what constituted a ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’ were increasingly blurred, with implications for how to construct a fair and durable post-conflict peace settlement. (Muggah and O’Donell, 2015: 3).

In Liberia, a country that experienced 14 years of one of the most deadly civil wars, the 2003 DDR programme led by the United National Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), demobilised 101,495 ex-combatants by 2005 (Jaye, 2009). Of this number, 10,972 of the demobilised and disarmed were children associated with the various fighting forces, where of this number, 8,532 were boys and 2,440 were girls. In this process, women as a category, constituted 22,370 of the demobilised, including the numbers of demobilised young girls.

Jairo Munive, in Context Matters: The Conventional DDR Template is Challenged in South Sudan (2013), reiterates that despite the multiple and complex dynamics that inform intra-state wars, a “central assumption in DDR programmes is that combatants can be distinguished from civilians in a straightforward manner during the disarmament phase” (p. 588). In this regard, DDR programmes “centre around the identification and verification of combatants” (Munive, 2013: 588, emphasis original). The settlement of the 21-years-long war between the South and North Sudan goes well beyond the fighting between the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Khartoum government under Omar al-Bashir. Although the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan (GoS), by 2005, “there were no fewer than 18 so-called ‘other armed groups’ (OAG) in the South that were not party to the agreement” (Munive, 2013: 590). After all, as Arnold (2007) argues, “the sad truth of the second Sudanese civil war in the south is that the war was largely
fought between southerners...the war has often been described as ‘civil wars within civil war’” (p. 492).

Arnold and Alden (2007) write about one of the OAGs, the White Army Militia, which they describe as “grouping of armed civilians, mostly youth, which during the course of the long civil war, notably during the 1990s, coalesced into village-level formations” that were active in the Upper Nile and Jonglei states, even after the signing of the CPA. The UN estimated that the members of the White Army Militia were between 20-30 000 (Arnold and Alden, 2007). They show that due to long-standing hostilities between the SPLA and the White Militia, the SPLA could not single-handedly be made responsible for demobilising members of this group as there was no trust between them. Rather, the successful demobilisation process in eastern Jonglei was due to the participation of multiple actors, mostly the encouragement of the community, NGOs and the UN’s symbolic presence (Arnold and Alden, 2007). One of the major tasks of the DDR process in South Sudan was to unite all these different and competing forces into one army. For the SPLA, this meant removing some of its long-serving members in order to make room for members of enemy structures, such as the GoS aligned South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). Munive (2013) argues that due to the continued fragility of conditions in the South in terms of the recurring violence, neither of the parties had the incentive to reduce their military capabilities. Arnold (2007) writes that the SSDF continued to operate as “a standing armed force until the 2011 referendum’s outcomes were known” due to its mistrust of the SPLA (p. 497). As a result, out of an estimated number of 90 000 targeted ex-combatants, from 2009-2012, only 12,525 ex-combatants had been demobilised (Munive, 2013: 593).

Using the case of the DDR programme in Torit State, the state from which the civil war started in 1983 between the SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as an example of the complexities of defining the combatant and civilian in a decades-long civil war, Munive (2013) shows that the programme managers had difficulty making the distinction, and thus gave power to the SPLA commanders to identify combatants. In this vein, commanders were noted to include their family members and relatives of deceased SPLA members who were known to them personally. Munive (2013) argues that the Sudanese case challenges the notion that former combatants have special needs compared to the rest of their community. In this regard, Munive (2013) argues that “on the ground it seems difficult to disaggregate the reintegration needs of ex-
combatants or special needs groups from the general needs of the population” (p. 598). It seems that women and young people became the biggest beneficiaries of this DDR participation, by proxy.

Thus, the South Sudan demobilisation process represents the complexities of a long war with multiple protagonists that needed to be included in the process for the country to have a chance at peace. The involvement of multiple fighting forces and multiple combatants reflected the nuances of the war itself. In this regard, due to the “unorthodox” nature of intra-state warfare, the demobilisation processes in Africa differ markedly in terms of the individuals who participate in them, compared to those in Europe and North America whose core criteria for inclusion in demobilisation processes is a formal membership in the state’s military, whether in war or peace time. Muggah and O'Donnell (2015) argue that the next generation of DDR will even be “more all-encompassing than its predecessors”, because unlike other DDR processes, it takes place while the conflict is still underway (p. 5). Making examples of Somalia and Libya, they argue that new generation DDR is beginning to precede the peace process, and is “also targeting groups that may not be explicit parties to an eventual peace agreement”, which is the case with transnational rebel and terrorist groups (p. 5). The context of ISIL in the wars in Syria and Iraq imposes new conditions for future demobilisation processes. The section below on gender and demobilisation demonstrates that even though the women and girls participating in state and armed non-state formations have largely been formally recognised in demobilisation processes, the implementation of such processes have been implemented in gender-blind frameworks, and in many cases, have been revealed to respond more urgently to the “threat” of male ex-combatants. More broadly, demobilisation processes have also made visible the extent to which, in the aftermath of war, women who participated in fighting forces face pressure to undermine their combat history, in order to return to the private sphere, thereby foregoing the symbolic and material benefits that veterans stand to access in postwar society.

3.4 Women and DDR

What happens to a liberation army or guerilla force after the war, if it manages to topple the old state? Does the revolutionary ‘post-war’ era deal with gender any differently to conventional ‘post-war’ eras? Is the demobilisation of women an integral part of post-war transformation? In
state-building, state defending process, do women lose the status they enjoyed during the war of liberation?

(Enloe, 1983:160 emphasis original)

In *Heroes and Misfits: The Troubled Social Reintegration of Disabled Veterans in The Best Years of Our Lives* (1994: 550), Gerber notes that in the aftermath of WWII in the US, beyond the extensive hand of the 1944 G.I. Bill, the state went to great efforts to frame the civilian integration of returning soldiers as the “restoration of the status quo antebellum in gender relations”. Gerber (1994) notes that in the absence of men, participating in the battlefront in Europe, many (white) American women, who had previously not worked, became confident and self-sufficient through wartime employment. But, in the aftermath, (white) women were placed under pressure “to give up their employment and their independence and to devote themselves to the domestication of the returning men” (p. 550).

Feminist literature on demobilisation also shows that women face social pressure to undermine their combatant status. This is because there is a tendency to sideline female ex-combatants in the aftermath of wars, as “again ‘soldier’ comes to mean male, and unemployed soldiers are seen to take precedence over married women (even where they are ex-soldiers themselves, or war widows and heads of households)” Mazurana (2004) argues that the numbers of women and girls within all fighting forces are routinely underestimated. This occurs in part because heavy emphasis on their roles as “wives,” “sexual slaves” and “camp-followers” obscures the multiple and diverse roles they play in conflict. According to Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpat (2005: 2-3) women are “largely absent at the peace tables and levels of decision making within foreign affairs, defence, or international relations bodies”; this despite the evidence of increasing numbers of women who have fought in conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Sudan and elsewhere.

In the case of Zimbabwe, Lyons’ in *Guns and guerilla girls: women in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle* (2004: 229) argues that “most women did not benefit from post-independence rehabilitation programs [sic] designed to integrate women ex-combatants into society”. Instead, women were often “labeled as prostitutes and thus not deserving of demobilization (sic) pay-
outs” (Lyons 2004: xxi). Musemwa (cited in Lyons, 2004: 223-224) also noted that “while ex-combatants generally faced problems of rehabilitation, female ex-combatants faced problems associated with conservative traditional customary belief about the social and marital position of women in Shona society”. Many of the female ex-combatants found social reintegration into civilian life particularly difficult, as they were seen by their communities as “too strong to be a female” and “too independent, rough, ill-educated and unfeminine to be good wives” (Musemwa quoted in Lyons, 2004: 223-224).

In her comparative study between women’s post-war constructions in the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELPF) and the SPLA in South Sudan, Weber (2011) argues that there is a need to interrogate the “trope of the fighter as highly gendered construction of performative images of masculinity, accessible to men, but with restrictions for women and idealized [sic] fighter as the imagined core identity blueprint for post-conflict citizenship” (p. 359). She argues that although women composed 40% of the fighting force in the ELPF which had an explicit ideological goal of social, economic and political reform, yet in the aftermath

“The admiration, support, and legitimization [sic] of female fighters, of women in arms was quickly devalued after demobilization [sic]. The emergency phase of war was over, now the reconstruction of state and society needed women to become normal, feminine, obedient members of society again, so that the society would not feel alienated and would continue to support the struggle despite hardships” (Weber, 2011: 363).

Weber (2011) further points to the high rates of divorces between the “male and female fighters in post-war Eritrea, with the men marrying non-fighter women instead” as an example of the “retraditionalisation” of society in post-war societies, which places pressure women to perform a specific kind of femininity (p. 361). With regards to the SPLA, she notes that social transformation during the war did not encompass an important component of the SPLA, as they were more concerned with winning “territory than hearts and minds” (p. 361). Women composed only 7% of the SPLA, and in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA, “hardly any women are listed on the SPLA payroll and therefore eligible for a proper DDR package, a pension, or continued employment in the armed forces” (Weber, 2011: 362). Furthermore, while women’s
role as “mothers and helpers is applauded…their active role involvement in the struggle goes unrecognized [sic]” (p. 363).

In the DRC, Baaz and Stern (2011) argue that the DDR process privileged “only combatants carrying a gun [to] qualify for this process” (p. 569). They point out that since many of the women in the armed groups do not possess a firearm of their own (often sharing with others, or performing duties other than active combat), they have been largely ‘auto-demobilized’ [sic] and do not reach the DDR/military intergration centres at all, or leave them without completing the DDR process. Moreover, many commanders also do not consider women as real combatants and have not encouraged/brought them with them in the process (assuming that many women in the ranks would not enhance their status and power within the new military structure). Hence, the ways in which the processes of military integration and DDR have been designed have resulted in a steady decrease of women’s participation in the armed forces (Baaz and Stern, 2011: 559).

In Liberia, although provisions were made for female ex-combatants such as “separate care centres in cantonment sites, reproductive health, counseling and training on women’s rights and sexual training support”, and apart from transport issues and other logistical challenges, “it became apparent that women combatants were not showing up” at the sites were former combatants were assembled, because “for these women, the risk of exposing their links with rebel groups presented a security risk which no sum of money could compensate” (Clarke, 2008: 62). Jaye (2009: 16), however, notes that when some young female combatants show up at these sites, they sold themselves as prostitutes “because of the perception that there are no other options for survival”. Halim (1998: 96) notes that the “change of the role of the men from breadwinner to a combatant entitles him to more rights”, while the “change of the role of the woman from a housewife and mother to a combatant causes further decline in her status”.

In the case of female combatants in Angola, Farr (2003: 31) argues that the exclusionary nature of the demobilisation process was “as if women [had] been completely forgotten”. Shikola (1998), writing about the life of a demobilised female ex-combatant in Namibia, also points to the unique conditions that women face when reintegrating into society, especially women who
return from combat with children, who are often fathered by different fathers during the war. Women are socially ostracised for returning with children with different fathers, and also face the challenge of providing economically for their children.

Feminists have argued that the invisibility of women’s role in military discourses in IR has contributed to the privileging of the needs of male ex-combatants in postwar adjustment interventions (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). The cases above demonstrate the need for states to expand DDR programmes to reflect the actual dynamics of the conflict context.

The next section considers the South African case, with its gendered dynamics of demobilisation. It shows that in South Africa, the context of demobilisation did not depart from these international trends, as discussed above. Like in other countries, the narrative of ex-combatants, as both heroes and potential security threats, is visible in South African discourse on the success and challenges of demobilisation. South African (male) ex-combatants have been accused of participating in armed robberies, as well as participating in various wars in and outside Africa, as mercenaries. This section shows that the literature on the demobilised ex-combatant offers little details on the wellbeing of the demobilised female ex-combatant.

### 3.5 South African demobilisation process

#### 3.5.1 The formation of the SANDF

Following the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990 and the announcement of the end of the armed struggle, and the negotiations between the National Party and the liberation movements, military negotiations occurred parallel the political negotiations. As part of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum of 1992 and 1993 between the NP government and the liberation movements, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was guided by the TEC Act of September 1993, “whose task was to oversee the process of transition”, sub-councils for different state sectors were formed in order to manage and direct the manner in which these institutions would be reformed to accommodate the needs of the would-be democratic and inclusive state (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 112). There was the Intelligence, the Law Sub-Council and the Defence Sub-Council, all charged with managing “managing security issues during the transitional phase” (Mokolobe, 2001: 63). The Sub-Council on Defence was tasked with overseeing the “military transition process at the political level” by planning and outlining the
“integration of all armed formations represented at the negotiations” with a view to designing a “military for South Africa that would be affordable, effective and legitimate” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 113). The committee responsible for handling the details of military integration was the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC), consisted of representatives from all the participating armed forces, statutory and non-statutory.

Those defined as the statutory forces included the “SADF and the armed forces of the nominally independent homelands of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC)”, while the non-statutory forces composed of MK and APLA (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 113). As noted by Motumi and Hudson (1995: 113), APLA “only joined the negotiations towards their conclusion, shortly before the April 1994 elections, whilst the IFP did not form part of the military negotiations, although the IFP has argued that it has a list of 6000 persons who should be eligible for integration into the SANDF”. It is also worth noting that even the initial informal military negotiations that took place at the ANC 1990 Lusaka Conference only involved the stated parties, MK, SADF, and TBVC army officers (Mokolobe, 2001: 62).

The first step to implementing the integration of the defence force and demobilisation, between 1993 and 1994, involved statutory and non-statutory forces being requested to “submit a list of their personnel to a centralized [sic] list called the Certified Personal Register (CPR), which was administered by the Department of Defence” (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 12). The new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) “subsequently came into existence at midnight on 26/27 April 1994” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 114). Members forming the new SANDF were all the personnel of the identified forces who, “in terms of the TEC Act”, had submitted a CPR, thus, by midnight on 27 April, “automatically became members of the new force” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 114).

As noted by Van der Merwe and Lamb (2009: 10) the “CPR-based SANDF integration and demobilised process was integral in defining who constitutes South African “ex-combatants”. Amongst those excluded were the paramilitary formations that operated inside South African townships, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party’s (FP) Self Protection Units and the SDUs (Gear 2004; Mashike, 2007; Cherry 2011). There is a view held by some members of these groups that they ought to have been offered the opportunity to disarm, integrate and demobilise. These same formations are excluded again by the 2011 Veterans Act.
Following the completion of the CPR list, the integration process was composed of four other stages (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 13; and Mokalobe, 2001:74):

1. former combatants were regionally mustered and then assembled at certain military bases (that is, at Wallmansthal, Hoedspruit and De Brug);
2. then appearing before a placement board that consisted of different armed forces and the British Military Training Team (BMATT), where those without formal military training or sufficient military qualifications did not undergo integration, and were released from the military; where
3. if required, former combatants were provided with bridging training and orientation; and
4. were placed in different arms of service.

According to Mokalobe (2001: 74), “there were eight intakes of former MK combatants and a few former APLA female combatants” who were received in Wallmansthal and Hoedspruit between 1994 and 1995, while “in the De Brug Base, there were five intakes of former APLA combatants”. The final mass intake was in April 1997, when 721 former combatants were integrated into Wallmansthal Base. Overall, about 11 727 former MK combatants and 4 901 former APLA combatants were integrated as uniformed members of the SANDF (Mokalobe, 2001:75). It was reported that “more than 2 000 [sic] MK and APLA soldiers who reported for integration were excluded from the SANDF because their names had not appeared on the CPR” (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 14). At certain points in time, ex-combatants also left military bases to protest, and there were strikes that took places in Durban and Cape Town due to disgruntlement with the integration process, which compelled President Nelson Mandela to offer symbolic guarantee that the former combatants would be addressed (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003).

According to Motumi and Hudson (1995, 114, also cited in Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokalobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Heinecken and Bwalya 2013; Lamb 2013), the numerical breakdown of those registered in the CPR list was as follows:
Table One: The content of the certified personnel register

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Force</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statutory forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former SADF (excluding part-time forces)</td>
<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former TBVC defence forces</td>
<td>11 039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>101 039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-statutory forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>27 801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK Non Formal CPR</td>
<td>1 087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLA Name List</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>34 888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>135 927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noted that BMATT was invited to assist in the integration because the British government had assisted in similar process in other countries in the region, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Motumi and Hudson, 1995). The role of BMATT was to:

- assess the criteria against which individuals are to be evaluated prior to placement in the SANDF;
- certify the agreed upon criteria before evaluation and screening test;
- observe and oversee the screening done by the evaluation teams made up of representatives from the constituent forces of the SANDF;
- evaluate SANDF training in relation to international standards and to make recommendations on improvements where necessary;
- assist in evaluating an individual’s competency and qualifications;
- advise on the type and nature of bridging and orientation training, as well as any other training assistance required; and
- adjudicate where necessary the ranking and placing of members of the constituent forces.
Furthermore, as part of integration, individual participants were required to “submit proof of educational (and or military) qualifications for eligibility as members of the SANDF” (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 118). The members who did not possess these qualifications were then required to undertake assessments tests designed to measure potential on a scale of Categories 1 to 10. Those whose assessments was in the Categories 1-3 did not qualify for acceptance into the new SANDF, while Categories 4-6 were accepted if they demonstrated a potential to become non-commissioned officers, whilst those who qualified for Categories 7-10 qualified to be accepted as officers (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 119). In terms of placement, candidates were either assigned to join the army, the corps such the artillery, technical assistance (mustering), or receive rank e.g. rank of sergeant placement was determined by a board that composed of representatives from statutory and non-statutory forces and BMATT (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 119). The Demobilisation Act of 1996 also made provision to extend demobilisation to former combatants who chose not to integrate into the SANDF due to dissatisfaction with rank placement, or choose not to continue due to age, health, or education.

Some of the major criticism pointed to the integration process with regards to the state’s disregard of reports of racial tensions between members of the former SADF and those of MK and APLA. For one, former combatants were resentful of the fact that it was only them who had to undergo the Potential Tests and orientation into professional military training, most of which was administered by former SADF members “who sometimes behaved with prejudice towards former MK and APLA combatants” (Mokalobe, 2001: 76). Combatants also had complaints about the ranking system itself, which they felt that many deserving combatants were placed in much lower rankings than they deserved, where, as a result, many of them chose demobilisation. It is also important to note that “instead of enlisting in the SANDF, some combatants chose to join the South African Police Service or other government departments” (Rupiya, 2003: 264).

Even BMATT reported to the state that during the integration process, warning that “attitudes had hardened” among SADF members towards their new MK and APLA colleagues and went on to state that these tensions may have “far-reaching” implications (cited in Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 15). One of the incidences that shone light to the gravity of difficult relationships within the new force happened on the 9th of September 1999, when Lieutenant
Sibusiso Madubela shot dead six white SANDF members, including a white civilian woman at the Tempe Military Training base in Bloemfontein (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 15). Other shootings also took place at the Phalaborwa 7 SA Infantry Battalion, where a platoon commander, Lieutenant Harry Ntoagae, shot and killed his white senior colleague; and in Simon’s Town Naval Base in Cape Town, where a junior black officer, Wiseman Mchunu, shot dead his white colleague (Mokalobe, 2001: 79).

For Motumi and Hudson (1995: 119), the integration process succeeded in “identifying former non-statutory force members who qualify for acceptance into the SANDF and those who do not”, while it has been “less impressive in catering adequately for the needs of those who do not meet the requirements for entry into the military, nor has it catered in terms of demobilization [sic], for those who are acceptable to the SANDF but refused the offer of employment made by the SANDF.”

### 3.5.2 Demobilisation and reintegration

The Demobilisation Act of 1996 also made provision to extend demobilisation to former combatants who chose not to integrate into the SANDF due to dissatisfaction with rank placement, or choose not to continue due to age, health, or education. Joe Modise, the first post-apartheid Minister of Defence, announced the demobilisation process for non-statutory forces on 21 August 1995, after months of delays, due to the inability of the leadership to decide on how to manage this process (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 120). The Act defines demobilisation as “the disbanding of members of the former non-statutory forces, who do not enter into agreements for temporary or permanent appointment with the South African Defence Force” (Demobilisation Act, 1996). It further defines “non-statutory forces” as the “armed forces not established by any law and known or formerly known as the Azanian People’s Liberation Army and uMkhonto we Sizwe”.  

The process involved the provision of a once-off gratuity to a member depending on their years of service in MK and APLA. A total of 3 770 soldiers were formally demobilised from the SANDF (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 14). The gratuity was divided as follows (cited in Motumi and Hudson, 1995:120):

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Table Two: Gratuity for demobilised combatants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Period of Service</th>
<th>Years of service</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>1 January 1961 to 31 December 1972</td>
<td>22-23 years</td>
<td>R42,058 (US $11,491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>1 January 1973 to 31 December 1976</td>
<td>18-21 years</td>
<td>R34,313 (US $9,375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>1 January 1977 to 31 December 1982</td>
<td>12-17 years</td>
<td>R28,721 (US $7,847)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>1 January 1983 to 31 December 1989</td>
<td>5-11 years</td>
<td>R20,201 (US $5,519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1 January 1990 to 26 March 1994</td>
<td>0-4 years</td>
<td>R12,734 (US $3,479)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the state announced that members who qualified for the once-off gratuity pay-out, referring to the members who were disqualified from integration who belonged to the Categories 1-3; those who were medically unfit to join the SANDF; and “the vulnerable” and the “veterans”, who were too old to join the new defence force, also qualified to receive the monthly special pensions. The Special Pensions Act of 1996, passed in terms of Section 189 of the South Africa’s Interim Constitution, identifies the beneficiary as:

a) persons who made sacrifices or who have served the public interest in establishing a democratic constitutional order, including members of any armed or military force not established by or under any law and which is under the authority and control of, or associated with and promotes the objectives of, a political organization; or

b) dependants of such persons

The allocation of the Special Pension funds is a sensitive issue, as many applications have not benefitted from the provision. According to the report by the Minister of Finance to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, “of 2 000 [sic] applicants, only 2 000 [sic] have been approved and a great deal of controversy remains in terms of how this is administered” (Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013: 35).
The state also offered the Service Corps to individuals who were being demobilized, which was composed of 18 months of skills training, conversion course, and career profiling (Gear, 2002). The 18 months was divided into three months of literacy training and adult life skills training, three months of vocational training, which was facilitated by the Department of Labour, and 12 months of practical experience (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 123). Very few of the thousands of the demobilised members took the opportunity to join the Service Corps. The Corps were criticised for failing to conduct adequate research to identify the needs and aspirations of the demobilized, and instead choosing to offer a blanket approach to the menu of skills that were offered (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 124). The state also offered participants just two weeks of personal counselling. In Chapter Five, one of the participants of this study, who was part of the conceptualisation of the Service Corps programme, offers a scathing critique of what she perceives as the failure of the SANDF to design a programme that responded to the socio-economic realities of the South African political economy.

Furthermore, the process of demobilisation, the SANDF “initiated a process of downsizing or rationalization [sic] in which it sought to reduce its personnel numbers by an additional 20, 000 to a total force of 70, 000” (Lamb, 2013: 11). The process of rationalisation entailed voluntary retrenchment or severance packages, combined with Service Corps training. According to Lamb (2013: 11; see also Everatt and Jennings 2006), by 2006:

it was estimated that the total ex-combatant population in South Africa was 80,000…however, poor record-keeping by the ANC and PAC of information on their combatants, combined with a lack of consensus over the definition of a combatant, particularly with regards to non-statutory forces, has made it impossible to verify this estimated figure.

In this regard, the politically fragile circumstances of the integration and demobilisation process that were characterised by an atmosphere of mistrust between members of the statutory and non-statutory forces, did not allow for easy recording of the numbers of the combatant community. Furthermore, the exclusion of other non-statutory groups, who are still fighting for legislative recognition, does not make it possible to have an empirical and socio-political sense of combatants in South Africa.
3. 5. 3 Literature on the demobilised South African ex-combatant

There have been several studies conducted on the integration of former combatants into civilian life in South Africa since the 1990s, some more substantial than others. The literature includes contributions by Cock (1993), Libenberg and Roefs (2001), Mokalobe (2001), Gear (2002), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (2003), Everatt et al. (2006), Maringira and Brankovic (2013), and Heinecken and Bwalya (2013).

Cock’s 1993 survey study sampled 180 MK ex-combatants during the informal demobilisation process during the period of transition, concluding that a majority of ex-combatants were unemployed due to poor education, lack of skills and experience, and that most of them stated that they suffered from psychological problems.

Liebenberg and Roefs’ 2001 questionnaire based study of MK ex-combatants, was a sample of 307 all-black, male ex-combatants. In the study, 60% of the respondents had not completed their high school education, and more than 60% of respondents were not employed. More than 90 percent of the entire sample claimed that the SANDF had not provided them with sufficient reintegration assistance. Women comprised 13% of this sample.

The CCR use a representative sample of 410 MK and APLA. The study found that few ex-combatants have a matriculation qualification or higher, which makes it difficult for them to transition into other sectors of formal employment. This has resulted in the majority of veterans remaining unemployed, with little financial capabilities to attain new skills from other sectors. Women, who made up 12% of the study population in the CCR study, reported facing additional psychological challenges, where apart from exposure to war-related violence, some were the victims of sexual abuse by their commanders.

Mokalobe’s 2001 dissertation sampled 35 former MK and APLA combatants, using semi-structured interviews (p. 164). The study also shows that “due to inadequate planning and implementation of the demobilisation programme, reintegration of former combatants was not successful in addressing their human security” (Mokalobe, 2001: 164). Furthermore, the study concludes that “although it was expected that the failure to provide for their human security would translate into instability, this did not happen. Some former combatants did engage in criminal activities, but this did not threaten the stability of South Africa” (Mokalobe, 2001: 164).
The author does not offer a gender aggregation of the respondents to this study, and only two female ex-combatants are cited in the interviews.

Gear’s (2002) study used in-depth interviews and focus groups of former MK, SADF, APLA, and Self Defence Unit from Thokoza (SDUs) and Inkatha-aligned Self Protection Units (SPUs). With exception of one APLA female ex-combatant, all ex-combatants in the study were male. Gear’s study is the only one that includes SDUs and SPUs in its sample under the category of “combatant”. Her study notes that difficulties with integration has led many ex-combatants turn to crime, or that they experience considerable pressure to do so. Gear (2002: 119) argues that mechanisms by the SANDF to assist in civilian integration (through skills training, conversion courses and career profiling) are apparently “either inadequate or failing”.

Everatt et al (2006) present a survey of 1, 200 ex-combatants, interestingly, SDUs composed the majority of the survey, or 41%, MK 33%, and the rest represented by APLA and SPUs. Women composed 21% of the sample, mainly from Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA), MK and SDUs. The study finds that 80% of the sampled group was unemployed, and that many combatants knew of ex-combatants who had engaged in criminal activities to make a living. The study also points to a high number of ex-combatants living with HIV/AIDS. Like others, the study also points to deep psychological problems faced by former combatants.

In a much smaller study, Maringira and Brankovic (2013: 1-13) conducted individual life histories interviews with 11 APLA former combatants as well as focus groups with 17 APLA ex-combatants. The all-male sample of 28 participants, points to the prevalence of a “gun syndrome” amongst the former combatants, who remained militarized [sic] at both an individual and a collective level in post-Apartheid South Africa”.

In another smaller study by Heinecken and Bwalya (2013: 44), composed of focus group interviews of 48 participants, 12 MK and 36 APLA, only six were female former combatants. The study also paints a picture of destitute veterans, who have a capacity to organise as a collective and have capacity to use violence. The authors also point out that ex-combatants who lived in exile see themselves as less advantaged than their counterparts inside the country. They argue that those who were inside South Africa were able to continue with their education, while they had to forsake the pursuit of education when they joined the armed struggle.

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Elsewhere, Cock (2004:5) has noted that there are at least three ways military veterans are not contributing to stability:

firstly, a number of the South African mercenaries that are involved in wars in the continent are ex-SADF soldiers [particularly in Angola and Sierra Leone and even Iraq]; secondly, a number of demobilized [sic] soldiers are now employed in private security firms; and thirdly, numerous press reports have pointed out that many of the widespread armed robberies in South Africa are being done by highly ‘professional’ bandits with military backgrounds.

Despite the concerning picture drawn from these various studies about the marginality of combatants, it has taken the government a long time to respond to challenges that are faced by combatants.

3.6 Women and demobilisation

None of the major case studies conducted in South Africa since 1994 provide any detailed analysis of the plight of the demobilised female soldier. This is despite the fact that even during the official integration process “women faced additional integration challenges” as many of the “integration sites did not have adequate sanitation and accommodation facilities for women, there was a shortage of women’s uniforms and there were a number of allegations from women of sexual harassment by their male counterparts”, which might have contributed to even fewer women being integrated to the new defence force and thus opting to re-enter civilian life (Van der Merwe and Lamb, 2009: 13).

Furthermore, the absence of female ex-combatant participants in these studies does not make explicitly clear the intersection between crime and poverty. Since men and women in the frontlines received equal military training, are female ex-combatants as likely to be seduced into using their military experience for criminal activities when faced with difficulties of civilian life? For Mashike and Mokalobe (2003:34),

“the specific ways that poverty and socio-economic insecurity affect them as women need to be considered. This will help to properly identify the concomitant challenges they generally face with reintegration vis a vis those
specifically related to women and development in the South African context. Generally, in this regard, it cannot be assumed that female former combatants’ experiences of poverty, unemployment and access to healthcare, shelter, assistance with childcare and other opportunities are the same as for male former combatants.”

The South African DDR process reflects a ‘modus operandi’ (Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015; Baaz and Stern, 2011; Munive, 2013) that involves an assumption about the clear distinction between combatants and civilians. The 34 888 members of MK and APLA that formally participated in the process do not account for the multitudes of people who fought in the armed struggle inside and outside the country. The irony of this process was that those who dominated it were the members of the SADF to the exclusion of those who fought against the SADF in order to end apartheid. This narrowing of the sense of the word combatant in the DDR process contributed to the only small number of women who were able to participate in this process. It ought to be noted that this South African case is much different to others in the rest of the continent, such as in Liberia and South Sudan, whose respective DDR processes reflected the different conventional and unconventional combatants that were foundational to the war.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter traced the DDR process as a fundamental part of post-war reconstruction, with a focus on several countries including South Africa. The chapter shows in the aftermath of war, combatants are presented as warrior citizens, whom the state is duty bound to support in their transition back into post-war life. It has been shown that this duty from the state is also grounded in the belief that, if not supported, former combatants have the ability to use their military training to undermine the stability of the very states that they served. Importantly, the chapter makes visible that even when women participate as combatants in war, their identities as combatants is threatened in the aftermath, as there is pressure for them to retreat into private space, and not to claim the material and symbolic benefits that are indeed due to them according to their legitimate role in the war as combatants, understood more broadly and with greater degree of nuance. The cases of DDR in various African countries offers a markedly different version of the process, as these cases have included historical non-combatants, such as women
and children. In spite of this, even in these cases, women are often excluded because they are not perceived as gun-holding combatants.

The South African experience of the DDR did not account for the various actors who participated in the armed struggle. The emphasis on the trained guerilla by non-statutory forces contributed to the exclusion of women in this process. The process itself was not conceived in ways that took seriously the gender implications of demobilising, where, as in other cases, most women simply ‘auto-demobilised’ (Baaz and Stern, 2011).

Chapters Five casts women combatants in a greater relief, by exploring the different methods they used to fight against apartheid along its various contours. Chapter Six details the experiences of the women who participated in the official demobilisation and reintegration process as a whole. The objective is to demonstrate how women navigated the various stages of demobilisation, and the reasons that determined their decision not to join the SANDF, for those who had the option not to do so. The study also examines women’s experiences of the state programmes that are designed to assist them in the transition to civilian life. The experiences of the women who did not participate in the official demobilisation process, but who see themselves as deserving of benefiting from reintegration packages, pensions and the programmes of the military veterans department, are also explored. These are the experiences of the women who participated on the side of the SDUs, which were not recognised in the demobilisation act, as well as the current Military Veterans Act. Chapter Seven argues for the ways in which the recently founded Department of Military Veterans can address the failures of the DDR process and include the various combatants who were left out of the initial process, especially women.
CHAPTER FOUR
“THINGS LOOK DIFFERENT FROM BELOW”: LIFE HISTORIES AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter accounts for the use of the life histories interview method in the data collection process of this research. It demonstrates the ways in which a life history approach has been historically suitable for accounting for women’s experiences in qualitative research. It contextualises the life history method within the narrative approach, and goes on to demonstrate the ways in which narrative approaches are useful for feminist researchers. It also locates qualitative research that privileges women’s experiences of war, as an important methodological tool in feminist IR. Feminists in IR have argued that although discussions on war are the mainstay of the discipline, it seems ‘unprepared’ both ideologically and methodologically to include ordinary people in the analysis. In this regard, feminists have challenged mainstream IR “to pay more attention to war as experience” on the grounds that “war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people” and that means centering human bodies as “units that have war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms” (Sylvester, 2012: 484).

Chapter One demonstrated the ways in which both the literature on the anti-apartheid struggle as a guerilla war and feminists debates on women’s participation have obscured the foundational nature of women’s role as combatants of that war. Chapter Two showed that the framing of the demobilisation process, which privileged transnationally trained combatants, contributed to a further obscuring of the multifaceted ways in which women participated as combatants, and excluded most women from participating and benefitting in the state-led demobilisation process. This methodology chapter seeks to show that dominant social science methods analysing the anti-apartheid struggle have excluded women in their data sampling and analysis. It is argued that taking women’s contexts seriously implies that research does not merely seek to ‘prove’ accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but rather offers a space to expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thereby
creating a space for new categories to emerge. The chapter draws on the life history work of Bozzoli (1991) and Motsemme’s (2004) work on black women’s silences in the TRC, and Motsemme’s important doctoral work on lived and embodied suffering and healing among mothers and daughters in Chesterville Township, KwaZulu-Natal (2011), as examples of narrative approaches for documenting black women’s experiences of apartheid and post-apartheid life. In doing so, it is argued that the exclusion of women from what is conceived of as the “public political” (Motsemme, 2011) in examining the limits of apartheid violence, has created a methodological vacuum, which makes it difficult to locate women’s role in anti-apartheid violence and to then examine the ways in which they have transitioned from an ‘everydayness’ of violence in post-apartheid life. Therefore, centering women’s coping strategies after war means that one must first unmask the seemingly ‘private political’, without, as Motsemme (2011) warns, totalising the political nature of women’s subjectivities.

The chapter then focuses on the design of the study with regards to sampling techniques, the interview process, and locates the positionality of researcher of this study. It concludes by discussing thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this research.

4.2 Narrative research

Creswell (2009: 4) defines qualitative research as a “means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social problem”. In this regard, qualitative research centres the subjectivities of the participants and the ways in which they relate and make sense of society. Sandelowski (1991: 161) argues that “one mark of the turn away from positivism and toward interpretation in the behavioral [sic] and social sciences has been a renewed attention to the human ‘impulse to narrate’”. She further notes that social scientists under the influence of interpretive traditions such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, symbolic interactions, and feminist and cultural criticism, have developed a “literary consciousness” which sees them “assuming standpoints and employing techniques once distinctively associated with literal analysis and criticism” (Sandelowski, 1991: 161). Connelly and Clandinin (1990: 2) argue that “the study of narrative, therefore, is the study of the ways humans experience the world.” In this regard, the researcher assumes that, as these authors have noted, “people by nature lead storied lives and tell stories of those lives, whereas narrative researchers describe such lives, collect and tell stories of
them, and write narratives of experience” (ibid.). For Riessmann (2000), narrative methods permit the expression of human agency and imagination in the sense that:

with narrative, people strive to configure space and time, deploy cohesive devices, reveal identity of actors and relatedness of actions across scenes. They create themes, plots, and drama. In so doing, narrators make sense of themselves, social situations, and history (Bamberg and McCabe, 1998, cited in Riessmann, 2000: page number).

As Sandelowski (1991: 162) reminds us, “narrative assumes many forms”. Narratives are heard, seen and read; they are told, performed, painted, sculpted and written...they are international, trans-historical and transcultural”. Time and place consistently reconfigure the meanings that are given to narratives, therefore, narratives are not considered to be static because “narrators are socially positioned to tell stories at given biographical and historical moments, under the influence of prevailing cultural conventions of narrative and the audience for a telling”. For Sandelowski (1999: 162)

[n]arratives are understood as stories that include a temporal ordering of events and effort to make something out of those events: to render, or to signify, the experiences of persons-in-flux in a personally and culturally coherent, plausible manner.

Stephanie Taylor (2006) defines the stories that inform people’s identities as “discursive resources” (p. 94). She argues that people’s narratives about themselves are constantly negotiated because “in constructing a life narrative, a speaker will not be starting anew but presenting a version of what has been said before, albeit one shaped to do work in the particular circumstances of the telling” (p.98). In this regard, Taylor (2006) argues that “a life narrative can therefore be considered as a construction which is resourced by previous constructions which aggregate over time” (p. 98).
Raymond Suttner (2008) in *The ANC Underground*, points to the disjuncture of the narrative that Thandi Modise provides Jacklyn Cock (1991) regarding power relations between men and women in MK camps, and a later narrative that Modise gives to Robyn Curnow (2000). In the earlier narrative to Cock (1991), Modise emphasises that relations between MK men and women were equal, that women were not subjected to constant sexual harassment, nor did they undermine their positions of authority. But a decade later, in an interview with Curnow (2000), Modise cites a pervasive patriarchal culture within MK. She narrates that women combatants had to prove themselves to their male comrades, where, she notes, “we said we wanted to be treated like everybody... so we dug the trenches and the men would sit there and smoke and we dug!” (Curnow, 2000: 38). The sentiments about the patriarchal culture within MK were also expressed to me by Modise, when I interviewed her for a documentary project on women in the security sector in 2010. At the time, I was working as a consultant in the security sector governance programme of the Institute for Security Studies, primarily under Professor Cheryl Hendricks, who was leading projects on women, peace and security in Africa. I co-produced with Hendricks a documentary on women in the security sector in South Africa, the aim of which was to track the journeys of key women in the South African security sector, i.e. how they became involved in the sector, what the challenges were that they had to confront, what they saw as their major contribution to facilitating gender equality in the security sector, and what lessons they could share from their experiences. We did this by profiling three women, Thandi Modise, who was then the deputy-secretary general of the ANC, Major-General Ntsiki Memela-Motumi, who was then Chief Director Transformation Management in the SANDF, and Mala Singh, the former South African Police Service Deputy Commissioner, who was in 2010 the Executive Director of Human Resources at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Modise detailed life in Nova Catengue camp in Angola. She echoed the anecdote shared in her interview with Curnow (2000) that women combatants faced the burden of proving themselves as equal soldiers to their counterparts by taking on more tasks than their male comrades.

In reconciling the disjuncture in Modise’s narrating of gender politics with MK a decade apart, Suttner (2009) postulates that the timing may have something to do with how much

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Modise could reveal to Cock, where Cock’s interview took place at a politically fragile time of the political transition, where the liberation movements, especially the ANC, were obliged to appear as representing a united front. The interview with Curnow (and subsequently that with Hendricks and Magadla in 2010) takes place when the ANC had firmly cemented its power in post-apartheid South Africa. The different contexts then permitted a different telling of the same story, which allowed Modise to reveal some details about gendered differences that would not compromise the political context of the present time.

Although Modise is not a narrative researcher, the example shows that narrative researchers ought to be aware that the narrative scripts that research participants are able to reveal at particular moments, are shaped by the contexts within which the narratives are being shared. Context and time determines what can be revealed and what remains hidden. It is also the case that because of time and space, Modise’s own ideas about gender may have changed over time giving new meaning to her interpretation(s) of life at the MK camps. As Riessmann (2000) points out, researchers ought to be aware that act of narration is a configuration of space and time by individuals, where, narratives are not static, but instead, are ever-changing.

In the case of Zimbabwe, Lyons (2004) also notes that it was close to fifteen years after the fall of Rhodesia that the women having participated in the liberation movements on the side of ZANU and ZAPU, began to narrate their experiences of unequal power relations between themselves and male combatants. One of the key moments that led to a public discussion about sexual politics in the liberation movements in Zimbabwe was cultivated by the release of the 1995 film, Flash, which documented the experiences of women in the training camps, and their suffering in post-independence Zimbabwe, because their war efforts remained unrecognised. The film and the legacy of sexual violence in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was evoked again in August 2016 following a news report “alleging that former vice-president Joice Mujuru, then a teenager, slept with a commander during the liberation struggle”, igniting a “debate on how women were abused during the struggle” (Zhangazha, 2016:n.d). A response by a Zanu PF official to the report noted that the treatment of “young girls during the war” remains an “untold story of the liberation struggle” (Zhangazha, 2016:n.d).

As Duff and Bell (2002: 208) argues, narrative researchers are cognisant of the fact that “people make sense of their lives according to the narratives available to them, that stories are constantly being restructured in the light of new events, and that stories do not exist in a vacuum
but are shaped by lifelong personal and community narratives”. As Plummer (in Riessman, 2000: cited page in Riesmsman) notes, all narratives are relational in that for them to “flourish there must be a community to hear...for communities to hear, there must be stories which weave together their history, their identity, their politics”.

Feminist researchers have used life histories as a methodological tool to move away from methods that depart from the general view which that “we already have knowledge about the culture in general against which individuals can be evaluated” (Geiger, 1986: 337). By doing so, feminist research makes visible the continued failure of “traditional social science research to encompass women’s experiences and perceptions”, and in this regard, “women’s life histories provide concrete substantiation for our claims that these cultural generalizations [sic] and models of social life are typically androcentric” (Geiger, 1986: 337). Furthermore, feminists have used life histories to also challenge dominant notions of objectivity expected from social research, which often function to silence the different interests and power dynamics that shape all processes of research. According to Geiger (1986: 338):

“...feminist scholars have revealed that notions of objectivity themselves are androcentric and that higher levels of abstraction assumed to present a ‘true’ picture of ‘reality’ often represent neither truth nor reality for women. From this vantage point, it is evident that precisely because they are subjective documents, life histories exhibit integrity: they do not claim ‘ungendered point-of-viewlessness’.”

Sangster (1994) shows that it is not only the South African case where women often do not place their own narratives in the center, even in cases where they have the space to articulate their roles in movements, as was the case with the women who testified in front of the TRC (Ross, 2004). She notes that even in narrating their histories, “women are less likely than men to place themselves at the centre of public events; they downplayed their own activities, emphasizing [sic] the role of other family members in their recollections” (Sangster, 1994: 7). The work of Motsemme (2004, 2011) below shows the multiple and complex ways in which women’s silences can be understood in social research and why silence is a language-in-itself.
The next section locates the ways in which feminist scholars in IR have recentered women’s role in war by centering the physical body as an important object of analysis. Feminists IR scholars have challenged “malestream” IR’s silence on women’s experiences by making visible the different guises that women appear as protagonists in war time. In this way, women appear in different roles, beyond those of victims and perpetrators, but in complex ways that sustain the political economy of wartime.

4.3 “In the shadows of IR people dwell”: IR writing women in war

What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations? To date IR has been operating comfortably in a world of theoretical abstractions — states, systems, power, balances, stakeholders, decision-makers — tacitly leaving people and war to journalists, novelists, memoirists, relief workers, anthropologists, women’s studies and social history to flesh out.

(Sylvester, 2012: 483-484)

It is noted in Chapter Two that the study of IR was founded as a response to the devastation of WWI (Carr, 2001; Tickner, 1992). According to E.H. Carr, “the war of 1914-18 made an end to the view that war is a matter which affects only professional soldiers, in so doing, dissipated the corresponding impression that international politics could safely be left in the hands of professional diplomats” (2001: 3). As noted by Tickner (1992), the founding objective of the discipline became the desire to prevent the occurrence of another war. In the article, War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory (2012), Sylvester presents a hard-hitting critique of the discipline of IR’s failure to examine war as experience, rather as a contestation of power. In this obsession with power balances, Sylvester (2012) argues that IR theories are not only mute on war as a bodily experience, but that the discipline seems “unprepared” to include ordinary people in the analysis. In this regard, she challenges the field “to pay more attention to war as experience”, on the grounds that “war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people”, by which she means centering human bodies as “units that have war agency and are also prime targets of war violence and war enthusiasms” (Sylvester, 2012: 484).
Sylvester’s (2012) critique of mainstream IR’s analysis of war with the absence of actual experiences of individuals has been at the core of the critique of feminist IR, whose departure point is to understand the varied ways in which women and men are thrust into war. It is for these reasons that feminist IR has reconfigured debates on war in the discipline by insisting on a fieldwork-based analysis of war.

Tickner (2005) notes that “IR feminists have used a variety of methods, most of which would fall into methodological frameworks that have variously been described as post-positivist, reflectivist, or interpretivist” (p. 2). Indeed, Tickner (2005) posits that most IR feminist work “has been situated in critical, constructivist or post-modern rather than empiricist frameworks” (p. 3), which privilege objective truths. Like Sylvester (2012), Tickner (2005) argues that “the questions that IR has asked since the discipline was founded have typically been about the behavior of states, particularly powerful states and their security seeking behavior [sic], given an anarchical international environment” (p. 5). Whereas, for Tickner (2005):

Most IR feminists have asked very different questions and used different methodological perspectives within which to provide their answers. While they may seek to understand state behavior, they do so in the context of asking why, in so many parts of the world, women remain fundamentally disempowered in matters of foreign and military policy ...moreover, the questions that feminists deem important are typically not adequately answerable within a conventional scientific framework. Feminist questions challenge the core assumptions of the discipline and deconstruct its central concepts; many of them are constitutive rather than causal (p. 6).

In the chapter in the volume edited by Naeem Inayatullah, Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR (2011) Narendran Kumarakulsingam reflects on his difficulty in theorising violence in Sri Lanka, where he realised that “violence fractures theory...it bends, distorts, breaks...your/my theory” (p. 36). This volume has been followed by another edited by Inayatullah and Dauphinee, Narrative Global Politics: Theory, History and the Personal in International Relations (2016), opening up a space within IR where they “seek to bind together theory, history, culture and the personal into a differentiated and vibrant whole”, in order “to
move the field of International Relations towards greater candidness about how personal narratives influence theoretical articulations” (2011: 6).

Noted war anthropologist, Nordstrom (2005) argues that going into the frontlines of warzones has enabled feminists to fundamentally challenge the conception of frontlines and the conception of combatant and non-combatants. In this sense, it is through qualitative methods, ‘speaking from the data’ as it were, that has informed feminist IR to move beyond a mere dogmatic understanding of war, and insist on contextual and realistic responses to the material and symbolic realities of war.

For Nordstrom (2005) talks about how conducting research in the warzones in Sri Lanka and Mozambique forced her to challenge conventional understanding of what constitutes the so-called ‘frontline’:

“...I realized [sic] that the whole discussion about women serving in the military is moot, and it is dangerous. In war, women are serving whether they are in a recognized [sic] military unit or not. They carry out primary functions of war; they are central targets, they are tortured and killed in numbers as great as, and often greater than, males...and they are generally unarmed. There is a profound irony in this: women in many locales are denied access to military combat positions because, ostensibly, it is too dangerous. This leaves them vulnerable to attack without weapons, training, and backup. My focus rests with a world today where the majority of battle deaths are civilians, and wars rage across community centers [sic], not remote battlefields. In such a world, the unarmed are the frontlines (Nordstrom, 2005: 402, original emphasis).

In the case of women and the war in Zimbabwe, O’Gorman (2011) meanwhile argues that

“[t]he analysis of life histories acknowledges women as agents in war, rather than simply as victims, and validates civilian experiences of war. The notion of voice is thus important in representing women’s differentiated experiences of
war to generate a more inclusive rendering of resistance in a revolutionary setting’ (p. 8).

In Chapter Three, the literature shows that the cases of demobilisation in Africa differs markedly to North American and European cases, where women and children are drawn into the epicentres of the war, as Nordstrom has noted above. In *Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of Frelimo’s ‘Female Detachment’*, West (2000) points out that, although the national liberation movement in Mozambique, The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), claimed that the women combatants who joined FRELIMO were eighteen years and older, the oral histories gathered “suggest that from quite early in the war, FRELIMO guerilla commanders systematically recruited (and sometimes armed) girls as young as ten year-of-age to assist the guerillas, although the training given such recruits was, at first, often minimal” (p. 183). From the oral histories, the women who were then young girls forming the female detachment, recounted that FRELIMO deployed them in the “advanced war zones” where the party was struggling to win support (West, 2000: 187). They pointed out that women were chosen because “as unfamiliar outsiders, they attracted less attention than men” (West, 2000: 187). Even further, the FRELIMO combatants argued that they were “effective in encouraging women to prod their husbands into joining the cause, and boasted that, simply as their example as women who had taken up the struggle, they often shaped men into joining FRELIMO” (West, 2000: 187).

The work of Mama and Okazawa-Rey (2012) examining the different ways in which women participated in the war economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is an example of feminist work that is informed by women’s experience, instead of imposing established categories on their realities. It is from taking the experiential seriously that Mama and Okazawa-Rey (2012) argued that “‘war and ‘peace’ are no the discrete, opposite conditions and circumstances...especially for women, the boundary between conflict and post-conflict is not so clearly demarcated” (Mama and Okazawa-Ray, 2012: 117). Enloe’s pioneering work (1989), which was also informed by qualitative research that took women’s personal narratives seriously, contributed to an important shift in feminist IR, the focus of which until then had been on recovering women as soldiers and guerillas warzones. Enloe’s contribution made visible the reality that women indeed participate in warzones in all kinds of roles, as soldiers, nurses, cooks, sex workers, wives and much more. Enloe (1989) showed that to understand the political
The economy of war means taking seriously all the different ways in which women participate in its maintenance, so as to think creatively about the ways in which to undermine and move beyond the systematic violence. As Sylvester (2012: 495) argues, “feminist IR research foregrounds experience – the lived experiences of women mostly, because these are less commonly credited with historical importance.”

The section below shows that writing women into the anti-apartheid archive, across disciplines, has constituted an insistence by feminists in these disciplines on the writing of women’s lived experience that often challenge the ‘public political’ (Motsemme, 2011) theorisation of life under apartheid and beyond.

4.4 Gender and struggle writing: silence as resistance

The Speed of Life
Now that our one-to-one TRC is done,
no cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop
I thank you for asking that we speak.

Now as we speed away in different directions, again
without cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop,
I ask for silence.
I cannot bear the piercing echoes:
I am sorry
I didn’t know
I simply don’t understand how I could have been so self-absorbed
It’s so out of character
It feels so long ago, so unclear

I just wish to pace through my journey at the regular speed of life,
forever
with no cameras, counselors, note-takers, translators and the archbishop.

Makhosazana Xaba (2008: 8)
It is important that I acknowledge that in locating work that centres on gender in writing about the apartheid, I have drawn heavily from the work of sociologists. From Jacklyn Cock, this particular section draws on sociologists Belinda Bozzoli, Debby Bonnin and most extensively, on the work of Nthabiseng Motsemme. As Tickner (2005) also acknowledges,

unlike conventional social science IR, which draws on models from economics and the natural sciences to explain the behavior of states in the international system, IR feminists have used sociological analyses that begin with individuals and the hierarchical social relations in which their lives are situated (p. 7).

Sangster (1994) also argues that oral histories in feminist research “not only redirects our gaze to overlooked topics, but it is also a methodology directly informed by interdisciplinary feminist debates about our research objectives, questions, and use of the interview material” (p. 6). Bozzoli’s *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migration in South Africa 1900 – 1983* (1991) contains twenty-two life histories of black African women from Phokeng in the former Bantustan of Bophuthatswana. Declaring that “things look different from below”, Bozzoli (1991:3) argues that “conventional sociological methods – the structured attitude survey, the questionnaire, or the rigid interview – are poor tools for understanding this elusive force” of how individuals come into consciousness. Bozzoli’s study shows that to study consciousness through the lives of black women living under apartheid, alerts the researcher to the various intersections that shape women’s lives, and the language they use to articulate their consciousness. Taking the intersections of race, class and gender into account, means understanding that even the conception of ‘hegemony’ by sociologists:

should in fact be modified to cope with the fact that the women of Phokeng are and were not simply the objects of the policies of white government and industrialising power-brokers – but they were affected by the policies of their own black chiefs and elders as well, so their oppositional visions contained within them contradictory forces. Opposition to one’s parent’s choice of a marriage partner might well entail an embracing of the individualism offered by the new society, while resisting the imposition of passes upon women may be
cast in terms of a preindustrial ideal vision of the family. The complexities involved in understanding the terms ‘resistance’ or ‘opposition’ are considerable when one perceives people as being intricately enmeshed in different types of domination such that opposition to one type may involve collaboration with another.

Taking women’s contexts seriously implies that the research does not merely seek to “prove” accepted categories through the lived experiences of participants, but rather offers a space in which to expand social categories in ways that speak to these realities, thus creating a space for new categories to emerge.

As pointed out in Chapter Two, Motsemme (2011:2) argues that studies on the violence in townships in the 1980s and 1990s are “conceived and characterised as largely public-political’. She notes that Bonnin’s work (1997, 2000 discussed in Chapter One) on women, township space and political violence in KZN “marks a significant departure” from the dominant “positivist and deterministic political-economy studies” (Motsemme, 2011:9). For Motsemme (2011: 10), Bonnin’s contribution “demonstrates how understanding of the historical, sexual and gendered nature of violence was important to grasp in order to reveal the layerdness and depth of the violence that overtook township life in the 1980s”. Motsemme (2011), however, criticises Bonnin for minimising the voices of African women in her work, in favour of centering her theoretical concepts, as well as for reproducing stereotypical binary images of African women as:

- heroic figures on the one end and stoic figures on other end of the spectrum, thus missing an opportunity to conceptualise them as complex and contradictory mothers, daughters, sisters and aunts who are also attempting to carve lives of dignity amidst economic scarcity and violence (Motsemme, 2011:13).

Motsemme, in The Mute Always Speak: On Women’s Silences at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004), examines the ways in which the TRC process relied heavily on a verbal account of the human experiences of violation during apartheid. She argues that the TRC did not offer its participants the required tools with which to articulate their experiences beyond spoken language, for those who discovered that their experiences remained
“unspeakable” (Motsemme, 2004: 915). She asks, “what happens when those who have been denied the occasion to tell their stories, and those whose bodies and cultures have been systematically violated and dehumanized, discover that there are things that remain unspeakable?...are these bodies simply forgotten in history?” (Motsemme, 2004: 915). She argues for social science methods that are able to comprehend the language of silence, including those devised by feminism.

Motsemme (2004: 916-917) acknowledges that “within feminist and women’s writings, the importance of speech for women to articulate their story, which has often been distorted or suppressed, is well established” in the sense that feminist project “seeks to give those who have been previously silenced the occasion to speak and to allow their feelings, thoughts, and actions to come to full view”. She notes that in much of feminist work, “breaking silences is viewed as a gesture of defiance” while silence is often “seen as giving someone else the permission to inscribe and dominate you” (Motsemme, 2004: 917). She points out that silence under apartheid was a matter of life and death, where women’s narratives revealed the extent to which their ability to keep silent served the protection of “loved ones or fellow comrades who were hidden in the house, neighboring towns, or had crossed borders and the state or from vigilante groups who were hunting them down” (Motsemme, 2004: 918). In this case, she argues that “through acts of refusal to submit to the state’s invasive harassment to reveal the whereabouts of sons and husbands, ordinary women were simultaneously voicing their awareness of their sociopolitical situations” (Motsemme, 2004: 919). She argues further that the disruption of family life and the normal nature of violence saw women resorting to silence in order to avoid discussing the violence almost as if to wish it away. More precisely, Motsemme notes that

For example, gunshots and running footsteps just outside one’s yard would awaken households in the quiet of the night. However, when families woke up in the morning, it was life as usual – porridge to be prepared for breakfast; uniforms to be ironed; baths to be timed; and other last-minute preparations for school and work. There might be a vague, or more commonly not a single utterance about what everyone had witnessed and heard during the night...This silence, which women’s narratives echo, is one which attempts to compensate for the loss of innocence for children who lived in a violent everyday in which

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women had, and continue to have, little power to change (Motsemme, 2004: 921).

Motsemme (2004) points out that often women’s use of silence as a coping strategy is interpreted as their strength, in the sense that it is read as women’s capacity to withstand high levels of pain and physical and mental violation. She argues that the “strong woman” myth has contributed to a limited understanding of “women’s notion of pain, suffering, humiliation and joy remain limited within the social sciences” (Motsemme, 2004: 924). In her doctoral work on township women’s subjectivities during apartheid, Motsemme (2011:17) argues that

[w]hether intended or unintended, what emerged from [these] kinds of framing of townships and township subjectivities, was a systematic erasure of resident’s subjective experiences and voices, and how this violence had intimately folded into their everyday lives and become a source of embodied existential suffering as well as bases to act creatively.

Motsemme’s analysis (2004) is important for this analysis in that in the process of this research, I became suspicious of the narrative that women veterans have not participated in post-apartheid criminality, like their male counterparts, because they are “stronger” than men mentally. As Motsemme (2011: 116) explains,

[t]he stoic figure is, of course, a very common one in African women’s iconography. A stoic person is basically someone who appears unaffected by emotions, and is generally admired for showing patience in the face of adversity...themes of resignation, endurance, and grief so memorably embodied in women’s stoic bodies, are strong themes in surviving oppression and poverty. In this sense stoicism is then strongly associated with performing dignity in the midst of hardship (original emphasis).

As discussed in Chapter Five below, the imposed and self-ascribed notion of women’s strength is the un-articulated but accepted assumption in the literature regarding why, for
instance, women have not used their military training to pose a security threat to the state or their communities after 1994. It is important to point to these silences in the narratives provided by the women and the ways in which they reveal the extent to which women “cope” with the transition to civilian life, as well as how this same narrative of strength poses the danger of obscuring women’s need for assistance with the process of reintegration, both materially and psychologically. One can imagine that the virtues of stoicism becomes amplified when one is a combatant. The historic image of the sacrificial soldier and the sacrificial mother may indeed become intertwined, leaving little room for women to articulate their personal challenges and their need for state assistance. Chapter Five reveals the various challenges that women combatants face, as the majority of the women interviewed for this study are the heads of their households, and often also assist their extended families.

The opening poem to this section, by Makhosazana Xaba, is the first of a series of her poetry used in this thesis, as a way of accepting Motsemme’s (2004) challenge that the social sciences ought to begin to use alternative tools to reflect on women’s experiences. Xaba is a former MK combatant, and a participant in this study. The quotes from songs that have been used in previous chapters also serve the same purpose.

Further illustrating women’s invisibility in post-apartheid writing of the anti-apartheid struggle, Unterhalter in *The Work of the Nation: Heroic Masculinity in South African Autobiographical Writing of the Anti-Apartheid Struggle* (2006), notes that while autobiographical writing in the Euro-American world “has been a generative form for women’s voice and creativity”, South African autobiographical writing of the anti-apartheid struggle departs from this trend, where it is men who dominate this narrative form (p. 160). Of the 66 texts that Unterhalter examines, 42 are written by men, with an over-representation of white men and a gross under-representation of black African women. She categorises the writing into three categories, firstly, “prison autobiographies”, which describe the physical and emotional consequences of political imprisonment. The second category is termed “journey autobiographies”, which catalogue “the movement from oppression to liberation, from exile to home, from exclusion to belonging”. The third category is that of “adventure autobiographies”, in which “the struggle is often portrayed as exciting and where politics, or living on a politicised terrain, is a matter of fast-paced narration – the political picturesque” (Unterhalter, 2006: 161).
She contrasts the autobiographical writing of Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo to that of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Ruth First, in order to demonstrate the ways in which men and women made sense of the sacrifices necessitated by political struggle, and how they wrote about their private lives. In the case of Nelson and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, she argues that the former’s writing describes home life as the conventional “soft” world that is contrasted with the hardness of life in prison in that:

his wife is associated with the soft world of outside prison. This is a world of silk dressing gowns, care of children, family connections, a feminine presence. Mandela describes his wife subject to stress, wounded by the abruptness of the guards, or just surviving under the skin of her smart clothes...Winnie’s own account, however, of her life after her husband’s arrest is not of anything ‘soft’, but of mental and physical hardship, constant surveillance by the police and the press, the official censoring of any political discussions between her husband and herself (Unterhalter, 2006: 169).

She concludes that the implications of the inscribed heroism that is articulated in the autobiographies by the mostly male participates of the struggle, is that it

…maintains a notion of women’s invisibility or homogeneity. In the discourse of heroic masculinity women may be ungendered equal comrades, they may be heroines who inspire, but somehow do not live the struggle. They may be the wounded, or the innocent the supportive relatives. In all these guises they have no autonomy, no different political interests, and no struggle. Their views are always expressed or interpreted by men (Unterhalter, 2006: 174).

This research wants to shed light on the women who are less publically known, when compared to the well-documented experiences of women such as Madikizela-Mandela. Chapter Five makes visible the ways in which women were affected by and participated in the armed struggle from various positions that framed their tools of participation in combat. The rationale for this was firstly to take up Motseemme’s (2011) call to transform the ‘public political’, and to
then examine the ways in which these women have transitioned from an ‘everydayness’ of violence into post-apartheid life. Therefore, centering women’s coping strategies after war means that one must first examine the seemingly ‘private political’, without which Motsemme (2011) warns, one contributes to the totalitising of the political nature of these women’s subjectivities. As shown through Bozzoli (1991), Motsemme (2004 and 2011) and Unterhalter (2006), women’s experiences of apartheid violence often alters the conventionally accepted notions of political consciousness, reconfiguring the conception of silence as compliance into one of silence as resistance, all the while often lacking in military uniforms.

4.5 Research design and method

4.5.1 Sampling

The sampling of this study did not aim to offer a ‘comprehensive’ representation of women combatants and their transition to civilian life. As argued in the first chapter, the nature of the armed struggle complicates the definition of combatant. Furthermore, there are no available statistics of the number of women who were involved in MK, APLA, Amabutho and other self-defence units. As noted by Motumi and Hudson (1995; also Motumi and McKenzie 1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009), the CPR list was fraught with challenges, as many participants were left out of it due to their inability to prove their identity, because they had had a number of aliases throughout their period of involvement. Part of the work of “recovery” that the Department of Military Veterans is undertaking is the registration of former combatants, who were left out of the initial formal process.

As argued in Chapter 3, the sample includes those who are not recognised as former combatants in the post-apartheid veterans legislation of 2011. In 2012, when working on the proposal for this research, I observed oral history workshops on the subject of Amabutho SDU in KwaZakhele in Port Elizabeth. The workshops focused on the groups’ role in the armed struggle. They were conducted by Janet Cherry, a colleague at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) and Theresa Edlmann, who was then writing up her doctoral thesis and heading the Legacies of Apartheid Wars project in the Rhodes University History Department. It
was in that year of observing that I became familiar with Amabutho’s role and their quest to gain legislative recognition in the current military veteran’s framework. This year-long observation challenged my assumptions about conceptions of combat. Until then, my understanding of combatants in general had focused on the transnationally trained combatant.

It was the leadership of Amabutho that directed me in 2013, when I began the fieldwork, to the women who were involved in Amabutho at the height of apartheid violence. It was the women themselves who then directed me to the women with whom they were involved. In this regard, snowball sampling was the key method of securing participants for this study.

It was also a similar process of snowballing that I used to gain access to MK and APLA combatants. For MK members, I visited the ANC office in Port Elizabeth, where I was given contact details of the Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) secretary, who then directed me to the deputy secretary of MKMVA, Nomfundiso Kulati. She would be my first MK participant. She directed me to MKs in PE, around the Eastern Cape, and Gauteng. After not being able to locate the PAC office in Port Elizabeth, I managed to find a PAC councillor in East London. He generously drove me to Nomvo Booi’s home in Amalinda, who is a founding member of the PAC, and received military training in Angola. I had read about Ma-Booi’s life story in a collection of essays edited by Lauretta Ngcobo called *Prodigal Daughters: Stories of South African Women in Exile* (2012). I could not believe my luck that I was getting the opportunity to meet her in person.

Ma-Booi’s daughter assisted me with some details of her mother’s life that she could not discuss herself, as she had suffered a stroke in 2009. Her daughter also gave me contacts of a senior PAC leader who had worked with her mother, allowing me to contact an APLA woman combatant in Mpumalanga, Joyce Sifuba, who then also directed me to two other APLA women. It was the PAC councillor in East London who shared contacts of an APLA leader in Umthatha. Upon calling him, he told me to find my way there, so that he could drive me to the women in Mqanduli, in Umthatha. I hopped on the bus the same day, slept on a friend’s couch, and in the morning I was on the road to Jixeni Village in Mqanduli, where I interviewed a group of women in their 80s, who had participating in what was then Poqo, in 1963.

I was also assisted by academic colleagues, such as Raymond Suttner, who I contacted after reading their work. They trusted me with their contacts from their time in the field. But in the main, it was the individual women of MK, APLA, Amabutho, who generously trusted me
with the cellphone numbers of their friends and comrades which resulted in the interviews of 36 women who participated in the armed struggle presented here.

I was also warmly welcomed at the Department of Military Veterans, where I showed up unannounced. I am grateful to Ntate Moloto, who asked me hard questions about this research, and directed me to Patricia Noyoo, Director of Social Services at the DMV, who was able to give me some of the figures of veterans receiving benefits from the department. I conducted the last interview in November 2014 at a research and stakeholders conference hosted by the DMV at UNISA. The participant is an employee of DMV, who had participated in the SDUs in Mamelodi. The interview was conducted in the corridors of the lecture hall where the conference activities had taken place.

So much of this sample is a result of the generosity of strangers, who were willing to open up about their lives talking about a difficult history, and also encouraged their friends to do the same.

The diagrammes below provide a representation of the profile of the participants in terms of affiliation, age, time of involvement, military training, countries of settlement during political involvement integration to the SANDF and official demobilisation. While I did have additional informal interviews with women and men of the different organisations, the table below accounts for the number of formal interviews conducted.
Figure 1: Number of Participants and Affiliation - 8 July 2013 - 23 May 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amabutho</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDU Pretoria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Military Veterans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 38
Figure 2: Age and Location of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Participants</th>
<th>Location of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born between 1928 - 1969</td>
<td>- 14 located in PE at time of interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 Peddie (interview conducted in East London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 6 Umthatha (5 in Jixeni village, Mqanduli, and 1 Umthatha central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2 Butterworth (phone interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2 Gauteng (phone interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 Somerset East (phone interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 Grahamstown interview (participant based in Johannesburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 8 conducted in Pretoria and Johannesburg May 2014 and November 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Total 5 telephone interviews]

Figure 3: Military Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received Training</th>
<th>Military Training</th>
<th>Partial training</th>
<th>Places of military training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 former MK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania, Lesotho, Angola, Germany, Cuba, Russia (Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 APLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swaziland, Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Amabutho marshals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL - 23
Figure 4: Era of Involvement in Armed Struggle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 MK (1961 &amp; 1962)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 MK</td>
<td>13 MK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 APLA (1961/1963/1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 APLA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Amabutho</td>
<td>8 Amabutho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Participants Who Have Served Time in Jail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Months/Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MK and 1 APLA</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 MK &amp; 1 APLA</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 MKs</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 MK</td>
<td>Undefined period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Different countries of Settlement by Participants
- Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Cuba, Russia, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Greece.

Figure 7: Officially Demobilised
- 18 officially demobilised (16 MK, 2 APLA)
- 18 participants received a once off R20 000 during demobilisation
- 1 received R40 000

Figure 8: Integrated to SANDF
- 4 former MK members
- 2 left between 1996 and 1997
- Two left after retirement
4.5.2 The interview process

The work of Motsemme (2004) and Segalo (2011) cautions that conducting research with people who have undergone violence means that there are things that will remain ‘unspeakable’. In adopting a life history method, I had recognised that it would be insufficient to examine the civilian integration of women combatants by only focusing on their demobilisation process and life after demobilisation. By using the life history method, it was possible to understand the ways in which women were thrust into the theatre of apartheid violence. It is due to the data that is provided by life history research that my analysis was obliged not to depart from the demobilisation process, but to ask deeper historical questions about the nature of the war itself, and the ways in which it accounts for how women participated and which forms of participation are recognised in the post-apartheid imagination and legislation.

Thus, the structure of the interview was that it started with questions about place of birth, where the participant grew up, went to school, where and how they started to become politically involved, how they were involved, for those who left the country – how they left the country, how they returned, and whether they participated in the demobilisation process. For those who did participate, I asked for the reasons why they opted not to integrate into the new SANDF, and for those who integrated and left shortly thereafter, I asked for reasons for their quick exit from the force. The length of the interview differed between three hours for the longest, to the shortest interview being about 30 minutes. I noted that the longest interviews were with the women who had left the country, and had resided in various countries in and out of Africa. I noticed that starting from the beginning, that is birth, I allowed the interviews to flow easily, to a point where I hardly had to interject while the participant was narrating their life. Yet, because of the distance of time, the life history method also allowed participants to arrange their lives as they remembered them.

In the section below, I reflect on the process of interviewing women about their role in the armed struggle and post-apartheid life.

4.5.3 Positionality: “one needs a strong stomach”

‘Whose research is it? Is her spirit clear? Does he have a good heart? What other baggage are they carrying?’

(Smith, 1999, p. 10).

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In *Southern African Liberation Struggles: New Local, Regional and Global Perspectives*, Sapire and Saunders (2013: 293) argue that in time, as it already is the case, “greater distance will grow between those who write these struggles and the struggles themselves”. As Smith further argues, “research is not an innocent or distant academic exercise but an activity that has something at stake and that occurs in a set of political and social conditions,” where my own positionality as researcher plays a vital role as it influences the exercise of research and its implications (Smith, 1999: 5). In earlier chapters, I have made a strong case for the importance of time and space. It follows that time and space come to bear where this research has been undertaken place two decades after the end of apartheid.

Before I reflect on what it meant to sit in the homes and offices of the women who took part in this study with them, listening to them recount their lives, I would like to first share a little bit about the personal road that led me to this research. If, as Smith (1999) and other feminist scholars have argued, research is not apolitical, it is also does not emanate from a vacuum. The kinds of questions that we ask are often shaped by a particular personal history which leads us to connect our own experience, those of our participants, with broader national and global structural processes. As Inayatullah (2011) argues, “theoretical decisions emerge from theorist’s needs and wounds” (p. 6).

The feminist powerhouse Cynthia Enloe (1989) has related that she began to think about women and militarism after reading her mother’s diaries during the time her father was serving as a soldier. Enloe, who had thought of militarism as affecting the uniformed soldier, was profoundly changed by her mother’s reflections and the ways in which the mother was also ‘serving’ in the military, because of the way in which her life was consumed by the war.

My own father was integrated into the SANDF from the Transkei Defence Force under Bantu Holomisa. He took ‘early retirement’ in 1996, what I now understand as the rationalisation project that was headed by then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise. At the time, I was merely 10 years old. His transition to civilian life had a profound impact on our family life, and I have vivid memories of him whistling in the morning while polishing his shoes in full military uniform. My curiosity was also compounded by the fact that my mother, who is a psychiatric nurse, used to come home with dramatic stories about the recently retired soldiers in her ward, who were
suffering with mental illness following their demobilisation. It was from my father that I heard of the case of Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela, who shot dead six white SANDF members, including a white civilian woman, at the Tempe Military base in Bloemfontein (Mashike and Mokalobe, 2003: 15) on 9 September, 1999. Madubela, a former APLA combatant, was from my hometown of Umthatha. I vaguely remember the television and radio reports about Colin Chauke, the former MK combatant turned cash-in-transit robber, and wanted fugitive. So, while the public image of the soldier is that of control, I grew up with an alternative archive of images of former soldiers who were overwhelmed by the realities of everyday life.

Thereafter, reading the literature on demobilisation while I was an intern in the then Security Sector Governance at the Institute for Security Studies provided the language by means of which to understand the sudden early retirement of my father, at what was such a young age. It also allowed me to understand the mental and psychological destabilisation that many of his peers experienced as they demobilised. I better understood the profile of the demobilised soldier, which Cook defines as the “walking wounded – depressed and violent men unable to overcome the traumas of combat and the institutions of war” (Cook, 2006: 41), which informs the debates on post-war demobilisation in this country.

In a sense, the literature helped me place my own family history within a broader national process of transition and reintegration. What I found missing in this narrative were the stories of the women who had fought in the armed struggle. They did not feature in the images of combatants who had turned robbers and private security mercenaries.

When I have had the opportunity to speak to the often-male colleagues who conduct research on DDR, I have in fact asked them why their samples do not include women. Often the response is that the women are “not ready” to talk about their lives as combatants and life afterwards. In one case, a colleague, upon hearing about the focus of my research, insisted that I spend time in Cape Town, where he would help me locate the women who were former APLA combatants. I then asked him why he hadn’t included them in his sample on APLA combatants reintegration into civilian life, and surprisingly, he did not have a response. When I began my fieldwork, I realised that the assertion that women are “not ready to talk” often comes from researchers, who have in fact not invited women to participate in their research. In the duration
of my research, only one former combatant ultimately declined an interview, preferring to seek
approval from her political party before doing so.

Throughout the interview experience, I had in mind the words of a former MK woman
who had advised me when the research was still in its initial stages, that to examine this part of
our history, “one needs a strong stomach”. I was obliged to use the same phrase when I reviewed
Mandla Langa’s novel *The Texture of Shadows* (Magadla, 2015). In terms of my own personal
transformation during this manner of fieldwork, it became a ritual that I would take a shower
after each of the interviews I faced. When I think about it now, it was my own attempt at
cleansing myself of the heaviness of the lives I was made witness to in these encounters. I cannot
describe how it felt, for example, when I interviewed a woman who was a marshall for
Amabutho, when she suddenly stopped mid-interview, because she was telling me about her son
and how he had died, shot in front of the house in which we sat talking. She stood up and had a
drink of water. I sat quietly. After just a few minutes, she came back and continued the
interview.

Even though the content of the interviews was difficult, I felt a profound gratitude as a
black woman to sit in the homes and offices of women who told me about their world and the
choices that context allowed them to make while under siege. I wish I could say much more
about the experience in the field, but in this regard, language escapes me.

4.6 Data analysis

In the research process, the analysis of the findings hinge on the alignment between the methods
used to collect data, life histories, and the chosen tool of analysis. Attride-Stirling (2001) notes
that in most qualitative research, there is a notable omission of the “how” question from accounts
of the way in which the data was analysed by researchers. Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that
most research suffers in explaining the process of analysis, because researchers make the mistake
of treating their interpretation of the data as self-evident, instead of seeing it as a critical process
that involves complex decisions that the researcher makes in deciding which elements of the data
are foregrounded, and which are less significant. In this regard, they argue that the process of
data analysis involves a series of decisions in which the research shows that “the theoretical
framework and methods match what the researcher wants to know”, and that the process of
analysing the data and the inferring on results involves stages of making decisions about the meaning of the data, with regards to the questions posed and these decisions about the data ought to “acknowledge these decisions, and recognize [sic] them as decisions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 80 emphasis original).

For this research, I used thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) describe thematic analysis as a “foundational method for qualitative analysis” (p. 78). Although the method is often located within other dominant analytic traditions, such as grounded theory, they argue that thematic analysis ought to be “considered a method in its own right” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 78). In this regard, they define thematic analysis as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data. It minimally organizes [sic] and describes your data set in (rich) detail” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 78). According to Vaismoradi (2013), thematic analysis examines “narrative materials from life stories by breaking the text into relatively small units of content and submitting them to descriptive treatment” (p. 400). The author argues further that thematic analysis is a chosen analysis method for narrative research, because it “provides a purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced account of data” (Vaismoradi et al., 2013: 400). For Attride-Stirling (2001), thematic analysis seeks to “unearth the themes salient in a text at differential levels” (p. 387). Therefore, the method is useful for narrative research, due to its privileging of a detailed account of the gathered data.

Due to the volumes of data gathered through life histories, organising the data according to themes and sub-themes allows the researcher to determine the salient issues that emerged from it, and the ones different participants returned to the interviews. Part of the thinking and coding process involved in thematic analysis pertains to the way in which the researcher develops what counts as themes and sub-themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that in determining what counts as a theme, one must reflect “something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 83, emphasis original). They argue that what determines them is connected to its “prevalence, in terms both of space within each data item and of prevalence across the entire data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82). They point out, however, that prevalence should not be confused with frequency, in terms of how many times the theme appears in the data in quantifiable measures, “but rather that on whether it captures something important in relation to the overall research question” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82), where the
process of teasing out a theme from the data set involves decisions from the researcher on the data in relation to their questions. Vaismoradi et al. (2013) point out that the difference between content and thematic analysis “lies in the quantification of data in content analysis” (p. 400).

Braun and Clarke (2006) point out that a researcher may arrive at a theme by using inductive (bottom up) or a deductive (theoretical) method. The inductive method means that the themes that are decided upon by the researcher “are strongly linked to the data themselves” (p. 83). In this regard, this means that the “process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 83). In this sense, they argue, inductive methods of determining themes are “data driven” (p. 83). A deductive theoretical method of teasing out the themes, is “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest in the area, and is thus more explicitly analyst-driven” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 84). They argue that this form of thematic analysis provides less details of the data set but often focuses on some aspect of the data (ibid.). The themes that are identified and presented in Chapters Five and Six were inductively delineated from the data.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter made a case for the use of oral histories as a narrative tool to centre women’s role in apartheid and in the aftermath. The chapter shows that life histories provide a complimentary tool for feminist research as women’s narratives have historically been ignored in social science research. Feminist researchers have drawn on women’s life stories to challenge dominant discourses about knowledge and society. Feminists in social science and in IR have also used narrative research to counter women’s invisibility in war discourses. It is shown that the literature on the anti-apartheid struggle is dominated by a focus on heroic masculinity at the expense of women’s narratives that have been coded in a complex use of silence that challenges feminists to invent methodological tools that “break the silence”. The chapter also explored the design of the study with regards to sampling techniques, the interview process, and positionality of the researcher, and thematic narrative analysis as the interpretive tool for this research.
CHAPTER FIVE

“YAYI LXESHA LENTO AYITHETHWA” (IT WAS THE TIME OF THAT WHICH COULD NOT PASS OUR LIPS):

GUERRILLA GIRLS, COMBATIVE MOTHERS AND THE IN-BETWEENERS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter thematically delineates the spaces from which women were affected by apartheid violence, and the different methods they used to push back against the violence. Chapter Two showed the multiple terrains of the apartheid war from which women, in different locations and ages, emerged as foundational combatants. Both Chapters Two and Three show that the transnationally trained guerilla fighter is the privileged combatant in the ways in which the armed struggle is written and remembered, while the demobilisation process further entrenched this by privileging a specific kind of non-statutory combatant, by only including the trained combatant. As shown in the previous chapters, this narrow depiction does not resemble the nuances of the war. What must be underscored is that the danger of this representation is an erasure of the foundational role played by women, as both victims of the violence and as central combatants in fighting against apartheid. This has enduring consequences for the writing of women’s contributions in anti-apartheid history and government policies that seek to honour former combatants. This chapter maps out the different locations where women fought against apartheid and the tools that were available to them to fight back against the state. The categories of “guerrilla girls”, “combative mothers” and the “in-betweeners” are introduced in order to emphasise the importance of space/location and age that shaped the methods that women used in participating in the apartheid combat. The aim is to argue that the majority of women participated in the armed struggle without military training. Therefore, the transnationally trained guerilla girls are the exception, not the rule, of women’s form of participation in the armed struggle. The ‘combative mothers' and 'in-betweeners' are not recognised as combatants and are

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4 A preliminary discussion of these three categories is in an article for the African Security Review journal, “Women Combatants and the Liberation Movements in South Africa: Guerilla girls, Combative mothers and the In-betweeners” (Magadla, 2015), where I began to argue about the significance of age, space and methods of struggle employed by women in the armed struggle.
therefore excluded from state processes dealing with former combatants. The chapter builds on the literature that has located women’s role in different spaces such as MK (Cock, 1991), the ANC underground, women in the ANC underground (Suttner 2003; 2007; 2008), and self-defence units and civic organisations (Marks, 2001; Cherry, 2007; Reynolds, 2013).

The section on ‘guerilla girls’ argues that while the public representation of women in the armed struggle was that of mothers with babies on their backs, the majority of women in MK were young adults of school-leaving age, who had been at the forefront of student organisations such as COSAS. Furthermore, it is argued that the institutional culture of MK, and the kind of mobility demanded by transnational combatant life, was also spatially more suitable to women of younger age. For these women, the personal experience of violence at the hands of the apartheid state is the key reason they became involved in politics, and eventually, led to their decision to leave the country for military training. It is shown that frequent arrests, and torture during personal confinement, are among the reasons that many of the women felt that they were left with “no choice” but to leave the country. The experiences of women who were underground operatives reveal the dangers that accompanied this work, which was the main form of operation for the banned liberation movements inside the country. It is argued that most of women and men, who carried out this work, are today not recognised as legitimate combatants, while those who also joined MK are better recognised for their contribution. This section shows that although the transnationally trained MK woman is the most recognised among all women combatants, there continues to be limited understanding about what was possible in the guerilla camp space, and why, ultimately, the majority of women never took the trained guerilla route.

The majority of women remained inside South Africa as the armed confrontation with the state reached its limits in the 1980s. The older women, the “combative mothers”, thrust into this battlefield, provided protection for their children, who were being hunted by the state in their homes, schools, churches and at funerals. These experiences of the mothers are traced back to the early years of the armed struggle in the 1960s, as the efforts of the women who fought within Poqo in the Transkei are placed at the centre. It is argued that the popular depiction of the revolutionary mother with the gun/spear, and the baby on her back, reveals the empirical reality of the majority of the women who were combatants of the People’s War. Yet, these women are written out of the dominant narrative of the armed struggle and excluded from the material and
symbolic benefits that are afforded other former internationally trained combatants in post-apartheid South Africa.

The ‘in-betweeners’ are the young women who remained inside the country fighting in the townships at the height of battles of the 1980s that ultimately made the country “ungovernable”. Schools and funerals are argued to be their main terrains of struggle with the state. It is argued that these women, together with their male peers who formed the generation of “young lions” at the forefront of ungovernability, are not recognised as combatants, due to their lack of formal military training and therefore have not benefitted from state processes on demobilisation and civilian reintegration. They live with palatable traumas of the war, and with little to no rewards accorded to them for their contribution.

The argument here is that the ability to delineate the woman who was likely to participate in the armed struggle as trained guerillas, and make visible the kinds of spacial conditions that made such participation possible. It opens up room to also ask questions about the other spaces in which the majority of women entered combat, such as the spaces where the combative mothers and in-betweeners operated throughout the armed struggle. Most importantly, acknowledging the different spaces that women of different ages occupied, and allows us to ask questions about the wellbeing of the ‘guerilla girls’ in post-apartheid South Africa, along with questions about the wellbeing of the un-uniformed ‘mothers with guns’, who participated in the center of the pursuit for “people’s power”.

While creating categories also risks reducing the complex space negotiated by women and men throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, I argue that naming and identifying the different spaces that women occupied in the anti-apartheid struggle is important for us to provide a language that builds on the multiple combatants that came out of that war. The creation of multiple, and overlapping, categories is also useful for our understanding of women’s roles that go beyond the current binary representation of the trained combatant versus the maternal mother that is present in both the literature on the anti-apartheid struggle, and feminist discourses on women’s participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. This task of naming women as combatants is important at this time when the government is developing state assistance programmes that aim to support those who risked their lives in order to end apartheid.
5.2 Guerilla girls

It is first important to clarify why a distinction between ‘guerilla girls’ and ‘combative mothers’ is important, and that the public representation of women in the armed struggle tends to conflate these different women. The public representation of women at the center of the People’s War was that of mothers with guns in their hands, and with babies on their backs. This image depicts the empirical reality of the women combatants who fought inside the country. But when it comes to the women who left the country and received training as guerillas, the majority of them were young adults of school leaving age, who had been at the forefront of student organisations such as COSAS. The institutional culture of MK, along with the kind of mobility demanded by transnational combatant life, was also spatially more suitable to women of a younger age. Many of them crossed the borders for training, because they felt that they were left “with no choice” after being identified as enemies of the state.

In her article, *Moms with Guns: Women's Political Agency in Anti-Apartheid Visual Culture* (2009), Kim Miller examines the ways in which the ANC used seemingly contrasting images of motherhood and militarism to galvanise women to join the armed struggle. Miller points to the 1968 cover image of the ANC political journal, *Sechaba*, with an image of a woman holding a spear and a baby on her back. She argues that this image of a “good mother” with a spear shows that this mother is “prepared for sacrifice in a much more literal sense than usual, this maternal image affirms women’s life-giving potential, while concurrently displaying the mother’s ability, if not willingness, to take it away” (Miller, 2009: 68). For Miller (2009), the spear in the mother’s hands plays two important roles in that the it “is an unmistakable reference to Umkhonto We Sizwe”, and that although “MK did not use spears as weapons…as an indigenous weapon, the spear is a clear reference to past African military traditions and resistance to colonial rule” (p. 71). At the center of Miller’s argument is that the use of this imagery by the ANC reconfigures the ‘good mother’ in an unconventional – if not uncomfortable – role: that of soldier” (p. 68). The author also examines a cover image of an ANC issue of *Voice of Women* (VOW), the political journal of the ANC’s Women’s Section, from 1980, which depicted an image of a woman carrying an AK47, with a baby on her back (Miller, 2009: 71). A similar image appears in a VOW poster commemorating August 9th Women’s Day in 1985, with two mothers carrying guns on their back, *and* babies, with the words “from ungovernability to

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*The name translates into English as ‘Spear of the Nation’.*
people’s power 1956-1986”. For Miller (2009), these images represented an explicit invitation of women to join MK, suggesting that “women were full participants in the ANCs military ‘powerhouse’” (p. 71).

The women in the three images that Miller (2009) examines are not military uniformed women. Although the images are read as serving as an inspiration to attract women to join the armed struggle, it is striking that they have been used to analyse the ANC and MK’s relationship to women. As Miller notes, the latter image in the VOW journal with two women with babies and guns on their backs, is perhaps indicative of the ANC’s shift to “people’s power” and therefore, the image served to persuade women, “from one township to the next”, to join the struggle as combatants in the pursuit of people’s power (Miller, 2009: 74). At play here is the “combative motherhood” that is understood to be the dominant frame of the female guerilla fighter in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Enloe, 1989; Pettman, 1996: 133).

Yet, what this discussion of the maternalised guerilla fighter hides, is the fact that most of the women who joined MK were not mothers, but were young women in their teenage years and early twenties. It is to be argued in the section on combative motherhood below that it is not a mistake that the images of militant women in both Sechaba and VOW political journals of the ANC are not uniformed guerilla women, because the ANC recognised that few women participated as combatants within MK. The women that joined the armed struggle were the ununiformed women who had to carry both the baby and their weapon in their everyday struggle against the apartheid state. Work by Cock (1991), Makau (2009) and Ngculu (2009) shows that the numbers of women in MK increased after the student uprising in 1976. The women who were able to physically escape the country to receive military training were women, in the main, in their youth.

While it is true that there were exceptions to this rule, such as the case of Thandi Modise who argues that she became a guerilla because she was a mother (Cock, 1991), and that three out of the twelve MK combatants interviewed in this study had children before going to exile, it is important to articulate that the women in MK were a product of the student protests that emerged in the 1970s. I argue here that it is important to acknowledge that most of the women who joined MK were, at the time, “girls”. If this is the case, acknowledging that young women, with no babies on their backs, were the ones who crossed borders to join MK, changes the question about women and maternalism in the armed struggle. What might the persistent use of the imagery of
the un-uniformed female soldier, with the baby on her back, tell us about what the ANC knew about the different kinds of female combatants that participated in the armed struggle across disparate times and place?

As noted in Chapter One, women challenged the rule within MK that women who became pregnant were not allowed to continue living in the camps (Cock, 1991; Ngculu, 2009; Tsampiras, 2012; Hassim, 2014). Therefore, unless the women left the child at home, most women who joined MK did not have children, and those who had children while training left during pregnancy, and although there was the option to return after giving birth, most women left the camps when they had children to find posts elsewhere in the ANC, often in Zambia and Tanzania. Thus, for the most part, it is young women without children who could take advantage of MK as a space within which to prepare themselves to participate in the armed struggle. Therefore, the image of the fighting mother with the child on her back does not represent the woman combatant in MK camps. The guerilla girl and the combative mother occupied different spaces in their participation in the armed struggle.

The theme of personal violence, as a “meta-reason” for women’s participation in the armed struggle, cuts across age and space as the core motivating reason for participation. Accounts of experiences of multiple forms of violence, including torture under solitary confinement, and the risks and state punishment that involved underground work, informed women’s decision to cross borders and join MK.

5.2.1 Personal violence: “I didn’t have a choice”

What do the young do in war? How do they do it? How are they drawn in?
How do they hold through it? Against what odds?

(Reynolds, 2013: 28)

In the case of the women who joined the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), Alison (2003) argues that the “nationalist sentiment” motivated women to join the LTTE, what she defines as a “meta-reason” for enlisting, where she argues that narratives from women combatants reveal that they were motivated by communal perception of suffering, oppression and injustice...related to personal experience” and “witnessing the experience of friends and
neighbors [sic]” (p., 40). The narratives expressed by women who became guerillas, is that they did so because of personal and communal experiences of daily violence. Thus, for them too, the “meta-reason” was to end the injustice in which they were living.

For instance, Pamela Daniels (alias Nombeko), from Zwide in Port Elizabeth, was arrested under the age of 18 on November 1984, together with executive leadership of COSAS in Port Elizabeth, in a case that became known as ‘The COSAS Nine’ (Newspaper clip, 28 November 1985; Detainees Parents’ Support Committee, 16 November 1984). Daniels left the country in 1985 to join MK following arrest as part of The COSAS Nine. Daniels recounts constant police harassment in her home as the traumatic events that led her to want to challenge the regime, which eventually forced her to leave the country:

Whilst I was already in high school I was introduced to COSAS. The reason for me to join that was my mother was a business woman, ’cause she had a shebeen selling vetkoeks, chicken, fish and all of that. Now from time to time police will come in, kick the doors, take everything, and I used to be very scared to an extent that when they’ve taken everything we’ll have to go out and sell anything, whatever my mother had. This picture of police coming, kicking the door, taking everything – it sort of got me...This police business traumatised me, in fact, to an extent that when COSAS came into play, I was readily prepared to join it because they were saying the same things that I felt needed to be dealt with in terms of fighting the regime, and of course, doing away with corporal punishment, because it was another way that they were instilling fear – the regime that is. So I readily joined COSAS.

(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

A former MK member that I interviewed in Port Elizabeth, who preferred to remain anonymous, articulated that she was abused in boarding school because her family name had been tainted due to her brother’s involvement in the struggle. She felt that the family involvement in politics destined her political life:
My brother was killed during the Maseru Massacre. Now, do you remember the Maseru Massacre of 1982 on the 9th of December? So what happened was that it became well known that there were a whole lot of people who were killed during the Maseru Massacre – it was in the newspapers, and my surname was in the newspapers. So when I got to school, I arrived already having a wrong reputation because of my surname. Even though they did not know me, but because of my surname was known as one of those who come from families who are active in the struggle, those who are considered problematic by the system. That is why even the administration there had an attitude towards me because of my surname. So in a way, I didn’t have a choice. I had to be involved in the struggle whether I liked it or didn’t, because my surname had already spoilt things for me, you understand?

(MK ex-combatant, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Former MK member, Belinda Martin (alias Gloria Mtungwa), who was born in 1952 in Kliptown, spoke about the separation of racially mixed family that saw family members that were classified as Coloured, along with her black grandmother, moved to Soweto:

I grew up in Kliptown, it was a township of diverse cultures, and we were happy, we saw no difference in each other. We valued each other’s cultures, you know, and that is what made us such a happy community. And a thriving community, rich in culture. Everybody coming to buy cakes, koeksisters, and what have you. Then we had the Chinese shop, Indian vegetable shop, the Shangaani people were doing small-scale farming, the Venda people as well, small-scale farming, we bought vegetables – we never had to go to town or anywhere. It was apartheid that destroyed our communities...It’s when we started having criminals, it’s when we started having racial hate, everything, because now people were indoctrinated, made to feel better in my community, given privileges over people that they lived with before, and you know, everything just became a racial mess. You understand? But my family kept together, and it’s because of that reason and because of hating human suffering
and because of hating segregation and apartheid that I decided I am going to join the struggle.

(Belinda Martin, Interview in Pretoria, May, 2014).

Martin became active as part of a youth group, called Anti-Collaborationist Front Group (AFRO), formed by Coloured high school students in Coronation High School. According to Martin, the group was affiliated with the Black People’s Convention (BCP), and was mentored by the activist-poet and journalist, Don Mattera. She was detained in 1975 after leaking information to Don Mattera who was then working as a journalist for *The Star* newspaper. She left the country to join MK following detention and solitary confinement in John Vorster Square:

Nineteen-seventy-five, I was detained; I was on the run for about six months. Six months I was on the run, after that article was exposed in the newspaper, because I was the main investigator and I had to do the article and filter it to Don Mattera, who was then working at *The Star*. So that is how I ended up being detained. Well it was horrible in detention, I was tortured severely, and I was made to watch other activists being tortured, to try and make me betray my comrades. And throughout my detention, I decided I’m not going to say a word, no matter how severe, I can rather die, and I had taken the oath on my own then, there’s no way I am going to betray anybody just to be free, you know, and denounce my belief in freedom and against apartheid. I told myself, and that is how it was, for those three months, throughout my torture I kept quiet. They told me I can go at any time, if I sign written statements, statements that were already written out against people, some of whom I didn’t even know… I became a broken record, I won’t do that. Severe beatings, making me stand on ice bricks, beating me with the butt of the gun, marks on my legs of the, you can see they are growing faint now, of the electrocution that I was exposed to while they were torturing me...Solitary confinement, and for three weeks, while I was in that cell, they never allowed me to wash or have a shower, I was pregnant three months, I was expecting three months, and I had a miscarriage, in the three weeks, because they started torturing immediately, and I miscarried and I
remained with the fetus in the cell. It started rotting and smelling until one of the matrons couldn’t stand it any longer…the matron couldn’t stand it any longer, so she took out the fetus and she cleaned the cell and she smuggled me to the shower, after three weeks, I was smelling and I had to drink water out of the toilet.

(Belinda Martin, Interview in Pretoria, May, 2014).

For many, as was the case with Martin and Daniels, the personal circumstances of living through apartheid were rendered valid in the community of other younger people in schools. In this regard, the communities of solidarity that they found in school legitimised their objections to the actions of the apartheid government and the impact these had on their families and communities.

5.2.2 Unrest in schools: “no choice but to leave”

In her case study of Diepkloof, Soweto, Monique Marks (2001) argues that it was a nationwide phenomenon that “most township youth who joined political organisations in the ’80s, were at school, and many of the leaders of these organisations were still at school” (p. 49). She argues that schools provided a “base for a common experience and also a geographical space for meeting and organizing [sic]” (Marks, 2001: 49). COSAS was launched in 1979 as a “response to the crisis in the schools” (Marks, 2001: 35). For the young women who eventually left the country and their counterparts inside the country, schools became a core site of mobilisation. Many such as Nomfundiso Kulati (alias Thabisa), born in 1969, was active in COSAS when she was in Matric at Nathaniel Nyaluza High School in Grahamstown:

So in terms of understanding the aims and objectives of COSAS, at first I never thought they would be that revolutionary, but as I grew into the organisation I learnt it was more than that, just a student organisation. I remember when my mom, I told my mom having been joined the Congress of South African Student Movement, my mom said, “eh, I hope that this thing will not organise boycotts in schools”. I said, “no, this thing is not organising boycotts”. This thing is about
talking about, you remember, this overcrowding in classrooms? This thing is about shortage, of issues we were really dealing with, I mean, there was a shortage of textbooks, overcrowding of classes, and corporal punishments were kind of our daily challenges in our schools. Shortage of teachers and black schools generally were not really being attended to during the days of apartheid... And then this then became more political in a way and we started to demand a non-racial and free education for all through the existence of SRCs in schools, you know. And this organisation started to organise congresses now. So I was growing politically because my exposure now with other people of my age; and understanding throughout the country as to what is happening in different schools was being broadened, by attending various conferences and congresses of COSAS.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013)

Her involvement in COSAS led to her detention in 1985, at the age of 16:

Remember, we called for boycotts when we were demanding for student representative councils. Then, you know, remember the system how they would deal with us, they would harass [and] they wouldn’t listen to us. They would chase us and we would be identified as the troublemakers and we were already labeled as terrorists then. So I was more of a target in my area and I was often detained, harassed I never slept home, I would run away. We never owned a house then...we lived in a backyard shack in someone’s house we used to move from one home to another...don’t know how many backyards I have stayed in Grahamstown alone. And eh, but then this led me to my being detained and I ended up in solitary confinement in Rooi Prison [also known as ‘Red Hell’ or ‘North End’ Prison, in Port Elizabeth]. This was now about 1985. After being tortured harassed and... Remember, the system the way it would respond to us as young people, they would kill and shoot and hit people, and we were already identified as the people that ‘are troublemakers’ and ‘terrorist people’, that were being ‘used by Oliver Tambo, wah, wah, wah’.

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After coming out of close to a year of solitary confinement, Kulati states that she discovered that she had been expelled by the Department of Education. With no choice to return to complete high school, she says that she felt that she “was left with no choice but to leave South Africa”. She left the country in 1986, through Lesotho, and eventually ended up in the MK camp Caculama in eastern Angola, in 1987.

I interviewed Brenda Badela in Grahamstown while she was attending events at her son’s school. Brenda Badela (alias Thoko Matthews), was born and grew up in New Brighton in 1962. Badela was a regional executive member of COSAS between 1980-1983, during her time in Newell High School in Port Elizabeth. She notes that she came to politics because her home was a space of meeting for activists because of the leadership that her father provided in the community. Her father, the activist-journalist Mono Badela, was known to support trade unions, PEBCO, COSAS and the UDF in Port Elizabeth while working for the Evening Post and later City Press newspapers (Mutasa, City Press Newspaper, 2003). Brenda Badela notes:

I had quite a number of friends who were members of COSAS and because my dad was a leader, a political leader at that time. So they would come to my house, discuss politics and then I happened to have interest in that and that is how I went into politics. And besides that, because my dad was a journalist, he would actually write negative things about the government but positive things about the ANC; and so he was then banned.

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013).

She talks about going to different schools to talk to other students about the history of the ANC, the use of Afrikaans in schools, and Bantu Education, as well opposing the introduction of the tricameral parliamentary system. Due to her active participation, Badela was in and out of detention between 1981-1983. Badela’s family home was petrol bombed in 1985, allegedly by members of the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) in the “inter-organisational conflict in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area” in 1985 – 1986 (TRC Final Report, 1998: 96). Badela narrates her time in solitary confinement and how she learnt about the bombing of her home:
During detention I was in solitary confinement in Algoa. That’s where my home is now. Every time I pass that police station, I laugh. I was all by myself, solitary confinement, all of us, because we were regarded as the most influential and most dangerous COSAS leaders at the time. You know, the treatment was very bad, because one of the guys who was torturing me is actually late now, [Gideon] Nieuwoudt. Nieuwoudt, was actually involved in the killing of the late Siphiwo Mthimkhulu, you know, Goniwe. He was very, very notorious but he has since died now. So, you know, they would either not give me food, give me water for three days, you know, take me to their rooms, torturing me, slapping me, you know, asking me many questions, thinking that you are hiding something, you are working for ANC underground; asking for some people I don’t even know, you know, “where is so-and-so, where is so-and-so? You are working with so-and-so underground” you know. So, ja, the torture was terrible, yho! Hm! And, eh, in my cell, I had, eh, fortunately it was a small cell, but I had a toilet, which was much better, and I had a shower. So there wasn’t, there was no bed. So we would sleep on the cement, but they gave us, you know the grey...those grey blankets, for us to put some on the cement, for us to sleep. Yho, those days were bad, yho! Whilst you are sleeping, at two o’clock, they would just come and kick your door. You were not allowed to close the door. You are allowed to, if it’s the door, you must sleep here, and the door must be wide open, because every time when the guard is passing, you know the security, they must make sure you are still there, you are still breathing. You know they would call your name from a distance, “Hey, Brenda!” you know, and then you have to respond and say “Yes, sir!” you know, then they just pass. So every 30 minutes they do that, because there was a period where people were dying in detention, you know. But at the same time, it was a torture, because if you are being woken up every 30 minutes, you are not going to sleep. And then sometimes they are going to wake you up, and I remember one Friday they called me and said, “Yho, but your house was bombed, petrol bombed”, and I thought they were joking. My dad was in detention, but my dad was in another police station. But I thought they were joking. “Ja, your house was petrol
bombed”, you know and I’m like, “Yho, wow! And then what happened?” “No, nobody died, nobody was hurt.” And I’m telling you, Siphokazi, I didn’t know about it until I was out after three months. And when I asked my mom, my mom said, “yes, that’s what they did”. Fortunately, you know, that we grew up in three-roomed house, so they threw the petrol bomb in my room. But we had two single rooms, myself and my brother, the one who comes after me. So it just, it landed on top of my brother’s bed, but fortunately, because me and my dad were in detention. So my mom and my two brothers were sleeping in the main bedroom. Now, if Phiko had slept there, it would have been something else. And they said, “Ja, and your brother was here, but we released them because we told them, ‘no, but his dad and his sister are already in detention.’” You know, there was a time when they would go house-to-house and take people in the police van, take them to the police station and torture them for unknown reasons. I mean, my brother was not an activist; he was never an activist. You know, and the gap between me and him is about seven years.

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)

At the time, Badela had two cases by the state against her, on one case she had been caught on the way from a COSAS congress in Durban carrying banned literature in Queenstown, on the way back home to Port Elizabeth. The second case involved the arrest of the COSAS executive, including Pamela Daniels, cited above, who was not an executive member, in a case that became known as the COSAS Nine (Louwe, Evening Post Newspaper, 1985). Following the bombing of their home, the Badela family moved to Johannesburg. Badela escaped the country with her fellow COSAS Nine accused, who joined her in Johannesburg. They first stayed at Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s home of banishment in Brandfort. It was Madikizela Mandela who organised their escape to Lesotho. She told me that she decided to leave the country because “[she] was in and out of detention, and the fact that [her] home was burned down. [She] could see that the system at the time really meant something; they really wanted to kill [her] family at the time” (Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013).

Pamela Reynolds (2013) notes that the “most frequently quoted figure for detention without trial for children under 18 between 1960-1988 is 15 000 [sic]” (p. 164). She notes that
this was “an estimate number based on numbers published by the HRC [Human Rights Commission] in the document ‘Detention without trial’- published in November 1988” (p. 164). As Reynolds (2013) notes further:

[a]t certain times and in certain places in the 1980s, to be, quite simply, a young black person out of place – moving, hanging out, visiting – was to be a target for the security forces. Even to be in place, or in a yard – or in school – was to be unsafe (p. 28).

It was through the strategies and networks of activists inside the country with those who were across the Southern African region that the women who joined MK and APLA were able to leave the country. The underground structures of the liberation movements inside the country were instrumental in creating communication between those inside and outside. Importantly, the networks that were established underground acted as a check and balance system for the movements to be able to ensure that those who went to exile were not agents sent by the state to infiltrate them. Some of the women who would go to exile began their involvement as underground operatives, and eventually decided to go outside to receive military training. As Suttner (2008) and Gilder (2012) have argued, underground work was an intensely transnational process across the region, which relied on the collaboration of different actors in order to achieve a single operation, the exiled leadership, those who facilitated the connections between those inside and outside, the gatekeepers who protected the security of the liberation movements, and the members of the local population, who shielded these actors from being captured.

Below I examine the ways in which women navigated underground structures and for those who eventually left the country to join MK, I examine the circumstances that influenced their decision to leave. It is clear that of those who were in the underground that the women and men who coupled that experience with formal military training are the ones who today recognised combatants in post-apartheid veteran’s discourses. Therefore, even though underground operations were the main form of access by MK inside the country, with intimate collaboration with operatives inside the country, the trained combatant is privileged.
5.2.3 Underground work

The banning of the liberation movements meant that these had to find subversive ways to continue organising against the apartheid state. Underground mobilisation is one of the four pillars that the ANC adopted in its 1969 consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania. As Raymond Suttner (2003) notes correctly, “underground work is political activity that is not open or openly declared for what it is. Under the cover of doing one thing, one may in fact also be performing an activity below the surface, and not visibly” (p. 126). The narratives of three women combatants that I focus on here indicate that for some, underground work was undertaken with partial or no military training, and usually launched operatives into comprehensive military training after some experience as an operative. The experiences of Nondwe Mankahla indicates that these possibilities may depend on what period of struggle one began their underground work, because for those, like her, who participated in the sabotage campaigns of the 1960s, escaping the country for military training was not as possible as it was for those who operated in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Dyantyi and Xaba. Suttner (2003) counts the different ways in which underground work became possible, one that resonates with three women who operated as underground operatives for the ANC is the aspect of having a public face that is “that is quite distinct from the underground one that will not be revealed publicly and will only be revealed in disguised form or to a restricted range of people” (p. 126).

Nondwe Mankahla was born on 28 August, 1935 in the Red Location in Port Elizabeth. She told me that she first heard of the ANC in 1952 during the time of the Defiance Campaign. She points out though that as a 17-year-old at the time, she was not clear about the content of the Defiance Campaign. At the time, she says, “it was like playing ropes. When we were called as young people, we just went.” It was in 1953 that she formally joined the ANC. In 1954, she became a volunteer for the ANC Youth League. At the time, the work for volunteers focused on door-to-door mobilisation in preparation for the Congress of the People meeting in Kliptown, which led to the adoption of the Freedom Charter. It was also in 1955 that she worked as a volunteer for the New Age newspaper, working with Govan Mbeki. She participated in raising funds for women from Port Elizabeth to be sent to the women’s march in Pretoria in 1956 against the introduction of passes for women, and was among a group that sent petitions to government offices in Port Elizabeth and did not attend the historic Pretoria march. In 1959, she
was employed by Real Printing and Publishing, working with Brian Bunting, Fred Carnerson, Govan Mbeki, Sonia Bunting and others. The job there was to collect the *New Age* which arrived in Port Elizabeth on Thursdays, and distribute it. She was still working with Govan Mbeki when MK was launched, although she was never given any details about the activities of MK. She was asked by Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba to courier parcels, as she did with the *New Age*, and only later learnt that the parcel equipment to assemble a bomb:

> I became involved with MK just after its launch. They started meeting here in PE. Since I worked at that office, Mr. Mbeki and Raymond Mhlaba used to meet at that office and ask me to carry a parcel to some place. And this parcel is fruit. I would fetch the parcel from a place called *Crack in the Wall*, here in Govan Mbeki; I did not know what I was carrying. I would take the parcel to them… I would learn later that the equipment was actually explosives… The MK then was focused on targeting certain areas. They were targeting the area known as Sheya Kulata. That place was targeted. There were offices there then, municipal offices. The target was successful.

(Nondwe Mankahla interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013).

She says that when Govan Mbeki disappeared in 1962, she worked with Vuyisile Mini, who was also part of the MK Eastern Cape High Command. But the apartheid regime had heightened its suppression, which eventually led to Mbeki and Mhlaba’s arrest, and Mini’s arrest and execution.

Oom Gov left, and I was left distributing the paper in the offices of trade unions. The union officers started getting arrested and I was left on my own… Mr. Mini also vanished, and it turned out that he was arrested and executed. So that is how I was involved. So they were arrested and that was followed by a silence. I did not hear from the headquarters that were in Johannesburg. I did not hear anything until I was arrested in 1963. This time I was sent to courier money that was meant to be for a child going to school in the Transkei, in Qokolweni. But it turned out that the money was being sent to a man who was wanted by the state,
and the money was going to be used to continue targets in the Transkei. So I was involved until then, until I was arrested.

(Nondwe Mankahla interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

Mankahla was in jail for three years. She was arrested again in 1969. She never went to exile. During our interview she was not in a space to detail her life after her arrest only that she worked for the Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation (PEWO) until 1994. In an interview in The Road to Democracy: South Africans telling their stories - Nondwe Mankahla (2006), she said that after her release from prison in 1970, she was “not well in the head. [She] suffered with nerves” (p. 233). Mankahla revealed in our interview that in order to receive military veterans benefits, she had been asked to produce a force number, which would prove her MK membership. In the absence of such evidence, she has not been able to receive any material benefits as a military veteran. It is not clear whether Mankahla can be defined as fitting a “typical” underground operative. In the case where most combatants who operated in the underground have the same background as she does, it may be the case that they, like her, are not recognised by the state as combatants.

Dr. Pumza Patricia Dyantyi (alias Alice Tsongo), born in 1948, now MEC of Health in the Eastern Cape, started being involved in politics when she was in high school in Cicirha College in Umthatha. She comes from Quthubeni location, which is also the home of Walter Sisulu. She told me that although there was “momentum about the struggle”, it was when she was studying her midwifery in Durban, and became an underground operative when she was working at Baragwanath Hospital in Johannesburg from 1968 to 1972. While working at Baragwanath, she worked with Nomazotho Gqabi, the wife of Joe Gqabi. It was at this time that she worked for the ANC, travelling underground to “Botswana carrying literature that was banned here in the country for cells that we had, underground cells” (Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, 2013). In 1972 she moved to Durban, and studied midwifery with Nosidima Pityana, who is married to Barney Pityana. She was a member of the National Youth Organisation (NAYO) which was founded in 1973, and South African Student Organisation (SASO). Through her connection with Nosidima Pityana, she became close with Barney Pityana, and Steve Biko.
From Durban, she was placed in Kuruman, in the Northern Cape. It is in Kuruman that she first became involved with MK:

So, I started being involved with MK there. Soldiers would enter the country from underground, they would be hidden there. We would look after them there with a family and for them, and they would proceed from there. We were doing this work, traveling up and down between Botswana and South Africa. Sometimes we would be carrying letters; sometimes we would courier things that were not disclosed to us. You would learn later that you were actually carrying a lot of money inside the country. I was arrested around this time.

(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)

She was arrested in 1979 as part of group that came to be known as the NAYO 7.¹ She recounted:

I was arrested while I was traveling from holidays at home in Transkei. I met the Boers at the train station in Gauteng. They arrested me there. And some of the people that I worked with underground, when I arrived in Gauteng, it turned out that they were already arrested. We were known as ‘The NAYO 7…We were charged under the Terrorism Act and sent to John Vorster prison. The trial carried on. Out of seven, two people were convicted. One of them was the mayor of Gauteng, Amos Masondo. But it is clear to me that this thing was following me, because even after I was acquitted, I was arrested at the stairs on my way home. I was arrested for something funny called ‘Inciting People by Writing Letters’ – something like that. They just wanted to arrest me. But then I managed to get out.

(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)

¹ Phyllis Naidoo writes about Kgoti (alias Andrew Moletsane), who was a member of The NAYO 7. Available from: http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/F5_KGOTI_1.pdf
Following three months at John Vorster prison, she received a banning order, banishing her to the Transkei. She never served the banning order, as she managed to leave the country through Swaziland in 1980. She spent time in Mozambique, then in Lusaka, Zambia and eventually went to train with MK Benguela camp in Angola. Although Dyantyi’s underground work was highly risky as she moved between South Africa and Botswana, the work that grants her recognition as a combatant is the formal military training. If Dyantyi, like Mankahla, had moved between courier work and routine arrests, would she have been able to participate in the SANDF integration process, and eventually demobilisation?

Makhosazana Xaba (alias Nomgqibelo) was born in 1957 in Greytown, but grew up in Ndaleni which is next to Richmond, Natal Midlands. She recounted that it was during her time as a junior in Polela High School that she first heard about Steve Biko and Black Consciousness, through the school’s debating team. She notes that “for some reason the debating students, they were often the senior students, were allowed to discuss political topics”. She notes that it was at Inanda Seminary that she openly engaged in politics and that there was a “much more open- even from the teachers- an open engagement with politics”. Even though she wrote Matric in 1975, she spent the whole of 1976 nursing an undiagnosed illness, while her peers were either at university or starting their careers. It was the Soweto uprising that energised and compelled her to action:

So when June 16 happened, everybody would leave me in the morning to go to school - my parents and my sibling – and return in the afternoon...So I just always used to listen to radio. I was either listening to the radio or reading lying on my back. I couldn't do anything...And then I'd listened to this thing about what had happened in Soweto and I'm thinking: damn, this is terrible, you know. So I just remember that time, because I had been ill and I was depressed, and that was a terrible year for me, because ‘my-age’ mates were either at varsity or starting their careers. I really wasn’t feeling good about myself. But when that happened, everything just seemed to change because it was like, ‘wow, I can do something in the world!’", you know.

(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)
She went to train as a nurse in Edendale Hospital in 1977. Following the killing of Steve Biko, she joined the Edendale Youth Organisation, with some doctors who had been friends with Biko. The space was for political education and discussion. She notes that Ben Martins (a former Minister of Energy after 1994) used to supply banned literature to the group. After serving as a nurse in a small hospital in an a highly impoverished area called Khombe, in what was then northern Natal, she decided to pursue her Bachelor of Nursing Administration and Education in Ongoye University (University of Zululand), where she became an active member of the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO). She was particularly influenced by the events of 29 October, 1983, that led to the death of five people, including students, between UDF aligned students and an estimated 500 members of the IFP who entered the university. She was one of seven students who were expelled by the university for her involvement in the events. It was at this time that she decided she wants to go and train. A friend linked her to a transnational ANC underground operative who was moving between Lusaka and Pietermaritzburg. He taught her basic “reconnaissance, the basics of unlocking keys and the basics of dead letter bombs” (Makhosazana Xaba interview, May 2014). She soon became part of the Natal underground machinery that was operating from Swaziland under Ronnie Kasrils, Jacob Zuma and Siphiwe Nyanda. At the time, she was working for an old age home for whites, where she could only work night duties, because a black nurse was not allowed to work there. She worked seven-nights-on, seven-nights-off. This position and schedule was ideal for her travels between Durban and Swaziland:

So the system was, you did seven-days-on, seven-days-off. So often during the off nights, that’s when I’d take a trip and come back. So it looked very innocent, you know. I’d come back from a trip. It was a very convenient because seven days was a good period of time to go do something and come back, you know. So whether I was going to Swaziland or we were just busy with our activities and...it was easy...was then doing the movements between Swaziland and KZN mostly, as a messenger carrying letters, and coming back with money, because it was difficult to find money to do the work. So I’d go there with some letters and

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come back. I never carried guns, but I carried money. Loads of money on my body. for the various operations that needed to happen [I would hide] with things like pantyhose and whatever, it’s very easy to hide money everywhere. Everywhere on your body, it’s very easy, and bags, obviously.

(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

Xaba operated between KZN and Swaziland from December 1984 until December 1986. She notes that that at this time, which was at the height of the state of emergency, she could not attend mass meetings, or be seen to be participating in any political activity. As a nurse, she had the “perfect” alibi for her underground work. This was until December 1986, when her trainer told her that it was time for her to leave the country. She left the country during the second state of emergency in 1986, through Swaziland, then Mozambique, Lusaka and then straight to the MK camp in Pango in northern Angola. Even in the Xaba case, it is not clear whether she had continued working in the underground while still working as a nurse, if she would then have been recognised and allowed to participate in the integration process, had she not had the military training she received.

It is perhaps not surprising that, of the women I interviewed, it is the women who were professionally employed who were able to conduct underground work involving moving in and outside of the country. For Dyantyi, nursing provided the method for moving between South Africa and Botswana while in the Northern Cape; while Xaba, who led a daily life also as a professional nurse, was able to move between KZN and Swaziland unnoticed for a full two years. During the launch of MK, Mankahla kept up a quotidian façade as a courier at the New Age newspaper, while she played a crucial role with others in the activities of the early days of MK in the Eastern Cape. Yet, the extent to which the apartheid state had encroached on “the everyday” makes it unsurprising that both Mankahla and Dyantyi would eventually face arrest for their underground activities. The accounts they make of their experiences demonstrate the high-risk nature of underground work, and the ways in which it was a fundamental part of the armed struggle. Suttner (2008) has argued that it is important for the various strategies of the liberation movements not to be understood in isolation, but to be understood as overlapping and even blurring. The uncontainable and shadowy space of the underground, pushes against the
generalisations that appear in post-apartheid literature about “exile culture” and “inzile culture” that have come to assume rigid meanings in the work of scholars such as Ellis (2012) and Trewhela (2009). Importantly, accounts of experiences of underground operatives point to the importance of recognising the various sites of struggle and the combatants that emerged from those sites.

5.2.4 Training and life in MK

*A Lone Soldier’s Yearning For Home*

*Deep, deep in a place never could be imagined,*  
*In the far off land of the Great Agostinho Neto,*  
*I sit and guard my Comrades just out of a*  
*Horrendous air attack*  
*The bombs of apartheid.*

*Deep, deep in a land never to be imagined,*  
*In the land where so much blood was shed,*  
*Where the Angolans sacrificed their lives to save ours, I sit and ponder, will I ever make it back home.*

( Belinda Martin alias Gloria Mtungwa)

The rituals of life in the training camps involved rigorous physical training and a distinct focus on political education. The MK women emphasised the weight given to tactics in guerilla warfare, as they understood that they were participating in an unconventional war. Pamela Daniels narrates her arrival at the Viana transit camp in Luanda, Angola thus:

We arrived to a place, a transit camp that was called Vienna, in Luanda... In the morning we had to go to town. The transit, where it was it was like farm area where ANC was given land by the Angolan government. We were doing everything for ourselves, cooking, you name it. We had our armoury...There were buildings where our HQ was staying, and comrades were sleeping in tents, and these coaches, because it was a transit camp. In the morning we were taken to town. Now, at night it was such a beautiful view- the lights, everything, people playing basketball. You could actually see them and everything. In the
morning it was a different view altogether. It was like at night we landed somewhere, we woke up somewhere else. Two out of three people that you saw had one leg or no legs. The buildings you could actually see the bullet holes. I remember thinking to myself, ‘where the hell did I think I was going?’…Now we had a new routine: wake up in the morning with morning sport; the bells will ring; go for morning sport. When we came back we bath; after bathing we eat; after eating we clean. After that we go and we’re drilled. Now we are being prepared to go to the training camps. And it is very funny how you, you quickly adapt. The environment allows you to do that and you actually see yourself as a soldier immediately, because the language, the behaviour and every other thing just points you out.

(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

Brenda Badela explained the everyday routine thus:

Military training in different tactics - your physical training, how to shoot, your topography, you know, if you want to grow, and politics as well. So we had classes; it’s like you are in high school, you know. Where there would be, where there would be (what do you call high schools), not lectures, but timetable, you know, for 45 minutes you are now going to do tactics. Tactics was more physical. The next 45 minutes is going to be politics, so teaching us about politics, you know, the countries that were close to the ANC, your Russia, your Cuba, your East Germany at the time and then topography…So those were some of the things, and then we had what is called engineering. Engineering is basically how to make bombs, how to use a hand grenade, you know. So it was very detailed, very dangerous because we had to be very accurate. It’s like science, engineering is more about science, it’s more about science; and then we had another one, which was called (what was it called?) – shooting; where they were teaching you how to shoot now, all sorts of weapons. AK 47…

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)
Belinda Martins emphasised the collaborative spirit that existed in the camps between women and men:

...as women in Mkhonto we Sizwe, there was no leniency. We had to do everything the men did, and we did it. We proudly did it, and we were not discriminated against by the men. We were helped, when we couldn’t carry on, they would hook you in. You know. And if you got tired, we would run together. And that’s what made me so proud of the men in MK at the time. They would never leave you behind because you are a woman, they would encourage you, you know? We used to run 16km every morning, so it made it 32 kilometers...Every morning that was part of our training, besides the field training, weapons training; you know we had to train in guerrilla warfare. Not conventional warfare, we were a guerrilla army. It was very rigorous; we were trained by the Cubans, the Russians, Czechoslovakians...I was the first female commander of the June 16 detachment.

(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)

Makhosazana Xaba noted that most of the combatants in the camps were young people:

The atmosphere was very... how would I describe it? Number 1: most of the people were younger than me. By this time I’m twenty (it’s ’86), I’m 29. They’re younger than me, some of them were not educated. Some left before they completed school. Therefore they have no experience working as activists at home. They skipped – the terminology that you skipped – so they skipped [left the country]. They just remember marching and then they had to skip. They have no touch but they know about guns and grenades, and they are teaching and they are commissars and they are this and they’re that. There were two other people who were at least my age - my peers, and the other one (he died two years ago, shame), and with the other one, we ended up doing literacy training - literacy education for the younger ones who really needed literacy at a very, very basic level.
Pumza Dyantyi, who was a professional nurse, worked in the camp’s clinic in Benguela, before she was moved to the Quibaxe camp. Joyce Sifuba of the PAC, also spoke about education programmes for young people in the camps:

…in Tanzania I trained in distant education because the Commonwealth wanted people who are going to teach or facilitate a programme distant education for the comrades who are in the camps who were not going to school; and for those who have at that time... you remember there were lots of these young people coming out, so they hadn’t finished school. When they arrived outside, some of them are too young to go to the camps, so the Commonwealth decided it would have a bridging school, where the young comrades are going to study. So I was one of the people chose to go to London to train in distant education. And when I came back I went to the schools in Bakamoyo the programme, I mean, the programme of the PAC and the ANC in Tanzania in the camps.

(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, November 2013)

Another participant noted that life in the camps was not easy, when it came to relationships between older and younger combatants, especially women combatants:

I’ve always been a person who is known to be stubborn and independent. I remember playing with boys, so I grew up with boys, so I never had that thing that I could let a guy take advantage of me. So when I arrived in Viana, some guys, the soldiers, the male comrades, were from the bush and it had been a long time since they saw women [laughs]. They will make moves, you know, towards new arrivals. That environment, when you arrive, you had fears when you meet the older people who have been there for a long time, and who have not been with women in a long time. So you would find that you develop relationships
that are not genuine, relationships that are based on what you are going to benefit and some would who were lazy to train – who wanted things to move easily – would accept situations whereby they would be involved in a relationship not because of love, but because they wanted the relationship to be easy; because some of our combatants, the males, were in high ranks. Some of them would abuse their positions and take advantage of the female combatants that just arrived, because “if you don’t do what I’m telling you, I will make you sweat”, that kind of talk... “I’ll make you sweat”; so you find yourself in this condition and think, “ey, let me jol [get into a relationship] with this commander”, because the lifestyle will be easy.

(Anonymous, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Joyce Sifuba also articulated the unequal treatment between men and women in the PAC.

Well, the treatment will never be the same. You know, women are always taken for granted and they are taken advantage of. You have to be strong, you have to defend yourself all the time, because it’s a man’s domain, and if you are there, men sort of, even if they are comrades, they sort of undermine and ask themselves questions ‘what does this woman want here?’, you see? It has always been like that. But we were quite strong, we were quite strong. We had to stand our ground and show them that we can also do things. There are duties that we felt improved because of women.

(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, November 2013)

As Cherry (2011) notes about MK, general life in the camps was about waiting. Following training, combatants awaited “umChina” (being chosen by the leadership for a mission home). For most of the combatants, including the women, the call was never made. As Xaba expressed in our interview, “the waiting begins and you’re supposedly in an underground camp and if you don’t find something to do for yourself, I think you go crazy”. As Cherry and others have noted, the waiting was excruciating for combatants, who had hopes to return to
South Africa to bring the regime to its knees. Some of them eventually became disillusioned, and often became alcoholics out of boredom and frustration. Some of the women were sent for further military training in countries such as Russia, East Germany and Cuba, and some were chosen to go and further their studies, after which they returned to other posts in the ANC in Lusaka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Following further training in Cuba, Totsie Memela-Khambule worked in the Swaziland underground. She was responsible for facilitating the infiltration of leadership ANC into the country. She notes that “the ANC took a view that they need to infiltrate the leadership [infiltrate the country with the leadership], because by just infiltrating troupers, people didn’t have guidance, they didn’t have support that, I mean, I brought Mac Maharaj in the country” (Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014). Of the women who were trained outside, only one participant (in this study) returned to the country following MK training. Nombulelo April, born in 1943 in Cathcart in Eastern Cape, fled to Maseru in 1978, where she received training in MK. She spent time in Lusaka. In 1988, she managed to come back to the country through the Transkei, and settled in Butterworth. She told me that because of its forests, Butterworth was made an MK Base 1 underground cell (Telephone interview with Nombulelo April, September, 2013). She expressed that they were protected by Holomisa’s government and that settling in Butterworth for underground work made her a “Transkeain” (Telephone interview with Nombulelo April, September, 2013). 8

The experiences of ‘guerrilla girls’ represents one part of a multifaceted armed struggle. Their accounts of experiences show the blurring of different forms struggle. namely the mass mobilisation from which the generation of student activists produced, some of which fled the country for military training; the underground combatants who carried the missions of MK inside the country, some of whom were eventually forced to leave the country; and those who received military training, in order to work the underground from neighbouring countries and smuggle guerrillas into the country. The narratives of women in MK make visible the intersections and overlapping nature of the different sites of struggle, all of which were instrumental towards the ends of armed struggle in a context of unconventional war.

While some women managed to cross borders to receive military training, and therefore claim the label of guerrillas, the majority of women, young and old, remained in the country as the confrontation with the apartheid state heightened in their homes and communities. They found places from their communities from which to mobilise and fight back. The next sections shift their focus to the respective categories of “combative mothers” and “in-betweeners”.

5.3 Combative mothers

The experiences of women such as Nondwe, who participated in the early MK sabotage campaigns, show that women’s contribution to the armed struggle can be traced back to the inception of the turn to armed struggle. The accounts of experiences by women, who fought along Poqo in the 1960s, show that older women, wives and mothers were at the forefront of the strategies that Poqo became known for, especially within the context of the Bantustans. These accounts show that at all stages and eras of the armed struggle, women responded from the specific locations in which they were affected. Poqo’s focus on resistance of the insertion of the Bantu authorities act in the Transkei made concrete the fight against an imposition by the apartheid state that had immediate impact on the lives of those in the Bantustan homelands. As the apartheid brutality and silencing intensified through different eras, while the young people transfigured schools as terrains of mobilisation and contestation, their mothers found other spaces, such as the church, as a battle site to protect themselves, their children and community. Thus, this section pays attention to how mothers participated in the struggle across different eras. For the Poqo women combatants of the 1960s, fighting against the imposition of Bantu authorities sprung them into action. In the 1980s, as the state violence escalated, women in townships found spaces from which to mobilise against a force that threatened their children in their homes, schools, churches, funerals and elsewhere. As Hiralal (2015) argues in her article about women detainees in the anti-apartheid struggle:

In the 1980s women became actively involved in the United Democratic Front and formed the UDF Women’s Congress. In addition, in the 1980s, women became actively involved in civic organisations and began to exert their
influence on housing, poverty, unemployment and neighbourhood issues. Women were also involved in trade union activities, playing a leading role as organisers and mobilising community support. The 1980s marked a high point in women’s struggles and demonstrations, which resulted in the prosecution of many women (p. 34-35).

It is true, as Ross (2003) argues that “women used domesticity, a space over which women usually have more control than other spheres, to map the interpolations of violence in their lives” (Ross, 2003: 42). With babies on their backs, these mothers were thrust into battle.

5.3.1 Contesting Bantu Authorities

In *The Poqo Insurrection* (1986), Tom Lodge argues that when the PAC and the ANC founded their military wings, Poqo and MK, the latter “operated as an elite framework of a larger clandestine and sometimes less committed support organization [sic]” while Poqo “in certain localities attained the dimensions of a mass movement…reaching the peak of its influence in 1963” (p. 1). For Lodge (1986), “in terms of its geographical extensiveness, the numbers involved and its timespan, the Poqo conspiracies of 1962-1968 represent the largest and most sustained African insurrectionary movement since the inception of modern African political organisations in South Africa” (p. 1). He points out that the “Cape Province and the Transkei contained the main centres of PAC activity” (p. 10). In Jixeni Village in Mqanduli, Mthatha, I interviewed women who were Poqo members, who were arrested in 1963, at the “peak” of Poqo activity.

Mildred Nonotice Daphu, born in 1928, became involved with Poqo at the time when Chief Sabata Dalindyebo opposed the imposition of the Bantu Authorities Act that would accept the imposition of separate development by the state. The contestation was between Dalindyebo and Kaiser Matanzima, who supported and promoted separate development and was appointed as a Regional Chief Emigrant of Tembuland in 1958. The TRC Final Report notes that in “December 1962, Poqo members made an abortive attempt to assassinate Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima at his home at Qamata near Cofimvaba…Seven Poqo members were killed and three police officers seriously injured in the encounter” (TRC Final Report, 1998: 48). In
1963, the Transkei became the first Bantustan to formerly accept separate development under Matanzima. The report traces political activity in Jixeni Village [spelt Jixini in the report] in 1962 that members of the “Jixini branch of Poqo planned an attack on white people near the area; but before this campaign could take off, more than 100 Poqo members were arrested” (TRC Final Report, 1998: 48). Mildred Nonotice Daphu traces her involvement with Poqo, under the leadership of Mr. Mamfengu Leonard Mzolisa, during this contested time between Dalindyebo and Matanzima:

I became involved in PAC in 1963…It was in the times of Sabatha Dalindyebo, It was the time of that which could not pass our lips! You cannot tell! It was the time of that which could not pass our lips!

(Mildred Nototice Daphu interview, Mthatha, October 2013)

She was arrested with others in Mqanduli while at a Poqo meeting about how to fight the Boers. When I asked what they were planning to do:

I would say that they were building a force, soldiers who would challenge white people. Their intention was to build weapons to fight white people. They were challenging the rule of the Boers… they believed at the time that they wanted to get the land back. They believed that the enemy was the whites who took their land. They were looking to fight with the whites.

(Mildred Nototice Daphu interview, Mthatha, October 2013)

Following the arrests, they were sentenced to five years outside prison that prohibited them from any political activity. They attended meetings during the night, and many of them were in and out of jail as they were known to be active in the community by the informants within their own community. They spoke of constant harassment whenever they were seen by the police in public, especially at funerals. Zile Xolo, the Jixeni PAC Chairperson, noted that the young PAC/APLA members of the 1980s, were inspired and guided by older women. Nocollege Mzolisa, also born in 1928, was arrested in Mqanduli. She had a young child with her
while she was arrested, sent back home with other people. The child died while she was in prison. The only thing she would say of the matter is that the “child that I left behind, when I was in jail, I came back and they were dead. What have I benefitted?” (Nocollege Mzolisa interview, Mthatha, October 2013). Some women are said to have given birth in jail, and others died there. I was told that when it came to the remains of some who died at Nongqongqo prison, in East London, that their remains were not returned to the families.

Thus, for many of those who stayed inside the country, and refused to be silenced by the apartheid regime, life was this cycle of arrests and return home. In Worcester, Reynolds (2013) points to the “repetition and return to the township”, the case of Poqo members operating underground in Mqanduli from the 1960s onwards shows that this was a countrywide phenomenon, in both urban and rural settings (p. 32).

5.3.2 Church

The church emerged as a site from which women found a space to strategise against the apartheid violence, and the violence that erupted between UDF and AZAPO in Port Elizabeth. While schools, funerals and stadiums were spaces where the young and old protested, the church provided a space from which women could use religion as a façade behind which to discreetly plan political activities. As Fatima Meer (1985) has argued, “religion, particularly Christianity, is an important factor in bringing women together” (p. 14). Scholars such as Haddad (2004) have shown that women’s prayer unions, known as the Manyano in the Methodist church, had been introduced by missionaries from 1906 onwards, as spaces where African women were to pray together, and for the missionaries “to prepare the young converts for domestic service by teaching them skills such as sewing, washing, and laundering as they saw appropriate to an ideal Victorian home” (p. 5). As Haddad (2004) argues, these spaces took a new meaning for African women dealing with the harsh urban influx control, working in racist white homes, and dealing with the separation from family members in both urban and rural areas. Women in the rural areas used the women’s only groups as a space in which to deal with the separation from their husbands and children in urban areas as influx control laws made their access to the city difficult. Women in urban areas used the weekly prayer meetings to cope with routine racism in the workplace and the psychological challenges of separation from their families. At the height of apartheid, Meer (1985) argues that “the Manyanos converted temporarily into protest groups
against apartheid” which “undergird women’s activities in overtly political organisations” such as the African National Congress Women’s League (p. 14).

It was thus not surprising to hear accounts from women about how they used the church to mobilise with other women about how to “protect” the young people who were being chased by the police and how to respond to police violence. Fezeka Klaas, born in 1948 in New Brighton in Port Elizabeth, spoke about meetings in church.

We used to have prayer meetings at Ngesi, at a church in Ngesi. We would carry the bible, but we would be discussing politics… We would pretend that we were reading the scripture by holding the bible during the meeting, while we are planning what we will do politically.

(Fezeka Klaas interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

She also mentioned that as women, they would visit people detained in prison, especially those children whose parents had died, whom they would visit “as their parents would”. They would also visit “cadres who returned homes and the parents had died”. We used to visit the jails, as their parents would. They would also confront black police officers, who were notorious for arresting “the children even if he did not see them doing something”.

Mrs. Mde specifically spoke about women’s actions during the violence between the UDF and AZAPO. As Buur notes, from 1985 onwards a tense battle between the UDF and AZAPO “tore Port Elizabeth townships apart […] rallies by hundreds of youths at the houses of political opponents were often followed by arson attacks and sometimes by necklacing” (Buur, 2006: 739; also see TRC Final Report, Volume 3, 1998). Mde narrated about how women tried to call for peace between the UDF and AZAPO by wearing white headbands:

We wore the head wraps so that they would think that we were gathering for a church service, maybe we were Zionists and so on. Yes. But mostly, there was the fighting between AZAPO and UDF. We wore the headband because it had two meanings: because 1) they would think that we were members of Zionist church; 2) and we want peace between the children. We wore the headbands to call for peace between the children. We used to pray, we would come together
with others in Walmer, Centenary, the place next to the library, it was just a field then, and the hippos would arrive, and on one side there would be UDF, and on the other AZAPO, it would be that confrontation. The Boers would get there and shoot towards the UDF. We would ask ourselves why not AZAPO, which was also a party of black people, why is that when the Boers arrive, they shoot one side and not all of them?

(Mde interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

The use of white to symbolise a call for peace seems to be a common factor for women in diverse societies, who use their identity as mothers to make claims about violence in their societies. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, wore “white head scarves” when they gathered every Thursday at 3:30pm in front of the presidential palace in Buenos Aires since 1977 calling for the return of the 30,000 Argentinians who had been “abducted, tortured, and permanently disappeared” in the “Dirty War” under “consecutive military juntas” between 1976-1983 (Taylor, 2001: 97). As Taylor (2001) argues further, “the Mothers had to manipulate the maternal image that was already rigorously controlled by the State” as they made the claim that it was precisely their maternal responsibilities as “good” mothers that took them to the Plaza in search of their children” (p. 100). As had been the case in South Africa, ‘the Mothers’ notion of motherhood had gradually became political rather than biological”, as “they came to consider themselves the mothers of all the disappeared, not just their own offspring” (p. 102).

The case of the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace is a similar example, as the women in Liberia came together in 2003 the height of what is known as the Second Liberian Civil War. They wore white every day and gathered next to the road that then-President Charles Taylor drove on his way to work, and in the markets, where they petitioned for all parties to participate in the peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana (Gbowee and Mithers, 2011). They wore white to symbolise their call for peace and their non-partisan nature (Gbowee and Mithers, 2011). It appears then that in instances of war women across the world subvert tropes of motherhood as essentially peaceful and the colour white as a symbol of peace to hold oppressive regimes towards the achievement of peace. The theme of protecting their families, especially children, is a central motivating theme in the activities of mothers who routinely put their own
bodies forward in a rhetorical statement towards oppressive forms of power. This theme of protection is one I now turn to.

### 5.3.3 Protecting the children

In Chapter Two, it is discussed that both dominant international and local feminist discourses that perceive the use of maternal identity as a claim to take up arms as conservative. As Gasa (2007) and other (black) feminists have argued, at the height of apartheid violence, young children of school-going age were subject to it, where it made sense for the parents of these children to want to defend them. The theme of protecting children was a central motivator of women’s actions in the townships in the 1980s, whereas Bonnin (2000) argues, “spaces of everyday life were to be reterritorialized [sic] and new spaces and boundaries within the township recreated” (p. 307). The experiences of women who were members of PEWO in Port Elizabeth speak to such a reality, and the extent to which the mothers put their bodies on the line for the protection of not just their children, but all the children of the struggle.

Mrs. Mabhengeza, born in 1944, an active member of PEWO, who use hide members of Amabutho at her home, spoke about how they used to rearrange their yards at home so that the young people would be able to jump over the fence to get in easily.

> I would say that the children would come to me when there was a problem in New Brighton. They would say “Mama, we would like you to hide these people here”. I would say “ok, my children, hide them here”…We just opened our homes and opened ways for them to get out when they were running from AZAPO. They would open the gate and go.

*(Mrs. Mabhengeza interview Port Elizabeth, July 2013)*

Mrs. Klaas had a son who was a member of Amabutho. She protected him and others at her home, recounting:
One of my children was a member of Amabutho. He died in 2008. When they were being chased by the enemy, we would open our home to them. Sometimes the enemy was here. I would let them inside the room so that they can sleep. I would stand outside and when the enemy has passed, I would throw a stone on top of the roof. I would do it like that.

(Fezeka Klaas interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

Their role in “protecting” the young men from the police often placed them at the direct line of danger, as Mrs. Mafutha articulated:

One night a bullet came through the window: Twaa! It hit the wall, the wall in the kitchen. We were protected by God, because I cannot tell you how we survived. I was cooking, making supper: Twaa! I reasoned that he was shooting at us; he wanted my life as well. I used to be woken up all the time by the Boers. They were looking for the young men. They would wake them up, beat them and leave with them... that is the life we lived.

(Mrs. Mafutha Interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

Victoria Nagetsana, born in 1936, talked about the constant police harassment in her home, because of her political activities, and suspicions that she was hiding members of Amabutho:

Do you remember when it [Hippo] used to come into the house? Yhu! You will see it stopping at your house. My husband liked his sleep, so I would get up to find out what they wanted, and they would be coming to our house. They would get in looking for me, they would have heard about a meeting taking place somewhere. They would be here to intimidate... they would call out my husband and say, “you had a meeting somewhere and you didn’t tell us. Get in!” My husband would be quiet and relaxed. I would say “wait for me to get dressed.”
You would search for whatever you were wearing the previous day. They were like that.

(Victoria Nagetsane interview in Port Elizabeth, August 2013)

The accounts of experiences articulated above point to the lack of distinction between home front and battlefront in the context of guerilla war where homes of women became sites of both struggle and retreat as they formed the barrier between the state and their children. These women would not define themselves as combatants, although the ‘young lions’ they protected would describe themselves as combatants of the ‘People’s War’. Without their participation, it is difficult to imagine that their children would have been successful in confronting the state. It is these women combatants that the mostly male leadership of Amabutho also led me to, while on my search for the women who had fought side by side with them. In the eyes of their own children, the mothers are seen as fellow combatants.

5.4 The In-betweeners

Cherry (2007) argues that the literature on the young lions who were central in realising the ANC’s call for ungovernability, are often represented in gender neutral terms, or in specifically masculine terms. Thus the ‘young lion’ is represented as male. The older women that are discussed above as the “combative mothers” did not mention that they hide young women in their homes, and there is a lacuna in extant literature on the role of young women who were also the ‘young lions’ at the height of violence in the 1980s, with further research being crucial. When I began observations of Amabutho in 2012, I was haunted by a woman who must have been in her mid-30s at the time, who shared with me that for the longest time, she could not eat meat, because she had seen “too many people blown up” in front of her. What did the young women who remained in the country do at the time of the People’s War? Of the women who were in their teens and younger, who were part of PEYCO and Amabutho, personal/family violence and unrest schools and funerals were key sites of struggle.
5.4.1 Personal/communal violence and unrest in schools

Nkosazana Sobantu, was born in New Brighton in 1964, and expressed that she became involved politically because her brother had been arrested at the age of 14 and taken to Robben Island. Following the arrest, her family was subject to constant harassment by the police:

My brother was in jail for 14 years, he was arrested in 1978 in Robben Island. So there was no chance that I would stay at home and fold my arms when the Boers used to frequent our house and they would torture my mother, kick the doors, you see? It was not nice… They would abuse her. They would instruct her to show her documents that were not there. They would even dig into the floor looking for ANC documents that do not exist.

(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

The constant harassment at home was combined with the unrest in schools at the pinnacle of the boycotts and further complicated by the violence between UDF and AZAPO:

There was no stability… I was doing Standard Seven then, and it was not nice; there was violence in the community, and the schools were shut down. Then we returned in 87… AZAPO was fighting with the ANC. It was difficult in those days, people’s houses used to be guarded. Even our house at that time, used to be watched… So we lived like that, such that I only wrote my Standard Ten in 1989. I was staying with relatives because of the unrest we had to leave the house because of my brother.

(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

Boniswa, also born in 1964 in New Brighton, spoke about the impact of the AZAPO-UDF classes on her family:

My sister in Motherwell… used to get beaten by the Boers here at home. And during the clashes between UDF and AZAPO, the clashes happened near our
home. We used to get searched. We did not stay at home. Our mother was also involved in politics but I can’t speak about the details of her involvement because I was young. We used to hide things in our garden, like the PEYCO t-shirts.

(Boniswa interview, July 2013)

She also spoke about the presence of police at school, where they held some of their meetings:

We also used to meet at Cowell [High School] to have our meetings and often there would be shooting. There were soldiers who monitored the school. There was a person who was shot close to our home, he died at our gate.

(Boniswa interview, July 2013)

To defend themselves and attack the state, Thandiswa spoke about how they assembled petrol bombs because it was too dangerous to be caught carrying weapons:

We used to make petrol bombs. We used to put paraffin, sand, put them on a matchstick and put petrol and spirit. Those are the things we used to destroy, you see? Because if you had arms, you would get arrested. What Amabutho used to do by hand are hand grenades and petrol bombs.

(Thandiswa, interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

The accounts by the women reveal that their everyday life was consumed by the presence of violence. At home and in schools, they found themselves under direct attack from the State. In their work as marshalls for Amabutho, they found that funeral sites became a key place of struggle between themselves and the State. They defended the space and mobilised within it.
5.4.2 Funerals

_Digging for freedom_

This young man says he and his friends refuse to work with us even though they know we can no longer cope with the digging; day and night. He and his friends say we must take a stand, refuse to dig graves for people dying all the time.
That way we too, would make a statement; about this unnecessary war of girls and women raped, of children dying in the cross fire while playing, of families fleeing homes, of brother against brother. This young man says no freedom can come from so much bloodshed and mayhem.

This young man doesn’t know that we are women disguised as men,
We started digging graves when men disappeared, fell dead,
He doesn’t know that when we send him away to sleep at sunset we start another mission of hiding women and children in these graves so they can at least get some sleep, suckle their infants in peace.
This young man doesn’t know that to an army of women gravediggers freedom is taking an energizing nap, on the other side of the hill.

Makhosazana Xaba (2016)

Mamphela Ramphele (1996) argues that funerals became a site of protest during the anti-apartheid struggle. She notes that male and female bodies were made political in particularly gendered ways. According to Ramphele (1996):

>[t]he body politic depicts and treats the female body as incomplete and inadequate to the task of representing nobility, heroism, and public office. The female body usually requires a male body to render it whole and acceptable, and yet when the man’s body, having lost its vitality, lies helplessly without form, its helplessness and lifelessness acquire meaning from the proximity of the relatively frail body of the widow (p. 103).

A large part of the actions of the young was the role they played as marshalls in protests and funerals. Every interview I did with the young women who were party of PEYCO and
Amabutho involved their encounter with the police in funerals. Nyameka Goniwe, the wife of Mathew Goniwe, recounts the atmosphere of the burial of her husband in a short documentary about the Cradock Four, that: "it was as if the ground was moving. It was just in defiance, a statement which was being conveyed to the government that there is nothing that you are going to be able to control. I can’t even explain that kind of spirit. It was a funeral but I felt like it was a liberation day for many. I think that is what lifted me that day…”

Fundiswa Menzeni, born in 1963 in Port Elizabeth, who was a marshall at the funeral of the Cradock Four, spoke about the following:

We used to get beaten during prayer, protest at a funeral while carrying the coffin... We would carry the coffin on our shoulders to the church, if the services was in church or to Dan Qeqe [stadium]. We would need to be the first ones in Dan Qeqe and do the guard of honour, so that people would not force their way in... I remember in 1986, Amabutho were being shot at in the church that I pointed out to you to pass as you were coming here, we were at a funeral. That church was not there then. We were shot by the Boers there, and they poured teargas inside, while Amabutho were carrying the coffins. My mother fell during the commotion there, while people were falling on top of the coffins. She was never fine after that. She died in 1986 on the 3rd of November; she was buried on the 15th of November. She inhaled the teargas and she was never ok after that. Even I use some medical treatment for high blood pressure, but still I’ve never stopped fighting.

(Fundiswa Menzeni, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Nkosazana Sobantu spoke about the fact that they would not be able to take someone who was shot to hospital.

We would notice that someone was shot by the pellets, especially pellets, because we would not take the person to hospital because if they do, you know that the police would arrest them.

(Nkosazana Sobantu interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013).

Tiny Tatelo Mokoena, born in 1963 in Mamelo, a former deputy secretary of COSAS in Mamelo and the publicity secretary of the Mamelodi Youth Organisation (MAYO) and a member of the Zakheni Women’s Organisation, spoke about confronting death on the day of the Mamelodi massacre.

Then came the Mamelodi massacre in 1985, the 21st of November in 1985. Zakheni women’s organisation, civic women’s organisation was in the forefront of that. There was a march of complaining about the rates that were very expensive, paying for things that we don’t know; paying for things called uh sundries on the receipt and when you as you don’t get answers. So there was a very big march in Mamelodi and it end up with 13 people died at that massacre. There was a massacre on that day 21st of November and then amongst the people that died there was a three-month-old baby, who died in my arms due to suffocation due to tear gas. Heh, I still have my memory. I carried the baby from the area it would be about..., I don’t know the kilometres. It could be about 10 minutes drive, 10 minutes’ walk from the place of the mother to the place of surgery... and when I was there, holding the baby, I requested the doctor to wait, check the baby, because in that surgery there were a lot of people that teargased, you know, bullets and all those things, and then when I went Dr... he said this baby’s finished, and the mother was here. ‘This baby’s finished’ ‘No! No! check, check.’ And he said, ‘no, no, Tiny. Come, come.’ And then he put me on side and said, ‘the baby’s finished. Please, let’s proceed with those that are still alive.’ And then I was wearing white tracksuit and he said, ‘please go home and put on something dark. If they have seen you, they will be able to shoot you from a distance.’ And then that part always comes back, it always comes back. And that was when we were fully involved with internal politics, ja.
The constant threat and reality of death pervaded the lives of women old and young. Like their mothers, young women find ways to resist the state, and in doing so, were implicated in the all-encompassing battlefront of apartheid violence. The state, which erased the lines between the civil and the military, attacked all who opposed it. Young women at the fault lines, protected the sanctity of the dead at burial sites. They also transformed these sites into redemptive spaces for the living to keep fighting the enemy state.

5.5. Conclusion

The chapter accounted for the different categories of women combatants and their sites of struggle. The guerilla girls at the forefront of challenging the state in schools in 1976 and afterwards, crossed borders to gain military training that would concretise their attempts at guerilla warfare. The combative mothers in the community constitute the space from which most women participated in the armed struggle. The erasure of the public and military spheres brought the war to their homes, the playing fields of their children in schools, in the churches and everywhere in their lives. From these sites they defended themselves, their children and lived under constant state interrogation and attack. The in-betweentners are those young women who fought the war within the country, without military training. Together with their male counterparts, they transformed their communities into battle zones and made themselves guards of honour for their communities. Despite this, the combative mothers and in-betweeners, and the spaces from which they fought, remain delegitimised.
6.1 Introduction

Following the February 1990 release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the national liberation movements the other important transition that took place, parallel to the political transition, was the formation of the new SANDF. As outlined in Chapter Three with reference to the DDR process, the creation of the SANDF involved the joining together of former enemies of the apartheid security force, the guerilla armies of the ANC and APLA and the defence forces of four of the ten Bantustan homelands. It was clear that the size of the new defence force would far outweigh the needs and material capabilities of the newly democratic state committed to a demilitarised society. The strict criteria for integration into the SANDF pointed to the state’s need to downsize the military, and thus to let go of thousands of former combatants who were to join civilian life. This thesis has shown that the formal DDR process, which was led by the ANC and the National Party representatives, was confined to a narrow definition and conception of combatants. In the end, members of the old SADF accounted for the majority of members of the new SANDF, which stood at 90,000, with the combined members of the TBVC armies at 11,039, while the MK and APLA accounted for only 34,888 members of a total 135,927 strong force. These numbers did not reflect the thousands of women and men who had participated in the armed struggle at the all-encompassing battleground of the People’s War. The women who participated in this formal state process also constituted the minority of women who had participated in the different terrains of the armed struggle, inside and outside the country. Chapter Five has shown that the war produced multiple combatants. The categories of guerilla girls, combative mothers and the in-betweener, used in Chapter Five, show that women of different ages, in different spaces and periods of struggle, were foundational to the success of People’s War strategy. Yet, it is the transnational woman combatant, together with the transnational male guerilla, who became understood as the formal combatants of the liberation armies in the SANDF integration and demobilisation process, whose hierarchy and criteria for
combatant recognition was based on military training. As shown above, it is evident from the experiences of the women combatants of MK and APLA below, that there were further hierarchies during the integration process, as the SANDF soldiers seem to have dominated the process and the guerilla combatants found themselves assimilated into a culture that undermined their skills and experience as non-statutory forces.

This chapter deals with demobilisation and reintegration of women combatants at two levels: 1) at the state structure level – state recognition services and benefits; and 2) at the personal level – personal, family, social, political, psychological and spiritual. In terms of organisation, a distinction is made between formally recognised combatants and non-recognised ones. The chapter first addresses the experiences of the formally demobilised women combatants. These are delineated into different themes, from the women’s return from exile under continued precarious security circumstances in the country, the DDR process, the reasons they chose not to integrate, and demobilisation benefits.

The chapter then examines the trajectories of the combatants who were not demobilised. Despite their substantial contribution to the success of the armed struggle, the Special Pension is the main route through which the internally-based combatant women have attempted to gain financial support for their role in the armed struggle. It will be shown that most of the combative mothers and in-betweenerers have been unsuccessful in applying for the Special Pension. The transnationally trained guerilla girls have been more successful in receiving the financial support. In the main, the majority of the internally-based combatants have received no form of support from the state, financial or otherwise. At a personal level, the chapter shows that women have had to reinvent themselves for the post-apartheid reality, economically, socially, politically and psychologically. The section examines the different ways in which women are navigating civilian life, and how they deal with the enduring memories and wounds of the past.

In the main, the chapter shows that although some women received the once-off demobilisation payment, and a few receive the Special Pension, the majority of women have had to find personal means to adjust to post-apartheid life. In terms of furthering their education, finding jobs in the formal and informal sectors, these have been self-help strategies that women have used in order to survive and support their families. It is therefore not surprising to conclude that most women combatants are poor and marginalised. Although there are few exceptions, their
reality reflects South Africa’s geography of poverty, where black women constitute the poor majority.

6.2 Experiences of formally demobilised women

The experiences of the demobilisation process articulated by women combatants who formally participated in the state DDR process, reflects similar themes from those expressed by the mostly male participants in most of the literature on demobilisation (Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mokalobe, 2001; Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006, Mashike, 2007; Maringira and Brankovic, 2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). They also depart in significant ways. Core similar themes include the feeling that members of the non-statutory forces weren’t properly treated in the process, in terms of the requirements in education levels, the manner in which the ranking was conducted by a committee dominated by members of the old SADF, as well as perceptions by the combatants that the non-statutory forces were assimilated into a racist SADF military culture. Furthermore, like their male counterparts, the women combatants felt that the once off-payment that they received for their years in the guerilla army was inadequate for the personal sacrifices that they had made in order to be part of MK and APLA. Some of the guerilla girls found that the Special Pensions Act required them to be above the age of 35 years, not taking into consideration that many of them sacrificed their youth in order to end apartheid. As a direct result of this, however, they found themselves with few resources to start their lives in the post-apartheid society. They also found the facilities that were to assist them with attaining new skills for civilian life, such as the Service Corps, wholly inadequate. As a result, many had to find personal means to further their education and gain new skills that would assist them in navigating new professions and new lives (where many of them had been out of the country for years, and some for decades).

There are, however, also significant differences between the experiences that women shared in this study to those found in the male-centred studies in DDR and civilian integration research. With regards to some of these themes, it might well be that they are muted in other studies, because they are concerns that are associated with women and femininity, such as concerns about family. Of the themes that became salient in this study, some women combatants articulated that they joined the armed struggle as a political end, and did not see themselves as
career soldiers. Some women expressed that with the end of apartheid, they looked forward to the opportunity to raise their children and be with family, while other women also expressed their concern about their age and health in deciding against joining the SANDF and opting to reintegrate into civilian life.

6.2.1 Demobilisation

As noted in Chapter Three, the CPR list was central to the ability for individual combatants to be able to integrate into the SANDF or to apply for demobilisation. For the women interviewed the first step was to confirm that their names appeared on the list. Of the women who fought from outside the country, none of those from MK and APLA experienced any issues with finding their names on the list. A total of twelve women who were interviewed for this study were officially demobilised, ten from MK, and two from APLA. Of the twelve, ten never integrated into the defence force, but instead chose demobilisation. Two MK women briefly integrated into the SANDF, and then demobilised in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Eleven of the participants received the demobilisation amount of R20,201 (US $5,519) for group four, which is meant for those who served for five to eleven years from 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1989 (Motumi and Hudson, 1995:120). One participant received R42 058 (US $11,491), which is the amount that was awarded to those who served between 22 and 23 years from 1 January, 1961 to 31 December, 1972. Another two, Colonel Belinda Martin and Brigadier Claire Bless, integrated into the SANDF until retirement. They shed light on the dynamics of the integration process that are similar to those expressed in other studies, mainly with regards to education and ranking, assimilation, demobilisation benefits, service corps and special pension (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013).

6.2.2 Education and ranking: “they didn’t recognise our training”

As Motumi and Hudson (1995: 118) note, a requirement for integration was that individual participants were required to “submit proof of educational (and or military) qualifications for eligibility as members of the SANDF”. Upon failure to produce the education qualifications, a
person was required to undertake assessments tests designed to measure potential on a scale of Categories 1 to 10. As Motumi and Hudson (1995) notes, assessments in the Categories 1-3 did not qualify for acceptance into the new SANDF, while Categories 4-6 were accepted, if they demonstrated the potential to become non-commissioned officers, whilst those who qualified for Categories 7-10 could be accepted as officers. This issue of education qualification was a contentious issue for many in MK and APLA, who felt that as a result of this, having sacrificed attaining education to join the armed struggle put them in a double-bind.

Linda Mjekula (alias Jessie Mlambo), a former MK combatant, expressed that when she returned to South Africa from Zambia in 1992, she had intended to join the SANDF. However, she did not qualify to integrate into the force, because she did not have Grade 12, and also did not manage to pass the subsequent tests that she was required to undergo in order to integrate (Linda Mjekula telephone interview, September 2013). The issue of education was a contentious one, as some members of MK and APLA felt that they sacrificed education and other qualifications in order to join the armed struggle. As Brenda Badela expressed:

...there are people who left the country in 1976/1977 who were doing Standard Five or something, and they stayed in the camps for the rest of their lives. And when they came back to South Africa they were asked for qualifications...There’s a huge difference between a guerrilla army and a conventional army, you see?...I mean, there’s a comrade who was our regional commander in Angola. You can imagine if you were responsible for that region, all the camps in Angola. That person is only a brigadier general. And when I said, ‘but [names the person], how come?’, he said, ‘it’s how things are, what can you do?’; because you’d actually think that this person must be far, far, far senior, not a brigadier general.

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)

Belinda Martin also expressed the sense that members of MK and APLA were undermined and ranked lower than members of the SADF:

...I integrated, they ranked me a ‘major’, although I deserved more than that. All of us were given very poor ranks, from MK and APLA, they didn’t recognise
our training that we had. Even medical doctors who trained abroad from MK, were not, they didn’t want to recognise our education...Because the seven armies merging wasn’t easy, and in the military house, we had all the medical professions, professionals both from the SADF, MK and APLA, and they wanted to tower above the non-statutory forces, that was MK and APLA, and undermine the qualifications of our doctors, our nurses and everybody, and rank them poorly.

(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)

Tiny Tatelo Mokoena, the only member of the SDU who integrated to the SADF, argued that the ranking system was used as a form of assimilating members of the non-statutory forces:

There was nothing like integration, honestly. It was just assimilation. Or, it was assimilation, or...because I integrated with a degree already...and then, but at the same time for the Defence Force to agree to make me an officer was a hassle. And then, I was lucky I had a very good person, who was representing me. They wanted to make me a lieutenant. And he said you can’t. I want her as a major. But they said MK doesn’t have an Airforce. MK was an armed struggle-conventional organisation. So you are taking her a step downwards. That’s when I became a captain. I integrated with the rank of a captain. We, we, firstly we were not educated as far as the rank system is concerned, we were not told whether we were comfortable with the rank system or whether we are comfortable with the process of integration. And the worst part is that MK put a lieutenant-colonel for integration, which to me says that the government of that time didn’t take issues of defence seriously, because if they did they wouldn’t put lieutenant-colonel as a low rank for someone to represent people. They were supposed to put a very high senior rank – a major general – to represent people, who would be able to fight for bigger and better ranks. And most of the TBVC states were promoted prior to integration. Immediately that they heard there’s integration, they fast-tracked their promotions. So when we came, most of were given very, very low ranks...So you needed a person from us to say, ‘heh-uh, if
you don’t have someone from your rank, from your organisation they will give you any rank whether you agreed to it or not’. And they will give a lot of funny reasons that you are not at this age. I was told you can’t be a major because I was not even, by then I was not even (was 27 or 30?, ja.) I was not 30, and then all to find I was not 35 or something, I don’t remember age they put. But all to find that there were people that they put when after integration, I realised there were white majors lower age than me, you see? So they were not systematic as far as that is concerned and they were not uh…there was no fairness in ensuring that they put the right people in the right ranks.

(Tiny Tatelo Mokoena interview, Pretoria, November 2014)

For many combatants, the tone of the ranking system was one that set hierarchies for the culture that they were to expect in the SANDF. For them, the explicit tone was that their guerilla experience was regarded as inferior, even though as part of the “People’s Army”, they saw themselves as the victors of the war that had been fought. The process undermined, and in the words of some participants, “humiliated” guerrilla combatants in what they saw as the entrenchment of the white supremacist culture of the SADF into the SANDF. The ranking and the education requirements of the process influenced the decision of many combatants in deciding that they wished to be demobilised. The theme of assimilation that speaks to perceptions by the combatants of a dominant Afrikaner culture of the SADF that was resistant to the new conditions of a post-apartheid South Africa. With fears of suffocating under this culture, some women combatants instead chose demobilisation.

6.2.3 Assimilation: “we humiliated our veterans”

A key theme that arises about the challenges of the integration process is the theme of assimilation (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998; Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013). As Mokalobe (2001) notes, members of MK and APLA were resentful of the fact that it was only them who had to undergo the Potential Tests and orientation into professional military training,
most of which was administered by former SADF members, “who sometimes behaved with prejudice towards former MK and APLA combatants (p. 76). As a result of the perceived dominance of the SADF and dissatisfaction with regard to the ranking system, which they saw as undermining the skills of the non-statutory forces, many ex-combatants opted for demobilisation, to escape entry into an new defence force that was still dominated by the old SADF logic. For the women I interviewed who participated in this process, assimilation was a major factor shaping their dissatisfaction with the integration process and their decision to demobilise.

A former MK who preferred to be anonymous pointed to various causes of tension, from the use of Afrikaans, the use of the old SADF uniform, the ranking system as the multiple causes of the tension that came with assimilated integration:

I think we humiliated our veterans, our senior people, by putting them on the same par as me, you know, to operate, to enter the system and try, try to and make a living like I would when actually I thought my view would have been to treat them differently and stuff, and thus, because they are in that situation, the main core of the Defence Force at the administrative level remained the old correspondence – in Afrikaans. Any correspondence that comes to me in Afrikaans, I don’t read it, I don’t care if it’s an instruction. And all my correspondences would be in English, because my argument is that if you create a new system you all have to learn into the new system, so there will be things that we know there will be things that we don’t know. Why does it apply only to non-statutory forces, because issues of language, issues of uniform, issues of culture in the Defence Force and stuff like that… which basically resulted into in the long term, in my view, in us being assimilated into the thing and stuff.

(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)

Of the uniform, she said:

I refused to wear the uniform, because I said, we integrated, so I’m not wearing the SADF uniform; we need a new uniform that can reflect both. So I left. Throughout my life in the Defence Force, I never wore [the] uniform.

(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)
Claire Bless, a white MK combatant who integrated into the SANDF, spoke about how members of SADF addressed her in Afrikaans, which she refused to and was not able to speak, while she sat next to her black comrades. She just kept saying that integration was a difficult process. For others, such as Pumza Dyantyi, the integration and demobilisation process were very difficult, because this meant that they came face-to-face with their former enemies, the Boers:

Truth be told, my child, I found the process very difficult for me having to work with the Boers. For grading, when we were being interviewed, they were assessing our grade and I was graded a sergeant, and I was Grade A. I am a colonel. I did just a part time at the Mthatha base, and I felt that I was not ready to work with these people. I decided that it is better that I go for demob.

(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)

For Pamela Daniels, entering the SANDF implied that the open spirit of engagement that she experienced while in MK was going to disappear under the new forms of engagement in the new army where soldiering was rigidly defined, and is not open to the challenge of institutional culture:

When I came back, of course I was planning, because there were not much options, I was planning to go to the Defence. Fortunately or unfortunately at the point when I wanted to integrate, there was a scene in Wallmansthal, where soldiers were fighting and looking at the situation, and of course seeing how the process was unfolding. I felt because I’m one person who speaks my mind, in the middle of Angola, I would speak my mind, and of course as you know there’s command and control in the Defence; you cannot just say or do whatever you want. But fortunately, we were taught that you respect leadership. You do not fear leadership; and therefore as political soldiers we had room to be able to air our views. Not like in any other army, where you are subjected to command and it ends there. So that’s the difference. So I felt...I would not survive in the Defence, one; and of course what I’ve stated – the way, the process unfolded, of
course, based on the fact that we had this whole negotiated settlement and all that. So I felt, once I saw what was happening in Wallmansthal, I decided to take … the money. Of course, not knowing what I was going to do, I was going to go. I took, I demobilised in 1996.

(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

As Daniels expresses, in the eyes of some combatants, the rigidity and the undermining nature of the SANDF integration could be understood as a result of the negotiated settlement between the liberation movements and the National Party. The taste of this environment of assimilation during integration motivated some combatants to opt for civilian life.

6.2.4 Health and age

By the 1990s, some combatants had been active since the 1960s and 1970s. At the time of integration, they were already in their 40s and 50s. Two such combatants in this study had been active in the 1960s and 1970s in APLA and MK, respectively, felt that their health and age compromised their ability to integrate into the SANDF.

Joyce Sifuba of APLA, expressed that after being away since 1964, she and her husband, who was also a combatant, wanted to quietly adapt to life back in the country after their arrival in Johannesburg. They both felt that they were too old to join the defence force. They also considered living in a place that would allow for an easy transition to South Africa for their children who were born in exile.

We did not stay for long in Gauteng. We went to register in our office, and then came to Mpumalanga. We came to Mpumalanga to find a place to live. We came to Mpumalanga because we came with children who do not know South Africa. So we felt if we, my husband said, if we go and live in Johannesburg, they will be swallowed by the volumes of Johannesburg. Let’s look for a place outside and then they can gradually go in and adapt the way of living in South Africa because Johannesburg was too fast. And, eh, my husband comes from Cape
Town, and he also thought that Cape Town is too fast. Let’s look for a remote place that’s quiet until they settle down.

(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)

Phumla Gaba (alias Phumla Williams), who was born in 1948 in New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, was a school teacher before she left the country to join MK in 1978 at the age of thirty. Upon returning to South Africa, she worked for the ANC office as part one of the officers responsible for repatriating people back home. She said that when the repatriation was over, she realised that she did not want to integrate into the SANDF, because she was not well physically, as she suffered with arthritis (Phumla Gaba interview, September 2013).

6.2.5 Not a career soldier: “I just wanted to be independent”

For many who gave their lives to the cause of liberation, inside and outside the country, the unbanning of the liberation movements and the eventual transition to democratic rule threw up new questions about the kind of professional lives that one was to take, now that the battle was won. For those in MK, like others in different positions within the different movements, had to ask themselves if they were to continue on as professional soldiers or take a different path now that the armed struggle was over. While material considerations were made regarding the decision to integrate or demobilise, some of the women expressed that they had not become soldiers for career goals. Therefore, after the end of apartheid, they did not see themselves becoming career soldiers. When I asked Makhosazana Xaba, who is now a respected writer of fiction and poetry, whether considered integrating into the SANDF, her response was:

No, I didn’t want to. I really didn’t like the idea. When I was in the camp, I knew what I was there for. I had wanted to be there, I understand why I needed to be there: so that I could come back and fight. But I didn’t want that as a profession. I couldn’t visualise myself as a 50-year-old who is in the SANDF. That’s not where I wanted to be.

(Makhosazana Xaba interview, May 2014)
Totsie Memela-Khambule, who is currently the CEO of Eduloan, expressed that after attaining a Masters Degree in Management and getting interested in the financial industry, she decided that she “could contribute in the Defence Force without necessarily being a soldier” (Totsie Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014). She did not elaborate on the ways in which she has been able to make this contribution outside of the SANDF. Another participant noted that she demobilised because she wanted to be independent, and not indebted to a political party or government:

“I decided that I did not want to go back to the military when I got back home because I was still ...I just wanted to be independent, completely independent and not feel responsibility to government and so I demobilised. There was a demobilisation process, so I became one of the people that demobilised.”

(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

When Bonnin (2000) argues that surviving and resisting apartheid terror meant that the lives of most people were suspended, for those the guerrilla combatants, there was little space for them to conceive of professional lives outside of the war that they were fighting. The end of apartheid opened a space for them to imagine a new future beyond a life of mere survival and resistance. Thus, it is not surprising that some women opted for demobilisation to give themselves a space to make concrete the rewards of freedom.

6.2.6 Family: “we’ve been away for a long time”

Some women chose against integration into the SANDF because, after years of separation with family, they wished to rebuild their family lives. Nombulelo April lost two of her children in 1994 and 1998; they both suffered from the physical injuries at the hands of the police in search of their mother during the apartheid years. She expressed that she looked forward to a time to be with her children. Phumla Gaba expressed a similar yearning for a family life after years of separation
...we’ve been away for a long time and you have that feeling that it has been a
long time since you were home. I studied primary, secondary, boarding school
and then I worked in Transkei and the left, so there is that feeling I want to be at
home.

(Phumla Gaba interview, September 2013)

Nomfundiso Kulati, who returned to South Africa in 1994 after completing a broadcasting
diploma in Zimbabwe, decided that she would not integrate in order to be able to look after her
then young son.

So I came with my son, tried to re-establish myself using the qualifications that I
had. I didn’t want to integrate and be part of the National Defence Force, not
because I didn’t have passion, but because I had this child, and when I looked at
my boy, I was asking myself, ‘who would best take care of him?’ So I just
wanted more to be a civilian. And I was lucky to get a job as a public relations
officer.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

The theme of family is muted in other studies about integration and demobilisation. It
may well be that, in those studies, the male combatants were not asked if family consideration
affected their decision to demobilise. Even though in this study, the women combatants were not
explicitly asked if family affected their decision not to integrate, it is unsurprising that women
combatants would feel more comfortable to articulate the importance of family in their decision
making, as women are socially expected to prioritise family, even when they consider their
professional development. In the same vein, it may be that certain male combatants did not feel
that it is “manly” to discuss family as a factor in their decisions. Thus, prevailing understandings
of femininity and masculinity shape, as in all research, what participants can reveal about their
motivations in making certain decisions.

6.2.7 Demobilisation payment: “not worth what I went through”

It was not a surprise that the many of the women who qualified to receive the once-off
demobilisation payment felt that it was an inadequate amount of compensation for the sacrifices
for the sacrifices that they had made. The money was particularly considered insufficient for
people who were starting their lives anew, often with enormous expectations from families which also needed their financial support.

I received the demobilisation [amount] … but you should realise what I received was not worth what I went through. The disadvantage being the recognition of all the years that I spent, the training that I went through, and what I went through. Now R21,000, really, I mean, I didn’t enjoy my youth; I went through what I went through. We were living under conditions that were not safe. From time to time we were attacked; from time to time we had to run away, to go to alternative bases, because the Boers might attack.

(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

Nomfundiso Kulati explicated the demands of having children, and also the expectations of financial support for one’s extended family, in relation to compensation:

[w]ith family, things are kind of fine, although they have great expectations because: 1) you have sacrificed your life at a young age, and at times, they look up to you to improve their socio-economic situations. Remember, because we as Africans have all these, you know, extended family, and you can’t provide. And you discover that: 1) I was entitled to... when I came back there was no United Nations, eish, UNHCR, so I never got all the benefits of those who came back earlier than me. So I had no money, I had a child, I did not integrate. Okay, I decide to take a minimum amount of a demobilisation fund, which was 20,000, which ended within few days, few months or so.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

The once-off payment that demobilised combatants were given to assist them navigate the socio-economic transition to civilian life did not take into account the multiple financial needs that many of the women and men were to face as they were making multiple transitions, from guerilla to civilian, and from life in exile, to life at home. The SANDF-run Service Corps was the
institutional mechanism provided to demobilised combatants to attain the skills that would assist them in finding their path to new careers as civilians.

6.2.8 Service corps

As noted in Chapter Three, the Service Corps was the main instrument that the state used to offer short term training of new skills that demobilised combatants would require for their post-military lives. As Gear (2002) notes, the Service Corps offered 18 months of skills training, conversion courses, and career profiling. The 18 months was divided into three months of literacy training, and adult life skills training, three months of vocational training, which was facilitated by the Department of Labour, and 12 months of practical experience (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 123). According to Motumi and Hudson (1995: 124), the Corps was criticised for failing to conduct adequate research to identify the needs and aspirations of the demobilised and instead choosing to offer a blanket approach to the menu of skills that were offered (Motumi and Hudson, 1995: 124).

Of the women interviewed for this study, only one participated in the 18 months training offered by the Service Corps. She focused on farming as a skill, and is currently a fulltime subsistence farmer. For the other women who officially demobilised, the Service Corps did not appear in conversation, having offered the training that they knew they would need in re-starting their lives. One of the participants, who preferred to be anonymous, participated in the design of the Service Corps programme, and offered an insider critique that is important to cite in detail, as it corroborates the weaknesses that scholars Motumi and Hudson (1995), and Gear (2002) have highlighted in their critiques. Her first response regarded the fact that the SANDF had not chosen skills training relevant to the combatants, but rather followed templates that had been used in other countries. Insightfully, her argument was that, due to a desire to maintain certain control, the SANDF was not able to let go of the programme and instead in the Service Corps, the ex-combatants behaved like soldiers, even though the purpose of the programme was to prepare them for civilian life.

You see, the concept and the initial research about, because the difficulty that you had is that you had to work with what you had. The audit of what skills people have was done. The ask [requirements] of the South African economy,
opportunities that were available around that particular time, was done...the whole proposal was based on that. But there were certain things that were part of that particular process that we had raised that were constraining what could be an effective programme, because the bigger issue was that our view was that you can’t do these things... My argument was that you can’t prepare people for civilian life, and then want them to continue to live as soldiers. First thing they do in the morning is to do is drill...the issue that we kept on raising as a constraint, and that was the source of the problem, was that these people – we are preparing them for civilian life – but we want to continue to treat them and to a point sometimes humiliate them in the soldiering environment; that they would have to wake up and drill and do all the things that, you know, for me, the first three hours they are awake, they are soldiers.

(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May 2014)

She extended her argument on the limited preparation give to soon-to-be civilians in a military environment, as a crucial weakness of the purpose of the Service Corps:

…the argument was that the environment was not conducive, is not enabling them to think outside of the military. So, when they finish these sessions for 3-4 hours, they go back, and are held to the same rules as they do, and to actually say what does discipline mean when you’re a civilian? What are the things that we need to carry that we’ve learned as a disciplined soldier, that you need to carry as a citizen? ...These were the issues that we were grappling with and we were saying, ‘this thing can’t be effectively done in a military set-up’. You see? You probably needed a different environment. It could still be owned by the Defence Force, but they can’t be living as soldiers. If it’s a question of releasing people to go to their families, and come to that particular process, they are still under the ambit of the Defence Force, but they are living a normal life. They are not staying in a camp and doing the drills, you know. That’s one.
She also pointed to the fact that the people who were running the programme were themselves soldiers as another limitation.

The second thing we’re saying, the big components of the people running the Service Corps are soldiers, you know? They don’t fully appreciate the nuances of the life that, you know, ordinary citizens who are non-soldiers that we are preparing these people for. So those were and those things were never answered. These were the things that were rejected and the thing was primarily run by soldiers who were primarily white, and the people were preparing were primarily black.

The formal demobilisation process, which for some began with a brief integration into the SANDF, was a hostile and undermining experience for many combatants, who felt that their guerrilla experience was being discarded in place of the white Afrikaner culture of the SADF. The fear of being assimilated into this culture influenced the decision of some women to opt for demobilisation. As it is also shown, the end of apartheid opened up an opportunity for some women to re-imagine their lives anew, and to form new personal and professional identities outside of guerrilla identities that had shaped all their life until then. While for some, age compromised health, and the desire to be with children informed their decision not to integrate. It is also shown that the once-off demobilisation payment and the Service Corp were inadequate in supporting former combatants in building new socio-economic identities. Thus, in the main, the former combatants were obliged to personally transition into civilian life. For those who could not participate in the formal demobilisation process, the special pension is the only way that they were able to obtain financial support to build their lives following the sacrifices they made to the anti-apartheid struggle. While the pension is meant to assist the broad range of individuals who participated in the People’s War, the formally trained transnational combatants are more likely to receive this form of state support than combatants who were inside the country.

(Anonymous interview, Pretoria, May, 2014)
6.3 Experiences of women who were not demobilised

6.3.1 Special pension: “there are a lot of problems with the special pension”

The provision of the special pension, as outlined in the Special Pension Act of 1996, has been the main form of state financial support that the women who fought inside the country along APLA, MK, and the Self-Defence Units, such as Amabutho, have sought to get from the state. As noted in Chapter Three, the Special Pensions Act provides for persons “who made sacrifices or who have served the public interest in establishing a democratic constitutional order, including members of any armed or military force not established by or under any law...” According to Heinecken and Bwalya (2013), “of 20,000 applicants, only 2,000 have been approved and a great deal of controversy remains in terms of how this is administered” (p. 35). Although the special pension was an issue for the women who were officially demobilised, it came very strongly amongst the APLA and Amabutho women in Mqanduli and Port Elizabeth. They detailed the various attempts to receive the pension, and the struggles of dependents, who have tried to apply for parents who have since died. For older women, accounts of experiences of APLA women in Mqanduli show that the process of applying for a special pension is a frustrating, bureaucratic procedure, which has not offered relief for many of those who have applied. For younger women, the fact that the act required applicants to be 35 years in order to qualify did not reflect the reality that many young people sacrificed their youth towards the ends of freedom. Thus, for those who could not participate in the formal DDR process, the provision of the special pension has offered little reward. In the main, these women have had no support towards building civilian livelihoods in post-apartheid South Africa. Out of the 36 women interviewed in this study, only seven receive the monthly special pension. Five are MK members and two APLA, all seven are women are the transnational combatants.

Nkosazana Sobantu commented on the fact that a requirement of the special pension was that applicants needed to be 35 and older at the time of the passing of the act:

Amabutho worked a lot in terms of putting force into the government. They were disrupting, burning cars, all the buildings of the government, because anything that had come through the system, was an enemy to us. So they played that role and the people using them were adults and the police did not understand
how children could do this. So would see that children were participating in the struggle and now they are not able to receive the Special Pension because they were still too young. There is an act that says they are too young: that they were not 35 during 1996, of which because of that, some of them are not able to receive the pension. We are fighting against that, because they are the ones who fought, but today they are not recognised. They are not being given the privilege that others are given.

Nkosazana Sobantu (interview in Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

This age criteria also affected those like, Nomfundiso Kulati, who were formally demobilised. Demobilised combatants were allowed to receive DDR benefits, and apply for special pension. Kulati could also not apply for the special pension because of her age:

It was around ’97, I think ’97/98. Because I was young, joined the struggle at a young age, I also – there’s this issue of special pensions. Many people were benefitting through that act, the act has disadvantaged me because of my age-they were saying I was too young then. Eh, the act wanted people were 35 years when the act was passed in 1996 and I was younger than 35 years so I don’t qualify. Now that I have children and both of their fathers are no more, the act does not even take into account the fact that I have two kids I must raise all by myself.

(Nonfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Mrs. Mabhengeza stated that with the help of members of Amabutho, she had applied for the special pension with no success:

I applied for the Special Pension, but I did not receive the money. It was done by Amabutho. There is a child called, [mentions name], who is from New Brighton. Another one called [mentions name], they did the special pension application for
me, but it never came out. They said we know that ma-Mabhengeza was there. You see?

(Mabhengeza interview, Port Elizabeth, July 2013)

Zile Xolo, the APLA chairperson of the Jixeni Branch in Mqanduli, outlined some of the challenges faced by women who applied for the special pension under the PAC/APLA:

…one of the problems is that the mothers did not know how to apply for the special pension. There was no one to assist them about how to apply, and so a lot of them were unsuccessful with the application. Then there was the opening of the Appeal Board, and they appealed. It did not help, because when a person has been unsuccessful the first time, it did not help when they tried other steps to apply. For example, their leader Nqeketho, the leader of the region, was arrested. He is a man. He then learned what one has to do when they are making the application. He then came back and taught others what they need to do when they apply, and the death certificates for the families who are applying on behalf of the deceased and birth certificates etc. But, in spite of all of that, their applications were declined again. We think that the issue is that the Special Pension was started without it, the process of application, being explained to people. And then they amended the section on children. The Special Pension allows your children to be the beneficiaries if the parent has died. The amount that they receive was just R50,000, when the parent has passed on. And then this provision was amended such that children of a certain age would no longer be eligible to receive this amount. This became a problem for those who made the application for their children to benefit before this provision was amended. These are some of the reasons that we are facing difficulties. One of the women in the area was so distraught after her application was not successful, that she suffered a stroke. The other issue was that with the emergence of new IDs, there were problems with Home Affairs. Some of the women, ages of the women, were inaccurately captured by Home Affairs. Often, the actual age was reduced, and others increased, and they would have already made the application with an
ID with another age, and a new one with correct age, and the different ages, which caused another problem for the application process.

(Zile Xolo interview, Mthatha, October 2013)

Xolo provided other examples of the kinds of administrative problems faced by applicants, such as those pertaining to surnames:

...we had a case of a Ma-Nquthula and her daughter in law. Ma-Nquthula is the second wife to her husband. The first wife died. When Nquthula married, her husband’s son had a wife already. When she was arrested, she was arrested with her daughter in law. And yet now, when they applied and were each other’s witnesses, they were asked why they have the same surname. They were witnesses for each other because they were arrested together. Their application was rejected, because they share the same surname. You see, there are a lot of problems with the special pension.

(Zile Xolo interview, Mthatha, October 2013)

Totsie Memela-Khambule complications that were faced by partners, who were both combatants and activists, often women are assumed to be the dependents of their partners, even though they made their own contributions:

But then, over the years, there was now when the special pension started. I mean, it took years to apply for the special pensions, going to Pretoria, polishing (what you call) chairs there, and it was quite interesting because over the years, my husband died, the father of my children died. We had been married in exile. And interesting thing happened, whereby they said to me I cannot get his money, because there are two of us. But I didn’t go to exile with him. I went to exile alone. It was not on his ticket that I went; I actually met him there, so my going there had nothing to do with him. But, besides, it’s not about him, for me it’s about his children. So it’s only now I’ve had again, I think it’s more because my sister works in the Defence Force, that I’ve been able to restart the process and
I’m still in the process of applying for his money. He died long time ago. He died (Lesedi was how old?) Lesedi was 7, and he’s now 24. I still don’t have that money.

(Totsie Memela-Khambule interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

There is overwhelming sense that the institutional mechanisms provided by the government to support combatants of the People’s War have not been sufficient to support them to rebuild their lives after the war. Those who participated in the formal process of DDR had the benefit of a once-off payment and a possibility of receiving special pension, as some of the women do. But for the internal combatants, there has been little to no institutional support to allow them to pick up the pieces and transition into post-apartheid life. Below, the chapter examines the personal, social, economic and psychological transition that the women combatants have negotiated for themselves. These accounts are of the guerilla girls, the combative mother and the in-betweeners.

6.4 Personal reintegration

The formal integration and DDR process that some women participated in was but one aspect of the reintegration that the women combatants were to undertake. The all-encompassing and transnational nature of the apartheid war means that separation and displacement is a key feature of the legacy of that war, like many others. The dead bodies of loved ones which remain unaccounted for inside and outside the country, the lack of payment of reparations for those who testified as victims in front of the TRC, point to an unrelenting ‘woundedness’ that continues to pervade post-apartheid memory of the People’s War. This section examines reintegration into peaceful civilian life beyond the state process of demobilisation, and civilian reintegration. The anxieties of the women who had been separated from family in exile are made visible, along with the profound pain and uncertainty of being reunited with one’s family, and the enduring psychological trauma that is palpable in the lives of all women combatants. It is shown here that in an economically challenging post-apartheid context, women carried the heaviest burden of being the breadwinners of their immediate and extended families. In such a context, women find
themselves needing to be “strong” for their families. The informalisation of the post-apartheid economy has resulted in the cheapening and feminisation of work, where women find poorly paid jobs to sustain their families (Hunter, 2011). In her doctoral work on township mothers and daughters, Motsemme (2011) argues that township mothers have found themselves in the post-apartheid context, where their children are poor, and many have been casualties to the HIV/AIDS crisis. Thus, in the aftermath of apartheid, poverty and death remain an everyday reality in South Africa. Women former combatants are at the centre of this socio-economic crisis, where they carry the social responsibility to find means for their families to survive. The section also examines memory, and the various ways in which women carry with them lingering thoughts and habits that are shaped by the war in which they participated.

6.4.1 Coming home: “I don’t know you”

For the South African women who went to receive training outside the country, coming back to South Africa following the unbanning of the national liberation movements was a tale of its own that offered no guarantee that one would find their family alive. There is evidence from other post-war societies showing that survivors of war deal with overlapping cases of trauma as they attempt to recover their lives in the context of peace.10 The separation and displacement that resulted from apartheid violence, is not unique in this case. The process of returning home after years of separation was, for many women, replete with personal, social, political and economic uncertainty.

Brenda Badela, narrated landing in East London with her family from Lusaka, describes the anxiety that she and her family felt as they arrived in the country:

…From Lusaka to Jan Smuts Airports, then from Jan Smuts Airport to East London. When we arrived in East London Airport, there was a problem with our flight here, there was definitely a problem with the flight landing here; so it

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10 The final Liberian TRC Diaspora Report (2009) revealed evidence of the “triple trauma” paradigm amongst Liberians who fled the country to Ghana, Ivory Coast, United States, UK and elsewhere. The triple trauma paradigm posits that “refugees experience trauma in the country of origin, during flight and in the country of refugee” (Liberian TRC Diaspora Report, 2009, p. 303). Liberians shared traumatic tales of how they were forced to leave Liberia after witnessing brutal killings of family members, of the hardship in trying to escape through Liberian borders that were overtaken by rebels, of starting a new life in a country with no material assets, and a family that was either all killed or scattered over West Africa.
ended up landing in, in… it ended up landing in… oh, you know what: we were supposed to go to Umthatha from Lesotho to here, from here we took a flight to Umthatha; Transkei at the time was independent. But on our way to Umthatha, the weather in Umthatha was very bad, in that the plane could not land. We were very scared, Siphokazi, we did not know what to do! We then realised that Bantu Holomisa was here in our plane. How many were we? I think we were only four. Here is Bantu Holomisa; I think my ex-husband approached him in the plane. They said the plane is going to land in East London, instead of Umthatha. So he approached Bantu Holomisa told him that these are MK people. We were scared; we did not want the whites to identify us. Bantu asked, ‘how many are you?’ Andile stated how many we were. Bantu said, ‘no, that’s fine’. Let’s land in Umthatha [corrects herself] – lets land in East London. That was 1990 January/February, I don’t remember. When we landed in East London he said, ‘those 5/6 comrades, can they please come with me?’ Five guys or something like that, you know, but he used a term. So as a result of that when we arrived at the airport, the Boers did not even bother to look at our passports or IDs, or so on. He took two cars, because we needed to be transported, so we drove from East London to Umthatha – that’s where we were supposed to land anyway – Mthatha, because of security reasons. Much as the ANC was unbanned, but we were still not sure how the Boers were going to treat us once we arrived.

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)

Joyce Sifuba also pointed out that the ways in which the repatriation process was carried out, left many people to fend for themselves with little to no social security:

“When people were repatriated when they came in, the United Nations has nothing to do with it. When you get home, you were dropped off, and from there, you have to fend for yourself. Your own organisation must see to it that it gives you information: where to get help, or where to get assistance.”

(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)
Besides the anxiety regarding actual arrival home, the biggest anxiety for many women was about the well-being of their families and their ability to re-build relationships. It was particularly difficult for the women who had left young children behind, when they left the country. Belinda Martin expressed the anguish of returning home to dying parents and a daughter who did not know her:

Nineteen-ninety-one, I came back home. Things were horrible when I came back home. The family was, the family was not the family I knew. You understand? Everything was topsy-turvy at home, because my mom was in hospital, my dad was also not too well, he had cancer. I was at home for a month before my mum passed away in my arms. I had just given her a bath one morning in June, and she passed on. And June, July, August, my dad passed away, the same year. 1991. Also in my arms, after bathing him… my daughter, my brother’s daughter, my step sister’s son was being taken care of by my parents, and they were absolutely traumatised. They could never accept me, you understand? And they always thought: ‘now that you’re back you’re coming to try and take over, when we were the ones who suffered with your parents when you were not here’, and things like that, and my daughter especially, felt I abandoned her. Ja, and would never accept me as her mother. You understand? When my mum, the coffin went down, she said to me at the grave, ‘there goes my mother, I don’t know you’. You know. And it took years; it took years for us to have a mother-daughter relationship.

(Belinda Martin interview, Pretoria, May 2014)

Pumza Dyantyi expressed the anxiety of starting afresh at home, while the peers that one left behind seemed to have met the professional and material expectations of adulthood:

Well it was not easy when I arrived. Remember that when you come back you see peers, people that you grew up with, they have cars and you are just coming back. You have no work, you have nothing. It was not easy to depend on your family to give you something. But it didn’t take me too long to get a job. But it’s
a very tough time to adjust, but the thing I am thankful to God, that my mother was still alive. At least, because there are those who came home and there were no homes, there was nothing. At least, I still have some people. It was very difficult, very.

(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)

The theme on psychological trauma extends on the mental demands of transitioning from exile to home, and for all women involved, the demands of transitioning from war to peace. The point of highlighting the step of coming home, for those who had left the country, is to show that the process of repatriation was coupled with anxieties about the status of one’s family and the transition from often unstable transnational life to the task of grounding oneself within their community again after years, and sometimes decades of separation. Combatants also faced the task of building new professional identities that were to determine their economic security in post-apartheid South Africa. The theme of economic security revealed that most women have struggled to find economic opportunities.

6.4.2 From umzabalazo to ukutabalaza (from the struggle to hustling)

Levels of education have made the biggest impact on the socio-economic well-being of women interviewed for this study. The women who have received tertiary education have more job security than those with high school, or no education. Of the thirty-six women interviewed in this study, fourteen are currently employed. Of that fourteen, eleven are former MK, one from Amabutho, one from an SDU in Mamelodi, and one from APLA. Amongst the employed include a former member of parliament, CEO, a current minister of health in the Eastern Cape, teacher, civil servants, five civil servants, and the rest either own their business or work in the private sector. Of the seven unemployed, three are member of Amabutho, three MK and one APLA. About fifteen are at pension age, six Amabutho, four MK (two retired from the SANDF), and five APLA. Most of the women in this sample, employed or not, are the ‘breadwinners’ of their families. Most of them are responsible for their immediate and extended family. Most of the women who are receiving old-age pensions support unemployed children and grandchildren.
Many of these women have to find different ways of making ends meet. In the main, for women young and old, have to ‘hustle’, in a manner of speaking, to keep the family afloat. Victoria Nagetsana exclaimed that she is struggling to support her grandchildren, who are under her care:

*Hey! I am struggling! The grants take long and I am not clear on the issue of foster care.*

(Victoria Nagetsana interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013)

Mrs. Mabhengeza that she has tried to get involved in community projects so that she can supplement her old-age pension, in order to support her unemployed children:

I attend meetings. There are no street committees. We are called to meetings and are told about new projects. We were told about a project that paid us R130, but we have not been paid. We would collect papers around and we were promised money. It has been four years and we have not been paid. We accept these projects, because the pension amount of R1200 is not enough, we have to pay accounts.

(Mabhengeza interview, Port Elizabeth, August 2013)

Motsemme (2011) denote “*ukuphanta*” (used interchangeably in isiXhosa as “*ukutabalaza*” and “*ukuphanda*”) as a means of ‘finding a way in order to survive,’ ‘getting by’ and ‘making ends meet’ (p. 104). She argues that this “is a social concept that can be found in several communities, particularly the working class, throughout the world” (p. 104), noting that the process of ‘hustling’ “involves a set of skills, a way of doing something to create opportunities for income to achieve often provisional results, such as acquiring groceries, school-fees, clothing, toiletries, beauty products, fast-food, entertainment, cover transport costs, airtime and other everyday household necessities” (p. 106). She notes that because, for the poor, the needs always outnumber the available resources, the poor often are forced to resign themselves to a hand-to-mouth existence, or as it is said in the Portuguese language, “*pra Hoje ja da, pra manhã chies dara*” (for today we’re covered; tomorrow God will provide) (Tavares, 1998, cited in Motsemme, 2011: 106).
6.4.3 Political involvement

For many women their past role in the anti-apartheid struggle has shaped their current political involvement or refusal thereof. In the main, most women remain politically involved in ANC, PAC and Amabutho structures. Some of them hold leadership positions at branch, provincial and national levels. The women who are poor, it is difficult for them to explain why they support a party that has not yielded material benefits for them. Some, such as Boniswa, who gave up their youth for the struggle, find themselves in a complex place where they have to explain to their children why she continues to support the ANC even though there is little material benefit to her current life. She shared that her

Eldest child often asks, “why are we still with the ANC because there is nothing it has given you”. Even the youngest child is tired of it. But I like the ANC; I live because of the ANC. I bought my children Sarafina the movie, to show them how white people used to treat us, because the youngest one used to come from school telling me about the DA, ‘the DA this and that’, I would get upset by that. But now they understand.

Thandiswa expressed similar sentiments that although she survives by doing domestic work, she will remain ANC:

The [children] usually laugh and say, “but Mama, you are still struggling”. I respond by saying, “yes, we were struggling for you”. Even now, we are still ANC here at home; no-one will change and join Helen Zille’s party. We are ANC, our vote will to ANC, not any other party. If you look at Cape Town, black people are still oppressed, and yet they vote for Helen Zille. White people are still living well, we are struggling. To white people, I will die a kaffir. I tell my children that if they have to fight a Boer for more money at work, they must fight them there not from the outside, you can’t fight from outside.

And yet, Boniswa expressed elsewhere a seemingly contradictory statement, where she noted:

People who are doing better are those who were always privileged, those who were poor are still poor. It is as if on top of the oppression they experienced, there is another layer that has been added. It is worse now. It is as if it would be
better if we were not free because the way I see it, we were better off when we were being chased by the Boers.

Winnie Tukushe, who was in the leadership of PEWO, reflected that the incorporation of organisations such as PEWO into the ANC Women’s League was perhaps a mistake, because women have stopped organising. Instead, women only grieve at funerals, and are not doing the political organising that is needed in their communities. She expressed that, due to her ailing health, she grew tired of attending political meetings, also because politicians are “liars”. Mrs. Mafutha also expressed that most people are in politics for personal gain, and that for that reason, dedicate her life to God rather than politics. The theme on psychological trauma shows that most women face the challenge of surviving current challenges while also dealing with palpable trauma from the past.

6.5 Psychological trauma

After the massacre

After the bodies had been identified, counted and taken away

After the police had come and gone, the neighbours stuck around

Four women walked the familiar path in a single file, paraffin lamps in their hands

The stars listened to their now hushed cries, watched them wipe away silent tears Mechanically they filled their water buckets from the homestead tank

Back at home, rags and soap from the cupboards they started cleaning: first, sweeping shards of glass scattered in every room, then, wiping splashes of blood on walls and broken windows, smeared across the furniture, doors, sometimes even spotting the ceiling.

In the kitchen, they removed pieces of brain tissue splattered in all directions

When they went on their knees to clean the floors cupping congealed blood in their hands—they told the girls to look away instructed them to comfort younger children, sing them lullabies until they sleep.
They put in a bowl all the cartridges and bullets they found. In the bedrooms, they stripped the blood-stained bedcovers and curtains soaked everything in large zinc tubs for washing the next day.

They went into each room, repositioned everything until the homestead looked almost exactly as it did before the massacre. By sunrise the women had restored the homestead. But images of bodies that were identified counted and taken away

Linger, years later, in the women’s hearts and heads

In their hands they still see blood, broken glasses and brain tissue.

Makhosazana Xaba (2016)

The theme of trauma is a central one in the research about the post-military lives of combatants. The studies show that beyond social and economic marginalisation, there is extensive psychological trauma of unaddressed pain and woundedness from the violence of apartheid (Mokolobe 2001; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mashike and Mokolobe 2003; Gear 2002; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009; Lamb 2013). The work on wellbeing of formerly-conscripted white soldiers in the SADF also reveals unaddressed trauma (Edlmann, 2014). The absence of literature on women’s experiences of demobilisation means that the testimonies by women to the TRC are the only ones that represent the psychological trauma that women have suffered due to the war (Ross, 2003; Motsemme, 2011). The hint towards cataloguing women’s multiple sources of trauma has focused on women’s sexual abuse in MK camps (Mokolobe 2001; Van der Merwe and Lamb 2009). The experiences that are articulate below offer a rich and distinctive account of the multiple sources of trauma that have not been articulated in other work.

This participant from MK expressed the pressure about starting a new life, family pressure, health issues that she faced because of the multiple pressures she faced. And a painful relationship with a child that she left behind when she went to exile:

Look, things were challenging, but I never went to counseling, neh? But I had a challenge, for instance, when I got back home, there were so many things I could not understand why they were happening that way, you know. I wanted to fix everything at once, forgetting that we had gotten back to reality and that
things would not go the way you wish. So I developed a low blood pressure, and with the low blood pressure I used to get admitted in hospital now and again. And, you know the other thing really I didn’t mention, was that when I left for exile, I had a baby who I left, who was a year and a few months – a son. Now, when I came back, I got back, and my son did not know me. That was my biggest challenge, really. It was difficult because he stayed with my mother’s sister. When I got back she prevented me seeing him. I had serious struggles with my aunt, serious struggles with my aunt in terms of my child. So much struggle that there was a time that I really hated her. I thought I would never forgive her for preventing me to bond with my child, by all means. And I even ask myself, what kind of parent would prevent another parent not to bond with their child, and she calls herself my aunt, you see? So I had such struggles, I did not understand how some people do certain things. So I would spend time in hospital with low blood pressure, stressing about this and that. But one day, while sleeping in hospital, I told myself that, ‘you know what, it’s not gonna help me stressing, so I better take one step at a time.

(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)

Fundiswa Menzeni of Amabutho expressed that the daily violence has physical and mental implications for the mental wellbeing of individuals today. Here, she highlights the lingering traumatic smell of the police teargas.

Sometimes you observe that there are problems, such as lack of health, people are not doing so well… most of them were beaten too much by the Boers. The tear gas because they mess up with you internally. You see the tear gas, yes.

(Fundiswa Menzeni interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Fezeka Klaas expressed that she is not able to look at a dead body because she saw too many people who were killed brutally.
It affects me badly, sisi. Even now when a person passes away, even if they were sick, I cannot look at the body, I cannot look at the body, regardless of who it is.

Nonfundiso Kulati spoke about her battle with anger, about living with memories of torture in jail, and the difficulties times in exile:

Honestly, when it comes to trauma, it manifests in many different ways. Yes, I don’t drink. We do suffer from that post-traumatic stress in a way. I mean, you can imagine having to be in jail at a young age, to be detained and beaten up at a young age and leave. That would affect you psychologically. It’s not like anybody was meant to leave and train in conditions that you never really, I mean, expect you to find yourself in, you know, to be. It does manifest, because at times you have this unexpected anger, you know. Okay, you try sometimes to manage it but you, it’s difficult at times; it’s not easy.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

Nkosazana Sobantu spoke about the ways in which women struggle in personal relationships, especially with partners whom they do not perceive as having been active in the struggle, but are benefitting today, while they themselves struggle.

…those who are suffering mostly are the women with social relations. Sometimes you see when someone is trying to study, but they still have that image that they are a soldier, and sometimes, she is dating someone who is not a soldier, who does not understand the way she feels. Sometimes you see a picture of something, maybe corruption, and the person comments by saying that, ‘we did not struggle for this’, and yet that person was not there during the struggle, and the person is benefitting from the struggle today. They were never arrested, did not go to exile, and were not part of Amabutho, but today he is benefitting.
Another participant shared about the difficulties she faced in her first marriage with a fellow MK member. Due to their training, she noted that they would come close to attacking each other. She struggled with meeting the expectations that families have within a patriarchal society:

But also, what I see as a major, major problem is the fact that we went to a state of war; as you know, when a soldier fall you can’t leave him, you must carry your dirt, you must watch your dirt, you must take care of them. You see, you live, you do all those things, and you come back there’s no de-briefing, there’s no psychological de-briefing; and you are expected to integrate and live a normal life. I mean, really, that’s not practical, that’s not realistic...you see being in the military you live in a certain way. There are these rules; there’s a discipline of the military, and you tend to want to live that way even in a family environment, and that will translate to a lot of...challenges with children, because with my late husband we were both soldiers and, and even when we do things, we used to come to a point where we would say, ‘okay we will shoot each other’, because we were equally trained in our own individual right...in our own individual right we are commanders, because in our training, we were told we are all commanders. We were trained. We did a commander’s course. And, and, and families would not understand that way of doing things...

Most women have found different ways to deal with psychological trauma, often outside of seeking professional help. In the main, most of the participants are still going through individual journeys of reconciling their current behaviours with the past. They share their experiences of the past with family members, often their children, as a way to appreciate the present and to reconcile with the wounds of the past. It is clear from this data that greater institutional attention ought to be paid to women’s psychological wellbeing. But one gets the impression that although communities are aware that women suffer from these difficulties, often women are expected to endure unremittingly. The adage that women are ‘stronger than men’ psychologically obscures the real ways in which women’s trauma remains unaddressed, and as such, ever more urgent.
6.6 Women are stronger than me

While the theme of trauma was salient in women’s articulations of the emotional and psychological challenges that they face in recreating their lives at the end of apartheid. There was also a repeated articulation of women’s emotional and psychological strength, which enabled them to better withstand than their male counterparts. When asked if women had been involved or attempted to engage in violent and criminal activities when they found themselves facing economic and personal challenges, women’s strength was expressed as a way of pointing to women’s coping capabilities. Pumza Dyantyi used strength as a way of explaining why destitute women ex-combatants have not turned to alcoholism, as have their male counterparts:

Lots of people are destitute, MK; both women and men. That’s why there is not much difference but men tend to be more accepted than women. I suppose we are stronger than them…Psychologically strong than them, because you find a woman that has been exiled who is not working, who is trying to make ends meet who is not a drunkard and an alcoholic. But you’ll find men, most of them are alcoholics. I think it’s a matter of them being strong psychologically.

(Pumza Dyantyi telephone interview, September 2013)

Another MK ex-combatant also argued that women may be perceived to be physically weaker than men, but held that they are psychologically stronger than them:

I believe that men are naturally weaker that women. We may be weaker physically, neh, because we are called ‘the weaker sex’. Physically we may be weak, but in terms of our mind set, we are stronger than men and we are used to dealing with pain. I think we are also designed to take care of others, and men are not designed for that, hence they break so easy. And they bottle things inside, we talk about things when they bother us, you know. We cry and most men still believe that men are not supposed to cry. It’s a healing process to cry. So, I didn’t really have to go through the counselling process.

(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)
Pamela Daniels reiterated this point:

The male character is different from ours. We are children bearers. We are home builders. We are the ones who are supposed to be strong for the family. We are caring for the families. And I would think that we are supposed to be having the same responsibility. But what I have experienced is that our male counterparts they abuse alcohol, not that we don’t have those challenges as women, but it’s at a much rather controllable rate than our male counterparts. Maybe because also we stayed with them in these camps in exile; they got married to foreign women; we were just brothers, even though we were women, we were soldiers; they did not look our way. But when we came back, our families were there. Families did not accept the women that they came back with, and it created a lot of tension, and they become targets to women (of course, no offence), women inside the country with this belief that they are having moneys; they have all these benefits, and every other thing that is happening. As you can see, we live in a society where you are who you are, because of what you have. So, I think these are the challenges that we are facing, that we are seeing in our counterparts of course. We also have challenges, but we are in a much better place than our male counterparts – MK women, that is.

(Pamela Daniels interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

In the African-American context, Harris-Perry (2011) argues the imposed and celebrated image of the strong black woman is a misrecognition of African-American women because this image of “super strength”, obscures the day-to-day suffering of black woman against structural poverty and discrimination by “defining endurance as natural”, and thereby robbing African-American women of the ability to engage freely in the public sphere, and “demand resources to meet their individual needs” (p. 2). Where Enloe (1983) asks if women are an integral part of post-war transformation, could we argue that states are well aware that patriarchal understanding of sacrifice allows men, exclusively, to claim the rewards of their sacrifices from the state? This is while women who sacrificed on behalf of national liberation do not have the same recourse to claim that which is due to them. In this regard, the celebration of strength by women ex-
combatants is not surprising in a context where their sacrifice does not guarantee material benefits from the state. On the other hand, patriarchal understandings of violence do not allow for a narrative where women ex-combatants can threaten the state with the tools of their military training in a post-apartheid context, since violence is masculinised.

6.7 Memory: “Please, I mustn’t die before [he] is 21”

The theme of civilian life applied more so to the women, who fit the conventional understanding of combatant. In this case, this applied to the women who were trained militarily outside the country. Some of the literature on integration in South Africa and elsewhere points to a self-perception by former combatants that even after demobilisation, they are fundamentally different to other civilians. This is often articulated in the adage ‘once a soldier, always a soldier’. I wanted to understand the ways in which a military past shapes the ways in which demobilised women perform their civilian lives. Brenda Badela affirmed that she remains a soldier:

We have this term: ‘once a soldier always a soldier’. Although I’m not a soldier, an active soldier, I’m still a cadre of the ANC… discipline, order in the house, and democracy, is something I don’t believe in, because in my army days, you know, we would be told there’s no democracy in the army. So on some days, in my house, I would say there’s no democracy, so I’d always fight with my kids, and they’d tell me, “mama, this is not MK, camps here this is the house’, you know.

(Brenda Badela interview, Grahamstown, October 2013)

Another participant expressed that at her workplace she is perceived differently to her colleagues, because of her military past:

I mean even at work, in a meeting we would be debating, and if there’s something I need to raise, they will hear it from my tone, that it is a soldier speaking now, not just anyone. Even at home, I think once you trained as a soldier, that thing stays with you, irrespective of where you are. It’s not the kind of training you easily…you don’t wear it away, understand? So even when I
walk, most women are ladies when they walk, I can’t even walk slowly; when I walk it is clear that I am walking. Sexy shoes would never work, because they break. I put my shoe down.

(Anonymous interview, Port Elizabeth, September, 2013)

Nomfundiso Kulati articulated that, in her everyday life, she behaves like a soldier. This has shaped who she associates with on the social level. Mostly importantly, she notes that her military past has shaped her to be an independent woman:

In my life, in a way, being a woman at times, it has made me to be very independent. I don’t like to be controlled. I like to think independently. And behaving like a soldier at all times, I don’t like to take orders. That’s not nice. I always want to lead others, that’s my problem. Yes, not arrogantly but at times it irritates to find people you know my school of thought is different from the South African public, I mean, I can’t even, I don’t even have friends like the people that I mingle with; either they were in exile, either they are very political, so I can’t just befriend the ordinary women of South Africa because their mind set is too narrow.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, September 2013)

Joyce Sifuba expressed that she is suspicious of placing soldiers in a pedestal as the ones with discipline amongst undisciplined civilians. She expressed that the behavior depends on person to person:

I think it depends with the person, really, because you find that these same soldiers are not disciplined. You find them without discipline. I quarrelled with one that I was asking if he was inside or outside, but the discipline is not there. So I quickly, because of my age, I quickly reprimanded him. I am a mommy,
even in the office. My children, they always say I’m not a good person, because I speak out. I don’t let something that is wrong pass me by; not that I’m perfect but...

(Joyce Sifuba, telephone interview, October 2013)

Makhosazana Xaba also provided a different perspective stating that because she never participated in combat, she does not identify with a distinctive soldier mentality. Instead, she pointed out that her past work in the underground is the one that affects her current daily habits such as the importance of keeping time:

I never fought, so I waited for umChina and I never had to fight. So if soldier mentality comes from fighting, I don’t have it. If I were to talk about mentality at all, it would be the mentality of living underground, because that is what I did a lot of, and sometimes I have to stop myself doing certain things that I know come from there, from that experience. So is that being a soldier? Yes, but in a traditional sense? No. You know? So I don’t know if I would say ‘once a soldier, always a soldier’, in that sense; but I know that, I mean, I’ve always been...there’s a small example: I told you how when we were working underground, we could only ever be three together. If I’m having a meeting with you at two o’clock; if you’re not there by five-past, I leave because it’s unsafe. Now even before I had to do that I just, I’m the kind of person who likes being on time, but when I was doing that; then it got worse. It got intensified, not worse. It got intensified. So I was very upset with Nkosana, because he was running late and I knew that the later he ran, then he will arrive and you know and then, and then, and then. And people say to me, ‘Can’t you just chill? People get late, people get...’ and I said no, you know. Now what’s the worst thing that could’ve happened? He ran late, we wait: nothing, really. But I just... things must happen as they should: on time. If there’s a change of plan, let’s know. If we must do this, let’s do it, you know. When I go into a restaurant and I see, I choose a seat that’s got a wall behind me, I won’t just go at any table. Now it’s

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no longer because I feel I’m at risk, but now the excuse is (it’s not an excuse, it’s still genuine) but I’m a writer so I need to look and observe and see things.

(Makhosazana Xaba, Johannesburg interview, May 2014)

Xaba continued to share that the premise of underground work was one’s ability to conceal the truth. She shared that after apartheid, she had to learn that revealing the truth is no longer a security risk, especially in how she was to raise her daughter.

I mean I can sit with someone, I had to tell myself this morning that she’s going to be interviewing me, so I must be open. I’ve given her the time. I’m happy to talk. But I can talk to someone for three hours and they can walk away not knowing a thing about me. I mean, I do remember a time when my daughter was young, when I consciously said to myself, you can’t be a parent and lie, because I was so used to having to lie about everything – about my existence – that I found that I was lying when it was not necessary and I had to say to myself, ‘you no longer have to. You’re safe now. You’re home. You’re free. You don’t have to lie about anything. And you’re raising a child, so stop it.’ I remember that being very, very hard, because part of lying was to just not be known. It was about removing anything that anybody could use about you. So it wasn’t lying because then you might be caught or, you know, it wasn’t a… I mean there were different kinds of lying. If I’m just meeting a complete stranger and we happen to be sitting at a bus stop and we’re talking. I’m not going to tell who I am. You see? But that’s not because the stranger might follow me. It’s just because part of keeping safe is that you must be anonymous. And then there’s lying because there’s a reason to lie. But when you’ve done that for so long, I personally found that it was very, very hard… I actually have a theory that the reason that a lot of ANC people, I say ANC people, because those are the ones that I know, but I think it might be applicable to PAC and others – the reason they tell so many lies is because they are not conscious of the fact that they no longer need to… because if lying was protective you have to be very conscious, and say, I no
longer need that shield, so I will stop lying. I mean, your mind, your body learns certain habits.

(Makhosazana Xaba, Johannesburg interview, May 2014)

Another former combatant expressed that her military past, especially her experiences of losing close friends to violent deaths, has shaped her own relationship with death. It has informed the ways in which she relates to her family, especially her children.

You know before I had a child death was, ja, you know, happens. And when I reflect on my experience, I remember when I was pregnant with him, [names the child], I was five months pregnant and that... during the war against Inkatha in [names place] and that’s I guess that last real fight when we kicked them out of the township. Basically, I’d made a decision that I’m not bringing up a child in this violence. Either I stop it or I die. It was that straight forward. It was, so my relationship with death was, so I could easily take risks on me in that sense. And it’s also the first time that I had coffee in my entire pregnancy, because I was there from about after seven [pm] lying on top of a shack in the shooting... When I got home, his dad was sitting outside on the stoep with my mum. They didn’t know whether I’m alive or dead or whatever and stuff like that, you know. Uh, so it kind of gives different meaning to life, my life, in the sense that things that I would do before [he] was born that would be risky on my life, I think twice about them. But I think as they are growing up, I mean, one of the things I do (now I’m doing less and less of them), I never thought I’d be this age. I actually never thought I’d be 21, so that’s my, so it was, I never thought I’d be 21...I celebrate my birthday seriously every year... I know we’re supposed to take that for granted that I’ll be 27, I’ll be 30. I never did. I never did. I always was conscious, so every year, I celebrate the extra year I have, and at some point I had a, a, this real dream that I’m grateful that I got to the age that I am, but please, I mustn’t die before [he] is 21, to be able to look after his brother, you know. And, ja. Last year, I made a big party, because he turned 21.
All women combatants struggle with the traumas of the violence of life under apartheid. As noted in Chapter Four, a woman who was a combatant of Amabutho told me that for a long time, she could not eat meat, because she had seen too many people killed in front of her. The visceral nature of that image is one that surely stays with all combatants in different ways. The unaddressed legacies of apartheid manifest themselves personally, and one imagines that it manifests itself in the post-apartheid institutions and political culture.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the different women combatants have transitioned to post-apartheid South Africa. Through the experiences of the guerilla girls in the demobilisation process, the chapter has shown that the process was dominated by the members of the old SADF, which contributed to the feeling by the non-statutory combatants, of being undermined and patronised. The accounts of experiences by the women who were demolished build on the literature on the process of demobilisation by adding women’s experiences, which have up to now been muted in that literature. The conclusion is that the demobilisation process did not offer institutional mechanisms that wholly supported the multiple challenges that faced the guerilla girls to transition to civilian life. The chapter also shows that the combative mothers and in-betweeners have had little-to-no institutional support from the state. The Special Pension has been a flawed mechanism, which has proven to be an administrative living nightmare for the women combatants and their dependents. It is shown, again, that although the pension is supposedly open for all types of combatants, and it is the transnationally trained guerillas that benefit from it. The chapter has also shown that the economic marginalisation of most women combatants has enormous personal consequences, because the personal sacrifices that women took have not translated to better lives for themselves and their families. The chapter has shown that psychological trauma tends to be under-discussed in the lives of black women in general, because the social pressure to be the bedrock of the family means that women are not able to
voice their challenges with trauma. The study has shown that materially and psychologically, many women combatants have not been supported by the state.
CHAPTER SEVEN:
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER? THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY VETERANS AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF VETERANS IN POST-POLOKWANE SOUTH AFRICA

While the future is certain, it’s the past that remains unpredictable.

(Langa, 2015)

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the success and weakness of the formal process that was led by the SANDF and outlined in the Demobilisation Act of 1996. This chapter examines the legislative framework that guides the work of the Department of Military Veterans. As argued in Chapter One, the establishment of the DMV and the subsequent adoption of the Military Veterans Act No. 18 of 2011 signalled a re-emergence of the combatant into post-apartheid public policy and public culture. A separate department of veterans emerges fifteen years into South Africa’s democracy, raising questions about the ways in which the government seeks to address the concerns of the military veteran community. It is shown in this chapter that the reemergence of military veterans discourse has been characterised by similar political tensions to those of the initial demobilisation process, in terms of contestation about the definition of the military veteran. There are many who perceive themselves former combatants who are excluded from this legislative framework and the material benefits that it offers. But one of the consequences of this Act is the recent acceptance of AZANLA combatants into the military veteran’s framework shows that the state is able to shift in its policy in ways that resemble the realities of the combatants of the anti-apartheid struggle. The acceptance of AZANLA former combatants raises the hope that this inclusion can be repeated to accommodate other combatants. In the main, the legislative framework resembles the narrow categories that defined the integration and demobilisation processes in terms of who is included, and who is excluded. Thus, in the interim, it is found that the transnational guerrilla combatant alone stands to benefit from
this new governing order for military veterans, to the exclusion of the domestically-based former combatant.

The chapter shows that the DMV’s policies and practice reveal a neutral approach to gender that seems to assume that the challenges that male and female veterans are the same. The reports and statements from the DMV do not demonstrate attentiveness to the ways in which challenges face by women and male veterans may differ because of gender. Furthermore, it is argued that the attention of the department seems to largely respond to the anxieties of destitute male veterans. In this regard, the chapter outlines the legislative processes of the DMV more broadly, and how women are present or absent in these processes. It also makes visible the hopes of women ex-combatants who participated in this study. It is shown that, since 2009, few former transnationally combatants are receiving military veterans benefits, as many of them are still to be verified by the DMV in a verification process that some women combatants have found elaborate and even intrusive in terms of the evidence it requires in order for one to be verified as a military veteran.

7.2 “Thrown outside like morning mucus …”

The literature on the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces into the SANDF, and the demobilisation process that followed it, shows that the formerly demobilised combatants felt that the process did not adequately prepare them for civilian life (Cock, 1993; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mokalobe, 2001; Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006; Maringira and Brankovic, 2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). In their study of MK ex-combatants, Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) note that a majority of demobilised combatants “said that the SANDF could have equipped them with skills that would have improved their chances in the job market” (n.d). The study points to feelings of “disillusionment, distrust and extreme dissatisfaction with the treatment received by former soldiers from the SANDF”, according to the authors, this is “related to a (perceived) lack of support in skills development, financial assistance and in securing alternative employment either inside or outside the SANDF” (Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001: n.d). The study then recommends “further (re)skilling of former combatants” and pilot projects in agriculture, security companies, tourism, bio-tourism and crafts (Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001: n.d). In her study that composed of ex-SADF seven soldiers, MK,
SDU, APLA, Inkatha Protection Unit, and SDU Thokoza, Gear (2002) points to the theme of “betrayal” that is felt by former combatants who demonstrate a “sense that the ideological paradigms that framed the wars they fought in, and their abilities as combatants, have been betrayed”, because “for many, the disjuncture between what they fought for and their present realities is a bitter pill to swallow” (p. 13). Gear (2002) also shows that that some former-combatants are resentful of what they see as the social mobility of few comrades, while many are left to fend for themselves. One participant in Gear’s study expressed that what the “ANC has done to us has destroyed us”, and that it also felt as if the “ANC has thrown [them] outside like morning mucus” (p. 16). Another participant expressed the disparity that exists between members of the same national liberation movement:

The disparities that exist now are not only between ourselves and our white counterparts but our comrades as well, that have become, overnight, bourgeoisie and they are driving flashy cars and sleeping in very expensive hotels; they fly over our heads. But I think after all is said and done, you look at the thing in a perspective that is consistent with what you did and you will tell yourself, 'Now when I joined the movement I didn't join to benefit myself...It was the common concern for all South African citizens - that we need[ed] to liberate ourselves from the draconian racial barriers that existed at that time. And for now what you need to do is only to make the most of the worst situation...the best way you know how.' But there are people who are in a more disadvantaged position than I am. I must recognise that.

(Gear, 2002:11)

Gear (2002) has meanwhile noted in this regard that

Ex-combatants are expected to re-integrate into civilian society and to leave their militarized [sic] pasts and accompanying identities behind. Not surprisingly this does not easily happen, especially in contexts where there are few opportunities through which alternative identities can be built. In South Africa, ex-combatants are often ill-equipped to make this transition and the communities
into which they are expected to integrate are equally unprepared for negotiating the soldiers return or the ending of their combatant status (p. 119).

Similarly, Cook (2006) argues that the South African demobilisation process was “sub-optimal”, where she contends that “the government’s efforts to help tens of thousands of demobilised soldiers to reintegrate into society were inadequate at best” (p. 44). Mashike (2004) describes demobilised combatants as “time bombs”. He argues that the demobilisation process was an “afterthought”. Adonis (2008) also argues that the DDR process “had limited success resulting in a concern that this could lead to political instability and violence” (p. 17). Cock (2004) also argues that “many ex-combatants are marked by their experiences of war, their training in the means of violence, their lack of marketable skills and their access to weaponry” (p. 5). She argues that if ex-combatants concerns are left unaddressed, ex-combatants may become a “destabilising force”, like they have been in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique (Cock, 2004). As shown in Chapter Three, the consensus in the literature is that most former combatants live in poverty, and that they present a potential political threat to the government if their needs continue unaddressed (Cock, 1993; Liebenberg and Roefs, 2001; Mokalobe, 2001; Gear, 2002; Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2003; Everatt et al, 2006; Maringira and Brankovic, 2013; Heinecken and Bwalya, 2013). This frame of thinking seems to have shaped the relatively recent push within the ANC to address the concerns of military veterans.

7.3 Enter the Department of Defence and military veterans

Since 1994, the legacy of the country’s militarised past had largely been subsumed under the Department of Defence, which was responsible for coordinating programmes to assist demobilised soldiers transition into civilian life, as outlined in Chapters Three and Six. Writing in the Cape Times newspaper, Dzinesa (2009:nd) argued that “President Jacob Zuma’s reorganisation of South Africa’s defence ministry into the Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans, which is also tasked with the concerns of war veterans, is a recognition of the important place this group occupies in the body politic.” For Dzinesa (2009), this reconfigured visibility of veterans’ issues by the State, pointed to recognition that “thousands of South Africa’s former liberation fighters are unemployed, lead destitute lives, and suffer psycho-social
problems.” Furthermore, he argues that the state was also reacting to anxieties that, if veterans socio-political issues are not addressed, “their military training may cause — and in many cases has, in fact, caused — destitute veterans to turn to crime or become mercenaries.” He notes further that the announcement of the new institutional framework dedicated to military veterans “is an outcome of the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane Conference resolution to establish a presidential commission on military veterans, ahead of the introduction of a ‘comprehensive social package for all ex-combatants of former liberation armies’” (Dzinesa, 2009: nd). The 2007 ANC resolution noted that “the Ministry of Military Veterans be established as a matter of urgency”.

According to Dzinesa (2009: n.d.):

The government should be commended for what could significantly pre-empt the disruptive potential of disenchanted freedom fighters. History has shown governments of neighbouring states, such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, which marginalised or neglected former liberation fighters, did so at their own peril as restive, poverty-stricken ex-fighters threatened national stability.

At the time, MKMVA general secretary, Ayanda Dlodlo, was quoted by the Business Day Newspaper to have stated that MKMVA had “long been lobbying for recognition, including the establishment of its own ministry”. For Dlodlo, their “first prize” would have been the establishment of a full military veterans ministry, thus “the renamed department - the Department of Defence and Military Veterans Department - was a compromise, but a major gain for the veterans, many of whom live in poverty”. According to Johwa, Dlodlo reiterated the risk of military veteran use of criminality by stating that the “failure by the state to harness the skills of military veterans had led to the establishment of mercenary outfits”.

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As noted by Van der Merwe and Lamb (2009) in Chapter Three, the CPR-based SANDF integration process “was integral in defining who constitutes South African ex-combatants” (p. 10). As they correctly point out,

these definitions are hotly contested, no doubt because they have a role in influencing access to or exclusion from scarce resources and opportunities, as well as informing other processes, such as building of actual memory. These controversies continue as parliament debates the provision of new benefits for ex-combatants (Van der Merwe and Lamb, 2009: 10).

The definition of the military veteran’s definition, as defined in the 2011 Military Veterans Act closely resembles the CPR-based definition. According to the Military Veterans Act, a military veteran is a South African citizen who:

(a) rendered military service to any of the military organisations, statutory and non-statutory; which were involved on all sides of South Africa’s Liberation War from 1960 to 1994; (b) served in the Union Defence Force before 1961; or (c) became a member of the new South African National Defence Force after 1994, and has completed his or her military training and no longer performs military service, and has not been dishonourably discharged from that military organisation or force (Military Veterans Act, 2011: 4).

Thus, the act confines veteran status to the members of the statutory and non-statutory forces who participated in the integration and demobilisation process. This, therefore, means that veteran status and benefits are likely to benefit the transnationally trained guerilla combatants of the non-statutory forces. This is in spite of the fact that some ex-combatant research includes all categories of ex-combatants beyond those of the transnationally trained, MK and APLA (Gear, 2002; Everett et al., 2006). This research shows that the informally trained and domestically based ex-combatants are in deep need of state assistance. The recent 2015 inclusion of Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA), the armed wing of the AZAPO, whose members have now been invited to present themselves for verification of their roles as ex-combatants, points to a possible widening of veterans status and benefits beyond the transnationally trained combatants. Since 2014, the DMV has been verifying the combatant status of members of the
AZANLA who can now be included in the veteran’s database for veteran benefits (News 24 report, 2015). The Western Cape AZANLA commander, Zola Mosia, noted that the organisation “did not participate in the amalgamation of forces because we were suspicious of being absorbed by the defence force. This means our cadres do not enjoy the benefits like other military veterans”. The inclusion of AZANLA combatants may open up a space for the further inclusion of the domestically based ex-combatant organisations.

In the 2013/2014 Annual Report by the DMV’s Tsepe Motumi, the first Director General of the department, outlines that the “aim of the Department is to formulate policies and standards aimed at providing a comprehensive quality service delivery system to Military Veterans and, where applicable, their dependents, in recognition of their role in the democratisation of South Africa” (Department of Military Veterans Annual Report, 2014: 17). He further notes that “there is an urgent need to provide visible rewards and due recognition to deserving those Military Veterans who sacrificed their lives and well-being in ensuring the greater realisation of the freedom.” Accordingly then, “the main objective of the Department of Military Veterans is to provide national policy and standards on socio-economic support to Military Veterans and to their dependents, on heritage and empowerment programmes including those that contribute to nation building and reconciliation” (Department of Military Veterans Annual Report, 2014: 17).

The Military Veterans Benefit Regulations was gazetted on the 19th February 2014. The benefits it outlines are the following:

1. **Compensation for injury, trauma and disease** – to a military veteran who sustained disabling injuries or severe psychological and neuro-psychiatric trauma or who suffers from a terminal disease resulting from participation in military activities, may apply for a lump sum payment as compensation if (a) the disabling injury; (b) the severe psychological and neuro-psychiatric trauma; or (c) the terminal disease, resulted from the military veteran's participation in military activities.

2. **Counselling and treatment for mental illness and post-traumatic stress disorder** - a military veteran or his or her dependant qualifies for dedicated counselling and treatment for serious mental illness or post-traumatic stress disorder if the mental illness or post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by his or her participation in military activities or is associated with his or her participation therein.

3. **Facilitation of employment placement** - an unemployed military veteran qualifies for facilitation of employment placement by the Department...must submit his or her curriculum vitae to the Department with supporting documents to enable the Department to facilitate his or her employment placement, subject to availability of opportunities...If necessary, a military veteran must be assisted by the Department to draft his or her curriculum vitae.

4. **Facilitation of business opportunities** - the Minister must establish a business vehicle through which business opportunities can be pursued by the State on behalf of all military veterans...All existing and potential military veterans' business entities that are partially or wholly owned by military veterans and that are benefitting military veterans qualify for facilitation of business opportunities...To qualify for facilitation of business opportunities, a military veteran's business entity must be registered on the military veterans business entity register.

5. **Subsidised public transport** - a military veteran qualifies for a public transport subsidy if he or she: (a) is not employed and receives a pension from the State; or (b) is employed and has an annual income of less than R125 000.
6. **Access to health care** - a military veteran qualifies for health care services, at the expense of the State, at a public or private health care facility in the Republic if he or she: (a) is not employed and receives a pension from the State; or (b) is employed but - (i) does not qualify for a medical aid subsidy from his or her employer; or (ii) the military veteran’s medical aid cover is not sufficient owing to the status of his or her health.

7. **Housing** – a military veteran qualifies for a housing benefit of a total value not exceeding R175 000 if he or she: (a) is not employed and receives a pension from the State; or (b) is employed and has an annual income of less than R125 000, and: (i) does not own a house; (ii) has not previously received a house or other housing benefit from the State; or (iii) if he or she is in a spousal relationship, his or her spouse has not received a house or other housing benefit from the State.

8. **Burial support** - a military veteran qualifies for burial support at the expense of the State if he or she, at the time of his or her death: (a) was not employed and received a pension from the State; or (b) was employed and had an annual income of less than R125 000, and was listed as a military veteran in the national military veterans database. The Department may, after considering evidence from either the demobilisation records, the certified personnel register or service certificates provided by a military veteran’s relevant recognised association, provide burial support for the military veteran who was not listed in the national military veterans database at the time of his or her death, provided it is proven by documentary evidence that he or she would have qualified to be listed in that database had he or she registered before his or her death. The amount for burial support payable to a military veteran is R25 000.
These benefits stand to make a substantive difference in the lives of ex-combatants. The section below examines just how many ex-combatants have benefited so far.

### 7.3.1 Delivery record

On visiting the DMV in May 2014, I interviewed Patricia Noyoo, Director of Social Services. She confirmed that there were 57,000 names of veterans on the department’s database, a figure which had also been circulated in the media\(^\text{16}\). The figures that she shared at the time are similar to the figures published in the DMV’s 2013/2014 Annual Report. This is the only report that is currently publicly available pending the 2015/2016 Annual Report. Thus, although the figures are sure to have changed, the figures shared here are the ones that are reflected in the report, and the ones that I was given by the DMV representative. However, a 24 March 2016 article by the Mail and Guardian newspaper cites the DMV’s spokesperson, Mbulelo Musi, referring to “roughly 70,000 registered military veterans in the country”\(^\text{17}\). The verification process is conducted in collaboration with the South African National Military Veterans Association (SANMVA) and other military veterans organisations. The 2013/2014 DMV Annual Report stated that out of the figure of 57,000 names in the database, only “342” military veterans had been interviewed, and “174 of these Military Veterans were recommended to be included in the DMV database.” (p.15).

In terms of veteran’s compensation, the report notes that a preliminary list of a 100 military veterans has been compiled and targeted for the once-off compensation, the amount of which is to be determined by the Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula. In terms of the healthcare provision, the DMV notes that it has signed Service delivery agreements with the South African Military Healthcare Services (SAMHS) and Military Veterans’ Healthcare Practitioners Association (MVHPA) as partners in the delivery of healthcare to Military Veterans. According to the report, “to date the Department has loaded a total of 7,703 Military Veterans on the SAMHS database for access to healthcare as legislated, and out of these 4,719 are accessing healthcare services” (DMV 2013/2014 Annual Report: p. 13). It also notes that “this process started in 2011, with 2000 Military Veterans who were 60 years and above and those with


\(^{17}\) Available from: [http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits](http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits)
chronic conditions. To strengthen easy access to healthcare, nine Military Veterans help desks were set up at the SAMHS healthcare facilities across all provinces in line with the Ministerial directive of April 2012” (p. 13). It also notes the establishment of the Military Veterans Health and Wellness Centre, whose benchmarks were to be determined after a visit which was instructed by the Deputy Minister to the United States in order to “finalise the Concept Paper and Business Plan for South Africa’s 1st Military Veterans Health and Wellness Centre” (p. 23). A Mail and Guardian news report recently noted the DMV was challenging the validity of a deal signed with Zeal Health Innovations in 2015 wherein department officials had signed a R200 million contract claiming that the department did not have a budget for it18. The article profiles Nkutsoeu Motsau, the chairperson of the AZANLA Military Veterans Association, a “former Robben Island prisoner survived the apartheid regime and a horrific car crash years ago, which left him quadriplegic”19. The article shows the administrative hurdles that veterans are obliged to go through in order to access health support from the department. For less visible veterans unlike Motsau, one imagines that for many veterans the access to health support through the DMV remains elusive.

In terms of delivery in education, the 2013/2014 report notes that 100 military veterans and dependents have been offered with education support. The department has Memoranda of Understandings with NSFAS and Department of Basic Education to assist facilitation of this benefit to the relevant institutions. If implemented successfully, the partnership between the DMV and NSFAS could mean that many veterans and their dependents would have access to tertiary education institutions. This would be a monumental relief for many veterans whose children are often not able to access tertiary institutions due to financial reasons.

In terms of housing, the Department reports to have signed:

Memoranda of Understanding and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with provincial departments of Human Settlements, specifically North West, KZN, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and Free State Funds were transferred or ring fenced for construction of Military Veterans houses for the 2013, 2014 financial years.

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18 Available from: [http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits](http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits)

19 Available from: [http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits](http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-war-veterans-left-without-benefits)
Subsequently, the number of houses to be built during 2014 financial year will increase. Service Level Agreements with Gauteng and Mpumalanga have been submitted for DG signature, Western Cape and Eastern Cape are currently in progress (p. 23).

The report also notes that Housing Subsidy System in Department of Human Settlements has been adjusted to accommodate the DMV housing means test. It points out that one of the barriers to the provision of housing to veterans “is the transfer of top-up funds to Provinces. National Treasury insists that funds should be transferred only after houses have been built i.e. in line with stipulations of the MoU signed by both Departments. Provinces prefer that funds be paid in advance to enable compliance with agreed specifications for “a military veteran’s house”.

In terms of pension, the report notes that the

[...]

first list of eligible recipients of pension was compiled in collaboration with Special Pensions, Department of Social Development and the DMV National Health assessment initiative, respectively. The Military Veterans Pension Framework was discussed with National Treasury and Treasury’s formal input has since been received and reviewed. National Treasury and DMV are cooperating to accelerate delivery on pension for Military Veterans, SASSA is ready to pay out pensions to Military Veterans as soon as DMV is ready.

The report does not detail how many pensions have been given out in the period of review. No numbers are given for the provision of financial support for veterans using public transport. The report only notes that “there has been a slow progression towards cooperative governance in the provision of this Benefit”, where it then notes that the “DMV is to intensify effort in this regard in the current financial year” (p. 24).

In terms of burial support, the department has provided amounts between R10, 000 to R25, 000 to “one hundred and eighteen (118) Military Veterans’ households provided with burial support” (p. 14). The report also notes that the DMV is working in partnership with the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to facilitate the “exhumation and
dignified reburial of former liberation fighters who had been buried in paupers graves in Limpopo and Northwest” (p.24).

Lastly, the report does not detail how many veterans have been able to gain access to counseling facilities mental illness and/or post-traumatic stress disorder. There is no gender representation in terms of how many of the veterans who have benefitted so far are women and how many of them are men. Overall, the report shows the limited scope that has been reached so far by the DMV. The accounts of experiences from women ex-combatants show that one of the key issues with regards to access to the DMV is that its processes and administrations mainly operate from its headquarters in Pretoria, at a distance from the majority of veterans across the country.

7.4 Celebrating guerilla girls in a gender neutral policy

Gender specific language is not present in the legislative framework of the DMV. The encompassing category of veteran is understood to represent the interests of all veterans. In this manner, the material and symbolic needs of veterans do not demonstrate an understanding that while veterans, as a group, are socio-economically marginalised, the ways in which this marginality is expressed may differ in specific ways to women and men. The presence of women, as a category, shows up in the July/August issue of the DMV’s magazine in celebration of women’s month. Although this special issue seeks to highlight the role of women in general, and women combatants more specifically, there is limited detail given to the lives of women beyond a celebration of known women combatants, and a rhetorical celebration of women’s contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle.

The July/August 2013 issue of the DMV’s magazine, Honour, carries a cover image of Ruth Mompati with the caption, “we celebrate and honour women military veterans for their contribution”. This issue was the first special issue dedicated to women military veterans. In the editorial, the DMV’s head of communication, Mbulelo Musi, commemorates the 1956 women’s march, and notes that women continue to face the challenge of “rape and all forms of women abuse in homes, schools, work places and indeed all societal endeavours”, while also daring “society to create that necessary enabling environment for women in general and women military veterans in particular to express themselves freely and to be given an opportunity to play a
meaningful role in all societal endeavours socially, politically, culturally and economically” (Honour Magazine, 2013: 3). The editorial does not speak to specific to contributions made by military veterans in society, and it also does not to speak to specific issues that women veterans face today.

The magazine also highlights “the first re-union for the uMkhoto weSizwe Women Military Veterans” which was held on “17 August 2013 at 9 South African Infantry Battalion (9SAI) in Khayelitsha Cape Town” (Nkosi, 2013: 7). The article on the event by Nkosi does not share the various issues that women discussed at the reunion, beyond affirming women’s roles in the armed struggle and the challenges that remain in order to fulfill the achievement of their human rights. Two participants in this study, Nomfandiso Kulati and Phumla Gaba, were part of this reunion. In the article, Kulati is noted for having read a poem by Maya Angelou. When I asked Kulati and Gaba about the event, they noted their delight in seeing old comrades that they had not seen in years, and expressed hopes that this was the beginning of a process by the DMV to support women’s veterans. The fact that this was the first re-union of MK women points to the lack of institutional mechanisms to support veterans more broadly, and women specifically. The women who were reunited were all transnationally trained guerrillas.

Besides honouring the contributions made by Ruth Mompati, the magazine profiles three other women military veterans: 1) Ellen Molekane, who is the deputy director-general in the office of the Minister of Defence; 2) Phumla Williams Acting CEO of Government Communication and Information Systems; and 3) Col (Ret.) Mokolanyane Patricia Moeti. In her profile, Ellen Molekane makes a striking point about the state’s effort to support the welfare of veterans, arguing that “from 1994 to 2008 the effort was halfhearted. The intention to deal with the socioeconomic issues of military veterans took prominence in 2009 when a Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans was proclaimed by the new administration under President Jacob Zuma” (Honour Magazine, 2013:12). She further notes that

we need to recall that the South African National Defence Force was formed on the 27 April 1994 by incorporating statutory and Non-Statutory Formations (NSF), namely South African Defence Force (SADF) and Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei Defence Forces on the one hand, MK and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) on the other. The statutory forces
military veterans were better taken care of as they moved from a privileged position as opposed to the NSF that had no systems in place in the previous apartheid dispensation. For the NSF, a deliberate decision had to be taken by the new democratic state to look after those veterans (p. 12).

Phumla Williams affirms this view by arguing that

> [t]he government started late to set up a dedicated Department to deal with the plight of ex-military combatants. Setting up that Department marks the start of acknowledgement of our retired military combatants’ contribution. I do however hope that the MV’s will make a contribution in teaching our younger generation the role that was played by these veterans to bring about this democracy that we are today all enjoying, values and skills such as patriotism and discipline, which MV’s understand are critical to impart to the youth (p. 13).

While this issue of the *Honour* magazine was dedicated to women veterans, it is striking how little detail specifically about the wellbeing of women veterans is offered in the issue. In form of the profiles noted above, more space is given to women veterans who already occupy senior positions in government or used to occupy senior positions like Moeti and Mompati (before her death in 2015). Little detail is offered about less visible women, and the ways in which they are grappling with life after MK. The magazine, like much of the legislative language used in veteran’s legislation, can be read as gender neutral. By gender neutral, I mean that the framing by the DMV assumes that the challenges faced by veterans are either uniform or ‘ungendered’. Therefore, there is no acknowledgement that women and men veterans may face different challenges beyond those of gender-based violence.

Furthermore, in the limited narrative that pays attention to women’s veterans as a category, it is the transnationally trained woman combatant who is venerated and is understood as deserving of the DMV’s support. There are no accounts of experiences of the women combatants who participated inside the country. Therefore, it seems that women combatants may have to push the DMV to move away from its gender neutrality, and pay attention to the ways in which women veterans face specific challenges compared to their male counterparts. In the discourse on human security, women and feminist activists challenged the presentation of policy in gender neutral terms and insist on gendered legislative responses from states that are today
reflected in the implementation of the human development index indicators and the human development goals (Hudson, 2005; Hudson, 2009; Hendricks, 2011).

Lastly, the misrecognition of combative mothers and in-betweener will inevitably cause resentment amongst women combatants if some feel that their contribution has been erased. In the current legislative framework and practice, the majority of women combatants do not stand to access material benefits. This is similar to how the narrow definition of the initial demobilisation process excluded these women.

7.4.1 “Women are disappearing”

The women who participated in this study expressed a desire to receive benefits facilitated by the DMV. Few of them had access to the department, either in their provinces or the headquarters. There is a sense that the department is out of reach for many women, and that their processes are highly bureaucratic. As a result, none of the women were yet benefitting from the stated benefits offered by the DMV.

One of the experiences articulated by one participant was the interview process that is part of the verification process for individuals to be part of the DMV database. Makhosazana Xaba shared her experience of going through the verification interview, which she found to be personally invasive:

…round about early last year I got a call from somebody else that I was at the camp with, Ndumiso, and he says, ‘why aren’t you on this, you know, they’re putting everybody on that list again,’ (because in the process people were left out) ‘and I was talking to Tsepe [Motumi] and Tsepe says he hasn’t seen you.’ And I said, ‘you know, I don’t know how many times I’ve tried following up on this process and it just feels so cumbersome for me so I left.’ He says, ‘No, no, no, no. Tsepe’s now in charge of that. He’ll help you.’ So I called Tsepe: ‘so what do I need to do?’ He says go to the verification committee in Braamfontein, give evidence there, and then they’ll come back to me after that. I said, ‘oh okay, fine’. So I go there (it was in March last year), I sit in this room, they record everything and they start asking me questions about the trees that grew around Pango: ‘what kind of trees where they?’ They asked me about the circumference of an AK47
cylinder. They asked me about the size of a grenade. I lost it. I lost it and started crying. I tried not to scream. There were all these SANDF people, SANDF, MK, ‘blah, blah, blah, blah’ represented in this committee: all these big fat men. I ended up looking like a fake and I said, ‘you know, I didn’t think I was coming here to answer questions that sound like I’m in primary school, you know. If I had known that that’s what I’m supposed to do I would probably would’ve gone somewhere and got a list so that I would answer this for you. You want to know when I was there, I can tell you. You want to know who my commander was at that time, I don’t remember. I didn’t try to keep names in my head. You know what kind of situation we were under. If you’re asking me about how to cock a gun, I don’t want to be an SANDF person. I don’t want to be in the military, so I’ve forgone all these things deliberately.’ I cried. I felt so horrible inside. So then they asked me so the person who had referred me said to me, ‘you know Khosi you mustn’t cry. There were two people who’d come here and they didn’t remember anything. So we are aware of this, this that’s happening and between you and me, I can tell you that I think these questions are inappropriate. But anyway, I will call you and we’ll take you through the process of [what do you call that process? The process where other people testify to the fact that yes they knew you?]’ But he didn’t come back to me, and I followed up and followed up and things just fizzled out and fizzled out. And I thought okay it’s happening again. So maybe I’m not meant to be in this. But now I’m more curious, because I’ve been told by Ndumiso that you can get medical aid for yourself and your daughter. You can get a bursary. And I’m thinking, but I do need those things now, you know. My daughter is at varsity, her father has died. You know, I’m gonna be very old soon, I’ll need medical aid. Maybe I should pursue this. But things just fizzled out completely until Mandela dies and I bump into somebody that I was at university with in town and he says, ‘where have you been? I haven’t seen you.’ We hadn’t seen each other since varsity. And so I tell him what happens. He says, “No but Tsepe is my friend. Tsepe is my friend.” I say, “Tsepe didn’t! I followed up and followed up. Tsepe just left me hanging because I didn’t remember anything and I broke down and cried. I was a bad case, so to speak, and
Tsepe couldn’t help.” So he says, “No, no, no I want to talk to Tsepe, I want to talk to Tsepe.” So we are trying to revive that right now, so I don’t know how it gonna go.

(Makhosazana Xaba interview, Johannesburg, May 2014)

In August 2016, Xaba updated me that she eventually managed to find the commander that she had served under, who was now working in China. She was now about to restart the process of verification. From her experience, combatants who will undergo the verification process are not only expected to undergo an interview, but their success also depends on the collaboration of former comrades whose whereabouts they may not currently know. This elaborate process of verification may be one of the reasons that the process has demonstrated limited success as noted above in the 2013/2014 Annual Report. Few military veterans have been successfully verified.

The Special Pensions application process also involved the verification of an individual’s participation through evidence provided by those they had worked with. It was not clear from the women combatants who served inside the country whether they felt that they would be eligible for this process, and what verification for those who did not have commanders may mean. Mrs. Mabhengeza noted that when she was applying for Special Pensions, she was assisted by the young men whom she had worked with when Amabutho was operating. Thus, there are ways in which to verify one’s role for the combatants who were inside the country, who did not receive military training.

Joyce Sifuba noted that for many APLA veterans, it is difficult to access assistance as most institutional assistance is confined in Gauteng. She pointed out that most women “are disappearing” in terms of this process, because they do not have time to attend countless veterans meetings, when they have families to look after, nor the resources to travel to Pretoria to the headquarters of the DMV:

I go to Pretoria often, because my children are there, and they are soldiers. So, what about someone who does not have a child in the system? And I get things because Ama-Afrika who are in high positions in the system still contact me. But
what about those who do not these opportunities, who are left out of the system? ...The person says to themselves “Yhu, let me stay here in the township and eat whatever I have. Women are disappearing. Like I said, there are MVA meetings, but there are very few women. If you see ten women in a meeting, that will be a lot. I hope that with this research you are doing you can apply for more funds, so that you can find these women. I asked Witbank, and Neilspruit but we still do not have the names and numbers of those women. NJS: It needs a person to constantly go to the meetings. When they say there is a meeting, you must go to that meeting and voice your concerns. I voiced out to Mr. Mlambo that we should search for these women. And these women they came and are breadwinners. So when they say there is a meeting in Gauteng and I am in PE, how will I get to Gauteng? The money I would use to travel from PE to Gauteng is the money I need to use to buy food for my children. You see, now you are wasting money because of the economic situation that we are in these days.

(Joyce Sifuba telephone interview, November 2013)

Other participants also complained about the centralization of the DMV work to its Pretoria offices, and that most of the filling up of documents is done in the offices of colleagues who work in government who have computer and printing facilities. Nomfundiso Kulati complained that the DMV’s emphasis on assisting veterans within a salary bracket, disadvantages those who are employed. She was arguing that measuring access to veterans’ benefits by salary does not take into account the multiple financial responsibilities that many individuals, like her, carry:

...in terms of the Veterans Act...I’m entitled to a house. I’m entitled to education if I want to study including my children. But I also learnt, okay I earn a salary; okay I’m a single mom. But they want my payslip. When they look at my payslip, they think I can afford, which I cannot. Look one of my kids now is at tertiary and I mean, it’s expensive, education these days and the other one will be at tertiary next year. Remember, now I have boys there are all these initiation
this and that. I'm not entitled to that house because by virtue of having... of working for government even though I've sacrificed so much at a young age. Eh, our story is a story that needs to be looked at seriously by the leadership again. Yes, they talk about it very nicely at conferences, Polokwanes and these other previous conferences as if things will be done, but nothing much.

(Nomfundiso Kulati interview, Port Elizabeth, September 2013)

While it is understandable why the DMV would prioritise the needs of the desperately poor, Kulati’s sentiments demonstrate the ways in which the framework has to consider the different interests of ex-combatants. Overall, women expressed a sense of confusion over the processes of the DMV and took a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. Many felt that the department is still new; therefore, perhaps with time, its administrative performance might evolve in a way that the DMV became accessible to different types of combatants in different parts of the country, especially women.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined the current legislative framework that seeks to address the interests of ex-combatants since 2009. The chapter has shown that the conceptualisation of the DMV from members of the ANC in Polokwane recognised the socio-economic and political marginalisation of combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The view of members of the ANC and MKMVA leadership, such as that of Ayanda Dlodlo, reflects the dominant view that if ex-combatants interests are not addressed, they will pose a security and a political threat to the state. The chapter shows that the definition of military veteran reflects the narrow definition that framed the CPR-based integration process. In this regard, it is the transnationally trained combatant who stands to benefit from this legislative order. However, the recent inclusion of AZANLA former combatants to this framework shows that the state may be able to adapt policy to include other combatants in the future. Furthermore, the chapter shows that the legislative framework of the DMV is presented in a gender-neutral operative vocabulary that seems to assume that the interests of women and male veterans are uniform. This gender neutrality sits side-by-side with a rhetorical positioning of women, whose current lives are under-written in the policy and
magazines of the DMV. For the participants of this study, the DMV presents a bureaucratic challenge to their ability to access veteran’s benefits. As a result, none of them are currently benefitting from this framework.
CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this study was to examine state assisted demobilisation and the civilian integration of women ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa. The thesis has shown that the context in which recognition for formal demobilisation takes place, is gendered in ways that excludes the majority of broadly defined women combatants. Once the lens of the combatant is widened, it becomes visible that there are combatants that find themselves without recognition according to the legislative framework that the state has devised. As such, most often these are women who exist at the margins of national liberation and post-liberation discourses. Through the literature on women’s methods of resistance in the townships, rural areas and outside the country in the wide terrain of the anti-apartheid struggle, the thesis has shown that women’s peripheral status in post-apartheid combatant discourses stands in dialectical opposition to the contribution that they made in defeating apartheid. The respective categories of guerilla girls, combative mothers and in-betweeners put forward by this thesis points to the reality that in fact not just some, but all women, were thrust into the anti-apartheid transnational struggle cum war effort. The study has shown that the once the extensive terrain from which guerilla war took place with the resistance of the apartheid state’s counter-insurgency methods, that the war against apartheid was carried out by private individuals, and more often than not, women. Yet, masculine nationalist discourses about the armed struggle present the complex confrontation against apartheid as if it had been between the state and two non-state liberation forces, MK and APLA. It has been shown in this study that this description exaggerates the international dimensions of the formally, externally trained (most often male) guerillas, who are posited as having won the day and the war. In excavating the complex terrain of this war that took place outside of any conventional battlefront, and was conducted in the shadows, and women’s role in the downfall of apartheid, the study has also shown that the war against apartheid and its enduring legacies are remembered differently in post-apartheid South Africa. The compromises of a negotiated settlement, whose credibility relies on the undermining of the country’s enduring legacy of war, has contributed to the silence in both policy and public culture on the demobilisation and civilian reintegration of
former combatants. It has been shown that these complex intersections, and their gendered nature, are under-studied.

Through the use of feminist theory in IR, the study has shown that the war, combat, combatant, struggle and outcome are all gendered processes, with material, psychological and symbolic consequences for the informal women combatants who were the heartbeat of the armed struggle. The study has made an original contribution in breaking down the domestic and external divide that is held by conventional IR theories, which functions to exclude and delegitimise women’s war roles. In accounting for the major findings of this study, this thesis has demonstrated that the recognition of women for participation in demobilisation process is based on an intricate intersection of binaries that together delegitimise women’s combatant roles, such as: combatant/civilian, internal/external, rural/urban, public/private, older/younger. This thesis has shown that the historic exclusion of women in demobilisation processes was also coupled with compromises of South Africa’s political negotiations, which generally undermined the demobilisation process for broader political ends. The conclusion of this thesis is that most women ex-combatants have not participated in the state-led demobilisation process and are, as a result, struggling to build their lives in post-apartheid South Africa.

This thesis has shown that the limited participation of women in demobilisation is due to the fact that the design of the process, which privileged internationally trained combatants, automatically excluded the majority of women from being able to participate in it, because they are not recognised as combatants. The narratives of the women who participated in the process reveal dissatisfaction with what they viewed as state assistance that did not appreciate the life-altering sacrifices that women made in participating in the armed struggle. The study sought to fill the identifiable gap in the literature on ex-combatants in South Africa, which until now focused on the lives of male ex-combatants who are struggling to rebuild their lives after apartheid. They mostly possess limited skills that are not compatible with the demands of the economy. This is while the literature offers limited details about the postwar lives of women ex-combatants. It has been made visible in this study that the task of examining women and the demobilisation and civilian reintegration process has demanded that the researcher begin by examining the conditions that facilitated or impinged upon women’s ability to participate in the SANDF integration and demobilisation process.
The study also shows that the concerns of women combatants are not taken to be as urgent as those of their male counterparts because, even when women have participated in combat, they are not expected to threaten the state militarily in the aftermath as a tool to pronounce their demands. Therefore, the state relies on tropes of women’s peacefulness and strength that make it acceptable for the state not to prioritise the needs of women combatants.

8.2 Major findings

8.2.1 Conventional versus unconventional combatant

The point of mapping the extensive and all-encompassing terrain of the armed struggle against apartheid was to show that, in order to understand the conditions of participation in the demobilisation process, we would need to understand women’s participation in the war itself and the ways in which the demobilisation process, in its criteria for combatant participation, resembled the nuances of the war. Through the use of feminist theory in IR, it has been possible for the study to show the ways in which women’s war contributions often go unrecognised and that it can be argued that demobilisation processes are important because they sanction recognition and heroic respectability, which determines whom the state views as having made the sacrifices for its survival or liberation. The feminist critique of the artificial nature of categories of war, such as combatant and civilian, and private and public, have made it possible to examine the often inherent gendered biases of demobilisation processes that are a result of a historic inability by states to count women’s war roles as part of ‘formal’ combat. This thesis has shown that, even in the context of a war that has been proclaimed by its own participants as “unconventional”, as was the case by the national liberation movements and the apartheid state, women’s participation continues to be understood within narrow lenses that often contribute to the erasure of women’s actions, and therefore their ability to qualify to participate in demobilisation processes.

Firstly, the study has shown that the debate about the demarcation of combat is a gendered discourse that imposes inapplicable categories in the topography of guerilla war. The study builds on Suttner’s (2007; 2008) work that has sought to count women’s methods of combat as a formal, constitutive element of the various battlefronts. It has been shown here that the artificial divisions that are created through formal military training do not account for the
multiple methods that make combat possible in the context of guerilla war. Thus, the study importantly adds additional categories of women combatants to the ones in Cock’s (1991) study, viz. the guerilla girls. It has been shown that the guerilla girls form one part of the various strategies of the armed struggle. The inclusion of combative mothers and in-betweeners builds on Magubane’s (2010) invitation for a feminist scholarship that takes seriously the context from which women resist and the methods that are possible to use in such contexts. The demands for formal training do not account for the kinds of resources that were needed in the articulation of the ‘People’s War’. The inclusion of non-conventional women combatants reflects the empirical nature of the armed struggle, which the demobilisation process ought to have resembled.

Secondly, the challenge against the use of military training to distinguish the combatants from civilians has also been used in this study to address the arbitrary divide regarding the internal versus externally trained combatants. By challenging the assumed divide of the internal and external, this study shows the complexity of space during apartheid. In Chapter Five, it is argued that the narratives of women who were interviewed for this study -- who operated in the underground, such as Mankahla and Dyantyi, and who were arrested for their activities -- demonstrates the extent to which the apartheid state impinged on the everyday in ways that reveal the real dangers that came with being an underground operative. The narratives of women who participated in the underground, Mankahla in the inception of MK, and Dyantyi in the late 1970s, demonstrate the importance of underground work to the practical articulation of the armed struggle. It is argued that the complex ‘space’ of underground work challenges the distinctions that extant discourses have made between different forms of struggle, which are understood to have taken place in particular spaces, contributing to a literature that views these spaces as espousing cultures of their own (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Trewhela, 2009; Ellis, 2012). The findings of this study challenge the separation of forms of struggle and the privileging of the external as the centre of armed struggle activity.

Ellis and Sechaba’s (1992) book details the weakness of MK, and the alarming ease in which the army could be infiltrated by apartheid security agents. This led to secrecy amongst the leadership, which became authoritarian, conspiratorial against and punitive towards those cadres suspected of working for the apartheid state. The authors argue the legacy of this secretive and authoritarian culture of the ANC in exile, if unaddressed, will find expression in the forms of
governance that take shape in democratic South Africa. Ellis (2012), in a later book, extends on this argument, by insisting that authoritarian, criminal and punitive ways of governing adopted by the ANC in exile, and indeed those of the apartheid security architecture, have not been reformed, and can be seen in how the ANC behaves in governance today. Paul Trewehla (2009: 69) has also argued in the same vein that ANC leadership is shaped by “two different styles of leadership within the ANC, the one – of the ‘external’ leaders – deriving from three decades of closed, autarchic, command society in the camps..., the other, of ‘internal’ leaders, from the more open and pluralistic culture developed in the trade union and civic associations within the country during the 1970s and 1980s”. Hugh Macmillan’s intervention to this debate has been to argue that “the ANC did not have a single culture of exile. This differed markedly from place to place, and from time to time. It was hugely different in, for example, the camps in Angola and the urban environment of Lusaka” (Macmillan, 2013: 281). He underscores the dangers of a homogeneous view of ‘exile culture’, and points out that “the case of ‘inziles’ were [also] not homogenous, and that the two groups overlapped” (p. 281). Raymond Suttner has also argued regarding the ANC, that there were no “stark and sharp” differences “between various decades and forms of struggle” (2008:165). What is implicit in Ellis and Trewehla’s claims about the dominance of a secretive, military culture is its masculine nature, which is evident in the tensions between the key figures in charge of different organs of the ANC, MK and the SACP, who all happen to be men, from Chris Hani to Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise, to Oliver Tambo. There is limited engagement in the discourse with how men and women were affected by the cultures and forms of struggle in respective periods. This study shows that when the spatial divide of the internal and external is interrupted, and more so when it is shown that the majority of women and men participated in the armed struggle from the domestic front, this invites new questions about the legacy of the armed struggle. In showing the central role played by women within their communities in the armed struggle, it opens a space to move beyond the fixation with personalities who are understood to have made key decision in exile about the armed struggle, where it becomes possible to seriously examine the ways in which communities were affected by the war and the ways in which they have transitioned in post-apartheid South Africa. In this manner, this research has shown that centering women’s roles allows refocusing our analysis not only on a few combatants who formed part of the ‘People’s War’. A focus on
women combatants has shown up multiple combatants who sacrificed their lives for the articulation of the people’s strategy.

The study has also shown the importance of challenging the distinction made between the public and private. As Sjoberg (2011) has shown, feminists in IR are suspicious of the boundaries between the internal and external central to demarcating the parameter of analysis for IR theories that assume that sources of insecurity to the state emanate from outside threats. By making visible the multiple ways in which women become part of global processes, including war, feminists have argued that the “international is personal”, in order to show the ways in which processes of war come are accompanied by real material costs for multiple actors, whether in direct combat or not. As Enloe (1989: 196) has argued, “accepting that the personal is the international multiplies the spectators; it especially adds women to the audiences”. It was shown in Chapter Four that the literature of the anti-apartheid struggle in general tends to depict the resistance to apartheid as a “public-political” spectacle that found expression in the image of the male protestor in the heat of township violence (Motsemme, 2004, 2011). As Motsemme’s (2011) and Bonnin’s (1997, 2000) work shows, the focus on the public interactions between the apartheid state and the black population overlooks the intimate nature of the violence. This study builds on the literature showing private and personal experiences with apartheid violence. It has been shown that the “shadows” that apartheid counter-insurgency executors, such as Eugene de Kock speak of, are the homes and communities in which women have control and which they are protective over. In the defence of their homes and communities, women resisted in both public and private spaces. The incessant instances of midnight arrests in the homes of women combatants and the use of spaces such as the church for political strategy, among others, has revealed the ways in which violence was meted out, as well as the way in which it was resisted by private individuals, many of whom were women. The examples of Liliesleaf, and the Masilela home in Swaziland, and the homes of individuals such as Conny Braam in the Netherlands, shows the extent to which both internally and externally, the armed struggle was in fact carried out in conventionally private spaces. This has consequences for how we theorise and define combat.

It has been shown also that, while the war is firmly located within the balance of power politics of the post-World War II Cold War order between the US and the Soviet Union, this
international posture often hides the fact that this was primarily a domestic contestation for the liberation of the oppressed majority. It has also shown that this domestic struggle took place in private spaces of the community. This study further shows that there is a distinction that is made between the urban and rural areas, which attributes the actions of the urban based combatants as the most decisive contributions to the armed struggle and the anti-apartheid struggle more broadly. What distinguishes South Africa’s guerrilla struggle from other countries in Southern Africa, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique, is that the struggles in such countries mainly took place in rural areas, similar to the guerrilla experiences of China and Cuba, which shaped the ways in which both Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara conceptualised the ideal terrain for guerrilla operations (Mao Tse-tung, 1961; Guevara, 1997; O' Gorman, 2011). As Badat’s (2012) work showed in Chapter Two, the South African guerilla struggle is often understood as an urban struggle, which can narratively obscure the methods of resistance that were used by combatants in the Bantustans. The study has shown that the distinctions used to understand the contributions of combatants and activists in the urban and rural areas does not appreciate the ways in which these spaces informed and shaped each other. This study has provided original data and analysis about the role of Poqo/APLA women combatants in the actions of Poqo as a mainly rural-based guerilla movement. The dual influence of the urban and rural for the PAC, whose members came, for example, from both Cape Town and the Transkei, shaped the forms of actions of combatants in the Bantustans, while the movement to urban areas shaped the guerilla strategies of Poqo there. The narratives of women combatants of Poqo/APLA in the early operations of 1960s are also illustrative of the methods of resistance that were possible in the different phases of the struggle. The underground activities of women combatants shaped and inspired the strategies that were adopted by the generation of “young lions” in the 1970s and 1980s, who were incited into action by conditions in the Bantustans, and in the public resistance of their peers in the schools in the township. Thus, the study shows, in these spatial ways, the unconventional combatant moved between urban and rural spaces, shaping the methods of struggle that changed across time, through the contributions of multiple generations, young and old. The centering of focus upon the women combatants of Poqo who fought in rural Transkei in the 1960s, contributes to the dearth of literature on the important role played by activists in the Bantustans. Badat (2012) does well in centering women’s roles in banishment, by emphasising the important role of women such as Makwena Matlala and Helen Joseph. Although Kondlo
(2009) provides a compelling account of the PAC and APLA, the main actors in the party’s history are overwhelmingly male. Thus although he points out the influence of the rural space in the shaping of PAC ideology and practice, women’s roles are not understood to be central in this process, in ways that this thesis shows.

Lastly, age has been shown in this study to be among the narrative technologies by means of which women become written out of the war effort. The emphasis on the generation of “young lions”, distorts the important ways in which the fight against apartheid relied on a close collaboration of the young and old. The combative mothers of Amabutho show in empirical ways how women’s homes became places of refuge. In turn, these combative mothers found themselves in constant confrontation with the security forces that frequented their homes, often in the dead of the night. The mothers used the church as a space for political strategy, to deal with the brutality of the police officers who also lived in their communities. The young women’s roles in schools, and in funerals as guards of honour, further show the complex terrain of the apartheid battlefront, and the types of combatants it produced. This is because age determined which spaces were accessible to different kinds of women. The findings in this thesis also contribute to a long-standing debate about women’s relationship with the national liberation movements and maternal politics. As Kimble and Unterhalter (1982), Gasa (2007) Miller (2009) and Magubane (2010) have all noted, it is important to understand the context of women’s struggle in order not to delegitimise their tools of participation. The shadows of apartheid violence fell in those spaces that are understood to be “women’s spaces” (Bonnin, 1997). The maternally centred forms of participations in the armed struggle were grounded in their defence of themselves and their communities, which included the protection of children.

8.2.2 The struggle continues

The study has shown that the state-assisted demobilisation programme was inadequate in supporting the transition of women combatants into civilian life in post-apartheid South Africa. Through developing categories from which to understand women’s participation in the armed struggle, the thesis has shown that most women combatants were excluded from the demobilisation process. This is the first study to center on women combatants and the
demobilisation process. Unlike the major studies on South Africa’s demobilisation process, which have not substantially challenged the criteria for participation in the process, this study has shown substantively why the design of the process itself over-determined which type of combatant would be able to participate in the process, and who would be left out. Thus, a key critique of the study has been to examine the design of the process, and the ways in which it failed to resemble the context of the unconventional war whose combatants it sought to demobilise.

For the in-betweeners and the combative mothers who were left outside of this process, the transition to democratic South Africa is imbued with multiple socio-economic and psychological challenges. The majority of the women, young and old, are the heads of their households. The combative mothers head the homes where their own children are unemployed and depending on their old-age pension and informal work. They also look after their grandchildren, which compounds their financial responsibilities. It has been shown that the special pension, the only vehicle of financial support from the state for the in-betweeners and combative mothers, is not accessible to the majority of the unconventional combatants who have applied and have been unsuccessful in accessing it. Although the guerilla girls are an exception as having participated in the demobilisation process, the main source of support was the once-off payment and the monthly special pension that some of them receive. Even the women who were externally trained found the process frustrating, and were unable to support themselves in navigating life back home, and outside of the military.

The study shows that similar to other post-conflict contexts such as Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Sudan, among others, the silence in the literature on women combatants is not unique to the South African case. The study has shown, as have others, that even when women have fought in wars, the threat of a post-war ex-combatant picking up arms against the state is understood to be exclusively masculine. Building on Motsemme (2004; 2011), the study has argued that the silence on women combatants has multiple functions, both as resistance and misrecognition. The study has argued that states’ reliance on tropes’ of women’s peaceful nature plays a role in the disregard for combatant women’s material and psychological needs in the post-war aftermath. Despite military experience, whether conventional or otherwise, women are not anticipated to be a security threat
to the state, and their interests are, therefore, not regarded as urgent. It has also been shown that silence plays a complicated role, because it is also articulated as a symbol of strength by women combatants themselves. The social assumptions that African women are able to withstand enormous challenges without falling apart, is evident in the way women combatants articulate the necessity and their ability to construct post-war livelihoods without the support of the government. The coupling of the use of strength for black women, and the social assumptions about strengths of soldiers, play a significant role in how women make sense of their neglect by the state. The role of silence, articulated as strength, builds on a long literary tradition regarding how black women cope with structural discrimination from colonial times, during apartheid and in the post-apartheid state. This use of language as strength, has underplayed the real psychological challenges that all women combatants face. This study has shown that the legacies of the armed struggle remain in the consciousness of women combatant’s everyday reality.

The study has shown that there is urgent need for state redress for all ex-combatants. The current veterans’ legislation that governs the work of the DMV does not seem to appreciate the gender dynamics that affect the lives of women combatants. Gender neutrality implicit in the policy assumes that the challenges faced by women and male veterans are uniform in the policies’ gender-neutral approach. There is an urgent need to expand the mandate of the DMV to include the needs and recognition of all women combatants. There is a need for the work of the department to be more transparent and far reaching, beyond its headquarters in Tshwane.

Lastly, this thesis has shown that assumptions about women and men’s roles in war have not substantially changed to consider seriously the empirical realities of war. This holding up of provincial Western derived, masculinist and statist categories continues to undermine women’s contributions and actions in the writing, theorising of war and in national liberation histories in South Africa and the Global South more broadly. Thus, this thesis makes a contribution to the IR approaches that have been critical of the foundations that inform the tools and categories of analysis in the discipline. The thesis makes a specific contribution to the body of postcolonial feminism that takes both the empirical realities and histories of the people in the Global South seriously in the theorisation of war and other social processes.
Ultimately, this study hopes to have shown that the material and symbolic recognition of all women combatants makes visible the broadness of the struggle against apartheid as a historical truth, and a matter of gender justice into an inclusive and more democratic future.
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