"CHIMURENGA" 1896 - 1897: A REVISIONIST STUDY

THESIS

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by

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The following typographical corrections have come to my attention since submission of this thesis.

p.i, line 8, "Phillip" should read Philip.

p. vi, line 11, "Risings" should read Rising.

p. vii, line 12, "response" should read response.

p. 3, line 17, "warrior" should read warriors.

p. 5, line 4, "96" should read 1896.

p. 8, line 3, "Lomangund" should read Lomagundi.

p. 9, line 2, "(inverted comma) missing after "role".

p. 19, line 9, "treatises" should read treatises.

p. 28, line 18, "analysis" should read analyses.

p. 30, line 10, "the and" should read "and the".

p. 42, line 28, "Historians" should read Historian's.

p. 47, line 13, "response" should read response.

p. 55, line 4, "sign missing before the figure of 121 000.

p. 55, line 5, "sign missing before the figure of 3.

p. 55, line 6, "sign missing before the figure of 100.

p. 56, lines 7-10, quote to be indented.

p. 62, line 16, "dela" should be separated out to read "de la".

p. 64, line 4, "assist him" should be separated out to read "assistant him".

p. 67, line 11, "internecine" should read internecine.

p. 83, line 17, "March 1895" should read March 1894.

p. 89, line 5, "fraction" should read fraction.

p. 95, line 29, fn. 12, "ZNA" should read NAZ.

p. 107, line 28, "hadf" should read had.

p. 108, line 19, fn. 158, the missing page reference to Beach, "The Risings" are pp.135 - 151, 178 - 180, 300 - 305.

p. 116, line 10, (.fullstop) missing after "Rebellion".

p. 146, line 12, "internecine" should read internecine.

p. 160, line 9, "sign missing before the figure of 25.

p. 161, line 13, "the of" should read "of the".

p. 170, line 18, fn. 43, the missing reference is p.132.

p. 184, line 2, "June 1896" should read June 1896.

p. 190, line 6, "sign missing before the figure 13.

p. 194, line 21, "which" should read with.

p. 222, line 18, there should be a . (fullstop) after "interesting".

p. 223, line 1, "sign missing before the figure 1.

p. 226, line 21, "villages" should read villagers.

p. 247, line 11, "there" should read their.

p. 247, line 22, "a" in front of "various" to be omitted.

p. 286, caption on the photograph needs to be reversed.

p. 286, line 37, "condemning" should read condemning.

p. 329, line 10, fn.2, reference to Cobbing, "The Ndebele" to be excised.

These corrections are please to be noted.

Mark. P. M. Horn.
10/02/86.
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Preface

It was while studying the "Rebellions" as an Honours paper under Dr. J.R.D. Cobbing in 1983 that I first became aware of some of the inadequacies of previous analyses. Due to the advances made at the Honours level it was decided to make the events of 1896 - 7 the subject of further research. My intention was to approach the study of the events of 1896 - 7 from a far wider perspective than is reflected in this thesis, but this would have been too major a task for a thesis which is restricted to 50 000 words of text. This thesis is therefore primarily historiographical in focus with an amplification of the factual, perceptual and conceptual advances made in 1983.

My study begins with an outline of the state of the debate so far. Against this summary of previous interpretations the factual, perceptual and conceptual advances made in this analysis may be measured. The change of perspective which underlies this study leads to a reassessment of many of the factual assumptions of previous writers. Building upon these factual and perceptual advances this study moves towards a conceptual revision in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the complex nature of the events of 1896 - 7.

A short note on the methodology employed in the pursuit of this study may assist the reader. The concern of this thesis is to establish what actually was and what actually happened. The subjective perceptions upon which actions were based forms part
of the total understanding this study strives to achieve. A strong philosophical interest is reflected throughout upon which the change in perspective is grounded. The critical approach employed is simple. An attempt is made to be as familiar with as much of the evidence as is possible. In the primary and secondary sources contradictions are looked for. An interpretation is then aimed at which is both consistent and coherent. A challenging alternative to simple documentary substantiation employed in this study is the technique of analysis by critical inference. One aspect of this technique is the use of statistical data against which conceptual evidence is evaluated. In order to appreciate the "wholeness" of the events described an attempt has been made to be conversant with as many subsidiary disciplines as possible. Finally, a serious weakness of previous writers has been their inability to appreciate the rigours of outdoor life. I have drawn upon personal experience to correct this flaw.

In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. H.C. Hummel for the care and consideration taken in the preparation for the presentation of this thesis. Dr. Cobbing has remained a helpful and interested critic throughout. My sincere thanks must be given to the Cox family of Bulawayo and the Gammon family of Harare, Zimbabwe, for welcoming me into their homes whilst conducting research. Acknowledgement must be given to the helpful assistance rendered by the staff of the Transvaal and Cape Archives, the National Archives of
Botswana, the National Archives of Zimbabwe, the Cape Town Library, Cory Library, Grahamstown, the National English Literary Museum and Documentation Centre, Grahamstown, and in particular to Mrs Paddy Vickery of the historical section of the Bulawayo Public Library. The staff of the Rhodes University Computer Department have rendered invaluable service. Many of my friends have assisted in the preparation of this manuscript, in particular Miss M. Sennet and Mr. B. Jackson. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of Rhodes University and the Human Sciences Research Council.
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Abstract

There were no "Rebellions" in 1896 - 7. The concept of "risings" which is to be found in the European perspective of the escalated violence has distorted an understanding of the complex nature of the events. The events of 1896 - 7 must rather be explained through an examination of the details of the conflict. European pressure on the African people prior to 1896 was minimal and cannot be assumed to be the "cause" of the first "Chimurenga". There was no planned, organised or coordinated "rebellion" in Matabeleland in March 1896. Further, no distinction can be made between a March "rebellion" in Matabeleland and a June "rebellion" in Mashonaland. A European war of conquest in 1896 - 7 evoked the response known now as the first "Chimurenga". It was the war of conquest of 1896 - 7 which saw the ascendancy of the European perspective over the African and thereby established the psychological foundations of the Rhodesian colonial state. The complex nature of the events of 1896 - 7 is to be understood through an appreciation of the different perspectives of those who became embroiled in the conflict.
OUR CARTOON

THE IDEAL

AND

FROM FACT.

THE REAL.

FROM A TELEGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION
WITH ADDED TO "BLACK AND WHITE"
Chapter One

The state of the debate

The "Rebellions" of 1896 - 7 in the area known now as Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, have been the subject of much professional and amateur scholarship. As latterly portrayed, they have provided a source of mythical heroism and endeavour to both black and white peoples. Yet, the nature of the events of 1896 - 7 still remains a mystery, despite the heated debate among historians. As Alexander Davis, a contemporary, - editor of the Bulawayo Sketch -, noted on the 4 April 1896, several theories even then existed as to the nature of the conflict:

"Since our last issue events have not marched very rapidly. We were then in laager and in haager we continue. The Matabele were then an unknown quantity and today their numbers, purpose, and the extent of the rising is still undefined. It is true that we have heard and seen laid down in print theories and conjectures innumerable. M’limo, the late king’s nephews, cattle shooting, droughts, etc, have each in their turn been mooted as the immediate cause of the insurrection, but the true history of the unprecedented and apparently unanimous rise of the natives has still to be narrated."

This thesis is a belated attempt to respond to Davis’s injunction to arrive at the "inwardness" of the events of 1896 - 7. What was needed was a totally different perspective to that which has dominated all accounts so far, because whatever their variation they all basically agreed that the risings were
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE REPORT ON NATIVE DISTURBANCES IN RHODESIA 1896-7

Scale of English Miles

[Map showing various rivers, forts, and geographical landmarks]

Taken from The '96 Rebellions.
a case of black resistance to the encroachments of white rule. This study, by contrast, seeks to demonstrate that the white pressure was just one of many factors which transcended racial as well as geographical boundaries. (4) But briefly, the state of the debate so far.

The first modern scholar in the field was Professor Ranger, whose work, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896 - 7, subtitled, "a study in African resistance", first published in 1967, has been enormously influential. (5) It is a work which on close examination is very similar to the official explanation of the conflict contained in Reports on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia 1896 - 7, drawn up by two officials of the British South Africa Company, the Acting Administrator of Matabeleland, A.H. Duncan, and the Salisbury Civil Commissioner, H. M. Hole. (6) Ranger's thesis is bold in asserting that the Ndebele and Shona risings against the British South Africa Company were instigated, coordinated and led by the Mwari cult, an organization of priests and their officials, operating from shrines in the Matopos and Mambo hills, who looked back to the supra-tribal mystique of the Rozvi "Empire" destroyed by the Nguni in the 1830's. (7) Ranger argues that the priests' solution to "the problem of scale" drew the previously feuding southern Zambezian peoples together in one anti-European unity, with the mass commitment that characterized the nationalist movements of the early 1960's. (8)
In the 1978 preface to the paperback edition of *Revolt*, Ranger admitted that the picture of the African past given in the first few chapters of the book "now look very over-simplified". (9) He had seen the Shona speaking peoples as "the heirs of Empire" and the Ndebele speaking peoples as "simple soldiers". (10) In the style of the 1960's he emphasized the importance of the "two great successive Shona state systems - the Mutapa and Rozvi "Empires". (11) He believed that the stone walls at Great Zimbabwe had enclosed a royal capital up to as recently as the 1820's, and that the surviving memories and structures of the Rozvi "Empire" were crucially significant as a means of achieving combined action against the whites. (12) It was argued that the religious authorities of the *mhondoro* spirit mediums and the officers of the Mwari cult, once associated with the "Empires", survived their collapse to play the most important role in "bringing unity to the risings". (13) The Ndebele were portrayed as powerful and efficient warrior, who were nevertheless dependent on Shona agriculture, technology and religious ideas. (14) After the overthrow of the Ndebele state in 1893, the influence of the Shona cult of the high God of Mwari linked the Ndebele aristocracy with their subject peoples, and ultimately with the independent Shona chiefs to the east. (15) In Ranger's view the African past, of which the Europeans were ignorant, provided in the Mambo and Rozvi "Empires," and the religious *mhondoro* and Mwari cult systems, the inspiration and organizational structures to effect a rebellion in 1896-7.
Turning to the question of the European impact between 1890 and 1896, Ranger presents a scenario of abuse by the settlers and the officials of the British South Africa Company which leaves no doubt as to the immediate impetus for a rebellion. The Europeans used violence to extract forced labour from African peoples for work on the mines, farms and the new settlements. (16) The traditional homes and land of the African peoples were expropriated and shared among the Europeans who streamed into the country. (17) The Ndebele were to be forced into reserves, which they regarded as cemeteries, not homes. (18) Following on the Ndebele war of 1893, this once proud people were subjugated to the humiliation of conquest. (19) Their cattle and grain were seized in vast quantities through force and subterfuge. (20) The situation in Mashonaland following on the creation of the Native Department was similar. The wealth of the African people in Mashonaland was seized under the pretext of a hut tax. (21) In a material sense the European impact was extensive, but it also provided a challenge to the traditions and culture of the African peoples. The Native Commissioners and their Native Police flouted the traditional authority of the headmen or izinduna (royal councillors or regional rulers). (22) By assuming the right to try African legal cases, and to inflict punishment, the Native Department personnel and other Company officials further undermined the fabric of traditional authority. (23) This cultural challenge to the traditional African way of life was compounded by the new European technology. (24) Though initially
welcomed, Christianity and its missionaries came into direct conflict with the traditional religions and their African values. (25) The European impact, according to Ranger, was extensive and oppressive between 1890 and 96. The presence of the Europeans, further aggravated by drought, rinderpest and locust plagues, became intolerable to African people with a long proud political and religious tradition, and they determined to throw off the yoke imposed by alien rule. (26)

Hence, the rebellion that ensued was a planned, organized and coordinated movement led by officials of the Mwari cult with the objective of expelling the European settlers from the land. (27) Though the cult had hitherto been primarily concerned with fertility and the arts of peace, in March 1896 it emerged with a new revolutionary role and led both the Ndebele and some Shona groups of the south-western south Zambezian plateau to take up arms against the whites. Though the cult had been carefully regulated and sometimes suppressed by the Ndebele kings during the previous half century, after the 1893 conquest the leadership of the Ndebele was disunited and thrown into confusion. The Ndebele izinduna had attempted to recreate the kingship, but failed. The Mwari cult was able to bring both the Ndebele leadership and the tributary Shona peoples together in a united attack on the Europeans, through each of the Mwari shrines at Matonjeni, Njele and Ntaba zika Mambo. The priests at Matonjeni brought in the Belingwe Shona, and Mkwati, the priest at Ntaba zika Mambo, the Rozvi of the upper Shangani and Gwelo valleys. Thus, states Ranger, the
rising in Matabeleland "was a coalition of different, and even hostile, groups combined in the common interest of overthrowing the whites". (28)

The Europeans in Matabeleland survived the first impact of the rebellion and rallied their forces. With the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Plumer's Matabeleland Relief Force the initiative seemed to have passed to the Europeans, but the "counter-stroke", according to Ranger, was the planning, organization and coordination by Mkwati of a June rebellion in Mashonaland. (29) In April he sent Tshihwa, a Rozvi Mwari cult officer from Madwaleni in the Gwelo district, to contact Bonda, another Rozvi Mwari cult officer, who lived under the Rozvi ruler Masarurwa in the Charter district, and Mashayamombe, a ruler on the Umfuli river in the Hartley district. (30) Bonda and Mashayamombe's representatives went back with Tshihwa to Mkwati's headquarters at the old Rozvi centre at Taba zika Mambo in the Inyati district, this being before the 24 May. (31) There they were encouraged to spread the rising into the central Shona country. Tshihwa and Bonda stayed at Taba zika Mambo for the time being, but Mashayamombe's men went back to their ruler, who promptly — still in April — contacted Gumboreshumba, the medium of the Kaguvi shondoro spirit. (32)

Gumboreshumba, according to Ranger, played the pivotal role in organizing the June rebellion. He was related to the Chivero dynasty of the Hartley district and possibly to Pasipamire, the
great Chaminuka mhondoro spirit who had been killed in 1883 while coordinating Shona resistance to the Ndebele. (33) He was living at the time in the eastern Salisbury district in the territory of the Chikwaka ruler, near the Chinamhora, Rusiki and Nyandoro rulers. (34) His spirit, Kaguvi, had been of little importance before 1896, but under the pressure of the times it was to assume superiority over other mhondoro, such as the famous Nehanda of the Mazoe district. (35) The Kaguvi medium had been chosen by Mashayamombe "when there was a need for a man to link the planned rising in the west [Hartley and Charter] with the paramounts of central Mashonaland" and he fulfilled this role by moving to Mashayamombe's which became practically a "powerhouse of the Shona rising" from then onwards. (36)

It was at the end of May or the beginning of June 1896 that the Kaguvi medium was shown by Ranger to have summoned representatives of the central Shona paramounts to his new headquarters. It was a distinguished assembly, or rather, a series of assemblies. The central Shona chiefs sent trusted headmen or close relatives, in many cases their sons. At these meetings the progress of the Ndebele rising was related and assurance given of the support of Mkwati and his Ndebele allies. The Kaguvi medium urged the central Shona peoples to join the west in a movement against the whites. Plans for an outbreak as simultaneous as possible were laid. It was to wait until the arrival of Bonda and Tshihwa and their Ndebele warriors at Mashayamombe's. Once it had begun the news was to be carried to central Mashonaland by messengers and passed
there from hill to hill by signal fires. (37) These conferences held by the Kaguvi medium influenced the Hartley, Lomangundi, Mazoe, Umvukwes, Marandellas and Gutu districts - "a spread covering virtually the whole area of the Shona rebellion" - and were reinforced by most of the local mhondoro mediums, including Nehanda in Mazoe and Goronga in Lomagundi. (38)

Finally in June, Tshihwa, Bonda and the Ndebele arrived at Mashayamombe's kraal, and the signal for the rising was given. Tshihwa went south to raise the Selukwe district and Bonda went back to Charter. Ranger suggests that apart from personal contacts made by these two and others, with the rulers in these areas, the Charter district was the "nursery of the Mashona rebellion". (39)

Turning to how the rising spread, Ranger states, "we may legitimately draw upon some later evidence" from 1913-15, when "chain letter" messages of the Mwari cult were passed from village to village. (40) In the rest of the area of the rising, the signal was given by messengers from the mhondoro mediums and rulers, and by pre-arranged signal fires. (41) Once the rising had begun, Ranger points out, the religious organizers used their ability to react and replan their strategy in response to the changing military situation. (42) Bonda became a liaison officer for the headquarters at Mashayamombe's kraal: "we catch constant glimpses of him in the next few months
[after June] carrying messages, raiding loyalists and generally playing a most significant role. (43) "Mkwati, his alliance broken with the Ndebele and forced out of Matabeleland, arrived at Mashayamombe's headquarters with Wamponga, his spirit wife, determined to carry on the fight, and reinforced the Shona high command". (44)

Then, at the end of 1896, according to Ranger, a new strategy was planned. Not only had the Kaguvi medium persuaded the eastern Salisbury rulers not to surrender, but he and Mkwati prepared to move into that area - over the protests of Mashayamombe who objected to their departure - as part of their plan to revive the "Rozvi Empire". (45) This plan misfired on the arrest of the Rozvi Mambo elect - Mudzinganyama Jiri Mteveri, but it did lead to a strengthening of the powers of the religious authorities north - east of Salisbury. (46) The Kaguvi medium was able to appoint a new Seki ruler, and the medium of the Mtoko district achieved a "triumph of the pan - Shona teachings.....over the raiding policy of a chief" of the Budja, Gurupira. On the death of Gurupira they persuaded the Budja to turn against Assistant Native Commissioner Armstrong's patrol and forced it to flee to Umtali, almost starving to death in the process. (47) In the end, however, the rising was gradually worn down by the superior force of the Europeans.

In brief, Ranger's view of the organization of the rising focuses on the traditional religious authorities:
"This supra-tribal coordination was not achieved through the Paramounts alone.... We have to look once again to the traditional religious authorities of the Shona to understand the coordination of the rising above the Paramountcy level - and also to understand the commitment of the people to the rising at the Paramountcy level, a commitment so complete and even fanatical that it cannot be explained simply in terms of loyalty to the Paramount chief." (48)

Having provided an excellent analysis of the effects of the conflict, Ranger then links the "Rebellions" of 1896 - 7 to the nationalist movements of the early 1960's. (49) According to Ranger there is a continuity of resistance characterized by an anti-European unity and mass commitment which transcends traditional feuds and divisions among the African peoples. (50) Pursuing a millenarian interpretation, Ranger argues that the Kaguvi medium had started to build "a new society" that looked to the future, just as the Rozvi "Empire" had looked to the past. (51) He offered the fighters a war medicine that made them invulnerable, received war loot from many areas, and thus:

"brought thousands of Shona into membership of a new society, the true believers of the M'lena, with their own distinguishing symbols and their own promises of divine favour. This loyalty to a supra-tribal society helps to account for the fervour of the Shona rising." (52)

Thus Ranger's view of the African past, as linked by Great Zimbabwe, the Munhumatapa and Rozvi "Empires", the Mwari and nhondoro cults, blend the interpretation of the "Rebellions" into one cohesive explanation of the origins of a Zimbabwean nation. The "Rebellions" were seen as the first strong surge of
African nationalism to resist British colonialism, a desire which led in due course to the creation of the Zimbabwean African National Union, (Z.A.N.U.), and the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union, (Z.A.P.U.). (53)

The subsequent historiography of the events of 1896 - 7 has taken the form of a critique of Ranger's interpretation. This has been an unfortunate development in the sense that it has inhibited the exploration of alternative perspectives. A great deal of effort has been expended proving aspects of Ranger's thesis wrong, time which academics could perhaps have better employed in strengthening and researching aspects of their own interpretation.

The most notable critic is Julian Cobbing. In a doctoral dissertation of the University of Lancaster, 1976, entitled "The Ndebele under the Khumaloes, 1820 - 1896", this scholar presented a detailed analysis of the Ndebele social, economic and political system and the history of its formation. In the one chapter devoted to the "Rebellions", he presented a political alternative to Ranger's religious interpretation. (54)

He subsequently published an article, "The Absent Priesthood; another look at the Rhodesian risings of 1896 - 1897", in which he developed the political perspective into a devastating criticism of Ranger. (55)

Cobbing's assessment of Ndebele society is in conflict with
Ranger’s traditional portrayal of a military state. Cobbing writes:

"Whereas it is true that the kings had considerable power, the izinduna were officials or military commanders, having a predominantly political function and establishing strong genealogical roots in what were in reality outlying chieftaincies. Throughout the life of the independent state there was a tension between the considerable forces of centralization and the significant areas of decentralization."

Cobbing establishes that the settlements were smaller than formerly postulated, and that it is incorrect to describe all Ndebele settlements as "regiments" (amabutho). The amabutho—describing a levy of young soldiers—comprised only a fraction of Ndebele settlement at any given time, though they could evolve to produce imuzi (chieftaincies or villages).

Cobbing states:

"Whereas it is true that the Ndebele male valued the martial role, and that the kingdom was organized upon a scale and had a military potential which differentiated it starkly from neighbouring African political units, the army was subordinate to the state, and the state is best described in political and socio-economic rather than military terms."

The basic economic activity of the Ndebele was grain cultivation, and Ndebele religion was centred on amadhlozi (ancestor spirit) worship and the Nguni high-God, Nkulunkulu, rather than on the Mwari cult which was treated with reserve. Around the central state there existed tributary states in which peoples lived on good terms with the Ndebele in
precisely those areas claimed to have been scorched earth belts. Ndebele raiding was bloody but seldom indiscriminate: "they were punitive devices undertaken to protect an empire built up with great tenacity by Mzilikatzi".

Under Mzilikatzi's successor, Lobengula, this state is shown to have been gradually encircled by an alliance of European and African enemies. Lobengula was consistent in his attempts to maintain Ndebele independence. He rejected the Rudd concession unequivocally and appealed in 1890-1 to anti-British interests for diplomatic aid. Cobbing maintains that the 1893 war was the fulfilment of Rhodes's schemes, as Matabeleland, not Mashonaland, had always been the objective. When this war was fought it did not end in the total defeat of the Ndebele nation. Indeed, according to Cobbing, "the Ndebele state was in much better shape in early 1896" than was previously supposed. The state had not been "demilitarised" and the Company was "unable in reality to control the Ndebele beyond Bulawayo and the main roads".

The izinduna were local leaders with deep genealogical roots in the "provinces", therefore, collectively,

"the izinduna were perfectly capable of administering their people through an interregnum," as their predecessors had done between the death of Mzilikatzi in 1868 and the "crowning" of Lobengula in 1870. Cobbing's view is that the Ndebele had only been shaken in
1893, and the Ndebele state had not expired. The actions of the settlers, who seized Ndebele cattle and labour indiscriminately, created tensions which made the continuation of the war inevitable. (67) Cobbing hints that the 1893 war had never properly ended, and the rebellion of 1896 was "perhaps the real war so many felt had not taken place in 1893". (68)

Cobbing's thesis is that the Ndebele began the war united "behind a "monarch" - elect, Nyamanda, one of the elder sons of Lobengula." (69) Cobbing maintains that despite contrary Company propaganda, Nyamanda was "a perfectly acceptable heir", known to be "military precocious, close to Lozengezi, and anti-white". (70) Though, Cobbing admits, "practically nothing is known of internal Ndebele political developments in 1894 - 5", Nyamanda's emergence as a candidate is shown to be well documented". (71) He was involved in the attack on Mac Farlane's column at Fonseca's farm (5 - 7 April), and thereafter involved in a civil war with the "loyalist" Gampu Sithole of Amagogo. (72) In June, according to Cobbing, Nyamanda was accepted as King by the fighting men of the north and east. Three weeks later Nyamanda was enthusiastically recognised by the Matopos chiefs in the south as well. (73) Nyamanda was then joined on the Bembezi by Lobengula's formidable widow, Lozengezi, about a dozen of Lobengula's queens, Tshakalisa, his full brother, Karl Khumalo, Lobengula's one time "secretary", and by loyal chiefs, such as the brothers Manyeu and Mpotshwana Ndweni of Nyamandhlovu and Madhliva of Mahlahehle. (74) Cobbing argues that it was from their headquarters on the Bembezi, that
the royal family influenced the fighting in almost every interstice of the state. (75) Through marriage it is established that all the rebel leaders were connected to the royal family and Nyamanda. Cobbing’s thesis is that it;

"was this royalised caste who, together with the lesser chiefs, instigated the first murders, arranged for the distribution of ammunition, organized the supply routes, and sent the women and children into the hills at the time of the outbreak. There is no need to look for hidden influences". (76)

As to the Shona peoples who rose in March, they, according to Cobbing, did so on the basis of alliances forged during the previous half century as tributaries of the Ndebele state. (77) Cobbing admits that our knowledge of the creation and organization of the Ndebele tributary system is scant, but:

"It most certainly existed however, and only its existence can explain the motley collection of tribes - Ndebele, Rozvi, Mhari, Dumbuseya, Lembə, Venda, Borwa, Kalanga and others - who came into the rising in the last days of March 1896". (78)

Turning to the June rebellion in Mashonaland, Cobbing states that the Shona peoples;

"had analogous political and economic grievances to the Ndebele, (and) rose in response to the opportunity provided by European difficulties in Matabeleland". (79)

The battle of Nxa on 22 May was possibly viewed as a victory,
and the movement of the Europeans from Salisbury to fight in Matabeleland may have given the impression that Mashonaland was defenseless. The decision to rebel was inspired in some cases by Ndebele units or people from Ndebele tributary areas, but is largely to be explained within the context of local politics. Cobbing considers these factors to account adequately for the timing of the Shona rebellion in June.(80)

Perhaps the most important contribution of Cobbing is to show that there was no religious coordinating factor. The evidence, according to Cobbing, does not link the Mwari cult with the Rozvi mambos in the pre-Nguni past, and the alleged shift from the Rozvi courts to the Matopos cannot be substantiated.(81) The founders of the Mwari shrines at Njele, Dube, Manyengegeweni and Wirriani are shown to have been of Venda origin, and to have only been established in the nineteenth century. As such, it is argued, the priests were unlikely to have appealed to the Rozvi past.(82) Cobbing examines the history of each Mwari shrine in 1896 and concludes;

"with one of the important priests murdered by the Ndebele, two more in the Transvaal (one in flight from the Ndebele) and no mention of the priest at Njele – though the last incumbent had also been killed by the Ndebele – the cult was virtually hors de combat in 1896".(83)

Returning to the personage of Mkwati, Cobbing doubts that a Leya captive from Ujinga, with no link with the Rozvi, could
have played the role attributed by Ranger. Cobbing suggests that as an influential person in the local context, Mkwati was probably a wossana or cult messenger. (84) Further, there is no evidence, Cobbing states, that Ntabazika Mambo was ever a Mwari cult shrine. The hills were not the command centre of the northern rising, but were probably a stronghold for women, cattle and corn seeking refuge from the conflict. (85) According to Cobbing, the Mafus of Godhlwayo committed the first murders and there is no evidence to suggest that they were under the influence of the Mwari cult. (86) The failure to close the Mangwe road, Cobbing states, was not due to Mwari injunctions, but to the collaboration of Gampu Sithole and Faku Ndweni. (87) Cobbing concludes that Ranger's thesis of a fanatical alliance between the Mwari cult and the Ndebele aristocracy in the first few months, which is then followed by an abrupt break in relations, is an unsatisfactory explanation, and the "divorce" which Imperial and Company officials reported in July 1896 was merely the result of their recognition of the true state of affairs. (88)

Cobbing also challenges Ranger's contention that it was the Mwari cult which was responsible for bringing the Shona into the rebellion in June as a response to the military defeat facing the Ndebele. Cobbing argues that it was rather the apparent success of the Ndebele which encouraged the Shona, who had similar grievances to the Ndebele, to rebel. (89) Cobbing claims that only thirty per cent of the Shona rose, all of whom had been "exposed to severe European pressures".
Cobbing also alleges that in areas where the Shona were less affected, such as to the south of Victoria, and in the east along the Sabi valley, they were inactive or neutral. Cobbing points out that Gutu, Chirumanzu, Chivi and Matibi, though subject to European pressure, decided to collaborate. This is significant since they lived in that area of the southern Shona country where the influence of the Mwari cult is thought to have spread by the 1890's. Turning to Mashayamombe, Cobbing considers the importance Ranger attributes to the chief to be unfounded as there is no evidence to show that the Gutu chiefdom was obeying cult orders. Cobbing states that the Mwari cult's influence did not extend into central and north-eastern Mashonaland, and the influence of the mhandoros was not subject to that of the Mwari cult. Further, the contribution made by such mhandoros such as Kaguvi has been overestimated and their influence was purely local. The mhandoros merely sanctified political decisions; this "process was the antithesis of fanaticism". Cobbing maintains that there was never an attempt to revive the Rozvi "Empire", the mamboship never having been extinguished. The election of Chikohore Chingombe in December 1896 had no effect on the Rozvi groups, who had already committed or failed to commit themselves to the rising. Therefore, Cobbing writes, the "last link in Ranger's chain, from the Rozvi empire at Great Zimbabwe, through the preservation of the imperial idea by the Mwari cult, to the Rozvi policies of the 1896 priests and Mkwati's recreation of the mamboship, is thus broken."
In short, the Mwari cult’s dominance in the explanation of the Rhodesian risings is dismissed by Cobbing as "essentially the history of a myth". The first telegrams spoke of Mlimos and witchdoctors, an explanation confirming European assumptions about African society which caught the imagination of the press.

"The myth quickly passed into Company based documents of the rising, and from there into more serious triatises. Ranger developed it further though for very different purposes against the background of Zimbabwean nationalism in the early 1960’s". (98)

Ranger’s pursuance of the false trail of millenarianism "accentuated the myth of Mwari cult instigation behind the risings". Commenting on Ranger’s link between the "Rebellions" and modern African nationalism, Cobbing writes, "the breaking up of the Ndebele state in 1896 and the crushing of the Shona (it was defeat not resistance that was to bring them together) was one of the preconditions for the development of a more sophisticated and tribe - transcending reaction by Africans to white rule in Rhodesia." (99) Finally, objecting to the confines within which Zimbabwean history has been forced, Cobbing considers that perhaps;

"the basic error not only of Ranger, but of a school of writers on Rhodesian history has been to imagine a common fountain to African history between the Zambezi and Limpopo. Great Zimbabwe, the Munhumatapa and Rozvi empires, the Mwari cult, and the mhondoro cults, were all interlocked into one cohesive explanation of the origins of a Zimbabwean nation". (100)
Cobbing suggests that attention be paid to the diversity of nineteenth century themes, in contrast to the seeking of an understanding of the origins of modern revolutionary nationalism. (101)

The most important scholar in the field of pre-colonial Shona history, a contemporary of Cobbing, is David Beach. Beach's various writings collectively challenge many of the myths which prevail in colonial and nationalist historiography. (102) Though initially influenced by Ranger, Beach has undergone a maturing of perspective of late which has produced a strong reaction against the interpretation found in Revolt. Beach has produced several articles and notes, but for an understanding of the development of his perspective his three most important writings are an article, "The politics of collaboration (South Mashonaland 1896 - 7)", his doctoral thesis, "The rising in South - Western Mashonaland 1896 - 7", and the revisionist article, "Chimurenga"; The Shona risings of 1896 - 97. (103)

Beach is problematical to summarise since a distinctive characteristic of his work is his inability to see the wood for the trees. The studies of the "Rebellions" are important for their detailed and dedicated research, though less for the cloudy conclusions derived therefrom. Initially influenced by and respectful of Ranger, Beach often suppressed his own conclusions when the research conflicted with premises derived
from Revolt. Subsequently, when it comes to the parting of the ways, Beach treads both paths, presenting research and interpretation which are clearly incompatible. Further, while sympathetic to the "radicalism" attributed to African nationalism, Beach's own academic perspective is conservative. Though his research often provides the stimulus for a revolutionary change of perspective, Beach shies away from the acceptance of such a challenge. Often verging on a break-through, Beach's caution prevents him from trusting his own judgement. Finally, Beach tends to obscure the thrust of his argument with "filler" material. Beach's thought is reflected in his writings; both lack discipline, direction and clarity, and need to be more precise, controlled and confident. If the meticulous research were matched by equal clarity of thought and articulation, there would be little need for a revision.

It is necessary to examine Beach's seminar paper, "The politics of collaboration (South Mashonaland 1896 - 7)" under headings which clarify his argument. Firstly, the question of perspective. Beach accepts without question the tenets of Ranger's thesis. There is no question of the role played by the Mwari and mhondoro cults. Beach views the "Rebellions" as a national conflict, a war between black and white. The occurrence of such a war is related directly to the effects of European penetration, 1890 to 1896. From an assumption of national black resistance to white colonization the question of "collaboration" is examined. This term is implicitly political,
suggesting that such "collaborators" were traitors. Clearly influenced by the events of the time in which he was writing, a lack of historical insight is reflected in this unawareness of change. (108)

Turning to the question of the European impact from 1890 to 1896, Beach writes, "This rising has been conclusively related to European penetration and certainly no rebellion occurred in unpenetrated areas". (109) Beach makes the important point that European pressure in the collaborator areas was as intense as in the rebel areas. (110) After outlining the extent of European impact, Beach would seem to accept that their physical impact was minimal; only a few sand roads ran between scattered towns, farms and mines. Farming was a factor in terms of land deprivation post - 1896, but not before. Beach considers the extraction of forced labour as the only major grievance. (111) The Field Cornet system had a minimal effect, despite the buccaneering behaviour of some appointees, such as at Tokwa. (112) The significance of Christianity and missionary endeavour is regarded as minimal. (113) However, the creation of the Native Department in 1894-5, is seen to herald an intensification of European pressure. The collection of hut tax is considered by Beach to have been a major imposition upon the Shona. The Assistant Native Commissioners also interfered in African politics, and administered their own justice, so undermining the powers of the traditional authorities. (114) Therefore, though the number of Europeans in Mashonaland
following on the 1893 war decreased, the pressure on the Shona increased. (115) These pressures provoked the subsequent "Rebellion".

Since the "collaborators" and "neutral" Shona suffered the same pressures as the "rebels", Beach then attempts to account for their unpatriotic decision to assist in the crushing of the "national" rebellion. Beach attempts to explain the phenomenon of "collaboration" with reference to the historical experience which formed Shona society. Beach maintains that the "collaborators" were influenced by factors such as the emergence of conflicting small polities following on the decline of the Rozvi "Empire", the Shona laws of succession which encouraged internal dissension, the hatred which had developed due to Ndebele raiding, and the relationship which had developed between certain African polities and the Europeans between 1890 and 1896. (116) The thrust of Beach's assessment is that some Shona communities "collaborated" due to established divisions and self-interest.

Beach identifies four categories of "collaborator". The first was that of a chief who mobilized his war host and fought along - side the Europeans as allies, even though there may have been an Assistant Native Commissioner in command. The decision to fight was the chief's, and the European was basically a liaison officer. Chirumanzu and Matibi are seen to fall into this category. (117) The second category was a chief who permitted an Assistant Native Commissioner to raise forces from
his people, but at that official's initiative. Gutu, Ranga, Kwenda, Chibi and perhaps Matibi, if not included in the first, fall into this category. (118) The third type of "collaborator" was he who, before the military victory was apparent, joined the Europeans, providing scouts, messengers, information and supplies, but not a field force. Chibi, Kwenda, Gunguwo and Meburatsi are seen to fall in this category. (119) Finally, though Beach suggests, they were possibly "neutrals", there were the individuals and clan houses who opted out of the fighting, and aligned themselves with the Europeans. Mutekedza's brother and Hokanya's section of the Dzete are seen to fall into this category. (120) Beach concludes that the "fact that some chiefs belonged to two categories shows the delicate shading of commitment that ranged from resistance through neutrality to collaboration". (121)

The military effect of the "collaborators", Beach considers was "useful, but [only in one instance] vital". (122) Their main value lay in "the decision to collaborate" since "a collaborationist polity, whether active or not, and however much it achieved against the rebels, was a major factor in keeping its neighbours neutral". (123) Beach's theory is that the collaborationist polities stemmed the tide of rebellion, and if "every polity had risen in 1896 the outcome might have been very different and that "neutrals" existed is partly due to the collaborators". (124) Finally, though the "collaborators" were to enjoy "European favour for a while,
there was from the beginning an underlying suspicion of them by certain elements in European society, that in many cases became apparent in government policy". (125)

One is left to conclude that though influenced by Ranger, the value of this paper lies in the details of local history. By seeking to give a localized perspective of the conflict it steered away from the grand sweep of Revolt and paved the way for an important challenge to Ranger's thesis.

Preliminary to the full challenge was Beach's doctoral thesis, "The rising in South-Western Mashonaland, 1896-7". This argued in essence that the 1896 Shona rising was a response to European pressures that owed much to the Shona past in general and to certain events of 1889 and 1893 in particular. (126) The slightly romantic theme of this thesis is the search for a factor which could provide the base for a sense of Shona national unity. Its absence is seen to account for the success of the Nguni invasions and the destruction of the Rozvi "Empire". (127) As the pressure of Ndebele raiding increased, though some Shona communities "collaborated", others began to look for ways to resist. (128) The Shona, according to Beach, unable to find a unifying factor in their own history and culture, looked with interest to the arrival of newcomers from the 1880's onwards. The missionaries and Afrikaner farmer-hunters were welcomed, but to the disappointment of the Shona, they failed to have a significant effect on the political balance of power. (129) Beach, however, regards the attempts of
Portuguese agents to sign treaties with Shona rulers as a "considerable political development". The Portuguese were attempting to gain international support for their claim to the northern half of the country in the face of British expansion. The Portuguese gave the Shona signatories of the treaties flags and guns in 1889. Though the "gun frontier" created by the Shona in the latter half of the century kept a rough equilibrium between them and the Ndebele, the acquisition of the Portuguese guns now, according to Beach, turned the balance for the first time in favour of the Shona. The arrival of the British in 1890, however, meant that these guns were never used against the Ndebele. Though some Shona "collaborated" in the 1893 war with the Europeans, they did so in the pursuance of their own interests. They found after the war, however, that "with the Company's occupation of the Ndebele country, they had exchanged one set of masters for another". After 1893 European pressures increased on the Shona as the search for gold began in renewed earnest and land was expropriated for farming. The newly created Native Department rounded up the cattle raided from the Ndebele, seized labour and corn to pay for a hut tax and undermined traditional authority. Beach argues that the situation was an essentially familiar one, and;

"that the central Shona who rose in June 1896 drew upon their experience of 1889, when they had known for the first time a feeling that they were all armed against the Ndebele, and applied it in order to rise against the Europeans."
According to Beach, both risings reflected the various Shona responses to the establishment of the Ndebele state earlier in the century. (135) Beach argues that the risings failed partly due "to the collaborators, who prevented the rising from covering the whole Shona country", but also to the superior military skills of the Europeans. (136)

The value of Beach's doctoral thesis does not lie in its romantic interpretation of Shona history, but in the factual details of local history and the mild questioning of Ranger's thesis. Beach writes that on the question of the importance of religious factors, relative to political factors in the 1896-7 rising, new evidence suggests a slightly different emphasis to that of Ranger. (137) The importance of the religious factor is slightly lessened with regard to the Kaguvi spirit, and new evidence puts the emphasis on the political factor. In Belingwe and Selukwe for example, the structures of the Ndebele state were responsible for organizing the rebellion. The Mwari cult in these two districts was important but the political factor was stronger. (138) Beach shows that there is no evidence for Mwari cult activity outside the Hartley and Charter districts, and the "chain letter" messages were only part of a medical ritual. (139) Beach makes an important contribution when he shows that a split existed between the Kaguvi medium, Gumboreshumba, and Mashayamombe before the "Rebellion". Further, it is shown that Kaguvi's authority was not accepted unquestionably, and his influence was limited to the Chivero chiefdom and the Shawasha country. These two districts lay on
either side of Salisbury and led the Europeans to exaggerate his influence. The Nehanda medium's authority, Beach shows also to have been regional, limited to the Mazoe valley. (140) Beach denies that Kaguvi postulated a millenarian "new society" and shows that the promises made were in accordance with accepted traditional practice. (141) Beach's critique of Ranger is deferential, but the process of questioning the premises derived from Revolt had begun.

The real challenge to Ranger's thesis came in his latest analysis, "Chimurenga"; The Shona risings of 1896 - 97. Beach questioned for the first time, the "night of the long knives" theory which assumed that "in the politically divided Shona countryside a preconceived and coordinated plan of resistance had been agreed upon by the people and kept secret for weeks or months until the signal came for an assault upon the Europeans". (142) Beach's gradual reconsideration of the evidence on 1896 led him to conclude that:

"all analysis of the risings made since 1896, including my own thesis were wrong on two important points; the rising was not "simultaneous" or "almost simultaneous" even within the limitations of Shona communications and technology, and it had not been predetermined and coordinated in the way that had been previously assumed. Consequently, the need for a "religious" or "political" overall organization falls away, and our understanding of the social and political situation among the central Shona in 1896 must undergo a sharp revision". (143)

As a prelude to examining the conflict, Beach describes the
Shona economy, outlines the impact of the Europeans, and explains the concept of "peripheral violence". (144) From this perspective Beach examines the main hondo (war) of June 1896. In Beach's opinion the central Shona country was very tense, and the various Shona chiefdoms had independently of each other been contemplating a hondo. Beach writes that it;

"seems highly likely that even if there had not been interaction between the Ndebele rising and the Shona of Hartley and Charter, in such an environment a major rising would have broken out somewhere else and spread producing a very different pattern of resistance but a similar effect." (145)

Beach then examines the sequence of events which brought the central Shona into the hondo. Beach focuses on Mashayamombe and outlines the evidence to show that "there was no preconcerted planning". (146) There was according to Beach, no joint headquarters, and the evidence shows in every district that the people had not known of a rising more than a day in advance. Beach denies that there were any conferences at the Kaguvi medium's village before the rising. The evidence for these meetings derived from Ranger's guesswork and misreading of the documents. (147) Beach states that whatever role Mkwati played in the Ndebele rising, "he was clearly not the supremo that Ranger thought", though it is "true that he had been an important local religious figure in the Inyati Ujinga area". (148) Beach then turns to explain how if the rising was not preconcerted beforehand, did it spread. Beach's answer is that;
"since it was nowhere near simultaneous, pre-planning was not needed and the different Shona dynasties simply joined the rising, opposed it or stayed neutral as the news reached them". (149)

As is evident, Beach's revisionist perspective is sharply critical of Ranger. Beach concludes that the risings in Mashonaland were neither pre-planned nor simultaneous, "though it may very well have been true of the Ndebele". (150) Beach points out that the people did not know of a rebellion until relatively late and initial violence at Mashayamombe was sanctioned by Dekwende, medium of the Choshota shondoro, rather than Kaguvi. The split between Mashayamombe and Kaguvi which had occurred before the rising is emphasized, as is the essentially regional influence of the medium. "In short, the Kaguvi medium was not a supreme coordinating figure in the Shona rising, but since the Shona evidently did not need such a figure in 1896, this is of less significance than it might have been". (151) Beach states clearly that there was no attempt to revive the Rozvi "Empire" or to create a "new order". The risings were traditional affairs with strong local influences. The Shona remained uncoordinated once the fighting had begun, and the resistance was that of a local war fought by each ruler in his territory. (152)

With the breakdown of the Rangerian model of a tightly knit Ndebele - Shona religious high command organizing a planned, simultaneous rising, Beach notes that the future of the
historiography of the risings lies in a portrait of complex personalities and interest groups in each area reacting to events, opportunities and pressures according to their conception of their own territory as an independent, undefeated entity, rather than as part of a larger organization that solved the "problem of scale". Beach writes that:

"In short, the history of the 1896 central Shona chimurenga promises to be the history of many local zvimurenga with their similarities, differences and connections - or lack of them".(153)

However, the question as to the primacy of political or religious influence has continued to dominate the historiography. Ranger's interpretation has been supported by writers such as Stanlake Samkange, Lawrence Vambe and Aneneas Chigwedere.(154) Yet, as Ranger admits:

"Often in the past ten years I have read a book which seemed at first sight to confirm the argument about religious leadership in 1896 only to realise that the book itself was drawing heavily upon the interpretation set out in Revolt".(155)

There have been detractors of the religious theory, such as the anthropologist Richard Werbner, who carried out field work on the Mwari cult among the Kalanga.(156) An interesting attack on Ranger has come from Madziwanyike Tsomondo, who contends that it is a mistake to exclusively associate "Shona resistance with the collective liberation war of 1896 - 7". He argues that the Shona had never accepted colonial rule and that the war should
not be characterized as a "revolt" or "rebelleion" because to do so "implies that the Shona had submitted to alien rule.....". Ranger’s *Revolt* has remained, however, a powerful influence on the popular conception of the events of 1896 - 7, and has stimulated a great deal of research into African resistance to colonial rule. It is the revisionist work of Cobbing and Beach that has generally been accepted by subsequent academic writers, including Ranger himself.

This thesis is not concerned with the historiographical debate as to the primacy of religious or political factors in organizing or influencing the initiation of a "Rebellion". Indeed, this thesis intends to show that the very concept of "Rebellion", involving as it does a black - white polarity perspective, distorts an understanding of the complex nature of the events of 1896 - 7. Briefly, the intention of this study is to reassess the impact of the European population on the African peoples between 1890 and 1896. Having shown that the white impact on African society was minimal, and the pressure exerted not of sufficient intensity to provoke a conscious determination to rebel, the question of "Rebellion" will then be examined. By making the events of 1896 - 7 the central focus of this thesis it is intended to establish that there was no planned or organized "Rebellion" in Matabeleland. A close examination of the local details of the conflict will make evident why the Ndebele did not conform to European concepts of military strategy. This makes this thesis primarily concerned with an examination of the process of escalated violence in
1896 – 7. Such an examination involves in turn an understanding of a variety of European and African perspectives, and with that understanding the distinction between a March "Rebellion" in Matabeleland and a June "Rebellion" in Mashonaland falls away, because such a distinction owes its origin not only to European geographical concepts and the military operations subsequently undertaken, but primarily to a white misconception of the nature of the events of 1896 – 7 and their position in the country they claimed as Southern Rhodesia. From this perspective, the escalation of violence in 1896 can not be interpreted as a nationalistic African rejection of European colonialism. Indeed, the escalation of violence in the early phase before the European war of conquest was dominated by a series of conflicts among various African peoples. This thesis, therefore, underlines the injunction of Marc Bloch that "causes are not to be assumed. They are to be looked for".(160) Therein lies the rationale for a close examination of the nature of the events of 1896 – 7, however complex.
Footnotes: Chapter One


(2) The events of 1896 – 7 exerted a powerful influence on subsequent Rhodesian-Zimbabwean history. In the close relationship which has developed between culture and politics, the events of 1896 – 7 have provided the inspiration for a number of myths exploited by both the European and African people. Rhodesian-Zimbabwean literature has been particularly influenced by the experience of the "Rebellions". A.J. Chennell’s doctoral thesis, "Settler myths and the Southern Rhodesian novel" (University of Zimbabwe, 1982), contains a useful discussion of these influences. The events of 1896 – 7 have also inspired a great deal of painting and sculptural works. The conflict has also been recorded in a number of cinematographic and radio productions.


(4) The assumption of a black-white conflict by previous historians predetermined their approach to the conflict, their methodology and subsequently their interpretation. In part, this was due to their awareness of the conflict which raged in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe at their time of writing and which influenced their historical perspective.


(9) Ranger, Revolt, Preface p.9.

(10) Ranger, Revolt, Preface p.9.


(12) Ranger, Revolt, Preface pp.x, 9.


(14) Ranger, Revolt, Preface pp.x, 26–33.

(15) Ranger, Revolt, Preface p.x.


(17) Ranger, Revolt, pp.83–84, 87, 100–104.


(19) Ranger, Revolt, pp.90–98, 121–123.

(20) Ranger, Revolt, pp.77, 87–90, 105–114.

(21) Ranger, Revolt, pp.69–73, 81.

(22) Ranger, Revolt, pp.67, 75–76, 118, 122.
(36) Ranger, Revolt, pp.218, 282.

(37) Ranger, Revolt, pp.219 -220.

(38) Ranger, Revolt, p.222.

(39) Ranger, Revolt, pp.202 - 205. This echoes the opinion of H.M. Hole, Reports, p. 54.

(40) Ranger, Revolt, p.204.

(41) Ranger, Revolt, p.220.

(42) Ranger, Revolt, p.224.

(43) Ranger, Revolt, p.205.

(44) Ranger, Revolt, p.283.

(45) Ranger, Revolt, pp.289 - 290.

(46) Ranger, Revolt, pp.290 - 292.

(47) Ranger, Revolt, p.304.

(48) Ranger, Revolt, p.200.

(49) Ranger, Revolt, Chapter 10, "The Risings in African Political History", pp.344 - 386.

(50) Ranger, Revolt, p.355.

(51) Ranger, Revolt, p.353.

(52) Ranger, Revolt, p.225.

(53) Ranger, Revolt, pp.344 - 386.


(61) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.9, Chapter 8.
(66) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.64.
(76) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.68.
(77) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.68.
(82) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.73.
(83) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.75.
(84) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.76.
(85) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.76.
(86) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.68.
(89) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.78.
(90) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.77. This premise conflicts with the evidence upon which this revisionist study is based.
(91) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.77.
(92) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.78.
(93) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.79.
(94) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.79.
(95) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.79.
(96) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.80. Cobbing derives this point from Beach who shows that Chinkohore Chingombe not Mudzinganyama Jiri Mteveni, as stated by Ranger, was elected Mambo.
(98) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.82.
(100) Cobbing, "Absent Priesthood", p.83.
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(104) Beach presents the evidence to show that Chaka’s "rebellion" should rather be viewed as a conflict between Chaka and Chirumanzu. Beach’s interpretation and the presented evidence in this instance are clearly in conflict.

(105) Beach provides the evidence relating to the first murders and raids undertaken by Mashayamombe which should have prompted a radical change of perspective. Beach, however, attempted to reconcile this evidence with the interpretive perspective derived from Ranger.

(106) Beach’s dissertation is at certain points clearly confused and the interpretation marred by "purple passages". The tendency to go off on a tangent is evident in "Chimurenga", where a discussion of the Shona economy and "peripheral violence" detracts from the central thrust of the analysis.


(110) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.2.


(112) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", pp.11, 17.

(113) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.11.


(115) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.16.

(116) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", pp.2, 33. The fourth reason is not stated by Beach, but emerges through his analysis.


(119) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", pp.29, 33.

(120) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", pp.29, 33.

(121) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.33.

(122) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.32.

(123) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.32.

(124) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.32.
(126) Beach, "The Rising", pp.2 - 3.
(127) Beach, "The Rising", pp.2, 158.
(129) Beach, "The Rising", pp.2, 158 - 166.
(130) Beach, "The Rising", pp.174 - 197.
(135) Beach, "The Rising", pp.345, 425.
(136) Beach, "The Rising", p.394.
(139) Beach, "The Rising", pp.353, 356 - 357.
(140) Beach, "The Rising", pp.363 - 368.
(142) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.395.
(143) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.401.
(144) Beach, "Chimurenga", pp.401 - 406.
(145) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.405.
(146) Beach, "Chimurenga", pp.406 - 411.
(147) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.409.
(149) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.410.
(150) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.418.
(151) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.414.

(152) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.416.

(153) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.419.


(155) Ranger, Revolt, Preface, p.xiv.


(159) Ranger, Revolt, Preface, pp.xii - xiii.

Chapter Two

The question as to "causes" of Rebellion

The period between the arrival of the Pioneer column at Harare Hill on 12 September 1890 and the escalation of violence in late March 1896, has provided historians looking for a clear and precise explanation, with a definite series of "causes" for the "Rebellion". The extent of the European impact on African society during the period September 1890 to March 1896 is a central issue for re-examination. That European pressure was very great has usually been assumed and hence often exaggerated.

The origin of this assumption can be traced to the propagandists of the British South Africa Company, who in their eagerness to attract financial and political support for their Central African enterprise, overstated the power and influence as well as the degree of development undertaken by the Company during this period. (1). Opponents of the Company also exaggerated its influence to castigate it for alleged abuses. Radical politicians in Britain, such as Henry Labouchere, the editor of Truth, as well as settlers aggrieved by Company policy condemned its administration. (2) The Company earned itself much hatred and envy; it was regarded as a threat and hindrance to the advancement of other interests, and to
strengthen their claims they exaggerated the impact it had.

The next step in the development of the traditional presentation of "causes" occurred in the wake of 1896 when rational explanations were sought, "causes" were needed - and under the pressure of public opinion - duly found, or to be more accurate - assumed. (3) The settler campaign for self - rule, culminating in the attainment of responsible government in 1923, furthered the need to indict the Company for malpractice during the formative period of its administration. These "causes", consisting as they do of a catalogue of abuses, were subsequently drawn upon by politicians and historians to explain the birth of conflict in Rhodesian - Zimbabwean society. The acceptance of these "causes" was not entirely the fruit of careful research; in many cases it reflected an absence of vigorous and independent thought, but too often historians have been indifferent to a critical questioning of conventional wisdom. (4)

More particularly, historians have accepted rather unquestioningly the Eurocentric perspective which sees the settlers as people who sought to challenge traditional African society. In seizing control they caused the then subject peoples to experience widespread oppression. The yoke they imposed is seen as sufficient "cause" to stimulate a decision to rebel. That classic conception of cause and effect underlies Ranger's analysis. Other historians have seen the European
challenge to African society to have been resisted from the outset. The Europeans did not succeed in subjugating the African people, but the challenge is seen to account for continued resistance leading to a conflict according to a black – white racial polarity. Cobbing and Beach adopt this latter position of cause related events in their more sophisticated analysis. Both conceptions glance back to explain 1896. That, and their Eurocentric squint at the “risings”, call for a study with a radical change of perspective.(5)

Benefitting from the revisionist studies of the English civil war, in particular the questioning of "causes" found in B. Coward's, *The Stuart Age*, this chapter will be concerned with showing that from a statistical analysis and consideration of the documentary evidence, the European impact in the period 1890 to 1896 was minimal.(6) The explanation of the nature of the events of 1896 – 7 must therefore be sought in the details of the conflict which are not to be assumed to lie in the European impact. A careful examination of the "causes" will help to show that the "Rebellions" were very true to life – complex, subtle and dynamic. To weigh the European impact it is essential to examine the demographic statistics.

On the basis of an assessment of various demographic figures, and having taken into account fluctuations in population, it is calculated that the European population at the beginning of 1896 was under 6000 persons, of which one third were women and children.(7) Roughly 2500 people lived in Matabeleland, of
which over 1500 were in Bulawayo or its immediate environs. (8) By far the majority of Europeans were involved in urban occupations unlikely to take them into the rural areas where their lives would intrude on those of the rurally based African population. (9) Numerous other factors reduce the likelihood of intensive European pressure on the African peoples. Many settlers were of an advanced or alternatively tender age. Factors such as fever, illness or accident considerably thinned the ranks of the able; and a hostile environment, transport and communication difficulties further dissuaded contact with the African peoples. (10) The white population, other than in Bulawayo, tended to concentrate itself, in small areas, in settlements such as Fort Victoria, Gwelo, Salisbury and Umtali. A breakdown of the white population in March 1895 shows that 250 people lived on 150 farms in Matabeleland, nearly 300 on farms in Melsetter, and the rural population of northern Mashonaland was about 233, many of whom were miners, prospectors and storekeepers. (11)

On the basis of this evidence it can therefore be deduced that the European population was a civilian orientated society; it was not a mobilized military force intent on subjugating the African population. (12) It was spread very thinly on the ground and was extremely vulnerable. In short, the impact upon the African people by this small alien presence is unlikely to have been extensive, and this can be substantiated when the pattern of white society is tested against the available evidence as to
its activities, particularly mining, farming and settlement.

Mining deserves special consideration, for this was the activity which was intended to be the backbone of the new El Dorado and hence would have exerted the greatest pressure on the local population.

Its beginnings go back to the fifteen mining claims granted to the Pioneers in 1890, each of which was 150 by 400 feet in size. Thereafter anyone was allowed to peg ten claims at random, the only obligation being a shilling for the prospector’s license and the sinking of a sixty foot shaft, within four months. (13) On being disbanded, the Pioneers scrambled for the gold fields. Some made for the Mazoe or Lomangundi, but the favourite field was the Umfuli. Prospecting needed no skill and was based on the belief that all one needed to do was locate "ancient workings", to which one could be guided by local inhabitants for a small reward. Once an ancient mine had been located, the prospector got to work with the crudest of tools. (14)

As uncertainty developed about the extent and depth of the reefs many prospectors became disillusioned. Though no man could peg more than ten, or if a Pioneer, fifteen claims, the claims were negotiable. Limitations on the prospector did not apply to the company promoter. In many cases groups of individuals formed syndicates and pooled their claims. In others, individuals were bought out by companies. The Mining
Regulations, promulgated by the Company soon after the arrival of the Pioneer column, were intended to deal with this situation. They included the provision that the Company must have a half share in every mining company formed. This rule, like most others, was enforced in a haphazard and irregular way. The process of amalgamation and absorption began early and advanced rapidly. Frank Johnson, the leader of the Pioneer column, began buying claim rights for 100 each from the moment the Pioneers were disbanded. Sir John Willoughby and other promoters did the same. The sellers, being without cash, often had no option and many of them left the country. (15)

Ten mining companies, with a total nominal capital of 121000, in which the Company had a share interest, were listed by the registrar of claims in 1895. There were another 187 companies and syndicates of whose formation the Chartered Company had been informed. These 197 companies owned all the mines named as the "principal properties" or "more important properties" in the mining commissioner's reports. (16) These concentrations theoretically made for more efficient mining methods. Johnson was the first to bring a three stamp mill into Mashonaland for use in one of the Mazoe mines. This was followed by a five stamp mill for a mine at Hartley Hills. (17) During 1892 a few more mills were imported and installed. However, by the beginning of 1894, the Mazoe, Umfuli and Mashonaland generally - mines, farms and towns - were comparatively neglected. Following on the 1893 war, there had been an exodus to the new
A VISION, WHY NOT A REALITY?

(Syndicates, exploration companies, B.S.A.C. please note)
El Dorado in Matabeleland. The reports of the mining commissioners in 1895 reflected, little or no work for some time (Mazoe), neglect of the district since the war (Umfuli), or much pegging and development but still no returns (Salisbury). Matabeleland went through the same cycle - several years of prospecting, "development" and wildly optimistic reports without any actual production of gold.

In September 1894, John Hays Hammond, an American mining engineer, was sent by Rhodes to assess the mineral prospects of Matabeleland. It was hoped that Hammond's report would counteract some rather negative assessments. On his return to Johannesburg, Hammond submitted his report to Rhodes. There it was pointed out that the reefs "belonged to the class of ore deposits known as true fissure veins, and that veins of this character are universally noted for their persistence in depth". But Hammond also called attention "to the fact that this attribute does not imply the occurrence of pay shoots or bodies of commercial value in their veins". Hammond warned investors to be careful in their choice of properties, and companies to prove the value of their reefs before incurring heavy development expenditure. Subject to these conditions he "confidently commended the country to the attention of the mining capitalists". Hammond's warnings and moderate optimism were both justified. Rhodes took careful cognizance of Hammond's report, but Jameson, among others, was less scrupulous. "To judge from the remarks of the various mining promoters", wrote Hammond, "I must have visited every mine and
Our Weekly Cartoon

Development vs. Crushing.

"Delay is dangerous"

British Public Boy to Company Jim: "Now then, Mister, you've enough money there, we want to see the show started!"

Matabeleland Settler (Jim's mate) (in a low voice): "Go on Bill, up with the curtain, people are getting suspicious; I have been inside the show all is in perfect order and nothing to fear" (which is the advice offered by The Sketch to all the large Syndicates).
claim in Rhodesia and reported glowingly on them all". (21)

Early in 1895 the registrar of claims gave a summary of the gold production of the country. The total for the four and a half years to date was 4,400 ounces, less than what the Witwatersrand was then producing per day. (22) Moreover, 3000 of these ounces came from the Victoria and 1000 from the Umfuli mining districts, both of which had been in the doldrums since the middle of 1893. Neither Bulawayo, Gwelo nor Salisbury had produced anything so far. (23) As the list of mines and gold production in the Chamber of Mines Report in 1897 illustrates, little changed within the space of a year, or as William Harvey Brown, an American natural scientist, conveyed in his book, On the South African Frontier, the mining industry—the economic backbone of the new Rhodesia—was a paper dream. The area of the claim was severely reduced in comparison with elsewhere in the world, with the intent of inflating statistics to encourage investment in Company shares on the London Stock Exchange. In Rhodesia, very few claims were actually worked and even fewer had the stamping machinery necessary to make them pay. (24) If one bypasses the official statements, such as the enthusiastic pronouncements of Jameson, the cartoons of the Bulawayo Sketch best express the frustration of the local population in the new El Dorado. (25) Many of the settlers had decided to leave and it is debatable as to whether Rhodesia in early 1896 was a colony dying of natural causes. (26) The whites in the country were not impressed by the glowing reports circulated in London. As early
OUR MINING LAWS.

PROSPECTOR - Now then Bill at the half past strike! - Jack! you observe the hammer fall, it's a witness; then take the sun's meridian & draw out the plans. (or else we're all wrong).

OUR WEEKLY CARTOON.
as 1893 the retarded economy was a source of intense dissatisfaction among the settlers. (27) Europeans in the country were sharply aware that while statistics were inflated, companies floated, all of which encouraged the rise of stock prices, nothing was actually done on the ground. A great deal of money was sunk in these mining ventures, stamp batteries, the transport of which was expensive, wages and salaries, the buying out of share holders; but the return for all this effort was less than one day’s output on the Witwatersrand. The Company’s attempts to encourage development, one pioneer contended, were counteracted by its own greed. The fifty per cent interest claimed by the Company acted as a disincentive as it reduced the profitability of new enterprise and discouraged active development. (28) The regulations promulgated in 1895 to regulate mining aroused intense opposition as they hampered development. These regulations were sharply lampooned in the Bulawayo Sketch. Similar regulations were discontinued in 1897 since they were “considered to be an unnecessary expense, seeing that the mining work at present done is limited, and is, for the greater part only in its early stages”. (29) The land occupied by the mines was limited and did not interfere with the African chiefdoms.

There remains the question of the labour requirements of the mining industry, but this is perhaps best examined after the impact of the settlers’ second most important economic activity - farming - is first determined.
Farming did not attract many people even though it was the other major European occupation. In 1890 the Pioneers and policemen were each promised 1500 morgen of land. Occupation was initially insisted upon but soon wavered as the search for gold took preference. (30) In 1892 the quitrent was 3 per 1 500 morgen. Land grants were freely given, many to absentee landlords. (31) Moreover, more than half the Pioneer farm rights with their exemption from occupation, had by the end of of 1891 passed into the hands of "commercial syndicates". In Mashonaland Frank Johnson’s company owned 40 000 morgen, H.C.Moore, 22 678 morgen and Sir John Willoughby 110 441 morgen. The land granted by 1893, excluding outspan farms, amounted to 973 688 morgen, of which 173 119 morgen was owned by these three syndicates alone. (32) In April 1893 the Company decided that land alienation could not proceed unchecked, and thereafter it was sold at 1.6d a morgen. (33) The Victoria Agreement on the eve of the 1893 Ndebele war promised the volunteers 3000 morgen exempt from occupation. (34) Following the "conquest" of Matabeleland, farms were claimed, located, granted, surveyed, but few were occupied. The fact that the Deeds Registry in Salisbury was only permitted to issue a land grant further delayed occupation. (35)

In March 1895 an estimated 700 white people were settled on farms in Rhodesia. In Matabeleland, 250 people lived on 150 farms, although 1070 farms of 3000 morgen had been pegged. Of these 150 occupied farms only 900 acres had been cultivated, an
average of six acres per farm. (36) In Fort Victoria in 1897 there were seventy registered farms. Twenty of these had been occupied by traders for grazing purposes and on only a few had five or six acres been ploughed up. The land owned by companies was not occupied. (37) In Hartley twenty- one farms were pegged between 1891 and 1896, but only three appear to have been worked, and only one had more than a single occupant at any one time. (38) In Umtali, 244 farms had been alienated by 1895, but only two people were farming. (39) In Mazoe there were only thirteen people, no farmer among them. (40) In Enkeldoorn, there were a few Afrikaners, and some left their farms to take up transport riding. (41) E.F. Knight, a correspondent for The Times, was to note during his tour of the country in 1894 that "most of the so-called farmers were merely prospectors and storekeepers, who had done next to no work on the land". (42) Melsetter was the one exception to the general rule of the non-occupation of land. There nearly half the farming population of Rhodesia lived. Following on the Moodie trek of 1892 -3, farms of 6350 acres were alienated, and these often did encompass African farm lands. (43)

Elsewhere in Mashonaland, the vast estates granted to speculative companies meant that such land was neither closely occupied nor greatly developed, and it prevented other Europeans from occupying the land. Many settlers also owned a number of farms and could not occupy them all. Company officials, well endowed with land, rarely found the time to use it. Afrikaners at Enkeldoorn bought family farms in adjacent
blocks, but the families tended to live together. Even those who lived on their farms and were not speculators, did relatively little farming work prior to 1896. Europeans who did take up farms tended to choose the heavy red soils which the Shona were inclined to neglect in favour of the lighter, more easily manageable sand soils. (44) Shona settlement was more widely dispersed than that of the Ndebele, which worked to their advantage, as did the fact that after the "Matabele war" of 1893, "Mashonaland settled down to a period of utter stagnation, for all interest was concentrated on the new province. The bulk of our fellow settlers," Hugh Marshall Hole, the Salisbury Civil Commissioner, recalled, "had gone with Jameson to the front, and as they were well rewarded with farms and gold claims they had every temptation to remain in Matabeleland". (45)

The Ndebele were no more conscious of the land problem, even though it was precisely the land on which they were living with its fertile red and black soils, which was coveted by the Europeans. (46) Though the white intruders fell over themselves pegging out their farms, many of the features which are apparent in Mashonaland applied equally to Matabeleland. Absentee landlordism was the rule rather than the exception. It was gold, rather than land which brought the Europeans to Bulawayo. Thus only 150 out of over 1000 farms were ever worked, and these at a subsistence level. Again vast areas were located in the hands of companies as many Europeans sold their
farm rights for between 10 to 60, a sure indication of the loss of confidence in Rhodesia, as the Mashonaland claims for only half the acreage had fetched an average price of 100 in 1890. (47) Thus over half the Umzingwane district near Bulawayo passed into the hands of Willoughby’s Consolidated. Moreover, no attempt was ever made to force the Ndebele into the distant Gwaii and Shangani Reserves, as they were generally too highly prized as potential sources of labour. (48) Though the Ndebele had been “legally” deprived of their land they were not conscious of this since the white “landowner” took little interest in their presence.

In relation to farming then, it is clear that despite the huge number of farms claimed and registered by 1896, the indigenous people had been little disturbed. Three main factors account for the failure to work the farms. A mining boom was expected, but people hesitated to become involved in agricultural production before there was a market. Land speculators, like Willoughby, bought up large tracts of land which saw no development. Most people did not have the necessary where-with-all to make a success of farming. While the extent of land alienated to Europeans on paper was extensive, it meant nothing in actuality. It therefore cannot be argued that the “Risings” of 1896 – 7 were a struggle for lost land. (49)

Some land had also been alienated for European settlement. The small European population was concentrated in the five main settlements already mentioned. These and other settlements
occupied such a small land area as to be considered inconsequential. Hole later wrote of Salisbury that "it would have been easy to pass within a hundred yards of the place itself without noticing it". (50) Rudyard Kipling commented in a similar vein on Bulawayo in a letter to the Freemasons, dated 23 November 1914:

" "Landsdown" and "Park Road" don't exactly fit in with my memory of Bulawayo. Have they given up killing lions on the town commonage? Last time I was there, they were putting down poison for them." (51)

The extent of European development in the two years following the occupation of Matabeleland, despite the optimism and braggadocio, was not impressive. Salisbury and Fort Victoria had not merely stagnated, they were visibly decaying. Descriptions of Gwelo and Umtali at the same time indicate small settlements of a rural disposition. (52) Contemporary photographs of all these main centres show small tin and brick buildings, with a number of wattle and daub dwellings still in existence, widely spread out. (53) The only settlement which had violently displaced people was Bulawayo, and it soon moved from the site of Lobengula's kraal to its present location. (54)

But no issue has been more firmly entrenched as a "cause" of the first "Chimurenga" than the extraction of forced labour. In the Selukwe district the cry was allegedly heard during the
fighting, "anything is preferable to working on the mines". (55)

In 1936, Mr Mganganyeri Mhlope, an African informant, told R. Foster Windram,

"the cause of the rebellion was labour recruiting - isibalwa. When the white people started the place they call Selukwe the police used to come to our kraals......and when they recruited us they used to beat us.......when we were recruited we were taken to Selukwe." (56)

In an interview in 1969, another African informant, Mr Mauto Ndaikwa, considered that;

"the thing that caused Chimurenga was sjamboks, since (at) that time people were being forced to work for the government, so these people were the ones who were being beaten thoroughly by sjamboks." (57)

While it is common cause that incidents of forced labour did occur, the extent and intensity of the abuse has not been determined. Several factors mitigate against forced labour being an intolerable burden. Farming was of such an undeveloped nature as to make labour demands minimal. In Matabeleland the Gwelo, Selukwe and Belingwe districts were largely neglected as far as farming was concerned. There were only a few farms east of the Doro range in Belingwe and one farm each in Gwelo and Selukwe appear to have been occupied. (58) Beach uses evidence from 1898 and 1899 to show that the Charter farmers had in "particular acquired a bad name for brutality towards their African labourers". The Native Commissioner reported that it was impossible to supply Enkeldoorn with labour "on account of
the bad name the Boers have amongst the natives" due to general ill-treatment and dishonesty in matters of pay. This Native Commissioner, a year later, added that:

"it is difficult to get natives to work for the Dutch farmers in the district owing to their having been accustomed to being their natives under the Transvaal Government where no justice is accorded a native."

Beach's conclusion that "Presumably this attitude was prevalent in 1894-5 when the bulk of the farmers arrived from the Transvaal", fails inter alia to take into account the anti-Afrikaner sentiment prevalent in Rhodesia in 1899 on the eve of the Anglo-Boer war. (59) In 1896 the Enkeldoorn laager had within its confines 210 people, 150 of whom were women and children. If besides the Melsetter area where just under half the European farming population lived, the Charter and Enkeldoorn areas were the heaviest in their labour demands, then a reassessment of forced labour in relation to agriculture must conclude that this demand was minimal. (60)

The problem of forced labour becomes primarily relevant to mining. The needs of the mining industry in relation to labour are difficult to assess due to insufficient or else contradictory data. Beach's statistics of underground footage, for example, are no indication of labour requirements. These statistics are derived from estimates of the underground work reported by Mining Commissioners and cannot be verified.
Further, the greater part of the underground work involved the use of dynamite in the opening up of pits in accordance with the sixty foot regulation. Beach also creates the wrong impression when he quotes the labour requirements of the Victoria goldfield as providing an idea of the average labour requirements of the industry. The figure quoted for February 1895 is 45 Europeans and 364 Africans. Though Victoria had declined after 1893, it was still the largest gold field, having produced 3000 of the 4400 ounces mined in Rhodesia by March 1895. Victoria, therefore, was no yardstick for the "mean". Furthermore, on the Victoria gold fields most coloured labour was supplied by foreign labour from the Zambezi valley around Tete and the Tonga country, and the hinterland of the Inhambane, and this reduced pressure on the Shona and Ndebele still further. Alongside these foreign labourers there were also volunteer Shona and Ndebele, all of which reduced the need for forced labour. There were also the over 400 "Cape Boys", African servants from South Africa, who had accompanied or followed in the wake of the Pioneer column. These men were largely personal servants and bore the responsibility for building the primitive settlements inhabited by the Europeans. On the mines, these men filled the skilled positions since the barrier of language precluded local African people.

What also mitigated against the exploitation of local black labour was the limited development undertaken by the Europeans. Often the supply of voluntary labour outstripped the
demand, as an entry into the logbook of A. L. Jameson, the Lomangundi Mining Commissioner illustrates; "Three half starved emaciated niggers turned up for work,(sic) have been forced to do without them as we have plenty of boys."(66) An anecdote of S. P. Hyatt, a labour recruiting agent, reveals that the "problem of labour" was a convenient excuse for the lack of development and for fraud. The Geelong mine, on the Umzingwani river, had been forced to close through lack of labour. Hyatt's point was that he had recently offered the mine a supply of workers, but had been refused. The closing down of the mine was fraudulent. Something to do with "Bears", Hyatt thought.(67)

The general reluctance of the local African people to do mine work was acknowledged. Attempts were made to recruit labourers from the Transkei and at the end of 1895 a labour recruiting agent was sent to Lewanika, king of Barotseland.(68) The ability of the Europeans to compel people to work was restrained by African resistance. African chiefs could, and did, refuse to supply labour to Europeans.(69) Some Africans chose their own locale of employment as they had done from the 1880's when Ndebele and Shona men had travelled to Johannesburg and Kimberley mines.(70) When forced labour did occur, the labour force generally succeeded in deserting.(71) There were incidents of abuse such as the refusal to pay wages, violent treatment and cheating, but these were the exception rather than the rule. The interests of the Europeans were recognised to depend on good labour relations, and abuses which came to
the notice of the authorities were quickly acted upon. (72)

Surprisingly, the evidence for extensive demands or violent treatment of Africans in the extraction of labour relates particularly to the Fort Victoria, Melsetter, Umtali, Hartley and Mtoko areas. With the exception of Hartley, these were the districts in 1896 - 7 which were either "neutral" or "collaborationist". This is an important point to bear in mind when the events of 1896 - 7 are examined.

Having briefly dealt with the impact made by the Europeans' major economic activities upon the African peoples, the effect of the Company's administrative and judicial machinery must now be determined. Though confrontations between the Company and the African peoples drew sharp condemnation in Britain from contemporaries and subsequent commentators, the African perspective of the Company's presence and its impact still needs to be determined. How did the Africans view the Company, and what was their reaction to the sovereignty it assumed? Were the African people uniformly aware of the Company's presence and the authority it claimed? Was the Company regarded as a hostile alien, or as simply another force in the flux of political power, to be resisted or allied with, as circumstances dictated? What we need to establish is, had the presence of 6000 Europeans created enough of an impact to distinguish their activities from those of the African peoples among whom they lived? It is contended that the assumption of an inherent conflict between black and white has led to undue emphasis upon the role played by Europeans in conflict with
Africans, and the effect of such conflict. A basic racialism pervades most analyses; whites are predators, blacks are victims, Europeans are oppressors, Africans are oppressed; settlers initiate action to which the indigenous inhabitants react. These crude characterizations serve only to confuse and obscure the reality of human beings interacting on a personal level. The complexity of the human factor and the dynamics of social interaction place a check on any clear delineation of moral black or white. The question of European military action is one of these grey areas.

The first instance to be examined is the Guerolt murder. J. F. V. Guerolt, a prospector of French origin and an American citizen, was murdered near Hwata's kraal in the Mazoe district on 22 January 1982. The motive is unknown. Captain M. D. Graham led a party to investigate the crime, assisted by the local Field Cornet, the Vicomte dela Panouse. The body was found. The kraal near the scene was deserted, but one man was captured on the hill. The prisoner stated that the local chief's name was "Chirumzela, and that the latter had instigated his two sons to commit the murder, and that he, Chirumzela, was present when the murder was committed." Chirumzela was captured at a small kraal after further investigation. Guerolt's coat, trousers and clasp knife were found in one of the huts. In the capture of the chief one of his men was shot while trying to escape. Chirimzimba's kraal was burnt. It was then decided to "take action against Chief Goledaima", because three of his people
had been with Guerolt when he was murdered, and there were "reasonable grounds of suspicion" against one of them. The attack was also justified by the fact that Goledaima's people had on numerous occasions threatened white men and were notorious thieves. The kraal was attacked, six of its inhabitants were killed and three wounded, and "an enormous quantity of stolen property" was found in the huts. Some ammunition belonging to the patrol was then stolen, so the kraal nearest the crime was burnt. Graham's report concluded that, "The punishment they received (was) in no way in excess of what they deserved". (73)

Guerolt's case was followed by the "Ngomo" affair. James Bennet had been a policeman in charge of the Company's trading store near paramount chief Mangwendi's kraal. At the end of 1891 he was discharged from the police, and formed a partnership with Llewelyn Meredith, a police associate, first in farming, then at the old trading station which they reopened as a private venture. In March 1892, Bennet took some trade goods to Gonwe's kraal and erected a small enclosure from which to trade. Despite protests from Bennet, Gonwe's son insisted on entering the enclosure, and Bennet pushed him out. Gonwe called on his people to kill Bennet, but the ex-policeman escaped and complained to the administrator, L. S. Jameson, in Salisbury. The people of the district, and Gonwe in particular, had been for some time in the view of the whites, "impertinent" and "insolent". A coloured wagon driver had recently been murdered in the district, but the murderer had not been traced. (74) A
patrol was despatched to Mangwendi's district, under Captain Lendy, later to play a controversial role in the "Victoria incident". (75) Lendy asked paramount chief Mangwendi to assist him with the arrest of his subject Gonwe, to stand trial in Salisbury. But,

"Mangwendi said that he was unable to do so, that he was afraid of the Chief Goma, who was too strong for him, and that if I wanted him I must take him myself; that Gomo would fight, and that he, Mangwendi, did not wish to interfere, but to let the white men settle the matter with Gomo themselves." (76)

Lendy then sent a message to Gonwe giving him until sundown to surrender. He did not do so, whereupon Lendy returned to Salisbury for reinforcements. On 17 March Lendy arrived at Gonwe's kraal at day break. They attacked and killed 21 people including Gonwe, and captured 47 head of cattle and several goats. (77)

W. E. Fairbridge, editor of the Rhodesian Herald, Salisbury's premier newspaper, accompanied Lendy's party, and his report of the incident reached the English press almost immediately. (78) The High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, stated that, "the punishment inflicted.......appears utterly disproportionate to the original offense". (79) When a full report was received in London, it "would" in the opinion of Lord Knutsford, Colonial Secretary, "have justified much stronger terms of remonstrance than were used by the High Commissioner ....... Proceedings of this nature are likely to do incalculable injury to the British
South Africa Company in public estimation in this country". It was in Britain that the real effects of the "Ngomo" affair were felt. Critics of the Company exploited the incident to the full, judging according to the standards then prevalent in Britain. It hardly needs to be stated that these standards are unsuited to the African context of the events. Before evaluating the African perception of the "Ngomo" affair, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of the Mangwendi chiefdom.

As Shona chiefdoms did not normally pass from father to son but circulated in the family, the scope for dynastic disputes was great. About 1869 the Mangwendi title had been assumed with the proper Rozvi investiture by Hundungu, to the exclusion of his elder brother Zinyemba. Civil war followed, in which Zinyemba's forces, led by his son Gonwe, were defeated by Hundungu's, led by his son Mungati. Gonwe retired to the hill top where Bennet found him. In 1878 Hundungu was succeeded by Katerer, who died in 1879. After a short interregnum, Hundungu's eldest son, Mungati succeeded in 1880, to the exclusion of Katerer's two sons, Chiredza and Chibanda. Chiredza, however, had taken control during the interregnum and had made himself very popular. The danger to the reigning Mangwendi led him to have Chiredza put to death, thus compounding the bitterness of the original dynastic quarrel. Mungati was the Mangwendi who refused to deal with Gonwe. Following on the usurpation, the civil war and the murder, an uneasy truce had prevailed. Gonwe,
faced by Lendy’s ultimatum, had been forced to swallow his pride and ask the paramount chief for help against the white men. Mangwendi would not allow him into his kraal and told him to fight his own battles. (81) Lendy’s report that after Gonwe’s death, “Mangwendi expressed himself delighted with what had been done”, can be seen to have some substance. Lendy’s action happened to fit into a pattern of tribal and dynastic politics, in terms of which the injury to one was a blessing to another. This incident was not unique. (82)

Another concerned Mugabe, a chief near Victoria, who in 1892 raided a neighbouring chief who then appealed to the Company for protection. Chaplin, the Victoria magistrate, and a few men, “were sent to assist the raided Chief, and give Meghabi a lesson”. Chaplin came in to report that Mugabe resisted, so his kraal was burnt and the chief killed. (83) Despite orders to the contrary, officials of the Company continued to become involved in these disputes. A few months later when the newly installed Chief Gutu complained to Fort Victoria about some interference and cattle stealing by whites, the officials sent to investigate “were seized and assaulted by rival claimants to Goto’s chieftainship”. A maxim gun was brought out, and one of the opposition party killed. (84)

The events of 1892 reveal an important aspect of the Shona world, which remained unchanged despite the slight escalation of violence following on the creation of the Native Department, until the war of conquest of 1896-7. The attention of the
Shona was still focussed on their domestic politics. Mangwendi and Gutu were more concerned with threats from dynastic rivals and tribal opponents than about hypothetical dangers from the handful of whites in the country. Rhodes's settlers were called upon by some as military allies in disputes, as had Portuguese and Venda mercenaries before them. These incidents were of more significance in Britain, where opponents of the Company stirred up public outrage, than in the embryonic Rhodesia. There is nothing to suggest that the Shona regarded Graham's or Lendy's patrols as differing in degree or effect from a Ndebele raid or their own internecine conflicts. Indeed, the effect of the Ndebele raid on Victoria in 1893 can be shown to have been a far more dramatic experience for the Shona peoples. The Europeans were behaving in accordance with the dictates of this violent and volatile society, where right ultimately depended on might. In the African interior in the late nineteenth century general insecurity prevailed, and every community depended upon violence to maintain its position. Humanitarian and legal criticisms are out of their historical context when examining these conflicts. The Company was not master of the land, its authority was not recognised by the African peoples, and the respect it commanded depended on force.

It has been argued that the extension of European jurisdiction to try cases involving the African peoples was a threat to the traditional power of a chief and that it undermined his authority.
The Victoria Court records, the only reasonably complete files, show that between 1892 and 1896, 13 Europeans and 25 others, out of a total of 42 accused, were convicted of various crimes such as murder, assault and theft against the local Shona. From this perspective the Company's judicial system was of benefit to the Shona as it presumably deterred some people from criminal acts. (88) William Harvey Brown in On the South African Frontier, describes an incident which shows how the Shona took full advantage of the Company's judicial system, much to the chagrin of the settlers who accused the Company of being overly concerned about the African people. (89) The Victoria court also tried crimes committed by the Shona such as desertion from work and theft. Beach is of the opinion that desertion from work, a charge made against 30 Shona during the period 1892 - 6, was not deserving of the sentences received, from a fine of 1 to 15 lashes, though theft was a mutually acknowledged crime. The penalties imposed were heavy, but they affected only a small number of people. (90) Shona and Ndebele justice could also extract heavy penalty from an offender. (91) As to the alleged undermining of traditional authority, Beach is only able to point to fourteen cases tried by the Victoria court between 1892 and 1896. At an average of three cases a year, the fourteen cases were not many and were not significant. (92) As the evidence relating to Kunzwi Nyandoro illustrates, a Shona chief could, and did, exercise jurisdiction over someone of a different chiefdom within his territory. (93) Further, if the intervention of the Europeans was resented to the degree
alleged, the traditional authorities would have had little difficulty in reversing a decision. Finally, it is pertinent to point out that Beach draws his statistics from Fort Victoria, an area unaffected by the conflict of 1896 - 7.

The European colonisation of Mashonaland would seem to be a unique process in that it took the form of a peaceful penetration, followed only in 1896 - 7 by a war of conquest from a position within the country, whereas the conquest of Matabeleland in 1893 would seem to follow the established pattern of a military assault. Many writers have considered the conquest of Matabeleland to have been the important turning point in the colonisation of the country. On one hand it led to the subjugation of the Ndebele and subsequent oppression which fired their determination to throw off the yoke of white conquest, and on the other, it caused the Shona to realise that the whites were not just a passing phenomenon but settlers determined to stay. As such the 1893 war is seen as the essential prelude to both the Ndebele and Shona "Rebellions". (94)

An assessment of the impact of that war upon the Ndebele requires an understanding of the structures of the Ndebele polity and of the conflicts within Ndebele society. An appendix at the end of this thesis presents an analysis of the conflict within Ndebele society which assists in an assessment of the significance of the 1893 war, and the subsequent conflict in
1896. (95) As a "cause", the 1893 war must be examined in the light of an understanding of the conflicts within the Ndebele polity. With the death of Lobengula in January or early February 1894, the local leadership continued to exercise their power over the imusi and ibutho in their izigaba as they had always done. The demise of Lobengula was not a dramatic psychological shock. The gut of the state was not ripped out with Lobengula's death. The local structures of power, where real authority lay, remained intact. The European invasion of the country, therefore, did not result in the devolution of power from Lobengula to the Company. From the Ndebele perspective, the role played by the Europeans in 1893 was significant not for the conquest of the state, but for the change of power it precipitated within the Ndebele polity. (96) The oral tradition suggests that internal dissension was particularly intense in 1893, and several izinduna found their interests best served by a withdrawal of support from Lobengula. (97) The European invasion in 1893, therefore, served the interests of dissenting local factions. If a national rising were later to be determined on, the overcoming of these factional interests would have been a prerequisite. To achieve the suppression of diverse antagonisms within the polity, the Europeans would have needed to impose a uniform degree of intense oppression as to forge a desire to unite and face a common foe. However, the European pressure was minimal, and the major effect of the 1893 war was to intensify these antagonisms among the Ndebele themselves. These internal conflicts remained entrenched between 1893 and 1896, and account for the
subsequent conflict assuming the character of a civil war. (98) The European intervention in 1893 again fitted into a pattern of tribal politics, where an injury to one was a blessing to another.

As a result of the 1893 war it has been argued that the Shona attitude to the Europeans underwent a sharp revision. Previously they had regarded the Europeans as a temporary phenomenon and were prepared to suffer the oppression and to respond to it on an ad hoc basis. The effect of the 1893 war it has been argued, was to cause them to conclude that only a united response would rid them of European pressure. (99) The objection to this rationalized analysis is that it is too theoretical and abstract. Further, this rationalization is in conflict with the facts. After 1893 the European population in Mashonaland decreased as there was a move to Matabeleland. The extent of the limited European pressure was further reduced. If the Shona had expected the Europeans to withdraw, 1893 would have confirmed their expectations. (100) The 1893 war cannot be seen to be a "cause". It did not lay the psychological foundations for the subsequent "Rebellion".

The 1893 war led to the creation of the Native Department as the Europeans attempted to give some substance to their claim to have colonized Rhodesia. The Native Department is alleged by Beach to have had a profound impact on African society. The Native Commissioners allegedly acquired much of the livestock
of the African people, interfered in traditional systems of justice, recruited compulsory labour and played a disruptive role in African politics. (101) However, a statistical analysis would seem to contradict any thesis which attributes a profound impact on African society by the Native Department. In December 1894 five districts were delineated in Matabeleland. In March 1895, 23 districts were defined in Southern Rhodesia. The average land area of a district was therefore just under 17 000 km². (102) Though the areas patrolled by the Assistant Native Commissioners varied, the extent of each district was considerable. The districts in Matabeleland were in existence for almost exactly a year before the violence escalated. In Mashonaland, taking into account the period of the "Tax collectors", the Native Department was in existence for two years. During this time there was a considerable turn-over in personnel. (103) Many of the appointees were young men with little experience in the duties they assumed. They were ill-equipped, often down with fever, sometimes without even guns or horses. (104) As a horse can only travel, at a push, about 30 km a day, the question must be asked; "What effect can one man, even if assisted by Native Police or "messengers" have in an area as extensive as that described in the Proclamation in the time given?". The innumerable incidents where their "authority" was rejected or ignored will be described in due course, giving further countenance to the argument that their impact was minimal.

A force of Native Police and "messengers" helped the Assistant
Native Commissioners in the performance of their duty. The Native Police are portrayed as having perpetrated many outrages, and at the Matopos Indabas in late 1896 were identified as a major "cause" of the "Rebellion". Vere Stent, the famous Cape Times correspondent, recorded at the first indaba, a statement by Somabhulana, a prominent Ndebele induna:

"He spoke of the brutality of the Zulu police, who ravished their daughters, and insulted their young men, who tweaked the beards of their chieftains and made lewd jokes with the elder women of the Great House, who abused the law they were expected to uphold, who respected none but the Native Commissioners and officers of police, who collected taxes at the point of their assegais, and ground the people in tyranny and oppression."(105)

The Native Police force was organised in May 1895 in accordance with a practice already established in several British colonies. The men, drawn mainly from the Imbezu and Insukumini amabutho, were to assist the Assistant Native Commissioners to collect hut tax, to arrest deserters, to brand cattle, to trace cattle, to collect evidence and to engage in the other duties of normal police work.(106) In the Company Reports of 1894 - 5, Colonel Frank Rhodes, brother of Cecil Rhodes, stated that the force consisted of 150 men and non - commissioned officers, and a further 50 who had been sent to Mashonaland.(107)

When the violence erupted in March 1896, C. J. Rhodes's immediate reaction was, "It's a Police revolt". (108) Out of the 330 Native Policemen in Matabeleland in March 1896, 172
"rebelled", 126 remained "loyal" and the position of 32 was uncertain.(109) Some changed sides at various points during the fighting, and some were killed by the "rebels". If they had committed outrages to the extent alleged, and were a "cause" of "Rebellion", their subsequent behavior cannot be as easily glossed over as does Keppel-Jones;

"A large part of the "Native Police force" went over in 1896 to the side of the rebels, but the belated repentance evidently failed to compensate for the misdeeds of the preceding ten months."(110)

As members of amabutho loyal to the Lobengula faction, the excesses they may have committed can be understood if directed against the formerly disaffected peoples. But the complaint comes from that faction loyal to Lobengula, while the factions likely to be subjected to abuse, such as Gampu or Faku, refrained from conflict with the Europeans.(111) The Native Police did not feature prominently in the grievances of the Shona. Yet if, as the literature suggests, the Ndebele were arrogant and contemptuous of the Shona peoples, incidents of high handed disregard for personal rights, theoretically would be more likely to occur in Mashonaland.(112) As such the evidence in relation to the Native Police would seem to enforce the conclusion that their activities were a post bellum rationalization of a grievance. After the war the Europeans were eager to shift the blame for all indiscretion from their own shoulders. It would seem that the Native Police were a convenient, and since many had joined the "rebels", expendable.
The Native Department in Matabeleland was created primarily to assist in the counting, collecting and branding of cattle. The cattle question, however, has provided the greatest research challenge of this section. None of the statistics are reliable, as are none of the opinions of commentators. On the basis of available statistics the intention here is to challenge the accepted wisdom and to open the question up for fresh research. This analysis attempts to be both coherent and to correspond with the known facts and thereby to expose the contradictions in the analysis of other writers.

The major questions faced in an examination of cattle expropriation as a "cause" are all unfortunately based on estimations as to the total number of cattle held by the Ndebele. Ranger quotes three figures; 280 000, 200 000 and 130 000, and then states that he prefers the higher figure.(113) On the basis of estimations apparently chosen by personal whim, historians have evaluated the question of cattle by subtracting the number known to be in Matabeleland from the estimation and then posed the question, "What happened to the rest?".(114) If the estimations were reliable this would be an acceptable procedure. The wide fluctuations in the estimates, however, cast doubt on this subtraction mode of analysis. One cannot start from an unsubstantiated premise, then subtract reasonably established estimates, on the basis of which an elaborate conspiracy is assumed to account for the statistical
discrepancy.

If the Ndebele were deprived by some machiavellian mechanism of 240,000 or 160,000 or 90,000 head of cattle, clear evidence must be led to substantiate this claim. To remove the vast number of cattle allegedly involved would have been an extensive and unavoidably public undertaking. It would have been impossible to carry out this project, which in effect implies the removal out of the country by the end of 1895, without an abundance of incontrovertible evidence, of six sevenths, or five sixths or two thirds of the cattle in Matabeleland in 1893. The evidence quoted to substantiate the belief of the removal of cattle out of Matabeleland to the South African markets is flimsy to say the least. Evidence of three lots of cattle, amounting to 600 head, detained by Lindsell, the Tati magistrate, cannot seriously be equated with 240,000 or 160,000 or even 90,000. (115) If cattle were taken from Matabeleland and infused into the established cattle routes there would have been some comment in Gaberones or Cape Town. The logistics involved in the elaborate conspiracy assumed by some writers are immense. It is doubtful whether there was sufficient manpower available to collect and herd the cattle. The tremendous distances involved in the removal of cattle from Matabeleland to the South African markets would have required a great deal of preparation, as it is doubtful whether the terrain, in terms of sufficient water and grazing would have been able to sustain such large numbers. More to the
point is the question as to how Cape Town and other southern African markets absorbed the inevitable glut which would have developed. If Rhodes had managed to achieve all this without comment on an exogeneous scale, the man is more remarkable than previously credited. This thesis argues that there is no evidence to support the removal of vast numbers of cattle from Matabeleland because there existed no conspiracy to do so. (116)

The failure to distinguish between the Company’s intentio in relation to assumed dominium, and the reality of Ndebele possessio, enforced by the Company’s own bloated expectations of Ndebele cattle holdings when invading in 1893 (upon which hostile critics based their own inflated estimations), have served to distort an understanding of the cattle question. Critical perspective is lost when the urge to condemn overrides the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality. We are concerned not with the discovery of an elaborate conspiracy by the Company, involving the Land Commission, covert cattle sales and the secret infusion of Ndebele cattle into established trade routes, but rather in establishing a realistic estimation of Ndebele cattle holdings in 1893, and an approximate calculation as to their distribution at the beginning of 1896. The available statistics need to be added together to form an estimation, and not subtracted from an assumed total.

An attempt must first be made to calculate the number of cattle under direct Ndebele control at the beginning of 1896. By
October 1895 the Assistant Native Commissioners had submitted their estimations of the cattle held by the Ndebele. In December 1895 the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland, H. Taylor, explained the proposed redistribution of cattle to an assembled two hundred izinduna. The estimated total of cattle in the possession of the Ndebele was 74,600. Of this, 40,930 were earmarked for Ndebele private owners "as their absolute property", 700 were set aside as police rations, and 32,970 were claimed by the Company for distribution as "loot". This theoretical redistribution must not be allowed to confuse the fact that 74,000 cattle, as estimated by the Assistant Native Commissioners, were in December 1895 still in the possession of the Ndebele. (117) The cattle estimated to be held by Europeans on the 150 farms in Matabeleland was 15,000 head, excluding imported Hereford, Shorthorn and Friesland bulls, as at 31 August 1895. (118) These cattle, as F.C. Selous, the renowned hunter, indicates in Sunshine and Storm, were herded by the Ndebele living on these farms. (119) A further 15,000 cattle therefore, removed from the dominium of the Ndebele, may be found nevertheless to be in their possessio. This brings the number of cattle that remained directly under the control of the Ndebele to a roughly estimated 90,000 head. The evidence also shows that the Ndebele had concealed their cattle from the Assistant Native Commissioners who attempted to count them. A further 10,000 head may be estimated to have remained in Ndebele possessio having evaded the attention of the Europeans. (120) A further 10,000 head, initially looted by the
Europeans, were either replaced in the care of the Ndebele or were stolen by the Ndebele from the loot kraals. As such, at the beginning of 1896, 110,000 head may be estimated to be still in the possession of the Ndebele, though only 40,930 were considered to be in their dominiun.

Having established an estimation of the number of cattle in Ndebele possession at the beginning of 1896 it now remains to establish what the number of cattle possessed by the Ndebele had been in 1893. Related are the questions of how many cattle had been taken to Mashonaland for white farmers and consumption, how many had been rieved by the Shona and the Europeans, how many had been driven to markets in the south. It also needs to be determined how many had been removed from and kept physically apart from those of the Ndebele, how many had been consumed by the Europeans and the Ndebele, and how many had died due to disease or improper grazing in the turmoil following on the 1893 war.

P. Stigger's article, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", despite the failure to distinguish between dominiun and possessio, provides some interesting revisionist estimates in relation to the questions raised above. His findings conclude that there were 170,000 head immediately prior to the invasion in 1893. He estimates that by 1896, 25,000 head, of which 22,000 were "loot" cattle and 3,000 rieved, had left Matabeleland for Bechuanaland, the Transvaal and the Cape colony. 2,000 were sold in Mashonaland and 6,000 of the 30,000 "loot" cattle were
consumed or locally retained. (122) Stigger does not give estimates of the number of cattle rieved by the Shona or Europeans, but calls to attention that previous assumptions must be treated with caution. (123) Stigger also refrains from estimating cattle losses following on the 1893 disturbance. (124) The 74,600 cattle "redistributed" and the 30,000 "loot" cattle and a further 30,000 head the Company is claimed to have held at Inyati are noted. (125) Stigger's estimation of 170,000 is calculated as follows:
74,600 - cattle "redistributed" in October 1895
30,000 - "loot" cattle (22,000 left the country, 6,000 were locally consumed and 2,000 were sold to Mashonaland farmers)
30,000 - Company cattle held at Inyati
3,000 - estimated cattle rieved to the south
32,400 - blanket estimate of inaccurate counting, cattle rieved by Shona and Europeans, and death following on war of 1893.

Stigger's estimates are generous, but more realistic than those offered by previous writers.

Detailed research on the number of cattle physically removed from the possession of the Ndebele is hampered by the lack of reliable statistical data. Nevertheless, it is here estimated that the Ndebele were deprived of the physical possession of no more than 30,000 head between December 1893 and the beginning of 1896. Of these 2,000 were sold to Europeans living in Mashonaland. (126) In assessing the returns of the Assistant
Native Commissioners of 50 head a month sent to Bulawayo, it is likely that facilities existed for a maximum of 10 000 cattle to be directly under European control. Of this number a possible 5 000 had been consumed in the form of police rations or as supply of fresh meat for the European population. (127) Possibly 3 000 head had died in the disruption following the war of 1893, but the evidence makes any estimation tentative; it may have been much lower. The Ndebele had been forced to live for a period on the meat of their cattle, but slaughter would only have been turned to in the last resort. (128) The rieving of cattle by Shona and Europeans has been a convenient means of accounting for lost cattle in an attempt to reach the assumed total of Ndebele cattle. To have rieved 5 000 head of cattle and to have taken them to the Transvaal or Mashonaland for the people involved would have been counted a remarkable success. (129) If cattle were rieved by Shona peoples it would have been in small numbers, and if some of the former captives of the Ndebele had fled to Mashonaland with the cattle under their control, little hardship can be said to have been inflicted upon the Ndebele. (130) Stigger also points out that many of the thefts took place from the kraals under Company supervision, and the cattle were retained in Matabeleland. (131) A figure is impossible to establish with any degree of authority, but 10 000 would be a generous estimate of the number of cattle that had been filtered into the established trade routes from those sold in Matabeleland. (132) On the basis of these statistics and estimates the calculated total of Ndebele cattle is 140 000. The 30 000 cattle removed from the
physical possession of the Ndebele were distributed as follows:

2 000 - Mashonaland Europeans
3 000 - Died in disturbance of 1893
5 000 - Rieved by Europeans and Shona
10 000 - Held in European kraals
10 000 - taken to South African markets

The 110 000 cattle retained in Ndebele possession brings the estimated total of cattle to 140 000.

The revised figures made of Ndebele cattle holdings made by the Company in the period following the disturbances of 1896 are interesting. The hopeful guesses made on the eve of the 1893 war were shrunk to more conservative calculations. Ranger and other historians were quick to seize on this discrepancy as an indication of bad faith and an attempt by the Company to obscure disreputable actions.(133) The statistics advanced by the Administrator on 9 June 1897 show the final distribution as 19 540 head taken for police rations, 30 000 head for the settlers (volunteers), 35 000 head for the Company while 40 930 head were "restored to the Matabele" so that "the grand total ..... after conclusion of the war of 1893 ..... was 125 470".(134) If one allows an estimated discrepancy of 10 000 head hidden from the Assistant Native Commissioners, and the death of 3 000 following on the invasion, and the 5 000 rieved directly from the Ndebele, the revised estimate based on the Company's more sober assessment in 1897 is very close to that advanced in this thesis.
Not that cattle and the activities of Europeans in relation to them must be discounted as a grievance. On the local level the disruption precipitated by the Europeans would have evoked resentment. The expropriation of 50 head of cattle a month from March to November 1895 certainly provoked hostility from the people affected. (135) Faced with violent opposition to such seizure of cattle, the Assistant Native Commissioners urged the clarification of the distinction between King's and private cattle, which took place in December 1895. (136) This did not make much difference in practical terms because the Ndebele did not appreciate the distinction between dominium of King's cattle now being vested in the Company and their possessio being regarded as simply retentio.

It is important to note that loss of cattle can be over-emphasized. Gampu Sithole is an interesting case study. As possibly the last izinduna to surrender, Gampu came into Bulawayo at the end of March 1895, bringing with him 1,000 head. (137) The Times of 9 December 1893 reported that a total of 700 head had been taken from Gampu's country. In June 1894, Johan Colenbrander, the then Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland, and a Company official, Sub-Inspector Dykes, accompanied by some policemen set out "for another visit to the native kraals", this time going "to the border of the Kalahari desert, past Gambo's district". They separated after reaching the western border, and came back each with half the detachment of police by different ways, "bringing in about 3,000
head". It is also alleged that Gampu's people were selling stock at very low prices on hearing they were to be confiscated. As Gampu was in the immediate vicinity of Bulawayo it is to be expected that he would be particularly hard hit by these activities. Yet he never took the opportunity of deserting the Europeans and fighting against them in 1896. Gampu had lost physical possession of some of his cattle, yet his people still retained enough to satisfy their needs.

Finally, Ranger's insinuation that the redistribution of cattle in December 1895 was determined by political considerations, needs to be examined:

"Moreover, the 40,930 cattle which were actually distributed as private property were distributed in a manner which increased resentment. The Land Commission had noted that the Company was prepared to give cattle to "the leading indunas". Vintcent later said that in the final settlement "the more deserving indunas and headmen" got cattle. It looks very much as if the share out was used to reward "loyalty" rather than to meet the need of the Ndebele in general."(140)

Ranger misrepresents the facts. The share-out had not physically taken place. By March 1896 the cattle were still in the possession of the Ndebele.(141) The Company did not have control and therefore was in no position to physically redistribute cattle. Further, there was no "loyalty" to reward in December 1895, as there had been as yet no "Rebellion". Ranger introduces into his cosmic interpretation the role of Judas in implying that those Ndebele who "collaborated",
betrayed the cause of national resistance in the interests of material self-gain. The facts do not support this theoretical assumption. No discernible prejudice in rewarding "loyalty" can be traced in the paper distribution of cattle, and no distinction between "rebels" and "collaborators" can be drawn on this assumption. (142)

Turning to Mashonaland, the collection of hut tax was the innovation which led to the formation of the Native Department under the former Fort Victoria interpreter, J. S. Brabant. (143) The rationale behind the hut tax was that every wife in a polygamous marriage had her own hut, that the number of a man's wives, and therefore huts, gave a rough indication of his wealth and status, that the huts were easily visible and countable, and that to tax each hut was to tax each owner in proportion to his wealth. Permission to impose the tax was provided for by the Matabeleland Order in Council of 18 July 1894. The Company's ordinance was issued on 27 July and took effect in September. (144) Under this law every male African was to pay a tax of ten shillings a year for each hut occupied by him, by one of his wives, or by "any woman of the kraal of any such native", during any part of the year. The tax was to be paid in sterling crown, but where this was impossible payment in grain or stock, valued at the prices prevailing at the nearest market, could be substituted. The ordinance would not apply to Matabeleland until the recommendations of the Land Commission had been made and implemented. The first payment (for half a year only) fell due in Mashonaland on 1 October.
The tax served two purposes; it was intended to help pay for the cost of the Company's administration, and to force people to sell grain or stock or go out and work for wages. The Acting Administrator, Duncan did not wait for the Order - in - Council or ordinance before putting the collecting machinery into operation in Mashonaland. The Colonial Office took note and required a clause in the ordinance providing that anything paid before the collection became legal was to be credited to the tax payee.(146) The process of tax collection was of the normal ad hoc basis which characterised the Company's activities. When the collection began illegally in March 1894 the collectors were whatever agents were available in each locality - Mounted Police, Mining Commissioners, Field Cornets; or in their absence, farmers were empowered to collect tax on a "share" basis.(147) Little tax was collected in the face of fierce Shona resistance. When the tax was made legal it was clear that the collection would need to be regularised. During the second half of 1894, J. S. Brabant was appointed Native Commissioner with a staff of hut tax collectors under him. These "Collectors" at their discretion recruited staffs of African policemen, who were called "messengers" and were provided with whatever arms their employer could find, and paid ten shillings a month and rations. In 1895 these "messengers" were reinforced by 50 Ndebele from the new police of the other province.(148)
The statistics provided by Beach in his seminar paper, and his doctoral dissertation, give the impression that the Native Department's seizure of livestock and grain had the effect of drastically depleting the wealth of the Shona peoples. This impression is unjustified. In Beach's paper the statistics of livestock seizures for three districts - Tuli, Victoria and Charter - is 3,903 cattle and 5,655 sheep and goats. In his dissertation the statistics for five districts - Hartley, Charter, Victoria, Tuli and Iron Mine Hill - is 2,369 cattle and 5,822 sheep and goats. The discrepancy in these estimates is an indication of the reliability of these statistics. (149) Further it is noted that only 116 beasts were collected in Hartley. (150) In Charter the Native Department concentrated on grain seizures, but the district was largely neglected with eleven personnel changes at the Range within one year. (151) No Assistant Native Commissioner can be traced in the Tuli district. It would seem therefore that the majority of livestock seizures, advanced in either of Beach's variant estimates, were taken in the Victoria district. According to Beach's paper, only 483 cattle and 875 sheep and goats were collected in 1894, so 3,540 cattle and 4,780 sheep and goats were collected between January and December 1895, mainly from the Victoria district. Yet, though livestock expropriation was, according to Beach, particularly intense in the Victoria district, this is the area where the chiefs "collaborated" and did not "rebel". (152) Beach's statistics as to livestock seizures give an incorrect
impression as to the impact of the Native Department on the Shona peoples. Though Beach maintains that the pressure of the Native Department increased after 1894, a study of the documentary sources indicated little intensification of cattle and food seizures in 1895. The reason being that there was a limited domestic market for livestock which the hut tax was used to satisfy. For the same reason that farming did not develop there was little sense in intensifying cattle seizures when faced with an inconsequential domestic market and no export market. Beach also fosters an incorrect impression of the impact of the Native Department by implying that the effect in the districts chosen for his study are an indication of its pressure throughout Mashonaland. Beach chose districts along the route of the Pioneer column to Salisbury. These districts experienced a degree of penetration not witnessed in other districts such as Lomangundi, Mangwendi, Mazoe, Makoni, Matibi or Sabi. In these districts the Native Department was firmly resisted and the attempt to collect hut tax a dismal failure. Curiously, besides Victoria, Melsetter was the other district where there was a visible European presence, and Melsetter like Victoria suffered no disturbance in 1896. The evidence would therefore seem to contradict the seizure of food supplies and depletion of Shona wealth through the extraction of hut tax as a "cause" for "Rebellion".

Beach has also suggested that the interference of Native Department personnel in Shona politics provoked a great deal of
resentment and hostility. (155) However, the political situation among the Shona was never static; there was continual struggle. The Native Department personnel, with no more than eleven Assistant Native Commissioners, including Brabant, at any time in Mashonaland, influenced only a faction of the conflicts and changed the distribution of power to a minimal extent. (156) Prior to the conflict of 1896 the Native Department had not established itself to the extent where it presented any dramatic threat to African society. Understaffed and inexperienced, the Native Department personnel attempted to carry out their instructions to the best of their ability in districts that were too large to effect any extensive impact. (157) The contact with the African people was of a fleeting and infrequent occurrence. When they began to impinge on local autonomy they were firmly resisted as had been the Portuguese and Ndebele before them. (158) Some of the Assistant Native Commissioners had integrated themselves into the political power struggles of the Shona and were looked upon as allies to be manipulated in the advancement of personal self-interest. The Assistant Native Commissioners who successfully integrated themselves into African society opened up important lines of communication which became vital during the conflict of 1896 - 7. Their activities prior to 1896 had varying results, but the effect often was to develop a special relationship with one chiefdom or house contra vie another chiefdom or house. The "collaboration" of some polities is only understood within the framework of civil war. This aspect was ignored by the Europeans intent on their own war of conquest in
Finally, the challenges of European technology and material culture and Christianity to traditional society need to be assessed. The Shona and Ndebele were eclectic peoples perfectly able to cope with any new innovation without a dramatic rending of the traditional social fabric. The number of Europeans who infiltrated the country was small, and the technology which accompanied them was basic. Cobbing has shown that guns were accepted within Ndebele society from a point very early in their history, and even wagons were well known before 1890. Traders and concession hunters had brought an assortment of European manufactured goods into the country, but in relation to the black population this represented a drop in the ocean. The use of a search light during the Pioneer Column's march and rockets in 1893 are, as is Mr Issel's attempt to build a hot air balloon in the Bulawayo laager in 1896, of interest only as historical curiosities. European settlement was restricted and even Bulawayo would have compared unfavourably with Mashayamombe's villages in the Hartley district. The mines with their not very impressive stamps were innovations, but were too few in number to make much of an impact. The Ndebele and Shona were not isolated from developments in the south. Some had sought work on the Rand and Kimberley mines and there had been subjected to a far more intense "cultural shock". Lobengula had sent Mtshete and Babayane, two izinduna to England in 1888 as envoys to Queen
Victoria. They had experienced the full impact of European culture and technology. If they had been disturbed by what they saw, which from the evidence relating to their latter conduct seems unlikely, they appear to have only confided their opinions to Lobengula and his closest izinduna. (165) The argument that European culture and technology provoked a reaction is difficult to sustain when the evidence suggests that European culture and technology was neither impressive nor oppressive.

The influence of Christianity and missionary activity prior to 1896 on the African people was insignificant. The number of conversions, despite years of toil, was small. (166) The missionaries were few in number and aspects of Christian theology difficult to understand and of no relevance to the African situation. The African peoples had their own religious beliefs and systems which prior to 1896 served them adequately. (167) The missionaries provided no challenge to the traditional religions. It has even been suggested that Christian doctrines were even on occasion assimilated into traditional beliefs. (168) However, by establishing friendships with certain communities the missionaries ensured that no breakdown of understanding occurred in 1896 - 7, which accounts for the "neutral" stance or "collaboration" of many Shona communities within the vicinity of the missions. (169) Though the latter brought limited material benefits, prior to 1896 their attempts at introducing literacy, western education and medicine were similarly frustrated. The impact of the
missionaries prior to 1896 was minimal, and they provided no challenge to the traditional religious systems. To see the events of 1896 in terms of a "cosmic conflict" as does Ranger, requires a very vivid imagination. (170)

This chapter has attempted to reassess the conventional wisdom with regards to the impact of European penetration on traditional African society in the period 1890 to 1896 as a "cause" for "Rebellion". Beach makes an important point when he writes, "the correlation between pressure and resistance is not exact", but he fails to come to the correct conclusion. (171) This thesis, however, is concerned with casting doubt on the assumption that European pressure led the Shona and Ndebele to rise in 1896. Having briefly dealt with these "causes", it is now possible to turn to the central focus of this study - the events of 1896 - 7 and therein to seek an explanation for the conflict.
Footnotes: Chapter Two

(1) British South Africa Company Reports, 1889 to 1896. For example, the Reports for 1889 - 1892 give a summary of the gold production in the country up to that date. These Company figures should be compared with those published by the Chamber of Mines, for the same properties, listing the total gold production in the country by March 1897.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REEF</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>1892 TONS</th>
<th>GOLD</th>
<th>1897 TONS</th>
<th>GOLD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Salamander</td>
<td>Hartley</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>392oz</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>439oz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matchless</td>
<td>Hartley</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78oz</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32oz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heatherfield</td>
<td>Hartley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100z</td>
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<td>Shepherds</td>
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<td>Inez</td>
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<td>Golden Quarry</td>
<td>Mazoe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>91oz</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>96oz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Mazoe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7oz</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7oz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wickens</td>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>89oz</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>1084oz</td>
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<td>Birthday</td>
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<td>51oz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37oz</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7oz</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This comparison of the Company statistics with those of the Chamber of Mines in 1897, indicates that the Company inflated the figures in 1892. The Company Reports, generally, exaggerate the degree of social, political and economic development which had taken place. This was done with an eye on the fluctuation of Company stock on the London Stock Exchange. As Henry Labouchere correctly noted in Truth 31, viii, 1983, the B.S.A.C. was "a stock exchange swindle". The Company Reports are not to be relied on to accurately represent the impact of the Europeans on the indigenous population.

See also M.C. Steele's Introduction to the Rhodesiana Reprint edition of E.F. Knight, Rhodesia of Today, (1894), (Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1975).

(2) M. P. for Northampton, a prominent radical politician and a vociferous critic of Rhodes and the Company.

(3) Sir Richard Martin’s Report (c.8547) reflected as Earl Grey noted, his hostility to the Company, and entrenched certain abuses as "causes" for the Rebellion. It is evident, however, that judgement was passed before Martin began his enquiry. In June 1897, Sir Alfred Milner, recently arrived High Commissioner, wrote: "The blacks have been scandalously used. A lot of unfit people were allowed to exercise power, or at any rate, did exercise it, especially with regard to the natives." C. Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers, vol.1, pp. 105 - 8, (London, 1931). Milner to Selborne, 2 June 1897. The same criticism and condemnation took place in the British Parliament and press, and was echoed in Rhodesia by those intent on indicting the Company for maladministration in order to, among other things, justify their claims for compensation. Many of the contemporary accounts of the "Rebellions" subsequently
published identified and discussed these "causes". These include: Sykes, With Plumer in Matabeleland, Selous, Sunshine and Storm, Baden - Powell, The Matabele Campaign 1896, Plumer, An Irregular Corps in Matabeleland.

(4) E. Tawse - Jollie, The Real Rhodesia, (Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1971), Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, N. Jones, Rhodesian Genesis, (Glasgow, The University Press, 1953), Ranger, Revolt, Cobbing, "The Ndebele under the Khumaloes, 1820 -1896", Beach, "The Rising in South Western Mashonaland, 1896 -7". An interesting exception is H.M. Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, (London, Macmillan, 1926), p.353: "In view of the prolonged dispute as to the causes of the Rebellion which afterwards took place between the Imperial Commissioner (Sir Richard Martin), the Company's officials, and various missionaries and settlers prejudiced in one direction or another, and of the efforts which have been made in later years to attribute the risings to gross oppression of the natives by the Government, or the settlers, or both, it may be as well to state here that a close study of the question based on the evidence taken at the time and in the country has convinced me that there is no justification for incriminating individuals or for seeking recondite causes."


(7) These statistics are derived from an examination of the Company Reports, 1889 to 1898, the official documentation relating to the conflict and the Historical Manuscripts collection of the Zimbabwean National Archives, as well as from newspaper reports. A census held on 1 March 1895 recorded 1 232 white males and 164 white females in Bulawayo, and 507 white males and 88 females in Salisbury. The appendix to The '96 Rebellions, p.122, states that the total population of Mashonaland in October 1896, including 22 police and 1 218 members of the relief force, was 2 736. The settler population of 1 497 comprised 765 men, 311 women and 421 children. James A. C. Mutumbirwa, The rise of settler power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1889 - 1923, (London, Associated University Presses, 1980) p.26, gives the following statistics: 1893 - 1 122, 1895 - 4 863, 1896 - 2 737, 1901 - 11 032, 1903 - 15 000 whites. The African population in 1902 is estimated at 514 813. Cobbing, "The Ndebele", pp. 466 - 467, Appendix B, estimates the Ndebele population in 1893 to have been between sixty and eighty thousand people. These estimates exclude non - Ndebele people living in Matabeleland. See also Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press,

(8) Plumer, *An Irregular Corps*, p.5, states that there were 1,400 men, 800 women and children, 200 "Colonial" Africans in Bulawayo. Selous, *Sunshine and Storm*, p.58, quoting the Matabele Times of 8 April, gives the figures of 832 women and children, 915 men, a total of 1,547 people in the Bulawayo laager.


(10) ZNA Hist. Mss. Co 1/1/1 - James Cock Diary. Only about 800 men were available for service when the violence escalated in Matabeleland in 1896, out of the 1,232 in the province. Thus one third were unavailable due to old age, sickness or other infirmity.


(12) ZNA A 1/2/2, Currey to Jameson, 11 and 18 Dec 1891. Jameson undertook to reduce drastically the police force at the end of 1891 under instructions from Rhodes to ecogonise. A system of volunteer units was then established but it never became an effective force, the men being more concerned with the pursuance of their own interests.


(22) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p. 365. Bulawayo Chronicle, 14 Dec 1895, Rand output for November 1895 was 195 218 oz.


(24) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, Appendix G. Chamber of Mines Second Annual Report, for year ending 30 June 1897. Brown, On the South African Frontier, p. 119: "Thus a block of ten covered an area of fifteen hundred feet by four hundred, equivalent I believe, to one claim in American mining districts. Doubtless, the idea of division into many claims arose from the demand in London that mining enterprise should be on a big scale. Ten claims would not sound large, but ten blocks of claims, making one hundred altogether, would appear much more imposing - on paper." NAZ Lo 30/1/1/13, telegraph, Jameson to B.S.A.C., 20 May 1893: "Everywhere new finds are occurring daily. Crushing everywhere successful. Wonderful developments in every district. Reefs certainly improve as depth increases." Phimister, "Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand", p. 82, quoting Rhodesian Herald, 16 March 1894: "(For) nine months each year the development of auriferous Mashonaland is gravely performed by cable and telegraph."


(26) This question deserves further research. Along with the growing pessimism as to the gold reserves of Rhodesia, the high cost of living forced many of those who had little financial reserve to leave the country. The "Rebellions" of 1896 - 7 may have given the anemic colony the necessary transfusion of new settler blood, as many of those who fought in the war were persuaded to stay on in the country.
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(27) NAZ Hist. Mss. 8i 3/4/1, letter, Tyndale - Biscoe, 9 August 1893: "I should like very much when we get back (if we ever do) to ask the Government (British) to take over this country (Rhodesia), there is hardly a man in the country who has not been sold by them (the Company) in one way or another. When the (Hiates?) were at home (Britain) they managed to get 50,000 subscribed to float ( ) a company to develop and prospect, but it fell through because the Company would not give them sanction as they said that we ought to float a gold mining company which would be a swindle on our part if we did as our properties have not been developed enough."


(29) Bulawayo Sketch, No 66, 19 October 1895, "Our Mining Laws". Chamber of Mines Second Annual Report, for year ending 30 June 1897, Appendix, letter dated 2 April 1897.


(33) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.369.


(37) Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.40.

(38) Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.40.


(40) Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.40.

(41) Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.40.

(42) Knight, Rhodesia of Today, p.36.

(44) Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.41.

(45) Hole, Old Rhodesian Days, pp.97 - 98. Mutumbirwa, Settler power, p.44. Cd. 8674, Interim Report, 1914, p.3 (Southern Rhodesian Native Reserves Commission): "The members of the original pioneer force, some 200 in number received the right of selecting farms of 1 500 morgen in Mashonaland.... Rights to mark out farms were also granted to members of the police force taking part in the occupation within a specified period, and a number of rights lapsed owing to the non-fulfilment of this condition. On the whole the number of farms occupied in Mashonaland during the first three or four years after the arrival of the pioneer expedition was small in proportion to the vast area opened up, and the indigenous native tribes scattered through the country were not exposed to any pressure or inconvenience from the presence of the European settlers."

(46) Cd. 8674, Interim Report, p.6: "Partly owing to their natural aversion for abandoning districts which they had occupied for several generations, and partly because of the distance of the reserves from their existing kraals, the Matabele did not at once, nor indeed for many years, avail themselves of the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves, and no efforts were made by the Government to induce them to settle on the ground provided for them. They remained scattered about the country in the districts where they had resided before the occupation."


(48) Knight, Rhodesia of Today, pp.15 - 17. Cd. 8674, Interim Report, pp.6 - 7: "The first tendency of the settlers was to encourage the Matabele to remain on the farms for the sake of their labour. The natives were regarded as tenants, and in many cases they were glad to enter into arrangements whereby in consideration of a small annual rent or of an undertaking to furnish labour for their landlords as stated seasons they should enjoy undisturbed possession of their old village site and lands." Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, pp.391 - 392, presents contrary evidence.

(49) Ranger, Revolt, pp.101 -105. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.42, recognised that his earlier seminar paper was wrong in this respect. The problem of markets is important to note, and it remained a barrier to agricultural development. In this respect, see Knight, Rhodesia of Today, pp.32, 34, 37, 84, 93; Mutumbirwa, Settler power, pp.29, 66; The Rhodesian Review, 1905 - 6, p. 57: "Markets were few and far between. Transport was expensive." Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year ending 31 December 1910: "The difficulty of the farmers is
not in the production ...but in the assurance of a market at reasonable prices, the demand by mines and prospectors for food, meat, potatoes, pumpkins, being of an erratic and unreliable character."


(51) Letter in the possession of the historical reference section (City Hall) of the Bulawayo Public Library.


(53) These photographs are to be found in the photographic collection of the Zimbabwean National Archives. Several photographs have also been published in the reprint editions of Rhodesiana published by Books of Zimbabwe, Rhodesia), Bulawayo.

(54) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, pp.359 - 361.


(58) Beach, "The Risings", p.263.


(60) The '96 Rebellions, p.63. NAZ Lo 5/6/1, Telegraphic conversation, Grey, Vintcent, Carrington, 25 June 1896.


(62) Beach, "The Risings", p.256.

(63) Beach, "The Risings", p.255. NAZ F4/1/1, C.C. Victoria to Statis, 12 July 1895: "most coloured labour is supplied by Shangaans, Inhambanes and Zambesis."

(64) Beach, "The Risings", pp.254 - 255. NAZ F 4/1/1, C.C. Victoria to Statis, 12 July 1895.

(65) Beach, "The Risings", p.255 - 256. Hole, Old Rhodesian


(68) Chamber of Mines Second Annual Report, for year ending 30 June 1897.


(71) Beach, "The Risings", p.254.


(74) Keppel - Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia*, pp.410 - 411. CO 879/36/426, no 131, encl 2, p.174, "Travellers and traders on the Manica Road one and all quoted the natives as speaking in a contemptuous way of the white man's authority! 'That they only talked, and did nothing', no doubt alluding to the before (mentioned) unpunished murder."


(84) Keppel – Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.413. CO 879/36/426, no171 end, p.212.

(85) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ja 3/1/1, Thursday 30 May 1896: "Macomba an old chief living about 8 miles to the west calls, spins a yarn about his kraal having been raided by natives and his son killed. Having some experience in regard to these fairy tales I pursued the enquiry and found that it happened a year ago. He wants me to surprise his rival promising a booty in the shape of cattle, sheep and goats." W. Posselt, "The early days of Mashonaland", N.A.D.A., 1947, p.37, August 1889, "Ultimately I reached the kraal of Chief Mugabe, who received me kindly. He was then embroiled in a quarrel with his neighbour Charumbira, and urged me to assist him in an attack on his enemy. This, of course, I refused to do."


(87) Beach, "The Risings", pp.272, 288, 289.

(88) Beach, "The Risings", pp.268 – 269. NAZ Dv 15/1/1, Fort Victoria Court Records. Brown, On the South African Frontier, p.386: "With time, the good moral effect of the Ngomo affair upon the Mashonas wore off, and their attitude again grew threatening. Robberies became frequent, and several more murders occurred. The custom then established of dealing with such cases solely in the civil courts resulted in a few prosecutions for theft and none at all for murder! The difficulties encountered in capturing criminals and obtaining evidence among such a multitude of barbarians were so great, and the legal stumbling-blocks in the way of conviction were so numerous, that up to the time of the outbreak of rebellion, not a single Mashona had been sentenced for the murder of a white man! As a natural result of such lame modes of procedure, murder and robbery increased in frequency, and finally culminated in the awful massacres of 1896."

(90) Beach, "The Risings", p.269 - 270.


(92) Beach, "The Risings", p.272.

(93) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ed 1/1/1.


(95) Appendix One.

(96) Appendix One.

(97) Appendix One.

(98) Chapter Three, Appendix One.


(100) Hole, *Old Rhodesian Days*, pp.97 - 98, Knight, *Rhodesia of Today*, p.36: "When I was in Mashonaland the townships were half deserted - there had been a diversion of population and cattle to Matabeleland."

(101) Beach, "The Risings", p.289.

(102) Appendix Two.

(103) Appendix Two.


(108) NAZ A 1/12/9, Rhodes to Duncan, telegraphic conversation, 30 March 1896.
Appendix Two. In Mangwe, for example, A.N.C. Armstrong is known to have exercised little restraint over his Native Police. Yet, Mangwe was not affected by the disturbances.

Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.409. There were complaints in Mashonaland as to the behaviour of the police, but these were not very clear. See NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, B 96 11 18(a). Generally the settlers dismissed these complaints as unfounded in view of the large number of Native Police who deserted, Al 1/2/1, p.33, Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1896.

Ranger, Revolt, pp.105 - 106, 113.

Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.398, Ranger, Revolt, p.113.


Judging from the writings of previous commentators it would appear that they have little idea of the difficulties involved in herding and kraaling such vast numbers of cattle. For example, the 30 000 head allegedly kraaled by the Company at Inyati would have required facilities and manpower they did not have at their disposal. Though the Company claimed these cattle they were still in the possession of the Ndebele. The Matabeleland News and Mining Record, 14 April 1894, notes that the 30 000 head at Inyati were not kraaled and each week there were "the loss of hundreds ..... by theft and other causes." C 8547, Sir Richard Martin in his report, though antagonistic to the Company, beyond quoting Carnegie's estimation of 200 000 head taken before the distribution, refrained from further comment as to the total number of Ndebele cattle or their disposal. Martin made no mention of cattle having been covertly removed from the country. Though he was in the country primarily to investigate the activities of the Company, he produced no witnesses or other evidence to substantiate the assumption of the removal of vast numbers of cattle from Matabeleland. Neither Ranger, Cobbing nor Stigger have produced any evidence to substantiate the assumption of covert cattle sales and removal of large numbers of stock to South African markets. In my own cursory examination of South African newspapers, I can find no evidence of such a conspiracy.

An indication of the terrain through which these herds would have had to pass is to be found in Hole, Old Rhodesian Days, p.14: "I will not dwell upon the journey of six hundred miles through the monotonous sand and bushveld of Bechuanaland, during which we were often hard pressed to find water for ourselves and our beasts." An article which is part of the revision of the cattle question
is R.S. Roberts, "African cattle in pre-colonial Zimbabwe", N.A.D.A., 1980, p.84. Roberts argues that the Shona and Ndebele were far poorer in cattle than previously estimated.


(119) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, pp.26, 69. NAZ Lo 5/4/4, Driver to C.N.C., 15 September 1896: "(Gwelo) until the rising a large number of large and small stock were being herded by Djumani for white men, with his own Matabele cattle and sheep." C 8547, Martin report, evidence of Bulawayo and Gwelo Resident Magistrates, C.N.C Bulawayo and A.N.C's Bulawayo, Gwelo, Belingwe, Gwanda, Insiza, Umzingwaani and Mangwe.

(120) Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", p.29 Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.12, C 8130, "Several ..... witnesses have expressed an opinion ..... that to their certain knowledge the natives have hidden large numbers of cattle placed in their charge by Lobengula." Bulawayo Sketch, 11 May 1895. Matabeleland News and Mining Record, 30 June 1894. NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 13/1/1, W.J.H. Barry, correspondence with mother, Bulawayo, 24 October 1894.

(121) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", pp.373 - 374, 381, fn. 3. Matabele Times, 25 May 1894. Matabele News and Mining Record, 14 April 1894. Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", p.29, quoting Public Records Office, Colonial Office, 879/40/459/32, encl 5, Jameson, Bulawayo to H.C. Cape Town, telegram, 26 December 1893: "so far from the looting of private cattle taking place, all the King's cattle that have been captured are already allotted to natives living in their kraals around Bulawayo, these natives being told to herd the cattle, and use the cows for their children.", 879/40/459/136, Loch to Rippon, telegram, 19 December 1893:"that in every case where natives give in their submission they are allowed sufficient cattle to take back with them to their kraals for domestic requirements.", 879/40/459/41, encl 1, Gould Adams, Bulawayo to H.C. Cape Town, telegram, 31 December 1893: "the cattle ..... taken on the troops first coming into the country have been given out to the poorer natives ..... to provide them with milk for their children."


(123) Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", pp.1,


(127) NAZ Misc. LMS 1/5/13, Carnegie to T. Lempson, 6 July 1895: "The Company are taking from the different kraals some 200 or 300 head every month." This is an exaggerated claim. C 8547, p.37, Grey to Martin, telegram, 18 January 1897, gives a realistic estimation of Company needs. Only 100 head were then in the loot kraals, and they claimed a further 700 reserved as police rations.


(129) Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", pp.20, 42, Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.397. The Company carefully patrolled the Transvaal border to prevent cattle leaving the country, and as most of the white population had left Mashonaland there was little incentive to take cattle to that province. Knight, Rhodesia of Today, p.36: "When I was in Mashonaland the townships were half deserted - there had been a diversion of population and cattle to Matabeleland.", (my emphasis).

(130) Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", pp.20, 42, Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.397, Beach, "The Risings", p.275, interview with Mr. Jim Nyika, 2 December 1968, p.458 : "Not many people of this country were brave enough to steal from the ama Ndebele people, only those who went there with the Europeans, and when they returned after the ama Ndebele were defeated by the Europeans, they drove the cattle here."


(132) As noted earlier, (fn.116), I can find no evidence of covert cattle sales or filtration of Ndebele stock into South African markets. This estimation is therefore made in deference to the views of previous commentators and the evidence led by Stigger, "The Land Commission of 1894 and cattle", pp.20 - 22, as to the existence of such a trade route. Stigger's evidence, however, does not substantiate the opinion expressed on pp.33 - 34: "Loch thus created the illusion in London that the Chartered Company's actions were not endangering the final settlement in Matabeleland, while he simultaneously facilitated the injection by the Company of at least 22,000 head of Matabele cattle into the mobs moving down the established stock..."
routes to the south. The Company was thus able to overcome the immediate financial and political difficulties which it faced as a result of the Victoria Agreement without, however, being able to surmount the problems created by its endemic lack of money at a time when its administrative responsibilities had increased through its recent conquests. In September 1894, therefore, the Chartered Company expected the Land Commissioners to conceal the sale of volunteers' loot cattle, then approaching the 30,000 head ceiling, and to provide a formula which would permit the Company to dispose of Ndebele cattle on its own account. The Land Commissioners concealed the sales made on behalf of the volunteers by hearing evidence only on African appropriations of cattle after the invasion and on alleged Holi movements into Mashonaland, while they enabled the Chartered Company to acquire control of cattle for itself by interpreting this and other evidence to create such an impression of confusion that their final recommendation, that ownership in virtually all cattle be transferred to the Company, appeared logical.

(133) Ranger, Revolt, pp.105 - 113.


(137) Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.396.


(139) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ed 6/1/1. Gambo also complained in October 1894 that 400 head of cattle had been taken from him and driven to the Tati concession.

(140) Ranger, Revolt, p.113.


(142) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.469, C 8547, p.37, Grey to Martin, telegram, 18 January 1897. What Ranger might be referring to, though in a very distorted way, is Carnegie's assertion that the distribution of cattle prejudiced the young men who now did not have the necessary labola to acquire a wife. However, young men did not "purchase" wives on their own initiative, they were aided by their kraalhead and relatives as customary marriages are of a communal rather than a private nature. See also C8547, p.55, report by J.M. Orpen. Selous,
Sunshine and Storm, pp.xii - xiii, notes Ndebele who "rebelled" despite living on Arthur Rhodes's farm with plenty of cattle and exempt from labour extractions.

(143) Appendix Two, Beach, "The Risings", p.278, NAZ M 1/1/1, Secretary to Mining Commissioner Lomagundi, 6 September 1894.


(145) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.400.

(146) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.400.

(147) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.400, Beach, "The Risings", pp.278, 284, Ranger, Revolt, p.69, NAZ A 15/1/1, Instructions on the collection of hut tax, 17 March 1894.


(150) Beach, "The Risings", p.286, NAZ A 15/1/1, N 1/1/3.

(151) Beach, "The Risings", p.287.

(152) Beach, "The Risings", pp.287 - 288, Brown, On the South African Frontier, pp.387 - 388: "In one locality alone were the mashonas dealt with, for any considerable length of time, by means which might be termed harsh. This was in the Victoria district, where the blacks were so extremely unruly that rigid discipline seemed absolutely essential. During the first years of white occupation, native affairs in that region were left largely to the discretion of Captain Brabant, who had had previous experience in Kafir management in the Cape Colony. This gentleman gave the tribes under him an opportunity to learn of the white man's power to rule. His regime became eventually the subject of so much criticism on account of its severity, that he was dismissed from the employ of the Chartered Company. He returned to his home at the Cape, but upon hearing of the rebellion and the critical straights of the white inhabitants of Rhodesia, he forthwith made his way with all speed to Victoria, where more than one thousand natives, from among the tribes formerly governed by him quickly responded to his call to arms. Thus, as allies of the whites, these Kafirs followed their so termed former "oppressor" to assist in quelling the revolt of their brother Mashonas residing in the more humanely treated sections."

(153) NAZ N1/1, N1/2, N1/3.
Chapter Four. Ranger, Revolt, p.??.


(156) Appendix Two. Chapter Four.

(157) Appendix Two. Ranger, Revolt, p.117. Bulawayo Chronicle, 23 January 1897, letter by "Politicus": "After the campaign of 1893, a native policy was gradually formed by the Government. It was a lax and crude policy, and depended too much on the individuals who were ordained to carry it out. The districts were too large and the native commissioners too few for the system to work well. They were supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with all the natives in their particular districts, which was in most cases humanly impossible. Many of them were young men, almost boys in fact, and young men are not reverenced by the native mind. Most of them had pastoral and household duties to perform which occupied no small portion of their time. The formation of two large reserves was talked about but was never carried out. The best of policies would have failed under similar conditions."


(159) Beach, "The Risings", p.276. Chapter Four, for example, the relationship between Chirumanzu and A.N.C. Weale.


(162) NAZ N1/1/3, Tax Collector Umfuli to C.N.C. Salisbury, 1 November 1895: Mashayamombe controlled "about 30 kraals covering a distance of 20 miles along the Umfuli river and 5 miles on either side of it. Mashengombie's own kraal being about 14 miles from Hartley close to the Beatrice Road. Approximate number of huts 450."


(165) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1, statement by Nkungusi, wife of Lobengula, 7 November 1937: "Babian was the real one who went to see the Queen. I don't know what these men told Lobengula
when they came back. He would never tell anybody."


(168) Bhebe, *Christianity and Traditional Religion*, p.100.


(171) Beach, "The Risings", p.250.
Taken from "The Ndebele", p.402.
Chapter Three

The question of "Rebellion" in Matabeleland

That there was a planned, organized and coordinated "Rebellion" in Matabeleland has not yet been questioned. The debate has been as to whether the "Rebellion" owed its origin to religious or political leadership. This chapter intends to challenge this basic assumption of previous writers. It will begin by outlining the oral and documentary evidence which contradicts any thesis of a planned rebellion. Having cleared the decks for a new interpretation, the escalation of violence will be traced through several phases which culminate in the war of conquest of 1896. This war will be briefly examined to emphasise the uncoordinated response of the Ndebele.

The rich oral evidence derived from African sources emphatically denies any planned or organized "Rebellion". Ndansi Khumalo, son of Mhlahle, induna of the Gaba izigaba, and grandson of Mzilikatzi, fought in the conflict of 1896. Yet he stated in an interview with J. W. Posselt and Margery Perham that:

"How the rebellion started I do not know; there was no organization, it was just like a fire which suddenly flames up." (1)

On the conclusion of hostilities, Maduna Mafu, induna of the Godhlwayo izigaba, regarded by Cobbing as the leading light in
the organization of the "Rebellion", made an important statement to the Chief Native Commissioner, Herbert Taylor. The recorded text of this statement is presented here in full:

"Gist of statement made by Maduna, 22 - 1 - 97

The first I heard of the rising was the killing of the Native Policeman by Umsobo (of Bulawayo) on the Umzingwane River. A few days later I heard that Fezela's (brother of Lobengula) people had killed Mr Cumming's wagon driver and the span of donkeys and looted the wagon. Then I heard that Feloni had killed Umfetshana, a white man, and also that Dumisa (another white) had been attacked but had repulsed the attack and had escaped. Thence the rebellion spread to the Insiza, where the Cunningham family and others were killed. All this time the 60dhlwayo people were quiet.

I had gone with Izana my grandfather to the kraal on the Umzingwane. On returning to my kraal I was told that the Godhlwayo men were arming and collecting at the Godhlwayo kraal. The Sergeant of Native Police at Umfulabuso was conferring with them as to what action they should take; they decided to arm and send to Mahlahleni, their induna for instructions. Meantime the Sub-Inspector of Native Police and other 'white men in the District were murdered. Mahlahleni ordered the murders but was not personally present. He sent and ordered the Godhlwayo people to bring their cattle and join him over the Umzingwane, and enter the Matopo Hills with him, they refused to do so as he had only ordered and not led them. Thus the Godhlwayo people saw no fighting, but when Sikombo sent and told them that peace was established, and the people were surrendering, and they must bring in their arms, they fled to Mpateni, where they are still in hiding.

Note - Maduna gave all the information he could in an apparently sincere manner, and his statement is I think reliable. Umsinzela, the elder man with him was more reserved, reticent and diplomatic, and seemed very disinclined to give any information.
Maduna further stated that the rising came as a great surprise to them - it arose and grew on the spur of the moment - and was not pre-arranged - but circumstances helped it on and fanned the flames of rebellion. The Godhiwayo people beyond committing the murders in the district took little or no part in the fighting.

S.D. Herbert. J. Taylor
C.N.C. "(2)

The importance of this document cannot be ignored. It offers a valuable insight into the African perspective, which Ranger and Cobbing among others, failed to penetrate. There is also a statement made by Gampu Sithole at the first official Matopo indaba:

"We have no leader, and it is impossible for a nation to live without a leader. These people sitting opposite us (meaning the rebels) brought trouble to the land. We did not know anything of the war until it was brought on suddenly." (3)

In latter years, a European interested in Ndebele history, collected an important statement by Nganganyani Mshlope, an Ndebele informant:

"The first place where we started to fight was Inyati. I can't remember who started it. 'It simply happened." (4)

Besides such statements by African participants in the conflict, there is a wealth of contemporary European evidence
before we had reached Bulawayo and safety."(10) Katey explains Umjaan's actions in terms of the strong personal ties established between the aged induna and her parents. It appears from the narrative that Katey was not aware of the stance adopted by Umjaan during the conflict.

Selous provides the link when he comments in *Sunshine and Storm* that:

"Umjan, once the Induna of the Imbezu regiment and now quite an old man, has also refrained from taking any part in the present hostilities, although he is one of the few whose cattle were shot by order of the Government because they were infected with the rinderpest. He came into Bulawayo soon after the outbreak of the rebellion with his wives and immediate attendants, and is now living quietly near the town. His sons, however, have joined the rebels, whilst the men whom he formerly commanded - the Imbezu - reformed themselves into a regiment, and have been fighting since the outbreak of the insurrection."(11)

As induna of the Imbezu amabutho, Umjaan was a man whose personal loyalty to the Ndebele royal family was beyond question. If a plan had been formulated and the rebellion organized, Umjaan would have been expected to play a prominent part in its preparation. So the decision of Umjaan to remain aloof from the conflict was not that of a weary old man, it is an explicit denial of a planned "Rebellion". 'It is not possible to question Umjaan's loyalty, as has been done with Gampu Sithole, to discount the fact of his "collaboration".(12) Gampu's "collaboration" is also strong evidence against a theory of a planned insurrection. Gampu was a powerful and
influential figure, though often in conflict with Lobengula. He may have been ambivalent in 1893, but he certainly was not eager to collaborate with the Europeans, and was possibly the last Ndebele induna to make his peace with the British South Africa Company. (13) Therefore, any argument which attempts to exclude Gampu from the planning and organization of the "Rebellion" on the basis of his proven disloyalty would be based on very tenuous ground indeed. Gampu, apprehended in Bulawayo during the escalation of violence, was clearly unaware of any planned "Rebellion". (14)

The actions of various Ndebele engaged in European employment during this period of escalated violence underline further the argument that there was no planned or organized "Rebellion". H. P. Fynn, the Assistant Native Commissioner at Insiza, sent one of his native policemen to Belingwe to warn the Europeans in the district of the first murders in Filabusi. That policeman, on completion of his assignment however "never returned to his duty but ......... went over to the rebels with his rifle and bandolier full of cartridges." (15) W. E. Thomas wrote in his report:

"I beg further to state my firm conviction that the Native Police, with the exception of a few in District No 6, were not in the "know" - in fact they knew no more about the affair than the white people did for three reasons.

1st Two native policemen were amongst the first victims.

2nd With the one exception above given none of the
Police absconded until they had been disarmed - or their comrades had been disarmed.

And although numbers were coerced eventually into joining the rebels the majority have remained loyal to the present time."(16)

Thomas had ample evidence upon which to base his firm conviction. Captain T. Laing, later to be ambushed in the Inungu Borge during the Matopo campaign, on receiving H. P. Fynn's message at Belingwe, consulted the Assistant Native Commissioner, S. N. G. Jackson. He sent out his native police to warn the Europeans in the district, and these duties were faithfully performed. These policemen were in due course to desert, thoroughly alarmed by the antagonistic and bellicose behaviour of the Europeans.(17) The native police on the Gwaai river helped the Assistant Native Commissioner to safety when threatened.(18) The native police who accompanied the Assistant Native Commissioner of the Umzingwani district, H. M. G. Jackson, on his patrol into the Matopos in pursuit of the Umgiorshlweni killers, remained loyal until their disarmament on returning to Bulawayo.(19) The Native Police were clearly unaware of any planned, organized or coordinated "Rebellion". However, the involvement of the Filabusi native police in some of the earliest murders suggests that a localized explanation for the conflict must be sought.(20) Cecil Rhodes incorrectly perceived the "Rebellion" as a police revolt.(21)

A reconstruction of the sequence of events during the period of escalated violence provides conclusive proof that there was no
planned, organized of coordinated "Rebellion". Selous describes a confrontation on 20 March 1896 between a party of Native Police and a group of Ndebele, led by Umzobo, former induna of Lobengula's Bulawayo. (22) There were eight native policemen, who acting under the instructions of H. M. Jackson arrived at the imusí of Umgorshlweni, situated near the Umzingwani river. They were eating their evening meal when Umzobo, and a retinue of attendants arrived and provoked a confrontation. It would seem that insults were passed and as tempers flared an attack was made on the native policemen. The attacker was apprehended, but then killed as one of his companions fired on the Native Police. Outnumbered the Native Police beat a hasty retreat. They arrived at Jackson's camp at 1 am the next day. They handed him the captured rifle of their first assailant, and reported the loss of two of their young servant boys. Jackson later found that one of these small boys "had been murdered in a most brutal way, his skull having been smashed to atoms with knobkerries". (23) Jackson then prepared to chase and punish the Umzingwani killers. Selous notes that the murder of these two servants and the accidental killing of one of Umzobo's men was not the only deed of blood to occur that Friday night. Among Umzobo's men was one "Ganyana", who after the retreat of the police went alone to the kraal of "Umfondisi", a nephew of Lobengula. He woke him up and told him what had happened. "Ganyana" roused "Umfondisi" who was eager to fight. Together they then went to a neighbouring kraal and awoke the headman to tell him the news. One of Jackson's native policemen happened to be sleeping at that kraal.
Awakened, he came out of the hut and enquired what was happening, informing them he was a policeman. "Ganyana" then shot him, and as he fell down, "Umfondisi" plunged his assegai into him. (24)

Though there had been a skirmish between the Assistant Native Commissioner and the Shona people of Belingwe in early March, the escalation of violence may be traced to the events of Friday 20 March, 1896 as described above. (25) This conflict bears all the characteristics of a typical African beer fight. The fracas was clearly a confrontation which arose out of the immediate situation. The two young boys cannot be said to have been representative of an alien and oppressive system. The decision of "Umfondisi" to participate in the killings was not the result of any planning. The first victims of the escalating violence were not Europeans, but Africans. The people who participated in these killings were aware that retribution would follow. They were faced with the choice of either submitting to punishment, or resisting. They decided to desert their kraals and seek refuge in the Matopos. (26)

The excitement which these initial confrontations generated in a very tense atmosphere provided the stimulus for further attacks. There was a gap of three days between these initial violent confrontations and the first killing of Europeans. During these three days the tension increased as those involved in the initial incidents realized the precariousness of their
position and the punishment that would follow. As the news of the killings spread to neighbouring kraals, apprehension increased. These initial killings generated a certain amount of elation and euphoria, which was heightened by the delay in retribution. Fear and the apparent success of the first killings provided the momentum for attacks on Europeans. Yet, even at this point the violence may have proved to be nothing more than the frantic attempts of a few isolated communities to escape punishment, or the seizing of an opportunity by disaffected elements to demonstrate their hostility. But since these isolated outbursts developed into a full scale confrontation, it still needs to be determined how and why this happened.

The chronology of the first murders of Europeans needs to be established if the process of escalated violence is to be understood. There are conflicting theories as to the sequence of events. Cobbing, who derived his information from the papers of Roger Howman's research into the life of Orlando Baragwanath, a legendary pioneer, argued that the Assistant Native Commissioner at Filabusi, George Bentley and the Europeans in the vicinity of Edkin's Store, were the first to be killed. (27) Howman expressed the opinion that;

"since the planning of the Rebellion was centred on Induna Umlungulu who lived near Essexvale, and the Filabusi community was near the militant impi of Fezela and Mahlahleni, it is reasonable to suppose that Bentley in his office and his neighbours were the first victims on the morning of Monday, that the signal then spread up the Insiza river to catch the
Cunningham family at midday and up to Maddocks in the evening." (28)

The evidence, however, suggests that the attack on Edkin's store at Filabusi was not the first. Maduna Mafu's statement draws a clear distinction between the initial acts of violence and the decision of the Godhlwayo people to send to Mahlahleni for instructions. (29) Maduna's statement suggests that the first murders of Europeans took place on the Umzingwani, the area disturbed by the killings of 20 March. It then moved down the Umzingwani into Insiza and then on to Filabusi. Maduna links Fezela of the Essexvale district with the initial killings. The statement of a "colonial native", who survived the attack on Edkin's store, said that the murders of seven white men, two "colonial boys" and an Indian cook "were committed suddenly and without warning by native policemen, aided by natives from the surrounding kraals under two brothers of Lo Bengula, Maschlaschlin and Umfaizella." (30) Fezela is therefore linked to two incidents of violence, which is an indication of how the violence spread engulfing people who were unprepared for a "Rebellion". Orlando Baragwanath stated in his correspondence with Howman that;

"The idea that the rebellion broke out prematurely in our minds was that Maduna the chief at Filabusi was very friendly with Bentley, and not keen to prove his loyalty to the cause." (31)

Baragwanath's observation corroborates Maduna's statement, and contradicts the oral evidence of Manhlehle Thili, an Ndebele
informant, relied upon by both Howman and Cobbing, who supplied the following information in 1973;

"Skonkwani was camped at Nkulwani Hill with his impi the Mkitika, Maduna Mafu Nkojene was camped on Inzinga Hills with the Godlwayo section. The two sections were camped on the hills for five days before they attacked. They had people working in the camp and on the mines. Skonkwani and his section attacked Edkin's Store which was situated west of the camp and Maduna and his men attacked from the Insiza Hills east of the camp." (32)

Manhlehle Thili's statement is unreliable and Cobbing made the mistake of uncritically accepting Howman's seemingly impressive research. Howman, however, was attempting to reconcile his assumptions as to the sequence of the first murders with the evidence of a letter, written by Orlando Baragwanath to his brother -in- law on 30 April 1896, which contradicted the argument that the first murder of Europeans took place at Edkin's store on Monday 23 March. The content of this valuable source of detail is quoted here in full;

"On March 16th Albert came to Bulawayo, Cummings and I followed two days later, as I wanted to see about getting a contract.

On Saturday evening, Albert started back and did not reach Filabusi until Monday night about 9 o'clock.

Arthur Cumming went back on Monday morning on his bicycle and reached our camp (which was about 12 miles west of Filabusi) Tuesday 11 o'clock. As he rode towards the hut he thought everything was very quiet. On looking in there lay our camp boy, who must have been killed Monday morning or Sunday night, and the place looted. He rode back to the Umzingwani Store - 3 miles distant to send a message to Bentley, the Commissioner, and give notice of the murder, not for a
moment thinking a rebellion had started, although there were rumours of it. In fact old Mr Cumming spoke to Albert as he had years of frontier experience. Arthur decided that he would go himself and was preparing to mount his bicycle, when a young native rushed up and told them that everyone at Filabusi had been killed, and the Store was burning. What confirmed this tale, was while talking to the boy they heard a big explosion, which turned out afterwards to have exploded at a camp a mile from the Store, but they took it to be the dynamite held in stock at the Store.

Arthur and a man Lucas started straight away for Bulawayo, and it was early on Wednesday morning that he got into Town. We went to the Administrator and demanded arms, and as they were under British control, owing to the Jameson raid, it was not until 2 O’clock that we got any. 33 Strong. (sic)

When we got to the Umzingwani Store, found it in flames. We pushed on as fast as our sorry nags could travel, most of us on foot by then. [W]e reached Filabusi Store, Thursday 11 o’clock.

The Store burnt and Albert’s hut, the other hut intact. Albert’s body was the first we came across. It was in front of his hut site. He was shot through the head. His partner Edkin, and another, some say Carpenter were the next. Carpenter (Percy Cumming’s mate). In the kitchen a Cape boy. Bentley and others at the Native Affairs post. I was too upset to go to the other camp at the Celtic, O’Conner and Ivers. The latter mutilated. We off saddled for a couple of hours as the horses were done up to go to all the camps. The Cunningham family, three generations, about 15 miles off were all killed. Percy Cumming was ill at the Store and just about to leave for Bulawayo in his wagon."(33)

Albert therefore only arrived at Edkin’s Store at about 9 o’clock on Monday night 23 March. Orlando Baragwanath’s correspondence with Howman led him to mention that;

"I rather doubt if on Albert’s return that they did discuss the possibility (of a rebellion), Edkin told his cook to get on with his work when he reported that some native women said the white men were being murdered on the Celtic mine."(34)
If a warning was given to the Europeans at Filabusi of the murder of whites on the Celtic mine, then the attack on the settlement probably followed on the morning of Tuesday 24 March. Baragwanath's letter contains a great deal of incidental detail confirming Maduna Mafu's statement that the attack on Bentley and Edkin's Store took place on the orders of Mahlahleni after the initial disturbances.

Though the facts of the initial incidents of violence are still obscure, a general theory may be advanced. It would seem that the violence initiated on 20 March on the Umzingwani had a rippling effect into Insiza. The movement of peoples disturbed by these initial incidents may have led to attacks on Maddocks and other prospectors, before the attack on Filabusi. Fezela can be traced to having been involved in the initial disturbances and the attack on Edkin's Store. The militant activities of individuals such as Fezela may have acted as a complement to other attacks provoked by specifically localized conflicts. There may also have been attacks based on purely personal initiative as is illustrated by Nganganyani Mshlope's account of the escalation of violence in the Inyati district. However, before turning to the spread of the escalated violence, Mahlahleni's decision to order the killing of Europeans is worth examining in the context of the history of the Godhlwayo people.

Godhlwayo lay on the north-eastern extremity of Ndebele
settlement. The chiefs were Mafus who had a very tumultuous history. The first Mafu remembered is Mlajana, whose son, Muhubu joined Mzilikatzi and became a famous igame (brave man). He received the praise name Dambisamahubo after a successful rearguard action against Tshaka's men, as Mzilikatzi fled west across the Drakensberg. During the 1830's he was elevated to lead the newly formed Godhlwayo ibutho. He opposed Mzilikatzi during the 1841-2 civil war and supported Nkuluman's attempt to establish a separate kingship. Defeated in battle he fled either south of the Limpopo or into Gazaland. (35) This did not alter the Godhlwayo succession. Dambisamahubo had twin sons by his chief wife, Ncozana, and Mtikana the second born, was by Ndebele custom the successor. Mtikana became an outstanding general, leading a semi-independent group of Ndebele in which the Mafu family controlled an assorted population of peoples of Nguni, Berwa, Rozvi, Kalanga and Venda origin. His rule extended east of the Umzingwane, as far west as the Ingezi, and the Godhlwayo people claim - as far south as the Limpopo. Mtikana was a prominent attendant at court, he dressed in European clothes, arranged private hippo shoots on the Umzingwani, led his own raiding forces into Mpateni and beyond into Chivi and Gutu, and in the late 1860's married Mzilikatzi's daughter, Makwa. After Mzilikatzi's death, Mtikana, like another Mafu, Tshukiso of Induba opposed Lobenguela and urged that a more thorough search be made for Nkuluman. (36) When at the beginning of 1872, Mangwane and Kanda invaded the kingdom, Mtikana was reputed to have sent them
cattle at their camp on the middle Tuli. (37) His part in helping to suppress the rebellion was considered to be equivocal, and in 1874 or early 1875 Lobengula ordered his execution. Thomas Morgan Thomas of the London Missionary Society asked Lobengula in 1875 why Mtikana had been executed. Lobengula replied, "Baya funda akulababa mina", they wished to kill me. (38) In 1878, Captain Patterson, an envoy to Lobengula, wrote, "Umtagan, a great induna of the Kutwayo, crime supposed sympathy with Kuruman, obeying the King's summons was without trial without warning killed on the road by the King's messengers". (39) In response some of the men of Godhlwayo armed themselves, marched to Bulawayo, and intimidated Lobengula into killing the amansiusa (executioners) who were from Imbezu. (40) After Mtikana's execution his brother, Mahlahleni Mafu, became regent for the heir, Maduna, the son of Mtikana and Makwa. In July 1888 the Berlin missionaries made a reference to "riot and troubles [which] have broken out at Makoa's as a result of the death of the Tuna there who acted as a regent for the chieftainess". (41) Godhlwayo was relatively unscathed during the years 1893 - 5, although the people moved south - east to the Shaga Hills.

Cobbing states that;

"Mahlahleni and Maduna were the major fermenters of the Rising in Filabusi in March 1896, operating west against the old Gwanda road and east towards Mpateni and Belingwe." (42)
Several reasons emerge from the brief history of the Godhlwayo people which tend to negate Cobbing's assumptions. From a strategic perspective, to begin a rising in the north-east on the extremities of Ndebele settlement would have been unwise. The European population of this district was small, and the African peoples were of varied origin and unlikely to respond with common purpose. If a rebellion had been planned, it theoretically should have received its impetus more to the north-west near the Ndebele heartland, and closer to the offending European community. (43) Further, the Mafus, as illustrated in the careers of Dambisamahubo and Mtikana, had aspirations to political independence, and were closely associated with the disaffected element in Ndebele society. Their participation in any scheme to plan or organize a rebellion to re-establish the Ndebele kingship under a Khumalo of Lobengula's line, would have been acting against their historical alignment and their self-interest. (44) The reference of the Berlin missionaries to "riot and troubles" in relation to the regency provides a clue which enables an understanding of Maduna's statement incriminating Mahlahleni. It would seem likely that a division occurred within the Godhlwayo people between supporters of the legitimate heir, Maduna, and the former regent, Mahlahleni. The age and experience of Mahlahleni would have given him a degree of prestige which Maduna appears to have resented. (45) Mahlahleni's motive for ordering the murder of Europeans is difficult to determine. He may have been influenced by the
presence of Fezela, or simply reacted to local provocation. It is possible that he may even have been challenging Maduna’s authority. Maduna clearly regarded it as a challenge. The fact that many of the Europeans resident in the district had gone into Bulawayo, leaving the whites who remained behind even more vulnerable than usual, may have influenced Mahlahleni’s decision. (46) Maduna Mafu’s statement links the conflicts of domestic Ndebele politics with the initial killings of Europeans, and indicates how these schisms retarded any movement towards a cohesive response even by the Godhlwayo people to the escalating violence.

The reaction of the Godhlwayo people to this violence conflicts with the role attributed to them as the fermenters of a planned “Rebellion”. The report of Chief Native Commissioner Taylor on the conclusion of hostilities noted that;

"The natives of the district are principally of the Gothlwayo Kraal or Regiment. They were the first to revolt and no less than 27 murders were committed in the immediate vicinity of Filabusi. They took no part in the fighting and have not in the least suffered." (47)

As the violence escalated, the Godhlwayo people under Maduna Mafu moved into the Mapeteni region. They were involved in no further conflict with Europeans. The failure of the Godhlwayo people to play a significant part in the subsequent conflict contradicts any thesis which attributes to them a central role in the initiation of a planned "Rebellion".
J. Chalmers, in *Fighting the Matabele*, provides a useful (factual and fictitious) insight into how the escalated violence spread. Two points emerge from the narrative; a relatively small group of armed men was responsible for a succession of attacks, and as many of the Europeans were killed in groups, the number of attacks required to kill 145 Europeans was small. (48) These two points are substantiated by Fezela’s involvement in the disturbances on the Umzingwani and the attack on Edkin’s Store at Filabusi. However, the account of Nganganyani Mshlope of the fighting in the Inyati district best illustrates the process of the spread of the escalated violence:

"We were only six of us when we killed those people. We left our kraal to kill them. There was Tjontjonlani, myself, Mkumbi, Kafuli, Malikinya and Ngonge. We divided off in groups to go off and kill the white people that we knew. Our kraal was separate and we decided to go off and kill these white people. No one came round to tell us that the fighting had started. We had the news from the Matopos that the fighting had started. We had the news from the Matopos that Mlimo was going to help us, so we just decided among ourselves that there were white people over there and we had better go there. We had no grievance against these people. We killed them merely because they were white people. We were going to kill all the white people because we had the news that the Mlimo was going to help us." (49)

The passage of time has given a racial edge to Nganganyani’s oral evidence, and Windram’s leading question about the Mlimo prompted the desired reply. (50) However the central thrust of
Nganganyani’s statement remains clear; there was no preplanned organized conspiracy for a rising of the Ndebele people. The important point to note is that the actions of six men brought the Inyati district "into rebellion", unbeknown to the rest of the African people in the district. According to Nganganyani they killed on the same day some people in the Insiza district. (51) A second attack by a much larger group of men took place three days later on Assistant Native Commissioner Graham and the Europeans at Inyati Store. The first attack took place on 24 or 25 March and the second attack on 26 or 27 March. (52) The news from the Matopos, referred to by Nganganyani, came after the initial confrontations on the Umzingwani river. As part of the process of escalated violence, the actions of small groups of men acting on their own initiative, explain why the general African population was caught unaware as were the Europeans. This facet of the conflict clearly emerges from Selous’s account of this period.

On the evening of Monday 23 March, Selous heard about the events of the previous Friday while resting at the camp of Assistant Native Commissioner Jackson. Selous had just finished a cattle patrol which aimed to contain the spread of the rinderpest disease. Jackson was on his way with a force to pursue the Umzingwani killers into the Matopo Hills. On the morning of 24 March, Selous rode back to his own home near Essexvale and passed Umgorshlweni on the way. He found the kraal where the murder had taken place, together with many smaller ones in its vicinity absolutely deserted. Selous
reached home about midday to find everything as usual. His wife reported that several Ndebele had come that morning and borrowed axes. That evening some of these men returned and they chatted about the recent murders on the Umzingwani, and the conduct of Umzobo and Umfondisi. (53) Selous's account emphasizes two things; Europeans were still living unmolested among African peoples two days after the first killing of whites, and though these African people were aware of the escalating conflict, at this point they were not involved. These facts are significant as the district was that of Umlungulu of the Intanteni izigaba. Umlungulu during the time of Lobengula presided over the Inxwala (first fruit) ceremony, and so as the most influential personage in Matabeleland, it is to him that the central role in planning, organizing and coordinating a "Rebellion" has been attributed. (54) Later that evening, Selous was informed by his servant George of the killings at Filabusi that morning. He then began to fear a rebellion, though he considered himself in no danger from the local population, but only from raiding parties coming from a distance. Nevertheless, Selous took precautions against an attack.

On the Wednesday morning Selous set about his normal tasks. He was about to sit down for breakfast when the same servant arrived. He brought the news that armed Ndebele from Gwibi's kraal, a nephew of Lobengula, had raided some of his Company's cattle. George was accompanied by a young boy sent by the
headman from the kraal from which the cattle were taken. Despite the threats of Gwibi's men the headman had sent the boy to inform Selous. The people who herded cattle for Selous were, therefore, clearly unaware of any planned or organized rebellion. This led Selous to conclude that "this rising had been fermented by members of the late King's family, and was confined so far to the Aberzantsi or Matabele of pure Zulu descent."(55) It was therefore not a general rising. These men did not attempt to attack or kill Selous, but contented themselves with a cattle raid. It would seem that far from engaging in a planned "Rebellion", the men from Gwibi's kraal were taking advantage of the growing uncertainty to steal Selous's cattle. Cattle theft clearly took preference over any desire to kill Europeans.(56) While Selous was still speaking to George, another messenger arrived to inform him that the Intunteni people had left during the night. They had taken their cattle into the Matopos with them, the greater part of which were "owned" by Willoughby's Consolidated Company, for which Selous worked. This action of Umlungulu would seem to be at odds with the role ascribed to him in the events of 1896. Though within easy walking distance of Selous's house, Umlungulu instead of attempting to kill the Europeans in his own immediate vicinity, decamped with the cattle placed in his care and sought refuge in the Matopos. These are most certainly not the actions of a man committed to "Rebellion", less still to a well planned and organized insurrection.(57)

Selous decided that the first thing to do was to take his wife
into Bulawayo, and then to return with a force of armed men. He believed that a show of force would deter those Africans who were still sitting quietly watching events from joining the "rebels". (58) Before travelling to Bulawayo, Selous sent messengers to summon all the headmen of kraals in the immediate vicinity to his homestead. These men all possessed cattle belonging to Willoughby's, and as they were not pure blooded Ndebele, Selous therefore "imagined they would have no sympathy with the insurgents". (59) Selous addressed these men and impressed upon them the folly of "Rebellion". They expressed themselves in perfect accord with what he said and disclaimed any desire to overthrow the white man. (60)

Selous's testimony illustrates clearly that there was no organized or planned "Rebellion" with the specific objective of killing all Europeans. As Ndansi Khumalo noted, "it was just like a fire which suddenly flames up". From the Umzingwani, the flame of "rebellion" spread through the Insiza and Filabusi districts, to the Shangani and Inyati, and thence to the mining camps in the neighbourhood of the Gwelo and Ingwenia rivers, until the whole of Matabeleland was perceived by the Europeans to be engulfed in its flames. What is also clear is that it was not a general rising. The initial murders were perpetrated by small groups of men acting often on their own initiative. Though the Europeans assumed that "the Ndebele struck with a simultaneity, cohesion and viciousness" which marked a planned, organized and coordinated attempt to drive them from the
country, this assumption failed to take note of the fact that in the evolving chaos, many victims of the turmoil were African peoples. The Europeans perceived the disturbances as a conspiracy to exterminate them and they struck back viciously. Indeed, in this tense atmosphere of agitation and uncertainty, it was the activity of the Europeans which played a significant part in the general escalation of violence.

Ross Townsend, the Civil Commissioner of Bulawayo, sent the first news of the disturbances to the Administrator, Sir Albert Grey, then at Umtali, by telegram at 9.30 am on 25 March:

"25 th news just in of further raiding and murder by natives in Filabusi reported that the native police have joined the rebels and shot some of their officers no really authentic news is yet obtainable but matters are certainly serious. Spreckly with 25 picked men is leaving in an hours(sic) time for Filabusi. Napier with 50 men and maxim left last evening for Insiza no answer being received from High Commissioner we have demanded ammunition. Nicholson organized defense of this place will be arranged today, horses are scarce and we are obtaining them from where ever possible. Duncan is taking command of whole business.

I do not regard as by any means organized or united rising of natives but drastic and decisive steps must be taken to quell the insurrection." (61)

Drastic and decisive steps were taken, but these served only to increase the uncertainty and to exacerbate the conflict. The reaction of the Europeans to the initial violence must now be examined.

On 23 March the death of the prospector Maddocks at Insiza
brought the news of the kindled "Rebellion" to Bulawayo. (62) Public pressure led to the formation of a Council of Defense to meet the perceived emergency. Inspector Southey of the Matabeleland Mounted Police was sent on patrol to Insiza to investigate. Colonel Napier of the Rhodesian Horse Volunteers left for Shangani, Captain Grey for Tekwe Store. Captain Dawson left to reconnoitre the Umzingwani Drift. (63) On Wednesday 25 March, Mr Duncan, the Acting Administrator, called a public meeting to ask for volunteers. Mr A. H. van Rensburg offered to form a Dutch Afrikaner Corps. That evening there was a false alarm of an impending Ndebele attack, (a fear which was constantly present even after the arrival of Colonel Plumer's relief force). The frantic scramble for arms and ammunition reflected the tension and unpreparedness of the community. (64) On Thursday 26th a strong laager was formed around the Market building, with four machine guns and barbed wire. Captain Pittendrigh and twenty of the Afrikaner Corps then left to rescue the people at Inyati. (65) The next day waggon's from all over Matabeleland began to pour into Bulawayo. The Rhodesian Light Horse Detachment was disbanded to form the Bulawayo Field Force, comprising fourteen troops. The Regiment was placed under Colonel Spreckly, with Lieutenant-Colonel Gifford as second in command, and Captain Corden as Adjutant. (66) On 11 April there were reported to be 850 men under arms with twelve machine guns and seven seven pounders and 680 horses. (67) In expectation of an Ndebele attack dynamite mines were laid outside the laager. The Dutch settlers now formed a second laager near the service reservoir. Captain Brand then built a
third laager in the south west corner of the town. (68) From the beginning of April to the end of May there were a succession of skirmishes. Inspector Southey was involved in the defense of Insiza Store. (69) Captain Brand was caught in a running fight through the Matzeni Hills on the Tuli road. (70) Lieutenant Colonel Gifford had a fight at Fonseca’s farm. (71) Captain Mac Farlain had two skirmishes on the Umguza. (72) Sorties were made every day by the Bulawayo Field Force. African people suspected of being spies were arbitrarily executed, it being argued in the circumstances that swift and brutal punishment was justified. (73) The desertion of many of the native police, taking with them their arms and expertise, made the apparent position of the settlers more serious. (74)

The defense measures undertaken unsettled the African peoples. The men who undertook the patrols were aggressive and arbitrary in their actions. The note at the bottom of page six of the Reports on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia 1896-97, illustrates the role played by the Europeans in the spread of the escalated violence.

"There is reason to believe that the rebellion could have been confined to these parts (Insiza, Umzingwani, Gwelo, Mavena, Bembezi and Inyati districts) had the suggestions of the Native Department, as to the desirability of keeping loyal natives (?), as yet not concerned in the rebellion, been acted upon. In certain cases, natives who had intentions of remaining loyal were driven to join the rebellion, as for example the case of Manyakavula, who was a nephew of the late King Lobengula, who acted as the principal induna of the Gwanda district and in the late King’s time exercised chieftainship over the Ematshetsheni
Kraals. On the 24th March, Mr Jackson, who in command of a patrol of 80 Native Police was about to enter the Matoppo Hills to apprehend the Engodhlweni Kraal murders, went with Mr Cooke to Manyakavula and borrowed from him with his willing consent, five head of cattle as food for the Police, and instructed him that he and his people were to take no part in any disturbance, but to remain quietly at their kraals, and no harm would come to them. Manyakavula accompanied Mr Jackson into the Matoppos and remained with him for two days. Manyakavula's people obeyed his injunction and remained at their kraals. On the 27th, however, a patrol passed the kraals opening fire on the natives, killing one or two, and setting fire to the kraals. Manyakavula then joined the rebels with all the Ematshetsheni tribe."(75)

Assistant Native Commissioner Jackson was not aware of any "Rebellion" when he called on Manyakavula on 24 March. He was only informed of this "fact" when he returned from the Matopo patrol, and his native police were disarmed.(76) As far as Jackson was concerned, though he ventured right into the heart of the subsequent "rebel" stronghold, he was simply on a routine police patrol. Manyakavula was clearly also unaware of any planned rebellion, or he would not have accompanied Jackson's patrol. As a nephew of Lobengula, and principal induna of the Gwanda district, had any "Rebellion" been planned, he would have played a part in organising it. Manyakavula's decision to resist the Europeans clearly, and understandably, arose from his outrage following on the random attack of a patrol of Europeans on his kraals. The effect of such arbitrary action on surrounding kraals is easily perceived. The escalation of violence which engulfed Manyakavula and the Ematshetsheni people of Gwanda district was provoked by European activities, and clearly involved no
planning or organization.

The ability to lose friends and make enemies is perhaps most strikingly evident in Captain Laing's account of the Belingwe laager, *The Matabele Rebellion 1896.* (77) There is described how the native police, the African labourers and the local Shona chiefs, despite protestations of "loyalty", each successively "rebelled". Reading between the lines it is apparent that the suspicious, hostile and bellicose attitude of the Europeans influenced the actions of the African peoples in the Belingwe district. Though the Native Police had faithfully warned all the Europeans in the district they were not trusted. Attempts were made to disarm them, and after further threats they decamped. Their desertion confirmed Laing's suspicion of their disloyalty. (78) The African servants brought into the laager were forced to prepare defensive works. They were identified as the "enemy" and treated as such. When the defenses were completed, Laing gave the Africans the choice of staying in the laager or departing. About seventy decided to leave at once, and about twenty-five decided to remain. Having threatened the Africans for several days, Laing interprets their decision to depart not only as an indication of their own disloyalty but also of their districts. Laing came to "the conclusion that there were very few loyal natives to the west, south, or north of us". (79) Laing's suspicious hostility also influenced the behaviour of the Shona chiefs in the district. He refused to believe their protestations of loyalty despite the fact that they had done nothing to support a "Rebellion". (80) In the
disturbed circumstances, some Africans took advantage of the opportunity to steal the possessions of the Europeans, but there were no murders in the district. A Mr Björqvist, before coming into laager on 28 March, had followed for some distance the spoor of his rieved cattle. They were being driven to the south - west by a large party of armed Africans, who merely laughed at his endeavours to retrieve them. Though armed they did not attempt to hurt him, but simply drove the cattle along a little faster and jeered when he gave up the chase. This is not quite the behaviour expected of men committed to a planned insurrection. (81)

If one assumes that there was a planned "Rebellion" then the striking feature of the events of 1896 is the apparent incongruities of the Ndebele strategy. Why did the Ndebele begin the "Rebellion" by attacking isolated individuals in outlying districts? Why was there no coalescence of forces for an attack on Bulawayo? Why did it take a month for an Ndebele force to venture into the environs of Bulawayo? Why was the Mangwe road to the south left open? Why was the Ndebele military strategy disjointed to the extent that their forces were perceived to be divided into three sectors, separated from each other by vast distances? Why did the Ndebele adopt a defensive strategy and seek refuge in the Matopos, allowing the Europeans to take the military initiative? Why was so much effort wasted on a civil war instead of uniting in a campaign against the Europeans? These, and other questions cannot
satisfactorily be explained away in terms of superstition or the different objectives of Ndebele military strategy. These questions reflect an incorrect perspective which hinders an understanding of the nature of the events of 1896.

As the initial killings of Europeans in outlying districts were not the result of any planned "Rebellion", there was no plan of campaign against the Europeans. Though the Europeans expected an attack on Bulawayo this did not materialize because the Ndebele were disorganized and no attack had been determined upon. The failure to attack Bulawayo was therefore no "missed opportunity". The Ndebele were as unprepared for a "Rebellion" as were the Europeans to face it. It took over a month for Ndebele forces to venture into the environs of Bulawayo, because it took that length of time for the Ndebele to get the measure of the situation. The forces that allegedly "massed" on the Umguza were small and possibly represented a local response to European harassment, rather than a mobilization for an onslaught on the settlement. The Mangwe road was left open not because of Gampu or the Mwari oracle's influence, but because there was never any strategy devised to cut it off. The dramatic flight of the Europeans into laager obscured their perception of the confusion which then prevailed among the African peoples. There was no central leadership to coordinate the various peoples. The local leadership responded to the situation on the basis of their localized perception. The Ndebele were faced with a series of European patrols which attacked and harried indiscriminately. "Rebel" impis, or rather
scattered bands of Ndebele, roamed the countryside taking advantage of the situation to raid and loot European homesteads, to attack other peoples and to pay off old scores. As such, even the perception of three military sectors attributes to the Ndebele greater military unity than existed. (84) The Ndebele adopted a defensive strategy because they were faced with a situation for which they had no planned response. The initiative fell to the Europeans who harried the Ndebele into defensive strongholds. (85) The civil war among the Ndebele is an aspect of the events of 1896 which deserves equal if not greater prominence than the conflict between white and black. The internal divisions prevented any planned "Rebellion" and retarded any movement towards a cohesive and united determination to expel the European settlers. (86)

Due to the assumption of a planned "Rebellion", no attention has been paid to the process whereby the Ndebele aligned themselves in the conflict. The process of alignment reflects the unplanned nature of events. Choices had to be made by the Ndebele who were faced with a crisis for which they had no preconceived response. Influenced by local circumstances different choices were made by different leaders;

"Bulina, chief of a kraal on the Shiloh Road, the late King's Head Gardner, came in with his men, having been chased away by surrounding rebels. Sikombi, petty chief near Thabas Induna, fled last night with all cattle to join rebels near Umzingwani." (87)
The Ndebele response to the escalated violence was a disjointed and disorganized campaign by several scattered groups;

"In conclusion, I beg to point that the greatest difficulty of the position has been in ascertaining the plans of the natives; they were evidently congregating to various centres, killing and destroying, as far as possible, all in their course, but it was uncertain whether they intended to continue this scattered method of fighting, or, by a sudden movement, to unite the many impis so formed, and make a dash in full force on Bulawayo."(88)

The confusion as to the movements of the Ndebele and their intentions, derives from the assumption of a planned "Rebellion".

In the chaos many groups of Ndebele fled seeking sanctuary in the Matopos Hills or other strongholds. Reverend Carnegie of the Hope Fountain mission station commented;

"Our position is unique. We can say there are rebels and loyalists among the natives, and we are told this is not so, they are all rebels, ought all to be shot etc etc. I send you a special edition of the local paper which is generally correct in regards to the native question.

Reed and myself rode out to Hope Fountain yesterday. I have been doing my best to calm own people and persuade them from fleeing to the Matopos Hills. Several stores and farm houses within (a radius of ten miles ?) have been burnt down. In our quarter I am thankful to say that all things remain intact, but that the natives are now in terror of their lives, in fact are between two fires, the white man on one hand and their rebel neighbours on the other. Yesterday I assured them that there was no safety in flight and urged upon them to remain quiet."(89)
Not everyone who took refuge in the Matopos Hills can therefore be described as a "rebel". Carnegie also reports that 450 Africans and 200 head of cattle were taken away from his district at the beginning of the conflict and were probably in the charge of the induna Sikombo in the Matopos Hills. However, even when in the Matopos "rebels" could still be persuaded to become "loyals". Father Prestage, a Jesuit missionary, in the opening weeks of the escalated violence;

"left his mission station near Mangwe last week, with only one attendant, bravely to go into the Matopo Hills, and endeavored to alienate many of the chiefs known to him from taking the rebel side, arrived in town, bringing with him 18 representatives of the leading 10 indunas, representing some 600 people, who were desirous of being protected by us, and granted special protection passes." (91)

The process of alienating "loyal" from "rebel" was further boosted when the Reverend Reed of Bulalima brought in thirteen izinduna, representing 2000 people who desired to remain neutral. (92)

The number of Ndebele peoples who played no active part in the conflict has been ignored by historians. The tendency has been only to refer to individuals such as Gampu or Faku and to brand them as "collaborator". An impression of a "general rebellion" is dispelled when it is realized that there were many more communities and leaders who refrained from embroilment in the conflict. Sikombo, a major "rebel", made this point to Sir
Richard Martin at the first official indaba on 11 August 1896;

"You speak to us as if we represented the whole of Matabeleland. The majority of us didn't take part in the rebellion. You must speak to us when we are better represented."(93)

In the Bulawayo district, by the middle of April, special passes had been given to 125 headmen, representing about 600 men, and a further 1200 had been issued for servants.(94) Izinduna such as Dakamela, Umtyana, Sevale, Mhlambezi and Selevi disassociated themselves from "rebels" like Madhlwa, Geledu, Topana, Mfelana, Mhlambi, Mpotshwane and Mtshete.(95) The Bulalima district to the south-west of Bulawayo was under Gampu. In the course of events about one third of the population of this region were to identify themselves with the "rebels".(96) In the Bubi district, Nyenyeni, a petty induna who had guided the invading column of 1893, was one of those who sought refuge at Gwelo.(97) The Belingwe district into which Maduna Mafal led the Godhlwayo people saw no fighting. Two Shona chiefs, Wedza and Mazeteze, were caught in an uneasy relationship with the Europeans, due to Captain Laing's extremely suspicious character.(98) In the Umzingwani district, major "rebels" such as Sikombo, Umlungulu, Fezela and Bundwe had their settlement, but even here;

"About one hundred head of families of this district remained loyal throughout the rebellion and rendered valuable service in accompanying the various columns which were sent to operate against the rebels by cutting road ways etc. These natives amongst whom are some petty indunas are being recompensed for their
services and loss sustained by them and are also being supplied with seed to meet their requirements."(99)

The Gwanda district, where the indiscriminate activities of a patrol on 27 March prompted the violence, had several prominent "rebels", among them Mezui, Sikota, Nyanda, Babayane, Dhilliso, Role, Malheza and Mtwani. This district also had several prominent "loyals" such as Faku, Mepisa, Mkatsvana, Ngameni and Mrwape. The report also notes:

"The natives in the southern portion of the district principally Makalaks under Dopi, Mule, Bezembile appear to have taken no active part in the rebellion, but have looted and destroyed a number of mines and dwellings there, possibly at the instigation of the Matabele."(100)

In Mangwe there was only one intimation of unrest, and that was in June. The "Makalaks west of Mangwe under Chief Maloy likely to rise". The prompt action of Assistant Native Commissioner Armstrong quelled this disturbance.(101)

Though a brief breakdown of "rebels" and "loyals" helps to dissipate the illusion of cohesive resistance, it still does not reflect the true complexity of the situation. Many of the "rebels" took no part in the conflict with the Europeans, and some of the "rebels" were involved in conflict not only with "loyals" but also with other "rebels". The situation is more complex than has so far been perceived. An Ndebele civil war has been described by Cobbing. The emphasis was on the latter phase of the conflict, and it was interpreted as deriving from
the primary conflict against the Europeans. (102) The civil war has been interpreted as a conflict between "patriots" and "collaborators" (meaning traitors). (103) This perspective denies the reality of conflict between the Ndebele independent of European influence. An Ndebele civil war can, however, be traced from the beginning of the escalation of violence, clearly independent of any consideration for the Europeans, and which, it would seem, even took preference over the conflict with Europeans. Indeed, if an assessment is to be made on the basis of the number of people involved in the conflicts, 1896 is more significant in the early phase from the perspective of internecine warfare. During the war of conquest the European factor gained ascendancy and determined the final manifestations of the civil war. In the opening phase, however, the civil war and the conflict with Europeans were distinct and independent of each other. This is clearly evidenced in the position of Gampu Sithole.

When the news of the initial disturbances was brought to Bulawayo on 23 March:

"Gambo, the Chief of Western Matabeleland happened to be in Town with twenty of his Indunas about the cattle disease question; and a guard was at once placed over the whole of them after an explanation of the causes necessitating such a step. They all expressed their entire ignorance of the rising and seemed quite agreeable to remain in Bulawayo with us." (104)

It was reported on 3 April that Gampu's people were to be
attacked by "rebels". (105) Despite further attacks by "rebels" on Gampu’s people, the Europeans were still not convinced of his "loyalty".

"Re. Gambo natives large forces in NW are reported attacking Gambo’s people. Gambo is still here the native advisers say keep Gambo here. A good general he might turn against us, they trust no natives." (106)

When these attacks took place on Gampu’s people he was still incarcerated at Bulawayo. He had done absolutely nothing to assist the Europeans in suppressing the "Rebellion". The attacks therefore could not be due to his being a "collaborator". The civil war in western Matabeleland raged on with increasing intensity throughout the conflict. Though the attacks on Gampu’s people have been interpreted as part of a war directed against the Europeans, it is clear that they were initially part of a conflict distinct from that involving Europeans.

Other instances of internal conflict among the Ndebele may be briefly mentioned. From the outset of the escalated violence Faku Ndiweni was under continual attack from peoples very often formerly under his command.

"Malisa was formerly a subsidiary chief of Faku’s and is one of the rebel indunas of the Inungu Gorge and bears as Faku states a bitter hatred towards him and will do his utmost to kill Faku before he surrenders." (107)
Long established conflicts and rivalries independent of the Europeans account for the civil war involving Faku. (108) The Assistant Native Commissioner was later to observe that the hatred of Faku took preference over the desire to fight Europeans or to surrender. (109) Bulina, as already mentioned, was chased away by "rebels" from his kraal on the Shiloh road and he came into Bulawayo. (110) Dagamela surrendered on 3 August and stated;

"I am a headman on the Bembine. I warned the N.C. to escape to Bulawayo as the natives were arming themselves. The day after the N.C. left, Mshliva and his impi, with Mutapene and Mkalazi came and surrounded my kraal and said they had come to kill me as I had warned the N.C. to move, and that if I joined them they would spare me. I refused and they then took by force some of my young men and said they would return and kill me that night. I and my people escaped and moved towards the Bembezi below Sabakezi’s and from there I moved to where I am now. Mshliva burnt my kraal two days before the Column fought near N’kalones (Mc Farlain)." (111)

The early reports at the beginning of April mentioned divisions among the Ndebele, between those who wished to flee for safety and those who were determined to stay and fight. (112) Towards the end of July there were more reports of quarrels and dissension among the "rebels" Ndebele. There were quarrels throughout the conflict over grain.

"Umgunzanz, who after looting Selous’s house remained in the Mulungweni Hills incurred the enmity of the Entuntweni people on account of his having helped himself freely to the contents of their corn bins during their absence in the hills. A strong party of Matabeles attacked him killing one man, captured 11 of
his women and flogged Umgunzana with sticks."(113)

Raiding also played a major part in these conflicts:

"The prisoners all speak of quarrels and dissension among the Matabele themselves - The Matabele have been plundering the Maholi granaries and the latter have retaliated by killing any stray Matabele they come across."(114)

As Ndebele *indunas* came in to profess loyalty towards the close of the conflict, more evidence emerged of internal conflicts:

"Up to the present five Native Chiefs who had not taken part in the rebellion; viz: -

Mataluse, Mlahana, Mtshembesi, Mwedzi, Mezwa of Ulangowa district have sent in to report themselves loyal. Muregu of Somakwa district, came in also and reports that he took no part in the rising. Since he came in I had a complaint from one of Malutux's men, Nkonke to the effect that Murega had, about two months ago, taken his, Nkonke's cattle, four head."(115)

There is evidence to suggest that the raiding by Ndebele was responsible for the spread of the disturbances into Mashonaland.(116) The fact of raiding is significant. As another facet of the conflict it suggests that an underlying tension influencing the escalation of the violence may be found in the shortage of food supplies.(117) A further aspect which deserves research as a facet of the conflict is the possibility of an attempt to regenerate local imperialism. The activities of the Godhlwayo people in the Mapeteni region of the Belingwe district, for instance, suggest an attempted extension of
The Enemy

Perplexed Officer Commanding Troops (outside Bulawayo): Oh! Boys, have you seen such a thing as an impi of NataliJe around the veldt? — Chorus: It'sa, Baas!
influence. As the Europeans began to gain dominance, the Ndebele began to surrender. The "rebels" did their utmost to prevent these surrenders. This led to further conflicts among the Ndebele. These internal divisions, conflicts and hostilities complicate an interpretation of the events of 1896. The black-white conflict must be seen in relation to an Ndebele civil war, opportunist raiding and the possible attempts of a revived local imperialism. What is clear is that these conflicts diverted a great deal of the Ndebele fighting energy, paving the way for the subsequent European war of conquest.

Considerations of length do not permit a detailed examination of the war of conquest. It is possible to only briefly examine aspects of the evidence which relate directly to the thrust of this thesis - the lack of a coordinated Ndebele response to conquest reflecting an unplanned and unorganized "Rebellion".

A distinctive feature of the campaign literature is the way European commanders pondered as to why the Ndebele failed to do what was obvious, and why during actions they seemed to be continually caught by surprise. Of the first two skirmishes on 25 May, Lieutenant-Colonel Plumer, commander of the Matabeleland Relief Force, commented:

"We were by no means impressed with the prowess of our adversaries. They had clearly shown that they could not stand a determined attack, even with all the advantages of a strong position and considerable superiority of numbers, and their shooting was
execrable. We had to learn subsequently that they had amongst them a certain number who could shoot pretty straight when ensconced in sheltered positions among rocks and caves. There was certainly no cooperation among the several indunas. The party we encountered in the afternoon was quite distinct from those we fought in the morning, and evidently as we quite surprised them, no attempt had been made by the latter to warn the others, though it would have been quite easy for them to have done so."(120)

The first major offensive of the relief force was the patrol down the Gwaai river between 5 and 25 June. The Gwaai patrol met no opposition as it passed through the country marked only by the confusion and frantic dispersion of its peoples into places of refuge. Though the district was considered to be heavily populated it proved impossible to make contact with the Ndebele. The "whispering patrol" of Major Watts attempted unsuccessfully on 16 June to force a confrontation with a rumoured large Ndebele force.(121) The existence of the rumoured impis is doubtful. The Column had to contend itself with burning hundreds of huts, and the only real adventure fell to the scouts who were able to hunt for souvenirs. Though the logistical preparations for the patrol were inadequate, it nevertheless was a formidable affair.(122) Its effect on the Ndebele to the north-west of Bulawayo was immense. Terrifying and justified rumours spread among the Ndebele of the Column and its barbaric behaviour towards "rebel" and "loyal" alike.(123) However, with the evident lack of stomach for fighting by the Ndebele during the course of this patrol, one must begin to question the nature of the "Rebellion". Was there a "rebellion", or had the people simply been caught up in a
turbulent series of events from which they would eagerly have extracted themselves, had there not been so much confusion and intense misunderstanding? The Ndebele attempt to cross the Zambezi in 1896 would seem to confirm the latter analysis.

In 1896, Chief Native Commissioner Taylor speculated that the Ndebele on being defeated would disperse into Mashonaland, into Gazaland, and others would move north across the Zambezi. (124) As the Ndebele surrendered in 1896 there came evidence to light that there had indeed been a movement of the Ndebele people to the Zambezi.

"Mpotshwane, with a considerable following, is at the junction of the Shangani and Gwai Rivers, and has sent men to the Zambezi to make arrangements about crossing that River. The Ingamazendhlovu regiment have been as far as the Matabele flats this side of the Zambezi — having intended crossing to the north — when illness broke out amongst them and they turned back — they are now on the Mbembezi river." (125)

It is significant to note that Nyamanda, Lobengula's eldest son and alleged candidate for the revived kingship, was a member of the Isukumini, part of the northern amabutho that moved towards the Zambezi. (126) This report is dated 18 July, so the movement north may have taken place in response to Plumer’s Gwaai patrol of the previous month. Subsequent reports confirm the movement north by various groups of Ndebele:

"That some of the Kaffirs which went north from Siberns Kraal have returned from the Zambezi as they could not get the assistance they required." (127)
"Some of the rebels who have surrendered state that they went as far as the Zambezi river where the Zambezis killed some of them and others escaped, hence their return. The Zambezis took the children over the river, but refused to take the men, saying we are going to treat you Ndebele as you have always done to us." (128)

The question is whether this movement north occurred as a response to the Gwaai patrol, or had it taken place earlier? If the latter, that would reflect the uncertainties which prevailed among the Ndebele before the intervention of Plumer's force. The correspondence of J. Chas Bagley, a labour agent attempting to recruit among the Lui for the Chamber of Mines, allows a tentative dating of the Ndebele presence on the Zambezi. (129) Bagley's first letter, dated 11 May, reveals a process of escalated violence similar to that experienced in other parts of the country. In the wake of the news of the disturbances to the south, Mpotshwane threatened the Europeans, in particular Bagley who had previously confiscated some guns. Bagley himself happened to be absent from the European settlement at Pandamatenga. News of the threats of Mpotshwane was brought to the Europeans by Wankie (Hwange), a former Ndebele tributary. The Europeans then fled to Kazungulu where Bagley encountered them. It was feared that the Ndebele intended if defeated to cross the Zambezi, and so Lewanika sent his son, Lutea to Kazungulu to prevent their crossing. Sambambam, a brother of Lobengula, then living on the Zambezi, had submitted to the Lui, and with no knowledge or faith in a "Rebellion", pessimistically viewed it as the beginning of the
extermination of the Ndebele. The evidence of this letter suggests that Mpotshwane took advantage of the disturbances to grind the axe of his grievances. It was clearly a local response and not part of any planned "Rebellion". It also led to conflict among the African peoples, Wankie being threatened and the Lui preparing to resist an invasion. (130) Bagley's second letter helps to establish a definite date for an Ndebele presence on the Zambezi. The Zambezi district had been in a state of tension following on the escalation of violence to the south in March, from the end of April when the news was confirmed. From April Lewanika was preparing to resist the crossing of the Ndebele over the Zambezi. The Ndebele were at the Zambezi in June 1896. It would therefore seem that from April to June movements of refugees had attempted to reach the Zambezi hoping to extricate themselves from the violence. Through Lewanika taking the necessary precautions to guard the drifts and force the Ndebele back, they did not cross the Zambezi. The unhealthy low lands also took their toll of the Ndebele who were forced to return south and come to terms with the Europeans. (131)

Though the Ndebele reaction to the war of conquest was localized and defensive, it would seem that there may have been an attempt to transcend the local perspective and to achieve a wider response to the European forces. This reaction may have led to an attempted revival of the Ndebele kingship in June 1896;
"about three weeks ago Nyamanda (the late King's son) with a strong body guard came from the west round the east side of the Fort and across to Babyaan's late kraal. From there he crossed into the hills. He had been sent for by the chief indunas (Umliso, Babyaan and Sikombo) who had assembled in council to elect the young chief as King. On the night of the last full moon a big dance was held and Nyamanda was formally elected King. A gathering was held at Dumbraine which is where Umziligazi was buried." (132)

If there was an attempt to make Nyamanda king, the question remains as to whether the attempt succeeded or failed. Nyamanda was allegedly made king at the time Plumer's patrol was ravaging the Gwaai valley, and the northern izigaba were attempting to cross the Zambezi. This was not only an inopportune time, but also unlikely as Nyamanda would have been without the backing of his own supporters. It is possible that Nyamanda was simply seeking sanctuary in the Matopos. Other obstacles lay in Nyamanda's path to being accepted as King. He did not have a clear and undisputed claim. He was Lobengula's eldest son, born before Lobengula became King, and therefore according to Ndebele law of succession excluded from the kingship. Njube and Ngabouenja had a clearer claim, but in 1896 it was not possible to consider their candidature. (133) Cobbing has argued that though Nyamanda was excluded by birth, his military prowess established that in the circumstance of war he was the only eligible candidate to lead the nation. The evidence, however, is conflicting as to the role played by Nyamanda in the fighting. Some reports claim he was actively involved;
"At the fight with Gifford at Fonseca's the late King's son Tshakilisa was killed. He was shot in the chest. Nyamanda was there also. He was on horseback. He is now at his own kraal on the Mbembezi." (134)

This report, relied upon by Cobbing, is of doubtful value, especially since Tshakilisa was never killed. Queen Mahwey disputed Nyamanda's fighting role. "She says Nyamanda has taken no part in the present fighting". (135) Chief Native Commissioner Taylor was of the opinion;

"The King's sons, Nyamanda and Tizakulisa are on the Bubi. There is no evidence to show that they have taken part in the rebellion. They have been sent for to report themselves to Bulawayo." (136)

Nyamanda was certainly no fighting leader, and there seems to be little reason to assume that his military prowess recommended him as a candidate for the kingship before those whose right was more clearly defined. It is possible that, faced with concerted European aggression following on the arrival of Plumer's column, an attempt was made to revive the kingship in a symbolic attempt to unite the nation. However, in a time of war, with the Ndebele scattered and harried by the Europeans it would have been difficult to assemble the Ndebele izinduna. There would almost certainly follow dispute, and even should that be resolved, the necessary ceremonies were complex and would take time to perform. (137) If an attempt was made in June 1896 to make Nyamanda king, it would have been a belated response in a struggle to achieve a degree of unity and
coalescence to respond to the situation. In the prevailing confusion, if an attempt was made by a group of izinduna in the Matopos to make Nyamanda king, it was abortive. It clearly did not have the support of the majority of the Ndebele izinduna who never claimed Nyamanda as king, and there is no evidence that Nyamanda ever declared himself to be king. The claim that Nyamanda was made king is most probably a reflection of European fears. Many Europeans from the 1880's were aware that Nyamanda was Lobengula's eldest son, and the missionaries had popularized the assumption that he would succeed to the kingship. (139) With the escalation of violence they faced uncoordinated aggression, but there were fears that this would change should a centralized structure of command be established. (140)

The Gwaai patrol was followed by the attack on Thaba zika Mambo. A large force of Ndebele were believed to be concentrated at the stronghold, assumed to be the headquarters of Mkwati, oracle of the "Mlimo". (141) On 5 July a large force of 1 200 men attacked the stronghold. The battle which followed was heralded as a success. About 600 women and children were taken prisoner and about 1000 oxen and 2 200 goats and sheep were captured. Plumer estimated that about 100 "rebels" were killed. (142) Cobbing argues, however, that the stronghold was weakly defended, the able bodied men having already departed, leaving mostly women and children behind. The few remaining defenders, Plumer had great difficulty in extracting. The Company reports of a great victory were therefore
exaggerated. (143) The assessment of the missionary Reed is perhaps the most pertinent comment on the war of conquest to this point, "Absolutely nothing had been done towards ending the Rebellion". (144)

After the attack on Thabazizika Mambo, Plumer turned his attention to the Ndebele ensconced in strongholds in the Matopos. Major-General Carrington, commander-in-chief, then arrived to take personal command of the campaign. (145) On 19 July the Column marched to the hills to begin the attack on N'kantola, held by the induna Babayane. While Plumer was attacking Babayane, a column under Captain Laing from Belingwe marched from Figtree on 19 July with the intention of proceeding into the hills from the north west and to join Carrington at N'kantola the following day. Laing camped for the night in the Inungu Gorge and was ambushed the following morning. Laing managed to extricate himself from the ambush. An attempt by Captain Nicholson to inflict retribution on the Ndebele of the Inungu Gorge also failed, and he was forced to withdraw. (146)

Having attacked the Ndebele with doubtful success from the Inungu Gorge to N'kantola, Plumer now turned his attention to the Ndebele between N'kantola and the Tuli road. On 1 August the Column advanced into the Mtshulezi valley, and after a short engagement withdrew. (147) The following morning the Column advanced to the retreats of Somabulane and Nyanda, but
found them deserted. (148) The Column then withdrew from the Matopos for a period of rest. On 5 August an attack was launched on Sikombo's stronghold. This was one of the fiercest battles of the campaign and the Ndebele were only driven from their position at a heavy cost to the force. Following on the engagement it is recorded that a gloom fell over the force occasioned by the loss of several comrades. (149) On the night of 8 August the Column marched into the hills to attack Umlungulu's retreat. As the Column travelled through the pass during its night march it disintegrated. Had the Ndebele attacked any of the sections adrift from the main body, the Column would have suffered a disaster. The Column was reunited and left the valley to proceed up the mountain track. After a brief skirmish, Plumer decided to camp for the night. An expected night attack did not materialize and the Column withdrew. The shots fired on 9 August were the last of the Matopos campaign. (150)

After the attack on Umlungulu's retreat, hostilities in the Matopos hills were soon suspended. Having realized that the complete subjugation of the Ndebele would require more men, money, forts and provisions, Rhodes was eager to end the war. In the light of these considerations Rhodes decided to attempt negotiations. These were initially without the knowledge of the military authorities. The capture of Nyambezana, one of Mzilikatzi's wives, provided the opportunity for opening contact. (151) The old lady was provided with two flags, one white and one red, and half a bag of mealies. Her instructions
were to tell the Ndebele that should they wish to continue fighting they were to place the red flag under the white one. If they wished for peace they were simply to leave the white one tied to a stick under some prominent rocks. The next day both flags had disappeared. This was taken to mean that the Ndebele wished for time to consider. The following day the white one was seen flying in its original place. Two volunteers from the "Cape Boys", James M'keza and John Sail, agreed for 25 each, to go and learn the intentions of the Ndebele. The conduct of these negotiations was entrusted to Jan Grootboom, another "Cape Boy". (152) On Friday 21 August, Jan Grootboom told Rhodes that the Ndebele wished to indaba. Colenbrander, Rhodes, Dr Sauer and the Cape Times correspondent, Vere Stent, went up to the hills at about 12 o’ clock. (153) Forty four izinduna came down to the indaba. Somabulane and Sikombo spoke, relating the history of the Ndebele and their grievances. It was agreed that peace was desirable and the Ndebele promised to open the Tuli road. (154) Colenbrander persuaded Sikombo to come down to Rhodes’ camp after the indaba, where the situation was discussed. On 28 August the second indaba took place about a mile from Usher’s Fort. Dhiliso, Babayane, Mshete, Karl Khumalo and two other unnamed izinduna were the principal spokesmen, and conducted themselves with decorum throughout the interview. However, the younger men of whom about a hundred and three were present, continually interrupted the proceedings with insolent remarks, until Dhiliso enforced silence. The atmosphere was tense and it was evident that many were still prepared to
fight. Dhiliso and the other izinduna, while desiring peace, asked for time to gauge the opinion of their people. (155) The third indaba took place on 9 September, and was the first official indaba. Sir Richard Martin addressed the assembled izinduna and outlined the conditions of peace. (156) Thereafter negotiations became more informal, and the Ndebele visited the camp. The final indaba was held on 13 October, where both "friendlies" and "rebels" were addressed by Rhodes. He promised to reinstate the worthy izinduna and to pay them a salary. They were urged to approach the Native Commissioners and to air their grievances at Bulawayo. Having promised peace the indaba ended with the distribution of gifts. (157)

The initiation of indabas did not intimate the end of war. Rumours that the Ndebele were massing again near the Inungu Hills led the Column to move back to Usher's camp on 19 and 20 August. This force then remained between the hills and the Malime river until 2 September. (158) On 3 September, 150 men were ordered to Bulawayo under Captain Drury, but the rumour that an impi threatened Red Bank appears to be unfounded. Drury's patrol waited on the Umgaza river until 10 September, and was then ordered to patrol to the Malengwane Hills in the Filabusi district. As events turned the Ndebele had no further stomach for fighting, and the patrol returned to Bulawayo, arriving back at Malema camp on 26 September. (159) The last patrol of Plumer's force was down to the Tuli road to establish two forts; one near Grange's Store, the other near the river Menje M'nyama. (160) Leaving these forts to be manned by small
detachments, the rest of the patrol returned to the Column. The High Commissioner then authorized the disbandment of the force which left Rhodesia in two parties, one on 27 October and the other on 30 October.\(^{(161)}\)

The Company's attitude to the northern Ndebele hardened during the negotiations between late August and early October 1896, largely because of a series of victories during September, and the total collapse of Ndebele morale in the face of severe food shortages, which were being reported from all parts of Matabeleland.\(^{(162)}\) On 8 September, Lieutenant - Colonel Baden - Powell, Chief Staff Officer, left Bulawayo to patrol the upper Shangani and Vungu, where it was hoped to track down Mthwini and Mkumbi, as well as the "Mlimo", Mkwati. The results were disappointing. On 13 September, the Rozvi chief, Uwini was executed on Baden - Powell's instructions, for which action he faced a court martial.\(^{(163)}\) Baden - Powell then trekked north to the confluence of the Shangani and Gwelo, and discovered that the majority of the Ndebele had moved north to the Shangani and Shangwe country towards the Mafungabusi plateau. In September, Pagnet visited the Que Que valley, and at the end of the month moved south and sacked Nhema's stronghold, after which the Selukwe district was effectively passified.\(^{(164)}\) In the first week of October, Baden - Powell moved from Inyati into the Belingwe district and attacked the Dumbesey of Mazeteze and Wedza.\(^{(165)}\) Surrenders mounted in the wake of these columns; Manonduana Tshabalela at Gwelo on 26 September, Nhema at Selukwe in the last week of October, Wedza, Mengate,
Sende and Mazetise on 31 October, and Gambiza and Cherewondura from the upper Que Que by mid November. (166) Meanwhile, Lanning and Gielgud were accepting the surrenders of many of the Bubi, Bembezi and Inkweguezi izinduna. (167) In December Nyamanda came in. (168) A group of the more desperate Ndebele such as Mpotshwane, Menyui, Mthwini and Gwabana moved north to the Sebungwe region, or like Fezela and Mahlahleni east into Mpateni, where one by one they were tracked down by patrols during 1897. In July 1897, Mpotshwane was captured. (169) As such the "Rebellion" can be seen to have ended as it begun, on the local level. It was neither coordinated in its initiation, conduct or conclusion.

The conduct of the war by the Ndebele indicates that they had failed to achieve a degree of coordination necessary to resist the European forces. They were unable to act in unison and made no attempt to confront the Europeans. The war was where Colonel Plumer cared to take it. There was never any offensive Ndebele strategy. The Ndebele never coalesced or concentrated their forces to attack the settlers in Bulawayo, nor to face Plumer, even though they theoretically had the advantage in men, arms, supplies and knowledge of terrain. There are no set piece battles in this campaign between two coordinated forces, and the fighting took the form of skirmishes distinct from those of a guerilla war. The campaign in Matabeleland is therefore on close examination similar to that undertaken in Mashonaland. (170) Plumer was forced to attempt to subdue the
Ndebele by eliminating one force at a time. This argument is embellished by the failure of the Gwaaï patrol to engage the Ndebele in battle. The disorganized Column should have been an ideal target, yet it was avoided by the Ndebele, and some even attempted to cross the Zambezi. After the Gwaaï patrol, Plumer had to turn his attention from the north west to the north east and the south east, to the Ndebele "rebels" isolated at Thabazika Mambo and the Matopos hills. Yet even after the Matopos indabas the war did not end as it would have had the Ndebele been united and coordinated under a central leadership. Each induna took the individual decision to surrender. If there was an attempt to make Nyamanda king it proved abortive. It came too late when the Ndebele were scattered and the izigaba of Nyamanda, the Nhandhlovu, were attempting to cross the Zambezi. If it was initiated by a small group of izinduna in the Matopos, it did not enjoy the support of the Ndebele people generally. An examination of the conduct of the war confirms that the "Rebellion" was not planned and Nyamanda was never a functional king. If the Ndebele had established even a rudimentary structure of coordination, then the blunders and anomalies are inexplicable. They are however, readily understood if no coordination or planned "Rebellion" is assumed. As Plumer’s Column fought several skirmishes in a disjointed campaign to crush each locality, so as each locality crumbled, the myth of a coordinated "Rebellion" is proved an illusion.

To explain how the violence spread and escalated into a war of
conquest is to leave the theme of this thesis at a superficial analysis. We need to understand why there was an escalation of violence. J. K. Rennie's doctoral thesis "Christianity, Colonialism and the origins of Nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia, 1890 - 1935", is an important work which gives an insight into the factors which influenced the process of escalating violence. Rennie suggests four reasons as to why the Ndau stayed out of the "Rebellion". These were, isolation (religious and political as well as geographical), fear of Ngongunyana (the Shangaan paramount who had only just been defeated by the Portuguese); the absence of rinderpest and the refusal of the white authorities in Melsetter to heed the warnings they were getting from the west. Because they took no precautions, the Ndau were not provoked. Rennie's last two observations are important clues to an understanding of the psychology of violence. (171)

The factors which created the psychological conditions conducive to the escalation of violence are complex, and unfortunately, can only be briefly touched on in this thesis. Foremost, the significance of the natural disasters, already alluded to or else noted in passing, in increasing the tension within both the African and European communities must be appreciated. Though the evidence may suggest that the districts where violence found its impetus were badly hit by the natural disasters, a deterministic cause and effect relationship may not be implied. The natural disasters did not affect the
districts equally and the process whereby the Ndebele aligned themselves was complex. The significance of the natural disasters is rather to be found in the increase of tension within the African communities which tended to make them more volatile. What the natural disasters do affirm is that a basic tension of the "Rebellion" was food. As the natural disasters threatened the food supply and survival of the African peoples, so those areas affected became more prone to violence. The collapse of the thin restraints imposed by the settler presence allowed the traditional dynamics of African society to come into play. Raiding for cattle and corn features prominently in the escalation of violence. Districts relatively unaffected by the natural disasters become embroiled in the violence through such raiding. (172) The settlers possessed corn and cattle to a conspicuous degree and it therefore followed that they should become involved in the violence. Several other factors, acting in conjunction with the natural disasters, were conducive to the psychology of violence. The tensions within Ndebele society were deep and had at various points in their history resulted in civil war. Personality conflicts, such as that between Maduna and Mahlahleni, increased the tension. There was a certain degree of resentment towards the Europeans, upon which disaffected elements could play to rally support. These tensions produced a very volatile atmosphere, and it is against this background that the complexities of the African perspective of the events of 1896 must be understood.

Tensions also existed within European society. The hoped for
economic boom did not materialize and the economy was depressed. The natural disasters served to intensify the frustration and resentment of the European community. The Jameson Raid and international tensions sharpened their aggressive sense of patriotism. The future of the European community seemed to be in jeopardy. They were aware of just how vulnerable they were. The claim to have "colonized" Rhodesia had very little substance in reality. In this atmosphere of intense insecurity, frustration and resentment, the settlers' aggressive sense of patriotism infused another charge into an already explosive situation. In these volatile conditions the Europeans were very much inclined to overreact to any potential threat. Their inclination to hit first and find out later was intensified by their sense of the alien nature of African society. Very few could communicate with the African people, and those that could did so imperfectly. There emerged a huge gulf of cultural misunderstanding, suspicion and fear, suppressed beneath a facade of bravado. It is against this backdrop of tension and conflicting perspectives that the European contribution to the escalation of violence in 1896 must be understood.
Footnotes: Chapter Three


(2) NAZ Lo 5/6/8. See pp.117, 118, 119, 121, 124 - 128, 144, 149 - 150, 162, 165 -166.

(3) The '96 Rebellions, p.15.


(6) NAZ Lo 8/2/1, "Re the Matabele Rising", W.E. Thomas, 5 April 1896.

(7) Katey Gardner - Hampsen, A Pioneer Family, (Private Publication, Eric Muir, 1972). A copy is to be found in the historical section of the Bulawayo Public Library, City Hall.


(9) Gardner - Hampsen, A Pioneer Family. The European who warned the Austins was either a Mr Holland or a Mr Fielding, both of whom left Bulawayo on Saturday 28 March to carry warnings to friends in that vicinity, NAZ Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896, containing report by Norris Newman.


(11) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.52.


(13) Keppel - Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, p.396.

(14) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.52. See pp.112, 116, 144, 146 -147.

(15) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.136.

(16) NAZ Lo 8/2/1, "Re the Matabele Rising", W.E. Thomas, 5 April 1896.

(17) Laing, The Matabele Rebellion 1896, see below fn.77 - 78.

(18) NAZ A1/12/10, Vintcent - Duncan, telegraphic conversation, 5 April 1896.

(19) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.33, NAZ Lo 8/2/1, "Re the Matabele Rising", W.E. Thomas, 5 April 1896. See pp.111, 118 -
(20) See pp.111, 116, 120, 128, 134.

(21) NAZ A 1/12/9, Rhodes to Duncan, telegram conversation, 30 March 1896: "The real fact is the N.C.'s were deceived and we have been training the Matabele to shoot ourselves, it's a police revolt."

(22) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, pp.19 - 21.

(23) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.21.

(24) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.22.

(25) NAZ A 1/12/27, Act C.N.C. to Administrator, Salisbury, 10 March 1896. During the first ten days of March the Belingwe Shona attacked two Native Police patrols, Ranger, Revolt, p.141. There had also been a scare a week before the escalation of violence when a group of farmers went into laager and was only persuaded out again by their Assistant Native Commissioner, Ranger, Revolt, p.124, NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 15/2/1, R. Howman's correspondence with O. Baragwanath.


(29) NAZ Lo 5/6/8, Gist of statement made by Maduna Mafu to C.N.C. Taylor, 22 January 1897.

(30) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.34.

(31) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 15/2/1, R. Howman, correspondence, O.Baragwanath.


(33) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 15/2/1, R. Howman, correspondence, O.Baragwanath.

(34) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 15/2/1, R. Howman, correspondence, O.Baragwanath.


(36) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.72, Appendix One.


(42) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.73.

(43) This is why Umlungulu’s behaviour as noted by Selous in Sunshine and Storm, p.26, discussed at p. , is so significant.

(44) See Appendix One.

(45) NAZ Lo 5/6/8, Gist of statement made by Maduna Mafu to C.N.C. Taylor, 22 January 1897.

(46) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ba 15/2/1, R. Howman, correspondence, O.Baragwanath.


(49) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/3, statement by Nganganyani Mshlope, 28 November 1938.

(50) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/3, p.2, clearly indicates that Windram contradicted Nganganyani’s initial declaration of independent action with a question that attributed the "Rebellion" to Mkwati. Nganganyani thereafter complied with Windram’s interest in Mkwati and supplied the information sought. Though this obscures Nganganyani’s evidence, details of the events contradict the Mlimo myth established by Windram’s leading question. See pp. 112.

(52) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/3, pp.2 - 5. There is confusion as to who was killed and where. Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.394, identifies the first attack as being on West's Store near Thabazimba. However, in assessing the information contained in, Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.96, The '96 Rebellions, Schedule 1, "Reported missing or murdered", NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Secretary B.S.A.C., 3 April 1896, containing report prepared by Norris Newman, leads this writer to believe that the first attack was on Pongo's Store.


(56) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.69. Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.397, NA2 Ba 6/1/2, Chief Staff Officer's diary, 8 June 1896, Laing, Matabele Rebellion, p.72, 80. 85. NA2 A 1/12/10, Duncan to Vintcent, telegram, 5 April 1896, NA2 A 1/12/10, Vizard to Vintcent, telegram, 19 April 1896, NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 3/1/1, Williams to his mother, 30 April 1896.


(58) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.27.

(59) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.27.

(60) Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.28.

(61) NA2 A 1/12/3, C.C. Bulawayo to Administrator, Umtali, 25 March 1896, NA2 A 1/12/9, Rhodes - Duncan, telegraphic conversation, 30 March 1896: "I have been considering the point as to whether we could not separate the friendly natives from the rebels. I have consulted a council of native advisers. Thomas Cook, Colenbrander not advise me to place any reliance on the natives who profess loyalty. I suppose the natives are just weather cocks and if I can only scare them quick they will go with the strongest."

(62) NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896,

(63) NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896, containing report by Norris Newman.

(64) NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896, containing report by Norris Newman.

(65) NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896, containing report by Norris Newman.

(66) NA2 Lo 5/2/48, Duncan to Sec B.S.A.C, 3 April 1896, containing report by Norris Newman.


(70) *The '96 Rebellions*, Schedule C, p.28.


(72) *The '96 Rebellions*, Schedule F, p.35.

(73) An embarrassing incident followed when one of those executed, Karl Khumalo, Lobengula’s one time “secretary”, was resurrected at the first official indaba and demanded an explanation for his “execution”, much to the discomfort of the Company officials.

(74) Selous, *Sunshine and Storm*, Appendix F.


(82) The expectation of an attack on Bulawayo was a constant fear of the settlers which remained with them even after the
arrival of Plumer's forces. The Bulawayo Sketch has constant references to an expected attack. This fear was also reflected in the official correspondence. No attack took place as should have occurred had there been a planned rebellion. NAZ Al/12/9, Rhodes - Duncan, telegraphic conversation, 30 March 1896: "Personally I doubt Colonbrander's statement that natives are going (to) attack us here at all events until they are further organised, but my hand is forced by the alarming rumours of people and I am obliged to take precautions, which I have done, as you can imagine the undisciplined mob the women and children and every man with his own opinion. The want of organisation owing to the suddenness of the crisis has made it somewhat difficult for me both to reassure the people, to take the necessary precautions and to show that the Chartered Co is a Co fit and able to govern what ever may be the enemy."

The battles on the Umguza in May and early June 1896 are a curious phenomenon. The accounts derived from official European sources present these confrontations as major battles (Baden - Powell, The Matabele campaign 1896, pp.43 - 65; Plumer, An Irregular Corps, pp.118 - 119). However, the lack of fight displayed by the Ndebele in these skirmishes suggests that the Europeans may have exaggerated the numbers involved. (This was not unique, see NAZ Hist. Mss. B1 6/2/1). The assertion that the Ndebele failed to cross the Umguza on the injunctions of a witch doctor who promised that the white men would die when they entered the water, is also unsatisfactory. A letter by "An Anxious Enquirer" in the Matabele Times, vol 4, no 100, Saturday 13 Jun. 1896, provides another view of these alleged "massings" which conflicts with all official accounts. The questions posed by an "Anxious Enquirer" refer to Colonel Spreckley's "decisive encounter" with the Ndebele on 6 June 1896:

(4) "Is it true that on Saturday the natives threw down their arms and waved white flags when fired upon and charged, a few picking up arms before bolting?" - It is true that they waved arms, legs, white flags, in fact they waved anything rather than be cut up - but our men weren't out on a flag waving expedition and couldn't see where they "came in". Re picking up arms before bolting, they did nothing of the kind - they dropped arms and then bolted!

(5) "Is it true that men without arms were shot from trees?" - No, our men dismounted and spent half an hour trying to persuade them to come down before potting them.

(6) "Were they not Zambesis and other Maholes(?) who were desirous of surrendering?" - The exact nationality of each individual was not ascertained, but the next time an armed impi is met in the veldt, "An Anxious Enquirer" can volunteer to meet them, take the census, nationality and other details before a hair on their woolly heads is touched.

(7) Re the desire of surrendering, they did more, they absolutely forgot themselves in flight - The "Impangela" (Scouts) were upon them."

These questions raised by "An Anxious Enquirer" debunk the myth of Ndebele "massings" in preparation for an attack on Bulawayo,
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(119) NA2 10 6/1/5, Gielgud to C.N.C. Bulawayo, 19 October 1896.

(120) Plumer, An Irregular Corps in Matabeleland, p.97. Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.141: "However, luckily they missed this opportunity as they have missed every other chance of striking a really effective blow at the white man. In fact, they have shown a general want of intelligence that stamps them as an altogether inferior people, in brain capacity at least, to the Europeans." Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.154: "Now the fact that this impi had stood idle by, not exactly watching, but at any rate listening to the firing that had been going on during the skirmish between their compatriots and the white men, shows, I think, the extraordinary want of combination amongst them, of which I have before spoken, and which has been one of the features of this campaign." NA2 Hist. Mss. Ac 1/1/1, H. Adams - Acton Diary, pp.31- 32. (Gwai Patrol): "the guide said he had no idea where the kraal was and we made such a row cursing each other trying to get backward or forward that when we did find the kraal two or three hours after the niggers had all left, if they had only attacked us in the bush they could have made mince meat of us - however we burned the kraal and several others and returned to camp (sic) and getting mixed up in some more bush this time in the dark - the niggers then lost the best opportunity they are ever likely to get."

(121) Sykes, With Plumer, pp.92 - 104. Plumer, An Irregular Corps, pp.103 - 120.

(122) Sykes, With Plumer, pp.104 - 129.

(123) Sykes, With Plumer, pp.98 - 99, NAZ Hist. Mss. Ac 1/1/1, H. Adams - Acton Diary, p.31: "During the twenty days we burned about 300 kraals - I set alight the first two and got made a prisoner for doing it - it appears that they did not want the niggers to know that we were on the Gwai at all and the kraals belonged to friendlies." Adams - Acton also describes another incident where a prisoner, having been promised his freedom by
Col. Plumer, was abducted by the men, tortured and murdered, p.35.

(124) NA2 Lo 5/6/7, Report on Native Affairs in Matabeleland, 9 November 1896.

(125) NA2 Lo 5/6/2, C.N.C. to Administrator, 18 July 1896.

(126) C. 8547, Carnigie to Martin, "The Matabele Rebellion and their position in the country".

(127) NAZ Ba 2/9/2, Taylor, O.C. Inungu Fort, to C.S.O., Bulawayo, 17 August 1896.

(128) NAZ Ba 2/9/2, James Mkiza statement, 10 October 1896.


(132) NAZ Ba 2/9/1, Pyke to C.S.O., 19 July 1896.

(133) NA2 Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1, statement by Ginyalitsha, 23 November 1937, p.7: "At that time Lobengula had only four sons (children ?). He had Njubo, Mpesini, Ngabowenya, and a girl whose name I have forgotten. He also had Nyamande and Tshakalisa, but these two had been born before he was appointed king, and so they did not count according to native custom as princes. They were inferior in rank to those born afterwards."

(134) NA2 Lo 5/6/2, Mzila statement, 27 July 1896.

(135) NA2 Lo 6/1/5, Gielgud to C.N.C., 19 October 1896.

(136) NAZ Lo 5/6/7, Report on native affairs in Matabeleland, 9 November 1896.

(137) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", Chapter 7, where he states that the umbuviso (bringing back of the dead' chief's spirit) ceremony was carried out only in the period just before the onset of the rains. As such Nyamanda should not have succeeded Lobengula until August or September 1896. If there had been a meeting in July, it is likely that it was in preparation for the umbuviso ceremony.

(138) NA2 Lo 5/6/4, Gielgud to C.N.C., 11 November 1896. "Also these fresh stories of a king are likely to unsettle some of
the people already surrendered to the N.W. who have not been in contact at all with the whites except to take passes."


(144) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.421. NAZ L.M.S. M1 1/5/c, Reed to Thompson, 19 July 1896, P.Gon, Send Carrington; The story of an Imperial Frontiersman, (Johannesburg, Donker, 1984), pp.78 - 93.


(152) Sykes, With Plumer, p.217.


(156) Sykes, With Plumer, pp.231 - 232, NAZ Ba 2/9/2, High Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner, 4 September 1896, NAZ Lo 5/6/3, Political affairs in Matabeleland no 35, 11 September 1896.


(158) Many accounts of the conflict give the false impression that the war in Matabeleland ended with the initiation of the indabas. (Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, p.375). This impression was firmly rebutted by Cobbing, "The Ndebele", p.434, Plumer, An Irregular Corps, pp.190 - 192.

(159) Plumer, An Irregular Corps, p.197, Sykes, With Plumer, p.212.


(163) Baden - Powell, The Matabele campaign, Chapters 11 -12. Uwini was executed because of an alleged family connection with Mkwati.

(164) NAZ Ba 2/9/12, Colonel. H. Pagnet’s Diary for September - October 1896.


(168) NAZ Lo 5/6/9, Gielgud to C.N.C., 14 December 1896.

(169) NAZ Lo 5/6/7 - 9.

(170) This point was made in passing by Plume, An Irregular Corps, p.188, in a comparison of the attack on Sikombo's stronghold and Alderson's attack on Makoni. This comparison can be fruitfully extended to draw further parallels between the military campaign undertaken in both provinces.


(172) A.S. Chigwedere, "The 1896 Rinderpest disease and its consequences", Heritage, Pub: no 2. 1982. Chigwedere correctly emphasises the importance of the natural disasters and their impact on the African psychology. However, the rest of his analysis is of little value, as he simply adds another tier to Ranger's religious trilogy. C. van Onselen, "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa", Journal of African History, xvii,(3), (1972), NAZ Lo 5/6/7, C.N.C. report on tour of inspection, 12 December 1896. The reason advanced by Maduna Mafu for refusing to leave the Mapatini region and to return to Filabusi was that there was a shortage of food in Filabusi and so they preferred to live with their "roles" (servants) who had plenty of grain in the Mapatini region. Semezela, a Godhlwayo induna, stated that "the shortness (sic) was owing to the locusts. This is partly borne out by the Native Commissioner who said that the locusts were very destructive in this district last year". Maduna's movement into the Mapatini region spread the "rising" into Belingwe. Similar raiding can be traced in the Gwelo - Selukwe and Charter districts, see fn. 116, 117.


'Mashonaland' in 1896-97.

Taken from "Chimurenga", pp. 396 - 397.
Chapter Four

The question of a June "Rebellion" in Mashonaland

This chapter is concerned to question that view of the conflict which seeks to make a distinction between a March "Rebellion" in Matabeleland and a June "Rebellion" in Mashonaland. What is needed here is an examination of the European perception of the escalation of violence in June and thereby to establish how such a distinction came to be perceived. It will then be possible to establish not merely that the June "Rebellion" in Mashonaland was also unplanned, unorganized and uncoordinated, but to go on to challenge the whole concept of "Rebellion". The various Shona peoples had never been subjugated, and the Europeans did not pose a threat of sufficient intensity to prompt a conflict based on racial antagonism. The African reaction to the escalation of violence and their perception of events in 1896 - 7 will be examined in the context of the various Shona chiefdoms. Finally, the European war of conquest in Mashonaland will need to be examined briefly to show why 1896 - 7 is the crucial turning point in Rhodesian - Zimbabwean history. 1896 - 7 sees the ascendancy of the European perspective and the creation of a colonial state.

At the beginning of the Mashonaland section of the Reports on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia 1896 - 7, the Salisbury
magistrate, Hugh Marshall Hole, stated that he recognized that the attempt to distinguish between Matabeleland and Mashonaland, between a March and June "Rebellion" is inaccurate and arbitrary;

"It is a matter of some difficulty to draw a definite line between the native troubles in Matabeleland and the subsequent rebellion in Mashonaland and Manica. But for the purpose of this report, the Mashonaland rebellion is confined to the period commencing about the middle of June, and to the districts of Lo Magonda, Hartley, Charter, Sabi, Melsetter, Umtali, Makoni, Mangwendi, Mazoe and Salisbury, excluding any event in the Victoria district (which are more closely connected with the Matabeleland outbreak) except in so far as they bear on the Mashonaland question." (1)

Though initially a matter of convenience, the concept of two "Rebellions" soon became entrenched in the historiography. The distinction may be traced to several factors: European geographical concept of administrative spheres, two separate military forces mobilised in 1896, the belief that the Ndebele formed a state distinct from the Shona chiefdoms, that the "Rebellions" were planned, organized and coordinated, and that the Mashonaland "Rebellion" was prompted in some way by the Ndebele. The interpretations of subsequent historians have entrenched this division. Ranger embellished the Mlimo myth and argued that the Mashonaland "Rebellion" was an attempt to open up a second front by Mkwati. (2) Without questioning its validity, Cobbing accepted the traditional March and June division, and accounted for Shona involvement in the conflict prior to June in terms of tributary state alliances. The June
"Rebellion" was a reflection of Shona opportunism in the light of serious difficulties experienced by the Europeans in Matabeleland. (3) Beach discounted all evidence blurring the distinction between a March and June "Rebellion" with the concept of "peripheral violence". (4) Beach revised his earlier interpretation to recognize that there was no planned "Rebellion" in Mashonaland, yet retained the concept of a main Shona "Rebellion" in June. This "Rebellion" was distinguished from "peripheral violence" by the conscious decision of each Shona chieftain to "rebel", and this decision was prompted by a sense of injustice and racial antagonism. The "Rebellions" spread as news of the violence, which found its impetus in the Mashayamombe chiefdom of the Hartley district, was carried to the other chiefdoms. (5)

However, the escalation of violence in Mashonaland is part of the same process as that begun in Matabeleland. The concept of a June "Rebellion" initially derives from the European perception of events in 1896 - 7 and their reaction in mid-June to a process of ongoing violence which led to a sharp escalation of conflict. The Europeans had developed a false consciousness during the period 1890 to 1896, believing they were in control of the country and the Shona people were subject to their authority. Whenever they attempted to give meaningful expression to their assumed authority, conflict arose with the Shona chieftains, who firmly resisted any impingements on their sovereignty. It is against this divergence of perspective that the belief in two "Rebellions"
must be understood. What Beach describes as "peripheral violence" prior to June 1896 was interpreted thereafter as "Rebellion". The escalation of violence is a complex phenomenon and must, and will in due course, be examined on the local level in order to understand how the activities and attitudes of the Europeans precipitated conflict and aggravated existing tensions. The origin of a belief in a June "Rebellion" is to be found in the settler perception of events. Upon their perception they intensified the challenge to the independence of the Shona chiefdoms so escalating the violence which culminated in a European war of conquest. 1896 - 7, as explained below, sees the subjugation of the African perspective and the ascendancy of the European, so establishing the psychological foundations of the Rhodesian colonial state.

There were incidents of violence throughout the country between March and June 1896 which blur any distinction between Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Violent confrontations took place throughout Mashonaland prior to mid-June, and these purely local responses to particular grievances cannot be distinguished from the conflicts thereafter. The European presumption that they had colonised, and were now in control of the country, was a perspective not shared by the African people. Kunzwi Nyandoro, a powerful chief to the north-east of Salisbury, recognized no claim of the Europeans to be in control. His policy remained constant and consistent, not only
in the period between March and June, but back to the period before the arrival of the settlers. (9) There is little to distinguish Makoni's, Mangwendi's or Gurupira's position prior to June from that adopted thereafter. (10) The African perspective of events did not change in June. A war was not contemplated according to theories of racial polarity. There was no base for a "national rebellion" against the Europeans. The various Shona communities had no reason to follow each other into "Rebellion". Beach has established that there was no planned, organized or coordinated rebellion in Mashonaland timed to begin in June. (11) What now remains to be done is to invalidate the concept of "Rebellion" before a new analysis of the nature of the events of 1896 is pursued. This flows from having established that the Shona peoples had never been subjugated, and the settlers had not established their dominance and European impact was minimal. The Europeans in 1896 were simply another force in the melee, often on the periphery of local African political concerns. To apply the concept "Rebellion" to the continued frustration of the European claim to rule, a claim which never had substance, is to simply accept the premises of European racial supremacy. The perception of a "Rebellion" is not to be found in the African understanding of the events of June 1896; it is to be found in the psychology of the European population.

The escalation of violence in Matabeleland increased the tension and uncertainty of the small European population spread
throughout the country. The European perception of a "Rebellion" in June 1896 was the culmination of fears and anxieties following on the disturbances in March. The continued denial of European authority was now interpreted as a direct challenge fulfilling the expectation of a "Rebellion". Though the European claim to rule had no base in reality, their reaction to resistance resulted in consequences which were real. Aware of their numerical insignificance and vulnerability, the Europeans reacted aggressively and violently. It was believed that the African peoples were impressed by, and could be overawed, by displays of firm determination and strength. This belief held that European security depended upon bellicose activity. This attitude, and the strong sense of cultural alienation, heightened the European tension and distrust of the African peoples. Suspicious expectation of a rebellion led to a self-fulfilling prophesy. Unless there was an able and reflective leader in firm control of a settlement, any incident could serve to provoke a "Rebellion" from the European perspective. (12) These characteristics of frontier psychology are evident in the account of the "Umtassa Scare", dated 6 April 1896, written by the Assistant Native Commissioner of Umtali, J. W. Nesbitt:

"Sir

re. Umtassa Scare

I have the honour to report that on Thursday last whilst I was very ill in bed Messers Fauawe C.C. and
Mentopin M.C., came to my room and told me that it was expected that Umtassa would attack Umtali that night and that a meeting was to be held that afternoon to arrange what was to be done - I told them that there was not the least indication or probability of such a thing and gave them my reasons for it, they said they would lay what I said before the meeting. I very much regret that I was unable to leave my bed and attend the meeting.

The upshot of the meeting was that the townspeople were armed and paraded the streets boasting to the natives that they were going to kill Umtassa and piquets were stationed around the town. As it happened at the time these valiant men were parading the streets "Chembadza" Umtassa's principal son and who is virtually the chief was about half a mile from town and had sent his two principal men in to ascertain whether he could see me on a matter - I have in hand for Umtassa - these men seeing all the fuss, the white people marching about armed asked other natives what it all meant and were told that the whites were going to kill Umtassa they naturally went back to Chembadza and reported this and fled. That night all Umtassa's subjects who were servants also fled the flight continuing through the next day so that now a great number of people in town and country are entirely without labour.

On Saturday Umtassa sent to me to say that he had fled and to ask why he was to be killed - I explained how the thing occurred and made an appointment to meet him tomorrow. You can imagine what an effect this had on the natives not only of Umtassa's but throughout the district - I reckon it will take some time to bring affairs back to the state in which they were before the scare - I don't know who is to blame but trust the Government will cause the fullest enquiry to be made with a view to prevent the repetition of this."(13)

A similar scare was to take place in June and November 1896.(14) Despite the persistent suspicion of the Umtali Europeans, Umtassa refrained from involvement in a "general Shona rising".(15) However, prior to June, Umtassa and the
Shona peoples of Manicaland were involved in conflict with the Native Department and firmly resisted impingements on their sovereignty. (16) Umtassa’s "neutrality" is not, therefore, to be explained in terms of divisions in Shona politics, estrangement from the main currents of Shona religious or political activity, nor in terms of respect, fear or benefit derived from the Europeans. (17) It lies in the personalities of Umtassa and Nesbitt. Also in the way Nesbitt mediated to successfully prevent the Europeans at Umtali provoking a conflict with Umtassa based on the perception of his being in "Rebellion". It lies, moreover, in the way Umtassa restrained his own people and attempted to enquire as to the reason for European hostility. The reason for Umtassa’s "neutrality" is to be found in communication. If there had been no attempt at communication between Umtassa and Nesbitt, the "Rebellion" in Mashonaland may have been perceived to have begun in April. The rumours that Umtassa intended to attack Umtali were fallacious. (18) That such a scare should occur within two weeks of the, escalated violence in Matabeleland, is a reflection of the fears, uncertainty and apprehension experienced by the Europeans.

At this point it is possible to advance an interpretive theory as to an aspect of the nature of the conflict, which will in due course be tested against several local studies. The potential for "rebellion" was greater in those areas where little European encroachment had taken place prior to 1896. This follows, since in these areas the claim of European domination would have had little impact upon the local
African leaders and so would have rebuffed the new challenge to their authority. (19) The converse is that in those areas where European encroachment was already intense the likelihood for "collaboration" or "neutrality" was greater. This follows since in these areas where the African and European peoples had already faced the initial conflicts of authority, a modus vivendi had been reached, and channels of communication between the African and European leadership had been forged preventing misunderstanding. (20) In areas where the European presence was weak these channels were largely absent and neither side was aware how the other perceived events. (21) Thus, the lack of correlation between pressure and reaction is the inverse of the cause and effect theories underlying the work of Ranger, Cobbing, and despite his identification of its invalidity, Beach. Local factors, however, must still be sought to account for and to explain the process of escalated violence in each district. (21) The presence or absence of communication channels explains why the "Rebellion" took the form of a war of conquest where the initiative lay with the Europeans as they struggled to give substance to the shadow of the suzerainty they claimed. (22)

The European attitude was a major factor in the perception of a Shona "Rebellion". The presence, or absence, of a white leader able to restrain his own people and to communicate with the African leaders explains the phenomena of "rebellion", "collaboration" and "neutrality" to a certain extent. The
absence of a restraining personality and the effect of the mentality of "firm action" are evidenced in an incident which took place in the Fort Victoria district in October 1896. A trader named Mann sent his partner into Victoria to report that a chief named "Gadzi", living about 90 km east of Victoria, had robbed his native assistant of 13. The servant was allegedly maltreated but released with the warning that "anyone coming on that ground again in trousers would be shot, white or black". The O.C. Victoria was of the opinion that the "natives in that district have been troublesome for the past twelve months", and he had been informed that Assistant Native Commissioner Eksteen had been fired on when he had gone to investigate the looting of Mann's Store some ten or twelve months before. He therefore begged that a small patrol be sent to the district at once, as;

"Very few white men go out that way, and such a proceeding would be likely to have a beneficial effect on the Native mind. I think it is highly essential that some demonstrations should take place, as the natives in the east have not been at any pains to disguise their dissatisfaction for some time past."(24)

Accordingly, a patrol consisting of a Captain Reed, Lieutenant - Sergeant Williams, twelve N.C.O's and men, accompanied by a small native contingent, was sent out. Reed reported;

"I proceeded to Sunday Pass, about 75 S.S.E from Victoria to arrest Chief Gabana. On route, I gathered, from friendly natives that Gabana intended to fight, and I accordingly surprised the Kraals, captured the Chief, the headman, and a number of native women and children. After this capture, the natives treacherously opened fire from rocks at a short range,
one bullet passing through the coat of Trooper H. de Beer. The Chief and his followers then attempted to escape, and we fired them, killing the Chief and ten men. The enemy then fled, with exception of one old Chief, whom we left in possession of a hut, and gave him provisions. We burned all kraals in immediate vicinity. The natives appear to be friendly to within eight miles of afore mentioned kraals". (25)

This apparent drama of high imperialism becomes an ironic parody when J. W. Eksteen, Assistant Native Commissioner at N'danga, reported that:

"A colonial boy was sent out trading cattle among the natives for his master raped a very young girl and being discovered by her people paid for what he had done with his master's money. His statement that he had been robbed and that the natives said they would kill "anybody with trousers on white or black" was accepted and a patrol was sent out - and 10 natives were killed - Forrestall at that time was about 30 miles on one side and I was about 30 miles on the other from the scene of this affair, and knew nothing of it until afterwards". (26)

This tragic comedy touches on the absurd when it is revealed that Reed's patrol also attacked the wrong people! (27) This event reveals a great deal about the European perception of events and themselves, against which the African perspective may be contrasted. The whole conflict was based on a series of fabrications and self-deceit. The Shona peoples of the Victoria district were regarded as "neutral" or "collaborationist" throughout the conflict. (28) Yet the officer commanding Victoria could state with conviction that "the natives in the east have not been at any pains to disguise their dissatisfaction for some time past". The European
response to this fabricated challenge to assumed authority was to send out armed men as "such a proceeding would be likely to have a beneficial effect on the native mind". It has been established not only that these people were not in "Rebellion" but also that the wrong people were attacked, yet Reed was able to gather "from friendly natives that Galema intended to fight". He surprised the kraals and captured the chief, and was highly indignant when "the natives treacherously opened fire from rocks at a short range". He reacted strongly, killing the chief and ten men when they attempted to escape. They then burnt the kraals, "with the exception of one old Chief, whom we left in possession of a hut, and gave him provisions". An objectively viewed wanton act of aggression is tempered by a subjective sense of humanity. A strong sense of righteous courage pervades the European consciousness. They believed themselves, generally, to be behaving with nobility and exemplary bravery. The African perspective would have been in sharp contrast. In a sense, both the Europeans and Africans were the victims of perception, and therefore misconception.

That the European psychology was a major factor in the perception of the Shona "Rebellion" is borne out by Rennie's analysis of the other major area of European settlement, Melsetter. Rennie points out that a crucial factor preventing a "Rebellion" in Melsetter was the refusal of the white authorities to heed the warnings they were getting from Bulawayo. No precautions were taken and the Ndau were not provoked or assumed to be in "Rebellion". However, other
areas of Mashonaland were not so fortunate to have men of the caliber of Nesbitt or Dunbar Moodie of Umtali and Melsetter respectively. Captain Laing did a great deal to provoke confrontation in the Belingwe district. (30) The news of the Ndebele "Rebellion" led the authorities to issue a number of warnings and precautionary statements. (31) Contingency plans were discussed and the Europeans adopted a more defensive attitude. (32) The belief that aggression was the best form of defense increased tension not only within the European community but also among the African peoples in their immediate vicinity. This sense of mutual distrust and hostility was engendered by a breakdown in communications, already hampered by an inability to speak each other’s language and intensified by a sense of cultural alienation. The European population overreacted to any incident which threatened their security. The people of Hartley were in laager for two months before the June "Rebellion". (33) The people of Selukwe went into laager at Gwelo at the end of March, abandoning the district. (34) The people of Charter, Enkeldoorn, Victoria and Umtali went into laager at the first news of disturbance, though there had been no offensive against them. The flight of the Europeans into laager did provoke an African reaction as evident in the Salisbury, Marandellas and Mazoe districts. In this tinder dry atmosphere incidents of local violence were interpreted as being part of a "general rebellion". With everyone in laager it was assumed that a cunning plan had been devised and a "Rebellion" had been coordinated to expel the Europeans. It is
to the myth that the June "Rebellion" was planned, organized and coordinated, that we must now briefly turn.

Beach's 1979 Journal of African History article, "Chimurenga; The Shona Risings of 1896 - 7", revised the conclusions of his 1971 doctoral thesis. In this latter analysis Beach outlines the evidence to show that the "Rebellion" was not "simultaneous" or "almost simultaneous" even within the limitations of Shona communications and technology, and it had not been predetermined or coordinated. (35) Beach accepts that the need for a religious or political overall organization falls away and that a new understanding of the social and political situation among the central Shona in 1896 must be sought. (36) While welcoming the advances made by Beach, his revision retains strains of contradictory thought. He correctly disregards his earlier arguments in favour of a planned June Mashonaland "Rebellion", but still retains the concept of a "general Shona rebellion". (37) Beach attempts to reconcile the fact of no organization with the assumption of a "Rebellion" through a "ripple effect" thesis. (38) This thesis is dependent upon two premises; racial antagonism between black and white which defined clear objectives, and that a conscious decision to "rebel" was taken as the news of the disturbances at Mashayamombe reached the other chieftaincies. Beach correctly emphasized that the "Rebellion" must be studied in its local context, but Beach's presumptions led to a distorted understanding of the complex nature of the events of 1896. No conscious decision was taken by the various Shona communities
to engage in a war with the Europeans, or to "collaborate" or remain "neutral" on the basis of a perspective of racial antagonism. The persistence of the March and June distinction is evidence of the failure to take cognizance of the continuity of the Shona political perspective. A change of interpretive perspective is needed if the traditional assumptions of European historiography are to be abandoned and the events of 1896 are to be appreciated in the totality of their African historical experience.

The European perspective is one of the simple subjugation by an armed military force of various rebellious peoples. The African perspective is more complex and does not allow for a clearly defined conflict between black and white. 1896 - 7, was from the African perspective a period marked by intense confusion and disorder. The various Shona polities found themselves embroiled in an escalating conflict with various peoples. The variety of positions adopted during the conflict indicates some of the complexities involved in an analysis of the events of 1896 - 7. A radical change of perspective also creates a difficulty in the use of terminology since phrases like "rebel", "neutral" and "collaborator" have not only unfortunate modern political connotations, but are also intricately related to a particular understanding. (39) The "collaboration" of Gurupira's Budja and Mtibi's Pfumbi was that of independent polities pursuing their own interests at the expense of other African peoples. There was no "national consciousness" upon
which a black–white confrontation could be based in 1896-7. (40) The consciousness which dominated the conflict was that of local African political considerations. The Shona levies raised from "collaborator" chiefdoms escalated the conflicts and existing feuds into a swirling series of tribal wars. The classification of some polities as "rebels" derived in part from these intestine conflicts, such as that between the "friendly" Chirumanzu and his "rebel" uncle Chaka. The intervention of Chirumanzu's son-in-law, Assistant Native Commissioner Weale, led to Chaka being termed a "rebel", even though he denied ever having "rebelled" and remained cordial to Assistant Native Commissioner Coole throughout the conflict. (41) The illusion of unity between the various Shona "rebels" is dispelled by the various conflicts and killings of "rebels" by other "rebels". (42) As each chieftaincy asserted its independence when challenged, the resistance of the challenge was viewed as "Rebellion". It is against this complex background that the killing of isolated Europeans must be understood. A reaction and counter-reaction blend indistinguishably into initial actions by both Europeans and Africans. The escalating violence was the result of the confrontation of divergent perspectives. These aspects all form part of the base of an understanding of the nature of the conflict, which is best explored in the reaction of the various African peoples to the escalating violence, culminating in conquest.

Beach divides the Gwelo district into two regions; the purely
Shona Selukwe district, where the Nhari of Nhema, Banka and Manikwa and the Shiri of Ndanga lived, and the lower Gwelo region, where settlements of Ndebele—the old Amaveni Insugumeni and other regimental posts—as well as the more recent, post-war migrations—were superimposed on the Shona peoples of Uwini, Lozani, Wezhela and the metal workers of the Kwe Kwe.(43) The Selukwe region is not considered to be in "Rebellion" in March because "there is no indication that either the Mhari or the Shiri people had joined the rising".(44) Beach argues that the spread of the "Rebellion" into Selukwe in June owed its impetus to the Ndebele.(45) The Selukwe rising in June is also seen as part of a strategic counterpoise to break the existing deadlock in Matabeleland.(46)

However, when the Selukwe region is examined the grand strategy is proved to be illusory, as is the distinction between March and June. In the Selukwe region the Mhari of Nhema, Banka and Manikwa, Shiri's Ndanga and Chaka, uncle of Chirumanzu, were viewed as "rebels" in 1896; Chirumanzu, Gutu and Zimutu as "collaborators".(47) But, the alignment of the Shona peoples in the Selukwe region cannot be explained in terms of pro- or anti-European attitudes; it depended to a large degree upon the absence or presence of channels of communication. The Nhema chiefdom, and those of Ndanga, Banka and Manikwa had been in a highly tense and volatile state since March when Sub-Inspector Driver had slaughtered their cattle infected with
rinderpest. (48) They had fired on Driver, but the 30 Europeans in the Selukwe region had gone safely into laager at Gwelo abandoning their possessions. (49) Thereafter, European homesteads and stores were looted and Nhema's people drove the Shangaan laboures on the mines away. (50) Beach dismisses these actions as "peripheral violence". This concept allows Beach to make an unacceptable distinction between March and June. With the Europeans in the Gwelo laager there was no one to "rebel" against, and the Europeans had no idea what was occurring in the district.

Selukwe, prior to mid June, had not escaped the escalating violence, but appeared "neutral" because of the absence of a European presence. The Europeans perceived a "second rebellion" in June when their patrols ventured into the district and met resistance. Notwithstanding the likelihood of aggression being initiated by these European forces, there are other factors accounting for the spread of the "rising" into Selukwe. In May European patrols in Gwelo, particularly those of Captain Gibbs, destroyed vast amounts of food supplies and captured livestock. (51) The Selukwe district became more volatile following on raids by the people of lower Gwelo disturbed by the European campaign. (52) The effect of these raids was to reduce food supplies in the Selukwe region and to further increase the tension in the district. There is nothing to distinguish between the attitude of any of the African chiefdoms in June from their position prior to that date. There had been rumours from 3 May that Nhema's people were watching
the road between Bulawayo and Gwelo, though they were not confirmed. (53) It was on 12 June that the O.C. Victoria reported "that Banga's and Indema's people are guarding the road between the Umgesa river and Iron Mine Hill". (54) Driver reported on the same day that the Selukwe district "had gone into open rebellion", and on 19 June that all the chiefs in the district were involved in blocking the Gwelo - Salisbury road. (55)

The conflict in Selukwe, however, was initially between the African polities. The effect of the raids on food supplies affected the relationship between the African peoples of the district, escalating the violence. The Europeans were only to assume a significant role in the conflict at a relatively late date, and much depended on the presence or absence of communication channels. The political considerations of the African chiefdoms determined their alignment to a large extent. Neither "collaborator" nor "rebel" had any intention of succumbing to European hegemony. The conflict in 1896 was initially viewed as an opportunity by the various African polities to advance their own interests in relation to other African communities. The Europeans became a force to be "collaborated" with or "resisted" depending on how they affected each chief's interests. The European presence was too small to give weight to their claim of sovereignty over all the peoples, and they were not therefore perceived as a threat against which the various Shona peoples would have seen a need
to unite or "rebel".

This analysis is borne out by an examination of Chirumanzu, the most important "collaborator" in the district. In the early days of the Ndebele disturbances his position was regarded as ambiguous. In March 1896, Chirumanzu warned Assistant Native Commissioner Weale that he did not want any white men in his district while the trouble was on. Chirumanzu did, however, allow Weale to take some of his relatives as a police force to Victoria, who subsequently went on active service. (56) When Banka and Nhema were perceived to be in "Rebellion" in June they were threatening Chirumanzu. A more serious threat was posed by Chaka and Gwatize, Chirumanzu's uncles who had been excluded from the title in a coup in 1891. (57) Their relationship with Chirumanzu and his son-in-law Weale had long been explosive. In March 1896, some Africans came to (E ?) Angelbreckt's farm at Driefontein near Mteo, wanting to kill "Charlie" (Weale) for burning down their village. (58) By the end of June Chirumanzu was asking for help against Nhema and Chaka. (59) On 7 June a patrol had reported that it had been fired on by Chaka's men. (60) Chaka was treated as a "rebel" from then on. He killed no Europeans, the local Afrikaners having moved to Enkeldoorn after March. However, he remained on cordial terms with Field Cornet Coole, who was it seems, hostile to Chirumanzu, and was certainly disliked by Weale. (61)

The traditional conflict with Banka may have prompted Chirumanzu's "collaboration" but the really decisive factor was
the hostility of Chaka and Gwatize, for they threatened his dynastic position. His forces, therefore, joined Forrestall in his attack on Banka in late June, and accompanied Forrestall and Weale in the 2,000 strong force of levies that aided Lieutenant Hurrell’s attack on Nhema in July. (62) In August Weale raised what ultimately grew to be a force of 1,800 men from Chivi, Victoria and Chirumanzu. This force aided the Mounted Infantry commanded by Major Jenner against Mutekedza’s Hera, but one survivor of the force, Headman Masunda, was insistent that a battle took place at Mteo, which suggests that Weale took the opportunity to harass Chaka on his way north. (63) By September, refugees from Chaka’s area were moving into the Gwelo district. In October Weale and Eksteen took 200 of Chirumanzu’s men into Nhema’s district, and with the Hussars and Mounted Infantry broke the Selukwe chief’s resistance in two campaigns by 30 October. (64) Chirumanzu then ended his "collaboration" with the Company, as there was no action closer than the Umniati after that date.

Chaka’s "rebellion" should now be considered. He surrendered to Vizard, the Civil Commissioner at Victoria on 28 October, "having been persuaded by Coole at Makowri who promised him protection". (65) Coole had remained at his post for most of 1896, unperturbed by Chaka’s hostility to Weale and Chirumanzu. Judge Vintcent, the acting Administrator, guaranteed Chaka’s life on condition that he was innocent of killings and he returned to his villages, having convinced Vizard that "it
appears that he has never been unfriendly to whites". (66) Meanwhile Weale had met Lieutenant Watson's Mounted Infantry on 30 October and led them to Chaka's village, which they destroyed on 2 November. (67) Fighting continued for two more days. The situation in Selukwe illustrates some of the complexities of the African perspective. Chaka's war was against Chirumanzu and Weale. The conflict was motivated by African political concerns. The European forces were manipulated by Chirumanzu and Weale to achieve local political objectives. Chaka would not have considered himself in "rebellion", but he would have considered the European assaults as unprovoked aggression. Beach correctly notes that Weale acted more as Chirumanzu Chenyama's son -in- law than as a Company official. (68) Weale clearly had successfully integrated himself into African society and politics. His close association with Chirumanzu ensured that no misunderstanding occurred and so Chirumanzu "collaborated" in the advancement of his own interests. These channels of communication were absent in the other chiefdoms. Chaka was in a curious position; his cordial relationship with Coole did not prevent Weale provoking his "rebellion". The conflict in the Selukwe district was dominated by African political concerns and conflicts; the Europeans were initially clearly on the periphery.

The events in the Hartley district are particularly interesting and form the basis of Beach's general interpretation. In this district the chiefdoms regarded as having "rebelled" were those of Mashayamombe, Chivero and Nyamweda, as well as
Mashayamombe's semi-subordinates, Mushava and Goro. The Ngezi-Mupawane and Rwizi chiefdoms are considered to have been "neutral".

In Hartley, as in Selukwe, the presence of raiding and bandit groups of people usually described as "Matabeles" has been established. These comprised peoples set in motion by the events in the south, as well as local people taking advantage of the prevailing social turmoil. The escalating violence affected both black and white peoples. The whites, however, only viewed the violence from a eurocentric perspective. They were aware that three Europeans had been killed within relatively short distances of Hartley Hill, and their servants had been molested or threatened. The effect of these incidents was that the Europeans at Hartley Hill went into laager in late April 1896. The atmosphere was tense and volatile. The Europeans were suspicious and distrustful of the African peoples. Though the African peoples affected disliked the limited demands made upon them by the minute European population, it is clear that at this point Europeans and Africans could still move about with relative, though diminishing, personal security.

An analysis of the history of the district between June 1896 and the final destruction of Mashayamombe's kraal on 24 July 1897 establishes the localised nature of the conflict. The events in Hartley stress that the initial killings were
spontaneous and the violence can be traced to the friction which existed between Mashayamombe Chinengundu's nephew, Muzha Gobvu and Assistant Native Commissioner Mooney. Mlembere, one of Mooney's policemen, later described the events:

"About three days before Mr. Mooney was murdered, Mjuju thrashed Jim's wife. On the woman coming to complain about the matter Mr. Mooney thrashed Mjuju. Four men of Umjuju's kraal ran out with guns. These were taken away by Mr. Mooney and sent to Hartley to Lukwata (Mr. Thurgood)." (74)

Oral tradition states:

".....it is when this chimurenga started, it started because this camp was in Muzhuzha's village, and then the fighting started straight away after the beating of Muzhuzha." (75)

Mlembere describes the events leading up to Mooney's murder. After the confrontation with Gobvu, a patrol was sent out to the dwellings of some Indian traders who had been reported as having been murdered. Two policemen deserted before the patrol began, and another deserted on the return journey. A further two deserted on reaching Muzha Gobvu's kraal. One of the policemen then saw the approach of a force of armed men and warned Mooney. He saddled up as Gobvu's men opened fire. Mooney and the policemen then scattered. He was pursued by a force under Mashayamombe's brother, Chifumba, and got as far as the Nyamachecke river, where his horse was wounded. He climbed a small hill to die in a gun battle. Some of Mooney's police were killed or wounded, some escaped to Hartley Hill. Mlembere was
separated from the others, and he states, had his gun taken away by the Shona, who allowed him to go free. "Charlie", another of Mooney's police, was captured, given a summary trial and executed. (76) Beach notes that the man who killed Mooney, Rusape, was returning to his kraal, when on seeing Mooney being pursued, borrowed a gun from his uncle. This is strong evidence to dispose of any theory of a planned "Rebellion". (77) Just after Mooney's murder, two traders, Stunt and Skell, with seven Zambezi Africans arrived and were killed near Muzhuzha's. (78) In assessing these initial murders, the killing of the Indian traders was probably an expression of a specific local grievance. The events leading up to the murder of Mooney were clearly local and due to a specific conflict. The arrival of the two traders in an inflamed atmosphere accounts for their murder.

What is now important to determine is what caused the attacks on other foreign peoples living in the district and surrounding areas. According to Beach, a force under the chief's nephew, Kakino, travelled over 64 km to kill J. C. Hepworth at his farm on the Umeweswe river, in the territory of the small Ngezi-Mupawane chiefdom. (79) Chifumba Muchena, another of the chief's brothers, went east to the Beatrice Mine to kill Tate, Koefoed and four labours on the afternoon of 15th. The Beatrice Mine was in the territory of the Rwizi chiefdom and about 32 km from the European settlement at Charter. (80) The evidence also hints that people from Mashayamombe's may have travelled as far as
the Norton farm on the outskirts of the Hartley district and been partly responsible for the killings which took place there on 17 June. (81) It is likely that the initial spontaneous killings had an accumulative effect in escalating the violence in the Mashayamombe chiefdom. The decision may have been taken by Mashayamombe and his council, or on the initiative of individuals to attack and kill foreigners, motivated either by the hope of material benefit or against whom there was a specific grievance or whose presence was found to be a local irritant.

Did the initiation of violence at Mashayamombe's lead to a "ripple effect", whereby the "Rebellion" became general? The assumptions of settler historiography were that the "Rebellion" in Mashonaland was planned, organized and coordinated, and that it found its impetus and focus in the kraal of Mashayamombe, and that it represented a determined effort by the black peoples to rid the country of white settlers. (82) Beach's doctoral thesis remained within the confines of these three presumptions, despite a minor quibble with Ranger as to the primacy of political or religious influences. (83) Despite the advance made by Beach's 1979 article as to the first of these assumptions, his revision is far less adventurous than it needs to be. Beach remains dependent upon an assumption of the central significance of the events at Mashayamombe's kraal which acted as a catalyst for the "Rebellion", and a black-white racial polarity perspective is integral to Beach's explanation of the "spread of the rising". Beach's revision is
a more sophisticated reflection of the European perspective, but it does not assist in an assessment of the complex nature of the events of 1896.

This thesis intends to challenge the final two premises of settler historiography. It argues that in the tense and volatile conditions which prevailed over a widespread area, the violent events at Mashayamombe's kraal should enjoy no pre-eminence in an analysis from the African perspective. (84) As such the related premise of racial antagonism cannot be used to account for the spread of the violence to become a "general rebellion".

Beach's revisionist explanation of a "general rising" in Mashonaland is dependent on a racial dialectic. Having emphasized racial conflict in Hartley, Beach extends this perspective to explain the spread of the conflict throughout Mashonaland. It was assumed that the violence at MtoKo, Makoni, Mangwendi, Mazoe, Charter and Lomagundi was prompted by news of the conflict at Mashayamombe. (85) As has already been shown in Selukwe, the explanation for the conflict is not to be assumed; it is to be sought in the details of the escalation of violence in each locality. The spread of the violence was not based on racial antagonism, but on the interaction of personalities and different perspectives. To argue that race is a false factor is not to deny the killing of Europeans as listed in the official reports, but rather to examine the circumstances surrounding
their deaths within the local context, and to extend the analysis to include those people not listed in official reports. (86)

Beach's evidence as to the manner in which the raiding parties were formed and executed their objectives also contradicts the "ripple" theory. It is noted that the attacks were undertaken by relatives of Mashayamombe. (87) These men were the most likely to be aggrieved by foreign impingements and most likely to benefit from the looting of the possessions of the Europeans. The raiding parties consisted of small groups of men who were unaware of their objectives, believing themselves to be out on hunting expeditions. If the men who actually undertook the raids were unaware of a "Rebellion" it must follow that the general population was even less aware. As such, even after the excitement raised by the murder of the Indian traders, Mooney, Stunt, Skell and individual foreign Africans, as far as the general population were concerned they were not engaged in a war with the Europeans, far less a "Rebellion". As such, to describe the initial killings within the Hartley area as the beginning of a "general rebellion" conflicts with the facts. It is an untenable thesis to argue that these initial killings produced the necessary degree of euphoria as a psychological precondition to induce a "ripple" effect of racially inspired violence, resulting in a "general rebellion". Though admitting the murder of Europeans in surrounding areas, the Mashayamombe people denied instigating a "Rebellion";
"The Matshayamombe people deny any knowledge of having in any way incited the other Mashonas to rebel and further state that they themselves were prompted by the Matabele." (88)

The oral tradition collected by Beach emphasizes the local inspiration for the initial violence, and the limited extent of the conflict. As Beach notes, "For the Guzho people of Mashayamombe, "Chisurenga" is primarily a Mashayamombe affair". (89) Beach is surprised to find that the nearby Chivero people agree: "it was only Mashayamombe and a few people who remained in the hills who fought the whites". (90) The oral evidence, the nature of the raiding parties, the prevalent widespread conflict and the lack of cooperation between the various Shona peoples, emphasises the essential local nature of the violence and contradict the racial conflict premise underlying a "ripple" effect theory.

The significance of the violence at Mashayamombe lies not in the inspiration they allegedly gave to a "general Shona rising" but rather to the effect on the European perception. The European and African perspectives diverge as to the facts of the initial conflict and their significance. Though the African perspective stresses the local inspiration for the violence in Hartley, the European perspective viewed Mashayamombe's attack on foreigners as part of a conspiracy to drive them from the country. No such conspiracy existed but the Europeans acted as
if it did. This perception influenced their activities throughout Mashonaland, often provoking a "Rebellion". The raids by Mashayamombe also spread the "rising" by implicating other people in the violence. This was not a situation unique to Hartley. African peoples in Mashonaland as in Matabeleland became embroiled in the "rebellion" through the actions of neighbours or even isolated individuals.(91) What emerges most clearly in a study of the events of 1896 - 7 is the fact that the Europeans did not know what was occurring in African society. They had no idea as to the nature of the violence, who was responsible or why. They acted according to their own presumptions, and as can be expected this was very often violently. The European perception of events saw a "general rebellion" due to a series of local conflicts where their activities precipitated African reactions over a widespread area in a relatively short time space. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the contrast between the European and African perception of events is to be found in Makoni's chiefdom, regarded by the Europeans as the second major instigator of "Rebellion".

Makoni was a powerful chief, whose principal kraal was situated on a cluster of granite rocks about 11 km off the Umtali road, near the Rusapi river. His influence extended over a large area, and he was, next to Umtassa, the most important chief in Eastern Manicaland. Makoni had found himself in conflict with the European authorities on many occasions, most notably in September 1894, when only considerations of British public
opinion prevented his being "smashed up". (92) Makoni is revealed in the documents as a man of high principle, honour and integrity. He clearly attempted to mediate between the maintenance of local autonomy and the accommodation of European pressures. A conflict with Assistant Native Commissioner Ross and his predecessor, O'Reilley in June 1896 was a purely localised confrontation relating to a specific grievance. He was antagonistic to Ross and O'Reilley and determined to resist any further impingements on his authority by the Native Department. He had no desire to fight the Europeans and never considered a general campaign against them. His actions after 9 June, the date on which he held a meeting of his headmen, enforce this interpretation. He took no offensive action against Ross, restricting himself to threats and warnings. He seized cattle taken by the Native Department, as had been done before. When his men confronted Native Department personnel they did not kill them, but disarmed and threatened them. (93) On 14 June the Umtali coach was threatened when a silent group of armed Shona lined the road. The word to attack never came and the coach passed on to Salisbury. (94) On 18 June a Native Policeman took a message to Makoni and was allowed to depart unmolested. (95) The attack made on Headlands in Makoni's territory on 22 June was made by men from Mangwendi's territory, following on the retreat from Marandellas. The Headlands party thereafter retreated through Makoni's territory to the Odzi without being attacked. The attack on the Headlands party wrongly attributed to Makoni led to the assumption that
he had joined the "Rebellion". (96) After Makoni was assumed to be in "Rebellion" the district was deserted of Europeans. But, as the reminiscences of a transport rider, B. A. Bland, illustrate, Europeans were still able to pass unmolested through his territory. (97) A local study of the Makoni area needs, therefore, to explore the question of Makoni's "Rebellion" and of a "general rebellion". Makoni denied any part in a "Rebellion" and viewed the Europeans as the aggressors, with himself more sinned against than sinning.

Every act of violence in the Makoni district can be traced to the Europeans, Makoni merely reacting, and with restraint to an intensification of provocation. In payment of the hut tax Ross seized a number of Makoni's cattle. On 17 June 1896, H.M. Taberer, the Chief Native Commissioner sent to Earl Grey a message from Headlands that "Makoni's district is in a very disturbed state". (98) Makoni had announced his intention to repossess his cattle and had threatened Ross and the Native Police. Taberer stated that, "I think Makoni should be dealt with without delay, it would be fairly easily managed. I consider the matter to be too serious to be overlooked". At this point the Europeans viewed Makoni's denial of their claim of suzerainty in purely local terms, as it had been in 1894. As yet it was not interpreted as part of a conspiratorial "general rebellion". Taberer then attempted to raise a punitive force in Umtali to punish Makoni's perceived challenge to European authority. The difficulties experienced in raising such a force is a clear indication of the weakness of the European presence.
To pull the seven pounder it was proposed that mules be commandeered in Chimoio or alternatively donkeys in Rusape, there being none in Umtali. It was then found that there were no fuses for the seven pounders and further, no one in Umtali was capable of working the gun. Taberer then received a request for fuses and a man to work the seven pounder, and for a maxim gun and a further five men to be sent from Salisbury. However, before the punitive force could be assembled, the European perception of events had changed. Makoni's denial of European authority was no longer considered to be a local disturbance, but was now perceived to be part of a "general rebellion". It was now considered impossible to undertake a punitive force with only 60 men at Umtali and 374 at Salisbury. Judge Vintcent advocated that the Europeans strengthen their laagers and adopt a "sitting tight policy", until the arrival of reinforcements. It is significant that the first major act of aggression by the Europeans was in response to a local conflict initiated by the European attempt to extend their influence. Makoni, between the end of June and the beginning of August, was left in peace. Following on the flight of the Europeans into laager at Umtali, he was in undisputed control of his territory. He did not attack any Europeans who ventured into his district and no Europeans were murdered. Only two killings were attributed to Makoni, that of an African missionary and a Native Policeman, and the circumstances surrounding their deaths are unclear. The deserted and abandoned stores and homesteads of the Europeans were broken
into and looted, but this does not justify the assumption of Makoni's "rebellion".

When Colonel Alderson arrived in Umtali in late July he perceived his first task to be the securing of the lines of communication which Makoni was assumed to threaten. Prior to leaving Umtali on 28 July, Alderson was informed that Makoni had occupied and fortified the Devil's pass on the Salisbury main road. He, therefore, decided to move round south of the pass and to again strike the main road at the Nyamatrutnui river, about 11 km southwest of Makoni's. Alderson's account of the progress of the column is interesting. Shots were allegedly fired on the afternoon of 30th, in an area where there is no evidence of any conflict prior to this account and none thereafter. That region was considered "neutral". On 31st the volunteer scouts fired on "Mziti's" men who had remained "loyal". This is an indication of the attitude of his men who in their eagerness for conflict were capable of provoking a confrontation. Thirdly, it must be noted that after these two skirmishes, a column comprised of 20 officers and 295 N.C.O's and men, could hardly have escaped the attention of Makoni. Yet when Makoni was attacked on 3 August;

"The natives had evidently had a big beer drink the night before and were still singing when we approached. The surprise was so complete that they had no time to drive away their cattle, and we captured 355 head of cattle and 210 goats and sheep, while I do not think that 50 head got away." (103)
Having surprised Makoni, Alderson’s forces succeeded in capturing their settlement and driving them into the caves. He did not consider it wise to risk the lives of his men in attempting to drive them out of the caves, and so withdrew his forces. The following day, Chipunza came in and reported that there was complete disorganization among Makoni’s men. Chipunza had allegedly been held prisoner by Makoni but escaped in the confusion. Internal conflicts were very evident in the Makoni chiefdom, and Chipunza was one of several of Makoni’s chiefs who sided with the Europeans. Alderson then organized the building of Fort Haines, to be garrisoned by 50 men from the West Riding regiment and ten Umtali Volunteers, before proceeding to Salisbury.

On 18 August Judge Vintcent received a report from Major Watts that Makoni had sent a messenger offering to come in if his life was spared. Lord Grey’s reaction was;

"Makoni is a man who deserves death if any man does and I should hesitate to give him the promise of his life if he surrenders, unless you think it politic to do so. Would it bring the war to an end if we sent him to Robben Island?" 

Lord Grey’s opinion that Makoni was a man who deserved death was without foundation, and based on no knowledge of the situation. The Administrator’s ignorance was displayed when he then enquired, "How many murders has Makoni committed?" The Judge was unable to give an answer except to say that Makoni’s
people had "frequently fired on Headlands people".(106) The reason for the intense hostility to Makoni then becomes clear. Even at this point the Europeans were searching to identify the factor responsible for the perceived "Rebellion" in order to destroy it. Makoni was at this stage assumed to be responsible for the "Rebellion" as later Kaguvi and Nehanda would be. As Judge Vintcent stated in regards to Makoni, "(His) coming in will break the back of the rebellion generally".(107)

Makoni having suffered a surprise attack by Alderson, for which he was clearly unprepared, attempted to establish peace, but the Europeans were determined "not (to) pursue a milk and water policy."(108) The terms they were determined to set for Makoni's surrender were the giving up of any murderer, the supply of corn and cattle, and significantly for the period following on the war of conquest, the complete disarmament of Makoni's people and their removal from caves and kopjes to locations under the Native Commissioners.(109) However, before Makoni could accept or reject these terms, the news came on 7 September that Major Watts had tried Makoni by court martial and had executed him.(110)

A petition by Thomas Dhlamini, a Zulu, contains an interesting account of Makoni's capture. According to Dhlamini, he ventured into the cave where Makoni was hiding after two young girls had attempted to escape from the entrance he was guarding. Having reached the cavern where Makoni was, he saw;
Commissioner, Charter) went off to Matabeleland to fight the Ndebele he left a European woman and property in charge of Chiwishira. The chief took the woman, shaved her head and made her conform to tribal custom and wear beads and skins. Some say he later killed her. When Taylor returned, he was angry and attacked the Hera people, and so "Chindunduma" started. (118) The tradition of the Guzho people of Moromo states that "Chindunduma" occurred because they looted the Range station during Taylor's absence with the Salisbury Column. (119) Beach discounts the Charter oral traditions, because apart from personalising the whole affair they do "not explain why "Chindunduma" which started in June should be caused by Taylor's return with the Salisbury column in July". (120) However, the June dating of the "Rebellion" is a fact only from the European perspective. From the African perspective, as the oral traditions emphasise, "Chindunduma" began in July when the Salisbury column attacked the African peoples of the district.

In Charter, the few Europeans in the district, on hearing rumours of a "Rebellion" began to move into laager on 18 June. The first killings of Europeans took place two days later on 20 June. (121) The delay in the "rising" in what Hugh Marshall Hole described as "the nursery of the Mashona rebellion" has usually been attributed to the presence of 70 men of the Natal Troop. (122) However, Hole's assessment was based on the premise of there being a pre-planned "Rebellion". The evidence clearly indicates that the escalation of violence in the district came as a surprise to the African peoples. When asked
about the "Rebellion", the response of Merandowi, a son of Mabarutze, a chief in the Range was that:

"The reason he did not report the trouble to the white men was that they did not know it was coming and when it came they ran away."(123)

Sixteen people were killed in this district, eight individuals, a family of four and two pairs of companions, either on their farms or on their way to a laager. This is not a large number and had there been a coordinated attempt to kill Europeans the list of fatalities would have been far higher. Several narratives illustrate the bellicose attitude of the Europeans as they moved into laager.(124) Their behaviour probably provoked isolated attacks.

With the movement of the Europeans into laager at Enkeldoorn and Charter on 18 June, the district was in effect deserted until the arrival of the Salisbury Column from Matabeleland on 6 July. In the intervening period the Shona took the opportunity to loot the deserted homesteads. The Europeans in laager were far too weak to take offensive action against the local Shona whom they now believed to be in "Rebellion", until reinforced by men of the Salisbury column. It was believed that all the peoples of the Charter district were in "Rebellion", but subsequent research has implicated only three chiefdoms, Mutekedza, Maromo and Sango.(125) The significant point about the oral traditions is that it is the Europeans who are seen to
bear the responsibility for escalating the violence into the "Chindunduma". The oral traditions of the Charter people present an interpretation of the events of 1896 which differs markedly from the European perspective. The Salisbury Column of the Rhodesian Light Horse was recalled from Bulawayo, reentered Mashonaland on 4 July and arrived at Enkeldoorn on 6th. The activities of Colonel Beal's force, described by R. Hodder-Williams, show them to be ill-disciplined and violent, given to looting and wanton aggression. (126) The men lived what has been described as a "semi-soldering, semi-brigand life". (127) It is, therefore, not surprising that Ranga's people who "collaborated", fled on their approach. (128) The activities of this force were a significant factor in the spread of the "rebellion".

Up until 6 July the Afrikaners at the laager had undertaken little offensive action, but they now joined Major Hoste and 75 troopers of the Rhodesia Horse in an attack on Maromo's stronghold. Maromo's Guzho held their position until artillery silenced them, and the stronghold was burned. This action virtually put Maromo out of the war. By 18 July the Afrikaners had made further patrols. Little was heard of Maromo until 7 August, when the Njanja chiefs reported that "Maromo cleared (sic) to the Zinzanga for protection. The Zinzanga people turned him out and told him that they did not want to be implicated in his affairs". (129) This incident is important as it shows the essentially local aspect of the conflict. No one who was involved in it saw it in racialistic or nationalistic
terms. It is also significant that Maromo should flee to the Njanja who were "collaborating", having supplied Brabant with 120 levies to attack Mutekedza in July. This illustrates that even traditional conflicts, such as that between the Njanja and Maromo, did not always determine alignment. On 26 September Taylor reported that "Maromo came to my station at Range to surrender himself; not finding me there he returned and will give himself up on my arrival there". (130) This is not the action of a man set upon "revolt" against an oppressive intruder. Maromo Muchengahuta, however, thought better of surrendering and he fled to his fellow Guzho chief, Mashayamombe, at the village of whose brother, Chifumba Muchema, he died of sickness in January 1897. (131) In the Maromo chiefdom, one house, that of Hokenya, was not implicated in the conflict; he protected some foreign Africans and made his peace independently of his chief in September 1896. (132)

The Mutekedza chiefdom of the Hera is the biggest in the Charter District. The chiefdom's history is interesting, supported by the tribal spirit authorities and the Company in the form of the local Field Cornet, the trader and farmer, Henry Short, Muchechirwa Chiwishira had managed to secure the title of chief after a period of exclusion of his house by the sons of Dete. (133) This alliance between Chiwishira and Short had been sealed by a diplomatic marriage, and Chiwishira was fairly friendly towards the Europeans. When violence erupted in Matabeleland in March 1896, W. M. Taylor raised some 200 men,
the bulk of whom came from Mutekedza's chiefdom, hired at 1 per month and a blanket each. (134) This important part of Mutekedza's fighting force went south to Bulawayo with Beal's Salisbury Column. Beach advanced the argument that Mutekedza believed this force had been wiped out with the column, and so decided to join the rising when Bonda, a Mwari cult official, arrived in June. (135) Henry Short was sacrificed to the needs of his father-in-law's policy and killed in spite of his wife's efforts to save him. The situation became more complex when the Salisbury Column reappeared in June with Taylor and the 200 Hera levies. Mutekedza then had men fighting on both sides. The Hera levies continued to serve loyally, and although given the option of leaving, as many as 55 continued on to Salisbury. (136) This unusual situation in the Mutekedza chiefdom suggests that in the general disturbed conditions which prevailed the Hera people became implicated in the attacks on persons and property and were thereafter perceived to be in "Rebellion". Major Jenner, commenting on Mutekedza's offer of surrender, wrote:

"I think that Umtegeza's influence with his people is not very great - of course he says he had no influence, was powerless to prevent them rising and took no part in the rising". (137)

The people in the Charter laager had made a few patrols up till 8 July, when Brabant arrived with ten men and a waggon of ammunition from Victoria. He then attacked the Hera with a brutality that later led to charges being brought against him.
White's flying column, which overtook Beal's force on the way to Salisbury, reached Charter and patrolled Mutekedza's country, doing a certain amount of damage. At the end of the month, Brabant made a patrol and collected Njanja troops and attacked Mutekedza. The resistance of Mutekedza's Hera wore down, and by early August cracks appeared in Hera solidarity. Taylor who patrolled on his own, learnt that "not all Umtegetze's people revolted". (138) By the time an Imperial Mounted Infantry column appeared in early September to finish off the main resistance in Charter, a new factor appears to have developed in Hera politics. By early September, Taylor had contacted a brother of Mutekedza, perhaps one "Shindwane" who had surrendered his rifles on 6 October and who was willing to cooperate. When Jenner's British and Natal troops arrived, they proceeded to Mutekedza's, accompanied by a large force of "collaborators" from Chirumanzu and the Victoria districts. There, through the medium of Mutekedza's brother, they persuaded him to give himself up on 15 September. (139) Mutekedza Chiwishira was taken to Salisbury, where he died in goal of "debility and old age" on 23 June 1897. Jenner was forced to undertake a subsequent campaign up to 23 September, because the Hera had refused to surrender with their chief saying "they would only be beaten to death if they did". (140) This is an indication of their fear and distrust of Europeans. However, resistance slackened and by 20th the Hera had virtually given up. After this the Mutekedza chiefdom remained absolutely quiet, and surrenders on a large scale occurred at the Range.
Two other chiefdoms remained. Sango's Rozvi on Chigura hill south of Enkeldoorn were regarded as the most determined "rebels" in the district. (141) On 3 September the Enkeldoorn people attacked an outlying village of the Sango chiefdom on the Selukwe, and on 30 October Rhodes, himself joined in the final assault on Chigura Hill that broke up the resistance of this little polity. (142) The other polity involved was that of Mudzimurema, which was on the north of the Sabi and was politically connected to the people of the Marandellas district, but like Mashayamombe, they had their main stronghold on the other side of a major river — in this case, south of the Sabi. By deserting their village they avoided Jenner in September, but in April they surrendered. (143) That Charter should be one of the first districts to be "pacified" is due to its geographical location. The European forces from Matabeleland passed first through Charter on their way to Salisbury; forces from Salisbury and Umtali detoured through Charter to get to Hartley. The two laagers at Charter and Enkeldoorn ensured that the district received a great deal of attention from the military. This was the first district to suffer the full impact of the European war of conquest and the least prepared. The looting and ravaging of the countryside by the Europeans generated a desperate determination to resist. Though in Charter "Chindunduma" is seen to begin in July with the arrival of the European forces, in the Mtoko district the concept of a "Rebellion" cannot be found.
The Budja people of Mtoko have a particularly turbulent history of resistance to impingements on their independence. (144) The Budja had threatened Assistant Native Commissioner Armstrong in February 1895 which led to a punitive expedition to the area under Brabant. (145) Two of Armstrong's police were shot by February 1896; a patrol was fired on by Mkota's Tonga shortly afterwards. (146) In May 1896 Ruping was acting Assistant Native Commissioner during Armstrong's absence on leave. Ruping was encamped near Mtoka's kraal with a party of about twelve Native Police. There were four isolated prospectors at the Kaiser Wilhelm gold fields to the east of Mtoko's, and between Ruping and Salisbury were the Abercorn gold fields in which there were about a score of prospectors and a trading station. Towards the latter end of May, Ruping paid a visit for the purpose of collecting hut tax to the kraal of Mahemba, nominal head of the Chiseru country. Ruping was accompanied by about six of his Native Police. On arrival at the kraal, the visitors found a beer drink in progress. The chief, an old man, had apparently lost all control over his people, but he sent Ruping a little meal, and a few men to build a shelter. Ruping's encampment was then attacked. One policeman was wounded. The villages dispersed, and Ruping finding himself out of ammunition, decided to return to his station. Mahemba's kraal lay about a day and a half's journey from the station near Mount Bismark. On 3 June Ruping decided to take his police and thirty-five native volunteers from Gurupira, who was friendly, to inflict an exemplary punishment on Mahemba. Taberer sent out a quantity
of ammunition for this purpose. On 6 June, Ruping heard a rumour of a sub-chief of Mahemba, called Cherewa, raising a force. Ruping sent his little force of police and volunteers to reconnoitre; they found Cheewa's kraal deserted and the natives massing in force in the neighbouring hills. Thinking it unwise to attack such a formidable number, Ruping had no alternative but to return to Matoka's. (147)

The disaffection then began to spread to the north and east. The chiefs Chembo of Wa-iri, Kuterere, Doro, Rundio of Inyagui district, and Siyuramkota denied Ruping's authority. Consequently, Ruping warned Jenson, Horne and W. A. Fraser, who were prospecting near Mahemba's, asking them to report to the station for their own safety. Ruping's concern on their behalf increased on hearing that the prospectors' employees had deserted, and the district chiefs were shunning them. At that time Ruping was at Kakomwe's kraal a few kilometers east of Matoko's with the police, forty men from Gurupira, and a chief called Magima. This was in Chesserwa country, which remained peaceful, though they had always refused to pay hut tax. On 7 June Mahemba and his sub-chief Makoni began to build stockades at their kraals, and Ruping spent the day in skirmishing. One of his native police, a son (and immediate heir) of Gurupira, was killed. Two others were wounded, and all his assegai bearers deserted, except a few from Gurupira's and Magima's. After this brush with Mahemba, Ruping was joined by Newman Smith, a prospector. Gurupira, probably angered by the
death of his son, then became hostile. Ruping retired to his station with the intention of fortifying it.(148)

In the last communication received from Ruping, dated 9 June, his opinion was that the hostility had been occasioned by his visit to Mahemba's on May 27, and the punishment expected for their earlier hostile reception. He regarded the hostility to have flowed from the attempt to collect hut tax.(149) What is clear is that no distinction is possible between the violence prior to and during June from that thereafter. It is also clear that the violence was initiated by purely local grievances. The Mtoko district also highlights the importance of communication between the European and African peoples. With the death of Gurupira's son, Ruping, a new man to the district, lost his only link with Gurupira. His nerve broke and he fled to be killed outside the Mtoko district.(150) The subsequent success of Armstrong, on his return from leave, to get the Budja to "collaborate" depended on his personal links with Gurupira.(151) With Gurupira's death during the subsequent campaign, these channels of communication closed, and again fear and suspicion led him to erroneously believe that the Budja were again preparing to "rebels".(152) The presence of people on both sides able to communicate is an important factor. The absence of these channels of communication led to the conceptual confusion evident in Beach's use of "peripheral violence" to account for the European change of perspective.

The Lomagundi district had, as in Mtoko, witnessed several
incidents of violent conflict between the few Europeans and African peoples. The most notable was the murder of Trooper Stanford by headman Geneou in 1893, and the murder of Trooper Cooper on 5 August 1894, while assisting Mining Commissioner Pocock to extract labour. (153) This second incident led to a notorious punitive expedition which inflicted retribution on the wrong people. (154) The Lomagundi district had subsequently remained unsettled and hut tax returns were poor. The Lomagundi district in 1896 was suffering from three years of drought and locust plague. The war in Matabeleland had further depleted the scant European population. (155) Though Assistant Native Commissioner Mynhardt thought the local Africans were unlikely to cause trouble, he did urge that some precautions be taken. In April the Government warned the Europeans in the district to take precautions and 1000 rounds of ammunition were sent out to strengthen their position. (156) The Mining Commissioner, A. L. Jameson, noted on 15 May rumours that "the natives are leaving their kraals going north and intend returning to wipe out the whites". (157) But the first intimation of violence on 25 May involved an attack by some Shona on some African travellers. (158) Two days later a report was drafted by Jameson concerning the murder of a prospector, J. Docherty by his workers. The men allegedly responsible were surrendered by Manyemba. (159) The Lomagundi district at this point was particularly vulnerable. The token police force had been withdrawn eight months previously, and there was thought to be not a single trooper in the district. Salisbury was slow in reacting to Docherty’s death, and Jameson wrote angrily to his
superiors to complain of the delay. (160) The atmosphere in the district was tense and volatile, yet chiefs like Manyemba were anxious to avoid conflict.

The first murder in June was that of Herbert Eyre, a farmer, killed on Sunday 21 June, by a party of six Africans who came ostensibly to trade. According to "Pollie", a servant, these men came from "Chimbamawas", "Chikombes" and "Mascombies". One of the murders, Samkange, was a former servant of Eyre. (161) According to another servant:

"I came on the main road from Umvokwe. I saw no natives on my way. I do not know the kraals or indunas who attacked Eyre. They do not live near Umvokwe. They came from a distance. The rebels came from the direction of Mazoe." (162)

Makombi's kraal was in the Abercorn region of Mazoe district. The evidence from Mazoe hints that a raid may have taken place on the Lomagundi district by a small party of men;

"The Mazoe natives went to Makombis to look for white people and police to kill them. Makombi's people then went round to the surrounding kraals." (163)

A raid such as this would have been quite possible and it would explain several features of the "rising" in Lomagundi. Manyemba, the previous month, had surrendered the alleged murderers of Docherty and seemed anxious to avoid conflict. If his position had changed, the killing of Europeans would have
been a far more concerted process. But if the killings were initially undertaken by Africans from a neighbouring district the process would have been haphazard. Due to the uncoordinated nature of the violence the Europeans were able to congregate and escape as parties or individuals. Some Africans in the district may have become embroiled in the violence, but this again was a lethargic process affecting only a small percentage of the population. On 22nd the Aryshire mine party was attacked, on 23rd a party of four Australians, and Messrs Brand and Grove were fired at on 27 June. All reached Salisbury safely. People were, therefore, still moving about unhindered in the district several days after the first killings. These factors seem to suggest that the impetus for the violence in Lomagundi may indeed be looked for in the direction of Mazoe. That the "rising" was carried into Lomagundi on 21 June and had not received support from the Africans of the district, is borne out by the experience of Messrs Bell and Franklin who came into Salisbury on Sunday 21 June, without seeing a single African and with no knowledge of a "rising". When Captain Godly led the first patrol into the district in October 1896, he found it deserted. Manyemba and his people had fled to the safety of the fly country near the Zambezi. This does not constitute the actions of a determined "rebel".

Moving east of Lomagundi, the Umtali road was Salisbury's main artery of supply from the railhead on the Pungwe River and
Beira in 1896. Stretching out from Salisbury along the road were isolated European stores and farms. The Balley Hooley Hotel, - a pleasure resort on the east bank of the Ruwa river - was 19 km from Salisbury, Law's Store 10 km further on, then Grahams' Store, and White's farm 19 km from Marandellas on the Charter road. There were Jesuit missionaries at their pioneer mission, Chishwashe, and 16 km east of them, a handful of prospectors and miners on the Enterprise gold belt. The Assistant Native Commissioner of the district was Alexander Duncombe Campbell. He owned a farm, managed by his younger brother, George, close to the kraal of Mashonganyika, off the Umtali road. The European presence in the district, as can be seen, was small.

Within the district there were a multitude of Shona headmen under the paramount chiefs Seki, Chikwakwa and Kunzwi. Seki's main kraal under the headman Daremombe was at Chesumba, 18 km north - east of Salisbury, close to the north bank of the Hunyani at its confluence, with the Mesethwe. Seki's headman Simbanoota lived on the banks of the Ruwa, and Chiremba on the Makabusi river. Closer to Salisbury was Besa, 6.5 km from the town, besides the Umtali road. East of Seki's country, Chikwakwa was paramount, with his kraal on the west side of the Goromomzi massif. Under him were Zhanta, the commander of Chikwakwa's warriors, and the headman, Gondo, living on a separate kopje, about a kilometer north of Chikwakwa. Mashonganyika was two or 5 km south east of Chikwakwa, on the eastern edge of the Enterprise gold belt. His brother Kuleya
lived in the hills of Mashona kop. Moving 8 km to the east lay the kraal of Kunzwi Nyandoro, a powerful independent chief who lived on the west bank of the Nyagui river and close to Shangari hill on lands belonging by right to the paramounts, Rusiki and Mangwendi.(168)

On 18 June following on the news of the first murders, a public meeting was held in Salisbury. Judge Vintcent promised to issue rifles, secured the formation of a defense committee and arranged for the completion of a laager. That night pickets were placed around the town and the next morning the inhabitants were called into laager.(169) A patrol under Captain Dan Judson was sent out on 18 June, followed on 19 June by another patrol to Mazoe under Captain Nesbitt. They were both to experience fierce fighting in the relief of the Mazoe party at Alice Mine.(170) On 19 June martial law was proclaimed in Salisbury. Up to this point no disturbance had been experienced between Salisbury and Marandellas. On 18 June, Campbell had come in with some headmen of Chikwakwa's kraal who had professed loyalty and asserted that they were friendly.(171) Campbell had then left to warn the whites in the district accompanied by Mr C. T. Stevens. He reached Balley Hooley at dawn on 20 th, and arranged for the settlers to assemble on his farm near Mashonganyika's. He went on ahead, had a friendly meeting with the chief, and then left to continue his warnings.(172) After warning Law and the Ortons, he and Stevens were reconnoitring when they saw the Ortons' cart
surrounded by Africans. There was no one in the cart and all they could do was dash off to Salisbury under heavy fire. (173)

Campbell was convinced that all the Europeans had been cut off, but there were several sensational escapes. (174)

What initiated the conflict at Mashonganyika's is not clear. Zhanta, the man who allegedly led the attack on the Europeans gathering at Campbell's farm, stated at his trial:

"Thus I heard the natives were being attacked by the white men and that "George" (Campbell) had been killed. I sent Chulawa to the police to warn the white men." (175)

During the subsequent peace negotiations it was reported:

"that in accordance with O.C. M.F.F. (sic) instructions I have indabered with Chiqwaqwa. He states his desire for peace and leave to sow; he says indeed that he has never fought against the Government at all and has never fired on the troops, further that at none of his kraals in the district has the first shot ever been fired by his people - As far as I can find out this is very possibly quite true." (176)

Kunzwi Nyandoro's attitude was similar:

"He also states that their men had not borne arms against the Government and that they have every wish to be loyal and peaceful. Mr Campbell informs me that there is no proof of their having borne arms against the Government, the only doubtful case being very possibly Chinamore's men." (177)

From the African perspective it was the Europeans who were the
aggressors. The Africans in the district, though informed by the Europeans of the "Rebellion" as early as 18 June, professed themselves "loyal" as late as the morning of 20 June. What changed within the space of a few hours is not clear. What is evident is that as the Europeans moved into laager they became defensively aggressive. This may have provided the spark. It is possible that small elements in African society were attracted to give chase like hounds to the hare. The possibility of a raiding party from a surrounding area, such as Mazoe, where fighting had already occurred, carrying the conflict into this district, cannot be ruled out. (178) Zhanta clearly blamed the Europeans for the escalated violence.

The search for the truth is hampered by several narratives from survivors which conflict and contain a certain element of self-aggrandisement which obscure the reality. Campbell's evidence, for example, as reflected in the Reports, conflicts with subsequent accounts. Campbell's false evidence has done tremendous damage to the historical perspective. (179) Another aspect of these initial confrontations which is important is the aid given by Africans to assist in the escape of Europeans. White's Store, for example, was allegedly attacked by men from Sehumba's kraal. Lieutenant H. Bremner of 20th Hussars, a passing traveller, was killed, and White was left badly wounded and dying. He was rescued by an African catechist, Mulete, and taken to headman Nengubo. Nengubo was preparing to take them to the Wesleyan mission when the same force again attacked. White, Mulete and two children of Nengubo's kraal were killed. The
significant aspect of this incident is that Nengubo was considered to have had a strained relationship with the Europeans before the outbreak of "Rebellion". (180)

A brief glance at the history of Kunzwi Nyandoro's chiefdom provides yet another insight into the African perspective against which the concept of "Rebellion" can be evaluated. Some years before Kunzwi had fled from a settlement in the Gwelo district to Shangari Hill on the banks of the Inyagui river. Rusiki, the paramount chief of the district, allowed him to settle there subject to a yearly tribute of cattle. Within a few years Kunzwi had built up such a strong following that Rusiki did not dare to enforce his tribute. When the Pioneers arrived, Nyandoro held a strong position in central Mashonaland. Many of his people had crossed the Inyagui river into the land of Noe of Chief Mangwendi, but continued to acknowledge Kunzwi as their paramount. The evidence indicates that Kunzwi exercised undisputed authority in his chiefdom. Europeans, such as "Wiri" Edwards were forced to rely on Kunzwi's good faith, and he exercised jurisdiction over the subjects of other chiefs who transgressed in his lands. (181) Kunzwi, it is not surprising to find, came into conflict with the Native Department on several occasions. In September 1894, a transport rider's oxen, under the care of his Zulu servants, were allowed to wander into the fields of one of Kunzwi's subjects. A great deal of damage was done and the man complained to Kunzwi who sent his son, Panashi, to investigate.
A fight broke out and Panashi shot dead one of the Zulus. The incident was reported to Campbell in Salisbury. The Native messengers sent to summon Kunzwi to Salisbury were chased from his territory. In *absentia* he was fined 20 head of cattle. Kunzwi made no attempt to pay but remained on guard for several months in his hill fortress, refusing to have anything to do with Campbell. An expected expedition to punish him did not take place. The suspense, according to Edwards, became too much for Kunzwi, and he came and saw "Wiri" in an attempt to defuse the conflict. (182)

Kunzwi, however, remained committed to following an independent policy. In October 1895 the police were fired on by Nyandoro's men when Campbell attempted to collect hut tax for the first time. (183) In April 1896 Nyandoro again threatened the police and some local Europeans. It was reported that:

"the chief Kunzwi had refused to allow the Native Police to collect hut tax in his district and had sent the police back to Mr Campbell with a threat that he would kill all police and white men in his district." (184)

Ranger regarded this incident as the "first intimation of the Shona rising". (185) Yet there is nothing to distinguish between Nyandoro's position before June 1896 and the stance he maintained throughout the subsequent conflict. He asserted and protected his independence when attacked and resisted any attempt to restrict his autonomy. The European presence in the district was minimal, and the Native Department had failed to
make any impact upon Kunzwi's authority. He had never acknowledged European authority and never considered himself in "Rebellion". Kunzwi also denied being influenced by Kaguvi or Nehanda during the conflict, and drew spiritual inspiration from Ganyeru, the mhondoro resident at his kraal. The attempt by Campbell in 1897 to negotiate the surrender of Kunzwi met with a foreseeable diplomatic rebuff;

"My opinion and the opinion of loyal natives at Chiwasha, who have been with the rebels until lately is that Kunzwi has not the slightest intention of surrendering, but simply wishes to gain time to get his crop harvested." (186)

Kunzwi may have wished for peace, but the price was subjugation, and this he was as yet unwilling to pay. The European authorities in a sense admitted Kunzwi's independence when on the conclusion of hostilities it was decided not to try him for "Rebellion". (187)

"Wiri" Edwards, the former trader in Kunzwi's territory, was appointed Tax Collector for the Mangwendi district in May 1895, the office evolving into that of Assistant Native Commissioner. It was a large district which lay to the east of Salisbury. It extended "from the Mazoe - Nyanderi river junction in the north to the Sabi river south of it, (to) Mt Wedza in the present Marandellas district". (188) Marandellas in 1896 was a way - side stopping place and an important centre of communications, situated as it was at the junction of roads leading from
Umtali, Salisbury and Charter. It consisted of a rambling collection of brick buildings over an area of many acres, and served as the administrative centre of a district with only a very tiny European population. There was virtually no farming done, and the area consisted of individuals running stores or inns, or scattered officials of the administration. Edwards as Assistant Native Commissioner first camped at Mrewa for the winter and then moved to Marandellas, "as it was impossible to work the district from only one centre". Edwards's instructions as to his duties were simple and indicate the ephemeral European presence; "get to know your district, and your people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God's sake don't worry headquarters if you can avoid it." (189) Edwards had one significant brush with Gezi, brother of paramount Mangwendi of Noe. Gezi's kraal was 19 km west of Mrewa. In December 1895 a woman accused of witchcraft was killed at his kraal. The messengers sent to summon Gezi to Salisbury were attacked, and a punitive expedition under Campbell failed to reach Gezi's kraal due to the rains. The reckoning with Gezi was postponed until March 1896. A surprise attack led to the capture of Gezi's cattle which were driven off under fire to Mrewa. Thereafter Gezi remained hostile to the Europeans. (190)

On Wednesday 17 June, Edwards set off for Headlands to meet Taberer to assist in the punitive expedition to Makoni. The Marandellas settlement was left in the care of Trooper Fitzgerald and a few African messengers. On Thursday 18 June, George Lamb, a transport rider, and the Comte de la Panouse
passed with their wagons through Marandellas. (191) They were overtaken by the Umtali coach and five white men heading for Umtali. On the morning of 19th, Lamb received a telegram from his brother warning him of the "Rebellion". The party decided to return to Salisbury. On the same day, Edwards at Headlands received the news of the Norton murders. (192) He sent an African messenger to Marandellas with instructions for Trooper Fitzgerald to gather the Europeans at the hotel. This messenger arrived late on Friday afternoon. The news on the following day was worse. So at sundown on the 20th, Edwards accompanied by Kennith Jarkins, a transport rider, left Headlands. They called at Lewis's Store on the Macheke river, but he would not believe in a rebellion. Meanwhile, Lamb reinforced by the Comte de la Panouse's party, reached White's Store on the evening of 20th, where they spent the night. White was out bartering and a message was left with his assistant, Lynch. At Marandellas, Trooper Fitzgerald had sent out messengers to warn the few whites in the district late on Friday evening. On the Saturday morning, Marandera's men moved threateningly towards Old Marandellas, and attempted to capture the cattle belonging to the settlement. The Europeans, having been warned by Trooper Fitzgerald, had already moved into the stronghold, bar two. James White, living about 19 km away on the farm Mendemu, had ignored the warning. He and Lieutenant Bremner, in circumstances already described, were killed on the Saturday. (193) Another man, of uncertain identity, also ignored the warnings. (194) He lived only 5 km from the inn, between the
hotel and Mangwendi's kraal on Mohopo. He experienced no sign of "rebellion" until first light on Sunday. Warned by an African, he saw a party of men, allegedly led by Mechemwa, Mangwendi's son, approaching his house. He made a dash for the inn which he reached, pursued by this party. At the hotel were gathered nine European men and a Mrs van der Spuy and her baby. On the Sunday morning the Europeans decided to try and make a dash for Headlands. Their progress was painfully slow, but despite their vulnerability they were not attacked on the road. At the Macheke they persuaded Lewis to abandon his store. Headlands was reached at dusk. During the night the Headlands laager was attacked, but the assailants were driven off. The next day it was decided to abandon Headlands and head for Umtali, which was reached without any trouble. Edwards states that it was afterwards ascertained that the Africans who attacked them at Headlands were not Makoni's people, but "the rebels from Mangwendi and Soswe who had chased us from Marandella". (195)

Hodder-Williams, in his article, commented that, "The peculiar pattern of the rebellion is beginning to take shape. It was not a well organized movement nor was the strategy coordinated". He went further, "It is surprising, in view of the nature of the European settlement that there were not more casualties. If men like the Whites and Harry Graham had believed the warnings they received, there would have been even fewer deaths. This was due to the extraordinary haphazard nature of the Mashona rebellion, the exact purpose of which seems more akin to a
demonstration than a determined attempt to drive out an invading people". (196) Edwards's impression that the "Rebellion" was a planned general rising is therefore clearly an overreaction. It is further important to note that the "Rebellion" in Marandellas began only after the Europeans had been warned on 19th, and had moved into laager. The first tentative aggressive move was a raid on cattle belonging to the settlement. Even then, a man living within 5 km of the inn was unaware of any "rising" until the following morning. Furthermore, White rescued by Mulete, was taken to headman Nengubo, who though on bad terms with the Europeans attempted to save him. Edwards also notes that his Native messengers remained "loyal" despite every opportunity to desert. The flight to Headlands was unhindered, as was the journey to Umtali. The evidence, if critically examined, would seem to conflict with any thesis of a "general rebellion". What violence there was would seem to be limited and of low intensity, and to a large degree was a reaction to the behaviour of the Europeans. The African perspective of the violence is illustrated in the record of an interview between Assistant Native Commissioner Morris and Soswe's son in 1897:

"He (Soswe's son) then replied that he would consult his sub chiefs and hear what they had to say, and if they were willing to surrender he would think about it. I then said when shall I return for your answer. He replied, "What do you want to return for, are you leaving anything behind you, Go away and remain away. I wish to have nothing to do with you white men. Go and live in Chimoioio and I will send you boys to work for you there if you want them."
Why did you burn my kraal, did I ever interfere with your waggons on the road. Go to Chimoio. I don't want any white man in my district." (197)

This interview illustrates the dichotomy between the European and African perspective. Soswe's son clearly regarded the Europeans as the aggressors in the conflict. He was not in "Rebellion".

The Mazoe district to the north of Salisbury is a difficult area to analyse. The available evidence as to the process which initiated the violence in this district is confusing and contradictory. The influence of Nehanda; the instigation of Mhasvi, a Native Policeman; a reaction to Assistant Native Commissioner Pollard's sjambokking of Shiwishi, are all possible avenues to explore to account for the initial spark of violence. The number of nominally independent African polities in this area also complicates matters. The effect of so many small chiefdoms was to create a particularly volatile situation, and the Mazoe district has a turbulent history of violent warfare. That Salisbury should have been sited so close to this disturbed area of the country is a quirk of fate. (198)

The Mazoe valley runs north and north-east from the river's headwaters near Salisbury. At the small centre known as Mazoe there was a Mining Commissioner, a Native Commissioner, a joint store and hotel, a telegraph office, a number of prospectors and others developing the Vesuvius and Alice mines. This
administrative post could be reached from Salisbury by a track via Avondale to Mount Hampden, and then down the valley to Tatugura, to its junction with the Mazoe river. There was another track from Salisbury which went from Mount Pleasant to fall steeply from the plateau into the Mazoe valley by way of the Golden Stairs, a series of rough descents, 26 km from Salisbury. From Mazoe, one track led over the hills towards the Jumbo Mine and another continued down the Mazoe valley, where some 32 km away, in an area known as the Abercorn, there was a scattered mining community and a store. Beyond this, out of the Mazoe valley and close to the Luia river, Major Patrick Forbes was in charge of a party engaged in building a telegraph line to Tete.(199)

The events leading up to the Mazoe patrols are too well established in Rhodesian history to need recounting here.(200) What does need to be determined is how the violence escalated in Mazoe. An article by Sergeant Sanhonkwe of the B.S.A.P. derived from oral tradition, provides an important insight into the process of "Rebellion" in the Mazoe district.(201) Sanhonkwe states that Mhasvi, an African constable stationed at Salisbury, heard of the violence at Mashayamombe. He decided then to desert to chief Hwata in the Mazoe valley with the news that Mashayamombe was fighting. Chief Hwata was persuaded to organize his people to "rebel". Nehanda, the spirit medium, was then consulted and she promised victory. Mhasvi taught Hwata's people to shoot and led the attacks on Europeans. Sanhonkwe's
article makes several interesting points; there was no planned, organized or coordinated "Rebellion", but there was, as in the case of Hwata and Mhasvi, the seizing of a presented opportunity. Further, it was a local response to particular circumstances, and though allegedly prompted by the news of Mashayamombe's fighting, it owed nothing to instigation by any other community. Religion is shown as clearly subordinate to political influences. Nehanda was consulted only after the news of the fighting was brought, and she gave sanction, but played no part in its organization and certainly organized no conspiratorial "Rebellion". Sanhonkwe's evidence, therefore, offers a very salient insight into the escalated violence in Mazoe. Mhasvi did play an important part in the attacks on Europeans, and the evidence records his presence at the negotiations.\(^{202}\)

Sanhonkwe's evidence must not be seen in isolation. It is known that Pollard was killed when investigating the murder of a white man near Mount Darwin.\(^{203}\) During the subsequent negotiations on 5, 6 and 11 September, the activities of this official were repeatedly said to have been the cause of the violence. Lieutenant Fairbain, the O.C. Mazoe Fort, reported that in an indaba on 11 September with the Mazoe chiefs that they had claimed they had "rebelled" because Pollard had sjambokked Shiwishi, an important chief.\(^{204}\) In sjambokking Shiwishi, Pollard may have transgressed accepted bounds. He was chased by the Mazoe Africans and killed, while his cattle were seized.\(^{205}\) In these unsettled circumstances Mhasvi gained
influence while Nehanda gave sanction to the process of violence. The activities of the Europeans also played a part. Having received warning of the Norton murders, they moved into laager at the Alice Mine and the Abercorn, increasing tension in the district. There were movements by some of the Mazoe Africans to prompt the involvement of other peoples, and raids did take place over a distance. Yet it would be incorrect to see all the Mazoe peoples becoming involved in the violence; most remained undisturbed. (206) A significant feature of the Mazoe violence is that it was directed against all "foreigners", black and white. (207)

These brief insights into the varied nature of the conflict necessitate the questioning not only of factual aspects, such as the extent of the conflict, or interpretive perceptions, such as who initiated the violence, how and why, but also conceptual terms such as "Rebellion". "Chimurenga" would seem to be a series of local conflicts precipitated to a large degree by the actions of the Europeans. The volatile conditions prior to June 1896 rapidly escalated into a violent war of conquest as the Europeans mobilised their forces to assert their claim to rule. "Chimurenga" would seem to be in a large measure a reaction to European conquest, rather than a process of violence initiated by the African peoples to drive the Europeans from the country.

As "Chimurenga" was a series of local wars fought by various
African polities to resist European conquest, at no point did a general campaign against the Europeans develop. The African peoples did not combine their forces in a united attempt to defeat the Europeans. Historians attempting to explain why the "Rebellion" failed, have asked the wrong questions due to the wrong perspective. A racial polarity perspective views the conflict in simplistic terms of black against white. However, the overriding concern of each African polity was the desire to maintain local autonomy and to advance its own interests. Thus, some Shona polities "collaborated" or remained "neutral", depending upon how their interests were affected. To view those who "collaborated" as "traitors to the cause", is a savage distortion of historical perspective. It was they who were using the Europeans, though with hindsight they were used to give substance to the European claim to have colonised Rhodesia. During the war the recurrent refrain of each Shona polity was the desire to reestablish peace with the Europeans in order to retain local independence. Peace from the African perspective was not to mean subjugation, which was the price demanded by the Europeans.(208)

The details of the war from the European perspective can be obtained from a various sources.(209) The significance of the war, however, needs to be briefly assessed. Even after the arrival of Colonel Alderson's forces the Europeans were still too few in number to achieve an effective subjugation of the whole country. The importance of the "levies" from "collaborator" chiefdoms in the pursuance of the war has been
underestimated. Large forces, particularly those raised from the Budja, Pfumbi, Chirumanzu and the chiefs of the Victoria district, played an important part in the fighting. The support given in terms of food and information also greatly assisted the Europeans. The effect of the use of "collaborators" was to turn the conflict to a large extent into a series of African wars. In this manner, through a process of "divide and rule", each chiefdom was in due course made to submit to European rule. Though the "collaborators" had initially fought in the pursuance of their own interests, their independence was subverted as the Europeans gained dominance. That they did not consider themselves to be subject to the Europeans, even though they had "collaborated", became a cause of complaint from several Europeans. (210) Though many African communities only suffered the impact of the Europeans infrequently, and did not suffer greatly, the war of conquest of 1896 - 7 was important because it was the first concerted attempt by the Europeans to give weight to their claim to rule. It would take several years before the Europeans had sufficiently established their authority to be in undisputed control, but 1896 - 7 was the first major clash of perspectives, from which struggle the Europeans were to gain dominance. The psychological foundations of the Rhodesian colonial state were laid in 1896 - 7 with the ascendancy of the European perspective over the African. A colonial state comes into being when the ascendancy of the colonisers is recognized by the colonised, so creating a shared perspective of psychological reality. Colonialism is a
psychological condition (211)
Footnotes: Chapter Four

(1) The '96 Rebellions, p.51.


(4) Beach, "Chimurenga", pp.403 - 406.

(5) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.410.

(6) See below, pp.210 - 218 for a discussion of the conflict in the Makoni district which makes this distinction absurd.

(7) Colonialism is dependent upon the recognition of a ruler by the ruled. This mentality is an essential psychological foundation for colonialism. Initially, colonialism is a concept only to be found in the mentality of the aspirant ruler. Until the people to be ruled accept this mentality they are not colonised. When the European perspective of events became a shared perspective, when the existence of a ruler and the ruled became accepted by both black and white as a reality, only then did the psychological foundations for colonialism in Rhodesia - Zimbabwe come into existence. Thereafter, though the reaction and strategy of black and white diverged, they shared a common perception of reality.

(8) These incidents will be briefly discussed in the context of the local studies. A brief description is to be found in Beach, "Chimurenga", pp.403 - 406.


(10) See below, pp.210 - 218, 226 - 228.

(11) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.401.

(12) Cape Town Archives, Accession 540 (32), Sir Lewis Michell collection, Trip to Rhodesia, (4 August - 7 September 1897), has this interesting account, p.50:
"We reached Fort Charter at 2.45 pm and saw Rhodes in another mood. The young fellow in charge came to say that the Chief Umswitchwe, 25 miles away was mutinous and had lately shot Major Ridley in the foot and killed one of the hussars and a policeman. He added that he himself had been defied the previous week when on patrol.

The following dialogue then occurred.
Rhodes - How did they defy you ?
N.C. Officer - They jeered at me.
Rhodes - What do you want done ?
N.C. Officer - I want you to wire Sir Rich(ard) Martin to send a strong force to destroy Umswitchwe."
Rhodes - But jeering doesn't constitute a *causus belli*.

N.C.O. - Doesn't it Sir? Well, I'm blessed if I know what to do.

Rhodes (calmly) - I'll tell you what to do. You go right up to
the kraal and be fired at. That will make it a *causus belli*.

N.C.O. (saluting) - Very well sir, I'll go on Wednesday.

This tranquil arrangement took my breath away but the fact is
Rhodes has the absolute confidence of all young men in this
country and at his bidding they would put their heads into the
cannon's mouth."

(13) NAZ N 1/1/1, N.C. Umtali to C.N.C., 6 April 1896.

(14) NAZ Lo 5/6/1, telegraphic conversation, Grey, Vincent and
Carrington, 25 June 1896.

(15) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.65, Mrs M. Cripps, "Umtali during

(16) NAZ N 1/1/11, N.C. Umtali to C.N.C., 15 April and 4 May
1896. In April 1896, Marange turned out an armed force to
recover cattle taken by the Native Department. J.C. Barnes,
"The 1896 Rebellion in Manicaland", *Rhodesiana*, pub no 34,

(17) Keppel - Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia*, p.475, attributes
Umtassa's "neutrality" to his enmity with Makoni.

(18) The rumours were a reflection of white fear and distrust
of the African people in general. Many Europeans expressed
distrust of Umtassa's intentions, though he offered assistance
soon after becoming aware of the conflict. R. Howman's article,
"Sir Herbert John Taylor, Kt ... First Chief Native
Commissioner", *Rhodesiana*, Pub no 35, Sept 1976, gives an
important insight into the uneasy relationship between the
Europeans at Umtali and Umtassa, and helps to explain their
anxiety. NAZ Al 1/2/1, p.11: "Up to the present the Chief
Umtassa has shown no signs of disloyalty, but the reverse,
having offered his services to the Chartered Company to assist
them in quelling the rebellion. It would be well not to place
too much dependence on this offer. The natives belonging to the
Upper Zambezi, Tete and Sena, have cleared out from Chimoio,
Massikessi and the construction camp." NAZ Hist. Mss. B1 6/1/1,
Reminiscences of a transport rider. In December 1896, there was
also a false rumour that the Africans in Chimoio had risen,
*Bulawayo Sketch*, vol 5, no 122, 12 December 1896.

(19) The European population outside such settlements as
Salisbury, Gwelo, Umtali and Victoria was extremely small. In
districts, for example, such as Hartley, Lomagundi, Mazoe,
Makoni and Charter, despite the pretensions of the whites to be
in control, the African chiefs clearly remained the real
authority. This is particularly evident in the history of
Kunzwi Nyandoro of the Salisbury district, who had very few
Europeans in his district and firmly resisted the attempts of
A.N.C. Campbell to collect hut tax.

(20) This also depended to a large degree on the personality of the people involved. In the Victoria district, perhaps the hardest hit by European pressures, the relationship established between men such as Brabant, Weale, Coole, Eksteen and Forrestall, and the African leaders played an important part in ensuring no misunderstanding occurred on both the white and black sides. The same is evident in Melsetter, where Dunbar Moodie had established a very powerful presence. In Umtali, the European presence was large enough to make them a factor, and the communication established between Nesbitt and Umtassa was important in ensuring peace.

(21) The presence of Europeans in sufficient force to make them a recognisable factor, gave credence to the claim of the A.N.C. to be taken seriously by the African people. The A.N.C. tended to be associated with one particular chiefdom, such as Weale with Chirumanzu, and largely neglected the others. The conflict therefore, often took an alignment according to patterns of local political disputes, rather than of black against white. The importance of the missionaries in keeping people neutral lay in the channels of communication they established which allowed for no misunderstanding of the other’s intention by either side.

(22) For example, the behaviour of A.N.C. Mooney in Hartley and A.N.C. Pollard in Mazoe, accounts for specific outbreaks of violence. The conflict in Makoni’s district can be traced to A.N.C. Ross’s activities and the changed European perception of events following on 14 June, and the belief that Makoni’s people had attacked the retreating Marandellas party at Headlands. In Mtoko, A.N.C. Ruping had been involved in conflict from the end of May. His attempt to collect hut tax led to confrontations and skirmishes. In each district the incidents, beliefs and misconceptions which prompted the violence must be sought.

(23) The oral evidence from African sources indicates that it was the Europeans who were seen as the aggressors. The "Rebellions" were reactions to a process of military conquest initiated by the whites, rather than an attempted insurrection by African people against white oppressors.

(24) NAZ A 1/15/4, O.C. Victoria to C.S.O. Salisbury, 26 October 1896.


(26) NAZ N 1/1/12, N.C. Victoria to C.N.C., 28 December 1896.

(27) Beach, The Risings", p.301.


(30) Laing, The Matabele Rebellion. See pp.138 - 139, for an account of Laing's activities.


(33) The '96 Rebellions. p.52.

(34) Beach, The Risings", p.312.

(35) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.401.

(36) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.401.

(37) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.403.

(38) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.410.

(39) A criticism which must be made of the modern historiography is its acute awareness of the process of conflict in Rhodesia during the civil war, 1965 - 1980. That the "present is too much with us" has distorted the work of Ranger, Beach and, though aware of the problem, Cobbing. Keppel - Jones's, Rhodes and Rhodesia is a curious study. The time taken in its preparation is revealed in the uneven nature of the analysis. There are several new insights which are of real value particularly in the chapters dealing with the white and black experience between 1890 and 1896. However, there are incorrect statements of fact, such as on p.449: "Within a few days, too, the rebel forces were well supplied with firearms, dug up from the hiding places of 1893; but the initial murders were by knobkerrie and axe. The recovery of firearms took time". Firearms were not buried in 1893 since, as J.M. Orpen notes on p.55 of the Martin Report (C 8547), they would have been destroyed by the white ants and rust; further, as chapter three indicated, firearms were present in every incident of violence, including the initial confrontation on the 20 March 1896. Keppel - Jones also allows untenable philosophical concepts and faulty logic to mar the analysis, such as the strange statement on p.475: "Great conflicts are often precipitated, but they are never caused, by trivial events". But Keppel - Jones's main failing is the use of inappropriate terminology, such as the statement on p.448, that "Mzobo was unable to restrain his patriotic zeal", or on p.441, that "various eager patriots acted too soon and the plan went awry". While the use of such inappropriate terminology may make racy reading, it is not supported by the facts and therefore does tremendous damage to historical reality.
(40) Col. Harding, Far Bugles, p. 61: "Nearly all of us fighting people (including Gurupila, our newly-found ally) have some ideal which we parade as a justification for the resort to arms. Personally, I do not for a moment believe that Gurupila cared a hang for either Armstrong or the Chartered Company, but he and his people had a grudge against one or two Mashona chiefs, a love for Mashona cattle, and still room in his well-filled harems for one or two young Mashona girls." Beach, "The Risings", pp.326 - 328, provides an assessment of Matibi's Pfumbi involvement.

(41) See below, pp.200 - 202.

(42) See for example, NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, for details of Mazoe prisoners who escaped from goal in Salisbury, only to be killed by other "rebels" in the Norton district, pp.31, 33, 57.

(43) Beach, The Risings", p.312.

(44) Beach, The Risings", p.312.

(45) Beach, The Risings", p.334.


(49) Beach, The Risings", p.312.

(50) Beach, The Risings", p.312. NAZ A 1/12/31, Inskipp to Administrator, 26 March 1896, R.M. Victoria to Secretary Administrator, 30 March 1896.

(51) NAZ Lo 5/6/7, N.C. Gwelo to C.N.C. Bulawayo, 30 November 1896. Driver stated that: "They (the Selukwe chiefs) seemed to wish however to convey that whatever part they have taken in it, was under coercion by the Matabele from adjoining districts, who not only came into these locations with the order, "Maialonde amakiwa", but in leaving took what cattle there were and also looted the stores. That the Matabele had been here and swept off the cattle I had heard several months ago." Driver added that the state of the district supported this story as the people were exceptionally short of food.

(52) NAZ A 10/10/2, Gibb's column Order Book, 19 May to 25 June, 1896, A 1/12/36, Administrator to Vintcent, Bulawayo, 9 June 1896.

(53) NAZ A 1/12/36, O.C. Victoria to Administrator, Salisbury, 4 and 5 May 1896.

(54) NAZ A 1/12/36, O.C. Victoria to Vintcent, Salisbury, 12
June 1896.


(58) NAZ Hist. Mss. Misc. Lo 5/1/1, Mrs Loots' memoirs.

(59) NAZ Ba 3/1/2, C.S.O. Bulawayo to High Commissioner, 1 July 1896.

(60) NAZ Ba 3/1/2, C.S.O. Bulawayo to High Commissioner, 7 July 1896.

(61) NAZ Hist. Mss. We 3/2/6.

(62) NAZ Ba 3/2/1, Hole to Cape Times, 8 August 1896. NAZ Ba 2/92, Hurrell to G.O.G., 2 August 1896. NAZ Hist. Mss. We 3/2/6.


(64) NAZ Ba 2/9/2, Pagnet to C.S.O., 19 October 1896, 7 th Hussars Diary, 27 October 1896, Watson to Pagnet, 4 November 1896.

(65) NAZ A 1/12/40, C.C. Victoria to Vintcent, 28 October 1896.

(66) NAZ Ba 2/8/1, O.C. Victoria to O.C. Salisbury, 17 November 1896.

(67) NAZ Ba 2/9/2, Watson to Pagnet, 4 November 1896. By 5 October at the latest, Watson was aware of Chaka's surrender, 7 th Hussars Diary, 6 November 1896.


(69) The '96 Rebellions, p.53.

(70) The '96 Rebellions, pp.52 - 53.

(71) The '96 Rebellions, p.52.

(72) The '96 Rebellions, pp.52, 61.

(73) A.N.C. Mooney had spies among Mashayamombe's people, one of whom reported in May that Mashayamombe had sent men to Mkwati, and an uprising was planned. After Mooney had consulted
with Mashayamombe he dismissed this report.

(74) NAZ N 1/1/3, Regina vs Parima, evidence of Mlemere, 20 September 1896.

(75) Beach, "Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro", Rhodesiana, Pub no 27, December 1972, p.40, interview with Mr Gutsa Mubuyira, 22 September 1969. Beach, "The Risings", p.349, interview with Mr S.M. Mutekwe Mondoro, 23 September 1969: "The coming of Moni (D.E. Mooney, N.C. Hartley) is the thing which caused the people of Mashayamombe to fight the white men, although they didn't want to. He flogged Muzhuzha. (Gobvu, who was a relative of Mashayamombe's). The man who was chief at the time was Chinerigunda. His younger brother was known as Chifumba. That's the time when these relatives of Gobvu went to see Chinerigunda about the case of this flogging. So when they were told about this flogging that's the time when Chifumba arranged a group of men to go and fight and they went to Moni and they killed him." Beach, "The Risings", pp.349 - 350, interview, acting Chief Mashayamombe, Mondoro, 22 September 1969: "Muzhuzho was beaten for two days and was the person that caused the rebellion."

(76) NAZ S 401 no 253, Regina versus Rusere and Wampi and Chiquaqu.

(77) Beach, "Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro", p.38. NAZ S 401 no 246, Regina versus Rusere and Gonye, 24 February 1898.


(80) Beach, "Kaguvi and Fort Mhondoro", p.38. NAZ 4 1/12/27, statement by Jan, 16 June 1896.

(81) NAZ A1 1/1/1, statement by Jack, a Zulu: "The Mashonas who killed Norton came from Mashangombi's. Yonewa told me not to come in, as Mashonas on the road would kill me. I came in now because Mutchanda's chief induna came to Yonewa and told him he wanted me killed and asked to know why I was there." A.S. Hickman, "Norton district in the Mashona Rebellion", Rhodesiana, pub no 3, 1958, p.14.


(84) Violence was already widespread before the murder of A.N.C. Mooney at Mashayamombe's. Makoni resisted the Native Department from 9 June. A.N.C. Ruping had had skirmishes in the Mtoko area from late May. In the Selukwe district, A.N.C. Driver had announced on 12 June the beginning of a second
rebellion. Kunzwi Nyandoro had been hostile since October 1895, and had issued threats in April 1896. There is also evidence of widespread looting in Mazoe before June.

(85) Beach, "Chimurenga", pp.410 - 415.

(86) Lists contained in The '96 Rebellions. refer only to Europeans murdered or killed. Contemporary reminiscences and reports contain details of Africans killed who were working for or associated with Europeans.

(87) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.411.

(88) NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Brabant to Administrator, Salisbury, 10 December 1896.


(91) This appears to be the case in Lomagundi and Makoni, and may also be the case in the Salisbury district: see below pp.110 - 118, 128 - 138.

(92) NAZ A 2/1/6, Duncan to Brabant, 8 October 1894.

(93) NAZ A 1/12/36, C.N.C to Acting Administrator, 17 June 1896.


(95) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.7.


(97) NAZ Hist. Mss. Bl 6/1/1, "Difficulties and the cost of transport in the early days of Rhodesia". Bland made two trips through Makoni’s territory. He writes of the first trip to Umtali: "News of (the) rising was very vague and we did not know whether we might be attacked before we reached Umtali, so we armed ourselves as best we could and kept a sharp look out, but nothing happened and we reached Umtali safely." Bland then made a trip to Salisbury carrying provisions: "That the rebels kept away from us under such favourable conditions can only be put down to the fact that they had not got over their fear of the Matabele raiders of not so many years before, when they took care to keep out of the raiders way until all danger was passed." This is clearly a very bland explanation for Makoni’s lack of "rebellion".

(98) NAZ A 1/12/36, C.N.C. to Acting Administrator, 17 June 1896.

(99) NAZ A 1/12/36, telegram, Taberer to Vintcent, 18 July
1896.

(100) NAZ Lo 5/6/1, telegraphic conversation, Grey, Vintcent and Carrington, 25 June 1896.

(101) NAZ Lo 5/6/3, telegram, Grey to Vintcent, 18 and 19 August 1896.


(103) NAZ Ba 2/8/1, Alderson to C.S.O., Bulawayo, 17 August 1896.

(104) NAZ Ba 2/8/1, Alderson to C.S.O., Bulawayo, 17 August 1896.

(105) NAZ 10 5/6/3, telegraphic conversation, Grey to Vintcent, 18 August 1896.

(106) NAZ 10 5/6/3, telegraphic conversation, Grey to Vintcent, 18 August 1896.

(107) NAZ 10 5/6/3, telegraphic conversation, Grey to Vintcent, 18 August 1896.

(108) NAZ 10 5/6/3, telegraphic conversation, Grey to Vintcent, 18 August 1896.

(109) NAZ 10 5/6/3, telegraphic conversation, Grey to Vintcent, 19 August 1896.

(110) There is debate as to whether Makoni was captured or had surrendered. Keppel - Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia*, pp.492 - 495, touches on the legality of Major Watt's actions. However, the facts upon which previous assessments have been made reflect the information contained in reports written by, or dependent on the account of Lieutenant Fichat of the Umtali Artillery Volunteers. According to Fichat, he was on guard at a cave mouth when Makoni emerged and was attempting to escape. Fichat then moved forward, seized Makoni, and threatened to shoot him if he resisted. Fichat was adamant that Makoni was captured and did not surrender. However, the accounts of Dhlameni and Manditshana, alias "Mary Jane", an African policeman from Umtali, *(N.A.D.A., 1955, p.17)*, conflict with this official account. According to Dhlameni, he advanced into the caves and persuaded Makoni that he was needed as a witness at the trial of the "rebels". Makoni then emerged only to be "captured" by the African police at the cave mouth. Fichat was then summoned by them. For this deed Dhlameni received the 100 reward that had been offered. "Mary Jane's" account does not support Dhlameni's claim of having entered the caves and tricking Makoni into surrendering. According to "Mary Jane", Makoni emerged from the caves and was captured by Dhlameni. Lieutenant Fichat was then called. "Mary Jane" does corroborate Dhlameni's claim of having received 100 reward. "Mary Jane" does,
however, reflect a certain degree of jealousy of Dhlameni. What is clear is that Lieutenant Fichat's account is rejected by both Dhlameni and "Mary Jane". The subject of Makoni's surrender - cum - capture is worthy of an article, where hopefully collected oral evidence may succeed in elucidating the conflicting facts found in the documents.

(118) Beach, The Risings", p.351.
(119) Beach, The Risings", p.352, interviews with Mrs Chiripi Muchibgwa Mudgiwa, Menyeni, and Chief Nyoka, Manyeri, 14 September 1969. For a map reference as to the location of the Range station, see The '96 Rebellions, Appendix 1, p.121.
(120) Beach, The Risings", p.352.
(121) The '96 Rebellions, pp.138 - 143.
(122) The '96 Rebellions, p.54.
(123) NAZ A 1/12/27, evidence of Merondowi, 13 July 1897.
(124) The '96 Rebellions, pp.138 - 143.
(125) Beach, The Risings", p.398.
(127) Hodder - Williams, "Marandellas and the Mashona rebellion", fn.70, as described by George Mc Duigal to his mother, 1 October 1896.
(128) Beach, The Risings", p.381.
(129) NAZ A 1/12/5, Charter Garrison Diary, 10 August 1896.
(130) NAZ A 1/12/40, Taylor to Vintcent, 26 September 1896.


(133) Beach, The Risings", p.378.

(134) NAZ A 1/12/10, Taylor to Vintcent, 3 April 1896, A 1/12/13, Beal to Vintcent, 12 July 1896.

(135) Beach, "The Risings", p.378.

(136) NAZ A 1/12/13, Beal to Vintcent, 12 and 13 July 1896, A 1/12/29, Beal to Vintcent, 22 July 1896.

(137) NAZ Al 1/1/1, report by Major Jenner, p.83.


(139) NAZ Ba 2/8/1, Jenner to Alderson, in Alderson to C.S.O. Bulawayo, 17 November 1896.

(140) Beach, The Risings", p.398.

(141) Beach, The Risings", p.398.

(142) NAZ Hist. Mss. Da 6/1/1, Darling to Singleton Darling, 4 September 1896, and to his father, 31 November (sic October) 1896.

(143) NAZ N 1/1/2, N.C. Charter to C.N.C. Salisbury, 9 April 1897.


(146) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.404. NAZ N 1/1/5, N.C. Armstrong to Taberer, 17 July 1896 and "Report on Mtoko’s district or Budgla". NAZ N 1/1/9, N.C. Salisbury to C.N.C., 22 April 1895.

(147) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ed 6/1/1.


(149) The '96 Rebellions, p.54.


(152) Beach, "Chimurenga", p.15.


(154) NAZ M 1/1/1, Ct 1/15/6, Reports by Mining Commissioner Lomagundi, May, July, August 1894, Ct 1/15/6, Hopper's report, 10 September 1894. NAZ Ds 1/1/1, Ferguson to Administrator, 29 March 1894. NAZ N 1/1/5, N.C. Lomagundi to C.N.C. Salisbury, 30 October 1894.

(155) Edwards, "The Lomagundi district; an historical sketch, p.11, Jameson: "The effect of the outbreak in Matabeleland has been to put a stop to mining and prospecting to a great extent. Besides those employed at the Ayrshire mine there are not a dozen men prospecting or doing development work."

(156) The '96 Rebellions, pp.51 - 52, 80.


(159) NAZ Hist. Mss. Ja 3/1/1.


(161) NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, p.6, statement 23 June 1896.

(162) NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, p.3.

(163) NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, p.3. NAZ A 1/12/27, re-examination of Shangaan boy, "Machine", indicates that Mazoe Shona were going to Lomagundi to kill whites.

(164) The '96 Rebellions, pp.60 - 61.

(165) The '96 Rebellions, p.61.

(166) NAZ Ba 2/1/1, Rhodes to Grey, 10 November 1896. NAZ Hist.


(169) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.56.

(170) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.57.

(171) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.58.


(173) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.58.

(174) *The '96 Rebellions*, p.58.

(175) NAZ S no 213, Regina versus Zhanta.

(176) NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Jenner to S.O. M.F.F., 21 November 1896, NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, p.106, Major Jenner, Chiquaquas kraal, 18 November 1896: "I had an indaba yesterday with Chiquaqu and he wants peace - he states neither he nor his people have ever attacked the white men and as far as I can make out this is very possibly true."

(177) NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Jenner to S.O. M.F.F., 21 November 1896, NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, Major Jenner, Kunzi's kraal, 21 November 1896, p.107: "(He) stated that he wished to be loyal, had never borne arms against the Government and that he would pay his hut tax."

(178) NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, statement of Tom, 22 June 1896. The first killings of Europeans in Mazoe took place on the morning of 18 June.

(179) NAZ S no 213, Regina versus Zhanta, no 253, Regina versus Rusere and Wampi and Chiquaqu, no 300, Regina versus Mashonganyika, Gonto and others.


(183) NAZ Ec 3/1/1, minutes of Executive Council, 4 November 1895, NAZ A 2/2/1, instructions to C.N.C., 16 November 1895.

(184) NAZ Ec 1/1/1, acting Secretary to Council, Salisbury to C.N.C., 20 April 1896.
(185) Ranger, *Revolt*, p.86.

(186) NAZ Lo 5/4/4, Campbell to C.N.C., Salisbury, 29 May 1897.


(191) Hodder - Williams, "Marandellas and the Mashona rebellion", pp.31 - 32.

(192) See pp.105 - 106.


(197) NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Morris to C.N.C., Salisbury, 16 January 1897: "He was then asked if Soswe did not want to surrender. He replied that he had never done anything to the white man and he was not going to surrender."


(201) D.M.S. Sanhonkwe, "Mhasvi; rebel policeman; the story of the Hwata people and the Mashona rebellion", *Outpost*, v 38, August 1960.

The '96 Rebellions, p.57. The death of Mr Brodie, telegraph operator at Mount Darwin remains a mystery. I have been unable to ascertain whether he died of natural causes or was murdered. If he was murdered this might provide a new insight into the violence in Mazoe.


The '96 Rebellions, p.57, states that he was attacked and murdered by his own police. NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, statement by Zhoinevett, Portuguese African from Tete: "While I was at the Mashona kraal, I heard them planning to go after the Gunyane (Native Commissioner Pollard). The Native Commissioner's cattle were brought in whilst I was there, I heard that the Native Commissioner had escaped to Ch'bianga's kraal (about 40 miles east of Mazoe)." Ranger, Revolt, p.209.

NAZ Hist. Mss. Al 1/1/1, statement by Charlie, John (Zulus) and Vleis Huismat, 23 June 1896, p.5: "Had heard that some Mashonas do not want to fight white men, for instance, Gootoona, Galseechier, Grootchalsoichro, Linamoia and Washawasha. The names of the kraals they know to be fighting are Garindi, Parlewewyo, N'jubaozi, Makoombi, Ruako, Maroivanyanga, Kameeli."


NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Jenner to S.O., M.F.F., 18 November 1896, NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Jenner to S.O., M.F.F., 21 November 1896, NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Brabant to Administrator, 10 December 1896, NAZ Lo 5/4/1, Taberer to Administrator, 31 December 1896, NAZ Lo 5/4/2, "Report on the present situation", 15 February 1897: "As far as I may judge from all the indabas I have been present at, and also from the general behaviour of natives, I conclude that we are far from any peaceful settlement. I do not mean to say that natives will come out of their kopjies to attack a strong patrol or fort; but that they mean to remain independent. "Let the white man (they say) stay where they are, and we shall stay where we are!"


Chapter Five

Reflections on the debate

The aim of this thesis has been to briefly challenge a great deal of the writing concerning "Chimurenga" and to suggest several new perspectives from which the events of 1896 - 7 in the area known now as Zimbabwe may be considered. The process of revision is an ongoing phenomenon, new facts and interpretations must constantly be absorbed, tested and integrated into an understanding of the past. Concepts and perceptions found to be false must be discarded if the search for a comprehension of the complex nature of the conflict of 1896 - 7 is to continue. It is now necessary to reflect on this thesis's criticism of the previous historiography. It will then be possible to sketch likely paths of future revisionist study. Finally, themes, relating to the significance of the events of 1896 - 7 in subsequent Rhodesian - Zimbabwean society, will be outlined.

This thesis has argued that the explanation for the conflict of 1896 - 7 is not to be found in the European impact on African society prior to the escalation of violence. The assumption of a planned rebellion led writers to search for causes. On the premise that the cause of the "Rebellion" was European oppression, historians have exaggerated the impact of white activity. This simplistic analysis resulted in an uncritical assessment of the European presence in the country. Though the
lack of correlation between pressure and reaction should have cast doubt on this simplistic mode of analysis, historians have been reluctant to break free of their conservative philosophical and interpretive perspectives. The question of causes results from a naive rationalist philosophy and a racial conflict perspective. However, as this study has endeavoured to show, an explanation of the conflict is only to be found in an understanding of the complex nature of the events of 1896 – 7.

In reassessing the impact of white activity on African society, this thesis found that the number of whites in the country between 1890 and 1896 was extremely small. The size of the population, their geographical distribution and concentration, their age, sex and occupation negate the premise that they had established an oppressive and intolerable presence. Other factors such as geographical terrain, communication difficulties and personal financial restraint, further hampered any extensive impact by them on the indigenous people. More specifically, this thesis has found that their activities in regards to land was limited and unlikely to have constituted a grievance. Land alienated for mining was minimal and did not impinge on African settlement. Farms were alienated, but an insignificant number were occupied and even fewer were worked. Land taken for urban settlement was small and was concentrated in five main areas; Bulawayo, Gwelo, Fort Victoria, Salisbury and Umtali. Photographs show how inconsequential these settlements were in 1896. Other settlements, such as
Marandellas or Filabusi, might consist of only a few huts and one or two white persons. Historians have failed to distinguish between the intentions of the Company and its "paper" development, and the reality of actual displacement by 1896. These factors, and the language barrier, make it highly unlikely that the African people were aware that they had been deprived by deed and register of their land. Since they were not made aware by forceful eviction, land can not be considered a cause of the subsequent conflict. (2) Forced labour as a grievance, linked as it is to land, has also been exaggerated. While such a coercive practice did exist, it was not universal nor intensive in its demands. The potential for oppression was further reduced by the availability of "foreign" labour of "Shangaans", "Zambezis" and "Imbabanes". A number of "Cape boys" from South Africa had accompanied the whites to the country and they bore the responsibility for much of the early development. The evidence also indicates that there were a number of Ndebele and Shona who voluntarily worked for the whites. The ease with which the African peoples evaded forced labour is well established. As such, oppressive labour demands must also be considered a post bellum rationalization of the conflict. (3)

By 1896 the European administrative and judicial system was extremely rudimentary. Claims to have "colonised" Rhodesia were pretentious. The system of Native Commissioners had been operative for only a short while in districts too extensive for effective control. A rapid turnover in personnel further
diminished the likelihood of an effective presence. (4) The Native Police force, in existence for a year, consisted of 330 men in 1896. If it is argued that this small force was a major grievance then it is a curious fact that the “rebellion” was initially perceived as a police revolt. (5) Though Stigger has recently revised estimates of cattle held and lost by the Ndebele, questions still need to be asked. This thesis has advanced new estimations as to the number of cattle held by the Ndebele and the number removed from their possession in an attempt to deflate the traditional assumptions. The success of the Ndebele in hiding their cattle and frustrating attempts at cattle seizure still needs to be more closely examined, as does the effect of trypsomania and other diseases on the Ndebele herds. In short, the question of cattle seizure is not quite as clear cut a grievance as previously thought. (6) The collection of hut tax in Mashonaland was not quite as effective as Beach would have us believe. There was a limited success, in the collection of tax most notably in the districts which subsequently “collaborated”. Generally, the attempts to collect the tax were resisted and the Shona suffered little loss of livestock. (7) Punishment inflicted by European judicial officers was limited and though harsh in instances, was unlikely to arouse much bitterness among the African peoples. The European system of justice was of little significance, though it may have restrained the latent rapacious tendencies of individual whites. (8)
Despite the various debates surrounding the war of 1893, that conflict, if viewed from the African perspective, was significant rather for the change in the distribution of power within the Ndebele polity than for the devolution of power from Lobengula to the Company. The actions of the Europeans in 1893 were significant for their effect upon a Ndebele civil war, the origins of which can be traced back to the 1830's. 1893 and 1896 see the tensions within the Ndebele polity manifesting themselves in a civil war where the intervention of the Europeans acted to their own advantage. The 1893 civil war is significant as a prelude to another civil war in 1896, but not as a necessary scenario for "Rebellion". (9)

The cultural challenge, allegedly provoked by European technology, cannot be seen as a cause for rebellion. No "cultural crisis" occurred in the period prior to 1896, which saw the rending of the social fabric in a conflict between the traditional and the new. The Europeans lived a rough and ready life, which in a material sense was little different from that of the African people. Their technology was basic and the Shona and Ndebele were already acquainted with it. As eclectic peoples, they readily responded to innovations. (10) European religion had by 1896 made very little headway, and certainly provoked no challenge from the traditional systems. It would be a fanciful distortion to view 1896 in terms of a "cosmic conflict" between Christianity and the traditional religious systems. (11)
Finally, a development in the new historiography which is concerned about the importance of economic factors, is creating a distortion which needs to be briefly rebutted. In those areas where the Europeans had established an effective presence, the immediate local population by 1896, would have had little economic benefit. While they would have been able to supply the demands for fresh vegetables and meat, the market would have been small and the benefit limited. Though the Europeans in the period prior to 1896 were heavily dependent on the local African population for food, this fact cannot be used to explain why some Shona and Ndebele communities "collaborated". This type of analysis illustrates the sterility of determinist economic theory. It is not acceptable to reduce the complexity of the human experience to a crude materialist analysis to explain historical developments. Further, this type of analysis is inconsistent with an argument which highlights European oppression and exploitation of the African peoples. As the evidence indicates, though it was the communities in the immediate vicinity of European settlement which bore most heavily the brunt of the abuses listed as causes for the rebellion, it was these people who "collaborated". (12)

Turning to the events of 1896 - 7, Cobbing succeeds in pinpointing the weakness of Ranger's interpretation, based as it is on European myths. However, satisfied with his criticism of Ranger, Cobbing in his interpretation merely substitutes a political coordinative force for Ranger's religious theory. It
does not automatically follow that if a religious coordinative force was not responsible for the conflict that a political coordinative force was. The presence of a political coordinative force still needs to be proved and Cobbing fails to do this. In support of his argument that the "Rebellion" in Matabeleland was planned and coordinated by a political force, Cobbing advances in his doctoral dissertation five points; Firstly, the presence of guns and ammunition in great quantities. (13)
Secondly, the supply of corn and grain in the granaries. (14)
Thirdly, the "simultaneous" outbreak of the violence. (15)
Fourthly, the role of the umpakathi. (16)
Fifthly, that Nyamanda became King. (17)
These five points will be dealt with briefly.

Guns had long held a prominent position in African society. The Journal of African History has several articles which illustrate the value African communities placed on firearms. (18) Guns had been acquired in increasing number from the early nineteenth century from a variety of sources. African peoples had mastered the techniques of making gun powder and their own ammunition. Guns were used for hunting and to protect crops from baboons and birds. Guns endowed their owners with status. Evidence suggests that that guns were even used to satisfy the labola contract. As such guns were avidly acquired for their intrinsic value, with no thought of a future rebellion. Cobbing's own thesis establishes these facts. (19) If Cobbing wished to use this point as evidence of planning, he
would need to prove the calculated acquisition of firearms for a rebellion. To simply prove the presence of guns is meaningless.

The argument that corn was stored in preparation for a rebellion, does not even bear up to the lightest scrutiny. Documentary evidence stands as heavy witness to the effect of drought in the three years prior to 1896. Locust plagues had also extracted a heavy toll on food supplies. Rinderpest then further threatened the survival of the African people. Far from being a "Rebellion" augmented by sufficient food supplies, it was the reverse. Tensions arose through scarcity of food and the violence was aggravated by diminishing food supplies. This resulted in a conflict with far wider ramifications than a rebellion of black against white. The corn raided from the granaries by the settlers was that which had been harvested between March and June 1896. There is no evidence to support a calculated storage of grain in 1895. (20)

Cobbing is mistaken when he argues that the outbreak of the "rebellion" was simultaneous. There was a steady escalation of violence over a two week period. The escalated violence began with initial conflicts in Umzingwani, Inshiza and Filabusi districts. The Europeans panicked and fell back into laager, increasing in the process the tension among the African people. Once in laager, the Europeans sent out a number of armed patrols. The aggressive attitude of these patrols heightened
the tension. The role of the Europeans in escalating the violence has not been given due emphasis. The initial conflicts caused the Europeans to overreact invoking further African response. The settlers were not aware of the nature of the violence; exaggerated reports heightened their insecurity, and to meet the expected onslaught they were undermanned and ill-equipped. Misunderstanding led to the adoption of incorrect tactics, which instead of resolving the crisis, escalated the conflict. Many African peoples were first made aware of the heightening conflict when faced with European hostility. This led to a general escalation of the violence. In the prevailing confusion peoples became involved in the violence against their will. Some merely retaliated, others took advantage of the confusion to raid or settle grievances in an assertion of local independence. Some attempted to extract themselves, either by flight to strongholds such as the Matopos or by professing "loyalty" to the Europeans. The evidence also indicates the revival of an Ndebele civil war, initially clearly distinct from the conflict involving Europeans. However, as the conflict developed it appeared to take the form of "friendlies" against "rebels". Sight should not be lost of the fact that there were some African communities in conflict with both the Europeans and the "rebels". This aspect is an important dimension of the events of 1896 which has not been fully explored by historians. The description of the conflict as a "general rebellion" fails to take cognizance of the number of Ndebele who were "loyal" or "neutral". The events of 1896 are complex and the nature of the violence defies simple definition. It was in the opinion of
Ndansi Khumalo and Maduna Mafu, like a fire which suddenly flames up helped by circumstances. (21)

The evidence as to the umpakathi, or advisers of Lobengula, suggest the existence of a very informal council. Its membership is not certain and its role was not that of a centralized administrative body. Indeed, the umpakathi seems to be a term applied to a shadowy group of izinduna who expressed their opinions, supported or opposed the desires of the King. The history of the Ndebele reveals a great deal of tension, jealousy, factionalism and division which clearly in 1893 and 1896 ran deeper than any concept of national interest. These divisions would clearly retard any attempt by an umpakathi to organize, plan or coordinate a rebellion. There was no central unifying force to impose allegiance since the death of Lobengula in 1894. If there was an attempt to make Nyamanda king this came in late June 1896. Further, several prominent Ndebele izinduna, who would have formed part of an umpakathi, should it have planned, organized or coordinated a rebellion, were clearly unaware, or came in to report themselves "loyal". Among those who declared their neutrality were Umjaan of the Imbezu amabutho who had an impeccable record of loyalty to Lobengula, as did Bulina, Lobengula's "head gardner", and Sambambam, Lobengula's brother who surrendered to the Lui on the Zambezi. It is not possible to impugn the reputation of these men as has been done with Gampu and Faku. Yet, if there had been plans by an umpakathi for a rebellion, Gampu would
certainly have been aware of it. Gampu's own pre-eminence would have ensured his membership of the *umpakathi*, and if aware of an intended rebellion he would not have been caught in Bulawayo. The evidence relating to the activities of the "rebels" also indicates that they were not aware of any intended rebellion. Manyakavula, a nephew of Lobengula and principal *induna* of the Gwanda district, only rebelled after having returned from an expedition to help Assistant Native Commissioner Jackson trace the perpetrators of the Umzingwani killings. His village was then attacked by a passing European patrol. Manyakavula would, if he had been a member of the *umpakathi* which was planning a rebellion, hardly have assisted Jackson in his expedition into the Matopos. If Maduna Mafu had played a role in planning, organizing and coordinating a rebellion as a member of the *umpakathi* his withdrawal to the Mapateni district and avoidance of conflict with the Europeans confounds understanding. If Umlungulu, the principal religious figure of the Ndebele, had played the pivotal role in the *umpakathi*’s organization of a rebellion, his flight to the Matopos and failure to kill the Europeans in his own immediate vicinity equally defies comprehension. The evidence is clear; no role can be assumed to have been played by an *umpakathi* in organizing, planning or coordinating a rebellion. The Ndebele leadership was divided and dispersed over a vast territorial area. (22)

Cobbing places undue emphasis on the personality of Nyamanda. Though the evidence suggests that there may have been an
attempt to make Nyamanda king, it appears that this attempt was abortive. Nyamanda was clearly not recognized by the Ndebele as king, and therefore even if the intention was to create a symbol of unity, it failed. Nyamanda was never a functional king, and there is no evidence to show that he played a part in organizing a rising. The Ndebele were disunited and disorganized, and the leadership was essentially localized. Nyamanda did not succeed in elevating a series of local confrontations into a national struggle. Nyamanda was not recognized as a leader in the fighting, and even his involvement is disputed. Cobbing in looking for a likely focus for his thesis of a centrally inspired political rebellion assumed that Nyamanda was the most likely candidate. This assumption was not proved and the evidence quoted reflects European fears rather than the fact. The alleged attempt to make Nyamanda king came in June 1896 and is more likely to have been a response to intensified settler aggression than formal recognition of Nyamanda's pivotal role in fermenting a rising. (23)

In the light of this perspective it is possible to finally consider Cobbing's criticism of the Matopos indabas;

"In the first place they were not fully representative of the Ndebele state, and in no way comprised a summit between the B.S.A.C. and the top Ndebele leadership. According to Vere Stent and Sauer the Main Ndebele spokesmen on 21 August were Somabulana (Insiza) and Sikombo (Intemba) both of them regents (?) for younger men. Virtually all the izinduna mentioned by name were from the Amakenda or Amnyama imusi of the Insiza,
Umzingwani or Tuli valleys. Few if any representatives of the nations leadership were there. Apart from Nyanda, no member of the royal family was present. Although the reports of Nyamanda being king were well known, no attempt was made to speak to him, on the contrary such a course was ruled out because of possible future difficulties."(24)

Cobbing implies in this paragraph that the Matopo indabas were surreptitious because Nyamanda, as lawful king was not the chief negotiator. Cobbing also states that it was Company policy to deliberately exclude Nyamanda from the negotiations. Cobbing gives no footnote to substantiate this claim. The Matopos indabas did not end the hostilities, it was not an agreement binding on the nation. The indabas were initially between Rhodes and the Ndebele izinduna in the Matopos; Nyamanda was then on the Bembesi. There was no need for Nyamanda to be present as he was not the political force coordinating the Ndebele. There was no political coordinative force. Each induna had to personally submit.(25)

Beach, despite his detailed research, developed several concepts in his interpretation of the conflict which obscure an understanding of the nature of the events of 1896 - 7. Beach’s major fault derives from his romantic approach to history.(26) His search for a pan-Shona consciousness led him to write a history which viewed the conflict as the culmination of a historical process forging an embryonic sense of Shona unity. As such he viewed the Shona conflict with the Ndebele and the signing of the Portuguese treaties of 1889 as a necessary preamble to the subsequent rebellion. According to Beach,
European oppression was the midwife of the embryonic sense of Shona unity conceived during the previous half century. It is evident that Beach’s attempt to find a pan-Shona consciousness led him to assume that such a consciousness had developed. It clearly had not, and the interpretation contained in his doctoral dissertation is the result of this flawed perspective. The conflict with the Ndebele and the Portuguese treaties, as well as the alleged oppression by the Europeans, forged no base for Shona unity. (27)

The concept of "peripheral violence" derives again from Beach’s pan-Shona interpretation, but is more specifically the result of a racial polarity perspective. Beach viewed the conflict of 1896-7 as the consequence of a conscious decision by the various Shona chiefdoms to rebel against the Europeans. By assuming that the conflict of 1896-7 was the result of a conscious decision by the Shona to rebel against the Europeans, Beach uses the concept of "peripheral violence" to discount all evidence which conflicts with the narrow confines of this perspective. As such Beach ignores the conflicts between the various Shona peoples and even manages to establish an approximate date for the beginning of the "Rebellion". The logical contradiction between the concepts of "peripheral violence" and main "rebellion", is perhaps best highlighted by the history of the Budja. According to Beach’s terminology, the Budja moved from a position of "peripheral violence" to "rebellion" then to "neutrality" and "collaboration". After the
“Rebellion” the Budja are again seen to engage in "peripheral violence". Ultimately such concepts as "peripheral violence", "rebellion", "neutrality" and "collaboration" must be reassessed because of the contradictions involved which make a mockery of any rational analysis. The basic understanding underlying all these terms is the racial dialectic where "peripheral violence" and "rebellion" is directed against the Europeans, where "neutrality" is in relation to the Europeans, and "collaboration" is with the Europeans. This racial dialectic distorts the reality from the African perspective. The Budja of Mtoko did not perceive the Europeans as a dominant force to whom they were subservient, or at any stage in "rebellion" against. To the Budja the Europeans were simply another threat to be resisted indistinguishable from the other forces in the African context such as the Portuguese or other Shona, and to be allied with if interests were mutual. The concept of "peripheral violence" is an integral part of a racial polarity perspective and eurocentric interpretation which obscures the complex nature of the events of 1896 - 7. (28)

Beach’s writings contain several other unacceptable concepts, such as the "principal of contiguity" and a "ripple effect" spread of the "rebellion". (29) These concepts are the vehicles Beach uses to convey interpretative assumptions which cannot be substantiated by the facts. These concepts derive from Beach’s perspective of racial conflict. Though Beach’s research contains a great deal of valuable detail, interpretive concepts such as these diminish the value of his work.
The future of revisionist study lies in an indepth analysis of the process whereby each locality became embroiled in the conflict. Studies, similar to that undertaken by Beach in south-western Mashonaland, need to be undertaken throughout the country as has been undertaken for England during the 17th century civil war. Aspects of the conflicts between the various African peoples should provide an interesting topic for research. It is suggested that a process similar to that of the *fecani*—*mfecane* in South Africa may have developed as displaced peoples raided their neighbours. Very little evidence is available to piece together the effects or nature of the conflict in areas such as those that border on the Zambezi. In the search for this dimension of the conflict oral evidence could prove invaluable. The study of the events of 1896–7 should also assume a far wider regional perspective. Disturbances were experienced in the Portuguese claimed territories, in the Zoutpansberg of the Transvaal and in what is now Botswana. A particularly interesting subject would be the reaction of the Lui to the attempted Ndebele crossing of the Zambezi. The future of revisionist studies lies in further indepth local studies and in a wider regional analysis. As a new understanding of the events of 1896–7 develops so new questions open as to the nature of Ndebele and Shona society, and their interaction. Past study has tended to emphasis their conflict relationship with the Europeans and failed to study them as entities within themselves. Europeans were on the
THE MATABELE SETTLEMENT.

What is threatened! (without blame to the General)  Rhodesia demands castigation. (if they have to do it themselves)
periphery of African society and it is a distortion of historical reality to view the Shona and Ndebele *viz a viz* the Europeans. Finally, the question of European penetration and their impact, as touched upon in this thesis, needs a more critical in-depth assessment. There is still a great deal of historical research to be done which will reveal yet more facets of the complex nature of the events of 1896—7.

Finally, the influence of the events of 1896—7 on subsequent Rhodesian—Zimbabwean society provides the material for several promising research themes. 1896—7 sees the foundation of the psychology of the colonial state of Rhodesia. The experience of the conflict of 1896—7 profoundly affected both the African and European psychology. From the European perspective, 1896—7 established their right to rule. The significance of this psychology in the immediate post-war period probably accounts for many of the abuses remembered in oral tradition. However, some communities still remained independent. The process of subjugation continued into the early years of this century. This is a process which still needs to be carefully researched. The influence of the events of 1896—7 can be traced throughout subsequent Rhodesian history. The psychology of both the European and African peoples needs to be studied from the turn of the century to the 1960's, and the influence of the experience of 1896—7 needs to be assessed. During the civil war from 1965 to 1980 both sides drew heavily upon the cultural legacy of the conflict. The Rhodesian forces named military units after
EMBASSY'S own statues of liberty — the historical heroes Sekuru Kagwe (left) and Mhaya Mebanda — will greet ministers and parliamentarians at the entrance of Parliament today.

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legendary figures such as F. C. Selous, while the Nationalists drew inspiration from figures such as Nehanda. (35) In modern Zimbabwe the first "Chimurenga" is a powerful myth, symbolized by the erection of statues of Nehanda and Kaguvi outside the Houses of Parliament in Harare in 1894. (36) The myth of the first Chimurenga has clearly inspired and influenced a great deal of Rhodesian - Zimbabwean history. Its influence on politics, social psychology and culture provides several themes to be researched. As critical revisionist study of the events of 1896 - 7 proceeds so should critical study of the myths derived from the conflict. The field promises to be as exciting a subject for historiographical debate as are the English civil wars.
Footnotes: Chapter Five

(1) See pp.45 - 47.
(2) See pp.47 - 56.
(3) See pp.56 - 61.
(4) See pp.71 - 72.
(5) See pp.72 - 75.
(7) See pp.85 - 88.
(8) See pp.61 - 69.
(9) See pp.69 - 71.
(10) See pp.80 - 91.
(11) See pp.91 - 92.
(20) Chigwedere, "The 1896 Rinderpest disease and its consequences", NAZ Lo 8/2/1, "Re the Matabele Rising", by W.E. Thomas, 29 April 1896, NAZ Hist. Mss. Pa 1/1/2, NAZ Lo 5/2/46, Secretary to Administrator to Acting Secretary, Cape Town, 13 December 1895, Lo 5/6/5, Jackson to Secretary Native Affairs, 30 September 1896, Lo 5/6/3, Jackson to C.N.C., Bulawayo, 5 September 1896, Lo 5/6/2, C.N.C. Report, 7 December 1896, Selous, Sunshine and Storm, p.11, See Chapter 3, fn.172.

(21) See pp.110 - 150.

(22) See pp.110 - 150.


(25) See pp.159 - 164.

(26) The term "Romantic" is one which like "Liberal" has undergone a change. The term is used here to refer to a particular world vision which assumes that the historical process is one which has inate meaning and is moving towards a predestined culmination. This idealism is reflected in Beach's search for the growth of Shona unity and nationalism.


(28) See pp.181 - 249.


(30) B. Coward, The Stuart Age, pp.464 - 465, provides a useful list of county studies which have been undertaken for England during the 17th century civil wars. The work of the Indian school of local historians has recently been brought to my attention and the ideas and questions raised by these academics could be fruitfully developed in relation to Rhodesian-Zimbabwean history. For an introduction to this school see Rajat K. Ray, "Three interpretations of Indian Nationalism", in B.R. Nanda, ed., Essays in Modern Indian History, (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1980).

(31) Cobbing, "The case against the mfecane", (Rhodes University, private manuscript). This analogy refers to the understanding of the term fetcani as salvaged by Cobbing in his analysis of the development of the concept of mfecane. Indeed, as Cobbing draws attention to the importance of droughts and natural disasters, the emergence of emaciated raiding groups and refugees and the part played by the whites in the escalation of violence in the process now termed the mfecane, perhaps it is in an understanding of the events of 1896 - 7 that we have the concept of fetcani in its pristine sense. The converse is that this study of the events of 1896 - 7 might
provide the base for the revisionist analysis of the *mfecane* that Cobbing calls for. It is also to be noted that the conflict of 1896 – 7 determined to a large extent which land areas were to be subsequently designated as Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia, just as Cobbing suggests white actions in the process termed the *mfecane* helped to establish the geographical basis of the South African homelands policy.

(32) H. Saker and J. Aldridge, "The origins of the Langerberg Rebellion", *J.A.H.*, VOL 12, P.299, C. van Onselen, "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa", *NAZ* Lo 5/6/1, telegraphic conversation, Vintcent, Grey and Carrington, 25 June 1896: "Col. Machado wired me today that there was every indication of the natives in north and east of this Territory rebelling and to-day the Railway people 2, 000 of Zorogoza people working on the Railway construction have deserted and it is feared they intend joining the rebellion. This being so Machado must help keep open the road from Chimoio to our boundary."


(34) *NAZ* Hist. Mss. Bo 10/1. See Chapter 4 fn.211.


(36) Sculptured by David Mutasa and Barnabus Ndadzo, *The Herald*, 26 June 1984: "When President Banana opens Parliament in Harare today, the two original prosecutors of the anti-colonial struggle will loom large over the occasion. Statues of the leaders of the first Chimurenga of last century – Sekuru Kaguvi and Mbuya Nehanda – will stand tall at the Baker Avenue entrance of Parliament overlooking the arrival ceremony." David Mutasa commented that, "the works in the doorway would help maintain the dignity of Parliament, because without them there would always be something missing from the buildings. The statues would stand to fulfil the just cause of the Zimbabwean people."

Another interesting example of the use of this myth is to be found in the Senate Parliamentary debates, vol B, no 7, Thursday 8 March 1984, pp. 200 – 201. Speaking to oppose a motion condemning the Republican Front on the discovery of the mass graves at Rusape, Senator Shoniwa urged reconciliation and began by stating: "Let me beg leave to remind hon. senators that I speak as the grandson of the man who blazed the trail for resistance in 1896, Chief Chinamore. It is he who started Chimurenga. We are now talking of the Second Chimurenga which was waged under the brave and valiant leadership of the honourable Robert Mugabe and his war councillors." Senator Shoniwa uses the myth of the first Chimurenga to establish his political legitimacy so as to oppose the motion.
The Gallows.

The Right Step, in the Right Direction.
Appendix One

The structure of Ndebele society

This analysis of the structure of Ndebele society forms an integral part of the revisionist study of the events of 1896-7. It will therefore be necessary to briefly outline the different models advanced by Ranger and Cobbing, against which this analysis may be contrasted. The theory of inherent conflict within an "amalgamative state" will then be tested against the available documentary and oral evidence relating to Ndebele socio-political structures. This essay argues that conflicts and divisions within Ndebele society retarded any movement towards effective centralisation or unity. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the effect these divisions and internal conflicts had on the events of 1893 and 1896. This revisionist analysis of Ndebele society should assist in an understanding of the complex nature of the conflict of 1896.

The important debate in relation to the events of 1896, as to the nature of the Ndebele state and the impact of the 1893 war has been between Ranger and Cobbing. Ranger represents the traditional assessment of the Ndebele state when he based his interpretation of the events of 1896 on the belief that the Ndebele state was a centralised autocratic kingship, whose military structures determined social relationships. Ranger believed that the 1893 war crushed this centralised military state. The destruction of the traditional structures of
leadership created the essential psychological conditions to allow Mkwati, a charismatic priest of the Mwari cult, to gain the necessary influence to organise and inspire a millenial rebellion against the white settlers. (1)

Cobbing challenged Ranger's interpretation on two levels. In an article, "The evolution of the Ndebele amabutho", published in the Journal of African History xv,4(1974), he questioned the belief in a centralised military state, and in a subsequent article, "The absent priesthood; another look at the Rhodesian risings of 1896 - 1897", he challenged the postulated theory of a millenial inspiration for rebellion. Cobbing believes that the Ndebele state was not primarily a military structure, and draws an important distinction between the concept of umusi (pl.imisi), a kraal or village, and ibutho (pl.amabutho), or "regiment". He argues that political power was exercised by Lobengula and his umpakathi, or King - in - Council. While recognising a tension between the powers of centralisation and locality, Cobbing sees a form of consensus central leadership, comprising the King and his izinduna, who represented the partially decentralised chieftaincy or izigaba of which the Ndebele state was composed. Despite local influences, the umpakathi was at the heart of the Ndebele state providing a central focus of power.

Cobbing then challenges the belief that 1893 saw the crushing of the Ndebele state, and argues that the necessary structures
of central command remained relatively intact after 1893. Cobbing believes that a religious inspiration was unnecessary since the izinduna representing izigaba were still able to consult each other in meetings of the umpakathi. Cobbing argues that the rebellion was planned by these royal councillors and the royal family. Cobbing draws particular attention to Nyamanda, whom he believes was made king in 1896. Cobbing seeks to explain the organisation of the rebellion in terms of political leadership, as distinct from Ranger's theory of religious leadership. (2)

It is evident that both Ranger's and Cobbing's interpretation of the events of 1896 and the significance they attach to the war of 1893 are influenced by their different perceptions of the structures of Ndebele society. However, the need to reassess Ndebele social interaction arose in this thesis, following on a close examination of the events of 1896 - 7 which drew attention to the incongruities in Ranger and Cobbing's perspective. An awareness of the conflict among the Ndebele in 1893 and 1896 necessarily led to the search for an explanation of that disension and resulted in a different understanding of Ndebele social and political interaction.

Cobbing has adequately revealed the weaknesses of Ranger's portrayal of Ndebele society, but Cobbing's assumption of an organic community still needs to be reassessed. The belief has developed, influenced by modern academic and political pressure, that pre-colonial African society was unified and
ruled by consensus. (3) Though Cobbing demilitarised the portrayal of Ndebele society, it is contended here that he failed to place sufficient emphasis on the divisions and tensions within that polity. The intention here is to build upon the understanding of a demilitarised society and to explore the factions within the Ndebele polity, to show how deep divisions within that society acted against consensus or centralisation. (4)

The historical process which underlay the formation of the Ndebele polity suggests that it may be best described as an amalgamative state. (5) As a society composed of many different peoples from South Africa, with the settling of these people north of the Limpopo, this society became yet more complex, further fuelling conflicts. As a sedentary society developed, local autonomy grew as an identification developed with a particular geographical area. Conflicts between the localities and central authority gained a clear physical expression. (6) Family loyalties were also a cause of conflict. Old established families found themselves in conflict with the new elites formed by the process of amalgamation. For example, Lobengula's succession was secured by what was perceived as a new elite, formed by the process of amalgamation, to the detriment of a traditional established elite. (7) A difference in the racial origin of many of the peoples who composed Ndebele society, linked to social position, led to a great deal of tension even on the local level. (8) Natural factors, in terms of terrain
and distance clearly hampered any attempt at effective centralisation. The localities did act independently and the evidence does suggest that these was a process of local imperialism. (9) It is clear that decisive decisions were taken on the local level. Some actions were referred to or reported to the central authority, but the ability of the central authority to enforce decisions depended upon the influence it could command from izinduna representing izigaba. Generally, a central unified response was inhibited by local antagonisms. But even within the local community there was conflict which must be appreciated if we are to understand the social dynamics which determined activities within the Ndebele polity. Most important were the conflicts associated with different age groups with different aspirations, conflicts between different sides of a house within am iusisi, and personality clashes. Ndebele laws of succession often led to the appointment of a regent for a minor, which often led to a clash when that minor came of age. (10) The Ndebele polity was a living, dynamic and generative community, and as such far more complex than that portrayed by concepts of a unified central authority or harmonious consensus leadership.

In brief, the Ndebele polity is perhaps best described as a complex organism of largely autonomous local communities or iusisi gathered together in izigaba, offering voluntary allegiance to the idea of a central confederal authority. Due to the independent attitude of the izigaba, precise delineations are impossible, and the state on its periphery
blended indistinguishably among the various Shona polities. (11) The Ndebele polity was of a localised nature, as the local authorities could and did act independent of any central control. Local loyalties and allegiances were stronger, as the evidence collected by R.F. Windram illustrates, than any concept of national allegiance. (12) There were internal conflicts on a personal, district and regional level which interacted with a discernible fissure in Ndebele society. The most severe crises, those of 1868–71, 1877–78, 1888–91, 1893 and 1896, emphasis a basic fissure which can be traced to the crisis of 1839. This basic fissure in Ndebele society will now be examined through a study of collected oral tradition. The use of oral tradition and oral evidence require that cautious conclusions be drawn after a careful weighing up of evidence. It is often not possible to be precise as the evidence is in conflict. Oral evidence does, however, allow a broad general analysis to be made of Ndebele history.

After the Boers had expelled the Ndebele from the Transvaal in 1837, two separate parties moved up to Matabeleland. The Amyama were under Dambisa Mahubo, and the Amhlope under Mzilikatzi. (13) Nkuluman was with the Zwangendaba, part of the Amyama. (14) The evidence is in conflict as to whether Lobengula was with the Gibbeklexu of the Amyama, or the Mhlahlandhlela of the Amhlope. (15) What is clear is that Lobengula is generally associated with the Mhlahlandhlela:
"Gwabalanda was the big induna of Mzilikazi. He was the chief induna of the Amhlope. He did not go up to the Zambezi. He stayed with Mzilikazi. Gwabalanda did not hide Lobengula at the time of the killing. Lobengula was of the Mhlahlandhele, and he was with the Mhlahlandhela at the time, not where the killing took place. Told that Lobengula in a letter said that he had been hidden by Gwabalanda at the time of the killing he says he doesn't believe that is correct." (16)

"Lubane: When the chiefs were killed at Gibbeklexu, meaning Thabas Induna, Lobengula was hidden away by Gwanbalanda.

Stambe: He was hidden in a grain bin – isibula, it was not a beer pot.

Lubane; Gwabalanda was a chief of the Mshlashlandhlela. He heard that these chiefs were going to be killed, so he went there and hid Lobengula. We cant tell whether he was sent by Mzilikazi, Gwabalanda was a big induna and might have done it on his own." (17)

The amabutho and isisi under Dambisa Muhubo include the Uyingo, the Intunte, the Godhlwayo, the Mzinyati, Intemba, the Dukada, the Insinda and Gibbelexu. The principal induna of the Amhlope was Gwabulanda. This party contained the Amamlumbo, Iaizenda, Dubinhlanga, Megdonza, and the Mhlaahlandhlela. The evidence is in conflict with the Amakanda allegedly being with both parties. The isisi which comprised the Amakanda included Insinge, Intenana, Dhlodhlo and Mzinzi. (18)

The history of the formation of umisi and amabutho is complex and confusing, and the evidence often contradictory. The broad outline of this analysis is that two distinct divisions emerge, the Amyama, with whom Nkulumana is associated, and the Amhlope,
with whom Lobengula is associated, as rival claimants to the Kingship. This basic fissure is fundamental to an understanding of Ndebele society and politics.

The division into these two parties between 1837 and 1839 may represent a breakup of the Ndebele kingdom, or it may simply have been a strategic division. (19) The oral evidence, however, makes it clear that a forced reunion took place under Mzilikatzi in Matabeleland. In the meantime, the Amyama under Dambisa Muhubo may have made Nkuluman king. Mzilikatzi killed the disaffected izinduna and drove Dambisa Muhubo into exile. The fate of Nkuluman was uncertain. Hobansi Kumalo states;

"When Mziligazi heard this he ordered Nkuluman back to the South and Gibbeklexu and his whole family to be killed. He did not order them to kill Nkuluman. But everybody at Gibbeklexu was killed. Lobengula was not at Gibbeklexu at the time. He was in the Amashlogoshlogo regiment. Certain people were sent to warn him not to be at Gibbeklexu."(20)

Ginyaletsha states;

"Ncumbata was told to take Nkuluman back to Zululand. I cannot remember well who the people were who were appointed to take Nkuluman back; but Ncumbata was in charge. On the way Ncumbata killed Nkuluman."(21)

Nkuluman was either killed or driven into exile. It is suggested in the evidence that Ncumbate bore the responsibility for a failed attempt on Nkuluman’s life, and as such on the death of Mzilikatzi was anxious to safeguard his own interests
by ensuring Lobengula succeeded. It may also be that he did
kill Nkuluman and as such was sure that Lobengula was the
heir. Whatever the truth, the oral evidence makes Ncumbate the
scapegoat for the turmoil which rent Ndebele society after
1868. This uncertainty as to the fate of Nkuluman provided a
rationalisation for the divisions within Ndebele society. The
disaffected could always rally to the ghost of Nkuluman and
claim they were asserting the rights of the legitimate heir.

The death of Mzilikatzi in 1868 brought these latent tensions
in Ndebele society to the fore. The succession of Lobengula in
1870 set a pattern for conflict which decisively affected the
history of the Ndebele polity. Umbigo was induna of the
Zwangendaba, the Induba, the Ngubo and the Nyamandhlovu.
Nkuluman had been a member of his umusi. Umbigo, on the death
of Mzilikatzi, insisted that a search be made for Nkuluman. Two
delegations were sent south. The oral evidence records that:

"When Mzilikazi died, Ncumbata had died, leaving his
son Mhlaba in his place. Mhlaba called the nation
together and told them that the heir to the throne was
still alive and was in the custody of Somtseu. And
Umbigo agreed with Mhlaba that if Nkuluman was alive
he was the heir." (22)

"During the lifetime of his father Lobengula was not
treated as the heir to the chieftainship. When
Mzilagazi died, the people looked for Nkuluman. People
were sent to look for him.

Lubane: Mshlala, son of Ncumbata was sent with
another.

Kalangubo, sister of Siatcha, (who had joined the
group): The other man was Nlotje."
When they got to Basutoland, the people there said: "You are the one who is looking for Nkuluman. Well, if he is made king then he is going to kill you, because your father took his blanket". So Mshlala came back and told the Matabele that he could not find Kuluman. He was sent twice, and each time he said that he could not find him." (23)

"They stayed for a long time, until, when they could not find Kuluman, they decided to have Lobengula for King. Gwabalanda and Ncumbata (presumably Mshlala) suggested Lobengula as king, and one other induna whose name we have forgotten. They told the people, "We can't help it, we have looked for Kuluman, and we can't find him. We think we had better take Lobengula." (24)

"This is what caused the trouble, because when Ncumbata was sent to fetch Nkuluman after the death of Mziligazi he was afraid to fetch him; because he had tried to kill him. He was afraid that if he came he would kill him, Ncumbata, and all his people in revenge. So that is why Ncumbata got hold of some of the chiefs of Amashlope and said, "I have killed Nkuluman, and Walai is my witness, and so the best thing is to appoint Lobengula as king." (25)

"There was a big argument then. The Zwangerfdaba insisted that Nkuluman should be sent for, and the rest of the regiments said no, and that they should appoint another son of Mzilikazi in his place. All the sons of Mzilikazi were present. Then Ngazana of the Mlahlandhiela regiment stood up and indicated Lobengula of the Mulindila house (the house of Lobengula's mother Futela). The Zwangendaba and Umbiko left then and went to the Bembesi (in the Queen's area) and the remainder of the regiments appointed Lobengula." (26)

The personality of Umbigo and the battle of Zwangendaba are subject to varied interpretations. The interpretation often depended on the alignment of the informant, an indication of deeply entrenched local loyalties.
"I remember the trouble between Lobengula and Umbigo. There was nothing wrong with Umbigo, the only thing was that he hated Lobengula. The reason they quarreled was that Umbigo wanted Nkulumane and not Lobengula." (27)

"(In reply to a question). It is true that Umbigo was a bit mad. While Mzilikatzi was still alive the people reported to him that Umbigo was a bit mad. And Mzilikatzi asked what he had said to them, and the people said that he had not said anything. Then Mzilikatzi said he is not mad; he is going to tell you a good word at the last. This was just before Mzilikatzi died." (28)

"Umbigo was chief over the Zwangendaba, the Induba, the Ngobo, and the Nyamandhlovu. He was a clever man because these were big regiments. The Zwangendaba was the biggest. There was nothing wrong with Umbigo. He was quite all right. The people liked him. Umbigo was quite right, because Nkuluman was the eldest son - the heir." (29)

"Lobengu now said: "Umbigo was in the right all along". That is why you have heard people say that Umbigo was mad. When the people sent to Mzilikatzi and said Umbigo was mad, Mzilikatzi said, "No, Umbigo is going to tell you something one day". And so it came to pass, because Umbigo told them the truth in the end. This is the truth about Kuluman." (30)

Umbigo and Lobengula's motives have also been variously interpreted. Depending on the alignment of the informant an attempt is made to impugn either Lobengula or Umbigo:

"The Zwangendaba were killed because they wanted Umbigo to be king. Umbigo was very popular so people suggested he should be chief, and they would not acknowledge Lobengula. They said, "We are not going to be ruled by a man who eats zebras". That was just a
When Mziligazi died these people did not want Lobengula to be king. All the time Lobengula had been living outside as was the custom with the heir during the lifetime of his father. When they heard that Lobengula was to be king they protested and said, "Why not Umbigo. He is our chief". The reply to this was that Lobengula was of the royal blood and Umbigo only belonged to the Masukus." (31)

"Umbigo didn’t like Lobengula because of what he was told by Mziligazi, who loved Umbigo greatly and trusted him. When Mziligazi was about to die he called all the big indunas, of whom Umbigo was one, and told them "I am sorry that I can’t die with you people; but the one who will be king after me will have his own people". Mziligazi meant by this that the one who would be king it would not be right for him to be king over those people, that is to say, it would be wrong to have a young man over the old people - because he loved the Zwangendaba greatly. Though he did not actually say it, the people thought he meant that it would be much better for Umbigo to rule the Zwangendaba. Umbigo took it that way. The old people knew perfectly well that the new king would be Kulumana." (32)

"It is not true that Lobengula did not want to fight the Zwangendaba. He did. The Zwangendaba had refused to come to Intumbane because of their hostility to Lobengula. They refused to come to the funeral of Mziligazi at Intumbane because they knew that Lobengula was to be king. They wanted Umbigo to be king." (33)

Thomas Baines, the pioneer artist, wrote that Lobengula;

"is now on the very edge of the milk jar and would rather jump in and drink for himself than go away and call another." (34)

The intransigence of Umbigo in the face of Lobengula’s election led to the battle of Zwangendaba. That battle is a significant event in Ndebele history. It brought to the fore many diverse
tensions and conflicts within Ndebele history. As the oral evidence reveals, even seventy years after the battle those tensions were still very acute and had not been glossed over, despite fifty years of colonialism. The conflicting evidence reveals the loyalties of the 1870’s.(35) Some oral sources say Lobengula initiated the fight, others say he was reluctant to take the field. Umbigo, as a personality, is subject to opposing assessments. He is accused of having provoked the conflict through lies and deceit, while others maintain he asserted the rights of Nkuluman with quiet dignity. The attempt to besmirch Umbigo’s character is interesting; claims that he was mad are staunchly denied, as is the claim that he wished to be made King himself. Each side attempts to impugn the social position and breeding of the other, Lobengula was considered inferior as the son of a Swazi princess, and as a "man who eats zebras", Mbigo was brushed off as a "Msuto" and the man responsible for the death of the father of the Ndebele, Manyeba.(36) Lobengula is claimed to have only had the support of a minority, while other informants assert that he was widely supported. Some informants present Lobengula as a reluctant candidate pushed into accepting the kingship on the instigation of Mshlala, while others insist that he was very much an active advocate of his own interests. The importance of these diverse interpretations is the insight they give into the deep divisions within Ndebele society in 1868 - 70, and which were projected into subsequent Ndebele history.
Some of the defeated Zwangendaba fled the country, others remained behind. Lobengula appears to have shown some clemency to the defeated who were prepared to accept his authority. Some of the "rebels" accepted the new status quo with an indifferent realism;

"That is why I said Lobengula was a good man. My father Mantilengwane, was in the Njuba regiment. He fought against Lobengula. My father said to the Zwangendaba: "If there are two things you want and one is near by and one is far away, which one can you get first", and the people answered; "the nearest one", meaning Lobengula. So they submitted then. My father told me all about it. My father liked Lobengula after that." (37)

The "Kuluman" factor thus created further divisions within Ndebele society.

"After that the Zwangendaba and the Nduba were divided. Some stayed with Lobengula and some went off and did not return. Some went South and some to Basutuland. After a long time Kuluman came up to Matabeleland, and he came right into Matabeleland, to a place called Ematojeni, to a kraal called Rwadalalo, near Suloswe mountains in the Matoppos - near the end of the Matoppos. News of this came through to Lobengula and he sent an impi to destroy Kuluman. When the impi had got there Kuluman had gone, I am not quite certain, but I think Kuluman heard he was going to be killed. Lobengula then ordered them to kill Rwadalala, because he was afraid Nkuluman might join these people." (38)

The "Kuluman" factor kept Lobengula in a position of extreme insecurity. He distrusted his people and was constantly weary of plots or rebellions.
"The Imbezu was the only regiment the King kept at Bulawayo. The reason why the King was suspicious was that the people were divided, and some used to tell him that Nkuluman was coming back to fight him. The Imbezu were collected from different places because Lobengula did not trust the old people. Some of them were not loyal to him but wanted Nkuluman. He collected the young men from different places because he wanted a great many and he only wanted young people because they would have no knowledge of Nkuluman. That is why he took them so young." (39)

Lobengula's position is thus seen to be extremely insecure. There was no form of consensus leadership and Lobengula's absolutism was a myth. Ndebele society was extremely divided, and the danger of a fresh eruption of rebellion due to the "Kuluman" factor, ever present. Ncupela, daughter of Lotje, links the conflicts from 1870 to 1889 directly to the "Kuluman" factor;

"The trouble over Lotje was a matter that lasted for many years. The indunas were dissatisfied with Lobengula as king. These indunas had accepted Lobengula as king, there were none of the Zwangendaba indunas left, but they changed their minds. They were influenced by the Zwangendaba men who followed Kuluman down south. They were influenced by communications with them. The Zwangendaba people used to pass to and fro. They did not come right into the country. They used to come as far as the Matopos and return, without the knowledge of Lobengula. This trouble of the Zwangendaba started at the time Lobengula was made King." (40)

The major conflicts in Ndebele society after 1870 can be traced to this fissure. When Nkuluman, a protege of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, made an attempt to enter Matabeleland, Lobengula sent an impi under Ntunzi and Umtigan to intercept him. (41) Umtigan was the son of Dambisa Muhubo, leader of the Amanyama
section in 1839, and the father of Maduna Mafu, an induna of the Godhlwayo izigaba. Cobbing attributes to Maduna Mafu the prime role as instigator of the 1896 "Rebellion". (42) To assign to him this role conflicts with the historical alignment of the Mafu, with Maduna’s own account of the events of 1896, and a wide range of documentary evidence. (43) The oral evidence clearly indicates the Godhlwayo people supported Nkuluman;

"Kuluman got the cattle from Rwdalala’s people because these people were under Ntunzi. When Kuluman got to Rwdalala’s kraal the people thought they must give him some food, and they gave him cattle – I don’t know how many. This happened before Ntunzi arrived. When Ntunzi arrived they gave him some more cattle and said; this is your food, by the orders of Ntunzi. These people were Basutos, but they were under Ntunzi. These people were Basutos, but they were under Ntunzi. These people were Basutos, but they were under Ntunzi. When Ntunzi arrived on the scene, instead of killing Kuluman, as Lobengula had ordered, they told him to run away. When Kuluman left there he went to another white man, whom they called Somtseo who was at Gungundhlovu. Kuluman brought Basutos with him when he came up. Mlusimbele was at Esizze he was at the Tshatshani river, which is the other side of the Antelope mine.

(They corroborate the story of Mbusimbele and Ntunzi.)

After that Mbusimbele was killed for joining Ntunzi. Kuluman made a camp at Esizze and built huts; but he did not stay long – not more than a year. For some time it was not known that he was there. This was at Rwdabala – because Rwdabala, a Basuto headman under Ntunzi, hid him. Afterwards the messengers were sent out, and the king got to hear of it. We are not certain, but we believe that Lobengula noticed that Kuluman was under Ntunzi’s people.

Ntunzi was one of those who favoured Kuluman and who remained faithful to him after the battle of Zwangendaba. Ntunzi fought against Lobengula at Zwangendaba, as did Mantea and Mganula." (44)

Another informant amplified this incident in Ndebele history;
"How it started was that some of the remnants of the Zwangendaba fled to Esizeze and after some time they went about spreading news, saying Utsho Njalo Omaya Omata masindwani ezunyamayansikulisizonke eziyama Luzize Esizene (Thus saith the black one who drinks water out of the holes made by the footprints of the wild animals all the black cattle are to be brought (to him) at Esizene). The "black one" refers to Kuluman and so does the expression Onato Eamasendweni ezinyamazaan. They gave Kuluman these names to "bonga" him. These messengers started at Kumalo's kraal, the chief of which was Moke, and they went to Ndweni, another regiment of which the chief was Tunzi, and then to the Isizenda, the induna of which was Chief Mapisa, taking this message around the country. Mapisa instructed the messengers to remain inside the cattle kraal and he went to the isigodhlo, the kraal of the Queens stationed there and fetched some beer and gave them some beer. And as they were drinking this beer he told the Isizinda regiment to surround them and kill them which was done. There were four. They killed three but one escaped but they chased him and caught him and killed him too. Then Mapisa sent messengers to report back to Lobengula. This happened after Nkuluman had been and gone - after he had left Esizeze. Lobengula thanked Mapisa very much for what he had done. That was where the grudge came against Tunzi because he had not reported this business. It was only after that that Tunzi was killed." (45)

Mapisa's change of allegiance was clearly motivated by an advancement of personal interest. This tended to sharpen the basic conflicts which disunited the Ndebele people. The different reasons given for Ntunzi's subsequent execution are interesting;

"There was a relationship between Umtigane, Ntunzi and Kuluman. Ntunzi and Mzilikatzi's mother were of the same sibonga, the Ndawene. This is why Ntunzi and Umtigane were killed." (46)

"Yes it is true that Umtigan was with Ntunzi in charge of the impi. The impi was under Ntunzi. He was married to Lobengula's sister, Makwa. He was blamed but he was
not killed until a long time afterwards." (47)

"Tunzi was killed because he was married to Nkuluman's sister and Lobengula then held that he must have been hiding Kuluman." (48)

The stress upon the personal family tie also casts revealing light upon the mystery of the execution of Lomandhlozi, Lobengula's favourite "sister";

"Umouka had two sons and a daughter, of whom Nkuluman was the eldest. The other two, Ulandhlule and Lomandhlozi died." (49)

Interpretations advanced which argue that Lomandhlozi was killed because she was believed to have "bewitched" Lobengula's royal wife, or due to some domestic quarrel misinterpret the allegorical meaning of the oral evidence. Lomandhlozi was sister to Nkuluman, wife to Tunzi, and as such clearly identified with the disaffected faction of Ndebele society.

It is difficult to sustain a theory that the royal family and umpakathi were united by common interest as advanced by Cobbing, in the light of the evidence which highlights conflicts and tensions within the ranks of the ruling elite.

"The Zwangendaba wanted Kuluman for chief, but when they looked for him they could not get him. It was the family of Lobengula that was looking for Kuluman. They said it would be better if Kuluman were king, but the whole idea was that Umbigo should be king. They had
the idea of making Umbigo chief (when) Mziligazi died." (50)

The execution of Mshlala, Ncumbata’s son, is also linked in oral tradition to the "Kuluman" factor.

"When Lobengula was appointed, after so many years he got gout, and he had no sons yet. And then Lobengula said to Ncumbata, the thing which kills me now is because you didn’t give me the power, how my father ruled this country you did not give me that power.

What Lobengula meant was - this was spoken to Mshlala - he wanted to find out what Mshlala was keeping on sending scouts out to look for Nkuluman; because he had heard that they had only bluffed him. They had not told him the actual truth. They had told that Nkuluman was dead. Mshlala replied to Lobengula’s question: "Mziligazi did not tell me that you would be appointed as king, and even my father Ncumbata only bluffed you. He meant you had better just act until Kuluman arrived". Lobengula replied: "I did not want to be king. That was the fault of your father; he said he had a witness he had killed Nkuluman. You people want to bulala me". Then Lobengula instructed the people. There were a certain group of people called the Amanusa, which is different from a regiment - they were executioners. Lobengula instructed them to kill the whole family of Ncumbata and Mshlala also and all his family were killed. Even their dogs were killed. All the relatives of Ncumbata far and near were killed by the executioners. This was long after the battle of Zwangendaba." (51)

The "Kuluman" factor was a source of constant division and conflict within Ndebele society. The execution of Lotje in 1889 emphasises the increasingly precarious hold Lobengula maintained over the Ndebele. Lotje had accompanied Mzikatzi’s section into Matabeleland. His interests therefore were those of the Amhlope. As a young man he was head of the Insindeni. After the battle of Zwangendaba, Lotje was promoted to become
head of the Nduba. The Nduba had fought with Mbigo against Lobengula. Lotje's appointment can, therefore, be seen to be a political strategy to place a personally loyal man over a dissenting, potentially rebellious people, to ensure their allegiance. As Siatcha stated earlier, there were those willing to affirm allegiance to Lobengula. Lotje was Lobengula's chief adviser, and as such an obstacle to the Nkuluman faction. His rapid advancement also aroused a great deal of jealousy.

"The plotting behind Lotje's back went on for years... from the time he was promoted to the command of the Nduba regiment." (53)

Ncupela, Lotje's daughter, alleged that the izinduna plotted against Lotje with the intention of securing Lobengula's downfall;

"I would not name any particular induna that plotted against Lotje because they all did. They did not come to Lotje and tell him they were plotting against, the King, nor did they tell him they were plotting to kill him (Lotje). They plotted secretly to kill him. It happened like this. These indunas, when they met Lobengula in front of Lotje, said to him: it is no good believing what Lotje says, that you must be friendly with these white people. That was a way of getting Lotje out of the way. Then Lobengula could be conquered by the Europeans, if he fought them at all." (54)

Ncupela insisted;

"Yes, it is true that these indunas were doing more than Lotje to bring the white people into the country by plotting against him. They knew what they were doing. They were doing it deliberately because they
wanted the white people to conquer Lobengula." (55)

On Lotje’s execution, Ncupela states:

"Lobengula granted the concession without the consent of his indunas, on Lotje’s advice. Lotje was then killed. They went behind his back again. They told Lobengula: Even if you refuse to get rid of Lotje we are going to kill him. Lobengula refused to have Lotje killed; but these indunas killed him against his will. It is not true that Lobengula ordered him to be killed. Yes, I am telling the truth." (56)

Ngungu confirms part of Ncupela’s statement:

"Lobengula called all his people and said that since the Europeans had come as far as Victoria he wanted to telu to them and all the people refused except Lotje who supported him, and that is why Lotje was killed. It was not the wish of Lobengula that Lotje should be put to death." (57)

Mvutu states:

"We were both present at the Indaba when Lotje told Lobengula not to fight the white people. (The story of the indaba as told by Ntabeni, is read to them, and they corroborate it).

Lotje said: "Because they are so many they will kill you. These people have got a stimela (train). They will come up by train, many of them. And they have guns which they haven’t given you yet. They have only given you the small guns. They have other big guns which they haven’t given to you. I have seen these things."

The indunas said: Lotje is telling lies because he wants to go and live with the white people. The best thing is to kill him." (58)
Mvutu also gives an idea of the restricted nature of Lobengula’s authority;

"Sikombo was not killed. Sikombo sold some sheep to Thompson, the one who ran away, for a gun; and Lobengula saw Sikombo with this gun and wanted to kill him; but Gxugutwayo refused to allow him to, because Sikombo was under him and he liked him. The day when Lotje was killed they also wanted to kill Sikombo, and it was then that Lobengula accused him of having this gun without his permission and wanted to kill him. But he didn’t kill him." (59)

Lobengula was unable to prevent the execution of Lotje by his izinduna, and his own attempt to execute Sikombo was resisted. This is a clear indication of the restricted nature of his authority. The divided nature of the Ndebele leadership may have had an influence on the 1893 war;

"Then Manyeo took the letter to the white people when the impi had already killed the boys. Then the white people asked Manyeo: "Why didn’t you bring this letter first: now your people have killed our boys and taken the cattle" and Manyeo said, "It was not my fault: that was Umgandaan’s fault". Manyeo lied. Manyeo wanted Umgandaan to get into trouble so that he, Manyeo, could take Umgandaan’s place." (60)

Mvutu and Posela simply say;

"There was a lot of trouble between the indunas. They used to be very jealous of each other; but we cannot tell whether this was the case between Manyeo and Umgandan." (61)

Ginyuitsha on being told the story of Manyeo and Umgandan replies;
"I am not going to talk about what took place privately between Umgandan and Manyeo because we were not told. But what happened was that we started killing the Amaswena before we had taken the letter. We had already taken some European cattle too. A great many Mashonas were killed, and we burnt a lot of their huts." (62)

Following on the July raid on Fort Victoria, L.S. Jameson began his preparations for the war of 1893. The oral evidence shows Lobengula as a bitter man, deserted and betrayed by his people. The oral evidence places the blame for the war on the impetuosity of Lobengula's young soldiers, in particular the Imbezu.

"The Matabele loved the Europeans greatly. They never molested them or threatened them. It was only Lobengula's regiments that did these things without his authority.

Longwena: Lobengula loved the Europeans although his regiments did things without his authority." (63)

"The first to fight with the white people were the Insugameni. When the Imbezu went out, Lobengula advised them not to fight the white people at Egodade. But the Imbezu said: "No, you are a coward. We will go and finish off these white people, and then we will come back and plough". It was just before the ploughing season. Lobengula told them No. "The best thing for you is to come with me, then you will fight them when they find me." But they would not listen. They said, "No. You are a coward." "(64)

"The Imbezu did not listen. They went straight to Ntatasinduna, to the place called Egodade, where the mission is today, and found the white people had already made their camp there. So they started to fight there, and the Imbezu were destroyed. Lobengula
had moved to the Shangani, and some of the people went to report to him that the Imbezu were destroyed. They found Lobengula at Lupani, on the way to Shangani. And Lobengula replied: "Well they have disobeyed my orders. I first told them to come with me, and they refused. Secondly, I advised them not to fight when the white people had already made their camp; and they didn’t listen to that." Then Lobengula spoke his last words to these people: "I think these people want me to be captured by the white people; but the white people won’t see me. I am going to drop myself into a place where nobody will ever see me." (65)

Kulungula’s account illustrates some of the difficulties inherent in the use of oral evidence;

"Siatcha: Lobengula did not want to fight the white man. The trouble started with the indaba with Umgandan.

Kulungula: It is not correct that the trouble started with Umgandan. The trouble was going to begin in any case over the question of paying tax. It was the people themselves who were talking of paying tax. The white people had not asked for a tax; but some of the people themselves had said the best way was for them to live under the white people and pay tax. This talk of tax was just among themselves. And then the Majha said that sooner than pay tax they would fight. The white people did not say that everybody must pay tax, but they said Lobengula must pay for his people, because they were refusing to let the white people come and make mines here. That is how the trouble started. That is where Lotje stood up and said: "No, the best thing is to pay the tax, because I have seen the white people."

Siatcha continues with the others:

Then the Imbezu regiment blamed Lotje and Lotje was killed. The Imbezu said: "Our King can not pay tax unless we fight. Then after that we'll pay, if we don’t succeed."

It was then the impi of Umgandan that started the fighting; but before that there was talk of fighting because the people did not want the white people to make mines here." (66)
This extract from the oral evidence is interesting. Kalungula and Siatcha view the killing of Lotje, the 1893 war, tax and mines as being related. In fact these events are separated by several years, but the linking factor is the conflict among the Ndebele themselves. Though the facts are distorted, the dissension within Ndebele society is the pervading truth. The oral evidence relating to Lobengula's last speech and the 1893 war, enforce the interpretation of a divided society:

"It is quite true that Lobengula said: "O umkumbula o Lotje - I am now thinking of Lotje" - Lotje had told him not to fight with the white people. But that was on the way to the Shangani - before the fight took place. Lobengula also said - "Umbigo told the people that Nkuluman was alive and the people misled me and told me Mkulumana was dead. Now these people have run away from me." He was talking to the impi. "All my property will be taken by the white people. You can take my cattle back, but you won't have them. The white people will take them all."

And he said: "You said I used to kill people, and yet I didn't kill anybody. You were the ones who were killing people. Now you see the white people are coming here you are all pleased." He was referring to those who had deserted. Nobody replied to that; they all kept quite. And Lobengula said: "The white people are coming now. I didn't want to fight with them. I want you to take a stone and put it on my head - lekalit je kanda - and tell them I no longer want to be king. It is finished today."

Be kalitzikandfa meant that this was the end of Lobengula as king." (67)

Mvutu and Posela insist that Lobengula only spoke of Lotje, and did not mention Umbigo or Nkuluman:

"Lobengula said: "If I had listened to Lotje there would have been no trouble, and these chiefs who have
deceived me, now they have hidden away instead of coming out to fight the white people. He said *oh sengkumhula amuzui* go *Lotje o wate angilite*, meaning, oh, I am thinking of the words of Lotje that I must pay tax." (68)

Lobengula is seen to be a deserted and betrayed king:

"I know nothing of the death of Lobengula because he trusted nobody when he disappeared. He trusted no one because some of the Matabele were already with the white people, and he was afraid they would give him away. When the *impi* went to report to him he had disappeared, and they don’t know what happened to him." (69)

Siatcha provides a gentle assessment of Lobengula, the wistful tone engendered perhaps by fifty years of colonialism and the longing for an age then past:

"The Bantu are never satisfied with a King. They will always find fault with their king. Lobengula was a good king, but it is custom among the people to be dissatisfied with a man in his lifetime, and then when he is dead they say he is a good man. It is not a native custom to say that a man is good in his presence, because he might get proud. When his people praised Lobengula to his face it was just formal praise, usually at feasting time. But the people never made any complaint against Lobengula. To complain privately does not mean to say he is a bad king but just that they don’t want to praise him in his presence or to his knowledge." (70)

In assessing the conflicts within the Ndebele polity, a belief in a centralised and unified state is shown to be a myth. Lobengula was neither an autocratic despot obsequiously obeyed, nor the focus for consensus rule through an *umpakathi*. The "Nkuluman syndrome" was a powerful divisive force in Ndebele
society. In 1893, it is recorded that some Ndebele communities believed that the invading Europeans were bringing Nkuluman to be restored to the kingship. (71) The failure of prominent men, such as Gampu Sithole, to engage the European forces gives emphasis to the disunity within Ndebele society. (72) The divisions of 1893 this thesis has argued were projected into the resumption of a civil war in 1896. This disunity prevented any attempt by the Ndebele royal family or izinduna to plan, organise or coordinate a "Rebellion".

In general terms, the Ndebele polity is perhaps best described as an interaction of largely autonomous local communities or izigaba, consisting of imisi and ibutho, which offered voluntary allegiance to a confederal authority, or King. The Ndebele state was localised, the local authorities could and did act independently. Entrenched conflicts continually threatened to shatter the facade of unity. Internal conflicts were diverse and complex, but the most prominent fissure is that which can be traced to 1839 with the forced reunification of the Ndebele under Mzilikazi. The "Nkuluman" factor remained a powerful source of conflict within Ndebele society throughout its history. It led to the development of a complex system of allegiances, at times prompted by convenience, but often entrenched in deep historical ties. The King as such, was essentially a local authority, the first among equals. The belief in his absolute power derived from the Europeans who found themselves at his kraal. Seeing life only from the
perspective of the royal kraal gave a distorted impression of the realities of the distribution of power within the Ndebele polity. The pervading beliefs of the Europeans as to Tshaka and the Zulu people may also have influenced their perception of the Ndebele. (73)

Lance F. Morrow in his University of London seminar paper, "Factional politics and white penetration in the Ndebele kingdom before 1885", attempted to explain the system of allegiances whereby the Ndebele polity was ruled. (74) Morrow recognised the insecurity of Lobengula's position, and notes that allegiances could be sustained by personal or historical ties. It is noted that many of the izinduna were bound to support Lobengula since they had initially promoted his candidacy and so alienated the Nkuluman faction. "However the king's dependence on his personal following increased the likelihood that other coalition leaders would feel that they were not getting their due." (75) Morrow notes that Lobengula also relied on political patronage to sustain his position. He attempted to replace persons of doubtful loyalty with reliable appointees of his own. It is noted however, that Lobengula's ability to remove opponents and instal placemen was limited as there "was always the chance of rebellion if he removed a popular officer." (76)

Unfortunately, Morrow was influenced in his interpretation by the modern tendency to explain social interaction in terms of economic theory. Morrow's dependence upon deterministic theory
reduces his rich insight into the complexities of Ndebele social interaction to an emaciated economic base. The sum of his argument is that; "This popular demand for European products transformed white penetration into a major issue in Ndebele domestic politics because control of European trade could alter the balance of political power within the state." (77) Morrow believes that Lobengula was far poorer in cattle, the traditional measure of wealth, than his father. As such, Lobengula had less largesse to distribute than Mzilikatzi, in an effort to sustain loyalty through patronage. (78) According to Morrow, Lobengula overcame this difficulty by creating a trade monopoly with the Europeans. This enabled him to continue a system of patronage reliant upon control of European trade. (79) This, Morrow contends, explains the hostility of the Nkuluman faction to the Europeans. "This policy threatened rival factional interests within Ndebele society and there are indications that their apparent hostility towards white penetration was at least partly a reflection of the king's success in exploiting white commercial activity for domestic political purposes." (80)

Morrow's interpretation can be questioned on a number of points. The establishment of a trading monopoly by Lobengula is not sustained by the evidence. Lobengula was powerless to prevent his izinduna from trading with the Europeans, and he certainly commanded no obedience from the disaffected factions. Further the trade was small and unlikely to have been
significant even from a point of limited patronage. Even if Lobengula had attempted to gain a trade monopoly, as the Ndebele had travelled south to work on the Rand and Kimberley mines, the influx of trade goods by those returning to disaffected izigaba would have countered this intention. Trade was also possible with the Portuguese to the north and east. (81) Economic explanations are unfortunately the vogue among many historians. Morrow draws his evidence from Europeans who were in Matabeleland primarily for economic reasons. To view the factional conflicts from the European evidence gives it an economic overtone, but this is to isolate one aspect of the conflict and to perceive it as the conflict. This appendix has been concerned with emphasising that these tensions were independent of Europeans and trade. These conflicts were the result of the historical experience which formed the Ndebele polity, and as such part of the nature of the Ndebele "state".
Footnotes: Appendix One.

(1) See pp.2 - 11.

(2) See pp.11 - 20.


(4) This appendix does not intend to provide a complete revision of Ndebele society, but simply to focus on those divisions which retarded a unified response to the settlers in 1893 and 1896.

(5) In an amalgamative state, as a heterogeneous society, there is likely to exist a degree of tension which is greater than in a homogeneous state. A dichotomy of interests may develop between the central authority and the localities. Internal conflicts may restrain the military effectiveness of the state, especially when the state is threatened, as the localities safeguard their own interests. The tensions within an amalgamative state are linked to geographical localities and the racial, social and cultural origins of the people. Conflicts are likely to arise between new elites formed by the process of amalgamation and the established elites. In an amalgamative state, since racial origin is likely to be linked to social position, a form of class tension may develop. Class tensions, racial origin, family conflicts, geographical identification and the emergence of personally ambitious men, may manifest themselves in a struggle for local autonomy. These tensions may divide the state against itself, reducing its effectiveness as a defensive and offensive weapon. Factions may perceive their local interests best served by acting against the interests of the central authority and the state as a whole. Though an amalgamative state may appear to be ruled by an absolutist monarch, this power is likely to be real only in the area over which he holds immediate sway. The central authority depends, therefore, upon its ability to win sufficient support from factions to maintain power. However, the central authority may be resisted, and such tensions would reveal themselves in outbreaks of rebellion, executions and punishment expeditions within the state itself. Natural factors would also further inhibit effective centralisation. As amalgamative states are likely to spread themselves over vast areas, difficulties of communication between local and central authorities mean that a local community inevitably acts on a day to day basis as an autonomous body. Some local authorities may take advantage of this independence to embark on a process of local imperialism. Should that locality gain sufficient power, it may in due course lead to a break-away from the parent state. Amalgamative states are likely to be in constant danger of civil war and fragmentation.

(6) Cobbing, "The Ndebele", Chapter two is a very important
source of detail for the growth of localism and the conflicts it precipitated. Cobbing in his analysis of the events of 1896 - 7 failed to bear in mind the lessons he so clearly enunciated in this chapter.

(7) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1 - 2.

(8) NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1, statement by Mvumi, p.8.


(10) Cobbing "The Ndebele", Chapter 2. This was the case with Faku and Tala as well as with Mahlahleni and Maduna. NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1, statement by Ntabeni Kumalo, p.67, as well as the evidence given below, indicates that a great deal of the opposition to Lobengula came from within the royal family.

(11) This point has also been made by Bhebe, Christianity and Traditional religion, Chapter one.

(12) NAZ Hist Mss. Wi 8/1/1 - 2. The oral evidence given by Ntabeni Kumalo is to be found in NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/1. NAZ Hist. Mss. Wi 8/1/2 contains a series of statements made by several Ndebele informants. Hereafter the oral evidence taken from the Windram collection will simply state the name of the informant and the page number at which the quote may be found.

(13) Statement by Ngungu, p.3. There is dispute at to who led the Amyama, Ginyalitsha, p.2, claims it was Gundwaan.

(14) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p.2.


(19) This episode is normally presented as a strategic division, however, the impression derived from the oral evidence by this writer leads to the suggestion that in the turmoil following on the clash with the Boers, the two groups which evolved in the flight north were but part of several refugee movements following on the dissolution of the Ndebele kingdom south of the Limpopo. Before their forced reunification they had evolved into two distinct polities independant of each other. The intentionality ascribed to this division is a rationalisation of the subsequent reunification whereby the oral tradition seeks to give a "wholeness" to Ndebele history.
(20) Statement by Hobasi Kumalo, p.3.
(21) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p.4.
(22) Statement by Ngungu, p.5.
(23) Statement by Siatcha, p.3.
(24) Statement by Siatcha, p.5.
(25) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p.5.
(26) Statement by Ngungu, p.5.
(27) Statement by Nkungushi, p.2.
(28) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p.6.
(29) Statement by Hobasi Kumalo, p.4.
(31) Statement by Mvumi, p.5.
(33) Statement by Mvumi, pp.5 - 6.
(35) Observation made by R.F. Windram, NAZ Hist, Mss. Wi 8/1/1, p.69.
(36) Statements by Ntabeni Kumalo, p.9, and Ginyalitsha, pp.6 - 7, deny that Umbigo was responsible for Manyebo's death.
(37) Statement by Siatcha, p.12.
(38) Statement by Siatcha, p.8.
(40) Statement by Ncupela, p.3.
(41) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p.2.
(43) See pp.110 - 167.
(44) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, pp.1 - 2.
(45) Statement by Ngungu, pp.6 - 7.
(46) Statement by Ncupela, p. 4.

(47) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p. 2.

(48) Statement by Ngungu, p. 6.

(49) Statement by Hobasi Kumalo, p. 4. See also Ntabeni Kumalo, p. 4, and p. 16, where he states that Mncenceningi, a full sister of Lobengula, was killed because: "The suspicion came up that Mncenceningi took some things (Ipashli) and handed them to the Zwangendaba, because they used to see Kuluman privately. The King got suspicious that his sister was taking his property and sending it to Nkuluman."

(50) Statement by Mvumu, p. 6.

(51) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p. 7.

(52) Statement by Ncupela, p. 1.

(53) Statement by Ncupela, p. 5.

(54) Statement by Ncupela, p. 4.

(55) Statement by Ncupela, p. 5.

(56) Statement by Ncupela, pp. 6 - 7.

(57) Statement by Ngungu, p. 12.

(58) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p. 3.

(59) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p. 4.


(61) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p. 5.


(63) Statement by Nkungusi, p. 3.

(64) Statement by Siatcha, pp. 16 - 17.

(65) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p. 16.


(67) Statement by Ginyalitsha, pp. 21 - 22.

(68) Statement by Mvutu and Posela, p. 7.

(69) Statement by Ginyalitsha, p. 21.
(70) Statement by Siatcha, p.11.

(71) Brown, The Ndebele Succession Crisis, p.17.


(73) See Cobbing, "The Ndebele", pp.446 - 460, for European misconceptions as to the Zulu and Ndebele.


(75) Morrow, "Factional politics and white penetration", p.4.

(76) Morrow, "Factional politics and white penetration", p.4.


(78) Morrow, "Factional politics and white penetration", pp.4 - 5.


Appendix Two

The Native Department in Matabeleland and Mashonaland (1)

The origin of the Native Department in Matabeleland can be traced to a report of 26 January 1894 in the Rhodesian Herald which stated that Johan Colenbrander and a Mr Carruthers had been appointed at Bulawayo with special instructions to pay attention to the affairs of the African people. Colenbrander had been in Matabeleland at the King’s kraal since July 1888, when he had accompanied Rennie Taylor’s concession hunting group. He had also accompanied E. A. Maud and Lobengula’s two izinduna, Mtshete and Babayan, to England in the early part of 1889 on a mission to Queen Victoria. He was at the King’s kraal when the Pioneer column passed through Matabeleland en route to Mashonaland, and he carried messages to Dr Jameson and Lieutenant - Colonel Pennefather from Lobengula which he delivered at the Lundi river. Having received replies he returned to Lobengula and then left for the south. By November 1890, he was back at Lobengula’s kraal with his wife Molly, and shortly afterwards accepted the post of Chartered Company’s representative with Lobengula. He appears to have played a part in spreading rumours of an impending invasion among the Ndebele in an attempt to provoke a reaction to serve as the pretext for the 1893 war. (2) The Matabeleland News and Mining Record of the 7 and 18 April, and 30 June 1894 refer to Colenbrander as Native Commissioner. T. V. Bulpin in The White Whirlwind claims
that he was Chief Native Commissioner from the beginning of this engagement. (3) The Appendix to the Second Report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons on British South Africa, dated 13 July 1897, sets out that he had been Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, in 1894 without further details.

No further appointments can be traced until Government Notice No 14 of 4 December 1894. This notice divided the "Territory" into five districts, each with an Assistant Native Commissioner in charge, together with a sixth assistant in Bulawayo and district. These districts were roughly:

No 1 - West of Bulawayo, with headquarters at Gampu’s kraal.
No 2 - North of Bulawayo, with headquarters at Inyati.
No 3 - North east and east of Bulawayo, with headquarters at Murenis.
No 4 - South east of Bulawayo, with headquarters at Belingwe.
No 5 - South and south west of Bulawayo, with headquarters at Gjatula’s kraal.

Respective appointments were W. Taylor, A. M. Graham, E. R. Miller, H. P. Fynn, H. Driver and D. Pennent.

On 1 May 1895 the Administrator proclaimed the name "Rhodesia" and divided the "Territories" afresh, giving an appropriate name to each district - Bubi, Bulawayo, Gwelo, Belingwe, Gwanda, Bulalema, Mangwe, Wankie, Sebungu and Mafungu Busi in Matabeleland. (4) The history of the appointment of Assistant Native Commissioners is a complex one. J. P. Richardson and W.
J. Leslie were appointed to Gwanda and Bulawayo respectively, neither of whom it seems stayed long. (5) To make room for Richardson, Driver it seems was shifted to Gwelo where he was in March 1896. (6) About this time Colenbrander resigned his appointment to be replaced by H. J. Taylor, who was gazetted Justice of the Peace for Bulawayo on 9 September 1895. (7) Leslie also resigned and his place was taken by R. Lanning who was appointed to the Bulawayo district on 17 September 1895. (8) At the same time H. J. Fynn was appointed to the Battlefields block of farms, a special area, already included in the descriptions set out in the Proclamation of March 1895. (9) On 11 November 1895, further appointments produced two new areas, namely Umsingwaan and Insiza, which were carved out of some of the previously, and so recently, gazetted districts, and to whom H. M. C. Jackson and H. P. Fynn (from Belingwe) went respectively. (10) At the same time C. G. Fynn took over from Richardson, who resigned at Gwanda, and B. W. Armstrong and S. Carter were appointed to Mangwe and Bulawayo respectively. (11) By 17 December 1895, S. N. G. Jackson had assumed duty at Belingwe. (12) There were other changes such as Carter to Inyati, but the likely situation in Matabeleland in March 1896 was:

Bulawayo - H. J. Taylor (Chief Native Commissioner, absent on leave), D. Pennent, R. Lanning.
Bubi - A. M. Graham, S. Carter.
Gwelo - H. Driver.
Belingwe - S. N. G. Jackson.
Gwanda - C. G. Fynn.
Bulalema - W. E. Thomas (acting Chief Native Commissioner)
Mangwe - H. M. Armstrong.
Umsingwaan - H. M. G. Jackson.
Insiza - H. P. F. Fynn.
Battlefields Block - H. J. Fynn.
Filabusi - A. Bentley.
No appointments can be traced for Tuli, Wankie, Sebungu or Mafungu Busi. (13)

The history of African administration in Mashonaland is similarly obscure. On being appointed to head a body concerned with African affairs in Mashonaland, the Fort Victoria interpreter, J. S. Brabant, turned to his comrades in the Pioneer column. (14) His first recruit was A. W. Campbell to control matters around Salisbury. (15) M. E. Weale was appointed to Marandellas, shortly after Brabant and Campbell started operations. (16) Brabant's companion of Pretoria days, W. E. Clarke opened up an office in Lomagundi in October, while another comrade, W. A. Armstrong was sent to Mtoko's in April 1895. (17) All of these men styled themselves "Native Commissioner", but it is likely that they were appointed under the Hut Tax Ordinance (No 5) of 1894 as "Collectors". This ordinance was published on 12 October 1894.

The Administrators Proclamation of 1 May 1895 set the Native Department on its feet with the definition of the following districts - Charter, Hartley, Lomagundi, Makoni, Mazoe,
Mengwendi (sic), Melsetter, Mtibi, Sabi, Salisbury, Victoria, Tuli and Umtali. The history of appointments to the Native Department during this early period is not always clear. In Charter the list of "Native Commissioners" is known to be incomplete. A man referred to as "Thompson" can be traced, who was probably replaced by Peter Forrestall, who was appointed to Charter on 1 October 1894. (18) L. C. Meredith became Assistant Native Commissioner in May 1895. (19) W. M. Taylor also claims to have been appointed in May 1895 to Charter. (20) In Hartley, Henry Thurgood was appointed "Collector" on 1 November 1894. (21) D. E. Mooney took over on 10 September 1895. (22) Thurgood went to his farm where he was murdered in late June 1896, as was Mooney on a visit to Mashayamombe's kraal. In Lomagundi, W. E. Clarke opened up an office on about 5 October 1894. (23) He appears to have moved away in February or March 1895. For about a month, between April and June 1895, T. B. Hulley claims to have been "Native Commissioner". (24) Hulley was shifted to the office of the Chief Native Commissioner in Salisbury after an attempt to collect labour led to the murder of a white trooper and the shooting of an African headman. (25) Mynhardt was moved from Melsetter to Lomagundi where he arrived on about the 30 July. Mynhardt was murdered at his camp with two other men, Slater and Cove, on Sunday 21 June 1896. (26) L. C. Meredith claims to have been appointed to Makoni's district in November 1894. (27) His first gazetted appointment was that of Field Cornet at Rusapi. (28) On 4 June 1895, T. Pretorius was made Field Cornet for Makoni's ward, Meredith having moved to
Charter. Pretorius appears to have been storekeeping at Headlands. (29) A. R. Ross became "Native Commissioner" at Lesapi on 20 April 1895. (30) On 10 December 1895, H. H. Pollard was appointed Field Cornet for the ward of Mazoe, and had his headquarters in the vicinity of the Alice Mine. He was killed by his own police in June 1896. (31) M. E. Weale claims to have been a "Native Commissioner" in Marandellas during 1894. He did not stay long and W. Edwards was appointed to the Mangwendi district as from 1 May 1895. (32) This district included Marandellas, where he built a second camp, "as it was impossible to work the district from only one center". (33) When Edwards went on sick leave towards the end of September 1896, a Mr Morris took over from him and worked from Marandellas. On his return from leave, Edwards went to Mrewa and Morris continued at Marandellas. (34) According to the Civil Service lists, A.H. Newnham was appointed to Melsetter on the 26 April 1895 and resigned in October of that year. Due to his experience in controlling Shangaan Africans while a compound manager in Basutoland, T. B. Hulley was sent to Melsetter in September 1895. (35) On the death of J. W. Nesbitt on 30 May 1896, Hulley moved to take his place at Umtali. L. C. Meredith replaced him arriving in June 1896. (36) In Victoria, A. Drew claims that he was appointed "Native Commissioner" on 1 September 1894. J. W. Eksteen was at N'danga from 1 August 1895. (37) P. Forrestall was transferred to Victoria from Chibi in January 1896. (38) W. E. Weale, once at Marandellas, assumed duty at Chilimanzi during the war of 1896. (39) E. H. Compton - Thompson was appointed "Tax Collector" for Umtali on about 21
September 1894. (40) He was replaced by J. W. Nesbitt., who was succeeded by T. B. Hulley in June 1896. (41) W. E. E. Scott was probably appointed at this time to an out station towards the south east, probably Mutanbare's section. (42) J. S. Brabant was dismissed as Chief Native Commissioner by the Executive Council in November 1895 and replaced by H. M. Taberer, who had become Assistant Chief Native Commissioner in June 1895. (43) No appointments can be traced for Sabi, Mtibi or Tuli.

The likely situation in Mashonaland in June 1896 was:

Lomagundi - J. Mynhardt.
Mazoe - H. H. Pollard
Charter - W. M. Taylor (absent in Matabeleland).
Hartley - D. E. Mooney.
Salisbury - H. M. Taberer (Chief Native Commissioner), D. Campbell.
Mangwendi - W. Edwards.
Melsetter - L. C. Meredith.
Victoria - J. W. Eksteen, P. Forrestall.
Footnotes: Appendix Two

(1) This Appendix is derived in a large measure from H. A. Cripwell's collection of notes, documents and research on the Native Department which forms part of the Historical Manuscript collection of the National Archives of Zimbabwe. The reader is also referred to J. Mclean, The Guardians, (Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1974), J.J. Taylor, "The origins of the Native Department in Southern Rhodesia, 1890 – 1898", University of Rhodesia, History Department Seminar paper no 7.


(4) Administrators Proclamation, 1 May 1895.

(5) Government Notice no 77, 9 September 1895; Government Notice no 99, 11 November 1895.

(6) Government Notice no 140, 15 December 1896.

(7) Government Notice no 77, 9 September 1895.

(8) Government Notice no 77, 9 September 1895.

(9) Government Notice no 81, 17 September 1895.

(10) Government Notice no 99, 11 November 1895.


(12) Government Notice no 110, 7 December 1895.


(14) Rhodesia Herald, 7, 21 September and 21 December 1894.


(17) NAZ N 1/1/12, NAZ Hist. Mss. Ed 6/1/1.

(18) Beach, "Politics of collaboration", p.19, notes eleven personnel changes at the Range Station within one year. NAZ N 1/1/9, list of officials dated 4 June 1896.

(19) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.

(20) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(21) NAZ N 1/1/3.
(22) NAZ N 1/2/1.
(23) NAZ N 1/1/5.
(24) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(26) NAZ N 1/1/12.
(28) Government Notice no 35, 30 April 1895.
(29) Government Notice no 48, 4 June 1895.
(30) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(31) Government Notice no 105, 10 December 1895. See p.245.
(35) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(36) Government Notice no 68, 9 June 1896.
(37) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(38) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2, Civil Service lists.
(39) Government Notice no 19, 23 February 1897.
(40) NAZ N 1/1/1.
(41) Government Notice no 119, 21 October 1896; Government Notice no 129, 17 November 1896, NAZ N 1/1/11.
(42) NAZ Hist. Mss. Cr 2/12/4/2.
(43) Government Notice no 100, 26 November 1895.
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