TRANSFORMATION IN LATE COLONIAL NGQIKA SOCIETY:
A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AFRICAN COMMUNITIES IN THE DISTRICT
OF STUTTERHEIM (EASTERN CAPE), c.1870-1910

THESIS

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by
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Abstract

This study analyses the methods and policies of the colonial government which shaped Stutterheim's African communities between c.1870 and 1910.

In 1870 the Stutterheim magisterial district had not yet been officially established. However, creation of the British Kaffrarian administration (1847-1865) had already ensured the entrenchment of colonial rule over the humiliated Xhosa chiefdoms west of the Kei.

This work studies transformations in late colonial Ngqika society and the development of Stutterheim as a magisterial district. It analyses the entrenchment of colonial bureaucracy and changes in indigenous social, economic and political structures.

In the period c.1860-1877, direct administration of the Ngqika was first attempted. While recovering from the 1856-57 cattle killing, the Ngqika were brought under colonial administration by the annexation of British Kaffraria to the Cape Colony in 1865.

The thesis also examines the process and implications of the breakup and resettlement of the Ngqika location after the 1877-1878 war and the mechanisms and complications in forming a new postwar settlement. The focus then narrows to Stutterheim magisterial district (finalised in 1880), where, after the removal of the main Ngqika population to the Transkei, formal structures of quitrent settlement were established around mission stations. A new form of social behaviour underpinned by principles of individualism evolved under missionary influence. Urged on by legislation that sought to intensify implementation of individual tenure, this social behaviour predominated under the new administration.

Attention is also given to the allocation of farm land in the district. On part of what had once been communally owned land, an immigrant farming community originally intended strictly for whites emerged. Numerous Africans later managed to hold property in this area. An urban area with a mixed African and white population resulted where allotments initially allocated to the German Legion were later auctioned. On crown lands, leasing and purchasing was initiated.

By the early twentieth century, settlement patterns were in chaos: on the mission settlements, quitrenters disobeyed settlement regulations, farms were overpopulated by tenants and interracial urban settlements faced imminent segregationist policies. By 1910 local administration was in difficulties and the Africans were becoming politically mobilised against local and colonial policies.
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Key to the list of abbreviations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Archives of the Attorney General.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGRI</td>
<td>Archives of the Department of Agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>Archives of British Kaffraria Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBCC</td>
<td>Blue Books of the Cape Colony.</td>
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<td>BBNA</td>
<td>Blue Books for Native Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFA</td>
<td>Bolo Farmers Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>British Parliamentary Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cape Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Cape Mounted Police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Archives of the Colonial Office.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cape Printed Annexures/Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCE</td>
<td>Archives of the Forest Department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GH</td>
<td>Archives of Government House.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>London Missionary Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LND</td>
<td>Archives of the Department of Lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVMB</td>
<td>Mgwali Village Management Board.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>National Education Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>Archives of the Department of Public Works.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>South African Library.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANC</td>
<td>South African Native Congress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANNC</td>
<td>South African National Native Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFPGA</td>
<td>Stutterheim Farmers and Fruit Growers Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Archives of the Treasury Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>Union Government Papers.</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, HISTORIOGRAPHY, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

Geographical and Historical background

Stutterheim is a district in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa. The principal town of the district bears the same name. The district lies about 90 kilometres north of East London, 110 kilometres south of Queenstown and 30 kilometres north east of Keiskammahoek. It covers about 1634 square kilometres of mostly plain terrain, with mainly grassveld and valley bushveld vegetation. The region is suitable for trees and extensive plantations have been established on the slopes of the Amathole range. It experiences a humid subtropical climate with moderate rainfalls and cold, frosty winters. With an undulating landscape, some areas are carved out by the winding Kubusi river and its tributaries Toise and Gqolonci. Against a background of altered geographical settlement, some sections of the district have high population density and some very low.

Between 1880 and 1910, Stutterheim district was part of the Cape Colony which was incorporated into the Union of South Africa in the latter year. The district first came under colonial rule in 1866, shortly after the annexation of British Kaffraria to the Cape Colony. Before that, various governors of British Kaffraria had already instituted indirect rule of the Ngqika who were one of the original Xhosa groups in the area. During this period the district had not yet attained full magisterial status. Its administration was centred in King William's Town until after the 1877-78 frontier war. The nucleus of local administration was then installed. After magisterial status was obtained in 1880, colonial administration became fully established in the new Stutterheim district.

2. Stutterheim district is a typical microcosm of apartheid land design. However, it was the late nineteenth century expropriation of African lands that led to an imbalanced ratio of landownership.
A brief look at early Ngqika history

The terms according to which the various Xhosa chiefdoms held land on the eastern frontier was repeatedly altered by colonial expansionism. The Ngqika Xhosa people who feature prominently in this study were not treated any differently. The Ngqika originated from the Rharabe house. Ngqika, the founding leader/chief of the Ngqika Xhosa, was the grandson of Rharabe. Rharabe’s stronghold was in the Amathole mountains, a place that Rharabe seized during the last third of the eighteenth century from the Khoikhoi chieftainess Hoho. As Rharabe’s son Mlawu died when Ngqika was a young boy, Ndlambe (Mlawu’s half brother and Ngqika’s uncle) became regent of the Rharabe until Ngqika entered manhood. However when that stage came, Ndlambe refused to hand over the chieftaincy. Consequently a dispute developed between Ngqika and Ndlambe and in the process other Xhosa clans were involved. By 1800, the Rharabe had been divided into factions led by Ngqika and Ndlambe. Peires notes that this development was particularly significant because it drew the Cape Colony into Xhosa politics.

Leaving Ngqika behind in his great place close to the Tyume and Keiskamma rivers, Ndlambe became a strong force west of the Fish river. However, a dispute developed between Ndlambe and the colonists over the Zuurveld boundary. The colonists’ intentions to clear the Xhosa from the Zuurveld led to a fourth frontier war in December 1811 in which Colonial troops under the command of Colonel John Graham "systematically and ruthlessly drove the Xhosa [east of] the Fish."

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3. Rharabe was a son of the righthand house of Phalo, the great Xhosa chief from the Tshawe clan. After Phalo’s death, the Rharabe resided on the western side of the Kei. See J Peires: The House of Phalo-A History of the Xhosa people in the days of their independence, (Johannesburg 1987), 45-50; J H Soga: The South-Eastern Bantu (Abenguni, Abembo Amalala), (Johannesburg 1930), 128.
8. B Maclennan: A Proper Degree of Terror- John Graham and the Cape’s Eastern Frontier, (Cape Town 1986), 110-117. Zuurveld was the area between the Sundays and Fish rivers.
With Ndlambe now east of the Fish, the old tension between him and Ngqika was resuscitated. This situation was exacerbated by Governor Lord Somerset's famous 1817 Kat River conference with Ngqika. At the conference, Ngqika was guaranteed paramountcy and recognition by the colony, but in return he was to permit colonial patrols to enter Xhosa territory in search of allegedly stolen cattle. In reality, the patrol system concentrated on Ndlambe's people. Angered by these arrangements and by the colonists' reluctance to hear his plea, Ndlambe attacked the Ngqika chiefdom in 1818. This conflict culminated in the famous battle of Amalinde in which Ngqika's army was defeated. However, the colonial intervention in 1819 transformed this Xhosa dispute into a fifth frontier war in which Ndlambe was crushed.

Ngqika's troubles did not end with the crushing of the Ndlambe chiefdom. Since Ngqika's paramountcy had been acquired with colonial support, Somerset ordered the Ngqika to move out of the area between the Keiskamma and Fish rivers. This was declared a neutral zone and subsequently filled with colonial military posts.

Further disputes brewed within the Ngqika chieftaincy. When Ngqika died in 1829, Maqoma who was Ngqika's right hand son was appointed regent for the under-age Sandile. But in reality, the chiefdom was split into at least three different semi-autonomous factions. Firstly, there was Maqoma (now regent), an experienced warrior who had once tried to establish a stronghold on the Kat river in the early 1820s, but was later expelled from the territory by Lieutenant-Governor Andries Stockenstrom who perceived Maqoma's settlement to be a violation of the Ngqika and Somerset agreement of 1819. Secondly, there was Tyali, Ngqika's son from a minor house who had become influential in the 1820s during Maqoma's period on the Kat river. Lastly there was Sutu,

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14. Sandile was Ngqika's great son born in about 1820.
Ngqika’s great wife, who rallied her forces near the late paramount’s great place and represented the interests of his son Sandile.  

However the internal feud was soon overshadowed by colonial expansion. Shortly after the sixth frontier war of 1835 (which was mainly directed against the Ngqika and Gcaleka Xhosa), Governor Sir Benjamin D’urban cleared the Xhosa from the area between the Keiskamma and the Fish rivers to make way for the settlement of the "Fingo". This settlement was intended to "guard against the entry of the Xhosa to the Fish river bush". D’urban’s original plan was to move all the Xhosa across the Kei (except those approved as loyal). But, given the fact that the Xhosa chiefs were not yet defeated, that plan faced difficulties. He had already annexed the territory between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers as the Province of Queen Adelaide. However, the retention of that potentially contestable province was not entertained by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Glenelg. Nevertheless, D’urban managed to squeeze various Xhosa chiefdoms such as Ngqika, Dange, Mbalu, Gqunukwebe and Ndlambe into the territory stretching from the Keiskamma/Tyume rivers to the Kei river. Thus the scheme of Fingo settlement was achieved by a systematic confiscation of Rharabe lands. Five years later (1840), Sandile was installed as the paramount chief of the Ngqika.

D’urban’s settlement pattern was later officially resuscitated by Sir Harry Smith who became the Cape Governor in 1847. During that year, the War of the Axe had just been fought and won by colonial troops against various Xhosa groups. Capitalising on the colony’s victory, Harry

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17. Peires: House of Phalo, 110.
20. J Meintjies: Sandile, the fall of the Xhosa nation, (Cape Town, 1971), 115.
21. Commonly referred to as the seventh frontier war.
Smith declared the area between the Keiskamma and Kei and further northward between the Klipplaats and the Zwart Kei rivers the separate colony of British Kaffraria.  

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**MAP 1**

**THE CAPE COLONY FROM 1779 TO 1865, WITH THE POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE BRITISH KAFFRARIA, 1847-1865.**

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23. Peires: *House of Phalo*, 165-169. For the precise location of British Kaffraria, see map 1.
This thesis commences when the Ngqika were still under the rule of the administration of British Kaffraria. Colonial expansion into the previously independent Ngqika chiefdom under Sandile was under way. Chapter 2 looks at the evolution of British Kaffrarian administration policy with specific reference to the Ngqika. In addition, the effects of significant events such as the war of Mlanjeni (1850-53) and the 1856-57 cattle killing which had a bearing on Ngqika social, economic and political life are also described in chapter 2 providing a context for the events examined in subsequent chapters.

The study of the Ngqika location offered here investigates the processes by which the region was subjected to colonial rule. Furthermore, it examines the area's transformation by White farming settlement and overlordship during the last four decades of Cape Colonial rule (1870-1910). Under the circumstances created by the 1877-78 war, the Ngqika location was replaced by the districts of Cathcart, Stutterheim and Komga (chapters 4 and 5). Although the study concentrates on transformation in late colonial Ngqika society from 1870 to 1910, it also analyses the development of Stutterheim as a magisterial district. As a local study, the thesis seeks to add to our understanding of the complications and experiences involved in the restructuring of social, political and economic relations in Stutterheim district. Although this is a study of a particular district with its own unique characteristics, the district is also examined against the background of broader Eastern Cape political economic and social issues. The thesis terminates in 1910 because of the significance of that year in South African colonial history: Cape colonial government was replaced by Union government and the Cape Colony was integrated into the Union of South Africa.

However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, changes and transformations in Eastern Cape rural production were already in progress. To a great extent, this was because of the mineral discoveries: diamonds in the late 1860s and gold in the 1880s. These developments activated a number of changes: at a political level, in labour relations and in agricultural production.24

24. There are a number of available examples for the study, these include W Beinart and C Bundy: Hidden struggles in rural South Africa, (Johannesburg 1987). W Beinart: The political economy of Pondoland 1850-930, (Johannesburg 1982), W Beinart: "Settler accumulation in East Griqualand from the demise of the Griqua to the Natives Land Act" in W Beinart, P Delius and S Trapido (eds): Putting a plough to the ground.
Four distinct forms of settlement, some which originated before the creation of the district was complete, will be analysed. These included firstly, mission settlements incorporating a number of Africans who had earlier clustered around the mission stations, particularly in the aftermath of the 1856-57 cattle killing. Later, as the area was subjected to direct colonial rule, exercised through the Stutterheim magisterial administration, a quitrent tenure system was introduced on the missions during the 1880s. Close attention will be paid to Presbyterian missionaries at Mgwali and the Berlin missionaries at Wartburg. Secondly, there was a mixture of African and White landowners (varying in scale of landownership), inhabitants of the crown reserve area that was formerly the Amathole stronghold of the Ngqika which was annexed by the colony during the 1850-53 war. After 1857, lands taken from the Ngqika who were shattered by the cattle killing were also reserved as crown lands but later settled by the German legion. Stutterheim village developed alongside the crown reserve settlement. The village also included African and White inhabitants. Part of the crown reserve, including Stutterheim village, was placed under magisterial authority in 1880 as the settlements of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge. Thirdly immigrant farming communities at Bolo, Quanti and St John came into existence under the 1879 Immigrant Act. Lastly, tenant communities were scattered around the district and various private properties.

It is crucial here to discuss the analytic framework within which the examination of the district settlements is located. The Stutterheim settlements developed under the guidance of the colonial administration. After 1880, resident magistrates and/or civil commissioners and their subordinate location inspectors wielded very extensive power over the indigenous social and political structure.


26 BBCC 1880, Reports by King William's Town civil commissioner 38, and Stutterheim civil commissioner, 32.
27. Act 33 of 1879.
By the late 1880s, Stutterheim was a colonial unit under the sovereignty of the British Empire which ensured law and order within its boundaries.

One of the basic features of colonialism has tended to be the transformation of the indigenous population into a working class. The availability of labour was a goal pursued by means of various measures in a colonial context. "Colonial powers tended to use [an] admixture of force, pressure via taxation, and high-powered persuasion to obtain the labour they needed within the boundaries of the colony". 28

Aside from brief sections in chapters 2, 3 and 7, this thesis offers neither a labour history of Stutterheim Africans nor of labour relations with dominant groups outside social and economic markets. Significant as these were, they could not be accommodated here. Unavailability of evidence on labour activity, 29 constraints on thesis length and the need to examine the internal and external dynamics of the colonial bureaucracy thoroughly, prescribed that this be largely a study of the evolution of a district.

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Historiography, Sources and Methodology

The history of Stutterheim has never been written in detail except for a recent collection of factual data about the village compiled from a White perspective 30 and Brink's recent examination of landownership in Kubusi village. 31 Brink's work is only an overview of the relationships between Kubusi landownership and legislation ranging from Kubusi's earliest period, 1864, to 1990. However, the study did not offer an explanation of the key issues of this thesis, and Kubusi landownership constitutes only a minor part of this study. Therefore since little is in print on the

29. Besides few tenants who worked either in surrounding farms or in forest plantations, out of 8,850 Africans in the district, only 688 were labouring outside by 1910, see UG17-1911 BBNA 1910, 362.
investigated period, extensive archival research was undertaken for this project. A large part of the source material was derived from the Cape Colony's official Blue Books and from unpublished manuscript sources. Most of the primary sources are in the Cape Archives Depot in Cape Town,32 but a number of manuscripts were in the South African Library in Cape Town and Cory Library at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. Amongst these, records of the Presbyterian missions at places like Mgwali, Lugilo and Henderson were useful. The old Bethel Mission house in Stutterheim holds some papers relevant to the early history of the Berlin missionaries in the area which were also useful. Newspapers such as the Cape Argus and Kaffrarian Watchman were used for the 1877-78 war period. Early twentieth century African social and political activities were researched in Imvo Zabantsundu and Izwi Labantu.

Analysis and major analogies have been drawn from the body of secondary literature on Eastern Cape regional history. However one learns little about the development of Stutterheim from these general works. Despite this drawback, there exists substantial literature pertaining to Ngqika history up to the late 1850s. Peires's House of Phalo is particularly useful for the early Ngqika history, and although his Dead will Arise does not cover the post cattle killing period it provides background information on the relationship between the Ngqika and the Cape Colony. Crais's Making of the Colonial Order probes this period in a rather different way. Being mainly concerned with identifying the making of South Africa's racial order, he draws very heavily on "postmodernist" work particularly that of Michel Foucault.33 Unfortunately, at times the essence of the argument is difficult to understand. Although the book provides framework for the colonial society, its description of the indigenous society is obscured by postmodernist jargon.34 In this study,

32. Useful sets of correspondence in the Cape Archive records were letters in the NA, AG and LND series between the Native Affairs Department, Attorney General, Surveyor General and the Civil Commissioner(s) of Stutterheim. Equally important for the British Kaffraria administration, were letters in the BK series, constituting the correspondence between the Ngqika Commissioner and the British Kaffrarian chief commissioner.


34. One of the underlying assumptions of postmodernism is the power of language. The tragedy here is that historical writing remains in the hands of academics who use abstract jargon to analyse the lives of the people on the ground.
Foucault's notion of space, bureaucracy and surveillance has also been used (chapter 5), but difficulties arose when trying to use these to analyse the indigenous structure.

Reviews of *The Making of Colonial Order* in the *South African Historical Journal* no 28 (May 1993), also provided useful literature for an analysis of the Cape Colony's administration policies. These provided a general context for the dynamics of the colonial government's African policy. Du Toit's 1954 "Native Policy" study was also useful, particularly on the British Kaffrarian African administration. Equally important was Williams's biography of Tiyo Soga, as it cast light on the pre-1877-78 war Ngqika settlement.

Regional studies of political and economic changes helped in the analysis of the evolution of the colonial Ngqika social structure. Lewis's work on economic changes in the Ciskei, Bouch's economic transformations study of Queenstown and Beinart's examination of settler accumulation in East Griqualand have indicated social tensions which arose when different communities clashed for primarily economic reasons.

Spicer's thesis "The war of Ngcayecibi" provides not only the course of the war but also the preliminary stages of the postwar settlement. Bundy's *Rise and Fall* is useful in analysing the collapse of the Ngqika economy during and after this war.

The post-1877-78 war settlement on the western side of the Kei is an underwritten aspect of the South African past. Here, there was little literature to draw upon, and pertaining to the

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38. Lewis: "Economic history". R Bouch: "The colonization of Queenstown (Eastern Cape) and its hinterland 1852-1886", (Ph.D thesis London University 1990); Beinart: "Settler accumulation".
restructuring of Stutterheim district, this work is grounded on primary material. However, several published sources exist on the early origins of urban segregation. Baines's and Kirk's works on Port Elizabeth, 40 Tankard's study of East London41 and Swanson's "Sanitation syndrome,"42 referring particularly to Ndabeni settlement in Cape Town, were all useful. Odendaal's study of African political mobilisation was also helpful.43

Although the process of rural change has been well researched by Bundy, Beinart and Lewis, unique circumstances pertaining to tenancy existed in Stutterheim. The Private Locations Act of 1899,44 which had a significant impact on tenancy, has been largely overlooked until now and on this particular aspect the thesis depends once again on primary sources.

It is regrettable that oral research was not conducted on a wider scale. It was only in the rural settlements of Stutterheim such as Mgwali, Wartburg, Upper Kubusi and on the surrounding farms of Bolo and Quanti that I was able to conduct interviews. It would have been useful to investigate how the people at Centane and Willowvale presently relate to those at Stutterheim and vice versa, and how Ngqika chieftainship solidarities have survived across the Kei, but as funds were not available for extended fieldwork, I restricted my focus to Stutterheim district. Oral evidence was gathered in formal and informal settings. In the former situation, interviews were pre-arranged and information was either written down or tape recorded. However, in the light of the current political climate, difficulties arose as some White farmers were suspicious about the questions asked. On many occasions questions such as "Are you not going to take our farms for Black people?" were asked. In an informal situation, general talks on aspects pertaining to the history of the district

44. Act 30 of 1899.
were informally started and sometimes would develop into a group discussion. Both techniques worked effectively, but in an informal setting there was obvious relaxation and on some occasions informal talk led to formal interviews. When I first talked about the war of Ngayecibi during the preliminary stages of this project, my father quickly intervened:

That story is well known here at MgwaIi, it has been with us for the past hundred years.45

I started to ask more questions. He mentioned Sprigg's name, then the removal of the Ngqika to Centane and Gatya (Willowvale). Fascinated, I then proceeded to ask other old residents of the community such as Mr Gija, Sam, Fetsha, Mrs Kalimashe, to name a few. From all of them I got more or less the same story.

The question I have been asking myself ever since I started this project stems from the feelings of old men and women who have been residents of settlements that were parts of the former Ngqika location such as Bolo, Lugilo, MgwaIi, Wartburg, Quanti and St John.46 These were/are some of the people who have probably been exposed to firsthand account narration of the event. The fact that this event is so established in their minds is indeed amazing. But, to my surprise, questions about the consequences of the war on the western side of the Kei were answered with hesitation. They could not relate the results of the war to the establishment of the three magisterial districts (Cathcart, Komga and Stutterheim), or the completion of the "white corridor" that stretched from East London to Queenstown. Nor could they associate changes in the rural settlement pattern with the outcome of the war.

The experience I have acquired makes me conclude that oral tradition is sharper where people were directly engaged in a particular event than when they are at the periphery of the events. As the late Mr Herman Gija, then the oldest man at MgwaIi village, told me, "Ameloh esizwe ajonge

45. Informal talk with Mr Wotshela (my Father), mid-1991.
46. A number of new settlements have developed in the area under the National Party government. I have only mentioned ones that were in existence under the colonial government.
KomKhulu" (The eyes of the nation are looking/focusing at the great place).\textsuperscript{47} I kept on asking myself why the old people can still remember this but had forgotten other aspects pertaining to the war. The trauma of the crushing of the Ngqika chiefdom (including the death of Sandile) and the removal of the main Ngqika population to the Transkei has become established in the Ngqika oral tradition to such an extent that it overwhelms the formulation of the postwar settlement because, although the latter involved the Ngqika, it was mainly an official programme.\textsuperscript{48} This is where Mr Gija's statement is valid.

Despite the fact that there is hesitation in talking about the postwar settlement, the voice of old Stutterheim rural residents cannot be dismissed. Although oral tradition (particularly pertaining to the nineteenth century) has its problems, written documents are not faultless. As orthodox Cape historical writing has until recently been dominated by settler perceptions that hinge on written white official sources, Xhosa oral tradition has been denied relevance. Although this is changing, oral evidence is still frequently ignored.\textsuperscript{48} This is not a call to replace written sources by oral evidence; rather it is a call for openness. Dismissal of oral sources may imply a number of misconceptions. I will mention at least two of these here. Firstly, it can imply that since some African communities' activities have not been documented, they have no history. Secondly, it can imply that the uneducated rural inhabitants have no idea of their history, and therefore we (historians) need to write it for them.

This is not the case. Knowledge and opinions are not only stored in written sources. Sometimes they are registered in people's minds. In addition to Mr Gija's statement, the older Stutterheim generation's remembrance of the Ngqika move to the Transkei might have been generated by the fact that they probably associated themselves with the Transkei Ngqika more strongly than their

\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Mr Herman Gija, Mgwali mission station, 10 October 1991.

\textsuperscript{48} I owe thanks to Nomathamsanqa Tisani of the Academic Development Programme of Rhodes University for her assistance in this analysis.

\textsuperscript{49} Sources that have relied on oral tradition include Peires: \textit{House of Phalo} and \textit{Dead Will Arise}; Stapleton: "Maqoma"; A Westaway: "The formulation of modern power configurations in the Ciskei district of Keiskammahoek, from c.1948 to the present", (M.A. thesis, Rhodes University 1993), also relies heavily on oral testimonies.
offspring did. The younger generation associate the development of the Stutterheim communities with the 1948 National Party rise to power. The study of the past has always been dismissed as either a waste of time or packed with lies but a systematic study of human behaviour in society necessitates analysis of social, economic and political action over a prolonged period. The present hinges on the past and the two cannot be divorced.

It is appropriate to clarify my stand concerning significant issues in historical writing such as fact, interpretation and accuracy. This study seeks to present a history of the district, but not in the sense that it tells the true and whole story of the period under investigation. Besides the fact that it has been limited to specific settlements and issues, it also cannot obtain full historical accuracy. Oral and written sources are impressionistic as they originate with people. Moreover, the writer's interpretations, opinions and sometimes emotions have influenced this writing. Thus it would be deceptive to suggest that this is a true history of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Stutterheim. Although use of evidence is one aspect of acceptable methodology in historical writing, objective use of historical facts is impossible. E H Carr is helpful here: "The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate."

Introduction of Chapters

Except for this chapter (chapter 1) and the conclusion (chapter 9), the chapter divisions of this thesis have been arranged according to specific related themes which have also been divided into three parts. The themes are arranged chronologically, but chapters vary from period to period.

There are nine chapters in three different parts. Part 1 consists of chapters 2 and 3. Here the main issues that will be dealt with relate to the Ngqika transfer from British Kaffrarian to Colonial

50. This perception dominates in the circles of Black education of which I am a product. In the circumstances, this is understandable, for under the National Party government, history has not only been used to justify apartheid, but also to legitimise white supremacy.

administration. The chapters analyse circumstances such as the arrival and the role of the missionaries, and the emergence of practised agriculture and local trade after the cattle killing. This section's chronology runs from the late 1850's to 1877.

Part 2 constitutes the crux of the thesis. It comprises chapters 4, 5 and 6. Here the study examines the breakup and resettlement of the Ngqika location following the 1877-78 war and the formulation of the postwar settlement. Strict measures of social control, mission cultural order and principles of individual landownership feature prominently in these chapters. This section covers the period c.1877-1890.

Part 3 consists of chapters 7 and 8. The crucial question here relates to the problems of local administration at the beginning of the twentieth century. Chapter 7 looks at the dislocations in rural landownership administration. Close attention has been paid to private landowners and mission quitrenters. Chapter 8 investigates the issue of urban segregation with specific reference to Stutterheim village and the surrounding settlement of Upper Kubusi, and political mobilization in the mission stations. The period dealt with here is c.1890-1910.

In chapter 9, the conclusion and a summary of findings are provided as well as a comment on South African historiography.
PART I

FROM BRITISH KAFFRARIA TO COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. EARLY MISSION SOCIO-ECONOMIC WORKS AND THE HUMILIATED CHIEFDOM
CHAPTER 2

TRADITIONALISM UNDER STRESS:
THE MANIFESTATION OF A NEW IDEOLOGICAL ORDER

Towards a new Ngqika location

Between the years 1845 and 1860, three major events effected significant changes in the lives of the majority of the Xhosa on the western side of the Kei. In 1847, Britain annexed the area between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers as the crown colony of British Kaffraria, and that marked the formal extension of the Cape's colonial jurisdiction over the various independent Xhosa chiefdoms such as the Ngqika, Ndlambe and Gquunukwebe. The creation of British Kaffraria was shortly followed by the war of Mlanjeni (1850-3); a war that affected the British Kaffrarian Xhosa to such an extent that it aroused sympathetic feelings from their compatriots across the Kei. In this war "the Xhosa knuckled down to fight the longest, hardest and ugliest war ever fought over one hundred years of bloodshed on the Cape Colony's eastern frontier" These two events were further exacerbated by the 1856-57 cattle killing which crushed not only the political power of the Xhosa, but their economic power as well.

Among these three events, the Mlanjeni war caused major relocations and resettlements of the area's African chiefdoms. Chiefs who had involved themselves in the war were deprived of their land or some portions of it, including the Ngqika. The new Cape governor, George Cathcart (1852-4) who replaced Harry Smith, instituted an uncompromising postwar settlement that was not unconnected with a ruthless intention to destroy the Xhosa economy during the war:

the burning of crops and dwellings had long been a part of frontier warfare. Throughout the period of Smith's command in 1851, the British had laid waste wherever they passed.

Not very much different from Smith's war aims, Cathcart's postwar settlement focused on completely expelling Sandile's Ngqika from the Amathole Mountains. However he later

2. Peires: Dead will arise, 20.
3. Peires: Dead will arise, 21.
reconsidered his decision and reversed the policy he had originally contemplated. On second thoughts, he granted the Ngqika a new location between the Amathole and the Kei river. The new location was bounded by King William's Town on the south and Queenstown on the north. The whole of the Amathole district was taken away from the Ngqika and declared a crown reserve "set aside for mixed Settler/Mfengu occupation".

The crown reserve was intended to serve as a buffer between the colony and the new Ngqika location. Attempts to re-enter the crown reserve were checked by erecting temporary military posts in the areas of Keiskammahoek and Middle-drift, as well as by the threat of court martial for any Xhosa entering the crown reserve. Additionally, chiefs of proven loyalty such as Kama of the Gqunukhwebe and Toyise of the Ndlambe were placed on the border lands of the crown reserve in the area down to the sea. Only village settlements under the control of a superintendent subordinate to the chief commissioner of Kaffraria were allowed in the reserve.

Cathcart favoured a system of self governing British Kaffrarian Xhosa, thus retaining the chiefs' judicial power. In turn the chiefs would be subjected to the general supervision of 'native commissioners' who would act as political agents in the administration of British Kaffraria. Thus British Kaffraria was transformed into a large African reserve internally ruled by African law while externally colonially administered. Du Toit maintains that "the Kaffrarian chiefs and people were still British subjects, but subject to very little interference with regard to internal rule from the chief commissioner and the two native commissioners, though their movements outside the particular locations were strictly supervised and controlled". By July 1853, Cathcart had detailed comprehensive suggestions for the future government of British Kaffraria. He suggested a civilian Lieutenant-Governor supported by a Colonel. Additionally, a Lieutenant-Governor of the eastern districts and a Solicitor-General from Grahamstown, would act as legal advisers to the British

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4. The new Ngqika location comprised most parts of the present districts of Cathcart, Stutterheim and Komga.
5. Peires: Dead will arise, 28.
6. Peires: Dead will arise, 28; Du Toit: "The Cape Frontier", 74-75.
Kaffrarian administration. Resulting from this administrative restructuring, John Maclean was appointed as Lieutenant-Governor of British Kaffraria in December 1853, enjoined to manage and control the Xhosa who formed the majority in the area.

Cathcart's policy of indirect rule never gained momentum. Sir George Grey who took office in 1854 (as Cathcart's successor) pursued a policy of direct rule of the British Kaffrarian Xhosa. The crux of his policy lay in undermining the chiefs' power in favour of commissioners and special magistrates. These officials would gradually take over whatever influence the chiefs had over the social and economic activities of commoners. Thus Grey aimed at reversing the policy of retaining the chiefs' influence which had been pursued by Cathcart. As Crais has pointed out, "Grey's policies centred on the institution of chiefship and on the homestead".

Implicit in Grey's policy of weakening the chiefs' power was the idea of a gradual transformation of African social life into that of 'Europeans'. The project of transformation was a complex one as it sought to stimulate the reconstruction of various modes of socio-economic behaviour in accordance with the newly designed social system. Emphasis on the establishment of schools, mission stations, industrial education and wage labour on public works became the hinges of Grey's project.

By employing [Africans] upon public works, which will tend to open up their country; by establishing institutions for the education of their children, and the relief of their sick, by introducing among them institutions of a civil character suited to the present condition; and by these and other like means to attempt gradually to win them to civilization and Christianity and thus change by degrees our present unconquered and apparently irreclaimable foes into friends who may have common interests with ourselves.

The newly created Ngqika location had no chance of escaping Grey's reconstruction. Cathcart's indirect rule might have been unsuccessful in gaining momentum in the area, but it offered a preliminary base for Grey's policies. The common denominator between these two Governors'
policies was their recognition of the chief commissioner and "Native" commissioners as in charge of the African population of British Kaffraria. However, their opinions about the region's type of settlement differed. They also differed about the level of the chiefs' and commissioners' administrative roles. Cathcart had already placed Charles Brownlee as a "Gaika commissioner" in 1853. It should be noted that Brownlee had been with Sandile before the war of Mlanjeni. In fact Brownlee had known Sandile since his childhood. Brownlee's extended relationship with Sandile and the Ngqika allowed him to understand the Ngqika traditional structure. Stationed within the vicinity of the Ngqika location, Brownlee was expected to be in direct communication with Maclean on Ngqika affairs. Maclean had been elevated to the status of chief commissioner by 1854. He was based in King William's Town which was the capital of the region.

Grey did not alter the abovementioned administration in the Ngqika location. Instead he sought to increase Brownlee's prominence while simultaneously striving to minimise Sandile's level of influence over the Ngqika. By 1855, Brownlee had already spotted one of Grey's needs in the location: African labour.

I have the honour to draw up for your information the following statement regarding Kafir labour. Kafir labour can be obtained to any extent in the Gaika District, the usual rate of payment being 24 pence per diem with food. In actual fact, this availability of labour in the area coincided with the district's inhabitants' new interest in adjusting to social reforms. Calls for the construction of water canals were heard in every corner of the location. Whether it was a coincidence with Grey's policies, or an attempt by local Africans to improve their cultivation practice, is difficult to assess. Even so, evidence seems to link these changes with Grey's policies. For the response to these new opportunities (new ways of obtaining a cash income for instance) was part of Grey's intentions. On the other hand,

13. Brownlee was stationed at Dohne, a small military settlement named after the region's first Berlin missionary Ludwig Dohne. When he was appointed Ngqika commissioner Brownlee stayed with Sandile in the vicinity of present-day Stutterheim for twenty years.
14. BK 69, Ngqika commissioner's correspondence 1853-1856.
15. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 3 July 1855.
16. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 14 July 1855, 18 July 1855.
this development should also be seen in the light of the influence of the missionaries who were already present in the area as early as the mid-1830s.17

Maclean had envisaged a policy of transforming the Ngqika location into a labour reserve. With Brownlee as a recruiting officer, that labour reserve would be useful for external demands. Up to the early months of 1856, Maclean’s objective had not yet materialised. Brownlee saw three reasons for that negative response. First there was the reluctance of local men to engage in long-distance labour for the same wage they could earn locally. Second was their lack of desire to remain at work for a lengthy period and lastly, preoccupation with their crops and harvest.18

Deducing from Brownlee’s statement, the economic capacity of the Ngqika location was still viable in the early months of 1856. This is not to suggest that the war of 1850-3 had had no effect on the Ngqika’s economic capacity, but it may be fairly argued that the Ngqika economy remained dependable until the 1856-57 cattle-killing. Lewis has indicated that wage labour to earn money to purchase grain, or a declining level of domestic consumption, was a phenomenon that emerged after the cattle-killing.19 By the 1860s a large section of the Ngqika community either depended on agricultural production for domestic consumption or on trading activity for the acquisition of money.20

Grey had already commenced his attempts to undermine Sandile’s authority by the first months of 1856. The programme included placing magisterial power in the hands of Brownlee for local disputes. This was followed by introducing a salary system for Sandile and his councillors.21 These measures did not necessarily mean that Sandile would lose his chieftainship to Brownlee

17. These were the Berlin Lutheran Missionaries, who by 1837 had founded Bethel mission station in the present Stutterheim vicinity.
18. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 19 February 1856. In this correspondence Brownlee responds to Maclean’s letter that directs Brownlee to use every effort to recruit road labour.
20. See pages 53-60 below.
21. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 1 January 1856 and 3 May 1856; C Brownlee: Reminiscences of Kaffir life and history, (Lovedale 1986), xvi.
as once happened under Sir Harry Smith. But the Ngqika chief was in the process of being gradually transformed into a colonial government agent. Grey hoped that eventually he would serve as a catalyst for the penetration of government policies into the location. Simultaneously, the Ngqika chief would bring to the government the loyalty of his followers.

The climax of Grey's policies came as a result of the 1856-7 cattle killing. This is not to suggest that Grey plotted the incident; there exists no empirical evidence for that. But since the cattle killing brought disaster to those who practised it, Grey turned this "tragedy to the political and economic profit of the Cape Colony".

The cattle killing is perceived to have been sparked by the epidemic of lungsickness (bovine pleuropneumonia) which annihilated cattle throughout the Cape Colony and Transkei between 1853-1857. But before the lungsickness, disillusions and disappointments resulting from material deprivations and territorial losses sustained by the majority of the Xhosa were evident. When the prophecies that promised renewal of material and ethics were made, a majority of the Xhosa widely welcomed what was to be their downfall.

Sandile's Ngqika may have been influenced by the prophecies, but lungsickness did not make inroads in his territory until August 1856. Simultaneously, the cattle killing began in the area. However the undecided Sandile did not authorize killing until 1857. Then he started killing his cattle openly, despite relentless opposition from Brownlee.

23. Peires: Dead will arise, 317.
24. Peires: Dead will arise, 317.
26. Peires: Dead will arise, 79.
27. Peires: Dead will arise, 167.
28. Peires: Dead will arise, 156.
Although Sandile's wavering stance might have delayed the Ngqika's full participation in the movement, the consequences were not less dire. The results were indeed horrific. As Peires has noted, the Xhosa population of British Kaffraria "dropped by two thirds between January and December of 1857, and then again by one third of the remainder to reach a low point by the end of 1858." The death toll was not the only factor. Movements in search for jobs either in the colony or on the public works of British Kaffraria gained momentum. It has been estimated that in the month of September 1857 alone, approximately 30 000 Africans sought passes to enter the colony. Though it is difficult to assess what the extent of mortality was, the large scale movement of the Ngqila from their location had profound effects for the people of British Kaffraria and the Eastern Cape at large. The colonial government strove to control the inflow and outflow of these numbers. On top of the Masters and Servants Act passed in 1857, the Kaffir Pass and Kaffir Employment Acts were passed in 1857. The last two tightened the control and authority of the employers over their workers. Moreover, they facilitated movement to the colonial farms and public works.

The large scale labour migration gave the colonial officials a misleading notion of the state of affairs in the various locations. Lewis suggests that "after the cattle killing the official opinion of the colonial state was that the former Ngqika, Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe locations were empty of population." Seizing this opportunity, the colonial government prepared the way for a massive white settlement in British Kaffraria.

Huge land loss was another measure of the cattle-killing's disaster. Peires points out that "more than 600 000 acres, not counting the land lost in the Crown reserve following the war of Mlanjeni" was lost after the cattle killing. The decrease in land quantity also affected the Ngqika location. Maqoma was convicted and transported to Robben Island for having allegedly believed

29. Peires: Dead will arise, 319.
31. Crais: The making of the colonial order, 212.
32. Lewis: "Economic history", 434.
33. Peires: Dead will arise, 319.
in the cattle killing. His lands were carved up, then filled with white settlements that were later connected with the districts of East London, King William's Town and Stutterheim.\textsuperscript{34} In these circumstances, Grey eventually set into motion what he had long been waiting for: the transformation of British Kaffraria from an exclusively African territory into a mixed African and white populated territory.\textsuperscript{35} Thus the policy of weakening the chiefs' power (which was already underway), accelerated by the results of the cattle killing, was to be fully reinforced by that of assimilation. Ngqika cultural and economic integrity was waning. Grey had started to penetrate it.

For a finer analysis of the evolution of Grey's policies in the Ngqika Location, it would be useful to examine very closely the different settlements evolved under his policies. Four distinct forms of settlement are worth mentioning: first, the mission settlements; secondly, the village of Stutterheim; thirdly, a sub-section of the crown reserve settlement at Upper Kubusi and Isidenge with African and white population; and lastly the Ngqika location under a humiliated chieftainship.

(i) \textbf{The Mission settlements}

The advance of the missionaries into Cape African society had commenced long before Grey set foot in the colony. However the religious and cultural penetration of indigenous social structures only fully blossomed after the cattle killing. For half a century, the missionaries struggled to make headway amongst the Cape Africans. With the chiefs still having extensive influence over their subjects and the integrity of indigenous Xhosa society still intact, the missionaries were repelled in various ways. These included non cooperation and militant resistance, inasmuch that in

\textsuperscript{34} Du Toit: "Cape Frontier" 109; Brownlee: \textit{Reminiscences}, 298. The writers do not state the exact amount of land taken from the Ngqika location. Du Toit however suggests that by 1857 the first batches of the German legion had arrived and as a result in 1859 about 300 farms averaging 1,500 acres were granted. Lewis: "Economic history", 434, states that 200 farms of 1,500 acres each were given out along the East London-King William's Town road.

\textsuperscript{35} Peires: \textit{Dead will arise}, 321.
successive "frontier" wars, a number of mission stations were destroyed.36

The first missionary group to move into the region now known as the district of Stutterheim was the Berlin Lutheran missionaries who in 1837 founded the Bethel mission station under pastor Ludwig Dohne.37 Although various Xhosa groups who were mainly the descendants of the Rharabe house were in occupation of the area, there is strong evidence that the vicinity in which the Lutherans were stationed was occupied by Gasela. He was the right hand son of Nukwa who was a son of Rharabe from a minor house.38 Gasela vied with Mhala, (Ndlambe’s son from a minor house), for the leadership of the Ndlambe in the 1830s. The feud resulted in Gasela moving to the vicinity of the present Stutterheim area.39

For the first twenty years, the Lutherans struggled to make progress in the area, but the results of the cattle killing made for a different experience. The missionary following was further enhanced by the arrival of the British German Legion in the area. As the legion included a considerable number of Lutherans, the strength of the Berliners was gradually restored.

While the Lutherans struggled to make headway in the region, the Scots Presbyterians underwent an opposite experience. Counting to their advantage was the time of their arrival. It was in the midst of the cattle killing that Sandile assigned a portion of land to the Scots Presbyterian missionaries in the centre of the Ngqika location along the Mgwali river.40 It is not clear how the state of settlement in the area looked then. Brownlee defined the area proposed for the mission

40. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 11 December 1856. The mission station was named after the river Mgwali.
station as containing a "large population". On the contrary, Rev Johnston, the new missionary at Mgwali later claimed the same area to have been completely depopulated:

at present, in consequence of depopulation, Emgwali has not a single inhabitant,- the solitariness of it conveyed very melancholy feelings to the mind,- but there is not the slightest doubt that when the Caffres shall have improved their means in those places whither they have fled from famile and death, they will return to this favourite spot.  

The abovementioned contrasting sources cannot be viewed independently from the complexity of the Eastern Cape in the aftermath of the cattle killing. As noted above, large scale movements in search of jobs and various conditions under which land was occupied in the late 1850s and the early 1860s, were part of this complexity. Williams indicates that in relation to Mgwali mission establishment, the missionaries profited from the massive disruption of the cattle killing which forced many starving Xhosa to seek relief at mission stations or white settlements such as King William's Town.  

To get to grips with Johnston's view of the area (as described by Williams), one would need to assess first the actual period to which he refers and second Johnstona's level of insight into the region's social settlement pattern. There is no hard evidence to answer these questions. It is fair to say that Johnston and Brownlee differed in their insight level of the region. Brownlee's understanding of the area was based on his regular visits to the location, continued throughout his career, and mostly on his close relationship with some members of the Ngqika community. He sometimes missed some of the hidden activities occurring in the location, but this could not have prevented him from noticing the changing state of population in the location. On the other hand, in comparison to Brownlee's vast experience, Johnston had just arrived in the area. However he observed the location nine months after Brownlee had filed his report. This was a long enough period for the clearing of the location to have taken place particularly during and after the cattle killing. There is a possibility that Johnston may have exaggerated. Xhosa oral tradition on the other

41. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean, 11 December 1856.
42. Statement of Reverend Johnston (February 1858), quoted in D Williams: The journal and selected writings of Reverend Tiyo Soga, (Cape Town 1983), 152.
43. Williams: Umfundis, 63.
hand suggests that it is unnatural for an area to be completely depopulated while its chief is in its vicinity. Sandile's great place at Gqolonci was approximately 8 miles from Mgwali. 44

Besides the Berlin missionaries and the Presbyterians, the Anglicans, Roman Catholics and the London Missionary Society also arrived in the area during the second half of the nineteenth century. However, these missionaries were not as effective as the Berliners and Presbyterians until the later stages of the century. The London missionaries started working with the crown reserve population during the 1860s forming Gladstone mission station. This station became active in Isidenge social and political affairs towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 45 The Roman Catholics became effective on the Stutterheim district Kei border during the 1880s. 46 Finally, from 1860 to 1877, Anglicans worked amongst the Ngqika on the banks of the Kubusi. From 1879, an immigrant settlement was placed around the mission. 47

The most distinguished mission work in the area was undertaken by the Presbyterian and Berlin missionaries. Favoured by the circumstances created by the cattle killing, the mission stations became centres for refugees. By 1865 there were approximately 870 Africans settled on these mission stations 48. The two denominations competed in extending the Christian enterprise beyond the stations' boundaries, having particular influence on Sandile, but the Presbyterians were more

44. Cory library, PR 4782. Folder 1 of 4 Chalmers and John Aitken papers 1863-65, United Presbyterian missionary records, (October 1863 and March 1865). My calculation of the distance between Sandile's great place at Gqolonci and Mgwali mission station is based on a rough estimation. Most old Xhosa I have spoken to suggest that wherever the chief was settled, there would be a considerable number of his subjects surrounding him.
45. CA. LND 1/504 Ref L 7867, Civil Commissioner of Stutterheim to the Surveyor General, 15 November 1893; see also pages 174-177 below.
47. LND 1/333 Ref L 3653, A Shaters of St John immigrant location to the Commissioner of crown lands, 29 December 1890.
48. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, 201. Cory library, PR 4782 Folder 1 of 4, Chalmers and John Aitken papers 1863-1865, United Presbyterian missionary records, (March 1 1865). These records confirm that there were about 550 Africans in the Presbyterian missions in the area.
successful in this regard. Their success rested primarily on their regular visits to Sandile's subjects and Tiyo Soga's ability to communicate in Xhosa.

Map 2.

49. Cory library, PR 4782, Folder 1 of 4 Chalmers and John Aitken papers 1863-1865, United Presbyterian missionary records, (October 1863).

50. Cory library, PR 4782, Folder 1 of 4 Chalmers and John Aitken papers 1863-65, United Presbyterian missionary records, (October 1863).
For various reasons, missionaries have been seen as part of white conquest. The underlying assumptions of this view hinge on the analogies between the missionary and government objectives. It is fair to say that there existed no clear distinction between the mission enterprise and western civilization since the two were closely linked in the Victorian way of thinking. Missionaries expected the Africans to renounce their "uncivilised" social practises (such as initiation and polygamy) and accept "civilised" standards (such as school, organised settlements and industrious habits), in order to be Christianised. As the cattle killing devastated the Xhosa social and economic structure, the momentum of Christianity was enhanced. The missionary task was expanded. "From being feeble and despondent Christianity in Kaffirland became aggressive and triumphant". The unfolding new stage was to be that of economic recovery and within this frame a vast field of work lay before the missionaries.

The writing that most closely connects the missionary activities to colonial conquest is Majeké's.

[The missionaries'] task would be to disarm the people morally and intellectually in order to ensure the continuance of white domination.

A close connection between the colonial government and the missionaries' aims and policies is obvious. It is interesting to note that the two institutions' objectives were two sides of the same coin. Order, accountability, obedience and diligence were sought by the government as well as by the missionaries, but it is simplistic to reduce this co-incidence of interests to a conspiracy of powers.

There is not enough space here to fully examine Majeké's thesis, but I propose to illuminate three loopholes that undermine her argument. Firstly, as it stands, her view implies that if there was no colonial government then the missionaries would have made no impact on African social lives. That is to say whatever the missionaries were doing, they did it solely for the benefit of the state. This perception does not only scorn the missionaries' ambition, but also suggests that the relationship

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52. Quoted in Bundy: Rise and Fall, 43.
53. N Majeké: The role of the missionaries in conquest (Cape Town 1952), 75-76.
54. There is detailed analysis of this in chapter 5.
between state and church was harmonious. The missionaries and the colonial government did not have an undisturbed harmonious relationship. There were disagreements.

Moreover, it is possible that the government and the church were in competition. The missionaries' insistence on education, church attendance, practised agriculture, organised settlements and in general the whole transformation of indigenous social activities can be explained as an attempt to create a converted class that would in turn increase the mission following. In some cases mission activity was extended beyond the stations. Williams points out that by 1866, Mgwali's mission activity was extended over a vast area stretching to 23 miles by 10 to 15 miles, with 30 kraals as preaching places and each place was visited at least once every three months.

The colonial government's interests (particularly under the governorship of Grey) were channelled similarly to those of missionaries. In other words, insistence on education, practised agriculture and organised settlements were methods employed; but the government's ultimate goal went far beyond achieving a following like the missionaries. Additionally it sought power and supremacy. By 1880, it had attained supremacy over the Ngqika location.

The second loophole in Majeke's work mainly stems from her tendency to generalise the different denominations' operations. The different missionaries were not a homogeneous group which behaved and operated uniformly. In Stutterheim, various mechanisms applied by the Berlin and Presbyterian missionaries eventually effected different changes on the indigenous structure. These mechanisms cannot be generalised.

55. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see especially the statements of Revs Soga and Kropf, 161-165, 201-204.
56. Williams: Umfundisi, 64; see also map 2.
57. Williams: Umfundisi, 64; Cory library, PR 4780 Folder 1 of 4 Chalmers papers, United Presbyterian Missionary records, January 1864. By 1865, Mgwali already had substations at Bolo and Lujilo and was by this period proposing another station in the northern part of the Ngqika location.
The last problem relates to period. The mission policies unfolding over an extended period were never consistent. The picture one gets from Majeke suggests that they were static. If the missionaries were ever "agents of the government"\(^{58}\), then at the turn of the nineteenth century they were the "poison of the government". In the late nineteenth century, many mission stations served as centres of African political mobilisation.\(^{59}\) If by the later stages of the nineteenth century, the colonial government and the mission camp were on opposing sides, then scholars will have to assess whether the term "agents of the government" was ever apt. Indeed, history is full of unforeseen consequences. Whether or not these later developments in the mission camp were unintended results, the relationship of the missionaries and the colonial government remains a complex question that necessitates careful treatment.

In Stutterheim, the late 1850s to 1876 were progressive years for the missionaries. They established schools and a number of outstations. External connections which aimed at promoting education were advanced. The schools that were started in the late 1850s were by 1865 attached to bigger institutions such as Lovedale and Genadendal.\(^{60}\) A considerable number of Africans by this period was capable of reading and writing; some were already trained as teachers and others subscribed to the newspapers such as Indaba [News]. Indaba was periodically published at Lovedale seminary.\(^{61}\) Mission influence was in accordance with Grey's policy of encouraging African education. Odendaal notes the increasing numbers of Africans enrolled at mission institutions such as Lovedale and Healdtown by this period. He adds; "the 1870s was the period when this group swelled to the extent that it became a clearly discernible stratum of Cape society and started to define its role in the colonial system".\(^{62}\)

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58. A terminology much employed by Majekj.
59. This is illustrated in the case of Mgwali and Gladstone mission stations in chapter 8.
60. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see statements of Kropf and Soga, 161-165, 201-204.
61. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see especially the statements of Brownlee, Soga and Kropf, 161-165, 201-204. Brownlee estimated those who could read and write at 200. Furthermore there were 35 of those who were involved in subscription to the newspaper, 3 African teachers at Mgwali and Kropf states 1 at Wartburg. D Williams: The Journal of Tiyo Soga, 50. For those who started school at Mgwali, Williams cites 100.
However the education policy developed further than Grey had anticipated. The combination of school and new ideas was the beginning of a new ideology that, when faced by colonial pressures, posed a threat to the government in the later years of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 83

Despite their success in spreading education, unlike other mission stations such as Burnhill and Pirie, which were in British Kaffraria (now in the districts of King William's Town and Keiskammahock), Stutterheim missionaries failed to effect changes in African communal tenure. 54 Even with Grey's vigorous villagization campaign in the background, missionaries like Soga, who saw communal tenure as a hindrance to the work of the missionaries, could not effect immediate changes to communal tenure. The British Kaffrarian government had already demarcated the boundaries of the two mission stations as early as 1859, giving Mgwali mission 500 acres and Wartburg mission station 400 acres. 65 This development strengthened missionaries' hopes of extending structured settlements even to Africans clustered around the stations, but the programme only materialized in the aftermath of the 1877-8 war, in which period the effectiveness of these particular stations was undermined by colonial administration. Thereafter, the colonial administration took direct control of the majority of mission Africans. 66 The missionaries' campaign to build a following was swallowed by colonial supremacy. The latter was prepared for a showdown to confirm its authority.

63. See pages 170-177 below.
64. CPP G116-'83, Reports on land matters in the division of King William's Town and Stutterheim, details that in these stations individual land tenure was introduced under the British Kaffrarian administration at the initiative of the missionaries, see especially, Melvill's report, 13-15; Peires: Dead will arise, 289-292, suggests that individual tenure was never implemented outside the crown reserve. Note that the other mentioned mission stations were within the boundaries of the reserve.
65. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean, 1 January 1860.
66. By the 1880s, the Location Act 40 of 1879 that led to the granting of individual lots and commonage rights was in effect.
(ii) **The village of Stutterheim**

As noted before, the cattle killing's detrimental effects assisted Grey's attack on the Xhosa community's cohesion. At last, the programme of settling British Kaffraria with a mixed African and white population was achievable. The dispersal of Xhosa and the transportation of some of their chiefs to Robben Island added to the severe losses already incurred in 1853. Pressing his advantage over the stricken chiefs, Grey utilised imperial funds to subsidise White immigration into the evacuated Kaffraria. The White immigrants would in turn "cast a beneficent civilizing aura over tribesmen in the propinquity to the settlers."

But the integrated system of settlement necessitated a guarantee of safety and security. Christopher points out that "in the European areas the first concern was the provision of a self-sufficient military force". Therefore, it came as no surprise that Grey's British Kaffraria white settlement plan offered first priority to the British German legion. The legion that was initially raised for the Crimean War in Europe was led by Major-General von Stutterheim (the village under investigation was named after him). It originally consisted of 8000 men, but eventually 2,362 sailed for the Cape.

In his hopes of creating one of the most successful military settlement schemes in Kaffraria, Grey safeguarded the legion's living and building allowances with regular payments. But there was a variance of benefits in terms of land grants and wages between commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

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67. Du Toit: "Cape Frontier", 109; Peires: *Dead will arise*, 324.
68. Du Toit: "Cape Frontier", 88-110; Peires: *Dead will arise*, 324.
70. A Christopher: *The crown lands of British South Africa 1853-1914*, (Kingston 1984), 34.
72. Schwarz and Pape: *Germans in Kaffraria*, 12.
73. Christopher: *Crown lands*, 35.
Each soldier was to receive a building lot in town and a garden lot of one acre. Later a four-acre lot was added, together with access to grazing lands on the settlement’s commonages. Officers were to receive remission on the purchase of land ranging from £300 for field officers to £150 for subalterns. The price of land was fixed at £1 per acre. All were to be subject to military tenure for seven years, during which time military discipline was to be maintained and no final grants issued. 74

By tying them to land, Grey hoped to make the legionaries permanent citizens of Kaffraria while their source of living would be supported by steady incomes. As a result, as soon as they anchored at East London in February 1857, they were divided into regiments that were moved into the British Kaffrarian interior. Less than two years after the cattle killing, the lands evacuated by the transported chiefs and the shattered Xhosa fell into the hands of the legionaries. Lands of chiefs such as Phatho, Maqoma and Mhala became German villages such as Wooldridge, Hamburg, Breidbach, Hanover, Berlin, Potsdam, Wiesbaden and Marienthal 75 which are still visible in the twentieth century Eastern Cape community.

It was one of these regiments that was to give birth to the village of Stutterheim and its surrounding villages. The third regiment of the legion had its headquarters in the vicinity of present day Stutterheim. 76 Its detachments were placed at Greytown, (a small settlement approximately 10 miles from Stutterheim), Braunschweig (presently in King William’s Town district) and thirdly at Keiskammahoek. 77 Attached to the village of Stutterheim, a smaller settlement known as Ohlsen came into existence. 78 This was where persons from the overflowing Stutterheim resided. 79 The number of the legionaries in Stutterheim and surrounding areas totalled 600. 80 109,550 acres was granted as an area of settlement for twelve German villages, 81 and amongst these, Stutterheim village received 30,210 acres. This was the largest grant of all the legion

74. Christopher: Crown lands, 35.
75. Schwar and Pape: Germans in Kaffraria, 17.
76. Schwar and Pape: Germans in Kaffraria, 17.
77. Schwar and Pape: Germans in Kaffraria, 17.
78. This was named after a member of the Legion.
79. G Steinbart: The letters and the journal of Gustav Steinbart, German military colonist to British Kaffraria, Cape Province, South Africa, (Port Elizabeth 1975), 4-87.
settlements. The area was designed to hold 292 1-acre lots, 301 4-acre lots and an additional 73 larger lots.82

The legion settlement greatly increased the white population of British Kaffraria. Furthermore, it inevitably forced a revision of the British Kaffrarian administration system. A firm land administration policy was embarked on when a deeds registry office was established in King William's Town. Additionally, the colonial field cornetcy system was introduced in British Kaffraria.83 This development led to the division of White occupied areas into wards and commissions.84 Stutterheim village was divided into two wards, with each ward having its field cornetcy.85

Thus British Kaffraria which had been exclusively an African territory settled under various chiefdoms was gradually transformed into a Cape colonial region with a sophisticated administration system. The new mechanism sought to oversee the legion's interests while simultaneously checking the Xhosa.

The popularity of the Germans in the area was not only undermined by their settlement on expropriated Xhosa lands, but also by the legion's character. Evidence reveals very strong African distaste of the legionaries' social activities.86 As Peires has pointed out, "the disbanded German Legion who arrived in Kaffraria ... were not exactly the sort of immigrants calculated to spread European civilization among the Xhosa".87 Steinbart, one of the legionaries settled in Ohlsen, confirmed some of the incidents:

the good reputation of our forces which most of us strive to maintain, sometimes suffers severe setbacks because of the attitudes of some few. These are rebellious and unruly characters who long for change and variety, who because they are accustomed to the military profession are driven to most dreadful deeds by these bellicose spirits of bloodthirsty appetites... Unfortunately, within all German

82. Christopher: Crown lands, 36.
86. Steinbart: Letters of Steinbart, 9-139.
87. Peires: Dead will arise, 287.
settlements, we have had several cases where unarmed kaffirs have been cruelly murdered by these evildoers and even some of their own comrades breathed the last of their vigorous lives at their hands.\textsuperscript{88}

Evidently, only a subsection of the Legion was implicated in the abovementioned behaviour, but the sizeable minority that was engaged in these disgusting activities, injured the reputation of the legion at large and also of Grey who had brought them to British Kaffraria.

It was however not only the legion's misbehaviour that condemned their settlement. Grey was not capable of managing the financial affairs that would have ensured their long-term comfortable stay and thus imperial funding was at stake.\textsuperscript{89} The situation was aggravated by a complete failure of the Stutterheim legion to utilise its land for farming. This unexpected development shattered Grey's illusions of transforming militarists into successful farmers. Pastor Fehsenfeld, the Lutheran minister who was stationed at Stutterheim during this period, commented:

\begin{quote}
the soldiers were not mentally and spiritually equipped to become farmers. To my knowledge there was not even a single officer of the legion who succeeded in becoming a farmer. The same may be said of the soldiers, only a few had grown up in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Not surprisingly, when volunteers were called for for the Indian mutiny in September 1858,\textsuperscript{91} Grey shipped off as many legionaries as he could. Amongst these were half of those who had been allotted to Stutterheim.\textsuperscript{92} To Grey's disappointment only 128 of the 301 larger 4-acre military lots remained occupied in Stutterheim.\textsuperscript{93} Some of the ungranted lots were used to settle later immigrants in the 1880s; others were sold by public auction.\textsuperscript{94} The legionaries who remained settled in Stutterheim became the backbone of that particular village.

\textsuperscript{88.} Steinbart: \textit{Letters of Steinbart}, 89.
\textsuperscript{89.} Peires: \textit{Dead will arise}, 324.
\textsuperscript{91.} Fehsenfeld: "History of German legion", 14.
\textsuperscript{92.} Fehsenfeld: "History of German Legion", 14.
\textsuperscript{93.} Christopher: \textit{Crown lands}, 36.
\textsuperscript{94.} Fehsenfeld: "History of German legion", 14.
In 1865, the Cape Colonial government set aside the commonage for the use of the lotholders, while it reserved the right to utilise the commonage as it wished. The village did not obtain its municipal and magisterial status until the aftermath of the 1877-78 war, when it became the headquarters of the newly created district of Stutterheim.

(iii) The crown reserve settlement of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge

The settlement pattern of the crown reserve was unique, for from the outset a village system was encouraged. As this area was held as crown property, lots were to be granted for buildings with accompanying garden lots and small agricultural farms were to be on lease. Leases were reserved for tenants who were residents of dwellings on lots in the village. Additionally, the farm proprietors had free utilisation of the commonage.

This was a settlement regulation that was devised by Cathcart. But it did not materialise until Grey took control of British Kaffraria. The reserve was intended for military occupation. Maclean strove hard but in vain to convince the Governor to give out larger grants of land for settlers. Cathcart would not entertain the idea of isolated farmers living on land that still attracted the interests of the Ngqika (who were the original occupants of the area). For him, military occupation was the key to the security and safety of the reserve.

I must remind you that military control, not colonisation, is the principle of policy which has induced me to advise the retention of Kaffraria as a separate government therefore the greediness of land speculators must be resisted.

However, Cathcart’s defensive military settlement was shortlived. Grey, who replaced him, pursued a villagization programme. This scheme was to be started in the crown reserve and later extended to the rest of the British Kaffraria. As the reserve was initially "set aside for a mixed

95. LND 1/481 Ref L 7251, Grant of Stutterheim commonage to the municipality 18 July 1893.
100. Crais: Making of colonial order, 200.
Mfengu/settler occupation\(^{101}\), Grey revised the British Kaffraria land regulations in 1858 giving purchasing rights to other African groups. The purchase rate was fixed at £1 per acre.\(^{102}\) To a large extent, the programme aimed to persuade Africans to have respect for and interest in private property and benefits and property protection were guaranteed with the purchase of larger amounts of land.

Purchasers of 40 acres would be allowed to lease another forty for 5 years at 1s 6p. per acre per annum. No alienation of his grant could take place without consent of the Chief commissioner, nor would other persons except the family of the grantee be permitted to reside on the ground.\(^{103}\)

The eagerness of the Africans to have access to land is shown by the rate of purchasing and leasing. Du Toit estimates that by the end of 1858, 184 Africans had purchased 3,081 acres and 22 had leased about 880 acres.\(^{104}\)

There is no hard evidence to illuminate the identities of those engaged in purchasing and leasing during this period. It would be hazardous to ascribe this activity to a specific racial or ethnic group. The complexity that arose in the aftermath of the cattle killing, now coupled with the newly applied non-racial land regulations, minimised the chances of survival of homogeneous communities in the crown reserve. Particularly for this region (which was set apart from the outset for a mixed population), it would be inappropriate to suggest the existence of a rigid ethnic and racial group. Information about settlement patterns in the subsequent years confirms the existence of mixed African and White inhabitants in the area.\(^{105}\)

Grey's 1858 land regulations were later reinforced by Act 2 of 1860.\(^{106}\) The Act was aimed at encouraging the leasing of crown reserve land. A variety of Acts that determined the leasing and purchasing of crown land in the reserve followed the 1860 Act. Among these was Act 19 of 1864 which resulted in leases.

105. See land papers in relation to Stutterheim from late 1870s to 1900.
106. See *Cape of Good Hope Statutes*, Act 2 of 1860 that empowered the disposal of crown lands in the Cape Colony.
But the colonial government which took over the administration of the British Kaffraria in 1865, encouraged purchasing rather than leasing. Leasing was to be allowed only for a specific period extending from 5 to 21 years and it applied to large agricultural lots ranging from 25 to 100 acres that were situated along the Kubusi river. With more emphasis on purchasing, Act 5 of 1870 and Act 14 of 1878 followed Act 19 of 1864 to control the transition from leasing to purchasing.

Up to 1878, 62 individual title holders held land under the abovementioned Acts in Isidenge. Additionally, there were six lessees. At Upper Kubusi, there were about 96 title holders. The complexity of land holding under these Acts in the crown reserve was revealed in the closing stages of the nineteenth century. Landowners and other residents clashed with the local administration on specific issues like Location Acts and tenancy problems. However despite these later problems, the Upper Kubusi and Isidenge settlements became the model of Grey's ideal of individual tenure with mixed African and White settlement. When these two settlements were included in the newly created district of Stutterheim in 1879, they were already based on individual landownership. During the 1880s, the colonial government introduced a similar policy in the rest of the African locations in the district.

107. LND vol. 1/481 Ref L 7251, Memorandum on Isidenge Allotments, July 1894.
108. Act 5 of 1870 gave rights to the lessees (under Act 19 of 1864) to purchase the property they had leased.
109. Act 14 of 1878 served to regulate the manner in which all unoccupied lands were to be disposed of on a perpetual quitrent for the highest annual rent that could be obtained on a public auction.
110. LND vol. 1/481 Ref 7251, Memorandum on Isidenge allotments, July 1894.
112. See pages 151-154 below.
113. See pages 105-112 below.
(iv) The Nggika location under a humiliated chieftainship

The creation of British Kaffraria in 1847 paved the way for the extension of the colonial legal machine outside the colonial boundaries. It also marked the minimization of the Xhosa chiefs' power. This was particularly true for those on the western side of the Kei. The new Nggika location that was created in the aftermath of the 1850-3 war was handicapped from infancy. First (and for most of its existence), it struggled to transform from a traditional patrimonial system of authority to a threatening colonial bureaucratic principle. Traditional chiefs like Sandile, who was paramount on the western side of the Kei, and his brother Anta were increasingly becoming overshadowed by the chief commissioner Maclean and the Nggika commissioner Brownlee.

Under the British Kaffrarian administration, especially during the governorship of Grey, the close connections between political, economic and ideological factors were psychologically apprehended, and every measure was taken to encourage a taste for a European lifestyle. The catastrophe of the cattle killing allowed the entrance of Grey's policies which gained leverage as early as 1857. The policies served as a barrier to any attempt the traditionalists like Sandile made to cling to what remained of the past precolonial way of life.114 While authority was gradually shifting away from Sandile, Brownlee was becoming persona grata with the Nggika.115 Traditional legal systems were overtaken by the judicial system of British Kaffraria. Thus Brownlee was hearing every criminal and civil case processed in the location.116

It was the network of political, economic and social activities that came in the aftermath of the cattle killing that eroded Nggika chieftaincy. New ways of social and economic life emerged as a result of hunger, starvation and land losses linked to Grey's policies. As a result, the majority of

114. Peires: Dead will arise, 321.
115. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 commission on native affairs, see especially the statement of Rev. Soga, 154-155.
116. BK papers, especially BK 70-73, confirm the activity of Brownlee in civil and criminal cases of the location.
the Xhosa deeply felt the cattle killing as they were increasingly transformed into a large working class. Crais points out that "colonists revelled, if in some cases only silently, in the destitution of the people who had little recourse but to accept work under a new master"\textsuperscript{117}. Those who managed to evade migratory labour became entangled in new socio-economic pressures at home, and as a result were forced to embark on practised agriculture,\textsuperscript{118} while their offspring were swallowed up in mission schools.\textsuperscript{119}

As the prominence of the Ngqika commissioner grew, the mission and school enterprise became enormous. These became the nucleus of new social groupings of Africans who detached themselves from traditional society and adapted to "western civilization". Thus traditional places which were primarily social centres gradually diminished as they were replaced by the evolving system.

The fragility of Ngqika unity became visible during the cattle killing. The rift between the believers and unbelievers\textsuperscript{120} dominated during this period. It set back any hope of homogeneity within the Ngqika community and facilitated the attack of British Kaffraria on the disunited chieftainship. When these defects were combined with Grey's administration policies, they were pushed to the extreme. Hence stratification within and among the Ngqika was escalated.

The system of individual tenure was one of Grey's crucial projects, but in all his career it was only achieved in the crown reserve.\textsuperscript{121} The scheme of settling a mixed African and White population in the area relied heavily on the availability of land which Grey got from the Xhosa shattered by the cattle killing. Although individual tenure inside the Ngqika location was only achieved in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Crais: \textit{Making of colonial order}, 212.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} See pages 45-60 below.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} CPP (Unnumbered) \textit{1865 commission on native affairs}, in this commission it is noted by Brownlee, Kropf and Soga that by that year there were over 850 Africans already settled on the mission stations, 11-20, 161-165, 201-204.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} For a better clarification of these terms see Peires: \textit{Dead will arise}, 174-181. These were terms used to define those who believed and those who did not believe in the cattle killing.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Du Toit: "Cape Frontier", 281-282.
\end{itemize}
aftermath of the 1877-78 war, Grey had moved the Ngqika into villages (without individual tenure) in 1858.

Magistrates were ordered to select sites suitable for villages up to 200 huts, and move the people into [villages] as soon as their crops were gathered. All their stock were to be registered and taxed and they were to pay hut tax of 10s per family.\footnote{Peires: Dead will arise, 291.}

Division of the Ngqika location into villages upset the earlier pattern of scattered settlement. The villages were constructed on new ground. It broke down the lineage pattern that had been arranged by means of kinship relationships. As the villagisation programme relied heavily on the reorganisation of space, the pre-village lineage settlement pattern was likely to be affected.

But the villagization system was never completed. Besides the replacement of Grey by Philip Wodehouse in 1862, most of the Xhosa, who were gradually recovering by the 1860s, were returning to their old locations. The Ngqika location's population had increased by a third by 1864.\footnote{C Holden : The past and the future of the Kaffir races, (London 1866), 161.} An analysis of census returns for the period 1857-1865 illuminates great variations in the density of population in the various parts of British Kaffraria. Du Toit has assessed that the population in the Ngqika location, including the lands of Maqoma and Xhoxo (the latter was also one of the sentenced Ngqika chiefs), changed from 11.0 per square mile in 1858 to 31 per square mile in 1864.\footnote{Du Toit: "Cape Frontier", 279.} This high population density counted against the village system. By 1874, most of the Ngqika still lived in scattered homesteads.

However, the infiltration of bureaucratic administration became obvious. Besides the fact that Sandile remained overshadowed by Brownlee, hut tax collection was intensified in the 1860s. The burden of hut tax was aggravated by the drought of the 1860s. The British Kaffraria papers reveal that the two were a slow-moving erosive force on the economy of the Ngqika after the cattle killing.\footnote{BK 73, The correspondence of Brownlee in the years 1863-65, reveals how hard it was to get hut tax from the Ngqika. See especially letter no 21 Brownlee to Brownlou 16 December 1864 and also BK 70, Brownlee to Mills, 26 September 1865.} As chieftainship lost political prominence, socio-economic change increased.
But within the Kaffrarian administration, the cracks that eventually undermined its credibility had already developed. Notably there was incompetency and maladministration of funds. The hut tax that was painfully extracted from the Ngqika and their neighbours was misused in several cases. Brownlee confessed that, during his absences, his clerk was repeatedly engaged in illegal tax collections that were in turn inappropriately used.\textsuperscript{126} The mishandling of funds could also be traced to prominent administrators of British Kaffraria such as Maclean and Grey. Peires has detailed how Grey "spent Imperial money with careless abandon",\textsuperscript{127} particularly on his project of settling the German legion in British Kaffraria.


Conclusion: From British Kaffrarian to Colonial Administration

When Grey left the colony in 1861, the British Kaffrarian chiefs had ceased to be influential, and thus his successor Wodehouse was left with the task of retaining the overlordship that had been extended to the Kei river. But Wodehouse sought to maintain this supremacy by complete domination. His scheme aimed at seizing the Ngqika lands and sending the occupants across the Kei river to the area between the Kei and the Mbashe rivers.\textsuperscript{128} Initially, Wodehouse had attempted to establish White settlement in Gcalekaland by 1863, but when his proposal was rejected by the colonial office, and colonial boundaries strictly set at the Kei, the removal of the Ngqika became a necessity.\textsuperscript{129} After the colony had been cleared of the Ngqika, Ngqika lands would be occupied by white farmers and groups of proven loyalty would remain swallowed in the colonial gizzard. Once British Kaffraria was annexed to the colony, surviving Xhosa chiefdoms such as the Gcaleka and Ngqika would be outside colonial boundaries.

This is not to suggest that the Ngqika were the main threat to the colony. Wodehouse also foresaw a threat coming from the Gcaleka under Sarhili, who sought to regain the territory suggested for the settlement of the Ngqika which the Gcaleka had lost after the cattle killing. For Wodehouse,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} BK 73, Brownlee to Brownlou 16 December 1864, 28 January 1864.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Peires: Dead will arise, 324.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} BK 73, Brownlee to Brownlou 11 March 1865.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} C. Saunders: The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories, Archives Year Book 1976, (Pretoria 1978), 13.
\end{itemize}
if the Gcaleka could be settled east of the territory between the Mbashe and Mthatha, sealed in by the Ngqika, who would be in the southern part of the area between the Kei and Mbashe and also by the Queenstown Thembu, who would be north of the Ngqika, then the colony's security would be guaranteed.\textsuperscript{130} Brownlee had proposed the move to the Ngqika by 1864. Although the Ngqika were not aware of Wodehouse's settlement plans nor of the annexation of British Kaffraria to the colony, they flatly refused Wodehouse's proposal, pointing out the inferiority of the land and the antagonism that might arise with Sarhili.\textsuperscript{131}

The squashing of the removal plan led the Ngqika to believe that they could stand up to colonial authority, although this was only a diplomatic victory. These high spirits were further enhanced by the disbanding of the British Kaffrarian administration following the annexation of the territory. The development marked the loosening of bureaucratic restraints on the chieftainship.

The colonial administration of the territory was weak. By 1867 the influential Brownlee had been removed, and his place was filled by Thomas Liefeldt, who was installed as clerk in charge of the government office in the Ngqika location. The prominence of Sandile was restored as Liefeldt could exercise no effective control over him.\textsuperscript{132} The years up to 1876 were to be the great years of Sandile. He regained what he had earlier lost to Brownlee, but finally lost it all when he entangled himself with the colony in the 1877-8 war.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Saunders: "Annexation", 14
\textsuperscript{131} BK 73, Brownlee to Brownlou, 11 March 1865 and 14 March 1865.
\textsuperscript{132} See pages 66-67 below.
\textsuperscript{133} See pages 70-73 below.
THE CROWN RESERVE SETTLEMENTS OF
UPPER KUBUSI AND ISIDENGE,
VILLAGE OF STUTTERHEIM AND
NGOIIKA LOCATION WITH MGWALI
AND WARTBURG MISSION STATIONS
BEFORE THE WAR OF 1877–78

Map 3.
CHAPTER 3

THE PERIOD OF RESURGENCE: NEW ECONOMIC FORCES: PRACTISED AGRICULTURE, LOCAL TRADE AND COMMERCE c1862-1876

The development of agriculture and its contribution to the economic capacity of the Eastern Cape African community remains a complex matter. Beyond doubt, the class of later nineteenth century African rural cultivators presents writers with problems. These are further aggravated by the fact that we are attempting to investigate rural groups the meaning of whose social and economic behaviour remains obscure. The different schools of interpretation within South African historiography have associated peasant cultivators with the development of agriculture. The transition of a majority of the rural African population from their "pre-colonial existence as pastoralists-cultivators to their contemporary status... of sub-subsistence rural dwellers, manifestly unable to support themselves by agriculture" seems to dominate this line of thinking.

The Oxford History of South Africa [OHSA] was actually the pioneer of the modern in-depth study of African rural cultivators. Monica Wilson, one of the most prominent contributors to the OHSA, connected the rise of African agriculture to the role of the missions.

Peasant communities began around mission stations, but as churches, schools, and trading stations were established, and external political control was enforced throughout what had been independent chiefdoms, the peasant communities spread.2

As has been indicated in chapter 2 the individual roles of mission and colonial expansion are very difficult to separate. The crucial question raised by Wilson is how important were these two institutions in the development of a class of rural peasants. Trapido questions Wilson's separate treatment of non-mission cultivators. He maintains that exclusive concentration on mission inhabitants can result in a perception that they were the sole constituents of the African agriculturist class, with the possible result that non-mission peasant cultivators who still retained

their traditional settlement pattern might have been overlooked: "It would seem that without missionaries there would be no peasants".3

The major obstacle to answering Trapido's question is the availability of sources. It remains a complex matter to map out agricultural activities of pre-colonial communities because of lack of evidence. Usable sources of evidence on African cultivators that mostly appeared in the middle and the later part of the nineteenth century, were confined to mission and government reports. One is unlikely to obtain complete accuracy in spite of the assistance of all these sources but an approximate picture of rural agricultural activity can be acquired.

Contemporary writing about the history of peasant cultivators in the Eastern Cape is closely associated with Bundy.4 Investigating the different responses by rural inhabitants to the changing nature of the South African economy as a result of colonial transformation, Bundy seeks to explain why an initially self-reliant African socio-economic community had, by the beginning of the twentieth century degenerated to such a degree that a majority of its inhabitants were dependent for survival upon wages earned in White work centres.5 He attempts to resolve this question by analysing the relationship between rural African cultivators and dominant political and economic groups. In his conclusion, he maintains that relations between the African agriculturalists and holders of economic and political power outside the rural cultivator's social stratum offer the explanatory key to the transition of rural Africans from farmer pastoralists to a reservoir of cheap, rightless and largely migrant workers.

Roger Southall's writings parallel Bundy's analysis.

5. Bundy: "Emergence and Decline", 369-388; Rise and Fall, 29-247.
The structures of a forced labour, combined with alienation by whites of the vast portion of land, successfully inhibited and eroded the potentialities of peasant production and subjected the vast majority of the African population to a process of impoverishment which necessitated the sale of their labour power to the free market.  

The cattle killing (1856-7), coupled with the establishment of an administrative control which undermined the power of the chiefs, disorganised the socio-economic coherence of African community in British Kaffraria. By the 1860s a substantial number of British Kaffarian Africans had been introduced to migrant labour. This was practised either in the Cape Colony or in British Kaffraria. Those who managed to escape migratory labour had to undergo new experiences in order to survive. Peires has remarked that after the cattle killing movement was over, the thoughts of unbelievers "turned to innovation and economic improvement". These were the people who were the forerunners of the agricultural revolution that emerged in the 1860s and progressed up to the 1870s.

However the incentives to establish economic capacity based on practised agriculture were discouraged by governor Grey. Grey's preoccupation after the cattle killing was with the creation and extension of the village system of settlement in the whole of British Kaffraria. But he had difficulty in obtaining acceptance of the system by Anta, brother of Sandile who occupied the northern portion of the Ngqika location, now the district of Cathcart. Peires points out that Anta was temporarily able to resist Grey's scheme as his chiefdom had been less affected by the cattle killing than others. As a result, a number of refugees had sought shelter in his locality. Anta's chiefdom was better stocked, better populated and in every way better equipped to return to normality than any chiefdom in Xhosaland.

7. Peires: Dead will arise, 289.
8. See pages 40-41 above.
9. Peires: Dead will arise, 293.
10. Peires: Dead will arise, 293.
Though economically strong, Anta’s strength was not enough to shield him permanently from a determined Grey. The latter’s persistent pressure finally broke Anta down. Eventually, he surrendered to Grey’s village scheme. As sources on social and economic activity within Anta’s chiefdom during this period are lacking, the chances of illuminating his chiefdom’s adaptations to social, political and economic changes in the post cattle killing period are slim. Peires states that the majority of unbelievers who sought refuge in Anta’s chiefdom also entered a period of economic decline in the post cattle killing period.11 Forced by the village system of settlement to start working up new and infertile ground, they were launched into destitution, as the sowing seasons immediately after the cattle killing were disastrous. They eventually suffered the same fate as the believers, forced to join the labourers on public works in the Colony.12

Lewis has offered a contradictory assessment of the accumulation of stock and property amongst different African chiefdoms of British Kaffraria. Tabling detailed figures, Lewis disagrees that Anta’s chiefdom was better stocked and better populated than any other chiefdom in Xhosaland after the cattle killing. In his comparisons of Anta’s number of cattle, sheep, wagons and ploughs with other chiefdoms, an average of 3 chiefdoms were above him in capacity on all the four mentioned commodities.13 However, Lewis suggests that much of the stock present in the Ciskeian district by 1864, belonged to "very large flock owners who had established themselves initially on the colonial farms and then reintroduced themselves to pride of place in the Ngqika locations".14 If one takes Lewis’s analysis as it is, a deduction that by the early 1860s a considerable number of British Kaffrarian Africans did not have access to stock, may arise. And hence the suggestion that the majority had no option other than labour on public works in order to survive may be reinforced.

But Lewis’s assessment should not be generalised. In the report of the Commission on Native Affairs held in 1865, productive activities of rural cultivators in the Ngqika district in the early

11. Peires: Dead will arise, 293-294.
12. Peires: Dead will arise, 294.
13. Lewis: "Economic history", 447. Also see table 1 below.
1860s are revealed. The Commission indicated that stratification existed in the levels of economic production within the different settlements that had evolved in the region by this period.\(^{15}\) The production force in the mission settlements was in the forefront in the pre-1865 period. Testifying to the Commission, Reverend Tiyo Soga revealed that a considerable number of Mgwali mission inhabitants were heavily engaged in cultivation, principally producing and selling crops such as wheat, mealies, barley, beans and oats.\(^{16}\) Besides these crops they owned and bred stock such as sheep, cattle and goats, sheep being utilised for wool production.\(^{17}\) The same practices occurred on Berlin mission stations.\(^{18}\) On the latter stations, some Africans were even engaged in buying land from the German legionaries whose settlement was being disbanded.\(^{19}\)

The Commission report further indicates the expansion of economic activity as exchange of commodities had already commenced amongst mission inhabitants. Their interests were not confined to crop and stock production, but also included a demand for imported goods such as clothes, sugar, tea and coffee.\(^{20}\) As the exchange of commodities rose, a number of trading stores were set up in the mission settlements. These employed some inhabitants and thus further stimulated the cash nexus that was already developing in British Kaffraria.\(^{21}\) As economic growth gained momentum in the area, a market developed at Dohne. The trading activity was mainly restricted to Dohne and Stutterheim villagers, crown reserve residents and the mission population.\(^{22}\) The Commission failed to furnish statistical evidence of commodities sold and bought at this market during the period in question, but it did confirm the active participation of mission Africans in trading activity.\(^{23}\)

\(^{15}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, 162-164, 201, 204.
\(^{16}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see especially the statement by Rev. Soga, 162-166.
\(^{17}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, statement of Soga, 162-166.
\(^{18}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, statement of Reverend Kropf, 201-205.
\(^{19}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 commission on native affairs, 162-164, 201, 204.
\(^{20}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, 162-164, 201, 204.
\(^{21}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, 162-164.
\(^{22}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, 162-164, 201, 204.
\(^{23}\) CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, the statements of Brownlee, Soga and Kropf, 11-20, 161-165, 201-204.
The above analysis is not intended to suggest that trading activity was exclusively monopolized by mission settlements, but the Commission did report on the quick recovery of mission settlements after the cattle killing disaster. This was particularly true of those associated with practised agriculture. Bundy has commented on the role of "the missionaries as the torch-bearers of capitalist social norms and the market economy, as advocates of increased trade." He has explained the missionaries' task of reconstruction of African communities as an attempt to link the indigenous economy fully to the British capitalist economy. Indeed the sale of crop products by Mgwali and Wartburg/Berlin mission inhabitants at Dohne, was fully connected or rather interrelated with the buying of imported foodstuffs. Thus the circle of economic co-operation was to give rise to accelerated participation in a wider economic market.

The churchgoing kaftirs purchase three times as much clothing, groceries and other articles in the shops as the red kaftirs, but with the change in their habitations the existing native trade would soon be doubled.

The above quotation fits the pattern of economic behaviour that had already evolved in the mission settlements of the Ngqika area before 1865. However difficulties exist in assessing the economic capacities of mission Africans. This is particularly true in cases where mission stations were located within a particular chiefdom. For instance, specific details are not available for the Ngqika district where the economic recovery between 1857 and 1876 was initially led by the mission settlements. Instead, the economic buildup undertaken exclusively in the mission settlements is not normally separated from the situation in the wider chiefdom. As a result, economic growth at Mgwali and Berlin missions during the early 1860's has previously gone unnoticed. This tendency results from a general impression that the Ngqika chiefdom was shaken in these years.

After 1865, the economic activity that was earlier confined to the mission settlements was expanded. The use of ploughs in the various chiefdoms of old British Kaffraria became common.

24. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, statements of Kropf and Soga, 161-165, 201-204.
25. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 37.
27. For instance see Lewis, "Economic history", 471-480.
In the Ngqika community, the use of water canals was revived. Increased grain cultivation followed. In 1868, the civil commissioner of King William's Town commented:

This region has never been in a better state as regards the pasturage than it has been during this year ... large quantities of grain have been sown, both by Europeans and Natives. The crops of wheat and oaty which have already been harvested are very good indeed. The natives have cultivated largely and have a fair prospect of an abundant harvest of mealies and kaffir corn.

In connection with the market in King William's Town he expatiated:

The market in King William's Town is always well supplied with every description of farm produce which, is cheaper now than it has been for years past.

This also led to a rise in the use of wagons which later became essential for transportation in the trade network. As King William's Town market grew, the number of wagons in the different chiefdoms of old British Kaffraria also increased. The wagon-making and transport business became linked to the rise of agriculture. The use of ploughs had a great impact here since it was followed by increased production. Large volumes of production required efficient transport.

The accelerated rate of crop production reaffirmed the position of King William's Town as a trading centre. Bouch has indicated that towns commanding interior trade routes were in most cases in an advantageous position for economic prosperity, and King William's Town was already "a centre for trade with African peoples" by the 1830s. He goes on to point out that King William's Town shared the interior trade from East London with Queenstown, but the latter gained the upper hand in the long run to become the key centre for the Transkei trade. Statistical evidence to support the link between Dohne trade and the wider markets in Queenstown or/and King William's Town is lacking, but the Cape Blue Books for the post-1865 period confirm the

28. BBCC 1866, JJ 42. The interest in water canals first arose during the preliminary stages of Grey's governorship.
29. BBCC 1868, JJ 42.
30. BBCC 1867, JJ 42.
32. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see especially the statements of Tiyo Soga and Charles Brownlee, 11-20, 161-165.
revival of King William's Town as a reliable trade centre for the Ciskeian territories. The increased participation of the Ngqika has been particularly noted. After 1865, King William's Town regained the prominent trade position that had been undermined by the cattle killing. As noted above, during the short interval between the cattle killing and 1865, small scale trading activity commenced within the mission settlements of the Ngqika district. The economic connections between the missions and the White community at Dohne and Stutterheim may be explained within the parameters of this small scale trade.

Lewis, who has looked closely at the productive forces of the mid and late nineteenth century Ciskeian chiefdoms, has overlooked the economic stratification within the Ngqika chieftaincy. The basic error in his analysis is the omission of the differentiated forms of settlement that had evolved in the Ngqika district by the 1860s. Although Sandile's power was gradually increasing at this time, it would be a mistake to suggest that by 1860s the Ngqika region was exclusively Sandile's territory. By this time, the area had ceased to be a homogenous community. Although it is difficult to draw economic boundaries, an analysis of a heterogenous community such as the Ngqika location during this period, necessitates identification of variations in the economic base. A generalisation of the district's economic capacity during the early 1860s would no doubt overlook or rather devalue that of the missions'.

35. "Ciskeian territories" in this regard refers to the Eastern Cape territories to the west of the Kei. This definition is not in any sense related to the South African homeland system's definition of the political boundaries of Ciskei.
36. BBCC 1866, JJ 42; BBCC 1868, JJ 42.
37. It is however difficult to gauge how viable King William's Town's market was in this period. A comparison of its viability between the pre-cattle killing and post-1865 periods could have been useful.
38. See tables 1 and 2.
39. In chapter 2 I have analysed various forms of settlement that had evolved within and around Sandile's chieftaincy. Most of these had a bearing on the lives of the Ngqika.
Table no 1

Lewis's figures on accumulation of cattle, sheep, wagons and ploughs in Sandile's, Kama's, Phato's, Oba's and Anta's Locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1863.</th>
<th>Sandile</th>
<th>Kama</th>
<th>Phato</th>
<th>Oba + Anta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle.</td>
<td>9593</td>
<td>10270</td>
<td>10881</td>
<td>2890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep.</td>
<td>10740</td>
<td>9271</td>
<td>5076</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughs.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lewis: "Economic history", 477, table 13. Note that only figures relevant to 1863 and 1864 chiefdoms have been selected from this source.

Table no 2.

Figures furnished in the 1865 Commission on native affairs pertaining to stock/property ownership in the Nggika district. Note well the entire district figures include those of the missions as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle.</td>
<td>9593</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses.</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep.</td>
<td>10740</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons.</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughs.</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Check the numbers given by Lewis for the year 1865 against those furnished by the 1865 Commission. Lewis has suggested that the entire district's stock was Sandile's overlooking the mission livestock.

For Lewis there was no economic prosperity following the cattle killing until 1865. In his critique of Rise and Fall, he identifies a period of prosperity between 1865 and 1875. He maintains that the economic growth "in this period derived more from stimulation given by political and demographic circumstances ... than from the effects of the growing capitalist mode". His point of reference is the movement of the "Fingo", during the 1864 to 1865 period from the Ciskei to the Transkei. They abandoned land that was later utilised by those who remained behind.

40. Lewis: "Rise and Fall", 20.
41. Lewis: "Rise and Fall", 20.
Lewis's prosperity period may be relevant regarding Sandile's chieftaincy, but it is imprecise with regard to the mission settlements. Moreover, in the Ngqika district where the number of "Fingo" was limited from the outset, it would be erroneous to suggest that the economic growth that emerged in the post-1865 period was a result of the movement of the "Fingo" to the Transkei. Yet published correspondence kept on emphasising the increased production and participation of the Ngqika in the economic market from 1867 onwards. By this period, economic expansion was no longer confined to mission settlements, but had been extended to the entire region.

But while the region was prosperous for some, the opposite story was experienced by others. These were mainly land owners and other residents in King William's Town, East London and, to some extent, the Albany district. Most of their grievances centred around labour shortages and increased stock theft. Their distaste for these circumstances can be assessed from the tone of the petition they drafted to the Legislative Council, particularly their recommendations to remedy these "unsatisfactory" conditions. They suggested the creation of a legal climate that would induce Africans to engage in labour.

Concerned reports about the sudden shortage of labour for local farmers in the region during this period, are complex to analyse. There is a possibility that farmers were exaggerating their situation, particularly if the alarming rate of African labour migration to the surrounding farms and public works in the aftermath of the cattle killing is considered. However since most labourers were returning home by the 1860s, labour demand could have been a pressing factor. Those who were returning home from their spell of forced labour in the colony were determined to avoid a second trip and hence focused on strengthening their chances of survival at home. Reflecting this

42. BBCC 1867, JJ 44; BBCC 1868, JJ 42; BBCC 1870, JJ 33-34; BBCC 1872, JJ 36; BBCC 1873, JJ 31-3; BBCC 1874, JJ 32-36; BBCC 1875, JJ 30-32.
43. CPP C4-'69 Petition by landowners and other residents of Albany, East London and King William's Town districts, 1-2.
44. CPP C4-'69 Petition by landowners and other residents of Albany, East London and King William's Town districts, 2.
determination, the rate of practised agriculture increased, while on the other hand the shortage of farm labour doubled.

The Ngqika particularly were once more becoming a viable force by the mid-1860s. The post cattle killing period saw some African communities such as the Ngqika rising from the ground, while, on the other hand, the colonial government was also gradually attaining supremacy. The two forces were not in equilibrium. The odds favoured the colonists. As Peires has pointed out, "independent Xhosaland was dead." It would be too simplistic to suggest that by 1869 (the year the farmers complained about labour), practised agriculture amongst the Eastern Cape Africans had progressed to such an extent that the African community was becoming increasingly self-sufficient, as the civil commissioner of King William's Town claimed in 1870:

Farmers complain of the want of farm-servants. This can only be accounted for from the fact that the natives, having plenty of food, do not require to go into service.

His statement may imply a number of things. Either local Africans had other ways of raising cash instead of embarking on outside services, or they were not in favour of working for local farmers, who might have been paying less than a living wage. Furthermore, it is naturally possible that by this period waged labour was not yet an established phenomenon in African social life. On several occasions, it was embarked upon in order to survive and abandoned when conditions improved.

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45. BBCC 1870, JJ 34.
46. BBCC 1870, JJ 34.
47. Peires: Dead will arise, 321.
48. BBCC 1870, JJ 34.
49. In an interview I had on 3 October 1991 with Mr Herman Gija, I learned that, during his childhood, numerous African families did not approve of their offsprings' engagement in outside services. It was a matter of necessity and/or desperation.
50. Interview with Mr Gija, 3 October 1991.
The alleged labour shortage (from the farmers' camp) suggests that there was no uniform Eastern Cape economic prosperity at that period. The petitioners in particular were unhappy about the state of their economic environment. Their petition reveals that they aimed at increasing trade and export rates, and also raising public revenue. Houghton and Dagut relate the backwardness of white farming in the Cape in the 1860s to low crop yields, poor land use and inefficient employment of labour. Additionally, Bundy has revealed the economic "background of the middle and late 1860s, when the Cape in common with the rest of Southern Africa suffered an economic recession marked by an agricultural and commercial slump, insecurity of credit and rickety public finances."

This slump was eased by the discovery of diamonds in 1867, which activated commercial activity in the country in general. The discovery of diamonds has been seen as one of the more significant events to have effected changes in the South African market. Sheila van der Horst illustrates how the diamond discovery brought changes to Africans and Whites who were engaged in practised agriculture.

In fact the discovery of diamonds offers a better answer to the scarcity of farm labour noted by local residents of King William's Town and neighbouring districts. Indeed, large scale movement to the diamond fields occurred from King William's Town district. The district civil commissioner

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51. CPP C4-69, Petition of landowners and other residents in the districts of Albany, East London and King William's Town, 2.
54. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 65.
56. CPP C4-69 Petition of landowners and other residents in the districts of Albany, East London and King William's Town, 2.
confirmed this movement in 1870. In addition, by 1875 the colonial government had established a fixed African labour agency in the region, supplying the diamond fields and the Transvaal.

It is difficult to specify which section of the Ngqika community was most heavily engaged in diamond labour. Without statistical evidence, the chances of identifying individuals who were actively participating are slim, but most probably those who had been unsuccessful in agricultural enterprises at home were most involved in diamond labour. One must, however, not overlook the fact that, to some residents, the diamond fields became more attractive than working at home, particularly in the context of new economic and social pressures such as hut tax and tight competition in the King William's Town market. After the cattle killing, hut tax in particular was collected with a heavy hand. Peires points out that during this period, Grey succeeded beyond doubt in turning the Xhosa into "contributors to our revenue". Under these circumstances, the quest for diamonds directed thoughts away from the burden of hut tax. While fortune hunting in the diamond fields was on, the pressure of tax collectors was directed to those who remained at home.

By 1870, the Ngqika economy was clearly linked to the expanding world economy. Whatever means of survival the Ngqika retained was moulded and then adapted to survive the system. But although the discovery of diamonds is assumed to have accelerated agricultural production in the rest of the country, King William's Town district underwent a contrary experience in the early 1870s. In that year, the civil commissioner commented:

> The agricultural operations in this division have been much neglected in consequence of the attractions of the diamond-fields, which has been the cause of drawing many of our agriculturalists to the bank of the Vaal river, leaving their farms down here quite unproductive.

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57. BBCC 1870, JJ 34.
58. CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59.
59. BBCC 1870, JJ 34; CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59.
60. Peires: Dead will arise, 321.
61. Though labourers contributed by sending cash back, they were not as directly pressurised by tax officials as were those remaining at home.
62. van der Horst: Native labour, 103.
63. BBCC 1870, JJ 34.
The fall in agricultural activity was aggravated by a severe drought in the early 1870s. The drought had detrimental effects on standing crops, food price, currency value and on the trade mechanism.

The effects of the drought may be judged by the price of meat, which is selling at from 7d to 8d a pound, while meal, which in ordinary seasons is procurable at from 20s to 25s. ... All the necessaries of life have increased in price from 50 to 75 per cent. The transport service could not be carried on, and trade was completely paralysed,...

Once in a better economic position, the district now faced difficulties. But interestingly, the termination of this drought brought about new forms of social and economic progression. In particular the desire to possess movable or immovable property grew. Those who had engaged in the early agricultural trade such as the mission inhabitants, crown reserve inhabitants and some individuals in the Ngqika chiefdom participated heavily. These were Africans who had saved most of the money they had accumulated during the favourable period. Having avoided diamond labour recruitment, they were keen to invest their savings in property. The civil commissioner of King William's Town noted in 1876 that by 1875 there were 32 African depositors using the savings' bank in King William's Town. Most of their deposits were invested in the purchasing and leasing of crown lands and the acquisition of sheep. Acquisition of sheep was not only restricted to the depositors. An exchange activity whereby oxen were exchanged for sheep was also occurring.

In the Ngqika district, various individuals were reported to have been keenly purchasing sheep as early as 1873. By 1875, the number of sheep in the district had more than doubled from 1863.

The years 1874-6 were the greatest trade years for the Ngqika district.

This remarkable economic growth was experienced by the district inhabitants at large. By 1874, there were about twenty-five trading stores in the district. Five of these were in operation as early as 1869 and most of them stood in the area which is now the village of Stutterheim.

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64. BBCC 1874, JJ 33.
65. CPP G16-'76 BBNA 1875, 62.
66. CPP G16-'76 BBNA 1875, 62.
67. CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 14-15.
68. See tables 1 above, and 3 below.
69. CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 14-15; CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59; CPP G16-'76 BBNA 1875, 64.
70. CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 14-15. CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59.
these shops trading activity flourished.\textsuperscript{71} The shops had the support of the mission population, crown reserve, Ngqika chiefdom and the military villagers.\textsuperscript{72} Thus the rate of currency circulation was increased. Even the proportion of revenue collection in the district grew. This can be gauged from the proportional rate of hut-tax collected in the district from the late 1860s to 1875.\textsuperscript{73} Hut-tax collections in Sandile's location rose from £166 10s in 1867 to £1,240 10s in 1875.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
          & Numbers & Value     \\
\hline
People.   & 33,000.  & -         \\
Horses.   & 3,500.   & £17,500.  \\
Cattle.   & 38,000.  & £228,000. \\
Sheep.    & 103,000. & £38,575.  \\
Goats.    & 44,000.  & £11,000.  \\
Ploughs.  & 900.     & £2,250.   \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Census and accumulation of stock in the Ngqika district during the year 1875}
\end{table}

\textbf{Source, CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 63.}

The local trade that had briefly existed between the mission population and white communities adjoining the Ngqika location between 1863 and 1865 (only to be replaced by regional trade at King William's Town) was again revived, but this time on a more extensive scale. It no longer served mission inhabitants exclusively, but now also various settlements within the district.\textsuperscript{75}

As capital of the district, King William's Town remained a viable trade centre right through the middle 1870s. The town was well supported by local Africans, particularly those who were landowners in the crown reserve. From Upper Kubusi and Isidenge, a high degree of cultivation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 14-15.
\item \textsuperscript{72} CPP G27-'75 BBNA 1874, 59.
\item \textsuperscript{73} I am aware that the increase could have been the result of an intensified collection campaign. It is not intended to suggest that the people were freely paying the hut tax, but to indicate the rate of capital/currency inflow in the area.
\item \textsuperscript{74} CPP G16-'76 BBNA 1875, 64.
\item \textsuperscript{75} CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 14-15. CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59.
\end{itemize}
and the sale of agricultural products and wool to King William's Town were noted in 1875. 78

Africans in that settlement were trading locally and as well as in King William's Town. 77

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Table no 4

Number of stock/property in the crown reserve district in the year 1876

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, CPP G16-76 BBNA 1875, 65.

NB. The crown reserve comprised some portions of the present districts of Middle-drift, Keiskammahoek and Stutterheim. The African landowners of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge were included in this area.

A description of trading activity in King William's Town in 1875 fully confirms the town's viability as a trade centre:

King William's Town and Queen's Town are the centres where this branch of commerce is especially studied and developed, hundreds of shops and out-stations having been established by them throughout the several locations, ... supplying native wants. For the 'red kaffirs', or heathens, there are a variety of beads, brass-wire, chains, and red clay, of which they are large consumers. For those in a transition state there are imported ornaments such as arm-rings, bracelets, earrings &c; but the chief item is the woollen blanket, - it is in general use, and at least 60,000 change hands at King William's Town in the course of the year. ... The purchasing power of the natives for these and other articles is at present estimated at not less than £400,000 a year, and their production such as wool, Angora hair hides. ... The amount of native produce purchased by one firm alone in King William's Town we know to have been over £58,000 from January to December, 1873. 78

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76. CPP G21-'75 BBNA 1874, 59; CPP G16-76 BBNA 1875, 64.
77. CPP G27-74 BBNA 1873, 14-15; CPP G21-75 BBNA 1874, 59.
Debate about the decline of rural productivity has been ongoing. How and when rural peasants ceased to produce viable products is still an elusive topic. Common suggestions amongst various interpretations are labour extraction and land expropriation. As peasants were affected by these, they gradually entered a cycle of social and economic decline. Eastern Cape historiography has emphasised the impact of aggressively expanding settler farming that was simultaneously accompanied by growing government supremacy. Beinart points out, "accumulation on the land depended on conquest and a continuing monopoly of the instruments of coercion, it involved settler farmers in a long struggle to draw labour from African communities and win favourable terms in the markets. In these struggles the state played a significant role."

Beinart's assessment coincides with what Macmillan and De Kiewiet had earlier suggested about the degeneration of African agriculture. The latter two stressed dislocation of the traditional economy and social structure, and particularly the hammer-blow of sudden land shortage, that finally marked the downfall of peasant communities.

However, the perception that the interests of mining capitalists exercised immense influence on colonial policy towards Africans dominates the debate. This interpretation focuses closely on the connection between political developments and industrial transformations that were taking place in South Africa during the later half of the nineteenth century. This perception can be associated with writers such as Lacey and Cooper. But published government papers reveal that the mining industry received formidable competition from Cape colonial farms and public works. Although this is still an under-researched topic, public works recruitments impacted upon the indigenous demographic pattern in more or less the same manner that the mining industry did. In 1877, the

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79. For example, Beinart: "Settler accumulation"; Bouch: "Colonization"; Bundy: Rise and Fall; Lewis: "Economic history"; Peires: Dead will Arise.
civil commissioner in King William's Town reported that three thousand African labourers had been forwarded to the public works of the colony.83

But there were specific events that impacted upon peasant productivity. In the case of the Ngqika, the war of 1877-78 was most significant.84 With increased demand, and Ngqika participation in various labour markets, it could not be expected that the Ngqika and some of their neighbours would be able to maintain their economic growth which had reached its peak by the mid 1870s. In 1875, the Ngqika and the surrounding communities were continuing to build their economy in the face of the waxing influence of the colonists, aimed at steering the future of the "African population as labourers in capitalist enterprises".85 The harmonious economic relationship remained unaltered in the Ngqika district until briefly interrupted by the "war scare" which lingered around the district in the year 1876.86 When the war eventually came, it marked the termination of the Ngqika social and economic structure. As Bundy has pointed out that the wars of 1877-78 and 1881 saw the last military resistance in the Cape, thereafter, the demand for African labour from mines and White farmers escalated.87

The 1877-78 war caused a marked disruption in Ngqika social and economic life. This is not to suggest that the cattle killing’s detrimental effects were less adverse on the district, but a resurgence had been achieved by 1876. As the Ngqika were adapting to the new social and economic order, a military event (the war of 1877-78), signalled the end of that period of recovery and adaptation. Horrific changes were on their way.88

83. CPP G12-'77, BBNA 1876, 112.
84. See pages 72-85 below.
86. Cape Mercury, 14 August 1876.
88. See pages 72-85 below.
PART II

DISCONTINUITY - THE BREAKUP AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE NGQIKA LOCATION, 1877-1890
CHAPTER 4

THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR OF NgCAYECIBI (1877-78) AND THE EMERGENCE OF DIRECT COLONIAL RULE

The socio-economic growth that had steadily been built by the Ngqika and neighbouring communities came to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of the 1877-78 war, popularly known as the war of Ngcayecibi.

Especially in its prosecution by the colonial troops and their black allies, the war was to a striking extent marked by plunder and looting of the meagre resources of the Ngqika and Gcaleka - that is to a large degree war pursued by the destruction of the economic capacity of the enemy.1

Indisputably, the war marked a turning point in the political, social, and economic lives of the Ngqika, though they had earlier demonstrated their responsiveness to opportunity.2 It has been argued that Sandile’s involvement in the war was a result of a ferment of nationalism and a realisation that white rule would undermine not only his power but also traditional Xhosa society as a whole.3

But Ngqika involvement in the war of Ngcayecibi remains a complex issue. As it is rather early for African nationalism to be the factor at this date, suggestions that nationalism might have been a stimulating force require careful analysis.4 Evidence based on oral tradition does however point out that Sandile was sympathetic to Sarhili with whom the origins of the conflict are partly associated.5 Peires and Spicer have added further to this point.6 Although it is fair to argue that no substantial evidence exists attributing the core of the 1877-8 turmoil to the Ngqika, yet by the

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1. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 85.
2. See pages 50-60 above.
5. Interview with Mr M Sam at Mgwali mission station on 13 June 1992. Mr Sam suggested that though the Ngqika had their paramountcy, the Xhosa great house has always been associated with the Gcaleka and added that according to tradition whatever practises affected the Gcaleka, would affect the Ciskeian Xhosa as well. This point is generally accepted by historians, e.g Peires and Spicer, see footnote no 6.
6. Peires, Dead will Arise, 334, see especially his interview with Chief F Mpangele, Mgwali location, 26 August 1975; Spicer, "Ngcayecibi", 147, see especially his interview with Mr S M Ncamashe, Rhodes University, 1 November 1977.
final stages of the hostilities the Ngqika community had been fully drawn into it and their involvement had the most regrettable consequences for the cause it was intended to serve.

The 1870s marked the climax of colonial military involvement in the continuing territorial confrontations in South Africa. A short while after colonial forces had been engaged with the Gcaleka and the Ngqika (1877-78), they were deeply involved with the Zulu (early 1879) and the Pedi (mid-1879). The remarkable colonial intrusion into these previously independent African chiefdoms cannot be simply attributed to expansionist policies; rather the conquests were geared towards promoting a policy of drawing various elements together into an "empire" built under the auspices of federalism, which was the agenda of the day. As Hicks has put it, under federal rule "very diverse elements in a colony: of language, culture and race, for the good of the whole" could be comprehended.

However, the major concern here is not to investigate the issue of federalism, nor it is to detail the whole British expansion process in Southern Africa. Rather, it is intended to detail the Ngqika’s involvement in one of these territorial confrontations (war of Ngcayecibi) and to see how this confrontation marked profound changes in Ngqika social and economic life.

The extension of turmoil to the Ngqika community became evident in the early months of 1878, but the seeds of confusion had been sown during the previous year. Having been involved in the earlier part of the hostilities occurring across the Kei, the colonial government failed to control the confusion prevailing in that area and in the process allowed it to spread into the Ciskeian territories. This became evident when Makinana, a Ndlambe chief living in exile in the Transkei and a great son of Mhala (who initially fought on the Gcaleka side but later opted for peace), sceptical of the government’s disarmament and fining policies, fled with his people to his brother Ndima, a petty Ndlambe chief who lived at Draaibosch, in the present Komga district adjoining

the former Ngqika location. Makinana's defection from the main Gcaleka section and his flight to his brother brought the Transkeian conflict to the Ciskeian territories. Having fled with his cattle in an attempt to elude the fine imposed on him for joining the war on the Gcaleka side, Makinana was unsystematically pursued by the colonial police whose intention was to seize the cattle in an attempt to recover the fine. This pursuit spread the Gcalekaland conflict to the Ngqika and the Ndlambe. By the time the police arrived at Draaibosch, Makinana's cattle were already mixed with his brother's and the police blundered by not attempting to ascertain who owned what. Their arrival in the region appeared to the Ndlambe and Ngqika to be an attack on their property.

Not surprisingly Ndima and Makinana resisted the advance of the police. The first conflict between Africans and Whites within the colony followed, precipitated by precisely the sort of occurrence that the then governor of the Cape, Sir Bartle Frere, and the commissioner of crown lands, John X Merriman, had feared and sought assiduously to avoid. Together with Brownlee, the secretary of native affairs, they had at least been aware of the importance of treating the Ngqika diplomatically, but their police had failed to apprehend Makinana before he arrived at Draaibosch, a blunder that resulted in the provocation of the Ngqika and Ndlambe.

Exacerbating the problem, the sub-inspector in charge of the police troops entered the Ngqika location without permission from Sandile or his special magistrate William Wright. This unwarranted action received the highest condemnation from Sandile who during the period 1867-77 was enjoying his greatest power and was at the height of his chieftainship. Thus the Ngqika were drawn into the conflict. The government's attempt to recover the fine from Makinana was regarded

10. More information on Makinana's defection is to be found in CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877, 210, Memorandum of proceedings with the view of disarming Mapasa.
11. CPP G17-'78 BBNA 1877, 210-211.
12. See Spicer: "Ngayecibi", 129. Frere became the governor of the Cape Colony in 1876 and he was to be very influential in framing the postwar settlement undertaken by the new Prime Minister Sprigg. Merriman was commissioner of crown lands and public works in Molteno's ministry which served until January 1878. After Molteno's quarrel with Frere, the latter almost singlehandedly supervised the conduct of the war.
13. Wright was appointed special magistrate with Sandile in December 1878, replacing Liefeldt who had been with Sandile since 1867.
as a hot pursuit operation by the Ngqika. It led to a confrontation between Wright and Sandile though Wright was probably as surprised by the intrusion as Sandile was. Sandile asked,

Why does the government treat me like this when I am taking the part of the neutral in this war? When refugees come to me why does not the government demand them from me instead of sending pursuit?

Wright replied:

Government holds the right of pursuing its enemies even among independent tribes, [it is] much so among the Gaikas who are subjects.¹⁴

Sandile, like other chiefs, desired to escape colonial overlordship. Since 1847 when British Kaffraria had been created, he had experienced British rule, especially when his paramountcy was overshadowed by the presence of Brownlee¹⁵ who remained stationed for a lengthy period as Ngqika commissioner in that area. Brownlee had had tight control of the area and, when he was transferred from the Ngqika location to the district of Somerset in 1868, his removal was a great relief for Sandile, as it destroyed at a stroke the large network of informers that only Brownlee, who had lived in the area all his life, could command.¹⁶ Brownlee's place was filled by T.Liefeldt who was installed as clerk in charge of the government office in the Ngqika location. Therefore, in the interval between 1867 and 1877 when the Ngqika location was brought closer to the jurisdiction of the growing but not fully developed Stutterheim magistracy¹⁷, Liefeldt was the colony's only source of information about its people.

Liefeldt's incompetence and maladministration may have been connected with excessive drinking. They deprived him of respect and authority in the location. As a result, he was unable to influence Sandile. Although he lacked authority in the location, he conveyed a false picture of absolute control to his superiors, misreporting by claiming complete supremacy in the area.

¹⁵. Brownlee was for twenty years assistant commissioner and later commissioner to the Ngqika.
¹⁷. A Burton: Sparks from the Border anvil, (King William's Town 1950), 290, traces Stutterheim's magistracy as far back as 1866, and Lewis "Economic history", 601 traces it from 1867. Evidence in the Cape printed publications indicates that Stutterheim gained its full magisterial status by late 1879, see BBCC 1880, 38-39; BBCC 1881, 32.
In fact Liefeldt allowed Sandile to regain most of the ruling power he had lost to Brownlee. Ten years after the departure of Brownlee, Sandile had resumed a state of quasi-autonomy. In 1877, William Wright noticed Sandile's independent rule:

I had not been long in charge when I found that I had little power except such as I might exert through Sandile, and that even the headmen although receiving salaries from Government were not willing to act on my orders without first referring to Sandile, thus showing the extent to which the authority over his people had gradually slipped into his hands. 19

Sandile's increasing prominence had been apparent to other officials, perhaps with the exception of Liefeldt. Even Brownlee, as Spicer has argued, was horrified to see how complete the reversion of power to Sandile had been when he visited the location on the eve of the war of Ngcayecibi. 20

As the hostilities of Ngcayecibi reached uncontrollable proportions, the fighting that had begun as a local skirmish spread to draw in imperial as well as colonial troops, their African allies, the Ngqika and other Africans.

By the beginning of 1878, tension was already visible in the Ngqika location. Stock theft had further increased and the farmers surrounding the location were allegedly suffering huge losses, most of these being blamed on the Ngqika. It is difficult to assess the exact figures involved in the stock theft, but there remains a high possibility that the farmers were exaggerating the numbers lost, especially if one considers the contrasting reaction between the Ngqika and the farmers to the "war scare" that lingered around the country in the year 1876. When questioned by Brownlee about the war, the Ngqika had remained cool exhibiting their innocence while the farmers on the other hand were excited, citing the Ngqika as a threat and requesting the creation of defensive measures. 21

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18. CO. 3140. Liefeldt to Southey, 10 October 1868.
19. CPP G17-78, BBN 1877 Special magistrate, Wright to the secretary of native affairs, 22 January 1878, 117.
21. Spicer, "Ngcayecibi" 130; Cape Mercury 14 August 1876.
The stock theft could have been an indirect form of warfare carried out by the "war party" of either the Ngqika or the Gcaleka, but "it did not signal an imminent recourse to overtly hostile behaviour". It was in fact to be complicated by the Makinana affair with which it coincided. The two factors were further complicated by the arrival of Kiva, a brilliant Gcaleka guerilla fighter who was one of the men pursued by the colonial troops. A coalition of the Gcaleka and the Ngqika against the colony was a situation that the latter sought very much to avoid. As a result, Kiva's presence in the location was immediately noted by Wright who harshly warned Sandile and his people that the government would class them as rebels if they failed to eject from the location those who were presumed to reject the principles of the colony.

The presence of Kiva in the location and the clash of Makinana's and Ndima's followers with the colonial forces at Draaibosch evoked excitement in the Ngqika location. By December 1877, tension was visible in the area but Sandile remained unintimidated until the end of the year. Wright commented:

Up to the last interview I had with Sandilli on the 29th December [1877] he continued to make his professions of loyalty.

For the Ngqika to join the Gcaleka in a war against the colonial government, a political decision of the whole people would be necessary. But there exists no substantial evidence that such a decision ever came. As has been indicated, the government feared a situation of resistance on a united front and that fear stimulated it to take precautionary steps. A strategy to minimize the Ngqika "threat" in an attempt to defuse the imminent "rebellion" was embarked on, by means of a government order which demanded the separation of those who were for rebellion from those who were against it. The technicalities of this separation offered no room for neutrality: one had a simple option of being classed as either "loyal" or a "rebel".

23. CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877, 117. Wright to secretary of native affairs, 22 February 1878.
24. CPP G17-'78 BBNA 1877, 117.
25. CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877. Wright to secretary of native affairs, 22 February 1878.
26. CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877, 117-118. My assumption that the separation system offered no neutrality option is based on the fact that Sandile and his followers were already classed as rebels towards the end of December 1877 by Wright, though they had not declared themselves so. There are two possible reasons for the government to have identified them in this category. The first one was that by December (1877) they had not yet offered to
Provisions for stricter commitment from those who identified themselves as "loyals" were undertaken, inasmuch that two venues were offered in the region for the registration of their identities and their property. The two venues were Greytown, special magistrate Wright's headquarters approximately ten miles north of the village of Stutterheim, and Mgwali mission station in the heart of the Ngqika location. 27 Official correspondence seems not to agree on the number of those who registered but probably about two thousand people registered with inventories of their possessions. 28 By December 1877, Wright was able to confirm that a general movement had taken place in the community, the "loyals" congregating and registering in the two proposed venues and the "rebels" moving away towards the Kei with Sandile whose residence then was in Ncemene, a small settlement some 25 miles north-east of Stutterheim village, very close to the Kei river. Oral evidence has pointed out that Ncemene had been Sandile's residence for quite a long period and was not an emergency residence sought as a result of the "rebellion". 29

Flowing from Wright's report about the then prevailing situation, it could be suggested that by December 1877, the inhabitants of the Ngqika location were congregated in and could be traced to three main centres, 30 leaving a large area unoccupied as a result of politics of the war.

27. CPP GI7-'78, BBNA 1877, 214. My figure of the distance between Greytown (now Fort Cunynghame) and Stutterheim village is a rough estimation.

28. G.H. 21/8, Conduct of Sandili file: Brownlee's memorandum, 11 January 1878, figures offered here for those who registered in Greytown are 1447 men, 224 guns 3554 assegais, 9911 cattle 672 horses, 26,175 sheep, 5696 goats. These figures are reported to have excluded Anta's, who also registered in that vicinity. The numbers at Mgwali were 325 men, 37 guns, 622 assegais, 1292 cattle, 92 horses, 5646 sheep, 1662 goats [numbers reported to be still on the increase. CPP. G17-'78, BBNA 1877, 117, lists numbers of Greytown registration as 2,239 people, 266 guns, 3,132 assegais, 12,762 cattle, 22,409 sheep 5,597 goats, 899 horses. Also Lewis, "Economic history" 615, using Magisterial correspondence file. Stutterheim Magistrate C3/186, Wright to Brownlee 11 January 1878, gives the numbers as follows 1722 men, 11 023 cattle, 25582 sheep and 6702 goats.

29. CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877, 117, Wright to secretary of native affairs 22 February 1878; Also G.H.21/8. Conduct of Sandili file: Brownlee memorandum, 11 January 1878. The figures used to locate Ncemene are based on a rough estimation. Interview with M.Sam: 13 June 1992. Sam has pointed out that Ncemene had been used by Sandile and some influential members of the Ngqika society as one of the initiation centres for young men (including Sandile's sons) in the region.

30. These were Greytown, Mgwali and with Sandile.
Sandile's people were nominally settled in unstructured villages that had resulted from Grey's villagisation scheme although this never gained momentum in the area. Instead the villagisation scheme had left loose groups of homesteads scattered within the location.\(^{31}\) The census of 1875 confirmed a high density population in the location, totalling up to 33,000.\(^{32}\) The coming of the war necessitated new schemes of settlement and resettlement that were to drag on indefinitely even after the war. These did not discriminate between "non-combatants" and "combatants".

(i) **A brief look at the military operation**

Detailed accounts exist of the military campaigns and of the general course of the war, seemingly over by December 1877 in the Transkeian territory, but flaring up again in the new year (this time mainly in Sandile's territory) and persisting until mid-June 1878 when the conclusion was hastened by Sandile's death.\(^{33}\) Government sources are not precise as to when and why Sandile entered the fighting. Neither is Spicer, but after the Draaibosch and Kiva affairs, tensions escalated. These were further intensified by the continued tension between the farmers and some sections of the Ngqika. The Ngqika entrance into the war may be best defined as a typical example of "frontier" confusion whereby war usually erupted haphazardly from awkward situations. But the odds usually fell in favour of the colonists. In this case, the Ngqika were militarily weaker than either the colony or the Gcaleka and as a result, by June 1878, their country was devastated and under military occupation and therefore there was no prospect of any terms except total surrender.\(^{34}\)

Considering Sandile's limited military power, his hope of throwing off white rule through military resistance was like grasping at a straw in the wind. Having cleared the opposition across the Kei, colonial troops, reinforced from King William's Town, attempted to surround Sandile and the Ngqika. By this stage the nature of the warfare had changed, and it had become simple or "almost

\(^{31}\) C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 4 October 1869.

\(^{32}\) CPP G21-'75. BBNA 1874, 63.

\(^{33}\) For details of the war on Ngqika territory, see Spicer, "Ngcayecibi", 173-183.

\(^{34}\) See Spicer, "Ngcayecibi" 172-173. He argues that whereas the Gcaleka probably marshalled 9-10,000 at their peak during the early stages of the war, Sandile does not seem to have been able to raise half that number even when supported by other Rharabe peoples.
mundane.35 By the beginning of March, it had been apparent that the Ngqika would not make it. In fact by March Sandile with a limited following had just managed to slip into the dense Pirie bush between Keiskammahoek and Izeli in a desperate attempt to survive. The bush was his last hope of survival, as it had been in the eighth frontier war,36 but in this instance the tide turned against him. The new Sprigg ministry that had just taken over from Frere's had promised a firm "native policy" that looked to the complete subjugation of Africans.37 This new emphasis in policy made the harsh methods of warfare already in operation more extreme. A scorched earth campaign was embarked upon to chase the Ngqika from their refuge. In each sweep, troops were stationed to prevent escape and allied African levies were used to harry the enemy and capture their food supplies and cattle.38 Deprived of their food and chased continually, the Ngqika began leaving the forest in small parties which were attacked as they emerged from the bush. It was in these circumstances that Sandile was shot on the 29th of May, to die a few days later.39

Ngayecibi represented for the Ngqika the most tragic war of their history. With the fate of the chieftainship in the balance, the situation was desperate. A fine ideal of retention of independence and human emotions straining at the leash paved the way for catastrophe. The war was marked by an air of desperation but also by an unreal optimism. Even Theal the pro-colonial historian writing in the early twentieth century, commented that:

after the loss of their leaders, the rebels became bewildered and they did not know what to do. They ought to have surrendered at once and trusted to the government to deal leniently with them, it may be said, but in their stupefied state they could not make up their minds to do this. And so some hundreds were ferreted out and shot down as if they were noxious animals, and a few were made prisoners.40

The fatality rate was very high, with nearly half of the Xhosa combatants perishing. When an amnesty was finally effected on 25 June 1878, it was assessed that African losses were greater than

35. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 85.
37. John Gordon Sprigg took over from Molteno in January 1878, and embarked on a harsh postwar settlement that was to crush the majority of Eastern Cape Africans for ever.
40. Theal, South Africa vol X, 133.
the aggregate of the wars of 1835, 1846 and 1851. Spicer has argued that altogether 3,680 Xhosa were killed, but there remain no figures in relation to specific groups e.g Gcaleka or Ngqika. Lewis has added further that the ferocity with which the rebellion was crushed was astonishing in comparison to the death toll as not even 200 prisoners were taken, most of whom were sent to the Western Cape as labour, though allowed to return at a later stage and resettled in the Transkei.

(ii) The preliminary suggestions for a stricter system of colonial administration

The Ngqika lost not only the war, but also their chieftainship and means of subsistence. Their fate in the postwar period lay in the hands of the Sprigg ministry whose "native policy" had the guiding principle of complete subjugation of Africans and was already in operation to a certain extent on the battlefield.

The kaffir war should be put down not in the manner of the former kaffir wars but that the white man is a master of the land ..... There will be no patched up peace this time - the Kaffirs will be effectually conquered and the white man henceforth be the master of the land.

The new secretary for native affairs, William Ayliff, who replaced Brownlee with the change of Frere's ministry, added further to what Sprigg had emphasised. Ayliff stressed that since the Africans were the perpetrators of the war, they would have to pay for their guilt. He expatiated on how the Africans, once subjugated and punished, were to be civilised through labour and in that scheme of things only a simple education would be offered to them as an inducement "to labour for a higher form of life."

The Social Darwinist ministry emphasised the fact that the postwar settlement would offer no resemblance to the prewar position of independence through neglect and incompetence which had been obtained by Sandile. Sprigg had already announced during the war that any remaining power the Ngqika retained after military defeat was to be broken by

41. Cory library, Lovedale Collection, PR 1234, Question by Mr George Blaine to Colonial Secretary re-granting amnesty to Native rebels, 25 June 1878.
44. Kaffrarian Watchman, 25 February 1878.
It should be noted that this imposition of colonial law was not only directed to the Ngqika location. A number of African groups who rebelled during this period were affected. Bouch has noted how colonial rule was intensified in Glen Grey after the rebellion and crushing of Gungubele.

Sprigg's policy followed Wright's earlier suggestion in relation to the Ngqika location, which was to constitute the new districts of Stutterheim, Cathcart and Komgha by 1880. After the outbreak of the war in the Ngqika location in early 1878, Wright had suggested the introduction of colonial law over all colonially situated locations. He suggested the replacement of special magistrates by a stricter form of administration:

Proper magistrate courts should be established and the natives taught that none but the colonial law can be administered.

Wright had already envisaged a postwar settlement that aimed at providing very firm control of Africans, strict official control of land and elimination of all African social practices.

As it may be convenient at the very onset to have the land surveyed, they [Africans] should in the meantime be so grouped in communities as to allow the Native location act no 6.of 1876 [that was to provide for the better and more effectual supervision and management of African locations], to be readily applied to such communities, and it would be well that the act should extend to all native locations, and that a full compliment of European Inspectors should be appointed who would strictly carry out the provision of the act. This would place a wholesome restraint over the people ... All native customs repugnant to decency and morality should be strictly suppressed and made punishable by law when practised in public.

Sprigg's plans were supported by other officials and were undisputed by the war-disadvantaged Africans who were too shattered to voice any opinion on the postwar settlement of the Ngqika and the Gcaleka. In fact by 1880, almost all important chiefs from the "great" generation of the Xhosa were dead. The majority of the leaderless Ngqika therefore had no choice but to bow to colonial rule. But Sprigg had a problem as well; the high rate of corruption and the lack of discipline that had developed on the colonial side during the war had already created the impression that Ngqika

45. Kaffrarian Watchman, 13 March 1878; Spicer: "Ngayecibi", 216.
46. Bouch: "Colonisation" 144-161.
47. CPP G17-'78, BBNA 1877, Wright to secretary of native affairs 22 February 1878, 118.
48. CPP G17-'78 BBNA 1877, Wright to secretary of native affairs, 22 February 1878, 118.
land would soon fall to the colonists. During the war, the local troops were paid not in wages and rations but by booty.49

(iii) The question of resettlement and its implications

Though eventually the "rebel" Ngqika land fell to the colonists, Sprigg had not anticipated that there would be such numerous land demands. His scheme was therefore affected by the existing land shortage on the frontier.50 The ministry had to look to the question of the settlement of Gcalekaland and in regard to that settlement, Sprigg was reluctant to allocate land to Whites.51 The plan for the Transkeian settlement would offer no white farms.52 In this decision Sprigg received opposition from parliamentarians and colonists and thus attention was directed to the resettlement of the Ngqika.53

The resettlement of the Ngqika location was planned to offer more room for white farming, inasmuch that after the prorogation of parliament in June-July 1878, Sprigg appointed two land boards, one to arrange for the demarcation and division of the Ngqika location into white farms, and the other to divide Gcalekaland into African locations.54 The proposed relocation scheme required large portions of land and it had an obvious problem since the Ngqika as original owners were still congregated in the registration centres within the location, and not unnaturally they still had high hopes of returning to their pre-war location. The point of reckoning amongst the ministry members was reached as the loyal Ngqika were impatiently waiting to reoccupy their location, and the scheme of a settler occupied Ngqika location was nullified by the very politics of the war, especially its system of separation and registration. While the system appeared to have been beneficial during the war, it turned out to be a burden in the postwar period.

49. CPP G76-'81, Commission on frontier losses in relation to the war of 1877-78, 39-300, 325-400, 595-717.
50. Spicer: "Ngcayecibi", 220.
52. Cape Argus, 6 August 1878; Spicer: "Ngcayecibi", 221.
53. Spicer: "Ngcayecibi", 221.
54. Cape Argus, 10 September 1878.
It was under these circumstances that Sprigg opted for the relocation of the Ngqika to the Transkei. The removal of the Ngqika across the Kei was regarded by the government as a solution that would ensure the end of "tribalism" in the area and was also a hinge of Sprigg's scheme for a settler occupied Ngqika location. It was to be applied in an uncompromising way with immediate effect and as a result Wright and Brownlee were mandated to be in charge of the move.55

The government failed to convincingly justify the removal to the Ngqika. The Ngqika loyals, who had not been consulted about their prospective removal during their wartime registration, did not agree with the government. They expressed their overwhelming wonder at the judgemental nature of the government's plan and the abrupt way in which the news of the removal was conveyed, particularly the fact that they were expressly prevented from discussing it when it was announced.56 On their registration, the loyals had hoped not only for the immediate benefits but for safety and the retention of the pre-war conditions, but after the war they were placed in a quandary by the severe nature of the post-war settlement offered by Sprigg's ministry.

Removal was the last thing the "loyals" had expected, and it was tragedy for the Ngqika community, especially the older members who had witnessed so many removals, beginning with the governorship of Harry Smith when the Ngqika were moved from the Amathole (see chapter 2). But this time the situation was bitter, as they remained without leadership. Anta,57 Sandile's brother, had died just before the hostilities ended. Having registered as a loyal himself, he had left most of his followers to the mercies of Sprigg's ministry; Sandile's death at the hands of the colonial troops still remained bitter news and on the eve of the announcement of the removal, an influential member of the community, Tyala, one of Sandile's old councillors who also registered as a "loyal",

55. I have likened the extension of the colonial law in the Ngqika location to that of Glen Grey (see page 73 above). However, it should be noted that the Ngqika "loyals" were treated more harshly than the Glen Grey "loyals", as the latter were allotted land instead of being removed. But during the 1880s the severity of colonial rule in Glen Grey was similar to the general treatment of the Ngqika, particularly those who remained in the new district of Stutterheim. For Glen Grey, see Bouê, "Colonisation" 162-174.
56. Cape Argus, 3 September 1878. The removal was announced in Greytown on 6 August 1878.
57. Anta ruled in the northern portion of the location which constituted the present district of Cathcart.
died probably from the shock of the imminent move. The recklessness with which the troops carried out the campaign, especially its indiscriminate destruction of economic resources, provided a sense of insecurity even amongst those who had earlier had faith in the colonial government.\textsuperscript{58}

Without their chiefs and some influential elder members, the "loyals" were left with the task of reorganising themselves. But under the circumstances created by the war (endless movements during the registration and the campaign), several homesteads were torn apart and those which managed to retain their integrity were still affected by the troops' indiscriminate looting.\textsuperscript{59} By the time the hostilities were brought to an end, the leadership of the "loyals" was no longer in existence and their social and economic structure was adversely affected by the war. On the other hand, the "rebels" had already taken a hammering during the campaign as the majority had died and the few survivors had been sent to the Western Cape.

When the removal was announced, the Ngqika community was too shattered by the war to resist the move. Their attitude was eloquent in the general silence in which the regulations were received and the muffled objections raised. Their objection is also confirmed by the fact that a considerable number of those who were registered at Mgwali managed to escape the move and sought refuge on Ciskeian farms. Their flight was noticed by the resident missionary, John Cumming, who was stationed there\textsuperscript{60} before and during the war but removed when the postwar settlement came into operation.

\textsuperscript{58} C.A. Cumming papers, Correspondence Box, Folder 5. 1846-83: Cumming to Dr MacGill, printed in circular from the United Presbyterian mission house, 7 November 1878; Brownlee: Reminiscences, 364-5; for more information on some old people who died on the move see, CPP. G33-'79, BBN 1879, report of B Shaw on Exodus of the Gaikas from the colony, and arrival and settlement in Gcalekaland, 111. On the recklessness of the colonial troops in their campaign during this war see CPP G76-81 Commission on frontier losses during the war of 1877-78, 40-200, 331-465, 389, 460, 474.

\textsuperscript{59} Valuable information about the looting of several homesteads' economic resources during this war can be obtained from, CPP G76-'81 Commission on frontier losses during the war of 1877-78, 474, 480-481. A number of individuals testified how the registration system contributed to the splitting of various homesteads.

\textsuperscript{60} C.A. Cumming Papers, correspondence box folder 5 1846-83: Cumming to Dr McGill, printed in circular from United Presbyterian Mission house. Those who were initially settled around the mission stations before the war were allowed to regain their prewar settlement ground, but now under a new individual tenure system. See chapter 5.
Receiving very limited opposition to the removal, the government put the relocation scheme in motion by the end of August 1878. Leaving behind only those who were already settled on the mission stations before the outbreak of the hostilities, Sandile's loyal Ngqika were moved first. Then the northern part (known as Anta's location) was cleared under the supervision of Wright, with the aid of Captain Maclean of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, and approximately twenty of his Corps. Magistrate B. Shaw, who was to be in charge of their future settlement, was also instructed to help with the removal.

The instructions for the clearing of the location were very strict and cautionary to the officers in charge.

I was directed to be very careful that no stragglers of any description are left behind, and if wagon transport was required, to apply to Mr Wright, who had been authorised to provide whatever conveyance is necessary.

Strangely enough, the total number of those who were relocated across the Kei far exceeded the number of those who registered as "loyals". This development is very complex to analyse, as a number of explanations are possible. Possibly the numbers of those who registered were miscalculated from the outset, or some of the people who were initially "rebels", fearing total land loss, later claimed to be "loyals" in order to get at least some land even though it was far away. It is also possible that the removal was administered with a determination that surpassed that of the registration process. But these uncoordinated numbers cannot be viewed independently from the problems of statistical unreliability that face any researcher dealing with the Eastern Cape in the nineteenth century.

61. Anta who registered as a "loyal" died shortly before amnesty was granted. When the location was cleared, not even a single living Ngqika soul was supposed to be left behind, (save those who were in mission stations) including sick and old who were in no condition to walk.
63. CPP, G33-'79, Exodus of the Gaikas, 110. Numbers of those who moved here are estimated at 7,459 people, with 6,320 cattle and 2,925 sheep; Spicer "Ngcayecibi" gives the following numbers: 7664 people, 6665 cattle. Compare these numbers to those for the registration, footnote no 28.
In the end however, the majority of the Ngqika were removed. Thus the stimulated "exodus" of the Ngqika to Gcalekaland, initiated and pursued with the zeal of a crusader by Sprigg and his ministry, finally opened up space for settler farms in the former location. After the division of the location into farms, public auctions to settlers were held and the farms were sold on quitrent tenure. Most of the farms, each averaging 1,500 acres, were incorporated into the newly created districts of Cathcart and Stutterheim. The removed Ngqika were joined to the main Gcaleka population in the congested districts of Centane and Willowvale where they were settled on an individual land tenure system, each homestead being allotted ten acres of arable land and a building plot, with grazing rights over an extensive commonage. They were placed under a supervisory network of colonial control exercised by the magistrates, inspector of locations and headmen approved and appointed by the magistrates.

iv) A brief look beyond the Ngqika chieftaincy

The war did not only affect the "rebels" and the removed Ngqika but also, to a large extent, those who remained within their prewar vicinity. These were mainly the crown reserve inhabitants in the settlements of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge, mission Africans and the White inhabitants of Stutterheim village and surrounding communities like Ohlsen and Dohne. The scorched earth campaign and the looting system of the colonial troops were destructive to these communities in much the same way as for the Ngqika. More than ten German farmers at Dohne had their buildings destroyed and stock and crops looted. Numerous trading shops within the Ngqika location, crown reserve area and the village of Stutterheim were also the casualties of war. Looting of stock was a common feature. At Mgwali there were approximately 52 claimants to the

64. The majority of these farms were held under Act 14 of 1878. The Act served to regulate the manner in which crown lands of the colony were to be disposed. Clause ii of the Act declared that all waste and unappropriated crown lands within the Cape Colony should be disposed of on quitrent for the highest annual rent that could be obtained for the same at public auction.
65. BBCC 1881, 32.
68. CPP G76-'81. Commission on Frontier losses in relation to the war of 1877-78, 39-856. Read especially the statements of P Ewers, G Lubke, A Brandt, W Kath and H Venke. Venke in particular lost 107 sheep, shop stock, furniture and standing crops and he attributes most of the losses to colonial troops, 378.
frontier losses commission. Their losses were mainly in livestock, but also in agricultural equipment, standing corn fields and harvested grain. Claims amounted to sums that ranged from ten to several hundred pounds. The same applied at Wartburg, a Berlin mission station.69

The booty system of payment greatly encouraged plunder and looting. Most witnesses and claimants testified to the frontier losses commission that most of their assets were taken by the troops and their allies.70 Early in 1878, the leading article of the Cape Argus newspaper commented that the colonial troops were no longer composed of patriots but idlers and profiteers who were benefiting from the continuation of the war.71 This remark was echoed by J Auld, one of the missionaries stationed at Mgwali during the war:

Perhaps, but it seemed to some of us that if there had been less desire to capture cattle, the rebellion could have been quelled in a much shorter time.72

Moreover, the assets the plaintiffs claimed from the "rebels" were in most cases recaptured by the troops, who failed to offer full returns, using the complicated war situation to their advantage. Commandant Schermbrucker's volunteer troops were repeatedly blamed for the capture of most innocent farmers' stock, but the commandant was unimpressive in justifying some of these actions.

Had [cattle] not been captured they would undoubtedly have been slaughtered by enemy [rebels]. The capture was made necessarily and according to custom of the kaffir war.73

Thus the Ngqika lost large portions of their land and, in addition, the capture of their standing crops and destruction of their white neighbours' trading stations, reduced them to a piteous state after the war. The same may be said of the whites who suffered from the war. To the people who were wholly dispossessed, the colonial troops were no longer soldiers but men cheating by fighting as the booty payment covered what the official payment to each trooper would have been.

70. See the commission report in general, CPP G76-'81 Commission on Frontier losses in relation to the war of 1877.
71. Cape Argus, leading article, 16 May 1878.
72. Cory library, PR 1272-4, J M Auld in the Blythswood Review, 137.
73. CPP G76-'81. Memorandum by Schermbrucker, 352. Schermbrucker was commandant of the Amatola division during the war and he was in charge of a number of Stutterheim German volunteers.
Perhaps one of the most devastating blows during the war period was the congestion of large numbers of cattle in very limited spaces in obedience to a government order in an attempt to secure the cattle from the "rebels". This move was not only nullified by the limited grazing ground available but was also jeopardised by a prolonged and ruinous drought.

South Africa was used to droughts..... but such a drought as oppressed Natives and Europeans in [successive months] of unbroken tyranny was beyond the experience of all. ....In 1877 and until the beginning of 1878 it raged most fiercely; in 1880 it still lingered here and there like a disease.74

The drought, coupled with other related diseases, like lungsickness, led to a considerable number of Stutterheim farmers and some mission Africans losing most of their stock in those confined grazing areas.75 Though it could be argued that the large stock death in the war time grazing areas was not an intended result, the stockowners blamed the losses on the war administration officials. On the other hand, the drought gave the colonial forces a great advantage because the emaciated herds belonging to the Africans could not be moved quickly and as a result they were easily captured.

The war tore apart the network of trade activity that most African communities of the Eastern Cape had struggled to develop. The intensive sale of produced goods, sale of cattle to buy sheep, increasing wool production and its sale became a life of the past. From Cathcart, Stutterheim, King William's Town, Komga and Kei Road, farmers both African and White filed claims to the commission.76 The period after the war became a desperate one: the most frequently sounded notes in official reports during the eighties were the increasing level of poverty, crime, congestion, endless removals and landlessness. The closing stages of the nineteenth century were marked by reports of general social and economic deterioration and with regard to these developments the districts of Komga, King William's Town, Stutterheim and Keiskammahoek were frequently

74. De Kiewiet: The imperial factor, 161.
75. CPP G76-81, Commission on Frontier losses in relation to the war of 1877-78. See especially evidence of William Martin Fleischer who was acting magistrate for Stutterheim from the 22 December 1877 to 8 April 1878, 852-856.
76. CPP G76-81 Commission on Frontier losses in relation to the war of 1877-78. For the intensive trade and practised agriculture see chapter 3.
The end of the war brought hostilities on the frontier to a close, not by only defeating the Ngqika in a military sense, but also by mercilessly ruining their economic existence.

(v) Conclusion: Exit chieftaincy

While the war forced most of the Stutterheim African communities to enter a cycle of overall economic decline, the colonial administration gained leverage in the district. It has already been noted above that Sprigg enforced a settlement pattern more far reaching than the expulsions and annexations of the past wars. The Ngqika uprooted from most of their territorial lands and relocated to a congested portion of Gcalekaland, were left a totally crushed people by the war. By 1881, the civil commissioner of Stutterheim reported that Africans could be only traced in three district settlements in the area and they only totalled 2,090, a very big difference from the population of the prewar settlement.

Table 5.

Demographic and stock number changes in the former Ngqika location in the year 1880.

| Upper Kubusi, Mgwali and Wartburg settlements |
| Population      | 2,090.  |
| Cattle          | 2,331.  |
| Horses          | 156.    |
| Sheep           | 6,331.  |
| Goats           | 1,358.  |
| Wagons          | 29.     |
| Ploughs         | 80.     |

If these numbers are compared to those in figure 3 (in chapter 3) and also to of the removed Ngqika (footnote no 63), an estimation of stock and demographic changes that mainly resulted from the 1877-78 war, can be made.

Source: A.16-'81 Return of Natives, Stock, &c., at the Upper Kabousie, Wartburg and Umgwali Location, in the Division of Stutterheim, under Inspector A Kropf.

77. In connection with Stutterheim's increase in the level of crime and poverty see CPP G33-'82 BNA 1881, 170-171, CPP G3-'84, BNA 1883, 66. For the other cited surrounding districts' rise of proletarianization, see CPP G33-'82 BNA 1881, 112-117, 118-121, 132; CPP G2-'85 BNA 1884, 30, 38, 67; CPP G5-'86 BNA 1885, 28, 39.

78. See table 5.

79. For the prewar population figure see footnote 32 above.
The deaths of Sandile and his brother Anta marked the end of the chieftainship in the area previously known as the Ngqika location. Most of the remaining Ngqika were brought under the administrative system of the new Stutterheim magisterial district by 1880,80 under a new magistrate W Wright, who was elevated from his former position as special magistrate to the Ngqika. As a result the provisions of the Native Location Act 40 of 187981 (which empowered the granting of lots and commonage rights) proper control and tight supervision of African locations were put into effect. The new social behaviour that emerged in the district after the war, was to be strictly dominated by formal agencies of social control that operated under the colonial law.

I found it necessary and convenient to the natives to have special constables stationed in the centre of each location …. this arrangement has proved to be the most satisfactory, and not alone have the constables rendered valuable service to Government, but especially also to the natives who very much appreciate this arrangement.82

It is difficult to assess whether the African people were in favour of the arrangement described in the abovementioned report. There were always different responses to colonialism, and several cases of collaboration and resistance have been noted. It would be too simplistic to generalise one form of response especially when referring to a heterogeneous society as was the case in the Ngqika community.83 However there were very few (if there were any) individuals in favour of bowing to colonial overlordship. One should not overlook the fact that the war had created an impression that the colonial government was unwilling to compromise, especially judging by the ferocity with which the colonial troops undertook the campaign. Thus most Africans in the district were forced to collaborate with the system even if they were not in favour of it.

80. BBCC 1880, 38-39; BBCC 1881, 32.
81. Cape of Good Hope Statutes, Native Location Act no 40 of 1879. The act empowered the granting of lots and commonage rights to individual Africans on perpetual quitrent. The effects of the Act in Stutterheim district are detailed in chapter 5.
82. CPP A16-'81 Return of Natives, Stock &c, at the Upper Kabousie, Wartburg and Umgwali Location, in the Division of Stutterheim, under Inspector A Kropf, 88.
83. The Ngqika community in the prewar period comprised mission settlements such as Mgwali and Wartburg, agricultural settlements such as Kubusi and Isidenge (although they did not feature prominently in this war) and also Sandile's chieftainship.
With the colonial administration in full force in the area, the Africans were collectively brought under disciplinary supervision. This supervision sought to reduce Africans to docility as thoroughly as possible. Constant patrols and increasing numbers of police became a familiar sight in the eighties. Registration of stocks, reporting of stock increase and stock theft detection were constantly applied. Punishment for neglecting or infringing these regulations of behaviour attempted to control the Africans, body and soul. Precise application of administrative techniques of knowledge and supervision was exercised not only by colonial administrators but by also local Africans.

One instance had occurred, when one of the natives had to be brought up before the magistrate for neglecting to report some strange cattle I have found in his possession. This had such good effect with other Natives, that they now all respect the law in a most satisfactory manner ....... The native location Umgwali is itself, at present in the same satisfactory state as Wartburg location. The constable here is a Native a very intelligent person who can read and write English.

The Ngqika were now systematically introduced into the broader system of colonial administration and they were expected to adapt to it. The new system became more obvious and effective when the control of space and the reorganisation of land became the most important factors in the 1880s.

The war of Ngcayecibi no doubt poleaxed the Ngqika. It marked the termination of armed resistance against white rule that had begun about a century previously. The war was a coup de grace to those who had survived the 1856-57 cattle killing; its course and effects caused the Ngqika to fall straight into the hands of the opportunistic colonial government. Having lost their economic power and much of their political and military power, the Africans were increasingly integrated into the colonial political economy on terms set by the colonists. Engulfed by Sprigg’s harsh

84. For more information on the increase in and constant patrols of the police and the effective work of the Stutterheim magistrates, CPP G33-'82 BBNA 1881, 170-171; CPP G3-'84 BBNA 1883, 66; CPP G5-'86 BBNA 1884, 53.

85. CPP A16-'81 Return of Natives, Stock &c at the Upper Kabousie, Warburg, and Umgwali Location, in the Division of Stutterheim, under Inspector A Kropf. 89. Note that Wartburg and Mgwali are now referred to as "locations" because of the introduction of the 1879 Location Act in the district. From the year 1882 the granting of individual lots commenced in these two mission "locations".

86. See pages 87-90, and 100-103 below.
postwar settlement, they were crushed for ever. The period after 1878 marked the beginning of a new form of war, the war for survival, that was to fragment the Stutterheim inhabitants into "deteriorating" and "surviving" communities - a development that became clear from the eighties to the end of the nineteenth century. Of course, it was inconceivable that a postwar settlement following upon a war that had been fought with so much feeling and won by the colonial force, should be much concerned with reforms and amelioration of the conditions of the Africans. But confiscation of the Ngqika location, merciless execution of the Ngqika "combatants" and the changes in stock ownership, had desperate effects which were spectacularly revealed in the fate of those who remained settled in the new district of Stutterheim.

It had been an established pattern in the history of the eastern frontier, that each of its wars resulted in the annexation of land and relocation of the African population, but the unique character of this one was the change in the nature of the "native" policy, to a policy of intensive systematic control drawing in an elite group of Africans to be part of the disciplinary system. The idea, conceived during D'urban's governorship that the Xhosa chiefdoms should be relocated across the Kei, then unsuccessfully reattempted by Wodehouse in 1864 was now achievable through the systematic crushing of the Ngqika. Inside the colonial political boundaries, the 1877-78 war served as a catalyst for change in the political and settlement pattern, as it allowed room for the operation of the Location Act of 1879, offering Africans no other option of gaining access to land except via colonial law. With the removal of chieftainship, individual tenure overtook communal practises. Therefore safeguarding and upgrading of property became individual initiatives instead of solely a community initiative. On the other hand, the removed Ngqika were punished until they could be punished no more as they were sent to the congested areas of Willowvale and Centane and a settlement the colonial government approved of as "tribal" tenure was substituted for an individual tenure system.

87. The group I refer to here is the mission population which was settled in surveyed quitrent areas in the 1880s, and also the crown reserve population (especially Upper Kubusi and Isidenge settlement) which was incorporated into the new Stutterheim district in 1880.
The story of the sheer hopelessness of the social and economic conditions and the systematic and complete political domination of the Ngqika can be read in the reports of magistrates in the following years. By 1880, incorporation of independent chiefdoms in the wider Cape political economy was almost over and, as a result, the colonial administration was gaining a momentum that subsequently acquired a sort of invincibility in the area. The administration merely needed favour and support from the local Africans in order to secure its long existence and welfare. In the following years, Africans who remained settled in the former Ngqika location were to be guaranteed ownership of property such as land. A new era of control by means of their participation, trust and responsibility was to emerge.
CHAPTER 5


The aftermath of the war of Ngcayecibi had been marked by a widespread process of land readjustments in the area previously known as the Ngqika location and its neighbouring communities. This development coupled with the new administration technique that emerged in the 1880s did not aim to crush or dismember the Ngqika as they had already been brought under colonial rule. Rather they were to be scientifically introduced into the broader system of colonial control and were expected to assimilate with it. Reorganisation of land became the essential constituent of this new programme and individualisation on land became the cornerstone of the system.

I should be exceedingly sorry to hear that the government has given up the idea of granting individual titles to Natives, as I believe it is the only way by which they will eventually be made to regard the colonial government as their own and, until this is fully impressed upon them, the colony will always be in danger of war. At the same time I think that these surveys should be judiciously enforced, beginning with locations where European customs and dress have obtained some footing, and gradually extending to the more remote and uncivilised parts.1

The above quotation clearly illuminates the preliminary suggestions in the shift of the nature of the colonial government's "native policy" from that of African exclusion to a policy of inclusion whereby intensive systematic control that drew in Africans to become part of the disciplinary system, was to dominate. Thus "an ideological vacuum which was filled by the humanitarian, elitist, free-enterprise discourse of the missionaries"2 was changing to include scientific incorporation policies. It was in accordance with under these policies that the principle of individualism (particularly with regard to land tenure) was vigorously applied.3 As Peires has pointed out, Cape liberalism predominated in the history of the Eastern Cape during the first half of the nineteenth century,4

3. This analysis is exclusively directed to the Ngqika location. I am aware that the principles of individual tenure were effected in the Eastern Cape as early as the 1840s.
4. Peires, "Pinning the tail on the donkey", 321. Here Peires is specifically responding to Crais. For him, "it is Cape liberalism rather than white supremacy [which features prominently in Crais's analysis] which should have constituted the central theme of any
but the 1877-78 war saw the brief triumph of the Sprigg ministry which marked the inception of principles of social Darwinism. Thus the struggle for existence was to become the "survival of the fittest" in the lives of the Stutterheim Ngqika. Complete subjugation of Africans and "labour for the highest form of life" was the language of the Sprigg ministry. The emergence of a dominant colonial administration which opted to decentralize administrative power through individualization of land and the creation of village administration bodies was underway. It should be noted that this system of administration was challenged in certain respects.

Reorganisation of land and the creation of structured settlements has been a long continuing process in South Africa and the movement of people from scattered settlements to closed villages accelerated from the second half of the nineteenth century and has been continuing right through the present century, varying of course in technicality from place to place and period to period. In the eyes of the colonial government and the nineteenth century missionaries, isolated homesteads were seen as hiding places for "uncivilised natives", while on the other hand African villages and structured settlements were regarded as promoting 'civilisation' and responsibility.

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A new settlement dispensation

By 1880, the Ngqika location and its chieftainship had come to an end, and most of the Ngqika population was already settled in the congested areas of Centane and Willowvale. The end of that location led to the creation of three magisterial districts, Cathcart, Stutterheim and Komga and the completion of the "white corridor" that stretched from East London to Queenstown. The crown reserve fell away to give full status to the new districts of Keiskammahoek and Middle-drift. Pressed under uncompromising Sprigg's thumb, the remnants of the Ngqika (mainly mission Africans in these districts) were settled under the guiding principle of the Location Act No 40 of 1879, an indispensable element in the new programme of reorganisation of land and control of space in these areas. As already noted the Act focused heavily on the granting of individual lots and commonage rights. Thus under this new settlement system, the placement of individuals in controlled areas was to predominate.

The internal organisation of space depends on the principle of elementary partitioning into regular units. ... Each slot in the grid is assigned a value....Once the grid is established, the principle reads, each individual has a place and each place has its individual. The reconstruction of pre-colonial Cape African settlements became more apparent as early as 1848 especially under the governorship of Harry Smith with his "Fingo" settlement project in the district of Victoria East, but it was Grey who vigorously strove to reconstruct the Xhosa social and political structure along lines that would fit the Cape political economy. With the help of the effects of the cattle killing, Grey managed to introduce the village system of settlement to most parts of British Kaffraria, but individual tenure was never carried out with much success beyond the Crown reserve settlement. A village system was introduced to the Ngqika location as early as 1858, but evidence from government published papers suggests that the system never

5. BBCC 1880, 38-39; BBCC 1881, 32.
8. Peires: Dead will Arise, 289-292.
9. See chapter 2 above especially the sections on the Crown reserve and the Ngqika location.
10. See pages 40-41 above; Peires: Dead will Arise, 292.
predominated as two of its many objectives, creation of a close settlement and undermining the "concealment" of African homesteads, were never achieved. By 1874, Liefeldt, the clerk in charge of Ngqika affairs confirmed the failure of the system. The report he filed about the settlement pattern in the Ngqika location during this period has clearly illuminated how unsuccessful the system was and how determined he was to enhance the visibility of the Ngqika homesteads:

On the eastern and south-eastern side of the location, there is much broken and rugged country along the banks of the Kei and the Kabousi rivers, scarcely inhabited but by such as prefer a life of seclusion. Were I authorised to commit raids on these locations from time to time, and bum out the kraals, forcing them to be on high and exposed lands, I think good would result. 11

Liefeldt’s desire to restructure the Ngqika location settlement was never fulfilled, not even with the aid of the Location Act of 187612. This failure can be attributed to the intensified strength of the Ngqika chieftainship during the years 1866-1877 which went hand in hand with high population density in the location during this period. The war of Ngayecibi (1877-78) eliminated the obstacles that stood in the way of reconstruction plans. The war obliterated whatever remained of precollonial social life and paved the way for the imposition of colonial laws to replace African social practices. Taking full opportunity of the situation created by the war, especially the fact that a limited and manageable number of Africans remained settled in the area, the colonial government devised an administration system of close observation, control and co-operation whereby each individual would eventually act as his own superintendent.13 This administration system relied on the Location Act of 1879 which was devised to be applied to African "locations" which in the eyes of the government necessitated more methodical observation and supervision in the cause of peace, welfare and prosperity of the colony.

The Location Acts of 1876 and 1879 were mainly concerned with the "better supervision and management of the locations". However, while the Location Act of 1876 gave strong supervisory

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11. CPP G27-'74 BBNA 1873, 58, extract from report of clerk in charge with Sandile.
12. Act No 6 of 1876.
13. The new regulation and conditions under which titles were granted to Africans under the Location Act of 1879 promoted a direct link between an individual and the government as far as land administration was concerned. The individual was expected to manage his individual lot, thus individualism was imposed on communalism.
powers to location inspectors, the 1879 Act emphasised self management. Thus, a shift from the outside administration exercised by location inspectors (as set out in the 1876 Act) to that practised by individual lotholders inside was to be observed. The 1879 Act stipulated and guaranteed the right of property ownership that was attached to perpetual quitrent. Furthermore, the Act was drafted in a manner which offered considerable influence for property owners in the decision making of locations management.

The 1879 Location Act was drafted when Sprigg's ministry was still preoccupied with clearing the Ngqika location. This coincidence was to be to the ministry's advantage. The Act would be applied to limited numbers of manageable inhabitants. Besides the fact that it was drafted to paralyse whatever measure of traditionality had remained, the Act became tempting to those who had been influenced to associate right of property ownership with prosperity and safety. For instance, on the mission stations (in which the majority of the African population during the postwar period remained settled), close connections between self reliance, motivation, trust and obedience to both God and the government were psychologically apprehended in such a way that the provisions of the 1879 Location Act which exhibited responsibility and "prosperity" were unlikely to receive a hostile reception. The following statement from Wright, the civil commissioner of Stutterheim in the year 1880, commented:

The natives of the three mission stations, Bethel, Wartburg and Umgwali are anxious to get a settlement of the questions as to the tenure on which they are to hold their land, and having been already informed that the Government intend to issue individual titles to the land after it had been surveyed, they are most anxious that this step should be taken and their holdings secured to them.

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14. Native Location Act No 6 of 1876, especially the first thirteen clauses.
15. CPP A 68-'80 Draft of regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to grant title to Africans under the Location Act No 40 of 1879, see especially clause no 5 of the section on Building Lots 3.
16. One of the basic teachings of Christianity is trust and obedience, and in most cases these characteristics are directed towards God and as well to the Government, see the Holy Bible Romans chapter 13 especially the first seven verses. Moreover, the missionary teachings stress individualism, the individual stands isolated on his/her own and neither his/her family nor a church organisation can help him achieve salvation.
17. CPP G13-'80 BBNA 1879, 193.
The role of mission ideology

The mission population's anxiety to gain access to individual tenure is not surprising. The mission Biblical influences were directed towards stimulating a social behaviour that exhibited order. Characteristics that demonstrated accountability and responsibility were key elements in mission society. These characteristics could be attained through order, and that order in the "eyes of the missionaries" was individual tenure which to them signified light as opposed to darkness. Thus a settlement set under light would be seen to shine in by observers who in turn might observe its work and then honour it.

Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your father in heaven.18

The interview held with Rev. Kropf of the Berlin mission by the 1883 Commission on native affairs, confirmed the process of attaining that order.

Question: On a station where the heathen kaffir lives in his original state what would be the first step to lead him on towards individual tenure?

Answer: Amongst such Natives I should have a mission station, giving certain natives individual titles. After these have been improved, the surrounding natives will begin to see the advantage and will themselves ask for it. After a time a form of municipality regulations might be introduced, and I would allow those who held individual tenure to elect men to make regulations under the sanction of the Government.19

It is interesting to note that for the missionaries a settlement that is visibly positioned brings light to the world.20 For, those who live under this light can not only be seen, but can also be heard. Once seen and/or heard, then the accountability of each individual is ascertained. Therefore order is established.

18. Holy Bible, Matthew 5 verse 16.
If people are allowed to live in their [non surveyed] lands the discipline in the locations will be corrupted in a short time, for the offenders leave the locations purposely in order to escape control and discipline. 21

The "goodness" of visibility was greatly confirmed by the local missionaries as early as 1865. Testifying to the commission held in that year, both Reverends Kropf and Soga strongly disapproved of communal tenure. For them, that settlement system resembled an arena filled with evil, confusion and darkness and could be only appreciated by a person who benefited from it.

Isolated kraals are a great nuisance and hiding place for thieves, and therefore liked by the Natives. 22

Significantly though, that darkness could only be transformed by "civilization" that could only function in openness. Thus accessibility and openness became accessories in stimulating and ordering structured settlement that would in turn prompt "goodness".

If we look to the education-christianization of the natives; if we look to the facility of detecting and preventing thieves, the system of native locations and villages, is admirable...There are some places in this country so inaccessible as to render it almost impossible for persons to reach the natives by education and Christianity. 23

The fundamental part of the missionaries' teachings lay in their rejection of both deceit and secrets and their promotion of openness and brotherhood. The teachings emphasised the association of openness and light and also how through this openness secrets might be overcome. Thus secrets went hand in hand with darkness and confusion, whereas openness and confiding with God would ensure the passing away of darkness and the shining of true light. 24 Under this new behavioural order, each individual confides in the other and grieves for the other.

Confess your trespasses to one another, and pray for one another. 25

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22. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, see especially the statement of Rev. Kropf, 245.
23. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, statement of Rev. Soga, 165.
24. Holy Bible, John 2, verses 6-8.
25. Holy Bible, James 5, verse 16.
As early as during the British Kaffrarian administration, missionaries had placed themselves in the centre of the local Africans' social lives, and by 1880 their influence on a portion of the population had become obvious. The penetration of the missionaries into the area opened the way not only for the "glorification of European civilization but for the conquest of the African mind," inasmuch as that when the government suggested individual tenure, the majority of the local Africans reacted favourably, as was indicated in the case of Mgwali, Berlin and Wartburg. Consequently the government exploited what missionaries invested. By the 1880s, a proper climate for the government's programme of introducing surveys was set.

The two mission stations Mgwali and Wartburg had already been allocated 900 acres by the British Kaffrarian government. Rev Chalmers of the Presbyterian Church confirmed to the 1883 commission that these grants were strictly for mission purposes.

Not surprisingly, however, a number of writings have indicated missionaries for their fundamental role in altering the social structure of the Africans. Ally has noted that "throughout the period of [late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] the missionaries were accordingly to be the foremost advocates for the introduction of a system of individual tenure for Africans." Cochrane has added further that "mission stations also became important centres for the transformation of the traditional land relationships." Recently Vazi who has written the history of the Presbyterian Church at Pirie mission has adopted Majeke's line of debate and has implicated the

27. See footnote 19 above.
28. Footnote 19 above.
29. BK 70, Brownlee to Maclean 1 January 1860. Mgwali was granted 500 acres and Wartburg 400 acres.
30. G4-'83, Commission on native laws and customs, see especially the statements by Rev Chalmers and Rev Kropf,156, 241-245.
33. N Majeke: The role of missionaries. Majeke has attempted to prove that throughout the process of colonial conquest, the missionaries had served as the colonial government's agents in preparing the way for the latter's triumph. Uncritically, Vazi adheres to a
missionaries as agents of the government in stimulating individual tenure at Pirie. Indisputedly, the role of the missionaries in stimulating the introduction of individual tenure remains a vital issue and it merits a critical analysis, but a reduction of missionaries to agents either of government or of contemporary socio-economically dominant groups, limits our rational understanding of their influences in social circles. The issue here is not to deny that missionary teachings complemented the government's goals. Indeed, some missionaries found their way into affairs of government and were to a certain extent implicated in decidedly worldly relations of power and dominance. Addressing the 1865 Commission on native affairs, Bryce Ross, Presbyterian missionary of Pirie mission station, commented:

Were [Africans] to be taught political geography in a proper way, they would soon see, that in the present state of the world, it would be the height of madness to think of keeping out the civilised nations of Europe from South Africa; and they would see, also that all things considered, the British are the Best European people to be governed by.

But equally this does not imply that the political implications of mission activity were solely pursued for the triumph of the colonial government. Rather, the main emphasis here hinges on the capability of missionaries to infiltrate and act on the indigenous society, to lay the ground work for conversion. Simultaneously however, they imposed (upon indigenous society) a new social behaviour that derived much from the "values and conventions of modern European culture".

While the indigenous culture, social and political formations and relations were vulnerable to transformation, it cannot be denied that that change (which the missionaries partly instigated) produced a new cultural order. Furthermore the teachings produced a kind of authority since they were taken possession of by some African groups and sometimes redefined before finally being put into use.

straightforward Majeke approach.

35. For Biblical influences on accountability, responsibility, light and order and as well as teachings on obedience suited the government's needs.
36. CPP (Unnumbered) 1865 Commission on native affairs, Statement of Bryce Ross, 151.
Interestingly, Bundy has noted that "transmission of skills from missionaries to Africans was not the one-sided process ... there was present, in varying degrees at different times and places, an active decision by Africans (individually or collectively) to partake of new skills, implements or life styles".38 Here Bundy shifts the centre of gravity (from the mission camp) and dissipates it between missionaries and indigenous population. Thus he has drawn attention to the bearings of mission teachings on family units' social lives. Therefore through individual or numerous family units the teachings impacted upon vast sections of the indigenous community.

It would however be too simplistic to suggest that mission teachings at Mgwali and Wartburg had by 1880 attained total success, and hence that each inhabitant by this period appreciated the standards of European civilization (as indicated in their anxiety to have access to individual tenure).39 Rather, one should not overlook the influential capacity of converted family units on the indigenous structure. Indeed, as Monica Wilson has indicated with the case of nineteenth century Keiskammahoek, the formation of voluntary associations based on mutual acceptance of the doctrines of Christianity undermined the principles on which both the kinship structure and the local structures were founded.40 Therefore the indigenous kinship structure faced a challenge from the Christian teachings. Subsequently Christian teachings negated retention of indigenous practices.

Introduction of the individual tenure system cannot be solely blamed upon the mission camp, for the government was anxious to have the system implemented. As noted above, during Grey's governorship individual tenure policies were firmly advocated but only partially introduced. Although the system might have resembled a perfect policy at an ideological level, practically it never took off in the Ngqika location until the 1880s, by which period the Ngqika chieftaincy had yielded to the colonial administration.

38. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 36.
39. See footnote 19 above.
But if the introduction of individual tenure was sought by both the government and missionaries, one needs to ask why the system never predominated in areas such as post-1857 British Kaffraria, which was heavily occupied by missionaries and also colonially administered. The simplest answer to this question is that the missionaries' teachings had not yet impacted upon the whole area, but also most crucially (as noted before) the existence of chieftaincy in some areas (particularly in the case of Sandile) was problematic to the colonial government.

Moreover, on some occasions there were issues of dispute between missionaries and government pertaining to the introduction of this system. There are clear cases in which the generalised notion of missionaries being the agents of the government is inappropriate. For instance, published correspondence illustrates the disharmony that existed between the colonial government and Pirie missionaries pertaining to the introduction of individual tenure at that station. The government blamed the missionaries for having hurried and extended the system even to individuals who were incapable of meeting the quitrent demands, but Vazi has claimed that the introduction of individual tenure was a joint mission-government enterprise conducted on a co-operative basis. The issue here is not to deny that the two institutions had a common aim in introducing the system; however one needs to assess how and why the system was effected, which according to the published correspondence seems to be much more complicated than Vazi suggests. The problem of Vazi's work here hinges on his failure to explore this disharmony and this pitfall results in a simplistic analysis.

Nor is it fair to conclude that different missionaries operated uniformly. On Mgwali and Wartburg mission stations, one finds a clear reflection of different denominational operations. Thus a

41. Peires: Dead will Arise, 291, has suggested that individual tenure was never carried beyond the crown reserve area.
42. Pirie mission was within the crown reserve area surveyed by the British Kaffrarian government in the 1850s. For more details on the survey of the area, see Vazi, "Pirie Mission" 62-71.
43. CPP G116-'83 Ministerial Department of Crown lands and public works. Reports on land matters in the Division of King William's Town and Stutterheim. See especially the report of S Melvill (special commissioner), 13.
generalisation of mission activity in the area is crude. Besides the fact that the Berlin missionaries (who were active at Wartburg) strictly pursued individual tenure, they also complied with the government in securing the settlement pattern by advocating the institution of a strict pass system. An orderly functioning mission society had no room for "loose characters". An exchange of views in a question and answer format between Rev. Kropf and top government officials during the 1883 commission enquiries confirmed his stringency on pass laws and the control of movement.

Q. What sort of pass laws would be most effective?
A. I would not allow one native to move from district to district without a pass.
Q. Are not these pass laws very harassing to natives?
A. No not at present, English men may have different views.

The above statement signifies a number of things. First it confirms how the Berlin mission enterprise was interrelated with the expansion of the colonial system, in this case however not only for the benefit of the government but also for that of the missionaries. Secondly if the Berlin missionaries wanted to implement pass laws for their benefit more strictly than the colonial government desired, then missionaries' ambitions have been underestimated. This is particularly true of views which maintain that the mission agenda was solely pursued for the benefit of the colonial government. Even if missionaries served as catalysts for change it remains difficult to assess if they were knowing or unknowing catalysts.

The Presbyterian missionaries stationed at Mgwali operated rather differently from the Berlin missionaries. They sought to attract converts by adopting an attitude of compromise towards traditional social practices in the district. Besides the fact that Tiyo Soga (who understood African social practices) was the pioneer of the denomination's activity in the area, the White ministers who worked with and after him believed that traditional practices should not be radically rejected in their evangelization enterprise (interestingly, Soga was less accommodating than his successors in

45. CPP G4-83 Commission on native laws and customs, see especially the statement by Rev. Kropf, 241-245.
46. CPP G4-83 Commission on native laws and customs, see especially the statement by Rev. Kropf, 241-245.
Also testifying before the commission of 1883, Rev. Chalmers disclosed how Presbyterians allowed the continued existence of communal tenure for the maintenance of harmonious relations among the inhabitants of Mgwali outstations such as Lujilo\(^{48}\) east of Mgwali and Henderson\(^{49}\) which was situated at the Thomas river in the northern portion of the district.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Q.</th>
<th>Did you select [land] allotments?</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>My principle was this: after the land was surveyed [referring to the earlier BK government surveys] and the present Auditor-General had pointed out the terms on which the people were to occupy land, I expected disputes unless I adopted some plan, and I told the Christian native men that they were to divide all the arable land according to the number of families located there, and that they were to settle all land disputes of any kind, such as trespass, allotting ground for widows, &amp;c.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Q.</th>
<th>Did you act upon that system?</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Yes up to time of my leaving.</td>
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<th>Q.</th>
<th>Was it satisfactory?</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Yes.(^{50})</td>
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The basic differences between these denominations (Presbyterian and Berlin missionaries) lay in their land administration policies and also in their methods of social control. While the Presbyterians preferred to retain communal practices and familial ties (or at least transform these gradually), the Lutherans envisaged a society that exhibited individualism guided by a strict system of mobility control. The latter policies were not radically different from the provisions of the 1879 Location Act, but there were parallels on issues that concerned certain aspects of civilization (i.e. education and Christianity). Additionally, an orderly arranged settlement pattern of mission inhabitants on the glebe\(^{51}\) (but without title deeds) was already in existence before the hostilities of 1877-78. Each mission homestead had access to arable lands that were divided into plots.

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47. CPP (Unnumbered) \(1865\) Commission on native affairs, especially the statement of Rev. Soga, 165.
48. Lujilo was already an outstation of Mgwali even before the outbreak of war, but as a result of the war it was depopulated and was taken over for settler farming, as it is still today.
49. Henderson was also an outstation of Mgwali established in the 1860s, but was also unoccupied as most of its inhabitants (loyal Ngqika) were removed to across the Kei. It has also become a settler farming area.
50. CPP G4-83 Commission on native laws and customs see especially the statement by Rev. Chalmers, 156.
51. Glebe is used strictly to denote mission ground/land.
averaging between two and four acres. Both mission stations held the titles which were registered under the name of the clerk of the Presbytery on behalf of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and under the name of the Berlin missionary society respectively. This settlement pattern paralleled that of the Catholic mission station at Keilands. The suggestion for the subdivision of Mgwali glebe into small arable plots was originally initiated by the British Kaffrarian government under George Grey. However the system was not extended beyond the glebe until the government administration took over from the missionaries after the 1877-78 war. Thereafter, the government assumed a dominant position in the control and supervision of mission settlements.

52. I owe thanks to the aldermen of these two denominations for their assistance in mapping out the above-outlined settlement pattern. Oral tradition gathered seems to suggest that most Africans who were unable to meet the requirements for surveyed lots (conducted in the 1880s) later joined the mission grounds as tenants. Interviews with Mrs B Ntsonkotha, Mgwali, 27 September 1993, and Mr Sam, 13 June 1992. The arrangement of arable lands in this settlement parallels that outlined Rev. Chalmers in his testimony during the 1883 Commission. See footnote 50 above.

53. CPP G4-83 Commission on native laws and customs, see especially the statements of Revs Kropf and Chalmers, 156, 241-245.

54. See page 139 and footnote 18 in chapter 7.

An in-depth analysis of the introduction of the individual tenure system has been undertaken by various scholars. Different conclusions have arisen. Du Toit concluded that no progress was made (by the government) in extending the system of individual tenure in the 1860s. He added that by 1866, there were three types of land tenure in the Cape pertaining to Africans. These were: individual tenure on small plots outside British Kaffraria and the Amathole (Crown Reserve); freehold plots of twenty acres in the Ciskei and "customary tribal tenure" in the Wittebergen, Glen Grey and the British Kaffraria "locations". Oiffert reinforced Du Toit’s analysis, but unlike Du Toit, who concluded that Cape African land policy had by 1866 reached a motionless state, Bouch maintains that the system remained changeable (at least in Glen Grey). Thus efforts to introduce individual tenure throughout the colony met with only partial success.

A close examination of the government’s emphasis on individual tenure for Cape Africans by Russell Ally has implied that the implementation of the 1879 Location Act was a crucial stage in the history of individual tenure. He maintains that the Act promoted the general applicability and effectiveness of quitrent tenure throughout the colony, especially in the African locations. He has further pointed out that since the vast African territories had by 1879 fallen under colonial rule, the 1879 Location Act became decisive. Hendricks has strengthened Ally theory. Although he has questioned the impact of land individualisation on African social structure,

63. For Hendricks “the practice of distorting the communal system of land tenure by substituting chiefs with magistrates consistently foreshadowed the expressed but nebulous commitment to individual tenure”(27). I have reservations about this assessment, for I believe that it would be hazardous to underplay the impact of the 1879 Act (or individualism on land) since the Act was applied to a large African area such as the ex-Ngqika location. Moreover the introduction of individual tenure not only effected new power relations at a local level (see the analysis below), but also marked the beginning of a new form of social behaviour amongst individual lotholders.
Hendricks maintains that the 1879 Act aimed at undermining traditional authority and was "a piece of legislation designed to end inchoate attempts at introducing individual tenure".64

The implications of the 1879 legislation

So the clear objective of the colonial government during the late 1870s and 1880s was to intensify its campaign to undermine and replace communal tenure. Communal tenure was always undesirable to colonial officials as it was regarded as a crux of "tribalism" that went hand in hand with chieftaincy. Therefore individualism on land was regarded as a deus ex machina that would end the Cape Colony's "native" land problem. An interesting feature of the 1879 Location Act was that it not only provided for the division of land and the granting of quitrent lots to separate individuals, but it also provided for the separation of building lot from garden lot65—a foreign notion for the ex-Ngqika location inhabitants. Thus a new development that marked the beginning of a comprehension of political power and social behaviour by the reorganisation of space came into existence. The Act was drafted in such a manner that colonial land administration ensured proper control and discipline relying heavily on the organisation of individuals in space. That control and discipline necessitated specific regulations which ensured the rearrangement of space while simultaneously assuring appropriate behaviour of individuals in the new system.66 Thus maintenance of local order in the new dispensation would no longer rest heavily on the hands of the state, rather it would be distributed to individual members of the community. The relation between an individual and his lot and vice versa would ensure that each individual was a docile member of the new system.

65. CPP A 68-'80 Draft of regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to grant titles to Africans under the Native Locations Act No 40 of 1879, 3-4. Building lot in this instance refers to the space specifically designed for residency, while garden lot refers to arable lands.
66. The Location Act of 1879 prohibited the alienation or transference of the two lots without the consent of the government, thus the government was to be the key player in the administration of the land while retaining the faith of the occupiers for the new settlement system's welfare.
Despite the fact that the Act aimed at stimulating self management, the government still retained overall land administrative power. Nevertheless, the new social settlement pattern opened the door for the decentralisation of management and supervision of individual lots to the lower echelons of the government. Simultaneously, it ensured the lotholders' participation in determining the goals of the new settlement system. For a more feasible administration therefore, the Sprigg ministry took into consideration the notion that participation in deciding the establishment of goals and priorities might lead to deeper commitment.

In addition to the missionaries' objectives of stimulating accountability and order, the colonial officials were embarking on a project of constructing a new Cape society in which social honour no longer derived from a style of life practised by kinship groups. Rather it was to be achieved simply by private ownership and appropriate handling of property, or by skill and attribute. Thus the policies of individual tenure that were pursued and advocated by Sir George Grey as early as in the 1850s, were rejuvenated, revised, reprogrammed and implemented with renewed vigour against the background of the intransigent Sprigg ministry that became supreme after the collapse of the Ngqika location. A point of parallel between these two Cape rulers' policies was their objective for a mixed population settlement in the Cape, while simultaneously the colonial officials retained a decisive role in the administration of different population groups (especially Africans) in the region. But while Grey favoured attracting, controlling and retaining the faith of the majority of the African people in the colonial government (as he had demonstrated with his salary and assimilation project amongst British Kaffrarian chiefs and councillors), Sprigg sought complete subjugation of Africans while retaining a limited African population within the colonial boundaries. In return, he expected the Africans to demonstrate firm faith in and obedience to the colonial

67 In this case I refer to the village management boards which were established during the 1890s in the mission locations of Mgwali and Wartburg. Board executive members were normally elected from the location population so as to imply their involvement in government affairs.
government through his individual tenure system. Even subsequent Cape premiers such as Scanlen (1881) and Upington (1884) operated in the shadow of Sprigg.  

Access to land might have sparked the interest of some Africans, but the 1879 Location Act did not necessarily mean that lotholders had the right to control their demarcated space. Nor had they freedom to utilise their lots as they wished. This was explicit from the Act's regulations and conditions under which titles were granted, especially those regulations that prohibited the alienation or transference of either the building lot or garden lot or vice versa without the consent of the government.  These conditions enabled the government to retain an influential position in the general management of the locations.

**The proliferation of colonial bureaucracy**

An interesting development during the same period (1880s) was the proliferation of the bureaucratic administration and in particular the entrenchment of bureaucracy in local districts. The regional administration centres such as King William's Town and Queenstown were reinforced with local administration structures as new magisterial districts such as Tarka, Cathcart, Komga and Stutterheim were created. With each district having its own resident magistrate or civil commissioner, subordinate location(s) inspectors and (later) Village Management Boards, detailed reports concerning political, economic and social affairs were no longer conveyed through regional centres such as King William's Town and Queenstown, but were compiled locally and then

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68. Sprigg assisted by the war of Ngcayecibi undertook the most far-reaching settlement that ever followed an eastern frontier war. By removing the Ngqika to the Transkei, he reduced the number of Africans on the western side of the Kei and thus ensured that Scanlen and Upington built upon his foundations.

69. See CPP A 68-80 Draft of Regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to grant titles to Africans under the Native location Act 40 of 1879, 3-4. The same conditions were adopted at Mgwali and Wartburg mission stations in the years 1883-1884 respectively. See the subsection on these mission stations below.

70. The Location Act of 1879, stipulated that the general management of the location might be subjected to a committee or municipality, that would be elected by the owners of the building or garden lots within each location, but the said committee or municipality would still be attached to the government.

71. BBCC 1879, Report by Queenstown civil commissioner, 22.
channelled directly to the Native Affairs department in Cape Town. The first secretary for Native Affairs (Charles Brownlee) was appointed as early as 1872 and during 1873 a resolution was passed "that a Blue Book on Native Affairs be placed on the table [during each session of parliament]"\(^{72}\), but it was only from 1880 that Stutterheim, Komga and Cathcart magistrates filed their own reports independent of King William's Town and Queenstown to the Blue Book on Native Affairs.

As colonial administration in Stutterheim and adjoining districts gained strength, the value system that demonstrated dominance by formal agencies of social control such as the educational institutions, the police force and the legal institutions of the courts and judiciary, gained momentum. Exercising continuous surveillance, these formal social control agencies drew indiscriminately from all races.\(^{73}\) This is not to deny that there existed limits on how far Africans could rise in the bureaucratic system, but the few that were employed offered an opportunity for government to infiltrate and eliminate any traditional social practices that might have still remained intact. The reorganisation of the police system in an attempt to effect a close system of surveillance that aimed at deterring "loose characters", became one of the priorities.\(^{74}\) In the year 1882, the commissioner of the Cape police confirmed the connection between the police and the legal institutions of the court and the judiciary, and also how the mechanism of the region's inhabitants policing was expanded during this period.

The force is gradually and tentatively being brought to its authorised strength...In these divisions [King William's Town, Stutterheim, East London and Komga] are seventeen police stations .... A close personal supervision is exercised by all offices .... In addition to the stations a certain number of native headmen are employed as policeman in the locations.... Secret police are employed as required ... The whole district is patrolled regularly... As the police gain experience and become more personally acquainted with the people amongst whom they serve, it will doubtless be found that there will be larger proportion of summonses issued to apprehensions effected and that fewer incomplete cases will be brought before the magistrates than is now the case.\(^{75}\)

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73. See the quotation footnoted 75 below.
74. CPP G100-'83 Report by commissioner of police on the several police districts of the Colony, 15-17.
75. CPP G100-'83 Report by commissioner of police on the several districts of the colony, 16-17.
Indisputably, the 1880s which saw the introduction of firm land administration policies in Stutterheim district, coincidental with this proliferation of legal bureaucracy. This new settlement model was first directed to the mission stations of Mgwali and Wartburg. It is worth illuminating the implications of these surveys on these mission stations and also the new set of behaviours that developed under this order.

The 1879 Location Act, space differentiation and power relations in Mgwali and Wartburg settlements

The mission stations of Mgwali and Wartburg were the main settlements that were heavily affected by the 1879 Location Act in the Stutterheim region. This new settlement system (particularly its condition of separation of building lots from arable and grazing lands), marked the end of open spaces between homesteads. Subsequently, the previously scattered homesteads were gathered into villages. Thus for the first time individualization of communally held land around Mgwali and Wartburg mission stations materialised with the backing of the 1879 Location Act. Now, each individual would be attached to his property to such an extent that he would act as his own policeman, since "each individual [was supposed to exercise] surveillance over and against himself". The Africans clustered around Mgwali and Wartburg mission stations were now at the mercy of the Act, and hence arrangements for speedy surveys for the postwar settlement were set into motion.

Surveys around these mission stations were vigorously implemented between the years 1880 to 1884. Interesting to note was the correlation between the manner in which surveys were conducted and the new set of power relations that emphasised individuals' interaction. Thus though

76. See CPP BBNA from years 1880 to 1900.
77. One of the most effective parts of the Act was its inclusion of the draft that detailed regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to grant titles to Africans.
78. The term village is used strictly here to denote a close settlement.
80. CPP G32-'84 Report of Surveyor General 1883, 11-12; CPP G50-'82 Report of Surveyor General 1881, 27. Note that the 1880s surveys were conducted around mission stations not in the mission glebe as was the case during the British Kaffraria administration.
the surveys were carried out with the clear aim of teaching the principles of individualism, they also gave birth to new power relations. Surveys ensured space differentiation by a proper separation of building lots from garden lots, and a reservation of a commonly used grazing commonage. As a result building lots averaging an acre each, were laid out rectangularly, concentrated in two adjacent lines. The building lots were arranged in block form with each block consisting of a standardized number of lots, which were in turn formally divided by streets which served as intersections and for communication purposes.\textsuperscript{81} Except for those lots in extreme exterior corners, either the back or the front of a building lot was clearly visible to other lots, that were either diagonally behind or diagonally in front. Thus each building lot positioned within this new settlement plan was forced to overlook other building lots, while itself in turn being overlooked over by other building lots.\textsuperscript{82} This is not to suggest this act of looking and being overlooked was a preplanned motive, but rather that the reorganisation of space (to fit the new settlement) prompted the visibility of building lots. As the system became entrenched it became "a central means [of operation] by which individuals [were] linked together in a disciplinary space."\textsuperscript{83}

Taking the analysis further, a shift in the nature of power relations from that between social group and government to that between individuals and government, then finally between and amongst individuals, became substantive.\textsuperscript{84} This is where close surveillance of village members materialized. Power relations at village level became twofold: first, power relations within and amongst villagers in the newly surveyed village, which I call inside power; second a power relation between villagers and the state, which I call outside power. The inside power rested heavily on how each lotholder related to his neighbour and/or vice versa. Obviously, in the surveyed villages, the diminishing of

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81. The definition of this settlement pattern here is not based on an official document or settlement plan. I have still not gained access to any survey plan of the district's settlements. However, due to observational experience during my fieldwork in Stutterheim area I have been able to approximate the settlement pattern of the early quitrenters of Wartburg and Mgwali as outlined in the main text.
82. For a similar analysis of space, see Westaway: "The formulation of modern power", 132-135.
83. Dreyfus and Rabinow: Michel Foucault, 156.
84. CPP G8-95 BBNA 1894, 43. The civil commissioner of Stutterheim, Whittam, reported in the year 1895 that the condition of African land owners in surveyed locations was "encouraging and generally satisfactory" since they depended on their efforts to achieve a livelihood.
\end{flushleft}
distances previously scattered between homesteads had a crucial impact on this aspect. Now that
the village was closely arranged, neighbours had far more chance of monitoring each other than
in the pre-survey settlement. The new settlement set on confined space did not guarantee
the invisibility of one’s intrinsic values. The act of looking and being overlooked strengthened this
system. Therefore concealment of private affairs in the close settlement became more difficult. It
is difficult to assess to what extent secrets of social life could be contained under the changing
settlement pattern at Mgwali and Wartburg mission stations, but given the fact that nature
(space in this regard) usually intermingles with its social organisms to provide social continuity,
therefore alterations to physical environment might have significant effects on social life.

Although it remains natural that any society seeks to survive by making the required adaptations
to its physical environment, usually the socialization process has a key influence on the values of
society. In the pre-survey scattered settlement, social action was largely justified and conducted
within a framework of tradition that operated within the parameters of kinship relations, but in the
surveyed settlement “modern” notions of rational action became more pervasive. The relative
stability of traditional thinking was substituted by rational thinking which became a “perpetual quest
for the best means to achieve a given end or goal - thereby tending to open up social life to more
scrutiny and questioning than hitherto”. This rapid change in settlement paralysed whatever role
traditional practices could serve and finally paved the way for the opening up of social goals and

85. A similar observation has been made by Westaway in Keiskammahoek, particularly after
the introduction of betterment programmes in the previously communal villages such as
Gwiligwili, see Westaway: “The formulation of modern power”, 132-145.

86. An assessment of extent to which the introduction of closely arranged sites had effect in
the private social lives of Mgwali and Wartburg people could not be conducted through
interviews as it is impossible to find surviving respondents who might have been directly
affected by this change. However this drawback does not close the door to the assumption
that there always exists a fundamental relationship between a society and its physical
environment or rather its nature; moreover this readjustment of this physical environment
as argued in the main text, will always have a detrimental effect on society members’s
social lives. The crux of the reorganised settlement pattern here hinged on the congestion
of a large number of people in a limited space, thus secret social practices arranged by
kinship relations maintained by different homesteads were exposed to public view thus
chances of retaining social secrets were minimised.

standards which could only be attained through the social interaction and competition that existed publicly.

Power relations in the quitrenters' village were not only restricted to village level. Here it will be useful to examine how the village administration mechanism operated. Although individual tenure and the village management board [VMB] system yielded supervisory powers to the quitrenters, there was always room for state intervention. The nucleus of the administration might have been in the village but overall power rested with the government. Though board members were elected by quitrenters, they were the ears and eyes of the government. Thus although they were from inside, the board members were a link to outside power. Indeed as Robinson has noted "efficient administration required knowledge - both of local politics and of the colonial territory"; the colonial government saw the inclusion of the VMB as a vital step in the administration. VMB members would have a better understanding of local politics and their connection with the colonial administration would enhance village supervisory powers.

Once again here, one needs to examine how this signified a change from the pre-survey settlement. Under the pre-survey settlement, location inspectors (who were obviously outsiders), with the aid of the Cape Mounted Police, the resident magistrate and finally the Native Affairs department monitored locations. Now under the surveyed settlement, the same powers, with the exception of the VMB on the village level, undertook the monitoring process. The difference came with the intervention of the VMB. Therefore, inside and outside power were now linked. An interesting aspect was the involvement of Africans in the bureaucracy. Not only were they VMB members, but were also joining the police force, including some individuals from Mgwali. Thus in this

89. CPP G46-1908 Appointments on the investigations of rural occupation of lands, vagrancy and trespassing, stock theft and cattle removal, Kaffir Beer, intoxicating liquor in the district of Albany, Bathurst, East London, King William's Town, Komga, Peddie and Stutterheim, 6-10.
90. See footnote 75 above.
91. See footnote no 85 and page 83 in chapter 4.
settlement, the colonial officials not only achieved the visibility of African settlements as they initially wished\textsuperscript{92}, but also the visibility of African social lives.

More than two hundred building and arable lots came into being as a result of the survey at Mgwali and Wartburg. At Mgwali, 153 building lots were divided into 5 villages, with each of 150 building lot occupants having access to the same number of garden lots. The other three building lots averaging 1,5 morgen were reserved for a trading station. These 150 garden lots averaged 10 acres each and were by law attached to their building lots.\textsuperscript{93}

A similar pattern of survey occurred at Wartburg as 88 garden lots averaging about 10 acres each were divided into 3 villages.\textsuperscript{94} Like in the survey of Burnshill in the district of Keiskammahoek after the war of 1850-53,\textsuperscript{95} Mgwali and Wartburg were surveyed strictly according to "modernisation" norms and practices.\textsuperscript{96} Surveys ensured that arable lands were located along the banks of streams and rivers within the boundaries of the locations while building lots were placed in higher positions away from their relevant arable lands. Reserved for each settlement was a commonage which was supposed to be utilised as a common pastureland. The technicality of administering this commonage rested with the lotholders. However the government held the highest authority to approve a proposed (but elected) administration committee/body.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{92.} See the quotation footnoted no 11 above.
\textsuperscript{94.} LND 1/740 Ref L 12092 Subject Wartburg mission station, see the report of J G Horne Surveyor General on Wartburg's settlement plan, 16 March 1899. Also interview with Mr M Fetsha an old quitrenter of Wartburg location, 2 October 1992; CPP G32-'84 Report of Surveyor General 1883, 11-12. Sequentially the villages' African names are: 1) Ngqanda, 2) Ndumangeni and 3) Bomvana.
\textsuperscript{95.} M Mills and M Wilson: Land tenure, 147-148.
\textsuperscript{96.} The crux of the modernisation theory is that the backwardness in the less advanced communities can be traced from primitive structures that prohibit the socio-economic growth of these communities, therefore they need to adopt those of the advanced communities in order to grow. It is in this context that the term modernisation is used.
\textsuperscript{97.} CPP A68-'80 Draft of regulations and conditions under which it was proposed to grant titles to Africans under the Native Location Act No 40 of 1879, see especially regulation no 6 of the building lot section and regulation no 7 of the garden lot section, 2-3.
The government reserved to itself the right of ownership of all timber forests that existed and might still exist on these commonages. The colonial government's monopolisation of timber forests in this regard can be cited as an indication of the close connection between colonial administration land policies and commercial interests. Moving briefly beyond Mgwali and Wartburg commonages, the colonial government also invested in forests growing on the commonages of Stutterheim village and Isidenge.

The colonial government's system of granting surveyed lots to Africans of Mgwali and Wartburg was not to be divorced from commercial interests. Significant was the effectiveness of the system in the social and economic lives of village inhabitants, while on the other hand, the colonial government eventually gained a double goal. Besides the fact that it was able to effect significant changes in the old settlement pattern, the government also ensured that lotholders were endlessly tied to the activity of maintaining their rights of access to the surveyed lands through perpetual quit-rents. As a result, the new settlement system safeguarded the colonial revenue. The statement from Murray (surveyor in charge of Kaffrarian surveys), confirmed the intransigence of the colonial government in land financial matters during the process of the surveys.

With reference to surveys to Natives, I would suggest that a general estimate of the cost of these surveys be framed from the work already done, and an averaged cost for each building and garden lot combined be taken as a general charge per man for all such surveys. The natives should be ordered to pay this, not asked if they are willing to pay it.

It is needless to argue further the avarice of the colonial government in controlling this source of income. Failure to fulfil payments would result in prosecutions as in the subsequent years. By 1885,
surveys at Mgwali and Wartburg were completed. Land papers reveal that 1887-89 were the crucial years in which most applications for allotment to surveyed lots were made.\textsuperscript{103}

Thus the 1880s, the period that witnessed the proliferation of colonial administration, was to be the turning point not only for the Ngqika who were removed across the Kei, but also for the Stutterheim mission stations, as the colonial government assumed a supreme position in administering these African settlements. The government’s triumph was momentary as the system was to face difficulties within a short time.

\textbf{An evaluation: Why quitrent introduction?}

One may deduce from the size of the garden lots that the government had not given up the idea of encouraging a peasantry. It is crucial to note that there was a firm relationship between agricultural productivity and payment of taxes. Here, Robinson is again useful:

\textit{... the government also had a direct interest in protecting African agricultural productivity in order to ensure the ability of the African people to pay taxes, which in the face of imperial reluctance to fund the administration of the colony, was an important source of government’s income.}\textsuperscript{104}

This hypothesis shifts the focus away from the established phenomenon that links taxes solely to labour. Central to this scheme was also the establishment of order. Instead of labour practice which has always been associated with coercion, friction and conflict, a systematic control of manageable landholders (while their cooperation was retained) existed under the quitrent system. Under these circumstances, administrative entrenchment overshadowed the need to extract labour. The colonial government never contemplated that quitrenters’ properties would later accommodate tenants as would occur at the end of the century.\textsuperscript{105} Moreover, it was never preplanned that production on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[103.] LND vol no 1/265 Ref L 997, Surveyor General to the Assistant commissioner of Crown lands and Public works, 17 June 1887.
\item[104.] Robinson: "A Perfect system of control?", 143.
\item[105.] Oral sources fully confirm that these arrangements were solely between quitrenter and tenant.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
quitrenters' lots would drastically fall.\textsuperscript{108} The state was well aware that low production would lead to poverty, increased crime and probably nullify the village system. The original numbers of quitrenters at Mgwali and Wartburg were manageable. Furthermore, the Village Board administration scheme was established to ensure the landowners' participation in the administration of the villages.

It is too hazardous to suggest that Mgwali and Wartburg were redesigned to serve as labour pools. One would have to explain why lots as big as ten acres were given to each Christian nuclear family; furthermore, if there was an urgent local labour demand, why were the majority of the Ngqika sent across the Kei? Finally, it should be considered that a substantial number of Mgwali and Wartburg quitrenters presently still work on their garden lots.\textsuperscript{107}

Although the abandonment of building lots and the encroachment on either the commonage and/or garden lots became a general pattern in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Cape African locations (including Mgwali and Wartburg), the government persisted in maintaining the village system. This was where the obsession of the colonial government to encourage, introduce and finally extend private ownership became explicit. Here, one needs to re-emphasise the implications of quitrent. Although it was also connected with annual rent payments, quitrent was not another form of hut tax. The latter had no significant bearing on social settlement pattern. Hut tax was collected even from scattered settlements.\textsuperscript{106} Quitrent on the other hand had a significant impact on rural social settlement. Contrary to hut tax, it was usually accompanied by a close or structured settlement system. Moreover, it signalled individual tenure.

Because the government pursued a policy closely connected with private ownership and quitrent tenure, individualism on land was the key to this project. The 1879 Location Act with its quitrent

\textsuperscript{106} Except in extremely unfavourable seasons.
\textsuperscript{107} It was only recently with the threat of forced removal to Ciskei (during the 1970s to 1980s) that the keen interest in practised agriculture has been diminishing.
\textsuperscript{108} Under the British Kaffrarian government, hut tax was collected even when most of the Ngqika were under the rule of a chieftainship.
THE MAIN SETTLEMENTS OF THE NEWLY CREATED MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT OF STUTTERHEIM AFTER 1880
COMMUNAL TENURE PERISHES: GROWTH OF AFRICAN AND WHITE PRIVATE LANDOWNERS, THE STATE OBTAINS LEVERAGE, c.1880-1890

The alterations to the former Nqikila location settlement pattern were accompanied not only by social, but also by economic changes. The 1877-78 conquests finally opened the door for the colonial government's political and economic policies. As a result from 1879, the colonial government began to change the social and political relations of the preconquest political and economic order to conform to the new political and economic structure.

The economic changes have been differently viewed. This chapter attempts to introduce the key viewpoints, and while simultaneously seeking to analyse the implications of these economic changes for the Stutterheim social and economic structure.

**Perspectives on the changing economy**

Lewis has assessed the years between 1880 and 1900 to be the "great downward shift" in the levels of subsistence maintained in production in the rural Ciskei.\(^1\) This unfavourable twenty year period has been noted to have constituted a general discontinuity era, in which rural production for the majority of homesteads shrank as conditions of stock ownership and access to and ability to utilise arable land were polarised. Under these circumstances less well equipped homesteads had minimal chances of resistance to those damaging conditions that might affect agricultural productivity.\(^2\) Distinct from Lewis, however, Bundy has analysed the period 1870-1890 as being one of expansion of the peasantry,\(^3\) but he has highlighted the closing stage of this expansion period as one of "social change in Nguni society".\(^4\) This period of change brought stratification in utilising or rather gaining access to land as fundamental alterations in land tenure and colonial regulations were

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effected. Pertaining to the effects of tenure alterations, Bundy has further commented on the intensity of stratification that emerged during the subsequent period.

Foremost amongst [changing forces] was the altered concept of land tenure that accompanied the emergence of large and progressive farmers: individual Africans not only sought land within an overall situation of land shortage, but they did so within the new contexts in which land could be granted by authorities other than the chief.

Examining this stratification further, it is fair to point out that generalisation of an economic situation in any community constituted of different homesteads and different types of social settlement is crude. It has been indicated in chapters 2 and 3 that after the 1856-7 cattle killing, economic stratification whereby mission settlements and African landowners in the crown reserve settlement gained an upper hand amongst the majority of the Ngqika became observable. Furthermore in chapter 4 it has been briefly noted that the 1877-78 war paved the way for the acceleration of the fragmentation of the ex-Ngqika location inhabitants into "deteriorating" and "surviving" communities, a development that became more intense from the eighties until the end of the nineteenth century.

**A formulation of rural political economy**

By 1880, the Cape Colonial government had clearly embarked on a variety of policies that allowed for a reconstruction of the political economy of the Cape community. Amongst these policies, two specific and interrelated ones had a fundamental role in altering the political economy. These were the reconstruction of African settlements according to the principle of individual tenure, and the commercialization of agriculture. I am not exclusively concerned with the changes in the material base as Lewis is, nor I am directly focusing on the development of capitalism as most materialistic historians have. Rather, this is an attempt to illustrate that while economic changes went hand in hand with social changes, unique characteristics in specific districts (such as Stutterheim in this particular case) prevailed, and in most cases, the state rather than the capitalist class (while not disregarding the role of the latter) had a crucial role to play in this transformation.

This hypothesis is not an attempt to reinforce the underlying assumptions of the instrumentalists' view of the state. It is doubtful if late nineteenth century Stutterheim farmers became a dominant class that manipulated the state at will. In fact the historical layout that follows below clearly indicates that the farmers were not a homogenous class. Moreover, the state had an upper hand over the farmers in formulating the nature of rural tenure, which was at times implemented without the farmers' opinions having been canvassed. Nor are my assumptions a reversion to "relative autonomy views". Even Poulantzas, who invented the term "relative autonomy", could not offer a definite answer as to how the state achieves this relative autonomy.

Indeed, there is a difference between the modern capitalistic societies that are marked by advanced industrialization and mega-corporations, and the late nineteenth century Cape society that was gradually shifting from an agrarian to a modern state, but while a number of materialists may maintain that the intrusion of the modern state into economic life is part and parcel of an attempt to impact upon the general mechanism of economic enterprise, one should be careful not to generalise this view in relation to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Cape colonial government. A reduction of community life exclusively to economic factors can be hazardous. This is particularly true of the formulation of the early formal settlements in the Stutterheim community.

The social transformation of the Ngqika went hand in hand with political and economic changes. Therefore, the establishment of farms in the area cannot be exclusively reduced to the government's obsession with readjusting the material base. It was also a stage in administration that relied heavily on the mapping up of a land policy, particularly land individualization which was

6. The crux of the Instrumentalist view is the association between the effectiveness of the state and that of either the dominant classes or/and in particular the capitalist class.
7. This view maintains that the state has a certain degree of independent power which it uses to sustain the general framework of capitalist enterprise. For more detail, see A. Giddens: Sociology: A brief but critical introduction, (Hong Kong, 1986), 71-91.
9. Of course one cannot deny the impact of the discovery of the minerals on Cape society. The pace of Cape infrastructural development and industrialization was linked to the Rand and Kimberley minerals.
intensified in the district by this period. One should also note that the Cape colonial government had no fixed land administration policy. At one stage, freehold settlements that encouraged mixed African and white population (as it was in the case in the ex-crown reserve) were introduced. Later a system of ten acre quitrent lots was extended to the late Ngqika location. By 1894, the Glen Grey Act which gave out four acre lots would be applied in the Glen Grey area and later would be gradually extended into the Transkeian locations. The group of incoming and outgoing colonial officials were at times hasty in decision-making. As a result, the government land administration technique, varied from place to place and from period to period.

Nor can the state's movement into the rural areas during the final phase of the nineteenth century be reduced to an attempt to bolster the existence of a capitalist class. It could also have been an attempt to normalise\textsuperscript{11} people's behaviour (for the benefit and welfare of the state rather than that of solely the capitalist class) either by creating structured settlements (such as locations and farms) and/or through labour activities, which (in Stutterheim district) were in most cases directed towards public works rather than the mining industry.\textsuperscript{12}

It remains problematic to conclude that, from the 1880s, a "stable form of relationship"\textsuperscript{13} between the dominant and subordinated groups existed so as to mark the maturation of capitalism.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore in several instances, capitalism did not simply mature as a number of materialists (e.g Lewis) have suggested. It even regressed in some rural sectors of late nineteenth century Stutterheim.\textsuperscript{15} By the same token, a generalisation that the period between 1870 and 1890 was one of expansion of peasantry,\textsuperscript{16} remains questionable. In most areas, only a small section of the African population managed to gain access to large portions of land.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, in a complex and

\textsuperscript{11.} Normalise in this case means orientating people's lives to the dominant norms of the day.

\textsuperscript{12.} See page 155 below.

\textsuperscript{13.} Lewis: "Economic history", 643.

\textsuperscript{14.} Lewis: "Economic history", 643-653.

\textsuperscript{15.} See the sections on immigrant locations of Bolo, Quanti and St John, and privately owned lands at Upper Kubusi and Isidenge below, and also chapter 7 which deals with the tenancy problems.

\textsuperscript{16.} Bundy: \textit{Rise and Fall}, 65-101.

\textsuperscript{17.} Research on how long immigrant farmers and Isidenge, Upper Kubusi (all analysed below), Mgwali and Wartburg quitrenters (see chapter 5) managed to hold on to their land effectively after 1910 has yet to be done.
heterogeneous community (such as post-1880 Stutterheim), various individuals reacted differently to economic changes and their responses cannot be generalised.

By this period, major resettlements that curtailed the Ngqika domination of the area while on the other hand bolstering the project of settling "European Emigrants" in the present Border region were one of the priorities of the colonial administrators. The project of resettling the Border region with "Emigrants" was pursued with the specific aim of creating concentrated agricultural settlements that in the long run would ensure a crucial role in the whole process of commercialization of agriculture. Given these circumstances, settlement administration policies and commercialization of agriculture in the Cape from the 1880s onwards may be closely related to the changing nature of the South African economy in which colonial infrastructure and the creation of structured settlements featured predominantly and the latter two indisputably effected significant changes in the Cape rural economy.

The period between 1879 and 1900 witnessed many natural disasters such as drought and cattle disease. As a result tenant groups living on privately owned lands faced difficulty in depending on returns from agriculture and therefore faced a declining standard of living. In the ex-crown reserve and mission locations where space was strictly controlled, ecological deterioration affected the rural economy by the early twentieth century.

Space precludes a full discussion of agricultural commercialization and industrialization in the eastern Cape and South Africa in general, but it is important to examine the settlement pattern

18. LND vol 1/302 Ref L 2144, Circular no 3- Cape of Good Hope Government Agricultural Emigration Year 1879.
19. The basic regulations for the introduction of agricultural immigrants into the Cape of Good Hope (Act 33 of 1879) specified that the government desired to settle only agriculturalists and industrious individuals in the proposed areas.
22. It was only in the year 1895 that the civil commissioner of the district noted the progress of some property owners in the "locations", see CPP G8-95 BBNA 1894, 43.
23. AGRI vol no 139 Ref 569, outbreak of lungsickness in Stutterheim, R Whitham (Stutterheim magistrate) to Strubels (under secretary for agriculture), 15 October 1894; AGRI vol 139 Ref 569, Whittam to Strubels, 29 June 1895.
that was geared towards agricultural activity within the various areas of the district of Stutterheim after the 1880s. Access to land played a crucial role in agricultural activity, however since tight measures to regulate access to land were implemented by the colonial government during the 1880s, communal agricultural activity yielded to individual activity. Stratified as they were, substantial numbers of Stutterheim agriculturalists reacted and adapted differently to these changes. However, it remains fair to argue that a considerable number lost the measure of economic independence they had enjoyed before 1880.

It has been indicated earlier (chapter 4) that changing patterns of stock and land ownership had an adverse effect on the lives of the Ngqika and other neighbouring groups. On the other hand however, the 1880s opened the way for an accelerated rate of land purchase. Disadvantaged Africans had slim chances of competing with wealthy Whites. The scene was set for the proliferation of crop and pastoral production on the White-owned farms from the 1880s onwards.24

Beinart has noted that during the 1880s East Griqualand witnessed the influx of "settlers who intended to make at least part of their living from the land"25 and these were eventually favoured by the changing patterns of land ownership during this period. This assessment is reminiscent of what was simultaneously occurring in the wider eastern Cape. Parallel to what Beinart has noted in East Griqualand, Bouch has indicated that the 1880s was the period of land loss and material deprivation in previously independent chiefdoms of the Queenstown hinterland and the process of land ownership exchange was accelerated by an official urgency in prompting "White occupation of forfeited lands".26

Unlike the case of Queenstown (in particular, Glen Grey), where land was confiscated from "rebels" such as Mfanta and then filled with "colonial loyalists from Gungubele's followers"27, the

confiscated Ngqika lands, except the surveyed settlements of Mgwali and Wartburg, provided space for settler farming. This is not to suggest that the 1880s terminated the existence of African owned lands in the district, nor to argue that during this period African farming was in no position to exist parallel to the more powerful White farming that was to come, nevertheless, it is fair to argue that massive expropriation of the Ngqika lands for settler farming gave the White farming community an advantage over the humiliated Ngqika.

**The problem of restructuring**

The forces that threatened communalism within the changing Ngqika society afforded some individual Africans opportunities for access to larger lands. Foremost amongst these forces was the altered concept of land tenure, and as early as the British Kaffrarian administration individual tenure that allowed Africans and Whites who settled in the crown reserve portion of Isidenge and Kubusi to gain access to small holdings and larger lands was introduced. 28

As the section that was previously crown reserve had a long history of individual tenure the major focus of restructuring land tenure in the newly designed district had been directed towards the portions that were within the former Ngqika location. The programme resulted in Mgwali and Wartburg being the main settlements for the area's African population. However, these settlements constituted very minor portions of the Ngqika location and in terms of space they were strictly bounded. Therefore, a considerable amount of unoccupied land in the Ngqika location still existed. The possibility of Ngqika reoccupation of these confiscated but unoccupied lands was intolerable to the Sprigg ministry. The 1879 Location Act proved to be insufficient in alleviating the problem of unoccupied lands. Rather, the Act had aggravated the problem as it ensured the strict confinement of initially scattered numbers of people into a demarcated space. 29 But it

28. See pages 37-38 above.
29. This is not to suggest that these mission locations were overpopulated, but the emphasis here hinges on the type of settlement, See chapter 5.
would be hazardous to suggest that the reconstruction of Mgwali and Wartburg on the principle of individual tenure was primarily intended to create unoccupied land; rather, the removal of the Ngqika across the Kei was pursued for that end. The reconstruction scheme aimed at exercising firm administration over the newly designed locations.

Applied measures may lead to unintended and unforeseen consequences that in some cases may be beneficial for those who apply them. Debatable however is whether the remaining unoccupied land after the introduction of the 1879 Location Act was a foreseen or an unforeseen consequence. Most interesting was the introduction of the Immigration Act of 1879 which made increased provisions for the disposal of former African lands in the Cape Colony to agricultural immigrants. The timing of the Act is a matter for curiosity. It came simultaneously with the 1879 Location Act. The subdivision of the Ngqika location into settler farms after the 1877-78 war, still could not resolve the problem of vacant lands: though there were a number of these farms in Stutterheim, the majority were located in the Cathcart district. Therefore a substantial amount of unoccupied land remained intact in the new Stutterheim district.

The House of Assembly was unsure whether the Immigrant Act would either alleviate the problem of non-administered lands or promote the occupation of evacuated territories by agricultural immigrants. However since programmes to introduce agricultural immigrants were already being undertaken as early as 1877, one may suggest that settler occupation was gradually taking precedence over traditional occupation of land. The official occupation of evacuated territories was established in the process. In Stutterheim district in particular, the Immigration Act of 1879 ensured the occupation of some remaining Ngqika lands by agricultural immigrants and thus stimulated the development of immigrant locations.

30. Act 33 of 1879.
31. Cape of Good Hope votes and proceedings of the House of Assembly, no 2 1879, no 61 1879, 569-575.
32. Act 10 of 1877 preceded no 33 of 1879 in providing for the disposal of crown lands in the Cape Colony to agricultural immigrants.
The growth of Agricultural settlements

The development of immigrant locations coupled with expansion of the district crop and pastoral farming demands an analysis of the interaction and evolution of African and White farming activity during the late nineteenth century. An illumination and categorization of two agricultural communities that became established in the district during and after the 1880s is essential, but one should consider that these communities were not uniformly administered and hence they metamorphosed in a number of ways. Attention here is drawn to: (i), immigrant locations of Bolo, Quanti and St John; and (ii), privately owned lands/smallholdings at Upper Kubusi and Isidenge and their surrounding subcommunities.

(i) The Immigrant locations of Bolo, Quanti and St John

This house is of [the] opinion that a judicious and well considered scheme of closer settlement, somewhat upon the lines of [a] similar system in Australasia, would materially tend to promote the best interests of the agricultural industry of the colony.33

Christopher has noted that the Cape government scheme for disposing of crown lands in the post 1870 period was devised to effect a workable system for pastoral farming as most lands capable of arable development had been distributed long before 1850.34 However this is not to suggest that arable agricultural activity after 1870 was to be sidelined, rather more attention was geared towards pastoral farming. Oral interviews held at and around Bolo and Quanti immigrant locations have illuminated that though cultivation activity has existed on these farms, up to the present it has never been as successful as pastoral farming.35 Thus the emergence of pastoral farming as a crucial activity in the ex-crown lands was witnessed at Bolo and Quanti. On the other hand St John, which started as an Anglican outstation during the 1860s, seems to have focused heavily on cultivation rather than pastoralism. This may be attributed to a number of reasons, probably a

33. Cape Legislative Assembly Debates 1908, 423, quoted in Christopher: Crown Lands, 93.
34. Christopher: Crown Lands 93.
35. Interviews with the Bowman family, Fairview farm in Bolo, 2 October 1992, M Fetsha at Wartburg mission station, 2 October 1992, and Mrs B Kalimashe at Mlungisi township, 26 January 1993. N.B-Mrs Kalimashe's father-in-law was one of the farm owners in Quanti. Mrs Kalimashe is one of the few surviving members of the family; having lived in Quanti in her early married life, she and her family were eventually removed from the farm in the late 1950s as a result of the Apartheid land policies.
combination of the mission influence in stimulating cultivation activity with the geographical location of this settlement especially its convenience for irrigation. St John is positioned on the southern bank of the Kubusi river adjoining the Kei Road district.30

Bolo and Quanti agricultural settlements presently constitute the northern and eastern borderlands of Stutterheim district. Quanti stretches north up to Thomas river which constitutes the Cathcart and Stutterheim border while, on the west it is adjoined by Wartburg settlement. On the eastern side, Bolo stretches diagonally eastward to the Kei river lands.37 All these three settlements are located within the boundaries of the late Ngqika district and as already noted they resulted from the 1879 Immigration Act.

The three immigrant settlements serve as a clear example of the process of changing patterns of landownership that characterised the 1880s as they ensured the population of some remaining Ngqika location lands. But there was a distinction between the Immigration Act farms and the settler farms that were bought on public auction in the aftermath of the War of Ngcayecibi. A clear distinction existed mainly in size and tenure. The Settler farms averaged around 1,500 acres38 and were mainly held under Act 14 of 1878,39 with the Act operating on all lands that were declared "waste and unappropriated" crown lands. In principle, under this Act land was disposed of according to perpetual quitrent system by public auction; thus though they were legally quitrenters, the settler farmers enjoyed a high level of freedom in utilising their lands. In practice therefore this tenure was not radically different from freehold tenure.

In contrast, the immigrant farms were not obtained by public auction. Instead, through its land board, the colonial government held the supreme position in facilitating the ownership process of

36. See map 4; There appears to have been no major involvement of the church in social activities of the local Africans as in the case of Mgwali and Wartburg except in the case of the farm workers who resided on the neighbouring farms. Mission work has ceased to exist. From the talks I had in October 1992 with Rev Martin Glover, the Anglican priest at Stutterheim, I learned that the station property has been sold to a farmer, resulting in the movement of the church out of that area.

37. See map 4.

38. BBCC 1881, 32; see also chapter 4.

39. Act no 14 of 1878 served to regulate the disposal of crown lands, see especially section II.
these farms. Immigrants were expected by law to begin holding land as lessees and after having paid a tenth annual instalment charged at the rate of one shilling per acre would receive a grant of land under a perpetual quitrent system. The 1877 Agricultural Act provided for the sale of crown lands at a fixed price of ten shillings per acre in lots of up to 500 acres in extent, and the 1879 immigrants were also entitled to between 20 and 500 acres.

Under these guidelines Stutterheim immigrant farms ranged in size between 250 and 400 acres with access to a commonage depending upon fulfilment of competence and progress requirements set down by the government. Competence and progress of the immigrants were ensured by an investment scheme that sought to underpin their new lives by binding them to erect houses valued at not less than £20 each, and also by encouraging the cultivation of at least one acre of arable land. The above conditions were expected to be fulfilled within a period of two years. Otherwise, partial or total failure would result in forfeiture of the leased properties including their improvements. Under these conditions, the government ensured not only the extension of its administration over the immigrants' lands and the surety of its commercial position in relation to the utilisation of these lands, but also ensured the movement of science into the rural economic and social structure for the benefit of the colonial political economy. If farmers were incapable of looking after their soil then the state would intervene. Thus a link between soil conservation, and the government's concern with productivity value appeared as a fundamental aspect of the formulation of the immigrant settlement policies. Beinart has commented that by the turn of the century conservationist ideas had deeply affected the way in which agricultural schemes were...
designed and implemented. It was pursued by "officials serving a rapidly expanding settler agriculture sector".\textsuperscript{47}

It is notable that in addition to its rather scientific base, the colonial government was uncomplimentary. Its diagnosis of the reasons for a land problem in the Cape was that the region's rural inhabitants, especially Africans, were plagued by either ignorance of the proper utilization of soil or by their obsession with communal tenure. Encouragement of agricultural settlements was therefore geared towards developing and adapting the internal dynamics of the rural socio-economic structure, but this grand design was formulated without any idea of accommodating Black farming, since the majority of Africans were expected to settle and remain in the locations. The structure of the "civilization" enterprise was constantly fed by an assumption that Africans did not understand the value of land or individual tenure.

The natives generally do not as yet appreciate or understand individual title, ... or ask for it, they are apparently suspicious of the approach of such a measure, and will have to be dealt with circumspectly, as they are tenacious and mistrustful regarding land.\textsuperscript{48}

The above hypothesis is staggering, for it ignores some earlier instances where Africans had participated actively in the sale of lands. In the crown reserve settlement section of Stutterheim district such as Upper Kubusi and Isidenge, for instance, Africans were participating in land investment even before the war. Nor did the above hypothesis allow for a rational African understanding of land tenure. Space had a crucial role to play in this regard and since individual tenure reflected extreme space confinement as in the case of a closed village system it was likely to receive a hostile reception; but individual tenure that was effected on convenient space as in the case of open farms could have received a warm reception and could also have been tempting to other Africans. In this case evidence suggests that a number of Africans bought farms that were

\textsuperscript{48} CPP G3-94 Report of Native labour Commission, xxviii.
originally allocated to immigrants at Quanti and Bolo and abandoned because of their poor soil
texture.49

The transition from lessees to fully qualified land owners by Bolo, Quanti and St John immigrants
was not achieved smoothly. Quanti and Bolo farms were unlike those in the region of the upper
Zwart Kei and along the Klipplaat valley which were both in the district of Queenstown where with
the assistance of a fair amount of water from a number of surrounding streams and rivers, both
pastoral and arable farming could be carried on.50 Bolo and Quanti lands were dry. Quanti
especially was rugged and stony but suitable for pastoral farming.51 What aggravated the problem
of transition from leasehold to ownership was the technicalities of the surveys which were
conducted on these three settlements' commonages.

The Immigration Act of 1879 gave immigrants the right to utilise the commonage freely for a
period of six years. Thereafter, the government would divide the commonage into portions equal
to the number of allotments, thus allowing each immigrant the right to purchase a portion of the
commonage as an addition to his allotment.52 Commonage expenses were set at an annual
quitrent not exceeding sixpence per acre, with survey and construction of beacons paid for
separately.53 However problems arose when the government fixed the survey expenses at a high
rate. As survey costs were linked to the quitrent price, it culminated in widespread dissatisfaction
amongst the immigrant community. On 14 June 1892, 32 immigrant farmers at Bolo drafted a
petition to the Commissioner of Crown lands and Public Works complaining about the survey

49. C.A. AG 1852, Subject: Native administration in Stutterheim district. See especially, letter by W Luyt,
King William's Town lawyer to H Burton, Attorney General, dated 28 August 1908.
51. In the course of my fieldwork in Stutterheim area, I observed that there is very little land reserved
for arable use at Quanti. More land is utilised for pastoralism. Water in this region has for a long
time been mainly derived from boreholes and wells as there are no viable streams that can be relied
on for heavy irrigation. This observation may be affected by the fact that it was made in a period of
drought, but the reputation of the two settlements for pastoral rather than arable farming is common
amongst the inhabitants.
52. LND vol 1/325 Ref L 3220, Stutterheim petitioners, to the commissioner of crown lands and public
works, 14 June 1892.
53. LND vol 1/325 Ref L 3220, Stutterheim petitioners, to the commissioner of crown lands and public
works, 14 June 1893.
expenses. Approximately seven months later Bolo and Quanti immigrants, with the backing of the newly formed Bolo Farmers' Association (BFA), drafted another petition requesting the fairness of the land board in fixing reasonable quitrent prices including survey costs. By August 1893, the issue had been tabled in the House of Assembly, and had managed to gain the attention of the ministry whose response was the formation of a commission of inquiry that would oversee the reduction of the respective quitrent and survey costs. By June 1894 the Prime Minister's office finally reached a consensus on the reduction of quitrent prices, viz Bolo at four pence per acre per annum, Quanti three and one half pence per acre per annum and St John's, which was least affected in the dispute, at four pence per acre per annum.

The historical forces surrounding the introduction of immigrant farming demonstrate the restructuring and the incorporation of rural dynamics into the wider Cape political economy. They demonstrate the transformation of the rural social and economic structure while simultaneously the state gained the upper hand in supervising the rural economy. A substantial link between the colonial government's commercial interest and its system of land administration remains indisputable for the government always retained a supreme position in regulating both the disposal and administration of crown lands which were disposed of either on perpetual quitrent (at a public auction) or by leases set for a specific period at a fixed price.

But the reservation of most of the countryside for immigrant farming in the former Ngqika location did not signal the end of African farming, nor was it successful in preventing African access to these farms. In the regions of Quanti and Bolo, farms were abandoned by immigrants as their soil

54. LND vol 1/325 Ref L 3220 Stutterheim petitioners, to the commissioner of crown lands and public works, 14 June 1892.
55. LND vol 1/429 Ref L 3220, Immigrant allotments in Quanti, secretary of Bolo and Quanti immigrants to the commissioner of crown lands and public works, 30 January 1893.
56. LND vol 1/429 Ref L 3220, Immigrant allotments in Quanti, secretary of Bolo and Quanti immigrants to the commissioner of crown lands and public works, 30 January 1893.
57. LND vol 1/429 Ref L 3220, Immigrant allotments in Quanti, secretary of Bolo and Quanti immigrants to the commissioner of crown lands and public works, 30 January 1893.
58. LND vol 1/432 ref L 3653, Reduction of quitrent, Prime Minister's office (1894) June Vide schedule letter, 9 June 1894.
was poor,59 and most probably also because of intense frustration with the surveys and quitrent technicalities. Hard evidence pertaining to the process by which Africans acquired ownership of these farms is lacking, but the Attorney General's papers reveal that a number of Africans such as Bhebe, Dyeshu, Gazi, Godwana, Kalimashe, Makunga, Melani, Myoli, Nganu and Skenjana purchased ex-immigrant farms in Quanti and Bolo.60 An analysis of these African farmers' pre-1880 social and economic lives and the abilities that qualified them to join the immigrant farming community would be useful, but nevertheless the assessment and conclusions that follow have been mainly based on probabilities and assumptions as there is a lack of empirical evidence on this subject.

Most probably, the Africans mentioned above came from the "loyal" sector of the region's Africans during the 1877-78 war. Significantly, the Attorney General's papers have disclosed that the majority of African farmers at Bolo and Quanti were the "Fingo".61 Formation of ethnic differences within Stutterheim district's African community awaits research as this thesis does not offer room for a detailed study of African ethnic differences, but it is fair enough to argue that the post 1877-78 war period reduced every African settled within the colonial boundaries to the status of a "loyal". Beinart has suggested that in this period "loyals" were no longer necessary; everyone had to be "loyal".62 Bundy agrees that the policy of creating a rural class of collaborators to "counteract the influence of the chiefs"63 became less relevant after 1870 as more and more African territory fell under colonial control. I am not however rejecting the probability that there might have been discrimination on the grounds of access or non-access to these farms, but it would be crude to suggest that ex-immigrant farms at Bolo and Quanti were reserved for "Fingo" farming settlement and/or were an attempt to rebuild a collaborator class. Access to these lands depended

59. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, W Luyt (King William's Town lawyer) to Attorney General, 28 August 1908.
60. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, Native administration in Stutterheim, W Luyt, to Attorney General, 28 August 1908. I am grateful to some older members of Stutterheim Black community for advice about the most likely original forms of these names, since they occur in various forms in the sources.
61. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, Native administration in Stutterheim, W Luyt, to Attorney General, 28 August 1908.
on sales that were conducted irrespective of ethnicity. Oral evidence has furthermore suggested that non "Fingo" Africans also held farms in these areas.

The purchase of individual farms in the region marked the complete passing of the previously communally controlled trade that had survived during the interval between the cattle killing and the war of Ngcayecibi. Taking full advantage of the ex-immigrant farms, some Africans were able to consolidate and enjoy a "modest economic success" as they managed to place themselves in the agriculturalist class. The pattern of acquisition of farms varied from sole to joint-ownership. For instance, Bebe, Melani and Nganu were joint-owners of Larnacia at Bolo. At times landowners practised both joint and sole ownership. Skenjana owned Antelope while simultaneously being a joint-owner of Moonstone with Makunga, who in turn solely owned Inverquanti. All these three farms were at Quanti. Other Africans held large farms at Bolo and Quanti as well: Godwana held Hightor, Gazi Kyber, and Myoli Heckel. In the lands between the Kubusi and the Kei rivers, Maqubela held Cowmead, Gcobo Keigates and Khali Gamelands.

Stutterheim immigrant farming was commercially oriented and accommodated both African and White farmers who briefly competed in the late nineteenth century. A number of African farmers engaged in rearing their stock with their tenants while simultaneously engaging in active market exchange. However, the existence of tenants on their properties was to be a problem with the government at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Archival sources (particularly Archives of the Native Affairs department) for 1900 to 1908 reveal the presence of large numbers of stock on the African farms. Furthermore, Land papers disclose that the late 1880s

64. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, W Luyt to Attorney General, 14 October 1908.
65. Informal talk with older members of Wartburg and Mgwali mission locations. A considerable number of old residents of these communities have useful information about the early settlement pattern of the surrounding farms.
66. Bundy: Rise and Fall, 110.
67. Joint-ownership here is used strictly to denote more than one owner.
68. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, W Luyt to Attorney General, 14 October 1908.
69. AG. 1852 Ref 17879, W Luyt to Attorney General, 14 October 1908; NA vol 738 Ref F 684, statement of F Philpott (Stutterheim magistrate) on Native farmers in the district, 20 June 1906.
70. NA vol 738 Ref 684, Proceedings against African farm owners charged under Act 30 of 1899, see especially the statement of Ncekiso, 20 June 1906.
71. This issue is detailed in chapter 7.
and early 1890s were the years when competition to gain access to farm lands between Africans and Whites was at its peak. By the late 1890s immigrant White farmers had organised themselves into the BFA. From then on, they were to engage in quarterly stock fairs held at Dohne.

Unfortunately, the African farmers' good fortune would be short. The government implemented the Private Location Act of 1899 which limited the number of inhabitants on private properties. Because African farms were overpopulated by tenants, a considerable number of farmers were charged for contravening the 1899 Act and because of legal costs and magistrates' fines difficulties arose in paying quitrents in the subsequent years. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the tide turned for the African land owners.

(ii) Privately owned lands/small holdings at Isidenge, Upper Kubusi and their surroundings

As early as the British Kaffrarian administration (1847-65), Kubusi and Isidenge had been mixed African and White settlements, since they were geographically located within the crown reserve that was "set aside for a mixed Settler/Mfengu occupation." Chapter 2 has detailed how the colonial government had embarked on a series of Acts that empowered the disposal and leasing of crown lands inasmuch that by 1878, a considerable number of title holders were in existence in these settlements. But after subsequent crown lands disposal and agricultural consolidation and amendment Acts, the number of title holders increased to 120 by the year 1887. Isidenge and Upper Kubusi lands cannot be distinguished on a clear cut basis, but, in terms of tenure, differences may be observable. Isidenge was/is mainly constituted of large scattered farms whereas

72. LND vol 1/253 Refs. L 641 and L 642, Leo Ewers (law, land, estate and general agent) to W Wright, 23 March 1887.
73. AGRI vol 160 Ref 782, secretary of BFA to secretary for agriculture, 5 January 1894.
74. Act 30 of 1899.
75. The implications of the 1899 Act on private landowners is detailed in chapter 7.
76. Peires: Dead will arise, 28.
77. See pages 37-38 above.
78. Acts 10 of 1881, 37 of 1882 and 15 of 1887.
79. LND 1/481 ref L 7251, Memorandum on Isidenge allotments, July 1894.
Upper Kubusi had/has a considerable number of title holders on smallholdings. These two settlements adjoin each other as they constitute the western portion of Stutterheim which adjoins the Keiskammahoek district.\(^{80}\)

The settlement pattern of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge evolved from the general settlement pattern of the crown reserve, which aimed to encourage villagization during the preliminary stages of the crown reserve settlement's formation.\(^{81}\) Two interrelated occurrences had a major influence on the reshaping of these settlements. First a series of crown lands leases and sales that in the long run afforded a number of Africans an opportunity to be landowners, as in the case of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge. Secondly, the arrival of the German military legion which was allocated 30,210 acres for settlement,\(^{82}\) but which barely settled as the majority left for the Indian mutiny.\(^{83}\) Eventually, the legionaries left unoccupied lands vacant for sale. The later sales of the 1880s paved the way for the extension of Upper Kubusi settlement. The 1883 Commission on Native Affairs shows that by 1883 more than 250 legion lots were sold and the majority had been bought and occupied by Africans.\(^{84}\) Sales gave rise to African and German competition, with bidding as high as £2 an acre.\(^{85}\)

Local Africans' participation in land sales implies two possibilities. Either by the 1880s a considerable number of Africans were beginning to appreciate individual tenure in an attempt to secure valuable properties, or (most crucial as the legion's story suggests that the government had earlier contemplated a segregated settlement) the local administration still had not taken a firm decision on whether a racially segregated settlement was necessary or unnecessary in the growing urban area. The sales created an African and White integrated social settlement around Stutterheim village. Despite the enforcement of segregation policies at the turn of the century,

\(^{80}\) See map 4.
\(^{81}\) Du Toit: "Cape Frontier", 78-79.
\(^{82}\) Christopher: Crown Lands, 36.
\(^{83}\) J Fehsenfeld: "Germans in Kaffraria", 14.
\(^{84}\) CPP G4-83 1883 commission on native laws and customs, see especially the statement of Rev. Kropf, 244.
\(^{85}\) CPP G4-83 1883 Commission on native laws and customs, 244.
Upper Kubusi and Isidenge retained their tradition of being integrated settlements for a lengthy period.\(^{46}\)

Brink, who has undertaken a detailed study of patterns of land ownership at Upper Kubusi, has fallen short of a finer analysis of the various legislation and incidents that contributed towards the development of this settlement. Nevertheless, she has noted the various trends of pre-1880 African land ownership in the area that all stemmed from the year 1864, in which the sale and leasing of crown lands were authorized.\(^{47}\) Her analysis of Upper Kubusi settlement misses the event of the legion land sales. She attributed the increase of 37 lots in Upper Kubusi between 1875 and 1913 only to the 1874 Location Act and the 1894 Glen Grey Act.\(^{48}\) This cannot be correct as the Glen Grey Act was never enforced at Stutterheim\(^{49}\) and no Location Act was passed in 1874. There seems to be less documentation and statistical evidence on Upper Kubusi inhabitants' participation in the legion's land sales, but evidence is overwhelming that a considerable number of Upper Kubusi Africans participated heavily in the sale of these lands.\(^{50}\) Upper Kubusi is a clear example of a settlement that had been adversely affected by land ownership dislocations. Evidence gathered from fieldwork, linked to dates of title deed papers, has proved that a majority of Upper Kubusi residents who purchased the legion lands, have in the present century been compelled to dwell on what was supposedly their four acre garden lots situated on the banks of the Kubusi river. Presently, they have lost most of their building lots to the expanding commercial core of Stutterheim.\(^{51}\) Thus their garden lots did not facilitate established and dependable farming as originally contemplated. Though Brink has noted this change of land ownership in the middle

\(^{46}\) UG17-1911 BBN 1910, 134, 160, 328, portrays Isidenge and Upper Kubusi as remaining mixed Black and White populated settlements briefly after the formation of the Union government. The older members of these communities in general have confirmed the existence of integrated Black and White settlements up to at least the 1950s.

\(^{47}\) See Act 19 of 1864.

\(^{48}\) Brink: "An examination", 16 especially table (figure) no 3.

\(^{49}\) CPP G12-1904 BBN 1903, 27.

\(^{50}\) The majority of Upper Kubusi residents I interviewed are presently living in their four acre garden lots and the few title deeds that have been retained reflect the dates of the sales in the 1880s. Interview with Miss Voyi (maiden name), Upper Kubusi, 13 September 1992.

\(^{51}\) A considerable number of old inhabitants who are presently with or without title deeds have indicated their building lots right in the middle of Stutterheim village. A few families who have managed to retain their titles, such as Miss Voyi (maiden name), have confirmed this change in the pattern of land ownership.
decades of the twentieth century, she has failed to explore the foundations of the settlement pattern of Africans who bought the legion lands and thus the present confinement of Upper Kubusi residents to their garden lots is obscurely analysed.92

Published papers pertaining to the period between the years 1893 and 1913 disclose substantial agricultural activity by Africans who were settled amongst the Germans in the areas of Upper Kubusi and Stutterheim village.93 Viable agricultural activity in Isidenge also occurred.94 As the war of 1877-78 was not heavily fought in the ex-crown reserve, the area's African occupants might not have been adversely affected. As a result a considerable number could have retained their prewar agricultural lots. Africans also held approximately thirty large farms at Lusana, Ngcobo, Ndakana, Xholorha and Nqantosi which were basins in the Upper Kubusi and Isidenge.95

But if the government had thought that its reconstruction of the rural area would stimulate agriculture and encourage "prosperity", then its reconstruction programme had unintended effects. Its scheme never prompted long term increased cultivation. These agricultural settlements were disappointing in the long term. The four acre garden lots became victims of settlement dislocations and land pressure whereby the inhabitants overcrowded the demarcated lands thus rendering them useless for arable purposes as in the case of Cenyu96 and Upper Kubusi. Space is limited for further investigation of the whereabouts of the latter inhabitants and this topic awaits research.97

Like the immigrant farming community, the 1890s saw the Upper Kubusi and Isidenge landowners threatened by the 1899 Location Act (chapter 7). Although a few would survive the effects of the

92. Brink: "An examination", makes no mention of African participation in purchasing the legion's lands though she has detailed the change of land ownership in the middle decades of the present century.
93. CPF G4'93 BBNA 1892, 31.
94. LND 1/481 Ref L 7251, Memorandum on Isidenge Allotments, July 1894.
95. NA vol 738 Ref L 7251, Memorandum on Native occupants at Isidenge and Upper kabusie, 31 July 1909.
96. Cenyu was initially a Berlin mission station (smaller than Wartburg) that was also inhabited by Christian Africans. Quitrent tenure was also introduced at the same time as at Mgwali and Wartburg. However, unlike Mgwali and Wartburg, Cenyu was within municipal boundaries by 1910. Lack of documentation on this settlement has prevented the exploration of its historical development, but today Cenyu's garden lots have developed into a rural slum, as the number of inhabitants of the garden lots surpasses that at the building lots.
97. The problem of landowners and tenants in this area is detailed in chapter 7.
Act, a considerable number were shaken. Thus they entered the twentieth century with slim chances of survival.

**Conclusion: the State obtains leverage**

The changing nature of the economy from the 1880s may be generally linked to the industrialisation and urbanization of South Africa on one hand, and commercialization and restructuring of rural agriculture on the other. These processes were interlinked and were accompanied by an accelerated growth of infrastructure. The state’s encouragement on labour and mission industrial teachings cannot be overlooked. Those industrial habits served the proliferation of the colonial infrastructure, while simultaneously keeping “idle” Africans occupied. Thus workplaces such as public works and/or mines (which provided work for a number of tenants) became new centres that were responsible for the construction of new social order. A new routinised set of behaviour that developed responsibility while ensuring the safety of the colonial order gradually became observable.

Infrastructure in the former Ngqika location grew enormously during this period particularly in communications such as railways and roads. The restructuring of the rural socio-economic structure might have benefited specific groups of Africans as in the case of Quanti, Bolo, Upper Kubusi and Isidenge and briefly some tenants along the Kei, but the existence of long term viable agriculture was never maintained. Nor did the restructuring benefit the majority of those who were in the old Ngqika location. Most Africans could not return to the old habits of socio-economic subsistence under the changing colonial administration. A restricting development was the

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99. I am aware that the majority of the people who opted for the public works (instead of mine works) were tenants who were not living in mission communities at the time, but considering the fact that the Kei tenants were close to the Roman Catholic mission at Keilands one may not be sure of how much influence they might have gained from the missionaries. Moreover we are not certain if tenants’ different backgrounds were not linked to mission activities, but given the fact that Stutterheim district as a whole was a centre of mission work in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it can be probably argued that a large proportion of the African population was exposed to mission teachings.
100. CPP G36-89, *Report on the question of road communication in the districts of Stutterheim, Cathcart and Komgha, lately forming the Gaika location*, 3-40.
proliferation of state reserved areas around these communities, and in this case in particular, forests to which access was a crucial part of the indigenous economy were affected.101 By the 1890s, the entire bushlands of the Isidenge and Upper Kubusi areas and also around Wartburg location had been declared state forest reserve.102 A substantial number of tenants were employed at a very low wage that only facilitated a hand to mouth existence.103 The restrictions of access to these forests terminated practices such as wood cutting and hunting.104 Subsequently, these restrictions were complemented by a number of infringements that eventually set the scene for arrests and prosecutions at the beginning of the twentieth century.105 Attempting to survive, a substantial number (most of whom were tenants) sought supplementary living wages in forestry departments.106 The civil commissioner of Cathcart noted in 1880 that a majority of the Ngqika were employed on railway works.107 Thus the changing economy further accelerated the polarisation of the district's inhabitants and in future was to pave the way for increased proletarianisation.

102. FCE vol 3/1/60 Ref 729, Crown forests Eastern Conservancy district no 3, annual forest department report for 1902.
103. FCE vol 3/1/60 ref 729, Crown forests Eastern Conservancy District no 3, annual forest department report for 1902; NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Circular on Families of poor whites residents in Upper kabusie, 3 November 1908.
104. CO vol 8326 ref 5906, letter by R Dick (special magistrate) to the civil commissioner of King William's Town, 13 November 1906.
105. CO vol 8326 ref 5906, see the file in general, especially letter by R Dick to the civil commissioner of King William's Town on "hunting by Natives at Isidenge and Stutterheim" written on 13 November 1906.
106. FCE vol 3/1/60 Ref 729, Crown Forests Eastern conservancy district no 3, annual forest department report for 1902.
107. CPP G13-'80 BBNA 1879, 193.
PART III.
THE PROBLEMS OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, c.1890-1910
CHAPTER 7


The most prevalent problem on Stutterheim private farms by the end of the nineteenth century was tenancy. Almost a decade after the restructuring of the old Ngqika location and ex-crown reserve, particularly after the scheme to allocate farms, the increase in tenant population had become obvious. These tenants were scattered on various private properties. They included a variety of population groups comprising not only Africans but Whites as well, but the highest proportion were those who could not obtain holdings in outside locations.¹ The majority of tenant population comprised Africans, except for a mixed African and White group who by the turn of the nineteenth century were settled alongside Stutterheim village particularly on the private properties in the Upper Kubusi and Isidenge area.² In addition on immigrant farms in the Bolo and Quanti locations and on the periphery, particularly on Kei river lands, a considerable number of tenants leased White farms that had been allocated in the aftermath of the war of Ngcayecibi but left unoccupied by their owners.³

At Isidenge and Upper Kubusi, a number of African farmers like Malgas who owned the Ndakana basin, Shampuli who owned a farm in Isidenge central and Sidumo who owned a portion of the Lusana basin had a considerable number of tenants on their properties by the beginning of the twentieth century.⁴ There is relatively little information to explain why landowners kept tenants on their properties. However, two basic factors offer an explanatory key. The fact that some farm owners carried numerous tenants indicates that tenancy was used either as a form of rent or of

². NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Circular on Families of poor Whites in Upper Kabusie, 3 November 1908.
³. CPP G3-94, 1893 Labour Commission, see especially the statement by G Nightingale, 521-527.
⁴. NA vol 738 Ref 684, Memorandum on Native occupants at Isidenge and Upper Kabusie, 5 November 1908.
service which could be easily transformed to an income. Secondly tenancy suggests that a land shortage existed that could have resulted from people entering the district in the closing stages of the nineteenth century. The commission sent in 1908 to investigate the methods of enforcement of Location Acts, vagrancy, African tenure, stock theft and sale of liquor to the African people of Stutterheim, Albany, King William's Town, Komgha and East London disclosed that by 1908 the tenant population had increased in these districts.

Both African and White farmers found it more profitable to abandon their farming efforts in favour of the easier mode of securing income from the rentpaying tenants. Under these circumstances tenancy could have been both a source of income and an attempt by the tenant to escape landlessness. There was neither uniformity nor standardization in the practice. A statistical analysis of landowners of Isidenge and Upper Kubusi indicates that sole owners practised tenancy more than joint owners. Usually large farms were expensive to run, thus in most cases unsuccessful landowners might have been tempted to resort to tenancy, while joint owners shared their responsibilities and could exercise effective farming. A few Africans who practised farming on half terms with either their neighbouring Whites or other Africans managed to avoid having a large number of tenants on their properties. The Isidenge and Upper Kubusi tenant class's social and economic structure had uniformity, though tenants belonged to different population groups. There were no fundamental differences in terms of standard of living and education background. Though differences in religion and language existed, both groups lacked valuable property and hence had few prospects.

5. Oral tradition suggests that tenancy was used more for service than income accumulation, whereas the official opinion was/is the opposite. Each is probably true in part.
7. NA vol 738 Ref 684, Memorandum on Native Occupants at Isidenge and Upper Kabusi, 5 November 1908.
8. Sharing in this context is used strictly to denote joint ownership.
9. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Memorandum on Native occupants in Isidenge and Upper Kabusi area, 5 November 1908.
11. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Circular on Stock stealing at Upper Kabusi, 3 November 1908.
But there was a distinction in historical background: whereas a considerable number of White tenant families were from King William's Town, African tenants had various origins. Dislocations of indigenous social and economic structure scattered lots of Africans and eventually led to complex situations.

The historical background of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge tenants can be associated with the latter class. Moving beyond this general analysis, one would need to examine briefly the changes in the King William's Town district that might have propelled the inhabitants from that district and also occurrences that could have attracted them to become tenants at Stutterheim. Writing recently, Webb has noted that King William's Town's economic base had gradually declined by the 1870s and 1880s and that the 1890s and early 1900s were "days of stress and strain." Political complexities were exacerbated in the climate of the South African war of 1899-1902. Considering the better land leasing and buying chances that prevailed in Stutterheim district, after 1880, local land administration policies were attractive to the disadvantaged King William's Town White inhabitants. Therefore the movement from King William's Town to Stutterheim could have been stimulated by opportunism.

Substantial evidence has however indicated that there were no viable socio-economic opportunities gained by the African or White tenant communities of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge region. Instead reports of high levels of crime, increased starvation and general social and economic deterioration emerge during the closing years of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

A rather different kind of social and economic life had earlier prevailed amongst the group of tenants who settled along the Kei river lands. The labour commission of 1893 had the task of investigating the existence of the "metayer system" and its bearing on the sufficiency of labour.

14. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Circular on Stock stealing at Upper Kubusie, 5 November 1908; NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Circular on Families of poor Whites in Upper Kubusie, 3 November 1908.
in the colony. The report of this commission was an illumination of the tenant class which occupied and worked privately owned Stutterheim White farms that were located along the banks of the Kei.¹⁸

Up to 1893 these people carried on a much more viable agricultural practice.¹⁷ The tenants who settled on Kei river lands and also on Keilands mission station property¹⁸ were an exclusive African group that had relied heavily on cultivation as was the case of Keilands mission station. A mixture of arable and pastoral farming was used to meet rental costs.¹⁹ Arable and pastoral farming also occurred at Bolo and Quanti.²⁰ However, unlike Kei White farmers who preferred leasing their properties, a majority of Bolo and Quanti White landowners were permanently settled with their tenants, while numerous African farm owners were leasing their farms. Reasons for the latter's preference to lease (rather than settle permanently like their White colleagues) are not precisely determinable. But possibly, since landlessness was becoming a glaring general problem for the African population towards the turn of the nineteenth century, sympathetic African landowners opted to lease their properties. It was explicit that the system of leasing (particularly joint leasing), allowed room for the congregation of large numbers of tenants on any leased property.²¹

**Government's attempts to regulate tenancy**

The closing years of the nineteenth century witnessed the Location Acts of 1892 and 1899²² which caused major concern to rural landowners and tenants. The two Acts mainly dealt with the administration of private properties and in particular the number of tenants and the cost of the licence fee each landowner had to meet for his/her property.²³ Although the Acts were mainly

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16. CPP G3-'94, 1893 Labour commission, see especially the statement by Nightingale, 521-527.
17. CPP G3-'94, 1893 Labour commission, see especially the statement by G Nightingale, 523.
18. Keilands was a Roman Catholic Mission station that was established in 1884 on the Transkei and Stutterheim border lands. The Catholics purchased two farms on the Kei river for both farming and evangelization activities. Though the mission was very active amongst the Gcaleka, it was briefly administered by Stutterheim up to 1908 after which year it was bought by the Trappists of Mariannhill. Though at present ecclesiastical activity still exists, the area is mainly used for farming.
20. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native Affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907.
23. See sections 1 and 9 of Act 33 of 1892 and 2 and 3 of Act 30 of 1899.
introduced to control privately owned African properties, they affected White owned properties as well.

Though both dealt with the administration of private properties, the two Acts differed in regulating tenancy. This variation subsequently became the crux of the confusion that in turn drew both tenants and landowners into a problem. The 1892 Act defined a "native location" as constituted of tenant households ranging in number between three and seven, who were either employed or not (by the owner). On the other hand, the Act of 1899 disallowed the settlement of unemployed tenants on private properties and gave right of settlement only to tenants who were continuously employed by the owner. Should unemployed tenants live on the property, the owner would be liable for hut tax. Additionally, the Act restated the provisions of 1892 and ruled that any private property settled by one or more unemployed tenant households was a "private location" that was supposed to be licensed. Thus under this Act, a farmer could keep no tenants without paying hut tax except his/her employee(s).

In practice, the Location Act of 1892 hit the tenants harder than the landowners. It stipulated the payment of twenty shillings as an annual licence for each adult male. Although farm owners were responsible for this licence fee, they repeatedly avoided payment. As a result, the tenants' living costs were increased as they were in turn forced to pay by the location inspectors. If the government had hoped that the implementation of the 1892 Act would restrict labour tenancy and thus force tenants into migrant labour, then the Act failed to achieve that goal in Stutterheim district. By 1899, the number of tenants on private properties had increased considerably.

24. Section 1 of Act 33 of 1892.
25. Sections 2 and 3 of Act 30 of 1899.
26. Sections 2 and 3 of Act 30 of 1899.
27. Act 33 of 1892.
28. See section 9 of Act 33 of 1892.
29. CPP G4-'93 BBNA 1892, 32.
31. Although there exists no statistical evidence on which to base a comparative analysis between pre- and post-1895 periods, increase of tenants or "squatters" after 1897 has been noted. Farms in Quanti, Kubusi, Isidenge and mission locations such as Mgwali and Wartburg were highlighted. See: NA vol 738 F 684, Magistrate's proceedings records against African landowners held in Bolo 30 June 1906;
the 1899 Location Act was applied in the district it set the scene for the prosecution of a number of landowners. Thereafter, sporadic landowners' reaction to the 1899 Act arose.

Formulation of a state-regulated system of tenancy on the White farms cannot simply be reduced to a government programme of establishing a "stable and tightly controlled labour force".\(^{32}\) Although the Location Acts sought to reduce the number of tenants on private farms, the transformation of farm tenants into a full-time labour force did not fully exist in Stutterheim district before 1910, nor was it possible for the government to secure a stable and tightly controlled labour force. Despite intense implementation of a sequence of Location Acts, uniform response could not be attained. The ways in which the local administration and government interpreted and exercised the Acts were inconsistent. As a result, various responses from different farms prevailed. Where White farm owners had leased their properties to Africans, numerous tenants flocked onto these farms. Where White farmers (some of whom complied with the Acts) remained on their farms, tenants left for either African owned and leased farms or neighbouring locations.\(^{33}\) By 1906, the local administration and government had still not formulated an effective solution to deal with the tenancy problem.

However, the Stutterheim administration pursued the provisions of the 1892 and 1899 Acts with gusto. The argument that follows seeks to illuminate the settlement pattern on the district's farms. Simultaneously it attends to the problems faced by, first, the farmers and their tenants, and secondly by the administrators in dealing with the Acts. Analysis of the effects of these Acts on rural private landowners has been focused on three sections of the district: first, in the Kei river lands (adjoining and on Keilands mission station), where a considerable number of African tenants were settled on the station and also leased White owned farms. There, the Acts were implemented and disobeyed by land owners, farm lessees and tenants.\(^{34}\) Secondly in the immigrant farming community where

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\(^{33}\) See pages 148-149 below.

\(^{34}\) NA vol 551 ref A 906, J Horning (Priest in charge of Keilands mission station) to the secretary of native affairs, 24 November 1892.
the Acts (especially the 1899 Act) first created tension amongst landowners, and later created tension between landowners and the government. Lastly in the ex-crown reserve area, particularly in the settlements of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge a mixed reaction by African and White farmers prevailed.

1892 and 1899 Location Acts and Keilands landowners/tenants

At Keilands, both Acts were condemned by farm owners. In connection with the 1892 Act, one can particularly note the Keilands missionaries who in 1884 purchased two large farms (Keilands and Rocky Nook) along the Kei river.\(^{35}\) By 1892, forty tenant households lived on these farms, so when the 1892 Act was applied to the mission farms, the missionaries had to pay a huge licence fee for keeping tenants on their property. Moreover the Act did not allowed the missionaries to keep such a large number of tenants.\(^{36}\)

The mission perceived the implementation of the 1892 Act on its property as a miscalculation on the government’s side. It claimed that its farms were not strictly utilised for private enterprise. In contest against the implementation of the Act on its property, the mission authority bypassed the Stutterheim administration and dealt directly with the native affairs department on the matter.

I do not believe that it was even contemplated by the legislative, that a regularly established well conducted and supervised mission of Evangelisation although situate on purchased property should be treated as a private farm in the sense of the location Act.\(^{37}\)

The mission’s defence aimed at explicitly proving that the farms were mainly intended for mission purposes. It threatened to abandon its Christianization enterprise amongst the farm tenants. The mission had the support of the tenants who feared being evicted from the farms.\(^{38}\)

There was no decisive action taken by the government to enforce the provisions of the 1892 Act at Keilands between the years 1893 and 1898. But when the 1899 Private Location Act was passed, it

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35. NA vol 551 Ref A 906, Horning to the secretary of native affairs, 24 November 1892.
36. NA vol 551 Ref A 906, Horning to the secretary of native affairs, 24 November 1892.
37. NA vol 551 Ref A 906, Horning to the secretary of native affairs, 24 November 1892.
38. NA vol 551 Ref A 906, Horning to the secretary of native affairs, 24 November 1892.
was also applied in the region. Thus the mission authority and Stutterheim administration found themselves in a state of disagreement.

I beg to point out that this location was in existence before the Location Act of 1899. The missionary in charge claims the right of admitting as many families as the place can support.  

The perseverance of the government in having the provisions of these two Acts implemented on mission stations reflected the growing tendency of the colonial administration to interfere in mission settlements. The prominence of missionaries in administering their stations was being weakened by colonial legislation. In the district, the Acts were extended to most mission stations but without success. However owing to sustained resistance from mission authorities, the native affairs department decided to exempt the mission stations from the Private Location Acts by 1908. The Mission Station and Communal Reserves Act of 1909 further protected the safety of mission stations (from the private Locations Acts), but on the other hand, it gave more supervisory and managerial powers to the respective mission societies and village management boards.

Meanwhile, between 1900 and 1907, complications had developed on the white owned farms adjoining Keilands mission station. Most of these farms were occupied by African tenants who leased the properties.

The crux of the problem on the leased farms lay in the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the provisions of the 1899 Private Location Act. In this particular case, the misinterpretation was by both the lessees and the local administrators. This was further complicated by the inconsistency between the colonial government and Stutterheim administration in carrying out the Act.

39. NA vol 624 Ref B 1983, J Apel (Priest in charge of Keilands mission station) to the Stutterheim acting location inspector, 28 August 1903.
40. NA vol 624 Ref B 1983, the chief inspector of locations to the secretary of native affairs, 21 September 1903.
41. NA vol 624 Ref B 1983, Stutterheim acting inspector of locations to the secretary of native affairs, 1 September 1903.
42. NA vol 738 Ref 684, secretary for native affairs to the prime minister, 25 July 1908.
43. Act 29 of 1909.
44. See sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and sections 20-29 of Act 29 of 1909.
45. CPP G3-'94, 1893 labour commission, see especially the statement by G Nightingale, 523; NA vol 738 Ref 684, secretary of native affairs to the law department, 30 January 1907.
46. NA vol 738 Ref 684, secretary of attorney general's office to the native affairs department, 30 January 1907.
government's assistant treasurer confirmed to the native affairs department that there existed considerable difficulty in applying the 1899 Act to farms held by lessees.  

The tenants' technicalities of lease were complicated and hence the 1899 Act could not be smoothly applied. Firstly, a number of tenants preferred joint leasing. As a result on several farms there was no sole occupier. The fact that numerous lessees were registered occupiers of a particular property meant difficulties for the local administration in detecting who was liable for licence fees. Moreover there was nothing anywhere in the Act which made the lessees individually liable for licence fees. In fact under the Act, the person liable for the licence fee was the owner.

The second problem directly resulted from the first. Joint leasing meant that a number of tenant homesteads would be in occupation of that particular property. As a result, several farms housed large numbers of tenants, a status quo which the Act sought to undermine. Under these circumstances, it was a complicated task for the administrators to decide whether the farm occupants were families of tenants, or permanent/continuous employees (whom the Act allowed to settle on the farms) or any group other than these two.

With these two glaring problems, the task of administering joint leased farms was a dilemma. The prevailing uncertainty regarding the provisions of the Act in respect of joint lessees had resulted in a state of confusion. While the native affairs department perceived that a majority of joint lessees were evading the law, the local administration maintained that joint lessees required no licences.

47. NA vol 738 F 684, assistant treasurer to the native affairs department, 28 October 1907.
48. Joint leasing here is used strictly to denote more than one lessee.
49. NA vol 738 Ref 684, Native affairs department's circular on Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 23 March 1907.
50. See the subsections of Act 30 of 1899.
51. Mainly adult males who were heads of tenant families would be lessees. As a result, their families would also settle on these farms.
52. Section 2 of Act 30 of 1899.
53. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native Affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 23 March 1907.
An interesting occasion where the provisions of the Act were met in an extraordinary way may be instanced with Mr Philpott. From 1900 to 1908, he was the district's resident magistrate. He owned two farms in the district and, like a number of White farmers, he leased his two farms to twelve Africans with six joint lessees on each farm. By 1907, there were over 200 occupants on these farms. Not unnaturally, higher authority was deeply concerned about these numbers.

The existence of large numbers of tenants on numerous farms nullified what the 1899 Private Locations Act sought to achieve. Including Philpott's farms, there were 37 farms with the same problem. However, most lessees possessed no licences and as a result they paid no licence fee and no hut tax. The farm owners who were also supposed to have licences for allegedly established private locations on their properties did nothing to remedy the situation. In any case, licence fees and hut tax were payable to the colonial government farm owners had nothing to gain from either. Instead they would be subjected to payment of perpetual licence fees. Their reluctance to secure licences either for themselves or for their lessees was strengthened by a Supreme Court decision taken in April 1904, which declared that a location licence was not required for property leased under section 10 of Act 30 of 1899.

Between 1905 and 1906, Philpott's judgements in cases connected with the 1899 Private Location Act were in concurrence with the 1904 Supreme Court findings. Although on some occasions light fines arising from police pressure were imposed, the sentences never forced lessees to pay either hut tax or a licence fee. CMP sub-inspector Percy Cumming commented, "I must however

54. See CPP BBNA for years 1900-1908.
55. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907.
56. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907.
57. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native Affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907. Section 10 of Act 30 1899, stipulated "Any two or more native male adults joined in any bona fide written lease and paying in cash a rental amounting to forty eight pounds, or upwards in the case of two such lessees, and not less than additional twelve pounds each for any greater number of lessees, or who shall occupy any private property as registered owners shall not be subject to the provisions of [1899 Act]."
58. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native Affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907.
state that the light fines imposed do not appear to have the desired effect.\(^{59}\) Philpott's judgements were not pleasing to other administrators and were also opposed by some farmers at Bolo. But the BFA which drew the attention of the attorney general to Philpott's judgements, was not unanimous in condemnation of Philpott's action. While some members felt that his administration of the 1899 Act was satisfactory, others had contrasting views.\(^{60}\)

However, there was a popular belief amongst administrators and a section of the BFA that farmers like Philpott were benefiting from alleged hut tax paid by tenants on the farms.\(^{61}\) Later the divisional council joined their side.\(^{62}\) The divisional council's aim centred on licensing the farms in question. Therefore the police would be provided with the necessary authority to enforce other provisions of the Act.\(^{63}\) Eventually, an effective check on tenants and their stock would be achieved, and the suspicions of the administrators and some members of the BFA about the operation of the Act would be attended to.

It remains difficult to conclude that first as a magistrate then as a farm owner, Philpott was the defender of tenants against the 1899 Act, but there is a possibility that he was sympathetic to his lessees and to other lessees in a similar position. The prevailing confusion in exercising the Act allowed him room to interpret the provisions of the Act. When he was removed in 1908,\(^{64}\) the local administration intensified the prosecution of joint lessees. Discontent amongst farm owners and tenants became extreme.

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59. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, P Cumming sub-inspector of CMP to the commissioner commanding CMP Cape Town 19 December 1906.
60. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, see the statements by members of Bolo Farmers Association at Bolo Periodical court, 10 and 11 December 1906.
61. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Native Affairs department's circular on: Administration of Private Location Law in Stutterheim, 27 December 1907.
62. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, A Hofmeyr (Divisional inspector) to the secretary of Law department, 27 December 1906.
63. Section 8 of Act 30 of 1899 was applicable to licensed farms. Section 8 dealt strictly with registration of people and stock on the farms.
64. He was removed to Cathcart for having been allegedly sympathetic to Stutterheim African farmers.
1899 Private Location Act and the immigrant farming community

Although the immigrant locations comprised three subsections of the farming community, it was mainly the Bolo and Quanti locations that were heavily affected by the 1899 Private Location Act.

During Philpott's term as magistrate, a number of African lessors from Bolo and Quanti were charged under the 1899 Private Location Act. In 1906, 5 African landowners: Bebe, Melani and Mganu, who were joint owners of the farm Larnica at Bolo and Skenjana and Kalimashe owners of Antelope and Moonstone at Quanti and Bolo, were acquitted (by Philpott) on charges under the 1899 Act. This judgement was passed simultaneously with those pertaining to the joint lessees of the Kei farms. The judgement in favour of African farmers keeping alleged large numbers of tenants was undesirable to the majority of White Bolo farmers. This state of affairs was aggravated by a continuous movement of tenants from White farms to neighbouring African farms and villages. This development subsequently decreased the labour supply on White farms. On the other hand, the BFA's condemnation of African landowners' evasion of the 1899 Private Location Act became a popular topic in government circles. A large number of White farmers resented the fact that tenants were flocking to African farms.

At this point it will be useful to suggest reasons that contributed to the tenants' preferences for joint leasing or settling on African farms. Besides the fact that Philpott was allegedly sympathetic to African lessees and landowners, a number of tenants were stockowners. Leasing offered them enough grazing land and self determination; moreover a number of lessees could share the leasing

66. In fact the BFA's complaints to the Attorney General were stimulated more by the acquittal of their African counterparts than the light sentences passed on the Kei farm lessees.
67. CPP G24-1908 BBNA 1907, Stutterheim civil commissioner to the secretary of native affairs, 17.
68. The Native Affairs and Attorney General papers for Stutterheim district during the period between 1905 and 1908, are dominated by the BFA correspondence and the 1899 Private Location Act.
fee.\textsuperscript{69} Oral evidence has shed further light on this topic. Some tenants were related to farmers who always accommodated to their landless relatives. Furthermore, unlike White farm owners, African landowners allowed their tenants to keep as much stock as they wished.\textsuperscript{70} On the other hand, the relationship between a White farmer and his tenant was limited to labour matters and offered no room for tenants' relatives.\textsuperscript{71} The fact that tenants might have large families who preferred to live together did not please White farmers, especially those who feared the consequences of overpopulation.\textsuperscript{72}

Thus sympathy and familial ties were dominant factors attracting tenants to African landowners. One should however not overgeneralise the oral tradition view. It is difficult to analyse the depth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century White farmers' feelings about African tenants. The only information at our disposal (particularly for Bolo and Quanti) concerns those who were allegedly antagonistic to tenants, with the exception of Philpott. It should be also noted that White farmers were also disadvantaged by the Act by which they chose to abide. This is particularly true of the section which sought to regulate the number of tenants on each property.\textsuperscript{73} Their obedience to this section actually led to the shortage of labour on their farms.

A number of Bolo and Quanti White farmers perceived allegedly overpopulated African farms as places where thieves congregated.\textsuperscript{74} This perception was largely maintained by the district's farming community before the implementation of the 1899 Act,\textsuperscript{75} but after 1900, a section of the BFA became concerned about the "loose native" who was allegedly posing a danger to the White farmer's livestock. Keegan has noted the antagonism that developed between African producers on

\textsuperscript{69} NA vol 738 Ref 684, proceedings against African landowners charged under Act 30 of 1899, see especially the statement by Ncekiso from Wartburg, who kept his sheep on Skenjana's farm, 20 June 1906.

\textsuperscript{70} Mrs Kalimashe, interviewed in Mlungisi Township, 26 January 1993.

\textsuperscript{71} Mrs B N Ntsonkota interviewed in Mgwali no 1 Village, 26 September 1993.

\textsuperscript{72} Mr M Fetsha interviewed in Wartburg, 2 October 1992.

\textsuperscript{73} See section 2 of Act 30 of 1899.

\textsuperscript{74} NA vol 738 Ref F 684, statement of James Whittal (president of the BFA) during Hofmeyr's commission about the working of the 1899 Private Location Act in Stutterheim, 30 June 1906.

\textsuperscript{75} Farmers Chronicle and Stutterheim Times, 14 February 1889.
absentee-owned land and rural White farmers in the southern Highveld during the 1890s, but unlike the southern Highveld where tension between African producers and White farmers was explicit, the white farmers of Stutterheim were not united in their fight to undermine African tenancy. This is not to deny that tenancy and administration of the Act in the farming community resulted in racial tensions, but this tension was limited by the fact that no two unified classes existed; even the BFA was divided.

Philpott's removal in the middle of 1908 paved the way not only for the fulfilment of immigrant White farmers' aspirations, but also for intensified application of the 1899 Act which led to a series of prosecutions of landowners and lessees. A number of farmers who had been acquitted by Philpott, were now recharged. Under a new magistrate, Preston, almost all African landowners, including lessees, were convicted and eventually fined.

African landowners resisted forcefully. As with their fellow townsmen, resistance was channelled constitutionally. By September 1908, all charged African landowners had taken cases to King William's Town and Stutterheim lawyers. However the matter moved beyond the level of the courts as lawyers corresponded directly with the House of Assembly and the Attorney General.

The plight of Quanti and Bolo African farmers also won the sympathy of other African farm owners at Kubusi and Isidenge, but it should be noted that at Kubusi and Isidenge, the response to the 1899 Act never developed into racial tensions as in Bolo and Quanti. There was closer co-operation between African and White landowners against the Act in Upper Kubusi and Isidenge. But the

76. T Keegan: Rural transformations in industrialising South Africa: the Southern Highveld to 1914, (Johannesburg 1987), 57.
77. AG 1852 Ref 17879, Preston to the secretary of Law Department 16 October 1908.
78. See pages 168-169 below.
79. AG 1852 Ref 17879, William Luyt (Lawyer from King William's Town) to Henry Burton Attorney General, 28 August 1908; Bousefield (lawyer from Stutterheim) to Stutterheim magistrate, 26 March 1909.
80. AG 1852 Ref 17879, Copies of letters written by George Blaine from the House of Assembly in Cape Town.
81. This is outlined below.
perception that the government or Stutterheim administration sided with White farmers (particularly the BFA), was widespread amongst African landowners.

An intensified African landowners' campaign against the Act was implemented. Besides fighting through the lawyers, measures to draw in even the least involved were undertaken as the matter was brought to the attention of the press by September 1908. Jabavu's Imvo Zabantsundu (Imvo), fuelled the fray. The caption of the article that dealt with the issue was provoking: "A REIGN OF TERROR". Whether it was the influence of the landowners, or Imvo's own stance, the likening of the Stutterheim administration to a "Reign of terror" not only drew the sympathy of local and neighbouring Africans to the matter, but also drew the attention of government personnel and intensified the antagonism between Preston (the new magistrate) and African landowners. Imvo reduced the issue to a racial level:

The aim of the Location Act [1899] appears to be to make it impossible for a Native to own and work a farm. It prevents a Native from doing what he likes with his own. It differentiates between a white and a black farmer. Whereas a white farmer may have as many helpers as he likes in working his farm, the black farmer has his wings clipped.

The anger of African farmers was understandable. It seemed to them that there was a conspiracy of power between the government and White farmers.

[African farming] has raised the gorge of their European neighbours, who agitated for the removal of Mr Philpott, and in his place had a man after their heart appointed by the late Progressive Government to vigorously enforce the draconian provisions of their wicked Act against the Natives.

The statement by Imvo can only be understood in the light of pressure coming from African landowners' dissatisfaction, but Imvo stressed the African anger too heavily. The majority of White landowners who had earlier aligned themselves with African landowners against the Act (particularly in Kubusi) were alienated. Their initial decision to side with African landowners was
condemned by the local administration. Now Imvo's stance categorized and identified the general White farming community with the government.

While racial tensions in the immigrant community were intensified in the following years, further frustrations repeatedly hit the African landowners. They had to pay their attorneys' bills which in some cases exceeded the average magistrate's fines. With annual quitrents, fines and endless attorneys' bills, they were trapped on both ends. The road ahead for African landowners was gloomy. By 1910, they had already taken a hammering. Attempts by the tenants to work on arable soil they leased at high rates met with disastrous crop failures. This development led to further frustrations as rentals could not be recovered. Faced with landlessness that was coupled with increased poverty, a majority of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge tenants faced a life of deterioration.

1899 Private Location Act, Isidenge and Upper Kubusi landowners/tenants

Nowhere in the history of nineteenth century Stutterheim had racial integration existed as early and for as long as at Isidenge and Upper Kubusi. When these two settlements were still under the crown reserve administration, a mixed population settlement had evolved. This situation remained unchanged even after the incorporation of these two settlements into Stutterheim district in 1879. By 1899, diverse cultural groups in this part of the district had been in contact for more than forty years. Thus coherent social integration had taken place.

In the light of that background, a unified response to the 1899 Act was possible, but this was not to be the case as mixed feelings about the provisions of the Act prevailed. Indeed, landowners irrespective of colour condemned the implementation of the 1899 Act in Upper Kubusi; however, suspicions about the presence of tenants arose among the Isidenge farmers who constituted the majority of the Stutterheim Farmers and Fruit Growers Association (SFFGA). With the backing

87. AG 1852 Ref 17879, Preston to Lonsdale (secretary of Law department), 10 October 1908.
88. T vol 1101 Ref F 1343, Land Revenue outstanding in Stutterheim, 1907-1908.
89. See chapter 2, pages 36-38 above.
90. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, G Gordon (secretary of SFFGA) to the Attorney General, 21 December 1908.
of the Act, they contemplated encouraging the prohibition of tenancy in the district. Like a section of the BFA, the SFFGA perceived African tenants as a potential danger to farming prosperity.\textsuperscript{91}

Ironically, although they were adjacent to Isidenge, Upper Kubusi landowners had a different perception. So, whereas the Act provoked racial tensions in the immigrant community\textsuperscript{92} and concern in Isidenge, unity pursued for economic goals dominated at Upper Kubusi. There, landowners together with their tenants joined forces in an attempt to retain their pre-1899 Act social and economic settlement pattern. During 1902 and 1904, African and White landowners with their tenants petitioned Stutterheim authority about its administration of the Act.\textsuperscript{93}

At least with the exception of Keilands mission station, in no other section of the district were the provisions of the 1899 Act enforced as vigorously as in Upper Kubusi.\textsuperscript{94} Even during Philpott’s term, a number of landowners were heavily prosecuted.\textsuperscript{95} The complications involved in exercising the Act was also the crux of the problem in the area. Landowners were constantly fined for not possessing location licences, but as they hired their lands to tenants for less than £36 per annum, they felt that it was unnecessary to pay licences.\textsuperscript{96} Section 9 of the Act maintained:

\begin{quote}
The occupation of any private property by any native male adult, who is the sole owner thereof, or who is the sole lessee thereof paying a rental in cash of not less than thirty-six pounds per annum under a bona fide written lease, shall not be regarded as constituting a private location.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Besides section 9 of the 1899 Act, landowners’ sympathetic feelings towards their tenants were evident. For social and economic reasons, the landowners thought tenants’ payment of £36 leasing or hiring fee plus the enforceable licence fee to be unfair. The landowners’ case was understandable

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} NA vol 738 Ref F 684, G Gordon to the Attorney General, 21 December 1908.
\item \textsuperscript{92} See pages 145-149 above.
\item \textsuperscript{93} NA vol 573 Ref A 1250, Stutterheim petitioners to House of Assembly, 29 February 1904.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Upper Kubusi farm settlement closely adjoins the town. There is a high possibility of connection between the strict enforcement of the 1899 Act and the local administrators’ disapproval of an integrated settlement.
\item \textsuperscript{95} NA vol 573 Ref A 1250, Stutterheim petitioners to House of Assembly, 29 February 1904.
\item \textsuperscript{96} NA vol 573 Ref A 1250, Stutterheim petitioners to House of Assembly, 29 February 1904.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Section 9 of Act 30 of 1899.
\end{itemize}
as each leased lot was worth about £50 on a freehold sale.⁹⁸ Therefore, extended leasing coupled with licence fee, was more than the actual lot value.

In these circumstances the landowner’s defence of his tenant's living rights was mainly pursued for economic gain, while tenants were desperately in need of land for which they were prepared to pay under any cost. This factor can be also generally applied to other agricultural communities analysed above. But variation in farm or property size made a difference in tenant's social and economic lives. For instance on the spacious Kei and immigrant farms, tenants owned much stock and practised more cultivation than those at Isidenge and Upper Kubusi. The latter tenants relied mainly on working for their landlords⁹⁹ and also in the Isidenge and Upper Kubusi state forests.¹⁰⁰

As in other parts of the district, intensification of prosecutions occurred during Preston’s term, but unlike the divided BFA, the SFFGA (with the exception of a few Upper Kubusi landowners) was united on the issue of enforcing the law.¹⁰¹ The Stutterheim divisional council and magistrate were also keen to see Upper Kubusi and Isidenge tenants removed. Preston had already authorised the CMP to check on the tenants by October 1908.¹⁰² Amongst things officers were supposed to check, two were:

a) If the lots [were] overcrowded with Natives who [were] unable to show fair means of subsistence.

b) If Natives of bad character [were] located in this vicinity.¹⁰³

Although the Act was primarily aimed to regulate the number of tenants on each property, local government sought to establish social and economic behaviour that exhibited order, prosperity and self sufficiency. Like the SFFGA, the divisional council perceived large numbers of tenants to constitute a danger to the farming community. By November 1908, CMP officers had completed their report on the Isidenge and Upper Kubusi tenants.¹⁰⁴ Whether the report reflected or

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⁹⁸. NA vol 573 Ref A 1250, Stutterheim petitioners to House of Assembly, 29 February 1904.
⁹⁹. CPP G19-1909 BBNA 1908, 15.
¹⁰⁰. FCE vol 3/1/60 Ref 729, Crown forests Eastern conservancy district no 3, annual forest department report for 1902.
¹⁰¹. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Gordon to the Attorney General 21 December 1908.
¹⁰². NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Preston to the officer commanding CMP, 2 October 1908.
¹⁰³. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Preston to the officer commanding CMP, 2 October 1908.
¹⁰⁴. NA vol 738 Ref F 684, Sub Inspector of CMP to the Stutterheim civil commissioner, 3 November 1908.
exaggerated the situation is difficult to say, but it justified the divisional council in passing a resolution that:

... in the interest of all concerned earnestly request the Honourable the Attorney General to institute such action, as he may deem desirable to eject squatters and prevent overcrowding in the future.\textsuperscript{105}

The divisional council's resolution not only resulted in intensified landowner/tenant prosecution, but also provoked resistance from the landowner and tenant sector. African landowners and tenants at Isidenge joined the Upper Kubusi landowners in contesting the Act, thus alienating their White counterparts. Like the immigrant African farmers, by 1909, Upper Kubusi landowners and a section of African landowners in Isidenge had taken up their case with the lawyers,\textsuperscript{108} but neither the landowners' resistance, nor the divisional council's intensified enforcement of the 1899 Act could offer a solution to the problem. In 1993 both Upper Kubusi and Isidenge landowners, still practise tenancy.

\textbf{Evaluation: No fixed solution to the problem}

Bundy has noted that the Natives Land Act of 1913 was not the first attempt to undermine the position of landless tenants.\textsuperscript{107} However, although it is possible that the passage of the 1899 Private Location Act might have been activated by farmers' complaints about the shortage of labour and land,\textsuperscript{108} it would be simplistic to suggest that the farming community was unified in that decision, nor was the 1899 Act able to meet Stutterheim farmers' demands. Although it has been argued that farmers' demands were met by the 1899 Act,\textsuperscript{108} the opposite was experienced in Stutterheim. Even the 1909 Private Location Amendment Act\textsuperscript{110} could not change the complicated situation. By 1910, the problem of tenancy on privately owned farms had still not been solved. Most
African farmers in the district only lost their farms under apartheid land policies. Research on the later period will cast light on the topic.

This is not to deny that tenants faced difficulties other than the implementation of the Private Location Acts. Towards the turn of the century especially after 1895, drought coupled with rinderpest plague adversely affected Kei tenant subsistence. Subsequently a considerable number became migrant labourers. 111 Beinart has noted the increased rate of migrancy resulting from the rinderpest during the closing stages of the nineteenth century in Pondoland. 112 Rinderpest, which was one of the most serious cattle diseases at the turn of the nineteenth century, was most damaging to African livestock. 113 Unlike Pondoland where the majority of the local male inhabitants headed for mine work either on the Rand or in Natal, 114 the Kei tenants of Stutterheim district opted in great numbers for public works. 115 Statistical evidence offered by the Stutterheim locations inspector during 1899 indicates that of 114 individuals who sought outside employment, 105 opted for public works. 116

Migrancy to public works during this period requires careful analysis, for it has been a well established phenomenon that the discovery of minerals across the Orange and the Vaal rivers caused a dominant shift of migrant labour towards those areas. 117 Overemphasis of a general trend to the mines may overshadow an analysis of the impact of public works on the Cape rural socio-economic structure and unique characteristics, as in the case of the Stutterheim district Kei tenants, may be overlooked. This is not to generalize that migrancy in the whole of Stutterheim district had a unique or a specific trend that was directed towards the public works. Government

111. CPP G42-98 BBNA 1897, Stutterheim locations inspector's report, 50-51.
115. CPP G31-99 BBNA 1898, Stutterheim location inspector's report, 51.
116. CPP G31-99 BBNA 1898, Stutterheim location inspector's report, 51.
117. Macro and Micro studies in political economy of South Africa, have with great strength emphasised the role of mines in either migrancy or the changing nature of the country's economy, see for instance Bundy: Rise and Fall, 166-183; and Lewis: "Economic History", 638-670.
published papers note (without statistics) a movement to the mines especially by Mgwali and Wartburg inhabitants. 118

Diverse movements in search of jobs in the aftermath of the rinderpest dislocated the social and economic structure that had earlier been attained within the Kei tenant community, but a decisive event for the general tenant community was the 1899 Private Location Act. The opening years of the twentieth century saw the tenants entering a cycle of economic decline. Reports for subsequent years confirmed the transformation of a substantial number into a wage earning class. Those who had earlier avoided migrant labour were increasingly becoming domestic servants in the neighbouring communities within the district. 118 By 1913 the chances of survival of a viable tenant class along the banks of the Kei river were remote; moreover the formation of the Union government (1910) and in particular its segregation land laws would ensure the diminution of the tenant class on rural White owned lands.

It is indisputable that rapid changes in administration policies in rural areas had profound effects on the district’s inhabitants’ political lives. The intensified intervention of the government on rural private properties produced various responses to the applied legislation. Although legislation was mainly directed towards regulating the number of tenants on private farms 120 there was little tangible effect on social and political life. When the colonial government stepped down in 1910, it had still not solved the problems it had diagnosed.

Mission inhabitants’ response to the quitrent and villagization system

... Though [Africans] generally try to evade the payment, or at all events put off the time of payment as long as possible, and when the payment of accumulated taxes are eventually enforced, they become dissatisfied and inclined to throw off all restraint. 121

Although the mission influences might have stimulated a social behaviour that exhibited order, that order could not be maintained easily amongst mission quitrenters. As in Oxkraal and

118. CPP G5-’96 BBNA 1895, Stutterheim location inspector’s report, 151.
119. CPP G50-1900 BBNA 1899, Stutterheim locations inspector’s report, 23.
120. Legislation which authorised native reserve locations in or near urban areas.
Kamastone, the failure to pay quitrents became one of the major problems of the system. Though Murray (who was in charge of the Kaffrarian surveys) spoke firmly about the payment of survey costs in 1882, he never contemplated that more arrear problems would arise in annual quitrents. A considerable number of Mgwali and Wartburg mission locations were incapable of meeting the quitrent demands.

Difficulties in raising quitrents may be attributed to a number of factors, but three fundamental aspects necessitate explanation. The first problem resulted from lack of proper communication between location lotholders and survey officials inasmuch that a considerable number of lotholders had to pay more than the original cost of the survey to have their boundaries properly defined. It is difficult to assess the origins of this problem since neither the officials nor the lotholders admitted responsibility. However the problem probably originated from the failure on the government's side to fix properly defined boundaries during the initial stages of surveys. Subsequently, the lotholders neglected these ill defined boundaries.

Resistance to the settlement system could be another reason for payment refusal. However one may question why the quitrenters opted to defy their annual quitrents instead of resisting the system in its preliminary stage. An answer to this question brings us to the third problem. The annual quitrent charges necessitated that each lotholder should have access to some sort of continuous source of income, but though a few inhabitants of Wartburg and Mgwali mission locations had access to wage labour through migrancy, the majority still depended on limited agriculture, which they used both as a source of subsistence and a means of accumulating income. However during unfavourable seasons low crop yields affected income and led to payment arrears. But the colonial officials were desperate to have the quitrent collected.

123. See footnote 102 in chapter 5, page 110 above.
124. T vol no 1101 Ref 1343, Land Revenue outstanding in Stutterheim 1907-1908, Stutterheim civil commissioner to the Assistant Treasury, 11 April 1908.
126. I have looked closely at the published correspondence and archival documents and I have not come across any documentation of resistance to surveys in the Stutterheim district.
I would here remark that it would be a very good thing to assimilate all native quitrents to one particular season of the year, say the month June, when all the crops are in, and the natives are, as a rule better off than any other period of the year.\textsuperscript{127}

If crop production was an unreliable income source, then quitrent was an invincible debt. As the above statement implies, the majority of the lotholders could only successfully meet the quitrent debts during harvest times, therefore cultivation was no longer just a subsistence source, but a means of settling quitrent debts. Under these circumstances, a considerable number of quitrenters were gradually entering a cycle of economic decline by the last third of the nineteenth century.

There is another side to the story. The most glaring response to the new settlement pattern was the lotholders' disapproval of their demarcated building lots. Approximately a decade after the surveys were conducted, a number of Mgwali and Wartburg quitrenters' homesteads moved and spread on to either the commonage or garden lots.\textsuperscript{128} This pattern occurred in many different areas of the Eastern Cape in the second half of the nineteenth century. Bouch has noted it in Kamastone and Oxkraal settlements (Queenstown district),\textsuperscript{129} and Ally also notes it in Burnshill (Keiskammahoek district).\textsuperscript{130}

One wonders if the movement to either garden lots or commonage was a deliberate act of disobedience against the new settlement pattern. Surely there is room for a resistance theory, particularly if we consider that the majority of quitrenters encountered some unforeseen problems with the system. However, much explanation of this development relates to demographic changes.

A considerable number of people who were initially tenants on surrounding farms had moved to Mgwali and Wartburg (probably after the introduction of the 1892 and 1899 Private Location Acts)

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{127} CPP G50-'82 BBNA 1881, A Murray to de Smidt-Surveyor general, 31.
\item\textsuperscript{128} AG vol 1800- Evictions of squatters on Emgwali commonage, A James of the CMP to Stutterheim Resident Magistrate, 26 June 1908. Interview with H Gija at Mgwali mission station, 3 October 1991. Mr Gija has noted that during his childhood years he had been aware of the existence of quitrent lotholders although there existed no rigid demarcated villages as it is today. He has further added that a considerable number of homesteads preferred living alongside or on their arable lands. This factor has also been reinforced by M Fetsha (interviewed 2 October 1992) in Wartburg location.
\item\textsuperscript{129} Bouch: "Colonisation", 213.
\item\textsuperscript{130} Ally: "Individual tenure", 80.
\end{itemize}
by the beginning of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{131} Archival sources together with oral evidence, confirm the movement and the settlement of farm people in these mission locations.\textsuperscript{132}

The additional numbers of inhabitants at Mgwali and Wartburg obviously had a bearing on average productivity. One should consider the fact that in most cases, quitrenters voluntarily accepted tenants in the hope of gaining either leasing payments or labour assistance. But the system was at times not beneficial for quitrenters. A few reasons were: in some cases, a quitrenter had to cede a part of his garden lot to accommodate a tenant family; tenants would be entitled to share the crop since they contributed labour services. The whole arrangement eventually affected the quitrenter. Now the ten acres which initially supported a nuclear quitrenter family had to maintain a number of tenant families. Thus later there was to be an imbalance between the ratios of production and consumption.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Law enforcement and its implications}

The government handled the task of clearing the settlements on Mgwali and Wartburg commonages and garden lots with gusto but with limited or no success at all.\textsuperscript{134} At Mgwali for instance, the government threatened to abolish the village management board (MVMB) which it blamed for negligence, particularly for the board's failure to remove the lotholders from the commonage and garden lots.\textsuperscript{135}

A fascinating factor in this case was the government's direct involvement in the prosecutions of those who were settled on the commonage. It overruled the MVMB in dealing with the matter and

\textsuperscript{131} NA vol 624 Ref 1983, Rev G Steward (in charge of Mgwali mission station) to Stutterheim Location inspector, 26 August 1903.

\textsuperscript{132} AG vol 1800 Ref F 13498, evictions of squatters on Emgwali commonage, surveyor general to the assistant law advisor, 9 September 1908. NA vol 624 Ref B 1983, G Steward to Stutterheim location inspector, 26 August 1903. Interview with Mr M Fetsha (2 October 1992), Mrs B Ntsonkota (27 September 1993).

\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Mr Fetsha (2 October 1992) and Mrs Ntsonkota (27 September 1993).

\textsuperscript{134} Interviews with H Gija 3 October 1991, M Sam 13 June 1992, at Mgwali Mission Station, and M Fetsha 2 October 1992 at Wartburg Mission "location". These three old men maintain that settlements on commonages and garden lots survived until the introduction of the National Party's betterment programme in the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{135} AG vol 1800 Ref F 13498, evictions of squatters on Emgwali commonage, surveyor general to assistant law advisor, 9 September 1908.
singled out a few "offenders" as test cases in an attempt to intimidate the rest of the lotholders into returning to their original demarcated building lots. By 1907-1908, prosecutions against two quitrenters, Jafta Ngcaku and Klaas Mene, who were amongst those who opted to settle on the commonage (rather than their building lots), were being repeatedly held. This issue was complicated by the fact that Ngcaku was also a member of the MVMB. Though it remains strange for a member of the Board to be implicated in a deliberate act of disobedience of land administration principles, one should also consider the fact that on many occasions the structure of the colonial administration was characterised by corruption. This corruption provided room for manoeuvre for government auxiliaries and private individuals.

On the other hand Ngcaku might have opted to join the popular cause in an attempt to build his prominence, while the government might have desired his prosecution as a crucial example to other offenders. However the prosecution gained Ngcaku sympathy from the village inhabitants and the other members of the MVMB.

The sporadic disregard by quitrenter of the demarcated settlement marked the acceleration of resistance to colonialism which was a cumulative process that passed through different phases. Gone was the resistance posed by the coherent Ngqika group (as in the case of the 1877-78 war) as "individual and corporate actions were incremental in consciousness-raising process as people demonstrated their own sense of grievance in the era of heightened colonial rule. The early 1900s clearly demonstrated that the new social problems that went hand in hand with colonial rule necessitated new solutions. Thus the dawn of civilization and colonial law still faced opposition, but this time rather than emotions straining at the leash, a new type of opposition expressed in the forms of non-participation, spoiling and disregard was to dominate.

136. AG vol 1800, evictions of Squatters on Emgwali commonage, surveyor general to assistant law advisor, 9 September 1908.
137. I have indicated an example of corruption in describing the administration of Liefeldt, see chapter 4.
138. AG vol 1800 Ref F 13498, evictions of Squatters on Emgwali commonage, Surveyor general to assistant law advisor, 9 September 1908.
140. An analysis of African political mobilisation (during early 1900s) in Mgwali mission station can be found in chapter 8.
CHAPTER 8
URBAN SEGREGATION POLICIES, POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND TRADITION REVIVAL IN THE MISSION STATIONS

Administration and territorial segregation in the urban area

The council shall from time to time select and appoint a site or sites for the purpose of locating the Native population of the town,... Every native or other person wishing to erect a hut or huts within the native location or locations of the town shall apply for permission to do so to the municipal clerk in a book to be kept for that purpose, and be called the "Native Location Register". It shall be the duty of the council to appoint a superintendent of the native location or locations, and such superintendent shall obey and carry out the municipal regulations and such instructions as he may time to time receive from the council.¹

The sale of the German Legion's land promoted the existence of racially integrated settlements in Stutterheim district. This was particularly true of the area that was gradually becoming urban, where Stutterheim village adjoined with Upper Kubusi had evolved as a mixed race individual tenure settlement even before the hostilities of 1877-78.

But a racially integrated settlement was not in the long term plans of the municipality.² Approximately five years after the municipality gained its full status in 1879 and while the Divisional Council was in the process of holding sales of Legion land, it was busy drafting the 1884 regulations that were to constitute the backbone of the twentieth century racially segregated urban area. Tankard has illustrated the case of Northend, initially a German settlement, which by the turn of the nineteenth century had developed into a mixed community in East London. There, sporadic attempts were made to expel the Africans from the area,³ but unlike the case of Stutterheim where the municipality had a decisive policy to establish a segregated settlement, East London municipal regulations had not yet been devised to expel Africans from the area by 1884. The councillors, some of whom entertained the idea of a separate African location, were still divided on this issue by the end of 1884.⁴

¹. CO vol 7553 Ref 784, Government Notice no 884, 1884 Municipal Regulations for Stutterheim, clauses no 64, 65 and 66.
². See clauses no 64, 65 and 66 of 1884 Municipal Regulations for Stutterheim.
Lewsen has maintained that "the habit of territorial segregation was so deeply ingrained in the Cape that it was automatically applied to groups of urban blacks who settled in and around the towns". However Baines has illustrated an early model of formal segregation (in Port Elizabeth), whereby a form of separate location "initially for Khoikoi and later for Africans" was in place by 1865. He has further noted that later the system of separate locations was extended to many Eastern Cape towns after the incorporation of Africans into the colonial system. But unlike Port Elizabeth, where the incentive for the establishment of local government came from merchants, Stutterheim local government was the result of colonial administrative expansion. By 1875, the Stutterheim villagers had repeatedly petitioned the government to place an administration centre in the region. Their wishes only materialized after the war of Ngcayecibi.

Kirk has identified intensified urban segregation in Port Elizabeth with the Native Reserve [Urban] Location Act no 40 of 1902, which stipulated that the Cape Governor could proclaim "native" locations in or near urban areas. An interesting fact she notes was the movement of large numbers of town Africans to a freehold settlement at Korsten, in an attempt to escape being relocated to a native reserve which was New Brighton. Although large numbers of town Africans moved to freehold Upper Kubusi in Stutterheim (resulting in Upper Kubusi being transformed into an overcrowded area), the movement did not immediately follow the 1884 regulations or the 1902 Native Reserve [Urban] Location Act.

In Stutterheim, territorial segregation did not gain strong ground in the ex-crown reserve and town until the Cape Colonial government was replaced by that of the Union. Up to this period (1910), there was no change in the social settlement pattern in the town sector and its surroundings such

7. CO vol 4188 Ref S 71, the petitioners of the village of Stutterheim to J L Molteno, 24 November 1875.
10. Segregation in town climaxed in the 1950s when the majority of Kubusi Africans lost their building lots to the commercial core of Stutterheim, forcing them to dwell on their garden lots.
as Upper Kubusi. In 1908, the Stutterheim magistrate confirmed the existence of African and White landowners and tenants at Upper Kubusi and Stutterheim village.11

The argument below seeks to answer two questions. The first question attempts to address the key reasons that were behind the introduction of an urban racially segregated settlement in Stutterheim district. The answer to this question draws analogies from the broader colonial community. The second one attempts to analyse the response to the system. Here the focus narrows as it is directed exclusively to the African population of the village of Stutterheim.

**Some key reasons behind territorial segregation**

An in-depth examination of a close connection between urban racial segregation and social and public health issues has been undertaken by Swanson.12 He has traced how during the late nineteenth century, "urban race relations came to be widely conceived and dealt with in the imagery of infection and epidemic disease".13 Packard has endorsed Swanson's analysis. He maintains that "African health problems became the central justification for implementing a system of urban segregation".14 Baines has suggested that "the so-called "sanitation syndrome" was used as a justification for segregationist practices in the Cape Colony [particularly in Port Elizabeth]" as early as 1859.15 There seems to be no fixed date for this "sanitation syndrome", as Swanson only identifies it with the late nineteenth century. Its identification and diagnosis mainly relied on the consciousness of it on the part of colonial officials. Moreover it also depended on the settlement pattern of that particular territory. Indisputably, disease and epidemiology had become a widespread urban societal metaphor that constituted a major strand in the creation of segregated settlements in the second half of the nineteenth century.

11. NA vol 738 Ref f 684, Sub Inspector Sgt E W Woon of CMP to the magistrate of Stutterheim 3 November 1908.
Perusal of government sources on public health in some Eastern Cape communities during the early 1900s discloses alarming reports of widespread disease amongst the African population. At Mgwali, typhoid fever had broken out in 1910; at Keiskammahoek 3,936 Africans were vaccinated for typhoid fever and tuberculosis in December of the same year. Various related diseases were noted in Komga, while simultaneously at King William's Town vaccination against small-pox was embarked on. Attempts to control typhoid fever were intensified as 4,507 Africans were vaccinated at Middle-drift. At Cathcart smallpox and syphilis were reported as rife. It is fascinating to note that the colonial officials were so conscious of "African diseases" in this period, but it must be considered that in the colonial context, over-crowding, slums, alcoholism, safety and public health were perceived largely in terms of colour differences.

In Stutterheim, segregated settlement also owed much to the assumed notion of "White supremacy" that was developing into an ideology by the twentieth century. The ideology of 'White superiority' flowing from assumptions of the "superiority of western civilization" was now fused with the idea of containing the spread of "African diseases". It became a compelling scapegoat for officials who sought to attend to social problems by implementing segregationist solutions. By 1908, a considerable number of White families living in Upper Kubusi alongside Africans who were either landowners or tenants gained the concern of a colonial official who explicitly showed deep scepticism of this integrated settlement.

[White families'] contact with the natives is, in my opinion, apart from the immediate evil, calculated to lessen the respect of the natives for Europeans generally.

A few months later, the divisional council passed a resolution that:

The attention of the Government be drawn to a report of [sub-Inspector Woon's November 1908] ... this council would strongly recommend that the law be so

16. UG-1911 BBNA 1910, Reports by different magistrates on Public Health, 76-78.
17. UG-1911 BBNA 1910, reports by various magistrates on Public Health matters, 79.
18. UG-1911 BBNA 1910, 73.
20. The tendency nowadays (particularly in South Africa) is to associate the origins of the notion of "white supremacy" with the general white population but I have associated this notion mainly with colonial officials, who I believe had great influence in promoting this notion as an ideology.
amended as to prohibit Natives becoming owners of lands within the municipality.22

The above statements clearly illuminate the shift from the earlier optimistic assimilationist colonial ideology to that of racial segregation. Though the 1879 Location Act had already ensured the construction of racially segregated settlements in the district's rural areas, the urban settlement remained an area of mixed population at least up to the mid twentieth century.23 The articulation of the whole question of segregation in urban Stutterheim in this period is not unique and hence can be deduced from other examples. Southey has indicated that though the majority of Blacks lived in the locations in Grahamstown during the years 1907 and 1908, a considerable number lived within the bounds of the city.24 He has further noted that a considerable proportion of Whites lived in the location during this period.25 This suggests that as in Stutterheim, racially segregated settlements around and within the growing urban areas were not yet entrenched.

This form of settlement was unacceptable to local officials.26 If a segregationist policy was to solve the problem of a threatened "White superiority" in Upper Kubusi and the surrounding areas, then it was to be connected with race. Dubow has maintained that theoretically segregation was associated "with the demise of mid-Victorian liberalism and the ascendency of racial science".27 Thus the fear of uncontrolled development of African and White and integration, of racial degeneration (in particular of the White group), could be counteracted by discouragement of multi-racial settlement. Poverty and unemployment in the Upper Kubusi White tenant community was believed to result from continued integration with the local Africans. Overcoming these social diseases was regarded as a solution that would end the integrated settlement. As Sub Inspector Woon put it "any employment...will enable [White families] to leave their present uncongenial surroundings".28

22. AG 1866 Ref 18923, disposal of certain lots at Stutterheim, minute of 22 January, 1909.
23. See footnote 10 above.
26. The statement of the sub-inspector E Woon(footnote no 22) implied that Black and White integrated settlements should be prevented for the sake of retaining assumed "White superiority".
28. NA vol 738 F 684, Sub Inspector E Woon to Stutterheim magistrate, 3 November 1908.
Thus by the early 1900s, the region's segregationist policies were developing at an ideological level. Marks and Trapido have carefully argued that scientific racism only emerged as a fully-fledged colonial ideology in the early twentieth century.  

Along with its development went the assumption of the "superiority of the White man", that reflected a deep concern and urgency to supervise and elevate the "uncivilised Blacks". Milner who was the High Commissioner of South Africa during the early 1900s was one of the outstanding colonial officials who sought to bridge "British race patriotism and the racial ideology of social control".  

One of the strongest arguments why the white man must rule is because that is the only possible means of gradually raising the black man, not to our level of civilization -which it is doubtful whether he would ever attain -but up to a much higher level than [that] he at present occupies.  

This assumed "racial superiority" had infiltrated a substantial number of British colonial territories, and in this light the statements of location inspector Woon may be understood. Thus segregation had become not only a race issue, but an ideological notion that was to affect South African society for a prolonged period.  

Robinson has added a further point to the list of causes of the implementation of territorial segregation. For her, "the Location [system] was a territorial strategy employed by the state to enhance its powers and capacities with respect to South Africa's black population". Thus the main theme here is the close connection between government actions and its ability to organise across space, while simultaneously intervening in the daily routines of society. Furthermore, organisational configuration of local government, centralised within a defined territory, made it possible for it to claim the right to exercise sovereign administration. Robinson sums up: "states have been active in shaping the distribution of population, in demarcating subdivisions of the state area, which enhances administrative capacity, and in either inventing or incorporating already existing techniques for controlling, surveying or dominating the population into the apparatus".  

30. Marks and Trapido: Race, Class and Nationalism, 7.  
32. Dubow: "Race Civilisation", 75-89.  
33. J Robinson: "A perfect system of control?", 135 (see the abstract).  
Finally, a close connection between segregation and economic factors has been offered by Martin Legassick.\(^{35}\) Although he is looking at a later period, he also connects the early twentieth century, especially the years 1903-1923, with the making of South African "native policy" and particularly the transformation of Africans to a labour class. His 1972 research aimed to explore the relationship between economic growth and racial discrimination. Thus for him segregation policies were devised and introduced to further and enrich capitalism.\(^{36}\)

Legassick's argument remains valid, particularly for the period from the 1920s, but it is problematic to generalise that "within the overall framework of segregation, adjustments were necessary in the delimitation of work roles under changing economic conditions".\(^{37}\) The reasons behind the introduction of segregation policies cannot be exclusively reduced to economic factors. In Stutterheim, for instance, suggestions for a segregated African settlement in town were not primarily prompted by a need for reserve labour. If the municipality was desperately in need of an African labour force, it could have embarked on recruiting that labour even though the Africans were integrated with their White neighbours in town. This is not to deny that, once assembled in one place, a labour force could be easily recruited, but the task of recruiting labour in the district was only partly successful after 1910, and owed much to the increase in population size.\(^{38}\)

However, as the 1884 municipal regulations implied, the need to control urban Africans, for administrative purposes, overshadowed the desire to recruit labour. Therefore, as long as local Africans were properly governed, the "safety and prosperity" of Stutterheim village was guaranteed. This is where Robinson's point about government's territorial strategy and intervention in inhabitants' social lives becomes appropriate. The municipal regulations decreed that every African within the municipal boundaries must not only be registered, but also be under the close observation of a superintendent. So by the time Inspector Woon sounded warnings about interracial settlements


\(^{38}\) UG17-1911, BBNA 1910, 362. By 1910, out of 8,850 Africans in the district only 688 were labouring. Note that there were only 2,090 Africans in the district in 1881.
in the urban area, the "African diseases" had gained the attention of Cape colonial officials and the 1884 regulations had already laid the groundwork for the introduction of a segregated settlement. In fact the two factors encouraged and accelerated the process.

The response to segregation policies

At this point the reader may ask if the segregation policies were contested. Local Africans were imperfectly aware of the reasons behind the implementation of segregation policies. There is no detailed documentation on their co-operation or non co-operation with the segregation system, but their overwhelming condemnation of the system was explicit. What aggravated tension was not only the municipality's segregation regulations, but also its attempts to control the social and economic lives of the town's Africans. Intense dissatisfaction resulted from the prohibition of their trading activity, and also the sale and consumption of African beer. Although statistical evidence concerning the number of African traders and trading activity does not exist, the African trade for the inhabitants that lived in the ex-crown reserve might have survived better than those at Mgwali and Wartburg in the post 1877-78 war period. Besides the fact that a number of these Africans were less affected by the 1877-78 war, some owned large agricultural lands on the banks of the Kubusi, but it would be misleading to suggest that these were a large group.

The 1884 regulations were exacerbated by the introduction of Act no 30 of 1895 (that prevented the movement of "non white" groups without passes in public places and streets between the hours of 9pm and 4am), an Act that was heavily enforced by the local administration. These restrictions did not apply to Africans who were registered voters.

39. 1884 Regulations for Stutterheim, clauses no 68 and 70.
40. See Chapter 6.
41. Cape Mercury. 22 November 1900. The term "non white" is taken directly from this source. It cannot be exclusively reduced to Blacks or African people since other groups for instance Khoisan and Griquas, were included.
The regulations were uniformly contested by the local Africans. In this case the prohibition of both African trade and beer consumption is worth mentioning. As African trade had a long history in the region, its prohibition was likely to lead to dissatisfaction. The same could be said about the consumption of African beer. It was part of several traditional practices and used also for general domestic consumption. Therefore in 1900, 160 African ratepayers who were registered owners of properties together with their tenants (within Stutterheim municipality's jurisdiction), twice petitioned the mayor and town councillors against the prohibition of trade and beer consumption. 43

The petition revealed the local Africans' distaste of segregated social and economic life and also their capability to mobilize on constitutional lines. Odendaal has shown that African awareness and ability to contest on constitutional principles was gaining momentum by the late 1890s and early 1900s. 44 In the case of Stutterheim's grievances and petition in particular, as is in the case of most rural areas, politics were an inward and outward expression of social and economic life. There were many causes for power to be contested. Regulations that defined how a specific group of people should behave and what they should not practise were seen as demoralising to social and economic character.

The municipality's 1884 regulations aimed at establishing a climate that would substitute control for free participation. 45 Although economic behaviour normally maintains "a degree of indifference to the market fates of others", 46 the institutionalization of group or individual differences along colour lines never had a warm reception from local Africans. Naturally the market place offers individuals or groups an opportunity to strengthen their economic position by engaging in competitive relationships "within limits set by ground rules". 47 Ideologically, segregation would

43. CO vol 7553 Ref 784, petition of Native ratepayers to the Mayor and Town Councillors of the municipality of Stutterheim, 22 November 1900.
44. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, 40-91.
45. Clause 70 of the 1884 Municipality regulations stated that "no shop or trading station shall be allowed in the location".
47. Hunt, Philosophy and Politics, 15.
rationalize the hierarchical structuring of Stutterheim’s urban community. Subsequently, the stratification in the urban population would be set in motion.\textsuperscript{48}

Let us now examine the role of the mission stations in channelling discontent.

Mission stations and political mobilisation

Your cattle are gone, my countrymen! Go rescue them... Leave the breechloader alone... So pick up your pen... Repair not to Hoho, but fire with your pen.\textsuperscript{49}

The mass spread of education is usually coupled with the development of a critical spirit, a state of mind that is dangerous for any political system that does not correspond to the basic interests of the majority of the people. The Eastern Cape was no exception to this general trend. In terms of school population, it probably figured higher than the rest of the Cape Colony.\textsuperscript{50} Having then developed and embarked on new skills, and acquired confidence in their numbers, the Eastern Cape Africans emerged from under the missionary wing to channel their aspirations. "Their strategy was constitutional- to fire with the pen to protect their rights".\textsuperscript{51}

One wonders if the late nineteenth and early twentieth century mission centres really posed any serious threat to the colonial government. It was these mission stations that accommodated the allegedly loyal or collaborating African class. In Stutterheim, the mission Africans were only allowed to remain in the district because they were supposedly "softened" by Christianization and the civilization enterprise.

\textsuperscript{48} The regulations set the groundwork for segregated development that was later intensified by the National Party's segregation policies. Of course the development of Upper Kubusi and Cenyu into an urban slum, filled with a considerable number of backyard dwellers, owes much to the National Party's segregation policies.

\textsuperscript{49} Isaac Wauchope, a prominent ex-Lovedalian, summed up in typical Xhosa idiom the aims and essence of the new constitutional philosophy. Hoho is the mountain stronghold where Sandile fell in 1878.

\textsuperscript{50} Although we have no statistical evidence, as opposed to other parts of the Cape Colony, a considerable number of the eastern Cape Africans were under mission influence.

\textsuperscript{51} Odendaal: "African political mobilisation", 48.
But that was not to be the case. No particular aspect was more potentially threatening to the colonial government than education. Indeed, the same education which Grey vigorously introduced, was now a useful tool with which a considerable number of Africans could pose a challenge to the government. Although education was originally devised to introduce and inculcate the values of western civilization, it was never contemplated that it would mobilize educated Africans to fight within the constitutional system of the Cape for the promotion of their interests and protection of their rights.

An investigation of late nineteenth century Eastern Cape political mobilisation cannot be confined to educational influence. Hogan has indicated that missionary education effect was only an influence in "shaping African attitudes at the level of individual socialization". He has attempted to define the ideology and political behaviour of the elite group of Africans on the basis of structural situation. Thus the crux of his argument focuses on Cape African political behaviour within the colonial political economy.

This methodology shifts away from notions that reduce the early growth of modern African political consciousness to the consequences of Christian values, missionary education, industrialization and liberal ideas. Various writers on the origins of modern African political consciousness briefly refer to the late nineteenth century political and economic dynamics. Prominent African figures and ideologies in this period have been referred to in the context of a building up process that gained momentum in the post South African Native National Congress political era. By the same token, an argument that Christian values and missionary teachings led to the involvement of a "devoted

laiety in founding and leading the political and nationalist movements, remains insufficient. It is however possible that biblical assertions about the equality of all believers appeared (then) as a solution to people demoralized by colonial conquest:

[African laymen and clergy] believed that the spread of Christianity, education and civilization would gradually lead to a society where blacks would be recognized and treated equally with whites. Such an explanation could concentrate exclusively on the Christianized elite and thus neglect a wider investigation that should hinge on the historical processes that shaped the Eastern Cape at large. As indicated in previous chapters, a series of colonial laws and the Cape's constitutional policy affected the majority of Africans in Stutterheim. Before the 1877-78 war, the largest proportion of the district's population depended to a great extent on agricultural produce whose marketable surplus had enhanced prosperity. With the introduction of additional land legislation from 1879 to 1900, stratification of rural cultivators intensified.

Christian teachings and mission education had no long established history within agricultural communities outside Mgwali and Wartburg, but their inhabitants demonstrated that they could constitutionally contest the government's unfavourable legislation. When legislation that threatened tenancy, such as the Private Location Acts of 1892 and 1899, was implemented, various responses of dissatisfaction prevailed. Thus a strong relationship between political ideology and socio-economic base was observable.

But this is not to undermine the impact of mission education and Christian teachings:

The members of the new educated class of Africans which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century became aware of the overall discrepancy between Christian doctrine and western political ideals on the one hand and the realities of white conquest on the other.

As Africans were increasingly becoming "socially and economically equipped to fit into western society", their aspirations to share political power in Cape society were enhanced. Encouraged

60. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, 3.
61. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, 3-4.
by a society in which individual skills and potentials were a primary criterion under Cape liberalism, African acquisition of Christianity and education became aggressive during the second half of the nineteenth century, but later, as liberalism was undermined by Social Darwinism and racial segregation, Africans actively participated in politics. Now their task focused on eliminating laws and practices that "perpetuated inequality and subordination on the basis of race and colour".

The subject of African political mobilisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Stutterheim district cannot be divorced from that of the wider Eastern Cape community. However, the Stutterheim African inhabitants were not split and posed as two antagonistic groups under the auspices of Imvo and Izwi labantu (Izwi). Although different mechanisms of political expression undertaken by these newspapers were observable and splits in church affiliation spilled to some mission stations (such as Mgwali), these never boiled down to ethnic differences in the district.

Ethnic differences were not crucial in the different operations undertaken by Imvo and Izwi during the early twentieth century in the area under investigation. As noted above, the discontent of African private landowners (irrespective of ethnic differences) against the 1899 Act was channelled through Imvo. This supports Ngcongco who maintains that Imvo encouraged and defended Africans who preferred private or individual landownerships. Later Izwi became active amongst the district's mission stations. It confined itself to mission inhabitants and it was only in March

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64. Mills: "Fork in the Road", 55.
65. See Mills: "Fork in the Road, 55, Mills implies that the two newspapers were divided along ethnic lines, Jabavu's Imvo siding with the "Fingo" on the one hand and Rubusana's Izwi with the Xhosa on the other; Odendaal: *Vukani Bantu*, 14-16.
67. See pages 150-151 above.
69. See pages 177, 180-183 below.
1909 that the paper proposed a resolution of a national crisis at Mgwali mission station. This was the first time that the Stutterheim district and the Eastern Cape wider community were mobilised in favour of a national agenda by Izwi.

Bearing in mind the abovementioned background, accessibility and class affiliation determined the operations of the press in the area. Whereas Imvo became the defender of the private landowners' rights, Izwi managed to have access to missions and the educated class. This is not to claim that these two papers' operations were rigidly based on different community classes, but, although there might have been some overlap on common issues (whose details are lacking), the two papers' involvements with the district's subcommunities were observably different.

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**A brief look at Gladstone mission stations**

The two short sections that follow below are focused mainly on Gladstone and Mgwali mission stations, and on the role of Walter Rubusana in the district. There is also an investigation of how the two mission stations were involved in the wider Eastern Cape community's political mobilisation.

Rubusana's direct involvement in the district can be traced from 1894, when he applied for a portion of land to be used as sites for a church and school in Nqantosi at Isidenge. At the time, he was a minister of the South African Native Congregational Church and vice-president of the National Education Association (NEA) which was one of the first, most lasting and most widely representative of the early educational associations.

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71. It has been indicated in chapter 7 that Imvo was deeply involved in the issue of the private landowners and the 1899 Act. Furthermore, it is indicated below that Izwi was only active in Gladstone and Mgwali mission stations in the area.
72. This was initially a LMS station established during the 1860s at Isidenge.
73. Walter Rubusana was born in 1858 in the Somerset district. Though he was a teacher and an ordained minister of the South African Congregational Church, he became heavily involved in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary South African politics between c.1890 and 1936.
74. LND vol 518, Ref L 8317, W Rubusana to Stutterheim Civil Commissioner, 20 November, 1894.
Having been vested with ministerial authority in Gladstone Native Congregational Church in 1894, Rubusana restricted himself exclusively to the ecclesiastical and educational affairs of the Isidenge community. Unlike Mgwali (which is discussed later in this section), Isidenge Africans did not have deep educational and ecclesiastical exposure until 1894, but as Rubusana was NEA vice-president, the community was soon linked to general and national educational affairs. In fact, the guiding principles of the NEA were directed towards taking an active part in all educational matters, in schools and other places engaged in similar work. Generally, the main objectives of the association were to promote the basic life and welfare of Africans.

The NEA soon developed from a kind of educational forum dealing exclusively with educational matters, to a militant organisation increasingly involved in politics.

What will move us, and what will make us have our rights is to have people on our side in parliament.

The NEA's change in direction became noticeable in the last decades of the century. It coincided with the period of heightening antagonism between Stutterheim administrators and inhabitants, particularly on the issue of administration of private lands. This coincidence placed Gladstone Mission Station within the circle of discontent.

At this point it will be useful to refer briefly once more to some causes of local dissatisfaction. As Isidenge community dissatisfaction cannot be divorced from that of the rest of district, I will attempt to link the role of the Gladstone station's inhabitants to the district's general actions.

After the town had passed the racial segregation regulations in 1884, it went on to implement restrictions on movement in 1895. At the same time, the government passed the 1899 Private Location Act which sparked widespread reaction from landowners and tenants. Between 1900 and 1910, political life in the district was mainly determined by social and economic discontent.

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76. LND vol 1/518 Ref L 8317, Rubusana to Stutterheim civil commissioner, 20 November, 1894.
77. SAL, Bokwe papers, vol 1 Native Educational Association constitution, 68-69.
78. Bokwe Papers, vol 1 Native Educational Association constitution, 68-69.
79. Isigidimi SamaXhosa, Xhosa original, 16 January 1884, particularly section entitled Umanyano ngemfundo [unity with education].
80. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, 56.
81. Act 30 of 1899.
This state of uneasiness also developed in the Isidenge community. Even before the 1899 Location Act was effected and heavily condemned by the Gladstone mission population, discord in Isidenge was already being brewed by the government's confiscation of surrounding indigenous forests. As state reserved properties, entrance to these (previously utilised forests) was forbidden by law. After reports of alleged hunting practices, hunting was prevented and hunters charged with trespass. To prevent access to the forests, police camps in the vicinity were multiplied. These security mechanisms, not only guaranteed the state leverage, but also fuelled dissatisfaction.

As in the case of Keilands mission station, introduction of the 1899 Act at Gladstone station was a miscalculation that eventually backfired to damage the government's reputation. The mission station became the weapon of the wider Isidenge community. In 1903 when Gladstone station was criticized for permitting "squatting" Africans on its premises, Rubusana and the church aldermen directly challenged the native affairs department to clarify the allegations. The government's case was not only nullified by the church's ability to withstand and contest the allegation but was also undermined by the results of the examination. It was revealed that only church people who were the caretakers of either the church or school property, were settled on the premises of the station.

Revelations of the non-existence of squatting might have been interesting at government and mission authority level, but what appeared significant to the Isidenge people was the ability of the church/station to successfully contest a government measure. As a result during the period 1904-1909, the station became deeply more involved in grievances of the greater Isidenge. When private landowners and their tenants were contesting the 1899 Act, the church became the centre of operations. Petitions were repeatedly used. In 1909, sixteen Isidenge residents linked to Gladstone

82. See pages 134-135 above.
83. Daily Dispatch, 10 September 1906.
84. CO vol 8326 Ref 5906, CMP inspector to King William's Town civil commissioner, 18 October 1906.
85. CO vol 8326 Ref 5906, assistant forests conservator to King William's Town civil commissioner, 19 October 1906.
86. NA 624 Ref B 1983, Rubusana to Stutterheim acting location inspector, 28 August 1903.
87. NA 624 Ref B 1983, Rubusana to Stutterheim acting location inspector, 28 August 1903.
mission, staged an open challenge to the 1899 Act. They wrote directly to the native affairs department demanding its repeal of the Act. Gladstone was now a thorn in the flesh of local and colonial government.

**Kwa Ngqika [at the Ngqika place], Mgwali becomes the centre for a Ngqika revival**

Although Gladstone was only capable of mobilising African aspirations at a local level, Mgwali station later became one of the prominent Eastern Cape African political mobilization centres. With the exception of Bethel mission and Wartburg, no other place in Stutterheim district had as long a history of Christianity and mission education as Mgwali. By 1865, Mgwali mission was already active in a vast territory that encompassed much of the Ngqika location.

Christian missionary education (with its moral principles of individual righteousness) has been dubbed one of the significant factors that bolstered increased African expectations of involvement in a modern state. However, one should be careful not to overstRESS the desires of Africans to partake in the decision making of the modern state. That could undermine the Africans value for their indigenous socio-political formation. Although the last of the military defeats stimulated change in political life, it is doubtful if large numbers rapidly became willing to become involved in the modern society. Certainly, the majority were forcibly introduced to modern society. Now, the fight was no longer aimed at defending the premodern social and political formation, but finding space or/and political rights in the new formation.

Mission Christian teachings might have produced a new cultural order, but a number of Christian Africans could differentiate between mission expansion and colonial conquest. Thus views such as

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88. NA 738 Ref F 684, Isidenge Residents to the native affairs department, 22 August 1909.
89. Odendaal: *Vukani Bantu*, 162.
90. See map 2.
"Africans in general, converted or not, saw the missionaries as part of conquest", should be treated with care. Such views do not offer reasons why Christian Africans such as Dukwana fought against the government during the 1877-78 war. As Saunders has indicated, some of the new Eastern Cape African elite with a long history of mission education, "drew serious attention in colonial circles" when they joined Sandile during the 1877-78 war. African perceptions of missionaries and government were not undifferentiated as Cochrane suggests.

With the exception of large areas such as Glen Grey, the Ciskei and Pondoland in Transkei, it is interesting to note that towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there existed a substantial number of Africans in the Eastern Cape (besides those who held land on freehold) who lived around and in the mission stations. Whether or not this settlement pattern was engineered by the colonial government, it is undeniable that during phases of turmoil some Africans used mission stations as refugee centres. Thus, like Majekе's, Cochrane's assessment falls short of a long-term analysis of an African's perceptions of missionaries.

At Mgwali, one finds an example of a community where established Christian values could not completely override traditional socio-political structure. Given the fact that Sandile permitted the establishment of the station, a strong relationship between Mgwali mission station and Ngqika chieftaincy had developed. When Sandile died, his mother Sutu stayed at Mgwali. Though later converted to Christianity, she remained a symbol of Ngqika traditional authority in the area. Even those who had long been associated with Christian teachings could not ignore ideas linked to traditional authority. Sandile's son Edmund, Nathaniel Mhala who was Sandile's cousin, and

94. See page 179 below, Dukwana was the son of Ntsikana (one of the great Xhosa prophets converted to Christianity) and an elder of the Presbyterian church at Mgwali. He died alongside Sandile while fighting in defence of the Ngqika chieftaincy during the war of Ngcayecibi.
96. CPP BBNA for the years 1874-1899.
97. Isigidimi samaXhosa, 1 December 1885.
Dukwana (mentioned above) were all Christians who sided with Sandile during 1877-78. The former two held positions in government offices.\textsuperscript{98}

The crushing of Sandile provided an outward victory for colonial administration, and by the time his mother died in 1885, the programme of individualization of land ownership at Mgwali was almost complete. Thus it appeared that the remaining symbol of the Ngqika had been outlived by the colonial policies. However, inwardly the colonial victory was premature. Sandile might have been dead but his spirit still lived and was and still is associated with Mgwali.\textsuperscript{99} The fact that some Christian Africans died in defence of his position suggests the feelings some church members still had for their chief. This perception was carried through even to the generation that followed after Sandile’s death. The conversation I had with the late Mr Herman Gija in 1991, is useful.

Q In your opinion who were greatest individuals that could be associated with the earliest history of Mgwali?

A It was Sandile and Tiyo Soga.\textsuperscript{100}

Gija’s highlighting of Sandile’s prominence was interesting. Like men such as Dukwana, Mhala and Sandile’s son Edmund, Gija’s Christian principles were fortified by a system of education laced with assumptions of the inferiority of non-western communities, but in their hearts they could not deny the ties of traditional values.

An interesting development was the line of thought pursued by Africans involved in new mechanisms of political expression such as the press. At the beginning of the present century, most Izwi editions pertaining to Mgwali referred to the place in question as kwaNgqika (at the Ngqika’s place).\textsuperscript{101} It is probable that this perception was absorbed by the newspaper readers. So by the beginning of the twentieth century a considerable number of Eastern Cape Africans identified

\textsuperscript{98} Saunders: "The new African Elite", 45.
\textsuperscript{99} I am reminded of my early visits to Mgwali (as a very young boy) during the 1970s (1973?). At that time a service was to be held to unveil Sandile's tombstone. The manner in which Sandile’s name was referred to created an impression that he was sacred. I have never seen old people so moved. Even now that perception has not died at Mgwali.
\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Mr Herman Gija, Mgwali 3 October 1991.
\textsuperscript{101} Izwi especially the years 1902-1909.
Mgwali as a Ngqika stronghold associated with the last remnants of Xhosa chieftaincy. There appears to be no evidence of a strong desire to regain chieftaincy, but as Eastern Cape Africans began to give "expression to their involvement in the activities of a common society", Mgwali became one of the centres where political decisions on the issues of the time were adopted.

At Mgwali the principle of individualisation in social values and also with regard to land might have been enhanced by mission influence, but it was the colonial government (with its military victory) that put the principle into practice. Although measures were strenuously pursued for the development of western notions of modernity, a dichotomy between traditional and official perception of land policy still existed. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the system was clouded with difficulties. Most quitrenters disobeyed the designated settlement pattern. Furthermore, when the 1899 Act was effected in an attempt to discourage tenancy on private properties, a number of farm tenants moved to Mgwali and other villages. Thus attempts to incorporate the landed African group into the broader system of colonial control were ineffectual. This reaction by quitrenters to the new system drew serious attention from officials. It marked a new form of resistance, although a rather passive method. Not even the government's prosecution of alleged offenders could overpower the quitrenters' disobedience to the system and their sympathetic feelings for the tenants.

Another key development in the community was the emergence of independent churches, but the establishment of separatist churches at Mgwali was solely the result of external influences. There exists no evidence that points to a possible split in Tiyo Soga's church. By 1902 however, a few individuals in the community had attached themselves to the Ethiopian church. Oral evidence

103. See pages 182-183 below.
104. See pages 157-158 above.
105. I have probed the question of the possible existence of a division in the Presbyterian congregation with care, but all old members of the church agree that there was no split in the history of the church. Oral evidence suggests that most new independent churches were external formations not homegrown developments.
106. Cory Library, Cowley Evangelist- A monthly paper on subjects missionary and religious, letters from Father Puller, May 1902, 155.
further suggests that Mzimba's Presbyterian Church of Africa was in existence at Mgwali before 1910.\textsuperscript{107}

The spread of separatist churches at Mgwali may not have been significant at village level, but it suggests that Mgwali was on a par with the general Eastern Cape community. Odendaal points out that Africans practice of religion on their own terms meant that separatist churches were a reaction against "the paternalistic control of white missionaries".\textsuperscript{108} If that was the case, separatist churches were a symptom of resistance to domination, but this time at religious level.

The association of Mgwali with the Ngqika place, quitrenters' resistance and the spread of separatist churches to Mgwali, together contributed to the forging of a political consciousness in the community. This phenomenon was soon picked up by prominent political formations that existed at the time, so much so that when decisive actions linked with the promotion of African political rights were taken, Mgwali would have a significant role.

Africans' attempts to participate actively in constitution-making climaxed after the assembly of the National Convention in October 1908 and the drafting of the South Africa Act.\textsuperscript{109} The National Convention was the culmination of a crucial process of reconciliation between Boer and Briton after the South African war. Though it sought to formulate an appropriate constitution for the proposed Union of South Africa, it became caught up in the question of "Native policy".\textsuperscript{110} The draft South Africa Act did not include the African franchise in the Union dispensation. Rather, it put the existing Cape African franchise at risk as it would be only safeguarded by a two-thirds majority parliamentary vote.\textsuperscript{111} The resolution was regarded as a "success betrayal"\textsuperscript{112} of Cape Africans.

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with Mr Mbongwe no 2 Village Mgwali, 21 October 1993. Mr Mbongwe, an African church alderman well into his seventies, maintains that it was an established pattern (until recently) that outsiders particularly from Alice often came to hold services at Mgwali.
\textsuperscript{108} Odendaal: "African political mobilisation", 268.
\textsuperscript{109} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 125-180.
\textsuperscript{110} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 125-150.
\textsuperscript{111} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 148-150.
\textsuperscript{112} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 152.
As Odendaal put it, "Izwi saw [the draft South African Act] as part of a calculating and deliberate compact to get rid of the African vote".113

The South African Native Congress (SANC) that was formed in 1898 with the aim of realising African political aspirations in an organised way,114 together with its newspaper Izwi, insisted on taking a strong line against the draft South Africa Act.115 After the publication of the draft in February 1909, preliminary congresses of Africans representing African political organisations in the Orange Free State, Cape, Transvaal and Natal were held.116 At these congresses, a national conference that was to deal with the African franchise was planned.117

Izwi and the SANC proposed Mgwali as the appropriate venue for the Cape congress.118 Mgwali, a mission station opened by one of the first ordained African priests (Tiyo Soga), was now one of the centres where African political aspirations (at a national level) were to be formulated. Izwi gave the matter its closest attention:

"Today is the day! The Congress is invited to meet at Mgwali KwaNgcika [at the Ngcika place] on the 17th March [1909]. We are in a hurry to make a decision before the next Parliamentary session. Respective branches should send their representatives. Places that are not under established branches should also send [unconstitutional] representatives.... The house [African nation] is in danger because of the Convention's decision."119

Izwi concluded with the popular expression: Zemk' inkomo Magwalandini! (There go your cattle [i.e rights] you cowards).120

Eighty delegates attended the Mgwali conference held on 13 and 14 March 1909.121 They came

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115. Izwi, 23 February 1909.
116. SAL, W P Schreiner Papers, no MSC 27, 8 (1424 A), The resume of the proceedings of the South African Native Congress and the South African Native Convention, especially section 1 on Preliminary Congresses.
117. Izwi, 9 March 1909.
118. Izwi, 9 March 1909.
119. Izwi, 9 March 1909, Xhosa original.
120. Izwi, 9 March 1909. Odendaal: Vukani Bantu, 162.
121. Schreiner Papers no MSC 27,8 (1424A), The resume of the proceedings of the South African Native Congress and the South African Native Convention, especially section II on Representation. There seems to be disagreement on the dates of the Mgwali conference between Izwi and the Schreiner papers. Izwi noted 17-19 March 1909, while Schreiner noted...
from various districts including Mgwali, Umtata, Glen Grey, Queenstown, Kimberley, Cape Town, Beaufort West, Colesberg, Port Elizabeth, Wodehouse, King William's Town, Komga, Cathcart, Fort Beaufort and Peddie.\textsuperscript{122} The conference represented traditional and "school" leadership. Chiefs who had responded to Izwi's call were there. They were: Chief Gamma Sandile, Chief Sigonyela Mapassa and Chief Mbingwe.\textsuperscript{123} Prominent figures of the SANC such as Rubusana, A K Soga, Thomas Mqanda, Jonathan Tunyiswa, William Siyo and Eben Koti were also present. Amongst these Rubusana, Soga and Mqanda were elected to represent the Cape at the national conference that was held in Bloemfontein the following week.\textsuperscript{124}

Although the Africans' painstaking political action failed to put an effective brake on the approval of the South Africa Act, political mobilisation of the educated and mission orientated Africans became plainly observable. This was the class that pioneered African nationalism. Thus the mission stations that were initially instituted (particularly by Sir George Grey) to produce a class that would abide by the norm of western civilization and Christianity, were becoming an ulcer to the colonial government.

An awkward problem here is the unavailability of evidence pertaining to the Mgwali quitrenters' degree of involvement in the 1909 Mgwali congress, nor is it documented whether Izwi recruited for the SANC in Mgwali. It could have been interesting to establish how many SANC members were from Mgwali, as well as how many voters were from this settlement. Voters were registered according to districts rather than subsettlements within them. Thus for Stutterheim it is difficult to specify whether Stutterheim voters were from Mgwali or any of the other surrounding settlements. However, we can speculate that Mgwali housed a considerable number of eligible voters. As far back as 1853, the Cape constitution had granted the franchise to all male citizens over the age of 21, who either owned property valued in excess of £25, received an annual salary of £50 or received\textsuperscript{13 and 14 March.}\textsuperscript{122} Schreiner Papers, no MSC 27, 8 (1424A), The resume of the proceedings of the South African Native congress and the South African Native Convention, especially Section II on Representation.\textsuperscript{123} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 162.\textsuperscript{124} Odendaal: \textit{Vukani Bantu}, 162-163.
a salary of £25 plus free board and lodging. Thus since Mgwalı quitrenters were property owners who might have qualified for the franchise, it can be deduced that they willingly joined the popular cause to contest the South Africa Act.

Because of these problems, it seems as though Mgwalı's prominence in 1909 owed more to being kwaNgqika than to anything actually done by its people. Nonetheless Mgwalı became prominent in wider Eastern Cape political activities. Regarded as kwaNgqika, Mgwalı had also made its reputation as a place where mechanisms for settling African grievances were devised. 125

The 1877-1878 and 1881 wars might have enforced the triumph of colonialism over previously independent Xhosa chiefdoms, but colonial subjects were not completely quietened and therefore colonial rule was never unopposed. Under the desperate situations that resulted from a series of setbacks during the second half of the nineteenth century, the African voice would be pursued constitutionally through school, mobilization and passive resistance. By 1910 sentiments of African nationalism that would later develop into militant opposition (observable from the second half of this century) were already underway.

125. For interest's sake, when the proposed removal of Mgwalı to Frankfort (in Ciskei) was announced by the Ciskei and South African governments during the 1980s, there was a national (and to some extent international) reaction.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

By now, it should be clear that much of the social, political and economic change that ensured the death of the premodern Stutterheim community occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result of several phases of transformation, the Ngqika became subject to the Cape Colony's values. Although at first these values lacked acceptability for the majority of the Ngqika population, the results of the 1877-78 war gave more coherence to the colonial government's treatment of the Stutterheim Ngqika. Under bureaucratic administration, these values were constantly applied and safeguarded by colonial legislation in Stutterheim and in other magisterial districts of the Cape Colony. It was within the framework of this uniform system of control that some inhabitants began to identify more and more with the society in creation, but later they began to challenge it, first by disregarding the basic regulations of the new social system and then by political mobilisation.

This thesis is not a study of present day Stutterheim. It is however an investigation of a crucial process in the development of the district. Although its chronology ends in 1910, it sets out preliminary answers for possible investigations into present day Stutterheim. We know now that a large proportion of land was reserved strictly for white farming after 1878, some locations were reserved exclusively for African quitrenters, some Africans, living alongside whites, held land on freehold, and some African farmers held land on a similar basis to whites. On the other hand, we know that tenancy (whether successful or not) existed in scattered areas of the district.

The key to the problems of an imbalanced ratio of landownership and congested rural settlements can be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Communal land ownership was distorted by land individualization policies and it was these policies that subsequently ensured the

1. Premodern Stutterheim in this case refers to the Ngqika community which was not yet under direct colonial control. The thesis indicates that the rapid changes in settlement pattern (from 1879) and in administration (from 1880) marked the beginning of the end of that premodern Stutterheim community.

2. This is still the case today.

3. Here I refer to Mgwali and Wartburg, the two mission locations which were declared African reserves by the 1913 Land Act. During the 1960s, National Party betterment programmes were introduced in the area.

4. Here I refer to Upper Kubusi and Isidenge. The 1899 Act and the segregation policies of the Stutterheim municipality (based on 1884 regulations) were the preliminary stages of the establishment of the present conditions in Upper Kubusi. Today, Upper Kubusi has become a rural slum as most of its inhabitants are congested on garden lots.

5. This development occurred mainly at Quanti and Bolo. These African farm owners, were finally bought out during the mid-1950s and early 1960s as part of the National Party government land policy of restructuring rural landownership.
confinement of Africans to reserves. As Hendricks put it, "[apartheid] foundations are to be found in the early colonial history of South Africa".6

This study has documented the process of development of Stutterheim as a magisterial district. While it has detailed the existence and the diminishing of the Ngqika as a coherent group in the area, it has also illustrated the process of development of formal and informal settlements7 within the district. In a South African colonial situation, African and white rural communities developed side by side under the same local magisterial authority, but the process of development was linked to an imbalanced ratio of landownerships.6

Land may be viewed as one of the most crucial material aspects of rural inhabitants' lives, but this thesis has not suggested that material forces were the sole sources of change in Stutterheim's African communities. It has attempted to show that economic and political formulations were interrelated in shaping the social aspects of life. It is true that the massive expropriation of Ngqika lands had a bearing on Africans who remained settled in the new district, but behind the expropriations was the British colonial notion of the freedom of the individual that went hand in hand with bureaucratic control and the rule of law. These developments, all taken together, contributed to the evolution of a new value system dominated by formal agencies of social control such as the school, police and legal institutions.

However it would be simplistic to treat the policies undertaken by various Cape governors together. Here we need to reassert the logic. The phases of Ngqika transformation were determined by various different governing policies. In chapter 2 it was shown that Cathcart's segregationist and militarist policies were soon replaced by those of integration, assimilation and civilization pursued by "liberal" Grey. It was however the results of the Cattle Killing that gave vigour to Grey's policies. Thereafter, Grey ensured the dominance of the colonial government. Peires points out that Grey's policies were like his predecessor's as they also centred on extending colonial administration.9

The German Legion was brought out to settle British Kaffraria and German villages such as Stutterheim came into existence. The missionaries entered and those who had been earlier in the Ngqika location (but inactive) were strengthened as they became foci for refugees (who constituted mainly the starving Xhosa). Additionally, the traditional social and political structure was challenged

7. I am aware of the complexities involved in the use of these terms. On this occasion I use the term formal settlement to refer to those settlements strictly designed by the colonial government, either by legitimacy of legislation or local administration proclamation(s). On the other hand, informal settlements refers to those created independently of official designation and approval. In this thesis, tenant settlements can be classed in this category.
8. Here I refer to the contrast between limited African lands and massive white farming areas, (see Chapters 4 and 6).
9. Peires: Dead will Arise, 318.
by that of the Colony. A village settlement system was introduced, Brownlee overshadowed Sandile and Ngqika children experienced mission education (chapter 2).

Grey's replacement by Wodehouse in 1862 may have been crucial in official circles, but it remains doubtful that it had a significant bearing on the Ngqika. Wodehouse meekly operated under Grey's shadow. However, during his governorship the strength of the Ngqika was gradually restored. With reference to the Ngqika, the change from separate administration in British Kaffraria to direct colonial administration in 1865 was only a change at administrative level. The perception that the Ngqika were now directly administered existed only in government circles. In fact, the Ngqika chieftaincy was once more set on a positive footing. The removal of Maclean and Brownlee, the remaining "strong arms" of Grey, tipped the balance in favour of Sandile.

Simultaneously during this period (post 1865) a remarkable recovery of Ngqika economic production occurred. New economic forces developed as a result of improved agricultural practise. Intensive trading activity dominated. Local and regional trade, centred at Dohne and King William's Town, became the pillars of economic activity in the Ngqika location and the old British Kaffraria. Subsequently trading stores proliferated in Upper Kubusi Crown Reserve and the Ngqika location (chapter 3).

Economic recovery and the removal of the influential British Kaffrarian administrative staff contributed to the restoration of Sandile's confidence as Ngqika chief. The replacement of Wodehouse by Henry Barkly (1870) and then the installation of responsible government under Prime Minister Molteno (1872), brought no significant change to the administration of the Ngqika. Liefeldt who was installed as "Clerk in charge" of Ngqika affairs (1868-1877) was handicapped by incompetence and maladministration. Not even a resolution passed "that a Blue Book on Native Affairs be placed on the table at each session [of Parliament]"10 could improve the colonial administration of the Ngqika. Instead, during this period, Sandile assumed a state of quasi-autonomy as he completely overshadowed Liefeldt.

This study has presented the above analysis as a form of dualism between the Ngqika traditional structure on the one hand, and the colonial government with western notions of civilization on the other. Mission activity has also been associated with the latter camp. But there has been no attempt to reduce the mission and state relationship to a conspiracy level.

Parts II and III constitute the crux of the study. Here the focus has been narrowed to, firstly, the diminishing of the Ngqika as a unified group and, secondly, the coming into full existence of the

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Stutterheim district. Relying on archival material, Cape Parliamentary Papers and oral evidence, I have
concluded that the war of 1877-78 marked a major dislocation of Ngqika social, political and economic
life. As a result of this war, Ngqika coherence was crushed for ever. Sprigg's programme of removing
the Ngqika across the Kei (Chapter 4), the replacement of the Ngqika location by white farming and
the establishment of the magisterial districts of Cathcart, Stutterheim and Komga ensured not only the
domination of traditional control by colonial rule, but also paved the way for continued white
monopolization of Eastern Cape lands.

Much attention in this section of the thesis has also been directed to the evolution of the district of
Stutterheim (Chapters 5 and 6). The postwar settlement saw rapid changes in the rural social and
political structure. While most white farmers remained on their enormous farms, mechanisms of social
control were formalised for Africans who remained behind. At Mgwali and Wartburg settlements, new
distinctions in land ownership and new power relations resulted from the process of individualization
on land. Closely settled villages filled with quitrenters having access to sizeable garden lots arose.
Extension of colonial administration through village management boards was also observable. The use
of Foucault's spatial notions, particularly the linkage of space bureaucracy and surveillance, has been
helpful here.

To a large extent in past writing, space has not been contextualised as an element that could be used
to discipline or supervise individuals. Space has been dismissed as an object that ought to be classified
with nature. But following Foucault's studies of hospitals and prisons, there has been a keen interest
in the role of space in social and political life. For Foucault, efficient surveillance of a social
settlement proceeds by identifying individuals who fit that defined pattern and who
will parallel the
distribution of functions in that designated space. After the designation of the area, "there should
be no waste, no gaps, no free margins; nothing should escape".

Chapter 5 examines not only the mechanism of colonial spatial organization, but also shows how close
surveillance through reorganisation of space was achieved. The process started under mission influence

11. My conclusions here are not aimed at reversing Peires's statement in Dead will Arise, 319, that
independent Xhosaland was dead. They are based on the events of the recovery period (Chapter 3),
between the cattle killing and the war of Ngcayecibi. During this period the Ngqika were once more a
viable force.
13. To mention a few in South African historiography, Crais: The making of colonial order, 103-105. Westaway:
"The formulation of modern power", 131-141. In other disciplines such as geography, Robinson: "A perfect
system of control?", 135-155.
14. Dreyfus and Rabinow: Michel Foucault, 155.
15. Dreyfus and Rabinow: Michel Foucault, 155.
with the manifestation of a new culture that exhibited principles of individualism and obedience. Then followed the government's introduction of individual tenure which subsequently promoted property self-management. In this defined and ordered space, power relations in the village made surveillance essential. The analysis here goes a little further than Crais's. His idea of the reorganisation of mission Africans' space ends with the inculcations of notions of private property and capitalist conceptions within the mission's space. However, my analysis is further influenced by the introduction of surveys and individual tenure. In these circumstances, spatial organization is no longer confined to introducing private land ownership. Once that ownership had been acquired self-management followed. With each villager managing himself on the one hand, and with the intervention of the village management boards on the other, close control of villages was enhanced.

Rural reconstruction has also been closely associated with the proliferation of private landownership. Regarding this aspect, much attention has been directed to the immigrant locations of Bolo Quanti and St Johns and the freeholders of Upper Kubusi and Isidenge (chapter 6). Factors that stimulated the existence of tenancy on some private farms were also examined in Chapter 8.

The last part of the thesis is devoted to changing administrative techniques and new forms of resistance. Although traditional authority might have declined, solidarity on relationship level and/or in family units did not disappear. When tenancy was discouraged by the implementation of the 1899 Location Act, a number of tenants moved to live with their relatives and close associates, who were either farmers or villagers (Chapter 7).

The short sections on urban segregation, political mobilisation and traditional revival on mission stations (Chapter 8) was drawn from general theory. While the study has focused on Stutterheim, I have attempted to link the district to a broader social and political context. As the Cape Colony was a multifarious community where a number of distinct ethnic groups called for conscious kinds of compromise, regional sentiments developed. Chapter 7 examined the problems faced by local administration with regard to private lands and quitrenters' properties by the end of the nineteenth century. It became impossible to regulate the number of inhabitants on each property. Here the issue of tenancy features prominently. By 1910, these problems had not yet been solved.

Having asserted the logic of the thesis, I would like to make a final comment specifically about my work and South African historiography. As in general historical writing over the past few years, South African historiography has evolved into various schools of interpretation. After the acrimonious academic debate

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of the 1970s, South African historians respond favourably to Johnstone's call for mutual openness. It comes as no surprise that, until recently, South African historiography was still influenced almost exclusively, by what can loosely be called a liberal-Marxist rapprochement approach. Since historical writing tends to be influenced by contemporary political climate, the hegemony of this approach cannot be broken down easily. Even later theorists like Louis Althusser who had some impact on South African historiography still worked within a Marxist paradigm.

However, although this is presently changing, the change is so slow that it is difficult to recognize. The situation at the moment is that some schools of interpretation are still prescriptive and doctrinal. Thus a patternised approach to study and writing still predominates. Of course my analysis is based on general theory (which dominates South African historiography). But, although dominated by general theory, some specific works are at the moment moving away from prescriptiveness. Nonetheless, since this is not a strict study of South African historiography, this question will be left to interested historiographical philosophers.

I have tried to break away from arbitrary ground. My work may be criticized for not abiding by current dogma, particularly on the grounds that it focuses on the second half of the nineteenth century (a remarkable period of economic change) "without paying serious attention to the labour question". Indeed major works covering this period have accommodated the labour question. Perhaps I should have joined one of the established paradigms by recognising the significance of the labour aspect, but it is better to sit on the fence than to be a blind disciple.

Having looked closely at the available evidence pertaining to the district, I have concluded that dynamics of the rural social and political structure, such as relationships between villages and colonial administrators, farm owners and legislators, landowners and their tenants, all operating outside of labour coercion, had a crucial role in shaping the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Stutterheim district. The Glen Grey Act, which was one of the influential pieces of legislation on African tenure linked to labour recruitment, was never implemented in the district. When it was passed in Parliament, the 1879 Location Act had already ensured that communal tenure had ceased to exist in

17. During the 1970s, South African Studies underwent significant changes under a new school generally referred to as radical or revisionist. Their work mainly centred on challenging the liberal methodology. See F Johnstone: "Most Painful to our hearts, South Africa through the Eyes of the new School", Canadian Journal of African Studies vol 16, no 1 (1982), 5-26.

18. L Althusser: Reading Capital, (London 1977), 119-145, Although Althusser went beyond the base structure model, the model is upheld in Marxist circles.

19. When I presented a seminar based on a chapter of my thesis in September 1993, the topic was repeatedly brought round to the labour question.

20. CPP G12-1904, BBN A 1903, 27.
the locations of Stutterheim. Rather the changes in settlement pattern, breaking down of traditional solidarity and intransigent administration techniques were major aspects of the passing of the premodern Stutterheim community.

As long as South African historiography is governed by set doctrines and established paradigms, it will lack the openness that will enable it to rediscover the exhilaration of history and any analysis of diverse activities of those voiceless nineteenth century rural inhabitants will remain limited.

21. I have laid changes in administration policies after 1870 at Sprigg's door. This may look simplistic as other Prime Ministers and governors like Frere (1879), Scanlen (1881) and later Upington (1884) were in office when most of these changes occurred. However, it is undeniable that the rapid changes in the Ngqika location during the post 1877-78 war were stimulated by the Social Darwinist Sprigg Ministry whose policy aimed at complete subjugation of Africans.
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