A FORGOTTEN FRONTIER ZONE -
SETTLEMENTS AND REACTIONS IN THE
STORMBERG AREA BETWEEN 1820 - 1860

by

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In 1778 Joachim van Plettenberg declared the Fish River as boundary between the Trekboer and the Xhosa. The area between the lower reaches of the Fish and Kei River was to become the main centre of conflict in nine frontier wars. It was here, too, that successive governors carried out experiments to stabilize land and people in the area. But after 1820, while official attention was focused on this trouble spot, a new and related zone of conflict was gradually and almost unnoticed opening up. This was in the northeast where the first encounters between Trekboer and Theebu were beginning to take place. By 1825 the spearhead of the Theebu, harassed by the amaNgwane raids, had migrated across the Kei River to settle south of the Stormberg in what is now the district of Queenstown. By this time the first Trekboers in their perennial search for water and pasturage had crossed the Stormberg Spruit to settle on the waste land north of the Stormberg. The history of the Stormberg area is predominantly an account of the interaction between these two peoples.

The term "Stormberg area", as used in this thesis, refers to the area between the Orange River and the Stormberg, bordered on the west by the Stormberg Spruit and on the east by the Wachbuck Spruit. Today it includes parts of the magistracies of Albert, Molteno, Wadehouse and Queenstown.

That settlements in this area had taken place relatively late, is understandable. The Stormberg, a westward elongation of the great Drakensberg range — had for many years barred the way to the interior as early travellers thought them impenetrable. There were even rumours that cannibals roamed about among the hills. The
farmers in the adjoining districts did not perhaps believe such stories, but they were well aware of the ferocious Bushmen who found in the Stormberg one of their last strongholds. Furthermore, climatic conditions were unfavourable for early settlers. Both the Thembu and the Trekboer first avoided the area on account of the extreme cold and the lack of firewood and timber. Although there were certain advantages for the Trekboer, such as running fountains and excellent sweet pasturage when times were good, yet settlement in this isolated area meant severe hardships. The area is often subjected to droughts, and in the last century locusts and hordes of Springbok, then known as "Trekboekken" caused havoc. Most travellers and visitors referred rather unfavourably to the area. John Centlivres Chane, the first Civil Commissioner for Albert called it "the netherend of existence", while Sir George Cathcart in 1853, after having spent a night in Burgersdorp wrote despondently of this "curious but miserable desert".

But against a background of bare and bleak mountains, the white and black settlers had woven a tapestry rich and varied in pattern. It reflects all the facets of early frontier settlements in this country: the problems of drawing boundaries in the absence of maps and accurate survey; the futility of official attempts to stabilize relations where there were no military force or administrative manpower to back such decisions; the fatal consequences of administrative bungling. It shows, too, that wherever white and black settlers lived in close proximity, their interests were inter-related. Above all, then, the history of the Stormberg is the history of the close interaction of white and tribal politics. In this thesis an attempt is made to analyse these facets in a relatively small and neglected area.
ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the footnotes in the text.

R.C.C. These refer to Theal, Records of the Cape Colony.
C.O. These refer to the official documents of the Colonial Office, Cape Town, now in the Archives, Cape Town.
P.P. This is a reference to the British Parliamentary Papers of the year and volume as indicated. It is sometimes referred to as the Imperial Bluebooks.
Col. Letters (1806-1834) These are the Cory transcript of Colonial Office letters, now in the Cory Library, Rhodes University.
L.G. This refers to despatches to and from the Lieutenant-Governors, in the Archives, Cape Town.
D.S.G.E.P. This refers to despatches to and from the Deputy Surveyor General of the Eastern Province, in the Archives, Cape Town.
M.A.L.C. These are the minutes kept by the Albert Land Commission. They are included in D.S.G.E.P.
G.H. This group of papers were originally housed at Government House, Cape Town, but are now kept at the Archives, Cape Town.
Theal, V, VI, etc. The History of South Africa, since 1795, volumes V, VI, etc. by Dr. George M'call Theal.
Noordwaartse Beweging. Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek, by Dr. F.J. Van Der Merwe.
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND NOMENCIATURE

In the nineteenth century the word Kaffir was used without any disparagement, real or intended. Hence in this thesis the term is kept, not merely when quoting from official contemporary sources, but also when using material closely related to the documents. Where personal opinions are expressed, the word Bantu is used.

In contemporary documents words like Kaffir, Tambookie, Thembu, Fetcani as well as other tribal and geographical names, vary in their spelling. In quotations these spellings have not been changed. In the text, however, the spelling that appeared most frequently in contemporary documents have been used. Likewise, the contemporary form Burghersdorp has been used instead of Burgersdorp.

A list is added of names showing their contemporary spelling, the modern spelling as used in The Oxford History of South Africa, and the various other spellings of the same name.

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There are Thembu people in Natal as well as in the Cape. Though their histories have diverged, historians agree that there is evidence of their kinship.\(^1\) Not only are there similarities in language and customs, but W.G. Bennie, writing in 1939 in his introduction to Volume III of A.M. Cronin’s *The Bantu Tribes of South Africa*, mentions that when in recent times German missionaries of Kaffrarian arrived in Natal, bringing with them Thembu families from the neighbourhood of Queenstown, these were gladly received as kinsmen by the Quentinin Thembu of Natal, many generations after their ancestors must have been separated.\(^2\)

Up to the last century the Cape Thembu were commonly known as Tambookie, and in some parts they are still known by this name. Around this appellation many theories closely connected with the early history of the Thembu have developed. G.W. Stow, who draws support from information collected during the years 1777-1779 by Lieutenant Paterson while on an extensive tour of various Xhosa and Bushmen tribes, comes to the conclusion that the name Tambookie is a remnant from a remote past when pioneer Thembu clans intermarried with the ‘Tam’buki Bushmen of the Tsomo valley. Stow finds further support for his theory in the physical resemblance between the two peoples

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and the influence that the Bushmen had on the Thembu: the click sounds in the language, and the habit of cutting the tip of one finger of a child. 1 Other prominent writers had also remarked on similar signs of close interaction between Thembu and Bushmen. Suti, the Thembu wife of the Gcaleka chief, Gaika, was living evidence of this mixture in her physical appearance. The 19th century traveller, C. Bunbury, wrote of her: "...the projection of her behind rivalling that of the famous Hottentot, Venus. The truly marvellous accumulation of fat in the rear is, as it appears, not quite confined to the Hottentot race. Suti is a Tambookie Kaffir...as great wives of the chiefs of the amaXhosa usually are." 2

But it would be presumptuous to accept physical and cultural similarities as strong enough proof for Stow's and Paterson's theories. Intermarriage was not limited only to the Bushmen and Thembu. Most Bantu tribes had at some stage or other absorbed Bushmen blood. Besides, the Thembu absorbed Bushmen blood other than that of people living in the Tsomo valley. Round about 1662, for instance, a large number of Bushmen beyond the Orange River, finding life among the Bafokeng tribe unbearable, had fled to the Natal and after many vicissitudes arrived in Thembuland where they became completely absorbed. 3

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1 G.W. Stow, The Native Races of South Africa (London, 1905), pp.32, 129, 159-170. Stow attached much value to Lieut. Paterson's information as Paterson gained his knowledge during his journeys from Bushmen in the north as well as from amaXhosa in the south. Witnesses so far removed and isolated from one another must, he argued, be independent.


In 1809 Lieutenant Richard Collins, who was sent by Governor Caledon on an extensive tour of the frontier, remarked that "the reluctance which Europeans appear to have felt in preserving national names of the countries they discovered, has operated in what are called the Tambookie people, who are known to their neighbours by the names of Temboo or Tenjain".\(^1\) It seems then that the main body of Thembu people along the coastal area have never accepted the name Tambookie,\(^2\) and it is tempting to accept the suggestion made in the report of the Select Committee on Aborigines in 1837, namely, that the Thembu were dubbed Tambookie by the English.\(^3\) This was also the view expressed in a report laid before the Cape Parliament in 1885, which was submitted by H.G. Elliot, Chief Magistrate of Thembuland.\(^4\) However, evidence of early travellers discounts such suggestions. The Swedish doctor, Andrew Sparman, who visited Achter Bruintjies Hoogte in 1776, noted: "On the other side of the Zomo dwells another nation who by the Snese Hottentots are called Tambukis and are said to resemble themselves, namely the Snese Hottentots, in complexion and dress".\(^5\) Evidence of the survivors of the shipwreck, Grosvenor, who set out for the interior from the Umzimvubu River in 1783, as well


\(^2\)\textit{infra}, p.6.

\(^3\)Report from Select Committee on Aborigines Vol. I, Part II (facsimile reprint, Struik ed.), p.25.

\(^4\)Cape of Good Hope Annenures 1385, 62, '65, Sec. iii, Thembuland, p.105.

\(^5\)A. Sparman, A voyage to the Cape of Good Hope (Dublin, 1785), p.147. 'Snese Hottentots' was the name given by the Dutch farmers to the Bushmen, apparently because of the shape of their eyes.
as the expedition from Swellendam who, in 1790 under Jan Holtshausen, set out to look for survivors, also bears witness that the Tambookies at the Tsomo River were known by this name before they had encountered the English. ¹ It seems then that the name Tambookie originated among that section of the Thembu who lived at the Tsomo River, and they were the people with whom, according to Stow, the 'Tam"buki Bushmen had amalgamated. Stow's theory is that the pioneer Thembu clans intermarried with the Bushmen, and as more and more Thembus invaded the Tsomo Valley, the Bushmen blood was completely absorbed until only the name remained.² This theory seems acceptable. In time, the name Tambookie ceased to correspond to any one section of the people, and was often used as a synonym for Thembu.

Although there is widespread difference of opinion as to the origin of the Thembu tribe, most writers are in agreement that this tribe has ethnological as well as historical precedence over the Bantu of the Cape Province. By tracing back the genealogy of the Thembu, Xhosa and Pondo to the chieftainship of Zwide,³ W.C. Holden comes to the conclusion that "the abaThembu is paramount, being the oldest or great stock of the tree, from which the other divisions in remote period probably descended, that is they have come down into these parts (Natal) in distinct great divisions, only acknowledging the Tambookie

³ Zwide, to whom Holden refers here, was the great chief from whom the abaThembu, amaPondo, amaPondo and amaXhosa have descended. He should not be confused with the Nduma chief, Zwide, who lived in Natal in the earlier part of the 19th century. See Genealogy in Appendix I.
as superior in the point of time”.¹

The precedence of the Thembu was also strongly urged by W.T. Brownlee who as Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian territories was in close contact with the Thembu people. Brownlee bases his plea on the grounds that in Bantu languages the prefix "aba" has national significance, while the prefix "ama" has clan or at the most, tribal significance. He then points out that only three divisions of the Cape’s black population are entitled to the prefix "aba", e.g. the Thembu, the Mbo (a name that embraces all the tribes north of the Umtata River and many tribes of Natal) and the Twa that embraces the Bushmen and Hottentot tribes. The Bantu would thus refer to the Thembu as abaThembu, but to the Pondo as amaPondo and in the same way to amaxhosa etc.² T. Soga, however, attaches nothing but phonetic significance to the prefix "aba" and "ama".³

In accepting the chieftainship of the Zwide as the beginning of Thembu history, Holden calculates that the Thembu must have settled in Natal by 1400 while the next tribe in order of importance, the Pondomise, had settled there by 1445.⁴ This, however, is nothing more than speculation, as Holden bases his theory on the assumption that the period that a people have occupied a country may be calculated by the number of generations mentioned in the genealogy, and that the first chief to be remembered by a tribe was the one that led them into

¹W.C. Holden, Past and Future of the Kaffir Races (London, 1866), pp.142-143.

²W.T. Brownlee, The Precedence of the Thembu (Private Paper, Butterworth, 7th June 1925, File 6/12/1).

³T. Soga, op.cit., p.62.

⁴Holden, op.cit., pp.142-143.
a new country. In fact, genealogy might date back much further, and settlement in Natal could have taken place as early as 1300.¹

According to the oral tradition, a Tsacleka chief, Togu, a Thembu chief, Hala, and Moleza (or Kudela), of the Pondomise tribe, had established themselves at a very early stage in what is known today as Griqualand East, at a river called Dedesi.² From here the Thembu pioneered the south-west migration of the South Eastern Bantu tribes.

The distribution and location of the Thembu at certain dates can be roughly established by examining the evidence of survivors of shipwrecks and by locating the graves of the principal chiefs. The survivors of the Stevenisse, a Dutch ship that was wrecked south of the present Durban in 1686, mention the first tribe they came across after having left the wreck, to be the "Seaboos", while the fourth name is given as "Matimbes".³ This seems to indicate that while some Thembu clans were at that time living near the Mtamvuna River in the present Pondoland, other clans were already living further west than the Pondo. There is ample proof that by that time other clans had already moved much further. The survivors of the Sàd Jàô

¹Jan Vansina in Oral Tradition (Penguin ed., 1972), p.153, in referring to the unreliability of oral genealogies says: "Genealogies are sources in which distortions are very prone to occur, because they form the ideological framework with reference to which all political and social relationships are sustained and explained. Because of the function they fulfill, they undergo many alterations and are frequently telescoped."

²Cape Commission on Native Laws and Customs 1883, ii, appendix i, p.403. The Dedeli of which Xhosa and Pondomise tradition speaks, is supposed to be the upper tributary of the Umzimabu. It is unidentified today.

(stranded near the coast of Pondoland in 1552), the *Sāo Bento* (stranded near the mouth of the Umtata River in 1554) and the *Nossa Senhora de Bolem* (stranded between the Mtatha and the Mtashe Rivers in 1635) all reveal that Bantu clans were at that time already roaming about in the present Transkei.\(^1\) The most significant piece of evidence, for our purpose, comes from a survivor of the *Santa Alberto*, which was wrecked, according to Theal, in 1593 near the mouth of the Bashee River.\(^2\) There they were greeted by a chief, Luspance, accompanied by about sixty "negroes". It has been established that a Thembu chief, Nxego, was buried at the Msana, a tributary of the Bashee, some time between 1600 and 1620 and Monica Wilson has come to the justified conclusion that Luspance was probably a Thembu chief.\(^3\)

The first date in Thembu history, commonly accepted as reliable, is 1680. In this year the two sons of Nxego, Dlomo and Hlanga, fought for the chieftainship and the former defeated Hlanga in a battle on the Msana. The main section of this tribe later took the name of Dlomo's chief son, Hala, and the adherents of the present royal house are still known as Hala.\(^4\) Ndungwana, the eldest son of a minor house, aided Dlomo and after the battle he established a clan of his own. Hlanga, after his first flight, married the daughter of a former Mpondo chief, Quiya. She had a much stronger personality than her husband, and in the praise verses of her husband's people she became the central figure. The tribe became known as the ama-Qiya, after

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\(^1\) For a full account of the shipwrecks and the evidence of the survivors, see *Oxford*, pp.78-84.

\(^2\) *Oxford*, p.60.

\(^3\) *Ibid*.

\(^4\) *Soga, op.cit.*, pp.470-471.
her father. This tribe lived in the modern Kentani and Butterworth
districts and Hlanga is buried at the Nganka, near Willowvale.

The location of the graves of Hala chiefs who died between
1600-1760, that of Nxego on the Msana near the Bashee (1600), of Tati
at Mkatu a few miles east of the Bashee (1700), of Zondwa in the
Maquanduli district, some distance north of Mkatu (1725), and of
Ndala, a little further north of Mtente, \(^1\) indicates that the main
body of Thembu people had since 1600 been living in, what is known to-
day, as Tembuland Proper, i.e. the districts of Engcobo, Umata, and
Elliotdale. It is possible that before 1600 some pioneer clans had
invaded the Tsomo Valley when intermarriage with the Bushmen took
place, but our first records of Tambookie living in proximity to this
river are those of Sparrman, and the survivors of the Grosvenor.

Jacob van Reenen, who in 1790 accompanied the Holtshausen
expedition, noted in his diary that "(we) passed the river Sencoe,
situated in a beautiful country and in five hours came to the country
of the Tambookies." \(^2\) The chief who came to see him was Jocobie,
presumably the head of a minor clan.

For at least the next twenty years there was little or no con-
tact between the Thembu and the European farmers. By 1809 Thembu
settlements were still confined to the territory between the Tsomo
and Bashee River, and the country beyond the Kei River to the
colonial boundary was uninhabited. \(^3\) A Thembu chief, Opato, was
encountered in 1807 by Andries Stockenström \(^4\) a few miles east of the

\(^1\) Soga, op.cit., p. 46.
\(^2\) J. van Reenen, op.cit., p. 155.
\(^4\) Stockenström Andries Smr., Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet,
Feb. 1804 - Dec. 1811.
Tsomo River. At the time he admitted to Stockenström that he had not been there for very long, and that he had never crossed the river. Theal believed that this chief was Tshatshu whose son, Bowana, was one of the first chiefs to cross the Kei River.

A few years later—before 1820—Thembu clans must have started to cross this river, and the process was accelerated as a result of attacks from the Bhaca as well as from the ama-Qwathi, a Xesibe clan. In 1821 Reverend Charles Brownlee reported from the Chumie River that "the Tambookies are not far from the Colony in an eastward direction from the Winterberg, they are so near that they can come from their country to this in one day". George Thompson noted during his travels of 1823 that "the Tambookies have for some time lived close upon the frontier, along the river Zwart Kei and they have conducted themselves in the most quiet and inoffensive manner." The reports of Field Cornet Van Wyk, Field Cornet of the Tarka district, also bear witness that the first encounters between the Europeans and the Tambookies were relatively peaceful. Even though refugee Bushmen with stolen horses were often found among the Tambookies, the latter had always readily given up all the stolen horses.

1 EEV. VII, p. 59.
2 Theal I, p. 233.
4 EEV. XIV, p. 164, C. Brownlee to Colonial Secretary, 23rd Nov. 1821.
6 PP. 252, 1835, Papers re Native Inhabitants no. 39, Field Cornet Van Wyk to Deputy Landdrost, W. Harding, 18th April 1823.
A development of major importance in the history of the north-eastern frontier was the settlement of Bowana, son of Thatshu, with a large number of followers at Hangklip, near the modern Queenstown. This took place approximately in 1823 when the main body of Thembu at the Bashee River was once again subjected to incursions from their northern neighbours, notably the Bhaca.\(^1\) The settlement of a large body of Thembu so near to the frontier and during a period of turbulence\(^2\) was bound to bring about a change in the hitherto peaceful relationship between the Europeans and the Tambookies.

In reconstructing the location of the Thembu in the first quarter of the 19th century, when encounters with the farmers in the Tarka district was beginning to take place, the following picture emerges: the main body under Ngubencuka, also known as Wusani, occupied the country from the Tsomo River to the Idutywa River and from the Idutywa to the seashore, including what is now known as Bowana Land;\(^3\) the greater part of the territory between the Bashee and the Tsomo River was occupied by Thembu clans; a large body of Thembu under Bowana were residing near the Klaus Smits River, while minor clans, possibly under the chiefs Grobie, Quesha and Calela\(^4\) had established themselves on the banks of the Kei River north of the Winterberg. (See map 1.)

\(^1\) G.G. 19/4, History of the Tambookie; Hammond-Tooke, Tribes of Mount Frere District (Ethnol. Publ. no. 23), p. 42; Sega, op.cit., p. 444.

\(^2\) infra, pp. 17-23.

\(^3\) Report of Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 393; C. 7090.

\(^4\) These chiefs fled into the colony during the Petcani disturbances. infra, p. 46. See also Ethal VI, p. 107; Col. Letters, p. 276; Somerset to Campbell, 23rd May 1834.
For more than two centuries the Thembu were known as a quiet, inoffensive tribe. Their genealogies have little reference to tribal and inter-tribal wars and they have produced no leader of military stature. It might be that the pattern of settlement and the environment in which they settled had produced results that had become interwoven in the character of these people. It will be noted that in their westward movement they enjoyed unimpeded advance into a vast, open tract of country. Where in the case of the Xhosa, the encounters with the white man led to raids and counter-raids which eventually resulted in ferocious warfare, the Thembu was never forced to wield the assegai. The journals of Van Reenen and Sparrman make it quite clear that there was a large tract of uninhabited land between the Thembu and the frontier farmers when the latter, during the last quarter of the 18th century, had advanced as far as the Middle Fish River.¹ To the north of Thembuland there was a large tract of no man's land, sparsely populated by Bushmen, so that northward expansion, if necessary, was possible. There was room for the right hand house to break away and establish itself, and tension within a tribe could be relieved by dispersal.² There was room for cattle to graze. Moreover, in the country that they occupied, the Thembu was relatively free from the drought and famine that were so often the cause of war among other tribes. The highlands of Thembuland enjoy a healthy and pleasant climate and the rainfall is usually ample as can be seen from the following description that was given of Thembuland by Benjamin Stout, captain of the ship Herculane that stranded

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¹J. van Reenen, op. cit., p.155; Sparrman, op. cit., p.151.

on the coast of Kaffraria in 1796: "Nearly as far as the eye could travel, we beheld a country finely wooded and considering the season, which is their winter, producing a most beautiful vegetation. Their cattle appeared in such prodigious number as to baffle calculation and their condition, which was equal to the best fed oxen in Britain, clearly demonstrated the richness of their pasturage." This picture might be exaggerated, but there is no doubt as to the abundant grazing available in this area.

The history of the Thembu, too, had played a part in shaping the character and disposition of this people. It seems as if the Thembu had absorbed Bushmen blood more readily than other tribes, and pioneer clans that broke away had frequently intermarried with other Bantu people. The Thembu tribe had consequently become composed of many clans among whom many may have been of alien blood. A tribe so constituted could be kept together by a nominal head preserving a balance of power among the sections, but with little military strength.

It was, however, almost inevitable that the Tambookie would be caught up in the chain of events that formed the frontier history of the 19th century. This came about by sheer chance and very indirectly. Ironically, there is only one recorded struggle of any importance in the 18th century in which the Tambookie were involved, yet the conflict had repercussions that vibrated through the 19th century frontier history. It is remarkable, too, that this war against the Xhosa chief, Rarabe, in 1745, had its origin in weak tribal politics; yet it not

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1 B. Stout, Narrative of the loss of the ship Hercules...on the coast of Kaffraria 16th June 1796 (London, 1798), pp. 44-45.

2 Cape of Good Hope Annals for 1805, 02-105, sec. iii, Thembaland, p.105.
only influenced future relations between the Tambookie and the Gcaleka, but also the politics of black and white interaction on the eastern frontier.

Round about 1745 Rarabe, son of the Xhosa chief, Palo, broke away from the main body of his tribe at the mouth of the Umzimvubu River, to settle near the modern King William's Town. Rarabe was married to a Thembu woman, daughter of Mdlunyana, who belonged to a lesser house of Nkazo, eldest son of Bonyo. The paramount chief was then Ndaba who is described by Soga as "a hasty and irritable man, and never satisfied except when fomenting trouble, although he was not renowned for personal courage." When trouble broke out between Ndaba and the ama-Mdlunyana, the latter solicited Rarabe's assistance. Ndaba was defeated and Rarabe seized all his cattle. Apparently there were several attempts to end the hostile feelings which resulted from this incident, but invariably Ndaba became more resentful and tempamental. For example, Ndaba himself took as wife a daughter of Rarabe, but for Lobola he supplied a miserable hundred head of cattle, either to demonstrate his poverty or to show his contempt for the chief. Not unjustifiably Rarabe considered this an insult to his status, and entered Thembuland with an army. Rarabe's Xhosa were victorious, but Rarabe was fatally wounded at the Xuka River. The surviving son, Gaika, was a more infant, hence Rarabe's brother, Tslambye acted as regent—with far reaching results.

In the years to follow, Tslambye's attempts to oust Gaika as chief of the Xhosa led to strained relations between the two chiefs.

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1 Soga, op.cit., p.131.
and consequently to internal conflict among the Xhosa. This conflict gained new impetus as the trickle of European hunters and graziers that since the mid 18th century approached the Fish River, had by the beginning of the 19th century grown into a more thrusting movement. The clash of black and white interests in the Fish River Valley made official interference in the internal Xhosa politics inevitable, and this resulted in obvious European backing for Gaika. In 1819 Lord Charles Somerset\(^1\) had made an agreement with Gaika whereby the latter had ceded territory between the Fish and Keiskamma River to the Colony.

In making this treaty Somerset had made the same mistake as Van Plettenberg in 1778.\(^2\) Both governors, arguing from a European point of view, had no concept of the segmentary structure of Nguni political units. The governors were thus looking for somebody who did not exist, namely a supreme authority to negotiate with. But the Nguni were organised in small chiefdoms which, as Hammond-Tooke explains, "enjoyed equal status, independent of each other, and free to manage their internal affairs without outside influence". "It was this freedom from external control", Hammond-Tooke emphasises, "even that emanating from the paramount chief of a group, that was not understood by white governments."\(^3\)

According, then, to Nguni tribal customs Gaika had no right to

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\(^1\) Somerset, Lieut.-Gen. Lord Charles Henry, Governor of the Cape Colony, April 1814-March 1826 (resigned in England, April 1827).

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 31.

\(^3\) Hammond-Tooke, Segmentation and Fiction in Cape Nguni, p.149. See also Oxford, p.118; Soga, op.cit., p.90.
ceede territory to Somerset, and what was more, T'slambie bitterly
resented Somerset's negotiations with Gaika as this implied that Gaika
was above the other chiefs. Gaika's liaison with one of T'slambie's
wives, Tuthula, together with a grazing dispute drove matters to a
head. T'slambie solicited the assistance of Rarabe's brother,
Gcaleka, and together the allies defeated Gaika in 1818 at the Battle
of Amalinda. Gaika called on the Governor for help. Troops and
burghers crossed the Fish River and captured many of T'slambie's
cattle. In revenge T'slambie fell on Grahamstown where he was defeated
by the English and Hottentots. After this Fourth Xhosa War (October
1819), Somerset proclaimed the Keiskamma River the boundary and he
declared the territory between the Fish and Keiskamma River neutral
territory to be completely depopulated.

With his proclamation a process that had already started with
Van Plettenberg's proclamation of the Fish River boundary, was
accelerated. Up to 1778 there was no restriction on the free move-
ment of the Bantu, and, when necessary, clans relieved tribal tension
by moving away; hence the gradual southward migration of the Cape
Nguni, and in particular of the Gcaleka and Rarabe Xhosa, from Natal
since the middle of the 16th century. Once Van Plettenberg's boundary
had put an end to their free movement, tension arose, albeit slowly
at first. Somerset's arrangements aggravated the position.

Given the tendency of fission among the Xhosa tribes, and the
role of cattle in their social structure, it will be seen that there

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1Soga, op.cit., p. 156; Hammond-Tooke, Tribes of King William's
Town, pp. 72, 73.

2Infra, p. 31.

3Hammond-Tooke, Segmentation and Mission, pp. 149-151.
was a relative congestion building up in the whole area now known as the Ciskei. Meantime the crisis in Natal occasioned by the 'nation building' first of Dingiswayo and then of Chaka, led to a dispersal of tribes from Natal. The displaced peoples from Natal fled over the Drakensberg and the over-spill reached the north-eastern Cape; others crossed the Umtamvuna River into the modern Transkei.

After Chaka had become head of the Zulu in 1816, he in due course swallowed up Dingiswayo's people and scattered the Ngwane under Matiwane, who in turn fell upon the tribes across the Drakensberg. Thus started the period of terror between the Orange and Vaal River commonly known as Mfecani.\(^1\) As one clan attacked the other, the spearhead of the clans crossed the Orange River and attacked the tribes to the south.

It seems as if the first attacks on the Tambookies took place in 1823. W. Rogers, who in official correspondence signed himself as Lieutenant of the Cape Cavalry, was sent in May 1825 by Major Forbes to obtain information regarding the attacks, from the Tambookies.\(^2\) Rogers found a chief whom he refers to as Chei-chei, but who was possibly Bowana,\(^3\) on the banks of the Black Kei River.

\(^1\) J. Omor-Cooper in *The Zulu Aftermath* (London, 1966), p.5, states that the term Mfecani is a Nguni word used for the wars and disturbances which accompanied the rise of the Zulu. Monica Wilson (Oxford, p. 391) writes: "The time of troubles on the high veld (i.e. during the 1820's) is known as Difaqane, a word meaning 'forced migration'." The word "Fetcami" as it appears on the following pages seems to have been a corruption of the term Difaqane. It was applied in contemporary writing indiscriminately to any displaced group.

\(^2\) *P.M. XXII*, p.430, W. Rogers to Major Forbes, 27th May 1825.

\(^3\) Bowana's tribe was known as the amaTshuu after his father. This name was possibly taken by Rogers as the name of the chief—hence the corruption Chei-chei.
According to Bowana, the first assault was two years earlier upon Voscerine (Vusani) who repulsed them. From there they plundered Hintea, Jalouse and Thlambic's people, until these chiefs combined their forces and overthrew them. This compelled them to move further westward until they came upon the Tambookies whom they attacked and put to flight. Bowana added that he himself had opposed the attacks three times and, although successful in the first battle, he had lost all heart. After Rogers, a party of settlers under George Rennie, a farmer from the Winterberg, went as far as Bowana's country, and obtained information that confirmed Roger's report. Bowana informed Rennie that the invaders came from the north-east.  

In a letter to Major Bourke, Colonel Henry Somerset reported that he had visited the whole area from the Tarka to the Orange River in October 1826. He too met the Tambookie chiefs on the Black Kei River who informed him that they were treated with great kindness by the farmers, but that they had suffered considerably from the Petcani or Gous—a nation coming from a far country and only heard of within the previous year.

In the area between the Kromme Nek and the Black Kei River and thence along the Klaas Smits River area Somerset found the farmers

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1Bourke, Major-General Richard, Acting Governor of the Cape Colony, March 1826-September 1826.

2Somerset, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry, eldest son of Lord Charles Somerset.

3The chiefs who were then residing on the Black Kei River were Bowana and Quehwa.

4In official letters at this time, reference has often been made to this strange people. It is uncertain who they were. Thoal states that the name is a corruption of Lechavan, who were in fact the Mantatees. See Thoal, p.446.
complaining that they were disturbed by straggling parties of Fetcani and Bushmen. The country across the Stormberg, Somerset said, was thickly populated by farmers, and was in a very exposed and unprotected state. The farms along the Stormberg Spruit had been abandoned through fear of the Fetcani, and the Bushmen from those parts had for the same reason deserted their territory and were seeking protection among the farmers.

Field Cornet Steenkamp from Tarka, who accompanied Somerset, told the latter that while on patrol some time before, he found a large plain covered with the dead bodies of Tambookies—many thousands, who had been slaughtered by the Fetcani.¹

Information as to the movements of the Fetcani in the area across the Stormberg is to be found in the evidence of a certain Majola, who described himself as "one of the Fetcani horde".² He dictated his memoirs in 1882, but unfortunately he does not state when the events that he narrated took place. After having related how the Nguni tribe, to which he belonged, were expelled from Natal by Chaka, he describes their adventures in the Caledon River area whence he was sent by his chief Natiwane to attack the Thembu country. He then gives the following narrative: "We crossed the highlands of Barkly. We descended into the country beyond. We arrived near Kubunculu (sic), the grandfather of Gangoliswe. The Thembus and their people were spread over a wide country...But the Thembus had already seen where we had slept. They fled. We chased them for three days. The fourth

¹Colonial Archives, Cape Town, Cory Transcript, Vol. IV. Somerset to Bourke, 9th October 1826.

²The Story of the Fetcani Horde by one of themselves - Majola of Jozani's village in Cape Quarterly Review, 1882.
day at sunset we saw the back end of their flying troops and cattle entering the bush where the Tsomo and Kiba join.... On the second day of our march we began to fall and die of hunger. None were lean but they sat down or lay down to die.... (sic!) Every day men fell and died, it was in the month of May.... One morning, near the Kraai River, we came upon five men driving thirty head of cattle. That was a help. Each company took one head. Nothing but bones were left; we ate them skins and all. We asked those men and they told us they were men of father Morosi and had captured cattle from Abelinju (white men).

The repeated attacks by the Fetscani hordes since 1823 created a critical situation along the frontier. The Tambookies were forced into an unaccommodating area to the north of the Winterberg. Lieutenant Rogers remarked that the country was not only very mountainous, but "among the ravines and recesses of these (the mountains) they, the Thembu, are so thickly crowded that they cannot subsist there, and must either come into the colony or move to the eastward to get among the Tsambie and Hinza's (sic) Kaffirs."¹ Bowana left George Rennie in no doubt that "unless they speedily obtained military aid from the English Government they must on the first advance of the marauders cross the frontier line and fly into the Colony for their lives."²

Although the Tambookies had always been quiet and inoffensive, many farmers undoubtedly frowned upon the idea of such a large body with their cattle, moving into the Colony. On the other hand it would have been dangerous to drive them away as they at least formed

a buffer between the farmers and the marauding Petaani.

"Should the Tambookies evacuate the country they now occupy," Lieutenant Rogers informed Major Forbes, "there will be no people between the Infindani and the Chumie. The distance across the plain will take them 1½ days to travel, and by coming this route they can enter the colony, without being opposed by, or their approach even known to the kaffirs..." The problem was given new impetus when in 1827 a severe attack was made on the Tambookies of Bowara's tribe and 3,000 members of this tribe with 1,200 head of cattle, fled into the Somerset district where they asked for protection. The problem thus had to be faced: they had either to drive away a friendly people and run the risk of seeing them replaced by a hostile tribe, or they had to allow them to overstock the Somerset district where the pasturage was hardly sufficient for the flocks of the inhabitants. Mackay, the Landdrost of Somerset East—the district most closely affected by the invasion—had previously recommended to the Colonial Government that this quiet, honest tribe should be given a limited invitation to the Colony. Mackay's despatch was laid before the Council of Advice, but the members did not see their way open to comply with this request. It was decided that the Tambookies should be replaced in their country, if possible, by means of negotiation with the invaders or otherwise by force of arms. Commandos were thus called

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1 Ibid., pp. 430-431, Rogers to Forbes, 27th May 1825.
2 PP. 252, 1827, Native Inhabitants ii, no. 4, Richard Bourke to Goderich, 15th October 1827.
3 Ibid., W. Mackay to Richard Plasket, 20th February 1827.
out, but Bourke, on reaching Grahamstown, was informed that the invaders had retired from Thembu country after devastating a portion of it. Bourke visited the portion that had been overrun by the Fetcani, and at the same time he had an interview with Bowana who proved to be unwilling to return to his country. Bowana maintained that the Fetcani had by then reached Umtata and he felt that their presence was a great threat to his security. It was only in December 1828, after some measure of calm had been restored on the frontier, that Bowana was peacefully conducted to his own land. The dispersal of Bowana's tribe, later termed the Emigrant Thembu, was a matter of much concern to the Cape Colony. During the Fetcani disturbances they were joined by other refugees, and had spread themselves thinly over the whole territory between the Stormberg in the north, and the Winterberg in the south, and from the Indwe River in the east to the Black Kei and the Klaas Smits River in the west. They were thus in a position where they could cause annoyance. Their presence was also from another point of view undesirable. Because of their loyalty to the Colonial Government they were unpopular with the hostile tribes on the frontier, and because they were militarily weak, such tribes looked upon them as an easy prey. Attacks on the Tambockies would inevitably call for official interference.

By 1828 the frontier was in such a turmoil that the maintenance of peace had become almost impossible. Not only were friendly chiefs

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1 Theal V, p.453.

2 Today the name Emigrant Thembu is mostly used for that group of Thembu who, in 1864-1865, was accompanied by J.C. Warner to Emigrant Themboland. In early official letters this name was used for Bowana's dispersed people. Later on the name Tambockie was more commonly used for them as well as for other Thembus who left the Bashee River.
already allowed in 1825 by Burchell to re-settle in the Ceded Territory, but the more daring Gaika chiefs, such as Macomo and his brother Mancazama, had of their own accord drifted back to the Kat River where they lived on suffrance. This not only resulted in strained relations between the Europeans and the Xhosa, but the general displacement of Xhosa tribes caused intermingling that soon led to inter-tribal hostilities. This became particularly evident after the defeat of Matiwane in 1828. The latter, who in that year crossed the Orange River to look for new plunder among the southern tribes, was unfortunate enough to encounter a combined Xhosa-Thembu-Colonial force and was completely routed at Mholompo in August, 1828.

Incidentally, the Matiwane invasion coincided with the advance of an army by Chaka who wanted to end the mourning period for his mother by a grand campaign. It was when news of the approaching Zulu army was received that the Xhosa and Thembu joined forces and secured Colonial help. This army crossed the Bashee River and Matiwane and his followers were attacked and defeated under the impression that they were Zulus. The latter had, however, already returned to Pondoland when the Battle of Mholongo took place.¹

But the panic caused by rumours of an invading Zulu army and the continued Fetoani inroads had caused Thembus, from Vusani's tribe, to join the ranks of Bowman's scattered tribes. Some stray Thembus settled on Macomo's lands and tension between these two tribes built up. In January 1829, Macomo, with a body of 500 men, attacked Bowman who fled with his people and cattle into the Colony for shelter. Macomo was so daring as to follow Bowman into the Tarka district, and

only returned after he had killed a number of Tambookies, and took most of their cattle. Bowana withdrew in due course, but a number of his people continued to live in the Colony, where the farmers were quite at a loss as to what to do with them.

Once again the frontier situation was intricately complicated by the effects of inter-tribal politics. Colonel Somerset, who was sent to investigate matters, declared that Bowana instigated the attack in order to punish Galela, a rebellious chief. However, Captain Campbell, who visited the Tarka district on receipt of Somerset's report, denied any insinuation that Bowana was instrumental in provoking the attack. In this conviction he was supported by a farmer, Christiaan Muller, who had always been on very friendly terms with Bowana. Muller stated that if it had not been for his help, Bowana would have been murdered. But even if Bowana had not instigated the attack, it seems reasonable to assume that the strained relationship between Bowana and Galela could have facilitated Macomo's attack. At the time of the attack many of Galela's followers were living nearer to Macomo than to their own chief. Macomo, knowing that these

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1 Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), P.P.538, 1836, p.132. Q 1173.

2 Bourke's Ordinance 49 of 1828 legalised the employment of Kaffirs in the Colony. Hazel King in Richard Bourke, p.114, writes: "It was intended that the system should be introduced very gradually and cautiously, that Kaffirs should at first be admitted in small numbers only, and for limited periods, perhaps only for a month or two at a time." The Ordinance was however modified by Cole and then suspended. See W. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton (Oxford, 1963), p.87.

3 Colonial Archives (Cory Transcript), p.96, Campbell to Bell, 30th January 1829.

4 Ibid., 27th February 1829.
people would get no help from Bowana, may well have thought that this was the opportune moment for an attack on people whose presence on or near his territory had become an embarrassment. Bowana probably could not have foreseen that an attack on the Galela Tambookies would have involved his people too. This was emphasised by Major Dundas in his evidence before the Select Committee on Aborigines. He was of the opinion that Macomo, having heard of the differences between the Tambookie chiefs, thought this an opportune moment to enrich himself.

The attitude of the Cape Government regarding the Macomo-Bowana dispute was explained by Andries Stockenström in his evidence before the Aborigines Committee. Asked whether the Tambookies that had been attacked by Macomo were living under colonial protection, he answered: "They were living on our border, and had been living peaceably, and the government were always in the habit of threatening any tribe that disturbed them." As to the question whether the government considered themselves bound to afford them protection, Stockenström made it clear that it was a matter of expediency that induced the government to render protection to the Tambookies because "whenever they were plundered, and their cattle taken away, they had no alternative than to rush into the Colony and plunder us." Other tribes, according to

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1Dundas, Major-General William Bolden, Landaadrost of Albany, March 1825-December 1827; Civil Commissioner for Albany and Somerset until June 1828; Military Secretary to the Governor, Oct.1828-Feb.1830.

2Infrm, pp. 59-60.

3Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), PP.53G, 1838, p. 132, Q. 1175.

4Stockenström, later Sir Andries, Landaadrost of Graaff-Reinet, May 1825-January 1828; Commissioner-General of the Eastern Districts, January 1829-December 1833; Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Province, April 1836-August 1839.
Stockenström, were aware that they would give the government offence by plundering the Tambookies. Macomo would thus have realized that he would not be allowed with impunity to pursue the Tambooke into the Colony and to murder them while on colonial territory. Official interference had become imperative.¹

Sir Lowry Cole,² directed that Macomo should be required to restore the cattle stolen from the Tambookies, and in the event of not complying, he should be forced to leave the Kat River, where he had been allowed to remain on sufferance on condition of good behaviour. According to Dundas, Macomo refused, replying that "he did not see that the English had any right to interfere between him and the cattle."³ Walter Gisborne, however, stated that Macomo did not actually refuse, but that he constantly put off the payment.⁴

In 1829 Macomo was expelled from the Kat River area, and Hottentots were settled on lands which he regarded as his own. Macomo never forgave this, and friction continued, not only between him and the Colony, but between him and the Tambookies.

In May 1831 Field Cornet Erasmus from the Upper Tarka, complained that large numbers of Tambookies had left the chief, Mapassas, crossed the Black Kei and were committing depredations with great impunity. Matters were so bad that many farmers were trekking to the north. It seemed once again that Macomo was the aggressor, but there was also

¹Ibid., p. 82, Q.966-969.
³Select Committee on Aborigines, p. 132, Q.1173.
⁴Ibid., p. 356, Q.3287-3290.
suspicion among the Tarka farmers that Mapassa shared in the cattle taken by Macomo.

Meanwhile a desperate struggle had developed between Mapassa and Galela which resulted in a battle near the Klipplaats River where Mapassa was defeated. Once again, Tambookies fled into the Colony where they were pursued by the enemy. It is not sure whether the refugees belonged to Mapassa's or to Galela's tribe; most likely people from both chiefs sought safety in the Colony. Inevitably this reacted on the frontier situation in general, as in the course of these disturbances Tambookies who were herding the cattle of a farmer, Jordaan, were killed. Somerset found that the frontier situation was explosive, not only because of irritating events like the above, but because there was general unrest among the tribes. In a report to Campbell he expressed concern about "Mapassa who is a very spirited and daring fellow with whom we are likely to have trouble." But more: he found the Gaikas in a most unsettled state "making shields and arms and quarrelling among themselves, and all ripe and anxious for some desperate act. The Kaffirs are preparing for some great affair, but where it will strike, is impossible to say, probably on some unfortunate Tambockie tribe."¹

Thus, as the year 1831 was drawing to a close, it became clear that the Tambookie, though constantly referred to in official reports as a quiet, inoffensive tribe, had been drawn into a situation in which they could not indefinitely remain passive.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN ADVANCE

The Trekboer movement which had begun by the end of the 17th century, was the characteristic Boer pioneer achievement of the 19th century. The quest for land, for grazing and hunting, and the practical necessity of extensive rather than intensive agriculture was to continue, albeit in attenuated form, until political events fixed the boundaries of the South African Republic. In the first three decades of the 19th century, the character and direction of the Trekboer movement was altered somewhat as frontier boundaries were changed and the interests of Europeans came into sharp opposition with the interests of Xhosa tribes particularly in the Fish River zone. This was the main reason for the deflection of one of the main lines of the 18th century advance—the drift of the settlement away from the coastal belt in favour of the drift to the north and north-east. For more than a generation before the Great Trek the first seasonal migrations had led to settlement across the Orange River. Penetration of the Stormberg area was rather later and more sparse. In due course, as the north-eastward migrating Trekboer and the westward moving Tambookie encountered at the Black Kei River another area of frontier interaction was to develop. Whereas Tambookie movements had been largely created by political events over which they had little or no control, the factors behind Trekboer migration had been mainly geographical and economic.

The era of the stock farmer had begun in the early 18th century when Willem Adriaan van der Stel issued grazing licences to stock farmers and soon afterwards lifted the ban on the bartering of cattle.
This, as much as the easy way in which land could be acquired, created a new attitude towards land occupation that was to determine the pattern of settlement over the interior throughout the century: the more stock a farmer acquired, the more land he thought himself entitled to occupy; the more children a farmer had, the more farms he needed. The way of life pursued generation by generation was in part a migration made possible by courage, self-reliance and skilled adaptation of resources to an environment which was often harsh and challenging.

By the mid 18th century the two great migration streams which in the north had already reached the Olifants River and in the east the Great Brak River were arrested by geographical factors that played such an important part in determining the routes of European movement. The northerly group, halted by the aridity of the Olifants River region drifted eastwards towards the Gamtoos and Fish River which they reached by 1770; the easterly stream, arrested by the dense forests, towards the Gamtoos and Sunday Rivers. By 1770 both migration streams, mainly for geographical reasons, began to concentrate in the regions of the Candebo which was to be the point from which settlement radiated and new encounters were made: that of the warfare with the Bushmen in the north; the conflict with the Xhosa on the Fish River; and the colonization of the extreme north-eastern parts of the present Cape Province, which in turn was to lead to the encounters with the

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1 In 1714 Governor Mauritz Pasques de Chavonnes and the Political Council introduced a new land policy which enabled a farmer to obtain a leeningyslants, i.e. a great cattle run of 3000 morgen held on loan from the Company, for as little as 12 rixdollars a year.

2 The Trekboer migration has been dealt with in detail by P. van der Merwe in Noordwaartse Beweging; L. Fouche, Die Evolutie van die Trekboer ( Pretoria, 1969).
In contrast to the rapid expansions over the vast area between the Drakenstein Mountains and the Fish River between 1700-1770, migration from the Camdebo to the relatively near north-east, i.e. the districts known today as the Albert and Wodehouse districts, was rather a slow process. To a certain extent this was due to climatic conditions, but it was actually the ferocious warfare that developed between the Trekboers and the Bushmen once the former entered the real Bushman domain in the vicinity of the Nieweveldberge, the Sneeuberge and the Bamboesberge, that hampered northward expansion to such an extent that the Cape authorities did not even deem it necessary to fix a northern boundary. On the contrary, various attempts were made to fix an eastern boundary and in 1774 a north-eastern boundary was laid down at Bruintjieshoogte. However, when landdrost P.A. Wyburgh of Stellenbosch visited the frontier in 1775 he found that several farmers had already settled beyond Bruintjieshoogte, and on account of their extreme poverty they begged the Governor to be allowed to stay on. On the recommendation of Wyburgh a new north-eastern boundary was laid down in 1775 which stretched from the Swarteberg in a direct line eastward over Bruintjieshoogte along the Rietberg to the middle Fish River. From this point fruitless attempts were made over a period of thirty years to combat the Bushmen danger so that this fertile Tarka area could be colonized. The Trekboer-Bushman conflict in the north-east followed the same pattern as that on the northern boundary. As raids became heavier, the commando system was reorganized, and the whole mode of warfare changed. Hitherto commandos had been called out

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1 Oxford, p. 212.
in response to a particular raid or to attack a particular band. After 1774 war became constant and increasingly ferocious.¹

But although thousands of Bushmen were killed, raiding continued and permanent settlement in the Tarka area was made impossible. When John Barrow visited this area at the end of the 18th century, he was struck by the utter desolation of once cultivated farms. He wrote: "It is a well watered country; and when inhabited considered as one of the best divisions of Graaff-Reinet for sheep and cattle. At some of the deserted farms we found vineyards, loaded with grapes, peach-trees..."²

Thus a natural line of expansion, viz. from Tarka northward into the modern district of Colesberg and from there eastward across the Stormberg Spruit was closed, and valuable land was lying waste.

While northerly and north-easterly expansion was thus hampered, the attention of the Cape authorities, during the last three decades of the 18th century, was focused on the eastern boundary. Between the years 1745 when the Great Brak River was proclaimed boundary, and 1771 when the Gamtoos River became the boundary, various attempts were made by governors to prevent uncontrolled eastward expansion. This was done partly to prevent illegal trading and conflict with indigenous people and partly to secure maximum revenues from grazing licences.³ The governors had little knowledge of the interior, and even after the district of Swellendam had been proclaimed in 1745 the districts in the interior were so large that the Landdrost could not maintain any


³ Oxford, p. 212.
kind of control; consequently their boundaries became polit fiction.

In 1774 Joachim van Plettenberg\(^1\) was sworn in as governor. He not only knew the country better, having been at the Cape since 1767, but he was also desirous of improving the administration of the outlying districts. He assumed responsibility at the time when the two great migration streams, viz. the eastward trekking Colonist and the westward moving Xhosa, encountered one another in the Zuurveld. When difficulties concerning border arrangements were discussed in the Council of Policy, Van Plettenberg informed the Council that he had decided to undertake a journey "to the most outlying regions as far as they are occupied."\(^2\) His visit to the eastern frontier in 1778 marked the beginning of a changed attitude on the part of the authorities as far as the relationship between the Colonists and the indigenous people was concerned.

On the northern boundary no attempts had thus far been made to draw a boundary between the Colonists and the Bushmen; in fact it would have been impossible to negotiate with a people who were spread out in mobile units over the interior, and who hardly had any political organization. But the Xhosa were a formidable and politically well-organized enemy with whom it seemed expedient to come to terms. Unacquainted with the fissiparous tendency inherent in the tribal structure of the Nguni,\(^3\) Van Plettenberg negotiated with two petty chieftains, Kobe and Godisa, who agreed that the middle Fish River should be the

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1 Van Plettenberg, Joachim, Governor of the Cape Colony, 18th May 1774 - 14th Feb. 1785.


3 Supra, Chapter 1, p.14. See also memorandum submitted to the Chief Magistrate of Umtata in terms of Secretary for Native Affairs, minute no. 271/362, 4th Dec. 1957.
dividing line between the Xhosa and the European farmers. This was
a promise that not even the paramount chief, Barabe, could have given;
consequently the Fish River, intended to be a great divide, was
ignored by the white and black alike. An attempt to afford a pro-
tection to the Colonists was made in 1786 when a new drostdy and the
district of Graaff-Reinet was established. The eastern boundary of
this district was to be along the Tarka and Baviaans Rivers and along
the Great Fish River to the sea. The northern boundary was not clearly
defined. Since further expansion eastward had become more difficult,
as well as illegal, the colonization of the northern-eastern districts,
gradually at first, was to begin. The proclamation of the Fish River
boundary, itself a response to a new situation, in part explains the
new swing of European expansion to the north-east. Yet the urge to
expand was the product of the same economic forces as lay behind the
evolution of the Trekboer throughout the 18th century: climatic
conditions, the nature of the land, and labour problems, had established
cattle farming as a far more lucrative mode of living than agricultural
farming. In 1812 W.S. van Ryneveld, P. Diemel and F.W. Pagel who drew
up the first report of the Circuit Court, pointed out that "all young
people of which many of the houses are full, have no other prospect
than the breeding of cattle...There is in fact no other way or pros-
pect for the young than the easy livelihood of breeding cattle...In
the districts...all look forward to becoming graziers, and no person
forms for himself any other plan of livelihood."

1 The eastern frontier of the district, which was also the dividing
line between the Colony and the Xhosa, was thus clearly indicated as
well as the boundaries between Graaff-Reinet and the other districts.
It is remarkable that no northern boundary was laid down.
See Coördinatse Beweging, p. 96.

The growing population thus needed more farms, and the Loan Place system enabled farmers to occupy or leave farms at their convenience so that land was uneconomically exploited. Often large tracts of virgin land lay waste between the farms. There was nothing to encourage the ardent farmer to cultivate his land more intensively. C.W. de Kiewiet aptly remarks: "The evolution of the Trekboers was the story of a successful, not of an unsuccessful adaptation to South African conditions, and their movements were in obedience to a simple law of economic life. Capital and labour were scarce, while land was cheap and plentiful. An extensive use of the land was really efficient, as intensive farming called for an expenditure of capital and effort for which the return was quite inadequate."\(^1\)

Furthermore, the low and erratic rainfall in the interior likewise called for extensive rather than intensive farming, and scarcity of natural dams and fountains made constant trekking inevitable. This, quite as much as the slow rhythm of expansion among Trekboers, help to explain the anomalous position that once eastward expansion was arrested there were constant complaints about land shortage while, in fact, the white population was sparsely distributed over a vast area.

Need for more land eventually then forced the Trekboer along a route that, rather ironically, had already been opened up by Van Plettenberg as early as 1778. The Governor, after having had proclaimed the Fish River boundary, proceeded between the Sneeuberg and the Seekoei River to a point at Toverberg near the modern Colesberg, where he planted a beacon. This beacon was related to the Fish River line and marked the north-eastern boundary. No attempt was made to fix a northern

boundary and settlement north of the beacon was not prohibited. This is understandable as, at the time of Van Plettenberg’s journey, the whole area between the beacon and Gordon’s Fontein was still unoccupied and twenty years later not even the latitude on which the beacon was planted, had been reached.¹

From the beginning of the 19th century expansion towards the Seekoei River began to accelerate. One reason for this was the non-availability of land on the eastern frontier. Secondly, the Bushmen danger had to a large extent been overcome. Since the first British Occupation in 1795 the policy of extermination had been replaced by a policy of conciliation. It was with a view to protecting the Bushmen that General Macartney² proclaimed the northern boundary in 1798. This boundary stretched from Van Plettenberg’s Beacon across the Seekoei River to the Great Tafelberg and thence along the Nieuweveldsberge, the Riet and Fish Rivers, Spioenkop, Kubiskow, across the Langeberg, the northern corner of Kamiesberg and thence to the Buffalo River at the sea.³

The farmers themselves realized the futility of their policy of extermination and in many cases genuine attempts were made by them to befriended the Bushmen. In some parts of Graaff-Reinet district, which at that time included the modern Colesberg district, Bushmen were sometimes saved from starvation by the farmers who organized hunting

¹ Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 99.

² Earl Macartney, Governor of the Cape Colony, 5th May 1797 – 20th Nov. 1798.

³ P.P. 252, 1835, Native Inhabitants, no. 25 in no. 8, Papers relative to the measure taken for fixing the boundaries of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope upon the eastern and northern frontier.
expeditions to shoot game for the Bushmen. Colonel Collins, during his tour of 1809, mentions the case of Commandant Van der Walt who, during a period of three months, supplied the Bushmen with 142 head of cattle, and, in his report to Governor Caledon, he remarked: "It was very satisfactory for me to observe the anxiety evinced by the farmers of the North-Eastern districts to preserve peace with that people [the Bushmen] rather by conciliation than terror."  

In the Tarka district Andries Stockenström, Snr., Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, during a journey in 1808, negotiated with the Bushmen and offered them gifts of dagga and tobacco. Convinced that the provisional Field Cornet, who had been appointed to carry out his policy, would be able to preserve peace, he repeated his offer of remission of recognition fees to the farmers, and from 1809 onwards, the Tarka area was gradually re-occupied.

However, migration towards the Seekoei River took place far more rapidly than towards the Tarka area. Professor P. van der Merwe in his authoritative work on Trekboer migration, suggests that the Bushmen along the Seekoei River, where they could catch fish and the necessity to steal was not so urgent, were of a more peaceful nature than those of the Tarka. It is argued too, he says, that the Bushmen of the plains were less isolated from contact with the Europeans, and being remote from the mountain ranges which were a safe point of retreat elsewhere, more ready to establish a modus vivendi.

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2 Ibid.
3 Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 109.
4 Ibid., p. 85.
In 1803 Governor Janssens found the most northward Trekboers about half a day's journey from the beacon. By 1808 the population on both banks of the Seekoei River had increased to such an extent that it was recommended that a Field Cornet should be placed there. The next year Colonel Collins could report that "this part of the country, although the most distant from the capital, is in a more improving state than any I have visited. The tracts stated in Mr Barrows chart to have been deserted on account of the Bosjesman and Hottentots are now entirely filled up and the country is inhabited as far as its limits."1

In an old country, well settled and closely administered, the term boundary carries with it the idea of clear definition, understood by those on both sides of it. In the Cape, at this time, maps were unreliable, and survey, even when completed, was rudimentary. Boundaries were not even beaconed off, and stretched by imaginary lines from one landmark to another. Moreover, instructions issued in English meant little to the Boers, to the Xhosa, or to the Bushmen. Hence people in the far interior took little cognisance of boundary lines which bore little relation to the business of daily living. Equally, those who devised the boundary lines rarely had close acquaintance with the conditions for which they were legislating. This is true whether one considers, for instance, Macartney's boundary3 or the extension of his boundary from the Riet River to the Sak River, by the

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1Ibid., p. 30.
3See map 2.
Batavian Government in 1805. As in the case of much else, the young Andries Stockenstrøm understood both the factor and the implications. In 1815 he wrote to Colonel Baird: "In short it is impossible to determine what the proclamation calls the boundary. The Plettenberg's or Edel Heer's Baken is the only definite point to be found, but hills or ridges, which we are fully referred to, and are marked in the inaccurate but only map we have of that part, are far beyond it, and some more inward, quite out of direction." Stockenstrøm realised that dispersal had been going on too long and too far to be reversed, and he recommended as the only practical solution the proclamation of "a conspicuous line of boundary over which no colonist should be allowed to trespass except by special permission." With the assistance of an engineer, Lieutenant Bonany, Stockenstrøm laid down a new line in 1822 whereby the boundaries of the Colony were extended to the Stormberg Spruit in the east and the Orange River in the north. The factor of uncertainty had now been removed. The other necessary factor, namely control and effective regulation, was missing: so too was any diversification of the economy.

The new boundary had been proclaimed at a time when it became increasingly difficult to find available land within the Colony.

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1Hoordwaartse Beweging, p. 102.

2At the age of 22 Andries Stockenstrøm was appointed as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet—the same position that was previously held by his father.

3Baird, Major-General Sir David, Acting Governor of the Cape Colony, 10th Jan. 1806 - 17th Jan. 1807.

4P.P. 252, 1835, Native Inhabitants, enclosure in no. 8, A. Stockenstrøm to Baird, 29th Sept. 1820.

5Ibid.

6Ibid., Stockenstrøm to Brink, Acting Col.Sec. 18th Aug. 1824. See map 2.
Damage suffered by increasing droughts had been intensified by the appearance of other menaces such as locusts and trekbokke. Even Stockenström, though in principle against expansion across the colonial boundaries, could not close his eyes to the sorry plight of the farmers. "I have visited Voor Sneuuberg, Rhenosterberg, Uitvlucht and Sneuuberg," he wrote in 1827, "and everywhere found the country in a most frightful state of locusts which may have been said to form almost one swarm over the District, nor is the drought less distressing." Even a greater menace was the periodical arrival of herds of Springboks, commonly referred to as the "trekbokke". These buck held on the vast plains between the Orange River and the inhabited parts of the Colony where there were no hunters to exterminate them. Occasionally, perhaps every four or five years, continuous droughts forced them to search elsewhere for food and water. By the time the herd reached the inhabited parts of the Colony, its numbers had grown into thousands, and wherever they passed their hooves destroyed every blade of grass.

The damage done by trekbokke had been pointed out by several 18th century travellers and one of the most lively descriptions to be found is that by W.C. Harris: "To offer an estimate of their numbers would be impossible: pouring down like locusts from the endless plains of the interior, whence they have been driven by protracted drought,

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¹ Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 179. Prof. Van der Merwe is of opinion that droughts had increased after 1813. He admits that it is very difficult to come to a definite conclusion as, in the absence of statistics, he bases his arguments on official reports; these can supply only partial information.

² J.C. Vol. XXXIV, p. 437, Stockenström to Sec. of Gov., 14th May 1827.

³ Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 200.
lions have been stalking in the middle of their compressed phalanx, and flocks of sheep had not unfrequently been carried away with the torrents.\textsuperscript{1}

Even before the Stockenström revision of the boundaries in 1822, seasonal migration across the Orange River had already begun. In good seasons, young farmers and others who could not afford to take up land in the Colony, had periodically crossed the Orange for grazing, hunting and the wood that abounded in the Caledon Valley.\textsuperscript{2} Drought increased the scale of seasonal grazing across the river, for land, adequate in good seasons, could not carry the stock in times of drought. Almost inevitably seasonal grazing gave place to partial settlement.

According to George Kalbe, a missionary at Phillipolis, about 1120 farmers had trekked across the Orange in 1834. Although Cory is of opinion that this number is exaggerated,\textsuperscript{3} there is abundant evidence that migration to the Trans-Orange increased on a large scale after 1839. Dr John Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society, who was violently opposed to European expansion that could lead to trespass on Bushmen or native lands, wrote in 1830: "It is almost impossible to calculate the exact number because at all the several fords they are continually passing their wagons. Nearly all the Colonists in the divisions of the fieldcormets near the river had migrated, and some who reside even within an hours ride of Graaff-Reinet... The farmers generally proceed with 3, 5, 10 or even more wagons, to a great distance up the Caledon, Orange and Modder Rivers, and continue

\textsuperscript{1}W.C. Harris, \textit{The Wild Sports of Southern Africa} (London, 1839), p. 33, quoted in \textit{Aequa Martinsburg}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Aequa Martinsburg}, pp. 232-237.

\textsuperscript{3}Cory 17, p. 463.
at different ravines, interspersed throughout the country, for many hundreds of miles. Each farmer brings nearly his whole stock of cattle with him, including often herds of one or two friends, who have remained at home." Dr Phillip's report makes it clear that the Trans-Orange held other advantages too: "They [the farmers] have the additional advantage of procuring large quantities of game,... shooting the wild animals wherever they find them.... A farmer and his son... shot 18 hippopotamus; sold from their skins a load of samboks,... the large at 3 rixdollars and the smaller at 4 shillings, besides 160 pounds of bacon.... And a still further advantage to the farmers is that they obtain supplies of wood for building from the banks of the Caledon. Seven wagons passed within 3 weeks at one spot: and two returned almost immediately well laden."

In contrast to the rapid expansion across the Orange, the Stormberg area was rather by-passed. By 1834 there were about 200 families living across the Stormberg Spruit, and then only as far as the Kraai River. The whole area across the Waschbank Spruit lay waste. This is understandable as the Stormberg area was in many respects an unaccommodating piece of land. The high plateau was extremely cold, and lack of timber and wood aggravated the uncomfortable conditions. There was a lack of springs and running water; and the geological structure of the land was such that remedy by artificial wells was hopeless. However, there were factors that encouraged settlement in this area. Farmers could still find excellent pasturage across the Stormberg Spruit and though not less subjected to droughts than the

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1 C.O. 1778 Sir R.S. Donkin's Collection of Missionary Complaints: Dr. Phillip, Return of Missions, 1850, quoted in Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 292.

2 Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 336.
farmers within the colonial boundaries, the position here was at least not yet aggravated by over-stocking. But the greatest attraction of this area was to be found in the fact that the first Trekboers encountered no hostile tribes. In fact, the area was regarded as completely uninhabited when the first seasonal migrations started round about 1815. In 1809, Collins made an extensive tour of the country as far as the Kraai River,\(^1\) and from his report it becomes clear that they encountered no native tribes.\(^2\) This was confirmed by W. Mackay, Landdrost of Somerset East, who in August 1827 after investigation during the Petcandi disturbances emphasised: "It may be necessary here to observe that the Stormberg were never known to be inhabited, unless by a few kraals of wild Bushmen, and occasionally by the Tambookie people in the summer months, previously to their suffering from the attacks of other tribes." The Stormberg, according to Mackay, was included in Tambookie country, but they did not live there on account of the cold and lack of firewood.\(^3\)

However, the accounts of travellers, whether as private ventures or on official business can describe only the areas along the route actually traversed. Areas are described as "empty" or "deserted" when there is high probability that the inhabitants were hiding or even watching. This is certainly true of the Stormberg, which was one of the last strongholds of the Bushmen. At the time of Collins' journey

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\(^1\) Collins named this river Grey's River, but it was soon corrupted by Dutch speaking farmers into Kraai River.

\(^2\) Supra, p. 6.

\(^3\) *R.C.C. XXIV*, p. 464. W. McKay to Sec. of Gov., 8th Aug. 1827.
the struggle between Bushmen and Trekboer for land in the Colony had already forced Bushmen refugees into retreat, and the inaccessible Stormberg area afforded ideal protection. By 1824, the large territory comprising the Stormberg, Witteberg and Holspruit Mountains were occupied by a considerable number of Bushmen under their chief Mandoor.\(^1\) Being less tractable than the Bushmen of the plains, the Stormberg Bushmen could easier evade pursuit; consequently the commandos that were sent out from time to time effected very little, and conflicts between the Stormberg farmers and the Bushmen continued until 1860.\(^2\)

It is extremely difficult to reconstruct the history of the settlers in the Stormberg area before 1830; the main source of information being the minutes of the Albert Land Commission,\(^3\) which, due to the transitory nature of early settlement reflects only a part of the land dealings, and conclusions, drawn from such dealings, are often contradicted by fragments of information that are obtained from official reports. According to the minutes of the Commission only 25 farms had been permanently occupied by 1832, but in fact, by that year, there were already 162 families living east of the Stormberg Spruit.\(^4\) This apparent conflict of evidence can be explained by the fact that many of the Trekboers, like their fathers and grandfathers

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\(^1\)G.T.J., 1st July 1848.

\(^2\)Infra, Appendix 7.

\(^3\)This commission was appointed in 1848 by Sir Harry Smith to investigate land claims in the then newly proclaimed Albert District. *Infra*, chapter 4.

\(^4\)Colonel Henry Somerset found in 1826 that the area across the Stormberg was thickly populated. *Supra*, p. 18.
before them, led a semi-nomadic life, moving from fountain to fountain by ox-wagon, without any desire to build a house or improve the land on which they were living. They did not claim ownership to any particular site, and we thus have no records of these farms, or the farmers.

In examining the minutes of the said Commission one comes to the conclusion that permanent settlement only started in 1822.\(^1\) Up to 1835, probably because preference was given to the Trans Orange, settlement took place rather slowly, but after 1835 there was a marked influx of farmers.

The trek across the Stormberg Spruit was mainly a spontaneous movement, but there is evidence that organized parties left the Western Province round about 1828. The motives behind this trekking was purely economic.

From 1826 onwards the wine farmers in the Western Province went through a period of trial. Although there were constant complaints of the bad quality of Cape wine, this product, prior to 1825, found a ready market in Great Britain, so much so that when the Cape wines reached the height of their popularity, they stood third on the English list of desirable wines. While their popularity lasted, the farmer in the Western Province flourished. After 1825, however, a steady decline in the wine trade set in, and the position was aggravated when in the same year Great Britain reduced the duties on the importation of non-colonial wines. Without preference the Cape product could not compete with the French wines in the open market.\(^2\) The depression

\(^1\)See Appendix 2.

that followed on the collapse of the wine market was aggravated by a decision of the British Government in 1825 to introduce sterling coins in its colonial possessions. This meant a devaluation of the rixdollar. In 1806 it had been generally accepted that the rate of exchange was 1 Rd = 4s. sterling. In 1825 the market rate of one rixdollar was no more than 1s.6d.¹ In the already impoverished state in which many wine farmers found themselves, the effects of the devaluation of their money was catastrophic. There was only one way out—to settle in the far interior where land was still cheap and plentiful.

When these farmers arrived in the north-east Cape they were so poor that they undertook to take charge of the cattle and sheep of the Stormberg farmers for a half or third of the increase. On the fertile highlands they soon grew rich, and many of them played a leading part in the community.²

At first the Government, while prohibiting settlement across the Orange River, seemed to have connived at settlements across the Stormberg Spruit. True, in 1834 a proclamation was issued by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, ordering all Trekboers across the boundaries on pain of severe punishment to return to the Colony. Steps were taken to make this known across the Orange River and most of the farmers either returned or made an attempt to settle nearer to the boundary.³ There is no evidence that any steps were taken to enforce the proclamation across the Stormberg Spruit, neither did any of these farmers return

¹Ibid., p. 340.
²See Appendix 3.
³Noordwaartse Beweging, p. 298.
to the Colony. Probably the Governor's strong action was not so much directed against settlement in the Trans-Orange as against the possibility that Trekboers could take their slaves with them into the interior. There was no evidence of this happening across the Stormberg Spruit.

For roughly a decade the Stormberg farmers, like their neighbours in the Tarka, had amicable relationships with the Tambookie in spite of an occasional cattle lifting. The first disruption took place within Tambookie structure. When the petty chief, Galela, died in 1829 Bowana's people were suspected of having poisoned him.\(^1\) The Galelas in revenge murdered Bowana cruelly.

Bowana was succeeded by his son, Mapassa, who, unlike his father, was despised by the white officials with whom he came into contact. Branded by Lieutent-Governor Andries Stockenström as "an apathetic barbarian"\(^2\) and as an "ignorant ill-dispersed, grasping savage" by Colonel Henry Somerset,\(^3\) he was nevertheless a shrewd leader whose influence over the Tambookies in later years often surpassed that of the paramount chief, Umtirara.\(^4\)

The murder of his father gave Mapassa the opportunity to attack the Galela Tambookie, and so to settle the long standing feud between the two tribes. As he feared that he was not strong enough, he obtained assistance from the Xhosa chiefs, Jalousa and Booko, and Galela's

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1. Between these two chiefs there had been a long-standing feud. Supra, p. 23.


4. Infra, chapters 3 and 4.
people were driven into the Colony.

Furthermore, Mapassa had sent messages to Hintsa and all the Kaffir chiefs to ask assistance in avenging his father's death. Mapassa claimed that Bowana was the head of the tribe of Tambookies from which the great Kaffir chiefs obtained their wives, which entitled their children to inherit "royal blood". He had thus made it appear that his cause, in some manner, was the cause of all the chiefs, and when Colonel Henry Somerset investigated the matter in January 1831 he found that the chiefs in general supported Mapassa in his determination to destroy the Galela Tambookies completely. He was of opinion that either Field Cornet Pretorius or he himself would have to take steps as "there seems to be considerable excitement throughout the whole Kaffir territory... and from what I have ascertained it is not a point which will be allowed to remain at rest." Apparently Somerset decided to settle matters himself, but he could do no more than to restore a nominal peace, and it seems as if, at this stage, he wanted to avoid armed conflict.

The actions of Mapassa had created chaotic conditions on the Black Kei frontier. The petty chiefs, Grobie, Guata and Quecha who had fled into the Colony during the Fetcani disturbances, now took advantage of the prevailing uncertainty. Ever since these chiefs had first settled either within the Colony or on the Black Kei boundary, the Government had thought it desirable to remove them back to the Bashoo River. While there were no serious complaints about their

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1 Suurs, p. 18; Col. Letters 1805-1834, p. 205, Somerset to Campbell, 17th Jan. 1831.

2 Ibad.

3 Suurs, p. 7; 18-20.
behaviour, no definite steps were taken to do this, but as a result of the disruptions after 1830 complaints from the farmers were becoming so frequent that Somerset gave this matter urgent thought. The chiefs, however, refused and presented Mepasa's hostile feelings as an obstacle to their returning to the Thembu territory on the Bashee River. Grobie even threatened to take up arms should attempts be made by the Government to drive him from the colonial territory where he had settled after 1828.

From this point in its history, the vulnerability of the Stormberg area in consequence of its geographical position becomes clear. For while inter-tribal disturbances amongst the Tambookie caused chaos in the Tarka area south of the Stormberg, trouble was fermenting north of the Orange River. Amongst the various tribes living beyond this river, there were at the beginning of the 19th century two particularly troublesome groups; the Koronas and the Griquas, both of whom had migrated from the Western Province where they had become partly westernized and were thus acquainted with the use of the horse and the musket in time of war. After their settlement across the Orange, round about 1800, they were assisted by the missionary societies, but the lawless elements in both tribes ignored the missionaries and preferred a nomadic, marauding life. At first their attacks were directed at the Bechuana and other bordering tribes, but since 1830,

\[1\] P.P. 503, 1835, enclosure 4 in no. 23, H. Somerset to W.H. Dutton, 9th June 1836.

\[2\] Ibid., Somerset to Dutton, 9th May 1834.


For the history of the Griqua see J.S. Marais, The Griqua Coloured People 1652-1937 (Johannesburg, 1957), Chapter II.
after having been joined by Bastard clans, they not only attacked
Moshech and Moselekatze, but they continued their maraudings across
the Orange River. In 1833, in consequence of their attacks 700
Tambookies fled into the Colony, and refused to obey Captain Campbell's
orders that they should leave. The general feeling among them was
that as they were pursued by these enemies they might as well be
killed on the colonial side of the border as in their own territory.
Campbell had no option but to allow them permission to stay temporarily. ¹
In September 1833 Kapassa himself was forced by Griqua
attacks to look for temporary refuge within the Colony. ² Marauding
and theft followed inevitably.

At first thieving was more or less confined to the banks of the
Black Kei River where cattle belonging to farmers or Tambookies grazed
in common. By 1834, however, there were complaints from all over the
Tarka district. Field Cornet P.W. Coetzer, from this district, in-
formed Somerset that since the month of April forty horses had been
stolen by the Tambookies, and that one patrol after the other had to
be sent out. Coetzer recommended that a commando should be sent out
to attack Mapassa's men. ³

While Somerset appreciated the very dangerous position in which
the Tarka farmers found themselves, being exposed to inroads from
Tambookies as well as from all the other tribes between the extreme
range of the Buffalo Mountains right down to the Klipplaats River;

¹ Col. Letters 1836-1834, p. 255, Report from Willem Coetzer
from Tarka, 23rd Oct. 1833.


³ Ibid., p. 275, Field Cornet Coetzer to Somerset (letter
undated).
he found the whole situation so complicated that it was about impossible to take effective action. "It is to be lamented," he informed Colonel Campbell in 1834, "that the farmers themselves cannot be brought to a sense of necessity of their remaining more generally on their farms, instead of being constantly on the move, occupying the opposite country, and establishing cattle farms for themselves wherever their fancy leads them. In fact, the whole country seems to be occupied by either party without any inquiry or order whatever. Thus concentrating or assisting one another for the protection of property becomes very difficult, and consequently gives the marauding tribes a strength and predominance, which from the number of successful depredations they have committed, and are daily committing, is evident that they later take advantage of."  

Although this letter refers specifically to the Tarka area, it must be made clear here that conditions were similar in the adjoining Stormberg area. As the Stormberg area was beyond the colonial boundary, similar incidents there were not officially reported unless such an incident in some way reacted on the colonial situation. Such was the case in May, 1834. Somerset received information from Captain Armstrong that Grobie, one of the petty chiefs who had established himself between the Black Kei and Klaas Smits River, had threatened to take up arms should any attempts be made to expel him from the Tarka.

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1 Campbell, Col. D., Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate for Albany.

2 Col. letters 1806-1834, Somerset to Campbell, 26th May 1834.

3 Armstrong, Capt. A.B., Officer in the Cape Mounted Riflemen.
district. Somerset visited this area in person. When he reached the site where Grobie was reported to be, he found that Grobie had removed his kraals to a considerable distance along the Stormberg Mountains. A messenger was despatched to him, and Somerset followed up, but on the way the messenger was told that Grobie was in pursuit of some Bushmen who had stolen 300 head of his cattle. Somerset did not pursue him further, but left him a message as to the effect that he was to remove his kraals to Donkerhoek on the opposite side of the boundary. ¹ No evidence could be found that Grobie complied with Somerset’s wishes or that any further steps were taken to settle the matter. However, this incident had made it abundantly clear that whether the Cape Government favoured the extension of British control over the Stormberg area or not, it was no longer possible to ignore events in this area.

While there is no evidence that the crisis in Kamboekieland reacted directly on the tension in the Fish River area, there is evidence that the crisis there reacted on the Stormberg area. Cattle thieving however, was considered a normal risk of frontier life, and it is doubtful whether the Cape authorities would ever have displayed active concern over the farmers in this far-off corner, had the conditions there not been brought into focus by the dramatic turn of events on the eastern frontier at the end of 1834.

Between 1819 when Somerset had annexed the land between the Fish and Keiskamma River as a “neutral belt”, ² and the outbreak of the Sixth Frontier War in December 1834, a whole series of experiments had


been made in trying to find a workable formula which would regulate interaction on the frontier zone.

In January 1834, Sir Benjamin D'Urban arrived to face the task of establishing the new Legislative Council System, to direct the process of slave emancipation, and to try to stabilize the frontier by the conclusion of a series of treaties with chiefs beyond the borders of the Colony. If his delay in Cape Town was in these circumstances unavoidable, this does not alter the conclusion that the delay and disappointment at his non-arrival on the eastern frontier, helps to explain the war of 1834. Of all the many complex causes of that war, the determinant of action was probably the wounding of an ama-Gaika chief, Xoxo, by a military commando, and the basis of the conflict was the land question. Conflict, though sharp, was quickly ended, and by April 1835, D'Urban planned the first scheme for a settlement which envisaged the extension of the boundaries as far as the Kei River, and the expulsion of all Xhosa chiefs west of this river. On 10th May 1835, D'Urban proclaimed that he defeated and dispersed the aggressive Gaika and Tsambie chiefs; that Hintsa had accepted his terms of peace, and to protect the Colony against "such unprovoked aggressions which can only be done by removing these irreclaimable savages to a safer distance" the offending tribes were "forever expelled beyond the Kei River, which was hereafter to be the boundary of the Cape Colony."¹

The impracticability of this arrangement was soon proved as the chiefs refused to be driven across the Kei River. In September the Governor modified his system. He now made treaties with the Gaika, 

Islamie and Congo chiefs whereby the territory between the Kei and Keiskamma River, the so-called Province of Queen Adelaide, was to remain British territory, but the chiefs were allowed to reside therein as British subjects under the laws of the Colony.

Inevitably the Stormberg area, itself torn by tribal feuds on the one hand, and cattle raiding on the other, was caught up in some phases of the conflict.

Even though officially Mapassa remained neutral in the war, his conduct was never absolutely above suspicion. In a recent work on the Moravian Missionary Society, Dr B. Krüger states that the Xhosa chiefs had secretly decided that Mapassa's Tambookies should remain neutral.¹ This implies some secret complicity on the part of Mapassa. Most likely his lands became hiding places for cattle stolen from the Colony by the warring tribes. The fact remains that his disposition towards the Colony and the strength of his tribe was not known with certainty, and his people took every opportunity to steal cattle wherever they could.²

Frontier experience had proved that cattle-lifting led to raids and counter-raids that in the end culminated in armed conflict. Experience likewise had shown that where whites and blacks lived in close proximity, cattle-thieving as well as tribal and inter-tribal clashes sooner or later called for official interference. Thus, when Mapassa in March 1834 complained about aggressive acts by the Islamie chiefs against his tribe,³ it was already clear that the Tambooke frontier

²Gory III, p. 249.
³Ibid.
would not be seen as separate from the complex eastern frontier situation. As the year went on, Mapassa's complaints increased, and after the war he openly stated that without British protection he was a dead man.\(^1\) To D'Urban the inclusion of Mapassa's territory must thus have seemed to be practical politics.

In October 1835 Colonel Somerset met Mapassa at Shiloh, and informed him that "the Governor was willing to receive him and his tribe under British protection provided that he abstained from depredations on the colonists...that they obey orders of the Governor...that they abstain from connections against us [the colony] with the Kaffir tribes...or from listening to all proposals of war, plunder or depredations upon the Colony...." It was further put to Mapassa that should he not adhere to the agreement he would be driven over the Kei. Mapassa replied that "he was under the Government, and that it was his wish to live peacefully under the Government and that without British protection he would be a dead man."\(^2\)

Mapassa must have thought every man's hand was against him. There were still echoes of the feud with the Galola Thembu; there was the ambivalence of his attitude towards the war of December, 1834; there was likewise the war of the Griqua raids; though had he realised it, the colonial treaty with Waterboer would check this. He was simply not equal to the situation, and this was what he implied when he said that, without British protection, he was a dead man. The words were given a completely different interpretation by Reverend Hans Hallbeck when, in 1836 he gave evidence before the Aborigines Committee. He

\(^1\) PP. 252, 1835, Enclosure 4 in no. 3, Government Notice, 8th Dec. 1835.

\(^2\) Ibid.
referred to a letter by Mr Bonatz, one of the signatories of the treaty between Somerset and Mapassa. In his letter Bonatz, according to Hallbeck, declared that Somerset arrived at Shiloh with 300 to 400 armed men and advised Mapassa that it was in his interest to become an ally of the Colony or else he would be removed beyond the White Kei. Mapassa, according to Bonatz, then said that he could not choose but to enter into the treaty "because he was a dead man". When Hallbeck was asked how he would interpret Mapassa's words, he replied: "I do not know, except that he was too weak to resist, considering the force that was before him." Asked where the letter of Bonatz was, Hallbeck answered: "In Africa".\(^1\) It is true that Somerset took with him all his disposable Burgher forces so as to make a powerful appearance, but there is no reason to accept Hallbeck's interpretation of Mapassa's words. Mapassa regarded Somerset's display of force as a safeguard. For although Mapassa was an important chief of the Tambookies he did not possess the strength or the personality to hold his own against stronger chiefs.

After having settled matters on the Tambookie frontier, D'Urban next wanted to stabilize matters on the northern boundary. He was of the opinion that this could best be done by extending the frontier as far as the Orange River, which would form a distinct frontier borderline. Support for his plans came from across the Stormberg Spruit where the expatriated farmers, in view of the increased depredations ever since the trouble on the Black Kei started, had realized the vulnerability of their position. Although they regularly did military service along the Klaus Smits River and paid their taxes,\(^2\) they were

\(^1\) Select Committee on Aborigines, 1836, pp. 337-338, Q.3044-3059.

\(^2\) Q.C. 2756, J. Ziervogel to Capt. Campbell, 26th June 1835.
living on extra-colonial territory with no claim to Government protection in the event of war. They now availed themselves of every opportunity to have their case laid before the Governor.

The case of these farmers was adequately laid before the Governor in June 1835 by J.P. Ziervogel, the Assistant-Civil Commissioner of Somerset. In a detailed report to the Governor he pointed out that the position was such that disputes could at any time arise between the farmers and the Kaffirs and the results for the Colony would be disastrous. There were thus two possible alternatives: either they could be compelled to return to the Colony, or the boundaries of the Colony could be extended to the Orange and Kraai River. The first possibility, according to Ziervogel, could not be adopted without considerable disadvantages to the emigrant farmers as well as to the colonial landowners. When the farmers had first moved across the Stormberg Spruit, they had few cattle, but the numbers by 1835 had increased considerably, and the little land they previously had in the Colony was now fully stocked by others, consequently they would have nowhere to go. Thus in Ziervogel's opinion the only sensible thing to do was to extend the boundary to the Kraai River, a strong stream of fine water that would be a clear boundary line.1

The annexation of Queen Adelaide had raised the hope that the Governor would extend his policy of annexation as far as the Orange River, but in the course of 1835 the farmers were disheartened by rumours that this was not going to happen. In their distress they found sudden support from the Reverend John Ayliff, a Wesleyan missionary, who was held in high esteem by the Dutch farmers—among other reasons for the very good command he had of their language. In

1Ibid.
a letter written to the Grahamstown Journal, in April 1844, when the Stormberg issue was being revived as a means of attacking the Stockenström pattern by praising the defunct D'Urban scheme, Ayliff gave a detailed account of his involvement in the Stormberg issue. He wrote: "Some time at the beginning of 1835 during the Kaffir War, business called me into the interior of the Colony, and a short distance beyond its boundary. In the course of my journey, while in the neighbourhood of the Witte Berge and the Kye Rivers (sic) I met with many young families who told me in a tone of great sorrow that they had been informed that the Government had resolved that the tract of country in their occupation could not be included within the limits of the Colony, and that no more taxes were to be received from them. They assured me that they would very willingly purchase the places on which they resided—all they required was to be considered as part of the Colony. They begged me to lay their case before the governor, who was at that time in Grahamstown, and several wrote petitions or letters on the subject to him of which I was bearer. On leaving they requested me as to ascertain if farms were to be purchased in the Colony, and accordingly on my way I made every inquiry without success, as places were not then (I speak positively) to be had at any price. On my arrival at Grahamstown I waited upon Capt. (now Sir) J.E. Alexander and who having heard my statement asked me if I had any objections to represent the whole to Sir Benjamin D'Urban....

Accordingly the next day I was admitted to an interview with Sir Benjamin."¹ Ayliff then very eloquently laid the case of the

farmers before the Governor, who remarked that he would have undertaken the journey to the north-east, but that public duties precluded it. Ayliff then suggested that Colonel Somerset should be sent on such a mission.

D'Urban readily accepted the advice, and Somerset was sent on behalf of the Governor. The definite date of this second visit could not be established, but presumably it was in June 1835, after Ziervogel's report had reached the Governor. In the name of the Governor, Somerset assured the farmers that they would not be removed from their farms and he encouraged them to improve their farms.¹

Taking into account the fact that D'Urban had no official sanction for his annexation scheme, this action was presumptuous, if not irresponsible. Moreover, it seems as if he had not only given an oral assurance, but that he in fact issued "titles". In evidence before the Albert Land Commission, F. Ullman, for instance, claimed that he like many others had received a title form from Somerset for the farm Klaplaatfontein, while G. Kruger stated that he received a "note" in 1835 from Somerset.²

D'Urban's plan for a bold strategy of annexation would have depended for its efficiency on two factors: first, a sustained and equitable policy of imperial rule with more emphasis on civil than military rule. The second factor is logically a pre-condition of the first, namely the willingness of the British Government to undertake a consistent policy of reconstruction. But Sir Benjamin's extraordinary despatch, dated the 17th September 1835, reached Glenclog only

¹G.T.J., 25th April 1844.
²D.S.C.E.T., M.A.I.C., Claim 5.
in January 1836. By that time Glenelg had already despatched his reply to D'Urban's May policy. This despatch, while not demanding categorically a retreat to the territorial status quo, made three things very clear: in the first place, official attention was confined to the traditional "coastal" frontier, the lands between the Fish, Keiskamma and Kei River. Nothing was said about the Stormberg area. Secondly, an explanation of the origin of the war was ascribed mainly to the blunders of authorities in the Colonial Offices of London and Cape Town, and, finally, Glenelg's dismay at the tone of D'Urban's despatch mounted to the level of a reproof.

Meanwhile on the 14th October, 1835, D'Urban had declared the north-eastern boundary of the Colony to be a line from the source of the Kei River in the Stormberg to the source of the Kraai River on the northern side of the same range, thence along the left bank of the Kraai to the Orange River and from this river to the junction of the Stormberg Spruit.

The crisis in the Colony coincided with a period in Britain when economists and humanitarians alike were influencing the British Government against expansion of British rule. Faced by an ebbing treasury, the British Government did not see its way open in 1834 to annex the harbour of Natal with its obvious strategic and commercial possibilities because it would be too costly to sustain the hundred men that would be needed for the protection of the harbour. D'Urban's

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1 Glenelg's dispatch was sent off in Dec. 1835. Its receipt was formally acknowledged on 23rd March 1836. See Macmillan, p. 154.

2 EP. 279, 1835, Enclosure 10 in no. 9. See map 3.

3 J.S. Calbreith, Reluctant Empire, (California, 1963), p. 133.
annexation of a vast, under-developed and economically poor area with an extended frontier to be protected, offered nothing to warrant a deviation from the declared policy.

But if the economists frowned on the annexations, the humanitarians were equally alarmed by the rumours that were filtering through during the months that the Colonial Office was waiting for D'Urban's report on the exact nature of his settlement. The men who held the key positions in the Colonial Office at this time had for years been closely associated with the philanthropic movement. Lord Glenelg, who became Secretary of State for the Colonies in May 1835, was an Evangelical, closely associated for many years with the philanthropical movements in Britain. Closely associated with him was the influential Member of Parliament, Thomas Fowell Buxton, who from 1824 onwards was recognized leader of the anti-slavery groups in the House of Commons. Having achieved the emancipation of slaves, Buxton now turned his attention to aborigines throughout the British Empire, and it was at his instigation that a Select Committee, that met for the first time in July 1835, had been appointed to investigate among other questions the policy pursued towards the native races of the Cape Frontier.

Buxton himself was appointed chairman of the committee.

Among the many people who gave evidence before this committee, was one man whose experience of frontier affairs exceeded that of all the others, Andries Stockenström. Having been brought up in Graaff-Reinet where his father was Landdrost, he was appointed in 1815 to the same position in this turbulent district. On the abolition of the Landdroost system in 1828 he was Commissioner-General of the Eastern districts, until 1833 when he resigned owing to his inability to work with the Governor, Sir Lowry Cole. In a frustrated mood he left for London where he was in due course introduced to the Buxton circle.
Obviously the humanitarian view of this frontierman impressed the philanthropists as, after Stockenström's departure to Sweden, T. Spring-Rice,\(^1\) was induced by Buxton to send him questionnaire on the relations of the Cape Colony with the native tribes. Stockenström's forthright answers to these questions, and later, in 1835, his testimonies before the *Aborigines Committee* enhanced his prestige in Downing Street.\(^2\) On frontier affairs he expressed views similar to those of the Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg who, according to Galbraith, has seen in Stockenström "a perfect instrument for the execution of his policy of retreat and retrenchment."\(^3\)

Accordingly in January 1836, Stockenström was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the eastern districts, and on the 18th July he arrived at the Cape to take up his new post. In this capacity he was instructed to implement the Glenelg system. This system briefly meant that the old boundaries of 1829 were resumed, the chiefs were to be freed from their allegiance to the Queen, and treaties were to be made with the border chiefs.

In a way the Sixth Xhosa War and the D'Urban and Glenelg policies marked the end of an era in the history of the Stormberg area. In the fifteen years since European immigration across the Stormberg Spruit had started, this area at times seemed like an island, cut off from the mainland of troubles. Now the annexation and retrocession of both Tambookie and white territory had drawn this area, too, into

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\(^1\)Spring-Rice, Thomas, Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 5th June - 14th Nov. 1834.


\(^3\)Galbraith, p. 133.
the main stream of frontier politics and controversies. Reactions to the Stockenström treaties were to be sharp and bitter.
CHAPTER III

THE CRUCIAL DECADE: REACTION TO THE STOCKENSTRÖM TREATIES ON THE NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER

The proposal to make treaty agreements with chiefs beyond the borders of the Colony had been considered first by Lord Stanley in 1833. When eventually in 1836 the policy was carried through by Stockenström, circumstances had changed. The war of December 1834, had been a traumatic experience: the annexation and retrocession of the Province of Queen Adelaide had first roused, then blocked European expectations of territorial advance and the imagined security it would bring. Most European colonists in the eastern districts disliked both the treaty system and its author. By contrast, C.J. Stretch, Resident Agent with the Gaika tribes, was convinced that in their original form the treaties were operable provided there had been the necessary civilian and military supervision on the European side of the boundary.  

It was here then in the areas adjacent to the old boundary and more exposed to problems of straying cattle as well as cattle rustling, that the more obvious points of friction were to arise in the decade 1836 - 1846.

The situation on the north-eastern frontier was rather ignored at the time, and has been rather neglected ever since. Yet the position in the Tamboukie area, though included in the Stockenström treaties, was very different. Administrative fumbling more than anything else seems to explain why sections of the Thambo people who had...
been neutral in December 1835, were deeply involved in the war of 1846.

Before dealing with the developments on the Tamboekie frontier, it is necessary to focus the attention on the expatriate farmers across the Stormberg Spruit. The return to the pre-war frontier of 1829 which followed in 1836 from the reversal of D'Urban's policy, meant the abandonment of sovereignty over the area between the Stormberg Spruit and the Kraai River. This exposed, but did nothing towards solving the problems of the farmers who had settled in this area since 1822.

During the years of their isolated trek to this far-off corner these farmers were seldom directly affected by the great political and social issues of the day. They were geographically remote from the centres of controversy, and their relative isolation led them to oversimplify what were in fact complex situations.

Colonel Henry Somerset's assurance in 1834 that the claims to their lands would be recognized was followed by the formal annexation of the area between the Stormberg Spruit and the Kraai River by D'Urban in 1835. From the farmers' point of view the annexation was the formal implementation of the previous promise. More: it was made in the name of the Crown, and thus considered to be a final act.

It is then understandable that the reversal of D'Urban's policy had thrown them into a state of despair. However, the real bitterness resulted from what was probably a misunderstanding, namely that their lands would be ceded in particular to Mapasa who had no valid claim to the area. Feelings ran so high that many of these farmers who, up to now, were indifferent to the Great Trek, decided to join the emigration movement.

\[\text{supra}, \text{pp. 54-60.}\]
Unfortunately, evidence as to the exact nature of Stockenström's negotiations with these farmers is tantalizingly scanty, and the little we have comes from sources, the objectivity of which is questionable. An examination of available evidence will reveal that most of the letters relative to this question were written by Wesleyan missionaries, and were published in The Grahamstown Journal. With regard to this it is necessary to note that, especially after 1834, there was a very close connection between the Colonists, the Wesleyan Church and The Grahamstown Journal. Robert Godlonton, a staunch Wesleyan who became Editor of The Journal in 1834, was a British settler himself, and in the turbulent years following the Sixth Xhosa War his paper took up the cudgel on behalf of the Colonists and the discredited Sir Benjamin D'Urban.

When, after 1840, opposition to the treaties began to mount, The Grahamstown Journal published some articles (ascribed by J.C. Chase to Reverend John Ayliff) "to show the world the despotic authority with which they (the Stormberg farmers) were treated, and the kind of person employed to supersede the measures of the benevolent Sir Benjamin D'Urban". In these articles Ayliff raked up the Stormberg controversies and, with special reference to the farmers who were said to have left this area after abandonment, he wrote in 1843: "Many of those who had perished in Natal are such as might not only have been spared, but would never have left the Colony had they not been as good as driven from it". The sequence to this article was published in April the

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2. Same, p. 56, footnote 1.
3. J.T.J., 14th Dec. 1843.
following year, and in this he elaborated on his statement: "Matters were in this state — the country (e.g. across the Stormberg Spruit) vastly improved and the people peacefully settled when Sir Andries Stockenström arrived and in his usual arbitrary manner announced that the solemn assurance of Sir Benjamin D'Urban would not be ratified, that their claim for land would not be admitted, but that it was to be ceded to Mapassa, a Tambookie chief, who never had any right to it or occupied it at any previous period. Such an act of injustice might appear incredible, but such is the fact". The tone of the letter, and certain recurring phrases, e.g. that "the farmers were constrained to quit their homes, to abandon for ever the land of their birth and plunge into the wilderness", do not only correspond with those used by the farmers in a petition sent to Stockenström in 1837, but also with those of another Wesleyan minister, William Boyce. In his Notes on South African Affairs, published in 1838, Boyce relates what he called "Stockenström's zeal to distinguish his administration by cession of land" which would then have motivated him to "present the Tambookies with a tract of country between the Stormberg Spruit and Kraai River which never belonged to them...the Boers were ordered out of the country which to this day remains unoccupied." Like Ayliff and the petitioning farmers he then points out that the Tambookies had no claim to the lands as they never lived there. In his Natal Papers, J.C. Chase quotes a letter written, according to him by "an Englishman who regretted and foretold the results we now experience, but who

1Ibid., 25th April 1844.

was treated with levity as "a prophet accursed for ever boding ill." There can be little doubt that this letter was written either by Boyce or Ayliff. As it so clearly reflects the attitude of the farmers as witnessed by the missionaries, the part dealing with the Stormberg issue is quoted here in full: "Generally speaking all the farmers who received grants of land from His Excellency Sir Benjamin D'Urban, between the Stormberg Spruit and Kraai River, have 'trekked', and I have learned from members of them that not one would have left, had they not been ordered off by the Lieutenant Governor when he ceded the land to the Tamboki Kaffirs (sic). Now the Tambokas had just as much right to the country as the Pascha of Egypt had to the Falkland Islands, and the Lieutenant-Governor had just as much right to cede the country to them as your humble servant. The short of the story is, there has been no nation inhabiting that tract of country within the memory of the oldest colonist on the frontier, nor can it be ascertained that any people with the exception of a few wandering Bushmen and runaway Hottentots, have ever resided between these two rivers. The kafirs themselves to whom the ground has been given, admit freely that they cannot and will not live there, want of bush prevents them, and now that the colonists have left it, it will become as before — a rendezvous for murderers and thieves.... The Boers who resided there, had constructed dams at the different spruits so as to ensure in the long droughts a constant supply of water. They had built good houses, brought the ground under tillage, made gardens and rendered their places of some value."²

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² Ibid.
It will be noted from the last two quotations that Stockenström was actually accused of having evicted farmers already settled. This remains non-proven. The farmers' own petition of 1st March 1837, bears evidence to the contrary. "Your memorialists", they wrote, "are in number about 50 families unwilling to leave their fatherland and paternal homes, but under new arrangements what can they do? They were making preparations for migrating with other farmers when they were persuaded by Christiaan van Niekerk\(^1\) that it was better for them to remain under a firm government." Neither does Stockenström's reply warrant the accusation that he "ordered them off". In fact he advised them "gradually to return to the Colony."\(^2\) The allegation that the country was now completely uninhabited is also contradicted by the above memorial as well as by a further memorial signed in June 1844, by 73 farmers.\(^3\)

Stockenström was certainly in a difficult position. D'Urban had acted without prior consultation and the British Government had decided against annexation. Hence Stockenström had no option but officially to withdraw sovereignty over the area. It is however doubtful whether he had any intention of ceding the land to Mapassa. He would indeed not have been justified in doing so. Once the Colonial Government had abandoned the area, it had no right to cede it to anybody.

In the treaty of January 1837, between Mapassa and Stockenström there moreover is nothing to justify a belief that Stockenström "gave"

\(^1\)C. van Niekerk was a farmer who resided near the Kraai River. He was one of the signatories to the petition, and at that stage he obviously hoped that the petition might lead to the reversal of the abandonment.

\(^2\)The petition of the farmers as well as Stockenström's reply was published by Rev. Ayliff in C.T.J. of 25 April 1844.

\(^3\)Noordwaartse Bewering, p. 337.
the lands to the Tambookie chief. Mapassa acknowledged that he
occupied the country between the Stormbergen and Kaffraria which
adjoined the eastern frontier of the Colony. He further agreed that
the boundary between the Colony and his territory would be "the
Black Kei from its source in the Winterberg down to the conical hill
called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called
Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smits River, and thence the latter
river to its source in that kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called Duffels
Hoek."¹ No northern boundary is mentioned, but once sovereignty
was withdrawn over the Stormberg area it would ipso facto become once
again a no man's land. As it adjoined Mapassa's territory, nobody
would legally have had the right to stop him from settling there.
The problem that Stockenström had to face, thus becomes clear. He
was instructed to retrocede the lands D'Urban had annexed: this meant
withdrawing sovereignty over Tamboockies and farmers alike. If he had
attempted to retain control over the area between the Stormberg Spruit
and Kraai River there would be a semi-detached splinter of colonial
land. This would be bordered on the south by an independent Tambookie
chief of doubtful allegiance. The Colonial Government would be res-
ponsible for the protection of this thinly-scattered population that
Stockenström knew — from experience acquired over long years of
association with frontier affairs — would continue to expand. "If I
could see a chance", he wrote in November 1836 to D'Urban, "that the
extension of the north-eastern border up to the Gray's River could put
a stop to encroachments, I should readily concede to the point; but
the farmers are scattered far beyond it, and Government would have to

¹See Appendix 4.
follow indefinitely." It will be noticed that he does not even mention the possibility of ceding the territory to Mapassa.

It would seem then that Stockenström's object was the limited one of redefining the old colonial boundary, and that he had justifiable reasons for doing so. But Stockenström was known to be tactless and abrupt, and his authoritarian manner often obscured the wisdom of his actions. Here was an example. He was dealing with people, some of whom had been established on their farms for fifteen years. After long years of uncertainty they had assumed that they were under the paternal care of the Colonial Government. It seems clear from documents, already quoted, that no attempt was made at any point to explain to the farmers the difficulties that probably would have arisen if sovereignty had been maintained. The tone of Stockenström's reply to the petition of 1837 was abrupt and hectoring: "There is no power in this colony which can comply with the prayer of the memorialists and if they really believe in the paternal feelings for which they give the Governor credit, they will take his advice and gradually return to the Colony, for if they emigrate into the interior they will have ample cause to repent it when it is too late." Constitutionally he was correct, but the tone of the letter reveals an insensitiveness to the real problems that would beset farmers if they were to decide to return to the Colony. The bitter tone of complaint

1 Stock. Auto., p. 72.


3 C.T.J., 25th April 1844.

4 Supra, p. 55 for Ziervogel's report.
in the letters quoted above, even if unwarranted, is understandable.

Stockenström's attitude was in part a matter of acting on instructions, in part a matter of expediency in particular circumstances. He was no sentimentalist and with clear-sighted logic he explained in a letter to D'Urban the situation that would arise should Mapassa remain a British subject. "The chief Mapassa is an apathetic barbarian equally afraid of the colonists and the Kaffirs and the Bushmen, and values British sovereignty only in so far as it may prove a protection against his enemies. He is as anxious as the kaffir chiefs to have the smelling dance against witchcraft re-established to its fullest extent. Such men I humbly submit, it will be difficult to rule by our laws, in our and their present circumstances." 1 Here he put his finger on the nub of the problem. On the one hand, beyond the border, were the problems of inter-tribal politics; on the other hand, within the border, in the shadow of the Colonial Government there was the double uncertainty of colonial attitudes on the spot, and the formulation of a policy in Britain. As late as 1883, Reverend H.B. Warner put it crudely in his evidence before the Commission on Native Laws and Customs: "Unstable as water, the Cape Government will never excel in Kafir policy." 2 In addition to the factor of vacillation, was the realization frankly admitted by Stockenström that an intelligible forward policy was "too colossal a task for our means." 3


3 Stock. Auto., p. 72.
The status quo was then legally restored, and Stockenström rounded off the treaty policy by making the last of the treaties with Kaffir chiefs, with Mapassa, on the 16th January 1837. Basically the treaties were aimed at bringing about a more amicable relationship between the Colonists and the independent chiefs. Diplomatic Agents were appointed with each tribe, and provision was made for a set of carefully enunciated rules whereby mutual restitution of stolen cattle could be brought about without the friction that accompanied the old "spoorstelsel". ¹ Henry Fynn was appointed Diplomatic Agent to the Tambookies with residence at Tarka Post.

The Stockenström policy had a very brief period in which to develop under his guidance. In June 1838, the Lieutenant Governor left the Cape following his loss of a libel suit against Colonel Campbell, Civil Commissioner of Albany, who had accused him of having murdered a kaffir in 1819. Lord Glenelg refused to accept Stockenström's resignation, but in August 1839, after a change of government in Britain, he was dismissed by Lord Normandy. Whether the treaties would in the end have proved successful had Stockenström had the time and means to develop his ideas, is problematic. The seven years following his dismissal, saw the revision of the treaty pattern by Sir George Napier in 1841, followed in 1844 by Sir Peregrine Maitland's new treaties. Two years later the whole eastern frontier was plunged into a war.

It is necessary to examine here the development of the treaty system, and to establish to what extent it contributed to Mapassa's participation in the war of 1846.

Stockenström maintained that Mapassa participated because he had

¹See Appendix 4.
never forgiven the annexation of his lands by D'Urban in 1835.\(^1\) This, however, is a debatable point. At the time of annexation Mapassa felt threatened by the surrounding tribes, and he welcomed British protection.\(^2\) But, even if he was not sincere in his acceptance of D'Urban's proposals, it is most unlikely that a brief annexation of 13 months could have caused so much bitterness that he wished to revenge himself by partaking in a war, ten years after his lands had been restored to him. What may be true, though, is that the recollection that his lands had once been annexed would have made him more sensitive to the threat of retribution in article 3 of the Stockenström and Napier treaties that stated that the Lieutenant Governor on behalf of the King undertook "not to molest the said chief (Mapassa) or tribe (Tambookies) or cause him or them to be molested in the possession of the said territory, or to lay claim to any part thereof, provided the said chief or tribe do not in any way disturb the peace of the colony, or molest the inhabitants therein; and provided also the said chief and tribe shall strictly adhere to the terms of this treaty."\(^3\) (My underlining.) The words underlined imply that the chief could lose his lands should he not comply with the terms of the treaty. There were similar stipulations in the treaties with other chiefs, and an uneasy feeling over the land question became conspicuous amongst all the chiefs especially after Stockenström's dismissal in 1839. The general belief was that the farmers made use of unfounded accusations and

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\(^1\)Report of the Select Committee on the Kaffir Tribes, London, 1851, p. 444, Q.3293.

\(^2\)Supra, p. 54.

\(^3\)See Appendix 4.
rumours in an attempt to get hold of tribal lands.\textsuperscript{1} Commenting on this state of affairs, Stretch pointed out that if the tendency of Colonists to spread rumours was not suppressed, "the time may not be distant...when an unparalleled scene of bloodshed and waste of treasure will be the result, for the kaffirs generally believe it is the desire of the Colonists to possess their country."\textsuperscript{2} Although there is no evidence of any rumours maliciously spread against the Tambookies, there can be little doubt that Mapassa had always been affected by unrest amongst the other tribes as he had been in fairly close contact with the Geikas, and their apprehension would have made him aware of his own vulnerable position.

In the months following his appointment as Diplomatic Agent to the Tambookie tribes, Henry Fynn reported that depredations had increased. For this he first blamed the Colonists. The Boers, he maintained, were unwilling to adhere to the treaty, while others professed their ignorance of the contents. He even went so far as to accuse the Boers of intentional delay to report losses until it was too late to secure redress. The loss would then be blamed on the Government whose alleged failure to make redress was used to induce farmers to join the Great Trek. Furthermore, many servants stayed behind on the farms evacuated by the Voortrekkers, and these servants stole cattle which they then conveyed to the Tambookie territory.\textsuperscript{3}

However, the two underlying causes of the failure of the treaties soon became evident. Firstly, in making the treaty with Mapassa, the

\textsuperscript{1} crankshaw, Diary of C.L. Stretch, pp. 126-128.

\textsuperscript{2} P.k., t24, 1851, Enclos. in no. 31, Stretch to Hudson, 16th April 1842.

\textsuperscript{3} L.C. 403, no. 24, p. 115, Fynn to Hudson, 2nd Nov. 1840.
complex tribal politics of the Tembookies were not taken into account. Mapassa's tribe was separated from the main body of the Thembu tribe at the Bashee River, where, until 1844, Vudana was acting as regent for the paramount chief, Untiruru. Although Mapassa was generally acknowledged as chief of the Emigrant Thembu 1 his hegemony was not complete. Several small clans refused to accept his chieftainship, and in case of interference from Mapassa's side they made appeal to Vudana. Others acknowledged him only as long as he connived at their thieving. The minor chief, Patoo, for instance, left in 1836 after C.L. Stretch, took cattle from him and handed them over to Mapassa. Patoo joined the ranks of Deneese, a Tembooke chief, who acknowledged no power and with whom Mapassa lived in enmity. Ever so often stolen cattle were found with Deneese, but according to the treaty Mapassa was responsible. Not only was he responsible for acts committed by Tembookies, but article 5 of the treaty bound him to recognize the Bushmen within his territory as the original owners of the soil, and "to be responsible for all their acts, in the same manner as he binds himself by this treaty for the acts of the Tembookies." 2 There were always hostilities between the Bushmen and the Tembookies, and it needs little imagination to appreciate the difficulties Mapassa would have experienced in controlling a people whose whole way of life differed so greatly from that of the Nguni. 3

Mapassa's dilemma was aggravated by the geographical position of his lands. These lands lay like a peninsula in a sea of marauders.

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1 Supra, p. 16, footnote 2.
2 See Appendix 4.
3 For economic and social structure of the Bushmen, see Oxford, pp. 47-53; for structure of Nguni society, see Oxford, pp. 116-130.
To the north was, of course, the apple of discord, the Stormberg area, which, as the missionaries had correctly pointed out, after retrocussion became a rendezvous for thieves and murderers. One typical report from that area will suffice to show to what extent disorder reigned there: "For some time past the country beyond the North-eastern boundary in the neighbourhood of the Kraai River had been the scene of a continual series of foray between the Kaffirs, Tembookies, Bechuanas and other native tribes. In course of disturbances colonial forces have been robbed of their horses and cattle. In the middle of July 100 Tembookies and Kaffirs, many of them armed with guns, passed through that country to attack the Bechuanas. They then turned round and fell upon the cattle and horses of the Trek Boers."1

The Bechuanas to whom reference is made here, contributed to the unstable conditions on the northern boundary. Like other people, they had been scattered mainly to the westward, and harassed by the Fetics. In 1835, when D'Urban annexed the territory across the Stormberg Spruit, an isolated Bechuan chief, Kapyn, and an estimated 1 000 followers were allowed to settle in a corner near the head of the Kraai River, called Donkerhoek. Between them and Jalousa, an uncle of Hintsza, there was a strong feeling of enmity which resulted in repeated attacks by Jalousa on the Bechuanas enclave. In course of these attacks Jalousa had to pass through Temboekie country, and this invariably caused commotions. Attacks on Donkerhoek were facilitated by a large tract of almost uninhabited land behind the Temboekie country. To the south and south-east there were equally large tracts of waste lands, and among the few Temboekie chiefs on Mapasa's immediate eastern border were those who did not acknowledge his authority.

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1G.T.J., 17th Aug. 1837.
The real paradise for marauders from other tribes was the uninhabited land east of the Winterberg and between the Tambockies and the Gaikas.

It would seem then that the system envisaged by Stockenström, even as modified by Napier and Maitland, was inoperable in this area. Geography, ethnography, and the patterns of tribal alliance and enmities militated against it.

In effect, a Diplomatic Agent was at once a spectator of intertribal forces at work, and an arbitrator between the chief in whose territory he served and the Colony. That the Diplomatic Agent succeeded even to a limited extent, depended on his skill and patience within his territory. He had neither bureaucratic nor military support either on the spot or within easy call. It had been stressed repeatedly by Fynn as well as by Stretch that the treaties could only have been upheld by an adequate military force. But in the 1840's the British Government was reluctant to extend its imperium in Africa, and moreover expected the colonial governments so far as possible to balance each its own budget. Not only was the military force inadequate, but in order to uphold the treaties, a strong police force was indispensable. Colonel Hare, Stockenström's successor, remarked that not soldiers, but police were needed as three times the military force then (in 1839) in the Colony would be found insufficient to put a stop to the kaffir's thieving. This is confirmed by Stretch's remark that the inadequacy of the police force was the greatest weakness of the

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1Napier, Sir George, Governor of the Cape Colony, 22nd Jan. 1839 - 16th March 1844. Maitland, Sir Peregrine, 1st March 1844 - 27th Jan. 1847.

2C.H. 8/5, no. 43, Hare to Napier, 21st Aug. 1839, quoted by Crankshaw in Diary of C.L. Stretch, p. 115.
treaty system. Thus the absurd position was that in the Colony a system, the sole success of which depended on police support, was upheld by an incredibly small force of sixty underpaid policemen. In December 1844 the police force had been reduced to forty men. Border control was mainly along the Fish frontier, and a very small part of this force was stationed in the north-east. In fact, even in 1848 after the eventual annexation of the territory between the Stormberg Spruit and the Kraai River by Sir Harry Smith, the Civil Commissioner, J.C. Chase, could not raise a police force and he had to depend on two Hottentot constables and two outcasts who had sought refuge in the Stormberg, and were promoted to the rank of constable, to maintain order in the Albert district. The Colonial Government thus carried the minimum share of responsibility for the prevention of theft and the tracing of stolen cattle. In effect, MacMillan implies, the chief and his amapakati were expected to maintain a quasi-police surveillance of the colonial boundary.

Towards 1839 Mapasela's attitude became remarkably unfriendly. This might have resulted from a feeling of frustration as he realized his inability to control his people as well as those for whom he was forced by the treaties to accept responsibility. It might be too that

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1C.L. Stretch, Memorandum on the Stockenstrum Treaty System XIX, ii, quoted by Crankshaw, p. 115.
2G.H. 8/9, no. 6, Hare to Napier, 12th Feb. 1840, quoted by Crankshaw, p. 116.
3P.P. 424, 1851, no. 50, Maitland to Stanley, 7th Dec. 1844.
4Ibid.
5Infra, p. 114.
6MacMillan, p. 264.
through his association with the Gaikas, he was influenced by the restlessess that became manifest amongst this tribe in 1859 when rumours were circulating that the popular Resident Agent, Stretch, was to be removed. These rumours followed on the dismissal of Stockenström as Lieutenant Governor.

Mapassa's initial reluctance to hand over stolen cattle, changed into flat refusal to do so. Sir George Napier, who had tried to preserve peace ever since he had become Governor in January 1838, was forced to take severe steps. He met Mapassa and Deneese in September of that year, and obtained a promise that redresses would be made. When they delayed to fulfill their promise, Colonel Hare entered Tambookieland with a detachment of the Cape Corps. The chiefs once more promised to make restitution within twenty-four hours. When this promise, too, was broken, Hare, who realized that the cattle had been driven to the uninhabited country beyond the mountains, gave orders that the required number of cattle should be seized from the Tambookies. More than 450 cattle were seized. Hare acted strictly within the letter of the treaty, and ordered the Resident Agent to take the exact number owed at a fair valuation and to return the rest.\(^1\) In some respects the treaty procedure, by its formality, was an improvement on the old commando system. It did not by-pass the chief, nor was action illegal in terms of the treaties. But as J.S. Galbraith points out "sporadic demonstrations by military parties... contributed to war. They were actions against a people and their chief and not against an individual thief on the assumption that the depredations could be committed only with the tacit approval of the tribe."\(^2\)

\(^{1}\)Appendix 5, no. 21.  
Napier tried to make the Stockenström treaties work more effectively by revising them. Since the Great Trek had revolutionized the political geography of Southern Africa, Napier's main preoccupation was with the problems of the lands further afield. The annexation of Natal had reacted on the existing unrest across the Orange River. Although from different points of view, both the Wesleyan and the London Missionary Societies appealed for British intervention there. This took the form of "limited liability" treaties concluded with Adam Kok, the Griqua leader at Phillopolis, Moshesh, the Basutu chief, and the Pondo chief, Faku. However, the northern treaties, designed to ensure territorial stability, were different from the Stockenström treaties. In the case of the East Cape frontiers, Napier sought only revision of the existing treaties with a view to making them more effective. But modification was in favour of the Colonists, and in part responsive to their clamour.\(^1\) Napier removed the prerequisite that cattle must be guarded, and modified the stipulation that pursuit must be immediate. Stockenström had strictly forbidden the pursuer to take any but his own identifiable property. Napier provided that alternative compensation, if offered, could be accepted. No proof was however required that the offer had been voluntarily made; hence the door to abuses, akin to those under the commando system, was wide open. In other ways, too, Napier went much further than Stockenström would have tolerated. He allowed the Diplomatic Agent to demand not only restitution for losses, but also for damages which the Diplomatic Agent was empowered to assess.

When Napier left the Colony in March 1844, matters on the frontier --- at a superficial view, seemed more tranquil than before, and from

\(^1\)See Appendices 4 and 5.
Fynn's reports he must have judged that his new treaties were working well. During 1843 Fynn reported nothing but tranquillity and the cessation of depredations. However, such assurances were premature. Under the seeming tranquillity a new set of conflicts were developing. On the western section of the Tambockie frontier where it marched with the Colony, black and white interests clashed. In the Tambockie territory itself there was increasing rivalry between Mapassa and the new paramount, Umhirara. Towards the east there was the simmering hostility between the Tambockies and the Gcaleka Xhosa.

It seems probable that tensions beyond the frontier added to the problems of interaction across the frontier. The Klaas Snit's River was by no means a satisfactory boundary between the Tambockies and the farmers. As a dividing line it did not prevent cattle theft and was no barrier to expansion and trespass. Few complaints, however, reached official ears. This was partly because of distance. Fynn, the Resident Agent for the Tambockies, resided sixty miles away at Tarka Post. The village of Cradock was even further away. It often happened that after a long journey to Tarka Post a farmer would find that the agent was officially occupied beyond the boundary, and that he had to wait for days to see him. Hence the farmers and Tambockies alike were inclined to settle differences among themselves.\(^1\) But undoubtedly the chief cause of disputes was to be blamed on ignorance on both sides as to what and where the boundary was. In fact, the Diplomatic Agent himself was not always sure whether farmers who applied to him for redresses were living in or beyond the Colony.\(^2\) This

\(^1\) O.H. 14/1, p. 17, Fynn's reports, 25th April - 11th May 1845.

\(^2\) Ibid.
unsatisfactory state of affairs was clearly illustrated when a boundary dispute arose in 1845 between Field Cornet Zacharias Pretorius of Tarika and the Tambookie chief, Chopo. Pretorius complained to Fynn that Tambookie cattle confiscated by him because they were grazing on his farm, were recaptured by armed Tambookies. Investigation showed that both parties were completely ignorant as to the boundaries, and an incredibly chaotic situation had arisen. The previous year Pretorius had bought a farm from a certain Martin who had left a couple of years earlier, leaving the farm unoccupied. While the farm was unoccupied Tambookie cattle grazed there as this farm adjoined the farm which the Tambookies had bought from a Mr. Roberts for an ox. Further investigation revealed that the lands that Roberts had 'sold' to them, actually belonged to the Tambookies. Matters were further complicated by the fact that Pretorius captured the Tambookie cattle at a time when Chopo's people expected an attack from Mapassa. As the cattle belonged to Chopo's kraal they immediately suspected Mapassa's people and planned a counter attack.\(^1\) The timely settlement of the dispute, though a final solution was not reached, averted a conflict between the two Tambookie tribes, but it was clear that black and white interests had been so intermingled that the smallest incident could have set the north-east frontier aflame.

Meanwhile disruptions within the Tambookie structure added to the crisis. Mapassa had for years played a lone hand. Diverted from the main Tambookie tribe, and linked by marriage to the Caikas, he had through the years become more and more associated with the latter tribe. Although the position of the paramount chief of the Thembus was quasi-

\(^1\)Ibid., Fynn's reports, 31st March 1845; 8th April 1845; 25th April 1845; Pretorius to Fynn, 31st March 1845.
political and more active than that, e.g. of the Ccaleka chiefs, the Emigrant Thembu seemed to have lived independently and only nominally acknowledged the paramountcy of the Thembu chief. The distance between the Emigrant Thembu and the main body at the Bashee might have accounted for this. However, the position changed in 1844 when Umtirara became paramount chief. Some years earlier, presumably in 1839, in consequence of attacks by the Pondo and Emaca, he had left his abode between the lower parts of the Untata and Bashee River and moved to the Black Kei River although a large number of his followers remained near the Clarkebury Mission Station at the Bashee River.

For the first time then a paramount Thembu chief became closely associated with the Emigrant Thembu, and when Sir Peregrine Maitland replaced the Stockenström and Napier treaties by new ones, he acknowledged the paramountcy of Umtirara by making the treaty with him and not with Mapassa. There are no proofs that, at this time, Mapassa defied Umtirara's authority; in fact he signed as his chief councillor. However, later events proved that his acknowledgement of Umtirara's authority was a matter of lip-service.

According to Cory Umtirara was "not a man of strong character, either good or bad and (he) had not the influence possessed by his sub-chief, Mapassa." But the implication that Umtirara lacked the vigour and resolution to control Mapassa, and that he thereby showed

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1 Memorandum to the Chief Magistrate of Untata in terms of Secretary for Native Affairs, minute no. 271/362, 4th Dec. 1957.
2 Theal III, p. 9.
3 G.H. 19/4, History of the Tambookie; Theal III, p. 9.
4 See Appendix 6.
5 Cory V, p. 476.
his inability to discard his titular responsibility, seems unjustifiable. Umtirara's position was certainly unenviable. Like his father, he believed in a pragmatic policy of goodwill towards the Colony, and he let no opportunity pass to win the approval of the Cape authorities. When, for instance, he left the Bashee River, he took with him a missionary, Reverend J.C. Warner, the uncrowned king of the Thembus; not so much for spiritual reasons, but because he hoped to win the support of the Government at that time. But Umtirara assumed paramountcy at a time when discontent was building up among the tribes, and the aggressive attitude of Mapassa would naturally have had a much stronger appeal to young malcontents. That under these circumstances Umtirara managed to retain the loyalty of the greater part of his tribe during the war, is proof enough of his ability as leader.

When Umtirara, then, became chief, events on the frontier were already pointing towards war. Maitland's new treaties had solved none of the frontier problems, but had in fact created suspicion and hostility, especially conspicuous among the Gaikas. In terms of these treaties a far greater liability was placed on the chiefs as they were not only bound to exert themselves to the utmost in the matter of apprehending thieves, but they were also made responsible wherever stolen property was traced into their territory. But discontent did not so much result from the content of the treaties which in reality differed very little from that of the Napier treaties. Historians are

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1 The Burton Papers, Glimpses of History, (MS 14, 636 in Cory Lib., Rhodes Univ.).

2 Crankshaw, Diary of C.L. Stretch, p. 57.

3 See Appendices 5 and 6.
in agreement that the frontier conditions after 1845 must be blamed on the way in which Maitland imposed his new system and the implied use of force to back this system. MacMillan accuses Maitland of having seen in the tribes nothing but a serious military danger, while Galbraith points out that the most significant distinction between the Stockenström and Maitland treaties was in spirit. "Maitland," he says, "had none of Stockenström's credentials, he had unilaterally repudiated an agreement, and imposed upon the tribes a new system backed by the force of military threat." Already in 1844 Reverend Calderwood had warned that the Maitland treaties was an act of war against the Gaikas, and that he feared the consequences of the Governor's injudicious conduct in suddenly breaking the Stockenström treaties.

As tension was building up among the Gaikas, both Mapassa and Umtirara were preparing a line of policy to follow in event of war, for they realized that any such war would affect their tribes whether they were officially neutral or active participants.

Umtirara saw the salvation of his tribe in an alliance with the Colonial Government. Apparently he had more in mind than just the safety of his people. A war in which he acted the faithful ally would give him the opportunity to incite the Government's feelings against Kreli, and in the end the longstanding boundary disputes between these two tribes could be decided in his favour. In the same way he could

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1 MacMillan, p. 264.
2 Galbraith, op. cit., p. 155.
3 Calderwood to Directors, L.M.S., 14th Nov. 1844 (L.M.S. Archives), quoted by Galbraith, p. 169.
4 The Balotto area was the bone of contention between these two tribes.
get hold of the land of the Bushmen chief, Mandoor with whom he had a similar dispute. But, most important of all, he could possibly get rid of his troublesome sub-chief, Mapassa whose continued stealing was becoming more and more an embarrassment to him.

Mapassa initially preferred to play a shrewder role. It seems as if, by prior arrangement with the Gaika, he would remain neutral in case of war. Neutrality would be a benevolent neutrality in which Mapassa's people would succour those who had taken the field, and at the same time receive into their care the booty carried off from the Colony. It is possible that he never had any active participation in the war in mind. But all the young men of the tribes were eager for war, and Mapassa found it more and more difficult to restrain his men.

The seventh major war on the eastern frontier broke out in April 1846. Ironically, because of the opening incident, this is popularly known as the War of the Axe; it would have been better called the war for land. Mapassa's official neutrality lasted a bare two months. It is doubtful whether he ever would have partaken actively at such an early stage of the war had it not been for two unfortunate incidents. H. Fynne, who was under the impression that the missionaries at Shiloh were in danger in July 1846, sent a large party of Bushmen to the missionary station, thereby ignoring the existing enmity between the Bushmen and the Tambookies. Mapassa took up a hostile attitude and the first fighting between the Thembu and the colonial forces — in this case loyal Fingo — broke out. Fuel was added to the fire by

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1 Cory IV, p. 476.
2 A Moravian Missionary Station established in 1828 when Bwana was chief of the Emigrant Thembu.
the murder of Aldum, a trader of Shiloh. This took place under the
following circumstances. Ferdinand Bona of Brak Kloof, apprehended
Tambookie trouble and sent his cattle to the grazing grounds round
Shiloh for protection, but as matters deteriorated he sent a messenger
to recover his cattle. When this man did not return in due course, he
himself, accompanied by six men among whom was Aldum, went to regain
his cattle. On their way back they were attacked by a hundred
Tambookies and Aldum was stripped and badly mutilated. It was believed
that the culprits belonged to the kraal of Mapassa's brother, Kapoma.
A company under Colonel Seagram and Field Cornet van Wyk proceeded to
the kraal where the alleged murderers of Aldum were residing. Kapoma
had left a few days before, and other Tambookies had occupied the
kraal. They had suffered for crimes of which they were innocent. The
already excited Tambookies could no longer be restrained.

For Mapassa the war was short and disastrous. It might seem as
if his participation with a force of 1500-2000 men could have had
little effect short of dividing the attention of the colonial forces.
It was, however, once again, a case of undercurrents directing the
course of the north-eastern frontier history. Umtirara waited for the
opportune moment, and while Mapassa was engaged with colonial forces,
he attacked him in the rear, seized about 4000 of his cattle (left
over from the original 12000) and broke his power temporarily.

Umtirara's action was a double triumph. For the time being it
broke the influence of Mapassa: thereby he solved what may be called
his internal problem. Equally important — even though he was suspected
of harbouring stolen cattle¹ — Umtirara had demonstrated loyalty to

¹Thiel VII, p. 32.
the colonial side; this he hoped would solve to his advantage the
problem of his external relations with the Colony. Sir Peregrine
Maitland was much impressed.

Maitland's plan for a settlement was very similar to D'Urban's
abortive system. The colonial boundary was to be formally extended
to the Keiskamma and Chumie River. Kaffraria, between Keiskamma and
the Kei was to be brought under the sovereignty of the Queen. The
whole of this area was to be divided into three parts, each ruled by
a magisterial commissioner. In the lower part of Kaffraria, the people
of the Xhosa chiefs such as Umhala and Pato were to be settled. The
middle sector was given to the Gaika and the upper part to the Tam-
bookies. The most significant point was that "the power of the chiefs
would be entirely done away with, excepting in Tambookieland where
Umtirara, for his faithfulness to the Colony, would have been allowed
to retain such a chieftain's power, as would not be inconsistent with
the paramount authority of the British magistrate."¹ This was not the
only favour that Maitland was willing to bestow on Umtirara. In December
1847 Umtirara met Maitland at Blockdrift where he implored the Governor
to take him under British protection. As reason for such a request he
pleaded the vulnerable position of his tribe after the war. He
admitted, too, that his Government was too weak to restrain the many
bad persons who were disposed to commit crimes and depredations.² Mait-
land was easily persuaded to recommend Umtirara's request.³ In his
draft proposal he defined the boundaries of this chief's country in

¹P.P., 312, 1849, no. 4, Maitland to Grey, 20th Jan. 1847.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
such a way that they included lands at that time occupied by both the Bushmen chief, Mandoor and the Goaleka chief, Kreli. Mandoor's original rights were to be placed in abeyance and he and his tribe would come within the stipulations of Umtirara's engagement.¹

In July 1846, Earl Grey ² succeeded W.E. Gladstone who had been Secretary of State for War and Colonies in Peel's government in succession to Viscount Stanley. Within six months, Maitland, who was weary of the war, and at seventy was feeling the effects of a lifetime of soldiering, resigned. He was succeeded by Sir Henry Pottinger, who added to his extensive powers, those of High Commissioner. But it was not so much the enlargement of his field of action, as his peremptory manner and impatience to be rid of his task, that determined the policy of Sir Henry Pottinger. It was this that reacted again to the disadvantage of the Tambookie. He could have had no clear grasp of the situation when in March 1847 he suggested to Grey the reversal of Maitland's Tambookie proposals made only two months earlier. He rejected the proposals to Umtirara as "an extra-ordinary and inadmissable scheme."³ He ruled that Umtirara's claim to the whole territory west of the Indwe River rested on no solid ground. Mandoor, the Bushmen chief ⁴ and chief Kreli of the Goalekas, he maintained, had counter

¹Ibid., no. 13, Pottinger to Grey, 13th March 1847.

²Grey, Earl Henry George, Viscount Howick, and third Earl Grey, Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 3 July 1846 - 27 Feb. 1852.

³EP. 912, 1843, no. 13, Pottinger to Grey, 13 March 1847.

⁴Mandoor, who was then living on the Cacado River, seems to have been wrongly called a Bushmen chief. He had gathered round him a small group of bastards and Hottentots who looked upon him as chief. In 1850 Shapstone found that he and another chief, Flux Iynx, had only about 40 men between them. According to Shapstone they considered themselves as chiefs, having certain control over the country near them. (See EP. 1334, 1851, R. Calderwood to H. Smith, 4 Oct. 1850.)
claims. This threw the whole situation in the melting pot again and the frontier experienced the tensions and suspicions of a "peace that was no peace".

Once again, then, crisis was fermenting when in December 1847 Pottinger was succeeded by Sir Harry Smith who had served his apprenticeship under D'Urban.

At this juncture, another piece in the kaleidoscope showed up more clearly, namely the case of expatriate European farmers beyond the Stormberg Spruit. Although many farmers had evacuated their farms in this area, during the Sixth Xhosa War, their numbers had increased throughout the 1840's. Between 1840 and 1846, 189 new farms were occupied. In 1842 a petition signed by P.J. de Wet, G.D. Joubert and several others had been handed to Sir George Napier in which he was asked to extend the colonial boundary so as to include their lands. Napier, who feared that such extensions would increase the spirit of emigrations that would in turn lead to encroachment on native tribes, had rejected their request. Similar requests were made in 1842 to Sir Henry Younge, the Lieutenant-General of the Eastern Province, and to Maitland in 1844, but although both of them strongly recommended this, the British Government rejected their recommendations. However, the Stormberg farmers could no longer indefinitely be left out in the cold.

From the beginning of the war, the Tambookies had raided the Stormberg area. Unruliness here reacted on the peace of the adjoining

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1 EP. 1269, 1850, no. 15, Smith to Grey, 11th April 1850.


3 Ibid.
Tarka district. The crisis of 1846-7 demonstrated once for all that the problems of the whole area were interlocking. What happened in the lands beyond the Colony reacted on the Colony; and what happened in the Colony reacted on the situation beyond the borders where inter-tribal conflicts threatened not only the peace of the Colony, but also the isolated, often stranded patch of European settlement in this neglected no man's land. The man destined to bring the Stormberg area within the framework of colonial policy, was Sir Harry Smith.
CHAPTER IV
THE ALBERT DISTRICT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO TOWNS

In July 1847 Sir Harry George Wakelyn Smith was appointed Governor of the Cape, and High Commissioner. Just as D'Urban's governorship had coincided with the problem of introducing the Legislative Council at the Cape, so the governorship of Sir Harry Smith was to involve a man who was primarily a soldier, in the complex problems of the anti-convict movement and questions of the constitution and franchise first posed by Porter's draft of 1848. But on his arrival in December 1847, his main preoccupation was with post-war settlement after the War of the Axe. He also sought to give a new equilibrium to the sub-continent whose political geography had been changed by the great Trekker migrations, and the Maitland treaties as well as by the British annexations of Natal. He saw the problem primarily as a strategic one which could not be resolved on a piecemeal basis. In effect he designed to spread the mantle of British sovereignty over the whole of Southern Africa at least as far as the Vaal.

Smith was a D'Urban man and his solution could well have been anticipated. Within three weeks of his arrival, he proceeded to Grahamstown, and annexed the old Ceded Territory to the Colony under the name of Victoria East. The territory between the Kei and Keiskamma River was proclaimed a separate British dependency, to be duly known as British Kaffraria. The north-eastern frontier was now to face the third project of settlement.1 The northern boundary was extended to the Orange River, while the area between the Stormberg Spruit and the

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1First, Maitland's Block Drift proposals of Dec. 1847, supra, pp. 87-88; then Pottinger's rejection of this scheme, see LM, 912, 1848, enclos. in no. 13, Pottinger's memorandum, 11 March 1847; now the Smith settlements of Dec. 1847.
Kraai River was annexed as a part of the district of Victoria East.\textsuperscript{1} After careful deliberation he decided to make this tract of territory into a separate division to be called the division of Albert, in honour of Queen Victoria's husband.

These arrangements were in general approved by the Colonial Secretary, Earl Grey. Although Grey would have preferred that the British territory in South Africa should be contracted rather than enlarged, he accepted that in practice the extension of British authority seemed inevitable. His favourable remarks as to the "well-adapted" measures of Smith were, however, directed at the annexation of British Kaffraria. On the extension of the northern boundary as far as the Orange River, he remarked that it was a subject of much regret to him that Smith had found it necessary so greatly to extend the territory of the colony in that direction. However, he felt that as he was at such a great distance, it was impossible "to set my judgement in competition with that which you have formed on the spot and I shall not interfere, or advise Her Majesty to interfere with the arrangements which you have made."\textsuperscript{2}

Annexations by proclamation was simple: so too was the creation of the new district of Albert. In practice, annexation highlighted the peculiar problems of this crucial and complex zone in which the new district was created.

The new Albert division was a relatively small block of territory about 8000 square miles in extent, and sparsely populated. The white people, mostly Dutch farmers, were numbered at 3914.\textsuperscript{3} The number of non-European inhabitants around cannot be determined. One estimate

\textsuperscript{1}See map 6.
\textsuperscript{2}\textit{P.P. 969, 1848}, Earl Grey to Smith, 31 March 1848.
puts the number at 3446, but any precise figure could only have been determined by means of a census, but none was taken. In any case a shifting population made counting of heads very difficult, and it is thus doubtful whether there is a reliable estimate. There was no dominant tribal group. Most of the non-Europeans were Tambookies and Mantatees who came to this part to look for employment. Further to the east were Bushmen who occupied kraals in the vicinity of the confluence of the Waschbank Spruit and the Kraai River.

To settle this particular kind of no man's land was very difficult indeed. There could hardly be questions of title, but rather questions of prescriptive right based on de facto occupation. A Land Commission was appointed with some promptitude. This, the Albert Land Commission, consisted of M.R. Robinson as president, Captain C. Bird and Commandant Olivier. At the time of annexation it was Sir Harry's intention to acknowledge as private property those farms which had been promised and occupied when the district was first included, albeit briefly, within the boundary in 1835. Personal observation and inquiry, however, made him change his mind as it became clear that much confusion could arise. In many cases farmers, in 1835, had sold their farms on any terms to join their relatives across the Orange River and much confusion could arise should they now come back and claim their lands. It was thus resolved that the date of last occupation should be the test of the claim. In the end there were 330 claims for farms averaging 5200

1 Ibid., 25th March 1848.

2 The ba-Thowa were sometimes known as Mantatees, derived from Mantatsa, the mother of Zikonyala. Confusion arises because as in the case of Rotoandi, the term Mantatees was used on occasion to describe any group of dislocated and/or marauding tribesmen.

3 See appendix 7.

4 When Sir Benjamin D'Urban annexed the area in 1835 there were 61 occupied farms covering an area of 345416 acres. See E.J. Heazlitt, 1833, 1850, Fofarios. 2 in no. 14, Surveyor-Genl. G. Bell's memorandum, 31st Jan. 1830.
acres (2600 morgen). Of these claims 306 were granted. Some common sense, custom and usage proved not a bad substitute for accurate survey. There was no rigid adherence to instructions. For instance, although farms were not to exceed 3000 morgen, a much larger farm was granted to Phillipus Myburgh for the following reasons: He was a man of great respectability; he had been to great expense to make improvements on his farm; a large portion of the farm was valueless being high mountains, and lastly, the piece of land that would be cut off would be valueless. In other cases, too, where a farm was exceptionally dry or mountainous the disadvantages were taken into consideration.

The Commission was cautioned to assess the value of land in a state of nature according to the capability of improvement. Farms were issued on a moderate quitrent. The aggregate amount of annual quitrent was approximately £1600. Quitrent varied from £7 to £9 for a farm of approximately 3000 morgen, but there were instances where farmers paid as little as £3.10. for a farm of 2800 morgen.

In the minutes of the Albert Land Commission, the history of this district unfolds itself. It is possible to trace the rhythm of movement. There is evidence of settlement well before 1835, and of new acceleration after 1840. After 1846 the pace of settlement was again stepped up.

The first farms that were occupied in the 1830’s were, in what became known after annexation, as the Barnard Spruit Field Cornetcy. Most of the farmers who claimed lands in this area had large families which indicate that they were mostly older people who had presumably

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1Ibid.
2RF, 1288, 1650, Bell’s memorandum.
been residing in this area for a long time, and they had accumulated many stock. The following are typical claims:

1. Johannes Jacobus Grobler - claims the farm Vaalbank, 4 hours from the boundary. Possessions: 1400 sheep, 300 oxen, 6 horses. Children: 16.

2. Jan Hendrik Olivier - claims farm 5 hours from the boundary. Possessions: 1200 sheep, 100 oxen, 100 horses. Children: 12.1

In the Klip Spruit and Upper Stormberg Spruit Field Cornetcies conditions were more or less the same. As the community became more established, farms became more expensive. In 1840 farms could still be bought in what became known as the Klipspruit Field Cornetcy, for 250 RD, but by 1848 most farms were sold at 2000 RD. In the early 1840's barter of stock for a farm was quite common. Johannes Jacobus Strydom, for instance, paid two oxen for his farm Droogtefontein.2

The rise in the value of land is reflected in the following transaction. In 1840 Hendrik van der Linde settled on a farm in the later Klipspruit Ward. He sold his farm in 1841 to Jacobus Buurman for one horse. In 1842 Stoffel Venter bought it for 250 RD and sold it two years later for 400 RD. The new owner, Frederick Botha, sold it in 1845 to Stephanus Botha for 1000 RD and eventually Pieter Jooste bought this farm in 1848 for 1800 RD.3

In the vicinity of the Kraai River and Waschbank Spruit a picture different from that nearer to the old colonial boundary emerges from the minutes of the Albert Land Commission. Settlement near the Waschbank Spruit only started to take place by 1844, yet in 1848 there were

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1DESER 52, M.A.L.C.; claims 12 and 26.
2Ibid., claim 18.
3DESER 50, M.A.L.C.; claim 3.
already 69 claimants. Smaller families or large families with fewer stock indicate that the younger and poorer families moved further away from the boundary. The following are typical claims:

1) John Paulus Rheeder: 125 sheep, 30 oxen, 12 horses. He lived 14 hours from the boundary and had 17 children.¹

2) Jacob Solomon Rheeder: Unmarried. Two horses and one span of oxen.²

3) Carl Werner: 400 sheep, 65 oxen, 25 horses. He lived 12 hours from the boundary and had 4 children.³

One of the exceptions in this area was Johannes Hendrik Schoeman who had other possessions elsewhere in the Albert district. According to his claim he had 1100 sheep, 140 oxen and 18 horses.⁴

Another interesting feature with regard to the Waschbank claims is that here, more often than in other areas, claimants stated that somebody else was living with them on the farm. This was a common practice in far-off districts and one that was many years later pointed out as an underlying cause of the poor white problem. Where farms were very large it was easy to obtain grazing and watering rights in the thinly populated areas on the lands of another man who desired company or protection. Thus a type of "bywoner" came into being who was disinclined, even at low cost, to take possession of a farm since he could easily move about with his stock from one farm to another according to his needs. Apparently it often happened that once a farmer was securely

¹DSCBP. 53, M.A.L.C., claim 48.
²Ibid., claim 49.
³Ibid., claim 55.
⁴Ibid., claim 56.
established, he invited a poor relative to come and live with him.  
Such a "bywoner" did not take the trouble to establish himself or to get a home of some kind; he was satisfied to live in a wagon.

The first Civil Commissioner of the Albert district was John Centlivres Chase. He held this post for only two years, but in this short period he laid the foundation on which the future prosperity of this district was built. Chase was well-equipped for his task. An 1820 settler, he gained brief experience as a farmer on lands near Cuylerville, and also between the two Kleinemonden Rivers. After five years he joined the civil service as accountant and soon became venue-master for Albany. It was in the years after 1830 while he held a senior position in the customs department in Cape Town that he had the opportunity to develop his literary and scientific skill. He became honorary secretary to both the Literary and Scientific Institution and of the Cape of Good Hope Association for Exploring Central Africa. His apt for commercial affairs led to his resignation from the civil service in 1835 but after two years in which he qualified as notary, he returned to official work, and was appointed Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province. It was in this capacity that he became acquainted with the fate of the expatriate farmers across the Stormberg Spruit through their memorial to Lieutenant-Governor, Henry Young, in May 1847. That Chase would have regarded this petition sympathetically is understandable. For many years he had already been closely associated with frontier affairs. These activities as leading advocate for the separation movement in

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2 Supra, p. 89.
the Eastern Province led to a confrontation between him and John Fairburn, editor of the South African Commercial Advertiser. When the latter, through the medium of his newspaper, launched bitter attacks on the frontier system of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Chase took up the cudgel on behalf of the Governor and the frontier farmers. He published three pamphlets in which he countered Fairburn's objections, and in 1837 both he and his friend, Donald Moodie, led actions for libel against Fairburn for which they obtained judgement for damages.

Not only had Chase developed an understanding of frontier affairs, but, probably led by Rev. Ayliff and other missionaries, he showed appreciation for the problems of the Dutch farmers, although his more progressive views often clashed with their conservative outlook.

The petition of the Albert farmers was rejected at the time, but apparently Chase had made some recommendations that had interested Sir Harry Smith when he was considering the extension of the boundary, as in December 1847 the Governor wrote to Chase: "Give me some information — what is the name of the slice of territory for which the Boers memorialised Sir Henry Young — its limits and boundaries, as I have a crochet in my head as to its rule."  

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1These pamphlets were: A sketch of the establishment, progress and present state of the settlement of Albany (1834); An exposure of a gross attack of the editor and of the 'South African Commercial Advertiser' on the character of the colonists and the civil commissioner of Albany, as to the treatment of the Caffers (Cape Town, 1835); and Some reasons for our opposing the author of the 'South African Researches', the Rev. John Philip...by the British immigrants of 1820 (Cape Town and Grahamstown, 1836).

2Supra, p. 65.

3C.T.J., 14th March 1857. In an outline of the history of the Albert district, this letter, written by Smith on 26th Dec. 1847, is quoted.
On receipt of the report that Chase had compiled in answer to the above letter, Sir Harry Smith immediately directed him to proceed to the locality, and at the same time appointed him Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate for the newly created Albert district. He was to be stationed at Burgersdorp.

The new town, Burgersdorp, that had been established in 1846, owed its existence to private enterprise. Until 1826 when a separate congregation was established at Colesberg, farmers from across the Stormberg Spruit used to go to Cradock for weddings and baptisms. After 1826 Colesberg became the religious centre, but the farmers found it increasingly difficult to attend the church services there. The journey was long, and in the troubled 'forties increasingly dangerous. Moreover, since the lands across the Orange were commercially undeveloped, the farmers were at a disadvantage in that they were moving further away from the Cape markets. From time to time they made efforts to have a township established, but even in 1843, Sir George Napier, although he admitted the necessity of a town, maintained that there was no money in the treasury to pay officials.\(^1\)

However, other forces were at work. The Cape Church had realised the necessity of more churches as a stabilizing influence on the interior, and already in 1840 the Circuit of Graaff-Reinet had decided in favour of such a step. In 1843 the new congregations of Victoria West and Richmond were established. The religious needs of the expatriates across the Stormberg could no longer be overlooked, and a committee was appointed by the Church Councils of Graaff-Reinet and Colesberg to find a suitable place for a church. After considerable

differences of opinion, and only after a new committee consisting of eight members had been appointed, agreement was reached, and in February 1846 the farm Klipfontein was bought for 15000 RD from Gerrit Buitendach for the erection of a church. Once a church building was erected, the usual pattern, as was the case in other church towns in the colony, set in. The first "serven" that were sold in the newly laid out township were mainly bought by farmers, for erecting cottages that they could occupy on occasion of their quarterly "Nachtmahl" visit. On his arrival in Burgersdorp in January 1848, Chase found a town consisting of an unfinished church and sixty unattractive flat-roofed houses. The population consisted of 268 whites and 468 coloureds.

Although having advocated the cause of the Albert district so sympathetically, Chase obviously never had any desire to fill a post in this far-off corner. In a letter to Smith, written immediately after his appointment, he expressed his dismay that the Governor, in spite of a promise not to send him, an educated man to the wilderness, had, "with one stroke of the pen banished him to the netherend of existence."¹ His first months in the Albert district proved that his pessimism was justified.

Chase arrived at Burgersdorp on the 14th March 1848 after a prolonged journey owing to bad weather and flooded rivers. On his arrival no suitable house was available, and he had to live in a tent under the most trying conditions. The town was badly situated in the bed of a narrow and unhealthy bog without sufficient outlet and natural drainage, and obscured by two ridges of hills about 600 yards apart.

The hills on the east were so lofty as to obscure the sun for more than an hour after its rising.

From the beginning, Chase was opposed to Burghersdorp as future capital of the Albert district and he let no opportunity pass by to acquaint the Governor in the most eloquent terms with his miserable fate. In one of his many ecclesiastics to Sir Harry he complained: "On my arrival I was told some of the inconveniences it suffered in wet weather. I have since experienced the luxurious effects of a thunderstorm. Its clayey nature renders it difficult to maintain a footing. It is one series of deep furrows and of pools of water requiring a long period to dry up, and when the sun is able to use its vigour, it is a complete steam bath." 1

Apart from physical discomfort there were more legitimate reasons why he was opposed to Burghersdorp as capital. First there existed in this town peculiar circumstances which, favourably inclined as Chase might have been to free institutions and the development of self-government for towns, made even the establishment of a municipality improbable. 2 Burghersdorp belonged to a private association of six members of the Dutch Reformed Church. This Church Committee had sold a number of "orven" under such conditions that it would interfere with the right of any municipality. No municipality, after all, could exercise jurisdiction upon a property legally vested in other parties.

The church hierarchy was in all respects unprogressive and unimaginative and the zealous Chase became desperately frustrated knowing how the development of the town would be handicapped by the restrictions imposed by a small group of men. "In the formation of

1 Ibid.
2 CO. 2851, Despatches of Civil Commissioner, Chase, 17th May 1848.
the new district of Albert," he wrote, "I have looked forward to the creation of the fund by the sale of erven in a new capital and which I have every reason to believe would realize a considerable sum for public purposes. From this source of revenue the Government is in this place precluded, and in a great measure placed under caprices of a small knot of men who from want of education and natural prejudices are not to be reasoned with. Of this bigotry I adduce one instance... which has come to my knowledge, and that is when the conditions of sale were framed one was introduced: that no Roman Catholic or any other church should be erected."

Some of the conditions upon which "erven" were sold were crippling to the progress of the town. Trade was for instance hampered by an article that limited the length of time that visiting traders could outspan. Likewise the building trade was handicapped by an article that bound all proprietors of erven to abide by all regulations made or to be made by the church committee regarding the burning of coal and lime. Chase particularly objected to the article that prohibited the selling of liquor, as this led to smuggling that resulted in loss of revenue for the Government.  

However, the most serious problems that Chase in his position as Resident Agent encountered, resulted from the anomalous position in

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1 Quoted by D. Kannemeyer in Albert District (South African Pamphlets, Vol. 16), p. 10. Under the conditions of sale it was originally stated that no person of another religion would be allowed to buy a plot in the town. This article was removed on the instigation of John Montgomery. Montgomery, an English speaking farmer, was a member of the original Committee, concerned with the selling of "erven", and should the article have remained in force it would have meant that he himself would not have been allowed to buy an erv. Montgomery lent the Church Committee money for the first installment on the Klipfontein.

2 Ibid.
which he found himself in that he had to control a district in which he had no legal jurisdiction. When the Albert district was proclaimed, Burghersdorp was not included within the boundaries. Chase was thus powerless in many cases which demanded that prompt and effective measures should be taken. He could for instance do nothing to prevent the smuggling of liquor. The only solution to his administrative problems was, in his opinion, that either another town should be erected that could in time become the capital of the district or that the boundaries of the Albert district should be extended so as to include Burghersdorp.

As Chase preferred the first alternative, one of the first steps after his arrival was to look for a more suitable site. Thirteen years earlier J.P. Ziervogel had already pointed out that Buffels Vlei would be excellent as a residence of a functionary, and he recommended that "an extensive village might be founded on this spot which far removed from other markets, and exceedingly well situated for inland trade would soon become very populous and prosperous." Chase, too, was favourably impressed with Buffels Vlei, and in one eloquent letter after the other he pressed the Governor for permission to erect a new town. He was convinced that the soil in the vicinity of Buffels Vlei was far more productive, the pasturage finer and the climatic conditions much healthier, than that of Burghersdorp 36 miles away. While there was a gradual weakening of springs round Burghersdorp — he even claimed that the original occupier of Klipfontein, Gerrit Buitendach, was forced to leave the farm as a result of the weakening

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1 CO. 2851, Despatches, March-May 1848.
2 CO. 2756, Ziervogel to D'Urban, 22nd June 1835.
3 CO. 2851, Despatches, March-June 1848.
springs and had settled on a spot where they originally wanted to build the town, Buffels Vlei had the advantage of a copious supply of water from the Orange River while agriculture could benefit from the irrigable streams of water from the tepid sulphurated hydrogen springs. Furthermore, Buffels Vlei was on a direct route from the new port of East London to the sovereignty in the north, and to the Basuto tribes under Moshesh.

When it became known that Chase was contemplating a new capital, the inhabitants of Burghersdorp presented him in March 1848 with a petition showing all the advantages of Burghersdorp as a capital.\(^1\) The main argument of the people was that this town had within fifteen months become the emporium of a considerable trade as it lay on a direct route to the interior from Sanddrift on the Orange River to Cradock. While Chase admitted that the village had within a short time made rapid progress, he was not convinced by the petitioners' arguments. His counter-arguments were that if the prosperity of Burghersdorp was based on the sure foundations of its legitimate trade and the necessities of the public, it would be able to support itself even if it was not the seat of magistracy. As to the argument that Burghersdorp was from a commercial point of view favourably situated, Chase pointed out that the route across Buffels Vlei was far more frequented, and that the route from this site to East London much nearer, more direct and easier accessible.\(^2\)

Although Sir Harry had already on the 20th April 1848 pronounced in favour of Burghersdorp, the Buffels Vlei protagonists did not accept

\(^1\)Ibid., Despatch, 30th March 1848.

\(^2\)Ibid.
the decision and, supported by Chase, they carried on a press campaign in favour of Buffels Vlei. Eventually, Sir Harry Smith was at least convinced that the erection of a town at Buffels Vlei, with the commercial advantages that such a town could offer, was most desirable. The Governor's consent was obtained and on the 12th May 1849 the first 34 erven were sold at an average price of £28 per erf. As the Assistant Surveyor-General, J. Robinson, to whom the vendue was entrusted, failed to give intending purchasers precise information as to what water privileges they would be granted, many Boers lost interest, and this probably accounted for the relatively low prices.

Chase was fully confident that the seat of magistracy would be removed to the new town, "the first", he proudly stated in his address on the occasion of the founding of the town, "to be established on the banks of this magnificent stream, the Great River...under the flag of our native land which has, I believe, for the first time floated in this locality...." A correspondent to the Grahamstown Journal of 26th May 1849 prematurely referred to Aliwal North as the future capital of Albert. Burghersdorp however, remained the capital of the Albert District.

But, as occupied as he might have been with the capital issue, Chase had at the end of his Civil Commissionership, far more than just the establishment of a new town to his credit.

On his arrival he took immediate steps to ensure the effective administration of the district by appointing Field Cornets and

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1 Between March and June 1849 the columns of the Grahamstown Journal were filled with correspondence on this subject.
2 G.T.J., 26th March 1849.
3 Ibid.
demarcating the different Field Cornetcies. Jan Olivier was appointed Field Cornet of the Barnard Spruit Ward. This ward, bounded on the east by the Stormberg Spruit included the oldest settled farms in this area. Hans Albertse of Sterk Spruit became Field Cornet of Upper Stormberg Spruit, while Andreas Greyling of Klip Spruit and Christian Schoeman of Wolwe Spruit were respectively appointed to the Klip Spruit Ward and Waschbank Spruit Ward. His choice of Piet Smit of Leeuwe Fonteins as Commandant for the whole division was rather unfortunate. Smit was represented to him as "a man of indomitable courage and perseverance, but who bore no ferocity or ill-will towards the savages." It was known that he had often made the Bushmen presents of meat and tobacco. Although he had led commandos against the Bushmen, "very few of them had been destroyed, they had been scared away to their present stronghold at the source of the Bashee River." Chase was favourably impressed by Smit, but shortly afterwards he found that rumours that Smit indulged in excessive use of liquor, were true and he was dismissed from office.1

Chase was full of energy and forward looking in his zeal for the new district. On his first visit to Buffels Vlei he not only inspected a possible site for a capital, but he also investigated the coal formation on the Orange River. After this visit Chase wrote a long despatch in which he pointed out the possibility of using the Orange River for irrigation.2 After another visit he pointed out the possibility of using the Kraai River for the same purpose.3 In a district where severe drought caused annual losses such a scheme could have

1Co.2851, Despatch, 14th March 1843.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., Despatch, 9th June 1848.
been of the greatest advantage, but his long letters on this subject made no impression on the authorities who were certainly not prepared to spend large amounts on irrigation schemes in a far-off district.

In spite of climatic drawbacks, Chase had always remained confident that this district could become extremely valuable as stock, corn and wool producing area even if it was not capable of carrying a very dense population. The wool farming, he pointed out, would be handicapped only by the distance from a market. The initial wheat shortage could be overcome by buying this by way of the Stockenström-drift and Buffels Vlei from the Mantatees, subjects of the chief Moshesh. This had already been done. During the war of 1846 the main portion of grain, used by the troops, had been obtained along this route at a price of 8 RDs (12/-) to 10 RDs for 180 pounds.\(^1\) Chase’s expectations as far as agriculture was concerned, were not fulfilled, but stock and wool production had indeed flourished after the proclamation of the district. Merino sheep farming was introduced and nine years later 2,000,000 lbs. of wool average 52c per lb. were produced.\(^2\)

Chase’s interest in geology directed his attention to the examining of coal deposits in the Albert district, but the results were disappointing. He made use of the opportunity to gather fossils that he sent down to Cape Town. As far as more practical matters were concerned, he gave attention to the erection of a gun-powder magazine, the establishment of a regular postal service, and the extension of the boundaries of the Albert district.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Ibid., Despatch, 14th March 1848.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 163.

\(^3\)Ibid., Despatches, May-August 1846.
Once it became clear that Chase had no alternative but to accept Burghersdorp as capital of Albert, he urged the Governor to extend the boundaries of the district so as to include the Groote River Ward in which Burghersdorp was situated. Fortunately the farmers in this ward had no objection to such a move; on the contrary, ten farmers of Achter Zuurberg in the Colesberg division had asked to be included in the Albert district. Their petition was sent along with one from the farmers between the Kraai River and the Witteberge who had settled in this area between 1840 and 1847. By 1847 forty-four farmers were occupying farms here and the inhabitants numbered about 300. They had accumulated considerable wealth as a census of 1848 showed that they possessed 5553 cattle, 25000 sheep and more than 500 horses. Houses had been built on almost all the farms although they were inferior to those west of the Kraai River. Although these farmers were living beyond the proclaimed boundaries they were led to believe that the Colony had some rights over their land. At the time of their settlement they became interspersed with some stray Tambookies. This resulted in disturbances, and in 1846 Commandant Gideon Joubert of Colesberg made, on his own responsibility, an attempt to withdraw his countrymen from the Tambookies. He drew a boundary, westward of which he recommended the farmers to establish lagers or camps for self-defence against hostile elements. This was only a temporary arrangement, but had been interpreted by the Boers as acknowledgement of the rights of the Colony over those lands, especially as it had been made by Joubert who had often been accredited by the Government as its special agent. Chase knew well that the Governor was not disposed, if not

1. Ibid., 31st March 1848; 5th June 1848.
2. Ibid.
restricted, to any further enlargements, and he therefore visited the area to make personal observations before presenting a memorial to Sir Harry. In June 1848 he undertook the journey, accompanied by a surveyor, Mr. Ford. They found Joubert's boundary to be very indefinite and one that was likely to lead to misunderstanding between the Boers and the natives. Both Chase and Ford felt that the Witteberge were admirably fitted for a colonial boundary as a result of the great elevation. Difficulty of passage contributed to its desirability as a boundary. The missionaries at Kamastone were not opposed to such an extension although they alleged that the south-east was a scarcity of land for natives. Chase and Ford investigated this claim, but found that the almost uninhabited land to the east was of equal quality to that on the west, and besides it was better watered by the Bamboes River and the Sterk Spruit. Previously, when possible annexation was mentioned to Sir Harry, he proposed that these lands might be annexed to the Sovereignty. Chase differed from the Governor, as this meant that the Boers would be cut off from ready communication with the country beyond because the Orange River was often flooded. It would also have been impractical to annex these lands to Kaffraria as the Stormbergen and Witteberge would prevent intercourse. There was, however, no obstacle to ready intercourse with the Albert district.¹

After thorough investigation Chase proposed the following extensions of the boundaries of the Albert district: In the north the Orange River from the mouth of the Zuurberg Spruit to the mouth of the Wilge Spruit; in the east the Wilge Spruit along its upward course to the summit of the Witteberge to where these mountains touch the Grey River and along the River to its source in the Stormberg; in the south

¹Ibid.
along the Stormberg and Bamboos range to the source of the Suurberg Spruit and in the west along this spruit to its debouchure in the Orange River.¹

To give impetus to his recommendation Chase mentioned a most convenient spot on the farm of a certain Van der Walt, a few miles east of the Krael River, where a bridge across the Orange would be built. With the eye of a financier he spotted the advantages of such a bridge. It was imperative that uninterrupted intercourse between the Sovereignty and the Colony could be maintained, but such intercourse was often interrupted by the swollen state of the rivers in summer and the melting of snow in the winter. During such times the price of ferrying a wagon without oxen over the Orange River was £1½. The cost of a bridge he thought would be about £250; obviously a considerable amount could be saved in the long run.²

Though he was opposed to further annexation, Sir Harry was persuaded by Chase's eloquence and on the 5th July 1848 the area between the Grey River and the Wittebergen was incorporated as the West Wittebergen Ward with Alwyn Voster as Field Cornet.³

Frontier history was repeating itself: the Trekboer moved on and the Government had no option but to follow.

Some months earlier Smith had already given permission for the incorporation of the Groote River and the Achter Zuurberg wards, then part of the Colesberg district, into the Albert district. This was done by the same proclamation.

Right through his period of service Chase had a most cordial

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., Despatch, 9th June 1848.
³Ibid., Despatch, 5th July 1848.
relationship with the Dutch farmers whom he described as a "quiet, decent and easily managed people". He lent a sympathetic ear to their complaints, urged the Governor to send instructions in Dutch to the Field Cornets and secured the services of a Dutch interpreter for the courts.

It was due to this attitude as well as to his untiring efforts to promote the interests of the Albert district that Chase was held in high esteem by the Dutch farmers, and experienced little of the antagonism they often displayed to the English official and missionary. It is a point of interest to note that although the Albert farmers were often strongly anti-English, the majority of them were exceptionally loyal to the British crown. For this there were several reasons.

Reference had already been made to the fact that the Stormberg farmers were for a long period isolated from the main stream of political events in the Colony. There was thus a marked difference between the Voortrekker who sought independence in the interior, and the Trekboer across the Stormberg Spruit who desired the extension of British sovereignty over them. The disillusionment that followed the retrocession of their lands after a brief annexation by D'Urban did not change the loyalty of the Stormberg farmers. It has been suggested by Dr. J.P. Jooste, in a study of the History of the Reformed Church, that the religious outlook of these people influenced their political sentiments. A large number of the Albert farmers were descendants of families like the Van der Valts, Krugers and Coetzers, who at the beginning of the 18th century settled in what became the district of Graaff-Reinet. They inter-married and lived a very isolated life in

1 Supra, p. 63.
2 Ibid.
which the Bible was the only link with civilization. Their very strict adherence to, and literal interpretation of the Bible, impressed on them the moral obligation of obedience to the lawful authorities.\footnote{J.F. Jooste, \textit{Die Geskiedenis van die Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika 1652-1952} (Potchefstroom, 1958), p. 28.}

Even then, though their lands were for years not within British jurisdiction, they retained the loyalty they once had for the British crown. Certainly, however, the main reason for the loyalty of the Stormberg farmers lay in the fact that they looked at the Cape, where many of them had old roots, for stability, and if need arose, security — even though it was often only an imagined security.

This then would explain their demonstrations of loyalty when in July 1848 the district was in commotion resulting from the arrival of farmers from across the Orange River who had fled during disturbances caused by Andries Pretorius.\footnote{After the annexation of the Orange River Sovereignty in February 1848, Andries Pretorius advised the Trekkers to fight or to die for their freedom. He immediately started to organise an army, but was defeated in August 1848 at the battle of Boomplaas.} Pieter Pelzer who was one of the refugees alleged that Pretorius warned all inhabitants on pain of having their possessions confiscated and they themselves being severely punished to join the Maatschappij. Other refugees spread even wilder rumours. It was alleged, quite falsely, that Pretorius had an army of several thousand Zulus, and that he had intended to set up his landmarks on the northern banks of the Orange River from Buffels Vlei downwards.

Chase immediately ordered Commandant Jan Olivier to call out the burgher division of Albert to assemble on the farm Buffels Vlei in order to prevent inroads by either Pretorius and his followers or natives under his command. The rumours regarding the Zulu invasion soon proved to be completely unfounded. Pretorius pushed up to the Orange with a
picket of 24 men at Sanddrift, 25 miles from Burghersdorp, but nothing came of the invasion — if that was what he had in mind. There was never any evidence of sympathy with Pretorius and his cause.¹

The years after 1849, however, certainly strained the loyalty of the farmers. Once native trouble started they were to find out that annexation offered little of the security they had expected. During the first months of its existence the Albert District was relatively free from native trouble. In his first letter to the Governor, Chase optimistically wrote that "few parts of the extensive colony enjoy more peace than Albert." The few Tambockies in the vicinity gave no trouble and only entered the district for the purpose of seeking employment. The farmers, however, preferred the Mantatees who were more intelligent, provided cheap labour at a heifer a year and could be obtained within a few hours notice from Koshesh's country.

The only occasional intruders were the Bushmen. It is remarkable that during the period 1 - 21 May 1848 only two cases of horse stealing were reported. Unfortunately this tranquillity did not last long. By July complaints about Tambockie depredations were pouring in.² In one case this led to a collision between the farmers and the Tambockies during which a Tambockie was shot. The Governor did not receive Chase's report on this incident very sympathetically. He accused Chase of having made more of the case than was warranted, and at the same time he expressed his disapproval of farmers being called out on expeditions.³ From these letters it was clear that the Governor did not appreciate the difficult conditions under which Chase had to carry out his duties. He had of

¹CO.2652, Despatches, July 1848.
²Ibid., Despatches, 11th June 1849; 9th July 1849; 21st July 1849.
³CO.2657, Montagu to Chase, 9th July 1849.
course no military force available to cope with increased threats of Tambockie inroads via the Waschbank Spruit. Neither did he have a reliable police force. The "police force" consisted of a chief constable and one constable. Shortly after his arrival Chase received complaints from the chief constable that owing to the weak behaviour of the constable and the gaoler he himself had to work for 18 hours a day. Chase was rather suspicious and in due course investigations showed that the chief constable was guilty of neglect. He was dismissed, and the constable, against whom he lodged complaints, was appointed in his place. The new chief constable, White, did not hold his position for long before he in turn was accused by the constable that he kept the prison "in no better state as an ordinary canteen." The gaoler was said "to have converted the prison into a boarding house and had employed convicts in his own wards for the use of himself and his boarders."

Accusations and counter-accusations led to one dismissal after the other, and desperately Chase complained that the constables were of the lowest class because sober men, whether white or coloured, could procure a better livelihood elsewhere in the Colony. This is not surprising, for the salary of a white constable was £40 a year and that of a Coloured, 1 RDS a day. Under these conditions it became impossible to maintain order.

As long as matters in the rest of the Colony were tranquil a certain measure of peace could be maintained, but as the year 1849 was drawing to a close, the first ominous signs of war had already appeared upon the horizon. The Albert farmers had a brief spell of two years to enjoy the economic prosperity and the psychological security that annexation had made possible. The worst ordeal in its history was about to begin.

1Ibid.; Despatches, May - July, 1849.
Since the latter part of the 18th century the lower reaches of the Fish, the Keiskamma and the Kei River had been the main zones of conflict, and even after the contact area between white and black had been enlarged by the great migrations of 1836, these zones remained the main theatre where successive experiments in frontier policy were mounted.

With Sir Harry's policy of expansion, there starts what may be called a new phase in frontier history. The extension of the boundary, the inclusion within it both of Xhosa chiefs and European farmers, hitherto expatriates, exposed yet another mosaic of settlement. At the same time, just as had been the case with each successive boundary line, it was found that there was interaction across the legal frontier and that the complex problems within the Colony were by no means self-contained. The scene is changed, the actors vary, but the themes are recognizable.

The pattern of events on the north-eastern frontier was in many respects similar to that which existed on the eastern frontier in the first part of the 19th century. In the east the two agricultural peoples, Trekboer and Xhosa, seemed to block each other in the Fish River zone. Likewise, in the north-east, the Trekboer and Tambockie arrested each other's advance at the Klaas Smits River and Black Kei River. These rivers, like the Fish River, were most unsatisfactory boundary lines, and settlements on the opposite banks led to mutual trespass and complaints of cattle lifting. However, in one important respect conditions on the north-eastern frontier differed from those on the eastern frontier.
On the eastern frontier there was often friction even in the years between the pitch of conflict. As Monica Wilson has pointed out, the listing of nine frontier wars in the period 1779–1879 is an over-simplification. Friction, raids and retaliation usually continued in the intervals between proclamation of a peace and the outbreak of a war.¹ In the north-east the pattern had been rather different. Here the Tambookies, who were in any case less war-like, were geographically on the fringe of military action, and their land traversed rather than extensively settled by farmers. Hence a nominal peace had been maintained through the years despite suspicion and alarm. Annexation in 1847 was however met by sharp reaction followed in 1850 by Tambookie participation in a general conflict which made the crisis of 1850–1853 the most serious which the Cape had hitherto faced.

Before an attempt can be made to examine the factors that led to increased tension between the farmers and Tambookies, it is necessary to attempt a general survey of frontier conditions in the pre-war years of 1848–1849.

At a superficial view these were years of promise. Sir Harry felt assured that he had handled frontier affairs with unprecedented effectiveness — a conviction in which he was strengthened by the unequivocal appreciation expressed by frontier farmers in one memorandum after the other.² Yet there were already disturbing undertones.³ In all the frontier zones the drought of 1849 not only meant tension and

¹ Oxford, p. 240.
² PP. 1537, 1831, enclos. in no. 11, memorials from inhabitants of the districts of Sarah, Fort Beaufort and Albany, received by Sir Harry Smith in Jan. 1850.
friction and complaints of cattle lifting, but effective control over the tribes who were continually moving about, looking for fresh pasturage, became impossible. Complaints were soon pouring in: the Tamockie agent at Shiloh, E.M. Cole, expressed concern over large numbers of this tribe who crossed the Kei to settle in Upper Victoria. The Reverend Henry Calderwood, Civil Commissioner for Victoria East, reported that Kaffirs had settled on the colonial side of the border. From Waterloo Bay came complaints about intrusions of Kaffirs without passes. Commissioner Charles Brownlee was irritated by Macomo's continual trespassing on the lands of T'slambie's people, and from the Kat River settlement came the alarming news that Hermanus Matroos had allowed Kaffirs to settle round him at Blinkwater.

The Xhosa had fought seven wars to maintain their land and the ethnic patterns which land had made possible. Annexation in 1847 and Sir Harry Smith's brash condemnation of lobola and witchcraft reacted not merely on the chiefs, but on the texture of tribal society itself. Hence the willingness with which the words of a new prophet were heard. Umlanjeni promised immunity to the white man's bullets, and victory. George MacKinnon, Chief Commissioner of Kaffraria, understood the mood, and warned the Governor. In October 1850 he wrote to Smith: "We have protected the people from their (the chief's) tyranny and injustice; hence they feel their influence diminished and would avail themselves of any adventitious occurrence to bring about a change in the present order of things."2

1Hermanus Matroos was the son of a Bantu woman and a slave who escaped from the Colony. He collected around him a horde of people who looked on him as their leader.

2PP. 1334, 1851, enclos. in no. 7, MacKinnon to Smith, 14th Oct. 1850.
Sir Harry Smith's reaction may be described as obtuse. He could not grasp that Victorian ideas of reasonable justice had no meaning in the context of tribal Kaffraria where loyalties and customs were based on very different assumptions. MacKinnon's warning was thus brushed aside: "It is much to be regretted that a fanatic of his character should be able to unsettle the minds of men hitherto so contented under our rule; I therefore incline to the opinion that the extent of evil cannot be great... I cannot conceive that the majority of Kaffirs are not most happy under our rule."¹

Even the Governor's military judgement was at fault. He saw only one part of the spectrum, and he thought in terms of siege and pitched battle, not in terms of what was to develop, namely a war of resistance. Even on the brink of war he still confidently maintained: "Our position, military, is far different from what it was in all previous wars, as we occupy posts in the midst of them (the Kaffirs) and have the port of East London to throw in supplies and reinforcements."² Thus convinced that the Kaffrarian chiefs could effect nothing "posted as we are in the midst of them",³ the Governor had forgotten that there was still a north-eastern frontier where Europeans lived side by side with the Tamboockies who would prove in time to be the real enemy to be feared.⁴

At first, points of tension was not as clear in Tamboockieland,

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¹Ibid., enclos. 5 in no. 4, Smith to MacKinnon, 10th Oct. 1850.
²Ibid.
³Ibid., enclos. in no. 6, Smith to MacKinnon, 14th Oct. 1850.
⁴Cory V, p. 342. Gilfillan, magistrate at Cradock, was one of the first to realize in 1850 that Tamboockie participation in a general conflict could have disastrous results.
and lacked in any case a diagnostician of the calibre of Mackinnon. Tambockie movements could be explained in terms of the hunt for pasturage, and even border disputes with the Bushmen on the Cacado River. Mapassa's movements were the true pointers. The 1847 settlement had broken the restless homogeneity of Tambockieland. In the final delineation of boundaries, Mapassa was as it were, excised from Tambockieland, and legally located in Kaffraria. This put the restless Tambockie chief in close contact with the core of Xhosa turbulence there.

There had been considerable fumbling in the delineation of the new boundaries. Initially Smith declared in December 1847 that the part of Kaffraria that was at that time occupied by Tambockies, was to be called Northumberland. Umtirara's place was to be at Howick, and that of Mapassa at Alnwick. However, following an agreement between Umtirara and the Governor, E.M. Cole was instructed in January 1848, to locate the followers of Umtirara according to their respective clans in the area between the Klaas Smits River and the Indwe River. The chiefs Tyopo, Fadana, Jumbo, Ketelo, Kolobeni, Kali and Quesha received lands in the said tract. But even now there were still Tambockies living within the colonial boundaries. Quesha asked Calderwood that the section of his tribe who had been residing for a very long time

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1 PP. 969, 1848, enclos. 6 in no. 17, Government Proclamation, 25th Dec. 1847. See map 6.

2 According to Theal, Smith gave Umtirara the choice to live in his "own territory" between the Umtata and Bachee Rivers, where he would have to protect himself against Kreli, or to move to the land between the Colonial boundary (the Klaas Smits River) and the Indwe River, where he would have colonial protection. Theal does not indicate the source of his information, and no other reference to this could be found. See Theal III, p. 94.

between the Klaas Smits and Black Kei River should be allowed to remain in this area. As Calderwood thought that these people could join up with Kama's location, and so cover a formidable line of frontier they were allowed to do so under Queens's son, Darala.

Mapassa's position was anomalous. He himself and part of his tribe was located in British Kaffraria under Smith's system. The rest of his tribe was excluded from Kaffraria and did not really fit into any firm territorial pattern. Hence his power over these were still in theory those of an unalloyed chieftainship which he could not in practice exercise. In Kaffraria he was in practice a chief, but his functions were limited by Smith's reforming zeal. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that he might have looked with envy on the independent chiefs on the Bashee River. For although the Emigrant Thembu had for many years been separated from the main body at the Bashee River there were still close links between the sections. When, for instance, Umtirara died in January 1848 the regency over the tribe was offered to Umtirara's senior brother Ncapain, then living at the Bashee River. Ncapain, presumably unwilling to accept regency over people subjected to European rule, declined the offer. Thwani, another brother of Umtirara was then appointed, but he accidentally shot himself. Cole looked upon this as a most unfortunate event as this chief was not averse to colonial interference with the affairs of tribes living beyond the colonial border. Nonesi, adopted mother of Umtirara, then became regent.

Mapassa's malaise soon found vent. But even though perhaps moved by the Umlanjeni prophecies — for instance that he would be victorious

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1. This portion of the tribe fled into the Colony during the Fetenani disturbances of 1828. *Burke*, p. 46.

2. *G.H., 22/2*, no. 171, Cole to D. Soutley, 12th June 1848.
when the white man should attack him in his country — he acted with caution, prepared to follow rather than to take the lead. He resorted meantime to a kind of free-lance banditry. After ravaging the northern part of the Albert district, he concentrated on the Whittlesea area. By the end of 1850 the north-east had been harassed to such an extent that a constant patrol of burghers from Cradock became necessary. The Albert farmers had no doubt that the Tambockies were contemplating war. Many servants deserted the farms without collecting their wages, and there was an unusual slaughtering of cattle, and much drying of mealies. Some of the Tambockies stated unhesitatingly that the country belonged to them, and that they were determined to fight for it. This seems to have been an echo of the war cry that Sandile had allegedly sent to Pato: "Arise clans of the Kafir Nation! The white man has wearied us. Let us fight for our country; they are depriving us of our right which we inherit from our forefather."

By the end of 1850, then, matters in the Albert District had become so critical that E.M. Cole, who had succeeded J.C. Chase as Civil Commissioner for Albert, warned the Governor that if urgent steps were not taken to protect the farmers in the district, they would sooner or later take the law in their own hands and attack the Kaffirs south

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3 Cory V, p. 346.
5 EP. 1344, 1850, encl. 1 in no. 9, Smith to Grey, 31st Oct. 1850. Statement by George Cyrus, 15th Aug. 1850. Cyrus was the Government Interpreter and Superintendent of Natives at Grahamstown.
of the Stormberg.¹

Hitherto most of the Tambookies had remained loyal to the Government, but such was the tension by now that, if war broke out, at least some of Umtirara's men would join with Mapassa. The reason for this transfer of allegiance must be sought in the friction that resulted from indistinct boundary arrangements.

The situation in the north-east, where a mosaic of black and white settlements fringed vast, undefined Tambookie lands, did indeed provide fertile soil for discontent. Tambookieland could not even be rated a geographical expression. As early as 1823, the traveller, George Thompson, remarked: "The Tambookie territory extends from the river Zwart Kei (sic) on the frontier of the Colony to the sea coast beyond Mintza's country. How far north eastwards is not precisely ascertained."² Nearly thirty years later, Dr. Andrew Smith, who gave evidence before the Select Committee on Kafir Tribes, was equally unable to define the appellation Tambookieland. "The country of the Tambookies", he vaguely stated, "is towards the Kei, Bashee and Umtata Rivers, but it is very difficult to establish a boundary."³ Thus geographical factors, peculiar to the north-east, complicated attempts to draw a boundary line between black and white. But here, too, as on all other frontiers, tribal, political and economic patterns operated against the successful separation of the two races. In the first place, the patrimony of a chief was land: his chiefly status and function depended in part upon it since he acted as a kind of trustee for his tribe. Territorial delimitation often meant therefore tribal dislocation.

¹CO. 2866, E.M. Cole to Smith, 8th Nov. 1859.
³Select Committee on Kafir Tribes 1851, p. 278, q. 2061.
European ideas of property were those of individual ownership. But the exigencies of extensive farming which the then practice of agriculture necessitated, meant sweeping claims and often, too, expansion. Even when areas were included within the Colony, survey and title deeds almost invariably lagged behind the claim. When moreover the problem was to draw what was, in fact, a political boundary, difficulties were almost insuperable. Lines were proclaimed, but not marked off by any visible sign; often, too, the geographical landmarks were confused. Even where attempts were made to make the boundary a line between black and white, there were problems of resettlement of displaced and dis-gruntled groups, whose tribal affiliations were rarely understood. These and other problems became clearly apparent when attempts were made to fix the northern and western boundaries of Tambookieland.

The first official line between the European farmers and the Tambookies had been drawn in 1822 when the Black Kei and Klaas Smits River were proclaimed part of the north-eastern boundary of the Colony.¹

These rivers were never more than arbitrary lines, for though the boundary was there on paper, there was neither the military force, nor, more important, the administrative manpower to implement government decisions. From time to time, whenever the Tambookies had fled into the Colony for protection, friendly chiefs were allowed for longer or shorter periods to remain within the Colony.² Equally, farmers from the Albert and Cradock districts had often trespassed, either to settle permanently on Tambookie territory or to hire land from the chiefs.

Once the Province of Queen Adelaide was closed to prospective settlers, there was naturally a scramble for unoccupied lands. Already in 1838

¹See map 2.
²Supra, p. 20.
there were several Dutch farmers who hired farms from Mapassa. When Umriara became paramount, he continued with this policy. To the farmers it was advantageous as they received fertile land for as little as one cow per year. From the Tambooke point of view it was an undesirable situation, as they themselves wanted these fertile lands. However, most of the time the relationship between farmers and Tambaockies was cordial. Although there were mutual complaints of depredations, trespasses on one another’s lands were first accepted and tacitly connived at. In 1845 for instance a farmer, John de Wet, complained about armed Tambaockies who were in the habit of hunting on his farm, and in the process did not always distinguish between game and the farmer’s sheep. When two of the chief Gudda’s followers were taken prisoner, the chief pleaded as an excuse for such encroachments the friendly terms between his people and the Colonists whose cattle used to graze on his lands, and the privilege that he as chief had given to border farmers to cut wood in his country. As long as matters on the frontier were calm such disputes could be settled peaceably, but on the slightest provocation tempers flared up as was the case with the Pretorius-Tambooke dispute of 1845. This dispute, far from being settled at that time, was revived after 1848 when increasing raids in the adjacent Albert and Cradock districts gave rise to serious land disputes.

1 WH-14/1, p. 33, Fynn to Houghton-Hudson, Agent-General, 19th May 1845; C0.2857, Shepstone to Smith, 6th Dec. 1849.

2 Ibid., p. 33, Fynn to Hudson, 19th May 1845.

3 Ibid., Fynn’s reports, 15th Oct. 1844 - 14th June 1845.

4 Ibid., Fynn to Lafland, 11th May 1845.

5 Supra, p. 81.
Trouble inevitably resulted from the resettlement of Uitirara's followers in the area between the Klaas Smits and Indwe River as the Cradock and Albert farmers now had on their borders a large number of Tambookies.\(^1\) Matters were aggravated by the fact that the Kaffrarian tribes, who after 1848 found it difficult to continue their raids in the eastern districts, had turned to the north-east and, as had happened under the treaty system, the uninhabited lands surrounding the Tambookie territory, gave all marauders the opportunity to commit thefts for which the Tambookies were held responsible.\(^2\) But in spite of increasing complaints from the Cradock and Albert districts, the farmers in these districts were left virtually unprotected. The whole military force was, after 1848, withdrawn beyond the Amatola Mountains and Commissioner E.M. Cole was allowed two policemen to preserve the peace in Tambookieland.\(^3\)

There was also another point of friction. The area between the Klaas Smits and Indwe River comprised about 2,400 square miles, but the Tambookies were so thinly spread that the actual land in occupation was only 1,200 square miles.\(^4\) The uninhabited spots in between were much coveted by farmers from the adjacent districts. Thus there were in the Tambookie territory not only those farmers who in previous years had settled east of the Klaas Smits River, but there was also a constant influx of farmers who were looking for fresh pasturage and running

\(^1\)G.T.J., 20th Jan. 1849. According to a letter by "Subscriber", a census taken by E.M. Cole showed that there were 25,000 Tambookies. The Assistant Surveyor-Genl., M. Robinson estimated the number to be 36,000. See DSGE 64, Robinson to Bell, 23 March 1849.

\(^2\)Ibid

\(^3\)G.T.J., 8th July 1848.

\(^4\)DSGEB 64, p. 14. Robinson to Bell, 23rd March 1849.
fountains. The Tambookies retaliated for trespass on their land by not only raiding from the farmers who had settled on Tambookie lands, but also from those in the adjacent white areas. From the farmers' point of view these raids were unwarranted. They claimed that the Tambookies had originally received the lands east of the Klaas Smits River from Stockenström in 1835 on condition of good behaviour, and since the Tambookies had, in the farmers' opinion, broken their part of the contract, the farmers wished the colonial boundary to be extended to the Indwe River, and the Tambookies expelled from the area between the Klaas Smits and Indwe River. ¹

In December 1847 when Sir Harry was on the frontier accompanied by his private secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Garrock, and Richard Southey, Secretary to the Government, he was presented with a petition by Field Cornets Alberts and Pretorius from the Albert and Cradock districts respectively, asking him to extend the boundary.² Presumably Sir Harry saw some justification for their request as on the 5th July 1848 the boundary was extended from the Klaas Smits River to the Indwe River.³ It was however explicitly stated that the Tambookies were not to be molested in the newly annexed area.⁴

After the proclamation of the new boundary the frontier was in a worse state of ferment than ever before. To begin with, the Tambookies in the area were placed under jurisdiction of H. Calderwood, Civil Commissioner of Victoria, but no immediate steps were taken to proclaim

²Ibid.
³Government Gazette 1848, Proclamation, 5th July 1848.
⁴PP. 1334, 1851, no. 1, Calderwood to Smith, 10th May 1850; PP. 1883, 1880, enclos. in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 8th March 1849.
the annexed area an integral part of the Victoria division. Under these circumstances Calderwood had doubts about his power to act legally in the country in question. 1 The Tambookies themselves were uncertain as to their position. It was only nine months after the proclamation of the new boundary that Calderwood on 8th March 1849 met the principal Tambookie chiefs at Shiloh to explain the new arrangement. 2 Meanwhile tension was building up in the disputed area, viz. between the Klaas Smits and Indwe River, which was now part of the Victoria division. Exactly how chaotic conditions in this area were, becomes clear from the following letter by "Subscriber" that appeared in the Grahamstown Journal in January 1849: "By the proclamation of the 5th (July 1848) .... the Tambookies' own laws and customs were broken up, and .... British Kaffraria has not been extended over them, and as yet British law had not been established. Everybody knows kaffir law cannot be enforced without the eating up system. The chiefs are afraid to do this lest they get themselves in trouble with the Colonial Government, and so, these people no longer fearing them, do as they like. When the Tambookies do commit depredations the colonists do not know to whom to apply for redress. Mr. Cole's jurisdiction is confined to British Kaffraria, but with the exception of Mapase's people, the Tambookies are now in the Colony, and consequently he has nothing to do with them. Some say that Mr. Calderwood is the man.... But where is he? Some eighty miles off. Now what could be the consequences in the districts of Cradock and Albert? The Tambookies do steal, and what else can be expected, left entirely without check in the matter?" 3

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1 No. 2857, Calderwood to Smith, 10th Nov. 1849.
2 Rep. 1282, 1850, enclos. in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 8th March 1850.
In an attempt to solve some problems in this north-eastern corner, the Government now devised a resettlement plan. When W. Shepstone and M. Robinson proclaimed a northern boundary for Tambookieland on 3rd December 1849 there was left a strip of almost unoccupied land just below the Stormberg. This boundary was proclaimed to be from the Wossley mountains on the Indwe River, about ten miles from the northern extremity of the eastern boundary to the Groot Vlei Mountains about twelve miles from the Klaas Smits River and about the same distance from the Stormberg through which it runs directly north through Salpatsberg. It was now, in 1849, contemplated to allot farms in this strip of land to farmers who were living in the northern portion of Victoria, while scattered Tambookies from below the Stormberg would be asked to move to the Victoria division. Both groups were to be given time to reap their crops, then the complicated exchange was to take place. But as soon as it became known that the farms would be allocated below the Stormberg on the same favourable conditions as in the Victoria and Albert districts, the farmers' scramble for land was challenged by the Tambookies. Understandably Europeans protested, and every letter to the Governor mirrors the tussle and tension that followed. The following two letters are typical of the complaints that reached the government office: In February 1849 James Pato applied for a farm in the said territory. He based his claim on the services his father had rendered to the Colony. The farm Reed Street that he was applying for was, according to him, "lately occupied by the Kaffirs."
Charles Linton claimed a farm near Donkerhoek. Apparently a certain Daniel Limburg had left this farm in 1835 in settlement of debts, but Linton only attempted to take possession after 1849. He now complained that "he was prevented by the insolence and forwardness of the Kaffirs, and not having a large connection of friends like the Dutch farmers, he was compelled to relinquish it."¹

But although there was considerable scramble for land in the strip below the Stormberg, the farmers in North Victoria were unwilling to relinquish their lands. In June 1849 Calderwood instructed Shepstone to visit these farmers personally, and to make it clear to them that they would not be allowed on those farms after their crops had been removed. He had also to explain to them the willingness of the Government to provide for them at the foot of the Stormberg.² In June 1850 the farmers, however, had not yet been evicted, and since they felt that they had a definite claim to the land, they had no intention of moving. Field Cornet Z. Pretorius from the Klein Smits River Ward complained in a letter to the Governor that he "as many farmers of the ward (Klaas Smits) have during the last seventeen years peaceably occupied certain pieces of land adjacent to this ward in the lately annexed district of Victoria, but that lately memorialists especially, as other farmers, have been put to the greatest inconvenience, annoyance and loss, by reason of the very summary manner by which they have been dispossessed by the natives living in the Victoria District, of these lands, their rights to which had hitherto been disputed."³ However, Assistant Commissioner W. Shepstone⁴

¹Ibid., Charles Linton to Smith, 12th Feb. 1849.
²NP. 1324, 1850, enclos. in no. 1, Calderwood to Smith, 10th May 1850.
³Ibid., no. 15, memorial of Zacharias Pretorius, 4th June 1850.
⁴In July 1849 William Shepstone was appointed Assistant Commissioner to the Temboockies in the division of Victoria.
maintained that the farmers themselves had weakened their case as they had paid Umtirara one head of cattle annually, thereby recognizing that chief's ownership of land.1

Calderwood found in 1850 that there were three or four farmers who could claim permanent occupancy west of the Klaas Smits River as they had occupied their farms before the Seventh Xhosa War. He was in favour of these farmers being allowed to stay on.2 The Tambockies, however, desired that all the farmers should be removed. But although the Tambockies and farmers jostled and threatened each other, they never came to actual hostilities. This was perhaps due to Calderwood's influence. That he could avert armed conflict, handicapped as he was by the limitations under which he had to perform his duties, is a great credit to his ability as Civil Commissioner, especially as the early part of 1850 was a period of accumulating grievances. Matters reached a crisis in May 1850 when Field Cornet Z. Pretorius, arguing that he had a legitimate claim to the farm that he was occupying in North Victoria,3 became involved in a dispute with a petty Tambockie chief, Kolosenie, who was living on lands adjacent to Pretorius' farm. Pretorius who had received permission from Kolosenie to make bricks on this chief's land, proceeded according to Kolosenie to plough up some gardens.4 Kolosenie threatened that should Pretorius not stop this, he would send to W. Shepstone for help. Pretorius, it was alleged by the Tambockies, had in turn threatened to collect an

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1 CO.2866, Shepstone to Calderwood, 24th Aug. 1850; CO.2857, Shepstone to Smith, 6th Dec. 1849.

2 RP. 1334, 1850, enclos. in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 4th Oct. 1850.

3 1Sumna, p. 81.

4 RP. 1334, 1850, enclos. in no. 1, W. Shepstone to Calderwood, 6th May 1850; see also evidence by a Tambockie, Booy, and by J.L. Pretorius, enclosed in no. 10.
army to drive the Tambookies away.\(^1\) Feelings ran so high that on receipt of information on this dispute, the Secretary of the Governor, John Montagu, urged Calderwood to "prevent a conflict which could not be but disastrous in its results."\(^2\)

Calderwood succeeded in averting armed conflict, but the affair had several unfavourable effects. Firstly it embroiled the relationship between the farmers and the Government to such an extent that it might well be counted among the reasons why, in the war of 1850, frontier farmers were unwilling to turn out and fight "the Governor's war."\(^3\)

Field Cornets Alberts and Pretorius claimed that when, in 1848, they petitioned Sir Harry in connection with the extension of the boundary to the Indwe River, he had actually consented to give the land between the Klaas Smits and Indwe River to the farmers. They had thus expected the Governor to fulfill his promise, and when no steps were taken to remove the Tambookies, they approached Andries Stockenström\(^3\) in November 1849, for help. At that time they actually produced a letter, which they claimed was in the Governor's own hand, in which he gave them permission to take possession of the Tambookie territory subject to the condition that "the kafir chief Khama, and his followers were not to be expelled because the former was a Christian and the latter would make good servants for the farmers."\(^4\) If this was true, then Smith had indeed contrived a situation which was bound to set the Boers and Tambookies at loggerheads. When the matter became one of open controversy,

\(^1\)Ibid., Bocq's evidence in no. 10.

\(^2\)Ibid., no. 2, John Montagu to Calderwood, 16th May 1850.

\(^3\)After having resigned in November, 1846 as Commandant-General of the Burgher Forces, Stockenström settled on his farm Manstrooom, in the district of Bedford.

Smith flatly denied that he ever signed such a letter, and he maintained that if the farmers had produced one, it must have been forged. However, the Governor took no steps to substantiate the charge. But whether he signed the letter or not, the farmers were generally led to believe that they were granted rights to certain Tambockie lands, and the fact that the boundary was indeed extended, strengthened them in their conviction. At the time of the dispute with Kolosene, Pretorius and Alberts made appeal to Stockenström for the second time, in May 1850. Stockenström refused, as on the first occasion, to have anything to do with the matter, but he could not resist the temptation to hit out at the Governor's policy: "I have neither the right, nor the power, nor the wish to meddle with the Governor's measures. I disapprove of them entirely, and I believe none of them more dangerous and pernicious than the one you have now made me acquainted with." Thus the Governor, who was prodigiously popular with the farmers after the boundary proclamation, had now fallen into disfavour. The complainants informed Stockenström that they had no reply to their further petition to the Governor, and that Commissioner Shepstone, when approached, sent only a contemptuous message. They impressed upon Stockenström that "robberies in their districts were incessant and unbearable in spite of assurance throughout the Colony that all was peace and success on the frontier."

On evidence laid before Calderwood by W. Shepstone and R. Gilfillan, Civil Commissioner for Cradock, Calderwood in October 1850 gave decision against the Dutch farmers. Calderwood met the farmers

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1 Southey Travers, ACC/611/3, Smith to Southey, 3rd Sept. 1850, quoted by A. Dunlop in The Role of Sir Andries Stockenström, p. 151.
3 Ibid.
personally, and from the discussions that followed he was convinced that the trouble was stirred up by Pretorius and a few friends. Calderwood regarded it as of the utmost consequence to the peace of the country that, with the exception of three or four farmers, all trespassers on Tambookie land should be evicted. Although he reported in December 1850 that matters had been settled, and that both Tambookies and farmers were satisfied, it is doubtful whether the disgruntled farmers were indeed pacified. Pretorius, who was dismissed from his office as Field Cornet, felt strongly that Shepstone was a most biased witness who had wilfully made false accusations for the purpose of persecuting him. In the light of conflicting evidence given by Tambookie servants, it is difficult to establish just how far Pretorius was justified in making such allegations, but there are certainly incidents that do cast a reflection as to Shepstone's reliability. On 2nd May 1850, for instance, Pretorius sent a letter to Shepstone requesting him to attend a meeting at Pretorius' farm, Zeekoegat, as Pretorius was desirous that a settlement be made between the Tambookies and the farmers of the Klaas Smits and Albert districts. Although Shepstone forwarded this letter to Calderwood, he ignored it in his correspondence and rather made use of oral witness by a Tambookie servant, M. Boda who, according to his own evidence, was sent by Pretorius to inform Shepstone of the meeting. Boda alleged that Pretorius had threatened to collect aid, if necessary, even from across the Orange River to drive the Tambookies from their lands. Boda further alleged that Pretorius had asked him to inform Shepstone that should he refuse to attend the meeting, he (Pretorius) would consider it to be a declaration of war. It seems then that Shepstone had intentionally

1 DSCGR, p. 64, Calderwood to Robinson, 13th Dec. 1850.
2 EP, 1334, 1850, no. 1, Shepstone to Calderwood, 7th May 1850.
stressed unreliable evidence so as to make Pretorius appear the aggressor. Even John Montagu, after having had examined all the available evidence, was convinced that "Mr. Shepstone had been rather unnecessarily alarmed by the proceedings of the farmers." Under these circumstances it is difficult to believe that Pretorius had accepted his dismissal and the farmers their eviction from the lands, as placidly as Calderwood seems to have thought.

While the Dutch farmers were understandably disgruntled, the Tambookies were by no means placated. When Calderwood had met the Tambookie chiefs in March 1849 they then agreed to the new boundary line, and expressed their wish to be governed on a similar plan to that which prevailed in British Kaffraria. They were also given the assurance that they would in no way be molested in or expelled from their country. Prompt action immediately after the dispute between Pretorius and Kolosenie had started, would have given them re-insurance. But correspondence between Calderwood on the one hand and the Colonial Office on the other hand dragged on for nine months. Meanwhile the Tambookies were losing confidence in the Government. Some of them said openly that Pretorius was a government official and therefore must be supported by the Government. When eventually decision was taken, and the farmers evicted, Calderwood allowed four farmers to stay on on Tambookie territory. Although the Tambookies wished these farmers to be removed, Calderwood made use of his influence to persuade them to the contrary. Events had already shown that irritation followed inevitably where white and black were living in close proximity. It is also by no means sure

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1Ibid., no. 11, John Montagu to Calderwood, 20th June 1850.

2Ibid., enclose, in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 4th Oct. 1850.
that effective steps were taken to prevent any future encroachment on
the part of the Dutch farmers on Tambockie lands. Certainly then, the
Umlanjeni prophecies would have appealed to those Tambockies who felt
that they had been let down by the Government.

Not the least harmful effect of the Pretorius episodes lay in
the rumours and counter rumours that worsened the already tense atmos-
phere. The Tambockies claimed that Pretorius had said that he had
government support for driving them away; that he threatened to call in
help that had been promised to him by farmers from beyond the Orange
River; that he had asked Stockenström to lead an army against them;
that he had applied to the Civil Commissioner of Cradock for gunpowder
and that he had assembled friends and relatives on his farm to cast
bullets.1 Pretorius on the other hand alleged that the frontier was in
such an explosive state that he needed ammunition for protection. The
Tambockies, he maintained, had become so audacious as to threaten to
drive the farmers from the lands which had been measured for them, claim-
ing that they were acting under the authority of Commissioner Shepstone.2

Threats and rumours on the frontier were usually like a diplomatic
offensive and prelude to war. In this case the truth cannot be
established beyond doubt, but it seems likely that Pretorius and his
friends were trying to scare the Tambockies from their lands so that
they could take possession of it. From their side the Tambockies
tried a counter-tactic of bluff. In an atmosphere of mutual distrust
it was easy to exaggerate and distort to a point where none could
distinguish fact from rumour. It often happened, too, that rumours were
spread with the deliberate idea of creating a war psychosis that would

1 Ibid., encl os. in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 4th Oct. 1850.
2 Ibid., Stockenström to Smith, 1st July 1850.
incite a fighting spirit. This policy was apparently followed by some Albert farmers who became increasingly aware of their vulnerable position, and who were at the same time alarmed by the complacency of their compatriots.

It is generally argued that Sir Harry Smith had a sound sense of continental strategy, and that this lay behind his bold annexations as High Commissioner. What perhaps he did not realise was that large scale annexations and territorial re-settlement was apt to multiply and enlarge the points of tribal intercommunication and resistance. Stress has already been given to the problems created by the relative isolation of Mapassa in Kaffraria, and the attempt to re-settle the Tambookies on the northern border. In two other zones there were signs of an interaction of tribal politics, namely in Tambookie relations with Morosi and Moshesh and in tensions between the Tambookies and the Gcaleka.

To the north of Tambookieland the annexation of the Orange River Sovereignty had solved no problems and emphasised new ones. Just south of the Orange River in the modern district of Herschell, a troublesome chief, Morosi, had his stronghold in the Witteberge. This chief had always been closely associated with the Tambookies; in fact some European inhabitants of the Sovereignty regarded him as a petty Tambookie chief, related to Moshesh. In evidence before the Cape Commission on Native Laws and Customs (1883) neither C.H. Driver nor W. Stanford\(^1\) could establish beyond any doubt whether Morosi's people were amaThembu or abaSutu people, but both inclined to believe that they were originally Thembus who went up to Basutoland whence they migrated southward.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) C.H. Driver was at that time Resident Magistrate at Lady Frere. W. Stanford was magistrate at Bagooba and was a member of the Commission.

\(^2\) Commission on Native Lands and Customs 1883, appendix I, p. 411.
Through the years fugitive Tambookies had always been welcome in Morosi's domain. The Tambookies moreover found the Witteberge an ideal hiding place for cattle stolen from the Colony. In 1847, for instance, Morosi admitted to Major Warden\(^1\) that colonial cattle had been brought into his country by Umtirara's people.\(^2\)

North of the Orange the land problems of the Basuto had not been solved by the exercise of British Sovereignty and the devising of the Warden lines. This may explain why, though Moshesh himself ridiculed the Umlanjeni prophecies, many of his people gave heed to them. The Albert farmers had reason to be alarmed, as there were signs of close co-operation between Moshesh and the Tambookies. Mountain messengers between Basutoland and Tambookieland increased, and a traffic in guns and ammunition was taking place.\(^3\) Moreover, there were in Moshesh's territory a large number of Tambookies who seemed to have had intercourse with the rebellious tribes in the south. These Tambookies had fought on Government sides during the war of 1846, and probably to escape the wrath of disloyal Tambookies, settled after the war north of the Orange River.\(^4\) Moshesh himself admitted to Warden that in 1847 he had allowed some 50 Tambookies from "motives of charity" to settle in his country, and within a few months their numbers had increased considerably. With typical shrewdness he added that he suspected that they were having intercourse with the enemies of the Colony; therefore he was determined on sending them back.\(^5\) There is no evidence that

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\(^1\) Warden, Major Henry Douglas, British Resident in the Orange River Sovereignty, 8th March 1848 - 23rd July 1852.


\(^3\) Cape Frontier Times, 4th March 1851.

\(^4\) Basutoland Records, p. 494.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 147.
Moshesh ever sent back the 400 Tambookies who were by December 1847 living in his country, and in the light of the gun traffic mentioned above it seems likely that his apparent disgust at their "intercourse with the enemies of the Colony" was just a smokescreen to hide his relations with the Tambookies south of the Orange River.

The Albert farmers who were naturally more sensitive than any other group, to the pressure of the Tambookies, were also alarmed at the inaction and indecision of the Cape Government, and the apparent reluctance of other farmers to stand by their fellow Boers. It would seem that, knowing the possible risk of an alignment between Moshesh and the Tambookies, they magnified it for propaganda purposes until they almost believed it themselves. In November 1850, for instance, there were rumours that a number of Mantatees had arrived at Badsfontein, the farm of Jan de Wet. They warned him that a large commando of kaffirs had assembled at Morosi's place, and were ready to invade the Colony.\(^1\) Cole investigated the matter personally, but found that there was no truth in the rumours.\(^2\)

Relations between the Thembus and Gcalekas had often been ambivalent. The dispute that had arisen after 1848 was a sore that had been festering ever since Umtirara's father, Vusani, made himself unpopular with the other chiefs by harbouring missionaries during the Sixth Xhosa War.\(^3\) The feud was intensified after the War of the Axe. Sir Harry Smith's settlements, whereby the boundary between the Thembus and Gcalekas was laid down as being from the junction of the White Kei and the Indwe River up to the source of the Indwe River and from there eastward along the old

\(^1\) CO.2866, C. Cloete to E.H. Cole, 18th Nov. 1850.
\(^2\) Ibid., Cole to Smith, 26th Nov. 1850.
\(^3\) PE. 503, 1855, enclos. in no. 23, W. Davis, Wesleyan Missionary to D'Urban, 9th June 1850.
boundary, added fuel to the smouldering fire as a considerable tract
of land up to then occupied by Gcalekas, was thereby given to the
Tambookies.¹ Moreover, the Governor did not try to hide his preference
for Umtirara. "You councillors of Kreli", he warned at the meeting with
the chiefs at King William's Town in January 1848, "[tell him] that if
I hear another word of fighting I will eat up the aggressor." In view
of the fact that he had just before promised Umtirara that "no Kreli
will eat you up", there can be little doubt as to whom he expected to
be the aggressor.² Kreli's appeal to Mackinnon for a revision of the
boundaries was futile. Smith had committed himself to protect the Tam-
bookies as this tribe had agreed that the tract of land below the Storm-
berg could be given to the farmers on condition that Kreli would be
ordered to move from the lands adjoining the Balotta River.
³
Clearly, if Kreli remained in occupation of the area, then the
stiffening of the Tambookie attitude towards the Dutch farmers could be
expected. For, as usual in the north-east, there were neither soldiers
nor police to enforce decisions, and the Gcaleka continued to penetrate
into the Balotta River area. Lack of administrative control at one point,
meant in fact lack of control at all points with the attendant risk of
war.

In the case of the Tambookie-Gcaleka boundary, the position was
further complicated by the Bushmen under the chief Manidoor whose right
as original owner to the lands between the Tambookies and the Gcalekas
were recognised in 1848. It was probably hoped at that time that they

¹ On this matter as well as on the dispute between Manidoor and
the Tambookie, Smith agreed with Kaitland's proposals. Supra, p.27.
For Smith's settlements, see RP. 969, 1846, enclos. in no. 10, Smith
to Earl Grey, 7th April 1848.
² Ibid.
³ RP. 1334, 1850, enclos. in no. 8, Calderwood to Smith, 4th
Oct. 1850.
would form a barrier between the two hostile tribes, but the Bushmen, too, had a longstanding feud with the Tambookies, and the long drought of 1850 inevitably led to trouble. Accusations by the Bushmen that the Tambookies were trespassing on their lands on the Cacado River, culminated in an attack in September 1850 by the Bushman chief, Flux Lynx, on the Tambookies. Although the Tambookies succeeded in routing them, there were rumours, not only about more attacks, but also about a possible alliance between the Bushmen and Krelli.\footnote{EP. 1334, 1850, enclos. in no. 5, Shepstone to Calderwood, 11th Sept. 1850.}

As one studies the complex patterns of Tambookieland between 1847 and 1850, it is clear that they were almost bound to be involved in any major war. Not only did they lack the clear guidance of Untirara after January 1848 but the death of the chief caused suspicion and internal disturbances. In fact, conditions were so unsettled that, when reports about this appeared in the newspapers, E.M. Cole was severely reprimanded by the Governor for having failed to investigate the matter. Although Cole assured the Governor that the chief had died of paralytic stroke, and that no influential person in Kaffirland dies without his death being attributed to witchcraft,\footnote{CH. 22/3, no. 48, Cole to Smith, 25th March 1845.} many Tambookies adhered to the idea that their chief was poisoned.\footnote{Ibid. It was generally believed by the Tambookies that Untirara's last words were: "by mother poisoned me." However, his mother accused his aunt, and eventually both women were put to death.} Thus, divided territorially as well as politically among themselves, the Tambookies seemed during these years to be the sport of fortune. They were jostled on one front by European farmers; on the other by the Gcalekas. Nonesi, the regent, was as loyal as Untirara had been, but, probably because she was only regent, it seems as if she was often treated with indifference. There were also younger
chiefs who were more ambitious and whose attachment to the government was not as strong as had traditionally been the case with chiefs who ruled over this section of the Tambookie tribe. Thus, a large number of Tambookies were waiting with Mapassa to join a war.

The explosion on the eastern frontier came in December 1850. Previously, in October 1850 Smith had deposed Sandile, the Gaika chief who had become troublesome, and set up Charles Brownlee as chief. The Gaikas refused to recognize Brownlee, and their restlessness soon called the Governor back to the frontier. In December, then, he appointed Gaika's widow, Sutu, in the place of Brownlee, outlawed Sandile and sent an expedition against him. The small force was attacked by a large number of Gaika at Booma Pass, and on Christmas Day, 1850, three of Smith's military villages in the Chemic Valley were attacked and destroyed. Gaikas, Thembus and Gcalekas all took up arms against the Colony. Hermanus Matroos, still resenting an incident six weeks earlier, when Kaffir police destroyed the huts of his followers who were squatting beyond the boundary assigned to them, attacked the inhabitants of Fort Beaufort. He was joined by many Kat River Hottentots.

The war was long and bitterly fought. It differed from previous wars not only in its intensity and duration, but also in two other ways. There was the alignment between the Hottentots and the Gcalekas which had begun with the Kat River rebellion, and, to the north there was the involvement of the Tambookies which explains the extension of the whole area of conflict. This was emphasised after the war both by John Fairbairn and by Andries Stokenschrän, when in 1857 they gave evidence before the Select Committee on Kafir Tribes.¹

¹Select Committee on Kafir Tribes, 1851, p. 62, Q. 526-531; p. 170, Q. 1272.
Admittedly the menace of the Tambookies lay in their numbers rather than in their valour and skill as warriors,¹ but Mapassa and those who joined him, by a twofold action, frequently managed to tip the balance in favour of the hostile tribes. Firstly, as a result of their intensified attacks on the Albert and Credock districts, the burghers of these districts were kept busy and thus prevented from joining the colonial forces in Kaffraria. Secondly, by making alliances with the Gaikas, Gcalekas² and Shiloh Hottentots they strengthened the numbers of the enemy. It was reckoned by farmers on the Tambookie frontier, that at the commencement of the war, Mapassa and his tribe were more influential than the Gaika themselves for they had never ceased to use their influence until they had drawn nearly all the other Tambookies into the war. It was by passing through them and joining with them that the Gaikas were enabled to supply from the back of the Amatola their commissariat when the troops attacked them from below.³ Moreover, Mapassa immediately after the outbreak of the war, sent about 800 men to assist Sandile in the Amatolas. If an available burgher force of 200 men had been on the spot, Mapassa might have been contained. As no such force was available, the opportunity passed by.⁴

¹When in January, 1851 Captain Tylden's force came into contact with Mapassa's force of between 3000 and 4000 men, the latter declined to attack them, even though Tylden's force tried to provoke him to do so. Vide AP. 1354, 1850, enclos. 5 in no. 6, Tylden to Smith, 26th Jan. 1851. See also C.T.J., 15th Feb. 1851. The reporter states: We have had several brushes, but the Tambookies under Mapassa are no good and will not stand a minute.

²It must be noted here that the enmity between the Gcalekas and Tambookies was confined to Umthirane's Tambookies. Through his association with the Gaikas, Mapassa had always been on fairly close terms with Krolí.

³C.T.J., 6th Nov. 1852.

⁴Ibid., 15th Feb. 1851.
One feature common to what Byron Farwell has called the Little Wars of Victoria's reign, is that in their initial stages, the effective military forces on the spot, when hostilities began, were rarely adequate, either in numbers or in the kind of equipment necessary to meet the difficulties on the terrain. This was certainly true in the Cape in 1850. Since his arrival in 1847 Smith had annexed 105 000 square miles of territory and was responsible for an extended frontier of 1 000 miles. An extension of area meant a multiplication of responsibilities. Yet such was his egoism and optimism, and probably his sense of duty that in 1850, despite the evidence of mounting protest and tension, he had reduced the number of imperial troops in South Africa.

When war began in December 1850 there were only 2 674 effectives for service on the frontier. In the opening and crucial phases, he had to rely on native levies, loyal Hottentots, local volunteers and burgher forces. The latter were small in number, partly because the conflict area was in a new geographical zone, and partly because they regarded the war as the Governor's war. Both Sir Harry and John Montagu believed that it was due to Stockenström's influence that the burghers who fought so bravely in the war of 1846 could now not be induced to move to the frontier. While it is true that Stockenström had regularly attacked the Governor's policy in letters to the press, it would be unfair to blame him entirely. Much of the difficulty in conducting the war arose from the extension of the area of conflict. The eye of the storm was on the old frontier area placed in a new jeopardy by the tough and skilled tactics of the Xhosa and their Hottentot allies.

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2 Du Toit, p. 63.
3 Ibid., p. 60; Cory V, p. 363.
north-eastern frontier, though not deserted, was left more to local
resources. Hence, Albert burghers, for instance, like those of Cradock,
played no small part in the defence of their own district. These two
districts, bordering on Tamboockieeland and thus exposed to devastating
inroads, had to rely on their own Burgher forces for their defence;
understandably they could give only a minimum of help in the main area
of conflict. When asked for help by the Civil Commissioner of Albany,
J. Gilfillan, Civil Commissioner for Cradock replied: "It is utterly
impossible....I have a frontier boundary on Tamboockie land which is
80 miles in extent with nothing but the inhabitants to look for its
defence."¹ In the Albert district, where the boundary of Tamboockie-
land extended for more than a hundred miles, the burghers would have
objected even more strongly to leave their farms exposed to barbarous
attacks. This, as has been said, did not mean that they were completely
inactive.

Even before the war started, the Civil Commissioner of Albert had
ordered patrols for the protection of the frontier, and at the outbreak
of the war this force was increased and stationed at a point whence a
descent into the plains of the Klaas Smits River could easily be effected.²
This commando, in conjunction with the Colesberg force under the staunch
old veteran, Gideon Joubert, rendered invaluable services during the
first months of the war. In January 1851 they were responsible for
the extrication of Captain Reid who was completely hemmed in at the
Buchman School on the Cascado, assisted at the Battle of Whittlesea where,
through their actions the Hottentots were diverted from their allies, the
Tamboockies, and during encounters with the Tamboockies on the Kei River,
managed to disperse them and caused them to flee in all directions. Immediately after their return from the Kei River they were ordered to proceed to the Witteberge where Major Warden was involved in a serious skirmish with those Tambookies who lived with Morosi, whose own attitude was uncertain. The commando was now divided. Some were left to patrol the border and about one hundred men were marching forward towards the Witteberge. En route, they were themselves surrounded by a large Tambookie force. There could well have been a disastrous massacre but for the presence of Rev. W. Bertram with the commando. This missionary, having been a confidante of Morosi, asked the latter to let the party go. The plans of the Tambookies had now been frustrated, and they turned back.¹ Events like these were admittedly incidents on the fringe of the main area of conflict. To the Albert farmers, however, such incidents underlined their isolation: they could not get help, either from the other districts or from the Government. They were beginning to feel the effect of their absence from their farms, as some of their houses had already been burned.² They tried to cope with this danger by establishing a strong patrol or "Wagt" on the frontier where the men from the Albert and Greyling Field Portions were posted,³ but this meant that their fighting force was reduced. Behind them, to the north, as it seemed the frontier was in turmoil. They certainly expected Morosi to be in league with the Tambookies, and they were uncertain of the neutrality of Moshesh.

The attitude of the Tambookies of Untirara's tribe was still uncertain. The Colonial Government, arguing from previous experience

² C.T.J., 31st May 1851.
³ Ibid., 15th March 1851.
counted on their neutrality. In January 1850 Nonesi had in fact proved her friendship as she offered to drive the hostile Tambockies out of the Colony, and then to move a part of her tribe immediately to the border of the Cradock district so as to protect this part of the border. Shepstone welcomed such a step as it meant that the Tambockies could control a border of fifty miles in length. Quesha, too, offered help, and Calderwood argued that in conjunction with the friendly chief Kama, their services could be invaluable;¹ hence these friendly chiefs were supplied with arms by the Government.² But even on this part of the frontier the position was anything but clear. Nonesi's control was by no means absolute, and the excitement of war was apt to be contagious to young warriors. In January 1851 Commandant Joubert passed through this area on his way to Whittlesea. According to his own report he was attacked by Tambockies of Untirara's tribe. Joubert had no doubt as to the guilt of Nonesi's people as several of those on the commando saw Nenel, chief councillor of Nonesi, among those who fired on the burghers.³ The Cape Frontier Times took a different view. It blamed Joubert for having attacked a tribe with whom the Colony was at peace, and the paper gloomily forecast that this serious blunder was likely to bring upon the Colony the largest Tambokie tribes which up to that period had been quiet.⁴ Here then was an example of typical frontier confusion which could only possibly have been resolved by the establishment of a judicial commission. It is, however, fairly certain that any unprovoked attack on the Tambockies

¹CO. 2075, Shepstone to Calderwood, 11th Jan. 1851.
²G.T.J., 15th March 1851.
³Ibid.
⁴The Cape Frontier Times, 11th Feb. 1852.
would have led to revenge on the part of this tribe. This did not happen, and the Cape Frontier Times seems to have been in error.

After Joubert had succeeded in dispersing the Tambookies, he dictated peace terms according to which the Tambookies of Umatirara's tribe had to hand over within eight days 2000 head of cattle and 150 horses, and then to retreat beyond the Bashee.¹ No evidence could be found that the stock was handed over, but in February 1851 Nonesi had indeed, with her followers, moved beyond the Bashee.² Thereby she had either adhered to Joubert's peace terms and by implication admitted guilt, or the above incident had proved to her that she was lacking control over her people and that it would be safer to move away from the danger zone.

As the Albert and Cradock frontiers were rather open parts without bush, the Tambookies preferred to avoid open warfare and took to a devastating type of guerilla warfare in which the tactic was that small parties were formed to make night attacks. Thus, while elsewhere successful operations were undertaken against the Tambockie, the Albert district was almost completely ruined. During the time that the Albert burghers were on commando at the Imvani River,³ 1200 head of cattle were carried off by such marauding parties.

By May 1851 the position was becoming desperate. A correspondent to The Grahamstown Journal reported: "Things look very bad in our

¹ G.T.J., 15th March 1851.
² RP. 1380, 1851, enclos. 6 in no. 3, Rev. J. Thomas for Clarkburg to Rev. Appleyard, 26th Feb. 1851.
³ In April, 1851 a joint commando consisting of Colesberg and Albert burghers under Gideon Joubert and E.H. Cole; Cradock burghers under Captain Tylden and native levies from North Victoria under Sheppstone, attacked Mapasa in his stronghold on the Uwani River. This army of about 1250 men encountered the united forces of Krelli, Mapasa, Chopo and Quesha. The Tambookies were decisively defeated, but the victory was not followed up.
district (Albert) which is now completely overrun by Tambookies who carry on cattle lifting to a fearful extent. In Hol Spruit three farm houses have been burnt down. The Boers are deserting their farms and trekking over the Orange River. Eighteen farms in the Stormberg and Bamboesb erg are deserted. The Wonderboomspuit is now the frontier line....We are here in constant alarm as there is no force in our front to stop or even warn us from an approaching enemy. At a meeting a resolution was passed to call in Graaff-Reinet and Colesberg people for assistance, but those far from the frontier seem very loath to turn out....Field Cornet Alberts is at present the only one on the Stormberg. Every means have been used by him to prevent his people from trekking, but they are hardly to be blamed, for seeing no assistance at hand and knowing the exposed state of the frontier— their lives in jeopardy—what was to be done?  

Conditions were aggravated by the severe drought. From Burghersdorp Cole reported that it would have been difficult to get up a strong commando of burghers for any lengthy operations, as the country was so dry that the horses were literally not fit to carry their riders.  

The position was well nigh intolerable, especially when the farmers in the Klaas Smits River area started to trek. These farmers provided a last stronghold in the rear of the Albert district against Mapassa's Tambookies who swarmed over the modern district of Queenstown and Whittlesea. The road to the Albert district now lay open. In June 1850 it was reported that the farms up to the Klaas Smits River were lit up for miles around every night, and that every farm from Turvey Place to Stormberg was deserted. All communication between the Klaas

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1 G.T.J., 10th May 1851.
2 WP. 1426, 1851, enclos. 8 in no. 17, Cole to Lt.Col. Cloete, 21st July 1851.
Smit and Albert had ceased. The Boers on the Hol Spruit had fled, and the colonial boundary was now a great distance from Burgersdorp. ¹

As large parts of the Albert district was becoming uninhabited, the burghers from the adjoining districts of Colesberg and Graaff-Reinet, belatedly, realized the strategic importance of the Stormberg area as a buffer between them and the hostile Tambookies. An attack on the farm of Dow Steyn near Steynsburg, in June, jolted them into action and 300 burghers from Graaff-Reinet, Achter Snoeuberg and Vleekpoort came to the aid of Gilfillan.² There were other hopeful signs.

The lull in Tambookie raids which was marked in July 1851 was due in part to fact and in part to rumour. The "wachts" on the border were beginning to control the raids, and at this point the Tambookies caught the rumour that a Zulu force was approaching to attack them in the rear.³ This is an excellent example of the speed and accuracy of the "bush-telegraph" and the powers of rumours so disseminated. Sir Harry had indeed requested in February 1851 that the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal send him a contingent of 3000 Zulus under command of the Diplomatic Agent, T. Shepstone. He intended to employ this force to attack the Galkas and Tambookies in the rear. Shepstone doubted the expediency of such a measure, and pointed out that the Zulus might attack friendly tribes on the way. Although the Governor subsequently countermanded the order, there was still ample evidence that Europeans were only too willing to make use of a Zulu army, as in April a Zulu army was sent into the Sovereignty at the request of Major Warden.

¹ G.T.J., 24th May 1851.
² HP, 1354, 1850, encl. 8 in no. 17, E.M. Cole to Lt.Col. Cloete, 15th April 1851.
³ G.T.J., 5th July 1851.
But the optimistic reporters who took a decline in cattle lifting as a sign that the Tambookies were subdued were soon to be disappointed. By August, in spite of drubbings in a skirmish with Captain Tylden at Hangklip, the Tambookies were once again back in full force.¹

To the farmers who fought so gallantly one of the most frustrating aspects of this war must have been the inconclusive results of battles won, often against heavy odds. The explanation for this lays partly in the nature of commando action, and partly in the inability of the colonial government to reinforce the burgher troops in this remote sector of the frontier. Burgher forces lacked strong leadership and on occasion action was rendered ineffective by personal or local rivalries. There were, for instance, considerable differences between Commandant Joubert and the Field Cornets of Albert. The burghers, many of them already disinclined to fight, became unruly when there was no strong authority to keep them in check. One incident may be selected to illustrate this. In April, during the battle on the Imvani River, the burghers in a gallant effort dispersed the combined Gaika and Tambookie forces. Captain Tylden then urged the burghers to remain in the field for at least ten days, and to follow up the advantages they had. They disobeyed, and the results were disastrous, as the Tambookies recovered in less than a fortnight. It seems reasonable to assume that the disastrous Tambookie inroads could at an early date have been stopped if the burghers had been led by a determined, active commander.²

¹O.T.J., 30th August 1851. A reporter from Burgersdorp stated: "Our border affairs wear a gloomy aspect. Hans and Sarel Eloff were murdered. Commandant Olivier stated that the Kaffirs, about 500 in number, were in the Hol Spruit and had swept 600 head of cattle, and all the horses."

²The Cape Frontier Times, 4th March 1851. Vide also RP. 1734, 1850, enclos. 5 in no. 3. This report states that misunderstanding made Joubert divert his commandos from the Albert commando.
It was only at the end of 1851 that substantial, and it seems timely help was available from the Colony. Colonel Somerset arrived at Whittlesea with 900 men consisting of Cape Corps Fingos and Hottentot Levies. This force was joined by forces under Captain Tylden and Colonel McKinnon so that the combined force consisted of about 4000 men. Captain Tylden with his force moved upon Tyopo's kraal on the Ukundula River and proceeded over a difficult pass to Thaba Mthako. Though the men were exhausted after the long march, they attacked the enemy who fled to their kraals up to the steep side of the precipices that crown the summits of the mountains in Tambockieland. The next day the enemy presented themselves near Mackay's Neck where they were dispersed, and more than a thousand cattle and numerous horses were captured by Somerset's men. This victory was followed by a successful attack on Kreli at the sources of the Bashee River. Here Somerset was informed by Mr. Thomas, the missionary at Clarkbury, that Kreli and the surrounding chiefs had planned a concerted movement which was to have been effected that month. The Tambockies were to move upon Cradock; the Gailekas upon Whittlesea and Shiloh, and the Gaikas in another direction, the whole forming a combined effort. Somerset's move on the Bashee was thus more than timely.1

In January 1852 events suddenly took a dramatic turn and it seemed as if the tide was turning against the Tambockies. While on his way to the Keats Smits River to join in a combined attack on Turvey's post, Mapassa was attacked by a violent pain in the chest and back, and he died a few days later.2 His death was a great blow to the Tambockie activists as it was Mapassa's men who had worked most

1 G.T.J., 13th Jan. 1852.
2 G.T.J., 10th Jan. 1852.
closely with the Gaika tribes. Moreover, resenting the position of Nonesi, he had weakened her guidance of Umtirara's people and acted like a magnet to Tambookie malcontents. The fighting spirit of Mapassa's people was temporarily paralysed, not least because disputed claims to the succession led to internal discord and suspicion. While Mapassa was still very ill, the witchdoctor, Vedana, accused Delisthazi, the chief pakati of Mapassa's tribe, of having poisoned his chief. Delisthazi, it was believed, would have been motivated by jealousy as his extraordinary bravery had never been recognized by Mapassa. Three other men of the amaPakati were accused of being accomplices, and together with Delisthazi they were put to death. When Mapassa died in spite of this, they looked elsewhere for a culprit, and decided that Mapassa's great wife, mother of the heir to be, had been concerned in the plot in order that her son might become chief. From the report on his death in The Grahamstown Journal it seems as if European observers suspected a certain Koos of having devised all the intrigues in an attempt to get rid of the heir so that the command of the tribe might devolve on himself.  

The death of Mapassa and the resulting disruption had certainly eased the pressure on the Albert district. Another factor was this: in the excitement of war, and in part as a result of the involvement of Mapassa in Kaffrarian affairs, the old conflict between Tambookies and Coalekas had been put in cold storage. Two things revived the old animosity. The death of Mapassa snapped one bond. The movement of Nonesi to the Bachee River in March 1850 had re-opened another historic claim. Nonesi took occupation of her old country on the western

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1Ibid. Probably this was Xosa, the father of Mapassa's great wife.

2Ibid.
side of the Bushoo and Umgwali Rivers which was at that time in occupation by the amaGcaleka. The latter were determined not to give the lands up. Rumour added its quota to crisis. It was reported in December 1851 that the Pondo chief, Faku, was himself mustering to attack the Gcaleka and that the Tambookies would align with him. Pacification would be no simple business.

Meantime, just when military success seemed finally within his grasp, Sir Harry was recalled. In February, chief Kreli had sent messengers to sue for peace, and by mid-March, the Waterkloof had been cleared and the most rebellious of the Xhosa chiefs were anxious that hostilities should cease. But in spite of this progress, Sir Harry had fallen into disfavour with the Colonial Office. Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, was shaken by the contrast between the Governor's reports of brilliant victories and the evidence of continual resistance. Both Earl Grey and Lord John Russel, the Prime Minister, had convinced themselves that Smith had prolonged the war by leniency to the Hottentot rebels and inadequate vigour against the enemy. Smith was recalled, and on 31st March 1852 Sir George Cathcart arrived as new Governor and High Commissioner.

For the northern part of the Colony, the war of 1850-1853 was decisive at the time. For a pattern of uneasy juxtaposition of white and black in a fairly tranquil no man's land, there was finally substituted, first European sovereignty as proclaimed by Sir Harry Smith, and then attempted territorial re-settlement made possible by intervention of Napassa in the great conflict of the mid-century. In part the rifts within the Tambookie tribes explain this; so too does some grasp of the flexibility of inter-tribal politics which did not follow a

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1 G.T.J., 10th Jun. 1852.
stereotype pattern, but were often determined by particular situations. But it would seem that the root cause of Mapassa's action, was the splitting of his tribal groups by Sir Harry Smith's territorial policy, and his close association with the Gaika and other tribes of the newly annexed Kaffraria. It does not seem possible on available evidence to determine the influence of Umlanjeni's prophecies on Mapassa. Silence would imply that like Moshesh he was sceptical. But it is suggested that younger warriors found in Umlanjeni's prophecies something like a will to victory. This, quite as much as plunder would explain why in the early exhilaration of small victories, Goaleka and Tambookies would forget the Balotta area and fight side by side. It would also explain the tenacity of the resistance mounted, and the complex patterns of alignment against the colonial forces.

For the district of Albert, the result of the war was decisive. Broadly, it confirmed what Sir Harry Smith's annexations made possible, namely, the more systematic opening up of the whole area to European settlement.

Sir George Cathcart's settlements, then, were an elaboration of Smith's policy. Cathcart was under no illusion as to what was required of him. His predecessor had been recalled because he failed to bring the costly war to an end. The Colonial Office, alarmed at the huge sum this war in a far-off country was going to cost the taxpayer, felt inclined rather to restrict the British sphere of influence than to maintain it at such heavy expense to the British treasury. Earl Grey's instructions to Cathcart were thus very clear. He was "to consider only what are the measures best calculated to meet the just claims and to promote the true and permanent interests of Her Majesty's subjects both in the Colony and in the mother country."  

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As a soldier who appraised frontier policy from a military viewpoint, Cathcart realized that the future tranquility of the border rested firstly on an immediate cessation of hostilities, and secondly, on a peace settlement that would eliminate the possibility of another war, or at least minimize the power of the chiefs should a war be unavoidable. "Cathcart was," says Galbraith, "neither proratic nor proselaller; the people of the frontier were important to him to the extent that they were related to military security."¹

On his arrival Cathcart found that the tribes, though semi-starved and weary of war, were by no means subdued. While troops were still occupied in the Amatolas and Kaffraria, the Albert district was experiencing fresh inroads from the Tambookies. Matters became especially bad during the winter of 1852 as the Tambookies made use of the long, cold nights to commit depredations and to get back to their own country before being overtaken by daylight. A correspondent to the Grahamstown Journal urged for official help before matters became unbearable.² As the farmers then argued that peace terms with the Tambookies were of no avail, and that their complete subjection was the only solution, they were extremely upset when it became known that Cathcart, after successful operations in the Amatola and the Waterkloof, was contemplating coming to terms with the Tambookies. In October, 1852 a commission consisting of Civil Commissioner Calderwood, Commissioner Owen and F. Warner, Superintendent of the Hingoes, was appointed to discuss peace terms with the Tambookies.³

The sentiment of the farmers on hearing this news was expressed

¹Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p. 264.
²G.T.J., 12th June 1852.
³Ibid., 16th October 1852.
by a correspondent to the Grahamstown Journal, who stated that the Tambookies had been "a continual scourge to the Colony ever since the commencement of the war; [they] have lost the British Government more money than their whole country is worth, and if we could prevent them from outrage in the future, we must keep them in subordination." ¹

Even more cynical is a letter by "Friend to the Colony", published in the Grahamstown Journal of 27th November 1852: "It is characteristic of our policy towards the Kaffirs to allow them peace as soon as they get tired of war. It is well-known that the Tambookie chief Tyopo had taken active part in the war throughout. His people had been constantly robbing farmers of this district [Albert] was with his men at Imvani, headed his own people at the attack on Turvey's post. In spite of this, Warner sent men into Tambookieland to instruct Tyopo to come out and get peace without the least submission on his part and without any intention on the part of the Kaffirs to cease hostilities." The correspondent further accused Warner of being biased in favour of the Tambookies as the Gaikas and the other kaffirs in the Waterkloof had been severely punished, but not the Tambookies who had been allowed to fatten on their spoil unmolested throughout the war.²

In spite of such criticism Cathcart was convinced that the time had come to put an end to hostilities, and after having dealt with Kologi, he granted pardon to the rebellious Tambookie chiefs who were now prepared to surrender arms. He could now dictate his peace terms which were largely aimed at the re-location of the rebellious tribes beyond the colonial boundary and the re-settlement forfeited Tambookie territories by European settlers. As Cathcart was of opinion that Mapassa had surpassed the other Tambookie chiefs in guilt by having associated with

¹C.G.J., 23rd Oct. 1852.
²Ibid., 27th Nov. 1852.
rebel Hottentots in destroying the lives and property of British subjects, the remnants of this chief's tribe were severely punished. Mapassa's lands were declared forfeited, but as the chief himself had been killed, and Cathcart considered the tribe sufficiently punished, the remnants of the tribe were included in a general pardon and were allowed to place themselves under the responsible authority of some other Tambookie chief. However, the name and independence of the tribe of Mapassa were to cease. Joseph Cox Warner was appointed to form locations of the Tambookie tribes in the district of North Victoria.¹

The future history of the Albert district was to be closely affected by the re-settlement of the Tambookies in locations. Nonesi and her followers were invited to return from the Bashee and to occupy the location west of the Indwe River where Warner was placed as representative of the Government. Although this location was situated south of the Stormberg, it was officially regarded as part of the district of Albert.² Another Tambookie location was created in the Albert district near the Wittebergen. Except for these two locations there were to the south of the Albert district the Lesseyton Missionary Location, which was inhabited by Tambookies only, and the Shiloh Missionary Station, occupied by Tambookies, Pingoos, Hottentots and Bostards. The Tambookie locations in the Albert district were exempted from the laws made by the Cape Parliament. The Governor, however, had the right to enforce laws by issuing proclamations.³

²Government Gazette, 1856, Proclamation 9th May 1856.
³Ibid.
The war of 1850-1853 was the most formidable of the frontier wars
in the Cape, and in many ways the most decisive. It was formidable in
part because of the distraction of crisis, part military and part
political, on both sides of the Orange River; in part because of the
calibre of the resistance which the Europeans encountered. It is
sometimes known as the war of Umlanjeni and sometimes it is associated
with the Kat River rebellion. It has been suggested here that if the
position be viewed from the northern sector, a third factor comes
decisively into play, namely, the intervention of the Tamboodies,
weakened though it was by tribal divisions. In military terms the
problem of the northern frontier which now marched with the Orange
River was closed. In that sense the war was decisive.

In the two balmy years between the arrival of Smith and the
outbreak of hostilities in December 1850 European farmers who for more
than a generation had sought the coverage of inclusion in the colony,
had begun to find security and the district of Albert, which survived
the baffling of war, had been established. There remained the
unspotted problem of how Europeans would react to victory, and the Nguni
to defeat. For the Thembu in particular, some of whom at their own
request were included in the Colony, (Nonesi's tribe), some of whom had
lost all their lands and identity; (Mpoposa's people), and some who
remained at the Bashee in the regency of Joe, there was the problem as
to whether tribal coherence would stand the strain of the enforced
peace and political division.
Viewed from the north-eastern sector, there were during the four years between the termination of the Umlanjeni War in March 1853 and the tragedy, generally known as the "National Suicide of the Xhosa", two developments of major importance. First, there was Sir George Cathcart's peace settlement. This made provision for the prolongation of the old Ceded Territory up to the Stormberg, the establishment of the new military village of Queenstown and the inclusion of the larger part of Thembu people in demarcated locations within the boundaries of the Colony. For the first time then, the north-eastern part of the Colony had become a factor of political and military importance. Yet the frontier problems were not solved, and Cathcart left his successor with a legacy of unrest and brooding discontent.

This led to the second important development: the complete reversal of the traditional policy of segregation, and the introduction of Sir George Grey's policy of integration and civilization. The black people, deprived of their land and age-old customs, reacted by turning, as in the years prior to the Eighth Xhosa War, to superstition and witchcraft. This culminated in the "National Suicide" which, in consequence of the non-participation of the larger part of Tmbokkies, left them as the strongest border tribe. This added to the importance of the north-eastern districts. In this chapter these two factors will be discussed.

1 Grey, Sir George, Governor of the Cape Colony, 5th Dec. 1854 - 15th Aug. 1861.

2 See E.J. Watson's evidence before the Cape Commission on Native Affairs, 1865, p. 63, Q. 681.
The Cathcart settlements had consolidated the position of the Tambookies. Instead of the two great sections of Umtirara's and Mapassa's people, together with all the other petty tribes, they were now all included in the Tambookie location under the paramountcy of Nonesi. But there were two anomalies. In the first place the Tambookies in the location were now officially regarded as a tribe distinct from the Bashee Thembu, but they themselves did not recognize such a distinction. Hence, while the government acknowledged Nonesi as paramount, \(^1\) her people looked on Joe, Umtirara's brother at the Bashee River, as paramount. E.J. Warner was explicit on this point when he gave evidence before the Cape Commission on Native Affairs in 1865. When he was asked to explain the difference between the Tambookie and the Fingo peoples, he replied that the Tambookie had never been broken up. \(^2\) He was then questioned more closely on the connection between the Bashee Thembu and the Tambookies in the locations, i.e. at Queenstown. He replied: "I consider them one nation. They acknowledge one paramount chief to all intents and purposes."\(^3\)

Given the Thembu concept of their identity as a single people, all of whom recognized the paramountcy of Joe, it is clear that Nonesi's influence was limited. Her position also was weakened by the location of the Tambookies within the bordered Colony. Although their separate identity was recognized and their chiefs allowed to govern their people according to their own native laws, they had legally no political existence distinct from that of other colonial subjects whether black, white

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\(^1\)See appendix 8.

\(^2\)Cape Commission on Native Affairs, 1865, p. 63, Q. 576.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 63, Q. 660.
or coloured. Warner was not even sure whether they were indeed colonial subjects or not. For although it was stipulated in May 1856 that none of the laws in force within other portions of the Colony would be applicable to the Tambookie location, no alternative provision was made for the legalization of the judicial authority of either Warner or the Tambookie chiefs. Hence Warner, whose duty it was to support the chiefs in controlling and punishing their people, was in constant danger of coming into collision with the judicial department of the Government. He found it "a very unpleasant situation for a functionary neither to know his power, duties or laws by which he is expected to govern the people over whom he is placed". On the other hand Nonesi was just as confused about her own position, and in 1857 she blamed her inability to restrain many of her followers from killing their cattle, on the administrative system. Clearly then, the creation of the Tambookie location was another example of myopic administrative fumbling that contributed nothing to the solution of the frontier problems.

Equally, in confiscating Mapassa’s lands and in laying down the boundaries of the Tambookie location, Cathcart had overlooked probable points of friction. Initially it seemed as if his grand northern scheme was working excellently. The distribution of Mapassa’s forfeited lands among European farmers operated to the advantage of the Cradock district.

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1 Cape of Good Hope Annexures, 1858, copies of communications from Agent with the Tambookies, Warner to Southey, 6th April 1858.
2 Cape Commission on Native Affairs, 1865, p. 68, Q. 677.
3 Government Gazette, 9th May 1856, no. 2715.
4 LG 410, Letters Received from Tambookie Agent, pp. 139-142, Warner to Richard Southey, Resident-Secretary at Grahamstown, 29th May 1855.
5 Infra, p. 180.
The farms allocated in this area, which later became the district of Queenstown, were relatively small, varying from 2800 to 3000 acres, and, where possible, homesteads were erected within a rifle shot of each other. The course of the Klaas Smits River was occupied throughout in this manner, and thus a formidable barrier was presented along that line. The district of Cradock, formerly an exposed frontier area, was now screened by the extended frontier settlement and enjoyed unprecedented peace. In 1858, C. Scanlen, M.P.A. for Cradock declared in the Legislative Assembly: "Formerly Cradock was the frontier district, but now we have the district of North Victoria, now Queenstown, in front of us, and this has given great confidence to the people of our district; in fact, thefts by the kaffirs from over the boundary are not heard of in our district, and our flocks and herds cannot be swept off now as in former times."\(^1\)

In the Albert district, too, conditions looked promising. In April, 1853 Cathcart reported to the Duke of Newcastle\(^2\): "The warfare carried on between the inhabitants of this district [Albert]...was with the people of the chief Morosi who is a tributary of Moshesh in conjunction with some Tambookies...but since the submission of Moshesh this war of retaliation...has entirely ceased, and uninterrupted peace, security and confidence has continued ever since the peace with the Tambookies and with Moshesh along that frontier."\(^3\) At a superficial view there was much to justify his optimism. Although it was reported

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\(^1\)Cape of Good Hope, Votes and Proceedings of Parliament 1858, appendix ii, p. 5, minutes of evidence taken before the Select Committee on T.H. Bowker's memorial.

\(^2\)Newcastle, Duke of, Secretary of State for War and Colonies, 8th Dec. 1852 - 10th June 1854.

\(^3\)PP. 1869, 1855, no. 1, Cathcart to Newcastle, 14th April 1853.
during the war that the district was almost deserted,\(^1\) the farmers returned in large numbers after hostilities had ceased. In August 1854 from the Upper Stormberg Spruit alone there were 132 farmers who had asked for remission of quitrent.\(^2\) As land sales had continued during the period of hostilities, the application for remission of quitrent involved much administrative work. For example, Louw Pretorius bought the farm Leeufontein in 1852 from Martin Kruger, but as he was unable to occupy it during the war, he sold the farm to Barend Bester and left the Colony. Bester was thus put to great inconvenience as he could not procure Pretorius's signature for the remission of quitrent.\(^3\) However, problems like these were soon sorted out, and in September 1853 a census showed that the male population of the district already consisted of 950 Dutch and 120 English.\(^4\)

Except for unoccupied lands in the vicinity of the Witteberge and Washbank Spruit where the Tembookies and other followers of Morset as well as the Bushmen\(^5\) endangered settlement, all available lands in Albert had been occupied by the end of 1854 and the value of farms had increased considerably. Farming was improved by the making of dams and the introduction of merino sheep. In 1856 it had been calculated that 2,000,000 pounds of wool were produced.\(^6\) More to the east, in the district of Aliwal North, wheat production had flourished to such an extent in 1857 that the price of wheat dropped from 50/– a mud to

\(^{1}\) Suma, p. 148.
\(^{2}\) CO. 2892: memorials included in a letter from E. Cole to Cathcart, 18th Aug. 1854.
\(^{3}\) Ibid.
\(^{4}\) PP. 1969, 1955, no. 6, enclos. in no. 3.
\(^{5}\) See appendix 7.
\(^{6}\) Cape of Good Hope Almanac 1857, p. 252.
25/- due to the abundance of wheat crops. 1

But frontier zones, especially in the years following immediately on an outbreak of organized hostilities, are not unlike a fire which often smoulders after the fire brigade has left. Memories rankle, and without firm as well as intelligent administration, what are called in Europe "border incidents" threaten to spark a general upheaval. This was particularly so in the Eastern Cape where African societies were diffusive. Restriction on the availability of land reacted in the social structures even when times were good, and periods of drought meant almost inevitably conflict for grazing.

The very words in which Cathcart expressed his hope for the future stability in the Albert district did in fact summarize the dilemma of that district: "In that country [Albert]...the old organization under field cornets with a very active Civil Commissioner, Mr. Cole...has been restored; all that is now necessary for security and protection, is accomplished without the aid of troops or paid levies or police, and so long as we keep peace with Mosesh on the one hand and the Tambookies on the other there is no cause to apprehend any disturbance of the peace in that quarter." 2 Signs of unrest among the tribes soon proved that peace with the Tambookies and Mosesh rested on very shaky foundations, and any disturbance in either of these territories would inevitably have reacted on the white area situated between them.

When he demarcated the Tambookie location, Cathcart tried, by laying down an equitable and well defined mountain boundary, to eliminate cattle lifting and reciprocating trespass by farmers and Tambookies on each others' lands. The boundaries of the location were as follows:

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2 RP. 1969, 1859, no. 1, Cathcart to Newcastle, 14th April 1853.
The western boundary stretched from where the most western point of Bram Neck range runs into the Black Kei, northwards along the summit of that range to Bram Neck, then westerly to Zaalboomneck and along the top of Andries Neck to Buffalo Thorns and Theodoraes Rand, and along the summit of Theodoraes Rand to the Stormberg and then the Indwe River. The Indwe and Kei Rivers formed the eastern boundaries.¹

A close look at these boundaries reveals two important factors:

Firstly, it will be noted that the north-eastern boundary, viz. the Indwe River, joined up with Krieli’s country, while the southern limit joined up with the Gaika location so that the Tambookie location was actually a continuation of the vast population of Kaffraria. This meant that the Tambookies, now located in the Tambookie location, were concentrated on the southern boundary of the sparsely populated and ill defended Albert district which in times of drought or distress — as during the "cattle-killing" episode — became the haunt of thieves and marauders.

The second observation concerns the northern boundary, and it once again focuses the attention on the problems of land settlement in this particular area. When Sir Harry Smith proclaimed the northern boundary of Tambookieland to be a line from the Wessley Mountains to the Klaas Smits River, there was left just below the Stormberg a strip unoccupied of land where, in due course, farms had been allotted to European farmers.² When Cathcart, in 1853, extended the boundary from Theodoraes Rand to the Stormberg he had therefore included within the Tambookie location farmers who had already been settled in the north-eastern corner of the location. The Deputy-Surveyor, M.R. Robinson, conceded

¹See map 7.
²See map 7.
that Cathcart did not know about Smith's arrangements when he proclaimed the new boundary. Robinson's further remarks on this issue are most interesting. Referring to the boundary and the position of the farmers in the Tambookie location, he stated: "And I should say it is not desirable to permit Boers to occupy it, but can the Government prevent it? If it is harshly prevented you will have another republic, long since thought of, established on the sources of the Tsomo, Bashee and Umzimavubu, and even now the Albert Boers had occupied nearly all dispersable lands in that division in defiance of the orders of the Civil Commissioner who admits his inability to stop it."¹

But there were also farmers living on lands that had since 1849 been proclaimed Tambookie territory. As the Tambookies had never occupied the lands in question, Albert farmers had for years been in the habit of living there occasionally for change of pasture or to avoid the excessive cold of their own district. The farmers claimed right to permanent occupation since they maintained that there had been no permanent occupation by Tambookies of lands east of Theodore's Rand before 1848 and that in fact, the whole of what was in 1853 known as Tambookieland was then only of recent occupation.² The crux of the problem was of course that Mapassa had always had more lands than he could effectively occupy; hence the farmers regarded the unoccupied tracts as waste lands. This is why with the proclamation of the Tambookie location there were already thirty farmers squatting within its limits. Some of these farmers admitted that they had not occupied the farms on a previous date, but they now appealed to the Government to grant them these farms. This was refused, but W. Shopstone, the

¹J.C. 522, Papers relative to the Hottentots in Kreli's country, pp. 162-54; M. Robinson to R. Scathen, 28th May 1853.

²Ibid.
Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner for Victoria, explained how they evaded the decision. By presenting the Tambookies with gifts of sheep, blankets and tobacco they obtained friendship of the Tambookie squatters who then remained quiet about new arrivals in spite of the chiefs' distinct orders to report such cases.¹

The Albert district had hitherto been in part a transit camp, in part the territorial outlet for farmers in need of cheap lands. But as the district was becoming more prosperous and the value of property rose, it could no longer provide its growing population with cheap land. Eastward expansion was hampered by the Bushmen. This situation probably explains why an increasing number of farmers coveted the green pastures of the Tambookie location. The closing of Kaffraria to prospective white settlers by Cathcart in 1853 underlined, as in 1835, the shortage of new farm lands in the Colony. For the quest for land was perennial, generation by generation. In 1856 for instance, farmers claimed in a petition that they had settled in the Tambookie location two years earlier as they could not obtain any land in the Colony.² Letters and reports from other parts of the Colony underlined the Albert farmers' complaint of lack of suitable farms. In 1853 more than a hundred Dutch farmers passed through the district of Graaff-Reinet to settle beyond the Vaal,³ while in 1856 a farmer from Swellendam informed a relative in the Albert District, "het word hier so nauw, en de plaatsen zyn soo duur, dat wij jonge beginners andere uitkomst zoeken moeten..."⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 163-184, Shopstone to Major Hope, 6th Feb. 1856.
²Ibid., memorandum enclosed in this letter.
³Graaff-Reinet Herald, 19th Jan. 1853.
⁴Albert Times, 6th March 1856.
The farmers who had settled in de facto Tambookie country would not thus easily be persuaded to leave the cheap farms they had occupied, and as in the pre-war years the Government lacked the military force and administrative manpower to carry its decisions into effect. As early as January 1854, the farmers were ordered away by Shepstone, but only one farmer, Piet van der Walt, obeyed.¹ According to Shepstone, the inability of the Government to enforce its decisions led, from the Tambookie point of view, to lack of confidence in the Government. When in 1856 Nonesi's great councillor and Tyopo attended a meeting that was held at Warner's place in the Tambookie location, Tyopo expressed concern over the occupation of Theodores Rand by Albert farmers. He wanted to know from Warner whether this arose from inability of the Governor to govern his own people or whether it was connived at. If the latter was the case, he wanted to know what had happened to Cathcart's promise that the Tambookies would be supported in keeping their country clear from the trespasses of the white men.² From Shepstone's point of view, it was most essential to maintain peace within the Tambookie location at all costs as any dissatisfaction there could be used by neighbouring chiefs to incite trouble. The years after 1853 were loaded with tension, and the geographical position of the various tribes was such that commotion among any one of them would have re-echoed along the whole of the frontier up to the Orange River and to the borders of Natal. The lands of the independent Gcaleka chief, Kreli, were bordered in the west by the Tambookie location and by newly-established Fingo locations along the Kei River, while on the east it joined up with the lands of the Bashee Thembu who had strong ties with

¹ L.G. 592, pp. 168-164, Shepstone to Major Hope, 6th Feb. 1856.
² Ibid.
the Tambookies who were living in the Tambookie location. Behind the Bashee Thembu were the Pondo, and to the north of Pondoland were Baca, Pondonise, Xesibe and other tribes of the Natal border. North of the Orange River was Moshesh, who was in close touch with his southern neighbours.

The chiefs had never regarded Cathcart's settlements as more than a truce, and when in December 1854, Sir George Grey arrived as Governor and High Commissioner he found the frontier in a state of panic due to rumours that the so-called loyal Fingo were contemplating revolt. "Our general position is now," the Governor stated in one of his first reports, "and may be said for some time past to have been only an armed truce, every day expecting a blow to be struck against us." The expected outbreak did not materialise. Yet though W. Calderwood's report on this matter indicated that in spite of dissatisfaction among the Fingo from overcrowded locations, there was no real cause for alarm, the Governor was not altogether reassured. Commenting on Calderwood's report he warned: "The general impression is that the Fingo... much overrate their strength and undervalue our power... that their young men are becoming haughty and insolent, that they are now a source of danger rather than of strength to us, and if immediate steps are not taken to remedy this state of things, disasters must speedily be anticipated."

Unrest was not confined to the Fingo. Kreli's conduct caused alarm, and rumours seemed to confirm that he was attempting to form an

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1 P.P. 1859, 1855, no. 20, George Grey to Earl Grey, 29th Jan. 1858.
2 Rev. William Calderwood, was appointed by Grey as Special Commissioner to inquire into the state of the Fingo locations.
3 P.P. 1859, 1855, no. 22, enclos. in no. 22, report of W. Calderwood dated 22nd Jan. 1855.
4 Ibid., no. 23, Grey to Earl Grey, 29th Jan. 1855.
alliance with the Fingo, Xhosa and amaPondo against the Colonial Government.

It is never easy to construe the significance of rumours. Sometimes the rumour is inventive to the point of fiction. At other times, even where distorted in the process of oral communication whose routes cannot be traced, it reflects, if not evidence of actual intent, yet the shapeless fears which result from tensions. Quite often there is a blend of truth and fantasy.

An excellent example of these are the distorted bits of news on the Crimean War that were circulating among the tribes. At first such rumours only gave the impression that heavy losses had been suffered by the British armies, but gradually the general tone became more ominous. The Russians, it was said, were black people, and they were coming to assist the tribes to drive the English into the sea. Others said that Iymx, Gaika and Umlanjeni were fighting in the Crimean War against the English. The Russians, then, were all former warriors who had died or had been killed in various wars against the Colony.¹

Resort to rumours and fantasies had become a last desperate weapon in the hands of disillusioned people. The Xhosa, with the Gaika spearhead, had fought the eighth major war against European penetration, and this time the annexation of Kaffraria seemed irreversible. What the war of 1850-1853 seemed to prove was that the resort to arms was ineffective: in contrast to the misery of the rebellious Gaikas, the loyal Islambies enjoyed prosperity; the rebellious Mapassa Tambedjes saw their lands forfeited and they themselves subjected to the faithful Nones. The fatal consequences of war on the Colony could thus not be

¹PP. 2202, 1857, enclos. in no. 7, J. Reeve (magistrate to Kama) to Chief Commissioner Maclean, 7th March 1856; ibid., enclos. 1 in no. 9, statements by "E.S." to Grey, 10th April 1856.
ignored. This was the position when in 1855 lung sickness hit the last symbol of pride and social status — their cattle. For the greater part of 1855 this disease caused havoc, and it was calculated that in Kaffraria alone the inhabitants lost two thirds of their stock.

Meantime, within annexed Kaffraria, Sir George Grey, whose benevolent intentions are not in question, had embarked on his Kaffraria experiment. The Imperial Government, having witnessed the success with which he had applied his policy in New Zealand, watched his efforts in South Africa with interest and approbation, and aided him with a substantial grant from the imperial funds. Grey’s settlement was based on the central concept that the Xhosa tribes should be acculturized as rapidly as possible and in their own interests. Reduced to its simplest elements, the formula would be the provision of schools and hospitals, interspersal of white and black settlements, and the provision of employment opportunities. To this end he encouraged also the foundation of villages with individual tenure supervised by headmen, and a more direct limitation of the power of the chiefs by the demarcation of locations and the limitation of the judicial power of the chiefs. Chiefs were no longer allowed to impose fines and income forfeited in this way was replaced by an annual salary. All cases had to be brought before the chiefs and the councillors who had to try them in joint session with a magistrate who would act as assessor and advisor. All fees and fines for public offences — except those levied for manslaughter — were to become part of the revenue of Kaffraria.

As the position of the chiefs was directly affected by interference with their judicial status, it may be accepted that the whole grand design would undermine the traditional way of life of the tribal hierarchy. It struck likewise at the very heart of tribal traditions — the belief in sorcerers and witchdoctors.
Those in close touch with the tribes foresaw the inevitable trouble that would follow on the disregard of age-old customs. E. J. Warner understood the mood when he wrote in 1856: "The rites and ceremonies of this system of superstition [religion of the Kaffir tribes] are not matters of indifference...they are the trust and confidence of the Kaffir; and, in his estimation, his life and well-being depend on their due performance...the political and religious governments of the Kaffir tribes are so intimately connected that the one cannot be overturned without the other."¹ Attempts, then, to overthrow the religious and political beliefs of the tribes had as a result that "the Kaffir tribes had become [so] thoroughly imbued with hatred to the 'white man' and appear [so] resolutely determined on his destruction."²

The pattern of reaction could almost be foreseen: "It naturally follows," says Du Toit, "that the prophets and witch doctors, the supporters of the chief's privileges and prerogatives, the practitioners who jealously guarded the maintenance of tribal equilibrium should lead the desperate struggle against the malignant power of the white man."³

The Nonquase prophecies that promised ancestral help in battle against the white man, provided that all cattle were slaughtered and all crops were destroyed, swept like a hurricane through Kaffraria. Even chiefs who initially rejected the prophecies, were in the end unable to control their people who either genuinely believed the prophecies or feared the revenge of those who did believe. News of the great prophecies reached the Tambookies not only from Kroli's country, but also from Basutoland. Already Mosesh was held in reverence by most

¹J. Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs (Mount Celo, 1858), Warner's Notes, 1st Dec. 1856, p. 106.
²Ibid., p. 103.
³Du Toit, p. 100.
of the tribes as he had proved in 1853 that he was the only great captain who could defeat the English. Now rumours added to his stature. Adam, the first father of the Kaffirs, so it was said, had proceeded to Mosheš for the purpose of requesting him to direct his people to destroy all their cattle and corn and not to cultivate. It was true that similar prophecies were later sent to Kreli and other chiefs, but early in 1857 Tambookies from Basutoland told their relatives in the Tambookie location that in Mosheš's country all the prophecies had been fulfilled, the earth had been removed, and the dead had arisen.

It was with this mighty chief, so the Tambookie had reason to believe, that their traditional enemy, Kreli, was scheming to drive the white man away.

Ever since the Nonquase rumours had started Kreli had tried, either by persuasion or by threats, to win the Thembu over to his side.

In September 1856 Fabu, a Thembu chief of considerable influence, went down on Kreli's invitation to see the prophet, Umhlahaža. Kreli had promised to show him the people on the water that had arisen from the dead. Fabu returned home with the news that there was to be peace among the people, that the cattle were all to be killed, and then the white things, (the English) would disappear, and that all black people were one and must live in peace. The result was that Joe, paramount of the Bashee Thembu, had sent down to Kreli to ask for reconciliation. Kreli's answer was that "the river is not broad, it might be crossed without difficulty." At the same time, however, he sounded the

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1 MP. 2352, 1857, enclos. 3 in no. 15, communications of Chief Tzatzoe to Laclean.

2 Ibid., annexure no. 17 in no. 26, Warner to Grey, 9th Jan. 1857.

3 Ibid., Grey to Earl Grey, no. 9, 29th Sept. 1856; enclos. in no. 9, Warner to Sheplestone, 23rd Sept. 1856.
warning that the Thembu would not escape the general destruction if they did not obey the prophet.\footnote{BP. 2352, 1857, Grey to Labouchere, encl. 2 in no. 15, 23rd Oct. 1856.} Certainly then, the dilemma of the Tambookies in 1856 was grievous. If the rumoured war took place with Gcaleka and Basuto in alignment, the Tambookies would have to define their position. The cattle-killing divided the Xhosa people and divided the Tambookies. It was crucial because the killing of cattle, the breaking of tools and pots, the destruction of seed — all of these ritual acts — were overt acts by which a man's allegiance to the movement was openly declared. Discreet and diplomatic equivocation was not possible as it had been in the past. Noneši undoubtedly used her influence to restrain her people, but like Kama,\footnote{The Goudkwebe chief, Koma, threatened to drive out of his tribe those who killed their cattle or destroyed their crops. In spite of this the Special Magistrate, R. Reeve reported from Middle Drift in August 1856 that Koma's people continued to kill their cattle and that excitement among the tribe was spreading daily. See BP. 2352, 1857, sub-encl. 3 in no. 2, F. Reeve to Maclean, 1st Aug. 1856.} she could not hold them. Here in the Cape, by the end of 1856, prophecy had achieved the seemingly impossible and cut right across tribal divisions into something like a local pan-African popular movement.

On the cattle-killing there are two main schools of thought. Firstly, there is a theory that millenary expectations motivated the whole movement. The cattle-killing then, was a spontaneous movement, not deliberately instigated by one person.\footnote{Gray, p. 258.} A millenium that could be brought about, so it was believed, by the black man's destruction of his own wealth and property, would not only mean the disappearance of the white imposter, but also of the foreign culture that had uprooted the age-old beliefs of the black man. Undoubtedly the introduction of
Grey's benevolent policy brought about sudden economic, political, social and religious changes which were, as Warner had warned, a traumatic experience to the tribes. In this respect it is worth quoting from a work by Norman Cohn. This writer, who had made a detailed study of conditions in Europe that at different times had caused people to commit the most outrageous acts in the hope of bringing about a millennium, concludes: "It may be that social and economic horizons expand too rapidly....It may be that traditional social groups, especially kinship-groups, disintegrate to the point where many individuals find themselves deprived of...material and emotional support to which they had been accustomed...it may be that society as a whole is deprived of its status and its independence and forced into a humiliating subjection....Finally, it may happen that contact with alien cultures shakes assumptions which are essential to the accepted view of the world and which for that very reason have hitherto remained unquestioned."\(^1\) The striking resemblance between such conditions and those that existed in Kaffraria after 1854 cannot be overlooked.

A second theory on the cattle-killing suggests that the whole episode was a grand strategy of political revolt, instigated by Kreli, and worked out in conjunction with Noshesh who, when trouble with the Free State was mounting, looked southward for allies. This was the view Sir George Grey adhered to.\(^2\) Reports from John Maclean, Chief Commissioner for Kaffraria, had convinced Grey that cattle-killing and excitement in Kaffraria reached a zenith at times when war between the


Orange Free State and Noshesh seemed imminent. Charles Brownlee, the Gaika Commissioner, believed at the time of the cattle-killing that it was a plot to enable the chiefs to force their people on the Colony in a state of desperation, but thirty years later he changed his mind, and only adhered to the opinion that Kreli instigated Umlahaza to spread the fatal rumours.

To this day historians and anthropologists are at variance, but the two theories need not be incompatible since both are directed against the European interlopers, with whom one or two persons linked the Kingo. Yet the question that remains unanswered is whether either Noshesh or Kreli seriously thought that starved warriors made good military effectives. After all, the Xhosa wars had never started in times of scarcity. On the other hand, it had been suggested that warriors were often in time of war more concerned about their cattle than about actual fighting, and that Kreli thought at that time that with the cattle out of the way the warriors could be kept on the battle field.

The possibility of a plot between the two chiefs, at least at an initial stage, cannot be discarded altogether. Already in 1854 M.B. Shaw, the British Resident to the Transkeian tribes, was informed by Joe and other Thembus that they had every reason to believe that a general combination of all the Kaffir tribes had been agreed upon, with a view to bringing about another war. Shaw reported that on this point the chiefs spoke "positively and without hesitation". It is significant,

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1Ibid., pp. 269-277, Maclean to Grey, 20th March 1857.

2C. Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History (Lovedale, 1896), pp. 153-154. "No one", Brownlee wrote, "who took an active part in the cattle-killing, except Umlahaza, has admitted that there was a plot."

3Ep. 2362, 1857, sub-encl. 6 in encl. 2, no. 2; Brownlee to Maclean, 2nd Aug., 1856.

too, that the chiefs told Shaw that the chief Xeso, a son of Hintsa and brother of Kreli, had "almost certainly started into existence as a prophet, and with this view had taken up the mantle of Unlanjeni with whom he declared to have spiritual intercourse." In conclusion the chiefs communicated rumours that "all the frontier tribes, including Kreli, are resolutely determined on making war as soon as practicable; and it is understood, in order to precipitate the same, that thieving in British Kaffraria and the Colony on a large scale is to be encouraged; and if that is not attended with the desired effect, then to murder one or two Europeans on the highways and elsewhere, in the hope of inducing the Government to take the initiative, and thus to afford them a pretext for resistance, with the consequent and desired result of war."¹ It seems impossible to imagine that the chiefs would have fabricated such stories if there were not at least some hint of truth in them.

Reference had already been made to the attempts made by Kreli to win over the Bashshe Thembu to his side. His manoeuvres were not limited to the Bashshe Thembu. As the cattle-killing rumours increased, there were also signs of his interference in the affairs of the Tembookie location. Maclean, in reporting to Grey on the communications between Moshesh and Kreli, added that "Mr. Warner...also believes that a constant communication is carried on, although the secrecy with which it is done, and the secrecy maintained by all aware of it, is so great that he can learn nothing more definite than a report from two distinct sources who themselves fully believe it, that to avoid detection these messengers cross the mountains at the back of the Thembu country, and go direct to the

prophet.\textsuperscript{1} Maclean was of opinion that the political intent of such intercourse could not be doubted.\textsuperscript{2} This seems to be confirmed by the fact that in 1856, as rumours of cattle-killing increase, conditions in the Tambookie location became most unsettled. Twice during 1856 indications of a possible outbreak among the Tambookies had caused panic. The "treking" of the Tambookies in April 1856\textsuperscript{3} from the farms where they had been employed, reminded the Albert farmers of the pre-war days of 1850 when similar migrations to Tambookieland were a prelude to war. In anticipation of an outbreak the farmers under the Stormberg trekked together for mutual protection. Warner dismissed any possibility of an immediate outbreak. He assured the Governor that the "trekking" of the Tambookies resulted from "a conviction on the minds of those trekking that war of some kind is very likely to result in this country from our war with the Russians, and that, in such case, they would prefer being with their own chiefs in their own country, to remaining in the service of the colonists. They say that those who remained faithful in the service of the colonists, during the last war, were generally employed as cattle and sheep herders in which situation they were exposed to danger from both colonists and kaffirs, and that they do not want to be in such an awkward position a second time." Warner nevertheless warned: "We cannot be too much on our guard, as I am fully convinced that some three or four attempts have been made, during the past three years, to stir up the warlike propensities of the kaffir tribes." Various other reports confirmed that there was frequent talk

\textsuperscript{1}BP. 2352, 1857, enclos. in no. 26, Maclean to Grey, 20th March 1857.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3}BP. 2202, 1857, sub-enclos. 2 in enclos. 5, unidentified letter dated 6th April 1856.
of war among the Tambockies. Rumours grew in extent until in August 1856 the Civil Commissioner of Queenstown warned the Field Comets to be prepared.

Meanwhile Kreli was concentrating on what he hoped to be a possible weak spot in the predominantly loyal Tambockie location. Although the name and lands of Mapassa tribe had been forfeited after the war, this tribe had not been completely dispersed. Remnants were living under Mapassa's widow, Yiliswa, in a southern corner of the Tambockie location near the Moravian Missionary Station, Goshen. Undoubtedly these people still begrudged the forfeiture of their lands, but they were too impoverished and disintegrated to resist. It was through them that Kreli saw a possibility to gain a foothold in the Tambockie location, and he asked their assistance in keeping a road open for him in event of an attack he was planning on Queenstown. The arrival of the 55th Regiment at Queenstown in September 1856 upset Kreli's schemes, and tension was once again relieved.

As the day of "judgement" was again and again postponed, some of the tribesmen began to waver. Possibly then, the chiefs, by the end of 1856, had realized that futile rumours could not bring about victory, and they had discarded the idea of bringing about a plot. However, by that time the delusion had gained a pathological momentum of its own and the tribes continued slaughtering independent of any plot, and in spite of attempts by some chiefs to put an end to the destruction.

1Ibid., sub-enclos. in enclos. 7, Warner to H. Giddy, Civil Commissioner of Queenstown, 4th April 1856.


3The Day of Judgement was first expected to take place in Aug. 1856 at the time of the Full moon. Vide no. 3 in endlos. 2 in no. 2, M. Shepstone to Halden, 6 Aug. 1856; Ibid., sub-enclos. 2 in enclos. 2 in no. 2, Brownlee to Halden, 15th Aug. 1856. It was then postponed to the next Full moon, and when, once again, nothing happened, the date was eventually set for 10th Feb. 1857.
By the beginning of 1857 Nonesi had to admit that she could no longer restrain her people. While Warner adhered to the opinion that she was regarded by her people as a mere cipher, she herself blamed the administrative system imposed on the Tambookie location for all the trouble. When she visited Warner in 1857 to profess her loyalty, she pointed out that matters would never have become so bad did she have the authority to act with promptness and according to Tambookie laws and customs. "Kaffirs", she said, "are not things to be reasoned with at such times."

As nothing came of the intended reconciliation between Joe and Kredi, Nonesi now took the wise step of inviting Joe who, as paramount was held in esteem by all the Tambookies, to visit the location. As a result of this visit, a very favourable reaction set in. In comparison with the other tribes, the mortality rate of 2207 Tambookies was indeed a very low figure.

After the cattle-killing episode the position in the Tambookie location, as well as among the Bashee Thembu, was that these people had more cattle than the surrounding tribes. The Tambookies were now subjected to inroads, not only from other tribes but also from their fellow tribesmen who had yielded to the prophecies. During the cattle-killing the two instigators in the Tambookie location were the chiefs Fadaan and Quecha, the latter being a chief with whom Cathcart had concluded a peace which in the Albert farmers' view was completely premature. Although the cattle-killing ended in failure, these two chiefs were by no means subdued by the misery they were instrumental in

1 [In. 410, Warner to Southey, pp. 199-205, 10th Feb. 1857.]

2 [During the cattle killing the number of Tambookies in the location had dropped from 18,000 to 15,973. See Cape of Good Hope Annals, 66-57, p. 205, Warner to Southey, 9th Dec. 1857.]

3 [Supra, p. 156.]
bringing upon their people. On the contrary, Fadana joined the Gcaleka in June 1857 in an attack on the kraals of well-disposed Tambookies. This incident led to a skirmish and Warner warned that a repetition might lead to hostilities during which it might have happened that the Tambookies fled the Colony.\footnote{L.C. 410, pp. 238-245, Warner to Southey, 12th June 1857.} Turmoil in the Tambookie location reacted on the Albert District.

Fadana was getting more and more troublesome, and in conjunction with Quesha plundered the Queenstown and Albert districts so badly that farmers began to say openly that war was inevitable. Not only did they attack the loyal chief, Darala, son of Quesha, and kill three of his followers, but they even threatened to kill Warner himself. Many Tambookies left the location and fled to the nearby farms for protection. Although there was uncertainty as to Quesha's guilt, his brother himself admitted to Warner that Quesha plundered Nonnest's people by day, and the districts of Queenstown and Albert by sending out night parties.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 292-296, 2nd Sept. 1857.}

Though the cattle-killing had come to an end, echoes of the prophecy in distorted form were still encountered. The hesitancy of the Albert farmers to risk adding to the crisis by taking direct action against marauders was distorted by Fadana and other hostile chiefs. It was held as proof that the prophecy was working. Manel, who led a commando against Fadana and some squatters of Kreli on the western bank of the Indwe River, told Warner that he (Manel) had often heard the remark that "it is now possible to steal their [Albert farmers] cattle, as the white man was now tamed, and would never be seen in pursuit of his cattle." Manel had even found loyal Tambookies who asked: "What would the reason be of the white man [Abelungu] allowing the kaffirs..."
to denude their country of all their cattle and without any attempt
on their part to prevent it?1

By June 1857 the activities of Fadana and Quesha had once more
thrown the Queenstown and Albert districts into a state of panic.
When war seemed inevitable, the Government at last took action and on
the 18th August 1857 Commandant Curry was sent to Queenstown. From
there the Commandant and a police force of 150 men, aided by Shepstone,
with 200 European volunteers, Darala with 100 men, 350 mounted Fingo
and 500 volunteer Tamboolies set out to attack Fadana. Fadana managed
to escape, but Quesha was captured and during a second expedition in
September 1857 Fadana was captured near the Tsomo River.

The two chiefs were tried. Quesha was sentenced to one year's
imprisonment and Fadana to seven years. As there was sufficient
evidence that Kreli played a leading role in the raids, an expedition
was sent against him, and he was driven across the Bachee River.

The fact that Tamboolies were in this case willing to give
evidence against their own chiefs, convinced Warner that the time was
ripe for a revision of all the laws regarding the Tamboolies.2 He did,
in fact, regard their loyalty during the whole Fadana episode as proof
that the Umhlahana delusion had finally uprooted the feelings of
veneration and sacredness which these people had attached to their
chiefs.3 The Tamboolies were therefore, in his opinion, ready to submit
to colonial rule.

1Ibid., pp. 246-258, Warner to Southey, 14th July 1857.

2For Warner's suggestions, see Cape of Good Hope Annual, A40-
158, pp. 615-617, copies of communications from the Agent with the
Tamboolies.

3Seven years later Warner seems to have changed his mind somewhat
on this subject when in evidence before the Commission on Native
Affairs 1869, he made it clear that the Tamboolies looked upon their
chiefs with as much respect as they ever did, and that they considered
the chiefs superior to themselves. See Evidence and Evidence taken
by Commission on Native Affairs, 1869, pp. 71-72, Q. 720.
As a first step Warner suggested that stipends should be granted to chiefs, and that the chiefs should be plainly told that such stipends were granted to them in lieu of all fines to which they had up to that immediate time been entitled. He felt, however, that the chiefs should retain the privilege to settle such law suits as their people might think necessary to lay before them.

A second suggestion was that the tribes should as soon as possible be interspersed with the Europeans. He therefore recommended that a strip of country from the junction of the Xaxoda with the Kei up the former to its junction with the Indwe and thence up the latter river should, with the consent of the Tambockie chiefs, be granted to a number of colonial Europeans experienced in frontier life. Warner also brought to the attention of the Governor that the Tambockies had been brought within the colonial boundary without their consent having first been obtained and before they had been guilty of any act of national hostility against the Government. He therefore argued that they should have a choice in the matter, and that, should they decline to remain within the colonial boundaries on such conditions, lands ought to be provided for them east of the Indwe River in the country that had shortly before been abandoned by Kraal. Should they choose to move to this tract of land, arrangements should be made for their protection, and government on a similar plan to that by which natives were managed in British Kaffraria. For the time being the Tambockies preferred not to move across the border.

After the annexation of Kaffraria in 1865 to the Colony, and the refusal of the Home Government to take over the administration of the Transkei, Sir Philip Wodehouse⁴ realized the necessity of filling

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⁴Wodehouse, Sir Philip Edmond, Governor of the Cape Colony, 15th Jan. 1862 - 20th May 1870.
up the lands, that had become empty after the expulsion of Kreli, by
the settlement of a friendly tribe. As he also thought it desirable
to get rid of the trouble of governing a large mass of the Kaffir
population by native law within the Colony, he proposed to move the
Thembu across the Indwe River. The inducement offered was that they
would be able to govern themselves through their own chiefs, according
to their own customs, and that they would be free, too, from hut tax.
It was, however, still to be understood that they would be under the
control of the Government as paramount authority. The chiefs declared
that they would only go under that condition. They were thus assured
of their own internal government under native custom and law, and their
supreme control by a government officer. E.J. Warner was consequently
appointed as Thembu Agent in Emigrant Thembuland. The only chiefs who
consented to move were Mantanzima, son of Umtrirara, Gecelo the regent
of the Fangelia tribe, Darala, of the Amadungwana and Stockwe of the
Amaqatu. The rest of the Tambockie tribe under Nonesi and Gunghole
preferred to stay in the Tambockie location. We thus find three major
areas of Thembu settlement: the core coastal settlement beyond the
Bashee; the migrant Thembu who moved across the Indwe River in what
became known as Emigrant Thembuland, and those who stayed in the
location that later became the Glen Grey District.

If one looks at a map on population distribution today, it still
reflects the actions of three factors which were shaping the northern
frontier in the first half of the nineteenth century. The inter-
spersal of white and black settlements in the district of Albert and
Wolvehouse shows on the one hand the pioneering European, and on the
other the tenacious Tambockies. Equally it reflects not so much the
results of the great war of 1850-1853 as the product of the benevolent
administrative bungling. Even where the design of policy was sound in theory, lack of maps, survey and trained officials led to on-the-spot adjustments which very often had to be accepted. Less obviously it reflects how tensions within tribal groups led to quasi-division within the ethnic tribal complex and how these, too, reacted on the patterns of settlements.

In some respects what happened in Tambo Island is typical of frontier zones in the Cape. In other respects it is atypical in the relative peace which prevailed partly because of suspicion of the Gcaleka, partly because of a balance of divisions among the Tambozulu, and partly because, until Smith's settlement of 1849, the ebb and flow of human movement was not constricted to any considerable extent. Black and white usually managed to co-exist despite their different social patterns and the different concepts of land ownership. Stabilization and control at some point was inevitable with the Free State on the one hand and the Cape on the other. It was more regrettable that the relative poverty of the Cape, in men no less than in money, and the hasty Governors who thought more in terms of military strategy than human necessities led, albeit indirectly, to the war of 1850 and the tragedy of 1857.
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Memorandum submitted to the Chief Magistrate of Umtata in terms of Secretary for Native Affairs, min. no. 271/362, 4th Dec. 1957.

### Appendix I: Thembu Genealogy Submitted to the Chief Magistrates of Umtata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thembo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonoyi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndunakazi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceduwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntande</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguthi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nxoko</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G.H.</th>
<th>Eldest, not heir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HLANGA (amaHLanga or amaQiya)</th>
<th>Ndungwana (amaNdungwana)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dlomo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAJA</td>
<td>Manusi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madiba</td>
<td>Tukwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tato</td>
<td>Xoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshatshu (amaTshatshu)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zondwa</td>
<td>Bavana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdaba</td>
<td>Maphasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gungubele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngubengcuka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juma (amaJumba)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mthikakra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngangelizwe</td>
<td>Mathanzi (amaHala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalindyebo</td>
<td>St Marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jongilizwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(amaHala: St Marks; amaJamba: amaNdungwana; amaHala: amaTshatshu; amaHala: amaHala; amaTshatshu: amaHala; amaHala: amaHala; amaNdungwana: amaNdungwana)
APPENDIX 2

List of farmers who had occupied farms in the Stormberg area before 1830.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F.P. du Plessis</td>
<td>Modderbult</td>
<td>1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Viljoen</td>
<td>Ackermans Knaal</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. van Tonder</td>
<td>Badfontein</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Erasmus</td>
<td>Dankfontein</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow Viljoen</td>
<td>Diepkloof</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacoba Smit</td>
<td>Dreunberg</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Ullman</td>
<td>Klipplaatfontein</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Viljoen</td>
<td>Melkspruit</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Durand</td>
<td>Zeekoeugat</td>
<td>(Date of occupation unknown but prior to 1830)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. van Tonder</td>
<td>Bultfontein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 3

The history of some of these early settlers from the Western Cape is indeed remarkable.

Piet de Wet was an extremely poor farmer from the district of Worcester. He trekked with some of his family and undertook to tend their cattle for a small portion of the increase. After they had crossed the Stormberg Spruit he examined a spot called Puffels Vlei. This was a popular hunting spot as the mass of reeds afforded cover for lions, tigers and wolves. De Wet noticed the fertility of the soil and came to the conclusion that there must be a large spring in the vicinity. Further research revealed a strong fountain with sufficient water to construct a mill. Thus the foundation of a valuable farm was laid.

De Wet became one of the richest farmers in the Albert District and rendered valuable services as Field Cornet. Throughout his life he was a loyal supporter of the Cape Government. On his deathbed in 1848 he warned his children: "Don't trek! Stop where you are; be loyal to your Queen, and obey your superiors. Then it will go well with you, and you will be blessed as your father has been. Recollect what I have told you; how that years ago many were shot and hung for riot and rebellion, and there is too much reason to fear that the same fate awaits many of the disaffected not in arms or opposition to lawful authority."

(Information from Grahamstown Journal July 1, 1848.)

The history of Wessel Gouws is rather amusing. Being unable to obtain a farm in the Tulbagh district, he left in 1828 and arrived in 1830 at a beautiful fountain about 25 kilometers from
the modern Molteno. To his dismay he found a stone bearing the
inscription: "P.J. Joubert. Ik annekeerd deze fontijn". In anger
he cast the stone away, and settled on the farm where his descendants
are still living today.

(Information from Mrs. R. Gouws, The Plains, Cathcart.)

The ancestor of the Greyling family, Arnoldus Jacobus Greyling
was born in 1805 in the district of Stellenbosch. It is not sure
when they settled on the farm Brocboort, near Burghersdorp. His
son Arnoldus Greyling was one of the most remarkable characters in
the early Stormberg history. He was only 20 years old when in 1848
he led a group of 13 farmers to the Waschbank Spruit area where they
built their first "hartebeeshuise".

Though it must have been one of the most isolated spots in
the Colony, he tried to preserve a civilized standard of living.
Some of the beautiful stinkhout furniture he had acquired through
the years, is still in possession of the Greyling family. By the
time of his death in 1877 he had acquired 10,000 morgen of land.

(Unpublished manuscript: Geskiedenis van die Greyling
familie te Waschbank deur:

B.M.J. Greyling. In possession of'
Dr. E.C. Greyling, Clanville.)
TREATY entered into between Andries Stockenstrom, Esq., Lieut.-Governor of the Eastern Division of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and the Tambookie chief Mapasa, when, after the fullest explanations by means of the Resident Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, the following articles of convention were fully agreed upon, in the presence of Hougham Hudson, Esq., Agent-General, and the said Resident Agent, Mr. Henry Fynn, as also the Tambookie Counsellors Quasha and Nyela, subject, nevertheless, to the ratification by or on behalf of his said Majesty.

Article 1. There shall be peace and amity for ever, between his said Britannic Majesty, his subjects — particularly those of the said colony — and the said contracting chief and his tribe, — and both parties shall honestly and faithfully use their utmost endeavours to prevent a rupture of the same, to remove every cause for disagreement which may occur, and scrupulously to abide by the engagements contained in this treaty.

2. The said contracting chief doth acknowledge that the country which he and his tribe do occupy between the Stormberg and Kaffiraria, and adjoining the eastern frontier of the colony, is part of what was the Bushman country, still thinly inhabited by the remnants of the said tribe.

3. The said Lieut.-Governor doth engage, on the part of his said Majesty, not to molest the said chief or tribe, or cause him or them to be molested in the possession of the said territory, or to lay claim to any part thereof, provided the said chief or tribe do not in any way disturb the peace of the colony, or molest the inhabitants therein; and provided also the said chief and tribe shall strictly adhere to the terms of this treaty.

4. The boundary between the said colony and the territory possessed by the said chief and tribe is agreed to be the Zwarte Kei or Winterberg Spruit, from its source in the Winterberg down to the
conical hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smit's River, and thence the latter river to its source in that kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called Buffels Hoek; provided, however, that the free communication between the Kat and Gonappe Rivers, and the said territory, of the Shiloh missionary institution, as also between the Tarka and Kaffraria through the now uninhabited country east of the Winterberg, continue uninterrupted as hitherto.

5. The said contracting chief engages to protect by all means in his power the Bushmen who reside, or may come to reside, within the said territory, as the original proprietors of the soil, to let them enjoy all the rights and privileges to which the Tambookies are entitled, and to be responsible for their acts, in the same manner as he binds himself by this treaty for the acts of the Tambookies.

6. No Tambookies, armed or unarmed, single or in number, male or female, shall be allowed to cross the said boundary into the colony, and no British subject, armed or unarmed, single or in number, shall be allowed to cross into the said territory occupied by the Tambookies, except with permission and under the restriction hereinafter to be specified in article

7. The said contracting chiefs shall, with the concurrence of the said Lieut.-Governor, or person appointed by him, fix upon certain points in the said territory, as near to the said boundary and to each other as convenient, at each of which he shall station a chief or responsible man of his tribe, to be called, for the sake of distinction, "pakati", to reside there, and to act as a guard.

It shall be the duty of such amapakati to keep a good and constant understanding with the field-cornets residing nearest to their said residences, and to do every thing in their power to prevent inroads or aggressions, either on the part of the colonists against the Tambookies or of the Tambookies against the colonists.

The amapakati, who shall be so stationed, must, by the said contracting chief, be made known, by name, to the said field-cornets, and any change, either or person or station, which may take place with reference to the said amapakati, must be previously communicated to the said field-cornets.

The amapakati shall be responsible to their own chief, who will see the necessity of selecting for such stations trustworthy men, and
to punish every neglect, fraud, or deception, which they may commit, as the said contracting chief hereby pledges himself to do.

8. The said Lieut.-Governor engages, on the part of his said Majesty, to place an agent, to reside in a convenient situation in the said territory, which agent shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity; and the said contracting chief binds himself to respect such agent as the representative of the British Government, and to protect his person, family, and property, to the utmost of his power, and to leave him full liberty of ingress and egress through the said territory, or across the boundary into the colony, at all times, without the least molestation or hindrance.

9. All representations, complaints, or applications, which may be made on the part of the colonists or their government, to or against the Tambookies, or on the part of the Tambookies, to or against the colonists or their government, shall be made through the said diplomatic agent, who shall be bound to observe the strictest impartiality and justice, and exert his utmost abilities to promote the peace and prosperity of the colonists, as well as of the Tambookies, to maintain the rights of both parties inviolate, and to cause the provisions of this treaty to be strictly observed.

10. The said contracting chief binds himself to afford free access to the said agent, to all persons from the colony, provided with such passes as shall be hereinafter specified. He also promises that such Tambookies or others who shall be employed by the colonial Government, as policemen or messengers, shall have free access into his said territory, either with messages or in tracing out, with the assistance of the amapakati, depredators or such criminals as shall have committed crimes in, and have escaped from, the colony; promising also to give them, and cause them to receive, in his said territory, every assistance and protection.

11. Any British subject desirous of crossing the boundary into the territory inhabited by the said chief and tribe, with the view of communicating with the agent, shall be bound to obtain a pass from the field-cornet living nearest to the spot where he wishes to cross the boundary. With this pass he shall be bound to proceed direct to the station of the resident agent; but no person, so entering such territory, shall be at liberty to go with firearms or other weapons of offence or defence, except with the consent of the said amapakati or of a chief.
12. Any British subject entering the said territory under any other circumstances than those mentioned in the two foregoing article, can do so only with the consent of the Tambookies themselves, and at their own risk. And the said contracting chief, and those acting under his authority, shall be fully authorised to send out of the said territory those who shall so enter the same without their consent; and it is hereby clearly understood, that all persons who shall enter the said territory shall be, and are considered to be, subject to the laws of the Tambookies, as long as they remain in the said territory.

13. Such British subjects as shall obtain licences to trade beyond the boundary, shall not be allowed to enter the said territory without the consent of the said contracting chief, who, however, pledges himself and promises to encourage trade and commerce to the utmost of his power, and to protect and encourage those traders whom he shall permit to enter said territory, as long as they conduct themselves orderly and lawfully, with all his means and authority, to cause their persons, families, and property to be respected and inviolate, never to allow any of them, or any other British subject in his said territory, to be prosecuted, fined, or in any way made to suffer by any proceeding or custom connected with witchcraft; but, on the contrary, to give such British subjects at all times, free access to the British agent, and to pay due attention to the representations of such agent, as well as to give satisfaction and redress upon his just remonstrances or complaints; but the said agent shall not be bound, or permitted, to extend his interference or protection in case of any seizure, to whatever extent, made upon the property of any British trader, or other person, who shall be proved to him to have imported into the said territory such articles as are by the law of the colony forbidden to be carried for sale across the frontier.

14. Every British subject who shall be charged with any crime or misdemeanour, in the said territory, shall have the right to demand that, previous to his trial, notice of such trial shall be given to the said agent, who shall be at liberty, if he see fit, to attend at such trial, and to speak or plead in behalf of the accused, if he shall find cause to do so; and due weight shall be given to the opinion of such agent, as promised and agreed on in the 13th article of this treaty.
15. If any British subject commit a crime or misdemeanor in the said territory, and escape out of the same across the boundary, the said agent shall exert himself to obtain satisfaction for the aggrieved party, by means of the British courts, and in every respect exert himself with as much zeal for the Tambookie, who may be thus wronged by a British subject, as he is bound to do in behalf of the British subject who may be aggrieved by a Tambookie.

16. Any Tambookie, or other native residing among the Tambookies, who shall be desirous of crossing the boundary into the territory inhabited by the colonists, shall be obliged to do so unarmed, and shall be bound to obtain a pass from the British agent residing among the tribe. Such pass shall be explicit, in the English and Dutch languages, specifying the name of the applicant, the place of his destination, the object of his visit, the number of days he may be absent, and the date when granted.

No pass shall be so granted, except at the request of, or upon the production of an understood token from a respectable chief, who will engage to be responsible for the conduct of the applicant during his stay in the colony; and it must be clearly explained to such applicant, that such pass will not protect him if he deviate from the road to the place of his destination, or go armed, or skulk in retired places, or exceed the period specified in the pass, or travel with others of his nation who are not provided with passes; in either of which cases he shall be dealt with as if he had no such pass. The agent shall grant no pass if he has the least suspicion of the motives of the applicant's visit to the colony, nor unless he has reasonable cause for such visit.

Visits on the parts of idlers are, for the sake of the colony as well as the Tambookies, to be by no means encouraged. The agent shall refuse them, and he shall also keep an accurate register of such passes as he shall grant, -- of the names of the chiefs at whose request they are granted, which names must also be stated upon the passes.

All Tambookies or others actually in the employ of agents, missionaries, or traders, will however be allowed to enter the colony with passes from such employers, provided such passes clearly state the names of such servants, their destination, and the time for how long they are to be in the colony.
17. All Tambookies found without passes to the westward of the said boundary, shall, for the first time, be immediately sent across the frontier, and delivered over to the nearest of the amapakati mentioned in article 7 of this treaty, who shall be bound to punish them, or cause them to be sent to the said contracting chief, who hereby pledges himself to use every endeavour, and to cause laws and punishments to be established, for the purpose of preventing such encroachments upon the colonial territory. And any Tambookie found so offending in the second time shall be punished according to the laws already established, or to be hereafter established, for the punishment of such offences.

18. Any Tambookie found in the act of committing a crime or depredation within the said colony, shall be dealt with according to the laws of the colony; and it is to be clearly understood that in case of resistance or attempt to flight, on the part of such criminals and depredators, it is perfectly legal to fire upon them, or otherwise to disable or kill them, if they cannot in any other way be secured, or prevented from completing such crime. But if such criminals or depredators, being pursued upon the spoor, be not overtaken before they shall have crossed the line occupied by the amapakati, the course agreed upon in the following article shall be adopted in the apprehension of such criminals or depredators, or the recovery of property carried off by them; -- and on no occasion whatever shall any patrol or armed party of any description be allowed to cross the said line, so occupied, for the said purpose.

19. If any person being in pursuit of criminals, or depredators, or property stolen by them, shall not overtake or recover the same before he shall reach the said line (provided he can make oath that he traced the said criminals, depredators, or property, across a particular spot on the said line, -- that the property when stolen was properly guarded, and, in case of cattle, horses, or the like, that they were so guarded by an armed herdsman, -- that the pursuit was commenced immediately after such property was stolen, -- that if the robbery was committed during the night, the property had been, when stolen, properly secured in kraals, stables, or the like, and that the pursuit in that case was latest commenced early next morning), such person shall be at liberty to proceed direct to the pakati living nearest the spot where he can swear such traces to have crossed the said line -- which pakati.
shall be bound at once to receive the statement, examine the traces, and, if the statement appear well founded, use his utmost endeavours to recover the stolen property, as well as the perpetrators pursued; and it will be at the opinion of the party pursuing to continue the search at once, under the guidance of the said pakati, provided he do not go armed, or accompanied by armed British subjects, or assist in any violence of any kind within the said territory. If the party pursuing shall thus, with the assistance of the said pakati, recover the property pursued, he shall be at liberty to proceed with the same, either to the said agent, or to one of the field-cornets residing most convenient to himself, in order to make, before such agent or field-cornet, a statement of his proceedings, and the quantity and nature of the property recovered, which statement he shall be liable at all times to be called upon to make oath to; after making which statement he shall be at liberty to carry off the said property, leaving the said pakati or police to pursue the criminal, and to recover compensation for their exertions, by means of the chiefs and their councils, according to the usage of the tribe; and the said contracting chiefs do hereby bind themselves in all such cases to exert themselves to the utmost to cause the criminals to be apprehended and punished, as well as on all occasions to cause the said pakati to be equitably rewarded for their exertions.

20. If, however, a party pursuing stolen property and depredators, in the manner specified in the foregoing article, shall deem it more safe, or convenient, or expeditious, to proceed to the nearest field-cornet, he shall be at liberty to do so. The field-cornet shall either accompany such party (after he shall have stated himself prepared to make oath required in the said foregoing article), or provide him with a competent witness, who shall accompany such pursuing party to the spot where the said traces cross the said line, and examine the same with the assistance of the said pakati, whose presence must be obtained. He, the said pursuer, shall then, if he do not think fit or safe to follow the spoor further, or, having so followed the same, prove unsuccessful, proceed to the resident agent and lodge his complaint, upon oath, and, in case of lost property, swear particularly to the circumstances stated in the said foregoing article, and also the exact value of the property stolen, and not recovered. Unless this affidavit be made, the agent shall take no further notice of the case; but, as soon as such affidavit shall be made, the said agent shall, if he have no
reason to discredit the same (he being at all times at liberty to demand further proof, and it being at all times the bounden duty of the party complaining to produce, good and sufficient proof), to lay the case before the chief, who does hereby engage to call a council, and to enter into the strictest investigation, to cause the stolen property to be recovered, if possible, and the perpetrators punished. And the said chief doth further pledge himself and engage that if, at the end of one month after the case shall have been laid before him, the said perpetrators or property shall not have been discovered, and if it shall, nevertheless, have been clearly proved, before him and his said council, by the evidence of the said pursuer, and pakati, or other proof, that the property was traced into his territory, he, the said chief, shall at once indemnify the person robbed to the full value of the property lost, and no more, and compensate the said pakati for their exertions.

21. With the exception of indemnification, obtained through the said chiefs and council in the manner specified in the foregoing article, no person pursuing stolen property shall be allowed to take any but his own property, or the identical property he is in pursuit of, even if tendered to him, on pain of having to restore the property so taken, and losing all further claim to the property actually lost.

22. The said contracting chief doth agree, promise, and pledge himself, to encourage, and protect by every means in his power, the propagation of the Christian religion throughout his territories, as also to protect, in their persons, families, and property, the teachers and ministers of the said religion, and all British subjects of whatever description, who may sojourn in, or enter into, the said territory, with their consent, or according to the terms of this treaty, as long as they conduct themselves with propriety and submission to the law, and never, under any circumstances, to allow them to be molested, or subjected to any prosecutions, or penalties, upon the plea or pretence of the laws and usages connected with or instituted against witchcraft, — as also to leave them free access to, and communication with, the colony.

23. The said contracting chief doth also agree, promise, and pledge himself to do every thing in his power to promote the tranquillity of the several tribes by whom he is surrounded, as well as
of the colonists.

Thus done and agreed, signed and sealed, at Shilo, this Eighteenth day of January, 1837.

(Signed) A. STOCKENSTROM, (L.S.)

Mark of x Mapassa.

(Signed) H. Hudson,
H.F. Fynn.

Witnesses - Marks of x Quesha,
x Nyela.

Provisionally ratified in Council,
Cape Town, 1st June, 1837.

(Signed) B. D'URBAN, Governor.
APPENDIX 5

PROCLAMATION by His Excellency Major-General Sir George Thomas Napier, K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Castle, Town, and Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, Commanding the Forces, &c. &c. &c.

WHEREAS a certain Treaty of Peace and Amity was entered into at Shiloh, on the 18th day of January, in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirty-seven, between Andries Stockenstrom, Esquire, Lieut.-Governor of the Eastern Division of this Colony, duly qualified, on the part of His Britannic Majesty, on the one side, and the Tambookie Chief Mapassa, on the other side:

And, whereas, I have deemed it expedient, with the concurrence of the Tambookie Chief Mapassa, to alter and amend certain provisions of the 12th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Articles of the said Treaty, and having met the said Chief Mapassa at Graham's Town, on the 28th day of January last, for the purpose aforesaid, -- It has been finally agreed that the above-named four Articles of the aforesaid Treaty shall be altered and amended. And also that the clauses appended thereto shall have the same force and effect as if they had been embodied in the Treaty itself: provided nothing therein contained be construed to alter any part of the said Treaty, save and except the aforesaid four Articles.

And I hereby make known that the 12th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Articles of the aforesaid Treaty have been altered and amended accordingly, and that the clauses appended thereto have been agreed upon, with the full and free consent of all the subscribing parties, and are herewith published for general information.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN!

Given under my hand and seal at Graham's Town, this 1st day of February, 1841.

GEO. NAPIER, Governor.

By Command of His Excellency the Governor,

H. HUDSON,
Acting Secretary to Government, Eastern Districts.
12. Any British subject entering the said territory under any other circumstances than those mentioned in the foregoing article, or in the pursuit of stolen cattle, can do so only with the consent of the Tambbookies themselves, and at their own risk. And the said contracting chief, and those acting under his authority, shall be fully authorised to send out of the said territory those who shall so enter the same without their consent; and it is hereby clearly understood, that all persons who shall enter the said territory shall be, and are, considered to be subject to the laws of the Tambbookies, as long as they remain in the said territory.

19. If any person being in the pursuit of criminals, or depredators, or property stolen by them, shall not overtake or recover the same, before he shall reach the said line (provided he can make oath that he traced the said criminals, depredators, or property, across the said boundary line, — that the property, when stolen, was properly guarded, and in case of cattle, horses, or the like, that they were tended by a herdsman, — that the pursuit was commenced within a reasonable time after such property was stolen, — that, if the robbery was committed during the night, the property had been, when stolen, properly secured in kraals, stables, or the like, and that the pursuit in that case was commenced next day), such person shall be at liberty to proceed direct to the pakati living nearest the spot where he can swear such traces to have crossed the said line, — which pakati shall be bound at once to receive the statement, examine the traces, and use his utmost endeavour to recover the stolen property, as well as the perpetrators pursued; and it will be at the option of the party pursuing to continue the search at once, under the guidance of the said pakati, provided he do not go armed, or accompanied by armed British subjects, or assist in any violence of any kind within the said territory. If the party pursuing shall thus, with the assistance of the said pakati, recover the property pursued, he shall be at liberty to proceed with the same, either to the said agent, or to one of the field-cornets residing most convenient to himself, in order to make, before such agent or field-cornet, a statement of his proceedings, and the quantity and nature of the property recovered, which statement he shall be liable at all times to be called upon to make oath to; after making which statement he shall be at liberty to carry off the said property, leaving the said pakati to pursue the
criminal, and to recover compensation for their exertions, by means of the chiefs and their councils, according to the usage of the tribe. And the said contracting chief doth hereby bind himself in all such cases to exert himself to the utmost to cause the criminals to be apprehended and punished, as well as on all occasions to cause the said pakati to be equitably rewarded for his exertions.

20. If, however, a party pursuing stolen property and depredators, in the manner specified in the foregoing article, shall deem it more safe, convenient, or expeditious to proceed to the nearest field-cornet, he shall be at liberty to do so. The field-cornet shall either accompany such party, or provide him with a competent witness, or a policeman, who shall accompany such pursuing party to the spot where the said traces cross the said line, and examine the same, with the assistance of the said pakati, whose presence must be obtained. He, the said pursuer, shall then, if he do not think fit or safe to follow the spoor further, or, having so followed the same, prove unsuccessful, proceed to the resident agent, and lodge his complaint upon oath, and, in case of lost property, swear particularly to the circumstances stated in the said foregoing article, and also the exact value of the property stolen, and not recovered. As soon as such affidavit shall be made, the said agent shall, if he have no reason to discredit the same (he being at all times at liberty to demand further proof, and it being at all times the bounden duty of the party complaining to produce good and sufficient proof), lay the case before the chief, who does hereby engage to call a council, and to enter into the strictest investigation, to cause the stolen property to be recovered, if possible, and the perpetrators punished. And in the event of the property and perpetrators being thus discovered, the said chief shall demand or take from such depredators, restitution of or compensation for the said property, together with such amount of damages as the said agent shall assess as a reasonable allowance to the party plundered for the injury done to his property. And the said chief doth further pledge himself and engage, that if, at the end of one month after the case shall have been laid before him, the said perpetrators or property shall not have been discovered, and, if it shall nevertheless have been clearly proved, before him and his said council, by the evidence of the said pursuer, pakati, or other proof, that the property was traced into his territory, he, the said chief, shall, within fourteen days thereafter, indemnify the person robbed, to the full value of the
property lost, and no more, and compensate the said pakati for his exertions.

21. With the exception of indemnification, obtained through the said chiefs and council in the manner specified in the foregoing or appended articles, no person pursuing stolen property shall be allowed to take any but his own property, or the identical property he is in pursuit of, unless tendered to him, on pain of having to restore the property so taken, and losing all further claim to the property actually lost.

Further: the said contracting chief doth hereby agree, that if any person in the pursuit of stolen property shall be unable to unwilling to make the affidavit above mentioned, but if, notwithstanding, he has good and sufficient reason to believe that his property has been taken across the said line, he shall, after having sent information of his intention to the pakati stationed nearest the spot where he means to cross the boundary, be at liberty to proceed at once in pursuit of the same, provided he do not go armed, or accompanied by armed British subjects, or assist in any violence of any kind within said territory; and the pakati shall in all such cases be bound to afford every assistance to the party pursuing; and in the event of his tracing the said property or depredators to a responsible party or kraal, he shall then proceed to the diplomatic agent of the tribe to which the said kraal belongs, to whom he shall make a statement of his proceedings, and if the agent shall be satisfied that sufficient proof has been adduced, he shall immediately lay the case before the captain of the kraal, who shall cause restitution of the property to be made, if possible, or compensation to be awarded for the same; and in the event of the captain of the kraal being unable or unwilling to make restitution or compensation, the said agent shall lay the case before the contracting chief in whose territory the kraal is situated, who shall cause restitution of, or compensation for, the said property to be made. And the said chief does hereby engage, in all such cases, to punish the depredators, if discovered, or in the event of such discovery not being made, to punish the captain of the kraal to which such depredators, were traced.

Further: If any person shall not be able to comply with the regulations above set forth, but nevertheless shall have ascertained that his property has been taken across the boundary, he shall be at
liberty to proceed across the said line in search of the same, provided he sends notice to the paki of his intention, and does not go armed, or accompanied by armed British subjects, or assist in any violence of any kind in such territory; and in the event of his being able to identify his property, upon sufficient proof of the correctness of his statement being adduced, the agent shall demand from the chief in whose territory the property is thus discovered and identified, restitution of the same, and the said chief shall likewise cause the party in whose possession the said property was found to pay such amount of damages as shall be considered equitable by the agent and chief.

The said chief doth further bind and oblige himself that in the event of information being given to him that a murder has been committed in the colony, and the murderer has escaped beyond the boundary, he will use every exertion to apprehend and deliver the said murderer to justice, and also to afford to the government every information with respect to the chiefs of other tribes who may harbour in their country the murderers of colonial subjects.

And lastly, the said chief doth further agree that the above alterations made in the treaty, as well as the clauses which have been now appended hereto, shall have as much force and effect as if they had been embodied in the said treaty itself.

Thus done, and agreed, sealed and signed by His Excellency Major-General Sir George Thomas Napier, K.C.B., Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, on the part of Her Britannic Majesty, and the subscribing chief on the part of the said tribe of Tambookies, before the undermentioned witnesses at Graham's Town, the 28th day of January 1841.

GEO. NAPIER, Governor.

Mapassa x his mark, Temboo Chief.

J. Hare, Lieut.-Governor.
H. Hudson, Agent-General.
H.F. Fynn, Diplomatic Agent.

Marks of Kafir witnesses.

x Koosse, x Gwada,

x Punguougno, x Pect.
GOVERNMENT NOTICE

Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope

17th April, 1845

His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to direct the publication, for general information, of the following Treaty of Amity entered into between His Excellency, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Umtara, chief of the Tambookie tribe.

By His Excellency's Command,
(Signed) JOHN MONTAGU,
Secretary to Government.

TREATY entered into between His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Peregrine Maitland, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, of the Royal Military Order of William of the Netherlands, and of the Imperial Order of St. Vladimir of Russia, Colonel of Her Majesty's 17th Regiment of Foot, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Castle, Town, and Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same, commanding the Forces, &c. &c. &c., on the part of Her Britannic Majesty; — and the Chiefs of the Tambookie Tribe, viz.: Umtara, for himself and Nation.

Art. 1. It is agreed between the said Governor and the said contracting chiefs, that all former treaties between the colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the said chiefs shall be annulled, and the same are hereby annulled accordingly, and this present treaty shall stand henceforth in room and stead thereof.

2. Peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, and her subjects, and the Tambookie tribe, and the contracting chiefs engage to use their utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, and to cause the strict observance of this treaty.

3. The boundary between the said colony and the territory of the said chiefs and tribe, is and shall be understood to be the Swarts
Key or Winterberg Spruit, from its source in the Winterberg down to the Conical Hill called Kogel Kop, thence a line across a narrow neck of land called Rhenoster Hoek into the Klaas Smit's River; and thence the latter river to its source in that Kloof of the Bamboos Berg, called Buffels Hoek; provided, however, that the free communication between the Cat and Gonappe Rivers, and the said territory, or the Shiloh Missionary Institution, as also between the Tarla and Caffiria through the now uninhabited country, east to the Winterberg, continue uninterrupted as hitherto.

4. The said Governor engages, on the part of her said Majesty, to place one or more agent or agents to reside in convenient situations near the residence of some of the principal chiefs, which agents shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity; and the said contracting chiefs bind themselves to respect such agents as the representatives of the British Government, and to protect their persons, families, and properties, to the utmost of their power, and to leave them full liberty of ingress and egress through their (the chiefs') territory, or across the boundary into the colony, at all times, without the least molestation or hindrance.

5. No Kafir, or other native residing amongst the Kafirs, shall cross the boundary into the territory inhabited by the colonists, without having received from some agent, or other authority empowered by the Governor, a pass, written in both the English and Dutch languages, specifying the name of the Kafir or other native, the place of his destination, the object of his visit, the time he is to be in the colony, and the date at which the pass shall have been granted; and any Kafir or other native found upon the colonial side of the said boundary, at a time or place not authorised by the terms of his pass, or found without a pass, shall be liable to be dealt with as the laws of the colony in regard to such persons do or shall provide. Kafirs, or other natives, in the actual employment of any officer of her Majesty, civil or military, on duty in any of the territories inhabited by the said chiefs, or of any contractor for supplies to the troops or police, or of any resident agent, missionary, or trader, shall be at liberty to cross the said boundary, having first received a pass of the nature aforesaid, which may be granted to them by their employers. But the agents, in any case in which they shall find that the Kafir or other native applying for a pass, reasonably requires, and, from his good
character, merits such a privilege, shall be at liberty to grant passes not restricted to one visit, and which may specify merely the name of the party, the date of the granting of the pass, and the length of time for which the same is to remain in force.

6. All British subjects resorting temporarily to the territories of the contracting chiefs, or residing therein, with the permission of the chiefs, for the purposes of trade or otherwise, shall be protected by them in their persons and properties.

7. The said contracting chiefs bind themselves to afford free access, at all times, into their territories, to the members of any police force employed by the colony, and to the men of the Cape Corps while acting as police, when searching for offenders who have committed crimes in the said colony, or property stolen therefrom; and the said chiefs will afford to such persons, so engaged, their countenance and assistance, and such persons shall have the right to apprehend, and bring before the agent for further investigation, all such persons found in Kafirland as they shall know, or have just reason to suspect, to have committed any theft or other crime in the colony, and they shall also have the right to seize and secure and bring before the agent, in order to the safe custody of the same, pending the final settlement of the case, all property which they shall know, or have just reason to suspect, to be property stolen from the colony. And the Colonial Government will at all times, through the agent, make good to any Kafir or other native, unjustly injured by any act of any individual authorised to act as a policeman, while acting as such, whatever damage in respect of either person or property he may thereby have sustained.

8. The contracting chiefs will use their best exertions to discover, and deliver up to the nearest British authority, for trial in the colony, according to law, all persons, whether Kafirs or not, who shall have committed, or who shall be reasonably suspected of having committed, any murder, robbery, or other crime, within the limits of the colony, and who shall be found in any part of the territories of the chiefs.

9. The Governor, on the part of her Britannic Majesty, engages to use his best exertions to seize and bring to trial in the colony, whenever so requested by any of the contracting chiefs, any subject of her said Majesty who shall have committed, or shall be reasonably suspected of having committed, within the territory of such chief, any act
of violence or wrong, which would, by the laws of the colony, committed within the limits of the colony, constitute any of the crimes enumerated in the last preceding article; and in regard to criminals, or suspected criminals, not being subjects of her Majesty, escaping into the colony from the territory of any of the said chiefs, the Governor engages, upon being requested by the chief to do so, to use his best exertions to discover and deliver up such criminals, or suspected criminals, to the chief for trial.

10. The contracting chiefs undertake to use their authority and influence to cause all persons within their territories, whose evidence they shall find to be required by any court of justice in any British territory in South Africa, to appear at such time and place as shall be prescribed; and the chiefs will, as much as possible, take care, when delivering up any prisoner under the 13th article of this treaty to any British authority, to produce, at the same time, to such authority, all witnesses acquainted with the matter in question, whose presence the chiefs can command or procure, in order that the truth of the said matter may fully be made known. The Government of the colony, on the other hand, will be prepared to pay all witnesses from Kafirland, who, having been required to do so, shall attend any such court as aforesaid, a reasonable compensation for their time and trouble.

11. Whenever any person resident in the colony shall have lost from the colony any horses, cattle, or other property, and shall afterwards identify the same in the possession of any person residing within the territory of any of the contracting chiefs, such property shall be immediately restored, upon the requisition of the agent, to the person proving the same to belong to him. And in all cases in which the claimant shall prove to the said agent that the property so identified was stolen from him, the contracting chief within whose territory it shall have been identified, engages to compensate the claimant for the expenses of the pursuit. But the chief will, notwithstanding, be relieved from the payment of the said compensation, if he shall deliver up for trial in the colony the supposed thief or thieves, and the person or persons so delivered up shall be duly convicted of the theft. And the Governor, moreover, engages to reward the chief in proportion to the magnitude of the theft committed, for his zeal and trouble in apprehending and delivering up the thieves.
12. Whenever any person resident in the colony shall have lost from
the colony, and can prove the same to have been stolen, any horses,
cattle, or other property, and can, by the traces, or other sufficient
evidence, satisfy the agent that such property was carried by the
thief, or some person privy to the theft, from the colony into the
territory of any of the contracting chiefs, and further, that he has
made no delay which could have been avoided in reporting his loss to
the said agent, — such chief engages, in case the stolen property shall
not be discoverable, to make good, upon being so required by the agent,
the value of the property, and further, to compensate the owner for
the expenses to which he shall have been put in his pursuit. But the
chief will be relieved from his liability for expenses, in case he shall
deliver up the thief or thieves for trial in the colony, and he or they
shall there be convicted in due course of law. And the Governor en-
gages, also, to reward the chief in every such case, in like manner as
is in the conclusion of the last preceding article promised and under-
taken.

13. The Governor aforesaid engages to nominate and appoint a
competent tribunal (to which tribunal the agent will not belong), to be
held from time to time, either within the colony or the territory of the
contracting chiefs, to hear and determine, by way of appeal, and accord-
ing to such convenient rules as shall hereafter be from time to time
established for its guidance by the Governor of the colony, in concert
with the said chiefs (which rules for the time being shall be considered
as if inserted in this treaty), all manner of questions regarding com-
ensation, and by whom and to what amount the same shall be made, and
generally, all matters requiring adjudication under the two preceding
articles; before which tribunal either the claimants or the contracting
chiefs may appeal against any decisions of the agent acting under this
treaty; and it shall be competent for the said tribunal, should it see
cause so to do, to award to either of the parties to any such appeal all
reasonable expenses occasioned by the said appeal.

14. The contracting chiefs, having admitted into their territories
Christian missionaries for the instruction of their subjects, hereby
engages to protect the persons, families, and property of all Christian
teachers who may reside amongst them.

15. The contracting chiefs engage to permit any of their subjects
who profess the Christian religion, or who desire to settle at or near
the missionary villages or institutions within their territories respectively, to take their property with them to such institutions without being molested or injured in any way; and they further engage that such persons shall not be disturbed or injured in their persons, families, or property, for refusing to comply with the Kafir customs of witchcraft, rainmaking, polygamy, circumcision, or forcible abduction or violation of families.

16. The contracting chiefs bind themselves to encourage their subjects to cause the regular attendance of their children at the schools of the Christian teachers within their territories.

17. The contracting chiefs engage to abstain from making war, as much as possible, on the tribes to whom they are adjacent, and that, before doing so, they will request the mediation of the Colonial Government, with a view to settling amicably the differences between them.

18. The Governor aforesaid engages to defend the contracting chiefs, in their respective territories, against any enemy who shall attack or make war upon any of them, provided such attack or war has not been occasioned by any aggression, or any other act of injustice, on the part of the contracting chief, or by his having neglected or declined the mediation of the Colonial Government.

19. The contracting chiefs, on their part, engage not to permit any tribe, or the property of any tribe, which tribe may be at war with the colony; or who may be known to the contracting chiefs, or any of them, to have hostile intentions towards the colony, to pass into or remain within their respective territories; and in the event of the Colonial Government having received intimation of the hostile intentions of any such tribe, before the same has come to the knowledge of the contracting chiefs, they engage not to permit such tribe, or the property of such tribe, to pass into or remain within their territory, upon being so required by the Government of the colony.

20. The Governor aforesaid, as a mark of friendship and approbation of the general conduct hitherto pursued by the contracting chiefs, engages to make to the contracting chiefs an annual present, in money or useful articles, to the amount of £100 (hundred), so long as the contracting chiefs observe the terms of this treaty, and remain the faithful allies of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain.
Although the Bushmen had never directly influenced frontier affairs as far as the Stormberg area had been concerned, they nevertheless caused trouble in the district long after matters with Tambookies had been settled. As mention has in this thesis often been made to the Bushmen, the following brief account of the activities of these people are added here.

The Bushmen of the Stormberg proved to be the most troublesome and ferocious of all the tribes.

While there is some evidence that the Bushmen of Natal raided the Albert District, especially the Waschbank Division, from their stronghold in the Drakensberg,¹ the real troublemakers were those under the chief, Mandoor. He and his followers originally lived near Whittlesea in the Queenstown area,² but later seemed to have joined those Bushmen from the Seekoli River and Sneuberg who found in the Stormberg a last stronghold. From here they raided the adjoining areas with the greatest ferocity.

In 1824, Landdrost Mackay of Somerset East, who had investigated the state of Bushmen on the frontier of the Cradock district, reported that the most friendly disposition prevailed on the parts of the Bushmen and the farmers. However, he found that a different picture emerged on the ridges of the Stormberg, and the southern bank of the Orange River. In his report he pointed out that "the immediate vicinity of that immense range of mountains, the Stormberg, which they

¹J. Wright, Bushmen Raids of the Drakensberg, p. 140.
²Wright, op. cit., p. 141.
(the Bushmen) inhabit to the frontie:~ line (the Stormberg Spruit) and which is most inaccessible except to Bushmen, facilitates those acts of aggression to which they are naturally prone. Their numbers are very considerable, and the injury they do the inhabitants, though daily decreasing, continue still to be inconceivably great. And as they are aware of the punishment to which murder and robbery subject them, they stand as much in dread of the inhabitants as the inhabitants do of them; consequently little friendly intercourse or confidence prevails between them.\(^1\) Being thus less intractable than the Bushmen of the plains, the Stormberg Bushmen could easier evade pursuit, consequently the commandos that were sent out from time to time effected little.

During one such campaign — the date could not be established — Mandoor fell. His son, Plyman, continued his marauding for some time. In 1828 he was still in the vicinity of Duffels Vlei, but eventually, he too was driven away and found refuge in the Drakensberg.

Here he was joined by rebel Hottentots and Bushmen, who equally coveted the large herds of the Washbank Spruit farmers. Here they were in a most favourable position to commit depredations.

Surveyor-General Ford who visited this area in October, 1848 when farms in the Albert District were measured out, informed Robinson:

"The Bushmen started to infest this part of the Division occupy kraals from beyond its limits. From the high points of the country they can observe with accuracy where the farmers' cattle are left unprotected, descending upon them after nightfall, sweep off as many as they can conveniently manage. These are scarcely ever recovered. The Bushmen, in fear of losing their prey when followed, usually kill every head.

\(^1\) Pp. 50, 1855, no. 167, MacKay to Commissioner of Inquiry, 7th May 1824.
They prefer horse meat to that of horned cattle and reserve only a few of the fastest horses for hunting the Quagga. When they drive off the prey they take the most difficult zigzag course they can find, forcing the cattle up and down the craggy ridges."

Ford then suggested that the area be opened up and farms distributed to farmers, for once the area was fully occupied they would not, as Ford put it: "Have the field to carry out their sports."\(^1\)

Although farms were distributed after 1848, the whole Waschbank area was still in years to come exposed to the inroads of these robbers. In February, 1857 a correspondent from Waschbank Spruit informed the Albert Times as follows on this question: "A band of these marauders (rebel Hottentots and Bushmen) are stationed by their leaders at Zuurberg under pretence of cutting wood, but more with the determination of wresting stock in its immediate locality. In reality their rendezvous is the Tzitsi, a mountainous range beyond the Zuurberg where it is said, a force, double in number of the Zuurberg are congregated, and where the whole of the stolen stock are taken to. The latter have their quarters in the Gatsberg on the Drakensberg range. Both places, the Gatsberg and the Tzitsi are represented to be dangerous, and to attempt dislodgement by a small force would be unwise and unpoltic." The correspondent warned that "should the governor not take effective measures to secure life and property the farmers, rather than be subject to such daring outrages, will at once vacate the country, and enlist under the blood-stained banner of the Free State."\(^2\)

That a letter such as this could have been written in 1857 was certainly a reflection on the official handling of the problems of the

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\(^1\)DSCUP, 56, Miscellaneous letters 1848-1850, Ford to Robinson, 15th Oct. 1848.

\(^2\)The Albert Times, 14th Feb. 1857.
farmers in this remote area. In the preceding years the government had regularly been approached for protection. In February, 1855 for instance Paul Rheeder and forty-four farmers had asked Field Cornet Jacobus Kruger to use his influence with the authorities for securing mounted police for protection, and they expressed their willingness to be taxed for the support of such policemen. Their losses for the year, they stated, was £655.1 Nothing was done about this. A year later the Albert Times painted an even darker picture: "Our border farmers at the extreme point of Waschbank Spruit...will soon be reduced to beggary and no other alternative left them to move out of that locality where life and property is in jeopardy." For the week January 26th to February 4th, the paper reported the following losses: Hans Coetzee, 70 head of cattle and 20 horses; Abraham van Straten, 3 horses; Rheeder, a lot of horses; Meyburgh, all his horses. The report ends gloomily, "Up to the evening of 4th the long talked of border police had not arrived at their respective stations." Some time afterwards four mounted policemen were stationed at the Waschbank Spruit, but in November, 1856 the Albert Times once more presented its readers with a sober report: "The withdrawal of the body of mounted police from the portion of Waschbank is one of the false steps of Sir George Grey. Numerous thefts are of daily occurrence in that locality, and while utmost caution is exercised by the farmers, the chiefs get off with large portions of the earnings of these men. No one, but those on the spot, can for one moment conceive the hardships which these men are labouring under."3 This was at the time when rumours about a

1 The Albert Times, 8th Feb. 1855.
2 Ibid., 7th Feb. 1856.
3 Ibid., 3rd Nov. 1856.
possible outbreak amongst the Kaffrarian tribes and the invasion of Queenstown were circulating. Hence Grey thought it expedient to withdraw the troops from Waschbank, and to station them at Queenstown.

Under these circumstances then, the attendance of church services at Burghersdorp and Aliwal North was impossible, and the farmers now petitioned for their own church. The Bushmen danger, then, was one of the main motives for the establishment of the township of Dordrecht in 1856.
APPENDIX B

CENSUS OF TAMBOOKIE CHIEFS INHABITING THE TAMBOOKIE LOCATION BY 1857

(a) A’mahala tribe - paramount: Regent Nonesi who is paramount of all Tambookies.

(b) Amagana tribe - paramount: Gacelo, elected by the tribe since Tyopo's death.
   Chiefs: Gacelo, Guwada, Kelelo.

(c) Amandungwana tribe - chief: Darala, son of Quesha. This tribe has been greatly scattered through UmhlaKazi's delusion.
   Chief: Darala.

(d) Amatshathu or late Mapassa's tribe - paramount: Yiliswa.
   Chiefs: Yiliswa, Vizi, Tabayi, Uytincuka, Umnuwila.

Total inhabitants of location:

- Men 3275
- Women 4487
- Children 6081
- Cattle 10134
- Horses 2391
- Sheep 4495
- Goats 9522
- Acres of land 2363
- Guns 903

amounts to 7762

(Cape of Good Hope Annexures, 1858)
MAP 1

MAP TO SHOW THE DISTRIBUTION OF THEMBU PEOPLE BY 1825

E. Wagens, Settlemen and Reactions in the Thembar Area.
MAP TO SHOW THE DIFFERENT BOUNDARIES OF THE CAPE COLONY: 1770-1822
MAP 3

SIR BENJAMIN D'URBAN'S ANNEXATION
SIR HARRY SMITH'S ANNEXATIONS

- District boundaries in 1848
- Smith's boundary - December 1847
- Eastern boundary by the Proclamation of 5th - 24th July, 1848