
A Thesis for the Degree of Master of Arts

by

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SUMMARY

A Critical study of the Evidence of Andres Stockenstrom before the Aborigines Committee in 1855, viewed in the light of his previous Statements and Policies.

The main features of the two opposing points of view may be summed up as follows:

Godlonton and his supporters maintained that Stockenstrom in his evidence not only refrained from disputing the Philip interpretation of frontier affairs and the causes of the war of 1836, but deliberately produced evidence which he must have known to be untrue or invalid, in order to lend colour to the philanthropist point of view and blacken the colonist in the eyes of the British Government. Not only could his statements on specific incidents, such as the Zeko affair, be scrutiny, but his general statement of opinion on frontier affairs could be shown to be utterly inconsistent with his previous opinions and policies. This was proved by constant comparison of certain of his statements as Band事ent with the views expressed before the Committee. And this extraordinary change of face, they asserted, could be explained by the fact that Stockenstrom believed that, in a parliament dominated by Baxter Hall, where Philip and Baxter constantly had the ear of the Secretary for Colonies, his only hope of gratifying his ardent ambition for high office was to toe the philanthropic line.

Initially, Fairbairn took a more balanced view of the whole issue. He maintained that Stockenstrom's views on frontier policy had indeed undergone a material change—b but not suddenly when he appeared before the Aborigines Committee, the change had occurred when he came into direct and continued contact with frontier affairs, as Commissioner General. From that time on, Fairbairn asserted, his statements of opinion in regard to the old frontier
system, and his statements on specific incidents, were entirely consistent with those so fearlessly made before the Aborigines Committee, as was proved by the fact that Stockenstron relied upon his despatches to back up his statements, and frequently referred the Committee to them. Moreover, Fairbairn contended that Stockenstron, far from attempting to blacken his fellow-colonists, defended them as a body, while revealing the abuses to which the old system could and did give rise. His appointment to office, according to Fairbairn, was a natural result of his experience and acknowledged abilities. If there were any change of face involved, it was a most gratifying one on the part of the British Government, which could at last appoint to high office a colonist of liberal views of long standing.

(ii) The Verdict of the Historians.

In general, where they refer to Stockenstron, the writers on South African history fall into two main groups: either they accept Godlonton’s interpretation, or they avoid all controversial points, only too well aware that at an independent understanding or explanation of Stockenstron’s position in 1835. They are Professor J.H. Strenchen, in Het toef: af we lop in die Kolonie; and Professor W.J. Mackilla in Scratch-soer and_again.

Godlonton’s version appears again in the case of the colonists, and finds an echo in J. Sheal’s Acts of the Life of Godlonton of 1835. The fullest exponent of Godlonton’s interpretation is C. Sheal, who seems to have accepted it more or less in its entirety, and to have judged Stockenstron accordingly. This view has never been subjected to thorough criticism since Sheal expressed it, though later writers have in some cases modified it; the problem of the assumed hiatus in Stockenstron’s career, from 1833 to the end of the Lieutenant-Governorship, is still untouched. And Sheal’s version crops up again and again.
Supporters of Theal are Gustav Feller and Edgar J. Brookes and also, as far as can be ascertained from passing references, S. R. Gie, Eric Stockenström, Menfred Nathan and P. van Biljon. "Justus, in the Bronze of the Colfire Nation," published in 1897, also regarded Stockenström as having radically changed his views. But, being an extreme philanthropist, he approved the supposed change.

However, not all the historians have been partisan. In *Notes on South African Affairs*, cv. W. B. Boyce, although no admirer of Stockenström, gives a remarkably fair account, avoiding the current derogatory allegations against him. He put the failure of the Lieutenant-Governorship down to the influence of the Fairbairn clique on Stockenström, rather than to any ideas he may have formed in England.

Whatever Sir George Cory's private opinions of Stockenström's extraordinary personality may have been, he contrived to keep them out of his historiographical works. He is not always strictly accurate in his representations of Stockenström's statements, but he makes no reference to the allegations about him, except in so far as they appear in quotations from the Graham's Town address and petition. He does not imply a sudden and unexpected change of opinion on the part of Stockenström. Nor, though he takes on the whole a very unfavourable view of the Lieutenant-Governorship, does he attribute its failure, as Theal does, to a temporary and sinister digression into philanthropic paths.

Other writers who adopt a neutral stand and neither accept nor refute the allegations against Stockenström are John Noble, E. V. Adler and C. H. Allier.

A new trend in what might be called Stockenström historiography has become apparent in recent years. Professor Heyburn and the students who worked under him have been pioneers in this field. Increasing interest in Stockenström's career has led to a careful study and revaluation of his work as Landdrost, Commissioner-General and Lieutenant-Governor. To this school belong P. J. van der Merwe, who has a most valuable study of the Landdrost-
ship of both the Stockenstroms in his *Landwirtschaftsberichte:
von die Boere voor die Prof. M. J. Verheul, with his thesis
on the Commisioneer-Generalship; and E. Van der Spuy, who has made a
study of the Lieutenant-Governorship. The latter points out that
he has found little ground for Thiel's assertion that Stocken-
strom, in giving evidence, turned his back on his previous
statements, but does not develop his argument. The general
tendency now seems to be to ignore altogether the implications
of the allegations about the period from 1835 to 1838.

The only two writers who have attempted to clear up the
allegations against Stockenstrom are Prof. Frencken and Prof.
McMillen. In his account in *Gentle Race and Nation*, McMillen
makes four important points: that Stockenstrom's views on
frontier policy were the product of a gradual development over
generations of practical experience; that his philanthropic symp-
thies were of long standing; that the most significant aspect
of his evidence was its critical review of frontier policy as a
whole rather than its reference to incidents; and that it
was given before his new appointment was ever in question. In
fact, implicit in McMillen's discussion is the suggestion that
the evidence and the appointment were not closely interrelated.

McMillen thus provides the most significant counter-claim so
far to the Thiel school of thought. In his book, however, in the
nature of things, his comments are made virtually in passing,
and with little or no reference to any authorities for his

Prof. Frencken provides a most refreshing contrast to Thiel.
In an excellent chapter on the background to the Stockenstrom-
Letter quarrel, in *Die Letter in die Kolonie*, he
tackles the question of what Stockenstrom really did say about
the frontier system and the colonists in 1835. Prof. Frencken's
digest of the evidence is the first clear and completely un-
distorted version of Stockenstrom's statements to appear in
South African historiography...but he, too, leaves a number of
problems connected with the period still untouched.
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CHAPTER II

The Background to the Evidence.

In the light of the allegations against Stockenstrom, what facts can be regarded as established about this period of his career?

It is clear that Stockenstrom left South Africa embittered by the failure of the Commissioner-Generalship as a result of what he regarded as arbitrary mismanagement on the part of the colonial authorities. He was determined to resign rather than continue to hold the office as a sinecure, but he was by no means anxious to shake the dust of the Colony from his feet. He had a wife and family to support, he knew his own capabilities as an administrator, he was deeply interested in the Cape and all its problems. He represented his grievances forcibly to the Colonial Office, possibly with the hope that his office might yet be re instituted on an efficient basis. This the Colonial Office could not do, and the Commissioner-Generalship was abolished.

Stockenstrom continued to hope that an office, equivalent to that which he had held, but on a satisfactory basis, would be created, and the Colonial Secretary's promise, that he would again be employed, fulfilled. It seems that his hopes were high when Spring Rice came into office and when he received the questionnaire on frontier reforms at the end of 1834. His hope gave place to bitter disappointment and bitterness when nothing was done, and the Commissioner-Generalship still remained. But it was not until the news arrived of the outbreak of war on the Eastern frontier in 1836 that Stockenstrom finally decided to settle in Sweden and give up all idea of returning to the Cape.

He was therefore eager, right until July 1835, at any rate, to hold office.

To speak of his "ardent solicitations for place", however, is to exaggerate - perhaps even completely to distort. He certainly gave the Colonial Office very clearly to understand that he was prepared and anxious to serve at the Cape. He may even have hinted at an appointment in his letter to Spring-
vice of 5 November 1833, but he cannot with justice be said to have solicited for office, when he gave evidence in 1830, it is clear that nothing was further from his thoughts than that his evidence would lead him to office. Stockenstrom appeared before the committee in a mood of indifference, disillusionment and considerable irritation at an unexpected delay in his private arrangements. He was actually on his way to settle up his affairs at the Cape, preparatory to settling in Sweden, when he was called to the Committee. Stockenstrom did not expect the findings of the Committee to influence colonial policy, and the only result he foresees from his own evidence was opposition from certain quarters. He made no attempt to make Glenelg's acquaintance and, in fact, avoided the Colonial Office. It was not voluntarily that he supplied the Committee with all the evidence he could lay hands on as to his past character in office. He was evidently surprised even that it was requested. He was, of course, only too ready to comply; he was proud of his record, and always ready to defend his character.

Neither can it be asserted with plausibly, quite apart from Stockenstrom's own attitude, that his evidence was the major stepping-stone to his appointment as Lieutenant-Governor. During the period that evidence was being taken, Buxton was not apparently, much in contact with Glenelg except in connection with the business of the Committee. Glenelg was not, at first, vitally interested in the findings of the Committee. He was concerned rather with the immediate problems connected with the war at the Cape, about which not one of the witnesses called during the first session was in a position to give his first-hand information. Buxton's closest contact with him, and his use of the evidence to support various contentions, only commenced nearly a month after Stockenstrom had finished his evidence. Very then, it seems probable that it was Philip's recommendation, rather than Stockenstrom's evidence, that was the decisive factor in the summoning of Stockenstrom.

Philip's recommendation of Stockenstrom had nothing whatever
to do with any statements made by Stockenstrom during the time he was in England, since it was made at a time when he could not have known what Stockenstrom had said or was going to say. It was based upon what he knew of Stockenstrom and his policy through long years of acquaintance at the Cape.

There, too, began Stockenstrom's supposed "collusion" with the London philanthropist group. His connection with Luton and his circle came about through very normal channels. Philip he had known for many years, and had much in common with him, despite their various heated differences on points of expediency and policy. Pringle had been, and became again of his own volition, an intimate friend. For from seeking "collusion" with the Luton circle, Stockenstrom studiously avoided it. He did not even make use of the opportunity of contact with Luton afforded by Philip's letter of introduction. Through Pringle, he made normal social contact with Luton and other well-known philanthropists, with whom he discussed the matters that were of deep and vital interest to them all. He knew that they were planning a campaign against the Cape frontier system, which would involve the administration of it by the colonial authorities. Where that campaign would touch other colonial authorities, Stockenstrom refused his official support, and made his own criticisms only through government channels. Where the campaign seemed likely to touch himself, he was quick to defend himself, his principles and his policy, as he did in the Memoir of 1833, and the evidence of 1835 and 1836.

From the general tone of that defence, from remarks in private letters, and from some evidence in Pringle's Narrative of a Residence in South Africa, it does not seem that Stockenstrom in any way attempted to blur over the fact that definite differences did exist between his views and those of the philanthropists or that he tried, from any motives whatever, to mould his ideas to suit their opinions.
CHAPTER III


Reviewing the causes of frontier discontent, in his evidence on 14 August 1833, Stockenstrom referred to the encroachments of the whites on the aborigines. This aroused great criticism in the Graham's Town Journal, which asserted that this was a new attitude to frontier relations in one who had himself been enriched by the very process of encroachment. There are two flaws in this assertion:

(a) It implied that Stockenstrom was referring to encroachments on Boer territory on the Eastern frontier. It is clear, both from the statement in evidence and from a similar discussion in Stockenstrom's letter to Spring-Naie, the Colonial Secretary, in November 1834, that he meant the encroachments of whites, and later also of Boers, on Hottentot territory.

(b) It suggested that the idea that the whites encroached upon the aborigines in South Africa was a view not previously held by Stockenstrom. Despatches from as far back as 14 February 1832 reveal that Stockenstrom had long considered the whites in the 17th and 18th centuries to have been the aggressors against the Bushmen and Hottentots, and to have provoked retaliation by an oppressive policy.

In his evidence, Stockenstrom did not accuse the 18th century frontiersmen in so many words of the first aggressions against the Kaffirs. But this is implied in certain passages in the evidence in 1832, and expressed in a passage in the report he wrote in 1835, and one in the letter to Spring-Naie of 1834. This had not been Stockenstrom's original attitude. Since the days of his father's treacherous murder by Kaffirs in 1811, the Kaffirs had been to Stockenstrom "the Enemy". He regarded them as the aggressors, against whom the colony
must always act on the defensive. And he played a vigorous role in the campaigns of 1811-1812, 1813, 1816 and 1819. But the change in Stockenström's attitude probably had its origin in the view of the frontier policy which he came to hold when, as Commissioner-General, he became aware of abuses of the reprisal system.

Colonel Lede, in giving evidence, had considerable comment to offer on Stockenström's statements in connection with Brecon's command of 1818. It seems likely that he considered Stockenström deliberately to have presented a false picture of the actual reasons for the command. But the instructions given to Brecon by Major Rogers bear out Stockenström's repeated statements to the Committee that the primary reason for undertaking the command was to assist Caxile against the confederate chiefs, and not to punish the Kaffirs for depredations on the colony. Stockenström's despatches of the period show that this was his own impression at the time of the command. In giving evidence, he did not deny that there had been depredations on the part of the Kaffirs. He stated that the cattle captured were used partly to compensate the colonists for losses. It is impossible to determine from the despatches whether or not Stockenström approved of the 1818 command at the time as a measure necessary for the security of the frontier. If he did, it is true that he did not emphasize this point in evidence, nor only reference to this aspect being his statement that the government had presumably decided to intervene from "motives of precaution."

In his statements in 1833, 1834 and 1838, however, Stockenström made it very clear that he considered the seizure of enormous quantities of Kaffir cattle by Brecon's command to have been the primary cause of the disasters of 1819. This was by no means a new point of view, but one most forcibly expressed by Stockenström in a despatch written on 13 February 1819.
Neither in 1819 nor at any time afterwards, however, did Stockenstrom express any doubts as to the necessity for the 1819 campaign, after the ghastly depredations which had taken place and the attitude which the Kaffirs had assumed. Accordingly, in his evidence in 1839, he emphasized the "unavoidable necessity" of Zilranshine's campaign, and the practical advantage of shifting the boundary line from the untenable Rish River jungle to the line of the Shumie Ridge and the Keiskama River, upon the absolute necessity of maintaining the boundary line of 1819 once it had been established, and the unwisdom of ever allowing the Kaffirs to re-cross it into the Seded Territory, Stockenstrom had always insisted. In despatches on 14 September 1823 and 21 November 1823, he stated his reasons very clearly, and he repeated the substance of these two despatches in detail and accurately in his evidence on 19 August 1839.

Codlenton devoted considerable attention to the last point in this section of Stockenstrom's evidence, viz. his statement, in answer to Q.338, that he could not say whether there had been any Kaffir irruption during Donkin's administration, since he had had no further connection with the frontier at that time. It was with this statement that Codlenton compared, in parallel columns, a despatch revealing that Stockenstrom must, in fact, have been aware of depredations during this period. It was in his own interest not to emphasize these, since he was a known and consistent advocate of the policy favoured by Donkin, as a solution to the frontier problem. He may, therefore, have been evading the point in his answer. But in the light of the fact that he had not elsewhere in his evidence denied allegations or cruelty on the part of the Kaffirs, it does not seem to warrant the attention it received at the hands of the Graham's Town Journal.

In seeing as the salient feature of this part of Stockenstrom's evidence his insistence that Ceka's cession of the Neutral Territory was unwilling, Codlenton obscured the significance
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of Stockenstrom's emphasis on the necessity for the 1819 campaign and the advisability of shifting the boundary and maintaining that of 1818.

(ii) The Expulsion of Namao and the Settling of the Dced Territory.

Stockenstrom's statements on 19 August 1818 on the expulsion of Namao were entirely consistent with his previously expressed views on the subject. He made no attempt to whitewash Namao, although he could not but have been aware of the opinion of Buxton and Frizzle on the subject.

The missionary Shaw had virtually accused Stockenstrom of making Namao's attack on the Ta-mboochie the pretext for expelling him in order to provide a site for a Hottentot settlement. But the documents show that the eventual expulsion of Namao was, quite clearly, as Stockenstrom stated in his evidence, the logical outcome of his views on the impolicy of allowing the Kaffirs to return to that strategic sector of the Dced Territory. Stockenstrom made no attempt to shelter behind Shaw's version of the expulsion, which might have served to soften the philanthropists' criticism of his policy.

Stockenstrom stated in evidence that the Karroo Hottentot settlement had occurred to him as a means of executing Sir Rufane Dockin's plan of settling the Dced territory with colonists, of which he had always approved. His dispatches to Cole in 1818 reveal that he did firmly recommend the settlement of the Dced territory after the expulsion of Namao as the only guarantee of future security, and that he then suggested that the Hottentots might be suitable settlers.

Stockenstrom told the Committee that he had drawn up regulations as to the conditions upon which farmers could obtain land in the Dced territory, because he considered that the government had the right to lay down stricter regulations for these people than for those on the western side of the old boundary, except for some minor details, such as, for instance, the number of armed men required to defend each farm, Stocken-
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Strom's description of his plan corresponds to that contained in his _Description_ of 1830.

His reasons for regarding such a plan as essential constitute his major criticisms of the abuse of the reprisal system.

**Conclusion: In this part of the evidence, the most significant apparent deviation from Stokenschon's earlier views is apparent upon the implied opinion of the Eastern Frontier colonists as the first agents or agents against the Affairs and in the criticism of overseas' reprisal system.**

(iii) _reprisal system_

(a) _Stokenschon's Earlier Views on the Reprisal System_

As Landrooy of Transvaal, Stokenschon was concerned with only a small sector of the Kaffir Frontier. After the creation of the district of Coorgye, he had no direct connection with the Eastern Frontier. Here are therefore few direct references to the policy on the Kaffir Frontier.

The absence of any criticism of the patrol and reprisal system, in instances where Stokenschon had occasion to refer to the Eastern Frontier, suggests that, as Landrooy, he was not alive to any extensive abuse of that system. In particular, his despatches expressing strong disapproval of Bouche's Frontier policy, suggest that, on the Kaffir Frontier, Stokenschon had not come across the abuses of the reprisal system which Bouche's suspension of it was designed to check.

But Stokenschon was by no means unaware of the dangers inherent in the system of allowing punitive of burghers, he raised by field-commissary, to go in pursuit of murderers. The fear that the "revenge motive would lead to "unnecessary bloodshed" seems to have obsessed him. He was aware of the existence of irregularities, as references in despatches from an early as 1817 show, although these do not appear to have been the general rule. He made a point of insisting on immediate pursuit of robbers, so as to avoid the possible punishment of the innocent. And he conducted a careful inquiry into the proceed-
ings of every patrol that went out.

Stockenstrom realized the tendency of frontier farmers to be careless and to exaggerate petty depredations on the part of scattered bands of marauders into frontier alarms. He always insisted that habitual marauders should be firmly dealt with, and he was extremely cautious lest the whole community be punished for depredations on the part of scattered groups, probably driven to theft by need.

Before the introduction of Somerset's policy, Stockenstrom followed the same policy towards the Kaffir kraals as towards the Bushman kraals: no kraal was to be in any way interfered with unless there were incontrovertible proofs of its guilt. Even after the introduction of the reprisal system, Stockenstrom evidently preferred the seizure only of cattle known to have been stolen from the colony.

Conclusion: while Stockenstrom as Commissioner may not have been conscious of any extensive abuse of the patrol and reprisal system as it existed on the eastern frontier, his experience of the frontiersmen may in some measure have prepared him for what he evidently found there during his Commissionership, and the general principles upon which he appears to have based his policy as Commissioner prepare us for many of the features of his Eastern frontier policy.

During his first tour of the Eastern frontier as Commissioner-General, Stockenstrom seems to have found nothing in any way to alter his ideas on the frontier system, he again gave expression to views on Bourke's system which may very possibly have been instrumental in persuading Cole to abolish that system and re-introduce the system of pursuit 'on the spoor'.

But on 5 May 1858, reporting on the situation after the expulsion of Mococo, Stockenstrom launched the first of a series of despatches severely criticizing the abuse of the reprisal system. These despatches were worded quite as strongly as anything he said in evidence before the Committee in 1855. His
attitude definitely changed during April-May 1889, the first period he had ever spent on that sector of the frontier during a period of frontier alarm. J. B. Pitman speaks merely of the developing of a clear policy towards Eastern frontier problems, and does not bring out the change distinctly.

Steenestrom's knowledge of the Northern frontier had taught him the need for the utmost caution in the operation of the patrol system. But on the whole, his experience of the Northern frontiersmen led him to defend the colonists against charges of injustice, and to support their plea for the pursuit of marauders. It seems quite evident that in 1889, when Burke's system was suspended, Steenestrom realized fully, for the first time, exactly what Burke had realized about the Eastern frontier three years before, when he insisted on putting a stop to the system of pursuit "on the spur." Although Steenestrom came to understand the reason for Burke's policy, he did not agree with him as to the means he had adopted to check the causes. The utmost vigilance on the part of the colonists, and the immediate pursuit and punishment of marauders, across the boundary when necessary, remained the recorded bases of his policy. He appointed the appointment of responsible field-coronets to supervise the patrols, and the prohibition of "reprisals" of Kaffir cattle, as the safest checks upon abuses of the patrol system.

Steenestrom's attitude towards all aspects of Northern frontier policy, with its different conditions, remained fundamentally unaltered throughout this period. That is to say, he cannot be said suddenly to have succumbed to the views of Philip and the philanthropist group. His attitude to this group as exemplified in his report on Philip's Return of his Time at the end of 1888 also makes this clear.
(b) Stockenstrom's attitude towards the Colonists as Landdrost and Commissioner-General.

Notwithstanding Stockenstrom's evident awareness of the faults of the colonists, perhaps the most striking fact which emerges from a study of his papers is his complete sympathy with the point of view of the frontiersmen. He was always ready to put the colonists' case. He refused to countenance the assertion that his own generation of colonists had brought their sufferings at the hands of the bushmen upon themselves, and he was quick to defend them, especially against the charges made by the Griqua, who found supporters in Dr Philip and the London missionaries.

Stockenstrom was not afraid to admit his sympathies with the colonists to the Colonial Secretary in England, as the conclusion to his letter to Springfield in 1834 shows.

Conclusion: the documents of the Landdrostship and the Commissioner-Generalship justify Stockenstrom's stating, towards the end of his evidence in 1866, that it had always been the most agreeable part of his duty to expound the cause of his countrymen, though he considered it inconsistent with that duty to justify or condone crimes which some of them might commit.

(c) The Reprisal System. Stockenstrom's Statements 1837-1838.

A digest of Stockenstrom's statements in evidence on the subject of the patrol and reprisal system reveals that the main points of criticism correspond to those made during his Commissioner-Generalship.

Stockenstrom's main criticism of Griqua's system was that the prospect of being able to get raffia cattle, if one's own were not discovered, not only set a bounty upon carelessness, but provided an irresistible temptation to some people to misrepresent their losses. His account of the abuses to which the system could lead represents his reasons for determining to put a stop to the taking of raffia cattle upon the frontier.
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In illustration both of his reasons for wishing his system adhered to, and of the violation of it on the frontier during the latter part of his Commissioner-Generalship, Stockenstrom quoted the cases of Treurn, Schoepers and Dreyer. The evidence does not seem to bear out the allegation that Stockenstrom used these cases deliberately to block the frontier colonists or that he knew his facts to be unfounded. He was clearly prepared and even anxious to have his statements investigated, quoting documents or names in each case.

It seems very clear that Stockenstrom did not intend his criticism of the abuses to which the reprisal system was subject to apply to the colonists in general. He had the bona fide territory specifically in mind, and he stated quite explicitly, in the Reapir of 1854 and in answer to questions 1044 and 1045, that the majority of colonists deplored the system and desired only peace and the protection of their property.

Stockenstrom denied that the Kaffir could be described as a "nation of thieves" or as "savages", but he made no attempt as did many philanthropists, to idealize the Kafir character, as his answers to questions 1045, 1049, 1052 and 1304, and passages in the Reapir of 1854 and the letter to Springbuck in 1854 show.

The absolute necessity for protecting the colonists against robbers and marauders was the first principle which Stockenstrom expounds in the Reapir of 1854. He repeated the same opinion forcibly in his letter of 1854, and it recurs constantly in the evidence.

Stockenstrom drew a distinction between "commandos" and "reprisal patrols". His answer to Q. 2149 seems to indicate that it was the reprisal system to which he objected, and that he evidently approved commandos under certain conditions. It can, however, be argued, as Prof. Bremken has shown, that there are statements in his evidence which definitely carry the implication that he condemned commandos in general. Other passages, again, convey the impression that Stockenstrom preferred
commandos under government authority to the use of the burgher patrol force - which, if applied to the Northern frontier, was not the case.

Part of the difficulty lies in the loose way in which the terms commando, patrol, commando system and reprisal system were used. It is possible that, in the evidence, Stockenstrom and his questioners were sometimes using the same words for different conceptions, with the consequent lack of consistency. The explanation lies mainly in the differing conditions on the Northern and Eastern frontiers.

On the Northern Buchman frontier, Stockenstrom preferred the use of small burgher patrols to pursue robbers "on the spur". Here, large-scale punitive commandos, sent out some time after the raids, could not possibly trace the real husema depredators, and the innocent might then be punished.

On the Eastern frontier, conditions differed, and the fact that the Kaffirs possessed cattle complicated matters. Here, Stockenstrom insisted that the Patrol and reprisal system led to success. He urged the pursuit of marauders "on the spur", but evidently preferred the burghers to act in conjunction with a disciplined military patrol, in order to lessen the danger that Kaffir cattle might be seized. As a further precaution, he forbade absolutely the "reprisal" of Kaffir cattle by a patrol, but, where a whole kraal could be proved guilty of habitual marauding, a commando, consisting of a military force, aided by burghers, could and should be sent against it, to punish the Kaffirs and seize their cattle to indemnify the colonists. Such government-authorised commandos on the Eastern frontier Stockenstrom believed to be both necessary and permissible, provided the utmost caution were exercised to prevent the calling out of commandos unless the provocation were very strong. It was criminal, he insisted, to send a commando to punish a whole community for false alarms or the depredations of individuals. Such a commando, he maintained, was simply, to the few abandoned frontiersmen who hoped to derive benefit from it, an easy,
lucrative, but most demoralizing form of retaliation, and to
the men of well-disposed farmers, a source of great end
and annoyance. But the abuses which Stockenstrom described were
those which took place on patrols.

then, therefore, Stockenstrom told the Committee that
Englishmen "very often" served on commando, and that the Eng-
ish settlers of Albany were liable to be called upon as well
as the Dutch farmers, and often were, he was surely implying no
slight upon the men of Albany. He annoyed Godlonton, and
later, Chase and Gory, at this section of the evidence is
apparently the result of their impression that "commando" and
"patrol and reprisal" system were the same thing. Chase stated
incorrectly that the Albany settlers were specifically exempt
from commando service. They were exempt for three years after
arrival and, although English settlers were only once officially
levied for service before 1830, many did apparently go out
on commando with the Dutch farmers as volunteers. Stockenstrom
therefore probably gave the information in good faith, under
the impression that the Englishmen had been levied in the same
way as the Dutch.

Conclusion: In his evidence on the reprisal system, Stockenstrom
cannot with justice be said materially to have contradicted his
former statements or to have attempted deliberately to blacken
the case of the colonists as a whole.

(iv) Stockenstrom’s plans for the frontier before and after
1832.

As Commissioner-general, Stockenstrom envisaged a policy
which, by capitalizing the enmity of the chiefs within the
Ceded Territory to maintain friendly relations with the Colonial
Government and retain their land, would enlist their co-operation
in the defence of the frontier. The dense population he consider-
ed essential for the Ceded Territory, was to consist of colonists—
Kototot and European—on the one hand, and Kaffirs on the
other, each group with its own clearly defined areas of settle-
ment. For each group the Colonial Government reserved the right
to lay down specific regulations, and to expel from the territory those who infringed the regulations. Although the authority of the Kaffir chiefs in their own areas was recognized, all inhabitants of the Ceded Territory were bound to recognize the undisputed right of the Colonial Government over the whole area right up to the boundary of 1838. To this latter point Stockenstrom adhered very firmly. As part of the territory, he maintained, should be ceded entirely to the Kaffirs as Kaffirs.

Stockenstrom regarded the tribes beyond the Keiskama as quite independent. There is no indication that he ever contemplated incorporating them. The degree to which he was prepared to acknowledge the independence and sovereignty of the chiefs is suggested by his policy towards the Griqua. He warned the emigrant farmers against molesting the Griqua, and advised that in case of non-compliance the offender should be left to the native chiefs to deal with according to the laws and customs existing amongst them, and the government should not interfere on his behalf.

On the Northern Frontier, Stockenstrom would have solved the problem of the Bushmen lands by setting aside reserves for them. He would have avoided the possible evil consequences of the northward migration of the colonists by a scheme of systematic colonization under government supervision.

The scheme which Stockenstrom prepared to the Secretary of State for Colonists in 1834 was based upon the ideas which he had contemplated, and in some cases even begun to put into practice, during his Commissioner-Generalship and before.

The leading features of the plan Stockenstrom outlined to the Committee in 1836 are those familiar from a study of his previous papers; no variations appear. One passage may be interpreted to mean that Stockenstrom now contemplated the incorporation of the Griqua tribes, where formerly he had included them in the category of independent groups with whom treaties would be made but which would not be incorporated.

The other more significant variation is the possibility he
suggested of an arrangement whereby compensation might be obtained through the chiefs, and the aggressors even brought to punishment, without using military violence on every occasion. This had not hitherto been explicitly laid down as a policy in any of his statements. The arrangement he suggested, more or less tentatively, in 1833, is, however, implicit in the obligation which, according to his 1839 scheme, rested upon all the Kaffir chiefs to capture and deliver up to the colonial authorities any plunderers or stolen property found within their territory, whether a colonial party had yet come in pursuit or not.

In Stoekenstrom's letter to Glencly on 7 January 1836, the only new feature which appears in his proposals is the suggestion that residents should be appointed in the Kaffir kraals to act as consuls on behalf of the colonial government. It was an idea of which his own practical experience of the value of missionaries as agents amongst the native tribes naturally would have led him to approve, although he had not suggested it before. There are two possible sources for it: (1) An article in the Commercial Advocate of 22 February 1831, in which Fairbairn made the suggestion of a British resident in Kaffirland—a proposal which Philip approved in his letter to D'Urban on 13 March 1834. (2) A similar suggestion from Rev. Show, in an open letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, quoted in his evidence on 7 August 1836.

J. Britton, in the Conquest and Civilisation of South Africa, is incorrect in supposing that Stoekenstrom's disapproval of D'Urban's policy of incorporating the Kaffir tribes beyond the Kaffirland represents a fundamental divergence from the policy suggested by him to Spring-Rice in 1832. Stoekenstrom himself explained to Glencly that he had at that time envisaged the incorporation of various tribes within the Caled District, but not of those beyond the boundary of 1828.

In Stoekenstrom's statements with regard to a general frontier policy, given in evidence in 1833, no features appear which he had not referred to and discussed, either in the letter
to Spring-Rice in 1834, or in the plan which he outlined to
Clenet in January 1835.

Stockenstrom and Philip are normally cited as having played
the largest part in the moulding of Clenet's ideas,
particularly as expressed in the despatch of 23 December 1833.
There are several features which appear both in Stocken-
strom's evidence and in Clenet's despatch. But to lay too much
stress on the similarity of Stockenstrom's and Clenet's ideas
is to ignore the fact that there are points on many of which
the South African witnesses concurred.

The blame for Clenet's unbalanced opinion of the encomi-
astics perpetrated by the colonists upon the aborigines cannot,
however, be laid upon the witnesses before the Committee in
1834. There is general agreement with Stockenstrom's view that,
though in a large community, unpleasant characters must be
expected, the colonists as a whole were law-abiding. It is true
that only Stockenstrom gives concrete instances of the irregu-
larities the possibility of which some witnesses admitted. In this
respect, his evidence may be said to have lent more support to
Philip's criticism of the reprisal system, which Buxton had
brought to Clenet's notice, than that of other witnesses. But
it must be borne in mind that there is ample proof in Stocken-
strom's evidence that he did not intend his strictures to apply
to the frontier colonists as a whole. Had Clenet made a thorough
study of Stockenstrom's evidence when he wrote the December
despatch, he must surely have been aware of this.

Two other features of the December despatch suggest that
Clenet had not made a thorough study of Stockenstrom's evidence:

(1) It is hardly credible that anyone who had paid the
attention which Clenet is supposed to have done to Stockenstrom's
evidence could have failed to be aware of the existence of large
numbers of European settlers in the Jeded Territory on the
western side of the Kat. It was only as a result of Stockenstrom's
recommendations in 1833 that Clenet was persuaded not to
insist on the abandonment of the entire Jeded Territory.
(ii) It is unlikely that anyone strongly under the influence of Stockenstrom's ideas would have proposed a boundary other than that of 1819 for the colony.

Conclusion: While bearing in mind the possibility that Luton used selected extracts from Stockenstrom's evidence to drive home Philip's ideas, one should be wary of exaggerating the general influence of Stockenstrom's own ideas upon Clennelg in 1839.

It has been as often, by those opposed to Stockenstrom's treaty system, that Stockenstrom, in working out his policy, prostituted his principles to serve Clennelg's purpose and retain his favour. Yet, in a study of the treaty, with the Cape tribes, as an example, features which one would expect to bear the stamp of Stockenstrom's approval emerge clearly.

Articles 27, 28, and 29, concerning the recovery of stolen cattle, gave rise to most of the unfavourable comment on Stockenstrom's system. In these articles, the familiar features of his policy appear. The entirely new feature is the prohibition upon the crossing of the boundaries by any patrol or armed party of any description. This is precisely the instruction issued by Bowke in 1833, against which Stockenstrom had protested very strongly. It is very likely that, in this respect, Stockenstrom relinquished one of his own ideas to meet Clennelg, for it is probable that the inclusion of this clause was at Clennelg's insistence, but this feature loses the sinister significance which his opponents read into it if the following points are borne in mind:

1) Stockenstrom had always opposed wholeheartedly of the principle of recognizing the Kaffir tribes and their chiefs as sovereign and independent in their own territory, and to be treated with on a basis of accepted international law. In a plan based upon such a principle, an armed party unauthorized by government could not be allowed for every theft to make an incursion into the territory of another nation state.
(ii) Even in the heat of his arguments against Bourke's system as it applied to the Graaff-Reinet district, Stockenstrom had admitted that it might be applied to the Kaffir community, where there were chiefs who could be held responsible for the acts of their people.

(iii) When Stockenstrom introduced this principle into his treaties, he made definite arrangements for the further proceedings of a patrol in pursuit of stolen cattle. Bourke had made no provision for the punishing of depredators who managed to get across the borders, or the compensating of the colonists. Stockenstrom himself admitted later that he was not altogether sure of the practicability of the final scheme under the conditions prevailing in the Colony. But all the basic features of the treaty were entirely in accordance with the principles which he has been shown to have held.

**Conclusion:** There is a remarkable consistency in the fundamental principles of frontier policy to which Stockenstrom gave expression as Commissioner-General, during his stay in England, and as Lieutenant-Governor. Certain basic features constantly recur. It cannot, therefore, with any justification be claimed that Stockenstrom prostituted his fundamental principles in order to ingratiate himself with Exeter Hall or Glenelg.
CHAPTER IV.
THE ZEKO INCIDENT AND THE COMMANDO OF 1831.
GLENSTONE vs. STOCKENSTROOM.

(1) The Zeke Incident and the Commando of 1831.
The Contemporary Documents.

The first account of the death of Zeke appears in Stockenstroom's despatch to Bell on 25 June 1830.

Stockenstroom stated that Kraamus reported that, having collected all the cattle from Zeke's Kraals, he was proceeding with them to Fort Milshire, where the colonial cattle were to be selected, when he was furiously attacked by Zeke and some of his men, who were assisting in driving along the cattle. In the skirmish, Zeke and several of his men were killed. Great quantities of Kaffir cattle were necessarily brought out with the colonial cattle. On hearing of the attack on the Kraamus party, Stockenstroom decided on the confiscation of all the Kaffir cattle.

The following points emerge from a study of the despatches connected with this commando:

(1) Stockenstroom was perfectly satisfied with the proceedings of the commando and the justice of it, although, as in previous despatches in 1830, he censured the carelessness of the colonists and was cautious about the dangers of indemnification.

(2) There was, when the commando set out, no question of the retention of any Kaffir cattle. Stockenstroom's views on this were clearly expressed in his correspondence with the Secretary to Government preceding the commando, and in his written instruction to Field Commandant Kraamus.

(3) The removal by Kraamus' party of all the cattle from Zeke's Kraals appears to have been in conformity with Somerset's instructions to the commando. The actual order to bring out all the cattle, from which the colonial cattle could then be selected, would have been given by Somerset. But Stockenstroom's despatch
certainly suggests that he knew of, and agreed with, this arrangement. In accordance with his principles, on hearing of the attack made by Zeko on the Bramaus party, Stockenstrom decided upon the confiscation of all the cattle.

The whole affair seems to have assumed for Stockenstrom a very different complexion in the middle of 1831. While he was investigating the state of the frontier, a propem of Somerset's representatives that a commando into Kaffirland was necessary, he recorded in his Journal Tzali's version of the incident.

Stockenstrom, Tzali said, had told him that the commando would only seize cattle recognized as colonial property, and that no Kaffir cattle would be taken, or Kaffir molested, unless the commando met with resistance. He had accordingly given orders that no-one should interfere with the commando searching the flocks. Zeko, when he saw Bramas rounding up all his cattle, asked him why he did so. Bramas replied that he was ordered to do so, but told Zeko he might accompany the cattle to Fort Milshire, and there demand them of Stockenstrom. But Zeko and his men were to leave their asses and wild cattle behind. As a concession, Bramas allowed Zeko first to pitch out the milch cows and leave them behind. Then Zeko and several Kaffirs, armed only with kleries, accompanied the party, assisting to drive the cattle. Suddenly, when the cattle were in the bush, some Kaffirs on a nearby hill shouted, the cattle made a rush, and the burghers commenced an indiscriminate fire in the midst of them, killing Zeko and six other men, and wounding an eighth.

Tzali's version Stockenstrom found confirmed by the Hottentot Boesak, the burgher Reifer, and Tzali's Kaffir witness.

In the face of all the confusing evidence which was later brought forward, it is difficult to arrive at a sound conclusion as to what really happened.

Stockenstrom reported the revised version of the incident in a despatch to government on 31 August 1831.

The following comments may be made on the report:

(1) Stockenstrom stressed the fact that the Boers were told that any man taking Kaffir cattle would be
severely punished, while the Kaffirs were threatened with confiscation of their cattle if they offered violence to the commando. But there is no indication that he considered Erazmus to have done wrong in bringing away all the cattle in the first instance.

(2) He drew the conclusion that there could have been no inducement for the brutal conduct of the burgher party but to have a plea for the confiscation of the Kaffir cattle. He considered the dismissal of Erazmus as essential, as a result of his false report. But he drew this very grave conclusion without mentioning the chief extenuating factor: the shouting of the Kaffirs and the stampede of the cattle, which may have thrown the burghers into a panic.

(3) It was unlike Stockenstroem to condemn a colonist lightly. The explanation may be: He was avowedly anxious to prove his argument against the whole patrol and reprisal system, which Somerset saw as the only solution to the frontier problem. Throughout July and August he spoke in strong terms against that system, in order to prevent the Governor from being induced to allow another expedition such as that of July 1850. His investigations just prior to his receiving Somerset's August despatches revealed several instances of the abuse of the patrol system and the violation of the Governor's agreement that Kaffir cattle would not be taken. All these factors may have combined to make Stockenstroem write as strongly as he did about Erazmus.

The events of July and August 1851 - the shepherds, Gorden and Erazmus came, and the sanctioning by the governor, without consulting Stockenstroem, of another commando - seem to have convinced Stockenstroem that he was powerless to impose his views on frontier policy on the authorities, and that the patrol and reprisal system, of the dangers and abuses of which he was now more than ever assured, would continue to be applied to Somerset's hands.

(11) The report of 1853 and the evidence of 1855.
(ii) The Memoir of 1833 and the Evidence of 1836.

In the Memoir of 1833, illustrating his condemnation of the reprisal system, Stockenstrøm gave an account of the Zeko incident, which agreed with the view he had come to hold of it in 1831, except in one significant feature: this account conveys the impression that the Boers brought away all the cattle, colonial and Zaffir, in the first instance, contrary to his orders, on the strength of the pretended attack by Zeko and his men.

This further blackens Kraamus' case, but the context does not suggest that this was deliberate, although Stockenstrøm was certainly anxious to put as forcibly as possible the case which, he considered, most clearly justified his attitude towards Somerset's requests for commandos in July and August 1831.

The explanation for this version may be that Stockenstrøm had uppermost in his mind his own repeated warnings before the commando of 1830 against the seizure of any Zaffir cattle as compensation, and his written orders to Kraamus on the subject before the commando went into action. It is possible that he actually did forget the tactical arrangement as to the rounding up of all the cattle, decided upon by Somerset and verbally communicated to the burgher division before it set out.

This was the version to which Stockenstrøm afterwards persistently adhered, all efforts to prove the contrary notwithstanding.

(iii) Gladstone vs. Stockenstrøm: The Zeko Incident.

The Zeko incident came under discussion again on 23 February 1836.

Stockenstrøm's evidence had already provoked criticism from certain quarters, which found a mouthpiece in W.T. Gladstone, a newcomer to the Committee in the 1836 session. Gladstone had evidently made a very thorough study of Stockenstrøm's evidence during the previous session, and of the papers delivered in connection with it, and had become aware of several discrepancies in the evidence concerning the Commissioner - Generalship. The lengthy cross-questioning to which he subjected Stockenstrøm on 26 February and 1 March, revealed not only that he wished to prove
Stockenstrøm that he himself, and not the Colonial Government had misinterpreted the instructions concerning the Commissioner-Generalship, but that there were several points upon which he considered him to have neglected his duty. Stockenstrøm, however, persisted in his contention that the office had never been put upon a sound basis by the governor, so as to enable him to fully carry out his instructions.

On reading the correspondence of 1830 - 1831 which Stockenstrøm had submitted to the Colonial office, Gladstone had become aware of the two obvious flaws in the 1833 and 1835 versions: (1) his assertion that Draemus had acted entirely contrary to orders in bringing away both the colonial and Kaffir cattle in the first instance; (2) his representation of Draemus as having reported that he was attacked while in the process of selecting the colonial cattle to bring off. His questions were therefore carefully planned, to show that these two assertions of Stockenstrøm were not consonant with the documents of 1830 and 1831.

Conclusion: After a study of the cross-questioning by Gladstone, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, on some point Stockenstrøm had indeed tried, albeit not very successfully, to make out a case. From the charge of wilful misinterpretation of the basic elements of the Zoko story he must be exonerated, whatever the weight to be attached to Tyali's evidence in 1831, there can be no doubt that by 31 August 1831 Stockenstrøm was convinced of the truth of it, and so represented it in all the later evidence. The effect of the manner in which Stockenstrøm described the affair in 1833 and 1835, however, was decided to worsen Draemus's case. The possibility that Stockenstrøm had really forgotten Somerset's orders to the commando, seems to be borne out by the evidence under discussion, where this is one fact about which Stockenstrøm is consistent throughout.

There was, in any case, no need for him to suppress the fact of these orders, or his conscience in them, as a point of self-justification. Somerset's suggestion provided it were explained to the chiefs, was, in fact, an added safeguard against
indiscriminate seizure of cattle by the colonists, and therefore something of which Stockenstrom could well have approved; as indeed he appears to have done. It may be that, going through the despatches of 1830-1831, preparatory to writing the memoir which was to justify all his proceedings against possible attacks, and having in his mind no recollection of Somerset's orders to the Comando, Stockenstrom stumbled over just the point which Gladstone had made: why had Erasmus not in the first instance been reprimanded for bringing away Kaffir cattle with the colonial cattle? Seeking the explanation which justified a procedure about which, at the time, Stockenstrom knew his own conscience to have been clear, he found what he wanted: of course, it was because Erasmus had reported the Kaffirs to have resisted the taking of the cattle in the first instance, that he had countenanced the Kaffir cattle being brought out and retained. In this version, in 1883 and 1884, Stockenstrom adhered. But it was not one which bore investigation, as he was to discover, to his cost, at Gladstone's hands. Nevertheless, nothing could convince Stockenstrom that he had ever known of or given orders for the rounding up and bringing to port all hire of all cattle, least of all the affidavits from the Jape which Colonel Bade produced in the Committee as the colonial counter-cast to Stockenstrom's evidence on the Zeko incident.

(iv) More clues in the evidence (about 1831)

Later Gladstone returned to the attack with the vexed question of the substantiation of the reports on the cases of Schessers and Gordon. That a government-authorized military enquiry had been threatened, before which he would be required to substantiate his charges, but which he could not institute, and which never took place, Stockenstrom asserted throughout. Even when confronted by Gladstone with his own comment on Bell's concluding paragraph, which suggested that he considered Bell to be requiring him to substantiate some aspect of what he had advanced concerning Schessers and Gordon, Stockenstrom said that what he had meant here was that he was prepared with evidence to substantiate his charges. But that the purport of Bell's letter may have been
that Government required him to give a fuller statement of the grounds on which his opinion was founded, Stockenstrom persistently denied.

Three other points raised by Gladstone suggested that he detected further flaws in Stockenstrom's case against the colonial authorities. He endeavoured, without success, to prove to Stockenstrom that Colonel Somerset's suggestion that it should be indispensable to shoot the Kaffir whenever a patrol carried the spoer of cattle to a kraal, should be related to the context, in which the murder of a Bottenbos herd was referred to. He asked whether Stockenstrom considered it true that Sole authorized commands to pursue stolen cattle and take from any Kaffir's kraal cattle to an equal amount to which Stockenstrom replied that he did not know, but that it was done. And he ascertained that, of the three commands against Kaffirs during Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship, two went with his sanction, while the third was sanctioned by Sole, on the supposition that Stockenstrom was absent from the spot at the time - a point upon which Stockenstrom remained sceptical.

(v) Gladstone v.s. Stockenstrom: Bourke's Frontier System.

The final flaw which Gladstone perceived in Stockenstrom's previous evidence was in connection with Bourke's Frontier Policy. Then cross-questioned by Gladstone on two occasions, Stockenstrom professed no recollection of a suspension of the reprisal system during the administration of Bourke, or of any effects of Bourke's system. It is odd that J.F. Pitman, in writing on the Commissioner-Generalship, appears to have accepted this evidence at its face value.

Stockenstrom had had no direct information on the subject of the suspension of the reprimal of Kaffir cattle on the Eastern frontier in 1836, since Somerset had been instructed to regard this part of the order as confidential. But he had not only known of, but had strongly objected to, that part of Bourke's system whereby patrols were forbidden to cross the boundary into Kaffir territory. In the despatch recommending the expulsion of Nacorns in 1836, the
other features of which Stockenstrom had recalled accurately in earlier evidence, he had consented forcibly on Bourke's system.

**Conclusion:** Two possible explanations of Stockenstrom's answers occur: (1) the explanation of this apparent mental aberration may lie in the unrelated context in which the questions appeared. (2) Stockenstrom may have been evading a possible discussion of the views he had expressed on Bourke's system, because he knew they could not meet with Clemen's approval. As Lieutenant-Governor, he was now bound to the support of a frontier policy approved by the Colonial Secretary.

(vi) **Stockenstrom, Philip and the Philanthropist Press:**

Two series of questions put by Gladstone offer some ground for supposing that he believed Stockenstrom to be deliberately contradicting himself in order, with some ulterior motive, to gain favour with Buxton and his philanthropic associates.

(1) Gladstone introduced the topic of Dr. Philip and the Crique station at Philippolis, on which Stockenstrom was known to have differed strongly with Philip, and questioned Stockenstrom minutely on the subject.

The statements which Stockenstrom made on the subject are fully borne out by the relevant documents. He made no attempt to ponder to Philip's point of view or to disguise the existence of differences between them, in answer either to Gladstone's or, during a later session, to Buxton's questions.

(2) Gladstone also questioned Stockenstrom as to his opinion of the general fidelity of the representations of Bruce, Hay and Pringle.

Stockenstrom replied that he knew some of Bruce's statements to be correct. But he said that his recollections of the works were very vague and he refused to commit himself as to whether there was any impression of serious misrepresentations on his mind. He could recollect one instance, in which Bruce had very incorrectly charged Colonel Somerset with great severity on the subject of Macomber's expulsion.
In his reply to the colonial office questionnaire in 1854, Stockenstrom had commented that he knew some of the most heinous things Bruce, Hay and Fringle had said to be true, and had never scrupled to give his sentiments on them. But he connected the impression, conveyed by Fringle in his *African Sketches*, that the conquests of the Kaffirs over the Hottentots were more merciful than those of the whites.

During the 1835 session, Stockenstrom had also indicated that he had been much displeased with the reports he had heard of certain statements made by Dr. Philip to the Kaffir chiefs, just before the Sixth Kaffir War.

**Conclusion:** On two important points, viz., the London Missionary Society Crique Stations and the speech Dr. Philip was alleged to have made to the Kaffir chieftains, Stockenstrom made no attempt to conceal the fact that he had differed strongly with Dr. Philip.
CHAPTER V.

SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EVIDENCE.

(i) Stockenstrom, Philip and the Hottentots:

Stockenstrom and Philip had also, in the past, diverged on the subject of Hottentot emancipation.

In June 1823, the Colonial office had forwarded to Stockenstrom a questionnaire on the Hottentots, which was submitted in evidence before the Aborigines Committee. This document, and the statements made by Stockenstrom in evidence, in which he confirmed all that he had said in answer to the questionnaire, must be studied in conjunction with one another. The following significant points emerge:

1. Stockenstrom as Landdrost had been averse to any measure that tended to bind the Hottentots in service for any length of time, thereby curtailing their liberty of movement. He favoured monthly parol contracts, and disapproved of the principle of apprenticing Hottentot children. His suggestions to the governor on 3 April 1825, upon which Ordinance 50, drawn up by Mr Justice Burton, was largely based, reveal that Stockenstrom's theory of the origins of the Hottentot problem was essentially in harmony with the Philip school of thought. He attributed the degradation of the Hottentots to the policy of discriminatory legislation, directed towards keeping them in submission. He recommended the enactment of a law, sweeping away all the earlier discriminatory legislation and placing every free inhabitant in the colony on a level as to the enjoyment of liberty and the security of his property. But he differed from Philip in believing that strong checks upon vagrancy, in the form of pass laws and a vigorous enforcement of the existing laws against vagrancy, were essential. He considered that the existing laws against vagrancy would have sufficed to check it, had they been vigorously enforced. If, as Cory suggests, Section II of Ordinance 50 did carry the implication that, while Europeans could be punished for proved vagrancy, Hottentots and other free persons of colour were exempt - and this is a moot point - it was obviously a complete misinterpretation of Stockenstrom's idea. Nowhere in his answer to the Colonial Office questionnaire nor in evidence did
Stockenstrom give support to the idea that there should be no restraint upon the liberties of the coloured classes.

(2) Stockenstrom admitted, in answering the questionnaire and also in evidence, that the promulgation of Ordinance 50 did give rise to vagrancy, drunkenness and breach of contracts on a considerable scale. He maintained that although the laws of the Colony would have sufficed to check vagrancy, even had no land been available, only by making land available to the Hottentots could full effect have been given to the spirit of Ordinance 50, but he was opposed to any form of exclusive Hottentot settlements. He explained to the Committee in evidence that his original plan for the Ceded Territory had been a dense settlement of Europeans and Hottentots; amalgamation and not exclusive colonization. His despatches of the period show that this was the case. Stockenstrom pointed out that circumstances eventually made the Kat River an exclusively Hottentot settlement, since the Europeans were not satisfied with the smaller grants of land which could be made to Hottentots.

(3) Stockenstrom asserted in evidence that the Missionary Shaw was wrong in stating that the Kaffirs were driven from the source of the Kat River primarily in order to obtain land for Hottentots. The expulsion of Basore was a measure necessitated by the depredations and the attack on the Tambookies, and one long advocated by Stockenstrom. The Hottentots were the class which would most easily be used in the experiment of a dense frontier settlement of colonists. The evidence which Stockenstrom gave to prove Shaw mistaken is fully supported by the documents of the period, and, in querying this point, W.B. Boyce was clearly wrong.

(4) There appears to have been in Dr. Philip and his supporters a decided predilection to regard Ordinance 50 as directly the result of Philip's influence, the excellent effects of the Kat River settlement upon its inhabitants as a direct product of the liberty granted to the Hottentots by that ordinance, and the success of the Kat River settlement itself as primarily the result of the influence of the London Missionary Society. Philip went so far as to list the Kat River locations as a London Missionary Society
Station in his *Return of Missions* of December 1830.

The impressions Stockenstrom firmly corrected in his *Remark* on Philip's *Return of Missions* in 1830, and in answer to the questionnaire of 1833. In the latter he pointed a glowing picture of the reformation in the character of the Kat River Hottentots. But he pointed out, and was quick to confirm in evidence, that what he had said applied specifically to the Hottentots of the Kat River settlement, and that these beneficial effects were not simply the result of granting liberty to the Hottentots under Ordinance 50, but of granting land to them under the government experiment.

(5) In evidence, he re-iterated the opinion, formerly expressed in his *Remark* on Philip's *Return of Missions*, that the Hottentots from the London and Moravian Missions had contributed to the improvement of the Kat River Settlement, but not more so than many that came from farmers with property.

(6) Stockenstrom similarly re-iterated before the committee the opinion that the Hottentots themselves, and not the missionary institutions, should have the right to the lands annexed to the institutions, and that the Kat River Settlement, since it afforded the prospect of gaining possession of the soil, was a type preferable to the missionary institutions.

**Conclusion**: The answers to the questionnaire of 1833, and Stockenstrom's evidence before the committee, reveal clearly the points both of similarity and of difference in Stockenstrom's and Philip's views.

(ii) Stockenstrom and the Missionaries:

Upon the subject of the missionary institutions, too, Stockenstrom and the missionaries, Dr. Philip in particular, had, in the past, not seen eye to eye. Stockenstrom acknowledged as much in his evidence. He told the committee that there were missionaries who, he considered, were sometimes in the habit of making ill-founded representations on behalf of the natives, which he, as magistrate, had had to refute. In these controversies, he said, angry feelings had often been displayed, from which he himself had been by no means exempt.
The records reveal several such controversies; though Stockenstrom specified no instances. But Stockenstrom was bigoted opponent of missionary work. Nor was he opposed to missionary institutions run on sensible lines. His despatches show, too, that he by no means disapproved of the presence of missionaries among the tribes beyond the borders, and considered that "good and prudent" missionaries could well do the work of government agents, keeping in touch with the government authorities and, as far as was compatible with their calling, assisting in seeing that local regulations were carried out. As Commissioner-General he recommended the employment of the missionaries in effecting a reconciliation among the various border chiefs and urging them to maintain peace and order.

And there is every evidence of his co-operating with, and using the services as agents of, the missionaries stationed with the Zeffir tribes beyond the borders.

In giving his evidence before the Committee, Stockenstrom must have run a mental eye over the many occasions when he had strongly criticized the missionaries, and recalled also the good he knew them to do. He remarked therefore that he always considered in "moments of sound reason", where missionaries felt themselves called upon to act more particularly as pleaders of the cause of the coloured classes, allowance should be made for very strong feeling on their part. That strong feeling had often been exercised with very great advantage in eliciting truth and bringing benefit to the natives. And if that feeling had sometimes led to so strong a bias as to lead individual missionaries to "shut their eyes and ears against every but their own side of the question", it should not be forgotten that they regarded their clients as the weaker party, and that their opponents often displayed "an equal degree of partiality."

It was in accordance with his experience, too, that Stockenstrom pointed out that the main value of missionary work beyond the borders lay, in the initial stages, not so much in
their religious as in what he called their "political" influence in restraining the natives amongst whom they worked, and acting as a medium of communication between the government and the natives beyond the borders. He was aware that his was not a popular view of the function of missionaries, but, notwithstanding several suggestions from Buxton that the roots of their influence lay in their Christian influence, it was a view to which Stockenstrom adhered. On the other hand, as might have been expected, Stockenstrom maintained that he could see no value at all in missionaries exercising any sort of "political" or "diplomatic" influence within the colony itself, where there were officials who could act in this capacity on behalf of the natives.

(iii) Stockenstrom Save His Say:

During the second-last appearance before the Committee on 11 March 1833, Stockenstrom emphasized that he had neither counted nor shrunk from examination before the Committee, and that when called upon, he had at once appealed to "public documents, every word of which was written under the impression that they would immediately reach the eye of the late governor ".

Stockenstrom was evidently suspicious of the motive behind the questions on his remarks on Philip's Return of Missions. He reiterated that he had never been the champion or instrument of any party.

Where he had differed from the missionaries he had given his sentiments, regardless of the supposed influence of the missionaries, and where he found them doing work directed to the promotion of the public welfare, he gave them his support. He concluded with the assertion that he had always consistently pleaded justice for both his countrymen and their non-European neighbours, and punishment for wrongdoers on both sides.

Conclusion:

These remarks reveal that Stockenstrom suspected that what Philip had foreseen, when in 1832 he warned Stockenstrom that they should avoid the appearance of collusion,
had come to pass. But no rumours from the colony could possibly have reached him at this time. This seems to bear out the idea that his source of information must have been in England, and that Godlonton's diatribes possibly had their origin in England.
CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION: THE OCCASION OF DISCOURAGEMENT.

The events of 1833 to 1836, and the analysis of the evidence in the light of his former statements and policies, lend astonishingly little support to the allegations against Stockenstrom. Except in the evidence on the Oeko murder and Bourke's frontier policy, Stockenstrom's statements have been shown to be consistent with his previous policies and statements. He did not attempt to disguise either the similarities or the differences between himself and the philanthropists. The evidence does not support the contention that he tried deliberately to blacken the colonists, or that he prostituted his basic principles in order to ingratiate himself with Glencelg or the Buxton circle. Stockenstrom's critics have not made use of or have not investigated the full facts.

In the final estimate, he stands vindicated. He may have been a man of many faults. But unscrupulous compromise, unprincipled and ambitious pondering to the influential, lack of integrity, cannot be counted among them at any period of his life. Those who have seen in Stockenstrom a man of principles and ideals, a capable and conscientious worker, an honest servant of the community, both European and non-European, have proved that opinion justified by their study of his terms of office before and after 1836. There is no need to except, in this evaluation of him, the period from 1833 to 1836.

This, however, is only one side of the picture. If the majority of the allegations against Stockenstrom cannot be regarded as valid, the question arises: why then all the violent opposition to him? It did not begin and end with a newspaper controversy. It seems clear that the opposition came originally from certain official quarters in London, and that Stockenstrom anticipated this. To explain the opposition to Stockenstrom solely as the natural and spontaneous reaction of a sensitive and sorely tried frontier community to the man who came to represent
the reversal of the D'urban policy, the dashing of their hopes and the unjust criticism of the frontier colonists, is to over-
simplify the situation. The campaign against Stockenstrom
began some time before any one in the colony was aware that a
Lieutenant-Governor was to be appointed, that Stockenstrom was
the chosen candidate, or that the D'urban policy was to be
reversed.

The whole question of the "Ocean of rascality" invites
re-investigation.