A NEW ROLE FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN
A POST-COLD WAR ERA.

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BY: MAHESH CHETTY

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SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR: PAUL BISCHOFF

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS/ INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

RHODES UNIVERSITY
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ABSTRACT

With the disappearance of the superpower conflict that characterised the Cold War era, many observers have begun to question whether the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has a role to play in the post Cold War era. However the emergence of a number of issues on the international agenda, such as United Nations peacekeeping operations, global environmental issues and an increasing unwillingness on the part of the major economic powers to abide by GATT/WTO rules, have increasingly become of concern to non-aligned states. However whilst the United States has recognised that these issues require leadership in dealing with them, it has not been willing to supply that leadership.

It shall therefore be argued that the changing nature of hegemony in world politics has set conditions that allow non-aligned middle powers and institutions greater scope for action and influence. The emergence of these issues has provided a scope for non-aligned middle powers, acting in accordance with their interests to play alternate leadership roles within an expanded scope for institutions, such as organisations, regimes and multilateralism, in addressing the interests of non-aligned states.

Firstly in looking at an expanded role for organisations, the United States has increasingly been unwilling to play a leadership role within UN peacekeeping operations. The continuing importance of the neutrality of UN peacekeeping operations has provided a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a burden-sharing role with the great powers in addressing the concerns of non-aligned states with regard to these operations.

Secondly in looking at an expanded scope for regimes, the emergence of a regime in the issue of ozone depletion may provide a foundation to analyse how non-aligned middle powers may play a bridge-building role between North and South in the issue of climate change. Middle powers could therefore play this role in the absence of United States leadership within this issue.

Thirdly, the role of the Cairns Group within the Uruguay Round in addressing non-aligned states’ interests of maintaining stable agricultural trade, can be seen as a model of small group multilateralism in bridging the divide between the major powers in issue specific areas.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

With the disappearance of the bipolar Cold War international system, many observers of the Non-Aligned Movement have begun to question whether the Non-Aligned Movement has a role to play in the post-Cold War era. In identifying what is meant by the term, the international system, Rourke states that system analysts focus on the world political environment that determine the pattern of interactions within a system. The factors that make up international systems include system level actors, the number of system poles, concentration of power, distribution of power assets, norms of behaviour, geographic characteristics and the level of interaction (Rourke, 1993: 58). A system pole can be seen as a major power centre whereby the power of a country can be determined by a number of characteristics such as military strength, industrial capacity, natural resources, technological advancement and population size. The end of the Cold War thereby meant that the international system moved from being a bipolar international system, dominated by two superpowers namely the Soviet Union and the United States, to a unipolar international system dominated by the United States (Rourke, 1993: 67).

As the Non-Aligned Movement enters an evolving post-Cold War international system, it did seem logical that the Movement would have little relevance in the post-Cold War era. After all, with the disappearance of the block rivalry that presented a need for developing states to protect their sovereignty against block encroachments, there seemed to be no role for the Non-Aligned Movement. These reservations were increasingly voiced from within and from outside the Movement. In an article published just prior to the conference of non-aligned states, held in Belgrade in September 1989, a former foreign minister of Yugoslavia, Milos Milnic attempted to answer these criticisms. As he states: “these statements have been motivated by the belief that the Non-Aligned Movement has exhausted its programme… the confrontation between the superpowers has moved to negotiations between them and to the process of disarmament. Whilst the Non-Aligned Movement cannot have the same role that it did in the past, a new situation has emerged in which problems will have to be addressed through negotiations”. These can be “successfully performed by the United Nations which will be revitalised and will be able to take its proper place which it could not have assumed in the conditions of the Cold War, the rivalry between the superpowers and military-political alliances “ (Cited in Jevremovic, 1996: 275).
Examining the question of whether the Non-Aligned Movement has a role to play in the post-Cold War era, cannot be answered without first examining the evolution of both the concept of non-alignment as well as the Non-Aligned Movement. The origins of the concept of non-alignment can be discerned in the speeches of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In a speech on September 7, 1946, a year before India’s independence, he declared that India was a free country that would not be a satellite of another country. In January 1947, Nehru further expanded on his concept of non-alignment; in which he stated that he wanted India to remain independent and free to co-operate with all countries on an equal footing (Alimov, 1987: 23). As Alimov argues, non-alignment according to Nehru was an independence of a country, especially colonies and former colonies, from participation in the political-military blocks of which the United States and the Soviet Union were members (1987: 23).

These sentiments were again expressed when Nehru convened the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, which met again in 1949. At this Conference the future policy of India as well as other Asian states were asserted. These were firstly the need for solidarity between the newly independent states of Asia in order to reinforce their independence and secondly the realisation that the protection of their national interests lay accepting that they had a role to play in safeguarding world peace. These views were reinforced in an agreement signed between India and China in 1954. These principles, which became known as the panch shila, were meant to guide relations between the two countries involved. These principles were namely: mutual respect for their territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference in their internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. These principles however were transgressed by the Sino-Indian War in 1962 (Jevremovic, 1996: 277).

These principles found further expression in the meeting of 23 Asian and 6 African states in the Indonesian city of Bandung on April 18 to 24, 1955. The conference adopted a declaration of World Peace, which emphasised the concept of peaceful coexistence, which became known as the ten principles of Bandung. The Bandung Conference could be seen as a major stage in the evolution of the concept of non-alignment in that it represented a climax of a struggle waged by former colonies for independence. As a result, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial solidarity became a basis to achieve solidarity amongst Asian and African states. It was however at the meeting of the foreign ministers of 20 Asian, African and Latin American countries in June 1961 in Cairo, that what has come to be accepted as the basic principles of nonalignment were outlined. According to them a country would be non-aligned if firstly its policy was independent and based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Secondly the country concerned would have to support national liberation movements. Thirdly it should not be a member of a military alliance that could be drawn into the conflict between the
superpowers. Fourthly, it should not be a member of a bilateral alliance with a great power (Wunsche, Linder and Voigtlander, 1986: 21). It was however at the Belgrade Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade from September 1-6 1961, that the Non-Aligned Movement came into being. The Belgrade Declaration urged the superpowers to bridge their differences. It cautioned against the expansion of military blocks and maintained that the Non-Aligned Movement was free to focus on any action undertaken by the great powers. Whilst the Movement did not evolve into a formal organisation during the Cold War era, subsequent conferences focused on greater institutionalisation within the Movement (Jevremovic, 1996: 282).

In the period from the Bandung Conference up to the Lusaka Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) focused mainly but not exclusively on military-security issues. However, after the Lusaka Conference, economic issues became increasingly prominent on the agenda of the Movement. Whilst economic issues were mentioned as early as the first Conference in Belgrade, which led to developing states forming the Group of 77 in 1962, it was in the seventies that economic issues came to dominate the NAM’s agenda (Alimov, 1987: 44).

Military and security issues gained greater prominence on the agenda of the NAM in the 1980’s due to the increased tensions between the superpowers. However, with the development of détente between the superpowers in the latter half of the 1980’s, developmental issues came to feature prominently once again on the NAM’s agenda. The ninth summit of the NAM, held in Belgrade in 1989 amongst significant changes in the international system characterised by increasing détente amongst the superpowers, signalled the end of a phase of non-alignment. This has consequently come to be called the classic era of non-alignment or the Belgrade to Belgrade era (Jevremovic, 1996: 295).

However as Rajan argues, the concept of nonalignment has not been a static one. The agenda of the Movement has evolved in response to changing systemic conditions as well as to the different challenges faced by non-aligned states, both at a systemic level and a domestic level. He further goes on to state that the Non-aligned Movement was not created only in response to the presence of military blocks in the Cold War international system, although this was a primary motivating factor in its formation. As it has been reflected in the statements of the founders of the NAM, such as Nehru as well as Tito and Nasser, non-alignment since its inception has meant the protection of the sovereignty of developing states, both in political and economic terms from major power encroachments. This view of non-alignment therefore means that the Non-Aligned Movement has a role to play, in the post-Cold War era, in...
protecting the interests of non-aligned states, especially within an international system dominated by the major powers (Rajan, 1990: 72).

This consequently means that the Non-Aligned Movement has a role to play in addressing the new challenges facing developing and non-aligned states, in a number of issues, in the post-Cold War era. The first challenge facing non-aligned states has been the increasing instability of many developing states within the developing world. Kennedy and Russett have termed these states as “failed states”. Failed states as characterised by them are states wherein “authority implodes… ethnic and religious conflicts erupt and millions flee across international borders (1995: 67). This has consequently resulted in an increasing demand for peacekeeping operations by developing states to implement cease-fires and agreements from disputants within a conflict. This was witnessed in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which was mandated by the Security Council to oversee the 1991 Paris Accords. The UNTAC operation can be seen as a model for United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, that will increasingly be demanded by developing states in resolving intra-state conflicts (Ratner, 1995: 23).

The second challenge facing non-aligned states has been the increasing prominence of global environmental issues, such as the protection of the ozone layer, on the international agenda. The significance of these issues for the NAM has been the increasing perception on the part of northern states that these issues adversely impact on their interests. The NAM has therefore voiced concerns that the Northern states may use these issues to impose further conditionalities on developing states with respect to issues such as market access (Morphet, 1995: 459). Whilst the NAM has viewed these issues with suspicion and hostility, they have increasingly come to recognise that these issues can impact favourably on their interests by enabling them to link Northern concerns with these issues to developing states’ concerns with development. This was reflected in negotiations within the Montreal Protocol wherein the developed states recognised that the absence of developing state participation within the Protocol would significantly weaken the Protocol. This resulted in the London Conference of the Parties to the Protocol, wherein the support of the developing states such as India and China were secured by the establishment of an Interim Multilateral Fund of 160 million dollars to aid developing states to implement the Protocol. Whilst the developed states did not live up to their commitments entirely, this issue did emphasise that these issues provide developing states with an opportunity to attempt to place their developmental concerns onto the global agenda (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 17). The international agenda can be defined as the sum of the various access points by which issues are brought onto the global agenda (Livingston, 1992: 318).
The third issue relates to the developmental concerns of developing and non-aligned states within the global economy. This is seen in the fact that developing and non-aligned states continue to be in a dependent position within the global economy. Dependency can be defined as an “exploitative relationship between the advanced capitalist societies and the underdeveloped periphery, whereby peripheral states are forced to specialise within a hierarchical world division of labour (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 142)\(^7\). This is seen in the fact the majority of non-aligned states remain primary commodity exporting states, wherein agricultural trade remains their primary source of trade income. Furthermore most non-aligned states remain dependent on Northern markets (Watkins, 1992: 10)\(^8\). It is in this context that the emergence of agricultural trade conflicts amongst the United States and the European Community in the 1980’s consequently destabilised global agricultural markets and adversely affected the interests of developing and non-aligned states (Watkins, 1992: 60). Furthermore the United States and the European Union were unable to come to an agreement within the Uruguay Round in bringing agricultural issues into the GATT. The increasing participation of developing states within the Uruguay Round signalled that they recognise that a weakening of the GATT would adversely impact on their interests (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 78)\(^9\).

The emergence of these issues on the international agenda, which have assumed greater significance for the NAM, requires new forms of leadership with which to deal with them. Leadership can be defined as “the ability to foster co-operation and commonality of social purpose amongst states (Ikenberry, 1996: 386)\(^2\). This is seen in the fact that leadership during the Cold War era was linked to the presence of a hegemonic state in the international system, namely the United States. Cox has defined hegemony as the presence of a hegemonic state in the international system that conceives of and protects a world order that other states would find to be in their interests to support (1996: 137)\(^10\). In playing such a leadership role, the United States served to facilitate co-operation amongst the Western industrialised states (Ikenberry, 1996: 385).

However the emergence of new issues on the international agenda requires the United States to play a leadership role in the post-Cold War international system. It needs to be noted that the relationship between the United States and the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War era has traditionally been an antagonistic one. However it also needs to be noted that it was under the leadership of the United States that both the United Nations and GATT was created, which have assumed increasing importance for the non-aligned states and the Non-Aligned Movement. Whilst the United States has perceived it to be in its interests to deal with these
issues, it has not been willing to supply the requisite leadership. This is seen in the fact that in contrast to the leadership role that the United States played in the liberation of Kuwait, it has increasingly been unwilling to commit its troops to UN peacekeeping missions that do not significantly impact on its interests (Daalder in Durch, 1996: 60).

With regard to global environmental issues, the United States has been unable to play a hegemonic leadership role. This was witnessed in negotiations within the Montreal Protocol wherein the United States and the other Northern states were unable to gain the support of the larger developing states, such as China and India. At the negotiations at the London Conference, the United States favoured weighted voting that would have given control over the negotiations to the industrialised states, which was however resisted by developing states. The compromise voting formulae that was reached involved two-thirds majorities rule but avoided simple majorities from either North or South. As the negotiations within both the Montreal Protocol and the London Conference illustrated, the United States was unable to play a leadership role (Kahler, 1992: 701).

In looking at the role of the United States within the global economy, it is significant to point out that the United States has increasingly been unwilling to play a leadership role in the global economy. The United States has increasingly been willing to ignore GATT/WTO rules and engage in forms of economic nationalism to protect its commercial interests. Whilst this has had adverse implications for Western economic growth, it has had broader implications for non-aligned and developing states. The agricultural trade conflicts between the major powers in the 1980’s illustrated the point that whenever the major powers ignore GATT/WTO rules, this can result in instability within the global economy and adversely affect the trading interests of developing states (Watkins, 1992: 60).

The emergence of these new issues has led to a renewed role for institutions in dealing with them. Keohane has defined institutions as “the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organisations that help implement those rules” (1998: 82). Whilst the United States and the other major powers, such as the European Union and Japan, have recognised that leadership is necessary to deal with these issues, they have been unwilling to provide the requisite leadership. There is a consequent need, therefore, to examine new forms of leadership in the presence of declining American hegemony within the post-Cold War international system (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 12).

However in examining new forms of leadership in dealing with these issues, it bears noting that these new forms of leadership have to be conducted within international institutions.
There is a consequent need to move beyond a hegemonic conception of institutions, which views institutions as an extension of a hegemonic power which are created by a hegemonic power to further its interests (Cox, 1996: 139). This is due to the fact that this conception of institutions allows no room for secondary actors. It will therefore be argued that the changing nature of hegemony in world politics has set conditions that allow middle powers and institutions greater scope for action and influence.

Holbraad has defined middle powers as states lying within a hierarchy of powers within the international system, namely those that are below the great powers but above the minor or small states (1984: 88). In attempting to broaden the conception of middle powers that defines middle powers in terms of capabilities or location within a hierarchy of power, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue that middle power diplomatic behaviour emphasises the building of consensus and co-operation in issue-specific areas (1993: 23). However middle power leadership is highly dependent on favourable systemic conditions. Therefore any analysis of middle power leadership at the global level, in facilitating co-operation between Northern states or between North and South has to be based on an assessment of major power interests (Higgott, 1997: 31).

There is a consequent need to broaden the conception of institutions in order to allow a space for middle powers to play an institution building role in international politics. This requires broadening the scope of various institutional forms international politics, such as organisations, regimes and forms of multilateralism that will allow a scope for secondary actors to play a role. Young has defined organisations as “material entities possessing budgets, personnel, equipment as well as legal personality. Organisations are actors in social practices “ (1996: x). Regimes are defined by Krasner as “sets of implicit or explicit norms, principles and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations “ (Cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993:31). Multilateralism is a specific form of institution in international politics, which is characterised by three properties, which are indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity (Caporaso, 1992: 602). This consequently involves enriching the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective on institutions by tracing how major power interests can change in response to changing systemic conditions. A neoliberal perspective on institutions states that institutions are created by major powers to facilitate common interests (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 32). Whilst this is an evolving research agenda, certain approaches such as cognitive approaches which argue that major power interests are defined within certain contexts, such as normative and epistemic contexts can be a fruitful research agenda to follow (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 511).
It can be argued that middle powers can play a role within international organisations, such as the United Nations, in issue-specific areas such as United Nations peacekeeping. Due to the continuing importance of the neutral composition of U.N peacekeeping forces, coupled with a lack of American leadership within this issue, this can present a scope for non-aligned middle powers, acting within their interests, to address non-aligned states’ concerns with regard to this issue. Middle power interests can be reconciled with their participation within peacekeeping operations in that the United Nations Charter states that elections to non-permanent status within the Security Council is contingent on burden sharing in the maintenance of international peace (Hendrikson in Cooper, 1994: 66). The unwillingness or inability of the United States to play a leadership role within United Nations peacekeeping operations has therefore provided a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play such a role. This was evidenced in the role that non-aligned middle powers played within the UNTAC operation.

In extending the reach of regime analysis in order to account for the emergence of global environmental issues on the international agenda, the Montreal Protocol can be seen as the foundation for the emergence of a regime in issue of ozone depletion. As the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol and the London Conference showed, major power interests cannot be assumed to be fixed but can change in response to changing systemic conditions. Applying this insight to an emerging issue on the international agenda, such as climate change, may posit a role for middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South within this issue. This may be possible especially when the major powers are operating under a “veil of uncertainty” when they do not have perfect information as to how the issue relates to their interests (Macneill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 64). This would therefore provide a scope for non-aligned middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South within the issue of climate change. Playing a bridge building role can be reconciled with middle power interests due to the increased reputation that actors receive in playing such a role and in some instances enhanced institutional positions (Hendrikson in Cooper, 1997: 52).

In examining the possibilities for new forms of multilateralism within the international system, the role of the Cairns Group within the Uruguay Round in facilitating co-operation between the major powers can provide a study of how small group multilateralism may be possible in issue-specific contexts. Whilst multilateralism will remain an institutional construct between the major powers, particularly within the GATT/WTO, a space has opened up for new multilateral coalitions of middle powers across the North-South divide in
strengthening the GATT/WTO. The role of the Cairns Group within the Uruguay Round illustrated that there is space for middle power multilateral co-operation across the North-South divide in issue-specific areas, to strengthen the global trading system (Kahler, 1992: 699).54

The role of the Cairns Group thereby illustrated how a multilateral group of middle powers could address non-aligned states’ interests of maintaining stable global agricultural trade, in the absence of major power leadership. As the issue of agricultural negotiations within the GATT illustrated, middle powers were able to play such a role due to the perception amongst the major powers that something needed to be done. Middle powers were willing to play such a role due to the fact that the issue of stable agricultural trade was of importance to them, which in part accounted for the unity of the Cairns Group within the Uruguay Round (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 60).9

Therefore in positing a scope for middle powers to play a leadership role within institutions, to deal with a number of emerging issues on the post-Cold War international agenda, requires an examination of how major power interests change over time. Developing this research agenda further should be of interest to international relations scholars and practitioners.

In proceeding further, however, an important counter-argument needs to be addressed. An argument could be made that middle powers could play alternate leadership roles within international institutions outside the structures of the NAM. The problem that needs to be addressed is how to relate middle power leadership in world politics with NAM leadership. However, the focus of this thesis is not on middle powers, but on non-aligned middle powers. This means that the focus is not on middle powers in general, but on non-aligned middle powers that subscribe to the principles of the NAM. This distinction is an important one, as this thesis attempts to identify a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play alternate leadership roles in a post-hegemonic international system. In doing so, it attempts to identify how the interests of non-aligned middle powers can be reconciled with their participation within these issues, and how their leadership role is of relevance to the NAM as a whole.

The NAM is relevant in the post-Cold War era, in that it provides a forum to articulate the interests of non-aligned and developing states. In so doing, it outlines the principles that are meant to guide the behaviour of non-aligned middle powers that wish to play alternate leadership roles within international institutions. This is especially important in multilateral forums such as the GATT/WTO or in global environmental negotiations, such as the Montreal Protocol or the Kyoto Protocol. This means that the NAM, along with other organisations
such as the G77, UNCTAD as well as the United Nations General Assembly, are forums for states of the South to articulate their interests. These forums can therefore act as a guide for middle powers who wish to assess how playing a leadership role relates to the interests of developing and non-aligned states as a whole. This point is an important one, due to the fact that middle power leadership is not always altruistic, as middle powers do act in terms of their own self-interest. This is seen in the fact that while the Canadian government of Paul Trudeau attached great importance to global economic development, it was still sensitive to the needs of Canadian industries. This meant that the Canadian government embarked on a policy of protectionism, which involved placing quotas on the imports of clothing and footwear from low-cost countries (Solomon, 1997: 60). This consequently means that non-aligned middle power leadership has to be related to the interests of non-aligned and developing states as a whole.

However, the contention that the NAM articulates the interests of non-aligned and developing states as a whole, demands closer scrutiny. This demands a closer inspection of the institutional and organisational structures and constraints of the NAM. A major organisational constraint of the NAM is that it is an association of states and not a formal international organisation. This means that the NAM does not have a permanent secretariat, which is one of the attributes of an international organisation. The NAM does not have a Charter, in which its structure, goals and principles are strictly outlined. This means that decisions on political, organisational and economic issues are made at Conferences of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which are held every three years (Rajan, 1990: 43).

At these summit conferences, the host country is designated as the Co-ordinating country and its leader is elected as Chairman of the Conference until the next summit meeting. The role of the Chairman is to ensure that there is continuity in the Movement by taking the necessary steps to maintain contacts among member countries as well as to ensure that the Movements’ principles or declarations are carried out. Furthermore, the Fourth Conference held in 1973, mandated the Chairman to inform the next sitting of the UN General Assembly about the declarations made at Summit Conferences. The Co-ordinating Country is furthermore entrusted with organising the Conferences of the NAM and drawing up the draft papers. The Co-ordinating Country, however, has no supra-state powers. Furthermore, the leader of a non-aligned country, on being nominated to the position of Chairman, becomes the spokesperson for the Movement. The Chairman is further expected to defend the common positions of the Movement, even though this may conflict with his own country’s interests. This provides a means for the Chairman to gain prestige among non-aligned member countries. Furthermore,
the post of Chairman provides the Co-ordinating country with a fairly good opportunity to gain support for his country on international issues (Alimov, 1987: 67).

Another important organisational feature of the Non-aligned Movement is the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries prior to summit meetings. Full Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs are normally held approximately midway between Summit conferences and are meant to review the existing international situation and to make recommendations to the forthcoming Summit, or to review the previous summit (Kodikara, 1982: 128).

Another important structure that has aided the institutionalisation of the NAM has been the Co-ordinating Bureau. The Co-ordinating Bureau has evolved since the Lusaka Summit of 1976 as the main body responsible for the maintenance of contact between non-aligned countries between Summits or the preparation of the agenda for Ministerial meetings. The Georgetown Foreign Ministers Meeting recommended to the 1973 Summit that a seven member standing committee, elected at Ministerial meetings on the basis of geographical distribution be created. Its task was to review the preparatory work of the Ministerial meeting and any matter they considered necessary to bring to the notice of the next Foreign Ministers Meeting. The Co-ordinating Bureau meets at three levels, namely ambassadorial, Ministerial or at the level of the Co-ordinating Committee, which is a Bureau meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives of non-aligned countries in New York. The Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau which preceded the fifth Colombo Summit outlined the structure and functions of the Bureau. It stated that "In the intervening period between summit conferences…the Co-ordinating Bureau is the organ entrusted with the co-ordination of joint activities and the implementation of decisions at Summit Conferences". This also includes "Ministerial Conferences and meetings of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the United Nations as well as other gatherings" (Cited in Kodikara, 1982: 133).

The composition of the Bureau is limited to a maximum of 25, selected at summit Conferences on the basis of continuity as well as rotation. The Bureau is required to convene once a year at the level of Foreign Ministers, and on a continuing or monthly basis at the level of Permanent Representatives of Non-Aligned Countries at the UN. The Chairman of the Bureau is meant to come from the host country and decisions within the Bureau are taken by consensus. The Bureau can be convened at the request of any non-aligned state, however non-Bureau members can participate but cannot vote at such meetings. The Havana Summit subsequently increased the membership of the Bureau to 36. The Bureau can therefore be
seen as an important organisational construct within the NAM, in the absence of a permanent secretariat (Kodikara, 1982: 127).

In short, therefore, the NAM is a forum for the states of the South to articulate their interests. A weakness of the NAM, however, is that it is a heterogeneous association of states with differing priorities, as well as differing levels of development and political systems. As a result the NAM works on the basis of consensus. The final Communiqué of the Ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau, held in Colombo in 1979, outlined the procedures for arriving at consensus. It stated that consensus is "a general convergence or harmonisation of views reflecting the broadest consent of a conference or meeting…it is both a process and a final compromise formula and is shaped by prior consultations, discussions and negotiations into a generally agreed position” (Cited in Rajan, 1990: 42).

The relevance or role of the NAM in the post-Cold War era, therefore, is to provide a guide or benchmark for non-aligned middle powers to assess how playing a bridge-building or mediating role within issue-specific areas is of relevance to non-aligned and developing states. However, middle power participation within UN peace operations has to be decided on a case by case basis, but non-aligned states’ declarations at its Summit conferences can be used by middle powers as a guide to assessing the views of other non-aligned states. Furthermore, in multilateral negotiations within the GATT/WTO or within the Montreal Protocol, non-aligned states may participate as part of regional groupings or other multilateral groupings (Kahler, 1992: 685). However, as it has been argued earlier, the NAM remains as one of the few forums, along with the G77 and the UN General Assembly, in which the interests of the South as a whole are articulated. As such, the NAM continues to have a role in the post-Cold War era, in guiding the leadership roles of its stronger members or middle powers.
CHAPTER 2

2. LEADERSHIP, INSTITUTIONS AND THE CASE FOR NON-ALIGNED MIDDLE POWER LEADERSHIP

“Under conditions of waning hegemony, there is a need to pay attention to new forms of leadership…the hiatus in structural leadership has provided a scope for new forms of leadership, namely that of middle power leadership (Higgott, Cooper and Nossal, 1993: 12).

2.1 Introduction

A significant feature of leadership during the Cold War era, was that it was linked to the presence of a dominant state that was willing to play a leadership role in international politics. The United States was instrumental in playing a leadership role in facilitating co-operation amongst the Western, industrialised states. The creation of institutions in international politics was therefore linked to the presence of a hegemonic actor that was willing to play a leadership role.

Theories of leadership therefore focused on the role of a dominant state in institutional creation in the Cold War era. Institutions were therefore linked to a dominant power and were created to serve its interests. However in the post-Cold War era, the emergence of new issues on the international agenda, which require significant forms of co-ordination and collaboration, require new forms of leadership. Whilst the United States has recognised that these issues need to be addressed, it has not been willing to provide the requisite leadership. The other major powers have also not been willing to provide the requisite leadership. On the other hand, the non-aligned states and the Non-Aligned Movement have increasingly come to recognise that institutions can serve to constrain the power capabilities of the developed states in issue specific contexts. The emergence of these issues has provided an enhanced scope for international institutions in the post-Cold War era.

This has provided a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a co-operating building role within international institutions in addressing these issues. There is a consequent need therefore to move beyond a hegemonic conception of international institutions towards an alternate conception that allows a space for middle powers to play such a role. However an examination of whether middle powers can play such a leadership role at the global level has to be based on a determination of the interests of the major powers. This consequently involves examining how the interests of major powers change in response to changing
external conditions and how this can provide a space for secondary actors, such as middle powers, to engage in institution building in issue specific contexts.

2.2. The United States and leadership in the Cold War era

As the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) enters a post-Cold War era, it finds itself faced with significantly different systemic conditions than those that prevailed in the Cold War era. In defining the concept of systemic analysis, Rourke argues that systems analysts take a “top down” approach in studying world politics. They focus on external events and the world political environment that determine patterns of interaction within a given system. In identifying the characteristics of international systems, Rourke identifies eight factors that constitute systemic analysis. These are namely system level actors, the number of poles, concentration of power, distribution of power assets, norms of behaviour, geographic characteristics and the scope of interaction. The disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the demise of a superpower in world politics and initiated a change of international systems. This meant that the international system moved from being a bipolar international system dominated by two powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union to a unipolar international system dominated by the United States (1993: 58).

The Non-aligned Movement has viewed these developments in decidedly cautious terms. At the foreign ministerial conference held in Accra, Ghana, in August 1991, a fear of impending unipolarism was expressed. Furthermore the fear was expressed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies, would increase the number of states requiring development assistance, thereby reducing the share of an already decreasing amount of foreign aid that developing states would receive (Jevremovic, 1996: 295). This apprehension on the part of non-aligned states was largely due to the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Non-aligned Movement throughout the Cold War era. This view had its basis in the involvement of the US in the Vietnam War, and in a number of “proxy wars” that it had engaged in within the territories of developing states such as Angola and Cambodia. These consequently had adversely affected the security interests of developing states during the Cold War era (Wunsche, Linder and Voigtlander, 1986: 55).

In looking at the NAM’s view of America’s role within the global economy during the Cold War era, the NAM viewed the Bretton Woods institutions as well as the GATT as serving the interests of the United States and the industrialised states. Keohane has defined institutions as “ the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organisations that help implement those rules” (1998: 83). This meant that developing and non-aligned states were seen to be
in a dependent position in the global economy that was perceived by non-aligned states as
diluting their status as sovereign independent states (Rajan, 1990: 81). Dependency can be
classified as an exploitative relationship between the advanced capitalist societies and
the underdeveloped periphery, whereby peripheral states are forced to specialise within a
hierarchical world division of labour (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 142).

In analysing the implications of this new unipolar post-Cold War international system for the
NAM, it is significant to note that this new external environment has provided the Non-
Aligned Movement with new challenges as well as costs and benefits. The main challenge
facing the NAM has been trying to find a role for itself within an international system
characterised by the disappearance of the superpower conflict that had provided the impetus
for its initial formation (Jevremovic, 1996: 274). However a disappearance of the bipolar
international system has also had important positive implications for the security interests of
non-aligned states, especially in mitigating their fears of great power intervention within their
territories. Indeed the spheres of influence strategy employed by the superpowers had resulted
in internal conflicts within developing states being magnified due to great power involvement.
With the easing of superpower tensions in the late 1980’s, a number of internal conflicts
which had been exacerbated as a result of the superpowers spheres of interest strategy had
been able to be settled, such as in Cambodia. The advent of détente between the superpowers
also enabled the decolonization of Namibia and Western Sahara and the achievement of
majority rule in South Africa (Ratner, 1995: 15). However while the disappearance of the
bipolar conflict has enabled a number of conflicts to be settled, it has provided the Non-
aligned Movement with new challenges, as exemplified in the civil war in the former
Yugoslavia (Morphet, 1996: 455).

It is in this context that the emergence of the debate amongst American scholars over the issue
of whether the United States is unwilling to play the leadership role that it traditionally has
played in facilitating co-operation amongst the industrialised states, would seem to have little
relevance for the NAM. Leadership can be defined as the “ability to foster co-operation and
commonality of purpose amongst states” (Ikenberry, 1996: 386). As scholars such as
Ikenberry have argued, both the United States and the Soviet Union were leaders of large
alliances and had the military power and material resources to assert their leadership
throughout the world. In particular, areas such as Western Europe and Asia largely welcomed
American leadership. American leadership was seen as being instrumental in maintaining the
stability of the non-communist world, protecting its allies and opening markets (Ikenberry,
1996: 385). As a result both political leaders and political commentators in the United States
have argued that the United States is increasing abandoning the leadership role that it has
played during the Cold War era. As a senior U.S. foreign policy official has stated: “we simply do not have the leverage, we don’t have the influence, the inclination to use military force. We don’t have the kind of money to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive results any time soon.” (Cited in Ruggie, 1994: 553)\(^8\).

However, as it has been argued above, for the majority of non-aligned states and the NAM as a whole, the benefits of American leadership seemed to accrue mainly to the industrialised states, and the decline of American leadership would seem to have little relevance for the Movement. Within the developing world, the one area where American leadership was welcomed was in East Asia, where the United States formed the South East Asia Treaty (SEATO) in 1954 and occupied a predominant position within the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). However the formation of these alliances were seen to be in the United States’ interests, in the aftermath of the Korean War, in attempting the halt Soviet penetration in the region. Both alliances fell apart however, namely SEATO in 1977 and CENTO in 1979 (Wunsche, Linder and Voigtlander, 1986: 16). Furthermore, it was precisely the role of the United States in guaranteeing European security within NATO that motivated leaders, such as Nehru, to recognise that there was a need to articulate a new vision of international politics. This vision was to provide an alternate vision of international politics, one that was not based on military blocks and that recognised the sovereign status of developing states (Jevremovic, 1996: 276)\(^3\).

However, with the benefit of hindsight at the end of the twentieth century, this argument does not take account of the fact that it was under the leadership of the United States that both the United Nations (UN) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were created. These institutions have consequently assumed greater importance for developing states and the NAM as a whole. In looking at the role of the United States in the creation of the United Nations and the GATT, it can be noted that the institutional impulse of the United States was in accordance with its interests. Stating this however, it can be noted that in acting in its interests, the pursuit of its interests by the United States was of an enlightened nature. In playing a leadership role in the creation of the United Nations, Roosevelt abandoned the “four policeman” scheme, in favour of an international security organisation. Roosevelt had feared that adopting a regional approach would encourage the isolationist tendencies that the United States had harboured in the inter-war period and he wanted the United States to be involved in world affairs, especially in Europe. Ruggie has argued that America’ institutional impulse had its basis in the United States’ sense of community (1994: 564)\(^7\). In playing a leading role in the creation of the United Nations, American objectives were to bring the Soviet Union into the organisation. Young has defined organisations as “material entities possessing budgets,
personnel, equipment as well as legal personality. Organisations are actors in social practices "(1996: x)\(^{13}\). With the onset of the Cold War however, this aim of co-opting the Soviet Union became no longer tenable (Ruggie, 1992: 587)\(^{69}\).

While the United States retained the veto in the Security Council, the United Nations became an important vehicle for the recognition of the sovereign status of many newly independent or former colonial states in the developing world in the 1950’s and 1960’s. With the accession of previously colonised states to membership of the United Nations, the United States increasingly found that it could not longer count on mobilising majorities in the General Assembly to support courses of action it favoured. With the formation of the Group of 77 in 1964, the United Nations General Assembly became a forum for the articulation of Third World concerns. This was most aptly illustrated in the strategy of the NAM to force the industrialised states to accept a need for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO) by attempting to increase developing state unity within the United Nations (Jacobson, 1997: 172). It can therefore be argued that although the United Nations was a creation of the United States, it became a vehicle for developing states to articulate their concerns within an international system that was dominated by the great powers (Keohane and Nye, 1985: 149)\(^{56}\).

In playing a leadership role within the GATT during the Cold War era, the United States led every tariff reduction round, by using its political and economic power to bring negotiations to a conclusion. Furthermore the United States kept its markets open in both good and bad periods so that other economies could sustain economic growth. However, as Garten argues, prior to 1990, GATT negotiations were as much about protecting the Western world against communism, as opposed to expanding trade for its own sake (1995: 51)\(^{47}\). However as it has been argued above, for most of the Cold War era developing and non-aligned states viewed the GATT with hostility. This meant that most developing states, particularly in Latin America, pursued economic policies such as import substitution due to the fact that they viewed free trade as institutionalising their dependent status within the global economy (Watkins, 1992: 32)\(^{8}\). However, in contrast to the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds within GATT, the Uruguay Round was characterised by greater developing state participation (Martin and Winters, 1995: 2)\(^{17}\). Greater developing state participation within the Uruguay Round signalled a change of perception of developing states towards the GATT, whereby developing states indicated that the strengthening of the GATT was in their interests. This was due to the fact that developing states recognised that a collapse of the GATT would affect them most adversely (Davenport and Hewitt, 1991: 1)\(^{18}\).
As it has been argued above, the presence of American leadership in the Cold War international system, did provide some means of satisfying the subordinate interests of developing and non-aligned states, even though the United States was acting in accordance with its interests. While the institutions, such as the United Nations and the GATT were initially viewed by developing states with hostility or uncertainty, they have become increasingly important to non-aligned and developing states (Morphet, 1996: 459). However, as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue, the decline of American leadership has provided a need to examine other forms of leadership. In examining the issue of whether the decline of American leadership has provided a scope for other actors to play alternate forms of leadership in the post-Cold War era, the nature of leadership in the post-Cold War era needs to be examined (1993: 12).

In examining the leadership question in international politics, Ikenberry has characterised American leadership during the Cold War era as being that of structural leadership. Structural leadership can be defined as the “underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of the world political order “(1996: 389). Accordingly it is the natural resources, capital, technology, military force and economic size which determine the capacity for leadership. Scholars, such as Gilpin and Modelski have examined the issue of structural leadership in greater depth. Gilpin has argued that the international order of any period is a reflection of the material capabilities of states. A change in material capabilities leads to contests or war over leadership and the establishment of a new international order by a new lead state. The new leader maintains its leadership due to its prestige and by the rights and rules that govern the specific relations between states. However it is ultimately the preponderance of power that enables a state to maintain its leadership position. Another theory of structural leadership has been the “long cycle” view of world politics articulated by Modelski. According to Modelski, a state comes to dominate an era through a combination of technological innovation, economic growth and state power. This domination takes the form of world leadership as the leading state diffuses economic and technical breakthroughs. What these structural theories have in common is that they emphasise that leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, and that it is not people who provide leadership but that it is the structure that makes a dominant state create world order (Ikenberry, 1996: 390).

The concept of structural leadership can be seen to have made an important contribution in understanding the nature of leadership in international politics. It emphasises that it is the nature of the structure that motivates states to strive for a dominant position with regard to other states, in enabling it to impose its will on other states and organise the post-war political
order. However, as Ikenberry argues, there are incentives for dominant states not to simply coerce but to persuade other states to embrace the norms and principles of order. In using the concept of structural leadership in analysing the nature of American leadership in the post-Cold War era, it can be noted that American leadership developed in the context of specific systemic conditions in the aftermath of the Second World War (1996: 390)\textsuperscript{52}. In creating a liberal trading system, the United States had sought to prevent a recurrence of the Nazi trading system, which it viewed as contributing to the outbreak of the Second World War (Ruggie, 1992: 587)\textsuperscript{69}.

However, while theories of structural leadership rightly point to the fact that it is the nature of the structure that makes a dominant state shape the world order, it does not give any clues as to what nature that order will take. This can be seen for instance in the fact that had Britain maintained its dominant position in the global economy in the aftermath of the Second World War, the shape of the post-war political order would have been very different. Colonialism would have continued perhaps forcing other states to carve out trading blocks for themselves. Therefore in analysing the nature of American leadership in the Cold War era, it can be seen to be specifically multilateral in form (Ruggie, 1992: 584)\textsuperscript{69}. Ruggie has defined multilateralism as an institutional form which co-ordinates relations between three or more states in the form of generalised principles of conduct, which determines how states should behave within certain issues. Multilateralist principles, which are adopted by a group of states, are characterised by the feature that they are perceived by member states to override the interest of any one state within an issue that is within the scope of a multilateral agreement. As generalised principles, they provide a framework that regulates states’ actions within certain issues, determining how states should act in a number of different circumstances that falls within that framework (1992: 569).

Multilateralism can therefore be seen as a specific institutional form in international politics. The first distinguishing characteristic of multilateralism is that generalised principles imply that members see themselves as part of an indivisible collective. This can be seen in the fact that members perceive an attack on one member as being an attack on all, as exemplified in the concept of collective security as defined earlier. Secondly multilateralist principles are perceived by members to generate expectations of diffuse reciprocity, in that members view their interests from a long term rather than a short term perspective. This is due to the fact that the benefits of being a member of a multilateral agreement are seen by member states to be on aggregate shared equally among members over the long term. Therefore multilateralism can be characterised by three properties, which are indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity (Caporaso, 1992: 602)\textsuperscript{45}. 
As it has been argued earlier, American objectives could be seen to be specifically multilateralist in orientation, as exemplified in creating the United Nations as a collective security organisation and promoting the creation of a liberal global economy. America’s vision of the post-war global economy conformed to the prescriptions of the liberalist international vision. In analysing the liberalist international vision, Hoffman argues that it consisted of two major principles, the spread of constitutional representative government and the formation of a “world public opinion and a transnational economic society of free commerce and industry linking people across borders.” These two factors would facilitate strong state interests in maintaining peace (1995: 161).

As it has been defined above, multilateralism can be seen to be a particularly demanding institutional form in international politics, and as such it has been linked to a state that is willing to play a leadership role in world politics. In playing such a multilateral leadership role, the United States played in a key role in facilitating Western co-operation in both political and economic spheres (Ruggie, 1992: 586). While theories of multilateralism provide greater clarity on the nature of American leadership in the Cold War era, theories of multilateralism as well as that of structural analysis shed little light on the institutional impulse of the United States. There is a consequent need to elaborate a theoretical framework that accounts for why the United States constructed a post-war international order that was broadly acceptable to other states (Ruggie, 1992: 572). The concept of hegemony can therefore be seen as an important theoretical framework within which to understand the institutional impulse of a hegemonic state.

2.3. A Gramscian analysis of the concept of hegemony

The origins of the concept of hegemony can be found in the Prison Notebooks of the political theorist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci, in writing about hegemony in a national context defined hegemony as the supremacy of a social class, which it maintains through either coercion or through intellectual and moral leadership. The latter form can be seen to constitute hegemony. Hegemony can therefore be seen as the means by which a dominant class shapes reality, through the medium of a common social-moral language. Hegemony is therefore the means by which a dominant class legitimates its rule over the other classes, thereby implying a measure of consent of the other social classes. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, occurs within civil society. Gramsci viewed civil society as the ideological superstructure, whereby the “institutions and instruments that create and diffuse modes of thought” (Cited in Femia, 1981: 26). The dominant class therefore attains hegemony within the institutions of civil
society, such as the church, the trade unions and the school, in order the shape the consciousness of men (Femia, 1981: 24).

The most significant scholar to apply Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, which he conceived of in essentially national terms to international politics, has been Robert W Cox. In applying the concept of hegemony to international politics, a hegemonic state would be one that conceives of and protects a world order that other states would find to be in their interests to support. However Cox goes beyond a state-centric conception of hegemony by arguing that hegemony also contains within it the emergence of a global civil society which refers to a global mode of production which links the various social classes of the states that fall under the control of the hegemonic state. World hegemony therefore can be seen as the internationalisation of the domestic hegemony of the dominant social class. This occurs according to Cox whereby peripheral countries adopt the economic and social institutions, the culture, and the technology of the hegemonic class of the hegemonic state. Whilst peripheral countries may try to adopt the economic models of the hegemonic class of the hegemonic state, adopting its political models is more difficult. According to Cox therefore, hegemony consists not only of a order between states but also of a world economy with a dominant mode of production that links all states and brings within its reach all other subordinate modes of production (Cox, 1996: 137).

According to Cox, one mechanism whereby the norms of world hegemony are expressed is through international organisation. International institutions are linked to the presence of a hegemonic power and serve to express the interests of the hegemonic state. International institutions are therefore seen to be a function of hegemony in that they firstly serve to embody the rules that legitimate the expansion of the hegemonic order. Secondly they legitimate the norms of the world order. Thirdly they serve to co-opt elites from peripheral countries and fourthly the serve to absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. In creating international organisations, the hegemonic state attempts to secure the co-operation of the other major powers. The support of some peripheral states is secured. While the hegemonic power may seek the consent of the other major powers, international institutions also serve in socialising elites from peripheral states to support the hegemonic world order. As Cox argues, while elites from peripheral states may come to international organisations in the hope of changing the system, they are forced to work within the system. Therefore international institutions serve to absorb counter-hegemonic ideas and serve to facilitate the expansion of the global economy (Cox, 1996: 139).
The primary contribution of Gramscian analysis in understanding hegemonic leadership, is that the hegemonic state, although acting in accordance with its interests, perceives its interests to be in accordance constructing a world order that has the support of the other major powers. A Gramscian analysis of the concept of hegemony is therefore closely related to the concept of hegemonic stability. According to the concept of hegemonic stability, the presence of institutions in international politics is closely linked to the presence of a unipolar actor in the international system. The concept of hegemonic stability can be seen to have two basic assertions, which are firstly that actors that have a preponderance of power within an issue maintain and support the establishment of institutions within the issue. Hegemonic stability theory asserts secondly that institutions decline or become less effective when power becomes more equally distributed among members. The theory of hegemonic stability can be seen to be most effective in highlighting the fact that it was under the leadership of the United States that the institutions that govern the global economy were created. The United States thereby provided a public good in being willing to maintain and protect the system. However a weakness of the concept of hegemonic stability is that it is only able to account for institutional creation within one area of international politics, namely within the global economy, particularly international trade (Hasenclaver, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 197).

A criticism that can be levelled against gramscian analysis is that it can be seen to be a particularly static conception of international politics. By tying the appearance of institutions to the presence of a hegemonic actor, it can shed little light on whether institutions can survive a decline of the hegemonic actor. Scholars such as Keohane however have argued that while hegemony may be a necessary ingredient in the creation of institutions, institutions can survive the decline of the hegemonic state due to the interests of the major powers in preserving them. Institutions can therefore facilitate co-operation “after hegemony”, a phrase coined by Keohane (in Milner, 1998: 116).

However as Young argues, leadership remains a necessary ingredient within international institutions, particularly within institutional bargaining. Young has defined institutional bargaining as the “efforts on the part of autonomous actors to reach agreement among themselves on the terms of constitutional contracts or interlocking sets of rights and rules that are expected to govern their subsequent interactions” (1991: 282). This is due to the fact that the major actors often operate under a “veil of uncertainty” in that the are unsure as to how institutional agreements will affect their interests over time (1991: 283). This would seem to apply to new issues on the global agenda in the post-Cold War era such as global environmental issues and agricultural negotiations within GATT, which shall be examined in greater detail at a later stage.
In defining the term the “global agenda”, it can be defined as the sum of the various access points by which issues are brought onto the global agenda. These access points can be divided into four categories, namely knowledge, communications channels, institutional loci and diplomatic norms. Knowledge refers to existing consensual understandings that serve as a means of influencing public policy. Communications channels refer to transnational networks and bargaining positions compared to other actors. Institutional loci refer to formal or informal positions within a regime or international organisation. Lastly, diplomatic norms refer to diplomatic practices that regulate state behaviour (Livingston, 1992: 318). In terms of global agenda setting, it is the major powers who determine the agenda of international politics. However, the NAM’s attempt to use the United Nations system to increase developing state unity with regard to its New International Economic Order strategy in the 1970’s indicated that developing states can on occasion affect global agenda setting. Stating this however, it needs to be noted that this would be dependent on favourable systemic conditions (Keohane and Nye, 1985: 149).

As it has been argued above, theories of leadership, such as theories of structural leadership and Gramscian analysis, typically focused on the role of a hegemonic state in institutional creation during the Cold War era. However as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue, the presence of waning hegemony in the post-Cold War international system presents a need to examine alternate forms of leadership in the post-Cold War era. As they argue, new forms of leadership may be required to deal with a host of emerging issues on the post-Cold War international agenda that require significant collaboration and co-operation (1993: 13). This is evidenced in three issues on the global agenda in the post-Cold War era, such as in United Nations peacekeeping operations, global environmental issues and the strengthening of the GATT/WTO system, which shall be examined in greater detail at a later stage.

2.4. **Towards new forms of leadership: the case for non-aligned middle power leadership in the post-Cold War era and the consequent need to enrich neo-liberal institutional analysis.**

In examining the nature of leadership in both institutional creation and maintenance in the post-Cold War era, two significant trends emerge. The first is the increasing inability or unwillingness of the United States to play a leadership role within existing institutions or in the creation of new institutions. This can be evidenced in three issues. The first relates to the increasing unwillingness of the United States to play a leadership role within United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. The United States has become increasingly
unwilling to place its troops under United Nations command. This can be evidenced in the fact that the United States has indicated that it would not participate in peacekeeping operations that did not impact significantly on its security interests. This has led to the United States to call for increased burden sharing from the other major powers (Higgott, 1997: 33).

The second issue relates to the inability of the United States to play a hegemonic role within global environmental issues as exemplified in the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol wherein the developed states were unable to gain developing state support for the Protocol, such as India and China. The realisation on the part of the major powers that developing state absence would significantly weaken the Protocol was reflected in the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, which secured significant developing state participation (Kahler, 1992: 701). The third issue relates to the increasing economic nationalism of the United States and its increasing unwillingness to play a leadership role within the global economy. This has resulted in increasing economic conflicts between the major economic powers, as evidenced in the Japanese American auto dispute and the conflicts between the United States and the European Union over farm subsidies in the Uruguay Round (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 78).

The second trend in the post-Cold War era is the increasing developing and non-aligned state support for international institutions. A primary reason for greater developing state support of international institutions has been the fact that a central feature of international politics has been the fact that it developing states have been vulnerable to major powers utilising their power capabilities in support of their interests. This was mostly evident in the Suez Crisis or the dependent position that developing states or the dependent position of developing and non-aligned states in the global economy (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 23). Increasingly developing and non-aligned states have come to recognise that institutions can constrain the unrestrained power influences of the great powers and can also serve their interests. This is evident in the three issues referred to above, namely United Nations peacekeeping operations, global environmental issues and the strengthening of the GATT/WTO system.

The increasing demand for peacekeeping operations in the Third World is evidenced in the increasing number of developing states that have been plagued by intra-state conflicts, and the increasing demand for United Nations peacekeeping operations (Kennedy and Russett, 1995: 67). Global environmental issues, such as protecting the ozone layer, have traditionally been viewed by the Non-Aligned Movement with suspicion and hostility. This was evidenced in relatively small developing state participation within both the Stockholm Conference and negotiations within the Montreal Protocol. However there has been a recognition on the part
of developing states that these issues provides them with a greater opportunity to link their development concerns with developed state interests in protecting the environment. This was evidenced in greater developing state participation in the latter stages of the Montreal Protocol and the Non-Aligned Movement’s support of the Rio Declaration (Srivastava, 1996: 109). Whilst non-aligned states have traditionally viewed the liberal trade orientation of institutions such as the GATT with suspicion, developing states have increasingly come to recognise the fact that the GATT/WTO remains the only institutional construct regulating world trade. Increasing developing state support for the GATT/WTO is due to the increasing importance of global trade for the economies of developing states and greater developing state membership of the WTO (Davenport and Hewitt, 1991: 1).

As it has been argued above, these issues can only be addressed within institutions and that leadership remains a necessary ingredient in addressing these issues. Scholars such as Higgott have argued that institutions will become of greater importance in the management of collective problems in the post-Cold War era. He accordingly argues that institutions will have three primary functions in the post-Cold War era. These are that of “agenda-setting…to facilitate the rationalisation of the political aspects of a particular problem, to provide the location for inter-governmental negotiation on a given agenda and to assist policymaking in states that participate in institutions (1997: 32).

In looking to other actors to substitute for declining American hegemony within the international system, one would look to the other major powers such as Japan and the European Union. Despite the debate among scholars and practitioners over the issue of whether the post-Cold War global economy is multipolar or not, scholars such as Cooper argue that there remains reservations over whether these secondary powers can provide the requisite international leadership. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly the traditional leadership roles played by Japan and Germany within international issues have been in terms of financial contributions. This was due to the fact that both states have traditionally been wary of playing a prominent role in the military or security domain. Secondly both Germany and Japan have been constrained in providing the requisite leadership due to the fact that both states have been preoccupied with domestic concerns, namely the question of integration within Germany and the recession experienced by Japan in the 1990’s (1997: 3).

There is a consequent need therefore to examine whether other actors can play a leadership role in addressing these issues in the presence of declining American hegemony or the unwillingness of the other major powers to substitute for declining American leadership. There is a consequent need to examine whether secondary actors can fill the space opened up
by declining American hegemony in the post-cold War era. As Cooper argues the increasing demand for institutions to deal with a host of emerging issues on the international agenda in the post-Cold War era, presents a scope for secondary powers namely middle powers to engage in forms of niche diplomacy in addressing these issues (1997: 4). Holbraad has identified middle powers as lying within a hierarchy of powers within the international system, namely those that are below the great powers but above the minor powers or small states. In identifying middle powers, he uses Gross National Product (GNP) as an index to measure the power of states, due to the fact that GNP is seen as an indicator that captures a number of factors of power. He consequently ends up with a list of eighteen middle powers, six from Europe, four from Asia and two from the remaining geographical areas (1984: 88).

Niche diplomacy has been termed by Gareth Evans, the longstanding Australian foreign minister as "concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field " (Cited in Cooper, 1997: 5). As it has been defined, niche diplomacy can appropriately be conducted by middle powers due to the fact that they may have the resources to play such a role that less developed states would lack. This was evidenced in the role played by non-aligned middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, within international institutions during the Cold War era. Canada and Australia could have seen to have had played a prominent role within resource related issues and the rehabilitation of displaced people in the Cold War era. Non-Aligned middle powers can therefore engage in niche diplomacy due to the fact that non-aligned middle powers do not have the resources to engage significantly in a diverse number of issues across the policy spectrum. Whilst the major powers may have greater resources to engage in niche specific area, they also have a greater number of priorities and may therefore not be willing to engage significant resources to deal with an issue that may be of greater importance to non-aligned middle powers (Cooper, 1997: 6).

In attempting to broaden the conception of middle powers that does identifies middle powers in terms of capabilities or location within a hierarchy of power, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue that the conception of middle powers can be enriched by examining the type of behaviour that these states engage in. According to these authors, middle powers engage in forms of diplomatic behaviour that emphasises technical and entrepreneurial competence in the pursuit of diplomatic activities. This form of diplomatic activity is devoted to building consensus and co-operation in issue specific areas. While this has been a common theme of middle power behaviour, middle power diplomacy can be differentiated into three categories, namely that of catalyst, facilitator and manager. The role of catalyst involves providing the intellectual and political energy to initiate a diplomatic initiative and securing the support of
other actors. The role of a facilitator involves being the facilitator for types of associational, collaborative and coalitional activity. The third stage would be that of playing a managerial role. This involves forms of institution building in which involves the establishment of a division of labour, the development of monitoring activity and possibly the establishment of a secretariat or bureaucracy. The managerial stage also includes development of confidence building measures and dispute resolution in which trust and credibility are built up (1993: 23).

In examining how the conception of middle power behaviour can be reconciled with middle power interests, it needs to be noted that middle powers have traditionally been supportive of the institutions established under American hegemony. Middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, have increasingly recognised that an unwillingness on the part of the United States and the other major economic powers to play a leadership role can result in instability within the global economy (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 6). Furthermore middle power participation, such as Canadian and Australian participation within international organisations were consistent with the principle of functionalism. A functional approach to international organisation emphasises that responsibility within certain areas of international organisation had to be in accordance with the burdens assumed. The benefits for Canada and Australia of adopting functionalism were twofold. Firstly, it presented these countries with an enhanced status in the international system, often with spillover benefits in terms of enhanced institutional positions. Secondly it provided a means for these states to be distinguished from the great powers (Cooper, 1997: 5).

However in stating that the emergence of new issues on the international agenda present an enhanced role for institutions in dealing with them and that leadership remains a necessary ingredient, an important point needs to be considered. This is that middle power leadership, which focuses on co-operation and coalition building is highly dependent on favourable systemic conditions. This means that the influence of middle powers in both agenda setting and the facilitation of policy co-ordination will be constrained by structural pressures. Furthermore their influence will vary by issue, by institutional arena and by the openness to initiatives from other actors (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 26). As it has been noted above, while non-aligned states have increasingly come to recognise the benefits of international institutions, the major powers, whilst recognising that leadership is necessary to address these issues, seem unwilling to supply the requisite leadership. Therefore in positing an enhanced role for middle powers within institutions, the point needs to be made that middle powers and institutions will be constrained by major power interests (Higgott, 1997: 31).
Whether non-aligned middle powers can play a bridge building role between Northern and Southern states within global environmental issues, in agricultural issues or within the GATT/WTO is highly dependent on how receptive the major powers are to middle power initiatives. This is reflected in the neoliberal institutional literature, which states that institutions are created by the major powers to facilitate common interests. This is reflected in two perspectives closely associated with the neoliberal institutional literature, namely the concepts of complex interdependence and regime theory. As the theory of complex interdependence asserts, under conditions of complex interdependence, national security issues may not always dominate states policy agendas due to the fact that government policies increasingly impinge on one another. The concept of complex interdependence further questions whether military force is the only dominant means of exercising influence, particularly amongst the industrialised states (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 31). The concept of international regimes is largely derived from the consensus definition of Krasner who defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 32). As the neoliberal institutional theory argues, common interests are assumed to only exist between the major powers, and international institutions are created to facilitate major power interests (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 32).

Therefore, middle power initiatives in strengthening the institutionalisation of international politics or the mechanisms of global governance in issue specific areas, has to be based on an assessment of major power interests which will consequently determine the effectiveness of international institutions. Cox defines global governance as “the procedures and processes, which exist at the global level for the management of political, economic and social affairs “ (1997: xvi). Therefore international institutions cannot ignore power realities. Therefore any assessment of whether any scope exists for secondary actors to fill the space left by declining American hegemony has to be based on an assessment of major power interests and how their interests change in response to changing systemic conditions (Keohane, 1996: 292).55

It is a contention of this thesis that this can provide a foundation for further research in this area that can be of interest to international relations scholars and practitioners. While this is an evolving research agenda, this thesis can make a contribution in further developing this line of research. It can make such a contribution by examining how various institutional forms in international politics, such as regimes, organisations and multilateralism can be expanded to allow a role for middle powers in their strengthening and maintenance. In focusing on

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international organisations, it can be noted that the study of international organisations can be seen to have gone through roughly three chronological phases. Kratchowil and Ruggie argue that the formal institutional focus assumed that the formal attributes of organisations such as their charters or voting procedures determined what they do. The second focus, namely the institutional process recognised that whilst formal arrangement were significant, political considerations such as the veto powers of the great powers in the Security Council could constrain the effectiveness of international organisations such as the United Nations. The third perspective, namely the organisation role focus, focused on the role of international organisations in the process of international governance. This focus examined the role of international organisations in the process of international governance in such areas as peacekeeping (Kratchowil and Ruggie, 1996: 755). These approaches thereby emphasise that while international organisations are created by major powers, they cannot be viewed as static conceptions. Whilst the Charter of the United Nations states that the five major powers within the Security Council are responsible for international peace and security and that the Security Council remains the principal peacekeeping organ, this organisational arrangement was superseded by Cold War events, as exemplified in the Suez Crisis. This consequently provided a scope for other powers, namely middle powers, to play a prominent role in peacekeeping operations in the Cold War era (Fetherston, 1995: 13).

With regard to expanding the concept of international regimes, the consensus definition of Krasner remains the dominant definition in the analysis of international regimes. According to Hasenclaver, Mayer and Rittberger, interest-based theories of regimes, while not ignoring power realities, emphasise that regimes are created to enable states to achieve common interests. As they argue, neoliberal approaches to regimes focus on the role played by regimes in reducing information and transaction costs and thereby facilitating co-operation between states (Hasenclaver, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996: 183). In attempting to enrich the neoliberal or interest based approach to regimes, Haggard and Simmons attempt to account for why regimes change over time or within specific issues. They argue that regimes change over time in four ways, namely strength, organisational form, as well as scope and allocation mode. In terms of strength, regimes may weaken due to the fact that short-term interests may collide with regime rules.

In terms of organisation form, some regimes may be largely decentralised in requiring states to share information or not to engage in certain actions. Scope refers to the range of issues that fall within the ambit of the regime, wherein inadequate scope may lead to a weakening of the regime by not taking into account how state interests can subvert regime rules in issues not covered by the regime. In terms of allocation mode, regimes can advance different
mechanisms for resource allocation, in that a market-oriented regime would discourage national intervention. On the other hand, authoritative allocation would involve some form of authoritative allocation by regime authorities, as evidenced in the I.M.F’s financing of balance of payments difficulties experienced by states (1987: 498)\(^4\). However in attempting to explain regime change, these approaches inevitably focus, as do much of the literature on regimes from Northern scholars, on how regimes could facilitate co-operation amongst the industrialised states after hegemony. It can therefore not posit any role for secondary actors, namely middle powers in strengthening the mechanisms of global governance.

In identifying how major power interests can change over time, cognitive theories of regimes can provide a means of filling this space. Cognitivists stress the role of ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the importance of issues and the knowledge available to them can influence how they perceive their interest. A number of problems still exist with the cognitivist explanation of co-operation in that they cannot predict at what point consensual values will produce co-operation. However a strength of the cognitivist approach to international regimes is that they stress that interests emerge from within specific normative and epistemic contexts and can therefore not be understood outside them. The cognitivist approach to regimes can therefore provide some theoretical insight as to how major power interests change over time, even though theory building in this area is still in its infancy (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 511)\(^4\).

With reference to the theoretical construct of multilateralism as an institutional form in international politics, one encounters a number of difficulties. As it has been argued, multilateralism is a particularly demanding institutional form in international politics. As such, it manifested itself within international politics in the context of a hegemonic state that is willing to play a leadership role in the international system. As a result, multilateral co-operation was manifested as co-operation amongst the major powers, particularly within the global economy (Kahler, 1992: 697)\(^5\). However, as Kahler argues, increasing developing state support of international institutions has meant that increasing number of smaller actors have recognised the need to play a leadership role in the absence of major power leadership. Whilst multilateral leadership will continue to remain an institutional construct amongst the major powers, new forms of multilateral collaboration has emerged particularly amongst small groups. These small groups can therefore play the role of a broker in facilitating co-operation. Therefore whilst multilateralism will remain an institutional construct amongst the major powers, space has opened up in the post-Cold War era for small number multilateral co-operation amongst secondary actors. However the ability of secondary actors in facilitating co-operation depends on whether the major powers are receptive to the initiatives of these
small coalitions. This involves a careful tracing of changing of how changing systemic conditions present a scope for such coalitions, which as it has been argued above can be an interesting research agenda for scholars and practitioners of international relations to pursue (Kahler, 1992: 707).
2.5 CONCLUSION

In developing a theoretical framework that will allow a scope for non-aligned middle powers to provide alternate forms of leadership in the presence of declining American leadership in the post-Cold War international system, a significant point has to be borne in mind. This is that middle power leadership at the global level, which emphasises coalition building and the facilitation of co-operation is highly dependent on structural and systemic conditions. It needs to be emphasised that middle power leadership at the global level, whether focusing on facilitating co-operation between the developed states or between Northern and Southern states, will be influenced by a number of factors. These are namely structural pressures, the issue in question, the institutional forum and the receptivity to its initiatives from other actors (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 26)⁹.

However conditions within the post-Cold War international system seem favourable for middle power leadership initiatives. The emergence of new issues on the international agenda which require enhanced forms of collaboration and co-operation require new forms of leadership with which to deal with them. The United States, however, has increasingly been unwilling to provide the requisite leadership to deal with these issues. The other major powers, such as the European Union and Japan seem unwilling to substitute for declining American leadership within the international system. Whilst the major powers, specifically the United States, recognises that there is a need to deal with these issues, they however remain unwilling to supply the needed leadership. On the other hand, non-aligned states and the Non-Aligned Movement have increasingly come to recognise that the institutionalisation of international politics in specific issues can serve their interests. This is especially the case when institutions can constrain the use by major powers of their power capabilities or when major power conflicts can adversely affect the interests of non-aligned states.

Theories of leadership that evolved during the Cold War era to explain the emergence of co-operation in international politics typically focused on the role of a dominant state in facilitating co-operation. As exemplified in theories of structural leadership, as well as in the Gramscian analysis of the concept of hegemony, institutions are created by a dominant state to further its interests. In both theories of structural leadership as well as the Gramscian analyses of the concept of hegemony, secondary actors are rarely considered. Secondary actors are only considered when they threaten the dominant position of the dominant state or where they perceive their interests to be in accordance with the order established by the dominant state.

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Theories of structural leadership as well as that of Gramscian analysis can therefore offer no room for secondary actors in providing alternate forms of leadership in dealing with the emergence of new issues on the international agenda in the absence of declining American leadership. There is therefore a need to move beyond a hegemonic conception of institutions towards an alternate conception of institutions that allows space for middle powers to play alternate forms of leadership in dealing with the emergence of these new issues. In moving beyond a hegemonic conception of institutions, American scholars and academics have focused on how institutions can facilitate co-operation amongst the major powers due to the interests of major powers in preserving them. Scholars, such as Keohane, have argued that whilst hegemony may be a necessary ingredient in the creation of institutions, the major powers come to recognise the value of institutions in reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements. According to this argument, even powerful states have an interest in following the rules of institutions, in that it makes the behaviour of other states more predictable (1998: 86).

Whilst this approach attempts to move beyond a hegemonic conception of institutions, it fails to take into consideration the fact that major the major powers can ignore institutional constraints when it is in their interests to do so. This approach therefore treats the interests of the major powers as a fixed constant. They can therefore not allow a space for other actors, namely middle powers, a role to play in strengthening institutions when such leadership is not forthcoming from the major actors. Therefore any consideration of whether middle powers can play bridge-building role between the major powers or between Northern and Southern states has to take into consideration whether the major powers are receptive to middle power initiatives.

There is a need therefore to consider how the various institutional forms international politics, such as international organisations, international regimes and theories of multilateralism can be expanded to allow a role of middle powers. This involves a consideration of how the interests of major powers change over time in response to changing systemic conditions. This involves a strengthening of neo-liberal institutional theory in tracing how the interests of major powers change in response to changing systemic conditions. Whilst this is an evolving research agenda, this thesis can make a contribution to furthering this research agenda. In looking at international organisations, such as the United Nations, that whilst institutional arrangements may favour the major powers, systemic conditions may present a scope for other actors to play a leadership role, as evidenced in the evolution of peacekeeping in the Cold War era, particularly in the Suez Crisis.
In expanding the concept of regimes, the constructivist approach offers some theoretical insights in emphasising that interests can be influenced by factors such as ideology. This approach can be utilised in expanding the concept of regimes to cope with new issues on the post-Cold War international agenda such as the increasing prominence of global environmental issues, such as the depletion of the ozone layer.

Whilst the institutional construct of multilateralism will remain an institutional feature confined to relations between the major powers, a scope has emerged in the post-Cold War era for small group multilateralism, particularly amongst middle powers in issues of concern to them. Whilst this is highly dependent on the issue, and the reception of the major powers towards these coalitions, there does appear to be some scope for these kinds of initiatives. This consequently, as it has been argued above, involves tracing how systemic conditions can influence major power interests. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a rigorous theoretical development of this approach, it is hoped that it may prove to have made some form of contribution to an evolving research agenda.
CHAPTER 3

3. United Nations peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions and peace-enforcement operations: a new scope for non-aligned middle power leadership in an era of declining American leadership

3.1 Introduction

Systemic conditions at the end of the Cold War era have facilitated an increase in the scope and demand for United Nations peace operations by developing and non-aligned states. With the passing of the Cold War, many observers expected the United States to play a leading role within United Nations peacekeeping operations, as evidenced in the role it played in galvanising Security Council support for repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However in light of the American experience in the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the United States has increasingly argued that it would not participate in peacekeeping operations that were not in accordance with its interests.

There has consequently been a need for other actors, namely middle powers, to play a burden-sharing role within United Nations peace operations. Due to the fact that United Nations peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations are carried out within the territories of non-aligned states, the consent of the host-state or the disputants’ remains a necessity, as evidenced in the U.S. led peace enforcement operation in Somalia. The concerns of the non-aligned states that these operations are being carried out without the proper mandate, highlights the concerns of the non-aligned states that these operations are being carried out without consulting other members of the United Nations. There is a need therefore to investigate whether the expanding scope of UN peace operations, coupled with increasing American unwillingness to shoulder the burden of these operations, presents a role for non-aligned middle powers in addressing the concerns of the non-aligned states, with regard to this issue.

In addressing this question, it shall be argued that the continuing importance of the neutral composition of UN forces within the expanding scope of UN peace operations, coupled with a lack of American leadership with regard to this issue, presents a scope for non-aligned middle powers, acting in accordance with their interests, to play a burden sharing role with the great powers, in addressing the concerns of the non-aligned states. In harmonising middle power interests with their participation within this issue, it shall be argued that middle power participation would strengthen the case for certain middle powers to attain the position of
permanent members of the UN Security Council, although without the ability to possess or use the veto. This is due to the fact that within the debate over the widening of the composition of the Security Council, the United Nations Charter states that, in addition to geographical location, election to non-permanent status is dependent on contributions by UN members to the maintenance of international peace and security.

That there is a role for non-aligned middle powers to play within this issue is evidenced in the increasing demand by failing or failed states within the developing world for second-generation peacekeeping operations. Due to the fact that second generation peacekeeping operations are carried out within the territories of non-aligned states, the consent of the disputants to the peacekeeping force remains a necessity. This was witnessed in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in which the neutrality of the peacekeeping force was important, due to previous superpower intervention in that state. Neutrality was also important to the success of the mission since the purpose of UNTAC was to facilitate a neutral political environment in which elections could take place. Middle power involvement in the operation was evidenced in the fact that UNTAC’s infantry and engineering battalions were drawn from the Asia and the Pacific, for example Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia.

The neutrality of composition of United Nations forces is also important in peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. This would, however seem to run counter to the fact that peace-enforcement operations are carried out without the explicit consent of the host state. With reference to humanitarian interventions, the United States has acted unilaterally, such as its intervention in Haiti or as part of a regional body such as the NATO bombings of Serbian forces in 1994-95. It needs to be noted however that humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations invariably involve elements of peace building to address the underlying causes of the conflict. There consequently remains a role for the United Nations to engage in peace-building activities once these forces have departed. It needs to be noted that UN forces carry out peace building, within humanitarian and peace enforcement operations, once consent has been gained through peacemaking efforts. This is evidenced in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which was mandated to implement the Vance Plan. In emphasising the fact that neutrality played a role in gaining the consent of the Serbs is highlighted in the fact the Serbian forces perceived that a United Nations Force would be more impartial than the European Community. While the Croatian president objected to the neutral composition of UNPROFOR, when he revoked its mandate on 12 January 1995, it needs to be noted that his attempts at securing an alternate NATO deployment were unsuccessful. This would substantiate the point that the United Nations remains the most
important organisation in maintaining international peace and security, due to its experience with regard to peace operations and the fact that regional bodies may not have the expertise or the political will to carry out such operations.

3.2 The contribution of middle powers to and NAM support of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Cold War era

The advent of the Cold War era has precipitated an increase in the number and variety of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations. With the passing of the Cold War, the developing world has witnessed greater instability within developing states, resulting in what has been termed “failed states” within the developing world. Kennedy and Russett characterise failed states as states wherein “authority implodes...ethnic and religious conflicts erupt and millions flee across international borders “(1995: 67). The developing world has witnessed a significant increase in intra-state conflict, as well traditional inter-state conflict (Kennedy and Russett, 1995: 68). In positing a role for middle powers within the issue area of United Nations peacekeeping, an outline of the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping needs to be examined focusing on middle power participation within this issue area. The relevance of middle power participation within peacekeeping operations for the non-aligned states will provide the means by which to posit a role for middle powers within this issue area. This provides the means to illustrate a continuing role for middle powers within United Nations peacekeeping operations in addressing the concerns of the non-aligned states with regard to peacekeeping operations.

In the founding of the United Nations as an international organisation, it was conceived by the major powers, principally the United States, in essentially multilateralist terms, namely as a collective security organisation (Ruggie, 1992: 587). In the aftermath of the War, leaders of the allied powers, principally Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, recognised that an international organisation was needed to maintain the re-established peace. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the name the “United Nations” (UN) was given to the organisation and signified the intent of the allied powers to maintain their war time co-operation with respect to maintaining peace. However this wartime co-operation could not be sustained with the advent of the Cold War (Baehr and Gordenker, 1994: 64).

It was within the context of the paralysis within the Security Council and its ineffectiveness to act as a collective security mechanism, that the concept of United Nations peacekeeping was born (Fetherston, 1994: 12). Ratner defines peacekeeping as “the stationing of UN military
personnel, with the consent of the warring states, to monitor cease-fires and dissuade violations through interposition between competing armies “ (1995: 10). The first peacekeeping mission can be identified as the Suez Crisis, which involved the French and British Forces’ invasion of Egypt. This led to a crisis within the international community due to the fact that the aggressors were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1), allowed English and French forces to withdraw without disgrace, and was stationed between Egyptian and Israeli forces at the request of Egypt. The UNEF operation set down the standards and principles for subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. These were firstly that the consent of parties to the dispute is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. Secondly the principle of the non-use of force was established, except in self-defence. Thirdly the principle of voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force was established. Fourthly, peacekeeping operations were to adhere to the principles of impartiality and non-intervention and lastly that day to day control of peacekeeping operations rested with the office of the Secretary-General of the UN (Fetherston, 1995: 13).

The principle of neutrality meant that the great powers were effectively ruled out as contributors to peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. In looking at the composition of peacekeeping forces during the Cold War era, Diehl argues that middle or non-aligned powers such as Canada, Fiji and Sweden were the major contributors of troops. Troops from states with vested interests and from the major powers were explicitly not used (Diehl, 1993: 8)26. As Cooper argues, middle power participation within the peacekeeping issue area has been consistent with a functionalist approach to international organisation (Cooper, 1997: 4)21. Kegley and Wittkopf define functionalism as a peace by pieces approach to international organisation which emphasises the sharing of sovereignty…a “bottom up” approach to building co-operative ties amongst states (1993: 525)7. Traditional functionalism, therefore, focuses on technical experts as the best vehicle for promoting co-operative ties (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 525). As Cooper argues, the middle power approach to international organisation has focused on playing roles within international organisations in accordance with their interests and task – related experience (1997: 4)21.

Within the peacekeeping issue area, Canada stands out as the principal middle power that has played a leadership role. A key feature of the post-war diplomacy of Canada has been its “niche” based leadership within the issue area of peacekeeping (Cooper, 1997: 11)21. Most significantly, it was under the leadership of Lester Pearson, the Canadian diplomat that served as Secretary General of the U.N. during the Suez crisis, that the concept of UN peacekeeping
was born. It was through Pearson’s diplomatic initiatives that the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created, to deal with the Suez crisis (Hendrikson in Cooper, 1997: 62)\(^\text{14}\).

Middle power leadership within the peacekeeping issue area was reinforced by non-aligned support of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and of the United Nations in particular. The Non-aligned Movement’s support of the United Nations has its roots in the decolonization of large areas of Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Many of these new states sought membership of the United Nations as a verification of their existence as sovereign states and successive summits of the NAM has reaffirmed the NAM’s commitment to the strengthening of the United Nations. The Lusaka Summit of the Non-aligned States, held in Lusaka in 1976, reiterated NAM support for the strengthening of peacekeeping operations. At the Lusaka Summit, non-aligned states pledged to consider the possibility of offering standby forces for future U.N. operations (Rajan, 1990: 136)\(^\text{4}\). The Non-aligned Movement’s support for peacekeeping during the Cold War era was based on the fact that the stationing of a peacekeeping force was dependent on the consent of the host-state concerned (Diehl, 1993: 9)\(^\text{26}\). Non-aligned support for peacekeeping operations has also rested on the fact that the NAM does not have the enforcement powers or the institutional capacity to enforce peace on disputants, or to undertake peacekeeping operations itself. This is due to the fact that decision making within the NAM has been based on the concept of consensual decision making, which has been one of the factors why the NAM has remained an association of states and has not developed into a formal intergovernmental organisation (Rajan, 1990: 42)\(^\text{4}\).

In analysing the continuing relevance of middle power leadership within the peacekeeping operations for the non-aligned states, systemic conditions in the post-Cold War era with regard to peacekeeping operations needs to be examined.

### 3.3 The new UN peacekeeping: a new scope for non-aligned middle power participation

*in the War era in the absence of American leadership*

A significant feature of the post-Cold war international system, has been the increased role of the United Nations in carrying out peacekeeping operations. This increase in the number and scope of peacekeeping operations can be attributed to the change in systemic conditions in the late 1980’s. Decreased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the settlement of a number of “proxy” wars, that had festered during the Cold War era, namely in Cambodia, Central America, Angola and Mozambique. Additionally, settlements that had long been on the agenda of developing states were amenable to settlement due to the
decreased tensions between the superpowers. This was due to the fact that a number of these conflicts were fostered as a result of the spheres of interest strategy of the superpowers during the Cold War era. This enabled the decolonization of Namibia and the Western Sahara, and included the achievement of majority rule within South Africa. The end of the Cold War also resulted in increased co-operation amongst the superpowers within the Security Council of the United Nations. In responding to the liberation of Kuwait in 1990, the superpowers authorised military action as well as sanctions against Iraq, as the aggressor-state. This resulted in many observers of the United Nations arguing that in the post-Cold War era, the United Nations could function as a collective security organisation as it was conceived amongst the major powers at the creation of the U.N (Ratner, 1995: 15).

With the benefit of hindsight at the end of the 1990’s, the collective security co-operation amongst the major powers to liberate Kuwait can be viewed as a focal point in distinguishing between Cold War and post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. As Mandelbaum argues, the future of peacekeeping operations was witnessed in the Northern Iraq once the war was won, in an operation carried out by the United States to liberate the Kurds. Two other interventions by the United States, one in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina can also be seen as characteristic of interventions in the post-Cold War era. A characteristic of these interventions authorised by the U.N, was that they represented a shift in military interventions from the Cold War era. While military interventions during the Cold War era were undertaken in terms of the East-West conflict, these intra-state conflicts were largely due to internal conflicts between groups and tribes over the question of sovereignty. These conflicts over sovereignty can be characterised into two categories, the first category being the efforts of groups to secede and set up their own states, which was the situation in Bosnia. The second category involves conflicts over who would govern the state, as was the case in Somalia (Mandelbaum, 1995: 4).

The liberation of Kuwait, and the United States’ successful efforts to gain the backing of the Security Council in repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, resulted in the Bush Administration, the Congress and to a large degree the American people viewing peacekeeping in a favourable light. This positive view of United Nations peacekeeping was taken up by the incoming Clinton Administration. Indeed as Rieff argues, the Clinton Administration came into office with a view towards U.N. peacekeeping that its officials termed “aggressive multilateralism”. According to this view, the United States would regularly place American troops under U.N. command and it would support peacekeeping operations throughout the world (Rieff, 1994: 3). However as United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia were on the verge of failure, congressional criticism against peacekeeping operations mounted (Daalder in Durch, 1996: 36)\textsuperscript{11}.

It was the failure of the U.N. operation in Somalia, in particular, that precipitated a change in the Clinton Administration’s approach towards peacekeeping operations. It was the death of American soldiers on the streets of Mogadishu that prompted greater congressional criticism. In addition to this, the American military had shown significant antipathy to the greater United States involvement in peacekeeping operations. This was reflected in the warrior culture of the United States military. Another factor was that the United States military, apart from providing troops for the multinational effort in the Sinai and the experience of a few marines in Beirut, had very little knowledge and experience of working within peacekeeping operations (Daalder in Durch, 1996: 42)\textsuperscript{11}. Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, addressed these concerns by stating that in future peacekeeping operations, the United States’ contribution would be in the area of logistics, intelligence, public affairs and communications rather than combat. In addition, she argued that “within large scale operations, we would be unlikely to accept UN leadership…and that we will rely on regional bodies such as NATO” (Cited in Daalder, 1996: 57)\textsuperscript{11}. This view of peacekeeping was reflected in the Presidential Decision Directive-25, which the U.S. president signed on 3 May 1994. The new policy directive stated that the primary role of the American military forces was to protect American national interests and that the goal of the United States’ policy was not to increase the number of peacekeeping operations or U.S. involvement in them. Secondly the Administration reiterated that large scale operations would be under U.S. control and that U.S. participation in low risk missions would be restricted to contributions of unique capabilities only (Daalder in Durch, 1996: 60)\textsuperscript{11}.

This wary endorsement of United Nations peacekeeping operations signalled that the United States was not willing to play a leadership role in future peacekeeping operations. In analysing the systemic conditions that present a role for middle powers in peacekeeping operations in the absence of American leadership, attention needs to be paid what relevance participation in peacekeeping operations has for middle powers. In addressing this question, the focus will be brought back onto the relevance of middle power participation in peacekeeping operations for the Non-aligned Movement.

3.4 Middle Power participation in the new peacekeeping: what relevance for non-middle powers and the NAM
In analysing what role middle powers can play within the issue area of international peacekeeping, the question of how participation in peacekeeping operations can be harmonised with the interests of middle powers needs to be examined. There are two views associated with middle power leadership within this issue area, namely one that privileges domestic concerns over opportunities to play a leadership role in the world arena and secondly one that focuses on the benefits of functional leadership to middle powers.

In referring to the first view, Pierre Dietrichsen who is a senior Department of Foreign Affairs official in the Government of South Africa argues against South Africa playing a middle power role in world politics. He argues that “South Africa is a medium power with limited resources at its disposal, for example for peacekeeping operations” (Cited in Solomon, 1997: 60). In addition theorists, such as Solomon, question whether South Africa has the political will to engage in peacekeeping operations, as reflected in ambiguous signals sent out by the country’s leadership’s willingness to play a leadership role (1997: 60).

The second approach to middle power peacekeeping focuses on the benefits to middle powers of playing issue specific leadership roles. In substantiating this view, an argument that accords greater prominence for middle power states as opposed to small states is based on the view that middle power states have the ability to provide forms of leadership, or engage in burden sharing, within international organisations. This view is reflected in the negotiations within the San Francisco Conference, which along with Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, resulted in the creation of the United Nations. Negotiations at the San Francisco Conference were characterised by the fact that the smaller states resisted the veto powers of the great powers in the Security Council. However they won provisions that enabled the best contributors to peace as well as equitable geographic distribution from their ranks, would be elected to the Security Council (Baehr and Gordenker, 1994: 16).

The argument for a strengthened presence for middle powers within the Security Council, has been given a boost with the emergence of the debate for the widening of the composition of the Security Council, which has gained prominence with the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995. This has led to the argument as to whether powerful states such as Germany and Japan should become permanent members of the Security Council, although without the right or actual use of the veto. Should these states get permanent status, there would be greater pressure for the largest and demographically larger states in Asia, Africa and Latin America to attain permanent status. However Article 23 of the Charter states that in the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council, attention should be given in the first instance to contributions by member states of the UN to the maintenance of international
peace and security. This would strengthen the case for states such as Canada to attain permanent status, despite not being the most powerful states within their respective regions, in terms of an Article 43 ‘special agreement’ in making national military forces available for UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This should clinch the case for permanent membership for a middle power state such as Canada, being elected to a security-maintaining body on a regular basis. This would enable such a state, as Canada, to participate in Security Council decisions with respect to the use of military force, although without veto rights. This provision is embodied in Article 44 of the United Nations Charter (Hendrikson in Cooper, 66).14

In arguing that middle powers have the ability to engage in sharing the burden of leadership with the permanent members of the Security Council, the question of the relevance of middle power leadership within this issue area for the Non-aligned Movement needs to be examined. In examining this question, it needs to be noted that while the Non-aligned Movement continues to support United Nations peacekeeping operations, it has voiced certain reservations over the nature of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. This was reflected at the Eleventh Summit meeting of the NAM in Cartagena, in Colombia in October 1995, in which the NAM expressed strong reservations concerning UN peacekeeping operations due to the fact that peacekeeping operations could turn into interventions without the proper mandate. They highlighted the concern that “peace-keeping operations should strictly abide by the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the U.N with respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs” (Cited in Jevremovic, 1996: 302). As Jevremovic argues, this wary endorsement of peacekeeping operations is due to the fact that the United States and its allies dominate the Security Council, which is mandated to authorise peacekeeping operations (Jevremovic, 1996: 302)53.

Consequently, the Non-aligned Movement emphasised at its Eleventh Summit that authorisations by the Security Council of peacekeeping missions should include consultations with the broader membership of the United Nations (Jevremovic, 1996: 302). The reservations of the NAM with regard to peacekeeping operations have its roots in the nature of military interventions in the Cold War era. As Wunsche, Linder and Voigtlander argue, military interventions by the superpowers within the territories of developing states, were viewed by non-aligned states as “proxy wars” between the superpowers. This was due to the fact that many areas of the developing world were labelled as “spheres of interest” by the superpowers in their confrontations in the developing world (1986: 28).
As the qualified endorsement of peacekeeping operations by the NAM at its Eleventh Summit illustrated, the neutrality of the composition of peacekeeping forces continues to be an important factor in gaining the consent of host states, in the post-Cold War period. This is especially important due to the increasing scope and diversity of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. As Durch argues, traditional peacekeeping operations have expanded to include multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations. In distinguishing between these categories, multidimensional or second-generation peacekeeping operations can be contrasted with traditional peacekeeping operations in that they mostly involve the settlement of internal rather than inter-state conflicts. In addition, multidimensional peace operations involve not only the reduction of tensions between belligerents but also the implementation of a peace accord that seeks to address the underlying causes of the conflict. The second category of UN peace missions in the post-Cold War era has come to include humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions are characterised by the fact that they are undertaken to relieve the suffering of populations in situations of anarchy. The difference between humanitarian interventions and traditional peacekeeping operations is that they may not have the consent of the Host State and may be opposed by certain belligerents within the conflict. Lastly, peace enforcement operations involve using coercive measures to stop the fighting, facilitating negotiations and shielding the civilian population against the effects of the conflict. Like humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement operations are characterised by the fact that they may have the consent of only one party (1996: 6).

Due to the fact the United Nations peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations are implemented within the territories of developing or non-aligned states, a degree of consent of the host-state or a majority of the disputants remains a necessity. It is within this context that a scope exists for middle powers in playing a role in addressing the concerns of the non-aligned states with regard to United Nations peace operations in the post-Cold War era. In answering this assertion, multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions and peace-enforcement operations need to be examined more closely.

3.5. Multidimensional or second generation peacekeeping operations: an increased demand for non-aligned middle power leadership

In examining multidimensional or second-generation peacekeeping operations, the neutrality of the composition of peacekeeping forces remains an important criterion for the success of the peacekeeping operation. This is illustrated in the definition of second-generation peace
operations, which are “UN operations, authorised by the political organs or the Secretary-General, responsible for overseeing or executing the political solution of an inter-state or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties” (Cited in Ratner, 1995: 17). In contrast to traditional or first generation peace operations, which were deployed primarily in inter-state conflicts, second generation peace operations have an expanded scope in that they are concerned with resolving intra-state as well as inter-state conflict. As a result, second generation peace operations cannot be separated from domestic political situations, in contrast to traditional peace operations (Ratner, 1995: 23).

The importance of consent within second generation peace operations is due to the fact that these operations aim at assisting a state or a group of states to implement an agreed upon political solution. In contrast to traditional peacekeeping operations which aimed at providing a buffer between the disputants whilst negotiations to end the dispute continued separately, second generation peace operations aim at resolving the underlying causes of the dispute. Second generation peace operations are consequently characterised by the fact that they have a substantial non-military as well as military component. These new peacekeeping missions therefore require civilian expertise in areas such as elections, human rights, public administration, and economics. In addition to this, second generation peace operations have complex agendas, which include tasks such as peace building. Peace building can be characterised as facilitating reconciliation between the disputants and assisting them in assessing the long terms needs of the nation (Ratner, 1995: 22).

As a second-generation peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) can be seen as a prominent example of the expanded scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. UNTAC which was mandated to oversee the political transition in Cambodia in terms of the 1991 Paris Accords, began on 15 March 1992 and ended in September 1993, with many observers praising the role that it had played in facilitating the peaceful transition in Cambodia. The UNTAC operation occurred in the context of the 1960 invasion of the Vietnamese Communist guerrillas, which precipitated the American bombing campaign of 1969. Other events included the overthrow of the head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the U.S. led intervention against the Vietnamese sanctuaries (1970). Thereafter there was the Khmer Rouge’s victory and reign of terror (1975-78), the Vietnamese invasion in 1979 and the civil war between the Vietnamese installed regime in Phnom Penh and a coalition of opposition groups which included the Khmer Rouge (1979-91) (Schear in Durch, 1996: 136).
The implementation plan for the Paris Accords was presented to the Security Council on 19 February 1992. Contributions to UNCTAC’s infantry and engineering battalions drew heavily from Asia and the Pacific, as shown in the fact that infantry battalions from Malaysia, Pakistan, and Indonesia were designated for Cambodia’s central and western provinces. Specifically there were eleven states that were the principal contributors, namely Bangladesh, Bulgaria, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Tunisia and Uruguay (Schear in Durch, 1996: 152)\(^28\).

The importance of neutrality as a factor in the success of the UNTAC operation is seen in the fact that the fundamental objective of UNTAC was to facilitate a neutral political environment, which would enable free and fair elections to occur. The composition of the peacekeeping force was important to the success of the operation in that disputants within the conflict, primarily the Khmer Rouge, could not opt out of the peace process on the grounds of the bias of the peacekeeping force towards any one party. Furthermore, in light of the context of the civil conflict in Cambodia, superpower participation in UNTAC was ruled out. The legitimacy of the peacekeeping force, while not accounting entirely for the success of UNTAC, was however a factor in determining its success (Schear in Durch, 1996: 175)\(^28\). With the expanding demand for operations such as UNTAC within developing states to help them to engage in the process of nation building, this provides a scope for middle powers to play a burden sharing leadership role within peacekeeping operations.

3.6. UN humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations: a scope for non-aligned middle power participation

In applying the concept of neutrality to UN peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions, one encounters an anomaly. This is due to the fact that unlike UN peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement and humanitarian interventions do not explicitly seek the consent of the host-state. It can be argued, however, that the principle of neutrality within humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations remains a necessity. This fact was recognised by the U.N in the conflict in Yugoslavia, which highlighted the fact that humanitarian interventions are difficult to terminate unless the underlying causes of the conflict are addressed. Due to the fact that humanitarian interventions may not have the consent of the host-state, certain groups within the conflict may oppose the operation (Durch, 1996: 5)\(^27\).

The dangers of implementing a peace enforcement operation without taking into account the consent of at least a majority of the disputants within the conflict was highlighted in the U.S
led intervention in Somalia in 1992. Due to the fact that peace enforcement operations rely on superior military capabilities, observers have argued that regional bodies such as NATO have the resources to carry out peace-enforcement operations. Indeed for much of the Cold War era, NATO was conceived as a security organisation that would manage conflicts in Western and Central Europe. Indeed NATO’s rational for its continued existence lies partially in the fact that NATO members have assumed that instability within Central and Eastern Europe affects their security interests adversely. It needs to be noted that NATO has scored some successes, namely the preventative deployment since 1993, on the border that Macedonia shares with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Other NATO successes have included the fact that the Dayton Accords were able to be crafted due to the Serbs losing power to the Croats and Muslims, as a result of NATO air strikes (Lepgold, 1998: 83). However, Durch argues that the limited NATO air strikes in Bosnia in 1994 complicated the U.N. mission in Bosnia and eroded local consent for the operation. Coupled with this, the diminishing political willingness of NATO to use force in late 1994 resulted in leaving the UN attempting to regain local consent in an unstable political-military environment (1996: 8).

While a role exists for regional bodies to supplement peace operations, a significant asset of UN peace operations is that they possess the characteristic of neutrality and therefore an element of legitimacy those regional bodies may not possess. This is a significant asset due to the fact that humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations invariably entail elements of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building. Boutros Ghali defines peacemaking as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means as envisaged in Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter” (Cited in Feterston, 1994: 129). Peacemaking consequently involves diplomats or high level United Nations Secretariat officials (Fetherston, 1994: 134).

As Fetherston argues, peacekeeping, peace making and peace building cannot be viewed as separate activities but need to be integrated into a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution. This is especially important within humanitarian and peace enforcement operations that operate without consent. Due to the fact that peace building occurs towards the latter end of peace enforcement and humanitarian operations, UN forces may have to implement a solution negotiated through peacemaking efforts. This was the case in first generation peacekeeping operations, as seen in the case in Cyprus, in which peacemaking and peacekeeping forces operated simultaneously (Fetherston, 1994: 134).
In contrast to second generation peacekeeping missions, U.N humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations are characterised by the fact that peace-building exercises are carried out in more anarchical conditions. As a result of the fact that these operations are not based on explicit consent, the U.N forces on the ground may attempt to carry out limited peace-building activities. In contrast to second generation peacekeeping missions which include significant civilian as well as military components, limited peace-building activities in enforcement and humanitarian interventions are primarily the task of the UN forces on the ground, until consent has been achieved by peacemaking efforts (Fetherston, 1994: 138). This was witnessed in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which was authorised by the Security Council, on 15 December 1991, to implement the Vance Plan. The UNPROFOR operation contained both humanitarian and peace-building characteristics, as seen in the fact that the UNPROFOR was deployed into UN protected areas to demilitarise, oversee the withdrawal of armed forces, protect the local population and monitor the movement of traffic out of the protected areas (Fetherston, 1994: 74). In emphasising the fact that United Nations Forces possess legitimacy above those of regional forces, is seen in the fact that the Serbs welcomed the U.N involvement in the Croatian crisis. This is due to the fact that a United Nations force was seen to be more impartial than a German led European Community (EC) (Durch and Schear in Durch, 1996: 205). As Diehl argues, commanders of UN peace operations usually come from a neutral state. It has become common practice for the United Nations to fill leadership posts in peacekeeping missions from individuals who have prior experience in such operations (Diehl, 1993: 13). This can be seen in the fact that General Satish Nambiar, from India, who served until March 1993, undertook the overall command of UNPROFOR (Durch and Schear in Durch, 1996: 213). As Durch and Schear argue, the failure of UNPROFOR was due to the fact that conditions in Croatia were not ripe for the achievement of a political settlement (Durch and Schear in Durch, 1996: 222).

As it has been argued above, United States has shown itself to be increasingly unwilling to undertake risky military interventions, that humanitarian interventions and peace enforcement operations invariably entail, that do not impact significantly on its security interests. Due to the fact that peace enforcement and humanitarian operations entail elements of peace building, Rieff argues that there is a scope for the United Nations, and consequently middle powers, to play a role in such operations. Due to the fact that while states may act unilaterally or as part of regional bodies to undertake enforcement actions, they may be unwilling to commit themselves for long periods of time. As evidenced in the Haitian crisis, the Clinton Administration was not unwilling to undertake enforcement actions, but was reluctant to commit itself once the invasion had been completed. This is seen in the fact that the Clinton Administration attempted to secure commitments for a force to remain in Haiti, once the U.S.
force had departed (1994: 17). Therefore, there is a role for the United Nations to undertake peace-building activities once enforcement operations have taken place. Therefore while it is conceivable that the great powers may undertake peace enforcement operations in the future, it is not possible to conceive that they will commit themselves for long periods of time (Rieff, 1994: 18). This is seen in the experience of UNPROFOR in the Croatian conflict, in that President Tudjman of Croatia was opposed to the non-partisan composition of UNPROFOR, which was a factor in his revoking of the mandate of UNPROFOR on 12 January 1995. However his attempts at getting a NATO deployment to replace the UNPROFOR operation did not get a response (Durch and Schear in Durch, 1996: 221).

Therefore, changing systemic conditions within the post-Cold War era, has led to an increasing demand for United Nations peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and even peace enforcement operations from developing states. In light of the fact that the requisite leadership has not been forthcoming from the United States as a unipolar actor in the international system, there remains a role for middle powers within United Nations peace operations to address the concerns of the non-aligned states.
3.7. Conclusion

In analysing the issue of whether a role exists for middle powers within United Nations peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions and peace-enforcement operations, it needs to be noted that systemic conditions at the end of the Cold War were conducive to an expansion of the United Nation’s role in peace operations. This was as a result of a decline in the superpower rivalry, which consequently provided favourable conditions for the settlement of a number of “proxy wars”, an example being the conflict in Cambodia. In addition to this, an increasing number of developing states fell victim to internal violence due to the fact that superpower support that had maintained those governments and provided the means to contain internal dissent was no longer available.

Many observers of the United Nations saw a renewed role for the organisation, in the post-Cold War era, to maintain international peace and security. Due to the fact that the Charter of the United Nations specifies that the great powers are responsible for maintaining international peace and security, this meant that the organisation could function as a collective security organisation, as its founder’s intended (Rourke, 1993: 311). This meant that the great powers, under the leadership of the United States as a unipolar actor in the post-Cold war era, would be seen to play such a collective security role. This is evidenced in the leadership role that the United States played in the peace-enforcement operation to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However it needs to be noted that the coalition building role that the United States played within the Security Council in this instance, was in accordance with American interests (Rourke, 1993: 5).

However the American experience in peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia has mean that the United States is increasingly unwilling to become involved in peace operations that is not in accordance with American interests. This has opened space for other actors, namely middle powers, to play a burden sharing role within United Nations peace operations, that is in accordance with their interests. Due to the fact that peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and peace enforcement operations occur within the territories of developing and non-aligned states, ignoring the consent of the Host State or that of the majority of the disputants will jeopardise such missions.

A prominent feature of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Cold War era was that they were based on the consent of the Host State. The prominent role that middle powers have played in peacekeeping operations provides them with the experience to play such a burden-sharing role, in contrast to the United States, which has had little experience within
peacekeeping operations. The importance of consent within second-generation peacekeeping operations is due to the fact that they are mandated to implement a political solution in an intra-state conflict, and consequently aim to facilitate the process of peace building. As the UNTAC operation in Cambodia highlighted, consent, which was dependent on the neutrality of the peacekeeping force, was a factor in the successful implementation of the mission. Due to the fact that missions such as UNTAC are increasingly going to needed and therefore demanded by disputants within failing or failed states in the developing world, middle power participation within such missions are going to be increasingly important.

In addition, peace-building activities cannot be divorced from humanitarian and peace-enforcement operations. It remains a possibility that the United States may act unilaterally or as part of a regional body such as NATO within humanitarian relief or peace-enforcement operations, that are seen to be in accordance with its interests. However the United States has proved unwilling to commit its troops to such operations for an indefinite time period. As a result there remains a role for the United Nations to engage in peace-building activities once these forces have departed. Due to the fact that consent of the disputants is a factor in the successful facilitation of peace-building efforts, there remains a role for middle powers within these operations.

As illustrated in the issue of United Nations peacekeeping, the United States has increasingly been unwilling to play a leadership role. As a result this has opened up a space for non-aligned middle powers to play alternate leadership roles in issue specific areas. The emergence of global environmental issues on the international agenda, such as protection of the ozone layer and global climate change needs to be examined further. This is to determine whether the absence of American leadership within this issue presents a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a leadership role in bridging the divide between North and South.
CHAPTER 4

The significance of global environmental commons issues for the NAM: a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a bridge building role between North and South in the absence of American leadership

4.1 Introduction

A significant feature of the post-Cold War international system, has been the increasing prominence of global environmental commons issues on the global agenda. Issues such as protecting the ozone layer and controlling climate change are international commons issues due to the fact that no actor can be excluded from their use, a common feature which international commons issues share with public goods. However, global environmental commons issues, can be differentiated from public goods and consequently share a common characteristic with private goods in that continued use of the resource results in a declining yield. Therefore global environmental commons issues can be termed common-pool resources. In using a common good, all actors have a long-term interest in maintaining the resource. However, in the short-term, actors have an incentive to pursue their short-term interests, in the absence of a guarantee that other actors would employ similar self-restraint. There is a need therefore, for actors to construct regimes that accommodate the interests of a large number of actors.

Structural theories that have focused on the role of a hegemonic power in bringing other actors into regimes are inadequate to explain regime formation within global environmental commons issues. This is due to the observation that international commons issues approximate the feature of complex interdependence, in that state interests are neither hierarchical nor constant. This point was evidenced in the changing positions of the developed and developing states within the issue of ozone depletion. While a hegemonic state may play a lead role in placing environmental issues as a prominent issue on the global agenda, hegemonic leadership entails some measure of satisfying subordinate interests. The United States, however, has been unable to perform such a leadership role either within the issue of protecting the ozone layer or controlling climate change.

As commons issues, protection of the ozone layer and controlling climate change, necessitate the participation of both developed and developing states in the management of these problems. This was evidenced in the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol, wherein the non-participation of the larger developing states, such as China and India, weakened the
regime. However, developing and non-aligned states’ participation in the management of these problems, is contingent on these issues addressing their development concerns. This means assessing the extent to which environmental commons issues allow non-aligned states to engage in linkage politics, thereby linking the concerns of the developed states with regard to protection of the environment with developing state concerns over development. There is a consequent need to investigate what scope these issues provide non-aligned middle powers in bridging the divide between North and South within these issues. As in the issue of UN peacekeeping, the emergence of these issues needs to be examined to determine whether a scope exists in the post-Cold War era, for non-aligned middle powers to play alternate leadership roles.

It will therefore be argued that the emergence of environmental commons issues on the global agenda cannot be addressed by a hegemonic power acting unilaterally or within the group of industrialised states only. These issues thereby provide a scope for non-aligned middle powers, acting in accordance with their interests, to reconcile the interests of Northern and Southern states within these issues. It will be argued that the benefits of playing a bridge-building or mediating role can be reconciled with non-aligned middle powers’ interests due to the increased reputation of playing such a role. The advantages of an increased reputation gained by an actor playing such a role are that the playing of such a role gives the actor a strategic position in the network of political communications. This means that an actor will be increasingly consulted and be informed by others. The mediating role that Canada played in the 1944 Chicago aviation conference, illustrates the benefits of playing such a role and could be used by non-aligned middle powers as a model on how engage in bridge-building within environmental commons issues. At the Conference, Canada’s bridge building role between the United States and Great Britain resulted in the two major powers recognising Canada as an important actor, and thereby elevated Canada’s status a one of the big three at the Conference. The ability of Canada in playing such a role was facilitated by Canada arriving at the Conference with a compromise solution or draft convention, which it was willing to present within various subcommittees and at the start of the Conference.

In identifying how a bridge-building or mediating role played by non-aligned middle powers with respect to environmental commons issues is relevant to the Non-Aligned Movement, the issue of ozone depletion will be examined in order to illustrate how non-aligned states can engage in linkage politics within environmental commons issues. As the negotiations to create a regime within the issue of ozone depletion illustrated, the increasing prominence of the ozone layer issue on the international agenda resulted in the developed states recognising that the non-participation of developing states within the Montreal Protocol would render any
ozone regime as ineffective. In attempting to gain developing state support, specifically that of India and China, the London Conference provided incentives for the recalcitrant developing states to sign the Protocol.

The insights gained by examining the issue of ozone depletion will be used to examine the relevance to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of its greater participation in the management of the issue of controlling climate change. In identifying how non-aligned states’ interests can be reconciled with their participation within international institutions to manage climate change, and whether the developed states wish to gain the co-operation of the developing states, will consequently posit a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a bridge-building role within this issue. As the negotiations within the issue of ozone depletion illustrated, state interests are not constant. This was witnessed in the evolving position of the United States within the issue of ozone depletion. As an evolving issue, within which no regime at present exists, the Kyoto Protocol represents the first significant step by the developed states in taking the lead to control climate change. As within the issue of ozone depletion, the United States altered its initial hard-line position, which enabled the Kyoto Protocol to come into being.

While the issue of climate change is still an evolving one, the Kyoto Protocol provides a foundation on which to build a regime within the issue of climate change. Extending any regime within the issue of climate change, to include developing and non-aligned states, faces two obstacles. It will be argued that while the United States (US) continues to demand that developing states accept significant greenhouse gas emissions targets, that would enable the US to sign the Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol does offer developing states some incentives to encourage developing state accession to the Protocol. However any global agreement on climate change has to satisfy the divergent interests of developing and non-aligned states. It will be argued that the Clean Development Mechanism has emerged from the Kyoto Protocol, as the most significant mechanism to encourage developing and non-aligned support of the Protocol. In order to gain the support of developing states, such as India that have yet to sign the Protocol, talks in Bonn leading up to the fifth meeting of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, have debated this issue. At the talks, the possibility of creating a separate Protocol for developing states was debated. While the United States has yet to sign the Protocol, it has attempted to delay any agreement on climate change until 2001, thereby indicating the desire of the present and possible future United States’ administrations to ratify the protocol.
Therefore, while the issue of climate change is an evolving issue on the international agenda, present conditions illustrate that there may be a scope for non-aligned middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South within this issue.

4.2. The NAM’S approach to Environmental Commons Issues

A significant characteristic of the post-Cold War international system, has been the increasing prominence of global environmental commons issues on the global agenda. This was witnessed in the emergence of global environmental issues on the global agenda at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, or the Stockholm Conference of 1972. In the post-Cold War era, global environmental commons issues were placed as a prominent issue on the international agenda as a result of the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Miller, 1995: 8)\(^3\). Young has defined the concept of international commons as “physical or biological systems that lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction of any of the individual members of a society, but are valued resources for many segments of the society “ (Cited in Young, 1996: 382). International commons issues include issues such as the stratospheric ozone layer and the global climate system (Young, 1996: 382)\(^3\). These issues are global in nature due to the fact that they can only be addressed through the co-operative efforts of a large majority of states in the international system (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 2)\(^6\).

In identifying the reasons for greater NAM participation in addressing global environmental commons issues and the consequent scope that these issues allow for non-aligned middle powers to play a bridge building role between North and South, the NAM’s approach to global environmental commons issues needs to be outlined. In positing a strategy of greater non-aligned states’ participation in addressing global environmental problems, systemic conditions with respect to the global nature of these issues which are unable to be addressed solely by a hegemonic power or within the group of Northern industrialised states will be examined. In identifying how the role conception of bridge building can be harmonised with non-aligned middle power interests, a strategy of greater NAM participation within international institutions to manage environmental commons issues such as controlling climate change will be posited. In positing such a strategy for the NAM, attention will need to be given as to how participation with the industrialised states in addressing these issues impact favourably on the interests of the non-aligned states, by examining non-aligned participation within the issue of ozone depletion. This will provide the context within which it will be possible to posit a bridge building role for non-aligned middle powers within international institutions aimed at managing these problems.
In tracing the evolution of the NAM’s approach to global environment issues, it can be noted that the NAM has moved from a particularly hostile position on global environmental issues to a position of conditional support in the management of these issues. The NAM’s initial position was highlighted at the Stockholm Conference, wherein the developing and non-aligned states put forward the view that environmental issues were a preoccupation of the rich and were therefore not as salient for developing states. In putting forward such a view, the non-aligned states further argued that the developed states were using environmental concerns to retard the economic growth of developing states (Porter and Brown, 1991: 46).

The non-aligned states’ ambivalence towards environmental commons issues such as the protection of the ozone layer were further reflected in the negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol. Within the negotiations, the non-aligned states and developing states did not emerge as an interest group, and indeed had shown very little interest in the issue, until 1987. This was due to the perception that the industrialised states were seen as the major producers and consumers of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s). As a consequence the non-aligned states contribution to the Vienna Convention was not particularly significant. However as the issue became an important issue on the international agenda, the developing and non-aligned states realised that their interests would be adversely impacted, and they consequently played a greater role in the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol (Miller, 1995: 73). Indeed, as late as the latter stages of the 1980’s, the non-aligned states viewed issues such as ozone depletion and climate change as northern issues. They accordingly wanted the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), set up after the Stockholm Conference, to focus on issues of more direct concern to developing states such as fresh water, urban air and desertification (Porter and Brown, 1991: 50).

In tracing the evolution of the NAM’s role with respect to global environmental commons issues, it needs to be noted that the non-aligned and developing states played a much more active role in the issue of global climate change as opposed to their initial disinterest within the ozone layer issue. This can be seen in the fact that the non-aligned and developing states participated within the negotiations within the Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee (INF) in Washington, DC, in February 1991. These negotiations were meant to lead to the signing of a treaty at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. This resulted in the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992 (Paterson in Vogler and Imber, 1996: 61).
The perception amongst non-aligned states that participating in the management of these problems was in accordance with their interests can be seen in the greater participation of non-aligned and developing states within the negotiations at the Earth Summit. While Stockholm was smaller in scope as well as attendance, the Rio Conference drew a gathering of 118 heads of state, which was the largest Conference ever. However, negotiations within the Conference reflected the fact that developed and developing states had different agendas with respect to environmental commons issues. The developed states wished to address issues such as ozone depletion and climate change. The developing countries however focused on the relationship between environmental degradation and underdevelopment. While the Northern states did acknowledge the relationship between the environment and development, and did pledge to make some financial commitments, they did not commit themselves to specific measures to reduce their industrial pollution and continued to pressure the developing states to protect their forests and wildlife (Miller, 1995: 9). It is significant to note, however, that while the industrialised states may have initiated the Earth Summit, the Summit occurred within the organs of the United Nations system. This reflected in part, a realisation by the developed states that the management of environmental issues needed developing state participation, which is reflected in the fact that the United Nations was entrusted with the responsibility for convening the Conference (Imber, 1996: 138).

The evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement’s stance from a position of hostility towards environmental issues to one of conditional acceptance was reflected in the eleventh summit of the NAM held in Cartagena, Colombia from October 18 to 20, 1995. At the Summit the NAM reaffirmed its support of the Rio Declaration. However the NAM noted with some concern that the financial commitments pledged by the developed states at Rio had not yet become a reality. They also noted that greater resources be given to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which had been set up after the Earth Summit. The NAM further called on the developed states to implement Agenda 21, which was an action plan for sustainable development, through the allocation of increased financial resources and the adoption of measures to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies on preferential terms (Srivastava, 1996: 109). The Non-Aligned Movement, however, reiterated its previous stance towards environmental issues, when they stated that environmental issues should not be employed to intervene in the internal affairs of developing states and that additional environmental conditionalities not be imposed on developing states (Srivastava, 1996: 109).

In positing an alternate strategy of greater support by the Non-Aligned Movement for the management of global environmental issues, systemic conditions with respect to how these
issues necessitate the participation of the non-aligned states will be examined. In doing so, the question of how these issues impact on the interests of the northern states will be examined.

4.3. The position of the United States, and developed state interests, with regard to environmental commons issues

In elaborating on the concept of international commons, Mcginnis and Ostrom differentiate between private goods and common goods or common-pool resources. Private goods are “aspects of goods or services that individuals buy or produce, which can be excluded from actors who would like to use them”. Common-pool resources however are characterised by the fact that “exclusion is non-trivial and the yield is subtractable“ (Cited in Mcginnis and Ostrom, in Young, 1996: 467). The concept of non-exclusion can be seen as a common characteristic between common-pool resources and public goods. However common-pool resources can be differentiated from public goods, in that common-pool resources share a common characteristic with private goods, which is namely the subtractability of the yield (Mcginnis and Ostrom in Young, 1996: 467).

In linking together the concepts of interdependence and international commons, Miller argues that a purpose of regime creation is to deal with issues of common interests. In this instance, there is a strong incentive for actors to pursue their own self-interest. In such situations, mechanisms need to be put in place for monitoring and compliance and states must be assured that short-term costs will be rewarded in the long term. A metaphor that has been used to describe situations of common interests, has been the issue of the “tragedy of the commons”. In this example, herders are allowed to graze their livestock on a common pasture, which is a satisfactory arrangement until the carrying capacity of the land has been reached. If the herders continue to act in their own self-interest, the result will be the overgrazing of the pasture. While each actor is aware of the results of his actions, he is aware that restraint on his part will impact on his interests adversely. While there is a long-term common interest in avoiding the overgrazing of the pasture, each actor needs to be assured that there is joint restraint and that the costs of his restraint are addressed. The actors can therefore choose a collaborative policy whereby they agree to abstain from certain behaviour, and thereby give the regime the power to mediate and monitor conflict (Miller, 1995: 54). As Young argues negotiations within issues of complex environmental problems frequently revolve around distributive issues. As he argues, in the creation of international institutions with respect to the formation of regimes within issues of environmental problems that are complex in nature, negotiations are characterised by a consensus rule that proves attractive to as many interests as possible (Young, 1996: 389). This point can be substantiated in the observation that while
certain non-aligned states, such as India, refused to ratify the Montreal Protocol. However India changed its stance at the London Conference to the Parties of the Montreal Protocol when it perceived that participation within the Protocol was in accordance with its interests (Porter and Brown, 1991: 36).

As Haas argues, structural theories that focus on the role of a hegemonic power or power differentials in the creation of regimes are inadequate to explain issues that are complex and interdependent in nature (Haas in Young, 1996: 359). As Keohane argues, in systemic analysis, actor characteristics are not treated as variables but are regarded as constants. Outcomes are therefore not explained by differences in actor characteristics but on the basis of changes within the system (Keohane in Young, 1996: 155). As Young consequently argues, structural analysis assumes that state interests are constant. However in cases where issues that can be seen as corresponding to the characteristic of complex interdependence, states are no longer sure as to how their goals should be ranked. This is as a result of their uncertainty with regard to how a change in their goals affects their opportunity costs (Haas in Young, 1996: 359).

As Porter and Brown argue, the structural explanations of the emergence of regimes focus on the role of a hegemonic power in regime creation. In the first variant, structural theories focus on the coercive power of a hegemonic state in using its military and economic leverage to bring other states into regimes (Porter and Brown, 1991: 23). However as Haas argues, in situations of complex interdependence, power becomes less salient as an explanatory variable for outcomes. This is due to the fact that states are unsure as how to apply their power capabilities amongst several divergent interests (Haas in Young, 1996: 359). This can be seen in the observation that while the United States was opposed to the issue of funding for developing states within the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol, its stance changed at the London Conference of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (Porter and Brown, 1991: 36). In the second variant, the focus is on the hegemonic state providing public goods, such as the role of the United States in making the dollar the stable currency for international transactions in the Bretton Woods system (Porter and Brown, 1996: 24). However, as it has been argued above, international commons issues cannot be viewed as public goods due to the fact that international commons issues are characterised by the fact that exclusion is non-trivial and the yield is subtractible (Mcginnis and Ostrom in Young, 1996: 467).

While regime formation within international commons issues cannot be tied to the existence of a hegemonic power providing public goods, regime creation within international commons issues can be facilitated by the leadership behaviour of a lead state, in placing an issue on the
global agenda. Porter and Brown characterise a lead state as a state that “has a strong commitment to international action on the issue.” It moves the negotiations forward by proposing its own negotiating formula as the basis for agreement and attempts to get the support of other state actors “(Cited in Porter and Brown, 1996: 36). Within the issue of ozone depletion the United States can be seen to have played such a leadership role. The issue of the protection of the ozone layer emerged in 1977 when the United States, along with middle powers such as Norway, Canada and Sweden urged UNEP to consider the issue of the international regulation of the ozone layer. Furthermore, in 1978, the United States banned the use of principal CFC’s for most uses (Miller, 1995: 69).

However the United States leadership role with regard to the protection of the ozone layer cannot be regarded as a hegemonic leadership role. This is due to a number of reasons. Firstly the United States had been forced by domestic pressures to control some CFC uses (Miller, 1995: 74). This can be seen in the observation that the United States played a leadership role due to the fact that protection of the ozone layer was in accordance with its short-term as well as long-term interests. This is seen in the fact that the United States had a lead over the European Community and Japan in finding substitutes for aerosol cans, so it joined Canada and the Nordic states in supporting such a ban. However Western Europe and Japan rejected a ban on aerosols, in the early 1980’s, due to the fact that technological alternatives were not available to them. In substantiating the point that the United States’ role was not a hegemonic one, it needs to be noted that both the Reagan and Bush administrations in the United States, were hostile to developing country demands for a restructuring of the global economic system to benefit developing states. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations were opposed to state intervention in national and international markets. They were consequently opposed to the principal of additionality, which meant that funds provided to developing countries for environmental purposes should not have been in addition to regular development funds (Porter and Brown, 1991: 46). The United States changed its position on additional funding a few days before the London Conference of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in 1990 (Porter and Brown, 1991: 36). While the United States may have played a leadership role in making the ozone layer issue an important issue on the global agenda, its role cannot be seen as being a hegemonic one. This is due to the fact that the United States was opposed to Third World demands over funding, which meant that the United States did not make provision for subordinate interests to be satisfied in the management of environmental commons issues (Cox, 1996: 136).

In contrast to the issue of ozone depletion, the United States has adopted a more cautious, somewhat hostile view towards the issue of climate change. The United States’ position in the
early 1990’s was a decidedly cautious one, in which the United States was opposed to setting emissions targets for carbon dioxide (Cooper in Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 290). This was reflected in the negotiations leading up to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) which was signed at UNCED in 1992. The negotiations within the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) held in Washington in February 1991, were characterised by two conflicts, namely that between the United States and the other industrialised countries, the other being North-South differences. In the first instance, the dispute between the United States and the other industrialised states revolved around the issue of their commitments to lower greenhouse gas emissions. The United States played a blocking role due to the fact that the United States remained sceptical over the existing scientific knowledge on climate change and also due to the economic costs that such actions would entail. While the European states and Japan made many attempts to persuade the United States to change its position, they were not able to do so. Eventually a compromise agreement was reached where a mention of dates were included, but the wording was sufficiently ambiguous to make a binding commitment unlikely (Paterson, 1996: 59).

As it has been argued above, global environmental commons issues can be characterised by the feature of complex interdependence. This means that they cannot be managed by hegemonic powers acting unilaterally. It also means that environmental commons issues cannot be dealt with solely within the group of Northern industrialised states. While a state can play a lead role in bringing an issue on the global agenda, such as the United States did within the issue of ozone depletion, a hegemonic leadership role entails some means of satisfying subordinate interests, which means encouraging non-aligned states’ support. However the United States was not able to play such a role, either within the issue of ozone depletion and climate change. In arguing that a scope exists for non-aligned participation in the management of global environmental commons issues, the question of how non-aligned participation can be harmonised with the interests of non-aligned middle powers and the Movement as a whole needs to be examined.

4.4. Global Environmental Commons Issues: what relevance for non-aligned middle powers and the NAM

In examining the issues of ozone depletion and climate change in order to detect a scope for a bridge building or mediating role for non-aligned middle powers, the question of why non-aligned middle powers would want to play such a bridge building role needs to be examined.
In substantiating the contention that a bridge-building or mediating role-playing is in accordance with the interests of non-aligned middle powers, it can be noted that one of the primary benefits of playing such a role is the increased reputation that an actor enjoys. As Cox and Jacobson argue, the role of brokers or mediators involves serving as a go between among the participants and the facilitation of consensus building. Brokers thereby exercise influence by bringing about modifications in the behaviour of all the actors in an issue. Playing a brokering or mediating role is in the interests of the role-playing actor due to the increased reputation and confidence that they enjoy. These benefits of enjoying a greater reputation can be seen as giving the actor a strategic position in the network of political communications, in that the actor may be increasingly consulted and informed by others. However, in sustaining the benefits of an increased reputation in the playing of such a mediating role, depends on the actor maintaining his reputation (Cox and Jacobson in Young, 1996: 14).  

In illustrating the benefits of playing a bridge-building or mediating role for non-aligned middle powers, the mediating role that Canada played at the 1944 Chicago aviation conference is instructive. As Hendikson argues, Canada's role can be considered as a model for global management for newer middle powers today. In the conference, the major source of conflict at the conference was between Great Britain, who favoured imperial preferences and the United States, which wanted a more liberal open skies regime. Canada thereby recognised that its role at the Conference was to play a mediating role between the United States and Great Britain, a role that Canada consequently played. Canada’s contribution at the Conference was recognised by both the United States and Great Britain. As Escott Reid, one of the Canadian delegates to the Conference, consequently argued: the acceptance “of Canada as a mediator and the concurrence of the conference resulted in the subsequent decision that Canada should be elevated to the rank of the big three.” This would “not have been so freely given had not other factors come into play, which were perceived as Canadian factors” (Cited in Hendrikson, 1996: 51).  

Canada was able to play such a role due to the fact that Canada arrived at the Convention with a meticulously worked out draft convention. At the opening of the Conference, Canadian government minister, C.D. Howe delivered an impressive restating of the Canadian convention-article by article, which had been presented in the subcommittees, as well at his press conference. Canada’s competence, in technical know-how and experience, commanded respect which enabled Canada to launch an idealistic proposal which became known as “Canada’s biggest businessman” (Hendrikson in Cooper, 1997: 52).
In positing an alternate strategy of greater Non-Aligned Movement support for the management of global environmental commons issues, the question of how participation with the Northern states is in accordance with the interests of the non-aligned states and the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole needs to be examined. It is in identifying how participation with the industrialised states in the management of these issues are in the interests of the NAM as a whole, that a scope will be posited for non-aligned middle powers to play a bridge building role between North and South. In identifying how participation in the management of these issues are in the interests of the Non-Aligned Movement, the position of Indira Gandhi, the former prime minister of India, at the Stockholm Conference needs to be noted. She stated to the Conference that “how can we speak to those who live in villages and slums about keeping the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source” (Cited in Ramakrishna, 1992: 145). Her stance at the Stockholm Conference subsequently became the acknowledged position of the developing states towards environmental issues (Ramakrishna in Rowlands and Greene, 1991: 145). This reflects the fact that developing country and non-aligned support in managing global environmental commons issues is conditional upon how these issues impact on their development prospects.

As Porter and Brown argue, developing states’ leverage within the global economy has steadily worsened since the oil crises of the 1970’s. As a result, non-aligned states have come to view global environmental negotiations as a means of broadening the agenda of North-South economic relations. They have consequently attempted to employ linkage politics, thereby linking their development concerns with developed states concern with preserving the global environment (Porter and Brown, 1991: 129). In substantiating the point that global environmental commons issues provide a scope for non-aligned states to engage in linkage politics, the issue of ozone depletion will be examined more closely. This issue will be examined more closely due to the fact that an established regime exists within this issue, and it therefore highlights how developing and developed states’ interests can be reconciled in environmental negotiations. It is through examining this issue that the relevance of non-aligned participation within the evolving issue of global climate change, in which a regime does not yet exist, will be examined (Rowlands in Rowlands and Greene, 1991: 32).

4.4. The issue of ozone depletion: what relevance for the NAM and developing states

In examining the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement’s stance towards the issue of ozone depletion, an outline of the emergence of the issue onto the global agenda, which consequently influenced the changing NAM stance towards this issue, needs to be outlined. The emergence of the issue of ozone depletion onto the global agenda can be seen to have
occurred in 1977 when the United States, Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden urged UNEP to consider the issue of the international regulation of the ozone layer. This resulted in the UNEP Conference of 1977 in which experts from thirty-two countries adopted a World Plan of Action on the Ozone layer. UNEP subsequently established the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer consisting of governmental agencies, which progressed to the level of negotiations towards a framework convention on ozone layer depletion in 1981. The Ad hoc working group of legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer, which included representatives from twenty-four nations, began meeting in January 1982 (Porter and Brown, 1991: 75).

In the negotiations two blocks developed between the United States and the European Community. While the United States had an advantage in that it had already cut down on CFC use, the four major producing states within the European Community, namely Britain, France, Germany and Italy, accounted for 45 percent of world CFC production. While Germany was willing to support controls on CFC use, the other major producing states wanted to preserve their export markets and wanted to avoid the economic costs of adopting alternative technologies. A striking fact of the negotiations, however, was that the large developing states, such as India and Indonesia, failed to play an active role and India remained outside the process until the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol (Porter and Brown, 1991: 76).

The negotiations within the Ad hoc working group led to the signing of the 1985 Vienna Convention. In the negotiations within the Vienna Convention, the European Community states continued to oppose any limits on CFC production (Susskind and Ozawa in Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 148). Due to the fact that the European Community states refused to accept quantifiable limits on CFC production, the Vienna Convention became an agreement to co-operate on monitoring, research and data exchanges. It consequently imposed no specific obligations on states to reduce their production of ozone depleting chemicals, and did not in fact specify which compounds were causing ozone depletion (Porter and Brown, 1991: 76). As a result of this, most developing and non-aligned states were not signatories to the Convention (Porter and Brown, 1991: 36).

The issue of ozone depletion, however, became an increasingly important issue on the global agenda due to the discovery in mid 1985 that a crater existed in the ozone layer above Antarctica. As a result of this information, negotiations on a control Protocol began in Geneva in December 1990. Within the negotiations for the Montreal Protocol, the negotiations centred on gaining the support of reluctant actors such as the EC, Soviet Union and Japan (Porter and
Brown, 1991: 76). The negotiations were characterised by the absence of a large number of developing and non-aligned states. However developing and non-aligned states such as Venezuela, acted as a voice for the interests of developing states. However a important fact to note is that the number of developing states increased from six in December 1986 to over thirty at Montreal in September 1987 (Kahler, 1992: 701). However in the negotiations at the Montreal Conference in 1987, the major industrialised nations were unable to deal with issues of importance to the developing states such as financial burden sharing and preferential access to technology (Macneill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991:64).

However as Pearce argues, any global agreement that aimed at encouraging co-operation had to deal with the problem of free riders. As he argues, the Montreal Protocol was a game in which there were only a few players, in which the costs of phasing out CFC’s were relatively modest. However, in order to gain the support of potential free riders, it was necessary to create incentives. This involves the transfer of resources, such as funds, technical assistant and technology, to free riders (Pearce in Rowlands and Greene, 1992: 79). This observation was reflected in the negotiations in the Montreal Conference in that developing states, such as China and India, did not sign the protocol. The developed countries recognised that a lack of co-operation from two large developing states, such as India and China whose CFC use was increasing, could render any agreement amongst the developed states as ineffective (MacNeill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 64).

Chinese and Indian delegates to the Conference demanded that assistance be provided to meet the targets of the Montreal Protocol. They argued that the industrialised states had caused most of the damage to the ozone layer and should therefore be primarily responsible for the cleanup (Rowlands, 1992: 24). It was at the London Conference that the industrialised states attempted to gain the co-operation of developing states whose non-accession could have weakened the regime. At the London Conference of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, held in June 1990 in London, it seemed as if the regular North-South lines had been drawn. The industrialised states opposed the setting up of new institutions, while the developing states continued to demand mechanisms for financial assistance and technology transfer (Kahler, 1992: 701).

However, the negotiations resulted in incentives being offered for developing state co-operation to sign the Protocol. These incentives were commitments for technology transfer and the creation of an Interim Multilateral Fund of 160 million dollars, to aid developing states to implement the Protocol through funding non-ozone depleting development in developing states which are parties to the Protocol (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992: 17). The
compromise was reached through a voting formulae that covered both future changes in CFC schedules and oversight of the fund. The United States favoured weighted voting which would have given control to the industrialised states. The developing states, on the other hand, wanted decisions to be reached through a two-thirds majority rule. The compromise solution involved a two-thirds majority rule, but one in which simple majorities from both North and South would not be valid. This rule enabled both developed and developing states to block decisions. This voting formula enabled developing states such as China, India and others to accept reassurances on technology transfer and accede to the Protocol (Kahler, 1992: 701).\(^{53}\)

As Porter and Brown point out, while Mexico and Indonesia initially refused to sign the Protocol, a year later they decided to do so, reflecting their greater vulnerability to trade sanctions against non-parties (1991: 77).\(^{32}\) However as it has been argued earlier, in environmental negotiations, a strategy that could be employed by Northern states, namely the use of coercive measures to gain the co-operation of developing states may not be feasible. This is due to the point that has been argued earlier, that in situations that approximate the feature of complex interdependence, states may have several competing interests that are non-hierarchical.

As the evolution of the issue of ozone depletion illustrates, in issues of environmental commons, the developing states, in particular the United States, were initially resistant to incentives to encourage developing states co-operation. However there was a realisation on the part of the industrialised states that developing state non-co-operation would weaken the regime. The insights gained by examining the issue of ozone depletion will therefore be used to examine the relevance of Non-Aligned participation within the evolving issue of climate change.

4.5. The issue of Climate Change and the scope for non-aligned middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South

In contrasting the issues of climate change and ozone depletion, there are similarities as well as differences. The evolution of the emergence of the issue of climate change onto the global agenda can be seen to be similar to the issue of ozone depletion, in that it emerged as an issue within the developed states. In detecting the similarities between the issue of ozone depletion and climate change, it can be noted that scientific developments provided the initial catalyst that brought both these issues to the attention of policymakers and the public. Other conditions that facilitated the emergence of the issue of climate change onto the global agenda included an economic boom in most Western nations in the 1980's and the drought in the United States in 1988 (Paterson in Vogler and Imber, 1996 59).\(^{32}\)
In detecting the similarities between the issue of ozone depletion and the issue of climate change, it needs to be noted that any agreement to deal with climate change has to be global in scope. This is seen in the fact that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries account for a mere 40 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Any agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include the larger developing states (Macneill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 78). This is seen in the point that India, China and Brazil account for an estimated 21 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. By the year 2020, the developing countries portion of global energy consumption is expected to reach 44 percent (Porter and Brown, 1991: 95). This view was reflected in the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, which states that “the global community must not only halt the net transfer of resources from developing countries, but must actually reverse it” (Cited in MacNeill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 79). The Conference called for the establishment of a world atmosphere fund that would be funded by a tax on fossil fuel consumption (Porter and Brown, 1991: 94). A similarity that can be noted between the two issues therefore is that both are concerned with the issue of free riders. The primary similarity between the issue of climate change and ozone depletion is therefore that they are commons issues, and are consequently perceived by the developed states as necessitating the participation of developing states in the management of these issues. In highlighting the similarities between the two commons issues, it needs to be noted that the United States has proved to be resistant in both issues to the issue of incentives to encourage developing state participation. Within the negotiations at the Toronto Conference in 1988, the United States proved to be hostile to any agreement on climate change (Porter and Brown, 1991: 61).

However a significant difference that can be noted between the issue of ozone depletion and climate change is that the climate change issue can be seen to be more complex in nature. This is due to the fact that while alternative technologies to CFC’s were available which minimised the costs of moving to CFC substitutes in developed states, the economic costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions will be significant for both the developing and developed states. Furthermore global warming would affect different countries in different ways. A few may gain from climate change, and even if all lose, some may lose more than others (Pearce in Rowlands and Greene, 1992: 78).

However, as it has been argued above and witnessed in the negotiations within the Montreal Protocol and the London Conference, state interests are not static. As Young argues, negotiations between states in the creation of international institutions in situations that approximate complex interdependence are characterised by the feature of a “veil of
uncertainty”. This means that states participate in negotiations with imperfect information. This consequently means that states settle on provisions that are perceived to be equitable by all participants. This point was evidenced most significantly in the evolving position of the United States within the issue of ozone depletion (Young, 1996: 389)\textsuperscript{30}. In applying this insight to the issue of climate change, the evolution of the issue needs to be examined focusing on what scope this issue has provided in addressing the interests of the non-aligned states. Focusing on present conditions within this evolving issue, may provide some pointers as to what scope this issue may provide for non-aligned middle powers in playing a bridge-building role between North and South within this issue.

The emergence of the issue of global warming on the international agenda can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the World Meteorological Association (MWO) and UNEP which established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) in 1989 (Porter and Brown, 1991: 94)\textsuperscript{32}. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) was established to lay the groundwork for the Second World Climate Conference, which was held in Geneva in November 1990. In the IPPC’s meeting in Washington in February 1990, President Bush of the United States stated that although the United States was committed to further research, he contemplated no early commitments on the part of the United States to reduce fossil fuel emissions. He further stated that the United States was not prepared to deal with equity issues that were of concern to the developing states. Developing states such as India and Brazil made it clear however that they wanted the negotiations to focus on issues that addressed North-South equity issues in general (Macneill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 63)\textsuperscript{16}. At the Conference, the main area of dispute was between two groups: one lead by the European Communities and the European Free Trade Association and the other between the United States, the Soviet Union and the Gulf oil states. While the European Community and the EFTA agreed to stabilise their carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2000 at the 1990 level, the United States and the Gulf Oil states opposed early commitments to reduce fossil fuel emissions (Maceill, Winsemuis and Yakushiji, 1991: 77).

Within the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, which was meant to lead to the signing of a treaty at the Rio Summit, it is significant to note that both the United States’ position and those of the developing states had not converged. The United States continued to resist attempts by the European countries and Japan to accept targets for reductions of carbon-dioxide emissions. The developing states continued to argue that the developed states were primarily responsible for causing climate change, and that they had the resources to enable developing states to reduce their carbon-dioxide emissions. However while the developed states acknowledged the concerns of the developing states, they provided
few resources and the consequent commitments of developing states were slight. The Convention was accordingly signed in 1992, and came into effect in 1994 following the required 50 signatories (Paterson in Vogler and Imber, 1996: 61). As a result, the Framework Treaty on Climate Change (FCCC) was characterised by being strong on policy prescriptions, but weak on commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The treaty, however, focused on the need for further research. Commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were to be dealt with in future negotiations. States were therefore to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions according to their own national targets (Christiansen in Vogler and Imber, 1996: 190). However the Convention did impose more burdens on the developed states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, by providing detailed reports of the measures they have adopted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The developed states were further required to provide projections of what effects their policies would have on reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000 (Greene in Vogler and Imber, 1996: 210).

The climate change issue is however an evolving issue on the international agenda. This is seen in the fact that the Convention was strengthened at a meeting in Berlin in 1995, in which the developed states agreed that no new commitments would be demanded from the developing states (Nature, 1997: 219). In charting the evolution of the issue of climate change, the third meeting of the parties to the Framework convention on climate Change, held in Kyoto in December 1997, can be seen to be a significant signpost. As the negotiations within the Kyoto Conference illustrated, state interests cannot be assumed to be constant. This observation can be substantiated by examining the changing positions of the developed states at the start of the conference and at its conclusion, and what incentives the Kyoto Protocol offered developing and non-aligned states in order to encourage developing state participation. At the start of the Conference, the Group of 77, which includes the Non-Aligned Movement reiterated its stance that it wanted the developed states to take the lead and make significant cuts to their greenhouse gas emissions. This meant an approximate 15 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the year 2000. At the start of the Conference, the United States put forward a target of stabilisation of emissions at 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The United States further put forward the controversial proposal to attach it’s agreeing to targets to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to major concessions from the developing countries. The European Union put forward a proposal that would drastically have reduced its greenhouse gas emissions without seeking developing country concessions (Nature, 1997: 205).
In analysing developing and developed states positions’ at the start of the Conference, their stances could be seen to reflect their interests. As Jonathan Weiner, an economist at Duke University argues, climate change is a difficult issue for the United States “because the benefits are significant, but also are the costs” (Cited in Nature, 1997: 215). While the United States has a vocal scientific community that would look favourably on the Administration taking a lead on global warming, the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions are in excess of any proposed target, and it would face significant costs in reducing them. However, other developed states such as Germany or Britain would have benefited from any agreement to drastically reduce emissions due to the fact that they faced small costs as a result of reducing their emissions since 1990. In analysing the Group of 77 position at the start of the Conference, they represented an uneasy coalition. This was due to the fact that the oil states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela would have preferred a weak agreement that would not have harmed their oil sales. At the opposite end, small island states such as Bangladesh would have preferred a strong agreement, as climate change posed a serious threat to their existence. In the middle lay states such as China and India who would have resisted any agreement that adversely impacted on their development prospects. However the Group of 77 remained united in their opposition to the United States’ proposal for developing country commitments (Nature, 1997: 216).

Within the negotiations within the Kyoto climate convention, a significant development was the new position adopted by the developed states after 10 days of complex and contentious negotiations resulting in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol by 160 countries. This is witnessed in Annex 1 of the Kyoto agreement, in which the OECD states and former Eastern bloc states agreed to cut their output of climate changing gases by 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels between the years of 2008 and 20012. The achievement of the Kyoto pact was the result of an intensive 48 hour negotiating session that which resulted in Vice President Al Gore announcing that his government would move from its initial hard line position, which had stalled the talks up till that point. Under the agreement, the European Union, which called for a 15 percent cut, agreed to an 8 percent cut. The United States, which wanted to stabilise emissions at the 1990 level, agreed to a 7 percent cut Environmental News Network. URL: http://www.enn.com/enn-features-archive/1998/03/032698/wwatch.asp [16 July 1999]

The significance of the Kyoto Protocol, therefore, within the evolving issue of climate change is that it represented the first significant step by the developed states to take the lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. The position adopted by the developed states, therefore addresses concerns of the G77 and the NAM that the developed states have to accept primary responsibility for climate change and therefore have to bear most of the
burdens of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Nature, 1997: 216). This positive development however has been overshadowed by the intransigent position of the United States with regard to developing country participation in the Protocol. The issue of developing country participation was brought onto the agenda as a result of the announcement of the United States Senate that it would not ratify the Protocol unless it contained significant developing state commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. As a result the United States found that its proposal being attacked by China, India and a number of other developing and non-aligned states in the early hours of the meeting’s final morning. Attempts to soften the proposals’ harsh language did not succeed, and the United States’ proposal was deleted from the text, but it was noted that these discussions could continue at the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to be held in Buenos Aires in December 1998. As a result several members of the United States’ Congress declared the Protocol “dead on arrival” Environment News Network. URL: www.enn.com/enn-features-archive/1998/03/032698/wwatch.asp [16 July 1999].

The United States has consequently announced that it will not submit the treaty for ratification, which begins in March 1998, until it contains “meaningful developing country participation” Cited in Climate Alert. URL: www.climate.org/Climate_Alert/articles/10.6/Kyoto_Meeting.html [17 July 1999].

However, while the United States’ position constitutes an important stumbling block to gaining developing state participation, the Kyoto Protocol does provide some incentives to encourage developing and non-aligned state participation. However as it has been argued above, any global agreement that aims to encourage developing state participation, has to take into account the disparate interests of non-aligned and developing state interests. At one end of the spectrum are the poor states, for whom the costs of reducing their emissions are low, but so have been the benefits. An incentive to encourage these states to accede to the Protocol would be the concept of joint implementation Joint implementation has been a concept used by economists to describe projects carried out by developed states within developing states. An example of such a scheme would be the United States helping to construct a hydro-electric dam in Guatemala rather than raising taxes to meet environmental obligations (Nature, 1997: 219).

It is important to note however, that at the start of the Conference, the United States was opposed to the concept of joint implementation on two grounds. The first objection of the United States was based on the condition that the participation of the United States in a programme of joint implementation was contingent on developing state participation. The
second objection of the United States was that it did not provide incentives for developing states to participate in the programme, through enabling developed states to get credit against their own emissions (Nature, 1997: 219). However, joint implementation emerged within the Kyoto Protocol as one of the flexibility mechanisms to enable developed states to reach their emissions targets, as reflected in Article 12 of the Protocol IISDnet. URL: www.11sd1.11sd.ca/trade/fccc.html [19 July 1999]80. The joint implementation programme, as spelled out in Article 12 of the Protocol, does address the United States’ objections and includes incentives for developed state participation. This is seen in that the Article states that the programme will offer credits to developed states that contribute to projects in other developed states, including states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union ENN News. URL: www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/1999/05/051/799/rulebook_3233.asp [18 July 1999]76.

Extending programmes of joint implementation, which at present only involve the developed states, to include the developing states, faces two obstacles. The first obstacle remains the United States’ position on developing state participation. The second obstacle remains developing states’ concerns that participation within these programmes would imply that they were accepting caps on their emissions. However, in an incentive to encourage developing state participation and allow developed states more flexibility in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, programmes of joint implementation have been extended include developing states through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The Clean Development Mechanism has emerged from the Kyoto Convention as one of the promising mechanisms to encourage developed and developing state participation Global Change. URL: www.globalchange.org/moderall/98oct13.htm [19 July 1999]77. In terms of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism outlines means for developed states, specifically developed state businesses, to gain emissions credits for investing in emissions-reducing projects, such as fuel efficient power plants, in developing states IISDNet. URL: www.11sd1.11sd.ca/trade/fccc.htm [17 July 1999]80.

While the Clean Development Mechanism may prove to be a vehicle to encourage the participation of the poorest states of the developing world, the Kyoto Protocol also had to provide incentives to encourage the participation of the larger and more affluent developing states, such as India and Australia. This is due to the fact that these states would have faced high compliance costs and very little domestic political benefit from agreeing to tough measures. The Kyoto Protocol therefore allows certain states to maintain stable emissions and allows three states namely Australia, Norway and Iceland to increase their emissions. According to the Kyoto agreement, Australia is allowed to increase its emissions by 8 percent.
As it has been argued above, the issue of climate change is an evolving issue on the international agenda. While the United States has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton Administration has attempted to postpone, until 2001, the completion of an agreement to implement the Kyoto Protocol, in order to give negotiators time to develop complex compliance mechanisms to implement the Protocol. As U.S. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Frank Loy has stated, major action on climate change will be difficult in the run up to the November 2000 Presidential election in the United States. Should the delay be accepted, the final say on any climate agreement would be either Vice President AL Gore, who is the most enthusiastic supporter of the agreement, or Texas Governor George W Bush. While Bush has stated that the science does not support the treaty, Environmental Defence Fund Chief Frank Krupp met with Bush, and stated that he was “impressed that Bush was open minded on the issue” Cited in Greenwire. URL: www.epa.gov/globalwarming/news/greenwire/a061499_2.html [19 July 1999]78.

With reference to the Clean Development Mechanism, the specifics have of the fund, which includes mechanisms to ensure that reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are in excess of what would have normally occurred, have yet to be specified. Furthermore, the Clean Development Mechanism has to become more than textual concept, which means that projects have to be put on the ground to ensure real reductions, and the industrial states have to implement their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol ENN News. URL: www.enn.com/enn-features-archive/1998/03/032698/wwatch.asp [19 July 1999]76. Furthermore, larger developing states such as India have yet to sign Kyoto Protocol. In talks in Bonn in June 1999, there was talk of creating a separate protocol for developing states, using indicators such as carbon intensity, which refers to carbon emissions per unit of GDP, rather than other wider measures of greenhouse gases. Argentina, which has been an ally of the United States, has states that it is interested in the idea Greenwire. URL: www.epa.gov/globalwarming/news/greenwire/a061199_1.html [19 July 1999]79.

It can be noted, therefore, that the issue of climate change does appear to provide some scope, at present and consequently in the future, for non-aligned middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South.
Conclusion

An important feature of the post-Cold War international system has been the increasing prominence of global environmental issues on the global agenda. A characteristic feature of global environmental issues such as the protection of the ozone layer and controlling climate change is that they are international commons issues. This consequently means that they share a characteristic with public goods whereby actors that use the resource cannot be excluded from their use. However they also share a common characteristic with private goods in that over-use results generates a declining yield. Therefore global environmental commons issues such as protecting the ozone layer and controlling climate change can be seen to correspond to the feature of complex interdependence. As commons issues that are used by all actors, there is a long-term common interest on the part of all actors to protect the resource. However actors have an incentive to pursue their own short-term interests in the absence of a guarantee that other actors would employ similar self-restraint. Within international commons issues therefore, there is a need for actors to agree on a collaborative policy where they agree not to pursue certain behaviours and to give the regime power to mediate conflicts. Therefore a significant characteristic with regard to negotiations to create regimes with regard to global environmental commons issues is that they have to operate by a consensus rule that proves to satisfy as many interests as possible. Examining the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol that enabled the larger developing states such as India and China to participate in the regime, can substantiate this point.

In attempting to satisfy subordinate interests, structural theories have focused on the role of a hegemonic power in playing such a role. Structural theories that have focused on the role of a hegemonic power in the creation of regimes, have focused on the role of hegemonic powers in using their coercive resources or greater leverage to bring other actors into regimes. However structural theories that focus on the role of a hegemonic power are inadequate to explain regime creation with respect to global environmental commons issues. This is due to the fact that in situations of complex interdependence, state interests are not hierarchical. This was witnessed in the United States’ decision to change its stance at the London Conference to the parties of the Montreal Protocol. While a hegemonic state may play a lead role in bringing an issue onto the international agenda, a hegemonic role entails satisfying subordinate interests, a role that the United States has not been able to play, either within the issue of ozone depletion or climate change.

In charting the evolution of the NAM’s position towards global environmental commons issues, a significant feature has been the increasing participation of the NAM within
international institutions to manage environmental commons issues. This is seen in the NAM’s hostility towards environmental issues at the Stockholm Conference and its greater participation within negotiations within the Montreal Protocol and the London Conference of Parties to the Montreal Protocol. The NAM’s participation within international institutions to manage environmental commons issues however has to address non-aligned states’ interests with regard to development, due to the fact that non-aligned states face environmental problems that are particularistic to developing states, such as the problems of desertification and the need for clean water. Non-aligned states’ participation in managing global environmental commons problems has to be contingent on the extent to which these issues enable non-aligned, states to engage in linkage politics, thereby enabling them to link their development concerns with the interests of the developed states to preserve the environment.

The issue of ozone depletion, within which an established regime exists, provides an example of how the non-aligned states can engage in linkage politics with regard to environmental commons issues. At the Montreal Conference, the industrialised states did not address issues of concern to the non-aligned states such as burden sharing and technology transfer. However, due to the increasing prominence of the issue of ozone depletion on the international agenda, and the consequent realisation on the part of northern states that the issue significantly impacted on their interests, there was a greater realisation that the regime needed to be strengthened. This meant gaining the support of the larger developing states, such as India and China, whose absence would have rendered the regime as ineffective. The London Conference was therefore characterised by the adoption of specific voting procedures that enabled India and China to sign the Protocol.

In examining the relevance to the Non-Aligned Movement of its greater participation within the issue of climate change, the insights gained by examining the issue of ozone depletion is instructive. In positing a role for non-aligned middle powers within the issue of climate change, within which no regime currently exists and is consequently an evolving issue on the international agenda, the insights gained by examining the negotiations within the issue of ozone change is relevant. As the negotiations within the issue of ozone change illustrated, state interests are not constant within issues that approximate the feature of complex interdependence. This was witnessed in the changing position of the United States with regard to gaining developing state participation within the issue of ozone depletion. In employing this insight in examining the issue of climate change, it can be noted that in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the United States was not willing to accept quantifiable targets to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. However, at the third meeting of the Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, or Kyoto Climate Convention, the United States altered its initial hard line position which resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol by 160 states. The Kyoto protocol represents an important milestone in the evolution of the issue of climate change, due to the fact that it signified a realisation on the part of the developed states that they had to take the lead with regard to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.

While the Kyoto Protocol provides a foundation, on which a regime in the issue of climate change can be constructed, the issue of climate change is still an evolving issue on the international agenda. However, two obstacles currently exist that would impede the extension of a climate change regime to include developing and non-aligned states. The first obstacle remains the United States’ position that it will not ratify the treaty unless developing states agree to significant commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The second obstacle to extending such a regime would be the fact that any regime would have to satisfy the divergent interests of developing and non-aligned states.

In charting the evolution of the issue of climate change, there does appear to be some scope for non-aligned middle powers to bridge the divide between North and South within this evolving issue. The Clean Development Mechanism has emerged from the Kyoto Protocol as a promising mechanism to encourage developing and developed state co-operation, the specifics of which have yet to be outlined. In encouraging the participation of the other larger, developing countries, such as India, talks in Bonn in June 1999 in the lead up to the fifth meeting of the Parties to the Framework Convention have proposed creating a separate Protocol for developing states. While the United States has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it is attempting to postpone an agreement on climate change until 2001, which has indicated a strong desire on the part of the United States Administration to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. While the development of a regime within the issue of climate change is still in its infancy, present conditions indicate that bridging the divide between North and South within this issue is not insurmountable.

As the emergence of global environmental issues has shown, there exists a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a leadership role in the absence of American leadership. As this leadership is highly issue specific, whether a role exists for middle powers to play a co-operation facilitation role within the global economy needs to be more carefully examined. This would indicate whether a scope exists for non-aligned middle powers to mediate between economic conflicts between the major powers and the relevance this would have for the NAM.
CHAPTER 5

5. The maintenance of open global trade in an era of declining American leadership: A role for non-aligned middle powers in the post-cold War era

5.1 Introduction

The increasing tendency of developing and non-aligned states to engage in liberalising their trade policies has been a significant feature of a global world economy. This has been in response to the increasing neo-liberal pressures on developing and non-aligned states to adopt market reforms and to adopt export led growth strategies. These neo-liberal pressures have come from two avenues, firstly from international institutions such as the GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This has been seen in the impact of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes which have prescribed those heavily indebted states open their economies and adopt export led growth strategies to meet their debt obligations. The second has come from the impact that neo-liberal ideas have had on policymakers in developing and non-aligned states wherein the adoption of export led growth strategies has become the only developmental pathway open to non-aligned states. This has been as a result of the impact that the export led growth of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC’s) has had on development thinking in developing states. However for the majority of non-aligned states, export led growth has meant or includes an increase in their agricultural exports. This is due to the fact that agricultural trade remains the major generator of trade income for the majority of non-aligned states.

This has consequently meant that the non-aligned states have increasingly affirmed their support for the GATT/WTO regime, due to the fact that a collapse of the WTO regime would result in non-aligned states’ economies being the worst affected. This is despite the fact that the trade barriers of developed states against unprocessed commodities from developing states have traditionally been low and have normally been erected against commodities that threaten the agricultural sectors of developed states. This is due to the fact that, despite its inequities, the WTO regime remains the only institutional construct preventing world trade from resembling the laws of the jungle, where only the mightiest survive. Despite the costs that liberalisation would have on their agricultural sectors, non-aligned states have been increasingly forced to open their agricultural sectors under WTO rules (Martin and Winters, 1995: 17).
Increasing non-aligned support for the WTO regime however is occurring in an environment characterised by increasing protectionism on the part of the major economic powers and an increasing tendency on their part to ignore WTO rules. While this has had adverse effects on non-aligned states, it has also had wider implications for Western economic growth. This can be attributed to the declining willingness of the United States to play a leadership role in the global economy, and an unwillingness on the part of the other major economic powers such as Japan and the EU to substitute for the decline in American leadership. Where the United States has failed to play a leadership role and instead has attempted to use its economic power to further its own short-term commercial interests, this has stimulated greater protectionism within the global economy. While institutions such as the WTO can play a leadership role in maintaining co-operation in the presence of declining hegemony, leadership remains a necessary factor in fostering co-operation. Where the major powers have tried to deal with their conflicts bilaterally, outside the scope of the WTO, this has resulted in the interests of the non-aligned states being adversely affected, such as the agricultural trade conflicts between the U.S. and the E.U. in the 1980’s.

As it has been argued, the declining willingness of the United States to play a leadership role has provided a space for non-aligned middle powers to play alternate leadership roles within international institutions in specific issue areas. These issue areas have included United Nations peacekeeping operations and environmental commons issues. The third issue that needs to be investigated is whether the decline of America’s hegemonic role in maintaining a liberal global trading regime has provided a scope for other actors, namely middle powers, to play alternate leadership roles in strengthening the GATT/WTO regime in issue specific areas.

It shall therefore be argued that the increasing trade conflicts amongst the major economic powers, has provided a scope for other actors to play a bridge building role within international institutions in strengthening the global trading system in issue specific areas. This has meant that there is a space for new forms of multilateral co-operation between middle powers across the North-South divide, acting in accordance with their interests, in providing new forms of leadership in addressing non-aligned states’ interests of maintaining an open global trading system in issue specific areas. In substantiating this statement it needs to be noted that it is the issue in question that will determine whether there is a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a leadership role in strengthening the global trading system. This will in turn determine the relevance to the NAM as a whole of middle powers playing such a role.
In examining the role of the Cairns Group and the role it played in placing agricultural issues as an important issue on the Uruguay Round agenda, it was significant that the group represented a multilateral coalition of states from across the North-South divide. Although the group consisted of a heterogeneous group of states with differing priorities, the Group managed to maintain its unity due to the fact that the Group perceived that bringing agricultural issues into the GATT was in its long-term interest. Had the Group not maintained its unity, it would not have been possible for non-aligned states to prevent the U.S. and the EC from cutting a deal without considering the concerns of non-aligned and developing states. In tracing the bridge building or mediating role that the Group played between the U.S and the E.C, it is significant to note that the Montreal deadlock was achieved through the Cairns Group pressurising both the EC and the U.S. to soften their previously hard line stances. While the Group’s influence waned after that, it’s most significant achievement was to make the U.S. and the EC recognise the concerns of non-aligned and developing states. This consequently prevented the U.S. and the EC from cutting a deal between themselves over the heads of the non-aligned states, at least in the early stages of the Uruguay Round.

The role of the Cairns Group thereby illustrated that there is a scope for middle powers to play alternate forms of leadership roles within international institutions, in the presence of declining American leadership in the global economy, in issue specific areas.

5.2. The NAM and the NIEO strategy during the Cold War era

A significant feature of an evolving post-cold War international system has been the increasing emergence of a global world economy of trade, finance and production. As Sachs argues, the buzzword of “Globalisation” has emerged to describe a global economy in which economies, that were once relatively isolated from one another in terms of transport costs and other barriers to trade and finance, have increasing become linked in an ever increasing web of economic transactions. A significant feature of this emerging global world economy is the increasing drawing of developing countries into the capitalist world economy, not as colonial dependencies but as market participants (Sachs, 1998: 98).

In identifying the pressures that this new global economy is exerting on non-aligned and developing states thereby forcing them to open their economies to international trade, two identifiable pressures to engage in trade liberalisation can be discerned. The first concerns the role that international institutions have played in forcing developing countries to open their economies, specifically the neo-liberal policy prescriptions of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes in heavily indebted countries in Africa and Latin America (Gill,
The second concerns the role that neo-liberal ideas have exerted on policymakers in both developing and developed states. Miller has termed this hegemonic ideology “the power of values”, whereby she argues that in addition to structural pressures which influence policymakers, perceptions or ideas that policymakers carry in their heads, for example the role of the state in the economy, are important determinants of policymakers’ behaviour. As Rodrik argues, the increased importance of trade to almost every economy has meant that the policy options open to policymakers has decreased considerably, with the result that the need to maintain “international competitiveness” has emerged as a policy prescription. This has meant that in addition to neo-liberal pressures from international institutions, developing countries are of their own accord opening up their economies and joining regimes such as the GATT (1997:23). This has been due to the fact that, as Sachs argues, the developing countries that have achieved the greatest growth in the past two decades have been those countries that have generated export led growth, particularly in labour-intensive manufactured goods. This is seen in the observation that of the most heavily indebted countries in the period from 1981 to 1992, ten were located in South America. However, developing countries in Latin America in the 1990’s are increasingly competing with one another in liberalising trade and deregulating their economies (Rodrik, 1997: 23).

In examining the evolving position of the NAM with regard to its concern with improving the developmental prospects of developing states, it is significant to note that its position on economic issues has shifted in response to changing systemic pressures faced by developing states within a global economy. This has meant that the NAM has moved from a position of advocating greater management of the global economy, to a recognition of the neo-liberal pressures faced by developing states within a global world economy (Gill, 1997: 69). In examining the relevance of an open global trading system for non-aligned states in light of their increasing integration into the global economy, outlining the changing agenda of the NAM which has shifted to reflect the twin neo-liberal pressures faced by non-aligned states, needs to be outlined. This will provide a context for examining the relevance to the NAM of non-aligned middle powers playing a leadership role in facilitating more open global trade, in the presence of declining American willingness to play the leadership role that it played during the Cold War era.

In charting the evolution of the NAM’s position on economic issues, it is important to note that developmental and economic growth issues has been a priority on the agenda of the Movement almost since its inception. This is seen in that in a summit preceding the Second Conference of Heads of State of Non-aligned Countries, held in Cairo from October 5 to 10, 1964, that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was
established and the Group of 77 of developing states was formed. This process was carried through into the Third Conference of Heads of State, held in Lusaka from September 8 to 10, 1970, wherein the non-aligned states adopted an Economic Declaration (Srivastava, 1995:16).

It was however at the fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in Algiers from September 5 to 10, 1973, where economic issues came to the forefront of the NAM’s agenda. It was at this summit that the concept of establishing a New International Economic Order (NIEO), an attempt by the Non-Aligned Movement to regulate the global economy that would better address the interests of developing states, was established. In analysing why the NAM pursued the NIEO strategy, it is necessary to trace why the North-South issue had become an issue of contention in the 1970’s. As Rothstein argues, North-South conflicts in international economic relations was not a contentious issue on the global agenda in the 1950’s and 1960’s due the fact that developing states appeared to enjoy rising levels of economic growth and were politically stable. Third world elites were consequently optimistic about the future, due to the existence of a fairly stable global economy, characterised by rising levels of trade and aid (1990: 165).

However, in the 1970’s, a number of factors contributed in making North-South relations a contentious issue in international politics. Tracing the contributing factors that led to the NAM adopting the NIEO strategy requires both a systemic and domestic explanation. With the advent of the 1970’s, developing and non-aligned states increasingly faced tougher domestic problems. The number of poor living near the poverty line appeared to be increasing within developing states, aid flows from the North were decreasing and conventional development strategies, such as import substitution, had failed to achieve the growth rates initially envisaged, particularly within Latin America (Rothstein, 1990: 171).

A contributing factor to the increasing problems faced by developing and non-aligned states, was the advent of a global economic recession. The roots of the recession lay in the combination of a number of factors. These were firstly, the decision of the United States to opt out of the fixed exchange rate system agreed to at Bretton Woods, ushering in the era of flexible exchange rates. A second factor was the apparent failure of Keynesian aggregate demand strategies in combating inflation particularly within the developed states, which adversely affected world trade (Rothstein, 1990: 170). A third contributing factor to the global recession was the OPEC oil rises of the 1970’s, wherein increasing oil prices had a negative effect on global economic growth rates (Ravenhill, 1990: 744).
With the advent of the “OPEC decade”, and the increasing domestic and systemic pressures faced by Non-Aligned states, the temptation amongst leaders of non-aligned states and Third world elites to launch an attack on the global economic system, which paradoxically, provided them with considerable benefits, can be understood. The rise of OPEC seemed to usher in a new era of resource power for the South. This, coupled with the appearance of Northern weakness, indecisiveness and dependence on Third World resources, led to the non-aligned states attempting to increase their bargaining leverage by attempting to achieve greater unity amongst Third World states within the United Nations system (Rothstein, 1990: 165).

The fact that the NIEO strategy has failed is as a result of a number of factors. These were firstly that any attempt to achieve a coalition amongst the diverse membership of the NAM that would accommodate the diverse interests of non-aligned member states, proved to be difficult to achieve. This was witnessed in the unwillingness of the richer developing states to support Third World demands that were inimical to their interests. Secondly, the global economic recession of the 1970’s meant that the international economic environment was not conducive to Northern concessions to Third World demands, and consequently stimulated a Northern counter-mobilisation against the NIEO strategy (Ravenhill, 1990: 744). This was witnessed in the attempts by the Reagan Administration to remove the issue of North-South relations from the international agenda in the 1980’s, following the collapse of the North-South dialogue at the Cancun Summit of 1981. The Reagan Administration’s strategy involved such measures as enhancing the role of private markets, through restarting the Overseas Investment Corporation as well as interacting with developing states on a more bilateral basis. This strategy involved attempting to shift the focus of multilateral negotiations from the U.N. and UNCTAD to conservative financial institutions such as the IMF (Livingston, 1992: 323).

The Reagan Administration’s strategy was aided by a global economic recession in the early 1980’s. This consequently strengthened the arguments of neo-classical economists who argued that regulation and statism were to blame for the recession. Furthermore, economic ministries came to power in developing countries that were sceptical of the North-South dialogue (Livingston, 1992: 323). In tracing the effects of both these systemic and domestic pressures on the stance of the NAM, it is significant to note that the 1970’s came to represent an increased radicalisation of the Movement. This increased radicalisation of the Movement was led by Cuba, who argued that the Soviet Union was an ally of the Third World, as opposed to the policy of non-alignment which stressed the “equidistance” of the non-aligned from both military blocks. However with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the position of
Cuba as a leader of the radical minority within the Movement was considerably weakened. The radicalisation of the NAM until the middle of the 1980’s was reflected in the documents of NAM Summits, which were characterised by anti-imperialist condemnations of the United States. However the Delhi Summit, held in 1983, and the Harare Summit of 1986, reflected a more moderate stance of the NAM towards the United States, reflecting in part the neo-liberal pressures that were being faced by non-aligned states (Jevremovic, 1996: 292).

In tracing the evolution of the economic agenda of the NAM, it is therefore significant to note that the shifting stance of the NAM has mirrored changing systemic conditions within a global world economy. In charting the neo-liberal pressures that this global world economy is exerting on non-aligned states, this primarily taken two forms. The first has occurred in the realm of ideas, in which adherence to free market principles have emerged as the only developmental pathway available to developing states in order to compete in an increasingly competitive global economy (Rodrik, 1997: 23). The second has occurred in the context of what Gill has termed the “G-7 nexus”, which refers to a constellation of both governmental and private sector actors, who wielded an increasing influence in the 1980’s, in both debt strategy and the management of international finance. This was evident in that the coordination of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes with G-7 directives (1997: 8).

In light of the increasing integration of developing and non-aligned states into the global economy, issues of whether the international trading environment faced by non-aligned states is in aggregate more open or more protectionist, has come to be of increasing significance to developing states. It is in examining this contention in greater depth that will provide a rationale for the relevance to the NAM of non-aligned middle powers playing a leadership role in maintaining greater openness in international trade. This consequently requires an examination of the broad systemic conditions within the global economy that will enable non-aligned middle powers to play such a role.

5.3 Declining American leadership within a post-cold War global economy: a scope for non-aligned middle powers to play a leadership role in a post-hegemonic global economy

The increasing integration of developing states into a global world economy, is witnessed in the increasing number of developing states that have sought membership of the GATT / WTO. This approach by developing and non-aligned states can be contrasted with the previous approach of developing states towards the GATT, which was viewed with hostility and was perceived as an elitist institution that reflected the interests of the Northern
industrialised states. This was witnessed in greater developing state participation within the Uruguay Round, as opposed to their greater non-participation within either the Kennedy or Tokyo Rounds (Watkins, 1992: 33). The greater willingness of the developing and non-aligned states to open their economies to international trade, is seen in the increase in tariff bindings in developing states, in both areas of manufacturing and agriculture (Martin and Winters, 1995: 2).

However, developing and non-aligned states are increasingly deregulating their economies and pursuing export-led growth strategies within an international economic environment increasingly characterised by trade conflicts among the major economic powers. This trend towards greater protectionism amongst the major economic powers was stimulated by an economic recession experienced by industrialised states in the early 1990’s. This was exemplified in the Japanese-American auto dispute of the early 1990’s and the faltering G-7 trade talks over farm subsidies in 1992 (Murray, 1992: 164). Whilst the American economy has achieved higher growth rates in the latter part of the 1990’s, growing unemployment and lagging technological capabilities as well as a pre-occupation with the problems of European integration has mirrored growing economic nationalism in Europe (Garten, 1995: 60). In addition to this, the Japanese economy has been in recession since 1992, making the Japanese increasingly focused on domestic concerns and less able to play a leadership role in the global economy (Garten, 1995: 162).

Many have therefore looked to the United States to play the leadership role that it has traditionally played in maintaining Western economic growth during the Cold War era. As Garten (1995) argues, GATT negotiations prior to 1990 were designed to keep the West prosperous in the face of the Soviet threat, in addition to the economic advantages of expanded trade. During this period, the United States led every round of trade liberalisation within GATT, by providing the political ideas and using its economic power to conclude negotiations (1995: 51). However the United States has increasingly indicated that it is not willing to play a leadership role, that it has traditionally played, in the post-cold War global economy.

The primary rationale to account for the increasing economic nationalism of the United States can be traced to the influence of two factors, namely the impact of globalisation on the American economy, and its associated costs and vulnerabilities. The second is a perception, in the American administration, that the protectionist practices of the other major economic powers are adversely affecting American economic interests (Garten, 1995: 53). As Rodrik argues, a review of the leading opinion publications in the United States, would reveal that a
perception exists that much of the declining fortunes of low skilled American workers are as a result of low wage competition from abroad. However as Rodrik points out, this view is a simplistic one as it ignores other factors, such as technological change and de-unionisation that have accounted for the increasing wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers (1997: 20). However this sentiment is echoed in the American Congress, which maintains overall responsibility for trade as opposed to other countries where the executive branch controls trade policy (Garten, 1995: 61). As a result of the relative openness of the American market, American firms are increasingly being faced with the costs of free trade. This led Lee Iacocca, the president of the Chrysler Corporation to state in 1983 that “because the United States government clings to free trade rules, America lacks a trade policy responsive to the new realities of international competition” (Cited in Kegley, Jr and Wittkopf, 1993: 246).

As a result of this, the United States has increasingly indicated that it is not prepared to bear the costs of leadership. As Mastanduno states “once a hegemonic power’s relative power declines, it will be less willing to accept “free riding” by its allies that works to its relative economic disadvantage. As military threats diminish…. the hegemonic state will be less inclined to subordinate its economic interests to the pursuit of political solidarity with the alliance.” This “results in a dominant state to act more as an ordinary country” and to strive for relative economic advantage with its allies “(Cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 217). The United States has increasingly indicated that supports the strengthening of the multilateral trading system. This, however, is not because it views open trade as a mechanism to prevent the “beggar thy neighbour policies” that were viewed by American policymakers as a cause of the Second World War, but because it is increasingly in its commercial interest to do so. This has meant that the United States has been increasingly willing to close its markets in retaliation to what it views as the unfair trade practices of other states. This is highlighted for example in Section 301 of the United States’ trade law, which permits the United States to retaliate against closed markets when negotiations prove unsuccessful (Garten, 1995: 54).

The increasing tendency of the United States to close off its markets against countries that run persistent trade surpluses against itself, has proved worrisome to the larger developing states such as the East Asian newly industrialising countries (NIC’s). The United States has increasingly taken aim at the protected markets of its trade competitors, such as South Korea and Japan. This however, sharply contrasts with the role that the United States played in the development of the NIC’s, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, during the Cold War era. That the development of the NIC’s was seen to be in America’s interests, is seen in the fact that with the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States became increasingly involved in Taiwanese and South Korean affairs. This led to the two countries receiving huge amounts of
U.S. aid and military assistance during the period from 1953 to 1958, which amounted to nearly 15 percent of Korean gross national product. This enabled the United States to pressurise both governments to liberalise their economies and pursue export led growth strategies in the expansionary international climate of the 1970’s, the OPEC oil rises and other factors notwithstanding (Koo, 1987: 167). The increasingly protectionist stance of the United States in the post-cold War era, however, strikes at the heart of the central principle that upheld the multilateral trading regime in the Cold War era. This is namely the principle of non-discrimination and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment that underpinned Western economic growth. This also further illustrates the point that the United States is increasingly unwilling to play the hegemonic leadership role, that it played in keeping its markets relatively open during the Cold War era (Ruggie, 1992: 569).

The increasingly inward orientation of the United States, and an unwillingness on the part of the other major economic powers to substitute for declining American hegemony within the international economy, consequently pose a serious obstacle to maintaining a stable liberal trading regime amongst the industrialised states. However authors such as Garten have argued that the increased tendency of the United States to engage in bilateral trade negotiations does not pose a serious threat to the stability of the multilateral trading regime. This is due to the fact that whilst Japan and the United States negotiated a bilateral agreement with regard to a greater liberalisation of the Japanese auto industry, the results were open to the E.U. and all other states, in effect the results were multilateralised (1995: 56). This argument would seem to be valid in that negotiations within the GATT were mostly bilateral in nature, conducted amongst the major economic powers, with the results being multilateralised via the most favoured nation treatment (Ruggie, 1992: 569). This argument however fails to note the fact that whilst the United States still has the largest economy in the world, and consequently the largest market, it does not have the leverage that it possessed in the Cold War era. Whilst the American market remains the principal market in maintaining Western economic growth, it cannot expect the other major economic powers to simply toe the line. This was exemplified in the trade disagreements among G-7 foreign ministers of the G-7 over farm subsidies at the Munich Summit of the G-7 in 1991 (Murray, 1992: 164).

In arguing that there is an absence of American leadership within the post-cold War global economy, the question that needs to be asked is of what relevance this is to the developing and non-aligned states. After all, the vast majority of non-aligned states have traditionally been cut off from the benefits of American leadership within the Cold War global economy. This has been primarily the result of two factors. The first reason has been that prior to the Uruguay Round of G.A.T.T, tariff-cutting negotiations were conducted in areas of relatively
less concern to developing states. Secondly due to the fact that a large proportion of non-aligned states are largely primary commodity exporting states, trade barriers against unprocessed products such as unprocessed coffee have been limited. Where preferential treatment has been awarded to developing states, such as the Lome Conventions or the US’ Caribbean Basin Initiative, quotas are levied on goods such as sugar which compete with those covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the E.U (Watkins, 1992: 35). However as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue, middle powers such as Australia and Canada have increasingly recognised that the impact of instability within the global trading regime is felt most acutely by the middle-sized states. This has meant that attempts by the major economic powers to resolve the economic conflicts between them bilaterally, such as the U.S and E.U. engaging in a subsidy war over agricultural products, have often led to the interests of smaller states being adversely affected. This is even more the case for the least developed or developing states, which are unable to influence bilateral dealings amongst the major powers (1993: 5).

With the maintenance of a stable global trading regime increasing being in the interests of non-aligned and developing states, examining the possibilities of new forms of leadership that will be able to fill the vacuum left by declining American hegemony, has become of increasing importance to non-aligned states. Theorists, such as Keohane have argued that institutions can fill the void left by declining hegemonic leadership due to the point that even powerful states have an interest in following the rules of established international institutions. This is due to the point that institutions reduce “transaction costs”, in that they reduce the costs of making and enforcing agreements (1998: 86). However as Keohane further argues, international institutions can be differentiated according to their effectiveness, with strong organisations such as the European Union existing alongside less effective institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity (1998: 83).

However this argument does not take account of the fact that powerful states can ignore institutional constraints when it is in their interests to do so. This is seen in the point made by Conklin that while the World Trade Organisation has strengthened the institutionalisation of the GATT, it is still a relatively new international organisation. This means that the actual meaning of the institutional arrangements contained in the agreement, still have to be determined in practice. While new institutional arrangements such as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism within the WTO have been strengthened, the United States has threatened to pull out of the WTO should it receive three unfavourable rulings within five years. Whether or not the United States actually enforces this decision, this does not bode well for the future of the multilateral trade system (Conklin, 1996: 396).
However, whatever the limitations of institutions such as the W.T.O/ GATT, it is important to note that these institutions remain the primary institutional constructs regulating global trade. While institutions may matter to powerful states, they are, as it has been argued, increasingly important to developing states. This means that a greater examination of the question of whether a scope exists for non-aligned middle powers to play alternate forms of leadership in international institutions such as the GATT/ WTO in mitigating conflict between the major economic powers has become of increasing significance to the N.A.M. This point applies to middle powers that rely on institutions to enhance their influence. As Hendrikson argues, membership, participation and leadership within international institutions can provide middle powers with the bargaining leverage which they may otherwise not possess (1997: 49).

As Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue, however, middle power leadership is highly dependent on the issue concerned. This essentially means two things. This means, firstly, that there has to be a willingness on the part of the major economic powers to resolve the issue concerned at a multilateral or institutional level, and that they are willing to take the viewpoints of less powerful states into consideration (1993: 7). Secondly, it needs to be noted that the issue concerned will determine it’s relevance to the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole, of non-aligned middle powers playing a leadership role in maintaining an open global trading system. After all, developed and developing states represent divergent interests within institutions such as the WTO. This means that while issues such as services and the protection of intellectual property rights are increasingly important to Northern states, especially the United States, developing and non-aligned states have a greater interest in reducing Northern barriers against Southern manufactured goods and agricultural exports (Kahler, 1992: 697). As a result, examining the possibilities that exist for new coalitions of middle powers to play a bridge building role between the major economic powers, in issues of relevance to the non-aligned states has become of increasing importance to the non-aligned states. This was evident in disagreements between the major economic powers in bringing agricultural issues into the GATT in the Uruguay Round. This requires examining in greater depth the role of the Cairns Group of Fair Traders, as a novel multilateral coalition of middle powers across the North-South divide, in bridging the divide between the United States and the European Union within agricultural negotiations within the Uruguay Round (Kahler, 1992: 697). Substantiating this assertion, however, requires a more detailed examination of why bringing agricultural issues under the ambit of the WTO is in the interests of the NAM.
5.4. The maintenance of more stable and open global agricultural trade: what relevance for non-aligned middle powers and the Non-Aligned Movement

In examining the contention that the maintenance of stable global agricultural trade bound by WTO rules is in the interests of the non-aligned states, it is significant to note that, firstly, the Non-Aligned Movement consists of a variety of states at varying levels of development. These are namely, the larger developing states, which could be classified as middle powers according to their capabilities, the newly industrialising states of Southeast Asia, and the least developed states (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: xiv). However, it needs to be noted that despite the diversity of membership of the NAM, the non-aligned states in aggregate would be the worst affected should the GATT system collapse for a number of reasons. These are firstly that, as the least powerful actors within the international trading regime, non-aligned and developing states would have limited retaliatory powers at their disposal. Secondly, their export dependence on Northern markets make them extremely vulnerable to increased Northern protectionism against Southern goods that a collapse of the GATT system would bring (Watkins, 1992: 3).

The liberalisation of their trade policies are, however, likely to result in non-aligned states bearing greater costs, due to an expansion in the volume of imports and the exposure of domestic sectors to foreign competition that liberalisation would bring. In contrast, developing states have increasingly voiced their support for a strengthening of the global trading regime. In substantiating this point, it is significant to note that whilst the launching of the Uruguay Round was initiated primarily by the United States, the smaller trading powers also played a role in launching the new Round. In launching the Round, the United States sought to bring issues such as services and intellectual property rights into the GATT regime, which signified a desire by the industrialised states to bring developing states into the GATT regime. The launching of a new round was opposed by some larger developing states, such as the G-10 led by India and Brazil, due to the fact that issues of interest to them such as safeguards and textile restrictions still remained on the old agenda. However a second group of developing states, articulated an alternative position in supporting a draft declaration proposed by smaller industrialised states or middle powers such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and five members of the European Free Trade Association. This group of developing countries rose to fifty in number and included significant and potential developing state middle powers such as Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand and Venezuela. In endorsing this text, a large number of developing states had defined their interests in strengthening the multilateral trading system (Kahler, 1992: 698).
Examining the contention that bringing the issue of global agricultural trade under GATT/WTO rules is in the interest of middle powers from both North and South demands closer inspection. In substantiating this point, it is significant that traditional Northern middle powers, such as Australia and Canada which are both members of the OECD, are characterised by being mainly, but not exclusively, commodity dependent economies. In examining the composition of the Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations, it is significant to note that the Group was heterogeneous in composition, consisting of fourteen states with different levels of development and different political systems. The Group consisted of northern middle powers such as Australia and Canada, as well as other traditional middle powers, based on their economic capabilities and diplomatic stature, such as Argentina, Brazil, Hungary and Indonesia. The Group also consisted of states, not normally thought of as middle powers, such as Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Malaysia and the Philippines. Despite this however, the group displayed a strong commonality of interest within the Uruguay Round in reforming global agricultural trade. In particular, the members of the Group displayed similarities in the structure of their economies. Each member had a highly competitive agricultural export sector with agricultural exports as a percentage of total exports ranging from 18 percent for Canada to 73 percent for Argentina. Further the Cairns Group states played a significant role in world agricultural markets, accounting for 21 percent of the world’s sugar and honey as well as 92 percent of the world’s vegetable oils (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 60).

In addition to middle powers and the larger developing states, agricultural trade remains the principal generator of foreign trade income for the majority of non-aligned and developing states. In illustrating this fact, it is significant to note that four countries, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong account for a third of the manufacturing exports of developing states, with another 17 accounting for a further half. This is especially the case for Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), where almost half of all states depend on one or two commodities for their export incomes. Furthermore, trade income from agricultural trade provides developing and non-aligned states with the means of obtaining critical imports and inputs, such as technology, which is required for their industrial development (Watkins, 1992: 10).

In addition, the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank, have typically required developing states to meet their debt repayment obligations through an expansion of their exports, particularly agricultural exports. However the demand for commodities, such as cocoa are relatively inelastic, as seen in the fact that fifteen major cocoa exporting SSA states lost over 3 billion dollars in 1983 due to the fact that oversupply depressed prices to their lowest levels in real terms. However for a large percentage of non-aligned states, expanding
their agricultural exports remains the primary means for them to meet their debt obligations
(Watkins, 1992: 14)\(^8\).

As the previous discussion has indicated, a decline in American leadership along with an
unwillingness on the part of the other major economic powers to play a leadership role within
the global economy, has presented a scope for new forms of leadership in issue specific areas.
Substantiating this contention requires a closer examination of the role of the Cairns Group of
Fair Traders, as a novel multilateral coalition of middle powers, and the leadership role it
played in bridging the divide between the major economic powers in agricultural negotiations
within the Uruguay Round.

5.5. The Cairns Group of Fair Traders and the maintenance of stable global agricultural
trade within the GATT Uruguay Round

In examining the role of the Cairns Group within the Uruguay Round, it is first important to
note the difference between agricultural issues and other issues on the international trading
agenda. The essential difference between agricultural issues and issues such as trade in
manufacturing goods on the global agenda is that prior to the Uruguay Round, agricultural
issues remained outside the GATT framework. This meant that prior to the Uruguay Round,
aricultural issues largely did not enjoy the benefits of American leadership within tariff
reduction rounds within the GATT. This was witnessed in the Tokyo Round wherein the
United States attempted to bring agricultural issues into the GATT, but agricultural issues still
remained outside the GATT framework at the end of the Round (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993:
244)\(^7\). This can be explained due to the difference between agricultural issues and issues such
as services and manufacturing in that agriculture has occupied a central or special position in
the economies of both developed and developing states. This is due to the fact that
agricultural self-reliance has been seen as an important factor symbolising the sovereign
status of both developing and developed states (Martin and Winters, 1995: 14)\(^17\).

However, agricultural issues are similar to other issues such as trade in manufactures and
services, in that they are dependent on the presence of a hegemonic power or willingness on
the part of the other major economic powers to play a leadership role in maintaining a liberal-
trading regime. As a result, when the United States appears unwilling to play a hegemonic
role in maintaining a liberal trading regime, and attempts to use its economic power to further
its own short term commercial interests, it results in increasing protectionism amongst the
other major economic powers. This is especially the case in an emerging multipolar global
economy, wherein the United States no longer has the leverage or preponderant power to
force the other major economic powers to open their markets. This has meant that the other major economic powers, such as the European Union and Japan, whom increasingly are faced with their own internal problems, are increasingly unwilling to accept American attempts at arm twisting. As a result, they increasingly will be willing to protect their markets from import competition (Watkins, 1992: 58).

In relating the above discussion to establishing a context for examining the role of the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round, it is significant to note that a decline in American leadership provided a background or catalyst for agricultural conflicts among the major economic powers in the 1980’s. In stating this, however, it is important to note that the food crisis of 1972 to 1974 was a combination of both natural and political factors. In examining the natural factors that precipitated the crisis, it is important to note that the failure of crops in Asia, Africa, North America and the Soviet Union in the 1970’s were as a result of drought. While these natural disasters constituted the direct shocks that led to the crisis of 1972 to 1974, the causes were also political in nature. The most significant of these political causes was the decision of the Nixon Administration to place an embargo on the export of soybeans from 27 June to 2 July 1973. It was replaced by export controls that were in place throughout the summer. While the embargo could be have been explained by a number of reasons, namely to protect consumers at a time of higher prices, poor crisis management or a capitulation to domestic interests, the results were adverse for global agricultural trade. In particular it induced both Japan and the European Community (EC) to become more protectionist in order to protect their agricultural sectors, whereas previously they had largely relied on the United States for foodstuffs which had allowed them to concentrate more on their economic development (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 55).

This led the European Community to focus on increasing its agricultural production through the maintenance of high internal prices. While this did not appear to have adverse consequences during the 1970’s, by 1986, world stocks of cereals had risen to a record 316 million tons and the prices for cereals, beef and sugar had slumped to their lowest levels since the Great Depression. This led to the United States and the EC increasingly subsiding their farmers in order to protect them from price fluctuations and consequently led to increasing export competition amongst the U.S. and the EC for declining agricultural markets. The first shot in this growing agricultural trade war was the 1985 U.S. Farm Act which reduced internal support prices, and increasing subsidisation by the U.S. government led to the Administration using 18 billion in export subsidies to dispose of wheat, rice, feed-grains and cotton onto world markets. This in turn prompted the EC to compete with the US’ subsidies, dollar for dollar, and led to the EC attempting to globalise the CAP. This led to the
agricultural interests of non-aligned states being adversely affected and provided the impetus for the formation of the Cairns Group of Fair Traders (Watkins, 1992: 60).

This growing agricultural trade war led to a recognition by the US and the EC, by the time of the Punta Del Este Meeting in September 1986, that there was a need to stabilise global agricultural markets. This provided a context for the Cairns Group to play a mediating and confidence building role between the major powers in the early stages of the Uruguay Round. In the period between the Punta Del Este Meeting and the Montreal mid-term review, the Group put forward a number of proposals which was aimed at confidence building between the U.S. and the EC. The Group’s proposals included issues such as an immediate across the board cut in subsidies by agreed percentages, the establishment of targets to reduce protection and a ban on the introduction of new non-tariff barriers. However the Cairns compromise position in the negotiations were hampered by the inflexible position of the United States, which demanded a complete phase-out of import barriers and subsidies over a ten year period. By the time of the Montreal mid term review, the position of the U.S. and the EC had not changed. In overcoming the Montreal deadlock, eleven Latin American states and four Cairns Group members threatened to block progress in other areas of the negotiations should agricultural issues not be addressed. In particular, many of the developing states such as India and Brazil linked an agreement on agriculture to progress in other areas, such as services and intellectual property, which were becoming increasingly important to the U.S. This led to a softening of the positions of the U.S. and the EC, and led the United States to accept the compromise position of the Group (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 78).

In tracing the contribution of the Group in breaking the Montreal deadlock and the subsequent breakthrough in Geneva, it bears noting that it was the Cairns Group’s proposals on progressive reductions that enabled the United States to move from its ‘zero option’ position. This was possible due to the fact that the Cairns Group’s demand on progress in agriculture being linked to progress in other issues such as services and intellectual property rights also provided a means of pressurising the EC to compromise. The contribution of the Group to the breakthrough in Geneva is illustrated in the fact that the American proposals for the November 1989 Geneva meeting, relied heavily on the Group’s proposals. These included such proposals as the conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariffs and a ten-year timetable for the prohibition of subsidies and other trade distorting barriers. While the Group provided the impetus for the softening of the American stance that led to the breakthrough in Geneva, its influence waned significantly after that. This was seen in the continued insistence of the EC to continue price intervention under the CAP, which led to the Cairns Group moving closer to the United States and the failure of the Brussels meeting to resolve any of the issues on the
agenda of the Uruguay Round. While the continued stand-off between the U.S. and the EC represented a failure for the Cairns Group, the primary contribution of the Group in addressing the interests of developing states was that it placed agriculture as an important issue on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. In doing so, the Group provided a forum for the interests of non-aligned and developing states to be articulated and be recognised by the major powers. This consequently prevented the major powers coming to an agreement between themselves without taking into consideration the position of developing states (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 80)\textsuperscript{9}.

In examining the role of the Cairns Group in bridging the divide between the major powers, especially in the early stages of the Uruguay Round, a significant attainment of the Group was that it was able to maintain its unity. This was despite the fact that it was composed of a heterogeneous group of states with differing priorities, being as they were a coalition of both developed and developing states. That it was able to do so, was largely due to the leadership role of Australia and the point that the Group as a whole recognised that it had a common interest in bringing agricultural issues into the WTO (Kahler, 1992: 699)\textsuperscript{54}. 
5.6. Conclusion

As it has been argued above, the Cairns Group can be seen as a novel multilateral coalition of middle powers across the North-South divide that was able to play a catalytic and facilitative role between the United States and the European Community within the Uruguay Round. In so doing it illustrated the point that there exists a scope for other actors to play non-traditional forms of leadership roles within international institutions in the presence of declining hegemony in the global economy. This point however needs to be qualified, in that the successful role that the Group played in the early stages of the Uruguay Round was contingent upon the convergence of a number of factors. First the issue concerned, namely the stabilisation of global agricultural trade provided the impetus for the formation of the Cairns Group and provided the rationale for a heterogeneous group of states to maintain their unity despite differing priorities. This was due to the fact that the Group as a whole had a long-term common interest in stabilising global agricultural trade. Had the Group not formed, it would have been unlikely that developing states, acting on their own, would have been able to influence dealings amongst the U.S. and the EC, whom would have cut a deal bilaterally over the heads of developing and non-aligned states. That the Group was able to play a role, and its role being recognised by the U.S. and the EC, was contingent on it maintaining its unity since acting as a group meant that collectively the Group accounted for a significant portion of global agricultural markets. This meant that the Cairns Group represented a significant force in global agricultural negotiations within the Uruguay Round.

In addition to this, the international environment was favourable for the Cairns Group to play such a role. This is seen in the fact that by the start of the Uruguay Round, both the U.S. and the EC had recognised that there was a need to stabilise global agricultural trade, although both remained intransigent with regard to protecting their agricultural sectors. Furthermore the Group’s influence was enhanced by the fact that it could link progress on issues of interest to the developed states, such as services and intellectual property rights, to progress in agricultural negotiations.

As the agricultural trade conflicts between the U.S. and the EC in the 1980’s illustrated, where there is an absence of leadership from a hegemonic state or a willingness to share leadership amongst the major economic powers, this results in greater protectionism amongst the developed states. This was illustrated in that the greater protectionism exhibited by the EC and Japan after the food crisis of 1972 to 1974, can partly be laid at the door of the U.S. embargo whereas previously Japan and the EC had largely relied on food imports from the U.S. As the agricultural conflicts amongst the U.S. and the EC illustrated, when the major
powers ignore GATT/ WTO rules and engage in bilateral dealings to resolve economic conflicts amongst themselves, this can result in the interests of smaller states being adversely affected.

Due to the increasing importance of trade, including agricultural trade, to the economies of the majority of non-aligned and developing states, the Cairns Group of Fair Traders played an important role in getting the developed states to recognise the concerns of developing states within the Uruguay Round. While institutions can play a role in fostering co-operation in the presence of declining hegemony, due to the interests of major powers in maintaining them, leadership remains a necessity due to the fact that major powers can ignore institutional constraints when it is in their interests to do so. This being the case, the Cairns Group’s role illustrated that there is a scope for middle powers, acting within international institutions, to play a leadership role in the presence of declining American hegemony, in issue specific contexts.
6. Conclusion

The appearance of leadership in international politics has been an area of significant research and debate amongst scholars and practitioners of international politics. Scholars focusing on the appearance of leadership within international politics have typically focused on the role of a dominant state in facilitating co-operation in international politics. Scholars consequently focused on the United States and the role it played in facilitating co-operation amongst the industrialised states. According to them, therefore, institutions were created by a dominant state to further its interests. This was seen in the fact that in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States was instrumental in the creation of both the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

In attempting to analyse whether institutions can survive in the absence or decline of a hegemonic actor, scholars have argued that institutions can survive the decline of a hegemonic actor due to the interests of major powers in preserving them. According to them institutions continue to be of importance to the major powers, in that regulation of states’ behaviour at the international level would be extremely difficult in the absence of institutions.

However the emergence of new issues on the international agenda, require leadership with which to deal with them. A characteristic feature of these new issues has been that they can only be addressed within institutions, a point that has been realised by the major powers. However this leadership has not been forthcoming from either the United States or the other major powers, such as Japan and the European Union. There is a consequent need therefore to develop an alternate conception of institutions that allows secondary actors a role in their strengthening and maintenance.

However in expanding the conception of institutions to allow more room for secondary actors in their strengthening and maintenance, major power interests needs to be considered. This is due to the fact that the emergence of new issues on the international agenda, which can only be addressed within international institutions containing both developing and developed states can not be addressed without consideration of major power interests. After all, the literature on institutions has focused on how institutions serve to facilitate major power interests.

There has been a consequent need to examine how various institutional forms in international politics, such as international organisations, regimes as well as the appearance of
multilateralism as an institutional forms, can be expanded to allow a role for secondary actors in their strengthening an maintenance. As the evolution of issues such United Nations peacekeeping operations, the emergence of global environmental commons issues and agricultural negotiations within GATT illustrated, major power interests cannot be assumed to be fixed. Major power interests are therefore influenced by systemic conditions.

There is consequently an increased scope for other actors, namely middle powers, to play coalition building and co-operation building roles within international institutions. Middle powers can play this role due to the resources at their disposal to engage in forms of niche diplomacy in support of their interests. This is seen in the fact that middle powers traditionally have highly educated foreign services, comparable to the great powers (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 33). These resources may not be available to less developed states. Furthermore middle powers have traditionally played this role within international institutions, notably Canada in the area of peacekeeping.

Middle power leadership, however, has hardly been altruistic in nature. Traditional middle power leadership, such as those exemplified by Canada and Australia have largely been in accordance with the concept of functionalism. The benefits of playing such a functionalist role for both Canada and Australia were twofold. It presented such states with an enhanced position in the international system in terms of higher institutional positions. Secondly it provided a means for these states to distinguish themselves from the great powers.

However an examination of whether a scope exists in the post cold War era for forms of middle power leadership, should not preclude a resurgence of American leadership or moves on the part of the other major powers to substitute for declining American leadership. However as it has been argued, such leadership does not appear to be forthcoming. Additionally middle powers have been able to play leadership roles that the major powers have not been able to play, traditionally in the area of UN peacekeeping. Whilst there is an enhanced scope for the major powers to participate in peacekeeping operations in the post Cold War era, they have been constrained by the fact that the success of a peacekeeping operation is highly dependent on the co-operation of the disputants.

The decline of American leadership has provided a scope for other actors, namely middle powers, to play alternate forms of leadership within international institutions in issue specific contexts. However this role does not have to be played by middle powers only. A range of non-state actors in the international system can play co-operation-building roles within international institutions (Cooper, 1997: 20)\textsuperscript{21}. However, in the final analysis, it does seem
that in the issues investigated, middle powers had both the technical expertise and resources to engage in forms of leadership that other less powerful actors would find difficult to play.
CHAPTER 7

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