NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AT THE UNITED NATIONS (1960 TO FEBRUARY 1990)

THESIS
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by

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The African National Congress (ANC) was the leading opponent of the South African Government's Apartheid policies. It was engaged in an Anti-Apartheid struggle and as part thereof called for South Africa's diplomatic isolation. In the course of its struggle, the ANC sought international support. Given the stature of the United Nations (UN) as the foremost international organisation, the ANC campaigned at the UN for South Africa's diplomatic isolation.

This thesis focuses on the activities of African National Congress at the United Nations. It firstly outlines a brief history of the ANC and the UN and examines the relationship which developed between the two organisations. It then focuses on the activities of the ANC at the UN which were aimed at isolating South Africa diplomatically from the international community. Finally a brief assessment of the extent of South Africa's diplomatic isolation is provided.
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<td>ANNC</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
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In April of 1994 South Africa held its first democratic elections following the acceptance of an interim constitution. These elections saw the African National Congress (ANC) voted into power and Nelson Mandela installed as President. The decades of diplomatic isolation that preceded these events were called to a halt and South Africa was reinstated as a member of the United Nations (UN) and welcomed back into the Commonwealth of Nations. South Africa's re-integration into the international community has not only been limited to the political arena. Trade, sport and entertainment are examples of the sectors which have flourished as a result of renewed diplomatic ties.

The ANC has played a pivotal role in bringing about these changes but it has not always enjoyed the status of a legally acknowledged organisation and has endured years as an exiled national liberation movement. However, this did not prevent it from campaigning and actively seeking political change within South Africa. One of the ways in which it did this was to engage the international community in seeking to isolate South Africa.

The diplomatic isolation of South Africa prevented the country from engaging in any diplomatic activity with member states of the United Nations. The ANC's campaign ensured that the Apartheid issue remained on the agenda of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition a Special Committee Against Apartheid was charged with the tasks of monitoring the socio-political situation in South Africa and lending support to the national liberation movements.

The diplomatic exclusion of South Africa which commenced in the 1960's continued until the 1990's. This period was marked by the banning and exile of the ANC, its campaign to isolate South Africa, the unbanning of the organisation and the concomitant changes which this brought about.
This study is concerned with the activities of the African National Congress at the United Nations. The central focus of this thesis is how the ANC through its intervention at the UN, contributed to the diplomatic isolation of South Africa from the international community during the period 1960 to February 1990.

Chapter one provides an understanding of the concepts to be employed in the thesis. It defines amongst others, non-state actors such as national liberation movements and examines their role in international relations. It also outlines a model of indicators of isolation which will be used to assess the diplomatic isolation of South Africa.

The second chapter focuses on the historical development of the African National Congress. It traces the development of the organisation from its inception in 1912 to the establishment of the External Mission in 1960, which paved the way for ANC participation at the United Nations.

Chapter three examines the background and the institutional framework of the United Nations. It provides a short history of the UN and highlights the principal organs and committees which the ANC approached to further its campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically.

Chapter four sets out the relationship that developed between the African National Congress and the United Nations. It examines the ANC's formal activities at the UN and assesses the campaign to isolate South Africa by using the model of indicators of isolation outlined in chapter one.

The concluding chapter comments on the findings in the thesis and consolidates the main arguments.
CHAPTER ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter outlines a framework which provides an understanding of the concepts to be employed. It defines the concepts of self-determination and national liberation movements and briefly examines the role of the latter in international relations. Furthermore it defines diplomacy and isolation and sets out the model of indicators provided by Geldenhuys (1990), which will be used to assess the diplomatic isolation of South Africa.

1.1 SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

'Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril'


'National liberation movements do not emerge one fine day out of the mind of some superman or at the instigation of some foreign power. They are born out of popular discontent. They emerge over long periods to combat oppressive conditions and express aspirations for a different kind of society'

(De Braganca & Wallerstein, 1982:iii).

International relations have often been defined solely in terms of the interaction between nation states. According to Keylor (1984) the historical narration of the conduct of international relations has tended to be state-centred. The role of non-state actors and the extent of their influence in international relations have always been downplayed. However with time non-state actors have increasingly exerted significant influence on the conduct of international relations. One such actor is the National Liberation Movement (NLM).
The mechanisms involved in the process of national liberation have been defined in several ways and reflect the particular orientation of the theorist. It is therefore useful to consider some of the definitions so as to gain an understanding of how the concepts of national liberation and national liberation movements have been employed.

Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) defines national liberation movements as revolutionary political organisations which mobilize the oppressed people to overthrow imperialist domination. He emphasises the notion of active liberation from the fetters of imperialist oppression and sees the national liberation movements as the vehicle for achieving this. Cabral (1980) shares Nzongola-Ntalaja's notion regarding the nature of the oppression which people have to be freed from. He views imperialism as being the root cause of this oppression and sees the liberation movement as the mechanism for achieving freedom. However, he also acknowledges that national liberation and social revolution are not commodities which can be exported. They are a local product, influenced by external factors but shaped by the historical reality of a people. National liberation involves the regaining of the historical personality of a people and signals its return to history through the eradication of the imperialist domination to which it was subjected.

Macfarlane (1985) is of the opinion that national revolutionary movements are engaged in struggles against foreign rulers or indigenous regimes. He argues that they are dependant upon and subservient to outsiders and indifferent to the needs of the people they profess to serve. Thus he does not share the view that national liberation and the movements involved in it are being driven by the needs and aspirations of the oppressed. Instead, he offers a somewhat dubious view of the legitimacy of liberation movements and the struggle which they wage.

According to Blaut (1987) most Non-Marxists negate the existence of political and economic oppression when considering the
motivation for the national liberation of a people. He rejects this view arguing that national struggles are in fact class struggles driven by the exploitation of one or more classes which then becomes a struggle for political power. In this sense he emphasises the economic disparities which give rise to liberation struggles.

Within the conceptual framework of national liberation various schools of thought such as the above-mentioned can be identified. Despite this diversity there are elements common to these theories. These are the struggle for political power, economic control and the need for social transformation. These elements encapsulate the essence of national liberation and enable one to understand it in a variety of socio-political contexts. In this sense Cabral's notion of the struggle being a product of the historical reality of a people, is of paramount importance.

National liberation movements are phenomena which developed in the wake of decolonisation in the 1960's. Their ability to influence international events increased following the UN's adoption of the principle of self-determination. This principle compelled colonial powers to grant independence to colonial territories.

Self-determination is recognised by the United Nations as the freedom of a people to determine their political status and pursue their social, economic and cultural development (Heunis, 1986). Alexander and Friedlander (1980) recognise that self-determination has economic, social and cultural connotations but that its essence is political power. In applying the principle of self-determination the United Nations came into contact with national liberation movements. The development of the relationship between the United Nations and national liberation movements is set out Chapter 4.
1.1.1 THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AS NON-STATE ACTOR

The United Nations Charter made provision solely for state actors. This provision merely reflected and enhanced the view that state actors are the only actors of note in international relations. For example, according to Grieves (1977) the nation state and the nation state system have been the main participants in international relations for over 300 years.

Nassar (1991) however, argues that nation states are not the only actors of note and that non-state actors are also significant in global affairs. The latter have increased in number and significance and groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have had a noticeable effect on international relations.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, for example, was granted observer status at the United Nations in 1974. This allowed the organisation to participate and influence the decision-making process at the UN (Thomas, 1989). Similarly, there are numerous other national liberation movements including the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia who have gained access to the United Nations system and influenced international relations.

1.2 A MODEL OF INDICATORS TO ASSESS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION

The nature of international politics has changed considerably during the course of the twentieth century. One of the factors which has influenced these changes is the growth of the international community. This is evidenced by an increase in the number of member states as well as the issues which need to be addressed by various governments.

States, as integral components of the international system, cannot operate in isolation of each other. According to Deon Geldenhuys (1990) states enjoy their independence in a setting of interdependence. He argues that when a group of states form
a closely-knit system, the involvement of many self-willed political actors impose upon each state an awareness that the others have interests distinct from its own. Given this awareness, it is understandable that nations enter into dialogue with each other to facilitate good relations. This dialogue forms an integral part of diplomacy between states.

Diplomacy is a concept which is used extensively with varied interpretations. Some commentators use the word when they refer to foreign policy, others to negotiations or it may be used to describe the process involved in such negotiations. For the purposes of an all-inclusive definition the Oxford Illustrated English Dictionary (1975) defines it as the management of international relations by negotiation.

The origins of diplomacy can be traced to antiquity when different tribes each appointed what was known as a tribal herald. This person was invested with semi-religious authority and regarded as an intermediary between the two worlds (Nicolson, 1939). From this early form, the practice of diplomacy developed as the structure of international society took shape. Throughout history diplomacy has developed as an indicator of relations between various peoples. For example, the various Dynasties in China and the Romans and the Greek City States also contributed to the development of diplomacy (Nicolson, 1939).

Three other important periods in the historical development of diplomacy have also been identified. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was common practice for states to send officials to conduct specific missions. These officials were known as emissaries who were despatched to conclude agreements on behalf of the principal. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Italian city states began to send resident missions abroad. This enabled events in rival states to be monitored and ensured continued dialogue between states. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 marked the third and most significant development as it recognised the need to regularise diplomatic relations.
between nations. A codicil was drawn up outlining proper diplomatic practice and rank orderings of officials (Nicolson, 1939).

In modern times the practice of diplomacy has been refined using the decisions of the Congress of Vienna as its basis. Currently, the system of diplomacy and diplomatic activity is centred at the United Nations. Here matters which affect the community of nations are discussed by the representatives of the various nations. Notwithstanding this practice provision has also been made for states to conduct diplomatic relations between each other.

Having set out the evolution of diplomatic practice it is important to note that diplomacy can take different forms. For example, Gideon Gottlieb (1985) recognises the traditional diplomatic mode, conference diplomacy and parity diplomacy. He describes the traditional diplomatic mode as diplomacy produced by states on a bilateral basis. Conference diplomacy refers to international meetings where negotiators meet collectively and are bound to that which they consent. Gottlieb recognises parity diplomacy as a new emerging mode which involves negotiations between groups of states.

The type of diplomacy which has a bearing on the central focus of this thesis is that of isolation diplomacy. In order to understand the essence of the diplomacy of isolation, it is necessary to define the concept of isolation. Furthermore, diplomatic isolation needs to be seen against the backdrop of normal state behaviour.

To isolate is to detach, separate or insulate something (Collins Paperback Thesaurus, 1993). Deon Geldenhuys in his book Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (1990) describes the isolated state as an island, created by its own design or forced thereto by outside compulsion. The isolation is either enforced or self-imposed. The latter concept applies where a state voluntarily
isolates itself from the community of nations as a precautionary measure. For the purposes of this thesis, enforced isolation will be examined in detail.

Enforced isolation, according to Geldenhuys (1990), is implemented against an offending state as a punitive measure. Pressure is exerted on an offending state whose value systems are deemed unacceptable by the community of nations. An important element of enforced isolation is intent. The enforced isolation of a state is a calculated policy involving premeditated action by the community of nations. It has to be distinguished from those actions where isolation is a secondary effect.

'Isolation is ... a multi-dimensional phenomenon embracing a wide spectrum of inter-state relations' (Geldenhuys, 1990:17). He identifies the following broad areas of isolation to which a state can be subjected: political-diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural. For the purpose of this thesis only the political-diplomatic sphere will be focused on as it is concerned with the ANC's contribution to the diplomatic isolation of South Africa.

The extent to which a state is isolated can be assessed by using various indicators. Geldenhuys (1990) provides an exhaustive list of indicators which can be applied to all four spheres of isolation. He identifies seven indicators which need to be applied to assess whether the diplomatic isolation of an entity has been achieved. According to Van Wyk (1988) the work of Geldenhuys provides the best operationalization of South Africa's international isolation.

These following indicators will be discussed in turn:
1. International recognition;
2. Pariah image;
3. Diplomatic relations;
4. Membership of international organisations;
5. Official visits;
6. International treaties;

According to Geldenhuys (1990) the severest form of diplomatic ostracism which a state can be subjected to, is the refusal of recognition of its statehood by the international community. With the United Nations stature being that of the foremost international forum, it follows that the exclusion of any state from that body would be deemed the severest international sanction. John Dugard (1987) identifies four criteria for the non-recognition of states by the international community. They are aggression, traditional acquisition by the use of force, racial discrimination and the denial of self-determination. South Africa's non-compliance with the latter two was responsible for the isolation campaign.

The isolated state is also known as a Pariah. The word has its origins in India where it was used to refer to Hindu outcasts. It can also be traced back to the Ottoman Empire where the Ottomans acquired this status because they were an Islamic state in an international society which was dominated by Christianity. Currently, pariah is used to describe states which are in conflict with the broader international community. Pariah status results from two conditions. Firstly, the status is determined by the international community and not the state itself. Secondly, the pariah is 'targeted' as a result of its beliefs and practices which do not comply with the accepted norms of international society. The pariah becomes isolated as a result of the measures adopted against it (Vale, 1977).

In dealing with the contemporary 'pariah state' Vale (1977) identifies the following characteristics which assist in determining their identity:
1. the pariah is in conflict with the international community;
2. conforming to the mores of the international community may result in the demise of the pariah;
3. the pariah is anti-communist;
4. the economic system of the pariah is modeled on the capitalist system;
5. the pariah maintains that its strategic importance cannot be eroded.

Diplomatic relations refer to the formal diplomatic ties which exist between states so as to facilitate communication. According to Geldenhuys (1990) the extent to which a state is represented abroad indicates the level of its acceptance in the international community. Furthermore he argues that the severing of diplomatic ties serves a political purpose when it is done to promote the isolation of a state.

Similarly, the number of international organisations in which a state is a member of, the number of treaties which it is signatory to and the frequency of official visits undertaken and received by its Head of State are indicators of the country's acceptance by the international community.

International censure is recognised by Geldenhuys (1990) as the final indicator of isolation. Censure in this context means the condemnation of a state which has transgressed society's norms. It is common for the offending party to incur the wrath of a multiplicity of international actors.

The above mentioned concepts and indicators provide a framework which is employed throughout the thesis, assisting in the understanding of how the African National Congress at the United Nations, contributed to the diplomatic isolation of South Africa.
'The African National Congress (ANC) in 1990 is a stronger organisation than ever before in its seventy-eight-year history...At the international level, the ANC is clearly viewed as the leader of the opposition to apartheid...' (Johns & Hunt Davis, 1991:3).

The African National Congress is one of the oldest political organisations in South Africa and Africa and was one of the national liberation movements which was active at the United Nations. This chapter outlines a brief history of the ANC from its inception in 1912 to the establishment of its External Mission in 1960 and provides a basic understanding of the organisation.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 in Bloemfontein, South Africa following a call for African unity by prominent African professionals. The meeting succeeded in attracting interested parties including chiefs and other prominent figures and the African Native National Congress (ANNC) was launched. The organisation's primary aim was to join the various local and provincial organisations concerned with the liberation of African people from white domination, into one national body (Motlhabi, 1988).

Meli (1988) argues that the 1910 granting of independence to South Africa by the British, was designed in the interests of imperialism in that power was transferred into the hands of the white minority to the exclusion of the black majority. After Union was achieved more legislation directed at negating the aspirations of Africans as citizens of the country was passed. Examples of these are the Immigrations Restriction Act of 1911 which prevented people of Indian origin from leaving their domicile and the Mines and Works Act of 1911 which reserved jobs for whites. Within this context of legally entrenched racial discrimination, the ANNC was born. Its formation marked the
union of all existing African organisations and sought to be the voice of the disenfranchised majority (ANC Handbook, undated).

In 1913 the new organisation was soon confronted with the Land Act passed in that year. The effect of this new Act was to exclude African people from possessing land. The ANNC's response to the government's action was to send a delegation to Britain seeking support for their cause. This move to canvass British support, reflected the nature of the organisation's early tactics.

At the end of the First World War, the ANNC was once more afforded the opportunity to send a delegation to Britain to draw attention to the plight of Africans in South Africa. However this venture was marked with limited success. It resulted firstly in the formation of a committee to keep abreast of developments affecting the 'natives'. Secondly, the organisation was able to foster links with the Pan African movement. Meli (1988) argues that this was as an attempt by the ANNC to link their struggle to the rest of the black world because of a need for collective and international condemnation of colonialism and racism. Walshe (1982) describes the 1919 trip as a watershed in the history of the ANNC. First of all, it would be the last time that Africans would turn to the British for intervention. More importantly, the failure of this venture marked the beginning of a period of relative decline for the ANC which was reflected in the declining membership of the organisation.

With the decline of the ANNC, the 1920's also saw a surge in the popularity of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). The ICU was a trade union formed in 1919 by Clements Kadalie after numerous failed attempts to organise labour. The growth and success of the ICU occurred, at the expense of the ANNC. The slump experienced during this period was also attributed to the tactics of the ANNC, which consisted mainly of petitions to the
South African authorities and delegations to Britain. Some Afrikaner analysts of the ANNC expressed the following sentiment, 'Van 'n rewolsonêre karakter was daar in hierdie periode geen sprake nie. Daar is gehoop dat deur die uitoefening van druk langs konstitutionele kanale die overheid tot veranderings beweeg kon word' (Van der Merwe & De Vries, 1981:323).

Translated it reads as follows,

'During this period there was evidence of a revolutionary character. It was hoped that pressure brought about by constitutional means would cause the government to change'.

For the ANNC the 1920’s was marked with very little success, the only development of note being the removal of the word Native from the name of the African Native National Congress. This move was designed to hail a new name, the African National Congress, which would be representative of all the people in South Africa.

The late 1930’s saw a revival within the African National Congress following the All African Convention. The Convention was a broad formation drawn together to oppose the Hertzog Bills, which had been passed by the government. These bills curtailed the voting rights of African people. According to Meli (1988) the year 1939 in particular marked the beginning of a gradual revival and rejuvenation for the ANC, with the organisation re-emerging as the mouthpiece of African views and opinions in South Africa. The Secretary-General and the President-General of the ANC had undertaken a national tour to address local problems, initiate provincial activity and draw young blood into the organisation.

Following this revival, the ANC achieved an important milestone in 1943 when it adopted a new constitution. This constitution restructured the organisation eliminating the House of Chiefs which had been the power base of the traditional leaders. More
importantly, a resolution was adopted to give effect to the formation of a youth league which would give expression to the wishes of the militant youth who had supported the ANC (Meli, 1988).

The establishment of the Youth League provided the African National Congress with impetus. It brought about a new approach with new methods of protest based upon the principle of non-collaboration. With reference to the Youth League, Price states that 'they provide a policy of fighting for African independence, freedom from domination by other national groups and the establishment of an African nation' (Price, 1980:68).

The formation of the Youth League influenced ANC policy with the adoption of the Programme of Action. This document when compared to earlier ANC efforts, introduced a new revolutionary component. The adoption of the Programme of Action by the ANC at its 1949 conference marked the beginning of an era, involving new methods with which the African National Congress would henceforth seek to achieve its goals (Mbeki, 1992). The Programme of Action outlined revolutionary actions such as strikes and boycotts with the focus remaining on non-violent protest (ANC, Advance to Peoples Power, undated).

In the year prior to the adoption of the ANC's new programme the National Party (NP) had come to power in South Africa. In the years that followed, the new government systematically introduced Apartheid via legislation.

'The NP government designed its apartheid legislation programme to achieve four goals: racial purity, physical separation of the races, more effective political domination, and stronger control over the black population' (Johns & Hunt Davis, 1991:22).

Apartheid was described as the sum total of all the policies and practices employed to ensure White political domination and economic exploitation (Segal, 1964).
Thus as the new government set about entrenching its Apartheid policies the African National Congress guided by the Youth League prepared to respond. The ANC in the 1950's, embarked on militant but non-violent forms of struggle against Apartheid. Of these, the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the Congress of the People in 1955 deserve mention (Johns & Hunt Davis, 1991).

The Defiance Campaign of 1952 was conducted against various issues including the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Group Areas Act (1950) and the Separate Representations Act (1951). It demanded, 'freedom from White domination' and the right of Africans to self-determination; it urged the use of boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation as weapons of the future' (Davenport, 1989:367).

This campaign was not exclusively an ANC campaign and was undertaken in conjunction with a number of other political organisations. However this campaign has been recognised as a watershed for the African National Congress. This new phase of struggle brought with it the realisation that extreme personal sacrifice would be needed if the ANC were to triumph.

Following the Defiance Campaign the first seeds of what was to be the Freedom Charter were being planted. At the 1953 Congress of the ANC, a proposal for the drawing up of a Charter of Rights was accepted. Taking the lead, the ANC then co-opted other organisations such as the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Organisation and the Congress of Democrats. The alliance of these political organisations came to be known as the Congress Alliance. All the members of this alliance shared the vision espoused in the proposed charter.

On the 26th June 1955 delegates from all over the country descended on Kliptown to give effect to this vision. According to the ANC the gathering at Kliptown was the most representative of all gatherings that had been held in South Africa up until that time (African National Congress, 1982). At what came to be
known as the Congress of the People, a charter of rights was adopted which came to be known as the Freedom Charter. This document gave the different national organisations as well as the working class organisations, a common programme for their national liberation (Price, 1980). In particular it served to guide the African National Congress in the pursuit of liberation.

The Congress Alliance was sustained after the drawing up of the Freedom Charter. However the continued relationship between the ANC and the Alliance soon became a bone of contention within the organisation. The Africanists within the ANC were opposed to the relationship with the Congress of Democrats. The latter body formed part of the Alliance and was comprised of white liberals. The Africanists were of the opinion that the struggle should be led by the African people and that White people could not be entrusted with this responsibility.

The African National Congress describes the controversy as follows, 'The transformation of the ANC into a greater mass movement, the formation of the Congress Alliance and the adoption of the Freedom Charter provoked a backlash from a minority of Africanists' (ANC, Advance to People’s Power, undated, p.12).

This difference between the two factions within the ANC could not be reconciled. The tension between the Africanists and the ANC leadership steadily mounted and eventually lead to a clean break in November 1958. The result was the formation of the Pan African Congress in April 1959. South Africa would henceforth have two organisations vying for the position as the true representative of the oppressed people of South Africa (Johns & Hunt Davis, 1991).

The year following the split in the ANC marked a new era in South Africa. This period had a profound effect on the African National Congress and influenced the strategies and tactics of the organisation. One such tactic was that the organisation’s struggle against the South African government was extended to the
international arena. The United Nations and its various organs became a central focus in this regard.

The ANC’s objective of international support was facilitated by South Africa’s prominence in the 1960’s. Two events viz. the Sharpeville Massacre and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a prominent South African focused international attention on South Africa and the ANC.

Early in 1960 a campaign had been launched by the ANC against the pass law system in South Africa. These laws stipulated that African people had to carry legal documents also known as reference books which restricted their movement and prevented them from being imprisoned. Before the ANC campaign was launched, the Pan African Congress called for a peaceful protest in support of its Anti-Pass campaign. The PAC’s campaign which was launched on 21 March 1960 ended when the police shot at peaceful protesters in Sharpeville, killing 69 and wounding 186. Following this massacre the government passed the Unlawful Organisations Act (1960) outlawing the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress, marking the end of legal protest and sowing the seeds for armed struggle (Johns & Hunt Davis, 1991).

Yet the massacre alone did not focus attention on South Africa. In 1960 Chief Albert Luthuli, President-General of the African National Congress was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This award gave the ANC standing in the international community. The consequences of the Sharpeville Massacre and the accolade received by Chief Luthuli paved the way for the establishment of the External Mission of the ANC.

Following the clampdown on ANC activities inside South Africa Oliver Tambo was sent into exile to set up support structures in the form of an External Mission. An important part of his task was to seek diplomatic representation in world forums. Initially this campaign was undertaken in Africa but was later extended to
the United Nations (Tambo, 1987). Alden (1993) argues that the ANC's diplomacy in this early period focused on publicising Apartheid's injustices thereby aiming to effect South Africa's isolation.

According to Scott Thomas (1989) the creation of the ANC's External Mission enabled the organisation to have a diplomatic presence so as to mobilize international solidarity against Apartheid. Furthermore whilst in exile, the ANC evolved from a nationalist organisation into a national liberation movement when it decided that the central focus of its revolution was the national liberation of the African people.

The essence of the struggle which the African National Congress waged is to be found in the words of the late Oliver Tambo, former President of the ANC.

'The South African Constitution excludes the blacks. They are outside the constitution. There is nothing they can do about the decisions, the policies of the South African regime ... They are fighting from outside this white state. This is not a civil rights struggle at all. If we were part of the constitution, if we were citizens like any other, then of course there would be rights to fight for ... But in South Africa the position is different. Our struggle is basically, essentially, fundamentally, a national liberation struggle' (Oliver Tambo cited in Pomeroy, 1989:12).

It is within this historical context that the role of the African National Congress at the United Nations will be examined. However before doing so, the background and the institutional framework of the United Nations will be outlined.
CHAPTER THREE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

This chapter outlines the formation of the United Nations and examines its principal organs and special committees. It also sets out the relationship which developed between the United Nations and national liberation movements.

3.1 BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

"For a brief moment in the high summer of 1944 world attention was rivetted on the Georgetown estate of Dumbarton Oaks, where delegates from major Allied powers ... were discussing plans for a postwar organisation to maintain permanent peace" (Hildebrand, 1990:1)

This was the setting in the aftermath of the Second World War, where the search for one of humankind’s eternal dreams continued. The notion of world peace has always been of paramount importance and the gathering at Dumbarton Oaks sought to secure that elusive tranquillity. These delegates however had the benefit of hindsight in that they could draw on the experiences of the League of Nations. The League had been established after the First World War with the Covenant as its guiding document so as to maintain world peace (Hildebrand, 1990).

The Second World War however shattered the dream of lasting peace and was seen as an indictment of the Covenant. More importantly, the failure of the League to achieve world peace gave rise to the sentiment that a 'new order' had to be installed. Thus using their experience of the League of Nations, representatives of the community of nations embarked on extensive consultations which resulted in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal (Hildebrand, 1990).

In April 1945 the United Nations was born with the UN Charter as its guiding document. It was a comprehensive document covering
every facet of relations between states. The goals of the United Nations as set out in the proposals were as follows:

(1) the maintenance of international peace and security;
(2) to develop friendly relations among nations;
(3) to strengthen universal peace;
(4) to provide a meeting place for all nations who actively pursued these common goals

(Goodrich & Hambro, 1949).

Membership of this august body was limited to states which meant that countries and their representative governments would be the sole members. To give effect to the purpose and principles of the organisation, a number of organs were created. The Charter also contained numerous articles which set out the powers, procedures and mechanics of each these organs. In terms of the Charter of the United Nations the following principal structures were created: the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

In addition to these principal organs the Charter provided for the creation of a number of subsidiary bodies. It is however beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on these subsidiary bodies. The focus will be on the above-mentioned principal organs, the Special Political Committee and the Special Committee Against Apartheid.

(A) The UN General Assembly

In terms of the Charter's provisions every member of the United Nations sends five representatives to the General Assembly. Luard (1979) points out that if contemporary international society was paralleled with a nation state, then the General Assembly can be seen as a parliament within the affairs of the world. The General Assembly does not have the power to make binding laws and merely makes recommendations with which members are not obligated to comply (Heunis, 1986).
Given the parliamentary nature of the Assembly it considers amongst others issues related to peace and security and also promotes world prosperity and justice. In keeping with this the Charter makes provision for the General Assembly to intervene in any situation which is likely to damage the welfare of a state or the friendly relations amongst nations (Goodrich & Hambro, 1949).

The following are some of the functions and powers of the General Assembly:

1. To consider and make recommendations on the maintenance of international peace;
2. to discuss issues, other than those examined by the Security Council, that affect international peace and security;
3. to promote international political co-operation, the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people as well as collaboration in social and cultural fields;
4. to elect the non permanent members of the Security Council.

The General Assembly has however been pro-active and has on occasion assumed greater power where the Security Council has failed to act to its satisfaction (Heunis, 1986).

To give effect to the provisions of the Charter, the General Assembly has seven main committees:

(a) The Political and Security Committee (First Committee);
(b) Special Political Committee;
(c) Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee);
(d) Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee);
(e) Trusteeship Council (Fourth Committee);
(f) Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee);
(g) Legal Committee (Sixth Committee)

Between 1947 and 1955 the General Assembly annually established an Ad Hoc Committee until 1956 when it formed the Special Political Committee, which has the specific function of dealing
with issues which are not dealt with by the First Committee (Heunis, 1986).

(B) The UN Security Council

Arguably, the most important structure within the United Nations is the Security Council. It consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent members of the UN. The permanent members are the United States of America, Great Britain, France, China and the former Soviet Union. The status of these countries in the Security Council was based on their positions of power during the post-1945 period. The remaining seats on this body are filled on a rotational basis. The General Assembly elects ten representatives to serve two-year terms (Everyman’s United Nations, 1968).

The responsibility of maintaining international peace and security rests with the Security Council. Such issues can be brought before the Security Council by any nation, regardless of whether it has member status or not. In addressing these issues the Council will first determine whether the particular issue threatens international peace and thereafter it will decide on an appropriate course of action (Everyman’s United Nations, 1968). According to Luard (1979) the Security Council should be seen as a mechanism for negotiating crisis situations among individual powers and groups of nations.

Whilst the maintenance of international peace is its primary function the Council has a number of other rather important functions. For example, the Security Council is empowered to call on member states to impose sanctions to give effect to its decisions or can take military action to maintain or restore international stability (Luard, 1979).

(C) The UN Secretariat

Like any other organisation, the United Nations has a component which serves as its driving force. In this instance it is the
Secretariat which propels the organisation. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer and is responsible for the appointment of staff. S/he is appointed by the General Assembly and all members of the Secretariat are accountable to that office. The United Nations Secretariat includes amongst others, the Office of Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories. Employees of the Secretariat are drawn from any country in the world and their appointment is not dependent on whether or not their country is a member of the UN. Individuals who are employed are not deemed to be representatives of their countries, they are issued with United Nations identification and are regarded as UN personnel (Everyman’s United Nations, 1968).

(D) The Special Political Committee (SPC)

The Special Political Committee was formed in 1962 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, its mandate being that of informing the General Assembly and the Security Council on matters relating to Apartheid. Its tasks included collecting testimony and petitioning individuals and organisations regarding their views on Apartheid. The Special Political Committee thus provided the definitive institutional support for petitioning the UN on Apartheid (Thomas, 1989).

(E) The Special Committee Against Apartheid

This committee, whilst not one of the principal organs of the United Nations also deserves mention. It was formed by the General Assembly to monitor the discriminatory policies of the South African government. In terms of resolution 2671 of 1970 the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to review all aspects of apartheid including:

(a) measures promoting racial discrimination;
(b) international action to eradicate Apartheid (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).
It was authorised to consult with liberation movements, the specialised agencies of the UN and non-governmental organisations so as to ensure that Apartheid was tackled internationally. The objectives of the Committee were:

(a) The overthrow of the South African Government, the removal of Apartheid and the establishment of a democratic government;

(b) International mobilisation against Apartheid in the form of an arms embargo, economic sanctions, a sport and cultural boycott and support for the national liberation movements (Heunis, 1986).

In achieving these objectives the Special Committee maintained a close link with the South African liberation movements, anti-apartheid bodies and various agencies within the UN system. Furthermore it had two sub-committees, one on Petitions and Information and the other on the Implementation of UN Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa, which collected data and assisted in strategy. Heunis (1986) states that the Committee initiated and contributed to most of the Anti-South African and Anti-Apartheid initiatives which were undertaken internationally.

The role that the General Assembly, Security Council and the Special Committee's played in the campaign to isolate South Africa will be examined in Chapter 4.

3.2 THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

As early as the nineteenth century self-determination was recognised by liberals as the most cherished proposition for freedom, democracy and the rights of individuals and peoples (Emerson, 1960). Notwithstanding this recognition, self-determination as a principle lacked formal acceptance. Not even in the wake of the First World War was self-determination expressly implemented. Emerson (1960) makes the point that despite Woodrow Wilson's recognition of the principle, self-determination found no place in the League of Nations.
However, the principle of self-determination was recognised after the Second World War. In this postwar period, the application of self-determination and decolonisation became focal points at the United Nations. The UN enshrined the principle of self-determination in the Charter of the United Nations. The UN recognised self-determination as being accessible to all people when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1541 of 1960, sanctioning the freedom of a people to determine their political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development (Heunis, 1986). Thereafter, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2105 (1965) recognising the legitimacy of national liberation movements in colonial territories and Resolution 27-8 (1970) sanctioning national liberation movements to use any means necessary to achieve their objectives (Schoenberg, 1989).

The right to self-determination was further entrenched in 1966 with the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In terms of both these documents, states which were parties to either Covenant had to promote the realisation of self-determination and ensure conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter (An-na'im, 1988).

The groundwork for the acceptance of national liberation movements at the United Nations was laid in the 1960's. Firstly, there was an increase in the Third World membership at the UN which brought about greater representation in the General Assembly and the Security Council. This in turn impacted on the influence which the Third World was able to exert on the United Nations. In addition, there was greater acceptance of national liberation movements and the role which they had to play at the UN.

The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly had developed the practice of inviting petitioners to address committee hearings. This initiative resulted from the SPC's meetings with national liberation movements in Africa. It paved the way for interaction
between national liberation movements and the General Assembly's specialised agencies. In May 1974 those national liberation movements which were recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League, were invited to participate as observers in UN meetings. This invitation was extended by the UN Economic and Social Council (Schoenberg, 1989). The recognition of national liberation movements as important role players in international relations heralded the implementation of self-determination.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was one of the first national liberation movements to benefit from this initiative. In terms of General Assembly Resolutions 3210 and 3237 of 1974 the PLO was allowed to participate in all sessions and debates of the Assembly. It had the right to make speeches, circulate and receive documents and the right to draft resolutions. The PLO also gained access to the Security Council where it deliberated issues with other participants. In effect, the PLO via its participation in these forums, influenced decision-making at the United Nations (Kirisci, 1986).

Another example is that of Cuba which frequently invited the Puerto Rican Liberation Movement to address the UN regarding American intervention in Puerto Rican affairs. The UN called on the United States to end its harassment of political activists and also declared the US action to be a violation of Puerto Rican people's right to self-determination and independence (Schoenberg, 1989).

According to Alexander and Friedlander (1980) nationalism stimulated claims for national liberation while self-determination propagated the right of subjugated groups to be liberated. However, the application of self-determination was not limited to colonies. McCorquodale (1994) states that the subjection of any people to domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle of self-determination. For this reason he argues that the right to self-determination
applied to South Africa. This is evident, he argues, from the resolutions adopted by the United Nations which state that Apartheid breached the right to self-determination.

The United Nations therefore recognised the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress as South Africa's two national liberation movements. Though they were not accorded the same privileges as the PLO, both organisations were granted observer status at the UN.

Having set out the institutional framework of the United Nations and its recognition of national liberation movements as legitimate actors in the international arena, the focus now shifts to the relationship which developed between the ANC and the UN.
CHAPTER FOUR: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

'It was at the insistence of the ANC that sanctions as a mode of struggle against the South African regime came to be considered at the United Nations. Thanks to the vigilance and consistent support of the African states as well as the Asian and Socialist countries, the UN has taken a correct position in adopting resolutions supporting sanctions against South Africa'

( Oliver Tambo, Sechaba, April 1968).

This chapter briefly examines the ANC's activities at the United Nations. It also examines the concomitant diplomatic isolation of South Africa.

4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UN AND THE ANC

The year 1960 was the beginning of a new era in South Africa and would have a profound effect on the African National Congress. The ANC's response to the South African government's repression changed as far as its strategy and tactics were concerned. Its campaign to remove the government was extended beyond the borders so as to involve the international community, particularly the United Nations.

However before the ANC entered the international arena in 1960, South Africa was already a familiar topic of discussion at the United Nations. As early as 1946 at the very first session of the General Assembly South Africa's discriminatory legislation came under attack. Between 1946 and 1950 India was responsible for placing South Africa on the agenda of the General Assembly. In June 1946 the Indian government recalled its High Commissioner from South Africa signalling the beginning of a worldwide condemnation of South Africa's Apartheid policies (Meli, 1988).
By 1952, the issue was placed on the General Assembly's agenda by Arab and Asian states who regarded it as a threat to international peace and a violation of basic human rights. Relations between South Africa and the UN continued to decline and in 1955 South Africa was forced to withdraw from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Barber & Barrat, 1990).

Prior to 1960 the issue of South Africa was deliberated extensively at the UN without any decisive action being taken. Most of these deliberations concerned the right of the United Nations to consider South Africa's Apartheid policies and its treatment of Indians (Barrat, 1985). The ANC did not raise the South African issue at the United Nations during this period as its activities at the UN were limited to ad hoc lobbying. It was only with the creation of the ANC's External Mission that the organisation had a diplomatic presence which mobilised international solidarity against apartheid (Thomas, 1989).

1960 marked a turning point for both the UN and South Africa with the influx of ex-colonies into the UN. In April 1960, the United Nations Security Council addressed the issue of South Africa and passed a resolution calling on the government to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality (Barrat, 1985).

In that same year the issue of sanctions was brought before the General Assembly for consideration. The motion for the implementation failed but a moral victory had been achieved in that Article 2(7) of the Charter, which stated that the UN has no authority to intervene in domestic issues of a member, was not accepted. Furthermore, the Security Council debates legitimated the claims by the liberation movements that Apartheid was a moral issue (Thomas, 1989).

Despite this moral victory the critical challenge facing Anti-Apartheid diplomacy at the United Nations, was the need for
greater access to the UN system. In 1962 the General Assembly created a Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid to review and report on developments in South Africa. In 1963 the Security Council increased accessibility when it established a Group of Experts to investigate ways of supporting peaceful change in South Africa. In the course of their duties the group met with the ANC allowing the liberation movement direct access to the United Nations. Whilst important, the ANC’s role was limited to providing information on the situation in South Africa to UN bodies (Thomas, 1989).

Four other events highlighted the development of the relationship between the African National Congress and the United Nations during 1970’s.

Firstly, in 1973 the General Assembly declared that the government did not represent all the people of South Africa and that the ANC and the PAC were the authentic representatives of the majority of South African people. Secondly, in March 1974, the ANC was granted observer status at the UN allowing the ANC the right to address issues of its choice. Thirdly, in October 1976 Oliver Tambo addressed the General Assembly for the first time, on the question of Apartheid. Fourthly, in 1976 the General Assembly authorised the provision of offices for the ANC at the headquarters of the UN and three years later a grant was made available to finance its Mission at the UN (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).

These measures conferred international legitimacy on the African National Congress and its fight against Apartheid, marking an important diplomatic breakthrough for the organisation and promoting its liaison with the various UN structures (Esterhuyse, 1989). The establishment of a permanent observer mission at the United Nations allowed the African National Congress to further its goal of bringing about South Africa’s diplomatic isolation.
ANC activity at the UN relates to the specific campaigns directed at the diplomatic isolation of South Africa. The focus will be on the three United Nations structures, namely, the Special Political Committee, the Security Council and the General Assembly which were part of the campaign for diplomatic isolation.

4.2.1 THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC)

In 1963 Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, addressed the SPC and called for the diplomatic isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world. He argued that such action was necessary because Apartheid was evil and therefore the United Nations had a definitive role to play in eradicating it (SPC 385th Meeting, 18th Session, General Assembly, 1963).

As early as 1966, the Committee was active in shaping international opinion against Apartheid when it participated in an international conference on Apartheid. This conference set the tone for future United Nations activity as it had a fundamental interest in combatting the heresy of Apartheid. The African National Congress attended as an observer and was allowed to make recommendations regarding its own diplomatic campaign. This provided the ANC with an opportunity to participate more vociferously in UN diplomacy. Following the seminar the Special Committee recommended that the UN should be more responsive to the Committee's anti-apartheid activities and proposed an international campaign against Apartheid (Y.U.N, 1965).

In December 1974 the Special Committee changed its name to the Special Committee Against Apartheid, reflecting the new approach to the question of Apartheid. No longer would UN activity focus on merely providing information on Apartheid, now its task was to mobilize against it (Thomas, 1989).
In keeping with the new UN approach, the Special Unit on Apartheid which had been created in 1967, changed its name to the UN Centre Against Apartheid. The Centre organised seminars and conferences to identify obstacles to effective action against Apartheid. The ANC participated in these activities recognising it as support for its goal of isolating South Africa (Finley, 1988).

At the 24th Session of the General Assembly in 1969, Robert Resha of the ANC addressed the SPC on the liberation movement's expectations of the United Nations. He argued that the UN was duty bound to support the South African struggle by applying diplomatic pressure. Following this address the SPC decided to reproduce his speech and distribute it as an official Committee document (SPC 656th Meeting, 24th Session, General Assembly, 1969).

The ANC addressed meetings of the SPC on a number of other occasions. Alfred Nzo also addressed the Special Committee as an ANC representative. On 10 October 1975 he addressed a meeting devoted to observing the Day of Solidarity with South African political prisoners and called for the total isolation of the Apartheid regime of South Africa.

Most of the ANC's activities at the United Nations prior to 1974 were confined to the Special Committee on Apartheid, particularly the sub-committee on petitions which allowed it consistent and direct access to the UN system (SPC 953rd Meeting, 30th Session, General Assembly, 1975). The Special Political Committee formed an important component in the chain of events at the UN. This is where issues were discussed, deliberated and draft resolutions prepared before being referred to the General Assembly.

During the late 1970's and the 1980's the ANC remained active at the Special Committee. The organisation focused on a variety of issues not all of which promoted South Africa's diplomatic
isolation. These included economic sanctions and the sport and cultural boycott which also formed part of the ANC’s general Anti-Apartheid agenda.

1990 was one of the last occasions during which the ANC addressed the SPC. Following Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, he addressed the Special Committee Against Apartheid expressing the ANC’s appreciation for the Committee’s role in the struggle against South Africa,

'We salute the Special Committee Against Apartheid which has been and is a very important instrument in our struggle...
We... pay homage to you all,... the Special Committee Against Apartheid and the United Nations itself, for the work that it has done to end the crime against humanity'

(Reddy, 1990:78)

4.2.2 THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council discussed the issue of Apartheid for the first time in March 1960, following the Sharpeville Massacre. According to Stultz (1989) the Security Council failed to discuss the issue earlier due to the belief that Apartheid, though abhorrent, did not constitute a threat to international peace.

The South African Government had tried to prevent the UN from focusing on Apartheid by claiming that the issue was a domestic one, thereby negating UN intervention. In justifying their position they referred to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter which states that:

'[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...'

However, South African efforts in this regard were foiled by the United Nations which declared Apartheid a crime against humanity.
According to Kaufman (1980), the ANC’s first contact with the Security Council came via the Group of Experts which had been established by the Council in 1963. At that time this structure allowed the ANC limited access to the Security Council. This changed in subsequent years as greater accessibility to the Security Council was made possible.

The influx of Third World countries into the UN brought about important structural changes which benefitted the African National Congress. Firstly, their representation in the General Assembly and the Security Council increased allowing them to influence not only the agenda but also the decision-making. Secondly, a new ethos was introduced emphasising consensus-building as opposed to confrontational voting (Thomas, 1989). In both the General Assembly and the Security Council the Presiding Officer gained influence. A fitting example is one involving the Algerian representative who, as President of the General Assembly, invited Yasser Arafat of the PLO to address the Assembly. He instructed the Chief of Protocol to escort Arafat to the rostrum, an honour which is reserved for Heads of States. This honour which was bestowed on Arafat was indicative of the recognition accorded to the national liberation movements (Kirisci, 1986).

As part of this new approach the President of the Security Council consulted with states as well as with liberation movements, according them equal status and allowing them to participate in Security Council discussions. This position is confirmed by Jaipal (1981) who recognizes the fact that national liberation movements were an important part of the decision-making process at the United Nations.

However, the participation of liberation movements in UN decision-making was not accepted by all concerned. Bailey (1988) notes that the main problem was the fact that no provision was made for the participation of any liberation movement in Security Council deliberations. The subsequent admission of post-colonial...
African and Asian countries as member states of the UN brought about a change in this policy. Henceforth representatives of national liberation movements were invited to address the Security Council.

In the years that followed, the African National Congress was invited under Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure to address the Security Council. Over a period of time it addressed this body on a number of issues, lobbying for action to be taken against South Africa. On 25 October 1974, for example, Duma Nokwe of the ANC addressed the Security Council calling for the expulsion of the racist, criminal regime of South Africa (Security Council, 1802nd Meeting, 1974).

Another of the ANC addresses to the Security Council worth noting is that of Johnny Makatini in 1977. He called for UN support stating that the support of the international community would facilitate the elimination of Apartheid given the fact that it constituted a threat to international peace and security (Security Council, 1992nd Meeting, 1977).

The question of Apartheid continued to be discussed by the Security Council but was linked to specific events in South Africa. According to Thomas (1989) the ANC's invitations to participate in the Security Council were related to particular South African issues such as John Vorster's Detente policy (1974), the Soweto Uprising (1976), the banning of organisations in 1977, the intervention in Angola (1979), South Africa's raid into Lesotho (1982) and South Africa's role in Namibia (1983 and 1985).

Between 1963 and 1988 the Security Council passed twenty four (24) resolutions on South Africa. Whilst all of them promoted or contributed to the ANC's Anti-Apartheid campaign, not all of the resolutions promoted South Africa's diplomatic isolation. For example, Resolution 525 of 1982 was an appeal to the South African Government to commute the death sentences imposed on six
political prisoners. Other issues addressed by the resolutions included economic sanctions, restrictions on sport, cultural relations and an arms embargo (UN Centre Against Apartheid, June 1989).

4.2.3 THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

As stated earlier, South Africa's racial policies first came before the General Assembly of the United Nations as early as 1946. According to Stultz (1987) the question of Apartheid has been more enduring before the world body than any other issue.

The General Assembly was foremost in taking South Africa to task for practising Apartheid and passed 215 resolutions on South Africa between 1946 and 1984. South Africa's failure to comply with the General Assembly's recommendations, the Sharpeville Massacre and the growth in African numbers at the UN led to increasing pressure against South Africa (Stultz, 1987). In 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution appealing to all states and organisations to provide political assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa in their struggle for the eradication of Apartheid. As part of this same resolution the Special Committee was mandated to consult with the ANC on an ongoing basis. In addition, the General Assembly recommended to its members that South Africa should be excluded from all UN activity (Resolution 3324 of 1974).

On 26th October 1976 Oliver Tambo addressed the General Assembly stating,

'[F]or the first time in the history of the United Nations, a representative of the majority of the people of South Africa has been allowed and invited to share this prestigious rostrum with the representatives of the independent and sovereign nations and peoples of the world' (31st General Assembly Session, 1976:698)
The ANC continued to address the General Assembly on a regular basis represented on occasion by Tambo and Johnny Makatini. On 13 November 1986 Makatini addressed a debate on apartheid calling for the increased isolation of South Africa and diplomatic assistance to the ANC’s liberation struggle (41st General Assembly Session, 1986).

Stultz (1987) argues that whilst the General Assembly’s treatment of Apartheid had little effect on the formal agenda of the world community, it did impact on the opinion of the broader political community. Public opinion came to identify South African Apartheid as an outcast social order and the regime itself, as a moral leper. This viewpoint was vindicated by South Africa’s ostracism from the international community.

4.3 THE DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The diplomatic isolation of South Africa was evidenced in several spheres of international relations. It is therefore necessary to focus on the facets of this isolation and assess its success.

Isolation, as Geldenhuys (1990) states, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon embracing four broad areas namely, political-diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural. He identifies seven indicators which can be used to establish whether diplomatic isolation has been achieved. These indicators are as follows:
1. International Recognition
2. Pariah Image
3. Diplomatic Relations
4. Membership of International Organisations
5. Official Visits
6. International Treaties
7. International Censure

The above-mentioned indicators are examined in turn so as to assess the extent of South Africa’s isolation and relies extensively on the work of Geldenhuys (1990).
4.3.1 INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

'Probably the severest form of diplomatic ostracism to which a state... can be subjected, is for the international community to collectively refuse recognition of its statehood' (Geldenhuys, 1990:124).

According to Dugard (1987) racial discrimination and the denial of self-determination preclude the recognition of states. South Africa fell foul of both by practising Apartheid and preventing self-determination in Namibia. The country's statehood was not recognised while the legitimacy of its government was a controversial issue at the UN (Geldenhuys, 1990).

South Africa had played a leading role in the formation of the United Nations and as a founder member its statehood was accepted by the UN. However its statehood became an issue at the United Nations when South Africa granted independence to a number of homelands, recognising them as states in their own right. The creation of Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981) by South Africa was condemned by the UN.

According to Dugard (1987) the independence of the homelands amounted to ethnic self-determination which was in conflict with the UN's demand that all South Africa's people be afforded the right to self-determination. Secondly, the people of South Africa were not offered the option of exercising their rights in South Africa and thus could not determine their own status.

Another fundamental flaw in the creation of the homelands was the fact that they promoted Apartheid. As early as 1962 the General Assembly had called on South Africa to abandon its policies of Apartheid and racial discrimination (Resolution 1761 of 1962). Dugard's (1987) further argues that the homelands violated basic human rights in that citizens of these new creations lost their South African citizenship.
In 1970 the General Assembly passed resolution 2671 stating that the Bantustans were a violation of the principle of self-determination and prejudicial to the integrity of the South African state (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989). This forced denationalization was also criticized by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1986 (Resolution 41/355) when it noted,

'...that the apartheid regime is persisting with its policy of "bantustanization" aimed at further uprooting the oppressed people of South Africa, dispossessing it of its inalienable rights, depriving it of citizenship and fragmenting the country...' (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989:133).

The status of the South African government also came under continued attack at the General Assembly and the Security Council. In 1969 the General Assembly passed Resolution 2506 reiterating its condemnation of Apartheid as a crime against humanity and recognising the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa. It urged its members to increase assistance to the national liberation movement.

Resolution 2671 of 1970 urged all member states of the United Nations to terminate diplomatic and other official relations with the government of South Africa. In keeping with the attack on the South African government, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3151 in 1973 which declared that the South African regime had no right to represent the people of South Africa. It also gave effective recognition to the ANC as one of the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of South Africans (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).

The General Assembly continued to reaffirm its recognition of the ANC as the authentic representative of the South African people. In Resolution 31/6 (1973) the ANC was mentioned by name as
representative of the majority of South Africans and the situation in South Africa was recognised as constituting a threat to peace.

In 1973 the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting its specialised agencies to expel South Africa. The effect of this resolution is discussed in 4.3.4. This move was followed by the rejection of South Africa's credentials by the General Assembly in 1974 and the subsequent granting of observer status to the African National Congress.

The attitude of the General Assembly was summarised as follows, 'the South African government is illegitimate and should be overthrown and replaced in power by the liberation movement[s]' (Geldenhuys, 1990:139).

The Security Council adopted a similar approach to the issue of Apartheid. As early 1963 the Security Council condemned South Africa's racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles of the UN (Resolution 181 [1963]). However, it only formally recognised the legitimacy of the struggle by South Africa's oppressed people in 1972 (Resolution 311) (UN Centre Against Apartheid, June 1989).

In 1980 the Security Council reaffirmed its opposition to Apartheid and recognised the right of the South African people to eliminate it. The political transformation in South Africa following the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, which extended the franchise to Coloured and Indian people was also condemned by the Council. It criticized the exclusion of African people from the political process and rejected the so-called new constitution as contrary to the UN's principles (Security Council Resolution 554 [1984]).
...South Africa's domestic policies have landed it in a uniquely isolated and friendless position in the United Nations...’ (Pienaar, 1985:10).

Before the dark days of Apartheid, South Africa was a prominent member of the League of Nations. The country's leader General Jan Smuts was a respected international figure and South African troops fought in World War Two as part of the Allied Forces. Following the war however, South Africa's prominence started to fade. It began to endure the wrath of the international community, in particular that of the United Nations. The Apartheid policies of the South African Government caused international concern and the United Nations was instrumental in ostracising South Africa from the international arena.

The campaign to isolate South Africa assumed various forms, with the most direct measures being imposed by the United Nations. In addition to this direct action, South Africa was accorded pariah status in a number of secondary ways. For example, South Africans were portrayed by the international media as villains. According to Geldenhuys (1990) these efforts strengthened the international consensus that Apartheid was evil and that the Apartheid regime deserved to be treated as an international outlaw.

Vale (1977) identifies the following characteristics of pariahhood:

a. The pariah is in conflict with the international community,

b. Conforming to the mores of the international community may result in the demise of the pariah,

c. The pariah is anti-communist,

d. The pariah's economic system is modelled on the capitalist system,

e. The pariah maintains that its strategic importance in the bipolar world cannot be eroded.
It is clear that South Africa's pariahhood stemmed from its interpretation of its Apartheid belief system. South Africa saw the system as offering Black people an equal opportunity in their own setting whilst the world saw Apartheid as racial discrimination.

The second characteristic of the pariah is that if it conforms to the mores of the international community it will cause its own demise. Thus if South Africa had to comply with the wishes of the international community and abolish Apartheid the socio-political face of the country would be transformed.

The adherence to Anti-communism in South Africa created such a phobia that any opposition to Apartheid was branded communist. Even non-communist opposition was branded communist in the guise of internal repression. Vale (1977) argues that this position of the South African Government in fact strengthened Communism's appeal in the country. Coupled with this was South Africa's claim to having a capitalist economic system. Yet an examination of the economy showed a high level of state control and that at best, the economy was mixed.

The final characteristic is that of strategic importance. South Africa believed that it was important to the international community due to the Cape Sea route and the country's mineral wealth. The importance of the sea route was negated by existence of alternate routes and the capacity of modern ships to stay at sea for lengthy periods and travel long distances. South Africa's mineral potential was also undermined by the development of substitute materials and new mining ventures in other parts of the world.

4.3.3 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

'The enforced curtailment of its diplomatic ties is in fact a typical means of promoting the isolation of an errant state' (Geldenhuys, 1990:144)
The recognition which a state is accorded influences the extent of its diplomatic relations. The term diplomatic relations refers to the ties which states have with each other so as to facilitate communication between them. An assessment of South Africa's diplomatic relations is thus an indicator of its acceptance in the international community.

An overview of South Africa's diplomatic relations shows that it experienced a great deal of fluctuation. Whilst it continued to lose diplomatic representation these losses were offset by gains in the TVBC (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei) states. These were the Black Homelands established by the South African Government as part of its Apartheid blue-print. In addition to this, South Africa recognised several military dictators in South America so as to bolster its level of diplomatic relations (Geldenhuys, 1990).

The diplomatic losses which South Africa experienced can be attributed to the United Nations. According to Geldenhuys (1990), the UN and the African National Congress were the isolators which actively promoted South Africa's diplomatic ostracism. He further recognises that due to the efforts of the ANC, South Africa was left with a diplomatic network which was incommensurate with its national power. Not only did the ANC cause the decline of South Africa's diplomatic representation but its own foreign representation experienced growth because of this.

By December 1987 the African National Congress had 26 offices throughout the world and in 1989 it announced the opening of new offices in Washington, Madrid, Caracas and Tripoli. Such was the ANC's diplomatic growth that by 1990 it exceeded the number of diplomatic missions which the South African Government had in the capitals of the world (Thomas, 1989).
4.3.4 MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The diplomatic isolation which South Africa was exposed to also had an impact on its membership of international organisations. The first blow in this campaign was delivered when South Africa was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961. According to Geldenhuys (1990) this success inspired the African states at the United Nations to pressurise South Africa to withdraw from other international forums.

Following the success at the Commonwealth, the International Labour Organisation passed a resolution on South Africa in 1961. It declared South Africa's membership inconsistent with the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation and urged that the Republic be advised to withdraw until Apartheid was abolished. Thereafter South Africa forfeited its membership of a number of international organisations including the Food and Agricultural Union (1964), the World Health Organisation (1964) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1968) (Geldenhuys, 1990).

At the United Nations a resolution was passed by the General Assembly in 1973 requesting all UN specialised agencies and other international organisations to deny membership to South Africa (Resolutions 3151). Following this resolution South Africa lost its membership of the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal Postal Union, the International Civil aviation Organisation and the Inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission (1977) (Geldenhuys, 1990).

South Africa also lost its seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors in June 1977. Two years later at the 25th Conference of the IAEA the credentials of the South African delegation were rejected, barring them from future participation in its activities (Heunis, 1986).

Internationally South Africa maintained contact with a limited
number of organisations. It remained a formal member of the General Assembly without having membership rights. South Africa also participated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Committee of the International Red Cross and it could address the Security Council on matters relating to South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1990).

Finally, it is worth noting that South Africa’s ostracism began in the 1960s and accelerated following the General Assembly’s call to deny South Africa membership of International Organisations (Geldenhuys, 1990).

4.3.5 OFFICIAL VISITS

'South Africa’s diplomatic isolation has long been manifesting itself in the relative scarcity of top-level foreign visitors to and from the country’

(Geldenhuys, 1990:227).

It is a common feature of diplomacy for states to exchange state visits when they are favourably disposed towards each other. In this regard the highest accolade is an official visit by the Head of the State. In this section the focus will be on visits undertaken and received by South Africa’s Heads of State.

Geldenhuys (1990) recognises that South Africa’s diplomatic isolation manifested itself in the lack of frequent travels abroad and the scarcity of visitors to South Africa.

Between 1960 and 1990 South Africa received 11 official visits by Heads of State. Of these Harold Macmillian, who visited in 1960, was the only leader of international note. The other leaders who visited included Ian Smith (Rhodesia), Lee Teng-hui (Taiwan) and Metsing Lekhanya (Lesotho). Rhodesia like South Africa was condemned because of minority rule, Taiwan’s statehood was not recognised internationally and Lesotho was under military rule.
At the inauguration of P.W. Botha as State President, the only foreign dignitary in attendance was the Vice-President of Taiwan. Similarly, when Margaret Thatcher was selected by the Johannesburg Press Club as the 1987 Newsmaker of the Year, she refused the award due to the political environment in South Africa. At that time South Africa was facing the brunt of a worldwide move to exclude it from all spheres of international interaction.

Not only does the lack of visitors to South Africa reflect its status as a pariah, the number of visits which it undertook is also indicative thereof. During the period 1960 to 1990 the various Heads of State visited forty-three destinations, undertaking a number of visits which included more than one destination. These visits are tabulated in Appendix A.

In 1961 South Africa attended a meeting of the Commonwealth of Nations the last visit to that body before its expulsion. No other visit was undertaken by a South Africa Head of State in the 1960's. Whilst some visits were undertaken in the 1970's they were insignificant. The seven nation European tour in 1984 was significant as it was the first meeting in twenty years between the South African and European Heads of State (Geldenhuys, 1990).

As previously stated, a number of the visits undertaken by the Head of State were unofficial. The European tour of 1970 as well as the visit to Uruguay in 1975 were private visits. The visits to France in 1984 and 1986 involved no contact with the authorities and involved visits to the Delville Wood War Memorial and the opening of a museum. The President attended the coronation of the Swazi King and the funeral of the Bavarian Premier. The visit to Switzerland was also unofficial.

South Africa was afforded international contact when the Namibian agreement was concluded in 1988. The highlight in 1988 was the meeting with the West German Chancellor. A year later the South African Head of State met the British Prime Minister and the
German Chancellor. An invitation to visit Washington was extended but pressure from the United States Congress prevented the visit.

Whilst the South African Head of State was ostracised by the international community, the African National Congress was accepted. Not only did the ANC enjoy de facto support at the United Nations it was also invited to international events at the expense of the South African government. For example, the ANC attended the funeral of the late Olaf Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden as official guests whilst the South African government was not invited. Similarly in 1989, the ANC was invited to attended a banquet hosted by the French government to celebrate the anniversary of the French Revolution whilst the South African government was not (Thomas, 1989).

4.3.6 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Diplomatic relations between states are reflected in a number of ways, one of which is the existence of treaties. The term treaty is used here to refer to any agreement entered into by states. The number of treaties which a state enters into as well as the identity of its treaty partners, reflect its level of recognition and status in the international community.

Geldenhuys (1990) conducted a study of South Africa's treaties and found that it concluded approximately 236 agreements during the period 1960 to 1990. This figure excludes secret treaties as well as those concluded with the Black homelands. A closer examination of the number of treaties entered into shows that it concluded 25 bi-lateral agreements in 1964. During this period the campaign to isolate South Africa was still in its infancy. Twenty years later, when that campaign was in full swing South Africa concluded only 5 agreements. In fact, since 1969 it concluded less than 10 treaties a year.
An examination of South Africa's multi-lateral agreements reflect a similar level of decline in the 1980's. This decline can partially be attributed to the campaign to isolate South Africa. In 1962 South Africa entered 18 into treaties, the highest number in any one year. This feat was repeated in 1971 and was the last time that the country averaged more than nine treaties per year. In the 1980's this figure was considerably lower with one treaty being concluded in 1981, 1982 and 1985.

A large percentage of the treaties which South Africa concluded were with the Black homelands. South Africa and the Transkei concluded 93 treaties between 1976 and 1986 whilst it concluded 123 with Bophuthatswana from 1977 to 1986. Only two of the multi-lateral agreements which South Africa entered into were of some significance. In the 1980's South Africa signed a non-aggression pact with Mozambique known as the Nkomati Accord (1984) and in 1988 the Brazzaville Protocol was concluded with Angola and Cuba thus paving the way for Namibia's independence.

Not all the treaties which South Africa entered furthered its diplomatic relations. From 1961 to 1986 South Africa concluded forty one agreements of a diplomatic, administrative or judicial nature. These treaties related to extradition orders, taxation and visa requirements. The other categories of treaties entered into during this period included economic co-operation, health, communication and military matters. These agreements were important in determining the extent to which South Africa was excluded from the international community.

Not only are the number of treaties entered into important, so to is the identity of the partner. As stated earlier, South Africa entered numerous treaties with the Homelands but these treaties are not recognised when determining the number of agreements entered into. In the 1960's South Africa concluded treaties with 13 countries most of these with the United Kingdom. In the 1970's South Africa's treaty partners numbered nine and by the 1980's this number was down to four. These partners
namely, Taiwan, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi were South Africa's only partners in the 1980's.

South Africa thus experienced a dramatic decrease in the number of treaties which it entered into between 1960 and 1990. In addition to this numerical decline, the international standing of its treaty partners in the 1980's was questionable. According to Geldenhuys (1990), the decline in the number of agreements and treaty partners suggest that South Africa was not in demand as a treaty partner. This position can be attributed to South Africa's status as pariah and the campaign to isolate it.

4.3.7 INTERNATIONAL CENSURE

Geldenhuys (1990) recognises censure as the final indicator of isolation. According to the Collins Paperback Thesaurus (1993) to censure means to reprimand, rebuke, denounce, castigate criticize or to condemn. In this context it means the condemnation of a state which has transgressed society's norms. The focus here will be the measure of censure applied to South Africa by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

As early as 1962 the United Nations censured South Africa when the General Assembly passed Resolution 1761 calling for members to break off diplomatic relations, close their ports to South African ships, refuse their aircraft landing rights and to boycott all its goods (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).

In subsequent resolutions the General Assembly continued in a similar vein. In 1966 it resolved (Resolution 2202) that its members should cease to sell and deliver arms to South Africa, it discouraged economic relations and called on the Security Council to consider the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The General Assembly recognised that Apartheid should be eliminated and continuously reaffirmed the legitimacy of the liberation movement's struggle (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).
In 1972 the General Assembly (Resolution 2923) invited all organisations and institutions to campaign for the discontinuation of military, political and economic ties with South Africa. In addition it called for a cessation of foreign investment as well as the institution of sport and cultural boycotts (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).

The General Assembly adopted an International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid in 1973 to allow for more effective international measures against Apartheid. The following year South African diplomacy was dealt a cruel blow when its credentials were rejected by the United Nations while the African National Congress was recognised as one of the authentic representatives of the South African people (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989). In the late 1970's and the 1980's the General Assembly continued to censure South Africa via the resolutions which it adopted.

In addition to the measures set out above, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965, it proclaimed 1978 the Year of International Anti-Apartheid and 1981 was proclaimed the International Year for the Mobilisation for Sanctions Against South Africa. Furthermore the General Assembly adopted the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports in 1985 and reaffirmed its commitment to isolate the racist South African regime from the field of international sport (UN Centre Against Apartheid, August 1989).

The Security Council first dealt with the South African issue when, following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, it passed a resolution condemning Apartheid and the Massacre itself (Geldenhuys, 1990). It next called for Apartheid to be abandoned by the Government in Resolution 181 of 1963. In Resolution 182 of 1963 the Security Council established a Group of Experts to propose solutions to the South African situation which extended
human rights and fundamental freedoms to all its inhabitants (UN Centre Against Apartheid, June 1989).

Since 1970 the Security Council considered the South African issue on an annual basis, adopting numerous resolutions censuring the country (Geldenhuys, 1990). In 1970 the Security Council adopted Resolution 282 calling for the strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa. The legitimacy of the struggle in South Africa was recognised by the Security Council in 1972 (Resolution 311) and it condemned the use of force by the South African government in response to peaceful protest in 1976 (Resolution 392). It also called on all governments and organisations in Resolution 417 (1977) to take appropriate measures to ensure that Apartheid was abolished and replaced by majority rule (UN Centre Against Apartheid, June 1989).

In the 1980's the Security Council proposed amnesty for political prisoners and it called for the death sentences imposed on a number of ANC members to be commuted. It also declared the 1983 Constitution of South Africa to be invalid (UN Centre Against Apartheid, June 1989). According to Geldenhuys (1990) the objective of the Security Council was the eradication of Apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democratic society based on self-determination and majority rule.

4.4 A BRIEF ASSESSMENT

It is evident from the above that the ANC's campaign to isolate South Africa was successful. The formal lobbying before the principal organs and committees of the UN bore fruit in that the country was systematically isolated from the international community. Its pariah status coupled with the rapid decrease in diplomatic links forced the country into a tenuous position. Not only was its statehood not recognised but its diplomatic links with First and Third World countries were severed.

In terms of the model of indicators provided by Geldenhuys (1990)
the position of South Africa during the period 1960 to 1990 was that of an isolated state. It is clear that the efforts of the ANC at the UN contributed to this status.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the African National Congress at the United Nations, setting out the ANC’s acceptance at the United Nations and its participation in the UN system. The central focus of the thesis has been how the ANC contributed to South Africa’s diplomatic isolation.

The international isolation of South Africa formed one of the pillars of the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle. In pursuing this struggle the ANC took its cause to the United Nations which was the foremost international institution of the time. The ANC’s entry into the international arena coincided with the growth of Third World membership at the United Nations. This influx of new nations and the recognition of national liberation movements, facilitated ANC participation at the UN. The ANC was welcomed at the United Nations and accorded observer status. This allowed the organisation to participate in the activities of the UN and to influence international opinion. In this regard the thesis has examined how the ANC contributed to the diplomatic isolation of South Africa. By addressing the various forums of the UN, the ANC continually called for South Africa’s diplomatic isolation. The extent to which South Africa was isolated diplomatically was assessed by using the indicators provided by Geldenhuys (1990).

The findings of Geldenhuys in this regard were that South Africa was an isolated entity in the international political arena. South Africa’s position during this period was described as follows,

'[t]he Republic’s position in the international community is thus a singularly unenviable one. The country stands utterly condemned and external pressure is mounting ominously’ (Geldenhuys, 1977:113).

South Africa pre-1960 was a respected member of the international community, having played an important part in the formation of the United Nations. This position changed drastically after 1960.
when the UN started taking an active interest in South Africa and its Apartheid policies. To force South Africa to abolish Apartheid the ANC called at the United Nations for South Africa to be isolated diplomatically.

The isolationist campaign lasted several decades and received impetus from events inside South Africa which brought international condemnation. These included the 1976 Soweto uprisings when students protested against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in Black schools and the 1983 Constitutional changes which extend the franchise to Coloured and Indian people but not African people.

South Africa's position as a diplomatic outcast was initiated in the 1960's and continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's until 1990. In February of that year F.W. De Klerk, then State President of South Africa, announced the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC. These events preceded the introduction of a democratic dispensation in South Africa and marked the end of the campaign to isolate South Africa diplomatically.

Whilst the success of South Africa's diplomatic isolation can be attributed to the activities of the ANC, the thesis acknowledges that this was not the only contributing factor. The support that the ANC received from organisations such as the United Nations proved invaluable in achieving this goal. Furthermore, the objective of isolating South Africa diplomatically was but one component of the wider Anti-Apartheid Struggle.

Another important aspect of this thesis is its examination of the role of non-state actors in the international political arena. In considering the role of the ANC in the international arena, Scott Thomas (1989) argues that international organisations had allowed the ANC greater access to decision-making by allowing it to participate in their deliberations. According to El-Ayouty (1972) the legitimization of African Liberation Movements at the
UN symbolised the revolution that has taken place at that institution. These developments reflect the growing importance of non-state actors in the international political arena.

Suggestions for future research

Whilst the central focus of the thesis is the ANC at the UN, the study only focuses on the formal input which the ANC Mission made at the United Nations. It excludes the informal lobbying of the ANC, the so-called 'corridor' or 'backroom' diplomacy. A full assessment of the ANC's role in contributing to South Africa's diplomatic isolation would need to focus on this aspect. Furthermore, the study has not addressed the importance of contextualising this campaign within the larger Anti-Apartheid struggle waged in South Africa.
APPENDIX A
THE VISITS OF SOUTH AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1960 AND 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>VISITOR</th>
<th>SP/PM</th>
<th>STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>HF VERWOERD</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>GREAT BRITAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>BJ VORSTER</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>RHODESIA, MALAWI, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE, SWITZERLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>JJ FOUCHÉ</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>IRAN, AUSTRIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>JJ FOUCHÉ</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>BJ VORSTER</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>IVORY COAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>BJ VORSTER</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>LIBERIA, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>BJ VORSTER</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>PW BOTHA</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>TAIWAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>PW BOTHA</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>GREAT BRITAIN, PORTUGAL, WEST GERMANY, BELGIUM, AUSTRIA, ITALY, VATICAN, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>PW BOTHA</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>FRANCE, PORTUGAL, SWAZILAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>PW BOTHA</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE, MALAWI, WEST GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, PORTUGAL, IVORY COAST, ZAIRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>FW DE KLÉRK</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>WEST GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, PORTUGAL, ITALY, MOZAMBIQUE, ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, LESOTHO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY:
PM = PRIME MINISTER
SP = STATE PRESIDENT
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