CUBA’S REVOLUTIONIST AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA

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TIMOTHY FRANKLIN OTHIENO

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Cuba’s role in the two southern African countries of Angola and Namibia during the Cold War period. It argues that Cuba’s ideological motivations have been embodied in the mutually reinforcing concepts of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. These conceptual perspectives constitute some of the central variables that influence Cuba’s foreign policy behaviour in international relations. It is within this context that one can understand Cuba’s involvement in Southern Africa.

This study also attempts to explain that Cuban foreign policy towards Africa was based on two complementary and contextual objectives namely, promoting nationalism at home and nurturing revolutionary Marxist-Leninist governments, as well as supporting anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements abroad. For the purpose of achieving these foreign policy objectives, Cuba not only engaged in state-to-state relations with Angola and Namibia; but had cordial relations with the rest of the continent and in particular Southern Africa, which also became a direct military testing ground for Cuba’s commitment to an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist revolutionary stance.

Furthermore, the thesis shows that Cuba’s relentless hatred of imperialism is rooted in its historical relationship with the United States because from the turn of the century till 1958, the Americans interfered in Cuba’s internal affairs by supporting corrupt administrations and exploited the country. These practices by the United States laid the foundation for Cuba’s anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism abroad. Ultimately, this thesis shows that Cuban involvement in Angola and Namibia can be conceptualised within these contexts (anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, proletarian internationalism and revolutionary Marxism-Leninism). The role of Cuban nationalism in the realisation of these objectives and ideals, as well as its role in perpetuating and consolidating her foreign policy is assessed in this study. This nationalism and ideals of internationalism constitutes the central idea in the Cuban revolution. Finally, this thesis asserts that Cuban motives for getting involved in the politics of Southern Africa were not motivated by economic or imperialistic reasons. Rather, the historical similarity and colonial experiences between Africa and Cuba were some of the central causal factors.
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GLOSSARY

ANC - African National Congress.

ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations.

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency.

FAPLA – Angolan Peoples Freedom Liberation Army.

FLEC – Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda.

FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional Para Liberataciao do Angola).


GDP – Gross Domestic Product.

MPLA – Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular Liberataciao do Angola).

NAM – Non Aligned Movement.

OAS – Organisation of American States.


OPEC – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

SADF – South African Defence Forces.

SWA – South West Africa.

SWAPO – South West African Peoples Organisation.

UN – United Nations.

UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Union Para Independencia Total do Angola).


**USSR** – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

**WHO** – World Health Organisation.
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CHAPTER 1

1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The 1988 Angola-Namibia Accords signed between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, contributed to a much-changed situation in southern Africa with major ramifications for Cuba today, if not in the future. These three countries together with the United Nations (UN), the Soviet Union, the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and the United States (US) as observers, signed the Tripartite Agreement. The Accords, once signed, meant that Namibia (then South West Africa) would receive its independence in November 1989 and that Cuban forces would be withdrawn from Angola, with the objective of eliminating a major source of superpower tension in the region, while at the same time establishing the necessary conditions for reconciliation in Angola.

The role of the observers should be clearly understood here, in that they had interests at stake in these negotiations that were crucial to each of the players. The only exceptions were the UN and SWAPO. The main aim of the UN was to see a peaceful and amicable transition to Namibian independence. On the other hand SWAPO- the major domestic player, was more interested in forming the national government in Namibia. If we focus our attention on the two superpowers - the Soviet Union and the US- we find that in 1988, they were the only two superpowers in the world. Both countries had tremendous political influence. The US based its policy in southern Africa on “constructive engagement”. This was a policy formulated by the Reagan Administration under the initiative and direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. One of the main objectives of the Reagan Administration was to try to convince the South African apartheid government that reforming the system was in its own interest. At the heart of the policy
were anti-communist concerns rather than emphasizing human rights or resource securement. For
the Reagan Administration, South Africa was seen as the regional bulwark against the menace of
communism. In practice, although this policy was anti-communist in nature, it meant that the US
would accommodate South Africa and her allies in the region in the fight against communism. With
this in mind, the US chose to pursue the “constructive engagement” policy by implementing the
Reagan Doctrine that essentially provided overt American support for anti-communist guerrilla
movements around the world (Reagan 1984:10).

In this scenario, the US paid lip service to the UN arms embargo against South Africa and behind
the scenes did everything possible to assist the P.W. Botha regime consolidate its power and
extend South Africa’s influence in not only Namibia but throughout southern Africa (Lulat
1991:33). This policy of Constructive Engagement contained four core premises namely:

(i) That South Africa’s high economic and military predominance in southern Africa
and powerful internal security machinery would in the short term enable Pretoria
“manage” internal and external pressures for change.

(ii) The Botha administration could be induced to agree to an internationally accepted
settlement in Namibia if South Africa’s withdrawal were linked to the withdrawal
of Cuban troops from Angola which would leave room for more cordial US-
South African and US-Cuban relations.

(iii) An early Namibian settlement would set a domino effect of positive developments
in South Africa and in the region, hence validating the policy itself.

(iv) The US government would hasten the progress (of the Namibian settlement) more
quickly with official rather than public channels for its criticism and pressure.
(Secretary of State 1987).

The Reagan administration chose to work closely with the South Africans by stressing common
strategic interests such as anti-communism, commercial and strategic interests, and the dislike for
Cuba, the Soviet Union and their allies (Baker 1989:3-5). In other words, Washington preferred to
deal with Pretoria alone than with all the other countries involved in southern Africa. Hence, Cuba and the Frontline States (FLS) (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) were each dealt with on an individual basis and not as a united front in relation to the Namibian independence.

In retrospect, Baker (1989) has noted that the policy of constructive engagement failed in its objectives despite crucial efforts on Washington’s part to resuscitate it. For example, in spite of the US’ sympathetic approach towards Pretoria, the South African government refused to address the central issue of black political rights and the Namibian independence. As a result of the intransigence of South Africa, the number of Cuban troops in Angola increased drastically, with violence escalating throughout the region.

On the other hand, Chester Crocker viewed “constructive engagement” as a great opportunity for US diplomacy in southern Africa and that by applying this policy, conflicts in Angola and Namibia would draw to an end (Crocker 1980:324-351). As far as Crocker was concerned, the US could best promote change in Namibia by working with the apartheid regime and taking account of white fears by increasing their confidence. Crocker believed that such a strategy would serve as a broker in the resolution of the conflict in Namibia and in the region, hence increasing Pretoria’s willingness to embark on a serious reform program.

Against her enemies, the policy of constructive engagement helped serve American interests well. It is now known that the US sided with South Africa (though there is little data to confirm this) in negotiations that later led to a peaceful settlement and by supplying her with the necessary military hardware and personnel vis-à-vis Cuba and the Frontline States. The military support provided to
South Africa and her allies was in conformity with the Reagan Administration’s geo-strategic interests in the region. China, who had earlier supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), backed off after Pretoria’s overt support for Savimbi became evident and known by the parties involved. Even though China and the Soviet Union supported Cuba in Angola and Namibia, the two countries (Soviet Union and China) were in favour of a quick solution to the conflict.

Going back to the situation in Angola, the presence of Cuban troops in this country even prior to Angola gaining her independence in 1975, had been as a result of the breakdown of the Alvar Accord (which called for a transition government at the onset of independence comprising of all the three major political movements) and also by an attempt by a joint National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), UNITA, and South Africa to take over the central government in Luanda before independence. Cuba’s involvement in Angola was justified by the fact that it was in conformity with its revolutionist and anti-imperial foreign policy. This was due to the fact that the main rebel group in Angola – UNITA, was backed by the US and apartheid South Africa. Cuba soon determined that this was yet another imperialist gimmick by the US and her allies to get involved in Angola so that they could place UNITA in power and continue exploiting the resources (oil and diamonds) in Angola. Hence, Cuba’s main and immediate aim was to ward off the threat posed by Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. The Cuban presence in Angola thus became a threat to both South West Africa (later Namibia), before its independence and to South Africa. Cuba in the meantime assisted SWAPO in making incursions into Namibian territory. As a *quid pro quo*, South Africa employed the same tactics in the Angolan territory by assisting UNITA. Cuba’s assistance to SWAPO can also be explained within the contexts of Cuban foreign policy. Cuba entrenched in her constitution the policy of proletarian internationalism, which involved the need for Cuba to support
all oppressed people of the world who had not yet attained independence and were under the yoke of colonialism. Cuba in this regard deemed it necessary that colonialism was to be eradicated and people set free to determine their own destinies by way of self-determination. It is in line with this policy that Cuba supported both the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and SWAPO.

Cuba’s military presence in southern Africa and in particular Angola has been noted as being a major factor in bringing independence to Namibia, securing victory for the socialist regime in Angola in 1975, as well as fighting colonialist forces in both countries (Briquets 1989:29-48). Hence, Cuba claimed an influential role in the demise of colonialism in southern Africa. Cuba was determined to ward off Pretoria’s colonial tendencies in Namibia and imperialist overtures in Angola militarily while at the same time prevented UNITA from destabilizing the democratically elected revolutionary-socialist regime in Angola.

Cuba’s deployment of more than 60,000 troops and an indeterminate number of civilians (doctors, nurses, builders and teachers) was a clear testimony of Cuba’s commitment in the fight against colonialism and imperialism. For example, by early 1988 over 38,000 troops and 11,000 civilian assistance workers were in Africa, and by the end of the same year, there were nearly 60,000 troops in Angola alone (Briquets 1989; CIA 1979 and US News and World Report, December 8, 1975: 27). For Cubans, international proletarianism involves much more than just the sending of military personnel to a country in need, but it also includes sending of other non-military personnel (civilian workers). This is because revolutionary ideals can be disseminated when the peoples of both countries work hand in hand to fight their common enemy, while at the same time staying true to the ideals they believe in. Since 1975, the Cuban economy has suffered not only because of the
demands created by her expeditionary forces, but also due to the economic embargo placed on her by the US and her allies. Despite all this, these military expeditions are designed to fight capitalism, imperialism and colonialism while at the same time spreading Cuba’s revolutionary ideals and providing the much-needed human technical assistance in southern Africa.

The central focus of this research is on Cuba’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, with special emphasis on Angola and Namibia. Cuba’s political and military objectives as well as her civilian assistance program in southern Africa are analysed. The research will look into the deployment of Cuban civilian and military personnel in the two states and the role they played in promoting Cuba’s internationalist policy of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.

Briquets (1989:3) has argued that Cuba embarked on a proactive diplomacy with sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970’s. Though Cuba’s initial diplomatic relations were selective and essentially determined by an affinity for revolutionary regimes, this stance changed towards the end of the 1960’s when Cuba embarked on a more “anti-imperial and internationalist” crusade. By the mid 1980’s, over 40 African countries had diplomatic relations with Cuba. Despite having diplomatic relations with most of the African states, Cuba still had limited economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, the severe economic crises of the 1980s forced Fidel Castro to reduce Cuba’s African presence, which culminated into the closure of a number of embassies.

It has been noted that the presence of Cuban troops in southern Africa would not have been crucial had Cuba not been able to combine her resources with the logistical support of the Soviet Union and her Eastern European allies. However, this is not to argue that Cuban-Soviet military ventures in the region were not at odds at certain times (Falk 1987:1077-1097). Cuba was the only Third
World nation that launched a worldwide foreign technical assistance program particularly in the areas of public health and education, which rivalled those of small and medium sized developed states. Consequently, thousands of Cuban teachers and medical doctors were sent abroad to work.

Cuba had more physicians abroad than those deployed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Briquets 1989). It is clear from Table One that the medical services Cuba provided to the African countries was vital to the medical well being of the peoples of these states as well as to their medical services. For example, in Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Tanzania, the Cuban medical personnel constituted almost 70% of the total number of physicians. All this assistance to the needy countries was provided free of charge, which increased Cuba’s prestige and influence abroad, especially with recipient countries. It can be argued that the deployment of Cuban workers in Africa was centred on Cuba’s internationalist proletarian policy to disseminate the ideals of her revolution around the world. Consequently, these workers not only aided these countries with their expertise, but in the process also spread the revolutions’ ideals to the people they came across.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Country</th>
<th>Number of Cuban Health Care Personnel</th>
<th>Number of Cuban Physicians</th>
<th>Total Number of Physicians</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Physicians from Cuba</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>2586</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK= Unknown</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In comparison with Namibia, Cuba’s political and military involvement in Angola was more complex. Military support for the MPLA represented a dramatic leap in the nature and scale of Cuba’s internationalist policy and influence in southern Africa. The longevity of the Angolan war and the fact that UNITA was not defeated, led to the signing of the Angola-Namibia Accords, which ended Cuba’s presence in southern Africa. According to Briquets (1989: 7), Cuba’s involvement in Angola and in the region was viewed negatively by some segments of the Cuban society, who were disillusioned with the Angolan crisis as it no longer brought immediate moral and financial rewards (Briquets 1989: 7). This was because Cuba’s involvement in Africa was meant to heighten Cuban nationalism at home and bring the much-needed respect among states to Cuba for
her contribution in fighting colonialism and imperialism. Still, Cuba’s policy was that though positive results would take time to be realised because of the complex nature of the conflict in southern Africa, in the long run, they would achieve their goals.

The key determinant in the Namibian independence process was the daring military move by the Cuban expeditionary force on the Angolan-Namibian border in 1987 against both UNITA and South Africa, which ended with the signing of the Angola-Namibia Accords and mediated by the US after years of futile attempts. These accords provided for, among other things, Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola and northern Namibia as well as South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia to enable Namibia gain her independence. What is crucial to note was the changed security equation in southern Africa as a result of the Cubans’ successful challenge to South Africa’s military forces. These agreements in the final analysis paved the way for Namibian independence in 1990 led by SWAPO, the major domestic political player in Namibia.

In summary, it must be noted that Cuba was neither a proxy of the Soviet Union nor a totally autonomous actor. Apart from the logistic support the Soviets gave to the Cubans, Cuba also benefited from the Soviet Union’s military assistance in both Angola and Namibia. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union were partners in arms over the Angolan conflict and in the Namibian question. Consequently, there is the possibility that the Soviets provided Cuba with support as a way of capitalizing on Cuban efforts noting that both states had the same interests and goals to pursue in supporting the MPLA and SWAPO over the other rebel movements in Angola and Namibia. Assessing Cuba’s involvement in Africa is a difficult process because of the scarcity of hard data, which has been concealed by the Cuban government. Ultimately, analysing the effectiveness and the extent of Cuba’s initiatives in the region, especially her contribution to the stability and development
of these southern African states, has become a laborious task. The development and continuity of Cuba’s relations with Africa has to a great extent been facilitated by Fidel Castro’s long tenure in power. Cuba has been involved in wide ranging activities in the region, some very successful such as the civilian international co-operation programs and military involvement, and others not, such as the failure to achieve a decisive military victory over UNITA in Angola.

Cuba’s international civilian assistance program therefore overshadowed her more traditional diplomatic, political and economic relations with Africa. This is because of the prestige that came to surround the program around the world. It was, and still is seen by most countries as prestigious, especially for a small nation like Cuba despite her economic hardships. This study traces the evolution of Cuba’s African policy, with special emphasis on the two southern African states, providing some background on Cuba’s actual involvement in specific issues. Specifically, the study examines Cuba’s revolutionist anti-imperial and anti-colonial foreign policy in southern Africa within the realist paradigm.

1.2 REALISM

The study of Cuba’s revolutionist and anti-imperial foreign policy in southern Africa can be understood within the context of realism as the theoretical point of departure. Realism is based on four key assumptions. First, that states are the principal or most important actors. They constitute the key conceptual focal units of analysis. Realists believe that the study of international relations is the study of relations among these units. Subsequently, realists use the concept of a system, defined in terms of interrelated parts usually referred to as the international system of states (Viotti 1993:53; Waltz 1995:67-82; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971:65 and Morgenthau 1978). It has been argued that international relations consists of relations among political units in a divided
world. To realists, these relations among states are marked by conflict (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971:95 - 99; Brown 1995 and Bull 1987:67-74).

Secondly, the state is viewed as a **unitary actor**. Here, realists view the state as having different internal views, but when it comes to interacting with the external environment, it is assumed to do so with one voice as an integrated monolithic unit. A common assumption associated with realist thought is that political differences within the state are ultimately resolved authoritatively, such that the government of the state is assumed to speak with one voice for the state as a whole. The state as a unitary actor is assumed to have a single policy at any given period on a particular issue (Olson 1987:146-160). This does not imply that there are not any exceptions, but that exceptions exist which do not undermine this assumption but demonstrate the rule that the state does and is an integrated, unitary actor.

In line with this assumption, the concept of statesman emerges. The inherent assumption here is that statesmen act rationally in their states’ interests. By interest here we mean the national interest of that particular country or state. In this regard it is vital to note that specific political issues are not the primary motives of statesmen, but their intellectual ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy and translate their decisions into successful political actions (Morgenthau 1978:5 and Kissinger 1979). Consequently, the statesman in this study is identified with Fidel Castro as the Cuban sovereign head of state. With this analogy stated, Castro is assumed to be a rational leader who meets the problems of his country’s foreign policy under certain circumstances and who has to choose among alternatives to deal with those problems involving Cuba. It is therefore the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that give meaning to the facts of international politics and make a theory of politics possible.
This concept of statesman also posits that statesmen think and act rationally in terms of their interests defined as power. Thus, Castro’s foreign policy objectives in Angola and Namibia can be conceptualised within this context. Hence it is assumed that Castro will not intentionally pursue policies that are morally wrong or which are not in conformity with Cuba’s national interests (Thompson 1960 and Deutsch 1968).

Thirdly, realists also argue that the state is essentially a rational actor. Rationality comes into play because decisions and policies pursued by that state are carried out by rational statesmen who have all the necessary information and machinery at their disposal to make rational decisions. A rational foreign policy decision-making process would include a statement of objectives and considerations of all feasible alternatives in terms of the existing capabilities available to the state. Hence, it is assumed that governmental decision-makers evaluate each alternative, selecting one that maximises utility (maximising benefits or minimising costs associated with attaining the objectives sought). As a matter of practicality, realists are aware of the difficulties in viewing the state as a rational actor. This is because the decision makers in government may not always have all the factual information or knowledge needed for making value-maximising decisions.

Fourthly, realists assume that within the hierarchy of international issues, national security constitutes the central concern for states. This is because military and related political issues dominate world politics. Realists focus our attention on actual or potential conflict between state actors, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, and how it breaks down. Subsequently, force is used as a means to achieve foreign policy objectives. War in itself, is traditionally a form of diplomacy. Power, therefore is a key concept in realism particularly with
regard to national security. To realists, military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as **high politics**, whereas economic and social issues are viewed as less important or **low politics** (Holsti 1995:35-66; Lieber 1995; Sondermann 1987:128-135 and Brown 1997). It is within this theoretical and conceptual contexts that Cuba’s involvement in Angola and Namibia can be contextualised.

When Cuba became involved in the politics of southern Africa, she did so in pursuit of her national interests taking cognizance of her military capabilities vis-à-vis the other actors. In summary, Cuban nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism played a major role in her foreign policy in southern Africa. Cuba’s nationalism stems from her oppressed historical situation which culminated into the war of revolution and liberation. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism are synonymous components of the realist school of thought particularly when conceptualised within the contexts of Cuban national interests. This is because, in the international system, states as the most important actors, struggle to acquire and maintain power to survive in the anarchic system. It is in this regard, that there was the need for Cuba to combat imperialism and colonialism in order to pursue its own objectives and destiny.

### 1.3 THE REALISM LINKAGE

According to Morgenthau, there is vitality in the moral significance of political action. Subsequently, the tension of interests between moral issues and the need for successful political action is resolved as a unified political decision (Morgenthau 1978: 12). State actions are assumed to be morally motivated and not politically motivated. It is within this context that one can explain Cuba’s involvement in southern Africa to liberate the region from colonialism and imperialism. These ideals
served as some of the main reasons for Cuban presence in Africa. To realists, state issues come first with morality conceptualised within the contexts of national interests.

There are six fundamental principles that make up the tenets of political realism. Also known as the state-centric view, with Hans J. Morgenthau as a principle proponent, these principles constitute the centre of realist paradigm. One of the main perspectives of the school is that the world as imperfect as it is from a rational point of view, is as a result of forces inherent in man. By this, the realists posit that it is man’s nature and drive for need and want of things selfishly that he comes into conflict with others who want the same things. Only by working with the forces inherent in man, can we improve the world. Accordingly, the world has opposing interests, which need to be changed and balanced in order to ensure order (Morgenthau 1978; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971 and Waltz 1995:67-82).

For that reason, politics is governed by objective laws, which have their roots in man. Here, the realist theory consists of ascertaining facts and giving them meaning via reason. Consequently, the character of foreign policy can only be assessed through the examination of political acts performed by man. Individuals such as Fidel Castro and Che Guevara created the Cuban concept of internationalism, which encompassed anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the foundations of Cuban foreign policy. All the acts they perform or undertake revolve around these concepts. Cuba does and has justified her actions in accordance with these revolutionary ideals. All the actions are justified and rationalised via the revolutionary ideals of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and internationalism.
In international politics, interests are defined as basic goals sought by actors on the global stage, including self-preservation and economic vitality, without which a political, international or domestic theory of politics would be impossible. This concept infuses rational order into the concept of politics. For example, what makes Cuban foreign policy appear the way it does? Here, the inherent assumption is that statesmen act rationally in their state’s interest. Subsequently, the idea of interest is the essence in politics and is unaffected by circumstances of time and place.

Power is one the core concepts of realists, but its definition remains relative and unclear (Domke 1989:159-170). Some realists understand power to be the sum of military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other capabilities at the disposal of the state. Others see power as a state’s capabilities relative to the capabilities of other states and not as some absolute value determined for each state as if it were in a vacuum (Smith 1986 and Kugler and Arbetum 1989:49-77). Both of these descriptions assume a state-centric view of power. An alternative definition of power focuses our attention on the interaction of states. A state’s influence (or capacity to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities or relative capabilities, but also by its willingness to use these capabilities and its control or influence over other states. Hence, power can be inferred by observing the behaviour of states as they interact. The relative power of states is most clearly revealed by the outcome of their interactions (Kugler and Arbetum 1989: 47-53 and Zinnes and Merrit 1989:11-28). Other scholars who argue that power potential is a rough estimate of material and human resources for power, also hold this notion. Indirectly, it can be used to examine the extent to which a state’s capabilities vis-à-vis other state actors ought to be measured. To these scholars, the power of a state is the measure of an outcome, which is under its control. Thus, power is the ability to prevent conflict and to overcome obstacles (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971:23-25).
How then does one measure power? Because of the definitional and conceptual disputes involved, attempts to measure power are also divergent. For example, if one takes power to mean the equivalent of capabilities, one looks for some way to measure military, economic and other component elements. Others view power as the actual control of influence, although some measurement of capabilities may still be useful if one is engaged in predicting the outcome of interactions between states. Even if one assumes that it is possible to measure these capabilities adequately through such indicators as defence expenditures or gross national product, the further problems of weighing and aggregating or adding up such diverse capabilities into a common measure of power remains.

There are other scholars who have defined the concept power in a number of ways. For Morgenthau, national interest of a state is the interest of those associated with power in a state. Interest is defined as power. National interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious and peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit of their national interests. It is also identified with national survival, that is, the ability of the state to use its tangible and intangible resources to protect its physical, political and cultural identity in the conflictual inter-state system. Hence, Cuba’s national interest and by extension its survival is in conformity with the objectives pursued by Fidel Castro in the international system. Specifically, there is no clear distinction between Cuba’s national interest and the objectives pursued by Castro as the sovereign head of state.

Power has also been disguised by ideologies and pursued in the name and for the sake of nationalism, which becomes the goal for all citizens. National interest is also a form of nationalism whereby nation-states identify themselves with their nation’s foreign policy (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff 1971 and Smith 1988:98-118). The Cuban people for example identify themselves with Cuba’s national interests—those being her revolutionary ideals of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and internationalism (spreading the revolutionary ideals abroad). These are also intertwined with Marxist-Leninist ideologies, which again reinforce her ideals and in the end make up Cuban nationalism. This is what is expounded as the main foreign policy objectives of the Castro Administration in Angola and Namibia.

There are other scholars such as Frederick Schuman (1941), Henry Kissinger (1979 and 1982), George Kennan (1984 and 1977) and E.H. Carr (1966) who have argued that national power constitutes geography, national resources, raw materials, military preparedness, population and national character. For Schuman (1941), military strength or fighting capacity is necessary to preserve national power from threats. As each state retains its independence, the state system is preserved and equilibrium results. Kissinger (1982 and 1979) and Kennan (1984 and 1977) on the other hand emphasise that domestic power does indeed spill over into the international system and that geopolitics is crucial to world politics. To these scholars geographical location, manpower, natural resources, scientific and technical motivations are vital to a state. For the Cubans, the deployment of about 60,000 military personnel in southern Africa and the willingness to fight in pursuit of her national interests was a display of its military power in Southern Africa. By engaging in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist ideals on the continent of Africa, Cuba sought to consolidate its power via her ideology abroad. Military and logistical support which Cuba received from the Soviet Union enhanced Cuba’s power capability. Cuba’s power was further demonstrated in both the number of soldiers she deployed in the region.
1.4 CONCLUSION

Putting aside the complications of lack of information and the unavailability of data, it is clear as one reads, that Cuba had a number of motivations to get involved in southern Africa. Cuba’s ideals of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, internationalism and policy of prestige were in conformity with her foreign policy. These concepts were part and parcel of the Cuban revolutionary stance, which the Castro Administration has used extensively in international relations. As I have explained, Cuban pursuit of her foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa was in conformity with her national interests defined within the contexts of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

Chapter 2 deals with the foundation of Cuba’s foreign policy and its effects on the African continent with specific reference to the two southern African states. However, for a more comprehensive understanding of Cuba’s foreign policy towards Angola and Namibia, a historical overview of Cuba’s policy in other African countries is *sine qua non*. Chapter 3 covers Cuba’s involvement in Southern Africa with a special reference to Angola and the obstacles she faced in trying to support the government of the day. Angola became a crucial testing ground for Cuban foreign policy priorities in the region. The military support of the MPLA regime in Angola against the onslaught of the South African forces and the UNITA rebels with the overt support of the CIA was an onerous task for the Castro Administration. Chapter 4 examines the implication of Cuban involvement in southern Africa on the independence of Namibia. Specifically, it examines the extent to which Cuban military presence in Angola influenced the independence of Namibia. Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive summary and conclusion of the Thesis.
REFERENCES:


CHAPTER 2

2. CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 THE FOUNDATION OF CUBAN NATIONALIST, ANTI-IMPERIAL AND ANTI-COLONIAL FOREIGN POLICY

Cuba’s foreign policy, which has often been seen to have ideological motivations, has embodied the concepts of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. These two conceptual perspectives constitute some of the central conceptual variables that influence Cuba’s foreign policy behaviour in international relations. In order to preserve and consolidate her ideology and nationalism, Cuba has officially inscribed in her constitution the idea of internationalism as the main guiding principle of her foreign policy (Briquets 1989; Carter and O’Meara 1979 and Gavshon 1981).

Article 12 of the 1976 Cuban Constitution formalised internationalism as the guiding principle of her foreign policy. It was defined not only as an ideology, but also as a course of action guiding Cuba’s international behaviour (Erisman 1985). According to the Cuban leadership, internationalism assumed an anti-imperialist nature geared towards drawing in revolutionary governments that espoused Marxism-Leninism as their country’s ideology. Internationalism encompasses a complex amalgam of both non-governmental and intergovernmental relations used by Cuba to explain the unselfishness of the revolution to its own people, as well as her generous support for liberation movements and governments with the objective of consolidating a socialist stance (Briquets 1989:18 and Ruffin 1990).

Cuba’s foreign policy towards Africa was based on two complementary contextual objectives namely, promoting nationalism at home and nurturing revolutionary Marxist - Leninist governments,
as well as supporting anti-colonial and anti-imperial movement’s abroad (Briquets 1989:18). To achieve these foreign policy objectives, Cuba has not only engaged in state-to-state relations with most of the African countries, but has also made Africa a direct military testing ground for her commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

Cuba’s dislike for imperialism is noted in its historical relations with the US, where, from 1898 to 1959, the Americans meddled in the Cuban independence struggle by means of support for the corrupt administrations and the exploitation of the country. These practices by the US laid the foundation for Cuba’s anti-colonial and anti-imperial nationalism both at home and abroad. Hence, Cuba’s involvement in Angola and Namibia can be conceptualised within these contexts. Indeed, Cuban nationalism played a pivotal role in withstanding imperial exploitation and suppression (Erisman 1985:31; Azicri 1988 and Carlsnaes 1986). Nationalism is defined to mean the manifestation by a stable community of a clear sense of group consciousness and a strong determination on its part to retain and reaffirm its separate and distinct identity (Erisman 1985:9; Nimni 1991; Smith 1979 and Davis 1978). Nationalism plays an important role in Cuba’s foreign policy behaviour. Her nationalistic foreign policy is embedded in realist contexts in the sense that it is centred on national interest (Domínguez 1985). Subsequently, Cuba’s role in the two southern African countries can be understood within this broad perspective.

Finally, to understand Cuba’s involvement in Africa, particularly in southern Africa, it is important to note that internationalism (a core part of the Cuban revolutionary experience and ideology) stresses sacrifice and struggle in order to build a new society both locally and internationally. Though ambitious in trying to alter the basic nature of the systematic relations of the North-South dialogue and East-West balance, this grand vision may never be realised (Smith 1988:101). The West, and
in particular the US failed to appreciate that Cuba’s behaviour emanated from its strong commitment to several basic principles, aims and objectives namely: security, autonomy, non-aligned leadership, proletarian internationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The various phases of Cuba’s foreign policy were symbolised by strategic shifts of emphasis regarding established goals, guiding principles and operational tactics. Nationalism still has a crucial impact on Cuba’s policies.

Studies of Cuban foreign policy revolve around the fact that its primary objective is to ensure the survival of the revolution. Likewise, Cuba’s policy toward Africa centred on the need to survive as well as having an anti-colonial and anti-imperial stance (Briquets 1989:12). Initially, after the 1959 revolution, the Cuban leadership viewed the world as entering an essentially new “revolutionary era”, one that offered new alternatives for the underdeveloped world. This alternative was anti-colonial in nature, especially at the time when anti-colonial movements all over the world (in Africa and Asia mainly) were fighting for self-determination. In light of this, Cuba supported the drive for independence for colonised peoples in regional and global forums. Cuba therefore established a close relationship between her revolutionary goals and those of liberation movements seeking to end colonialism in Africa (Domínguez and Hernandez 1989: 26 and Perez 1988).

Cuba delayed establishing formal diplomatic, economic and political relations with most countries in Africa because of her support for guerrilla groups on the continent. Initially, Fidel Castro, frustrated by the fact that Latin America supported the US in its attempt to isolate Cuba from the rest of the world, decided to support liberation movements around the globe, especially those in Africa (Briquets 1989:18). Since the global interests of the world powers did not include Africa as a priority area, Castro decided to fill this vacuum. Emanating from this scenario was the image Cuba
intended to portray of her being independent from the Soviet Union. At the same time she was offering Africa a development alternative based on the Cuban model, based on the idea that the path of the revolution followed by Cuba, though long and hard, is the only path promising a people a secure, great and stable future (Munoz and Tulchin 1996 and Lincoln and Ferris 1982).

Even though revolutions similar to the Cuban one were expected to take place in Latin America, conditions in Africa were viewed as appropriate for the armed struggle against colonialism and imperialism. It has been noted that even after most of the African countries attained independence, the masses began to demand immediate material solutions, which the elite could not provide to solve the socio-economic and political problems acquired at the time of independence. To this end, the Marxist economic theories of centralisation and freedom from the capitalist international division of labour appeared to provide the answer to these questions. Cuba’s willingness to assist those in Africa who were committed to armed struggle against colonialism and imperialism was embraced full heartedly by most of the independent and colonised African states. These nations either struggled against the colonial regimes in their countries or were opposed to the post-independence governments in power. Briquets (1989: 17) has noted that Cuba and the Soviet Union substantially increased military assistance to African liberation movements in the 1970’s, particularly to the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), both of which were Socialist or Marxist in outlook. These African campaigns consequently legitimised the concept of “internationalism”.

2.2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
Before dwelling on the core issue of this research, which is Cuba’s foreign policy in Angola and Namibia, it is essential to give an overview and origin of Cuba’s involvement in the continent, which sheds further light on Cuba’s foreign policy in general and in Africa. By briefly analysing Cuba’s activities on the continent, a clear picture will emerge about Cuba’s policy in the two southern African states not being different from Cuba’s policy throughout the continent. Consequently, it will be shown that that policy was in conformity with Cuba’s policy of proletarian internationalism, which sought to eradicate imperialism and colonialism. Cuba ultimately reached out to Africa to comply with the objectives of its new independent foreign policy by which she committed herself to supporting vital issues that concerned the Afro-Asian world such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Initially, these were essential parts of Cuba’s effort to expand her international role and secure solidarity and foreign support for the Cuban revolution. Cuba’s policy toward Africa was later radicalised with her active participation on the continent. Even though many African colonies attained independence in 1960, Cuba did not immediately establish diplomatic ties or had any other ties with them, except with those countries that were seen as “truly revolutionary”, for example, Guinea, Mali and Ghana.

After the 1961 Bay of Pigs victory where the Cuban government and peoples resisted and defeated an attempted invasion of the island by US-backed Cuban exiles with the aid of some American soldiers, Cuba was even more belligerent towards the US and any country supporting American policies. This led Cuba to redefine the objectives of her foreign policy and committed herself to the anti-imperialist struggle. For Cuban officials, imperialism was out to destroy Cuba and this determined their conduct and policy on the international scene and at the UN. Only between 1959 and 1963 did Cuba’s foreign policy appear to be inconsistent as Castro struggled between fighting to ensure his personal power internally, and searching for logistical support for Cuba’s
internationalist foreign policy. Still, her policy toward Africa received increasing attention as Cuba became isolated from the Western Hemisphere (Smith 1988: 112-114 and Minter 1994).

The link between Cuba and Africa in the 1960s entered the post-independence phase. During this time span, her contacts with the continent were so intense that they contributed significantly to the formation of the Cuban culture and to the integration of the Cuban nation (Briquets 1989). Prior to 1959, Cuban-African relations were limited, but this later changed with the increase in intensity and scope of relations between Cuba and Africa due to the cultural background of the Cubans of African heritage on the one hand, and the massive de-colonisation of Africa between 1957 and 1960 on the other.

What motivated the development of intense relations with Africa after 1959, and which contributed a great deal to Cuban-African relations, was the nature of Cuba’s foreign policy, the principles on which it was based and the receptiveness that it encountered throughout Central and South America. That was the case because the Western hemisphere was a region that though regaining its political independence, was still recuperating from centuries of colonial rule. As stated earlier, Cuba’s policy in Africa has been characterised by consistency and continuity. What are the underlying general principles of this policy, the characteristics of its civilian co-operation programs and the circumstances surrounding its military presence in Africa? The principles of Cuba’s policy towards Africa are clearly stated in Cuba’s revolutionary manifesto (Erisman 1991: 95). These can be summarised as follows:

1. Denunciation of colonialism and support for national liberation struggles. The first statements of the new representative of the revolutionary government, for example showed this, to the United Nations in 1959, when he declared that Cuba’s solidarity with the cause of the
Algerian patriots was evident. More so, Cuba condemned the Portuguese colonial presence in southern Africa during the entire period of its existence.

2. Denunciation of institutionalised racism in southern Africa in the form of Apartheid in South Africa, its extension to Namibia, and its expression in the Rhodesian regime. Here, Cuba’s support for the nationalist movements in the three countries was made known from the onset.

3. Denunciation of the neo-colonial policy of the leading capitalist powers in Africa: this principle was applied with regard to the firm solidarity with Patrice Lumumba’s cause and with the countries of the Casablanca group* after its inception in 1961. The Cuban revolutionary government identified this group of countries as the most committed to the struggle for “real de-colonisation” and for positive non-alignment.

4. Support for anti-imperialist unity among African states: this solidarity contributed to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the main goal of which was to eradicate powerful colonial-racist remnants and neo-colonial interference. Its aims were consistent with those of the Cuban revolutionary government and she consequently offered active and unlimited support for African unity because of the OAU’s limitations (especially in its first years of existence).

5. Establishment of diplomatic relations and mutually beneficial collaboration with any member of the OAU, irrespective of its political regime. Cuba first established relations with the governments of the Casablanca group and later with Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, diplomatic ties and collaboration links had been developed with a number of countries that were very active in the UN and Non-Aligned Movement (Erisman 1991:95).

Cuba’s diplomatic and political relations with Africa were very limited in the 1960s and 1970s. The development of these customary ties was sacrificed for the sake of disseminating world revolution. In 1964, with the Congo crisis intensifying and with the capitalist countries involved in the crisis, Cuban officials were convinced that they needed a greater presence in Africa. Initially, Cuba established diplomatic relations with only those states identified as “progressive” by the Cuban leadership and later with those seen as reactionary (Erisman 1985). In the 1970s, Cuba launched her major diplomatic offensive toward Africa by establishing diplomatic relations with independent states that had been earlier viewed as reactionary. For example in 1972, Cuba had diplomatic

* This group advocated for a United States of Africa hence uniting all African countries to form one government and push the colonialists from the continent.
representatives in Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Zambia, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania. At the same time Cuba also formalised relations with Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zambia, Mauritania and Equatorial Guinea (Briquets 1989). Similarly in 1974, more formal ties were established with Benin, Burundi, Gabon, Madagascar, Zaire, Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon and Guinea-Bissau. One sees a trend emerging that as the years passed - from the 1960s into the 1970s, Cuba forged more relations with African states because of their support not only for such deposed leaders as Lumumba and their opposition to the meddling by Western powers in the Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) but other African states as well. Consequently, Cuba’s reason to begin having relations with states she had earlier thought as reactionary just goes a long way to show that Cuban rationale within the region was more nuanced and pragmatic than Cuban leaders would like us to believe.

Cuba did not develop her relations in sub-Saharan Africa easily due to the fact that Cuban revolutionaries failed to understand African socialism. The symbolism, nationalism and agrarian communal spirit of the African masses could not be categorised according to strict Marxist-Leninist ideology. This lack of understanding of African realities accounts for many of Cuba’s decisions reflecting poor judgement, such as Cuba’s miscalculation on the prospect of guerrilla warfare in the Congo, her paternalism towards Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, and her inability to convince Francophone African leaders such as Leopold Sedar Senghor and Ivory Coasts’ Felix Boigny of Cuba’s independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, Cuba had greater ease in developing relations with Maghreb Africa (Briquets 1989:18).
Cuba having established diplomatic relations with African countries in the early 1960s then made efforts to develop economic and cultural ties with those countries. Egypt was the first African country to sign a commercial agreement with Cuba in 1959. Trade agreements with other countries followed soon thereafter for example Morocco (1961), Ghana (1962), Mali (1962), Algeria (1963); and cultural agreements were also signed with Guinea and Egypt in 1960, and with Mali (1964) and Ghana (1967). In Algeria, the two countries co-operated in the fields of education, television, journalism, sports, arts, culture and radio. In a 1969 agreement, Cuba was to establish and staff a medical training centre in Mostaragem, Algeria, which was later followed by the provision of a medical contingent to staff the Ernesto Che Guevara hospital also in Mostaragem (Briquets 1989:19). The depth of co-operation Cuba established with Algeria was unrivalled in Cuba’s formal relations with other African countries and such co-operation remained non-existent with sub-Saharan Africa until the mid 1970s, when Cuba established close ties with Angola. After 1975, Cuba became more willing to establish relations with the newly independent nations of Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, and, after the overthrow of Haile Selassie, with Ethiopia. Between 1976 and 1979, Cuba established relations with most of the remaining African countries namely Libya, Niger, Chad, Mauritius, Comoros, Botswana, Seychelles, Gambia, Lesotho, Rwanda and Togo. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, Cuba immediately recognised it.

After its independence, Angola became the centrepiece of Cuba’s foreign policy in Africa. In addition to the deployment of thousands of troops in that country, other intergovernmental relations were established. The extensive list of agreements signed in the 1970s between these two countries, depicts the depth of Cuba’s relations with the new nation. These agreements encompassed co-operation in a wide variety of fields and expertise such as sports, agriculture, light and heavy
industry, health, economics, science and technology industries, communication, labour issues and party co-operation. Later, Cuba continued to strengthen these relations with Angola, as she became Cuba’s main partner in Africa (Virmani 1985).

Despite the expansive and diversified relations Cuba had with many African countries, she did not maintain close ties with all of them. Politically, Cuba remained closer to countries whose regimes at least espoused a socialist orientation, such as Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The more Western-oriented African countries did uphold diplomatic ties with Cuba, but political and economic ties were kept at a much lower level. On the other hand, Cuba by the mid 1980s, abstained from breaking relations with friendly countries when a close ally was deposed, but condemned the lack of unity amongst revolutionaries. This was clearly seen for example in Burkina Faso when Blaise Compaore, a close collaborator, assassinated Thomas Sankara, leader of the revolution in that country in 1987. Another example is Uganda, where state-to-state relations continued to be upheld regardless of the changes in leaders, so that relations have been unaffected by coups d’état and harmonious relations continued regardless of changes in leadership (Briquets 1989:21 and Erisman 1991).

Consequently, Cuba’s relations and presence in various African countries can be said to have taken a more pragmatic approach which were determined and justified not only by real political issues “on the ground” where she was involved, but also by their foreign policy tenets enshrined in the Cuban revolutionary ideals. Cuba’s military presence in Angola as in other parts of southern Africa for example for more than a decade allows certain conclusions to be drawn concerning the circumstances in which her military presence occurred and the principles governing them. Firstly, such deployments can occur following the break up of negotiations or the violations of agreements
by one of the parties, who then opt for a quick military victory and the unlawful crossing of internationally recognised boundaries. Cuba in this case will often encourage peaceful solutions in such situations. This was clearly shown in the early and late 1980s when the negotiations for a peaceful transition to Namibian independence and the conflict in Angola fell through. Cuba on this occasion entered into the conflict on the side of both SWAPO and the MPLA government. South Africa in this case had violated the territorial integrity of Angola by unlawfully crossing the Angolan territory while at the same time they had withdrawn from the talks in Geneva, Switzerland. This confirmed to the Cubans that South Africa was in no uncertain terms ready for a peaceful end to the hostilities that lay therein.

Secondly, Cuba would reply favourably to the request of an African state only when such a move had the general support among the governments of the continent and was accepted by the OAU. The respect and defence of the objectives and principles of the OAU have therefore been at the core of Cuba’s concerns. The point often noted here is that the MPLA government requested Cuba’s help to try and help the MPLA fight off the enemies of the democratically elected Angolan government. Cuba, it should be noted, had not only the backing of the MPLA but also of the OAU and most of the African states. These states saw the US, UNITA and South Africa as agents of neo-imperialism trying to continue oppressing the African people.

Thirdly, a vital point to be noted is that any Cuban presence in Africa was in response to situations involving other external countries’ involvement in the continent. Both the continued movements of its troops within the borders of the host country and fluctuations in her contingent’s size depended on the situation and was stressed by this notion. For example, the fact that Cuba’s sent a large number of troops to Angola who eventually numbered about 60,000, was in response to and determined by
the involvement of South Africa, the US and UNITA in the region. Because of the escalation of
hostilities in Angola by the external actors, Cuba had to increase her military deployment at the
request of the MPLA regime.

Lastly, the duration of the presence of Cuban forces depended on the sovereign decision of the
host government and whether or not it hindered negotiations between the conflicting parties seeking
a lasting solution that would make their presence unnecessary (Sommerville 1990). Cuba’s
presence in Angola for over a decade was mainly due to the insistence by Angola that Cuba
remains on her territory to protect it from the hostilities it faced from both her internal as well as
external enemies. This could have hindered the peace negotiations that kept falling through
depending on how one wants to look at it. There are those who called for a Cuban withdrawal
from Angola as a prerequisite for Pretoria’s withdrawal from Angola and subsequent independence
of Namibia. On the other hand, there are those like Cuba who insisted that there had to be a
peaceful and lasting solution to the Angolan and Namibian questions. This obviously meant that
Cuba would not leave Angola and Namibia until South Africa withdrew from both Angola and
Namibia, leading to the Namibian independence.

When one assesses the most recent years, the crucial point to note when analysing future prospects
for Cuban intervention or presence, is the fact that contrary to many Western predictions, the
Front-Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) resisted a
great deal of pressure and many acts of aggression from South Africa and her allies. Cuba’s
positive response to this situation enjoyed growing consent in Africa and parts of the world. Even
the West, which had earlier been sceptical of the Cuban and Angolan positions, later viewed their
actions (via joint communiqués), as showing signs of realism and flexibility though the principles
underlying those policies remained unchanged. For example, after the signing of the Lusaka Accords of 1983 that laid a framework for a ceasefire between Angola and South Africa, a joint Cuban-Angolan communiqué was issued in early 1984, which served as a basis for a “negotiated, fair and honourable” agreement among all parties (Briquets 1989). Four years later, just as South Africa’s aggressive acts were increasing, Cuba and Angola agreed on indispensable conditions for a settlement which included the cessation of foreign intervention in Angola’s internal affairs, the withdrawal of South African troops which had invaded Angola, the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) that called for Namibian independence, and international guarantees that there would be no more attacks on Angola. Later, a schedule for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist contingent in Angola was undertaken (Erisman 1991: 100). This does not in any way mask the fact that both the US and South Africa insisted that Cuba’s withdrawal was a prerequisite for a settlement.

Even though South African forces had invaded Angola, jeopardising all previous agreements and ongoing negotiations, this did not deter Cuba’s genuine peace efforts. A Cuban, SWAPO and Angolan offensive on Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola in late 1986, stopped the South African onslaught and brought them to the negotiating table. By the end of 1988, all four parties (Cuba, Angola, South Africa and SWAPO) signed the peace accords for Namibia (South West Africa) at the UN headquarters in New York. This showed the joint Cuban-Angolan delegations’ willingness to negotiate despite “deliberate hesitations and arrogant stands on the part of the South Africans and the inconsistencies of the mediator - the US, an ally of the South Africans” (Erisman 1991:101). These accords secured Namibia’s independence and Fidel Castro later concurred that the most wonderful outcome of the whole situation was that they achieved their goals by solving the military situation, and that it was a great chapter in Cuban history (Briquets 1989).
TABLE TWO

CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL CALENDER FROM ANGOLA

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 1989</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 1990</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER 1990</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1991</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The return of the 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola (Table Two), represents the successful culmination of the last thirty years of relations between Cuba and Angola. More so, it was an opportune time to reaffirm the principles, objectives and actions of Havana’s policy in Africa. To the Cuban’s, once all is said and done, humanity will have witnessed their loyalty to the principles that explain and encourage the policy of solidarity of the Cuban revolution. For Cuba, this aid represented a modest but reliable contribution to the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racism and apartheid while at the same time honouring their debt to black Africa, one of the roots of the Cuban nation. Cuba’s loyalty to these principles determined her firm decision to remain in Africa for as long as was needed, actively helping to strengthen the sovereignty of a sister nation against foreign aggression. The same commitment was evident in Cuba’s unwavering readiness to search for lasting settlements to the complex conflicts by means of discussion and in an atmosphere of brotherhood to reach a negotiated solution. Cuba has tried to involve all parties in deliberations and rejected the notion that only the great powers be involved, obliging the rest to adhere to decisions agreed upon. In light of this therefore, Cuban leaders have stated since 1975 that:
“We did not go to Angola in search of economic benefits, nor to defend strategic interests to which we cannot aspire as a small Third World country. We do not leave behind military bases or properties, or rights over Angola’s riches. As we said twelve years ago, from Angola and Africa, we will take only the love and respect of its long suffering and heroic people and the remains of the sons of the people of Cuba who fell defending Angola’s sovereignty and integrity against external aggression and apartheid” (Erisman 1985:103).

The Front-Line States, the OAU, the NAM and other vital international actors understood and welcomed Cuba’s actions and policy on Africa in general. Hence, a growing number of countries were willing to accept Cuba’s statement that they were willing to work without fail to achieve peace and security not only in southern Africa but in any other parts of the world where they could make a contribution to the opening and consolidation of the potential for independence and development for all peoples without a nation. And to those ends, they were ready to work with all those prepared to undertake real and specific actions in the absence of a search for hegemony or profit motive.

In the mid 1980s, a number of analysts were suggesting that the return of Cuban troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia, as well as other parts of the world, would have an unfavourable impact on Cuban-African relations, the bottom line being that the intensity of those ties would dramatically diminish in the near future (Dominguez 1985 and Abudu 1983). It is a fact that these ties will have to adapt to changing circumstances, but as the past has shown, adapting to new trends and being imaginative and creative allows a prediction that the firm solidarity established over three decades, will not cease when it is needed and that the diverse factors uniting African countries with Cuba will find a foundation on which to perpetuate new dimensions in the near future (Erisman 1985:105 and Kaufman 1990:113-130).
In the economic sector, Cuba’s increased pragmatism has allowed for the development of economic and technical co-operation with many African countries. The export of manufactured goods later became one of Cuba’s most significant revenue-earning exports. Although she does not disclose figures in her annual statistical reports, Cuba’s main African customers for the exports of her services and produce (Civilian Assistance technicians, Sugar, tobacco and Maize) are Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, Seychelles and Congo.

The trade with Africa remained limited as Tables Three and Four indicate. However, Cuba’s export of food items for example in 1980 amounted to 89.2% of its total exports of manufactured goods. On the other hand, Havana’s lack of foreign exchange reduced its capability to import from Africa. Cuba’s trade with Africa though is unbalanced, for example, of a total of 102,087 thousand pesos traded in 1985, 78,296 were Cuban exports to Africa, while the total imports from Africa amounted to only 23,791 thousand pesos. Cuba’s primary commodity, sugar, is the only item exported to Africa. However, because of her worsening economic situation and the decline in the price of sugar, her total trade with Africa has declined gradually since 1981. For example, as Table Three indicates, its total trade in 1986 was 77,833 thousand pesos. Of this amount, 25,056 were imports and 62,678 were exports. This declining trend may be related to the downward swing in Cuba’s total world trade. Table Four demonstrates that Cuba’s total world trade declined from 5,534,907 thousand pesos in 1983 to 5,325,012 in 1986 (Erisman 1985:24). The importance of economic contact with Africa compliments Cuba’s political relations that have dominated her interaction with the continent and perpetuates the future potential of these ties. Africa could welcome Cuban goods and services if and when Cuban capacity to export them

* The Cuban Peso is pegged to the US Dollar at 1=1; $1 = 1 Cuban Peso.
increases or when she enters the liberal international market by dropping the Marxist model of economics.

### TABLE THREE

**CUBAN TRADE WITH AFRICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL TRADE</th>
<th>IMPORTS FROM AFRICA</th>
<th>EXPORTS TO AFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>102,087*</td>
<td>23,791*</td>
<td>78,296*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>77,833*</td>
<td>25,056*</td>
<td>62,678*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE FOUR

**CUBAN WORLD TRADE STATISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>7,579,800*</td>
<td>5,518,316*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8,124,200*</td>
<td>5,392,004*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Though sincerely concerned and fully participating in African issues at the time, it must be remembered that Cuba lacked and still lacks the capacity that would enable her to share in great volumes of commercial exchange or financing for large-scale projects with her African counterparts. The revolutionary government has, however, developed an increasingly strong policy of co-
operation in all spheres namely, political, economic and social, within the contexts of proletarian internationalism (Erisman 1985:24).

Cuba’s military collaboration with African countries especially by the sending in of her troops monopolised the attention of the western world from 1975 onwards. As I have explained, Cuba was also extensively involved in civilian cooperation and aid with the African countries. There are three main characteristics of Cuban civilian collaboration. Firstly, in the areas of health and education, Cuba sent its first group of personnel to Africa, mainly to Algeria in 1963 and expanded and diversified in the 1970s and 1980s. Health and education continued to be the most vital assistance supplied by Cuba. For example in the 1980s, the number of African scholarship students in Cuba exceeded 13,000.

Secondly, Cuba gave grants to Africa without attaching conditionalities. However, it is important to note that the Cuban doctors dispatched to Africa left a gap at home, forcing the government to stretch its resources while launching domestic projects to increase mass access to these services. This aid to Africa was intended as an act of solidarity and to build Cuba’s prestige that would have a positive local impact. It was not initially designed as a revenue generating arrangement, nor was it an attempt to place excess personnel abroad. After 1977, Cuba began to charge modest amounts for some of these programs (to oil-exporting countries, which had the ability to pay), but the basic principle was not altered. The general trend was that the host government provided accommodation, food and a modest stipend for the Cuban technicians’.

As a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s that had adverse effects on Africa, the states that were being charged small sums were given waivers. For example, whereas Angola benefited from
these arrangements since 1983, Cuba also got oil concessions from Angola. One should note that Cuba’s main gain from this type of collaboration lies essentially in the ideological and professional development of its specialists who faced difficult working conditions in some of the African countries (Briquets 1989:34). The ability to respond quickly to urgent needs and to adapt to local conditions was shown by the granting of civilian assistance by Cuba, which preceded the formal establishment of co-operation agreements, as was the case with Algeria (1963), Guinea (1965), Congo-Brazzaville (1968), and Angola in 1976. This rapid response and the modest lifestyle of the Cuban cadres and the special programs initiated, adapted to the needs of the African students in Cuba and pointed to Havana’s serious efforts to adjust its collaboration to the requirements of the recipients.

Thirdly, the high degree of local acceptance and compatibility in the spirit of south-south cooperation made Cuban relations with Africa very popular. On the African continent, this has been explained as a unique model for collaboration among developing countries (Erisman 1985:96). The West’s attention focused much more on the military aspect of Cuba’s assistance in a negative sense. Consequently, its most common feature was the training of African soldiers involving the dispatch of Cuban advisors to Africa. Only in unusual circumstances, has military collaboration led to the dispatch of combat forces, such as was the case in Algeria in 1963, to assist that country in its war against Morocco. In the case of Angola, solidarity with the Angolan revolution was built on the basis of a shared history of oppression, rebellion, and heroism. Clearly outstanding was the acceptance by African governments and African public opinion of the amount and nature of Cuban assistance. This military support was perceived in Africa as an active example of the defence of the juridical principles contained in the charters of the UN and the OAU with regard to the exercising
of the right to self-determination and the protection of national sovereignty in the face of aggression against Angola and Namibia by the South African racist regime (Erisman 1985:97).

2.3 CONCLUSION

Some of the conceptual tenets that emerge with respect to Cuban foreign policy priorities in Africa include her commitment to nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. These concepts are intertwined with Marxism and Leninism, ideologies that influence Cuban foreign policy. Likewise, it is crucial to note that the reasons for Cuba’s incorporation of such foreign policy orientations lies in her historical past and conforms to her national interest. It is in light of this that the policies Cuba has undertaken, derive directly from her historical experience and are enshrined in her constitution. One thing is clear though, history and the sense of connection with Africa through their common African heritage and history of oppression enabled Cuba to make the long journey to Africa.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER 3

3. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE ANGOLAN SCENARIO

3.1 A HOME AWAY FROM HOME?

This chapter puts into proper perspective Cuba’s three main foreign policy objectives in Angola namely, assistance to the MPLA during the Angolan civil war, pursuit of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist policies in Angola and seeking the acquiescence and diplomatic support of the Angolan government and other African countries for her military involvement in the area.

The year 1975 marked a crucial period in the history of Cuban foreign policy in that Cuba entered the Angolan conflict with increased military presence. By this time, Cuba was receiving an increased military aid from the Soviets, which enhanced her capability for more military ventures abroad. For example, between 1974 and 1976, Cuba received $ 450 million worth of military assistance from the Soviet Union and in the years that followed, up until 1987; over $ 4.5 billion had been dispensed to Cuba (ISSUP Bulletin No.4 1988:6). It must be noted here that even though the Soviet Union funded Cuba, this did not in any way undermine Cuba’s ideological and revolutionary commitments abroad. It is also fair to argue that Cuban foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis Angola was in conformity with the Soviet Union’s geo-strategic interests in the region. Specifically, the Cuban-Soviet involvement in Angola was to contain American influence in the area. It can also be argued that Cuba’s greatest expectation was the possibility of gaining a two fold “bargaining power” from its Angolan involvement (Briquets 1989). On the one hand, the Soviets needed Cuba to play the Marxist card on their behalf without involving themselves directly in Angola. On the other hand, Cuba was set to gain more influence vis-à-vis the US. Erisman (1985) notes that the prestige that came with Cuba’s involvement helped diversify her international economic relations,
that is, reducing her level of economic dependence on the Soviet Union. One case in point was her involvement in Angola, which had the capabilities of being a major alternative petroleum source for Cuba other than Soviet oil (Erisman 1985:68–69). Indeed, such nationalistic aspirations were inhibited by the fact that Cuba’s military internationalism still needed Soviet logistical support to help Cuba’s aspirations function as a link between the Socialist bloc and the Third World.

In Angola, Cuba’s role was pivotal and demonstrated that Cuba had the will and ability to project her power thousands of miles from home and shape political outcomes. As I have explained, the revolutionary stance that Cuba had taken with respect to her international proletarian policy vis-a-vis Angola was in conformity with her anti-imperialist and anti-colonial foreign policy. Cuban military presence in Angola meant salvaging the MPLA regime against UNITA, South Africa and their allies.

With Soviet help, Cuba sent combat units to help the MPLA defeat its Western-backed foes and consolidate its control of Angola. At one point, combat units numbering up to 50,000 were instructed to be in Angola, an unprecedented military commitment abroad by Cuba. Victory in Angola came at a crucial point when the MPLA was encircled by UNITA and South Africa. The Cuban military involvement tipped the balance in MPLA’s favour from late 1975 to early 1976 when the war was won. Despite defeating a heavily armed and well-equipped South African army, the Cubans remained in Angola at the request of Agostinho Neto’s government. This led to the 1979 Cuban–Angola military agreement that committed Cuba to the unlimited defence of Angola against hostile neighbours. Even after consolidating MPLA’s control of Angola, Cuba continued her presence in the country not only for defence purposes, but also to try and assimilate Angolans into Cuba’s revolutionary experience in all spheres of Angolan socio-economic and politico-military
milieu. Cuba’s international civilian assistance program in Angola were designed in these contexts. This is evidenced by the fact that Cuba’s international proletarian policy encompasses all areas of political, social and economic life. In pursuit of all these objectives Cuba came into conflict with both UNITA and especially South Africa, which led to the need for a military pact between Angola and Cuba.

As Table Five indicates, Africa received the most attention in terms of both the number of Cuban missions and total personnel, with 1978 being the high point of Cuba’s military globalism. Roughly 40,000 officers and soldiers were stationed in Africa in 1978. Even though the US was against Cuba’s military activities in Angola, most of the Third world countries as well as the OAU and the UN gave Cuba their support and approval. Whereas the UN General Assembly gave consent at least where “struggles for liberation” were concerned, the OAU on the other hand gave consent for states to use “foreign security” measures to preserve their independence (Erisman 1985:76). During its 1976 summit in Sri-Lanka, the NAM commended Cuba for helping the people of Angola to deter the expansionist and colonial strategy of the South African apartheid regime. In sum, almost the entire world, with the exception of the US and some of her allies, supported Cuban initiatives, which further increased her prestige in the international system.

Table Five also indicates that Cuba deployed her troops to other parts of Africa for various reasons but more so in line with her internationalist policy of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. In Ethiopia, Cuba sent her military personnel there to help consolidate Mengistu Mariam’s socialist regime after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selessie and to deter the Somali military incursions during the 1977 Ethio-Somali war (Adar 1994). In Zaire, Cuba supported the socialists who were
led by Patrice Lumumba to try and create a unified Zaire. The same was the case with Mozambique, where Samora Machel’s Mozambican Freedom Liberation Movement (FRELIMO) took over from the Portuguese colonialists. Cuba’s role in Mozambique was to consolidate the socialist FRELIMO regime in power.

**TABLE FIVE**

**CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFRICA, 1975 – 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>MIDEAST/NORTH AFRICA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td>(215)</td>
<td>(150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage increase over previous year)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+90</td>
<td>-45.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola*</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (Conakry)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(4,206)</td>
<td>(17,936)</td>
<td>(21,453)</td>
<td>(38,256)</td>
<td>(34,850)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage Increase Over Previous Year)</td>
<td>+326</td>
<td>+19.6</td>
<td>+78.3</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Increase Over Previous Year)</td>
<td>4206</td>
<td>18,286</td>
<td>21,716</td>
<td>39,621</td>
<td>+800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Increase Over Previous Year)</td>
<td>+335</td>
<td>+18.8</td>
<td>+82.5</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total Minus Angola and Ethiopia</td>
<td>5286</td>
<td>2316</td>
<td>4131</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Increase Over Previous Year)</td>
<td>+338</td>
<td>-56</td>
<td>+78.4</td>
<td>-57.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Russell Warren Howe, “Cuba: private Gutierrez Goes to War,” *The Atlantic* (November, 1978), p. 21, the U.S. State Department estimated the number of Cuban troops in Angola in 1978 at 27,000. Also, Fidel Castro in a December, 1979 Speech indicated that there had at one time been 36,000 Cuban troops in Angola. But since these figures are so far out of line with those regularly given by numerous other sources, they were treated here as being seriously overinflated and consequently not factored into the calculations used to produce the table.

Cuba’s involvement in the Angolan conflict has been interpreted as a major departure from the foreign policy behaviour of Latin American countries. The point often made is that never before had a Latin American revolutionary government committed regular troops outside the Western Hemisphere (Briquets 1989). However, Cuba had deployed regular military forces in Africa on more than one occasion. But before one can indulge in the analysis of Cuba’s involvement in Angola, it is important to put into proper historical perspective Cuban-Angolan relations.

Cuban interests in Angola date back to its activities in Africa, which began in the early sixties in Algeria as part of advancing the Cuban revolution. In addition, Che Guevara undertook a tour of Africa for three months between late 1964 and early 1965 in Congo–Brazzaville, where he met with various Angolan liberation movement leaders such as Agostinho Neto and which culminated into Cuban–MPLA relations. As a result, Cuba began to train the MPLA military cadets in, among other places, Congo- Brazzaville as well as in Cuba itself. Subsequently, Cuba maintained and strengthened her links with Angola over the years. Though Cuban-Angolan relations were significantly aided by the Soviet Union’s moral, political and material support, Cuba’s foreign policy in Angola came into conflict with that of the Soviet Union. This was mainly with regard to the activities of Che Guevara whom the Soviets disliked because of Che Guevara’s tactics as to how revolutions were to be conducted or achieved. When the Cubans declined to reprimand Guevara, the Soviets withdrew their support for Cuban efforts in Angola, particularly because of their reluctance to be directly involved in the looming crisis.
What needs to be reiterated here is the fact that Cuban support for the MPLA was as a result of its own foreign policy initiative, with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism being the driving force. In other words, by supporting MPLA, they were fighting UNITA, South Africa and by extension the US who were using overt and covert actions in the region to fight the Angolan regime. Cuban military support for the MPLA vis-à-vis her adversaries in Angola as well as her diplomatic support for SWAPO within the UN and other multilateral forums, enhanced the global status of the liberation movements. For example, in the UNGAR 2325 of 1968, Cuba condemned South Africa’s continued occupation of South West Africa. Another resolution dealing with the South West African question was UNGAR 2248 of 1966 that called for the South West African territory to be administered by the UN. But the most important backing by Cuba was in the UNGAR 1514 of 1960 which called for the granting of independence to countries and peoples under colonial rule and embracing all territories that had not yet attained independence. This resolution was especially vital to southern Africa, which was still under colonial rule. It is in this regard that Cuba supported Ethiopia and Liberia in instituting legal proceedings against South Africa’s illegal occupation of South West Africa at the International Court of Justice.

In an attempt to justify its involvement in Angola, Cuba has always reiterated that the Angolan government needed to oppose counter-revolutionary forces, particularly because of South African aggression. Accordingly, Cuba saw herself as morally justified, serving a just cause in order to uphold the Angolan people’s revolution to suppress counter-revolutionary activities. It has been noted that even before it became independent, the squabbles in Angola between the varying factions prompted Cuba to aid the MPLA, as the other factions were either being funded by the US or China (Mesa-Lago and Belkin 1982). The Cubans were not only aiding the MPLA over the other Angolan groups such as UNITA and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA),
but rather over the imperialist and aggressive South African forces who had invaded Angolan territory (Mesa-Lago 1978). For example, the South African attack on a training camp at Benguela in southern Angola and operated by Cuban instructors in late 1978, led to the escalation of military assistance to the MPLA (Briquets 1989). As a result, the attack on the military training school by South Africa created interesting opportunities for the Cubans. This was due to the fact that a radical victory over the South Africans, would cast serious doubt on their (Pretoria’s) military capabilities and contribute positively to the liberation movements in the entire region.

Angola gave Cuba an opportunity to defy the US by resuming its militant role and leadership of the Third World fighting imperialism and colonialism (Abudu 1983: 170). In addition, Cuba showed that it was able to change the “terms of the game” in a war that indirectly involved the US in the region. From 1975, at the MPLA’s request, Cuba continually expanded its military training activities in the country so that by the time South Africa sent its troops north against the MPLA, there were nearly 2,000 Cuban troops in Angola. The major Cuban military escalation in Angola was the 1975 “Operation Carlotta” with a capacity of over 7,000 troops. The main aim of the Castro Administration was to drive back the South African offensive that had crossed into the Angolan territory. By early 1976, Cuba’s military presence in Angola had reached 12,000. In sum, what Cuba was essentially trying to achieve was to help the MPLA consolidate itself in power. Though Cuba’s involvement in Angola was a remarkable one, Briquets (1989:40) has noted that between 10,000 and 12,000 Cuban troops were either wounded, killed or went missing (Johnson and Martin 1986).

Angola was now being seen as Cuba’s “Vietnam”, mainly because of her involvement in all spheres of Angola’s military and political life and resembled a Cuban government in exile. Briquets
notes that Angola was still paying Cuba huge sums of money to assist the MPLA consolidate itself in power. This was seen in the payment of $800 per Cuban soldier by the Angolan government and with oil resources in kind (Briquets 1989:56). Irrespective of Cuba’s insistence that Moscow was informed of her actions only after it had deployed troops in Angola, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union did not have prior knowledge of the decisions, given its intelligence contacts within the Cuban administrative hierarchy (Briquets 1989: 42 and Virmani 1985).

**TABLE SIX.**

**CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1982</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NB: Cuba has military personnel in 17 African Countries. There are for example 12,000 in Ethiopia, 2,500 in Mozambique, 200 in Zambia, 100 in Tanzania, and 7 in Lesotho, to name but a few. 2,800 East German, 1,150 Soviet Personnel are included in these figures. *Angola reportedly paid Cuba $ 800 a month for each soldier.


As Table Six indicates, the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola grew steadily from 1975 to late 1988 when the peak of her military personnel reached 60,000. The initial 4,000 Cuban troops to Angola were sent there to protect the young MPLA government from UNITA, FNLA and South Africa who operated both within and outside the Angolan territory. Later, the number of soldiers and military advisors increased over time and by the mid 1980’s, Cuba became actively involved in the Angolan civil war. With increased attacks from the FNLA in southern Zaire and the South African-UNITA combined military efforts in the south of Angola, Cuba was forced to send
even more troops to create a more even balance of power in Angola. The drastic increase of military personnel from 42,000 in early 1988 to 60,000 in late 1988 was also attributed to the escalation of conflict especially in southern Angola at Cuito Cuanavale, and Caleque Dam in northern Namibia. South Africa made a final push into Angolan territory through these areas.

**TABLE SEVEN.**

**SOVIET ARMS SALES TO ANGOLA** *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974 – 1976</td>
<td>$ 450 Million **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 – 1987</td>
<td>$ 4.5 Billion ( $ 3 billion since 1984) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1987 – March 1988</td>
<td>$ 1 Billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total Angolan debt to the former Soviet Union was estimated at $ 20 billion.  
** All amounts in US Dollars  
*** NATO sources cite $ 8.1 Billion since 1978.


Table Seven shows the Soviet military assistance to Angola, increasing tenfold from $ 450 million between 1974-1976 to $ 4.5 billion between 1976-1987. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union provided both Cuba and Angola with logistic, military and material support during this period to counter the South African, UNITA, FNLA as well as American covert actions into Angola. Tables Six and Seven demonstrate a clear correlation between Cuban military involvement and the Soviet Union’s military assistance in Angola. The increase in the number of Cuban military personnel and military aid from the Soviets enhanced Cuba’s capacity to consolidate the MPLA’s grip on power. It has been noted that this maximum military assistance to Angola by Cuba and the Soviets, overwhelmed both the FNLA and UNITA forces hence continually solidifying the MPLA administration (Erisman 1985).
3.2 THE WAR THAT WENT WRONG?

Cuba has probably been involved in Angola more than any other country has, that is, over two and a half decades. Though her initial objective there was successful, as the conflict evolved, Cuba’s influence over Angola was not without its difficulties. This was especially because of the risk of getting dragged into domestic conflicts and the inability of Cuba to change Angola’s policies without threatening internal order.

It has been noted that in the 1960s and 1970s, Cuba’s involvement in Angola and Africa in general gave Fidel Castro greater ability to manoeuvre in both local and international politics, which enhanced his leadership role. Castro was now able to disseminate his country’s internationalist anti-colonial and anti-imperial foreign policy. Initially, Angola engaged in talks with the US and South Africa for a peaceful settlement to the hostilities in Angola, whereas Cuba was not involved in these negotiations until early 1988. This was more so due to the fact that the Soviet Union’s military and geo-strategic interests overshadowed Cuba’s role in Angola (Briquets 1989:103). This did not in any way dampen Cuba’s struggle in the fight against imperialism and colonialism.

Cuban support for Angola ultimately set the scene for a power struggle between the movements, that is, the MPLA, Holden Roberto’s FNLA and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA. The continued inter-MPLA-FNLA-UNITA rivalry undermined a peaceful transition to Angolan independence contained in the Alvar Agreement (Marcumi 1978). The Alvar Agreement was a peace treaty signed between the three major political movements (MPLA, UNITA and FNLA) in Angola on the eve of independence, which would have ensured a smooth transition for Angolan independence. According to this agreement, the date of independence was set for the 11th of November 1975. In
return, these movements were to share power in a transitional government at the onset of independence. The persistent civil war among the three dominant movements led to the collapse of the agreement and the internationalisation of the conflict.

Whereas the US, Zaire and South Africa backed both the FNLA and UNITA, the Soviets, Cubans and the Portuguese supported MPLA. The invasion of Angola by South Africa provided an opportunity for Cuba and the Soviet Union to increase their military support for the MPLA and to prevent imperialist aggression as provided for in the Brezhnev Doctrine and in Cuba’s proletarian internationalism that embraced ant-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Angola was at this time spending 60% or more of her foreign exchange on defence, most of which was from oil sales. Between 1976 and 1986, for example, Angola purchased $4 billion in Soviet arms (Hodges 1987).

The initial role of Cuba was to defend Agostinho Neto’s revolutionary regime from being overthrown by imperialist forces. In the process of trying to defend Neto’s regime, Cuba came into conflict with both UNITA and South Africa in southern Angola and the FNLA in the north. These areas were strategic in that the southern part of Angola had huge mineral deposits, mainly diamonds that UNITA had been taking advantage of as a source of extra revenue to support its military campaigns. Malaquias (1999:23-43) has noted that in this region UNITA runs a $500 million per year diamond smuggling operations. In the north, particularly in the Cabinda enclave in northwestern Angola, the stronghold of the FNLA and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) are huge oil deposits. The area is also endowed with some mineral deposits but not to the degree of southern Angola. The FNLA had its bases both in northern Angola and southern Zaire, with the latter providing the logistical, moral and military support. Despite all this leverage, UNITA and FNLA not only experienced severe losses, but that Castro himself was
quoted as having said that UNITA together with FNLA and FLEC were destroyed and would never rise again! (Taber 1985: 109).

However, the underestimation of UNITA by Cuba, resulted in a no-win situation. Bernard Expedit (1986:81) has argued that this method by UNITA’s light infantry was more home based in the bush, creating tactical military difficulties for the Angolan Peoples Freedom Liberation Army (FAPLA) to which FAPLA and the Cuban forces were not adapted. Briquets (1989:110) has further argued that some of the major reasons why the Cubans were unable to achieve a decisive military victory over UNITA was also due to a number of reasons namely, the conflicting Soviet-Cuban military strategies, the increased number of Cuban casualties and the unfamiliar terrain in which they were militarily engaged. This “uncoordinated union” between the allies explained their inability to reach a conclusive solution to the Angolan question.

However, the military scenario changed in 1987 with the arrival of Cuban elite troops led by General Arnaldo Ochoa, the veteran of the initial Angolan operation and the Ogaden conflict. General Ochoa moved swiftly from the Namibian-Menongue deterrence line, south west of Angola, to the Namibian border. The point here is that whether the Soviets agreed to the Cuban plan or not, they approved of it simply because of their united and common interests, that is, to push out the imperialists and their allies. In fact, Cuba was looking for a one-on-one duel with the South Africans in order to prove that the Cuban’s “did not lose their shoes on the battle field” (Briquets 1989:112 and Bridgland 1990). This was because Cuba was out to protect her image and prestige especially at home where there was some resentment over Cuba’s decision to take part in a war in which she had no chance of winning with thousands of Cuban sons in a foreign continent.
When the Cubans were finally invited to take part in the Angolan / Namibian talks in early 1988, their willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of all their troops from Angola marked a major shift from their previous stand. The negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the Angolan conflict and subsequent independence to Namibia that had stalled for a while in the early part of the decade, now seemed feasible because of the new developments that emerged. These developments were that the US had begun to link Namibian independence (under UN supervision) with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, while at the same time ensuring South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia and Namibia’s subsequent transition to independence.

Throughout the negotiating process, Castro portrayed Cuba as Angola’s “big brother” and they had made some concessions which were necessary for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement, such as deploying Cuban troops north of the 13th parallel, and agreeing to the fact that they were not going to stay on the continent until the end of the apartheid as was the case initially. To Castro, their participation in the talks could only benefit Angola. In light of this, Briquets (1989:119) has noted that the no-win situation in Angola and Cuba’s long involvement there could finally facilitate a quick solution to the Angolan conflict and secure the independence of Namibia. The volte-face of Cuba from her earlier stand, that is, her determination not to leave southern Africa until apartheid was eliminated, and now willing to negotiate their withdrawal from Angola, did not necessarily contradict her revolutionary ideals. On the contrary, Cuban troops’ withdrawal meant that Namibia would get her independence while at the same time South Africa would depart from Namibia and Angola. In a nutshell, Cuba did achieve the initial goals she set out to achieve. Cuba ensured that the imperialist forces with the exception of UNITA left Angola which also paved the way for the independence of Namibia. Though the apartheid regime was still in power, South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia was of utmost importance to Cuba.
There were a number of peace negotiations involving the belligerents before and after the 1988 London peace negotiations. However, the London discussions emerged as the most important ones because, for the first time, representatives of Angola, Cuba, the US and South Africa sat together to discuss a political solution to the Angolan conflict and the Namibian independence. This was indeed a step forward, because all the parties agreed on a political solution to the Angolan conflict. Cuba accepted the agreement in principle even before dealing with the issue of apartheid, which was a major shift from their earlier position. Briquets (1989:120) states that “Cuba, sitting across her two arch-enemies –the United States and South Africa, agreed that Angola needed peace before the end of apartheid”. The schedule for the gradual withdrawal of Cuba from Angola and the subsequent withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia to ensure her independence was drawn and agreed upon at this stage.

The political dynamics of the conflict are quite complex in that there were a lot of issues involved. Apart from the domestic political and economic factors (petroleum and minerals) as regards contributing to the war in Angola, there were external factors that influenced the war. At the continental level, there were divisions within the ranks of the OAU members as to who was responsible for the war and whom the organisation should back as the legitimate power holder. Both UNITA and the MPLA were backed by different countries in Africa but at the same time the OAU and the UN had the moral obligation to defend the government of the day, that is, the MPLA. Whereas Zaire supported the FNLA, South Africa and Malawi gave UNITA moral, logistical, and military support. However, it is fair to point out that Malawi only provided moral and political support to UNITA.
Southern Africa has been of geostrategic importance especially to the US and her allies for decades due to the vast mineral and oil resources in the region. Immediately after the Angolan independence, the US was keen to undermine the legitimacy of the MPLA Marxist-Leninist regime so that it could undertake fundamental political transformations favourable to the Western capitalist countries. The pronouncements of the policies of “Constructive Engagement” and the “Reagan Doctrine” can be understood in this broad context. The constructive engagement policy was the policy devised by the Reagan administration to “…help foster a climate conducive to compromise and accommodation in both southern and South Africa” (Malaquias 1999: 30). Basically what it did was to justify her continued support for UNITA and the South African regime by emphasising interdependence. The Reagan doctrine on the other hand was to be the implementation wing of the constructive engagement policy in that it would provide overt US support for anti-communist guerrilla movements around the world. Consequently, it was through this doctrine that UNITA received massive military technology and hardware to challenge the MPLA.

3.3 CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE

As mentioned earlier, the Cuban civilian assistance program to Africa constituted part of Cuba’s proletarian internationalist foreign policy. Even though the civilian assistance initially served a variety of foreign policy objectives, Briquets (1989:48) notes that this assistance has often been used by Cuba to take advantage of certain geo-political equations. As I have observed, Cuba was paid $800 for every soldier present in Angola. Secondly, Cuba also imported large amounts of oil from Angola though the details of this are very sketchy because of the lack of hard data to substantiate this claim. This illustrates the political realities of the war in Angola. The Cubans were paid for their services because the high cost of the maintenance of the civilian technical personnel involved in Angola. (Erisman 1985).
These programs focused on the fields in which Cuba had had some successes, namely, public health, education and sports as well as in the sugar, fishing, animal genetics and construction industries (Briquets 1989:49). This civilian assistance was consistent with Cuba’s strong anti-Western stance, as it was granted to countries that were ideologically compatible. Briquets (1989) has further noted that sub-Saharan Africa, being one of the least developed and most politically turbulent regions of the developing world, had been a major focus for Cuban civilian aid programs. For example, in Angola, Cuban medical doctors, veterinarians, builders, teachers and agricultural technicians had been very active to the extent that some had engaged in other obscure duties such as felling trees—as in the Mayombe jungle in central Angola, to produce timber for factories (Briquets 1989:49). Although Cuban overseas civilian assistance began as early as 1963, active programs began during the 1970’s when Cuba aided Angola in a host of economic and social development activities. For example, the Angolan and Cuban governments signed numerous agreements for co-operation in the fields of health, sports, youth development, economic and scientific technical co-operation, agriculture and labour. In other words, Angola could send some of her people to Cuba for training while at the same time, the Cuban government could send in her experts to train Angolans in the various fields mentioned. Briquets (1989) further reckons that these assistance programs were partly undertaken as an integral component of Cuba’s institutions. Likewise, the magnitude of Cuban assistance not only in Angola, but also in other countries has been difficult to assess, since Cuba does not publish separate systematic statistics on the magnitude of its military or civilian assistance abroad (Briquets 1989:49-51). As Table Eight illustrates, Angola absorbed 70% to 80% of Cuban civilian personnel in sub-Saharan Africa between 1976 and 1984.
### TABLE EIGHT

**CUBAN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola 6000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>6650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo 140</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana 40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar 35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
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<td>Nigeria 5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4095</strong></td>
<td><strong>5885</strong></td>
<td><strong>10970</strong></td>
<td><strong>8385</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources compiled from:**
It has been stated that because of the economic hardships that came about as a result of the 1973 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, the Cubans saw this crisis as an opportunity to obtain hard currency income from the sale of her services abroad (Briquets 1989:52). In a speech in late, 1977, Fidel Castro justified his country’s mission in Angola by stating that charging the Angolans and other countries for services rendered was better for Cubans due to the fact it opened new possibilities for his country (Castro 1978:2).

Numerous reports have pointed out that Angola did indeed pay for some of the civilian services offered by Cuba such as the medical and construction personnel. One source pointed out that in 1978, Angola covered all their expenses including salaries (Bender 1978:9). Bender (1978) reckons that there were arrangements in which Angola paid Cuba with oil instead of hard currency. With regard to the public health sector, Cuban physicians represented over 50% of the doctors in Angola. Comparatively, therefore, Angola had one of the highest percentages of doctors in sub-Saharan Africa. As Table One depicts, Angola had one of the highest percentages of medical doctors from Cuba constituting about 75% of the total number of doctors in the country. In general, it can be noted, therefore, that Cuba’s contribution to Africa’s medical needs was substantial. This is clearly seen in some countries where dependency on Cuban medical personnel was up to 84% as was the case with Guinea and Tanzania.

In 1982, 30% of all Cuban public health personnel serving in sub-Saharan Africa were stationed in Angola, which is a total of some 355 Cuban doctors (Briquets 1989:59). Cuba’s public health care involvement began in late 1975 following her military intervention in Angola. The Cuban medical brigade began work in the Cabinda province of Angola, working hand in hand with other civilian personnel from Poland and the Soviet Union (Brooke 1988: A2). At the time of her independence,
Angola had only 55 physicians out of a population of 5.5 million. The Cuban medical personnel were therefore a welcome contribution to the Angolan people. The Cuban public health personnel were in every Angolan province providing training for Angolan health workers and helping to organise and implement major preventive medicine programs such as polio and infectious disease vaccinations (Briquets 1989).

In terms of training, the Cubans focused on primary health care, Para-medical personnel and health technicians. According to a 1982 report, the Cuban health staff operated 19 technical health schools in 15 Angolan provinces (De la Osa 1976:6). Many more Angolans were trained under the scholarship program established by Cuba that provided for the training of physicians, dentists, epidemiologists and medical technicians both in Cuba and in Angola. In 1986, an agreement was reached whereby up to 200 Angolan patients were to go to Cuba for medical treatment (Valdo 1986: 12). All these training programs by Cuba show the extent of their contribution to the medical well being of the Angolan people.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Cuba achieved most of the objectives entailed in her foreign policy tenets vis-à-vis Angola. The peace agreement Cuba, South Africa and Angola signed contained, among other things, the withdrawal of around 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. Gillian Gunn (1987:2) has noted that Cuba not only received favourable and much improved trade terms from the Soviets after their intervention in Angola, but that Cuba gained prestige as a defender of blacks against the white racists of South Africa and her imperialist allies. Cuba has always believed that “humanity will have witnessed the loyalty to the principles that explain and encourage the policy of solidarity of the Cuban Revolution” (Briquets 1989). Even though the apartheid question still lingered in the mind of
Cuba, Havana looked at this situation as a first step in the eradication of apartheid in the region. Indeed, Namibia gained her independence a few years thereafter.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER 4

4. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CASE OF NAMIBIA

4.1 BACKGROUND AND LINKAGE POLITICS

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435 of 1978 endorsed a plan backed by the Western Contact Group (US, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada), which called for a cease-fire in Namibia and for the UN-supervised elections leading to her independence the following year. This objective was not realised because the resolutions implementation was derailed by South Africa’s withdrawal from the Geneva talks convened to implement the UN plan for Namibia.

The analysis into the causes of the implementation of the UNSCR 435 requires an understanding of the historical background of Cuba’s involvement in Namibia. “South West Africa” was a German colony from 1884 to 1915, when it fell to South African forces during World War I and five years later, the League of Nations assigned the territory to South Africa as a “Class C” mandate to be administered as part of and by South Africa. In 1966, Pretoria refused to sign a trusteeship agreement with the UN, which required that South Africa administer the territory under UN supervision. South Africa on their part maintained that the UN was not a direct successor of the League. In the same year, the UN General Assembly voted to terminate the mandate and bring South West Africa under the UN supervision. As a result, in late 1966 the UN General Assembly by 114 votes to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 3 abstentions (France, Malawi and the United Kingdom), adopted Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating the mandate for South West Africa (Dugard 1973).
This meant that in no uncertain terms South Africa ceased to have territorial rights (political, administrative, constitutional or otherwise) over South West Africa like it did before. This resolution was ratified and endorsed by UNSCR 2649 of 1966. Subsequently in mid 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted, by 85 votes to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 30 abstentions, Resolution 2248 establishing an eleven-member UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory until independence. However, Pretoria rejected the resolution(s) and later that year, SWAPO announced the launching of a guerrilla war to liberate Namibia (Rodman 1994:360 and Hanlon 1986).

The history of both Cuban and Angolan support for “Namibia” and SWAPO began in the 1970’s. Namibia’s proximity to Angola made it easier for Cuba and Angola to fight Pretoria from Angolan territory. When Angola became independent in 1975, the Cuban-backed MPLA government provided SWAPO with bases from which to launch cross-border operations into Namibia, paving the way for the movement to become more active than before (Leo Grande 1990:53). As a result, South Africa retaliated with invasions into Angola and stepped up support for Jonas Savimbi’s anti-MPLA movement, UNITA. On the other hand, Cuba, in Angola at the behest of the MPLA, also supported SWAPO politically and militarily (Cliffe et al 1994:54 and Greig 1977:243).

The 1978 UNSCR 435 approved a report by the UN Secretary-General that described the plan for the international recognition of Namibian independence. The resolution became the basis for the process that lead to Namibian independence. The US in the meantime, introduced the concept of linking implementation of Resolution 435 to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The justification was that an independent Namibia would be threatened by the continued Cuban presence in Angola (Rodman 1994: 318). Although both Havana and Luanda argued that
Namibian independence and Cuban troops in Angola were separate issues, Pretoria used this linkage concept to delay the independence negotiations. Consequently, talks between Angola and the US on Cuban troop withdrawal continued for a number of years, and in 1986, the negotiations stalled after Savimbi’s US visit where it was decided that more military aid was to be given to UNITA. In 1987, talks resumed because, among other things, Cuba was becoming frustrated with the stalemated military situation and was concerned about the ongoing financial and human cost of the war. As a result, Cuba was more willing to improve her relations with Washington, in part due to an anticipated reduction in Soviet subsidies needed for the war efforts.

The Tripartite and Bilateral agreements signed thereafter centred on four major issues. First, it was resolved that both Cuba and South Africa were to withdraw troops from Angola. Secondly, that South Africa was to withdraw its troops from Namibia. Third, that elections in Namibia would be held and supervised by the UN. Finally, that the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO bases in Angola were to be dismantled. Under the terms of the agreements, the UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), to monitor the Namibian elections of an Assembly that was to be responsible for drawing up a constitution. Those agreements established the following timetables. By early 1989, the implementation of the UNSCR 435, which mandated a precise schedule for the elections was to be carried out and that Cuba had to reduce its troop strength to 47,000. The UNTAG forces were also set to begin their monitoring. This was followed by the agreement that all Cuban troops were to move north of the 15th parallel (200 miles north of the Namibian border) beginning mid 1989. In November 1989, elections were to be held for the Namibian National Assembly, which would draw up a constitution. At the same time, 50,000 South African troops were to leave Namibia, and all Cuban troops were to move north of the 13th parallel, and be reduced by one half. In early 1990, 8,000 Cuban troops were to
be withdrawn (from both Angola and Namibia), with a further 5,000 troops withdrawing from Angolan territory six months later. Finally, by mid 1991, the final 12,000 Cuban troops were scheduled to leave Angola completing the chronological order of events as agreed upon in the peace accords.

Even though the accords were signed towards the end of 1988, the final agreement remained elusive, because some personalities in Pretoria believed that a military solution was still possible and that Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola would also be perceived as a defeat back home in Havana. Cuba did not trust the commitment and sincerity of South Africa, anticipating a possibility of the resurgence of Pretoria’s military incursions in southern Angola (Cliffe 1994:59). Subsequently, even before the negotiations properly took off, both sides (Cuba and Angola versus South Africa) had made efforts to end the hostilities in Angola and by extension in Namibia.

The 1986-87 period saw intense fighting between the belligerents in southern Angola, particularly at Cuito Cuanavale and at Caleque Dam in northern Namibia. It was during this period that Angola, Cuba and South Africa first made concessions about linkage and indicated their willingness to consider the total Cuban withdrawal not only from southern Angola but also from Angola entirely. This was a shift from Cuba’s earlier stand that they would never leave Angola until apartheid was eradicated. In return, the Cubans demanded a guaranteed withdrawal by all the South African Defence Force personnel (SADF) from Angola and a Namibian settlement.

In the weeks that followed, South Africa withdrew from the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola, not only because of the heavy defeat she had suffered there, but also due to the high number of casualties and the difficulty in replacing her aircraft and weapon systems that had been
destroyed in the conflict. Ultimately, had they continued with the war, they stood no chance of victory over Cuba and her allies. Hence, Pretoria bleakly saw that withdrawal was to be their only logical option. Each side in the meantime maintained a hard-line stance as the fighting continued until the first face-to-face talks began between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the US in London in mid 1988. According to Dreyer (1994:174), South Africa could either gain from the negotiations or face the consequences of further sanctions imposed by the international community, which even the US, her ally, could not and would not prevent. This would have lead to further disastrous effects for Pretoria had that happened, thus their quest for a quick settlement to the conflict.

Meanwhile, Cuba dispatched 15,000 men and 220 tanks to the Namibian border and to the area west of Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola that now threatened and created fear in the South African detachments and bases in Angola and in Namibia. Jaster (1985:23) has noted that this fear by Pretoria was due to the fact that they could not have stopped the Cubans had the Cuban’s decided to cross deep into Namibian territory. The military clash at Caleque Dam underscored the possibilities for a further massive escalation, the effect of which was to bring the belligerents “closer” to negotiate in order to avoid further clashes. In the process, Cuban planes bombed Caleque Dam in northern Namibia killing 11 South African soldiers, which marked a decisive point in the negotiations (Dreyer 1994:178-179). The build-up continued into late 1988 without any tangible cessation of hostilities.

The conflicts around Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola and the confrontation that led to the Caleque dam clash in northern Namibia were inconclusive and ended in standoffs. Consequently, these conflicts proved to the South Africans the dangers of continued warfare in terms of costs incurred. At the same time, South Africa’s containment of the struggle in Namibia would have been
seriously threatened in the east around the Caprivi border (Angola-Namibia border), unless Pretoria backed UNITA then in the south western part of Angola. In the meantime, the Cuban-Angolan build-up continued to the north of Ovamboland, in Namibia (Cliffe 1994:58–60 and Dreyer 1994:177-187). Other authors such as Wood (1991:751), have noted that the changing attitudes and events such as the mutinies within the South West African Territorial Forces’ (SWATF) black troops because of the odds stalked against them in Angola, further forced the South Africans to negotiate (Falk 1991:101 and Hanlon 1986). All these events changed the protagonists’ views contributed to the end of the war.

4.2 THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION

Negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the cessation of conflict and subsequent independence of South West Africa began in earnest in late 1978, but later stalled for a while till 1981 when the US began to link Namibian independence with the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. It was not until the peace settlement in late 1988 as part of the New York Accords that provided a framework for South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia, and Namibia’s subsequent transition to independence under the UN supervision. Unlike Angola, Namibia is unique in that Cuba was never militarily involved directly. That is, Cubans were never present in that country as was the case in Angola.

As mentioned in the beginning of this study, one of the tenets of Cuba’s foreign policy in Africa was the elimination of colonialism by means of national liberation struggles. More significantly, the denunciation of institutionalised racism in the form of apartheid in South Africa and by extension in Namibia, constituted a core part of Cuba’s foreign policy objectives. It was because of these reasons that Cuba found herself drifting towards Namibia as in the case of Angola. Briquets (1989)
has noted that in the early 1980’s, the prospect for a just solution to the Namibian question declined. From Cuba’s viewpoint and to all those opposing the Pretoria regime in Namibia, this decline in the hope of finding a solution arose from attempts to establish a link between Namibia’s independence and the presence of Cuban military forces in Angola. This meant that only the unilateral withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola would guarantee the Namibian independence. This was not to be a smooth transition (of Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence) as expected because of the renewed and strong Western support for Pretoria and the Reagan Administration’s overt assistance given to the Angolan rebels after 1985.

Because of the aggression and pressure by South Africa on her neighbours, Cuba formed “joint partnerships” with some of the southern African states notably, Angola. It has been noted that Cuba stood to gain little apart from some respect among progressive Third World countries for its massive commitment of military personnel in the region (Deutschmann 1985). Others have also shared the view that Cuba was not simply acting as a Soviet foreign policy tool, but rather, it took the initiative to come to Namibia’s and the region’s aid (Stockwell 1980). When Angola and Cuba were on the verge of reinforcing military defences because of an increase in attacks by South Africa, the two countries formed a joint delegation that participated in talks with the US team in the Angolan capital in 1988. The negotiating positions of Angola and Cuba were premised on the following viewpoints: the cessation of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Angola; the withdrawal of South African forces that had systematically raided Angola; the implementation of Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council, which called for Namibia’s independence and international guarantees that there would be no more attacks on Angola (Erisman 1991 and Erisman 1985).
Whereas the four proposals were vital, it was the question of Namibian independence that was of paramount importance to Angola and Cuba. Cuba’s stance on the Namibian question was based on this proposition. The OAU and the Frontline States shared the view that Namibian independence would be realised if the US strongly supported the UNSCR 435 (Erisman 1991:101; Dreyer 1994:110; Rodman 1994: 361 and Deutschmann 1985). Indeed, 1988 marked a turning point in Namibia in that South Africa finally ceased its delaying tactics and accepted that UNSCR 435/78 had to be implemented, while at the same time agreements for the simultaneous withdrawal of SADF and the Cuban troops from Angola were reached.

It must be noted that what brought South Africa to the negotiating table was the Cuito Cuanavale offensive of early 1988 in southern Angola, where the South African advance was stopped and pushed back to the Namibian border by the combined Angolan, Cuban and South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) troops. The four-party discussions (Cuba, Angola, US and South Africa) began in London in mid 1988 and ended with the signing of a peace accord later that year at the UN headquarters in New York. The first agreement signed in mid 1988 laid out the principles for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian crisis. It was signed in New York between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. In principle, they agreed to implement resolution 435 of 1978 of the UNSC, which was geared towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. This agreement also laid out the schedule for the peaceful withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory, while at the same time all parties involved in the Namibian question were to cease from any form of hostilities. This New York agreement was followed six months later by another agreement also signed in New York, which was officially termed as the “Tripartite Agreement”, and which formally ratified the principles agreed upon earlier.
Eventually, the final agreement signed later in 1988, was a bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba where both parties agreed to implement the UNSCR 435 of the UN Security Council, while at the same time the actual time frame for the redeployment of Cuban troops from Angola was laid out. Basically, this last agreement sealed the termination of Cuba’s military contingent in Angola. These meetings showed Cuban-Angolan willingness to negotiate despite “the deliberate hesitations and arrogant stance of South Africa and the inconsistencies of the mediator, the US, an ally of South Africa” (Dreyer 1994:182-183). In the end, at the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, the Cuban position was that the illegal occupation of Namibia would come to an end and Namibia would not only cease to be a South African colonial territory, but would become a sovereign and independent country (Erisman 1985:102). The signing of the accord “ended one of Cuban history’s glorious pages” (Briquets 1989).

4.3 CUBA’s ROLE IN THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE QUESTION

As I have noted, Cuba’s foreign policy has been conceptualised within the contexts of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Cuba’s main agenda for Namibia was to secure her independence by all means necessary such as by using military support as well as diplomatic initiatives within the UN, NAM, and other international forums. All these were in conformity with her foreign policy objectives and ideals of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and internationalism.

Cuba’s anti-colonial and anti-imperial foreign policy perspectives had consistently been articulated in, inter alia, the UN and NAM conferences. For example, during the 1973 NAM conference in Algiers-Algeria, Fidel Castro told the delegates that it was their solemn duty to support in a steadfast manner, the oppressed people of Namibia and against imperialist forces that aided colonialism and oppression (Erisman 1985: 61). Almost all of the Third World countries led by
Cuba and the East bloc countries including most Western countries were in favour of Namibian independence. There were exceptions in that Portugal, Malawi and South Africa did not support the resolution whereas 25 other states abstained from making their positions known (Dreyer 1994; Leo Grande 1990 and Erisman 1991). But the support for Namibian de-colonization in international forums showed a clear majority calling for the Namibian independence.

Though there was some opposition from the US and some of her allies as to the procedures and modalities of the implementation process, the resolution was finally adopted. What also enabled the resolution to be adopted was the support it received from the members of the NAM, the OAU, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These organisations were in favour of the UNSC resolution 435/78. However, it is crucial to note that there was little division within the UN Security Council in that out of the 14 members of the Security Council, 12 voted in favour of the resolution with no votes against, whereas Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstained. The Soviets viewed the US as taking control over the whole Namibian issue with scepticism because it was they (the US) who all along supported South Africa’s presence in Namibia and now they were playing the role of mediator! To the Soviets, this was just another ploy by the imperialists to get an upper hand in world politics by taking advantage of the Namibian situation. Ultimately, this was their major reason for abstaining in the voting process.

4.4. HAVANA’S AIMS, ROLES AND REACTION TO THE CRISES IN NAMIBIA
In early 1989, Cuba slowed down her withdrawal from Angola as laid down in the peace agreement in reaction to the UN’s decision to permit South African troops to leave their bases. At a meeting later at Mount Etjo-Namibia, the Cubans, irrespective of the Angolan displeasure, agreed with the South Africans that SWAPO bases and troops in Namibia south of the 16th parallel in Angola were to be withdrawn north of the 16th parallel. Cuba on the other hand promised to
arrange for the remaining SWAPO troops on both sides of the border to be removed and confined to camps north of the 16th parallel. On several key issues and occasions – such as in the UN where they (Cuba) strove to find a lasting solution to the conflict in Angola and Namibia, and in the negotiations leading to the signing of the peace accord, Cuba sided with the US and South Africa against her long-term allies, SWAPO, Angola and the Soviet Union. The most evident scenario was the case where by SWAPO wanted to refuse to participate in the first Namibian elections for fear of the possibility of defeat. However, Cuba persuaded SWAPO to accept and participate in the elections unconditionally. According to Gillian Gunn (1989:4), the motive for Cuba taking this stand was the fact that her allies were jeopardising her national interests. Cuba like the US, feared that SWAPO’s action would be used by South Africa as a pretext for calling off the implementation of UNSCR 435 and re-invade Angola.

Cuba was not keen on a military solution and at the same time there was pressure from Moscow for Cuba to resolve these conflicts, which drained Moscow’s resources (Briquets 1989:148 and Jubri 1990). China on the other hand used the issue of scarce resources to try and force Cuba to tow their line and pursue Beijing’s interests in the conflict but without much success. China’s earlier position to support UNITA was for the purpose that such pressure on the MPLA would force Angola to try as much as possible to reach a negotiated settlement. Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola served all these ends, including the fact that retreating could create an opportunity for other negotiations between Havana and Washington. Cuba’s national interests were more fundamental irrespective of the difficulties Havana encountered (Leo Grande 1990:56). Gunn (1989:6) has further noted that the vigour with which the Cuban delegation expressed their view to SWAPO in the pre Mount Etjo meeting in Luanda must have been very harsh, judging from the rapid retraction
of SWAPO’s initial position. This crisis was averted with Cuba’s help, without which the entire process would have been derailed.

The second crisis came in late 1989, when the UNITA forces in Angola killed 6 Cubans. Havana’s response to this was that she would halt her withdrawal and retaliate effectively. Cuba further declared a “no more Cubans can die” period that would ensure her ability to comply with her troop withdrawal schedule, but at the same time, the withdrawal of her equipment would be “reconfigured” to ensure an instant retaliation if UNITA attacked her troops again. Gunn (1989:5) has emphasised that this retaliation would and could have gone as far as UNITA’s headquarters in Jamba, southeastern Angola. Meanwhile, the US gave UNITA stern orders not to attack the departing Cuban forces.

Again, as in the first crisis, Cuban rationalisation of not retaliating but rather responding with threats, lay in her long-term interests. Getting involved in a confrontation with UNITA would hinder her ability to complete a withdrawal it had come to view as desirable. As part of her policy of prestige, among other reasons, Cuba had always reiterated the fact that she was only in Angola to protect it against Pretoria’s aggression and not to participate in the war with UNITA. Cuba also had other agendas in line to be fulfilled with the implementation of Resolution 435. For example, Cuba objected to the plans for a centralised vote counting system in Namibia instituted by the South African administrator-general as being “too elementary”. Cuba suspected that Pretoria would fix the elections and initially reduce SWAPO’s share of the vote. In the event of this happening, SWAPO might have had to resume guerrilla warfare from Angola, which Cuba would not have been able to prevent. The success of other movements apart from SWAPO would have led to a
Pretoria-backed Namibian regime, jeopardising Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola (Leo Grande 1990:55).

Whatever the outcome of the elections, they had to be seen to be free and fair so that even if SWAPO lost, Cuba would have been able to discourage SWAPO from going back to the bush. On the other hand, the South Africans feared the presence of a large foreign military force in Angola, which would have been seen as the ally of one of the political parties in Namibia and therefore able to disrupt the elections (South African Department of Foreign Affairs 1989:10). In the end, all the fears by all parties were laid to rest by the undertaking of a UN supervised independent general election and also by the assurances made by the UN that there would be no foreign interference in the elections. At the same time, the UN ensured that the resolutions and agreements arrived at by all parties in the New York Peace Accords were to be followed through to the letter without any hitches.

4.5 CONCLUSION

Namibia was probably one of the most complex problems in which Cuba became involved in southern Africa. As in Angola, where they became involved to protect the MPLA regime and consolidate it in power, Havana achieved the same success in implementing its principles by liberating Namibia from South African rule as part of her anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance. The financial and human costs were high for Cuba let alone the financial and material expenses incurred by the Soviet Union. Namibia did gain her independence, but part of her territory, Walvis Bay, still remained under South African rule. It is not difficult to imagine what this could have lead to had it never been returned to Namibia, especially as Walvis Bay is the only deep-water port in
Namibia. It was only four years after her independence, that Namibia claimed Walvis Bay as part of her territory from the new government in South Africa in 1994 (Dreyer 1994).

Cuba achieved the objectives it set out initially and Castro even kept the promise he had made to the Namibians in 1985, that Cuba would ensure that Namibia got her independence (Erisman 1991:102). Cuba made some concessions during the negotiations and pressured SWAPO back to the negotiating table, to accept the outcome of the deliberations and to implement the Tripartite Peace Accords agreed upon in New York. Cuba’s international prestige was enhanced in spite of her withdrawal from Angola and Namibia. In the final analysis, Cuba’s revolutionist anti-imperial and anti-colonial foreign policy was unleashed for the entire world to witness taking into account the outcomes of the Namibian independence.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER 5

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Cuba’s activities in the region, particularly in Angola and Namibia, enhanced her status globally, particularly within the ranks of the Third World countries. Falk (1991:95) reiterates that Cuba has evolved from being a small ambitious Latin American nation exporting military assistance programs to being a prominent Third World military force with its own place at a US-Soviet Union negotiation table. After nearly four decades of being suppressed, oppressed and manipulated in her own backyard in the Western Hemisphere, the only way Cuba could finally come face to face with her arch-enemy as equals, was in Africa where she tried to iron out the continent’s problems.

Cuban foreign policy in southern Africa, especially in Angola and Namibia, has shown signs of realism intertwined with idealism. Cuba used idealist and moral causes to justify its actions on the continent. What is important to note is that in pursuit of their national interests states always justify their actions on moral grounds. The complexities of political realism and the portrayal of political actions justified in moral terms, is what Cuba’s presence in Africa demonstrated. As Havana’s foreign policy has shown, it is bounded in idealistic and moral ideologies that justified their presence and actions in both Angola and Namibia.

This theoretical perspective sheds more light on Cuba’s revolutionary anti-imperial and anti-colonial foreign policy in southern Africa. Indeed, it is fair to argue that Cuban national interests in Angola and Namibia were in conformity with her foreign policy objectives. It is also fair to reiterate that Cuba succeeded in exporting her revolution especially to Angola and Namibia through military support and international civilian assistance programmes. Nearly 100,000 Cubans, both civilian and
military, participated in one way or another in the development of the African continent, particularly between the 1960s-1990s.

Cuba also established a different relationship with the US and the Soviet Union. Whereas Cuba became less dependent on Moscow, her military presence in Angola and Namibia forced Washington to negotiate with Havana on the question of the Namibian independence. Cuba’s pivotal roles in southern Africa led to this geo-political scenario. In many respects Cuba’s historical similarities with Africa influenced her decision to be directly involved in fighting against imperialism and colonialism. These foreign policy objectives are likely to continue to influence the Castro Administration’s policy vis-à-vis Africa.

Cuba stood as a champion of national liberation movements and even though she was provided with Soviet logistic support, this did not in any way make her a surrogate of the Soviet Union in Africa. On the contrary, we have noted that the decisions Havana took were independent of the Soviet Union up to and including negotiating Namibia’s independence and South Africa’s troop withdrawal. This study has established that Cuba’s foreign policy objectives were intertwined with her continued support for the liberation movements and the African countries that were engaged in such anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles.

This research has also demonstrated that Cuba’s policy towards Africa and specifically Angola and Namibia was motivated by a genuine revolutionary conviction. Cuba’s principle of international solidarity, in the ideological sense, has always been crucial and held in high regard because it constitutes the cornerstone of the survival of the Cuban Revolution. The aims of Cuba’s activism are clear: the advancement of the socialist idea and proletarian internationalism as her key foreign
policy tenets. In conclusion, Cuba’s role in southern Africa fulfilled the objectives of her international prestige, which were grounded in her ideological commitment to help Third World countries in their fight against colonialism and foreign domination. Consequently, one would tend to agree with Abudu (1983) when he argues that Cuba was highly motivated by ideological considerations in her foreign policy, which rules out any imperialist or economic motives. In the final analysis, what is witnessed is that a despicable intervention by one actor, is a welcome liberation for another (Abudu 1983: 250-265).
REFERENCES


6. APPENDICES

6.1 APPENDIX I

Agreements Signed Between Cuba and Angola in 1976

− The Ministries of Public Health of Cuba and of Angola agreed that Cuban medical and paramedical personnel would staff hospitals and clinics in Angola.

− The Cuban National Institute for Sports, Physical Education and Recreation, and the Directorate for Youth and Sports of Angola, set the basis for co-operation in sports, organisation, training of specialists, and exchange of athletes.

− The Cuban-Angolan Intergovernmental Commission for Economics and Scientific-Technical Co-operation was created for co-operation in the fields of fishing, construction, public health, foreign trade, education, labour, poultry breeding, etc.

− Direct co-operation between the Cuban National Fishing Institute and the Angolan State Secretariat for Fishing was established.

− The Cuban Communist Party and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) agreed to co-operate in the field of revolutionary propaganda.

− Direct co-operation in domestic trade was established between the Cuban Domestic Trade Ministry and the Angolan State Secretariat for Commerce.

− Direct co-operation between the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry and the Angolan State Secretariat for Commerce was established for co-operation in foreign trade.

− Direct co-operation in the sugar industry was established between the Cuban Sugar Industry Ministry and the Angolan State Secretariat for Industry and Energy.

− Political co-operation in the training of Angolan cadres was established between the Cuban Union of Communist Youths and the Youth of the MPLA.

− The Labour Ministries of Cuba and Angola agreed on exchanges in the areas of labour, resources, wages, work organisation, social security, administration of work justice, etc.

− Cuba agreed to provide assistance to Angola in the field of agriculture, with special emphasis on coffee cultivation. Co-operation included both work to be performed by Cuban workers and technicians as well as training of Angolan personnel. Similar agreements were signed for technical co-operation in the areas of education, forestry, public health and transportation.

− The Cuban Communications Ministry and the Angolan State Secretariat for Industry and Energy agreed to co-operate in the area of communications.

– The Cuban Group for Community Development and the Angolan State Secretariat for Social Affairs agreed to co-operate in the development of urban and rural communities.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT,
22 DECEMBER 1988

Agreement Among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

The governments of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa hereinafter designated as “the Parties,”

Taking into account the “Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-western Africa,” approved by the Parties on 20th July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as “UNSCR 435/78,”

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the re-deployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola,

Recognising the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement, affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the south-western region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of south-western Africa to peace, development, and social progress,

Urging African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the south-western region of Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa, agree to the provisions set forth below.
– The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

– All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

– Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and People’s Republic of Angola shall co-operate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organisation, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

– The People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature on this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

– Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organisation or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of south-western Africa.

– The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

– The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of co-operation any disputes with respect to the interpretation of implementation thereof.

– This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
AFONSO VAN DUNEM
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
ISIDORO OCTAVIO MALMIERCA
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
ROELOF F. BOTHA
6.3 APPENDIX III

BILATERAL AGREEMENT,
22 DECEMBER 1988

The following document is the unofficial US translation of the original Portuguese and Spanish texts of the agreement, with annex.

Agreement Between the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba for the Termination of the Internationalist Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent,

The Government of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, hereinafter designated as the Parties,

Considering,

That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the United Nations for independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st of April,

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of Angola are closely interrelated with each other and with peace and security in the region of southwestern Africa,

That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agreement among the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa shall be signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the region of southern Africa,

That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an end the reason which compelled the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the deployment to Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA [the Angolan Government Army], its territorial integrity and sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory,

Noting,

The agreements signed by the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on 13 December 1988,

Taking into account,

That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission, The parties agree as follows:
Article 1
To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People’s Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and time frame established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the 1st of July.

Article 2
The Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from Article 1 of this Agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the Tripartite Agreements are verified.

Article 3
The Parties, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisations, hereby request that the Security Council verify the redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola, and to this end shall agree on a matching protocol.

Article 4
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa. Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United Nations Organisations, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic.

FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
AFONSO VAN DUNEM

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
ISIDORO OCTAVIO MALMIERCA

Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule

CALENDAR

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the parties establish the following calendar for the withdrawal:

Time Frames
Prior to the 1st of April, 1989
(Date of the beginning of implementation of Resolution 435)
3,000 men.
Total duration of the calendar starting from the 1\textsuperscript{st} of April, 1989:

27 months

Redeployment to the north:
To the 15\textsuperscript{th} parallel by 1 August 1989
To the 13\textsuperscript{th} parallel by 31 Oct. 1989

Total men to be withdrawn:
By 1 November 1989
25,000 men
(50\%)

By 1 April 1990
33,000 (66\%)

By 1 October 1990
38,000 (76\%)

12,000 men remaining
By July 1991
50,000 (100\%)

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men.

APPENDIX IV

(Source: CSIS Africa Notes, 8 September 1988)

Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa

The following agreement was initialled by the delegations from Angola/Cuba and South Africa in New York City on July 13, 1988; subsequently approved by their respective governments; and made public by mutual agreement on July 20, 1988.

The Governments of the Peoples Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the Southwestern region of Africa. They recognise that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

A. Implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

B. The Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with these dispositions of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of the said Resolution.

C. Redeployment towards the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the Peoples Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.

D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of states and for the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

F. Abstention from the threat and utilisation of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.

G. The acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states.

H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.

I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.
J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

K. Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.

L. The right of each state to peace, development, and social progress.

M. African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.

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