APARTEID SOUTH AFRICA'S
FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH
AFRICAN STATES, 1961-1994

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of

RHODES UNIVERSITY

by

ROGER PFISTER

April 2003
Abstract

This thesis examines South Africa’s foreign relations, viewed from a South African perspective, with the black African countries beyond southern Africa from 1961 to 1994. These relations were determined by the conflict between Pretoria’s apartheid ideology on the one hand, and African continental rejection of South Africa’s race discrimination policies and its exclusion from the community of African states on the other.

The documentary material used primarily stems from the Department of Foreign Affairs archive in Pretoria, supplemented by research conducted in other archives. Furthermore, we conducted interviews and correspondence, and consulted the relevant primary and secondary literature. Given the main source of information, we chose to make this work a case study in Diplomatic History. In consequence, and constituting the core of the study, Chapters 3 to 6 explore the interaction between South Africa and the black African states in a chronological order. At the same time, we draw on the analytical concepts from the academic disciplines of Political Science and its derivative, International Relations, to comprehend developments more fully. We discuss the significance of the approaches from these two disciplines in both the Introduction and Chapter 2. In particular, we emphasise that this study is about Pretoria’s foreign policy, involving state and non-state actors, and we suggest that the unequal status between South Africa and the other African states constitutes an inherent factor in the relationship between them.

The Conclusion examines the role of the state and non-state actors in determining Pretoria’s foreign relations and the relevance of the structural imbalance between South Africa and the black African states in this context.
Contents

Map of Africa iv
Tables and Figures v
Abbreviations vi
Preface ix

ONE INTRODUCTION 1
Aim and Scope 1
Conceptual Framework 4
Sources and Literature 12

TWO SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 19
Introduction 19
Prime Minister and State President 23
Department of Foreign Affairs 28
Military 34
Department of Information 36
National Intelligence 38
Political Parties 43
Civil Society 45
Think Tanks 47
Media 49
Organised Business 51
Parastatal and Private Companies 60

THREE WIND OF CHANGE: PRIME MINISTER VERWOERD, 1958-66 73
African Independence 73
Appeasement 74
Congo Crisis 78
Isolation 87

FOUR WHAT FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH AFRICA? PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 89
Outward-Looking Policy 89
Outward Movement 91
Malawi (93), Madagascar (100), Lusaka Manifesto (108)
Dialogue 110
Chad (118), Nigerian Civil War (121), Ghana (131), Gabon (133),
CONTENTS

Ivory Coast (135), Uganda (136), Mogadishu Declaration (137),
Mauritius (140), Hawks versus Doves (143), Gabon (147),
OGAPROV and other Projects (150)

Secret Diplomacy 161
   Ivory Coast and Senegal (164), Liberia (185), Central African
   Republic (189), Air Routes for SAA (199), Western Indian Ocean (204),
   Non-State Initiatives (213)

Détente 220
   Superpower Détente (222), South African Détente (223), Rhodesia and
   S.W.A./Namibia (225), Zaire (228), SMTF Project (231), Gabon (242),
   Angolan War (251)

Outward-Looking Policy: An Assessment 258

FIVE THE MILITARY IN COMMAND: PRIME MINISTER AND STATE
PRESIDENT BOTHA, 1978-89 263

Securocrats 263

Assistants, Bystanders and Outsiders 269

Contact with Opposition Movements 277
   Uganda (277), Ghana (280), Nigeria (282)

Western Indian Ocean 283
   Comoros (284), Madagascar (290), Seychelles Coup (290)

Armament Sales 296
   Somalia (296), Sudan (304)

Co-operation with Gabon 308
   Chad, 1980-81 (308), Chad, 1982-83 (310), Project Canteen, Gabon (313)
   Equatorial Guinea (314)

End of Cold War 317

SIX NEW DIPLOMACY: STATE PRESIDENT DE KLERK, 1989-94 322

Preliminaries 322

New Diplomacy 323

Negotiations 329

Outreach Into Africa 337
   Economic Co-operation (338), Sudan and Cameroon (340),
   Uganda and Nigeria (346)

Post-Boipatong Developments 361

SEVEN CONCLUSION 368

APPENDIXES 386

A. Biographies of Department of Foreign Affairs Officials 387
B. South African Export to Black Africa, 1961-94 395
C. South African Import from Black Africa, 1961-94 399
D. Government Expenditure for the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs
   and Information, 1961-94 403
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives  405
  • Archive for Contemporary Affairs  405
  • Department of Defence  406
  • Department of Foreign Affairs  408
  • National Archives  423

Interviews  426

Correspondence  428

Literature  429
  • Bibliographies, Document Collections  429
  • Secondary Sources  430
  • Primary Literature  435
  • Secondary Literature  436
  • Annual Reports, Journals, Magazines  463
  • Newspapers  464

Websites  464
Map of Africa
Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1  State Actors Involved in Pretoria’s Foreign Policy Making Towards Black Africa  22
Table 2  Directors of Military Intelligence / Chiefs of Staff: Intelligence  35
Table 3  Non-State Actors in the Realm of South Africa’s Foreign Relations with Black Africa  43
Table 4  Voting on Dialogue at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, June 1971  138
Table 5  Results of the Outward-Looking Policy on a Country-to-Country Basis  259
Table 6  De Klerk’s Journeys Abroad (1990 – June 1992)  332
Table 7  Mandela’s Journeys Abroad (1990 – June 1992)  332

Figures

Figure 1  Environments of South African Foreign Policy Making  21
Figure 2  Policy Network in the Realm of the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy  169
Figure 3  Africa in South African Airways’ International Network  201
Figure 4  SMTF Project in Zaire and the Angolan War, 1975-76  233
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABDG</td>
<td>African Business Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHI</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azania People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCA</td>
<td>Archive for Contemporary Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMSCOR</td>
<td>Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation / Armaments Corporation of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCOM</td>
<td>Association of Chambers of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Technical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDC</td>
<td>Bantu Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bureau interafricain pour la conservation de la terre et l’utilisation du sol (Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>Bureau for State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>British Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britmon1nd</td>
<td>British Zaire Diamond Distributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTA</td>
<td>Commission pour la coopération technique en Afrique (Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Campaign for Democracy in Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGIC</td>
<td>Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Conseil scientifique pour l’Afrique (Scientific Council for Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Selling Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSE</td>
<td>Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (General Directorate for External Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Department of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Directorate of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskom</td>
<td>Electricity Supply Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMA</td>
<td>Fondation pour l'assistance mutuelle en Afrique au sud du Sahara (Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Front national de libération de l'Angola / Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frolinat</td>
<td>Front national de libération du Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gécamines</td>
<td>Générale des carrières et des mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>Herstigte Nasionale Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Imperial Chemical Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iscor</td>
<td>Iron and Steel Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miba</td>
<td>Société minière de Bakwanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAT.ARC.</td>
<td>National Archives of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAM</td>
<td>Organisation commune africaine et malgache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAMM</td>
<td>Organisation commune africaine, malgache et mauricienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGAPROV</td>
<td>Office gabonaise d'amélioration et de production de viande (Gabonese Office for the Improvement and Production of Meat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Progressive Federal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Progressive Reform Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>Republican Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>South African Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAF</td>
<td>South African Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABRA</td>
<td>South African Bureau of Racial Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACOB</td>
<td>South African Chamber of Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFF</td>
<td>Southern African Freedom Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safmarine</td>
<td>South African Marine Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFTO</td>
<td>South African Foreign Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPA</td>
<td>Société Africaine des Produits Alimentaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARTOC</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Tourism Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDECE</td>
<td>Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage (Department for Foreign Information and Counterespionage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Society for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDCO</td>
<td>Séminaire International pour le Dialogue et la Coopération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMTF</td>
<td>Société Minière de Tenke Fungurume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNH</td>
<td>Société Nationale d'Habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soekor</td>
<td>Southern Oil Exploration Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudanese People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>State Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W.A.</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAL</td>
<td>Union Acceptances Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMHK</td>
<td>Union Minière du Haut Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSALEP</td>
<td>United States-South African Leadership Exchange Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XDC</td>
<td>Xhosa Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

Research for this study began in 1998 at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Zurich in Switzerland, whilst working simultaneously with Professor Jürg M. Gabriel as a Research Assistant at the Center for International Studies (CIS) in Zurich, joint initiative by the ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich. Professor Gabriel was then concurrently supervisor of this thesis, and I thank him for facilitating and partly financing a four-month research stay in South Africa in early 1999. In this context, acknowledgement is most gratefully made to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Bern for providing the major part of the financial assistance. In addition, I sincerely thank Professor Marie Muller, then Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria, for allowing me the use of an office and of the infrastructure at the Department during the three months I was based in Pretoria.

In July 2001, I transferred my PhD registration to the Department of Political Studies at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa, for the final preparation of the study. However, given his departure for Pretoria soon after my arrival, Professor Roger Southall’s supervision was minimal. This was partly compensated by the critical viewpoints generously given by Doctor Ivor Sarakinsky, also from the Department. During many late afternoon walks, we exchanged insights on a number of issues important to the study, particularly the transition period from 1990 to 1994 and the role of business. Academic input also came from Professors James Barber, Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg and Member of the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University, and Deon Geldenhuys at the Department of Political Studies of Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg. I thank them for their time and helpful comments on earlier drafts.

The most relevant and crucial contribution to the present study, however, came from Professor Peter Vale, whom I cannot thank enough for his excellent assistance as the supervisor of this thesis during the revision process after August 2002. Even though he had many other commitments, Peter made his time available for this task and I hold in high esteem his significant and valuable input. He took over the supervision of my work after leaving the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape and accepting the appointment as the Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics at Rhodes University from 2003.
The academic aspect aside, I received great assistance from several archivists and librarians. The study is based on primary documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria, and I am foremost indebted to the extensive help given by Neels Muller from their archive. Among the librarians, two deserve special mention, namely Sue Ogterop from the University of Cape Town’s African Studies Library and Amanda Wortman of the Africa Institute in Pretoria. Their support was always speedy and is acknowledged with many thanks.

While an intellectual exercise, this study also became a great personal challenge.

My stay in South Africa in early 1999 halted abruptly, when I became the victim of a car accident in Fort Beaufort in the Eastern Cape on 25 April. I sustained serious injuries that resulted in great hardship during the following eighteen months and made me aware of the finality of one’s existence. At the same time, the traumatic event changed the future course of my life in the most positive way. I do not think I would have made it without the presence of my parents, Agnes and Peter. Their support and encouragement in those most difficult of times will never be forgotten, and the tragic developments in the wake of the accident bound us together. I also like to thank the members of staff of the three rehabilitation clinics where I spent more than six months for their caring help, and in particular Dr. Peter Zangger from the SUVA Clinic in Bellikon, Switzerland.

My dear friend Jackie from Johannesburg accompanied me throughout the turbulent times and a close friendship developed between us. I would not want to miss the common experiences, travels and adventures, particularly those on Lesotho’s Sani Pass and in Calai in Angola, both before and after 25 April 1999. I most sincerely appreciate her time and commitment in editing chapter after chapter of the original and the revised thesis, the provision of and searching for relevant literature from the University of the Witwatersrand’s Main Library, as well as making countless local phone calls on my behalf after I had left South Africa in June 2002. At the same time, friends in both Switzerland and South Africa restored my belief in the good of human nature, and I wish to extend hearty thanks to Reto and Regula, Beatrice, Silvia, Jürg and Sharon, Christine, as well as Duan and Debbie with Kay-Leigh for the many happy moments they shared with me. Particular thanks are due to Sharon for her proofreading assistance, and to Gina and Robert for their kind hospitality while in Bloemfontein in 1999.

Roger Pfister
Fribourg, Switzerland
April 2003
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Aim and Scope

South Africa’s foreign relations with the black African countries beyond southern Africa, viewed from a South African perspective, constitute the principal focus of this study. This relationship was determined by the inherent conflict between Pretoria’s apartheid ideology and its ambition to be accepted as a fellow African state on the one hand, and African continental rejection of South Africa’s race discrimination policies and the consequent exclusion from the community of African states on the other. Furthermore, African diplomatic activities against apartheid significantly contributed to South Africa’s increasing international isolation. It was therefore generally recognised that the road to international acceptance was contingent on the normalisation of relations with the African states. Primarily guided by information derived from research in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) archive in Pretoria, this thesis examines the resulting South African ambitions to end its pariah status by way of impressing on African leaders that there was more to gain from co-operation and dialogue than from a resolute anti-apartheid posture.

The geographic area of interest to us encompasses the thirty-nine African states between southern and North Africa. The South African approach to this region differed significantly from that towards the other two. Due to their geographical proximity, economic dependence and vulnerability to Pretoria’s military might, and once independent, the countries in southern Africa – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zim-

---


2 Including the islands of Cape Verde, the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe and the Seychelles.

3 Prior to its independence in 1990, the South African government referred to it as South West Africa (S.W.A.). In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly named it Namibia (Resolution 2145 (XXI)). The term S.W.A./Namibia is used when making reference to the legal case, while Namibia is used in all other cases.
babwe - effectively constituted South Africa’s backyard, allowing it to enforce its interests through the means of power. The secondary literature has extensively covered South Africa’s role as a “regional superpower”, or “regional great power”, in its immediate neighbourhood, and military maps of the mid-1970s from the Department of Defence archive show that all of the above countries lay within reach of its fighter planes. As this criterion was not applicable to Malawi, it is not considered as part of southern Africa for purposes of this study, despite its relatively strong economic dependence on South Africa. The North African countries – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara – are excluded from this study because the DFA organigrams reveal that they were dealt with separately, attributing them to the European and Middle Eastern spheres of influence.

The study begins in 1961, when South Africa attained the status of a Republic, independent from the British Commonwealth while, concurrently, a wave of independence was sweeping across the continent. In 1963, the newly independent African states formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that had as its main aim the liberation of the African continent from colonial rule. In South Africa, a unique form of legally entrenched white minority rule held sway, with the OAU equating the struggle for decolonisation with that against apartheid. African states mobilised international opposition against the apartheid state through the OAU and at the United Nations (UN), and thus meaningfully contributed to Pretoria’s pariah status within the international community. Support was also given to both of South Africa’s princi-

---

4 Prior to its independence in 1980, it was called Rhodesia.


6 Department of Defence Archive, HS/11/1/2/6, Vol. 30.

7 See the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of External Affairs/DFA) for the period under review.


pal liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

The first democratic elections in April 1994 mark the end of the study, as this historical event finally removed the divisive issue between South Africa and African states. However, the political reforms initiated by South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk four years earlier, had already sounded the death knell for apartheid. Thereafter, Pretoria’s ambition in the African countries of interest to this study no longer concentrated on acceptance as a white African state, but rather aimed at obtaining their recognition for the reforms that had been instituted. This would allow it to fashion the post-apartheid order by wresting from the ANC as many concessions as possible for the white minority during the negotiation process. Yet, on the night of 17/18 June 1992 forty-six people died in the township of Boipatong, south of Johannesburg, and this undermined the South African government’s strategy. The ANC accused Pretoria of being the main culprit for the massacre and, at its request, the OAU called on the UN Security Council to discuss South Africa’s political crisis. Subsequent meetings held in July and August led to the deployment of a UN and other observer missions to South Africa, finally ending Pretoria’s ambitions in Africa. It will be argued that this seminal event in South Africa’s political transition from 1990 to 1994 has not been given enough attention in the secondary literature and that the importance of the African dimension at that particular moment has been neglected.

Regarding this study’s structure, Chapter 2 on South Africa’s Foreign Policy System, a term derived from Deon Geldenhuys’ standard work on South Africa’s apartheid foreign policy,10 presents the various state and non-state actors relevant to this thesis, placing an emphasis on the structures and personalities involved. For easy reference, Table 1 on page twenty-two depicts the country’s executives, the key government departments and the names of their ministers and administrative heads, while the Appendixes A and E contain comprehensive biographies of a number of DFA officials and the exchange rate between the South African Rand and the United States Dollar respectively. The years under review in this study saw the rule of four South African executives, each of whom left his specific imprint on domestic and foreign policy, including Pretoria’s approach towards Africa. It is therefore appropriate to organise the evidence on South Africa’s foreign relations with those states in four main chapters following these periods, detailing in a chronological order the interaction between South Africa and the relevant African states.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework encompasses aspects from the academic disciplines of History, Political Science and its derivative, International Relations (IR). While the differences between them are usually emphasised, significant voices from all sides propagate a conversation across the demarcations, arguing that this would add value to their research. As IR scholar Scott Burchill remarked about his own heterogeneous discipline: “truth is not an attribute of any one tradition, but of the dialogue between them”. While the present work is an example of such “cross-fertilization” between various academic fields of study, it is best categorised as Diplomatic History. Claimed by both historians and international relations scholars to be a sub-field of their discipline, Diplomatic History in this thesis is understood in broad terms, as set out in the journal of the same name that is devoted to the study of Washington’s foreign relations: “Diplomatic History should be a forum for discussion of many aspects of the diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and cultural relations of the United States”. Let us now turn to the various disciplinary components indicated above and their contribution to the present subject of investigation.

This study is a historical one, one of the recent past, certainly, and for this reason the main thrust of evidence follows a chronology. It entails the principal ingredients of what a historian’s profession is generally said to be about, namely a “commitment to uncovering an objectively knowable past”, the description of a particular event rather than classes of events in a “narrative-based rather than theory-based” way, coupled with an acceptance of multi-causal over mono-causal explanations. In addition, and of great importance in this work, historians insist on the use of archival sources. The single most innovative aspect resulting from their approach is that it allows a revisionist assessment of IR and Political Science hypothesis: “At

---


15 Holbo, Paul S. 1977. Editor’s Note, Diplomatic History 1, 1: vi.

the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of their own models if historians would use them and offer critical assessments of their strengths and limitations".17 The findings in this study, for example, vitiate the claim that South Africa’s foreign relations with African states beyond the immediate neighbourhood were an expression of the country’s political economy, as will be discussed below.

As much as IR scholars and political scientists were, and still are, suspicious of History, the reverse situation did, and still does, hold true. Noting in 1982 that “[e]ven the best of the older diplomatic histories tended to be descriptive rather than analytical”, the President of the American Historical Association urged his fellow colleagues interested in the study of international relations to cross boundaries and use the insights gained by scholars in both IR and Political Science: “we may gain in analytical sophistication if we overcome our congenital distrust of theory and our insistence upon the uniqueness of the historical event”.18 This study attempts to do precisely this, using IR and Political Science concepts that provide a helpful conceptual framework for the historian’s narration.

As regards the input from the former, International Relations has been circumscribed as a “generic concept for a vast array of activities, ideas and goods that do or can cross national boundaries” and that “embraces social, cultural, economic, and political exchanges that occur in ad hoc as well as institutionalized efforts”.

Among its many aims, this discipline tried “to explain the relationships between power, stability and order” in the international system dominated by the Cold War, in the context of which the term hegemony was coined.19 Being a contested concept, it has been altered and enlarged, and the concept of preponderance, of which political scientist Hedley Bull distinguishes three sub-forms, is useful for our purposes:

- **Dominance**: “characterised by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland”

- **Hegemony**: “The great power prefers to rely upon instruments other than the direct use or threat of force, and will employ the latter only in situations of extremity”

- **Primacy/Leadership**: “A great power’s preponderance in relation to a group of lesser states takes the form of primacy when it is achieved without any resort to force or the threat of force (...). The position of primacy or leadership which the great power enjoys is freely conceded by the lesser states within the group concerned”

---

In this study, sub-Saharan Africa is viewed as a "sub-system" in international relations, with South Africa as the most powerful nation in terms of economic development, technological superiority and military capacity. The above categorisation thus helps to describe its ability in bringing stability and order to this part of the world. Pretoria's behaviour in the immediate neighbourhood is suitably described as dominance, while its approach beyond southern Africa varied between hegemony and primacy. If a certain country was prepared to accept South Africa's predominant position, the relationship was closer to primacy, but nearer to hegemony in the other cases. Naturally, in its own view, Pretoria always presented itself as a leader on the continent, stressing "that it desired 'leadership through service' in its relations with Africa" by generously offering economic, technical and other assistance. It had difficulty in understanding that, because of its apartheid policy, the majority of less developed black African countries beyond southern Africa refused to accept what it was offering and did not want to become appreciative followers.

We can contrast this situation with the constructive leader-and-follower situation that emerged after World War II in the relations between the United States and Europe. The former provided the war-torn continent with material and normative, or moral, resources. Its international relations value system of a world order "that stressed openness, nondiscrimination, and greater prospects for joint gains" was shared by, and found followers among, European states. This did not apply to South Africa's position in black Africa, as its apartheid ideology in no way matched the moral and political objective of pan-Africanism. Consequently, Pretoria could not even become a member of continental or regional bodies, such as the OAU and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). In fact, the very purpose for the latter's establishment in 1980 was to reduce the economic dependency of member states on South Africa. In comparison to that, again taking Europe's position vis-à-vis the great powers during the Cold War as an example, the provision of material and moral resources made the United States an attractive partner for multilateral arrangements, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Compared to that, the Soviet Union acted on a

bilateral basis, trying to establish "an East European security system based on country-by-
country dyadic ties to Moscow". This corresponds to South Africa's ambitions in Africa
beyond southern Africa, interacting with the relevant states on a bilateral basis and applying
economic and politico-military incentives as "bargaining chips" for them to deviate from
their anti-apartheid stance and to establish contact with Pretoria.

Apart from IR insight, we also draw on Political Science, particularly the study of foreign
policy for which the following definition finds application in this thesis: "Foreign policy,
then, can be said to be the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent ac-
tor (usually a state) in international relations". The only reservation relates to "official", as
much of South Africa's foreign policy of interest here was conducted in secrecy. Based on
this definition, Chapter 2 presents the state and non-state actors involved, making the case for
a bureaucratic politics model that rejects the notion of the state being a homogeneous unit.
This study further subscribes to an understanding of foreign policy being determined by dom-
estic and external factors, with the latter distinguishing between regional, continental and
international influence. On the domestic front, the system of apartheid discriminated and seg-
regated peoples along racial lines; the minority was the beneficiary, holding the political,
military and economic power. Acknowledging that foreign policy is conducted in pursuit of a
country's national interest, the relevant secondary literature agrees that the survival of apart-
heid was the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy:

The overriding aim of South African governments in this period was the preservation of a
white controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and iden-
tity changed as the challenges increased. That aim shaped and dominated domestic and
foreign policy as Pretoria fought to ensure the security, status and legitimacy of the state
within the international community.

The developments in South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood and Pretoria’s role in this regard are understood as the regional environment, which significantly impacted on the country’s foreign relations with the countries further north from the mid-1970s. In fact, they proved to be largely interdependent. As long as South Africa’s neighbouring countries were controlled by the colonial powers, Portugal and Great Britain, the white minority had a feeling of security. To sustain this situation, Pretoria maintained its presence in Namibia and, after Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from London in late 1965, assisted the white Rhodesian government for a number of years. In addition, after the independence of both Angola and Mozambique from Portugal during 1974/75, Pretoria saw itself increasingly surrounded by hostile governments and consequently supported Western-oriented rebel groups in the two countries. Over time, the South African government made some compromise in southern Africa, such as the withdrawal of support for the Smith regime, to improve its relations with the rest of black Africa. Yet, Pretoria could not achieve acceptance as a fellow African state as long as its own black community was deprived of the vote (Chapter 4).

The continental factor comprised, first, the condemnation of and struggle against apartheid by the relevant countries. Second, black Africa as a sub-system was generally composed of politically and economically weak states. In view of South Africa’s comparatively strong position, Pretoria’s bargaining chips therefore stood some chance of achieving the desired results. Third, dealing with these African states involved taking into account certain characteristics relevant to their foreign policy making, particularly the dominant role played by the head of state or government. This was important to the extent that advantages resulting from


economic co-operation with South Africa were thought to persuade them to take Pretoria’s side. The attitude prevailed in Pretoria, whose own foreign policy making was highly person­alised in the Prime Minister, later State President, and his entourage, that an exchange with African countries on a presidential level signified “that you could trust the other side”, as phrased by a former DFA official.32

While shaped by its position in southern Africa and on the continent, South Africa’s foreign relations with the countries of interest here were embedded and influenced by developments in international politics. Three factors stand out in this regard. First, and as has been mentioned, the African community of states used the United Nations to put pressure on Pretoria so that it abandoned apartheid. Direct anti-apartheid lobbying aside, their activities in this forum changed norms in international law, most notably that colonialism and racial discrimi­nation became unacceptable.33 Second, in its undertakings in the former French colonies, the Pretoria government had to acknowledge the continuously strong influence of Paris. Until the mid-1970s, the South African government greatly benefited from this factor, but the increasingly hostile French attitude towards apartheid during the 1980s then posed a stumbling block, developments that are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Third, from the 1970s onwards, parts of the African continent became hot spots of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, as will be primarily seen in the same two chapters.

In the context of South Africa’s foreign policy toward Africa, it is also necessary to dis­cuss the thesis that it had been the expression of the country’s political economy, foremost in the early 1970s. The study of political economy is concerned with the “interaction of the state and the market as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modern world”,34 while three fundamentally different perspectives exist: economic liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism. The Marxist view interests us here. Without going into all its details, it stressed “the primacy of economics, seeing all else as derivative, as epiphenomena, the superstructure upon an economic base”.35 It further argued that the capitalist economy had a tendency to overproduce particular types of goods due to insufficient domestic demand. As a result, and taking into account the uneven development among nations, capitalist economies were forced

32 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. See Appendix A for his biography.
to look for new markets. Accordingly, this explained colonialism and imperialism: “The acquisition of colonies had enabled the capitalist economies to dispose of their unconsumed goods, to acquire cheap resources, and to vent their surplus capital”.36

Two political scientists, Timothy Shaw and Roger Southall, used the Marxist view of political economy to explain South Africa’s drive into Africa in the early 1970s as part of the so-called ‘Outward-Looking Policy’ (Chapter 4). Their argument was based on South Africa’s economic development in the 1960s, which is now briefly outlined. Throughout this decade, the country’s domestic economy had significantly expanded, with growth rates of more than 7% on average, resulting in increased import while export stagnated. Pretoria’s subsequent import substitution policy to counteract this trade imbalance proved not to be entirely successful. As a result, a commission of inquiry was established, and in 1972, the Reynders Commission presented its report, highlighting the need for export promotion.37 Its recommendations led to the formation of both the Private Sector Export Advisory Committee in 197238 and the Interdepartmental Committee for Exports in 1974,39 composed of representatives from the Departments of Economics, Commerce and Industries, as well as the principal business associations.40 Prior to this, Pretoria had been served solely by the Export Trade Advisory Committee from the late 1950s to 1967 and thereafter by its successor, the Export Promotion Council. In the second half of the 1960s, and parallel to the growth of South Africa’s domestic economy, Pretoria fostered plans for a ‘Greater South Africa’ and a ‘Southern African Common Market’ (Chapter 3). These twin concepts aimed at consolidating and extending Pretoria’s powerful economic position in the immediate neighbourhood, thereby strengthening its political role as a “sub-imperial” power. Against this background, Shaw and Southall argued that Pretoria’s drive into Africa was “an expression of the dynamics of South African political economy”.41 Even though not denying that the Outward-Looking Policy had “major

40 DFA, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3.
political-diplomatic and military-strategic objectives’, they emphasised the “underlying material basis in the requirement of South African-based capital for increased resources, larger markets, expanding spheres for investment and maintenance of the existing supply of foreign migrant labour”.  

The accuracy of their interpretation can now be assessed, by analysing the hitherto unavailable statistical evidence on South Africa’s trade with sub-Saharan Africa. In 1962, the Department of Customs and Excise ceased publishing trade figures with Africa on a country-to-country basis, probably to prevent unnecessary embarrassment for those countries that were engaged in trade with the Republic despite their verbal anti-apartheid stance. In 1995, the Cabinet decided to still treat these figures as confidential, suggesting that the post-apartheid government was guided by similar considerations. This situation notwithstanding, the African country files in the DFA archive contained that data, evidently provided by its sister department. The statistical information compiled in Appendixes B and C present a comprehensive picture of South Africa’s trade with all black African countries. Although the absolute accuracy of the figures cannot be guaranteed due to “backdoor trade” through third-party countries, double-invoicing, clandestine trade and private businesses seemingly holding back relevant information from the Department of Customs of Excise, they permit one to draw two important conclusions. First, the countries in South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood constituted its main trading area on the African continent. Second, trade relations were


44 Telephone interview with Trevor van Heerden, 8 March 1999.


maintained with all sub-Saharan African countries, though some were at a very low level, with Pretoria usually exporting more than importing from each country on an individual basis. Yet, compared with southern Africa, the trade volume with the black African countries further north was insignificant. This becomes even more evident when compared to global trade figures. In addition to this data, the ambitions of the principal export promotion organisations that will be introduced in Chapter 2 reveal that the area between southern and North Africa was not considered to be of major economic interest during the Outward-Looking Policy period. This influenced the discussions at the Export Promotion Council’s Sub-Committee for Africa, whose meetings during 1969, for example, focused solely on southern Africa.

In conclusion, we find Shaw’s and Southall’s view that the Outward-Looking Policy in southern Africa was motivated primarily by economic considerations to be valid. However, we do not agree with their thesis that Pretoria pursued the same goals further north, namely that it was “an attempt to divide the continent’s opponents of apartheid by establishing cooperative relations with willing black African states”. Rather, the now available statistical evidence validates the opinion of another political scientist, Adrian Guelke, who suggested in 1974:

I am not arguing that she [Republic of South Africa] has no economic ambitions outside Southern Africa, or that her industrial and commercial interest groups have not played a part in promoting an expansionist foreign policy towards Africa. But outside Southern Africa at least, the Republic’s political objectives – notably, the neutralisation of African-sponsored campaigns in the U.N. against apartheid – clearly enjoy the highest priority in the formation of her outward-looking policy.

Clearly, organised business and private enterprises were part of Pretoria’s Outward-Looking Policy in Africa, as we shall see in Chapter 4, but trade and other economic activities were not the ultimate aim, rather one of the levers utilised to convince the relevant African countries to enter into contact with Pretoria.

---

48 See the minutes in DFA, 34/2, Vol. 4.
50 Guelke. 1974. Africa as a Market for South African Goods, pp.87f. At the time of writing his article, Guelke was a Graduate Student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. In 1975, he became Lecturer and later Professor in the Department of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Sources and Literature

The prime motivation for this study lay in the fact that our topic has been relatively neglected in the secondary literature. To our knowledge, no source-based study on this particular aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy has been produced to date. The little published material that exists is often based on assumptions, resulting in erroneous conclusions. The main fault of authors such as Willie Breytenbach and John Spicer was to reduce the focus of Pretoria’s Africa policy on southern Africa, despite their claim to examine its relations with the entire continent. In an attempt to fill the gap in this under-researched topic, in 1999 and again in 2000 research was conducted in six South African archives considered to house relevant documentation. Regarding the non-governmental archives, unrestricted access was gained to the Archive for Contemporary Affairs (ARCA) at the then University of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein and to the ANC Archive at the University of Fort Hare in Alice, Eastern Cape. The former has existed for a long time and houses, inter alia, collections obtained from politicians, foreign service officials, economists and cultural and economic bodies. Since the individuals and organisations themselves selected what to donate, the well-preserved files are not very substantial. Nonetheless, the consulted documents gave an insight into the thinking and worldviews of several relevant personalities from politics and the economy, and provided especially relevant information on one organised Afrikaner business association, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. The ANC Archive, open to the public since 1996, stores the documents from twenty-two of the forty-three ANC Exile Missions. Due to a lack of finance and expertise, the material is not adequately looked after and yielded meagre results for the purposes of this study. It has been included in our recent article on the ANC’s exile diplomacy in Africa and some of its results are used in this study. A final note needs to be made on the use of documents from the Africa Institute in Pretoria, which will be introduced in Chapter 2. This think tank does not have an archive per se, but a number of in-house reports, such as commissioned work, were kept separately from the library, as they were not for the eyes of outsiders. Two of these reports, dated of the mid-1970s, were relevant to this study (Chapter 4), and we could access them with the assistance of the librarian, Amanda Wortman.

52 <http://www.uovs.ac.za/lib/arca/default.asp>. It was previously named Institute for Contemporary History. The word Orange has since been dropped from both the name of the province and the university.
The sources are referenced, but not listed in the Bibliography. Apart from these three archives, no other what could be termed ‘private body’ opened its doors to their documents. The archive of the multinational Anglo American Corporation, in particular, would undoubtedly have provided a mine of information. However, as experienced by other researchers, it is practically inaccessible, more than likely because this private company tries to prevent embarrassing information about collaboration with the apartheid regime to come into the open. Generally speaking, at the time of research for this study, there was no obligation on the part of the private sector to lay bare the past. This might change with the Promotion of Information Access Act (No 2 of 2000) that came into force in 2001, legislating the constitutional right of access to the records of ‘private bodies’.

Due to the post-1994 political dispensation, a different situation prevailed with regard to the use of government archives. Most importantly, the National Archives Act (No 43 of 1996) replaced the Archives of South Africa Act (No 6 of 1962) on 1 January 1997, reducing the closed access period applied to material in state archives from the previous thirty to twenty years. During his stay in South Africa in 1999, the author of this study therefore had the right to access material up to and including 1979. In spite of this liberal legislation, the state of affairs of archival management in South Africa necessitates critical comments relating to the substance of and the practical access to the material. Both questions are of great significance to a study such as this, where primary sources are supposed to uncover an “objectively knowable past”, as has been argued earlier. A general answer is not possible and the four government archives in question are now dealt with separately, beginning with the National Archives.

Although its custodial mandate embraced the archives of central and regional government offices, the National Archives did not have much power to enforce its brief and several government departments refused to subject their records to archival appraisal or transfer them into its custody. Amongst them were the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence and national intelligence, all of which are examined below. The only remaining collections accessible in terms of the legislation and of potential interest for this study therefore came from the Prime Minister (1910-84) and his Private Secretary (1966-78), the Private Secretary to the Minister of Information (1966-78) and the Department of Information (1971-80).

---


Printed finding aids existed for the last three collections, revealing some interesting files, whereas a computer search on the Prime Minister’s records did not produce any worthwhile hits. This dearth in material can be explained by Pretoria’s manipulation of social memory. South African archivist Verne Harris has rightly suggested that secrecy and an authoritarian management ethos were the modus operandi of the government, including the National Archives. Transparency was not the order of the day, with serious implications for the collection and preservation of archival documentation necessary for the redrawing of history. This statement most clearly applied to the security apparatus, as we will show below.

In contrast, we gained the impression that the Department of Foreign Affairs is a special case in this regard. As mentioned, its records have not been transferred to the National Archives on a permanent basis. In consequence, only a small section that dates from the early 1960s is stored there, whereas the bulk of material is housed in the basement at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, the seat of both the State President and the DFA. In general, the Department’s lower-ranking civil servants appear to have followed a rather legalistic policy regarding the collection of records. Furthermore, and unlike in the case of Pretoria’s security establishment, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) only mentions one case of record destruction in this department prior to the 1994 elections. However, one qualification regarding the DFA’s files comprehensiveness needs to be made in reference to correspondence with André Jaquet, who held various diplomatic posts in the period under review and currently is the High Commissioner to Canada. He commented on the working ethos of Roelof Frederik ‘Pik’ Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1977-94), and two several senior civil servants of importance in this study, namely DFA Director-General Bernardus Gerhardus ‘Brand’ Fourie (1966-82) and Peter Rae Killen, Deputy Secretary (1974-77), Deputy Director-General (1980-84) and Director-General (1985-87): “both the Minister and Brand Fourie had their own extensive files. (...) Rae Killen had three safes and a few filing cabinets in his office which were crammed full of files, some of which eventually went to Registry and most of which were probably shredded. (...) I believe that Pik Botha also took a large number of files to his smallholding in Pretoria North when he left office”.

Jaquet’s assessment finds evidence in this thesis with regard to South Africa’s relationship with Senegal in the mid-1970s (Chapter 4), while it is possible that we did not discover other instances

---

60 See Appendix A for his biography.
61 Correspondence with André Jaquet, December 2002.
precisely because the documents no longer exist. Regarding the research in the those files that were available in the Union Buildings, this was greatly facilitated by the archive’s organisation, with finding aids available in both print and electronic form. The collections consulted were well organised, comprehensive and substantial, sometimes containing documents from other government agencies. The pages were numbered at the time of transfer from the various offices to the archive, and there was only the occasional gap. An essential prerequisite for productive research in this archive was the knowledge of both, Afrikaans and French, the lingua franca of the diplomats. Access to the DFA archive was not arbitrary, such as seems to have been the case during apartheid. Prior to our arrival, we had established contact with the person in charge, Neels Muller, and his assistance proved to be incredibly helpful. For reasons that are unclear to date, he originally granted access to the files up to April 1994. However, after more than a month of research in early 1999 the situation was suddenly reversed at the beginning of March; access was curtailed as provided for in the Archives Act and the so-called ‘Pink Files’, considered “Top Secret”, were no longer made available for consultation. The only plausible explanation for this change in attitude was the arrest of a Swiss journalist in Cape Town on 5 March 1999 during his investigations into Swiss military and intelligence contacts with Wouter Basson, the head of South Africa’s apartheid chemical weapon programme. The journalist was accused for having been in the illegal possession of a military document, but was released three days later as the allegation could not be substantiated. The result was that research in the DFA files now became limited to 1979 in the case of sixteen countries, as opposed to access up to or beyond 1991 for fifteen countries. Nonetheless, there is enough justification for defining the time framework for this study as encompassing the period from 1961 to 1994. In particular, access to the files on relations with Nigeria and Uganda, key countries post-1990, was granted for the entire period under review.

A different situation was given regarding the Department of Defence and national intelligence. Both state actors were involved in human rights violations and therefore had a keen

---

64 The files of the following countries were consulted up to and including 1979: Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congolese Republic, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo and Zaire. The files of other countries were consulted as follows: Seychelles (April 1980), Comoros (November 1980), Equatorial Guinea (February 1984), Somalia (August 1984), Tanzania (May 1985), Burkina Faso (July 1987), Mali (September 1987), Gambia (November 1988), Guinea Bissau (May 1991), Cameroon (July 1992), Ethiopia (February 1993), Sudan (September 1993), Burundi (October 1993), Rwanda (November 1993), Nigeria (January 1994), Benin, Chad, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Uganda (all until April 1994).
interest in preventing their records from falling into the hands of a post-apartheid government. In its findings, the TRC concluded:\footnote{65}

The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evidence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. (\ldots) the urge to destroy gained momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the former state. By May 1994, a massive deletion of state documentary memory within the security establishment had been achieved.\footnote{66}

Regarding the national intelligence agency, it does not appear to have kept an archive and records seem to have been destroyed on a regular basis since at least 1982.\footnote{67} Only a meagre number of photocopies was obtained from the Minister’s Office. The few noteworthy documents are referenced in this work, but not listed in the Bibliography.

The Department of Defence has its own archival repository in Pretoria, staffed by military personnel.\footnote{68} In principle, access was granted subject to the National Archives Act regulations, but most of the documents that could be consulted date back to the early 1960s. Staff shortages are possibly to blame for the slow declassification process, as claimed by archive personnel. However, and probably more importantly, there seems to be no desire on the part of the still largely white-controlled department to disclose its apartheid activities,\footnote{69} as underlined by a personal anecdote. Having requested photocopies of material contained in a box dated 1970 and declared “Top Secret”, we were summoned by Military Intelligence staff, and during the course of the interview, it became clear that this box had been erroneously declassified. Furthermore, members of staff mentioned that higher-ranking military officials had removed a large amount of material from the archive prior to the 1994 elections and the TRC hearings, as confirmed in the TRC’s final report:

\begin{quote}
in mid-1993, the Cabinet-approved guidelines for the disposal of ‘state sensitive documentation’ were received. The Chief of the SADF [South African Defence Force] ordered their immediate implementation (\ldots). Two joint teams, consisting of inspector general and counter intelligence personnel, were appointed to visit all units and to identify records for destruction. A countrywide destruction exercise followed. (\ldots) Several processes sustained the disposal of SADF records outside the ambit of archival legislation. Not mentioned above, and impossible to quantify, were the unauthorised ad hoc removals and de-
\end{quote}

struction undertaken by individuals. Assessing the overall impact of these processes was beyond the joint investigative team’s capacity.70

Recent revelations in the South African press suggest that Defence and Military Intelligence documents could be released in the future, and these might shed more light on hitherto unknown activities.71

In order to supplement the patchwork of archival evidence and the examination of the existing literature, interviews were conducted with academics, former DFA officials, politicians, as well as representatives from private and state companies. The Bibliography contains the list of all interviewed people, together with their biographical background. The most insightful interviews were those with Pik Botha, who agreed after having pestered three times on the phone, and Neil Peter van Heerden, DFA Director-General from 1987 to 1992. On the other hand, several other sources of oral history remained inaccessible. Brand Fourie, a potentially rich source of information, declined to make any statements. Regarding access to Lukas Daniël ‘Nieël’ Barnard, the administrative head of the national intelligence agency during the 1980s, different avenues were pursued. However, neither his last employer, the Western Cape Provincial Administration, nor several relevant academics and journalists had Barnard’s contact details, while his brother at the University of the Free State, Schalk Leopold Barnard, bluntly refused to divulge them. Finally, several other people of importance in this study and who could have been helpful, such as Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes ‘John’ Vorster, Minister Cornelius Petrus ‘Connie’ Mulder and Secretary Eschel Mostert Rhodie from the Department of Information, or Nieël Barnard’s predecessor, Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh, are no longer alive.

CHAPTER TWO
South Africa’s Foreign Policy System

Introduction
Given that this thesis is also about Pretoria’s foreign policy towards the black African states beyond southern Africa, this chapter provides the setting necessary to the understanding of the key players who determined the course of events in the period under review. In doing so, a distinction is drawn between state and non-state actors, acknowledging that “states are definitely not the only significant actors in international relations”. While pursuing individual interests, what could be called a “policy coalition” existed between the different state and non-state actors, guided by the advancement of the interests of the white minority. Of significance in several instances in this study is an actual network of both private and official links that existed between the two groups of actors. In this context, we refer to the Policy Network approach, a lose politico-sociological description for such contacts in pursuit of powerful interests. A suitable definition of this phenomena for this study is the following:

‘Networking’ is a skill in developing a pattern of human relationships. Political scientists have found the study of networks useful in identifying structures of power within local communities. Within society at large and within the nation the significant factor may be the linkages between different organization though, again, these will be conducted by individuals. The approach is helpful in understanding the nature of power. For example (...) without which people may be powerless. People in networks are thus strategically placed to exert power (...).3

We now discuss the issues pertaining to the state as an actor, subsequently turning our attention to the non-state actors. Of crucial relevance to our work, the state as a foreign policy actor is not considered as a homogeneous monolith. Rather, and adding a factor to the domestic

---

and external environment that shape a country’s foreign policy, the “agency-based perspective” serves our purposes. While recognising that a country’s executive “is formally the key figure in all foreign policy decisions”, this approach emphasises the role of bureaucracy and its public servants within the state. Within this perspective, the “bureaucratic politics model” and the “psychological model” are of relevance to this study in Diplomatic History. They help to explain the course of events in South Africa’s foreign policy towards black Africa, since it is not sufficient to take an event as the “natural outcome of a sequence”, as is the case in most historical works. In contrast, Diplomatic History does not simply happen, but it is fashioned by individuals. Based on an analysis of Washington’s foreign policy decision mechanisms during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the proponents of the bureaucratic politics model stipulate that “the foreign policy decisions and actions of a government do not represent the intent of any one figure, but rather are the unintended result of bargaining, pulling, hauling, and tugging by bureaucratic competition in their ceaseless quest for more funds, resources, and influence”. The model’s confrontational aspect, due to “different conceptions of national, organisational and personal goals”, is usually emphasised, but Vale and Mphaisha have rightly suggested that it can also be about “the building of coalitions between the competitors” and about “doing ‘deals’ with their bureaucratic opponents”. The material provided in this study illustrates that both versions are possible. Although the “primary locus of expertise in and implementation of foreign policy” is ascribed to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the military, the Department of Information and national intelligence challenged its position repeatedly between 1961 and 1994. Consequently, we will encounter several instances of in-

---

terdepartmental feuds, jealousy and tensions in this thesis. On the other hand, several examples of co-operation among them will be noted, with the current executive’s background and preferences decisively impacting on the balance of power (Figure 1). It is against this background that South African scholars in the field used the description of a “village council running a foreign policy”, leading to “haphazard” policy formulation. Greg Mills aptly rejected the idea of South Africa’s foreign policy being a “concerted, well-organised, well-thought out, unified, homogenous, linear-directional policy”, and instead suggested that “it is characterised by great struggles between government departments”.

Figure 1: Environments of South African Foreign Policy Making

The second model within the agency-based perspective, the psychological approach, examines the foreign policy bureaucracies at a micro-level, stressing the role played by the individual public servant. In contrast to the rational actor model, according to which actors pursue set goals by making rational choices between competing alternatives, it emphasises that different

---

11 Interview with Richard Cornwell, 19 February 1999.
12 Interview with Maxi van Aardt, 1 March 1999.
people react differently when confronted with one and the same situation: "It is individuals (...) who define and interpret the concept of national interest, who plan strategies, who perceive issues, who make decisions to act, and who evaluate actions undertaken. As a result, psychological factors are crucial in the decision process, since individuals tend to act and react differently to the same kind of stimuli". Adhering to this view, we put a relatively strong emphasis on the personalities of the relevant officials. In spite of the psychological model's explanatory value, the constraints imposed by the dictate of the agency for which an official works must not be neglected. This connection between an individual’s belief system and his organisational position has been termed as “where you stand depends on where you sit".

Table 1: State Actors Involved in Pretoria’s Foreign Policy Making Towards Black Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister / State President</th>
<th>Department of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Other Government Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary / Director-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hilgard Muller (January 1964 - March 1977)</td>
<td>Department of Defence (Pieter Willem Botha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Balthazar Johannes ‘John’ Vorster</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau for State Security (Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(September 1966 - September 1978)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Information (Cornelius Petrus 'Connie' Mulder, Eachel Mostert Rhoodie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Pieter Willem Botha</td>
<td>Roelof Frederik ‘Pik’ Botha</td>
<td>Department of Defence (Magnus André de M. Malan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>Johannes ‘Hans’ van Dalsen</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service (Lukas Daniël ‘Niël’ Barnard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(May 1982 - March 1985)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Frederik Willem de Klerk</td>
<td>Peter Rae Killen (April 1985 - March 1987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Leo Henry ‘Rusty’ Evans (October 1992 - )</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service (Lukas Daniël ‘Niël’ Barnard)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Taking into account all of the above, the next four sections present the state actors, beginning with the Prime Minister, later State President, followed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the military, the Department of Information and finally national intelligence. For easy reference, Table 1 gives the names of the executives, the ministers and administrative heads in the DFA, and indicates the rival government entities with the names of the relevant officials that influenced South Africa’s foreign policy relevant to this study. Thereafter, we provide profiles of the non-state actors. The impact of all these state and non-state actors on South Africa’s foreign policy towards black Africa will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 to 6.

**Prime Minister and State President**

Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd served as Prime Minister from 3 September 1958 to 6 September 1966, when a parliamentary messenger stabbed him to death. During this period, in February 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his Wind of Change speech in Cape Town, heralding Great Britain’s departure from Africa. This was a contributory factor that led to Pretoria’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961; South Africa thus took preventive action before it could be excluded as a result of African and Asian opposition to its apartheid system. Another consideration was its move towards the attainment of republican status, as approved by the white population in a referendum in October 1960. Two months after its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, on 31 May 1961, Pretoria proclaimed the Republic of South Africa. That decision in South Africa’s foreign relations was supplemented by Verwoerd’s position in domestic politics as a stalwart of the ruling National Party (NP), declaring that the whites were going to stay in South Africa, and that he wanted to “maintain white supremacy for all time to come”.

His stance reflected the *laager* mentality of the Afrikaner community. The term describes a defensive and isolationist frame of mind and originated from the closed defensive circle into which the Afrikaner settler ox-wagons moved when threatened by attacks from the blacks. It was further defined by the hostilities fanned by the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

---

policy post-Verwoerd, since all of the country’s executives and most incumbents of the relevant government departments were Afrikaners. Regarding foreign policy making, Verwoerd had no practical experience in this field and therefore tended, at least initially, to rely on his Minister of External/Foreign Affairs.

On 13 September 1966, John Vorster became South Africa’s next Prime Minister. Compared to Verwoerd, his leadership style was more relaxed and pragmatic. He adhered to the basic principles of apartheid, but did not apply its laws as rigorously: “While Verwoerd basically wanted to adapt reality to his ideology, Vorster has tried to adapt the ideology to the demands of reality.” In trying to break South Africa’s international isolation, he permitted a degree of racial interaction in sport and it was in 1971, during his premiership, that Malawi replaced its white ambassador to South Africa with a black one (Chapter 4). This pragmatism had repercussions on Vorster’s foreign policy, particularly toward Africa, which became known as Outward-Looking Policy and was “marked by secrecy, ad hoc arrangements, and over-dependence on close confidants”. As a result, this study shows that, of the entire period under review, his premiership experienced the most serious inter-departmental fights over the leading role in this field; the Department of Foreign Affairs was put in the shade, first, by the men from the military, and then by Department of Information in conjunction with the national intelligence agency, Bureau for State Security (BOSS). Indeed, it can be argued that Vorster stumbled over his “serious lack of decisive leadership”.

During 1977, South African newspapers brought to light some of the clandestine activities that the Department of Information and BOSS, backed by Vorster, had pursued since 1972, resulting in the ‘Information Scandal’. The picture presented was, in short, one of “corruption, mismanagement and political misdirection”. The impression created was that taxpayers’ money, worth millions of Rand, had been wasted on projects with little benefit. The appointed Commission of Enquiry, headed by Judge Rudolph Erasmus, found Prime Minister Vorster and his Information Minis-


20 Born in 1901; emigration to South Africa (1903); lecturer and Professor at the University of Stellenbosch (1924-30); correspondent for the Afrikaans newspaper Transvaler in Johannesburg (1931); Senator (1948).
21 Born in 1919; BA, University of Stellenbosch (1936); LLB (1938) and active as an advocate for many years; Deputy Minister for Education, Art and Science (23 October 1958 – 2 August 1961); Minister of Justice and Prisons (3 August 1961 – 17 September 1966); Minister of Police (9 April 1966 – 11 August 1968).
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM

Due to the mounting political pressure, Vorster resigned in September 1978. However, the Information Scandal served as a smokescreen to hide a power struggle between two factions in the National Party for the leadership of the country. Jaster described this battle as “Byzantine political infighting”, revolving around the bureaucratic and personal feuds that had developed during the 1970s. The military strongly resented both the Department of Information’s and BOSS’s dominant position within Vorster’s ambit, with divergent policy approaches, especially toward Africa, being at the centre of the conflict. Once Vorster had resigned, the race for the premiership began. The main competitors were the Ministers of Information and Defence, Mulder and Pieter Willem Botha, who were also the NP’s Transvaal and Cape Province leaders respectively. The Information Scandal gave Botha the advantage and helped tip the balance in his favour, as it had exposed Vorster’s ad hoc policy that often circumvented Cabinet, whereas P.W. Botha was then known as an “organisation man”, attributing Cabinet and bureaucracy more importance. The bitterly contested election took place on 28 September 1978, and two rounds were needed for P.W. Botha to defeat Mulder.

Botha was essentially a National Party man. At the early age of thirty, he was the party’s national campaign organiser. During his steady rise through the ranks from 1946 to 1966, he was a Member of Parliament, Deputy Minister and Minister in various departments. During 1966, he became the NP’s leader in the Cape Province and, in April of that year, the Minister of Defence, a post he held until October 1980. P.W. Botha was thus experienced in both domestic and foreign policy making, the latter being dominated by a realist worldview whereby the “wise and efficient use of power by a state in pursuit of its national interest is (...) the main ingredient of a successful foreign policy”. Following the collapse of the Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique in 1974/75, and Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, South Africa’s regional security and the struggle against communism became P.W. Botha’s overriding

---

28 Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.34.
30 Born in 1916; organiser of the NP’s countrywide campaign (1946-49); MP from 1946; Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs (October 1958 – August 1961); Minister for Coloured Affairs, Community Development (and Housing) (August 1961 – April 1966 (1961-64)), and Public Works (1964-66); Minister of Defence (April 1966 – October 1980); NP leader in the Cape Province (1966-78). See Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa’s Foreign Policy, pp.247f.
ing issues in this realist approach, with his trusted men coming from the military. This resulted, in the 1980s, in the formulation of a policy towards South Africa’s neighbourhood that became known as “Destabilisation”.\textsuperscript{33} The change in leadership from Vorster to P.W. Botha therefore “brought dramatic changes in personality, style and substance in the policy-making process”.\textsuperscript{34} Crucially, Botha established “the political dominance of the military (...) in key decision-making”,\textsuperscript{35} and the State Security Council (SSC), established in 1972, but seldom used under Vorster, emerged “as the primary overall planning and decision-making body within the state”.\textsuperscript{36} Botha also streamlined the bureaucratic apparatus, reducing ministerial portfolios and departments and centralising planning and decision-making. In practice, he initiated a constitutional reform whereby, after 1984, the country’s executive was no longer referred to as Prime Minister, but as State President, while the formerly symbolic position of State President was abolished. The Department of Information was reintegrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1980, with the word Information being deleted from the department’s name in December 1983. In 1980, after a brief spell, the Department of National Security was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and remained so until November 1994.\textsuperscript{37} Botha’s tough and uncompromising policy came to an end in August 1989, when he was forced to resign due to illness and allegations of erratic behaviour. At the same time, the end of the Cold War made his military approach inappropriate in resolving South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy problems.


\textsuperscript{34} Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, pp.28f.
\textsuperscript{35} Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.35.

With Frederik Willem de Klerk succeeding P.W. Botha, pragmatism returned to Pretoria and this time it was the NP leader of the Transvaal who won the race. De Klerk was born to a politically renowned family, with a father as Cabinet Minister and President of the Senate, and an uncle, Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, as Prime Minister (1954-58). The Dutch Reformed Church and the Calvinist tradition upheld by his family formed his belief system. De Klerk studied law and worked as an attorney before entering politics at the age of thirty-six. From 1978 to 1989, he held a variety of ministerial portfolios. Parallel to his ascendancy in government, de Klerk rose within the NP ranks, becoming the party's Transvaal and national leader in 1982 and February 1989 respectively. Of relevance for this study, de Klerk was not experienced in foreign policy matters and, in stark contrast to his predecessor, none of de Klerk's ministerial portfolios had dealt directly with security matters. As a result of these two factors, the foreign service officials held a predominant position within Pretoria's foreign policy making. In domestic politics, de Klerk was not known as an advocate of reform during his ministerial days, and so his speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990 was particularly surprising. He lifted the thirty-year ban on the ANC and other black liberation movements, and announced Nelson Mandela's release from prison that materialised nine days later; de Klerk had fundamentally broken with his party's apartheid orthodoxy. The suddenness of his actions gave rise to debate over whether de Klerk's initiatives were born of personal conviction or political necessity. We subscribe to the view of South African political scientists Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotzé who, in mid-1991, suggested that he did not come to question the philosophy behind apartheid, but found its practical application impossible to maintain:

On the first view, De Klerk is a reluctant reformer who has been forced by circumstances beyond his control to adjust or abandon his true conservative political preferences. Some commentators would then depict his changes as evidence of pragmatism, whereas others would read opportunism into them. The alternative explanation would emphasise De Klerk's commitment to such values as justice (...) inspired with a new mission, namely to create a just society in South Africa. The truth (...) probably lies somewhere between

---


these two perspectives: elements of both necessity and choice explain De Klerk's behaviour. He might be depicted as something of a principled pragmatist. This description also applied to de Klerk's foreign policy toward Africa when the Department of Foreign Affairs again rose to prominence, although in some competition with national intelligence, as will be indicated below.

Department of Foreign Affairs

The Department of External Affairs was established in 1927, but the executive was effectively in command of foreign policy until January 1955, when the department was separated from the Office of the Prime Minister. It subsequently enjoyed more influence and was renamed Department of Foreign Affairs in 1960. The majority of the foreign service officials in this study, and therefore the department's foreign policy of interest here, were guided by idealist or liberal worldviews, with a belief in moral and democratic principles and the rule of law, rather than the use of force, guiding interaction between states. Two aspects were therefore central to the DFA's approach toward Africa. First, the non-interference in the domestic matters of another state was a sine qua non. Second, while Pretoria's foreign relations with black African countries beyond southern Africa were also military in nature, the foreign service officers restricted themselves to civil aspects, even if they had knowledge of the military's activities. As Pik Botha, the long-standing Minister of Foreign Affairs described the DFA's attitude toward their endeavours: "Do what you need to do, but don't let us know about it".

Within the DFA, the Africa Division as the bureaucratic section was instrumental in the formulation and implementation of Pretoria's Africa policy. Established in 1955 as Africa and International Organisations, it later changed its name to Africa Division (1957-78), to International Organisations, Central and North Africa (1979-80), to Africa Directorate (1981-87) and finally to the Africa Branch (1988-94). The one significant name change, that of 1979, can be seen as a result of P.W. Botha's policy priorities in Africa. In particular, he put that part of...
the African continent, in which he had a relatively minor interest, together with International Organisations. At the same time, a special Southern Africa Division was created, reflecting the military’s focus of interest at the time. Despite the name changes, and for practical purposes, reference will be made to the Africa Division throughout this study. In late 1954, the foreign affairs ministry launched the idea of an Interdepartmental Committee on African Affairs, but this never became functional, and the Africa Division remained the most important unit in shaping the DFA’s Africa approach. The superiors of the civil servants in this Division were the Minister and the Secretary, Director-General after 1984. They proved to be relevant figures in this area of Pretoria’s foreign policy making.

This certainly applied, at least originally, to Eric Hendrik Louw, the Minister of External Affairs from 1955 to 1963. In his capacity as the Minister of Mining and Economic Development (1948-49), and thereafter as Minister of Economics until 1954, his diplomatic experience was a valued attribute and appreciated by Prime Minister Daniel Francois Malan (1948-54). Eric Louw also held an important position under Prime Minister Strijdom, who even entrusted him with the External Affairs portfolio in 1955. Given these credentials, he became Verwoerd’s trusted man in the field. Foreign policy matters were primarily under Louw’s guidance and he was responsible for most of the Prime Minister’s relevant public statements. He made his influence felt in 1960 by insisting on the renaming of the Department of External Affairs to that of Foreign Affairs, possibly to prevent stronger intervention either by the Prime Minister or the Information service that itself was to become a separate department in 1961. By 1955, Louw had already been instrumental in creating the Department’s first geographical division, Africa and International Organisations. Under Louw, therefore, Africa was given special attention within Pretoria’s foreign policy. In his approach toward that continent, he was known for having “no inhibitions about socialising with the leaders of other African countries”. He attended Ghana’s independence celebration in 1957, had lunch with Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and attempted to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic rela-

---

45 Letter from Douglas David Forsyth (Secretary for External Affairs) to all heads of department, Pretoria, 14 October 1954 (DoD, Group 5, KG/AOC/4/7, Vol. 22).

46 This can be concluded from the fact that the relevant DFA file (1/99/13) contains no material.


tions with this West African state. However, Verwoerd’s self-assurance in the field of foreign policy increased over the years, and Louw’s influence waned accordingly. This was also contingent on the strong personality of the Secretary, Gerhardus Petrus ‘Gerhardt’ Jooste, who held this position from 1956 to 1966. He had an impressive diplomatic record, with ambassadorial postings to Washington, to the UN and to London. However, it was his firm National Party commitment that facilitated the development of a close relationship with Verwoerd, closer than one would normally expect between a Prime Minister and the administrative head of a department. Although being a NP stalwart, Louw “scrupulously upheld the principle of political impartiality” in his work, while Jooste had the reputation of having been “concerned with political “reliability” of his officials”. In consequence, Verwoerd on occasion either ignored Louw’s advice in favour of Jooste’s, or decided for himself.

Jooste’s power base also curtailed the influence of Hilgard Muller, Louw’s successor from January 1964 to March 1977. Characterised as quiet, courteous, mild-mannered, self-effacing, cautious, modestly and sparingly spoken, having little drive and being an implementer rather than an initiator, Muller carried little weight and played a fairly subordinate role under Verwoerd. He rose in status under Vorster, but was increasingly by-passed by Brand Fourie, who succeeded Jooste in July 1966. This picture emerges from the memoirs of Donald Sole, a career foreign service officer with a keen respect for Muller:

He [Muller] was a much more successful Ambassador than he was a Foreign Minister, mainly because his natural diffidence and his inclination not to push forward were qualities which constitute a distinct handicap for any Foreign Minister. In Verwoerd’s time, as a Foreign Minister he was no more than a figurehead. Often Gerhardt Jooste would see the Prime Minister without the Foreign Minister being present. He developed more self confidence and initiative under Vorster but again it would happen that Brand Fourie saw the Prime Minister without Hilgard being present.

Fourie held a long record as a professional foreign service officer and, as a hard-working official with immense knowledge of international affairs, became a dominant figure in the

---

53 See Appendix A for his biography. His memoirs as Secretary of External Affairs are to be found in his autobiography: Jooste, Gerhardus Petrus ‘Gerhardt’. 1977. *Diensherinneringe*. Johannesburg: Perskor: 185-205. His private collection (PV.532) is housed at the ARCA.
55 See Appendix A for his biography.
57 Sole, Donald Bell. 1989. “*This Above All*”: Reminiscences of a *South African Diplomat*. Cape Town: 261. See Appendix A for his biography.
58 See Appendix A for his biography. His private collection (PV.854) is housed at the ARCA.
The personalities of Fourie and Muller significantly impacted on Pretoria’s relations with black African countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In their intention to win them over, their thinking was based on the expectation that South Africa would benefit from its current status as the economically and technologically most advanced nation on the African continent. The key bargaining chips were the provision of technical assistance, as well as technological know-how and financing for the construction of projects, in the context of which parastatal and private companies played a central role (Chapter 3). In the implementation of their policies, Fourie and Muller were assisted by able men from the Africa Division, responsible for sustaining the activities in Pretoria while occasionally travelling to black African countries. They were Robert Montgomery as Director (1969-71), the Deputy Secretaries Albertus ‘Albie’ Burger (1966-69) and François Viljoen (1971-72), as well as the Under-Secretaries Norman Best (1970-72), Johan Pretorius (1972-75) and Hendrick ‘Hennie’ Geldenhuys (1972-74). Burger later carried a particularly heavy weight as Ambassador to Paris from October 1969 to 1974. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the close links with France played a crucial role in advancing Pretoria’s ambitions in black Africa, with the South African Embassy in Paris becoming the co-ordination centre for its activities in Francophone Africa, the former French colonial territories. Burger played a proactive role in this context, accompanied or led several missions to these countries, and French political scientist Daniel Bach therefore described him as “one of the principal artisans of [South Africa’s] opening towards the outside world”.

Pik Botha replaced Muller as Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 1977. He had started his career in the DFA at the age of twenty-one, and subsequently interrupted it only once, as a Member of Parliament (1970-74). From 1963 to 1966, Botha held the important and prestigious position as a member of South Africa’s legal team in the S.W.A./Namibia case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He subsequently made his way further up the ranks, finally becoming Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the UN (1974-77). In stark contrast to his predecessor, Pik Botha’s character has been described as assertive, ambitious, flamboyant and ebullient, pursuing a highly visible style that was ad-

60 See Appendix A for their biographies.
61 Interview with Neil van Heerden and Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.
mired by his colleagues. As a result, he became one of Pretoria’s key foreign policy formulators and it was probably due to his influential role that the budget for his department increased dramatically (Appendix D). In politics, he demonstrated a more liberal attitude than many of his staunchly conservative colleagues. While both P.W. and Pik Botha tried to sustain white minority rule, it was in their style that they differed. Asked about his relationship with P.W., Pik Botha acknowledged that life became difficult under this Prime Minister, later State President. Most importantly, the S.W.A./Namibia issue was not a non-negotiable theme for Pik Botha; this eventually led to Namibia’s independence in 1990 and greatly improved both Pretoria’s relations with black Africa and its standing in the international community. This was further facilitated by Pik Botha’s personal approach; he has been described as an Africanist, who felt at ease even in private discussions with black African counterparts. Two senior DFA officials commented that “his chemistry with them [African politicians] (...) was excellent”, “they walked arm in arm”, and “he had a way of dealing with the black people which made them believe that he was absolutely not a racist. The colour of his skin didn’t matter”.

During his seventeen years as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha had the assistance of three consecutive administrative departmental heads. Following Brand Fourie, Johannes ‘Hans’ van Dalsen held this post from May 1982 to March 1985, but did not have his predecessor’s high profile. Although described as “a very competent and professional civil servant and diplomat” he was low-profile; there is no reference to him in the literature and his name occurs in comparatively few of the primary documents examined in this study. It is possible that the military’s relatively dominant position in those days curtailed his influence. In contrast, Peter Rae Killen, Director-General from April 1985 to March 1987 and simply referred to as Rae, was a far more established and respected personality with significant influence. He had a particular interest in Africa, having headed the Africa Division from 1982 to 1984. Former senior foreign service official Sole described Killen’s work as a “sterling contribu-

---

63 See Appendix A for his biography.
65 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999.
67 Interview with Neil van Heerden and Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.
68 Correspondence with John Barratt, 28 October 2002.
69 See Appendix A for his biography.
70 See Appendix A for his biography.
tion”, laying “the groundwork for the improvement of relations with other African states”.71

The Minister and the Secretary/Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs were supported in their work by energetic civil servants in the Africa Division. Career foreign service officer Carl von Hirschberg served as Deputy Secretary in the late 1970s, assisted by Under-Secretary Antonie ‘Anton’ Loubser who spoke French, a highly sought after attribute in the department. Glenn Babb played an influential role, especially as Deputy Director (1980-83), then Director (1984-85) and eventually Deputy Director-General (1987-89) of the Africa Division. Leo Henry ‘Rusty’ Evans was of significance as Minister Plenipotentiary at the Embassy in London (1983-86) and as Head of the West Africa Section from October 1986, before becoming Deputy Director-General for Africa in 1990. On a more junior level, Jan Wentzel and Johan Marx were Directors from 1981 to 1983 and from 1985 to 1987 respectively. Finally, French-speaking Paul Runge was Third Secretary at the Embassy in Paris (1981-85), where he worked on Francophone Africa. He then was Project Liaison Officer in Gabon (1985-86) and Senior Officer in the West Africa Directorate (1988-89).73

While the DFA’s role as prime foreign policy actor had suffered under P.W. Botha, it again rose to prominence after the late 1980s. Seen against the end of the Cold War, both de Klerk and Pik Botha shared the conviction that South Africa’s problems could only be solved through diplomacy and not by military force. Another momentum of importance was the strong team of Pik Botha and Neil van Heerden, DFA Director-General from April 1987 to September 1992, whom Pik Botha had favoured as a young official when they served in Washington in the mid-1970s. They subsequently worked together in the Namibia negotiations that were close to Pik Botha’s heart, realising that this issue was the stumbling block in preventing the normalisation of South Africa’s relations with Africa and the world. In 1986, van Heerden was Deputy Director-General of the Africa Division and was duly appointed as its Director-General.74 Interviewed in early 1999, he emphasised his interest in Africa: “There was no other Division in the Department [of Foreign Affairs] which was more enthusiastic than the Africa Division. (...) There were no other Divisions that worked under lousier condi-


72 The post of Minister Plenipotentiary was second to Ambassador, existed at the important embassies in Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna and Washington and was a diplomatic appointment, as opposed to the Ambassador, who was a political appointment.

73 See Appendix A for their biographies.

tions (...), [but people] were driven with a passion". Van Heerden’s crew consisted of several experienced officials who significantly contributed to the Africa Division’s work, namely Deputy Director-Generals Derek Auret and Rusty Evans, Chief Director Christoffel 'Christo' Prins, as well as Directors Justus de Goede and Colin Paterson. The consecutive Ambassadors to the United Nations, Jeremy Shearar and Vernon Steward, also played an important role.

After this presentation of the two principal actors in the realm of Pretoria’s foreign policy formulation and making, the three following sections introduce the state actors that challenged the DFA’s presupposed dominant position, following a lose chronological order.

Military
The military was the first state actor to invade the Department of Foreign Affairs’ terrain. Their influence on Pretoria’s foreign policy making towards the countries beyond southern Africa was significant during two periods, both times related to P.W. Botha. The first refers to the late 1960s, during Botha’s early days as Minister of Defence, and the second was the 1980s, when he was the country’s executive. The men from what is generally referred to as the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) played an important role in both phases, as will be detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. DMI was established in 1961 and underwent substantial expansion from the late 1970s, becoming the predominant intelligence-gathering agency. This is mirrored in Table 2 that lists the Directors of Military Intelligence, renamed Chief of Staff: Intelligence in 1974. Accordingly, holders of this post originally were rather low-ranking military, while during the period from July 1971 to March 1994, only two were not Lieutenant Generals, the second highest rank in the military’s hierarchy, below General. Frederik Wilhelm ‘Fritz’ Loots deserves special mention for the crucial role he played in the late 1960s, when he served as P.W. Botha’s personal envoy responsible for maintaining the link with the presidents of both the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Loots became Lieutenant in the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 1951, rising to the rank of Major eight years later. In 1964, he became Colonel and joined Military Intelligence. In 1966, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and became Director of Military Intelligence. Reflecting Loots’ position as his close confidant, P.W. Botha later appointed him as Head of the General Officer Commanding Special Forces (1974-82). This military unit was “directly responsible to the Chief of

---

75 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.
76 See Appendix A for their biographies.
the South African Defence Force, bypassing normal channels of command” and utilised in the destabilisation of southern African countries, P.W. Botha’s central approach to the region.78

**Table 2: Directors of Military Intelligence / Chiefs of Staff: Intelligence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1961 – December 1961</td>
<td>Colonel Matthys Johannes ‘Thys’ Uys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1961 – January 1966</td>
<td>Brigadier Pierre Marais Retief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1971 – September 1977</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Hein de V. du Toit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1978 – June 1985</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Pieter Willem van der Westhuizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1985 – March 1989</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Andries Petrus ‘Dries’ Putter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991 – March 1994</td>
<td>Lieutenant General Christoffel Pieter ‘Joffel’ van der Westhuizen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military again relegated the foreign affairs ministry to the background during the 1980s, with P.W. Botha holding the political power. In reaction to the country’s security situation after the mid-1970s, when the independence of the Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozambique removed South Africa’s *cordon sanitaire* (Chapters 4 and 5), the military applied their favoured policy, namely power and the use of force, to achieve their goals. Regarding their interest in Africa, the focus of activity lay in the immediate neighbourhood in order to ensure the Republic’s security. Further north, we will only reveal selective activities. In this context, the Minister of Defence from 1980 to 1991, Magnus André de Merindol Malan, made an appearance on several occasions. He was the SADF’s Commander-in-Chief from 1976 to 1980, a period during which he developed close ties with P.W. Botha, whose political and strategic views he shared. His rise in the military ranks has been explained by his senior position in the secretive Broederbond, an organisation that will be the subject later in this chapter.80 Daniel S. ‘Daan’ Hamman from Military Intelligence also played an important role. He was the Military Attaché at the South African Embassies in London (1975-76) and Paris (1977-79),81 while holding the rank of Brigadier. He was promoted to Major General during the 1980s and it is

---


81 *Foreign Affairs List*. Pretoria: DFA. (December 1975, September 1977, October 1979)
known from a secondary source that he was Head of the Directorate of Special Tasks within the DMI.82

Whether in the late 1960s or during the 1980s, and in line with its realist worldview that power and force were the essential tools with which to conduct an effective foreign policy, the military also relied on power politics in its approach toward black Africa beyond southern Africa. This involved, inter alia, military co-operation with France and mercenaries, as well as armament sales. In this context, Deon Geldenhuys appropriately argued that the military “would typically be less concerned than the diplomats about potential international diplomatic repercussions flowing from the use of the military instrument of foreign policy”.83

Department of Information

In the first half of the 1970s, the Department of Foreign Affairs’ primacy was challenged by the Department of Information, in conjunction with the Bureau for State Security. Senior foreign service officials felt that Muller’s relatively weak personality traits caused this intrusion,84 but the reasons for this are also to be found in personal connections between senior Department of Information and BOSS officials and Prime Minister Vorster. Vorster’s pragmatism in politics allowed them to convince him of the validity of their approaches, outlined below, lying somewhere between the military’s realist and the foreign service officer’s idealist or liberal stance.

The Department of Information judged Minister Muller’s policy style as being too mild to successfully alleviate South Africa’s international isolation. In their autobiographies, two of its senior officials argue that the DFA’s low profile diplomacy “had got South Africa nowhere”, Brand Fourie is described as an “old fashioned diplomat” and the Department of Foreign Affairs colleagues as “stick-in-the-mud types with a mentality belonging to nineteenth-century diplomacy”.85 Those attempting to render Pretoria’s foreign policy more assertive and more successful were Connie Mulder, Minister of Information since 1968, Eschel Rhoodie as Secretary since September 1972 and Lourens Erasmus Smit ‘Les’ de Villiers, Deputy Secretary since 1973. Mulder had an academic background and was a member of the Broederbond,

the secretive organisation we introduce later in this chapter.\textsuperscript{86} He had been active in local and national politics, and led the NP’s country-wide information campaign.\textsuperscript{87} As Minister of Information, he intensified the department’s propaganda overseas activities, increased the number of offices abroad from four to nineteen, while the budget doubled from 1966 to 1971. During his student years, Rhoodie acted as an editorial staff member of an army magazine and a conservative South African daily. He subsequently served for many years as Press Attaché and Information Officer at several important South African missions, was Deputy Editor of the Department of Information’s secretly funded magazine \textit{To the Point}, before becoming Information Secretary.\textsuperscript{88} Les de Villiers had been active in South African journalism and was later involved in the Information section at the South African missions in Ottawa (1963-66) and New York (1967-72).\textsuperscript{89} The bureaucratic vehicle used to impact on South Africa’s foreign policy was the Department of Information that had been an integral part of the Department of External/Foreign Affairs since 1955 and only became a separate department in 1972.\textsuperscript{90} In Rhoodie’s and de Villiers’ view, it had previously operated “more like a glorified post office or a tourist agency”. Together with Minister Mulder, they upgraded the Department of Information and subsequently “embarked on a large-scale secret propaganda offensive”, also in black African countries.\textsuperscript{91} It is worth quoting the section from Rhoodie’s autobiography that sets out the Department’s strategy:

\begin{quote}
The objectives were obvious: To try to get to the opinion formers and the decision makers in the world, to influence their stand on South Africa, to create channels of communication through which South Africa could channel its messages so that, ostensibly, the message or argument would be that of an independent individual organisation. Politicians,
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{88} D.Phil., University of Pretoria (1964); Editorial staff member, \textit{Commando} (1951-53) and \textit{Die Vaderland} (1953-55); Press Attaché and Information Officer, Canberra (1957-60), Washington (1960-61), New York (1962-65) and The Hague (1967-71); Deputy Editor, \textit{To The Point} (1971-72).

\textsuperscript{89} De Villiers. 1980. \textit{Secret Information}, p.22.


Members of Parliament, religious leaders, top business people, newspapers, individual newspapermen, the anti-apartheid organisations, labour unions, student leaders—these were the targets. So was the establishment of workable links with Black Africa for I believed, intensely, that acceptance by the moderate states in Africa was the key to acceptance by the rest of the world.\(^\text{92}\)

A vital element in the Department of Information’s activities was the support of BOSS. We now examine the role of this national intelligence agency and that of its successors.

### National Intelligence

The Bureau for State Security’s task was intelligence gathering in order to secure South Africa’s national security. Its forerunner was the Republican Intelligence (RI), launched in January 1963 as the “clandestine extension of the Security Police” that had been formed in 1947.\(^\text{93}\)

As the RI had not been a legally constituted body, its existence only became public knowledge in May 1969, when BOSS was established. Hendrik van den Bergh, who, because of his imposing height, was commonly known as Lang Hendrik, headed both RI and BOSS. His father, having fought against the British in the Anglo-Boer War, van den Bergh was brought up in a fiercely Afrikaner environment. Membership of the Broederbond and the Ossewabrandwag,\(^\text{94}\) a right-wing and anti-Semitic movement congruent with Hitler’s ideas on racial purity, resulted in his internment during World War II. He was held in the same camp as John Vorster, a leading figure in the Ossewabrandwag,\(^\text{95}\) and a strong bond of friendship developed between them. During his days as Minister of Justice (1961-66), Vorster promoted van den Bergh to the first head of the RI and of the Security Branch in the reorganised police force. As a team, they made a name for themselves in suppressing the wave of sabotage that swept across the Republic in the wake of the ANC’s and PAC’s banning.\(^\text{96}\) A previously unavailable primary document issued by Vorster confirms that BOSS became Pretoria’s prime intelligence gathering body, intruding even the domain of military intelligence:

---


\(^\text{94}\) Literally translated: Ox-wagon Guard.


In order to prevent confusion and overlapping and improve efficiency, the central intelligence organization, to be known as the Bureau for State Security, shall formulate the intelligence policy in regard to state security and by way of consultation, co-ordinate the operations of departmental intelligence organizations within this framework.

According to the same source, van den Bergh had “unrestricted access” to the Prime Minister, and due to his influence on Vorster, he was accurately depicted in the secondary literature as being the “power behind the throne”. A particularly close relationship existed between van den Bergh and Rhodie from the Department of Information and Deon Geldenhuys makes reference to the “Mulder-Rhodie-Van den Bergh triumvirate, with De Villiers close at hand”. With van den Bergh on board, the men from that department enjoyed direct access to and protection from Prime Minister Vorster. On the administrative side, BOSS facilitated the clandestine transfer of money to the Department of Information. This was important, as only a small group of Cabinet members, let alone Parliament, were involved in its plans. In 1973, Vorster approved the Department of Information’s first five-year plan and its budget mushroomed to 13 million Rand per year. After 1974, funds were first channelled through the Department of Defence, as its accounts were protected by law and could not be discussed in Parliament, and were then transferred to BOSS, which acted as “bankers for Information”. This put an additional strain on the already tense relationship between BOSS and Defence, with Les de Villiers citing Mulder and Rhodie as having made the remark that “Defence Minister P.W. Botha was unhappy about his department being used to breast-feed Secret Information”. On a personal level, sharp clashes featured in the relationship between van den Bergh and P.W. Botha. It was van den Bergh, rather than Vorster or any other Cabi-

---


98 'Instructions of the Prime Minister in Regard to the Intelligence Set-up for the Republic of South Africa', Pretoria, April 1969, p.4. Document obtained from the National Intelligence Agency, Pretoria.


net member, who challenged the headstrong Minister of Defence and Botha consequently regarded him as an enemy. 104

Like the DFA and the military, BOSS and the Department of Information benefited from the close links with France for their activities in Francophone Africa. In particular, Albertus ‘Albie’ B. Geldenhuys was an important figure in the behind-the-scenes contacts with the Ivory Coast. According to the DFA’s Foreign Affairs List, he was employed as a Technical Adviser at the Paris Embassy, but in reality he was an under-cover BOSS agent. He reached this position because his father, Mike Geldenhuys, was van den Bergh’s personal friend, and because he spoke fluent French. In 1966, Mike Geldenhuys succeeded van den Bergh as Chief of the Security Branch and was number four at BOSS headquarters in Pretoria during the 1970s, controlling its overseas agents. 105

The Department of Information’s and BOSS’s foreign policy ventures came to an end with the Information Scandal. The political decks were cleared with Vorster’s resignation, Mulder became Minister for Plural Relations and Development (February-November 1978), 106 the political careers of both Rhodie and de Villiers ended in 1977, and van den Bergh resigned on the very day P.W. Botha was elected Prime Minister in September 1978. During the two years that followed, the military undertook to bring the activities of the national intelligence agency in line with its own to prevent renewed clashes between the two state actors whose briefs were overlapping. Of crucial importance, and in addition to holding the premiership and remaining the Minister of Defence until 1980, P.W. Botha, in November 1978, took over the ministerial portfolio in what now became the Department of National Security. 107 Furthermore, P.W. Botha made Hendrick Jacobus ‘Kobie’ Coetsee the Deputy Minister in both the Department of Defence and the Department of National Security. 108 Holding a Law degree from the then University of the Orange Free State, Coetsee was a National Party Member of Parliament for Bloemfontein West, the capital of that province, from 1968 to 1994. As an indication of his influential position in party politics, he was also the NP leader in the Orange Free State. Finally, and reflecting his interest in security matters, Coetsee chaired the National


Party’s Study Group on Defence from 1978. That Group was one of twenty-four such study groups and gave the parliamentarians from the ruling party the possibility “to familiarise themselves with the various aspects of the ministerial portfolio with which a particular group corresponded”. In returning to P.W. Botha and Coetsee as the Minister and Deputy Minister in the Department of National Security respectively, they cemented their grip on the national intelligence’s work by making Alec van Wyk the administrative head of this department. Significantly, he did not have van den Bergh’s assertive profile and van Wyk is barely mentioned in the secondary literature. Accordingly, this study demonstrates that the Department of National Security only played a minor role in Pretoria’s foreign policy making towards Africa.

A new chapter in the history of the national intelligence agency began in 1979, linked to the person of Lukas Daniël ‘Niel’ Barnard. In November of that year, P.W. Botha appointed the thirty year old Political Science Professor from the University of the Orange Free State to the post of Secretary in the Department of National Security. Botha had made his choice without consulting the government’s Public Service Commission, a procedure usually applied when outsiders are nominated for top public servant posts. Consequently, the country’s current press expressed their astonishment. One newspaper wrote: “His appointment from outside the ranks of the Public Service has been one of the most surprising made so far by the Prime Minister”. However, it was only in June 1980, seven months after his appointment, that Barnard assumed his post in what now was renamed National Intelligence Service. This delay is an indication that P.W. Botha’s choice was met by some resistance from those who were not consulted, probably the national intelligence officials and possibly also the parlia-

---


mentarians that did not approve of this fait accompli. In any event, Botha’s appointment clearly bore the handwriting of the national intelligence Deputy Minister Coetsee, given his political power base in the Orange Free State and his close links as an Alumni of the university of this province.115 As a South African daily commented in November 1979:

Professor Barnard (...) is believed to have been hand-picked by the Deputy Minister of National Security (...) Mr. Coetsee, a fellow Bloemfonteiner, would have been aware of and impressed by Professor Barnard’s studies of strategic matters at the University of the Free State. It is likely that the Prime Minister, on the recommendations of Mr Coetsee and his Defence Force advisers, chose Professor Barnard on the strength of his conservative, orthodox attitudes to security questions linked with his knowledge of the threats as seen by the Government.116

Indeed, and Coetsee’s apparent role apart, Niël Barnard’s academic profile legitimised P.W. Botha to make him the national intelligence head, thereby avoiding confrontation between national intelligence and the military such as had occurred during van den Bergh’s days. In fact, Barnard’s doctoral thesis on The Power Factor in International Relations and other publications117 were testimony “to a close correspondence between his views and those of Prime Minister P W Botha on the need for a comprehensive strategy for securing South Africa’s interests in an alien environment”, as a magazine commented in June 1980.118 The same source quotes from Barnard’s press conference that month: “What we face today is a total politico-ideological war (...); a total onslaught also involves diplomacy, propaganda, education, sport and, above all, the economy. A counter-strategy cannot therefore be based on the military aspect alone”.119 With hindsight, later secondary sources suggest that under Barnard the NIS consequently “co-operated closely with military intelligence”.120

We reveal in this study that the National Intelligence Service remained an important actor, at least initially, even after P.W. Botha’s presidency had ended in 1989. The intelligence agency’s influence on Pretoria’s foreign policy under de Klerk, and in spite of the DFA’s resurgent predominant position in the early 1990s, is likely to be explained with the powerful position it had built up during the 1980s. This finds confirmation in reading de Klerk’s autobiography, describing Barnard as follows: “Another key figure was the enigmatic Dr Niël [sic] Barnard (...). Barnard had built the service into an effective organization which had a

118 ‘NIS supremo says he’ll ‘keep it clean’”, To the Point 13 June 1980, p.19.
119 ‘NIS supremo says he’ll ‘keep it clean’”, To the Point 13 June 1980, p.19.
reputation for professionalism and for playing by the rules. He was quiet, reserved and thoughtful (...).”

It is therefore justified to argue that Barnard held such a strong position that the foreign service officials and de Klerk were not in a position to curtail his influence. This led to competition with the Department of Foreign Affairs, led by Pik Botha and Neil van Heerden, as will be revealed in the context of Pretoria’s contact with Uganda and Nigeria between 1990 and 1992. However, in February 1992, de Klerk made Barnard the Director-General of Constitutional Development Services, engaging him more closely in the negotiations with the ANC, thus removing him from the foreign policy making scene. Significantly, and supporting the argument that Barnard interfered with the DFA’s work, de Klerk cynically explained the move by saying: “so that we would be able to make fuller use of his abilities in the negotiating process”.

This concludes our discussion of the different state actors of relevance in this study. We stated at the outset of this chapter that non-state actors also played a role. In describing their significance, we have organised them in six main categories (Table 3) and the subsequent sections follow this order. As illustrated in Figure 1 above, non-state actors played a peripheral role in Pretoria’s foreign relations with the African states. Our current interest, therefore, is to provide their profiles in order to then, in Chapters 3 to 6, examine their position vis-à-vis what Figure 1 depicted as the locus of decision-making.

Table 3: Non-State Actors in the Realm of South Africa’s Foreign Relations with Black Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Progressive Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Broederbond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td>Africa Institute; South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Rand Daily Mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised Business</td>
<td>Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut; Durban Chamber of Commerce; South Africa Foundation; South African Foreign Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>Anglo American Corporation; Bessemer Steel Construction; Brian Colquhoun Hugh O’Donnell and Partners; Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation; LTA; Roberts Construction; Safair; Southern Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Hugh O’Donnell and Partners; Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation; LTA; Roberts Construction; Safair; Southern Sun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Parties

South Africa’s foreign policy was only seldom discussed in Parliament, which was, in any case, dominated by the ruling National Party. The most significant opposition came from the

Progressive Party. Formed in 1959, it changed its name to Progressive Reform Party (PRP) in 1974, to Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 1977 and to Democratic Party (DP) in 1989.\footnote{De Klerk, 1998. The Last Trek, p.118.} Being in opposition to the NP and relying largely on financial support from the Anglo American Corporation, discussed below, it criticised the government for not going far enough in introducing domestic reforms to improve South Africa’s international standing.\footnote{Hackland, Brian. 1984. The Progressive Party of South Africa, 1959-1981: Political Responses to Structural Changes and Class Struggle. PhD, Oxford University; Hackland, Brian. 1987. Incorporationist Ideology as a Response to Political Struggle: The Progressive Party of South Africa, 1960-1980, in Shula Marks, Stanley Trapido, eds. The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. New York: Longman: 366-388.} Three of its prominent politicians, Colin Wells Eglin, Helen Suzman and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, paid visits to several black African countries beyond southern Africa. Eglin was the party’s prolific leader from 1971 to 1978, contributing to its parliamentary breakthrough by winning six seats in the 1974 elections,\footnote{Gastrow. 1987. Who’s Who in South African Politics, pp.85-89.} and it was during his tenure that the party was particularly active in Africa. He briefly held this post again from 1986 to 1988.\footnote{The section Correspondence in the Bibliography contains more information on his biography.} Suzman, a well-respected political figure and one of the earliest female parliamentarians, held the Progressive Party seat in Parliament from 1961.\footnote{Gastrow. 1987. Who’s Who in South African Politics, pp.302-305. The section Correspondence in the Bibliography contains more information on her biography.} Slabbert had a strong academic background, with a doctoral degree in Sociology, a discipline in which he subsequently lectured at various South African universities.\footnote{The section Correspondence in the Bibliography contains more information on his biography.} As a result, he never became a party-man. In his memoirs, Slabbert indicates that he was not specifically imbued with an ambition to become a career politician: “I suppose nothing could have prepared me adequately for the world I was about to enter. I stumbled into it almost by accident. (...) I enjoyed lecturing but did not have enough time to do research and read (...). I suppose I was ripe to consider alternatives”.\footnote{Slabbert, Frederik van Zyl. 1987. The Last White Parliament: The Struggle for South Africa by the Leader of the White Opposition. New York: St. Martin’s Press: 5.} Similarly, Slabbert describes his feelings on becoming the party’s leader in September 1979: “I did so reluctantly and with apprehension. (...) I definitely did not want to spend the rest of my productive days in the South African Parliament”.\footnote{Slabbert. 1987. The Last White Parliament, p.53. On Slabbert, see also Gastrow. 1987. Who’s Who in South African Politics, pp.292-295.} In February 1986, in a move of surprise, even shock, to white South Africans, Slabbert resigned as Leader of the Progressive Federal Party and from Parliament because, as he put it: “Obviously after twelve years in Parliament (...) I had a very real
sense of ‘having had enough’, especially as ‘things’ had worsened and not improved’. The South African political scientists Hennie Kotzé and Anneke Greyling suggest that Slabbert was frustrated that “white politics was stagnating and that a search for extra-parliamentary options was needed to break the political stalemate”. After his resignation, and of relevance to this study, Slabbert established the Cape Town-based Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA).

The activities of this relatively liberal party in Africa are almost entirely ignored by the secondary literature. In this study, we are in a position to shed some light on the party’s strategy by using the material in the DFA files, supplemented by correspondence with the above-mentioned politicians.

Civil Society

In his seminal study, Deon Geldenhuys names several actors within what he calls the “organised public” that influenced Pretoria’s apartheid foreign policy, but among them only the Broederbond is of significance to this study. The only restriction regarding its status as a civil society actor is its male exclusivity. Established in 1918, the Broederbond was preoccupied with the survival of the Afrikaner volk and “played a crucial role in creating, legitimising and maintaining the system of apartheid” until the mid-1980s. It not only had ministers, politicians and civil servants among its members, but also thousands of ‘average’ Afrikaner citizens. There were, however, splits within the brotherhood between the verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (constricted) elements. This was a contributing factor to factional struggles within the National Party, exemplified by the formation of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1969 and the Information Scandal imbroglio in 1977/78, both of which are given prominence Chapter 4. With regard to the Broederbond’s involvement in Pretoria’s

134 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.159-204.
135 Literally translated: Brotherhood Union.
Africa policy, it disposed of a task group called the ‘Africa Committee’ in the mid-1960s. It was chaired by Paul Friedrich Detlev Weiss, the then Director of the Africa Institute, and Petrus Johannes ‘Piet’ Cillié, the editor of the Afrikaans daily Die Burger (1954-77) with close ties to the National Party, was a member.\(^{140}\) Resting on the assumption that the Afrikaners were a chosen people, the aim of the Africa Committee was to christianise and civilise Africa and to keep up the struggle against communism. Thus, Broederbond Chairman Pieter Johannes ‘Piet’ Meyer (1960-72) suggested that it was their mission to “carry the light and spirit of Christianity into Africa from the South to the North”.\(^{141}\)

Regarding the Broederbond’s influence on Pretoria’s policy decisions, it effectively constituted the unofficial decision-making centre of the ruling National Party, aptly described by Hennie Serfontein: “One thing should be clear. The Broederbond does not dictate as such to the various bodies in government (...). There is, rather, direct interaction between the Bond and these bodies (...). The key people with whom the Broederbond discusses matters of the day are all Broeders anyway”.\(^{142}\) In the period under consideration, only two Cabinet Ministers were not Broederbond members, namely Eric Louw and Finance Minister Nicolaas Christiaan ‘Klaas’ Havenga (1924-39, 1948-54),\(^{143}\) with Louw’s above-mentioned non-political attitude probably accounting for his non-membership.\(^{144}\) Thus, there can be little doubt that the belief system prevalent amongst Broederbond members also became imprinted on Pretoria’s foreign policy generally, and its Africa policy in particular,\(^{145}\) making reference to the strongly held Afrikaner belief that the whites were superior to the blacks, and to the assumption that they had the right and mission to both dominate and civilise Africa. This formed the underlying basis of South Africa’s policy toward Africa for much of the period under consideration. Apart from that general observation, the Broederbond’s input into Pretoria’s foreign policy making was considerable during Vorster’s ‘Detente’, the S.W.A./Namibia issue and South

---


\(^{141}\) Cited in Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.120.


Africa’s relations with Rhodesia. In contrast, and although a Broeder, Prime Minister and State President P.W. kept the secret organisation at some distance and “it was clear that he wanted to make sure the Bond knew its place”.\textsuperscript{146} Towards the end of P.W. Botha’s rule, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the Broederbond came to realise that the means of power were no longer useful to ensure Afrikaner security, but inclusive negotiations. In fact, de Klerk himself suggests that he would not have undertaken the reforms he did after February 1990, if the Broederbond had not identified the need for change.\textsuperscript{147}

**Think Tanks**

We now discuss the two think tanks that made an appearance within Pretoria’s foreign relations with black African states. For the purpose of this study, we apply to them Diane Stone’s recent definition of think tanks:

> Research institutes and think tanks are relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of government, political parties, and pressure groups. They are relatively autonomous, although they are often in resource-dependent relationships with these organizations, funding may come from government sources, but institutes attempt to maintain their research freedom and usually claim not to be beholden to specific interests. Think tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying (...). Think tanks collect, synthesize and create a range of information products, often directed towards a political or bureaucratic audience, but also for the benefit of the media, civil society groups, and the general public.\textsuperscript{148}

As Deon Geldenhuys aptly noted, “South Africa did not have anything like a foreign policy community found in countries such as Britain and the United States”,\textsuperscript{149} with two institutions dominating, namely the Africa Institute in Pretoria and the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg. They were engaged in researching aspects of the South African foreign relations investigated in this study. We present them henceforth in alphabetical order.

The Africa Institute was established by parliamentary statute in 1960, financed by the South African government from the Department of Education’s budget. Its governing body, the Council, was dominated by Broederbond members. In the period from 1980 to 1984, for


example, eight of the eighteen Council members belonged to that secretive Afrikaner organisation. In spite of this organisational framework, the Africa Institute was not a front organisation of the government. As agreed upon in the secondary literature, its work was primarily “fact-producing and not policy-making”. In particular, mention must be made of their two journals, *South African Journal of African Affairs* (1971-79), continued by *Africa Insight* from 1980, and the *Africa Institute Bulletin*, published since 1960, as well as a wide range of monographs, many of which are referenced in this study. Having said this, though, we will reveal in Chapter 4 that both the Africa Institute’s Director and Vice-Director at the time, Joseph Hulme Moolman (1971-77) and Gerhard Max Erich Leistner (1973-77), simply referred to as Erich, became drawn into Pretoria’s Africa ventures in the mid-1970s.

Established in 1934 in Cape Town as South Africa’s version of the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs, the South African Institute of International Affairs was completely different in nature. The ideological and social base of this independent research body has been characterised as “upper-class, English-oriented and liberal”. Reflecting this description, the Institute has been located in Jan Smuts House on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg since 1960; as South African Prime Minister (1919-24, 1939-48), Smuts supported the British at the outset of World War II. Even more significantly, the Institute’s funding came primarily from the English-speaking business community, especially the mining sector. Crucially, Harry Frederick Oppenheimer, Chairman of the mining giant Anglo American Corporation from 1957 to 1982, described below, was its National Chairman from 1980 to 1990. The Institute was well-respected, due mostly to its publications, its high public profile in the form of conferences and media presence. Former foreign service officer John Barratt, who came from an English-speaking background, was its Director from 1967 to 1994 and significantly boosted the Institute’s stature, also internationally. He published extensively on South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa during the Out-
ward-Looking Policy. Despite Barratt’s suggestion that the Institute should “provide a link of bridge between the academic world and those in politics and government”,157 it was relatively removed from foreign policy making circles dominated by members of the Afrikaner community,158 primarily to be explained with its liberal academic outlook and the financing from English-speaking business. Thus, it was a matter of formality only that the Minister of Foreign Affairs ranked as one of its honorary presidents. Consequently, and in comparison to the Africa Institute, contact between the Institute and the South African government related to this study was low key (Chapter 4).

**Media**

The Rand Daily Mail, a white South African English-speaking newspaper, was significantly critical of Pretoria’s apartheid policy during the period under review. Established in 1902 in the then gold-rush boom town of Johannesburg, it began as “a businessman’s paper, devoted to the mining interests and to the white mineworkers”.159 Originally, its style of reporting was acceptable to the South African government, but this changed when the National Party came to power in 1948. This event marked the beginning “of the long war of attrition between government and the English newspapers”, among them the Rand Daily Mail.160 Over time, the daily took a more radical, in South African terms, political stance in response to the growing government pressure in the form of limitations to press freedom. In particular, it began to side with the Progressive Party, for example in the early 1960s, when it supported the party’s stance against the imposition of apartheid laws, such as detention without trial. This change was also linked to the personality of Laurence Gandar, Editor from 1957 and Editor-in-Chief after 1966. He had previously worked as public relations adviser to Anglo American’s Harry Oppenheimer. By arguing, in an attempt to make a positive contribution to the country’s development, that the full racial integration in South African society was inevitable, he took an extremely radical stance in the South Africa of 1964.161

Some of its more prominent journalists, for example Allister Sparks, sustained the paper’s liberal tradition. Sparks had joined the Rand Daily Mail in 1958 and, after holding several assistant positions, became its Editor (1977-81). In 1966, whilst he was the political corre-

---

spondent, the daily won a World Press Achievement Reward for its exposure of apartheid injustices and the maltreatment of prisoners, especially blacks, in the country’s prisons. Sparks also authored several books denouncing the apartheid system, some of which were widely acclaimed. 162 Two other journalists of note were Benjamin Pogrund and Anton Harber. Pogrund worked with the paper from 1958 as “African affairs reporter”163 covering the activities of the ANC and black leaders such as Nelson Mandela and PAC leader Robert Sobukwe, both of whom became Pogrund’s lifelong friends. He rose to eventually become the paper’s Deputy Editor and served in this capacity until his resignation in 1984. 164 It was during these days that the Rand Daily Mail published the revelations that led to the Information Scandal and to Prime Minister Vorster’s resignation in 1978. The Rand Daily Mail also proved to be a thorn in the flesh of the next government and this led to its closure in 1985. 165 Anton Harber, with the paper since 1981 and political reporter at the time, reacted to this as a “blow against the liberal press” 166 and launched The Weekly Mail to uphold a critical voice against the government. Subtitled The Paper for a Changing South Africa, it became an integral part of South Africa’s ‘alternative press’, “the only significant media voices not controlled by either the government or big capital”, 167 therefore giving it more freedom in its reporting. Reflecting its co-operation with the British daily The Guardian, it was renamed Weekly Mail & Guardian in 1993 and Mail & Guardian in 1995, under which name it is still published today. 168

The Rand Daily Mail and The Weekly Mail covered South Africa’s Africa policy fairly extensively, as is evidenced by many of the DFA files containing clippings from that newspaper, publishing several reports critical toward, or revealing elements of Pretoria’s initiatives.

Organised Business

In this and in the following section, we detail the profiles of the organised business entities, as well as of the relevant private and parastatal companies. Regarding the latter, this is defined a firm “at least 50 per cent owned by the state”.\(^\text{169}\) Before proceeding, however, a few general remarks are necessary concerning the relationship between the business sector and the government. While we have already vitiated the argument that South Africa’s Africa policy was the expression of the country’s political economy (Chapter 1), we now need to discuss two other issues of significance in this study, namely the relationship between business and apartheid politics, as well as the division between Afrikaner and English-speaking business. They are important issues in this study and help us to analyse the role of the business sector in South Africa’s foreign relations with black Africa.

Business activity during the apartheid period became a matter of intense academic controversy from the 1970s.\(^\text{170}\) The central question in the debate has been whether business was against or supportive of the apartheid system. The significance of this issue was highlighted by the Carlton Conference in Johannesburg (November 1979) and the Good Hope Conference in Cape Town (November 1981), when Prime Minister P.W. Botha attempted to draw business into the realm of politics and to form a new partnership.\(^\text{171}\) On both occasions, “the list of names from the private sector read like a Who’s Who of South African business”.\(^\text{172}\) In a nutshell, the viewpoints of the two main schools of thought, the liberal and the Marxist, also referred to as revisionist, have been summarised as follows: “the revisionists emphasise the compatibility of apartheid with capitalism whereas the liberals view apartheid as alien to it”.\(^\text{173}\) The domestic South African context has usually been the focus of investigation, for example with regard to the mining companies’ influence on labour regulations. In this study, the pivotal question is whether business activities coincided with, maybe even furthered, Pretoria’s foreign policy towards Africa, or whether they were in conflict with one another. In trying to


establish an answer, we approach the matter on the basis that business-government interaction in South Africa cannot be generalised, and needs to be individually assessed.174

Regarding the second issue, the disjuncture between Afrikaner and English-speaking business, it must generally be said that South Africa’s white population could not be regarded as a homogeneous unit, neither in political nor in economic terms. Until the end of the 1940s, “government power was dominated by Afrikaner coalitions, while economic hegemony was held by imperial [British] capital”.175 Traditionally, Afrikaner economic activity was largely restricted to farming, while British capital was strong in mining and in the industrial sector: “The Afrikaners gradually became involved in small-scale industry but not a single large factory was in Afrikaner ownership in 1930. By 1960 Afrikaners still owned only a few major industrial undertakings”.176 Harry Oppenheimer, long-time Chairman of the mining giant Anglo American Corporation, personified English-speaking big capital. Notable exceptions among Afrikaner business were Jan S. Marais, whom we will discuss later in this chapter and in Chapter 4, and Anton Edward Rupert, whose Rembrandt Group, a tobacco empire, started in 1948, bought out Rothmans in Great Britain and was involved in other sectors of the South African economy.177 In geographic terms, Pretoria was associated with Afrikanerd and political power, while Johannesburg represented economic influence by a predominantly English-speaking upmarket social class.

By 1940, the Nationalist government had attempted to promote Afrikaner economic and social advance with the establishment of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) that was to finance new industries. After the assumption of political power in 1948, the National Party’s initiatives intensified; state-owned industries and nationalised services were established to give employment to the Afrikaner community. Prime examples were the state Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom), South African Railways, the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the state oil and gas company, Sasol.178 Over time, the disjuncture between Afrikaner and English-speaking organised business became eroded in many areas, but the latter’s stronghold in diamond and gold mining

174 In line with, for example, Pretorius. 1994. The Head of Government and Organised Business, pp.209f.
remained relatively untouched. By the late 1970s, this process had developed to such a degree that P.W. Botha attempted to co-ordinate industrial policies and integrate Afrikaner and English-speaking business, for example, at the 1979 Carlton Conference – symbolically held in Johannesburg – with representation from both camps, such as Oppenheimer and Rupert. The division between the two business groups is also mirrored in this study. Economic interaction between the Republic and the African countries of interest throughout the period under review was primarily initiated by English-speaking business. Individual Afrikaner companies and organised Afrikaner business did not show much interest, with the exception of a brief spell of activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Now turning to the role of the organised business sector, four organisations play a relevant role in this study, namely the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), the Durban Chamber of Commerce, the South Africa Foundation and the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO). With the exception of the South Africa Foundation, they were all engaged in the promotion of South African external trade. The profiles of these four actors are examined individually and in alphabetical order, again with an emphasis on the personalities involved.

The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was established in August 1942 with the purpose of "promoting the Afrikaner’s economic interests and establishing the Afrikaner in the business world". It was an early expression of Pretoria’s intention of challenging the dominance of the organised English-speaking business community. Its organisational and ideological links with the government and its influence on the country’s economic policy were manifold: the Broederbond was crucial in establishing the Handelsinstituut to promote the economic interests of the Afrikaner community; after coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist government recognised the AHI as the official representative of Afrikaner business interests; in 1960, the AHI helped lay the foundations for the establishment of and was subsequently well represented on the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council; it was on both the government’s Export Trade Advisory Committee and the Export Promotion Council; finally, and unlike most private companies and business associations, the AHI chose Pretoria, and not Johannes—


180 Botha’s speech and the list of business representatives is contained at the ARCA, PV.203, File PS 5/1/1.


182 DFA, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3.
burg, as its base. Reflecting all this, the AHI made final reports of its missions available to the relevant government departments. For example, a report on the Angola mission in 1968 was sent to the Departments of Commerce, Economic Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs and to the Office of the Prime Minister. In turn, government officials, such as Brand Fourie, gratefully acknowledged receipt of the documentation. The DFA established a special file for correspondence with the AHI, something it did not do for the English-speaking counterpart, SAFTO.

Similar to the process of South Africa’s foreign policy formulation, a relatively small number of individuals were influential in the AHI and in Afrikaner business generally. The names of three men are significant in this context. Frederick François de Wit Stockenström dominated the AHI’s activities from 1966 to 1984 as its Executive Director. In the 1970s, he was also a member of the Economic Advisory Council. An important figure in Afrikaner as well as English-speaking business was Paul Kruger Hoogendyk, referred to as a “successful independent businessman” by the Financial Mail, South Africa’s leading business magazine. Within the AHI, he was a Board Member (1961-68), Vice-President (1969-72) and President (1973-74). He was also the director of the parastatals IDC, Iscor and Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC), as well as private companies, SAFTO Chairman in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a South Africa Foundation Trustee (1974-92) and, in the 1970s, a member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Board. In the sphere of politics, he appears to have supported many aspects of Pretoria’s apartheid ideology. First, he was relatively close to the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), a product of Broederbond inspiration in 1948 with obvious connections to the ruling Nationalist government.

---


185 ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/3/C(2).

186 DFA, 34/3/4.

187 Who’s Who in Southern Africa, 1985, p.492. His private collection (PV.782) is held at the ARCA.


Second, from 1972 to 1977, he was Chairman of the XDC, an institution established in 1965 as a by-product of Pretoria’s homelands policy. The XDC aimed at promoting the economic development of both the Transkei and Ciskei, a view shared by SABRA; this objective was pursued with the purpose of making these homelands self-sufficient economic units, thereby preventing the need for black migrant labour to enter white South African territory. The third man of relevance was Jan S. Marais who held various positions within the AHI and gradually rose from Deputy Chairman in 1961 to President during 1967/68. He was also on the IDC Board of Directors (1968-77), a member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council (1967-68) and Member of Parliament for the National Party (1977-81).

The AHI involved itself in export only at a relatively late stage, becoming active in the promotion of overseas trade towards the end of the 1960s with trade missions to Europe (Belgium, France), the Far East (Hong Kong) and the Middle East (Israel, Iran). In Africa, the focus was on southern Africa. Trade delegations visited Mozambique in July 1967, Angola in June 1968 and Rhodesia in August 1970, and in March 1970 the South Africa-Angola-Moçambique Economic Promotion Committee was established. The drive into Africa further north was limited to Malawi, the destination of an AHI trade delegation, led by Hoogendyk and Stockenström, in August 1969 (Chapter 4).

Regarding the Durban Chamber of Commerce, this was South Africa’s largest chamber of commerce. According to Geoffrey Winston Tyler, the Chamber’s Chief Executive from 1985 to 1999, it was active world-wide, mounting economic missions to the United States, South America, Australia, Japan and Europe. On the African continent, such missions were dispatched to countries both in southern Africa and beyond from the mid-1960s through the 1970s. In particular, Trade Missions were undertaken to Rhodesia (1969) and Angola (1970).


195 ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/3/A(1).
196 ARCA, PV.799, Files S33/14/3/B(1), S33/14/3/A(1).
197 ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/3/A(1).
Further north, the emphasis was on Malawi and the western Indian Ocean islands (Chapter 4).199

The Anglo American Corporation has been mentioned previously. In 1959, its Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, together with Anton Rupert, established the important South Africa Foundation to make the interests of the organised business heard, and this must be seen against the background of the potential imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa at the time. The Foundation’s main purpose, therefore, was “to sponsor visits to this country [South Africa] by important and influential businessmen and opinion makers”200 to improve South Africa’s image overseas so as to prevent possible such punitive measures.201 Mirroring the relatively little economic interaction between South Africa and the African countries of interest in this study, these countries did not figure prominently on the list of the Foundation’s target areas. In line with the proposition that the Foundation’s input into Pretoria’s foreign policy making came “not so much from the Foundation as an organisation, but rather from prominent individuals associated with it”202, the DFA files record activities by the Foundation’s representatives Christian Neethling ‘Chris’ Barnard, Basil Edward Hersov and James de Lacy ‘Peter’ Sorour. Barnard’s position as a Trustee (1970-92)203 was related to his being a Professor at Cape Town’s Groote Schuur Hospital, becoming internationally famous by performing the world’s first heart transplant in 1967.204 Hersov had joined the Foundation as a Trustee in 1970, rising in importance thereafter,205 reflecting his positions as the Chairman and Managing Director of Anglovaal, a very large company involved in mining, financial and industrial enterprises, and chair of a number of other important firms. Hersov could therefore be rated as one of South Africa’s most important representatives of English-speaking busi-

199 The reports of these trade missions were provided by courtesy of Sheila de Villiers from the Chamber’s head office in Durban.
203 See the relevant Annual Report of the South Africa Foundation.
ness, second only to Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American. Peter Sorour, finally, had no positions of specific importance, therefore only holding more administrative Foundation posts. Probably the most important South Africa Foundation Trustee was Harry Oppenheimer (1970-92), but it was not in this position that he played a role within South Africa's foreign relations with African countries. His company, Anglo American, was much more powerful than the Foundation; it was therefore more effective for him to use the lever of his company to achieve political ends, such as we will illustrate in Chapter 4.

Established in 1963, more than two decades after the AHI, the South African Foreign Trade Organisation was engaged solely in the promotion of external trade and composed almost exclusively of English-speaking companies. In July 1995, SAFTO was integrated into the parastatal IDC. In 1984, Willem Bernard ‘Wim’ Holtes, SAFTO’s Chief Executive from 1963 to 1992, described SAFTO’s raison d’être:

> We have always seen our role as making the SA businessman more aware of his export potential and the need for him to become more internationally orientated in his outlook. The rest of the world is a large, untapped market and he should be looking to establish his place there. There are many reasons for this. There is the national need, of course, but there are also very real, straightforward business reasons why we should expand into world markets.

To live up to this mission, SAFTO provided its membership, which increased from 130 companies in 1963 to peak at 1,443 in 1987/88, with an information database and a number of export focused publications. Other services rendered were the provision of SAFTO executives for specific assignments such as market surveys, the organisation of export marketing, and the running of export seminars and workshops. At a later stage, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so-called special “area services” or “business groups” with a geographical focus were established.

---


208 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1994/95, p.3.


SAFTO’s relations with the government must be differentiated, depending on the time period, and the personality factor once again played an important role. In contrast to the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, SAFTO was based in Johannesburg, and not in Pretoria. Yet, it was also represented on the government’s Export Trade Advisory Committee and the Export Promotion Council.\footnote{DFA, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3.} In addition, and although nominally a private sector organisation, it received financial support from the government, accounting for 18% of SAFTO’s revenue in the early days, decreasing to 12% by the early 1980s.\footnote{Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.163f.; SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. pp.16f.} However, the board of directors was composed of representatives from private business only.\footnote{Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.} Then again, in 1963, SAFTO declared, in what could be called its White Paper: “It will be an important part of SAFTO’s work to maintain close liaison with the Government, official export trade services, national bodies such as (...) [Afrikaanse] Handelsinstituut, as well as organised mining and agriculture, which are actively interested in the economic development of South Africa.”\footnote{‘Policy and Initial Operations Plan’, 1963, pp.1f. (ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/13/2(1))). The need for cooperation with the AHI and the government are emphasised in SAFTO Annual Report, 1967/68, p.5; 1968/69, p.4; 1970/71, p.4; 1976/77, p.6; 1977/78, p.6; 1984/85, p.5; 1986/87, p.5; 1987/88, pp.6f.} Interaction between SAFTO and the government also took place on an official level. For example, we know that the Minister of Mines and Planning (1964-67) and of Economic Affairs (1967-70), Jan Friedrich Wilhelm Haak, addressed SAFTO in 1965 and 1968.\footnote{Address Delivered at the 2nd Annual General Meeting of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, November 10th, 1965 (ARCA, PV.118, File 3/2/6); Address Delivered at the Banquet to Commemorate the 5th Anniversary of SAFTO, Johannesburg, 29th August 1968 (ARCA, PV.118, File 3/2/9).} On a personal level, during his Chairmanship from 1981/82 to 1985/86, Paul Hoogendyk established a particularly close liaison between SAFTO and the government,\footnote{SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.17. Hoogendyk was also member of SAFTO’s Board of Directors (1969/70-76/77, 1986/87-89/90) and its Vice-Chairman (1977/78-80/81). See SAFTO: Annual Report for the years 1967/68-94/95.} which seems to have caused some friction with those running SAFTO on a day-to-day basis. Thus, speaking about Hoogendyk, former Chief Executive Holtes commented somewhat disparagingly that he “was a great supporter of government, that’s for sure”.\footnote{Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.} Talking about the relationship between the foreign affairs ministry and SAFTO in the late 1980s, Paul Runge, who had worked for both of them during the 1980s, explained in 1999: “The relation between SAFTO and Foreign Affairs was a particularly good one. There was a lot of interaction. (...) It was a quite natural thing to move from the Department of Foreign Affairs into SAFTO. It was all very well received”\footnote{Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. Also SAFTO: Annual Report, 1987/88, p.6."}
By promoting South Africa’s export industry, SAFTO inevitably supported the policy goals of the South African government in Africa. Only a fine line existed between rejecting apartheid whilst, simultaneously, pursuing export promotion that was in line with the policies of the government that maintained this very system. Asked about this inherent dilemma in his work, Holtes commented in 1999: “We did a lot of things which perhaps should not be done by a trade organisation, but our attitude was always in the broad support of trade (...). And if we could help any of these companies to find a market (...), we did it. (...) [business] is supportive of anything that ensures stability”. Holtes further agreed that while there were “clashes” of interest, business and politics also went “hand in hand”, depending on the period and area under consideration. Regarding the former, he made particular reference to the military’s involvement in Angola and Mozambique as being “counterproductive to business interests”, as South Africa’s involvement in the war there hampered economic interaction with these countries of potential interest given their mineral and other resources.

Concerning SAFTO’s activities in black Africa beyond southern Africa, a harmonious picture prevailed. In terms of export promotion in those countries, SAFTO gained much more significance than its Afrikaner counterpart, while a reading of SAFTO’s annual reports and its monthly SAFTO Exporter magazine reveals that they only became an area of intense interest from the mid-1980s. Until a decade earlier, SAFTO’s principal focus was on South America, Europe, the Middle and Far East. In Africa, and like its counterparts, southern Africa was given preference in the second half of the 1960s, with Angola being considered to hold great potential because of its oil reserves and other resources. Outside this area, it restrained itself to the not too far distant countries, namely Malawi and the western Indian Ocean islands. At a meeting of the Export Promotion Council’s Sub-Committee for Africa in early 1969, SAFTO Managing Director, James J. Williams, explained: “South Africa should in the first instance concentrate on the development of trade with those countries which were favourably situated from a geographical point of view”. Trade opportunities further north were acknowledged prior to the early 1980s, but caution was advised:

---


224 ‘Afrika Subkomitee’, Annexure 3(C), from the Department of Commerce, 16 May 1969, p.4 (DFA, 34/2, Vol. 4).
Parastatal and Private Companies

Given South Africa’s economic strength and technological expertise, one of Pretoria’s bargaining chips used to achieve its ambitions was the provision of technical assistance and capital goods to establish a wide range of projects beneficial to individual countries. While the projects in the engineering, hotel, housing, mining and transport sectors could be considered as South African development aid to the continent, this assistance was not provided without self-interest. Compared with technical assistance, they were financed and executed by one South African parastatal and several private enterprises with a primary interest in economic profit from these investments. In this context, it is important to examine which private companies were involved in these development/investment projects, as they reveal the nature of the government’s relationship with the business community in furthering its interests beyond southern Africa. This section provides relevant background information on both the parastatal and the principal private companies involved, beginning with the former and presenting the latter in alphabetical order, with no indication of their importance. Due to the restrictions regarding access to archives of ‘private bodies’, most likely imposed for fear of evidence about corporate complicity in apartheid coming to the fore, this is based on freely available annual reports and other in-house publications of these companies, as well as on secondary literature. Interviews or correspondence with informed people in the relevant companies could be conducted in only a few cases, due to staff turnover, death of the incumbent or because the company had ceased to exist. The overview presented will assist in the clarification, in Chapter 7, of the two issues elaborated upon at the beginning of the previous section, namely the relationship between government and business and the division between Afrikaner and English-speaking business.

The parastatal Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1940 as Pretoria’s early attempt to support Afrikaner economic activity, leading Anthony Sampson to refer to it

---

225 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1974/75, p.3.
as a “bulwark against the Anglo-American Corporation”. Constituted in terms of the Industrial Development Act (No 22 of 1940), its general objective was defined as:

to promote industrial development, by assisting the private sector in the financing of new industries or schemes for the expansion or rationalisation of industries, by initiating development projects preferably in partnership with either local or overseas interests (...), and by establishing new industrial undertakings, if so directed by the Government.

In 1960, in a move away from merely promoting new industries with the purpose of import substitution, the IDC launched an Export Finance Scheme to finance the export of South African capital goods and services. Its main facility to this effect was, and still is, the provision of credits for periods from two to ten years at attractive interest rates, contingent on export credit insurance cover from South Africa’s Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. According to its own presentation, the IDC “operates on normal commercial considerations”, but although its Directors came, and still come, from the private sector, they were nonetheless government-appointed. This inevitably impacted on its business practice, as will be shown in case studies in this thesis. The personality factor again played an important role, with the names of IDC Managing Directors and Chairmen throughout the period under review revealing the influence of Afrikanerdom on this parastatal. Paul Hoogendyk and Jan S. Marais, members of the Board of Directors from 1958 to 1968 and from 1968 to 1977 respectively, deserve special mention. They were well-established Afrikaner businessmen, involved in the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and ideologically close to Pretoria’s apartheid policies. Also of note is Petrus Solomon ‘Piet’ Rautenbach, Manager of the IDC textiles section from 1967 to 1974, Director of the parastatal Xhosa Development Corporation in 1971 and Prime Minis-

---

In the latter capacity he was involved in establishing contact with both Madagascar and Malawi (Chapter 4).

In terms of financing the export of capital goods to African countries, the IDC was “very active”, according to SAFTO’s Holtes. In the 1960s and early 1970s, it appears that the IDC’s engagement outside South Africa focused on the immediate neighbourhood, for example with the financing of two massive South African projects with major political implications, namely the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique and the Cunene River Dam on the Angola-Namibia border.

Among the private companies of significance in this study, the Anglo American Corporation, commonly known as Anglo American, was undoubtedly the largest, the most powerful and influential. It has been mentioned as the financial backer of the Progressive Party and as one of the two founding organisations of the South Africa Foundation, and its long-term Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, has been referred to as the personification of English-speaking capital in South Africa. This represents only a minor portion of Anglo American’s many activities and different facets. Industrial sociologist Duncan Innes aptly described its overall significance in the South African context as follows:

the Anglo American Group of companies is a major force in the economic, political and social life in South Africa. In virtually every major sphere of mining, financial and industrial activity in the country the name of Anglo crops up either as the dominant authority, such as in gold and diamond mining, or at least as an important influence. Overall, the consolidated value of the Group’s investments makes it easily the largest single company in the country.

Founded in 1917 by Ernest Oppenheimer, Anglo American soon expanded its diamond and mining activities throughout southern Africa. Over time, it developed into South Africa’s leading private enterprise with world-wide financial connections. It is a typical example of a Multinational Company (MNC), “privately owned business enterprises organised in one society with activities in another growing out of direct investment” that, in order to secure their


234 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.


investments, "have an interest in both economic and political stability". On the African continent, its investment was concentrated in southern Africa, but it also had a stake in several countries further north. By the mid-1970s, Anglo American was said to own more than half of the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and to control a network of more than one hundred and fifty different holding and operating companies. The most important of these was De Beers Consolidated Mines, the leading global diamond producer. This aside, Anglo American held top positions in all of South Africa’s economic sectors – mining, manufacturing, industry, property management, finance, life assurance, short-term insurance – except agriculture. In the period under review, the Oppenheimer family controlled Anglo American through a highly complicated labyrinth of cross-holdings in the persons of Chairmen Ernest Oppenheimer (1917-57), his son Harry (1957-82), Gavin Relly (1983-90), Julian Ogilvie Thompson (1990-2002) and currently Tony Trahar.

Besides being the “octogenarian patriarch of South African business”, Harry Oppenheimer was active in South African domestic politics. Immediately after World War II, he was a Member of Parliament for the United Party – the then opposition to the ruling National Party – while during the second half of the 1950s, he became the financier of the opposing Progressive Party. Significantly, he was the first and only businessman whom Nelson Mandela wanted to meet before his imprisonment in 1962. Interviewed in 1999, Anglo American Executive Director, Michael Spicer, spoke of “overt hostility” between the multinational company and the government in the 1960s, mentioning that Harry Oppenheimer was not accorded a meeting with the Prime Minister outside of Parliament until 1981. In spite of this, we agree with the suggestion in the secondary literature that “there can scarcely be constant war between Anglo American and the government. Their economic embrace may be devoid of love, but is nonetheless muscular”. In the mid-1970s, for example, Harry Oppenheimer openly supported Pretoria’s Détente policy in southern Africa, and at the Carlton Confer-

---


241 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.


ence in 1979 he spoke of "the beginning of a new relationship between the state and private business in South Africa." In view of this uneasy relationship between Anglo American and the government in domestic and regional politics, it will be particularly interesting to observe how the company's leadership interacted with Pretoria in the other parts of Africa.

The privately-owned and non-registered company Bessemer Steel Construction was established by Afrikaner businessman Paul Hoogendyk, whom we have met before, in 1952, primarily to serve the agricultural industry. Since then, its main activity has been "the design, manufacture and the erection of steel silos for the storage of bulk grain". The South African homelands, southern Africa and the United States were the main markets, while minor activity also took place in black African countries further afield.

The engineering company Brian Colquhoun Hugh O'Donnell and Partners was established in Rhodesia in 1948 as a regional practice of Brian Colquhoun and Partners, Consulting Engineers, London, with the primary objective of providing a comprehensive consultancy service for building and civil engineering projects in Africa. It provided expertise in housing, hotels, airports, mining, bridges, railways and other projects. Its core area of interest in Africa was in southern Africa, with offices in Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In 1956, South Africa's leading banks, insurers and financial institutions established the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. This took place in response to a discussion held during the 1950s, a forerunner to the export debate during the late 1960s and early 1970s, whereby there was a "growing feeling among South African exporters [that they] were at a definite competitive disadvantage, because they didn't feel secure in offering long-term credit facilities". In the sphere of external business, Credit Guarantee's objective was the provision of insurance for the export of capital goods as distinct from commodity exports, namely cover against the risk of non-payment by a foreign buyer. Designed to promote South Africa's

---


245 <http://www.bessemer.co.za>.


247 'Profile of the Firm of BCHOD Consulting Engineers (Brian Colquhoun Hugh O'Donnell and Partners)', dated September 2001. This and the following unpublished documents were provided by courtesy of Tim Ashford from the company's South Africa office in Johannesburg: 'Statement of Experience in Building Projects', 'Statement of Experience in Housing and Township Projects', 'Statement of Experience for the Associated Infrastructure in the Mining and Processing Sector', 'Statement of Experience in Project Management', 'Statement of Experience in Major Road Work Projects', 'Statement of Experience in Water and Waste Water Engineering Projects'. Also <http://users.iafrica.com/bib/bchodjhb/profile.htm>.

export trade, any contract submitted for consideration to Credit Guarantee had to have at least a 70% local content, that is contract value, spent on South African goods and services. In 1957, Pretoria passed the Export Credit Insurance Act (No 78) and, in June 1958, entered into a long-term contract with Credit Guarantee. According to this agreement, the South African government provided the firm with reinsurance cover, particularly in the case of political risks that could not normally be covered by the South African private insurance market.\textsuperscript{246} In Africa, and as we shall see in later chapters, it was common practice for the IDC to finance a long-term contract and act as an “export bank”, whilst Credit Guarantee acted as insurer.\textsuperscript{250}

Over the years, Credit Guarantee became an important financial institution, growing from thirty-eight employees and an insured value of 212 million Rand in 1966 to 372 employees and an insured value of 18.5 billion Rand in 1991.\textsuperscript{251} African countries beyond southern Africa did not feature prominently in terms of geographical distribution of insurance cover for the export of capital goods. In correspondence with Credit Guarantee Managing Director Christoph Theodor Lutz Leisewitz in 1999, he refers to the business involving these countries as being “of minor importance”.\textsuperscript{252} This finds confirmation in a 1991 Financial Mail corporate report that presents the following picture of business activities according to geographic area: Italy 35%, Netherlands 14%, Belgium and Germany 13% each, Great Britain 8%, rest of Europe 6%, southern Africa 5%, rest of the world 6%.\textsuperscript{253}

Regarding the company’s relationship with the government, a look at the personalities involved is once again useful in understanding its significance within the context of Pretoria’s foreign relations of interest to us. Klaus Oppenheimer was Credit Guarantee’s General Manager from 1956 to 1965, the company’s representative on the government’s Export Trade Advisory Committee and the Export Promotion Council,\textsuperscript{254} and he co-authored a book on the firm’s early history.\textsuperscript{255} A relatively close link to Pretoria can be attributed to Johannes Jeremia ‘Jan’ Bouwer, who held various positions since 1959, eventually becoming Managing Director (1982-88). Prior to that, from 1952 to 1959, he worked for Pretoria’s Department of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{249} Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999; Meinardus. 1980. \textit{Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Südafrika}, pp.351-355.
  \item \textsuperscript{250} \textit{Credit Guarantee}. 1991. p.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Correspondence with Christoph Leisewitz, 27 May 1999.
  \item \textsuperscript{252} \textit{Credit Guarantee}. 1991. p.7.
  \item \textsuperscript{253} \textit{DFA}, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3.
\end{itemize}
Commerce and Industries. At a later stage, he was on SAFTO’s Board of Directors (1974-88) and became its Vice-Chairman (1987-88).\textsuperscript{256} This flirtation with English-speaking organised business notwithstanding, Wim Holtes described Bouwer as a “firm Afrikaner”\textsuperscript{257} and it is therefore no surprise to see his name among the list of participants at the Carlton Conference in 1979.\textsuperscript{258} Furthermore, in 1989, President P.W. Botha awarded him with the Order for Meritorious Services.\textsuperscript{259} Lastly, mention must be made of German-born Christoph Leisewitz, who does not seem to have had any particular connection with the government, but who was a driving force in Credit Guarantee’s activities in black Africa beyond southern Africa. He joined the firm in 1965 as a Trainee and worked his way up to Senior General Manager (1982-86), Executive Director (1986-88) and finally Managing Director, a position he held until February 2002. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, underlining his significance, he was also on SAFTO’s Board of Directors.\textsuperscript{260}

The construction company \textit{LTA} came into existence in 1965 as a result of the merger of four companies within the building, contracting and civil engineering sectors, namely Lewis Construction, Janes Thompson, Steeledale Reinforcing and Trading Company and Anglo American Corporation Construction. Anglo American’s dominant influence over LTA was a constant factor in the company’s financial structure. It held a direct 28% share in LTA, with an indirect participation of 35% through the Anglo American Industrial Corporation.\textsuperscript{261} On a personal level, Zacharias Johannes ‘Zach’ de Beer was LTA Chairman (1975-88), while concurrently on Anglo American’s Board of Directors (1982-88).\textsuperscript{262} De Beer was also actively involved in politics as a Member of Parliament for the Progressive Federal Party (1977-80) and a key player in the formation of the Democratic Party that succeeded the PFP in 1989.\textsuperscript{263} Anglo American’s stronghold on LTA only came to an end in July 2000, when the company was acquired by the construction group Aveng in a transaction valued at over 1.3 billion


\textsuperscript{257} Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.

\textsuperscript{258} ARCA, PV.203, File PS 5/1/1.

\textsuperscript{259} Oppenheimer and Mynhardt. 1996. Make the World Your Market, pp.46f.


Together with Murray & Roberts, LTA dominated, and still dominates, South Africa’s construction sector. It has been involved in some of the key infrastructure installations in South and southern Africa, namely the Orange Fish River Tunnel, the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg and the international concourse of the city’s then Jan Smuts Airport, the Groote Schuur Hospital in and the Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town, as well as the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique. The last two projects, in particular, entailed great hitting power and were of importance within South Africa’s foreign policy.

Roberts Construction was part of the civil engineering and building construction firm Murray & Roberts, the other principal company in that field besides LTA. Murray & Roberts came into being in 1967, result from the merger between Murray & Stewart, founded in Cape Town in 1902, and Roberts Construction, established in Johannesburg in 1934. Murray & Roberts subsequently acted as an umbrella organisation and grew in terms of financial assets and number. Following a gentleman’s agreement between owners Douglas Murray and Douglas Roberts at the time of the merger, Murray & Roberts concentrated on the Cape Province and Namibia, while Roberts Construction serviced South Africa’s three remaining provinces. As a result of that arrangement, only Roberts Construction was active in black Africa. Its interest in this area was significant throughout the period under review, exemplified by the 1991 Annual Report: “Murray & Roberts’ heart is in Africa”. The ties to the DFA were particularly close. According to Paul Runge, “there was a lot of interaction. I would, at Foreign Affairs, receive Murray & Roberts and people like that”, indicating that they had the ear of this department and that there was an attempt to co-ordinate activities in the relevant African countries. This close interaction was most probably brought about by the personality factor, as is so often seen in this study. Greek-born Stephen Alexander Boyazoglou held various positions within Murray & Roberts from 1954 to 1979, most importantly that of Deputy Managing Director since 1970. Significantly for this study, he was the cousin of Jan George Boyazoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Paris from 1969 to 1985.
who made a "positively brilliant" contribution, as described by former Ambassador Donald Sole.\footnote{Sole. 1989. "This Above All", p.314. See Appendix A for his biography, while his full CV is in DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 5. Alliki Boyazoglou (Johannesburg) provided the information on Stephen Alexander and Jan Boyazoglou’s relationship during a telephone interview on 21 April 1999.} In this capacity, Jan Boyazoglou was closely involved in an important technical assistance project in Gabon, and it cannot be a coincidence that Roberts Construction was particularly active in Gabon and other Francophone African countries. In 1976, Murray & Roberts’ Managing Director John Edgar Dale ‘Bill’ Bramwell openly declared: “we are also doing a fair amount of work in what used to be called French Africa. The only country I dare mention here is the Ivory Coast but we are working in others too. We think this whole area has great prospects for us”.\footnote{Murray & Roberts. 1976. p.48.}

Safmarine’s interests in the airline companies Air Cape, Namib Air, Trek Airways, Luxavia and Aviation Technical and Terminal Services were co-ordinated and rationalised by Safair. Significantly, and an early indication of the nature of Safair’s links with Pretoria, Luxavia flew from Johannesburg to Luxembourg. Although a South African-financed firm, Luxavia’s registration in Luxembourg allowed it to fly directly to the heart of Europe across the African continent.\(^{277}\) It thus undercut the air sanctions imposed against the national airline South African Airways (SAA) that resulted in enormous costs for the South African government. Pretoria’s activities in obtaining both landing and overflying rights from African countries became an important aspect in South Africa’s foreign relations with them, an issue that will surface in Chapters 4 to 6. Safair’s specialisation was the provision of technical maintenance to other airlines and transport of all kinds of cargo. It was only in the early 1990s, with the deregulation of South Africa’s domestic airline routes, that Safair became interested in the domestic passenger service.\(^{278}\) The business of providing technical assistance to African airlines grew during the 1980s. In southern Africa, Linhas Aéreas de Angola, Air Botswana, Lesotho Airways, Linhas Aéreas de Mozambique, Royal Swazi and Air Swazi Cargo were among its customers. Further afield, it serviced Shabair in Zaire, Air Malawi and Air Transafrik in Sao Tome and Principe.\(^{279}\) The DFA files also reveal that Safair carried out the repairs for the private aeroplane of Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1976 in Swaziland at the cost of 1.5 million Rand.\(^{280}\)

This study focuses on Safair’s cargo transport activities in Africa. For that purpose, it utilised its Lockheed-built Hercules fleet that, at the height of Safair’s expansion in the 1980s, consisted of eight L100 aircraft. They formed the basis of what Braam Loots, Safair Managing Director from 1981 to 1993, called “our total Africa strategy. (...) These aircraft are ideal for remote areas. They can move bulk and require little ground infrastructure”.\(^{281}\) Jacobus Pieter van Aswegen, Safair Managing Director from 1993 to 1999, referred to them as “Land

---


\(^{280}\) ‘Note’, from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 10 November 1976 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 8).

Rovers of the sky". Safair only began to acquire Boeing aircraft in the early 1990s. Not being allowed to offer scheduled freight service and compete with South Africa's national airline, SAA, Safair resorted to a pragmatic solution and leased out its planes. Due to the imposition of the 1977 mandatory UN arms embargo and given South Africa's involvement in several military conflicts in the region until the late 1980s, the South African Defence Force became Safair's most important client. After 1977, the SADF no longer received spare parts for its own Lockheed-built C-130 aircraft, and to avoid the unnecessary wear and tear on these planes, it leased Safair's civilian Hercules planes to transport personnel, ammunition, logistical material and other items. In 1988, for example, Safair transported between 250,000 and 300,000 troops plus their families and friends. According to van Aswegen, business with the SADF formed the "backbone" of the company, and "if it were not for them, it would have been difficult". The Department of Foreign Affairs was also a Safair customer, but one of little significance in comparison with the SADF.

One of South Africa's leading hotel resort chains during the period under review, Southern Sun, was established in 1969 to counteract the dearth of tourist hotel facilities. The impetus came from South African Breweries, South Africa's leading brewery which was partly owned by Anglo American, in order to rationalise its hotels and licensed house interests. Solomon 'Sol' Kerzner, another major shareholder in South African Breweries, became Southern Sun's Chairman and influenced the fate of this and other companies in the same field during the following two decades. Southern Sun greatly expanded its presence in South Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s, and began to hold a dominant position in the country's luxury tourist and business hotel trade. It also operated five casino resorts in two of the South African homelands, the flagship of which was Sun City in the homeland of Bophutatswana. Of relevance to our study, Kerzner participated in two companies that became involved in the western Indian Ocean islands of the Comoros and Mauritius. However, no primary information could be obtained on these matters for reasons discussed in a moment and because financial data on the firms involved was not available. Regarding the Comoros, we will see in Chapter 5 that, from the 1980s, a company called World Leisure Group Limited undertook the development and management of two resort and casino properties. Kerzner had established

283 See the current composition of its fleet at <http://www.safair.co.za>.
285 'Safair prepares', Financial Mail 13 May 1988, pp.84, 86.
this company on the British Virgin Islands in the Caribbean, a tax heaven, and subsequently acted as its Chairman. World Leisure Group Limited was also one of three shareholders of Sun International Investments Limited, which, in turn, was the majority shareholder of Sun International Hotels Limited, a company engaged in luxury hotels and the casino resort industry. Sol Kerzner had formed the latter in 1983 and subsequently was one of its Directors and Chairman until 1989. A different situation applied to Mauritius, where local shareholders owned the relevant hotels, while the management was in the hands of companies in which Kerzner again participated, namely the Mauritius Southern Sun Hotels Limited and Sun Resorts Limited. Their involvement on Mauritius dates from the mid-1970s, developments we will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5.

Kerzner’s interaction with the South African government is of a special interest, given the allegations made in the second half of the 1990s accusing him of dubious dealings with Pretoria in other matters. A few words therefore are necessary about Sol Kerzner. Born in 1935 in Johannesburg as the son of a Jewish-Russian immigrant family, he worked his way up to become “one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the entertainment business”. Described as “flamboyant” and as a “man who achieves what he sets out to do – usually ahead of schedule”, his importance in the South African business community was reflected in him becoming a South Africa Foundation Trustee (1980-92). However, since the 1994 elections, numerous newspaper reports have suggested that Kerzner did not hesitate to use his financial means to garner political support for his business plans. In 1999, he was accused of having bribed the prime minister of the Transkei to obtain gambling rights in that former homeland. The media had highlighted his business practices already in July and August 1996 by publish-

295 ‘R2m Kerzner pay-out next on SIU agenda’, Daily Dispatch 3 February 1999. According to apartheid legislation, casinos were only allowed in the ‘independent’ homelands and not on South African territory.
ing allegations that Kerzner had financed both the ANC and the NP 1994 election campaigns. After the ANC’s original rejection of the media reports, Nelson Mandela later confirmed their validity, while the NP neither confirmed nor rejected the claim. Finally, in 1997 and again in 2002, Kerzner’s lawyers succeeded in preventing the sale of the book entitled *Kerzner Unauthorised*, written by journalist Allan Greenblo and published by Jonathan Ball in Johannesburg. This action certainly did not help in silencing those critics who accused him of being a businessman with shady dealings.

The information contained in this chapter served to introduce the state and non-state actors of relevance to this study, providing necessary background with which to contextualise their role within South Africa’s foreign relations with the black African countries beyond the country’s immediate neighbourhood. Their activities will be of particular importance in Chapters 4 and 5.

---


CHAPTER THREE
Wind of Change:
Prime Minister Verwoerd, 1958-66

African Independence

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Pretoria’s foreign relations with black Africa under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. His term as the country’s executive coincided with the wave of independence that swept across the African continent, with more than half of all the African countries gaining their freedom from colonial rule during the first half of the 1960s. An event in South African history that has become closely tied to these events was the Wind of Change speech by the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, in Cape Town in February 1960, heralding Britain’s departure from Africa. As has been explained in Chapter 1, this was a contributory factor leading to Pretoria’s decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth and to pursue its new political status as a Republic. In pursuing the goal of pan-Africanism, the newly independent states declared the eradication of colonialism as their primary goal. South Africa became their target due to its domestic apartheid policy,\(^1\) including the implications such as its occupation of South West Africa/Namibia and its support for the white regime in Rhodesia. The anti-apartheid struggle took place at the UN, co-ordinated through the ‘African Group’, the largest caucusing group, and through the OAU. African initiatives to isolate South Africa at the UN Security Council were generally met with resistance by the Western permanent members, but stood a better chance of eliciting sufficient support in the General Assembly due to Africa’s numerical majority in that forum.\(^2\) This resulted in the establishment of the

---


CHAPTER THREE: PRIME MINISTER VERWOERD, 1958-66

Special Committee against Apartheid\(^3\) in 1962 and the Centre against Apartheid\(^4\), attached to the UN Secretariat, in 1966.\(^5\)

In 1960, the machinery of the African Group was exposed to its first test after the South African police killed sixty-nine blacks during protests in the township of Sharpeville on 21 March.\(^6\) On 25 March, eight African and twenty-one Asian states took action and pressed for the denunciation of Pretoria’s apartheid policy. They demanded a Security Council meeting, drafting a resolution that declared the situation in South Africa, if it continued, to be “one that might endanger international peace and security”.\(^7\) It did not call for action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, providing for the imposition of mandatory sanctions, but it sent a warning to Pretoria that this might be a future option. On 1 April, the draft document was adopted as Resolution 134.\(^8\) France and Great Britain abstained from voting, as they did not wish to unnecessarily alienate a partner on the African continent, where they both still possessed colonial territories. Three years later, on 7 August 1963, African pressure resulted in Security Council Resolution 181 that imposed a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa.\(^9\)

**Appeasement**\(^10\)

Such developments had hitherto been unthinkable for white South Africa and, as it was relatively unprepared for them, coming to terms with this new condition proved to be a difficult task. Not only did it “not at first realise the full impact of the changing political climate”,\(^11\) but the wave of African independence must have been a “traumatic event”\(^12\) for both the government and the white populace. Foreign Minister Eric Louw had established the Africa and In-

---

\(^3\) Temporarily called Special Committee on Apartheid from 1971 to 1974.

\(^4\) Known as the Unit on Apartheid from 1966 to 1975.


\(^7\) UN documents S/4279 and Add.1 (25 March), S/4299 and S/4300 (1 April 1960).


ternational Organisations Division within the DFA as far back as 1955. Yet, this was most certainly not intended to deal with independent African states, but rather with the European colonial powers. As late as 1959, Louw referred to the African independence movements as "disturbing, and indeed, alarming events". He acknowledged the right of African states to "eventually grow to nationhood and independence", while arguing that this process should not take place in an "unduly hastened" manner. According to his view, African independence should only come about in the far distant future, if at all, with nothing to perturb the present. Yet, the new political dispensation on the African continent now required a different strategy for deflecting the disquieting and ever-increasing African attacks on South Africa at the UN.

As indicated in the previous chapter, Minister Louw and Secretary Gerhardt Jooste strongly influenced Verwoerd’s foreign policy making at the time, and actively pursued their proposal of further providing African states with technical and other forms of assistance. Since their establishment in the early 1950s, Pretoria had been a fully functional member of the following four organisations concerned with co-operation in the fields of science and technology: the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation (BIS), the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (CCTA), the Scientific Council for Africa (CSA), and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (FAMA). Through these agencies, Pretoria’s primary motivation during the last decade of the colonial period was to assist the poorer African nations, and thereby portraying itself as both developed and superior. South Africa even rendered assistance to non-African countries such as Poland, Romania and Thailand as late as 1963, further demonstrating the validity of this line of argument. Immediately after African independence, the original motivation for Pretoria to provide assistance was supplemented by its aim of presenting itself as a trustworthy partner. By showing its interest in fostering friendly relations, Pretoria hoped to appease the African states seeking South Africa’s international isolation. In that context, the “friendship criterion” was of significance, meaning that assistance was only rendered to those African countries whose stance

---


toward South Africa was positive. The implications of this are reflected in a report by Robert Jones, DFA Under-Secretary for Africa, in 1960: "The question of policy involved is whether, in the light of Nigeria’s attitude towards South Africa, the Union Government is prepared to allow that country to benefit from the results of research carried out in the Union, even against payment for the material made available".18

However, appeasement was not a successful policy, because Pretoria “seriously underestimated African hostility towards apartheid”19 after the Sharpeville massacre. As a result, by 1963, South Africa was excluded from the OAU, CCTA, CSA, BIS and FAMA, while African pressure had resulted in its expulsion from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).20 South Africa’s diplomatic representation on the continent was also severely affected. In July 1957, it had maintained offices in Angola, the Belgian Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, British East Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Madagascar, Mauritius and Mozambique. Seven years later, its presence was limited to those countries that were still under colonial rule, namely Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique and Rhodesia.21

Even if Pretoria’s appeasement intentions had been successful, the establishment of equitable relations between South Africa and black African states would have remained impossible due to the intricacies of apartheid. For ideological reasons, treatment of any black in South Africa, including an ambassador from a black African state, on a par with a white person was unimaginable to the proponents of apartheid. For example, Verwoerd described Nigeria’s head of state as a “fanatic” in an internal DFA document of April 1962,22 because Abubakar Balewa proposed an exchange of diplomats between their two countries. This incident took place at a Commonwealth press conference in London, and after a meeting with Verwoerd there.23 On a practical level, the mere presence of a black ambassador in South Africa would have meant his exposure to the apartheid legislation applied to any black South African, something that was obviously in conflict with the international conventions on diplomatic immunity. The question of black diplomats in South Africa also touched the country’s political nerve, as shown in this article that appeared in the widely read daily The Star in 1958:

19 Spence. 1965. Republic Under Pressure, p.73.
21 Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: Department of External Affairs/DFA. (July 1957, June 1964)
22 DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 2.
But the Government have, thus far, dared to do nothing actively to seek the friendship of independent Black Africa for the reason that it has been impossible to overcome the political problems which would be posed by the presence of Black diplomats in the Union. (...) If the Government were to welcome Black diplomats in the Union it would involve not only organization, but a major change of heart within the Nationalist Party. African diplomats would enjoy diplomatic status and immunity. They would have to be invited to official functions. The social colour bar would have to be relaxed completely for them. There could be a major international rumpus if a policeman had, for instance, to ask a Black diplomat from an African state for his pass.

This situation persisted throughout the 1960s, as illustrated in a report by Colin Vale, Second Secretary at the South African Mission in Stockholm, dated 1969, on a meeting with an Ethiopian diplomat: “I explained as clearly as I could that, although black diplomats in South Africa were accorded all the courtesies, privileges and immunities accorded to any other diplomat in South Africa, no diplomat could ever expect to be above the law and certainly no diplomat would ever behave in a manner which was out of tune with the accepted social customs of the country in which he was stationed”.\(^\text{25}\) In attempting to find a solution to the problem, Pretoria came up with the plan to establish diplomatic suburbs for black ambassadors outside Cape Town and Pretoria, but this did not eventuate as Verwoerd probably found that dealing with black African counterparts on South African territory was still too risky.\(^\text{26}\) As an alternative, he favoured the idea of a “roving ambassador”, a white ambassador touring Africa’s capitals, thus avoiding the posting of black ambassadors to South Africa. This proposal found governmental acceptance, but was only introduced on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, with the Head of the Africa Division usually acting in this capacity.\(^\text{27}\) As a compromise, the construction of a multiracial hotel at Jan Smuts Airport, where diplomats could meet, became a reality.\(^\text{28}\) Yet, the issue of black diplomats in South Africa continued to be a sensitive one even a decade after the inception of African independence, as revealed in a letter by Under-Secretary Albie Burger:

\begin{quote}
The Hotel will not provide facilities such as swimming pools, dancing areas, games rooms, etc., which could lead to social mixing between whites and non-whites staying at the hotel. The purpose of the Hotel may have to be carefully explained to the public by
\end{quote}

\(^{24}\) ‘Nat. M.P. touches sore spot in Africa policy: black diplomats or more isolation the choice’, \textit{The Star} 4 November 1958 (ARCA, PV.93, File 1/9/2/1).


\(^{26}\) Barber and Barratt. 1990. \textit{South Africa’s Foreign Policy}, p.77.


means of advance publicity so that it will be understood to whom the facilities of the Hotel will be available.\(^2^9\)

The hotel was eventually built in the early 1970s as a Holiday Inn,\(^3^0\) while the choice of this American brand-name reflected Pretoria’s intention to make it sound as non-South African as possible and to therefore dissociate it from its locale.

In the same context, it was only in December 1967, under Prime Minister Vorster, that Malawi became the first black African state to establish a diplomatic mission in Pretoria. Although *The Star* hailed this as the “start of a new era in South Africa’s foreign relations”,\(^3^1\) the government did not dare to take it to its fullest conclusion; the appointed ambassador was white and only the Chargé d’Affaires was black. It took another four years for Malawi to appoint a black ambassador (Chapter 4).\(^3^2\)

### Congo Crisis

While the previous section focused on the foreign ministry’s attempts to deal with the consequences of African independence during Verwoerd’s premiership, this section separately examines the military centered approach to this situation, as it differed significantly. The military became involved in the context of the deteriorating political situation in the Republic of Congo after its independence from Belgium in June 1960. Within a week after that event, an army mutiny threw the third largest African country into turmoil, the events of which are now outlined briefly to provide the background for South Africa’s subsequent initiatives. As a result of the political problems, Belgium decided to send troops to its former colony, but following accusations that it wished to reoccupy the country, they were replaced by a UN peace force.\(^3^3\) Yet, neither that UN force nor the armed forces, led by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, could prevent Moïse Tshombe, with strong mercenary assistance, from declaring the southern and copper-rich Katanga province as independent from the rest of the country in July 1960. In August, Albert Kalonji followed this example with the diamond-rich Kasai province, north of Katanga, and early in the following month, the central government collapsed and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba resigned. After Lumumba’s death in detention in January 1961, under

---

\(^2^9\) Letter from Albie Burger to the Department of Transport, accompanied by ‘Comments of the Department of Foreign Affairs’, Pretoria, 11 June 1968, pp.1f. (DFA, 22/12, Vols. 2, 3).

\(^3^0\) DFA, 22/12, Vols. 2, 3.

\(^3^1\) ‘Start of a new diplomatic era’, *The Star* 12 December 1967 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 4).

suspicious circumstances, Mobutu intervened and his army subsequently administered the country. Despite the deployment, in February 1961, of a UN task force to Katanga to terminate the secession, this only materialised in January 1963 when Tshombe, after months of hostilities and negotiations, went into exile. However, rebellions continued in the eastern parts of the country throughout 1964. Given the relative success of his troops and mercenaries during Katanga’s secession, Tshombe was invited home in July 1964 to bring stability to the country. Upon his return, he formed a new government, of which he became Prime Minister until October 1965, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tshombe once again relied on mercenary help, but also called on Belgium and the US for assistance.

Given the nature of these developments, Pretoria’s response was fashioned by the military, contextualised in its position during the colonial period, when Pretoria equalled its importance on the continent to that of the status enjoyed by the colonial powers. This found expression in 1949 in the Africa Charter, conceived by Prime Minister Daniel Malan. It proposed cooperation between the colonial powers and South Africa in an attempt to prolong Western control over Africa. Pretoria intended becoming the bridgehead of Western civilisation in Africa, defending the continent against communism and the Indian influence, and keeping it non-militarised. In line with this stance, the military took part in the conferences in Nairobi (1951) and Dakar (1954) that brought together the colonial powers to discuss the issue of “African Defence”. On the occasion of the Dakar conference in 1954, Francois Christiaan Erasmus, Minister of Defence from 1948 to 1959, indicated, according to the New York Times, “that South Africa’s participation in any defense of Africa would be with only limited manpower. Vaguely, the suggestion has been made that South Africa could provide a small air force and a small armoured force. Her chief contribution would have to consist of war mate-

---


rial and general supplies". In its reaction to the Congo crisis, the military's room for manoeuvre was apparently not much greater due to its limited capacity at the time. From the available evidence, it was only in 1963 that it became directly involved in the first phase of the crisis, although Jacobus Johannes 'Jim' Fouché, Minister of Defence from December 1959 to April 1966, shared the principles of the Africa Charter.

After pro-Western Tshombe had declared Katanga's independence in July 1960, we can safely assume that Pretoria sided with him for ideological reasons. In 1964, for example, Verwoerd stated: "South Africa is unequivocally the symbol of anti-Communism in Africa. Although often abused, we are also still a bastion in Africa for Christianity and the Western world". Maybe being aware of Pretoria's position, two ministers from Katanga visited the Republic in August and September 1961, in an attempt to obtain assistance of any kind. According to Defence documents, the issue of armaments supplies to Tshombe was discussed at the highest level in the SADF during 1962. However, there is no indication that Pretoria did, in fact, provide him with military assistance in this phase, as has been alleged. Three arguments can be used to sustain this. First, the DFA opposed military engagement in any African country to prevent damage of South Africa's diplomatic image. Due to the Louw-Jooste team's influence on Verwoerd, it is conceivable that they would have had the upper hand over Fouché, who had only just become Minister of Defence. Second, and following this argument, it is unlikely that Pretoria was going to engage itself directly on the side of a secessionist leader against a UN task force, risking another barrage of accusations from the international community. Third, the military's capacity to get involved in a relatively distant African war was arguably insufficient at the time. Its budget, contained in Appendix D, only began to grow exponentially after 1961, the figure tripling in the next two years alone. While direct military intervention is therefore improbable, Pretoria chose something of a middle road in that it approved of South African mercenaries fighting for Tshombe. In doing so, it avoided becoming directly involved in a military conflict, while still making a contribution in achieving the desired political aims. As different degrees of co-operation with mercenaries were

40 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.100f.
41 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch. 1964. I. Crisis in World Conscience; II. The Road to Freedom for Basutoland, BechuanaLand, Swaziland. Pretoria: Department of Information: 4. See also Verwoerd's first interview after having taken office in the Rand Daily Mail 15 December 1958 (ARCA, PV.93, File 1/9/2/2).
43 DoD, Group 5, DKG/EXT/6/6, Vol. 175.
44 DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4.
important elements in South Africa's foreign relations with Africa at this time and during later instances, the following paragraphs introduce relevant personalities and pertinent aspects necessary to the understanding of the mercenary ethos.

A mercenary can be defined as a "hired professional soldier who fights for any state or nation". Having its roots in the 18th century Europe, the period from 1960 to 1970 was a "Great Epoch" of mercenary activity on the African continent, when the 'soldiers of fortune', 'frightful ones' or 'dogs of war' were used in several conflicts. Two mercenaries played a meaningful role in South Africa's foreign relations with Africa on several occasions. These two "colourful characters" were Frenchman Pierre Robert 'Bob' Denard and the South African-based 'Mad' Mike Hoare of Irish origin. While the evolution of international law at a later stage aimed at outlawing the use of mercenaries, it was an accepted international trend in the 1960s. This also applied to the position of mercenaries in South African law. On reading section 121A of the Defence Act (No 44 of 1957), applicable in the period under review, it becomes clear that "being a mercenary is not per se an offence in terms of South African law":

Prohibition of certain acts in connection with service as mercenaries
(1) Any person who—
(a) is a member of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve or an auxiliary or voluntary nursing service established in terms of this Act and who binds himself to service or renders service as a mercenary; or
(b) makes any utterance or performs any act or does anything with intent to advise, encourage, assist, incite, instigate, suggest to or otherwise persuade any member referred to in paragraph (a) to bind himself to serve or to render service as a mercenary,
shall be guilty of an offence.

Therefore, any South African citizen who was not a member of either the SADF or the Reserve could become a mercenary.

Both Bob Denard and Mike Hoare were amongst the Katanga mercenaries, but only Hoare's role is of relevance here, as there is no evidence of contact between Pretoria and De-

nard on this occasion. As with previous actors appearing in South Africa’s foreign relations with Africa, their background is also important to an understanding of their role. A description of Hoare follows now, while Denard will be introduced in Chapter 4. Hoare, whom The Star described as “no-nonsense commander”, was born in India as son of Irish parents. After a childhood and education in Ireland and Britain, he served the British Army as an Officer in the Royal Tank Corps in India and Burma, leaving the service in the rank of Major. After World War II, he immigrated to South Africa, started a safari business and travelled extensively on the African continent. In South Africa, he lived in Pietermaritzburg, near the Indian Ocean city of Durban. The question of his nationality defied final clarification, although this is an important aspect for an understanding of Pretoria’s reaction to his mercenary activities. In 1964, The Star reported: “Although everyone here thinks that Maj. Mike Hoare is British, the Foreign Office told the Embassy here that he does not hold a British passport. This would indicate that he could be of South African nationality”. Circumstantial evidence supports the idea that he adopted South African citizenship after his emigration from Britain, reinforced by the fact that a South African court sentenced him to prison after the Seychelles coup in 1981 and that Britain did not demand his extradition then (Chapter 5).

In returning to the Congo crisis, the information gleaned from the DFA files on Hoare and his co-mercenaries in Katanga is cursory, but the documents suggest that Pretoria knew of Hoare and of about sixteen South African mercenaries supporting Tshombe. Despite the lack of clear evidence revealing direct collaboration with Pretoria’s military, there can be only little doubt that their activities found tacit approval, at the least, because the mercenaries with South African nationality had to be given leave, either from the SADF or the Reserve, to prevent legal action against them upon their return. While the respective numbers are not known, it is a reasonable assumption that the majority of mercenaries had been serving SADF soldiers, as their use in a war situation promised to be more effective than that of reservists. Whereas the military did not do anything to stop South African mercenaries fighting in Katanga, Brand Fourie, Permanent Representative to the UN at the time, warned Jooste that this might further worsen the country’s international image, advising the government to take the necessary steps to stop mercenary involvement. With Louw certainly and Jooste possibly supporting the view that South African mercenary activity in Katanga could become another

50 ‘Leaders of Tshombe’s “foreign legion”’, The Star 7 October 1964 (DFA, 1/112/5/1, Vol. 3).
52 ‘Mercenaries into action: Congo still denies recruitment’, The Star 25 August 1964 (DFA, 1/112/5/1, Vol. 3).
battlefield at the UN, Pretoria subsequently threatened that all future mercenaries would lose their passports.\(^\text{53}\) Whether this was translated into action by the military is uncertain, however.

Still in the period 1960-63, but under different circumstances, two representatives from Kasai province, governed by Kalonji since August 1960, approached the South African government for military support. They had initially sought a meeting with Anglo American’s Harry Oppenheimer in Johannesburg in September 1960 to obtain mining and military assistance. For Kalonji’s men to contact a mining company was an obvious route, as only an operative mining industry in their province generated the income necessary to finance the war against the central government. That their choice specifically fell on Anglo American was no coincidence, because the Republic of Congo was probably the multinational company’s largest involvement in black Africa beyond southern Africa, with mining activities in the fields of copper, cobalt and diamonds. Dating from the 1920s, De Beers had considerable diamond mining interests in Mbuji-Mayi,\(^\text{54}\) capital of the central Kasai-Oriental province. Even though Oppenheimer was supportive of Kalonji’s cause, hoping that he could create the necessary political stability for Anglo American to continue its diamond mining operations, he does not appear to have been in a position to assist as requested. However, and most significantly, he described the meeting in a written report to Prime Minister Verwoerd, hoping to receive assistance from Pretoria, and linking both Anglo American’s economic and the government’s political interests in the province:

> I understand that you are acting as Minister of External Affairs, and therefore I feel I should tell you that I have just received a visit from two Africans from the Congo (...). They told me that their object in visiting the Union was to obtain a supply of arms for use against the troops of Lumumba who are invading the Kasai Province, and in particular they hope to obtain two Fighter Aircraft and numbers of machine guns. (...) They seemed to think that I would in some be in a position to assist them in their mission. I expressed sympathy with them in their opposition to Lumumba but explained that it was naturally quite impossible for any private individual in South Africa to obtain arms for them. (...) I felt it desirable that I should at once inform you of what had taken place.\(^\text{55}\)

According to Verwoerd’s instant reply, the two men consequently had a discussion with a DFA official on that matter, but the government could not assist them either:

> They were received by a member of the Department of External Affairs and treated with every courtesy. He informed them that having regard to all the circumstances, it would

---

\(^{53}\) Letter from Brand Fourie to Gerhardt Jooste, New York, 31 March 1961 (NAT.ARC., BTS 1/112/5/1, Vol. 1); NAT.ARC., BTS 1/112/5/1, Vols. 1, 2.


\(^{55}\) Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hendrik Verwoerd, Johannesburg, 13 September 1960 (ARCA, PV.93, File 1/53/2/4).
not be possible to supply them with military equipment, but like any other buyer they would be able to purchase non-military equipment from private sources if they so desired.\textsuperscript{56}

Apart from the reasons that have been stated above, dissuading Pretoria from becoming directly involved in the Congo crisis, Verwoerd’s negative attitude may also have been motivated by the government’s unwillingness at the time to have any formal dealings with this key representative of English-speaking big capital. This, at least, has been suggested by Anglo American’s Executive Director, Michael Spicer, who argued during an interview in 1999: “There was this schizophrenic attitude; Anglo American was still seen as part of the whole Randlords\textsuperscript{57} phenomenon, the enemy. There was overt hostility”.\textsuperscript{58} Even though Spicer’s argument may have some validity, it would have to be probed more deeply, but this is not possible due to the unavailability of additional sources on Pretoria’s relations with Anglo American at the time and later.

In the second phase of the Congo crisis, during Tshombe’s premiership from July 1964 to October 1965, Pretoria became comparatively more engaged. The issue at stake was again military support for Tshombe, this time to keep him in power. In particular, the press reported on the presence of South African mercenaries on the side of Tshombe,\textsuperscript{59} while DFA documents euphemistically refer to them as “white volunteers”.\textsuperscript{60} Among the mercenaries was Hoare, who, as he later recounted in his memoirs, was the leader of the 5 Commando, with an education camp for some 350 to 400 mercenaries based in Kamina, in northern Katanga.\textsuperscript{61} Compared to Pretoria’s earlier position, Verwoerd now openly approved South African mercenary activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the opening of the Cape Nationalist Congress on 26 August 1964, he argued that Pretoria saw no reason for action because: “We will not interfere if a legitimate government goes about this matter legitimately”.\textsuperscript{62} Within days after that statement, possibly after the intervention of Pretoria’s foreign service officials, fearing negative diplomatic implications, Verwoerd issued a press statement on 1 September,

\textsuperscript{56} Letter from Hendrik Verwoerd to Harry Oppenheimer, Pretoria, 13 September 1960 (ARCA, PV.93, File 1/53/2/4).
\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.
\textsuperscript{59} ‘Twelve more recruits go to Congo’, \textit{The Star} 19 October 1964 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4).
\textsuperscript{60} ‘Huursoldate in die Kongo’, from Tassie Taswell (Under-Secretary, Africa Division), Pretoria, 13 October 1964; ‘The Congolese Army and the white volunteers’, from Albie Burger to Gerhardt Jooste, Brussels, 5 April 1965 (DFA, 1/112/5/1, Vol. 3).
in which he tried to dissimulate his earlier pronouncement: “When I said in Port Elizabeth that the Government of the Republic, like other governments, did not intend at the moment to interfere if there were people in South Africa who went to the Congo as volunteers to assist a legal and internationally recognised government, it was of course with the understanding that it would not affect South Africa’s interests”. However, the reasons given for this attitude were not political or legal, but economic in nature. In Verwoerd’s view, the departure of mercenaries from South Africa might “disrupt the labour market”, therefore adding to the “manpower shortage which has to be filled at considerable cost by means of State aided immigration”. Furthermore, it would be “undesirable that students who are being fitted for great tasks in the future should interrupt their study careers in this way”. These pronouncements were somewhat half hearted and it is doubtful how effectively Pretoria tried to halt further South African mercenary action, as the military had again been supportive of such moves. According to the recent work by diplomatic historian Piero Gleijeses, Lawrence Devlin, the Station Chief of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Congo, reported to Washington: “many of the mercenaries arriving at Kamina are actually South African Army regulars placed on leave status for six months”. On 22 August 1964, Gleijeses further states, Pretoria’s military even despatched a C-130, a Hercules-built military cargo plane, “with what is obviously military equipment” to Tshombe. However, and as Gleijeses indicates, Pretoria’s confidence did not go as far as sending military forces, even though it had apparently been asked for them.

The above suggests that Defence Minister Fouche’s and the military’s influence on Verwoerd, compared to the first phase of the Congo crisis, had become somewhat stronger vis-à-vis the foreign service corps. The reasons for this were, first, the military’s strongly increased capacity since 1961, with France as main armaments supplier in spite of the UN’s voluntary arms embargo of 1963; this aspect will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 4. Second, Verwoerd’s above-cited statement of 26 August indicates that he felt more confident as Tshombe was the country’s legitimate leader and, crucially, he was also supported by the US. Referring back to Malan’s Africa Charter of 1949, this latter aspect may have raised earlier hopes of

62 ‘Die Republiek se verhoudings met Afrika in die algemeen en met die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo in die besonder’, 3 September 1964, contains a summary of Verwoerd’s speech. Also ‘Verwoerd reveals: we gave aid to Tshombe’, Rand Daily Mail 27 August 1964 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4).
63 ‘Press statement by the Hon. the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa’, issued by the Department of Information, Pretoria, 1 September 1964 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4).
64 ‘Press statement by the Hon. the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa’, issued by the Department of Information, Pretoria, 1 September 1964 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4).
South Africa achieving an equal footing with other important nations intervening in Africa and this made military involvement more acceptable, even though Washington preferred not to be seen together with Pretoria.\textsuperscript{66} Third, and although the two countries did not share a border, South Africa had an economic interest in the political stability of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In particular, the hope was for its inclusion in a “Greater South Africa”, an idea proposed by Verwoerd and Jan Haak, then Deputy Minister of Planning, Economic Affairs and Mines (1961-64) (Chapter 2), and comprising the plan for a “Southern African Common Market”. With South Africa as the core country, it would have embraced Southern and Northern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe, Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the High Commission Territories Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland (BLS) and the Democratic Republic of Congo as the only independent African nation among them. This would have resulted in a greatly extended Customs Union, initially enacted in 1910 between the Union of South Africa and the BLS countries, and would therefore have enlarged Pretoria’s economic influence in these countries.\textsuperscript{67} Overall, Pretoria thus had three motives to support pro-Western Tshombe.

Yet, the stability brought about by Tshombe was not long-lasting. Due to a deadlock that threatened to paralyse the government, the Chief of Staff, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, and his troops intervened in November 1965 and ruled the country with an iron fist until 1997. He renamed the country Republic of Zaire in 1971 and himself Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972. According to DFA documents of the early 1970s, Mobutu’s “attitude towards the Republic” was considered to be “unfriendly” and he tended towards communist support.\textsuperscript{68} Thus, with Tshombe, Pretoria had lost a potential political partner in a country with great economic potential. As late as August 1974, Rae Killen noted: “Our present day relations with Zaire are limited to our mutual trade which, apart from our immediate neighbours, is the highest for the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{66} Gleijeses. 2001. \textit{Conflicting Missions}, pp.126f.
\item\textsuperscript{68} ‘Attitude of Zaire towards the Republic’, from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 16 January 1973, p.1; ‘President Mobutu’s change of attitude towards the Western world’, ca. March 1973, p.4 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 5) (emphasis in the original).
\end{itemize}
rest of Africa." Mobutu’s hostile stance only changed towards the end of 1974, in the context of the Angolan war, and this will be examined in Chapter 4.

Isolation

Toward the mid-1960s, South Africa thus found itself completely isolated on the African continent and increasingly so within the international community. The DFA’s approach of winning over those black African states that were amenable to contact with Pretoria through the provision of technical assistance did not result in any tangible results, and the military’s Congo excursion also fell short of establishing a Pretoria-friendly government. These developments were an important factor in causing the Afrikaner community to retreat into the laager. Piet Cillié, whose role as the editor of Die Burger, Broederbond membership and close links with the National Party have been mentioned in Chapter 2, described the prevailing sentiments:

We have scarcely had time to digest these radical changes in our destiny; but we certainly are groping our way to a new sense of purpose, and we are trying to define our proper role in the brave new circumstances (...). (...) Thus the events of 1960 and its aftermath threw South Africa into a fiercely patriotic and defensive mood which to a large extent still persists (...). The early sixties, then, were dominated by a defensive, an often aggressively defensive mentality and a sense of isolation, which (...) did generate patriotic energies which have served South Africa extremely well.\textsuperscript{69}

Even though isolation was dominant, this was not the complete picture as far as Pretoria’s position in Africa was concerned. According to the mainstream secondary literature, the Outward-Looking Policy on the African continent only began under Vorster in 1967, with both Lesotho and Malawi as the initial successes. Yet, cognisance is not taken of the fact that several significant developments in this direction had already taken place under Verwoerd, leading Deon Geldenhuys to attribute to him “a commendable degree of flexibility in foreign policy matters”.\textsuperscript{71} In particular, reference is made to Verwoerd’s meeting with Leabua Jonathan, the Prime Minister of soon-to-be independent Lesotho, on 2 September 1966 in Pretoria. Being the first open top-level encounter between the South African executive and a foreign black leader, it was a great diplomatic success for Pretoria. However, the meeting took place in complete secrecy for fear of repercussions among the conservative elements in response to Verwoerd’s breaking of a racial taboo. The meeting specifically took place in Pretoria, as Parliament was debating in Cape Town, and Verwoerd apparently did not even lunch with Jona-
than, but sent a retired top official instead. Four days after this encounter, a messenger, who was later declared to have been mentally unsound, assassinated Verwoerd in Parliament under circumstances that have never been clarified.

Already in April of that year, and as revealed by the research presented in the following chapter, the Malawi Labour Representative in Johannesburg who represented the Malawi mine workers, had approached DFA Deputy Secretary Burger to extend an invitation to three government officials to attend Malawi’s independence celebrations in July. This came to fruition, and Burger led the three man group to Malawi. We therefore argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs, with Muller as Minister since January 1964, was responsible for Verwoerd’s surprising openness and flexibility regarding contact with both Lesotho and Malawi. While not intending to stretch the importance of personalities and make undue connections between historical dates, it is nevertheless significant to note that Verwoerd’s meeting with Jonathan took place roughly two months after the resignation of Secretary Jooste, who was said to be a staunchly committed NP follower in comparison to his successor, Eric Louw. This once again exemplifies the importance of the personality factor in South Africa’s foreign policy making.

This chapter served the purpose of outlining the situation in which Verwoerd found himself during his premiership and to examine the inappropriate responses from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military in coming to terms with African independence. As a result of continuous African anti-apartheid activity, South Africa found itself increasingly isolated in the international arena. The following chapter examines the various Africa approaches the different state actors pursued during John Vorster’s premiership from 1966 to 1978.

---

CHAPTER FOUR

What Foreign Relations with Africa?
Prime Minister Vorster, 1966-78

Outward-Looking Policy

John Vorster inherited Verwoerd’s legacy of a South Africa that was an outcast on the African continent and which was steadily attaining a pariah status within the international community. The government’s attempts during Vorster’s premiership to extricate itself from this isolated position can be succinctly summarised by the term Outward-Looking Policy, originating in a contribution to the magazine News/Check, edited by “a prominent and somewhat controversial Afrikaans journalist” and “forerunner of verligte thought” with “political views that were certainly well ahead of those of any other publication with pro-government sympathies”.1 With the magazine’s primary focus on Africa, an article in the September 1965 issue was entitled “The Choice before South Africa: Look Inwards or Look Outwards”,2 and the term subsequently entered the South African vocabulary.3 While Verwoerd was somewhat taken aback by the sudden developments on the African continent, only reacting towards the end of his premiership, Vorster’s position was different in that his foreign policy was based on a deeper appreciation of the new situation South Africa found itself in. This did not, however, result in a consistent strategy, as we will see.

The basis for Pretoria’s Outward-Looking Policy was its regained mood of confidence in the political, economic and military spheres. First, the ruling NP strengthened its position during elections in both 1965 and 1966. Second, right-wing splinter groups were defeated, despite their criticism of the NP’s policy to grant sectors of the black population a degree of self-autonomy in the form of ‘homelands’, an aspect of apartheid ideology that is examined more closely in the later section on Secret Diplomacy; the chances of a right-wing backlash

---

on Pretoria as a result of establishing open relations with black African states further north, were therefore reduced. Third, in July 1966, the International Court of Justice found that Ethiopia and Liberia did not possess the *locus standi* in the S.W.A./Namibia case to challenge South Africa’s occupation. Although the decision was not in favour of Pretoria, it removed a serious problem that had occupied the foreign affairs ministry’s work for six years. Finally, South Africa was experiencing an economic boom and the country’s defence capacity was steadily strengthened.

The Outward-Looking Policy resulted in the establishment of closer contacts with both Latin America and Australasia, but this thesis agrees with the secondary literature that its principal aim was to bring about a *modus vivendi* with independent African states, whose endeavours had mainly been responsible for South Africa’s isolation. In a speech of August 1967, Minister Muller expressed Pretoria’s willingness to pursue a policy of “friendly co-existence and fruitful co-operation with countries in Africa”:

South Africa is in a unique position to make a real contribution to the development of the continent. We are in a position to help other countries in Africa with their problems in the scientific, technological, economic and numerous other spheres, because down the centuries we have learnt to solve these problems. We are prepared to share our knowledge with the African states, and they are free to consult us and co-operate with us.

This statement is reminiscent of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ failed attempt to win the allegiance of African states by providing assistance to them in the early 1960s, through organisations such as the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa, the Scientific Council for Africa and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (Chapter 3). The foreign service officers continued to believe that technical assistance was key in breaking South Africa’s isolation. However, as indicated in Chapter 2, Vorster’s foreign policy making towards Africa became dominated by interdepartmental rivalry between the DFA, the military, national intelligence

---


and the Department of Information over the route to be followed. The main theme in Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa was a struggle over how these should be conducted. While being interrelated and often running parallel, the conflicting strategies towards different countries can be broadly categorised into the four phases Outward Movement, Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente. This periodisation is based on the insights gained from research in the primary sources located in the Department of Foreign Affairs archive and thereby enhances the proposals in the secondary literature. Roughly speaking, the Outward Movement describes the DFA’s activities aimed at establishing contact with black African states immediately beyond southern Africa after 1967. Dialogue was initiated by the military, beginning in late 1966, and refers to interaction with countries further afield, namely in Francophone Africa. Secret Diplomacy, practised by the Department of Information and the intelligence agency, BOSS, began after 1972 and peaked in Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974. Détente, finally, describes the strategies of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, as well as BOSS, during the mid-1970s in seeking a lasting and peaceful solution to both the S.W.A./Namibia and Rhodesian issues. These phases are now analysed in turn.

**Outward Movement**

In pursuing his Africa policy, Vorster initially followed in Verwoerd’s footsteps by meeting with Lesotho’s Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, on 10 January 1967. It is probable that this meeting took place on the advice of Foreign Minister Muller, since we argued in Chapter 3 that he held a relatively influential position vis-à-vis the Prime Minister at that point in time. Given Lesotho’s geographical position as a mountainous and landlocked country, with an almost complete dependence on its all-surrounding neighbour, it was easy for Vorster to find Jonathan willing to interact with Pretoria despite its apartheid policies. It is thus not surprising that the final communiqué after their meeting emphasised the importance of Pretoria’s economic assistance, one of its key levers at the time, to Lesotho.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, equally, utilised South Africa’s economic strength and the country’s advanced technical standards in impressing the black African countries further north. This was applied through the provision of technical assistance and the expertise and

---

finance for development/investment projects, in the context of which parastatal and private companies played a central role. This must be seen in the wider context of the developed Western nations providing development assistance to the underdeveloped parts of this world during the Cold War, "motivated by the need to maintain a presence in the Third World and to facilitate the fight against the spread of communism, which the West feared might get new impetus from the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union". The report by Deputy Secretary Killen, justifying technical assistance to the Comoros in the mid-1970s, examined in the later section on Secret Diplomacy, provides a nice illustration of the current thinking: "The Comores [sic] are desperately poor and undeveloped, and any well-directed technical assistance which would assist in raising the standard of living and create employment prospects would serve our interests in helping to keep out alien philosophies and hostile influences".

South African technical assistance to African countries had its roots in the 1950s, when South Africa was still a member of the BIS, CCTA, CSA and FAMA. After Pretoria’s exclusion from these bodies, it offered the same kind of assistance on a government-to-government basis, with the DFA co-ordinating the activities. Given the diversity of projects, these were undertaken in co-operation with other governmental agencies, foremost with the Department of Agricultural Technical Services (ATS). The Department of Foreign Affairs also co-operated with the private and parastatal companies, presented in Chapter 2, in the establishment of development/investment projects. It usually supported those projects or provided technical assistance in areas that were meaningful to the leaders of target states as the key figures in shaping foreign policy. By appealing to them in this way, the foreign service officials hoped to significantly alter their foreign policy to South Africa’s advantage. This motivation remained throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, as evidenced in a report of December 1979 from Deputy Secretary Carl von Hirschberg, indicating where the priorities lay regarding the provision of technical assistance to the Comoros: "projects which are closest to the heart of the President and therefore likely to appeal to him. This is politically important".


13 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.


The economic component and the related ambitions were crucial in the DFA’s activities in both Malawi and Madagascar, the key countries in its Outward Movement, as we shall presently see.

**Malawi**

It seems likely that the Department of Foreign Affairs primarily targeted Malawi, a British colony until July 1964, due to its propinquity as an independent black African country situated close to South Africa’s borders. Furthermore, President Hastings Kamuzu Banda ruled Malawi with a strong hand, and his conservative and western-oriented politico-ideological style made him a promising partner for Pretoria. In addition, and although outside of Pretoria’s immediate sphere of influence, Malawi was strongly dependent on South Africa in terms of trade, investment and employment for migrant mine workers. The latter was pivotal for the promotion of close contact between the two countries after 1966. In April 1966, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Malawi Labour Representative in Johannesburg invited Under-Secretary Albie Burger and two other South African government officials to attend Malawi’s July independence celebrations. This should only be “in their private capacity”, however, still reflecting some caution on Banda’s part as his endeavour entailed the risk of a backlash from other African leaders. In accepting the offer, Burger was accompanied by a member of the Board of Trade and Industries, a Mr Kruger, and the Chief of the SADF, Werndly Renaut van der Riet. The reasons for the presence of the latter are uncertain, but it substantiates suggestions in the secondary literature that Pretoria gave Banda military support in return for a friendly position towards South Africa. This initial contact appears to have been fruitful to both sides, as Burger subsequently, from 4 to 10 December 1966, led a trade mission to Malawi. In the decade that followed, more than a dozen official delegations, mainly composed of representatives from the departments involved in trade, finance, commerce, industry and development, paid reciprocal visits, of which only the most significant

---


20 DFA, 1/158/3, 2PL.
are mentioned now.\textsuperscript{21} From 12 to 19 March 1967, the Malawi Ministers of Natural Resources, Development and Planning, as well as Trade and Industry, visited South Africa to sign a trade agreement that sparked off increased economic interaction (Appendixes B and C). It was only at this stage that the close contact with Malawi became public knowledge,\textsuperscript{22} revealing the DFA's caution in only admitting such interaction once the practical and beneficial results to South Africa could be presented to the conservative Afrikaner whites critical of Pretoria's outreach into Africa.

After the signing of the trade agreement, Banda wrote to Pretoria that he was confident that "there will now be increased opportunities for co-operation in various spheres".\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, in order to facilitate communication between Malawi and South Africa, missions were opened in the country's capitals in September 1967 and diplomatic relations on an ambassadorial level were established. Further substantiating indications of military support for Banda, a Military Attaché was also accredited at the South African Mission in Malawi.\textsuperscript{24} Yet, again reflecting Pretoria's fear of a white backlash, Malawi's first ambassador was of white skin colour. Subsequently, from 27 to 29 August 1968, Minister Muller met Banda in Malawi and discussed the possibility of a follow-up visit by Vorster. This proposal materialised in May 1970, with Vorster being accompanied by Muller. At this stage, Vorster was confident enough to undertake such a step despite a possible rejection from conservative white voters. He was probably reassured by the inroads Pretoria had simultaneously made into more distant and more important black African countries, as will be shown in the following section on Dialogue. As the first visit of a South African executive to this independent black African state, Malawi, it was hailed as an "historic breakthrough" for the Outward Movement.\textsuperscript{25} However, the credit for this cannot entirely be attributed to the Department of Foreign Affairs alone. In particular, but for reasons that could not be clearly established, Piet Rautenbach, Vorster's Planning Adviser, was an important figure in maintaining contact between the two countries during 1969 and probably was responsible for arranging Vorster's eventual visit.\textsuperscript{26} A possible

\textsuperscript{21} 'Malawi', pp.4-11, 14 (DFA, 1/158/3, AJ 1979).
\textsuperscript{22} 'Malawians in white hotels', \textit{Rand Daily Mail} 8 March 1967 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 2).
\textsuperscript{23} Letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Charles Roberts Swart (South African State President), Zomba, 29 April 1967 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 8).
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Foreign Affairs List}. Pretoria: DFA.
\textsuperscript{26} Letter from Piet Rautenbach to Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Pretoria, May 1969 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 5); letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Piet Rautenbach, Blantyre, 3 June 1969 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 8; ARCA, PV.132, File 2/6/1/19).
explanation was Rautenbach's experience as a Manager in the Industrial Development Corporation, as indicated in Chapter 2. His parallel involvement in promoting Pretoria's contact with Madagascar, detailed later in this section, is an indication of Muller's increasingly weak position in Vorster's foreign policy making towards Africa. Vorster's meeting with Banda in Malawi in May 1970 was reciprocated in August 1971, when Banda visited South Africa at the invitation of its State President and former Minister of Defence, Jim Fouche. Even though the State President was only a representative figure at the time, the first visit by the head of state of an independent black African country was significant. As a direct result, both countries upgraded their missions to embassies, which continued through to 1994, while Fouche and Muller returned Banda's visit in March 1972. The close ties between the two countries were strengthened by the involvement of South African companies in two major development/investment projects, namely the construction of the new capital, Lilongwe, and the railway link from Malawi to the Mozambican seaport of Nacala. They are now discussed in some detail, providing answers to the question raised in Chapter 1, namely how politics and business interacted in Africa.

At the time of independence, the southern town of Zomba served as Malawi’s capital. President Banda argued that, to attract capital investment that had so far been focused on the southern town of Blantyre, it should be situated in the country's centre. It has been convincingly suggested, however, that his personal interest in bringing the centre of political power closer to his home terrain was decisive. Banda originally approached the British government to finance the building of the new capital at Lilongwe, two hundred kilometres north of Zomba. However, in early 1966, London concluded that this was a waste of money, and therefore refused to participate. Banda did not abandon his plans and asked South Africa for support, one of many examples of an African leader utilising Pretoria's willingness to provide assistance for political gain, to the benefit of the country concerned and often to the advantage of the leader himself. South African private firms, together with Pretoria's financial support, subsequently participated in what became known as the Lilongwe Capital Project, and despite critical voices from Under-Secretary Burger. In mid-1967, he wrote to Banda that the World Bank would not continue to provide financial aid to Malawi if he pursued the plan and wasted money on transferring the capital. Disturbed by this, Banda directly complained to Minister Muller:

I have just recently received confirmation from the World Bank that they are prepared to assist us by way of loans (...) with no mention of such loans being conditional upon my abandoning my plans for Lilongwe. As you will know from what I have already told Mr. Burger, I am firmly convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that the move of our Capital to Lilongwe is not only in the best interests of Malawi but an essential pre-requisite to the full development of my country, and it is my earnest hope that one of the fruits of the friendship which is being established between our countries may be that I may count upon your Government to assist me to the best of their ability in the task of finding the necessary finance for this project.\footnote{29}

A later DFA report states that the building of the new capital was a “prestige project for Malawi”, while emphasising the importance of the project for Banda.\footnote{31} In the end, political logic and the ambition of winning a friend in black Africa prevailed over doubts that the project would lead to the economic development of Malawi’s centre.

On 6 October 1966, the Malawi Development Corporation signed an agreement with the Johannesburg-based company Imex, which became responsible for both the planning and design of the new capital.\footnote{32} The costs involved could not be established, but referring to the development cost of a complete city as a whole, an Imex spokesperson explained to the \textit{Rand Daily Mail}: “you can work it out that it will run into millions”.\footnote{33} Imex had only been established one month prior to the signing of the above agreement, with Anglo American, the IDC and Union Acceptances Limited (UAL), Anglo American’s private merchant bank, formed in 1955,\footnote{34} as main shareholders. Klaus Oppenheimer, related to the Oppenheimer family who owned Anglo American and former General Manager of Credit Guarantee, was Imex’s Managing Director.\footnote{35} In spite of Klaus Oppenheimer’s claim, in correspondence with us, of having kept his distance from the Oppenheimer family of Anglo American,\footnote{36} this points to the contrary and indicates a family strategy to further diversify their economic activities. The above arrangements suggest that the IDC provided the Malawi government with the necessary loan, insured by Credit Guarantee, to employ Imex as the planning firm. There is little doubt that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[29] Banda’s speech before Malawi’s House of Representatives, 29 January 1968 (ARCA, PV.377, File 1/A1, Vol. 1).
\item[33] ‘Big Malawi job for S.A.: Jo’burg firm will build new capital’, \textit{Rand Daily Mail} 7 October 1966 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 2).
\item[36] Correspondence with Klaus Oppenheimer, 26 March 2002.
\end{footnotes}
Klaus Oppenheimer’s influential position in both Credit Guarantee and Imex was crucial in obtaining financing through the IDC. In order to get the project off the ground, he also engaged the Department of Foreign Affairs, including Minister Muller, and the Department of Commerce and Industries. The cordiality displayed by Oppenheimer in a letter to Albie Burger indicates a keen interest on his part to obtain Pretoria’s financial support in the form of an IDC loan, economically lucrative for the newly founded Imex and financially risk free due to Credit Guarantee’s cover:

“I am sorry that the very tight programme has delayed my thanks to you for the time placed at our disposal in Cape Town last week when you and Mr. Steyn [Under-Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries] were good enough to discuss the Malawi situation with me. (...) If I may suggest this, and if it meets with your own arrangements and convenience it will probably be useful if I meet with you and Mr. Steyn again before the intended meeting between the Hon. The Minister [Muller] and my Chairman.”

After the completion of the planning process, the construction work began, with Pretoria and South African firms again playing important roles. Rumours to that effect began to circulate in the South African press during December 1967, prior to the announcement, on 4 May 1968, that the South African government granted a loan of 8 million Rand at the interest rate of 4%. Deducing from the financing arrangements in the development/investment project analysed next, it is likely that the IDC again provided the finances, insured by Credit Guarantee. Regarding the participation of South African firms, the only indication is a note stating that the loan was “expressly tied to the condition that maximum use was made of South African contractors and of South African materials when materials need to be imported”. However, we could only ascertain the identity of one company, the Johannesburg-based firm Dominion Earth Works that won the contract worth 1.4 million Rand for the construction of some fifty kilometres of the road from Zomba to Lilongwe. Malawi’s new capital was eventually inaugurated in 1975.

The second development/investment project in Malawi in which South Africa was involved, the railway line to Nacala, provided the landlocked country with rail access to the sea for both import and export, and this was essential for Malawi’s economic development. In
Banda’s search for an alternative to the Mozambican seaport of Beira, through which trading was relatively costly and slow, Nacala seemed ideal.\textsuperscript{43} The aim was to link this Mozambican harbour with Liwonde near Blantyre, Malawi’s economic centre. Of the entire seven hundred kilometres distance to be covered by a railway line, approximately one hundred covered the Malawi section to the Mozambican border. Banda had already secured some financing from the Japanese government for the project, but for the rest, he expressed the hope to Minister Muller in September 1967 “that it may be possible to find this from South Africa; anything therefore that you can do to assist us in this too I should naturally very greatly appreciate”.\textsuperscript{44} This was another instance where Banda counted on Pretoria’s ability and preparedness to help with the purpose of making political inroads into black Africa. Banda’s calculations proved correct, and a few months later he was provided with the necessary financing. On 7 May 1968, only three days after the announcement of the Lilongwe Capital Project loan, the IDC granted the Malawi authorities a credit of 11 million Rand. The construction of the railway line, the provision of rolling stock, locomotives and the necessary ancillaries was awarded to the Malawi Railway Construction Company, created by South Africa’s engineering firm Roberts Construction and the British firm Dorman Long\textsuperscript{45}. The IDC acted as the financier and Credit Guarantee as the insurer with the provision that 60% of the material, and not 70% as stipulated in its business guidelines, had to be bought from South Africa.\textsuperscript{46} The successful completion of this railway project is a good example of how the South African government and the country’s business sector co-operated to the benefit of each other. While it helped Pretoria to fulfil its political ambitions in Malawi, it allowed Roberts Construction to land a profitable and risk free order. It also gave the firm privileged access to the Malawi government; a photograph taken during a Malawi export workshop in mid-1972 shows Managing Director Bramwell sitting next to Malawi’s first black ambassador to Pretoria from August 1971, Joe Kachingwe.\textsuperscript{47}

South Africa’s economic links with Malawi encouraged the country’s trade promotion organisations to become active, which reinforced Pretoria’s political ambitions. From 30 September to 5 October 1968, the Durban Chamber of Commerce undertook a Business and

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{43} ‘S.A. Trade Pact – Malawi has no regrets’, \textit{The Star} 31 May 1967 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/A2/3/2).
\item \textsuperscript{44} Letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Hilgard Muller, 4 September 1967, p.3 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 2PL).
\item \textsuperscript{45} <http://www.dormanlong.com>.
\item \textsuperscript{47} ‘Malawi Workshop’, \textit{SAFTO Exporter} 9, 9, September 1972: 1, 4.
\end{enumerate}
Goodwill Mission to Malawi, while Hoogendyk and Stockenström led a trade delegation from the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut there from 12 to 15 August 1969. The former mission, the first such venture by South African organised business to an independent black African state, was undertaken as a direct result of the signing of the trade agreement between the two countries in March 1967. The mission’s final report concludes: “South African exporters should not underestimate the value of the Malawi market. Although relatively small at the moment, it has significant potential for the future and is as well a bridge over which South Africa can reach adjacent markets”. This reflected the initial enthusiasm of South African business in tapping the unexplored African markets. For example, a businessman who went to Malawi in the early 1970s expressed that he was “very excited” about the opportunities in that “unknown country, far, far away”. Yet, after its second mission to Malawi in November 1973, the Chamber concluded more realistically that trade between the two countries still had not taken off the ground. Although further stating that “Malawi certainly holds promise for the future and that South African exporters should seriously consider this market”, this hope was once more in vain, as indicated in the final report on the Chamber’s third mission to Malawi in April/May 1979: “it would seem prudent to point out that Malawi is not a captive market”. The Chamber’s decision to send three missions to Malawi, despite that country’s low rating, was more than likely linked to Kenneth William Hobson, the Chamber’s General Manager from 1965 to 1984. He had good connections with and knowledge of Malawi, as he had been a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance in the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland prior to becoming General Manager of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of that Federation. The relevance of the personality factor in this instance can be underlined by comparing it with SAFTO’s approach. The South African Foreign Trade Organisation also displayed a special interest in Malawi, but not enjoying any special access to that country, it did not undertake any particular activities until 1972.

Ideologically close to the government, the AHI saw its Africa excursions as economic supplement to Pretoria’s political Outward Movement. Political scientist James Barber described this interplay fairly appropriately: “You get a like-minded group – that’s an Afrikaner élite – that share many values, that the project into Africa is seen as for the good of everybody and to the defence of the country, for the trade of the country, for the diplomatic breakthroughs of the country. So, it’s a combined effort”. This finds explicit expression in the AHI press statement issued on the occasion of the trade mission’s departure to Malawi:

Above all, the A.H.I. is fully aware of the fact that the Republic of South Africa is part and parcel of the [African] continent. We believe that we must develop means so that the people on this continent, and particularly on the sub-continent, can assist each other and help develop one another. For that reason, we are prepared to share our business acumen, technological knowledge and ingenuity with less developed areas.

Yet, despite its close links with the government, this remained the AHI’s only activity in Africa beyond southern Africa, because it did not rate Malawi as an overtly interesting market and because preference was given to the development of Afrikaner business at home, as mirrored in the mission’s final report on the Malawi visit: “There is no doubt that the country has possibilities for sound and profitable capital investment, and also opportunities for profitable development. It should be pointed out, however, that investment possibilities in the Republic of South Africa are probably greater and more promising”.

Access to the DFA’s Malawi files was restricted to the end of 1979, but the department’s support for the above-described two development/investment projects had won Pretoria a reliable partner in Africa. There is therefore no indication that the bilateral relations between the two countries suffered any serious setback in the remaining period under review. However, Malawi’s importance in South Africa’s foreign relations with black African countries beyond southern Africa declined due to the shift in Pretoria’s focus on the countries further north during the Dialogue period, examined in the next section.

**Madagascar**

Turning to Madagascar, the second country of importance in the Outward Movement, it was presided over by Philibert Tsiranana since its independence from France in June 1960. In comparison to Pretoria’s relationship with Malawi, the reasons for the establishment of contact with this country are less evident. In particular, there is no indication that France played a role in bringing these two countries together, as was crucially the case in Pretoria’s Dialogue

---

57 Interview with James Barber, 16 February 1999.
58 ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/3/D(1) (translation from Afrikaans).
contacts, examined in the next section, and the factor of economic dependence was not as important as in the case of Malawi, because Tsiranana maintained close political and economic relations with the former colonial power. As a result, Pretoria does not, initially, seem to have considered Madagascar a worthwhile partner and, in consequence, it was Tsiranana who made the first step. In October 1965, possibly being aware of South Africa’s considerable expertise in the mining sector, he invited a mission to conduct a general survey of his country’s sizeable and hitherto non-exploited deposits of chrome, graphite, bauxite and gold, and to make suggestions for their exploitation. Seeing this as a possibility to make relatively easy inroads into another independent African country, the Department of Foreign Affairs approved. The mission it subsequently deployed comprised representatives of the IDC, the state-financed Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor), the Afrikaner investment and mining company General Mining and Finance Corporation, as well as the Chamber of Mines. While no follow-up initiatives to the above mission are evident from the available DFA files, economic interaction between the two countries entered a new phase when Albie Burger led a mission, mainly consisting of representatives from the Departments of Tourism, Commerce and Industries, to Madagascar from 19 to 26 July 1967. Presumably as a result of this visit, and an indication of Pretoria’s attempt for closer co-operation in the tourism sector to their mutual benefit, the number of flights between the two countries was increased from one to two per week.

Peripheral to these official contacts, private companies also showed an interest in Madagascar. In March 1968, a five-man Anglo American delegation was dispatched in an exploratory mission, facilitated by its Paris representative, Serge Combard, and thereby strongly resembling the way in which Pretoria sustained its Dialogue with Francophone Africa. After the mission’s return, P. Commeny, Technical Adviser to President Tsiranana, and Combard called on Albie Burger “to inform the South African Government about the investment plans of Anglo-American in Madagascar, and to enquire whether, in principle, the South African Government approved”, as the Under-Secretary reported. His report further reveals that Anglo American’s interests embraced nickel, bauxite and uranium mining. Soon thereafter, in late

---

62 DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 2PL.
63 DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 1A.
64 DFA, 1/115/3, Vols. 1, 5; DFA 1/115/4, Vol. 3.
April 1968, one Mr. Robb from Anglo American contacted Burger in connection with a telegram that he had received from Combard, informing him about the visit of a Malagasy ministerial delegation to South Africa in May. According to Burger’s report to Brand Fourie, Robb had asked for confirmation of this visit as Anglo American “would very much like to extend some hospitality” due to their “own interest in the development of the Malagasy Republic”. Indeed, the Malagasy Minister of Finance and Commerce, his Special Adviser and the Director for Trade came to South Africa from 27 April to 2 May 1968 to discuss matters of technical assistance and economic co-operation. Whether Burger responded to Robb’s request is not reported, but the features of that account show that Anglo American performed like a foreign policy actor. Whether, and to what extent, Anglo American became involved in Madagascar’s mining sector is not recorded in the files. The secondary literature suggests that the company mined the nickel deposits in the mid-1970s, but Anglo American Executive Director, Spicer, argued in 1999 that nothing came off the ground because of the government’s “nationalistic policies”, referring to the Marxist orientation of Tsiranana’s successor after 1972.

Still on the economic supplement to the official Malagasy-South African contacts, Afrikaner business also displayed some activity. From 7 to 19 November 1968, four businessman from the Afrikaner insurance, investment and mining companies Sanlam, Federale Volksbeleggings and again the General Mining and Finance Corporation visited the island. They briefed officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Commerce before and after the mission, an indication of the interest in closer contact with Pretoria. Their report, made available to the DFA, suggested that the “political climate (...) is most favourable to South Africa, but could receive a severe setback if no action follows our visit”. Quite likely due to this closer liaison, Vorster took this up by sending Planning Adviser Rautenbach and another Department of Planning official on an extended visit to Madagascar from 27 February to 12 March 1969. They considered the development of Nosy Be island in the northern tip of Madagascar to be “a good investment”, as it was “comparable to Tahiti”, and that by “concentrating on that island, tourism, commerce and other activities will combine to give a maximum return”. In conclusion, they recommended the deployment of an official South African

---

68 DFA, 1/115/3, Vols. 2, 3.
70 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.
71 O’Meara. 1983. Volkskapitalisme.
mission to Madagascar for further investigation of the project. Led by Deputy Secretary Robert Montgomery, that mission took place from 18 to 25 November 1969, concluding that a hotel project would be viable.75

Probably as a result of the Anglo American mission to Madagascar in March 1968, which had investigated various “investment plans”, the hotel chain Southern Sun became involved in the hotel project. Despite Anglo American’s focus on mining, tourism was “also involved”, as Burger reported after the above meeting with Serge Combard and Tsiranana’s Technical Adviser.76 The multinational’s interest in this sector must have been motivated by its participation in South African Breweries, the major shareholder in Southern Sun, even though Anglo American Executive Director, Spicer, unconvincingly argued that this had always been “a minority indirect position” and that “it simply wouldn’t register on our radar screen” how South African Breweries “handles its business”.77 Yet, within only six months after Anglo American’s mission to Madagascar, South African Breweries engaged itself in the project and the South African press subsequently reported on the envisaged construction of a five-star hotel with costs of 2 million Rand.78 In December 1969, South African Breweries presented its “preliminary thinking” to the Department of Foreign Affairs, proving another example of co-operation that served both Pretoria’s political ambitions and the company’s profit-seeking interests. With its proposal, South African Breweries asked for Pretoria “to provide 70% of the capital costs of the hotel at an interest rate of 7% per annum”, while Anglo American itself was going to “provide the remaining 30% (...) in the form of equity capital”. Repayment would start after ten years and take place over a period of fifteen years, while Pretoria was again “asked to guarantee the entire hotel project against nationalisation by the Malagasy Government”.79 Further developments reveal that the Department of Foreign Affairs adopted that proposal, thus providing South African access to another black African country for a relatively small investment, in comparison to the 19 million loan made to Malawi.

During the discussions with a Malagasy delegation that visited the Republic in late June 1970, Pretoria proposed granting a “low-interest loan” of 2 million Rand to the Malagasy government “for the development of the Nossi Bé infrastructure”, “dependent upon the satisfactory conclusion of detailed negotiations to be entered into by S.A. Breweries/Southern Sun Hotel Corporation group (...) with the Malagasy Government”. The proposal further reveals

76 Letter from Albie Burger, Pretoria, 8 April 1968 (DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 3).
77 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.
that Pretoria was prepared to offer South African Breweries a loan at even softer conditions
than originally requested by them. The estimated cost of 2.2 million Rand was to be shared, as
suggested by South African Breweries, with the IDC providing and Credit Guarantee insuring
a 1.5 million Rand loan to the Malagasy government at an interest rate of only 6% and for
repayment in six-monthly instalments over ten years after the date of completion of the pro-
ject. From 15 to 25 August 1970, further discussions on the proposal took place between a
visiting Malagasy delegation, Brand Fourie, two DFA officials from the Africa Division, Piet
Rautenbach, the Deputy Secretary in the Department of Finance, an IDC representative and
Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee. The composition of that delegation suggests, first, that
the Department of Foreign Affairs did not accept Rautenbach’s role as the sole mediator be-
tween the two countries, and the evidence presented here indicates, once again, the impor-
tance of the economic component within the Outward Movement.

The hotel deal was finalised in the following months and signed by Minister Muller in
Antananarivo during a visit to the island from 19 to 21 November 1970. On this occasion, he
was accompanied by Brand Fourie, Counsellor Jeremy Shearar, Rautenbach, his Private Sec-
retary, two high-ranking representatives from the IDC, the Chairman and Managing Director
of South African Breweries, as well as Southern Sun Directors Sol Kerzner and John Howell
Ward. The agreement detailed the government-to-government loan of 2.32 million Rand at
the interest rate of 4% to be repaid in six-monthly instalments only twelve years after com-
pletion of the project and over a period of ten years. This loan, for which Credit Guarantee pro-
vided insurance, was to be used for the improvement and upgrading of the infrastructure at
Nosy Be, particularly water and electricity supplies, a tarred road to the hotel and the exten-
sion of the airfield to provide landing facilities for large aircraft the size of a Boeing 737. In
a separate agreement, the IDC granted the Malagasy government a credit of 1.5 million Rand
to be used for the construction of the hotel. The facilities were an interest rate of 6%, credit
repayment in six-monthly instalments after February 1983 and over a period of ten years, with

81 DFA, 1/115/4/1, Vol. 1.
82 They were Frans Johannes Cornelius Cronje and Richard John ‘Dick’ Goss. See Who’s Who of Southern
84 'Loan Agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
Government of the Malagasy Republic’, signed by Hilgard Muller and Jacques-Félicien Rabemanjara (Malag-
asy Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Social Affairs), Antananarivo, 20 November 1970, Articles II and
Credit Guarantee insuring the deal. Pretoria subsequently announced this in a press statement. Compared with Credit Guarantee’s and the IDC’s normal business practices, the terms and conditions of the two agreements were particularly soft for the credit taker. This again illustrates that the economy served the interests of Pretoria’s political ambitions, and not the opposite way, even though, of course, the involved companies benefited from such deals in financial terms.

South Africa’s initiative in upgrading the island’s tourist infrastructure also received impetus from Malawi’s President Banda. In him, Pretoria had evidently found a reliable and supportive partner who even tried to convince his fellow African statesmen to seek contact with South Africa. During Tsiranana’s visit to Malawi in early April 1969, Banda proposed the idea to him, and they both subsequently agreed that tourism should be developed in southern Africa, including South Africa. Yet, Banda was not entirely successful, as Madagascar did not join the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC), established in May 1971 by Malawi, South Africa and Swaziland. However, and in the context of the Banda-Tsiranana meeting, Pierre-Jerome Ullmann organized a tourism seminar that took place in Antananarivo in June 1969. Of subsequent importance, he was the director of both the management and industrial consulting firms Bedeaux Africa in Johannesburg and Inter-Afrique Services in Madagascar. The nature of his businesses could not be ascertained, but Ullman’s presence in both countries seems to have been the reason for him to become, by the late 1960s, the DFA’s middleman with Antananarivo. In particular, he was instrumental in interesting South Africa in the construction of a dry dock in northern Madagascar, as detailed in the following paragraphs.

The sea route around the Cape and through the Mozambique Channel was of strategic significance for freight shipping after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 that resulted in increased oil tankers traffic from the Persian Gulf to both Europe and North America, as will be discussed later in this chapter. As shipyards and dry docks with the depth to accommodate

---

85 Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Malagasy Republic and la Société Anonyme Malgache des Hotels “Southern Sun” and Southern Sun Hotel Corporation (Proprietary) Limited and the Export Finance Company of South Africa (Proprietary) Limited, pp.3f. (DFA, 1/115/4/1, AJ 1970);
87 Banda’s speech on 9 April 1969 is contained in DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 4.
these tankers were non-existent along most of the route at that time, Narinda Bay, situated in the upper region of Madagascar’s west coast, was considered as a possibility to counter this lack. In 1969, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) granted credit of half a million Rand to the Malagasy government for the financing of a viability study. A French firm presented a preliminary study in 1970, concluding in April 1972 that the project was economically sound. Pretoria was informed of this project during Muller’s visit to Madagascar in November 1970, while Ullmann further updated Muller and Fourie of developments in March 1971.

In line with the approach of providing technical assistance and assisting in development/investment projects to win over African friends, the foreign affairs ministry saw this as a unique opportunity to significantly expand and strengthen the bilateral contacts. However, Pretoria was faced with a dilemma; it had to decide between improving and extending the facilities in Cape Town or Richards Bay, north of Durban, to permit the docking of oil tankers and thereby contribute to the country’s economy, and supporting the Narinda Bay project for political reasons. The financial and opportunity-cost implications of the Narinda Bay project complicated South Africa’s participation. First, the original cost estimated 30 million Rand rose to circa 50 million by June 1972. Second, the Industrial Development Corporation would normally have provided the loan, but by the nature of its status as a parastatal, was “bound to continue investigating the Cape Town project and the Minister [of Foreign Affairs] did not know how the Government would react when this scheme was finally put up to them for consideration”, as a DFA report stated. While the political considerations spoke in favour of the Narinda Bay project, the financial aspects pointed towards the upgrading of either Cape Town or Richards Bay.

After Ullmann’s meeting with Muller and Fourie in March 1971, the Department of Foreign Affairs pursued the Narinda Bay project more stringently to bolster the Outward Movement. From June to August 1971, a number of delegations paid reciprocal visits to discuss the

---

91 DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 2.
92 ‘Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services’, Cape Town, 3 March 1971 (DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 1).
94 ‘Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services’, Cape Town, 3 March 1971, p.6 (DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 1).
95 DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 2.
96 ‘Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services’, Cape Town, 3 March 1971, p.8 (DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 1).
details of South Africa’s participation. Most importantly, on 23 June 1971, Pierre-Jerome Ullmann met Deputy Secretary John Montgomery, Under-Secretary Norman Best and Counsellor Jeremy Shearar to report on the results of his contacts with South Africa’s business sector since the March meeting. According to him, an IDC representative had expressed a clear preference for the upgrading of Cape Town harbour. Ullmann’s discussions with Basil Hersov, Managing Director of Anglovaal and a South Africa Foundation Trustee, were similarly not conducive to obtaining South African assistance. While the IDC’s stance as a parastatal is understandable, Hersov’s attitude is surprising in the light of his position at the Foundation that had more than a little interest in improving South Africa’s image abroad. However, the benefit to his firm Anglovaal possibly becoming involved in improving and extending South African harbours appears to have outweighed the political incentives, thus not being compatible with the DFA’s view. Despite these sobering responses, but being aware of the DFA’s stance and possibly pursuing his own business interests in the project, Ullmann tried to impress the foreign service officials by once again stressing “the political importance which the Malagasy Government attaches to the Narinda project” and that its abandonment “could seriously affect the climate of relations between the two countries”. In view of later developments and the fact that the DFA files contain no record of further activity on the Narinda Bay project, we argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs’ standpoint could not compete with South Africa’s own economic interests.

The DFA’s policy of promoting development/investment projects in Madagascar for political gain was halted in June 1972, when Tsiranana was ousted in a coup d’état led by Colonel Didier Ratsiraka, a Marxist. In view of his political stance, Ratsiraka’s position vis-à-vis Pretoria was completely different to that of his predecessor. In an interview granted to a local newspaper on 24 June, he answered the question of whether the new government would abandon its official contacts with South Africa as follows: “Yes, because this policy has not given the expected results. We are therefore going to make a radical change”. His coming to power negatively affected the progress of South Africa’s development/investment projects in Madagascar. Even though the hotel project in Nosy Bé had seen satisfactory development, Ratsiraka stated in the above interview that “the Malagasy government will take control of the realisation of the hotel at Nossi-Bé”. South Africa’s press instantly reported this and cited

100 Interview to Matin (Antananarivo) 24 June 1972 (DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 2).
Southern Sun Chairman Sol Kerzner who described Ratsiraka’s decision to cancel the agreement as “a great blow”. However, the South Africans did not lose all investment, as delegations from both countries discussed the matter in Paris in December 1972 and the Malagasy government was prepared to honour the agreements. The People’s Republic of China, symbolic of the island’s new political orientation, granted Ratsiraka the necessary finances to repay the loans. The South African hotel project finally ended in March 1973, when the Malagasy government fully repaid both loans. In contrast to that, Ratsiraka did not express any intention of forcing the South Africans to withdraw from the Narinda Bay project, as this was probably more important for the country’s economic development. In the above interview, for example, he argued that “Madagascar is not strong enough to prevent South Africa from doing this [pursue the Cape Town option]. If the country restarts its own project, things will be very clear: its decision to take an interest in Narinda will then have been tainted with a taste of imperialism”. In pursuit of its own economic interests, Pretoria did indeed disengage from the project, and the IDC financed the construction of a 20 million Rand dry dock in Saldanha Bay, north of Cape Town. In response to this, during his speech at the UN General Assembly in 1972, Ratsiraka accused South Africa of having withdrawn to punish his government for its political stance “by using measures of extortion such as sabotage or the abandonment of certain economic projects that might have been great sources of income for our country”. The Narinda Bay project received a final blow in September 1972, when the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) decided to construct a dry dock in Dakar, Senegal.

**Lusaka Manifesto**

In assessing the progress of the Outward Movement since 1966, the DFA’s initiatives in Africa only produced one tangible result, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi and Banda’s and Vorster’s reciprocal visits. Yet, given Malawi’s economic dependence from South Africa and its relative insignificance in continental matters, it was only a relative success. Nonetheless, it had some impact on Africa’s unified anti-apartheid position. In parti-

---

102 DFA, 1/115/4/1, Vol. 4.
107 Letter from Roger Chaufournier (Director, West Africa, IBRD) to Abdou Diouf (Prime Minister, Senegal), 28 September 1972 (DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 3).
lar, Malawi, together with South Africa and Portugal, the latter being befriended by Pretoria because of co-operation over Lisbon’s colonies Angola and Mozambique, abstained when the UN General Assembly voted on the so-called Lusaka Manifesto in November 1969,\(^{108}\) which became the guiding document for Africa’s position vis-à-vis South Africa for the next twenty years. This document had previously been adopted by thirteen black African states\(^{109}\) at the Fifth Summit of Eastern and Central African States in the Zambian capital on 16 April 1969, and by the OAU in September of that year. As the first major assessment of African policy towards South Africa, the Lusaka Manifesto opened the door for some contact with Pretoria, giving room to those countries that later did establish such an exchange, and it therefore is of great significance to this study. The strategy document registered something of a retreat from the OAU’s uncompromising stand towards South Africa, emphasising a preference for conciliation and non-violent change, yet calling for the boycott and isolation of South Africa if it showed no signs of abandoning apartheid. Paragraph 12 stated: “On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill”. It was thus a compromise between those African states advocating confrontation and those favouring contact with South Africa. It supported those African countries that fundamentally rejected apartheid, but also legitimised those who interpreted it as allowing contact with Pretoria.\(^{110}\) Nevertheless, when comparing the pragmatic approach expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto with Pretoria’s overall task of winning over black African states so that they would refrain from constantly attacking South Africa in diplomatic forums, the DFA’s approach of utilising its economic levers fell short of achieving this aim.

In addition to the Department of Foreign Affairs’ policy not having achieved the desired political results, the contentious issue of black ambassadors in South Africa, raised in the context of the Outward Movement, was a contributory factor that brought to the fore the struggle between the verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (constricted) that eventually led to a split within the ruling National Party in 1969. Another reason for this break-up was Vorster’s

---

\(^{108}\) Reprinted in *Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70: C41-C45.*


mixed sports policy, allowing non-white teams to play in South Africa. Pretoria had persistently tried to avoid such a split by mooting the idea of diplomatic suburbs for black African ambassadors, by allowing Malawi only to send a white ambassador in 1967, by Vorster and Muller trying to assure the electorate that relations would only be established with well-disposed African states and by Muller emphasising that "nothing will be done that is not to South Africa's advantage". Yet, despite these reassurances, the ultraconservative section broke away from the NP and formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). It understood Vorster's mixed sports policy and the Outward Movement to be slow, but perceptible moves towards the dismantling of apartheid. It did not generate a large following, but was a constant reminder of the political divisions within Afrikanerdom and thereby weakened the Afrikaner-dominated government. Afrikaner conservatism was a factor that required consideration in the formulation of South Africa's foreign policy toward Africa. Any move that could be construed as undermining the privileged status of these whites might have political repercussions at home. The HNP's mere existence curtailed Pretoria's visible endeavours in Africa.

This limitation did not apply so much to the military's Africa approach, one that resulted in the Dialogue policy and the subject of the next section. Even though it ran parallel to the DFA's Outward Movement, the military's activities were not hampered, because, and in stark contrast to those of the Department of Foreign Affairs, they were not conducted in public. Furthermore, they took place in close co-operation with partner France and produced tangible results with the pro-Discourse statement of Ivorian President Felix Houphouët-Boigny in November 1970 that proved to be of vital importance for Pretoria.

Dialogue

The purpose of this section is to examine the developments leading to the Dialogue strategy that dominated Pretoria's Africa policy from about 1969 to 1972/73. Initially the military was the principal actor, heavily reliant on co-operation with France and two of its former key colonies in Francophone Africa, as well as engaging in rivalry with the foreign service offi-

---

113 Literally translated: Reconstituted National Party.  
cials who were bent on profiting from their efforts. We now analyse these features chronologically.

Originating in Malan's Africa Charter of 1949, the military sought to play a continental role alongside the colonial powers, an ambition that remained even after African independence, as shown in the section on the Congo crisis in Chapter 3. While the military's relatively limited capacity to conduct war was the probable reason for it not to assume a more active role in this instance, the situation changed in the mid-1960s, with a significantly expanded arsenal due to arms deliveries, from France in particular. This also gave it necessary confidence to play a more prominent role further north than the Congo, namely in the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970, the complexities of which will be outlined below. In fact, we argue that the military attempted to play the role of continental gendarme or African superpower, the latter term being borrowed from a journalistic account of the SADF's involvement in the Angolan war of the mid-1970s. While seemingly a contradiction to the DFA's Outward Movement, the military saw its activities as compatible to, and within the ambit of, Pretoria's stated policy objective of achieving acceptance by black African states. For example, a paper presented by a SADF Commandant at a South African conference on the Outward Movement in 1969 was entitled "The Military-strategic Aspect of the Outward Movement", part of which read: "Everything must thus be done to prevent isolation, and the most effective manner to achieve this is to undertake well thought-out and energetic activities to establish ever more ties of friendship and co-operation with other countries in as many fields as possible". To achieve this goal, the main emphasis was on South Africa's fight against the "communist threat" and how this might appeal to other African states. This aptly illustrates that the various departments involved, in their attempt to raise their status in government, pursued different approaches to appeal to African countries. These differing policies led to unequal successes, and resulted in interdepartmental jealousy. For example, Minister Muller later claimed that Dialogue was the result of the DFA's endeavours, even though, and as we will see shortly, it had been initiated by the military. Given the latter's co-operation with France over Dialogue, the following paragraphs examine the framework in which this took place,

analysing France’s Africa policy, followed by details on the bilateral Franco-South African relationship.

Great Britain aside, France was the colonial power with the most territorial possessions on the African continent, located mainly in West and Central Africa. Although the decolonisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s removed its direct political control over these areas, France successfully managed to institutionalise and cement the political, economic, military and cultural ties with its former African colonies, by means of defence agreements and the creation of a common CFA monetary area with a fixed exchange rate. While the majority of Francophone African countries remained within the French sphere of influence, particularly close relations were maintained with an inner core group, namely and in order of importance, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and Senegal. With the exception of the latter, they all concluded defence and military assistance agreements with France immediately after their independence. Yet, the relations between Francophone African countries and their former colonial power were interdependent. While in need of French military support and economic assistance, most Francophone African leaders accepted, and even enjoyed, being part of the French system. They continued to perceive themselves as belonging to the intellectual and political life of the former colonial power, and it accorded them a certain grandeur to be received by the French President on the same footing as the US President, for example. For France, on the other hand, the wielding of power in Francophone Africa was central to its ambition of becoming a global power in world politics, a situation that gave these countries some form of leverage. This applied particularly to Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny who influenced Paris to become involved in the Nigerian Civil War, as we will see below.

Similar to Pretoria’s foreign policy making towards Africa, a small number of officials in Paris influenced France’s foreign relations with South Africa and other African states. The


personalities now introduced are essential in understanding the *modus operandi* of the Paris-Pretoria alliance in Francophone Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A dominant role was played by Jacques Foccart who was instrumental in shaping Franco-African affairs and in maintaining the Paris-Pretoria alliance in Africa during that period. A quotation from the secondary literature aptly reflects this: "With the exception of [French President Charles] de Gaulle himself, no other Frenchman has left a greater imprint on France’s relations with Francophone black Africa".122 Embodying French-Francophone African relations, Foccart’s influence stemmed from an elaborate network of personal connections to the African political élite, the French military and intelligence, and it is probably no exaggeration to say that “little went on in Francophone Africa that Foccart was not quickly made aware of".123 Foccart laid the foundation for his “bureaucratic predominance in all things African”,124 as suggested by Francis Terry McNamara, US Ambassador to Gabon from 1981 to 1984, with the work in his family’s business of an import-export company that primarily traded with France’s African colonies prior to World War II, and this resulted in Foccart making many important acquaintances there.125 In France, Foccart’s close contact with the politico-military and intelligence establishment was rooted in his involvement in the French Résistance during World War II, when he became a close confidant of General Charles de Gaulle. Foccart later assisted the General in establishing the future ruling Gaullist party and accompanied him on pre-presidential visits, including Africa, during the 1950s. In 1961, two years after the assumption of the presidency, de Gaulle chose Foccart to serve as the first Secretary General in the Presidency of the Republic for African and Malagasy Affairs, a position he held until May 1974.126 During de Gaulle’s presidency, lasting from 1959 to April 1969, this agency was the key vehicle in formulating French Africa policy. Consequently, Foccart “was at the elbow of his own president and in constant touch with African presidents and their important ministers”.127 De Gaulle’s successor from July 1969 to April 1974, Georges Pompidou, was less interested

in African affairs, and so Foccart enjoyed an even more powerful position during that period. He resigned in May 1974, within weeks after Pompidou’s departure from the presidency and returned to the import-export business until 1985. From March 1986 to April 1988, he once again appeared on the political scene, as adviser for African affairs to Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The bureaucratic politics model, introduced in Chapter 1, stipulates that it entails some danger to over-emphasise the importance of personalities due to the restraints imposed on them by the administrative framework within which they work, but Foccart’s network of contacts made him too influential to be ignored in France’s Africa policy.

As mentioned, his status was also based on close relations with the military and intelligence. He was a “close friend” of Michel Debré, minister in several important departments since 1958 and Minister of Defence from June 1969 to April 1973. This connection was crucial in the context of French-South African co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War, as will be shown in a moment. Foccart’s involvement in the Résistance further provided him with direct personal access to the Department for Foreign Information and Counterespionage (SDECE). In particular, he put Maurice Robert, Colonel in the Résistance, in charge of SDECE’s Africa operations from 1960 to 1973, resulting in very close co-operation between the two governmental agencies in Francophone Africa during that period. This situation most likely hinged on the role he played during the Nigerian Civil War to promote the interests of the French oil company Elf Aquitaine, as will be indicated below. Thereafter, from 1974 to 1979, Robert headed Elf Aquitaine’s secret services. Subsequently, he was France’s Ambassador to Gabon until 1981 and thereafter Head of Elf Aquitaine Gabon.

Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré was another, rather mysterious, figure in Foccart’s politico-military network. To cite a journalistic work on the French secret services:

His name neither appears in the Who’s Who nor in the directory [of French government officials]. He does not belong to any department, not even to the secret services. (...) In fact, he occupies an office in the general secretariat in the Presidency of the Republic for

---

132 The Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage was established in 1946, changing its name in 1982 to Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE; General Directorate for External Security) <http://www.dgse.org/informations/histoire.php>.

African and Malagasy Affairs. But one can never find him there. Officially, he is also said to be technical counsellor to the President of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. But in Abidjan, no trace of him. From 1960, «Monsieur Jean» finds himself involved in all jolts on the black continent. Wherever France hesitates to intervene officially, or the SDECE is too detectable, we can see appear the profile of Mauricheau-Beaupré.

Mauricheau-Beaupré was of prime importance in the Paris-Pretoria alliance in Francophone Africa. Foccart himself referred to him as an “indefatigable militant of a reconciliation between black Africa and South Africa”. Due to his involvement in the Résistance, Mauricheau-Beaupré was very close to Jacques Foccart, Michel Debré and Maurice Robert. He was attached to Foccart’s African and Malagasy Affairs agency and has been described as Foccart’s “right arm”. Mauricheau-Beaupré’s contact with Debré originated in the late 1950s, when the two owned a weekly newspaper, and he worked for Debré during the 1960s, while having a working relationship with Maurice Robert. Finally, and of crucial significance for this study, Mauricheau-Beaupré was adviser to, and maintained particularly good connections with presidents Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Albert Bernard Bongo of Gabon, who changed his first name to Omar in 1973, and François Tombalbaye of Chad.

After having introduced the main personalities that influenced Paris’ Africa policy, we now examine the close bilateral Franco-South African relations, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, providing the framework for an understanding of the co-operation between the two countries in Africa. As we pointed out in the previous chapter, France abstained when the UN Security Council voted on a voluntary arms embargo against Pretoria in August 1963, and thereafter became one of South Africa’s main armaments suppliers until the mid-1970s. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France sold Pretoria 239 aircraft, 159 missiles, 800 armoured vehicles and three warships during that period. Pik Botha described the importance of these arms deliveries: “All these helicopters..."
and the aircraft, coming from France, at a time in our history when we were totally isolated; you must not forget the impact of that; it is tremendous. If you are alone on the ocean, and your boat is about to sink, then another ship goes along; that is quite something". Military exchange between the two countries intensified after P.W. Botha became the Minister of Defence in April 1966, as he was keen to obtain French armaments to strengthen the military’s standing and to have the support of an important international political actor. From 1969 to 1971 alone, he paid four official visits to France during which he also met both Debré and Foccart, thus emphasising the importance of these two Frenchmen in the military’s Africa approach. In a military-related area, South Africa was an important provider of uranium, thus furthering France’s goal of playing an important role in global politics. In that context, de Gaulle once made the statement that “no country without an atom bomb can consider itself properly independent”. From 1965 to 1974, French personnel also made use of South Africa’s space tracking station at Paardefontein, near Pretoria, to monitor French satellites launched from its space centre in Kourou, Guyana. After the mid-1970s, however, Franco-South African relations became more “banal”, because Foccart departed from office in May 1974, and South Africa’s military involvement in both Angola and Mozambique made it increasingly difficult for Paris to explain to its Francophone African partners why it still collaborated with Pretoria. This also negatively impacted on France’s preparedness to assist Pretoria in finding support from Francophone African countries.

After having outlined both the personalities that shaped France’s Africa policy and the bilateral relations between France and South Africa, we now turn to the resulting co-operation in Africa that reinforced the already close ties between the two countries. The following quotation from the secondary literature, a publication that analyses various aspects of French-


144 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999.


146 Bach. 1990. Un système autonome de relations, pp.179f.


South African contacts, appropriately presents the geopolitical convergence of their interests in that area until the mid-1970s:

In the case of both France and South Africa, the condition of their power status was consciously linked to their chosen role in the field of Africa. Each state, aspiring to play a significant role in international politics through the projection of power on the African continent has based its claim to this status on the combination of military wherewithal and economic pre-eminence in the context of Africa.¹⁴⁹

On the South African side, the various Directors of Military Intelligence largely ensured the promotion of military co-operation in Africa in the decade after the mid-1960s. Fritz Loots, who held that post from 1966 to 1971 and was introduced in Chapter 2, played an especially crucial role in directing South Africa’s engagement in the Nigerian Civil War in his capacity as P.W. Botha’s personal envoy to Presidents Bongo of Gabon and Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. In that context, Cornelius Jacobus ‘Neels’ van Tonder was of equal significance. Officially accredited as a member of the diplomatic corps, as Second and First Secretary, at the South African Embassy in Paris,¹⁵⁰ he was charged with overseeing Franco-South African co-operation in Francophone Africa and possibly other matters. Van Tonder impressed officials even outside the military sphere. Interviewed in 1999, former DFA Director-General Neil van Heerden spoke in the highest terms about him:

[In the 1970s, the military] started to develop a breed of military officers that were (…) quite excellent. They were enormously well trained, they spoke languages, (…) and they needed no sloppy diplomats to tell them what to do. That was their attitude. They were all can-do people, and Neels van Tonder was one of the prime examples of that. (…) Neels was one hell of an operator. (…) Speaks French like a Frenchman, understands the culture, and goes anywhere.¹⁵¹

Reflecting his high respect for and close relationship with van Tonder, also in the context of the Nigerian Civil War, P.W. Botha later put him in command of the Directorate of Special Tasks, responsible for the military destabilisation of Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, from 1975 to 1984.¹⁵² In 1986, P.W. Botha further supported his promotion from Brigadier to Major General.¹⁵³


¹⁵⁰ Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DFA. (December 1971)

¹⁵¹ Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.


Chad

The first available evidence of Franco-South Africa military co-operation in black Africa we found related to Chad during the mid-1960s, and prior to P.W. Botha becoming the Minister of Defence. Pretoria’s primary interest probably needs to be gauged against the intensifying military exchange with Paris, making this something of a test run for practical military interaction in the field. This aside, Chad’s strategic geographical position, particularly the fact that it shared the northern border with Islamic, anti-Western and Moscow-allied Libya, possibly made it an interesting listening post for the military intelligence community. It appears that the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Pierre Retief, established the first contact with Chad five years after the country’s independence from France, when he met President Tombalbaye in October 1965 in the capital Fort Lamy, renamed N’Djamena in 1973. Later evidence suggests that this meeting was facilitated through the services of Jacques Foccart and Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré. In a letter dated 29 May 1970 to P.W. Botha over Nigerian Civil War issues, Fritz Loots states: “Up to now, they [Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré] have gone out of their way to be helpful to make contact in Africa. So, for example, we have to thank them for our contact with (...) Chad (...).”\(^{154}\) During their encounter, Tombalbaye and Retief agreed that communism posed a threat to the African continent and that closer cooperation should therefore be established between the two countries.\(^{155}\) As the first step in this direction, Retief proposed geological assistance for the exploration of Chad’s mineral resources, motivating Tombalbaye to make such a request to Vorster.\(^{156}\) For reasons we could not establish, the mission of two South African geologists to Chad for the above purpose was only deployed from 12 October to 25 November 1966.\(^{157}\) It is possible to explain this delay by the fact that P.W. Botha became the Minister of Defence in April 1966, and that only he was assertive enough to push through the military’s interest against that of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The latter was then in a relatively strong position due to the promotion of contact with Lesotho, Malawi and Madagascar.

After returning from their mission, the geologists Jacob Wouter du Preez and Gerrit Johannes Smit suggested that Pretoria should provide the country with equipment so that further explorations could take place by the relevant authorities in Chad.\(^{158}\) On 1 March 1967, enclos-

\(^{154}\) "Voorgenome ontmoeting : Dr Muller en 'n ander Minister – Presidente Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo", from Fritz Loots to Pieter Willem Botha, Pretoria, 29 May 1970, p.3 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans).

\(^{155}\) DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. 1.

\(^{156}\) DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. 1.

\(^{157}\) DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. 1PL.

\(^{158}\) The final reports are contained in DFA, 1/184/3, AJ 1971 and DFA, 1/184/4, AJ 1966.
ing the final report, Vorster offered Tombalbaye two Land Rovers, a rock cutting machine, a driller to operate five diamond drills and the deployment of further geologists, and concluded: “If you feel there is any other way in which South Africa might be able to assist, you should not hesitate to let us know”. After Tombalbaye had happily accepted Vorster’s offer, Muller promised to deliver as soon as possible and generously offered to pay the travel expenses and salaries for the two geologists. Yet, according to the DFA files, it was only in February 1970 that Tombalbaye resumed contact with Muller on that matter, informing him that all material had arrived and that it was still in good working order. In the same letter, Tombalbaye explained his long silence due to domestic problems, referring to the military attacks from the Front national de libération du Tchad (Frolinat), formed in mid-1966 by the politically underrepresented northern Muslim community with Libya’s support. While not neglecting the validity of that reason, Tombalbaye’s behaviour towards Pretoria’s DFA officials also lay in rivalry between the foreign affairs ministry and the military over the shaping of relations with Chad, the intricacies of which are now outlined.

Apart from assisting Pretoria’s military intelligence in Chad, Tombalbaye’s adviser, Mauricheau-Beaupré, also served as the link between John Vorster, Hilgard Muller and François Tombalbaye from 1967 to 1969, delivering letters, ensuring the transport of the South African equipment to be used for geological exploration and allowing his house outside Paris to be used as a meeting place. In a letter to Tombalbaye, Muller therefore referred to him as “our mutual friend in Paris”. However, what van Tonder later termed “the cotton affair” brought to the fore the policy differences between the military and the foreign affairs ministry, troubling the DFA’s access to Mauricheau-Beaupré. This incident had its origins in Tombalbaye’s letter to Vorster, dated 31 March 1967, in which he asked Pretoria to buy cotton, Chad’s major agricultural product, accounting for more than 80% of its export income. In April 1967, van Tonder discussed the cotton sale issue with Tombalbaye, informing him  

159 Letter from John Vorster to François Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 1 March 1967 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL).
161 Letter from Hilgard Muller to François Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 14 May 1967 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
162 Letter from François Tombalbaye to Hilgard Muller, Fort Lamy, 14 February 1970, p.2 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
163 ‘Tsjaad (24-26 April 1967)’, from Neels van Tonder, p.1 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1). Also DFA, 1/184/3, Vols. 1, 1PL; 1/184/4, Vols. 2PL, 3PL.
164 Letter from Hilgard Muller to François Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 14 May 1967, p.2 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1). Also DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL; 1/184/4, Vols. 2PL, 3PL.
166 Letter from François Tombalbaye to John Vorster, Fort Lamy, 31 March 1967 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL).
that "the Government itself normally does not buy cotton, and that the requirements for this season have already been bought". Evidently not satisfied with this response, Tombalbaye also discussed the cotton sale with Ambassador Burger during his visit to Paris in early May. In line with the DFA's policy of providing technical assistance and assisting in development/investment projects, Burger gave the scheme his approval after authorisation from Pretoria. Following that lead, and trying to position the Department of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis the military, Muller wrote to Tombalbaye, claiming to speak on behalf of Pretoria: "My Government has accepted Mr. Burger's recommendation that we should buy, if the quality is acceptable, some of your cotton at a special premium above world prices. My Government does not normally act as buyer of cotton, but we are prepared to do so in this instance in an endeavour to assist you". This divergent approach caused significant friction between the foreign service officials and the military. In July 1969, during a discussion with Muller, van Tonder used the incident to exemplify the dispute over respective areas of responsibility between the two departments: "I recalled the episode when I newly arrived here [in Paris] and when the Ambassador [Burger] warned me not to cross wires with him. (You know the story of the telegram that was sent about the cotton affair in Chad.) I sometimes have the impression that people work more for themselves than for anything else".

Deducing from Tombalbaye's silence towards the Department of Foreign Affairs, the South African military and/or its French partners seem to have convinced the president that it was not useful for him to co-operate with the foreign service officials in view of his military needs in the fight against Frolinat. However, after the defeat of the Franco-South African military alliance on the side of Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War in January 1970, the Department of Foreign Affairs reasserted itself over the military, causing Tombalbaye to resume contact with the above-mentioned letter to Muller in February 1970. In addition to apologising for the long silence by citing domestic problems, he also assured Muller that his Foreign Minister would in future refrain from launching verbal attacks against South Africa, such as he had done during the UN General Assembly in 1969. Furthermore, and undoubtedly the main aim of that letter, he again requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to buy 170,000

169 Letter from François Tombalbaye to John Vorster, Fort Lamy, 10 May 1967 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
172 DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. 3PL.
Possibly tired of Tombalbaye's behaviour, Muller only replied more than two months later. While appreciating the president's assurances of no further diplomatic faux pas, he simply stated that he had taken note of the cotton offer, while making it clear that the geological assistance offered in 1966/67 was "no longer valid" and would have to be reconsidered. To that end, he enquired about the possibility of a meeting with one of Tombalbaye's ministers during June 1970 in Europe. Presumably not primarily interested in that assistance, but in selling cotton, Tombalbaye left this unanswered and the Department of Foreign Affairs did not try to establish contact again. Both in July 1971 and May 1972, the South African Consul-General in New York reported that direct contact with Tombalbaye might be feasible through the mediation of two businessmen, but this was not pursued, as we deduce from the fact that the relevant DFA file does not contain further communication on this issue.

**Nigerian Civil War**

The differences between Pretoria's foreign service corps and the military over the cotton affair in Chad were insignificant compared to those that erupted in the context of Pretoria's military involvement in Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). During that war, a network of overlapping interests evolved between France, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and South Africa, while we will argue that Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny was of crucial importance in bringing France and South Africa together in this operation. His role apart, the joint French-South African engagement was maintained by P.W. Botha, Fritz Loots and Neels van Tonder, as well as their French colleagues Jacques Foccart, Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré and Michel Debré. The SADF's activity during the Nigerian Civil War laid the groundwork for Pretoria's Dialogue with Africa from 1970, with Houphouët-Boigny as the prime exponent. These developments are our present subject.

In May 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed the independence of Biafra, Nigeria's south-eastern province. The Nigerian federal government, mainly supported by the Soviet Union and, towards the end, Great Britain, opposed this move militarily. The ensuing Nigerian Civil War lasted until January 1970, but the chances of Biafra succeeding already faded during 1969. In order to understand Pretoria's involvement in this war, we

---

173 Letter from François Tombalbaye to Hilgard Muller, Fort Lamy, 14 February 1970, p.2 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
174 Letter from Hilgard Muller to François Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 17 April 1970 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
175 Letter from Gert Cornelius Nel (Consul-General) to Pretoria, New York, 2 July 1971 and 19 May 1972 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1).
need to examine the position of its partners in the conflict. In Africa, only Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia recognised Biafra as a sovereign state. In doing so, they deviated from the OAU’s position that the territorial integrity of African states had to be safeguarded with the purpose of promoting nation-building and political stability. While the reasons for the latter two countries’ stance need not be of interest here, the presidents of both Gabon and the Ivory Coast were outspokenly anticommunist and considered a Soviet-supported Nigeria as a danger to their security in West Africa. Consequently, Bongo and Houpouët-Boigny offered their countries as transit areas for the channelling of weapons to the Biafra secessionists, co-ordinated by Mauricheau-Beaupré and Maurice Delauney, the French Ambassador in Libreville from 1965 to 1972, and again from 1975 to 1980. In fact, French journalist Péan refers to Mauricheau-Beaupré as the “chief conductor of the French clandestine support to the Biafra secessionists”.

The French government supported the secessionists, while withholding diplomatic recognition of Biafra, for the reasons now indicated. To begin with, the presidents of Gabon and especially of the Ivory Coast pressured de Gaulle into supporting Biafra so as to secure their stability. Their pro-Biafra advocacy was effective because they enjoyed a privileged status among the Francophone African countries, having direct access to de Gaulle, Foccart, Mauricheau-Beaupré and Debré. Another reason for France to support Biafra was Nigeria’s hegemonic position in West Africa that posed a potential threat to the French sphere of interest in that region. As Foccart frankly declares in his memoirs, de Gaulle considered a “break-


up of Nigeria” desirable in order to weaken that country’s influence in West Africa. In that context, Paris attempted to forge closer links with Ghana, a former British colony surrounded by the former French colonies Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Togo, to counterbalance Nigeria’s influence. In a report of November 1972, Under-Secretary Johan Pretorius stated: “We also know that Mr. Foccart’s organisation, and Mr. Beaupré [sic] in particular, became involved in (...) Biafra and Ghana in the framework of France’s attempts to “infiltrate” the English-speaking countries in Africa for economic and political reasons”. This needs to be seen against the overall picture of French-British rivalry in Africa, accentuated by de Gaulle’s dislike of the British. His distrust toward and suspicion of the Anglo-Saxons, shared by Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré, was rooted in World War II, when the Résistance fought for the ‘Free France’ movement against the pro-German ‘Vichy’ government. Great Britain pledged to support the Free France, but its actual policy was inconsistent and some of its actions were actually detrimental to de Gaulle’s ambitions. After de Gaulle’s resignation from power in 1946, both Great Britain and the United States undermined France’s position in world politics. One of de Gaulle’s main aims after becoming President of the Fifth Republic in January 1959, therefore, was to save “France’s honour”. The importance of these anti-British feelings as a factor for France’s decision to support Biafra is confirmed in a handwritten letter from Mauricheau-Beaupré to P.W. Botha in November 1970: “We know the subject well, we who were a moral colony of the Anglo-Saxons until De Gaulle returned”. In the same correspondence, he speaks of “Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy” on two occasions, referring to the inconsistent British policy towards de Gaulle during World War II. A final dimension of France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War was the interest of the French petroleum group, Elf.  


Aquitaine. This is admitted by Foccart and finds confirmation in a report by van Tonder to Ambassador Burger in Paris. Elf Aquitaine was a pillar of French influence in Africa since the 1960s and, through a web of contacts with intelligence, especially SDECE’s Robert, had established particularly close relations with Gabon’s President Bongo. Attempting to extend activities from its Gabon base to other African countries, “Elf and its clan deployed a policy (...) that was in symbiosis with [that of] Jacques Foccart”. Elf Aquitaine already had some oil rights in Biafra, but its ambition to control all reserves clashed directly with the interests of the British-Dutch oil companies British Petroleum (BP) and Shell, part of French-British competition in Africa. In order to secure its claims, according to Foccart, Elf Aquitaine was directly involved in financing weapons and arms deliveries to Biafra by transferring the income generated from selling oil from Biafra to the secessionists.

While France, Gabon and the Ivory Coast supported Biafra from the early days of the Nigerian Civil War for the above reasons, the South African military as an armament provider to Biafra only enters the stage during the second half of 1969, when the chances for the success of the secessionist cause became uncertain. For that reason, and based on the evidence presented below, it is reasonable to argue that Houphouët-Boigny, in conjunction with Mauricieux-Beaupré and Foccart, turned to South Africa to boost Biafra’s position in the war. At the same time, we argue that Pretoria’s military engagement at this stage, despite the bleak situation for Biafra, was motivated threefold. First, again with reference to Malan’s Africa Charter of 1949, it provided the military an occasion to perform as a continental power alongside a respected international player. Second, it could be seen as the key in establishing a network of black African states with anticommunist, conservative and politically stable leaders, that might find followers among other countries and, eventually, lead to Pretoria finding acceptance in Africa. Co-operation with both Gabon and the Ivory Coast in the Nigerian Civil War was promising, as their presidents fulfilled these criteria and were held in high esteem among African leaders. The third motivation for the South African military to assist France and two important Francophone African countries in that war, was to ensure the continued French armament supplies to strengthen its own capacity.

---


Pretoria’s military engagement, according to the available Department of Defence sources, was rooted in P.W. Botha’s contacts with Houphouët-Boigny dating from early 1969. There is no clear evidence, but it was most certainly Mauricheau-Beaupré, in his capacity as Houphouët-Boigny’s adviser, who forged the initial contact between the two men, seeing a potential benefit for all parties involved. That link was subsequently maintained through the services of Loots, P.W. Botha’s personal envoy to the West African leaders, Houphouët-Boigny in particular. Botha’s first recorded direct meeting with Houphouët-Boigny took place on 19 March 1969 in Paris. A thread running through their discussion was the shared pre-occupation with the communist influence from both the USSR and the People’s Republic of China in Africa. As Ivorian political scientist Cyril Daddieh aptly remarks: “Abidjan and Pretoria shared an ideological affinity. President Houphouët-Boigny detested communism and saw in Pretoria the much needed bulwark against this menace to the continent”. The military’s strategy of emphasising the common stance against communism and propounding that this “was a greater threat to the continent than apartheid”, as political scientist Sam Nolutshungu argued, was successful and the initial meeting was the breakthrough necessary for future contact. Within a month, Houphouët-Boigny met with Loots in Paris, subsequently writing to P.W. Botha: “Thank you for having sent General Loots to me and it was a great pleasure to meet him again. He explained to me what is possible as of immediate from your side”. In the same letter, P.W. Botha and Loots were invited to come to Abidjan. Later correspondence and events suggest that Loots, on behalf of P.W. Botha, had offered South African military assistance to Biafra and a loan of 1 million Rand to the Ivory Coast. The primary documents do not reveal the purpose of this loan and Neels van Tonder, whom we interviewed in 1999, did not divulge any information, but it is possible that the proposal was made to provide the Ivory Coast with money to buy arms for Biafra.

Given the already close link with Paris and the newly created connection with Pretoria, Foccart plausibly suggests that Houphouët-Boigny now began to push for closer contact be-

---

195 Transcript of that meeting (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26).
between P.W. Botha and himself, through Mauricheau-Beaupré’s mediation, on the matter of a joint military operation in support of Biafra. Van Tonder’s report to Fritz Loots on a meeting with Minister Muller also validates Foccart’s claim that it was Houphouët-Boigny’s “profound conviction” to seek contact with Pretoria and that it was not brought about by French pressure. This and another document from van Tonder to his superior further underline that president’s influence on the French and South African governments regarding support for Biafra:

The Minister [Muller] also said that the RSA was a small country and therefore should not carry the whole burden of Biafra alone. Therefore, the position of the new French government in this matter is very important. I [van Tonder] have advised that he should approach the situation with a view to what we can and what we are prepared to do together with HB, if France would also help, which would be necessary for the successful accomplishment of Biafra, and it is the choice of the French to say what they will do. The importance of HB’s leadership for the RSA (...) was again emphasised.

The Minister [Muller] also reported on the importance that we attach to the policy that the French government pursues regarding indirect as well as direct help to Biafra. HB responded by saying that he would see [French President Georges] Pompidou on 16 July [1969] and that he would inform us what the results of the discussion were. He added that the indirect help actually goes through the Ivory Coast and therefore was more a matter between him and France rather than Biafra and France.

In July 1969, P.W. Botha decided to provide Biafra with “plus minus 200 tons”, for which time period is not recorded, of unspecified “weapons of ammunition”. This did not, however, correspond to the two hundred and fifty tons that Mauricheau-Beaupré had requested on behalf of Houphouët-Boigny. The reasons for this difference are not known to us, but it is possible that it was a compromise decision, having weighed up the military’s keen interest in promoting contact with Houphouët-Boigny against the caution of launching itself into an uncertain adventure, as there was no guarantee that the Biafran cause would succeed.

Soon thereafter, official British sources and newspapers close to the British government articulated claims of South African arms deliveries to Biafra, most likely trying to discredit the secessionists’ standing by stating that it was prepared to deal with the apartheid state. The

---

203 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots on a meeting between Houphouët-Boigny and Muller, Paris, 11 July 1969, p.3 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans).
first report to that effect appeared in the conservative *Sunday Telegraph* on 10 August 1969, followed by a report in the same daily on 30 November that year. The publication of the report in this newspaper, which usually kept a Pretoria-friendly style, can be seen as a warning from London that this military activity of South Africa, an otherwise important partner, was intolerable. These two articles formed the basis for a publication by the Nigerian Ministry of Information in which Pretoria was accused of providing Biafra with military assistance. Still in August, similar allegations were voiced in the *Scott Report*, prepared by Colonel Robert Scott, Defence Adviser in the British High Commission in Lagos. On 11 August, in reaction to the *Sunday Telegraph* article, P.W. Botha refuted the allegation as “fantasy”, and on 23 September, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement that emphasised that only medical and other emergency relief material was supplied to war-torn Biafra via the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); this claim cannot be verified due to the highly restricted access to the ICRC archive. The denial of both the military and the foreign affairs ministry can be explained by their attempt to prevent exposure of the black African countries co-operating with Pretoria in that operation, as this would have endangered their ambitions of making inroads into black Africa. However, the already presented material reveals that the military did supply the secessionists with arms, thereby confirming the claims made in the secondary literature. The following paragraphs detail further developments and

---


implications of the military’s engagement in the Nigerian Civil War and the resulting clashes with the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In the months from July to October 1969, a rectangular network of co-operation between France, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and South Africa evolved, ensuring the delivery of military supplies to Biafra. Within this network, Portugal actively supported the Biafran cause and granted South African planes the permission to fly over Angolan territory en route to Libreville and thence to Uli, an airstrip in Biafra.212 As a DFA document of 1983 points out, the island of Fernando Pó, belonging to Spain’s former colony, Equatorial Guinea, was equally used as a “staging post” for South African arms deliveries.213 Portugal’s support for Biafra also surfaced during talks between the South African and the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 June 1969 in Lisbon, with the latter asking Muller to give assistance to Biafra.214

South African military support in this limited range continued until October 1969, when P.W. Botha reviewed the situation after meetings with Bongo, Houphouët-Boigny and Debré in the second half of October 1969. According to a provisional itinerary, he and Loots were to fly to Libreville in the morning of 26 October, where van Tonder and the SADF Commandant General,215 Rudolph Christian Hiemstra,216 would join them. On that afternoon, discussions were to take place with Bongo, who had already invited P.W. Botha and Loots in August to visit him.217 In the late afternoon, the company was to fly to Abidjan with a Mystère 20, an eight-passenger VIP plane,218 of which both Bongo and Houphouët-Boigny owned one219 and which was put at their disposal by either of them, to hold discussions with the Ivorian president the following day. Just before midnight of 27 October, they were to board a flight to Paris, where talks were to be held with Debré on 28 and 29 October. P.W. Botha, Loots and Hiemstra were to arrive back in South Africa on 30 October.220 That trip did take place, but a

214 ‘Notes on the talks between Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, and Dr. Franca Nogueira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, on Monday, 16th June, 1969, at the Palácio das Necessidades’, p.2 (DFA, 22/3/29, Vol. 3).
215 This designation changed to Chief of the SADF in July 1973.
few days earlier than envisaged, as can be deduced from later correspondence and the fact that P.W. Botha sent a hand-written note from Pretoria to van Tonder in Paris, dated 29 October.

These meetings caused P.W. Botha to reconsider South Africa’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. It is not cited specifically, but one of the reasons for this was the deteriorating chance of Biafra winning the war. In addition, van Tonder reported of the “weak reception” from Debré, possibly due the fact that he had only been Minister of Defence for three months at that stage, and this had a negative impact on P.W. Botha.221 According to a letter from Ambassador Burger to Brand Fourie, Botha did not share with Debré the “spirit of understanding”222 he had with Pierre Messmer, the Minister of Defence from February 1960 to June 1969. As a result, Botha wrote to van Tonder in the above-mentioned note of 29 October:

After an open-hearted discussion between the French Minister of Defence [Debré] and myself, the following has been decided by me:

I. Regarding further arms and weapons deliveries to Biafra, we shall make it available only if the French Minister of Defence informs me in writing that such armaments are still considered to be necessary.223

It is unclear whether the French made such a further request, but it appears that Mauricieu-Baupré, on behalf of Houphouët-Boigny, requested additional supplies around October 1969.224 Judging from the available documents in the one relevant box in the Department of Defence archive, South Africa’s military did not further provide armaments, possibly because it had become clear by then that Biafra was going to lose the war. Before turning to the results of Pretoria’s military activities, one aspect has not yet been mentioned, namely the role of the French mercenary Bob Denard and his South African colleagues. This deserves special treatment because co-operation with Denard fell within the framework of French-South African co-operation and, even more significantly, Pretoria’s military used his mercenary services as an indirect, although essential, tool to advance its interests on this occasion and in other black African countries later on.

Bob Denard, who worked under different aliases, was probably the most notorious mercenary of the twentieth century because of his participation in the conflict situations of numerous countries. Born in 1929, he served in the French navy from the mid-1940s. He left the French army in 1953 and became a policeman in Morocco. In 1960, he moved further south and worked as a security officer for a mining company in the former Belgian Congo. This

marked the beginning of his career as a mercenary and, during the 1960s, he fought for the Katanga secessionist movement under Moïse Tshombe and later for President Mobutu.225 Regarding Denard’s contacts with the relevant French authorities, one DFA document dated 1971 suggests that he was working for Mauricheau-Beaupré and the French intelligence agency, SDECE, in Gabon.226 While Foccart claims to have “never had any relation with Bob Denard”,227 it is a reasonable assumption that he acted with, at least, “orange light” from Foccart’s Africa agency and that he therefore became a “banal instrument of French Africa policy”, as Foccart’s interviewer suggests.228 Denard himself described it as follows:

All the sleeping partners for whom I worked were states or future states, never private people. But not France. France was behind Gambia, behind Gabon, behind Morocco, but they never directly gave the orders. It was always the people who represented the state, or who were going to represent the state, who gave the orders. I never had direct contact with the French services. But it’s their job to watch, to control, to manipulate . . . of course we were manipulated.229

In the Nigerian Civil War, Denard and his mercenaries fought on the side of Biafra. McNamara, later US Ambassador to Gabon (1981-84), argued that they were stationed in Libreville, prior to nocturnal airlifts into Biafra.230 Foccart admits this, but suggests that Mauricheau-Beaupré and the French Ambassador in Gabon, Delauney, were in charge of them. His further claim of not having had any direct contact with Denard231 might be true, but he at least had knowledge of Denard’s activities through his large network of contacts. This is substantiated with Denard’s own account. With the knowledge of an insider, he describes the role of Mauricheau-Beaupré as the “great architect of the rapprochement” between Pretoria and Paris, and their alliance with Houphouët-Boigny and Bongo over the Nigerian Civil War. He also reveals that Loots was P.W. Botha’s personal envoy to Houphouët-Boigny and claims that he was “sometimes” present during their meetings.232 This information cannot be verified, but it seems plausible and there can be little doubt that both Paris and Pretoria were aware of Denard’s role and that some co-ordination took place on the ground.

Regardng the question of South African mercenaries fighting in that war, Denard claims that he was in contact with them, although not providing more specific details.\textsuperscript{233} By citing the British \textit{Daily Telegraph}, Suzanne Cronjé suggests that South African mercenaries were employed by the Nigerian government "on a strictly commercial basis" after 1967 to train its troops.\textsuperscript{234} According to the same author, but without substantiation, some fifty-three South African mercenaries arrived in late 1967, this time in support of Biafra, while only nine remained until early 1969.\textsuperscript{235} Deon Fourie, a South African academic in strategic studies with close ties to the South African military, recalled that one South African, "Mitch", flew as a transport pilot for Biafra. He further mentioned that Mitch "was put (...) out of the South African Air Force and he had to become a civilian",\textsuperscript{236} suggesting that the military had actively approved of their mission. Yet, according to Neels van Tonder, it were not South African mercenaries that fought in Biafra, but a small contingent of five SADF members, officially deployed to Biafra.\textsuperscript{237} Given this sparse and contradictory information, no clear picture emerges as to how many South Africans were involved in Biafra and in what capacity.

After this lengthy presentation of the military's endeavours to win friends among black African countries through France's assistance and likely co-operation with mercenaries, the following paragraphs provide an analysis of its success. This is particularly important for a later comparison with the results achieved by the DFA in utilising their leverage of technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. Pretoria's military contacts with those countries that surfaced in the context of the Nigerian Civil War, namely Ghana, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, will be examined within that context. Thereafter, the focus will be on the resulting friction with the Department of Foreign Affairs.

\textbf{Ghana}

The military's interaction with Ghana was only incidental to the Nigerian Civil War. While not directly implicated in the war, Foccart, Mauric peaceau-Beaupré and Houphouët-Boigny had an interest in making this former British colony part of the Francophone African states network in West Africa to counteract Nigeria's predominance. In doing so, and as we will see shortly, they also tried to facilitate Pretoria's access to Ghana, probably as an incentive to win its subsequent support for the Biafran cause. Apart from further strengthening interaction with

\textsuperscript{236} Interview with Deon S. Fourie, 22 April 1999.
\textsuperscript{237} Telephone interview with Neels van Tonder, 19 March 2002.
Paris, Ghana was an important country to have on South Africa's side given its political significance; it attained independence in 1957, and thereafter, Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister until 1960 and State President until he was ousted in a military coup in February 1966, became the symbol of Africa's liberation, pan-Africanism, thus supporting liberation movements, such as the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa.  

It would have represented a considerable success for the military to have the backing of such a leading African country. The resulting activities by Paris and Pretoria in Ghana in pursuit of their overlapping interests are now outlined. In April 1969, General Akwasi Afrika came to power in Ghana's second military coup. Wishing to prepare Ghana for democratic rule, he subsequently set presidential elections for August of that year, and Kofi Busia was one of the candidates. According to a military document on van Tonder's discussion with Muller within weeks of the elections, Houphouët-Boigny had "undoubted influence" on Busia and the latter's chances of winning the elections were estimated at 85%. Therefore, Muller was urged to discuss with Houphouët-Boigny "the modalities of support to Ghana" and "to find a way whereupon we can offer help to Busia in such a way that he would accept it in the best of spirit". In less diplomatic terms, the military tried to convince the Department of Foreign Affairs that it was worthwhile to support Busia at that time, presumably with economic lures, in the hope that the assistance would be remembered by the president-to-be, and that he would then promote a pro-Pretoria stance within the African community of states. Houphouët-Boigny apparently played a leading role in this framework, with the mediation attempts of Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré again being of crucial importance. According to one document, dated 7 July 1969, Mauricheau-Beaupré "discussed" Ghana with Muller, while Loots wrote to P.W. Botha on 29 May 1970: "Up to now, they [Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré] have gone out of their way to be helpful to make contact in Africa. So, for example, we have to thank them for our contact with Ghana (...)". A final statement on the outcome of these endeavours is not possible due to the lack of additional sources. However, later evidence on Busia's South Africa stance suggests that Pretoria probably had provided him with some assistance. In particular, after his


239 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 9/7/69', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.3 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans).


election to the presidency, Busia adopted Houphouët-Boigny’s Dialogue approach, details of which are examined below. In a speech before the National Assembly on 10 December 1970, Busia articulately argued that “dialogue and armed pressure are not necessarily incompatible”. Yet, Accra’s pro-Discussion attitude was contradictory, because the government was divided on the issue. While Victor Owusu, Foreign Minister from 1969 to 1971, rejected this approach, his successor up until 1972, William Ofori-Atta, favoured Dialogue, and this resulted in conflicting statements by Busia and his Foreign Minister during 1971. Given his pro-Discussion view, Ofori-Atta was invited by Prime Minister Vorster in March 1971 to visit the Republic. This visit never materialised, possibly because Accra judged it to be too great a risk in view of Africa’s condemnation of apartheid and the negative reactions for Ghana. In any event, Accra’s unstable pro-Discussion stance ended in January 1972, when Busia was ousted in a military coup.

**Gabon**

In comparison to the Ghanaian case, Pretoria’s military’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War resulted in a strong and long-lasting military bond with Gabon’s President Bongo through to the 1980s, examples of which will be provided later in this and the next chapter. However, whereas these case studies clearly show that Bongo had no qualms in interacting with Pretoria’s men from the military and happily accepted their armaments, he felt continuously uncomfortable with the visible and diplomatic style pursued by the Department of Foreign Affairs, despite his acceptance of their technical assistance and support for developmental/investment projects. In November 1974, for example, Under-Secretary Pretorius noted that Bongo was “cautious at all times” regarding contact with Pretoria and that he carefully watched the “reaction” from fellow OAU members. Even though Gabon’s representatives no longer verbally attacked Pretoria at international gatherings, as the report further stated, their UN ambassador still voted in favour of anti-apartheid resolutions. Similarly, in view of his OAU Presidency from July 1977 to July 1978, Pretoria’s man in charge of the agricultural project in Gabon, examined later in this section, described Bongo’s viewpoint: “He again mentioned that it would be appreciated if during this period a low profile policy is followed...

---

242 The speech is contained in DFA, 1/106/3, AJ 1970.
243 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 5.
by South Africa, as he will be open to criticism and will at times be obliged to react in a manner not necessarily or truly representing his way of thinking”.

The first example of Bongo’s co-operation with Pretoria’s military as a follow-up to the Nigerian Civil War was the latter’s provision of armament supplies in April 1970 and early 1971. The initial act of delivering three T6 planes, light Harvard planes of North American origin, used for pilot training, low-intensity warfare and border surveillance, from Pretoria to Libreville can be interpreted as a gesture of thanks in return for Bongo’s co-operation during that war. The journey extended from 23 to 26 April and went via Namibia, Angola and then over the sea before reaching Gabonese territory. Mirroring the alliance established during the Nigerian Civil War, the Portuguese provided aircraft to escort the planes across Angola and made a frigate available in the area where the planes would fly across the sea. The French provided a plane to accompany the squadron from the north of Angola to its final destination. On 9 November 1970, through the services of Loots, Bongo appealed to P.W. Botha’s anticommmunist stance to convince him of Gabon’s need for an additional three T6 planes, spare parts for them and coastal patrol boats. In particular, Bongo argued that Gabon was surrounded by the communist-inspired countries Cameroon, the Congolese Republic and Equatorial Guinea. Either judging Bongo’s argumentation as reasonable and/or seeing this is an opportunity to reinforce the military link with Gabon, P.W. Botha replied on 2 December: “It gives me pleasure to inform you that I have approved of both requests and that the items in question will be delivered to you in accordance with arrangements to be made by Maj Genl Loots in consultation with our mutual friend Mr Beaupré [sic]. No charge will be levied on these items”. Regarding the naval equipment, P.W. Botha informed Bongo that he could not, or was not prepared to, assist and proposed that he contact Paris, arguing “that the French Government might be in a better position to assist you in this regard”. In contrast, he appears to have had sufficient stock to supply him with three additional T6 planes, with anticommmunism appearing to have been P.W. Botha’s guiding principle in providing them, as

---

reflected in his letter to Bongo of 17 February 1971, acknowledging the letter of thanks for the T6 delivery: “With regard to the communist threat which is the cause of your serious concern, I wish to assure you that we are equally concerned. I am sure that we shall all have to bend our efforts towards a better understanding amongst our friends of our several and mutual problems”.

The military arrangements between Pretoria and Libreville outlined above were not known to the public until March 1995, when the *Weekly Mail & Guardian* reported them through a reference to a commander in the Gabonese defence force who, however, merely stated that “South Africa [had] supplied a number of military aircraft to his country” in the late 1960s.

**Ivory Coast**

In contrast to the relations with Ghana and Gabon, as a result of the military’s engagement in the Nigerian Civil War, the ensuing contact with Ivory Coast was by far the most significant success for Pretoria. Given Houphouët-Boigny’s high profile among Africa’s leaders and the backing he enjoyed by France, this allowed him to take a much more prominent stance and to openly advocate Dialogue with Pretoria. In November 1969, at the opening of a congress of the country’s ruling Democratic Party, he raised that issue for the first time, clearly influenced by the Nigerian Civil War that was still in operation. One year later, on 4 November 1970, he reiterated his stance at a well-attended international press conference, and again at a widely noted press conference on 28 April 1971: “Apartheid is South Africa’s domestic problem. It is not through the means of force that we will ensure its disappearance in the Republic of South Africa. (...) allow me to come back (...) to the necessity of dialogue with South Africa.”

Once Houphouët-Boigny had made the bold step of openly promoting Dialogue with Pretoria, he paved the way for other African states to follow with less hesitation, for example Ghana’s Busia in December 1970. At the same time, the counting game of which African countries were pro- and anti-Dialo gue was a tricky issue, with speculation abounding in the South African media and also in the contemporary literature on which African leader had already talked

---


to Pretoria. The South African government, on occasion, deliberately fuelled these conjectures, although it had to avoid openly exposing any African state involved in Dialogue to political pressure from other African nations, as this would endanger the existing relationship.\footnote{Ivory Coast, a target for S.A. diplomacy', The Star 31 March 1970 (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 2); 'Willing to talk to S. Africa', The Argus 29 March 1971 (DFA, 1/181/3, Vol. 1).} For instance, on 7 May 1969, Minister Muller told Parliament that Pretoria was in contact with more African states than he was able to mention.\footnote{Barratt. 1970. South Africa’s Outward Movement, p.134.} This, however, was also due to the fact that the Department of Foreign Affairs was not alone in trying to establish relations with African states, as has been shown, and was not always fully informed of the activities by its sister department. Contradictory statements from a minister and the head of state, for example in the case of Ghana, gave further impetus to the controversy. The features of politically unstable African countries and personalised African politics embodied in the head of state caused additional problems. Previously pro-Discourse countries, such as Ghana and Madagascar, could change sides overnight because of a coup d’état. Finally, the concept of Dialogue was not uniformly and unconditionally interpreted. Several African countries committed themselves unreservedly to the concept, while others wanted Dialogue to encompass all aspects of Pretoria’s apartheid policy, including domestic ones.\footnote{Barratt. 1971. Dialogue in Africa, pp.10ff.; Barratt. 1972. South Africa’s Outward Policy, pp.55ff.; Legum. 1972. Dialogue, pp.66-68; Preiss, David Cecil. 1973. The Bridge and the Laager: South Africa’s Relations with Africa, with Specific Reference to Malawi. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs: 8; Von der Ropp. 1971. Chancen eines Dialoges zwischen der Republik Südafrika und dem schwarzen Afrika, pp.73ff.; ‘Conflicting Reactions’, Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71: C32ff. Newspaper clippings of that period: ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/A2/5/3; PV.451, File 1/11/35/1.} The latter aspect that contributed to the confusion is now briefly demonstrated by the case of Uganda.

**Uganda**

Within months after his assumption of power through a military coup, Colonel Idi Amin sought direct contact with Pretoria, and the first step in this direction took place in April 1971. While attending a conference in the United States that month, a Ugandan participant approached Professor John Phillips from the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg with the message that Amin “would be prepared to meet Mr. Vorster if given the opportunity”.\footnote{Letter from John F.V. Phillips to John Vorster, Pietermaritzburg, 4 May 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1).} Phillips duly conveyed this to the Prime Minister, who subsequently invited Amin in September 1971, to visit South Africa. In his reply, Amin suggested the deployment of a “10 man delegation made up of students, outstanding politicians and other prominent Ugandans to study conditions prevailing in South Africa and to make a report to me which will also be submitted to
the Organisation of African Unity". The evidence we present now suggests that Vorster inquired from the DFA, probably Secretary Fourie, rather than Minister Muller, how to respond and that they, in line with their guiding principle of non-interference in the domestic matters of other countries, advised him not to continue. This, at least plausibly explains why Vorster rejected Amin’s proposal by arguing that it could “only be construed in my country as an attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and would, therefore, be unacceptable”. Their subsequent interchange, partly exposed by the *Rand Daily Mail*, lasted until 5 October 1971, but did not lead to any rapprochement. Amin’s visit to South Africa did not materialise, and he thereafter pursued a hard-line stance against Pretoria.

**Mogadishu Declaration**

Given the confusion among African states regarding Dialogue with South Africa, clarification was necessary and this occurred during 1971/72, at meetings of the OAU and regional African bodies. In January 1971, the issue was discussed at a meeting of the Organisation commune africaine, malgache et mauricienne (OCAMM), an alliance of Francophone African states, in Fort Lamy. The OCAMM final communiqué took note of Houphouët-Boigny’s argument that “there is no other solution than contact and dialogue which will pay in the long run”, but did not propose further action. In mid-June 1971, the OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in Addis Ababa, rejected Dialogue on the grounds that such an exchange of ideas first had to take place within South Africa between the government and the black population. The issue was subsequently tabled at the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa from 20 to 23 June, with Table 4 presenting the voting results.

---

260 Telegram from Idi Amin to John Vorster, Kampala, 28 September 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1; ARCA PV.614, Plakkboek Nr. 53, Bylae A).
261 Telegram from John Vorster to Idi Amin, Pretoria, 1 October 1971, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1).
262 ‘Uganda visit a lost chance?’, *Rand Daily Mail* 4 October 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1).
263 Telegram from Idi Amin to John Vorster, Kampala, 3 October 1971; letter from John Vorster to Idi Amin, Pretoria, 5 October 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1).
264 Organisation commune africaine et malgache (OCAM) from 1965 to 1970.
The final death knell to the Dialogue debate came at the meeting of the Conference of East and Central African States from 18 to 20 October 1971 in Mogadishu, whose Declaration read:

We (...) therefore do declare (...) that there is no way left to the liberation of Southern Africa except armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to give our fullest support; that the policy of dialogue advanced by a small group of African leaders which has already been rejected by the OAU is again rejected because it is a ploy to hoodwink the African people.\(^\text{267}\)

In this context, it is important to discuss the visit of the Progressive Party’s Colin Eglin and Helen Suzman to Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia, only days before the OAU adopted the Mogadishu Declaration.\(^\text{268}\) Regarding their motivation for that journey, it must be borne in mind that none of their party’s members had previously toured Africa. In recent correspondence, Eglin explained that it reflected his strategy as the party’s leader from 1971 to increase the Progressive’s popularity that had steadily declined since its establishment in 1959, as is shown in the secondary literature:\(^\text{269}\)

The decision of the Progressive Party to engage in “reaching out to Africa” was part of the broader strategy which I as the new leader in 1971 put forward to establish the political relevance of the Party which, save for Suzman’s victories, had been badly mauled at three successive elections. Indeed its viability as a political party was in question.\(^\text{270}\)

Eglin further argued that by going to Africa they aimed at breaking the foundation of the apartheid ideology:

The Progressive Party’s success in promoting the acceptance of a non-racial democratic South Africa required breaking the racial stereotypes that existed in the minds of the ma-

---


Chapter Four: Prime Minister Vorster, 1966-78

Majority of white South Africans. In this “Africa” was very relevant. It was important to show that white South Africans representing an anti-apartheid party like the P[rogressive Party] were welcome in ‘black’ Africa. It was important to come back with a message to white South Africans that the black leaders we met were not anti white or anti South Africa, but that they were anti the policy of apartheid that treated black people as lesser citizens.271

Finally, Eglin convincingly rejected the idea that the Progressives went to the African countries to counter further economic sanctions against South Africa “to do the bidding of Anglo American [the party’s main financier] or any other business house”: “While the PP representatives did not shy away from the fact that they did not believe comprehensive economic sanctions was the appropriate policy to apply, indeed hardly any of the countries were applying this policy in practice, the issue of sanctions was not the main thrust of our discussions”.272

At the same time, whether intended or not, both Eglin’s and Suzman’s initiatives in Africa favoured the English-speaking business community, as any attempt to alleviate South Africa’s isolation benefited them.

Returning to the analysis of the success of Pretoria’s Dialogue, of the six African countries that had approved that policy at the OAU Summit in June 1971, only Gabon and the Ivory Coast could really be considered as major successes in Pretoria’s Dialogue policy. Regarding Madagascar, it was not overtly dependent on South Africa in economic terms and could have therefore refused Dialogue. Having nevertheless won it over was thus a partial success, partial because it could have never found a large following due to its relatively low political standing in the African context. The economic dependence of both Lesotho and Malawi, finally, left them with little choice but to establish open contact with Pretoria, although Banda’s conservative political style greatly favoured this move. In any event, by the end of 1971, the Dialogue policy had stalled and received another blow when Tsiranana was ousted in the coup d’état in May 1972.273 Only Houphouët-Boigny firmly stood by his Dialogue stance until the mid-1970s, for example evidenced by the visit of his Minister of State, the Director of Cabinet and one parliamentarian to South Africa from 6 to 8 October 1971, meeting Vorster and P.W. Botha.274 While the reasons for the pro-Discourse stance of Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho,

271 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
272 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
Madagascar and Malawi at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa have been outlined above, what follows is an examination of the position taken by Mauritius.

**Mauritius**

The stance of Mauritius at the OAU Summit in June 1971 can be partly explained with the role played by Gaëtan Duval. As the leader of the main opposition party until 1969, he campaigned against Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister since the island’s independence from Great Britain in March 1968. During 1969, in an attempt to quell this opposition, Ramgoolam included Duval’s party in a government of national unity and Duval became Minister of External Affairs, Tourism and Emigration. In this capacity, and in contrast to the prime minister, he openly advocated Dialogue with Pretoria and paid a visit to South Africa in May 1971. As the OAU Addis Ababa Summit took place shortly thereafter, it is likely that Duval influenced the stance that was taken by the Mauritian representative. Besides this component, however, Mauritius’ position at that OAU meeting must primarily be seen against the background of its economic dependence on South Africa.

Trade and tourism were the main aspects of interaction between the two countries. Regarding trade, this had been a dominant feature for a long time, illustrated by the presence of a South African Honorary Trade Commissioner on the island since 1957, a post that remained during the remaining period under review. Mauritius was economically dependent on South Africa for its tea export, second only to sugar, while it was South Africa’s largest export market in Africa beyond southern Africa, rivalled only by Zaire (Appendixes B and C). The dependency of Mauritius gradually increased and, in early 1971, South Africa raised the country’s tea quota. In the context of Dialogue, Pretoria did not need to make specific use of that situation to demonstrate to Ramgoolam that this approach was in his country’s own interest; Ramgoolam already followed the prescribed line, cognisant of Pretoria’s ability to use the dependency factor as a means of leverage. In fact, such a situation occurred in 1973, although under slightly different circumstances, as the next section demonstrates. Still in the domain of increasing trade activities between the two countries, the DFA files record a number of reciprocal economic missions from the late 1960s. Among them, the Durban Chamber of Commerce’s Trade Mission to Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius in September/October 1971

---


276 See the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of External Affairs/DFA).


deserves special mention. It is mentioned here, and not in connection with Pretoria’s contacts with Madagascar or Reunion, because Mauritius was the prime motivation for the Chamber’s visit, and this lay in the person of its Manager from 1965 to 1984, Kenneth Hobson. Similarly to the Malawi missions that were mentioned in the previous section, he had personal connections with and knowledge of Mauritius, because he was married to a Mauritian and therefore was generally well acquainted with the Indian Ocean islands. It is justified to cite these reasons in order to clarify the Chamber’s subsequent missions to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion in October 1973, as well as to Reunion, Mauritius and Malawi in April/May 1979.

Turning to tourism, the other factor of importance in South Africa’s economic exchange with Mauritius, South African Airways had opened an office on the island in October 1969 and subsequently flew to Port Louis four times weekly. Two of these flights served as an essential stopover en route to Australia, with the island becoming an important locus within SAA’s international network, an aspect of South Africa’s foreign relations with Africa examined more closely in the next section. The other two flights served the South African holidaymaker, as they simultaneously operated a service to Reunion, another sought-after holiday destination in the western Indian Ocean. In recognition of this region being an important holiday destination for South Africans, the hotel chain Southern Sun had already become active in Madagascar during 1968, and now began to show an interest in a hotel project on Mauritius. After the positive outcome of feasibility studies during 1970 for such an investment, Southern Sun approached Jan Bouwer in May 1971 to assess Credit Guarantee’s willingness to insure a credit with conditions similar to those of the Nosy Be project in Madagascar. The estimated cost was 2.5 million Rand, with 1 million being equity capital from Southern Sun and the rest a long-term loan from Credit Guarantee. Bouwer informed the Department of Commerce of this development, while Southern Sun Chairman Sol Kerzner “mentioned” the project to DFA Under-Secretary Pretorius in April 1972. Apart from these primary documents, there was a paucity of additional evidence, and the sparse information on that project therefore does not allow a pronounced statement on the intensity of Pretoria’s interaction with Southern Sun in this instance. The outcome of this project, as well as an assessment of the interest by national

---

279 Correspondence with Geoffrey Tyler, 27 February 2002.
281 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
intelligence and the military is provided in the next section on Secret Diplomacy, as their activities took place during that phase. After this excursion to Mauritius, with the purpose of illustrating why it adopted a pro-Discourse stance at the important OAU Summit in June 1971, let us now return to the implications of that policy for the future course of South Africa’s foreign policy towards black Africa beyond southern Africa.

The evidence presented so far has revealed that Pretoria’s Dialogue originated in the military’s activities, in conjunction with France, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, during the Nigerian Civil War, causing Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny to make the pronouncements of November 1969 and November 1970 in favour of this policy. As stated at the outset of this section, Dialogue was therefore not the result of any diplomatic initiative, even though the DFA became part of the military’s activities. In comparison to the DFA’s achievements with the Outward Movement, namely the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi, the military’s approach of achieving its goals through the means of power was much more successful, as illustrated by a country as far away and politically influential as the Ivory Coast, which could be won. Yet, the foreign affairs ministry’s policy of providing both technical assistance and support for development/investment projects did not predispose them to achieve such results. As Deon Fourie appropriately suggested: “DMI was prepared to take risks. They were prepared to go into places that the diplomats, because of their cultural attitude [i.e. their diplomatic rules], would not go in without following the normal channels.”284 In addition, Minister Muller’s relatively tame personality was also responsible for his department being overtaken. It is not difficult to imagine that this caused jealousy among Pretoria’s foreign service officials, as their role as the country’s principal foreign policy makers had been severely and, what was even worse, successfully, undercut. Evidently not prepared to accept this fate, they sold the military’s achievements as their own. While the DFA had not been in a position to stop the military’s Africa adventures, it now began to reap the fruits of these relatively risky manoeuvres and began to set foot in countries that otherwise would not have been accessible, Gabon in particular. A closer look at these inter-departmental rivalries resulting from the military’s participation in the Nigerian Civil War constitutes our current interest, helping us to understand Pretoria’s subsequent foreign relations with this West African state.

283 Letter from the Director of Southern Sun to Jan Bouwer, Johannesburg, 10 May; letter from Jan Bouwer to the Secretary, Department of Commerce, Johannesburg, 12 May 1971 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 1); DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 4.

284 Interview with Deon S. Fourie, 22 April 1999.
Hawks versus Doves

The role played by South Africa in the Nigerian Civil War provides an illuminating illustration of the frictions that occurred between the militants and the moderates, the hawks and the doves respectively, in the formulation and implementation of Pretoria’s Africa policy. In this example, the main opponents were the military, the hawks, represented by P.W. Botha, Fritz Loots and Neels van Tonder, against Minister Hilgard Muller and Secretary Brand Fourie from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the doves. The military tried to build a military network with friendly African states, while the establishment of diplomatic relations with them was only a ‘nice-to-have’ by-product, as revealed by van Tonder’s note of 29 October 1969 to P.W. Botha: “at present we will not try to build up a diplomatic representation between the R.S.A. and West African states, but rather a non-official mission”. For the foreign affairs ministry, however, the list of priorities was precisely the opposite. The foreign service officials’ profession was to maintain diplomatic relations between states and to establish such contact was their primary aim, and while military co-operation might be a means to that end, it was not the ultimate goal. On the French side, Jacques Foccart and Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré fully shared the military’s views, as they also had military and intelligence backgrounds, in other words realist worldviews. In Mauricheau-Beaupré’s hand-written letter of 19 November 1969 to P.W. Botha, these socio-ideological affinities are very pronounced. Given their importance, an extensive quotation is justified:

I am well aware of the fact that you, like me, are contemptuous towards laurel-wreaths; (...) The Trojan horse that holds great danger for you, a nationalist Afrikaner, is, as far as I know, not black terrorists, but Anglophile views. (...) What can we do? To take away all the privileges and brotherly relations that you had with our friends [Bongo and Houphouët-Boigny] and replace those with relations that have a “diplomatic” form? (...) You, an old Afrikaner, should know, to what extent your black brothers are not considered as normal strangers. There is no “foreign affairs” possible with them (...). When I accepted, almost two years ago, on your formal demand, to introduce him [Muller] to HB [Houphouët-Boigny] in Geneva, I knew that I made a mistake and he himself gave me the proof: the only specific subject that he seriously dealt with HB, was his desire to have his name published in a communiqué after the meeting had taken place ... (and HB judged him adequately, do not be in doubt). (...) it is really sad to come to such a position with regard to less important things such as the possible establishment of diplomatic relations, that is but an unimportant factor of that which we must do. This will also happen, but at the right time. (....) You have to have a real Africa policy with men and means to execute it.

Having introduced the differences in attitude and behaviour of the military and the foreign service corps, we turn now to an examination of the implications of these during the final phase of the Nigerian Civil War.

As we have seen, Fritz Loots was P.W. Botha’s personal envoy to West African heads of state, while Neels van Tonder, at the Paris Embassy, was charged with co-ordinating Pretoria’s activities with the relevant French authorities. P.W. Botha had initially given permission for the Department of Foreign Affairs to utilise van Tonder’s services for its agricultural project in Gabon, our focus later in this section. This facility-sharing deal, however, proved to be difficult from the beginning and led to disputes over who had the right and permission to do what and through whom, as illustrated with three examples. First, during his meeting with Mauricheau-Beaupré in July 1969, Hilgard Muller questioned van Tonder’s presence, even though he relied on the latter’s co-ordinating and translating services. Second, regarding Pretoria’s initial armaments supply to Biafra, P.W. Botha rejected a request from Houphouët-Boigny to this effect that the Department of Foreign Affairs had handed over to him, and was only prepared to accept when that same request came through Mauricheau-Beaupré. Third, after his Paris meeting with Houphouët-Boigny in July 1969, Muller had a lengthy conversation with van Tonder, pressuring him to co-operate with Ambassador Burger. According to van Tonder, Muller said “that it would be a pity, but if I could not work with the Ambassador, he would be obliged to talk with Minister [P.W.] Botha, whom he considered to be one of his best friends in Cabinet, and he would ask him to take me away from here”. In reply, van Tonder “assured him [Muller] that it would make things much easier for me if I did it in cooperation with the Ambassador [Burger], but that I had no confidence in their [foreign service officers] good faith. I got the impression that they were more concerned about me trespassing on their territory, rather than an attempt to co-operate with me”.

This tension between the foreign service officials and the military steadily developed into open confrontation after the end of the Nigerian Civil War, with the Department of Foreign Affairs trying to escape from its perceived position of weakness. It appears that Secretary Brand Fourie, in confirmation of what has been said in Chapter 2, now took the lead and side-

lined Muller in the Department’s dealings with Prime Minister Vorster. During a meeting with van Tonder at the end of May 1970, Fourie argued that “we ought to build our own communication with African states because tomorrow or the next day Foccart and Beaupré [sic] may not be there and then we will have no contact with these countries”.291 He acknowledged “the extraordinary manner in which initial contact was made with West African states” and the “particular role” of Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupré, as well as “that the SA Defence Force (…) [had] organised this contact and has kept it going since then”.292 Nonetheless, he wanted to use direct political and diplomatic contacts as the channel of communication between South Africa and West African states. With this in mind, Fourie urged a direct meeting between Bongo, Houphouët-Boigny, Muller and another, unspecified, South African minister in Europe.293 For both van Tonder and Mauricheau-Beaupré, this request was the antithesis of their approach towards African political matters and they felt that the foreign affairs ministry would reap the fruits of the seeds that they had sown. For example, in his letter of 19 November 1970 to P.W. Botha, Mauricheau-Beaupré speaks of “the workers of the 25th hour”,294 referring to the Department of Foreign Affairs’ intention of invading their field of activity at the last minute and benefiting from their work.

Towards the end of May 1970, Brand Fourie’s intention of setting up the above-mentioned meeting in Europe, notably with Mauricheau-Beaupré’s assistance, proved central to the divisions between the foreign affairs ministry and the military. In particular, the Frenchman wanted to know the identity of the unspecified South African minister, but Fourie either was not prepared to, or could not divulge this, causing Mauricheau-Beaupré to say that he “unfortunately” had to come to the conclusion that this was an attempt to “bypass him and the responsible French authorities”. He therefore requested a direct meeting with Vorster in South Africa “with the purpose of personally discussing the matter with the Prime Minister in detail”.295 Fourie flatly rejected this request. According to van Tonder’s notes on his meeting with Fourie, the latter accused Mauricheau-Beaupré of having dragged South Africa into the

---

already lost Nigerian Civil War and “wanted to know who Mr. Beaupré [sic] thinks he is to dictate to us, and where he thinks he comes from to demand to see the Prime Minister.”

Brand Fourie’s attitude and behaviour caused great concern among the military. In a letter to P.W. Botha on 29 May 1970, Loots expressed the following:

It must be realised that Mr. Foccart’s African Affairs organisation, in which Mr. Beaupré [sic] plays a leading role, holds the key to our further contact with, in particular, West Africa, but also to other parts of Africa, (...). If the Department of Foreign Affairs thinks that they could get by without Mr. Beaupré’s [sic] help, then, in my view, they are making a mistake as they don’t realise the extent of his organisation’s influence in West Africa. This can only result in the collapse of everything that was built up with difficulty in the past years. I want to, in all seriousness, warn that refusing to allow Mr. Beaupré [sic] to meet the Prime Minister in the RSA before his departure could have serious repercussions for us. He shows no interest at all in discussing matters with Mr. Fourie, or even Dr. Muller. (...). I am afraid that if he is forced to work with Foreign Affairs, instead of DMI, as in the past, he would end his co-operation with the RSA.

Although the military worried about the possible negative impact on South Africa’s future relations with West Africa and France, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and particularly Secretary Fourie, appear to have won the upper hand and convinced Vorster to henceforth use diplomatic channels of communication, possibly by citing the military’s failed involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. This shift was not well received by Bongo, who, on 9 November 1970, wrote to P.W. Botha: “I do not agree with the new dispositions that seem to have been adopted by your government with regard to the form that our future relations should take. I will think about it and propose to soon write a letter to your Prime Minister in which I will convey him my feelings.”

Mauricheau-Beaupré also disproved, writing in his lengthy and hand-written letter, dated 19 November, to P.W. Botha:

you had a system of relations with HB [Houphouët-Boigny] that worked very well. (...) Now you have nothing left. I nevertheless cannot believe that your diplomats would carry their lack of self-respect so far that they would (...) still ask me to help them. (...) He [Houphouët-Boigny] again reassured me that, from his side, I still was his only mediator regarding the relations with you, i.e. with you or your Prime Minister. But if the situation has not changed in the meantime, I will tell him, if he asks me to go to Pretoria, that I nevertheless prefer to abstain.

---


Despite these intimidating warnings from both Libreville and Paris, the evidence on later developments suggests that Pretoria’s inter-departmental clashes did not seriously affect the link with Gabon. The military remained the key player, as we shall see later in this chapter, but the foreign affairs ministry came to play a more significant part, probably due to Fourie’s insistence. In particular, it now became involved in providing Gabon with technical assistance and support in the context of two development/investment projects, which are examined below. Regarding contact with the Ivory Coast, the military’s role appears to have been curbed, but this did not automatically allow the Department of Foreign Affairs to establish itself more prominently than during the Nigerian Civil War, when there had been some contact between Muller and Houphouët-Boigny. In contrast to Gabon, there are no traces of technical assistance or development/investment projects being launched.

As we argued earlier, the military’s activities in the Nigerian Civil War and the resulting successes in establishing contact with both Gabon and the Ivory Coast were met with jealousy by the foreign service officers. In response, they not only claimed Dialogue to have been their work, but also tried to benefit from the situation brought about by the military’s endeavours. This is amply illustrated by the Department of Foreign Affairs’ engagement in Gabon with the use of its usual levers, technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. It is true that some contact had already been established during the second half of 1969 and without any apparent connection to the Nigerian Civil War. Yet, the DFA’s activities expanded significantly in the wake of that war, developments we now examine.

**Gabon**

The DFA’s initial contact with Gabon dates from 1969 and involved a visit of three Gabonese doctors to the Republic. This took place as a result from a trip to Gabon earlier in the same year by medical authority Chris Barnard and Jack Penn, a renowned plastic surgeon. Barnard subsequently informed the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the South Africa Foundation, of which he was a Trustee, of their wish to invite two Gabonese doctors to South Africa. In the end, three medical doctors visited the Republic during August 1969.300 This account is on the Foundation’s first appearance in the framework of Pretoria’s foreign relations with the black African states of interest in our study. Given that we did not have access to the Foundation’s archival material and that we could not interview Chris Barnard,301 the motivation of the organised business association for this approach could not be ascertained. On 20 August 1969, as a likely outcome of the above medical visit, Minister Muller informed President

---


Bongo accepted this offer and requested that representatives from the mining, agricultural, industrial, fisheries, road-planning and pharmacy sectors be included. That mission, however, was only deployed in April 1970, probably because the military did not want to have DFA officials on the spot who might disturb their interaction with Bongo in the context of the Nigerian Civil War. Thus, and confirming this assumption, during a preparatory meeting for the economic mission on 25 March 1970, Fourie regretted what he called “unfortunate delay”. In contrast, DFA Deputy Secretary Montgomery had led a different mission to Gabon from 21 to 27 September 1969, comprising a SAA representative, two officials from the Department of Agriculture, the Inspector in the Department of Mining, his working colleague Shearar and van Tonder. Whereas the economic mission could not take place due to the military’s likely intervention, this one was evidently not considered problematic, as, according to Montgomery’s report, the entire visit had been organised by Mauricheau-Beaupré, the military’s go-between. In other words, the military was not against any Department of Foreign Affairs involvement per se, but it wanted to determine how and when this took place.

The purpose of the Montgomery mission was to “establish contact” and to obtain information on Gabon’s requirements from Pretoria. A meeting was held with Bongo on 23 September 1969, and visits were made to several sites where South Africa could possibly provide assistance. Montgomery concluded that assistance was urgently needed to upgrade the existing transport infrastructure, while mentioning agriculture and mining.

However, and for reasons we could not establish from the DFA files, the September 1969 mission did not result in a follow-up exercise, while Muller’s original proposal of sending an economic mission was now given preferential treatment. As mentioned above, a preparatory meeting for such a mission took place on 25 March 1970, attended by four officials from the DFA and nine from the Departments of Trade, Finance, Agriculture and Mining, as well as from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). Fourie itemised agriculture, mining, trade, housing and pharmaceutical equipment as the priorities of the mission that

---

301 He died in September 2001, at the age of 78.
305 DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 1.
spent the week from 12 to 18 April 1970 in Gabon, led by the Secretary for Trade, but funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{307} The Deputy Secretary for Trade, van Tonder, the Agricultural Counsellor at the Embassy in Paris, Jan George Boyazoglou, a representative from the CSIR’s National Building Research Institute and three members from the private business sector involved in mining and pharmaceutical drugs made up the mission to ascertain Gabon’s needs in the field of technical assistance, an operation aimed at impressing President Bongo.\textsuperscript{308} After their return, the government officials gathered to discuss the outcome. From the outset, Fourie stated that Gabon’s “needs are unlimited” and the crux of the matter was to determine how assistance might be provided in a “practical manner”, but without “burdening the Treasury too much”. In consequence, emphasis was put on the provision of medical services, assistance for stock-breeding, the establishment of a game park and mining.\textsuperscript{309} In June 1970, presumably after closer examination, the Department of Foreign Affairs offer looked somewhat different, entailing the provision of medical services, assistance for the development of stock-breeding, a supply of seeds to improve agricultural production and technical assistance to preserve the fauna.\textsuperscript{310} After Bongo’s acceptance of the offer,\textsuperscript{311} Pretoria deployed a “technical assistance mission” from 27 September to 3 October, composed of Under-Secretary Best, van Tonder, Boyazoglou and four medical doctors, for the further clarification of Gabon’s needs.\textsuperscript{312} In reflection of its composition, the mission concluded that medical and agricultural assistance should begin with immediate effect.\textsuperscript{313} After a brief outline of the former, Pretoria’s major agricultural project will be our main focus.

Concluding that “South Africa can play an important role in providing aid to Gabon without excessive expenditure” the medical doctors that were part of the mission recommended to supply vaccines and drugs to combat “the major endemic diseases”, to invite Gabonese medical officials to South Africa for an exchange of experience, to despatch medical experts to Gabon to solve particular medical problems and to provide treatment in South Africa to Ga-
bonese patients with special medical problems. Evidently finding Pretoria’s support, the relevant government authorities organised a variety of medical supplies. The vaccines, pharmaceutical products, blood plasma, vehicles for transportation and two mobile X-ray units were subsequently delivered to Gabon in November 1970. Fourie supported all of the remaining proposals and concrete offers were made to Bongo, mainly through the South African Embassy in Paris. Yet, in February 1973, foreign affairs official Glenn Babb reported on the assistance provided thus far, stating that the X-ray units “proved to be white elephants”; the visit of Gabonese medical teams had been abandoned, no further action had been taken with regard to the visits by South African medical teams to Gabon and the training of Gabonese doctors in South Africa proved too difficult because of the language problems. That situation and Bongo’s reaction in later cases of co-operation with Pretoria justifies attributing to him a large degree of egocentric behaviour, only showing real interest in projects that were to his own personal benefit or that strengthened his political standing. For that reason he preferred dealing with the military, as they provided armament supplies. Consequently, Bongo’s main interest regarding the DFA’s offers, examined below, centred on the agricultural project in his home area, and he wanted to obtain his own personal doctor from South Africa. Even though the foreign affairs ministry had approved that request, so as to “have the President’s ear day and night”, it was not possible to find a suitable person, particularly one who could speak French.

**OGAPROV and other Projects**

While Bongo does not appear to have been particularly keen on the DFA’s medical assistance to Gabon, what became known as the OGAPROV agricultural project was relatively close to the president’s heart and forms a case study on Pretoria’s provision of technical assistance to Gabon.

---

314 ‘Report of the medical mission to Gabon, September 1970 by Prof. F. Daubenton and Prof. A.B. Bull (Members of Council) and Dr. J. Terblanche (Honorary Registrar, College of Physicians, Surgeons and Gynaecologists of South Africa) and Brig. J. Gilliand (Department of Health)’, October 1970 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 2).


African states. Similar to the interdepartmental problems experienced towards the end of and after the Nigerian Civil War, as seen above, the establishment and the maintenance of this project brought to the fore differences in approach as to how foreign relations should be conducted and the nature of their content.

The English translation of the acronym OGAPROV stood for Gabonese Office for the Improvement and Production of Meat.\footnote{OGAPROV: Office gabonais d’amélioration et de production de viande.} It was a show model for Pretoria’s technical assistance, demonstrating “South Africa’s core competency in agricultural research, cattle breeding under very difficult circumstances”, as former DFA official Runge summarised in 1999.\footnote{Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.} It was an ambitious project, also in terms of finance, with the credit for the first five years amounting to 800,000 Rand.\footnote{‘Report on the agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27th September to 4th October 1970 (Special Report No. 34)’, from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 7 October 1970, pp.3f. (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 1).} It bore considerable significance within the DFA’s aim of impressing leaders from black African states with that kind of assistance to win their political approval of apartheid, and we will show in the next chapter that it even appealed to other African countries, such as the Comoros. Jan Boyazoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Paris, was Pretoria’s man responsible for all issues relating to agricultural assistance to Gabon, with a focus on the OGAPROV project. OGAPROV comprised a separate ranch for both cattle and goats, as well as two sheep farms in Franceville and nearby Okouma, as well as a small model farm situated near Franceville, capital of Bongo’s home province Haut-Ogooué in the west of Gabon, with subtropical fruit and pastures for the use of the president. The project, “planned to be self-supporting after 5 years”, was intended to reduce Gabon’s dependency on the import of meat,\footnote{‘Technical aid to Gabon’, from Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 October 1970, p.1 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 1).} with Pretoria’s foreign service officials attempting to make inroads to Bongo with this practical aspect of their technical assistance. Furthermore, Boyazoglou chose the area around Franceville as the location of the project by arguing that this combined “the best potential and possibilities for the successful introduction of imported animal material and for the implantation of the first cross-breeding units, particularly for cattle and sheep”.\footnote{‘Report on the agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27th September to 4th October 1970 (Special Report No. 34)’, from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 7 October 1970, pp.3f. (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 1).} However, it is a reasonable assumption that it was selected largely because Franceville was Bongo’s home-town, and the Department of Foreign Affairs therefore stood a good chance of appealing to the president. Boyazoglou suggested the Frenchman Jean Muxart as the director of the project, because he had already been involved in similar projects for the French development agency, and because he considered him as “po-
liticaly quite secure” and “as a friend of South Africa”. Proving this assumption correct, six months after his retirement in May 1976, Muxart was decorated with the lowest class of the Order of Good Hope award, the highest award with which South Africa honours citizens of other countries, “for his unselfish and devoted contribution to O.G.A.P.R.O.V.” Having introduced the principal characteristics of that project, let us now turn to the developments that led to its establishment. This also serves the purpose of again highlighting the conflict between the foreign affairs ministry and Mauricheau-Beaupré, this time as Bongo’s adviser, dating back to the final phase of the Nigerian Civil War.

The OGAPROV project was the result of Pretoria’s decision to follow the recommendations of the technical assistance mission that visited Gabon in September/October 1970 by providing assistance for the development of stock-breeding. Expressing an interest in Pretoria’s proposals, Bongo formally established OGAPROV in April 1971 and a management board was established. The DFA designated Jan Boyazoglou and the Agricultural Attaché Julian A. Thomas, seconded to him at the Paris Embassy, to represent South Africa on this board. Subsequently, the South African input was co-ordinated through the Department of Agricultural Technical Services, the Agricultural Section at the Paris Embassy and the DFA’s Africa Division. The early days of the project were overshadowed by clashes between the parties involved in OGAPROV, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs and the relevant Gabonese authorities vs. people close to Mauricheau-Beaupré. According to his report dated August 1971, Boyazoglou initially took decisions “in agreement with, and in many cases on the proposals of” one of Bongo’s personal advisers and two officials from the Gabonese Ministry of Agriculture. While Mauricheau-Beaupré “and his organisation [French intelligence agency SDECE] were only indirectly involved” at that time, this changed after the deployment of more French staff seconded to him and their subsequent engagement in OGAPROV.

Boyazoglou’s correspondence with Pretoria suggests that these Frenchmen tried to give orders to Muxart who, by then, had accepted the South Africans “as his only direct bosses, and might not easily agree to orders from any other source than from us or the Presidency”. Mauricheau-Beaupré was upset by the fact that his men were not given the expected respect, summoning both the DMI’s van Tonder, who happened to be in Gabon, and Boyazoglou.

327 Letter from Albert Bongo to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 7 April; letter from Hilgard Muller to Albert Bongo, Cape Town, 23 April 1971 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 2).
Probably in an attempt not to endanger the link with Bongo by upsetting his adviser, Mauricheau-Beaupré, Boyazoglou smoothed over the situation as one of “a simple misunderstanding between two people who have possibly been wrongly incited by persons who have no say in the whole matter”.

In order to prevent a similar incident, he suggested to Mauricheau-Beaupré, who agreed, that he could second two men to Muxart. At the same time, he wrote to Pretoria: “I personally feel that it would be better if it is we South Africans that pay these people and not Jean’s organisation. (...) After all, the person who pays is the boss!”

That the situation was not entirely clarified suggests that the position of the foreign service officials in Gabon did not give them sufficient leverage to remove Bongo’s adviser from the OGA_PROV project. As a result, the problems persisted. In October 1971, Agricultural Attaché Thomas visited Gabon and stated that “at present these [technical] aspects pose minor problems when compared with the personnel/human difficulties that are handicapping the development of the project”.

For the diplomats, the main problem lay in the clashes between Muxart and Mauricheau-Beaupré’s men seconded to the project, as described by Ambassador Burger to Under-Secretary Best in October 1971: “The position – very simply – is that Jean [Mauricheau-Beaupré] cannot or will not draw the line between matters of high policy and technical detail. We are playing matters as coolly as ever we can. But the position is quite as difficult and complicated as Jean is himself.”

A later DFA report, dated November 1972, even describes Mauricheau-Beaupré as a “refractory personality”.

Towards the end of 1971, for reasons that are not reported, Mauricheau-Beaupré and his men withdrew from the project, and this facilitated the project’s progress. By April 1972, there were some five hundred and thirty cattle on the ranch, most of the equipment had arrived and Boyazoglou concluded that “the essential facilities have been provided, a lot of groundwork has been done, and invaluable experience gained. The project has reached take-off point.”

The 800,000 Rand originally allocated to the project, however, proved to be insufficient and, in April 1972, Boyazoglou indicated that a further 400,000 Rand would most probably be needed “to cover.

---

329 're: visit to Libreville from 28 July to 1 August 1971', from Jan Boyazoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, 2 August 1971, p.6 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 3).
the effect of devaluation (15%), galloping inflation and other unforeseen costs”. The Department of Foreign Affairs nevertheless still felt very strongly about OGAPROV, because, as noted by Best, it “could be a major break-through in the field of intensive beef production in tropical Africa and, as such, an international “first” for South Africa”. Yet, by May 1973, and contrary to the original pessimistic forecast, some 60,000 Rand remained unused and the project was therefore well on track. In the ensuing months, numerous South African missions, usually composed of officials from the Departments of Agricultural Technical Services and Foreign Affairs, as well as Boyazoglou and Thomas from the Paris Embassy, visited the project to follow its progress.

It is not necessary to discuss the technical details of the project, but rather its overall development with the political implications. In late 1973, Boyazoglou and Thomas strongly motivated for an extension of South Africa’s commitment in OGAPROV. By then, the 800,000 Rand were almost depleted, some five hundred hectares of pasture had been cleared and there were approximately six hundred cattle on the ranch. This success was also due to the military’s cost free assistance, indicating an interest on their part to make OGAPROV a success; if Bongo was pleased with this project, this would undoubtedly also benefit them in the long run. In particular, the South African Air Force (SAAF) flew to Libreville numerous times, airlifting cattle and equipment for the OGAPROV project to prevent them from being damaged or stolen during the delivery by sea. Regarding Boyazoglou’s and Thomas’ proposal of continuing with OGAPROV, this hinged on the project’s “spectacular and striking” achievement to produce “beef under an intensive system in tropical conditions, and in a country where domestic animals are hardly known”. Even other African leaders, as well as FAO and European Development Fund (EDF) representatives expressed an interest in

339 The EDF was one of the key instruments of the European Commission’s development assistance in terms of the various Lomé Conventions that it had concluded with African, Caribbean and Pacific states since 1975. See Cosgrove, Carol, James McLeod. 1987. Trade from Aid: A Guide to Opportunities from EEC Funding in
OGAPROV. Boyazoglou and Thomas therefore insisted: “Withdrawal would certainly mean the collapse of the project before it has really had a chance to become autonomous. So far (,), it has become one of the showpieces in the country, thus gaining the confidence and support of certain influential people, including President Bongo”.340 Ambassador Burger concurred with the recommendation to continue with the project.341 As for Bongo himself, during a meeting with Boyazoglou in May 1974, he also stated that “he would welcome the continuation of the co-operation between the two countries”, provided that the project remained confidential.342 In March 1975, summarising the first five years of the project, Boyazoglou and Thomas again emphasised the success of the project.343 However, it was only in November 1976, after Bongo had approved an additional 1 million Rand to his annual contribution of 200,000 Rand, that Minister Muller agreed, in principle, to the allocation of some 3 million Rand for five years, beginning in 1979. This shows the Department of Foreign Affairs’ growing scepticism vis-à-vis President Bongo, due to his behaviour in the current example of supposed co-operation and other cases presented later, whereby he merely tried to drain Pretoria’s finances, while neither coming out in favour of Dialogue nor making a significant financial contribution to the project. Presumably for the same reason, the DFA’s policy was “to gradually reduce our financial participation in this project” and the financial commitments were scaled down to 150,000 Rand annually for both 1976/77 and 1977/78.344 Regarding South Africa’s participation in the OGAPROV project beyond 1979, the date to which access to the DFA’s Gabon files was restricted, the DFA remained engaged until the mid-1980s at the least, such as indicated by Paul Runge, who was Project Liaison Officer in Gabon during 1985/86 and whom we will meet again in the next chapter.345


After this detailed presentation of the DFA's medical and agricultural assistance to Gabon from the early 1970s to win the support of President Bongo, we now examine two development/investment projects in which the Department of Foreign Affairs became involved at around the same time. This is of importance, as this economic leverage supplemented the technical assistance programmes aimed at furthering its political ambitions in Gabon.

Regarding the smaller of the two development/investment projects, the firm LTA informed the Department of Foreign Affairs in August 1971 that it had negotiated a housing project with the Gabonese government earlier that year. The motivation behind LTA's late approach is unclear, but in view of later developments it is possible that the private company was looking for some kind of official backing in case things should become problematic. After all, it seems that this was LTA's first activity in a black African country beyond South Africa's immediate neighbourhood and it therefore lacked the necessary experience. The cost of the envisaged 1,000 housing units was estimated at 6.1 million Rand, for the financing of which LTA had previously approached the IDC, with Credit Guarantee acting as the insurer. In terms of repayment, the Gabonese government objected to the 20% initial cash payment, as required by the IDC. After discussions with Credit Guarantee and the Department of Commerce, but for reasons not mentioned in the documents, the IDC reconsidered the issue and lowered it to 10%. Prior to completion, "not less than 5%" had to be paid, with the remaining 85% to be repaid in ten annual instalments commencing one year after the project's completion. In addition to the soft terms and conditions, the loan was granted at the low interest rate of 6.5%.346 Even though primary documents on the negotiations on these economic matters were not available, it is a reasonable assumption that Pretoria had such a keen interest in closer political contact with Bongo that it was prepared to step in with financial assistance to enhance the chances of LTA getting the job. This supports our argument, presented in Chapter 1, that South Africa's Outward-Looking Policy in Africa was not an expression of the Marxist interpretation of political economy, but, and just the other way round, that the country's economic strength was used to achieve its political aims.

According to a report from Under-Secretary Best, LTA was ready to commence with the construction of the housing units, when President Bongo intervened in late July 1972 "to cancel the arrangement for reasons which are not clear but he apparently felt the houses were too expensive and not suitable for Gabon". Consequently, LTA demanded payment, within three months, for those few houses that had already been built for demonstration purposes. Finding himself in an "embarrassing situation", according to Best’s report, Bongo approached Mau-
richeau-Beaupré, his adviser, for help. He, in turn, approached Neels van Tonder who discussed the matter with Norman Best. Van Tonder's information to Best was for the Department of Foreign Affairs to "intervene with L.T.A. to get them to agree to payment in six months, so as to avoid litigation and consequent harm to relations between Gabon and South Africa". Given his low ranking, Best presented the matter to his Secretary Fourie, who then approached the Department of Commerce. Deputy Secretary François Viljoen also discussed the matter with the LTA Chairman "in veiled terms" and was assured "that L.T.A. would co-operate with the government to the fullest extent possible". The DFA's compliance with the military's instructions to sort out the matter amicably can be interpreted as its intention to endanger neither the now relatively co-operative situation between the two government actors, for example evidenced in the SAAF flights for OGAPROV, nor the continuation of that project as a whole. On its part, LTA contacted Credit Guarantee during July 1972, and they resolved the matter by downplaying the problem and putting the blame on misunderstandings on both sides. Given Pretoria's interest in the housing project, and in terms of the contract that existed between Credit Guarantee and the South African government (Chapter 2), Credit Guarantee's financial involvement was reinsured by Pretoria, as Bongo's behaviour would be considered as a political risk. In consequence, Credit Guarantee could reassure LTA that it would get back its money in any case and this, in the final analysis, is the interest of any private firm. The outstanding payment was finally made by November 1972, when Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee flew to Libreville to "convey apologies" to President Bongo for the problems that had arisen, again showing the importance of that project for Pretoria.

The second development/investment project in Gabon with Department of Foreign Affairs involvement in the early 1970s was the construction of a railway line, in which the firm Roberts Construction of Murray & Roberts was interested. There is no clear evidence, but as we argued in Chapter 2, the relationship between Jan Boyazoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at the Paris Embassy, and Stephen Boyazoglou, Murray & Roberts' Deputy Managing Director,

346 'Housing project', from J. van der Walt (Secretary, IDC) to Mbouy Boutzit (Minister of Economic Affairs, Gabon), Johannesburg, 6 August 1971, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
348 'Relations with Gabon: L.T.A. Ltd. housing project', from François Viljoen to Paul Kruger (Department of Commerce), Pretoria, 2 August 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
349 'Relations with Gabon: L.T.A. Ltd. housing project', from François Viljoen to Paul Kruger (Department of Commerce), Pretoria, 2 August 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
350 Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director, Credit Guarantee) to J.P. Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), Johannesburg, 7 August 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
351 Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director, Credit Guarantee) to J.P. Chassang (Union Gabonaise de Banque), Johannesburg, 27 November 1972, p.2; 'Gabon – L.T.A.-kontrak', from Jan Bouwer to Norman Best, to the attention of Brand Fourie, Johannesburg, 29 November 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
was important in the context of Pretoria's co-operation with this private firm in Gabon. Given Jan Boyazoglou's close involvement in the OGAPROV project, it is quite likely that he had insider knowledge about important political and economic developments in Gabon, the relevant parts of which he would communicate to his cousin. In any case, in August 1971, two Roberts Construction representatives held talks with South Africa's Ambassador in London, Robert Montgomery, to inform him of their London office's interest in the so-called Transgabonais railway project. The proposed railway line, a project of some 200 million US Dollars, was some eight hundred kilometres long, running from Owendo at the Atlantic Ocean to Bououé in central Gabon (Section 1), then splitting into branches to Bélinga in the north-east (Section 2) and Moanda/Franceville in the south-east (Section 3). Its main purpose was to make good the lack of infrastructure needed to transport iron and manganese for export to the sea, and to access the country's vast timber potential. It was clear that the project would only become viable after the completion of either Section 2 or 3 as only then did the export of the mineral resources, located in the Moanda/Franceville area, become possible. By early 1972, the railway project became a matter of international interest, as Bongo tried to secure financing from donors such as Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the United States, the EDF and the World Bank. During discussions with Deputy Secretary Viljoen, a Roberts Construction representative stated that his company was also "very interested in the development of this project". He proposed that Pretoria should also tender for the project with "implications [that] go much further than that of just a normal construction project for a South African Company", thereby implying that government assistance for Roberts Construction in this instance would aid Pretoria's political Dialogue with Gabon. In further promoting the company's own financial interest in that project, the Roberts Construction representative suggested that Pretoria should try to undercut the loan conditions offered by others: "In this regard it is our [Roberts Construction's] opinion that we may achieve some success if we were able to offer a loan of R5.000.000 repayable over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 5½% or less". Viljoen informed Fourie about the meeting, who then contacted the Treasury to ascertain their attitude towards such a loan. In his reply, the Treasury's Secretary for Finance advised the DFA not to become involved in arranging a "soft loan" for a project that,

333 'Re: Transgabon railway project', from C.J. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to François Viljoen, Johannesburg, 6 March 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
334 'Re: Transgabon railway project', from C.J. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to François Viljoen, Johannesburg, 6 March 1972, p.3 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
with reference to Section 1, "certainly looks like a bottomless pit as far as capital require-
ments are concerned". Roberts Construction was informed of this negative position, but, in
July 1972, pursued another avenue by approaching Credit Guarantee for a credit facility to
participate in this potentially lucrative railway project. Yet, Credit Guarantee was not in a
position either to make a commitment at that point, while indicating that "it was possible for
us to offer a loan facility" to the amount of 10 million Rand, with repayment conditions simi-
lar to the LTA's above housing project and at a 6% interest rate.

By April 1973, however, the next available documents reveal that the situation had
changed. In particular, World Bank President Robert S. McNamara had informed President
Bongo in February 1973 that he was not in a position to provide the expected 30 million US
Dollars, and Bongo now turned to South Africa for help. Two months later, Jan Bouwer
informed President Bongo that Credit Guarantee was in a position to offer the necessary fa-
cilities for Roberts Construction to tender for the Transgabonais project with a contract value
of 15 million Rand and for the IDC to negotiate with the Gabonese authorities a loan covering
85% of that amount. Repayment would commence four years after the project's completion
and the interest rate was set at 6.5%. While there is no indication in the DFA files as to why
Credit Guarantee was all of a sudden prepared to commit itself to that project, a reading of To
the Point, the magazine secretly funded by the rival Department of Information, is infor-
mative. Against the background of competition between the Department of Foreign Affairs and
the Department of Information over Pretoria's Africa policy at the time, examined in detail in
the next section, the latter tried to undermine and belittle its rival's ambitions regarding the
Gabonese railway project. Thus, To the Point argued that Bongo now considered approaching
South Africa as a last resort, but that "the South Africans", evidently meaning the Department
of Foreign Affairs, "would certainly welcome a prestige coup of this kind".

This is, indeed, what seems to have happened. The next available document, dated No-
vember 1973, shows that South Africa was present at a meeting with other interested parties,
namely the government of Gabon and its railway authority, representatives from Canada,
France, West Germany, Italy, the United States and the EDF, to discuss the project. The South

356 'Trans-Gabon railway project', from the Secretary for Finance at the Treasury to Brand Fourie, 3 July
1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2).
357 're: Transgabon railway project', from C.J. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to Fran-
359 Letter from Jan Bouwer to Albert Bongo, Johannesburg, 13 April 1973 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 3).
360 'Expresso Bongo', To the Point 30 June 1973: 27f.
African delegation consisted of an IDC official, Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and an interpreter. According to the available evidence, in May and June 1974, the Committee of the EDF and the European Commission decided in favour of the EDF’s participation in the financing of Section 1 of the Transgabonais railway project with some 20 million US Dollars. Initially, Roberts Construction was meant to participate in the project, and this became public knowledge through press reports and the secondary literature. By September 1974, however, Bongo decided to finance the entire project from the country’s own financial reserves that had received a substantial boost from the discovery of oil, assisted by the sale of uranium and manganese ore. A French consortium was awarded the project and Roberts Construction was merely left with a small contract to build a bridge for the project to the amount of 2 to 3 million US Dollars. The DFA files were accessible until the end of 1979, but contain no further material on Roberts Construction’s involvement in the railway project, of which Section 1 was completed in 1983 and Section 3 to Franceville three years later. The overall impression gained from Pretoria’s participation in the Transgabonais railway supports the earlier argument that Bongo tried to manipulate the situation to his own advantage, approaching the South Africans when all other channels seemed closed, but dropping them quickly if a different source of assistance became available.

The purpose of this section was to examine Pretoria’s Dialogue policy. In contrast to what has been assumed in the secondary literature on this aspect of South Africa’s foreign relations, it was not brought about by the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was due to the military’s endeavours in the Nigerian Civil War that President Houphouët-Boigny made his famous Dialogue pronouncement in November 1970. Their realist approach, based on the premise that African leaders only understand the language of force and power, was thus more successful than the Department of Foreign Affairs’ diplomacy. The distrust and jealousy between the two government branches led to rivalry, particularly over the contact with Gabon, with the foreign affairs ministry not hesitating to reap the fruits of the military’s risky initiatives.

363 Letter from David de Villiers du Buisson (Ambassador to the European Communities) to Brand Fourie, Brussels, 5 June 1974, p.1; also translations from the French magazine *Industries et travaux d’outre-mer* of October and November 1974, provided by Roberts Construction to the DFA (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 4).
Whatever the merits of their different approaches, neither the foreign service corps nor the men from the military could have done it alone. The former depended a great deal on the assistance from the economic sector in financing the development/investment projects, while the military needed the French intelligence and military network of interests in Africa. Another point in common was that neither achieved their original intentions. For the Department of Foreign Affairs, the primary motivation was to find political acceptance and establish diplomatic contacts; this was only fully realised in the case of Malawi. For the military, the main purpose was to create a network of allied African states through which it could play the role of continental gendarme; this was partly achieved in Gabon. One of the problems faced by both state actors was the fragile nature of African politics, with regime changes resulting in immediate adjustments in government policy towards South Africa. This made the outcome of their ventures unpredictable, such as experienced by the military in both Chad and Ghana, and by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Madagascar. The overall situation after some six years of Dialogue within the Outward-Looking Policy was appropriately summarised in South Africa’s daily *The Star* in October 1972:

>The outward policy may not be quite dead, but these days it is looking very moribund. (...) A couple of years ago the outward policy looked quite promising. It is clear now that the only way to reactivate it is to show some dramatic betterment of race relations at home.367

This type of analysis formed the basis for what became known as Secret Diplomacy and Détente, that the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security pursued respectively. Their policies are examined in the two following sections.

**Secret Diplomacy**

Friction between the foreign affairs ministry and the military over strategy dominated Pretoria’s foreign policy making towards Africa during roughly the first half of Vorster’s premiership. Interdepartmental struggles also characterised the remaining period of Vorster’s rule until his forced resignation following the Information Scandal in 1978. However, the spectrum of actors competing over the shaping of Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa in those years was extended, with the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security prominently entering the scene from around 1972. While working together, they pursued their individual goals, namely the conduct of unconventional diplomacy to break South Africa’s international isolation and the collection of intelligence respectively. Their strategies became

known as Secret Diplomacy and Détente, used to describe Vorster’s subsequent approach to Africa during his last six years, or so, as Prime Minister. The implications of these policies are analysed hereafter, but it is appropriate at this stage to summarise the main points. The Department of Information was the main protagonist of the Secret Diplomacy, an approach which did not follow the conventional concept of inter-state relations being conducted on a formal level between diplomats. The climax to this approach was Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974, meeting Presidents Felix Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal. At around the same time, Détente was predominantly pursued by the Bureau for State Security, aimed at easing the strained relations in southern Africa with the ultimate goal of establishing contact with African states further north. Its highpoint was the Victoria Falls Bridge Conference in August 1975 under the chairmanship of both Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and the South African Prime Minister, and attended by the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists.

We have so far emphasised that the Department of Information and BOSS shaped Pretoria’s approach towards Africa beyond southern Africa from roughly 1972 to 1978. However, similar to the rivalries surrounding the Dialogue policy, competition became evident and involving other state actors. Given the access to the DFA files, we can now reveal and discuss several pertinent diplomatic activities during this period illustrative of both their interrelationship with, and counter approaches to both the BOSS and/or the Department of Information. Détente ran parallel to some of the initiatives discussed here, but it needs to be considered separately in the next section, as this phase was dominated by major rivalries between BOSS and the military. Previous military activities cannot be excluded, but their documentation is not possible due to the lack of archival sources. At the same time, it can be argued that the military remained relatively inactive in Africa until then because P.W. Botha’s men were hesitant to venture into Africa beyond South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood after their setback in the Nigerian Civil War. This explains their focus on the Angolan war from late 1975.

We presently investigate the nature of Secret Diplomacy. As we have argued earlier, neither the Outward Movement nor Dialogue had been successful in breaking South Africa’s international isolation. Deon Geldenhuys describes the reasons for the Secret Diplomacy primarily as the Department of Information’s “strong feeling of dissatisfaction and impatience (...) about the results achieved by Foreign Affairs’ conventional diplomacy”.

\[68\] With their avowed intention of outshining diplomatic activities in Africa, for this department “there was

a clear-cut case to supplement conventional diplomacy with unconventional or unorthodox means," with the ultimate intention of improving South Africa’s image overseas. In 1971, Minister Mulder and his then Secretary, Gerald Barrie, undertook an extensive foreign tour and found that there was a “propaganda onslaught” against South Africa, as Mulder described it, and this became one of the principal reasons prompting the Department of Information to pursue Secret Diplomacy. The Department used unorthodox methods to that end and these can be succinctly summarised as buying, bribing or bluffing the way to the opinion and decision makers of the world, by launching aggressive clandestine propaganda operations. To mention only a few of the known examples, attempts were made to buy the US daily Washington Post, The Citizen newspaper was launched in South Africa to counter the liberal Rand Daily Mail and front organisations, disguised as think tanks and introduced later in this chapter, were formed. Given both Secretary Rhoodie’s and Deputy Secretary Les de Villiers’ journalistic background, special attention was paid to the press and, in 1971, the Department of Information established the weekly current affairs magazine To the Point, with Rhoodie as Deputy Editor for the first two years after its inception.

The secondary literature has ascribed the policy of Secret Diplomacy solely to the Department of Information, based on the assumption that both the Outward Movement and Dialogue had been the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs alone, and the failure of which therefore had to be attributed to the foreign affairs ministry. As has been shown in Chapter 2, note is taken of the rivalries between the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, and the head of BOSS, Hendrik van den Bergh. However, due to the lack of knowledge about the military’s crucial role in bringing about Dialogue as a result of the Nigerian Civil War, the motivation for BOSS to become involved alongside the Department of Information has been neglected. This part of the study argues that the Bureau’s activities during Secret Diplomacy and Détente were the product of van den Bergh’s ambition to outmanoeuvre the men from the military. As both BOSS and the Department of Information attempted to gain advantages over their respective opponents, they assisted each other in gaining a more powerful bargaining position vis-à-vis the Prime Minister. This endeavour was greatly enhanced by the close personal relationship between Prime Minister Vorster and van den Bergh, dating from their common experience in an internment camp during World War II, as well as Information Secretary Eschel Rhoodie (Chapter 2). This study primarily relies on DFA documentation, containing only a few primary documents on the Department of Information’s activities, and this applies even

more particularly to BOSS. While constituting a weakness in this study, attempts were made to overcome the lack of information by resorting to secondary sources. Yet, regarding details on BOSS’s activities, not even Deon Geldenhuys’ seminal study on South African foreign policy making provides much insight, notably because van den Bergh bluntly refused him an interview, the only ex-official approached to have done so.\textsuperscript{372} Thus, Geldenhuys’ assumption that there was a geographical separation of work between the Department of Information and BOSS with “an understanding that Rhoodie would focus on the Francophone states and Van den Bergh on Southern, East and Central Africa”\textsuperscript{373} is of little help; the remaining part of this chapter reveals that joint operations were conducted in the Ivory Coast, in Zaire and on the Seychelles. Rather, a separation of tasks is discernible in that BOSS appeared in all matters related to security aspects of Vorster’s visits abroad and intelligence gathering, while the Department of Information concerned itself with unconventional diplomacy.

In this section, we first probe the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy endeavours. Subsequently, we investigate the parallel activities by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Liberia and the Central African Republic, as well as Pretoria’s concern in obtaining overflying rights for South African Airways. We then examine a third major aspect pertinent to South Africa’s foreign relations with African states in the first half of the 1970s, namely contact with the islands in the western Indian Ocean. Finally, we analyse the roles played by two non-state actors, the Progressive Party and the South Africa Foundation, at around time.

\textit{Ivory Coast and Senegal}

The Department of Information was the driving force in Pretoria’s endeavour to establish presidential contact between South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, culminating in Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast on 22/23 September 1974, when he met Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor. The choice of these two countries appears to have been based on the judgement that these two Francophone states held such political influence in African political matters that South Africa’s ambition of being accepted by the continent could be achieved by securing their joint support. This assumption most probably rested on them maintaining close links to Paris, therefore holding something of an international status. In his autobiography, Eschel Rhoodie explains:

\begin{quote}
The logic of our argument (...) was that international dialogue will not be achieved unless South Africa could speak to at least some of the more prominent African States. (...)\end{quote}


These States did not include the third raters such as Liberia, the Central African Republic and Malawi, but countries with internationally recognised leaders: Leopold [sic] Senghor of Senegal, Houphouet Boigny [sic] of the Ivory Coast (...). President Houphouët-Boigny’s pro-Discussion attitude had remained unchanged since 1970, as shown in the previous section. As for Senghor, an article on ‘Dialogue with Africa’, published in To the Point in January 1972, noted that he had recently “called for an OAU summit to discuss the question of dialogue with the White-rule African states”. It went on to say that this linked him “with the pro-dialogue policies of Houphouet-Boigny [sic], Banda, Tsiranana and Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho (...). Banda and Jonathan, however, do not wield much influence. On their own they would always have remained renegades in the eyes of the rest of Africa. On the other hand, Houphouet-Boigny [sic], and now with him Senghor, are powerful figures who lead the influential Francophone African bloc”. Despite this assessment, the Department of Information does not seem to have approached Senghor more vigorously until early 1973, for three possible reasons. First, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Department of Information’s budget only underwent a drastic increase in that year. Second, Senghor’s pro-Discussion position was uncertain. Even in April 1973, in an interview with To the Point, he stated: “In some respects I am a man for dialogue. It is my opinion that problems between states can be adjusted at the negotiating table, so long as those conferring do so on a footing of equality. (...) In the first place dialogue would have to take place, not between us and Mr Vorster, but between the Vorster government and the black majority in South Africa”. Third, Pretoria may have been confused by Senghor’s explanation in the same interview: “if Mr Vorster wishes to talk to me he will first of all need to talk with representatives of the OAU. If Vorster’s National Party is prepared to enter into dialogue with my party, the UPS [Union Progressiste Sénégalaise], then I can say we are ready, in the same way as I personally am ready in my capacity as chairman of the UPS. But then it will be a dialogue between political parties”. It is possible that this statement disturbed the South African government, as it could be interpreted as Senghor’s overture towards the Progressive Party, opposition to the ruling National Party. There was some reason for Pretoria to consider this as a possibility, as we will see in the discussion on that party’s activities in Africa at the end of this section.

Possibly due to its improved financial position, and even though the last two of the above factors remained unchanged, the Department of Information tried to establish contact with Senghor during 1973. Utilising its favourite propaganda tactic, the press, the department

---

375 To the Point 29 January 1972: 42. Also To the Point 15 January 1972: 37.
376 To the Point 21 April 1973: 20.
enlisted the services of Bernard A. Lejeune, a French journalist based in Johannesburg, becoming one of its first secret collaborators. That contact was established through Eschel Rhoodie, who met him when he was the Deputy Editor of the Department of Information’s To the Point magazine. The choice specifically fell on Lejeune, because he could speak French, which was an essential attribute in any contact with Francophone Africa. Furthermore, he “knows Africa like the back of his hand, especially French West Africa, and will help us to make good contacts out there, including people around President Houphouët-Boigny and President Senghor”, as Information Deputy Secretary Les de Villiers recalls in his autobiography. A primary Department of Information source in the National Archives reveals that Lejeune, in early May 1973, paid a visit to both Senegal and to the Ivory Coast. According to his final report to Minister Mulder, this trip had been “very successful”, as he had meetings with Bara Diouf, Editor-in-Chief of the Senegalese daily Le Soleil, and Laurent Dona-Fologo, Editor-in-Chief of the Ivorian daily Fraternité Matin. As an outcome of the talks, these two newspapermen were “scheduled to come to South Africa towards the end of this year”. From the same report, we learn that Diouf was “married to President Senghor’s niece, and he enjoys the full confidence of the President”, while Dona-Fologo was “very closely associated to the work of his President (...) and he is a member of the political bureau, with a recognised influence on the political trends of his country”. Lejeune therefore appears to have selected these two newspaper editors in order to get direct access to both President Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny through them. In the case of Dona-Fologo, this strategy was very productive, as “instead of the ten minute interview secured by Laurent Fologo [sic], the President kept me a full hour”, and Houphouët-Boigny gave Lejeune “a personal assurance that I can go back to him any time to discuss any problem with him whenever it may prove necessary to ease up the Dialogue issue”. In Dakar, however, again mirroring Senghor’s ambivalence towards Dialogue, Diouf could only arrange a future meeting between Lejeune, Minister Mulder and President Senghor. Lejeune consequently insisted that the Department of Information should encourage strengthening the Ivorian-Senegalese relationship over the Dialogue issue: “the more we will be able to encourage an association between Ivory Coast and Senegal the greater advantage we will derive from it, bearing in mind that the real leadership for the Dialogue is

377 To the Point 21 April 1973: 20.
unmistakably in Abidjan (although we must accept that the Dakar leader takes precedence of his counterpart for diplomatic considerations”).

Due to the lack of archival documentation, the Department of Information’s follow-up initiatives after Lejeune’s visit cannot be reconstructed. Judging from later evidence in the DFA files, however, and in contrast to Houphouët-Boigny, President Senghor retained his critical stance towards actively promoting Dialogue. Thus, while the Department of Information’s contact with Abidjan had a stable foundation, Senghor still had to be convinced. How this was attempted in practice is unclear, but in their autobiographies, Les de Villiers and Eschel Rhoodie concurrently suggest that Vorster’s eventual visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974 was the result of painstaking groundwork that went by the code-name of Operation Wooden Shoe. Rhoodie undertook most of this task and shuttled between Pretoria, Paris, Abidjan and Dakar. While primary BOSS or Department of Information sources were not available, the relevant DFA documents covering the months until September 1974 provide an indication of the problems experienced in wooing Senghor. Examination of these documents reveals that there was a genuine willingness on the part of this African leader to conduct Dialogue with Pretoria, but this was dependent on the South African government making significant moves in changing the apartheid system. We now illustrate how Pretoria attempted to convince him of its bona fides.

More than likely within the framework of Operation Wooden Shoe, a DFA document records correspondence between Senghor and Vorster from March to September 1974, with the Senegalese President expressing his concern over an ongoing court case against Barend van Niekerk, a white Professor of Law at the University of Natal in Durban since 1970. According to the university’s Website, he “was an avid crusader for human rights and the need for a just legal system in South Africa” who “fearlessly attacked the apartheid legal system” and who was particularly concerned about the freedom of speech. This made him highly unpopular in government circles, and court cases were conducted against him in 1970, 1972 and 1975, the last of which triggered President Senghor’s current interest. This case concerned the newspaper publisher South African Associated Newspapers Ltd. and van Niekerk v Estate


Peiser, managed by Petrus Cornelius Peiser, the Minister of Prisons and Justice from 1966 to April 1974. Given his background as a poet and writer, Senghor was concerned about Pretoria’s restrictions on the freedom of speech, and by intervening he more than probably wanted to assess the seriousness of Pretoria’s Dialogue intentions. His special interest in this particular case, however, was undoubtedly due to van Niekerk having written a book about Senghor’s literary work in 1970. The ensuing correspondence between Senghor and Vorster is not contained in the DFA files. However, and drawing from later DFA reports, Senghor expressed “his satisfaction” with Vorster’s attitude in a letter of 27 June 1974. In addition, on 26 September 1974 and on 16 May 1975, John Barratt, the Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, informed Deputy Secretary Killen that Senghor had expressed “satisfaction to the correspondence and said that it was a useful example of dialogue.” Barratt’s information was based on a meeting with Senghor during a group visit organised by the Africa Institute to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in mid-August 1974. The background to this visit is important and discussed now, because it provides some insight into the intricacies of the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy.

The essence of the present argument is that the Department of Information attempted to convince both leaders, and especially Senghor, that Pretoria intended reforming apartheid, that a dialogue took place among South Africans and that not all whites supported apartheid. The concept of separate development and an exchange of views between the more verligte sections among the minority and the two presidents, particularly Senghor, were important pillars upon which their approach rested. In this context, and with reference to the Policy Network concept introduced in Chapter 2, Figure 2 illustrates a web of individuals and organisations of the verligte Afrikaner political and economic elite involved in fostering this strategy. Their links with the Department of Information will now be disentangled.

In doing so, we need to discuss the apartheid idea of separate development that formed the kernel of Verwoerd’s ‘grand apartheid’, supposed to solve South Africa’s racial problems. To this end, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (No 46 of 1959) had provided for the establishment of eight homelands, accommodating the Pretoria-defined black ethnic groups. Over time, these would, under white guardianship, develop into self-governing units and could, if so desired, attain full independence. In 1963, the Transkei first took this route by establishing a Constituent Assembly. Yet, during the remaining part of the 1960s, the homelands idea remained a paper tiger, because the conservative voices among white society saw this, in similar vein to the official contacts between Pretoria and African leaders, as the beginning of the end of apartheid. However, as Pretoria became more confident in establishing contact with independent African states, significant steps were also taken in promoting the homelands issue in the early 1970s. External factors resulting in changes to international law were also relevant, particularly the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on the S.W.A./Namibia case. The UN Security Council had requested this in July 1970.

---

at the instigation of Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.\textsuperscript{391} Reversing its 1966 ruling, the ICJ now concluded “that South Africa’s continued presence is illegal” and “that she is obliged to withdraw her administration immediately from the territory”,\textsuperscript{392} a finding both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council endorsed in late 1971.\textsuperscript{393} In essence, the Advisory Opinion meant “that the primary issue regarding South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia was its refusal to allow the Namibians the right to determine their own future”,\textsuperscript{394} and this had implications on Pretoria’s homelands policy. Notably, Pretoria promulgated the Bantu Homelands Act (No 21) on 31 March 1971, “designed to accelerate the development of the homelands”.\textsuperscript{395} As a result, by the end of 1972, Bophutatswana, Ciskei, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa and Venda joined the Transkei as self-governing entities.\textsuperscript{396} That the ICJ ruling was of great relevance in this respect is evidenced in a \textit{To the Point} article of 15 January 1972:

substantial progress towards eventual sovereignty for the embryonic Black nation-states is expected in 1972 with at least two of them joining the Transkei in partial self-government. Externally, the heat is perceptibly off South Africa at the moment. After the flush of success when the World Court [=ICJ] gave South Africa an unfavourable advisory opinion last June, critics of South Africa had a rough time at the United Nations.\textsuperscript{397}

While Pretoria’s increased homelands activities appear as a reaction of the \textit{verkrampte} to accommodate both the needs of the minority and external pressure, the more \textit{verligte} took the idea of separate development further, trying to improve foreign relations with African states. An article in the same \textit{To the Point} issue is again illustrative: “The conservatives, as well as the moderate nationalists, are in agreement on one point: that the development of the South African Bantu Homelands towards independence, be drastically speeded up. However, the moderates presently attach more importance to the success of the government’s dialogue with Black Africa, while the conservatives would like to see independence of the Homelands given priority.”\textsuperscript{398} In the forefront of the former was Information Secretary Rhodie, who appears to have convinced Minister Mulder of his views to some extent.\textsuperscript{399} Even though known for his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{391} S/RES 284; S/9886 (22 July 1970); Lissitzyn, Oliver J. 1972. International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, \textit{Columbia Journal of Transnational Law} 11, 1: 50-73.
\item \textsuperscript{393} S/RES 301; A/RES 2871 (XXVI).
\item \textsuperscript{395} Geldenhuys. 1984. \textit{The Diplomacy of Isolation}, p.35.
\item \textsuperscript{396} Horrell. 1973. \textit{The African Homelands of South Africa}.
\item \textsuperscript{397} \textit{To the Point} 15 January 1972: 38.
\item \textsuperscript{398} \textit{To the Point} 15 January 1972: 47.
\item \textsuperscript{399} Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. On Cas de Villiers, see below.
\end{itemize}
otherwise conservative leanings, Mulder recognised the potential of the concept of separate development in breaking South Africa's isolation, as Deon Geldenhuys notes: "He acknowledged that the policy was a stumbling block to South Africa's foreign relations, but saw this as being caused by the caricature made of the policy abroad. The way out of the dilemma was by correcting the distorted image through improved salesmanship, and not by tampering with the fundamentals of separate development".400 In particular, and probably due to both Mulder's and Rhodie's increasing influence on Vorster as of the early 1970s, the Prime Minister intensified interaction with the homeland leaders. For example on 31 July 1971, and after a week-long journey through several homelands, Vorster rejected the accusation that he only talked to the leaders from the rest of Africa.401 This trip was rather likely Pretoria's response to the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in mid-June 1971, examined in the previous section, which stipulated that Dialogue could only take place parallel to discussions among all South Africans. Thus, by initiating political contact with the homeland leaders, Pretoria sought justification for Dialogue with African countries further north.402 Vorster interacted particularly with Kaizer Matanzima, Chief Minister of Transkei, and Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive of KwaZulu.403 This was quite obviously due to their policies being compatible with those of Pretoria's; Matanzima held a keen interest in leading Transkei to full independence, as eventually requested in March 1974,404 while Buthelezi rejected sanctions and violence to bring about political change, such as advocated by the African National Congress.405

In consequence, and as will be revealed, both Matanzima and Buthelezi held prominent positions in Pretoria's Africa plans, even accompanying South African delegations to African countries.

We have now explored the background to Pretoria's verkrampte homelands policy. The more verligte Eschel Rhodie and, to a lesser degree, Connie Mulder tried to utilise the separate development concept to convince African leaders of Pretoria's willingness to talk with the majority. As argued earlier, this was an important element in the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy, especially over contact with Senghor of Senegal. The principal promoter of what can be termed a marketing strategy was Secretary Rhodie, who applied this

403 To the Point 4 November 1972: 39.
aspect of US politics, to which he had been exposed during his five years as Press Attaché and Information Officer in Washington and New York. Of relevance within the Department of Information’s strategy was the support from the policy network with exponents from the verligte Afrikaner political and economic élite (Figure 2), of which Caspar Francois ‘Cas’ de Villiers and Frederick Redvers ‘Red’ Metrowich are presently discussed. Both of them enjoyed a close relationship with Information Secretary Rhoodie, dating from their early days as Associates of To the Point, while de Villiers was also a Broederbonder, as was Information Minister Mulder. Based on the former link, they issued publications for both the Department of Information itself and Valiant Publishers, covertly financed by the same department. Subsequently, they headed two front organisations, set up clandestinely by that very department, under the guise of think tanks. From 1975, de Villiers was the Director of the Foreign Affairs Association (FAA), financed by five South African Afrikaner millionaires, among them Louis Luyt, whom we will meet again later, while Metrowich became the Executive Officer of the Southern African Freedom Foundation (SAFF) in 1977. Regarding their political views, these were somewhat conservative and in line with Pretoria’s current official policy. Notably, their numerous publications conveyed the message that closer co-operation between South Africa and the countries in the rest of Africa benefited their economic development, which, in turn, would stem the communist influence on the continent. In the context of the Cold War, it was generally accepted that economic development would result in political stability and prevent communism from making inroads into Africa. On the other hand, To the Point described de Villiers as a “strong believer in separate development”, one who argued that “we must create a marketing value for separate development via Africa to the rest of the world”. In fact, during our recent interview, Cas de Villiers stated that his then long-term view of separate development was that of “separate independent viable states”

---

406 This assumption was confirmed during the telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003.
408 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003.
413 To the Point 12 September 1975: 7.
in a "confederal arrangement similar to that of Switzerland", and that he had a “remote hope” for this to succeed in influencing African leaders to accept Pretoria’s domestic policies.\textsuperscript{414} Indeed, de Villiers indicated that this thinking was among the messages he conveyed during his numerous visits to African countries. While not at the direct bidding of the Department of Information, these activities supported its Secret Diplomacy endeavour. In addition, Cas de Villiers communicated his ideas to the NP Foreign Affairs Study Group that, “on occasion” invited him to address them.\textsuperscript{415} We mentioned in Chapter 2, that the ruling party had twenty-four such study groups, giving its parliamentarians the possibility to inform themselves more comprehensively about issues related to the relevant ministerial portfolio. Although Deon Geldenhuys did not find this particular Foreign Affairs Study Group to have a significant impact on Pretoria’s foreign policy making,\textsuperscript{416} the fact that Cas de Villiers was invited reflects his importance on the one hand, while simultaneously offering the Department of Information a channel in making itself heard in political circles, on the other. At the same time, de Villiers claimed that this brought him in conflict with the country’s political leadership, stating that Prime Minister Vorster had summoned him several times to his office, telling him to restrain advocating his liberal views.\textsuperscript{417}

Apart from the issue of separate development discussed above, it has been stated earlier that personal contact with African leaders, inferring not all South Africans were apartheid supporters, was another important aspect of the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy. Here again, the policy network in support of this department’s policies is of significance (Figure 2). Before discussing the journeys of members from both the Africa Institute and the South Africa Foundation to Senegal and the Ivory Coast in 1974, we need to examine their connections with the Department of Information. In beginning with the South Africa Foundation, Chris Barnard and Jan S. Marais personified the link. In addition to being an Associate of \textit{To the Point}, it is known that the Department of Information made use of heart surgeon Barnard’s fame in promoting several of its projects,\textsuperscript{418} although these are not of relevance to this study. Deon Geldenhuys explains this relative closeness as follows: “the former Department of Information no doubt saw the Foundation as a valuable ally in promoting South Africa’s interests in a hostile world, particularly because of the Foundation’s independ-

\textsuperscript{414} Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003.
\textsuperscript{417} Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003.
ence from government". Another important contact was Jan Marais, whose importance as a businessman has been mentioned in the context of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Chapter 2). Although an Afrikaner in origin, he quickly rose in the Foundation ranks, becoming its President within four years of membership (Chapter 2). Significantly, commenting on his election to that post, *To the Point* observed that this might give the Foundation a more verligte outlook. Marais laid the foundation for his business career by forming the Trust Bank during 1955, combining Afrikaner nationalism with modern banking and finance methods. *To the Point* praised his achievements: “Marais (...) has not only built it [Trust Bank] up into an institution with assets exceeding $1 billion, but has changed the entire face of banking in South Africa. He is also known outside of South Africa for his enlightened views on cooperation between white and black and on the economic development of Africa”. Marais’ relationship with the Department of Information was manifold. He was an Associate of *To the Point*, which offered him a platform for his verligte views, most notably expressing his opinion in an article of August 1972 entitled “There is no alternative to dialogue”. Marais also wrote an article for Metrowich’s *Towards Dialogue and Détente*, published by Valiant Publishers, alongside the country’s prominent citizens, such as Prime Minister Vorster, State President Fouche and Minister Muller. On the other hand, Marais provided the Department of Information with offices in his bank to publish *To the Point*; the magazine’s editorial address was the African International Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd., located on the seventh floor of the Trust Bank Centre in Johannesburg. It further appears that the Department used Trust Bank for financial transactions. As has been shown, Lejeune reported after his visit to the Ivory Coast and Senegal in May 1973 that newspaper editors Dona-Fologo and Diouf were to come to South Africa before the end of 1973, suggesting the following: “Although I ignore what procedure you usually follow in regards to air tickets and other material arrangements, I heard that Dr. J. Marais will very much appreciate it if you would consider dealing with Trust Express for the occasion”.

---

420 *To the Point* 20 September 1974: 25.
422 *To the Point* 26 August 1972: 39.
423 *To the Point* 26 August 1972: 37ff.; *To the Point* 5 January 1974: 9f.
ther substantiated by correspondence from Marais to Connie Mulder, in which he reports on his journey through the United States during September 1975. Significantly, in the section on “South Africa – what to note and what to do”, Marais suggests to Mulder: “Separate development” is not fully understood and there is much confusion about the basics of the separate development programme. Once explained, one could say that the concept is saleable!” In his letter of 20 November 1975, acknowledging receipt of the brief, Mulder wrote: “I have read it with interest and found it very interesting and insightful. Above all, I agree with the thoughts in the section S.A. - WHAT TO NOTE AND WHAT TO DO. We shall soon give more attention to these matters”.

The last element in the Department of Information’s policy network for consideration is the Africa Institute. Again, it was a personal link, with both Cas de Villiers and Red Metrowich working at the Africa Institute and Director Joseph Moolman serving as an Associate with To the Point. We will illustrate later in this section that Deputy Director Erich Leistner was also close to Cas de Villiers. Similar to the contents of the publications by de Villiers and Metrowich, Leistner and Moolman emphasised the need for economic co-operation among African countries, especially in southern Africa. Regarding their views on separate development, former Africa Institute researcher Richard Cornwell aptly suggested that the Department of Information used their academic output as “intellectual gloss” for selling this concept to African leaders. As a pointer in this direction, part of the Department of Information’s material stored in the Archive for Contemporary Affairs originates from the Africa Institute. Clearer evidence that this department made use of the Africa Institute in its Africa plans is provided in Bernard Lejeune’s above-mentioned report after his trip to the Ivory Coast and Senegal in May 1973: “It has been unanimously agreed that the invitation

---

426 “South Africa and the United States of America: brief notes on a visit to the U.S.A. by Dr. Jan S. Marais, Chairman and Chief Executive of the Trust Bank Group and President of the South Africa Foundation, September 17th to September 25th, 1975”, to Connie Mulder, October 1975 (NAT.ARC., MNL, INL8, Vol. 52/5) (emphasis in the original).
429 Interview with Richard Cornwell, 19 February 1999.
430 ARCA, PV.395. One of the five boxes contains Africa Institute publications only.
newspaper editors Diouf and Dona-Fologo] should be issued under the auspices of the Africa Institute”.

Let us now examine the relevance of the personalities and organisations that have been discussed within the realms of the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy, particularly towards Senegal. For this purpose, we recall the above-mentioned visit of a South African group to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in mid-August 1974, a mere five weeks before Vorster met with Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny. In our interview, then Deputy Director Erich Leistner recalled that Africa Institute Director Joseph Moolman had arranged this excursion together with the Department of Information’s middleman, Bernard Lejeune, who “helped to somehow prepare the ground”. Further, according to Leistner, both Moolman and himself were aware of Lejeune’s role with the department. Joseph Moolman could not be contacted on that issue, as he passed away in the 1990s. However, we learn from his published account of the trip, and Leistner confirmed this, that the Afrikaner bank Volkskas and insurance company Sanlam, as well as Anglo American had provided the necessary financial assistance. The DFA files, finally, contain a report on this visit, although we could not establish how the foreign affairs ministry obtained it. This document reveals that the group comprised both Moolman and Leistner from the Africa Institute, John Barratt from the South African Institute of International Affairs, as mentioned earlier, Professor William M. Kgware, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the North and the financier Jayaram N. Reddy. They first flew to Dakar, where talks were held with President Senghor and newspaper editor Bara Diouf. The second stop was in Abidjan, from 12-16 August 1974, where the group attended the 14th World Conference of the Society for International Development (SID) on the theme ‘Confrontation or Cooperation?’ They also met Laurent Dona-Fologo, now the newly appointed Ivorian Minister of Information. In correspondence, John Barratt suggested that attending the SID conference was the main purpose of the group’s journey. Furthermore, taking into account that talks were held with the Department of Information’s interlocutors in both Senegal and the Ivory Coast, one gains the impression that the department and Lejeune had organised this visit in an attempt to engage academic and business circles interested in

---

432 Correspondence with Erich Leistner, December 2002 and telephone interview, 26 February 2003.
436 Correspondence with John Barratt, 15 January 2003.
contact with Africa within its Secret Diplomacy. Notably, the side-trip to Senegal was intended to place its policy towards President Senghor on a broader foundation. First, the presence of both Kgware and Reddy, a black professor and an Indian businessman respectively, illustrates the attempt by the Department of Information to present the group as representative of the full spectrum of South African society. Second, both of them were Trustees of the South Africa Foundation, again revealing the department’s close link with this organised business association at the time. In addition, although unconnected to the group’s visit, an article in *To the Point* reveals that Peter Sorour, the Foundation’s Director General, and Richard John Maponya, supermarket entrepreneur in the Soweto township and Foundation Trustee (1974-95), also attended the SID Conference. While the above-mentioned individuals appear rather close to the Department of Information, this observation does not apply to John Barratt. In correspondence, Leistner explained Barratt’s participation: “We had a cordial working relationship with Barratt’s Institute, and he was a member of the Africa Institute’s Council. You can be assured that he would not have come with us if there had been even the vaguest whiff of suspicion that State funds were involved!” Asked about this, Barratt confirmed, although adding with hindsight: “I later came to suspect, correctly it seems, that Information had a hand in arrangements”. His main motivation to join, Barratt further states, was the fact that “in those days we had very few opportunities of visiting other parts of Africa”, and he later published an article on the visit.

Having presented the available evidence on this excursion to West Africa, one is quite justified in proposing that the above-mentioned Africa Institute members, especially Moolman, became part of the Department of Information’s strategy of winning Senghor for direct contact with Pretoria, while the South Africa Foundation Trustees were probably less deeply involved. While the importance of the visit described above should not be overemphasised, it quite probably favoured Senghor’s eventual decision to meet Vorster in the Ivory Coast in September 1974. Other reasons were certainly his correspondence with Vorster over the van Niekerk case and, above all, the Department of Information’s propaganda activities, of which precious little could be revealed due to the lack of archival information. In any event, Vor-

437 *To the Point* 20 September 1974: 25.
438 Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa Foundation, November 2002.
439 *To the Point* 20 September 1974: 25.
440 Correspondence with Erich Leistner, 20 January 2003.
441 Correspondence with John Barratt, 15 January 2003.
442 Correspondence with John Barratt, 15 January 2003.
ster’s meeting with Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor in the Ivory Coast in September 1974 can be ascribed to the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy. Reflecting this, those aboard the plane from Cape Town to Abidjan on 22 September included Vorster, his son, his personal physician and his private secretary, van den Bergh, Mike Geldenhuys, Rhoodie and Fourie, while BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys and journalist Lejeune awaited the party in Abidjan. The latter two acted as interpreters and accompanied the party to Yamassoukro, where the meeting took place in Houphouët-Boigny’s presidential palace. Yet, the journey was cloaked in secrecy; the plane, parked far away from the terminal so as not to provoke attention, left before dawn from the Cape Town airport, chosen for the same reason as it was less frequently utilised than Johannesburg’s Jan Smuts Airport. Additionally, and probably acknowledging Senghor’s persistent uneasiness towards open Dialogue with Pretoria, the visit was kept secret at the time. Significantly, in December 1974, the Rand Daily Mail became the first paper to claim that Vorster had undertaken a trip to the Ivory Coast.

The news was only officially released with the consent of Vorster and Houphouët-Boigny on 15 May 1975, while Senghor still denied that he had met Vorster. Given the fact that both Senegal and the Ivory Coast belonged to Francophone Africa with especially good relations to Paris, the question of France having played a role in Vorster’s visit requires some reflection. All the available information indicates that Jacques Foccart, Jean Mauricéau-Beaupré and South Africa’s Ambassador to France, Albie Burger, did not play a significant role. There is no such evidence in the DFA files, Eschel Rhoodie argues that the Department of Information did not use their services and Foccart suggests in his memoirs that he tried to decelerate Houphouët-Boigny’s Dialogue initiative. Although To the Point positively reported that Foccart was the “crucial link” between Francophone Africa and described Burger as “one of the chief proponents and executor of the dialogue policy”, the aforementioned information seems plausible. It must not be forgotten that Foccart and Mauricéau-Beaupré were Defence Minister P.W. Botha’s contact men, and it was most unlikely

---


449 To the Point 29 January 1972: 42, 46. On 14 June 1974, To the Point (p.25) featured a short report on Foccart, as he left office.
that they were prepared to offer their services to either BOSS or the Department of Information, particularly given that the former was a great rival of the military. We can even take this point one step further, by arguing that the Department of Information’s plans of Vorster meeting with Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor in September 1974 could only become possible once Foccart had left office in May 1974.

We now examine Pretoria’s contact with both Abidjan and Dakar after Vorster’s historic trip to the Ivory Coast until his resignation as Prime Minister in 1978. This will reveal, first, that these two countries remained within the orbit of the Department of Information, while second, diplomatic activities curtailed its rival’s contact with Senegal after 1976. Regarding interaction with the Ivory Coast, that country’s Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, and Balla Keita from the Ministry of Scientific Research spent ten days in South Africa during September 1975 as a guest of Information Minister Mulder, accompanied by BOSS agent Geldenhuys during the entire stay. One must recall that Bernard Lejeune, the Department of Information’s secret collaborator, had proposed such a visit as far back as May 1973, upon returning from the Ivory Coast and Senegal. He had also suggested that a possible invitation should be made through the Africa Institute in Pretoria. While the reasons for the long delay are not recorded, the latter aspect remained an important component. In particular, Dona-Fologo visited the Africa Institute in the company of Mulder, and a dinner was arranged there. This supports the earlier claim that the think tank played an important role in assisting the Department of Information to gain both Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor’s support. Furthermore, the Africa Institute’s Deputy Director, Erich Leistner, visited the Ivory Coast from 25 January to 9 February 1976. While Leistner could not recall the exact circumstances of this visit as part of a journey through Europe and to Israel, he agreed that, “in all probability”, it took place in a reciprocal move to Dona-Fologo’s stay in South Africa, as Leistner met both the Ivorian Information Minister and Balla Keita while in Abidjan.

Coinciding with Leistner’s visit, and as gleaned from internal Africa Institute documents, Louis Luyt had flown to Abidjan in his private BAC 111 Lear Jet, accompanied by, inter alia, journalist Lejeune, Cas de Villiers, as well as Kobus Hamman and Daan Claassen from the


South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Although not co-ordinated undertakings, Leistner’s travel itinerary reveals that he spent considerable time together with Cas de Villiers from 26 to 28 January. This constellation shows the importance of the policy network supportive of the BOSS-Information policies of the day. Regarding Louis Luyt, he was an influential Afrikaner businessman, running his own fertiliser company, Triomf Fertilisers Ltd., one of the world’s largest producer of finished product at the time, while acting as a front man in two of the Department of Information’s principal covert projects inside South Africa during 1975. These were the establishment of The Citizen newspaper and the Foreign Affairs Association, mentioned above. In addition, and again supporting the earlier argument of relatively close co-operation between this department and the South Africa Foundation, Luyt was also a Foundation Trustee from 1973 to 1995. Thus, a critical biographer, South African journalist Max du Preez, referred to him as a “business tycoon” and “political maverick”. Concerning his link with the Ivory Coast, Luyt stated in recent correspondence that he had been in contact with President Houphouët-Boigny since 1968, allowing him to land with his Lear Jet in Abidjan. Luyt also indicated that he “regularly visited” the country thereafter by, in particular, stopping “en route to Brazil”, his “biggest [fertiliser] customers”. With respect to the visit to the Ivory Coast in 1976, Luyt elaborated that he had been invited by the Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, because of his involvement with the French shipping company Gasocean from 1976. Further on the circumstances of that trip, Luyt informed us:

I was contacted by the SABC and Cas de Villiers when news of the visit leaked out for a ride (...). I went there on my own behalf and as possible supplier of fertilisers to the country. The minister, together with the president, supplied us with contacts.

Significantly, and confirming the continued importance of the Department of Information in Pretoria’s contact with Abidjan, a short while later, Connie Mulder led a party there. This

---

457 Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa Foundation, November 2002.
459 Correspondence with Louis Luyt, 23 February 2003.
461 Correspondence with Louis Luyt, 25 February 2003.
462 Correspondence with Louis Luyt, 23 February 2003.
delegation was composed of Information Secretary Rhodie, DFA Deputy Secretary Killen, as well as Lejeune and Justus de Goede as their respective translators, and stayed in the Ivory Coast from 22 to 24 March 1976, holding talks with Houphouët-Boigny and Dona-Fologo. The DFA’s interest in establishing contact with the Ivory Coast was to obtain landing rights for South African Airways, an issue that will be discussed in detail later in this section. Attempts to this end began after Dona-Fologo’s stay in South Africa. In a letter dated December 1975, Brand Fourie wrote to the Ivorian Minister of Information: “South African Airways are anxious to introduce as a start-off as soon as possible one weekly service northwards and one weekly service southwards through Abidjan.” After an exchange of correspondence and the visit of a SAA delegation to the Ivory Coast from 22 to 25 February 1976, led by Salomon ‘Pi’ Pienaar, the airline’s Chief Executive from February 1975 to October 1977, the relevant Ivorian authorities granted SAA technical stopover facilities as of May that year. Furthermore, SAA showed an interest in obtaining passenger rights, but the Abidjan-based African airline Air Afrique opposed such a move by this competing airline. SAA subsequently approached all Air Afrique member countries “to plead the cause of passenger rights in Abidjan”; SAA only received full traffic rights during 1990/91. After Houphouët-Boigny’s meetings with Secretary Fourie and Prime Minister Vorster in Geneva, in February and May 1977 respectively, SAA was furthermore “allowed to place a technical representative in Abidjan”. These developments underline the depth of support given by the Ivorian President to the South African government in assisting it to overcome the negative consequences of its apartheid policy. Not even the Soweto Uprising of 16 June 1976 appears to have affected the good relationship.

However, the death of Steve Biko, the leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, on 12 September 1977, seriously strained the relations between Abidjan and Pretoria. The ban-

---

464 Telex from Brand Fourie to Laurent Dona-Fologo, Pretoria, 4 December 1975 (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 6).
465 ‘Former chief of SAA was top-flight instructor’, Sunday Times 4 February 2001.
469 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
ning of eighteen anti-apartheid movements to counter a wave of township violence following Biko’s death, as well as Pretoria’s non-compromising attitude towards Namibian independence were further contributory factors. After Biko’s death, a DFA report noted that “several Ivory Coast spokesmen had expressed condemnation of the South African Government”. Abidjan’s position was in line with that of the African Group at the UN which displayed heightened activity, such as pushing the Security Council to adopt Resolution 418 on 4 November 1977, imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. In addition, the S.W.A./Namibia issue began to weigh heavily on the Ivory Coast-South African relationship. For example, in December 1976, South Africa’s daily The Star cited an appeal made by the Ivorian Ambassador to the UN, urging Pretoria to “see reason and to co-operate with the UN on the South West African issue”. As a result of these developments, the Ivorian President began to distance himself from South Africa. In June 1978, a DFA report noted that “representatives of Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Senegal said in interviews that they had concluded that their peaceful approach to South Africa had produced no significant change”, indicating that Houphouët-Boigny and his colleagues from the other two countries were rethinking their approach to this matter.

Regarding South Africa’s contact with Senegal, Senghor had maintained a more sceptical attitude towards Dialogue than Houphouët-Boigny ever since. A contributing factor prompting Senghor nevertheless to meet Vorster in September 1974, was their correspondence over a court case against author and Law Professor Barend van Niekerk, as discussed above. At a later stage, Senghor appears to have been similarly pleased with Vorster’s reply to his letter of concern regarding the fate of Breyten Breytenbach, a white South African writer in exile in Paris since the early 1960s who was jailed during a clandestine return to South Africa in August 1975. In particular, Vorster assured Senghor in October 1975 that Breytenbach’s life

---


was not threatened, as the Senegalese President had feared. However, by early 1976, Senghor had become disillusioned with Pretoria. In January 1976, he hosted an international conference on “Namibia and Human Rights”, an indication of his concern regarding the continued South African presence there. This conference was also attended by Christopher John Robert Dugard, Professor of Law at the University of Witwatersrand from 1969 and author of many publications on the S.W.A./Namibia issue, who went there in the company of his “friend and colleague”, Barend van Niekerk, as we established in correspondence with John Dugard. This exchange also underlines what has been discussed previously, namely that Senghor’s concern over the van Niekerk court case had been motivated by his friendship, flattered by van Niekerk’s study on his literary work; Dugard further mentions that Senghor had invited van Niekerk to Senegal on previous occasions. According to a DFA report, during the international conference just mentioned, Senghor expressed his disappointment over Pretoria’s attitude to Professor Dugard. According to this brief from Under-Secretary Pretorius, marked for the attention of Brand Fourie, Dugard had “revealed” to André Jaquet from the Francophone Africa Desk “in a private conversation” that Senghor “felt that his attempts at dialogue had been rebuffed by South Africa”. Senghor’s view was based on his having sent two letters to Vorster in early 1975 and not having received a reply. In these letters, Senghor had expressed the intention of despatching a fact-finding mission comprised of three Senegalese jurists to South Africa and asked Vorster to free political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill. The Paris correspondent of the Rand Daily Mail communicated this information in May 1976, after talks with Senghor, while it was also reported in several local newspapers and by the French news agency Agence France Press. The subsequent evidence suggests that Senghor’s idea of a fact-finding mission led to controversy between the Department of Information and the foreign affairs ministry, with the former being in favour. In particular, Information Secretary Eschel Rhodie recounts in his memoirs that Prime Minister Vorster had.

\[479\] ‘Senegal : President Senghor and Détente’, from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2).


\[481\] Correspondence with John Dugard, 4 December 2002.

\[482\] ‘Senegal: President Senghor and Détente’, from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). In correspondence of 4 December 2002, John Dugard states that there “was a steel wall between me and [the Department of] Foreign Affairs”, but he confirms to have met Jaquet unofficially.


“refused to reply to Senghor’s two letters”, although Rhoodie had emphasised the importance of a positive reply necessary to sustain Pretoria’s contact with Dakar. The foreign service officials, on the other hand, and judging from circumstantial evidence now presented, seem to have been against such a mission, probably deeming that this represented an act of interference in the country’s domestic affairs. Importantly, in the above-mentioned report destined for Brand Fourie, Under-Secretary Pretorius states that their “records show no evidence” that Senghor had written the two letters. Queried about the developments surrounding Senghor’s proposal and why the DFA files would not contain more information, André Jaquet proposed the following:

Rae [Killen] was the consummate bureaucrat and a very cautious chap indeed. He always made his comments or instructions on documents in pencil in the margins and regularly drew files to review how events had unfolded. If with hindsight he had made an unwise decision or had given a directive that later proved to be wrong, he would erase his initial comment and, with the benefit of hindsight, write an insightful new remark in the margin. (...) Finally, Rae Killen had three safes and a few filing cabinets in his office which were crammed full of files, some of which eventually went to Registry and most of which were probably shredded.

Indeed, Johan Pretorius’ report to Brand Fourie first went to Deputy Secretary Killen, and it is not certain whether it ever reached the Secretary. A hand-written note from Counsellor Anton Loubser, dated 25 January 1978 and at the end of this document reveals that Killen transferred this report to the files only at that stage: “This brief (prepared by Mr J. Pretorius on 4/2/76 and handed over to Mr Killen) was returned to me today by Mr Killen with the request to file it”. As we know, Senghor completely retreated from any contact with Pretoria after Vorster’s non-reply to his proposal of a fact-finding mission, while it is possible to argue that Vorster’s acceptance of such a mission would have convinced Senghor to pursue a more active pro-Discourse stance, representing a significant contribution to Pretoria’s ambition of breaking its isolation. Given that Killen had kept a relevant document on that matter to himself suggests that he and/or Brand Fourie had been against Senghor’s idea and that it was suppressed to cover their unwise attitude that subsequently caused the demise of Pretoria’s important contact with Dakar.

On the whole, therefore, the Department of Information’s successful initiative leading to Vorster’s meeting with Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor in the Ivory Coast in Sep-

487 Correspondence with André Jaquet, 2 December 2002.
tember 1974 did not result in a stable relationship between South Africa and these two countries. This was due to Pretoria’s intransigence over the S.W.A./Namibia issue and because the two African leaders became dissatisfied with South Africa’s domestic situation. Parallel to these developments, the Department of Foreign Affairs was active in two other relatively important mainland African countries, but this was not given the same attention as received by the Department of Information’s coup in the Ivory Coast. The diplomatic undertakings, examined as follows, led to Vorster’s visit to Liberia in February 1975, and we subsequently focus on the DFA initiatives in the Central African Republic.

Liberia

Although it was not public knowledge at the time, the Department of Information’s preparations for Vorster’s mission to the Ivory Coast did not go unnoticed by the Department of Foreign Affairs top officials. Clearly, this added to the already strained relations between the two state agencies. For example, Brand Fourie’s autobiographical accounts devote only a few pages to the Outward-Looking Policy in Africa. Fourie emphasises the establishment of contact with Malawi, but he does not make any reference to the activities of either BOSS or the Department of Information and criticises the latter’s boastful behaviour. He also objects to the fact that not enough credit was given to DFA’s achievements. Thus, in an attempt to prove their ability against the Department of Information, the foreign service officials also tried to achieve a breakthrough in Africa. Liberia did not have the high political standing of the Ivory Coast, but it was important for symbolic reasons; it was founded in 1847 by liberated Afro-American slaves and it was never ruled by a foreign power. In addition, in 1966, Liberia and Ethiopia had taken Pretoria to the International Court of Justice over the S.W.A./Namibia issue, but the ICJ did not deem that South Africa’s presence in the country was illegal, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This ruling was only made in 1971 by virtue of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, and it is possible to argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs considered establishing contact with their former adversary as a tactical success. The first evidence of interaction between Pretoria and Monrovia is noted in April 1974, when South Africa’s Ambassador at the Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Harold Langmead Taylor ‘Tassie’ Taswell, held informal talks with his Liberian counterpart, David Thomas. Thomas “remarked that he would very much like to visit South Africa”, but he had “to act with caution” because “undue friendliness would not stand him in good stead with many of his African colleagues

---

The main diplomatic activities subsequently took place at the UN in New York and Geneva, and appear to have been pursued more vigorously after Vorster’s trip to the Ivory Coast in September 1974. On 31 October 1974, South Africa’s Ambassador to the UN, Pik Botha, met Ambassador Thomas in Geneva. Evidently having resulted in a fruitful exchange of ideas, Liberian President William Tolbert signalled his preparedness to meet Pik Botha on 6 November, on the fringes of the UN General Assembly. On 18 December 1974, probably encouraged by these developments and by the energetic Pik Botha, Prime Minister Vorster invited Tolbert to visit South Africa and alternatively proposed that he himself would go to Liberia.

The documentation, relating to December 1974, on the diplomatic endeavours to organise a meeting between Tolbert and Vorster, suggests that the foreign service officials imitated the Department of Information’s more aggressive propaganda style to win followers in Africa. In the first instance, from 17 to 23 December 1974, Pik Botha and BOSS’s van den Bergh courted Ambassador Thomas by taking him on a confidential mission through both South Africa and Namibia. Shortly thereafter, from 31 December 1974 to 6 January 1975, KwaZulu leader Buthelezi visited Liberia, where he also met President Tolbert. The aim was to convince Monrovia of Pretoria’s respect for the freedom of the South African majority and of its intention to grant Namibia self-autonomy. These unfolding events, examined later in the Détente section, eventually led to the Turnhalle Conference. The idea of sending homeland leaders to African countries to generate the goodwill of their leaders was most probably derived from the Department of Information. Notably, in July 1972, To the Point had run the following Editorial: “South Africa would have to include in its delegation to any talks the leaders of its planned non-white states, to avoid creating the impression that only the white man’s interests are at stake”. Both Thomas’ visit to South Africa and Buthelezi’s trip to Liberia fulfilled their main purpose. It was after Thomas’ journey that Pik Botha reported: “It is Ambassador Thomas’ firm conviction that there is now a definite desire, conscious effort and determination on the part of the Vorster Government (...) to bring about a favourable change which totally eliminate inequity and injustice an [sic] equal rights to all in South Africa. (…) in view of its efforts (…), the present South African Government deserves a sympathetic listening ear

491 Memorandum’, from Pik Botha to Brand Fourie, New York, 4 November 1974; letter from Pik Botha to William Tolbert, New York, 7 November 1974; telegram from Pik Botha, New York, 8 November 1974 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vols. 1A, 2).
492 Letter from John Vorster to William Tolbert, Pretoria, 18 December 1974 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 1A).
493 To the Point 1 July 1972: 21.
instead of complete condemnation and ridicule”.\textsuperscript{494} Regarding Buthelezi’s excursion to Liberia, Tolbert stated in a press communiqué one week after Vorster’s visit to Liberia in February 1975: “As I had been informed by Chief Buthelezi that the South African Government had undertaken dialogue with the black people of that country, the criterion for dialogue with that Government had been met and the stage was now set for direct communication between us”.\textsuperscript{495}

Significantly, a mere five weeks after Buthelezi’s visit, South Africa’s Prime Minister went to Liberia on 11/12 February 1975. The list of people that accompanied Vorster this time was very different to that of the Ivory Coast, reflecting the influence of the players behind this meeting: Vorster’s Private Secretary, his medical doctor, Minister Muller, Secretary Fourie, Pik Botha, Hendrik van den Bergh and Mike Geldenhuys.\textsuperscript{496} Probably to demonstrate the effectiveness of their policy in Africa, the DFA immediately made the meeting public. It was hailed as a breakthrough,\textsuperscript{497} but this move was overtaken by events when, only three months later, Vorster’s trip to the Ivory Coast became known and was reported as the more important achievement. As a result, during our interview in 1999, Pik Botha insisted angrily that both BOSS and the Department of Information had “jumped on the bandwagon” and stolen the merits of the Liberia trip.\textsuperscript{498} A final note needs to be made on the relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and BOSS in this instance. We suggest that BOSS’s intelligence support was essential for the Department of Foreign Affairs to pursue plans of this nature. Notably, BOSS agent Gert H. Rothmann was involved in the run-up to Vorster’s meeting with Tolbert, as Brand Fourie’s unpublished memoirs reveal, but without further specification of Rothmann’s role.\textsuperscript{499}

Subsequent to Vorster’s visit to Liberia, and similar to the stance taken by Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor, Tolbert also became disillusioned with Pretoria and ceased all contact, due to Pretoria’s uncompromising attitude towards Namibian independence and treatment of South Africa’s majority. Regarding the S.W.A./Namibia issue, we learn from a brief in the DFA files that during a discussion with Liberia’s Ambassador to Geneva, David Thomas, in June 1975, Tolbert pleaded with Pretoria “to help him to further help”. In addi-

\textsuperscript{494} Report from Pik Botha to John Vorster, Pretoria, 6 January 1975, pp.11f. (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 1A).

\textsuperscript{495} Official statement by Liberian President William Robert on 18 February 1975, issued by the Embassy of Liberia, Rome, 11 March 1975, p.4 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 1A).

\textsuperscript{496} DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 1A.


\textsuperscript{498} Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999.

tion, he stated that “if some dramatic statement were made indicating some imminent spectac- 

tacular action (...) to show willingness and plans for cooperation with the United Nations for 

the independence of Namibia, e.g. if within two years plans would be undertaken to prepare 

for granting the people of Namibia independence, the President would be able to present 

something tangible to his colleagues with the plea for understanding and patience in behalf of 

South Africa”. Vorster’s reaction, the Turnhalle Conference in September 1975, outlined in 

the next section, was only a half-hearted solution, however. Even less promising was Vor- 

ster’s attitude towards Tolbert’s written plea, dated 3 December 1975, requesting that Robert 

Sobukwe, a prominent PAC figure, be granted permission to attend a political ceremony in 

Liberia. Vorster rejected the idea, possibly influenced by foreign service officials, reasoning 

that this constituted an interference in South African domestic matters. Notably, Fourie com- 

municated the following to Ambassador Pik Botha in New York two weeks later, for further 

transmission to Liberia’s Ambassador, Thomas: “invitation is regarded as transparent move 

which if permitted would establish dangerous precedent. Sobukwe is not regarded as leader of 

black people. He has furthermore not been inactive since his release from prison”. This evi- 

dence supports the earlier argument that Vorster’s non-reply to President Senghor’s proposal 

of sending a fact-finding mission to South Africa was due to the intervention of the foreign 

service officials. After the expiry of Tolbert’s two years deadline on S.W.A./Namibia, he 

again contacted Vorster in September 1977, raising the issues of Namibian independence, 
hospital treatment for Sobukwe and the oppression of the majority in South Africa. By now, 

Vorster’s attitude had hardened and he only replied more than a month later, possibly again 
on diplomatic advice, declaring that the enquiries constituted an “interference in domestic 

affairs”. We explain Vorster’s harsh response with Pretoria’s defeat in Angola in early 

1976, examined in the Détente section, causing him to state before Parliament on 30 January 

1976 that “when it comes to the worst, South Africa stands alone”. His flexibility and pre- 

paredness to engage in foreign interchange thus appears to have suffered as a result. 

Apart from the Department of Foreign Affairs’ Liberian venture, undertaken to rival the 

Department of Information’s exploits in Senegal and in the Ivory Coast, the foreign service 

officials were also actively applying their favourite policy-levers, namely technical assistance

500 ‘Memorandum’ on a discussion between Ambassador Thomas and President Tolbert, 23 June 1975 (DFA, 

1/13/3, Vol. 3).

501 Letter from William Tolbert to John Vorster, Monrovia, 3 December 1975 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 3).

502 Telegram from Brand Fourie to Pik Botha, Pretoria, 17 December 1975 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 3).

503 Letter from William Tolbert to John Vorster, Monrovia, 14 September 1977 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 3).


and development/investment projects, in the Central African Republic. This forms the basis of
the following discussion.

**Central African Republic**

Two factors probably influenced the DFA’s interest in the C.A.R., namely its close relation­
ship with France, the former colonial power, an aspect we examined earlier in this chapter and
attributing that country an importance in continental matters. Second, the C.A.R. President,
Jean Bedel Bokassa, had taken a pro-Discussion attitude, although somewhat questionable in
content. On 8 June 1971, he made positive statements to this effect to the news agency
Reuters, but this remained unconfirmed at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa some two
weeks later, due to the country’s non-attendance. A later DFA report notes that the C.A.R.
Foreign Minister supported the Mogadishu Declaration in October 1971, adopted by the Con­
fERENCE of East and Central African States to put an end to the Dialogue debate, and that the
same minister also attacked South Africa at the UN. According to the same brief, the first
direct contact between the two countries occurred in April 1972, when the C.A.R. Ambassa­
dor in Brussels met South Africa’s Ambassador in Paris, Albie Burger. Yet, further interac­
tion did not take place until mid-1973, this time initiated by both BOSS and the military.

As an indication of the relevance of economic interaction in stimulating political contact
between South Africa and Africa at the time, on 26 July 1973, Jack Kagan of a Johannes­
burg-based import-export company implicated in drawing up a development programme for the
quently informed the Bureau for State Security that he might be in a position to establish con­
tact with Bokassa. A month later, on 27 August, and according to the DFA files, Kagan also
consulted with Major van Rhyn from Military Intelligence, and reported the event to the Min­
ister of Defence, P.W. Botha, who subsequently informed both Hilgard Muller and Brand
Fourie. Significantly, the DFA report indicates that van Rhyn’s wife was related to that of
P.W. Botha’s. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs’ “enthusiasm was (..) still only
weak” and it did “not react immediately”. It was only on 29 January 1974 that both Muller

---

from Afrikaans); ‘Interview with Mr J. Kagan of Union Fabrics, 20 June 1974’, Pretoria, 20 June 1974, p.1;
from Afrikaans); ‘Interview with Mr J. Kagan of Union Fabrics, 20 June 1974’, Pretoria, 20 June 1974, p.1;
Thereafter, the military retained an important position in the DFA’s initial contact with the Central African Republic. Their particular interest in this Francophone African country may have been Barkan’s background. According to DFA documentation, he was in the service of the Israeli Foreign Ministry before being seconded to Bokassa in the early 1970s, and it is possible that Barkan became the contact man for the Israeli intelligence, which had close links with Pretoria. In any event, the military’s keen interest is shown by the fact that high-ranking Military Intelligence personnel met with either Kagan or Barkan, and was present when foreign service officials held meetings with them. Thus, a Colonel Oosthuizen met Barkan in September 1973 in Paris, the Chief of Staff: Intelligence, Hein du Toit, saw Barkan in South Africa in March 1974 and he was present when Kagan met Deputy Secretary Killen three months later.

Barkan’s visit to South Africa from 25 to 29 March 1974 laid the foundation for the Department of Foreign Affairs’ significant interaction with the C.A.R. in the form of technical assistance and development/investment projects. In particular, Barkan was in the company of Maurice Methot, Director of Services at the Presidency of the C.A.R., and they held meetings with the DFA’s Muller, Fourie and Killen. During the discussions, these officials raised the issue of overflying rights for SAA, an important factor prompting their interest in establishing contact with Bangui and other African countries, as we will investigate closely later in this section. Talks were also held with the Secretary in the Department of Commerce, as well as representatives from the parastatal and private business community, namely the IDC, the Bantu Development Corporation (BDC), Roberts Construction, LTA and Credit Guarantee.

While the other enterprises were discussed in Chapter 2, the BDC was established in 1959 with the objective of promoting industrial and other undertakings in the homelands, as well as

512 ‘Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joël Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa’, 10 April 1974, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).
514 ‘Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joël Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa’, 10 April 1974, p.12 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).
515 ‘Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joël Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa’, 10 April 1974, pp.1ff. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).
to act as a development, financial and investment institution. Its presence in this instance can be seen as Pretoria’s attempt to create political goodwill by demonstrating that its work was to the benefit of the majority, and that this expertise could also be used for development/investment projects in interested African countries. A visit was made to an industrial project in a township created by the BDC, to show what could be achieved.

Evidently impressed by the feedback from Barkan and Methot after their visit, Bokassa met a South African delegation in Paris from 17 to 23 September 1974. This was led by Johan Adendorff from the BDC, and consisted of representatives from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry, as well as from the enterprises that attended the March meetings, to discuss development/investment projects. Contact intensified in the following weeks, leading to important projects and the provision of technical assistance. A brief overview of the relevant meetings is now provided, followed by a detailed discussion of the types of assistance rendered. Bokassa wrote directly to Prime Minister Vorster on 3 October 1974, acknowledging the “extremely positive” results of the Paris talks and emphasising the importance of the proposed projects for his country. Then, on 7 October, Barkan met Vorster in South Africa. Subsequently, from 5 to 11 November, Ambassador Burger led a South African delegation comprised of officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, as well as private business, to the C.A.R. A joint communiqué was issued during the visit, the contents of which are noted in the secondary literature.

“Operation Bokassa”, as it was code-named by the DFA, consisted of the following projects: a hotel complex of five hundred bedrooms, a railway line, five hundred prefabricated houses, mineral research and exploitation, an agricultural-industrial complex, tourist facilities, a second hospital in the capi-

---


517 Letter from Jean Bokassa to Hilgard Muller, Bangui, 6 September 1974 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).

518 ‘Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M.’ (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).


521 Letter from John Vorster to Jean Bokassa, Pretoria, 1 November 1974; letter from Rae Killen with an invitation to the various companies, Pretoria, 25 October 1974 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 3).

tal, Bangui, educational projects and a paper pulp mill. We henceforth examine the relevance of those projects where sufficient primary sources were available.

Similar to Gabon's President Bongo, Bokassa's motivation to seek contact with Pretoria was self-interest. As one journalist wrote at the time: "For Bokassa, his "flirtation" with South Africa is a matter of economic expediency rather than part of an overall ideology."

The prime example was his wish to have a hotel of international standing built in Bangui, named Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa. For the reasons aptly summarised in a DFA report, Bokassa accorded it absolute priority over all other projects of Operation Bokassa:

The third hotel is an absolute necessity and must be completed before January, 1976, when 65 countries of the O.A.U. will confer in his country. He considers the selection of his country for the conference (...) as a great honour (...) and must at all costs provide the necessary accommodation by that time. He also mentions that many members of the O.A.U. have suggested that the permanent seat of the Organisation be changed from Addis Ababa to his capital city (...).

In spite of Bokassa's reputation as a corrupt and eccentric politician, but being aware of his role as foreign policy maker in the C.A.R., the Department of Foreign Affairs pursued the plans for the prestige-building exercise. Besides winning Bokassa's sympathies, the foreign service officials saw the hotel project as an opportunity for gaining recognition by other OAU member countries. The report quoted above reads: "It can hold great advantages for South Africa if we can undertake this prestige project for the accommodation of the O.A.U."

Muller being the cautious Minister of Foreign Affairs he was, argued in October 1974 that "the Republic cannot participate in prestige projects" and that it should "support something productive". Yet, possibly overruled by Secretary Fourie, Pretoria went ahead in providing assistance. For this purpose, the foreign affairs ministry approached the companies Brian Colquhoun, introduced in Chapter 2, and its associate, Cereal and General Exports, considering them to be suitable for involvement in the project. Representatives from these two firms formed part of the group invited by the DFA to visit the C.A.R. in November 1974. Several problems soon became apparent, however. The provision of credit finance was the most critical issue, as Cereal and General Exports was responsible only for the delivery of material, with no involvement in construction activity. In addition, the C.A.R. request for credit repayment exceeded the normal duration of five years usually stipulated by Credit Guarantee, the

525 'Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M.', p.3 (DFA, I/183/3, Vol. 2).
526 'Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M.', p.3 (DFA, I/183/3, Vol. 2).
company contracted by Pretoria to insure the export of capital goods. Furthermore, the cost of 6 million Rand was considered too high and it became clear that the required amount of cement was not readily available in South Africa. It therefore became apparent that the completion of the hotel by January 1976 was not a feasible proposition. The South Africans thus decided to build only sections of the hotel, known as Blocks A and B.\footnote{Report on Working Group 1', pp.1-4, 8f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4).} On 17 December 1974, Ambassador Burger communicated Pretoria's preparedness to finance them with a 1.5 million Rand credit over ten years at 5% interest, with a moratorium of two years before repayment, which would have to be completed in sixteen instalments and interest payments every six months. Two days later, the provider company, Cereal and General Exports, obtained insurance from Credit Guarantee.\footnote{Letter from Albie Burger to Jean Bokassa, Paris, 17 December 1974 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 5).}\footnote{Letter from Jean Bokassa to John Vorster, Bangui, 5 February 1975 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 5).} In a letter to Vorster on 5 February 1975, Bokassa gratefully accepted the offer\footnote{DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 5 contains photographs of this visit.} and deployed his Technical Adviser, Barkan, the Minister of Housing and the Permanent Secretary of Housing to Pretoria from 12 to 17 February to negotiate and sign the loan agreement, and meetings took place with both Vorster and Muller.\footnote{Dr Koomhof: visit to Bangui', from Johan Pretorius to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 17 November 1975, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7).} The agreement was not contained in the relevant DFA file, but later documents suggest that the IDC provided an export credit of 3 million Rand and Pretoria added 1.015 million Rand in the form of a loan.\footnote{Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joel Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa', 10 April 1974, pp.10-13 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).} This evidence shows, once again, that the Department of Foreign Affairs made use of the country's economic capacities for its political objectives aimed at impressing African leaders at every attempt, stretching credit guarantees provided by Credit Guarantee to the absolute limit.

Second on the list of priorities itemised in Operation Bokassa was a railway line to the port of Douala in Cameroon, facilitating import to and export from the landlocked C.A.R. While in South Africa at the end of March 1974, Barkan and Methot discussed this project at great length with Fourie and a Mr. Catacuzene from Roberts Construction.\footnote{Letter from Jean Bokassa to John Vorster, Bangui, 5 February 1975 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 5).} In a letter to President Bokassa after the visit, Minister Muller singled out the project:

regarding the railway line project, a project of vital importance for the Central African Republic, a first contact has been established with a very important South African com-
pany [Roberts Construction] that has great experience in that field. A representative from this company will shortly come to Bangui to examine the documents more closely.\footnote{Letter from Hilgard Muller to Jean Bokassa, Pretoria, 29 March 1974, p.2 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 1) (translation from French).}

The project again figured prominently in Bokassa's discussions with the South African delegation during September 1974 in Paris.\footnote{Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M.', pp.1f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2).} Catacuzene was also part of the South African delegation that visited the C.A.R. in November 1974. Yet, given the size of this project, the joint communiqué of 9 November stated that it could only be undertaken by a consortium of companies, following which Catacuzene made it clear that Roberts Construction was not interested in joining, but merely in undertaking sub-contractual work,\footnote{Report on Working Group I', pp.10, 4f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4).} and they consequently did not take part in this project.

Third on the list of development/investment projects contained in Operation Bokassa was the construction of five hundred prefabricated houses in Bangui. The main parties involved were LTA, the IDC and Credit Guarantee. Spencer R. Whiting from LTA and Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee were part of the group that the DFA had invited to visit the C.A.R. in November 1974. For the same reasons applicable to the hotel project, the provision of credit finance proved to be a critical issue. However, rating the railway line as bearing less political weight in comparison and judging this project to be "the only one [of Operation Bokassa] which appears capable of being dealt with on a normal commercial basis", the South Africans insisted on the normal five year repayment period in this case.\footnote{Report on Working Group I', pp.10, 6f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4).} On 14 March 1975, during their visit to South Africa, the C.A.R. delegation and the relevant South African parties signed several financial agreements. Accordingly, the total cost of the project to be undertaken by LTA amounted to close on 10 million Rand.\footnote{DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 6. 6.882 million Rand for the material, 753,000 for the transport, 2.321 million for the erection.} In line with its Export Finance Scheme, the IDC provided the credit that was insured by Credit Guarantee. Repayment was to begin three years after the commencement of the contract and in six-monthly instalments over a period of ten years, with an interest rate of 7.25\%.\footnote{DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 6.} Sections of the agreement were thus not consistent with what the South Africans termed a "normal commercial basis" in November 1974, another example that shows that economic logic was subordinated to political interests. This again repudiates the Marxist interpretation of political economy, examined in the Introduction to this study, that economic ambitions formed the motivation for South Africa's Outward-Looking Policy in Africa beyond its neighbourhood.
The final aspect of Operation Bokassa to be examined here, is Bokassa’s request for technical assistance in mineral research and exploitation of its reputedly rich mineral resources. During the talks in November 1974, the C.A.R. representatives asked for assistance from private South African mining companies, but no names are mentioned in the relevant DFA report. Evidently preferring to actively display the government’s expertise, this request remains unanswered in the documents. Instead, the South African delegation proposed sending one or two geologists from the National Metallurgical Institute in Johannesburg to undertake surveys. In consequence, a South African geologist visited the C.A.R. sometime between November 1974 and June 1975, recommending the concentration of operations on diamonds.

This overview of the key projects within Operation Bokassa is followed by an investigation of aspects relevant to their development until the end of the Vorster era.

Only one year after the financial agreements had been signed, the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa, which originally enjoyed top priority status, encountered financial difficulties as a South African delegation, led by Minister Muller, learnt during a visit to Bangui from 21 to 24 February 1976. Bokassa told Muller that due to “inflation etc.”, another 4 million Rand was required. Furthermore, Muller was informed that the OAU congress, the raison d’être for building the hotel, would no longer take place in Bangui. Muller's reaction was cautious, not wanting to give “false hopes” as to Pretoria’s preparedness in providing additional finance. The South Africans “noted with surprise” that the additional money was needed to pay the salaries, as the original agreement stated that Bangui was responsible for the construction costs. Nonetheless, the IDC drafted a set of contracts to formalise an additional credit of 1.5 million Rand, while Pretoria intended to send a clerk of works to Bangui “to streamline construction procedures and ensure proper control”. It is likely that the foreign service officers displayed such generosity to win Bokassa’s assistance in two important matters. The first issue was their request for SAA overflying rights to form an air corridor through Africa, an

---

546 ‘Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Paleis of 23 Februarie’, from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 26 February 1976, p.4 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7); ‘Procès-verbal de la séance de travail entre la délégation
aspect examined in the next sub-section. The second matter dealt with Pretoria’s homelands policy. We have seen that the Department of Information attempted to win over African leaders by selling this concept as the government’s answer to reforming apartheid. Similar to the situation when KwaZulu leader Buthelezi visited Liberia in January 1975, the foreign affairs ministry imitated the Department of Information’s strategy, including George Matanzima in the delegation that went to Bangui in February 1976. He was the Minister of Justice in the Transkei and brother of Kaizer Matanzima, the leader of this homeland and strong advocate of its independence.\footnote{Laurence, Patrick. 1976. The Transkei: South Africa’s Politics of Partition. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 11, 25.} While the foreign service officials’ promise of additional financing for the hotel projects did not achieve obtaining overflying rights for SAA, they could report some success in their second aim. Significantly, Bokassa expressed that he was “pleased” to receive Matanzima, adding “that there was no doubt that he would not accept the independence of Transkei”.\footnote{‘Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Paleis of 23 Februarie’, from Johan Pretorius, 26 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7) (translation from Afrikaans).} Bokassa also indicated that he was “prepared to establish, without delay, diplomatic relations on an ambassadorial level and with fully-fledged embassies in the two countries”.\footnote{‘Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Paleis of 23 Februarie’, from Johan Pretorius, 26 February 1976, pp.2f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7) (translation from Afrikaans).}

Returning to the hotel project, this was again the main issue of discussion during the visit of a South African delegation, led by Deputy Secretary Killen and André Jaquet from the Francophone Africa Desk, and comprising ten businessmen,\footnote{Spencer Whiting and Brian Melhuish from LTA, Jan Bouwer and Robert Speedie from Credit Guarantee, Johan van Vuuren from the Industrial Development Corporation, C. Lewis and David Lewis from Cereal and General Exports, Mr. Lister from Brian Colquhoun, M. Simpson from Hallows Architects and interior decorator L. Hansen. ‘Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977’, from Rae Killen, Annexure A (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).} to Bangui from 10 to 17 August 1977. According to the available information, new financial agreements had been negotiated, revealing that the IDC provided further credit, while Cereal and General Exports continued their responsibility for the hotel’s building material and LTA supervised the construction of the hotel, in the meantime scaled down to two hundred and seventy rooms.\footnote{Spencer Whiting and Brian Melhuish from LTA, Jan Bouwer and Robert Speedie from Credit Guarantee, Johan van Vuuren from the Industrial Development Corporation, C. Lewis and David Lewis from Cereal and General Exports, Mr. Lister from Brian Colquhoun, M. Simpson from Hallows Architects and interior decorator L. Hansen. ‘Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977’, from Rae Killen, Annexure A (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).} In spite of the problems, it still remained a profitable enterprise for the private companies involved; if Bangui should not be able to pay, Credit Guarantee would act as the financial guarantor, again reinsured by Pretoria. Mirroring this situation, a relatively close contact developed between LTA’s Spencer Whiting and Rae Killen. In a letter of November 1976, addressing Killen by...
his first name, Whiting reported on a recent visit to Bangui: “we saw B. [Bokassa] twice and he was very affable. He undoubtedly has genuine regard for Minister Muller, and I would think a deal of gratitude for what South Africa has done”.\(^{552}\) Regarding the further development of the hotel project, Bangui’s increasing financial difficulties meant that it could not repay the loan of 1.015 million Rand provided by Pretoria.\(^{553}\)

In contrast, and turning to the development of the other projects that comprised Operation Bokassa, the erection of the five hundred prefabricated houses “was proceeding satisfactorily” and “there was a 12-month waiting list of eager purchasers”, as Rae Killen reported after his visit to Bangui in August 1977.\(^{554}\) In March 1978, Johan Pretorius also reported that most “of the houses have been bought or let and the scheme is a great success”.\(^{555}\) The last aspect of Operation Bokassa entailed South African technical assistance for mineral research, resulting in the engagement of a South African geologist for exploration purposes by June 1975. Based on his report, indicating that further assistance was worthwhile, the South African delegation led by Minister Muller to Bangui from 21 to 24 February 1976 conveyed Pretoria’s decision to provide the C.A.R. with some 5.5 million Rand to cover the period 1976/77. The South Africans also proposed a visit by the C.A.R. Director of Mines to South Africa to hold talks on the prospecting and exploitation of diamonds with the Department of Mining and private mining companies.\(^{556}\) The offer further included Safair’s delivery of technical material to establish the extent of the diamond areas, the secondment of a South African geologist for a year to undertake prospecting in the C.A.R. and the training of three local geologists by Pretoria’s Geological Service.\(^{557}\) In June 1976, Killen reported to Muller that the C.A.R. Director of Mines, who had recently visited South Africa, was suspended from his post, that the country’s diamond industry had been nationalised, that two planeloads of material were awaiting delivery and that a geologist from the Department of Mines would soon leave for Bangui.\(^{559}\) How-

---

\(^{551}\) ‘Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977’, from Rae Killen, pp.4f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).

\(^{552}\) Letter from Spencer Whiting to Rae Killen, Johannesburg, 15 November 1976 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).

\(^{553}\) ‘Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire’, from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 March 1978, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 9).

\(^{554}\) ‘Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977’, from Rae Killen, Bangui, p.6 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).

\(^{555}\) ‘Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire’, from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 March 1978, p.2 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 9).


\(^{558}\) ‘Central African Republic’, from Rae Killen to Hilgard Muller, Pretoria, 2 June 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).
ever, according to a DFA report of March 1978, "a private company of Israeli and American interests has been formed to develop the diamond deposits"\(^{559}\) putting an end to this aspect of co-operation between South Africa and the C.A.R.

In summary, Pretoria's contact with Bangui, which had begun during 1973/74, proved to be a very difficult exercise. With only one of the projects advancing well by 1978, their final outcome falls within the ambit of the early part of P.W. Botha’s premiership and is therefore examined in the next chapter. The DFA's involvement in costly prestige development/investment projects, namely the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa, is a prime example of the foreign service officials placing the political goal of impressing an African leader higher than the economic viability of the project itself. The actual gain for Pretoria, however, was minuscule. Once it became clear that the envisaged OAU conference, for which purpose the hotel was to be built, would not take place in Bangui, Bokassa's interest in co-operating with Pretoria dropped significantly. On a personal level, during the above-mentioned stay of the South African delegation in the C.A.R. in August 1977, Killen was supposed to have a meeting with Bokassa at 6p.m. on 12 August, but "was eventually received" at 10:30a.m. on the next day, as Killen disappointedly reported. The signing of the documents relating to the hotel project also proved to be a tedious exercise.\(^{560}\)

On the whole, the contact with Liberia and the development of Operation Bokassa in the Central African Republic were not conducive to the DFA's ambition of establishing itself vis-à-vis the Department of Information, in view of their simultaneous activities in both the Ivory Coast and Senegal. The visit of the C.A.R. delegation to South Africa in February 1975, mentioned above, appeared in South African newspapers and in the secondary literature, presenting the contact as an important breakthrough for Pretoria in Africa.\(^{561}\) However, this was overshadowed by the Department of Information's subsequent public relations coup in revealing Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast. Apart from that, the DFA's initiatives in the C.A.R. did not produce any tangible results to Pretoria's advantage. In particular, Bokassa did not recognise Transkei as a sovereign state when Pretoria declared its independence in October 1976. Fur-

---

\(^{559}\) 'Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire', Pretoria, 7 March 1978, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 9).

\(^{560}\) 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977', from Rae Killen, pp.2, 5 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).

thermore, the foreign affairs ministry did not obtain overflying rights for South African Airways, an aspect of Pretoria's foreign relations with African countries beyond South Africa's neighbourhood that became increasingly important, our focus now.

**Air Routes for SAA**

South African Airways was established in 1934, operated by the equally state-owned South African Railways and Harbours until 1990, ensuring a connection to the developed world and to Western Europe in particular. Geographically, South Africa occupies a remote position on the southernmost tip of Africa, "far from principal trading partners, far from the major hubs of commerce, industry and innovation of the world, far from the Anglo-European cultural hearth to which many South Africans remain firmly bound". As white South Africans identified themselves with the culture in Europe and because the country's economy was dependent on trade with this continent, air transport to and from the Republic was of vital importance. The first international service, between South Africa and the United Kingdom, became operative at the end of 1945, with the first non-stop flights to Europe taking place from 1962. However, with independence sweeping across Africa in the early 1960s, the most direct air routes to Western Europe traversing the continent became disrupted. Exploiting their geographical location, African countries began to attack South Africa's vital lifeline, withdrawing both landing and overflying rights from SAA to put pressure on Pretoria to abandon apartheid. Western European airlines serving South Africa were hardly affected by these actions, but they posed a severe problem for the South African government. By having to fly around the western bulge of Africa, "flying distance to all European centres increased by at least 1 400 kms, the journey time lengthened correspondingly, and fuel usage

---


562 Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002.


566 The DFA files document only two exceptions. In 1975, the Congolese Republic closed its airport to the French airline UTA and the Dutch airline KLM, both of which served Johannesburg, which gave rise to the idea of using Bangui instead: 'Central African Republic', 2 December 1975 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7). In 1977, UTA planes on the way to and from Johannesburg were not allowed to land in Libreville for the duration of the OAU conference there: 'UTA flights to and from South Africa during OAU Conference', from André Jaquet, Pretoria, 11 May 1977 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8).
soared" (Figure 3). Yet, SAA could not increase its prices accordingly for fear of losing passenger volume and thereby income to the competing airlines on the profitable routes between South Africa and Western Europe. The result was great additional expenditure by Pretoria to sustain these SAA flights. In an attempt to circumvent the impact of African air sanctions, the airline, in conjunction with the government, tried to gain landing and overflying rights in specific African countries and this was an important feature of South Africa's foreign relations with Africa, especially after the mid-1970s. Apart from the information contained in the DFA files, a particularly useful source to reconstruct their initiatives and results were interviews and correspondence with both Frans Swarts and Gerrit Dirk 'Gert' van der Veer, SAA Chief Executives from 1982 to 1983 and then until 1993 respectively.

Given that African countries withdrew their overflying and landing rights for South African Airways in the wake of independence, and according to Swarts and van der Veer, "numerous African countries were targeted on an on-going basis since August 1963 to reduce costs and also flying time in order to stay competitive on the European route". Las Palmas on the Spanish Canary Islands became an important stopover in this regard, permitting planes to start with less fuel in Johannesburg, thereby increasing their capacity to carry passengers and making the flights more economical. During the first half of the 1970s, SAA increasingly switched over to Ilha do Sal on Cape Verde, an island off the Senegalese coast and Portuguese colony until July 1975. In particular, Ilha do Sal was used as a stopover for the New York flights that commenced in November 1973 and lasted until 1986, when the US Congress imposed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) (Chapter 5); Las Palmas was still used for other flights until April 1983. In return for the landing rights on Ilha do Sal, Pretoria provided financial compensation and technical assistance to ensure the maintenance of airport standards, notably by calibrating the airport's landing and navigational aids, as prescribed by the United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to comply with airport safety standards world-wide. Based on the available documents, Pretoria contributed 60,000 Rand for that purpose covering the budget years 1977/78 and 1978/79. In addition, a loan agreement of 15.75 million US Dollars at an interest rate of 6% was concluded with the

---

568 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
Cape Verde government in late 1979 to finance repairs and improvements to the runway, apron and control tower at Ilha do Sal. The available documents reveal that the operator of SAA, South African Railways and Harbours, was involved in the project.\footnote{DFA, 1/224/3, Vol. 1.} Also, around the mid-1980s, and according to the firm’s in-house publication, LTA was responsible for maintenance work on the runway at the airport, serving as another example of private business activity in support of Pretoria’s ambitions in Africa, with a financial benefit for the firm involved. At the same time, it saved the South African government a great deal of money in subsidising SAA flights. On this issue, former foreign service official Paul Runge candidly stated in 1999: “there were projects that paid off nicely. In Cape Verde, for example, we only uplifted the runway, and in return we could put through three SAA flights a week. One flight paid for the project”.\footnote{Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.} For its part, and the assistance necessary to maintain and improve the airport’s standards aside, the Cape Verde government was financially so dependent on the income from the SAA stopovers that it could not afford to cancel the landing rights, despite the condemnation of the apartheid system. In fact, one secondary source suggests that this income constituted “about 90 percent of the income generated by the airport”.\footnote{King, Godfrey. 1986. Cape Verde: Airport Dresses up, but Who Will Come?, African Business 98: 42. Also Whann, Christopher A. 1998. The Political Economy of Cape Verde’s Foreign Policy, Africana Journal: A Bibliographical and Review Quarterly, 17: 46.}
The DFA files reveal increased activities on the part of SAA to circumvent the African air sanctions after 1974, as a result of Pretoria’s critical lack of access to petrol such as we now detail. Already in the 1950s, the two oil-from-coal plants Sasol I and Sasol II near Johannesburg had been established to synthetically produce oil, and, in 1965, Pretoria formed the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation, mentioned earlier in this chapter, to co-ordinate and promote the search and development of commercial gas and oil fields. In spite of these measures, it was still important for South Africa to obtain the precious raw material directly from oil-producing countries, as the quality was generally better and the cost for producing oil synthetically was very high. The Arab states proved to be an important source, but this changed substantially after October 1973, as a result of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt. In order to create pressure so that Tel Aviv would withdraw her troops from the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the oil-producing Arab states embargoed Israel’s allies, among them South Africa.\textsuperscript{576} The only Arab country to continue supplying oil to South Africa was Iran until the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979,\textsuperscript{577} supplementing the alleged close cooperation between the two countries in the fields of nuclear development and arms manufacturing.\textsuperscript{578} The Arab oil embargo aggravated the situation regarding SAA flights to Europe around the bulge of Africa. The further restriction of Pretoria’s access to the oil and the dramatic rise in the price of the available oil increased the cost of these SAA flights. In sum, as stated by Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, “the increase in fuel prices in 1973 and 1979 obviously highlighted the need for more economical routes”.\textsuperscript{579} Apart from the stopover on Ilha do Sal, Pretoria pursued two principal strategies from 1974 to alleviate the problem, as further explained by them: “two routes in particular were considered; i.e. over West Africa, cutting the bulge of Africa and over East Africa and the Red Sea”\textsuperscript{580} (Figure 3).

In his study, Deon Geldenhuys indicates that both BOSS and the Department of Information actively supported the airline’s endeavours during 1976. Between them, van den Bergh and Eschel Rhoodie tried to secure overflying rights in Sudan and Egypt respectively.\textsuperscript{581} 

\textsuperscript{576} See Adams. 1984. The Unnatural Alliance.
\textsuperscript{579} Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{580} Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
\textsuperscript{581} Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.117.
Rhodie’s advances cannot be verified because the files on Egypt were not consulted, falling outside the scope of this study, but DFA files partly document van den Bergh’s enterprise in Sudan. Importantly, this failed because he rejected the Sudanese demand of a 200 million US Dollar loan and a 50 million Dollar grant in return. The reasons for this could not be ascertained, with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer merely stating that “Sudan proved to be the major stumbling block”. In consequence, as the two former SAA Chief Executives informed us: “The possibility of over-flying Somalia, Djibouti and up the Red Sea was seriously considered [by SAA] and theoretically possible, but never introduced due to the high risk of passing between Yemen and Ethiopia where a Russian no-go area (Sub-marine base) was proclaimed. Any adverse weather conditions would have forced us over either Yemen or Ethiopia, both of which would not have given us any rights. The risk of running a commercial service under such conditions was totally unacceptable”. Regarding the West African route, we have seen that overflying rights for the C.A.R. were not obtained. Yet, SAA persisted in finding the support from other relevant countries, thus reflecting the importance of this issue in the company’s strategy. In particular, during 1978, the engineering firm Brian Colquhoun reported its interest in a road-building programme in Cameroon to the Department of Foreign Affairs, leading it to the following assessment: “As far as the firm Brian Colquhoun’s interest (...) is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the Cameroon forms part of an area in central Africa, together with the adjacent Congo[lese Republic] and Central African Empire [=C.A.R.], where we are trying to expand our interests. As far as our interest in regaining rights to overfly central Africa is concerned, it is also necessary for us to make contact with and extend our friendship in this area”. The files up to and including 1979, however, do not contain any trace on whether the road project was pursued, while we could establish that SAA never obtained overflying rights for Cameroon. In any case, and with hindsight, Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer corresponded that overflying rights for these African countries would have been of little use, as the same rights could not be obtained from the North African countries Algeria and Libya, necessary to form a complete air corridor.

---

583 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
584 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
586 Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002.
587 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
The information presented so far proposed that the Department of Information targeted the Ivory Coast and Senegal in an attempt to break South Africa’s isolation. For its part, the Department of Foreign Affairs liaised with Liberia and the C.A.R. to the same end, but also to establish itself vis-à-vis the Department of Information and to obtain overflying rights for SAA. Another dimension, based on geo-strategic concerns, shaped Pretoria’s relations with those black African countries beyond southern Africa that formed the western Indian Ocean area, namely the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles. The next section examines Pretoria’s contact with these islands and reveals that the Bureau for State Security, given its position as the dominant intelligence gathering agency, played an important role.

**Western Indian Ocean**

The five islands itemised above constituted the western part of the Indian Ocean that experienced ever increasing rivalry over the spread of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. The relevant developments are now outlined to provide the framework necessary to the understanding of Pretoria’s activities in this area.

Three major events explain why the Indian Ocean as a whole, and the western part in particular, became of “strategic importance in the external powers’ jockeying for both global and littoral influence and for positions of strategic offense or defense vis-à-vis each other.” To begin with, Great Britain held a relatively strong position in the western Indian Ocean with its colonial administration over Mauritius and Seychelles until 1968 and 1976 respectively, and in late 1966 signed an agreement which allowed the United States to use both these islands for defence purposes. Yet, in a landmark decision, the British government announced, in early 1968, that it was going to withdraw from east of the Suez Canal by 1971. Shortly thereafter, Moscow sent four warships to the Indian Ocean from the east and subsequently deployed naval units on a regular basis. A second reason for the strategic importance of the western Indian Ocean area relates to the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967, in the context of the Six Days War between Egypt and Israel. During the next eight years, shippers were forced to sail around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope to reach either Europe or the United States. As a result, and “by virtue of their potential for command of the Cape route”, the Comoros,

---

Madagascar and Seychelles gained particular significance, more so than the further distant Mauritius and Reunion. While the Suez Canal was closed, the Yom Kippur War erupted in October 1973 between Egypt and Israel. As was mentioned earlier, the Arab states cut off their oil supply to Israel and its allies, and this constituted the third reason in explaining the western Indian Ocean’s growing strategic relevance. In particular, a military or intelligence presence in this area allowed the monitoring of shipments around the Cape sea route generally, and particularly the movement of oil tankers. This aspect remained highly significant even after the Suez Canal was reopened in June 1975, because its closure had led to the construction of more voluminous tankers to make the long route around the Cape more economical; these tankers were now too large to pass through the canal and still had to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and pass the Comoros, Madagascar and the Seychelles.

An important note on the strong French presence in the western Indian Ocean is relevant at this point, as it partly curtailed Pretoria’s undertakings in this area. The French ambitions were symptomatic of its desire to be a global player. Their military forces were based on Madagascar, even after the island’s independence in 1960, but were moved to the Comoros, Reunion and, further north, to Djibouti after Ratsiraka took power in June 1972. The presence on Reunion remained unaffected due to the island’s status as a Département d’Outre-Mer (Overseas Department), administered by Michel Debré from 1963 to 1988; as seen previously, he was of some relevance as the Minister of Defence in the context of Pretoria’s engagement in the Nigerian Civil War. Regarding the Comoros, this island declared its unilateral independence from France in July 1975. While originally refusing to grant it independence, France accepted this development by the end of that year, because it could retain its military presence on Mayotte, part of the Comoros, while suspending all assistance to the island state.

Having outlined the geo-strategic relevance of the western Indian Ocean, we now investigate Pretoria’s activities there. The DFA files serve as the main source of information, revealing some interest by both the military and by BOSS, but a full picture on their activities cannot be given due to a lack of archival material. The presentation of the available evidence follows a loose chronological order, beginning with Madagascar.

The only information in the DFA files on Pretoria’s interest in this island reveals that, in January 1973, BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys reported from Paris on the “existing possibility that the Bureau [for State Security] could again establish contact with the Malagasy Intelligence through agents of General Andriamahazo [Malagasy Minister of Regional Develop-

ment']", after Ratsiraka’s assumption of power in June 1972 had put an end to contact between the two countries. There is no record of any further activity, but Geldenhuys’ brief reveals that BOSS held an interest in Madagascar as a source of intelligence gathering.

The geo-strategic interest shown by BOSS was also reflected in Pretoria’s attitude towards Mauritius. We have seen in the section on Dialogue that Mauritian-South African relations were primarily based on trade and tourism. Together with the role played by the Minister of External of Affairs, Tourism and Emigration, Gaëtan Duval, this resulted in its pro-Discussion stand at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in June 1971. At the time, Mauritius was already dependent on tea export to South Africa, but Pretoria did not need to make use of that economic lever to exert political pressure. However, it was applied after the two countries had reached an understanding in September 1973, whereby South Africa bought the tea at a price 15% above world price, thus increasing Mauritius’ dependency; the reasons for this agreement are not recorded and could not be ascertained from secondary sources. On 5 October 1973, Mauritius’ UN Ambassador, in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group, prevented Minister Muller from addressing the General Assembly and called him a “criminal”. On 12 October, in retaliation for the diplomat’s behaviour, Pretoria stopped all tea import from Mauritius. In an attempt to alleviate the tension, Minister Duval wrote to Muller, explaining that the ambassador, who “had not acted in accordance with Government instructions”, had been “recalled for consultation on this matter” and that a press conference would be held to clarify the government’s position. Duval’s prompt action and the visit of Mauritius’ Minister for Trade and Industries to Pretoria in late October 1973 soothed South Africa sufficiently to resume the import of tea in November. Regarding the tourism sector, we previously showed that SAA flew to Mauritius from October 1969. Further, and recognising its value as a holiday destination, Southern Sun Chairman Sol Kerzner displayed an interest in the island. Taken in conjunction with Southern Sun’s activities on Madagascar that came to a halt after President Tsiranana’s fall in June 1972, this provides an early indication of the hotel chain’s increasing ambition to expand into the western Indian Ocean. On Mauritius, Kerzner directed the Mauritius Southern Sun Hotels Limited that opened the Le Saint Gérán Hotel.

596 ‘‘U proar as UN stops Muller speech’, Rand Daily Mail 5 October 1972 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 7).
597 Letter from Gaëtan Duval to Hilgard Muller, Port Louis, 2 November 1973 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 7).
598 DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 7.
Casino and Golf Club in October 1975. According to a secondary source, this was financed partly by a loan ostensibly provided by the IDC and insured by Credit Guarantee. Sol Kerzner undertook further activities on the island in the 1980s that are examined in the next chapter on Pretoria’s relations with Africa during P.W. Botha’s rule.

Bureau for State Security involvement on Mauritius can be discerned in early 1974, linked to the sacking of Minister Duval by Prime Minister Ramgoolam in December 1973, thus putting an end to the political coalition between them that political scientist Larry Bowman described as “shaky from the outset”. One contributory factor to the difficult relationship was that Duval “tended to run a pro-Western, pro-French, and pro-South African foreign policy that was often at variance with the more muted pro-British, pro-Indian, and somewhat more nonaligned stance” promoted by Ramgoolam, this helps to explain South African press speculations that Duval’s active pro-Discussion stand had cost him his job. In early January 1974, BOSS agent Rothmann, whom we have met in the context of the DFA’s contact with Liberia, was planning on going to Mauritius for reasons unknown, but obviously entailing intelligence work, and asked Deputy Secretary Killen whether he could do anything for the foreign affairs ministry. Being interested in trying to ascertain the new political climate on the Indian Ocean island after Duval’s sacking, it took up the offer. Rothmann spent 24/25 January 1974 on Mauritius, meeting the Prime Minister, his Security Adviser and the Commissioner of the Police’s Special Branch, and, on his return, reported to Secretary Fourie on Ramgoolam’s affirmation that “contact must continue”. Whereas the preceding events reflect a degree of mutual acceptance by BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs for their respective roles in foreign policy making, the ensuing developments illustrate the inherent risk of friction. In particular, Deputy Secretary Killen lamented to his superior that Rothmann “had entered diplomatic terrain” in having met Ramgoolam and that this “had gone further

---


than what we had asked". Whether this dispute had any consequences is not known, but similar to the Madagascar case, BOSS held an intelligence interest in this Indian Ocean island in view of Mauritius’ overtures towards the communist camp, reflected in Ramgoolam’s visit to Moscow in August 1973 and the presence of a Soviet warship in Port Louis in December of that year. The DFA was equally concerned and, in January 1974, the Minister at the South African Embassy in Washington, David Vrede Louw, held discussions with Herman J. Cohen, Director for Central African Affairs in the US State Department, who had just returned from Mauritius. According to Cohen, there was no reason for Pretoria to worry, as the “U.S. Navy still used Port Louis, side by side with the Soviet Union”.

Now turning to Reunion, due to the island’s factual status as a French colony, administered by Michel Debré, and its importance for the French military, Paris was not prepared to let Pretoria benefit from this advantageous position. One example of Pretoria’s limited possibilities was SAA’s interest in obtaining landing rights on Reunion, as the South African authorities had to make a formal application to Paris for permission. The negotiations were only successful, because SAA was prepared to perform the weekly flight to Saint-Denis, and onwards to Mauritius, in co-operation with the French airline UTA after March 1974. Related to that, both Holiday Inn and Southern Sun showed an interest in establishing casino hotels on the island; during his visit to South Africa from 4 to 13 March 1972, the Prefect of Reunion met Sol Kerzner. Subsequent attempts by both companies to establish a foothold on Reunion remained unsuccessful, the principal reason being the strong position of the French hotel chain Novotel and Air France’s share in a casino hotel that was nearing completion in mid-1976. In consequence, the flow of South African tourists to this Indian Ocean island remained low, as reported by Johan von Gernet, the South African Consul on Reunion since late 1974: “There is a steady trickle of South African tourists to the island – almost without exception they prefer Mauritius with its vastly superior beaches, better hotel facilities and easier

---

611 DFA, 1/138/3, Vol. 1.
language communication". The establishment of a South African mission on the island was another example of France’s highly critical attitude towards South African ambitions to gain a foothold on Reunion. Pretoria’s plan for a permanent mission on the island for economic and military purposes was born in mid-1974. In order to determine their viewpoints, the Department of Foreign Affairs contacted the relevant departments in Pretoria. On the economic front, according to a DFA report of August 1974, the Department of Commerce felt that the “trading possibilities (...) have been neglected” and therefore favoured “the opening of a Consulate on Reunion”. In all likelihood, that position was influenced by the Durban Chamber of Commerce’s positive assessment after a visit to the island in October 1973. As early as June 1973, the Secretary in the Department of Commerce had contacted the Chamber to ascertain its views regarding the appointment of a trade representative. In his reply after the return of the mission to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion, the Chamber’s General Manager, Kenneth Hobson, enthusiastically stated that “the Chamber would support wholeheartedly the appointment of a full-time Trade Representative on Reunion with responsibilities for the whole Indian Ocean Island area”. The military also supported the idea of a permanent mission on Reunion. In March 1974, the Naval Chief of Staff, Hugo Hendrik Biermann, wrote to Fourie that the naval presence from East and West in the southern Indian Ocean made it “desirable to have a listening post in the area”. The only factor blocking the plan was the French attitude, causing Under-Secretary Pretorius to suggest to Fourie, in August 1974, that “perhaps we should consider bringing pressure to bear via Mr Debré to facilitate matters, but it is not recorded whether or not this avenue was pursued. The Consulate was eventually established in late 1974, originally staffed by a Consul, joined by a Vice-Consul from 1985. Also not known is whether Military Intelligence posted a representative, such as indicated by a report from Pretorius in January 1975: “D.M.I. are also likely to place one of their people there”.

616 Letter from Kenneth Hobson to the Secretary in the Department of Commerce, Durban, 26 October 1973, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/138/3, Vol. 1).
Turning to the Comoros, a military interest also becomes evident in Pretoria’s contact with this island, which had begun before its independence in July 1975 and through the Eilandse Sending. Its visit to the Comoros in early 1974 resulted in the island approaching Pretoria for technical assistance. Compared to the situation on Reunion, and although the Comoros were still a French colony then, there is no indication in the documents that France put obstacles in the way of Pretoria establishing contact with this island. This is surprising and cannot only be explained by recalling that Mayotte, part of the Comoros, had remained French territory and a site of its military. In any event, and following up on the request for technical assistance, from 18 to 23 July 1974, Killen led government officials in charge of fisheries, trade, agriculture and a SAA representative on an “exploratory visit” to the Comoros to establish what they required. A reading of Killen’s reports after the visit indicates the reasoning for providing such kind of assistance, namely the DFA’s interest in obtaining landing rights for SAA en route to Asia. In contrast, the men from the military were interested in the island for strategic reasons, but the files contained no further evidence of possible activities. On 3 September 1974, based on the findings of the above-mentioned visit, Muller offered to provide Ahmed Abdallah, the President of the Comoros’ Governing Council, with chickens and assistance in cattle breeding, seven fishing boats, an ambulance and protein supplements to combat the problem of malnutrition. On Abdallah’s acceptance of the offer, Killen led another delegation with officials from the Departments of Fisheries and Agriculture to the Comoros from 14 to 21 February 1975. They brought material needed for technical assistance with them and held meetings with several ministers. In particular, they handed over a hundred fowls, two bulls, three sheep, three goats, the ambulance, medical supplies and the seven fishing boats. The only demand Pretoria did not comply with was to establish a five hundred-bed hospital, because this “was beyond our resources”, as Killen argued. The decision was

---

621 Literally translated as Mission to the [Indian Ocean] Islands.
622 'Proposed invitation to Comoros Head of State to visit South Africa’, from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 29 April 1979, p.1 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 3).
626 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Ahmed Abdallah, Cape Town, 3 September 1974 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 2).
reinforced by the fact that “technical, nursing or para-medical personnel to provide essential services” were unavailable on the Comoros and that such a hospital would therefore be pointless. Abdallah wrote a thank-you letter to Muller, expressing “the hope that this was the beginning of a greater and more fruitful co-operation between the two countries”. However, in August 1975, the relatively fruitful relations came to a standstill, when Abdallah was deposed by a group of mercenaries led by Frenchman Bob Denard. Nonetheless, the Department of Foreign Affairs’ endeavours on the Comoros had been productive, in that SAA landing rights were obtained for comparatively little technical assistance. At the same time, the airline did not make use of these rights until 1983, thus reflecting the increasing tourism to the island at the time (Chapter 5).

Finally turning to the last western Indian Ocean island in which Pretoria held an interest, the Seychelles, the previous section mentioned the visit of a Trade Mission of the Durban Chamber of Commerce in October 1973. This aside, the DFA files contain no record of diplomatic interaction between the two countries prior to the island’s independence in June 1976. However, for intelligence reasons, the Bureau for State Security showed an interest in the Seychelles, and we presently examine the subsequent joint BOSS-Department of Information venture. The British government granted its colony limited self-government in 1970 and preparations for full independence were under way during 1975. In the presidential election, set for April 1975, the island’s pro-capitalist Chief Minister since 1970, James Mancham, competed against the leftist France Albert René. According to the autobiographies of Eschel Rhoodie and Les de Villiers, the Department of Information supported Mancham financially in the run-up to the election to ensure that the island remained in the hands of a Western-oriented leader, and one who favoured contact with Pretoria. Aware of Mancham’s lavish lifestyle, they ironically code-named their policy on the island Operation Playboy. Mancham won the election and became President upon the island’s independence in June 1976, while the leftist René became Prime Minister. Operation Playboy had evidently appealed to Mancham, because the Department of Information’s contact with him continued post-independence. For example, in January 1977, Rhoodie and de Villiers, accompanied by their families and several friends, spent a luxury holiday on the Seychelles during which time they

---


630 Letter from Ahmed Abdallah to Hilgard Muller, Moroni, 21 February 1975 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 3).

631 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.

CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78

met President Mancham. The developments surrounding this visit contain one significant element, namely that the holiday makers used the Lear Jet of the tycoon Louis Luyt. In recent correspondence, Luyt tried to distance himself from specific knowledge about these developments: “My BAC 111 aircraft was chartered on different occasions, through a charter company, but I believe to carry government officials”. Nevertheless, it is an indication that BOSS and the Department of Information favoured dealings with this influential Afrikaner businessman, thus making him part of the network that supported their policies of the day. Significantly, this holiday trip to the Seychelles was one of the examples cited in the Information Scandal to substantiate the waste of taxpayer’s money by this Department, which subsequently led to Prime Minister Vorster’s resignation (Chapter 2).

One year after independence, René, with Tanzanian assistance, ousted President Mancham and this affected the island’s relationship with South Africa. René initially pursued a pragmatic approach towards Pretoria, in all likelihood fearing to lose the revenue from South African tourists. On its part, Pretoria’s intelligence community retained an interest in the island. Notably, and again evidencing the close relationship with the Department of Information, Luyt and BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys together informed Brand Fourie in January 1978 of their separate meetings with President René in the previous December. Luyt informed us in correspondence that he visited the Indian Ocean island twice a year with his family, but that he had never been accompanied by Geldenhuys. However, he further enlightened us that “Albie Geldenhuys started to work for me after I entered into an agreement with Gasocean, the French Shipping company in 1976, because he could speak French fluently”. Later that year, René’s pragmatism towards South Africa changed; he informed Brand Fourie in July 1978 that he had comply with the international pressure against Pretoria. After a week-long visit to Tanzania in August, “President René announced that his country would be severing trade and tourism ties with South Africa”, as noted by Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg. Furthermore, the Seychelles Tourist Office in Johannesburg was closed in December 1978.

---

636 Correspondence with Louis Luyt, 23 February 2003.
637 ‘Dr Rhoodie’s remarkable jaunt’, *Sunday Express* 2 April 1978; ‘Rhooide slams claim of R30m Seychelles deal’, *The Citizen* 24 July 1978 (DFA, 1/194/3, Vol. 2).
639 Correspondence with Louis Luyt, 23 February 2003.
spite of his anti-Pretoria statements, René did not completely break relations, probably still dependent on the money spent by South African tourists. As Rae Killen summarised the conversation between President René and Brand Fourie in July 1978: “The President added that his country was under international pressure to terminate SAA’s landing rights. However, they had to consider their own interests and this pressure was being withstood”.

To safeguard these important landing rights, Pretoria provided technical assistance to ensure the safety of the international airport on the Seychelles. However, and according to former SAA Chief Executives Swarts and van der Veer, the airline’s stopover en route to Hong Kong that had commenced in June 1974 eventually ceased in September 1980. In consequence, and together with the flights to Taipei that were introduced in November 1980, the services were routed via Mauritius henceforth.

Non-State Initiatives

We have so far analysed the endeavours by the Department of Information in both the Ivory Coast and Senegal, by the Department of Foreign Affairs in both Liberia and the C.A.R., as well as Pretoria’s interests in the western Indian Ocean. An important element in these accounts was the inter-departmental rivalry and the fact that no lasting contact could be established to break South Africa’s international isolation. This situation appears to have motivated non-state actors to engage in contact with African countries, and we presently discuss the initiatives undertaken by the opposition Progressive Party and then by the South Africa Foundation, the organised business association.

Visits made by senior members of the Progressive Party to various African states are of interest to this period. Based on the DFA files and on recent correspondence with Colin Eglin, trips were made to the following: Senegal and The Gambia, September 1972 (Eglin, Helen Suzman); Botswana, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, July 1974 (Eglin, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert); Zaire, May 1975 (Eglin); Mauritius, August 1975 (Suzman); Tanzania, October 1975 (Eglin); Kenya, Senegal and The Gambia, September 1977 (Eglin); Zaire, 1978 (Eglin).

643 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
646 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
647 DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 10.
648 DFA, 1/199/3, Vol. 5.
as well as Nigeria and Senegal in 1979. In correspondence, Eglin and Suzman provided some insight into the circumstances of these excursions. The latter commented on her trip to Mauritius that “this was simply a stopover visit to address students at the university there on my return from a lecture tour I did to Australia (...) sponsored by the Australian Institute of International Affairs”. The most relevant person in all the visits was Eglin, the party’s leader from 1971 to 1978. The reasons mentioned in the previous section apart, namely to boost the party’s relevance, Eglin argued that the entirety of these trips “led to the leadership of the PP/PFP being informed of and sensitised to developments and thinking taking place on the African continent. The contacts we made in Africa were politically valuable and personally enriching”. Two countries can be singled out, however. According to Eglin’s explanations, the trips to Zaire were linked to the developments in Angola, discussed in the following section. In particular, in May 1975 Eglin met Zairean President Mobutu “to get another perspective on the events that were unfolding in Angola following the Portuguese withdrawal. Zaire appeared to be an important player in view of its proximate to Angola and the close ties it had with Holden Roberto of the FNLA”. During the 1978 visit, Eglin states to have “had discussions with senior members of the government. The object of this visit was to try to assess the role Zaire was playing in the civil war in Angola”.

The Progressives developed special ties with Senegal. In the Dialogue section, we noted that both Eglin and Suzman had paid a visit to Dakar in October 1971, while Eglin revealed in correspondence that he met President Senghor on four occasions thereafter. Although not specifying the dates, this must have happened prior to December 1980, when Senghor voluntarily resigned from the presidency, the first African leader to do so. Elaborating on the reasons for the Progressives’ close link with Senghor, Eglin proposed: “I found his views on the liberation of Africa, negritude, and on the form of democracy that he was trying to establish fascinating. These discussions, supplemented by discussions with Senegalese journalists and business entrepreneurs, gave me an insight into the Francophone perspective, one which was very difficult to get from SA”. Given the last reason, we queried Colin Eglin why the Progressives had not gone to the Ivory Coast. Crucially, he responded that both he and Suzman

---

650 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
651 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January 2003.
652 Correspondence with Helen Suzman, 18 November 2002.
653 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
654 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
655 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
656 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
had tried to see Houphouët-Boigny after their visit to both Senegal and The Gambia in September 1972, but that they were prevented from entering the country: “Suzman and I had visas and an appointment but we were refused entry upon arrival at Abidjan airport. Years later in Paris I was told that the French government at the request of the SA government had put pressure on H-B not to meet with us”.

Thereafter, Eglin indicates, the Progressives “did not attempt to go again as it appeared that the door had been closed to us as a result of H-B responding to South African Government pressure and would be likely to remain closed”.

While it appears that Pretoria managed to prevent the Progressives from snatching their important link with the Ivorian President, they evidently had less influence on Senghor, who pursued Dialogue only reluctantly, as shown earlier. Nevertheless, the party’s contact with Senegal led to friction with the South African government. Earlier in this section, we discussed the Department of Information’s ambition to engage in political contact with Senghor. In the interview he gave to the Department of Information’s magazine To the Point in April 1973, Senghor spoke of dialogue between political parties and this may have led to confusion in Pretoria as to whether Senghor was interested in direct contact with them. In fact, the visit of both Eglin and Suzman to Senegal in September 1972, meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs there, lent some justification to these doubts. Open confrontation between the Progressives and Pretoria over contact with Senegal occurred later. According to his interview given to the Rand Daily Mail prior to departing for Dakar in September 1977, Eglin had been invited by President Senghor “to discuss the South African situation with him”. The background to this lay in Vorster’s non-reply to Senghor’s request to send a fact-finding mission to South Africa in early 1976. The foreign service officials probably influenced his lack of response, as was argued earlier in this section. Eglin, in fact, viewed his role as something of a mediator, as he claimed in the interview: “It is difficult to understand why, when President Senghor recently wrote to Mr Vorster asking if he could send a group of magistrates to South Africa (...) he received no reply whatsoever”. Yet, upon Eglin’s return, Pik Botha criticised that Eglin had played “a negative role” in South Africa’s African policy” and that if President Senghor “knew what Mr Eglin and the PFP stood for, he would have nothing whatsoever to do with Mr Eglin”. Two issues probably motivated the minister’s harsh reaction. First, he may have been upset about the fact that the opposition party still had access to Senegal, while

---

657 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January 2003.
658 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 19 January 2003.
659 ‘Eglin will try to restore SA link with Senegal’, Rand Daily Mail 13 September (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2).
660 ‘Eglin will try to restore SA link with Senegal’, Rand Daily Mail 13 September (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2).
the foreign service officials had blocked their way to Senegal by their own attitude; in recent correspondence with us, Eglin commented: “the Nationalist politicians were irked by the access that the P[rogressive] representatives had to the African leaders, by the cordial way in which they were received and the frank discussions they were able to have.” 662 Second, a general election amongst the white population was due in two months, and Pik Botha’s verbal attack entailed criticism of Eglin’s goal of having sought party-political gains through the visit to Senegal.663

The tour of four African countries by Eglin and Slabbert in 1974 drew even heftier criticism for similar reasons. In its mouthpiece, To the Point, the Department of Information decried the activities as pure party politics:

Dialogue is high fashion in Southern African unofficial diplomacy just at present. (...) Leaders from various political groupings are outbidding each other in their enterprise, the idea being to talk with as many African leaders as possible, within the country and beyond its borders. The Progressive Party, with an eye to arming itself with plenty of ammunition for the coming parliamentary session, has been extraordinarily busy in this field within the past two weeks.664

A particularly strong reaction came from the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, who “assailed Eglin for sitting around the table with “terrorists” and falling over his feet in front or President Kaunda of Zambia”.665 P.W. Botha’s statement evidenced his special dislike for Eglin, as will be shown in the next chapter, and, at the same time, he did consider Kaunda as a terrorist for harbouring the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka since the early 1970s.666

In contrast, by turning to the activities of the South Africa Foundation in Africa, these were generally well received by Pretoria because the information provided so far revealed a close link between the Foundation and the Department of Information. Significantly, the Foundation’s activities in Africa involved two countries that did not have formal relations with Pretoria, thus supplementing the government’s current ambitions. The first account involved its efforts to initiate contact with Uganda during 1978 and through the services of the American, Edwin Stanton ‘Ned’ Munger.667 He was a Professor in Political Geography at the California Institute of Technology since 1961. As a member of the American Universities Field Staff (1950-60), he had travelled extensively in Africa and became well known to the politically powerful there, including South Africa’s prime ministers. Munger had especially

662 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003.
664 To the Point 2 August 1974: 19.
close ties with South Africa and Pretoria’s political elite. These were based on his stay as a Research Fellow at the University of Stellenbosch during 1955/56, his marriage to a South African, Ann Boyer, who served as a Cultural Attaché in Washington during the 1970s. Furthermore, he was a Trustee of the important US-South African Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP), whose purpose was to organise visits from South Africans to the US to promote communication between the two countries.\textsuperscript{666} In this context, the majority of his publications on African affairs focus on the US-South African relationship or on political developments in South Africa.\textsuperscript{669} That Munger’s publications held a generally favourable view towards the minority in this country is evidenced, for example, by a statement he made during an USSALEP-organised visit to South Africa in March 1976: “I am a strong believer in the recognition of the Transkei, but I don’t think there is one chance in a hundred of the USA recognising the territory at the time of its independence”.\textsuperscript{679} Almost certainly aware of his position, the South Africa Foundation approached him sometime during 1977 to ascertain if he knew “anyone from East Africa” to bring to South Africa in order “to soften the SA image and maybe make a convert”, as Munger divulged in correspondence. Given his relatively positive stance toward South Africa, he was willing to assist and, in his words, “thought that my old friend Martin would be effective”,\textsuperscript{671} meaning the Ugandan, Martin Aliker. Their friendship had begun during their concurrent studies at Makerere College in Kampala in the late 1940s. They subsequently remained in contact, especially as Aliker studied dentistry at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.\textsuperscript{672} Aliker then became politically influential in his home country, while also holding important contacts in the United States. In particular, he was Uganda’s Ambassador to the US and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, married to an American


\textsuperscript{668} On USSALEP, see Geldenhuys. 1984. \textit{The Diplomacy of Isolation}, pp.176f.


\textsuperscript{670} \textit{To the Point 9 April 1976: 49.}

\textsuperscript{671} Correspondence with Ned Munger, 7 February 2002.

and a successful businessman with directorship posts in numerous Ugandan and international companies. However, his political viewpoints were evidently not popular with Idi Amin and he therefore fled to Kenya when Amin became Ugandan leader in January 1971.\(^{673}\) While the reasons are not recorded, the fact that Aliker approached the South African Embassy in London in 1977\(^{674}\) is an indication that he appears to have been looking for contact, possibly even for support to stop Amin’s terror regime. It could not be established whether Aliker’s contact with the London Embassy took place in connection with Munger’s initiative, following the query from the South Africa Foundation. In any case, Munger facilitated contact between Aliker and Pretoria, culminating in Aliker’s visit to South Africa in April 1978. Accompanied by Munger, he held separate meetings with Prime Minister Vorster, Pik Botha, Brand Fourie, Hendrik van den Bergh, Pieter Gerhardus Jacobus ‘Piet’ Koornhof, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, as well as the South Africa Foundation representatives Harry Oppenheimer, Basil Hersov and Jan Marais.\(^{675}\) The concentration of so much political and economic power reveals a keen interest in Aliker from a political, economic and intelligence point of view. While it is not recorded what the South Africans had to offer, Aliker assured Vorster of his services to ensure South Africa’s participation in the 1980 Olympic Games and to organise landings rights for South African Airways in Mombasa, Kenya.\(^{676}\) Yet, it is known that South Africa did not participate at these Olympic Games and SAA never used Mombasa.\(^{677}\) Possibly as a result, the official contact with Pretoria appears to have ceased, although Aliker made renewed visits to South Africa in July 1978, August 1979\(^{678}\) and July 1982,\(^{680}\) again meeting Oppenheimer and Hersov.

The second case study on South Africa Foundation activity in Africa relates to Kenya in 1978, involving heart specialist and Foundation Trustee, Chris Barnard. This is the only recorded example of friction with Pretoria, giving credence to the above-made statement of an otherwise generally cordial relationship. According to the files, Pretoria had no diplomatic contact with Nairobi from Kenya’s independence in December 1963,\(^{681}\) which can be ascribed to the vehement anti-apartheid stance adopted by its President, Jomo Kenyatta. This changed...

---


\(^{674}\) DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 2.


\(^{676}\) DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 2.

\(^{677}\) Correspondence with Gert van der Veer, 5 January 2003.

\(^{678}\) Telegram from the South African Embassy to Brand Fourie, London, 19 July 1978 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vols. 1PL, 3).

\(^{679}\) DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 2.

\(^{680}\) DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 3.

\(^{681}\) DFA, 1/135/3, Vols. 3, 4, 5.
in August 1978, when he was succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, Vice-President since 1967. Arap Moi’s political leanings were towards the West and Deputy Secretary Killen judged him to be “a businessman-orientated man”.

In line with this assessment, the files record that, on 20 October 1978, Under-Secretary Hennie Geldenhuys met one Mr. Marend, a Kenyan businessman, member of the Board of Commerce and Trade in Kenya and “well acquainted” with arap Moi, in Pretoria. Possibly as an offshoot from this meeting, the Department of Foreign Affairs began to actively court Kenya’s Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, with whom Marend was equally “well acquainted” and who was highly influential in Kenyan politics and close to President arap Moi at the time. According to a later report from Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg, the DFA made “many attempts (…) to bring Attorney-General Njonjo to South Africa”, but based on the available files, this did not materialise until the end of 1979 and there is no indication that it did at a later stage. The Department’s hopes to get Njonjo to South Africa were, in all likelihood, based on the new political situation in Kenya after Kenyatta’s death, but also on Njonjo, on 8 August, having made a pro-Discussion statement in a TV interview, which was reported in the South African press.

It is not known whether the fact that Njonjo had passed his law studies at South Africa’s University of Fort Hare, renowned for educating a number of African political leaders, was of any relevance in this context. However, it appears that Njonjo’s verbal advances towards Pretoria in August were related to a heart transplantation on an eight-year-old Kenyan girl, the second of its kind within months, by Chris Barnard in Cape Town in mid-July 1978. It further seems that this caused some friction between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the South Africa Foundation over the conduct of contact with Kenya. In particular, after his statement, Njonjo was severely attacked by Kenya’s Foreign Minister for “interfering in the country’s foreign policy and contradicting Government policy on South Africa”.

Almost certainly related to that event, Pik Botha later complained to the Foundation’s President and Secretary General, Hersov and Sorour respectively:

---

Njonjo had become over-awed by the interest displayed in him. Dr Christian Barnard had invited him [to South Africa] but the professor just did not understand the political situation in Kenya. Instead of keeping quiet about his plans he had publicised it. The Minister felt that we should be more sophisticated about the way we set about inviting people of the stature of Njonjo.689

Pik Botha was probably irritated about the exposure of Pretoria’s contact with Njonjo at that early stage, maybe aware of the friction between Njonjo and arap Moi that led to their eventual fall-out in 1983.690 In fact, he may have feared that the publicity given to Njonjo’s pro-Discussion attitude would undermine Pretoria’s position vis-à-vis arap Moi. In any case, and supporting this argument, the files up to 1983 do not contain any further documentation on contact with Njonjo.

This takes us to the end of this section, which foremost documented the initiatives taken by the Departments of Information and Foreign Affairs during the second half of Vorster’s premiership. These however, were not successful in moving Pretoria substantially closer towards achieving its principal foreign policy aim of breaking South Africa’s isolation. Vorster had visited both the Ivory Coast and Liberia and met Senghor, but there were still more than thirty African states that refused to even talk to Pretoria. A more thorough assessment of Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa during this phase of the Vorster era is provided in the conclusion to this chapter. For the moment, we still need to discuss Pretoria’s Détente initiative. We stated at the outset of this section that the Bureau for State Security was the main promotor of this policy in the mid-1970s, thus supplementing the Secret Diplomacy engaging its partner, the Department of Information. While this section mentioned some BOSS and military activity in Africa, especially in the strategically important western Indian Ocean, Détente is now examined separately because these two government agencies were the key actors during this period of the mid-1970s, with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information playing rather comparatively peripheral roles.

**Détente**

The majority of African states had won their independence from 1960 onwards, but Angola and Mozambique remained Portuguese colonies. By the beginning of 1974, white minority rule also continued in Rhodesia following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in No-

---


November 1965 and South Africa still occupied Namibia, notwithstanding the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1971, which had declared its presence illegal. Thus, South Africa was surrounded almost entirely by countries run by white governments, and this was referred to as a *cordon sanitaire*, on which South Africa’s “security and relative isolation had relied for so long to keep the black insurgent movements at a distance from its own frontiers”.

Relations between Pretoria and the Portuguese colonies were friendly and co-operative, and in the case of Rhodesia, support was provided to Ian Smith in the form of police units to quell guerrilla attacks, thus circumventing the UN sanctions imposed on the UDI government. Yet, on 25 April 1974, a military coup in Lisbon ignited Portugal’s retreat from the African continent and undermined South Africa’s protection through the *cordon sanitaire*. With the realisation that the days of white supremacy in southern Africa would soon be over, Pretoria needed to find an arrangement to safeguard the position of the white minority in South Africa. The new situation engendered a particular military dimension, namely that the leaders in both Luanda and Maputo would render assistance to the Namibian and South African national liberation movements, thus further encircling the Pretoria government. In the face of such a possibility, Pretoria’s reaction to the watershed developments in South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood became an intense struggle between the actors involved in intelligence and security issues, the Bureau for State Security and the military. Regarding BOSS, van den Bergh applied the Detente model between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, to southern Africa, while P.W. Botha pressurised Vorster to intervene militarily in the Angolan independence war in October 1975 to counter the Cuban and Soviet presence. The rivalry between BOSS and the military over Pretoria’s southern Africa policy took place in the context of the Cold War that became an important catalyst, as shown throughout this section. Even though the developments focused on southern Africa, its analysis below is of great significance to this study given its implications on South Africa’s foreign relations with the countries further north.

The present investigation into the Detente phase begins with an analysis of the reasons causing BOSS to pursue this policy and how this was applied in Pretoria’s approach towards Rhodesia, Namibia and Zaire. Concurrently, the military undertook preparations to further arm itself for the eventuality of a war on South Africa’s border, and of great relevance in this

---


context were the arms deliveries via Gabon that are subsequently examined. The final section, then, focuses on the Angolan war where the different approaches by BOSS and the military reached their climax.

_Superpower Détente_

It is generally accepted that the idea for Détente among the superpowers is American in origin, going back to the 1960s.\(^{695}\) It is associated with Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, consecutive US Presidents from 1969 to 1976,\(^ {696}\) but the driving force was Henry Alfred Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs to both Presidents and Secretary of State from September 1973 to January 1977.\(^ {697}\) It is not possible, here, to provide a comprehensive overview of Détente,\(^ {698}\) but it is important to this study to present its broad characteristics. The principal motivation for Kissinger to promote Détente was to extricate the United States from Vietnam, where they had become involved in 1954. The longer the US presence lasted there, the more Washington became embroiled in a regional conflict that it could not win. As a result, cooperation was sought, first with the Soviet Union, then with China, to terminate Washington's traumatic experience while ensuring that Vietnam did not fall into the hands of the communists.\(^ {699}\) Détente, in the view of the US government, or Kissinger, for that matter, thus became “a means of maintaining the balance of power in a way that would be consistent with available resources”,\(^ {700}\) as appropriately summarised by diplomatic historian Gaddis. What Kissinger referred to as “Nixon’s Triangular Diplomacy”\(^ {701}\) between Washington, Moscow and Beijing resulted in respectable success. To mention but the most significant achievements during 1972/73, the US and Soviet government signed several treaties, notably the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I, the document on Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the US, which “seemed to hold out the promise of a more or less permanent flowering of relatively harmonious relations between the two great nuclear powers”, and the

---

Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Regarding Washington’s Dé­tente with China, Kissinger and Nixon visited Beijing in July 1971 and February 1972 respectively, meeting the country’s leader, Mao Zedong, and restoring Sino-American relations. Yet, Dé­tente with Moscow came under pressure, particularly in the context of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, mentioned earlier, between Washington-backed Israel and the Moscow-supported anti-Israel alliance. Underlying this problem was a difference of interpretation over what Dé­tente was supposed to mean in regard to the superpowers’ behaviour in the Third World. In essence, Washington, more precisely Kissinger, intended to link Dé­tente to a Soviet restraint in that part of the world, while in Moscow’s view, Dé­tente “never meant renunciation of their support for national liberation and other ‘progressive’ struggles in the developing world”. Crucially, as we shall see later in this section, this difference surfaced during the Angolan war, an important event in Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa.

After this brief introduction on the main themes in the international Dé­tente debate, the following section examines how BOSS applied this approach to southern Africa.

**South African Dé­tente**

The first evidence of the term Dé­tente entering Pretoria’s political jargon as a strategy with which to come to terms with the new situation in southern Africa, dates from late 1974. An early indication that its principal promoting agency was BOSS, aided by the Department of Information, appeared in the latter’s *To the Point* editorial on ‘Southern Africa’s new Era’ on 6 December, introducing the term Dé­tente and outlining its purpose:

> The lessons of the failure of South Africa’s former Africa policy have been invaluable. The earlier attempts to achieve détente, as was done with Madagascar, for example, were a crushing disappointment. They taught the RSA that no breakthrough could come by depending on good relations with single states whose political control could be switched overnight. The revised diplomatic objectives had therefore to include all Southern Africa and through them other to the north; which is precisely what Vorster’s moves have recently been about. (...) The impediments to larger co-operation are still formidable. The South West Africa and Rhodesian issues are two of them.

The argument was that South Africa’s relations with Africa could only improve by a consolidation of its position in southern Africa, and Vorster was therefore supposed to “set his sights

---

706 *To the Point* 6 December 1974: 17.
lower than previously". To achieve that goal, the editorial suggested, the situation in both S.W.A./Namibia and Rhodesia had to be settled to ease the strained relations between South Africa and the continent, paving the way for contact with African states. As an initial challenge, however, this meant that representatives from South Africa and other African states were to sit at the negotiation table, even though the latter disapproved of Pretoria’s apartheid policies. In this regard, reference was made to the Détente debate between the superpowers. In November 1972, for example, Information Minister Mulder argued that dialogue and constructive co-operation was possible between countries despite differences over domestic politics. To substantiate this, he referred to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Washington and Moscow, as well as the talks between Washington and Beijing that took place despite their differing internal political situations. On reading the To the Point issue of 11 July 1975, it becomes evident that in promoting Détente, the Department of Information followed Washington’s approach towards Beijing at the time: “Yet it is open dialogue that has achieved most in the West, on the model of Kissinger-Nixon and Mao as the pioneer of new US-China relations”. Based on evidence presented later, we suggest that BOSS, given its privileged access to Prime Minister Vorster and its co-operation with Washington’s CIA, instigated the concept of Détente for Pretoria’s southern Africa policy, with particular application by the Department of Information, BOSS’s partner. Before proceeding, in the next three sections, to analyse South Africa’s Détente characteristics, it is important to show that this policy, in all likelihood, met with Vorster’s approval because it had a large backing from significant parts of the Afrikaner community. This dimension is now examined.

It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the Broederbond favoured Détente to protect the interests of the white population in South Africa, and Vorster thus had the support from this powerful domestic lobby. Additionally, elements from the policy network of the Afrikaner political and economic elite that promoted the homelands concept to African leaders during Secret Diplomacy (Figure 2), now backed Détente. In particular, mention needs to be made of Cas de Villiers and Red Metrowich, the directors of the Department of Information’s front organisations, the Foreign Affairs Association and Southern African Freedom Foundation respectively. While Metrowich’s edited study Towards Dialogue and Détente has been mentioned, their other publications, issued under the auspices of the FAA, SAFF or the Department of Information’s front publishing house, Valiant, emphasised the political changes that had already taken place in South Africa. At the same time, taking into account the Cuban in-

---

708 To the Point 4 November 1972: 38.
volvement in Angola and the Soviet-US rivalry in the Indian Ocean outlined in the previous section, they stressed South Africa’s importance for Africa in terms of economic cooperation, its significance to the West as the source of several strategic raw materials and as an anticommunist bastion, as well as the strategic importance of the Cape sea route. In this context we must also mention a publication by the Centre for International Politics at the University of Potchefstroom, a think tank that was also secretly funded by the Department of Information. Finally, a FAA researcher, Daniel Stefan ‘Daan’ Prinsloo, published two papers in which South Africa’s activities in Namibia were presented as anticipating independence. In summary, the Department of Information’s propaganda activities aimed at presenting a picture of a South African government that was sincere in its intention of reforming the domestic apartheid system and of withdrawing from Namibia, while stressing the need for the West to support Pretoria during these turbulent times. Finally, Afrikaner businessman and Department of Information front-man Louis Luyt, examined in the previous section, also became part of the policy network in the realm of Vorster’s Détente, particularly with Zaire. As in the case of Secret Diplomacy, resulting in Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974, the BOSS-Information alliance, strengthened by this policy network, was still the dominant factor in the Prime Minister’s approach towards Africa. With these considerations, and taking cognisance of the above-mentioned issues raised in To the Point on 6 December 1974, Vorster began to approach both the Rhodesian and S.W.A./Namibia problems, and the relevant developments are now outlined.

Rhodesia and S.W.A./Namibia

The main parties involved in trying to resolve the Rhodesia impasse were BOSS, the Department of Foreign Affairs and, under their influence, Prime Minister Vorster, as well as Zambian President Kaunda. The co-operation between Pretoria and Lusaka was a “coincidence of

709 To the Point 11 July 1975: 18.
interests (...) in regard to the avoidance of direct confrontation in Southern Africa". With the choice of continued support for Smith, resulting in South Africa’s further isolation, or withdrawing from Rhodesia and improving relations with Africa, Vorster chose the second option, Détente. This would buy the time needed to accommodate developments in Rhodesia in such a way that they would not pose a threat to white South Africa. With reference to the traumatic US experience in Vietnam, British political commentator Colin Legum specifically argued that Pretoria’s involvement in Rhodesia could lead to a “Vietnamisation” of the situation. Regarding Zambia’s engagement, Kaunda was motivated by the need for economic interaction with Pretoria and a desire to play a leadership role in southern Africa. The active co-operation between Pretoria and Lusaka, necessary in solving the Rhodesian conflict, began in late 1974. This was initiated by Vorster’s speech to the South African Senate and foreign diplomats on 23 October, in which he proposed finding a “durable, just and honourable solution” for Rhodesia, causing Kaunda to state three days later that this was a “voice of reason”. What followed was a flurry of activities by BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs between the capitals of South Africa, Zambia and Rhodesia until mid-1975, with Hendrik van den Bergh playing a major role. In particular, he was present at the Victoria Falls Conference on 25 August 1975, which was attended by the main protagonists of the Rhodesian conflict, as well as the initiators of the meeting, Kaunda and Vorster. Mirroring the coalition that had engineered this conference, it took place in a South African railway carriage “perched on the Victoria Falls bridge spanning the border between Zambia and Rhodesia”. Shortly before the meeting, and to indicate Pretoria’s commitment in finding a solution to the problem, Vorster withdrew the remaining police units from Rhodesia. Yet, the conference did not bring about Smith’s immediate capitulation; his premiership only came to an end in 1979. While Vorster was quite prepared to sacrifice Rhodesia in pursuit of his Détente am-

---

720 Barber and Barratt. 1990. *South Africa’s Foreign Policy*, p.185.
bitions, the situation with Namibia was different. Pretoria considered what it called South West Africa, as South Africa’s fifth province;\(^{223}\) to abandon this territory, therefore, was a much more sensitive issue, entailing far bigger risks of a white backlash. At the same time, this was a matter of prime concern to African leaders, as reflected in a memorandum, partly cited earlier in the previous section, on a discussion between Liberian President Tolbert and the country’s ambassador to Geneva, David Thomas, in June 1975:

The President further said that he has reached a point that it is necessary and imperative that the South African Government should do something to help him to further help them – that if some dramatic statement were made indicating some imminent spectacular action on the part of the South African Government to show willingness and plans for cooperation with the United Nations for the independence of Namibia, e.g. if within two years plans would be undertaken to prepare for granting the people of Namibia independence, the President would be able to present something tangible to his colleagues with the plea for understanding and patience on behalf of South Africa.\(^{224}\)

After the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1971, international pressure on Pretoria mounted in the attempt to force it to withdraw its presence from Namibia. It thus became evident that Vorster faced “increasing pressure from the UN and Western states, the changed southern African balance of forces and the requirements of détente”, and “needed to show progress on Namibia, but the constraints of his own political beliefs and the potential reaction of his white electorate still applied”.\(^{225}\) As was characteristic of his premiership, Vorster bumbled his way through the minefield of foreseeable conflicts and launched the Turnhalle Conference, Turnhalle being the German word for gymnasium in which the meeting took place. The idea for this came from the local National Party in September 1974, in an attempt to make it appear as an initiative emanating from the white population in that territory, but the party undoubtedly followed instructions from Pretoria. In addition, the black national liberation movements, especially the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), were excluded, and several of their leaders were even arrested prior to the first Turnhalle meeting in September 1975. The Turnhalle Declaration of Intent stated that a draft constitution for Namibia would be drawn up within three years.\(^{226}\) However, Pretoria remained adamantly against granting Namibia’s independence and the previous section showed that this was an important factor causing Presidents Houphouët-Boigny from the Ivory Coast and Tolbert from Liberia to withdraw from contact with Prime Minister Vorster.

---


\(^{224}\) ‘Memorandum’ on a discussion between Ambassador Thomas and President Tolbert, 23 June 1975 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 3).

\(^{225}\) Barber and Barratt. 1990. *South Africa’s Foreign Policy*, p.198.

\(^{226}\) Barber and Barratt. 1990. *South Africa’s Foreign Policy*, pp.198f.
Zaire

We have now examined the ways in which BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs applied the superpower Détente model to its relations with both Rhodesia and S.W.A./Namibia. Running parallel to these developments, BOSS and the Departments of Information and Foreign Affairs were engaged in endeavours to draw Zaire into the Détente strategy, so as to establish political stability in southern Africa and to ensure white South Africa’s security. Judging from Eschel Rhodie’s autobiography, President Mobutu was rated as influential in African politics as the presidents of the Ivory Coast and Senegal, and to win his support seems to have been considered to be of prime importance in Pretoria’s ambitions. Examination of this case is of great significance to this study because it plainly demonstrates that the different policy approaches followed by the various state actors could be detrimental to each other’s objectives. Furthermore, these developments entered into the realm of global politics, and this becomes a crucial element in the following paragraphs.

As has been stated in the previous chapter, Zaire did not seek close contact with Pretoria after Mobutu had come to power in 1965, and as late as January 1973, Under-Secretary Pretorius noted that Mobutu came out “strongly against dialogue” and that his “attitude towards the Republic” was “unfriendly”. This hostile stance changed towards the end of 1974, in the context of Angola’s war of independence. In this war, Mobutu actively supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) because it pursued a pro-western attitude, it was led by his brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, and its ethnic base was among the Bakongo, who lived in both northern Angola and western Zaire. Together with the equally western-oriented National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the FNLA opposed the communist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In early 1975, Mobutu had unsuccessfully tried to solicit US support for Angola’s pro-western liberation movements and so turned to South Africa’s intelligence and military community, as discussed in more detail later in this section when we focus on the Angolan war. Our main interest at present lies with the civilian aspect in the contact between Kinshasa and Pretoria.

In the first example of such interaction, in early 1975, the Department of Foreign Affairs had some interaction with Etienne Kallos, owner of the Cape Town-based firm Kallos & Co.,

729 Front National de Libération de l’Angola / Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola.
730 MPLA: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola; UNITA: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola.
which exported foodstuff to Zaire through the Zairean-based Société Africaine des Produits Alimentaires (SAPA). The director of SAPA was Justin Marie Bomboko, Zaire's former Foreign Minister (1960-63, 1965-69), and it was through him that the DFA gained access to President Mobutu. The practicalities of the resulting exchange are not recorded, but it motivated Mobutu to invite a South African business delegation to Zaire from 1 to 4 April 1975. Reflecting his wider interest in gaining Pretoria's support for the FNLA in Angola, he courted the Director of the Department of Trade, a representative from the Industrial Development Corporation, Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and Under-Secretary Pretorius as translator, putting two cars and an aircraft at their disposal. During the visit, discussions were held on the provision of a 3 million Rand credit to SAPA and a similar firm dealing in food imports, while Bomboko mentioned three development/investment projects for which South African assistance might be considered. From 12 to 16 May 1975, representatives from the Department of Trade and the IDC, in the company of Pretorius, made a follow-up visit, offering the Zairean authorities an additional 5 million Rand credit for the import of South African capital goods. Given that the DFA also held a keen interest in promoting Détente with Zaire, the IDC concluded four agreements with Bomboko's SAPA in the period from June 1975 to February 1976. They provided a total credit of 15 million Rand for the purchase of South African foodstuff, pharmaceutical and medical goods.

After the successful attempt to promote South African export to Zaire, the Department of Foreign Affairs launched several development/investment projects. From 5 to 10 July 1975, the Secretary for Commerce, with the DFA's Justus de Goede as translator, led a group of seven business representatives to Zaire. Those destined to play an important role came from the firms Bessemer Steel, Brian Colquhoun, LTA and Roberts Construction. Mobutu again courted them, putting four cars at their disposal and breakfasting with the party one morning. Following their report, which identified an “enormous potential” in Zaire and therefore recommended “an energetic follow-up”, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Commerce selected ten development/investment projects considered suitable for South African participa-

733 'Besoek aan Zaire deur 'n amptelike missie om die toestaan van 'n wentelkrediet aan twee staatsbeheerde invoerders van lewensmiddel te onderzoek, 1-4 April 1975', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 April 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6).
734 'Tweede besoek aan Zaire deur 'n amptelike missie om die toestaan van 'n wentelkrediet van R3 miljoen aan twee staatsbeheerde invoerders van lewensmiddel te beklink – 12 tot 16 Mei 1975', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 19 May 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6).
735 'Unpaid exports made from South Africa to Zaire', ca. May 1977 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 9).
736 'Visit of delegation from private sector to Zaire, led by Secretary for Commerce: 5-10 July, 1975', July 1975, p.7 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6).
For a closer investigation, Bombooko arranged the visit of fourteen business representatives to Zaire from 12 to 17 October 1975. During their stay in Zaire, they discussed the construction of a railway line and the establishment of grain silos. The representatives from Brian Colquhoun, LTA and Roberts Construction were interested in the construction of the one hundred and fifty kilometres railway line linking Matadi with the seaport at Banana to facilitate import and export to and from Kinshasa. The project cost was estimated at 30 million Rand, 85% of which the IDC was prepared to finance with Credit Guarantee as the insurer. Yet, the proposed railway line covered only part of the route from the coast to Kinshasa; the construction of the remaining two hundred kilometres of railway line posed several geographical problems and Banana did not have port facilities. Therefore, Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee expressed caution regarding participation in such a project, judging from the DFA files available until the end of 1979, no South African activity ever took place. Regarding the second project discussed in October 1975, Bessemer Steel’s three representatives, among them Paul Kruger Hoogendyk, were interested in the provision of “silos to contain grain” for import and export and of “storage facilities for food supplies for periods of up to three months”. The estimated cost was 4 million Rand, to be made available by the IDC and insured by Credit Guarantee. Bessemer Steel decided to first undertake an analysis of Zaire’s needs prior to engaging in any concrete action, and Hoogendyk and his two colleagues remained behind for a few days to inspect the silo sites. However, a DFA report, dated end of 1976, states that “not much progress” had taken place since and, similar to the railway line, this project does not seem to have been implemented.

Simultaneous to the above developments, the DFA’s contact in Zaire, Bombooko, wrote to Secretary Fourie on 17 October 1975 regarding the establishment of an agro-industrial complex in Gbadolite. This high-level approach was more than likely pursued because this was Mobutu’s birth-place, which he tried to develop during the 1970s. According to the plans, the project was to include “a palm-plantation of more than one thousand hectares, an oil-pressing factory, tabacco [sic] plantations, cattle breeding, the breeding of more than 20,000 pigs and other agricultural undertakings”. Similar to the successful OGAPROV agricultural

---

737 ‘Notes for the discussions to be held with Mr. Steyn on Thursday July 17, 1975’, 15 July 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6).
738 Telex to Justin Bombooko, Pretoria, 9 October 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7).
739 ‘Memorandum: visit of group of contractors to Zaire’, 23 October 1975, pp.4-10 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7).
project in Gabon, the foreign service officials hoped to make a particularly strong impression on Mobutu by providing assistance to a project close to his heart, so as to gain his support for the Détente policy. Thus, it took Fourie only a week to reply that “in principle we are absolutely ready (...) to provide our assistance in the agro-industrial domain such as desired”. On 22 December 1975, Bomboko asked Fourie whether a visit by South African agricultural experts to Gbadolite was possible at the end of January 1976. Thereafter, however, the Department of Information took over that initiative. While the reasons for this are not recorded, we consider it possible that BOSS felt it too risky to have foreign service officials involved in this project so close to Mobutu, who, at the time, worked closely together with BOSS over the Angolan war, as will be shown below, and therefore asked its partner to carry out the project. Whether any inter-departmental discussion took place is not recorded. In any event, according to Rhodie’s autobiography, van den Bergh, himself and BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys as translator flew to Zaire in early 1976 in Louis Luyt’s Lear Jet, the Department of Information’s front man and “fertiliser king”, to meet Mobutu. This confirms the significance of the above-mentioned policy network in support of Détente. Further, and according to a later DFA document, two representatives of Luyt’s Triomf Fertiliser company went to Zaire in May 1976 in “connection with the supply of fertiliser” for that project. This was the only additional information on the issue in the files. Luyt, whom we asked about it, claimed to have no knowledge of any such activity, while stating that Mobutu had invited him in 1978 because he “wanted plant nutrients”.

**SMTF Project**

The previous paragraphs examined the activities of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information related to development/investment projects in and technical assistance to Zaire in order to promote Détente with Mobutu. The following account details a special kind of interaction between Pretoria and Kinshasa in this context and one that entered the global political scene. Similar to the situation in the western Indian Ocean, this part of southern Africa became an issue of Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a Détente focus between Washington and Beijing. In consequence, Pretoria was no
longer the only dominant player in the area and became itself prone to external pressures and influence. Prior to detailing the resulting complexities, it is appropriate to provide a brief overview of the main actors and interests.

The Anglo American Corporation and US financial and mining interests with direct access to both Washington’s Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department were involved in a mining project in Zaire. During 1975, this was faced with financial difficulties. Exploiting Pretoria’s interest in Détente and Washington’s concern over the Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola, the companies approached these two governments for assistance. Judging the project to be of vital importance to keep anticommunist Mobutu in power and on the side of the FNLA-UNITA coalition against the MPLA in Angola, Pretoria and Washington supported their bid to support the mining project. However, Pretoria withdrew from the mining project in early 1976 as a result of the humiliating experience in the Angolan war, brought about by a change of direction by the US government. An attempt has been made to illustrate the intricacies of this South African Détente case study in Figure 4, with no claim to completeness, as the nature of the intelligence and military activities is not sufficiently documented. We shall now provide the information necessary to an understanding of the various interconnections.

Zaire was probably the African country beyond southern Africa in which Anglo American held its largest involvement. While its diamond mining activities were discussed in Chapter 3, it also held an interest in the fields of copper and cobalt, resources that were rich in Tenke Fungurume, province of Katanga. Exploration of these deposits by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) had started in 1918. In 1967, Mobutu expropriated the UMHK as part of his economic nationalisation policy and created the state-owned Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines), but given Zaire’s worsening financial situation, Gécamines was not in a position to function effectively. Thus, in 1970, the Zairean government concluded an agreement with foreign enterprises to form the Société Minière de Tenke Fungurume (SMTF), with Charter Consolidated, the London-based Anglo American subsidiary, and the US Standard Oil Company of Indiana, as the largest shareholders, with a 28% participation each. Until 1973, the SMTF conducted several exploration and feasibility studies, establishing that the copper and cobalt resources were sufficient to make the mining project viable.

---

During 1974, Washington’s export credit agency, the Export-Import Bank,\(^{751}\) provided an export credit of 232 million, a Chase Manhattan-led bank consortium made available bank loans of 195 million and shareholder’s funds accounted for 234 million, totalling 661 million US Dollars to implement the project. Yet, originally estimated at 500 million US Dollars, the project soon went beyond the available finance, mainly due to Zaire’s hyperinflation, the falling copper price and the rise in the price of oil since late 1973.\(^{752}\) By late 1975, the cost estimate had risen to 812 million US Dollars and the date of completion was postponed to 1978. Consequently, the loan-providing agencies became reluctant to remain engaged; the Chase Manhattan bank consortium withdrew in January 1976, while Anglo American and Standard Oil

\(^{751}\) <http://www.exim.gov>.

decided not to make any further investment for three years. At this point, the US administration became involved due to its interest in keeping Mobutu in power as a guarantor of political stability in Central Africa and as an ally against the communist MPLA in Angola.\(^{753}\) In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger declares that “during 1975 and 1976 the Ford Administration considered Zaire an essential counterweight to Angola”.\(^{754}\) Yet, Kissinger’s State Department was aware of the country’s economic crisis, threatening “the Mobutu government at a time when its help over Angola was needed most”,\(^ {755}\) and feared that a postponement of the SMTF project would further undermine Mobutu’s standing. Therefore, in early January 1976, Harry Oppenheimer from Anglo American and a Standard Oil representative were invited to discuss possibilities of keeping the project alive. It is not known whether Kissinger himself was present at the meeting, but the simple fact of Anglo American being approached by the State Department evidences the multinational’s vast influence in international politics. As a further indication of Washington’s keen interest in keeping the SMTF project alive, Robert S. McNamara, former US Secretary of Defence (1961-68) and World Bank President from 1968, was contacted to obtain the 150 million US Dollars estimated sufficient to get the project off the ground. This powerful link was not helpful, however, as Oppenheimer informed Minister Muller in April 1976: “Mr. Robert Macnamara [sic] indicated that the World Bank was not in a position to mobilise such a loan”.\(^ {756}\) In a parallel move, Washington approached Pretoria; in February 1976, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Edward Mulcahy, held discussions with Jeremy Shearar, Minister Plenipotentiary at the South African Embassy, while Robert Bernerd Anderson went to South Africa to investigate the possibility of Pretoria raising the required 150 million US Dollars.\(^ {757}\) Anderson was US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of the Navy (1953-54) and Secretary of the Treasury (1957-61). He carried out diplomatic missions on behalf of President Lyndon B. Johnson until 1968,\(^ {758}\) and was the Press Secretary in the State Department in 1974, time during which he came close to Henry


\(^{754}\) Kissinger. 1999. *Years of Renewal*, p.945.


\(^{756}\) On the above, unless otherwise stated, see ‘SMTF-Zaire copper project: memorandum number one. Background information’, attached to a letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976, p.5 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1); ‘Confidential note on the activities of the Anglo American group in Zaire’, from Chris R. Stals (General Manager, South African Reserve Bank), Pretoria, 7 January 1976 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7). Note: the South African Reserve Bank became involved because Anglo American’s investment in the SMTF project had to be approved by them as a result of the Exchange Control.

Kissinger, who reports that Anderson was part of his “usual team of Mideast aides”. Later on, Anderson attended to the management of his extensive ranches and oil properties in Texas and became “an investment adviser for wealthy individuals and corporations in New York”. Furthermore, Anderson was engaged in Standard Oil of Indiana and maintained very close ties with David Rockefeller, the business magnate who presided over the Chase Manhattan bank. Having said this, we argue that Anderson’s mission to save the SMTF project came about due to his link with Kissinger and with the purpose of representing the financial interests of both Standard Oil and Chase Manhattan. This web of overlapping interests in the SMTF project by Kinshasa, Pretoria, Washington and Anglo American was further enlarged in the first half of 1976, when Iran entered the picture.

From its side, Anglo American tried to resuscitate an investment of 35 million US Dollars, and in February 1976, both Oppenheimer and Julian Ogilvie Thompson, Executive Director at the time, went to Tehran with that aim in mind. They thus followed the Shah’s invitation after his Minister of Finance had met Sidney Spiro, Director of Charter Consolidated, in Tehran in 1975, while rather likely taking into account the close politico-military relations between South Africa and Iran, mentioned in the previous section. Benefiting from the existing diplomatic contacts between the two countries, Oppenheimer made use of the services of South Africa’s Consul-General to Iran, Colonel Charles Alan ‘Pop’ Fraser. In particular, Fraser set up meetings such as that of 11 February 1976, when Oppenheimer, Ogilvie Thompson and Fraser held talks with Iran’s Prime Minister and two ministers. Three days later, Oppenheimer and Fraser were given an audience with the Shah. According to Fraser’s report, and confirming the alleged co-operation between the two countries in nuclear development, “the Shah’s interest is undoubtedly in acquiring more uranium while other minerals such as bauxite, copper and iron ore were mentioned in passing”.

---

762 'Confidential note on the activities of the Anglo American group in Zaire', from Chris R. Stals (General Manager, South African Reserve Bank), Pretoria, 7 January 1976 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7).
heimer had emphasised the need for co-operation in Zaire’s SMTF project, arguing that it was “undoubtedly one of the potentially richest copper mines in the world”, nothing specific in this regard resulted from the discussions.\textsuperscript{765} In January 1976, and supplementing Anglo American’s initiatives in Iran to save the SMTF project, US mediator Anderson introduced a proposal whereby Pretoria would purchase additional oil from Iran over a period of two years to the amount of 150 million US Dollars. In return, it would not repay Tehran, but put the money into the SMTF project in the name of Tehran, making the Shah an investor and shareholder. Pretoria replied in the negative, stating that the necessary funds were not available. Anderson then devised a similar proposal whereby two US oil companies would buy the extra oil from Iran and sell it at a price somewhat lower than prescribed by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with Pretoria making good the shortfall. This would have made Pretoria a shareholder with 10 million US Dollars, with Iran’s share still amounting to 150 million US Dollars. Pretoria again declined to become involved, citing a lack of clarity as the reason.\textsuperscript{766} However, Pretoria’s negative response on both occasions can be counted as an early indication that its interest in the project began to suffer due to the deteriorating US-South African engagement in the Angolan war that is discussed below.

As all previous attempts to obtain the necessary financing for the SMTF project had failed, both Anglo American and Washington increased their efforts and appear to have engaged Maurice Tempelsman. He was an apt choice as he had maintained special contact with both the US government and the South African multinational, as well as Zaire. He had close ties to all US Presidents from the 1960s to the 1990s and to the CIA, as well as “enjoyed excellent access to the State Department”, according to historian and political scientist, David Gibbs.\textsuperscript{767} As a businessman, he was successful as a senior partner in his father’s firm, Leon Tempelsman & Son, active in the fields of mining and minerals trading, particularly in Africa, for example holding a 3% share in the SMTF project.\textsuperscript{768} Tempelsman was also Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of Lazare Kaplan International, the largest American diamond cutting and polishing firm.\textsuperscript{769} These connections led Richard Mahoney to pen the statement

\textsuperscript{765} ‘Co-operation in development of Iranian mines’, from Pop Fraser to Brand Fourie, Tehran, 18 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).

\textsuperscript{766} On the above, see ‘Suid-Afrikaanse hulp aan Zaire’, ca. October 1976, pp.3f. (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).


\textsuperscript{768} ‘SMTF-Zaire copper project: memorandum number one. Background information’, attached to a letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976, p.1 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).

that Tempelsman “had a liking for mixing conspiracy with commerce in his African trade”.\textsuperscript{770}

In this context, co-operation was particularly fruitful with Mobutu, who later awarded Tempelsman the post of Zaire’s Honorary Consul in New York as a result of his diamond trading with Zaire.\textsuperscript{771} This activity took place in co-operation with Anglo American, a contact dating back to the late 1950s. At the time, Tempelsman became uniquely important as the middleman in the supply of diamonds from the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) to the US. Crucially, the CSO was the world-wide monopolistic diamond marketing subsidiary of De Beers, itself an Anglo American subsidiary, and Washington had barred it from trading in the US in retaliation for its under-supply of tool diamonds during World War II.\textsuperscript{772} Furthermore, Tempelsman held a concession to exploit diamonds in western Kasai, an area not controlled by the government-owned Société minière de Bakwanga (Miba), while the British Zaire Diamond Distributors (Britmond), the Zairean subsidiary of De Beers, sold both Miba’s and Tempelsman’s production through the CSO.\textsuperscript{773} Thus, it is not surprising that Michael Spicer, Anglo American Executive Director and Special Adviser to the Chairman in 1999, referred to Tempelsman as Oppenheimer’s “personal friend”.\textsuperscript{774}

On 6 April 1976, reporting on his first mission to safeguard the SMTF project, Tempelsman informed Oppenheimer that he and Robert Anderson had met Iran’s Minister of Finance to discuss the above-mentioned oil-for-copper deal and Iran’s participation. During this meeting, the Iranian Minister informed them that Henry Kissinger had encouraged the Shah “to consider participation” in the SMTF project.\textsuperscript{775} Kissinger’s position on this matter was evidence of his personal involvement in US policy towards southern Africa, which, against the background of the war in Angola, “was the product of his geo-political view that southern Africa was now a focal point in the East/West global struggle and a threat to superpower détente”.\textsuperscript{776} Harry Oppenheimer was equally active both in the US and South Africa to prevent the SMTF project from collapsing. In mid-April 1976, he submitted two memoranda to Charles W. Robinson, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who was to accompany

\textsuperscript{774}Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.
\textsuperscript{775}Letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Harry Oppenheimer, 6 April 1976 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).
\textsuperscript{776}Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa’s Foreign Policy, pp.201f.
Kissinger to Zaire shortly thereafter. In South Africa, he lobbied for Pretoria’s assistance by keeping Minister Muller and Secretary Fourie informed of developments, providing them with the same documentation as had been given to Robinson and including the above-mentioned letter from Tempelsman. On 30 March 1976, Oppenheimer held a meeting with Muller, which he later summarised in a letter to the Foreign Affairs Minister, indicating that Anglo American “would, naturally, welcome any assistance the South African Government might be in a position to offer”. Emphasising that it was “important for us to remain in close communication on all matters relating to the project”, Oppenheimer concluded: “If you wish, I would be happy to arrange for representatives of our Group to discuss the project further with members of your Department. We will, of course, keep the Department informed of any new developments”. On 22 April, Oppenheimer despatched a letter containing very similar contents to Brand Fourie. However, the South African government was less than enthusiastic, and Muller only replied on 4 May with a very short message:

Thank you for your letter of 14 April 1976 about the SMTF copper project in Zaire. It was certainly very useful to have had an exchange of views on the subject. I also appreciate your kind offer to keep my Department informed of any new developments.

Pretoria had evidently lost interest in assisting Anglo American and the Americans in getting the SMTF project off the ground, but Muller’s curt reply indicates that the decision was not solely motivated by economic considerations. While interaction between Pretoria and Anglo American had been fairly intensive until the end of 1975, the atmosphere became markedly cooler in 1976. This change of attitude can be attributed to the failure of the US-South African intervention in the Angolan war on the side of the Mobutu-supported FNLA, which badly affected Pretoria’s relations with Washington, as we will see later in this section. A similar fate, detailed below, was experienced by another example of co-operation during the same time period and that expressed the common interest of Pretoria, Washington and Anglo American in keeping Mobutu in power as a political ally against the MPLA in Angola. This instance reveals for the first time that South Africa’s intelligence agency, BOSS, was in close liaison with its American counterpart, the CIA, over Zaire; this supports the earlier argument that BOSS had become integral to Washington’s activities in southern Africa.

After mid-1975, Zaire appears to have experienced an oil shortage, possibly no longer being in a position to pay the petrol price that had risen since 1973 due to the country’s finan-

777 Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976; letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Brand Fourie, Johannesburg, 22 April 1976 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).
778 Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).
780 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Harry Oppenheimer, Cape Town, 4 May 1976 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. 1).
cial crisis. Thus, Bomboko, the DFA’s middleman for Zaire, approached the foreign affairs ministry for help in finding a solution and sent Lawrence Raymond Devlin as an intermediary to Pretoria on 10 October 1975. This department knew that Devlin was a “former official” of the US government with “long experience” in Zaire, that he now worked for Leon Tempelsman & Son as their representative there and that he was “well known to, among others, Mr. H. Oppenheimer and General van den Bergh”, as Under-Secretary Pretorius reported. It is uncertain, however, to what extent the foreign service officials were aware that Devlin was the CIA’s key person for Zaire. From the secondary literature, we established that he was the CIA Station Chief in Kinshasa from 1960 to 1963 and again from 1965 to 1967; in this role he had informed Washington about South African mercenary activity in the Congo (Chapter 2). Subsequently, Devlin was alleged to have been involved in Patrice Lumumba’s assassination in 1961, the act which brought Mobutu to power. As Chief of the CIA Africa Division from 1971 to 1974, Devlin remained in very close contact with Mobutu even after his departure from Kinshasa. Thereafter, and until 1987, he put his connections at the disposal of Leon Tempelsman & Son, thus consolidating a connection that seems to have come into existence during Devlin’s days in the Congo, where Maurice Tempelsman was involved in diamond mining. Given his close contacts with Mobutu, Anglo American, Tempelsman and the intelligence communities in both South Africa and the United States, Devlin was the ideal man to make the necessary arrangements to help solve Kinshasa’s oil problem. His stay in South Africa in October 1975 served merely to convey Zaire’s needs and to establish contact regarding the matter. He again visited the Republic from 21 to 25 November, holding meetings with Brand Fourie and representatives from the private business sector. Significantly, however, he

781 Telex from Justin Marie Bomoko to Justus de Goede, Kinshasa, 30 September 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7).
does not appear to have met with Muller, offering further evidence that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs often bypassed Muller because of the minister’s weak personality and due to his unease in interacting with people, such as Devlin, who came from outside the diplomatic circle.

According to the available documents, a scheme was devised whereby US Mobil Oil International, which already had investments in Zaire, would supply Kinshasa with oil and oil products worth 50 million US Dollars. This would serve to bridge the gap for four to five months until the expected assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was forthcoming. Repayment by Zaire would take place over a still-to-be-negotiated period of eighteen months to two years at approximately 2.8 million US Dollars per month. Kinshasa would pledge its 12% share in the oil production of US Gulf Oil, expected to begin at the end of 1975 in Zairean off-shore wells; this would amount to an estimated 1 million US Dollars monthly as repayment. The remaining 1.8 million would come from Zaire’s general budget. However, given Zaire’s dire economic situation, Mobil Oil International insisted on bank guarantees, and this is where Mobutu hoped to obtain South African assistance. Among the businessmen consulted by Devlin, was Harry Oppenheimer, who either knew him in connection with De Beers’ diamond mining in Zaire and/or through Maurice Tempelsman. This again reflects the significance of Anglo American as a foreign policy actor, involved in economic arrangements of geo-political significance. Furthermore, given Devin’s close contact with Tempelsman, it can be reasonably assumed that Oppenheimer was aware of Devlin’s work for the CIA, indicating that the South African multinational had no qualms in interacting with the US intelligence agency when it served its interests. In any event, Oppenheimer was not in a position to assist Devlin with a bank guarantee, possibly because Anglo American’s own private merchant bank, Union Acceptances Limited, mentioned earlier in this chapter, experienced financial problems and subsequently underwent two mergers during 1973/74. However, he referred Devlin to Frank Dolling, the Managing Director of South Africa’s Barclays Bank, advice that was probably related to that bank’s participation in the UAL after 1959. With Oppenheimer’s recommendation, it is not surprising that Dolling showed his willingness to provide the necessary bank guarantee that would ensure Mobutu’s political survival. Although Oppenheimer could not provide the bank guarantee, he offered to make

good any shortfalls in the monthly repayments by Kinshasa to Mobil Oil International by Britmond, De Beers’ diamond agency in Zaire, by using the income derived from the sale of Miba’s diamonds. Oppenheimer had previously obtained permission for such sales from Mobutu, again reflecting Anglo American’s keen interest in keeping Mobutu in power as a guarantor of political stability, an important factor in the multinational’s mining plans for Zaire. Oppenheimer had also contacted Secretary Fourie to ascertain the foreign affairs ministry’s preparedness to reinsure the deal and therefore act as guarantor in the last resort. The State Security Council, the principal decision-making body during P.W. Botha’s era, discussed the proposal in late November 1975. The SSC’s involvement is highly significant, because, as stated in Chapter 2, the SSC only seldom met during the Vorster era. This suggests either that the Zaire deal was one of the few cases that warranted discussion, or that the SSC held a more prominent position in this phase of Vorster’s premiership than the secondary literature has assumed so far. The DFA files do not contain the final decision reached by the State Security Council, but again with reference to the failed US-South African military intervention in the Angolan war, it is unlikely that Pretoria co-operated any further.

We have now discussed the activities of BOSS and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information as part of Pretoria’s Détente initiative in southern Africa. This entailed attempts to provide a settlement to the situations in Namibia and Rhodesia, as well as securing support from Zaire’s Mobutu in order to maintain political stability in South Africa’s neighbourhood. In this context, mention has been made, in several instances, of the Angolan war and its negative effect on the Détente initiative. We noted at the beginning of this section that Portugal’s withdrawal from both Angola and Mozambique destroyed South Africa’s cordon

---

791 ‘Dr. Smit’, 26 November 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 8). The document itself does not specify Dr Smit’s identity, but in all likelihood this refers to Robert van Schalkwijk Smit. He was Secretary in the Department of Finance and part of the Geneva Trade Negotiations (1964-67), did a doctorate in Economics in 1968 at the University of Stellenbosch, later became Alternative Executive Director of the IMF for South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Lesotho, Swaziland and Western Samoa (1971-74) and then Director of Finance in the Treasury (1975-76). On 22 November 1977, and under circumstances unresolved until today, Robert Smit and his wife were murdered, while his mention in this context of this study adds to the recent speculations in a South African paper: “No South African murder has provoked more skuldugery, conspiracy theorising and sheer guesswork than the killings almost 25 years ago of politician Robert Smit and his wife, Jean-Cora. (...) Who killed the Smits and why? A quarter century later, nobody knows for sure. A National Party MP, Smit was, according to one theory, investigating corruption at the highest levels of government. According to another theory, he was involved in dodgy offshore business deals. A third theory holds that he was involved in sanctions-busting. We may never know the full truth”. ‘Nasty secrets’, Sunday Times 5 May 2002. Also Who’s Who of Southern Africa, 1977-78, p.817; De Beer, Mona. 1995. Who Did What in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ad Donker: 129.
don sanitaire and that Pretoria’s reaction was dominated by the struggle between BOSS and the military, with the former proposing Détente, and the latter armed intervention. Having examined the activities of BOSS, the following section details Pretoria’s relations with Gabon, where the military took the lead, serving them as a stopover for armament transports to South Africa. These supplies are an important factor in understanding the reason for the military’s confidence in becoming involved in the Angola war during October 1975. This represented an apogee in the conflicting approaches followed by the military and BOSS over Pretoria’s southern Africa strategy.

**Gabon**

We found earlier in this chapter that Gabon’s President Bongo had become a reliable partner to Pretoria’s military during and after the Nigerian Civil War. This prompted access to Gabon by the Department of Foreign Affairs that showed interest in development/investment projects and launched the OGAPROV agricultural project. However, although OGAPROV was successful, the establishment and maintenance of this project revealed Bongo’s favouritism towards the military. While disapproving the situation, the foreign service corps had little choice other than to accept the military’s predominance in order not to lose contact with this relatively important African country.

Bongo’s interests and those of the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs led to a complex interplay that originated in May 1975. The co-operation with Pretoria’s military in the Nigerian Civil War was most probably the background to Bongo’s renewed approach to the South Africans. Significantly, although Jacques Foccart, who had been kingpin in the network of Gabonese-French-South African co-operation in support of Biafra, was no longer in office, Maurice Robert and Maurice Delauney were still present. During the Nigerian Civil War, they had been part of Bongo’s entourage as the head for Africa intelligence agency, SDECE, and as French Ambassador to Gabon respectively. These functions involved co-ordinating both French and South African support to Biafra. Presently, they were again part of Bongo’s entourage, 92 Robert as Head of the French petroleum company Elf Aquitaine and Delauney serving once more as France’s Ambassador, as indicated earlier in this chapter. While their names do not appear in the DFA files relating to Pretoria’s co-operation with Bongo during 1975, the following developments leave little doubt that they pulled the strings.

Bongo’s mediators in this instance were Patrick Monier-Vinard and Jean-Pierre Daniël, who shared the official title of Technical Adviser in the Presidency of the Republic of Ga-

---

but actually served as Bongo’s advisors in political, military and intelligence matters from 1971 to June 1975 and from 1975 respectively. Daniël was an agent for the French intelligence agency, SDECE, and so more than likely was Monier-Vinard. Their importance to both Pretoria’s military and the DFA in providing a conduit to Bongo led to their award of the Order of Good Hope in 1979 on the recommendation of both Jan Boyazoglou, Pretoria’s man in charge of OGAPROV, and Deputy Secretary, von Hirschberg. The latter argued that Daniël was the “most important contact person” in Gabonese matters, while, according to Under-Secretary Loubser, Monier-Vinard was responsible for promoting “good relations between South Africa and Gabon”. One of the many cited examples demonstrating his diligence, some of which will be outlined below, was that he “acted as a contact between South African military authorities and the Gabonese”.

On 10 May 1975, and probably following the joint interventions of Monier-Vinard and Pretoria’s military, Bongo granted the South African private airline, Safair, the right to use Libreville airport as a refuelling stop-over on the routes to and from Europe. Safair made this request as their previous stop-over, Ilha do Sal on Cape Verde, became unstable during the country’s strive for independence. The available documents suggest that Safair made frequent use of the new facility until late 1976, with at least one north- and southbound weekly flight landing in Libreville. Thereafter, for reasons that are not recorded, the number of landings was drastically reduced; in the twelve months after September 1977, Safair appears to have made only made thirteen stopovers.

---

797 ‘Award of the “Order of Good Hope” to’, from Anton Loubser, 2 July 1979, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 9).
velopment/investment projects in the C.A.R. and Gabon, \(^{801}\) examined in the two previous sections. Judging from later evidence, however, the main purpose of the Safair flights to European destinations was the delivery of parts necessary for armament production in South Africa by the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation (Armscor). In addition to its airline subsidiary, Luxavia, undercutting African airspace closure to South African Airways (Chapter 2), Safair now assisted Pretoria in circumventing the 1963 UN voluntary arms embargo. Armscor had been established in 1968 to counter this embargo and subsequently became the SADF’s main armaments supplier. In 1976, it merged with the equally state-controlled Armaments Production Board to form the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, while retaining the acronym Armscor.\(^{802}\) To make armament deliveries to Armscor, and according to the DFA files, the destinations for which Safair most frequently required clearance from Libreville were Malpensa Airport outside Milan, Glasgow Prestwick International Airport and Bordeaux.\(^{803}\) The French armament supplies after 1963, mentioned in the Dialogue section, explains the Bordeaux destination, while Malpensa possibly served as a trade centre for the alleged United States arms supplies and direct Italian deliveries to South Africa.\(^{804}\) The use of Glasgow’s airport is explained in the case study that now follows.

One Safair clearance request in the DFA files sheds some light on the secret deliveries to circumvent the UN arms embargo: “Freight from Malpenza [sic] consists of aircraft components from Atlavar to Atlas Aircraft Corporation. Freight from Prestwick consists of Jet engine starter cartridges and detonators from Nobel’s Enterprises to Naschem (Pty) Limited”.\(^{805}\) Both Atlas Aircraft and Naschem were Armscor subsidiaries; the former produced aircraft


\(^{803}\) Several documents in DFA, 1/178/3, Vols. 4, 5, 6.


\(^{805}\) ‘Route clearances’, from J.J. le Roux (Safair) to Johan Pretorius, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6).
and maintained "high technology alloys", while Naschem was described as "one of the largest ammunition producers in the southern hemisphere".\textsuperscript{806} Regarding the provider companies, only little information could be gleaned on what is referred to as Nobel’s Enterprises, but whose actual name was Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). It had its origins in 1871, when Alfred Nobel established the British Dynamite Company south of Glasgow. Renamed Nobel’s Explosives in 1877, the company expanded and later merged with other British chemical companies to form ICI.\textsuperscript{807} It appears, therefore, that Naschem needed ICI substances for the production of ammunition.

Bongo was satisfied with the arrangements concerning Safair landings in Libreville. In November 1976, after a meeting with Bongo, the Agricultural Counsellor in Paris, Boyazoglou, reported: “In respect of the Safair flights, the President is clearly satisfied with the situation, and hopes that this will continue satisfactorily in the future”.\textsuperscript{808} In particular, the deal comprised the monthly payment of an “honorarium”, as Under-Secretary Loubser described it, of 8,000 Rand,\textsuperscript{809} paid directly to President Bongo.\textsuperscript{810} However, and in similar vein to the discussion earlier in this chapter over the exposure of the South African presence in Gabon related to the DFA’s technical assistance and development/investment projects, Bongo expressed concern over the visibility of Safair aircraft during the stopover at Libreville airport. In July 1975, Boyazoglou wrote to Deputy Secretary Killen that Bongo had “emphasised the necessity for discretion”.\textsuperscript{811} Therefore, Safair’s stopovers were only permitted during the night, except on Thursday nights when “Libreville airport was overcrowded”, as DFA reports reveal.\textsuperscript{812} The situation was to become even more critical from July 1977 to July 1978, when Bongo was the OAU Chairman. During the OAU Summit, he did not want Safair to land in Libreville in order to avoid accusations from fellow African leaders, and proposed Port Gentil and Franceville as alternatives.\textsuperscript{813} Bongo, through Daniël, had previously suggested the
Franceville option to Pretoria should a problem arise in the use of Libreville.814 Pretoria’s Safair deal with Bongo was only one element of what Rae Killen described as the “package”.815 This was supplemented by Bongo’s interest in the air cargo carrier Affretair, a Gabonese company registered in Rhodesia,816 and SAA’s desire to obtain landing rights in Gabon. As we learn from an instructive secondary source, Jack Malloch established Air Trans Africa, the operator of Affretair, in May 1970. The South African-born pilot lived in Rhodesia and had already co-operated with President Bongo by flying Rhodesian support, via Gabon, to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War.817 We now turn our interest to the other elements of what formed the ‘package’.

Gabon was almost entirely dependent on imported meat, offering the Department of Foreign Affairs the ideal motivation to launch the OGAPROV project. One of Gabon’s principal meat suppliers was Rhodesia, against whom the UN had imposed the first mandatory economic sanctions in 1966 to force a settlement of the UDI issue. During mid-1975, Bongo openly admitted that he contravened these sanctions by importing Rhodesian meat.818 The airline cargo carrier Affretair, in which Bongo was averred to hold “a financial interest”, as revealed in a DFA document,819 transported this commodity to Gabon, as we learn from Péan’s illustrative work, then proceeding to European destinations with unknown purpose. The same source indicates that the Affretair planes, on their return trip to Rhodesia via Libreville, were mostly empty and that this lack of economic viability was not in Bongo’s financial interest.820 In addition, given the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the stop-over in Libreville on the southbound journey also posed a political problem. To resolve this situation, Bongo approached Pretoria for assistance in pursuit of his personal interest in Affretair and the cargo carrier’s meat deliveries, while making use of Pretoria’s support for Rhodesia at the time, the Safair deal and the already close ties between Libreville and Pretoria. The resulting intricacies are now examined.

---

814 ‘Gabon’, from Rae Killen, October 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6).
815 ‘Note’, from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 19 July 1976 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 8).
819 ‘Notes on a meeting at 10.30 hours Friday, 8th August in S.A. Airways Boardroom, Air Terminal, Johannesburg’, August 1975, p.1 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6).
On 16 May 1975, Jack Malloch met SAA Planning Manager Frans Swarts in South Africa and proposed a weekly Affretair cargo flight from Europe to Johannesburg, “wet-leased” by SAA and in conformity with its “poolpartnership [sic] arrangements with carriers in Europe”, and then onwards to Salisbury. Earlier that month, Monier-Vinard, on behalf of Bongo, had discussed the controversial aspect of traffic rights for cargo on the then Johannesburg-Salisbury route with Brand Fourie, agreeing that Affretair would be apportioned traffic rights for a weekly flight. Probably in return for this concession, Bongo offered South African Airways the use of Franceville airport as a technical stopover to and from Europe. All these elements were subsequently consolidated in an agreement signed by Air Trans Africa and SAA officials on 13 June 1975. Monier-Vinard, and later Daniël, acted as Bongo’s principal agents in this deal. Daniël later revealed that Bongo “had told him that he must help Affretair”. Bongo used their services to resolve any problem, assuming that the French intelligence officials would impress both the foreign service and SAA officials. This is illustrated by the difficulties encountered by Affretair concerning the initial landing rights in Johannesburg, causing Monier-Vinard to contact Julian Thomas at the South African Embassy in Paris. Thomas then informed Secretary Fourie in Pretoria, who, in turn, intervened through SAA Chief Executive Pi Pienaar. The matter was quickly resolved and Affretair made its first landing in Johannesburg on 17 July.

Given that South African Airways had fulfilled its obligations vis-à-vis Affretair, their use of Franceville airport became the next item on the agenda. However, at the time, this airport was not capable of handling large aircraft and the provision of jet fuel could not always be guaranteed. Therefore, based on its interest in extending SAA’s landing and overflying network in Africa, Pretoria offered Gabon a loan of 3 million Rand “for a basic improvement

---

822 In contrast to a dry-lease, this meant the lease not only of plane but also of the entire crew and making insurance arrangements. Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 2001.
826 ‘Use of Franceville airport: discussion at S.A.A. headquarters on 13 August 1975 between Mr. J.P. Daniël and Captain Pienaar and Mr. F. Swarts’, August 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6).
of the Franceville airport complex”.

This was to ensure adequate landing facilities for large SAA aircraft, such as the Boeing 747, used on the European routes. A promise was made to provide an additional 10 to 12 million Rand loan for the “development” of Franceville airport and the construction of “a small project” at Libreville airport by a South African company.

In late July 1975, Daniël, on behalf of Bongo, informed Brand Fourie and SAA Chief Executive Pienaar that a SAA Boeing 747 would be able to land at Franceville airport in early August, but “discreetly, on a Sunday, and during dusk”, again reflecting the cautious stance taken towards the foreign service officials. However, SAA soon lost interest in co-operating with Affretair and the Franceville option for the following reasons. On 13 August, Pienaar and Swarts informed Daniël during a meeting in Johannesburg that they had lost faith in Affretair, because it had concealed a similar arrangement with UTA, a French airline and SAA pool partner. Furthermore, the provision of sufficient jet fuel at Franceville airport was not guaranteed at all times and other pool partners complained about Affretair undercutting cargo tariffs on the Europe-South Africa route. SAA’s attitude endangered the entire package deal between Pretoria and Bongo, especially the Safair landings in Libreville as a stop-over for the transport of armaments for the South African military.

As we argued initially, the importance of the Safair armament deliveries from Europe to the South African military cannot be minimised as an increase in its capacity was vital in view of the situation in southern Africa after Portugal’s withdrawal. The subsequent developments suggest that the military therefore tried to pressurise both the foreign affairs ministry and SAA to sustain the Safair landings in Libreville. In particular, they appear to have approached Bongo’s adviser, Daniël, who now intervened. On 17 August 1975, he phoned Jan Boyazoglou at the Paris Embassy and “appeared to be disillusioned” about SAA’s waning interest in Franceville, according to the Agricultural Attaché. Boyazoglou assessed the situation to be so critical that a complete breakdown in bilateral relations was feasible, writing to Secre-

---

833 ‘Use of Franceville airport: discussion at S.A.A. headquarters on 13 August 1975 between Mr. J.P. Daniël and Captain Pienaar and Mr. F. Swarts’, August 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6).
tory Fourie and Deputy Secretary Killen: “I am lost in the matter and I do not know how I must handle it to have the least harm as a result”. However, due to their senior positions in the foreign service corps, Fourie and Killen adopted a pragmatic stance in order not to further damage the Gabon-South African relationship. They retained the 3 million Rand loan offer, the possibility of an additional 9 million Rand loan, the arrangement of the weekly Affretair flight to Johannesburg, the Safair deal in Gabon, while qualifying SAA’s interest in the Franceville option by proposing the “principle of SAA eventually landing at Franceville, and with deviation rights at Libreville”, the latter reflecting SAA’s principal interest. This news, forwarded via Daniël, was apparently to Bongo’s satisfaction, as he authorised his Economics and Finance Minister to sign the 3 million Rand loan agreement for the improvement of Franceville airport, with Pretoria on 13 September 1975. The soft conditions of the loan comprised an interest rate of 4% and repayment in forty half-yearly instalments commencing on 1 January 1977; Pik Botha later approved Bongo’s request for a two-year moratorium.

DFA documents reveal the likely involvement of South Africa’s engineering company, Roberts Construction, in the planned construction of “aeroplane parking facilities and fuel storage tanks” at Franceville airport. Similar to Roberts Construction’s interest in the construction of a railway line in Gabon during 1971/72, the company’s engagement in this project was probably also facilitated through the personal affiliation between Jan Boyazoglou at the Paris Embassy and Stephen Boyazoglou of Roberts Construction. In particular, Jan Boyazoglou and Killen were in co-operation with Daniël over the firm’s participation in the project at Franceville airport, even though Boyazoglou’s brief was the OGAPROV project. As the available DFA files up to 1979 contain no further documentation on this project, we doubt whether it

---

836 ‘re: Gabon arrangement with special reference to AFFRETAIR’, from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie (to be opened by Rae Killen in Fourie’s absence), Paris, 25 August 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 7).
839 ‘Questions to be raised during Mr. J.P. Daniel’s visit during July 1979’, from J. Williams, Pretoria, 28 June 1979, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 9).
was ever realised. South African Airways never used Franceville airport due to the uncertainty of jet fuel supply, but the airline was granted emergency landing rights in Libreville.\footnote{Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002.}

In assessing Pretoria’s co-operation with Bongo in the Affretair-Safair deal, one cannot escape the impression that Gabon’s President was working to his own advantage. In his study on Gabon’s relations with French, French journalist Péan aptly describes Bongo’s ability to manipulate matters to his own advantage by stating that Bongo “had become master in the art of driving a wedge between each clan and to then profit from the conflict”.\footnote{Péan. 1983. *Affaires africaines*, p.245 (translation from French). Also Barnes, James Franklin. 2003. The Bongo Phenomenon: Power in Gabon, in Michael Charles Reed, James Franklin Barnes, eds. *Culture, Ecology, and Politics in Gabon’s Rainforest*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press: 309-331.} In this instance, he linked the Safair landing rights that served the military to the DFA’s interest in obtaining landing rights for SAA and his own interest in Affretair and meat transport. Obviously judging them to have significant political influence, Bongo kept his agreement with the military, while the offer of Franceville airport to SAA was only a token. Given the importance of the Safair armament deliveries for the military, Bongo more than likely calculated that they would pressurise the national airline in accepting the deal, providing Affretair with the requested access to profitable air routes. In fact, South African Airways became something of a pawn in Bongo’s plans, as Affretair did not adhere to the agreement with SAA and concluded a simultaneous air cargo arrangement with the French airline UTA. Apart from Bongo himself, the main beneficiary was Pretoria’s military, as the Safair stopovers in Libreville allowed them to deliver parts for Armscor’s subsequent armament production. This factor contributed to the military’s confidence in becoming directly involved in the Angolan war, a highly significant step compared to its earlier and comparatively minor roles in the Congo during 1964 and in the Nigerian Civil War five years later. The Angolan war has been mentioned above as the likely reason why Pretoria did not, eventually, participate in two schemes that aimed at strengthening Mobutu’s position, even though they would have harmonised with Pretoria’s desire to keep anticommunist Mobutu in power as an important Déétente ally. An investigation into this war is necessary for this reason alone. It is furthermore of significance, as it highlights the policy differences and rivalries between BOSS and the military in the context of Pretoria’s current Africa policy, with important implications for South Africa’s subsequent foreign relations with Africa.
Angolan War

Pretoria’s Détente had been conceived in reaction to Portugal’s withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique during 1974/75. Its initiatives in settling the Rhodesia and S.W.A./Namibia issues were an attempt to safeguard the security of South Africa’s white population and to simultaneously ease the strained relations with African states. In both Angola and Mozambique, however, the possibility of communist forces coming to power was imminent. Regarding Mozambique, the Portuguese government recognised the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) as the only liberation movement and its leader, Samora Machel, led the country to independence on 25 June 1975. Once Portugal began retreating from Mozambique, the military revived co-operation with South Africa’s long-standing ally in Africa, Malawi, to ensure the security of both countries; as was noted in the earlier section on the Outward Movement, a Military Attaché was accredited at the South African Mission in Lilongwe from its inception in 1967. A background report written by Under-Secretary Pretorius for Minister Muller’s visit to Malawi on 15/16 July 1974 reveals the launch of Operation Dobbin. This project entailed the delivery of a patrol boat to ensure the security of Lake Malawi, common to both Malawi and Mozambique, and of training facilities for potential Malawi sailors at the South African seaport of Durban. The same report notes that a Malawi military team “had a very successful visit to the Republic to investigate possibilities of purchasing certain equipment”, and the prospects seemed “favourable” that the SADF “will be able to supply the requirements indicated by them”. Finally, a DFA report from circa October 1977 summarises: “Military cooperation excellent with a very able Military Attaché”.

While FRELIMO was unrivalled in Mozambique at the time of independence, three liberation movements were opposed over who was to govern an independent Angola, with the generally western-oriented FNLA and UNITA fighting the communist-Marxist MPLA (Figure 4). The Alvor Accord of 15 January 1975, stipulating a cease-fire among the liberation movements and setting November of that year as the independence date, was short-lived; in August, the FNLA-UNITA coalition declared war against the MPLA. South Africa’s na-

---

843 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.
tional intelligence and the military exploited this rivalry, hoping to bring a Pretoria-friendly liberation movement to power, and, in February 1975, established contact with both Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, the FNLA and UNITA leader respectively. They became Pretoria’s partners because of their anticommunist stance and because they gave assurances of their sentiments against SWAPO that fought for Namibia’s independence. In Washington, and parallel to these developments, the CIA was predisposed to support both the FNLA and UNITA, but the US Congress “had no stomach for another intervention so soon” after the Vietnam debacle and banned all military assistance to any of the Angolan liberation movements. To overcome this embargo, the State Department, specifically Secretary of State Kissinger, approached Zaire’s Mobutu, seeing in him a force for political stability in Central Africa and an ally against the MPLA. In combining its interest in the FNLA and Mobutu, Kissinger’s support for the FNLA and circumventing the ban on military support to Angola’s liberation movements, the CIA, according to South African military commentator Hilton Hamann, arranged “for Zaire to supply armaments to the FNLA and then simply replenished Mobutu’s stocks”; for this purpose, it launched a secret operation, code-named IAFEAT URE. From Pretoria’s side, BOSS appears to have co-operated with the US intelligence agency by aiding the FNLA. A BOSS report from 21 November 1974, made available to Brand Fourie, reveals that its support for the FNLA aimed specifically at appealing to Mobutu, Pretoria’s potential Détente ally: “Mobutu’s policies (...) are solely an expression of his ambition to play a leading role in Africa. The only curb to this ambition resides in his incapacity to play it alone”. Consequently, in the first half of 1975, and parallel to the Pretoria-Kinshasa interaction examined previously, BOSS officials met FNLA representatives on several occasions to discuss areas of possible support, and Mobutu “most likely knew of and approved these contacts”, as stated by political scientist Thomas Callaghy.

While BOSS sided with the northern-based FNLA in order to appeal to Mobutu within the context of Détente, the military favoured UNITA, whose predominantly southern support was possibly judged to be the safer option in protecting Namibia from SWAPO incursions. There was also the possibility that they considered UNITA stronger than the FNLA, making it more likely that this liberation movement would govern an independent Angola. The seemingly

852 Letter from BOSS’s Secretary for Security Information to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 2 December 1974, with the attached document ‘Zaire: Mobutu’s attitude towards the RSA’, 21 November 1974 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6).
opposite approaches followed by BOSS and the military supplemented each other, however, as their combined support for the FNLA and UNITA encircled the MPLA in the central part of Angola, enhancing the chances for its defeat. In June 1975, General Constand Viljoen, Director General of Operations and Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of the SADF, and BOSS Head van den Bergh prepared a list of weapons for both Roberto and Savimbi and, after Vorster’s approval, delivered this covert assistance to them in mid-July 1975. In his well-documented and source-based study, Gleijeses suggests that BOSS, due to its “notoriously close” relations with the CIA, had previously sounded out Washington so as not interfere with US plans. This supports the view, often advanced in these pages, that BOSS was working in line with the CIA over southern Africa. Yet, in late August 1975, the situation changed when Cuba sent military advisers to the MPLA in reaction to the assistance channelled by the US and South Africa to the FNLA through Zaire. In response, South African troops were deployed into Angola, with the first soldiers arriving on 14 October 1975. Vorster’s decision brought to a head the conflict between the military and BOSS, aided by the foreign service officials in this instance, over Pretoria’s southern African policy. The discussion of the related events is important, because it will assist us in understanding why P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, became Prime Minister three years later.

Unsurprisingly, Foreign Minister Muller had opposed the move of sending South African troops to Angola, considering it a flagrant contradiction of South Africa’s stance of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state, and fearing that “South Africa could endanger détente by fighting in a black African state and running the risk of being branded an aggressor by the OAU and the UN,” according to Deon Geldenhuys. However, with reference to his weak profile, Gleijeses notes that Muller was “largely excluded from the decision”. Van den Bergh also opposed a direct military involvement, and following upon the desires of the CIA, favoured arms supplies to the FNLA through Zaire. In sharp contrast, the military advocated the idea of deploying troops, and the argumentation of the powerful Defence Minister P.W. Botha evidently gained the hearing of Prime Minister Vorster. The military proposed to intervene in Angola due to the conviction that South Africa’s security

---

was threatened should a communist government come to power in Luanda. In addition, we argue that they had the ambitious plan of becoming a continental power by fighting alongside the Western superpower, in a motivation similar to their involvement with France over the Nigerian Civil War. SADF General Viljoen confirms this assumption, by commenting that "it was good for South Africa to be cooperating with a big force like the U.S., even though it was clandestine". Although this view later justified the military's argument that, by withdrawing from Angola, the US administration had betrayed them and the struggle against communism, Viljoen's statement is probably not devoid of the truth. Notably, informed accounts suggest that Washington had sent mixed signals, giving some foundation to the military's later feelings of betrayal. Gleijeses, in particular, convincingly argues that while direct approval of Pretoria's invasion could not be proven, Washington had not discouraged it either and later collaborated with South African troops, contrary to what Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified before Congress and wrote in his memoirs. Another often-cited reason for the military sending troops to Angola, and in similar fashion to the Nigerian Civil War, was the encouragement from African states, further supporting the notion that the military desired to attain the status of a continental power. Notably, Gleijeses proposes that pleas for such an intervention had come from the Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zambia and even Senegal, while General Viljoen suggests that the military's decision to support UNITA was the result of requests from Zaire and Zambia:

I got the impression from P.W. Botha and Vorster that they saw the request from black Africa as the sign of a breakthrough (...). It was a very important development because, ever since we'd been involved with the Rhodesian situation, and because of the assistance we gave to the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, it had become clear to us in the military that the real issue for us would be to become part of Africa. The opinion-makers regarded this as a breakthrough. South Africa was starting to side with black Africa instead of the colonial powers. This was perhaps the most important reason for participating in the whole effort, apart from the idea of combating communism.

While these statements cannot be verified, the previous section showed that Pretoria's interaction with the Ivory Coast and Senegal continued beyond the Angolan war and only came to a standstill due to Pretoria's intransigent attitude towards apartheid and the S.W.A./Namibia issue. This continued relationship suggests that P.W. Botha's military invasion in Angola may have had their backing. Pretoria's contact certainly continued with Zaire's Mobutu, who was

a significantly motivating factor causing Prime Minister Vorster to become involved in Angola in the first place, even though the deepening of Zaire’s economic crisis strained the diplomatic and economic contact. By May 1977, the outstanding amount owed by Kinshasa, without interest, amounted to almost 11.9 million Rand. Despite South African missions during 1977 “to call the attention of the Zaire authorities to the escalating unpaid debt”, foreign service officer Jaquet concluded in July of that year that “no positive action to start repayment of amounts outstanding is expected”. Later documentation shows that no repayments took place until March 1979, when yet another South African delegation composed of representatives from the Departments of Industries and Commerce and Credit Guarantee visited Zaire “to press various bodies to repay outstanding lines of credit amounting to around R13 million”.

Having explored the approaches of BOSS, the DFA and the military towards the Angolan war and the predominance of the latter in Vorster’s decision to send troops, we now need to examine the subsequent developments, as this reveals a shift in the balance of power among the three state actors. In late December 1975, Vorster held three meetings related to the situation in Angola with Hilgard Muller, P.W. Botha, Hendrik van den Bergh and their senior officials, during which the BOSS and foreign service officials pushed through a decision for the phased troop withdrawal from Angola after 6 January 1976. Their strengthened bargaining position at this stage lay in the negative military situation in Angola; it became obvious that South Africa could not win the war. The FNLA offensive in the north had virtually collapsed, and South African troops and its ally, UNITA, were still fighting MPLA soldiers with heavy Cuban and Soviet military support some three hundred kilometres to the south of Luanda. The capture of the capital was critical because the MPLA had declared Angola’s independence on 11 November 1975 and installed itself as the country’s government, but Washington undermined Pretoria’s military plans. Crucially, on 19 December, Congress adopted the Clark Amendment, banning further covert military assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA, and the Ford administration appealed to Pretoria not to attack Luanda. Washington’s changed

---

attitude at this point in time was due to geo-political considerations that need closer examination, as it explains why South Africa’s military felt betrayed by the US.

Irrespective of what had motivated them to support the FNLA and UNITA or the MPLA respectively, Washington and Moscow subsequently were at loggerheads for having broken the rules of Détente relevant to their relationship, specifically those laid down in the aforementioned Basic Principles of Relations. In consequence, their respective engagements in the Angolan war led to the failure of the superpower Détente. In contrast, Washington and Beijing had undertaken successful steps towards rapprochement. Importantly, in the midst of the Angolan war, Kissinger had gone to China in October and November 1975 to hold talks with the country’s political leadership. This was followed, on 3 December 1975, by a meeting between US President Ford and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in the presence of Kissinger and other high-ranking US and Chinese officials. The Angolan war, in which Beijing was also involved, was an important focus of the talks, as we know from a memorandum that Piero Gleijeses has declassified from the US National Archives. Like the Americans, the Chinese channelled support to the FNLA through Zaire. While an extension of growing Sino-Soviet rivalry, Beijing’s support for African liberation movements was also an expression of its ambition to establish its revolutionary credibility and thereby bolster its own global position. However, Deng Xiaoping realised this plan could be jeopardised as the FNLA was receiving concurrent support from the apartheid regime. Thus, in answer to Ford’s and Kissinger’s entreaties during the December meeting for Beijing’s continued Détente co-operation, the Chinese leader declared: “We hope that through the work of the two sides we can both bring about a better situation there. The relatively complex problem there is the involvement of South Africa”. In response to Deng’s concern, Kissinger bluntly stated: “We are prepared to push South Africa out as soon as an alternative military force can be created”, and President Ford added: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we

will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in". It appears, however, that Washington considered Détente with Beijing of such importance that it withdrew from Angola anyway, without replacing the South African presence.

After this brief analysis of the Cold War implications on the Angolan war, we now proceed to the consequences of Pretoria’s involvement. Possibly aware of the reasons behind Washington’s departure from the Angolan war, Pretoria’s military withdrew its last troops on 27 March 1976, with the bitter feeling of betrayal by the US administration. P.W. Botha expressed this very pointedly in a statement before Parliament on 17 April 1978:

I know of only one occasion in recent years when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to tell that story: the story must be told of how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch.

While the military complained about having been treated unfairly, they themselves were accused of having destroyed Pretoria’s Détente plans in Africa, as is generally expressed in the secondary literature. Particularly strong criticism came from the foreign service officials, who had been powerless to stop P.W. Botha from sending troops to Angola. For example, career foreign service officer Donald Sole argues that they had “ruined” Pretoria’s ambitions in Africa. However, in the discussion of Pretoria’s relations with, most notably, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia in the previous section, we revealed that they in no way suffered a setback because of the Angolan war involvement. Rather, Presidents Houphouët-Boigny and Tolbert were disillusioned over Pretoria’s treatment of the black population in South Africa and its uncompromising attitude towards the S.W.A./Namibia issue. Regarding Senghor, he withdrew from contact with South Africa due to Vorster’s non-reply to his request of a fact-finding mission, on the advice seemingly given by the foreign service officials themselves. We therefore suggest that the military invasion in Angola conveniently served them in covering up the fact that their attitude had led to the failure of Dialogue and further, that they were

unable to devise a suitable strategy that would have alleviated South Africa’s international isolation and to convince the Prime Minister of its viability.

This takes us to the end of the discussion on Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa during the second half of Vorster’s premiership. Secret Diplomacy and Détente constituted the last two phases of the Outward-Looking Policy. This term was used to describe the Prime Minister’s foreign policy towards Africa, and it is appropriate that the concluding section in this chapter provides an assessment of the results achieved during Vorster’s twelve years as the country’s political leader.

Outward-Looking Policy: An Assessment

Vorster’s pragmatic policy approach led to heavy inter-departmental rivalries between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, as well as between BOSS and the military over Pretoria’s foreign relations with black Africa, resulting in four different approaches within the Outward-Looking Policy. In order to analyse the success of the Outward Movement, of Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente respectively, it is helpful to summarise the activities by the different state actors on a country-by-country basis and in the order presented in this chapter (Table 5). Before examining their credentials individually, a few general remarks need to be made. Most importantly, none of the different policies had served to break South Africa’s isolation, Pretoria’s overarching objective in Africa. They produced short-term successes, discussed henceforth, but they “failed to produce any substantive and lasting political benefits for South Africa”.

Based on the findings in this study, we are therefore in agreement with the secondary literature that the achievements of the Outward-Looking Policy in Africa were modest but did not lead to a modus vivendi with Africa.

### Table 5: Results of the Outward-Looking Policy on a Country-to-Country Basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Diplomatic relations after 1967; economic interaction; development/investment projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>End of contact after coup d’état against Tsiranana in 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Military, DFA</td>
<td>End of contact due to political turmoil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War; OGAPROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War; Houphouët-Boigny’s pro-Discourse statement in November 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>End of contact after coup d’état against Busia in 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>End of contact after Vorster’s refusal of a jurist delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Landing rights for SAA; economic interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast, Senegal</td>
<td>BOSS, DFA, Information</td>
<td>Vorster visits the Ivory Coast in September 1974; technical landing rights for SAA; Houphouët-Boigny withdraws because of Biko’s death and S.W.A./Namibia; Senghor withdraws because of Vorster’s non-reply over fact-finding mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Vorster meets with Tolbert in Liberia in February 1975; Tolbert withdraws due to S.W.A./Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Development/investment projects and technical assistance, experiencing mainly financial difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Landing rights for SAA; end of contact after coup d’état in 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>BOSS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>BOSS, DFA</td>
<td>Landing rights for SAA; tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunion</td>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Landing rights for SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>BOSS, Information</td>
<td>Landing rights for SAA until early 1980s; tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>BOSS, DFA, Information, military</td>
<td>Economic interaction; development/investment projects; cooperation in the Angolan war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Military, DFA</td>
<td>Landing rights for Safair armament deliveries; restricted landing rights for SAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa’s political instability proved to be one obstacle to Pretoria’s ambitions, with leadership changes often resulting in a reversal of policy by a specific country towards South Africa. This occurred in Ghana, Madagascar, the Comoros and, it may be added here, in the Central African Republic during September 1979. A more serious problem was the lack of coordination and co-operation between the foreign affairs ministry, the Department of Information, BOSS and the military. In fact, the circumstances surrounding Pretoria’s contact with Senegal and its engagement in the Angolan war vividly revealed that the different objectives and approaches of the former two state actors served to offset each other. The rivalry among the departments also made them prone to external manipulation, such as that most ably exer-
cised by Gabon’s Bongo, who played the military against the foreign service officials to his own advantage. Yet, these factors were comparatively minor reasons for the failure of Pretoria’s Outward-Looking Policy. The major obstacle in placing rapprochement between South Africa and black Africa on a stable basis was the apartheid ideology, with the differing interpretations of the Dialogue concept becoming an additional stumbling block. For Pretoria, it meant explaining apartheid to ill-informed African states, while retaining the domestic status quo. In contrast, those African countries that participated in Dialogue saw it as a means of instituting significant political change in South Africa. As long as Pretoria did not acknowledge this fundamental reality, an amelioration of South Africa’s continental and international standing was impossible. The only substantial concession Pretoria made was its withdrawal from Rhodesia, leading to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. In trying to resolve the S.W.A./Namibia issue, in a territory which was closer to South Africa’s political nerve than Rhodesia, the initiated Turnhalle Conference was a deliberate attempt to temper African demands. Thus, the more African states wanted Dialogue to confront the central issue at stake, apartheid, the less Pretoria was prepared to change.

Indeed, in an analysis of their Africa approaches, it becomes apparent that the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, BOSS and the military were guided by the notion that the apartheid system as represented by white minority rule, was there to stay. In starting with the role of the foreign affairs ministry, its main achievement during the Outward Movement was the establishment of relations with Malawi on an ambassadorial level, but this was a relatively unimportant country in terms of political influence on the African continent. The Department of Foreign Affairs’ only other success was Vorster’s visit to Liberia. Yet, in the issue of obtaining overflying and landing rights for South African Airways, the foreign service officials did not achieve their principal goal of establishing an air corridor through Africa. This was largely due to the attitude adopted towards African states that proved to be non-conducive in establishing a working relationship. In particular, their perceived likeness to a development agency implied an unequal relationship and promoted disrespectful behaviour. In the case of Uganda, probably also Senegal, the foreign service officers ignored the presidential requests to ascertain the situation of South Africa’s majority by sending fact-finding missions. A speech of Minister Hilgard Muller to the Foreign Affairs Club in London in September 1975 is evidence of the somewhat arrogant attitude held by the foreign service officials in this regard:

To the black African States the question of one-man-one-vote should not be such a burning issue as discriminatory measures which degrade the black man and impair his human dignity. After all, very few African States have a good record of franchise issues and it is
commonly recognized that there are more ways of ensuring an orderly, democratic soci­ety.\textsuperscript{885} In comparison, and due to its more verligte attitude, the Department of Information produced respectable successes with Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast, meeting with both Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor, two senior African leaders with significant influence in continental politics. At the same time, even Information Minister Mulder was not prepared to abandon the apartheid policy. In fact, we could see that there were serious rifts among the Afrikaner community over the issue of separate development and to what extent this should be taken, a struggle defined by the gap between what African leaders expected from South Africa and what the politicians could do in view of a possible white conservative backlash. In any case, Pretoria’s concept of separate development did not transcend what became the homelands, whose promotion as Pretoria’s reform commitment towards the country’s majority completely failed to impress African leaders. The Western governments also rejected the idea on the grounds that the homelands “did not fit the legal definition of self-determination required for recognition as an independent state”.\textsuperscript{886} Consequently, the international community recognised neither the Transkei nor Bophuthatswana when Pretoria granted them ‘independence’ in 1976 and 1977 respectively. The minute changes influenced by the Department of Information in supposedly ameliorating the so-called ‘petty apartheid’, meaning discriminatory harassment of the black population, were almost pathetic. In May 1975, for the first time in the country’s history, a Coloured was promoted to the rank of Officer within the South African Defence Force.\textsuperscript{887} In February 1976, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, James Thomas ‘Jimmy’ Kruger, announced that the government granted sixteen hotels the right to rent out rooms to black and Coloured people without having to obtain prior special permission. However, these guests had to have a “good reputation” and were not allowed to dance in the hotel.\textsuperscript{888} These steps were clearly not sufficient for Pretoria to sustain its Dialogue policy, a vain hope expressed by the Department of Information’s mouthpiece To the Point in January 1972: “it is the future of the so-called “petty apartheid” (...) which will determine whether the pro-dialogue states are justified in their undertaking”.\textsuperscript{889}

In contrast to the strategies employed by both the DFA and the Department of Information, neither BOSS nor the military focused mainly on breaking South Africa’s isolation. Their prime concern was to safeguard the security of white South Africa. The Détente initia-

\textsuperscript{887} Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 1975, p.19454.
\textsuperscript{888} Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 1976, p.19998 (translation from German).
ative was van den Bergh’s response to the new situation in which the Republic found itself in southern Africa after Portugal’s retreat from both Angola and Mozambique. Together with the Secret Diplomacy of its partner, the Department of Information, with both the Ivory Coast and Senegal, this seemed to be a promising development that would lead to an improvement in South Africa’s continental and international position. However, while the foreign service officials appear to have undermined the contact with Senghor, the military sabotaged its rival’s Détente by invading Angola. Yet, this did not make P.W. Botha and his men winners in the game. In fact, the military can be considered as the main loser during Vorster’s premiership. They established a particularly fruitful co-operation with President Bongo of Gabon, but suffered setbacks in both the Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan war. Incidentally, their involvement in the former led to Pretoria’s Dialogue policy, but this was not even counted to their credit. Crucially, the humiliating military withdrawal from Angola in all likelihood further heightened the rivalry between them and BOSS, and even impinged on South Africa’s domestic political arrangements. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Information Scandal served as a smokescreen to camouflage the serious struggle over Vorster’s succession between the men from the Department of Information and BOSS, represented by Connie Mulder, and the military leader P.W. Botha. It was not only a fight for the political control of South Africa and the country’s future direction, but it was also over Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa. Thus, when, on 28 September 1978, the National Party caucus voted against Mulder, and for P.W. Botha as South Africa’s next Prime Minister, it was a choice for a hardline politician. This had serious consequences for the course followed by South Africa during his leadership, and particularly for the country’s foreign relations with Africa, the implications of which are examined in the following chapter.

889 To the Point 29 January 1972: 46.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Military in Command:
Prime Minister and State President Botha, 1978-89

Securocrats

The dominance of the military became the principal characteristic of P.W. Botha’s foreign policy making towards black Africa beyond southern Africa throughout the 1980s. This description also applied to South Africa’s foreign relations elsewhere and every aspect of public policy. This represented a volte-face in the rivalry between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, national intelligence and the military that was central to Vorster’s premiership. In a continuation of the performance during his long incumbency as the Minister of Defence from 1966 to 1978, and as evidenced with direct military involvement in both the Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan war, P.W. Botha pursued a realist approach, with power and the use of force considered to be the only effective means to achieve political ends. In Africa, and as shown in the previous chapter, the military’s primary concern was South Africa’s security after the country’s cordon sanitaire had ceased to exist during 1974/75 with both Angola’s and Mozambique’s independence. In addition, Rhodesia’s majority rule came closer and with it the likelihood of another Marxist-communist-oriented country on South Africa’s border. Thus, whereas independent Africa had previously been relatively far away from white South African political reality, it was now at its doorstep. In consequence, the need for Pretoria to devise an Africa policy became more imperative than ever before.

In interpreting the dramatic events in the region in the second half of the 1970s set against the background of the Cold War, the military argued that South Africa would be Moscow’s next target. Its analysis of the situation found expression in successive Defence White Papers published from 1975. In summary, they reasoned that the Soviet Union tried to conquer mineral-rich and strategically important South Africa in its attempt to achieve global communist domination. For that purpose, assistance was provided to both the Angolan and Mozambican governments, and in turn these ‘proxies’ supported the ANC, PAC and SWAPO, particularly by harbouring their military camps, allowing them to launch attacks on South Africa and Na-
mibia, which Pretoria still considered to be part of the Republic. This appraisal went by the label 'Total Onslaught', such as formulated by the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, in 1980. The corresponding reaction became termed 'Total Strategy', comprising military and economic means to force the neighbours to succumb to Pretoria’s hegemony. A central aspect of the military dimension was the support for both Angola’s UNITA and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) through the 1980s, aimed at undermining the communist governments in Luanda and Maputo respectively, and this approach to managing regional relations became known as Destabilisation. Southern Africa now effectively constituted the region with South Africa as the regional power. Before discussing the relevance of the geographic area beyond this area in Pretoria’s Africa approach, we need to consider the international political setting within which South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa took place.

Similar to Vorster’s Détente policy in the mid-1970s, the military acted in a wider geopolitical framework, now characterised by the failure of rapprochement between Washington and Moscow and heightened Cold War tension. As a result, the military saw and presented “its role within the international system as the Southern African bulwark against communist aggression and on the side of the West in a ‘war of proxy’, between the United States and the former USSR”. Primary Military Intelligence documentation of the mid-1970s reveals that the Soviet presence in southern Africa was a real concern. At the same time, however, the stance against communism and the presentation of South Africa as the last outpost of Christianity, free market economy and Western ideas on the African continent became important arguments to appeal to the Western governments for political support. The aim of gaining political backing for activities pursuant to ensuring the survival of the whites in South Africa

---


2 Malan, Magnus André de Merindol. 1980. Die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika, ISSUP Strategic Review November: 3-16.


4 Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana.


7 DoD, Group 2, Vol. 1, HS/11/1/17, Vol. 31; HS/41/3/8,1+2, Vol. 119; HS/41/3/13, Vol. 120.
was especially successful with Ronald Reagan, the Republican US President from 1981 to 1988, and Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, both of whom decidedly favoured the white minority government for its hefty anticommmunist stance. Reagan’s Constructive Engagement policy ensured the maintenance of overtly friendly relations with South Africa until the mid-1980s. On her part, Thatcher described the ANC as a “typical terrorist organisation” and saw South Africa as a bulwark against communism and as a supplier of strategic minerals. In addition, the conservative German Chancellor from 1982 to 1998, Helmut Kohl, also pursued a Pretoria-friendly policy, especially over its former colony, Namibia, which was still inhabited by a large population of German descent. The one principal Western power that took an increasingly critical position towards apartheid during the 1980s was France, due mainly to the stance of Socialist President François Mitterrand (1981-95). In reversing earlier French policy, and acknowledging the need to support the anti-apartheid struggle, the ANC was given permission to establish an Exile Mission in Paris in 1981, serving the liberation movement as another base to promote Pretoria’s international isolation to force it to abandon its racial policies. Furthermore, Mitterrand was the only European leader to refuse a meeting with P.W. Botha during his tour of Europe in May 1984 and, on 24 July 1985, four days after Pretoria imposed a partial state of emergency, Paris recalled its ambassador for eleven months.

This international constellation impacted on the work of the Western Contact Group. Established in 1977 and composed of France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada and Germany, it was supposed to advance the independence of Namibia. In April 1978, both Pretoria and SWAPO accepted the Contact Group’s Namibia Peace Plan and the UN Security Council endorsed it with Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978, foreseeing “the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations”.

---


However, as the two most important Contact Group countries, Great Britain and the US, saw in Pretoria an ally against the progress of communism in Africa, the Contact Group’s work became paralysed. Crucially, during a visit to South Africa in June 1981, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, introduced the idea of the Cuban Linkage.\(^\text{15}\) This was met with relief in Pretoria, because it stipulated that South Africa would only have to adhere to Resolution 435 once the Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola.\(^\text{16}\) The Cuban Linkage reflected Reagan’s obsession with the fight against communism and consequently “construing every local mess as a test of global will”, as proposed by the renowned American historian Schlesinger.\(^\text{17}\) Washington’s approach led to the virtual disbanding of the Contact Group and brought to a halt the search for a settlement of the S.W.A./Namibia case by transforming the problem into a Cold War one. In a sense, one could summarise the situation by saying that an international protective shield had replaced the regional cordon sanitaire. Indeed, Pretoria’s military felt so reassured that, only two months after Crocker’s presentation of the Cuban Linkage, it launched Operation Protea in August and Operation Daisy in November 1981 against SWAPO. Crucially, in the aftermath of Operation Protea, Washington vetoed a draft resolution seeking to condemn Pretoria, France supported it and Great Britain abstained.\(^\text{18}\)

The international backing for the South African government began to crumble from the mid-1980s, when the Reagan and Thatcher policies attracted both domestic and external criticism. In the US, a growing anti-apartheid movement exerted increasing pressure and brought about the fall of what became known as the Constructive Engagement policy;\(^\text{19}\) in October 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act against the presidential veto.\(^\text{20}\) In addition, the US government recognised the African National Congress and, in early 1987,
Secretary of State George Shultz officially received ANC President Oliver Tambo. Margaret Thatcher’s pro-Pretoria stance came under attack from Commonwealth states, while the pressure exerted by the European Community was less significant and is not considered here. In October 1985, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau, on the Bahamas, overrode the British Prime Minister by supporting a wide range of sanctions against South Africa. Importantly, it laid the foundation for the Eminent Persons Group, which, co-chaired by Malcolm Fraser, former Australian Prime Minister (1975-83), and Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian President (1976-79), visited South Africa in May 1986 and met Nelson Mandela, among others. Even though it was not its purpose to make policy recommendations, the EPG shared a view that further anti-apartheid measures were necessary. Yet, the initiative failed due to Pretoria’s military attacks in the region, as shown below. In addition, a follow-up discussion on the EPG report, dated June 1986, at the Commonwealth Meeting in Vancouver in October 1987 did not result in any action, because of Thatcher’s persistently favourable position towards the minority, evidenced by her above-cited statement of the ANC being a terrorist organisation, which was expressed on this occasion. Nonetheless, London’s approach towards Pretoria underwent some change from 1987 onwards. In particular, with the appointment of Robin Renwick as Ambassador to South Africa from July 1987, the British government sought to convince the P.W. Botha government through quiet diplomacy that political reforms were necessary to alleviate the country’s isolation.

We have now seen that Pretoria’s interest in Africa focused on the region and thereafter we outlined the geo-political power constellation over South and southern Africa during the 1980s. While we showed that this impacted on South Africa’s foreign policy towards the immediate neighbourhood, we argue that the conduct of Pretoria’s foreign relations with African countries beyond the region was equally influenced by these international developments. Based on the available documentation, it is particularly significant to note that the military’s activities in this area took place predominantly in the first half of the 1980s. The evidence, to

---

22 For this, see Holland. 1988. The European Community and South Africa.
be presented in this chapter, suggests that they felt more confident in undertaking action beyond the region until then, foremost under the protection shield of the US. In contrast, we will see that Pretoria’s co-operation with Paris in Francophone Africa was insignificant during the 1980s. In fact, DFA reports of February 1985 and January 1988 indicate that France even tried to undermine Pretoria’s activities there. In the first instance, Director Glenn Babb suggested that “France’s actions in Africa [are] aimed at frustrating South Africa’s attempts in expanding our relations with French-speaking African countries”. Three years later, Senior Officer Paul Runge communicated to Babb from Cameroon that “France which as you know has watered down our influence in certain neighbouring countries”.

Given the military’s realist policy approach, the initiatives undertaken in African countries beyond South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood did not aim at establishing diplomatic relations or breaking South Africa’s isolation. Rather, they can be summarised into three categories, namely the gaining of access to the strategically located western Indian Ocean islands, the sale of armaments to finance the military involvement in the region and co-operation with President Bongo of Gabon, the military’s long-standing friend. These three issues form the core of Pretoria’s activities in black Africa beyond the region. In addition, and reflecting their perception of the military’s role in these instances, rebel movements from several African countries considered it opportune to approach the South African government for assistance. Acknowledging the powerful position of the military in Pretoria’s policy making, the following section first outlines the relevance of the other state and non-state actors in South Africa’s foreign relations with the geographic area of interest in this study. Subsequently, we explore the South African government’s interaction with the countries of relevance. As the military’s influence on P.W. Botha’s foreign policy remained a constant feature throughout the 1980s, it is appropriate to organise the evidence in thematic sections that focus on the above-mentioned issues. We will begin with the least important aspect, namely the approaches of rebel movements, while the other three categories are dealt with in the order presented above.


Assistants, Bystanders and Outsiders

In this section we discuss potential roles that could be played by state actors other than the military in foreign policy making, as well as by relevant non-state actors. In doing so, we begin with the supposedly predominant player in this domain, the Department of Foreign Affairs. Although access to the DFA files after 1979 was partly limited, the available primary sources and the secondary material suggest that its activities beyond the region were significantly reduced and became subordinate to the military's security considerations in the region.

In particular, the DFA’s Africa Division was restructured. As Pretoria continued to consider the homelands as independent states, they became part of the foreign affairs ministry’s area of activity and the southern African countries were given more prominence with separate administrative entities (Chapter 2). Generally speaking, the military’s predominance under P.W. Botha significantly curtailed the DFA’s influence in foreign policy making, especially in South Africa’s neighbourhood, causing political scientist Robert Jaster to describe its designated primary responsibility in this domain as “more formal than real”.

For instance, largely due to Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s efforts, non-aggression pacts or cease-fire agreements were concluded with Swaziland in February 1982, Angola in February 1984 (Lusaka Accord) and Mozambique in March of that year (Nkomati Accord), with the latter being the most acclaimed success. The foreign service officers’ motivation being that South Africa’s regional problems could not be solved militarily, the accords stipulated that Pretoria would refrain from direct or indirect military engagement, in return for which these countries would no longer harbour military camps from South Africa’s liberation movements. However, their hopes for a regional *modus vivendi* were short-lived, destroyed by SADF activities and in many ways resembling the situation in Angola during 1975, when the military intervention undermined Détente pursued by BOSS and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information.

In the present situation, the military violated both the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords by continuously supporting both UNITA and RENAMO respectively. In addition, on 19 May 1986, in the presence of the Commonwealth Eminent Person Group in South Africa, air raids were conducted on the capitals of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Together with the gov-

---

ernment’s decision, on 12 June 1986, to extend the partial to a full state of emergency to quell the increasing political protest from the black population, Pretoria’s growing international isolation caused political scientist Jack Spence to suggest that Pretoria had retreated into its laager.33 As will be examined in the final section of this chapter, this situation only changed towards the end of the 1980s, closely linked to the ending of the Cold War and with the Department of Foreign Affairs consequently regaining its predominance.

Returning to the DFA’s endeavours in Africa beyond the region, we have previously argued that they were drastically reduced due to the military’s focus on southern Africa. This is vividly illustrated in a report from Deputy Director-General Killen to Pik Botha regarding the provision of technical assistance to Somalia in 1983:

It is clear that the RSA does not have the necessary financial means at its disposal to provide development assistance to the rest of Africa to approximately or to the same amount as the assistance provided to the neighbouring countries. Therefore it is questionable whether the relatively small amount of development assistance that the Republic can spend in the rest of Africa makes a noteworthy difference to the decayed economies in those countries. South Africa cannot rescue Africa from its poverty.34

Even though Appendix D reflects an exponential rise of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ budget after 1978, its activities in the African countries beyond the region were basically frozen. Crucially, and in stark contrast to Vorster’s premiership, there is no evidence of any major development/investment project. The DFA’s only lever still to be applied was technical assistance, but this only occurred subordinate to and supplementing the military’s operations in countries of their interest. An important reason for Pretoria to refrain from involvement in large-scale development/investment projects was quite likely their pitiful lack of success in the past. Possibly with the exception of the Lilongwe Capital Project in Malawi, none of the others had achieved a measurable political benefit for Pretoria. This also applied to Operation Bokassa in the Central African Republic, which began during 1973/74 as part of the Secret Diplomacy phase (Chapter 4), and it is appropriate to outline its outcome now.

Operation Bokassa entailed two main components, namely the construction of Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa and five hundred prefabricated houses. As illustrated in the previous chapter, little progress was made due to President Bokassa’s growing disinterest and this trend continued during the early days of P.W. Botha’s premiership. Regarding the hotel project, by 1979, additional requests from Bangui, inflation and other factors had multiplied its cost to an


estimated 28 million Rand, with 11.7 million already disbursed. While the financial aspect made the hotel project difficult, Bokassa's fall in September 1979 put an end to it. The attitude of the new president, David Dacko, towards South Africa was very unstable; statements advocating diplomatic relations were followed by denials. In early December 1979, Under-Secretary Loubser, Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and two businessmen travelled to Bangui to ascertain the new situation, meeting Dacko and several of his ministers. During the talks, the new Minister of Public Works and Housing informed the South Africans that "although his Government felt that the hotel was very necessary for Bangui (.), it was regarded as a prestige object and had to take lower rating in the urgent development needs of the country". Nonetheless, he asked Pretoria "to consider putting in money to complete the hotel as otherwise the project would have to be stopped and the whole structure would go to ruin". Yet, Bouwer noted "that there was a general feeling in South Africa that we had reached the limit of the financial resources we could allocate to this project". Pretoria consequently withdrew and the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa is a five-storey ruin that presently still forms part of the Bangui landscape. Concerning the prefabricated housing project, a C.A.R. mission visited South Africa in January 1979 and requested another 1.3 million Rand from Credit Guarantee to complete the remaining two hundred and six houses and a moratorium of two and a half years for the repayment of the previous IDC loans. Credit Guarantee considered the additional loan to be "very high" and that it was "unexpected and requires consideration by the South African Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance". Nevertheless, the foreign service officers possibly still hoped for a successful outcome. Eventually, the additional loan was granted and a new agreement concluded with the Société Nationale d'Habitat (SNH), responsible for the construction of the housing project. However, during the visit to Bangui in December 1979, the South African delegation was informed that Maurice Methot, who had been instrumental in establishing contact with Pretoria in 1974 and was now Director of the SNH, would soon leave this organisation and that an investigation into mone-

39 <http://www.centravrique.com/imagesBG.htm> shows a photograph of the unfinished hotel.
40 'Record of discussions held at C.G.I.C., Johannesburg, on Wednesday, 24 January, 1979', p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 9).
tary irregularities was imminent. It is worth quoting the report that Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee provided on the state of affairs regarding the project:

We discussed stage-for-stage the agreement which we reached in January and which was embodied in the agreement in May according to which extension of repayments to us was granted and assistance promised to erect the remaining 200 houses provided that that particular programme was followed and the cash-flow was brought into order. None of these steps (...) had been implemented by them [SNH]. (...) No payments had been made by Government, they had started to construct only 5 houses, tenants of houses were not paying their rents (...) and no action was being taken against them, the 200 houses which the Government had taken are being left unoccupied and are deteriorating, looters are stripping the houses and [are] also stealing from the supplies for the 200 houses to be erected. (...) I expressed our great disappointment and dissatisfaction (...) that matters at SNH were completely disorganised and chaotic as far as the new arrangements with us was concerned.41

In summary, Operation Bokassa was a complete failure, another venture for the South African government resulting in considerable financial wastage for projects that did not materialise and without gaining any political advantage. This gave the Rand Daily Mail ammunition with which to attack the government. On 13 October 1979, after the fall of Bokassa, the paper exposed Operation Bokassa, arguing that Pretoria had wasted millions of taxpayer’s money in the C.A.R.42 This report was taken so seriously that it elicited a prompt denial from Minister Pik Botha.43 In comparison, the foreign service corps probably found it harder to defend itself against the military that dominated South Africa’s foreign policy making. If, as has been argued, the military was sceptical towards development/investment projects in Africa beyond the region, the outcome of Operation Bokassa was handed to them on a plate to substantiate their claim and such ventures therefore had to cease.

While the DFA was prevented from pursuing development/investment projects in Africa beyond the region, the military allowed it to assist within its own operations by offering technical assistance, the few cases of which are examined in subsequent sections. Asked about any resulting tensions between the military and the foreign affairs ministry, Paul Runge and Neil van Heerden, both of whom were involved at a senior level in such activities in the 1980s, tried to downplay this, but the foreign service officers’ subordinate position can be read between the lines:

Runge: There was a fair degree of co-operation and interaction. (...) I was talking to them, and they were talking to me. (...) If it hadn’t been for military support, we couldn’t

have run the aid programmes we had in Africa. Because we used their aircraft, we used their engineering services.\(^4\)

Van Heerden: Were there any agreements, disagreements or conflicts? Not really. Because from Foreign Affairs’ point of view, anything that promoted relations with Africa, as long as it’s not a military thing, we were fine. (…) Disagreement was mostly confined to not being informed. The foreign minister and the foreign minister’s officials, always pushed him [P.W. Botha] and said “You can’t allow the Defence Minister to do things offshore without him at least informing us”. Because you as foreign minister have to have an overall view of what the hell is going on. Whereas P.W., egged on by his colonels and his generals, was fundamentally opposed to the idea of having to tell any other minister what he does. So that tension was there, but I don’t think it is a major conflict in terms of objectives.\(^5\)

Evidence that the foreign service officials had ill-feelings about them being sidelined by the military, assisted by the National Intelligence Service for reasons discussed below, is provided in correspondence from Deputy Director-General Rae Killen to Pik Botha of May 1983. In this brief he makes reference to uncoordinated activity in his department and the other two agencies in Somalia:

> It is an evidently unhealthy situation that the named departments concentrate on the furtherance of the tasks entrusted to the relevant department, i.e. information gathering, while paying little attention to the political aspects of government-to-government contacts which (…) is the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. The result is a one-sided and half-hearted foreign policy towards the rest of Africa.\(^6\)

Having outlined the Department of Foreign Affairs’ subordinate position \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) the military during P.W. Botha’s era, we now turn to the other state actors formerly involved in Pretoria’s foreign policy making. As has been stated in Chapter 2, the Department of Information was reintegrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1980 and ceased to exist three years later. The Bureau for State Security, which had maintained a very prominent position during the Vorster premiership, became the Department of National Security in 1978 and the National Intelligence Service in 1980, with Niël Barnard as its Director-General from June of that year. By choosing Barnard, P.W. Botha followed the advice of Kobie Coetsee, the Deputy Minister in the Departments of Defence and of National Security between 1978 and 1980 (Chapter 2), also in trying to avoid confrontation between the military and national intelligence, such as surfaced in the Angolan war in late 1975 and on a personal level between Hendrik van den Bergh and P.W. Botha, then the Minister of Defence. This measure proved to be effective, as the available sources suggest that national intelligence only managed to play a small role in foreign policy making towards Africa during the interim period from 1978 until

\(^{44}\) Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.

\(^{45}\) Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.

\(^{46}\) "Verhoudinge tussen RSA en Somalië: beleidsbepaling t.o.v. die res van Afrika", from Peter Killen to Pik Botha and Johannes van Dalsen, Pretoria, 26 May 1983, p.2 (DFA, 1999/19, Vol. 2) (translation from Afrikaans).
until Barnard’s appointment. We now examine the one significant activity during this time. It concerned oil shipment from Nigeria to South Africa, the only hard evidence of Pretoria attempting to obtain the precious resource from Africa’s largest oil-producing country in order to lessen the impact of oil embargoes. Such action was taken by the Arab states in 1973 and beyond, when they used the oil weapon against Israel’s friends, such as South Africa. The only remaining oil supplier in this region was Iran until the fall of the Shah in 1979 (Chapter 4). It is possible that the oil shipments from Nigeria in March and April of that year, both of which became public knowledge, are related to Iran no longer being able to supply the requisite oil to South Africa. In the first instance, the S.S. Jumbo Pioneer was prevented from loading oil in Nigeria and transporting it to its presumed destination of Cape Town. One month later, the Lagos authorities seized the tanker, S.T. Kulu, owned by the South African Marine Corporation and already loaded with crude oil. Significantly, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 4, both Safair and Luxavia were part of Safmarine, serving Pretoria in an attempt to undercut both the aviation and military sanctions. The Nigerian government presented the two cases as an “apparent act of piracy”, a “meticulously planned high powered propaganda campaign” by Pretoria to undermine Lagos’ credibility to maintain a resolute anti-apartheid position. While this may have been the outcome, the Department of National Security’s main interest was to obtain oil for South Africa. According to an intelligence document that verifies its involvement in the second case, the tanker Kulu was registered in Panama, a safe haven for any such dubious activity, and on a long-term loan to the British-Dutch oil company BP. The report further states that the Kulu had called at a Nigerian port on ten previous occasions and without any problems, at least partly substantiating secondary literature allegations of Nigerian businessmen, middleman and even government ministers facilitating such illicit oil transfers for personal gain. In retaliation to the BP’s behaviour in this incident, and pretending to have a clean slate, the Nigerian government took over the company’s assets in September 1979.

49 ‘South Africa’s Oil Game is Aimed at Falsifying Nigeria’s International Image’, Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 9, 5, May 1979: 3.
Apart from this example of national intelligence engagement in Africa beyond the region prior to Barnard’s appointment as the NIS Director-General in 1980, evidence on the only other notable endeavour relates to the attempted coup in the Seychelles in 1981 that is discussed later in this chapter.

Now turning to the role of South Africa’s organised business sector, this was of minor relevance, with the South Africa Foundation making only one significant appearance in the DFA files, and this is discussed now. Thereafter, the files contain no evidence of any noteworthy activity on their part in Africa beyond the region. Prior to leaving for Kenya on 1 May 1979, both the Foundation’s President and Director General, Basil Hersov and Peter Sorour, met Pik Botha and Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg on 28 April to inform them of their five-day visit. The fact that this meeting took place is a further indication of the co-operative attitude between the Foundation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, as noted in Chapter 4. Apart from Pik Botha’s complaint about Chris Barnard’s contact with Charles Njonjo, examined at the end of the previous chapter, the Minister and von Hirschberg showed interest in obtaining their assistance in one particular area. The latter suggested that, “if the opportunity arose”, they “might enquire” whether Pretoria would be allowed to be accredited to the UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) with headquarters in Nairobi. For Pretoria, the establishment of such a mission “might be a convenient way of arranging a South African presence in Nairobi”. According to the travel itinerary made available to the DFA after their visit, Hersov and Sorour combined their own interests, not recorded in the files, with those of the foreign affairs ministry, meeting representatives from the private business sector, the Ministers for Housing and Social Services, Tourism and Wildlife, as well as Habitat’s Executive Director. On their return, they duly briefed the Minister and von Hirschberg that Habitat “saw no reason why South Africa should not have a mission accredited”, while they “encountered different reactions” from the Kenyan ministers, and that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs had “refused to see them”. In their conclusion, Hersov and Sorour judged the visit to have been a success for the Foundation and suggested that the DFA should arrange “reciprocal visits of small business groups”. Maybe as a result of this proposal, two Kenyan businessmen visited South Africa from 2 to 7 December 1979 and Pik Botha hosted a dinner for them. It cannot be excluded that the mutually fruitful co-operation between the Foundation

---

53 ‘Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation’, from Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/135/3, Vol. 8).
54 DFA, 1/135/3, Vol. 8.
55 ‘Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation’, from Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, pp.3ff. (DFA, 1/135/3, Vol. 8).
56 DFA, 1/135/3, Vol. 8.
and the Department of Foreign Affairs continued, but access to the DFA’s Kenya files was restricted to the end of 1979.

After having examined how the military’s powerful position affected the activities of the DFA, national intelligence and the South Africa Foundation, a statement needs to be made on the Progressive Federal Party, whose role can be described as that of an outsider. In his study, Deon Geldenhuys notes that P.W. Botha strongly disliked the Progressives’ foreign affairs ambitions. This was particularly the case since its leader, Colin Eglin, openly attacked the military’s decision to send troops to Angola in October 1975 by declaring in Parliament in January 1976 that this had been “an error of political judgement ... which could seriously prejudice and jeopardise the future security of South Africa”.

P.W. Botha’s hostile attitude towards Eglin found expression in February 1979, when he bluntly told him in Parliament: “Don’t you show your face in my office again”, a warning he repeated three weeks later.

When Frederik van Zyl Slabbert became the PFP leader in 1979, the situation improved only for a short while, as Geldenhuys further notes. Regarding the PFP’s undertakings in Africa beyond the region, the available DFA files, some of them with limited access after 1979, do not contain any evidence. From secondary sources and correspondence with Colin Eglin we know, however, of the contact with Senegal. We saw in Chapter 4 that Eglin had established a close link with President Senghor during the 1970s, meeting him four times. This liaison continued even after Senghor’s departure from the presidency in December 1980. In particular, Eglin informed us that, in 1982, he “had discussions with Pres Abdou Diouf [President from 1981], whom I had previously met when he was Senghor’s prime minister.” Later, in July 1987, Slabbert organised a meeting in Dakar, “widely regarded as the beginning of the negotiations process”, between sixty-one intellectuals from the Afrikaner community and seventeen ANC representatives, among them Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s future president.

The relevance of this event will be discussed at a later stage in this chapter.

The preceding accounts detailed the roles of the Department of Foreign Affairs, national intelligence, the South Africa Foundation and the Progressive Federal Party, substantiating

60 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 and 15 January 2003.
the dominance of the military foreign policy making towards Africa under P.W. Botha. With this in mind, the forthcoming four sections examine the interaction between the Pretoria government and African countries beyond the region. In following the thematic order proposed earlier, we begin by investigating the approaches made by several opposition movements in the hope of obtaining weapons.

**Contact with Opposition Movements**

South Africa’s isolation within the international community, its outspoken anticomunist stance and its comparatively prosperous economy not only made Pretoria an interesting partner for politically similarly-minded African governments. This also appealed to the groups and movements in Africa feeling alienated or suppressed in their home country and who required external military and financial assistance to bring about their desired political change. In many cases, tactics employed to elicit Pretoria’s support included the proclamation of their own anticomunist stance and a promise that their control over a future government would ensure a more favourable position towards South Africa.

The DFA files record such attempts in relation to three countries, namely Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria, and suggest that the Department of Foreign Affairs did not accede to any of these requests. This raises two questions we cannot answer due to the unavailability of military documentation. For one, it is not known whether additional approaches were addressed to the military, rather than to the foreign affairs ministry. Second, and contingent on this, it is uncertain why the requests that will be presently outlined, fell into the domain of the foreign service officials. Either the groups considered this to be the relevant channel, or the military handed them over due to a lack of interest. Although leaving many aspects open, the following paragraphs provide an important insight into the attitude of the foreign service corps through the 1980s, which stood in stark contrast to that of the military. Following a lose chronological order, we now examine the case studies of Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria.

**Uganda**

Idi Amin came to power through a military coup against Milton Obote, Uganda’s President from 1962 to 1971. Amin then ruled the country with an iron fist and a reign of terror. However, the military intervention of October 1978 into neighbouring Tanzania over a territorial dispute strongly weakened Amin’s position and eventually led to his fleeing the country when Tanzanian troops, assisted by exile Ugandans, invaded Uganda in early 1979. In this context, the Committee on Uganda wrote to P.W. Botha, requesting “concrete support – militarily and
“Your Excellency, we strongly urge your Government, by assisting us with the military raid, to demonstrate that your nation is still united in its determination to meet its responsibilities and halt the spread of Communist dictatorship and Castroism by every means”.

No further communication on the matter is contained in the files, but requests from other Ugandan movements continued even after Amin was toppled in April 1979. The most significant was that of Yusufu Lule in July 1982, who met Brand Fourie in Washington. Crucially, Lule briefly held political power in Uganda from April to June 1979, then succeeded by Godfrey Binaisa. His discussion with Fourie revolved around his need to obtain assistance in returning to power. It is not recorded how Lule had established this contact, but it is relevant that Martin Aliker, who had been to South Africa in April 1978 through the services of both Ned Munger and the South Africa Foundation (Chapter 4), was his confidant and adviser during his short presidency. Aliker possibly facilitated Lule’s contact with Pretoria’s foreign affairs ministry on this occasion. Regarding its decision on this matter, a later document cited below suggests that no assistance was provided. In a very similar case, during early 1985, Binaisa, Uganda’s President from June 1979 to December 1980, requested the necessary material and military assistance from Minister Plenipotentiary Rusty Evans at the London Embassy to overthrow his successor, Milton Obote. In return for this, he promised to establish a South African trade mission and to grant SAA landing rights in Kampala once he was in power. Binaisa again approached the same embassy, for the same purpose, in March 1987. Whereas there is no conclusive answer as to the outcome of these requests, by July 1984, Director Babb had already noted that support for either Binaisa or Lule could not be considered worthwhile:

The opposition to President Obote is divided into multifarious groups (...) most of whom have approached the RSA for help at one stage or another. (...) NI [=NIS] is unenthusiastic about helping them except in as much as we keep contact on a long-term basis. It is difficult to see any one successor to Obote emerging and the two likeliest candidates Lule and Binaisa failed miserably when they held the reins of power, and to choose any one would be a futile exercise.

Importantly, Babb seems to have contacted the National Intelligence Service, indicating that there was a degree of co-operation with the foreign service officers, at least with some of them. As we will see later, Babb’s name often surfaces in such situations, pursuing an asser-

---

67 ‘Relations with the RSA’, 25 August 1987, p.8 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 4).
tive foreign policy style and not hesitating to cross the border of diplomatic rules and dealing with issues that were previously the sovereign territory of the military and national intelligence. His last statement in the above citation is an indication of this, deviating from the foreign service official’s usual stance not to even consider any such involvement due to their policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Fellow official Paul Runge described us Babb as an “absolute fireball”, an “extremely enthusiastic person”, the “major driving force for the Africa effort” and “the key Africa man in [the Department of] Foreign Affairs”.

Regarding Babb’s dealings with the NIS and the military, Runge further commented: “he was very collaborative, but if you think he was the bridge into the military from the Foreign Affairs side, that could be, but he was the bridge for everything. Wherever there was action, he would talk to whoever to achieve the objective. He had a lot of relations with national intelligence”. Reflecting his relevance in terms of political importance and closeness to the military, Babb became Member of Parliament for the National Party in 1989. Crucially, he was so-called indirectly elected, meaning that the State President, then P.W. Botha, had chosen him, a privilege that was only accorded to one person in each of the then four provinces.

The last recorded case of Ugandan opposition movements requesting assistance from Pretoria deserves special mention, because John Kazzora from the Ugandan National Resistance Movement made several approaches over a number of years. According to a report from Under-Secretary Geldenhuys, he was a personal friend of former President Obote and a member of parliament during his presidency, and after 1971, “Mr Kazzora assisted in making plans to get rid of President Amin”. In 1984, Glenn Babb noted that Kazzora then went into exile in London, sought work as a lawyer and formed the above-mentioned movement. Other documents reveal that contact with Kazzora began in September 1978 through the London Embassy, by meeting Rae Killen and Brand Fourie on several occasions. This culminated in April 1979, when he came to South Africa for discussions with Pik Botha, Defence Minister Malan and Brand Fourie. During talks with the latter, he raised the possibility of obtaining 25

---

71 Information provided by courtesy from the Library of Parliament in Cape Town, January 2003.
72 'Mr J.W.R. Kallora', from Hennie Geldenhuys to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 23 April 1979, p.2 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. IPL).
74 DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1PL.
million British Pounds, some 44 million Rand, of which 40% was designated for military support.75 Again, no final statement is possible on whether assistance was provided, but the records reveal that Kazzora made a renewed approach to the London Embassy during 1985. On 14 July 1985, after his meeting with Kazzora, Rusty Evans contacted the DFA’s Director-General for guidelines, and Killen replied in diplomatic style:

After due consideration of many requests made to us by a wide spectrum of Ugandan opposition groups last year, and having regard to our attitude of non-intervention, it is felt that no encouragement should be given to Kazzora.76

However, the name of John Kazzora appears again in the DFA documents after 1986, him now being the Personal Adviser to Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s President from January 1986.77 Most notably, Kazzora came to South Africa from 24 to 29 August 1986 to hold discussions with Pik Botha, Jannie Geldenhuys, the Chief of the SADF, Andries Putter, the Chief of Staff: Intelligence, homeland leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Piet Koornhof, now Chairman of the President’s Council. According to a DFA report on this visit, “Mr Kazzora saw the purpose of his visit as establishing contact with the RSA, thus initiating a process of dialogue to facilitate the finding of solutions for South Africa’s internal problems in an African context”.78 The strong military presence indicates that they, and not the Department of Foreign Affairs, maintained the contact with Uganda. Their prime interest may have been motivated by advance knowledge about Ugandan plans to harbour training camps of the military wings of both the ANC and PAC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azania People’s Liberation Army (APLA) respectively. Such camps were, in fact, established in the later part of 1986, and according to a letter of January 1992 from then Director Justus de Goede to Director-General Neil van Heerden, some four hundred MK cadres had arrived in Uganda.79

Ghana

The files also record that opposition movements from Ghana turned to South Africa for assistance after Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings had ousted President Hilla Limann in December 1981, again suggesting that Pretoria did not comply with these requests. In the first instance, during 1982/83, the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana (CDG) contacted the South African Consul-General in Glasgow, Gideon Johannes Volschenk, on several occasions. The main

75 ‘Mr J.W.R. Kazzora’, from Hennie Geldenhuys to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 23 April 1979, p.3 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1PL).
76 Telex from Rae Killen to Rusty Evans, Pretoria, 22 July 1985 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1PL).
77 DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 4.
78 ‘Relations with the RSA’, 25 August 1986, p.5 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 4).
protagonist was Kofi Asiedu, who was the Director of the Britain-Africa Trade Organisation in Scotland. In October 1982, he introduced one of the CDG’s leaders to Volschenk, a certain F. Badjie, a “confidant of ex-President Hilla Limann”, as Volschenk reported to Director-General van Dalsen.80 Badjie complained that neither Great Britain nor the US were prepared to assist, that Israel was more positive, but “occupied elsewhere”, and that Ghana’s neighbours were sympathetic towards their cause. As a means of increasing the appeal of his request, Badjie declared that “he would rekindle contact [with Pretoria] which has apparently been made before Rawlings’ coup”, but Volschenk merely gave the standard reply “that it was South Africa’s policy not to interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs”, while promising to “report on our meeting to Pretoria”.81 Again, the files contain no further information, but according to a telex dated November 1982, Asiedu once again approached Volschenk for the ammunition needed for a planned coup.82 Following his dispatch to Pretoria, and unlike previous instances, the foreign affairs ministry informed national intelligence of the move, concluding with the request: “Your opinion as regards the activities of CDG and Mr K Asiedu would be appreciated”.83 There is no evidence of any follow-up, an impression substantiated by Volschenk’s report to Pretoria of 8 February 1983, disqualifying any renewed approach from Asiedu as his “usual request for assistance”.84

The next recorded instance of requests for military and financial support dates from October 1983, when the Free Democratic Congress and the Ghana Democratic Movement contacted the London Embassy, but Minister Plenipotentiary Evans informed Director-General van Dalsen that no such assistance was forthcoming: “It will be noted that the Embassy has endeavoured to discourage contact with these dissidents who have been clearly informed that they should not expect assistance or support from the RSA”.85 Finally, in February 1984, Kwasi Oppong-Addai, claiming to represent one hundred and fifty exiled Ghanains based in Togo, appealed to the London Embassy “for material and financial assistance” to overthrow Rawlings. However, as in the past, Rusty Evans reported to Pretoria, that “in view of our policy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state, no action has been taken”.86 Two months later, and verifying the notion that Oppong-Addai’s request was not acceded to, he again came to the embassy and this time tried to gain the Minister Plenipoten-

82 Telex from Gideon Volschenk, Glasgow, 11 November 1982 (DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7).
83 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7.
84 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7.
tiary’s support by proposing the launch of a magazine in Ghana to promote contact with South Africa, but Evans gauged that “the journal project would have little chance of success in Ghana”, then leaving it at that.

Nigeria

In a relatively similar situation, two Nigerians, Enuma Mahmud-Okereke and Jaja Anucha Wachukwu, approached Pretoria for armaments to topple the Lagos government, while offering to promote contact with South Africa. According to the files, Mahmud-Okereke was a journalist and owner of several businesses in Nigeria, while Wachukwu had been engaged in the country’s politics as UN Ambassador (1960-61), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1961-65) and Aviation (1965-66). They visited South Africa on 23 April 1980, meeting with DFA officials, while their letter to P.W. Botha of 30 April suggests that they also had contact with the military. This correspondence summarises their motivation in establishing contact with Pretoria, namely to obtain military assistance for a coup against President Alhaji Shehu Shagari, proposing Okereke as the new president and Wachukwu his foreign minister. In return, they offered to launch the pro-Pretoria magazine Moment and to publish a similarly focused book with Pretoria’s financial support. They again came to South Africa from 2 to 14 August 1980, this time proposing the establishment of a “liaison office” in London, in return for which they requested 1.23 million British Pounds, 2.23 million Rand at the time, for the publication of Moment and an unspecified amount for Wachukwu’s presidential campaign in the forthcoming 1983 presidential elections. To substantiate their sincerity and the claim of holding a stance favourable towards Pretoria, they circulated a copy of an interview given by Wachukwu to the Nigerian magazine The New Nation in August 1980, part of which read: “if I were the President of this country, I would persuade the rest of the rest of independent African States to let us recognise South Africa, open embassies in South Africa”. The Department of Foreign Affairs took a cautious stance, however, as a report from Killen reveals: “The justification of financial support at this stage is not very strong. (...) In order not to alienate the two Nigerians, however, we could show continued interest by endorsing their “normalisation campaign” by way of a message or indicating our willingness to receive a fact-finding

87 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7.
88 DFA, 1/129/3, Vois. 1PL, 7.
89 DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 7.
90 Letter from Enuma Mahmud-Okereke to Pieter Willem Botha, 30 April 1980 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 7).
mission at a suitable time”. The only substantial result of this contact was the DFA’s financial contribution of 320,000 Rand to Mahmud-Okereke’s publication *OAU: Time to Admit South Africa*, published in 1983. To ensure a wide dissemination and a second edition of this book, which appeared in 1986, the DFA provided an additional 200,000 Rand in 1985.

Having examined the relatively unproductive contact, at least from Pretoria’s point of view, with three African states beyond the region, the following sections analyse three aspects central to the military’s considerations. Following the order indicated earlier, we begin with the strategic concerns over the western Indian Ocean.

**Western Indian Ocean**

The previous chapter explored the geo-strategic importance of the western Indian Ocean during the closure of the Suez Canal (1967-75), and especially after the oil crisis in late 1973, finding that this area remained of great significance even after the reopening of the Suez Canal, as newly built tankers were no longer in a position to take this route. Control in the entire Indian Ocean gained in importance after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, raising Western fears over continued access to the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf. As a result, the “United States then adopted several measures designed to enhance its military presence in the Indian Ocean area and to enable it to react swiftly and flexibly should rapid deployment of added forces to the area become necessary”, and Washington concluded agreements with Oman, Kenya, Somalia and Egypt. The superpower competition further gained in intensity when Ronald Reagan became US President in 1981, because he interpreted every local conflict in terms of the East-West rivalry. In this context, he considered South Africa as an ally against communism in southern Africa, as we have already noted. Pretoria’s military also showed an interest in the western Indian Ocean for strategic reasons and its involvement meant indirect support for the Western presence there, thus strengthening South Africa’s relations with the West, particularly with the United States. The subsequent accounts detail the military’s endeavours to establish footholds on the Comoros, on Madagascar and on the Sey-

96 DFA, 1/129/3, Vols. 3PL, 12. A consultation of relevant library catalogues revealed that the book is, for example, available in the Library of Congress (Washington) and the British Library (London).
Chelles, while Mauritius and Reunion are notable absentees. The previous chapter noted that the location of these two islands to the east of Madagascar made them comparatively less important in strategic terms. Regarding Reunion, we have also seen that South Africa's presence on this island during the 1970s was hampered by the French, preventing an intrusion into their territory. Given the increasingly strained bilateral relations between France and South Africa during Mitterrand’s premiership, we propose that Paris was even less prepared to accept the idea of Pretoria establishing a link to Reunion. This assumption will be verified by an event related to the Comoros in 1986. What follows is a presentation of the available evidence on Pretoria’s approach towards the Comoros, Madagascar and the Seychelles.

**Comoros**

Links between the military and French mercenary Bob Denard possibly date from the Nigerian Civil War, as suggested in Chapter 4, when both parties supported Biafra. Substantial cooperation between South Africa’s military and Denard revealed by the DFA files, however, can only be traced on the Comoros from 1979 and forms the subject of this case study on Pretoria’s ambitions in the western Indian Ocean under P.W. Botha.

The previous chapter revealed that Pretoria had provided some technical assistance to the Comoros in the first half of the 1970s. We also suggested, although not explicitly recorded in the DFA files, that the military may have held an interest due to the island’s geo-strategic position. The activities of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military on the Comoros after 1975 were determined by Bob Denard. In the first instance, when he overthrew the government of Ahmed Abdallah in 1975, technical assistance came to an end. Thereafter, President Ali Soilih ruined the island’s economy, causing Denard to intervene again in May 1978 and reinstate Ahmed Abdallah as the head of state. However, in effect, Denard’s Presidential Guard ruled the island for the next ten years and it could be considered as his personal fiefdom, Denard using in this instance his alias Saïd Moustapha M’hadjou. Given their presumed earlier contact and the new situation on the Comoros, the military grabbed the opportunity to establish a presence on the island with Denard’s help. There have been suggestions in the secondary literature that the Comoros served them as a listening post to monitor shipping movements through the Mozambique Channel and to track ANC activities in Mozambique and Tanzania, as well as a springboard from which to support RENAMO in Mozambique.98 In addition, there have been allegations that the Comoros Islands were used “as a

---

transshipment centre for South African arms, bartered for Iraqi crude”. These assumptions can only partly be substantiated, given the unavailability of archival documents from Military Intelligence and Defence, and because access to the relevant DFA files was limited to November 1980. What follows is a presentation of the available archival evidence, supplemented by Denard’s autobiographies and secondary literature.

In view of the new political arrangements on the Comoros, Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg noted in April 1979 that the advantages of renewed contact were “numerous”, the island, for example, becoming “an important stopover for SAA and a tourist haven for South Africans”, as Rae Killen had already proposed in September 1978. According to a report from von Hirschberg after a mission to the Comoros in December 1979, the military was greatly interested in the archipelago for strategic reasons: “The Comores [sic] are strategically situated at the northern entrance to the Mozambique channel [sic] and are thus ideally located for surveillance operations. Defence are keenly interested and have established a presence on the main island for which they have been prepared to pay a substantial fee in the form of uniforms for the Presidential guard [sic] and, for the present, a portion of the latter’s salaries”. As a result of these assessments, both actors subsequently aimed at establishing a foothold on the island, with the military clearly taking the lead and the foreign affairs ministry joining in the attempt. Thus, the South African group to have the first recorded meeting with Denard on the Comoros on 29 October 1979 was composed of three Military Intelligence officials, Colonel Martin Knotze, a Miss Williams and a Mr. Barbour, while the DFA was only represented with von Hirschberg. Since the military and the diplomatic activities on the island were separate, we first have a look at the former, with little primary information available.

Based on Denard’s memoirs, Colonel Knotze acted as the DMI contact to the Comoros and was, for example, present at a meeting between Deputy Director-General Killen and De-
nard on the island on 1 September 1980, when the latter proposed a petroleum products-against-crude oil exchange between the Comoros and South Africa. In addition, Killen noted: “Mr Denard said that in the event of sanctions against South Africa, [the] Comoros would be willing to help out by supplying goods that might be in short supply”. While the petroleum products would very probably have come from South Africa’s oil-from-coal plants, Sasol I and Sasol II (Chapter 4), the Comoros did not have any oil fields and the crude oil evidently had to come from elsewhere. Regarding the oil deal, Pretoria’s relevant government agency showed some interest, as Glenn Babb reported back to Killen:

The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs says it has no objection to the arrangement and will grant permits to oil companies exporting the petroleum products to the Comoros. It is up to the Comoros and Mr Denard to arrange for the exchange via a registered South African oil company.

Even though no other documents were available on this matter, this suggests that the Comoros may well have been used as a trans-shipment centre for oil, while the DFA files contain no indication of weapon deals. Above all, the military had entered a mutually beneficial agreement with Denard, the latter allowing them to establish a “presence on the main island”, in return for which they paid “a substantial fee in the form of uniforms for the Presidential guard [sic] and, for the present, a portion of the latter’s salaries”, according to von Hirschberg’s above-cited report. This is confirmed by Denard, who reveals that Pretoria’s financial assistance to the Presidential Guard for 1985 and 1987 was 4.5 and 6 million Rand respectively. In fact, the purpose of the Presidential Guard, which can also be referred to as Denard’s private army, was to safeguard President Abdallah, as von Hirschberg described vividly after the visit to the Comoros in December 1979: “They are capable of keeping Abdallah in power in all circumstances other than a foreign backed coup attempt”. The great significance of this and other military involvement on the Comoros, and once again emphasising their leading role there, may be deduced from President Abdallah’s visit to South Africa in April 1983, and his meeting with P.W. Botha, with whom he also signed a secret Memorandum of Under-

---

108 ‘Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979’, from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 1 May 1980, p.3 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4).
standing, as indicated by Denard. Upon our recent enquiry with the Department of Foreign Affairs on the contents of this memorandum, they were not prepared to comment, however, or even to acknowledge its existence. In addition to Abdallah’s visit, Defence Minister Malan went to the Comoros on 4/5 December 1986. In the light of the strained bilateral French-South African relations at the time – the French Ambassador had returned to South Africa only six months previously after an absence of eleven months due to Pretoria’s imposition of the partial state of emergency – Paris condemned this ministerial visit. It is possible that France had not overtly criticised the South African presence on the Comoros until then, because this did not hamper their use of Mayotte, while it may have feared that Malan’s publicised visit would impact negatively on the relations with its other former colonies. In any event, the military’s activities on the Comoros, the little available evidence of which has now been presented, appear to have been to their satisfaction, whereas this did not apply to the same extent to the foreign service officials, whose endeavours we now examine.

As has been mentioned above, they were interested in the Comoros as a stopover for South African Airways en route to the Far East and as a tourist destination. During his discussion with Denard on 29 October 1979, von Hirschberg queried what they could offer in return, to which Denard replied “cattle breeding, agriculture, fishing and tourism”. In order to assess the situation, von Hirschberg led a mission to the Comoros from 4 to 7 December 1979, joined by Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, Director of the Animal and Dairy Science Research Institute; Julian Thomas, the former Agricultural Attaché at the Paris Embassy, who worked on the OGAPROV agricultural project in Gabon in the early 1970s and now was with the DFA’s Agricultural Technical Services; Southern Sun Director Peter John Venison; and an unspecified representative from the Department of Industries, Division of Sea Fisheries. Finding the socio-economic situation on the Comoros deplorable, and due to southern Africa constituting the focus of South Africa’s involvement, von Hirschberg concluded that the cost for technical assistance with any meaningful result was outside of Pretoria’s capacity. Regarding tourism as a possibility in promoting contact between the two countries, he stated that the “absence of suitable beaches on the islands has also ruled the Comores [sic] out as a tourist

---

attraction”, suggesting that a development/investment project in this sector was not commercially justified. In consequence, all that remained was von Hirschberg’s recommendation of a “small Ogaprov project”, with costs for the first three years estimated at 350,000, 250,000 and 100,000 Rand. This seemed a worthwhile investment for Pretoria, because Abdallah had heard of the OGAPROV project in Gabon and was “keen to develop the cattle industry to reduce their dependency on imported meat if not entirely to eliminate imports”.

It appears that Abdallah knew of the OGAPROV project through Bob Denard. According to journalist Péan’s account, Gabon’s President Bongo had “lent” the French mercenary to Abdallah so that he could come to power. In return, Affretair, the air cargo carrier in which Bongo held a vested interest (Chapter 4), was allowed to use the Comoros as a stopover for deliveries to and from the Seychelles.

As no other primary sources are available on the agricultural project on the Comoros, the remaining information is derived from Denard’s memoirs. According to them, for reasons that are not mentioned, the Sangani “pilot farm” appears only to have been launched in 1983, comprising six hundred hectares and being administered by the Presidential Guard, with actual costs to Pretoria of 200, 400 and 600 thousand Rand in 1984, 1985 and 1987 respectively. Equally based on Denard’s account, in the mid-1980s, Sol Kerzner’s firm World Leisure Group Limited nevertheless became involved in the establishment of the Galawa Hotel and the renovation of the Itsandra Hotel, with Denard himself selling private land to World Leisure Group Limited and mediating the negotiations. The amount involved was some 50 million Rand, with the Industrial Development Corporation providing, and Credit Guarantee insuring, the credit. While the reasons for Kerzner’s undertakings at this stage are not recorded, this reflected his current expansion strategy due to limited possibilities in South and southern Africa (Chapter 2), an argument supported by the parallel developments on Mauritius. Incorporated in February 1983, and with Sol Kerzner as its Director, Sun Resorts Limited expanded on that island and took over the management of an existing casino resort and a

116 ‘Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979’, from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, 1 May 1980, p.3 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4).
118 ‘Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979’, from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, 1 May 1980, p.4 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4).
tourist hotel. Although they had obtained landing rights on the island already in 1975, and linked to this development, South African Airways began to fly South African tourists to the Comoros from July 1983 (Chapter 4). In order to make these flights economically viable, they were an extension of the service to Blantyre. In addition, and given the substantial Muslim population on the Comoros, the planes then flew members of this religious group to Jeddah, the place of pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. Returning to Sun Resorts Limited, by 1984, it had negotiated with the Mauritius government over a fourth hotel and in the following years increased the number of managed holiday resorts to five. In this context, political scientist Bowman suggests that Kerzner held a passport of Mauritius from 1986 and that he was related to “murky operations of certain local businesses”, a proposal which seems credible in the light of Kerzner’s activities in South Africa itself, as indicated in Chapter 2. Given Kerzner’s legal activities to ban his biography from being published, no attempt was made to obtain his view on that.

On the Comoros, and in contrast to World Leisure Group Limited and the military, the Department of Foreign Affairs became increasingly sceptical towards Abdallah. For instance, in November 1982, the island was granted the right to open a Trade Mission with diplomatic status in Pretoria, without a reciprocal privilege being accorded to the South Africans. Furthermore, on the occasion of the OAU’s 40th Anniversary Meeting in 1985, Abdallah strongly attacked the Pretoria government. In consequence, and apparently also due to deteriorating relations with Denard, the Department of Foreign Affairs steadily withdrew from the Sangani farm project. According to Denard, Glenn Babb argued that “this must simply be considered as the logical consequence of the general feeling that prevails, i.e. that the time has passed of giving and aiding and to only receive slaps in return”. Thus, judging from the listing of DFA files pertaining to the project, South Africa’s involvement ceased in July 1989. The final straw causing Pretoria to withdraw from the island, was Abdallah’s assassination in November 1989, when the foreign service corps, now favoured by President de Klerk, had the upper hand, and these developments are examined in the following chapter.

124 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003.
129 The files in DFA, 1/203/4/2 undoubtedly contain the relevant documents.
Even though sparingly documented, the above account of Pretoria’s involvement on the Comoros during the 1980s confirms the military’s strategic interest in this western Indian Ocean island and that they took the lead, with the Department of Foreign Affairs following. A similar situation prevailed in relation to Madagascar, where the even less substantial archival evidence is presented as follows.

**Madagascar**

The South African activities on Madagascar that began during the Outward Movement in the second half of the 1960s were abruptly halted in June 1972, when the Marxist Ratsiraka came to power through a military coup. The intelligence interest subsequently displayed by the Bureau for State Security (Chapter 4) persisted with the military. Thus, in mid-June 1979, the Chief of Staff: Intelligence, Pieter van der Westhuizen, assessed the situation in Madagascar as follows:

> At present Madagascar does not pose a military threat to the RSA. When, however, one considers the increasing activity of the USSR, Cuba and other East European countries on the island, as well as the fact that Madagascar is attempting to extend her influence to the remaining Indian Ocean islands, the long term threat to the RSA and the Western world is intensifying progressively. (...) It is recommended that the RSA should make a final attempt to win the goodwill of the Ratsiraka Government by rendering economic assistance. Only after such an attempt has failed, should the RSA consider supporting the resistance movements, preferable on the condition that two or more of the movements form a coalition. This coalition must then prepare a detailed plan of how they intend to overthrow the Government, the means they have at their disposal, as well as their requirements as far as the RSA is concerned.  

There is no indication that the military undertook any such activities, however, in all likelihood because Madagascar was the only western Indian Ocean island that “maintained armed forces of any size”. It is possible that such considerations influenced the military’s involvement in an attempted coup on the Seychelles in 1981, the details of which are now examined.

**Seychelles Coup**

The previous chapter examined the Bureau for State Security’s ambition of bringing pro-Western James Mancham to power on this geo-strategically important island by launching Operation Playboy to support him in the run-up to the country’s independence elections of June 1976. Mancham won these elections and chose Albert René as his Prime Minister, but only a year later, René ousted Mancham with the help from both Tanzania and China. Even

---

130 Letter from Pieter van der Westhuizen, 14 June 1979 (DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 1PL).
though Pretoria lost this ally in the western Indian Ocean at the time, there was renewed interest from the military during the P.W. Botha era, and this is examined in the following account.

Similar to the situation described in the previous section, detailing the approach of opposition movements to Pretoria with requests for assistance in coming to power, the files reveal several attempts by Seychelles groups in exile after 1979 to obtain support in overthrowing President René. In January 1979, such a request was made through the Paris Embassy by "a movement of Seychellois in exile", but adhering to the diplomatic code of conduct, a later DFA report states "that under no circumstances could we become involved in the internal affairs of another country". In April 1979, a representative of the Seychelles Government in Exile, Albert G. D’Offey, approached the Department of National Security. He had worked for the Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Mancham’s Presidency and emigrated to Durban in South Africa after René’s coup in June 1977. However, the national intelligence agency, according to the same DFA report, “was not interested in following up the contact”.

In mid-November 1979, President René accused South African and French mercenaries of having fomented protests on the Seychelles in an attempt to overthrow him, reacting with the imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew. The available documents provide no indication that Pretoria pursued such attempts at the time, but it is possible that René was aware of the attempts from exile groups to obtain foreign assistance for a plot and that he knew about the plans of a parallel visit of Bob Denard and Carl von Hirschberg to Mahé towards the end of November, as revealed in a DFA telex. Prior to this visit, the DMI’s Brigadier Daan Hamman and Colonel Martin Knotzé had organised a meeting with Denard in South Africa. In view of René’s coup allegations against Pretoria, the foreign service officers tried to avoid further embarrassment and the telex to von Hirschberg reads: “You will appreciate that visit of Denard to S.A. next week plus his presence and yours the following week in Mahe [sic] could be used negatively if it became known. Suggestion is not that visits be cancelled but that they be handled with extreme discretion. In the meantime it is suggested that you may

consider it advisable to issue calm denial of René’s allegations". 136 It is not recorded whether the respective meetings finally took place, but there is no indication to the contrary. In any case, while the above-mentioned telex reveals that von Hirschberg’s planned meeting with Denard was related to the DFA’s interest on the Comoros, subsequent developments suggest that Hamman’s and Knotze’s involvement formed the basis for the attempted Seychelles coup on 25 November 1981.

Before proceeding to these developments, and given the DMI’s contact with Denard, it is necessary to examine why the coup plan was not executed by the French mercenary, but by Mike Hoare, whom we met in Chapter 3, in the context of Pretoria’s military activities in the Congo in the first half of the 1960s. Significantly, whereas Denard had continued with mercenary activity from the 1960s through the 1970s, Hoare appears to have remained inactive after his Congo engagement, working as an accountant in the Far East, sailing in the Mediterranean and thereafter settling in Durban. 137 In addition, by 1981 he had reached the advanced age of sixty-two. 138 Having interviewed Denard in the early 1990s, Samantha Weinberg suggests that one of Hoare’s motives may have been simple competition with his French counterpart: “One of the aspects that must have rankled most bitterly, was that his despised rival, Colonel Bob Denard, was still sitting happy and wealthy on the nearby, larger, more populous Comoros”. 139 Another noteworthy factor was that the Durban area had become home to many former Rhodesian soldiers, several of whom had fought alongside Hoare in the Congo in the early 1960s and nine of whom accompanied him to the Seychelles. The most famous of these was Jeremiah ‘Jerry’ Puren. 140 It is therefore possible that informal contact existed between the Seychelles exile movement and Hoare, and that this prompted him to action. The ensuing paragraphs outline the events surrounding Hoare’s attempted coup, with particular attention being paid to the question of Pretoria’s role therein. In addition to the secondary material, the main source used here are the testimonies heard at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on this matter.

On 25 November 1981, Hoare and forty-two of his men boarded a Royal Swazi aircraft at Manzini, Swaziland’s international airport, under the guise of tourists. On their arrival at Mahe International Airport, a customs officer discovered the weapons in their luggage and

---

137 Hoare. 1989. The Road to Kalamata, back cover.
this led to a brief gun-battle during which one of Hoare’s men was killed and another one defected. Realising that the coup had failed, Hoare and most of his men hijacked an Air India plane that had landed during a scheduled stopover on a flight from Harare to Bombay. President René, who had meanwhile been advised of developments, gave permission for the plane to take off for South Africa.\footnote{See Hoare, Mike. 1986. The Seychelles Affair. New York: Bantam Press: 59-91; Rogers. 2000. Someone Else’s War, pp.155-173. <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/seychelles.html>, contains the submission of the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa to the TRC in November 1997, listing the names of all men involved.}


This validates Pik Botha’s claim that neither national nor military intelligence informed the Department of Foreign Affairs to the full extent of their involvement from the outset, referring to the Seychelles coup as one example of their “must know principle” whereby “certain matters were so delicate, sensitive, and risky, that the number of people who ought to know about it must be limited”.\footnote{Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999.}

Importantly, the secondary sources also indicate that national intelligence initiated the Seychelles coup plans, but that these were taken over by Military Intelligence sometime during 1979 after some infighting between the two units. This serves as another example to illustrate that the period from the end of van den Bergh’s BOSS in 1978 to P.W. Botha’s appointment of Niël Barnard as the NIS Director-General in June 1980, saw disputes over respective areas of responsibility between national and military intelligence. Thereafter, however, and reflecting the co-operation between NIS and the military, as suggested in Chapter 2, Dolincheck remained liaison officer for the NIS, while Brigadier Hamman and Colonel Knotzé were in charge of the DMI operation and organised the provision of necessary armaments to Hoare and his men.\footnote{TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.163; Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, pp.22f., 26, 125. Also Ellis. 1996. Africa and International Corruption, pp.172f. <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/seychelles.html>, referring to the Rand Daily Mail and The Guardian, both 24 May 1982.}

The TRC’s report states that “there is \textit{prima facie} evidence of high-level state involvement in this operation”, but it could not come to a final conclusion whether “this operation was undertaken on the instructions of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the heads of the relevant intelligence agencies”. It continues that this “cannot, however, absolve them of representative responsibility for the fact that senior National and Military Intelligence officers and senior officers of the SADF were involved”.\footnote{TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.161.} Furthermore, the TRC report cites the findings of the
UN Commission of Inquiry into the Seychelles coup, established on 15 December 1981,\textsuperscript{146} which argued that “if responsible ministers were not at least aware of what was going on, this indicates both a remarkable lack of control by the South African government over its own agencies and a lack of awareness that is hard to reconcile with the tight and effective control exercised by the security authorities in South Africa”.\textsuperscript{147}

Prime Minister Botha tried to minimise the damage for Pretoria; on 29 July 1982, he claimed before Parliament that “neither the South African government, the Cabinet, nor the State Security Council were aware of the coup”.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, the plans of the Progressive Federal Party to establish a parliamentary commission of enquiry were blocked, P.W. Botha prevented any further investigation by invoking national security legislation and Hoare was only reluctantly put on trial after international pressure.\textsuperscript{149} Finally, during the court case, Hoare and the men that had returned to South Africa immediately after the coup attempt were not permitted to give evidence, as Defence Minister Malan invoked a security law barring them from providing “evidence on matters concerning their involvement in SADF operations prior to 24 November 1981”.\textsuperscript{150} Hoare was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for hijacking, defined as the unlawful interference in the smooth operation of civil aviation in terms of the Civil Aviation Offences Act (No 10 of 1972).\textsuperscript{151} The application of this law is an indication that Hoare either did not have the South African nationality and/or was not a member of the SADF or its Reserve, because only then was the Defence Act of 1957 valid, as it specifically dealt with mercenary activity (Chapter 3). However, Hoare did not serve the full sentence and was released on 6 May 1985, as part of an amnesty declared by State President Botha.\textsuperscript{152} Of the more than forty other men put to trial, only nine were convicted and given a minimum sentence of five years, but they were all released conditionally after six months.\textsuperscript{153} The six men who had remained behind after the coup plot, among them agent Dolincheck, were arrested and sentenced; four of them received the death penalty, but Pretoria paid a ransom of 3 million US Dollars and the six prisoners could return to South Africa on 23 July 1983.\textsuperscript{154} This

---

\textsuperscript{146} Security Council Resolutions 496 (15 December 1981) and 507 (28 May 1982).
\textsuperscript{151} Botha, C.B. 1993. Soldiers of Fortune or Whores of War?, p.86.
\textsuperscript{152} Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, pp.190-195.
evidence indicates that Pretoria did not really have to be concerned with international reaction, especially given the backing from Washington which considered the Seychelles of strategic importance, as “the site of a US Air Force installation, officially described as a satellite tracking station” since 1963, as former CIA agent William Blum informs us.\(^{155}\) In fact, on 10 May 1982, *The New York Times* suggested that Hoare had met an official from the US Central Intelligence Agency prior to the coup to inform him of the plans.\(^{156}\) Both Washington and London had voted for the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry into the Seychelles coup, but the report it produced did not propose any specific action against Pretoria, and it is reasonable to assume that such proposals would have been vetoed by them.\(^{157}\) Thus, it was sufficient for Pretoria to show initial severity toward the perpetrators to appease the situation. As Hoare put it: “It had become obvious to me in the few weeks since the operation that the government was obliged to have us tried in the full glare of world publicity and that they would be at pains to show that South African courts were part of an independent judicial system free from any governmental interference”.\(^{158}\) Once the situation had abated, the sentences of Hoare and his fellow perpetrators were ameliorated.

Despite the coup’s failure and the outcry from the international community that the Seychelles coup of 1981 is the last recorded instance of South African military engagement in the western Indian Ocean during P.W. Botha’s era, which, as has been stated above, took place against the background of intensified Cold War developments in this region. This proactive involvement, relatively far from South Africa’s borders, shows their preoccupation, shared by Washington, that the communist threat came not only from Angola and Mozambique, but also from this direction. In addition to these strategic considerations, a cen-


\(^{157}\) Security Council Resolutions 496 (15 December 1981) and 507 (28 May 1982).


tral theme in the military’s undertakings in Africa beyond the region, presented in the next two sections, was a keen interest in selling surplus arms. In contrast to the earlier account of opposition movements approaching Pretoria for such support, what follows is an examination of similar interaction, but taking place on a government-to-government level with both Somalia and Sudan after 1984.

Armament Sales

Armscor had been created in 1968 to counter the impact of the 1963 UN voluntary arms embargo, while its role as an armament producer was discussed in connection with Safair deliveries to South Africa, via Libreville, prior to the Angolan war (Chapter 4). Due to Pretoria’s growing involvement in regional wars after 1975 and in view of the 1977 UN mandatory arms embargo, Armscor gained in importance as the provider of the necessary weaponry to the military. The need to develop ever more advanced weapons, in fact, not only rendered the UN weapons embargoes obsolete, but made Armscor “South Africa one of the world’s largest producers of armaments, and led to the development of some of the world’s finest weapons and military equipment”.

Thus, during the early 1980s, when faced with “economic problems due to rising production costs, excess capacities, and a drop in domestic demand”, Armscor initiated arms exports to mitigate these problems. This also impacted on Pretoria’s foreign relations with African countries beyond the region. This section examines the interaction with both Somalia and Sudan after 1984, where armament sales constituted the essence of contact. Given the military’s leading role in this contact, the documents in the DFA files did not always provide conclusive information on the outcome of certain activities. These gaps could be bridged through correspondence with Glenn Babb, Director in the Africa Division at the time and key figure among the foreign service corps in the present context.

Somalia

We initially provide the background necessary to understanding South Africa’s endeavours in Somalia post-1984. The DFA files do not record any relevant interaction between the two countries from Somalia’s independence in July 1960 until the late 1970s, possibly because South Africa was engaged elsewhere on the continent. Furthermore, the Marxist orientation of Somalia’s President from October 1969, Siad Barre, was incompatible with Pretoria’s anti-

---

163 DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 1.
communist stance, posing an obstacle in the way of contact. In a situation similar to that in Angola during the mid-1970s, Somalia became a Cold War zone when Barre began to side with Moscow, offering the Soviets the port of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden, important for surveying oil tanker and other ship movements to and from the Suez Canal, in return for military equipment and training. With this support, Barre invaded the Ogaden region, which forms the border with Ethiopia, in mid-1977. However, in the second half of that year, Moscow switched its support from Somalia to Ethiopia. Consequently, Barre lost the war that had crippled the country’s economy, a situation exacerbated by the drought and famine of the 1970s. Consequently, he severed all ties with Moscow and expelled the Soviets from Berbera. In his search for new military and financial assistance, Barre found support from the United States after 1980/81, benefiting from Reagan’s obsession with communism, mentioned earlier in this chapter and as confirmed by the then US Ambassador to Somalia: “As much as anywhere else on the continent, in the Horn of Africa U.S. policy is heavily influenced by East-West considerations”.

Within this new policy framework, Barre also approached South Africa and this developing relationship is now outlined. In view of the Cuban and Soviet presence in neighbouring Ethiopia and South Yemen, Mogadishu considered Pretoria as a potential partner because of its own war against the communist forces in Angola since the mid-1970s. In fact, after a visit to Somalia in February 1984, Glenn Babb reported: “They see in us a colleague fighting the same battle and need our expertise and material, but more importantly our support”. Furthermore, during the stay of another South African delegation in Somalia in May of that year, the Somali Defence Minister declared that the “RSA and Somalia have the same aggressors”.

An important person in establishing contact between the two countries was Hassan Wehelie, a Somali citizen and businessman, whom Babb referred to as the “trusted go-between” in correspondence with us. His role as the Pretoria-Mogadishu middleman from the late 1970s was based on the directorship of two Johannesburg-based trade and finance companies, and documents dated 1984 reveal that he applied for permanent residence in South Africa.
helie’s initial contact with Pretoria was with Military Intelligence; Colonel Martin Knotzé asked Rae Killen to meet Wehelie. At a recorded meeting, held in Knotzé’s presence on 14 February 1980, Wehelie explained that the Somali government was particularly interested in obtaining arms from South Africa, an initiative which was endorsed by Knotzé who “indicated that DMI were anxious to visit Somalia to see what could be done in the way of assistance”.169 According to Killen’s report of September 1980, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs was cautious regarding “too close a contact with Somalia as they probably would want large financial support and the sale of arms to that country could jeopardise our relations with Kenya because of the troubled border situation between Kenya and Somalia”.170 Possibly due to this concern, a later document reveals that, in 1981, “the State Security Council decided that Somalia was not a priority, but that the possibility for contact should be explored at a later point”.171 Wehelie again sought contact with Pretoria in mid-1982, by which time the border conflict between Kenya and Somalia had been resolved, and met Glenn Babb in August 1982. Based on Babb’s report, the foreign affairs ministry now showed a keen interest in interaction with Somalia in order to obtain overflying rights for South African Airways and to establish “political collaboration (eg [sic] the exchange of intelligence) (...) of mutual benefit to both parties particularly in view of the heightened activity of the Soviet Union”.172 However, as will be presently shown, the military’s interest in selling arms to Somalia became the dominant aspect of contact, with the Department of Foreign Affairs’ ambitions being comparatively peripheral.

According to our correspondence with Glenn Babb, his meeting with Wehelie in August 1982 triggered “several visits, meetings with Barre and the Vice-President”,173 leading to President Barre’s invitation, in January 1984, to both Pik and P.W. Botha to visit Somalia. While the latter’s response is not contained in the files, Pik Botha acknowledged the invitation in February, but stating that he could not come “at this stage” due to “pressing obligations at home and long-standing arrangements abroad”,174 possibly referring to the negotiations with Mozambique over the Nkomati Accord. At the same time, he proposed sending an official delegation to Somalia, and this took place from 11 to 15 February 1984. Reflecting

170 ‘Contacts with Somalia’, from Rae Killen to Pik Botha, 4 September 1980 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 2).
174 Draft letter from Pik Botha to Siad Barre, February 1984 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3).
Pretoria's varied interests in Somalia, the members of the delegation were Glenn Babb, Brigadier Hamman, Mike Kühn from NIS, and SAA Chief Director for Flight Operations from 1979 to 1986, Jacobus Gustavus 'Gus' Schoeman; Wehelie acted as the go-between. Talks were held with President Barre, Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samatar, who was First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, the head of the Somali intelligence agency, the Minister of Finance, the Deputy Minister of Water and Mineral Resources, as well as the Minister of the Criminal Investigation Department. We will see that the sale of armaments to Somalia constituted the key theme in the discussions, once again supporting the argument that Pretoria's activities in Africa beyond the region during the 1980s were guided primarily by military interests. Related to this was the initiative of the National Intelligence Service that maintained close links with the military at the time. In particular, during the talks of NIS agent Kühn with his Somali counterpart they "agreed to a meeting between a South African representative and their [=Mogadishu's] man in Rome to establish a permanent liaison system". As we will see below, the ambition of SAA to obtain overflying and/or landing rights became linked to that of the military, while the following issue stood in the shadow of these arrangements.

Reference is made to the interest expressed by the Somali Deputy Minister of Water and Mineral Resources in joint economic ventures, with a particular focus on mineral resources. Probably in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position to achieve the main goal of overflying rights, Director Babb, in Wehelie's presence, held separate meetings with representatives from the mining companies Gold Fields (South Africa) and Anglo American on 24 April 1984, to gauge their level of interest. Babb expressed a keen interest in their cooperation, while also clarifying to the Anglo American representatives that Pretoria "could do not much more than create a favourable climate within which the private sector could operate but would welcome inputs from the private sector". Interest from Gold Fields (South Africa) was limited, as the London branch was responsible for any initiative in that part of Africa. The discussion with Theodore Ludwig Pretorius and Stefan Adolf Waldemar Lands-

---

177 'Verhoudingen met Somalíë', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.2 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3).
178 <http://www.goldfields.co.za>.
180 'Meeting with Gold Fields, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 25 April 1984 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 4).
berg, the Anglo American Deputy Technical Director (Mining) and their Metal Studies Consultant respectively, proved to be more fruitful. After being informed of the investment conditions and the nature of the minerals, Pretorius concluded that "he would take the matter up with his Board", although he did "not know what the outcome would be and said some members of the Board, because of experiences in Zaire and Zambia, were fundamentally opposed to ventures in Africa", as Babb reported to Rae Killen.\(^{181}\) While the Zaire reference was to the SMTF project, examined in Chapter 4, which Anglo American abandoned in 1984 due to huge losses,\(^{182}\) the Konkola Copper Mine project in Zambia posed geological problems according to information we obtained from Stefan Landsberg,\(^{183}\) and this project was eventually halted in January 2002. Given these two unprofitable investments, Landsberg and the multinational's Executive Director, Michael Spicer, stated independently from each other that Anglo American never became involved in Somalia.\(^{184}\)

Let us now return to Pretoria's main interest in contact with Mogadishu, namely armament deliveries. After the mission to Somalia in February 1984, Babb noted: "Military collaboration is the most important facet of our future relations".\(^{185}\) In this context, a report from Deputy Director-General Killen to his superiors, Director-General van Dalsen and Pik Botha, reveals that by December 1983, the State Security Council had approved 250,000 Rand for humanitarian aid and 300,000 Rand for the supply of light weapons and ammunition to Somalia.\(^{186}\) It is a reasonable assumption that the SSC presented these grants as a gesture of goodwill, hoping to establish a foothold in this arms market, the importance of which is evidenced by the fact that discussion on Somalia reached this important decision-making organ. It is rather likely that Armscor was the driving force, as we have seen that the arms producer faced economic difficulties at the time and sought export markets for its surplus arms. In fact, Killen's above-mentioned report suggests that Armscor's keen interest in Somalia was motivated by the hope of reaching markets in the Middle East.\(^{187}\) In the subsequent developments, now

\(^{181}\) 'Meeting with Anglo-American: Somalia', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 24 April 1984, p.3 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 4).
\(^{184}\) Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999; telephone interview with Stefan Landsberg, 4 December 2002.
\(^{186}\) 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.3 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3).
\(^{187}\) 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.5 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3).
outlined, the military included the foreign service officers in its attempt to obtain a beneficial package deal from Mogadishu.

The discussions began during the visit of a Somali delegation to South Africa from 17 to 19 May 1984, comprising the First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Samatar, the Deputy Minister of Minerals and Water Resources, Somalia’s Ambassador to Mozambique, Yusuf Hassan Ibrahim, and the heads of both the Somali armed forces and national intelligence. The South African counterparts were Defence Minister Malan, the Chief of Staff: Intelligence, Pieter van der Westhuizen, Brigadier Hamman, the DFA’s Deputy Minister, Louis Nel, Glenn Babb, the SAA Chief Executive, Gert van der Veer, and the NIS officials van der Merwe and Kemp; Wehelie was again the go-between. The presence of Louis Nel is astonishing, as the DFA Deputy Minister, a post established in August 1982, generally did not play a role in negotiations, but concerned “himself largely with liaison between Government and the media”. Queried about Nel’s present and subsequent role, Babb explained to us in correspondence: “the Africa policy was almost entirely driven by officials with politicians being the stalking horses for the objectives of expanding relations and having a figure to place in the meetings and carry things to Cabinet. Nel’s tenure as Deputy Minister was always on a knife-edge and his political decisions were more dictated by his own precarious position that by a genuine interest in the Africa venture”.

On the second day of their visit, the Somali military representatives spent the entire day at Armscor, where they were shown a range of weapons and dealt with officials from Nimrod, a division created in 1982 to promote arms exports. After the inspection, Samatar held talks with both Defence Minister Malan and DFA Deputy Minister Nel to find common ground on the previously mentioned package deal. Malan’s offer included a 10 million Rand loan to Somalia for their purchase of South African weapons at the following conditions: a soft loan of 2.4 million Rand, repayable over ten years, for the Somalis to finance a required 23% deposit, plus a normal loan for the remaining sum at an interest rate of 10.5%, to be repaid over five years. This offer had been negotiated prior to the Somali visit between Armscor, the SADF, the Treasury and Credit Guarantee, again underlining the military’s leading role. South African Airways promised an additional 10 million Rand if Somalia granted the airline overflying rights. However, as such rights for Somalia alone were worthless without similar

---

189 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.
agreement from both Sudan and Egypt, Samatar was requested to use its influence in helping to secure them. Nel reassured him that SAA would not fly to Israel on that route “if that created difficulties” due to the Arab hostility towards that country due to Tel Aviv’s Middle East policy. In return, the Somalis offered a base for the stationing of a DMI officer, with the proviso that only civilian dress could be worn, and they extended the offer to the Department of Foreign Affairs and the NIS. In addition, Samatar promised that President Barre would make use of his close friendship with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak to secure overflying rights for SAA.¹⁹²

Yet, the Barre government was not satisfied with the outcome of the discussions and requested softer loan conditions. While South Africa’s military subsequently juggled the figures to ensure a successful conclusion to the deal, again showing the high importance they attributed to it, Deputy Minister Nel also gave the arrangement strong support. The South Africans made a number of further visits to Somalia in their quest for a resolution to the dilemma. In June 1984, Nel presented a new offer with a soft loan of 3 million Rand, providing for the deposit, at 5% interest and repayable over ten years, a 500,000 Rand grant from the SADF and the remaining loan of 6.5 million Rand at 6% interest, to be repaid over twelve years.¹⁹³ This was followed by another visit on 4/5 July, with Glenn Babb, Hamman from DMI, a SAA representative and Wehelie participating. Nel was supposed to be part of the group, but did not join eventually, possibly in reflection of his relatively low genuine interest in African matters, as suggested by Babb above. The mission’s offer stood firm regarding the grant from the SADF, while the soft loan with 5% interest was now only repayable over fifteen years and the 6.5 million Rand loan had to be repaid over eight years, but at an interest rate of 10.25%. In addition, SAA offered to provide a 10 million Rand loan at 6% interest, in return for Somali overflying rights and the undertaking to secure the same permission from both Egypt and Sudan. The new proposal again did not meet the Somali expectations and Samatar expressed disappointment both at the amount of the credit and the repayment facilities. While Babb replied that he deplored Somalia’s rejection of the package deal, he noted that Pretoria did not view this as an “offence” and that bilateral relations would nevertheless continue.¹⁹⁴ Yet, subsequent developments and the evidence presented below on interaction with Sudan suggest


¹⁹⁴ ‘Verslag van besoek aan Somalië, 4-5 juli 1984’, from Glenn Babb, 10 July 1984, pp.2f., 6 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 4) (translation from Afrikaans).
that the deal was never struck, because the Somalis demanded more than they could offer for Pretoria to bid higher.

On 11 July 1984, motivated quite probably by a keen personal interest in promoting closer relations between the two countries, businessman and go-between Wehelie again approached Babb. He emphasised the importance of the deal for both sides, highlighting the Somali overflying rights and indicating that he would make an attempt to obtain the same from both Egypt and Sudan. He further claimed that Barre would use his influence to promote the South African case in Africa and the Arab world, probably trying to lure Pretoria with the prospect of obtaining oil from there. Wehelie’s case appears to have gained the hearing from the foreign service officials; Deputy Minister Nel met Rae Killen and Glenn Babb on 23 August, arguing that the DFA should offer the 3 million Rand loan at no interest, declaring that it would save SAA some 40 million Rand for jet fuel per annum. However, Killen replied that SAA’s savings would only amount to 10 million Rand, as overflying rights for Sudan were estimated at 30 million Rand. The last record in the files suggests that SAA nevertheless considered participation with a more substantial offer so as not to endanger the entire package deal, particularly Armscor’s keen interest in armament sales, but that it still needed time to make calculations. Possibly with the intention to convey the new offer, Louis Nel planned on travelling to Somalia again in early September, but this trip was cancelled. In a telephone conversation with Glenn Babb, the Deputy Minister argued “that his decision had been caused by political developments over which he had no control and were not related to SAA’s request for more time”, to which Babb warned “that this would put us in a very bad light in the Somali Government’s eyes”. In any case, the package deal never materialised. Chief Executive van der Veer recently revealed to us that SAA never gained overflying rights for Somalia and Armscor did not make any armament deliveries to Somalia. With hindsight, Glenn Babb argued that Barre “turned out to be more rapacious than we had imagined. Somalia would never have been in a position to be a client of ARMSCOR – it was almost a bankrupt state. (...) The armoured cars offered were of the contemporary use of the SADF. Repayment for all this might have come out of the overflight rights had we ever got to that point”. 

198 Telephone interview with Gert van der Veer, 7 December 2002.
199 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.
Sudan

After the examination of Pretoria’s contact with Somalia, mainly promoted by the military and centring around Armscor armament sales, the following paragraphs document that the relationship with Sudan was closely linked to this. In a similar pattern to the interaction with Somalia, middleman and maverick Francis Arthur Nzeribe established and maintained the Pretoria-Khartoum liaison. Nigerian of origin, Nzeribe had been Biafra’s ambassador during the Nigerian Civil War and subsequently made his “wealth from oil, arms trade, banking, and insurance business”, as indicated in a DFA report. By 1985, he owned the London-based firm Fanz Organisation Nigeria Ltd., with offices in Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and a budget of 58 million British Pounds. In the political arena, he served as a member of Nigeria’s Senate from 1979 to 1983. His name first appears in the DFA files in November 1980, when Nzeribe proposed to the South African Ambassador in London, Stefanus Jacobus Marais Steyn, that his country finance an oil refinery in Benin in return for which it would receive 60% of the refined products, but the Department of Foreign Affairs did not approve this scheme. It was only after 1984 that Nzeribe played a substantial role as the middleman between South Africa and Sudan, introduced to the foreign service officers by Jimmy Kruger, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons from 1974 to 1979. In correspondence, Glenn Babb, who again played an important role subsequently, provided the background to these developments: “Nzeribe took almost all the initiatives – he got in contact with Jimmy Kruger himself, latching on to the latter’s unforgivable “Biko’s death leaves me cold” imagining (perhaps correctly) that despite his political career’s limbo he would still have influence with the boys in the Cabinet – and so it turned out to be: Kruger approached [Pik] Botha, only too pleased to be in the loop again, and convinced [Pik] Botha that we should receive him as he had important recommendations to make about Africa”. Apart from his own financial interests, Nzeribe’s appearance as the middleman probably owes his role to the severe drought in Sudan and the flaring up of conflict between the ethnically and politically opposed movements from north and south Sudan. In particular, as we will see, Colonel Gaafar al-Nimieri, Sudan’s President since 1969, showed some interest in drought relief, but was

203 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.
keenly interested in obtaining South African arms, quite likely necessary to oppose the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south of the country. In this context, Nzeribe offered his services, as he "claimed to have good relations in the Sudan and undertook to try and improve relations between the two countries," as a later DFA report states.

According to the files, the foreign service officers did not show an interest in Nzeribe at the time, maybe feeling that his assistance was not required in achieving their main goal, namely SAA overflying rights for the Sudan. In particular, as has been shown above, almost parallel negotiations were conducted with Somalia to the same end. This left only Egypt outstanding in the quest for a comprehensive air corridor necessary to shorten the distance to Europe, and according to middleman Wehelie, President Barre intended using his influence in both Sudan and Egypt to bring about SAA overflying rights there. In July 1984, the SAA's Chief Executive, van der Veer, wrote to the Director General of Sudan’s Department of Civil Aviation to obtain landing rights, supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs’ simultaneous offer of relief aid to Khartoum. However, these activities do not seem to have borne any fruit and only gained in momentum in late 1984, when Nzeribe and the military entered the scene. Nzeribe came to the Republic from 29 November to 6 December 1984, holding talks with Pik Botha, Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Daniel Wynand Steyn and Defence Minister Magnus Malan. In the discussions with Pik Botha, Nzeribe asked for financial assistance to run a publishing house in Nigeria, whose magazines would promote a pro-Pretoria stance. To Steyn, Nzeribe offered oil supply from his refinery in Saudi Arabia and to facilitate contact with Sudan. During the talks with Malan, he stated that he was in a position to act as a salesman for South African weapons, taking as a commission the difference in price he would buy and sell them for respectively.

After these initial meetings, Pretoria displayed serious interest in the possibility of Nzeribe establishing contact with Khartoum. Regarding the idea of a publishing house in Nigeria, and according to our correspondence with Glenn Babb, Pik Botha was "impressed" by Nzeribe's "swashbuckling style" and opted for this proposal. Babb further indicated that "money was to be put at his [Nzeribe's] disposal under the control of the DFA", but that the go-between "ran away with the funds" at a later stage, when he, himself had already been posted to Can-

---

204 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.17 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8).
206 DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 1PL.
208 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.
Thus, Babb's successor as the Director of the Africa Division, Johan Marx, reported in October 1985 that the possibility of a publishing house in Nigeria had been abandoned.\footnote{Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.} In contrast, according to a report from Director Babb of 1 February 1985, the State Security Council had declared SAA's ambitions in Sudan a top priority: "Sudan is of active strategic interest for South Africa. The SSC has decided that all possibilities must be investigated to establish a way for SAA through Africa and the Government was even prepared to offer Somalia a considerable amount to convince Sudan to accord SAA overflying rights".\footnote{Report from Johan Marx, 30 October 1985 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 12).} Even though not recorded in this document, but judging from later developments, it seems likely that the SSC considered armament sales at least as important, trying to link the two as in the Somali case. Probably related to the SSC decision and invited by the military, as the list of contacted people suggests, Nzeribe went to South Africa from 2 to 8 February 1985, again holding separate talks with Ministers Malan, Steyn and Pik Botha, the latter in Babb's presence. While expressing caution over arms deliveries that were not on a government-to-government basis, as this entailed the risk of its own weapons being used against South Africa itself, Malan made it clear that "ARMSCOR (...) is looking to get rid of redundant stock", which was in line with their current business strategy. Nzeribe mentioned having a list of ten African countries interested in purchasing from South Africa's surplus arms production and allayed Malan's fears by stating that he would "only sell to countries miles from RSA borders".\footnote{Toenadering tot Soedan: Hoofman Nzeribe’, from Glenn Babb, 1 January 1985, p.2 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 4).} During the rest of his stay, Nzeribe made direct contact with Armscor and they compiled a list of arms ready for sale.\footnote{Visit of Chief F.A. Nzeribe of Nigeria from 2 February 1985 to 8 February 1985, 12 February 1985, pp.2f. (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 2PL).} In discussing the oil issue, Minister Steyn displayed little interest due to previously negative experiences with middlemen. In contrast, the talks with Minister Botha on SAA overflying rights and relief aid were productive;\footnote{Chief Nzeribe’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 12 February 1985 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 4).} in early February 1985, the DFA provided 350,000 Rand to combat the drought and to promote the airline's cause.\footnote{Visit of Chief F.A. Nzeribe of Nigeria from 2 February 1985 to 8 February 1985, 12 February 1985, pp.3ff. (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 2PL).} However, after a meeting with President Nimeiri on 2 March 1985, Nzeribe reported to the Minister Pleni potentiary Evans at the London Embassy, that the President was "not
overly impressed” by the amount of drought aid received from South Africa. This is not surprising, because Khartoum was primarily interested in acquiring South African weaponry, as further emanates from Nzeribe’s report back to Evans. In addition, Evans reported to Pretoria that Nzeribe had “suggested that as a further indication of serious intent on our part, one aircraft of equipment be donated in the near future”, suggesting, as a “practical proposition”, that Armscor might assist in restoring a defunct ammunition factory in Sudan.

Babb was then in contact with Colonel Johan H. Pretorius from Military Intelligence, “who indicated that there is a strong possibility that the SADF could manage to provide a load of outdated stock and would be interested in (1) the operation of a flight through Africa to Khartoum and (2) a meeting with their brother officers in Sudan”, as he later reported to Killen and Magnus Malan. However, Pretoria’s efforts in obtaining SAA overflying rights through armament deliveries and relief aid came to naught when Nimeiri was toppled on 6 April 1985. In a subsequent interview with Babb, Nzeribe argued that he “did not feel that the coup had ended our chances of ameliorating relations with that country”, but the documents do not reveal any further interaction until the early 1990s.

This takes us to the end of the aspect of the military’s ambition to sell Armscor’s surplus armament production. As mentioned in the case of Somalia, Armscor was hoping to use these Muslim countries as stepping-stones to find markets in the Middle East with their significantly greater absorbing capacity, and it is obvious that the sale of weapons would have generated some income to finance Pretoria’s wars in southern Africa. Yet, as so often was the case, the political fragility of African politics thwarted Pretoria’s plans for interaction with Sudan. In contrast, the deal with Somalia failed because Barre probably judged South Africa’s international isolation to be such that Pretoria would be prepared to go at any length to break it. An additional problem was the role of middlemen in these activities, as the interaction did not take place between two actors, but three. Importantly, these go-betweens obviously pursued their own financial interests, trying to benefit from a Pretoria that they perceived to be in dire straits, and this factor rendered contact somewhat unreliable. A different situation prevailed in the following and final account of military activity in Africa beyond the region. In

---

this instance, co-operation took place with President Bongo of Gabon, with whom Pretoria had maintained a long-standing friendship dating from the Nigerian Civil War.

**Co-operation with Gabon**

Pretoria’s close link with Gabon was primarily rooted in military co-operation, for instance with the Safair landing arrangements in Libreville prior to the Angolan war, strengthened by the Department of Foreign Affairs’ provision of technical assistance, with the OGAPROV agricultural project being of key importance in this regard (Chapter 4). Given Bongo’s importance both to the military and the foreign affairs ministry, the latter holding a keen interest in overflying rights for SAA, they assisted him on at least four occasions in the period from 1980 to 1986, by providing military assistance to Chad (1980-81 and 1982-83), as requested by Bongo, by constructing a military installation in Gabon itself (1983-85) and with an involvement in Equatorial Guinea after 1986. These examples are now examined in turn.

**Chad, 1980-81**

Before outlining Pretoria’s military engagement in Chad at Bongo’s request, it is important to briefly provide information on the complex framework within which this took place so as to comprehend the scope of its activity. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the SADF had tried to establish a foothold in Chad during the mid-1960s. This became difficult due to the political instability in Chad throughout the 1970s, caused by the tensions between the north and south. We also mentioned that the northern-based and Libya-supported Frolinat launched military attacks against President Tombalbaye after 1966. In 1972, Libya annexed the mineral-rich Aouzou Strip, the border area between Chad and Libya. Three years later, Tombalbaye was assassinated in a military coup d’etat, masterminded by General Felix Malloum. The new government was paralysed by a split within the Frolinat rebel ranks, namely between Goukouni Oueddei, who continued to co-operate with Tripoli, and Hissène Habré, who opposed Libya’s role in Chad. In an attempt to strengthen the government, President Malloum appointed Habré as Prime Minister, but a power struggle erupted between them soon afterwards. As a result, in March 1979, Habré-loyal Frolinat forces overthrew Malloum and this led to turmoil. At around the same time, Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué formed his own government in southern Chad, adding to the country’s political crisis. By August 1979, African mediation brought about a transitional government of national unity, presided over by Oueddei, and with Habré and Kamougué as members. However, fighting between the two archenemies resumed, with Oueddei, supported by Libya, forcing Habré out of N’Djamena in
March 1980.\footnote{Ngansop, Guy Jérémie, Philippe Decraine. 1986. Tchad, vingt ans de crise. Paris: L’Harmattan.} It was in the aftermath of this situation that President Bongo approached the South Africans for assistance.

Judging from Péan’s work, Bongo was supportive of Kamougoué’s move in southern Chad to flex his muscles against Paris, due to disagreement over François Mitterrand’s policy towards Gabon.\footnote{Péan. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.137f, 262; Sery. 1986. Le grand retour des barbouzes, pp.23ff.} In particular the initiatives of the French President curtailed the effectiveness of Bongo’s influential network, for example evidenced in the “brutal sacking”\footnote{Faligot and Krop. 1985. Lapiscine, p.231 (translation from French).} of Maurice Robert, the French Ambassador to Gabon, in 1981; Robert had been Bongo’s confident from the Nigerian Civil War (Chapter 4). Based on a report of November 1980 from Deputy Director-General Killen, Bongo’s adviser, a certain Colonel Jules, who worked for the French intelligence agency SDECE,\footnote{Péan. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.115.} had come to South Africa in late October to discuss Pretoria’s assistance to Kamougoué.\footnote{‘Proposed help to Colonel Kamougué via President Bongo’, from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 28 November 1980 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. IPL).} According to the same report, Colonel Jules met Minister Pik Botha, but evidence presented below suggests that he also talked to Military Intelligence. It seems that Jan Boyazoglou from the Paris Embassy, who was in charge of the OGAPROV project, played a role in initiating Pik Botha’s meeting with Bongo’s adviser. Probably after separate discussions among the military and the foreign service officers, Boyazoglou and Brigadier Daan Hamman from Military Intelligence met on 24 November 1980, together with Brand Fourie and in the Director-General’s office.\footnote{‘Military aid to Col Wadal Abdul Kamouge : Chad separatist movement’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 24 November 1980, and other documents in DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL.} It appears that Pik Botha had given an assurance to Colonel Jules to make a contribution with “goods worth about R200 000” and to “send a team of experts to investigate the position on the ground”.\footnote{‘Proposed help to Colonel Kamougué via President Bongo’, from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 28 November 1980 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. IPL).} Judging from this and another document, these “goods” would have comprised “medical equipment”, such as proposed by Boyazoglou,\footnote{‘Col Kamougué : Chad’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981, p.1 (DFA, 1/184/3, IPL).} as well as military supplies, as Killen wrote: “It would therefore seem that we should obtain a special allocation for R200 000 which would then enable us to include the weapons and ammunition”. In addition, Pik Botha had spoken to Defence Minister Malan about it “and got his support for this offer”.\footnote{‘Col Kamougué : Chad’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981, p.1 (DFA, 1/184/3, IPL).} Yet, during the meeting of 24 November in Fourie’s office, it became clear that Military Intelligence, according to Brigadier Hamman,
"had no funds", causing Deputy Director Babb to note: "It therefore seems that we are to foot the bill".230 In piecing these fragments of information together, it appears that the Department of Foreign Affairs tried to impress Bongo by supplying Kamougué with medical supplies, in the belief that the military would be interested in sending arms and take over the delivery costs. While the primary sources do not record what exactly was delivered and by whom this was paid, Babb’s report from June 1981 notes that the material was supplied at the request of President Bongo: "The original decision to help Col Kamougué was taken in order to satisfy Pres. Bongo".231 Yet, towards mid-1981, Pretoria became increasingly sceptical towards Kamougué, when it became evident that he was striving towards the fully-fledged secession of southern Chad. Such a move would not have been acceptable either to the central government in N’Djamena or the OAU, which insisted on the territorial integrity of African states, as stated in Chapter 4. To further support Kamougué could therefore not be in the DFA’s interest and Babb recommended the cessation of support to Kamougué, arguing that to “become further emeshed in an intractable situation beyond the requirements of our relations with Gabon, would not bring any real benefit to us”.232 We could not establish what happened thereafter, because the relevant DFA files contain no further documents on the matter and Babb did not comment when queried about it.

Chad, 1982-83

In late 1982, the military took a decided stance and, following a request from Bongo, provided military assistance to Chad in early 1983. The political situation in Chad had changed, however, as Hissène Habré had ousted Goukouni Oueddei in June 1982, forcing him to withdraw to the north. Oueddei continued to receive Libyan support, while Kamougué fled the country. To avert a further deterioration of the situation, the OAU deployed a peacekeeping operation in early 1982.233 As a point of relevance pertaining to Pretoria’s subsequent assistance to Habré, it should be noted that the French mercenary Denard provided the help of seven officers who facilitated the Frolinat leader’s accession to power. The Department of

231 ‘Col Kamougué: Chad’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981 (DFA, 1/184/3, 1PL).
Foreign Affairs was aware of this, as two DFA reports mention it, making reference to Rémy Destrieux, Denard’s alias used in Chad.\textsuperscript{234} His role aside, Chad became a hot spot during the Cold War. In particular, with Reagan as US President, the Central Intelligence Agency began to support Habré during 1981 in his attempt to overthrow President Oueddei and to curb the influence of Moscow-supported Libya.\textsuperscript{235} Even though Mitterrand shared that concern, he pursued the approach of supporting the OAU peacekeepers and of detaching Oueddei from Libya.\textsuperscript{236} Concern over the increasing communist influence in Chad was one reason for Pretoria’s involvement in support of President Habré, as illustrated by a letter from Pik Botha to him in October 1982:

The threats to the progress of our continent come from the struggle for domination by a superpower, the problems of malnutrition, economic retrogression and disease. The South African government has often declared its commitment to the African continent where it has a vast role to play. South Africa and Chad themselves are facing common enemies and have mutual interests therefore to defend.\textsuperscript{237}

In addition, in their report from June 1982 to Glenn Babb, Director Wentzel and Deputy Director-General Killen list a range of other considerations motivating Pretoria to assist Habré. First, the “good relations” between Habré and President Bongo of Gabon; second, “the possibility of exchanging intelligence with Chad interests the SADF in view of its proximity to Libya”; third, the apparent discovery of oil in the north of Chad, “which is in the process of being exploited”, was appealing because the embargoes made it otherwise difficult to obtain; fourth, Habré’s “friendship with Sudan”, where Pretoria attempted to obtain overflying rights for SAA to form an air corridor together with Somalia and Egypt. Given these considerations, they recommended consultation “with the SADF on the possibility of sending a message to Chad to form a channel of communication and to find grounds for mutual understanding”, a role subsequently filled by the French mercenary Denard. As mentioned, he assisted Habré in assuming power during June 1982, probably at Bongo’s request; Denard, under the pseudonym of Gilbert Bourgeaud, had served as an adviser to Gabon’s President since 1971.\textsuperscript{238} In


\textsuperscript{236} Letter from Pik Botha to Hissène Habré, Pretoria, ca. October 1982 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL).


addition, and as seen earlier in this chapter, Pretoria’s military had acted in fruitful cooperation with Denard on the Comoros since 1979. Thus, in their report of June 1982, Wentzel and Killen note that Denard had “offered to take to Mr Habré a letter from us (...) in which we (...) express interest in future contact”.\textsuperscript{240} Subsequently, Military Intelligence took the initiative, because of their organisational means and their vested interest in the project that also received mention in the June 1982 brief. “According to Brig. Hamman, the SADF is examining the possibility of providing a small amount of aid since Chad will in all probability be purchasing hardware from us”.\textsuperscript{241} This was in obvious reference to Armscor’s interest of selling surplus weaponry production, as we have seen in the preceding section.

It appears that Denard took the communication to Habré, as he thereafter requested arms supplies from South Africa in December 1982.\textsuperscript{242} Given the military’s interest, Brigadier Hamman and Colonel Jurie Bosch, together with the requisite ammunition, flew to N’Djamena on 23/24 February 1983. During a stopover in Libreville, they discussed the mission with Bongo’s old and new security advisers, Colonel Jules and Colonel Philippe Cauvin respectively.\textsuperscript{243} This was an indication that Bongo, as in the case of Pretoria’s support for Kamougué during 1980/81, was a crucial factor in the military’s decision to support Habré. The documents do not provide details of the ammunition delivered, but, according to Denard, 15 tons were transported in a SADF aircraft.\textsuperscript{244} Military Intelligence had invited Glenn Babb to join the mission, as the plane also contained equipment to the OGAPROV project in Gabon, but he did not go for the following reason: “After consultation with Mr Killen, Col Bosch was informed that I would not be accompanying the flight. Col Bosch reiterated the invitation and expressed disappointment that our Department would not be represented”.\textsuperscript{245} This example demonstrates that the military went into areas that were not permitted to the foreign service corps, because of its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. At the same time, while Killen strictly adhered to this policy, Babb would have joined, had it been for him to decide, otherwise he would not even have discussed the matter with his superior.

\textsuperscript{240} ‘Chad: relations with Pres. Hissène Habré’, from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 September 1982 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL).

\textsuperscript{241} ‘Chad: relations with Pres. Hissène Habré’, from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 September 1982 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL).

\textsuperscript{242} DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1PL.

\textsuperscript{243} ‘Chad’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 25 February 1983 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 2PL). However, Glenn Babb informed us that “Jules & Cauvin were false names provided by the French Presidency’s Africa bureau”. Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.


\textsuperscript{245} ‘Chad’, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 25 February 1983 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 2PL).
We indicated above that Pretoria’s activity in support of Habré took place in the Cold War context and with the likely knowledge of Washington. This supplemented their shared interests in southern Africa under the umbrella of the Constructive Engagement policy. The role of France, however, is an important aspect we still need to consider. In stark contrast to the Nigerian Civil War, there was no co-operation between Paris and Pretoria, mirroring President Mitterrand’s increasingly hostile stance towards South Africa. Even though Pretoria was aware that Habré had French support, there is no evidence that activities were co-ordinated. Notably, the French intelligence only launched Operation Manta, supportive of Habré against Libya, in August 1983. This underlines the earlier argument that the US and France differed over the policy applicable to Chad, with South Africa now siding with its new ally.

**Project Canteen, Gabon**

Unaffected by all this was the military’s relationship with Gabon, as is evidenced by the third example of their assistance to Bongo. While the previous accounts were based on primary sources, the *Weekly Mail & Guardian* revealed this case study in March 1995. According to journalistic research, the military’s Project Canteen involved the construction of a “military base”. After an initial denial of the paper’s report, the Department of Defence admitted that the project “was undertaken jointly by Armscor and the SADF. The SADF (...) undertook the planning and construction of sleeping quarters, ablution blocks, a light workshop, a water tower and an aircraft hangar. The operation took six months and was completed in November 1985, with the total number of personnel involved numbering about one hundred, and financed by a loan of 2.3 million Rand that had been “facilitated by the Department of Foreign Affairs on a government-to-government loan basis”, as the paper stated.

We queried both Glenn Babb, Director of the Africa Division during 1984/85, and Paul Runge, the DFA’s Project Liaison Officer in Libreville during 1985/86, about what they knew of Operation Canteen, and a somewhat fuller picture of the setting within which this took place emerged. They both were not familiar with the military’s code-named project, but judging from their statements, Operation Canteen was linked to the Department of Foreign Af-

---


fairs’ OGAPROV project. In particular, it seems that the above-mentioned facilities served the military crews when delivering material necessary for the agricultural project or as a stop-over for deliveries elsewhere in the area.

**Equatorial Guinea**

Similar to the previous case study, the evidence now presented on the military’s activity in Equatorial Guinea after 1983 once more underlines their close contact with President Bongo of Gabon. It appears that his close relationship with the Equatorial Guinea’s President since 1979, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, motivated Bongo to seek renewed co-operation with Pretoria’s military, which, for its part, appears to have been interested in establishing a listening post in this part of Africa. Significantly, a similar situation had prevailed during the Nigerian Civil War, when Fernando Pó, a small island belonging to Equatorial Guinea, served as a staging post to fly weapons from Gabon into Biafra (Chapter 4).

The earliest trace of a military interest in Equatorial Guinea is recorded in a discussion between Deputy Director Babb and Colonel Bosch from Military Intelligence in June 1982. According to Babb’s report, Bosch “expressed extreme interest. He had had the intention of going there himself, since from a logistical point of view and also because of the SADF’s relations with Gabon, the SADF would like to establish a working relationship with that country”.

However, this ambition only seems to have been activated after Colonel Cauvin, Bongo’s Security Adviser, visited South Africa from 14 to 18 November 1983. In his report on the meeting with Cauvin, Rae Killen stated: “President Bongo has given special instructions to Col. Cauvin to approach the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information concerning Equatorial Guinea. Aid EG [Equatorial Guinea], which is one of the most impoverished countries on earth, is the subject on which Col. Cauvin has been instructed to intervene”. Bongo was “particularly anxious that we involve ourselves in EG”, both because of his friendship with President Obiang and the Fang population in Equatorial Guinea, with whom he was “attempting to form an alliance in view of the large Fang population in Gabon”, as well as because of his concern over the Soviet presence there and his wish, shared by Obiang, “to break away from their yoke”. Thus, almost identical to the request for the T6 planes in the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War (Chapter 4), Bongo appealed to Pretoria with reference to anti-communism and was again successful. Given the restricted access to the relevant

---

DFA files to February 1984, the last recorded contact with Equatorial Guinea is the visit of a South African five-man delegation from 12 to 15 December 1983. This mission, probably a follow-up of Cauvin’s visit to Pretoria in November, was led by Glenn Babb and consisted of government officials from the Agriculture and Fisheries departments, a representative from the state-owned petroleum company, Soekor, and a Mr. de Wet from the National Intelligence Service. While it is indicated that they met with President Obiang, the content of their discussions is not recorded in detail. However, the secondary literature reveals that South Africa became involved in a cattle-breeding project from 1986, and it is probable that the foundation for this engagement was laid in those days. Significantly, the agricultural project was situated on Bioko island, named Fernando Pó until 1979 and site of the capital Malabo.

According to information on the Internet, the project began with some two hundred cattle and forty sheep, and still existed in 1990, albeit independently and without South African participation. Interviewed in 1999, Neil van Heerden, Deputy Director-General when the project began, commented: “It was really a project that you could be excited about beyond description. (...) These were not just Mickey Mouse projects”. Yet, due to the island’s short distance of some two hundred kilometres to Nigeria, and especially the oil-rich south eastern region, the Bight of Biafra, both Nigerian authors and the ANC claimed that Pretoria’s presence on Bioko pursued military-strategic objectives, namely intelligence gathering aimed at destabilising Nigeria and gaining access to the country’s oil resources. From its side, Lagos saw this as a proof of Pretoria’s Destabilisation strategy applied to southern Africa. Although it consequently concluded a non-aggression pact with President Obiang in February 1987, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu, described the South African presence as a “threat” to Nigeria’s security after a visit to Equatorial Guinea in early May 1987.

256 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.
When queried about these allegations, Neil van Heerden countered that the “prime motivation” for the agricultural project had been “a political one”,\(^{259}\) a claim that can be backed by internal reports of March and September 1987 from the Nigeria files, providing no indication of military activity.\(^{260}\) In addition, a recent study by a Nigerian researcher suggests that the Nigerian press exaggerated the situation,\(^{261}\) serving as an indication that Lagos’s concern over South Africa’s presence on Bioko island may have been caused by domestic pressures. At the same time, given Pretoria’s secret military and intelligence activities in other African countries beyond the region, revealed in this study, and the above-mentioned interest displayed by both the NIS and the SADF, it would not be surprising if the project was used for intelligence gathering purposes. A pointer in this direction was the conclusion of a contract between the two countries in 1987 “for the construction of a satellite tracking station”, as reported in secondary sources.\(^{262}\) Based on the available evidence, a conclusive statement on Pretoria’s true intentions cannot be given, while it appears that Nigerian pressure on President Obiang resulted in South Africa’s withdrawal from Equatorial Guinea by mid-1988.\(^{263}\)

These case studies on Pretoria’s activities related to Gabon show that Bongo, probably apart from President Banda in Malawi, was Pretoria’s most constant partner in Africa beyond the region, the basis for which was laid in the late 1960s during the Nigerian Civil War. The military, in particular, seem to have been satisfied with their contact. On the other hand, Bongo maintained a relatively low-key diplomatic profile and was not keen on publicising contact with Pretoria. In consequence, the Department of Foreign Affairs did not achieve one of its principal aims, namely the establishment of official relations. As Glenn Babb described the situation in retrospect: “Bongo, being what he was, was only interested in using us as an instrument to help his pals in the region. (...) Military aid was important to Bongo who once had SADF helicopters used for an election”.\(^{264}\) In addition, SAA never obtained overflying rights from Chad either, thus preventing it from establishing an air corridor across Africa.\(^{265}\)

However, even the military’s short-term gains were tenuous and certainly did not serve to break South Africa’s international isolation. In fact, the military’s realist perceptions and their

---

\(^{259}\) Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.


\(^{264}\) Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003.

\(^{265}\) Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002.
use of force to resolve the country’s domestic and regional conflicts resulted in more town­ship violence and police repression. In addition, Pretoria was still embroiled in several military conflicts in southern Africa, all of which contributed to South Africa’s increasing pariah status. Two central issues still prevented Pretoria from joining the international community as a respected member, namely its illegal occupation of Namibia and the domestic apartheid policy. However, in the context of the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow after 1986, ending the Cold War in the second half of the 1980s, the two superpowers aimed at a resolution of the S.W.A./Namibia issue. These developments decisively impacted on Pretoria’s foreign relations with black Africa in the final phase of P.W. Botha’s statesmanship and this is examined in the final section to this chapter.

End of Cold War

At the outset to this chapter, we emphasised the importance of the Cold War for Pretoria’s military in conducting a realist approach, especially in the region, sustaining a war in Angola, supporting RENAMO in Mozambique and occasionally launching military attacks against other neighbouring states. As has been argued, their activities in the countries beyond the region also took place in the leeway of Western protection, particularly from the US administration in Washington. Yet, the increasing domestic and external pressure from the mid-1980s on both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher respectively, curtailed their ability to unreservedly support P.W. Botha. However, it was the waning Cold War that crucially impacted on South Africa, and particularly on Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa, and these developments are now explored.

In particular, there was a growing realisation by both Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, that superpower involvement in regional conflicts inhibited the improvement of bilateral relations between them, such as expressed in the Reykjavik Summit in Iceland on 11 October 1986. Crucially, in the context of his reform policy, Perestroika, Gorbachev stated that “the Soviet Union has no special interest in southern Africa”, and the

---


resolution of the conflicts in southern Africa was among the topics at the Washington Summit from 8 to 10 December 1987 between the two world leaders. An important stumbling block in this area was South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, which had become tied to the Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola through the Cuban Linkage that Washington had introduced during 1981. In the light of the new developments between the US and the Soviet Union, however, the deadlock situation began to improve. Washington, and particularly Chester Crocker, now became the mediator between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. With the gradual demise of the Cold War, the military's predominance in Pretoria's foreign policy making declined and the foreign service corps regained influence. As was shown, they had been the driving force in concluding non-aggression pacts and cease-fire agreements with Swaziland in 1982 and Angola and Mozambique in 1984, but the military subsequently undermined these accords with their realist policy approach. Given the new international political order, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs now took the lead in the Namibia negotiations and the country's eventual independence was primarily its achievement. Without going into the details, these talks took place during 1988, resulting in the Namibia Accords, signed by the three relevant parties at the UN Headquarters in New York on 22 December 1988. While Havana agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola, Pretoria committed itself to applying Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, shelved after the introduction of the Cuban Linkage, ending its presence in Namibia and allowing the United Nations to organise and monitor the country's independence elections. The date set for the transition process was 1 April 1989, the elections were held in November of the same year and the independence celebration took place on 21 March 1990.

This event significantly improved Pretoria's foreign relations with African countries beyond the region. With the Namibia Accords, Deon Geldenhuys aptly argues, South Africa had taken "a giant step towards removing a major source of conflict with the international com-
munity, black African states in particular". Neil van Heerden, DFA Director-General at the time and closely involved in the Namibia negotiations, referred to them as the “watershed event of the year”, which gave the “green signal” for further contact with Africa, among them the Congolese Republic. While access to the Congolese file was restricted to the end of 1979, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, reveals in his autobiography that the country’s President, Sassou Nguesso, took a pro-active role, arranging meetings between him and the leaders of Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zaire, all of whom, like Pretoria’s military, supported the pro-Western UNITA in Angola. Significantly, on 13 December 1988, the relevant parties concluded the Brazzaville Protocol in the Congolese capital, the breakthrough after ten rounds of bargaining that led to the signing of the Namibia Accords nine days later. Undoubtedly linked to these developments, P.W. Botha officially met with both President Mobutu in Zaire on 1 October 1988 and with President Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivory Coast two weeks later. In effect, the two African leaders were the military’s interlocutors from old times, dating back to the Angolan war and the Nigerian Civil War respectively. In addition to the presidential meetings, Pretoria had an Ambassador, Albert Warnich, stationed in the Ivorian capital from September 1988. Incidentally, in discussions with Neels Muller from the DFA archive, we discovered that Ambassador Hermann Hanekom headed the under-cover Liaison Office in Kinshasa from September 1989, concurrently being accredited to the Congolese Republic. In subsequent correspondence with us, Hanekom confirmed the impression that the soon-to-be concluded Namibia Accords removed an important stumbling block in Pretoria’s contact with Africa, and the aforementioned three countries in particular.

Parallel to the international developments that impacted on South Africa’s position in the region, bearing great significance for its standing on the continent, South Africa’s domestic situation had also changed considerably in the second half of the 1980s. Most notably, the

---

279 See Appendix A for his biography.
280 The Liaison Office became official during 1991, and it is then listed in the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: DFA) of September 1991.
banned African National Congress had risen to such a prominent position that Pretoria could no longer ignore it. In particular, during 1987, the ANC entered into an alliance with the country’s largest trade union, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of a wide range of groups from civil society. Building on this power base, in the course of the 1980s, the ANC had gained regional, continental and eventually international acceptance as South Africa’s leading liberation movement, thus winning against the rival PAC. Acknowledging this situation, a number of rapprochement meetings took place from 1985 to 1990 between representatives of South African big business, the Afrikaner intelligentsia and ANC representatives. Two highly significant events took place in Zambia (September 1985) and in Senegal (July 1987). Regarding the former, three top leaders of the Anglo American Corporation, Chairman Gavin Rellly and Directors Tony Bloom and Zach de Beer, joined by South Africa Foundation Director General Peter Sorour, met ANC President Tambo and other leading figures from the ANC and its other partner, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Frederik van Zyl Slabbert was the initiator of the other meeting at which ANC representatives held discussions with intellectuals from the Afrikaner community. Slabbert had resigned as the leader of the Progressive Federal Party and as the party’s Member of Parliament in February 1986, feeling that “I was wasting my time in Parliament”, as he put it in his memoirs and as we discussed in Chapter 2. He subsequently co-founded and directed the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa that organised the 1987 Dakar meeting. Regarding the choice of Senegal as hosting country, this was not connected to the links Colin Eglin had established during his party leadership (Chapter 4). Rather, Slabbert indicated in correspondence with us that his long-standing friend Breyten Breytenbach, the South African writer who was exiled in Paris from the 1960s, had established this link. In this context, we recall that Breytenbach was jailed upon his clandestine return to South Africa in 1975 and that this caused President Senghor to intervene with Prime Minister Vorster (Chapter 4). Of relevance in the present instance, Breytenbach was on the Board of France Libertés, the Paris-based Foundation established by Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the French President, in 1986 with an engagement for the

---

281 Correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, 24 January 2003.
protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{287} According to Slabbert, Danielle Mitterrand was close to the Senegalese President, Abdou Diouf, "and this is how we settled on Dakar. I only met [him] once we got there but [we] have since become good friends and he gave us diplomatic immunity for the Gorée Institute\textsuperscript{288} to promote Democracy, Development and Culture in Africa".\textsuperscript{289}

The above-mentioned encounters in Zambia and Dakar were a diplomatic coup for the ANC, as we have concluded elsewhere:

While the Anglo initiative helped to remove the business community’s suspicion that the ANC was an unreasonable and communist-dominated party, the Dakar meeting allayed fears that all the ANC was interested in was to ‘kill the Boer’. These two meetings were of crucial importance, as they reflected the status the ANC had achieved among important segments of South Africa’s white society. There can be little doubt that this contributed to Pretoria’s realisation that this liberation movement could no longer be ignored and wished away.\textsuperscript{290}

The domestic, regional and international changes that have now been outlined necessitated a change in South Africa’s political leadership. In particular, the end of the Cold War required other policies than the use of military force to resolve the country’s problems. In consequence, and his deteriorating health aside, P.W. Botha was no longer considered fit to rule the country. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, the Broederbond, the secretive Afrikaner organisation with significant influence on Pretoria’s policy decisions, appears to have acknowledged the need for change and it is likely that this was a factor in Frederik Willem de Klerk becoming the country’s new State President in September 1989. This change in leadership had considerable consequences for both South Africa’s domestic situation and external relations. The consequences for Pretoria’s foreign policy towards Africa, in particular, are examined in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{287} <http://www.france-libertes.fr/intro.htm>.

\textsuperscript{288} The idea for the creation of the Gorée Institute, named after an island off Dakar that was used during the slave trade, was first articulated by President Abdou Diouf during the 1987 Dakar meeting. It was eventually established in June 1992 and Tania Slabbert, daughter of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, was among the first staff members of the Gorée Institute. See <http://www.goreeinstitute.org>.

\textsuperscript{289} Correspondence with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, 10 February 2003.

\textsuperscript{290} Pfister, 2003. Gateway to International Victory, p.60.
CHAPTER SIX

New Diplomacy:
State President de Klerk, 1989-94

Preliminaries

After more than ten years, military domination in both South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy came to an end when President Frederik Willem de Klerk brought a very different political style to Pretoria and broke fundamentally with the apartheid ideology of his National Party. De Klerk’s ascendancy to the presidency became possible due to P.W. Botha’s deteriorating health situation and given the new international political context after the Cold War. In particular, after a stroke on 18 January 1989, P.W. Botha withdrew as the leader of the National Party. On 2 February, de Klerk became his successor after winning against Pik Botha, Constitutional Affairs Minister Chris Heunis and Finance Minister Barend du Plessis. However, reflecting divisions within the NP caucus over the country’s future political leadership, de Klerk defeated du Plessis in the third round with a narrow majority of 69 to 61 votes.1 While the positions of State President and NP leader had so far been held by the same person, P.W. Botha now abandoned this principle and fiercely opposed stepping down as the country’s executive. Thus, de Klerk first had to push through the notion of reuniting the posts again, a proposal that the NP Federal Council approved in March 1989. Yet, even now P.W. Botha was adamant in his position. As a result, it took another five months until de Klerk could be elected and sworn in as Acting State President on 15 August 1989, and it was only one month later that he was unanimously elected State President and eventually inaugurated on 20 September.2

Whereas P.W. Botha had relied on his military advisers in formulating foreign policy, de Klerk was guided principally by the advice from the foreign service corps, to be explained by his inexperience in foreign policy making on the one hand, and none of his ministerial portfo-

---

lios having dealt with security matters on the other. In the domestic arena, he presented himself as the reformer, symbolised by his announcement, in February 1990, to release Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. However, while the reasons for de Klerk’s moves are discussed in the ensuing section, he was not in a position to unilaterally impose the reforms on the majority. Rather, de Klerk had to acknowledge the position of the African National Congress as the leading and internationally recognised liberation movement, and it therefore became imperative for him to engage Mandela’s organisation in a process of negotiations.

These negotiations form the background to this chapter, but the main concern is to explain how this related to Pretoria’s foreign relations with black African states beyond the region. In trying to unravel the links between the two issues, we argue that the negotiations were a tactical power play between the two main political opponents, the ANC and the South African government. In this bargaining, each group wished to achieve a particular outcome that will be discussed in the subsequent section on the negotiations, with both parties trying to manage the balance of power to their own advantage. This was the key feature of the rivalry among the actors. In this context, the diplomatic support from African states became a vital element, an issue to which the secondary literature has given insufficient attention. This is especially true for the developments following the Boipatong massacre of 17/18 June 1992, which decisively changed the course of the negotiations, as we shall see. With this premise serving as the basis, the present chapter comprises four sections. It begins by exploring the starting point and goals of both sets of actors at the outset of the talks in early 1990, followed by an investigation into the key issues pertaining to the negotiations until mid-1992, the relevance of the African continental dimension therein and developments post-Boipatong.

**New Diplomacy**

In order to investigate the motivation prompting both the South African government and the ANC to enter into negotiations after 1990, the emphasis first falls on de Klerk’s position, because it was due to his efforts that they became a reality. Chapter 2 referred to de Klerk’s speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990, lifting the ban on the ANC and other opposition movements, as well as announcing Mandela’s forthcoming release. Attempting to explain his unexpected reforms, we argued that de Klerk was guided by pragmatism, ac-

---

knowing that apartheid as a state ideology could no longer be maintained. In addition, as seen in the previous chapter, with the demise of the Cold War during the second half of the 1980s, political pressure for change even came from the governments in both London and Washington. It is important to state at this point, however, that it was never de Klerk's intention to simply hand over white political power to the country's majority. As late as August 1991, he vehemently rejected a "winner-takes-all" model, based on "one man, one vote" elections, as "the worst possible" scenario for South Africa, as this would mean an overwhelming majority for the ANC, excluding the whites from any meaningful role in politics. While it was not de Klerk's ambition to retain apartheid, his negotiation strategy was to retain the political initiative in Pretoria's hands, enabling him to shape the post-apartheid order by wresting from the ANC as many concessions as possible for the white minority. This argument is supported by the following description of de Klerk's strategic principles, based on an analysis of his initiatives between 1990 and 1992:

It is to maintain the initiative so that Pretoria can force previously banned organisations to compromise on a whole range of issues that, in turn, will enable the government to realise its goal of entrenching a constitution that will guarantee the protection of minority or group rights. Not only will the winning of concessions from the opposition strengthen the hand of the government, it will also weaken the opposition who will then have the difficult task of selling such compromises to their constituencies.

De Klerk's strategy in the talks with the ANC also found expression in Pretoria's foreign policy. This had the dual aim of ending South Africa's international isolation and strengthening the minority government's domestic bargaining position. To achieve this end, as will be shown, he made overseas visits to explain the reform initiative so that sanctions would be lifted. In his ambition to end South Africa's isolation, de Klerk considered the amelioration of relations with Africa as a crucial element. In his autobiography, he states: "We also had to break out of our international isolation, and in particular improve our relations with our immediate neighbours in southern Africa and in the continent as a whole. (...) It was for this reason that my first visits as state president were to countries in Africa". Later, he argues that he had "enthusiastically supported" Vorster's Outward-Looking Policy of the 1970s: "Its main theme was that South Africa's future was inextricably linked to Africa and that South Africa's route to the international community ran through its neighbours to the north". In his early

---

6 De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek, p.156.
Africa endeavours, de Klerk benefited from the progress made by his predecessor, P.W. Botha, in establishing contact with both Zaire and the Ivory Coast (Chapter 5). Thus, while holding the position of Acting State President, de Klerk met President Mobutu in Zaire on 25 August 1989, discussing developments related to the situation in Angola.8 Subsequently, de Klerk’s first presidential visit abroad took him to the Ivory Coast on 1/2 December 1989. During the eight hour meeting with President Houphouët-Boigny, they discussed mutual relations, including technical assistance to develop the Ivorian gold mining industry, the reform initiatives in South Africa and the peace plan for Angola.9 A few months later, and in line with the kind of technical assistance provided during Vorster’s premiership, Pretoria helped in the establishment and management of the Abokouamekro Game Park near Yamassoukro, the Ivorian political capital from 1983, as requested by the Ivorian President.10 Shortly thereafter, in November 1990, Ambassador Colin Paterson replaced Albert Wamich as the Head of the South African Mission in Abidjan, and in September 1992 he inaugurated what now was an embassy.11 Given the ambassadorial presence in the Ivory Coast, no further presidential meetings took place. In fact, we shall see that de Klerk’s political priorities in Africa beyond the region were elsewhere and only one South African ministerial delegation visited the Ivory Coast until 1994.

In his foreign policy making towards Africa, de Klerk took the advice of the foreign service officials, which steadily re-emerged from their subordinate position during the P.W. Botha era, particularly due to the influence of Pik Botha and Neil van Heerden, as we will see below. An early illustration of their new standing was South Africa’s co-operation with the French mercenary Denard on the Comoros, which the military had begun in 1979. By July 1989, the foreign affairs ministry had halted its involvement in the Sangani farm project on the island, but the financial and military support for Denard’s Presidential Guard continued (Chapter 5). Then, on 26 November 1989, President Abdallah was assassinated under unresolved circumstances, even though Denard was a suspect. It served to bring to a head the rivalry between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military over whether or not to maintain a presence on the Comoros. The view of the former prevailed under de Klerk and, on 4 December, within days of this event, Pretoria announced that all assistance for the Presiden-

8 Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 1989, p.33713.
tional Guard would cease.\textsuperscript{12} A relevant development in international law may have strengthened the DFA’s argument to withdraw from the Comoros, namely the UN attempts aimed at outlawing mercenary activity. In December 1980, the General Assembly had established an Ad Hoc Committee to make specific proposals\textsuperscript{13} and its work now came to a close. In December 1989, the General Assembly adopted its draft for an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, South African support for any mercenary activity would have henceforth brought it into disrepute. However, once Paris and Pretoria had pressured Denard to withdraw from the island, and mirroring the close links that existed between him and Pretoria’s military, a Safair aircraft flew Denard and twenty-five members of his Presidential Guard to South Africa on 15 December 1989. Denard was granted temporary residence rights in the Republic until he left for France on 2 February 1993.\textsuperscript{15} The two hotels on the Comoros, managed by Sol Kerzner’s World Leisure Group Limited, also subject to the political volatility, were opened briefly during 1989, but closed again in the wake of President Abdallah’s assassination.\textsuperscript{16} While some secondary sources contain contradictory information regarding Kerzner’s commitment to remain on the island,\textsuperscript{17} the \textit{Africa Research Bulletin} reveals that, in mid-September 1990, the South African government and World Leisure Group Limited signed a loan agreement to re-launch the defunct hotel development scheme.\textsuperscript{18}

After this excursion to the Comoros as an example of the DFA’s growing influence on de Klerk’s foreign policy making, we now examine Pretoria’s general approach towards the continent. The earlier citation from his autobiography suggests that de Klerk was inspired by Vorster’s Outward-Looking Policy in the shaping of the current relations with Africa, with an emphasis on the diplomatic aspect and the use of economic leverage. In implementing this approach, he found strong support from Pik Botha and the minister’s confidant, Neil van Heerden, Director-General from 1987. In 1989, van Heerden formulated the principles of foreign relations with Africa that became known as ‘New Diplomacy’, underlining South Af-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Correspondence with Colin Paterson, 7 January 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{13} UN document A/RES/35/48.
\item \textsuperscript{14} UN document A/RES/44/34.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Rogerson. 1990. \textit{Sun International,} pp.351f.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Denard. 1998. \textit{Corsaire de la république,} p.418; ‘Sun International to pull out of Comoros’, \textit{Business Day} 22 May 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27,} 9, 16 September-15 October 1990: 10107.
\end{itemize}
rica's aspiration to be both part of Africa and a regional power with a substantial development capacity. Resembling the argumentation of the Minister of External Affairs in the early 1960s, Eric Louw, he stressed South Africa's willingness to provide technical and scientific expertise, while great importance was now attached to trade and commerce. In devising Pretoria's Africa policy, de Klerk and Pik Botha adhered to van Heerden's ideas, an indication of the latter's influential position. The application of the New Diplomacy was facilitated by the fact that the African continent experienced both economic and political marginalisation after the end of the Cold War. The formation of trade blocs, especially in Europe, required "African solutions to African problems", as political commentator Dave Peterson aptly summarised the new situation. Importantly, this meant closer economic co-operation, and this made South Africa an attractive partner as the leading African country in terms of economic performance. A letter sent to thirty African heads of state and government on 23 May 1991, within days of the OAU Summit held in Abuja, Nigeria's new capital after December of that year, verifies that de Klerk made specific use of these developments to appeal to African leaders:

Abuja 91, Mr President, will take place against a backdrop of dramatic changes in the international environment, of shifts in economic patterns and in power balances which provide both challenges and opportunities for our Continent. The emergence of a unified European market in 1992, coupled with changes in Eastern and Central Europe and in the USSR, represent potential threats to continued economic investment and involvement in Africa by the industrialised countries. There is a school of thought that Africa runs the risk of being marginalised. We in Africa should urgently consider steps to counter this

---


tendency. We are experiencing a new era of peace, free from superpower rivalry, with the prospect of resolving the internal conflicts in Southern Africa. The time for isolation and mistrust has passed. (...) We believe that it has become imperative that co-operation in all fields of development be established to safeguard and advance our common interests.25

South Africa had much to offer in this regard. Technical expertise aside, its manufactured goods were low in price in comparison to international products, they were suitable for African conditions and the South African market was in relative proximity.26 As a result, trade figures in Appendixes B and C show a significant increase in economic interaction between South Africa and African countries beyond the region after 1988/89. South African export, in particular, experienced a strong upswing and we will see that the prospering trade relations became an essential lever used by Pretoria to establish political contact with these countries.

We have now outlined Pretoria’s negotiation position and that it attributed the improvement of its foreign relations with Africa a high priority. Having argued previously that the negotiations and the African continental dimension were interrelated, it is important to now discuss the ANC’s comparable situation in this regard. To begin with, although it gradually learnt how to pursue a diplomacy of liberation during the exile period,27 the ANC clearly did not have the experience of a government in conducting politics. In addition, in spite of having secret contacts with the South African government dating from the mid-1980s,28 the ANC was relatively unprepared for de Klerk’s announcements in February 1990 and the necessity to subsequently engage in a direct confrontation with Pretoria at the negotiation table. In fact, we argue that it still pursued a strategy that focused on the struggle against apartheid, rather than having any well thought-out ideas of a post-apartheid South Africa, apart from the mandatory non-racial structure of society. The ANC’s guiding document was the Discussion Paper on the Issue of Negotiations, dating from June 1989.29 This document openly declared the organisa-

tion’s willingness to talk to the South African government. However, it stipulated that five conditions had to be met, prior to holding substantial negotiations on South Africa’s political future. These were the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees; the lifting of bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons; the removal of troops from the townships; the ending of the state of emergency and the repeal of all legislation circumscribing political activity; and the cessation of political trials and political executions. Crucially, the African National Congress had the diplomatic support of the African community of states and this was an important advantage over the Pretoria government in the negotiations. Most importantly, on 21 August 1989, the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa had endorsed the ANC’s above-mentioned position paper at a meeting in Zimbabwe and the document subsequently became known as the Harare Declaration. 30 It was the most comprehensive and detailed statement by African states since the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto three decades earlier (Chapter 4). 31 In addition, the African Group at the United Nations ensured that the General Assembly endorsed the same document on 14 December 1989. 32

Having examined the starting positions of the main contenders prior to the negotiations that began in early 1990, with particular attention being paid to the relevance of African diplomatic support, the following section provides an analysis of the negotiations up until the Boipatong massacre took place in June 1992. It is important to have this framework in order to provide an understanding as to why and how the African continental dimension became so pivotal after this event.

Negotiations

As noted above, the ANC had indicated its willingness to hold talks with Pretoria in June 1989, but it was both de Klerk’s February 1990 speech and Mandela’s release that made the subsequent negotiations possible. The ensuing bargaining led to South Africa’s first democratic elections in April 1994 and can be divided into three phases, namely the ‘Talks about Talks’ from February 1990 to October 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) until May 1992 and the Multiparty Negotiation Process until December 1993. Following the argument raised at the outset of this chapter, the period until the Boipatong

---

massacre constitutes the focus, because Pretoria's foreign relations with the African countries beyond the region were only of crucial significance up to mid-1992. The complexity of the negotiations is analysed elsewhere, with a relatively brief survey of the power struggle sufficing for the purpose of this study. Emphasis is placed on those developments that are relevant in Pretoria's foreign relations of interest to us.

During the Talks about Talks, the ANC was outmanoeuvred, as Pretoria had the upper hand from the outset. With his unexpected announcement in February 1990, de Klerk capitalised on the lack of preparedness by the liberation movement. He seized the political initiative, permitting him to define both the terrain and pace of the negotiations. In the Groote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990 and in the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990, the government pressured the ANC into making substantial compromises, particularly the suspension of the armed struggle that had “tremendous emotional and symbolic value in terms of its mass appeal”. At the same time, de Klerk’s negotiators had only partly fulfilled the ANC’s demands itemised in the Harare Declaration. In fact, the only precondition fully implemented was the lifting of bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons. Other than that, the state emergency still applied in the province of Natal, not all troops had been withdrawn from the townships, political trials continued and fundamental differences existed over the question of who constituted a political prisoner. Thus, six months after Mandela’s release and the unbanning of the ANC, de Klerk was in a position to show the white electorate that there was no danger of the ANC taking power through the means of force and that the government had not surrendered any political power. On the other hand, the ANC could not produce any significant achievements to its followers. As a result, on the occasion of the ANC National Consultative Conference from 14 to 16 December, criticism came from the grassroots level, with members expressing “their extreme frustration over the organisation’s failure to achieve visible progress”. Increasingly sceptical voices also came from the allied COSATU and SACP, arguing that mass action as their preferred bargaining option had been ne-


glected. Already on 2 July 1990, COSATU had launched a general strike to put pressure on de Klerk to halt the violence in Natal, suggesting that this was an orchestrated attempt together with Pretoria’s friend and homeland leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to undermine the ANC’s standing there.\(^{39}\) Regarding the Communist Party’s view, Raymond Suttner, Member of the SACP Central Committee and Head of the ANC Department of Political Education, complained in November 1990: “The talks up to now have not involved the masses. (…) Where there is a blockage, with the government reneging on its agreements, we realise again that we must strengthen mass action to make sure our goals are realised”.\(^{40}\) Thus, Pretoria successfully put strains on the ANC-COSATU-SACP alliance and thereby weakened the ANC’s bargaining position in the negotiations.

Parallel to these developments, the international dimension became an important arena in the tactical power play. Supplementing the strategy of outwitting the ANC in the negotiations, de Klerk travelled to thirty countries from 1990 to mid-1992 with the goal of ending South Africa’s international isolation (Table 6), while Nelson Mandela paid visits to forty-nine countries in order to maintain the sanctions against Pretoria (Table 7). A comparison of their destinations reveals a common concern over the support from specific countries. Particular importance was attributed to France and Great Britain, with both de Klerk and Mandela travelling there twice, while de Klerk even went to London a third time. The relevance of these two countries hinged on their role as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Great Britain’s support was furthermore considered important as it was the leader of the Commonwealth, while that of France was probably also sought due to its influence in Francophone Africa. We examine de Klerk’s and Mandela’s journeys to African countries later in this chapter, and for the moment it suffices to note that de Klerk’s international anti-sanctions campaign was the more successful of the two. His reforms were welcomed during his visits to European capitals and Washington in May and September 1990 respectively. The view prevailed that the changes were irreversible and many countries considered the lifting of sanctions against South Africa.\(^{41}\) In anticipation of later developments, the European Community lifted its 1986 sanctions in April 1991, the US Congress abolished the 1986 Comprehensive

---


Anti-Apartheid Act in July and Japan removed its anti-apartheid measures in June and October 1991.42

**Table 6: De Klerk’s Journeys Abroad (1990 – June 1992)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-26 May 1990</td>
<td>France, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 1990</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25 September 1990</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-14 October 1990</td>
<td>Portugal, Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 October 1990</td>
<td>Luxembourg, Netherlands, Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24 April 1991</td>
<td>Denmark, Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1991</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-16 November 1991</td>
<td>Israel, Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 February 1992</td>
<td>France, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 April 1992</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23 June 1992</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1990</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-21 May 1990</td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1990</td>
<td>Geneva (UN), Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Vatican, Netherlands, Canada, United States, Ireland, Great Britain, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July 1990</td>
<td>States, Ireland, Great Britain, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1991</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October 1991</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October 1991</td>
<td>India, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, Great Britain, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November 1991</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17 February 1992</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 1992</td>
<td>Nigeria (OAU Conference of Ministers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 1992</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1991</td>
<td>Spain, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1991</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6 November 1991</td>
<td>Ghana, Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 December 1991</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-20 January 1992</td>
<td>Tunisia, Libya, Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 February 1992</td>
<td>France, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20 May 1992</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1992</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The international dimension aside, the question of culpability for the domestic violence that climbed to unprecedented levels, with thousands of black South Africans being killed, became another factor that increasingly impacted on the course of the negotiations. At the outset of the talks, there was no indication of government and security force involvement. Due to his reform initiative, de Klerk retained the status as the “man of integrity” in the eyes of the inter-

---


national community, such as described by Mandela on the day of his release from prison.45
During the second half of 1990, however, the ANC started accusing de Klerk of pursuing a
double agenda, negotiating while simultaneously fomenting the violence to weaken the ANC.
In particular, as mentioned above, the government was accused of co-operating in this attempt
with Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was at loggerheads with the ANC. As a re-
result, on 5 April 1991, the ANC leadership addressed an open letter to de Klerk. They de-
manded specific action against the violence before 9 May, while expressing doubts about his
true motives: “The government’s inaction [against the violence] calls into serious question its
true intentions and sincerity regarding the entire peace process and the democratization of
South Africa”.46 In other words, if the government’s response was judged to be insufficient,
this would verify the thesis that de Klerk used the negotiations as a smokescreen to undermine
the ANC’s standing in the negotiations. This was precisely the strategy followed by the ANC-
COSATU-SACP alliance, breaking off the negotiations on 18 May by stating that “de Klerk
has not demonstrated any willingness to end the violence”.47 In effect, this meant that the vi­
olence had replaced differences on political matters as the pivotal issue of the talks, permitting
the ANC to seize the initiative for the first time since February 1990.48 On 2 July 1991, at its
first National Conference on South African ground, the ANC also managed to close its inter-
nal ranks and to smooth over differences with the alliance partners, resulting in a strengthened
bargaining position. Finally, on 19 July, the ANC received a further boost when the ‘Inkatha-
gate’ scandal made international headlines. According to documents published simultaneously
in South Africa’s The Weekly Mail and its British partner, The Guardian, Pretoria had sup­
ported Inkatha both financially and with the supply of weapons after February 1990. This
caused de Klerk’s international prestige to plummet considerably, while the ANC’s standing
in the negotiations improved.49 As a result, the two political rivals signed the National Peace
Accord (NPA) on 14 September 1991, which can be seen as the outcome of the ANC’s April
ultimatum. At the time, de Klerk’s reaction had been to hold a peace conference on 23/24

45 The entire speech is reprinted in Clark, Steve, comp. 1993. Nelson Mandela Speaks: Forging a Demo­
mann: 101.
Their Instrumentalisation. Paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Soci­
May with a wide range of representatives from political parties and civil society. However, the ANC alliance boycotted this meeting, arguing that de Klerk’s proposals were not conducive to a curbing of the violence.\textsuperscript{50} Thereafter, the ANC’s withdrawal had more than likely resulted in political pressure on de Klerk and the liberation movement was now in a position to push through its concerns in preparatory meetings to the NPA. In particular, ten of the thirty-three pages of the National Peace Accord dealt with the role of the security forces, forcing Pretoria to acknowledge at least partial responsibility for the violence.\textsuperscript{51} Another success for the ANC was that the NPA provided for the establishment of a commission to investigate the causes of the violence; it subsequently became known as the Goldstone Commission, named after its well-respected head, Judge Richard J. Goldstone. On the whole, thus, the NPA reflected a more equal bargaining power between the ANC and the government, and the negotiations were subsequently resumed. In effect, the talks that led to the NPA have appropriately been described as a “dry run for the forthcoming multi-party negotiations”\textsuperscript{52}.

In continuing with a presentation of the relevant developments in the negotiations, necessary to an understanding of the importance of the African continental dimension therein, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa I convened on 20/21 December 1991. This meeting of nineteen political parties and organisations ended the phase of Talks about Talks and ushered in the start of substantial negotiations on South Africa’s political future. The give-and-take bargaining took place in five Working Groups. However, the success of the entire negotiation process depended on the progress made in Working Group 2, mandated with the task of Constitutional Principles and a Constitution-making Body/Process, because the new constitution would determine the political power sharing arrangement post-apartheid. Current polls indicated that the ANC would achieve majority rule in “one man, one vote” elections, allowing it to shape South Africa’s future to its liking, while raising fears among the minority. Consequently, de Klerk’s negotiators tried to ensure some sort of say for the white population. In an attempt to restrict the ANC’s political influence in a post-apartheid South Africa, they pushed for the fragmentation and decentralisation of power at the legislative and executive

\textsuperscript{50}Haysom. 1992. Negotiating a Political Settlement in South Africa, pp.33f.


\textsuperscript{52}Africa Confidential 32, 19, 27 September 1991: 8.
levels, in contrast to which the ANC demanded a parliament directly elected by the people and a strong central government.53

After almost half a year of debate, CODESA II convened on 15/16 May 1992 and the negotiation results were presented to both the domestic and international audience. All of the Working Groups, except Working Group 2, had successfully concluded their discussions. Even though some progress had been made, a fundamental difference on the future constitutional model persisted; the government “still wanted a slow transition to power sharing”, whereas the ANC “still wanted a quick majority rule”.54 At this decisive moment, de Klerk again held a strong bargaining position. On 17 March 1992, the white electorate had endorsed his reform process in a referendum that he had announced on 20 February.55 The insightful political magazine SouthScan commented on this move that by “manufacturing a contest against the advocates of continued white domination, de Klerk’s image-makers (...) were able to pose de Klerk as the champion of the other side”.56 The result of the referendum strengthened de Klerk’s negotiation position, as described by political scientist James Hamill: “The de Klerk government, its confidence now almost fully restored following last year’s Inkathagate scandal, (...) seems to believe that it is once more in a position from which it can control the pace and direction of the country’s reform process”.57 In addition, de Klerk was applauded internationally for his reform commitment,58 and we will see later in this chapter that it was a key event in motivating Lagos to invite de Klerk to come to Nigeria. The ANC, on the other hand, was again on the losing end. By the beginning of June 1992, therefore, the government seemed to have successfully outmanoeuvred the ANC. Major apartheid laws had been abolished, but the prospect of the ANC finally coming to power in South Africa was still remote. For the ANC, the “book of apartheid” was not yet closed, no matter how successfully the South African government tried to reassure the international community to the contrary.59


56 SouthScan 7, 15/16, 17 April 1992: 120.


In this politically tense situation, with the entire negotiation process hovering on the brink of collapse, the Boipatong massacre occurred on the night of 17/18 June 1992, with forty people losing their lives in this township south of Johannesburg, and this proved to be the turning point. This made international front-page news that unanimously presented Pretoria as the main culprit. On 21 June, in an address to the residents of Boipatong, ANC President Mandela announced his intention of requesting a special UN Security Council meeting; two days later the ANC leadership broke off the negotiations. The ANC’s decision to call upon the United Nations to become involved in the South African crisis served two purposes. First, it was an ideal opportunity to regain the support of the international community. As South African political commentator Stanley Uys aptly argued: “If evidence is produced to substantiate the ANC’s repeated allegations of government “complicity” in the violence, international opinion will turn against President de Klerk. Government “complicity”, or even failure to act expeditiously against the violence, is the one factor that could reanimate public opinion world-wide and bring it back into the South African arena as a decisive influence”. In fact, Mandela had already threatened to ask both the OAU and the UN to send observers to monitor the violence when he toured the Johannesburg township of Alexandra in April 1992.

Probably judging that this would not find support among the international community, however, the ANC leadership refrained, even though numerous publications by local and international human rights organisations and newspaper reports since 1990 had suggested that a government-orchestrated ‘Third Force’ colluded with Inkatha in stirring the violence against the ANC. It was the Boipatong massacre, then, that provided the ANC with what it termed as solid proof of its allegation that Pretoria deliberately fuelled the violence in order to weaken the movement’s negotiation position. With the international media coming to the same conclusion, the liberation movement could be quite certain of gaining international support in its request for the deployment of observers. Second, the ANC’s decision to request a Security Council meeting was a compromise within its own ranks and between the alliance partners, in

---

essence between those favouring negotiations and the more radical elements that preferred mass action as a means of bringing the ANC to power.64

Prior to discussing the ensuing developments, we first need to examine the African continental dimension within the context of the ANC-government negotiations. It has been mentioned several times previously that Africa’s diplomatic support in this process was important and it proved to be a pivotal factor at this particular point in time.

Outreach Into Africa

Having stated that external support was an essential aspect of the negotiations, we specially mentioned both de Klerk’s and Mandela’s visits to both France and Great Britain, and argued that the two leaders attributed a similarly high priority in gaining the support of the African community of states. Given the focus of this study, we presently focus on Pretoria’s endeavours to establish contact with the black African countries beyond the region. The next section examines the ANC’s undertakings to this end, and we will see that the developments following the Boipatong massacre brought to a head the competition between the liberation movement and the South African government in the quest for Africa’s diplomatic support.

Judging from later evidence, the de Klerk government appears to have pursued a two-pronged, and sometimes overlapping Africa strategy. On the one hand, Pretoria was eager to secure the support of the Organisation of African Unity through the presidents of both Uganda and Nigeria in their position as the consecutive OAU Chairmen during the period July 1990 to June 1992. This becomes the focus later in this chapter, but we now examine the other aspect of Pretoria’s approach towards Africa, namely its intention of broadening the contact network through means of economic interaction. It has been stated earlier that President de Klerk adhered to the ideas of Prime Minister Vorster’s Outward-Looking Policy, namely to provide African countries with technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. The world had changed since Vorster’s days, however, and the concept of such aid was found rather ineffective in advancing socio-economic progress in Third World countries.65 In addition, as we have seen, Africa became increasingly marginalised within the international community from the late 1980s, requiring it to find its own solutions to stimulate development. As a result of these two trends, Pretoria sought to engage with the continent primarily through


trade and other economic exchange, in all likelihood hoping that this would eventually result in political contact. It had good reason to believe in such a possibility. In particular, we will see below that the national airline, South African Airways, was granted landing and overflying rights in many African countries. We begin with a tour d’horizon on South Africa’s economic interaction with those countries until mid-1992, when the Boipatong massacre significantly undermined Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa, where we had to rely on information from secondary sources due to limited access to the DFA files after 1979.

Economic Co-operation

In June 1990, Malawi government officials came to South Africa to sign a trade agreement between the two countries, replacing the one dating from 1967 (Chapter 4). Two months later, on 14 August and “accompanied by a retinue of businessmen”, de Klerk inaugurated the air link with Madagascar when he flew to the island to conclude a bilateral air transport agreement and probably held economic talks. Another agreement followed in April 1991 that laid the basis for the establishment of a South African Trade Mission in the capital, Antananarivo. On 13 December 1990, the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs and Public Enterprises, Dawid Jacobus ‘Dawie’ de Villiers, led a South African delegation to the Ivory Coast, discussing political reforms and bilateral relations with President Houphouët-Boigny.

On 21 January 1991, a group of seven people went to the Congolese Republic, which, relevantly, was also a small oil producer. The secondary source from where we have this information, indicates that this delegation was headed by a “senior DFA official”, but we established in correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, then Ambassador based in Kinshasa and accredited to neighbouring Brazzaville since 1989 (Chapter 5), that he had merely acted as a facilitator. While he did not comment on the nature of the business delegation’s visit, the Shipping Research Bureau, established in 1980 to monitor the oil sanctions against South Africa, suggests that technical assistance for oil exploration as an area co-operation was dis-

---

71 Correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, 24 January 2003.
The same source suggests that the supply of this resource featured in the talks that Minister de Villiers held during his visit to the oil producer Gabon in February 1991. This probably followed the stay of a Gabonese delegation, comprising President Bongo’s daughter and his Personal Adviser, in South Africa the previous month, also meeting with President de Klerk. While the above-mentioned exchanges involved African countries with which Pretoria had had some kind of relationship in earlier years, contact with Togo was new. In early November 1990, the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it had established a “representation of interests” in the capital Lomé. More than likely as a result of this, the Togolese Ministers of Planning and Mines, and of State Enterprise and Industry came to South Africa from 3 to 12 March 1991, also meeting Dawie de Villiers with whom they evidently discussed economic matters. The two ministers also invited interested parties from South Africa, singling out the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, to come to Togo; the particularly important role of SAFTO in supplementing Pretoria’s diplomatic outreach into Africa will be discussed later in this chapter. Then, from 22 to 27 April 1991, Chief Director Christo Prins led a South African government delegation to Sao Tome e Principe, discussing SAA landing rights, tourism and agriculture. A particularly important country within Pretoria’s plan to approach African countries through the backdoor of economic interaction was Kenya, where Minister Pik Botha paid a visit on 30 November 1990. Undoubtedly as a result of his meeting with President Daniel arap Moi, SAA was granted a weekly flight to Nairobi from December 1990. Pretoria’s contact with the political and economic heavyweight in African affairs intensified, leading to de Klerk’s visit to Kenya on 8 June 1991. Most notably, during the discussions with arap Moi, he presented his vision of four main African economic regions, namely North, West, East and southern Africa, formed around Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa as respective engines of growth, with the purpose of stimulating economic

---

growth on the African continent.\textsuperscript{80} What can in all likelihood be considered as a direct outcome of this visit, a Kenyan business delegation came to South Africa on 4 September 1991 to explore future economic ties.\textsuperscript{81} This kind of contact eventually resulted in Daniel arap Moi paying an official one-day visit to South Africa on 9 June 1992, thus representing the climax of Pretoria’s contact with Nairobi.\textsuperscript{82}

We presently remain engaged in the discussion on Pretoria’s ambition of strengthening its presence on the African continent through increased economic interaction. Given the link between external support and the domestic negotiations, such as we have argued previously, Pretoria’s initiatives in Africa aimed at bolstering its bargaining position in the talks. The above information was derived from secondary sources and could therefore provide only relatively little indication of political implications, notably landing rights for SAA. In contrast, the following case studies that relate to Sudan and Cameroon are based on primary DFA documents and reveal a clear connection between economic interaction and Pretoria’s political goals. These two examples further show that Pretoria’s foreign relations with Africa during the de Klerk era were conducted in a manner similar to the DFA’s activities during Vorster’s Outward-Looking Policy, although the foreign service officials appear to have learnt from past experiences, presently only becoming involved in worthwhile projects.

\textit{Sudan and Cameroon}

We have seen in the previous chapter that Pretoria was in contact with Khartoum through the mediation of maverick Nzeribe from 1984 to the fall of President Nimeiri in April 1985, with armament sales to Sudan and overflying rights for SAA constituting the key issues. A similar situation characterises the present contact that was prompted by a meeting between Deputy Director-General Rusty Evans and General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the head of Sudan’s military government from 1989, during Namibia’s independence celebration in Windhoek in March 1990. Evans was particularly well suited for interaction with this country, as he had knowledge of Sudan due to the dealings with Nzeribe during his days as the Minister Plenipotentiary in London (Chapter 5). The Windhoek encounter was followed-up when Evans visited Khartoum in January 1991, with subsequent contact focussing on military assistance, SAA overflying rights and economic interaction.\textsuperscript{83} In February 1991, and probably linked to


\textsuperscript{83} Background document: Republic of the Sudan’, 1992, p.17 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8).
Evans’ stay in Sudan, SAA Chief Executive Gert van der Veer requested the granting of landing rights. This was necessary to close the Zaire-Sudan-Egypt air corridor, because both Egypt and Zaire had already granted these rights during 1989 and during the first half of 1990 respectively. Judging from de Klerk’s letter of August 1991 to President al-Bashir, in which he welcomed Khartoum’s decision to grant overflying rights to SAA, the above-mentioned air route created a viable option to fly diagonally across the African continent. Later DFA documents reveal the payment of 188,400 US Dollars per month for the Sudanese overflying rights, but we could not establish for how long SAA made use of this route. An important person in this context, and indicating the military dimension of the contact, was Elfatih Erwa, Sudan’s Defence Minister. He met Pik Botha and SAA Executive Director van der Veer in April 1991 and this was followed by two reciprocal visits later that year. Given the military’s contact with Sudan during the P.W. Botha era and judging from later developments, it is possible that they undertook more activities than those recorded in the DFA files.

In any case, a South African and Sudanese delegation paid almost parallel reciprocal visits. From 18 to 22 September 1991, the Sudanese Minister of Energy Affairs and Natural Resources, President al-Bashir’s Economic Adviser and the Deputy General Manager of Sudan Airways came to South Africa. They held meetings with representatives from the parastatal oil companies Sasol and Soekor, SAA, the mining firm Genmin and Engen, the private petroleum company. On 12 August, de Klerk had informed President al-Bashir of “a visit to Sudan of high-level South African representatives in the fields of transport, mineral prospection, aviation technology and energy”. This mission, led by Chief Director Christo Prins, took place from 22 to 24 September and included four representatives each from SAA and Spoornet, the former South African Railways, two each from Atlas Aircraft, a subsidiary of

---

84 Letter from Gert van der Veer to the Director General of Sudan’s Department of Civil Aviation, Johannesburg, 8 February 1991 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 6).
87 ‘Invoice’, from the Director General of Sudan’s Department of Civil Aviation to South African Airways, Khartoum, 18 January 1992; fax from Elfatih Erwa to Uys Viljoen (Deputy Director, North and East Africa), Khartoum, 4 April 1992 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8).
arms producer Armscor, and the firm Engen and one each from the South African Air Force and Genmin. The participation of the various private and parastatal companies reflected Pretoria’s strategic thinking at the time, one that capitalised on its economically strong position. The motivation for the different firms and government agencies to enter into contact with Sudan is not recorded, but can be deduced from subsequent documents. According to Deputy Director-General Derek Auret’s correspondence with Minister Erwa after the South African mission’s visit to Sudan, Soekor and Engen showed “a great deal of interest” in exploring the potentially rich oil fields in the south of the Sudan. Later briefs, however, suggest that no investment was forthcoming without indicating the reasons. Spoornet’s intention to “upgrade the existing railway network in Sudan” was discussed with al-Bashir’s Economic Adviser in South Africa in February 1992, but this idea was not taken any further due to the lack of available financing. Solely the involvement of Atlas Aircraft produced a concrete result. They provided expertise to restore ten helicopters to working order and to upgrade the airforce base in Khartoum, but this was only possible due to cross-financing from the fees paid by SAA for overflying rights in Sudan. Thus, reminiscent of events in the mid-1980s, the military and SAA tied up a package deal that, under the present circumstances, was successfully concluded. In contrast to this situation, where Sudan’s economic interest was related to SAA obtaining overflying rights, Pretoria’s economic interaction with Cameroon not only achieved the same privilege for SAA, but became linked to a diplomatic goal in the proper sense of the word, and we now explore these developments.

In early 1991, Pretoria was approached for assistance in a Hydroelectric Project named after Gustav Nachtigal, who had declared Cameroon a German Protectorate in 1884. This project was aimed at providing electricity for the port city of Douala and for the running of an aluminium-from-bauxite smelter. We learn from the files that the German company Siemens was in charge of the engineering, while the financing came from the Bayerische Vereinsbank. On 18 January 1991, the Director-General of Siemens’ South Africa representation

---

95 'Besprekingspunte: gesprek met Minister Elfati Erwa, Staatsminister in die Presidentie van Soedan', from Uys Viljoen to Derek Auret, 5 November 1992, p.4 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8).
97 'Besprekingspunte: gesprek met Minister Elfati Erwa, Staatsminister in die Presidentie van Soedan', from Uys Viljoen to Derek Auret, 5 November 1992, p.2 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8).
wrote to President de Klerk: “The government of Cameroon confirms its intention to carry out this operation. It would be appreciated if a participation of your government, together with the banks of your country, your industrialists and your advanced technology, could assist in the carrying out of this project.” He was probably influenced by Pretoria’s New Diplomacy in Africa that revolved around the provision of technical and economic assistance. The files do not contain de Klerk’s reply to this enquiry, but rather, contain a relevant letter to Cameroon’s President Paul Biya, dated 20 February 1991. According to this correspondence, Biya had made the same request to de Klerk on the same day as the Director-General of Siemens Cameroon. In reply, South Africa’s President stated: “I welcome your proposal (…), for I firmly believe that there is a growing need for closer cooperation between African countries as regards their economic development”. The letter further indicates that this response would be hand-delivered to Biya by the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, de Villiers, who combined the visit to Cameroon with that to Gabon, mentioned earlier, in February 1991. Due to its expertise, South Africa’s electricity parastatal Eskom became involved in the Nachtigal Project. The documentation is relatively thin on subsequent developments, revealing two meetings between representatives of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs and Finance, Eskom, Credit Guarantee, Siemens and the Bayerische Vereinsbank during June and July 1991 to assess the project’s feasibility. The DFA files further contain material whereby the Canadian firm Consortium Hydro Quebec International had originally shown some interest in the Nachtigal Project, but then withdrew due to Cameroon’s dire economic situation. Their decision appears to have influenced the South Africans, who then did not become involved for similar reasons. In fact, a letter from Eskom’s Engineering Proposal Manager to the Bayerische Vereinsbank from 20 August 1991 reveals:

It became evident from feedback provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the CGIC [=Credit Guarantee] that, due to political uncertainties and the present high financial risk in the Cameroon, an involvement and required financing from South Africa, is

103 <http://www.hydro.qc.ca>.
104 DFA, 1/101/3, Vol. 5.
This situation remained unchanged, despite a visit to South Africa, from 11 to 13 August 1991, by Cameroon’s Minister of Industrial and Trade Development, accompanied by his Secretary General and four businessmen. They emphasised the importance of the Nachtigal Project to South Africa’s new Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, George Shepstone Bartlett. Possibly in an attempt to lure the South Africans into the project, the report on this visit reveals that the Cameroon Minister conveyed Yaoundé’s decision to grant South African Airways landings rights. Pretoria’s non-participation in the Nachtigal Project notwithstanding, later documents indicate that the bilateral contact continued, especially in the economic sphere with political connotations. Most significantly, more than one hundred South African businessmen were present at the Séminaire International pour le Dialogue et la Coopération (SIDCO) ’91, held under the auspices of President Biya from 30 October to 2 November 1991.

Parallel to this event, Deputy Director-General Derek Auret visited the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Senegal from 26 October to 2 November 1991, also attending SIDCO ’91. The main purpose of his West Africa tour, however, was to enlist African diplomatic support for South Africa’s readmission to the Food and Agricultural Organisation during the upcoming annual meeting of this UN agency in Rome. The report on Auret’s journey notes that he “made special reference to South Africa’s intention to seek readmission to the FAO” during the meetings with the Prime Ministers of both the Congolese Republic and Cape Verde, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Senegal. Derek Auret did not gain much political support, however. The Cape Verde Prime Minister merely stated “that his Government will give positive consideration to South Africa’s request”, and the Senegalese Foreign Minister indicated “that Senegal would not take the lead in the acceptance of such an application but that support (...)

---

106 ‘Report on a visit by The Hon Rene Owona, Minister of Industrial and Trade Development of the Republic of Cameroon to South Africa from 11 to 13 August 1991’, from the Programmer (Africa) of VIP Visits, pp.2f. (DFA, 1/101/3, Vol. 5).
107 DFA, 1/101/3, Vol. 5.
could be forthcoming". Cape Verde’s comparatively favourable stance can be explained by the country’s long-standing contact with South Africa due to SAA’s use of Ilha do Sal (Chapter 4). In contrast, de Klerk’s one-hour talk with President Abdou Diouf in Dakar on 25 October 1990 does not appear to have been successful in changing Senegal’s sceptical position dating back to the days of President Senghor (Chapter 4). The only clear indication of diplomatic support came from Cameroon’s Foreign Minister, Jacques Roger Booh Booh, who said “that Cameroon will support and encourage the application both amongst African countries as well as in international fora”. While we do not know the context within which Auret’s approach took place in the other countries, it is reasonable to argue that Yaoundé’s pro-active stance in this matter was motivated by its economic interest in contact with Pretoria. In particular, hopes of obtaining South African support in the Nachtigal Project may have still remained, as Derek Auret indicated in the talks with Minister Booh Booh “that other sources of investment would have to be looked at, but that ESKOM should be use for its expertise and also from a development point of view”. During the FAO meeting in November, Cameroon kept its promise of diplomatic support for Pretoria’s readmission, as reported by Glenn Babb, then Ambassador to Italy and Permanent Representative to the FAO, to Deputy Director-General Jeremy Shearar. According to Babb’s feedback, there was dissension among the ranks of African countries on the issue of Pretoria’s return to the FAO and Cameroon’s Ambassador, who was simultaneously the leader of the African Group in this forum, “asked in a spirit of co-operation that South Africa withdraw its application”. After consultations with Pretoria, Babb followed the advice of Cameroon’s Ambassador, but Shearar drew a positive conclusive from the exercise:

The Department does not consider the exercise to gain readmittance [sic] to the FAO to have been a failure. Our application was not rejected out of hand: those countries, or groups of countries, that could not support it, went out of their way to settle the issue amicably; a few years ago, this would not have happened. We thus experienced a surprisingly large measure of goodwill, much of it from unexpected quarters. But above all,

---

112 ‘Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa : 26 October to 2 November 1991’, pp.3ff. (DFA, 1/103/3, Vol. 5).
113 ‘Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa : 26 October to 2 November 1991’, p.5 (DFA, 1/103/3, Vol. 5).
valuable experience was gained on the manner in which countries should be lobbied to support our aspirations in this regard.\(^{115}\)

The principal argument of this chapter is that competition over external support became an important factor during the negotiations between the ANC and the government, and that both sides paid special attention to the African continental dimension. We have so far seen in this section, that Pretoria’s corresponding undertakings relied principally on the use of economic leverage in what we consider as one element of its strategy. In the case of Madagascar, Kenya, Sudan and Cameroon, this resulted in concrete politico-diplomatic successes such as arap Moi’s visit to South Africa, landing/overflying rights for SAA in all four countries and support from Cameroon for Pretoria’s ambition in returning to the FAO. We earlier mentioned that Pretoria’s strategy of winning African support entailed a second aspect, namely the targeting of the OAU. Contact with Ethiopia, the host of the OAU headquarters, does not appear to have been sought until mid-1992, possibly due to the political turbulence in this country, with rebels fighting the central government. The only relevant DFA source in this context is Derek Auret’s correspondence with Director-General van Heerden of 30 July 1992, stating: “it is felt that, given the important role which Ethiopia plays in East Africa as well as its importance as the seat of the OAU, contact should be taken up with the interim government as soon as possible”.\(^{116}\) However, we now reveal significant activities on the part of Pretoria to secure the backing of Uganda and particularly Nigeria, the OAU Chairs from July 1990 to June 1991 and the following year respectively. The accounts also document an involvement of the National Intelligence Service, which had become a powerful player during P.W. Botha’s era, and we shall see that this now led to friction with the foreign service officials.

**Uganda and Nigeria**

The first recorded contact between Pretoria and Kampala after 1990 is NIS Director-General Niël Barnard’s visit to Uganda on 3/4 July 1990. He held a two-hour discussion with President Museveni on his way back to South Africa from the visit to Nigeria, discussed below.\(^{117}\) Uganda’s position as the OAU Chair aside, the interest displayed by intelligence stemmed, in all likelihood, from the training camps that Kampala harboured for the armed wing of both the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the PAC, Azania People’s Liberation Army. As revealed by a DFA source in the previous chapter, these camps were established in late 1986. This contra-


\(^{117}\) Letter from Niël Barnard to Neil van Heerden and Frederik Willem de Klerk, 18 July 1990 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 6).
dicts the secondary literature that erroneously suggests that such developments had only taken place after the conclusion of the Namibia Accords in December 1988, stipulating that the ANC had to close the MK training camps in Angola. Barnard’s meeting with Museveni, then, presumably had three purposes. First, his report to President de Klerk and DFA Director-General van Heerden indicates that South African domestic matters were discussed, suggesting that in all probability Barnard was promoting de Klerk’s reforms. Second, and related to this, Barnard may have tried to convince Museveni to close the MK camps, claiming that in view of the reforms the MK’s armed struggle against Pretoria was now redundant. This closure would serve to weaken the ANC’s position. Third, the discussions may have provided de Klerk with ammunition to put pressure on the ANC to abandon the armed struggle, arguing that this was irreconcilable with conducting “peaceful negotiations”, such as foreseen in the Groote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990. We do not have the knowledge if any reference to Uganda was made in the ANC-government discussions at the time, but we have seen earlier that the ANC agreed to the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990, and the cessation of the armed struggle. Apart from the interest in contact with Uganda related to the MK camps, the subsequent developments suggest that de Klerk was eager to meet Museveni in his capacity as the OAU Chair. The idea for this meeting, however, came from the same John Kazzora who had approached the South African Embassy in London several times from the late 1970s in order to obtain assistance to topple the Ugandan leadership. He even came to South Africa in August 1986 as Museveni’s Personal Adviser (Chapter 5). According to a report dated 28 September 1990, Kazzora felt that a meeting de Klerk-Museveni “somewhere in Europe” would be “appropriate at this time”. A later document indicates that de Klerk planned to meet Museveni in London, at the end of his visits to Portugal and Great Britain (Table 6). Yet, this did not materialise “due to private circumstances on the part of Museveni”, as noted in the same DFA report. Thereafter, Pretoria does not appear to have undertaken any diplomatic activity in organising a presidential meeting during Uganda’s OAU Chairmanship, probably because Museveni maintained a pronounced stance in favour of sanctions against South Africa until further moves towards the dismantling of apartheid were made, as reported in a


120 Letter from Pieter Schabort (First Secretary, Embassy, London) to Rusty Evans, 28 September 1990 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 7).
South African daily in March 1991. This is in sharp contrast to Pretoria’s intention of gaining a foothold in Nigeria, whose government showed a significant openness in liaising with South Africa. The related undertakings are now examined.

In order to understand the high importance of contact with this West African state, we need to remind ourselves of Nigeria’s position in continental politics and towards apartheid in particular. In the period under review here, Nigeria was one of Africa’s most powerful states in terms of economic and military capacity, as well as political influence in African affairs. It was also reputed to be a generous supporter of Africa’s liberation movements, providing especial assistance to those in southern Africa in their struggle against Pretoria, while both South Africa’s ANC and PAC enjoyed accreditation from 1975. Furthermore, Nigerian foreign ministers had the distinction of chairing the UN Special Committee against Apartheid for twenty-one of the thirty-one years of its existence. The evidence outlined below reveals that Pretoria fairly successfully applied two strategies in an attempt to convince Lagos that bilateral contact was to Nigeria’s advantage. First, emphasis was placed on the economic dimension and the prospect this held for both countries and the African continent. In doing so, Pretoria capitalised on Nigeria’s interest in gaining a foothold in the South African market that was promising for export, and we later discuss that the activity of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation in this regard was an important factor. Further to this issue, de Klerk’s above-mentioned concept of four African economic regions envisaged Nigeria as West Africa’s economic powerhouse. Within Pretoria’s second strategy to gain access to the Lagos government, de Klerk and Pik Botha used Nigeria’s aspirations for continental leadership to

121 Letter from Herbert Beukes (Deputy Director-General) to Pik Botha, 9 October 1990 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 7).
their advantage, particularly during the OAU Chairmanship. They flattered Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, President from August 1985, in correspondence and meetings by commending him on his statesmanship and by underlining the country’s seminal role in African and international politics.

An initial contact between the two countries was made when de Klerk had an unofficial meeting with his Nigerian counterpart during Namibia’s independence celebrations in March 1990.\textsuperscript{127} However, the National Intelligence Service was instrumental in establishing significant interaction between Pretoria and Lagos. In fact, the DFA files contain communication to and from Lagos that was intercepted by NIS, suggesting that they had at least one official stationed there from April 1984.\textsuperscript{128} How this came about is not known due to the non-availability of archival sources from their side. Yet, the text of a NIS document, dated 16 November 1984 and contained in a Top Secret DFA file, might serve as an indication: “During December 1984, Nigeria will receive two C-130 aircraft from the RSA”.\textsuperscript{129} It is likely that there were secret dealings in operation between South Africa’s and Nigeria’s intelligence community, with the former providing these two Hercules military cargo planes to maybe buy their way into Nigeria. The fact that NIS could dispose of military aircraft possibly serves as an example of close collaboration with the military at the time (Chapters 2 and 5). The DFA files contain no further material on this matter. There is no mention of this in the secondary sources and we have unsuccessfully tried to obtain the views of the then NIS Director-General, Niël Barnard, as indicated in Chapter 1. In any case, based on its long-standing presence in Nigeria, NIS quite obviously had knowledge of the relevant channels through which to establish contact. Thus, on 1/2 July 1990, Barnard went to Lagos and held talks with Babangida on South Africa’s domestic political situation.\textsuperscript{130} Given that Barnard reported on this meeting to de Klerk, it can reasonably be assumed that his visit to Nigeria and then to Uganda was undertaken at the request of his president. From a later document we learn that Barnard’s messenger duties were supplemented by similar activity by a certain General Mohammed,\textsuperscript{131} referring to General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, Lagos’ man in charge of intelligence at the time and

\textsuperscript{128} Telex from Lusaka to Lagos on the visit of ANC President Oliver Tambo to Lagos, 10 April 1984 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 2PL); report on the conference “Alternative Strategies for Eradicating the Apartheid System”, 7-9 November 1988, Lagos (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 15). Also documents in DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 3PL.
\textsuperscript{129} Telex No. 1022, numbered T31/SA/10121014, 16 November 1984 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 3PL) (translation from Afrikaans).
\textsuperscript{130} Letter from Niël Barnard to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Pretoria, 6 July 1990 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 6).
National Security Adviser to Nigeria's President since 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo. However, all contact between Pretoria and Lagos, including that of the Department of Foreign Affairs, had to use intelligence channels, and this became an area of conflict with the foreign service officers, as we shall presently see.

Parallel to the intelligence activities, they pursued their own lines of communication. This resulted in the visit of Olusegun Obasanjo, former and current Nigerian President, to South Africa on 26 July 1990, meeting, in this order, Pik Botha, Neil van Heerden and de Klerk. The previous chapter mentioned Obasanjo’s Co-chairmanship of the Commonwealth Eminent Person Group that visited South Africa in May 1986 and it appears he struck up a friendship with Pik Botha in this context. Thus, with his coming to Pretoria, the foreign service corps successfully reactivated its contact without any apparent NIS involvement. Obasanjo reminisced on his 1986 visit, prior to informing Pik Botha of Nigeria’s stance towards South Africa. The Lagos government was eager to be “associated with the things happening in the RSA”, while he wanted to “give encouragement for the SA Government to sustain the good being done” and “learn what Nigeria could do to help the process along”. In their statements, the South Africans strongly promoted Pretoria’s interest in establishing closer contact with Lagos through economic interaction and explained their hopes for the Republic’s participation in the OAU. Crucially, van Heerden suggested in his main message “that the OAU might now invite a South African delegation (not ANC or PAC or any of that sort) to go to the OAU as observers”. De Klerk, in turn, expressed the hope that “South Africa could open a real dialogue with a country so important as Nigeria”, emphasising the concept of Nigeria and South Africa promoting continental economic development. Based on Obasanjo’s concluding statement that he “had come on his own and on behalf of the Nigerian Government and President Babangida himself, who had an open mind on the subject of South Africa”, Pretoria could be quite certain that the content of the discussions would reach Lagos.

---

wake of and supplementing Obasanjo’s visit, de Klerk wrote to Babangida, underlining that South Africa was “an African state with an African destiny”, while again stressing the need for economic co-operation between the two “major economic powers in Africa”. Quite likely due to Obasanjo’s visit to South Africa and Barnard’s trip to Nigeria, Nigerian-South African relations received a positive spin-off. We will show that Babangida subsequently adopted a positive stance towards contact with Pretoria. A statement by Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Ike Nwachukwu (1987-89, 1990-93) to the Nigerian Society of International Affairs in November 1990 reveals that de Klerk’s economic concept, in particular, appealed to important members of the Nigerian government. He stated that “combining the South African know how and our resources, both human and material, should provide the basis for the regeneration of our African homeland”. As for Obasanjo, he remained in contact with Pretoria both through correspondence and in person, acting as something of the DFA’s mediator. Most notably, the New York-based Africa Leadership Forum, founded in 1987 and chaired by Obasanjo, organised a conference on “The Challenges of Post-Apartheid South Africa” in Windhoek that took place from 8 to 10 September 1991. Immediately after this event, Obasanjo and sixteen prominent Nigerians went to South Africa for two days, calling for an end to South Africa’s isolation, as indicated in a secondary source. Another avenue that the Department of Foreign Affairs pursued in establishing contact with Nigeria without NIS involvement, was diplomatic exchange at the UN in New York. In an interview, Jeremy Shearar, South Africa’s Ambassador there from 1988 to 1991, indicated that this began after the Namibia Accords in December 1988. Notably, he held several meetings with Joseph Nanven Garba, the former Nigerian Foreign Minister (1975-78), who was Ambassador to the UN, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid from 1984 and President of the UN General Assembly during 1989. This diplomatic link remained even after Garba’s replacement by Ibrahim Agboola Gambari in January 1990, who was also a former Foreign Minister

(1983-85) and now represented Nigeria at the UN and chaired the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. In fact, Shearar mentions that the contact intensified in the wake of de Klerk’s February 1990 speech. Apart from discussions related to South Africa’s position at the UN, the two diplomats discussed the political situation in South Africa, while a correspondence from Shearar to Gambari in April 1991 reveals that the diplomats tried to appeal to Nigeria by placing the emphasis on “the need to combine our efforts to confront the compelling development needs of Africa”.

After this initial and successful process of establishing contact between Pretoria and Lagos through diplomatic and intelligence channels, we now see that the South African government promoted its reforms to ensure closer access to this West African state. Nigeria’s diplomatic backing promised to open doors simultaneously to the OAU, chaired by President Babangida from July 1991 to June 1992, and the Commonwealth, whose Secretary-General since July 1990 was Eleazar Chukwuemeka ‘Emeka’ Anyaoku, a distinguished Nigerian diplomat. Pretoria’s aim of gaining recognition for its reform policy from the OAU by way of Nigeria, was strengthened by a press statement issued on 19 April 1991 by the Nigerian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. It sent an unambiguous signal by reproducing Ibrahim Babangida’s statement of 12 April. This made it quite clear that Nigeria would support the lifting of sanctions within the ranks of the OAU, while setting standards for Pretoria: “I wish to reiterate that we (...) would be fully prepared to promote and undertake initiatives at the forthcoming OAU Summit to lift sanctions on South Africa if the remaining apartheid laws are abrogated by May, 1991.” What follows suggests that Pretoria felt the Nigerian government’s pulse so as to make those changes that would make the most appeal to Lagos. Significantly, the DFA files contain a telex, dated 14 May 1991, sent from the Belgian Embassy in Lagos to Brussels. This message had been intercepted by the National Intelligence Service, documenting that they still retained a prominent position in the Pretoria-Lagos contact, while sharing some information with the foreign service officials. Crucially, the telex contains the Belgian perception of the Nigerian government towards the political situation in South Africa:

147 Telephone interview with Jeremy Shearar, 8 January 2003.
151 The files also contain a telex from the Algerian Embassy to Algiers, Lagos, 12 June 1991 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 19).
"Nigeria stands for the following position: Sanctions should be maintained until the Pretoria Government abrogates three laws, the Population [Registration] Act, the Group Areas Act, and the [Native] Land Act". De Klerk being the pragmatist that he was, he usually timed the actions for them to achieve the maximum effect and utmost political gain, such as is apparent in this instance. We have already cited his letter of 23 May 1991, sent to thirty African heads of state and government within days of the OAU Summit in Nigeria, emphasising South Africa’s preparedness to promote economic co-operation with Africa. In the same letter, he equally stressed that Pretoria continued with its domestic reforms and underlined his “total commitment to the cause of bringing violence under control and ensuring that the political process leading to a new constitutional order in South Africa remains on track”. To give substance to his apartheid reform claim, and possibly with knowledge of the above-mentioned telex intercepted by NIS, de Klerk now undertook activities to repeal three central pillars of the racial system. While he had announced the abrogation of these acts in February 1991, it was only on 5 June that de Klerk repealed both the Group Areas and the Native Land Act. It is likely that the delay in taking this action was due to dissension in Cabinet on the speed of these reforms, but the above-described circumstantial evidence also suggests that the timing was related to the OAU Summit which was held from 2 to 5 June. Whether Nigeria nevertheless lobbied for Pretoria’s cause despite this late action is uncertain, but we know that the OAU Summit decided not to advocate the lifting of sanctions by the international community, obviously judging de Klerk’s reforms as insufficient.

The OAU’s standpoint notwithstanding, the political exchange between de Klerk and Babangida remained unaffected and in the hands of national intelligence. Significantly, on 17 June 1991, the same day on which the Population Registration Act was repealed, Babangida reassured de Klerk of his continued support in a message conveyed by Niël Barnard: “Pres Babangida request that Dr Barnard convey his congratulations to Pres de Klerk for the bold steps taken by repealing the apartheid laws. Pres Babangida would also like Dr Barnard to bring under the attention of Pres de Klerk, to be assured that he will do anything he can to assist Pres de Klerk in achieving his goals”. On 17 September 1991, three days after the

conclusion of the National Peace Accord, Babangida commended de Klerk for this important initiative in curbing the violence,158 indicating that the ANC’s accusations of government-Inkatha involvement in the violence had not hampered the Pretoria-Lagos link. In the knowledge of this backing, as well as Anyaoku’s position as the Commonwealth Secretary-General, de Klerk replied to Babangida’s latest correspondence on 26 September. Lobbying for Nigeria’s support in view of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit to be held in Harare from 16 to 22 October was obviously behind this move:

I would like to propose that the first such meeting [between Babangida and de Klerk] took place in Abuja before the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference. Accordingly I suggest that I arrive on October 13, 1991, accompanied by my Minister of Foreign Affairs. (...) I have no doubt that a visit by you to South Africa, after the Commonwealth Conference, which could include meetings with Mr Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, can make an important contribution towards the peaceful political process in South Africa.159

Babangida did not act on de Klerk’s proposal, and neither their meeting nor Babangida’s visit to South Africa materialised. While the reasons for this are not recorded, it is possible that there was disagreement within the Nigerian government over the country’s attitude towards Pretoria. In particular, while formerly supportive of economic co-operation with South Africa, as seen above, Foreign Affairs Minister Nwachukwu had stated on 1 August 1991 that Lagos would lobby the United States, the European Community and Japan to maintain economic sanctions against South Africa.160 Whether Nigeria’s representatives lobbied for Pretoria’s cause at the Commonwealth Summit is therefore uncertain. The Commonwealth leaders decided to lift sanctions in the fields of sports and cultural contact, as well as tourism, but the final communiqué after the Summit declared that the removal of the remaining measures was conditional on the establishment of a transitional government.161

In continuing with this analysis of Pretoria’s endeavours to gain Nigerian backing for its domestic reforms and providing an entree into both the OAU and the Commonwealth, the next correspondence from de Klerk to Babangida in the DFA files is only dated 11 February 1992. It contains a resume of the political developments in South Africa since CODESA 1,162 while this relative silence probably resulted from Pretoria’s lack of success in gaining Abuja’s active diplomatic support. This is substantiated by UN Ambassador Vernon Steward’s state-

158 Letter from Ibrahim Babangida to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Lagos, 17 September (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 21).
ment made during a meeting in February with his Nigerian counterpart that developments during 1991 "seemed to have come to naught". He therefore proposed the visit of "an official, if not a Minister, (...) to Nigeria for discussions", a suggestion to which Gambari "fully agreed". With his statement, Steward indirectly expressed the discontent among the foreign service corps that all communication had to be channelled via the National Intelligence Service, and given that they had not achieved any concrete diplomatic result to date, this led to interdepartmental friction as to who should take the lead in promoting contact. Yet, while the NIS had the advantage of having been stationed in Nigeria for a long time, it seems that not only the Nigerian government, but even its diplomatic corps, was divided regarding contact with Pretoria and this did not augur well for diplomatic relations between the two countries. As an indication of this, Ambassador Steward’s meeting with his Nigerian counterpart had taken place in a cordial atmosphere, whereas Minister Nwachukwu still proposed sanctions. However, we now see that South Africa's foreign affairs ministry managed to establish itself vis-à-vis the NIS. In examining its activities henceforth, we need to recall that these took place within the wider framework of the negotiations between the ANC and the government, and Pretoria’s overarching goal was to have the external support to strengthen its bargaining position. The present investigation into the relationship with Nigeria is therefore particularly important because Abuja’s backing proved to critical within the context of the UN Security Council meeting called after the Boipatong massacre, which we will subsequently examine.

The documents in the DFA files suggest that late February and early March 1992 proved to be a transition period in the struggle between the Department of Foreign Affairs and national intelligence over contact with Nigeria. In a letter of 3 March 1992 to Babangida, de Klerk accepted his invitation to come to Abuja, stating that this offer had been transmitted to him by the Nigerian High Commissioner in Botswana, Ambassador Alaba Ogunsanwo. While a later report from Deputy Director-General Auret indicates that this served as the foreign affairs ministry’s principal channel of communication, he revealed in an interview with us that this connection had originally been established by the NIS, thus explaining why Babangida’s original invitation to de Klerk is not contained in the DFA files. However, and indicating that the NIS was now replaced as the transmission centre, it was Derek Auret who took

---

166 Telephone interview with Derek Auret, 20 March 2002.
de Klerk’s letter of acceptance to Abuja, as had been suggested by Minister Pik Botha.\textsuperscript{167} The Deputy Director-General visited Nigeria from 7 to 11 March 1992, meeting with Babangida in a “very relaxed and friendly atmosphere”. He informed the president of the white referendum on de Klerk’s reforms, argued that the allegations regarding Pretoria’s involvement in the violence were not correct and flattered Babangida by stating that South Africa would like Nigeria to play an important role in the reform process.\textsuperscript{168} Regarding de Klerk’s visit to Nigeria, several documents indicate that this was contingent on the outcome of the referendum of 17 March 1992,\textsuperscript{169} in which the white electorate was asked whether they supported de Klerk’s reforms. On the day after the favourable outcome of the referendum to de Klerk, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement stating that the “‘Yes Vote’ (...) has now removed a major obstacle to the efforts to transform South Africa from a racially segregated country to a non-racial, united and democratic society”.\textsuperscript{170} For Babangida, this evidently signalled that South Africa’s reform process was irreversible and, on 23 March, Ambassador Ogunsanwo confirmed that de Klerk’s visit could take place on 9/10 April.\textsuperscript{171} Before discussing this coup for Pretoria’s diplomatic endeavours, we need to consider the important role that South Africa’s business community played in the run-up to this event. While we previously discussed Africa’s considerable interest in establishing economic interaction with South Africa, we noted earlier in this section that Nigeria was particularly eager in this regard. The ensuing developments suggest that Pretoria capitalised on the economic factor at this point in time to achieve political goals.

Notably, the delegation that accompanied de Klerk during the visit to Abuja on 9/10 April comprised the key representatives of South Africa’s business sector. In particular, these were Adriaan Sarel ‘Attie’ du Plessis, President of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut during 1991/92, Wim Holtes, Chief Executive of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, and Jan Hendrik ‘Hennie’ Viljoen, President of the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) during 1992.\textsuperscript{172} Judging from the DFA files, however, SAFTO was the most significant participant in

\textsuperscript{167} Letter from Pik Botha to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Pretoria, 3 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL).
\textsuperscript{169} Letter from Pik Botha to Frederik Willem de Klerk, 27 February; letter from Derek Auret to Johannes Petru Roux (Director-General, State President’s Office), Pretoria, 2 March; letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Ibrahim Babangida, Pretoria, 3 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL).
\textsuperscript{171} Letter from Alaba Ogunsanwo to Derek Auret, Gaborone, 23 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 21).
participant in this instance and within the framework of Pretoria’s foreign relations with black Africa beyond the region more generally at the time. This impression was confirmed to us by both Attie du Plessis and Hennie Viljoen, who stated that the AHII and SACOB as umbrella organisations for their members had not been active in the part of black Africa of interest to us until then. In contrast, we have noted earlier in this chapter that the delegation from Togo that had visited South Africa in March 1991 specifically asked for a SAFTO mission to come to their country, mirroring the reputation of this business association. Furthermore, a report, dated November 1992, on Pretoria’s relations with Ghana from Carel Wessels, Chief Director for Africa, to Derek Auret reveals: “SAFTO has received an invitation to participate in a manufactured goods fair in Accra early next year”. In addition to these two examples, SAFTO played a highly significant role in the run-up to the Nigerian visit, and this is now examined.

SAFTO had not displayed any particular interest in undertakings in African countries beyond South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood during the 1960s and 1970s, probably deeming the area to be economically unattractive. This picture began to change during the first half of the 1980s; its 1981/82 Annual Report found that South African export to Africa was “growing because of reliability, fast delivery and relatively low transport costs”. As early as 1980, SAFTO had established the African Business Development Group (ABDG), only the second such “area service” to be created after the Asian Market Monitor, indicating a growing interest in the African market. Five years later, SAFTO formed the Africa Intelligence Service to provide in-depth market information on African countries. Optimism began outweighing SAFTO’s earlier scepticism on trading opportunities in Africa by the mid-1980s, such as reflected in the 1986/87 Annual Report: “South Africa’s exports to Africa have risen consistently over the last few years, although South African exporters are usually wary of selling on anything other than a cash or short-term credit basis”. Significantly, the next Annual Report states: “Relations between South Africa and Africa are primarily determined by economic factors (...). Last year, we called for a more visionary approach to South Africa’s

177 ‘Soaring Trade with Africa’, SAFTO Exporter 22, 9, September 1985: 7.
relations with Africa; it seems that such an approach is now being implemented". The ABDG was a “very effective” and “very successful” group, which “did better than any of the others”, according to SAFTO’s Wim Holtes, and the SAFTO Annual Report of 1994/95 further claims: “[the ABDG] is widely recognised as one of the world’s most powerful groupings of business interests focused on Africa”. Holtes, who stated in an interview to have had “a great interest in Africa”, and Paul Runge, who ran the ABDG from May 1989 to 1991 and then the Africa and Europe section until 1997, were the driving forces behind SAFTO’s work in Africa in the late 1980s. Runge, whom we mentioned in the previous chapter as the foreign service official with several postings related to West Africa during the 1980s, now maintained a personal link between the traders and the DFA. In particular, he was rather close to Director-General van Heerden, who had formulated Pretoria’s New Diplomacy that foresaw the strengthening of trade and commerce, and we argue that SAFTO became something of an implementer of the foreign affairs ministry’s approach towards Africa, and Nigeria in particular. In fact, the SAFTO Annual Report 1991/92 suggests that the “opening up of this market [Nigeria] to South African companies” had strong political implications, since “the psychological effect of establishing business relationships with this leader on the African continent cannot be underestimated”. As an indication that the co-operation between SAFTO and DFA was mutually beneficial, Runge followed van Heerden to the South Africa Foundation in 1997 and became its Director. The activities of SAFTO’s Africa Business Development Group in Nigeria in early 1992 were of great significance, supplementing Pretoria’s ambition of winning over this powerful West African country. Crucially, the DFA files contain considerable documentation that we now examine, indicating that Runge kept them informed of SAFTO’s activities. Runge paid a “pilot visit” to Nigeria from 15 to 20 March 1992, to “examine first-hand an important new market and to provide practical feedback to the ABDG”, to “set up logistics for a confidential South African trade delegation to visit Lagos from 3 to 10 May 1992” and to “ canvass for Nigerian participation in the SAFTO Africa con-

---

180 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.
182 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999.
184 Telephone interview with Derek Auret, 8 January 2003.
ference scheduled for 28 and 29 April 1992”.186 Significantly, Olusegun Obasanjo, an important contact for the foreign affairs ministry with Nigeria, attended this conference; Runge is seen in a photograph with him on this occasion.187 Following Runge’s initial visit and this event, a ‘Special SAFTO Group’ visited Nigeria from 10 to 17 May, a week later than planned and only after the Department of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of SAFTO, had “obtained official approval for the visit to take place” from the Nigerian authorities.188 Even though these last two developments took place after de Klerk’s visit to Nigeria, they are nonetheless an illustration of the especially close liaison between DFA and SAFTO, in facilitating and assisting each other’s tasks.

On the issue of de Klerk’s Abuja visit on 9/10 April, the DFA files contain relatively little documentation, an indication that the NIS managed, once more, to somewhat relegate the foreign service corps to the background in maintaining contact, as suggested by a report dated 12 August 1992 from Director Justus de Goede to Derek Auret: “We are using a channel which is not a Foreign Ministry one. We have little choice in the matter, but it seems clear to us that the Nigerian Foreign Ministry is happy to keep this distance”.189 Nonetheless, one of the documents in the DFA files contains the issues to be raised in the talks between Babangida and de Klerk. This brief verifies several of the above points, namely that economic interaction and the role played by SAFTO in this context were important, and that the DFA-NIS rivalry over who was to take the lead in communication remained a contentious issue. In particular, the agenda item “Specific Points” lists “Normalisation of trade and other relations”, “Overflight rights for SAA”, “Facilitation of SAFTO-delegation visit – 3 to 10 May 1992” and “Channel of Communication”.190 It is not known whether all of these points were raised, as the only other relevant document in the DFA files, summarising the ninety-minute talk between Babangida and de Klerk, merely notes that South Africa’s domestic political developments were discussed.191 According to secondary sources, the oil issue surfaced, speculating that

---

190 ‘Points for discussion’ (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 21).
Nigeria might become a future supplier of oil to South Africa.\textsuperscript{192} The main emphasis in the Joint Communiqué at the end of the visit, however, was again on South Africa’s internal situation, focusing on both Babangida’s and de Klerk’s concern over the violence. The economic aspect of the talks is only mentioned in the last paragraph, underlining that “close regional cooperation was essential for economic growth and progress”.\textsuperscript{197} The little information on the content of the talks notwithstanding, this venture into Nigeria was a tremendous breakthrough for Pretoria’s Africa policy,\textsuperscript{194} and a DFA report of 25 May 1992 records that relations between Nigeria and South Africa had “made significant progress” since de Klerk’s Abuja visit.\textsuperscript{195}

We have now concluded the investigation into South Africa’s foreign relations with black African states beyond the region from 1990 to mid-1992. The information we provided showed that the economic lever played a very important role in Pretoria’s endeavour to promote contact with some of these countries. This was relevant in the wider context of strengthening the bargaining position in the negotiations with the ANC and particular attention was paid to the OAU Chair countries of Uganda and Nigeria. During an interview, in March 1992, with the RSA Policy Review, a magazine issued by Pretoria’s Bureau of Information, Minister Pik Botha boasted that an entry into the OAU might be possible: “It is important for us to gain membership of the organisation, and as I said earlier on, I would like to see South Africa taking its rightful place in the OAU this year [1992] still”.\textsuperscript{196} By way of diplomatic backing from the OAU, Pretoria appears to have hoped that the sanctions would completely crumble, thus achieving its central foreign policy objective of returning to the international community. Never before had Pretoria seen itself so close to achieving this goal. We have already mentioned de Klerk’s important visits to Paris, London and Washington between 1990 and 1992 (Table 6), but contact was also established with Moscow, the former archenemy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. South Africa and the Russian Federation had established consular contact on 9 November 1991, extended to full diplomatic relations on 28 February 1992, during the visit of Andrej Kosyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, to South Af-

---


\textsuperscript{193} ‘Joint Communiqué’, Abuja, 10 April 1992, p.2 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 21).


rica. This was followed by President de Klerk’s meeting with his counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, in Moscow on 1/2 June 1992, discussing a South African loan of 100 million Rand and Pretoria’s possible readmission to the UN General Assembly. In 1999, Neil van Heerden admitted that it was Pretoria’s goal to secure the support of the permanent Security Council members in re-entering the United Nations as a fully fledged member: “Whether we specifically aimed at the five permanent [Security Council] members? Yes, of course, that was always in the back of one’s mind”. Regarding the People’s Republic of China, the fifth permanent Security Council member, South African newspapers revealed that Minister Pik Botha had paid a secret visit to Beijing, at the beginning of his trip to Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand in October 1991, to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. Three months later, on 21 February 1992, China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, came to South Africa during his Africa tour. Finally, during the visit to Moscow, Tokyo and Singapore in early June 1992 (Table 6), de Klerk hoped to make a stopover in Beijing, but this did not materialise despite strong lobbying from Pretoria, as suggested by the well-informed SouthScan magazine. Nonetheless, on his return on 8 June, de Klerk stated: “South Africa is back in the international community. This time I am more convinced of it than ever before”.

Having proposed that the external dimension was of vital relevance to the negotiations between the ANC and the government, we now resume the analysis of the developments after the Boipatong massacre of 17/18 June 1992. It was at this particular juncture that both the external and domestic dimension came together so critically. It will be recalled that this event had caused the ANC to break off the talks, arguing that the Pretoria government fuelled the violence to weaken the black organisation, and it now requested a special meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the political crisis.

Post-Boipatong Developments

The weeks following the Boipatong massacre saw a flurry of diplomatic moves. The ANC’s goal was the re-imposition of international pressure on Pretoria, while the government aimed

---

199 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.
202 SouthScan 7, 22, 5 June 1992: 162.
at refuting both the accusation that it was not committed to negotiating the demise of apartheid and that it was responsible for fomenting the violence against the ANC. The principal activities took place on the fringes of the OAU Summit in Dakar, in Abuja and in New York, where the UN Security Council convened on 15 and 16 July 1992 at the request of the African National Congress. We now explore these developments.

The township massacre almost coincided with the timing of the OAU Conference of Ministers from 22 to 27 June, followed by the Heads of State and Government meeting in Dakar from 29 June to 1 July. In trying to capitalise on this, the ANC requested the OAU to draft a resolution that condemned Pretoria for submission to the UN Security Council.\(^{204}\) Even though the OAU had recognised the ANC as South Africa's principal liberation movement and endorsed its negotiation Discussion Paper in the Harare Declaration, mentioned above, Mandela's organisation could not rely on this backing because, as we have seen, Pretoria had managed to make significant inroads into Africa. In fact, and reflecting the high priority the ANC attributed to continental diplomatic support, twenty of the forty-nine countries visited by Mandela until mid-1992 were in Africa (Table 7). A closer look at the individual destinations suggests that the choice was guided by three goals. First, in similar vein to Pretoria's strategy, primary importance appears to have been attached to lobbying for OAU support, with Mandela going to Uganda in September 1990 and attending the Conference of Ministers prior to the OAU Summit in Nigeria in June 1991. Second, and recognising the country's political influence in African political matters, Mandela paid two visits to Kenya, which again resembled Pretoria's priorities. Third, with his visits to Nigeria in May 1990 and to Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Ghana in the course of 1991, Mandela tried to broaden the ANC's diplomatic network in Africa by securing the support of those countries critical towards the recognition of the liberation movement or of those that had not allowed the ANC to establish a presence during the exile period.\(^{205}\) The two Francophone African countries had not supported the ANC, but rather advocated Dialogue with Pretoria, while Ghana had favoured the PAC over the ANC due to its policy of black exclusivity. The latter also applied to Nigeria, even though the ANC had an Exile Mission there.\(^{206}\) Despite all these activities, the ANC had to undertake significant diplomatic efforts to rally the African community of states at the OAU Summit in Dakar in furthering its goal of increasing Pretoria's political isolation. This was


necessary tactic given President de Klerk’s Abuja breakthrough in April 1992. This motivated the *Africa Research Bulletin* to comment: “For the ANC this marks a major and almost total defeat in an area which, six months before – when the movement won widespread agreement to delay further normalisation until an interim government – seemed to have been uncontested ANC turf.” Reflecting the great significance attached to the Dakar meeting, Mandela himself flew to Senegal, despite health problems and against the advice of his doctor to rest, and urged Africa’s leaders to think again before “hastily re-establishing relations with Pretoria.” In addition to its president, the ANC was represented by nine relatively high-ranking representatives, most notably Thabo Mbeki, Head of the ANC Department of International Affairs (DIA) from 1989 to 1993.

Before we examine the OAU Summit’s decision regarding the situation in South Africa, we need to discuss the parallel developments in Abuja because, in this instance, the Pretoria government tried to rally diplomatic support through Nigeria’s assistance. In furtherance of his African leadership ambition, as mentioned earlier, President Babangida convened UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and South African government representatives in Abuja on 27 June 1992. On this day, two separate rounds of talks were held between Boutros-Ghali, Pik Botha and Roelof Petrus ‘Roelf’ Meyer, Pretoria’s chief negotiator in the talks with the ANC, on the one hand, and between President Babangida, Foreign Minister Nwachukwu, Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer on the other. Also present at both meetings were Deputy Director-Generals Jeremy Shearar and Derek Auret, UN Ambassador Vernon Steward and Deputy Director Anton van Dalsen, the son of former Director-General Hans van Dalsen. The violence issue dominated both talks, with Pretoria again rejecting any culpability. Only one day prior to the Abuja meetings, de Klerk and Pik Botha wrote to their Nigerian counterparts. However, again indicating that presidential communication went through the NIS, only the latter’s correspondence with Nwachukwu is contained in the DFA files and this reads: “The charges of Government complicity in the tragedy in Boipatong or in any other instance of killing, are without any substance whatsoever. (...) How can it now be argued that we as a Government wish to foment violence, knowing what the result would be both at home and abroad?”

While questioning the legal justification for action by the UN Security Council, Pretoria left room for compromise: “If the Security Council feels that it needs to be reliably informed on

---

209 Cited in *West Africa* 3903, 6-12 July 1992: 1134.
events in South Africa, the Government would certainly be prepared to assist by participating in any meeting in this respect”. Pretoria’s officials adopted the same stance during the talks with Boutros-Ghali, Babangida and Nwachukwu. Pik Botha argued that the ANC used Boipatong “to make unpleasant propaganda” and as an “opportunity to cancel Codesa and proceed with mass action”. He laid all blame for the violence on the black organisation and presented a picture of ethnic violence: “It should be pointed out that there is only fighting where there are Zulus and Xhosas”. The arguments were repeated during the meeting with the UN Secretary-General, with both Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer emphasising Pretoria’s steps to curb the violence and its commitment to negotiations, such as evidenced in the March 1992 referendum. In response, Boutros-Ghali stated “that he was willing to assist in trying to find a solution to the problems”, but also indicated that he had lost some of his faith in Pretoria due to its handling of the violence: “The question that comes to mind is how it is possible that with all its infrastructure and means, the SA Government is still unable to cope with such acts of violence after two years. This leads to possible international perceptions that there is something fishy going on”. In contrast, Babangida confirmed his support for de Klerk: “Nigeria will continue to talk to its brothers to encourage them to negotiate. The position of President de Klerk is appreciated and there is faith in his sincerity”.

We now return to the OAU Heads of State and Government meeting in Dakar, to assess the success of both the ANC’s and Pretoria’s endeavours in securing African diplomatic support. In fact, the outcome of the OAU Summit revealed whether or not de Klerk’s New Diplomacy in Africa had been effective. While we do not know what position the Nigerian President took in Dakar, the ANC’s networking in Africa had evidently found acceptance by the majority of states as the draft resolution prepared by the Conference of Ministers was

---

213 ‘Subject – meeting on 27 June 1992 in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr RP Meyer and the President of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida and the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu’, from Anton van Dalsen to Pik Botha, 30 June 1992, pp.1f. (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 23).
214 ‘Subject – meetings on 27 June 1992 in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr RP Meyer and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali’, from Anton van Dalsen to Pik Botha, 29 June 1992, pp.2f., 5f. (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 23).
215 ‘Subject – meetings on 27 June 1992 in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr RP Meyer and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali’, from Anton van Dalsen to Pik Botha, 29 June 1992, pp.1, 3f. (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 23).
216 ‘Subject – meeting on 27 June 1992 in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr RP Meyer and the President of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida and the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu’, from Anton van Dalsen to Pik Botha, 30 June 1992, p.3 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 23).
adopted by the heads of state and government. In addition, on 2 July 1992 and on behalf of the African Group, Madagascar formally requested a special meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the Dakar resolution. While to date, Pretoria’s initiatives in Africa had not produced any substantial diplomatic achievements, its fairly intensive contact with Abuja bore some fruit in the context of the Security Council debates on 15/16 July. Notably, a comparison between the OAU draft resolution and what eventually became Security Council Resolution 765, shows that the sections in which Pretoria was accused of being responsible for the violence and the Boipatong massacre were either strongly toned down or deleted in their entirety. Crucially, according to the both well-informed magazines, *Africa Confidential* and *SouthScan*, these alterations were due to the lobbying of both Pretoria’s newly-gained and old friends, Nigeria and Great Britain. The consequences of the Security Council meetings of 15/16 July were significant for South Africa’s subsequent political development. Most importantly, Resolution 765 requested the UN Secretary General to send an envoy to investigate the situation in South Africa. Boutros-Ghali chose Cyrus Vance, the former US Secretary of State (1977-80) who also acted as Boutros-Ghali’s personal envoy to other crisis areas of the world during 1991/92, namely Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. From 22 to 31 July, Vance consulted with the relevant parties and groups involved in South Africa’s political transition process. Based on his findings, Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council. The discussion of this document on 17 August led to Resolution 772 that stipulated the creation of a UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) and based on which fifty observers were deployed to South Africa in early September.

Thus, in analysing the developments after the Boipatong massacre, the ANC’s strategy of capitalising on this event can be considered as successful. It managed to raise the necessary African diplomatic support to re-establish international pressure on Pretoria. With the pres-

---


ence of UNOMSA in the country, the ANC had won some assurance that the South African government could no longer sabotage the negotiation process, such as Mandela had accused de Klerk of doing after the Boipatong massacre. Between 1990 and 1992, the South African government had accepted international fact finding missions from Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and even the OAU, but the deployment of a permanent international observer mission was altogether a different matter. Pretoria considered this as external interference in its domestic affairs, something that it had always resisted. As late as 23 April 1992, President de Klerk stated: “South Africa is a sovereign state (...). Demands for international involvement (...) are (...) rejected by the government”. Therefore, the direct involvement of the international community in the South African transition process represented a major victory for the ANC. At the same time, it was a defeat for de Klerk, because he could no longer procrastinate on rapid political change, as he had previously done, in his attempt to secure as many concessions as possible for the white minority. Unnoticed by the general public at the time and despite the public hostility between the South African government and the ANC after the Boipatong massacre, their chief negotiators, Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa respectively, met behind the scenes to work out a deal acceptable to both parties. The result of this process was the signing of the Record of Understanding on 26 September 1992. This put an end to the antagonism that had so far characterised the relationship between the government and the ANC. Consequently, the Multiparty Negotiation Process proceeded unhindered until December 1993, even though the violence continued, and South Africa’s first democratic elections were finally held from 26 to 29 April 1994.

We do not need to examine the above-mentioned developments more closely, given that the African continental dimension no longer played a significant role in the negotiations. The days of soliciting their support were over. In particular, the DFA files for those twelve countries where access was granted until September 1993 or beyond do not record any relevant interaction post-Boipatong. Judging from secondary sources, the remaining months of white rule became something of a handing over period. In fact, and similar to the behind-the-scene talks between the negotiators of both the ANC and the government after the Boipatong massacre, a degree of co-operation also appears to have taken place between officials from the


Department of Foreign Affairs and the ANC’s Department of International Affairs. Most notably, when interviewed in 1999, Pik Botha confirmed suggestions made in the secondary literature that his department had funded several of Nelson Mandela’s overseas trips.

Thus, the developments after June 1992 put a definitive end to de Klerk’s ambition of gaining recognition for his reforms among the African community of states. In spite of all the undertakings from the Pretoria government to this effect, white South Africa could never find acceptance as a fellow African state until the country’s majority had been given the vote. This fundamental reality was the underlying cause for the renewed African diplomatic activity in the wake of the Boipatong massacre. De Klerk’s New Diplomacy approach towards Africa had brought about some concrete results, particularly overflying and landing rights for South African Airways, the establishment of missions in Madagascar and Togo, diplomatic support from Cameroon in the forum of the FAO and notable meetings with the presidents of Kenya and Nigeria. However, and similar to Vorster’s breakthroughs with his visits to the Ivory Coast and Liberia in 1974 and 1975 respectively, these were not substantial enough and more than thirty African states would not relinquish their anti-apartheid stand. Despite Nigeria’s positive stance towards Pretoria during the UN Security Council meetings of 15/16 July 1992, the supportive role of the African community of states towards the ANC persisted. On 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was sworn in as South Africa’s President, so terminating the last outpost of white minority rule on the African continent and subsequently putting South Africa’s foreign relations with Africa on a sound basis.

---


An examination of South Africa's foreign relations with the black African states beyond southern Africa constitutes the focus of this thesis. These relations took place within a framework chartered by Pretoria's apartheid policy and the fundamental opposition to this ideology by African states. Consequently, although South Africa considered itself as an African state, the Organisation of African Unity could and did not grant South Africa membership.

This study is written in an academic register called Diplomatic History. Most studies on the country's foreign relations are, in fact, a form of Diplomatic History, but these are seldom based on primary sources, notwithstanding that archival sources constitute a fundamental element of this academic discipline. However, in this work we had the advantage of access to different archives in South Africa, with the material from the Department of Foreign Affairs providing the core. In addition, we interviewed a number of people, former foreign service officials in particular, that were of relevance in shaping South Africa's foreign relations with Africa. At the same time, in the Introduction, we discussed the limitations of Diplomatic or other History in objectively uncovering the past and suggested the importance of using concepts provided by other disciplines, like Political Science and its derivative, International Relations, to explain developments in diplomatic history. In particular, and borrowing from the Political Science theory, both Chapters 1 and 2 noted that South Africa's foreign relations with the black African countries were the expression of Pretoria's foreign policy-making processes which are shaped by both domestic and external factors. Drawing from the study of IR, we also suggested that South Africa had a higher socio-economic development and disposed of greater politico-military strength than the other African states. This inequality in status constituted an inherent factor in the Republic's interaction with these states. In acknowledging the importance of both the Political Science and IR concepts for an understanding of the evolution of South Africa's foreign relations in this study, we will presently turn to discuss their relevance and how they impacted on the course of events. In doing so, we stipu-
late that they are of such importance that South Africa's early post-apartheid foreign policy making was marked by continuity rather than change, as argued by Peter Vale in 1995.1

In both the Introduction and in Chapter 2, we proposed that South Africa's foreign policy towards black Africa resulted from an interplay of domestic, regional, continental and international environments. The focus in this thesis is the first, since we stated at the outset of this study that our principal interest was the domestic perspective. We now discuss the role of both the state and non-state actors within the country; this distinction was introduced in Chapter 2, called South Africa's Foreign Policy System. Regarding the state actors, we have argued throughout that competition and rivalry, but also a degree of co-operation, prevailed between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, the military and national intelligence. This intermittent conflict and co-operation gives credence to both the bureaucratic politics and the psychological models, which draw from the bureaucratic theory on foreign policy making and which are outlined in Chapter 2. These theories suggest that governments are not homogeneous entities but, rather, involve departments and individuals that compete against one another, at certain times, and collaborate at others. Their goal is to gain maximum influence in charting the direction of a country's foreign policy. Our immediate task here is to explore how these different agencies fared over time, and for this purpose we begin with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the supposedly predominant foreign policy actor.

Over time, this department was relegated to the background, notwithstanding an attempt to prevent such an outcome through the launching of an Interdepartmental Committee on African Affairs in late 1954 (Chapter 2). Although intended to overcome bureaucratic tussles, this never functioned because the other departments were not prepared to relinquish their independent axis to decision-making. Consequently, South Africa's foreign policy towards African states in the early 1960s appears to be the only period during which the DFA was univalled in conducting Pretoria's foreign policy. Certainly, officials from this ministry were not exposed to discernible bureaucratic competition in their later contact with the Central African Republic, Liberia, Malawi and Madagascar (Chapters 4 and 5). However, and this is a core finding of the study, they were never the sole players in the African countries to which this work has directed its attention. One reason for this was the stronger position, which will be discussed below, held by either the military, national intelligence or the Department of Information. Above all, the Department of Foreign Affairs' central approach in providing technical assistance and support for development/investment projects was not helpful in achieving the

---

Nationalist government’s principal goal of breaking South Africa’s isolation through greater acceptance by African states. This weakened the position of the DFA in the decision-making process, and made it vulnerable to interference from sister departments.

The DFA’s policy of applying the levers of both technical assistance and development/investment projects had its roots in the 1950s, when South Africa participated in continent-wide organisations that focused on technical forms of co-operation. However, during the course of the 1960s, the independent African states gradually excluded South Africa from these bodies, despite its continued willingness to make a contribution. From the mid-1960s, we discerned that the foreign affairs ministry shifted from this multilateral approach, hoping to co-opt support by providing the same assistance on a bilateral basis. However, this strategy was not significant enough to convince targeted African leaders to establish relations with Pretoria. The attempt by the DFA to secure the support of Gabon’s President Omar Bongo illustrates the unsuitability of a bilateral strategy based on technical assistance. Launching the OGAPROV agricultural project in Bongo’s home area, notwithstanding Gabon’s dire lack of meat production, proved ineffectual. In spite of attracting some of his attention, as we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, this president was far more interested in engaging with South Africa’s military because they could provide arms. As a result, on the 101 anti-apartheid sanctions resolutions voted on by the United Nations General Assembly between 1962 and 1989, the Gabonese Permanent Representative abstained only six times, giving his approval in all other instances.2 A similar situation prevailed on the Comoros during the 1980s, where the DFA’s participation in the Sangani farm project did not result in diplomatic recognition (Chapters 5 and 6) or other forms of diplomatic support. Similarly, even though not constituting technical assistance per se, the DFA’s offer of drought relief to both Somalia and Sudan in the mid-1980s was seen as a friendly gesture by both Mogadishu and Khartoum respectively, but this did not marry with their immediate interests, obtaining weapons (Chapter 5). The department’s only engagement that we could judge as worthwhile was the upgrading and maintenance of the airport on Cape Verde, in return for which South African Airways obtained landing rights on the island (Chapter 4).

An equally sobering conclusion must be drawn from the DFA’s development/investment projects that differed from technical assistance insofar as it also involved private and parastatal companies. The expertise of both South Africa’s financial and industrial sector, and the growth of the country’s economy during the 1960s and 1970s, afforded the DFA the ideal platform to engage with private and parastatal firms in developing partnerships. Here, too, the

department favoured initiatives that were close to the heart of the targeted African leader. This was the case with the Lilongwe Capital Project, the Transgabonais railway and the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa in the Central African Republic (Chapter 4). While eager to secure South Africa’s participation, many African leaders exploited the DFA’s sometimes desperate attempt to gain a foothold in black Africa. The only country to exchange ambassadors was Malawi in 1967, and the country’s voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly was at least more supportive of Pretoria than that of Gabon; on the above-mentioned 101 anti-apartheid sanctions resolutions voted on between 1962 and 1989, Malawi cast a no-vote three times, abstained seventy times, while approving in twenty-eight instances. Yet, on close inspection, this was a relatively unimportant country. When asked, in 1999, about this dearth of concrete results from the policy, Neil van Heerden downplayed disappointment:

The need to break the isolation was quite a strong mental thing, to say ‘here I am, in Gabon’. (…) It actually didn’t always make economic sense. (…) It was a thing of breaking the isolation. We certainly didn’t get a regular return for the money, but this was as one would say in the Bible: it is bread on the water. You are putting the bread on the water and you are hoping that it will (…) [be] an investment for the future. And you know full well that you would not get a one-to-one return.4

The main purpose of these projects, then, according to the same former top foreign service official, was the provision of what he called “appetisers”,5 to promote South African acceptance among the African community of states.6

Pretoria’s increased focus on southern Africa and South Africa’s declining economic performance in the 1980s aside, the ineffectiveness of the DFA’s Africa approach caused the government of P.W. Botha to curtail both technical assistance and development/investment projects; this was shown in Chapter 5. In addition, the philosophy behind the department’s policy towards Africa underwent a change as the decade matured. Until the mid-1980s, international development assistance followed a Cold War logic; Third World countries received support from either the East or the West, primarily depending on their political ideologies and often without providing deep or even material returns. This changed with the end of the Cold War; development and technical assistance became increasingly linked to specific demands by the donor country. This applied to South Africa’s assistance to African countries, too. During President F.W. de Klerk’s tenure, Pretoria used a lever that rested on reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade relations. Under the emerging circumstances of Africa’s increasing eco-

---

4 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.
5 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999.
6 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999.
nomic marginalisation, these trade relations rendered the Republic an attractive partner for African states. In return, SAA obtained landing and overflying rights in several African countries and Pretoria was able to establish wider political contacts (Chapter 6). The Africa policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs thus took on a new and promising form towards the end of the period under review in this study. Previous efforts, however, resulted in rival government departments challenging the DFA’s dominance in foreign policy making. This had the effect of channelling Pretoria’s foreign relations in different directions, developments we now turn to discuss.

The military, through the South African Defence Force, was, after P.W. Botha became the assertive Minister of Defence in 1966, the primary actor to invade the DFA’s domain. Later as Prime Minister and then as State President, Botha was influenced by the military, whose approach to diplomacy in Africa remained constant throughout the period under review. The principal aim of the military was not to end South Africa’s isolation, but, guided by the realist interpretations of the world, to ensure the security of the white South Africa. This was mirrored in the military’s initiatives in black Africa, where we have identified two chronological phases, one from the early 1960s to roughly the mid-1970s, and the second period which followed. During the first phase, the military’s view corresponded with the ideas expressed in the Africa Charter of 1949, namely that South Africa would co-operate with the colonial powers to maintain Western control over Africa and to defend the continent against communism. The diplomatic historian Geoff Berridge makes the point repeatedly in his work on this subject. The military’s initial ambition to play a continental role was detected in the Congo crisis, when they provided, alongside the United States, assistance to western-oriented Katangese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe (Chapter 3). In addition, as we have seen, the military gave at least tacit approval to a South African mercenary force because of their own limited capacity to participate in the unfolding war in the Congo. This situation began to change from 1963 onwards, when France became South Africa’s main armaments supplier, seen in Chapter 4; this strengthened the SADF’s position in both domestic and foreign policy making. The fruitful bilateral relations between Paris and Pretoria were complimented, after P.W. Botha had become the Minister of Defence, by a working relationship over Francophone Africa. With strong networks deep into the continent, two French officials, Jacques Foccart and Jean Mauricheau-Beaupré, provided the South African military with direct access to two key leaders, Presidents Bongo of Gabon and Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Linked by overlapping interests in the Nigerian Civil War, France and South Africa, together with both

Gabon and the Ivory Coast, jointly provided military assistance to the Biafra secessionists. This represented the high point of Franco-white South African co-operation in African politics and diplomacy. South Africa’s interests aimed at creating a military network with the politically stable and anticommunist African states, preferably with French and pre-revolutionary Portuguese support. This was confirmed in an interview with the military’s representative in Paris during the Nigerian Civil War, Neels van Tonder. So, in September 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster offered to conclude non-aggression pacts with the independent African countries. Yet, changes in the international, regional and domestic environments in the mid-1970s undermined the military’s plans. For one thing, Foccart left office in 1974 and Mauricheau-Beaupré also disappeared from the French foreign policy making circles, thus ending the military’s crucial links with Paris and their African clients. Second, the Lisbon coup of April 1974 and the impending independence of both Angola and Mozambique removed Pretoria’s *cordon sanitaire*; this compelled the military to concentrate on safeguarding South Africa’s national security in its immediate neighbourhood, subsequently pursuing what became known as the Total Strategy. Finally, the Department of Information, in conjunction with the Bureau for State Security, became Pretoria’s primary foreign policy actor, replacing the Department of Foreign Affairs. To this direction in the making of South Africa’s foreign policy we now turn our attention.

The privileging of both the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security during John Vorster’s premiership followed upon the strong ties between Information Secretary Eschel Rhoodie and BOSS head Hendrik van den Bergh, as well as the latter’s longstanding and personal friendship with Vorster (Chapter 4). This particular access ensured that large budgets were put at the disposal of the Department of Information in order to launch what we have called Secret Diplomacy. This strategy to ending South Africa’s isolation is best characterised as a “middle way” between the conventional diplomacy of the DFA, and the military’s perspective which relied both on arms sales and close contacts with select countries. Information Minister Connie Mulder and his colleagues conducted then a “marketing foreign policy”, to capture a phrase recently used by the young South African IR scholar Janis van der Westhuizen: “The concept of marketing power echoes many tenets familiar to students of IR theory, but is ultimately too eclectic to firmly reside in any one of the traditional paradigms. Although it rejects Realism’s impoverished conception of power, marketing power redirects attention to the primacy of the state as a repository of a particular form of

---

8 Telephone interview with Neels van Tonder, 19 March 2002.
 CHAPTER SEVEN : CONCLUSION

power".10 Van der Westhuizen suggests further that “[s]uccessful deployment of marketing power usually coincides with a well consolidated sense of national identity of which the USA, despite its overwhelming structural power, is probably the most celebrated example”.11 Significantly, as outlined in Chapter 4, Eschel Rhoodie’s experience in the United States was an important contributing factor that led to the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy; an approach to diplomacy that was supported by a net of verligte Afrikaner whose aim was to ensure the survival of the minority. A cornerstone of this approach in Africa, as well as elsewhere, was to sell the concept of separate development as Pretoria’s intention of reforming the apartheid policy. In comparison to the DFA’s initiatives in securing breakthroughs to Africa, the Department of Information’s strategy proved to be more successful. Although benefiting from the SADF’s co-operation with the Ivory Coast over the Nigerian Civil War, the Department of Information managed to independently convince both the Ivorian and Senegalese President that Pretoria wanted to “reform” apartheid. This led eventually to Vorster’s visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974 (Chapter 4) and his meeting with that country’s president, Houphouët-Boigny. This breakthrough into Africa influenced even the policy of the rival Department of Foreign Affairs. In particular, in Chapter 4 we discussed the DFA’s imitation of Secret Diplomacy which, undoubtedly, contributed to Prime Minister Vorster’s meeting with President William Tolbert’s in Monrovia in February 1975. In particular, and following an invitation from the DFA, the Liberian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva toured both Namibia and South Africa in December 1974, and the then homeland leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, met Tolbert in Liberia later that month. This flexible approach found a parallel expression in Transkei leader Kaizer Matanzima’s inclusion in the South African delegation to the UN General Assembly in late 1974, a development that the scholar of apartheid’s foreign policy, Deon Geldenhuys, has called “multiracial diplomacy”.12 After more than a decade of limited dealings with the independent African states, the DFA appears to have questioned its reliance on economic and technical leverage in achieving South Africa’s diplomatic goals on the continent.

The Department of Information’s work was greatly facilitated by their co-operation with the national intelligence agency, BOSS. Charged with intelligence gathering to safeguard South Africa’s national security, its activities included: monitoring the security situation in

the western Indian Ocean after the closure of the Suez Canal; securing South Africa's access to oil from Nigeria, for example; obtaining SAA's overflying rights in African countries; and arranging the security for high-level visits, such as that of Vorster to both the Ivory Coast and to Liberia (Chapters 4 and 5). Although not primarily briefed to break South Africa's international isolation, some of BOSS's activities, of which the issue of overflying rights is a good example, coincided with Pretoria's primary foreign policy goals. BOSS's concern with South Africa's national security, coupled with the endeavours of its partner, the Department of Information, in improving South Africa's public international standing, formed Pretoria's response to the then current issues in the country's Africa policy. Complementing each other, the Department of Information was active in both the Ivory Coast and Senegal, while BOSS pursued the Détente objectives in southern Africa (Chapter 4). However, after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, and the collapse of the cordon sanitaire around South Africa, the regional policy goals of national intelligence clashed with those of the military. The central point of division was how best to ensure white South Africa's immediate security following upon the establishment of Marxist governments in the neighbouring states of Angola and Mozambique. The approach towards Angola was most controversial, with BOSS opting for indirect support to the western-oriented and American-supported Angolan liberation movements through Zaire, whereas the military preferred direct military intervention. This struggle brought to a head the long-standing conflict between these two government agencies, personified by Hendrik van den Bergh and P.W. Botha respectively. In October 1975, the military succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Vorster of the necessity to deploy troops and thus won an important battle against BOSS (Chapter 4). But the invasion ended with a defeat and the troops were forced to withdraw, humiliated, from Angola in early 1976. The struggle for policy ascendancy between the military and national intelligence was not over, however. Its final showdown came after Vorster's resignation from the premiership in 1978. The principal contenders for succession were Information Minister Connie Mulder and Defence Minister P.W. Botha who, after Mulder was discredited as a result of the Information Scandal, became the country's Prime Minister. This had long-term implications for Pretoria's foreign policy towards Africa because the military, in co-operation with national intelligence, became the dominant actor during the 1980s. The Department of Foreign Affairs was pushed deeper into the background, and it is to this period that we now turn.

Following the demise of the Bureau for State Security in the wake of the Information Scandal, the national intelligence agency became the Department of National Security from 1978 to 1980. During a transition period of two years, Kobie Coetsee, this department’s Dep-
uty Minister, restructured the national intelligence agency, eventually becoming the National Intelligence Service. Coetsee was also instrumental in influencing P.W. Botha to appoint Niël Barnard, a Professor in Political Science at the then University of the Orange Free State, as the NIS Director-General in November 1979, developments we explained in Chapter 2. Importantly, Barnard shared P.W. Botha’s politico-ideological views of the South African security situation. Consequently, Barnard’s appointment prevented confrontation between the military and national intelligence, as had surfaced in the Angolan war in 1975, and on a personal level between van den Bergh and the then Minister of Defence (Chapter 4). In consequence, Chapter 5 documents close co-operation between the NIS and the military during the 1980s. Following the collapse of the cordon sanitaire, and especially after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the military’s priority turned to southern Africa, with ventures beyond concentrating on four items: co-operation with Omar Bongo of Gabon; relations with the French mercenary Bob Denard; armament sales; and the presence in the western Indian Ocean which was seen, by some, as confirming the threat that the country faced from the Soviet Union. In these endeavours, both the military and national intelligence benefited from Cold War tension between Washington and Moscow. In many cases, but certainly not all, Pretoria could count on backing from the United States. Measured against its own goals, the military probably pursued the most successful approach towards the black African countries beyond southern Africa. In particular, and in stark contrast to the Department of Foreign Affairs, they secured themselves a stable partner in President Bongo. With the end of the Cold War, however, the military’s dominance in foreign policy making waned, because their realist policies of power and the use of force were no longer found to be suitable to resolve the problems faced by South Africa’s foreign policy makers. This development took place gradually. As a remainder of the military’s dominance in the 1980s, and owing to the strong position established under P.W. Botha, the NIS retained its influence in contact with both Uganda and Nigeria into 1992. Nevertheless, the Department of Foreign Affairs steadily rose in prominence from the late 1980s. This trend was further facilitated by the brief, but busy, presidency of F.W. de Klerk, who preferred to rely on the advice of the foreign service corps, as explained in Chapter 6. This concludes our discussion of the policies of the different state actors and how changes in power relations between them affected the course of developments regarding South Africa’s foreign relations with the black African states. But as we have seen, different non-state actors also played a role, and it is to these non-state actors that we now turn our attention.

In Chapter 2, Table 1 on page twenty-two presents an overview of the players in which we are interested. First, however, a warning: as in all foreign policy processes, the Prime Minis-
ter/State President and the government agencies formed the core of decision-making in South Africa. Non-state actors played only a peripheral role. Their relevance, which was most marked during the 1970s, waxed and waned. For the purposes of this discussion, it seems appropriate to form four clusters, namely the Progressive Party and the *Rand Daily Mail*, the think tanks Africa Institute and South African Institute of International Affairs, the Broederbond, and the business sector.

The Progressive Party and the *Rand Daily Mail*, as well as their progeny, shared a critical stance towards Pretoria's policies in general, including its foreign relations with Africa; this was shown in Chapters 4 to 6. With regard to the Progressive Party, its activities and interests in Africa were an expression of concern over South Africa's increased isolation. Colin Eglin, the party's leader from 1971 to 1978, and again between 1986 and 1988, went to several African countries during the 1970s to offset the impression that all white South Africans supported apartheid. At the same time, his meetings with the relevant leaders were meant to strengthen the party's political profile (Chapter 2). Eglin's excursions drew, on occasion, somewhat heavy criticism from the country's minority leadership, as shown in Chapter 4. A further indication that Pretoria regarded Eglin as a serious player in politics, the South African government, through its network with France, ensured that both Eglin and Helen Suzman could not, as was intended, meet the Ivorian President in 1972 and thus intrude its worthwhile relations with Houphouët-Boigny (Chapter 4). During the leadership of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert until February 1986, we detected no comparable Africa activities by the Progressives. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Slabbert came from the academia and never became a party-man. He withdrew from party politics during the internal crisis of the mid-1980s, feeling that extra-parliamentary activities were more conducive to overcoming the apartheid system. As the Director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, he organised the Dakar meeting between members of the ANC and the Afrikaner intelligentsia in 1987, which is seen as a seminally important event that contributed towards the abolition of apartheid (Chapter 5). In this sense, Slabbert impacted significantly on the country's political development. The *Rand Daily Mail* also represented a critical voice towards Pretoria and exposed developments within the country. It was the first newspaper to suggest that Vorster had gone to the Ivory Coast in 1974 (Chapter 4) and its reports led to the Information Scandal that eventually caused the Prime Minister's fall from power (Chapter 2). It also exposed the financial wastage in development/investment projects in the Central African Republic (Chapter 5). Later on, and following in the footsteps of the *Rand Daily Mail, The Weekly Mail* and then *The Weekly Mail & Guardian* revealed the military's secret project in Gabon (Chapter 5) and
was responsible for uncovering what became Inkathagate in July 1991 (Chapter 6). The latter scandal seriously questioned President de Klerk’s commitment to peaceful negotiations with the ANC, undermining the National Party’s international standing, and weakening its negotiation position. Thus, both the Information Scandal and Inkathagate significantly changed the course of South African political developments.

In turning to the role of both the Africa Institute and the South African Institute of International Affairs, the findings of this study on their activities justify us to consider them as think tanks, as defined in Chapter 2. Most notably, we recall that they are “relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of government, political parties, and pressure groups”.

Researchers from both the Africa Institute and the South African Institute of International Affairs published a number of studies on Pretoria’s foreign relations with the African states beyond southern Africa. Most of this work on dates from the period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, much of which is included in this study (Chapter 4), reflecting the peak in the government’s outreach activity towards these countries during the Vorster premiership. It may well be that they have added “to the wisdom of the attentive publics, diplomats and policy-makers”, such as suggested in a forthcoming study on the role of institutes of international affairs, among them that of South Africa.

We only traced one instance in which one of the think tanks, namely the Africa Institute, was crossing the border of being solely “engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of government”, according to the above definition. Reference is made to the visit of both Africa Institute Director Joseph Moolman and Deputy Director Erich Leistner, who were joined by the Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, John Barratt, to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in August 1974. Chapter 4 details that in this instance, and due to concurring politico-ideological views on the issue of separate development, the Africa Institute members, and especially Moolman, were drawn into the policy network supportive of the Department of Information’s Secret Diplomacy, while Barratt’s Institute retained its non-partisan character. A different assessment would have to be made of the Foreign Affairs Association and the Southern African Freedom Foundation. Founded and funded by the Department of Information, they were strongly supportive of both Secret Diplomacy and Detente. We do not discuss them here, however, because their status does not correspond to the notion of think tanks introduced above.

This work has certainly benefited significantly from Paul Williams' recent thesis in outlining the profile of the Broederbond (Chapter 2), but to gauging its impact on Pretoria's Africa relations from the DFA files is difficult. What we can conclude is that the Broederbond did not try to directly influence the Pretoria government regarding foreign policy making towards the black African states. Instead, personal contact and informal networking influenced political decisions. Importantly, as indicated in Chapter 2, almost all Cabinet Ministers in the period under review were members of the Broederbond and thus shared its set of values. Importantly among these was the acceptance of the idea of white supremacy. This factor, it can be suggested, underpinned the approach of Pretoria's leadership towards Africa. The clearest evidence of the Broederbond's indirect influence on Pretoria's foreign policy can be traced during the Détente period, when it constituted a core element of the policy network that promoted this strategy. However, after the failure of Détente and P.W. Botha's rise to Prime Minister, the Broederbond's standing decreased, only to increase in status under de Klerk, who, in his autobiography, suggests that the organisation's views supported his move to undertake the reforms of February 1990 (Chapter 2). This indicates that the Broederbond's thinking had changed during the 1980s. It now considered the continued suppression of the majority as detrimental to the aim of securing the survival of the minority, because this policy continuously severed the country's political and economic position. Consequently, the Broederbond viewed political reforms to be more conducive to ensure the minority's security.

Our attention now turns to the final non-state actor which has engaged our interest, the business sector. In the context of South Africa's foreign relations with black Africa, it came close to the political locus of decision-making. In discussing its significance, we will further reply to two questions initially raised in Chapter 2, notably the relationship between business and apartheid politics, and the division between Afrikaner and English-speaking business. Concerning the latter, this study suggests that their importance varied significantly; English-speaking business featured dominantly within Pretoria's approach towards the black African states, while the Afrikaner counterpart played a negligible role. On the part of organised business, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut undertook one sole independent venture to Africa beyond the immediate neighbourhood, namely to Malawi in 1969, while the Durban Chamber of Commerce dispatched five business missions between 1968 and 1979 (Chapter 4). The South African Foreign Trade Organisation and the South Africa Foundation, on the other hand, were very active, comparatively speaking, in Africa. Although not purely English-speaking institutions, both had a strong basis in this business sector. Aside from the Afrikaner’s limited in-

---

volvement, generally, in doing business, South Africa's foreign service officers seemed more at ease with English-speaking business. Significantly, and supporting this conclusion, the only significant engagement of private Afrikaner capital dates from the period during which the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security dominated foreign policy making. As we noted in Chapter 4, the fertiliser king Louis Luyt became part of their policy network, while Bessemer Steel, owned by influential Afrikaner businessman Paul Hoogendyk, showed an interest in a project in Zaire in 1975. In contrast, English-speaking private firms were crucial in the development of the DFA's development/investment projects, especially during the Outward-Looking period of the 1970s. Here, two engineering and construction companies stand out: Roberts Construction was involved or showed interest in major railway line projects in Malawi (1970), Gabon (1973), the C.A.R. (1974) and Zaire (1975), while LTA was intimately connected to the housing and hotel projects in Gabon (1971-72) and the C.A.R. (1974), as well as the Zairean railway project (1975) (Chapter 4).

Although both were representatives of English-speaking business, Southern Sun and Sol Kerzner's other hotel firms, as well as the Anglo American Corporation, must be viewed as cases apart. Southern Sun became part of the DFA's development/investment project approach with a hotel on Madagascar (1970-72) and Mauritius (1974-75) (Chapter 4). However, the principal activity of Kerzner's other hotel groups took place during the 1980s on both Mauritius and the Comoros (Chapter 5). These reflected Kerzner's expansionist strategy, we have suggested, that was unrelated to the foreign affairs ministry's current policies, pursuing business and not political interests. The Anglo American mining conglomerate played in a different league altogether. As a multinational company, it did not need the assistance of the Pretoria government in implementing the strategies necessary to achieve its business goals in black Africa, although, as we have suggested in Chapter 4, their interests did at times overlap. Anglo American's status more closely resembled that of a foreign policy actor similar in kind to national intelligence or the military, in effect a rival to, collaborating with, or acting against the foreign service corps. This study does not reveal any clashes of interest between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Anglo American. Regarding collaboration between them, relatively minor exchanges with the DFA occurred in the early 1960s over the Congo (Chapter 3), over Madagascar in the late 1960s (Chapter 4) and Somalia during 1984 (Chapter 5). A rather close relationship, however, evolved over the SMTF copper project in Zaire during 1975, where Pretoria's Détente policy coincided initially with Anglo American's mining interests (Chapter 4). In this context, we recall that Harry Oppenheimer had openly supported
Pretoria's southern Africa approach. Often, however, Anglo American went its own way. Notably, the secondary literature mentions mining operations in the C.A.R., in Gabon, in the Ivory Coast, in Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Tanzania, but the DFA files do not contain any information on contact between the mining firm and the foreign affairs ministry in these cases. For example in Tanzania, and dating from the late 1950s, De Beers held 50% of the shares in the Williamson Diamond Mine, an engagement that was possible through contact on the highest level, as Anglo American Executive Director Michael Spicer explained in 1999: "The Tanzanians, of course, had a very strict policy towards South Africa. And yet, De Beers officials went backwards and forwards (... ) with British passports. (...) And [Tanzania's President] Nyerere and [Harry] Oppenheimer [were] close personal friends". Not only did Anglo American not require Pretoria to assist them, government involvement might even have rendered the multinational's efforts more difficult in view of Nyerere's vehement anti-apartheid stance.

Let us now examine the nature of the relationship between the business sector and apartheid politics. In doing so, and by acknowledging their leading role, we concentrate on the English-speaking firms. In Chapter 2, by examining the hitherto unavailable evidence on South Africa's trade with sub-Saharan Africa, we statistically challenged the thesis advanced by Timothy Shaw and Roger Southall who explained Pretoria's Outward-Looking Policy in Africa as an expression of the country's political economy. Empirically, we have demonstrated that the reverse applied; the Department of Foreign Affairs needed and profited from the knowledge and services of the business sector in its efforts to establish diplomatic contact with African countries. So much so that the state-controlled Industrial Development Corporation usually offered loans on soft conditions and the contracted Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation insured the loans with the government's backing. Examples of soft loans were the Lilongwe Capital Project, the hotel on Madagascar, as well as the housing projects in the C.A.R. and Gabon, while Credit Guarantee insured the loan to finance Malawi's railway link

---


19 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999.

with Mozambique, although this involved 60% local content only, and not 70% as stipulated in its statutes. The IDC's loan policy and Credit Guarantee's deviation from its practice mirrored the importance Pretoria attributed to establishing and promoting diplomatic contact with those countries. Political criteria thus overruled the application of business conditions.

The role of business in maintaining the apartheid system was an issue in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, when considering the forty pages devoted to this subject in its final report, and comparing them with the close on 2,800 pages in total, one cannot escape the impression that the TRC shied away from probing this delicate issue too deeply. Nonetheless, the TRC did introduce a helpful threefold classification of business culpability with apartheid:

First order involvement: “Direct involvement with the state in the formulation of oppressive policies or practices that resulted in low labour costs (or otherwise boosted profits) can be described as first-order involvement”.

Second order involvement: “However, a distinction needs to be made between those businesses that made their money by engaging directly in activities that promoted state repression and those whose business dealings could not have been reasonably expected to contribute directly or subsequently to repression. Businesses that provided armoured vehicles to the police during the mid-1980s would fall into the former category”.

Third order involvement: “Finally, one can categorise third-order involvement as ordinary business activities that benefited indirectly by virtue of operating within the racially structured context of an apartheid society”.

Business activities in black Africa may not have directly contributed to the oppression of the deprived in South Africa. Nevertheless, this categorisation is of some use to us because the participation of the private firms in the development/investment projects discussed in Chapter 4 aimed at finding diplomatic acceptance by African states, and therefore potentially prolonged the apartheid system. While the government was dependent on their technical expertise, the relevant companies benefited financially from these projects, while practically no risk was involved, as payment was usually forthcoming from the IDC, insured by Credit Guarantee and reinsured by the Treasury. Without this mechanism, it is doubtful whether the South African private sector, with the exception of the powerful Anglo American Corporation, would have become engaged to the same extent on the economically unattractive and politically unstable African market during the days of the Outward-Looking Policy.

This suggests that all the private companies examined in this study displayed an involvement of the third order in the TRC’s taxonomy, as they all profited from this aspect of the apartheid policy. Taking into account both the size and the financial value of the projects in

---

which they participated, and the close personal contact established with government officials, it could be further suggested that the engagement of both LTA and Roberts Construction was of the second order. This judgement can also be made on both the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation and Safmarine with its aviation subsidiary, Safair. The former was the key financial backer for the development/investment projects and without Credit Guarantee’s support, the foreign affairs ministry could not have pursued its approach towards African countries. Importantly, the managers of this firm were obviously aware of the political connotations of their role; in correspondence, Klaus Oppenheimer, General Manager of Credit Guarantee from 1956 to 1965, commented on the firm’s involvement as outlined in this study: “There is no doubt that (especially in later years) the export credit financing facility also played the political role that you have described”. An equally strong case of economic-cum-political association between private business and Pretoria was displayed in the case of Safmarine, whose different entities were involved in sanctions-busting to their mutual advantage. We stated in Chapter 2 that Safmarine’s airline subsidiary, Luxavia, circumvented the African overflying rights sanctions against South Africa, while Chapter 5 revealed that tankers from Safmarine, collaborating with national intelligence, secretly shipped oil from Nigeria to South Africa in the late 1970s. In addition, Safair served the military in a crucial manner, circumventing the arms embargo by flying armaments from Europe to South Africa via Libreville. On occasion, these flights also transported equipment necessary for the DFA’s development/investment and technical assistance projects in both the C.A.R. and in Gabon (Chapter 4). In considering the last private firm, Anglo American’s interaction over Zaire during 1975 was significant and of political importance, because it initially complemented Pretoria’s Détente policy. This relationship, therefore, can also be rated, in applying TRC categorisation, as second order involvement. This concludes our discussion based on the concept, embedded in orthodox Political Science, of foreign policy making and the interplay of domestic and external factors, the former entailing the activities of state and non-state actors. We now briefly, and in conclusion, explore the relevance of the International Relations premise whereby the structural inequality among states is a factor in shaping the relationship between them (Chapter 2).

The Introduction proposed that the interaction between unequal states could take the form of either dominance, hegemony or primacy/leadership, reflecting a decrease in the importance of the use of power and force by the preponderant state. The same chapter showed that South Africa’s status on the African continent was that of a preponderant force. Chapters 4 and 5

---

23 Correspondence with Klaus Oppenheimer, 26 March 2002.
demonstrated that Pretoria’s approach towards the region from the mid-1970s was one of dominance, while beyond southern Africa it fluctuated. Capitalising on the country’s preponderance, the Department of Foreign Affairs was in a position to offer technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. The military’s preponderant capacity enabled them to become involved in a war as far away as Biafra, later to provide armaments to both Chad and Gabon, as well as to establish a presence in the western Indian Ocean. Somewhere in-between the foreign service ministry and the military, the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security followed a marketing strategy; this also relied on South Africa’s preponderance. Although pursuing different goals and applying different levers, we have shown that the approach of the different state actors towards the countries beyond southern Africa rested on South Africa’s preponderant power and her geographical position. Yet, as emphasised in the Introduction, for a state to assume the role of a leader requires it to provide not only material resources, but also what we called normative/moral resources, such as a shared worldview. Even though Pretoria could offer technical assistance, support for development/investment projects and supply arms, its apartheid ideology fundamentally clashed with the ideal of pan-Africanism as promoted by the African states. As Denis Venter suggested, consecutive white governments had no comprehension of the basic premise that “treating other people differently on the basis of race and treating them as inferior on the basis of race would not be acceptable” by African states.24 This, more than anything else, separated South Africa and its foreign policy goals from Africa.

Crucially, the end of apartheid altered entirely South Africa’s position on the African continent. Most importantly, several authors have stipulated that the Pretoria government was now in a position to attain middle power25 leadership in both African and international politics.26 Post-apartheid South Africa fully participates in several multilateral organisations, most

24 Interview with Denis Venter, 10 March 1999.


notably the Organisation of African Unity\textsuperscript{27} and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).\textsuperscript{28} Pretoria’s multilateral involvement in resolving continental issues continues in many other places; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, while personal diplomatic efforts, particularly those of Nelson Mandela, were apparent in managing the conflict in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa.\textsuperscript{29} South Africa’s preponderance on the African continent and its role as a middle power now permits it to play a respected and recognised role in world politics and, of particular interest to this study, in Africa.\textsuperscript{30} This demonstrates that South Africa’s political destiny always has been and remains inextricably linked to the rest of the African continent, underlining the central argument of this study. While acceptance by African states now proves to be essential in realising its ambition of attaining middle power status, diplomatic recognition was the vital key necessary for South Africa to break its international isolation during the apartheid era.

\textsuperscript{27} African Union (AU) from 2002.
\textsuperscript{28} Known as SADCC until 1992.
\textsuperscript{29} For an overview of the early relevant literature on these developments, see Pfister, Roger. 2000. \textit{South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Towards Africa}. Iowa City, IO: University of Iowa Libraries.
Appendixes

A. Biographies of Department of Foreign Affairs Officials 387
D. Government Expenditure for the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Information, 1961-94 403
Appendix A. Biographies of Department of Foreign Affairs Officials

Auret, Derek William
1973-77. First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York
1978-82. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
1982-85. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Bonn
1985-87. Deputy Director, Africa Directorate (S.W.A./Namibia)
1987-89. Chief Director, Overseas Countries Branch (North and Latin America, Middle East, Australasia and South East Asia)
1989-91. Chief Director, Overseas Countries Branch (Americas, Middle and Far East, Australasia and Canada)
1991 (January) – 1995 (February). Deputy Director-General, Africa Branch

Babb, Glenn Robin Ware
1967. Cadet
1967-69. S.W.A./Namibia Division
1969-70. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1971. Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1972-73. Head, East, West and Central Africa Section
1974-75. Training Officer
1975-77. Counsellor, Embassy, Paris
1978-80. Counsellor, Embassy, Rome
1980-83. Deputy Director, Africa Division
1984-85. Director, Africa Division
1985-87. Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa
1987-89. Deputy Director-General, Africa Directorate/Branch
1989-91. Member of Parliament (National Party)
1991-95. Ambassador to Italy, Rome, accredited to Albania, Malta and San Marino, as well as Permanent Representative to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome

Best, Norman John
1946-51. Third Secretary, High Commission, Ottawa
1951-55. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1955-58. Deputy Chief, Protocol
1958-60. Head, Political Division (West)
1960-65. First Secretary/Counsellor, Embassy, Cologne
1966-68. Counsellor, Embassy, Brussels
1968-70. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris
1970-73. Under-Secretary, Africa Division (Rest of Africa)
1973-78. Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa
1978-80. Ambassador to Argentina, Buenos Aires

Botha, Roelof Frederik ‘Pik’
1953-56. Cadet
1956-60. Legation, Stockholm
1960-63. Embassy, Cologne
1963-66. Legal team in the S.W.A./Namibia case at the International Court of Justice
1968. Under-Secretary
1968-69. Head, S.W.A./Namibia and United Nations Section
1970-74. Member of Parliament (National Party) for Wonderboom, Pretoria
1974-77. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York
1975-77. Ambassador to the United States, Washington
Boyazoglou, Jan George

Burger, Albertus Beyers Fourie ‘Albie’
1957-58. Assistant Secretary, Politics and Economics Division
1958. Consul, Consulate, Antananarivo
1961-65. Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels
1966-69. Under-Secretary, Africa Division
1975-79. Ambassador to the European Commission, Brussels

De Goede, Justus
1967. Cadet
1969-73. Vice Consul, Consulate-General, Beirut
1973-75. Counsellor, Middle East Division
1976-77. Parliamentary Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town
1977-81. Vice Consul-General, Embassy, Tokyo
1983-86. Head, Training Division
1990-92. Director, Africa Branch
1993-95. Head of Mission, Cairo
1995-98. Ambassador to Egypt, Cairo

Evans, Leo Henry ‘Rusty’
1969. Third Secretary, Embassy, Lisbon
1972. Consul, Consulate-General, Rio de Janeiro
1974-77. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Sao Paulo
1979. Counsellor, Departmental Administration (Personnel and Training)
1983-86 (September). Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, London
1986 (October) – 1990. Head, West Africa Section
1990. Deputy Director-General, Africa Branch
1992 (October) – 1997 (December). Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs

Fourie, Bernardus Gerhardus ‘Brand’
BCom, University of Pretoria
MA, City University of New York
1939. Legation, Berlin
1940-46. High Commission, London
1952-58. Africa, Political, International Organisations Division
1962-63 (October). Under-Secretary, Africa Division
1963-66. Secretary, South African Information Service
1966 (July) – 1982 (April). Secretary/Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs
1985-89. Director-General, South African Broadcasting Corporation
Geldenhuys, Hendrick Albertus 'Hennie'
1959. Second Secretary, Mission, Bern
1966-69. First Secretary, Embassy, Cologne
1969-70 Counsellor, Embassy, Cologne
1972-74. Under-Secretary, Africa Division (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland)
1975. Consul-General, Embassy, Buenos Aires
1978-79. Under-Secretary, Southern Africa Division (Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe)
1982-83. Ambassador to Switzerland, Bern
1984-85. Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa
1986. Chief Director, Africa Directorate (Rest of Africa)
1987-91. Ambassador to France, Paris

Hanekom, Hermann Albert
1965. Cadet
1966-70. Third Secretary, Embassy, Bern
1970-72. Under-Secretary, Africa Division (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Indian Ocean Islands)
1978-80. Under-Secretary, Information Division, Head Office
1980-81. Counsellor, Embassy, Rome
1985-89 Deputy Director, South Africa Desk
1989-93 Ambassador to Zaire, Kinshasa, accredited to the Republic of Congo and Consul to Rwanda
1994-96 Deputy Director, Africa Division (Organisation of Africa Unity and Security)

Jaquet, André
1973-76. Press and Cultural Affairs Attaché, Embassy, Paris
1977-78. Francophone Africa Desk
1978-82. Consul, Consulate, Montreal
1983-84. Counsellor, Embassy, Washington
1986. Director, Overseas Countries Directorate (United States)
1987-90. Director, Africa Directorate (Angola and S.W.A./Namibia)
1990-94. Ambassador to Switzerland, Bern
1995-99. Chief Director, Americas and the Caribbean
1999-. High Commissioner to Canada, Ottawa

Jooste, Gerhardus Petrus 'Gerhardt'
1929-34. Private Secretary to the Minister of Finance
1941-46. Deputy Secretary, Economic Section
1954-56. High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, London
1956 (August) – 1966 (June). Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
1966-69. Special Advisor to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
APPENDIX A

Killen, Peter Rae
1959. Vice-Consul, Consulate, Elizabethville (Belgian Congo)
1961-62. Second Secretary, Embassy, Ottawa
1963-64. First Secretary, Embassy, Ottawa
1974-77. Deputy Secretary, Africa Division
1979-80. Deputy Secretary, Southern Africa Division
1980-84. Deputy Director-General, Africa Directorate
1985 (April) – 1987 (March). Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs
1987-90. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, London

Loubser, Antonie Eduard ‘Anton’
1970. Deputy Representative to the European Economic Community, Brussels
1971-72. Counsellor, Embassy, Brussels
1976-78. Counsellor, Africa Division (French-Speaking and North Africa)
1979-80. Under-Secretary, International Organisations and Central and North Africa
1982-83. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris
1986-88. Ambassador to Israel, Tel Aviv
1988. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Copenhagen

Louw, Eric Hendrik
1890. Born
1924-25. Member of Parliament (National Party) for Beaufort West
1925. Trade Commissioner, Washington
1929. High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, London
1931. Envoy Extraordinary, Washington
1933. Envoy Extraordinary, Rome
1934. Representative at the League of Nations, Geneva
1938-64. Member of Parliament (National Party) for Beaufort West
1948-49. Minister of Mining and Economic Development
1949-54. Minister of Economics
1954-55. Minister of Finance
1955 (January) – 1963 (December). Minister of External Affairs

Marx, Johan
1970-72. Cadet, Multilateral Division (United Nations and Specialised Agencies)
1972-76. Third/Second Secretary, Embassy, Buenos Aires
1976 (February-April). Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy, La Paz
1976-77. Latin America Division
1978-82. First Secretary/Counsellor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva
1982-85. Consul, Consulate, Saint-Denis, Reunion, accredited to the Comoros
1985-87. Director, Africa Directorate
1988-90. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Marseilles
1990-93. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris
1993-94. Head, West, Central and East Africa Section
1994-99. Chief Director, Africa Branch (Equatorial Africa and Indian Ocean Islands)
1999-. Ambassador to Israel, Tel Aviv
Montgomery, Robert John
1944. Political Secretary, High Commission, London
1957-58. First Secretary, Embassy, The Hague
1961-63. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Maputo
1964-68. Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury
1969-71 (May). Deputy Secretary, Africa Division
1971 (June) – 1972. Embassy, Lisbon
1974-77. Ambassador to Portugal, Lisbon

Muller, Hilgard
1935. BA, University of Pretoria
1937. MA, University of Pretoria
1941-47. Lecturer in Latin, University of Pretoria
1947-50. Lawyer’s firm Dyason, Douglas, Muller and Meyer
1951-57. Member, Pretoria City Council
1953-55. Mayor of Pretoria
1958. Member of Parliament (National Party) for Pretoria East; Secretary, National Party Foreign Affairs Study Group
1964 (January) – 1977 (March). Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paterson, Colin Ernest
1973-75. Third Secretary, Embassy, Brasilia
1975-77. Latin America Desk
1978. Transkei Desk
1979-81. Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy, La Paz
1981-83. Southern Africa Division
1984-88. Trade Representative, Maputo
1988. Chief Director, Africa Branch (Rest of Africa)
1989-90. Director, Africa Branch
1991-95. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, Abidjan, accredited to Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, as well as Consul-General for Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde
1995-2000. Chief Director, Human Resources

Pretorius, Johan Frederick
1972-76. Under-Secretary, Africa Division (French-Speaking and North Africa)
1987-91. Ambassador to Switzerland, Bern

Prins, Christoffel Caesar ‘Christo’
1964-66. Third Secretary, Embassy, Rome
1975. Counsellor, Embassy, Lisbon
1982-85. Ambassador to Spain, Madrid
1986-88. Ambassador to Taiwan, Taipei
1989-91. Chief Director, Africa Branch (Rest of Africa)
1992. Chief Director, Africa Branch (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei)
1993-97. Ambassador to Japan, Tokyo
Runge, Paul Gustav
1980. Cadet
1981-85. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1985-86. Project Liaison Officer in Gabon, Libreville
1987. Far East Section
1988-89. Senior Officer, West Africa
1992-97. Senior Manager, Africa and Europe, South African Foreign Trade Organisation
1997-2000. Director, South Africa Foundation

Shearar, Jeremy Brown
1958-61. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1961-64. Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1964-66. First Secretary, Embassy, Paris
1966-68. Consular Division
1969-70. Counsellor, Africa Division (Rest of Africa)
1975-78. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Washington
1978-80. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris
1980-84. Deputy Director, Overseas Countries Directorate (International Organisations)
1985-87. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva
1991-94. Deputy Director-General, Multilateral Relations

Sole, Donald Bell
1957-58. Chargé d’Affaires, Mission, Vienna
1959. Minister Plenipotentiary, Mission, Vienna
1961. Under-Secretary, Political, Economic and Consular Division
1963-64. Under-Secretary, Politics, International Organisations and Economics Division
1969-77. Ambassador to Germany, Cologne/Bonn
1977-82. Ambassador to the United States, Washington

Steward, Vernon Rudston Whitefoord
1957-58. Third Secretary, Mission, Cairo
1963. Vice-Consul, Consulate-General, Beirut
1977. Under-Secretary, Overseas Countries Division (North America)
1979. Under-Secretary, Public Liaison Division
1983-86. Ambassador to Italy, Rome
1988. Director, Overseas Countries Branch (Europe II and III)
1989-90. Chief Director, Overseas Countries Branch (Europe, European and Multilateral Organisations)
**Vale, Colin Alfred**

1960-61. Cadet, United Nations Division
1961-64. Third Secretary, Diplomatic Mission, Salisbury
1964-66. Africa Division
1967-69. Second Secretary, Mission, Stockholm
1970-71. First Secretary, Mission, Stockholm
1972-73. Counsellor, Mission, Stockholm
1974-75. Counsellor, Department of Foreign Affairs (Western Europe I)
1976-78. Teacher, Wynberg Boys High School, Cape Town
1979-95. Lecturer/Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand
1980. MA, University of Stellenbosch ("The Role of Britain as an Intrusive Power in the Genesis and Evolution of the Southern African Regional Sub-System")
1992. D. Phil., University of Stellenbosch ("The Internationalisation of Apartheid")

**Van Dalsen, Johannes "Hans"**

1963-64. Counsellor, Africa Division (Politics and Economics)
1969-70. Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels
1971-79. Deputy Secretary, Overseas Countries Division
1980-81. Ambassador to France, Paris
1982 (January-April). Deputy Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs
1982 (May) – 1985 (March). Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs

**Van Heerden, Neil Peter**

1964-66. Vice-Consul, Consulate-General, Tokyo
1971-75. Counsellor, Embassy, Washington
1975-80. Under-Secretary, Planning Division (Namibia)
1980-85. Ambassador to Germany, Bonn
1986. Deputy Director-General, Africa Directorate
1987 (April) – 1992 (September). Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs
1992-95. Ambassador to the European Union, Brussels
1996-. Executive Director, South Africa Foundation

**Viljoen, François Abraham Jacobus**

1961. Counsellor, Africa Division
1965-69. Ambassador to Portugal, Lisbon
1971-72. Deputy Secretary, Africa Division
1973-75. Ambassador to Brazil, Brasilia

**Von Hirschberg, Carl Friedrich George**

1946. Political Section
1957-59. Second Secretary, Mission, Vienna
1961. First Secretary, Mission, Vienna
1963-64. Counsellor, Scientific Relations Division
1975. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Tokyo
1979-80. Deputy Secretary, International Organisations and Central and North Africa
1982-86. Deputy Director-General, Overseas Countries Directorate
1990. Special Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wentzel, Jan Frantz
1969-70. Chargé d’Affaires, Mission, Blantyre
1971-72. Ambassador to Malawi, Blantyre
1977-80. Ambassador to Switzerland, Bern
1981-83. Director, Africa Directorate (Political Branch)
1984. Consul-General, Tokyo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Central African Federation</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Comoros</th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Total Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>96.279</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85.519</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75.142</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2.503</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.399</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2.113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.709</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6.399</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35.743</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>16.308</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>35.743</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>1.611</td>
<td>1.694</td>
<td>3990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.277</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.144</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>5.481</td>
<td>2.149</td>
<td>36312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>12.956</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>36312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1.618</td>
<td>0.1152</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>4.528</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>36312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>11.045</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>3.927</td>
<td>6.185</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>20.38</td>
<td>5.019</td>
<td>51891</td>
<td>51891</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.239</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.227</td>
<td>7.952</td>
<td>2.576</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>23.717</td>
<td>5.019</td>
<td>51891</td>
<td>51891</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>52.674</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>5.908</td>
<td>2.709</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>21.231</td>
<td>8.799</td>
<td>60929</td>
<td>60929</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>4.134</td>
<td>10.919</td>
<td>5.594</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>33.102</td>
<td>13.737</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>365.17</td>
<td>1.732</td>
<td>12.003</td>
<td>46.034</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>31.738</td>
<td>24.669</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>263.38</td>
<td>8.021</td>
<td>13.187</td>
<td>41.082</td>
<td>4.354</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>36.866</td>
<td>48.744</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>311.83</td>
<td>2.901</td>
<td>21.483</td>
<td>15.384</td>
<td>2.969</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>39.752</td>
<td>32.011</td>
<td>90021</td>
<td>90021</td>
<td>93871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Equatorial Guinea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Gabon</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Guinea Bissau</th>
<th>Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Madagascar</th>
<th>Total Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>7.436</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>5.451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>3.854</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.329&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.03&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.181&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.093&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.019&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.002&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.03&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.089&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.15&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.008&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.002&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.002&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.084&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.238&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.003&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.054&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.001&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.023&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.096&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.174&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.357</td>
<td>1527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.121&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.527</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.496</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2.153</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>1.164</td>
<td>1541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>1.778</td>
<td>2.121</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.733</td>
<td>14811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.147&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.086</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>18207</td>
<td>19189</td>
<td>20620</td>
<td>24868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>6.395</td>
<td>4.111</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>43671</td>
<td>49724</td>
<td>58199</td>
<td>60929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>6.395</td>
<td>4.111</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>43671</td>
<td>49724</td>
<td>58199</td>
<td>60929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.715&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>7.748</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>8.44&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>21.223</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>5.444</td>
<td>42011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>7.574</td>
<td>0.053&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.802</td>
<td>5.402</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>7.812</td>
<td>43671</td>
<td>49724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>8.018</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>44.652</td>
<td>11.025</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>58199</td>
<td>53.084</td>
<td>60929</td>
<td>60929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>5.735</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>48.774</td>
<td>24.953</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>53.084</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>60929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.155</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>48.774</td>
<td>24.953</td>
<td>53.084</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td>80671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>2.222</td>
<td>9.226</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>4.618</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>66.491</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>42.902</td>
<td>40561.1</td>
<td>169116</td>
<td>244116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>10.023</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>13.989</td>
<td>3.508</td>
<td>21.799</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>83.462</td>
<td>151.04</td>
<td>53.498</td>
<td>46997</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>68997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>3.863</td>
<td>21.966</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>49.477</td>
<td>1.807</td>
<td>97.892</td>
<td>205.414</td>
<td>60.958</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>80671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>16.411</td>
<td>13.463</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>80.922</td>
<td>8.951</td>
<td>52.833</td>
<td>664.723</td>
<td>68.471</td>
<td>90021</td>
<td>90021</td>
<td>90021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Mauritius</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Reunion</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Total Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3.494</td>
<td>9.775</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4.174</td>
<td>12.132</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3.482</td>
<td>13.734</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2.722</td>
<td>11.688</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.174</td>
<td>13.104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>23.934</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.974</td>
<td>26.406</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.078</td>
<td>30.199</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.359</td>
<td>33.674</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>620.867</td>
<td>11.054</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.921</td>
<td>36.013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.992</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>2041</td>
<td>2421</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>3990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.815</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.098</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>5698</td>
<td>5683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.625</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8.081</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>29.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>13.177</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>6.789</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>20.856</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>19915</td>
<td>19915</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>32.018</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>5683</td>
<td>5683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>31.261</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>17.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td>7333</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>34.557</td>
<td>78.091</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>29.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>42.266</td>
<td>73.349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>52.747</td>
<td>182.512</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>18207</td>
<td>18207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>35.204</td>
<td>182.512</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>25.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>18207</td>
<td>18207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>33.344</td>
<td>34.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>33.344</td>
<td>34.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>33.344</td>
<td>34.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td>24868</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>79.163</td>
<td>253.939</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>48.96</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.256</td>
<td>36312</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>36.013</td>
<td>36.013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>3.007</td>
<td>40211</td>
<td>40211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>36.013</td>
<td>36.013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>3.007</td>
<td>40211</td>
<td>40211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>261.9</td>
<td>293.537</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>82.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.823</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>49724</td>
<td>49724</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>435.36</td>
<td>300.588</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.543</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>58199</td>
<td>58199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>420.18</td>
<td>464.663</td>
<td>1.706</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29.718</td>
<td>2.768</td>
<td>60929</td>
<td>60929</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>577.52</td>
<td>690.013</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>208.7</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>14.752</td>
<td>3.973</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td>64355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>697.98</td>
<td>678.262</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>181.3</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>4.031</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td>68997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>593.053</td>
<td>964.534</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>40.658</td>
<td>190.653</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>8.671</td>
<td>2.549</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td>80671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seychelles</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zaire</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Total Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>6.455</td>
<td>18.461</td>
<td>33.704</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>7.473</td>
<td>25.926</td>
<td>30.106</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.139</td>
<td>51.393</td>
<td>51.392</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>79.191</td>
<td>72.893</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>7.844</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>30.106</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>6.783</td>
<td>42.716</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Central African Federation</th>
<th>Central African Republic</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Comoros</th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Total Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>26.678</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>7.374</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.002&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.048&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.048&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3.057</td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.006&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.006&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.721&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.093&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.093&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3.418</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.399</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.553&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.745</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.704&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.923</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>7.788</td>
<td>7.788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>5.653</td>
<td>5.653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>16.286</td>
<td>3.111</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>8.997</td>
<td>8.997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.891</td>
<td>9.331</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.383</td>
<td>7.383</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October; 5: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Equatorial Guinea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Gabon</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Guinea Bissau</th>
<th>Ivory Coast</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Madagascar</th>
<th>Total Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>2.749</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.128</td>
<td>4.161</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>2.817</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>1556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>2.506</td>
<td>1.277</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>4.433</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>2128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>2.543</td>
<td>4909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.934</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4562</td>
<td>5562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>26.502</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.416</td>
<td>5867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>21.795</td>
<td>2.765</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>6253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>23.275</td>
<td>4.117</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.766</td>
<td>9004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.931</td>
<td>4.024</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.809</td>
<td>14381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.219</td>
<td>12.248</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>16204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.582</td>
<td>5.213</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>22691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>4.487</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.344</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>18430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>2.675</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16.601</td>
<td>13.453</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>39484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>3.108</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>27.382</td>
<td>19.571</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>44141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>5.804</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>25.395</td>
<td>10.876</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>44125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>6.452</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>44.153</td>
<td>19.084</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>4.401</td>
<td>52514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>2.487</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>23.582</td>
<td>5.213</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>2128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>30.758</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.088</td>
<td>59018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>22.556</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>85.705</td>
<td>28.119</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>3.692</td>
<td>79471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Mauritius</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Reunion</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Total Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>2.722</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>1.328</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.951</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.423</td>
<td>6.409</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>8.428</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>1.718</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>8.748</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.604</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>9.694</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.216</td>
<td>9.727</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.427</td>
<td>10.856</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>2543</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.821</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20.761</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>2484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1.922</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>9.155</td>
<td>4.345</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>3275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5.855</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.427</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>5562</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6.409</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>5867</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>5141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.204</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>6253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.567</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>9.799</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>9004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>5.859</td>
<td>7.221</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>14381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.416</td>
<td>7.221</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>22075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>9.799</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>18374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>13400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>16204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>22691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.567</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>26864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>28673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>66.875</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>20.421</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>39484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>58.539</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>20.368</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>44741</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>81.13</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>14.279</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>44512</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>133.953</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>50.978</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>52514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>159.606</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>60.324</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>59018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>185.221</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>15.145</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>79471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seychelles</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zaire</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Total Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>4.321</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>1.221</td>
<td>22.603</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>3.402</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>2.289</td>
<td>3.441</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>2.025</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>24.146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>22.924</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>17.622</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>6.343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.284</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>3.375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>7.748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>7.748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>1.778</td>
<td>5.199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>3.256</td>
<td>2.245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.197</td>
<td>3.115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>1.778</td>
<td>5.444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>6.016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.535</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.535</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.587</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.093</td>
<td>218.729</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>19.353</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.323</td>
<td>8.323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>6.729</td>
<td>31.099</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>18.034</td>
<td>395.342</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>1.637</td>
<td>23.834</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>48.147</td>
<td>45.803</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>10.698</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>21.79</td>
<td>44.155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>21.339</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>12.977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1.412</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>6.278</td>
<td>21.832</td>
<td>29.985</td>
<td>1.101</td>
<td>262.188</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1021801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>4.325</td>
<td>15.856</td>
<td>61.607</td>
<td>1.632</td>
<td>353.576</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October
### Appendix D. Government Expenditure for the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Information, 1961-94 (in thousand South African Rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Department of Defence</th>
<th>in % of Budget</th>
<th>Department of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>in % of Budget</th>
<th>Department of Information</th>
<th>in % of Budget</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>43,596</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>684,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>71,550</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>721,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>119,695</td>
<td>14.97</td>
<td>3,273</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>799,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>121,654</td>
<td>14.27</td>
<td>3,890</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>852,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>232,830</td>
<td>22.23</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1,047,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>229,400</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1,130,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>255,850</td>
<td>20.06</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1,275,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>6,194</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3,524</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1,392,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>252,900</td>
<td>16.28</td>
<td>6,985</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>4,159</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1,533,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>271,600</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>6,967</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,700,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>257,100</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>8,250</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>5,725</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,958,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>316,500</td>
<td>12.22</td>
<td>9,252</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2,589,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>335,336</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td>11,818</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>7,049</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>2,878,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>472,022</td>
<td>13.32</td>
<td>13,064</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>7,961</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>3,544,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>692,025</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>13,849</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>10,651</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>4,388,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>970,661</td>
<td>18.28</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>11,801</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>5,310,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>8,260,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,654,000</td>
<td>17.61</td>
<td>147,444</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>15,370</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>9,390,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,554,375</td>
<td>15.17</td>
<td>183,766</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>15,812</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>10,247,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,612,400</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>202,144</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>15,100</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>11,653,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>294,971</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,564,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,465,000</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>386,151</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,329,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,668,000</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>646,090</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,717,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,754,667</td>
<td>14.52</td>
<td>772,144</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,850,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5,123,275</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>1,335,714</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38,205,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6,683,469</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>2,176,202</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46,909,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8,195,551</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>2,530,034</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54,006,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9,937,450</td>
<td>15.52</td>
<td>3,255,213</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64,016,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10,070,995</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>3,833,469</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72,286,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9,187,096</td>
<td>11.09</td>
<td>5,025,703</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82,821,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>9,704,549</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>5,995,241</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98,831,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9,335,331</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>7,060,490</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>113,043,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Account During the Financial Year Ending 31 March 19... Pretoria: Republic of South Africa. (always the second and final print) The figures refer to the period from 1 April of 19... to 31 March of the following year.*
### Appendix E. Exchange Rate South African Rand / US Dollar, 1961-94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1 Rand = US Dollar</th>
<th>1 US Dollar = Rand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1.398</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1.395</td>
<td>0.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.392</td>
<td>0.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.389</td>
<td>0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.389</td>
<td>0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.398</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1.386</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>0.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1.398</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.444</td>
<td>0.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1.472</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1.188</td>
<td>0.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.285</td>
<td>0.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>1.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>1.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>1.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>2.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>2.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>2.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>2.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>2.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>2.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>2.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>2.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>3.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>3.546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography

Archives

Archive for Contemporary Affairs

PV.58 Jacob Daniel du Plessis 'Japie' Basson
File 3/2/1 Persverklarings Afrika, 1954-72

PV.59 National Party Information Service
File KN 59/A2/1/2 Afrika allgemeen, 1962-63
File KN 59/A2/3/1 Afrika Lande
File KN 59/A2/3/2 Afrika Lande
File KN 59/A2/5/3 Afrika: Suid Afrika se verhouding tot Afrika-Lande
File KN 59/D4/1/1 Dialoog (Binne- en Buitelandse)
File KN 59/M1/1/1 Malawi, 1968-1979
File KN 59/V3/2/1 Verdediging: Afrika
File 43/1/1-220 Afrika, 23.10.1974-4.3.1975
File 43/2/1-220 Afrika, 17.1.-12.4.1975
File 43/3/1-220 Afrika, 12.4.-30.6.1975

PV.93 Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd
File 1/9/2/1 Department of Foreign Affairs: Africa, 1955-59
File 1/9/2/2 Department of Foreign Affairs: Africa, 1958-59
File 1/53/2/1 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1958-59
File 1/53/2/5 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1961
File 1/53/2/7 Department of Foreign Affairs, April-June 1961

PV.118 Jan Friedrich Wilhelm Haak
File 3/2/6 toespraak, 1965
File 3/2/8 toespraak, 1967
File 3/2/10 toespraak, 1969-73

PV.132 Balthazar Johannes 'John' Vorster
File 2/1/9 Algemeen: Korrespondensie, 1971
File 2/6/1/19 Algemeen: Korrespondensie, July-September 1969
File 2/6/1/23 Algemeen: Korrespondensie, February 1970
File 2/6/1/24 Algemeen: Korrespondensie, February 1970
File 3/6/24 toespraak, No. 95-98
File 3/6/31 toespraak, No. 130-135
File 3/6/33 toespraak, No. 141-146
File 10/6/3/1 Programme en Gedenkstukke, Reise Malawi
Koerantknipsels Détente, 1974-77

PV.203 Pieter Willem Botha
File 1/A1/1 Afrika, 1960-76
File 1/A1/2 Afrika, 1977
File 1/T2/1 Transkei, 1966-78
File PS 5/1/1 Constellation of States, November 1979
File PS 5/1/2 Constellation of States, November 1979
File PS 5/1/4 Constellation of States, 1980-81
File PS 6/12/6 Constellation of States, November 1979
PV.206 Anthony Edward ‘Anton’ Rupert
  File 3/1/5  Toesprake, 1966-68
  File 3/1/6  Toesprake, 1968-69
  File 3/1/8  Toesprake, 1971
  File 3/1/10 Toesprake, 1973-74

PV.377 Johannes Wilhelm Rall
  File 1/A1 Vol.1  Afrika, 1962-68
  File 1/A1 Vol.2  Afrika, 1956-75

PV.395 Department of Information
  5 boxes.

PV.451 Johannes Albertus Munnik ‘Albert’ Hertzog
  File 1/11/1/5  Afrika: Algemeen, 1968-70
  File 1/11/35/1  Afrika: Madagaskar, 1970-75
  File 1/90/1/2  Détente, 1975

PV.546 Nicolaas Diederichs
  File 1/A3/1  African Common Market, 1964-71
  File 1/A6/4  Afrika Knipsels, 1955-68
  File 1/E5/1  Economic Commission for Africa, 1960
  File 1/E5/2  Economic Commission for Africa, 1958-63
  File 1/K3/1  Kenya, 1973
  File 1/S24/1  South African Foreign Trade Organisation, 1963-66

PV.799 Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut
  File S29 (1)  Prime Minister General, 1965-87
  File S33/14/3/A(1)  Trade Mission to Rhodesia, 1965-71
  File S33/14/3/A(1)  Trade Mission Overseas, 1968-87
  File S33/14/3/B(1)  Trade Missions Mozambique/Angola, 1967-68
  File S33/14/3/C(1)  Trade Mission Angola, 1968
  File S33/14/3/C(2)  Trade Mission Angola, 1968/69
  File S33/14/3/D(1)  Trade Mission Malawi, 1969
  File S33/14/13/2(1) South African Foreign Trade Organisation, 1963-65
  File S33/14/13/2(2) South African Foreign Trade Organisation, 1966-77
  File S36(1)  Department of Information, 1964-80

Department of Defence

  File  Box  Contents
  M.V/10/1  25  Constituency, Prime Minister, 1963-64
  M.V/10/3  25  Constituency, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1964-65
  M.V/27/12  86  Memos, Cabinet Meetings, Minister of Defence, 1965-66
  M.V/27/16  88  Cabinet meetings with Department of Foreign Affairs, 1956-63
  M.V/194  148  Defence of the sea-routes around Southern Africa
  M.V/200  149  Defence of Africa, 1954-60
  M.V/213  152  Exchange of officers with the French armed forces in Madagascar

Group 2: Minister of Defence (P.W. Botha)
  File  Box  Contents
  MV/41/25  6  Information material by the Military Intelligence, 1970
BIBLIOGRAPHY

MV/41/25 6 Department of Foreign Affairs, information material, 1970
MV/48/5 1+2 14 Information material, Department of Foreign Affairs
MV/48/5 3 15 Information material, Department of Foreign Affairs
MV/56/16 26 Ivory Coast and Gabon, 3.11.1969-14.5.1971
MV/58/2 27 Programme CACTUS, 1967-69
VR/4/9 34 Chemical warfare, 1967
VR/4/11 34 Project Cricket, 1967
MV/51/18 52 Defence agreements with Angola, 1967-71
MV/51/22 52 Defence exchange with other countries: Africa, 1968-71
MV/53/1, 2, 3, 7 53 Visitors from overseas, 1969-73
MV/54/3 54 Contacts with governmental organisations
MV/51/1 69 Defence exchange with other countries: general
MV/23/5 122 Correspondence with other departments: Ministry of the Interior, 1948-66
HVS/403/8 148 Project Cricket, 1967
MV/28/14 175 Politics, other departments: Department of Foreign Affairs

Group 2, Vol. 1: Chief of Staff (H.V.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS/11/1/10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Forwarding of material and staff manuscripts, Malawi, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/11/1/26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Top Secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/11/1/17</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Portuguese coup and consequences for South Africa, June/July 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/12/4/8</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Relations with Rhodesia, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/12/4/9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Relations with Mozambique, 1974/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/12/4/10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Relations with Angola, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/41/3/6</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Relations with Mozambique, 1975-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/41/3/8</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Relations with Angola, 1975-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/41/3/10</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Relations with Zambia, 1976-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/41/3/13</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Information reports, Botswana, 1976-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/41/3/14</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Information reports, Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/4/8</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Reports from the Consul-General, Mozambique, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/4/9</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>Reports from the Vice-Consul, Angola, 1973/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/4/13</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>Reports from Malawi, 1974-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/5/8</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Relations with Mozambique, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/5/9</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Relations with Angola, 1973-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/62/5/13</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Relations with Malawi, 1974-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/71/3</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>Project Geisha (Rhodesia), 1975-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/82/1/3</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Reports on terrorist activities in Angola by Intelligence, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/82/1/4</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Reports on terrorist activities in Rhodesia, 1973-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVS/82/1/5</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>Reports on terrorist activities in Mozambique, 1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Group 4: Secretary of Defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26/1 1+2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Courses – Overseas; Permanent Force, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64/1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overseas representatives and consuls of foreign countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>711/7/1 1+2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Offer of stores to the Dept. of Defence by overseas governments and private firms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Group 5: Commandant General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KG/AOC/4/7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee for African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG/EXT1/1/3/6</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>Reports from the Vice-Consul in Mozambique, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG/EXT1/1/3/7</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>Reports from the Vice-Consul in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG/EXT1/1/4, v. 1</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>Letters for information from overseas military representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG/EXT1/1/4, v. 2+3</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>Letters for information from overseas military representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS/EXT2/8/1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>Prince Edward-Heard and Marion Islands, 1948-54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CGS/EXT/3/2, v. 1+2 157 NATO, early 1950s
KG/EXT/4/3/2 159 Disarmament at the UN, 1951-57
KG/EXT/5/1/1 160 Visits of distinguished persons and high ranking officers
KG/EXT/6/6 175 External relations South Africa – African states, 1961-62
CGS/EXT/12 178 Military information on African states and colonies, 1951-56
KG/GC/4, v. 1-3 194 Defence co-operation with other governments and departments
KG/GC/4, v. 4+5 195 Defence co-operation with other governments and departments, 1962-64
KG/GC/4/2, v. 1 197 Defence co-operation with the Central African Federation, 1959-62
KG/GC/4/2, v. 2 198 Defence co-operation with the Central African Federation
KG/4/4 199 SADF co-operation with the British protectorates
KG/GC/5, v. 1 199 Defence co-operation with civilian bodies and organisations
KG/GC/5, v. 2+3 200 Defence co-operation with civilian bodies and organisations
KG/GPW/2/5/1 341 African Defence, 1955-59
KG/GPW/2/5/2, v. 1-4 342 African Defence Facilities Conference, Nairobi, August 1951
KG/GPW/2/5/3 342 African Defence Facilities Conference, Nairobi, August 1951
KG/GPW/2/5/6/1 344 Defence of Africa: help to CAF, 1960-61
KG/GPW/2/5/6/2 344 Defence of Africa: help to Angola and Mozambique, 1961-63
KG/GPW/7/5/1 351 Communism in Africa, 1951-52
KG/HIV/12 393 Central and Southern African Transport Conference, 1955
KG/AAK/22/2, v. 1+2 411 Overseas and diplomatic post
KG/ADM/7/5 415 Circulars by the Department of Foreign Affairs
KG/ADM/7/7 415 Circulars by the Prime Minister’s Office
KG/BEL/8/3 443 Reconnaissance: Mozambique, 1965
KG/BES/1/2/3, v. 1+2 445 Movements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence
KG/BES/1/2/3, v. 3+4 445 Movements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence
KG/KONF/5 469 International Conferences, 1964
KG/OPS/10/3/1 482 UK/USA co-operation in the Indian Ocean, 1965/66
KG/OPS/12/2/2 483 Correspondence with the Department of Information, 1966
KG/OPS/12/2/8 483 Correspondence with the Department of Trade and Industry, 1966
KG/OPS/12/8/5 488 Co-operation with Congo/Zaire, 1964-65
KG/OPS/2/9/6 488 Co-operation with Madagascar, 1964
KG/OPS/9/2 495 Treaty between Nigeria and Canada, 1965
KG/OPS/19/6 495 Agreement between Germany and Nigeria, 1966
KG/SD/17/10 522 Military forces of the African states, 1965
KG/SK/1/2/5 554 Military co-operation with Rhodesia, 1965
KG/SK/1/2/8 555 Military advisors in Angola
KG/SK/1/2/9 555 Military advisors in Mozambique
KG/SK/1/3/5 561 Reports from the Military Attaché, Rhodesia
KG/SK/1/3/7 563 Reports from the Military Attaché, Mozambique
KG/SK/1/3/9 563 Reports from the Military Attaché, Angola

Department of Foreign Affairs

Explanation on how to use the below list:
1/13/3, 1PL: Relations with (=3) Liberia (=13); PL = Pink Leer (Afrikaans: Pink File) = Top Secret
1/203/4, AJ 1975: Technical assistance (=4) to the Comoros (=203); AJ = Attached Jacket
22/3/26, 3A: P.W. Botha’s (=26) visits (=22) abroad (=3); File 3A
34/5/163, 1: Trade with (=34/5) Sudan (=163); File 1

Notes: NA: held at the National Archives; NS: New Series (April 1980 -); OS: Old Series (1940 - March 1980). The italicised files were not consulted.

1/13/3 Relations with Liberia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th></th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/13/4</td>
<td>Technical assistance to Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.4.1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/62/3</td>
<td>Relations with Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/79/3</td>
<td>Relations with Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6.1956-30.6.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/99/13</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on African Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/99/19</td>
<td>Relations with African states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/101/3</td>
<td>Relations with Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/106/3</td>
<td>Relations with Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.6.1960-22.2.1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/106/4</td>
<td>Ghana: technical assistance and co-operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5.1980-1.6.1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/3</td>
<td>Relations with Zaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/4</td>
<td>Zaire: technical assistance and co-operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/5/1</td>
<td>Zaire: volunteers for Katanga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/5/1</td>
<td>Zaire: volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8.1968-1.11.1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/5/3</td>
<td>Medical expenses for South African mercenaries in the Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/115/3</td>
<td>Relations with Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/115/3/1</td>
<td>Relations with Madagascar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1966-70 2 19.1.1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.2.1968-18.2.1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/115/4</td>
<td>Madagascar: technical assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.10.1969-29.2.1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/115/4/1</td>
<td>Nossi-Bé project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/115/4/1/1</td>
<td>Nossi-Bé project: disposal of loan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.11.1969-29.3.1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.3.1973-4.1.1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Symbol(s)</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1960-31.3.1961</td>
<td>Relations with Tanganyika/Tanzania</td>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>8.6.1963-23.3.1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1961-31.7.1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>3.2.1989-12.5.1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>3PL</td>
<td>1.5.1984-27.10.1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Relations with Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/135/3</td>
<td>Relations with Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (NA)</td>
<td>15.5.1959-31.3.1961</td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.3.1992-20.5.1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.11.1980-31.3.1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/135/4</td>
<td>Kenya: technical assistance and co-operation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.1.1972-5.4.1982 (-1979)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6.1988-10.5.1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6.1976-18.4.1980 (-1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29.4.1980-16.8.1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/138/4</td>
<td>Reunion: technical assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/144/3</td>
<td>Relations with Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>2.1984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1.1985-30.4.1985</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.1.1985-17.11.1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/149/3</td>
<td>Relations with Gambia</td>
<td>27.1.1970-9.11.1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/170/3</td>
<td>Relations with Djibouti</td>
<td>1.7.1975-7.10.1987 (-1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/178/3</td>
<td>Relations with Gabon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/178/3</th>
<th>Relations with Gabon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/178/4</th>
<th>Gabon: technical assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/178/4/1</th>
<th>Gabon: technical assistance in the health sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/178/4/2</th>
<th>Gabon: loan for improvement of airport (13 September 1975)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1.1983-7.5.1987</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/178/4/3</td>
<td>Gabon: OGAPROV loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.5.1983-3.4.1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/178/4/4</td>
<td>Gabon: loan for infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>28.4.1984-28.11.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/178/5/1</td>
<td>Gabon: loans for certain structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/179/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/179/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/179/4</td>
<td>Ivory Coast: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/179/7</td>
<td>Ivory Coast: South African representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8.1989-4.11.1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/180/3</td>
<td>Relations with Upper Volta/Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.8.1960-14.7.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/181/3</td>
<td>Relations with Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/182/3</td>
<td>Relations with Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.10.1987-30.4.1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/182/4</td>
<td>Niger: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.5.1971-6.5.1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/183/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/183/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.9.1960-29.3.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4.1974-26.9.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.10.1974-31.10.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.11.1974-29.12.1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1.1975-31.3.1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.4.1975-24.6.1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.6.1975-27.2.1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.3.1976-27.10.1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.11.1977-25.9.1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/183/4</td>
<td>Central African Republic: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.9.1974-30.1.1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.10.1976-15.3.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/183/4</td>
<td>Central African Republic: loan for the hotel project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30.10.1974-24.1.1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27.1.1975-5.2.1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.5.1976-12.1.1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/183/4</td>
<td>Central African Republic: loan agreement, state redemption fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.5.1975-31.8.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.9.1978-12.8.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/184/3</td>
<td>Relations with Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/184/3</td>
<td>Relations with Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1971-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.1.1971-7.10.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.10.1985-30.4.1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/184/4</td>
<td>Chad: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/PL</td>
<td>15.11.1965-18.10.1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PL</td>
<td>11.5.1978-22.2.1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A</td>
<td>12.1.1988-29.2.1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/185/4</td>
<td>Congo: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/185/4/2</td>
<td>Congo: technical assistance (agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/194/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/194/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/194/4</td>
<td>Seychelles: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>AJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/199/3</td>
<td>Relations with Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/199/3</td>
<td>Relations with Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/203/3</td>
<td>Relations with the Comoros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1984</td>
<td>AJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 1985</td>
<td>AJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/203/4</td>
<td>Comoros: technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1PL</td>
<td>18.4.1978-26.4.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/203/4/2</th>
<th>Comoros: technical assistance (agriculture)</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/203/4/4</th>
<th>Comoros: technical assistance (health)</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>28.9.1983-3.2.1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/207/3</th>
<th>Relations with Equatorial Guinea</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.7.1988</td>
<td>1.3.1987-30.6.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6.1985-30.6.1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/207/4</th>
<th>Equatorial Guinea: technical assistance</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1.1984-8.4.1984</td>
<td>1.5.1985-18.5.1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1.1985-20.2.1985</td>
<td>AJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3.1985-30.4.1985</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/224/3</th>
<th>Relations with Cape Verde</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/225/3</td>
<td>Relations with Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/12</td>
<td>Eric Hendrik Louw: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/23</td>
<td>Balthazar Johannes Vorster: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.2.1975-12.8.1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/26</td>
<td>Pieter Willem Botha: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>17.11.1966-10.7.1984</td>
<td>AJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.5.1962-17.3.1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/29</td>
<td>Hilgard Muller: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ (NA)</td>
<td>2.1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/39</td>
<td>Cornelius Petrus Mulder: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5.1972-27.6.1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/55</td>
<td>Roelof Frederik Botha: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.5.1977-29.5.1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.6.1978-23.8.1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3/57</td>
<td>Frederik Willem de Klerk: visits abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/12</td>
<td>Jan Smuts Airport Multiracial Hotel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/79</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.1.1979-13.2.1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/106</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Ghana</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/116</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Tanganyika</td>
<td>1952-1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/120</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Uganda</td>
<td>1.12.1978-1.12.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/131</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Sierra Leone</td>
<td>9.11.1979-31.6.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5/135</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Kenya</td>
<td>18.5.1972-6.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Commercial Relations with Country</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-22.1.1968</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1+PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980-1.6.1985</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>34/5/170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.10.1985</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>34/5/175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.9.1971-29.7.1983</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>34/5/178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11.1983-12.1.1987</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>34/5/179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3.1969-4.2.1969</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>34/5/185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.6.1979-10.3.1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>34/5/188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8.1983-12.1986</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Senegal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980-31.10.1985</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Mali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980-12.6.1986</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980-1.6.1985</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980-1.6.1985</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1977-12.1987</td>
<td>Commercial relations with the Seychelles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1975-19.12.1985</td>
<td>Commercial relations with the Comoros</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11.1982</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1979-31.11.1985</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1980</td>
<td>Commercial relations with Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1972-8.2.1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Archives**

Department of Foreign Affairs (Buitelandse Sake (BTS))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/22/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.5.1959-31.3.1961</td>
<td>Relations with Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/112/5/1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.1.1961-25.4.1961</td>
<td>Volunteers for the Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/116/3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4.1961-4.12.1961</td>
<td>Relations with Tanganyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/129/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.2.1959-13.3.1961</td>
<td>Relations with Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/135/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.5.1959-31.3.1961</td>
<td>Relations with Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/158/3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4.1961-23.3.1962</td>
<td>Relations with Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/160/3</td>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Relations with Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/176/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1960</td>
<td>Relations with Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.8.1955-1.12.1960</td>
<td>Consul in Elizabethville (Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5.1941-2.8.1952</td>
<td>Consulate-General in Leopoldville (Zaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.11.1952-31.12.1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26.1.1943-28.7.1949</td>
<td>Representation in Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.2.1952-20.11.1958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/2/81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.1.1947-18.2.1959</td>
<td>Representation in Southern Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27.2.1959-8.3.1962</td>
<td>Malawi government representative and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/7/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.1.1947-26.4.1963</td>
<td>Visits from East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/58</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.4.1937-7.8.1964</td>
<td>Visitors from Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/106</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30.1.1931-31.3.1960</td>
<td>Visitors from the Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/112</td>
<td>1+PL</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/132</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from the Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/142</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28.8.1961-31.10.1961</td>
<td>Visitors from Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/183</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from the Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/223</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/243</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from the Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/283</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/303</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from the Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/323</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28.8.1961-31.10.1961</td>
<td>Visitors from Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/343</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/363</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.5.1962-22.3.1965</td>
<td>Visitors from the Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/1/403</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.7.1946-23.3.1948</td>
<td>Trade mission to African territories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.8.1963-1.8.1964</td>
<td>Technical assistance: other African countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1963-26.2.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4.1964-30.12.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.1965-29.10.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11.1965-18.7.1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2.1962-5.1.1963</td>
<td>CCTA: constitution, membership, foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1963-13.2.1963</td>
<td>CCTA: Annual and Special Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1965-18.10.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-56 - Nov. 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1963-13.2.1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2.1963 - 19.1.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1965-18.10.1965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private Secretary, Minister of Information (INL), 1966-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16/1/2/A</td>
<td>1/2/26</td>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/1/2/A</td>
<td>1/2/27/2</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/1/2/A</td>
<td>1/2/27/3</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/30</td>
<td>1/2/45</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Confidential correspondence: general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Department of Information (INL), 1971-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31/4/13</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.1.1976</td>
<td>Transkei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/4/89</td>
<td>Box 1568</td>
<td>23.10.1969-29.9.1970</td>
<td>Guests from overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/4/75</td>
<td></td>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>Guests from Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/4/98</td>
<td>Box 1628</td>
<td>1967-1978</td>
<td>Guests from Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/4</td>
<td>Boxes 1276-80</td>
<td>1964-1980</td>
<td>Guests from overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private Secretary of the Minister of Information (MNL), 1966-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IN10/1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1966-68</td>
<td>Guests of the South Africa Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN10/2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>Information programmes: publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1966-68</td>
<td>Financial help to foreign visitors and publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>Organisations and persons that spread information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>Personal affairs of the Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Personal affairs of the Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1968-71</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP78</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>To the Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>51/3</td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>51/4</td>
<td>1973-75</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>52/5</td>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>52/6</td>
<td>1976-78</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL8</td>
<td>53/7</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL20</td>
<td>68/2</td>
<td>1975-77</td>
<td>Foreign visitors and guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL20</td>
<td>69/3</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Foreign visitors and guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1974-77</td>
<td>Organisations and persons offering help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL22/1+2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>Foreign visitors and guests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL22/3+4</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>Foreign visitors and guests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews

Auret, Derek: telephone, 20 March 2002; 8 January 2003
See Appendix A

Barber, James: Johannesburg, 16 February 1999
Prof., Department of Political Science, Open University, London (-1983); Master, Hatfield College and Prof., Department of Political Science, University of Durham (1983-93); Research Fellow, South African Institute of International Affairs; Member, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University

Botha, Roelof Frederik ‘Pik’: Pretoria, 20 April 1999
See Appendix A

Cornwell, Richard John: Pretoria, 19 February 1999
MA (Hons) (History), University of Bristol (1969); Researcher, Africa Institute, and co-founder and Editor, Journal of Contemporary African Studies (1979-82); Lecturer in Development Administration and African Politics, University of South Africa (1982-87); Head, Current Affairs Section, and Editor, Africa Insight, Africa Institute (1987-97); Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg/Pretoria (1997-)

De Villiers, Caspar Francois ‘Cas’: telephone, 18 January 2003
Editor, Africa Institute Bulletin (1969-75); Associate, To the Point (1972-76); Director, Foreign Affairs Association (1975-78)

Fourie, Deon S.: Pretoria, 22 April 1999
Lecturer, University of South Africa, Pretoria; introduced the first degree in Strategic Studies to be taught in South Africa (1960-1997); Director, Citizen Force Liaison, on the staff of the Chief of the Army (1988-95); consultant for the Department of Defence, serving on various committees of enquiry on defence questions

Geldenhuys, Deon Johannes: Johannesburg, 1 March 1999
MA, University of Pretoria (1973); PhD, Cambridge University (“The Effects of South Africa’s Racial Policy on Anglo-South African Relations, 1945-1960”) (1977); Research Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1979-81); Prof., Department of Political Studies, Rand Afrikaans University (1984-)

Holtes, Willem Bernard ‘Wim’: Johannesburg, 31 March 1999
Chief Executive, South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO) (1963-92); Board of Directors and Deputy Chairman, South African-Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (1995-)

Landsberg, Stefan Adolf Waldemar: telephone, 4 December 2002
Metal Studies Consultant, Anglo American Corporation (1980-94)

Leistner, Gerhard Max Erich: telephone, 26 February 2003
Professional Officer, Department of Finance (1957-60); Lecturer/Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of South Africa (1960-64); Head of Economic Section, Africa Institute
Mills, Gregory John Barrington ‘Greg’: Johannesburg, 1 March 1999
MA, Lancaster University (1986); PhD, Lancaster University (“South Africa: The Total National Strategy and Regional Policy During the Botha Years, 1978-1989”) (1990); Research Associate, Institute for Defence Policy, Johannesburg, and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University (1991-93); Director of Studies, South African Institute of International Affairs (1994-96); Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1996-)

Runge, Paul: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999; telephone, 18 January 2003
See Appendix A

Shearar, Jeremy: telephone, 8 January 2003
See Appendix A

Spicer, Michael Wolseley: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999
MA, Rhodes University, Grahamstown (1978); Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (“South Africa in Conflict” Project) (1978-80); Assistant Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1981-84); Executive Director, Anglo American Corporation (1985-)

Swarts, Frans: telephone, 7 December 2002
Planning Manager, Commercial Manager, Deputy Chief Executive, South African Airways (SAA) (1945-81); Chief Executive, SAA (January 1982 – September 1983)

Van Aardt, Maxi: Johannesburg, 1 March 1999
PhD, University of Wales at Aberystwyth (“Building a Secure Community in Southern Africa: The Case of SADC”) (1998); Prof., Department of Political Studies, Rand Afrikaans University (1998-2000); Prof. Department of Political Studies, University of Pretoria (2000-)

Van Aswegen, Jacobus Pieter: Cape Town, 2 November 2001
Prof. and Head, Department of Business Economics, Rand Afrikaans University (1978-80); Group Economist, South African Marine Corporation (Safmarine) (1981-87); Board of Directors, Trek Airways, Air Cape, Namib Air (1986); Director, Safair (1986-87); Chairman, Safair (1987-91); Group/Executive Manager, Safmarine (1987-99); Managing Director, Safair (1993-99)

Van der Veer, Gerrit Dirk ‘Gert’: telephone, 7 December 2002
South African Railways and Harbours (1959-77); Chief Superintendent, Railway Operating (1977-79); Regional Manager Railways and Harbours, Natal (1979-81); Head, Railway Operating (1981-83); Chief Executive, South African Airways, and Deputy Managing Director, Transnet (October 1983 – June 1993)

Van Heerden, Neil: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999
See Appendix A

Van Heerden, Trevor: telephone, 8 March 1999
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service (1997-99)

Van Tonder, Jacobus Cornelius ‘Neels’: telephone, 19 March 1999
Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris (1969-70); Head, Special Tasks Directorate (Military Intelligence) (1975-84); Brigadier (1983); Major General (1986)

Venter, Denis: Pretoria, 10 March 1999
D.Litt et Phil University of South Africa (“Van Nyasaland tot Malawi: politieke ontwikkeling en verandering in ’n koloniale samelewing, 1891-1964” (From Nyasaland to Malawi: Political Development and Change in a Colonial Society, 1891-1964)) (1988); Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Politics, University of Pretoria (1970-74); Assistant Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1975-77); Senior Researcher/Chief Researcher/Director, Africa Institute (1978-91); Executive Director, Africa Institute (1992-99)
Viljoen, Jan Hendrik ‘Hennie’: telephone, 26 January 2003
Director, Coca-Cola South Africa (1975-95); President, Transvaal Chamber of Industries (1987-
88); President, Witwatersrand Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1989); Member, Executive
Committee, South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) (1990-94); Deputy President, SACOB
(1991); President, SACOB (1992)

Correspondence

Babb, Glenn: January 2003
See Appendix A

Barratt, John: October 2002; January 2003
Cadet, Department of Foreign Affairs (1954-57); Third Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United
Nations, New York (1958-65); Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1967-94)

Du Plessis, Adriaan Sarel ‘Attie’: January 2003
Executive Director, Sankorp Ltd. and Sanlam (1986-2002); President, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut
(AHI) (1991-92)

Dugard, Christopher John Robert: December 2002
Professor of Law, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (1969-98)

Eglin, Colin Wells: January 2003
Leader of the Progressive Party/Progressive Reform Party/Progressive Federal Party (1971 – Sep-
tember 1979; February 1986 – 1988); Member of Parliament for Sea Point, Cape Town (1974-)

Hanekom, Hermann: January 2003
See Appendix A

Jaquet, André: December 2002
See Appendix A

Leisewitz, Christoph Theodor Lutz: May 1999
Trainee Underwriter, Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) (1965-68); Branch Manager,
Natal, CGIC (1968-69); Underwriting Manager, CGIC (1969-73); Assistant General Manager,
CGIC (1973-78); Manager, Projects Department, CGIC (1978-82); Senior General Manager, CGIC
(1982-86); Executive Director, CGIC (1986-88); Managing Director, CGIC (1988-2002)

Leistner, Gerhard Max Erich: December 2002; January 2003
See Interviews

Luyt, Louis: February 2003
Founder and Chairman, Triomf Fertilisers Ltd. (1965-86); Trustee, South Africa Foundation (1973-
95); PhD in Business Administration, University of Michigan (“A Critical Analysis of Arbitration
through the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce”)
(1980); D.Com (honoris causa), University of the Orange Free State (1983); Honorary Professor of
Law, University of Pretoria (1986-88); LLD, University of Pretoria (1988); President, South Afri-
can Rugby Football Union (1994-98); Candidate for the Federal Alliance in the Presidential elec-
tion (1999)

Munger, Edwin Stanton ‘Ned’: February 2002
Research Fellow, University of Stellenbosch (1955-56); Professor in Political Geography, Califor-
nia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California (1961-88); Founder and President, Cape of Good
Hope Foundation (1985-97); Board Member, United States-South African Leadership Exchange
Program (USSALEP) (1958-)

Oppenheimer, Klaus: March 2002
General Manager, Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) (1956-65); Member, Export
Trade Advisory Committee (1956-65); Managing Director, Imex (1966)
Literature

Bibliographies, Document Collections


Secondary Sources


Munger, Edwin Stanton 'Ned'. 1968. *South Africa’s Prime Minister, John Vorster: New Impressions of His Evolving Political Commitment*. Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff. (Central and Southern Africa Series, 12(1); Field Staff Reports)


Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch. 1964. *I. Crisis in World Conscience; II. The Road to Freedom for Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland*. Pretoria: Department of Information.


### Primary Literature


Sole, Donald Bell. 1989. "This Above All": Reminiscences of a South African Diplomat. Cape Town. (Unpublished manuscript)


**Secondary Literature**


Bibliography 438


Booyse, Wim J. 1986. International Isolation of South Africa: The Role of the “Special Committee against Apartheid” (SCAA), *ISSUP Strategic Review*. October: 25-34.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Holbo, Paul S. 1977. Editor's Note, Diplomatic History 1, 1: vf.


Static State. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Program of Eastern African Studies: 45-69. (Occasional Paper, 18)


**Annual Reports, Journals, Magazines**

*Africa Confidential.* London.

*Africa Contemporary Record.* London.


*Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series.*


*Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut: Jaarverslag.* Pretoria.

*Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut: Kongresagenda.* Pretoria.

*ANC News Briefing.* London.


*Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Account During the Financial Year Ending 31 March 19...* Pretoria: Republic of South Africa.

*Facts and Reports.* Amsterdam: Holland Committee on Southern Africa.

*Finance Week.* Johannesburg.


*Industrial Development Corporation: Annual Reports and Accounts.* Johannesburg.


*Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart.* Bonn.


*Munzinger Archiv.*

News/Check. Johannesburg.
Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa. Amsterdam: Shipping Research Bureau.
SAFTO Exporter. Johannesburg.
Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly.
SouthScan. London.
The Complete Marquis Who's Who. Chicago, IL.
To the Point. Johannesburg.
West Africa. London.

Newspapers

Mail & Guardian. Johannesburg.
The Citizen. Pretoria.
The Friend. Bloemfontein.
The Guardian. Manchester.
The Star. Johannesburg.
The Washington Times. Washington, DC.

Websites

Affretair Zimbabwe: <http://www.planet.nu/sunshinecity/affretair>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Africa Intelligence (magazine): <http://www.africaintelligence.com>
Africa Leadership, New York: <http://www.africaleadership.org>
African National Congress, South Africa: <http://www.anc.org.za>
Armscor, Pretoria: <http://www.armscor.co.za>
Bessemer Steel Construction, Johannesburg: <http://www.bessemer.co.za>
Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea: <http://www.bioko.org>
Compulsive Gamblers Resource Site, South Africa: <http://www.cghub.co.za>
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation, Johannesburg: <http://www.creditguarantee.co.za>
Daily Independent, Nigeria: <http://www.dailyindependenctng.com>
Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure, Paris: <http://www.dgse.org>
Dorman Long, Durham, United Kingdom: <http://www.dormanlong.com>
East African Railways Development Corporation, Kampala:
<http://www.eardc.com/Direction.htm>
Forbes: <http://www.forbes.com>
France Libertés, Fondation Danielle Mitterrand: <http://www.france-libertes.fr/intro.htm>
Freedom of Expression Institute, Johannesburg: <http://fxi.org.za>
Gold Fields, Johannesburg: <http://www.goldfields.co.za>
Gorée Institute, Dakar: <http://www.goreeinstitute.org>
Hydro-Québec: <http://www.hydro.qc.ca>
Industrial Development Corporation, Johannesburg: <http://www.idc.co.za>
Lazare Diamonds, New York: <http://www.lazarediamonds.com>
LTA Limited, Johannesburg: <http://www.lta.co.za>
MBendi: <http://www.mbendi.co.za/vpsabeh.htm>
Murray and Roberts, Johannesburg: <http://www.murrob.com>
National Security Archive, Washington: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>
Nobel Museum, Stockholm: <http://www.nobel.se>
Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (formerly Southern Oil Exploration Corporation, Cape Town: <http://www.soekor.co.za>
Rulers: <http://rulers.org>
SAB Miller (formerly South African Breweries), London: <http://www.sab.co.za>
Safair, Johannesburg: <http://www.safair.co.za>
Safrmarine: <http://mysaf.safrmarine.com>
South Africa Foundation, Johannesburg: <http://www.safoundation.org.za>
South African Airways Museum Society: <http://www.saamuseum.co.za>
South African Airways, Johannesburg: <http://www.saa.co.za>
Spoornet, Johannesburg: <http://www.spoornet.co.za>
Stock Exchange of Mauritius: <http://www.semdex.com>
Sun International Hotels Limited, Johannesburg: <http://www.suninternational.com>;
   <http://www.sun-international.com>; <http://www.suninternational.co.za>
Sun Resorts Limited, Mauritius: <http://www.sunresort.com>
Tenke Mining Corporation, Vancouver: <http://www.tenke.com>
Truthout, Los Angeles: <http://www.truthout.com>
University of Natal, Faculty of Law, Durban: <http://www.nu.ac.za/law>
US Navy, history: <http://www.history.navy.mil>