AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY POWER SHARING IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE

By

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DECLARATION

In accordance with Rule G4.6.3, I hereby declare that the above-mentioned treatise/dissertation/thesis is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another University or for another qualification.

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ABSTRACT

This study is a conceptual analysis of power-sharing. It applies power-sharing in the context of Mozambique. The study is informed on the premise that components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace. However, findings from empirical investigations show that certain types of power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. The specific objectives of the study were to contextualize the concept of military power sharing arrangement; to explore the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique; to explore the strategies used to manage the Mozambique peace process; to ascertain the challenges faced by the BDF during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces; and to propose recommendations for future interventions.

In order to achieve these objectives, the study used a purposive sampling technique to assemble participants that provided useful data for the study. The target population was made up of members of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) who participated in the United Nations Peace Mission in Mozambique dubbed UNOMOZ; and those who conducted the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO military personnel. Thematic analysis of the participants’ responses from the interviews was used to address the objectives of the study.

The findings of the study reveal that poorly trained military personnel were a challenge to the implementation of power sharing deal in Mozambique. Also, there was a lack of trust and confidence between constituent parties, and a lack of transitional authority in holding forth power until the power sharing deal was fully implemented. In addition, the study found out that there was the problem of language barrier, and that very little counselling was offered to those who were traumatized by the conflict. Also, there was a kind of unwillingness by civilians to accept former combatants in their midst and a lack of logistics for both the peace keepers and the combatants. Among others, the study recommended that NGOs, civil society organizations, and churches should be more pro-active in engaging the government and not only ensuring that every party involved in the power-sharing deal fulfils its
role, but also organizing and carrying out counselling sessions for ex-combatants as part of reintegration process.
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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my family without whose support and regard, the completion of this work would not have been possible.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>Mozambique News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADM</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas da Defesa de Mozambique (Mozambique Defence Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (Mozambican Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Mozambican Christian Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non Commissioned Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted Social Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDDR</td>
<td>Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAFT</td>
<td>South West African Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSRSG</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER ONE

CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Africa has for many years been known as a continent with various forms of conflicts, notably ethnic conflicts due to inequalities in the distribution of political and economic power as well as issues relating to land distribution. Decolonisation and the acquisition of political independence did not do much in ensuring that peace prevails in Africa. Analysts, researchers and scholars have maintained that the search for a democratic model that would help stabilise those societies which are deeply divided, especially by the effects of war, has been a difficult one. However, there were attempts to solve some of these conflicts and situations of political instability with power-sharing agreements. This means opting for deals in which rival parties agreed to coexist in the government and to share power in ways predetermined, at times under the mediation of international community leaders or diplomats. The results of such power-sharing have, however, mostly not been positive. Kenya and Zimbabwe adopted power-sharing in 2008 while in previous years it had occurred in Mozambique, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. One thing to note is that in most cases, countries managed to temporarily escape from war, but then continued to be tormented by corruption and bad governance.

The scholars of power-sharing arrangements including Norris (2008), Sisk (1996) and Schneckener (2002) acknowledged that the likelihood of success in power-sharing agreements was basically determined by the way these agreements were made. They argued that power-sharing constitutions that were imposed by third parties seemed less likely to survive and provide durable peace settlements (Norris, 2008) and that agreements should be indigenously arrived at, not as a result of much external pressure (Sisk, 1999). In view of this, Schneckener (2002) argued that the role of third parties should only be limited to that of providing assistance for the implementation of the power-sharing agreement. Power-sharing practices, argued Sisk (1999:78), “often evolve as a direct response to a history of violent confrontation.” In Africa, during the period 1980 to 1996, of the six peace settlements that were reached which included sharing or dividing military power, only
Mozambique and South Africa completed the implementation, resulting in maintenance of peace. However, Chad achieved partial success in the implementation of the peace settlement, while Rwanda and Sierra Leone failed, hence returning to war (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003b:312).

Mozambique has proved to be a success story as far as power-sharing arrangements and the involvement of external actors are concerned, compared to countries like Angola, Liberia and Rwanda. Mozambique witnessed a devastating civil war which went on for sixteen years after gaining independence in 1975 from Portuguese colonial rule. The civil war resulted in nearly a million lives lost, as the FRELIMO government and RENAMO rebels fought each other (Adebajo, 2011:124). However, attempts were made to stop the civil war on the 16th March 1984 when then President Samora Machel of Mozambique and South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha signed the Nkomati Accord. Under the terms of the Accord, South Africa undertook to halt its support for RENAMO, and Mozambique agreed to close down the military operations of the African National Congress (ANC) in the country (Ludin, 2004:7). However, the signing of the Accord did not stop the war as it continued until Mozambique embarked in 1992 on what would become a successful transition to peace following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome in 1992. Article 6 (ii) of Protocol IV of the GPA mandated the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), with the Government and the forces of RENAMO each contributing fifty percent (50%) (Guebuza and Domigos,1990).

Dos Santos (2000:105) posists that, after the signing of the Peace Agreement by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO, the UN was invited “to send a peacekeeping mission to Mozambique to verify and monitor the implementation of the Agreement.” RENAMO, acting as a spoiler in the peace process, “…threatened to boycott elections and return to war, however accepted parliamentary elections and was disarmed, hence ending a civil war that had taken 800,000 lives” (Stedman, 2010:85). The section that follows presents the problem that informs the current study.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Mozambique is an interesting country which has experienced in its political history two transitions from war to peace. The first one was in 1974 and was in the context of the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial regime, which resulted in the Lusaka Accord. The Lusaka Accord defined governmental and military structures for a transitional period, from the signing of the Accord on 7 September 1974 up to the proclamation of independence of Mozambique on 25 June 1975. The second in 1992, which is of much interest to this study, was in the context of internal and external war of destabilization and culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992. To oversee the two year transition period until the holding of multiparty elections in 1994, a United Nations peacekeeping force, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), was deployed.

This study seeks to analyze military power-sharing as a conflict management tool, in particular, the 1992 Mozambique military power-sharing arrangement between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Article 6 (ii) of Protocol IV of the GPA mandated the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), with the Government and the forces of RENAMO each contributing fifty percent (50%) (Guebuza and Domigos, 1990).

The study seeks to find out what accounted for the success in Mozambique when countries like Angola failed dismally. Finally, the role played by UNOMOZ in facilitating the formation of FADM, as well as the role played by BDF (and challenges faced) in conducting reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO will be explored. Having presented the background details and the problem that necessitates this study, the next section now presents the underpinning motivation that informs the study.

1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY

This study is worth undertaking as of late power-sharing has been adopted in some countries as a way of resolving complex ethnic conflicts in Africa. The aim of the study is to analyze the 1992 military power-sharing arrangement in Mozambique. To do this, the study will ascertain how the joint command in the military entity
contributed to the peaceful transition from war to peace. It will also explore the challenges that were encountered in implementing the military power-sharing arrangement. The researcher will offer recommendations to enhance the implementation of future military power-sharing arrangements. The researcher believes that the findings will benefit scholars, military personnel and conflict management practitioners. In order to add lustre to the motivation of this study it is imperative to state the significance of this study.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study seeks to analyze the 1992 military power-sharing in Mozambique as a conflict management tool. In doing so, the research will unearth measures that were undertaken in implementing the General Peace Agreement, in particular the military power-sharing aspect of it. This study also seeks to document the role that the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) played in UNOMOZ as well as during the conduct of reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers between 1998 and 1999, as Adebajo (2011:127) has highlighted that “Botswana played an important role in supporting the (Mozambican) peace process.” The research is expected to benefit the BDF, future researchers, peacekeepers, policy makers and analysts in better understanding the Mozambique conflict in general and in particular military power-sharing. The study also aims at contributing to the existing body of knowledge in the field of peacekeeping and in particular power-sharing arrangements. Thus far, the problem that underpins the study has been stated. Therefore, it is crucial to state the objectives that guided the study. These objectives are drawn from the overall problem that gave rise to the study.

1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of the study are:

- To understand the concept of military power-sharing arrangements.

- To explore the challenges faced in implementing the military power-sharing arrangement in Mozambique.

- To explore the strategies used to manage the Mozambique peace process.
- To ascertain the challenges faced by the BDF during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces.

- To propose recommendations for future interventions.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.6.1 Primary Research Question

- What were the challenges faced in implementing the military power-sharing arrangement in Mozambique?

1.6.2 Secondary research questions

- What strategies were used in managing those who wanted to undermine the peace process?

- What challenges did the Botswana Defence Force face during reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers?

- How effective was power-sharing as a conflict management tool in the peace process?

- What challenges were faced by the peacekeepers in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme?

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Many researchers have underscored the need for a theoretical framework in a research study. Theory serves many purposes. For instance, it serves as a guide tool and sign post, as a means of identifying and collecting data and indicator of performance. The researcher has chosen the Consociational theory for this research project. Arend Lijphart first coined the term consociationalism as he attempted to explain how countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands managed to maintain stability, despite their divided subcultures. He credited the political elites’ highly cooperative relationships for the countries’ stability (Lijphart, 1969).
This study adopts Lijphart’s (1969) definition of consociationalism, in which he describes it as,

“pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of executive power-sharing in which the autonomy of contending groups is constitutionally guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and where there is a strong respect for the principles of proportionality in elections, civil service appointments and government subsidies” (Taylor, 2006:4).

Over time, consociational democracy was discovered in such other countries as Colombia, India, Lebanon and Czechoslovakia. Arend Lijphart began to examine democratic consociational systems in the late 1960s, coining the very term when making reference to the political systems of Scandinavian countries and of the Netherlands and Belgium (Lijphart, 1968).

The phenomenon of diverse political systems which Lijphart was describing, however, was not new. As a pattern of social structure, characterizing a society fragmented by religious, linguistic, ideological, or other cultural segmentation, it had existed and been studied long before the 1960s. However, the studies were extensive. The extensive inquiry of the theory has brought about the existence of many structural aspects. These structural aspects, studied among others by Lorwin (1971), were not the primary concern of Lijphart, who was more interested in why, despite their fragmentation, such societies maintained a stable political process and identified the behaviour of political elites as the main, but not the only, reason for stability.

1.8 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The term ‘research design’ is one whose definition is not exhaustive. Various authors have defined it in different ways. Zikmund, et al., (2010:66) observed that a research design is “a masterplan that specifies the methods and procedures for collecting and analyzing the needed information.”

Basically the choice of a research design is influenced by the objectives of the study. Ordinarily three types of research designs exist to tackle varied research objectives, namely, exploratory, descriptive and explanatory or casual research (Hair, et al., 2000). This study takes a descriptive design approach whose main thrust is to
describe the characteristics of existing phenomena. The description is usually in the form of concepts and themes. Sometimes, graphs and other visual images of the results are used (McMillan, 2012). The researcher selected a descriptive design to describe the power-sharing scenario in Mozambique. Hence, this is a qualitative study, simply because it is descriptive and exploratory in nature.

1.9 TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING

A population is defined by Wild and Diggines (2009:186) as ‘the total group of people or entities [social artefacts] from whom information is required.’ On the other hand, Babbie (2010:199) defined the population as the theoretically specified aggregation of the elements in a study. The target population is a set of specific population entities that are used to give information to the study. Information is obtained from a population to answer research questions. The population must be relevant to the research questions and must have a homogenous group who has similar characteristics to enhance objectivity of the information obtained from them, and it should also be large enough to provide a representative sample.

In the context of this study, the target population will consist of all those from the Botswana side, both military and civilians, who were involved in the negotiations for the return of peace in Mozambique. However, not all the individuals who participated in the peace process can also participate in the study. Therefore, a sampling technique is used to arrive at a specific frame of participants. The sample will be chosen on the basis of non-probability, purposive sampling. Purposive sampling, according to Babbie (2010:193), is “a type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgement about which ones will be the most useful or representative.” In this study, the researcher will select the sample based on predetermined criteria that make sense given the research question and situation. The sample for this study is twelve (12) selected Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officers who participated in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and those who conducted the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO military personnel. The interviewees will be selected based on their roles during UNOMOZ and the training of FADM soldiers. In addition, two (2) officials from SADC, and at least one former
Botswana Ambassador to the UN are to be interviewed in their personal capacities because of the wealth of knowledge they possess. The aim is to get diverse views and insights from various sources for informed analysis of data.

1.10 DATA COLLECTION

Interview is the only data collection tool used in this study. According to Babbie (2010:274) the interview is a “data-collection encounter in which one person (an interviewer) asks questions of another (a respondent).” Coombes (2001) adds that interview provides a way to obtain peripheral information that may be linked directly or indirectly to the causes and effects associated with an analysis goal. Interviews may be conducted face-to-face or by telephone. There are two types of interviews that one could adopt, and these are structured, which is a formal approach, and unstructured, being an informal approach. For the purpose of this research semi-structured interviews will be used because questions could be prepared ahead of time. Another reason is that semi-structured interviews will allow the interviewer to be prepared and appear competent during the interview (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006).

1.11 CASE STUDY METHOD

This research will use a case study of Mozambique to analyze the implementation of military power sharing as a conflict management tool. Vennesson (2008:226) defined a case study as “a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations. One of the advantages of a case study, argued Neuman (2014:42), is that “it helps with constructing new theories, developing or extending concepts, and exploring the boundaries among related concepts.”

1.12 PILOT STUDY

Blanche, Durrheim and Painter (2006:94) maintained that pilot studies are “preliminary studies on small samples that help to identify potential problems with the
design, particularly the research instruments”. They are important in that they are useful for improving both the validity and reliability of measuring instruments. For this study, weaknesses of the semi-structured interviews will be realized by conducting a pilot study using a few military personnel who took part in UNOMOZ. In view of this, the pilot study would be a dress rehearsal for the main investigation.

1.13 ANALYSIS OF DATA

Data analysis is an important aspect of any research. It helps in drawing conclusions and generalizations of findings to a problem statement. Data analysis refers to the application of logic to understand and interpret the data that have been collected about a subject, and it may involve determining consistent patterns and summarizing the appropriate details that have been revealed in the investigation (Zikmund, 1997:57). It has been pointed out by Creswell (2003) that data analysis is not distinctly disconnected from other activities of the research process, such as data collection and formulating of research questions, but rather it is a continuation.

The data will be recorded by a tape recorder after getting permission of the participants, and their views will be quoted verbatim. For the purpose of data analysis, qualitative data collected through interviews will be organized according to research questions, categorized into related themes and presented in narrative form. The results will be put together to produce a single interpretation and then conclusions drawn. In other words, analyses and interpretations of research findings will be in line with the study objectives and research questions presented.

1.14 ETHICS OF THE RESEARCH

This study is guided by fundamental ethical considerations of scientific research that relate to responsible research in human sciences. According to Neuman (2007:14), “ethics include the concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts over the proper way to conduct research. Such ethical considerations assist to define what is or is not legitimate to do, or what moral research procedure involves.” However, Bless and Higgins, (2000) warns that as much as the researcher may want information from respondents, participants have the right to refuse to participate.
By its nature, this study will not in any way expose the participant to any danger. The researcher will take a number of steps to uphold ethics. Firstly, he will inform the participants about the study and what it was all about. Its objectives will be outlined to them, including the purposes of the study, before their consent to act as subjects was sought. Secondly, the researcher will make it very clear that participation in the study is voluntary. The participants will be informed that they were not being coerced to take part in the study and that they had the liberty to say no to the request for them to serve as participants. Thirdly, the participants who accept to serve as respondents will be guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. This will be accomplished through a number of ways, for instance, no responses from a particular respondent will be analyzed (used) separately. Furthermore, no names or any information that could be used to identify particular participants will be employed in reporting the research findings. Rather, information from each participant will be reported only in combination with those from all other respondents. The researcher also guarantees that the surveys would be destroyed at the end of the study and that answers to all questions would be kept completely confidential.

1.15 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

This study focuses on an analysis of military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique as a conflict management tool. The researcher will acknowledge all limitations of the study. As qualitative research, the findings may only be applicable to Mozambique mainly due to the actors in the conflict. It may not be applicable to other conflicts either in the region or elsewhere in the world. Secondly, participants may refuse to speak in the presence of cameras or may withhold their views so that true feelings are not represented. Thirdly, most of the documents which could be of much use are written in Portuguese which the researcher does not understand, hence information which could be of value may not be utilised in this study. Lastly, it may not be possible for some of the officials intended to be interviewed to be present considering their tight work schedules.
1.16 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

**Conflict.** Is a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources (Wallensteen, 2007:15).

**Peacekeeping.** Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2005) defined peacekeeping as the interposition of international armed forces, traditionally with the consent of the conflict parties, to separate the armed forces of belligerents.

**Peacemaking.** According to Boutros-Ghali (1992), the UN defined peacemaking as action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as envisaged in Chapter VI Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations- ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes.’

**Post Conflict Peace-Building.** This refers to action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Neethling, 1998:115).

**Conflict Management.** It is a process that aims at channelling the violent manifestation of an incompatibility of goals between two or more parties into a political process where their disputes can be addressed by non-violent means (Wolff and Yakinthou, 2012:1).

In order to give a picture of the overall shape of this study, it is important that a section presents the structure of the study. In effect, the section that follows is on the structure thereof.

1.17 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study shall be comprised of six chapters as follows:

**Chapter One:** It shall provide an introduction which gives a brief overview of the study, problem statement, aims and objectives, methodology and layout of the study.

**Chapter Two:** This chapter will discuss the theoretical perspectives on conflict. It will also give appropriate background information on power-sharing issues.
Chapter Three: Will provide a historical background to the Mozambique civil war.

Chapter Four: The Research design and methodology to be used in the study will be covered in greater detail.

Chapter Five: The Mozambique Military power-sharing case study.

Chapter Six: Will provide an analysis of the participants’ responses from the interviews based on the objectives of the study.

Chapter Seven: will provide a summary of the findings of the study, with concluding remarks and recommendations.

1.18 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the background and significance of the study as well as the objectives and research question. It also discussed the concept of power-sharing under the theoretical framework. Lastly, the chapter outlined the layout of the chapters of the study and what will be covered in each chapter. The next chapter will discuss the literature and other power-sharing related concepts.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is devoted to the review of literature on power-sharing and related topics. According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), in reviewing what others have contributed in a certain field, one is able to find out what existing knowledge is there, identify gaps, compare own ideas or even create new ideas. Literature review is important as it shows command of the subject area and an understanding of the problem. A comprehensive literature review justifies the research topic, the design and methodology adopted for the study. This literature review chapter begins by critically examining the concept of power-sharing. Further, it discusses the major forms of power-sharing with emphasis on political power-sharing, military power-sharing, economic power-sharing and territorial power-sharing. The relationship between power-sharing and peace agreement is presented. The notions of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are also discussed as they represent an important aspect of post-conflict transformation. Finally, the theory on power-sharing that underpins the study is articulated. All the foregoing will be presented in the sections and sub-sections that follow.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF POWER-SHARING

Power-sharing, like many others in the Social Sciences, is a contested concept. There is no agreement about the exact definition of power-sharing and how it works. The concept of power-sharing has been used in many contexts, as a response to conflicts ranging from ethnicity, political differences of resource allocation and use, a means of setting up government coalition in a context where political parties have failed to win a majority of seats in parliament, or in post-conflict situations where multiple actors who represent diverse backgrounds seek to control the state’s power. In literature, there are many meanings and definitions associated with it. These meanings and definitions have contributed to a large variety of conceptualizations which can cloud the understanding of power-sharing. The current study will interrogate a handful of definitions and adopt a single definition that will guide it.
Power-sharing could be described as a conflict management system and according to Bradshaw (1994:3), a conflict management system is “...a permanent rather than a once-off intervention, which is substantially ‘owned’ by the parties to the conflict. It should be self-sustaining and accessible to the community at the point of need.” Sisk (1996:5) borrowed the definition of power-sharing from Arend Lijphat, who said it is “a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group.” On the other hand, Norris (2008:23) defined political power-sharing as “formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process.”

In multi-ethnic societies, therefore, power-sharing looks like a good approach to sustainable conflict management as it represents a compromise that could halt conflict and save lives in the short term, but there could be situations where it does not offer stability in the long term if the basic pillars of multi-party democracy were undermined. Walter (2002) noted that power-sharing pacts were likely to become unstable over time and she concluded that a second transition will almost certainly be needed to maintain peace over the long term. An observation made is that since the end of the Cold War, power-sharing has been proposed time and again and even adopted in peace agreements, with varying results.

In trying to come up with an approach of measuring power-sharing, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a:327) and Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) posit that the more power-sharing dimensions, the lower the risk of recurring internal armed conflict. In total, four power-sharing dimensions were included in their analyses and they were political, economic, territorial and military power-sharing. The results obtained from the analysis showed that when all four power-sharing dimensions were included in peace settlements, the likelihood of settlement failure was reduced by 53% (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a:327).

Africa, as earlier argued, is one continent which has experienced many civil wars. In the aftermath of a civil war it should be noted that political and social organizations generally were absent and the ability of militia leaders to deliver the compliance of their own fighters was often questionable. This therefore means that the consociation
democracy argument which maintains that trust between parties in a post-conflict climate was minimal, should be carefully used in the context of resolving African civil wars. Lyons (2002) highlights that power-sharing pacts may best be expected after post-settlement elections.

By contrast, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) argued that power-sharing may have beneficial effects in the initiation phase of a transition from war to peace and more harmful effects in the consolidation phase. In view of the above, both arguments tell us that power-sharing is more likely late in the process and more beneficial earlier on. We could therefore note that power-sharing is a difficult element of a peace-building strategy. A good number of peace settlements were agreed upon over the last decades in the name of preventive diplomacy, whose sustainability might have been doubted early on. Roeder and Rothchild (2005) count twenty two comprehensive peace settlements in ethnically divided societies worldwide, which included Eritrea 1993, South Africa 1993, Rwanda 1993, Burundi 1994, Bosnia 1995 and Sierra Leone 1996.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) see power-sharing as provisions in peace agreements for the inclusion of rebels in settlements. Walter (2002) defines power-sharing from a much narrower perspective as simply the inclusion of the political opposition in joint national governments. In the view of Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008), power-sharing is exclusively a short-term measure of conflict resolution in post-conflict countries. Contrary to their view, Roeder and Rothchild (2005a) argue that power-sharing is rather a long-term approach toward reconciliation of diverse interests in societies. Consequently, a number of pertinent issues associated with power-sharing are evident in the definitions articulated above. These include power-sharing as inclusion of rebels; power-sharing as a joint national government; power-sharing as a conflict resolution approach in a post-conflict country; and power-sharing as a reconciliation of diverse interests. These definitions all have their merits. For the purposes of this study, power-sharing is any guaranteed arrangement between the government of a state and rebel groups regarding the use of state power. This definition of power-sharing is informed by the position of Ottmann and Vullers (2014) and the interest of the current study in exploring the use of power-sharing as a tool of conflict resolution in post-conflict countries.
Power-sharing is a popular policy prescription for post-conflict societies such as Burundi, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria and Sierra Leone and in many countries beyond Africa and the Middle East, including Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The basic rationale is clear: if all of the main warring parties are incorporated in the political system, then they are more likely to develop vested interests in its stability and proper functioning. Yet power-sharing remains controversial.

It is evident in the literature that approaches to power-sharing are diverse. For instance, both Roeder and Rothchild (2005a) and Mehler (2009) view power sharing as specific provisions within peace agreements; Jung and Shapiro (1995) view it as specific institutional arrangements of governance. Lemarchand (2007) sees power-sharing as improving democracy; Roeder (2005) and Siriam (2008) see it as hindering democracy; Norris (2008) sees it as stabilizing peace; whereas Mukherjee (2006:501) sees it as reproducing violence. Some researchers analyse power-sharing statistically, while others study only one case as in the cases of Tull and Mehler (2005) who studied the Democratic Republic of Congo’s post-Cold War history and Walter (2002) who studied some 72 civil wars from 1944–1992. Others look at only peace agreements as in the case of Mehler (2009) who studied 19 African peace agreements from 1999–2007. These divergent views suggest that whereas power-sharing has succeeded in ushering in peace and democracy, others have criticized power-sharing as having failed to create peace and development in divided and conflict-ridden countries. Evidently, power-sharing is a broad term which can involve a number of approaches. However, it should be viewed as an attempt to avert any or further conflict and is used as an immediate solution to placate disputants albeit temporarily. The basic principles of power-sharing as traditionally conceived include grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments, protection of minority rights for groups, decentralisation of power and decision making by consensus. The next section discusses the major forms of power-sharing.
2.3 MAJOR FORMS OF POWER-SHARING

According to Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), power-sharing practices first came to the attention of the academic community as part of the consociational model developed by Lijphart (1968), in his study of the politics of accommodation in the Netherlands. In his study, Lijphart advanced the argument that pluralistic societies that made use of power-sharing rules and practices would be able to exercise power consensually. Similarly, Nordlinger (1972) sought to demonstrate that power-sharing could be used to regulate conflict in democracies within deeply divided societies.

In contrast to the power-sharing mechanisms favoured by Lijphart (1968), Horowitz (1991) proposes the use of alternative institutions that encourage moderate behaviour by both elites and their followers. In Sisk’s (1996) view, the alternative institutions may be defined as a form of power-sharing because they tend to foster the creation of broad coalitions representing diverse interests. Whereas both Lijphart (1968) and Nordlinger (1972) identify institutions that might prove capable of managing conflict in pluralistic societies, none of the two considered the value of these mechanisms in efforts to stabilize the peace among states emerging from civil war via the process of negotiation. In a nutshell, power-sharing is most famously associated with Lijphart’s (1969) notion of consociational democracy. However, Cammett and Malesky (2012) expound consociational democracy more clearly and use it to refer to a set of non-majoritarian, elite-level formal and informal arrangements that limit threats to democratic stability in societies where ethnic or other societal cleavages are politicized. They distinguish between territorial, military, economic and political forms of power-sharing. Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) refer to territorial power-sharing as decentralization or local autonomy; military power-sharing as proportional or systematic allocation of positions and leadership roles in the armed forces and economic power-sharing as agreements over the distribution of oil or other commodities. The discussion continues by articulating each of the four major forms of power-sharing. It begins with political power-sharing.

2.3.1 Political Power-Sharing

Raft (2013:7) defines political power-sharing as “…the guarantee of a considerable electoral, administrative, or executive proportional representation for either the rebel
organization or its political arm by the incumbent government." From this definition, it is evident that political power-sharing concerns itself with the allocation of political power between the belligerents. Cammett and Malesky (2012) did a comparison of power-sharing arrangements in their fifty-three sampled cases. Political power-sharing is the most frequent form, with some presence in forty-three cases. However, it is also the most unsuccessful, with the highest failure rate and lowest average duration of peace. They disaggregate political power-sharing into five subcomponents which include closed-list proportional representation, executive coalition, specialized veto, proportional civil service appointment and open-list proportional representation. This shows that a great deal of diversity exists under the general banner of political power-sharing. While political power-sharing as a whole is the most unsuccessful general form, some types are clearly better at maintaining peace than others.

Confirming the findings of Hoddie and Hartzell (2003), Cammett and Malesky (2012) showed that the non-result of political power-sharing is derived from the disparate effects of the components of the aggregate measures. Only one form of political power-sharing is statistically significant. For instance, the study by Cammett and Malesky (2012) shows that countries with closed-list proportional representation are 57 per cent less likely to resume conflict than those without such arrangements. In addition, they report that other types of political power-sharing are not statistically significant, although the coefficient on proportional civil service appointments is just shy of traditional benchmarks. Interestingly, it has the opposite effect on peace: countries employing proportional civil service appointments are 76 per cent more likely to resume conflict. These countervailing influences help in understanding why political power-sharing is not useful in aggregate (Cammett and Malesky, 2012).

Furthermore, Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) contend that political power-sharing has no effect on durable peace and that it is only territorial and military provisions that reduce the risk of recurring conflict. Similarly, Mukherjee (2006:501) specifically studied the political dimension of power-sharing and concluded that offers of political power-sharing after civil wars ending in military stalemates do not make peace more likely to last. On the one hand, Mukherjee’s argument is that offers of political power-sharing make war less likely to resume if they are made following military victories.
On the other hand, Walter (2002) contends that political pacts may influence the successful implementation of an agreement, but the support for it is likely to be weak.

Following the dissolution of the Apartheid Regime in South Africa, Maphai (1996) posits that the new government was a political power-sharing system. However, the South African instance is power-sharing in only one aspect and that is the Government of national unity, established after the first elections, in which there was, of course, very minor representation of other parties. As a result, De Klerk was included, as was Buthelezi, as minister. Be that as it may, this was an informal arrangement, a once-off arrangement and without minority guarantees. Nevertheless, one might indicate that it had a small element of power-sharing principles on a temporary basis.

Whether the South African settlement fully exemplified Lijphart's consociationalism, however, is open to debate. Lijphart's (1995) own conclusion was that the newly founded South African democracy embodied all of consociationalism's basic principles and, of course, represented optimal power-sharing, although one component of the model, an explicit minority veto, is missing. More importantly, the South African constitution does not contain a single group-based provision, focusing instead on the rights of the individual.

The political dimension of power-sharing details the distribution of political power among the parties to the settlement. Literature limits political forms of power-sharing to electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional representation and executive proportional representation. Because of the crisis associated with political power-sharing, Jarstad (2008) has suggested 'joint rule'. But this kind of arrangement should hold only through the transition to a more democratically elected government. Another major form of power-sharing is that of the military and is being discussed below.

2.3.2 Military Power-Sharing

The term military power-sharing refers to the concept of integrating insurgent fighters in the national armed forces or a newly formed army, says Hoddie and Hartzell
In simple terms, military power-sharing is an integration of the rebels into a new national army. This is what Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) refer to as military integration, a peace solution which they argue reduces the rebels’ insecurity vis-à-vis the government. According to Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) military power-sharing is an increasingly popular peace-building strategy, having been used in almost one-third of all peace processes in the 1990s. Their view is that military power-sharing may be more effective if it is combined with political power-sharing.

The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR, 2005) indicates that military power-sharing is a critical component of security sector reform which provides a costly signal of the parties’ commitment to the peace. The Report posits that even signing a military power-sharing agreement may send a positive signal, compared to cases where the parties cannot agree to stop fighting. However, it warns that failure to implement a military deal could be both a cause and a symptom of broader peace failure.

Furthermore, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003:303) consider the role that the implementation of peace agreements has on the prospects for fostering a durable peace following the negotiated resolution of civil wars. Focusing on the 16 peace agreements between 1980 and 1996 that have included provisions for the sharing or dividing of military power among former combatants, the study reports that the complete implementation of this aspect of settlements significantly improves the prospects for maintaining peace. They suggest that this proves to be the case because of the important and credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies that are made through the process of implementation. They find that implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups. Based on these results, the authors offer policy recommendations focusing on the role that third-party actors and aid donors might play in facilitating the successful implementation of negotiated peace agreements.

However, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) did not analyse the impact of military power-sharing on peace just as Walter (2002) briefly discusses ‘military pacts’, but does not analyze the effects of military power-sharing. Empirical evidence on the successes of
military power-sharing gives credence to Hoddie and Hartzell’s (2005) argument that other forms of power-sharing, other than that the political, have resulted in durable peace.

Some of the cases of military power-sharing suggest that it is substitutable and often used to accommodate an excess supply of ex-combatants. For example, Parsons (2004) reports that in Angola’s most recent peace process, UNITA combatants who had been formerly integrated into the government army and demobilized, were paid five months of back pay, and given an integration allowance and a reintegration kit of household and farming items. This also happened in Namibia, where most of the 21000 or so demobilized Namibian soldiers from The South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), the largest Namibian force to fight for the South African side, continued to take their pay well after the peace process had concluded (Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). Likewise, in Cambodia in 1998 and Iraq in 1972, former rebel combatants who could not be integrated in the national army were provided with cash payments.

Notably, a major challenge to military power-sharing is funding and its poor management. In Angola, vocational training programs for ex-combatants were not funded because foreign donors were much more interested in funding election organization and supervision (Anstey, 1996). Similarly, Liberia grappled with the demobilization and reintegration program in 1997 which the International Crisis Group (2004) has called ‘an important part of the lost chance’ in 1997. This failure saw a facilitating and re-recruitment of fighters for the armed groups that tore the country apart between 1999 and 2003. Despite its challenges, military power-sharing agreements are increasingly popular strategies to end civil wars and armed conflicts. It has therefore gained more credence and acceptability than political power-sharing.

The position of the current study is that military power-sharing is mainly implemented with two outcomes in mind: democracy and peace. However, both perspectives assume that the societies in need of such governance are in crisis. Thus, in both cases, the aim of military intervention is to avoid conflict and ultimately to achieve peace. The relationships among power-sharing, democracy and peace are central in the current discussion of the literature. The interaction between economic and
political outcomes has always been at the centre of attention. In effect, the next subsection discusses the third type of power sharing economic power-sharing.

### 2.3.3 Economic Power-sharing

Economic power-sharing is “often used where discrimination has resulted in differential distribution of state resources and economic development among various regions of a country.” (Sriram and Zahar, 2009:17). In an attempt to understand how political outcomes affect economic growth and development, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the main hypothesis that drives recent empirical and theoretical research is that democracies and political systems that foster pluralism are on average performing better, in economic and social terms. Accessing the performance of a pluralistic set-up is not within the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, the relationship between economic and political outcomes is certainly bi-directional. Not only do the quality of political institutions and the degree of democratization and political power-sharing affect economic growth; the opposite is also true (Matakos and Xefteris, 2012).

In Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), the twenty four cases of economic power-sharing demonstrate a lower failure rate of 38.75 and the longest-lasting average peace of 229 months. This security mechanism is based on the higher costs of mutual defection with military intervention. Military power-sharing, however, can also work through an economic mechanism: by offering rebels employment, it creates economic disincentives for war (UN, 2014). This shows relationship, or better put, an interconnectivity among the major forms of power-sharing.

Additionally, Lijphart (1999) finds a positive relationship between his consensus model of democracy and good economic performance. The relationship is strong for inflation but less so for economic growth, budget deficits and unemployment. The implication is that power-sharing does not induce a trade-off with good government performance. In countries emerging from war, political stability and macro-economic stability often come into tension. In the short run, borrowing, inflation and deficit spending may be necessary to purchase peace but over time these policies contribute to political uncertainty (Boyce and O'Donnell, 2007).
Africa’s oversized cabinets provide another set of clues of flamboyance because they resisted budget cuts, even during the era of economic reform (van de Walle, 2001). Large cabinets in Kenya and Zimbabwe, for instance, appear to be repeating the same mistake of growing government without increasing capacity. AfriCOG (2008:14) complains that not only are Kenya’s ministers among the highest paid in the world, but also many of the ministerial portfolios are pointless: “everyone feels like they must be a part of the government and this has nothing to do with improving government performance”. Business Daily (2008) says that the power-sharing agreement shows “little regard for public opinion that has been heavily tilted against a bloated government”. The return to oversized cabinets is especially surprising since Kenya’s previous rainbow coalition generated the same complaints and excessive spending on salaries (AfriCOG, 2008).

Consistent with the notion of power-sharing value is that two parties agree to benefit mutually from either the political or economic capital of the state. For example, the case of Sierra Leone deals with the notion of wealth-sharing. Some conflicts on the African continent, which are economic in nature, in Pratt’s (2009) view deviate from the primordial causes of conflict which are tribalism, religion and land. The Sierra Leonean conflict is a classic example. In dealing with this example, Pratt (2009) contends that good settlements should not only bridge opposing interests, but should also represent the wider interest of public goods in which the conflict is situated. The Sierra Leonean case presents an ambiguity of overlap between political power-sharing and economic power-sharing. The consistent overlapping among the major forms of power-sharing further points out that no single/one form of power-sharing is effective on its own. The next discussion focuses on territorial power-sharing.

### 2.3.4 Territorial Power-Sharing

Territorial power-sharing is generally defined as an elite settlement relating to the division of responsibility between different geographical sub-entities of a national territory (Zanker, Simons and Mehler, 2015). Rothchild (2005) argues that in terms of structure, territorial power-sharing is supposed to foster an all-inclusive state system or allow for territorial integrity whilst permitting greater autonomy to minorities. The forms of territorial power-sharing most widely discussed are formal political and
administrative decentralization and federalism. In territorial autonomy, there is a focus on the self-rule component of federalism. However, it is not within the scope of the current study to embark on detailed discussions of this topic.

Territorial power-sharing is not frequently implemented in Africa as the parties to conflicts have been more concerned with political power (Hartmann 2013). For instance, of the 48 peace agreements concluded in Africa between 1989 and 2006, Ottmann and Vullers (2014) reported that 20 contained elements of political power-sharing, 32 included military power-sharing and just 15 embraced territorial power-sharing. They indicated that territorial arrangements, by contrast, were by far the most frequent type of power-sharing in both Europe and the dominant type in Asia over the same period. In other words, territorial power-sharing is not only less frequently implemented in Africa, but also seldom practised in Asia and Europe. On the basis of the handful of instances of power-sharing in Africa, Zanker, Simons-and Mehler (2015) argue that whereas forms of territorial power-sharing are in fact insignificantly present in Africa, they are typically overlooked because they are informal. However, Zanker, Simons and Mehler (2015) recommended territorial power-sharing as a catalyst for sustainable peace and democracy.

One thing to note is that when territorial power-sharing is properly implemented, clustered communities that concentrate in one region recognize their distinctiveness. Bauböck (2004) contends that territorial autonomy allows a national community to define policies in the fields of education, culture, media or language rights according to their respective needs. This also comes closest to the idea of having the right to self-determination or being a sovereign nation within a state that several national minorities share.

Nevertheless, McGarry and O'Leary (1993) posit that in the context of territorial power-sharing, new minorities will be formed with the creation of sub-state entities that will raise the same demands for protection from majority rule and assimilation within the smaller territory. They further argue that new internal boundaries may follow historical legacies but may not coincide entirely with the area in which the people belonging to one cultural community reside. Like McGarry and O'Leary (1993), Mattes and Savun (2009) find that issues like proportional electoral systems and a guaranteed number of seats in the cabinet matter more than territorial
decentralization. Sriram and Zahar (2009) argue that territorial power-sharing is used to address the self-determination demands of minorities that are both ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct from the rest of the country. This shows that there are those who are in favour of territorial power deals and those who are against them. From the empirical interrogation of each of the major forms of power-sharing, it is evident that there are related problems. No doubt, any related problem stops or hinders the success of the power sharing form. Having stated this, our study goes further to inquire and to report the implementation of power-sharing.

2.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF POWER-SHARING

Studies on the implementation of power-sharing have merely looked at promises of power-sharing and have not explored how the implementation of such provisions may translate into durable peace. Where implementation is brought into focus, it has not been treated separately from the recurrence of war. In addition, as far as the implementation of power-sharing provisions has been explored, this has been confined to the effect of military power-sharing on the durability of peace. Hence, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) argue that little is known of the extent to which the implementation of political, military and territorial pacts, respectively, may influence the risk of continued conflict.

Be that as it may, Downs and Stedman (2002) focus on the general patterns of peace implementation after 16 civil wars from 1980 to 1997 that ended through a settlement and where third parties were expected to play a major role. Their argument is that the success of peace implementation to a large extent is dependent upon the legacy of the conflict as well as the willingness of external actors. Hence, Downs and Stedman look at the issue of peace implementation broadly and made no attempt to explore whether the stipulations of the peace agreements are put in place and whether this could affect the stability of peace. Regarding military and territorial pacts, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) indicate that only territorial pacts are found to significantly reduce the risk for civil war recurrence. Walter (2002) further proposes that power-sharing in itself is insufficient to obtain peace and she argues that these measures need to be coupled with third-party security guarantees. In a
nutshell, these studies show that some types of power-sharing pacts may influence the recurrence of conflict, whereas others are less successful.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) examine how the implementation of power-sharing may affect durable peace. However, this research is limited to exploring military provisions in peace agreements. Also, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003:303) focus on the sharing and dividing of military power and whether the implementation of such arrangements serves to enhance the prospects for lasting peace. Both these studies also took into account the costs associated with the initiation of negotiations and the signing of a settlement. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) entails an analysis of 16 peace agreements from 1980 to 1996, where the warring parties have agreed on the sharing or dividing of military power. They convincingly argue that the parties, by implementing these military pacts, are accepting costs, which signal their genuine commitment to peace and thereby improves the prospects for lasting peace. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) find strong support for this expectation, as the results show that the settlements in which the parties implement the military power-sharing arrangement are considerably more likely to see peace prevail. The bottom line of power-sharing implementation is to ensure durable peace and sustainable democratic practices and institutions. In effect, the section that follows examines the relationship between power-sharing and peace agreements.

2.5 POWER-SHARING AND PEACE AGREEMENTS

Power-sharing was originally advocated to garner the commitment of local actors in signing peace agreements (Mehler, 2009:2). Siram and Zahar (2009:12) aver that power-sharing arrangements are commonly built into peace agreements to provide critical assurances to negotiating parties and induce them to sign and implement them. Peace agreements are defined as “arrangements entered into by warring parties to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility” (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). In other words, they are arrangements to which individual parties seek to commit themselves with a view to realising peace, although in some cases, their grievances may not have been met.

According to Sisk (1996), the principal assumption underlying power-sharing theory is the belief that appropriate political engineering can help in constructing a capable
democratic system that can withstand the centrifugal tendencies that tear deeply divided societies apart. Amendment can be made through peace agreements. Sisk’s (1996) argument is that through such constraints as mutual veto and incentives for co-operation, power-sharing can nudge ethnic groups and their leadership to behave moderately toward one another and lead their communities to do so as well. Mutual co-existence can be restored through peace agreements. The content of agreements is often considered a determinant of successful agreement. Fortna (2004) makes this argument pertaining to interstate ceasefires and agreements. According to Fortna (2003), specific agreements are more likely to result in strong agreements, an indication that each side is willing to endure potential domestic fallout. For example, release of rebel prisoners could decrease public approval for the regime that agrees to such terms.

Studies such as Fortna’s (2003) and (2004) focus on the type of termination process and those settlement types which have been most successful in prolonging peace duration and delve into specific attributes of the agreements, including: power-sharing, provisions for formal reconciliation and integrative efforts to provide greater insight into the success or failure of a settlement. The content of the peace agreement is important as its provisions must make the costs of reinitiating the conflict outweigh the incentives to attack for one or both sides (Fortna, 2004). In the long term, confidence and cross-communal trust must be built for the agreement to have a lasting impact.

However, capacity to implement the terms of the agreement is also important. Failure to implement peace agreement provisions, either through wilful abrogation of the terms of one party or via a lack of structural or institutional capability, can significantly undermine the success of a settlement. In considering state capacity to implement the agreement terms, one must consider what the general concessions in an agreement entail. Some examples of peace agreements in Africa include the 1994 UN-sponsored Lusaka Peace Accord which was signed between the ruling Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the guerrilla opposition, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The agreement was to be mindful of the need to conclude the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" signed in Lisbon on 31 May 1991, the need for a
smooth and normal functioning of the institutions resulting from the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 and the need for the establishment of a just and lasting peace within the framework of a true and sincere national reconciliation. The Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993, is another peace agreement. Yet another is the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November. These are just a handful of peace agreements concluded in Africa.

Consequently, the implementation phase of a peace agreement is the most volatile (Werner, 1999). Failure to move forward with the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement, specifically on the part of the government, can ignite suspicion and fear that the settlement is being used as a ruse to buy time for military recovery. However, lack of implementation cannot always be viewed as a calculated move with intent to renege on the terms of the agreement. Pratt (2009) listed a number of factors that may hinder the due implementation of a peace agreement. The factors include the number of warring parties, the presence of a peace agreement signed by all parties before implementation, the likelihood of spoilers, whether or not the state has collapsed, the numbers of armed soldiers and warring factions, disposable natural resources and the presence of hostile neighbouring states (Pratt, 2009). At this juncture, one can easily see the fundamental role that implementation plays. It is clear that implementation is not only important in power-sharing, but also in peace agreements. In other words, implementation remains a common variable in the two processes. Also, both power-sharing and peace negotiation and agreement have a common way of installing peace and democracy. Therefore, in order to restore and sustain order in a post war situation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration must be meticulously conducted. The next section succinctly interrogates the programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in post-war instances.

2.6 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

According to Gleichmann et al (2004), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a composite programme that is designed to provide assistance in the form of training, allowances, tools and implements, so that ex-combatants can be
productive and rehabilitated members of society that no longer pose a threat. The process of reintegration includes a number of interrelated aspects. The aspects are sometimes presented as stand-alone issues. Programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants have become an increasingly important component of peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction plans. The success of such programmes is essential for sustainable peace and development and to prevent renewed violence, but in many cases these have failed because not enough attention was given to the reintegration phase of the process. Each aspect of DDR is succinctly discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

Disarmament is the first component of the DDR program. The UN (2005) indicates that disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. Disarmament is usually done by amassing combatants in assembly or cantonment areas. The separation of combatants from their weapons signals the end of their involvement in active combat. It also enables a secure environment where demobilization and reintegration can take place. Weapons are collected from combatants, registered, safely stored and, rendered for re-allocation or destruction. Combatants are identified and registered and issued new papers. Douglas et al (2004) aver that disarmament often includes such activities as information gathering and operational planning, weapons collection, stockpile management and weapons destruction. They suggest that if the disarmament processes are not systematically carried out, there will be crisis as in the case of Sierra Leone in 2000 when they were used to restart the conflict.

Demobilization is the second component of the DDR program. The UN (2005) posits that demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. Demobilization entails a number of stages. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose, cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks respectively. The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.
Depending on the specific context and circumstances, ex-combatants are either returned to civilian life, or integrated into the national armed forces, which, in some cases, might have to be newly established. The separation of combatants from their command and control structures marks their formal transition from military to civilian life. This process is frequently facilitated with transitional allowances to tide ex-combatants over until they find a peaceful livelihood. Whereas disarmament is primarily carried out by the military and supported by civilians, demobilization is primarily carried out by civilians and supported by the military.

Reintegration is the third component of the DDR program. The UN (2005) asserts that reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level (Ngoma, 2004). In other words, it is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

As pointed out above, reintegration is a social and economic process. It includes the stimulation of viable economic growth and development; the establishment of income generating projects; the provision of education and training programmes; the preparation of host communities for the return of ex-combatants and the response to the psycho-social impacts of war. Reintegration shifts from a primary focus on the individual and his/her needs to a focus on the person becoming a responsible member of the community, thereby supporting community development. Therefore, reintegration links to several other dimensions of peace-building including security and security sector reform (SSR), transitional justice, reconstruction and economic development, education, gender, child protection and so on. Reintegration is indeed one of the most complex processes in the immediate post-conflict contexts.

The sustainability of the disarmament and demobilization processes depends on the successful social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. This is a complex process where ex-combatants, many of them with no memory of family or community life, return to their communities and adjust to civilian life. It is therefore imperative that this process is meticulously carried out. The next section discusses the consociational theory as a theoretical framework for this study.
2.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY

Many researchers have underscored the need for a theoretical framework in a research study. Theory serves many purposes. For instance, it serves as a guide tool and sign post, as a means of identifying and collecting data and indicator of performance. The researcher has chosen the Consociational theory for this research project. Arend Lijphart first coined the term consociationalism as he attempted to explain how countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands managed to maintain stability, despite their divided subcultures. He credited the political elites’ highly cooperative relationships for the countries’ stability (Lijphart, 1969).

This study adopts Lijphart’s (1969) definition of consociationalism, in which he describes it as,

“pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of executive power-sharing in which the autonomy of contending groups is constitutionally guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and where there is a strong respect for the principles of proportionality in elections, civil service appointments and government subsidies” (Taylor, 2006:4).

Over time, consociational democracy was discovered in such other countries as Colombia, India, Lebanon and Czechoslovakia. Arend Lijphart began to examine democratic consociational systems in the late 1960s, coining the very term when making reference to the political systems of Scandinavian countries and of the Netherlands and Belgium (Lijphart, 1968).

The phenomenon of diverse political systems which Lijphart was describing, however, was not new. As a pattern of social structure, characterizing a society fragmented by religious, linguistic, ideological, or other cultural segmentation, it had existed and been studied long before the 1960s. However, the studies were extensive. The extensive inquiry of the theory has brought about the existence of many structural aspects. These structural aspects, studied among others by Lorwin (1971), were not the primary concern of Lijphart, who was more interested in why, despite their fragmentation, such societies maintained a stable political process and identified the behaviour of political elites as the main, but not the only, reason for stability.
Furthermore, Lijphart (1977:25) identified four features shared by consociational systems. The first is a grand coalition government. This type of government exists between parties from different segments of society. One might expect parliamentary parties to form a minimum winning coalition; in other words, a coalition just large enough to control a majority of parliamentary seats. Presumably, this would enable the coalition to implement policy without sacrificing too many goals. However, in consociational democracy, one expects quite the opposite. Lijphart (1977:31) argues that with a grand coalition, the cabinet includes extra parties so that it can represent the views of a broader portion of the public. This tendency can be either formally prescribed or informally adhered to.

The second is segmental autonomy. This kind of autonomy exists in the cultural sector. All component groups should have the ability to apply brakes to a decision process. Any one minority can essentially veto a policy change. This feature of mutual veto could lead to policy immobility, but Lijphart (1977) thinks that it would not, because each party will want to preserve the system's stability. So, they will make concessions occasionally to prevent constitutional change or war.

The third feature is proportionality. This feature is evident in the voting system and in public sector employment. The idea is to move decision-making as far up, that is, away from the citizens as possible. So the parliament proportionally reflects the population and the cabinet proportionally reflects the parliament. Only at the highest elite level does decision-making take place, often in secret negotiations because it is at this level that elites can recognize the need to work across their cleavages and make good decisions. Compromises happen when elites, that is, cabinet members bargain behind closed doors; whereas conflict happens when members of parliament openly pander to their supporters.

Then the fourth feature is the minority veto. This feature advocates for minorities to rule themselves territorially. These characteristics were, more or less prominently, present in all the classic examples of consociationalism: Lebanon, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Fiji and Malaysia. Some of these consociations have succeeded, such as in Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, while others have failed, such as in Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia (Lijphart, 1977).
However, McGarry and O’Leary (2004:5) highlight some important weaknesses in consociational theory. These include the failure to address the role of external actors the trans-state nature of some self-determination disputes and the necessary institutional arrangements to address them, the increasing complexity of conflict settlements in which consociational arrangements form an important element but require complementary mechanisms to deal with ‘the design of the police, demilitarization, the return of exiles to their homes, the management of prisoners, education reform, economic policy and the promotion of language and other group rights’ McGarry and O’Leary (2004:13). In dealing with these weaknesses, McGarry and O’Leary (2004) offer both refinements of, and advancements to, consociational theory. They elaborate the usefulness of sequential proportionality rules, in the allocation of cabinet positions in order to avoid protracted bargaining between parties and increase parties’ incentives to remain part of cross-communal coalitions.

A final, and perhaps the most significant, advancement of the power-sharing dimension of consociational theory is McGarry and O’Leary’s (2004) contention that Lijphart’s grand coalition requirement is overstated, as what makes consociations feasible and work is joint consent across the significant communities, with the emphasis on ‘jointness’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004:15). In other words, what matters for a democratic consociation ‘is meaningful cross-community executive-power sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment’ (O’Leary, 2005:13).

In a nutshell, consociational theory advances a system of consensual multi-ethnic power-sharing as opposed to majority rule. The basic argument is that a plural, deeply divided, society can become stable and democratic through elite accommodation, co-operation and grand coalition. The autonomy of deeply divided groups is institutionally guaranteed (segmental autonomy) and there is strong respect for principles of proportionality (in elections, allocating civil service appointments and granting government subsidies) as well as mutual veto rights (Lijphart, 1977).

Also, since its initial formulation in the late-1960s consociationalism has led to a highly influential school of studies as a genuinely attractive option to address the seemingly intractable ethnic divisions of Nigeria and South Africa. Mainly, it is argued
that consociationalism does not result in the permanent exclusion of minority interests from government (Lijphart, 1985). The next sub-topic will discuss the deep-rooted conflict.

## 2.8 DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT

The nature of violent conflicts across the world has changed in recent decades. The changes are both in their actual subject-matter and in the form of its expression. One of the most dramatic changes has been the trend away from traditional inter-state conflict and towards intra-state conflict. For there have been the on-going Syria armed conflict, which has given rise to the refugee crisis in Europe and that of South Sudan which has displaced millions of citizens of the newest nation in the world.

Harris and Reilly (1998) pointed out two elements that often combine in such conflicts. These, in their view, include identity and distribution. They argue that identity is the mobilization of people in communal identity groups based on race, religion, culture and language, whereas distribution is the means of sharing the economic, social and political resources within a society. Armed conflict arises where perceived imbalance in distribution coincides with identity differences, for example, one religious group is deprived of certain resources available to others (Harris and Reilly, 1998). It is this combination of potent identity-based factors with wider perceptions of economic and social injustice that often fuels what Harris and Reilly (1998:9) call 'deep-rooted conflict'. The foregoing scenario is what Azar (1989) in Bradshaw (2008:37) refers to as protracted social conflict.

Furthermore, the description of deep-rooted conflict by Harris and Reilly (1998) as presented above is consistent with that of Azar (1989) who argues that deep-rooted conflicts are characterised by issues of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other cultural identities. In addition, Bradshaw (2008:37) indicates that societies that are bedevilled by deep-rooted conflict have such enduring features as economic and technological underdevelopment and a porous socio-political system. For the purposes of clarity, Bradshaw (2008:37-38) highlights four cluster variables that make up the background conditions of societies that are beset with deep-rooted conflicts. The variables include communal context, (where a society is characterized by multi-communal composition), human needs, (where a society is denied of basic human
needs), authoritarian government, (where a society is governed by an incompetent, parochial and fragile system that has failed to provide the people’s basics) and international dependency, (where a society is found in foreign relations characterized by economic dependency).

One could see a prevalence of the fore-going typology of deep-rooted conflict. Harris and Reilley (1998) contend that what makes this kind of conflict so prevalent, so pervasive, so durable and so insoluble, is the way in which the issues of the dispute are so emotionally charged. Be that as it may, it is outside the scope of the current study to investigate the emotional circumstances surrounding a deep-rooted conflict-ridden society. The overall interest of this study is to posit that power-sharing is a conflict management tool, especially with respect to Mozambique. As such, the study will now discuss the term conflict management.

### 2.9 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

On the global scale, nations struggle with one another, both diplomatically and militarily. And with the increased globalization of the world's economy, states are all becoming more interdependent on one another (Costantino and Merchant, 1996). War, international negotiation and ethnic/racial conflicts therefore become important arenas of study. This section of the study focuses on conflict management. Conflict is an inevitable part of the human existence and relatedness processes. Putnam and Poole (1987:552) argue that conflict is “the interaction of interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims and values and who see the other party as potentially interfering with the realization of these goals”. Ting-Toomey (1987:22) insists that there must always be ways of dealing with conflict. This could be referred to as conflict management.

Conflict management is the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of conflict (Rahim, 2002). It involves the control, but not resolution, of a long-term or deep-rooted conflict. Thus, conflict management minimizes the negative outcomes of conflict and promotes the positive outcomes of conflict. Conflict management techniques include collaborating, compromising, competing, accommodating and avoiding. Conflict management means constructive
handling of differences. It is an art of designing appropriate institutions to guide inevitable conflict into peaceful channels.

Collaborating involves working through differences which leads to creative solutions that will satisfy both parties’ concerns. In compromising both ends are placed against the middle in an attempt to serve the common good while ensuring that each party can maintain something of their original position. Competing is employed when goals are extremely important, to the extent that one must sometimes use power to win. Accommodating involves appeasing others by downplaying conflict, to protect the relationship. In avoiding, a party avoids conflict by withdrawing, sidestepping, or postponing.

African countries today face greater challenges to peace and stability than ever before. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including Sierra-Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, are a volatile mix of insecurity, instability, corrupt political institutions and poverty. Alarmingly, most of these countries lack the political will to maintain previous peace agreements and thus have fallen prey to continuous armed ethnic conflict (Mare, 1993). This could partly be due to ineffective conflict management. The conflicts in these countries are mostly between ethnic groups, not between states. Marshall and Gur (2003) argue that conflicts in Africa are contagious and if they are not checked, ethnic conflicts can spread quickly across borders like cancer cells. They also contend that conflicts in Africa are caused by the combination of poverty and weak states and institutions.

There are, however, theoretical dimensions to conflict management. One example is Burton’s (1979) human needs theory. This approach to ethnic conflict explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These include peoples’ need for identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. This theory provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by undemocratic regimes. Evidently, conflict management encompasses different methods of identifying and interjecting techniques related to a specific conflict-stricken environment. It is imperative that a clear definition of conflict management is discussed. However, dissecting the different layers that intertwine with one another in conflict management with the objective to grasp a better
appreciation of all the techniques utilized in managing conflict may fall outside the scope of the current study. This is because explaining the meaning of conflict management in the arena of peace and security research, demands a discussion of several terms that refer to different ways of dealing with conflict including peace-making, peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcement, collectively known as peace operations or missions.

2.10 CONCLUSION

From theoretical sources that have been interrogated so far in this study, it may be argued that power-sharing is an effective way to give all parties a stake in governance. The reason is that the underlying goal is to give warring factions political legitimacy. In addition, studies have argued that power-sharing is necessary for states embroiled in war and it is often the only way to forestall conflict, restore the rule of law, strengthen social support for government and create political space for democratic election and transition. Power-sharing is an incentive for rebels and warlords to negotiate for peace. In other words, power-sharing is a conflict management strategy. The next chapter of the current study gives the political and economic landscape of Mozambique.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MOZAMBIQUE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a brief historical background of Mozambique. This background gives one an insight into the political past of Mozambique. The brief background traces Mozambique to its independence in 1975. Thereafter, a discussion on the civil wars after independence follows. As the civil war raged on, there were efforts to restore order in Mozambique. These were such peace accords as the Lusaka Accord, Nkomati Accord, the Rome Agreement and the subsequent United Nations Operation in Mozambique. The chapter ends with a discussion on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique.

3.2 BACKGROUND OF MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique was a Portuguese colony. It is located on the Indian Ocean in Southern Africa. There are 10 major ethnic groups that are divided into subgroups with their own languages, dialects, cultures and history; the largest are the Makua and Tsonga. The north central Provinces of Zambezia and Nampula are the most populous, comprising about 50% of the population. Mozambique has three major ports in Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. These are all ideally suited for naval bases and have long been coveted by the super-powers. Maputo, the capital, is the economic, political and cultural centre of Mozambique. The geographic position of Mozambique, according to Cadeado and Hamela (2009:2), gives it the privilege of being the main corridor for the landlocked countries that are bordering it to access international markets. Nevertheless, there is more about Mozambique that is of interest to the current study.

In 1960, as the UN General Assembly recognised the need to dismantle the colonial yoke, in Resolution 1514 (XV), Portugal refused to adopt the resolution. The UN General Assembly resolution brought about a wave of independence which swept across Africa. Portuguese colonial rulers denied the legitimacy of the independence movement in Mozambique and continued to encourage European settlers into the
country. By 1962, the Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO), the first independence movement in over 400 years in Mozambique was launched. Yet, the Portuguese were unwilling to negotiate, despite FRELIMO's nationalistic quest for self-rule. Thus, in 1964, the call for independence metamorphosed into a military struggle. For example, FRELIMO began its campaign in northern Mozambique. It launched ten years of a bitter struggle.

However, the Portuguese dictatorship responded with a major military effort, sending out large numbers of troops from Portugal. In spite of the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, the pioneer leader of the struggle, in 1969, the revolutionary movement was hard to suppress. By 1974, FRELIMO controlled the whole of the northern part of the colony and was moving south. Ciment (1997) reports that the fight for independence lasted eleven years until 1975. In other words, this culminated when the fascist government was toppled in Portugal and Mozambique was granted independence by the incoming government. This simply means that the colonial masters withdrew from Mozambique. It should be noted that the colonial withdrawal from Mozambique is exclusively a matter of negotiation between Portugal and FRELIMO, the only organized resistance movement at that time. In September 1974, a provisional government was put in place, made up of representatives from both sides. When the eventual constitution for the forthcoming Government of Mozambique was published in June 1975, it stated that the President of FRELIMO will also be the President of the new nation, to be known as Mozambique. Samora Machel was FRELIMO's President at that time. It should be recalled that he had taken over the leadership after the assassination of the pioneer leader, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969.

According to Awortwi and Nuvunga (2008), the power relations between Portuguese colonial regime and the FRELIMO were highly influenced by international, regional and local dynamics in political and military realms. Awortwi and Nuvunga (2008) stated two variables of politics and military. First, in terms of politics, in his view, Portugal had seen its international legitimacy and power of influence reduced due to the global condemnation of its fascist regime and the refusal to give the independence to its colonies. In this context, the war for liberation and FRELIMO gained international legitimacy and saw its power of influence increase even in the
Portuguese public opinion, in Portugal. The second variable in the view of Awortwi and Nuvunga (2008), in military activities, the war was painful and tiring for both parties but mainly for Portugal. The obvious reason is that, at that time, Portugal was facing, simultaneously, other wars in its colonies, namely Guinea Bissau and Angola. In this context, the colonial wars brought social and political contestations in Portuguese society. Thus, three main conversations or, put differently, negotiation rounds held in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania and Lusaka, Zambia, in 1974 produced the Lusaka Accords. Facets of the Lusaka Accord are presented later in this study.

In conclusion to this succinct background of Mozambique's landscape, there are two crucial facts to be kept in mind, especially as it concerns the security situation in post-independence Mozambique. These include: (i) there was no real peaceful transition from colonialism to independence, with a metropole committed to the security of a newly installed sovereign state and (ii) there remained settlers in the country who were deeply angered at their loss of status as preferred citizens of Portugal living in Portuguese-controlled Africa. The section that follows presents an overview of the civil war era of the Post-independence Mozambique.

3.3 THE CIVIL WAR ERA IN MOZAMBIQUE: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE

After independence, the FRELIMO-led government was characterized by many problems. The problems were compounded by the unremitting hostility of the neighbouring white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (now and henceforth, Zimbabwe). The then Zimbabwean intelligence services helped to set up in 1976 an anti-FRELIMO guerrilla movement, RENAMO - for Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance). According to Ellsworth (1994:59), RENAMO has since its birth been a political actor and that the white-minority ruled Rhodesian government established it to destabilize and discredit FRELIMO. Consequently, when Zimbabwe became independent of the white minority rule in 1980, South Africa then became RENAMO's chief sponsor (Vines 1991).

Young (1996) reported that RENAMO was estimated to have between 15,000 and 20,000 combatants and that Mozambican civilians were RENAMO's principal targets in the war, although the insurgents also attacked government installations and the
economic infrastructure. Ellsworth (1994:58) posits that during the seventeen years of war against Mozambique’s government, RENAMO killed as many as 100,000 civilians and indirectly caused the deaths of about 1 million. Evidently, RENAMO’s campaigns were brutally violent. The brutally violent campaign in rural districts combined with raids across the border by Zimbabwean and South African forces means that by the mid-1980s FRELIMO had lost control of much of the country. The regimes of Zimbabwe and South Africa sponsored RENAMO because FRELIMO in Mozambique was providing a safe haven for the Patriotic Front and African National Congress (henceforth ANC) exiles in Mozambique.

Consistent with Domingues (2010), the civil war era of Mozambique can be divided into four periods. These include: 1977-1980, 1980-1986, 1987-1990; and 1990-1992. This division is imperative as it aids one to capture the period of the civil war in smaller time demarcations. Each of the periods of the civil war is briefly discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

The first period of the civil war era ranges from 1977 to 1980. This period was referred to as one of dispute (Vines, 1991). In the view of Vines (1991), there were a number of smaller movements vying for power in Mozambique at that time, but none had FRELIMO’s widespread and organised urban and rural support. On a regional level too, there was a strong degree of opposition from the white minority government of Zimbabwe and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The reason for such opposition could be the fact that FRELIMO placed itself in the front line of attack from its two neighbours.

During this first period, the opposition RENAMO was totally controlled by Zimbabwe and it had launched the first attacks on Mozambican soil. According to Domingues (2010), the RENAMO attacks took place mainly in central Mozambique near the border with Zimbabwe and spread gradually towards the south. At that time, Serapiao (1990) avers that RENAMO, a heterogeneous group of opponents at the Mozambican government, targeted camps of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the Rhodesian counter-insurgency operations and the infrastructures of FRELIMO. This suggests that RENAMO was not only fighting the FRELIMO government of Mozambique, but also the militant African nationalist organisation (ZANLA) that participated in the Zimbabwean Bush War against white
minority rule. RENAMO assumed this stance because much of its support comes from the ruling white minority regimes in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The second period of the civil war era was from 1980 to 1986. Following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, Serapiao (1990) indicates that RENAMO lost the support of Rhodesia, whereas South Africa, willing to destabilize Mozambique, became its new supporter. From 1981 South Africa stepped up its commando attacks and raids into Mozambique, attacking both ANC members and Mozambicans. Vines (1991) reports that the American government did nothing to discourage these actions and with increased resources and training, RENAMO's presence throughout Mozambique increased. By 1981 up to 7,000 rebels were active, up from less than 1,000 during the Rhodesian-command days. Although RENAMO's primary source of support was South Africa, the group maintained its own independence and leadership (Vines, 1991).

Reports from Davies (1989) show that fighting intensified during this period. First, it occurred in the south during the RENAMO's offensive towards Maputo between 1982 and 1983 and then in the north. This period of the civil war era in Mozambique saw the emergence of a significant peace agreement. In 1984, FRELIMO came to an agreement with South Africa. Under the terms of the Nkomati Accord, FRELIMO no longer provided refuge for the ANC exiles. Aspects of the Nkomati Accord are discussed later in this Chapter. At this time, South Africa withdrew its military support for RENAMO and consequently one would expect that this likely constituted a blow to RENAMO, but according to Ellsworth (1994:59) the activities of RENAMO were very little reduced by the withdrawal of South African support as they consolidated military and political power for themselves. Unfortunately, the civil war continued, causing more than a million refugees to flee the country. Later in the late 1980s, the FRELIMO leadership decided that peace depended on ending Mozambique's rigid system of one-party rule.

The years of 1987 and 1990 constitutes the third period of the war era. Both Serapiao (1990) and Robinson (2006) concur that this was also a period of high violence perpetrated by RENAMO against civilians, especially in the south. Indeed, in 1989, South Africa began to change its opinion on the best strategy towards Mozambique. In fact, the continuation of a conflict on its borders proved to be an
important source of inconvenience for South Africa as she experienced a huge influx of refugees. Zimbabwe was also affected by the RENAMO attacks in Mozambique as thousands of refugees fled into Zimbabwe. Adebajo (2011:125) posits that Zimbabwe provided air and ground support for the Mozambican military in battles to recapture towns from RENAMO in 1987 and 1988.

However, this period saw remarkable development in that under the presidency of Chissano, the Church was permitted to recognise the parties to the conflict as well as the possibility of dialogue in 1987. President Chissano also gave the Mozambican Christian Council (MCC) the go-ahead to conduct dialogue with RENAMO. Additionally, there was also the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, which continued to meet RENAMO officials and to outline its objectives toward restoring peace (Lundin, 2004). Though aware of RENAMO’s hostility towards the Government, the Commission became convinced of the group’s fatigue and willingness to end the conflict.

The fourth and last period of the Mozambican Civil War Era ranges from 1990 to 1992. According to Vines (1991) this period is also characterized by negotiations. One outstanding negotiation of this period is the Rome Peace Talks, which led to the resolution of the conflict on October 4, 1992. However, during this period, fighting continued in most provinces. It was then that FRELIMO and RENAMO signed a peace treaty, with an agreed plan for elections which RENAMO was to contest as a political party. The civil war was long and brutal. RENAMO’s strategies included kidnapping, looting, mutilation against the civilian population and the enrolment of child soldiers. One hundred thousand Mozambicans were killed directly by the war and nearly one million perished from its indirect consequences, such as starvation and lack or disruption of health services (Saul, 1999). The section that follows surveys some of the key negotiations aimed at both instituting democratic rule and restoring peace in Mozambique.

3.4 NEGOTIATIONS TO RESTORE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE

Lundin (2004:4) posits that the road to peace in Mozambique was difficult, long and troublesome but in the end, successful. Various state and non-state actors played a major role in facilitating negotiations to restore peace in Mozambique. Most of the
negotiations centred around who should govern and how the available state resources should be distributed. The first key negotiation to be discussed is the Lusaka Accord. This Accord was signed before the independence of Mozambique and it is imperative to articulate it because it is directly linked to the subject matter of the current study, power-sharing.

3.4.1 The Lusaka Accord

The signing of the Lusaka Accord between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Government on the 07th September 1974 brought to an end protracted negotiations which had been initiated soon after the Lisbon Coup of 25th April 1974. The Lusaka Accords defined governmental and military structures for a transitional period, from the signing of the Accord on 07th September 1974 up to the proclamation of independence of Mozambique on 25th June 975 (Cadeado and Hamela, 2009:13). The Lusaka Accord, therefore, created a government of transition and a Joint Military Commission in which both parties were represented. However, Rupiya (1998:12) maintains that the speed at which power was handed to a FRELIMO-dominated transition government caught FRELIMO by surprise as they had little military success in the cities and advances in many rural areas. FRELIMO leaders had predicted at least ten more years of armed struggle before independence could be achieved.

3.4.2 Nkomati Accord

The Nkomati Accord was a non-aggression pact signed on 16 March 1984 between the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the apartheid government of the Republic of South Africa. The Accord was signed at the South African town of Komatipoort with Samora Machel of Mozambique and PW Botha of South Africa as key signatories. The need for the return of peaceful co-existence and co-operation in Southern Africa was of paramount importance for the Mozambican leadership under President Samora Machel, in the beginning of the 1980s. The Nkomati Accord, according to Rupiya (1998:13) was meant to lay the groundwork for a cessation of hostilities.
However, the expected climate of non-aggression, co-existence and co-operation between the Accord parties, South Africa and Mozambique, failed. The war not only continued, but also assumed “highest physical, psychological and unprecedented cruelty in Africa and elsewhere in the world” (FRELIMO, 1989:114). While FRELIMO largely stuck to the terms of the Nkomati Accord, the South Africans did not, as they publicly conceded in 1985 that ‘technical violations’ had occurred, hence the Nkomati initiative failed (Rupiya, 1998:13). A number of children were used to commit crimes beyond the human imagination. Civilians were kidnapped in urban and rural areas, tortured, mutilated or murdered. These acts were in direct violation of human rights.

That is to say that after the 1984 Nkomati deal, RENAMO intensified its campaign and seemingly, “provisioned itself from the Mozambican Army” and from South African military forces (UN, 1995:14). The central aim of RENAMO, according to Rupiya (1998:13-14), was to destroy transport links, health clinics, schools and all other infrastructures that represented social security and government provision.

One major problem of the Accord is its evident concentration or focus on security issues. It bound each of the contracting parties to refrain from the use of force against each other and to prevent the use of their respective territories by any other state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals against the other party. Nevertheless, the Accord was also understood to be part of a wider package which would include the renegotiation of various aspects of economic relations between the two countries.

The Accord is essentially about two security problems: South Africa’s demand that ANC attacks should end and Mozambique’s demand that South Africa’s military operations inside Mozambique and support for the RENAMO should cease. According to AIM (1986:11) South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Ron Miller, on 08 October 1986 declared that “If Mozambique is allowing its territory to be used by the ANC, it will have to run the risk of strong reaction from South Africa in an attempt to defend itself from the ANC.” However, Adebajo, (2011:126) maintains that FRELIMO kept its side of the bargain, but South Africa did not and continued supporting RENAMO. According to AIM (1986:25), the Director for Information of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, dismissed allegations by the South African government that the ANC uses neighbouring countries to launch attacks against it. Thabo Mbeki
maintained that “all the ANC military operations are planned and executed from within South Africa”. Evidently, the first security problem deals with actions from the territory of a country sympathetic to a national liberation movement while the latter problem also concerns the use of force by one state against another. The experience of Nkomati has thus revealed much about the objectives and tactics of South African regional policy, as well as about its strengths and weaknesses, limits and possibilities and contradictions. These continued violations led to an increasingly evident strain in relations between the two states over the period (Adebajo, 2011).

South African violations of the Nkomati Accord showed that the apartheid regime never had the slightest intention of honouring the agreement. According to AIM (1986:9), on the 07 October 1986, following an incident in which a South African military vehicle detonated a landmine in the South-Eastern Transvaal injuring all its six occupants, the South African Defence Minister General Magnus Malan insinuated that Mozambique was responsible for the landmine explosion. General Malan declared that “the Nkomati Non-Aggression Accord between South Africa and Mozambique and landmines cannot exist side by side. If President Machel chooses landmines, South Africa will react accordingly”. Rupiya (1998:14) posits that by 1986, more conventional RENAMO units had also consolidated their strong-holds in West-Central Mozambique and pushed deep into Zambezia Province, routing poorly supplied army units.

AIM (1986:37) highlighted that on the 19 October 1986 President Samora Machel and thirty-three (33) others died when his aircraft crashed under circumstances that were not clarified at Mbuizi, in South African territory, about five (5) kilometres North-West of Namaacha. The President was returning from one of the missions seeking the establishment of peace in Southern Africa and the development of Regional cooperation. Only ten (10) people survived the crash. According to AIM (1986:90), the then Chairman of the Frontline States, then President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, pointed out that there was substantial ‘circumstantial evidence’ pointing to the involvement of the government of South Africa and that “the plane was being monitored by South African radar…and we know that electronically it is possible to tamper with machines like aeroplanes. To date, the mysteries surrounding the death of President Machel of Mozambique have not been resolved.
The conflict destabilised the government significantly and drained resources from the state, halting the process of development. Neither side was however, able to achieve a military victory. The government was incapable of imposing a military solution to the conflict. RENAMO clearly did not have sustainable military capability to achieve its goals to bring down the government. With this military impasse, the possibility of a political solution gradually gained strength. At this point, it was clear to Mozambique that the Nkomati Accord had failed and the civil war was raging. Therefore, there was need for a more pro-active negotiation. Smock (2004:3) noted that the Catholic Archbishop of Beira who was familiar with Sant’ Egidio, Don Jaime Goncalves, thought Sant’ Egidio might succeed in bringing the governing FRELIMO together with the RENAMO insurgents. After many months of patient probing, Sant’ Egidio succeeded in making contact with the RENAMO leadership and encouraged the Mozambique government officials to meet with them. This took Mozambique a long walk into the General Peace Agreement.

### 3.4.3 The General Peace Agreement

In July 1990, six years after Nkomati Accord, the first direct meetings between RENAMO and Mozambican government officials finally took place at Sant’ Egidio’s Headquarters. Sant Egidio is a Catholic Church intermediary that undertook tentative negotiations to bring peace in Mozambique. According to Smock (2004:3), both RENAMO and FRELIMO government viewed Sant’ Egidio as a neutral and compassionate organization whose sole interest was to promote peace. As it had no political and economic agenda, Sant’ Egidio successfully maintained a position of strict even-handedness and neutrality. Another advantage of the Church, considering its own shortcomings, was that it sought out the special expertise of governments and international organizations to achieve its mission of bringing peace to the people of Mozambique. Sengulane & Goncalves (1998:31) maintained that during the talks, the government was more interested in achieving an immediate ceasefire, while the rebels wanted to discuss sensitive political issues first, including guarantees for their security and the make-up of the new Constitution. The churches, therefore, pursued various strategies to help speed up the talks.
The core mediation team, according to Smock (2004:3), was comprised of the Mozambican Archbishop, an Italian Socialist Parliamentarian and former Diplomat and two key leaders of Sant’ Egidio, as well as involvement of other African governments namely: Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. It should be noted that after seven more torturous rounds of dialogue, FRELIMO leader Chissano and RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama finally signed a General Peace Agreement in Rome on 04 October 1992 (Rupiya, 1998:15). The mediation work of Sant’ Egidio in Mozambique, noted Smock (2004:3,) is an illustration of how religious organizations, building on their neutrality and compassion and utilizing the skills of other institutions, could bring feuding parties together and help end civil wars. Notwithstanding their success, Sant’ Egidio’s modest claim that it offers no prescriptions but seek to create opportunities for people to find solutions themselves is perhaps one key reason why the 1992 Mozambique peace settlement was achieved (Sengulane and Goncalves, 1998:32). At the conclusion of the negotiating process for the establishment of a lasting peace and effective democracy in Mozambique, key stipulations in the protocols were that (i) all armed forces were to be demobilised under United Nations supervision and a small portion of both of them incorporated into the new 30.000 strong armed forces; and (ii) presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held before 4 October, also under the UN supervision (Lundin, 2004:12).

Furthermore, the amnesty provision offered by the FRELIMO government was an important step in creating a discontinuity between war and peace and significantly by the terms of the GPA all prisoners were released (Protocol VI). According to Lundin (2004:15), a general amnesty was granted to all Mozambicans in collision with the law of the state and with the normative practices of the government. Those regarded as armed bandits were peacefully reintegrated into the Mozambican society without any legal procedures taken against them.

For the reason that the issue of human rights abuses was closely linked to the war, all parties involved in the negotiation process agreed that it was necessary to stop the war in order to pave the way for the political transformation that would create the conditions for solving the human rights problem (Bartoli and Jebashvili, 2005). Therefore, the focus of the Rome Accords was peace and political transformation.
The Accord provided a comprehensive framework for the transition from war to peace and democracy by addressing such key issues as the assembly and demobilization of troops, the formation of new armed forces, the reintegration of demobilized military personnel into civil life, the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and the process of holding the first democratic multiparty elections.

Unarguably, the presence of peace would allow human rights to attain feasibility within the structure of the new constitution and transformed society and guarantee other fundamental rights such as private property, freedom of religion and press (Bartoli and Jebashvili, 2005). Mozambique did not get to peace by insisting on human rights, but on the contrary, it arrived at human rights through starting the dialogue and creating conditions for sustainable peace. In order to implement the agreement reached at the 1992 Peace Agreement in Rome, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (henceforth, UNOMOZ) was formed. The section that follows presents UNOMOZ’s role in the peace process in Mozambique.

### 3.4.4 United Nations Operation in Mozambique

Hampson (1996:535) argues that a “successful peace process depends upon a lot of outside help and assistance, not only with the negotiation of a peace agreement, but also with its implementation.” The UN played a key role in the establishment and maintenance of peace in Mozambique, as it was invited “to send a peacekeeping mission to Mozambique to verify and monitor the implementation of the Agreement” (Dos Santos, 2000:105). UNOMOZ was established on 16 December 1992 to help implement the General Peace Agreement, signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO. It was headed by the UN Special Representative, Aldo Ajello (an Italian) and was envisaged as a one year operation. However, due to logistical, political and other problems which required extensive negotiation between RENAMO, the Government and the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, the mandate was twice renewed. UNOMOZ was provided with 7,500 military personnel made up mostly of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops. The mandate included facilitating the implementation of the Agreement, monitoring the ceasefire, monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the
transport corridors, providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire electoral process. Due to long delays in processing funds for the operation, work did not commence till June 1993. Through the long delay before their arrival, the ceasefire agreed to in Rome barely held without international oversight (Jett, 2002; Alden, 1995).

Adebajo (2011:127) posits that the Republic of Botswana also played an important role in supporting the Mozambican peace process. As one of the anti-apartheid Front Line States, Botswana provided political support for peace initiatives in Mozambique throughout the 1980s. In the later stages of the Rome peace process in July and September 1992, two crucial summits were held in its capital, Gaborone, which led to a breakthrough on sensitive political issues (Vines, 1998:71). The President of Botswana, H.E. Ketumile Masire, was among the Presidents who were present during the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome on the 04 October 1992. Botswana also sent its military personnel to be part of the UNOMOZ contingent. Furthermore, in 1999 Botswana conducted the reintegration standadized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process.

Overall, UNOMOZ was strong in responding to immediate crises, especially its response to rioting soldiers who were impatient for demobilization, longer-term issues such as the destruction of surplus arms, the organization of a comprehensive de-mining operation and the integration of RENAMO precincts into the state administration were not satisfactorily addressed. The last UNOMOZ military officers left Mozambique in March 1995. Lundin (2004:15) maintained that “there is no doubt that the presence of the UN through the UNOMOZ has contributed to keep peace and stability in Mozambique, paving the road also for reconciliation within the Mozambican family”. However, an assessment by Synge (1997) is that a more streamlined operation which addressed only the short-term crises would have been sufficient and would have avoided unnecessary inter-organizational competition. In other words, peacekeeping operations should stop the dying members of a conflict from re-igniting rather than rebuild what has been burned in the fire. This study takes no further articulation in understanding how types and styles of peacekeeping operation should relate to types and stages of conflict. Such further articulations fall
outside the scope. However, there are some concrete lessons to be learnt from the UNOMOZ experience, such as the need to consider police monitoring and post-election power sharing as issues in the peace negotiations. The next section will discuss the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

3.5 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME

This section succinctly discusses the role of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in the Mozambican peace transition. It begins by putting forward the definitions of the words that make up the integrated programme. The study goes further to describe the programme in the Mozambican context and makes a statement as regards the success of the programme. The civil war in Mozambique lasted for sixteen (16) years. During this time, much of the country’s physical infrastructure was destroyed. Following the Rome Peace Accord in 1992, UNOMOZ was established in December 1992 to oversee the implementation of the Global Peace Agreement and the ensuing elections. Among the mandates of the GPA were the disarmament and demobilisation of soldiers in the country and their social and economic reintegration into society. This is referred to in this study as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. According to Gilligan et al (2014), post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programme have become key features of most peace agreements that end civil wars.

The latest and the most broadly accepted definition of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (henceforth DDR) is provided in UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) of 2006. The UN (2006:10) defines the DDR process as follows:

Disarmament is:

“the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.”
Demobilisation is:

“the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in individual centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.”

Reintegration is:

“the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”

This study places more emphasis on reintegration as it addresses the identity transformation from that of a soldier to that of a civilian. Consequently, reference to this identity transformation is evident on how reintegration is achieved according to UNICEF’s Paris Principles, which maintains that,

“Reintegration is achieved when the political, legal, economic and social conditions needed for children to maintain life, livelihood and dignity have been secured. This process aims to ensure that children can access their rights, including formal and non-formal education, family unity, dignified livelihoods and safety from harm” (The Paris Principles 2007:7).

As could be deduced above, reintegration addresses the long-term goals for the return of the former combatants to civilian life. It involves training and support programs that enable ex-soldiers and their dependents to adapt and succeed in peacetime social, political and economic life. Apart from the foregoing processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, some studies such as Bragg (2006) and Knight and Ozerdem (2004), however, included another R which either represents “rehabilitation” or “reinsertion”, both using the acronym DDRR. As in the case of Nigeria, after here civil war (1967-1970), triple R of Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation was adopted. Whatever the approach adopted, this study maintains the DDR(R) approach which means measures of assistance
offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation prior to the longer-term processes of reintegration and reconciliation.

Fortna (2008) argues that the first two components of DDR, disarmament and demobilization, take place before the reintegration phase in order to create the security and trust necessary for implementing peace agreements. Following disarmament and demobilization, the goal is for ex-combatants to find a livelihood and submit to laws and norms that govern civilian society. In the view of Muggah (2009), reintegration programs usually include short-term measures such as cash assistance or in-kind material benefits to address immediate needs upon leaving armed groups and longer-term measures such as vocational training, seed capital and counselling. The overall objective is to reintegrate former combatants into the social and economic structures of the society. Both Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) and Pugel (2009) have tried to measure the benefits of reintegration programs, using large scale surveys of ex-combatants. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) investigated the effects of the UN-sponsored DDR program in Sierra Leone using a propensity score that fits on ex-combatants who did and did not enrol or complete the program. For both types of participation, these comparisons suggested no discernible effect on economic or political reintegration.

Pugel (2009) conducted a similar study among ex-combatants in Liberia by using regression analysis to control for background characteristics and found that those who had completed the UN reintegration program were significantly more likely to have a “livelihood-producing activity,” although no significant effects were evident on poverty status or “spending patterns indicative of excess earning capacity”. Although the findings of the studies raise questions as to whether reintegration programs achieved both economic and political reintegration, however, both Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) and Pugel (2009) admit that their studies cannot be definitive on the effectiveness of reintegration programs in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In order to add value to the efficacy of reintegration, the current study argues for the inclusion of reconciliation as part of the reintegration process.

Reconciliation is a chain of related after-war programmes. It is both a process and a goal that are linked with DDR. According to IDEA (2003:12), it is a process that includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing and is rooted in the
idea that societies are capable of moving from a “divided past to a shared future”. Reconciliation involves acknowledging previous grievances. The overall objective of a Reconciliation programme is to move toward attitudinal changes that will eventually pave the way for developing a shared vision of the future, in which people can live harmoniously without returning to conflict (Hamber and Grainne, 2004). Characteristically, reconciliation is generated through three institutional practices: war crime tribunals, truth commissions and peace commissions (Douglas et al, 2004). There are also local processes, such as traditional ceremonies and cleansing rituals.

3.6 DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

After the civil war, the demobilization and reintegration programme in Mozambique was developed. The programme is perceived to be a response in addressing the socio-economic status of the soldiers and guerrillas and at the same time facilitate the activities of UNOMOZ. It should be re-called that the 16-year-old civil war ended after the October 1992 Rome Agreement, signed by both the governing FRELIMO and the opposition RENAMO. One of the emerging decisions of the Agreement was a mandate to the United Nations to oversee a 12-month process that involved monitoring the ceasefire, cantonment and demobilization of troops and, finally, facilitating the reintegration of these former combatants into society (United Nations Security Council, 1992:28). The progress of the programme was monitored by representatives of FRELIMO, RENAMO, UNOMOZ and donor agencies. One could therefore see that the demobilization and reintegration programme in Mozambique was a broad-based one.

Lundin, (1998:111-112) posits that the ritual of social integration is divided into three parts, namely:

- To help the ex-soldier overcome his acquired identity as a ‘killing machine’ and regain a civilian identity after which he ‘becomes a person again’. The ceremony is meant to cleanse both physically and spiritually, so the individual first takes a steam bath, and then washes afterwards in water fortified with various herbs.
• The propitiation of the spirits to announce to the dead relatives that the ‘lost sheep’ is back home. In this ceremony thanks are given for the protection that made possible his safe return home.

• The reconciliation with the spirits of the dead persons killed by the ex-soldier, a symbolic ‘encounter’ with his victims. In this last moment, forgiveness is requested and is backed by a show of remorse…In some regions a collective meal is served, and everybody eats together as a sign of reconciliation.

In the case of RENAMO, reconciliation cleansing rituals played a critical role in reintegrating the fighters into communities in Mozambique. The reconciliatory processes consisted of rituals designed to purify the identity of the individual and reintegrate him or her back into the community (Honwana, 1998). In some cases, ex-combatants spent their demobilisation money on gifts to be given to village elders (Kingma, 1997). Evidently, Mozambicans utilised local instruments for reconciliation and reintegration. There is no doubt that this community-focused approach aided the formal reintegration and reconciliation programmes of ex-combatants in Mozambique.

3.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented a brief historical background of Mozambique. It also traced the civil wars in Mozambique after independence in 1975. As the civil war raged on, efforts were put in place to restore order in Mozambique. The signing of the GPA by FRELIMO and RENAMO in October 1992 marked the official end of Mozambique’s civil war. This chapter outlined that the peace agreement was overseen and supported by the UN peacekeeping force (UNOMOZ) and complimented by substantial support and active participation by key donor countries. The chapter ended with a discussion on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique. The next chapter will discuss the research design and methodology, as well as the methods of data collection and analysis, as well as the ethical issues and responsibilities of the researcher.
CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided a historical background to the Mozambique civil war. It also discussed the efforts made to restore peace in Mozambique. This study is undertaken with the aim to investigate the role of power-sharing in stabilizing peace in Mozambique. The justification for the choice of selected individuals is that although there are many individuals who were alive prior, during, and after the Mozambican crisis, there are only a few reachable individuals who were able to participate and play mediatory role in the peace process. In addition, the researcher is a security agent in Botswana. Therefore, the subject-matter is of interest to him. A qualitative approach was selected to achieve the objectives of the study. This chapter covers the research questions, research philosophy, research approach and design, research methodology, and methods of data collection and analysis are also discussed. The limitations of the study are described and explained as are ethical issues and responsibilities of the researcher.

4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions were as follows:

4.2.1 Primary Research Questions

- What were the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique?

Secondary Research Questions

- What strategies were used in managing those who wanted to undermine the peace process?
- What challenges did the Botswana Defence Force face during reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers?
• How effective was power sharing as a conflict management tool in the peace process?

• What challenges were faced by the peacekeepers in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme?

4.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the research were:

• To understand the concept of military power sharing.

• To explore the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique.

• To explore the strategies used to manage those who wanted to undermine the peace process.

• To ascertain the challenges faced by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces.

• To propose recommendations for future interventions.

4.4 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

Research philosophy can either be in a positivist framework (most likely assume a quantitative methodological research approach), or interpretivist (superficial, descriptive content analysis) or a combination of both (Saunders, et al., 2000; Henning, et al., (2010:16). This is also known as the philosophy of science debate. It examines the relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology. According to Cooper and Schindler (2008), research is based on reasoning and observations. How observations and reasoning are related to each other is an old and still ongoing philosophical debate on the development of knowledge. Various research philosophies exist, but in this study the researcher has used interpretivism.
The central tenet of interpretivism is that there is a fundamental difference between the subject matters of the natural and social sciences. The methods of the natural sciences cannot be used in the social sciences. The study of social phenomena requires an understanding of the social worlds that people inhabit, which they have already interpreted by the meanings they produce and reproduce as a necessary part of their everyday activities together. Whereas the study of natural phenomena requires the scientist to interpret nature through the use of scientific concepts and theories, and to make choices about what is relevant to the problem under investigation, the social scientist studies phenomena that are already interpreted (Henning, et al., 2010).

Interpretivism is

“associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used to group together diverse approaches, including social constructionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics; approaches that reject the objectivist view that meaning resides within the world independently of consciousness” (Collins, 2010:38).

Moreover, interpretivist studies usually focus on meaning and may employ multiple methods in order to reflect different aspects of the issue or subject matter. Furthermore, interpretivism involves researchers to interpret elements of the study. Thus, it integrates human interest into a study. Accordingly, Myers (2008:38) argues that “interpretive researchers assume that access to reality is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments.” Interpretivism argues that positivism is too limiting when it seeks to study human behavior the same way that it studies things (Du Plooy-Colliers, et al., 2014). An example is that human behavior could not be subjected to laboratory tests as does positivism to things. The interpretivist phenomenological approach pays particular attention to understanding how individuals make choices on the basis of their unique biographies, the specific features of the situations in which they do so and in relations to individuals’ interactions with others (Hyde, et al., 2004).
4.5  RESEARCH DESIGN

The term ‘research design’ is one whose definition is not exhaustive. Various authors have defined it in different ways. Zikmund, et al., (2010:66) observed that a research design is “a masterplan that specifies the methods and procedures for collecting and analyzing the needed information.” However, Gatrell, et al., (2005) assert that

*Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions. The plan is the overall scheme or program of the research. It includes an outline of what the investigator will do from writing hypotheses and their operational implications to the final analysis of data. A research design basically transforms an idea, interest or question from ‘just a thought’ into a meaningful and purposeful investigation of social or physical process.*

Basically the choice of a research design is influenced by the objectives of the study. Ordinarily three types of research designs exist to tackle varied research objectives, namely, exploratory, descriptive and explanatory or casual research (Hair, et al., 2000). This study takes a descriptive design approach whose main thrust is to describe the characteristics of existing phenomena. The description is usually in the form of concepts and themes. Sometimes, graphs and other visual images of the results are used (McMillan, 2012). The researcher selected a descriptive design to describe the power-sharing scenario in Mozambique. Hence, this is a qualitative study, simply because it is descriptive and exploratory in nature.

4.6  TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING

A population is defined by Wild and Diggines (2009:186 ) as ‘the total group of people or entities [social artefacts] from whom information is required.’ On the other hand, Babbie (2010:199) defined the population as the theoretically specified aggregation of the elements in a study. The target population is a set of specific population entities that are used to give information to the study. Information is obtained from a population to answer research questions. The population must be relevant to the research questions and must have a homogenous group who has similar characteristics to enhance objectivity of the information obtained from them, and it should also be large enough to provide a representative sample.
In the context of this study, the target population consists of all those from the Botswana side, both military and civilians, who were involved in the negotiations for the return of peace in Mozambique. However, not all the individuals who participated in the peace process could also participate in the study. Therefore, a sampling technique is used to arrive at a specific frame of participants. The sample was chosen on the basis of non-probability, purposive sampling. Purposive sampling, according to Babbie (2010:193), is “a type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgement about which ones will be the most useful or representative.” In this study, the researcher selected the sample based on predetermined criteria that make sense given the research question and situation. The sample for this study is twelve (12) selected Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officers who participated in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and those who conducted the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO military personnel. The interviewees will be selected based on their roles during UNOMOZ and the training of FADM soldiers. In addition, two (2) officials from SADC, and at least one former Botswana Ambassador to the UN are to be interviewed in their personal capacities because of the wealth of knowledge they possess. The aim is to get diverse views and insights from various sources for informed analysis of data.

4.7 DATA COLLECTION

Interview is the only data collection tool used in this study. According to Babbie (2010:274) the interview is a “data-collection encounter in which one person (an interviewer) asks questions of another (a respondent).” Coombes (2001) adds that interview provides a way to obtain peripheral information that may be linked directly or indirectly to the causes and effects associated with an analysis goal. Interviews may be conducted face-to-face or by telephone. There are two types of interviews that one could adopt, and these are structured, which is a formal approach, and unstructured, being an informal approach. For the purpose of this research semi-structured interviews were used because questions could be prepared ahead of time. Another reason is that semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewer to be prepared and appear competent during the interview (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006).
Specifically, the study utilizes a self-administered interview schedule to obtain the primary data to be analyzed. This is beneficial as the interviewer can explain or rephrase the questions if interviewees are unclear about the questions (Patton, 2002: 343). Primary data is a type of data collection method in which respondents are interviewed independently. The questions will be for the most part be open-ended questions and are preferred because they provide greater diversity of responses and are easier to process. A few of closed-ended questions will also be used. The close-ended questions will form part of the biographical background.

Babbie (2010:322) argues that there are seven stages in the complete interviewing process, namely;

(i) **Thermatizing** - clarifying the purpose of the interviews and the concepts to be explored.
(ii) **Designing** - laying out the process through which you will accomplish your purpose, including a consideration of the ethical dimension.
(iii) **Interviewing** - doing the actual interviews.
(iv) **Transcribing** - creating a written text of the interviews.
(v) **Analyzing** - determining the meaning of gathered materials in relation to the purpose of the study.
(vi) **Verifying** - checking the reliability and validity of the materials.
(vii) **Reporting** - telling others what you have learned.

### 4.7.1 Advantages of Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews have an additional benefit over other methods of data collection as they afford direct contact between the researcher and the interviewee. Interviews afford the researcher the opportunity to clarify questions which might be difficult to answer for respondents, and as thus offer more flexibility in following up initial answers. It is therefore possible for the researcher to get more detailed information (Neuman, 2007).
4.7.2 Disadvantages of Interviews

Interviews in general have three major disadvantages. They are time consuming and expensive to undertake and there is also the likelihood of biasness on the part of the interviewer (Aina, 2002). An interview guide has been formulated to aid in data collection and to counter biasness. According to Coombes (2001), interview guides are useful as they put the researcher in a position to ask the right questions at the right time and in the right sequence. However, the use of interview guides is costly as they will have to be paid for their services.

4.7.3 Case Study Method

This research will use a case study of Mozambique to analyze the implementation of military power sharing as a conflict management tool. Vennesson (2008:226) defined a case study as “a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations. One of the advantages of a case study, argued Neuman (2014:42), is that “it helps with constructing new theories, developing or extending concepts, and exploring the boundaries among related concepts.”

4.7.4 Pilot Study

Blanche, Durrheim and Painter (2006:94) maintained that pilot studies are “preliminary studies on small samples that help to identify potential problems with the design, particularly the research instruments”. They are important in that they are useful for improving both the validity and reliability of measuring instruments. For this study, weaknesses of the semi-structured interviews will be realized by conducting a pilot study using a few military personnel who took part in UNOMOZ. In view of this, the pilot study would be a dress rehearsal for the main investigation.
4.8 ANALYSIS OF DATA

Data analysis is an important aspect of any research. It helps in drawing conclusions and generalizations of findings to a problem statement. Data analysis refers to the application of logic to understand and interpret the data that have been collected about a subject, and it may involve determining consistent patterns and summarizing the appropriate details that have been revealed in the investigation (Zikmund, 1997:57). It has been pointed out by Creswell (2003) that data analysis is not distinctly disconnected from other activities of the research process, such as data collection and formulating of research questions, but rather it is a continuation. Content analysis as a tool of qualitative data analysis was used in this study, according to Henning, et al., 2010:138), is divided into three (3) phases namely;

- **Phase 1 (Orientation to the data)** - recording or studying data sets to form overview and to apprehend the context within the data text.

- **Phase 2 (On the way-working the data)** - coding segments of meaning. Categorizing related codes into groups. Seeking relationships between categories to form thematic patterns.

- **Phase 3 (Final composition of the analysed data text, verbal and visual)** - writing the final themes of the set of data. Presenting pattern of related themes.

The data was recorded by a tape recorder after getting permission of the participants, and their views will be quoted verbatim. For the purpose of data analysis, qualitative data collected through interviews was organized according to research questions, categorized into related themes and presented in narrative form. The results were put together to produce a single interpretation and then conclusions drawn. In other words, analyses and interpretations of research findings were in line with the study objectives and research questions presented.

4.9 ETHICS OF THE RESEARCH

This study is guided by fundamental ethical considerations of scientific research that relate to responsible research in human sciences. According to Neuman (2007:14),
“ethics include the concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts over the proper way to conduct research. Such ethical considerations assist to define what is or is not legitimate to do, or what moral research procedure involves.” However, Bless and Higgins, (2000) warns that as much as the researcher may want information from respondents, participants have the right to refuse to participate.

By its nature, this study did not in any way expose the participant to any danger. The researcher took a number of steps to uphold ethics. Firstly, he informed the participants about the study and what it was all about. Its objectives were outlined to them, including the purposes of the study, before their consent to act as subjects was sought. Secondly, the researcher made it very clear that participation in the study was voluntary. The participants were informed that they were not being coerced to take part in the study and that they had the liberty to say no to the request for them to serve as participants. Thirdly, the participants who accepted to serve as respondents were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. This was accomplished through a number of ways, for instance, no responses from a particular respondent were analyzed (used) separately. Furthermore, no names or any information that could be used to identify particular participants is employed in reporting the research findings. Rather, information from each participant was reported only in combination with those from all other respondents. The researcher also guarantees that the surveys would be destroyed at the end of the study and that answers to all questions would be kept completely confidential.

4.10 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

This study focuses on an analysis of military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique as a conflict management tool. The researcher will acknowledge all limitations of the study. As qualitative research, the findings may only be applicable to Mozambique mainly due to the actors in the conflict. It may not be applicable to other conflicts either in the region or elsewhere in the world. Secondly, participants may refuse to speak in the presence of cameras or may withhold their views so that true feelings are not represented. Thirdly, most of the documents which could be of much use are written in Portuguese which the researcher does not understand, hence information which could be of value may not be utilised in this study. Lastly, it
may not be possible for some of the officials intended to be interviewed to be present considering their tight work schedules

4.11 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the research design and methodology used in the study was covered in greater detail. Furthermore, the method of data collection (including advantages and disadvantages) and analysis of data were also discussed. Lastly, ethics of the research were discussed in detail. The next chapter will deal with the Mozambique power-sharing as a case study.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE MOZAMBIQUE MILITARY POWER SHARING CASE STUDY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As highlighted in chapter one of the current study, this study sought to analyse military power-sharing as conflict management tool. The focus of this study is the Mozambique power-sharing arrangement between FRELIMO and RENAMO. This study extends the frontiers of power-sharing research especially in line with Jung (2010) who argues that Mozambique is widely regarded as one of the most successful cases of post-civil war peace-building and democratization. According to Guebuza and Domigos (2000), Article 6 (ii) of Protocol IV of the GPA mandated the formation of Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) with the FRELIMO Government and RENAMO opposition contributing fifty per cent (50%). Therefore, this chapter presents a discussion of some of the factors that contributed to the perceived success of power sharing in Mozambique.

5.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that when the civil war ended, Mozambique faced triple transitions, which include transition from war to peace; transition from socialist to market economy; and transition from collapsed state to functional democracy. At each stage or aspect of the transition, the international community was deeply involved in the multiple transitions.

In comparing the success rates of peace between Bosnia and Mozambique, Jung (2010) argues that Mozambique is an easy case, compared to Bosnia, because peace and democracy are generally more difficult to be established after ethnic civil wars. The crux of Jung’s contention is that the civil war in Mozambique is non-ethnic in nature. Advancing more on this thought, Jung (2010) posits that due to the non-ethnicity nature of the Mozambican civil war, it should not be simply understood as a beneficial factor for the country’s transition from war to peace and democracy. This view appears to be consistent with Weinstein (2007) who contends that in Mozambique, the most salient cleavage throughout the war and post-war period is
not that of ethnicity, but is that of a regional disposition, south versus centre and north.

Nevertheless, West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) and Weinstein (2007) did not dismiss the devastating effects of the war, as they argue that the 16-year long civil war actually created multiple cleavages: the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) which was often identified as an ethnic Ndau project against the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government dominated by Shangaan; the conflict was also understood as an armed struggle between the haves versus have-nots, or between the centralized socialist state versus traditional local authorities. From the foregoing, one could deduce that although the element of ethnicity cannot be completely ruled out, ethnic cause was not the propelling force behind the war.

The GPA was signed in Rome on October 4, 1992. It was an accumulated outcome of peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO for more than two years (Jung, 2010). The Rome Agreement consists of seven Protocols and four short Annexes. In particular, Protocols II, III, and IV are the fundamental parts of the agreement and specify criteria for the formation of political parties, principles of national elections, and demobilization of combatants in the early post-conflict transition period. The overall rationale of these three Protocols was to set up a framework in which RENAMO could transform itself from a guerrilla group to a legitimate political party competing in a multiparty democracy, without calling into question the country’s territorial integrity and national unity. Notably, the Rome Peace Agreement did not arrange for any power-sharing institutions but simply provided for an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation for election to the National Assembly (Jung, 2010).

Practically, in the absence of an existing power-sharing institution, FRELIMO and RENAMO settled for the creation of politically balanced commissions in which both warring parties and the international community were fairly represented and decisions based on discussion and consensus. As matter of necessity, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and major donor countries such as U.S., UK, Italy, Portugal, and France were closely involved in creating and running those commissions during the transition period.
Put specifically, Annex IV of the Rome Agreement laid out the composition of four transitional commissions:

- The Supervision and Control Commission is responsible for overall implementation of the settlement terms and consists of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (UNSRSG) as the head of ONUMOZ, the Organization of African Union (now African Union) (OAU, now AU), and major donors, in addition to FRELIMO and RENAMO.

- The Ceasefire Commission monitors ceasefire, disarmament, and demobilization and comprises the UNSRSG (chair), donor countries, FRELIMO, and RENAMO.

- The Reintegration Commission plans and oversees social integration of demobilized combatants and is composed of UNSRSG (chair), donor countries, such as U.S., UK, Italy, Portugal, France, Botswana, Nigeria, and Egypt, and the two warring parties.

- The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Forces oversees the creation of 30,000 unified armed forces and consists of FRELIMO, RENAMO, and major donors which include European Community, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and South Africa.

Evidently, the power-sharing process in Mozambique was not supervised by any substantive institution, but rather by transitory commissions. On the one hand, one of the propelling factors that triggered the smooth implementation of power-sharing in the Mozambican context is FRELIMO’s biggest concern. Apart from the war with RENAMO, the FRELIMO-led government had suffered severe economic recession since the early 1980s. Therefore, the government abandoned its socialist economy and began to pursue market reforms under the 1987’s International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Jung (2010) avers that the FRELIMO government also gave up the notion of being a Leninist vanguard party and adopted a multiparty democratic constitution in November 1990, just four months after the peace negotiations started. On the other hand, Alden and Simpson (1993) opine that
RENAMO had sought to gain political legitimacy by calling for a structured market economy and multi-party democracy since 1981, when it adopted its first official manifesto. This is in repugnance to the nomenclature of “an ethnic Ndau project” or a bloody puppet backed by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Nevertheless, RENAMO seems to ignore impasse of inability to win the war decisively and the fear of competition with FRELIMO at the ballot box.

The non-existence of formal institutions to monitor the power-sharing process in Mozambique appears to be a blessing in disguise. The transitory commissions allowed room for informal compromise between the warring parties during the process of political transition from war to peace and democracy, in the absence of a rigid institutional barrier to further negotiations. Making, reference to the absence of formal institutions, Manning (2002) avers that instead of imposing the power sharing on Mozambique, the international community created one crucial incentive structure: in order to receive substantial support for economic reconstruction and market reforms, FRELIMO had to preserve the perception that Mozambique had established a durable democratic peace. It therefore had reason to engage RENAMO in informal negotiations and make concessions to RENAMO during the peace negotiation and post-conflict transition period.

Furthermore, the Rome Peace Agreement provided for a detailed DDR process in Mozambique. No doubt, drawing lessons from the flawed peace-building process in Angola, the international community consistently emphasized that demobilization should be completed before the first post-conflict elections (Jung, 2010). In the view of Jung (2010), the military aspects of implementing the peace agreements have been largely successful in Mozambique. Unarguably, such implementation normally involves a DDR process, which consists of interrelated short- and long-term projects.

For the DDR process to be effective, it is widely recognized that the international community should take an integrated, holistic approach, rather than considering each element in DDR separately. This is imperative especially looking at how UN-DDR (1999) defines disarmament as the collection and disposal of small arms and light and heavy weapons of combatants; demobilization as the process by which armed forces of both government and rebels either downsize or completely disband; and reintegration as assistance measures provided to former combatants that would
increase the potential for their economic and social reintegration into civilian life. Details of DDR were provided in Chapter Three of this study. As a result, further articulation will amount to redundancy.

The international community embarked on one of the most comprehensive reintegration programs ever attempted in the context of UN Peace-Keeping Operation, which involved different approaches and mobilized $95 million from donor countries. In particular, one of the approaches, the Provincial Fund, was initiated when ONUMOZ declared its mission complete and withdrew in November 1994 (Alden, 1995). This program designed explicit plans for demobilized soldiers to start small and-medium sized businesses in their home provinces. Within three years after its initiation, the Provincial Fund was considered a resounding success (Alden, 2002).

Consistent with the provisions of GPA, ONUMOZ estimated 63,000 FRELIMO and 20,000 RENAMO soldiers would be demobilized, and reintegrate both government and rebel soldiers into a 30,000-member new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). However, Alden (1995) reports that ONUMOZ found it difficult to constitute the 30,000 new armed forces because such retirement package to demobilized soldiers as 18 months of subsidies in cash was more attractive than the salaries for soldiers in the new army.

Alden (2002) argues that the Rome Agreement was not without its flaws. According to Alden, the Agreement’s relative neglect of disarmament delayed the verification of arms and ammunition until August 1994 and made little progress thereafter due to the program’s short time frame and poor funding. For instance, ONUMOZ requested $52.4 million in 1993 to implement a more comprehensive disarmament program, but it was rejected by the UN Headquarters in New York (Vines, 1998). This was a big set-back to the DDR in Mozambique.

In effect, the flawed disarmament generated continuous problems of weapons smuggling to South Africa, nurturing criminal networks of ex-soldiers within Mozambique (Jung, 2010). In conclusion, the DDR process in Mozambique largely hinged on the degree of commitment by the international community. Such
commitments were demonstrated in the form of funding in the early period of peace-building operations.

The National Electoral Commission (henceforth CNE) was created under the auspices of the GPA for management and organization of the electoral process (Cadeado and Hamela, 2009). This commission was technical and apolitical institution created by the government. However, according to the GPA, 1/3 of the member of the CNE should be designated by RENAMO. In this context, the creation and composition of CNE was politically dominated despite the presence of the civil society representative which assumed the presidency. Thus, the CNE was composed by 21 members. 10 members proposed by FRELIMO, 7 from RENAMO, 3 from non-armed parties and one from civil society.

The power-sharing at CNE served two important functions. One, it revealed the crucial nature of election in the restoration of democracy in Mozambique. Two, it continues to reduce the mistrust initiated in Rome, during the peace negotiations and was important as an instrument of mutual control of the electoral process (CNE, 1995).

Muzula (1995) also confirmed that the relationship between former belligerents was marked by mistrust that is referred as one of the major obstacles to the “pacification and democratization of the country” (Mazula, 1995: 43). However, the composition of the CNE made the political process become bipolarized and monopolized by FRELIMO and RENAMO. This is one of the arguments used by “non-armed political parties” to consider the political debate and process not inclusive (Brito and Wimer, 1993:15).

Cadeado & Hamela (2009) strongly argue that the discourses, measures, and efforts for the restoration of peace produced successful results. According to Weinstein & Laudemiro (2005:161), “FRELIMO sought, as part of its central mission, to build a deep sense of national unity among the ethnically and linguistically diverse population.” In this context, the FRELIMO’s efforts contributed to guarantee, Mozambique’s internal cohesion, and the safeguard of the national sovereignty. Therefore, the debate on power-sharing in Mozambique cannot be seen in the context of wars in ethnically fragmented states.
5.3 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted three factors that encouraged the smooth sailing of power-sharing in Mozambique. One of such factors is the absence of formal institutions. In the absence formal institutions, there was the inauguration of transitory commissions to ensure the implementation of the joint command as defined for the transitional period, according to GPA. Another aspect of the power-sharing process in Mozambique is in the formation of the defence force. The GPA defined the general principles and procedures for the constitution of the FADM. “To ensure trust between the parties over the transition period, co-joint commissions were established, including RENAMO, Government and representatives of foreign countries to direct the security forces from cease-fire period until elections were held and a new democratically elected Government instituted” (Lala, 2001:64).

Lastly, the formation of CNE at a later stage of the process contributed to the power-sharing success. Although, it yielded a level of mistrust, but the mistrust factor played a function. The mistrust between FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO, probably, played a relevant role to force both parties to share the power in technical institutions, on one hand. On the other hand, this power-sharing served to minimize the mistrust and ensured some degree of transparency to the political process of peace and reconciliation. Its relevance is highly recognized at the point that the principle of composition and the transitory character, in terms of time, was not respected in the electoral institutions and even in the FADM at level of the leadership. The next chapter will present the results of the study as well as an analysis of the findings based on the objectives of the study.
CHAPTER SIX

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the Mozambique military power sharing case study. It discussed some of the factors that contributed to the perceived success of the power sharing in Mozambique. This chapter presents the results of the study as well as an analysis of the findings based on the objectives of the study. Overall, the targeted study population was fifteen (15). However, a total of twelve (12) respondents were able to participate in the study. The respondents include eight (8) members of the BDF who participated in the UNOMOZ and four (4) members of the BDF who participated in the reintegration standardization training programme. These indicate a response rate of eighty percent (80 %) which is positive. This is supported by Ngoepe (2008) who asserts that a response rate of over 50% can be considered good for analysis. In this study, twelve (12) interviews were conducted. Data from interviews were analyzed qualitatively. The demographic details of the respondents are presented first in Table 1 under Section 4.2 below.
6.2 PARTICIPANTS DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS

Table 6.1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Area of service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Standardized Training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Role/Task</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Platoon Commanders, Information Officer, Operations Officer, Deputy Contingent Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Standardised Training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Instructors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the demographic table above, 25% of the respondents have served the BDF 20-25 years; 50%, that is half of the respondent population, have served from 26-30 years; while the other quarter, 25% of the respondents, have served from 31-35 years. In terms of area of operation in Mozambique peace keeping mission, 67% of the respondents participated in the UNOMOZ, whereas 33% participated in the Standardized Training. In addition to area of operation, 8% of the respondents were Major General; 17% of the respondents were Brigadier General; 17% of the
respondents were Colonel; 50% of the respondents were Lieutenant Colonel; and 8% of the respondents were Major. Finally, 67% of the study respondents served as Platoon commanders, Information Officer, Operations Officer, and Deputy Contingent Commander in the UNOMOZ; while 33% of the respondents served as instructors in the Standardized Reintegration Programme. From the demographics of the respondents, one could see that they are both mature in service and diverse in operation. One therefore expects to elicit rich amount of data for the current study. The section that follows gives a step-by-step presentation of the study results.

6.3 THE CONCEPT OF POWER SHARING

In order to understand this concept, both secondary and primary data were collected. Secondary data was gathered and analysed through library search and synthesis of materials published on power sharing. On the other hand, primary data was gathered through interview of respondents who participated in the power sharing process in Mozambique. Such data was analysed through thematic analysis, an approach that is consistent with Creswell (2003). The respondents were asked directly to express their understanding of the concept of military power sharing. Participant 1 puts it thus:

“The way I understand it, it is unity of effort in collaborations to focus military power or towards a common goal or national security, that how I understand it.”

A number of interesting phrases emerge from the response above. For example, the respondent used such phrases as *unity of effort, common goal, and national security*. This indicates that there are parties involved in the military power sharing contexts including the case of Mozambique. The parties involved, according to Participant 1, must share a common goal, and such goal must be targeted towards national security. Suffice it to say that military power sharing is a unified effort to achieve national security. The foregoing view, especially that which suggests that power sharing is a composite effort, is consistent with evidences from secondary data. For example, Walter (2002) argues that power-sharing is simply the inclusion of the political opposition in joint national governments. In other words, opposition front politicians constitute the other arm of composition in military power sharing.
In response to his understanding of power sharing, Participant 2 said:

“Well, I understand power sharing to mean the integration of belligerents/parties to the conflict into a unified national army or defence force.”

The participant’s understanding of power sharing underscores integration, and like the foregoing understanding, one would see that there must be two or three parties to be integrated. Also, the two participants highlight unity. Whereas the first participant points to unity of efforts, perhaps those of the ruling and the opposing fronts, the second participant does not only point to integration of opposing ideas into mainstream governance, but also points to unity in terms of the national army. This suggests to one that the national army should be united, thereby reflecting national unity. Using issues of integration and unity in describing the concept of military power sharing, significantly relates with Rothchild (2005a) who contends that power-sharing is rather a long-term approach toward reconciliation of diverse interests in societies. One can see that both secondary and primary sources of data are in agreement as regards what power sharing is.

Participant 3 puts his understanding of military power sharing thus:

“Military power sharing is mostly common where there are conflicts. This is whereby at the end of the conflict we will have the warring factions coming together to make one military structure.”

This view of power sharing is rather coming from the fact that military power sharing is consequent of conflict or a rather post-conflict strategy to restore peace. This is the view that Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) maintained on military power sharing when they assert that power-sharing is exclusively a short-term measure of conflict resolution in post-conflict countries. Clearly, both sources situate power sharing within the context of a conflict, and as thus, making military power sharing relevant to be a conflict management measure or strategy.
Similarly, Participant 4 posits:

“Giving both the warring factions approximately equally number of slots within the new military which will be formed after the conflict so that neither party can complain about being marginalised by the other or being the peace keeper being biased towards another faction to avoid favouritism”

Participant 4 brings out more exciting expressions that are related to military power sharing. For example, one could see such phrases and words as warring factions, new military, conflict, marginalized, peace keeper, and favouritism. The use of these words and phrases in explaining military power sharing could suggest to one that a feeling of marginalization and undue favouritism can bring about conflicts and further create factions that can engage in warfare and destroy an existing army. Power sharing, therefore, glues the factions and creates a new army in conflict-ridden situation. Thus, power sharing becomes a peace keeper.

Participant 5 focuses more on the various relevant stakeholders who are primarily involved in the engineering of the power sharing process. He puts it thus:

“For the concept of military power sharing, in other words the government or the military in partnership with NGOs like other United Nation agencies like United Nation High Commission for Refugees and so on and to me it is closer to civil military liaison and the military cannot do it alone they need partners and such partners will naturally be NGOs and other civil society groups.”

Apart from the factions that come together to share sovereign state power, Participant 5 above highlighted that NGO, UN agencies, and civil society organizations. This further highlights the idea of collaboration in the power sharing process. This is consistent with Lemarchand (2007) who sees power sharing as improving democracy. Indeed, the interest of power sharing is to restore and sustain peace in a post-conflict situation. One could see that participants use words that share similar semantic relations in expressing their understanding of military power sharing. As highlighted earlier in Chapter 2 of the current study, the basic principles of power sharing as traditionally conceived include grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments; protection of minority rights for groups; decentralisation of power; and decision making by consensus. Furthermore, the researcher sought to understand the respondents’ opinion on how effective
military power sharing as a conflict management tool in the peace process in Mozambique has been.

In response to this question, Participant 2 posits:

“It was very much effective though at the start there was the issue of trust because immediately they started this power sharing, the two forces now as you know that the troops are aligned to their commanders, they realised that their commanders have agreed to this and then even the civilians realised that since their militants are sharing power then the conflict is over and things started to run smoothly and it was effective in that regard.”

Participant 3: To me it went very well, it was very effective ultimately because of that very strategy it gave birth to demobilization of troops and obviously we are talking about the RENAMO freedom fighters they gave in their weapons and they were reintegrated into the society and that was the beginning of the foundation of peace in Mozambique.

6.4 THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE MILITARY POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE.

In order reach this objective, secondary data was sought after to put power sharing into perspective. Then primary data was gathered through the use of scheduled interviews with respondents who were purposefully selected. To elicit data for this objective, a direct question on the challenges of power sharing implementation in Mozambique was asked. Participant 1 answers thus:

“The challenge could have been the differences in terms of training or doctrine to both parties to the conflict because both parties had different parts regarding their training. Some were Eastern oriented while some of them where supported more or less by the Western block, because by the view this was during the cold war era more or less all this conflicts started during the cold war era where by there was this bipolar kind of which was prevailing by then. “

The response above is loaded with a number of challenges. One, the participant mentioned differences in training. This suggests to the different trainings that both FRELIMO and RENAMO fighters have. The point that the participant is making here is that the two fronts have diverse training backgrounds. As a result, it will be difficult for them to work together for a common goal. It should be noted that the participant
did say in terms of good or bad training. To be succinct, the participant used doctrine as a synonym for training and this suggests to one that the component parties to the Mozambique power sharing deal had either western orientation or eastern orientation or leaning.

The use of the word doctrine is imperative to this discussion because it points to Beleyev’s (1989) concept of military doctrine. Firstly, NATO’s definition of the word doctrine has been used unaltered by many member nations, and the definition is that doctrine is a set of fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. Doctrine, in the military context, is perceived to be authoritative, however, it requires judgement in its application. Sheffield (2005:4) of the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London summed Fuller’s (1923) rather elaborate definition of doctrine as the “central idea of an army”. Secondly, having had a picture of what doctrine is, it imperative to grasp what military doctrine is and see how it constituted a challenge in the Mozambican context.

As regards to military doctrine, The Canadian Army (1998:11) states:

“Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflict, and the method of engaging in conflict to achieve success. It does not establish dogma or provide a checklist of procedures, but is rather an authoritative guide, describing how the army thinks about fighting, not how to fight. As such it attempts to be definitive enough to guide military activity.”

The Canadian approach is rather elaborate. It broke down what is referred as the central idea in the previous definition to include relevant military knowledge and thought which covers the nature of conflict. So, when two or more groups of diverse military knowledge converge for a common goal, one could logically see a challenge. Similarly, military doctrine, according to Beleyev (1989) is a guide to action, which provides a common frame of reference across the military, rather than hard and fast rules. As a guide to action, military doctrine helps standardize operations, facilitating readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Therefore, in the context of this discussion, one of the challenges of implementing power sharing in Mozambique is the diversity of military doctrine of the component soldiers.
In response to the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique, Participant 5 puts his views thus:

“The main one was on the RENAMO side, they didn’t have properly trained military personnel while FRELIMO had. Because initially they had a ready army so it was difficult for them both parties to bring equal number of people or personnel particularly on the hierarchy to form a new army and it kind of disadvantaged RENAMO along those lines because they were not properly trained. Lack of trained personnel by RENAMO.”

The response above suggests that there were an unequal efficiency levels between FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers. Whereas the FRELIMO soldiers are trained, those of the RENAMO are not trained. Ghobar (2016) states that lack of adequate military training can bring about a loss of ground in negotiations, a dangerous situation which may in turn bring about unrest. The foregoing challenge is descriptively presented in the verbatim response provided by Participant 2. He describes the challenges thus:

“There were two warring forces in Mozambique RENAMO and FRELIMO. So when these soldiers were demobilized I could say there was fear of the unknown from both parties. They were demobilized, reintegrated and then you form a government. First of all, you are not sure of what is going to happen to us soldiers as we are now working with a person that we fought. The fear of the unknown, just as the project started, and they was lack of trust as well and confidence to manage the transitions. People were not sure of what they were getting themselves into. Confidence in the since that you don’t trust somebody you fought with, when you are going to be integrated and working together. “

The opinion of Participant 2 above is similar to the view maintained by Participant 4: He posits:

“The first major challenge was the issue of trust between the factions. The RENAMO did not trust Frelimo therefore it was a really difficult task and it took some time to ensure that the two forces share command though it later happened, it was a difficult task. There was also the issue of command, none of the two warring factions wanted to be commanded by either; they all wanted the top posts in the military.”

The responses of Participant 2 and 4 above gives a picture of the kind of relationship that existed between the warring factions. He used such expressions as fear of the unknown, a lack of trust and a lack of confidence to manage the transitions. All these could be combined to suggest that there was no mutual relationship between the
uniting parties. As a result, it would be difficult to reach a consensus on matters of national security.

Participant 2 continues:

“The other problem was a lack of transitional authority to assume the responsibility for command and control. When the dismantling has happened there should be a supervising committee that will ensure that operations will go smooth, although it was under the UN, there was no structure that both parties would recognize as a government.”

The major challenge of the power sharing deal highlighted in the second aspect of the response of Participant 2 is that of lack of transitional authority. Evidently, the participant was referring to such transitional initiatives as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which existed between February 1992 and September 1993. The Authority was established to ensure implementation of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military arrangements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure (UNSC, 1992). Also, there was a transitional council in Libya, known as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) which at that time, was the de facto government of Libya between 2011 and 2012). The Council played a key role in Libya’s regain of peace, following the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s era (UNSC, 2011. Similarly, in Kenya, a Transition Authority was established as a statutory body with the mandate of facilitating and coordinating the transition to the devolved system of government. The Authority executed its mandate within three years following the first General Election held on March 4, 2013. Be that as it may, it does not fall within the scope of the current study to assert whether the transitory initiatives were satisfactory or not. However, the point it intends to highlight is that a lack of such transitory initiatives like in Cambodia, Libya, Kenya, etc., constitutes a challenge to the power sharing process in Mozambique.
However, despite the foregoing challenges, participants maintain that the power sharing initiative in Mozambique remains an effective conflict management strategy. Participant 4 puts his view thus:

“It was effective in that it gave the warring factions equal opportunities. I think mainly it’s because the war had taken too long they wanted to go and join their families, they were tired of the war.”

For Participant 3, his view is thus:

“To me it went very well, it was very effective because ultimately because of that very strategy it gave birth to demobilization of troops and obviously we are talking about the RENAMO freedom fighters. They gave in their weapons and they were reintegrated into the society and that was the beginning of the foundation of peace in Mozambique.”

This view of power sharing success in Mozambique is consistent with the third of the four elements of Lijphart’s consociational power-sharing model. The model’s third element is proportional representation. This extends across the electoral system, the military and security forces and economic to financial distribution. The benefit of proportionality vis-à-vis majoritarian democracy is that the latter is a winner-takes-all game in which minority participants have no incentive to play. In a divided society a proportional system allows for a more inclusive, positive-sum result. Furthermore, the view of the success of power sharing in post-conflict setting is also maintained by Hartzell and Hoddie (2005) when they statistically tested the effects and success of power-sharing in civil war settlements on the endurance of peace. Their list was composed of 38 civil wars resolved in peace negotiations from 1945-1998, including 15 African conflicts. They consistently found that the more dimensions of power sharing, political, territorial, military and economic, adopted among former combatants, the higher the likelihood of peace enduring. In other words, the statistical findings are predominately positive for promoting power-sharing.

In summary, this aspect of the study has articulated the challenges of implementing the power sharing deal in Mozambique. In its second objective, the study set out to identify the challenges of power sharing implementation. Through the use of interviews, the study has identified four challenges of power sharing implementation in Mozambique. First, the participants confirmed that differences in terms of military
training/doctrine are one of the challenges. This is because soldiers who were directly involved in the power sharing were made up of those from both FRELIMO and RENAMO. The two opposing factions have diverse military doctrine or orientation. Second, the study has confirmed that poorly trained military personnel are another challenge of implementing the power sharing deal in Mozambique. Whereas the soldiers from the FRELIMO front are reported to be trained, those from the RENAMO front are not trained. This brought about an imbalance of efficiency among the composing parties. Third, a lack of trust and confidence is another challenge identified in the study. It was difficult for members of the RENAMO to trust the opposing FRELIMO in implementing the various aspects of power sharing—political, territorial, military, and economic. Finally, a lack of transitional authority in holding forth power until the power sharing deal is fully implemented. The section that follows presents results on the strategies used in managing the peace process in Mozambique.

6.5 THE STRATEGIES USED IN MANAGING NUISANCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

In other words, the study sought to find out what tactics were used as well as strategic approaches used to manage those who wanted to undermine the process, what the researcher, in this case, refers to as spoilers. It should be recalled that about 80% of the study participants participated in the UNOMOZ, a UN agency for peace keeping in Mozambique. In response to the question on managing ‘spoilers’, Participant 6 puts it thus:

“They will always be spoilers, and you need spoilers for the peace process to go well. Even though these people are called spoilers, they question the way things are done to avoid routine. We need people who can challenge that wisdom to provide checks and balances; they are the doubting Thomas because they want to make sure that things go smoothly. “

From the response above, the so-called ‘spoilers’ were seen to be an integral part of the peace process. The interpretation is that they contribute indirectly to the smooth implementation of the peace process, perhaps through their interrogative disposition. They are the equivalents of opposition or leftists in secular democracy. Furthermore, the response provided above is consistent with Solanki (2014) who argues that the
opposition in democracies, among other things, constitutes a counterweight that makes it possible to guarantee transparent and responsible government serving the public interest and to avoid the majority being tempted, to conduct a policy that interferes with rights and freedoms.

In essence, the ‘spoilers’ in the Mozambican context criticized the government’s programme, decisions and actions by closely examining its draft laws and its budget. Notably, the respondent used the phrase ‘checks and balances’ to attribute to the ‘spoilers’. The system of checks and balances is another important aspect of secular democracy. Accordingly Gordon (2004) refers to checks and balances as a mechanism designed to limit power of a single individual or body of government and provide for the harmonious inter-relationship of the people and all of the organs of government or other social institutions. With checks and balances, each of the component parts of a government can limit the powers of the others. This way, no one branch becomes too powerful.

One of the core mandates of the peace process in Mozambique was to advocate for all voices to be heard and to effect changes in both the social and economic fabrics of Mozambique. As a result, it falls on the shoulders of the ‘spoilers’ to emphasize more on discussion; ask more questions; interrogate the solutions that the mainstream players have adopted for a particular problem; and help in amendments and passage of important bills. Above all, the spoilers could unite with the mainstream players in the peace process in issues of national interests. At the same time, they warned or bring in focus issues that government is not addressing effectively. Clearly, the participant above did not give any strategy in dealing with ‘spoilers’, but brings out the importance of having ‘spoilers’ in the peace process. In dealing with them, Participant 6 reminiscences:

“The strategy that was used is the political reconciliation, by then you could see that people wanted to form a new government because those combatants were tired. This is why it was a success by that time because even when we were still in peace keeping they were few cases were we could see/hear people wanting to fight. They were tired as a result of political reconciliation. Things were moving smoothly and it worked for the Mozambique case.”

In its most general sense, the word reconciliation refers to a condition of non-violent, mutually acceptable coexistence where former enemies come to re-envision one
another as fellow citizens. Reconciliation initiatives often focus on official apologies, amnesties, and other institutions and policies to address the past. Where violence was between countries such as between Japan and Korea, reconciliation normally refers to re-establishing social, political, and economic relations among erstwhile adversaries (Kwak and Nobles 2013). More specifically and rather elaborately, Philpott (2012) posits that political reconciliation concerns itself with the right relationship in the political realm, where the goal is to respect citizenship defined by human rights, the rule of law and respect for international law between and within political communities. From the foregoing description of political reconciliation, one could see that it includes the strengthening of democratic institutions and rule of law, which may include setting up consociational cum power-sharing arrangements. It also involves helping victims or survivors and society to heal after months or years of violence through self-help and support groups, physical and mental health services, processes of remembering and memorializing the dead.

Consequently, political reconciliation has as its goal towards improved relationships of warred parties. The approach of political reconciliation, as used in the Mozambican case, often denotes restoration, which suggests a return to the status quo, that is, the state of affairs before the wrong or conflict. This connotation, apparently led Moon (2009) to the use of ‘conciliation’ rather than ‘reconciliation’ in contexts where groups or individuals have never lived according to good, just relations, such as the white and black populations of South Africa at the moment the apartheid regime fell. But given the importance of South Africa’s post-apartheid experiences to the literature on reconciliation, such studies as Krog (2008); Govier (2006); and Murphy (2010) chose to brook the linguistic infelicity of defining the term ‘reconciliation’ so that it includes the pursuit of good relations for the first time, and not merely the reestablishment of formerly good relations.

In summary, the process of repairing relationships is obviously valuable and important. For one thing, it enables individuals and communities to achieve uniform set goals. In the political context, the cessation of violence, the prevention of future violence, and the attainment of democracy are some values that may be promoted. Participant 7 points to an important strategy that was used to keep ‘spoilers’ and other former combatants. He posits:
“The other strategy was the DDR program which assisted in the establishment of sustainable peace. To demobilize soldiers and reintegrate them into the society is not an easy task but in Mozambique it worked very well because people now wanted to start their new lives after so many years of fighting. So that program was supported by both the RENANO and FRELIMO against the suspicion that was there earlier. DDR was aligned for them to reintegrate them back into the society like some were given allowances and life skills to survive after conflict and this assisted that the spoilers will not disturb the peace process.”

Although the DDR program has been empirically interrogated in Chapter Three of this study, it is imperative to reiterate what DDR is. The abbreviated DDR means: Disarmament- the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population; Demobilization- the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants; Reintegration- the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.

DDR activities were crucial components of both the initial stabilization of Mozambique as well as their long-term development. The DDR activities were integrated into the entire peace process from the peace negotiations through peacekeeping and follow-on peacebuilding activities in Mozambique. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in the post-conflict Mozambique so that recovery and development can begin. DDR helped in creating an enabling environment for political and peace processes by dealing with security problem that arises when ex-combatants are trying to adjust to normal life, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. So, the DDR programme was one of the strategies used in keeping ‘spoilers’ in check. Participant 8 points to another strategy that was used to deal with ‘spoilers’ in Mozambique, and this was consultation. He puts it thus:

“There was too much of consultation than any other thing. Each warring faction had committed to the fact that they will talk to their people, try to deal with the spoilers at their level first at the force level and if these continued that’s when the military observers were used to help and there was much of negotiations in these missions to tenderize these issues.”
Baizerman and Hall (1977:142) view consultation as a political-bargaining process in which actors seek to maximize at minimal cost expertise, organizational position, and organizational reputation. A view of consultation as political process allows for a shift in language in discussions of consultation. Such a language shift suggests shifts in the social meaning of the consultation process. In the case of Mozambique, emphasis was placed on two suggested functions of consultation: raising the priority of an issue on the agenda of action in a consultee’s agency; and creation and sustenance of interagency linkages.

6.6 THE CHALLENGES FACED BY THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE (BDF) DURING THE REINTEGRATION STANDARDIZED TRAINING AND THE DDR PROGRAMME OF FRELIMO AND RENAMO FORCES

Notably, four of the participants who participated in the current study were part of the BDF contingent who conducted reintegration standardized training of FADM soldiers. The respondents have an average of 25.5 years in military service and have participated in a number of foreign missions. This gives one an insight as to why they were selected for the study.

Before going into details as to what the challenges of the BDF was during the reintegration standardized training of both FRELIMO and RENAMO forces, the researcher sought to find out the participants’ understanding of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. In response, Participant 8 puts his understanding thus:

“Disarmament is a programme which takes place after confirming that the two opposing forces complied with the peace agreement and they have stopped fighting and they comply to obligations of peace agreement. Demobilization is the 2nd stage after disarmament which is moving of all the equipment, taking off those that were in war to centralize them in one place. Reintegration is the last stage of the mission.”

The response is succinct and technically clear. The participant demonstrated good knowledge of the DDR programme which he participated. He was able to technically present the stages of DDR, showing clearly that DDR is a process that takes a specific procedure. Also, the participant indicated that DDR is a part of the peace agreement which only comes up after the factions have complied or adhered to the
preliminary stages of the peace agreement. Key of the preliminary stages is to stop fighting, according to Participant 8.

Participant 9 puts his views thus:

“I would say peace requires compromisers therefore at integration the FRELIMO had to accommodate the RENAMO to make peace. Therefore, the elements of peace building that you have mentioned being the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration they have to be put together to ensure that there is peace.”

Here, Participant 9 did not precisely say what his understanding of DDR is. Rather, he elucidated the relevant background for an effective peace process. First, the participant highlights the importance of comprise and pointed out that compromisers are imperative in the peace building process. Second, Participant 9 then alludes to DDR as different elements of peace building. The use of the phrase ‘peace building’ as opposed to ‘peace keeping’ in his response is interesting. It suggests to one that for peace to last, there has to be a foundation for it. Just as a house is built on a foundation, so is peace, hence, the phrase ‘peace building’.

Having had a background knowledge of the respondents’ view of DDR, it is important to ascertain the challenges of the peace keepers in the implementation of the peace programmes in Mozambique. In order words, this objective of the study is to determine what challenges were faced by peace keepers when conducting reintegration standardized training and DDR of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers. Respondents have divergent views of the challenges. For example, Participant 10 puts his view thus:

“Firstly, the main problem was language barrier, because in Mozambique they speak Portuguese and in Botswana Defence Force we spoke English and our local language, so language barrier was one of the problems. The other problem faced by the Botswana Defence Force was the equipment shortage. The equipment shortage was that the area was too big, and if the area is too big you have to be covered you need a lot of equipment and you need more manpower. And the other problem was trust, lack of trust from this liberants, sometimes they will think that you side with the other party and others will also think you side with the other party that was one of the main concerns.”
Participant 6:

The biggest challenge was language because in Mozambique the official language is Portuguese and none of the BDF officers were knowledgeable in Portuguese language so we had to use interpreters who some of them were civilians who had no military knowledge and it was difficult to use them as interpreters so some of us had to learn the language on the streets and it was very difficult.

Participant 10 highlighted two challenges which include language barrier and shortage of equipment. Language is needed for any kind of communication, even people with speech impairments communicate with sign language and brail. Communication becomes difficult in situations where people do not understand one another’s language. The inability to communicate using a language is what Mishra (2016:1) refers to as to language barrier to communication. According to Mishra (2016:1), language barriers are the most common communication barriers which cause misunderstandings and misinterpretations between people. Most of the soldiers who participated in the Mozambican peace process were speaking either French or English and Mozambicans do not speak English. If the speaker and receiver do not use same language and words, there is no meaning to the communication. Not using the words that other person understands makes the communication ineffective and prevents message from being conveyed. One therefore imagines the significance of the problem of language barrier. The issue of language as a problem was also highlighted in Maseko’s (2014:87) study of the challenges of implementation of peace in the case of Somalia. Maseko (2014:87) highlighted that due to little or no communication peace keepers sometimes did not know what was happening around them, and this brought about a lack of situational awareness. One sees that the problem of language gives rise to some other problems.

In response to the challenges faced by peace keepers in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, Participant 11 indicated that there was a lack of trust especially from the RENAMO side, in that they showed a lot of push backs to surrender their arms, and those that they surrounded were very old weapons and they remained with their best weapons, because they did not
trust if the peace deal will work. In essence, there was fear of the unknown. Participant 11 continues:

“The other challenge is that when they were now demobilized and put in assembly areas there was very little counselling to those who were traumatized by the conflict. You know conflict, more especially child soldiers, so people had to be counselled and initially there were no such arrangements. People were just loitering around the assembly areas. They did not know or were not sure about tomorrow. “

Counseling, according to Cole (2002:291) is defined as a way of relating and responding to another person so that he or she is helped to explore his thoughts, feelings and behaviour to reach a clear self-understanding. Also, the person is helped to find and use his or her strengths to be able to cope more effectively with making appropriate decisions, or taking appropriate actions.

Makinde (2003:19) also looks at counselling and defines it as an integrative process between a client, who is vulnerable and who needs assistance, and a counsellor who is trained and educated to give this assistance. The goal of the interaction is to help the client learn to deal more effectively with him or herself and the reality of his environment. The definitions of counselling provided above would help one to see how important counselling was in the Mozambican situation. In the absence of counselling, former combatants from the RENAMO front were not disposed to be part of the reintegration programme because they were still battling with some issues that could be handled through counselling.

Participant 12 raises the issue of non-welcoming of former combatants on the part of the larger society. He reminiscences:

“The other thing, although it was not a big area it was observed in certain areas, more especially in areas that the fighting took place that they was unwillingness by civilians to accept former combatants, in their midst, you can imagine, RENAMO was fighting in village X and tomorrow they have to accept them. So people were not comfortable with that, I do not know how it ended but we could see a lot of resistance amongst the people.”

Geneva Convention III Article 50 (1) defines a civilian as any person who does not belong to one of the categories of combatants, and Article 50 (2) maintains that a civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians (I.C.R.C., 1949). However,
the Geneva Convention Protocol (2009:51-3) defines a combatant as a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities of an armed conflict. Whoever is not a combatant is a non-combatant. Combatants may engage in violence against other combatants, but they may not intentionally target non-combatants civilians. Nevertheless, as in the case of Mozambique, civilians find it difficult to co-exist with non-combatants even long after they have been disarmed. Perhaps, the civilian population is tied to imaginaries of wars.

Another issue, according to Participant 12 was the delay in providing assistance to combatants when they got in certain areas.

“They would come there and stay there, assistance in issues of logistics was not very much taken care of. They had to have abolitions for men and females; there was no entertainment for them. Most of the time they ended up sitting there bored.”

Logistics is pointed here to be a challenge in the peace implementation process. In November 1994, the UN General Assembly endorsed the creation of a permanent logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. This is known as the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) which was initially a site for pack-up kits and general supplies. The role of the UNLB expanded in 2002 to include the creation of the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) Concept. The SDS is the United Nation’s Peacekeeping material reserve, which supports rapid deployment and the initial operational capability of a complex peacekeeping mission. The UNLB stores and maintains the SDS, provides airlift support to missions, and conducts UN logistics training. The setting up of logistics base in Italy suggests to one that logistics is not a new challenge in peace keeping operations. However, Leslie (2011:13) points a few situations that could be challenging to the administration of logistics. He mentions such factors as political complexity and dynamic nature of each operational scenario; geographic, topographic, and climatic variations of theatres of operations; number of individual nations involved in each operation; variations in national standards in training, equipment, operational procedures, and operational support; and language and communications differences. The absence of adequate logistics can bring about adverse effects. Participant 12 recalls that “most of them ended up absconding from the peace keeping areas”. Evidently, the problem of logistics was of two-fold. The
keepers had their own logistics to cope with, the disarmed combatants also had their logistics issues to contend with.

“Our other challenge was that these people did not have enough logistics in terms of food, I remember in one of the assembly areas they went to the extent of harassing some of the military observers who were taking care of them, because the military observers were taken care of and they did not run short of anything. So you are there as a peace keeper and you are having your three meals, somebody is out there having nothing, and one of our military observers was nearly killed in an area and we had to go extract him from there. More especially the RENAMO people, they said “you had brought us here; you are having your meals and we are having nothing. This happened because of issues of logistics. So, it was security challenge more especially for the peace keepers to contain these demobilized soldiers.”

From the response above, there is an indication that a lack of basic amenities for the ex-combatants was a problem for the peace keepers. They, the ex-combatants, were aggressive and non-cooperative to the whole process because they lacked food. This could suggest to one that since food could be provided for the ex-combatants, it will be difficult for them to trust in the whole peace programme.

The final challenge of the peace implementation programme in Mozambique is highlighted by Participant 11: He puts if thus:

“Our challenge was just that the mandate was not very clear as to how will we manage this process, we managed it without any UN mandate that this is how DDR is going to be done, most of the time you need to use your intuition based on your experience in the military area but there was no proper guidance as to how is supposed to be run. So even if people absconded from the assembly areas we didn’t know what we should do whether to chase them, or to arrest them because even the lectures were not effective.”

Unclear role-assignment can bring about strained relationship. It is an indication of lack of effective communication practices. In the Mozambican context, such challenge as unclear mandate can bring about confusion. When the mandate of a group of individuals is not clear, the organization does not communicate properly, discourse is lost and the strategic lines become unclear. The issue is that each person understands things in his or her own way. Also, this kind of situation can bring about a culture based on distrust. As no one is certain about what the reality is, group members will generate a climate of distrust, a lack of connection and credibility. Since peace keepers feel that they are not informed about what is
happening and that their opinions and ideas do not really matter, they will lose interest and passion for what they do; and this will make them less productive, and ultimately lose motivation, focus, and productivity.

Despite the foregoing challenges of the peace keeping programme, respondents indicate that the programme was a success in Mozambique. For example, Participant 9 shares his opinion thus:

“I would say yes it was a success because ultimately we ended up having capable Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs); they were working together both with the FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers and ultimately they conducted their own training. So that showed that indeed there was success and they learnt English and even Setswana language which showed that indeed it was a success.”

Participant 8:

‘To me it was a success because in 2000 there was another group of instructors which was left there to observe whether the Mozambican instructors were training as we were doing while we were there. And according to their recommendations, they said yes it was. But also there was this training between Mozambican officers and Botswana officers, Company Commanders Course which was run every year from 2000 to 2005 in Botswana, and the final exercises was done in Mozambique. Looking at how they were responding you could see that yes indeed it was a success.”

Participant 7:

“I would say it was a success by then because we could see from the way things were done. Although at the current stage because of political differences it is going back, but by then it was very well.”

Participant 6:

“The reintegration standardized training was a success. Since the 3 consecutive years of training Mozambican soldiers we were conducting a course of 150 students per course and with these students we were doing it in 3 phases. Phase 1 we were doing what we call the standardized or basic training. The second phase we converted most of them to instructors and the third phase we were looking at command and administration. Currently most of our course participants, the graduates filled up the positions of command sergeant majors and capable in NCOs who can conduct range management qualifications to include any other task that can be allocated to them.”
6.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the results of the study as well as an analysis of the findings based on the objectives of the study. The respondents included eight (8) members of the BDF who participated in the UNOMOZ and four (4) members of the BDF who participated in the reintegration standardization training programme. The next chapter will present conclusion and recommendations of the study based on the data collected and analysed.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter showed how the empirical data of the study was analysed and interpreted by the researcher to address the objectives of this study. This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations of the study based on data collected and analyzed. It is expected, therefore, that this chapter will be useful in helping peacekeepers and policy makers deal with the Mozambican conflict, and future conflicts around the world when using military power sharing. To achieve this, the chapter will first highlight the objectives and the limitations of the undertaken study. Thereafter, it will give an overview of the literature reviewed in chapter two. The chapter will also discuss the summary of the findings of the study. Lastly, the chapter will make recommendations, highlight areas for future research, and then conclude.

7.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE UNDERTAKEN STUDY

The aim of this study was to analyze the military power sharing in Mozambique as a conflict management perspective. The objectives of the study were:

- To understand the concept of military power sharing arrangement.
- To explore the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique.
- To explore the strategies used to manage the Mozambique peace process.
- To ascertain the challenges faced by the BDF during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces.
- To propose recommendations for future interventions.
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The participants of the study were members of the BDF who took part in the UNOMOZ peacekeeping mission from 1992, as well as those who conducted reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO military personnel, and as such some of the participants may have forgotten some important aspect which could have been beneficial for the study. It was not possible to interview any officials from SADC as well as a former Ambassador to the UN due to their non-availability. Another thing is that the results of the study may not be a true reflection of the experiences of all who participated in UNOMOZ and the reintegration standardized training as none of the lower ranking BDF personnel were not interviewed.

7.4 CONCLUSION

This study sought to analyze military power sharing as a conflict management tool. It focused on the 1992 Mozambique military power sharing arrangement between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Article 6 (ii) of Protocol IV of the GPA mandated the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), with the Government and the forces of RENAMO each contributing fifty percent (50%) (Guebuza & Domigos, 1990).

The overall objective of the study was to find out what accounted for the success in Mozambique when countries like Angola failed dismally. Furthermore, the role played by UNOMOZ in facilitating the formation of FADM, as well as the role played by BDF (and challenges faced) in conducting reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO will be explored. However, the specific objectives were to understand the concept of military power sharing arrangement; to explore the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique; to explore the strategies used to manage the Mozambique peace process; to ascertain the challenges faced by the BDF during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces; and to propose recommendations for future interventions. In order to achieve this objective, the study was divided into six chapters. In the first chapter, the study presented an introduction which gives a brief overview of the study; the problem statement, which
presents the reason for the study; the aims and objectives, which are drawn from the problem that underpins the study; and the significance of the study, which shows how important it is to do this study.

Also in the first chapter, the study presented a discussion of the theoretical perspectives on conflict. It also give appropriate background information on power sharing issues. From the analysis of empirical evidences presented in that chapter, the study concluded that power sharing is a broad term which can involve a number of approaches. This view is consistent with the views of early studies in power sharing. However, reports on power sharing shows that it should be viewed as an attempt to avert any or further conflict and is used as an immediate solution to placate disputants albeit temporarily.

The literature review is presented in Chapter Two. It focuses on power sharing and therefore has such sub-sections as conceptualizing power sharing, Forms of Power Sharing, Implementation of Power Sharing, etc. From the articulation of empirical literature, it is evident that the basic principles of power sharing as traditionally conceived include grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments; protection of minority rights for groups; decentralization of power; and decision making by consensus. Four different forms of power sharing were articulated in literature. These include political form of power sharing, military power sharing, economic power sharing, and political power sharing. Empirical evidences presented in Section 2.3.1 shows that political power sharing is the most frequently applied form of power sharing, but is also the most unsuccessful with the highest failure rate and lowest average duration of peace.

Regarding military and territorial pacts, Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) indicate that only territorial pacts are found to significantly reduce the risk for civil war recurrence. As a way of integrating rebels into a new national army, military power sharing is considered as a peace solution which reduces the rebels' insecurity vis-à-vis the government. Rothchild (2005) argues that in terms of structure, territorial power sharing fosters an inclusive state system or allows for territorial integrity whilst permitting greater autonomy to minorities. In a nutshell, the principal assumption underlying power-sharing theory is the belief that appropriate political engineering can help in constructing a capable democratic system that can withstand the
centrifugal tendencies that tear deeply divided societies apart. Therefore, the position of the current study is that military power sharing is mainly implemented with two outcomes in mind: democracy and peace. However, both perspectives assume that the societies in need of such governance are in crisis. Also, the basic principles of power sharing as traditionally conceived include grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments; protection of minority rights for groups; decentralization of power; and decision making by consensus. The chapter concludes by presenting such forms of power sharing military, economic, territorial, and political.

In Chapter Three, the study provides a historical background to the Mozambique civil war. It presented a brief historical background of Mozambique which gives one an insight into the political past of Mozambique. The brief background traced Mozambique to its independence in 1975. Thereafter, there was a discussion on the civil wars after independence follows. As the civil war raged on, there were efforts to restore peace and political stability in Mozambique. These were such peace accords as the Lusaka Accord, Nkomati Accord, the Rome Agreement and the subsequent United Nation Operation in Mozambique. The chapter ended with a discussion on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique. The DDR was a peace-keeping programme that was designed to welcome the ex-combatants into the civilian society. Chapter Four presents the research design and methodology that was used in the study. It highlighted that a qualitative approach was selected to achieve the objectives of the study. In addition, the chapter discussed the research philosophy, research approach and design, research methodology, and methods of data collection and analysis. The limitations of the study are described and explained as well as ethical issues and responsibilities of the researcher.

Furthermore, the Mozambique Military power sharing case study was presented in Chapter Five. The chapter highlighted three factors that encouraged the smooth sailing of power-sharing in Mozambique. One of such factors is the absence of formal institutions. In the absence formal institutions, there was the inauguration of transitory commissions to ensure the implementation of the joint command as defined for the transitional period, according to GPA. Another aspect of the power-
sharing process in Mozambique is in the formation of the defence force. The GPA defined the general principles and procedures for the constitution of the FADM. “To ensure trust between the parties over the transition period, co-joint commissions were established, including RENAMO, Government and representatives of foreign countries to direct the security forces from cease-fire period until elections were held and a new democratically elected Government instituted” (Lala, 2001:64). Finally, Chapter Six provided a thematic analysis of the participants’ responses from the interviews, and a summary with concluding remarks and recommendations. Having presented the overall conclusion of the study, it is important to highlight the summary of the answers elicited from the research objectives.

The first objective of the study set out to determine the participants’ understanding of power sharing. From their individual responses, it is evident that the BDF contingent, who participated in the UNOMOZ and in the Standardized Reintegration Programme in Mozambique, do have adequate understanding of what power sharing is. This is unfortunate because power sharing was a major conflict resolution tool used in restoring and sustaining peace between FRELIMO and RENAMO. This development has been recommended in Recommendation Section for action on the part of BDF.

In the second objective, the study sought to explore the challenges of implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique. In this regard, four challenges were identified: First, there were differences in terms of military training/doctrine, and this was one of the challenges. Second, poorly trained military personnel were a challenge of implementing the power sharing deal in Mozambique. Third, was a lack of trust and confidence between constituent parties. Finally, a lack of transitional authority in holding forth power until the power sharing deal was fully implemented. The third objective of this study was to explore the strategies used in managing spoilers (nuisance) in the peace process in Mozambique. Three major strategies became outstanding. These are: political reconciliation, the DDR program, and party consultations.

The fourth objective of this study was to determine the challenges faced by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) during the reintegration standardized training and the DDR programme of FRELIMO and RENAMO forces. The first challenge and, of course, the biggest challenge identified in the study is language barrier. The second
is that there was very little counselling to those who were traumatized by the conflict. Unwillingness by civilians to accept former combatants in their midst is the third challenge. The fourth challenge is lack of logistics for both the peace keepers and the combatants. Finally, the fifth challenge identified in the study is that the mandate was not very clear to the peace keepers as to how they would manage the process.

7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the data collected and analyzed, the following are recommendations which have been found to be appropriate for this study:

- There is need for the UN and other agencies to embark on an aftermath monitoring, evaluation and feedback to the appropriate quarters. Monitoring the programme affords the agencies an opportunity to watch for and identify anomalies throughout the implementation process. Evaluation on its own, assesses whether the power-sharing and peace initiatives were properly implemented as planned; whether the intended target population was reached, and the major challenges and successful strategies associated with program implementation are checked. Monitoring and evaluation of peace keeping missions will determine the sustainability of re-integration programmes for ex-combatants.

- NGOs, civil societies, and the church should organize and carry out awareness campaigns. The campaigns should target the civilian population and prepares them to welcome/ accept ex-combatants into the society. On their part, The UN and regional bodies should organize comprehensive induction programmes for soldiers. Such induction programme will enable soldiers to be familiar with technical terms in peace keeping operations. From the findings of this study, for example, participants scarcely know what power-sharing is.

- The BDF should come up with a long term strategic language plan to have more of its personnel conversant in languages spoken in Africa. This will check the language barrier challenge which recurrently occurred in the current
study. Meanwhile, BDF and other regional bodies may also consider hiring translators to be part of the whole process.

- NGOs, civil society organizations, and churches should organize and carry out counselling sessions for ex-combatants as part of reintegration process. Counselling will enhance their degree of self-awareness and understanding of themselves and others. As victims of warfare, counselling will improve their self-esteem, and make them become reflective in their personal relationships with other members of the society.

- The BDF and other regional bodies should ensure that logistics are greatly cared for. The importance of logistics for peacekeepers (readily available mobilization stores) as well as demobilised people is enormous. As a result, the absence of this, as it was evident in Mozambique, can make ex-combatants to be aggressive and non-cooperative to the whole process.

- There is need to keep communication channels in a peacekeeping operation wide open. Most of the respondents in the study indicated that they were not fully briefed as to what to do. Consequently, this study recommends that the UN and the regional bodies should ensure that members of the peace keeping operation must be clearly and adequately briefed of their mandate. This will bring about clarity and unambiguity of mandate by all peacekeepers. In addition, a feedback mechanism should also be put in place in order to convey some complications and grievances of the peace keepers.

### 7.6 FUTURE RESEARCH

This section points to just a few areas for future research.

- Future studies can investigate power-sharing agreements as a tool of for state building and democratization.

- Another study can focus on using power sharing as means of arms recovery and reintegration of children and youths involved in armed conflict.
• Future studies may focus on implementing just one aspect of power sharing depending on the need of the situation.

• Finally, a study might do a summary of all studies on power sharing.
REFERENCE LIST


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UN. (2005). *Note by the Secretary-General on Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: UN.


APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Part One: Participants of United Nations Military Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)

1. Rank/Position
2. What was your role/task in UNOMOZ?
3. In your own words, how do you understand military power sharing as a concept?
4. In your opinion, what were the challenges faced in implementing the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique?
5. What strategies were used to manage those who wanted to undermine the peace process (spoilers)?
6. In your opinion, how effective was power sharing as a conflict management tool in the peace process in Mozambique?
7. What challenges were faced by peacekeepers in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme?
8. Do you have any other information or experiences with regard to military power sharing that you want to share with me?

Thank you very much for having found time to share with me your opinions and expertise on the military power sharing in Mozambique.

Part Two: Participants of the Reintegration Standardized Training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers

1. Rank/Position
2. What was your role/task during the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers?
3. In your own words, how do you understand disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme?
4. In your opinion, what challenges were faced by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) when conducting reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldier?
5. In your opinion, was the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldier a success? Please support your answer.
6. Do you have any other information or experiences with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme that you want to share with me?

Thank you very much for having found time to share with me your opinions and expertise on the reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers.
APPENDIX 2: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

P.O. Box 41642
Gaborone

28 April 2014

The Commander
Botswana Defence Force
Private Bag X06
Gaborone

Dear Sir

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THE BDF-MYSELF

This serves to kindly request for permission to conduct a study in the BDF as a requirement for the award of Master of Philosophy: Conflict Transformation and Management by Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa. The Title of the Research is: “An Analysis of the Military Power-Sharing in Mozambique-A Conflict Management Perspective.” I intend to interview members of the BDF who participated in UN Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) and also those who conducted Reintegration Standardized Training of the RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers in 1999.

I trust that the study will benefit the BDF as it aims to document our past achievements.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Your Obedient Officer,

Maj IRM Molefhe
APPENDIX 3: INFORMATION TO PARTICIPANTS

My name is Ishmael Rapula Molefhe. I am a student studying towards a Master of Philosophy in Conflict Transformation and Management at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa. I would like to thank you for the opportunity you have accorded me to conduct an interview with you. The title of my research is **An Analysis of the Military Power Sharing in Mozambique: A Conflict Management Perspective**. This research seeks to find out what accounts to the success of the military power sharing arrangement in Mozambique when countries like Angola failed dismally. It further explores the role that the Botswana Defence Force played, and challenges faced, when conducting reintegration standardized training of FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers.

While your (participant) participation in this study is voluntary, you are at liberty to withdraw from the study at any moment you feel uncomfortable. I promise to treat all those who will volunteer their participation with all the human dignity they deserve. All the information gained from you will be treated confidentially and anonymously.

**Interviewer:** Ishmael Rapula Molefhe  
**Supervisors:** Prof. Gavin Bradshaw  
Dr. Ntsikelelo Breakfast
APPENDIX 4: CONSENT FORM

Rank/Position.................................................................................................................................

Length of Service with your Employer (in years) .................................................................

Date: ..............................................................Time: ........................................

Salutation

My name is Ishmael Rapula Molefhe. I am a student studying towards a Master of Philosophy in Conflict Transformation and Management at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa. I would like to thank you for the opportunity you have accorded me to conduct an interview with you. The title of my research is An Analysis of the Military Power Sharing in Mozambique: A Conflict Management Perspective.

The information gathered in this interview will be treated with confidentiality and anonymity of participants will be maintained. I would like to ask for your permission to record this interview so that I will not miss any point when compiling my report. If you wish to ask me any question please do so before the interview starts.

Interviewer: .........................................................

Ishmael Rapula Molefhe (s211253235)

Date:.............................................................

Supervisors: Prof Gavin Bradshaw

Dr. Ntsikelelo Breakfast

Interviewee: .............................................................

Date..................................................................................

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APPENDIX 5: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

APPENDIX 5
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

REFERENCE: PF 190552

Major IRM Molefe
P.O BOX 41642
Gaborone

U.f.o Commander
Special Forces Regiment

Dear Major

CONDUCT OF RESEARCH—MAJOR I.R. M. MOLEFHE

The above subject matter refers.

2. Please be informed that approval has been granted to you to conduct a study on An Analysis of the 1992 Military Power Sharing in Mozambique: A Conflict Management Perspective in the BDF towards fulfillment of a requirement in your studies on Master of Philosophy: Conflict Transformation and Management.

3. We wish you the best in your studies.

4. Thank you.

Yours Sincerely,

Captain D. Mpharithe
FOR/COMMANDER, BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

COMMANDER,
BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE,
PRIVATE BAG X06,
GABORONE VILLAGE,
BOTSWANA.

23 May 2014
APPENDIX 6: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

Ref: H/15/ART/PGS-003

14 May 2015

Mr IRM Molefe
P O Box 41642
GABORONE
BOTSWANA
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Dear Mr Molefe

AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY POWER SHARING IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE

Your above-entitled application for ethics approval served at the FPGSC Higher Degrees sub-committee of the Faculty of Arts Faculty Postgraduate Studies Committee.

We take pleasure in informing you that the application was approved by the Committee.

The Ethics clearance reference number is H/15/ART/PGS-003, and is valid for three years, from 07 MAY 2015 – 07 MAY 2018. Please inform the FPGSC, via your supervisor, if any changes (particularly in the methodology) occur during this time. An annual affirmation to the effect that the protocols in use are still those for which approval was granted, will be required from you. You will be reminded timely of this responsibility.

We wish you well with the project.

Yours sincerely

Mrs N Mngonyama
FACULTY ADMINISTRATOR

cc: Promoter/Supervisor
    HoD
    School Representative: Faculty FPGSC