TOWARDS AN EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF C.G. JUNG'S
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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ROGER WILLIAM ACTON BROOKE

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ABSTRACT

The central aim of this study was to interpret the psychology of C.G. Jung in the light of existential phenomenology, thereby to lay the foundations for an integrated phenomenological analytical psychology. It was recognised that although Jung introduced a poetic understanding of psychological life he tended to adhere theoretically to a Cartesian and natural scientific epistemology and ontology, in which the knower is separated from the known, and psychological life is encapsulated inside the human subject. Thus the main task, which defined generally the study's scope and limitations, was to undercut the lingering Cartesianism in Jung's thought, thereby to recover the world in which one lives as intrinsically and authentically psychological, and one's psychological life as irreducibly world-related. The ontological guidelines for this endeavour were taken primarily from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but it was consistently argued that this hermeneutic movement towards an existential understanding is given within Jung's work itself.

Thus: Jung's method is primarily hermeneutic-phenomenological; the psyche is not "mind" or an inner realm more or less linked to the body, but is the embodied life-world, and Jung's descriptions of it - of its autonomy, spatiality and bodiliness, for instance - achieve ontological clarity when it is articulated as Dasein; the self as the totality of the psyche is interpretated in terms of Dasein, and individuation involves differentiation, personalisation and appropriation within existence itself; the complexes, archetypally grounded, are the vital densities of incarnate life, ambiguously conscious and unconscious, known and lived;
the archetypes are the fundamental necessities of psychological life, autonomous imaginal structures within which both body and world are founded. Imaginal autonomy is revealed ontically as the metaphorical reality of things, but since imaginal autonomy has no ground thought about psychological life is ultimately poetic.

Where relevant, recent theoretical developments in analytical psychology were discussed, particularly the Developmental and Archetypal movements. A clinical study was presented to illustrate some of the main themes of the thesis. In conclusion, the main themes of an integrated phenomenological analytical psychology were outlined, and the central contributions of analytical psychology and existential phenomenology were highlighted.
I would like to acknowledge and express my sincere thanks to those who contributed directly to my understanding of analytical psychology and phenomenology and who helped make the study possible:

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DEDICATION

For Robert, Sebastian and Nicola.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aims

Essentially the aim of this thesis is to understand and articulate the psychological insights of C. G. Jung in the light of existential phenomenology. Thus it is an attempt to see through Jung's writings to the phenomena he saw, or, to use a different metaphor, to hear through his words to what he was trying to say, and to express this in a phenomenologically accurate way.

It is not a question of merely "translating" Jung's language into "existential" language, for it is necessary to understand clearly what it is in human existence that holds the different languages together, in other words, the psychological insights that would make translation possible. It is not the words themselves that speak but the phenomena revealed therein. To read Jung hermeneutically, therefore, is to do more than merely read his writings in a different way. It is to encounter them, that is, to hold them in a dialogue that is both respectful and critical at the same time (Sardello 1975). Out of this dialogue it is
hoped, and expected, that a way will be found to read Jung with an existential depth and significance that is often lost in his struggle with words and his own metatheoretical foundations.

A second aim, which complements this, is to offer existential phenomenological psychology something of the psychological depth and richness that Jung can provide. Primarily this means making Jung's insights phenomenologically accessible, so that some of the themes of existential phenomenology can be fleshed out psychologically. It is too easy, for example, to speak of facticity, or hiddenness, without ever fully realising the power which these terms imply, and there is much that Jung can offer here.

In order to achieve these aims it will be necessary to evaluate critically Jung's theoretical formulations, particularly in terms of the metatheoretical assumptions on which they are based. It will be found that many of these formulations will have to be bypassed if the insights contained in them are to be revealed. Significantly, although the criteria for doing so will come from phenomenology, clues and guidelines will be found in the writings of Jung himself. One of the central themes of the present thesis is that many of Jung's own writings lead beyond the confines of his theoretical thinking and indicate an understanding of man that lies at the heart of existential phenomenology. In following this theme it will be shown that Jung has been much closer to phenomenology than phenomenologists have generally recognised, and that the transition from Jung's understanding of his own work (various as it was) to an existential phenomenological understanding
of it is given within Jung's work itself.

1.2. Rationale

Jung's scientific endeavours were guided primarily by inner experience and personal need (Jung 1961), and his difficulty in meeting the academic needs of the moment reflects this. At an Eranos seminar in 1940 he made the following remark:

"I can formulate my thoughts only as they break out of me. It is like a geyser. Those who come after me will have to put them in order" (quoted in Jaffe 1971, p.8).

Jung is acknowledging here a tension between his experience and the ways in which he tries to talk about that experience. For one thing, Jung always struggled with the problems of writing. Anthony Storr has commented that he has known "of no creative person who was more hamstrung by the inability to write" (1973, pp.37-38). But the issue is more than this. In the above quotation Jung is pointing to the fact that his speaking and writing occur with an immediacy that is not transparent to itself. When Jung says "that the pioneer only knows afterwards what he should have known before" (1949c, p.521), and that even then knowledge is incomplete (ibid), he is making a personal statement that reflects for the phenomenologist an epistemological truth. That is, consciousness is embodied and lived as action before it is reflectively appropriated as "knowledge" (Merleau-Ponty 1942, p.173 and passim). To what extent Jung's conceptual knowledge accurately reflects the intuitive awareness that was given in his acts of perception is precisely the question that opens
In Jung's case the tension between experience and knowledge is one between profound insight and an apparent conceptual eclecticism. Jung's eclecticism means that he did not write consistently from any particular perspective, and it reflects his continual dissatisfaction with his own formulations. In a personal way, it reflects his own creativity, the differing needs of his Number 1 and Number 2 personalities, and his ambivalence regarding both his scientific and religious traditions. But it also reflects his insistence on the perspectival and historically contingent nature of knowledge.

Jung's eclecticism seems to gather around to two general styles, which might be called the natural scientific and the poetic. Once again, these reflect the different styles of his Number 1 and Number 2 personalities respectively.

In the first instance, when Jung speaks of projection, dissociation of the personality, complexes, schizophrenia, psychic epidemics and so on, he is seeing and writing through the language of psychiatry and psychopathology, the language of his doctoral supervisor, Eugen Bleuler. Having its roots in medicine, this language reveals some of the essential assumptions of natural science: the human being as a self-contained entity inside of which sickness can be located, health and sickness as reflections of energy distribution and availability (to the ego), and the independence of the observer. This link between psychiatry and natural science is to be found in Jung's word-association studies (Jung 1904-10),
which sought to ground the budding disciplines of psychiatry and psychoanalysis experimentally. It is found in his attempts, occasional though they were, to link psychology to biology, as in the following statement:

"The separation of psychology from the basic assumptions of biology is purely artificial, because the human psyche lives in indissoluble union with the body. And since these biological assumptions hold good not only for man but for the whole world of living things, the scientific foundation on which they rest obtains a validity far exceeding that of psychological judgement, which is valid only in the realm of consciousness. It is therefore no matter of surprise if the psychologist is often inclined to fall back on the security of the biological standpoint and to borrow freely from physiology and the theory of instinct" (Jung 1937/42, p.114).

Jung's adherence to this tradition seems clear when he speaks of psychic energy, entropy, the law of psychic compensation in energetic terms, the possibility of the quantification of psychic energy, etc.

It is at this point that the phenomenologists have been most concerned to distance themselves from Jung, but have been insufficiently cautious in doing so. Jung warns us not to understand his notion of psychic energy as a biological derivative, after the reductionist manner of Freud, but as autonomous to the psyche, where it is simply the measure of the intensity of psychic value, or meaning (Jung 1928a, pp.9-10). It has the same meaning as in the statement, "He puts more energy into his work than into his family life". (Even Boss, for whom any reference to psychic energy is like a red flag to a bull, occasionally uses the term in this descriptive way).
Moreover, since Jung understands the term psychic energy as the modern equivalent of the "primitive" experience of power (mana) (ibid., pp.64-66), he seems to be aware of the metaphorical and historical nature of his terminology, and this undercuts the claims to an a-historical reality premised in natural science (cf. Brooke 1985, p.166).

Existential phenomenology recognises that Freud broke the bounds of the natural scientific view of man even as he adhered to it in his metapsychology (eg. Boss 1963; Izenberg 1976). But if this was true of Freud it is even clearer with Jung. However, Jung's historical acumen is sometimes offered in the name of natural science, and this can lead him to be at cross-purposes with himself. For example, his last major theoretical paper, On the Nature of the Psyche (1947/54), opens with a defence of natural science that would clearly not be his intention if he understood the term more accurately. He tries to defend the independence of natural scientific psychology from philosophy, which from his description of it can be identified primarily as rationalist. Then he criticises Wilhelm Wundt, the father of natural scientific psychology, for refusing the concept of the unconscious for "philosophical" reasons (pp.160-164)! Clearly, what Jung means by natural science in this context is not what is usually meant - namely, that approach developed by Wundt - but is more akin to psychoanalysis, and this needs to be borne in mind whenever it seems that he identifies himself as a natural scientist. We might also note that Jung's view of natural science is significantly influenced by his relationships with Einstein, Bohr, Pauli, and Heisenberg, i.e. those natural scientists who have paved the way for a new scientific paradigm: acausal, systemic, and with a participant and relativist epistemology.
Jung's link with phenomenology is often explicit, even though he uses the term somewhat loosely. But Jung's emphasis on meaning and immanence shifts psychology into a perspective that is essentially poetic. As Hillman said of Jung:

"His theory of images announced a poetic basis of mind, and active imagination put it into practice, even while Jung went on using scientific and theological language for his explanations" (1978, p.162).

From this perspective he speaks the language of religion, myth and alchemy. This is rightly the perspective for which he is best known and in which he did most of his writing. There seem to be at least three reasons for this. First, this language was the most satisfying for him personally (Jung 1961, p.17). It was the language of his Number 2 personality, that throughout his life unfolded to become his self (Papadopoulos 1984). Second, he believed that metaphor was the most accurate way of speaking about man, for every statement about the psyche - every personal interpretation, or scientific "explanation" - has the "as-if" quality of metaphor (Jung 1940, pp.156, 157, 160). Third, as has already been mentioned, there is Jung's historical sense with regard to natural science.

Thus when Jung began his search for deeper, indigenous foundations for analytical psychology and for its authentic language, he turned, "for better or for worse", as he put it, "to the teachings of our forefathers" (Jung 1931b, pp.344-345). Here he found concepts uncluttered by contemporary prejudice and closer to primordial experience: soul, spirit, shadow, anima, etc. Jung preferred "to call things by the names under which they have always been known" (Jung 1929c, p.339), and was
therefore right in saying that analytical psychology "will certainly not be a modern psychology" (Jung 1931b, p.344). It is a perspective in which materialism is a religious vision that resurrects God in a new form (ibid. p.341), and scientific psychology is myth-making. As Jung (1940) says of psychology: it

"translates the archaic speech of myth into a modern mythologem - not yet, of course, recognised as such - which constitutes one element of the myth "science" (p.179).

The effect of this movement in Jung's understanding of man and the psychology that speaks of him is to see through the natural scientific language to the perspective, or vision, which forms it. Psychology becomes intrinsically metaphorical, or poetic (de Voogt 1984).

Now, while this view is central to Jung, and marks a profound contribution to contemporary thought, it raises several issues which form a large part of the rationale for the present thesis.

Firstly, in analytical psychology the natural scientific approach - its anthropology, its reductionism, its experimental, positivist criteria for establishing truth, etc. - has tended to persist, even though it became less and less relevant as Jung matured. Although Jungian analysts tend to eschew reductionism there does seem to be a widely held view that the "truths" which emerge from analytical practice are in some sense provisional. This can be detected, for example, when experimental findings with regard to dream research (Gabel 1985) or cerebral hemispheric preference (Prifitera 1981) "support" or "modify" Jung's intuitions, or when his "theory" of psychic energy is defended with reference to the concept of energy in physics (Mattoon 1981, pp.105).
Jacobi's (1942/68) classic book introduces Jung's theory by referring to "the laws of psychic processes and forces" (p.1) and "the principle of psychic energism" (p.2). L. Stein (1967) attempts to relate the archetypes and the self to intra-cellular activity, and his attempt is praised by Michael Fordham (1974). In the field of psychopathology, Vitale (1978) describes depression as "a quantative term indicating energetic, psychic 'tone'.... (which) occurs when the subject spends more libido than he produces" (p.220). If pressed, perhaps those authors would concede the difference between their model, as analogy, and reality, but this tends to be blurred, at least, by the persistence of the model and the apparent realism of their accounts. But if Jung broke with this tradition he did not do so clearly or consistently enough, and many of his followers, in falling back upon this natural scientific anthropology and methodology, have failed to follow through with the vision that Jung introduced.

Secondly, the poetic perspective which Jung introduced was never systematically grounded in a coherent anthropology by Jung or by his followers, despite the direct influence of existential phenomenology in some quarters. As indicated above, one result is that the natural scientific model persists. A further result is that the work of poesis that Jung introduced often remains caught in a self-enclosed, almost solipsistic, ontology. For example, when Jung (1931b) says "All our knowledge consists of the stuff of the psyche which, because it alone is immediate, is superlatively real" (p.353), it seems that he fails to capture the profound significance, which he so clearly saw, of the world in which man makes his home and finds the meaning of selfhood. If Jung is not being solipsistic, such a statement needs radical re-reading.
It is a central aim of phenomenology to meet this need.

Thirdly, the poetic perspective needs an anthropology according to which the adequacy or relevance of Jung's various metaphors can be measured. To say that all knowledge is perspectival or structured through an imaginatively vision of the world, is not to say that one metaphor is just as good as another. But if some metaphors are better than others, then the basis on which such judgements are made needs to be clarified.

Fourthly, existential phenomenology can offer an explicit methodology that is indigenous to psychology conceived as a human science and which is therefore more appropriate than the experimental methods of natural science. Moreover it will be shown that in many respects Jung developed a method that is more clearly articulated by phenomenology.

Fifthly, providing an existential phenomenological framework for analytical psychology can form a basis for viewing its developments since Jung's death in 1961, particularly the object-relations work pioneered by Fordham and the imaginal, or "archetypal", work pioneered by Hillman.

Finally, phenomenology's concern with the intrinsic meaningfulness of things and the existential situatedness of experience characterises the persons Jung and Heidegger as well as their cultural-therapeutic endeavours. The primitive concreteness of Jung's presence and work is legend (cf. Jung 1977, pp.88-92). Despite the exalted language of *Being and Time* it is clear that Heidegger, like Jung, had

"an almost uncanny personal sensibility to the grain and substance of physical existence, to the 'thingness' and obstinate quiddity of things, be they rock or tree or
human presence .... Heidegger felt the world with a rare concreteness" (Steiner 1978, p.38).

But what Heidegger bequeaths us in a way that Jung could not do is an ontology in which this awakening of presence (Being) remains on its own terms. Thus, in a sense, while Jung's personal sensibility and therapeutic work constituted an undercutting of the Cartesian separation of knower and known, and what we are calling poesis, it is Heidegger's thought and the impact this has had on phenomenology which allows Jung's therapeutic intentions to be thought poetically as well.

Thus, what is to be argued is more than that Jung's psychology can be reworked phenomenologically, or even merely that Jung and phenomenology are intimately compatible. This study intends to explore the more daring claim that Jung saw and understood as an existential phenomenologist but that he lacked the conceptual tools to express that. Thus this study, while being guided by phenomenology, intends to remain as close as possible to the heart of what Jung was really trying to say.

1.3. The poetic perspective

A certain hesitation in identifying Jung's psychology as essentially poetic is understandable, and the term needs to be clarified and focussed. There are three reasons for the term poetic being introduced here.

Firstly, the term is used in the classical sense, derived from the Greek, poesis, which means "to make". To make involves both the "thing" or raw
material out of which poesis occurs and the one who works that transformation. Therefore, to say Jung was a poet is not to say that his psychology is merely a product of empty fantasy. It speaks rather, to the intrinsic, irreducible, and mutually transformative relationship between him and his subject-matter. If Jung's personal vision is present in his work, so too, and no less is the reality that gave that vision its place. There is a difference between poetic vision and hallucination.

Secondly, there seems to have been a growing tendency in analytical psychology to situate psychic life (symbols and individuation for instance) in the real contingencies of interpersonal life. This is implied in the move by some analytical psychologists to situate the transference - countertransference in the centre of analytical work, in the increasing recognition that individuation begins at birth and is not limited to the second half of life, and in the endeavour to ground symbols in reality-tested interpersonal relationships (cf. Whitmont 1982). While phenomenology tends to be more concerned with the foundational issues in which successful therapeutic work takes place, the implication of its foundational critiques and interpretations would support this therapeutic move in analytical psychology towards incarnate particularity. It seems that the poorly named "introversion" of that (especially Classical?) analytical psychology which retreats from the world into a headful of symbols misses the central thrust of Jung's whole cultural therapeutic endeavour, which was to reawaken for modern man a sense of soul in the world of things (Jung 1928/31a). This return to the pregnant immediacy of things is the work of poesis.
Thirdly, the term poetic shows that the relationship between Jung and his subject matter was a work of the imagination. Just as some of the alchemists were aware that the transformation of their *prima materia* was psychological, or imaginative, so was Jung regarding his own work. It might be important to stress that this point does not open the door to wild flights of fancy, or rather, if it does, there is built in to the social structure of analytical psychology as a discipline the possibility of self-criticism. Said positively, the poet’s imagination is an attempt to see accurately what is there and to find precisely the right words to speak what is seen. Poetic work is both disciplined and committed to accuracy.

Fourthly - and this was the decisive factor in choosing a term - Jung was a poet in the sense used by Heidegger. For Heidegger, a poet is given in that fallen and profane time between the retreat of the gods and the emergence of Being (Heidegger 1954a, p.4). The poet is thus a pivot in cultural history through which his fellow mortals are turned towards the advent of the divine presencing of Being. As this historical significance he is situated most urgently in this post-Enlightenment age of technology, especially since Nietzsche announced the death of God a century ago. "To be a poet in a destitute time means," says Heidegger (1936), "to attend ... to the trace of the fugitive gods" (p.94). In these terms Jung was a poet through and through. He was powerfully aware that the historical significance of the rise of psychology was as a reaction to rationalism, materialism, and the death of God, and he saw that no-one was truly healed who had not recovered a "religious outlook" on life. But that outlook is not given by retreating from incarnate life into a heavenly place of prayer - which would perpetuate the very
Gnostic dualism that Jung sought to heal— but by descending deeper into those things with which the patient is concerned: his symptoms. "The gods have become diseases," says Jung. "Zeus no longer rules Olympus but the solar plexus" (1929b, p.113).

Fifthly, the poet speaks in metaphors, and, as has been noted already, for Jung all statements about man and his world are metaphorical. Through metaphor reality becomes intensely alive, yet at the same time remains strangely elusive. This tension, which is between the revealing and concealing of that about which the poet speaks, is central to Jung's understanding of psychology and the archetypes. It is also central to existential phenomenological ontology and the hermeneutic method. In other words to identify Jung's approach as poetic is to ground it in a tradition that has articulated the implicit ontology and epistemology of its method.

1. "The cardinal feature of Gnostic thought is the radical dualism that governs the relation of God and world, and correspondingly of man and world. The deity is absolutely transmundane, its nature alien to that of the universe ... and to which it is the complete antithesis: to the divine realm of light, self-contained and remote, the cosmos is opposed as the realm of darkness" (Jonas 1963, p.42).

Gnostic dualism can be found in Jung's sentiments at times (eg. Jung 1973, p.49). S. Hoeller (1982) has tried to establish this as the hermeneutic key to Jung's work but his polemic, thin on evidence, has not been well received (Carvalho 1983). At one time the Buberian scholar Maurice Friedman (1967) made Gnosticism central to his critique of Jung. (We shall return to Friedman later.) My own view, which the tenor of the present thesis as a whole would hope to show although it is not a central explicit theme, is that this view is mistaken. The "modern man" Jung recovered his soul in the world of things; things were not the enemy of his spirit.

As a somewhat side issue, Avens (1984, p.132) claims that recent research corrects the traditional, radically dualistic understanding of Gnosticism, but we shall not follow this up here.
1.4. Scope and limitations of the present study

The central aim of the present thesis is to articulate the main terms of Jung's analytical psychology in a way that is phenomenologically rigorous. This endeavour requires a sustained critique of the extent to which Jung formulated his psychological insights in terms consistent with the insufficiently questioned scientific and philosophical assumptions of his time. The scope and limitation of the present thesis are defined according to this central endeavour.

The pioneer in existential phenomenological thought, Ludwig Binswanger (1946), once called the dichotomy of subject and world, knower and known, "the fatal defect of all psychology" (p.193 - the original reads "the cancer evil of all psychology": Prof. D. Kruger, personal communication, 1986). This dichotomy achieved its clearest philosophical expression with Descartes (1647), and it forms the basic assumptions of scientific psychology up to the present time. Descartes' distinction between the res cogitans and the res extensa locates human consciousness in the mind, which is an immaterial, internal "location", radically separate from the natural, material world of which the body is a part. Mind, for Descartes, is essentially reasonable and free, whereas the body-world is subject to the determining forces and relations of nature.

With the rise of psychology Descartes' ontology appears to have softened somewhat, but only to the extent that the "mind", now called "psyche", includes feelings, fantasies, and unconscious "contents". The essential separation of human experience from the world in which experience
immediately takes place and the belief that the assumptions and methods of natural science account for the "real world" - and may even account for psyche some day - remain.

This ontology informs the cultural atmosphere in which post-renaissance, and especially post-Enlightenment, man's thought takes place. As will be suggested, it is the atmosphere in which Jung tried to construct his sense of himself, and this has had fateful consequences for analytical psychology. As Giegerich (1987) recently said, perhaps with mild overstatement:

"Whenever (Jung) exercised conscious control over his theorizing and intended to be critical, he wanted to freeze his amazing psychological insights on the logically lowest level, the ontic level of "empirical findings", which hold his insights imprisoned in the logical status of "substance" and prevented them from becoming (psychological) in themselves" (p.108).

This is not the place to exhaust this theme, for it will be returned to repeatedly in the chapters that follow. From, the existential phenomenological point of view, it is the "fatal defect" of much of Jung's theoretical thinking, and it has continued in varying degrees to this day in analytical psychology.

Thus the scope of the present study revolves largely around the critical attempt to lay to rest the lingering spirit of Descartes. The means for doing this is the foremost contribution of phenomenology, but much help is to be found in Jung's work as well. Indeed, the spirit of Jung's work seems to move in this direction, and it is to be found in the way he

2. Giegerich is referring not only to that about which Jung thought but also to Jung's writing as such. The founders of psychology, he says, were not psychological; it is we who must read them psychologically.
deals with those terms central to his thought: conscious, unconscious, the self, individuation, the archetypes, etc. Moreover, despite his claim to being an "empiricist" concerned with "the facts" and hypothesis testing, Jung used a hermeneutic method that in many respects is adequate to phenomenology. These themes and developments in Jung's work will be addressed systematically.

Analytical psychology has matured and changed. For one thing, partly due to increasing contact with psychoanalysis, clinical skills have developed very significantly. However, the present study will not address clinical issues or those developments in any detail. The concern here is mainly limited to theory, although a clinical study will be presented with the aim of grounding the theory in the practical world. On the other hand, there are occasions where thinking about clinical issues has led to important shifts in theory. Some of these will be discussed, for they tend to move in the direction of a phenomenological analytical psychology. But we shall also discuss some of those occasions in which Jung's work read phenomenologically can be used to criticise post-Jungian theoretical developments that seem inadequate to these clinical and developmental insights. In addition, there has grown in (or "out of") an analytical psychology a movement that is expressly concerned with the same ontological and epistemological issues as the present thesis. This movement, known as Archetypal psychology, will not be discussed in detail as a theme - or chapter - on its own, but its critiques and contribution (and some problems) will be discussed along the way.

The focus of the thesis will be on Jung's own published work, particularly *The Collected Works* edited by Sir Herbert Read *et al.*, Jung's
Letters, and his autobiography, but reference has also been made to *Man and His Symbols*, *The Visions Seminars* and *C.G. Jung Speaking*.

To orientate ourselves regarding post Jungian developments in analytical psychology Samuels' (1983, 1985b) classification will be used. Firstly, Classical analytical psychology refers to the approach that has remained closest to Jung's own. The term "Jung's psychology" will sometimes be used for this approach. Secondly, the Developmental school, based mainly in London and pioneered by Michael Fordham, emphasises infant and child development issues, object-relations and transference-countertransference analysis. Thirdly, Archetypal psychology, pioneered by James Hillman, is concerned primarily with deconstructing Jung's "scientific" and theoretical thought, with its positivist fantasies, and re-visioning psychological life on its own imaginal terms. When referring to these schools the terms Classical, Developmental and Archetypal will be capitalised. These terms do not cover the range of interesting work that is being done in analytical psychology, but they capture its essential theoretical developments.

It is striking that Samuels' (1985b) very substantial book, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, makes almost no reference to the field outside of the English-speaking world, and in the English (language) journals there is a similar dearth of cross-reference. Unfortunately, this limitation in English-speaking analytical psychology is continued in the present study.

A further limitation is that the aims include an investigation into the concepts of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, but do not explore particular archetypal themes in detail. In fact, particular
archetypal themes are discussed primarily to illustrate fundamental conceptual issues and to highlight one particular psychotherapeutic theme in the clinical study.

Further still, Jung's interest in parapsychology and his concepts of synchronicity and the *unus mundus*, etc. will not be addressed, except insofar as these terms reflect a magical attempt on Jung's part to jump over the chasm that his separation of subject and object had already created. This means that one growing edge in analytical psychology, which is to integrate it with aspects of contemporary physics, will be left out as well. To say anything useful in this regard would demand another study on its own.

Existential phenomenology is a heterogeneous movement, and it would perhaps be prudent to limit the dialogue to one particular phenomenologist's approach. Medard Boss, who knew Jung and remained indebted to him, would be a good choice. However, it is not necessary to be so restrictive. As Luijpen (1969) and Kruger (1979/88), for example, have shown there are a number of themes that are common to the movement as a whole. To a large extent different phenomenologists can be understood to highlight different existential phenomena, but their ontological assumptions are essentially the same. My own indebtedness is mainly to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and thus includes Boss, Kruger and Romanyshyn in particular. However, Sartre's (1956) ontology does not seem to have survived as well as his situated descriptions. Thus, although a tentative move has been made to compare and contrast Jung and Sartre (Shelburne 1983), this relationship will not be pursued. Further, although the work of Atwood and Stolorow (cf. 1977) is starting to find
its place in the literature, it will not be discussed here. Their understanding of Jung, drawn almost solely from Jung's *Two Essays*, is very thin, and their understanding of phenomenology is even poorer. To overcome reified "archetypes" by interpreting them as "representational objects" does not lead anywhere.

1.5. Summary

The central aim of the present study is to understand and interpret the psychological insights of C.G. Jung in the light of existential phenomenology. A complementary aim is to assist in making Jung's work accessible to existential phenomenologists, who have by and large tended to bypass his work. To a significant degree, the impetus for this phenomenological reading of Jung comes from Jung's own work itself, for Jung, it will be argued, *saw* as a phenomenologist even as he generally continued to think theoretically as a natural scientist.

The rationale is that a basic ontological and epistemological tension exists between the natural scientific and the "poetic" perspectives that cut across Jung's work. The poetic perspective deconstructs and embraces the natural scientific perspective, although this is often not recognised. It is necessary for this poetic perspective to be elaborated within a coherent ontological and epistemological framework if Jung's work is to fulfil its promise as an original indigenous psychology. Phenomenology provides such a framework as well as an appropriate methodology.
If the central aim is to rearticulate Jung's work in phenomenological terms, the main task in doing so is to undercut the Cartesian subject-object split in which much of that work has been conceived. This task defines to a large extent the scope of the present thesis. Undercutting the Cartesian split will neutralise Jung's temptation to endorse the natural scientific vision of reality, and will recover the world as the authentic home of psychological, imaginal life.

Limitations of the study are that it is limited mainly to theoretical issues rather than practical psychotherapeutic ones, that it is largely restricted to English-speaking analytical psychology, and that it does not address Jung's attempts to explore parapsychological phenomena.

The Archetypal and Developmental movements in post-Jungian analytical psychology will be discussed where relevant.

1.6. Outline of the thesis

Chapter one describes the aims, rationale and scope of the present study, as summarised above.

Chapter two presents an overview of Jung's psychology. The purpose is to orientate the reader relatively unsure of Jung's thought: his concepts and the theoretical relation between them. Thus this chapter provides a conceptual base in analytical psychology upon which more detailed analyses can be constructed. Since this overview attempts to remain true to Jung's theoretical self-understanding, it closes with a number of
conceptual questions that have been submerged but which call for consideration in the chapters that follows.

Chapter three describes Jung's hermeneutic method in terms of phenomenology. Before phenomenology also became an intellectual movement, it was essentially a method for describing the essences of phenomena. Its four dimensions, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty, are used as a framework within which to discuss Jung's method and evaluate his claim to being a phenomenologist.

Chapter four discusses Jung's experience in Africa for several reasons: it is Jung's only concrete description of an individuated consciousness, and it shows vividly Jung's own understanding that the authentic home of psychological life is the world in which man lives. The chapter also highlights the error of imagining that psyche can be conceived in Cartesian terms as an internal location ontologically separate from the world in which experience takes place, and it suggests that Jung's personal and cultural anxieties prevented him from sustaining his theoretical thought in terms adequate to his own essential understanding of the nature of man as this was revealed to him in his African experience.

There is a sense in which these first four chapters lay the ground work for the chapters that follow. The focus thus far will have been introductory (chapters one and two), methodological (chapter three), and empirical (chapter four). The following chapters discuss in detail the central concepts of analytical psychology.
The first of these later chapters, chapter five, discusses the term psyche. This will have been addressed in the previous chapter, when discussing Jung's experience in Africa. But here the discussion will revolve around the definition of psyche and its "place" in relation to the body and the world. It will be shown that, although Jung tends to write in Cartesian terms, as though the psyche were an encapsulated interior "place" more or less connected to the brain, Jung's intention is to recover the world in which we live as psychological, i.e. psyche. Thus the "autonomy of the psyche" does not refer to a domain separate from the body or incarnate life, nor does it admit of an epistemological solipsism on Jung's part - although it is often understood in these ways. It refers to the ontological priority of the life-world, the psychological world in which man lives. The term psyche is an intuitive attempt on Jung's part to refer to the essential structure of human existence. Interpreted in terms of the life-world, psyche as understood by Jung approaches Heidegger's explication of Dasein, and interpreted in terms of Dasein it achieves ontological and structural clarity. The chapter closes with a recollection of "earth", the supportive, nurturant and stabilising ground of psyche.

With the meaning of psyche thus opened out, it becomes possible to explore and interpret phenomena such as the self, individuation, the unconscious and the archetypes without begging questions as to their "psychic" location, or feeling impelled to leap out of the "psyche" in order to assert their existential, relational structures.

Thus chapter six discusses the self and individuation. Jung (1961, p.235) regarded individuation as the "central concept" of analytical psychology.
But it is not possible to speak of it without discussing the self at the same time, so these themes are discussed together here. The self has had many definitions, and the first task is to show that these are not incompatible with Jung's most general definition of the self as "psychic totality". However, this argument requires a de-literalising of the self defined as the centre of the psyche. Jung regarded the totality of the self as a synonym for psyche. Thus the self, like psyche (chapter five), is interpreted in terms of Dasein. After this and a brief discussion of the term ego, Jung's concept of individuation is explored and interpreted existentially. Individuation is articulated as the (ego's) appropriation of those possible world-relations that the incarnate primordial self has gathered. In this, the transformative moment appears to be less the retreat of psychic life from one's engagements with the world than the deliteralising of these relations into metaphoric structures. Thus it is important to note that the emergence of the "symbolic life" does not evaporate incarnate reality but situates imaginal life. Interiority is addressed anew.

In chapter seven conscious and unconscious are discussed. It is shown that despite Jung's attempts to link his terms to Freud's there is an ontological divergence from Freud's position. For Jung the terms are thoroughly ambiguous, and do not refer to psychic locations so much as the known and lived dimensions of incarnate life. Jung's notion of the complex and his early word-association studies are discussed in order to show that consciousness is embodied and the body is itself a vital consciousness structured existentially in the world of culture, language, etc. The unconscious is interpreted as the lived matrix of the known; the collective unconscious is interpreted as "fundamental hiddeness", that
no-thingness out of which everything comes into being. The chapter closes with a discussion of the attitude of consciousness and its reflection in "the" unconscious.

Chapter eight discusses the concept of the archetypes. Considerable attention is paid to Jung's meaning of the term and his contribution to various misunderstandings of the notion that have arisen. The essence of existential phenomenology's contribution here is that it is able to link two important and seemingly incompatible interpretations of the archetypes. The archetypes are both centres of meaning within images (or clusters of images) and bodily potentialities for inhabiting the world in typical ways. Situating the archetypes in being-in-the-world recognises their bodiliness but at the same time insists on a hermeneutic approach to analysing archetypal reality. This integration is followed by some discussion of archetypal images and relations. Finally, Jung's (and especially Hillman's) insistence on the imaginal autonomy of archetypal reality is expressed in a way that does not spatialise it in Cartesian terms, or even humanise it. Imaginal autonomy is not separate from the world of things.

Chapter nine presents a clinical study in order to illustrate the applicability of the theoretical work to psychotherapy, and, reciprocally, to show how moments in psychotherapy would support a move towards an integrated phenomenological analytical psychology.

Finally, chapter ten draws together the conclusions of the study.
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGY

The aim of this chapter is to provide a point of orientation and departure for the critique and dialogue that follows. The structure and dynamics of personality will be outlined and terms defined. This chapter can be read as an introductory chapter to Jung's psychology, in which the focus will be those concepts that are most relevant for this study. A common approach to Jung is through the structure and dynamics of the psyche, followed by a discussion of the individuation process.

It would seem needlessly pedantic to cite sources for each point made in a general overview such as this. If cited in the text itself, principle sources for what follows would be the "Definitions" in Jung's *Psychological Types* (1921) and Samuels *et al* (1986) *A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Psychology*, Jung's *Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious* (1928b), *Symbols of Transformation* (1912/52), *On the Nature of the Psyche* (1947/54), and the essays gathered in volume 9 (i) of Jung's *Collected Works*, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*. Excellent secondary sources are: Adler's (1949/69) *Studies in Analytical Psychology*, Edinger's (1972) *Ego and Archetype*, Frieda
2.1. The structure of the psyche

Precisely what Jung means by the psyche will be part of the subject of chapter five. For present purposes it can be noted that Jung's investigations are concerned almost exclusively with the psyche of man, its significance, its range, its structure and dynamics. The psyche is the "place" of conscious and unconscious processes. Jung vacillates as to whether or not these processes can be brought under the control of the human will. In any case, the psyche is the place of experience and meaning.

There are three conceptually distinct but dynamically interrelated levels of the psyche.

2.1.1. Consciousness

Consciousness refers to the range of experience of which a person is aware at any given moment. Despite the changing perceptual field from moment to moment, this range of awareness tends to coalesce to provide the individual with a sense of the continuity from day to day. This coalescence can be understood as a function of, or perhaps preferably, as
a reflection of the ego, or ego-complex. This can be defined as the centre of consciousness, the "I" that thinks, sees, makes conscious decisions, is concerned with questions of personal identity, etc. The relationship between consciousness and the ego is mutually and reciprocally determined. As the centre of consciousness the ego is a content of consciousness, yet consciousness is also a function of the ego, which is thus its precondition. The most significant feature of consciousness, which is definitive, is its power of discrimination, or differentiation into opposites (me and not me, inner and outer reality, male and female, good and evil, etc.) However, one is not always reflectively aware of one's ego functions, and there has been a general move in analytical psychology to recognise that the ego is partly "unconscious".

2.1.2. The personal unconscious

This is that part of the psyche which contains the personal thoughts, experiences, memories, etc. that have been forgotten or repressed. Here are to be found the personal complexes. A complex is a psychic energy centre around which are clustered particular types of, or themes within, personal experience. Complexes "twist together" (i.e. com-plex) experience into familiar patterns. Therefore, they can be said to structure the experience that enters consciousness in accordance with those patterns that have developed in the life history of the individual.

1. Jung likens the personal unconscious to Freud's concept of the unconscious, but this is not entirely accurate. Freud's concept includes the id, which contains phylogenetically inherited material and can never be made conscious, whereas for Jung the personal conscious is ontogenetically constituted and can in principle be made conscious.
Whether they function as neuroses or not depends not on their content but on whether or not they are a nuisance to the individual and those around him and whether they inhibit further psychological development. For psychological development to proceed it is important that the ego differentiate itself from the unconscious effects of the complexes. However, this does not mean dissociating oneself from them, which amounts to a neurotic denial. It means seeing through them to the archetypal nuclei of meaning that usually (always?) lie at their core.

2.1.3. The collective unconscious

This is that part of the psyche which is inherited, which the individual therefore shares with others. The term is a hypothetical construct intended to account for the great structural similarity in behaviour and experience across cultures and times where this similarity cannot be put down to "learning". The collective unconscious - sometimes also called the objective psyche - is of limitless extent and depth. As the product of man's evolution it contains the possibilities for the typical patterns of response that reach back into man's phylogenetic past. In a sense, therefore, one can speak of "layers" of the collective unconscious, which reach right down into the primal constituents of inorganic matter.

The collective unconscious is the matrix of consciousness, the source out of which the ego develops and to which, particularly in death and in sleep, it returns. The contents of the collective unconscious are the instincts and the archetypes.
2.1.4. *Instinct*

This term is used in its everyday sense and refers not only to the drives for food, sex, warmth, etc., but to any action or psychological tendency that is not a function of the conscious will. In this sense one can refer to the mothering or the religious instinct and say that the child "learns by instinct". Moreover, psychological processes that are split off from consciousness can then function as instincts. In other words, the term refers to a *quality* of psychological activity rather than to a "fixed action pattern" (ethology) or a dynamic psychophysiological source upon which psychological functioning is founded (Freud).

The term instinct is partly a leftover from Jung's association with Freud, and as Jung went his own way, the concept came to be used more and more loosely and was superceded in conceptual precision and psychological significance by the term archetype.

2.1.5. *Archetypes*

These are the sources of those typical patterns of behaviour, reaction and experience that characterise the human species, in the same way that nest-building characterises the behaviour of birds. It is important to distinguish between the archetype *as such*, i.e. as a potentiality, and the images, or range of images, that give it expression. The archetype is inherited, the image is not. Thus for any archetype there is a large variety of archetypal images, and this reflects the different cultural
and historical settings in which the archetype is realised.

As potentialities the archetypes are formative of affects as well as images, and the relationship between affects and images is reciprocal. In other words, archetypal images portray the meaning of the affects, and they can also act as a cue for the release of these affects. On the other hand, affects or emotions (Jung uses these terms interchangeably) are the media through which archetypal images are realised. The closer an experience is to an archetypal core the greater its emotional impact and the fascinating power of its image.

Because the archetypes are those typical patterns of adaptation that have been passed on through man's phylogenetic history, they tend to be realised in typical, or archetypal, situations, e.g. initiation, abandonment, marriage, parenting, menstruation, dawn and dusk, seasonal changes, death.

It should be noted that the term archetype, like the collective unconscious, is a hypothetical construct used to account for the similarity in the images that cluster around typically human themes and situations, whether cross-culturally, in the dreams of modern people, in children's drawings, or in the delusions of psychotics. Their existence is inferred on the basis of their effects, and the essential cores of meaning within them remain an unfathomable mystery. Hence anything said about the meaning of an archetypal image, or symbol, is only ever an approximation to this core. Common archetypal motifs are the child, the eternal youth, the mother, the hero, the shadow, death, birth and rebirth, the wise old man or woman, anima and animus and, in clinical
psychology and psychiatry, the wounded healer.

The archetypes of the collective unconscious are not isolated "entities" but tend to be related to each other particularly in polarity, for example, child and mother, mother and wise old woman, mother and death, hero and maiden, victim and victor, or trickster and wise old man. Thus there seems to be an order or pattern within the collective unconscious as a whole, or, more accurately, within the psyche as a whole as this sense of order includes the ego's relations with the unconscious. Moreover, this tendency to create order and harmony within the psyche is often revealed symbolically, particularly in mandala form. This tendency is called the *self*.

2.1.6. The *self*

The self is thus defined paradoxically. It is the totality of one's innate potentialities, given in that unique blend forming the individual; it is the totality of everything one potentially is. On the other hand, the self is often experienced as the *centre* of the total personality, the point at which the opposites and tensions within the psyche are reconciled. The opposites meant here are not only the archetypal dyads mentioned above but also those within existence as a whole and within each archetype itself. In the former case, there are the opposites such as the individual vs the collective, conscious vs unconscious, spirit vs matter; the latter case refers to the bipolarity - positive and negative - within each archetype. Examples of this are the great mother, whose nurturing embrace also suffocates, the wise old man, whose sense of
history inhibits youthful initiative, and the shadow, whose darkness lends depth, perspective and humility to the individual.

Further, the self as centre and totality, and as the psychological form of the most original author of one's life, is indistinguishable from the God-image, or even God insofar as God is experienced at all.

Finally, if psychological development refers to the ever widening and deepening of consciousness so that ultimately the mysterious and divine is realised, then the self can be understood as both the source and goal of human life.

2.2. The dynamics of the psyche

Jung accepts much of what Freud says concerning psychodynamics, especially with regard to the defence mechanisms and the significance of childhood conflict. However, Jung limits the scope and meaning of sexuality to its everyday, common usage. Thus he does not accept the significance that Freud gives to displacement and sublimation. Further still, he does not accept that psychic activity has to rest on instinctual foundations as Freud conceives them. Jung is thus sharply critical of Freud's theoretical reductionism and prejudice. This means

2. Actually, there is a problem in this, for Jung's concept of the ego does not include unconscious processes, but the central significance of Freud's insight into psychodynamics is precisely that the defence mechanisms operate within the ego and unconsciously. One has the impression, however, that this reflects a theoretical lapse on Jung's part rather than a real point of debate. In any case, Samuels (1985b) points out that no post-Jungian would assume that defence mechanisms operate under conscious control (p.68).
that Jung does not look to assumed instinctual activity for the meaning or significance of psychological events, and so to some extent — certainly when compared with psychoanalysts — questions of unconscious, personal psychodynamics are downplayed.

Nevertheless, Jung argued that there were dynamic tendencies within the psyche as a whole.

2.2.1. Relations between the ego and the archetypes

Psychic activity is primarily a function of the archetypes and archetypal images and of the ego's relationship to them. The archetypes as potentialities of the self seek realisation in the incarnated life history of the individual (ego), and how the ego relates to these centres of psychic energy is the key issue. There are several possibilities.

1. The ego may be taken over and engulfed by them. This identity between ego and the archetypes (or an archetype) is called an inflation. A variation of this theme occurs when the ego, too weak to cope with the impact of archetypal material, disintegrates into fragments, which are then at the mercy of the archetypal powers. This characterises psychosis. If the ego does not disintegrate but still lives in fusion state with archetypal reality, there is inadequate differentiation between inner and outer reality. Jung called this participation mystique, following social anthropologist, Levi Brühl.
2. The ego may heroically and defensively fight against the archetypes and the changes they are trying to bring about in the total personality structure. In this case the person is at odds with himself, which amounts to being neurotic.

3. The ego may become detached from them. Then contact with the self is lost and life loses its meaning.

4. The ego may relate to them as an equal partner in an inner dialogue. In this case one discovers both a sense of individuality and uniqueness and a deeper, humble sense of one's participation in the mysterious drama of life, of which one is not the author. This shift in the centre of psychic gravity from ego to self is an act, or at least a sense, of submission to some greater whole, and is a religious sense whether or not any orthodox religious dogma is held. It should be noted that, although the singular term self is used, the ego's submission is to the many archetypes that comprise the self and call that particular individual. Thus the mature and healthy individual (ego) is not a slave to a single univocal master, but rather a host who provides a space in consciousness for the many faces of the self to come into being.

When considering these possible dynamics between the ego and the unconscious it is important to realise that these positions are not at all static and that there is a continual movement between them as well. Ordinarily there is a dialectic between ego inflation, detachment and alienation, and then a synthesis in the form of dialogue. This dialectic can be followed in the conflicts, disappointments and
resolutions of day to day living, but it also serves as a model for normal development throughout life as a whole.

2.2.2. Compensation

Owing to the inherent one-sidedness of consciousness, which is always directed and selective, psychic adaptation is maintained by a process of compensation, in which unconscious but complementary contents are added to consciousness. Generally, the more one-sided consciousness is the more pressing will be those unconscious contents seeking realisation. It is important to note, however, that despite Jung's quasi-energic model, Jung explicitly rejects a mechanistic understanding of compensation. Typically, unconscious contents appear first in the form of projection or in dreams or fantasies but they are not yet integrated. Integration occurs largely as a function of symbolic activity itself, which works independently of the conscious reflections or insight of the ego. However, especially in crises, neurosis, or the purposeful working towards wholeness, then moral integrity, humility, strength of ego and a symbolic attitude are required.

2.2.3. Symbolic activity

Psychological functioning is largely the work of symbolic activity. That is, psychological development, integration, breakdown and transformation, are mediated through symbols and the ego's relationship to these. Symbols are psychic images which link the known (conscious)
to the unknown (unconscious), ego to archetypes. Since the unconscious is the matrix of consciousness, consciousness emerges by means of the realisation and integration of symbols in the life of the individual. The stage of the ego's development is important here. In childhood especially, symbols tend to be related to in projected form and concretely (eg. mother and father, fear of the dark, etc.), but in maturity symbols are perceived more clearly as "inner" images and as symbols. This means that the images are not understood in their empirical or primitive concreteness but are seen to point to a reality beyond the immediacy of the image itself. The image as a symbol is pregnant with layers and shades of meaning, to be responded to and integrated by the individual himself. To a large extent, although not exclusively, this process of symbolic integration means understanding one's life situations, dreams, images, etc. in terms of meanings whose sources lie within the unconscious psyche itself. This process of withdrawing projections serves to differentiate the inner meaning from the empirical content and to appropriate this meaning as an imperative to which one is in one way or another personally indebted, and through which one's life is enriched.

It may be noted that Jungians, through their familiarity with symbols, have tended to treat them as abstractions or signs. The sea, for instance, is then a "symbol" of the unconscious. This approach drains the symbol of its immanence and impact. The sea is no longer its own meaningful image. For this reason many post-Jungians now tend to prefer the term image for its specificity and concreteness (Hillman 1977; Samuels 1985b, pp.118-120). What this should highlight is not primarily a theoretical divergence in post-Jungian thought but criticism of
methodological abuse. It needs to be stressed, therefore, that symbols are images which are pregnant with meaning and transformative power, and their immanence is as central to their definition as symbols as is their transcendence.

2.3. Development of personality

It has already been noted that normal development involves the differentiation of the ego from the unconscious and its subsequent relationship with it, and this process is mediated through symbols as they are realised and integrated in the life of the individual. It is a process of differentiation and reintegration within the total self, as contents from the collective unconscious are integrated within consciousness. Put less theoretically, development is the process of becoming undivided against oneself in a way that is appropriate to one's years. Hence it is known as the individuation process. Paradoxically, one becomes a unique individual as one realises and responds personally to those archetypal, and hence universal, potentials that are one's inheritance. The goal of individuation is thus to be true to one's nature, but in doing so, of course, that nature is transformed by consciousness and life experience, and is realised individually. This paradox is experienced as one discovers a deep sense of his own unique identity and responsibility, but this occurs as one establishes a humble, perhaps reverent, relationship to some greater reality.

Psychological development extends from birth to death unless interrupted or arrested. Most broadly, Jung speaks of only two "stages" of
development: the "morning" of life and the "afternoon". The transition between these, the "noon" of life, is often experienced as the so-called "mid-life crisis". The first half of life has to do with the development of the ego, that is, establishing one's social identity (persona) and place in the world, independent of parents, etc. The second half involves the realisation of the self instead of the ego as the new centre of psychological life. The term "individuation" is often used to refer to the latter half of development only, because there is a sense in which the socially well-adjusted young adult is still functioning with a consciousness immersed in collectivity. Instead of the ego being dormant in the collective unconscious of inner life, it is now lost in the collective consciousness of social conformity. However, the term is used to refer to the whole of psychological development as well, and this can be taken as an acknowledgement that this two-stage schema is over-simplified. It is radically and convincingly challenged by Michael Fordham (1969), who argues that all the essential ingredients of individuation, including the development of the symbolic function, are operative by the third year of life.

There are two other senses in which the term individuation is used, and this ambiguity also reflects an ambiguity in the process itself. On one hand, individuation is a natural process of unfolding, in the same way as an acorn becomes an oak. On the other hand, unlike acorns, human beings can assist this process in a conscious and purposeful way. This latter form of the individuation process is relatively rare, but it is the focus of much of Jung's writing - as it was of his practice (Jacobi 1965). It refers to the spiritual search for meaning and a sense of one's place in the scheme of things mentioned earlier.
The realisation of the self is the goal of individuation. However, since the depths of the collective unconscious are unfathomable, self-realisation is never completed and individuation can never refer to a fixed state that has been attained.

2.3.1. Stages in the individuation process

Jung regarded individuation as the central concept of analytical psychology, and in a sense nearly all his works (at least those after 1916 when the term first appeared) can be understood as amplifications of this central theme. Therefore, a convenient way to approach some of the archetypal themes and issues for which Jung is best known is through a brief description of these as they occur in the individuation process. This will also serve to clarify concepts and issues already addressed. Although individuation concerns two broad stages, as mentioned above, these can be described in more detail as follows.

At birth and in early childhood psychic functions are largely undifferentiated, as are pairs of opposites such as outer and inner, self and other, male and female. Slowly the ego begins to develop out of the collective unconscious, that is, to differentiate itself from the totality of the self. At this point the self is largely experienced in the form of the Great Mother archetype, projected onto the child's actual mother (or mother substitute).

The ego emerges out of the self as fragments which gradually cohere.
This process, mediated by good enough interpersonal experience, amounts to an integration of psychic functions, the personalisation of archetypal images and themes, and the development of a personal identity and boundary.

The archetypal themes of childhood include the eternal youth (*puer aeternus*/*puella aeterna*), who lives in the orbit of the Great Mother, oblivious to Oedipal issues, any real future, or the death which is always near him.

Through childhood, adolescence and young adulthood, the ego develops and strengthens, thus giving the person a sense of identity and autonomy. This development necessitates overcoming the power of the Great Mother, so it is often symbolised by the hero slaying the dragon in some form and embarking on a journey. The father, as the "spiritual principle" which counteracts the regressive longing for instinctuality and unconsciousness, tends to aid this process, for he opens up, for both boy and girl child alike, a world beyond mother.

The development of identity is always to some degree a compromise with society. This compromise formation that, at best, links the identity of the individual with the needs of society is called the *persona* (Latin: a mask). A typical problem of this stage is that the ego identifies too closely with the *persona*. This amounts to submersion in the anonymity of collective life, where "they" become a new kind of Mother, and true individuality and consciousness, which is founded on dialogue with the self, is lost.
Such a situation is inevitable to some extent and is not necessarily pathological, but if it is severe and persistent it is likely to lead to a psychological crisis, often in mid-life. With the ego alienated from the self, there is a loss of meaning, disorientation, and neurosis, often in the form of anxiety or depression. Classical images which symbolise this period are the death of the hero, of one's own death, being lost in the desert or wilderness, and being swallowed by a whale and taken under the sea.

This period is often characterised by misguided attempts to restore the persona, to "get back to one's old self again", and Jung regards these attempts as regressive. For Jung, it is important to face the crisis openly, steadfastly, and patiently to bear witness to what is happening in the psyche.

Typically, archetypal images will emerge out of the unconscious, which will have the effect of transforming the personality and giving new life to the ego. These symbols of transformation may emerge in projected form (eg. seeing one's spouse in a new and deeper way, or in the transference relationship with a psychotherapist), and the individual may not immediately be aware of their transformative significance. Christ may come "like a thief in the night". In any event, as symbols they transform personality by: a) releasing archetypal energy (libido) to be made available to the ego, and b) presenting the ego with an image of the goal towards which the person is growing. This symbolic activity is usually experienced as some sort of rebirth, in which the link between ego and self, or conscious and unconscious is re-established.
The process of self-realisation is different from person to person because the archetypes are realised in individual historical contexts which vary considerably. Nevertheless, there are structural, or thematic, similarities that can be detected cross-culturally, let alone between individuals in one culture. The following archetypal motifs are some of the most common to emerge, but the order in which they are presented may vary and there usually would be overlap and repetition. To use a geometric metaphor, individuation seems to follow a spiral form (i.e. circular through time) rather than a linear one. Moreover, it needs to be borne in mind that each archetype has both positive and negative qualities, and that, although they form the source of our humanity, they are pre-personal and archaic. Therefore, in self-realisation they need to be recognised and integrated into consciousness by the ego, on one hand, but also not identified with, on the other.

The shadow contains those same-sexed qualities that form a "negative" to the persona, those undeveloped and "inferior" parts of oneself often associated with such feelings as anger, envy, guilt and shame. The shadow is archetypal because we have a tendency to form the shadow in fairly typical ways, and also because it tends to be the "dumping ground" of the collective shadow of a culture as well. To this extent it is non-personal. However, because it takes its particular form according to personal experience in one's upbringing, it is usually an ego that too closely identifies with the narrow confines of the persona that regards the shadow as all negative. The shadow tends often to reflect the face that sees it, so it usually conceals positive qualities too, and is capable to an extent of transformation. For example, the integration of shadow anger may yield greater autonomy, self-confidence and capacity for
love. Thus shadow integration has relevance for *anima/animus* differentiation as well.

The *anima* and *animus* are the archetypes of our contrasexual qualities and capacities for heterosexual relationships. The *anima* refers to the latent femininity in man; the *animus* to the latent masculinity in woman. It is important to try to distinguish these images from the influence of one's personal parents. In essence, *anima* qualities have to do with connectedness and depth(soul); *animus* qualities with differentiation and height (spirit).

The *mana* personality characterises an inflated ego, which often occurs after valuable insights have been gained. With the ego swallowed up in this archetype, almost-won individuality is lost.

The *trickster* can help keep a sense of distance from what is happening within one by being the capacity for humour, but it can also spoil good psychological work. It is sometimes an immature form or prefiguration of the hero or the wise old man.

The *wise old man* is that capacity for reflection, insight and wisdom. On the negative side it can be over-conservative in upholding tradition.

The *great mother* is the capacity for nurturance and a kind of "natural wisdom" (in contrast to the cultural, historical and "spiritual" tendencies of the old man). Her embrace offers depth, security and an ecological sense, but it also smothers individuality and independence, and especially for the young heroic ego, represents the abysmal darkness
of unconsciousness itself.

The child is the capacity for play and spontaneity. As something that is just born it is dependent and "needy", yet this dependency points towards future development. A multivalent symbol, it often links, for example, instinctuality and spirituality, regression and progression, innocence and wisdom.

If the self is considered as the totality of the psyche then all archetypal images can be understood as images of the self. But Jung usually speaks of symbols of the self with reference to the self as psychic centre and to its ordering capacity. In this regard, the stone, the diamond, and the mandala (typically a circle with four axes) are common symbols of the self. They suggest permanence and the resolution of psychic conflict. Because these are symbols of the goal of individuation - wholeness and centeredness - they often appear as symbols of transformation when the ego is "lost" and disorientated. Thus the appearance of such symbols does not necessarily mean that the person is nearing wholeness; clinical experience recognises them most often as compensatory responses to egoic disintegration.

Finally, because the above archetypal themes have been described in isolation, it should be repeated that they tend to occur in dyads or as part of a network that makes sense of the person's life situation.
2.4. Questions and a point of departure

The brevity of the above overview has the obvious disadvantage of losing the subtlety of Jung's thought and of forfeiting the use of evidence and argument. Hopefully the following chapters will recover some of that. On the other hand, that very subtlety can be quite bewildering if one approaches his thought without some simple questions as a guide, and an overview such as the one above has the advantage of making such questions fairly accessible. A hermeneutic reading of Jung's work will reveal answers that depend upon the right questions being asked, for questions and answers are reciprocally determined (this circularity being the so-called "hermeneutic circle"). Hence the following questions, which evolve out of this chapter, form a point of departure for the detailed analyses that follow.

1. What is the nature of the psyche? More specifically, what is its range, or where is it? If the answer to this question can be more precisely defined then questions about the psyche's "contents" can be sharpened accordingly.

2. What is the relation between psyche and soma? Actually it can be asked whether it is accurate to speak of a "relationship" at all, for this tends to imply two distinct entities that precede their "interaction", and it is important not to beg the issue here. Thus this crucial question needs to be asked differently. It is related to question 1 above and is part of the more general question of Jung's view of man and of man's relationship with the world.
3. What are Jung's view of man, of the world, and of the relationship between them, that is, of the human world in which man dwells? Providing answers here forms the necessary ontological pivot for the hermeneutic as a whole, for unless this is made explicit the dialogue will lack foundation and could easily become an exercise in miscommunication.

4. What is Jung's method of psychological analysis and what are the methodological assumptions that underlie it? The answers here will make it easier to know the paradigm within which he is thinking. This needs to be asked because there often seems to be a tension between his methodology, which, as will be seen, is essentially phenomenological, and the language of some of his findings. For example, Jung speaks of the archetypes as gods, as nuclei of meaning, and as potential patterns of behaviour. There seems to be an ambiguity here between the natural scientific and poetic perspectives mentioned in chapter one, but an enquiry into his methodology should help resolve this.

If an explicit ontology and methodology can be worked out, even if some of Jung's language is transformed in the process to make it compatible with his vision, then the investigation into his psychology as such (as opposed to his ontology, epistemology, and methodology) can begin anew. The following questions come to mind.

5. What is the self? More particularly, how can the self be founded ontologically and existentially, so that some of its ambiguities and
paradoxes can be integrated conceptually? A related question is whether the self can be more sharply defined, but in a way that does not betray its essential mystery.

6. How can individuation be understood in terms of a phenomenological reading of self?

7. How can conscious and unconscious be conceived so that their place in the psyche (interpreted in terms of being-in-the-world) is more clearly and explicitly understood? This question is particularly important with regard to the unconscious. Jung's model, as it developed from Freud's, tended to situate the unconscious "behind" or "beneath" consciousness, without direct access to the world. But a closer look reveals the terms conscious and unconscious to be thoroughly ambiguous. Thus what does Jung mean when he says that everyday, "collective consciousness" is a form of unconsciousness? And how is it that the complexes and archetypes, which are supposedly "in the unconscious", can structure experience directly and organise the world in which one lives? Following this the "place" of the collective unconscious and of the images which it constellates need to be more closely examined.

8. What is the ontological "place" of the archetypes and of the archetypal images, and how is it that they are co-constituted even as the images themselves are not genetically inherited? The connection would seem to be more intimate than "mere" structuring on the part of the archetypes as such for clearly some images are more appropriate than others as symbols of archetypal meaning. Further,
what is the relationship between archetypal images and affects? Differently put, is their connection perhaps ontological and not merely empirical? Finally, how are these related to archetypal situations?

9. Given this model of a structured psyche within which dynamics operate and individuation unfolds, the place and function of psychotherapy - or any other interpersonal relationships for that matter - would seem to be rather uncertain. Jung is very critical of any psychological development that amounts to a schizoid retreat from the world, yet it can be asked how that criticism is founded given this model which tends to close man in upon himself and his "inner world".

At this point, however, these questions return to the beginning, for the suggestion that Jung encapsulates man within a psyche separate from the world begs the questions about the nature of the psyche and its relation to the world. As mentioned before, it is this ontological question which will provide the pivot for the investigation as a whole, and it is that to which we must now turn.

Before doing so, it might be noted that the above questions are, in turn, the questions which will focus the issues in the rest of the present work.
CHAPTER THREE

JUNG'S METHOD IN THE LIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Lauri Rauhala has written:

"Even a superficial knowledge of Jung's thought gives grounds for supposing that a phenomenological-existential analysis would apply even more fruitfully to his views than to Freudian psychoanalysis, bound as it is in a sense to the natural scientific tradition of research (1984, pp. 229-230).

Concurring with this view, it is somewhat surprising to find that phenomenologists have largely bypassed Jung's work. Spiegelberg's (1972) wide-ranging and detailed study of phenomenology in psychology devotes only one-and-a-half pages (pp. 130-1) to Jung, in which he says that Jung's claim to being a phenomenologist owed to the movement's popularity rather than to his actual approach. As has been pointed out by Carafides (1974), such a cursory dismissal does not do justice to Jung's position at all. Yet Boss, too, tends to put Jung on the same Cartesian-cum-positivist shelf as Freud, after which almost anything that Jung (or Freud) says is read only in those most ungenerous of terms. It is not that to identify Jung's Cartesianism or positivism is wrong; it is simply extremely limiting.

For one thing, it is noticeable that all the major criticisms of Freudian
psychoanalysis made by the existential phenomenologists were anticipated by Jung: Freud's exclusive focus on bodily reality, his failure to understand bodily reality (e.g. sexuality) in terms of the total human being, his determinism and search for historical causes to the neglect of present contexts and the human being's futurity, his reified, quasi-physiological metapsychology, his uncritical acceptance of the assumptions of nineteenth century natural science, his endorsement of reason to the neglect of feeling and imagination as giving access to the "real world", his tacit and naive acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth and the rejection of the possibility of his own cultural and historical perspectivity, and his resistance to recognising the extent to which the analyst's personality co-constitutes the therapeutic space. (These criticisms of Freud's psychoanalysis can be deduced from the tenor of Jung's work as a whole, but are to be found particularly in volumes 4 and 15 of the Collected Works: cf. Jung 1913/55, 1914c, 1916a, 1929c, 1932b, 1939c, 1961 ch. 5.)

The aim of the present chapter is to discuss Jung's approach and method in the light of existential phenomenology. The focus is not on what Jung sees or on his attempts to formulate what he sees, but rather on his manner of seeing, that is, his approach and method. The term approach is taken from Giorgi (1970), who writes:

"By approach is meant the fundamental viewpoint toward man and the world that the scientist brings, or adopts, with respect to his work as a scientist, whether this viewpoint is made explicit or remains implicit" (p. 126).

As Giorgi proceeds to illustrate, there is a continual dialectic between the approach, the method, and the object of study. Approach and method mutually imply each other. The approach structures the method, the method
brings the approach into being. When it comes to considering Jung, it seems at first glance that he makes use of several approaches in a kind of muddled eclecticism. As has been discussed this gives rise to several different and incompatible languages within analytical psychology. On the other hand, he is clearly not content with the languages of natural science and psychiatry, and he sees through these in mythic or what has been called poetic terms. There is, therefore, considerable consistency in his method of understanding psychological experience, and that consistency is given through the more fundamental continuity Giorgi calls approach.

This continuity has been noted by Robert Steele (1982), who identifies Jung's work with the hermeneutic tradition. Steele does not argue that Jung's thought needs to be reinterpreted, like Freud's, in the light of hermeneutic principles. Rather, he seeks to identify Jung as a fairly consistent hermeneut, whose disagreements with Freud were largely founded upon that hermeneutic stance. It is a stance that is situated within the dialogue between subjects, where one of the subjects might be another person but could also be a text, a work of art, a dream image, etc. (ibid., p. 344-5). Subjects are identified as carriers of meaning, which can therefore answer questions (ibid.). As soon as the other is perceived as an object, a determined product of physical contingencies, ontologically different from the perceiver-subject, then the other can no longer "speak for himself". Meaning is then "spoken" only in terms predetermined by the perceiver-subject. Historically fixed and denotatively circumscribed, meaning is not really meaning at all; dialogue and the hermeneutic circle of question and answer break down.
Steele's argument need not be repeated here. For one thing, the link between Jung and hermeneutics should be clear enough. As James Hillman (1974b) noted:

"Understanding is perhaps the most operational of all Jung's concepts, implied throughout all others, and places Jung's approach within the tradition of psychologies of understanding (Dilthey, Nietzsche, Jaspers), rather than psychologies that are explanatory, descriptive, or medical in the narrow sense" (p. 171).

To reflect on this, one can recall Jung's criticisms of Freud, already mentioned, his concern with meaning and purpose rather than the measurement of so-called "objective" processes, and his sensitivity to the historically contingent nature of truth, for each historical era transforms images and meanings anew. Indeed, Jung clearly identified his work in terms of this historical recovery and transformation. Psychology, he says,

"translates the archaic speech of myth into a modern mythologem - not yet, of course, recognised as such - which consists of one element of the myth "science"" (1940, p. 179).

Thus analytical psychology is in an essential sense not "modern" at all but is historically grounded and amplified (Jung 1931b, pp. 344-5).

Secondly, much of the argument for situating Jung's approach in the hermeneutic tradition will be presented below but with a more focussed aim. The focus here is that particular form of hermeneutics called existential phenomenology.

The relationship between hermeneutics and phenomenology has always been a tricky issue. The present thesis, as an interpretation of Jung's texts, is hermeneutic, yet such an interpretation is not possible unless one is
also present to those phenomena about which Jung wrote. On the other hand, since phenomenology is the "linguaging" (logos) of phenomena, since language is historical and limited, and since phenomena are usually revealed partly as dissemblance, existential phenomenology is an interpretative, i.e. hermeneutic, exercise (Heidegger 1927, pp. 53-54, 71-62). Given this intimate connection, it is not surprising that, when systematically formulated methodologically, hermeneutics and existential phenomenology should overlap considerably. Both are embedded within language; both are an attempt to conduct a receptive dialogue with the other (phenomenon, text, etc.); both recognise the impossibility of asking presuppositionless questions and therefore acknowledge that in principle the dialogue never ceases, or can be taken up again and again. The essential difference seems to be that, 1) while existential phenomenology is hermeneutic, its focus is limited to phenomena as they are lived existentially; and 2) it is founded within as explicit anthropology.

It is not to be argued here that Jung's approach and method can be limited to phenomenology. Apart from such an assertion being false, much of Jung's value lies in his re-reading of classical texts, his religious thought, and arguably his early experimental researches. The aim here is simply to show the extent to which Jung worked as a phenomenologist. To that extent, the phenomena he revealed have already achieved

1. Giorgi (personal communication, 1987) thinks that the existential-hermeneutic thrust of phenomenology has overstated this case. He points out that Husserl was well aware of this character of a phenomenology of the life-world, but he did not want to restrict phenomenology to it. He insists that one can take an attitude (called "transcendental") that is not bound by existential immediacies; further, not all phenomena - eg. mathematical and geometric forms - are historically mutable. And such an attitude must have been achieved by Heidegger, for his existentialia are trans-temporal structures even as they are realised temporally.
phenomenological clarity, and a genuine existential phenomenological articulation becomes that much easier.

In fact, that extent was significant, although analytical psychologists have been as slow to recognise this as have phenomenologists. Apart from a few pertinent remarks by Hobson, the authors of volume 1 of The Library of Analytical Psychology, *Analytical Psychology: A Modern Science* (Fordham *et al.*, 1973), have not made use of these connections. Following Jung's lead, analytical psychologists may admit of a methodological link with phenomenology or hermeneutics, and there seems to have been a general shift in post-Jungian analytical psychology to a less reified, "quasi-phenomenological" orientation (Samuels 1985b, p. 266). But the search for a scientific ground in physics and biology, however "modern", tends to remain, as does the realist perspective which reifies the other. The hermeneutic circle is then broken, and whatever is said theoretically or conceptually after that contradicts the analytical psychologist's hermeneutic methodological assumptions. Thus part of the purpose of the present chapter is to clarify Jung's methodological home-ground, and to justify his phenomenology as more than simply propaedeutic to the search for an explanatory theory or model. More limited in scope than Steele's (1982), this chapter can be taken as complementary to it.

3.1. The definition of phenomenology as a method

Almost half a century after Husserl's first works appeared Merleau-Ponty (1945) asked the question again: what is phenomenology? His answer, which forms the Preface to his book, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, is
probably as well-known as the book itself. It has for many people become the definitive statement of phenomenology, and it will provide the framework here for discussing Jung's methodology.

According to Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is essentially a method for studying the essences of phenomena, and the method has four overlapping characteristics: description, phenomenological reduction, the search for essences (eidetic reduction), and intentionality. Each of these characteristics will be briefly described and the extent and style of Jung's use of these characteristics in his own approach will be critically discussed.

3.2. Description

Phenomenology is primarily and thoroughly descriptive. The phenomenologist is "obsessed by the concrete", says J H Van den Berg (1972, p.76). Theoretical and scientific hypotheses and accounts are distrusted, even if - or especially if - they have come to be generally accepted as the unquestioned prejudices of the community at large. Reality as it is present within lived experience is the mistress to whom the phenomenologist promises to remain faithful at all times.

The assertion that phenomenology is merely the description of reality (eg. ibid., p.124). and that it avoids theorising and the search for explanations, can be deceptive. Description, for the phenomenologist, is not at all the bland positivist categorisation of observables. To describe is to return repeatedly to the phenomenon itself so that it may
show itself in ever deeper, richer, and more subtle ways. This repetitive return is the disciplined and self-critical hermeneutic circle. Description is not opposed to interpretation, therefore, but interpretation is required to remain intrinsically descriptive.

When Jung identifies his method with phenomenology, as he does frequently, he is arguing the case for an essentially descriptive approach that avoids nineteenth century philosophical assumptions and psychoanalytic reductionism. In the well-known beginning of *Psychology and Religion*, Jung (1938/40) identifies phenomenology in terms of the "mere classification and accumulation of experience" (p.5). But this lowly beginning is particularly significant for Jung, for in avoiding "metaphysical considerations" Jung is opening an area of investigation and discourse that is indigenous to psychological experience. Thus the virgin birth, for example, is a "fact" (p.6), that is, an image or belief to be taken on its own psychological terms. In other words, it is Jung's determination to describe psychological experience on its own terms that gives access to investigating religious experience in a non-reductionistic way. Jung (1941) explicitly warns against looking too soon for "explanations", and says

"In view of the enormous complexity of psychic phenomena, a purely phenomenological view is, and will be for a long time, the only one with any prospect of success" (p.182).

As well as pointing to the "complexity" of the field, Jung (1928/31a) makes the more important point that the search for explanations, whether of life histories, dream images, or works of art, leads away from the meaning that is immanent.

"When we trace a poem of Goethe's to his mother-complex, when we seek to explain Napoleon as a case of masculine-
protest, or St Francis as a case of sexual repression, a sense of profound dissatisfaction comes over us. The explanation is insufficient and does not do justice to the reality and meaning of things. What becomes of beauty, greatness, and holiness? These are vital realities without which human existence would be superlatively stupid. What is the right answer to the problem of terrible sufferings and conflicts? The answer should strike a chord that at least reminds us of the magnitude of the suffering" (p.367).

Jung's concern with manifest meaning, and his endeavour to amplify it rather than to dissolve it into reductive explanations, is what separates him methodologically from Freud. It is, in fact, in the name of phenomenology that Jung criticises Freud's materialist assumptions, and insists that theory should emerge secondarily to and derived from phenomenological description (Jung 1936/54, pp.54-55). To the extent that Jung used terms such as collective unconscious and archetypes as explanatory concepts, he stopped being a descriptive and phenomenological psychologist. But it is interesting that Freud (1914, pp.58-66) regarded Jung's divergence in terms that complement Jung's critique. Freud criticises, inter alia, Jung's rejection of the libido theory, his rejection of the notion of the dream-work and latent meaning. In effect, for the psychoanalyst, Jung's process of amplification, interesting enough in itself, constitutes a return to a pre-analytic psychology of consciousness, for the amplifications would themselves be in need of interpretation (cf. Dry 1961, pp.114 ff and passim; Glover 1950). For example, Jung might say that a patient's drawing of a quadrated circle "symbolises" wholeness, in the same way as mandalas do in India (and elsewhere). For the psychoanalyst, this amplification describes the outcome of elaborations that are largely conscious, and it fails to ask the question: what are the specific ontogenetic conditions, now unconscious, that produce quadrated circles as images of wholeness? Of
course, like the phenomenologist, the Jungian is logically correct to reverse the question and ask: what is it about certain ontogenetic conditions that they are so meaningful? The answer, then, is that these are occasions for the experience of wholeness, such as is "symbolised" in images of quadrated circles. This is not the place to try to resolve this tension. The point being made here is that the argument for Jung being primarily a descriptive psychologist receives support from psychoanalysis, which criticises Jung precisely on those grounds.

Examples of Jung's descriptions are to be found scattered through the *Collected Works* and in his autobiography, etc. By and large they are not as sustained or as disciplined as phenomenologists would like. Further, sometimes he seems more concerned with classifying structures or categories of experience than with explicating their experiential physiognomy. But examples of Jung's descriptions that we shall consider presently are of introversion and of his experience in Africa, which is actually a description of the goal of individuation.

Finally, before leaving this section, mention should be made of the scholarly study by Avis Dry (1961). She finds that Jung's theoretical concepts, such as collective unconscious, archetype, and complex, lack the precision and consistent definition necessary if they are to have any explanatory value or to guide hypothesis-testing research - even if very loosely defined, as in psychoanalysis. Jung's value, she argues, lies

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2. As a hermeneutic tension it is found within analytical psychology itself, between the Classical and Development groups. The issue is not clear-cut, however. Even Jung says that an archetypal image has to be interpreted in terms of the actual situation in which it was constituted (e.g. Jung 1954, p.344). Regarding the interpretation of mandalas that illustrates hermeneutic complexity, see Redfearn (1985, ch.9) and Scott (1949).
largely in his concrete description of immediate experience and in his therapeutic practice. Scientifically, he should be regarded as essentially a pre-scientific descriptive psychologist (p.138 and passim). As far as it goes, the phenomenologist would have no objection to Dry's thesis. However, it is unfortunate that her "uncommitted" standpoint tends to be traditional in scientific terms, and she does not explore the hermeneutic value of Jung's method or descriptions.

3.3. The phenomenological reduction

In order to be properly descriptive the phenomenologist has to give up his theoretical and philosophical prejudices. This involves a kind of "mental leap" known as the phenomenological reduction (or simply, sometimes, reduction). In fact the reduction has several different, but overlapping aspects, and Husserl makes a number of subtle distinctions which are not necessary in the present context (cf. Husserl 1913; Kockelmans 1967b; Schmitt 1959-60). But in the phenomenological reduction two aspects are immediately relevant. The first involves the "bracketing of being", or the epeche, that is, the disconnection from the "natural attitude" in which unacknowledged ontological prejudices hinder access to an understanding of the phenomena as they would present themselves to a naive consciousness (Husserl 1913, pp.107-111). These prejudices are often concealed within the attitudinal stance of natural science. Second is, as Luijpen puts it, "the return to our most original experience of our most original world" (1969, p.115). This return is sometimes called the reduction in the stricter, more limited sense. But these two aspects mutually implicate each other, and comprise the more general meaning of
the term reduction.

It is, in other words, the reduction that ensures, at least in principle, that phenomenology is essentially descriptive. As Giorgi explains

"(W)hatever presents itself to consciousness should be taken precisely with the meaning with which it presents itself and one should refrain from affirming that it is what it presents itself to be" (1982, p. 35).

This is not to make a Kantian distinction between the *phenomenon* (the appearance) and the *noumenon* (the thing-in-itself). Such a distinction perpetuates the sort of categories that the reduction is intended to overcome. The reduction does not separate the phenomenon from reality as it is primordially given in experience, as casual interpreters of phenomenological psychology tend to assume. Rather, what is bracketed are the ontological and scientific assumptions which prejudicially affirm, doubt, or otherwise categorise, the phenomena as they primordially appear.

In *existential* phenomenology, which does not concern itself with the pure forms of mathematics, geometry, etc., the reduction constitutes a return to the "life-world" (*lebenswelt*; also translated as "lived world"; both "life-world" and "lived world" will be used here). Zaner (1975) makes the important point that to turn away from the natural attitude is extremely difficult, for such a turning involves an abstention that is not given within factual existence. Thus there is no appeal to experience in arguing for the value of the reduction, which, in the end, can only be grasped in doing and having done it. It is not surprising, therefore, that the phenomenologists' (and Jung's) appeal to scientific colleagues to return to the wonderful meaningfulness of phenomena is largely
unheard. Nor is it surprising that, to quote Merleau-Ponty's famous statement: "The important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (1945, p.xiv).

The themes of the phenomenological reduction, bracketing and the return to immediately meaningful experience, are as central to Jung's endeavours as they are to the phenomenologist's. For Jung, this guiding sensibility was passionate. "The experimental psychology of today," he wrote in 1912(a),

does not even begin to give (him) any coherent insight into what are, practically, the most important psychic processes. That is not its aim .... Therefore anyone who wants to know the human psyche ... would be better advised to abandon exact science, put away his scholar's gown, bid farewell to his study, and wander with human heart through the world. There, in the horrors of prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals, in drab suburban pubs, in brothels and gambling-hells, in the salons of the elegant, the Stock Exchanges, Socialist meetings, churches, revivalist gatherings and ecstatic sects, through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than textbooks a foot thick would give him, and he would know how to doctor the sick with real knowledge of the human soul" (pp.246-247).

That Jung had a limited understanding of phenomenology is obvious, yet he did understand the centrality and importance of the reduction's themes. For example, he writes:

"A psychology that is to be scientific can no longer afford to base itself on philosophical premises such as materialism or rationalism. If it is not to overstep its competence irresponsibly, it can only proceed phenomenologically and must abandon preconceived opinions" (1949a, p.3).

This standpoint of Jung's, his own form of the phenomenologist's *epoche*, is achieved by seeing through the historically contingent ontological premises of materialism and rationalism. But Jung's historical sense does
more than undo the grip of the contemporary metaphysics on his perception and thought; it deepens our understanding of this metaphysics by situating it within the historical movements of psychological life. In other words, Jung's critical attitude towards his cultural assumptions limits the effect of those assumptions and also opens up a world in which the meanings of our psychological life emerge as thoroughly historical. Of course, as twins in a dialectic, épocche and reduction are reciprocally related. That is, in wanting to bypass the prejudicial assumptions of psychophysiology and psychoanalysis, thereby to found an indigenous and historically sophisticated "psychology with a psyche", Jung (1931b) turns to pre-Enlightenment sources (pp.344-5). But when Jung admits that "[it] will certainly not be a modern psychology" (ibid., p.344), he is not advocating a regression to pre-psychological thought. As Casey (1987) notes, Jung's rejection of metaphysics and his contemplative focus on the immediacy of image places him in the "post-modern" current of phenomenological thought.

The phenomenological reduction, as performed by Jung, gave access to some of the structures of psychological life in general, but it also was a hallmark of his approach to psychotherapy. Thus he writes:

"If I want to understand an individual human being, I must lay aside all scientific knowledge of the average man and discard all theories in order to adopt a completely new and unprejudiced attitude. I can only approach the task of understanding with a free and open mind" (Jung 1957, p.250).

More specifically, Jung (1913/55, p.166-168) is critical of psychoanalytic determinism as an unquestioned assumption that necessitates the reductive search for historically positive causes, and he focusses instead on the present situation and future goals. Secondly,
in working with dreams and fantasies, Jung (cf. 1934b, p.149) focusses on the images as they appear, and he rejects the psychoanalytic rationalist assumption that their obscurity is a function of deception. In fact, Jung was so vigorous in his defence of the meaningful integrity of the manifest "thing itself" that he seemed to lose sight of the possibility of phenomenal dissemblance, and those contemporary analytical psychologists influenced by object-relations theory have criticised him for being psychologically somewhat naive (in the negative sense) (Lambert 1981a, p.176). But, in principle at least, concern with the manifest should not be understood to imply hermeneutic "shallowness". Jung's concern here is quite subtle. Jung does not deny that a patient might dream of the analyst as a hair-dresser, for example. However, he insists that this is not a "displacement" but an image, direct and clear, of devaluation of the analyst (Jung 1954, p.347). Thirdly, Jung adopts a dialectical approach in psychotherapy. This approach, central to hermeneutic self-discipline, is, for Jung (1935a, p.7-8; 1951c, p.116) an explicit attempt to overcome his theoretical and conceptual prejudices.

Like the existential phenomenologist, Jung recognises that the historical situatedness of man limits the extent of the phenomenological reduction.

"The ideal would naturally be to have no assumptions at all. But this is impossible even if one exercises the most rigorous self-criticism, for one is oneself the biggest of all one's assumptions, and the one with the gravest consequences. Try as we may to have no assumptions ... the assumption that I myself am will determine my method: as I am, so will I proceed" (Jung 1937, p.329).

This bold statement can be sharpened, and Jung brings to bear his analytical skills to do so. "The assumption that I am" involves man's guiding philosophy of life (Jung 1943, p.79), which in turn involves his
psychological type, his cultural situation and finally his complexes, 'the most absolutely prejudiced thing in every individual' (Jung 1934c, p.103).

This does raise the question of what Jung's complexes were, and how these have limited understanding of the phenomena within analytical psychology's world. It seems that he tried to overcome his bias through the guiding image of wholeness, which transcends opposing viewpoints (cf. Jung 1917/43), but this attempt has not been unequivocally successful. Personally overdetermined, there emerged a limiting tendency towards unity and stability to the neglect of multiplicity. Thus Hillman (especially 1979) uses Jung's hermeneutics to identify a defensively heroic stance in some of Jung's writings, particularly when he emphasises ego strength, individuation as a movement in the direction of indivisibility and unity, and the self as a singular authority.

Although he seems to have overstated his case (Shelburne 1984; Wharton 1985), Hillman's critique is well taken. Through it, he has developed the 'post-Jungian', or 'neo-Jungian' movement known as 'Archetypal psychology'. However, it may be that a greater value of Hillman's analysis lies in the shift that occurs in one's understanding when re-reading Jung. In this view, Hillman is less an originator of a new movement than a healer of, and within, analytical psychology itself. Reading Jung after having read Hillman, the latter seems no longer so original, and therein, partly, lies his brilliance. Jung's heroic tendencies are simply bypassed as personal quirks, and the radically non-egocentric world into which Jung invites and delivers us is more clearly revealed. Thus Hillman's critique assists our own phenomenological
interpretation, for it moves in the direction of opening up what Jung saw prior to his egoic anxieties (hero complex) and, as will be shown in the next chapters, his Western Cartesian metaphysics.

Jung's success with the phenomenological reduction is clearly mixed. It will be evaluated briefly at the end of the chapter.

3.4. The search for essences

If the phenomenological reduction situates the phenomenologist in the life-world, the search for essences differentiates in a systematic and articulate way those essential structures under investigation. For Husserl the essence of a thing is not to be confused with its factically given properties (weight, extension, etc). Rather, the essence of a thing is given within the imaginative intuition of the consciousness which discriminates that essence from its empirical contingencies (Husserl 1913, pp.54-56; Kockelmans 1967a, pp.80-82; Levinas 1963). This process of discrimination and articulation Husserl called the eidetic reduction, and it is achieved through using free imaginative variation. Kockelmans (1967b) summarises it as follows:

"(A)s a rule, we start with an arbitrarily perceived or fancied sample of this or that kind of thing. With the aid of memory, modifications in perception, and especially acts of phantasy, we carefully investigate what changes can be made in the sample without making it cease to be the thing it is. Through the most arbitrary changes, which wholly disregard reality as it is and which therefore are best made in our phantasy, the immutable and necessary complex of characteristics without which the thing cannot be conceived manifest themselves .... Through this grasp, the absolutely immutable and unique *eidos* which governs all individuals of this species stands before our minds" (p.31).
This endeavour for a "pure", or "transcendental", phenomenology has been the subject of much criticism, but this criticism has not been conclusive. It even seems that recent compilations and translations of Husserl's unpublished writings show that he has been misunderstood and misrepresented in the "general wisdom" of existential phenomenology (Giorgi 1987, personal communication). Therefore, the question of the extent to which the method of existential phenomenology is the same as, or different from, Husserl's is still an inconclusive philosophical issue. However, this need not concern us. Wherever the authorship for existential phenomenology's methodological tenets will be found to lie, the following points concerning the eidetic reduction can be noted:

- the essences of phenomena are given within the things themselves, yet are not to be confused with empirical contingencies;
- these essences can be intuited by a naive consciousness, i.e. one that has broken the chains of the natural attitude;
- these essences are revealed in the mode of imagination, i.e. the positivist fantasy of an empty consciousness passively receiving empirical data and somehow revealing the essence of a thing, is abandoned;
- in the life-world these essences are meaningful relations.

With the reservation that Husserl may have been misunderstood, it seems that existential phenomenology has made four interlinked departures from "pure", or "eidetic", phenomenology.
First, there are no immutable essences. In psychology, the search is specifically for essences that are generally valid and not ontologically immutable (Giorgi 1982, p.38).

Second, essences are seen less as "pure", or "eidetic", that is, given in the perceiving consciousness, and are situated epistemologically more clearly within the given density of the things themselves. In this way the ghost of Descartes that is said to linger in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is more surely laid to rest.

Third, since phenomenology is always an act of revealing within the temporal horizons of Dasein, every act of understanding is an interpretation (Heidegger 1927, p.62). There can be thus no "pure" intuition of lived structures; the phenomenological reduction is forever incomplete.

Fourthly, the significance of language in the moment of interpretative understanding has achieved increasing clarity. Phenomenology becomes hermeneutic phenomenology as language is seen less as a means for "describing" the phenomenon, as though it is somehow "there", self-contained, prior to any articulation. Rather, language is understood more clearly to have constitutive power. The existential phenomenologist would not want to go so far as to dissolve the givenness and density of the phenomenon into language, to study the "language" world instead of an "object" world (Ihde 1971, p.98). But to recognise the constitutive power of language is to recognise phenomenological understanding as an interpretative moment that, in the very act of bringing the phenomenon into being, is transformative of both the thing itself and the perceiving
consciousness. It makes a difference to the thing itself and to human existence whether that thing in the stormy late afternoon is called a rainbow or a spectrum, or that place at the centre of our bodily life is called a heart or a pump (Romanyszyn 1982, pp. 45-46, 102-134). Phenomenologists have become finely tuned to the metaphorical character of psychological life, often concealed behind those dead metaphors of the everyday world called literal or scientific "truths". However, metaphors are not regarded in terms of their linguistic or cognitive significance but as the primordial means whereby the very Being of beings is made manifest. But the power of metaphor to reveal is curiously ambiguous. "Tom is a wolf" reveals the essence of Tom even as we understand that Tom is not a hairy Canadian canine.

"Thus the metaphor can itself be described metaphorically as a lie that tells the truth, a confusion that clarifies, a detour that puts one more directly on the road, a blindness that enables one to see" (Murray 1975, p.287).

Jung's method has much in common with the phenomenological search for essences. If Jung aligns himself with phenomenology in its attempt to bracket the natural attitude and return to the life-world, he also aligns himself with hermeneutics. He does so in a way that was ahead of his time: dreams, symptoms, paintings, and behaviour are treated equally as texts, to which the hermeneutic method of philology is applied.

In 1914, just after his break with Freud, Jung had already offered a tentative formulation of his method, which he then described as "constructive". He referred to "paralleling with other typical formations" (1914a, p. 187), and insisted that he was concerned with analysing phenomena without reducing them to an extraneous material base as Freud did. Thus:
"From the comparative analysis of many systems the typical formations can be discovered. If one can speak of reduction at all, it is simply a reduction to general types" (ibid.).

By 1916, Jung's "constructive" method had found a methodological home in hermeneutics. It defined the broad parameters of his approach as it differed from Freud's and Jung stayed fairly consistently within these parameters for the rest of his working life. In the passage below, Jung is speaking of symbols; hermeneutics, he says is the proper method for elucidating their emergent meaning:

"The essence of hermeneutics ... consists in adding further analogies to the one already supplied by the symbol: in the first place subjective analogies produced at random by the patient, then objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. This procedure widens and enriches the initial symbol, and the final outcome is an infinitely complex and variegated picture the elements of which can be reduced to their respective tertia comparationis" (Jung 1916b, p.291).

Jung goes on to say that this links an individual's psychological life to cultural ("collective") meanings (p.293). While Jung's therapeutic intent is clear from the beginning, its full significance emerges only later, when Jung uses hermeneutics to recover the pre-Enlightenment, mythic foundations of psychological life. Hermeneutics helps modern man recover his soul.3

3. Jung's hermeneutic approach has been recognised most generally in relation to Jung's work on Christianity. Murray Stein (1985, pp.10-12) surveys some of these discussions and argues that the thesis that Jung was a hermeneut is limited at the point at which Jung attempted the therapeutic task of critiquing and transforming Christian thought. While we can agree with Stein that Jung's hermeneutic had therapeutic intent from the beginning - and not only with regard to Christianity - we do not think this disclaims Jung as a hermeneut. For Van den Berg and Romanyshyn, phenomenology is a hermeneutic phenomenology that is a psychotherapy (Van den Berg 1980), of culture and individuals, and this not only in intent but logically as well. Hermeneutics always moves in some sense from the manifest to what is latent.
Jung's hermeneutic approach to phenomena such as the child (1940), the spirit (1943/48; 1945/48a), transference (1946), the Trinity (1942/48) and the Mass (1940/54) are well known. The particular psychological significance of this approach, however, is that it is not restricted to the reading of texts but is expanded to describe an approach to the structures of psychological life. With this new focus, hermeneutics is integrated with phenomenology. Pathological behaviour, bodily symptoms, love affairs, the therapeutic relationship, and dreams can all be read as texts. They express meaning. In The Tavistock Lectures of 1935 Jung gave an extensive description of this method, which by this time he called amplification. Contrasting it with free association, which leads away from the phenomenon in question to the person's complexes, Jung says his concern is with the specific meaning of the dream itself:

"Therefore I handle the dream as if it were a text which I do not understand properly, say a Latin, or a Greek, or a Sanskrit text, where certain words are unknown to me or the text is fragmentary, and I merely supply the ordinary method any philologist would apply in reading such a text. My idea is that the dream does not conceal; we simply do not understand its language. The assumption that the dream wants to conceal is a mere anthropomorphical idea. No philologist would ever think that a difficult Sanskrit or cuneiform inscription conceals ....

"[Therefore] I adopt the method of the philologist, which ... is simply that of seeking parallels" (1935b, pp.82-83).

The amplificatory parallels are given in the analysand's controlled association to the dream and its images, and, more tentatively, in those analogies provided by the analyst from his own experience or his cultural-historical knowledge. An important point is that a series of dreams provides its own context for a dream; the series is in effect the text in which the "obscure" passage (the dream) is situated.
It seems, therefore, that amplification is essentially similar to Husserl's method of free imaginative variation. Both use imaginal variations in an attempt to set rough outer limits to the phenomenon's essential meaning, and to spiral ever closer to the forever receding nucleus of meaning in the essential heart of the phenomenon itself. Therefore, like the existential phenomenologists (one thinks here particularly of Merleau-Ponty and Romanyszyn; cf. Romanyszyn 1975, 1982) Jung recognises that "every interpretation necessarily remains an "as-if" (1940, p.156), for the metaphors through which the phenomenon is revealed always necessarily leave it concealed as well. (This ambiguity at the centre of phenomenological interpretation becomes particularly significant in understanding the relation between archetypes and archetypal images, as well as in detecting the epistemological and ontological difficulties Jung got into in developing his theory of the archetypes.)

Jung also had a sense of the significance of language as a power that constitutes experience. He understood that the language one uses when articulating a phenomenon makes a difference to the experience and meaning of the phenomenon itself. For one thing, "interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images. From whatever side we approach this question (of meaning), everywhere we find ourselves confronted with the history of language, with images and motifs that lead straight back to the primitive wonder-world" (Jung 1934/54, pp.32-33).

This is why Jung uses a language that speaks out of and to that primordial world. The pre-Enlightenment language of myth, alchemy, folklore and dream is congruent with the primordial structures of
psychological life; it does not tear experience in two. To speak, therefore, of a "complex" instead of a god, or of "libido" instead of love, is of doubtful accuracy, not in a positive, nominalist sense, but in the sense that the experience itself is torn from its own vital roots. Such a language perpetuates modern man's alienation. Jung was very aware of this power of language. Thus his attempt to be phenomenologically accurate is also a therapeutic endeavour (Jung 1931b, pp.344-345; Hillman 1980). If experience is ruptured, cut off from its own foundations, then a phenomenology of experience is intrinsically a psychotherapy. Jung understood this significance in his own hermeneutics. Thus, he can say, for example:

"It is not a matter of indifference whether one calls something a "mania" or a "god". To serve a mania is detestable and undignified, but to serve a god is decidedly more meaningful and more productive because it means an act of submission to a higher, spiritual being .... Where the god is not acknowledged, ego-mania develops, and out of this mania comes illness" (Jung 1929b, p.38).

Similarly, Jung prefers to speak of Jehova instead of the "super-ego" (1929c, p.339). Or again, with polemical brilliance: "To the psyche, spirit is no less spirit for being named sexuality (Jung 1929a, p.52).

This last statement is interesting for another reason. If Jung perceives spirit where Freud perceives sexuality, then spirit, like sexuality, is not a circumscribed entity with thing-like qualities, but is a dimension or quality that pervades human psychological life (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1960b, pp.227-228). The visual analogy for the search for essences tends to be a spiral towards a core, like a meteorological chart of a low

4. This allusion is to Freud, who calls libido "the energy of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word "love""(1921, p.90).
pressure system. Although such an analogy has its uses, and although he clearly had it in mind some of the time when reflecting on the structure of archetypes, Jung does recognise its limitations. As will be seen later, archetypal essences are less things-in-themselves than essential dimensions within relational matrices.

Finally, a note on validity. Jung's claim to being an empiricist and his frequent appeal to "the facts" misleads both himself and his critics for it suggests a positivist epistemology that he does not intend. In an illuminating series of letters with E.A. Bennet, Jung (1976a) first defends himself as a scientist concerned only with "the observation of relevant facts" (p.562). In the next letter he seems surprised that the measure of acceptable proof that is expected of him is "something like a chemical or physical proof" (p.565), and he argues that psychology's criteria are of a different order, hinting that they are more like those in a court of law. In the third letter, he vacillates: although he endorses the hypothetico-deductive method of observation, prediction, and experimentation (where possible), he ends up situating psychology in the European rather than Anglo-Saxon scientific tradition. "Thus," he adds, "historical and comparative methods are scientific" (p.567). If Jung's self-perception as a scientist was unsophisticated, he nevertheless muddled his way through to a more secure human scientific, hermeneutic home. The letters to Bennet, written in 1960, characterise, in a sense, the shift that occurred in his working life, from the association experiments at the turn of the century, through psychoanalysis, to the cultural and textual treatises of the 1940's and 50's. But the result is that he sometimes defends his later work in terms of his earlier paradigmatic criteria. He defends "natural science" against "philosophy", 
for example, when clearly he means to defend an approach more akin to phenomenology from the philosophical assumptions (rationalism and materialism) that characterise what is more properly called natural science (cf. Jung 1947/54, pp.161-163). What this excursion means is that the criteria by which Jung's assertions are judged need to be explicitly and consistently hermeneutic.

Analytical psychologists who often seem apologetic about the lack of certitude regarding their perceptions and interpretations might bear in mind the following lines by Ricoeur (1973):

"That the meaning of human actions, of historical events, may be construed in several different ways is well known by all experts in the human sciences. What is less known and understood is that this methodological perplexity is founded in the nature of the object itself, and moreover, that it does not condemn the scientist to oscillate between dogmatism and scepticism. As the logic of text-interpretation suggests, there is a specific plurivocity belonging to the meaning of human action. Human action, too, is a limited field of possible constructions" (pp.34-35).

It follows, then, that

"[t]o show that an interpretation is more probable in the light of what is known is something other than showing that a conclusion is true. In this sense, validation is not verification. Validation is an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures of legal interpretation. It is a logic of uncertainty and qualitative probability" (ibid., pp.32-33).

3.5. Intentionality

Strictly speaking, intentionality is not an aspect of the phenomenological method as such. It is, instead, a characteristic of
consciousness that is presupposed in any phenomenological analysis. Intentionality means that consciousness is always and necessarily directed towards an object that is other than consciousness itself. Consciousness is always consciousness of something.

This expression, "consciousness of something", can be misleading. Intentionality is not a "bridge" or "connecting link" between two entities, consciousness and something, but is the ontological "there" of world-opening which makes it possible for a thing to "be" and consciousness to be appropriated as "someone's". The placing of a someone and a thing as "here" and "there" is a derivative of consciousness-as-intentionality, and is not its precondition. This is despite the fact that, hide-bound in our language and our ruptured ontic experience, we continue to talk of intentionality as the "relation between" self and world, as though self and world were the given entities. In short, consciousness is that irreducible, non-optional occurrence within which the world comes into being. It cannot be an encapsulated entity, enclosed within itself, or a little person looking at images in the brain. As being-in-the-world, consciousness is the open clearing that gathers the world together. Its constitutive power is that such a world is gathered together in history, culture and language, as well as through the peculiar twists of individual lives.

But this means that, although consciousness as intentionality is the definitive characteristic of human existence (ex-sistere, to stand out towards), it must not be understood in the narrow terms of depth psychology. A phenomenological analysis of consciousness leads very quickly to the realisation that consciousness is for the most part not
self-reflectively aware. Moreover, it is not genuinely personal. In other words, it is not an attribute or function of the particular person, John, but rather is to a large extent an operative yet pre-personal latency. Situated as world-relatedness, this latency is the foundation for that place of appropriation and reflection called John. Intentionality means that consciousness precedes and surrounds the boundaries of personal identity (Brooke 1986; Merleau-Ponty 1942, 1945; Scott 1973).

Intentionality also means that human existence is manifest as the world in which man lives, that is, as the things and images (cf. pp.158-9) through which the world speaks or, to use a different metaphor, through which man finds his reflection. Thus existential phenomenology can be defined as a method for describing "and" interpreting lived experience as it is revealed in the life-world.

Jung tends to vacillate considerably in his recognition of the intentionality of consciousness. Its ontological reality and significance confronted him most surely, and with liberating effect, in his trip to East Africa. But intentionality undermines the foundations of Western thought, which conceives of subject and object as separate, self-contained entities only contingently and unnecessarily related to each other. Psychologically, it calls into question modern Western man's identity, his sense of himself as a pre-existential subjectivity, self-contained, imperious in relation to a matter-of-fact world. The following chapter can be thought of as Jung's confrontation with the reality of intentionality; it explores his ambivalence and the task of a phenomenological analytical psychology. Here the aim is to indicate the extent to which Jung addressed the phenomenon of intentionality directly,
even if not in those words.

In his autobiography, Jung reflects on his book, *Psychological Types* (1921) as

"an effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things. It discussed the various attitudes that the conscious mind might take towards the world, and this constitutes a psychology of consciousness regarded from what might be called a clinical angle" (1961, p.233).

But if Jung felt his approach to be clinical, *Psychological Types* has ontological and epistemological significance. The perceived world is always, says Jung, a world-for-someone (with a particular type). On the other hand, there is no consciousness of the world that is not (typologically) limited. Ontologically, there is no consciousness that is not world-related as a certain perspective. Consciousness and world form a structural unity.

Ira Progoff (1956, p.107) has argued that Jung's theory of types marks the beginning of his move away from Freud's reductionism, for the term libido is freed from the quasi-physiological, hydraulic model of Freud and is given "direction". Whether this really is the beginning, as Progoff claims, is debatable, but that does not matter. The point is that libido is no longer conceived as an encapsulated, intra-psychic energy, but as a measure of the shifting values and intensities in one's relation with the world.

Much of *Psychological Types* is written through the libido metaphor, so that, however well Progoff's point is taken, there is a problem here that needs to be addressed. Jung claimed that in his theory of libido (1928a)
what he

"wished to do for psychology was to arrive at some logical
and thorough view such as is provided in the physical

This type of view persists in the reified expositions of "the laws of the
psychic processes and forces" (Jacobi 1942/68, pp.52 ff.), which still
abound in Classical Jungian literature. It is quite misleading, and
Jung's claim either represents a failure or is a self-misunderstanding,
for Jung's theory of psychological types had already freed the concept of
libido from those parameters that made any paradigmatic connection with
physics possible. In using the term libido Jung is adopting a physical
term only in the loosest metaphorical way. In a deeper sense, Jung argues
that both the physical concept of energy and his concept of libido emerge
from the same primordial structures of human experience (Brooke 1985,
p.166). As Abenheimer puts it:

"The energies of dynamic psychology are motivating forces
or will-powers and not energies in the sense of natural
science. We deal with an infinitely older concept of
energy than that of the sciences, a concept which has its
basis in internal subjective experience and which does not
refer to the measurable objective reality" (1968, p.63).

A second problem, which also has the effect of loosening the ontological
tie to the world which the theory of types effected, has to do with the
notion of introversion. The essence of Jung's definition is as follows:

"Introversion means an inward-turning of libido, in the
sense of a negative relation of the subject to the object.
Interest does not move towards the object but withdraws
from it into the subject. Everyone whose attitude is
introverted thinks, feels and acts in a way that clearly
demonstrates that the subject is the prime motivating
factor and that the object is of secondary importance"
(1921, p.452).

Apart from the problem that this definition lacks experiential clarity,
it can be interpreted to mean that the introvert is concerned primarily with objects in his "inner world" to the neglect of objects in the "outer world". In other words, the relation to the world becomes contingent only; being-in-the-world is no longer understood ontologically but mostly as a function of extraversion.

However, as far as the energy analogy goes, Jung is not describing introversion as the result of inward-turning libido but as the process of shifting attention from perceived to perceiver (Shapiro 1972, p.64), that is, the thematising of the constituting power of the perceiving consciousness. As a detailed phenomenological analysis of introversion as a lived experience makes clear, the ontological world-relatedness of consciousness is never in question (Shapiro 1972; Shapiro and Alexander 1975).

The intentionality of consciousness as described in *Psychological Types* means that the categorical distinction between outer and inner worlds, which guides much of Jung's thought (cf. 1929c, p.337), is existentially and theoretically untenable. In a passage of considerable power, Jung describes the attempt of an introvert to retreat from the world, but far from being successful the retreat simply reveals the world as unrelenting and increasingly primitive. Slightly abbreviated, it reads as follows:

"In spite of positively convulsive efforts to ensure the superiority of the ego, the object comes to exert an overwhelming influence, which is all the more invincible because it seizes on the individual unawares and forcibly obtrudes itself on his consciousness .... The more the ego struggles to preserve its independence, freedom from obligation, and superiority, the more it becomes enslaved to the objective data. The individual's freedom of mind is fettered by the ignominy of his financial dependence, his freedom of action trembles in the face of public opinion, his moral superiority collapses in a mass of inferior
relationships, and his desire to dominate ends in a pitiful craving to be loved. It is now the unconscious that takes care of the relation to the object, and it does so in a way that is calculated to bring the illusion of power and the fantasy of superiority to utter ruin. The object assumes terrifying proportions in spite of the conscious attempt to degrade it. In consequence, the ego's efforts to detach itself from the object and get it under control become all the more violent. In the end it surrounds itself with a regular system of defences ... for the purpose of preserving at least the illusion of superiority .... These efforts are constantly being frustrated by the overwhelming impressions received from the object. It continually imposes itself on him against his will, it arouses in him the most disagreeable and intractable affects and persecutes him at every step .... He is terrified of strong affects in others, and is hardly ever free from the dread of falling under hostile influences. As his relation to the object is very largely repressed, it takes place via the unconscious (which is) mostly infantile and archaic, so that the relation to the object becomes primitive too, and the object seems endowed with magical powers" (1921, pp.378-379).

What is unfortunate is that, as Rauhala (1969, p.96) has noted, Jung did not subject the philosophical and theoretical issues this relationality indicates to more detailed and sustained criticism. For, although Jung (1921) stresses repeatedly that both perceiver and perceived are implicated in every act of perception or reflection, it is true that he seems to fall away from this insight. But as Jung himself says, extraversion and introversion, however much we tend to spatialise their references to outer and inner realms, are given existentially as breadth and depth in human life (ibid., p.326). He never realised the extent to which Heidegger and Boss could have been his spiritual friends. But the above passage indicates that, if the consciously introverted person is "unconsciously extraverted" then "the unconscious" is not at all a place within the person but the lived experience of an incarnate existence which, disappropriated and degraded, remains undifferentiated and archaic.
A further point is that, if one's psychological attitudes and functions are world- engagements at every moment, then the sense of psyche as a Cartesian "inner world" needs to be radically re-evaluated. Both these concerns will be addressed later. But to anticipate: it will not be surprising to find that these terms, psyche, conscious and unconscious are situated by Jung, although not always explicitly, as world and world-related respectively. In fact, if these terms are reinterpreted in this way, then an existentially acceptable continuity emerges between Psychological Types and his later work on the nature of the psyche, the relation between ego and archetypal images, etc. In these terms, Psychological Types can be regarded as laying the groundwork for his later thought by delineating those typical modes of being-in-the-world that set existential (ontic) parameters for psychological life, or, in other words, psyche.

The connecting link between Psychological Types and the later work, and between one's typical attitude and functions and one's relation to archetypal reality, is fantasy. Jung situates fantasy squarely within intentionality, for it is the medium that integrates one's psychological functions and brings both the constitutive power of one's psychological life and the world into being. In Jung's words:

"Fantasy is just as much feeling as thinking; as much intuition as sensation. There is no psychic function that, through fantasy, is not inextricably bound up with the other psychic functions. Sometimes it appears in primordial form, sometimes it is the ultimate and boldest product of all our faculties combined. Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is ... where, like all psychological opposites, the inner and outer worlds are joined together in living union. Fantasy it was and ever is which fashions the bridge between the irreconcilable
claims of subject and object, introversion and extraversion" (1921, p.52).

In other words, fantasy, psyche's definitive structure, is world-related. Nevertheless, a conceptual limitation in this account of fantasy needs to be noted. Jung does not overcome the habitual tendency of the "natural attitude" to begin his reflection with the unquestioned positing of two a priori, intact poles, subject and object, and then to regard fantasy as the place and medium of exchange between them. But in the wider context of Jung's thought as a whole, and particularly in the light of Hillman's (and other's) analyses of those archetypal fantasies through which one plays one's life, it becomes clearer that fantasy in analytical psychology is the definitive quality of that "between" out of which the world and one's sense of oneself (ego) emerge and are derived. Intentionality as fantasy has ontological priority, not in a spatio-temporal sense, but in the sense that whatever is said about self and world ultimately refers thematically back to it (Jung 1929a, p.45).

To summarise: psychological life is always lived as a "typical" mode of being-in-the-world, and no matter how much a person tries consciously to withdraw from the world he remains bound to it. The psychological richness and subtlety of this intentionality is identified by Jung as fantasy. It is fantasy that consciously and unconsciously weaves one's attitudes and functions into the patterned fabric that is existence, and

5. This seems to be what Avens (1980) intends when he insists that "imagination is reality", yet sometimes, I think, he is in danger of losing sight of imagination's world-disclosiveness. To that extent, imagination precedes world-disclosure and perception, and echoes a subjectivism that we are endeavouring to overcome. In any event, imagination/fantasy's ontological priority needs to be clarified in the terms taken here. (Fantasy and imagination are often distinguished, although used interchangeably here. The meaning should be clear, however.)
both one's sense of self and the world emerge as figures out of this imaginative existential ground.

If this interpretation of Jung's thought is correct, then it suggests that the human being has a primary understanding of the meanings of things and relationships within his world, and that this understanding is lived whether or not it is dealt with appropriately. This is certainly the view of Heidegger (1927, p.182), who, in describing understanding (verstehen) as an existentiale, insists that it is an essential characteristic of Dasein as being-in-the-world. What Heidegger means to stress is that the intentionality of existence's world-disclosiveness already has - or rather is - an understanding of existence and the world. But such an understanding is mostly implicit, or "unconscious", and it is not what we usually think of as cognitive.

In the index to the Collected Works, one finds many references to "understanding", but none is meant in the existential sense. Yet understanding as a dimension of intentionality is a theme that characterises much of Jung's work, and needs to be made explicit if that work is to be grasped. One recalls, for instance, that there are no psychological functions that are not consciously or unconsciously, maturely or primitively, engaged with the world, that is, that do not reveal the world in a certain way. As has been stressed by Metzner et al (1981, pp.36-37), even the "irrational", perceptual functions, namely intuition and sensation, do not operate without some evaluative processes. There is no "sensation" that is not organised, however unsuccessfully; there is no operative function that is not a mode of understanding. Further, since the greater part of psychological life is
lived unconsciously, "the" unconscious, with its own primitive functioning, lives an originary understanding of a person's situations in ways the person (ego) may not like or even comprehend. In one sense, the goal of individuation is that one's self-knowledge remains in harmony with this lived understanding. This may be what Jung was implying in one of his letters when he wrote: "True understanding seems to be one which does not understand, yet lives and works" (Jung 1973, p.32). Thus William Barrett (1967) could have been speaking of Jung as well as Heidegger when he wrote:

"Some dumb inarticulated understanding, some sense of truth planted, as it were, in the marrow of my bones, makes me know that what I am hearing [is or] is not true. Whence comes this understanding? It is the understanding that I have by virtue of being rooted in existence.... We become rootless intellectually to the degree that we lose our hold upon this primary form of understanding, which is there in the act of opening our eyes upon the world" (p.198).

The question of understanding in Jung and Heidegger will be returned to later, when considering psyche and Dasein (p.155; cf. also Rauhala 1984, p.234).

A fourth characteristic of intentionality that Jung recognises needs to be mentioned only briefly: teleology, or less specifically, "finality". Despite being perilously unscientific (Jung 1916a, p.295), Jung insists that psychological life cannot be understood adequately except in terms of its purposeful significance. Jung sometimes continues to pay lip-service to the causal point of view, but finds meaning in psychological events only in the "final" perspective. In fact, Jung rejects the Aristotelean notion of "final causes" as self-contradictory, thus effectively rejecting causality as a meaningful perspective in
psychology. Jung's psychological questions are thus always directed
towards the unfolding fantasies and feelings that bring a possible future
into being (cf. Jung 1928a, pp. 4-5, 23-25; Rychlak 1984).

Enough has been said to conclude that Jung recognised the fundamental
intentionality of psychological life. This does not put the theme behind
us, however, but rather introduces it. It will be central in the chapters
that follow, even if the focus will not be on intentionality as such.

3.6. Summary

Broadly speaking, Jung's approach is essentially hermeneutic, an attempt
to understand psychological phenomena rather than to explain them. But in
treating psychological phenomena as texts Jung becomes a hermeneutic
phenomenologist. Merleau-Ponty's definition of phenomenology is used as a
framework for discussing Jung's method in the light of phenomenology.

It is argued that Jung, like the phenomenologists, is essentially
descriptive, and that his endeavour to be descriptive opens up a domain
of investigation in depth psychology that is indigenous to psychological
life.

The phenomenological reduction involves the bracketing (epoche) of the
natural attitude and the return to existentially original experience in
the life-world. Both these endeavours characterise Jung's work, but he,
like the existential phenomenologists, recognises the impossibility of a
complete reduction. In particular, an unnecessarily anxious, heroic
attitude in some of Jung's thought, identified by Hillman, will need to be bypassed if the world he saw is to be more adequately revealed.

In phenomenology the search for essences has undergone several significant epistemological changes: from essences as immutable and eidetic to essences as historical, present in reality itself, and constituted through language. Jung's search for essences is similar to both Husserl's free imaginative variation and the hermeneutic analysis of texts. Jung does not go so far as to dissolve phenomena into language, yet he recognises that all understanding is interpretative, and he is particularly sensitive to language as a constituting power in hermeneutic understanding. Thus Jung uses pre-Enlightenment language in an attempt to be at once phenomenologically accurate and a therapeutic hermeneut who reconnects experience to its authentic ground. Like some contemporary phenomenologists he is aware of the epistemological significance of metaphor, and he makes use of its experiential/therapeutic power to articulate psychological phenomena. The need of analytical psychologists to understand the epistemological structure of interpretative understanding is met with Ricoeur's guidelines in this regard.

Intentionality is articulated as the ontological "between" from which both the world's specificities and one's sense of self are derived. Jung does not speak of intentionality, yet it has an irreducible place in his understanding. Firstly, his work on psychological types reveals the structural unity of self and world; even introversion is a certain mode of being-in-the-world. Secondly, fantasy is often written about as though it were located in a disembodied "inner world", yet Jung situates fantasy squarely in intentionality, as the psychologically rich ontological
matrix to which self and world refer. A third recognition of intentionality emerges in the theme of understanding (Heidegger's verstehen): for Jung, consciousness is a developmental achievement and always only relative, which means that man lives his existence as an understanding of his world whether or not he reflectively appropriates it. Fourth, intentionality is recognised and addressed in Jung's emphasis on "finality".

3.7. An evaluation of Jung as a phenomenologist

Evaluations of Jung as a phenomenologist are spread throughout the present study. Here we shall draw some conclusions and highlight a few salient criticisms of Jung's method from the phenomenological point of view.

Firstly, Jung seems to have understood the central endeavour in phenomenology to return "to the things themselves": to overcome metaphysical and scientific prejudices in order to return to immediate experience where phenomena can be described in their essential fullness. It is also tempting to suggest that Jung wanted his work to be evaluated in these terms, but his cosy relationships with several eminent natural scientists and his frequent appeal to modern physics for defense counsel make the phenomenological hermeneut cautious. It seems that when he reflects self-consciously on his work Jung usually appeals to a peculiar mixture of Kant (cf. section 5.3) and physics, even though the central thrust of his work is hermeneutic and phenomenological. Thus, although Jung referred to phenomenology with a broad understanding of its aims,
and although he made use of some of its essential guidelines, phenomenology was not a consistent methodological home.

Secondly, because his pioneering work ran mostly in parallel with phenomenology's development in the first half of this century, and his acquaintance with phenomenology was in any event poor, he never made use of its methodological guidelines in a systematic and disciplined way. His success as a phenomenologist owes to his skill as a psychologist and hermeneut, but the necessary philosophical understanding was severely lacking. Thus the heart of the method, the phenomenological reduction, was entered without sufficient rigour or self-criticism. The result is that he sees through rationalist and materialist prejudices, but not the Cartesian ontology that remains in his thought, even as his vision continually transcends it. In particular, although he recognises and elaborates the intentionality of existence, he nevertheless does not question the ontological premises of terms as central as psyche, and outer and inner. He does not seem to recognise that his continuing use of psychoanalytic terms such as psyche, and conscious and unconscious belies an ontological difference in his emerging conceptions. Jung did more than dig a deeper basement.

Thirdly, Jung's interest in the archetypes and Western cultural history leads him increasingly into books in his search for the roots of meaning in modern man's psychological life. Here he found structures which made sense of some of the bewildering images with which he had been confronted, both in himself and in his patients. The methodological danger in this was probably not always avoided by Jung himself, but some Jungians seem to have fallen headlong into the trap. That is, the arduous
task of staying with the phenomenon so that its intrinsic meaning may be revealed in its fullness and particularity is bypassed by taking a shortcut - academically interesting, perhaps - through texts. This can even degenerate into a sort of Jungian pop-psychology. As one trainee in Zürich experienced it:

"(V)ery seldom did discussions about the meaning of dreams, pictures, and so forth go beyond the mechanical application of a few stock devices. All opposite-sex figures were soul representations, and all same-sex ones, the shadow. Every child was a symbol of the Self. Anything appearing on the left side was of the unconscious attitude, and on the right side, the persona .... The archetypes of the wise old man, the great mother, the trickster, and the puer aeternus provided names and stereotypes for a multitude of things" (Cohen 1976, pp.145-6).

Whether or not this accurately reflects the Zürich Institute, the point is taken that this is a danger in analytical psychology, particularly in its Classical form. But if this is no longer phenomenology, it would also be a caricature of Jung's method.

Interestingly enough, Spiegelberg (1960) has identified a danger in Heidegger which parallels the movement towards textual sources in Jung's work, and his critical comments, read with Jung equally in mind, make a useful end to this chapter:

"Phenomenology in its early stages was characterized by its courageous attack on the things themselves, regardless of previous opinions and theories. There is in Heidegger an increasing tendency to go to the "things" by way of classical texts and by an interpretation based ... at best secondarily on an appeal to the phenomena .... To be sure, it would be a sad loss if phenomenology should deprive itself completely of the insights of the past .... But it would be just as fatal if "going to the sources" should again assume the sense of going to the texts, instead of going to the phenomena" (p.352).

In the next chapter, we shall begin to look more directly at what Jung
saw, rather than at his manner of seeing. Our criticisms of this manner of seeing should help us be sensitive to his methodological limitations, and to see through these to a clearer articulation of those phenomena that guide his vision and thought.
CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF JUNG'S EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA:
THE PLACE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE

It has been suggested that this chapter will illustrate Jung's confrontation with that fundamental world-openness phenomenologists call intentionality. It forms a bridge between considerations of Jung's method and his theories, between his way of seeing and what he saw and thought. Primarily descriptive, it is an enquiry into the place and significance of psychological life as Jung experienced it, for the task here is to discover an experiential and descriptive base from which to address Jung's thought.

Jung's experience in Africa provides such a base. It is relatively unspoiled by theoretical and philosophical reflection, and it is Jung's only concrete description of the goal of individuation and a consciousness that has attained that goal. Described most extensively in his autobiography (1961), it thus makes excellent "data" for phenomenological analysis.

Jung repeatedly asserts that all experience, because it is psychological, takes place within the psyche. But this is not a logical connection,
for what appears to be a deduction is merely the nominal reification of a
descriptive term. At least the term psyche needs considerable
clarification - to be addressed in the next chapter. But an
investigation into the term psyche needs to be preceded by an explication
of the place of experience on its own terms, otherwise the questions of
its place and meaning remain begging. The place of experience, of
course, is none other than the world in which man lives. Thus this
chapter will also thematise the real immediacy of the world in
psychological life.

It will also be seen that Jung's experience in Africa radically
challenged his European identity, and it exposed an existential tension
that his conceptual thought was unable adequately to heal, except perhaps
near the end of his life. Thus an enquiry into Jung's trip to East
Africa is also an exposition of a fundamental tension in his thought
concerning human existence, the felt sense of personhood, the world, and
the structure of their relation. Therefore a descriptive account of
Jung's African experience is effectively a critical analysis of some of
the foundations of his thought. This will be made explicit in the present
chapter.

In the summer of 1925/26 Jung spent a few months in East Africa, and it
affected him more deeply, it seems, than even his visit to India (Van der
Post 1976, p.51). As he travelled into the interior of East Africa he
felt as though he was returning home, but this sense was paradoxical for
he was both returning to his origins and yet somehow fulfilling his
destiny, the purpose of his life. Moreover, he had an uncanny and
impelling sense that Africa had been waiting for him, and that his
destiny, therefore, was intimately bound with the destiny of the world.

Travelling west on the train from Mombasa Jung awoke at dawn and looked outside. He recalled:

"On a jagged rock above us a slim brownish-black figure stood motionless, leaning on a long spear, looking down at the train. Beside him towered a gigantic candelabrum cactus.... I had the feeling that I had already experienced this moment and had always known this world which was separated from me only by distance in time. It was as if I were this moment returning to the land of my youth, and as if I knew that dark-skinned man who had been waiting for me for five thousand years. I could not guess what string within myself was plucked at the sight of that solitary dark hunter. I only knew that his world had been mine for countless millennia" (Jung 1961, p.283).

This sense of returning to a source that was also a goal remained with him throughout his journey. It had the effect, therefore, of enacting in the concrete terms of actual life one of the essential themes of the individuation process: that the realisation of the self as the goal of psychological development is also a return to that self which forms the original matrix of one's life (Jung 1928c, pp.237-8; 1950, p.357; Adler 1949/69, ch.4).

Therefore, it is tempting to regard this journey as "symbolic" of the individuation process, where individuation is a process of unfolding and differentiation "within the psyche". Analytical psychology generally takes this view, as Jung himself does. For example, he reflects that

"In reality a darkness altogether different from natural night broods over the land. It is the psychic primal night which is the same today as it has been for countless millions of years" (Jung 1961, pp.298-9, emphasis added).

From this perspective, in which light and darkness are understood "symbolically", the "real" meaning of development is internal to Jung's
(or anyone else's) psyche. If individuation means becoming "a separate, indivisible unity, or 'whole'" (Jung 1939a, p.275), then it demands that projections be withdrawn, "in order to restore them to the individual who has involuntarily lost them by projecting them outside himself" (Jung 1938/54, p.84).

This temptation to interiorise the meaning and place of individuation is profoundly mistaken. If the significance of Jung's experience in Africa is to be adequately understood then those central terms of analytical psychology which define human existence need to be recovered as descriptions of man's relationship with the world, for that is the inescapable place of experience and setting within which the drama and meaning of human life unfolds. In other words, the task here is to recover the essential structure and meaning of Jung's experience in Africa. On one hand, it is an experience of the realisation of the self, perhaps the central theme of analytical psychology; on the other hand, it is an experience the existential meaning of which tended to be forgotten in Jung's reflections when he returned to Europe. Europe and Africa are "states of mind" as much as geographical locations, and it is difficult to think through an African experience in European terms. The separation of the world from the place of experience (i.e. Cartesianism) is the single biggest obstacle for European, technological man to overcome if he is to understand that the essence of psychological life is its world-relatedness (see Romanyszyn 1982). But this essential world-relatedness is what needs to be recovered here if Jung's experience in Africa is to be understood on its own terms, and if analytical psychology is to be rescued from its tendencies towards a headbound interiority.
4.1. The recovery of the world

Jung's sense that the motionless hunter had been waiting for him became clearer as his westward journey continued. That patient waiting strengthened into an appeal, and it came from the African world itself. From a low hill on Kenya's Athai plains Jung watched the vast herds of silent animals.

"Grazing heads nodding, the herds moved forward like slow rivers. There was scarcely any sound save the melancholy cry of a bird of prey. This was the stillness of the eternal beginning, the world as it always had been, in the state of non-being; for until then no-one had been present to know that it was this world" (Jung 1961, p.284).

Writing about the same scene elsewhere Jung continues:

"I felt then as if I were the first man, the first creature, to know that all this is. The entire world around me was still in its primeval state; it did not know that it was. And in that moment in which I came to know the world sprang into being; without that moment it would never have been. All nature seeks this goal and finds it fulfilled in man, but only in the most highly developed and fully conscious man. Every advance, even the smallest, along this path of conscious realisation adds that much to the world" (Jung 1938/54, pp.95-6).

Thus the appeal to which Jung responded was the call of the light of consciousness, which he saw as the goal of human life. As such, therefore, it is intimately connected with the individuation process and the realisation of the self (Brooke 1985).

Before going further, it is important to see the irreducible link between the call of consciousness and the call of the world. Jung was not
"projecting" an "inner need" onto "outer reality". After all, whereas projection implies a lack of insight this moment was one of heightened consciousness and self-awareness. Rather, the longing for consciousness is a longing of the world itself: "All nature seeks this goal" (op.cit). Thus the development of consciousness does not refer to a process outside of the world, but to a process in which the world itself comes into being in that human light called consciousness.

Jung's awareness of this ontological connection between the being of the world and the being of man remained with him and was profoundly liberating. No longer did his psychic life need to be contained within his European head as an embalmed inner world, like the *res cogitans* of Descartes. As Jung put it: "My liberated psychic forces poured blissfully back to the primeval expanses" (Jung 1961, p.293). In other words, with the emergence of the world into the light of consciousness, Jung's psychological life returned to its original place in the world. Thus he experienced a "divine peace" and a sense of kinship and harmony with all things.

If Jung's psychological life came home, then "home" was transformed in the process. It emerged as a world radically different from that imagined by the modern European mind¹. The European's world, which he

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¹ This expression, "modern European mind", needs specification. "Modern" is used in the way Jung uses the term, when he writes, for example, that "modern man [is] in search of a soul" (1933). The "modern European" is one who orientates himself in the world in a way characterised by post-renaissance and post-Enlightenment thought. Essentially, there is a radical split between the knower and the known, and a continual attempt, despite the protestations of the incarnate order, to establish psychological life and meaning in interior, subjectivistic terms. Ontologically and epistemologically, his roots find their clearest expression in Descartes. Ethically and theologically, his roots lie in humanism. (Continued on p.98.)
takes for granted as real, immutable, and inescapable, is nevertheless contingent upon its own peculiar history (see Romanyszyn 1982, 1984; Roszak 1972). More specifically, it is ontologically disconnected from man and therefore alien. It is the world of technological man, there to be set upon and harnessed, the world of Faust, who could not tolerate the uselessness of land left under the sea and before whom the gods fled and wandered homeless (Giegerich 1984). It is a disenchanted world bereft of purpose, where even life is dissolved into the meaningless movements of energy and matter according to the brute inevitabilities of natural law. It is the world Jung identified as reflecting the sickness of modern man, and against which he set his life's work. As Jung says in the very passages we are considering, "In such a cheerless clockwork fantasy there is no drama of man, world, and God...but only the dreariness of calculated processes" (Jung 1961, p.284). And it was this world that was radically and permanently transformed. It became a temple.

Before looking at Jung's description of the particular physiognomy of experience after this "ontological transformation", it is necessary to pause for a moment. The above reflections might make one ask whether Jung is not describing a form of regression. There seems to be some evidence for this. For example, he describes the journey as a return to the land of his youth. More importantly, as will be seen, he later took fright at the prospect of falling back into the participation mystique of a "primitive" existence, in which, he believed, the boundaries between

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The twentieth century has seen the erosion of this "modern European's" world, and the term here is in danger of being a misnomer. However, it is used in this chapter because it highlights the cultural and existential issues involved in Jung's experience in Africa. As is admitted at the end of the chapter, we are all ontologically "archaic".
self and world were collapsed. Further still, if psychological development involves the "withdrawal of projections", i.e. the separation of subject and object such that the subject is the source and vehicle of meaning and the object is " uncontaminated" by the subject's psychological life, then there certainly seems to be a problem here. But there are several ways to address this.

Firstly, it can be pointed out that it was a continual conceptual problem for Jung. Throughout his work there are remarks about the importance of modern man's withdrawing his projections from the world together with a discussion of the fateful significance of doing so. For example, in *Psychology and Religion* he writes:

"The hypothesis of invisible gods or daemons would be, psychologically, a far more appropriate formulation (of the unconscious), even though it would be an anthropomorphic projection. But since the development of consciousness requires the withdrawal of all the projections we can lay our hands on, it is not possible to maintain any non-psychological doctrine about the gods. If the historical process of world despiritualisation continues as hitherto, then everything of a divine or demonic character outside us must return to the psyche, to the inside of the unknown man, whence it apparently originated" (Jung 1938/40, p.85).

This is a telling piece from a much longer discussion in which the development of consciousness is correlated with the despiritualisation of the world. As James Hillman put it in his inimitable way, it amounts to "stuffing the person with subjective soulfulness and leaving the world a slagheap from which all projections, personifications, and psyche have been extracted" (Hillman 1973, p.123). However, not only is the world abandoned as a disinfitted and godless slagheap, but "the withdrawal of all the projections we can lay our hands on" amounts to an heroic inflation. In the same passage referred to above, Jung writes:
"Why did the gods of antiquity lose their prestige and their effect on the human soul? Because the Olympians had served their time and a new mystery began: God became man" (Jung 1938/40, p.81).

The two figures who epitomise this, and to whom Jung repeatedly refers, are Faust (mentioned earlier) and Nietzsche. It was he who announced the death of God and the coming of the Superman, and who even went so far as to say that if God were not dead then man, as Superman, should kill him in order to be his own master (Nietzsche 1883, pp.109-10). But Nietzsche broke under the strain of his philosophy and collapsed into insanity. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination can these figures be regarded as examples of individuated man. In fact, Jung's prime interest in Nietzsche seems to have been as a case study (Moreno 1970). In any event, to be swallowed up in an archetypal motif, in this case heroically inflated, is to lose precisely that differentiation that defines an individuated consciousness.

It seems, therefore, that Jung's appeal to the development of consciousness sometimes reflects the very heroic mentality against which he had set himself as a "doctor of the soul", so that he ends up at cross-purposes with himself. He insists on the importance of withdrawing projections, yet he describes those who, like Nietzsche, do as "clever specimens of homo occidentalis who lived yesterday or the day before, ... tin gods with thick skulls and cold hearts" (Jung 1917/43, p.71).

On the other hand, there is clearly an important insight in the notion of "withdrawing projections" that needs to be retained. Somehow a way needs to be found to understand our vital engagements within the life-
world symbolically without spatialising that understanding and hauling psyche out of the world. As Jung himself notes, the question is whether or not metaphors are taken concretely (Jung 1931a, p.65), but there is nothing inherently spatial in this. The shift then is not from "out there" to "in here" but from blind literalism to metaphor. In this case there is no reason to believe that Jung's recovery of the world as the home of psychological life necessarily implies a regression.

A second way to meet the idea that Jung's experience in Africa was regressive is to recall the numerous occasions in which he showed an understanding of psychological life very different from the anthropocentric terms described above. He then insists that, for example, the psyche is not in man but rather that man is in the psyche (eg. Jung 1957, p.271), or that the psyche is not originally "projected" but is formed through acts of introjection (Jung 1934/54, p.25). When Jung writes like this he manages to avoid an error he noted in his critics, but into which he himself sometimes fell: confusing psyche and ego, or in other words the place of experience with the boundaries of the individual person (Jung 1947/54, p.226). These difficult issues lie at the heart of a phenomenological critique and interpretation of Jung's thought, and will be addressed at some length after Jung's experience in Africa has been described further (and they will be returned to in chapter 6).

Finally, if Jung's experience was at all regressive, or if the meaning of returning his psychological life to its original home in the world was to confuse his sense of his own boundaries, then he could not have had that ontological sense of man's unique place in the scheme of things. Nor,
within his sense of connection with the world, could he have also understood man's and his own peculiar difference. For Jung, the revelation of the African world was equally the birth of ego identity, not its dissolution (Jung 1955-1956, p.107). Thus he saw that it was man

"who alone has given to the world its objective existence - without which, unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads nodding through hundreds of millions of years, it would have gone on in the profoundest night of non-being down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being" (Jung 1961, p.285).

4.2. The world as temple

Washed in this ontological vision Jung continued westward. He travelled by train, truck, and finally on foot to Mt. Elgon, the slopes of which he and his party climbed to over 6,000 feet. By the time he arrived there the world had not only been recovered as a world; the recovery revealed the world to be a temple. And it was a pagan temple rather than a Christian "church" (or at least the church that Jung knew) for the divine had not retreated skywards, beyond the stars, leaving the world forsaken. Rather, the divine was given within the pregnant immediacy of the phenomenoa of the world itself. As Jung said, "we found a dawning significance in things" (Jung 1931a, p.62).

Presumably Jung could have chosen any number of places or events on which

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2. Zinkin (1987) makes the same point as he reflects on a similar experience of his own, while watching windsurfers from the beach. Wholeness, he discovers, does not mean fusion, and it includes a sense of being a part of a more embracing whole.
to found his meditations, but, in keeping with the theme of consciousness as the illuminating realm within which the being of the world can shine forth, it is not surprising that he found himself most compellingly drawn to the dawn. Although Jung writes of this time some thirty-five years later, the vivid impressions still shine through. He says:

"The sunshine in these latitudes was a phenomenon that overwhelmed me anew every day. The drama of it lay less in the splendour of the sun's shooting up over the horizon than in what happened afterwards. I formed the habit of taking my camp stool and sitting under an umbrella acacia just before dawn. Before me, at the bottom of the little valley, lay a dark, almost black-green strip of jungle, with the rim of the plateau on the opposite side of the valley towering above it. At first, the contrasts between light and darkness would be extremely sharp. Then objects would assume contour and emerge into the light which seemed to fill the valley with a compact brightness. The horizon above became radiantly white. Gradually the swelling light seemed to penetrate into the very structure of objects, which became illuminated from within until at last they shone translucently, like bits of coloured glass. Everything turned to flaming crystal. The cry of the bell bird rang round the horizon. At such moments I felt as if I were inside a temple. It was the most sacred hour of the day. I drank in this glory with insatiable delight, or rather, in a timeless ecstasy" (Jung 1961, pp.297-8).

At these moments Jung was present to "the great god who redeems the world by rising out of the darkness as a radiant light in the heavens," and was thus bearing witness to the most primordial metaphor through which the meaning of human life is given. In terms of this primordial metaphorical reality, therefore, the European Jung discovered his own personal myth (ibid., pp.284-303), and at the same time participated in a process that was older than history and possibly even humanity. The Elgonyi left their huts each morning and in short, individual ceremonies they spat into their hands and held them up to the sun (ibid., pp.295-6). But Jung further recalls that at the moment of dawn the baboons too would sit motionless, facing east, like carved baboons in an Egyptian
temple performing "the gesture of adoration", and this was in stark contrast to their noisy ranging through the rest of the day (ibid., p.298).

In other words, the world's revelation as a temple in which the drama of the ancient Egyptian sun-god, Horus, is daily enacted is older than human consciousness. For Jung, human consciousness is neither a man-made invention nor a gift that arrived "out of the blue". Rather, consciousness has evolved as witness to the endlessly repetitive drama given through the moment of dawn. The psyche, insists Jung (1938/40, p.84; 1957, p.271; 1976a, p.410) is antecedent to and the precondition for that phenomenon now called man. Thus the world as a temple is the primordial reality, and without it there would be no reflective consciousness. Its significance as a metaphor for the shape and meaning of human life is therefore a later development, but the existential density of that place at which the metaphor is grounded remains. The dawn is still a glorious divine moment of "insatiable delight" (op.cit).

As has already been argued, one way to forget this primordial reality is to spatialise the metaphor by locating its meaning as an experience within one's head. On one hand, this allows the world to slip into darkness, and in our time, as both Jung and Heidegger agree, while the scientific light glares upon the world, that world which is essentially a temple disappears under the profane darkness of natural law. On the other hand, the Cartesian interiorisation of psychological life loses an essential quality of metaphor, namely, its capacity to intensify reality. As Philip Wheelright expressed it in his classic study on metaphor:

"What really matters in a metaphor is the psychic depth at
which the things of the world, whether actual or fancied, are transmuted by the cool heat of the imagination" (Wheelright 1962, p.71).

Thus a metaphor opens up the world and at the same time situates the imagination. It is important to understand that what might seem like two processes here is in actuality one. Intentionality, it may be recalled, is fantasy. Thus the opening up of the world, as a temple for example, is imaginative; and to imagine the world as a temple is to open up the very temple-like being of the world. In other words, the structural unity between the world and human consciousness is given as metaphorical reality. Thus metaphors are not abstractions from reality, in which two distinct entities, world and temple, are cognitively linked together. Rather, metaphors are the primordial means within which our shy and ambiguous world comes into being in the imaginative light of human consciousness. The same can be said of symbols, for they have the same essential structure.

Now the point of these reflections is that, when Jung refers to the "symbolic life" or the "symbolic attitude" as a measure of psychological maturity, he is not intending to evaporate the metaphor into an intellectual abstraction. He is rather trying to encourage modern man to recover his existential heritage and find the meaning of his life as it is given through the metaphors within which the world speaks. Jung's overwhelming experience of the dawn on the slopes of Mt Elgon needs to be understood in these terms.
4.3. Jung's retreat

Throughout his life Jung was concerned with the question of the self. In a deeply personal way it was the central problematic that held his life and work together (Papadopoulos 1984), and it seems that Jung, more than most people, was threatened with the terror of its disintegration and loss (Winnicott 1964). If this was so - and the arguments by Papadopoulos and Winnicott (and others) are sensitive and convincing - then perhaps one can understand something of Jung's emergent fears, and the relief he felt at turning northwards towards Europe. The purpose is not to embark upon a mini-analysis of Jung. However, Jung's frightened retreat from Africa needs to be dealt with as it seems to contradict the significance of his African experience as understood here, and the above comments about Jung's relation to this self offer a clue to resolving this. Gerhard Adler has pointed out that the path of individuation is "from an unconscious anonymity to a conscious anonymity" (Adler 1949/69, p.152), with the establishment of a personal identity as a middle stage. Although somewhat overstated, anonymity is thus the theme common to both source and goal, regression and progression (Jung 1930/31, p.403; Redfearn 1985, p.109).

The question can be put as follows: If Jung's experience in Africa touched the goal of individuation, and therefore reflected a developed and integrated consciousness, then how is it that Jung feared losing the degree of conscious development that he felt he had achieved?

Jung returned to Europe by travelling northwards to the Nile, then down river to Cairo and the Mediterranean. Although it was "with heavy
hearts" that he and his companions left Mt. Elgon, as they travelled northwards Jung came to realise that the intensely personal nature of his journey into Africa "touched every possible sore spot in (his) own psychology" (Jung 1961, p.303). He realised that he had been trying to avoid his dreams, which had been reminding him of his indebtedness to his European identity. In one dream Jung's American Negro barber was using a red-hot curling iron to give him Negro hair, and Jung woke in terror. He recalled:

"I took this dream as a warning from the unconscious; it was saying that the primitive was a danger to me.... The only thing I could conclude from this was that my European personality must under all circumstances be preserved intact (ibid., p.302).

It would seem that the "European personality" that was so threatened has to do with the specifically European constitution of identity. Jung felt that his dreams were advising him to think of "the African journey not as something real, but rather as a symptomatic or symbolic act" (ibid., pp.301-302). Given the European's Cartesian heritage, this could only mean retracting all those "liberated psychic forces (that had) poured blissfully back to the primeval expanses," and enclosing psyche, individuation and his self inside him. The existential liberation that had revealed to Jung the goal of individuation, the spiritual realisation of the world as a temple, is now seen through the defensive eyes of the psychiatrist.

In Africa Jung had realised the self as a non-substantial openness within which the world could come into being, first as a world, then as a temple. But to realise the self as a non-substantial openness is to discover that the self is not an entity but a capacity that emerges
through the revelation of the world. The spirituality of the self, for example, is a capacity that emerges through the world's revelation as a temple; what is actually found is not one's spirituality but a temple. Thus, the self is recovered as a world in which the meaning of one's life is given. This means that the European understanding of the self, with its Cartesian and humanistic roots, is called radically into question. For the European, or, to be more precise, for those like Jung who have inherited the Cartesian separation of subject and world, the self is contained as a private place within one, a place of consciousness, and an inner domain on which one's identity is founded (Heidegger 1927, pp.366-368). Thus when Jung recovered the ontological unity between the self and the world it would have called into question the very foundations of his self-understanding and the direction of his life's central problematic.

When Jung felt threatened by the possibility of losing his identity he reasserted himself in the only way that he, as a European, knew: by taking psyche out of the world. Jung felt the need to hold onto his ego (personality identity), but he did so by encapsulating psyche, "withdrawing projections", and evaporating the power of the world into a symbolic "inner" reality. Psyche and world became truncated in the service of his vulnerable ego boundaries, and at that point his insight into the material place of experience (or psyche) was largely undone.

It might be objected at this point that Jung's distinction between the ego and the self is being confused here. For Jung the ego is the seat of identity and an individual's consciousness, and the self is the totality of the psyche and the place of experience (all experience being
psychic reality). In a sense self and psyche are synonymous for the totality (Jung 1921, p.460n.) of which the ego is that part concerned with personal boundaries. But in the European Cartesian heritage, however, the place of these is virtually indistinguishable, and, significantly perhaps, it was only after Jung's return from Africa that the terms became clearly distinguished in his writings (Jung 1928c). (The distinction between ego and self had emerged to some extent by 1921, but the self was added as a separate entry to the "Definitions" in Psychological Types only much later.) Louis Zinkin (1985) has made the point that the shift from Freud to Jung is a shift from the body to the self as the focus of psychological life, and that the inner-outer distinction, therefore, does not refer to the skin unless the self identifies with the body. But it seems that Jung's fear reflected his Cartesian heritage and his fragile ego boundaries, and he did not yet have the insight or strength to make these distinctions.

One place where Jung does seem to resolve these issues is in the beautifully written epilogue to Psychology and Alchemy (1944/52). Here Jung distinguishes between "withdrawing projections" and "making psychological contents personal". The latter, he says, leads precisely to the Faustian inflation described earlier, and Jung (following Goethe, in fact) contrasts this attitude with that of Philemon and Baucis. These two humble tramps gave hospitality to whatever was revealed in their world, and in that act of reverence allowed the world to reveal its divinity (pp.479-481; cf. Giegerich 1984). The attitudinal stance of these two figures would seem to describe Jung's experience in Africa more adequately than terms which set man's psychological life loose from its moorings. Moreover, a shift from heroic conquest to reverent hospitality
as a metaphor for an individuated consciousness is clearly more appropriate to Jung's overall therapeutic intentions. At the heart of psychological life is an ecological sensibility which Jung does not want violated by the heroic ego, one expression of which is natural scientific and technological iconoclasm.

Interestingly enough, in the closing pages of his autobiography Jung once again captures that ontological vision he had had in Africa. He writes:

"The older I have become, the less I have understood or had insight into or known about myself... I exist on the foundation of something I do not know. In spite of all uncertainties, I feel a solidity underlying all existence and a continuity in my mode of being....The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all things" (Jung 1961, pp.391-2).

The uncertainty of the ego is no longer a threat, for the integrity of its functions is assumed, and it rests upon the realisation of the greater self, even though this too is not an entity but a fundamental connectedness with things.

Before leaving this description of Jung's experience in Africa, it should perhaps be repeated that it has been used as a point of access only. As Jung points out, access to archaic existence is given equally well through Zurich's Mr. Muller at Easter time, "running about the garden, hiding coloured eggs and setting up peculiar rabbit idols" (Jung 1931a, p.72), for we all live from the archaic levels of psychological life. Jung's studies of "archaic man" make no sense at all unless it is understood that he is not primarily studying how "modern man" might have been "a long time ago", but is trying to reveal those primordial structures that found psychological life now (Giegerich 1975).
4.4. Conclusion

It seems that our task as psychologists is to sustain our thinking in these terms which authenticate Jung's experience in Africa, despite whatever neurotic "European" anxieties we might have. For Jung's experience in Africa has a meaning for analytical psychology that transcends the fundamental ontological and epistemological assumptions on which it has tended to rest. It may be added that, in terms of our personal response to Jung, it invites us to incarnate our psychological life and recover that vital ecological sensibility that is the foundation of a meaningful existence.
CHAPTER FIVE

PSYCHE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE

In describing and discussing the essential significance of Jung's experience in Africa, it is inevitable that a number of themes of the present thesis have been anticipated, and stated without having been argued in a sustained way. Furthermore, what arguments there are have revolved around his experience rather than his theoretical writings as such. As has been asserted before, these writings are more or less successful attempts to account for this and other similar experiences. In any event, more detailed discussions of terms such as self, individuation and consciousness which have already been opened within an existential phenomenological hermeneutic, will be shelved until later Here the task is to use the foregoing discussion to reconsider the meaning of the term psyche.

5.1 The psyche's autonomy

The term psyche seems to have been the most powerful metaphor through which Jung thought, yet like all great metaphors its source receded forever elusively beyond his grasp. As a metaphor psyche enveloped his
thinking and, more or less, his view of man yet, or possibly because of this, he was unable to grasp it conceptually. "I have not the faintest idea what 'psyche' is in itself," says Jung (1973, p.57) in one of his letters, and he expresses a similar sentiment in a number of other places too (eg. Jung 1931b; 1934d, p.409).

However, Jung's difficulty was not primarily that he was a pioneer in a new territory but that there was no Archemedian point outside of the psyche from which to look "objectively". He argued that it is only the psyche that can ask questions about the psyche, and that what the psyche shows of itself is always in a sense a reflection of the psyche that is asking the question.

It was this point of view which helped Jung understand the differences between Freud, Adler and himself, and which he attempted to account for in his seminal work, *Psychological Types* (1921). The thesis of that book is that the phenomena of the world, including the human psyche, show themselves through the psychological perspectives of the observers. That he called these perspectives introversion, extraversion, thinking, sensation, etc., is less important here, than the epistemological argument that one does not have any non-psychological access to the world in which one lives or which one studies.

Depending on how the term (non-)psychological is understood, phenomenology would have no problem with Jung's position. However, Jung makes a subtle but fateful epistemological turn. Because all experience of, or thought about, the world is psychological, he concludes that we therefore have no direct access to the "real world" but only to psychic
images which may or may not be accurate representations of that world. In his words:

"We are in truth so wrapped about by psychic images that we cannot penetrate at all the essence of things external to ourselves. All our knowledge consists of the stuff of the psyche which, because it alone is immediate, is surperlatively real" (Jung 1931b, p.353).

Similar statements are made throughout his writings. "The psychic alone has immediate reality," he says elsewhere (Jung 1933b, p.384), and the non-psychic world is all but completely inaccessible. We have access only to images. "Far from being a material world," he continues, "this is a psychic world" (ibid.) Or again: "Only psychic existence is immediately verifiable. To the extent that the world does not form a psychic image it is virtually non-existent" (Jung 1939/54, p.480-481). Yet again: "Without the psyche there would be no world at all, and still less a human world" (Jung 1957, p.291).

The immediate effect of this self-enclosed position for Jung is that the psyche lacks a definition that is not tautological. In the extensive definitions that conclude Psychological Types (1921), there is no entry under "psyche", and it is defined only in a passing contrast to "soul". Here he defines psyche as "the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious" (p.463). This definition, if it can be called that, is repeated in a letter written in 1951, thirty years later (Jung 1976a, p.6).

It is rather surprising, perhaps, that hardly any Jungians have addressed the problematic issue of having a tautological definition of their most
fundamental guiding concept\textsuperscript{1}. Even the recent dictionary of Jungian terms, which has an extensive entry under "psyche", does not try to find its way out of the tautology but merely mentions that its problem has to do with "the overlap of subjective and objective interest" (Samuels \textit{et al} 1986, p.115). (Actually, this dictionary also mentions that psyche can be understood as a perspective on phenomena, but this reflects a recent shift in Jungian thought which will be addressed later.) However, given the internal coherence of Jung's position, any attempt to step outside the psyche and to look at it "objectively" is doomed to self-contradiction and failure. Esther Harding (1968), for example, asserts that "the reality of the psyche" is

"the most fundamental tenet of our whole discipline and all our work depends on it .... The nearest we can get to an understanding of the psyche is to consider it as an energetic system that is known to us through its manifestations, much as atomic physicists tell us that the universe itself is a manifestation of energy. That the psyche is an energetic system is of course, only an hypothesis, and someday it, too, may be considered a superstition, a projection" (pp.1-3).

It is impossible to try to step outside the circle of self-understanding implied in the position that only the psyche can understand the psyche, so that what is understood is always presupposed in the act of understanding. As Heidegger (1927) says, "An entity for which ... its Being is itself an issue, has ontologically, a circular structure" (p.195; cf.also p.27). He also says, however:

"But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up" (ibid., p.194).

In this passage Heidegger is speaking about the circular structure of Dasein's enquiry into Being, and the relationship between Jung's concept of psyche and Heidegger's understanding of Dasein has yet to be disclosed. Nevertheless, Heidegger's comments suggest that Jung's self-enclosed position and his tautological definition of psyche might reveal its nature more clearly than do attempts to step outside it, as Harding does, and so does Jung occasionally.

Significantly, even when Jung does step outside his circle of understanding, he self-critically returns to the circle, and he opens up a domain of investigation that at the time was arguably unique in the psychoanalytic world. The return is problematic, however. In his essay, *Spirit and Life*, for example, he says that the psyche "consists of reflected images of simple processes in the brain" (Jung 1926, p.323), and he discusses the central nervous system, reflex arcs, etc. These pages seem to be reminiscent of Freud's early *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895; cf. Smith 1975). However, Jung then proceeds to criticise this viewpoint, which he identifies as "realistic". Given that he has been describing a view of psychic images as an epiphenomenon of brain processes, together with the contradictory view that "ideas" correspond to "external" material events, Jung is taking issue with the "dualistic realism" of Descartes, Locke, and many - perhaps most - scientists (Edwards 1967, p.80). Unfortunately, however, Jung's unsystematic and muddled criticism of realism does not expose the contradiction - which is that, if there are only "sense data", then there is no way of knowing that these refer to any "world" other than themselves and he falls right into the Cartesian trap himself:
"It is my mind, with its store of images, that gives the world colour and sound; and that supremely real and rational certainty which I call "experience" is, in its most simple form, an exceedingly complicated structure of mental images. Thus there is in a certain sense, nothing that is directly experienced except the mind itself" (Jung 1926, p.327).

Not only is psychological life locked within an encapsulated psyche, or mind, but the "outer world", drained of meaning and human habitation, is none other than the res extensa of Descartes, that can be accounted for only in terms of natural science. Jung endorses this vision when he says:

"So thick and deceptive is this fog about us that we had to invent the exact sciences in order to catch at least a glimmer of the so-called "real" nature of things" (ibid.).

Jung thus becomes, like Freud, a "Descartes of the depths", to use Romanyszyn's (1982, p.95) phrase.

Phenomenology's two fundamental reciprocal criticisms of Cartesian thought in psychology are in this case appropriate. First, Jung is guilty of enclosing psychological life into a solipsistic inner world from which, amongst other things, it is impossible to speak coherently of any real relationships with other beings. In other words Jung is guilty of psychologism. Secondly, in emptying the world of any intrinsic meaning other than that prescribed by natural science, Jung is endorsing that epistemological vision which came to be known a positivism². (cf. Boss 1957, pp. 95-99). In this regard, one can also recall Jung's comments about the "despiritualisation of the world" brought about by the "withdrawal of projections", which he seemed to understand as an inevitable effect of the development of consciousness.

² Excellent discussions of positivism in psychology are offered by Strasser (1963) and van Kaam (1966).
The above exposition of Jung's view of psyche, which calls for a Cartesian and positivist interpretation, needs to be recalled in the chapters that follow. It will be met again when concepts such as the self, the unconscious and the archetypes are discussed. So too will Boss' critique of Jung, as it evolves around this view.

However, the last few paragraphs began with the assertion that Jung was critical of the realists' attempt to found psychology on a base that was not indigenous to psychology. The fact that he unwittingly fell into the trap himself needs to be pointed out, yet to do so tends to lock the critique into the letter of what he says rather than follow the spirit of his intention. To recall Jung's experience in Africa, for instance, it is clear that to identify Jung as a positivist is at best limited, but more properly absurd.

In *Spirit and Life*, in which he falls most clearly into the positivist, or more generally, the realist trap, he is arguing against the realist attempt to found psychology on a material base, specifically neurophysiology. It is an argument he repeats in one way or another throughout his writings, and was in fact, central to his criticism of Freud (cf. Wollman 1982). Jung is quite categorical: "The structure and physiology of the brain furnish no explanation of the psychic process" (Jung 1957, p.270). Even terms such as psychic energy, or libido, which would seem most clearly to lend themselves to a reductionist interpretation along realist lines, are explicitly not to be understood as biological derivatives but as terms with a psychological meaning only (Jung 1921, p.456; 1928a).
In *Spirit and Life* Jung is trying to persuade his natural scientific colleagues that the "spirit" is a psychological experience and, as such, needs to be studied by psychology. Psychology can do this adequately, however, only if it studies spirit as a psychological experience on its own terms, without trying to reduce it to physiology, on one hand, and without becoming an apology for Christian theology on the other. While this is the specific thrust of this essay, his more general intent is clear. Jung is saying that only the psyche can understand the psyche, and any attempt to stand outside psyche in order to study it, as the natural scientists do, is both dishonest and impossible. There is no *a priori* epistemological base outside of the relationship of psychic images to each other (cf. Jung 1938/54, p.77). Even if a scientist adopts a reductionistic materialism he is, says Jung (1931b, p.341), relating not to matter as such but to a psychic image, which is what gives materialism its meaning and power (cf. Berry, 1973). It is this consistently intra-psychic epistemology that most clearly distinguishes Jung from his early psychoanalytic colleagues, and indeed from many psychoanalysts today. If Freud's view of man is of *homo naturalis*, as Binswanger (1963) showed, the object of analytical psychology is *homo psychicus* (Hostie 1957, p.213). Thus Jung's notion of the autonomous psyche is essentially an epistemological assertion about the self-contained autonomy of psychic life and knowledge. The charges of reductionism and positivism can therefore not be sustained.

The charge of psychologism, however, is a more serious one, but it too, is a tricky issue as Jung's concept of psyche emerges as something rather

3. This is in contrast to Freud, who tended to regard the spirit as a sublimation of the sexual instinct, which in turn was ultimately a transformation of a biological need.
different from its popular meaning. The popular meaning thinks of psyche as a synonym for "mind", located in the head where it somehow is linked to the brain. To repeat a point made earlier: the "somehow" in this popular Cartesian view is the insoluble mystery and place of contradiction. If there is no certain way beyond our experience, or "ideas", then it is self-contradictory and meaningless to assume those ideas are reducible to positivist premises or explanations.

Jung often talks about the mystery of how the body influences the psyche and vice versa. His experience of organic disorders is sufficient evidence for the body's influence on psyche; his experience of psychosomatic and hysterical disorders is sufficient evidence for the psyche's influence on the body. However, from the beginning Jung was never satisfied with linear causal explanations of this relationship, even if it was accepted that the causality might be reciprocal.

His interest in synchronicity, which sought to describe the meaningful, but acausal, connection between a psychic image and a material situation (Jung 1952c), tempted him to think of the psyche-body relationship in the same way (ibid., p.500n.). One of Jung's closest associates, C.A. Meier (1963), picked up this idea in an attempt to develop a model of psychosomatics, and R. Stein (1976) followed suit.4

However, Jung never seemed satisfied with this highly speculative

4. Stein's analysis is more subtle than Meier's. Meier finds in the classical Greek notion of the "subtle body" a "third term" responsible for both psychic and bodily manifestations. Stein, less fanciful, finds the "third term" in the religious attitude, yet he also seems to get lost in reified linear thinking when he discovers the source of that attitude in "that higher power and directing intelligence within (man's) own soul" (p.71).
approach and it has not caught on in Jungian thought. More importantly, it tended to undermine the very psychosomatic unity towards which his experience was leading. As Fordham (1974) points out, the notion of synchronicity continues to treat the body as external to psyche (p.172). Archetypal psychology, too, rejects the dualistic synchronicity hypothesis for the same reason (Boer and Kugler 1977, p.141). The psyche remains an interior locality outside of which is the body and the world. Although rid of causal relations, Descartes' ontology nevertheless remains essentially intact.

The notion of synchronicity, therefore, is clearly unsuccessful in overcoming Cartesian dualism. However, it is a notion that does not seem to be essential to Jung's model. What his theoretical reflections continually try to lead towards is that, in his own words, "Psyche and body are not separate entities but one and the same life" (Jung 1917/43, p.115). In other words, psyche and body form a unity beyond the limits of understanding, but, in the meantime, they are treated as though they were separate for investigative, heuristic purposes (Jung 1936, p.547).

5.2 The psyche's body

Interestingly enough, before Jung elaborated his concept of synchronicity in the early 1950's, some remarks on it in his Tavistock Lectures of 1935 lead the notion more clearly towards the existential unity that his later thinking lost.

In these lectures he says that the notions of body and mind reflect the
"most lamentable" limitations of our conceptual thought. The terms indicate the way we think, but "probably" refer to "one thing" (Jung 1935b, p.33). "Body and mind", Jung continues, "are the two aspects of the living being, and that is all we know" (ibid., p.34). Synchronicity is the term that attempts to illustrate this "being together" (ibid.). Here Jung is saying that the problem is conceptual rather than real, and the notion of synchronicity is thus an attempt to cope with a conceptual problem.

It is unfortunate that Jung did not follow up his intuition that psyche and body are not so much entities as perspectives on that unity5. phenomenology knows as the lived body or body-subject.

Analytical psychologists have not followed this line of thought either, but one fairly influential exception needs to be mentioned. L. Stein (1967) attempted to link the archetypes, the self and the process of deintegration to intra- and inter-cellular activity. The direction of Stein's paper is favourably reviewed by Michael Fordham (1974), who calls it the only radical attempt to formulate a psychosomatic theory of the self. The irreparable defect in this paper, however, is that it overcomes psyche-body dualism by the positivist reduction to psychophysiology. There are indeed loose analogies between certain archetypal experiences

5. Analytical psychologists, especially in Britain, use the term "psychosomatic" to describe this unity of functioning. There are two flaws in this. First, the term presupposes the very two categories, psyche and soma, which the term is meant to undercut. Second, the term is not used to describe a unity of presence, or existence, but an encapsulated unity within-itself. Sometimes (eg. Fordham 1969, p.111) there is a tendency to regard "psychosomatic unity" as a hypothetical state which breaks as soon as the human organism begins to relate to the world (i.e."deintegrates"), even in intrauterine life. Philosophically, this existential unity achieved categorical clarity with Merleau-Ponty's (1968) term "flesh", but is approached by means of the term body-subject.
and physiological responses, for example the rejection of something that threatens to destroy relative equilibrium, but to situate one within the other is to confuse two radically different areas of discourse. As Stanton Peele (1981) has shown, reductionism always implies a certain magical thinking which goes curiously unrecognised.

To return to Jung's intuition regarding the psychologically living body: it seems that the intuition lacked the tools for its clear articulation, and Jung continued for the most part to speak the heuristic language of "psyche and body". Yet that language, given its expressed limits, cannot completely lose sight of the lived unity which was fundamental to Jung's understanding. Perhaps it needs to be pointed out that calling Jung's sense of this unity "fundamental" is not question-begging. It makes no sense at all to refer to this unity on occasion if psyche "and" body are considered dualistically. On the other hand, recognising the unity does not preclude one from making practical distinctions between "bodily" and "psychological" issues. It only needs to be remembered that no bodily functioning is devoid of intrinsic human significance, and no psychological phenomena occur without being embodied, at least minimally. Indeed, one of the themes of Merleau-Ponty's work is that the existential ambiguity of the vital and human orders does not negate the necessity for both physiological and psychoanalytic research (cf. Giorgi 1974; Hoeller 1982-83).

As we shall see later when considering the complex, Jung's word association studies reveal this existential ambiguity particularly clearly: the body's response to ("stimulus") words is immediate, direct and meaningful, and there are no psychic complexes that are not
intrinsically embodied.

The discussion thus far leads to the conclusion that the psyche, for Jung, is neither an epiphenomenon of brain processes nor a distinct realm that operates in parallel to the body. That is, neither traditional dualistic views, epiphenomenalism nor psychophysical parallelism, are Jung's. When he speaks of the "autonomy of the psyche" he is referring to a dimension of investigation and functioning that is inextricably linked to the existential ambiguity of the living body. In a passage in which he uses the terms spirit and psyche interchangeably, he says that psychology, like Western culture, has moved toward

"the mysterious truth that the spirit is the life of the body seen from within, and the body the outward manifestation of spirit - the two being really one" (Jung 1928/31b, p.94).

To work with the depths of the psyche, therefore, is to reclaim those significances revealed within the lived body. If the psyche is imagined as being in the head, this reflects only the curious course of Western history in which one's existential centre has come to be felt there. The psyche is not in the head, asserts Jung, not only because it involves more than thinking, but because thinking is not necessarily done with the head either:

"Our [Western man's] theory is that the seat of consciousness is in the head, but the Pueblo Indians told me that the Americans were mad because they believed their thoughts were in the heads, whereas any sensible man knows that he thinks with his heart. Certain Negro tribes locate their psychic functioning neither in the head nor the heart, but in the belly" (Jung 1931b, p.347).

It might seem that this point is being rather laboured yet it is remarkably easy to lose sight of it. An eminent British analytical psychologist (Redfearn 1985), for example, recently made the following
insightful comments:

"Post-renaissance medicine has lent a spuriously crushing support for a head-dominated view of the psyche. It is completely spurious because it has confused the anatomical body with its head and brain with the subjectively felt body scheme in which, for example, what we call thinking is felt in the head, and various feelings and emotions are felt in other parts of the subjectively experienced body" (p.72).

He rightly points out that "dynamic" psychology reinstates the subjective body (ibid.). Incredibly, he then loses this perception and falls into the confusion he has just clarified. He says that the location of "I" shifts bodily, and its location can be "attacked" by sensations advancing on it from other regions, the genitals to the head for instance. He then apologises for his formulation sounding anthropomorphic (!), and thinks that "it must reflect some corresponding activity on a neurophysiological level" (p.85). "My hypothesis", he continues,

"is that the locus of an unconscious complex or other sub-personality corresponds with hyper-excitability in some sub-cortical region which has some kind of topographical bodily-representation" (p.87).

Jung's view of psyche, on the other hand, radically questions this thrust. This questioning did not take root in analytical psychology, however (with the possible exception of Hillman's work). For one thing, it was not clearly articulated, let alone sustained. Another reason, perhaps, is that it appears to draw analytical psychology towards the reductionist hermeneutics of psychoanalysis, which Jung vigorously rejected. In rejecting those hermeneutics however, Jung seems at times to have lost sight of the existential density of a psychology that is embodied. The archetypal amplifications of Jungians who have followed suit tend to be disembodied abstractions, intellectualisations, and in relation to patients psychotherapy grinds to an exhausted halt (Boss
1963, pp.273-283; Herman 1984). In this case, the Developmental Jungians are right to insist that analytical psychology ground itself again within the experiences of the body-subject. Yet this insistence, too, is problematic, for, as is often sensed in the Jungian professional world, it tends once again towards reductionism. Then for example, one reads: "Symbols are all at root body-based, and are related to body zones" (Moore 1983, p.133).

What these tensions mean is this: the lack of a clear articulation of the relationship between psychological hermeneutics and the body is the source of the most significant debate and rupture in the Jungian professional world. A phenomenological articulation of that position at which Jung arrived but did not follow through should help clarify issues that have been misinterpreted. The best guide here is Merleau-Ponty (esp. 1942, 1945), who explices existence as the specifically human mode of being, for it unites the physical and the psychic in every human moment (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.88).

Briefly, to understand psyche as the experience of the lived body is not to limit psychological life to those few primitive structures of which psychoanalysis speaks so well. To do so is to limit the body's temporality to those modes of relationship that are dominant in infancy and childhood; it is to forget that with psychological development the lived body itself opens to a wider and more subtle range of possible

6. As Robert Hobson (1958) once remarked, "We are seldom allowed (by these Jungians) to let a penis or a breast remain as a concrete living symbol. It quickly becomes not really flesh but a sign leading us to an aerial sphere where we float around amongst wraith-like animas and esoteric mandalas, searching fruitlessly for a solid bed on which to consummate the hieros gamos" (p.69).
relations. Thus psychological development does not involve the separation
of the psyche from the body, as it is sometimes (usually?) put, but the
transformation of the body's psychological experience. As Merleau-Ponty
(1942) put it:

"Man is not a rational animal. The appearance of reason
and mind does not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed
instincts in man .... But if the alleged instincts in man
do not exist apart from the mental dialectic,
correlatively, this dialectic is not conceivable outside
of the concrete situations in which it is embodied. One
does not act with mind alone. Either mind is nothing, or
it constitutes a real and not an ideal transformation of
man. Because it is not a new sort of being but a new form
of unity, it cannot stand by itself" (p.181).

The emergence, or even "triumph", of the human order, therefore, does not
involve a separation from the vital order, but is a transformation of the
vital order itself. The same is true of the transformations from the
natural (physico-chemical) order to the vital order, or the natural to
human. The structural ambiguities still inhere within existence itself.
Such transformations allow the human being a wider range of possibilities
than is given to an animal (ibid., p.174). Now it is true that the human
and vital orders can be in conflict with one another, that the person can
flee from the relatively inert givens of his natural life. But it must be
understood that it is not a question of a "mind" being resistant to a
distinct "body". Such a formulation evaporates psychological life, and at
the same time empties the body of its vital significance as it, too, is
abstracted to become the anatomical body of medicine and psychiatry. The
tension between the human and vital orders is given as an ambiguity (or
ambivalence) within the structure of the lived body itself. It is
structured as different temporalities in conflict, not as different
entities (Brooke 1986). The vital order, what is loosely and misleadingly
called the "body", provides density and limits to psychological life; the
human order, loosely and misleadingly called the "psyche" or "mind", offers reflection and transcendence of (freedom from) the particularities that beset animal existence.

This formulation of Merleau-Ponty's reveals and articulates Jung's understanding at this point in a way that the latter was unable to do, and it corrects several tendencies, which can now be called tangential, in analytical psychology. In this view the psyche is indeed autonomous, as Jung argued, but that autonomy refers to the integrity and quality of psychological functioning and not to a domain, or area, that is distinct from the body. Neither need the autonomous psyche be interpreted as a domain separate from the evident primacy of human intercourse, as Jung also seemed to do (Goodheart 1984a, 1984b). Correlatively, the psyche is indeed embodied as the Developmental Jungians argue, but this embodiment does not allow for either psychophysiological reductionism or the hermeneutical reduction of psychological diversity and subtlety to those primitive phenomena embodied in infancy and childhood. Temporal priority is not an ontological one.

This point should be obvious to Jungians, yet is in continual need of reasserting. Louis Zinkin (1979), one of the more reflective analysts, points out that the term "the psyche" tends to separate conceptually one person from another and cannot deal with two persons communicating. He discusses Buber with favour, but then, in the name of scientific psychology, he "translates" Buber's "pronouncements" into "testable hypotheses". Thus, Buber's "in the beginning is the relation", an ontological statement, is "translated" into an hypothesis about mother-child interaction. Ontology surrenders to ontic possibility, and presence
to repitition; of Buber's thought hardly anything remains (cf. also Samuels 1985b, pp.81-82).

5.3. Jung's "psychologism"

It is appropriate at this point to discuss Buber's critique of Jung and the problem of psychologism. Although Buber himself is not a central figure in the existential phenomenological movement (Luijpen (1969) and Spiegelberg (1960) never refer to him in their classic overviews), his critique of Jung captures very well essential features of the phenomenological critique. Buber was responded to by Jung, and is thus well known to analytical psychologists, which is another advantage in referring to him here.

It has been shown that Jung failed to follow through a consistently psychological analysis of the lived body. In other words, although Jung seems to have understood, even better than Freud, the body as a psychological body, he did not conceive of that psychological body as the bodying forth (Boss 1975, p.100-105) of human existence. Thus his insight into the nature of psyche as the experiential realm of the lived body still tends to be an interiority placed over and against the world "outside". Of course, such an interiority is exacerbated in those formulations which describe psyche as a distinct place inside the body. Existential phenomenology shows that the body situates human existence as world-relatedness (Zaner 1964, p.241), that there is no human body that is not shaped in accordance with its tasks in the world (Kruger 1979/88, p.40; Van den Berg 1972, p.58). As Erwin Straus (1966) once put it: "That we are beset is decisive; the How and the What are secondary. The That of
being engaged and seized precedes the What" (p.259).

For Jung, however, the psyche seems to be conceived as an inner world, radically separate from an incarnated life-world. Moreover, although Jung tends to separate outer and inner worlds along Cartesian lines (Jung 1929c, p.337), he also tends, as we have seen, to view the phenomena and relations of the outer world in terms of the interplay of psychic images. Jung's model thus endorses the alienated ontology of post-renaissance culture, in which the meanings of an event are separated from the event itself (Jung 1952c, p.492).

It is not surprising that the most vociferous critics of this position were the theologians, Buber being one of them, for the otherness of God tends in this psychologism to disappear as the theist is thought to relate merely to a psychic image. The question here, however, is not only theological but the issue of the Otherness of any being to which man is related.

Buber's critique of Jung appeared in the journal, Merkur, in February 1952, and was published in Eclipse of God the same year. The May issue of Merkur contained both Jung's (1952b) "Reply" and a further response from Buber (also published in Eclipse of God). The dialogue has been taken up by others. Continuing Buber's critique has been Maurice Friedman (1967, 1984, 1985). As he himself admits, his early critique was particularly harsh and failed to do justice to the Jungian sensibility, but recently his reading has become far more generous. On the other side of the debate, a number of Jungians have tried, either more or less successfully, to deal with Buber (eg. Gordon 1968b; Hobson 1985; Sborowitz (in Friedman 1985); Trüb (in Friedman 1964, 1985); Whitmont
1973; Zinkin 1979). Despite some yielding on the part of the Jungians (Samuels, 1985b; Whitmont 1982), and an obvious respect for Buber, the result tends to be an eclecticism that does not question the ontological premises of Jung's model of the psyche. A significant exception is Robert Hobson (1985), who founds an image of the human being drawn from the area of human meeting. Another is Edward Whitmont, who will be discussed presently.

The essence of Buberian criticism is that there is, for Jung, no ontologically separate Other to whom one is existentially indebted. The effect of this is that the Other has significance only as he/she/it facilitates inner psychological development, for it is one's relationship with the self that is the measure of individuation. There is no effective reality that does not originate in the psyche itself. The other to whom Jung felt indebted was most fundamentally that Other within, which he came to call the Self (Papadopoulos 1984). Relations with real beings appear ultimately to be expedient, in so far as they are real at all, for the psyche is the only immediate referent and place of meaning.

As Friedman (1985) has pointed out, even where Jung recognises the necessity of interpersonal relationships for personal wholeness, he tends once again to retreat. Where Jung writes

"The unrelated human being lacks wholeness, for he can achieve wholeness only through the Soul and the Soul cannot exist without its other side, which is always found in a "You"" (1946, p.244),

he then elaborates his meaning as follows:

"I do not, of course, mean the synthesis or identification of two individuals, but the conscious union of the ego with everything that has been projected onto the "you." Hence wholeness is the result of an intrapsychic process ..." (ibid., p.245n; quoted more extensively in Friedman
The ruptured ontology implicit in this view is prevalent throughout analytical psychology's writings. For example, Carotenuto (1981) says that emerging psychological maturity in relation to a woman "represents the rapport with the inner reality of the anima, which has only a projective link with persons in real life" (p.52, italics added). A rather more critical and subtle discussion of psychosexual relations is presented by Guggenbuhl-Craig (1977), but the problematic ontology seems to remain. Without becoming side-tracked into justifying the assertion in detail, it does seem that Samuels' (1985b) assessment of Jung's psychologism is generally true of analytical psychology today: "The interpersonal dimension," he says,

"is not ruled out by Jung's theory of opposites but the apparently real figures with which the ego may be in conflict are usually seen by him as external manifestations of inner process: for example, conflict with anima rather than wife" (p.115).

The point is being made with regard to the interpersonal dimension, but it is true of the more general relation to the Other and the world as such. It has been argued by one Jungian analyst (Satinover 1985) that Jung's model of the psyche is an expression of his own schizoid retreat in the face of an "object-less" world. Few readers of Jung would want to go that far, yet it does seem that Jung's model of the psyche is founded on an ontology that feeds the narcissist's grandiose retreat from a ruptured and impoverished existence - or, perhaps, one that is incestuously threatening (Goodheart 1984a).

Jung's (1926b) response to Buber was, in effect, to shout louder. He defended himself as an empiricist concerned with "facts", and denied
responsibility for being misunderstood. It did not help to stress that
the psyche was the "objective psyche".

In this debate many Jungians may have sympathy for Whitmont's (1973)
sentiments. He is annoyed by Buber's "consistent misunderstandings" of
Jung but equally frustrated by Jung's inability to bring his position
home clearly. After presenting and discussing Buber's criticisms in turn,
he suggests that ambiguities of terminology and Jung's introverted bias
obscure Jung's intentions. He then reformulates these intentions in a
way the existential Buber would probably find more acceptable. Whitmont
concedes that there has been a failure

"to make a clear distinction between the psyche as a
vehicle of experience and the non-psychic object "out
there" even though that object be endowed with qualities,
intentionality, and a spirit of its own.

"The result is a confusion between that which is being
observed and the means of observation" (p.193).

Although Whitmont does not say it, he is pointing to Jung's peculiar use,
or misuse, of Kant - which, in fact, Buber had spotted (Buber 1952,
p.80). There are several authors who have discussed this Jung-Kant
relation (Bar 1976; de Voogt 1977, 1984; Eckman 1986), but some of their
points are tangential to the present focus. What needs to be understood
is that Jung takes the two terms used by Kant to illustrate the structure
of the relation between man and world (Durant 1926/61, pp.253-299; Kant
1781) and then collapses them. Firstly, Jung (eg. 1938/54) refers to
Kant's "categories of the understanding" in order to authorise his
assertion that all perception and knowledge is personally structured,
i.e. that the mind is not a tabula rasa. Like the "categories" the
archetypes are those structuring tendencies given within animal and human
life. In fact, Jung regards Kant's "categories" as a rationalised,
"deteriorated" intuition of the archetypes (Jung 1919, p.136). Secondly, Jung makes use of Kant's distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon. For Kant the noumenon referred to the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon to the thing as it appeared to the subject. The distinction was necessary, thought Kant, to account for the limitations of human perception and understanding given that perception and knowledge is humanly structured. It was not a distinction which intended to lift the phenomenal realm out of the world and make it a creation of the subject. But this is what Jung does. In a passage that illustrates his confusion he says "As the eye to the sun, so the soul corresponds to God" (Jung 1944/52, p.10). He elaborates this assertion by saying that

"the soul must contain in itself the faculty of relationship to God, i.e. a correspondence, otherwise a connection could never come about. This correspondence is in psychological terms, the archetype of the God-image" (ibid., p.11, italics in original.).

The problem is that a relationship is precisely not a correspondence. In Kantian terms, what is initially roughly-speaking a "category", a faculty of relation, is expanded by Jung to include a "phenomenon", the thing to which the subject is related. The archetypes become both "categories" and "noumenata" (unknowable things-in-themselves); and if archetypal images are "phenomenal", they are no longer grounded in the given world but in the psyche. Instead of the structural relation between man and world, or "category" and "phenomenon", there are the intrapsychic relations between consciousness (archetypally structured, perhaps) and archetypal images. Even the postulated noumenon is no longer "out there" but is equally the unknowable intrapsychic source of archetypal images.

To return to Whitmont: when he reformulates Jung's position he is in effect correcting Jung's use of Kant. He suggests that Jung's emphasis on
the "reality of the psyche" should be understood as referring to man's perspectivity and metaphoric, or symbolic, sense when relating to the world. Thus man's anthropomorphising tendency when relating to the transpersonal should not be called "projection" but rather "symbolic perceptions". Experiences of "transpersonal objects" should be regarded as experiences sui generis, thus avoiding the Cartesian mind-object split. The term "objective psyche" could simply be dropped, and the term "psyche" should refer to the realm of subjective experience only. Similarly, the term "projection" should be limited to its clinical usage only. This type of formulation, says Whitmont, expresses more clearly what Jungians "really mean".

Whitmont thus goes a long way towards overcoming the charge of psychologism, and he does indeed open human experience to phenomena in a shared world. It is unfortunate that his discussion is brief. Even so, it contains a couple of rather serious flaws. In limiting the psyche to the subjective realm he tends to forfeit Jung's profound insight into the nature of the "objective psyche" - however problematic this term might be (see below). Further, despite his intentions, he tends to separate ontologically, that is spatially and substantially, the reality of "transpersonal objects" and the psyche that perceives them. As Hobson (1958) once pointed out in response to the same separation made by the Jesuit theologian, Raymond Hostie (1957), the issue is rather more subtle. The psyche as the means of observation and the world as observed cannot be that clearly distinguished, for they form a structural unity which precedes differentiation into this or that entity. (It is surprising that Hostie should have endeavoured to separate psyche and Other so radically, as his scholarly and searching book was significantly
influenced by Boss.) Thus, apart from being untenable phenomenologically, Whitmont's view fails to be adequate to the existential spatiality that Jung's understanding of the psyche intended. To reveal this spatiality and to found it ontologically is the next task in these reflections. If successful, it will suggest that Jung's intuition into psychic reality was more properly of that fundamental world-relatedness Heidegger called *Dasein*.

5.4 From encapsulated psyche to psyche as lived world

The critiques of Jung's psychologism might have good grounds, yet seem to be based more on the confusion in his thinking and expression that on his intention. It is particularly significant that Boss, who, although indebted to Jung seldom concedes anything to him, makes the following comment:

"Jung, as no psychologist before him, clearly recognised the artificiality of the mental separation of human reality into psychic subject and isolated external objects. He saw in this a malignant disease which had attacked all previous psychology" (Boss 1957 p.52).

The discussion thus far has concentrated on the psyche as an autonomous realm of human functioning *within the person*, but these remarks by Boss effectively question the adequacy of that discussion. Yet what is this "adequacy"? The discussion and critiques seem accurate enough. What Boss implies, therefore, is that Jung's intuitive understanding of psychological life far surpassed most of his theoretical formulations. Yet the question of what Jung saw and understood does not require a fantastic (in both senses) leap into his mind, for throughout his writings he makes statements which reveal this understanding in ways that
simply bypass his conceptual inadequacies. What is to be argued here is that these statements should be given a more central status than that of mere asides.

Jung (1931b, p.346) introduces the term "objective psyche" to stress that the psyche is hardly subject to the will, but instead it lives its own life, and it affects the individual whether he likes it or not as surely as does "objective reality". The "objective psyche" is therefore essentially equivalent to the unconscious (Jung 1944/52, p.44). The "subjective psyche", on the other hand, Jung says is a synonym for consciousness (Jung 1973, p.497), but presumably the personal unconscious, relatively uninteresting and unimportant for Jung, can be included here. Therefore, personal identity, with its temporal and spatial situatedness, is roughly equivalent to the subjective psyche only. Jung's terms, subjective and objective psyche, have not caught on. The reason for this seems partly that the "subjective psyche" refers essentially to the ego complex, and the "objective psyche" refers to no more than what Jung had called psyche all along. In other words, the introduction of the term "objective" does not reveal a new entity; instead it is an adjective which "only" stresses that the psyche is not to be confused with or limited to the boundaries of the individual person, whose personal psychology is organised around the "ego". Thus there is strictly-speaking not his or her psyche but rather the psyche (Jung 1973, p.556), within which he and she have individual perspectives and play their parts. The psyche, insists Jung (eg. 1938/40, p.84; 1957, p.271; 1973, p.410) surrounds man and is antecedent to him. It is not inside man any more than sea is inside the fish (Jung 1929b, p.51). In contrast to psychoanalysis therefore, for Jung the psyche is not in
This point is crucial but is often forgotten amongst Jungians. It is forgotten that the psyche is the person's world of work, interpersonal relations, etc. (cf. Cahen 1983). There are probably many reasons for "forgetting" this, particularly, perhaps, the historical drag of Cartesian thought and analytical psychology's relationship with psychoanalysis. The debates in this relationship focus exclusively, it seems, on the "contents" of the psyche or its "depth", whereas the difference is much more fundamental. The problem also lies with Jung himself, who seems to have been insufficiently aware of the ontological difference his work indicated. Thus for example, he says:

"An unlimited amount of what we now feel to be an integral part of our psychic being disports itself merrily for the primitive in projections ranging far and wide.

"The word 'projection' is not really appropriate, for nothing has been cast out of the psyche; rather the psyche has attained its present complexity by a series of acts of introjection. Its complexity has increased in proportion to the despiritualisation of the world" (Jung 1934/54, p.25).

This passage reflects a line of thinking that occurs frequently in Jung's writings and its thesis is elaborated in detail in one Jungian's book (Von Franz, 1978). The following points need to be noted:

- it suggests that archaic man does not have a psyche;
- having a psyche is a relatively recent phenomenon and is a developmental achievement;
- the psyche is a complex organisation which situates subjectivity as

7. The most notable exception is perhaps D.W. Winnicott (1964 p.453), who saw the profound sense in which Jung, as a person, had no place within him - psyche in Freud's terms - in which to have a repressed unconscious.
- a place and an interiority over and against the world;
- psychic development implies disenchantment and alienation.

As became clear when considering Jung's experience in Africa, it is a line of thinking that flatly contradicts Jung's personal experience of psychic development. Now it can be added that it contradicts his understanding that the psyche precedes and is the condition for the appearance of man, as well as his assertions that the psyche surrounds man and is not "inside" man. If Jung's concept of the ego is loosened a little, so that it refers to subjectivity rather than to consciousness alone — and this would be compatible with its sense in analytical psychology if not its definition in *Psychological Types* (1921) (cf. section 6.3) — then it is clear that Jung in the passage quoted is confusing psyche and ego. The place of psychological life is then interpreted in terms of the boundaries of the individual person.

Jung does not seem to have noticed this conceptual confusion, or rather error, in his own writings, and was therefore insensitive to the degree of his own responsibility when misunderstood by his critics, Buber being an example. But in answer to these critics, he stresses that the self (as totality, a synonym for psyche) and ego are different in their ontological spatial dimensions:

"(T)he self comprises infinitely more than a mere ego .... It is as much one's self, and all other selves, as the ego. (The coming-to-be of the self) does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself" (Jung 1947/54, p.136).

To identify the existential spatiality of the psyche is to show that psychic reality is world-related. When Jung (1933b) says, therefore, that we live not in a material world but a psychic world (p.384), he is not
endorsing a solipsistic idealism. Christine Downing (1977) has not developed the above argument, but in a remarkable intuitive defence of Jung has said:

"I do not have a psyche, but am present in the world in a variety of ways, waking, dreaming, fantasying, but always in a characteristically human, that is psychical, way" (p.92).

Furthermore:

"To be in the world psychically ... leads us naturally to speak of psychic space, and of psyche itself as a space. Heidegger, too, speaks of man as a clearing" (ibid., p.95).

Thus what Jung calls the psyche, phenomenology situates as the life-world (Husserl's Lebenswelt). It should be mentioned that this interpretation, implied by Downing, has been made by Rauhala (1984, p.239) who, however, does not support his assertion with reference to Jung's writings. What needs to be noted here is that to situate psyche as life-world does not involve a hermeneutic leap from one ontology into another, from the Cartesian "mind" or Freudian "psyche" into existence. It is rather that Jung's understanding of psyche achieves terminological clarity, so that the existential significance of his thought can more appropriately be grasped.

The analytical psychologist might question whether this interpretation of psyche can be adequate to the (unconscious) depths of which Jung speaks, for it might seem to dissolve psychic reality into the banality of common-sense everydayness. There are two answers to this. First, it is precisely Jung's contribution to phenomenology to deepen its understanding of the lived world. Second, the phenomenology of the lived world has come a long way since Husserl defended the "everyday world" against the scientific vision of positivist reality (Strasser 1963,
pp.65-97). We can recall here Luijpen's (1969) definition: it is "our most original experience of our most original world" (p.115).

Jung did not consistently give ontological priority to the life-world. This can be seen in all those occasions in which he endorses the scientific definition of reality, despite his uncomfortable sense that this endorsement alienates human life and desecrates the world. This tension and inconsistency give rise to his repeated assertion that experience is real but "only psychic". Phenomenology's contribution to analytical psychology at this point is a sustained legitimation of the ontological priority of the life-world, that is, the world constituted through and disclosive of human existence. The scientific view is always in the last analysis derived from and dependent upon that world. (Hence it is not strictly necessary in existential phenomenology to include the term "life" in the expression "life-world".)

To express the psyche in terms of the lived world grounds a number of features of Jung's psychology which otherwise lack theoretical coherence. These features suggest, however, that an existential interpretation of psyche is necessary if Jung's intentions are to be realised. Of course, the justification for this assertion is the present thesis as a whole, but several features can be mentioned here: Jung's personal understanding of the goals of individuation; the psychoid archetype and the link to the earth; and psychotherapeutic practice.

Jung's personal understanding of the goals of individuation has already been discussed in relation to his experience in Africa. But Jung's recognition of the existentiality of the psyche and of its ontological
priority is apparent in many other places in his writings as well. One of
the most memorable is as follows:

"It is quite possible that India is the real world, and
that the white man lives in a madhouse of abstractions. To
be born, to die, to be sick, greedy, dirty, childish,
ridiculously vain, miserable, hungry, vicious; to be
manifestly stuck in illiterate unconsciousness, to be
suspended in a narrow universe of good and evil gods ...,
that is perhaps the real life, life as it was meant to
be, the life of the earth. Life in India has not yet
withdrawn into the capsule of the head. It is still the
whole body that lives. No wonder the European feels
dreamlike: the complete life of India is something of
which he merely dreams. When you walk with naked feet, how
can you ever forget the earth? .... (But) I did not see
one European in India who really lived there. They were
all living in Europe, that is, in a sort of bottle filled
with European air" (Jung 1939b, p.518).

It is only a little unfortunate that Jung did not include here phenomena
such as love, sex, laughter and dance, but there is no reason not to.
Jung's suggestion that the modern Westerner dreams the reality he can no
longer live appears elsewhere as well (Jung 1964, p.85), but it would be
a mistake to think of dreams as psychic and the Indian's reality as non­
psychic. Even the Westerner's disinfected world Jung sees as a "wish­
fulfilling fiction" (ibid., p.86), hence as a psychic reality.

Therefore, when Jung (1933b) says we live not in a material world but a
psychic world (p.384), he is not saying that the psyche is an
encapsulated "world" unto itself, but that the world in which man lives
is psychological.

It follows that the aims of analytical psychology do not refer to the
development of an interiorised psyche, constituted through "withdrawn
projections". They can only refer to the development of appropriate
relations and boundaries within psychic reality itself, that is, within
the vitality of the lived world. Thus in *Analytical Psychology and a Weltanschauung*, Jung (1928/31a) writes:

"(A)nalytical psychology is a reaction against the exaggerated rationalisation of consciousness which, seeking the control nature, isolates itself from her and so robs man of his own natural history....

"Hemmed round by rationalistic walls, we are cut off from the eternity of nature. Analytical psychology seeks to break through these walls" (pp. 380, 381).

Or again, as consciousness expands beyond

"the petty, oversensitive, personal world of the ego, (it) participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This widened consciousness ... is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large" (Jung 1928b, p.178).

These remarks are meaningless if the psyche is thought of in terms of personal boundaries.

A second feature of Jung's thought which intends to overcome the Cartesian interpretation of psyche is his notion of the psychoid archetype and its connection with the earth. The whole question of the archetypes will be discussed later. At this point it needs only to be noted that Jung (1947/54) introduced the concept of the psychoid archetype to define an area of "quasi-psychic" functioning that is neither merely vital nor specifically psychological. The language of this formulation still echoes the Cartesian fantasy of man as a "rational animal", an animal with psychological life and civilization added onto it. However, until Merleau-Ponty (1968) introduced the term "flesh" there was no philosophical category available to express Jung's intention - nor, for that matter, could Merleau-Ponty's earlier integrative descriptions of the natural, vital, and human orders achieve categorical clarity. Nevertheless, Jung's use of the term "psychoid" is an attempt to
found psychological life within the materiality of the body in a way that is not reductionistic but that sees the body's natural vitality as fundamentally, however rudimentarily, psychological: in Merleau-Ponty's (1964) phrase, as "the natural face of mind" (p. 229).

Some commentators (Samuels et al 1986) do not take the term further than this, but others do. Jaffe (1971), for example, argues that, with the introduction of the term psychoid archetype, "the rigorous separation of the psyche and world is abolished" (p.23). She says that the term is intended to name the ordering principle that underlies the structural unity between man and world, such as is discovered in mathematics for example. Mathematics is a "human invention", yet also describes patterns in the natural world (ibid., pp 32-33). This formulation of Jaffe's is somewhat problematic, but her point is that Jung's analysis of the psychological body deepens into an appreciation of the psychological materiality of the world itself. References to this appreciation can be found throughout his writings. In a well known passage, for example, he writes:

"The deeper "layers" of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat further and further into darkness. "Lower down", that is to say as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e. in chemical substances. The body's carbon is simply carbon. Hence "at bottom" the psyche is simply "world". In this sense I hold Kerenyi to be absolutely right when he says that in the symbol the world itself is speaking" (Jung 1940, p.173).

It is rather unfortunate that Jung's appreciation of the psychological reality of the world emerged in conjunction with his interest in parapsychology, because he usually (eg. Jung 1934d, p.409; 1958a, p.411) asserts the former point by arguing the validity of the latter. This
tends to confuse different types of experience, and to render extraordinary the presence of the world that is always immediate. It also belies his habitual metaphysical sense of being an *a priori* subjectivity, for whom the world's meaningfulness is always problematic (Scott, 1975).

The common theme in the interpretations of "psychoid", however, is the suggestion that the human psyche is not ontologically separate from the world; in a profound sense, it is that open place in which the earth-world can realise herself. Human consciousness, for Jung, is Nature conscious of itself. This is the deepest implication of Jung's consistent attempt to think of psychological life as an expression of Nature. It is also his way of thinking through human bodiliness to a non-Cartesian, non-dualistic ontology.

It is significant that it is similar to Merleau-Ponty's (1968) late attempts to overcome the remains of subject-object dualism which he self-critically detected in his earlier works, that is, to explore the "pre-intentional" unity that is revealed through the body as "flesh". As Kwant (1968), who discusses this phase of Merleau-Ponty's thought, puts it:

"The self-actualization of the body brings into existence man's individuality and personality. Man's personality comes into existence because in man Being comes to awareness of itself .... Since Being in man comes to awareness of itself, man's personality is co-extensive with all Being" (p.133).

Thus, although Jung's analysis of the body's materiality as psychic depth and Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the body as flesh follow different paths, both intend a vision of an embodied psychological life that is no less than the earth-world's coming to awareness of itself at that place of opening called man or, for Jung, psyche.
The third feature of Jung's work which achieves clarity through the interpretation of psyche as lived world is analysis and psychotherapy. It is interesting that Maurice Friedman (1984, p.52) recognises Jung's notion of the psychoid archetype as his attempt to get beyond psychologism. Yet Friedman (1985, p.21) thinks that it is more particularly Jung's writings on therapy that successfully modify his encapsulated view of man. The point has been made (Zinkin 1979) that the traditional notion of psyche tends to separate conceptually one person from another, and ultimately cannot deal with the reality of two person's communicating. Yet it is this reality in the therapeutic relationship that is irreducibly primary for Jung. That is why Jung recognises that the goals, processes, and "findings" are different from one therapy to another: Freud, Adler, and himself, for example. Whatever the therapeutic benefits of putting the chair behind the psychoanalytic couch, as a research strategy it is a spurious attempt to find that Archimedian point outside of the human encounter from which one's thoughts (theoretical ideas, etc.) will simply correspond without mediation to the "real" nature of the psyche of the patient. Throughout Jung's essays on psychotherapy (Vol 16 of The Collected Works, as well as elsewhere) is the theme that what emerges in therapy does so out of the interaction of the two people present. "Countertransference", the involvement of the therapist's totality in the therapeutic process, was regarded by Jung not only as an inescapable fact but as essential to the healing process (cf. especially Jung 1929d, 1946). Even dreams occur not in one or other person but in the interpersonal therapeutic space (Jung 1977, p.91). Thus Jung (1916/57, p.74) saw that the "transference" was the primary mode in which the relation between conscious and unconscious (the so-called
"transcendent function") emerged, and that the lived presence of the analyst is as an image which has its own purpose (Jung 1917/43, p.92).

It should be mentioned that this theme has been developed by several analytical psychologists, although their adherence to a Cartesian intrapsychic ontology sometimes tends to obscure their radically non-dualistic intuitions. However, for example, Plaut (1956) follows Jung in admitting the extent to which the analyst is required to "incarnate" archetypal images in the service of the patient, and Plaut's seminal paper has considerably opened up the interpersonal field of enquiry. Davidson (1966) sees that the transference is a form of active imagination, an implicit corollary of which is that active imagination's structure occurs primarily not inside the individual but in the psychic room between therapist and patient. Personal boundary - the ability to contain active imagination in the privacy of interior fantasy - is derivative, and emerges out of that shared psychic space. Fordham (1977) and Gordon (1985b) develop this idea by situating active imagination in what Winnicott (1951) calls the "transitional space". Redfearn (1978 p.215) has made the important therapeutic point that to fail to situate a patient's fantasies in terms of his behaviour or to what is happening to him is to become swallowed up in his psychopathology and, in effect, to abandon him. In other words, Redfearn is saying that the "psyche", the place of fantasy, is incarnate and situated as world-relatedness, and one way of abandoning the patient is to forget that and to be swallowed up in a severed headful of fantasies. Goodheart (1984b) points out that Jung's repeated insistence on the dialectical immediacy of psychotherapy tends to be undermined in his notion of an encapsulated "autonomous psyche", and Goodheart insists that the analysand's psychological life as it
emerges is co-constituted in the primacy of the therapeutic interaction itself.

These lines of thinking have been followed up by Samuels (1985a, 1985b), who, with characteristic integrative power, links clinical insight into the therapeutic relationship with Corbin's and Hillman's insistence on the primacy of the imaginal and, it can be added, the dream. The imaginal realm, or mundus imaginalis (Corbin 1972), is not an "inner world" projected into the relationship by the patient or analyst; it is rather that psychic reality which envelops both people present and which structures their mutual presence. The structure between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal is thus exposed as a conceptual error which is practically limiting (Samuels 1985b, p. 264). What Samuels does not say, but clearly implies, is that the conceptual error involves the definition of psyche, which should be understood as that shared imaginal world within which the two people play their egoic and other parts. The term shared should not be misunderstood: it does not deny the experienced reality of or necessity for personal (ego-) boundaries, nor does it deny misunderstandings, or interpersonal conflicts, "transference", etc. For example, even a neurotically based or defensive response on the part of the therapist - "illusory counter-transference", to use Fordham's (1957, 1960) expression - reveals something about the deeper psychic reality that is shared and mutually understood.

One further point regarding psychotherapy can briefly be mentioned. Jung recognised better than Freud that, when a person comes for therapy, he presents not his neurosis but himself, for the neurosis does not come "from some obscure corner of the unconscious ...; it comes
from the totality of a man's life and from all the experiences that have accumulated over the years and decades, and finally, not merely from his life as an individual but from his psychic experience within the family or even the social group" (Jung 1934e, p.159).

Of course Jung's oblique, polemical reference to Freud is not really accurate. However, the point is that that "totality of man's life" is not more than his psyche, for, as was discussed earlier, there is no real, effective experience that is not psychic. The Cartesian mistake here would be to think this means the patient carries the world inside himself (Jung 1945, p.95). Rather, it means that the patient's psyche, in which experience takes place, is non other than the world in which he lives. And an essential part of that world is the person of the therapist.

It is time to summarise and conclude this long and detailed discussion.

5.5 Summary and provisional definition

Jung insists that there is no experience that does not take place in the psyche for the psyche is the only immediate reality, an autonomous realm contained within itself. It is not reducible either materially or hermeneutically to the body, i.e. Jung rejects both psychophysiological and psychoanalytic reductionism. Nor does the psyche exist and function as an "inner realm" in parallel with the body, i.e. Jung rejects psychophysical parallelism. The psyche is not ontologically separate from the body, but is the body's experience; correlatively, the body is not to be understood as the "anatomical body" but as the bodily materiality of psychological life. Although Jung clearly understands the body as a
psychological body, he fails to understand the human body as the bodying forth of human existence. Hence Jung tends to retain the Cartesian separation of psyche and world. The separation of experience from the world's otherness is the source of cogent criticism. However, this Cartesian tendency seems to reflect the historical drag of Cartesian thought and Jung's dialogue with psychoanalysis, and is inconsistent with his own understanding of the psyche as the life-world. In this sense the autonomy of the psyche refers to the ontological and epistemological autonomy of the life-world. To sustain this understanding it is necessary to identify Jung's own occasional confusion of psyche and ego, i.e. the place of psychological life with personal identity. Three advantages of situating conceptually the psyche as lived world are: that it is consistent with Jung's Weltanschauung; that it embraces his non-dualistic, ontological view of the mutual implication of "mind and matter", theoretically approached with the term psychoid archetype; that it renders coherent his understanding of the process and place of psychotherapy.

Throughout the discussion references have been made to analytical psychologists other than Jung. At times they seem to remain caught in (reductionistic) thinking that Jung himself overcomes. At other times (eg. understanding the therapeutic structure) they extend his thought in useful ways, even as their fine insights strain at their Cartesian paradigmatic seams without conclusively breaking them.

A brief, simple definition of the psyche at this point could be expressed as follows: the psyche is the place of experience, and that place is the world in which man lives.
5.6. Psyche as Dasein

Psyche has been situated as that open realm within which the world comes into being and engages man's life. Implied so far, but not yet stated, is that the psyche is both the lived world and the opening of that world. One is ontologically coeval with the other. There is no "opening" that does not open a world, and no world that is not revealed within a certain open, i.e. psychic, light. The lived world is equally its opening in the incarnate light of human experience. "Both" these phenomena describe psyche for Jung; and "they" describe Dasein for Heidegger who says:

"Ontologically, 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself" (1927, p.92).

This difficult point to grasp does not mean that Dasein has "two meanings", that it refers both to the process of illuminating and to the world that appears. For Heidegger, there is no world-in-itself in any meaningful or communicable sense at all that is somehow "there" prior to its perceptual opening. Similarly, there is no opening that does not open a world, no consciousness that is not conscious of something. Man as Dasein is not a subject, and not even a "relation" between subject and object, but is that "between" that makes relationship possible. As Heidegger puts it:

"Man is never first and foremost on the hither side of the world, as a "subject", whether this is taken as "I" or "We". Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which simultaneously is related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that lights the "between" within which a "relation" of subject to object can "be""
(Heidegger 1935/36, p.229).

The same structural unity needs to be understood for the term psyche. If psyche is not a Cartesian or Freudian "inner realm" but the life-world, that does not imply the dissolution of the density and imaginative power of psychological life into environmental concerns. Psychology does not dissolve into sociology or general systems theory. On the contrary, the lived world is a testament to psyche; it is that place at which the magnitude and multiplicity of the psyche is materialised and revealed. This should become clear when recalling, for instance, Jung's perception of the world as a temple. As the very temple-like being of the world was revealed, that revelation situated and, for Jung, fulfilled the imaginative power of psyche. The psyche, like *Dasein* therefore, is "both" that constituting power "and" the constituted world.

It is not being suggested here that Jung saw this coconstitution in any sustained or articulate sense. But Jung did view the psyche both as a constituting power and as a phenomenal world. Insofar as he saw the phenomenal world not as a Cartesian "inner world" but as the lived world, then it does seem that Heidegger's analysis of the structural constitution of *Dasein* clarifies Jung's intuition regarding that power-world relation. It also, most importantly, grounds the meaning of psyche ontologically. Finally, it also makes ontological sense of Hillman's (1975, p.x) definition of psyche as perspective, even as his work attempts, rightly, to see psyche within things and events (cf. Hillman 1982, 1883b; cf. also Moore 1987).

A question that emerges is to what extent Jung's notion of psyche is
his attempt to speak a pre-conceptual intuition of that structure Heidegger called Dasein. It should not be too surprising to discover that it may well be, for Jung's concern was the foundation of human experience and meaning, and we all live, says Heidegger, in a relationship to Being "and" Dasein that is pre-conceptual and simultaneously understood and "forgotten". In a sense the question cannot be answered, but it does invite us to clarify and situate existentially a number of features of the psyche that otherwise are left hanging. Reciprocally, however, the connections to be found between psyche and Dasein lends further weight to the existential phenomenological interpretation of Jung's thought. These points of connection concern the following:

1. spatiality,
2. a forgotten presence,
3. the hermeneutic circle of self-understanding,
4. pre-reflective understanding of the world,
5. prepersonal structure,
6. "ownmost" yet not personal,
7. bodiliness,
8. finitude,
9. imagination,
10. no-thingness given through images/things,
11. truth,
12. the authentic attitude.

Each of these will be discussed briefly.

Firstly, both psyche and Dasein are spatial, yet that spatiality can in
neither case be restricted to its Euclidian definition: distance and
closeness, high and low, are lived realities, whereas geometric space is
a limited abstraction from that primary lived reality. This understanding
of the primordially lived spatiality is given particular emphasis by Jung
in his exploration of synchronistic phenomena, but, as mentioned earlier,
it should not be limited to these phenomena. For Heidegger, spatiality is
an existentiale, that possibility without which human existence or any of
its disclosive phenomena is inconceivable; and the term Dasein (there­
being) is Heidegger's attempt to think that ontological openness in which
our particular (ontic) spatial relations are lived. The lived space of
psychological life is not homogenous; it differentiates values, the
loved, the hated, the feared, the envied, inside and outside, mine and
not mine, the sacred and the profane (cf. Bollnow 1967; Eliade 1957).

Secondly, both psyche and Dasein are immanent yet strangely ineffable.
For Jung, we are immersed in the psyche which surrounds us, yet he
repeatedly says that he does not know what the psyche is and its
definition eludes him. On the other hand, although Dasein is the
structure of human existence itself, hence the most proximate of all
phenomena, it took the genius of Heidegger to bring our curiously
forgetful understanding of it to light.

This all-embracing yet unarticulated presence of psyche and Dasein
reflects the autonomous realm that each is. There is no Archimedian point
outside of either from which it can be inspected. The third point, then,
is that both psyche and Dasein are necessarily caught within the
hermeneutic circle of self-understanding. For Jung, every statement
about the psyche has the nature of a "subjective confession"; that is,
every answer is given by the same psyche that asks the question about its nature and to some extent is an image of the question itself (cf. Jung 1921, p.52). Jung restricts his analysis to the level of (ontic) psychological life, yet given his epistemology and the world-embracing definition of psyche it would seem reasonable to recognise his position as ontological. Heidegger's ontological analysis of Being begins with an analysis of that being for whom Being is an issue, viz. Dasein. As such an entity, Dasein has a pre-conceptual understanding of Being, and this is necessarily presupposed in the initiation of the enquiry as a whole. It may be noted that part of that prior understanding, which is then revealed in its articulation, is of the difference between the Being of Dasein, which as being-in-the-world discloses beings, and the Being of those beings which are thus disclosed.

Fourthly, for both Jung and Heidegger man lives an understanding of his relationship with his fellowman, work, God, etc., that is neither rational nor even properly conscious, in the sense of being reflectively appropriated. For Jung, the psyche is primarily that matrix within which one's loves, hopes, fears, prayers and psychotherapeutic relationships are embedded, but that matrix is largely unconscious. For Heidegger, Dasein is an attuned, illuminating realm that is lived as a non-thematised, functional intentionality that may be described as "unconscious" (Richardson 1965, p.273). For most of the time to a large degree, and always to some extent, psyche and Dasein remain opaque to conscious self-reflection.

Fifth, implied above, is that neither psyche nor Dasein should be confused with the ego-boundaries of the individual person who is seen
situated bodily at a particular place. Both psyche and Dasein describe pre-personal existence, that fundamental matrix that precedes and is the condition for personal identity formation. For both Jung and Heidegger, the establishment of personal identity is a process of appropriating as one's own what is found to be already lived, however dissociatively or primitively. Moreover, both Jung and Heidegger regard that process of differentiation as essential to human fulfillment - individuation for Jung, and authenticity for Heidegger.

A similar point, sixth, is that both psyche and Dasein are somehow one's "ownmost" (eigenst) yet they are not personal. That is, they are for the most part collective. For Jung the greater part of the psyche is the "collective unconscious", and even the person's consciousness is often indistinguishable from the collective consciousness of the mass man. For Heidegger, Dasein is Mitsein; it is for the most part in its everydayness indistinguishable from the deteriorated (verfallen) Dasein of the anonymous "they" (das Man). Because this "fallenness" is ontological, it follows that what is personal is not a range of possibilities that are not in any sense shared. What is personal is rather that range of possible relations that are appropriated, or affirmed, as one's own. Authenticity means that one's very fallenness is appropriated as one's own; it is not magically expelled. Similarly, for Jung, individuation refers to the individual differentiation and integration of archetypal - i.e. collectively shared - relations. Individuation is not "individualism" (Jung 1921, p.449; 1928b, p.173), an especially concocted parody that would probably be recognised as the acting out of an archetypal fantasy such as hero or trickster.
Seventh, both psyche and *Dasein* are embodied, but in such a way that the body gives itself through and through to those meaningful contents within which it is situated. The body, therefore, has to be understood in terms of psyche, for Jung, i.e. as a "subtle body". For Heidegger, as becomes clearer in the work of Boss, the body is the bodying forth of human existence, and it is only in terms of those existential relations that it can be adequately understood. For neither Jung nor Heidegger can the body be adequately understood as the meaning-less body of anatomy. Rather, the body is the incarnation of psychological life.

Eighth, at the centre of both the psyche and *Dasein* is mortality or, more generally, finitude. Although death is an intrinsic and inescapable dimension within human life itself, it is more particularly with deepening psychological maturity or authenticity, that mortality is thematised and appropriated as one's own. In fact, for both Jung and Heidegger the confrontation with one's own mortality helps facilitate the deepening of human life (cf. Gordon 1978; Herzog 1966; Hillman 1964; Singer 1972 ch. 14; Zoja 1983). For Heidegger, temporality means that *Dasein* is a being-towards-death and, ultimately, this being-towards-death is given within the Being of beings from moment to moment. Jung tended to situate death as a dimension of the "second half of life", but his position is rather more subtle (Gordon 1978; Hillman 1964, 1979). When Jung says that not wanting to live is identical with not wanting to die, and that waxing and waning make one curve (1934d, p.407), he is not only, or even primarily, referring to the arc from youth to old age but to a "curve" that is given within each moment or image itself. It should be noted that much of James Hillman's work has revolved around this point: to intertwine psyche, death, and metaphor as single occurrence.
This understanding of finitude is compatible with Heidegger's.

The connection becomes even clearer when it is realised, ninth, that imagination is an essential structure of both psyche and Dasein. Edward Murray (1986, p.62) has pointed out that, although imagination is not discussed in Being and Time, it is implicit in all Heidegger's work as it is essentially identical with temporality. That means imagination is not one intellectual faculty among others, nor is it a discrete, self-contained possibility, but it is rather a characteristic of Dasein's perceptive world-openness, given within Dasein's primordial understanding of world. There is no perception that is not also an imaginative understanding, for every perception is situated within a temporal horizon that structures its meaning. Similarly, for Jung, imagination is the definitive hallmark of psyche, and all access to the world, even scientific, is structured imaginatively (Jung 1921, p.52). Intentionality, it will be recalled, is fantasy. As was seen so clearly in Jung's African perception of the world as a temple, the psyche is truly realised in that imaginative perception which reveals the world's divinity. For Heidegger, too, imagination is the implicit quality of our perceptual world-openness that reveals the divine in things.

The tenth point is that neither psyche nor Dasein are substantive entities in themselves, which then relate to the world, but are given through images (Jung) or things (Heidegger). For Jung, "the psyche is indistinguishable from its manifestations" (1938/40, p.49), those manifestations being essentially images. Hence "image is psyche" (Jung 1929b, p.50). For Heidegger, Dasein is ontically indistinguishable from its appearance as things. This is why Van den Berg says "If we want to
understand man's existence we must listen to the language of objects" (1972, p.40) and Romanyszyn identifies psychology's essential historical task at present as the recovery of the world as the authentic home of psychological life (1978, 1979, 1982, 1984). The connection between things and images is not immediately apparent as it is obscured by the perpetuated subjectivism of analytical psychology's epistemology. Even Hillman writes: "In the beginning is the image; first imagination then perception; first fantasy then reality" (1975, p.23), and it is only recently (1983) that he has come to see that the imaginal gods are present concretely and immediately as things. If psyche is the lived world, and imagination "is a way of being in the world and giving soul back to the world" (Hillman 1973, p.123), then the term image can be rescued from its implicit subjectivist ontology. Then images are indeed those things, actual or fantasised, which are revealed in that imaginative light called psyche. The lingering subjectivism of the term image is unfortunate, yet Jung does not seem to have intended images to be separated from the reality of "things". The term seems, rather, to have been Jung's attempt to rescue the imaginative autonomy of the perceptual revelation of things from the limited and literal imaginings of natural science. For the Heideggerian phenomenologist, however, there is no apology for seeing things in their manifold significances. This depth of things is their reality (Heidegger 1935/36; Sardello 1984; Van den Berg 1965). Therefore, from the Heideggerian point of view, it is not so much "wrong" for Jung to speak of images as simply superfluous. In other words, it is essential to note that things and images are ontologically identical. It is not the case that things are actual whereas images are fantasised. Whether actual or fantasised, one is directly present to the thing/image itself, only the mode of presence is
Given the preceding reflections, it is not surprising to find that, eleventh, Jung and Heidegger have similar approaches to the question of truth (Avens 1984, p.24). For Jung, there was never any "truth" worth discussing that was not psychologically true, i.e. true for the psyche. For neither Jung nor Heidegger is truth an agreement between a proposition and the "real state of affairs" (realism) or a correspondence between ideas (idealism). For Jung, it is rather a quality of the psyche's relationship to its images; to be true something has to be effective; to be effective it has to be immanent. Jung's approach to dreams and his use of active imagination suggest, further, that an attitude of respectful receptivity is necessary for images to reveal more of themselves, and that psychic truth, therefore, is most appropriately given within this attitude. For Heidegger, truth is uncoveredness (aletheia), or more precisely, that moment of uncovering that emerges most clearly in the attitude of letting-be. It might also be noted that for both Jung and Heidegger truth is thoroughly historical and situated. That is, there is no truth that is not given within the temporal unfolding of psyche, or Dasein.

The discussion of truth has led to the twelfth and final connection. Jung stresses that the attitude of respectful receptivity towards psychic phenomena is not to be appropriated as a "technique" to be used in relation to dreams, etc. The psyche cannot unfold and realise itself to an egoic attitude of heroic mastery. For both Jung and Heidegger, Nietzsche stands at the pinnacle of egoic (Jung) or anthropocentric (Heidegger) life, and as such epitomises nihilism. Thus the guiding
metaphor of Jung's life and work, which is also the authentic stance within psychic reality, is not Faust (or Nietzsche) but Philemon, the humble hermit who gave hospitality to the gods in our ungodly age (Giegerich 1984). For Heidegger, the fundamental illuminating openness of Da sein means that "man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being" (1947, p.221).

5.7 The meaning of earth

It may be recalled that Jung's attempt to link the psyche to the earth through an analysis of the materiality of the body was similar in some respects to Merleau-Ponty's. The conclusion, too, was similar: human consciousness is that place at which the earth-world comes to know itself. There is something deeply appealing about this aspect of Jung's work (and of Merleau-Ponty's), but it has two problems. Phenomenology adequately redresses the first; Heidegger's reference to "earth" points the way to redressing the second.

The first problem is that Jung offers a vision of mind-body-world unity which, like the alchemists' unus mundus, lacks differentiation and contextual specificity (Samuels et al 1986, p.185). Jung offers a grand vision in an attempt to account for a relational non-duality that is immediately present in ordinary life, and is much more easily describable. As suggested earlier, Jung failed to describe this because he did not follow through an analysis of the psychological body as presence, or disclosive openness to the world. Van den Berg describes the ontological unity between the embodied dimension of psychological life
and the world in a way that highlights rather than clouds its specific
differentiations. He writes:

"In the relation of body and world, neither of the two is
second. The body forms itself in accordance with the world
in which its task lies. It takes on a form, a figure: a
working figure, a fighting figure, a loving figure. But
one is equally justified in saying that the world is
changed by the body moving about in it. Objects take on
different shapes, working shapes, fighting shapes, loving
shapes. Do objects not look different to the fighter and
to the peaceful person? Objects are different to them.
Thus prereflective body and prefeflective world are united
as in a dialogue" (1972, p.58).

The clinical advantage of this analysis of the body-subject as presence­
to-the-world is that it gives access to understanding the pathological
embodiments observed in the consulting room (ibid., pp.58-60; Boss 1963,
p. 142-177; 1975, pp.127-131, 179-189). In Jungian terms, such an
analysis provides contextual structure and meaning to the gods that are
detected in diseases. In fact, without that existential context such
meanings remain half hidden.

A question that emerges at this point can be expressed as follows: what
is it about the "world" that provides density and ground to human being­
in-the-world, that prevents the human world from melting into endless
fluidity? Van den Berg (Kruger 1984) has argued that man changes over
time, yet fundamental as these discontinuities might be, they are not
absolute. Jung, who also had a profound sense of history's psychological
changes (Lambert 1977), also noted, nevertheless, its continuities.
Theoretically, Jung links these historical continuities to his concept of
the archetypes. Phenomenologists for the most part have not addressed
this question - and Van den Berg's emphasis on change seems at times to
suggest such a degree of fluidity that the premise of the question, that
there is a necessary continuity through history, may even be regarded by
him as false. However, accepting that the premise is true, phenomenology
might emphasise the continuity of the lived body and its structuring
power. But such an approach is in danger of starting on the wrong foot,
for although the body is "sensed" to be primary, it is a derivative
expression of existence as a whole and hence is phenomenologically
secondary (Boss 1975, p.105).

Nevertheless, this is the approach taken by David Levin (1985), who,
through an examination of "the body's recollection of Being", seeks to
"deconstruct" our culture's nihilism, exemplified in post-structuralist
thought. That nihilism is the endless dissemination and relativisation of
meaning and truth, as each signification dissolves into yet another
signifier. For Levin, who draws largely from Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Jung, and Neumann, the body has an "always accessible felt sense, however
inchoate and untutored, of what is basically good, basically true, and
basically beautiful" (p.171). Levin avoids subjectivism by recovering the
body as the embodiment of Being itself, and by grounding it on Earth.

Jung, too, sensed that the world is grounded as an incarnation upon the
earth. The interpenetration of psyche, which we have articulated as
world, and earth was a constant intuition that was sometimes explicit
(eg. 1927/31b; 1930).8. It certainly guided his life at Bollingen, and it
seems to have guided his practice. In a letter of 1935 he confessed that
he had no empathic "feel" for a psyche not rooted in a particular soil

8. The intuition could also be quite fanciful and degenerate into
literalism such as when Jung asserts that "in America, the skull and
pelvis measurements of all European races begin to Indianize themselves
in the second generation of immigrants" (1918, p.13). But foregoing
Jung's literalism should not blind us to his intuition.
Yet Jung's understanding of the significance of the earth's substantiality, psychologically insightful though it was, lacks a rigorous ontological articulation. This, then, is the second of the problems in Jung's analysis of consciousness as the earth's coming to know itself. If phenomenology's analysis of the lived body as presence provides Jung's understanding of the embodied psyche with existential clarity and access to contextual specificities and differentiations, Jung's intuition regarding the earth provides limitations to and grounding for being-in-the-world's temporality. But if Jung's intuition regarding earth requires hermeneutic clarification, so does the "grounding" of being-in-the-world (cf. Levin 1985; Vycinas 1972). Heidegger's references to earth point in a direction that meets both these needs. Thus:

"Earth is that which comes forth and shelters. Earth, irreducibly spontaneous, is effortless and untiring. Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in the world.... World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds itself on the earth, and the earth juts through world. But the relation between world and earth does not wither away into an empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there" (Heidegger 1935/36, pp.171-172).

The earth is the "resolute foundation" (ibid., p.173) of world, an endlessly supportive and containing ground for psychological life. The paradox is that there is no earth of which one can speak - no earth in any meaningful sense at all - that is not revealed within the world that is Dasein. Thus the moment of earth's unconcealedness as a world is also the moment of earth's negation as earth, that retiring, supportive ground. The importance of this paradox is that, in thematising earth as
world's foundation, we are not introducing a new category that would contradict Jung's insistence on the autonomy of the psyche, let alone undermine the ontological integrity of *Dasein*. For Jung and Heidegger, the meaning of the earth is as man's indigenous (*Dasein's own*) ground, "identical with that of man and beast" (Heidegger 1936, p.100); it is man's stability, support, and materiality, encouraging conservative consistency and density to his "worldly" fantasies; it is the home of authentic dwelling, work and even thought (Heidegger 1951).

5.8. Summary and conclusion

Most of this chapter has been summarised already (section 5.5), and it would be superfluous to repeat that here. However, it may be recalled that that summary led to the conclusion that Jung understood the psyche not as a Cartesian "inner realm" but as the life-world. This conclusion was elaborated using Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. Twelve structurally definitive characteristics of psyche and *Dasein* were found to be similar. This convergence strongly suggests that Jung's concept of psyche was an attempt, intuitive and admittedly unformed, to speak of that world-disclosive openness Heidegger called *Dasein*.

At this edge between ontology and psychology it is perhaps imprudent to define psyche. Nevertheless some definitive shape can be given to the term, and perhaps the following will be adequate for our purposes: the psyche is the open realm within which the world is constituted as a human world. The open realm as an imaginative constituting power and the world thus disclosed are each inconceivable without the other, so that the
revealed world is not that to which psyche is contingently related but a constituent dimension of psyche itself.

Both Heidegger and Jung had a sense of the earth's nurturance and stabilising support and its endless capacity to materialise human life. Ontological clarity for this sense was attempted by articulating earth not as that to which Dasein relates but, like "world", as a characteristic of Dasein itself. This means that earth, yielding itself to the human world, is always intrinsically a meaningful disclosure of psyche itself, and there is no psyche which is not called to admit into its light that materiality which is already its own.

This conclusion would seem to be a description of psyche that is adequate to Jung's experience in Africa, the integrity of his life at Bollingen and his cultural-therapeutic endeavour. What is theoretically especially significant is that this description of psyche emerges within Jung's own thought itself. Looking backwards in the present study, we can note that it is consistent with Jung's descriptions of the psychological world and of fantasy as intentional. Looking forwards, it sets the existential stage for the analyses of psyche's "contents" and "dynamics" that follow. It will not be surprising to find, for instance, that individuation awakens an ecological sense, that the unconscious is an incarnate intentionality, and that archetypes are the typical ways in which human beings gather the world.
CHAPTER SIX

THE SELF AND INDIVIDUATION

6.1. The self as psychic totality

In 1960 Jung added the following definition of the self to his 'Definitions' in *Psychological Types* (1921): "(T)he self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality as a whole" (p.460). The editors of the *Collected Works* point out that this definition of the self is virtually identical with the definition of the psyche as "the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious" (ibid., p.463), and add:

"The inference would seem to be that every individual, by virtue of having, or being, a psyche, is potentially the self. It is only a question of "realizing" it. But the realization, if ever achieved, is the work of a life-time" (ibid., p.460n.).

But for Jung the self as totality is given as potentiality whether or not it is actualised, and in this widest meaning seems to be a synonym for the psyche. Given that we have followed the train of Jung's thought through to an interpretation of psyche as *Dasein*, the question arises as to the relationship between the self, for Jung, and *Dasein*. If the psyche is *Dasein* and the self is at some point psyche, can the self be
interpreted as *Dasein* as well? And in what sense? It may be that such an interpretation, if justified, will provide an ontological understanding such that the different meanings and functions of the self in analytical psychology can be existentially linked.

There are several meanings and uses of the term self in Jung's works. Perhaps the most detailed set of differentiations has been made by Redfearn (1977, 1983), whose investigations yielded the following meanings of the term in Jung's writings:

"(1) a primary cosmic unity analogous to oriental concepts of the unity of oneself and all creatures and things;
(2) the totality of the individual;
(3) the experience of, or intimation of, such a totality, an experience of 'wholeness';
(4) a primary organising force or agency outside the conscious 'I';
(5) the unconscious, or the organising centre of the unconscious;
(6) emerging parts of the self" (1983, pp.97-98).

These differentiations require some immediate comment. Despite certain problems, especially with the second phrase of number (5) ("the organising centre of the unconscious"), these are not necessarily incompatible definitions or contradictions. Even number (6), where the term refers to emergent parts of the self, is compatible with the definition of the self as totality (2). Examples of such usage would be where Jung might refer to the child, the tree, or the phallus as symbols of the self. In the same way that the many manifestations of the holy should not be confused with God's ineffableness, so the manifest and emergent parts can be authentic expressions of the self even as they do not reveal the self's totality; and although the self as totality has no shadow, this does not preclude the self from manifesting as shadow (Jung 1955-56 p.108n.).
An important point is that the self as an experience of wholeness (3) is different from the self as the conceptual totality of the individual(2). Sometimes it is not clear which of these meanings Jung intends. But the difference is important not only conceptually but therapeutically as well. Contemporary analytical psychologists have become particularly sensitive to the fact that the experience of wholeness, even if it does indeed reflect greater psychological range and integration, is nevertheless an experience of only a part of the psychic totality. As Edinger (1972, pp. 179-193) noted, every psychological synthesis becomes in effect a thesis that constitutes a new antithesis; and this is particularly true if the experience of wholeness is idealised, for an idealised self always constitutes shadow (Gordon 1985a, p.268). It would have been only human if Jung's experience of the integrative power of the self, mediated through the mandala images that emerged during his own psychic upheaval (Jaffe 1979, pp.77-94; Jung 1961, ch.6), tended to blind him to the difference between his experience of wholeness and psychic wholeness as such. Nevertheless, the contemporary sensitivity is also found in Jung's work. In one of his late letters, for example, he criticises the Hindu belief that the self's totality can be experienced, and adds:

"When you recognise yourself, you have not necessarily recognized the self but perhaps only an infinitesimal part of it, though the self has given you the light" (Jung 1976a, p.195).

When Jung uses the term self to mean a primary organising force or agency outside the conscious 'I' (4) he is referring both to a certain type of experience and theoretically - or better, ontologically - to the non-egocentric structure of human existence. This means, of course, that the
ontological truth of human existence can be experienced (and should be if individuation is to progress). It is important to note, however, that the specificity of the self's function in this way does not necessarily imply that the self is a particular archetype, behaving like an officer directing his troops, one of whom is ego. In other words, to experience the forceful "otherness" of the self should not lead to a reification of the self and its reduction to something less than psychic totality. Rather, the self is the total Gestalt which organises the many "parts", viz. archetypes and experience.

This point is particularly significant when considering Jung's reference to the self as the unconscious, or more specifically, the organising centre of the unconscious (5). Fordham (1963) argues that Jung's definitions of the self as organising centre and as totality are mutually exclusive, and that the contradiction cannot be hidden under the idea of paradox. Fordham thus prefers to use the term self as psychic totality, present at birth as a pre-existential primary integrate, and he uses J.W. Perry's term the central archetype to describe the archetype of order and the experience of centeredness that this facilitates.

It seems that, despite several advantages of minding the distinctions Fordham makes, he treats Jung's formulations as though they presented a scientific model, a geography of mind with the archetypes spread out like stars in an interior space. To the extent that Jung was trying to develop a model of mind Fordham's criticisms have particular merit. Yet there is good reason to believe that Jung was not doing so. Thus he does write with bold paradox: "The self is not only the centre, but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious" (1944/52,
The paradox becomes at least manageable when recognising that, despite the language, these are not spatial arrangements. Jung several times quotes with favour a saying of St. Bonaventure: "God [the self] is a circle whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere" (cf. 1921, p.461). And Serrano (1968) quotes Jung as saying:

"So far, I have found no stable or definite centre in the unconscious and I don't believe that such a centre exists. I believe that the thing I call the Self is an ideal centre ...(a) dream of totality" (p.50).

It would seem, therefore, that the self as centre, whether experienced existentially or only intuited as ("theoretical") possibility, does not refer to a reified entity within the psyche (however defined) but to the capacity of the self as a totality to structure psychic life around a centre. Thus only if the capacity for psychic ordering and centering is reified is it necessary to argue, as Fordham does, that the self cannot be an archetype as well as psychic totality. But accounting for psychic ordering and centering with reference to an archetype forgets that all archetypes order and centre psychic life in some way, that the archetypes are arrangements that eventually implicate each other, and that order is given with the *Gestalt* of "the" psyche/self as a whole.

All too often, even within Jungian literature, that centre is understood in the humanistic sense, as a self within the *person*, but to do that is to muddle ego and self, and ultimately to deify the person. Rather, the centre of the self is that to which I am related most deeply, and to which I try to return in times of ethical questioning, of crisis, of silence. It is a centre that is most intimately mine, yet is not "in me" unless I put it there for a time, anxiously and narcissistically protecting it against the unrelenting presence of the world. But that
centre may equally be one's home, a holy sanctuary or a favourite tree (cf. Kruger 1979/88, pp.53-55).

There is a further usage of the term self, to which Redfearn does not refer, but which needs to be considered at this point. The self is sometimes described as the new centre of the psyche that emerges out of dialogue between conscious and unconscious, or ego and archetypes (eg. Jung 1929b, p.45). The realisation of this new centre is the goal of individuation. The issue of the self as both source and goal will be addressed later. Here it can simply be noted that such a description exists, that the above remarks about the centre being an existential centre rather than a mental location apply here as well. To anticipate: the self in this sense is the realisation of the ambiguity of existence that is lived and known, unconscious and conscious.

What emerges from the discussion thus far is that the various meanings of the term self in Jung's work, however restricting they seem, are compatible with Jung's definition of the self as psychic totality. It is thus a totality that includes the ego yet is super-ordinate to it, and it has the power to organise psychic life whatever one's egoic intentions. The advantage of calling the psyche self is that the psyche can be appropriated as "mine", even as it is still distinguished from egoic "me". But in terms of their defined scope psyche and self would seem to be identical.

The self is defined most simply and comprehensively as psychic totality. But we cannot use the argument of the previous chapter, that the psyche is Dasein, to conclude that Jung "meant" Dasein when referring to the
self as well. The extent to which this is so needs to be established on its own terms by exploring the structure and spatiality of the self in both Jung and Heidegger.

6.2. The Self as Dasein

Redfearn (1985) concludes his studies of the self by concurring with Jung that

"The limits or boundaries of the Jungian Self are impossible to define. They extend far beyond ... the material body. There is of course a very real sense in which we are all part of each other and all part of past and future history, and we do not know the relationship between our material selves and our Selves in this wider sense" (p.31).

If the self is the totality of the individual (Redfearn's number 2) then the individual does not have boundaries limited to his sense of personal identity. This can create some conceptual confusion. The individual is better thought of as equivalent to "person" or ego. Thus Jaffe (1971, p.90) even distinguishes between "man" and self in terms of ego and self.

Therefore the self, like Dasein, is most intimately mine, yet it is not (only) "in me". Both Heidegger and Jung want to distinguish the self from the personal "inner self" that the humanistic psychologists describe. The self is as much "in" the world and one's cultural history as in personal identity. To forget this is, as Jung (1947/54, p.136) pointed out, to confuse self with ego and individuation with schizoid isolation.
The self that is one's foundation is not of one's own making, or even a product of ontogenetic development, for "the self is not only in me but in all beings, like the Atman, like Tao" (Jung 1959, p.463). If one recalls Jung's analysis of the body's carbon as "simply carbon", it is evident that Jung sometimes thought of the self in terms of a continuity of identity through space. However, this attempt by Jung to overcome the subject-object schism is undermined by the positivist logic of the res extensa and the correspondence theory of truth (Giegerich 1987). More important than the self as a "something" is an understanding of the self as "no-thing". Thus when Jung in his old age had a sense of continuity between himself and all things he was incarnating the self as a fertile and hospitable emptiness within which the things of the world could shine forth, and it was through these things that his sense of himself was founded. Similarly in East Africa the self was realised as a world which sprang into being, while Jung's sense of himself was of being true to the deepest calling of Being itself.

It is this calling which is at the centre of the individuation process. Jung regards man's deepest source of guilt as the failure to respond to the call of the self which one hears as conscience (Brooke 1985). However, to understand this as a call to "fulfil one's potentials" can easily and mistakenly be interpreted in anthropocentric terms: "I" can then do this or that. While this might have some clinical merit, a close examination of this calling's structure reveals a different ontology from such a Cartesian-humanistic interpretation, for the self that beckons is mine yet equally "not-I" (Harding 1965).

The impression is often given in analytical psychology that the self
simply refers to subjectivity at a "deeper" level, perhaps particularly in Britain, where the Developmental analysts have been significantly influenced by psychoanalysts such as Winnicott. Moreover, they have had considerable clinical experience of working with borderline and psychotic patients for whom an emergent sense of a continuous embodied self in the place of a brittle and fragile "emergency ego" is a theme of successful therapy. Quite possibly such a sense emerged in Jung as well, so that he too sometimes thought of the self in these personalistic terms. Thus Plaut (1985), one of Britain's most eminent analytical psychologists, records that he uses the term self in two ways: when he recognises personal repetitive fiction in events to which he has contributed, and when he is aware of "the autonomous processes of (his) body and the 'chemistry' set up between (himself) and others of which mind alone knows nothing" (p.249). However, this usage by Plaut seems to be a good example of the tendency, noted by Rosemary Gordon (1985a, p.265), to subsume ego functions under the term self. The distinctive hallmarks of the meaning of the self in analytical psychology are then forfeited.

6.3. A brief digression: the ego

The term ego has been used in this thesis as a synonym for "person"; "ego boundaries" refer to personal identity. The suggestion that the term self has at times come to be used in a way that conflates it with ego calls for a reflection on the definition of ego as well. The aim here is not to give an account of ego development, or to discuss its many functions but to define it.
Jung used the term ego (Ich) in a loose way to describe the "I" that one identifies as oneself. It is thus "the centre of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and identity" (Jung 1921, p.425). This definition is not much more than a formalisation of the ordinary language meaning of the subjective "I". The usage occurs in Jung's earliest work (1902), and it is useful to recall that this is some twenty years before Freud (1923) developed the notion of ego, and thus of subjectivity, in terms of a topographical metapsychology. The central significance of the Freudian development was the inclusion of unconscious life, including defences, anxieties, etc., into subjectivity - in other words, deepening subjectivity from the superficially "known" into the darker reality of the lived body (as Merleau-Ponty might put it). Jung did not follow this move, however, which occurred ten years after he and Freud had parted. This is despite the fact that even in his original doctoral thesis he described the ego-complex in terms that accounted for an unconscious unity that underlay splits in consciousness (Jung 1902, p.76), and he also claimed to prefer the term ego-complex to ego because it accounted for its composite structure and fluctuating composition (Jung 1926, pp.323-324). Generally, therefore, Jung tended to retain the ordinary, naive equation: ego = subjectivity = consciousness = freedom, willpower and responsibility.

This perspective validates the experience of Rational Man, but it is not an endorsement of Rational Man's humanistic-Cartesian ontology and epistemology. Jung situates that experience as a tiny island in the wider and deeper reality of the self, or "objective psyche" as a whole. In fact, he so limits the scope and power of the ego that he claims with justification to speak the same language as "primitives" (Jung 1977,
The domain of the gods begins where consciousness leaves off, says Jung (1942/48, p.156), "for at that point man is already at the mercy of the natural order, whether he thrive or perish".

Unlike Freud, Jung chose to remain faithful to the psychologically naive experience of subjectivity, ego. Even when he reflects on the ego as a constitution that emerges out of the self, Jung does not make the type of psychoanalytic theoretical shift which would leave the ego as largely unconscious. But the mystery of subjectivity did not leave Jung complacent with the simplicity of his ego-consciousness equation. Thus, he writes:

"The ego, ostensibly the thing we know most about, is in fact a highly complex affair full of unfathomable obscurities. Indeed, one could even define it as a relatively constant personification of the unconscious itself". (Jung 1955-1956, p.107).

It can be concluded, therefore, that the ego is not a theoretical term, at least not in the sense of requiring a highly specific metapsychological understanding. Thus it can be used fairly loosely when referring to personal identity and its related issues.

This looseness, and Jung's perplexity as shown in the above quotation, have opened the door for subsequent analytical psychologists to deepen Jung's conception. A step was taken by Plaut (1959), but the most impressive move in this direction was made by Abenheimer (1968), who fortunately had a keen phenomenological sense. While Abenheimer deepens the Jungian notion of subjectivity he avoids taking the quasi-physiological direction of Freud. This paper was followed by others (eg. Fordham 1969; Lambert 1981a, 1981b). The upshot is that there is a
greater appreciation in analytical psychology of the dimensions of subjectivity (eg. reality testing, relative autonomy and choice, organisation abilities, memory functions, defences, symbolic understanding, a capacity to tolerate frustration, pain and ambivalence, and a capacity to yield to the spontaneous emergence of the self), as well as the ontogenetic conditions which facilitate (or damage) its development. Nevertheless, the seductive pull of Freud's topographical metapsychology of the ego has not been unequivocally overcome (eg. Redfearn 1970), and an early warning by L. Stein (1962) still has value. While Stein finds it scientifically useful to speak of "an entity named ego" he admits that in doing so "we remain on the magical level, with its belief in gremlins, spirits, and the like, who in a clandestine way do the work for us" (p.52).

It seems fair to conclude, therefore, as Whitmont (1982) does, that analytical psychologists generally have a fuller appreciation of the ego than Jung did but at the price of losing some of the distinctive features of the self. The deepened sense of ego means, for instance, that one's relationship with one's "unconscious contents" cannot too hastily be identified as a relationship with the self, for the ego is also lived as much as known. The conceptual obscurity that emerges here is not a muddle but is appropriate to that ambiguous and ever changing edge, or even series of edges, between the lived and the known. Finally, subjectivity and the ego are not nearly so tied up in the fantasies of heroic humanism as Hillman likes to believe (Wharton 1985). But what does need clarification are ego and self in existential terms.
6.4. The self as *Dasein* (continued)

The call to realise the potentialities of the self is a call to disclose the world in its various possibilities. As has been expressed elsewhere:

"To be guilty of failing to develop the archetypal potentialities that comprise the totality of the self is - not in an analogous way but directly - to be guilty of failing to allow the world to come into being in that individual and irreplaceable way that is one's personal destiny" (Brooke 1985, p.170).

The ontological unity between self and world here must not be understood as an "intentional realtionship" in which the self as an entity relates to the world as another entity, for the self's unfolding is the world's disclosure. Neither should the world's disclosure be understood as an expedient for "inner" development (eg. Jung 1946, pp.244-245; 1951b, p.351). Perhaps no-one has described the issue more clearly than Charles Scott (1975), who writes:

"Given our tradition, we find it immensely difficult to think of ourselves as living, non-substantial, concretely related possibilities that are immediately aware and transitional in nature. We think more easily of ourselves in terms of an identity structure that ... molds the world according to its human and individual perspective. We are then inclined to describe the world as though it were an intentional synthesis" (p.186).

But, as Scott continues:

"The effort to return to human existence, its intrinsic openness, its given intimacy with beings, its living communicability, cannot fulfil its own mandate as long as the self and subjectivity are primary in one's interpretation .... A [psychology] that centres in the self or in subjectivity loses the prevoluntary openness of man. It loses the pre-intentional givenness of being-in-the-world" (ibid., p.191).

Jung's concept of the self can be interpreted in terms of this non-optional occurrence Heidegger called *Dasein*. To experience the "totality"
of the self is to yield oneself to the exquisite "yes" of Being's revelation. But while Jung's experience in Africa, for instance, highlights a mystical dimension to the experience of this non-duality, it is important not to be side-tracked into thinking of non-duality in "mystical" terms, for the unity of self and world is given ontologically within the ontic structures of human existence even if they are immature or pathological. Jung understands this: although he writes that "the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego" (Jung 1955-56, p.546), he also recognises that the self is given within the immediacy of one's life, so that self-realisation has to do with becoming what one already is (eg. Jung 1940; 1954, pp.258; Samuels 1985b, p.103). It will be useful to elaborate this point by considering Michael Fordham's sober and careful observations on infants and children.

Fordham (1969) develops Jung's (1947/54) thesis that the self is the original matrix out of which the ego develops; fragments of consciousness slowly cohere to form the continuity and differentiation Jung calls ego (cf. p.189). According to Fordham, the "primary self", or "primary integrate", repeatedly "deintegrates" in significant transient contexts. The prototypical example is when the infant's archetypal potential to feed from the mother's nipple and to experience the breast in certain ways ("good" and "bad") unpacks (deintegrates) in the context of the mother's presentation of the breast. There is, hopefully, a good enough fit between archetypal need and expectation, on one hand, and reality, on the other. This matching is repeated many times, more or less successfully, and is gradually personalised and integrated within the developing ego structure as an "archetypal object" (Lambert 1981a, p.95).
Such a brief outline does not even attempt to do justice to the quality and subtlety of this line of thinking, but it should be sufficient to justify the ontological point being made. Fordham has been particularly concerned to illustrate the dialectical relationship between infant and mother and to establish the infant's agency in that relationship. He thereby wants to correct the mythical and evidently inaccurate view of mother-infant non-differentiation held by Jung and popularised by Erich Neumann (1949, 1973 cf. Fordham 1981). However, in insisting on mother and child's evident separateness Fordham creates an ontological duality that tends to reify the self as an actual entity, pre-existent and enclosed within itself. This is unfortunate, but it also seems unnecessary as Fordham's observations of infants and children can lead to a different ontological interpretation.

He notes, for example, that in intra-uterine life the foetus finds itself in a "noisy and periodically uncomfortable" (ibid., p.112) world which it embodies responsively. Even blissful sleep ("integration") is the embodiment of a blissful world. In other words, there is no identifiable time that the foetus is not "object-related" (cf. Kay 1984). Moreover, Fordham (1976) recognises that autistic children, who can have as profoundly ruptured a relationship with the world as is ever seen, are not ontologically self-enclosed. They live in a world that is unstable, terrifyingly intrusive, or meaningless, etc., and they are sensitive to the changes in that world. They are only self-enclosed in the sense that their whole world is virtually impenetrable. Finally, Fordham's model of development is that the world of the infant comes into being - that is, emerges as a world to which the infant can relate and from which he can learn to differentiate himself (as ego) - only as it meets the archetypal
potentialities of the self, those innate patterns of need and expectation that structure the infant's experience. Thus it is that

"if the child's mother does not match the infant's needs closely, she, or any part of her not provided, is deemed by the infant not to exist (ibid., p.89).

Such non-existence is not a function of omnipotence, as Fordham points out. Rather, the self's "deintegration" is the unfolding of a phase-appropriate capacity that emerges as an inhabitable world. Hence the world is the place at which the infant's self is made visible and real1.

In other words, the self's essential world-disclosiveness and its manifestation as the world thus disclosed is present as an ontological foundation throughout human life: in foetal deintegrative-integrative processes, in psychopathology, and in the mature awakening of a heightened consciousness. That is why, when Jung experienced Being, it was not so much an experience of something new as the experiential transformation of a presence he had always lived yet never known within the full light of consciousness. Moreover, if the self is "unconscious", or only a "potentiality" rather than an actuality, then so too is the world, whether only the many "parts" of the mother or the world as such (Brooke 1985, p.169).

The self's call to individuation is curiously and rightly ambiguous. It is a call that is often felt to come from "inside", yet it is equally a call from the "world". But even if it is experienced as a call to respond to some entity within the world, it is not a call from a

1. This thrust of Fordham's work, to situate the self and self-realisation within the dialectics of development, has also been a feature of the work of J.W. Perry (1962, 1970) in America.
category outside of selfhood. If a mother does not answer her baby's call she betrays her self too; as a mother her baby's call is also her own as a mother. This existential structure of the self is especially clear in the vicissitudes of the "transference", where the therapist's "mere" presence continually calls the patient to inhabit and befriend more open and responsive worlds. It is the unfolding self, for instance, that calls the patient, after more than a year of therapy, to see the therapist as a man and not only an asexual professional, or mother, despite the patient's resistances (Brooke 1986).

If this interpretation of the self is still Jung's it has been guided by Heidegger's ontological analysis of selfhood to the point where the two views are virtually indistinguishable. But Heidegger avoids more clearly than Jung the humanistically spatialised interpretation of the self by using the term *Dasein*, which, as being-in-the-world, is the illuminating occurrence of Being. The analysis of *Dasein* is an anthropology that is not anthropocentric but centered in Being. This does not dissolve selfhood, but articulates its ambiguity with ontological clarity (Heidegger 1927, pp.152-153).

Thus, like Jung (1958b), Heidegger distinguishes between the accusing pull of the crowd, the anonymous voice of the "they" (*das Man*), and the

2. This is not always sufficiently understood. Thus Buber (1938), for example, mistakenly criticises Heidegger's understanding of conscience for the same reasons he criticises Jung's: Heidegger's emphasis on the self, says Buber, undermines the ontological claim of the Other (cf. Le Fèvre 1962). For a defence of Heidegger's ethics, see Boss (1964) and Scott (1975). But it cannot be denied, however, that Heidegger's analysis of the call to selfhood lacks a norm by which to decide how to answer the calls of one's being (Macquarrie 1972, pp.278,213; Wooker 1977). Jung faces squarely this problem in his own account of guilt, and he calls us to question continually our own motives (Brooke 1985; Jung 1958b, p.444).
voice of conscience, which is a call from the self to live authentically (Parker 1985). Furthermore, Heidegger recognises that the call of the self is uncanny, for it is not a call from the "me" that I know, and it calls "against our expectations and even against our will .... The call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (Heidegger 1927, p.320). That is, the self in its uncanniness calls the inauthentic self to become the authentic self (Gelven 1972, pp.72-73). But such a call "has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care" (Heidegger 1927, pp.322-323). Therefore, one is called by the self to accept the inevitable limitations and contingencies that beset one's existence and, within this acceptance, to carry out one's potentialities for taking care of the beings of one's world. The self that calls is the radical possibility of revealing that Being of beings in the light of care. Given that Heidegger is not referring to the "care" of a sympathetic nurse but to care as an ontological awakening and presencing, does not this account of selfhood articulate the ground of Jung's experience of the self in East Africa?

It is also noticeable that Heidegger, like Jung, feels obliged to raise the question of whether the call of the self should be interpreted theologically as a call from God. Heidegger says not (ibid., pp.320-323). He insists that, 1) the theological interpretation "annihilates" the phenomenon of uncanniness as it is actually experienced, 2) the injunctions thus heard are indistinguishable from those of the "they", and 3) it misinterprets in personalistic terms the ontological structure and depth of Dasein. At first glance this commitment of Heidegger's would seem to be different from Jung's, for Jung consistently tried to avoid responding to "metaphysical" questions. But a closer look suggests that
Jung's thinking pointed in the same direction. Jung insists on the primacy of experience, asserting that the experience of that power called God is indistinguishable from the experience of the self (eg. Jung 1955-56, p.546), and Jung steadfastly refuses to step "beyond" the parameters of the experience thus revealed (eg. Jung 1944/52, pp.14-15). Secondly, even more than Heidegger, Jung is sensitive to the fact that there are many "voices" in one's psychological make-up, and he does not let man (ego) shirk responsibility for his differentiation of and responsiveness to these voices (Jung 1958b). Thirdly, as has already been argued, Jung is opposed to the subjectivistic interpretation of self. To interpret the voice of God as a call from the self is psychologising only if the self is misunderstood in egoic terms (Jung 1951a, p.25). Thus, like Heidegger, Jung establishes an ontology of the self that has a transpersonal structure and depth that embraces religious experience. What Heidegger provides is a clearer ontology and epistemology for the structure and religious content of the self which Jung's thought intends. What Jung provides is an incomparably rich analysis of the meanings of the manifestations of the self and of one's relationship to these.

It would lead us too far afield to pursue this discussion of the structure and meaning of religious experience further, but there are several points that might be made. Firstly, both Jung and Heidegger were deeply religious. Martin Heidegger's father was a sexton in the local Catholic Church, St Martin's, and he himself spent time studying for the priesthood in a Jesuit seminary (Macquarrie 1968, p.1). He retained his Catholic affiliations to his death although his spirituality was not exoteric-orthodox. Like Jung he was a "modern man". Secondly, Heidegger's notion of Being certainly includes the Divine (ibid., pp.57-60) as does
Jung's notion of the self. Thirdly, there is one occasion where Jung (1951a, p.268) supports a thesis that the emergence of the self is correlated with monotheism and that it succeeds the polytheistic (anima-animus) stage. But Jung's sense of self as a totality of contradictions and opposites, his concern to differentiate and amplify the multitude of images that structure one's psychological life, his focus on myth and his connection with nature, all indicate a thoroughly polytheistic perspective. This, of course, is developed by Hillman et al (cf. Miller 1981). It is also a perspective that emerges clearly in some of Heidegger's later work. For both Heidegger and Jung (and Hillman), this polytheism is given ontologically as a metaphorical reality (cf. Avens 1982, 1984). Fourthly, Jung's epistemological caution, which he justified with reference to Kant, has the effect of undermining the traditional theist-atheist debate of natural theology. This caution secures itself into a commitment, however, with Heidegger's ontology of Being.

The argument thus far has sought to interpret Jung's concept of the self in terms of Dasein, and it seems that such an interpretation does not conflict with Jung's own understanding of the self. Like Dasein, the self is "mine" yet not personal; it is the embracing totality out of which individuality and identity emerge; it is realised at all levels of psychological development as a world with which one is engaged (even autistic flight is a kind of engagement); as a gathering of the world it

3. One can also recall Jung's observation that "(t)he striving for unity is opposed by a possibly even stronger tendency to create multiplicity, so that even in strictly monotheistic religions like Christianity the polytheistic tendency cannot be suppressed" (Jung 1912/52, p.99). If this is true of religions, it is equally so of psyche, which Jung calls "a contradictory multiplicity of complexes" (1928b, p.201). "My self", says Redfearn (1985), "is my many selves".
brings the world into being in the light of human consciousness; it surrounds that place of identity one usually points to as "oneself", yet its spatiality is not extensive in the philosophical sense; it is a home within which the gods can be experienced and thought. With these themes in mind, it is difficult to imagine how a different ontology of the self in Jung's thought could be sustained.

6.5. Individuation, gathering and appropriation

The task thus far in this chapter has been to establish and articulate the ontological parameters of the self according to Jung, and Heidegger's analysis of Dasein has guided us in this. Inevitably, several overlapping themes have been mentioned without having received sufficient attention. In this section the self's transformation in individuation will be outlined in terms of gathering and appropriation.

Jung's statement that "Individuation does not shut one out from the world but gathers the world to oneself" (op.cit.) repeats a theme developed in his seminal work on individuation. In that essay Jung (1928b) writes that, as consciousness expands beyond "the petty, oversensitive, personal world of the ego", it

"participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This widened consciousness ... is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large" (p.178).

The gathering of which Jung writes is thus not primarily the ontological gathering of the world as a world, given with existence, but is a
gathering which takes place with the development of consciousness. We shall call this appropriation. It occurred for Jung on the slopes of Mt. Elgon. To a significant degree, it reflects Jung's (1944/52) view that

"Natural man is not a "self" - he is the mass and a particle in the mass, collective to such a degree that he is not even sure of his own ego ....

"Life that happens in and for itself is not real life; it is real only when it is known. Only a unified personality can experience life, not that personality which is split up into partial aspects, that bundle of odds and ends which also calls itself 'man'" (p.81).

Probably every psychotherapist, or anyone who has been in a successful psychotherapy of depth, will recognise the sense of Jung's remarks. But if Jung regards individuation as a process of gathering in which the self comes into being, he regards it equally as an emergence of the ego, as the above passage implies.

It seems that what remains unclarified is the difference between gathering, as an ontological condition of the self as Dasein, and appropriation, as a theme of an emergent ego. This difference between gathering and appropriation is, once again, guided by Heidegger. Gathering is a condition of Dasein as Dasein finds itself already in a world of meanings, a matrix of meaningful relations "gathered together", and it is within this pre-personal relational matrix that identity and authenticity are founded. Appropriation refers to Dasein's responsible acceptance of such a gathered world as uniquely "mine". It is appropriation, therefore, that is concerned with the establishment of personal identity and boundary, as one says yeah or nay to the different appeals that call one.
This distinction is not always clear in Jung's work, partly, perhaps, because the link between gathering and appropriation is itself beset with paradox. As Jung wrote in one of his letters:

"Although the self is my origin, it is also the goal of my quest. When it was my origin, I did not know myself, and when I did learn about myself, I did not know the self. I have to discover it in my actions, where it first reappears under strange masks" (1973, p.196).

For both Jung and the existential phenomenologists (not only Heidegger), existence is a world-disclosive gathering that is lived in the twilight of semi-anonymity before it is ever appropriated in the clear light of reflective consciousness as "mine". Thus appropriation awakens in one the truth of one's gathered world; without appropriation even the gathering remains dumb.

In Jungian terms, the emergence of the self is dependent on the emergence and consolidation of the ego. But if the difference between gathering and appropriation, as well as their link, is not always clear, it is nevertheless discernible. Thus, when Jung writes that "Natural man is not a self" (op. cit.) and says that the self has to be attained, he adds the following footnote:

"This does not mean that the self is created, so to speak, only during the course of life; it is rather a question of its becoming conscious. The self exists from the very beginning, but is latent, that is unconscious" (p.81n.).

Or again:

"What I have left behind, seemingly lost, I meet in everything that comes my way and I collect it, reassembling it as it were" (Jung 1973, p.195).

Further still, although Jung's reflections on his experience in Africa are primarily concerned with the emergence of the self in consciousness,
Jung did have at the same time an equal sense of his own individual differentiation, and there is a passage in which the emergence of the ego as a theme of that time is explicit. He writes:

"All the worlds that have ever existed before man were physically there. But they were a nameless happening not a definite actuality, for there did not yet exist that minimal concentration of the psychic factor, which was also present, to speak the word that outweighed the whole of Creation: That is the world and this is I. That was the first morning of the world, the first sunrise after the primal darkness, when that inchoately conscious complex, the ego, the son of darkness, knowingly sundered subject and object, and thus precipitated the world and itself into definite existence, giving it and itself a voice and a name" (1955-56, pp.107-108).

Once again, it is unfortunate that Jung himself seems sometimes to have confused ego with self. In ordaining the ego Jung is inclined to sunder the world as the sanctuary in which psychic life is gathered. But a phenomenological analytical psychology would seem to be closer to Jung's ecological sensibility and his cultural therapeutic intentions: it insists that the moment of personal awakening - "This is I" - is no less an awakening of the world - "That is the world". It insists further, that that world is not a meaningless brute fact but is a gathered world of meaningful relations. It agrees with Jung that that primordial gathering of psychological life is human yet pre-personal; it is a manifestation of the self - or better is the world-disclosive self - even though such an ontological gathering may be "unconscious". Furthermore, a phenomenological analytical psychology insists that the emergence of individual identity (ego) is an appropriation of one's world as one's own. The establishment of "ego boundaries" does not constitute an ontological separation of oneself from the world but a certain sense of oneself and one's separateness within the world. Ego boundaries consolidate an identity at the same time as "they" clarify the world.
Once again, these are not two correlative, or "parallel", processes. As Murray (1986) says, our personal identity "is an existence to the structure of whose mine-ness belongs the world" (p.206). Thus personal identity does not constitute an inner-outer distinction at an ontological level, even though an emergent sense of "having a body" and an "interior" may be a meaningful experience. To quote Murray again:

"The unification of which we speak is a unification of the personal self [ego]: the imaginative integration of the worlded me. Thus the putting of one's self [ego] together is a putting of one's world together" (ibid.)

It is noticeable, for example, that, as a patient becomes more intact, he begins to see the therapist and others anew. At the same time the therapist finds it easier to see and hear the patient, and no longer, or to a much lesser degree, feels idealised, swallowed, emptied, bewildered, sexually abused, or otherwise "not myself". It can be a considerable relief for both therapist and patient to discover that there are two people present. Thus Jung's exclamation, "That is the world and this is I!" (op. cit.) is ontologically irreducible to two processes. Ego boundaries presuppose that self as perceptive world-disclosure, and appropriation creates boundaries within intentionality itself.

This interpretation of the "development of the ego out of the self" makes immediate existential sense of several of Jung's tenets regarding individuation, which, if they are understood in terms of a quasi-reified geography of mind, remain "hypothetical" or conceptually obscure.

Firstly, there is Jung's view that:

"The self ... is an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves. It is, so to speak, an unconscious prefiguration of the ego. It is not I who create myself, rather I happen
These well-known lines occur in a passage in which the self is described as the unconscious matrix within which psychic life is lived as participation mystique. But if the self is not a "thing" neither is "the" ego, which is, rather, a capacity of the self as existential matrix: it is a capacity, inter alia, to become reflectively conscious and freer. Thus, although analytical psychologists refer to ego-self separation or conflict, and some (eg. Edinger) speak of an "ego-self axis", they, like Jung, never lose sight of the sense in which the ego is an emergent capacity of the self to realise and personalise itself in space and time.

Secondly, if it is recalled that fantasy is the primordial intentionality of psyche as the lived world, then it becomes immediately understandable that one perceives the self primarily through images, and that the ego's relationships are essentially relationships with images of the self. Understood existentially there is no need to revert to the convoluted language of "projection" and "introjection", a language that presupposes the Cartesian ontology which analytical psychology endeavours to reject. Jung's concern with images (or symbols) of the self does not intend to evaporate the existential density of the things around which psychological life is gathered.

Thirdly, it makes immediate existential sense of the paradox that the ego, for Jung, is the "centre" of consciousness, yet, insofar as it lives blindly the metaphors of contemporary social life, it is also "unconscious". Further development of consciousness occurs when the ego reconnects its metaphors to their primordial and vital roots. Discussion
of the paradoxical meanings of conscious and unconscious needs to be postponed until the next chapter, but some comment on transformation is called for now.

6.6. Transformation: from literalism to metaphor

Ego development involves the appropriation of the world, into which one is thrown and with which one is already engaged, as "mine". There are, of course, vicissitudes and rhythms of appropriation and disappropriation over time, changes that, especially in the early years, are largely concomitant with maturation. But by and large the ego comes to appropriate as "mine" those metaphors that are dominant within one's culture. It is thus these metaphors that shape one's cultural identity. Particularly in modern western society, with its iconoclastic and technocratic heroism, ego identity tends to be thinned out within the literalisms of contemporary life. Jung, as no psychologist before him, was sensitive to the ancient and primitive metaphors that continue to appear today, and he was critical of the fact that these realities have insufficient cultural room to emerge on their own terms. The gods are not addressed as powers of depth and mystery, but are flattened out onto the horizontal plane where they are lived as the profanities called ideology, ambition, "personal needs", hunches, whims and psychopathology. The more one identifies oneself with these disenchanted powers, the more they lose their metaphoric possibilities, and identity is to that extent pressed into the thin literalisms of one's social self (ego-persona identification). The situation is not necessarily excessive (Fordham 1968, p.55), but it seems fairly exceptional for identity not to be
established at the expense of psychic depth. This seems to be the price paid for a social and personal identity in a technocratic society (Roszak 1972).

For further development of consciousness to occur, which may be the same as healing, it is necessary for something to emerge that is beyond the will-power of the heroic ego. One then discovers that one is no longer the author of meaning and healing. That insight is itself a revelation, which can be overwhelmingly powerful or quite subtle (Jung 1932a, pp.345-346). That author who is Other, says Jung, used to be called God, but now it is called "the unconscious", or, Jung's own preferred term, the self.

This transformative move can also be described in terms of appropriation, but it is less the utilisation of possibilities on the horizontal plane of the social world than the development of a mode that is receptive and hospitable to psychic depth. Receptivity to the self is not necessarily incompatible with ego development. Jung's (1940/54) remarks in this regard are worth recalling:

"The sacrifice proves that you possess yourself, for it does not mean just letting yourself be passively taken; it is a conscious and deliberate self-surrender, which proves you have full control of yourself, that is, of your ego. The ego thus becomes the object of a moral act, for "I" am making a decision on behalf of an authority which is supraordinate to my ego nature" (pp. 297-298).

It needs to be borne in mind, however, that this statement by Jung was made in the context of discussing religious structure (the Catholic Mass), and he was also trying to defend himself against the charge of advocating a passive capitulation of responsibility. Thus, while Jung's point may be taken, we should not be blinded to the fact that the
emergence of the self into a relatively stable identity is often experienced as a psychic upheaval, or even disintegration (Hillman 1975, p. 35; Jung 1955-56, pp. 360, 546; Williams 1983).

The self is lived as a primitively incarnate and imaginal reality, a participation mystique in which the gods are met no less literally than in the flattened images of secular life. Thus the appropriation of the self within a receptive mode does not imply regression to primitive modalities, although, of course, in practice more or less regression will probably occur. In other words, Jung is trying to find a way of transformation in which one comes to inhabit a world that is neither elevated into the empty literalisms of contemporary social life nor submerged in the pre-personal world of archaic man. The way between these opposites Jung called the transcendent function (1916/54), or the symbolic life (1939d; cf. Edinger 1972, pp. 117 ff.), and he regarded it as the authentic expression of selfhood (Jung 1947/54, p. 225n.). It is a way in which the personal truths of one's identity (ego) are reconnected to their impersonal and primordial roots, but the hermeneutic tension in that link is maintained in that quality of experience called metaphorical. In other words, the literalisms of personal life are deepened into metaphors, but the literalisms of one's archaic fantasy are softened into metaphors with which one can live a personal life as well. It is metaphor, not as a linguistic device but as a structure of experience, that maintains the link between the proximate and the remote, the actual and the dreamed, the profane and the sacred.

It needs to be noted that the tension between ego and self, personal and impersonal, modern and archaic, is somewhat exaggerated here, especially
when superimposed onto a developmental model, but it is used in order to
highlight these existential issues in Jungian thought. But the "post-
Jungian synthesis" (Samuels 1983; 1985b, p.113) considerably plays down
this tension. The Developmental school shows that the structure of
individuation occurs much earlier than Jung supposed: children develop a
"symbolic" (i.e. metaphorical) sense as they, too, need to find a way
between these opposites. The Archetypal school argues that the link with
the self is given in adulthood in more diverse and subtle ways than
Jung's interest in mandalas and similar grand images of "wholeness"
would seem to suggest. Phenomenology has no argument with these points of
view, so the descriptive tension between ego and self does not imply an
endorsement of Jung's (1930/31) Classical viewpoint. In any
event, the
tension is an existential tension between appropriation in an egocentric,
perhaps heroic, mode and appropriation in a receptive, hospitable mode.
It is the tension encountered earlier between Faust and Philemon, and it
will be met again presently as a tension between "speaking" and
"listening".

6.7. A note on symbols

This metaphorical ambiguity, in which psychological life is both
concretely real and at the same time imaginal and personally significant,
Jung describes as symbolic reality. Without being side-tracked into an
extensive discussion of symbols or the developmental conditions which
facilitate a symbolic consciousness, it may nevertheless be useful to
highlight a few essential points. Jung (1921) defines the symbol as "the
best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing" (p.474). This
means that a symbol is not a sign which points to a known entity with a
denoted meaning, as it does for Freud (eg. pencil stands for the
literal penis). A symbol, for Jung, has a fundamentally metaphorical "as
if" structure (Stein 1957, p.45), but there is an intrinsic relation
between the signifier and the signified. The unknown in the symbol is
thus an interiority within the symbol itself.

As a bridge between the known and the unknown, the symbol is said to link
conscious and unconscious, ego and self (ibid.), but there is a problem
if this shift in formulation is understood metapsychologically - which
unfortunately generally seems to be the case. In this regard Gordon
(1968) makes the very important point that the "symbol-hunter" who
focusses only on the "inner meanings" of images may forfeit true
symbolisation by denying concrete existence, which is one essential pole
of the symbol's constitution (p.295). The symbol, insists Zeman (1977),
is intrinsic to things.

As was mentioned earlier (Chapter 2) there has been methodological and
conceptual abuse such that Jung's notion of a symbol has sometimes
deteriorated into a mere sign pointing to an empty psychological
construct (sea = unconscious, female = anima, etc). To recover Jung's
emphasis on concrete immanence there is a growing tendency amongst
analytical psychologists to speak simply of images (eg. Hillman 1977).

However, image and symbol are not quite synonymous. Generally, a symbol
is taken to be an image which has fascinating and transformative power
(Fordham 1957b), but for this function to be properly fulfilled a
symbolic attitude is required (Gordon 1968; Jung 1921, p.478; Stein
1957). Such an attitude is concomitant with a mixture of ego strength and flexibility. Thus, although there may be a sense in which an image can be unconsciously lived - and the image in a symptom may be difficult to find - a symbol, properly speaking, is always appropriated consciously as an image of personal significance (which is not to say that its meanings are conscious).

Finally, symbols integrate psychological functions and emerge out of the relation between conscious and unconscious, or ego and self, i.e. the "transcendent function" (Jung 1916/57). Thus symbols do not signify intrapsychic "archetypes" but emergent patterns of world-relationship. Symbols are immanent and transcendent, concrete and imaginal, personally appealing yet impersonal in origin. They emerge as much from the world as from one's self (Jung 1940, p.173).

It would seem that Boss' (1957) criticism of Jung's position is relevant only to the extent it belies a natural scientific ontology: Jung speaks of symbols in an attempt to recover psychological life, and he does so by adding "symbolic meanings" to positivistically defined "facts". Boss contends, for example, that a bridge is intrinsically meaningful in manifold and mysterious ways, and is not made meaningful by being turned into a "symbol" (ibid., p.198), especially if the meaning of the symbol is located intrapsychically. On the contrary, such a shift effectively renders the bridge meaningless. But it does seem that Jung's practical sense of symbols and symbolic transformations was far more grounded than this formulation allows. As a personal example, Jung's symbolic attitude was certainly not vapid or schizoid. Thus if symbols are understood not in scientifically contrived metapsychological terms but in terms of
immanence, existential concreteness, and psychological function, then phenomenologists may be less inclined to balk at the term.

6.8. Interiority

Transformation in individuation is often experienced, and described, as a process of turning inwards. This is no doubt partly due to the renaissance and post-renaissance epistemological need to interiorise psychological life (Romanyszyn 1982; 1984), and partly due to Jung's own introverted bias. But Jung's emphasis on psychic balance, and his desire to articulate a psychology of individuation and transformation that is not limited to a particular attitudinal type, both mean that the experience of "turning inwards" should not be confused with introversion. And even if it does mean, for the extravert, a shift towards introversion, this should not be interpreted in the spatialised terms of post-renaissance thought. As we have already noted, introversion is also a mode of world-relatedness, and even the introvert constitutes an identity that may be in conflict with his primitive self. It seems, therefore, that the experience of interiority needs to be addressed anew.

The Age of Enlightenment established for Western culture a world which had found its clearest ontological and epistemological expression in the philosophy of Descartes (1647). It is a world in which reality is defined according to the vision of natural science. That reality defined as a system of mathematical and physical references was originally a vision, and still is, has long been forgotten (cf. Romanyszyn 1982; Roszak 1972). But the appropriation of such a vision as the single definition of
reality means that the life-world loses its ontological claim. As Romanyshyn (1982) astutely observes:

"In such a world, in which rainbows nevertheless continue to matter, a new science is needed to explain why what we experience is not real and what is real is not what we experience. Modern psychology is that science. It originates in order to save the hypothesis of the scientific world. And it saves that hypothesis by making the experience of the world an event inside the subject" (p.30).

It is in this context that Jung usually uses the term "projection". Science, he says (1938/40, p.83), involves the "withdrawal of projections", although this involves a "despiritualization of the world". However, he continues, "our ordinary life still swarms with them. You can find them spread out in the newspapers, in books, rumours, and ordinary social gossip. All gaps in our actual knowledge are still filled out with projections" (ibid.).

The effect of this is ambiguous: Jung's use of projection in this context reinstates the psyche as the world in which we live, but it does so by endorsing Descartes' vision of a disenchanted and disinhabited world, as well as scientific psychology's latent meaning according to Romanyshyn. Psychological life becomes an interior event unless it is "projected" outwards. But since the development of consciousness implies the "withdrawal of projections", such projection implies a degree of unconsciousness. To this extent Jung not only tends to endorse the Cartesian ontology of modern psychology but makes it a kind of moral imperative.

That the main drift of Jung's thought moves away from this is clear. But there is a tendency in Jung's thought to endorse, and even promote, a
vision of psychological life as an interior world within the subject. The
boundaries of this subject vary: they may be the imagined boundaries of
an imaginary place called "mind" (what Freud called the psyche), but,
more often than not, nowadays they are roughly equivalent to the body's
skin. Thus "ego boundaries", which consolidate a person's sense of
identity, are drawn theoretically in a way that recalls Freud's (1923)
statement: "The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely
a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface" (p.364).

The metapsychological issues involved in the transformation of bodily
sensations into the "psychical apparatus" are complex (Laplanche and
Pontalis 1973/80 p.141), but need not be addressed here. Existential
phenomenology rejects Freud's metapsychology as unsound in its
foundations, and rejects, therefore, any attempt to rescue its
superstructure with theoretical ingenuity (Boss 1963). The essential
point here to note is that depth psychology, despite the theoretical
differences between Freud and Jung (and others could be added), tends to
perpetuate in its conceptual foundations an image of Cartesian man: an
isolate in his experience, standing over a meaningless, homogenous world.

Critiques of these foundations have been more than adequately made by
1975; Steele 1982; Van den Berg 1972). The critiques have not had an
unequivocal impact on analytic thought (broadly defined, but returning to
Jungian thought specifically now). Part of the reason for this may be
that insufficient attention has been given by the existential
phenomenologists to the experience of interiority as a bodily experience.
It cannot be denied, for instance, that patients say in one way or
another: "I feel something inside me that is trying to get out". It may be a shaky feeling in the stomach, a tension in the throat, a feeling of increasing sexual arousal, and it may be dreamed as being pregnant or having a snake emerge from one's mouth. One's self as a bodily interior may also be felt to contain others: the warm presence of a distant lover, for instance, or in some pathological states persecutory parental figures.

In addressing interiority anew, there are at least two reflections on such experiences that should be made. The first is prompted by some remarks by the analyst, Peters (1987); the second sustains attention on the phenomenon of such bodily experiences.

Peters (ibid.) writes:

"Since the demise of alchemy, the eagle-like ascent of a scientific world view has de-animated matter so thoroughly that for most people the human body itself has become the last refuge of the divine in matter. No longer can most of us experience the divinities at work in the metals, as the alchemist did. Not, at least, until we have redeemed the numinous from the prison in our matter. Both dreaded and longed for, as Jung said, we are now most likely to experience the manifesting of the gods as pathologies: the most potent compulsions, the terrors which evoke real spontaneous prayer, the autonomous, the overwhelming, the mysterious - in our body-selves we experience the power of the unknown god" (pp. 379-380).

In a disenchanted world the body is the last receptacle of the holy, or slightly more prosaically, of an enriched and deepened psychological life. These lines by Peters give clinical insight to those by Romanyshyn, cited at the beginning of this section. Taken together, they suggest that the interiorisation of psychological life into the subject conceived as a bodily location is not an ontological necessity but the effect of a
cultural shift. Further, despite the conceptual ontological difficulties pointed out in the phenomenological critiques, the experience of interiority in these spatialised terms makes a specific cultural sense. In former times the experience of oneself, either as the place of personal identity or as the place of an emergent "centre" of psychological life, may have been quite different. Certainly the Japanese experience of the self seems to be different from the West's (Hayasaka, 1984), which corroborates the view of Romanyszyn and Peters - and Jung, in that he too saw the experience of the psyche as an "internal" event to be a peculiarly Western, post-Enlightenment phenomenon. This reflection leads to the conclusion, therefore, that phenomenological critiques of Cartesianism - at least those in English⁴ - may have given insufficient attention to "inner experience" as an ontic possibility that reflects the peculiar structure of Western selfhood. Further, it suggests that psychology's focus on "inner experience" is not merely a misarticulation of existential bodyhood but an attempt to rescue psychological life (or the holy) in the place at which it is now largely to be found. (Witness the array of "body therapies"!) The second reflection, however, affirms that, despite this interiorisation of psychological life, a sustained receptivity to the phenomena of bodily experience shows that bodily interiority is not the source of experience or of selfhood but the medium of its appropriation. It is true that one can feel something in one's body (identity, an emergent self, or even the presence of others). However, staying attentively with that bodily experience to its proper moment of

⁴. Unfortunately J.H. Van den Berg's (1959,1961) studies have not been translated into English.
articulation yields a "felt sense" which is always situated within a world-disclosive context (Gendlin 1978, 1978/79).

Thus a patient may speak superficially about various people and events, then begin to feel frustrated and empty. Something is not right, and he feels called back to his bodily feeling. It is an interior that sometimes affords relief as it anchors him more stably in the world, but this time it is an uncomfortable place of contradictions: empty and heavy, flat and frantic. Within the containment of psychotherapy he finds the courage to stay with these feelings, and out of the silence tears emerge. He sinks bodily into the less complicated mood of sadness. For the time-being he feels himself, and his speech is embodied and true.

What is noticeable, however, is that the patient now talks about his life: his parents, brothers, teachers, dogs, lovers, his house, the garage-mechanic, the therapist. The speech and feeling that at first seemed to emerge from deep within his body now show themselves more clearly as authentic expressions of his historical, world-disclosive existence. His body, in other words, is neither the source nor the location of his experience but the medium through which the lived truth of his existence at that time becomes reflectively known. Interiority, therefore, is not a literal interiority.

This conclusion is also reached by Zinkin (1985). He points out that the shift from Freud to Jung is a shift from the body to the self as the psychologist's central field of reference. The implication of this is that the inner-outer boundary does not refer to the skin unless the self identifies with the body. Zinkin continues:
"Thus a man may feel and even be whole if he has lost his legs, his sight, his hearing, even his reason. He is not using his bodily boundaries as his territory. On the other hand, one may feel and be incomplete without one's car, one's wife, one's house, one's membership to a professional body" (ibid., p.12).

In this way Zinkin distinguishes between the felt sense of a cohesive bodily interior and the existential place of experience and unfolding selfhood.

The West's tendency to literalise and spatialise interiority has been the subject of cogent criticism by the Archetypal analysts as well (cf. Boer and Kugler 1977; Hillman 1973, 1974, 1975, 1981; Sardello 1984). For Hillman, "depth" in "depth psychology" refers not to a literalised "downwardness"; rather, "the vertical direction refers to interiority as a capacity within all things" (1981, p.29). Or again:

"The sense of "in-ness" refers neither to location nor to physical containment. It is not a spatial idea, but an imaginal metaphor for the soul's non-visible and non-literal inherence, the imaginal psychic quality within all events" (Hillman 1975, p. 173).

Thus, if individuation involves "an enriching of conscious psychological life" (Jung 1921, p.450), it is a process which deepens existence as a whole, of which the world is intrinsically a part. Jung's remark regarding East Africa, "We found a dawning significance in things" (op. cit.). comes to mind, for wholeness is intrinsically constituted as an aesthetic consciousness (Moncrieff 1978).

Such a transformation occurs together with a shift in (the ego's) attitude from heroic utilitarianism to reverent hospitality.
There is something in this shift which has been mistakenly taken up in the language of projection. But David Holt (1975) sees the "withdrawal of projections" not in these familiar spatialised terms but as a shift from speaking to listening. In this case the transformational awakening of interiority involves the shift from habitually speaking at the world in terms of one's anthropocentric (egoic) needs and anxieties to listening to the things and people that speak (whisper, cry, shout, etc.) the calls and meanings of one's life. Listening does not imply that a vigorous response is necessarily inappropriate. Being fully present to a psychotic or a child, for example (Callanan 1979, pp.27-28), does not mean being deaf to madness or immaturity. Such deafness is a form of mindless and faddish sentimentality (ibid.); it is a form of "speaking" that is oblivious to the Otherness of the other. But the shift from speaking to listening is one that realises one's capacity for faith, which, as Holt put it "is the activity which lets the world be, which allows Presence to sound" (ibid., p.143).

One advantage of this interpretation of interiority is that the tension between "adaptation" and "individuation", or first half of life and second half of life, is significantly reduced - as both Fordham and Hillman would like - even though a proper place is given to Jung's sense of the meaning of individuation as a mature form of deepening and awakening. Clearly, however, speaking and listening, using and serving, being full and being empty, being somebody and being nobody, form a dialectic.
6.9. A summary of themes

At this point a number of themes of the present work as a whole, and of this chapter, can be brought together.

1. The psyche is not a Cartesian interior locality but is the life-world. In other words, the world in which man lives is not exterior to psyche.

2. The open realm that is psyche has a texture that is revealed primordially as fantasy. Fantasy is man's primordial being-in-the-world, which means that the lived world is a revelation that occurs in the light of human imagination.

3. The self has many descriptions in Jung's work, but can be defined most briefly as psychic totality. Using the term self instead of psyche encourages a greater sense of responsibility for one's world; it helps awaken a sense that selfhood is to be found in one's world-relationships; it speaks directly to the profound and paradoxical truth that the foundation of one's personal identity is not personal yet is intimately one's own.

4. The definitive hallmark of psyche is fantasy, and the realisation of the psyche/self is mediated primarily through images. Jung's insistence on the primacy of images is an attempt to avoid the positivist fantasy of "things", but is in danger of setting images and imagination loose from their moorings. More clearly than Jung, we wish to maintain the link between the images of the self and concrete existence. It is not that images have a "projective" link to concrete existence but that existence is concretely and intrinsically imaginal.
5. The self is thus a gathering of the world as a human world. (This point and the preceding one will be discussed more fully when discussing the archetypes and archetypal images.)

6. The ego is equivalent to personal identity, which is established as one's self is appropriated responsibly as one's own. Without appropriation the gathering of one's world remains unconsciousness and lost in semi-anonymity.

7. Individuation is the development of consciousness. This involves the increasing differentiation of self-world possibilities. The process is both an expansion and a deepening of existence. In modern Western society expansion tends to be willfull, utilitarian and heroic, and thus tends to empty the primordial powers and meanings of the self into the literalisms of contemporary life. Therefore there tends to be an emphasis in analytical psychology on psychological transformation as a deepening process.

8. This transformation involves the deliteralizing of existence such that one's personal identity and one's world are experienced and lived with metaphorical resonance. This is the essential meaning of interiority.

With these themes highlighted, a phenomenologically rigorous understanding of the self and individuation might be outlined. This outline is not a summary of the above themes, and it may be read on its own terms. Nevertheless, the above thematic highlights should help to make the following outline accessible and familiar.
6.10. The self and individuation: a phenomenological outline

Individuation is a process of differentiation and transformation in which personal identity is established as an appropriation of a limited number of possible world-disclosures and relationships from out of the totality of possibilities that Jung calls the self. Such an appropriation constitutes a personalised incarnation and transformation, within the limits of a cultural space and time, of the primitive and archaic self. Appropriation is thus prone to the particular ways in which a culture is closed as well as open, so that personal identity may be more or less constricted, in different ways and with varying effects. At least in modern Western culture, appropriation tends to be predominantly within heroic modes. To that extent, personal identity is established anthropocentrically, or humanistically, in terms of will power, triumph, a fear of the dark and mysterious, and iconoclasm. To that extent as well, it is in conflict with the primordial reality of the self and the voice of Being that calls to be heard.

It is that call, which is also a call from the self, that initiates the individuation process in its maturer form. Psychological transformation involves the sacrifice of the heroic as the dominant mode of being-in-the-world, and the realisation of a mode that is essentially receptive and hospitable. This sacrifice and transformation may be quite subtle or it may be experienced as a psychological upheaval. It constitutes a deliteralising of one's contingent life, including one's personal identity. This deliteralising reawakens the existential link between personal identity and the self as a primordial incarnation. Since self-realisation involves the establishment of that link, there is an
important sense in which the self as such is not only that Other to which identity is linked but is the "link" itself. Personal identity is not dissolved (except perhaps for transient moments) but rather is situated within the ambiguity of existence, which is both personal and prepersonal, contemporary and primitive, known and lived, revealed and concealed. The centre of gravity of psychological life thus shifts from the humanistically imagined ego to that ambiguous and embodied clearing within which the depth of beings is revealed and the world is thereby gathered. Because that clearing is ambiguously a revealing and concealing, in which experience and action are deliteralised, the images through which psychological life is structured and empowered are equally differentiated and deliteralised. Thus the reconnection with the self is also in a paradoxical sense a process that frees the person from the images which previously lived through, or haunted, him. Again paradoxically, the move to increasing openness and freedom is a process that deepens a person's sense of himself and his experience of those beings with which he is engaged. If self-realisation is a movement towards wholeness, then wholeness is a relative term which points to a capacity to remain flexible and responsive in a variety of contexts. But because most, if not all, contexts have many possible interpretations (imaginative disclosures), wholeness refers to a quality of undefensive openness in situations, and thus to a sense of being appropriately at home in the world.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS

7.1. Introduction: the divergence from Freud

It has been suggested, with a touch of irony, that the hypothesis of the unconscious has reified into a hypostasis in order to justify analytical psychology as an endeavour concerned with solving the "real" problems that supposedly reside there (Hillman 1970b, p.141). It is true that many of Jung's essays contain appeals for a recognition of psychic life that is not conscious, and in the context of two world wars these appeals took on a moral urgency. But the extent to which Jung actually reified his notion is equivocal. Interestingly enough, at risk of caricature, it seems that the two main movements of post-Jungian analytical psychology (Developmental and Archetypal) tend to fall on either side of Jung's equivocation in this regard.

Jung does speak of the "contents" of the unconscious, particularly in terms of complexes and archetypes, and in some of his theoretically self-conscious moments he describes the unconscious in terms that link his concept to Freud's (eg. 1919, p.133; Jung 1921, pp.483-486; 1934/54, p.3). In this case the unconscious is thought to contain contents that
are beneath the "threshold" of consciousness, and the collective unconscious is conceived as a "deeper layer" of the unconscious than the personal unconscious (Jung, 1934/54). Jung (ibid., p.3n) acknowledges that his concept of the collective unconscious is approached by Freud's theory of the "id"; and it may indeed be that Freud (1923) developed the term in order to meet the challenge that Jung's concept had posed (Progooff 1956, pp.147-150). Furthermore, Jung sometimes uses the metaphor of psychic energy, or "libido", to describe the "dynamics" of the unconscious. Further still, he does not always clearly distinguish the unconscious from a supposed association with the brain (eg. Jung 1914b, p.203), and this confusion is exacerbated when he situates the archetypes in genetics and brain structure.

It is against this background that Boss (1957, 1963, 1975) criticises Jung, saying, "so our criticism of the collective unconscious applies equally to the Freudian notion [of the id]" (Boss 1975, p.147). Boss asserts that, given this essential similarity between Jung's and Freud's concepts, Jung makes the faulty assumption "that human beings consist, aside from their bodies, of an independent, stratified psyche" (ibid., p.140) that is filled, like Freud's, with energies, forces and reified things.

Given Jung's explicit connection to Freudian metapsychology and his use of some similar terms and spatial analogies, the criticisms by Boss effectively demolish Jung's concept ("hypothesis") of the unconscious. The distinction between the personal and the collective unconscious disappears too. Boss's point is that if man is essentially and irreducibly that open, illuminating realm within which the beings of the
world can shine forth, then there is no need to think of an encapsulated entity called the psyche in which "representations" need to be stored in order for the world to be perceived or psychological life to be imagined. If there is no container called the psyche then the idea that there are compartments (conscious, personal unconscious, collective unconscious) in this container obviously falls away as well.

However, our sustained investigation of the meaning and structure of the psyche for Jung indicated a conception very different from Freud's, and the situation is similar regarding the conscious and unconscious. Once again, there seems to be a difference between some of Jung's self-conscious theorising and the spirit of his intention. There are in fact clues which suggest that Jung was aware of an essential dissimilarity between his notion and Freud's even where he blurbs this. In the 'Definitions' section of *Psychological Types* (1921), for instance, Jung makes several favourable references to Freud's concepts of the unconscious and repression, and to Freud's "proofs" for the existence of "an unconscious" (quotation marks mine). However, in the midst of this discussion he states:

"As to the actual state an unconscious content is in when not attached to consciousness is something that eludes all possibility of cognition. It is therefore quite pointless to hazard conjectures about it. Conjectures linking up the unconscious state with cerebration and physiological processes belong equally to the realm of fantasy" (p.484).

Here, as elsewhere, Jung is again trying to establish an understanding of psychological phenomena as well as methodological limits that are indigenous to psychology. With reference to the unconscious, height and depth are not situated within a topographical model, neither do they necessarily refer to distance from consciousness. They describe that
structure of human experience in which some of the fundamental polarities of existence are found: spirit and animal, day and night, spirit and soul. It is in this context that Jung prefers the spatially uncommitted term, unconscious (Jung 1939a, pp.282-283).

But Jung's break with Freudian metapsychology goes much further than a rejection of its physiological assumptions. Although Jung never abandoned thinking of the collective unconscious as a "deeper" layer of the psyche than Freud had explored, this thinking was not consistent. In fact his last major theoretical paper (Jung 1947/54) consolidated an understanding of consciousness and the unconscious that rendered the two terms thoroughly ambiguous, and situated both within intentionality.

7.2. The ambiguity of the terms conscious and unconscious

In Psychological Types (1921) Jung writes as follows:

"By consciousness I understand the relation of psychic contents to the ego, in so far as this relation is perceived by the ego. Relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are unconscious. Consciousness is the function or activity which maintains the relation of psychic contents to the ego" (pp. 421-422).

In this definition consciousness presupposes more than being awake or even engaged with the world in some rudimentary way, for it assumes that there is an "I" to whom perceptions, fantasies, feelings, etc. refer. If consciousness is "an activity which maintains psychic contents to the ego", it is a capacity of the ego to maintain relative continuity and stability in its perceptions, fantasies, feelings, etc. Ego and consciousness mutually implicate each other (Jung 1926, p.323). In other
words, the development of consciousness has to do with appropriation, apperception and reflection.

Appropriation has been described already. Apperception is a process by which things, images and events are perceived psychologically and not merely literally (cf. Samuels et al 1986, p.25). This process is intimately linked, for Jung, to reflection. In this regard Jung (1942/48) writes:

"'Reflection' should be understood not simply as an act of thought, but rather as an attitude.... As the word itself testifies ('reflection' means literally "bending back"), reflection is a spiritual act that runs counter to the natural process; an act whereby we stop, call something to mind, form a picture, and take up a relation to and come to terms with what we have seen" (p.158n.).

Reflection is the same as becoming conscious (ibid.), and for Jung the themes of appropriation and apperception are contained within it. Thus Samuels et al (1986) comment:

"Attainment of consciousness would appear to be the result of recognition, reflection upon, and retention of psychic experience, enabling the individual to combine it with what he has learned, to feel its relevance emotionally, and to sense its meaning for his life" (pp.36-37).

The problem, however, is that the mode in which this complex of activities is accomplished is consistently structured in the ego's terms. Consciousness is not an empty container of formal possibilities, or a laboratory in which "the facts" are weighed and measured. What we have called the interrelated themes of appropriation, apperception and reflection are not empty, disembodied calculations, but acts from a particular perspective: a perspective called ego. Thus what might appear to have been a deliberate act of consciousness at one time upon later reflection turns out to have been yet another compulsive repetition. What
a psychotherapist intended to be a therapeutic move turns out to have been motivated by habitual neurotic anxieties. As Newman (1980, pp.121-122) points out, it is precisely where the analyst complacently discovers and sees what he expects that he is dangerously "unconscious". In other words, there is no consciousness that is transparent to itself; to a greater or lesser extent consciousness is permeated with unconsciousness (Jung 1947/54, pp.187-188).

This inherent opacity within consciousness is particularly severe, and easily recognisable for the psychologist, when the ego's stance is heroic. Then appropriation, apperception and reflection all manifest the heroic perspective. Of course, identification with any archetype implies a corresponding loss of autonomy and consciousness on the part of the ego, but the hero is a motif that is especially seductive, for heroic differentiation and transcendence characterise consciousness in rudimentary form.

Heroism and consciousness are not always distinguished in Jung's writings either. Thus for example, he writes of consciousness as

"the magical weapon which gave man victory over the earth, and which we hope will give him a still greater victory over himself" (Jung 1934a, p.140).

Or again:

"The hero's main feat is to overcome the monster of darkness: it is the long-hoped-for and expected triumph of consciousness over the unconscious" (Jung 1940, p.167).

It may be conceded that the development of consciousness has an heroic dimension. The problem arises when the ego is inflated by the hero, for when this happens the heroic imperative defines consciousness. The more
this occurs the more existence is blinded by the glare of the heroic mentality. What is called consciousness now has the driven quality of a manic defence (Lambert 1981b, p.17). Symbolic depth is perceived as mysticism and fuzz, and the lived body solidifies into anatomical and mechanical self-understanding. If Faust epitomises heroic consciousness, Faust was also profoundly unconscious. As Jung (1944/52) put it:

"An inflated consciousness is always egocentric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of drawing right conclusions about the future. It is hypnotized by itself and therefore cannot be argued with. It inevitably dooms itself to calamities that must strike it dead. Paradoxically enough, inflation is a regression of consciousness into the unconscious" (pp. 480-481).

The other typical way in which consciousness is a form of unconsciousness, for Jung, is when the ego is identified with the persona: in other words, when consciousness is no more than the "collective consciousness" of the social world. Jung generally uses the term "collective consciousness" to describe "those who have the least access to their interior selves and have strayed the furthest from their instinctual roots" (Jung 1947/54, p.206). It is a "truly chaotic world" (ibid.), for the person's identity is dissolved into collective anonymity, cut off from the self yet prone to those collective archetypal seizures Jung called "psychic epidemics" (eg. National Socialism).

Of course, these two forms in which consciousness is unconscious are not mutually exclusive. The heroic consciousness is culturally sanctioned as the technocratic and capitalist mentality; in white South Africa it is also sanctioned as apartheid.
If consciousness can be a form of unconsciousness, what of "the unconscious"? Is the unconscious a form of consciousness? The answer here has to be both yes and no.

There are many passages in which Jung describes the unconscious in ways that situate it as a mode of being-in-the-world, which is therefore a kind of consciousness. He writes, for example, that "the primitive is as unconscious as a child" (Jung 1927/31a, p.41). Or again:

"During the first years of life there is hardly any consciousness, though the existence of psychic processes manifests itself at a very early stage. These processes are not grouped, however, around an organised ego; they have no centre and therefore no continuity, lacking which a conscious personality is impossible.... Only when a child starts to say "I" is there any perceptible continuity of consciousness. But in between there are frequent periods of unconsciousness" (Jung 1926/46, p.52).

That Jung overstated his case (Fordham 1969) is not an issue here. The point is that unconsciousness, for Jung, describes the quality of a life that is lived yet not reflectively known. This structure of unconsciousness describes, however, an ontological condition that continues in some sense throughout life. Therefore, it describes not only unconsciousness as a quality of existence in childhood but a necessary dimension that existence later comes to understand as "the unconscious". Underneath the veneer of civilisation, we are all, says Jung (1931a) archaic men. The unconscious is not an encapsulated locality but is a kind of world-relationship.

Thus the unconscious thinks, or at least has thoughts (Jung 1902, p.87; 1940, p.153). The unconscious "behaves like a conscious subject" (Jung 1958b, p.439). The unconscious has tendencies towards a goal that is both
independent of, and greater in significance than, the wishes of the person (Jung 1928b, pp.134-135). The unconscious is directly concerned with familial and communal relations (ibid., p.179). "The unconscious mind of man sees correctly even when conscious reason is blind and impotent" (Jung 1952a, p.386; cf. also 1955-56, p.359). Or, perhaps the most remarkable passage of all:

"If the facts do not deceive us the unconscious processes are far from being unintelligent. The character of automatism and mechanism is lacking to them, even to a striking degree. They are not in the least inferior to the conscious processes in subtlety; on the contrary, they often far surpass our conscious insights" (Jung 1926, p.334).

The so-called "unconscious", continues Jung, is only "unconscious" from "our point of view" but is not necessarily "unconscious of itself" (ibid.).

Therefore the unconscious is a kind of consciousness. What it lacks is that differentiation from and perspective upon itself which makes possible the moment of interior reflection Jung called consciousness.

7.3. The complex as existential complexity

Jung's ambiguous use of the terms conscious and unconscious is given theoretical coherence with his concept of the complex, particularly as developed in his essays, A Review of the Complex Theory (1934c), and On the Nature of the Psyche (1947/54; cf. also Jacobi 1959). But these works pull together ideas that can be traced back to his very earliest writings. In his doctoral dissertation Jung (1902) spoke of complexes as
"unconscious personalities" that had the quality of consciousness and sought integration; and in his *Studies in Word Association* (1904-10) Jung (1905, p.321) understood complexes in terms of language, cognitions and affects. These are terms which situate complexes as modes of being within a shared world. Thus, when Jung (1934c) reflected on his association experiments he recognised explicitly that they, and their results, were grounded in dialogue:

"What happens in the association test also happens in every discussion between two people. In both cases there is an experimental situation which constellates complexes that assimilate the topic discussed or the situation as a whole, including the parties concerned. The discussion loses its objective character and its real purpose, since the constellated complexes frustrate the intentions of the speaker and may even put answers into their mouths which they can no longer remember afterwards" (p.95).

A complex is thus a "fragmentary personality" or a "splinter psyche" (ibid., p.97-98), and the ego is fundamentally only one complex among many. Therefore, as Jung concluded:

"Everyone nowadays knows that people "have complexes". What is not so well known ... is that complexes *have us*. The existence of complexes throws serious doubt on the naive assumption of the unity of consciousness ... and on the supremacy of the will" (ibid., p.96).

The "living units" of the psyche are complexes, says Jung (ibid., p.101), whether they are integrated into conscious volition or not. The question of ego development, and what is properly called consciousness, has to do with one's relation to these complex intentionalities and with their integration and personalisation. But the essential intentionality of complexes remains unchanged. Thus, Jung (1947/54) criticises Freud's psychophysiological reductionism regarding unconscious contents, and asserts:

"[E]verything goes on functioning in the unconscious state
just as though it were conscious. There is perception, feeling, volition, and intention, as though a subject were present" (p.186).

Human existence is structured primordially as a multiplicity of complexes, each with its own intentionality, each with its own "consciousness". At this primal time ontogenetically, and at this level ontologically, consciousness is not a unity but a series of fragments, an archipelago of islands (ibid., p.189). As ego-consciousness slowly coheres, it is still "surrounded by a multitude of little luminosities" (ibid., p.190). Therefore, the unconscious, says Jung (ibid., pp.190 ff.), is multiple consciousness.

It may already be apparent that Jung's account of the unconscious as a multitude of complex intentionalities approaches Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the unconscious as an ambiguous lived consciousness, structured through the ambiguously revealing and concealing intentionality of the body-subject (Brooke 1986; Merleau-Ponty 1942, 1945; Romanyshyn 1977).

Jung prefers the term consciousness to describe that quality of self-reflection in which the person (ego) is able to appropriate as his own, and utilise effectively and freely, the complexes that are already structuring his existence. Without the ego's self-reflection the complexes function "automatically" and have a compulsive quality; when severely dissociated, they tend to become increasingly archaic and numinous (Jung 1947/54, p.187). But this suggests that, if the complexes are the "characteristic expressions of the psyche" (Jung 1934c, p.101, italics in original), they are not ontologically separate from the lived body. With Jung's theory of complexes, psychic density and necessity are
incarnate.

Jung's word association studies illustrated the intrinsic connection between language, cognition, affects, and the body's responsiveness. Bodily responses such as sweating, or changes in heartbeat, breathing, or skin colour were recorded together with reaction times in the context of stimulus words. Jung (ibid.) rightly recognised that these tests reproduced "the psychic situation of the dialogue" (p.95), as he rather quaintly put it, and that every investigation of complexes involved a dialogue between two people (ibid., p.102). In other words, much of Jung's primary access to psychic complexity was through an implicit understanding of the human body as an intrinsically and thoroughly psychological body.

In a particularly brilliant paper Jung (1906) presents a case study of a 24-year-old woman in which he shows that a single complex is revealed in her word association test results, in her dreams, and in her hysterical bodily symptoms. At this point, the complex can be identified as that which structures her thoughts, language, affects, bodily responses, dreams and hysterical symptoms. The complex, therefore, is the feeling-toned core of meanings which structures (and limits) her existence as a whole. If Jung shows that word association test results, dreams, and hysterical symptoms are structured by a complex, he shows implicitly that the complex can be located neither in "the mind" nor in "the body", as traditional philosophical categories, nor can it be placed in "the unconscious" - wherever that might be. A new term is needed. "Psyche" was

1. This word is being used deliberately to bring together ordinary English usage and Jung's term, complex.
such a term for Jung. It captured and embodied the essential structure of human life, for it is never discretely mental or physical but an embodied mentality and a mindful bodiliness. Jung's experimental researches show, above all, that Jung's analysis of the psyche does not exclude the body but swallows it, with the result that the body tends to remain unthematised.

A less misleading term, and one which emerges out of the same logic, is "existence" (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.88; Olkowski 1982-83, p.99).

7.4. The unconscious as lived matrix

Jung situates the complexes in the totality of the psyche, for which the term existence provides greater ontological clarity. But if phenomenology provides analytical psychology with a term adequate to Jung's work on the complex, this work of Jung's provides a phenomenological analysis of existence and of the lived body with substantial psychological import.

Inter alia:

1. Jung shows that the incarnate intentionalities of psychological life are many and various, and cannot be reduced to sexuality and aggression².

2. Merleau-Ponty's dialogue with Freud effected a transformation of phenomenology perhaps more than of psychoanalysis. But the result has been that, when Merleau-Ponty (or his followers) writes about the lived body with psychoanalytic richness, he tends to thematise sexuality, even as he is critical of "this pitiless hermeneutic" (1960a, p.69). Jung's notion of complexes provides a far wider range of possible thematisations, particularly when it is recalled that there are as many complexes as gods. In "adding" Jungian thought to the phenomenology of the lived body, however, the mistake must not be made of reducing the
2. These intentionalities are more or less autonomous and independent of conscious, egoic volition.

3. These incarnate intentionalities require reflection and appropriation (which includes personalisation and integration) if life is to be lived responsibly and freely, open to other complexities.

4. Their dissociation or repression has serious consequences that will be felt throughout the whole of one's existence: in one's thoughts, behaviour, mood, and in one's dreams. In particular, these complexities of incarnate life tend to become increasingly primitive and numinous.

5. These incarnate intentionalities have both personal and impersonal dimensions to them: personal psychological life emerges from impersonal foundations, but these foundations continue to provide structure, consistency and density to psychological life despite the vicissitudes of culture and history (and despite the claims of much contemporary thought).

6. Each existential complexity has its own fantasy life, its own cluster of images, which shows itself in sleep in the form of dreams and when awake in the form of fantasy (Jung 1929, p.56). In other words, each complex is an incarnate intentionality that illuminates and inhabits a certain world, and that world is revealed immediately and directly in the form of images. This is despite the scope or relevance of Merleau-Ponty's analyses of the sexual body. As one complex among many sexuality is not a "part" of existence along with other "parts". According to Merleau-Ponty Freud shows that sexuality is not an instinct but a dimension of incarnate necessity that pervades human life (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1960b, p.227). This interpretation by Merleau-Ponty needs to remain intact. But the Jungian contribution is to insist on a similar hermeneutic for other complexes too.
contingencies of everyday life that may tend to smother the imaginal complexities of the lived world.

7. The transformation of the lived body into the authentically human order, or in other words, the spiritualisation of incarnate psychological life, is mediated through symbols. Jung's contribution is not only to show that this is so but to describe in unparalleled detail the symbolic structure of these transformative moments.

It is remarkable how Jung's analysis of complexes wedds with Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the lived body. To adapt Merleau-Ponty's famous phrase regarding phenomenology and psychoanalysis, "They are both aiming towards the same latency" (Merleau-Ponty 1960a, p.71). Both Jung and Merleau-Ponty render the terms conscious and unconscious ambiguous, and regard the unconscious as a latent, unreflective intentionality. Both Jung and Merleau-Ponty seek a conceptual foundation for thinking about human life in more substantial and coherent terms than conscious and unconscious, or mind and body (etc.) allow; Jung deepens and sharpens psyche in thinking about complexes "and" images, and Merleau-Ponty shifts similarly from existence to thinking about the lived body. Complexes, for Jung, and the lived body, for Merleau-Ponty, are the latent, pre-reflective, incarnate intentionalities that found and structure psychological life. These vital matrices, embodied and imaginal, are usually what is called "the unconscious".

3. This point has been made in a paper by Levin (1982-83), who links the work of Merleau-Ponty to Neumann's account of Eros and Psyche. Levin's aim is to give explicit embodiment to Neumann's story (and to Jung's accounts of symbolic transformation), and to make explicit the symbolic and transformative character of reflection in Merleau-Ponty's hermeneutics of the lived body. It need not detract from Levin's fine essay to reassert, however, that Jung's analysis of symbolic transformations is not of a domain separate from the lived body, which would then require a substantial hermeneutic shift.
Each author thematises dimensions of existence that remain implicit for the other. Merleau-Ponty articulates the bodiliness of psychic complexity, Jung the multiple psychic complexity of the lived body. Merleau-Ponty, more clearly than Jung, situates the complexities of the lived body in the historical, perceptual, linguistic, and interpersonal matrices that are meant by the term existence. Jung, more clearly than Merleau-Ponty, reveals the body's imaginal matrices which inspire, structure, limit and transform existence in all its dimensions (historical, perceptual, etc.).

A detailed account of the unconscious in Merleau-Ponty's work is not necessary at this point (cf. Brooke 1986; Romanyshyn 1977). But if Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of the lived body is integrated with Jung's psychological analysis of the complex, then an account of the unconscious as vital matrix leads to several conclusions:

1. The unconscious is not a psychic locality that is situated vertically within the person, with no immediate access to the "outside" world. This topographical fantasy is, as Dry (1961, pp.127-128) noted, a spatialised concretistic metaphor which intends to mark a shift from relatively meaningless considerations to philosophically "deeper" - i.e. more meaningful - considerations. If one does want to speak accurately of the spatiality of the unconscious, it is an incarnate intentionality that is situated directly in a populated world of language, history, perception and culture. Its depth is therefore lateral rather than vertical, as it surrounds us as the world in which we primordially dwell (Jung
2. The unconscious is not "unconscious of itself", as Jung put it, but is an ambiguous consciousness, an existential incarnation and awakening that lacks, however, self-reflection.

3. As a domain that may be actively (though not deliberately) dissociated or repressed, the unconscious is the relatively impersonal, lived time of bodily life. The natural rhythms that make up this lived time remain inchoate and diffuse, perceived in dreams and symptoms, yet as incarnate necessities, they remain in the present and intend a future. The unconscious is one's present and future at least as much as one's past (Jung 1928b, pp.134-135).

4. The unconscious calls for appropriation and self-reflection in the light of a personal consciousness (Jung 1938/54, p.95), and it continually attempts to correct the limitations or one-sidedness, of the personally accepted and known. If understood in classical intrapsychic terms, this process of "compensation" quickly deteriorates conceptually into magical thinking or a literalised model of energetics. But, compensation is not at all a mechanical process (Jung 1945/48b, pp.287-288); it is a process of self-regulation that is fluid, flexible, and at some point profoundly embodied (Jung 1934/54, pp.19-20).

5. As an embodied intentionality, the unconscious is immediately

4. There are primordial, culturally historical and personally idiosyncratic dimensions to the unconscious, but if the unconscious is imagined as a topography of sedimentary layers then some very odd and untenable theorising follows. For example, the historicity of the unconscious becomes a layer called the "ethnic unconscious" that is squeezed in between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious (Hersch 1980).
present in interpersonal relationships and is in principle directly available to the experience of an observer. To analytical psychologists this claim may be startling, yet it does no more than make explicit what Jung "knew" in his word association studies, or what every psychotherapist "knows" in every session. This claim does not suggest a return to an empty positivism, for the manifestation of psychological life as behaviour is multivalent and shy, and, moreover, what is manifest may be perceived and responded to by the therapist without having been held and known in the light of reflection. That is why access to "the patient's unconscious" is found, as often as not, while reflecting on one's own bodily presence and responsiveness (Jung 1929d, p.71). An implication of this point is that interpretation is not inference, a leap into the patient's mind, but the hermeneutic articulation of latencies that are immediately (however subtly) present (Romanyszyn 1978, pp.30-31).

6. The realm of the known - that is, what one identifies as one's person (ego) - can even at best only more or less reflect the existence that is already being lived unconsciously. Self-understanding is never absolutely transparent to itself, for the impersonal opacity of the lived continues to be the existential ground of reflective consciousness.

7. If consciousness is inherently ambiguous so too is "the unconscious", for the pre-reflectively lived is a moment of perceptual opening and world-disclosure that is both a revealing and concealing. For human beings there is no one-to-one relation between what is expressed (eg. love or anger) and its manner of expression, nor is there a one-to-one relation between what is seen (eg. a
smile) and the possible meanings of what is seen. In both cases the relation is many-to-one. Therefore the structure of experience and behaviour is such that meaning is carried forever beyond the proximately manifest to the interior latency which the manifest brings forth. As Romanyszyn (1975) concludes, existence is lived as a metaphorical reality. In Jungian terms, the unconscious drifts of psychological life are revealed symbolically, for a symbol has essentially a metaphorical structure (Jung 1940, p.157).

8. The unconscious as primordial intentionality has an inarticulate understanding of the world in which one lives. Since this world is a shared world, and since that intentionality is equally prepersonal and common, the unconscious is a body of shared attunements and meanings, or in other words, compassion (Jung 1927/31c, p.150; Levin 1982-1983, p.234). This last point has been elaborated by David Levin (1985), who identifies the collective unconscious in terms of the primordially lived body. Levin's evocative reflection on the collective unconscious in these terms ends this section. The collective unconscious, he says, is

"the body's primordial and archaic attunement; its automatic and always already functioning intentionalities; its generous endowment of inherent dispositions and propensities; its latent, and sometimes involuntary perceptivities; its implicit structures of pre-understanding; and its always accessible felt sense, however inchoate and untutored, of what is basically good, basically true, and basically beautiful.

"[It is] that gesturing of the personality through which the dream of our community, the unrecognised dream most latent in our ancestral body, comes spontaneously to articulation, and enters the circle of cultural conversation" (ibid., pp.171-172).
7.5. The collective unconscious as fundamental hiddenness

When the question of whether the unconscious could be described as a form of consciousness was raised the answer was given as both yes and no. Despite the foregoing discussion, in which the unconscious has been articulated as a multitude of latent incarnate intentionalities, the answer must also be negative. Jung would not want to account for the totality of the psychic unknown in terms of intentionality, an ambiguous, vital consciousness. On the other hand, another error must be avoided: regarding the vital matrix as all potentially conscious (in the reflective sense). That would in effect suggest that the above discussion concerns only the personal unconscious and that the collective unconscious is something different. But the discussion of the complexes as incarnate intentionalities included their impersonal foundations, even though the archetypes, as these foundations are called, were not thematised. In other words, the primordial body is, as Levin (1982-83; 1985) has suggested, the collective unconscious.

The problem is that existence described as a complexity of incarnate intentionalities is already an awakening of Being. It presupposes an occurrence, an opening, within which Being can manifest as incarnate intentionality. In fact, this problem, formulated in Heideggerian terms, is what prompted the shift in Merleau-Ponty's (1968) last work. To recognise that the body's intentionality is a possibility that rests upon a prior occurrence, that it emerges out of and is constituted by "the between", is to loosen the unconscious from its conceptual containment in existence and to let it fall into the fertile void out of which existence can emerge factically. Most fundamentally of all, therefore, the
collective unconscious is what Boss (1979, pp.135-143) calls fundamental hiddenness.

This ontological deepening is necessary phenomenologically, and it is given in Jung's work as well. Thus, on one hand the collective unconscious is that "place" which "contains" the archetypes and instincts: embodied potentialities for disclosing and relating to the world in specific and typical ways (eg. Jung 1927/31c, pp. 152-155). On the other hand, however, Jung also allowed the collective unconscious its essential ontological mystery (eg. Jung 1934/54, p.22). He says, for example:

"The collective unconscious, it's not for you, or me, it's the invisible world, it's the great spirit. It makes little difference what I call it: God, Tao, the Great Voice, the Great Spirit" (Jung 1977, p.375).

To situate the lived body within the disclosiveness and gathering of Being is to shift attention from the body to the world, or, more precisely, to the "between" out of which both body and world appear. The collective unconscious, therefore, may be thematised as the primordially incarnate body, but the shift in attention from body to Being affirms that the collective unconscious is given equally in the world. It reminds us that incarnate intentionality cannot be interpreted subjectivistically or dualistically, which would make the revealed world a "function" of intentionality, whether conscious or unconscious. In other words, when Jung says that complexes are revealed as images and we interpret this as Jung's attempt to say that complexes reveal the world as images, this must not be interpreted as saying the revealed world is a function of complexes. As Jung insists, complexes are intrinsically imaginal, just as they are intrinsically affective and embodied. Therefore, if something
emerges from the unconscious it emerges as a newly revealed world as much as an embodied felt sense. If, as Jung (1928/31b) says, exploring the unconscious must "give the body its due" (p.94), then it must give the things of the world their due equally, for the unconscious is to be found there too.

The above analysis of the unconscious would seem to be of direct relevance to contemporary developments in analytical psychology. It gives ontological coherence to the (largely intuited) claim of Archetypal psychology that the unconscious is the "environmental unconscious" or the "tacit environment" (Boer and Kugler 1977, p.147). (The term "life-world" would be more appropriate, as "environment" seems too restrictive and it tends to lack psychic depth.) The above analysis also redresses the lack of bodily life which is sensed in Archetypal psychology by the Developmental School. On the other hand, while the above analysis situates the unconscious "in" bodily life, as the psychoanalytically-oriented Developmental school tends to prefer, it also redresses the tendency of this school to retreat from the world into Cartesian dualism.

7.6. The face of the unconscious and the attitude of consciousness

The unconscious has been described as the vital matrix of psychological life and of personal identity. As vital matrix, it discloses and gathers a life-world that is at once primordial and historical. Consciousness is an emergent capacity of the self to appropriate such an incarnated world as one's own, so that one is no longer so immersed in the impersonal vicissitudes and passions of the still unconscious self. Thus the
development of consciousness is intimately related to the development of the ego. The act of appropriation, which facilitates the claim, "This is I!", has an heroic quality to it, yet Jung's understanding of consciousness is not restricted to heroic terms. Apart from being ecologically disastrous and manically defensive, heroic consciousness tends to be thoroughly unpsychological. Thus, if consciousness is an act of appropriation, it is equally an act of apperception and reflection. This much has been established. What needs to be discussed further is the reason for this being the appropriate meaning of consciousness for Jung, and, with this clarified, the attitude of consciousness in the relation between consciousness and the unconscious.

The relation between conscious and unconscious is essentially compensatory: the unconscious seeks to add "contents" to consciousness so that a deeper and fuller perspective on one's world may be realised. This is as much a call from the world as a call from one's bodily and spiritual life. Consciousness is always and necessarily selective and therefore limited (Jung 1921, p.419); in existential terms, consciousness is always finite, situated, and perspectival. Thus the unconscious can be thought of as that presence that is present-as-an-absence within existence, an absent presence that calls for revelation and appropriation. As a kind of presence the unconscious is an absence that is not "out of mind". As a world it is a voice that can he heard but not understood, a figure in the dark whose features are not visible, a stranger who seems oddly familiar, a childhood friend who has not been thought about for years, a room that has never been entered, a maze, or simply the endless sea and sky. In other words, the unconscious is a world that always has a face, but it is a face that, even when given
within things rather than between them, is not bound by the contingently and factically real. If the world is always revealed according to the way one stands within it, this self-disclosure as a world is especially apparent when that revealed world is uncluttered with social platitudes and empirical literalisms.

As Jung (1944/52) said:

"We know that the mask of the unconscious is not rigid—it reflects the face we turn towards it. Hostility lends it a threatening aspect, friendliness softens its features" (p.25).

Thus, "[t]he man who submits to his fate calls it the will of God; the man who puts up a hopeless and exhausting fight is more apt to see the devil in it" (ibid., p.30n). Further, an attitude of Christian moralism reveals the unknown as a heathen world (Jung 1952a, pp.440-441), which means that a savage and heathen world reflects the face of Christian moralism (cf. Scott 1980). Or again: the hero lives in perpetual fear of, and secret longing for, the abyss of the Great Mother (Jung 1912/52, p.355), which means that the unknown as an abysmal darkness reflects the shining and manic face of the hero.

In other words, the unknown is always filled out with fantasy (Jung 1938/40, p.83), and fantasy is always a "self-portrait" (Jung 1940, p.155). Thus there is a reciprocal moment of self-reflection as fantasy discloses the unknown, yet beckoning and inchoately lived, world.

This insight is what forms the basis of Jung's approach to dreams and active imagination. Jung realises, for example, that the menacing figure in a dream is not the "reason" that the subject flees in terror but is a
self-portrait of the dreamer's fear. Attitude and image form a structural unity as the image reveals the attitude. Thus the first task in working with the dream may be to support the dreamer and encourage him to shift his attitude towards the figure. Only then can the meaning of the fear be explored and articulated.

An image befriended always unfolds and changes, opening and enriching one's world. This is true whether the image appears in a dream, fantasy, or a painting, or more concretely as the tree under which one habitually sits, the pet dog one gets to know better, or the acquaintance one invites to dinner. For both Jung and Boss, who follows Heidegger, things can show their true faces only in the hospitable and even reverent light of care. Strangely enough, those true faces seldom remain monstrous and murderous: there is a prince in the beast, and gold in the symptom. But the hand of friendship cannot be offered as an expedient trick; the beast has to be loved as a beast before his princely qualities can be revealed. In other words, we do not change the image; if befriended, the image heals us (Hillman 1978, p.181; 1979, p.137; Jung 1934e, p.170).

Thus as Jung (1944/1952) says of the unconscious:

"[A]ny efforts to drill it are only apparently successful, and moreover are harmful to consciousness. It is and remains beyond the reach of subjective arbitrary control,

5. This clinical insight tends to be obscured by Jung's notion of the "objective psyche" and his theory of the archetypes as things-in-themselves to which the ego relates. However, as the following chapter will try to show, even here Jung leaves room for an understanding of the archetypes that would be consistent with this conscious - unconsciousness reflectivity and Jung's clinical approach.

6. The example attempts to make an ontological point. Technically, any shift that occurs through such actively supportive intervention may be short-lived, and it may be preferable to work with the dreamer's defences (Dieckmann 1980).
in a realm where nature and her secrets can be neither improved upon nor perverted, where we can listen but may not meddle” (p.46).

Although the birth of consciousness may be an hybris (cf. Edinger 1972), the development of consciousness requires a different range of metaphors from those of sunlight and heroic conquest. Heidegger and Boss think of the shepherd or the poet, for the will of the poet, says Heidegger (1936), is not the "wilfulness" of technological man but is a revelation of the pre-personal will of Nature, a will that draws the essences of things into that clearing that is the Being of man (passim, cf. p.141). Romanyszyn (1985) says we are called to bear witness to those hushed whispers which would otherwise be forgotten. Jung's (1928b p.154) reference to a sense of humour is well known, but he also recalls Philemon and Baucis, who gave their humble visitors reverent hospitality. Finally, Hillman recalls, as well, the figure of Hekate, through whom we can face the limits of our human freedom. He writes:

"There is evidently a perspective that can witness the soul's struggles without the flap of Persephone or the disaster of Demeter. It is also a dark angel ..., a consciousness ... that shines in the dark and can witness such events because it already is aware of them a priori .... Part of us is not dragged down but always lives there, as Hekate is partly an underworld Goddess. From this vantage point we may observe our own catastrophes with a dark wisdom that expects little else" (1979, pp.49-50).

7.7. Summary

Despite Jung's attempts to espouse a continuity between his concepts of "the" conscious and unconscious and Freud's, his descriptions of each indicate an ontological divergence from Freud's topographical account.
Both conscious and unconscious, for Jung, are ambiguous: collective or heroic consciousness is a form of unconsciousness, and the unconscious has its own operative intentionality and is therefore a form of consciousness. Generally, Jung prefers the term consciousness to refer to the capacity to reflect upon, apperceive, and appropriate as one's own those incarnate intentionalities that are pre-reflectively, or "unconsciously", lived.

Jung's word association studies helped develop his notion of the complex. It was argued that, since the complex structures one's bodily responsiveness, dreams, thoughts, language, feelings and interpersonal presence, it could not be conceived in terms of classical philosophical categories such as mind and body. The complex is that vital intentionality which discloses the world imaginically. Thus it opens up that essential ambiguity of human life which Jung called psyche and the phenomenologists call existence.

Jung's description of the complex was integrated with Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the lived body, and the contributions of each were highlighted.

Although the unconscious as a network of vital intentionalities includes archetypal, i.e. non-personal, dimensions, it was recognised that Jung's understanding of the collective unconscious required an ontological deepening of the analysis thus far. Just as the body's intentionality presupposes the prior occurrence of Being, that moment of world-opening within which bodily intentionality is constituted, so the collective unconscious as prepersonal and archaic intentionality presupposes that
fundamental hiddenness out of which both world and body can emerge.

Finally, the relationship between conscious and unconscious was discussed. For Jung, the unconscious is that absence which nevertheless calls for appropriation so that the one-sidedness and limitations of consciousness may be compensated. This can best be done with an attitude of steadfast receptivity to that which seeks to show itself. Jung's clinical acumen here is based on the recognition that the attitude of consciousness and the face of the unconscious form a reflexive unity.

It has been established that the complex which structures psychic life has pre-personal dimensions. These, of course, are known as the archetypes, and it is to a more detailed examination and interpretation of these that we now turn.
ARCHETYPES

8.1. Introduction to Jung's concept

Together with the concept of the collective unconscious, Jung's concept of the archetype is that for which he is best known. Much of the controversy surrounding the notion owes to misunderstandings of Jung's meaning, but it must be said immediately that Jung himself contributed considerably to the difficulties. To some extent the difficulties arise from differences in definitions which can be accounted for historically.

In 1912, in the original edition of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, Jung used the term "Imago" instead of "Complex" in order to stress the autonomy and "living independence" of the emotional complex (cf. Jung 1912b, pp. 55 and 492). In revised editions of this work Jung (1912/52, p. 44n.) says that the term "Imago" anticipated the concept of the archetype. In another work of this time Jung (1912a p. 264) referred to trans-individual "race memories".

In 1914 Jung made a tentative formulation of the archetypes and of the method of archetypal amplification (which he had already used implicitly
in Wandlungen). He wrote about "the reduction to general types" (1914a, p.187), and he noted that the "typical formations (which) show obvious analogies with mythological formations" (ibid., p.188).

In 1916 Jung distinguished between the personal unconscious and the "impersonal" unconscious (later to become the "collective" unconscious), and he described the contents of the impersonal unconscious as "vision(s) born of nature" and "primordial ideas" (Jung 1916b, p.272).

In 1917 Jung introduced the term "collective unconscious", and its contents he described as primordial images and "dominants" (1917/43, p.66). Samuels (1983c; 1985b, p.24) makes the important observation that this essay marks a shift from thinking about images to thinking about structure, or a shift from content to form. He also notes in passing, however, Jung's continuing reliance on Freudian metapsychology at this stage: economics, dynamics, libido.

Thus by the time Jung used the term archetype the notion had a history in his personal thinking, but when, in 1919, the term was introduced, it was not clearly and explicitly differentiated from his earlier formulations. In other words, Jung introduced the term archetype without critically distinguishing his concept from terms such as "primordial image", "primordial idea", "imago" and "dominant". The crucial differences between image and thematic structure, content and form tended to remain blurred.

Nevertheless, the 1919 essay, Instinct and the Unconscious, is particularly important. Although Jung seems to introduce the term
archetype as a synonym for primordial image, the terminological change effects a shift in emphasis from image to structure. The archetype is conceived less as an image than as a form of perception and apprehension, and as a structure which gives imaginal shape and direction to instinctual life. Therefore Jung is not trying to smuggle into psychology the discredited views of Lamarck (1744-1829): the archetypes are not contents (images, ideas, memories) that have been genetically inherited but forms in which perceptions, apprehensions, instincts, etc. are structured. Secondly, this essay situates the fundamentals of human psychological life on that edge which is both continuous and discontinuous with animal life and the natural world. The archetypes are specifically human in that they reveal the world as a human world - they give the world its "anthropomorphic stamp" as Jung says elsewhere (1936/54, p.66) - but they also ground human life in nature. The archetype is "the instinct's perception of itself" (Jung 1919, p.136), and it structures human incarnate life (behaviour) in the same way that an archetype structures the instinctive behaviour of the yucca moth (ibid., pp.132,137).

The distinction between the archetypal image and the archetype as such was clarified further in his essay, On the Nature of the Psyche (Jung 1947/54), where he described the archetype as such as "psychoid". This meant that the archetype was not strictly a psychological content, or phenomenon, but was on the ambiguous edge between the psychological and the organic dimensions of existence. In principle, therefore, the archetype itself could never be experienced. As Jung puts it:

"The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied
structures which all point back to one essentially 'irrepresentable' basic form. The letter is characterized by certain formal elements and by certain fundamental meanings, although these can only be grasped approximately. The archetype as such is a psychoid factor that ... does not appear, in itself, to be capable of reaching consciousness" (ibid., p.213).

Or elsewhere:

"Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content, in other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if such an expression be admissible). It is necessary to point out once more that archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as regards to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience" (Jung 1938/54, p.79).

Jung's insistence on the separation of the archetypal image from the archetype is vigorous and frequently repeated, and it is clearly his intended position. But Jung does not criticise his earlier formulations in which he did not separate the image from the archetype. Worse, his own usage is loose and often contradicts his theoretical position. Thus he does sometimes describe the archetypes as inherited unconscious images (eg. Jung 1922, p.80; 1928b, p.190; 1936-37/59, p.44), and on at least one occasion (Jung 1935/53, p.518) he uses the term "inherited ideas". Added to this is the fact that Jung situates his notion in a lineage that extends through Plato ("forms"), Augustine ("archetypes"), Kant ("categories") and Schopenhauer ("prototypes").

Not all commentators have cleared the confusion. Jacobi (1959), one of the best known expositors of Jung's thought, makes the above distinction even as she says the archetype "is an image in its own right" (p.37).

Generally, however, the position has been to recognise Jung's
carelessness for what it is. Thus Hobson (1971) makes the important point that "to speak of the archetype of the snake is to use the words very loosely" (p.72). This is because, "(w)ith reference to the archetypal theme, a snake biting its tail might have more affinity with a walled city than with a snake going into a hole" (ibid.).

A final introductory point is that Jung's concept of the archetype developed as an extension of his notion of the complex. Jung noticed that the complexes formed in typical ways, that these ways could be discerned in fairy tales and myths, and that at some point they were structurally identical across space and time (i.e. cross culturally and historically). Thus Jung felt it necessary to describe a trans-personal foundation of psychic complexity and ontogenetic development, and the archetype provided that foundation. But although Jung (eg. 1936-37/59, p.42) tends to situate the complexes in the "personal unconscious" and the archetypes in the trans-personal "collective unconscious", there is an essential link between them. Archetypes emerge in a person's life as complexes; complexes have an archetypal core (Jung 1928/31a, p.369). This means that for practical purposes the distinction between the personal and the collective unconscious may be contrived and misleading (Williams 1963). It also means that the greater emphasis placed by some Jungians on personal and developmental issues does not neglect the collective unconscious for it is an attempt to make the archetypal dimension more immediately and existentially real (Whitmont 1982, pp. 342-343). More importantly for present purposes, it means that the terms which define the complex - body/behaviour, image, and affect - also define the archetype. To a considerable extent Jung approached the archetype through his understanding of the complex.
With these preliminary comments in mind, a definition of the archetypes as Jung conceived of them may be approached. The problem is, however, to formulate a definition that does not beg theoretical questions, for the archetype is already a theoretical notion. This seems to be the problem, for example, with the definition in the recently published "A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis" (Samuels et al. 1986), where the archetype is defined as

"The inherited part of the psyche; structuring patterns of psychological performance linked to instinct; a hypothetical entity irrepresentable in itself and evident only through its manifestations" (p.26).

A fundamental point about the concept of the archetype was expressed particularly clearly by Progoff (1956), who said that

"The aim of Jung's theory of the archetypes is to identify and describe those patterns of behaviour that are generic to the human species in the same way that nest-building is generic to birds" (p.165).

The term "patterns of behaviour", which occurs repeatedly in Jung's definitions, is rather global and may be differentiated further. Thus the archetypes, for Jung, may be defined as the sources of those typical patterns of initiated action, reaction and experience that characterise the human species. They are specifically human propensities, which give structure and density to human life, and they also, presumably, set the outer limits of what it is possible for mankind to imagine and therefore accomplish. Therefore Jung also calls the archetypes "categories of the imagination" (Jung 1935/53, p.518).

The archetypes are intimately related to the instincts, but this connection seems somewhat ambiguous in Jung's work. On one hand the
archetypes are "the forms which the instincts assume" (Jung 1927/31c, p.157), and the archetypal image is "the instinct's perception of itself" (Jung 1919, p.136). On the other hand, Jung sometimes seems to describe an opposition between instinct and archetype. Where this happens, however, Jung is merely acknowledging the fact that archetypal images may constitute a tension with what is commonly called instinctual life, so that the archetype-instinct connection is experienced in terms of a spirit-instinct polarity (Jung 1947/54, p.205). Jung's view, therefore, is that, as a structure which gives form to human instinctual life, the archetype is that capacity which transforms bodily life - or what Merleau-Ponty calls the vital order - into human life. If the archetype is an image of instinct it is also a "spiritual goal" (ibid., p.212). An implication of this is that the conceptual separation of instinct and archetype is not very meaningful. A base and brutish "instinctual" life is still archetypally structured with its images and meanings\(^1\), and there is no archetype that is not inherited as an incarnate propensity with imaginal and affective power.

Thus the term instinct, particularly in Jung's later work, tends to be subsumed under the concept of the archetype and is by and large dropped from these writings. He uses the term loosely to mean "emotional aptitudes" (Jacobi; 1959, p.x). A definition that was made in passing

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\(^1\) This point is intended to correct a common misunderstanding, especially among lay persons. However Hillman (1980a) seems to be addressing analytical psychologists as well when he writes:

"To envision the archetype as primordially pristine, a perfect form without inherent passion that binds and weakens its power or screws it to mad intensities, isolations and stubborn refusals, without its destructive spearpoints and flashes, and its hapless vulnerabilities, is to idealize and falsify the nature of archetypal reality as given in myths" (p.3).
seems to capture his metatheoretically unspecific concept. "The idea of instinct," he says, "is nothing more than a collective term for all kinds of organic and psychic factors whose nature is for the most part unknown" (Jung 1925, pp.191-192).

Jung's inclination to drop the term instinct reflects his increasing paradigmatic distance from biology and from Freud and a recognition, perhaps, that there are no actions or reactions in human life (except the most simple of reflexes, and even then only to some extent) that can be accounted for in the predetermined one-to-one stimulus-response patterns that the term instinct originally implies (Merleau-Ponty 1942). Needless to say, phenomenology would support Jung's dropping the term.

If an archetype is the source of initiated action, reaction and experience, then behaviour and experience are not essentially separable but intrinsically linked, and the archetype is that structure that is common to both. Like the complex the archetype manifests bodily as behaviour and psychically as image. Like the complex too, the archetype is affective. Thus Jung (1927/31b) writes the "(a)rchetypes are systems of readiness for action, and at the same time images and emotions" (p.31; cf. also 1964, p.87).

Because the archetypes structure psychic life as a whole, and because at the archaic levels of psychic life "Thought [is] essentially revelation" (Jung 1934/54, p.33), given in perception, the archetypes structure thought as well. Jung is not wanting to deny that one can think freely. He makes a distinction between "thinking" as an activity (of the ego) that is open, free and disinterested, and "having thoughts", which is a
more primitive activity (of the self, or an ego identified with the self) that is merely the cognitive aspect of primordial perception and affection. However, this distinction does not deny that the root metaphors, or images, which give shape to thinking, however free, are archetypal. The difference between genuine thinking and merely "having thoughts" depends not on whether the thoughts have archetypal, imaginal roots but on the ego's relation to these. It can also be noted, incidentally, that, like Heidegger (1954b) Jung regards thinking as a capacity to hold and appropriate thoughts which come to one. The roots of thought are not anthropocentric (Heidegger) or egoic (Jung). Therefore, as Jung puts it, risking overstatement:

"All the most powerful ideas in history go back to the archetypes. This is particularly true of religious ideas, but the central concepts of science, philosophy and ethics are no exception to this rule" (Jung 1927/31c, p.158).

Finally, Jung tended to think of the archetypes as internal potentialities giving rise to images that are also encapsulated internally. However, even in his introductory essay of 1919, he noted that these potentialities emerge as images in specific situations which function as "triggers" (Jung 1919, p.137). Thus it became appropriate to think of archetypal situations (Jung 1928b, p.110; 1934/54, p.38), and these are what Jaffe (1971) calls "the primal situations of life" (p.16) such as birth, death, motherhood and transformation.

To summarise this introductory exposition: Jung conceived of the archetypes as the sources of the typical initiated actions, reactions and experiences that characterise the human species. They thus structure behaviour, images, affects and thoughts as these emerge in the typical situations of human life. Jung proposed the concept of the archetype as a
hypothetical construct which would account for the structural similarities and densities in human psychological life. Thus the archetype as such is never apparent, and is known only through its particular manifestations as these occur in individual and collective lives. In other words, it is assumed that complexes have an archetypal core, but although this core can never be fully perceived or comprehended its formative power can be intuited in the workings of the complex.

8.2. The hermeneutic critique

Jung's method is broadly speaking hermeneutic, and it is mainly from this perspective that he criticises psychoanalysis. But it is also from this hermeneutic perspective that several telling criticisms of Jung's concept of the archetype have been made.

To date, the only extensive hermeneutic critique of Jung's work (at least in English) has been made by Steele (1982). Steele's main argument, it may be recalled, is that Jung's method and justifications were interpretative and historical, so that Jung's frequent recourse to natural scientific epistemology and biological language is both unnecessary and misguided. Steele notes a special irony, which is approached by Jung early in his work (1914a) but becomes clearer later. In one essay in particular, Jung (1936/54, pp.57-58) launches a

2. Throughout Jung's works there are many places in which the archetypes are linked to the inherited structure of the brain, and such a link seems to be his most consistent theoretical position (eg. Jung 1921, p.444; 1936/54, p.66; 1937/42; 1938/40, p.104; 1976a, p.256). It is odd that Jung never questioned this link in a sustained or critical way, as it is clear that any attempt to reduce psyche to brain was rejected by him (supra. ch. 5; cf. footnote 4, infra.).
blistering attack on psychophysiology, and links its reductionism to the laughable claims of the alchemists. Yet Jung seems unaware that this is his error too. As Steele puts it:

"Archetypes cannot be used as physiological agents because to do so Jung must transform a psychic structure into a material force, he must translate that which is found by introspection and interpretation into an object .... (Jung) realised that such alchemy was a mistake for it was analogous to the error the ancients made of projecting into matter what were psychic realities. Jung has made this same error by projecting the archetypes into the gray matter" (1982, p.332).

Thus Steele's interpretation of the concept of the archetype (and the collective unconscious) does not deviate from the methodology in which "it" was discovered, a methodology that is thoroughly historical and cultural. Staying within this methodology and the epistemological limits it implies means that the collective unconscious is not an "inherited unconscious" but "our collective unconscious heritage" (ibid., p.334), and the archetypes are common historical concerns:

"Archetypal images are shaped and moulded by cultures and individuals so they are not equivalent, but there are fundamental human concerns which are represented in remarkably similar symbolic forms across cultures and down through history" (ibid., p.333).

Images are thoroughly historical, and they need to be interpreted in historical (individual and cultural) terms. But in admitting of "fundamental human concerns" Steele comes to the edge of the hermeneutic epistemological limits. Although Steele's argument prevents us from stepping across these limits into biology - a step which Jung (1931b) himself recognised as the tempting "spirit of the age" (p.340) - it need not prevent the human scientist from analysing these fundamental human concerns with greater ontological precision. In this regard, it should also be mentioned that Steele briefly discusses an effort on Jung's part
to link the archetypes to human bodiliness as a whole rather than to the brain. This discussion and its significance will be explored presently.

The hermeneutic critique is also to be found within analytical psychology, although somewhat obscurely. James Hillman is expressly anti-hermeneutics. "Hermeneutics is monotheistic," he says (1983, p.57), by which he means that phenomena are interpreted in terms of concepts with a single meaning (ibid., p.52). Instead of this, Hillman is arguing for a phenomenological method which stays with the image and articulates only what is immediately intelligible to an imaginative consciousness (ibid., pp.51-57). But this separation of hermeneutics and phenomenology is philosophically and methodologically naive. It separates too sharply interpretation and description, and actually makes a naturalistic caricature of both (and of language). The fact is that Hillman's deconstruction of personal ideas into mythic fantasies is an interpretative move that has a distinctly hermeneutic character. As always with Hillman, it is a hermeneutic that is given an original twist.

The springboard for Hillman's critique of the concept of the archetype is given in the approach of Jung himself, according to whom we no longer ask what is thought but, rather, who is thinking (Jung 1938/54, p.77). When applied to the concept of the archetype, the question about its empirical and ontological status yields to a question about the perspective through which Jung thought.3 Thus Hillman's unique hermeneutic move is to

3. In fact, Hillman (1974a) does raise an empirical objection as well. He points out a contradiction in the assertion that the archetype is an unknowable noumenon which produces many images (phenomena): if all that can be known are the many images, then it cannot be asserted that there is one archetype, whatever that is, since it is by definition beyond
identify the fantasy that would make an hypothesis about archetypes as things in themselves which produce images. "You can't open your mouth without an archetypal perspective speaking through you," says Hillman (1983, p.119). Thus if Jung thought that "behind" an image was an hypothetical archetype, Hillman, using Jung's initiative, sees that "behind" the hypothesis of the archetype is another image.

Thus Hillman remains consistently within an epistemology and ontology of images. Therefore, with regard to Jung's encyclopaedic "proof" for the archetypes, Hillman (1981) writes:

"Gathering of data does less to demonstrate objectively the existence of archetypes than it does to demonstrate the fantasy of 'objective data'" (pp.12-13).

It is the Philistine's fantasy of real and singular "things" in an objective world (Berry 1973), a Cartesian fantasy which separates the known from the knower. Such a separation is also an heroic endeavour for it homogenises and flattens out the rich physiognomy of the life-world as it is immediately present to an embodied and historical subject. The perceived world no longer has an embodied context, and the perceiving eye becomes the disincarnate ahistorical, anonymous eye of the natural knowledge. As de Voogt (1984) and Giegerich (1987) point out, Jung uses Kant's distinction between \textit{phenomenon} and \textit{noumenon} to support an empirical distinction between image and archetype that is pre-Kantian, for Kant's critique (like phenomenology's we may add) is effectively to demolish Jung's notion of the archetype \textit{as such}.

However, Jung's misuse of Kant and his overzealous empiricism does not get rid of the problem entirely, and Hillman's point may be overstated. The human order is not of fixed significations: there are many expressions for that which is expressed, and it is only in understanding that which is expressed that the many expressions can be recognised as related. A clenched fist, a tight smile, a gastric ulcer and an exasperating passivity are expressions of anger (although each expresses more than that too). Similarly, despite Hillman's polemic, there are many images of the mother, for instance. To deny this is to deny that images have an interiority that points beyond themselves.
scientist. Thus it is a fantasy which belongs to that vision Romanyshyn (1984) calls the "despotic eye".

This deconstruction means, for Hillman, that the notion of the archetype as a thing - the word archetype as a noun - is no longer ontologically or empirically useful. Nevertheless, the word archetypal is retained as an adjective which describes specific characteristics of images as these are given in experience. Archetypal images are transpersonal in meaning and value (Hillman 1981, p.13), and the archetypal is given as a dimension within the images themselves. If the archetypes are unknowable, as Jung said, this is not because they are entities situated in the Kantian noumenon but because the images themselves are operationally unknowable, in the sense that they have endless mystery, power, and possibilities for articulation and reference (Hillman 1977).

The common ground in the critiques of Steele and Hillman is that the concept of the archetype as an hypothesis which refers to a substantive entity is rejected. It is rejected as a naturalistic fantasy that is contradicted by Jung's hermeneutic method, circumscribed as it is within language, individual experience, texts, mythology, social anthropology and cultural history. It is also rejected in the sense that the "hypothesis" is seen through in terms of a particular cultural fantasy. In other words, Jung's own method provides for a hermeneutic reduction from empirical considerations concerning a supposed entity to thought about the existential perspective within which such considerations are possible. Finally, the images Jung described as archetypal are understood in terms of culturally acquired imaginative structures. They are thoroughly historical, and their universality lies in the fact that
historically situated imaginative structures are nevertheless also shared across great expanses of space and time. For Hillman specifically, their universality lies in their transpersonal significance and value.

The irony has been noted that the hermeneutic critique finds its roots in Jung's approach itself, that Jung provides the tools to undermine his own hypothesis. In fact, Jung did more than provide these tools, and there is a significant hermeneutic thrust in some of his own accounts of the archetypes. What does not seem to have been adequately recognised is that these accounts effect a logically different order of discourse, and cannot simply be added eclectically to the natural scientific perspective.

Jung's contention that consciousness or, more generally, experience provides the content for archetypal structures (images, behaviour, rituals, etc.) means that the archetypes are always "locally, temporally, and individually conditioned" (Jung 1954, p.346). But Jung noticed that despite this there is something ineffable about images, particularly when they are numinous and have obviously transpersonal, cultural reference. This inherent ineffability led Jung always beyond what had already been articulated and understood into further amplifications. The amplifications seemed to spiral around an ever-receding core of meaning, so that an image, or cluster of images, could never be fully and permanently articulated. As Jung (1940) put it: "Every interpretation necessarily remains an 'as-if'. The ultimate core of meaning may be circumscribed but not described" (p.156).

This variously termed "ultimate core of meaning", or "unconscious core of
meaning" (ibid., p.157), or "invariable nucleus of meaning" (Jung 1938/54, p.80), which is always both present in the image yet inaccessible, is what Jung called the archetype. But this definition of the archetype is indigenous to an hermeneutic methodology, and it does not step across the hermeneutic epistemological limits into biology.

According to Jaffe (1971):

"The differentiation between the hidden reality and its appearance in consciousness formed for Jung the essential epistemological foundation of his psychological thinking and his work" (p.42).

What generally seems to be missed, however, is that this differentiation reflects a structural tension that is contained within the image itself. Jung himself seems to forget this when he distinguishes between the archetype and the archetypal image, for this formulation is in danger of separating the meaning of an image from the image itself, of disinheriting the image by reducing it to the status of a mere sign which points to something else. It is tempting to fall into this style of thinking (Cohen 1976; Hillman 1977). But this is clearly not what Jung intended, however, as he insists repeatedly that an image is its own meaning. As Jung (1947/54) puts it: "Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes shape, so the latter becomes clear" (p.204).

Therefore the tension between the revealed and concealed is not an ontological tension between two essentially different but connected entities. It is an hermeneutic tension which is given in the structure of imaginal presence itself. Thus the archetype is not extraneous to the image but is that quality of presence which leads to the depths of its own interiority.
This is to say, however, that an image is a metaphor, and that all we have access to is presence as a metaphorical reality. Jung and contemporary phenomenologists such as Romanyszyn agree here (Jung 1940, p.157; Romanyszyn 1975, 1982); and it is perhaps this recognition of the metaphorical structure of presence that, as much as anything, links Archetypal psychology to both Jung and phenomenology (Avens 1984).

Interpretation is thus an historically contingent act of articulation. It does not lead to a discrete ahistorical entity (archetype) with a hypothetical denotated meaning, as the ineffability of archetypal presence does not imply an empirical (or "metaphysical") inaccessibility. Interpretation leads to a fertile interior which calls for further acts of articulation. In this regard Jung's somewhat awkward expression is not particularly significant as his meaning is clear. He writes:

"Not for a moment dare we succumb to the illusion that an archetype can be finally explained and disposed of. Even the best attempts at explanation are only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language" (Jung 1940, p.160; cf. p.179).

Jung did not use his hermeneutic understanding of archetypal presence to rethink his metaphysics or his reference to biology. In other words, even as Jung dissolved the Kantian metaphysical distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon, and even as he recognised that the attempt to find the origins of psychic life in the brain was an alchemist's fantasy, he hardly addressed these issues critically at all. Instead, as was his style, he allowed several epistemologies and ontologies to run in parallel.
Jung's Kantianism has been discussed already, and need not be addressed further at this point. Jung's biologism, however, is another matter. There is a tendency - explicit in Steele, implicit in Hillman - to regard reference to biology simply as errant. It is true that Jung's attempt to situate the archetypes in the structure of the brain violates his methodological and epistemological limits; and it is true that between salts, fatty acids, genes and neurons, on one hand, and experience and meaning on the other it is an unbridgeable ontological and conceptual chasm. Nevertheless, the hermeneutic rejection of Jung's reductionism may be in danger of losing sight of aspects of the concept of the archetype that are important for a fuller ontological understanding. In other words, while it may be agreed that Jung's attempt to situate the archetypes in the brain was an error, his attempt to do so may suggest something significant about the archetypes. Perhaps, once again, Jung's error lies more in his thinking and expression than in his intuition.

What seems to be lacking in the hermeneutic interpretation of the archetype is a sufficient sense of existential density. If there are no archetypes but only images (whether they are called archetypal or not), and images are thoroughly cultural and historical, then there seems to be no ontological dimension to the images that necessarily anchors them. And since "image is psyche" (Jung 1929b, p.50), psychological life loses its necessity as it dissolves into fluidity and relativity. With it goes value and meaning, and thought about psychological life quickly becomes nihilistic (Levin 1985). In analytical psychology, this type of dissolution means that the term archetype is trivialised. It becomes a "power word" (Plaut 1982, p.288; Samuels 1985b, p.45) which seems to identify an analyst's adherence to analytical psychology (or Jung) rather
than to anything either theoretically or existentially necessary. The cultural-historical dimensions of the archetype require an anchor. Steele's reference to "fundamental human concerns" seems too vague and weak to counter-balance this dissolution, or it at least requires much further ontological articulation.

Secondly, the hermeneutic interpretation of the archetype fails to account for an essential and valid aspect of Jung's scientific endeavour: to describe some of the imaginal and behavioural structures that define the human world as a species-specific world, or what von Uexküll, the father of ethology, called the Umwelt.

8.3. Jung's ethology and the bodiliness of the archetypes

Oddly enough, the terms ethology, innate releasing mechanism, fixed action pattern, and top centre, and the names Von Uexküll, Lorenz and Tinbergen do not appear in the indices to Jung's Collected Works, Letters, autobiography, Visions Seminars', or Man and His Symbols. Nevertheless, Jung seems to have been aware of the work of the ethologists as early as 1938 (according to Humbert in Gordon 1987, p.97), and the ethological sense is found across the span of his writings on the archetypes.

In 1919, when the term archetype was introduced, Jung described it as that which co-ordinates the instinctual behaviour and perception of the yucca moth and of human beings. In 1927 Jung defines the archetypes as "systems of readiness for action" (1927/31c, p.31). This anticipates
Tinbergen's notion of an "innate releasing mechanism" which is "triggered off" in the context of a species-specific "sign stimulus". In 1949(b), this ethological sense is particularly clear as Jung writes that the archetype is

"an inherited mode of psychic functioning corresponding to the inborn way in which the chick emerges from the egg, the bird builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the motor ganglion of a caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas (p.518).

It is rather surprising that the ethological significance of Jung's thought became apparent to colleagues fairly late (Fordham 1957a; Jacobi 1959; Progoff 1956) and it has been discussed in detail only recently (Stevens 1982). But it seems to be this ethological sense that is behind Jung's attempts to situate the archetypes in the brain's genetic structure rather than it merely reflecting a lingering biologism on Jung's part. What Jung seems to be saying is that the human world has a consistency and structure that is analogous to the worlds of other species (although it is more complex and variable), and that the differences between the species would not occur were it not for different genetic structures. References to the brain and genetics are less references to a causal source than an acknowledgement of the fact that the world would not open itself as a human world were it not genetically possible (Jung 1976a, pp. 159-160; cf. Jaffe 1971, p.16).

There can be no objection to this, and in fact phenomenology can provide an adequate epistemological framework for ethological research, as long as that research is stripped of its positivist contrivances (Fourcher 1979a, 1979b). For existential phenomenology to accept Jung's ethological understanding of the archetypes it is necessary to make a few essential
points.

Firstly, if the archetypes have a genetic dimension, this does not mean that archetypal images are in any sense located inside the subject unless "projected" outwards. Jung's tendency to confuse archetypes and images tends as a result to situate the images themselves in the brain, or at least the subject. Archetypes structure experience, they do not produce it.

Secondly, Jung's references to the brain or genetics should be rejected unless he seems to be referring to human bodiliness as a whole. Child, mother, father, eternal youth, hero, marriage and sacrifice are fundamental human occurrences that would not be possible for a being born with the genetics of a shark, but these themes have a cultural significance and personal complexity which makes it inconceivable that any one of them could be reduced in any explanatory way to a particular gene or genetic combination. Thus, although the body does largely mature according to genetic structure, it is human bodiliness as a whole and not the genes or the brain that discloses a human world. As Jung (1928/31a) puts it:

"The whole anatomy of man is an inherited system identical with the ancestral constitution, which will unfailingly function in the same way as before. Consequently, the possibility that anything new and essentially different will be produced becomes increasingly small. All those factors, therefore, which were essential to our near and remote ancestors will also be essential to us, since they are embedded in the inherited organic system. They are even necessities which make themselves felt as needs" (pp.371-372).4

4. In a 1947 letter to Boss, Jung (1976a) writes: "You are utterly mistaken in saying that I have described the archetypes as given with the brain structure. Is the fact that the body also expresses character totally
Thirdly, as Ludwig Binswanger (1946) noted in a discussion of Von Uexküll, the obvious similarity between the *Umwelt* and the phenomenologist's "world" should not lead to a confusion of the two. In particular, the human "world" has an open flexibility and self-transcending variety that is not given in the notion of *Umwelt*, which refers to the sensory environment. According to Fourcher (op. cit.), even contemporary human ethology tends to fall into this positivist perspective.

Fourthly, as both Binswanger and Fourcher point out, a phenomenological ethology would not want to separate bodiliness from its world-disclosive occurrence, or to treat, in other words, being-in-the-world as though it were the outcome of a functional relationship of the primarily isolated and discrete variables, subject and object.

In conclusion, Jung's repeated references to the brain and to genetics are problematic for several reasons: they confuse methodologies and transgress his hermeneutic epistemological limits; they tend to lose sight of the historical and cultural nature of man; when archetypes are conceptually confused with images, or even thought to produce images, then experience and imagination are taken out of the world and located unknown to you, or do you believe that the pattern of behaviour familiar to biologists is not somehow expressed in the biological structure? You yourself say that the human body is not only a thing of nature, but 'one of the possible manifestations of human nature itself'. The body as a whole, so it seems to me, is a pattern of behaviour" (pp.xi-xli).

We take Jung's point, but note Jung's responsibility for being misunderstood.
inside the subject, from which point meaningful relations become a function of "projection"; they lose sight of man's radical self-transcendence as a perpetually unfolding and self-transforming world. Nevertheless, these references to the body are a continual attempt to remember (re-member) the body in a hermeneutic understanding of psychological life, an attempt, in other words, to anchor experience and meaning in the existential density and specificity of incarnate reality. The recollection of the body is an attempt, according to Judith Hubback (1986, p.142) to keep analytical psychology "as sane as possible".

A still unresolved problem, however, is how Jung can refer on one hand to the archetypes as the cores of meaning within an image or cluster of images, and on the other hand as the species-specific potentialities that structure behaviour and experience. Jung is using two forms of discourse, hermeneutic and ethological, and these do not seem readily compatible. The hermeneutic answer is to reject Jung's ethology as an untenable biological reductionism, yet this ethology can be interpreted in a way that makes existential sense. On the other hand, to adopt the ethological definition of the archetype would seem to lose Jung's important hermeneutic understanding of the ontological and interpretative tension within images. It may be objected that the term archetype can not logically be used in both senses.

It is in the face of this difficulty that existential phenomenology may provide a solution, for it provides an anthropology that is embodied and grounded yet requires an hermeneutic approach to understanding bodily presence and experience.
8.4. Archetypes and being-in-the-world

Phenomenology articulates an anthropology that situates the body and experience of the world in that single occurrence known as existence, or being-in-the-world. In so doing, it shows that the body is not an essentially isolated anatomical entity that is involved in a set of functional relations with other entities in an environment. Rather, the body is essentially a disclosive presence which mirrors and is reflected by a world. Thus the body's posture, anatomical parts and even genes are not so much what "cause" the world to appear in certain ways but the bodily expressions of that unity called existence. This is not to say that posture and genes are equally available to reflection, appropriation and transformation: one can change one's posture (thus changing one's world) but not one's genes. But it does mean that the human body is an expression of meaning and not a causal source.

Thus, if the archetypes are the human species-specific bodily potentialities, they are not a-meaningful anatomical entities that appear prior to human bodiliness as a meaningful, world-disclosive presence. Therefore, the mistake is not in situating the archetypes in the body (as long as "in" is not taken too literally) but in trying to do so through the medical fantasy of the body as meaningless anatomy. "The body" says Jung in a seminar in the 1930's (1976b, p.475), "is a visible expression of the here and now". It discloses a meaningful world in its own meaningful posture, age, health, intelligence, gender, etc. The

5. This comment and its similarity to the thought of Merleau-Ponty has been noted by Jungian analyst, Roland Schenk (1986).
archetypes are the human being's bodily potentialities which structure being-in-the-world in typically human ways. This does not mean, however, that the archetypes are not also given as the ineffable cores of meaning in the images in which one's psychological life is found. Being-in-the-world means that the humanly structured life of the body is a presence that discloses a humanly structured world. If the archetypes are not bodily entities but fundamental possibilities for bodily presence, then the archetypes are equally fundamental modes in which the world is revealed and engaged as a human world. If the self gathers the world it does so archetypally. The archetypes are given as a revealing-concealing presence in the world as much as in the body. Existence is the ontological unity in which archetype as body and archetype as image cohere. Thus a phenomenological understanding of human existence situates the archetypes within bodily life at the same time as it insists on a hermeneutic approach to understanding that bodily life and the experience it reveals. It returns thinking about the archetypes to that fundamental intuition of Jung's, which is that the archetypes are at once "instincts" and images.

It only needs to be reaffirmed that the psyche is the world in which we live psychologically, and that images reveal this world, not an encapsulated, intrapersonal state of affairs. In other words, what analytical psychology calls images phenomenology, following Heidegger, calls things. Jung chose to speak of images in order to rescue the

6. This goes considerably further than the analysis of Rauhala (1969), who limits his phenomenological analysis to "archetypal experiencing" (p. 104). Even with that limitation, there seem to be problems with his analysis, but it would digress too far to follow this up here. The analysis here also elaborates a view touched upon by Welwood (1977), namely that archetypes are "universal patterns of body-in-the-world" (p. 14).
autonomy and integrity of psychological life, and to the extent that his metaphysics endorsed the Cartesian view of the world as res extensa, he interiorised these images within the subject (even if he did add a "collective unconscious"). From this point, as Redfearn (1985, p.31) notes, the relation between the bodily dimension of the archetypes and the world became a problem which Jung addressed only with the concept of synchronicity. But an existential articulation of the archetypes undercuts the tradition which calls for this kind of magical solution, for it situates archetypal images directly within the world, the original home of psychological life. The fundamentally metaphorical structure of psychological reality is then given in the structure of the image itself, for the image is a moment of revealing that also conceals an inexpressible interiority which nevertheless calls for articulation.

It may seem that the integration of instinct and image, body and world, is forgotten in much of Archetypal psychology, given the fluidity of imaginal life that seems implied in its "hermeneutic" critique of the archetype and its puer-like flights of fantasy. It may therefore be useful to recall Hillman's (1974b) warning that "to conceive of images independent of instinct is to deprive them of vitality and necessity" (p.174), and his sobering, saturnine admission that "fantasies are not so light, not so easy" (1983, p.65).

To situate the archetypes within being-in-the-world in such a way that its incarnate density and opacity is recollected and thematised is to recall that the consistency and structure of psychological life is given within existence itself. This has some very significant implications, and it forms the basis for the Daseinsanalytic critique of Jung's contention
that there needs to be an archetype behind a range of structurally similar images.

Boss (1957) and Scott (1977) make the point that Jung's metaphysical background, in which subject and world are essentially isolated, made it impossible for him to imagine that the commonness of man was self-presented and available for description. It is only once the unity of man's relationship with objects/images has been severed that it becomes necessary to postulate something - an archetype - to account for the unity that is clearly evident. In other words, it is accepted that Jung noticed a thematic and structural consistency within a range of images that stretched across space and time from the consulting room to Greek mythology to aboriginal ritual. But having forgotten the constitutive power of man's incarnate relation to the world which these images reveal, Jung felt obliged as an empiricist to hypothesise something to explain their thematic unity.

To conceive archetypes in terms of man's relation to the world rather than as hypothetical entities that produce images frees one's thinking and perception from a position that violates experience. If archetypal images are thought to be produced by archetypes then there is essentially a one-to-one relation between an archetype and its images: archetypal images of the mother emerge from the archetype of the Mother, child images from the Child archetype, etc. This conception violates experience because it immediately becomes problematic how, say, a child or a regressed adult experiences the world (whether awake or dreaming) in terms of Mother images. Instead of correcting one's "hypothesis" and returning to experience this original violence is perpetuated in the
theoretical concoction which says that the child or regressed adult has an archetype in his psyche and the image it produces is "projected" onto the world. Thus the hypothesis that there is an archetype of the Mother behind the images of the Mother is rescued at the expense of understanding directly that a child or regressed adult lives in a world of mother images. As Boss (1957, p.117) insists, the unity of maternal images is given in the structure of childishness (or childlikeness), and there is no need to posit a structuring Mother archetype. Therefore, if the term archetype is to be retained it needs to refer to the child-mother relation, not to one or the other as though it were a self-contained entity.

This is not to suggest another simplistic one-to-one relation to replace that between archetype and image. Each potentiality for being has a range of typical world-relations. The Child, for example, lives not only as child-mother but also as child-father, brother, sister. Moreover, as Child the image can be further differentiated as, for instance, Hero or Eternal Youth, and each of these has its typical relations. The Hero-child does not only fight Maternal dragons but also tyrannical Fathers (Zeus-Chronus; Prometheus-Zeus), and the Eternal Youth is linked equally to Mother, Old Man (puer-senex) and anima. Further still, each of these figures to whom the Child is related is situated in a context that is its own network of relations.

There is also an essential self-reflection in human existence, which is given not as an abstracting power of self-observation - or at least not that primarily - but as a capacity to see the way one is as this is mirrored self-reflectively in the world. Thus the regressed adult may
dream of a child and his wife or therapist may have fantasies of mothering him. But even where there is such symmetry between behaviour and image, there is no reason to return to the hypothesis of an archetype correlating in a predetermined way with its image. In each of these dreams or fantasies the person is confronted by an image of him- or herself, and thus in that moment of self-confrontation is looking at the world not through his or her own usual eyes but through the eyes of another. The adult confronted with his childishness sees himself through the eyes of someone else or some other figure, or indeed his own unintegrated capacities for being an adult.

To summarise these points: an existential phenomenological interpretation of the archetypes can retain Jung's attempts to link them to human bodiliness as well as his description of them as the ineffable cores of meaning within images themselves. Being-in-the-world describes the ontological unity of man's disclosive presence to the world, thus unites thematically body and world, or what Jung called instinct and image. To situate the archetypes within existence is to recognise their relational structure and to forego the need to explain the unity of images by recourse to an archetype that lies as an entity behind the images.

This analysis has the advantage of being able to integrate several facets of Jung's thought regarding the archetypes which otherwise remain tangential or conceptually problematic.

Firstly, there is Jung's contention that the archetype is a structure that unites instinct or behaviour, and image. This has already been
discussed.

Secondly, Jung's assertion that there are archetypal situations becomes central to thinking about the archetypes and integrated with his descriptions of archetypal behaviours and images. Every archetypal situation calls forth its imaginal world and its bodily presence or response. Conversely, there is no archetypal activity that does not reveal a situation. The archetype is the gathering of situation, activity and image in human life. Each term mutually implies the others.

Thirdly, it makes room for Jung's (1929a, p.45) insight that whether an image or event is archetypal or not depends more on how it is perceived than on the image or event itself. This insight, which seems to have gained custom in contemporary thinking (Samuels 1985b, p.53), makes no sense if one holds to the reified view of an empirical relation between an image and its formative archetype.

Fourthly, and very importantly, it makes sense of Jung's view that the archetypes need to be understood referentially. The archetypes, as Jung (1934/54) puts it:

"are indescribable because of their wealth of reference, although in themselves recognizable. The discriminating intellect naturally keeps on trying to establish their singleness of meaning and thus misses the essential point: for what we can above all establish as the one thing consistent about their nature is their manifold meaning, their almost limitless wealth of reference, which makes any unilateral formulation impossible"(p.38).

Thus an image is situated and, as Jung (1921) puts it, "is a condensed expression of the psychic situation as a whole" (p.442). The archetypal image is not only the entity on which one is focussed but is the
referential situation as a whole in which that entity shows itself in the way it does. This point is beautifully made by Heidegger (1935/36) who, in describing a Greek temple, says:

"Standing there, the building rests on rocky ground. But this resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of that rock's bulky yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The lustre and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to radiance the light of day, the breadth of sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are" (p.169).

Thus the temple

"gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people" (p.168).

The image reveals and gathers a world, and its meaning is the world that is thereby brought into being.

The essential relationality of the archetypal image implies that it will have different meanings depending on the context. This is especially evident in psychotherapy, where a particular image will be returned to again and again, each time with new significance. The old man's helping hand in a dream shows the contempt a person experiences in his parents' attempts to treat him as a child, later it shows his dependency, then it shows his own resources that have helped him in times of need, later still it shows his capacity for humility and respect in the face of God, then it shows his own compassion for others in need, and so on. These
vicissitudes of the *puer-senex* relation also reflect obliquely other archetypal themes, such as hero and *anima*, and each has its own biographical and personalised context in the life of this dreamer. Therefore Jung is insisting that archetypal images do not only point deeper into themselves to an "invariable nucleus of meaning" (1938/54, p.80) but also "outwards" to other images and historical contexts.

This view, which would be central to a phenomenological analytical psychology, and which contradicts the empirical fantasy of a one-to-one archetype – archetypal image relation, seems to be gaining ground in Jungian thought. A pioneering move in this direction was made by Perry (1970), which carried forward his earlier (1962) thesis that the self was not realised intrapsychically but essentially interpersonally. His thoroughly Cartesian expression cannot obscure his essential insight, which is that archetypes are not primarily discrete units but dyadic patterns, realised interpersonally and bound together emotionally. Satinover (1985b) is highly critical of the attempt by Jung and his Jungian colleagues to think of the archetype as a latent potentiality within the individual. "The archetype is not 'in' a person but 'between' persons," he says (p.81). "Archetypal images express patterns of human interaction and are more than just parts of the self" (p.82). Although she still seems to be struggling with dualistic premises, Gordon (1985b) situates the archetypes within the imaginal space that opens up between a person and his world (Winnicott's "transitional space"). Thus she regards the archetype as a "hybrid concept" (1987, p.113) which refers, not to the inherited potentialities (Jung's "archetypes", Fordham's "deintegrates", Tinbergen's "innate release mechanisms") *per se*, but to the typical complexities that emerge out of the relation between these
and their "objects". Papadopoulos (1987) has come to think of the archetypes in terms of typical ecological networks which structure a system of relations, such as a family. This view is also central to Archetypal psychology (cf. Berry 1974; Hillman 1978).

There has also been a move away from thinking about reified and autonomous archetypes by analysts such as Singer (1979) and Zinkin (1987), who have been influenced by movements in contemporary physics concerning the hologram and the "implicate order". Under this influence the archetypes are understood in deeply systemic terms, where whatever is manifest is not primary but a derivative expression of the movements of the implicate order. It must be said, however, that similarities of critique should not blind the phenomenologist to significant differences. For one thing, whatever the scientific merits of this thinking, it does recall Jung's magical attempt to account for the ontological relationality of existence by means of synchronicity (Redfearn 1985, p.31). Like Jung, Zinkin seems to forget the self-disclosive relationality and integrity of existence which is immediately available for description.

Finally, expressing the archetypes in terms of being-in-the-world founds Jung's infrequently expressed yet important suggestion that the archetypes "contain" their own affects. The significance of affect is clearly expressed in his last work, Approaching the unconscious (1964). The archetypes, he writes

"are, at the same time, both images and emotions. One can speak of an archetype only when these two aspects are simultaneous. When there is merely the image, then there is simply a word picture of little consequence. But by being charged with emotion, the image gains numinosity (or
It must be stressed that Jung is not reducing emotion to a mere contingency, albeit one with practical significance, but is calling for a recognition and appropriation of the affect\textsuperscript{7} that is already present, however dimly. Each image has its "special feeling tone", and this is conceived as a bridge which connects the images and the "living individual" (ibid.) i.e. the embodied subject. Thus the archetypal affect is, precisely speaking, neither "in" the body nor "in" the image but in the "between" which both body and image (world) reveal. In other words, each archetype has an affect that discloses in its own pre-articulate way the quality of being-in-the-world.

From the phenomenological point of view the human being is always attuned to the world in some way. Feelings, emotions and moods are thus always situated. More than that they always disclose one's situation in a manner that is immediately (i.e. without cognitive mediation) intelligible, however difficult it may be to "find the right words" to express this incarnate understanding (Gendlin 1978-79; Strasser 1970). Thus, as every psychotherapist knows (or should know!), attunement is an original mode of communication; what it communicates is nothing less than the quality of being-in-the-world itself. This quality is more precisely formulated by Boss (1975, pp.109-114) as the relative openness or closedness of existence at that time. For both Jung and Boss, openness softens and

\textsuperscript{7} Jung uses the terms affect and emotions synonymously (1921, p.411). They are distinguished from "feeling" primarily in terms of intensity. As a process of rational evaluation the feeling function is "voluntarily disposable". Intensified, however, evaluation is embodied and thus tends to be relatively inert, and it may be unconscious - recall Jung's word association experiments. For a discussion of these issues, see Hillman (1970a).
brightens the face of the world; closedness hardens and darkens it.

If the essential meaningfulness and world-disclosiveness of attunement is established then analytical psychology has a unique contribution to make. It suggests that each attunement (feeling, emotion, mood) is an attempt to call into consciousness an image that clarifies one's self and world at that time. (Thus in psychotherapy it is often helpful, especially when the attunement is diffuse, to ask what a feeling "looks like".) It suggests that different attunements are embodied by different archetypal figures, and that the elucidation of these is a process, slow and painstaking as this may be, that intrinsically calls forth other possible stances in one's world. If attunements are archetypal then it suggests that they are not only modes of presenting the world in the here and now, but are attunements with a destiny: they have their own purpose and lead us to their own ends. As Jung (1917/43) remarked regarding images, perhaps they "are what men mean by fate" (p.109).

A question that arises is whether all attunements are archetypal. Stewart's (1987a; 1987b) pioneering effort suggests seven archetypal affects, each with its own image and context: 1) terror, imaged as the Abyss, in context of the Unknown; 2) anguish, imaged as the Void, in context of Loss; 3) rage, imaged as Chaos, in context of Restriction; 4) disgust/humiliation, imaged as alienation, in context of Rejection; 5) startle, imaged as disorientation, in context of the Unexpected; 6) ecstasy, imaged as illumination, in context of the Familiar; 7) excitement, imaged as insight, in context of the Novel. These affects are integrated into other aspects of Jung's thought such as the typological functions.
This is not the place to try to evaluate Stewart's work, although it can be said immediately that his heavily natural scientific approach would for the phenomenologist raise as many problems as it answers. Further, other primitive attunements such as envy and jealousy are arguably equally irreducible as typical human structures. On the other hand, Stewart may have a point in recognising fewer archetypal affects than images, and he may be right in arguing that only primitive affects should be called archetypal. Subtle attunements such as righteous indignation, social embarrassment, disappointment or gentle optimism should not be regarded as archetypal. It may be that individual analysis in each case would reveal an archetypal core, but to assume such is to dissolve the meaning of archetypal altogether or, on the other hand, to deny the unfolding self-transcendence and flexibility of man.

For a different reason it may be suggested that serenity is not archetypal. Boss suggests that serenity is the fundamental attunement of an existence that is open, receptive and free. "Such a serenity," he says,

"is a clearness and openness in which a human being is emotionally connected to everything he meets, wanting not to have things in his own power but content to let them be and develop on their own" (1975, p.112).

Kruger (1979/88) makes the important point that this serenity should not be understood as an emotion or mood that contrasts with "negative" attunements such as anger, anxiety and misery. A Dasein that is open and free puts itself at risk and therefore cannot avoid anxiety, and if it genuinely encounters the world it cannot avoid suffering. Thus, as Kruger puts it:

"The opposite of serenity is non-involvement and denial of
openness, i.e. a restriction of existence such that one is not at risk, thus closing off not only one's possibilities for anxiety, suffering, humiliation and ridicule but also for genuine love, hate, anger and ecstasy" (p.81).

In terms of analytical psychology, this means that serenity cannot be identified with any particular archetypal situation or figure, for it describes the capacity of the human being (ego) to be freely available to the variety of psyche's situations and figures and the capacity to transform these into individually styled and interpersonally appropriate form.

8.5. Archetypes as psychic necessities

The archetypes have been situated in existence itself, recalling both the bodiliness of existence and its metaphorical ambiguity. But Jung's insistence on the fateful density of psychological life has not yet been sufficiently addressed. Yet this would seem to be his particular contribution to phenomenological psychology, for while the latter has accepted the existentialist emphasis on human facticity, such as bodiliness, historicity and death, it has not gone far in thematising many other densities of psychological life.8. Analytical psychology's explorations of the archetypes have thematised these in detail.

8. An exception is Kruger (1979), who outlined the following ontological givens: that the human being is universally born to a woman and therefore has a mother first, then a father; that the neonate is always prereflectively related to as a human being; that people relate to each other not as neutral objects but as significant others with whom one can communicate; that every child is born into a place called home, and a set of relations called family; that people must grapple with death (p.52). Most of these would be recognised by analytical psychologists as archetypal themes.
It is important to understand the "level" at which Jung's insight is situated. Unfortunately, Jung uses the term archetype so broadly that it crosses several levels, or dimensions, of existence. At one point, in a letter to Boss of all places, he even says that "man as a whole is an archetype" (Jung 1976a, p.xli)! Generally, however, the archetypes seem to be situated at a level between the existentialia and the personally idiosyncratic. To say that the archetypes are not existentialia means that they are not philosophically definitive characteristics of Dasein, such as spatiality, temporality, bodiliness, and fallenness (cf. Heidegger 1927, p.70). Existentialia set the most fundamental possibilities and limits within which every moment of human life takes place, since all archetypes presuppose spatial and temporal (etc.) dimensions.

The archetypes are not the existentialia described by Heidegger and Boss (1975), but they are the potentialities which give structure and consistency to psychological life within those "existentialae" parameters. The archetypes are fundamental necessities in human psychological life, primordial themes in which human beings participate and with which they have to deal. They are not personal "inventions" but pre-personal structures within which personhood is founded.

Here are a few examples of archetypal themes: the development of consciousness as a movement from darkness to light; the establishment and appropriation of a sense of oneself in relation to one's world; transition and initiation from one phase of life to another, especially, perhaps, from youth to adulthood and adulthood to old age; the separation (splitting) of one's self and world into good and bad, right and wrong,
loving and persecuting, etc., and the necessity to reintegrate these divisions in some way (i.e. the struggle with ambivalence); the experience of sickness and renewal, death and rebirth, dismemberment and wholeness, etc.; the ambivalent fear of and longing for the Void, Mother, death; negotiating the Oedipus complex; the need for courage - a neglected theme that makes dealing with many other existential themes possible; dealing with masculine and feminine possibilities of identity and relationship; parenting; facing a taboo; transformation as a journey through the underworld; appropriating a sense of justice and fairness; presence to the sacred; the spiritual journey.

The list could continue almost endlessly, and within each theme listed here there are typical - i.e. "archetypal" - variations. Some of these can be quite subtle, but Jung would not wish the subtlety to collapse essential differences or to dissolve them into mere socialisation patterns. For example, there is a subtle, deeply felt difference between being a mother and being a father even though both of these are modes of parenting and both are to some extent available to individual mothers and fathers.

The archetypes overlap and their boundaries are not fixed. In this, they are different from the ethologist's "fixed action patterns". Furthermore, they are possibilities which we are all to greater or lesser extents called to address, but they are not "causes", nor are the ways we address them absolutely determined. Some people do not have children. But parenting is nevertheless a psychological necessity to which every adult is called, and it may be lived in a more metaphorical way, for instance in parenting one's students or the underprivileged. A choice not to have
children is a "creative" act which pulls against the drift of one's incarnate life. Thus it is likely that unless parenting is done consciousness at least in some metaphorical way it is likely to enter through the back door, so to speak, as such people attempt narcissistically to parent themselves or be parented by others, or there may be other symptoms.

There is something of a contradiction between Jung's thesis that the archetypes are the foundations of man's psychological life and are given within his behaviour, feelings and even thoughts, on one hand, and his tendency to describe the experience of the archetypes as an awesome, even potentially shattering, experience. There is no doubt that some archetypes are generally more powerful than others in the extent to which one's personal life is sacrificed to mythic and universal patterns. (Being an infant at mother's breast has greater weight than offering help to a friend, although both could be called archetypal.) But it is also true that, as Marriott (1983) has pointed out, the ambivalent idealisation of and recoil from the self and the archetypes reflects a neurotic dissociation in ego/persona adaptation. When interpersonally and personally mediated, archetypes are more gently integrated into one's personalised psychological life (cf. Newton 1965/71). Thus the archetypes are more proximate than Jung's own ambivalence would seem to suggest (Hoy 1983). In Marriott's (op. cit.) words:

"The gods are abroad, the numinous and a sense of wonder is [sic] available not principally to those self-consciously seeking it, but to all those who go through life with a natural and open heart" (p.82).

This emphasis on the ordinary and the proximate is an important redress to much of Jung's thought and his personal style, in which the archetypes
are imagined as split off from personal psychology. Jung's own ambivalence towards the archetypal is then repeated in the difficulty which psychologists of other persuasions have in dealing with his ideas: archetypes seem mysterious, deep, remote, frightening and enchanting, and thinking about them remains equally murky and ambivalent.

However, it would be a mistake to allow the present emphasis on the ordinary and the proximate to lull us into underestimating their structuring and transformative power. The archetypes are bigger than us. However personalised and culturally-historically conditioned, they are the foundations upon which a meaningful life is constituted. Cut off from their vitality and sustenance, man is cut off from authentic community as well as his self. Existence becomes volatile and nihilistic. Increasingly in our day, identity is a narcissistic and isolated grandiose self (Satinover 1987) or a centrifugal whirl into fusion with the other (Schwartz-Salant 1987).

9. As Steele (op. cit.) notes, Jung's case studies seem cut off from life. For example, The Visions Seminars (1976b) is an incomplete analysis of a series of dreams and visions of a woman. Over 500 pages long, it has a few vague remarks on the first 3 pages about the patient being a "thinking type" and in her 30's, after which the patient's personal life disappears almost entirely. "I omit personal details intentionally," says Jung in the first seminar of 1930, "because they matter so little to me." (A rather more sympathetic account of these seminars, which shows that Jung was at least attuned to the patient's bodily interiority, is presented by Sandner 1986). Equally revealing is a moment in the analysis of Joseph Wheelwright (Serbin 1984), when Jung apparently exclaimed:

"Don't mention the word 'Mother' to me! I've been listening to that for forty years. You go to Toni Wolf. She's a bottomless pit and you can talk about your mummy with her. But if you get some kind of collective unconscious stuff, archetypes, well then, we can talk about that, can't we?" (p.159)!
The density of the archetypes lies primarily in the inertia of the body's incarnate and communal life. But body and community empty into "mere facts" if the equiprimordial constitutive power of human consciousness is forgotten. Thus the power of the archetypes lies not only, or even primarily, in either their bodiliness or their communality but in their imaginal significance. The revelation of the world is primarily an appearance in the imaginative light of human consciousness. Therefore to focus on the communal, everyday reality of the archetypes does not take them out of imaginative psychological life. Rather, to recognise the archetypes in the everyday world is to deepen one's sense of that world, to appropriate the imaginative psychological patterns that one's interactions in the world reveal. Thus when Jung (1935/53, p.518) describes the archetypes as "categories of the imagination" he is not intending to take the archetypal dimensions of psychological life out of the world. He is pointing to the imaginative potential of archetypal reality. It will be recalled that fantasy, which at root is archetypal, is intentionality. Whether lived concretely in interpersonal relations or revealed concretely in dreams, archetypal reality is an imaginative realm. As Robert Avens (1984) says "The basic feature of things and beings in the imaginal world is that their outer manifestations correspond to their innermost spiritual structures" (p.106). This is not to deny that one can fail to perceive this, nor that the possibility of loosening one's literalisms into imaginative metaphors can be resisted with anxiety or even psychotic terror.

The essentially imaginal dimension of the archetypes means, firstly, that
their presence and significance are not equivalent to conventional reality. Marriage can be a deeply felt, private union within one's self, whether or not one acquires a spouse. The imaginative dimension means that the archetype of marriage is essentially that possibility of felt union and the wealth of meanings it contains. Acquiring a spouse makes that possibility public.

Secondly, the imaginal dimension means that the transformative possibilities of the archetypes can unfold and do their work in the unconscious silence and inchoate rhythms of the body, sleep, dreams, and unconscious fantasy. This has always been the central focus of analytical psychology. Without it, analytical psychology could never have been dreamed, and psychotherapy would be social work. More than anything else, perhaps, analytical psychology is distinguished by its elucidation of and work with the archetypal complexities that unfold, shape and transform the person's imagination, that constitutive power which is world-disclosive, ambiguously private and shared at the same time.

It only needs to be recalled that the autonomy of psyche's imaginative life is not personal, or even human (Hillman and Kugler 1985, p.147). Imaginal autonomy has no explanatory ground. It is itself the ground of both man and world for it is the possibility of their disclosure. "Things are founded in the gods," says the Heideggerian scholar Vincent Vycinas (1972, p.79), which means that, in Jungian terms, imaginal autonomy is the irreducible and mysterious ground that constitutes archetypal reality as concretely real. Thus it is imaginal autonomy which allows a thing to be the profoundly meaningful thing it is and which situates man in relation to that thing.
It might be noted that this insistence on the imaginal autonomy of psyche characterises Archetypal psychology. However, despite Hillman's (1982, 1983) attempts - inspired by Dallas colleagues Romanyshyn and Sardello, perhaps - to return the gods to the world, a strongly idealistic tendency remains (cf. Hillman and Kugler 1985). But a phenomenological recognition of imaginal autonomy does not retreat from the world of things. Thus if it is imaginal autonomy that allows a thing to be, it is the things of the world that hold and nurture the archetypal imagination. As Jung, sitting with the baboons on Mount Elgon saw, there would have been no dawn of consciousness without a rising sun.

The psyche, is not a natural entity essentially equivalent to other natural entities; it is the illuminating imaginative light in which things are disclosed. Therefore, when Jung (1933a)10. says "The psychic depths are nature, and nature is creative life" (p.248), he is saying that the archetypes are possibilities which are situated in the same creative, imaginal matrix which discloses entities within the world. As Vycinas puts it:

"We know well that man is creative, but we do not know that his creativeness is responsive to the creativeness of Nature. Man establishes an order in his living world; however, he does so by partaking in the all-ordering play of Nature, in her logos" (op. cit., p.86).

There is an ontological deepening in Jung's thinking: from the archetypes as behavioural and experiential patterns in the shared communal world to archetypes as imaginal possibilities in which both we ourselves and the

10. This quotation is taken from The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man. However, it does not appear in the Collected Works to which we have referred elsewhere, but in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933a). Hence the reference is to this edition.
world are gathered. This shift drops the ground of psychological life into the fertile darkness which is the ground of all things. It calls for a different kind of language. Jung speaks of archetypes and of gods interchangeably, and he has often been criticised for this. But it seems that there may be a difference, which, in this sense, is not a "theoretical" difference or merely a muddle of approaches. In speaking of archetypes and trying to describe their evident patterns Jung is speaking the language of a godless culture (if "godless culture" is not a contradiction in terms), even as he is attempting to deepen modern man's understanding of himself and his place in the scheme of things. But with this attempt at "scientific" discourse Jung is still (ambivalently) on the edge of an anthropocentric articulation of Being. Thus Jung's recourse to myth marks a significant moment of ontological deepening. It is not that the gods become something substantively different from the archetypes. But the ontological deepening steps unequivocally over the edge of an anthropocentric world. The archetypes can then no longer be interpreted humanistically as the potentialities of the human being - as potential "deintegrates" (Fordham) for example. Rather they are the possibilities in which Being itself is disclosed, and within which the human being finds his life most fundamentally constituted.

Yet even to speak of gods is a moment of imaginal awakening that still leaves the abysmal source concealed. Thought is returned to the poetic ground with which this study began. Thus it is appropriate to leave this discussion with Jung's reminder:

"Science is the art of creating suitable illusions which the fool believes or argues against, but the wise man enjoys their beauty and their ingenuity, without being blind to the fact that they are human veils and curtains
concealing the abysmal darkness of the Unknowable" (1976a, p.57).

8.7. Summary

Jung's concept of the archetype was discussed in detail. Considering the evolution of the concept made it possible to sift out some of the inadequate or misleading formulations Jung had made, and to arrive at the following definition: the archetypes are the sources of the typical initiated actions, reactions and experiences that characterise the human species. The archetypes are the primordial roots of those complexes which structure behaviour, images, affects and thoughts as these emerge in the typical situations of human life.

Steele's and Hillman's attempts to deconstruct the notion of the archetype as an "hypothesis" about an empirical, reified "entity" were discussed and endorsed. It was argued, however, that their critiques were compatible with the hermeneutic aspect of Jung's thought regarding the archetypes as cores of meaning, historically situated, and manifest as images requiring repeated interpretation. However, it was thought that a purely hermeneutic approach to the archetypes was inadequate to their existential density, or facticity. In this regard, Jung's ethological perspective was critically interpreted as his attempt to recollect the bodiliness of archetypally structured psychological life. Integrating these perspectives within an existential ontology, the hermeneutic approach to understanding the archetypes was accepted and given incarnate weight, and the inherited bodiliness of the archetypes was situated within the ambiguities of human presence and meanings. Thus situating the archetypes within being-in-the-world allows that they are both "instinct"
and "image", but it recognises their relational structure more clearly than Jung did, and, most importantly, it foregoes the need to explain the unity of archetypal images by recourse to an archetype that lies as an hypothetical entity behind the images.

Several advantages of the existential interpretation of the archetype were discussed. In particular, it provides ontological clarity to Jung's assertion, increasingly recognised and elaborated by contemporary analytical psychologists, that the archetypes are essentially relational. Archetypes as affects were also discussed and interpreted existentially, and it was suggested that not all attunements are archetypal. Serenity, for example, seems to characterise the attunement of an openly receptive consciousness.

As fundamental structures of being-in-the-world the archetypes are the primordial necessities in human psychological life, pre-personal structures within which personhood and meaning are founded. Within each archetypal theme there are variations, and there are no fixed boundaries between themes.

It was argued that the archetypes are guiding thematic structures within ordinary life, and that Jung's ambivalent idealisation and fear of them and his insistence on their numinosity reflect neurotic dissociation. It is important to have a sense of the structuring and transformative power of the archetypes within an integrated and personalised life.

Finally, it was argued that to recognise the archetypes in the everyday world is to deepen one's sense of that world. This moment of deeping
constitutes a recognition of the imaginal autonomy of the world's disclosure. If archetypal reality is an autonomous imaginal world then a) particular archetypal themes may be lived symbolically, without concrete enactment, and b) their transformative possibilities can function unconsciously. But the recognition of imaginal autonomy must not constitute a conceptual retreat into subjectivism for it is the quiddity of things which holds and nurtures the imagination. Thus imaginal autonomy in its deepest sense refers to that capacity for psychic opening in which both things and man come into being. This ontological deepening makes sense of Jung's inclination to speak of the gods rather than to use the quasi-scientific language of "archetypes".
CHAPTER NINE

A CLINICAL STUDY

This thesis has not considered clinical issues except briefly where these have had direct relevance to analytical psychology's theory of psyche, its "contents", or individuation. But such an effort would have very little usefulness for practicing psychotherapists if it did not have clinical value. Thus this chapter presents a clinical study and will use this to highlight the therapeutic applicability of the theoretical work. It is also intended to show how some of the concrete realities of psychotherapy lend evidence to support the move to a phenomenological analytical psychology. The example is not meant to "demonstrate" a "Jungian" or "phenomenological" psychotherapy, nor is it a comprehensive case study, but it may show that a phenomenological and Archetypal epistemology can be integrated with some of the clinical insights of the Developmental analytical psychologists.

9.1. The setting

The following introductory remarks are not meant to represent a full clinical picture or case history. The purpose is only to give sufficient
sense of the context within which the period to be described took place. We shall call the patient "Elizabeth".

Elizabeth was a 25 year-old teacher when she began therapy. We had been meeting three times per week for two years, and she was using the mattress in my office as a "couch".

Her presenting complaints had been that for many years she had lived in a continual "fog", isolated and without real feeling. She had come to have almost daily panic attacks and depersonalised experiences in which she would lose any sense of bodily groundedness or continuity, and it would feel as though her mind were in "orbit". Although she "got on well" with people, she felt very isolated and had an unrelenting subliminal sense of abandonment. Looking back on her relationships with others, she said she felt as though she had been acting, despite apparent involvement, and she was aware that in some way she kept others at a distance out of a fear that she would overwhelm and destroy them with her needs.

Elizabeth looked anxious and dilapidated. Her clothes were mostly black or "punk" (garish, mismatched colours), and her hair was dishevelled. Her body seemed to hang from her neck like a dead weight, and I was not surprised when in her initial dream she and a man opened up her stomach to see what was inside her only to discover the electronic gadgetry of a robot. The fog in which she lived was so powerful that often I found I could not see her. I would rub my eyes thinking a thin film had crossed my pupils, or move the position of my head to try to peer around an invisible barrier that nevertheless kept her half hidden from view. I also felt her ambivalence regarding therapy and me: she took her therapy
seriously yet also, especially during breaks in treatment, thought of it as another passing "experience" on her inner spiritual quest. I felt special and contemptible, important and useless: volatile, as though too no longer had a situated and stable body from which to engage her.

She had grown up with a mother whom she experienced as manipulative and needy herself, yet cold and ungiving towards her child. Elizabeth's father left the family when she was five, and she had a brother and a domestic nanny. Fortunately, the nanny seems to have been a remarkable woman, and she had a loving grandmother in the neighbourhood as well, but no-one was present or powerful enough to come between her and her mother. While Elizabeth's father continued to be an influential (and problematic) figure in her life, he was not thematically present in the phase of therapy to be described, and he will not be discussed further.

Nearly all her early memories, including her earliest, are of violence: crouching under the dining room table, huddling terrified in a corner, watching her mother beat the housekeeper, feeling her mother's hands around her neck, attacking her mother with her fists while screaming mindlessly, finding pornographic magazines lying about the house, etc. She and her mother often threw things at each other, and what good she got she felt she had to take: she stole from her mother and physically fought her for things. Out of mother's sight she felt out of her mother's mind. There was no felt connection across the space that separated them. She often went and sat on the street corner, where for hours she would hope that her mother would come to look for her, but apparently she never did. Even today, unless she contacts her mother there is no contact at all.
In the two years since starting therapy Elizabeth had changed considerably. The "fog", panic attacks and depersonalised states had been gone almost continuously for about a year; she felt real and alive, although still with "tension" in her body; she had discovered that feelings could be subtle and ordinary and not only archaic and absolute; she had discovered and attained a continuity in her experience, so that feelings from one session were carried to the next, and she missed friends who were absent, etc; she not only felt dependant on me but was starting to enjoy this; she had developed a capacity to imagine, so she could "play" with fantasies about me, for instance, without undue anxiety or guilt; she was beginning to take more adult responsibility for her life; she had sorted out her own values from the fragmented clutter with which she had lived. These movements seemed to anticipate the imaginal and structural events that followed, but it is equally true that these events consolidated at a deeper level the changes that had occurred. Up to this time, the "tension" in Elizabeth's body was still a place of inaccessibility, a steel ball that protected a minute foetus, a cold barrier that would not yield either to my presence or to her own longing to "let go".

9.2. The scene

Elizabeth was lying on the mattress feeling detached, "flat", and a kind of frantic passivity. This mood sharpened into despair of ever being free or being properly at home in her body. It was a familiar mood. Then she grimaced and made jerky movements with her right hand saying she wished
she could somehow hack open her stomach. She felt it was a positive image and it had something to do with feeling free. I suggested that she wanted to hack herself out of her mother's cold dead body.

This interpretation did not make much sense to her at the time, but something was clearly happening as she felt herself filled with rage. She left the session imagining putting a gun in her mother's mouth and "blowing her brains out". She denied that any of this had reference to our relationship, but she was clearly very angry at me too. I did not feel, however, personally attacked or frightened as I might have done two years previously. Somehow there was a space between us in which this was taking place. In retrospect, as will be discussed presently, it seemed that our relationship stayed quite smoothly intact at this time partly because I was a good paternal figure at least as much as a good maternal one.

The following day she went for a long bicycle ride with a friend. For a while she felt heavy and "flat", as she had done the previous day, then she felt a surge of anger which quickly became "pure energy". She felt a wave of energy and power well up inside her, and found herself pedalling faster and faster. She then remembered my interpretation, felt it made sense of what was happening, and felt herself light and free of the body she had known. She was ecstatically happy for the rest of the ride; her body was no longer an issue; the tension was gone.

It was after this separation from the mother that she became more directly in touch with her self, and also was able to perceive both herself and her mother more clearly.
During the following session she was unambiguously present, feeling bruised and battered, like a wounded hero, and in the session after that she felt herself consumed with greedy rage. I had sensed her rage before this, but now, with a body that was her own, she sank into it. She had seen the "Do Not Disturb" sign on my door a few hours before our session, and had wanted to smash the door down screaming in inarticulate fury. She had an image of cutting her mother’s heart out with a knife.

In the next session it seemed that Elizabeth was about to return to that ambivalent flatness that being defensively in her mother’s iron body had shown. But an image emerged of herself holding a little girl on a leash. The girl, dirty and neglected, was facing away from her. She was frightened of seeing the girl’s face, so held her firmly under control by having the leash around her neck. I commented that she had often described a strangled feeling before. Elizabeth then said the little girl had started to scream and cry, so she had yanked the leash tight in fear and anger. "Like your mother would do?" I suggested. A few minutes later she left the session in great distress but with an image of the mother-child polarity.

In the next session she reported how the image had shocked her, for it had made her realise the extent to which she wilfully embodied those ruthless qualities she saw in her mother. The image was still present and vivid, so we stayed with it. It seemed rather stuck, however, so after a while I asked whether there might be another way of relating to that little girl who was, after all, her self. With anxiety and considerable courage she crouched down, put an arm around the girl (so that the girl
would not run away or attack her), and undid the leash. The little girl turned to face her; she was bruised, dirty, unkempt, and frightened. In this session and the next these images were held between us, and gently handled as though the image itself was the frightened child. Thus the image of holding a battered child shaped us in several ways: it was an image of Elizabeth's relation to herself, my relation to Elizabeth, our relation to her image and her growing capacity to imagine, and it even touched my relationship with my own vulnerabilities and hurts as I found afterwards that I was gentler on myself for a time. Later she said she felt herself relating less ambivalently towards her pupils at school.

The following session (five sessions after that in which she hacked her way out of her mother's body) was deeply moving, and was characterised by its gentle calmness. A remark I had made in our previous meeting about a "deprived child" had stayed with her for the two intervening days, and she said she had just realised that she had been living her life as a deprived child. She said it made sense for her of her anger, envy and greed, her belief that the world owed her something, her stealing, bruised woundedness, ruthlessness, defensiveness, and chronic inner sense of abandonment. I also brought together some of her experiences in therapy, such as her desire to smash my door down and scream at me for having another client, her expectation of and fear of rejection, her contemptuous disregard of any expression of caring towards her even as she craved it, and so on. As she was talking it struck me that she was no longer a deprived child relating to me. She spoke with a deep and gentle empathy for that rejected life which was her own. I said I noticed how she was not speaking as a deprived child but with the gentle empathy of a different kind of mother. Elizabeth gave a relaxed smile and moved her
arms slightly so that she was holding herself. I said it seemed that her body was not only either battered or steel cold but now could also be a home in which to hold that little girl. Later I reflected that what was coming into being was not only her self as a neglected and hurt little girl but also as a caring mother.

9.3. Lysis

In the weeks that followed Elizabeth experienced several changes, and I noticed them as well.

Firstly, she described a new experience of the world being around her rather than merely in front of her. That is, she no longer felt that the world was an adversary to be conquered, or something to watch like a spectator. She felt the world as a supportive home in which to dwell and play.

Secondly, her feelings came to be embodied more clearly and fully. Although she had certainly come a long way in being able to access a feeling life, up to this time feelings lacked body and had no felt place. Happiness, sadness, fear and anger had been primarily head-experiences for her (by which I do mean something more than "thoughts"), and for me they had been sensed in her behaviour, often split off and disowned. Interestingly enough, up to this time I often did not know what she was feeling if she was still and if she did not tell me. I could not perceive her feelings immediately in her bodily presence, but could do so more often and more accurately after this time. Elizabeth seemed to have a
real pleasure in finding that her body was sad, or homeless or afraid.

Thirdly, Elizabeth's body became a place in which she could hold the little girl self. Thus, while she felt the little girl's feeling bodily, she also felt her body had a containing maternal power to hold those feelings without herself being frightened and over-controlling (with the leash). This sustained openness meant that other figures and feelings could be embodied and appear in her world as well. For a few weeks she had a recurring fantasy of children dancing happily in a circle. Significantly, the bruised little girl was in the fantasy too, and Elizabeth felt an integrated joy that the world she was now embodying was open to ambiguous textures and moods. It felt very "real". I noticed, but did not mention, the difference between this flexible ambiguity and ambivalent splitting.

Fourthly, the two of us felt closer together and at the same time more separate. We were more separate because the child-mother polarity was less definitive of our relationship, and we both felt freed from each other. Very soon after those few sessions Elizabeth became anxious about breaks in treatment and termination. Our separateness had become an issue. For several sessions she was sunk in a terribly painful isolation and I found myself once again trying to reach her. I felt myself thwarted, but at some point it became clear to us both that there was nothing "wrong" with her painful isolation; it was the truth about her life and history; it was her own experience and it was not to be taken away from her. Thus the separation anxieties were balanced by a determined need to have her own experience, a psychic space for her own feelings, imaginings and history. I realised that I had not always been
sufficiently attuned to the extent to which the robot-like body of her mother had been an attempt to create this space for herself. But now that this space was no longer an inhuman barrier within herself, through which neither of us had direct and real access, the need for a proper psychic space emerged in the relationship between us. She was still very dependent, of course, but she had a growing feeling that she could survive intact in the world without either her steel defences or me.

Fifthly, a distinct spirituality she had always had began to take shape. There began to emerge a sense of being held by a centre that was not of her own making. The first evidence of this was when she suddenly remembered the joy of being swung round and round by her father. That this image described her experience of therapy at that point was obvious, but neither the historical event remembered nor her experience with me could adequately "explain" what was happening. That was one reason I did not comment on the "transference" significance of her recollection: it would personalise and literalise what was essentially a spiritual experience.

Finally, and perhaps needless to say, therapy was far from over, and the earlier defences and ways of relating reappeared at times. However, the chronic condition was truly a thing of the past and the recurrence of schizoid defenses was situational and temporary.

9.4. Discussion

The first point to note is that even though the clinical example has been
limited in its description to those aspects necessary for present purposes, it also reveals more than can be discussed here. As is always the case, expression is less than that which calls for expression, yet it also expresses more than is intended. This serves as a reminder that there is no real, positive foundation of meaning that is separate from the interpretative structure of human intercourse. Thus it must be admitted that although Elizabeth's story is true, as is the story of our relationship, these stories would have been different to an unknown degree if she had had a different therapist. On the other hand, this does not mean that Elizabeth's story was "made up". A different therapist would have facilitated a story that, although different, was not incompatible. The clinical evidence and significance for this epistemological point will be discussed presently. Here, this basic epistemological insight reminds us that our method is hermeneutic: the unfolding of Elizabeth's drama was an hermeneutic process, as is any discussion which interprets that drama. Thus hermeneutics defines the epistemological status of the discussion that follows. It means, for example, that the archetypes referred to are not entities, however existentially dense, but thematic patterns which constitute Elizabeth's story.

Secondly, it is clear that neither Elizabeth's body nor mine were primarily the anatomical entities considered by medicine. Our bodies were thoroughly psychological, the incarnate materiality of psyche. As such, our bodies shared a landscape (as Romanyshyn puts it); they embodied a psychological world and understood each other in terms of that landscape. When Elizabeth felt herself to be in "orbit", no longer anchored to the earth, I could not see her; when she felt isolated and abandoned I found
myself trying to reach across an abyss; when she felt gently held by me I felt my own body open to her presence and my voice would soften as well; and it was my body rather than some abstract cognitive understanding that would let me know whether her expressed anger was real or playful. This flexible, pre-articulate understanding Merleau-Ponty describes in terms of the "anonymity" of the body. What analytical psychotherapy and the present clinical study suggest is that this flexibility is imaged as various figures. Anonymity is not an "emptiness" but a multiplicity of embodiments. It is not simply that Elizabeth can have different "feelings" in her body, but that Elizabeth's body is the embodiment of a range of figures that comprise her self. As well as having the body of a woman or a friend, she had her mother's cold, rejecting and violent body, a nurturant containing body, a triumphant body and the body of a bruised little girl. It was noticeable that in this last instance she said her muscles felt sore to the touch. Sometimes (always?) the tension in her body expressed the intolerable relationships between these figures.

Thirdly, the realisation of Elizabeth's story would not have been possible without the people in her life, yet it is not reducible to a sociological analysis of the effects of these peoples' behaviour on Elizabeth. As individuals the people in Elizabeth's life form a rather haphazard and loose arrangement, but Elizabeth herself is that psychic space in which these people become a coherent, if problematic, story. Elizabeth's world has its own structural coherence, its imaginal primacy, and it is this with which her psychotherapy is concerned. To the extent that psychotherapy is successful the patient realises a story that can be both lived and known, felt and believed in, at the same time (Romanyshyn 1988). She no longer lives an incredible story that, like a tragedy,
betrays or kills its central figure, a young woman who is trying to survive and establish a place for herself in the world.

This is why Elizabeth's memories were not simply pictures of past events which added together form a "case history". They were always recollections which occurred as amplifications of her world and her relationship to me at the time of recollection. Such memories emerged as analogies, expectations, or as contrasts, but they were always recollected in a contemporarily expanding or shrinking world.

Similarly, although my presence had a direct bearing on the story that unfolded (and no doubt interfered with its unfolding at times), my presence was not primary but the embodied amplification of an image. Elizabeth's relationship with me developed and changed over that period according to the imaginal patterns of the mother-child relation, but the two of us as Elizabeth and Roger were personal participants, not primary agents. In this regard there seems to be more convergence between the thinking of the Developmental and Archetypal schools than their polemics would suggest. The Developmental School recognises that the therapist "incarnates an image", to use Plaut's (1956) well-known phrase, and Hillman (1983b) representing Archetypal psychology writes:

"Don't make too sharp a distinction between the relationship to the analyst and the relationship to the world of images. After all, the analyst - and the patient, too - are images in the world of images, are enacting fantasies. I just prefer to start with the fantasy rather than with the person, that's all" (p.65).1.

1. Technically, it is generally preferable to "start with the person" of the therapist if the images and feelings are "negative" (angry, hurt, greedy, deprived, etc.). This helps to hold and contain these, to personalise their primitive quality, and to undo their omnipotence. But the essential ontological point regarding the presence of the therapist as an imaginal figure in a story remains.
This emphasis on the ontological primacy of the image also means that Jung's (1917/43, p.83) distinction between interpretation on the "objective" level and interpretation on the "subjective" level needs to be revised. Jung had the therapeutically brilliant insight that the figures of one's dreams and fantasies could be referred to one's self and not only to other people, in other words, that it may be more appropriate (and honest!) to own an image's thoughts and feelings as one's own rather than to find a person in one's life to whom it corresponds. However, Jung tended to found this difference on an ontological separation of subject and object and to derive his hermeneutic from the basis of this prior understanding. As is clear from the shifting place of the mother-child polarity, however, the image was primary, and it structured a number of interpersonal and "intrapersonal" relationships. Given the structural primacy of the image, it is the persons who shift, change place in relation to each other, and embody different poles at different times. Interestingly enough, Jung's distinction seems to have fallen somewhat into disuse, perhaps precisely because the distinction is theoretically unsound, however useful heuristically from moment to moment in therapy.

Fourthly, the clinical presentation of Elizabeth and the events described were not accessible within her everyday social world. Although it is true that her relationships were impaired before her therapy, these impairments would only have been pronounced within the demands of intimacy. In an important sense the clinical picture does not do justice to Elizabeth's social, professional and intellectual competence. On the other hand, Elizabeth's "inner world" was not spatially encapsulated inside her. It was an interiority within her relationships, lived
interpersonally as an anxious but subtle hide-and-seek.

In the context of the clinical example, this point has several implications:

a) Elizabeth was not psychotic, as she always retained a sense that her perceptions - of me, for instance - did not literally and unambiguously reveal all there was about me. There was always an ordinary understanding that I lived a life with its own story independent of hers.

b) The life-world has a subtlety and depth that is ambiguously perceived and dreamed, personally known and archaically lived. Thus it would not be quite true to say that the clinical description describes Elizabeth's life-world, or psyche. It describes primarily the dreamed and primitively imagined while the consciously known was taken for granted. The compelling drama of imaginal life and therapy can blind one to the crucial truth that psyche is lived as that ambiguity and not as the literalisms of social platitudes or archaic imaginalty.

Fifthly, Elizabeth's need to tear herself loose from her mother's body and to perceive that body as suffocating, cold, and uninviting is a personal realisation of an archetypal necessity: the birth of individuality (ego) requires the heroic differentiation from one's matrix, within which self, body, unconsciousness and mother are more or less symbolic equivalents. This process was an important phase in the development of consciousness for Elizabeth, for afterwards she was more clearly able to perceive both herself and her mother. With regard to
herself, she was able to see both a deprived child and a ruthless adult, and this moment of insight marked the realisation of a more compassionate mothering as well.

The archetypal perspective here helps the therapist to understand that, whatever Elizabeth's personal mother was like, she needs to be a "bad mother" if Elizabeth's individuality is to be born (Hillman 1983a). Just as bad mother and deprived child form a structural unity so bad mother and triumphant hero(ine) require each other in their imaginal polarity. At some point Elizabeth mentioned the possibility that her mother also had her vulnerability and bruises, but she became anxious and said she could not bear to think of that at this time. One can certainly see in this what Melanie Klein would call depressive anxieties defended against by splitting. But an archetypal perspective would seem to make a therapist less inclined to interpret Elizabeth's images and anxiety in these terms. At this point in her development Elizabeth required a bad mother. Elizabeth was not "attacking the bad" so much as separating from the matrix. In the following sessions Elizabeth came to embody other figures more fully, and it is noticeable that the whole imaginal structure changed. Bad mother and heroine shifted to become empathic mother and hurt little girl.

Elizabeth's birth has structural and thematic analogies with the myth of Dionysos, who, it may be recalled, was taken from the cold womb of his dead mother, Semele, by his father, Zeus. Semele had not carried Dionysos full term, so Zeus sewed Dionysos into his thigh until the child was due. Briefly, Elizabeth's individual life was being threatened by being locked up in her cold, dead, body, which was identified as her mother's body.
appropriated ("introjected") as her own. Although Elizabeth's fantasy was of cutting herself free, it does seem that the therapist was an important (necessary?) figure in the story. Although I was present to Elizabeth as a "good" mother, I also had a sense of being a male figure, whose phallic-spiritual power came between mother and child. My interpretation, both penetrative and verbal aided in her delivery. But, like Dionysos, Elizabeth was not yet independent or truly free. For some time she remained sewn to my leg, so to speak. Finally, Dionysos is the god of disinhibition, and is associated with fertility and madness. Although Elizabeth did not, like one of Dionysos's Maenads, join a cult of orgiastic revelry and frenzy (!), she did become significantly less inhibited, and over time more sexually alive and assertive. She also, as was shown, became more in touch with her anger.

The sixth and final point is that the thread which led Elizabeth and me through that period of therapy was not of our own making. Elizabeth's story and the drama of its transformation at this time had its own logic, requirements, and resolutions, and our task as both therapist and patient was primarily to make room for this to happen. That is, Elizabeth's self was a multi-figured structure that understood itself and "knew" what

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2. Seligman (1982) writes:
"It is the father (nevertheless) who plays a specific and central role as mediator of the difficult transition from the womb to the world. Without the father's emotional support, it seems to me that it becomes almost insurmountably difficult for a child to be properly born and confirmed in his own identity.... The 'absent father' syndrome encourages a mutually collusive 'embrace' with the mother ... from which the developing child cannot extricate himself, leaving him neither in, nor out, of the womb, but wedged, so to speak, half-way, half-alive, half-born" (p.10).
needed to be done if her life was to be fulfilled. In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine how egoically constructed therapeutic design could have been anything other than an abuse which would have perpetuated Elizabeth's schisms. The problem with more directive approaches to therapy - and this even happens with interpretations in psychotherapy - seems to be that it is difficult to know "who" is hearing and responding to them. Directives and interpretations are as likely to be picked up by Elizabeth's mother as her child, and there are other figures listening as well. An advantage of allowing images to show themselves, with all their thoughts and feelings, is that the figures who comprise a person's self are addressed directly.

9.5. Summary

A clinical study is presented which shows that the method of psychotherapy realises the ontological and epistemological claims of the hermeneutic and phenomenological approaches. The body's anonymity is revealed as a multiplicity of figures each of whom embodies a landscape. The ontological primacy of psyche's imaginal structure is shown, and implications regarding personal identity, memory, "transference", and the subjective and objective levels of interpretation are discussed. The patient's everyday competence is recalled in order to remind us that psyche is not the compelling world of archaic imaginality but the ambiguously known and lived. Finally, the archetypal structure of the patient's experience is discussed and amplified in terms of the myth of the birth of Dionysos.
CONCLUSIONS

Each chapter contains its own summary which highlights the main conclusions reached in that chapter, and in chapter one an outline of the thesis, which summarises the study as a whole, was presented. Thus it seems unnecessary to present another summary at this point. Similarly, it would overburden the present work to detail all the conclusions reached thus far. However, the different chapters considered different issues and concepts separately. Thus it may be useful to draw the main conclusions together by showing how the various interpretations of Jung's concepts may be integrated. Thereafter, summaries of the contributions of existential phenomenology and analytical psychology towards an integrated phenomenological analytical psychology are presented.

10.1. An integration of themes

The psyche is that perceptual world-openness within which the world comes into being as a humanly constituted and engaged world. Psyche is not an entity in the world similar to other entities, but is the imaginal texture that is given through the manifestation of things.
As imaginal intentionality, psyche is that "between" out of which personhood and one's world emerge and in which they are founded. As an imaginal intentionality, psyche's openness is a "no-thingness" which, however, is not an emptiness, a sort of vacuum. Its imaginal dimension is richly textured and structured as the world opens and is gathered in its specifically human and necessary ways. This matrix of psychic openness is the collective unconscious, and its potential structures, the archetypes, are the primordial patterns within this matrix into which the human being is born. This is not to deny that the psyche is thoroughly historical, cultural and structured in language, but it is to claim that history, culture and language are to an extent derivative dimensions of those transhistorical and necessary structures Jung called the archetypes.

Individuation is the process of differentiation, and it takes place within existence itself. It begins in rudimentary form soon after (or probably before) birth, as the child begins to differentiate good and bad experiences in relation to his mother, his mother as a being different from other presences, his sense of himself as bodily situated and, more gradually, as having a private fantasy life of his own. Individuation means dealing with the fact that those others who populate one's world have their own volition, and that their mothering and fathering, for example, do not define the totality of the who one's parents are. With good enough parenting the child usually copes with this "separation anxiety" and develops a more flexible and symbolic relation to the world. This development occurs repeatedly and to varying degrees, and in its maturer form includes the recognition that even with regard to one's own personal identity and life authorship is not of one's own making. Thus
individuation means differentiating and appropriating as one's own those archetypal potentialities of the self within which the depths of one's incarnate life already participate, at least to some degree.

This differentiation and appropriation of what is archetypally given occur to an extent with ontogenetic development. The archetypes take historical and personal shape as they manifest in the complexes of one's personal life. But these complexes of one's incarnate life, although they constitute a degree of differentiation and personalisation, can remain at the inchoate level of the pre-reflectively lived. What Jung calls consciousness tends to refer to the further differentiation and personalisation of archetypal complexity which occurs as one ("ego") reflectively appropriates as one's own the complexes one has blindly lived. This appropriation of the pre-reflectively lived in the light of consciousness involves recognising that one's world had been inappropriately constricted, disclosed within the confines of those archetypally grounded complexes with which one has identified. Here, what Jung calls the development of consciousness does not refer to something akin to greater intellectual understanding but to a movement of existential opening. Deeper insight into the incarnate intentionalities of the self is equally a deepening sense of the interiority of things (natural objects, people, events) within one's world, as, loosened from the grip of complex-limited perceptions, these things show themselves with richer, deeper, and more subtle significances.

Finally, Jung's hermeneutic approach, with its phenomenological emphases on receptivity to the immediately experienced and on sustained focus on the continually revealing phenomenon, is appropriate to his views of
10.2. Summary of phenomenology's contributions to a phenomenological analytical psychology

Phenomenology's contributions towards a phenomenological analytical psychology have been discussed in detail throughout the present study, but the highlights may be summarised as follows:

1. The Cartesian separation of the subject from the world is overcome. This restores psychological life to its original home in the world of people and things, and it recovers the primary reality of the world as a world of meaningful relations.

2. It explores and articulates the human body as the bodily dimension of human existence as a whole, the incarnation of psychological life. With the body psychological and the psyche embodied, questions about "mind-body" relations are rescued from the view that these are empirical quandaries. To the extent that empirical questions remain (eg. as to constitutional factors in manic depressive psychosis) these are situated within the inherent perplexity of the ambiguities of human bodily existence itself. But since the human order constitutes a transformation of the vital and natural orders of the body, it is recognised that there is no human bodily phenomenon that is devoid of intrinsic psychological significance.

3. It articulates an ontology and epistemology of ambiguity by
exploring the existential tensions between the revealed and the concealed, the known and the lived. Thus it is not apologetic for calling the metaphorical character of human existence its fundamental structure, and it undoes the positivist belief that the contemporary status of psychological insights, metaphorically expressed, is merely "provisional". Thus it articulates the scientific and epistemological status of psychology's findings.

4. It articulates a method of psychological enquiry that is indigenous to psychology conceived as a human science.

10.3. Summary of analytical psychology's contributions to a phenomenological analytical psychology

The highlights of analytical psychology's contributions may be summarised as follows:

1. Jung's method of psychological enquiry effectively realised the therapeutic and research value of the phenomenological approach in psychology. That is, Jung's emphases on overcoming assumptions, receptivity to the immediacy of lived experience, and focus on the metaphorical texture of things/images has yielded a wealth of psychological insight and is therapeutic as well.

2. Analytical psychology deepens existential phenomenology's understanding of the human being by elucidating psychological
insights that, read correctly, are not incompatible with an understanding of man as existence. Particular mention may be made of the complexes, the archetypes, the structure and function of images, and the patterns of psychological development and transformation.

3. Analytical psychology describes in detail the fundamental patterns of human intercourse, i.e. the structures of the shared life-world. In showing that these patterns are mythic Jung shows equally that the myths are psychologically present still, and that within historical existence there is a transhistorical, anonymous sensibility to which man remains bound and indebted.

4. Analytical psychology thematises the imaginal structure of human existence. It shows that the quiddity of existence is not ontologically separate from or prior to its imaginal self-disclosure. Existence is lived as a multiplicity of images, and it is within this relational matrix of images that man seeks to understand himself and others, and out of which he seeks to constitute himself as someone.
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