Rural livelihoods and food security in the aftermath of the fast track land reform in Zimbabwe

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
of
RHODES UNIVERSITY
by
Eddah Vimbai Jowah

Supervisor: Dr. Kirk Helliker

December 2009
Abstract

Land reforms are back on the development agenda. Different types of land reforms have been adopted globally in recent years, but by far the most controversial and most radical has been the fast track land reform pursued by the Government of Zimbabwe from 2000. There is general scholarly agreement that the fast track process has been accompanied by various socio-economic and political challenges, including an increase in levels of food insecurity. This thesis examines fast track reform in specific relation to the livelihoods of smallholder households and household food security amongst land beneficiaries. It argues that the problem of food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a complex social, political and economic issue, which cannot be simplistically reduced to the failures of fast track.

Understanding household food insecurity post-2000 needs to go beyond the notion that the nation’s food security hinges on overall levels of production alone. In particular, livelihoods and food security need to be conceptualised at community and household levels. Therefore, while addressing the broad macro-level analysis and discourse around the process of fast track, the study also adopts a micro-level analysis to look at the varied impact of fast track on the actual beneficiaries. The research focuses on small-scale beneficiaries in the Goromonzi District of Zimbabwe and, through the use of the sustainable livelihoods framework, looks at how their local contexts have been influenced by the wider socio-economic and political processes, and how beneficiaries have sought ways of coping with the challenges they face.
Acknowledgements

The last two years have truly been an experience of understanding and maturing in relation to the discipline of Sociology. Often a lonely and at times frustrating journey, undertaking this thesis has ultimately been made easier and extremely rewarding through the contributions of several people. Firstly I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and continuous words of encouragement. To my parents, I thank you for your love and for always pushing me towards being the best that I can be. To my siblings Monica, Marvin and Hillary, I know I can always count on your support and belief in me. Being so far away from home, my family’s encouragement made this intellectual endeavour so much easier.

To my supervisor, Dr. Kirk Helliker, thank you for your unwavering dedication which, combined with your extremely constructive and rigorous criticism, pushed me towards developing my thesis and continuing until the very end to complete my work. To the lecturers, support staff and fellow colleagues in the Sociology Department, thank you for your advice, guidance and help for the last two years.

To Professor Sam Moyo, together with the management and staff of African Institute for Agrarian Studies, thank you: firstly, for allowing me to be part of the process towards what will become ground-breaking research on Zimbabwe’s land and agrarian reform process; and secondly for making the dream of furthering my studies and knowledge a reality, through your financial support. I wish to also offer a special thank you to my colleagues Charity and Dumisani for their assistance with the data analysis, as well as to Obert Jiri for his assistance in the field.

To my friends, especially Tendai, Gina, Theona, Lucia and Hugh, thank you for your advice, support, patience and tolerance, especially through the difficult and often crazy moments encountered during the development of my thesis.

I would also like to thank the actual small-scale farmers and key informants interviewed during the process of this research for taking time out to speak to me and allowing me the opportunity to understand more about the reality of the situation on the ground.
Above all I thank God, without whom none of this would have been possible.
Acronyms

ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
ADA  Area Development Association
AIAS  African Institute for Agrarian Studies
ARDA  Agricultural and Rural Development Authority
AREX  Department of Agricultural Research and Extension
ASPEF  Agricultural Sector Enhancement Productivity Facility
BAT  British American Tobacco
BIPPAs  Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements
CA  Communal Area
CBOs  Community Based Organizations
CFU  Commercial Farmers Union
CSO  Central Statistics Office
CSOs  Civil Society Organizations
DAE  Department of Agricultural Engineering
DDF  District Development Fund
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DVS  Department of Veterinary Services
EPZ  Export Processing Zone
ESAP  Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU  European Union
FAD  Food Availability Decline
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organisation
FFSSA  Forum for Food Security for Southern Africa
FNC  Food and Nutrition Council – Zimbabwe
FTLRP  Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDA  Group Development Association
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GoZ  Government of Zimbabwe
ICFU  Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INGOs  Indigenous Non-governmental Organizations
LDT  Livestock Development Trust
LPD  Livestock Production Development
LSCF  Large Scale Commercial Farmers
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MLLRR  Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement
NGOs  Non-governmental Organizations
NOCZIM  National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
ODA  Overseas Development Administration
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................... 1
  1.1 Development – Land Reform, Rural Livelihoods and Food Security................. 1
  1.2 Research Methodology ..................................................................................... 5
    1.2.1. Research problem ..................................................................................... 5
    1.2.2 Goals of the research ................................................................................. 7
    1.2.3 Research methodology and methods ......................................................... 8
  1.3 Outline of Remainder of Thesis ...................................................................... 12

2.0 RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ...................................... 14
  2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 14
  2.2 Global Restructuring, Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods ............................. 15
  2.3 Land Reform .................................................................................................. 23
    2.3.1. Definition and historical analysis ............................................................ 23
    2.3.2 Market-led and reform ............................................................................. 26
    2.3.3 Land reform from the 1990s ................................................................. 27
  2.4 Food Security and the Global Food Crisis ...................................................... 29
    2.4.1 Food security – definitions and paradigm shifts ....................................... 29
    2.4.2 The global food crisis .............................................................................. 35
  2.5 Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches .............................................................. 38
    2.5.1 Historical approaches to studying rural livelihoods ................................. 38
    2.5.2 The new approaches ................................................................................. 41
    2.5.3 Key elements of framework ..................................................................... 45
    2.5.4 Debates around social capital ................................................................... 48
    2.5.5 Application of sustainable livelihoods framework .................................... 49
    2.5.6 Critique of framework ............................................................................. 50
  2.6 Rural Livelihoods, Land Reforms and Food Security – Developing a Conceptual
    Link .................................................................................................................. 51
  2.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 53

3.0 LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 1980 - 1999 ..................... 55
  3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 55
3.2 Geographic and Physical Attributes of Zimbabwe ........................................... 55
3.3 Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe Prior to Independence ................................. 56
3.4 Land Holdings at Independence in Zimbabwe ............................................... 60
3.5 Early Post-independent Zimbabwe Agrarian and Land Reform ...................... 62
  3.5.1 Agrarian reforms ....................................................................................... 62
  3.5.2 First phase of land reform 1980 -1990 .................................................... 63
  3.5.3 Outcomes of early land and agrarian reforms ........................................... 67
    3.5.3.1 Reforms and their impact on rural livelihoods ................................. 68
3.6 The Second Phase of Land Reform in the 1990s and Structural Adjustment ..... 72
  3.6.1 ESAP, land reform and agrarian change .................................................. 73
  3.6.2 Outcomes and impacts of land and agrarian reforms in 1990s .................. 74
3.7 Appraisal of Land and Agrarian Reforms from 1980 to late 1990s ............... 79
3.8 Post-ESAP Land and Agrarian Reforms ....................................................... 83
3.9 The Re-emergence of Land Occupations ...................................................... 85
3.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 86
4.0 FAST TRACK LAND REFORM AND THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS .............. 88
  4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 88
  4.2 The Process of Fast Track Land Reform Programme .................................... 89
    4.2.1 Legal framework guiding the FTLRP process ........................................ 91
  4.3 The New Agrarian Landscape ..................................................................... 93
  4.4 Political and Socio-Economic Impacts of FTLRP ....................................... 95
    4.4.1 Political impact of FTLRP ..................................................................... 97
      4.4.1.1 International political isolation ......................................................... 97
      4.4.1.2 State – civil society relationships ..................................................... 101
    4.4.2 Economic impact of FTLRP ................................................................. 103
      4.4.2.1 Decreased agricultural production .................................................. 103
      4.4.2.2 Economic contraction and hyperinflation ....................................... 107
      4.4.2.3 Changes in agricultural labour patterns ........................................ 109
    4.4.3 Social impact of FTLRP ....................................................................... 111
      4.4.3.1 Food insecurity .............................................................................. 111
  4.5 Attempts to Address Challenges Faced by Resettled Farmers .................... 115
    4.5.1 Public sector input and credit schemes ................................................ 116
    4.5.2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe initiatives ............................................... 118
      4.5.2.1 Agricultural Sector Enhancement Productivity Facility (ASPEF) ....... 118
      4.5.2.2 Mechanization programme ............................................................ 119
    4.5.3 Private sector and NGO initiatives ....................................................... 120
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 121

5.0 FTLRP AND ITS IMPACT ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY
IN GOROMONZI DISTRICT – AN ANALYSIS OF A1 BENEFICIARIES ........ 122

5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 122

5.2 Background to Study Area .............................................................................. 122

5.2.1 Physical attributes (climate, geology, vegetation) ....................................... 123

5.2.2 Land structure in Mashonaland East ........................................................... 123

5.2.3 Agricultural production in Goromonzi ......................................................... 125

5.3 Characteristics of A1 Land Reform Beneficiaries in Goromonzi ....................... 125

5.3.1 Socio-geographic origins of beneficiaries .................................................. 125

5.3.2 Socio-economic nature of beneficiaries ....................................................... 126

5.3.3 Age and gender based allocation patterns .................................................... 126

5.3.4 Household size ........................................................................................... 127

5.3.5 Residency status ......................................................................................... 127

5.3.6 Mode of land access .................................................................................... 128

5.3.7 Land conflicts ............................................................................................. 129

5.4 Centrality of Agriculture to Rural Livelihoods .................................................. 130

5.5 Resources Available to Newly Resettled Farmers for Production ...................... 131

5.5.1 Natural capital ............................................................................................ 131

5.5.2 Financial/Economic and technical capital .................................................... 132

5.5.2.1 Asset ownership and access amongst resettled A1 households ............... 132

5.5.2.2 Access to finance for A1 households ....................................................... 134

5.5.2.3 Household investment levels ................................................................. 137

5.5.2.4 Access to inputs for crop and livestock production .................................. 137

5.5.2.5 Access to agricultural extension services .............................................. 138

5.5.3 Human capital ............................................................................................. 139

5.5.4 Social capital ............................................................................................... 141

5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 144

6.0 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PATTERNS OF NEWLY RESETTLED A1
FARMERS IN GOROMONZI ................................................................................ 146

6.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 146

6.2 Land Utilisation Levels of A1 Farmers in Goromonzi ....................................... 147

6.3 Production Patterns of A1 Farmers in Goromonzi ............................................ 147

6.3.1 Crop production levels ............................................................................... 148

6.3.2 Livestock production .................................................................................. 150
List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework .............................................................. 45
Figure 2.2: Conventional Conceptual Links between Land and Food ............................... 52
Figure 5.1: Map of Goromonzi District ......................................................................... 124

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Key Informant Interview Schedule ................................................................. 10
Table 3.1: Rainfall Characteristics in the Five Natural Regions of Zimbabwe ................. 56
Table 3.2: 1980s Maize Production Levels (Tonnes) ......................................................... 68
Table 3.3: Production, Exports and Imports of Maize 1991 – 1999 (metric tonnes) .......... 75
Table 4.1: Maximum Farm Sizes According to Natural Region ..................................... 91
Table 4.2: Zimbabwe’s Emerging Agrarian Structure .................................................... 94
Table 4.3: Overall Crop Production Trends Since 2000 .................................................. 104
Table 4.4: Machinery and Equipment Acquired Under the Farm Mechanization Programme .......................................................... 119
Table 5.1: Place of Origin of Resettled Farmers in Goromonzi .................................... 125
Table 5.2: Current and Previous Formal Employment of Beneficiaries in Goromonzi .... 126
Table 5.3: Marital Status of Plot Owner by Gender in Goromonzi ................................ 127
Table 5.4: Household Size Ranges of Households in Goromonzi ................................. 127
Table 5.5: Residency of Plot Owners in Goromonzi ....................................................... 128
Table 5.6: Mode of Land Access of Beneficiaries in Goromonzi .................................. 128
Table 5.7: Year of Formal Allocation versus Commencement of Farming Operations in Goromonzi ........................................................................................................ 129
Table 5.8: Source of Land Conflicts in Goromonzi ....................................................... 130
Table 5.9: Households in Goromonzi Involved in Non-farm Income Generating Activities ........................................................................................................ 130
Table 5.10: Cropped Area versus Arable Area in Goromonzi District ......................... 132
Table 5.11: Asset Ownership for Households in Goromonzi ......................................... 133
Table 5.12: Access to Productive Tools in Goromonzi .................................................... 134
Table 5.13: Source of Finances for Crop Farming for Households in Goromonzi ......... 135
Table 5.14: Households Involved in Contract Farming and Out-grower Schemes in Goromonzi .......................................................... 136
Table 5.15: Investments on Farm since Resettlement by Farmers in Goromonzi ......... 137
Table 5.16: Source of Key Crop Inputs for Farmers in Goromonzi ............................... 138
Table 5.17: Access to Extension Services for Crops and Livestock in Goromonzi ........ 139
Table 5.18: Formal Training versus Years of Farming Experience of Household Heads in Goromonzi ........................................................................................................ 140
Table 5.19: Type of Labour Used by Households in Goromonzi ................................. 141
Table 5.20: Collaboration Between Resettled Farmers in Goromonzi ............................ 142
Table 5.21: Type of Farmer Groups in Existence in Goromonzi .................................... 143
Table 5.22: Linkages Between Communal Areas and Resettlement Areas Identified by Households in Goromonzi .......................................................... 143
Table 5.23: Reverse Linkages Between Communal Areas and Resettlement Areas
   Identified by Households in Goromonzi ............................................................ 144
Table 6.1: Levels of Land Utilisation Amongst Households in Goromonzi .............. 147
Table 6.2: Crop Matrix of Survey Area ................................................................. 149
Table 6.3: Average Crop Production Levels of Households in Goromonzi ............. 150
Table 6.4: Livestock Production Amongst Households in Goromonzi District ...... 151
Table 6.5: Markets for crops grown by A1 households in Goromonzi ................. 152
Table 6.6: Production Challenges of A1 Farmers in Goromonzi ......................... 153
Table 6.7: Main Food Source for the Past Season for A1 households in Goromonzi 157
   Table 6.8: Coping Strategies Adopted by A1 Households in Goromonzi to Ensure
   Household Food Security .............................................................................. 158

List of Plates

   Plate 6.1: 2008 Winter Wheat Crop at Swiswa 2 Resettlement ....................... 162
   Plate 6.2: Failed Wheat Crop Due to Lack of Fertilizer at Swiswa 2 ............... 164
   Plate 6.3: Current Irrigation Infrastructure in Place at Swiswa 2 Resettlement .. 166
   Plate 6.4: Winter Wheat Under Irrigation at Swiswa 2 ................................. 167
   Plate 6.5: Irrigation Trenches Around Original Plots at Swiswa 2 .................. 168
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Zimbabwe since the year 2000 has undergone a radical process of land reform, which has become officially known as the „Fast Track Land Reform Programme” (FTLRP). This programme has been highly controversial in terms of the politics of Zimbabwe and in relation to Zimbabwean social studies. Over the past ten years, wide-sweeping political and intellectual generalisations have been made about the form and content of the Programme; at times, these claims appear at best as bold assertions and at worst as sheer speculation. Of particular significance to the Programme, with regard to its effects and impacts, are the lives and livelihoods of rural citizens of Zimbabwe.

This thesis seeks to offer an empirically-grounded understanding of the effects of „fast track” land reform on small-scale farmers in contemporary Zimbabwe. Of special concern to this thesis is the link between land reform on the one hand, and rural livelihoods and food security on the other. It is often argued, notably by critics of „fast track”, that the land reform process undermined a viable large-scale commercial agricultural sector as well as national food security, and that all rural citizens have suffered as a consequence. My thesis addresses this argument by focusing on the lives of small-scale farmers (resettled under „fast track”) in a particular district in Zimbabwe, namely, Goromonzi District near the capital city of Harare. It is at district – and ultimately household – levels that one is able to offer a more refined and nuanced understanding of the impact of land reform programmes on small-scale farmers. My thesis contributes to this intellectual quest.

This introductory chapter is divided into three main sections. First of all, it highlights the significance of land (and agrarian) reform for questions of social and economic development. Secondly, it outlines the research methodology that underpins the thesis. Finally, it provides an overview of the balance of the thesis, including the main issues discussed in each chapter.

1.1 Development – Land Reform, Rural Livelihoods and Food Security

Land and agrarian reforms are critical to improving the lives of citizens of the global South, where rural populations still constitute the majority of the population and where agriculture is central to rural livelihoods. Agrarian reforms and more specifically land reforms have been an important component of modern development strategies during the 20th Century (Atkins, 1988:935), especially in the 1950s and 1960s when these reforms...
received widespread political and financial support. This period (falling under the rubric of „modernisation”) was significantly shaped by the ending of World War II (WWII) and the start of the decolonisation process. In the context of neo-liberal restructuring, the rate of land and agrarian reform waned in the 1980s, but the 1990s ushered in the revival of reforms, as these were weaved into a reinvigorated development agenda (under „globalisation”).

Development strategies at the end of WWII seemed to be centred on trying to address the challenges left behind by colonisation. Colonial conquest (in many parts of the global South) resulted in the massive expropriation of land and other natural resources, as well as the undermining of peasant agriculture, in order to create reserves of cheap labourers to either work for the colonialists or to grow cash crops required to drive the process of economic expansion in Europe. Former colonies were therefore characterised by poverty, hunger and the lack of economic and social development. The proposed (post-colonial) solution was modernisation, or bringing modernity and structural change to „backward societies” (Sobhan, 1993:1). The focus – or road to development – entailed increasing urbanisation and industrialisation on the back of enhanced levels of agricultural production.

Therefore, agrarian reform policies entailed maximising national levels of agricultural production, by (for instance) offering remaining small-scale farmers incentives to work their land more intensively so that they could feed and enrich themselves through market transactions. At the forefront of driving this process was the United States of America (USA) and development agencies such as the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The latter was established in 1945 with the mandate of assisting developing countries (and countries in transition) to modernise and improve agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices, and thereby ensure good nutrition and food security for all. Land reforms sponsored by the USA were pursued in South-East Asia and Latin America concurrently with strategies to improve agricultural production.

Increased levels of crop production at the national level was made possible through the use of the technology of „high yielding varieties” of grains, and inorganic chemicals and fertilizers in a process coined the „Green Revolution”. The aim was to transform
agriculture from peasant production – which was considered backward, localised, household and subsistence-oriented, – to a solid commercial basis. This process (which incorporated agricultural research, extension and infrastructural development) was funded by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and initially began in Mexico in 1943. The Mexican experience was termed a „success” from a national perspective, as by 1956 the country was „self-sufficient” in terms of agricultural production and by 1964 it was exporting half a million tonnes of wheat. The same model was replicated in Asia, focusing on wheat together with rice production. The results realised in Asia were even more impressive than those in Mexico, with „miracle” rice yields soon occurring for example in the Philippines (Cleaver, 1972:178). On the back of these impressive results, development agencies such as the World Bank, FAO and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) further advocated for the modernisation of agriculture to overcome rural poverty.

However, underlying these development processes were powerful political and economic forces. This included the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union, and the ever growing needs of capitalist expansion. Agrarian reform policies were in large part aimed at stopping the propagation and influence of socialist ideology as well as at opening up new opportunities for American investors who were offering financing for irrigation systems, fertilizers, tractors and other key inputs essential for agricultural development.

Agricultural development through the Green Revolution was successful in the sense that it increased global levels of food production; however, hunger and poverty persisted throughout the global South, especially in rural households. According to Payer (1980:65), the agricultural modernisation strategy would never address the challenges of rural poverty; the strategy sought merely to make the land more productive without necessarily improving the livelihoods of rural peasants. In the end, the Green Revolution resulted in the increasing integration of agriculture in developing countries into the capitalist market through the adoption of the new technological packages. This integration was though a form of global subordination. Certainly, the benefits of integration were not experienced by the mass of citizens in the global South who were still dependent on rural spaces for food security and sustainable agriculture (Amin, 1990:11).
As the problems inherent to "modernisation" became more and more apparent, other (more endogenous) strategies of development were attempted. Of significance in this regard is the Tanzanian experiment. Under the auspices of President Julius Nyerere, the problem of underdevelopment was addressed by encouraging citizens to rely on their own social and productive forces and to use the communal past as a model for future development (Rist, 2008:123). This form of African Socialism, referred to as "Ujamaa", envisaged collective ownership of the means of production. It was also attempted to a certain degree by Cuba following the USA blockade in 1960 as well as by other countries. Pursuing these (inward-looking) strategies within the confines of the dominant capitalist world economic system was dubious, but they did raise important questions about self-reliance (and de-linking) that continue to resonate to this day. At the time they existed (into the early 1970s), these strategies (in seeking to address land and agrarian questions) were consistent with the early nation-building efforts by newly-independent nations in notably the African continent.

The process of land reform began to slow down however in the 1980s, as development became dominated by "neo-liberal" thought. Development discourse from the mid-1970s became synonymous with "structural adjustment", which sought to reduce government expenditure, open up local economies to more foreign investment, improve production levels, and ultimately enhance levels of debt repayment by developing nations. As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed for structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), governments” role became one of balancing national budgets by cutting back on social spending (i.e. education, health and subsidies in agriculture) and creating an environment for foreign investment by upholding the rule of law especially in relation to property rights (McKay, 2004: 62). Ultimately this process slowed down land reforms, and agrarian policy shifted away from any endogenous focus (that might have existed) to even more export-led agricultural growth.

Accompanying the adoption of SAPs were increasing levels of rural and urban poverty, as manifested in growing levels of food insecurity (especially at the household level). In the light of this, mainstream development thinking for the first time began (from the 1990s) to emphasize the importance of adopting pro-poor (redistributive) growth initiatives instead of simply crude economic growth models (Remenyi, 2004a:34). It became recognised that huge (financial) capital inflows into developing countries were not having the designed
impact and that real poverty-reduction development was only possible based on a deep understanding of the problems and constraints facing poor rural households. Hence, all kinds of human capital and social capital (and participatory) concerns became prominent within development circles and discourses. However, economic growth remained (and remains) at the centre of contemporary development practice; it is simply that the links and connections between economic growth and poverty reduction – under conditions of deepening globalisation – have been seriously re-assessed, such that there is a series of „powerful structural, institutional, social and cultural“ barriers which inhibit poverty reduction and food security (Remenyi, 2004b:217).

Given the powerful international forces underpinning new-look development under globalisation, it seems questionable whether such development marks a significant advance (or any advance at all) over more traditional „modernisation“ development. Certainly, evidence around the globe points to the ongoing marginalisation and exclusion of rural citizens, to new forms of land dispossession arising, and to endemic levels of rural poverty and food insecurity. Land-based movements have emerged, although often localised and sporadic, to address these dire global challenges. The case of Zimbabwe, under fast track reform, in many ways illustrates the social conflicts that mark the contemporary phase of land and agrarian reform.

1.2 Research Methodology
1.2.1. Research problem
The discussion in the preceding section provides the broad context for the most recent land reform initiative in Zimbabwe, that is, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The programme has involved the massive redistribution of land to rural people who, in terms of land access, were historically dispossessed or disadvantaged along racial lines. However, FTLRP has been blamed for causing the existing food crisis in Zimbabwe. Analysts (for example, Sachikonye, 2005:35-36; Richardson, 2005:2) argue that FTLRP has led to once productive commercial farms being under-utilised and has thereby contributed to the undermining of national food security in Zimbabwe. Richardson (2002:5) claims that land reform coupled with the loss of property rights are responsible not only for food insecurity but for the total collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Although drought and other macro-economic conditions since 2000 have been factors in
the reduction of grain harvests, the FTLRP is seen as largely responsible for destabilising food production (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:8).

As noted previously, agrarian reforms (of which land reform is a component) have been a central development strategy adopted to try and overcome the development challenges (including rural poverty and inequality) of the global South. The outcomes of land reforms (including „fast track”), and whether they address the challenges faced by rural populations, remains highly debated. The radical and extensive nature of the FTLRP has created new debates around the problem of food insecurity and the nature of the development process in Zimbabwe. The socio-economic challenges (which have manifested themselves in economic decline and food insecurity) being faced by Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the FTLRP are a complex social, political and economic issue, which cannot be simplistically reduced to the FTLRP.

Zimbabwe’s food situation has historically been characterised by a paradox of chronic food insecurity at the household level amid plenty at the national level (Jayne, Chisvo and Rukuni, 1994:289). Therefore the notion that the nation’s food security hinges on overall levels of production alone seems problematic. Another critical factor in analysing food security in Zimbabwe is that whilst the historical contribution of the large-scale commercial farm sector to national food security cannot be ignored, about 70% of the country’s grain requirements (aside from wheat) in the late 1990s (just prior to „fast track”) were met by communal and smallholder farmers (Moyo, 2003:1).

In many instances, the FTLRP has allowed communal farmers access to better quality and bigger pieces of land. As a result, the key question which the FTLRP (and the accompanying agrarian reforms put in place by the government) has raised is the ways in which communal and smallholder households’ livelihoods and food security have been affected by the new agrarian structure and reforms that are now in place. Undoubtedly, the chronic food insecurity problem faced by the country has coincided with the FTLRP, and this has reinforced the notion that the nation’s food security hinges on overall levels of production at a national level. It may be that access to good quality land by previously disadvantaged groups is the only way forward to address poverty effectively and improve levels of food security in Zimbabwe in the long term.
In this regard, it is therefore important to understand how access, availability, utilisation and affordability of land (as well as agrarian reforms) are significant in influencing levels and types of food security, more so at a household level where food insecurity becomes a lived experience. Such an understanding also involves analysing government programmes (particularly the FTLRP) not only within a national context but also in relation to global processes that impinge on national processes. It is the complex interplay between national and global processes that have animated „fast track” and that, in the end, impinge on the challenge of food security in rural Zimbabwe.

1.2.2 Goals of the research

The main goal of the thesis is to understand and analyse the rural livelihoods of households on the newly resettled farms in contemporary Zimbabwe, with particular emphasis on resettled small-scale farmers. The temporal focus of the study is from the year 2000 onwards, in the light of the government’s FTLRP and ongoing challenges of food security in the country. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been undergoing a severe food crisis yet, until the late 1990s, it was considered to be largely self-sufficient in food production and was an exporter of large quantities of surplus maize to its regional neighbours.

In pursuing this main goal, the study tackles some of the methodological and conceptual weaknesses in the existing literature on food security in Zimbabwe, by examining the livelihood strategies of resettled households with the advent of FTLRP. It seeks to assess food insecurity in resettled areas using the „sustainable livelihoods framework” and specific versions of it. In so doing, it challenges the oversimplification of the causes of Zimbabwe’s current food crisis, and seeks to identify and analyse the coping mechanisms that households in newly resettled areas have adopted to overcome the challenge of food insecurity.

Therefore the research seeks to, first and foremost: assess the impact of the FTLRP on the livelihoods of newly resettled small-scale farmers and their attainment of household food security. Necessary subsidiary goals to this main goal are: first of all, to understand the formal and informal coping strategies adopted by rural households within newly resettled areas to attain food security in the aftermath of the FTLRP; and, secondly, to provide
insight into the causes of contemporary food insecurity in Zimbabwe and analyse to what degree the FTLRP and other socio-economic and political causes have contributed to the problem of food insecurity.

1.2.3 Research methodology and methods

The main empirical focus of the thesis is Goromonzi District, which is used to address the main and subsidiary goals of the thesis. The study is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data was collected from a baseline survey of six districts across Zimbabwe including Goromonzi District. It was carried out by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) from November to December 2006, with a household questionnaire being administered to resettled farmers. The survey enabled the AIAS to collect “original data for describing a population too large to observe directly” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:232). I was part of the research team involved in the survey work and had full access to the data. The data remains unpublished and I needed to collate and analyse the data for purposes of the thesis.

Goromonzi district, which has twenty-five wards, was selected for study because of its location within Natural Region II, which has historically been highly diversified and productive for both commercial and communal farmers (Muir, 1994:46). Given the highly diversified ecological regions in Zimbabwe, the analysis of Goromonzi is not representative of Zimbabwe as a whole. However, it provides a rich insight into the impact of the FTLRP on resettled households as well as the coping mechanisms adopted to ensure household food security.

The FTLRP questionnaire was a “highly structured data collection technique” (de Vaus, 1986:70), whereby each respondent was asked the same set of questions. The survey, which was carried out in 2006, gathered empirical data at the household level on the impact of the FTLRP on newly resettled farmer households in both A1 (small-scale) and A2 (commercial) resettlement schemes. This data includes the livelihood strategies that have been adopted by households to militate against food insecurity, the changing patterns and processes of land access and use, and how these have affected household livelihoods and in turn household food security levels. The empirical evidence was gathered to provide evidence on who the major beneficiaries have been, the demographics of the beneficiaries, land tenure, land use patterns, the resources available to resettled households, the assets
they have been able to acquire, farmers production trends (i.e. crop outputs), the main use of crop outputs (i.e. whether for domestic consumption or for sale), marketing channels and distribution, as well as the social relations that are developing in resettlement areas. The methods adopted allowed for information to be gathered from the actual beneficiaries themselves, giving a greater insight into the concrete situation on the ground concerning the resettlement process. The data collected was then analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), a computer software application which provides statistical analyses of survey data. SPSS allowed for the development of descriptive statistics such as frequencies, ranges and averages which were used to analyse variables such as origins of households, household size, residency of plot owners, as well as access to key productive resources and assets to undertake agricultural production. Certain variables were then analysed using cross tabulations in order to determine whether there was an association or relationship between two variables. These variables included the year of plot allocation and the year farming operations commenced; cropped areas and arable area; and formal agricultural training and number of years of farming experience. My thesis is concerned specifically with the A1 small-scale farmers in Goromonzi District and not with A2 commercial farmers.

In addition to the survey, key informant interviews were also conducted in August and September 2008 (see Table 1.1) with agricultural extension officers (operating in the resettlement areas), district lands officers and the Assistant District Administrator of Goromonzi. This entailed the use of semi-structured interviews. As well, a focus group discussion was held on 28 August 2008 with resettled A1 farmers in the district, to further augment the information collected from the survey and the key informant interviews.
Table 1.1: Key Informant Interview Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Informant</th>
<th>Organisation and Position</th>
<th>Date and Place of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Guti</td>
<td>AREX – Senior Extension Officer</td>
<td>August 2008 - Goromonzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss Jacqueline Chikarate</td>
<td>AREX - Agricultural Extension Worker Ward 4</td>
<td>August 2008 - Goromonzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sombrero</td>
<td>Goromonzi District Lands Office – Lands Officer</td>
<td>August, 2008 – Goromonzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr M. J. Hamandishe</td>
<td>Goromonzi Rural District Council – Assistant District Administrator</td>
<td>August, 2008 - Goromonzi Rural District Council Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Katherine Manase</td>
<td>FOSENET¹ – Programme Officer</td>
<td>September, 2008 – FOSENET Offices - Harare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondary data from relevant government bodies, including the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Agricultural and Rural Extension (AREX), multilateral agencies such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Bank, as well as food relief Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was also collected. The above information was further augmented by the use of policy documents and secondary literature dealing with food security, agricultural production and the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. This provides a historical and contemporary context to the food security situation, and also enables the thesis to understand changes to government policies and regulations in agriculture and the impact of these changes on local farmers.

The thesis data, then, was collected using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The quantitative method involved the use of the structured questionnaires that were administered to new A1 farmers. The qualitative method relied on the focus group discussion with different groups of farmers, key informants and informal interviews conducted by the researcher. The questionnaires were administered by research team enumerators from the government’s Agricultural and Rural Extension (AREX) department, who received training and were led in the research process by the AIAS.

¹ Food Security Network (FOSENET) is a network of twenty Zimbabwean based Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) formed in 2002 engaged in a number of food security intervention activities such as food distribution, agricultural recovery and the dissemination of information particularly around HIV/AIDS.
The target of the baseline survey was to sample in more than 50% of the thirteen wards in Goromonzi District that were affected by the fast track land reform process. The wards were primarily selected by taking into consideration the spatial distribution of land use patterns in order to capture the diversity in the district as much as possible. The wards selected for the survey were Glenforest, Munhenga, Cromlet, Goromonzi, Melfort, Bromley and Twentydales. Within each of the wards, the target was to interview 10% (i.e. a total of 630) of the A1 households in each of the wards selected for the survey. On completion of the survey, a total of 608 A1 households had been interviewed across the seven wards targeted in the survey.

There were a number of challenges experienced in the field. The period of administration of the survey instruments coincided with the start of the rains. As such, most of the farmers were busy preparing and working in their fields. A large proportion of the interviews were carried out in the agricultural fields. The questionnaire also proved to be rather lengthy and took at least 2.5 to 3 hours to complete, which was strenuous on both the part of the interviewee and the enumerator, and (often towards the end) respondents would show signs of impatience.

The emphasis in this study is on micro-level analysis as opposed to the conventional macro-level analysis which has dominated discussion of the FTLRP process and its outcomes in Zimbabwe. Macro-level studies place more emphasis on the political conflicts and human rights violations which have arisen due to fast track (see Alexander, 2006; Hammer and Raftopoulos, 2003; Sachikonye, 2003 and 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Richardson, 2005 and 2007). The result has been highly polarised debates, with the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) taking a very defensive stance around land reform, and overemphasising some of the successes of the FTLRP and accusing the West and others who have been critical of land reform (remaining white farmers, commercial banks, private inputs suppliers) of sabotaging the process. Foreign governments (especially the USA and Britain), international multi-lateral agencies and donors accuse the government of implementing policies (especially the fast-track process) that violate human rights and ignore the rule of law especially around the protection of property rights and the sanctity of the market.
1.3 Outline of Remainder of Thesis

The next chapter (Chapter 2) provides the global context around rural livelihoods and discusses in detail the conceptual framework for the study, i.e. the sustainable livelihoods framework. Through an analysis of literature on land reform, rural livelihoods and food security, the chapter highlights the plight of smallholder farmers globally and discusses the challenges they continue to face in their attempts to attain a sustainable livelihood. The chapter also unpacks key concepts, such as land reform, agrarian reform, food security, livelihood, which need to be conceptualised and contextualised in line with the objectives of the thesis. I also provide a conceptual linkage between land reform, rural livelihoods and food security, which is key to understanding the FLTRP process and how it has affected resettled A1 households, within the broader socio-economic and political context of rural development and livelihoods.

Chapter 3 highlights how the process of agrarian and land reform in Zimbabwe did not begin with FTLRP but can be traced back to the time of colonisation. Colonial processes and policies had a significant impact on the rural landscape in Zimbabwe, which were still evident just prior to the FTLRP. This impact was two-fold. First of all, the process of expropriation of land from the African population by colonial settlers created an unequal land ownership pattern which saw the bulk of the country’s fertile land owned by the minority white population. The second impact of colonial polices was the undermining of African smallholder agriculture and rural livelihoods in favour of European large-scale farming operations. The chapter traces the period from 1980 (the year of Zimbabwean independence) to show the nature of land and agrarian reforms and the impact they had in trying to reverse the imbalance in landholding patterns as well to improve support for smallholder farmers in communal areas. In addition, I address the nature of food security in Zimbabwe throughout the 1980s and 1990s, taking a critical look at the way in which government and other agencies evaluated food security in Zimbabwe. This chapter essentially lays out the historical and social platform from which the FTLRP took off.

Chapter 4 outlines the contemporary land and agrarian reforms in Zimbabwe (i.e. since 2000) which have been coined „fast track“ land reform. The chapter discusses the highly polarised debate around the fast track process and its outcomes, and whether this process alone can be blamed for the political and socio-economic crisis that Zimbabwe has been
facing in recent years. The crisis has manifested itself in the form of economic decline (due to reduced agricultural and industrial productivity) and in food insecurity (at least as understood from a national perspective). The issues raised in the chapter are a key to understanding the macro political, economic and social environment within which land reform beneficiaries must operate in and develop their livelihoods.

Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the data collected from the baseline survey in Goromonzi District. The chapter pays particular attention to the socio-economic characteristics of the A1 beneficiaries who were interviewed in the survey. In the chapter, I seek to outline the key livelihood activities of households, and I discuss the livelihood patterns and trends which are emerging amongst them given the advent of the FTLRP. Chapter 6 is a continuation of the analysis of the Goromonzi evidence, however with greater focus on the production patterns of the resettled A1 households. Essentially the chapter explores the levels of land utilisation and production patterns of newly resettled farmers based on their levels of access to available resources: and I link their current production patterns to levels of household food security. The chapter looks at the production constraints identified by farmers and the mechanisms they are using to overcome these challenges. I also, more specifically, discuss Swiswa 2 Resettlement Scheme in Goromonzi district.

Chapter 7 provides an overall conclusion to the thesis based on the discussions and issues raised throughout the chapters, linking the conceptual framework and the empirical evidence. In the light of my research, the chapter also suggests possible ways forward with regards to deepening our understanding of rural livelihoods and food security as well possible areas for future research.
2.0 RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a global, historical and social context to issues surrounding rural livelihoods and food security in developing countries, with specific reference to smallholder farmers in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and southern Africa. The chapter will specifically unpack the sustainable livelihoods theoretical framework as a tool to analyse rural livelihoods and food security amongst A1 households in newly resettled areas in Zimbabwe. The thesis makes use of a slightly modified Sustainable Livelihoods Conceptual Framework originated by Scoones (1998) and modified by Carney (1998), to guide research into rural livelihoods and food security in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the FTLRP.

Rural livelihoods involve the utilisation of a combination of resources – such as networks, labour, land, capital, knowledge, employment, technology and markets – to produce food, harvest natural resources and generate incomes in order to make a living (Hebinck, 2007:11-12). Clearly, a livelihood is more than simply dependent upon a cash income (Lipton and Maxwell, 1992). According to Ellis (1998:4), livelihoods encompass income both in cash and kind (for instance, consumption of own produce, payments in kind such as food, transfers or exchanges of consumption items), as well as social organisations and property rights that enhance livelihoods. Livelihoods also include access to and benefits derived from social and public services provided by the state such as education, health services, roads and water supply (Lipton and van der Gaag, 1993; Blackwood and Lynch, 1994).

The chapter will begin by describing the condition of, and shift in, rural livelihoods in developing countries highlighting the key challenges which affect the rural poor, as well as the emerging problems they are facing, more specifically diminishing livelihoods and increasing levels of food insecurity. The chapter will seek to show the precariousness of rural livelihoods due to the expansion of neo-liberal policies and the adoption of neo-liberal frameworks by governments in developing countries, which is manifesting itself in the growing number of hungry people amongst the rural populace. This situation has once again brought to the forefront of the development agenda the need for land and agrarian reform.
In addition the chapter will introduce the sustainable livelihoods framework and illustrate how the framework is most suited to understanding the challenges faced by rural people in developing countries as well as explain how land reforms, food security and rural livelihoods are intricately linked. The chapter aims at showing how access to land in rural areas is a major aspect of improving rural livelihoods and, in turn, addressing the challenge of growing food insecurity amongst rural populations.

2.2 Global Restructuring, Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods

Rural livelihoods, especially in developing nations, have been synonymous with agriculture. As Bernstein (1992:3) argues, there have been hidden assumptions that rural residence entails that farming is the only means of a livelihood, and that rural households are “tied to the land” and lack the mobility to achieve a livelihood beyond farming. Whilst farming is indeed central to the rural economy, it is not the whole of the rural economy. There has been a movement away from farming as the key household livelihood, due to various global processes centring on the impact of capitalism and more recently the extension of neo-liberal policies around the globe (Bryceson, 1996; Bryceson et al., 2000). This process goes against previous images of peasant households producing „subsistence” and „cash” crops, with „off-farm” activities being conceptualised as „temporary”; often seasonal in nature, or pursued by marginal groups such as female heads of households engaged for instance in beer brewing. Nevertheless, in many agrarian settings, a significant proportion of income for the rural poor comes from farming, despite their engagement in other non-farming activities (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:1).

Of the developing world’s three billion rural people, more than two-thirds reside on small farms (less than two hectares), of which there are nearly 500 million (Hazell et al., 2007:1). Rural people comprise small farmers, tenants, sharecroppers and landless workers, who are often the most vulnerable to hunger and poverty and usually have inadequate access to land and other productive resources (Ghimire, 2001:1). Rural communities comprise half the world’s undernourished people, three-quarters of Africa’s malnourished children and the majority of people in the world living in absolute poverty (International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI), 2005). Research has shown that poor rural communities often derive a significant share of their sustenance from land-based activities, such as livestock husbandry, cultivation and the utilisation of „wild” natural
resources (Cavendish, 1999; Shackleton et al., 2001; World Bank, 2002). Conventional socio-economic surveys often tend to omit the contribution of natural resources to livelihoods (Cavendish, 2002).

Ellis (2000:3) however notes that for many rural households in the global South, farming on its own does not provide a sufficient means of survival and households have come to depend on a diverse portfolio of activities and income sources, amongst which crop and livestock production feature alongside many other contributions to family well being. Rural people have been unable to gain adequate and secure livelihoods from farming due to landlessness or because they are farming on marginal lands (Bernstein, 1992:3). The rural landscape in developing countries sees much of the cultivated and fertile land being held by a small number of powerful land owners (Ghimire, 2001:5). A crisis of rural livelihoods in developing countries exists, and this has been characterised by rising rural poverty, malnutrition, declining food production levels and rising inequality (Ghimire, 2001:19). Globally poverty still has primarily a rural face, with two-thirds of the world’s poor being made up of the rural poor (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:1). The UNDP estimates that two-thirds of the world’s 2.6 billion poor constitute the rural poor (UNDP, 2007:8).

Smallholders, rural labourers and the landless tend therefore to be the least powerful and vulnerable groups in society. Further, in their struggles to obtain and secure access to land and other productive resources, they face numerous challenges such as harassment from police and landowners, unfair imprisonment and repeated acts of coercion to expel them from their land (Ghimire, 2001:5). Coupled with this is the increased drive for agricultural modernisation based on the high use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, fossil fuels and capital intensive machines. This drive involves cash crop production for export by powerful landowners and agribusiness groups (Ghimire, 2001:5), and it is displacing smallholders from their land and adversely affecting the health of farm workers.

Conflicts over land and natural resources, especially involving indigenous people, have been rising. The roots of the conflicts and tensions over rural land access can be traced back to the expansion of capitalism to the global South in the form of colonisation, and these tensions have intensified with time due to external population pressure on land resources and commercial interests (Ghimire, 2001:14). The presence of unfair social and
agrarian structures combined with the lack of off-farm rural employment opportunities are clear signs of widespread socio-economic marginalisation and vulnerability amongst land poor groups such as agricultural workers, tenants, indigenous people and women, despite the diffusion of agricultural technology and increased agricultural productivity as assessed at national (rather than local) levels.

Rural development programmes have had only marginal success in terms of poverty reduction as they have often lacked effective agrarian and institutional reforms. Effective control over productive resources, especially land, is critical for the rural poor to construct rural livelihoods and overcome poverty (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:1). Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) also hindered programmes around rural development as governments reduced subsidies for credit and extension services for poorer farmers (Ghimire, 2001:14). The importation of basic food (for example, wheat, rice and maize) especially from rich countries continues to be emphasised, whilst production of export crops from developing countries is encouraged. In any event, a larger number of poorer rural households in the global South are lacking the basic production item, namely, land.

Rural livelihoods in SSA and the socio-economic patterns that have emerged within the rural landscape have been heavily influenced by colonialism and the subsequent process of neo-liberalism and globalisation. The process of colonialism began in Africa at a time when Europe was undergoing its second industrial revolution, and from the 1870s (Hobsbawm, 1987) this created a high demand for agricultural and mineral raw materials as well as tropical raw materials, which were to be supplied by the colonial economies in an expanding and shifting international division of labour (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:68). The process of colonisation affected the rural landscape of SSA in different ways, as the sub-continent had an immense range of social formations, habitats and modes of livelihood. Samir Amin (1976: 317-333) identifies three „macro-regions” of SSA by a broad typology of their colonial formations.

West Africa was characterised by agricultural export production by smallholder farmers and in some cases large scale indigenous producers. There was no widespread dispossession of land and the rural economy operated without the institution of private property rights and markets in land. In many cases, more land for cultivation was realised through movement into and clearing of new areas to farm cocoa and oil palm (for example
in the forest belts of Ghana and the Ivory Coast) or cotton and groundnuts (in the savannah, in countries like Burkina Faso and Mali), which were the four classic export crops of west Africa. Central Africa (i.e. the Congo basin area) was an area of the concessionary companies which were granted vast territories for exploitation. The result was a brutal history of resource extraction and plunder evident even today. The companies were however unable to establish conditions of systematic and sustained capitalist agriculture as was the case in east (for example, Kenya) and southern Africa (including Zimbabwe and South Africa).

East and southern Africa were mostly „labor reserve” colonies. There was widespread alienation of land to colonial settlers and the removal of the African population into „native reserves”. This was done in order to provide land for white settlement and to ensure regular supplies of labour to the large farmers and plantations and to mining areas of Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively) and South Africa. Large numbers of migrant labourers were drawn from Mozambique, Nyasaland (Malawi) and Lesotho.

Bernstein (2005:69) notes that Amin’s categorisation provides a useful approximation of colonialism but that the actual situation on the ground was not as clear cut. In west Africa, land was often expropriated for extractive activities such as mining and timber (notably in Ghana) and not necessarily for white settlement. Countries like Mozambique and to some extent Angola combined all three elements of the colonial economy, whilst African smallholder production was not completely destroyed in „labor reserve/settler economies” like Kenya and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). With the exception of southern-east Africa (especially Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa), smallholder African farmers (including pastoralists) were not entirely dispossessed of land but were rather „encouraged” by different methods (taxation, obligations to grow certain crops, signing of labour contracts) to enter the monetary (commodity) economy as producers of agricultural commodities or labour power (Bernstein, 2005:70).

According to Bryceson (1996:97), studies (Kenya: Carleson, 1980; von Braun, de Haen and Blanken, 1991; Evans and Ngau, 1991; Tanzania: Havnevik, 1993) have pointed to the importance of non-agricultural employment for rural households in SSA. The significance of non-agricultural rural employment relates to its growth as a substantial proportion of total household labour time and its contribution to household disposable income. The view
that African farmers are strictly self-sufficient, subsistence-based producers has long been discarded. Several comparative studies (Haggblade et al., 1989; von Braun and Pandya-Lorche, 1991; Sahn, 1994; Reardon, 1997) have shown that it is the maintenance and continuous adaptation of a highly diverse portfolio of activities that has become a “distinguishing feature of rural survival strategies” in developing countries.

The diversification of activities and income sources accelerated because of the implementation of SAPs in developing countries. Bryceson (2004) notes a decline in peasant commodity production, a surge in non-agricultural income diversification, the proliferation of multi-occupational households, accelerating rural class stratification and growing poverty (Bryceson, 2004:617). This has entailed what she labels as “de-agrarianization” and “de-peasantization”.

De-agrarianization is defined by Bryceson (1996:99) as “a process of (i) economic activity re-orientation (livelihood); (ii) occupational adjustment (work activity); and (iii) spatial realignment of human settlement (residence) away from agrarian patterns”. Specifically there is a shift away “from strictly agricultural based modes of livelihood” (Bryceson, 2004:617). Whilst there has been a global trend towards de-agrarianization (because of urban biased industrialisation), this cannot be equated necessarily to de-peasantization (Bryceson et al., 2000:4). De-peasantization is “a specific variant of deagrarianisation whereby the economic capacity and social coherence of peasantries are being progressively undermined” (Bryceson, 2004:618). De-peasantization regularly fluctuates in association with de-agrarianization but the two processes are not synonymous; for example, the replacement of peasant agriculture with plantation agriculture is de-peasantization but not de-agrarianization (Bryceson, 2000:4). However, the situation surrounding de-peasantization is also paradoxical given that with industrialization from 1800, labour has been drawn out of agriculture but peasantries have also been growing across the world (Bryceson, 2000:4).

Bryceson et al. (2000) argue that the process of de-agrarianization was accelerated by the introduction of SAPs and market-liberalisation policies in sub-Saharan Africa. More

---

2 For purposes of this research, non-agricultural activities are activities which do not involve plant or animal husbandry.
specifically, governments began placing a greater emphasis on commercial global agro-
industrialised production activities against subsistence-oriented peasant production which
was viewed as „low yielding, under-standardised agriculture with high transport costs“
(Goodman and Watts, 1997). Neo-liberalism thereby severely weakened the continent’s
agrarian foundation and led to an acceleration of both de-agrarianization and de-
peasantization. There has been a downsizing of both the peasantry and large-scale landed
property class, though the downsizing has been more severe among the peasantry. Moyo
and Yeros (2005:9), however, point out that „socio-economically the peasantry has not
entirely “disappeared” but that semi-proletarianization has continued to absorb the cost of
social reproduction as they (peasants) have been systematically “expelled” by capital”\(^3\).
Further, de-peasantization and de-agrarianization have deep historical roots on the African
continent and are not a new phenomenon associated with the advent of SAPs as Bryceson
et al. (2000) imply.

Nevertheless, in seeking to correct parastatal transgressions, improve (albeit competitively-
based) prices and enhance the supply of inputs to peasant farmers, structural adjustment
and market liberalisation largely abandoned small-scale producers to the forces of the
global market (Bryceson et al., 2000). This entailed the removal of agricultural subsidies,
pan territorial pricing systems and input price increases, resulting in many small-scale
peasant farmers being unable to compete favourably with large-scale farmers and having
to diversify their incomes. In general, the decline in the importance of farming in the
livelihoods of rural households can be attributed to the global expansion in international
agricultural trade, the reduction of agricultural commodity prices and increasing
competition in agriculture around the world (Ellis, 2000:4). These factors made it more
difficult for farmers in countries with poorly developed agricultural sectors to compete
either in traditional export markets or in their own domestic markets for food or animal
stock feed.

---

\(^3\) Semi-proletarianization is a process whereby households combine petty commodity production and wage
labour to sustain the household. This creates a wage labour-force that is not wholly dependent on the wage
for economic subsistence, but also retains access to land, either working it themselves or with other family
members. The process also applies to seasonal workers, who spend part of the year on peasant plots, and part
working during harvests on other farms for wages. It is a phenomenon that is mostly evident in Latin
America and Africa amongst poor rural households.
Livelihood diversification increased as African peasant farmers tried to secure their economic needs, with SAPs taking their toll on basic commodity production. Numerous studies show that between 30%-50% of rural household income in SSA is derived mostly from non-farm activities (Ellis, 2000:5). Bernstein (2006:403) in fact concludes by arguing that „relatively few in the “South” today are able to rely exclusively on farming for their living“. Diversification can occur either as a deliberate household strategy or as an involuntary response to a crisis. It is found to both diminish and to accentuate rural inequality and can be either a safety valve for the rural poor or a means of accumulation for the rural rich (Ellis, 2000:5).

Whilst the importance of independent smallholder/family farming has steadily declined, the number of rural households who use farming as a platform for their livelihoods strategies continues to grow in absolute numbers. This is of some significance, as existing evidence shows that improved productivity on small farms can be highly effective in slashing poverty and hunger and raising rural living standards (Hazell et al., 2007:2). In fact, various studies (Lipton, 2005; Poulton, Doward and Kydd, 2005; Hazell et al., 2007) explicitly demonstrate that agriculture in the form of small farms has a central role in rural development.

With regards to equity and poverty reduction, there is a strong argument for preferring small to large farms. Small farms are usually operated by „poor people who use proportionally more labour, both from their own households and from their equally poor or poorer neighbours“ (Hazell et al., 2007:12). Whilst these arguments for small farms are well-known and have been widely accepted, Maxwell (2003) and Ellis (2005) note that under conditions of global restructuring, the prospects for smallholder farmers are deteriorating. At national level, challenges also exist, including more open domestic markets, changing production methods and greater market concentration, all of which undermine smallholders” efficiency in land use (Rosset, 2006:8). Agriculture has become highly industrialised resulting in the consolidation of agricultural land and assets into the hands of big land owners, agribusiness and other commercial entities. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have also been increasing their control over different parts of the food system, its markets and worldwide food production, as well as the input sectors of the food production industry, especially seed, fertiliser and pesticide production (Rosset, 2006:8).
In this light, Hazell et al. (2007:3) detail the many problems that small-scale farmers currently face; these include

Falling prices for most of the agricultural commodities that small farmers grow, especially food staples; the scourge of HIV/AIDS; mounting pressure on natural resources from population growth; intensified international competition; and the vigorous entry of supermarket chains into some developing-country markets where they make new demands on potential suppliers for quality, consistency and timeliness.

The prices of most agricultural commodities have in real terms been falling in the long run. Despite the increase in prices since 2005, throughout the 1980s and 1990s prices fell dramatically, more so with the increased openness of domestic markets. As TNCs increase their market domination in the processing and retailing of food, smallholders who do produce enough to trade face a continuous struggle to exert influence over the inputs they need and also to improve the terms and conditions of the trade of their produce (Rosset, 2006:9).

Current rural livelihoods in southern Africa have also been influenced by the legacy of racially unequal land control, especially in the settler colonies of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, but also in Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana which experienced „low-intensity settlerism“ (Moyo, 2004a:1). African reserves in the form of communal lands (in Zimbabwe) or homelands (in Namibia and South Africa) were created and they were characterised by poverty, under-development, and land as well as labour shortages, as able bodied men were drawn out of the reserves to work on settler mines and farms, leaving women, children and the elderly to try and meek out an existence in the reserves. Communal lands were essentially labour reserves from which settlers drew African men to work on mines and settler farms, and no concerted efforts were undertaken by governments to develop the areas and create opportunities for African smallholder farmers. Cross-country and internal migrancy has also been incorporated into the livelihoods system of rural families in southern Africa, and has created „worker peasants“ (i.e. men who migrated to urban areas for work, circulated between urban and rural homes, and often eventually returned to the land) and „farmer housewives“ (i.e. rural-based women left to farm the land) (Potts, 2000:808).
Unequal land ownership patterns continued in southern Africa even with the advent of independence, as independence agreements regularly sought to protect white capital, especially that of large scale white commercial farmers. In South Africa in the year 2000, 83% of the land was held by white landholders who only made up 13.7% of the population; in the same year, in Namibia, 44% of land was alienated by settlers who made up 11.1% of the total population (Moyo, 2004a:7). This trend continues despite the fact that livelihoods of the rural poor depend significantly upon farming, and formal employment is unable to absorb the numerous unemployed, land-short, landless and homeless (Moyo, 2004a:1).

Rural households regularly rely in part on migrants’ remittances, which traditionally became fundamental to their survival. But these remittances have become less as industrialisation has slowed down significantly in the light of market liberalisation and globalisation. This has seen the contraction of the formal economy forcing industry to either retrench existing workers, or offering fewer opportunities for employment resulting in reduced levels of opportunities for wage employment for rural migrants. Added to this, in the last two decades southern Africa has experienced major food crises, which have been particularly severe during periods of climatic disasters due to flooding or drought or a combination of both. These crises have been coupled with the lack of government policies to diversify rural livelihoods away from agriculture and to improve rural economies (Potts, 2000:808).

In summary, the challenges faced by rural populations in the global South – including southern Africa – centre on their deteriorating livelihoods, which continue to be linked or tied to their access to and control of land. Because of the challenges being currently faced by rural populations, the need for land and agrarian reforms has once again been brought back into the policy arena at both global and national levels.

2.3 Land Reform

2.3.1. Definition and historical analysis

Land reform and agrarian reform are often used interchangeably to designate the same social phenomenon; however it is important to differentiate between the two processes. Land reform refers to „the reform of the redistribution of landed property rights” and land tenure reform, whilst agrarian reform refers to „land reform and complementary socio-
economic and political reforms” (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:5). Moyo (2004b:1) notes that whilst land reform is a „fundamental dimension of the agrarian question” it is „not a sufficient condition for overall agrarian reform and national development”. Land reform deals with the change in agrarian structure, and leads to an increased access to land by the rural poor and secure tenure for those who actually work on the land (Ghimire, 2001:7). In essence land reform is a component of agrarian reform, and can take place without necessarily involving a change in the support structures designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries, such as credit, input or marketing facilities. Agrarian reform refers more broadly to the reform of agrarian institutions (for example, credit and marketing institutions) combined with the redistribution of landed property rights (Olano, 2001: 200).

Land reforms without agrarian reforms will result in increased land access for the rural poor and landless, but will not necessarily result in an improvement in their economic status if the supporting structures in place are not redesigned and changed to meet the change in the agrarian structure. Overall reform should not merely shift land from one tenurial group to another, but must result in changing power structures and socio-economic relations and ensuring a better livelihood for the rural poor. Land and agrarian reforms though distinct are complementary, since land reform coupled with socio-economic and political reforms constitute agrarian reforms (Thiesenhusen, 1989: 7-9).

Land reforms have been carried out globally in various forms and scales. They are not merely a recent phenomenon and occurred during ancient Greek and Roman times and throughout history prior to WWII in the form of the French (1789-1799), Russian (1917) and Mexican (1910) Revolutions (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:5). Borras Jnr. et al. (2007:5) point out that „land reform became a favoured policy of most countries immediately after WWII until the early 1980s”. The reasons for this are varied but can be categorised into two groups, namely, economic and socio-political. The economic rationale around land reform centred on the belief that „large farms underutilise land, whilst small farms are wasteful of labour, resulting in low levels of land and labour productivity and consequently leading to poverty” (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:5). From an economic perspective, it made sense to institute land reforms in order to increase agricultural (i.e. land) productivity rather than labour productivity. Though there was general agreement
amongst scholars that large farms were inefficient, the major question behind land reforms was the question of enhancing national economic development. This raised the question concerning the type of development paradigm land reform was to serve or achieve, i.e. would reforms take place with the aim of increasing agricultural productivity or to absorb the rural surplus into productive economic sectors.

Although the economic basis for land reforms was and is important, a range of socio-political imperatives have in fact and on most occasions provided the impetus for reform policies to be adopted and implemented by national governments. Borras Jnr. et al. (2007:6-9) divide these socio-political reasons into six categories:

1. Land reforms immediately after decolonisation and brought about through nationalist governments, attempted to re-distribute land to their landless rural citizens as a means to reduce the racial imbalance of land ownership patterns. This took place in countries like Algeria, Egypt and Indonesia, and in Zimbabwe with its initial land reform initiative in the 1980s.

2. Land reforms were linked to the geo-political and ideological imperatives of the Cold War between the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China, and the USA. The USA imposed and financed sweeping land reforms in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, partly in reaction to China’s revolutionary land reform as well as to quell „communist’’ and „socialist’’ inspired liberation movements.

3. Land reform became a crucial component of the national projects of victorious peasant-based revolutions, for example in Mexico, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Vietnam.

4. Land reform was also used, as a result of internal and external pressures, to „manage’’ rural unrest in countries like Peru, Philippines, Indonesia, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

5. Land reforms were deployed to legitimise and/or consolidate the claim of state power by one faction of the elite over the other. For example in Peru in the late 1960s, the new military government tried to undermine possible elite challenges by
expropriating their landholdings and courting popular support by redistributing land to peasants (Kay, 1983).

6. Land reform was pursued by central states in nation- and state-building processes. Land reform under colonisation programmes required systematic and standardised cadastral maps, land titles, peasant household registration, and so forth. These in turn fed into the need of the central state to extend its administrative, political and military-police presence and authority into the more remote parts of the country as well as to create a tax base.

The varied causes and reasons behind land reforms have produced diverse outcomes, with the most common being widespread land redistribution and poverty reduction. However, in the 1980s, land reforms slowed down significantly and virtually disappeared from the development agenda (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:10). Even though most nation-states and development agencies had land reform policies, these remained dormant and the state did not exert any will or initiative to drive land reform programmes (Ghimire, 2001:4). Leading agencies mandated with promoting land reform activities such as the FAO and government institutions centred their land reform activities on issues such as carrying out cadastral surveys, improvements in national land registration systems and introducing information technology for better consolidation of holdings (Ghimire, 2001:4). They did not deal with issues of altering the distribution of power and building economic resources in rural areas, whilst the politically sensitive issue of land redistribution was carefully avoided even though land reform laws existed in many states (Ghimire, 2001:4). Essentially there was „no political will to implement the land reform law” (Borras Jnr. et al., 2001:10) from either development agencies or the state. Even amongst NGOs there was an absence of a strong call for land redistribution.

2.3.2 Market-led and reform
The stagnation of land reform in the 1980s gave rise to a paradigm shift in terms of how land reforms should be carried out. It led to the development of pro-market land policy reforms, essentially market-led/assisted land reform programmes. These programmes were shaped by the growing trend of economic liberalisation and private land ownership promulgated by the World Bank, FAO, the United States Agency of International Development (USAID), IMF and several multilateral and bilateral agencies of the West (Ghimire, 2001:5); the policy was a „one size fits all” approach.
The emphasis on market-led land reform continued to grow due to a combination of other factors. These included increasing levels of debt which crippled the fiscal capabilities of many national governments of developing countries, forcing them to cut back on public spending (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:11). Land reform was negatively affected as it is a policy requiring substantial state financing for implementation. Secondly, the agricultural sector was facing an economic crisis, especially within the land reform sector where there was mounting social discontent with existent land reforms, especially „collectivist land reform” (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:11). This forced states and external development agencies to adjust and modify their land reform programmes. Proponents of market-led reform argued that state-led reforms had failed to distribute land adequately to the landless and resulted in a distortion of land markets; state-led reforms had prevented efficient producers from acquiring land and encouraged inefficient farmers to continue farming (Courville and Patel, 2006:18). The establishment of private ownership rights to land was considered as the main solution to increasing agricultural productivity and stimulating the regeneration of marketable produce beyond just meeting peasant subsistence needs (Ghimire, 2001:4). Market-led land reforms were to be mainly facilitated by land registration and titling by increasing credit facilities to allow people to purchase land.

2.3.3 Land reform from the 1990s

Market-led land reform policies gained further prominence in the 1990s, more-so as land reform was unequivocally brought back onto the policy agendas of international development institutions and nation-states. According to Borras Jnr. et al. (2007) this was the result of various factors. Firstly, in the 1990s, there was an increase in „land-based political conflicts over land” (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:13). Three of the most significant ones have been the Chiapas uprising in Southern Mexico, land invasions by the landless poor of white commercial farms in Zimbabwe and the resurgence of militant peasant occupations in Brazil (Moyo, 2000a and 2004b; Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Ghimire, 2005; Veltmeyer, 2005; Petras, 1998; Moyo, Murisa and Helliker, 2008). As Borras Jnr. et al. (2007:14) argue:

National governments were compelled to address these boiling social pressures „from below” whilst the international development community grappled with the meanings and
implications of such complex conflicts resulting in the convergence of international and national efforts to address land based grievances.

Secondly, some countries have been ravaged by political conflict, and negotiated settlements or regime changes had taken place. These processes also required that the issues of poverty and social exclusion be addressed in the peace building processes or democratic (re)constructions (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:13). In-coming governments in El Salvador and Guatemala as part of their efforts at post-conflict peace-building resurrected issues around land reform (Diskin, 1989; Foley, 1997; Pearce, 1998; de Bremond, 2006; Gauster, 2006), whilst in countries like Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa, it has been within post-authoritarian regime transition that land reforms were resurrected in the official policy agendas.

Thirdly, with the end of the Cold War and consequent collapse of the Soviet Union, several countries in the early 1990s began abandoning socialism but had to address the question of what to do with huge state and collective farms. The challenge of how to transfer these farms to individuals put the question of landed property rights among the top policy agendas of concerned national governments and international development institutions (Deininger, 1995, 2002; Spoor, 2003, 2007).

The fourth factor which has brought about the resurgence of the land reform debate has been not simply the rise of neo-liberalism, but its failure to address persistent poverty and growing inequality between the rich and the poor. These problems became more persistent in the late 1980s and it forced mainstream economists to adjust their development policy model. Poverty was now viewed as being a result of peoples’ lack of access to productive resources such as land, especially in the countryside. Consensus amongst mainstream economists was that the rural poor have insecure access to land resources leading to their unstable livelihoods and low level of investments (Borras Jnr. et al., 2007:14). Access to land was therefore seen as an increasingly important poverty alleviation strategy (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:52). The World Bank has been at the forefront of pushing land reform back onto the development policy agenda and re-channelled their efforts widely to national governments, government agencies and NGOs.
It seems that land reform never left the development agenda. The events described above validate Herring’s (2003:64) observation that ‘dead land reforms are not dead. Promises un-kept keep movements alive; past failures in implementation are not forgotten. Both become focal points for new politics’. From the cases above, it is clear that various actors are involved in driving the reform process. This includes rural peasants and their organisations, the state, NGOs and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. However, current policy discourse on land has been dominated by pro-market mainstream economists, who ‘emphasise market-led land reforms as opposed to expropriatory land reform’ (Borras Jnr. et.al, 2007:15). This has pushed the discourse on land reform to issues around the nature of land reforms, whether they should be state versus market-led reforms; coercive versus voluntary reforms; centralised versus decentralised reforms or top-down/supply driven versus bottom up/demand driven reforms (Borras Jnr. et.al, 2007:15). These diverse approaches are reflective of the ongoing land reforms on the ground: from ‘state instigated’ in Zimbabwe (Palmer, 2000; Moyo, 2000a; Moyo, 2007), to ‘peasant led’ in Brazil (Rosset, 2001; Wright and Wolford, 2003; Veltmeyer, 2005;), to ‘state-society driven’ in the Philippines (Borras Jnr, 2001; Franco and Borras Jnr, 2005), to ‘market-led’ in Colombia, Brazil and South Africa (Deininger, 1999; Moyo and Yeros, 2005).

2.4 Food Security and the Global Food Crisis

2.4.1 Food security – definitions and paradigm shifts

Maxwell (2001:14) notes three major shifts in the history of thinking on food security since the first World Food Conference in 1974 which was held in Rome by the United Nations (UN) under the auspices of the FAO. These are the shifts from global and national notions of food security to household and individual aspects of food security; from a ‘food first perspective’ to a ‘livelihood perspective’; and from objective to subjective indicators of food security.

At the 1974 food conference, the definition of food security placed emphasis on the physical supply and availability of food. Food security was defined as ‘availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food stuffs, to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices’ (United Nations, 1975:9). The 1970’s concept of food security highlighted the importance of producing sufficient food to meet the needs of the global population. Countries hence aimed at self-sufficiency, i.e. producing enough food domestically or ensuring they had the financial resources to
purchase imports to cover the domestic shortfalls. In such instances, the solution to food insecurity lay in "pursuing food production self-sufficiency by raising crop yields through bio-technology (Green Revolution and genetically modified crops)" (Maxwell, 2001:16; Devereux, 2007:9).

The perception that food security depends on physical supply and availability of food, as described above, can be linked to the work of Thomas Malthus. In his "Essay on the Principle of Population" (1798), he argued that "human populations could not increase indefinitely in a world of limited natural resources – famine would eventually intervene to regulate population growth and balance the demand for food with food supplies" (Devereux, 2007:6). His theory emphasises failures of food supply as the cause of food insecurity and in the worst instances famine, and it underpins contemporary resource scarcity debates. The theories developed on this basis became known as the "food availability decline" (FAD) theories. They focused on "demographic process, (for example Malthusian predictions the famine will occur when population exceeds an area’s “carrying capacity”") (Devereux, 2007:9). Other factors which FAD theories identified as causes of disrupted food supply included environmental processes like desertification as well as climatic shocks like droughts and floods.

The major weakness of these theories in explaining food insecurity is that they only explain "disrupted availability to food (e.g. crop failure) but pay very little attention to failures of access to food" (Devereux, 2007:9). This means that the social and political dimensions of food security are not analysed, so as to explain why some people were more vulnerable than others to food insecurity. These dimensions became important because widespread hunger continued to exist even if there was sufficient food supply at the national and global levels.

This resulted in a paradigm shift in the 1980s credited to the work of Armatya Sen (1981). His study focused on developing a new theory on the causation of starvation in general and more specifically famines. It moved away from the traditional approach of analysing famine which focused solely on food supply. Sen (1981) developed the entitlement approach which instead concentrated on ownership and exchange, using case studies of the Great Bengal famine in 1943, the Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1974, the Bangladesh
famine in 1974 and the famines in the Sahel countries of Africa in the 1970s. The new paradigm highlighted that food security went beyond the single component of production shocks as it now needed to entail „secure access to adequate food at all times“. This shifted the analysis from „food production systems to the relationship between people and food“ (Devereux, 2007:10). For Sen (1981), „starvation is characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is characteristic of there not being enough food to eat“. The new question asked with regard to food security was whether „people had enough to eat“ as opposed to whether „there was enough food to feed everybody“ (Devereux, 2007:10). It therefore became more usual to define food security „as being a problem of access, with food production at best a route to entitlement, either directly for food producers or indirectly by driving market prices down for consumers“ (Maxwell, 2001:17).

The second paradigm shift in the approach to defining and analysing food security has been from „food first“ to „livelihoods“ and to the long-term resilience of livelihoods or „sustainable livelihoods“. This shift took place after 1985 and was stimulated by observations of the famine of 1984-5 in the Sahel region of Africa (Maxwell, 2001:18). Food was initially seen by analysts as a primary need, but now it is recognised that food especially short-term nutrition is only one of the objectives rural people pursue. De Waal (1991:68), in his study on the famine in Darfur, found that people were prepared to go hungry to preserve assets and future livelihoods. People chose to go hungry in their current circumstances to avoid going „more hungry“ later (De Waal, 1991:68). Chambers (1988) and Davies (1996) broadened this analysis further by noting that the management of risk and vulnerability to food insecurity were central as people and households try to achieve secure and sustainable livelihoods.

This paradigm shift identified livelihood security as a necessary and often sufficient condition for food security and led to the focus on the long-term viability of the household as a productive and reproductive unit (Maxwell, 2001:19). Food needs are therefore met to the extent possible, given the immediate and future livelihood needs (Maxwell, 2001:20). In this context, food security is defined as „the ability of a household to procure, through income, production and/or transfers, adequate food supplies on a continuing basis, even when the household is faced with situations of unpredictable stress, shocks or crises“ (Maxwell, 2001:20). Such situations could include crop failure resulting from drought,
market fluctuations such as sudden price rises, the decline or loss of employment and loss of productive capacity because of sudden illness.

The challenge with this shift from “food first to livelihoods” relates to the unit of analysis; in particular, whether it should be the household’s or the individual’s access to food that becomes the critical dilemma. Recent research (Hart, 1986; Evans, 1991; Kabeer, 1991, 1995) has favoured analysis of an individual’s access to food in the household, as this is linked to the control they have over resources in the household and their access to household income (Maxwell, 2001:17). Because of this, most definitions of food security begin with the individual element, though recognising the complex inter-linkages between the individual, the household, the community, the nation and the international economy” (Maxwell, 2001:17).

The third paradigm shift which has occurred in food security discourse has been from “objective indicators” to “subjective perceptions”. Conventional approaches to food security have relied on objective measures such as “target” levels of consumption, meeting the required calorie intake and the timely, reliable and nutritionally sufficient supply of food. The major problems with this approach are that “nutritional adequacy” and requirements are a function of age, health, size, workload, environment and behaviours (Maxwell, 2001:20). As a result, such requirements are subject to constant change and revision. The second problem is that qualitative aspects such as local food habits, culture and human dignity, are omitted from these measures. This highlights the need to assess not just the quantity of food entitlement (i.e. how much food you have access to) but also its quality.

Maxwell (2001:21) highlights that whilst the subjective dimension of food security has become important, questions have been raised as to how to measure the subjective perceptions about the quality of food, whether there are trade offs (i.e. can some aspects of what food quality is be overlooked or replaced) and who decides on these perceptions of food quality. Nevertheless, Maxwell (1988:10) goes on to define food security as follows:

A country and people are food secure when their food system operates in such a way as to remove the fear that there will not be enough to eat. In particular, food security will be achieved
when the poor and vulnerable, particularly women and children and those living in marginal areas, have secure access to the food they want.

Contemporary definitions of food security place emphasis on individual entitlement, but they also recognise the complex inter-linkages between different spatial levels, from individuals and communities to the international level. Food security therefore is the capacity of households, communities and the state to mobilise sufficient food through production, acquisition and distribution, and on a sustainable basis (Chambers, 1995; Frankenberger, 1996). As a result, it depends on the land resources available to the household or community and their ability to mobilise resources for the production and/or distribution of food to achieve an active and healthy lifestyle. Food availability is a crucial but not adequate condition to ensure food security for a household. Reliable access to food is also linked closely to concepts of sustainability and vulnerability. Sustainability in this context refers to households being able to maintain a consistent level of access to food without this causing challenges or problems to future levels of access, whilst vulnerability refers to a situation where households are faced with a scenario which threatens their access to food (for example, natural disasters). Households which are able to maintain their levels of food access either through using stocks in reserve or having enough money to purchase food are considerably more food secure.

Food security clearly does not imply food self-sufficiency, especially at a national level. Examples of countries that are food secure yet not food self-sufficient include Kuwait, Finland and Singapore (Maxwell, 2001:22). These countries rely largely on food imports to meet their food requirements. At the same time, food availability at a national level does not mean food security at a household or individual level: „Food security is not just a matter of the immediate availability of food, but a failure of livelihoods to guarantee access to sufficient food at household level” (Jooma, 2005:61). In such instances households either lack the assets to produce enough food or lack the financial resources which can be exchanged to buy food.

When households are unable to acquire sufficient food using their regular means of access to food – for example, because of poor crop production or a loss of a source of income – they will employ a sequence of „coping strategies“ to meet their food needs (Corbett,
1998). Coping strategies are „involuntary responses to disaster or unanticipated failure in major sources of survival” (Ellis, 1998:13). Such strategies are different from risk management, which is a more deliberate household strategy to avoid or anticipate failures by maintaining a range of livelihood activities. Coping includes the adoption of tactics for maintaining consumption levels, for instance „drawing down on savings, using up food stocks, gifts from relatives, community transfers, sales of livestock and other asset sales” (Ellis, 1998:13). There are sequential phases which characterise coping strategies. Initial strategies seek first to protect the future income generating capabilities of the household, even if current consumption is compromised. It is only as a last resort that assets critical for future survival are sold or abandoned to stave off starvation (Ellis, 1998:14).

Rosset (2006:6-7) has however argued that the whole notion of food security has been stripped of its real meaning. Whilst food security means that every child, woman and man must have the certainty of having enough to eat each day, the concept even in its evolution has said nothing about where the food comes from and how it is produced. Therefore, agricultural policy makers in the USA have often argued that it is better for poor countries to achieve food security by importing food rather than producing it themselves. The consequence of this policy has been that the massive imports of cheap and subsidized food has undercut farmers especially smallholders in the developing countries, driving them off their land. Alternative sources of income through employment either in rural or urban areas are often insufficient for such households to purchase food. Rosset (2006:7) argues that to achieve genuine food security people in rural areas need to have access to productive land and receive prices for their crops that allow them sufficient livelihoods. This perspective has been termed „food sovereignty”. It is a concept that has been used in discourse on food issues since the mid-1990s especially amongst social movements across the world (Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005:1). Whilst there are various definitions of food sovereignty, the most commonly used is from the Peoples Food Sovereignty Network (2002:3):

> Food Sovereignty is the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict the dumping of products in their markets; and to provide local fisheries-based communities the priority in managing the use of and the rights to aquatic resources.
Food Sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples to food and to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production.

Food sovereignty therefore is an umbrella term for particular approaches to tackling the problem of hunger and malnutrition that challenges the prevailing world agricultural model dominated by corporate entities, as well as promoting authentic rural development, environmental integrity and sustainable livelihoods (Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005:xiv).

2.4.2 The global food crisis

Since 2000 the prices of the main grain commodities have been steadily increasing, culminating in a global food crisis that has further exacerbated the problem of hunger and undernourishment in the global South. The food crisis can be situated at the heart of a fundamental struggle between competing methods of food production: a corporate-controlled and globalised industrial food system versus a diversity of efforts to maintain, develop and expand food sovereignty. Moyo and Yeros (2005:14) note that the agricultural food system has become globalised with “every country in the world producing for it”, which in turn has led to a globalised agricultural market system, of which Zimbabwe is a part.

The foundation of this globalisation can be seen in a number of critical developments. First of all, in the 19th century, there was the rise of tropical agro-exports to the metropoles (Europe) from the colonies (Africa, Asia, Latin America) for mass consumption (i.e. sugar, coffee, tea, vegetable oils). Secondly, there is the constitution of ex-colonial states (e.g. New Zealand, United States of America, Australia and Canada) as important components of the agricultural core of the world economy, with these nations exporting cheap grain, fuelling industrialisation and developing agro-industrial linkages. Thirdly, there exists the collapse (in the 1940s) of the free trade regime and increased proletarianization in agriculture and industry, with the centre opting for the concentrated management of national agro-industrial linkages and the reliance on imperial trade preferences with the colonies (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:14).

McMichael (1997:640) refers to the new global structure as a „food regime” and as a „political construct managed by states across the north/south divide.” It has involved the
consolidation of metropolitan agro-industrial complexes and has incorporated developing states and consumers into concessional circuits of food aid as a new form of colonisation (McMichael, 1997:640), creating a situation which allows the USA and European Union (EU) to export their surplus agricultural production to the developing world, mostly in the form of food aid. Therefore the problem of food insecurity is not just a technical one, but is a social and political problem of global proportions.

Indeed, recent „food regime” developments have resulted in the undermining of subsistence agriculture and the integration of all agricultural production into commercial cropping (whether for export or domestic use) rather than placing a greater emphasis on the growing of food crops for domestic consumption (Feder, 1983:222). This has had an adverse effect on food security, especially in developing countries, as it has involved a shift amongst developing countries from being „grain exporters” to „grain importers” between the 1930s and 1970s (de Janvry, 1981:70). Across the developing world as a whole, the ratio of food importers to food exporters increased from 50% in 1955 - 1960 to 80% in 1975 (Araghi, 1995: 350). On a world scale, a new division of agricultural labour has developed which centres on the complementary specialisation in high value „non-traditional” exports from the South and low-value cereals exported from the North, which further reinforces the South’s food dependency. FAO reports that overall this agricultural „modernisation” has reduced national food production in favour of agro-exporting, leading to intensified land concentration, food dependency and hunger (Wiehoff, 1996).

Undeveloped nations” food dependency has grown despite and perhaps because of the „green revolution” (McMichael, 1997:639). Whilst the initial premise of the original revolution was to improve national production within countries growing rice and maize, the revolution also introduced the agro-industrial dynamic into the whole developing world’s food production system. According to McMichael (1997:639), a new „green revolution” involving the substitution of feed crops for basic food crops, for example sorghum displacing maize in Mexico, has developed. This new revolution also entails the alteration of arable farmland into cattle pastures to meet the needs of rising affluent diets in the West and in Asia. As well, the technologies of the original green revolution are being applied to „new agriculture” which is aimed at high value foods such as fresh fruit and vegetables and animal proteins, whose demand is increasing amongst local and global
elites (McMichael, 1997:640). The needs of these elite are causing a restructuring of agriculture globally.

The subject of rural livelihoods and sustainable livelihoods has become extremely relevant with the advent of the current global food crisis, especially given the concomitant rise in prices of basic foodstuffs. According to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), modern agriculture has failed to serve the needs of the poor and hungry, and needs to radically change if it is to cope with a growing population and climate change (City Press, April 20, 2008). For example, Gordin (2008:13) points out that, in terms of food prices, „the heart of the problem is that harvests of rice, wheat and corn have been devastated by bad weather in many countries”. In addition, farmers have reduced the amount of land for growing wheat and maize, and expanded the area for crops required for bio-fuels. As a result, the „prices of staple foods have risen internationally by 80 percent since 2005” (Gordin 2008:13).

According to the FAO (2008:1), the impact of rising food prices on the prevalence of hunger is striking. The soaring global food prices have increased the number of people in the world suffering from acute hunger to more than one billion yet, in the year 2000, world leaders had proposed to cut the number of hungry people in the world by half to around 500 million by 2015 (FAO, 2008:6). Regionally, the largest increase in the number of hungry people due to the increase in food prices has taken place in Asia and in SSA. The two regions combined account for 750 million, or 89% of the hungry people in the world, in 2003-2005 (FAO, 2008:1). The rising food prices have plunged an additional 41 million people in Asia and 24 million in SSA below the hunger threshold. Other regions (Latin America, Middle East and north Africa) have also experienced increases, but the number affected is smaller.

SSA is the only region in the world currently facing widespread chronic food insecurity as well as persistent threats of famine (Devereux and Maxwell, 2001:1). According to the FAO (FAO, 2001) the number of undernourished in SSA doubled to 215 million between 1969 and 2000. The region is characterised by widespread poverty and malnutrition, large national food deficits, and an increasingly higher dependence on food imports and food aid. Food insecurity is more severe in central and southern Africa compared to east and
west Africa. Despite having a smaller population, the number of undernourished is proportionally highest in southern Africa (Khanya-acidd, 2006:8).

Further, the SSA region has recently suffered from a combination of food shortages, lack of access to basic social services, and an alarmingly high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Maxwell, 2001: 2–3), which has contributed to the growing number of vulnerable people in both urban and rural areas. The food crisis in the region has been partly a result of the accumulation of poor harvests over time, but the FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) note that there are a number of factors that have affected food output and availability. These are poor rainfall, economic problems and inflation, mismanagement and poor governance by nation-states, corruption and HIV/AIDS. The challenges facing rural households in attaining sustainable livelihoods and food security, especially in SSA, highlight the growing livelihoods crisis within the developing world especially amongst the rural populace. It stresses the need to look strategically at rural livelihoods as a whole, if the challenges that have been raised in the discussion above are to be addressed. From the discussion, it is indeed clear that the challenges faced by rural households, especially increased poverty levels, food insecurity and landlessness, centre around their livelihoods, and any attempts to address these challenges must be looked at from a more holistic framework at the core of which must be the notion of rural livelihoods. The next section of this chapter seeks to outline one such framework - that of sustainable livelihoods - to identify and assess its importance in analysing the challenges and issues that have come out in the discussion so far.

### 2.5 Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches

#### 2.5.1 Historical approaches to studying rural livelihoods

The study of rural livelihoods has evolved over the last century. Whilst rural livelihood studies have become important and critical within development studies discourse, there have been contestations as to how to approach the study of rural livelihoods. Moral economists (for example, James Scott, 1976) and the moral economy paradigm broadly, romanticise rural livelihoods and emphasise the importance of collective subsistence, economic security and survival; as well, the village is seen as a ritual and cultural unit and an important setting for peasant economic life (Colburn, 1982:441). The theory assumes that peasants have a „traditional distaste for buying and selling” (Scott, 1976:189) and that
their livelihoods are primarily concerned with subsistence and security, i.e. they adopt a „safety first principle” (Scott, 1976:189).

According to Popkin (1979:5), moral economists assume that peasants are „anti-market, preferring common property versus private property and disdaining buying and selling”. Peasant welfare and livelihoods are based on closed, corporate villages (that were common in pre-capitalist society) and/or on multi-stranded feudal ties to those who control the land. Peasants are averse to risk, and focus on avoiding drops in production levels and not on maximizing expected profits. Although cash crops offer a larger expected income than subsistence crops, cash crops sold via the market are assumed to increase the probability of a drop below the danger line, with the end result being a threat to the long-term survival of peasants (Popkin, 1979:7).

Scott (1976:189) states that the „advent of state formation, capitalism and colonialism brought harm to peasant welfare because these processes increased inequality and stratification, and forced peasants into economically and socially isolated positions without the insurance and protection of their traditional institutions”. Moral economists argue that the commercialisation of agrarian relations and the centralisation of the state cut through the integument of subsistence, customs and traditional social rights to replace them with contracts, the market and uniform laws (Scott, 1976:189). Social relations in pre-capitalist societies were „moral” (for the common good) and the introduction of capitalism sees the moral economy corrupted and destroyed. The moral economy approach however, leaves a number of significant questions unanswered. Such questions include: how are norms derived?, what determines subsistence levels?, how are village sources allocated?, how are competing claims of need assessed and resources distributed? (Popkin, 1979:16 - 17).

Critical questions such as these resulted in the development of one of the central approaches to the study of rural livelihoods, based on the work of Samuel Popkin (1979) in his book The Rational Peasant. Popkin’s main argument is that while peasants/smallholders are poor and live close to the margin of existence, they on many occasions do generate surplus and make risky investments. The main premise of the rational peasant theory is (one version of) the classical political economy approach, in which the individual peasant is adopted as the unit of analysis (Popkin, 1979:17).
particular, this approach claims that "the peasant" is a self-interested, rational actor (making rational decisions) rather than the victim of "traditional culture" or the "idiocy" of village society (Colburn, 1982:439). It draws upon economic theory to explain individual choices and behaviour (Colburn, 1982:439).

Peasants attempt to make long- and short-term investments, and although the approach recognises that self-improvement is usually pursued through income maximisation, it is not the exclusive means for enhancing an individual’s welfare. Improved security of tenure and income, access to social services, greater status, and increased political empowerment are also important to peasants. This neo-classical approach of the "rational peasant" gives the impression that peasants "efficiently allocate land, water, labour, manure, seeds and other inputs in production" (Adams, 1986:275). In the end, peasants make a choice which they believe will maximize their expected utility for the ultimate security of family and self (Popkin, 1979:31). Earlier work by Schultz (1964) had also alluded to the notion that "peasant smallholders are optimisers in line with neo-classical perfect competition and that their optimizing behaviour was observable through price responsiveness" (Bryceson, 2000:25). This approach of peasant rationality influenced the policies of development agencies in their approach towards rural economic policy agendas.

However, Adams (1986:273) argues that peasants cannot be rational because "they lack sufficient information and live in a world of uncertainty”. At the same time, the notion of a rational peasant "leaves little or no role for families’ social and economic characteristics or for personality, motivation and intelligence of individual farmers” (Adams, 1986:275). Thus the "rational peasant construct and the efficient community economy it implies leaves no scope for the diverse consequences of culture and personal attributes” (Adams, 1986:275). Lipton (1968) argues that there were a number of environmental and contextual factors that prevented peasants from acting rationally. This included weather patterns, changes in the productive environment brought about by local population growth and government policies, and imperfect market factors (Bryceson, 2000:25). The approach also fails to take into consideration how peasant production decisions are tied up with household consumption requirements and, resultantly, how households develop and pursue a number of strategies that suit their circumstances. The approach takes rationality as inherent in individuals, and assumes that individuals who possess this characteristic will
automatically succeed in improving their livelihoods. However, even where peasants have adopted a more profit-oriented approach to agriculture, this has not translated into improved livelihoods. The continued growing poverty and landlessness amongst rural populations across the developing world is testament to this. At the same time, peasant households may adopt practices which are not rational in the economic sense but provide greater security for households in the long run based on individual preferences and immediate household or family needs.

Both the moral economy and rationale peasant approaches fail to appreciate the individual circumstances and contexts of peasants, and seek to neatly fit peasants into either one of the two categories (i.e. either as moral or rational). To its credit, the sustainable livelihoods framework merges the social and economic approaches of the moral economy approach and the rational peasant approach to studying rural livelihoods, through the analysis of livelihoods outcomes and choices of peasant households based on the particular contexts households find themselves in.

2.5.2 The new approaches

Farrington et al. (2004:91) note that the framework „is an analytical structure for coming to grips with the complexity of livelihoods, understanding influences on poverty and identifying where interventions can best be made“. Since the early 1990s the notion of a „sustainable livelihood” has come to prominence in international development circles as a way to analyze poverty and natural resource use. The sustainable livelihoods approach has been particularly influential in the study of community-based natural resource
management, but it originates in studies of the relations between development, poverty and food security.

In its simplest sense, a „livelihood” is a means of gaining a living, but the concept has broadened with the recognition of the full range of diverse activities and resources that make up a person's or household's ability to survive over time. Ellis (1998:4) notes that a livelihood is often conceptualized as „incomes in cash and in kind: as well as the social institutions (kin, family, compound, village), gender relations, property rights required to support and sustain a given standard of living”. The Sustainable Livelihood approach involves a conceptual shift away from analyzing rural people as smallholder farmers to a much broader understanding of their social existence (Murray, 2002). Rather than conceiving people as „peasants”, „farmers”, „labourers” or some other fixed category, the sustainable livelihoods framework recognizes that households may employ multiple economic strategies simultaneously, sometimes in different locales. The concept of „sustainable development” arose out of a move away from conventional analysis of development in developing countries, which traditionally focused on three modes of thinking that have been resistant to change: these are production thinking, employment thinking and poverty line thinking (Chambers and Conway, 1991:2).

„Productionist thinking” focuses on analysing hunger, malnutrition, famine and undernutrition as problems of insufficient food production. However, work by Sen (1981) provides evidence that the problem lies in entitlements (and being able to command food) rather than in merely the production or supply of food. Sen (1981) notes that entitlements act as a guarantee of access to benefits either because of rights or through actual agreements made through law. Entitlements reflect relationships of power to access resources, which in turn enhance the capabilities of social actors to utilise resources such as networks, labour, land, capital, knowledge, employment, technology and markets (Hebinck, 2007:12-13). Although entitlements are not synonymous with livelihoods, the two do complement each other.

„Employment thinkers” see the problem of poverty as being borne out of unemployment and the need to create more employment (Schumacher, 1973). This narrow focus though does not fit into the rural reality in which people seek to stitch together a living through diverse activities (Chambers and Conway, 1991:2). „Poverty line” thinkers see deprivation or poverty in terms of a continuum; that is, the poverty line, which is measured in terms of
incomes (especially wages or salaries) or consumption. The programmatic aim becomes to enable more people to rise above the line and fewer to sink below it. However, deprivation and wellbeing, as poor rural people perceive them, have many dimensions which do not correspond with this measure (Jodha, 1988).

The main problems with these forms of development thinking, as outlined by Chambers and Conway (1991:3), are as follows. First of all, they are an industrialised country/developed world imprint and, secondly, they are reductionist to facilitate ease of measurement. Production, employment and cash incomes as indicators of wellbeing are industrial pre-occupations and all three are also amenable to measurement along single scales, i.e. the amount produced (e.g. tonnes of food grains), numbers employed in jobs, and earnings or wages in a weekly or monthly pay packet (Chambers and Conway, 1991:3). The concepts and measures are narrow and moreover are often suited to mainly urban contexts, formal economic markets and standard means of employment. Their acceptance accounts for the failure of much conventional analysis to explore and identify the plural priorities of the rural poor and their many and varied strategies to obtain a living. Conventional socioeconomic surveys for example often tend to omit the value of natural resources (Cavendish, 2002). In contrast, the sustainable livelihoods approach draws attention to the role of the environment in the household economy, illustrating how the sustainability of a livelihood may be connected to the sustainable use of natural resources (Cavendish, 1999; Shackelton et al., 2001; World Bank, 2002).

The concept of „sustainable rural livelihoods” has become increasingly central to the discourse on rural development, poverty reduction and environmental management. Such an analysis is important to understanding the livelihood strategies that have been adopted by rural households in Zimbabwe, within newly resettled areas. The approach has been used by a wide number of development institutions and policy makers in the development field (e.g. Department for International Development (DFID), Care, Oxfam, UNDP); and while it was initially used in a rural setting (Brock, 1999; Ashley, 2000; Turton, 2000; Allison and Ellis, 2001; Orr and Mwale, 2001), it has now been applied to an urban context (Rouse and Ali, 2001).

Several specific frameworks have been proposed for the analysis of livelihoods within the context of „sustainable rural livelihoods”: These include: the Sustainable Livelihood
Framework (SLF) (Carney, 1998, 1999; Scoones, 1998); the Framework for Thinking about Diverse Rural Livelihoods (Ellis, 2000); Bebbington’s (1999) Capitals and Capabilities Framework; and the UNDP’s (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Diamond. These frameworks have different emphases rather than fundamental conceptual differences. They all attempt to integrate assets, constraints, and human capabilities in a logical and comprehensive manner to analyse the status, form, nature and conditions of livelihoods over space and time (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006:729).

The SLF posits that households make a living by using five types of assets (or capitals) – natural, physical, human, social, and financial – in an environment influenced by institutional and structural factors (see Figure 2.1) (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006:729). Assets are the basic building blocks upon which households are able to undertake production, engage in labour markets and participate in reciprocal exchanges with other households (Ellis, 2000:31). Assets are used directly or indirectly to generate the means of survival of a household or to sustain its material well-being at different levels above mere survival. The elements in the framework are related in a variety of ways (indicated by arrows in Figure 2.1), all of which involve dynamic flows. None of the arrows implies direct causality, although all imply a certain level of influence (DFID, 1997). The SLF has been the most popular in the academic and development literature, partly because of its robust analytical ability; for this reason, I draw specifically on the SLF for making sense of rural livelihoods in contemporary Zimbabwe.
2.5.3 Key elements of framework

The ability to pursue different livelihood strategies is dependent on the basic material and social, tangible and intangible, assets that people have in their possession. These livelihood resources are the capital base from which different productive streams are derived and from which livelihoods are constructed. Scoones (1998: 8) notes that the following need to be in place for the creation and successful pursuit of a livelihood:

- Natural capital which is the natural resources (soil, water, air, genetic resources, etc.) and environmental systems (e.g. hydrological cycle, pollution, droughts) from which resource flows and services useful for livelihoods are derived;
- Economic or financial capital, or the monetary base (cash, credit/debt, savings and other economic aspects including basic infrastructure and production equipment and technologies);
- Human Capital which are the skills, knowledge, ability to labour, good health and physical capability; and
- Social Capital, or the social resources (e.g. social networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, associations) upon which people draw.
According to Farrington et al. (2004:191), the assumption of the framework is that "people pursue a range of livelihood outcomes (health, income, reduced vulnerability, etc.), by drawing on a range of assets to pursue a variety of activities". The specific activities they adopt and the way they reinvest in asset building are driven in part by their own preferences and priorities. They are also influenced by vulnerability issues including shocks (such as drought), overall trends such as the levels of inputs and finances (resource stocks) and seasonal variations; as well as by broader social structures and processes (such as the roles of government and private sector, institutional policy and cultural factors) (Farrington et al., 2004:191).

It is through a particular combination of access to and control of these "capital" endowments that people create livelihoods, in an environment influenced by institutional and structural factors (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006:729). At any scale, livelihoods are composed in complex ways, with multiple and dynamic portfolios of different activities often improvised as part of an "ongoing performance" (Richards, 1989). Based on specific combinations of these "capital" endowments, three broad clusters of livelihoods strategies have been identified. These are agricultural intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification and migration (Scoones, 1998:9).

Agricultural intensification/extensification involves households increasing their agricultural (including livestock, fish farming and forestry) productivity either through increasing the production per unit area through capital investments or increased labour (intensification), or increasing the areas of land cultivated (extensification). Diversification is a process by which rural families construct a complex portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in order to survive and improve their standard of living (Ellis, 1998:4). Livelihoods diversification is not synonymous with income diversification; however, the majority of studies done on diversification within rural households have focused on different income sources and their relationship to household income levels (Ellis, 1998:5).

The diverse activities that rural households undertake can be categorised into three groups: farm, on-farm and off-farm activities. Farm activities and incomes consist of livestock and crop income, as well as the consumption of own farm output and cash income from output sold (Ellis, 1998:5). Cash income from crop or livestock sales refers to the gross value of
sales less the cost of purchased inputs, including seasonal wage labour, used in production (Brown, 1979). Off-farm activities and incomes refer to wage-earnings or the exchange of labour on other farms (that is, still within agriculture), plus labour payments in kind such as harvest-share systems. Non-farm activities comprise several sub-categories, which are non-farm rural wage employment, non-farm rural self-employment, property income (rents), urban-to-rural remittances arising from within national boundaries, and international remittances involving cross-border and overseas migration. The third livelihood strategy is migration. This can be temporary or permanent, to another region or urban centre, but explicitly in search of a livelihood.

The reality on the ground is that livelihoods pursued in rural areas tend to be a combination of the three strategies, and this combination varies according to the time of year or the economic conditions in a country. In the end, the concept of sustainable livelihoods is a composite of many ideas and interests, the coming together of a number of different strands in development debates. The important point to recognise is that, in practice, sustainable livelihoods are always subject to negotiation. Thus contradictions and trade-offs between different elements of any overall livelihoods strategy exist. To a limited extent, the different capitals can be substituted for each other; for example, the poor may draw on social capital (family and neighbourhood security) at times when financial capital is in short supply. Within this context, people are likely to engage in various activities and outcomes. For instance, households may depend on their own farming activities, the selling of their labour locally and migration within the same year. However, outcomes will not simply be „monetary“ nor even tangible in all cases – in some cases the outcome may simply be a sense of empowerment to make wider and clearer livelihood choices.

The SLF therefore seeks to answer the following key question: Given a particular context (of policy setting, history, agro-ecology and socio-economic conditions), what combination of livelihood strategies are adopted (agricultural intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification and migration) and what are the outcomes of these strategies? In relation to my study, the framework is deployed to identify, unpack and analyse newly resettled farmer livelihoods in Zimbabwe within the broader context of land reform and economic decline, including the utilisation of land and other assets in pursuing household food security.
2.5.4 Debates around social capital

While there has been general agreement by scholars on the notion of natural, economic/financial capital and human capital, social capital remains a concept under much debate. Social capital appears in much development discourse as a „mysterious substance, elusive yet vital, holding communities together, underpinning coping strategies, enabling entrepreneurship and thus forming one of the key conditions for poverty alleviation and poverty reduction strategies“ (Du Toit et al., 2007: 521). Social capital broadly encompasses social networks, the reciprocities that arise from them, and the value of achieving mutual goals (Schuller et al., 2000:1). The social capital of any society includes the „institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development” (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2001:4). The main scholars around social capital are Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1980), James Coleman (1988, 1990) and Robert Putnam (1993).

Bourdieu”s concept of social capital places emphasis on conflicts and power functions (i.e. social relations that increase the ability of an actor to advance his/her interests) and is connected to his theoretical ideas on class (Siisiäinen, 2000:1). According to Bourdieu (1986:249), social capital has two components. First of all, it is a resource that is connected to group membership and social networks, and is a quality produced by the totality of the relationships between actors (rather than merely a common „quality“ of the group) (Bourdieu, 1980:2). Secondly, social capital is based on mutual cognition and recognition (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 1998).

Robert Putnam has popularised the concept of social capital across a wide range of fields and can claim responsibility for its entry into mainstream political discourse (Schuller et al., 2000:8). He defines social capital as „the features of social life – norms, networks and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1996:56). Putnam however has been criticised for not addressing issues of power and conflict, though he does argue that „social capital is incompatible with high levels of inequality“ (1996:56). He identifies two forms of social capital, i.e. „bridging” and „bonding” social capital (Schuller et al., 2000:10). Bonding social capital refers to the links between like-minded people, or the reinforcement of homogeneity (Schuller et al., 2000:10). Although this can build strong ties, it can also exclude those who do not qualify.
Bridging social capital refers to the building of connections between heterogeneous groups; these connections may be more fragile, but they are also more likely to foster social inclusion (Putnam, 2000). There are often trade-offs or tensions between the two forms.

Putnam’s latest work since 2000 has added a new dimension to the concept of social capital away from the need for trust between society members. People may be untrusting and yet make a major contribution to building social capital, for example through civil projects in areas of high criminality (Schuller et al., 2000:11). In his study across states in the USA, Putnam (2000) traces the correlation between high levels of social capital and various kinds of relatively desirable social conditions such as low crime rates, better levels of health, happiness, education and higher levels of economic prosperity. What created the high levels of social capital was the need to achieve the desired social conditions, and not necessarily the existence of trust between community members.

2.5.5 Application of sustainable livelihoods framework

The sustainable livelihoods framework can be applied at a range of different scales – from individual to household cluster, to extended kin grouping, to village, region and even national level. Sustainable livelihoods outcomes are therefore assessed at different levels. The framework has become an important tool for analysing the evolution of rural livelihoods in the developing South.

The strength of the framework in the context of this thesis is that it places „a strong focus on natural resources as productive assets in supporting rural livelihoods” (Carswell and Jones, 2004:185). The approach starts with what people have (assets/capitals) and what they do (livelihood activities), so moving attention away from what they lack; in practical terms, it enables strengths to be strengthened. It shifts the focus away from „problems, constraints and needs” to perceived “strengths, opportunities, coping strategies and local initiative” (Carswell and Jones, 2004: 185). The approach highlights trade-offs that people make between the different assets, livelihood activities and outcomes. It embodies a people-centred, responsive and multi-level approach to development (Carswell and Jones, 2004:185). Of particular interest in this framework are the institutional processes (embedded in a matrix of formal and informal institutions and organisations) which mediate the ability to carry out specific strategies and achieve (or not) particular outcomes.
2.5.6 Critique of framework

Despite its influence and widespread use, several significant critiques have been made of the approach. Fay (2007) notes four criticisms of the sustainable livelihoods approach. First, while access to different forms of capital depends on political processes, the livelihoods approach may lead to a focus on individuals and households, rather than emphasising the political and economic macro-environments that often create “vulnerability contexts”. Second, the focus on the household may lead to potentially false assumptions that households act in a unified manner toward common goals and this may ignore inequalities of gender and age within households. Third, as Murray (2002:492) also points out, the notion of “sustainability” is seen to beg important questions: “Who defines “sustainability”, and for whom or of what, second by what criteria and over what time scale is it defined?” Finally, the holism of the approach may make it effective as a tool for describing existing diverse livelihoods, but it may lead to undue complexity when it is used as a basis for defining policy priorities and formulating interventions.

Criticisms of the sustainable livelihoods approach are related to both the application of the framework and the framework itself. The very strength of the tool (i.e. it seeks to understand the complexity of people’s livelihoods) makes it difficult to use because livelihoods are so complex. Ashley and Carney (1999:31) point out that it is time consuming, whilst Carswell et al. (1997) note that existing literature on the framework shows insufficient clarity about how contradictions and trade offs are addressed. In general, they argue that “definitions of sustainable livelihoods are often unclear, inconsistent and/or relatively narrow without clarification; there is a risk of simply adding to a conceptual muddle” (Carswell et al., 1997:10).

Scholars further claim that the framework underestimates the significance of history (including agrarian changes) (Carswell et al. 1997; Ashley and Carney, 1999; Longley and Maxwell, 2003), and that it is too broad and all encompassing to be useful. At the same time, sustainability at an environmental level within an overall sustainability framework is not clear. The framework, in addition, tends to convey a somewhat cleansed and neutral approach to power issues, yet power imbalances play an immense role in causing poverty.

Livelihoods are not a “cut and dry” process given largely unpredictable changes in contexts, constraints and opportunities affecting households, which results in households
adopting a wide variety of livelihood strategies and activities. The sustainable livelihoods approach is therefore essentially concerned with the dynamic and, at times, repetitive nature of livelihood strategies.

2.6 Rural Livelihoods, Land Reforms and Food Security – Developing a Conceptual Link

While the sustainable livelihoods framework has been criticised, it has a number of key features which make it especially relevant to studying land reform and resettlement (which forms a central focus of this study); Chimhowu and Hulme (2006:729-730) note five such features. Firstly, it views resettled households as making a living in a variety of ways, of which farming may be just one. This liberates us from the „smallholder farmer“ straightjacket that dominates rural development discourse in Zimbabwe and much of Africa. Secondly, the framework emphasizes the need to see land as just one among several different assets/capitals required to make a living. Thirdly, livelihood approaches place the interaction of the various capitals within a broader policy environment. Fourthly, the framework allows one to investigate livelihood dynamics in a given geographical and historical context. Livelihoods are not static but change in response to various internal and external stimuli. This aspect is crucial in understanding livelihoods of resettled households as they move from the vulnerable early days of settlement to securer livelihoods. Fifthly, the focus on risk and vulnerability is appropriate for resettled households in frontier regions (i.e. land not previously used for agricultural purposes), which face high levels of both distinctive and covariant risks.

In addition, the sustainable livelihoods approach is linked to food security, which is another central focus of this thesis. Indeed, the approach is critical in this regard, in that it „shows that food security is not just an issue of productivity or even the sustainability of production, or entitlements but depends on how people, especially poor people, gain access to production and exchange capabilities and to food” (Swift and Hamilton, 2001:84). There is also evidence of qualitative links between land reform and food security, as Maxwell and Wiebe (1999:830) show from the food security and famine literature. They argue that a reduction in (or outright loss of) access to land in an agrarian society leads directly to a reduction in income and access to food.
Several scholars (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1999; Marongwe, 2000; Moyo et al., 2003) have studied directly the ways in which food security is linked to access to land. Access to land determines access to other critical resources such as water, forests and wildlife. Therefore, land reforms can be viewed as being a critical strategy that will facilitate not only access to good quality land by the near landless but also access to the wide spectrum of land-based resources needed by local communities. Land, land tenure and food security are linked so as to comprise a dynamic system in which decisions about production, marketing, consumption and investment generate, and are in turn driven by, structural changes over time in the distribution of resources within a household.

A range of studies (Deninger and Squire, 1998; Dett and Ravallion, 2002) show that in situations with an equitable (unimodal) distribution of land, agricultural growth can be powerfully pro-poor. A more egalitarian distribution of land not only leads to higher economic growth but also helps to ensure that any economic growth that is achieved is more beneficial to the poor. In instances where countries have had an inequitable distribution of land (bimodal), agricultural growth has tended to be less pro-poor. Examples of these incidences include South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and many parts of Latin America. The most apparent qualitative link that these studies suggest is that increased security of access to – and ownership or control over – productive resources enables more efficient and profitable agricultural production and hence greater access to food (UNECA, 2004:30). Where land and food are explicitly conceptualised together, they generally fall within a linear framework (see Figure 2.2) that begins with access to resources (in this case land) and proceeds casually through production, income generation, and consumption to nutritional status (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1999:829).

**Figure 2.2: Conventional Conceptual Links between Land and Food**

| Resource (1) | Production (2) | Income (3) | Consumption (4) | Nutritional Status |

Source: Maxwell and Wiebe (1999:830)

Like the sustainable livelihoods approach more broadly, Maxwell and Wiebe’s framework raises important questions with regards to the links between land reform and food security. Of particular importance to this study is that, qualitatively, it has been shown that food security is improved by secure access to and ownership of productive resources, which
allows for more efficient, profitable and sustainable agricultural production and therefore improved income and access to food (Feder et al., 1988; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994). There is also evidence of a quantitative link between access to land and access to food in an agrarian economy (Drèze and Sen, 1989; Barraclough, 1991; Rahmato, 1993). Attempts to monitor food security in famine-prone areas recognise access to productive land as one of the most important factors determining household or individual food security (Frankenberger and Coyle, 1993; Davies, 1996).

Through the use of the sustainable livelihoods approach, the framework proposed by Maxwell and Wiebe (1999:830) can be further developed to shift analysis to how households can make re-investments (and make decisions about future investments) in order to ensure the sustainability of income generated in the future, especially when faced with crisis situations as in contemporary Zimbabwe.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide a historical and conceptual context of rural livelihoods in the global South in an attempt to highlight the salient challenges faced by rural households. These challenges have mainly manifested themselves in two forms – the acute landlessness of households and the resultant challenge of ensuring food security within rural households. The challenges rural households face have become more acute through the manifestation of decreased livelihoods and food insecurity.

In an attempt to address these challenges, land reforms in developing countries have been brought back to the forefront of the development agenda by various actors ranging from the state, multi-lateral agencies especially the World Bank, grass-roots social movements and NGOs. Yet, as the discussion in the chapter has shown, the understanding and conceptualisation of food security has changed over time. Hence, there is a need to study and identify how land reforms and the access to resources by rural households can be beneficial and make tangible contributions towards improving rural livelihoods.

Research is increasingly showing that rural livelihoods, land reforms and food security are conceptually linked. The SLF is an essential framework of analysis which links the three concepts, providing the platform for continued debates on how to improve rural lives as well as offering an alternative paradigm to previous methods of analysing rural
livelihoods. The next chapter seeks to further unpack the three concepts in specific relation to Zimbabwe’s land and agrarian reform process by, analysing the initial phases of land reform prior to FTLRP, from 1980 – 1999.
3.0 LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 1980 - 1999

3.1 Introduction
Zimbabwe has a long history of attempts at land reform, prior to the recent events of the FTLRP from 2000. This chapter seeks to outline and analyse the attempts at land reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1999 and assess their impact with regards to improving the livelihoods and food security levels of the rural population. The historical analysis is hence important in order to contextualise the challenges rural households have faced in Zimbabwe pre- and post-independence, as well as to identify the effects that early land reform programmes in Zimbabwe prior to FTLRP had in trying to improve rural livelihoods.

Land remains a central issue, underpinning social, economic and political processes in southern and eastern Africa (Mbiba, 2001:426). Rural society in Zimbabwe is dominated by small-scale communal farmers who make up the bulk of the rural populace. Since colonialism their livelihoods have been dramatically affected by various policies; these policies were mostly geared towards uplifting settler commercial agriculture and creating a reserve pool of labour to serve commercial farms, mines and industry in urban settings. This scenario continued to exist after independence due to the neo-liberal policy framework which the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) adopted. The chapter starts with a brief geographical overview of the country, and then discusses the status of rural livelihoods with the advent of colonialism.

3.2 Geographic and Physical Attributes of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country covering 390,000 square kilometres. The country is divided into three broad physiographic regions, distinguished primarily by altitude: the Highveld, the Middleveld and the Lowveld. The Highveld, which is between 1,200 and 1,700m above sea level, comprises 25% of the country; the Middleveld (900 to 1,200m) comprises 40% of the country and has less natural potential but higher rainfall than the southern Lowveld, which is between the Limpopo and Save basins (Muir, 1994:43). The northern Lowveld in the Zambezi basin has the lowest potential for agriculture.

Although the country lies within the tropics, most of the country has a sub-tropical climate. The country has variable seasonal rainfall occurring mainly between November and March, with 37% of the country receiving more than the 700mm annual rainfall considered
necessary for semi-intensive farming (Muir, 1994:42). Zimbabwe is divided into five broad natural regions (Table 3.1), in which the dominant natural factor conditioning agricultural production is climate, more specifically rainfall characteristics (i.e. quantity and variability of average rainfall), and this provides a broad framework for the potential of land use (Weiner, 1988:64).

### Table 3.1: Rainfall Characteristics in the Five Natural Regions of Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>% of total land area</th>
<th>Rainfall Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>More than 1, 050 mm rainfall per year, with some rain in all months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>58 600</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>700-1, 050 mm rainfall confined to summer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>72 900</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>500 – 700 mm rainfall per year, subject to seasonal droughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>147 800</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>450 – 600 mm rainfall per year, subject to frequent seasonal droughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>104 400</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Normally less than 500 mm per year, very erratic and unreliable. Northern lowveld may have more rain but topography and soils are poorer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>390 700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rukuni and Eicher (1994: 42)*

### 3.3 Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe Prior to Independence

Before the white settlers arrived in Zimbabwe in 1890, livestock was the major agricultural activity of African farmers. Shona and Ndebele farmers, however, also grew a wide variety of crops which included finger millet, bulrush millet, sorghum, maize, groundnuts, potatoes, rice, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, cowpeas, cucumber, tomatoes, yams and cassava. Millets were the staple foods (Rukuni, 1994:17). African farmers initially saw a boost in their production as the arrival of settlers created an increase in the demand for agricultural products, especially food crops. The settlers” initial economic strategy was based on mining.

As the settler economic strategy shifted from mining to agriculture, the settler government began to create conditions to curb African agriculture and attract white settlers from abroad for settlement on land in high potential areas. The majority African populace was moved over time into areas known as „Native Reserves”. The first reserves created were Gwai and Shangani in Matabeleland in 1894 (Moyana, 1984:14). They were located in the ecologically marginal areas of the country and were not sufficient for the economic and subsistence needs of Africans (Rukuni, 1994:18; Mbiba, 2001:428). Specific colonial
policies created conditions which forced rural African households to turn to wage employment and which prevented them from solely relying on farming as a livelihood strategy.

A key policy was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. It became the most important law governing land distribution in colonial Zimbabwe, establishing the principal of possessory segregation between Africans and whites, and therefore paving the way for differential agricultural production (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:79, Moyana, 1984:14). The act formally established exclusive European areas which accounted for more than half the total land area of Zimbabwe, while Africans were forced into Native Reserves (or communal areas) which accounted for about 21% of the country (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:79-80; Rukuni, 1994:18). At this point, the African population stood at 1,081,000, whilst that of European settlers was around 50,000 (Moyana, 1984:71). As compensation for the loss of land to Europeans, African farmers were given the right to the purchase of land in exclusive areas known as Native Purchase Areas, which were – where possible – adjacent to Native Reserves (Moyana, 1984:68). In these areas, the colonial state allowed potentially for the creation of a „black agrarian capitalist class” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:168).

Initially this land allocation – and relocation of African farmers – was to make way for white commercial farmers, but as the nation began to build its agro-industrial and mining sectors, rural areas also became a source of cheap labour. As settlers acquired more land it became important for them to create a „landless class who might make that land valuable by providing the necessary labour with which to exploit its resources” (Moyana, 1984: 72). Seemingly, the major aim of this division of land was to ensure a steady supply of labour to white farms, mines and industries through the partial displacement of Africans from rural areas (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:80). Smallholder agricultural production became insufficient to maintain adequate rural livelihoods, leading to the pauperisation of the African population (Moyana, 1984:72).

This „artificial creation of poverty” (Moyana, 1984:72) set conditions that gave rise to the phenomena of „worker-peasant” and „split families” (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:77). This meant dual households as communal area development was ignored by the state and very few economic opportunities existed, leading to significant migration to urban areas for employment purposes, especially amongst men within the reproductive age group. In terms
of social demographics, „labour migrancy drew men out of the communal lands leaving women, children and the old” (Mbiba, 2001:435). Women were essentially „de facto” household heads and were the bulk of the agricultural producers and labour force.

The Land Apportionment Act was amended in 1941, 1944 and 1945, and between 1945 and 1960 it was amended fifteen more times, further tightening the conditions under which African populations could occupy land (Moyana, 1984: 74-77). Essentially the act and accompanying state practices pauperised the African populations by keeping them in a state of serfdom, and prevented the majority of the country’s population from participating in the exploitation of productive resources (Moyana, 1984:77). Indeed, the various legislations implemented by the colonial state, especially around land segregation, severely affected rural African populations for whom land was traditionally the most important asset. According to Moyana, „to be a landless peasant [in colonial Zimbabwe] is to be the like a ship without a rudder, destined to destruction” (1984:72). Agricultural productivity began to decline soon after the creation of the reserves and further deteriorated after the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act.

The reduced productivity of the land in the reserves was due to adverse ecological conditions, brought about by the shortage of space for both cultivation and grazing, which resulted in over-crowding and overstocking, and ultimately contributed to diminishing agricultural returns. The forced increase in the human population and of small stock (notably sheep and goats) led to overgrazing and created problems for soil conservation. However, the settler government viewed the challenge of soil erosion in the reserves as a natural product of the „destructive nature of African farming methods”, notably shifting cultivation and overstocking (Moyana, 1984:89). Moyana rightfully notes that shifting cultivation and overstocking were rather the consequences of state policies which created overcrowding in the African Reserves. As these problems within the reserves persisted, the settler government in 1951 enacted the Land Husbandry Act to alleviate the environmental challenges within the reserves. The act regulated farming practices and stocking rates. The conservation laws of the act were harshly enforced, often resulting in fines and imprisonment for those who failed to comply (Rukuni, 1994:26).

In an attempt to further erode African smallholder agriculture and force Africans to look for wage employment in mines and urban areas, the colonial government also imposed a
barrage of legal restrictions on African productive activity and discriminatory pricing policies, like the Maize Control Act of 1931 (amended in 1934), which created a two-tier pricing policy for maize grain which protected white farmers” (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:80). African farmers received no state support, unlike white commercial farmers who had facilities such as research stations, the Land Bank (established in 1912) which provided credit, and agricultural marketing boards. This situation continued up until independence in 1980.

The isolation of smallholder farmers from mainstream markets and lack of state support prior to independence meant that they only participated marginally in the production of maize in the domestic market. Commercial farmers dominated maize production with 5,000 to 6,000 large-scale commercial farmers delivering close to 90% of the maize sold in the formal market in the 1970s; approximately 750,000 smallholders contributed 5%, and 8,000 small-scale commercial farmers within the African Purchase Areas marketed the remaining 5% (Rohrbach, 1989:2). Commercial farmers sold between 70% and 75% of their maize to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and used the balance for stock feed and to feed farm workers. For smallholder production, 95% of maize grown was retained for home consumption or localised inter-household sales (Rohrbach, 1989:12).

It must be highlighted that rural communities are not homogenous, as social differentiation exists, including in communal lands. Even under settler colonialism there was a “high degree of social differentiation on the basis of land asset holdings where land holdings and productivity were turned into wealth and social prestige” (Mbiba, 2001:429). Under colonialism, the development of the “master farmer” programme facilitated this social differentiation amongst communal farmers. The programme allowed selected peasant farmers to undergo “rigorous modern farming techniques prescribed by extension officers” (Mbiba, 2001:429). These farmers were able to increase production levels of both staple food crops and cash crops. The farmers formed local farmers’ clubs, extended their land claims, and generally evolved into a distinct socio-economic group considered by Rukuni (1994) as important communal area agricultural producers. Their increased levels of production also helped to ensure their purchase of land in the „Native Purchase Areas”. 
3.4 Land Holdings at Independence in Zimbabwe

The structure of land holdings (or agrarian structure) in Zimbabwe which existed prior to independence in 1980 – and indeed after independence until the advent of FTLRP – saw the minority whites owning large tracts of the most productive land, notably in (agro-ecological) Natural Regions I and II. African farmers who, were able to, acquired land in the Native Purchase areas (after independence these became known as small-scale commercial farmers). Within the communal areas or reserves, there were a core group who made up 20 – 30% of the entire populace who „owned land” (without freehold title). Finally there was the majority of the peasantry who owned no land at all and who accessed it through communal tenure (Mbiba, 2001:429-30). Households within the communal areas who „owned land” were African farmers who had been trained as „Master Farmers” and had then been allocated individual land ownership by colonial authorities within the African Purchase Areas.

Zimbabwe like many other newly independent states acknowledged the primacy of agriculture in post-colonial development, and this entailed the development of specifically African agriculture. Agriculture remained the most important economic sector „employing” 70% of the population and contributing to 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Stoneman and Cliffe, 1989:43). The racially-skewed, unequal land holding structure and dualistic agricultural system inherited at independence saw 6,000 white commercial farmers owning 15.5 million hectares of land, compared to 8,500 small scale African farmers owning 1.4 million hectares and one million communal subsistence households or peasants on 16.4 million hectares of mostly marginal land (Weiner, 1989:63; Muir, 1994:40; Kinsey, 1999:177; Moyo and Yeros, 2005:171). Communal households occupied less than 50% of the agricultural land in the country (42% to be exact), of which 75% of this land was located within Natural Regions IV and V which are drier and less fertile (only 15% was in Natural Regions I and II) (Moyo, 1995:129; Sachikonye, 2003:229).

Overall, whilst land was divided more or less evenly between black and white, the communal areas – which comprised 42% of Zimbabwe’s land area – held 75% of Zimbabwe’s rural population and approximately 56% of Zimbabwe’s total population (Moyo, 1995:129). In comparison the white agrarian bourgeoisie, who comprised less than 3% of the country’s population, owned 39% of Zimbabwe’s land area. Furthermore, the
consequences of the inequitable distribution were further exacerbated by the differences in the quality of land in commercial farming areas and communal areas.

There was a strong sense of historical injustice and deprivation over the land question, and this made it a contentious issue at the Lancaster House Conference at which the terms of Zimbabwe’s independence was negotiated (Sachikonye, 2003:229). The Zimbabwean state in 1980 was therefore caught up in a dilemma: it had to meet the needs for land and social redistribution called for by the disadvantaged peasant sector, while at the same time maintain the status quo (namely, an entrenched commercial farming sector) so as to sustain production and prevent the collapse of the economy. Indeed, domestic food needs were still met primarily by commercial farmers who contributed to at least 90% of the country’s domestic food requirements (Murisa, 2008:120) and also dominated the export crop sector (the exported crops included tobacco, coffee and sugar), making commercial agriculture the second largest foreign currency earner after mining (Herbst, 1990:37; Palmer, 1990:167).

Commercial farmland had the vast majority of irrigation infrastructure, was heavily subsidised by the state and was linked to markets and input suppliers through a good rail and road system. Infrastructural development, including roads and dams, had been readily provided historically by the state to enhance the white agricultural sector. The communal areas, in contrast, represented a disadvantaged sub-national regional entity based on the state’s racially-focused administrative and political demarcation of rural lands (Moyo, 1995:128). As farming within the reserves deteriorated the „native reserves” became more like „labour reserves” (Wiener, 1988:67). As a result, at independence it was generally assumed that smallholder production in communal areas was limited and agricultural yields when compared to commercial farmers were low. Indeed, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) highlighted that the „maize yields on European commercial farms were four times those of the African smallholder” (Cliffe, 1988:5). Such comparisons did not consider the different contexts in which communal and commercial farmers operated. As more research was done on communal areas, it became clear that peasant farming was not inherently unproductive and, when smallholders in the same natural regions (especially Natural Regions I and II) as commercial farmers were given access to productive resources (like the commercial farmers), yield levels could be quite high (Wiener, 1988:68).
Nevertheless, communal areas faced numerous challenges which severely undermined production levels amongst smallholder farmers. By 1980, land use experts were arguing that over 66% of communal lands had excess populations of more than double their assessed carrying capacities (Whitlow, 1980). In 1995 the communal areas population stood at approximately six million comprising one million households (Moyo, 1995:129), a substantial increase from the population of around three million in the 1960s (less than 500,000 households). Ultimately, this densification can be linked back to the land alienations under colonialism, which were in large part left un-addressed by the post-independent state; this densification contributed significantly towards the accentuation of environmental degradation in those areas (Moyo, 1995:131). The main aspects of environmental degradation found in communal areas included: land degradation, deforestation, siltation, over-grazing, stream bank degradation and the general loss of biodiversity (Gore et al., 1992).

Further, communal areas have been unfavorably located in terms of density of roads, railways and urban centres. Communal areas were (and are) fragmented into approximately thirty pieces nationally, weaving their way along and around large-scale commercial farm areas and state lands (Mehretu, 1991:8). Commercial farm lands dominate the highlands, prime arable lands and major transport infrastructure routes in a relatively continuous land mass. Traditionally, communal farmers also faced discriminatory marketing policies and produce pricing programmes, although the post-colonial state sought to remedy this. Overall, though – by 1980 – the pattern of poverty, environmental degradation and economic marginalisation of the communal areas prompted the application of a „dual economy” thesis to Zimbabwe’s agrarian and land structure.

### 3.5 Early Post-independent Zimbabwe Agrarian and Land Reform

#### 3.5.1 Agrarian reforms

After independence, there was a rapid expansion of government and private sector support for the previously disadvantaged smallholder sector, and this opened up the sector’s access to improved technologies and inputs (for example, seed and fertilizer) derived from over forty years of agricultural research (Rohrbach, 1989:18). This transformation of the smallholder sector was a result of several factors, such as the end of the liberation war, increased producer prices and availability of suitable maize technology (Stanning, 1989:260). This was coupled with government policies aimed at redressing the imbalance
between white commercial farmers and African smallholder farmers in terms of the latter’s access to agricultural services such as extension, credit and marketing, as well as the expansion of GMB collection points into communal areas (Cliffe, 1988:4; Stanning, 1989:260; Karumbidza, 2004:1).

The state-owned GMB increased its coverage of collection depots into the communal areas, from just three in 1980 to thirty-seven in 1991, as well as setting up additional seasonal collection centres. It also announced buy-in prices in advance of the harvest: prices were fixed across the countryside irrespective of transport costs, and thus represented a considerable increase in profit for farmers living in more remote locations who in the past saw their prices discounted by the costs of transport from farm to depot (FFSSA, 2004:17). The Ministry of Agriculture, through the extension service, promoted a maize production package based on high yielding hybrid varieties, with fertiliser application to capture the yield potential; credit to buy fertiliser and seed was provided by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) (FFSSA, 2004:17). The AFC also increased the number of loans it gave out to smallholder farmers in communal areas, and between 1980 and 1985 the number of loans increased from 18,000 to 64,000 (Cliffe, 1988:6).

The GoZ agricultural policy immediately after independence and throughout the 1980s therefore focused on enhanced extension, training and research, improved access to credit and input supplies, strategic geographical spread of marketing depots and collection centres, improvement in communication networks and improved support to farmer organisations in communal areas. These changes in agrarian policy coincided with the GoZ’s first attempts at also addressing the skewed landholding pattern (inherited at independence) through the implementation of land reform.

3.5.2 First phase of land reform 1980 -1990

One of the major grievances driving the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe had been the lack of access to land by the majority African population. Despite the governments early agrarian reforms it soon became clear that the question of land access still needed to be addressed. The GoZ then embarked on a land reform programme in conjunction with its agrarian reforms. The first phase of land reform began in 1980 up until 1990. The Zimbabwean government embarked on a market-based land reform programme, i.e. based on the willing-buyer willing-seller principle, as enshrined in the Lancaster House
Agreement. This agreement in addition had a clause which ensured the protection of private property, including land, but it also sought to establish an egalitarian production system, reduce rural destitution and settle ex-combatants of the liberation struggle (Karumbidza, 2004:3). Land reform was carried out within the confines of maintaining existing relations of commercial production, particularly considering the ongoing dominance by multinational corporations of the local economy. Within this overall constraint, land reform (in the form of redistribution) was supposed to "promote national self-sufficiency (in terms of ensuring enough food at the national level) and enhance labour intensive small farmer production through the efficient use of land" resulting in "food security and household self-reliance" (Moyo, 2000a:7, own emphasis).

Zimbabwe’s land reform programme comprised four different resettlement model types (Kinsey, 1999:175). These were Model A which emphasised uniform family-based holdings; Model B which were collective co-operatives; Model C which entailed links between satellite producers and centralised commercial crop and livestock production and processing; and Model D (or the three-tier model) where households in more arid areas were encouraged to keep livestock as this offered more promise than a farming system based on cropping. The Model A scheme resettled individual households into clustered villages and allocated each family a 0.4 hectare residential plot, a uniform five hectares of arable land and the right to use a variable amount of grazing land on a communal basis (Kinsey, 1999:180). These models were implemented until 1993 (Moyo, 1995:86).

The land reform programme began officially in September 1980 with the initial objective of resettling 18,000 families from communal areas onto one million hectares over three years (Murisa, 2008:121). This was designed to relieve population pressure in communal areas, expand the base for productive agriculture in the country (Murisa, 2008: 121), improve the standards of living of the poorest sections of the population (notably the landless, land-short and destitute), and bring under-utilised commercial land into full production as part of equitable distribution of and access to land (Kinsey, 1982:96; Kinsey, 1999:176). The overall objective according to Gordon (1984:136) was to "undertake a

---

4 Lancaster House Agreement was the independence agreement for Zimbabwe signed in 1979 after negotiations between representatives of the Patriotic Front (PF), consisting of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith at a Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House which brought about independence in Zimbabwe in 1980.
large scale resettlement programme and to maintain a high level of agricultural production in the commercial farming sector”. The early land reform programme could be further divided into two distinct periods, one from 1980-1983 and the other from 1984-1990.

The programme started on a high note and, by March 1982, 8,600 families had been resettled on 520,000 hectares of land; by 1983, the figure had risen to 15,000 families (Murisa, 2008:121). This was a significant achievement as Zimbabwe had in eighteen months managed to transfer only 10% less land than Kenya had done in fifteen years (Kinsey, 1982:102). During this early period, the GoZ also revised its target for resettlement, from 18,000 to 162,000 households (to be resettled by 1985) as stipulated in the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982. After 1983 the rate of resettlement slowed down, such that in 1983 and 1984 only 2,500 families were resettled. Between 1980 and 1985 the rate of resettlement was approximately 7,000 households per year (Bratton, 1994:77), with approximately 430,000 hectares acquired each year; however, this was mostly abandoned land in liberated zones established during the war years or land in the more arid regions of the country (Moyo, 2004b:7).

According to Bratton (1994:75), after 1985 the GoZ shifted the priorities of its agricultural policy away from redistributing commercial farm land towards agrarian reform, by placing greater emphasis on „providing services for communal farmers in existing communal lands”. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development also had to drastically reduce its budget in line with economic reforms introduced by the government. In 1983 its budget was cut by 53%, reducing the amount of money available to the state to purchase land. Eventually in 1986, the Ministry was dissolved and staff were incorporated into the Ministry of Agriculture. The criteria for land beneficiaries was also modified as the state sought to allow „experienced agriculturalists with private means” (Bratton, 1994:75) to become part of the resettlement programme, as opposed to just the rural poor and landless. After 1985, land purchases and the rate of resettlement slowed down significantly and the state fell further and further behind the targets which it had set itself, such that by 1989 only 52,000 households had been resettled or 32% of the 162,000 families targeted (Murisa, 2008:121). Despite the slow-down in the pace of land purchases and resettlement, the state still made policy changes in what seemed like an attempt to overcome the restrictions of the Lancaster House Constitution and ensure that land reform remained on
the policy agenda. The GoZ passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1985 which gave the government the right to first refusal (i.e. all land put on sale had to be offered first to the state), and allowed for the expropriation of under-used derelict land. The state did not however fully enforce the clauses of the act (Bratton, 1994:75).

Kinsey (2004:1691) argues that, after the initial fast pace of resettlement at independence, the GoZ increasingly lost all but rhetorical interest in land reform and for a number of years it failed to appreciate that – if left unaddressed – land would become a source of conflict. As a result, a growing tension arose between the new landed elite who had benefitted from initial land reforms in the early 1980s and the majority of landless people, including war veterans, whose pleas for land had been ignored. This occurred despite the fact that the struggle for land prior to 1980 was led by the liberation movement and in the 1970s was mainly pursued by means of an armed struggle (Moyo, 2001:313). The evidence of this discontent was characterised by the continuation of land occupations alongside the resettlement programme. In the early years of independence the occupations were “low profile, high intensity” and occurred mostly in the Manicaland province (Moyo, 2005a:201).

The pace and structure of the first phase of land reform was heavily influenced by the low productivity assumptions about communal farmers highlighted earlier. These assumptions were utilized by the World Bank in their 1983 Agricultural Sector Study, and by the Whitsun Foundation (1983) and Bill Kinsey (1982, 1983) in two influential studies warning against resettling too many African farmers. Comparisons were often made between the contributions of commercial farmers and communal farmers to the economy of the country, as well as their respective output levels. This was despite the fact that there were methodological challenges to comparing high output farming on high-potential land with low-input farming on poor quality land, and that yield levels were highly sensitive to spatial and temporal environmental variation (Wiener, 1988:68). At the same time, land owners represented by the influential CFU argued against any significant land distribution, claiming that large-scale redistribution would result in the overall decline in agricultural production and the loss of employment for farm labourers. The GoZ therefore embarked on a land reform which was overshadowed by the need to maintain high levels of agricultural production on commercial farms so as not to disrupt the national economy through the destruction of a highly productive sector.
Another major problem with this tentative reform was that such land programmes „assume[d] the current large landowners “land rights” must be protected and compensated where transfers occur” (Moyo, 2004b:1). The popular expectation was that compensation would (and should) come from the former colonial master (Great Britain) both for the „victims” of current land reform (i.e. the current large landowners whose land was being expropriated) as well as the victims of colonial exploitation (Moyo, 2004b:3). In Zimbabwe, major pledges were made by international donors, notably the British government, towards agricultural development and land redistribution. The pledged amounts were to be matched by the GoZ. With this promised backing, the GoZ initially embarked on a land reform programme of which the „centre piece was resettlement of the landless and poor on newly acquired land” (Sachikonye, 2003:229).

3.5.3 Outcomes of early land and agrarian reforms
The British government regarded land redistribution in the 1980s as successful because of the fact that, within less than ten years, 56,000 households were resettled (ODA, 1989; Durevall, 1991; Herbst, 1991). The majority of resettled households during the 1980s were resettled on the family farm schemes (Model A). By 1987 official government statistics indicated that 91% of the total area settled was under model A; 6% under model B; 2.5% under model D and 0.5% under model C (Bratton, 1994:76). However, although this was a significant step, several scholars (such as Sam Moyo) note that the early land reform programmes faced severe challenges, and were rather limited in their impact. A major critique of this first phase of land reform was that under the „willing-buyer willing-seller” scheme, government was reduced to a „reactive buyer” as the land for sale was identified and supplied by the white large scale commercial farmers, and on the latter’s terms (Moyo, 2004b:6). Government merely responded by offering a price on land that was made available to it by the farmers; it was not actively involved in actual expropriation of land for resettlement. This led to a reduced pace in the redistribution of land, as government did not have sufficient funds to buy back land at the prices set by commercial farmers. At the same time, the land acquired was largely of low agro-ecological value (Moyo, 1995:121).

This attempt to resolve the country’s land question through a market-based process failed to reverse the colonial legacy of „grossly inequitable” land ownership (Moyo, 2001:313) and continued the „narrow racial and class monopoly over land” (Moyo, 2000a:6) which existed under colonialism. In the end, the GoZ followed a „liberal land reform programme
which assumed that the land rights of large land owners needed to be protected and where land was taken from them compensation needed to be paid” (Moyo, 2004:6). This programme, as became increasingly noticeable during the 1990s, also resulted in ongoing frustration among landless peasants with market-driven processes and the state’s support for these processes.

3.5.3.1 Reforms and their impact on rural livelihoods

The major outcome of the first phase of land and agrarian reform in the 1980s was that Zimbabwe became renowned for the dramatic expansion of smallholder crop output levels, which led to the country having large reserve stores of grain and the ability to export grains in most years (Scoones et al., 1996:11; Rukuni and Eicher, 1994:393). This meant the increasing importance of smallholder farmers in the production and marketed surplus of maize, the country’s major food crop (Stanning, 1989:260). As Karumbidza (2004:1) highlights, Zimbabwe „recorded an increase in communal farmers“ contribution to the marketed maize crop after independence”. In fact, maize production increased three-fold between 1980 and 1986 (Table 3.2). By 1985, 40% of smallholder maize production was sold in formal markets, over one-quarter of all smallholders were registered to sell crops directly to the GMB, and these farmers provided one-third of the parastatal’s maize intake (Rohrbach, 1989:12). A year later, smallholder farmers accounted for over half of the country’s total maize production and 43% of total deliveries made to the GMB (Stanning, 1989:261). Though initial increases were in maize, cotton and groundnuts, they also spread to tobacco, coffee, sunflower and horticultural products in the latter part of the 1980s (Mabeza-Chimedza, 1998:529).

Table 3.2: 1980s Maize Production Levels (Tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commercial Farms</th>
<th>Communal Lands</th>
<th>Resettlement Schemes*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>948 739</td>
<td>600 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 584 739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1 833 395</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 833 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1 213 376</td>
<td>595 000</td>
<td>4 263</td>
<td>1 812 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>624 786</td>
<td>285 000</td>
<td>6 636</td>
<td>916 422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>678 403</td>
<td>454 000</td>
<td>56 417</td>
<td>1 192 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1 151 110</td>
<td>1 558 000</td>
<td>117 000</td>
<td>2 826 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1 197 600</td>
<td>1 200 000</td>
<td>148 000</td>
<td>2 545 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>503 150</td>
<td>518 430</td>
<td>109 260</td>
<td>1 130 840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>725 977</td>
<td>1 450 400</td>
<td>164 832</td>
<td>2 341 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>798 327</td>
<td>1 061 680</td>
<td>158 568</td>
<td>2 018 575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Resettlement schemes did not exist until 1982.

Source: CSO, 2003
Peasant farmers became increasingly recognised as an integral part of the national agricultural economy. At the same time, and despite the increases in their maize sales, per-capita smallholder maize retentions (for home consumption) rose almost 15% above the highest levels reached in the 1970s (Mabeza-Chimedza, 1998:529). This surge in post-1980 smallholder production, „transformed the communal sector from a relatively minor participant in the national maize economy to the principal source of national production growth” (Rohrbach, 1989:11). Overall, smallholder maize area planted and small farm yields more than doubled compared to their average levels during the 1970s, while the commercial sector declined (at least in relative terms). Even though smallholder yields remained around one-fifth of commercial yields, national production managed to still reach record levels on the strength of the increase in communal sector production. However, Andersson (2007:682) notes that this led to a reliance on smallholder food production which was increasingly vulnerable to rainfall variability, and Zimbabwe in the 1980s was characterised by a number of recurring droughts (1981-1982; 1982-1984 and 1987-1988). This vulnerability emanated from the relocation and expansion of smallholders on marginal and degradation-prone lands which occurred during the colonial period and was to a large extent maintained until the inception of the FTLRP in 2000. In other words, the relocation of maize production to the smallholder farming sector – ironically – increased the country’s vulnerability to maize shortages. While „extensive irrigation systems helped Zimbabwean [commercial] farmers cope with erratic rains”, the smallholder irrigation sub-sector still accounted for a mere ten percent of the country’s irrigated area in the 1990s (Andersson, 2007:685). Households that rely on rain-fed agriculture, in Africa generally, face enormous fluctuations in annual income. Livelihoods based purely on such agriculture leave households vulnerable to downward variations in consumption, which at low-income levels can be a serious risk to survival and which reduce the ability of households with higher income levels to save and invest (Kinsey, 2002:620). In response to this risk, rural households in Zimbabwe over the years tried to reduce the effects of an income shock by either „diversifying within agriculture, so that farm income increases or by diversifying out of agriculture into rural based activities that will not be affected as much by a bad farming season” (Kinsey, 2002:621).

At the same time, the agricultural boom within the communal areas was not felt by smallholders across the board; it was limited to a minority of smallholder farmers, with the
marketed output being differentiated significantly in terms of agro-ecological regions and social class. The material conditions under which the population in communal areas lived varied (Wiener, 1988:69). Benefits were confined to a minority of regions; there was considerable regional disparity in terms of increases in both smallholder maize output and sales between 1980 and 1985, with the largest gains occurring in communal areas within the regions of high agro-ecological potential (Stanning, 1989:261). Households in typically low rainfall areas benefited the least from Zimbabwe’s broadly focused agricultural development strategy, since the maize technologies developed were more suited for higher rainfall zones. Cliffe (1988:5) notes that, in the 1983/1984 season, 63% of the communal areas’ marketed maize came from areas in Natural Regions I and II, where only 15% of the country’s communal population lived. They accounted for 80% of all (per capita) smallholder maize deliveries to the GMB in the 1980s, even though they only constituted 22% of the smallholder population (Cliffe, 1988:5). In comparison, communal areas in Natural Regions IV and V, which made up 87% of communal areas and had two-thirds of the communal population, produced only a small marketed surplus. According to Sachikonye (1992:88) these regions, which are sometimes termed “peripheries”, were characterised by more or less permanent drought conditions and therefore food deficits existed there for many years.

Aside from the agro-ecological variations, class-based differentiations also existed within the communal areas. The differences were brought about by variations in land holding sizes, access to productive assets and ability to produce. Households with bigger plot sizes and with greater access to productive assets (i.e. inputs, services, finances) were able to take advantage of early agrarian reforms to increase their levels of production and produce surplus maize to sell to the GMB. The majority of communal area farmers with the exception of Natural Region V had less than three hectares of land, whilst there was a small minority with over ten hectares (Cliffe, 1988:6). Cattle ownership and access to draught power was also an indication of class differences, with the 1983 National Household Surveys revealing that about 40% of communal area households did not have their own livestock (Cliffe, 1988:6). Though households could access livestock through

---

5 These regions comprise Matabeleland North and South provinces, large portions of Masvingo and Midlands provinces, the Zambezi and Save Valleys and the northern portions of Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Manicaland.
informal exchanges, this created a dependent relationship between those who had livestock and those who did not.

The result of these differentiations was the apparent paradox of widespread hunger and poverty in rural areas and a simultaneous growing of marketed supply coming from the smallholder sector. Hence, while at the national level there was a significant increase in the maize output, this masked the insecurity which occurred at sub-national and household levels, more so for smallholders located in Natural Regions III – V, which are more prone to drought conditions.

The agrarian policies adopted by government between 1980 and 1990 were in large part geared towards stimulating increased food production to meet national food security needs (FFSSA, 2004:12), and were successful to a limited extent in that the surpluses generated allowed the GMB to maintain three years of food security reserves of maize and over eight years supply of small grains as Strategic Grain Reserves (SGR). The situation on the ground (i.e. significant pockets of rural poverty) was a clear indication that food insecurity was caused by distribution and entitlement problems at the community and household levels. Therefore, although there was sufficient food available in terms of national requirements, poverty and inequality meant that poorer households had limited access to food. This was because they either were too poor to buy basic foodstuffs available on the market, or lacked the land and other resources to enable them to grow their own food. In this instance, food insecurity in Zimbabwe can be linked to Sen’s (1981) work on the failure of entitlements. In the 1980s, rural households – especially in communal areas – were more likely to be poor than urban households and poverty rates were especially high in the marginal areas within Natural Regions III to V (FFSSA, 2004:13).

At the national level, the nature of food insecurity in Zimbabwe during this period was primarily transitory, i.e., it was temporary or seasonal and occurred mostly during periods immediately before harvest. It included periods of shortfall resulting from natural disasters or other negative shocks. In particular, food insecurity coincided with drought periods

---

6 The SGR was introduced in the 1980s to ensure enough supplies even in periods of low production. The system in place would see the GMB stock the reserves when production was high and release stocks onto the market when supplies on the market were low. The SGR for maize was 936,000 tonnes (500,000 as physical stock and the balance in monetary terms) and for wheat the figure was 200,000 tonnes (Moyo et al., 2003:52).
experienced either by the whole country or in the more vulnerable natural ecological zones. However, the shortages brought about at the national level by droughts were covered by the stocks from the grain reserve plus food imports. At the same time, the state-owned marketing boards, of which the GMB was one of the largest, were running up fiscal deficits equivalent to 5.8% of all public spending by the mid-1980s, mostly from the maintenance of the SGR.

In conclusion, communal and smallholder producers played an increasing role in meeting domestic food needs during the 1980s, but the support offered to them in terms of inputs, improved infrastructure and marketing channels, as well as access to better quality land, still remained limited. State programmes increased grain production (especially maize), which ensured food security at a national level and in turn Zimbabwe was “self-sufficient” in terms of food production during the first decade of independence. However, due to the concentrated nature of increased production (confined to specific districts only), this national self-sufficiency did not translate into sub-national self sufficiency (Moyo et al., 2003:52). Further, despite redistribution efforts by the state, the overall (racially-based) agrarian structure continued on into the 1990s.

3.6 The Second Phase of Land Reform in the 1990s and Structural Adjustment

The 1990s ushered in the possibility of a new structure or phase of land reform in Zimbabwe. It saw, in 1990, the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution, and the introduction of new legislation to allow state-led land expropriation in the form of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, as the state attempted to rejuvenate the land reform programme. Under a new National Land Policy, the GoZ’s aim was to resettle an additional five million hectares for 110,000 families. This restructuring of the land programme coincided though with the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).

In 1990 government introduced a five-year structural adjustment programme in an effort to promote economic growth through better fiscal management and market liberalisation. Although touted as a “home grown” initiative, the GoZ still needed IMF support to access US$3.5 billion in foreign exchange for the initiative’s implementation (Chattopadhyay, 2000:310). The first phase of ESAP began in October 1990 with the introduction of trade liberalisation; this required the state to remove agricultural and food security subsidies, and
opened up the Zimbabwean economy to the international influence of the global agro-industrial complex, which facilitated the liberalisation of local agricultural markets. The government also had to scale back its expenditure by imposing wage restraints and cutting social spending, as well as devaluing the currency. Structural adjustment placed increased emphasis on developing a vigorous export programme in order to earn foreign currency, especially within the agricultural sector.

3.6.1 ESAP, land reform and agrarian change

ESAP had a significant impact on land and agrarian policy in the 1990s. The Lancaster House Agreement had come to an end, but the main principle underlying structural adjustment helped to reinforce the market-based character of land reform (Moyo 2004b:7). It also reduced state support to smallholder farmers and perpetuated the unequal agrarian economy. Like other Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) implemented elsewhere on the continent, ESAP’s development strategy had economic and agrarian policies involving the use of land for export purposes rather than developing the national market and related local industries (Moyo, 2000b:53). The neo-liberal framework of ESAP viewed land as a commodity for macro-economic growth based on the commercial (industrial) farming model, against the more redistributive model of the 1980s where land reform was viewed as a necessary condition for poverty reduction amongst the rural landless (Murisa, 2008:123).

The land policies adopted under structural adjustment resulted in the continuation of „a dramatically skewed income distribution which reflected an unchanged legacy of colonial rule” (Moyo 2000:6). This involved favouring the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few local elites and foreigners, resulting in under-consumption and mass unemployment. As with the 1980s, the agrarian structure continued to be dualistic in nature, i.e., a „progressive, productive, large scale and market oriented agriculture located in the white farming zone” versus „backward, unproductive, small-scale, subsistence production in the communal areas” (Murisa, 2008:125). In fact, Karumbidza (2004:2) argues that government never seriously considered the development needs of smallholders, but only looked to the peasant sector for „political patronage and where possible to top-up the food provision gap created by the shift in the LSCF (large scale commercial farms)” away from basic food crops to cash crops. The smallholder sector played an insignificant role in the
development and refinement of agricultural policy, markets and services though they constituted the majority of farmers in Zimbabwe.

The pace of land reform slowed with market-driven structural adjustment and, simultaneously, there was significant employment retraction in both the private and public sectors of the urban economy. This saw people who had migrated to urban areas returning to rural areas (i.e. communal areas) to try and earn a living from reduced and unfertile lands, resulting in the burden of structural adjustment being borne by the peasant-worker (Murisa, 2008:175). The official reason given by the GoZ for the slowdown in land resettlement was that land acquisition through the „willing buyer-willing seller“ approach limited the scope of spatially matching land supply with the demand for supply. This meant that land bought in small and isolated parcels was expensive for resettlement. In the end, the scarcity of land put up for sale on the market, exorbitant prices for available land and the inability of government to pay market prices for the land available, limited the GoZ’s capacity to reach land reform targets of resettling 110,000 families on one million hectares of land as outlined in the 1990 National Land Policy (Sachikonye, 2003:231).

3.6.2 Outcomes and impacts of land and agrarian reforms in 1990s

Despite the introduction of structural adjustment in 1991 (including amongst other things a drop in government support and financing), smallholder farmers continued to play a pivotal part within the agricultural sector. Like their counterparts within the commercial sector, communal farmers were able to diversify and increase production in higher value crops such as tobacco, coffee and horticultural products. However the degree of their participation remained limited, as commercial farmers (with their capital base) were in a stronger position to respond favourably to the neo-liberal policy framework adopted by the state. At the same time, the successes and progress made by small scale farmers hid the untold story of poverty and vulnerability in the rural areas, mostly communal (Scoones et al., 1996:11). In terms of the distribution of this increased production, as in the 1980s with the „maize miracle“, the benefits were mostly found amongst smallholders in „regions of high to medium agro-ecological potential“ (Wiener, 1988:69).

---

7 It is estimated that by the mid-1990s land prices had increased three-fold since the late 1980s (ODA, 1996).
However, immediately after ESAP began, the country was hit by the worst drought of the twentieth century in the growing season of 1991/1992. The harvest of 1992 was pitiful: maize production fell to just one fifth of the average for the previous five years (Table 3.3). To make matters worse, the GMB had – on the advice of the World Bank and IMF – just sold off most of its grain stocks as one of the measures to cut down on public spending (FFSSA, 2004:18). The drought had serious consequences but mass starvation was offset through combined relief efforts by the state assisted by donors. The costs incurred by the state in providing food relief were enormous and hence any immediate plans to bring public spending into balance were put on hold. During this period, Zimbabwe began importing food for the first time since independence (Table 3.3). This began in the 1991/1992 marketing season, when the country imported 83,171 tonnes of maize (Masanganise, 2002:10).

Table 3.3: Production, Exports and Imports of Maize 1991 – 1999 (metric tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketing year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Total Production for year</th>
<th>Percentage of exports to total production (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>414,381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,993,800</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>230,219</td>
<td>83,171</td>
<td>1,585,800</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,845,000</td>
<td>361,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>396,119</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>2,011,850</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>597,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,326,200</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>44,102</td>
<td>101,237</td>
<td>839,600</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>329,182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,609,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>310,327</td>
<td>390,719</td>
<td>2,192,170</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>304,953</td>
<td>188,105</td>
<td>1,418,030</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The highest imports were recorded in the 1992/1993 season, following the declining harvests of 1992, when close to two million tonnes of maize was imported. At a fluctuating level, Zimbabwe was able to export some of its grain to countries like Malawi and Mozambique during the 1990s. As an average, the exports amounted to 15% of total production levels for a season (Masanganise, 2002:10).

As noted earlier, the bulk of the maize produced came from communal farmers, a situation that had started taking shape in the 1980s and increased in the 1990s as commercial farmers under ESAP shifted production away from food crops. By the mid-1990s, a third of commercial farmers had become involved in horticulture, eco-tourism, game ranching and ostrich rearing (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:176). Communal farmers also benefited from
the improved access to export markets, especially through cotton, tobacco and paprika production (FFSSA, 2004: 18).

The diversification away from grain crops by commercial farmers was significant for two reasons. First of all, Zimbabwe’s ability to remain “self sufficient” in food at a national level became increasingly dependent upon farmers in communal areas. Secondly, food production became vulnerable to five yearly droughts, especially in the small-scale (peasant) sector which, while producing 70% of the staple foods (maize, groundnuts, small grains) relied almost exclusively on rain-fed farming (Moyo et al., 2003:1). Commercial farmers however continued to dominate the production of wheat, as it is a winter crop which requires irrigation and the greater proportion of irrigation infrastructure was located on commercial farms.

Despite the bulk of the country’s domestic food needs being met by small-scale farmers, communal areas continued to face the problem of food insecurity. In the 1990s, communal areas experienced a significant drop in both food access and availability as compared to the 1980s (Moyo et al., 2003:53; Masanganise, 2002:17). In terms of food availability, 50% of the country’s 174 communal areas did not produce sufficient food to meet local household needs. As noted in the earlier reference to Zimbabwe’s “smallholder miracle” success story, the benefits and outcomes of government agricultural policies in the 1980s only benefitted communal lands located within high rainfall areas, which constituted a mere 15% of the total population in communal areas.

With regards to reduced food access in communal locations, under ESAP the producer prices of food crops (especially maize) dropped in real terms during the 1990s as government support prices and subsidies were removed and the Zimbabwe dollar devalued, and this reduced income flows into households. The liberalisation of agricultural markets had a negative impact on the communal lands in particular (even though liberalisation gave farmers more marketing options). For example, the removal of price controls increased the prices of inputs against a decrease in producer prices. At the same time, accessing markets became a bigger challenge due to inadequate transport or high transport costs. Overall, agricultural support and infrastructure continued to be heavily skewed towards the large-scale commercial sector. In fact, this support increased in favour
of the commercial sector, as it produced the bulk of the country’s export crops and was considered by government as vital for the success of the SAP.

These conditions created a vicious cycle of poverty in communal areas and saw communal households – which were already experiencing problems in producing enough food for their own requirements – unable to purchase the food available on the markets. Coupled with this, communal areas were experiencing increasing population densities on already marginal land and this was lowering productivity. These trends were more prevalent in the drier northern, southern and western parts of the country, where communities had been receiving food relief for years (Masanganise, 2002: 18).

The state of landlessness amongst the peasantry was worsened by the adoption of ESAP-driven agrarian policies, which did not benefit the Zimbabwean peasantry but instead helped to polarise national and local politics and exacerbate extremes of wealth (Moyo, 2004c:3). ESAP’s economic and agrarian policies privileged the use of land for growing export cash crops, and the conversion of large pieces of farming land to exclusively wildlife and nature-based land uses (such as conservancies and eco-tourism); this resulted in the underdevelopment of the national market (Moyo, 2004c:4), as these sectors were targeted specifically at foreign markets and the profits generated were not always used for the development of local areas and communities. As Moyo (2000:6) notes, “together with transnational capital, white agrarian interests controlled key sectors such as tourism, forestry, commodity exports and the narrow agro-industrial sector underlying the urban political economy”. With white farmers reaping the benefits of these policies, local black capital also began to lobby for specific kinds of land reform in order for them to obtain the benefits offered by structural adjustment (Murisa, 2008:123).

In the end, ESAP failed to live up to any promise of rural development and this brought the land question back onto the development agenda, as the livelihoods of the rural poor continued to diminish. Specifically, ESAP offered little in the way of addressing “the key constraints facing small-scale farmers such as discriminatory land and financial markets, distorted water rights, and lack of access to essential infrastructure for more effective land use” (Moyo, 2000a:11), thereby limiting export-led growth in commodity production within the communal sector. Land reform policy under ESAP in fact placed emphasis on “capable” and “productive” farmers as opposed to the “landlessness”. The policy sought to
acquire land for both peasants and capitalists, but greater emphasis was placed on acquiring land for the interests of black capital. In this respect, Yeros (2002:34) notes that „the lobbying done by the elite indigenous people resulted in the racial substitution formula for the development of capitalist formula”.

Structural adjustment also affected levels of remittances to (and levels of investment in) communal lands. ESAP policies resulted in massive retrenchments within the urban areas which saw workers turning to rural areas as a means of survival. This placed added pressure on both communal and resettled household incomes. It became common for urban households to turn to their more successful kin in resettlement areas for shelter and assistance. Resettlement areas began to carry an enormous share of the welfare burden brought about by the poor macro-economic management under ESAP (Kinsey, 2002:629). Within both resettlement and communal areas, opportunities for household diversification to allow farmers to finance their agricultural operations through off-farm jobs were a possibility; but this had no effect as rural employment was not available and rural farming livelihoods became more demanding and difficult (Kinsey, 2002:629).

These problems highlighted the need for more vigorous land redistribution. However, the government was in a precarious position as market-based land reform undermined the compulsory acquisition of land, despite the constitutional amendments of 1992. As a result, less urgency was attached to resolving the country’s land question, with less than 20,000 households receiving land between 1990 and 1997 (Sachikonye, 2003:231). Instead attention, as noted, shifted towards the interests of the „capable indigenous elites” as a counterweight to the established „white agrarian bourgeoisie” (Moyo, 2000a:12). Through market-based land reform in the late 1990s, black capital in the form of 800 black farmers had established itself in the LSCF sector (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:185) through either land purchases or leases.

Agriculture in communal areas during the 1990s was still characterised by „small land holdings” (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:12) and the size of land was problematic for production purposes. On a national scale, 25% of households in communal areas had land holdings of less than one hectare; 45% between 1.0 – 2.5 hectares; 20% have between 2.6 – 4.0 hectares and only 10% over 4 hectares (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:13). This meant that a significant proportion of communal households, which comprised a population of
between five to six million people, did not have „access to adequate operational land to allow for proper crop husbandry, i.e. rotation and replenishment of fertility through fallow‟ (FFSSA, 2004:30), yet the country was increasingly dependent on this group of farmers to produce the bulk of the nation‟s grain. Simultaneously, commercial farmers were sitting on over three million hectares of underutilised land and studies (Deininger et al., 2004:1698) showed that redistribution of land would increase productivity on underutilized or unused land.

3.7 Appraisal of Land and Agrarian Reforms from 1980 to late 1990s

When land reform began in 1980, participants targeted for resettlement were the poor, the landless, the economically disadvantaged and those affected directly by the liberation war. It is estimated that over 80% of beneficiaries during the pre-2000 land resettlement period met these criteria (Kinsey, 1999:181). Families selected for resettlement were then assigned land in a random order (on a former large-scale farm), resulting in planned villages comprised of a collection of strangers.

There have been very few long-term studies carried out on the outcomes of land reform in Zimbabwe. Kinsey (1999:175) suggests that the benefits or otherwise of programmes which involve large-scale resettlement are unlikely to become apparent and assessable in less than a generation. Despite this, sweeping statements on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme were made within just a few years of its inception; many of these statements were exceedingly negative, yet some evidence existed that small-scale farming could be a powerful source of growth in Zimbabwe (Eicher, 1995:813). A myth grew in political thinking, promoted by vigorous lobbying, that the beneficiaries of the land reform programme were the least productive farmers in the country and hence undeserving of the land they had been „given” (Kinsey, 1999:175).

The nature and timeframe used to analyse the outcomes of land resettlement has often been contested. Often assessments of land reforms, especially in Zimbabwe, have been premature, incomprehensive and made use of inappropriate criteria. Kinsey (1999: 173) highlights that the design of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme „indicates that full economic maturity even of the earliest phase, which was concluded in 1985, will not be attained until the year 2000”. However, there have been evaluations carried out for example by the (British) Overseas Development Administration (ODA) (Cusworth and
Walker, 1988) in 1988 which indicated that, in the short term, the resettlement programme had made significant strides towards achieving its objectives.

Deininger et al. (2004:1697) note that an assessment of the performance of Zimbabwe’s programme of the 1980s and 1990s depends on whether one takes a „per household or per capita perspective“. An assessment from a household perspective sees land reform as highly beneficial. Kinsey et al. (1998) report that resettled households they studied in a panel survey from 1983 to 1997 „had been given access to superior resources (i.e. land) and have used it to build up a base of assets particularly livestock“. Gunning, Hooddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000:131) in a study which examined the income dynamics for a panel of households resettled between 1980 and 1982 on former LCSFs had four main findings. These were:

(i) over a 13-year period (1983-96) there has been an impressive accumulation of assets and a dramatic increase of crop incomes; (ii) the rise of crop incomes is partly due to asset accumulation but largely to increased asset returns; (iii) differences between households in initial conditions, such as previous farming experience, have few persistent effects; and (iv) income growth has been widely shared, income inequality has fallen sharply and the largest percentage increases in incomes are recorded by households that initially had the lowest incomes.

There are key achievements which land reform did manage during this period, especially when looked at in the context of the main objectives of the programme as they were originally formulated. Resettled families in the 1980s had access to more arable land and better soils, and to grazing land which was not under pressure of livestock (Kinsey, 2002:615). Resettled areas also had – compared to communal lands – better access to services such as seasonal credit, agricultural extension and veterinary assistants (Kinsey, 2002:616). At the same time, because they were dispersed throughout the countryside, resettled farmers experienced a reduced access to markets, compared to the densely populated communal areas. Kinsey (1999:182-195), in his long-term study carried out from 1983 to 1998 of 400 resettled households in three sites (Mupfurudzi, Sengezi, and Mutanda) notes some clear distinctions between resettled households and households in communal areas. In particular, resettlement areas had larger household sizes than
communal areas, communal areas had smaller pieces of land planted and lower productivity levels than resettlement areas.

In fact, Kinsey’s (1999:183) study found that, in terms of farm income, resettled households on average earned 6.8 times what communal farmers earned. This was due to the fact that resettled households marketed 78% of their crop as compared to communal households which only marketed 53% of their crop. But it was soon realised in policy circles that resettled households, for sustainable livelihoods, could not rely on their income from crop sales alone. Initial planning around resettlement ignored the importance of off-farm income sources, such as remittances and transfers from urban areas to rural areas. Kinsey did note that whilst resettlement households continued to receive remittances, cash transfers were 60% higher for communal households compared to resettled households. It seems that resettled household heads were initially prohibited (or at least discouraged) from engaging in urban employment and non-agricultural employment in the initial stages of resettlement in the 1980s, and that this was reversed in the early 1990s after „repeated drought, growing default rates on seasonal loans, leading to reduced use of purchased inputs” (Kinsey, 2002:617). A common phenomenon of households that rely on rain-fed agriculture has been that they experience enormous fluctuations in annual income (Kinsey, 2002:620); this leaves households vulnerable to downward variations in consumption, which at low-income levels can be a serious risk to survival. Non-agricultural employment therefore offered the opportunity for rural households to reduce the shock of reduced levels of agricultural income in the event of extreme weather conditions.

It seems clear then that the shift in land policy in the early 1990s sidelined the rural poor and hence resulted in further critiques of the land programme. Under structural adjustment, land redistribution was structured to meet the needs of black capitalist farmers and the productive smallholder community, as well as to alleviate land pressure in some communal areas. Importantly, one of the salient features of the Land Acquisition Act of 1990 was that the criterion to be used in selecting resettlement beneficiaries was no longer social need but rather proven farming experience and competency (AIAS, 2007:8). There was an increasing ideological shift in the objectives of land reform ushered in by structural adjustment, where criteria for access to land shifted from „landlessness” to „capability and productivity” (Moyo, 1995:280).
In addition, land reform in Zimbabwe prior to 2000 is seen as further perpetuating patriarchal land policies, as it favoured male beneficiaries. Government policy in the early years of resettlement stated that candidates for resettlement had to either be married or widowed, and this discriminated against single/unmarried women (Ruswa, 2007:6). Tshuma (1997:82) notes that, at first sight, women satisfied the criteria for resettlement (and for having permits issued in their name) but in practice only widows and unmarried women with dependents qualified to have land allocated to them. In the case where women were married, permits were issued in the name of the husband. Given that research has shown that women in Africa have borne the brunt of rural poverty, land reform in Zimbabwe continued the marginalization of women and, as a result, a group of well deserving beneficiaries was ignored (Ruswa, 2007:6).

In summary, analyses of the outcomes of land reform from 1980 to the late 1990s have been varied and often extreme opposites. In some instances, the pre-2000 era of land reform has been seen as the „Golden Era”; others, while acknowledging that land reform made some important achievements, claim that it has failed to meet a number of its key objectives or even undermined agricultural production and exports. But Moyo, Helliker and Murisa (2008:11) rightly argue that land reform in Zimbabwe prior to 2000 was „exceeding limited” and hence not an effective strategy for addressing the historical land imbalances and alleviating poverty. During this period, land reform in Zimbabwe was heavily influenced by external forces due to the Lancaster House provisions and the adoption of ESAP in 1991, which „entailed significant global pressure on the post-colonial state” to minimise the land redistribution process (Moyo, Helliker and Murisa, 2008:11). In this light, proponents of land reform argue for an enlargement of the resettlement programme to help redress the unequal distribution of land resources, to rectify acute land scarcity in communal areas, and to provide economic opportunities in – by the mid-1990s – a shrinking economy.

By 1997, when government started engaging in significant policy rethinking around land in order to move beyond the ESAP phase, the GoZ had managed to resettle 71,000 families on 3.5 million hectares of land which it had purchased or acquired (United Nations, 2001:67). Whilst GoZ had failed to meet its own standards of resettling 162,000 families on nine million hectares, it had been able by global standards to carry out a successful land resettlement programme. But the needs of the landless and the poor continued to be
overlooked. Repeated attempts up to the late 1990s to address the land question in Zimbabwe envisioned that some of the commercial land would be set aside for indigenous commercial farmers. However, this involved merely a transfer of ownership from a few white hands to a few black hands (Dashwood, 2000:164) and made no concerted attempt to alleviate landlessness and rural poverty.

3.8 Post-ESAP Land and Agrarian Reforms

In the second half of the 1990s, as the negative impacts of structural adjustment continued to be experienced, the GoZ – in facing internal pressure – abandoned the envisaged second stage of structural adjustment and instead adopted a „heterodox” economic reform programme called Zimbabwe Programme of Economic and Social Transformation (Zimprest) in 1997. The aim of this programme was to correct the weaknesses of ESAP, especially around the issue of rural development (Dashwood, 2000:164). Under Zimprest, the GoZ was supposed to play a greater role in the economy and in driving development in Zimbabwe.

The general populace had increasingly expressed their frustration with the outcomes of ESAP and the lack of benefits from the land reform programme. From 1997 onwards, worker strikes gripped the nation and occurred across several sectors including „construction, commercial, hotel and catering, clothing, cement, railways, urban councils, and post and telecommunications” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005: 186). Farm workers also downed their tools for the first time to demand better wages and working conditions. In addition, the ruling party faced pressure from the National War Veterans Association which brought the demands of war veterans back into the political arena; they were incensed at the abuse and misuse of their War Veterans Compensation Fund and were demanding that the state compensate them from the national budget. According to Moyo and Yeros (2005:186), this demand was indicative of „a class split within the ruling party between the elites at the forefront of indigenisation and the lower echelons, on the other, who had never been accommodated by the post-independence state and many of whom were indeed living in poverty”.

Realising that they were facing a serious challenge from within, the Government gave into the demands of the war veterans and gave them a large compensation package outside of the national budget. The state went a step further by bringing the land question back to the
forefront of the policy arena, notably in designating (in October 1997) 1,471 white commercial farms for compulsory acquisition and promising 20% of these farms to war veterans (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:187). These events however had a negative effect on the economy, sending it into a downward spiral, which saw the Zimbabwean dollar crashing by 74% in one day (November 14, 1997). Soon, the IMF plunged the economy into further decline by suspending balance of payment support. This all occurred simultaneously with the rise of localised land occupations in the countryside. The occupations were organised and led by „dissident ruling party members, traditional leaders, displaced workers, and the war veterans association” (Moyo, 2001:321). Government moved in to try and control the occupations (often, with force) and promised a new phase of accelerating land reform.

The threat of compulsory acquisition brought the land question back onto the local and international development agenda. It gave rise to yet another round of negotiations with foreign donors, including the World Bank and the British Government (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:187). A major Donors Conference was held in Harare in 1998, where donors stressed that if land reform was to proceed it had to be carried out in a „transparent, fair and sustainable manner, with regard to respect for the law and broadened stakeholder and beneficiary participation” (Sachikonye, 2003:232). A tense agreement was reached between the GoZ and donors in which both compulsory and market acquisition would take place as well as other complementary approaches, but the agreement reached was overtaken by events on the ground as a wave of „high profile occupations swept through the country” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005: 187). The state used this new wave of occupations as evidence that the land question had not been addressed. However, the state did step in to regain control of the situation on the ground and it made assurances that land grievances would be met through negotiations between the state, commercial farmers and foreign donors.

Despite the agreement at the Donors Conference that the government would institute land reform through both compulsory and market acquisition, very little progress was made between 1998 and 2000. Attempts to acquire farms were hindered by legal challenges made by large scale commercial farmers, who through vigorous lobbying efforts internationally, also received widespread support from the West. The state hesitated in acquiring the 1,471 and was forced to delist 625 farms, which failed to meet the criteria the state had set up for designation; as well a significant proportion of land owners were able
to successfully challenge their designation in the courts (Murisa, 2008:126). Politically, the ruling ZANU-PF party was facing a serious challenge to its governance, with the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which quickly formed an alliance with large scale commercial farmers and international donors in challenging the state’s land reform agenda. Within this tense climate, a new wave of land occupations started taking place across Zimbabwe in the year 2000. Clearly, the land and agrarian question remained unresolved.

3.9 The Re-emergence of Land Occupations

Whilst land occupations have been synonymous with land reform history in Zimbabwe, a new and more intense wave of land occupations began in February 2000 following the rejection of the draft constitution (Moyo, 2001:318) and continued into 2001. The government was unable to pursue clauses which it had introduced in the draft constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition and a system of compensation for improvements made on the land as opposed to paying compensation for the actual land. Moyo (2001:314) describes this period of land occupation as the „climax of a longer, less public and dispersed struggle over land shortages and land demand in the post-independence period”.

The land occupations were led by war veterans together with the rural landless (those who had failed to benefit from earlier land reform programmes), farm workers and the unemployed in urban areas. They initially began in the province of Masvingo and spread to other provinces of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Whilst the occupations in 1998 were more sporadic, Sadomba (2008:160) notes that the occupations after February 2000 were a „spontaneous wave of occupations which engulfed the whole country”. At their height, in June 2000, approximately 800 farms around the country were occupied. As a result of these occupations, the land question was once again brought back to the development agenda. The occupations focused initially on white farms but also began to include black capitalists and political elites (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:190). In the beginning they focused on underutilized land, but soon also incorporated productive land, especially land under multiple land ownership or foreign ownership or which was adjacent to communal areas (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:190). Peri-urban land began to be occupied, especially when the urban-poor and petty bourgeoisie began to participate in occupations (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:189). The nation-wide land movement was to set the stage and tone for major developments in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 onwards, as the occupations were a
precursor to the FTLRP and the GoZ’s official announcement to resettle 30,000 families on one million hectares within a year (Murisa, 2008:127).

This period of land occupations attracted a myriad of attention both within and outside of Zimbabwe. The occupations were referred to as land seizures or land “grabs” by the independent media to emphasise the negative political action of the war veterans, whilst the GoZ referred to the occupations as “land demonstrations” in an attempt to emphasise the symbolic aspect of the need to redress the injustices of colonialism and for the state to acquire land in order to address the grievances of its population (Moyo, 2001:320). The processes were often characterised by tense and sometimes violent confrontations between land occupiers and LSCF owners and their workers. Moyo and Yeros (2005:191) estimate that violence occurred on about 300 farms depending on the response of the farmers and their workers. There were also opportunistic and criminal elements within this process that included individuals claiming to be war veterans or members of the ruling party, who in turn would try to extort money from farmers, poach wildlife and firewood or assume sharecropping rights over farmers’ crops or even used pieces of land for their own cropping activities (Moyo, 2001:325).

During this period of land occupations, the state and ruling party were lagging behind as processes aimed at redressing unequal land holding structures were unfolding on the ground. The state tried to contain and co-opt the land occupation movement within the broader land acquisition programme. The launch of the FTLRP programme in 2000 was by far the most far-reaching attempt by the state to curtail the growing movement, by formalising land occupations which had occurred as well as beginning a strategy of land redistribution which – although controlled by the state – was aimed at addressing the grievances of the landless.

3.10 Conclusion

The events discussed in this chapter and their outcomes provide the context out of which the FTLRP in Zimbabwe emerged. Land and agrarian reform are processes that have a long history in Zimbabwe. However, while significant strides have been made to address the challenges faced by smallholder farmers in the communal areas, it was evident that the challenges faced by the majority of these farmers from the 1980s (such as landlessness, food insecurity and diminishing livelihoods) continued right up to 2000. Whilst the
agrarian reforms were important, key to their sustenance and success – and any attempts to address the challenge of poverty and landlessness – was a radical land reform which would address the skewed and racially imbalanced land ownership patterns in Zimbabwe. Land reform especially under the “willing-buyer willing-seller” strategy failed to produce this change as well as address the wider rural development challenges, as evidenced by the re-emergence of land occupations from 1998. The next chapter seeks to analyse in particular the FTLRP and to assess whether the radical shift in land ownership patterns has been able to address the ongoing challenges faced by smallholder farmers.
4.0 FAST TRACK LAND REFORM AND THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe and discusses the key debates that have emerged with the implementation and completion of the FTLRP process. The FTLRP debates have been highly polarised and, given the highly contested nature of Fast Track, it is important to discuss the issues raised in the debates to understand the macro social environment under which land reform beneficiaries are developing their livelihoods.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the history of land reform in Zimbabwe until FTLRP can be traced back to the 1980s when the country gained its independence. Between 1980 and 1996 the GoZ implemented a market-led land reform process under the Land Reform and Resettlement Phase I. This process was based on the „willing-buyer, willing-seller” model agreed to at the Lancaster House talks and was enforced in the constitution of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1990. Structural adjustment in the 1990s slowed down the pace of land reform even more and the result was that, even though Zimbabwe had made great strides in resettling households, the needs of the poor and marginalised rural populace continued to be ignored.

Land reform between 1997 and 2000 saw the government attempt to acquire land through expropriation with the designation of commercial farms for resettlement. However, government faced massive resistance from the predominantly white commercial farming sector which used the courts to obstruct government’s challenge. As government (led by ZANU-PF) failed to address the land needs of the rural poor through the market-led land reform, land occupations began taking place at an even greater intensity and scale as compared to land occupations which took place in the 1980s. Government also faced external pressures from donors who continued to push for conditional market-led land reform which invariably involved continuous consultations, transparency and adherence to the rule of law (van den Brink, 2000).

Following the rejection of the proposed new constitution in the February 2000 referendum, a constitutional amendment and a modified Land Acquisition Act were promulgated in
April 2000 to bring about land designation and compulsory acquisition without compensation. The same Act also declared Britain „liable“ to pay compensation. The British government – along with other donors – had indicated in the past a willingness to fund land reform, but only if reform deliberately targets and benefits the poor. At least one delegation was sent by the Zimbabwean government to London to request funding from the British, but was unsuccessful. Despite (if not because of) this setback, the GoZ decided to „go it alone using its own limited resources to settle people“ (Zimbabwean Vice-President, Joseph Miska, July 2000 quoted in Thomas, 2003:701).

This chapter will provide a brief outline of the process of FTLRP, highlighting the emerging agrarian structure and the contested nature of this period of land reform in Zimbabwe. This will provide the contextual backdrop to understanding the political and socio-economic challenges being faced by newly resettled A1 households and how this, in turn, has affected agricultural productivity and food security. The chapter will also illustrate the measures which have been taken by the state, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), private sector and NGO players to support resettled households and start the process of reviving agricultural production.

4.2 The Process of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

The FTLRP was officially launched on 15 July 2000. In terms of this programme, government initially sought to acquire one million hectares and resettle 30,000 families. Thereafter, the FTLRP would be completed in three years with the additional acquisition of four million hectares of commercial land in which about 120,000 families would be resettled. However, the programme was implemented with no budgets, equipment or personnel to achieve this target; in fact, it seemed as though „the target was set in response to political pressure from war veterans and popular demand from chiefs and other community leaders” (Murisa, 2008:127).

The “fast track”, state-driven approach to land reform resulted in extensive land transfers by 2004 (Moyo, 2007:344). This phase of land reform took „centre stage in Zimbabwe‟s politics and economy and has polarized land policy discourses nationally and internationally‟” (Moyo, 2005b:2). The FTLRP is an antithesis of the earlier period of land reform in the 1980s and early 1990s, which was characterized by a slow pace of redistribution under the willing-buyer, willing-seller market led system. Debate still
continues to this day on the motives behind the FTLRP, that is, „whether it was really intended to address the still racially skewed land distribution or whether it was a political gimmick meant to bolster the waning support of the ruling ZANU PF party” (Moyo and Chambati, 2007:2), and whether it was necessary to deviate from Zimbabwe’s commercial agricultural success story, despite noticeable potential in the smallholder sector.

From the viewpoint of those opposed to the reform process, the FTLRP in its entirety (including the land allocation process) is characterized as „chaotic” and lacking orderliness, implying a „free for some” situation (self-allocation of land through illegal land occupations) in accessing land in the former LSCF sector (Marongwe, 2003; Sachikonye, 2003; Davies, 2004; Masiwa and Chipungu, 2004). However, other scholars (Moyo, 2005b:22) argue that „the land reform process gained structure as the state moved to adopt and co-opt the land occupation movements” through the establishment of district and provincial land committees in 2000\(^8\), and as the state made revisions to the country’s land laws to facilitate fast track. In the end, government embarked on fast track, facing a myriad of challenges both internally and externally. In light of these challenges, the President of Zimbabwe in May 2003 commissioned a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Charles Utete to provide an assessment of the FTLRP\(^9\). The final report presented by the Committee (commonly referred to as the „Utete Report”) notes that the FTLRP was a fundamental departure from previous philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land as it was undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on domestic resources (Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC), 2003:18).

According to the PLRC Report (2003:18), the key elements of the FTLRP were:

- Speeding up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than five million hectares of land for resettlement;
- Accelerating the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler emplacement on this land;

\(^8\) These committees were made up of local Ministry of Lands” officials, war veterans, ruling party officials, traditional healers and security organs involving fifteen to thirty people.

\(^9\) The main terms of reference for the Committee were: to assess progress achieved in the implementation of the Land Reform Programme as a whole; to outline any on-going challenges and constraints in the implementation of the Programme in order to successfully address the more fundamental agrarian reform agenda; and to recommend policy interventions and other measures necessary for the undertaking of targeted crop and livestock production.
- The provision of only limited basic infrastructure (e.g. boreholes, dip tanks and access roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and agricultural inputs);
- Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces to ensure the reform programme was comprehensively and evenly implemented; and
- The provision of secondary infrastructure such as schools, clinics and rural service centres as soon as resources became available.

Under the FTLRP, land was acquired compulsorily under the amended Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10). The land targeted for acquisition was, notably, derelict and under-utilised land, land under multiple ownership, foreign-owned land and land contiguous to communal areas (PLRC, 2003:19). Land which was exempt from acquisition included: plantation farms engaged in large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit, sugar cane, etc; agro-industrial properties involved in the integrated production, processing and/or marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products and seed multiplication; properties with Export Processing Zones (EPZs) permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) certificates; farms belonging to church or mission organisations; and farms subject to Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) (PLRC, 2003:19).

The FTLRP also took into account and allowed for the regularisation of maximum farm sizes as had been set out in Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999, which had specifically indicated the maximum permissible land sizes per natural region (Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Maximum Size (Ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.2.1 Legal framework guiding the FTLRP process

The legal framework governing land acquisition had to be significantly amended to take account of the policy environment in which fast track was being implemented. The first major step the GoZ took was to amend the constitution in 2000 (Constitutional
Amendment No. 16 of 2000) to allow the state to compulsorily acquire land and place the financial obligations of paying compensation of land acquired on the British Government. The GoZ was henceforth only obliged to pay full compensation for any (infrastructural) improvements that had been made on the land of acquired properties. The amendment came into effect in April 2000 and it significantly extended the grounds on which land could be compulsorily acquired. Buckle (2002:35) however views this constitutional change as one which gave President Mugabe „unchecked executive“ powers which allowed the government to disregard the rule of law and the courts, thereby unilaterally changing laws (and centralising power) under the guise of land reform.

The Land Acquisition Act in 2000 was also changed to reflect the changes made in the constitution (Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act15/2000). Soon after the change, on 2 June 2000, 804 white-owned LSCF were gazetted for compulsory acquisition. Land owners, occupiers, and any person with an interest in the gazetted properties and who wished to object to their compulsory acquisition had to lodge their objection in writing with the Minister of Lands and Agriculture by 2 July 2000 (Meredith, 2003:195 and 197; Human Rights Watch, 2002: 12-13; Buckle, 2002:129). The amended Land Acquisition Act also instituted the policy of „one man, one farm” together with „swap and subdivision” options; in the case of the latter, farmers were given the option to offer the government a subdivision or portion of a gazetted farm (PLRC, 2003:20).

In addition, government enacted the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection) Act in June 2001, to protect land occupiers (see Section 3.8) on land not yet acquired by government (meanwhile, government was making steps to regularise the process of land acquisition). The Act protected land occupiers for a year and nullified all court orders (secured by commercial farmers) that had been issued to evict land occupiers from farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). The Act was however repealed in 2006 by the Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) (Act No. 8/06), making it illegal for anyone to occupy land without lawful authority.

In November 2001, the Land Acquisition Act was amended to alter the procedure of acquiring land. The amendment allowed the ownership of the designated land to be transferred immediately to the acquiring authority (GoZ), regardless of pending court
actions against such an acquisition. The immediate transfer of ownership served as a ninety-day eviction notice for the previous farm owners, and gave the GoZ the right to halt the farming operations on designated farms at any time after the serving of a Section 8 notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (Meredith, 2003:223; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). The Act was amended again in 2004, to counter efforts by commercial farmers to offer alternative land for resettlement as opposed to acquired land (Chidziva, 2007:11). The Constitution was amended again in 2005 (Constitutional Amendment No. 17-2005) to counter growing litigations which were slowing down the land reform process. The amendment ousted the jurisdiction of courts with regards to judgements over land acquisitions, though farmers could still contest issues around compensation.

Aside from the legal framework concerning the actual acquisition process, the GoZ put into place measures to protect against the destruction and theft of farm equipment. In 2004, the State gazetted the Acquisition of Farm Equipment and Material Act (No. 7/2004) to allow for the acquisition of farm equipment and material; in addition, it prohibits the damage of any irrigation equipment or material and, once the farm equipment and material has been identified, the farmer cannot sell, donate, demolish or damage or alter in any manner the farm equipment (Chidziva, 2007:11).

4.3 The New Agrarian Landscape

The FTLRP has transformed Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure from an unequal bi-modal distribution structure to a, relatively speaking, tri-modal structure (Moyo, 2004b:12; Moyo and Yeros, 2005:195). Under the FTLRP, resettlement was to take place in terms of two settlement variants (put forward in the 1997 Land Policy), namely, the A1 and A2 models. The A1 farming category was designed with the specific aim of addressing the needs of landless, land-short and congested households through the decongestion of communal areas (Moyo, 2004b:22). However, 20% of the land was reserved for war veterans. Beneficiaries would be resettled in either villages or self-contained small farm units, of about five hectares in size, depending on the natural region (PLRC, 2003:20). Farmers in this sector would therefore tend to grow crops more for subsistence purposes than for commercial enterprise. The A2 scheme is a commercial farming land-use model aimed at increasing the number of black indigenous commercial farmers. All citizens of Zimbabwe could apply to be resettled according to this model, provided they have entrepreneurial skills, some form of agricultural experience, as well as financial resources (PLRC,
2003:20). It was envisioned that, with the increased number of farmers with access to better land, Zimbabwe would see a boost in its production base and economy.

Controversy surrounds the nature of the beneficiaries, especially those who were allocated land under the A2 scheme, with Marongwe (2003), Bernstein (2005) and Sachikonye (2005) arguing that the land allocation process was characterized by chaos and corruption – the bulk of the beneficiaries of land reform are said to be high ranking ZANU PF government officials and elites, and not landless peasants. They also argue that peasants who were amongst the initial land occupiers were evicted or displaced by these officials. However, empirical studies carried out by the AIAS, and government statistics, show that land beneficiaries under the FTLRP are highly differentiated and not limited to the so-called elites (Table 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Class</th>
<th>Land Tenure</th>
<th>Farms/Households</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Hectares (million ha)</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder</td>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>16.400</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old Resettlement</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>141,656</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>1,313,656</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small to Medium Scale Commercial</td>
<td>Old SSCF(^{10})</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small A2</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>22,072</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Scale Commercial</td>
<td>Medium-LargeA2</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black LSCF</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White LSCF</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>4,317</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Estates</td>
<td>Company</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parastatal</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,340,919</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>34,141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the end of 2002, „“fast track” land reform had compulsorily acquired some 10 million hectares of land – approximately 90% of white commercial farm land – and redistributed

---

\(^{10}\) The old Small Scale Commercial Farmers (SSCF) refers to black farmers from the colonial period and those farmers who either had been able to purchase small-scale farms in African Purchase Areas or were allocated land in the earlier phases of post-independence land reform prior to FTLRP.
most of it to 127,000 peasant households and 8,000 middle capitalist farmers” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:188). By 2005, the new landholding structure included approximately 150,000 families or farm units (excluding existing communal farmers) established on the ten million hectares (which had previously been occupied almost exclusively by a mere 4,500 white commercial farmers on approximately 5,000 units). The overall landholding structure had now been differentiated to incorporate smallholder farmers, small-, medium- and large-scale commercial farm holdings, and corporate estates.

From Table 4.2 it is clear that the smallholder sector is now dominating the agrarian landscape. The average plot size ranges from one to thirty hectares (depending on the natural region) with family arable land varying from 0.2 to 5.0 hectares plus common grazing land. The small- to medium-scale commercial sector comprises the old Small Scale Commercial Farmers (SSCF); as well as small scale A2 farmers with plot sizes ranging from 30 to 150 hectares. Overall, they total 1.0% of farm households. The large-scale commercial units (0.3%) comprise the larger A2 farmers and some remaining LCSF farms, with plot sizes ranging from 150 to 400 hectares in Natural Regions I and II and up to 1,500 hectares in Natural Region IV. Finally, corporate estates range from 1,000 to 1,500 hectares (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:197).

4.4 Political and Socio-Economic Impacts of FTLRP

There is general agreement between scholars that Zimbabwe is facing a social crisis. A significant amount of literature has been written about this crisis and its causes. The history of the crisis has often been traced back to the 1990s on two fronts, namely, the adoption of ESAP and the related macro-economic crisis, and the rise of a broad-based political opposition in urban areas which challenged the ruling ZANU-PF (Helliker, 2006:194). Under these circumstances, the ruling party found itself in a crisis of „profitability” and „legitimacy” causing it to feel cornered and become increasingly authoritarian (Raftopoulos, 2002:418), as the political regime sought to solidify and reconstruct its support base. The loss of the constitutional referendum in 2000, according to Moore (2001:255), proved to be „the straw that started to break the ZANU PF”s camels back” and precipitated the FTLRP process, although the incessant demands from an „aroused” peasantry were not far from the minds of the political elite (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:190). There was a pronounced political hardening of the radical nationalist social forces and an escalation of demands to address land reform as a matter of sovereign right,
pride and reparation, rather than as a mere matter of poverty alleviation (Moyo, 2000a:5) or even for that matter productivity (Helliker, 2007:195).

The debate over FTLRP and its outcomes has been polarised, and has regularly lacked any empirical grounding. Moyo and Yeros (2005:194) note that the controversy has pitted two self-enclosed camps against each other, with one camp “denouncing the land reform merely as an “assault on the state” without a class analysis of the neo-colonial state, civil society or the land occupation movement and its nationalism” (see for instance Bond and Manyana, 2002; Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jansen, 2003). Brian Raftopoulos (as a leading member of this camp) argues that a key aspect of the current economic crisis “relates to the problems created by the land occupations, and the massive financial, infrastructural and extension support required by the new settlers to transform the settlements into sustainable productive resources” (Raftopoulos 2002: 426).

Moore (2001) likewise claims that accelerated reform was never located within a broad macro-economic strategy because it was driven by political imperatives. Further, and contrary to the ruling party’s sloganeering about „the land is the economy”, the economic crisis in the late 1990s was not even rooted in the unresolved land question. These analyses (by Moore and others) have tended to dwell on the immediate challenges of reduced productivity on farms and the legality of the acquisitions and the compensation process, and are informed by narrow human rights concerns and neo-liberal ideologies of property rights which disregard the land rights of the majority population and ignore the grassroots demand and mobilisation for land (Murisa, 2008:135).

The other camp, represented in large part by ZANU-PF intellectuals (such as Ibbo Mandaza), has „defended the land reform but obscured the class struggles within the liberation movement and celebrated fast track as the culmination of “black empowerment” in line with the accumulation priorities of the indigenisation lobby” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:194). For their part, Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros have often been criticised for simply reproducing this romanticised interpretation of the FTLRP. However, from my perspective, they seem to offer a more balanced understanding. In this respect, they claim that a „significantly broadened home market, including an enlarged peasantry and an enlarged black capitalist class” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:199) has emerged from the
FTLRP. In particular, the programme has created an expanded number and array of small, medium and large scale farms, effectively transferring ownership from the minority white farmers to new indigenous farmers” (Moyo, 2004c:1) as evidenced by the new agrarian structure illustrated in Table 4.2. Re-peasantization has been the dominant phenomenon under FTLRP (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:195), which is contrary to the global experience where there has been a shrinking of the peasantry as a social class (Bryceson et al., 2000). The expansion of the peasantry, which potentially has the capacity to enhance rural livelihoods, has been in terms of the actual numbers of „A1” farmers.

However, land reform has also brought with it various challenges which cannot be ignored. It has been accompanied by worsening poverty levels, the inability to restore the supply of food to the population (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:195) and increasing international isolation and condemnation of the Zimbabwean state. The economy faces multiple crises, centring on hyperinflation, foreign currency and commodity shortages, the erosion of incomes, increased food insecurity and downsized social services, the halving of production in the real economic sector, and reduced formal employment (Moyo, 2004c:1). The challenges faced have been worsened by severe droughts occurring within the entire Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, especially between 2001 and 2002, and erratic rainfall patterns. According to Richardson (2005:2), Zimbabwe has within a short period of time „gone from a place of hope to one of the grimmest places on earth”, and the main reason for this is the Zimbabwean government’s wrong policy choices, more so with its adoption of the FTLRP in 2000.

The FTLRP has clearly impacted on Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social environment. It is important to analyse these impacts in order to understand how the macro-environment has shaped the lives of land reform beneficiaries. This provides the context for considering the emerging trends and outcomes of the land reform programme.

4.4.1 Political impact of FTLRP

4.4.1.1 International political isolation

The political impact of the FTLRP has both an external and internal dimension. When the Zimbabwean government officially embarked on the FTLRP, it resulted in the isolation of the country from the international community and strained political relations especially with the West. The souring of relationships began in 1997 when Zimbabwe suspended the
structural adjustment programme, began to intervene more forcefully in the land question, intervened militarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and defaulted on debt repayments to the IMF and World Bank (Moyo and Yeros, 2007:184). Relations steadily deteriorated from 1998 to 2000, the height of which was Britain’s renunciation of funding land reform after the International Donors” Conference in 1998. The relations with Britain further worsened after the enactment of Constitutional Amendment Number 16 in 2000, and this sparked a war of words between the British and Zimbabwean governments around the issue of compensation for evicted farmers. The Zimbabwean government had expected that the British government would give £36 million for the land reform programme, but the latter refused to do so (Buckle, 2002:81; PLRC, 2003:16). The British government did not believe that the GoZ was giving priority to land reform to help the country’s poor and landless people, and was also concerned with issues of lack of transparency in the settler identification process (Sarimana, 2005:165).

There was continued conflict between the GoZ and the West and donor community over the processes necessary for effective land reform in Zimbabwe. The donor community felt that Zimbabwe was not committed to implementing a planned, sustainable and effective land reform programme targeted at helping the country’s poor and landless, while the Zimbabwean government felt that the donors” preference for market-based land reform hindered rapid reform, not just in relation to this particular phase of land reform but since independence (Human Rights Watch 2002:41). Subsequent to the radical land reform under the FTLRP, the West has accused the GoZ of using land redistribution as an electioneering gimmick, more so with the rise of formidable opposition to challenge the ruling ZANU-PF party in the form of the MDC (Sarimana, 2005:165). Aside from disagreement on the objectives and type of land reform to be implemented, the World Bank, IMF and Western governments viewed the FTLRP process as unlawful and not within the agreed guidelines of „transparency, consultation, and poverty alleviation orientation” which were recommended at the 1998 Donors Conference.

As government continued the FTRLP process, the IMF, World Bank, Britain and the United States of America (USA) withdrew funding, and the British and American governments instituted sanctions against the Zimbabwean Government and specific Zimbabweans. The sanctions were aimed at promoting democracy and democratic behaviour by the Zimbabwean government as opposed to oppressing its people
(specifically the white community, the opposition and its supporters) (Sarimana, 2005:161-2). The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Bill in January 2001 [signed into Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) in December 2001], which ordered United States representatives on international financial institutions to oppose extensions of loans, bilateral assistance and debt-forgiveness to Zimbabwe. The Act also instructed the United States president to take any action against individuals responsible for politically-motivated violence and the breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005: 42-43; Human Rights Watch, 2002:38). The conditions of this Act would only be reversed once there was a restoration of the rule of law, the respect of property rights, and commitment to equitable, legal and transparent land reforms.

The European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe on 5 October 2000, and the French Ambassador announced (on 15 December 2000) that France would not be funding Zimbabwe’s land reform programme because it was not being implemented within the law (Buckle, 2002:235-241). The IMF and World Bank refused to extend loans to Zimbabwe, and in September 2001 they removed Zimbabwe from the list of countries eligible to use resources under the IMF’s poverty reduction and growth facility; ultimately, the IMF withdrew all technical assistance to Zimbabwe (Sidiropoulos, 2004:113). Throughout this process, the majority of African countries, more so within SADC, had not openly condemned Zimbabwe’s FTLRP.

In response to the above imposed conditions, the Zimbabwean government became more critical of the stance adopted by Western governments and multilateral organizations. The government adopted the stance of seeking to protect its national sovereignty by resisting attempts by outside forces to impose policies. The GoZ led by President Mugabe adopted a militant stance against the West, implementing the full ambit of FTLRP and formalizing the land occupations which had taken place from 2000 onwards, in what Buckle (2002:101) terms a desperate bid by the Mugabe regime to stay in power by appeasing agitated land-hungry masses.

Since the inception of FTLRP and the resultant international fall out, there have been attempts to mediate between the Zimbabwean government and the British and American governments. The Commonwealth in September 2001 convened a committee of nine
Foreign Ministers to meet and discuss the „Zimbabwean Situation” in Abuja, Nigeria. At the end of the meeting, the ministers agreed on the need for the GoZ to address the land question in Zimbabwe in a „transparent and equitable” manner which maintained the rule of law, respect for human rights and democratic principles (Human Rights Watch, 2002:39; PLRC, 2003:18). The GoZ agreed in principle to these conditions; however land occupations still continued. The EU attempted to also mediate on this issue in October 2001, under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement ¹¹.

Simultaneously, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union) – at a Heads of State and Government meeting in July 2001 held in Zambia – pressed Britain to honour its obligation to fund Zimbabwe’s FTLRP. In December 2001, SADC Heads of State and Government met to assess progress on the Zimbabwean situation, concluded that violence in the country had reduced significantly and stated that they were opposed to the sanctions proposed by the US government and the EU (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). This stance was contrary to a stance taken by the Commonwealth Ministerial Group, whose report released in December 2001 had concluded that violence, political intimidation, illegal farm occupations and infringements on the freedom and independence of the media were still prevalent in Zimbabwe (Human Rights Watch, 2002:39).

Despite these attempts at mediation, the GoZ continued with the FTLRP and, in February 2002, the EU introduced targeted sanctions against seventy-nine of Zimbabwe’s senior government officials citing continued political violence, infringements on media freedom and judicial independence, and the illegal occupations of farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). The sanctions imposed included the following: provisions for freezing of personal assets of key politicians responsible for Zimbabwe’s human rights crisis; prohibition of travel to EU countries by such persons; suspension of financial development programmes with the Zimbabwean government; and an embargo on arms sales by EU member states to Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:11). The USA also followed suit and imposed sanctions of a similar nature on 22 February 2002. In March 2002, the Commonwealth as well imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, whilst in June 2002.

¹¹ The Cotonou Agreement regulates relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), with Article 96 incorporating human rights and good governance criteria into the relations. It states that „if there is no progress on human rights issues within 75 days of opening formal consultation, appropriate measures including sanctions would be undertaken” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:38).
the IMF suspended Zimbabwe’s voting rights and the provision of technical assistance. In October 2002, Australia imposed bilateral smart sanctions on Zimbabwe; these were similar to the EU and US sanctions but also included the suspension of bilateral ministerial contact between the two countries. Several other countries withdrew aid to Zimbabwe with the exception of humanitarian assistance to combat food shortages (Sarimana, 2005:172). In response, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth.

4.4.1.2 State – civil society relationships

Internally, land reform had pitted government against urban civil society. The GoZ has painted a picture of complete success with regard to the land reform, while civil society – in adopting a very narrow human rights approach to land reform – has concentrated its criticism on how land reform has impacted land owners and farm workers. In particular, the beneficiaries of land reform, together with government, are often depicted as “violators” of the rights of farm owners and workers (Sacco, 2008:340). Sacco (2008) however argues that there has been very little analysis done by civil society on the rights of the beneficiaries. Even government has not fully recognized the rights (i.e. social, economic, cultural, civil and political) of the beneficiaries and their need for land reform, and has rather concentrated its efforts on the passing of legislation to empower government to take land (as evidenced by the number of laws and amendments passed with the inception of the FTLRP).

The deadlock between government and civil society has created a situation whereby, if not resolved, the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of land reform would stand to lose the most. „Civil society” is a fluid concept with different meanings according to the school of thought analyzing it. However, within the Zimbabwean land and agrarian reform context, civil society refers to „(urban) society against the state” (Masunungure, 2008:61). It emerged as a force that often challenged the state, especially in the 1990s when structural adjustment and the challenges it created provided fertile ground for the development and strengthening of many civil society organizations (CSOs) (Masunungure, 2008:61). Civil society in Zimbabwe has been dominated by urban-based NGOs, which are often indigenous Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs). This urban bias of civil society has meant that – beyond war veterans – Zimbabwe has not had an organized civil society consistently making radical demands for land reform or land redistribution (Masunungure, 2008:62). In fact, urban civil society has opposed this process notably with
the advent of FTLRP. In its attempt to implement land and agrarian reform on its own, government has had insufficient funds. Donors refuse to fund what they perceive to be „illegal” settlements under land reform, as their establishment goes contrary to the „willing buyer willing seller” principle agreed to at the 1998 Donors” Conference. Sacco (2008:341) states that the concentration (by urban civil society and donors) on the legality of acquisition distracts from more important human rights issues relating to the distribution of land and the protection of the „beneficiaries” of land reform.

State and civil society relationships in Zimbabwe have deteriorated, according to Mhlanga (1999:18), because civil society historically has only been comfortable in dealing with symptoms of the inequalities of land reform. He also notes that CSOs have lacked intimate knowledge of land laws and have had minimal capacity for training and awareness-raising both within CSOs and the constituents which they seek to represent. Masunugure (2008:64) describes civil society in Zimbabwe as being „shackled” because although it agitated for autonomy vis-à-vis the state, it did not enjoy such autonomy vis-à-vis international donors and partners who are extensions of foreign national governments. This financial link has caused local CSOs to adjust their work to suit international agendas, more so with the implementation of FTLRP. Overall, FTLRP used unorthodox methods of delivery and unconventional methodologies (for example, land occupations) which the Western donor community frowned upon. Masunugure (2008:65) states that it would take a radical paradigm shift on the part of the donor community to endorse and appreciate the „jambanja” methodology of radical, seemingly chaotic and violent land reform.

Most urban CSOs that emerged in the 1990s confronted the state on governance and human rights issues that were increasingly receiving international predominance as part of neo-liberal restructuring. Hence, their work has centred on „good governance”, human rights (often defined restrictively to exclude second and third order social and economic rights), the rule of law, and the land tenure and property rights of the LSCF sector; these are issues at odds with the needs of rural grassroots communities, where access to and rights to land were historically critical. In the aftermath of the FTLRP, with beneficiaries

---

12 „Jambanja” is a term which literally translated means violence or an angry argument. Within the context of the FTLRP process it has become a term synonymous with the farm invasions and the violent nature which characterised this process.
firmly on the land, CSOs continued to focus on the negative aspects of land reform – now portraying beneficiaries as having been abandoned by the state.

Helliker (2008:267) notes that although NGOs (as part of urban civil society) have taken a regressive stance to the land reform process, the casual mechanisms underpinning this stance cannot be located solely in the relationship between donors and NGOs but also arises from internal organizational dispositions. In this respect, Masunungure (2008: 65) says that the stance taken by NGOs is also linked to the leadership which is characteristic of these organizations. In general, CSOs in Zimbabwe have been highly urban-based and elite-led. Even local community-based organizations (CBOs) often retained a heavy influence by the urban elite, for whom radical land reforms (like the FTLRP) were a peripheral issue. Civil society in Zimbabwe has not been active in the land reform process, unlike their counterparts in Asia and Latin America, and have been “preoccupied with “soft” development issues of human rights, governance and the rule of law and not with the “hard” issues like land and agrarian policy concerns” (Masunungure, 2008:66).

Olaleye (2005:7) notes that Zimbabwe’s political life during the land reform period has been marked by violence and repression in which the ZANU-PF government has effectively “criminalized” opposition politics, notably urban civil society. This is not however the first time that repression has emerged on a significant scale, including the victimization of the Ndebele population in the 1980s until the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, and the victimization of members of political parties during electioneering periods in a process entailing the formation of a one-party state and the consolidation of executive power in the Presidency. Recent conflicts between the state and civil society need to be seen in this historical context, as the state seeks to redefine the nation and citizenship in a manner that legitimizes significant land redistribution.

4.4.2 Economic impact of FTLRP

4.4.2.1 Decreased agricultural production

While land reform programmes have enormous potential to increase agricultural production, it is essential that they be accompanied by comprehensive programmes of agrarian reform including access to inputs, credit, savings and markets in rural areas, particularly if they are to fundamentally redress the inefficiencies of inequality and improve production levels amongst smallholder farmers. Agriculture has been the
mainstay of the national economy of Zimbabwe and accounted for 15 to 20% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It generates a large proportion of foreign currency earnings, although the share of agricultural exports in the country’s total exports decreased from 39% in 2000 to 21% in 2006 (FAO/WFP, 2007: 8). This reduction has been mostly due to the fact that FTLRP has been accompanied by a decrease in agricultural production. There is general consensus amongst scholars, government and international agencies [i.e. World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)] that there has been a decrease in production in most of the major crops in Zimbabwe, but debate focuses on the reasons for the decline and how dramatic the drop has been, given the problems of reliable statistics and the manipulation of statistics by both the state and international agencies.

Table 4.3 is an attempt by the AIAS to measure the levels of production since the inception of statistics by both the state and international agencies (i.e. World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)] that there has been a decrease in production in most of the major crops in Zimbabwe, but debate focuses on the reasons for the decline and how dramatic the drop has been, given the problems of reliable statistics and the manipulation of statistics by both the state and international agencies.

Table 4.3: Overall Crop Production Trends Since 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Main grain crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1,668.6 (-11%) 476.2</td>
<td>(-70%)498.5 (-44%)929.6</td>
<td>(-37%)1,059.0</td>
<td>(-55%)750.0</td>
<td>(-43%)945.0</td>
<td>(-52%)799.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>219.3 (3%)225.0</td>
<td>(6%)231.7</td>
<td>(-11%)195.0</td>
<td>(-53%)103.0</td>
<td>(-38%)135.0</td>
<td>(-45%)120.0</td>
<td>(-38%)135.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>50.0 (67%)85</td>
<td>(-25%)37.4</td>
<td>(81%)90.0</td>
<td>(69.6%)374.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Traditional export crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>197.6 (2%)202.4</td>
<td>(-16%)166.0</td>
<td>(-59%)81.8</td>
<td>(-65%)68.7</td>
<td>(-62%)73.4</td>
<td>(-72%)55.0</td>
<td>(-61%)77.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>214.1 (34%)386.1</td>
<td>(-21%)168.8</td>
<td>(7%)228.1</td>
<td>(6%)228.0</td>
<td>(-8%)198.0</td>
<td>(26%)270.0</td>
<td>(26%)270.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Oil seed crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>95.5 (84%)175.1</td>
<td>(-24%)72.4</td>
<td>(-72%)26.3</td>
<td>(-57%)41.0</td>
<td>(-25%)72.0</td>
<td>(-25%)72.0</td>
<td>(32%)170.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>92.0 (87%)171.8</td>
<td>(-36%)58.6</td>
<td>(59%)146.7</td>
<td>(53%)141.0</td>
<td>(-47%)135.0</td>
<td>(-37%)57.7</td>
<td>(-3%)89.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>36.4 (-57%)15.8</td>
<td>(-35%)23.6</td>
<td>(-87%)4.8</td>
<td>(-53%)17.0</td>
<td>(-45%)20.0</td>
<td>(-62%)14.0</td>
<td>(-43%)20.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Plantation and industrial crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>438.9 (17%)513.6</td>
<td>(35%)593.6</td>
<td>(18%)520.0</td>
<td>(1%)422.3</td>
<td>(-2%)429.6</td>
<td>(2%)446.6</td>
<td>(1%)442.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>10.6 (105%)21.8</td>
<td>(115%)22.7</td>
<td>(105%)21.7</td>
<td>(118%)23.0</td>
<td>(101%)21.2</td>
<td>(58%)16.7</td>
<td>(45%)15.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>8.4 (-10%)7.5</td>
<td>(-4%)8.1</td>
<td>(19%)10.0</td>
<td>(7%)9.9</td>
<td>(19%)10.0</td>
<td>(-57%)3.6</td>
<td>(-70%)2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paprika</td>
<td>12.5 (2%)13.8</td>
<td>(10%)13.8</td>
<td>(-48%)9.5</td>
<td>(-13%)10.9</td>
<td>(-68%)9.0</td>
<td>(60%)3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floriculture</td>
<td>9.2 (98%)18.2</td>
<td>(170%)21.2</td>
<td>(171%)24.9</td>
<td>(-19%)20.1</td>
<td>(67%)16.2</td>
<td>(74%)14.3</td>
<td>(73%)10.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>20.0 (78%)35.5</td>
<td>(124%)43.9</td>
<td>(163%)52.7</td>
<td>(159%)47.7</td>
<td>(71%)34.2</td>
<td>(32%)26.5</td>
<td>(5%)21.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export vegetables</td>
<td>7.9 (355%)36.0</td>
<td>(406%)40.0</td>
<td>(406%)40.0</td>
<td>(-30%)10.2</td>
<td>(-8%)7.2</td>
<td>(37%)4.9</td>
<td>(33%)5.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS, 2007

13 AIAS estimates are based on production statistics from GoZ; Agricultural and Rural Development Association (ADRA); Central Statistics Office; FAO; Zimbabwe Tobacco Association; National Association of Cotton Ginners, Merchants and Buyers; Soyabean Promotion Taskforce; Zimbabwe Tea Growers Association; Paprika Zimbabwe; Horticultural Promotions Council and Hippo Valley Estates.
Major declines are seen in grain crops (such as maize) and export crops like tobacco, coffee and soya beans, which in the deepest troughs dropped by at least 70%. Richardson (2007:471) states that the major crops affected have been tobacco, wheat, soya beans, coffee and sunflowers (which have dropped between 25 and 70%). However, it is important to note that, despite the initial declines, levels of production have increased steadily, although they are still below the 1990s averages; this signals a process of recovery. Agricultural decline has been common in countries where extensive land reforms have taken place (Moyo, 2004b:33). In the case of Zimbabwe, this „transition“\(^{14}\) has been longer for various reasons. This includes declining state support to agriculture, late and poor land preparation due to limited tillage capacity, unsustainable financing mechanisms for the sector and the generally unfavourable macro-economic environment, as well as natural factors like erratic rainfall patterns (Moyo, 2005b:16).

According to Moyo et al. (2003:16), there has been a tendency to oversimplify the explanations for declines in production of various commodities, by not recognizing the different causal factors varying according to commodity and the producers (e.g. large-scale versus small-scale) of such commodities. Politically positional analyses cloud the complex factors and processes which induced the fall in agricultural production (Moyo, 2004b:33). The factors are reduced to a non-existent binary explanation which posits the cause as either the drought (which is common in GoZ discourse) or the „chaotic“ land reform and the resulting lack of skills of newly resettled farmers (Richardson, 2005:553; Action Contre la Faime, 2006:23).

The factors highlighted in explaining the drop in production levels also vary from season to season. In the 2000/2001 season, the processes preceding the official FTLRP programme – for example, farm occupations, accompanying violence, and theft and vandalism – disrupted farm operations (World Bank, 2006:65). With the formalisation of the FTLRP, the process of widespread farm acquisitions began, which stopped production on a large number of LSCF farms. At the same time, actual settlement initially proceeded

\(^{14}\) According to Moyo (2004a:33) the „transitional period“ of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe can be viewed as the five year period (2000-2004) during which the structural changes in land ownership and producer establishment have been occurring, as well as the period of sustained economic instability and isolation which affected the supply side of inputs and credit markets of agriculture. Land transfers have taken a full four years to occur, while settler occupations and farm establishment, including the land allocations, have been phased over the five years.
at a slow pace leading to significant amounts of land lying idle (World Bank, 2006:65). This was due to resistance on the part of the former white commercial farmers (especially in the courts) as well as conflicts over land allocations on the part of resettled farmers, resulting in the transfer process taking over four years to complete and much of the land being unused or unallocated in the meantime. In the formative years of the FTLRP (2000 to 2003), these challenges were coupled with the problem of insecurity of tenure, which made it difficult for farmers to make meaningful investments on their land.

Land tenure relations are critical where communities depend on control of land to ensure production and food security (UNECA, 2004:24). With the advent of the FTLRP, all land eventually became nationalised and freehold tenure was converted to leasehold tenure – A2 farmers were issued with 99-year leases and A1 farmers were given permits. Currently most farmers on the ground have offer letters\(^{15}\), which provide for limited security of tenure and have often resulted (until recently) in farmers being unable to secure loans from formal credit institutions and banks. A2 farmers have been unable or reluctant to put major capital investments into their properties due to these conditions. Most of the title deeds for the 6,700 acquired farms are in fact still in the hands of the original owners, and it is not clear how the transfer of property rights will take place especially since the issue of compensation is not resolved (World Bank, 2006:xiv).

This scenario has resulted in substantial areas being either not planted or being farmed at a lower intensity than the pre-2000 period, and hence a decrease in production in agriculture was experienced during the early years of the FTLRP, that is, in the period of transition. The dip in agricultural production has however been prolonged despite the bulk of resettlement having taken place by 2004. The drop is also linked to the economic and agricultural policies adopted by the state, which have had a negative effect on agricultural production. This includes the re-introduction of price controls on most food commodities and a reversion to public monopoly in the marketing of grain products. These actions translated into lower farm prices for most food crops and encouraged a shift to less controlled agricultural crops (World Bank, 2006:65). In addition, continuing and

\(^{15}\) Offer letters are the initial documents given to individuals whose applications for land have been successful and these indicate the plot allocated to the individual. The offer letter is a temporary document and gives access to land whilst the farmer is still waiting for the formal leasehold agreement with the GoZ.
increasing overvaluation of the Zimbabwean currency during this period has negatively impacted upon the competitiveness of most export crops.

There have also been natural factors affecting productivity, including limited rainfall in some regions during the 2002/2003 and 2004/2005 seasons as well as an uneven temporal distribution of rainfall, leading to reduced yields. Coupled with this have been the low supplies of tillage services, seeds, fertilizers and stock feeds, leading to reduced plantings and yields. At the same time, lack of skills, capital and physical resources among the newly resettled farmers kept land utilization rates low.

4.4.2.2 Economic contraction and hyperinflation

Agricultural production levels have adversely affected other industries in Zimbabwe, such as manufacturing, due to close linkages with the agricultural sector. The decline in production has as well reduced availability of raw materials and led to a shortage of essential goods and basic commodities (for example maize meal, bread, cooking oil and sugar). Further, the reduced foreign currency inflows have forced businesses to downscale their productions, leading to increased retrenchments and rises in rates of unemployment, with unemployment in Zimbabwe estimated to be between 70 – 80%.

Indeed, since 2000 the Zimbabwean economy has contracted significantly. The economic decline has created a political standoff amongst internal and external forces, namely the GoZ against the West, especially the USA and Britain. At the centre of the economic decline is – it is said by some analysts – land reform (Richardson, 2005:542). However Moyo (2002:2) argues that the economic collapse in Zimbabwe started in 1996 as a result of drought and trade imbalances, and was further exacerbated by the fiscal and monetary impacts of the 1997 payouts to war veterans and the large-scale attempt to expropriate land, resulting in extensive capital flight and reduced aid inflows.

Richardson (2007:471) argues that earlier studies, including that by Clemens and Moss (2005), concluded that „government misrule (evidenced by poor fiscal policies, price controls, compensation of war veterans, loss of rule of law and implementation of land reform) was to blame for the Zimbabwean [economic] crisis”. Undoubtedly, government’s expropriation of commercial farmland without compensation was a critical reason for the economic collapse leading to a „cascade failure” that caused severe disruptions throughout
the economy (Richardson, 2007:471). This in turn created a situation which scared away foreign investors, and led to steep declines in the banking, mining, manufacturing, and tourism sectors.

The shortage of foreign currency and price controls has affected the capacity of industry to supply adequate inputs to farmers. According to the Zimbabwe Seed Traders Association (ZSTA), the country had over 60,000 metric tonnes of maize seed for the 2004/2005 season. On the other hand fertilizer production continues to be a major problem in terms of provision of inputs. Sable Chemicals, the country’s sole producer of ammonium nitrate, which has the capacity to produce 240,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, is now operating at less than 70% capacity level. Price controls continue to adversely affect the industry as plant maintenance has been neglected, and the cost of importing the 30% of ammonium nitrate required for full capacity is significantly higher than the cost of the locally produced ammonium. In 2004 the company produced 135,865 tonnes of ammonium nitrate while in 2005 it was expected to produce 125,000 tonnes \(^{16}\). With the sheer increase in the number of farmers, the overall result is an increased demand for farming inputs, which industry is failing to meet.

The flight of foreign capital and the shortage of foreign currency have also resulted in increased inflation and high interest rates, which have made business (including the agriculture sector) a different environment in which to survive. Inflation in December 2005 was set at 619.5% (Zimbabwe Independent, December 16, 2005). Inflation and the shortage of foreign currency have seen the emergence of a parallel market for foreign currency. Government’s response has been the introduction of stringent measures to try and curb this parallel market by making it illegal for Zimbabwean citizens and companies to trade in foreign currency unless it is through the RBZ. The contraction in the economy and the resultant job losses and hyperinflation has led to skilled professionals (doctors, nurses, teachers, accountants, engineers, etc) leaving the country mostly as economic and political refugees. Kibble (2004: 369) estimates that 15% of Zimbabwe’s population is living outside of the country. At the same time, Moyo and Yeros (2005:194) emphasise that the economic crisis has not entailed – pure and simple – local financial mismanagement on the part of the GoZ, as imperialism continues to exercise its financial

\(^{16}\) Interviews with Shingai Mutasa, Executive Chairman of TA Holdings – Financial Gazette, September 22-28, 2005 and September 29-October 5, 2005.
power to “deliberately isolate Zimbabwe politically and financially, thereby smothering the process of agrarian reform and severely impeding agricultural recovery in the country”. Irrespective of the question of causality, the economic conditions since 2000 have dramatically affected the pricing of crops, the decisions by farmers to grow particular crops, agricultural funding, marketing policies, and the availability of inputs, labour, farm equipment and irrigation facilities. There is also a lack of government and private sector strategic partnerships to ensure that adequate inputs for crops are made available to farmers on a timely basis.

4.4.2.3 Changes in agricultural labour patterns

The impact of the FTLRP on farm workers in the LSCF sector and on prevailing agricultural labour patterns is diverse and complex, but also at times difficult to assess. Hence, there is contestation over the sheer number of farm workers employed in the LSCF sector prior to fast track and the actual number of jobs lost because of the FTLRP. Prior to 2000, farm workers constituted (as a reasonable estimate) 350,000 part-time and full-time workers (or 26% of total formal employment in the country) (Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008:207). These workers were part of broader rural employment patterns made up of wage and non-wage labour, which included communal area farmers as well. In fact, communal area farmers comprised the bulk of non-wage agricultural employment and traditionally made up the majority of the total agricultural labour force, with wage employment only totaling 16% of the overall agricultural labour force (Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008:207).

Undoubtedly, farm workers were the most vulnerable, marginalized and „invisible” group in the formal sector, earning extremely low wages, living in poor housing and involved in „paternalistic relationships with farm owners that was manifested in insecure residential and agricultural tenure” (Krieger, 2000:447). Farm workers had dual livelihoods, with an estimated 75% of farm workers straddling the communal and LSCF areas (i.e. maintaining households in both areas) prior to 2000 (Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008:208). Historically, their needs have not been on the national development agenda, with the state regarding farm workers’ welfare as the responsibility of commercial farmers and local rural councils.
The FTLRP process has revealed the continued vulnerability of farm workers and their households. Only 85,000 of the 175,000 full-time farm workers retained their agricultural employment – on commercial farms (black and white owned), state owned farms, estates and plantations – by the beginning of 2003 (Chambati and Moyo, 2004:12). Chambati and Magaramombe (2008:219) estimate that about 50,000 casual and part-time workers (or just over 25% of the 175,000) could have also retained their jobs within these sectors as well. Newly resettled farmers have absorbed a significant number of retrenched farm workers, but their capacity to retain farm workers is restricted by their limited resources.

Proponents of FTLRP have argued that FTLRP has created a potential opportunity for the restructuring of the labour and land rights of agrarian labourers. Moyo and Chambati (2003:27) for instance claim that the reformed agrarian structure (involving broader and more inclusive participation) has created the basis for expanding the rural wage market as the number of wage employees especially in the middle and large farm holdings has increased. However the full potential of this opportunity will not be realized until production constraints have been resolved. As a result, the current jobs in the new farm sector tend to be casual and irregular and with low wages, making them non-viable (Moyo and Chambati, 2003:28).

Farm workers, despite (and because of) their vulnerability, have not benefitted significantly as a group in terms of access to land under the resettlement programme. Calculations by Moyo and Yeros (2005:196), based on official figures of applicants who indicated they were farm workers, show that about 5% of beneficiaries were former farm workers. There were no set land allocation quotas for former farm workers and the residence of farm workers after FTLRP has in addition been precarious. Prior to 2000, farm workers’ residence was dependent on their employment on the LSCFs; after 2000, the residence of former farm workers, especially those who had not been re-engaged by new farmers, became a problem. The current government policy states that former farm workers who have not been re-employed by other farmers or who have not been absorbed elsewhere in the economy or in communal areas are entitled to temporary residence in farm compounds (Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008:226). Regrettably, this policy is not implemented uniformly or widely amongst new farmers, especially amongst A2 farmers who have preferred to house only their employees in their compounds. At the same time,
though farm workers are entitled to severance packages from their previous employers under the Labour Relations (Terminal Benefits and Entitlements of Agricultural Employees Affected by Compulsory Acquisition) Act (SI 346, 2001), the vast majority have not received these either because farmers left their land without paying out these benefits or have indicated that they can only pay the benefits after they have been paid their compensation by the state (Chidziva, 2007:15).

4.4.3 Social impact of FTLRP

4.4.3.1 Food insecurity

There is general consensus amongst scholars that Zimbabwe is facing a food crisis. However the right to food is not a problem synonymous with Zimbabwe and has been receiving global attention, further heightened by the global food crisis in 2007. Global strategies on how to ensure that citizens of the world enjoy adequate and nutritious quantities of food are still unclear. While it is agreed that land redistribution is central to the attainment of the right to food in many agrarian-based communities (such as Zimbabwe), approaches to land reform remain contested (Moyo and Murisa, 2008: 75). In the case of Zimbabwe, the FTLRP has been associated with reduced foreign currency inflows into the country, reduced production in all sectors of the economy and massive inflation. Local shortfalls in agricultural production were not compensated by food imports by government, and this led to significant price increases for basic foodstuffs. The GoZ has been accused of politicizing food and using food aid for votes, but food agencies have also been accused of politicizing food and abrogating aid by discriminating against newly resettled farmers and failing to support the recovery of the wider food system (Amnesty International, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004). Moyo and Murisa (2008:82) note the limited role by civil society organisations in promoting food security; instead of focusing on agricultural recovery amongst poor farmers, emphasis is placed on short-term relief feeding.

The exact food security situation in Zimbabwe remains open to debate given the extreme variations in estimates between the GoZ and its critics; in particular, there has been considerable difficulty in estimating the actual food deficit that Zimbabwe is facing. Several variables are taken into account when assessing the food deficit. These include domestic production, food exports and imports, food consumption and the requirements of other users of food (i.e. animal feeding and industries). Caution however must be exercised
when employing estimates arrived at in the past few years. The ideal food consumption level is determined by required per capita cereal consumption, which in Zimbabwe is set at 163 kgs/year. This is a relatively high figure compared to Zambia, which has a similar maize-based diet but has a targeted consumption of 110kgs/year (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:15). At the same time, prior to the 2002 census in Zimbabwe, estimates of food requirements were based on a population of 13.6 million; however, the official population was 11.7 million. This translates into a difference of two million people, who would require 342,000 metric tonnes of maize.

Coupled with this is the decrease in population due to migration out of the country since 2000, estimated at 3.4 million people (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:15). This represents a further decrease of 554,000 metric tonnes in food consumption, or 29% of the national requirement. There has also been informal cross border trade which is not taken into account when estimating the food deficit, as well as large quantities of grain being transferred onto the parallel markets by farmers and traders. These various trends have raised difficulties in determining the food aid needs of the country, with the figures of government and international aid organisations often at variance. For example, in 2005, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVac)\textsuperscript{17} estimated that a total of 2.9 million people would need assistance, whilst the WFP estimated the number of hungry people at 4.3 million (Action Contre la Faim 2006:17). This discussion highlights that whilst mass starvation does not exist in Zimbabwe, there are clearly vulnerable groups and displaced persons (for example communal farmers and farm workers) who are in need of food aid every year. ZIMVac carried out vulnerability assessments since 2002, which have indicated that all districts and provinces in the country have some populations that are consistently food insecure. The reports show that the food insecurity situation in Zimbabwe is chronic in nature, i.e. specific groups of people suffer from food insecurity all the time.

At the height of this problem, in the year 2002, the President of Zimbabwe declared a State of Disaster in all communal lands, resettlement areas and urban areas as a result of the

\textsuperscript{17} The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVac) is a committee composed of a consortium of government, NGOs and UN Agencies. This Committee is chaired by the Food and Nutrition Council (FNC) of Zimbabwe, which is part of the Scientific and Industrial Research Centre (SIRDC). The committee has been carrying out annual assessments since August 2002 using household surveys to understand the food security situation for rural and urban households in Zimbabwe.
drought. In the 2003/2004 season the ZIMVac assessments showed that 4.4 million rural people (56% of the rural population) would fall short of their minimum cereal requirements. In the 2005/2006 agricultural season, the corresponding figure was 2.9 million people – this meant that 36% of the rural population were not able to meet their household food requirements (ZIMVac, 2005:vii). During this period, the main cereal crops (maize, wheat and sorghum) and the key nutritional commodities (groundnuts, milk, beef and soya beans) as well as oil seed derivatives continued to be in short supply (Moyo et al., 2003:51). ZIMVac (2005) noted that chronic food insecurity conditions existed in Zimbabwe and that these entailed such trends as food insecurity in certain districts for four or more agricultural seasons, the increased intensity of food insecurity over time (showing increased numbers of people in need and increased household food deficits over time), and the marked deterioration of basic living conditions.

FTLRP, involving the large-scale redistribution of land to people who have been historically dispossessed or disadvantaged, has been blamed for causing this food crisis, despite the fact that – prior to the FTLRP – smallholders produced about 75% of the basic staple food – maize. Analysts (for example, Sachikonye, 2005:35-36; Richardson, 2005:2) argue that FTLRP has led to once productive commercial farms being under-utilised and has thereby contributed to the undermining of national food security in Zimbabwe. Richardson (2005:2) claims that land reform coupled with the undermining of a stable property rights regime are responsible not only for food insecurity but for the total collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Although drought and various macro-economic conditions since 2000 have been factors in the reduction of grain harvests, the FTLRP in particular is regularly seen as largely responsible for destabilising food production (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:8).

According to Richardson (2007:463) the GoZ especially – and to some degree – specific international aid organizations (WFP, Relief Web, Action Contre la Faime) blamed food security on the country’s sharp economic downturn and persistent and severe droughts. However, he argues that there is little evidence that Zimbabwe’s recent economic difficulties were caused by either low or erratic rainfall, and instead feels that „the recent collapse of the economy is far more likely a result of government mismanagement” rather than drought (Richardson, 2007:463). While there is an established link between rainfall
and GDP levels (see Cane, Eshel and Buckland, 1994; Phillips, Cane and Rosenzweig, 1998), the current slump in Zimbabwe’s agricultural production, food insecurity and the general decline in the economy are due to misguided government policies (most notably the FTLRP) which have destroyed the once vibrant commercial farming system (Richardson, 2005:553). His arguments are based on an analysis of thirty eight country-wide rainfall stations during the 1960/1961 - 2002/2003 time frame.

In countering this, Moyo (2005b:16; 2007:364) argues that the production decline that Zimbabwe has been experiencing is not uncommon where extensive land reforms have been effected, and hence the decline is transitional – although in Zimbabwe’s case, the „transition” has been longer. Indeed, scholars like Andersson (2007:681) disagree with the narrow view propounded by Richardson, with Andersson „challenging the rather simplistic association of „food production with the commercial farming sector” (2007:682). According to him, Richardson (2005 and 2007) „ignores the historical dynamics of Zimbabwe’s divided agricultural sector, which saw the smallholder farming sector accounting for 60% of the country’s main food crop since the 1980’s” (Andersson, 2007:682). During the colonial period, smallholder food production became vulnerable to rainfall vulnerability as it was relocated to and expanded on marginal lands, characterised by poor sandy soils and erratic rainfall. Even with independence in 1980, there was no significant change in the quality of the area farmed by communal farmers, despite some land reform taking place. This vulnerability was made more prominent by the „increase in the smallholder farming sectors share in the country’s total maize output” (Andersson, 2007:682). Andersson’s (2007) argument is critical in that it highlights potential for increased food security at both the household and national level, if the production levels of smallholders can be increased.

Clearly, the FTLRP has sought to create a platform to increase the number of people who have legal entitlement to produce their own food, in large part by increasing their access to better quality and larger pieces of land. The situation in post-fast track Zimbabwe has become quite complex, because even those with entitlements have been failing to access food either through their own production or on the markets, while national food production during the FTLRP era has declined significantly (Moyo, 2005b:16). In the end, the current food insecurity problem in Zimbabwe results from a combination of interrelated problems
that include drought and adverse weather patterns, the current political crisis, economic mismanagement and HIV/AIDS, all of which have affected family and community capacities and livelihoods. No single factor is uniquely responsible, and food insecurity does not hinge on inadequacies of production alone.

Rural households are also vulnerable to the economic crisis and the challenges of HIV/AIDS – if these are not addressed concurrently with increased agricultural productivity, the result may be national food production levels that are adequate overall to meet domestic needs existing alongside major pockets of rural poverty. Within communal areas, the situation is particularly precarious as families that were once supported by (formally employed) family members are currently depending entirely on their own agricultural production on fragile and overexploited land, while also caring for HIV/AIDS victims (Action Contre la Faim, 2006:15). The economic decline prevailing in Zimbabwe has resulted in 60 to 80% of the population living below the poverty datum line. The increased poverty levels and rising prices have also taken their toll amongst the urban populace (Buckle, 2002: 236-237). Urban areas have been experiencing critical food shortages and sharp price increases of basic food stuffs (bread, milk, sugar, cooking oil). The economic challenges have highlighted how poverty, which still continues to be a predominantly rural phenomenon, is also increasing within urban areas.

4.5 Attempts to Address Challenges Faced by Resettled Farmers

The GoZ, through the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, has embarked on various policy measures to address the economic decline. However, it has not yet devised a clear plan for reconstruction and development, and has not been able to bring on board private capital for a national plan of „introverted accumulation” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:201). The main policy interventions since 2000 have centred mainly on: land redistribution; controlling agricultural, food and commodity prices; state control of agricultural and mining foreign currency revenues; relying less on external finance, which has been withdrawn because of the FTLRP; the diversification of exports; and fuel and energy subsidies targeting mainly the urban poor. These economic policies have attempted to create a new form of state and market reciprocity, which Moyo (2002:3) argues has not been adequately articulated by the state.
Any new economic policy has to accommodate the demands from a growing and vocal indigenous bourgeoisie (comprising black commercial farmers and key players within the financial, retail, transport and other minor economic sectors), who have recognized the significance of agrarian landholdings and agricultural distribution for their reproduction and expansion; as well as being responsive to the peasantry and other social classes (working and middle classes, unemployed, etc)” (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:199). Policy debates are leaning towards articulating the myth that the larger A2 farmers – as the commercial arm of fast track – are inherently more productive and a lesser credit risk for irrigation and technical and input schemes, compared to the smaller A1 farmers. The dominance of the black bourgeoisie in the policy making process goes some way in explaining this (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:199).

According to Moyo (2002:4), the „political economy policy project of agrarian reform could very well marginalize the peasantry and even continue to undermine their incomes and livelihoods if the policy is deliberately not balanced in favour of small farmers”. Any policy must include incentives to expand performance among small to medium scale farmers. Measures need to be introduced to reduce poverty and redress the continuing inequalities, between the LSCF sector and the smallholder (comprising remaining communal farmers and A1 farmers) sector, which are emerging in the post-land redistribution period. The policy framework should balance the competing and growing demands for domestic (food and agro-industrial) and export markets. As noted in Chapter 3, the smallholder sector has traditionally been the major source of maize for domestic consumption, yet it has continuously been marginalized in the policy domain with more attention and support being given to commercial farmers who dominate the export sector. Both sectors though have crucial roles to play in the revival of the country’s agricultural sector.

4.5.1 Public sector input and credit schemes
The government of Zimbabwe, having noted the challenges emerging during the process of resettlement, has since 2000 instituted a number of programmes targeted especially at boosting agricultural production on both the remaining LSCFs and newly resettled areas. The programmes have included the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Crop Input Scheme, the Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) Irrigation Fund, and the ARDA
and Livestock Development Trust (LDT) livestock support schemes (World Bank, 2006:54), and Operation Maguta.

The GMB crop input scheme mostly targets food grain production and is linked to trying to address the challenge of food insecurity in Zimbabwe. The scheme aims at improving production by providing seed, basal and top dressing fertilizer and herbicides in the form of a low interest (20%) loan, repayable using a stop order on grain delivers to the GMB. The scheme has been targeted at both A1 and A2 farmers. While government has come up with facilities and schemes to alleviate the inputs shortage, farmers have also complained about late disbursement and insufficient quantities of these inputs from the GMB and ARDA. These delays have often resulted in targeted hectarage for tillage and planting not being achieved. Small-scale farmers are the most negatively affected, as better-off farmers can afford to travel to GMB depots to collect inputs.

Other aspects of government’s agricultural policy which are problematic include the GMB’s monopoly in the procurement and domestic marketing of maize and wheat, as well as the poor price incentives for stimulating production of wheat, maize and other small grains. Most of the measures put in place by government since 2000 have been stop-gap market intervention policies, yet there is a need to put in place strategic marketing and institutional development policies to stimulate the recovery of agricultural production and to sustain optimal growth in domestic food production in the medium to long term, through providing appropriate incentives for farmers.

The irrigation fund has been administered by ARDA with assistance from the Department of Agricultural Engineering and the Agricultural Research and Extension Services (AREX). Under this scheme, newly resettled farmers who want assistance in installing or rehabilitating irrigation systems on their properties were encouraged to seek quotations from reputable irrigation firms for the provision of such services and to apply for the funds. Applicants would then be subjected to an on-site inspection by ARDA staff, involving an assessment of existing equipment and prospects for installing irrigation systems. If successful, farmers would then be offered a loan at 20% interest with a rate of repayment of between three and five years. By 2002, US$196,000 had been distributed to 323 applicants to reconstruct 7,751 hectares of irrigation infrastructure (Manzungu, 2004).
The public livestock resettlement schemes implemented after FTLRP have catered mostly for smallholder and resettled farmers. The schemes give farmers money to buy heifers. A2 farmers were given money to buy up to fifteen heifers, and communal and A1 farmers could apply for two or three heifers.

While government has tried to revive agricultural production through these schemes, there have been several dilemmas associated with these programmes. With regards to the inputs credit scheme, the World Bank (2006:54) notes that there was difficulty in accounting for the inputs due to lax monitoring systems within the GMB, which resulted in poor repayment rates. The programme also had high administrative costs, and inputs were often provided late and were deemed inadequate by farmers (FAO/WFP, 2003). The irrigation and livestock schemes were limited in terms of their coverage, and there were allegations that guidelines were not adhered to in the processing of applications. The process of applying for funding was highly centralized, with the approval of applications taking place in Harare.

4.5.2 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe initiatives

The central bank, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), has identified the need to revive agricultural production in order to resuscitate the nation’s economy, and has joined government in its attempt to support resettled farmers.

4.5.2.1 Agricultural Sector Enhancement Productivity Facility (ASPEF)

In June 2005, government through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced the Agricultural Sector Enhancement Productivity Facility (ASPEF). The aim of ASPEF was to: (i) provide low cost funding for targeted primary production in the agricultural sector; (ii) enhance capacity utilization, infrastructure development and output from the agricultural sector; (iii) ensure food security and import substitution; and (iv) generate foreign currency. This facility was targeted towards commercial farmers who were creditworthy and once again small scale A1 and communal farmers have been excluded. As at 31 August 2007, Z$3.9 trillion (US$3.3 million at the parallel rate of US$1:Z$300,000) had been disbursed to 21,940 applicants at concessionary interest rates to stimulate agricultural production (RBZ, 2007:33).
4.5.2.2 Mechanization programme

The RBZ has also embarked on a Mechanisation Programme in order to develop agricultural engineering services, mechanization and irrigation systems to raise farm level efficiency. The programme, which was launched on the 11 of June 2007, seeks to procure and distribute agricultural machinery and equipment, including tractors, combine harvesters and other (tractor- and animal-drawn) farm implements. The programme is comprised of ten phases spread across four years up to the end of 2010.

To date, three phases of the programme have been implemented. The machinery distributed ranges from tractors and combine harvesters to ploughs, scotch carts and knapsack sprayers (see Table 4.3). The sophisticated machinery and equipment has had to be imported, and has targeted mostly the large scale commercial farmers, A2 farmers and agricultural institutions such as ARDA; while the simpler equipment (mostly animal drawn and hand implements) has been manufactured and assembled locally through small and medium enterprises and local fabricating companies, for distribution to the smallholder (communal and A1) farmers. According to the RBZ, the machinery and equipment has been allocated with emphasis on transparency, fairness, proven productivity records, geographical spread, ability to pay, type of farm soils, historical product delivery records to GMB and other formal markets, record of previous debt or loan repayment, size of land, and type of national crops grown by each selected farmer.

Table 4.4: Machinery and Equipment Acquired Under the Farm Mechanization Programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Programme</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Machinery, Equipment or Implement</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm Mechanization</td>
<td>A2 Farmers, Large Scale Commercial Farmers, Agricultural Institutions</td>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combine Harvesters</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ploughs</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disc Harrows</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planters</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boom Sprayers</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vicon Fertilizer Spreaders</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hay Bales</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder Farmers (A1 and Communal)</td>
<td>Scotch Carts</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>26,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planters</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ploughs</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harrows</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knapsack Sprayers</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chains</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RBZ, 2008
This machinery and equipment are on a hire-purchase loan basis over three years and, if no primary productivity at the beneficiary’s farm is taking place, the central bank reserves the right to repossess after three years and reallocate the equipment to a productive farmer. This means that the equipment cannot be resold to anyone until after three years and only with the consent of the RBZ.

4.5.3 Private sector and NGO initiatives

The private sector in Zimbabwe has also tried to initiate schemes to revive agricultural production, mostly through providing financing to newly resettled farmers. One such approach has involved various agro-processor companies. Agro-processors or exporters (for example, Cottco, Reapers, Chibuku, National Breweries and Ingwebu Breweries) contract farmers to grow produce that forms the key raw materials (cotton, groundnuts, barley, sorghum) for these industries. Under these contractual arrangements, the companies provide inputs and extension support in exchange for exclusive buying rights at a pre-arranged pricing formula (World Bank, 2006:57).

Finance has also been provided directly by commercial banks, through special schemes and existing general financial arrangements that are not specific to agriculture, such as over-draft facilities. The over-draft facilities are available at commercial rates and farmers need to provide collateral security, which most resettled farmers lack (World Bank, 2006:58). Four banks have offered loan facilities for farmers for the purpose of acquiring vehicles, farming machinery and equipment. Some banks have offered some special commodity financing schemes that target high investment-high turnover farming ventures such as tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar and horticulture (World Bank, 2006:58).

Private sector initiatives have come under criticism. Agro-processors involved in contract farming schemes have been accused of overpricing inputs and inflating costs resulting in low returns for contracted farmers (World Bank, 2006:58). The uptake of over-draft facilities by farmers has also been limited, as most lack the collateral security required and have not been able to apply for this facility. The commercial interest rates charged are very high. These rates, coupled with the prohibitive costs of farming equipment, have limited farmer use of the loan facility to purchase farming equipment.
Private sector financing has been targeted mostly towards A2 farmers. Smallholders continue to experience challenges in accessing finance, even though the FTLRP has expanded this farming sub-sector. This means that the extent of the geographical area not covered by financial services has increased (World Bank, 2006:81). As well, the majority of A2 farmers face limited access to private sector financing due to unclear tenure and the lack of a proven track record in farming. Overall, the private sector has failed to create and develop agricultural financing schemes to try and meet the needs of the new form of farmer-customers who are in need of financing.

In addition, Zimbabwe’s traditional development partners have, by and large, withdrawn their support from agricultural and rural development programmes in the country. The majority of aid agencies and NGOs have refused to work within the newly resettled areas. Their support is now largely focussed on emergency food aid relief, mostly in communal areas.

**4.6 Conclusion**

The chapter has provided a summary of the FTLRP process in Zimbabwe, its controversies and the emerging outcomes of the process. What is evident is that the FTLRP has radically transformed the Zimbabwean agrarian structure, resulting in approximately 90% of white commercial farm land being acquired and redistributed; most of it to 127,000 peasant households and 8,000 middle capitalist farmers (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:188). Accompanying this transformation has been a severe socio-economic and political crisis, resulting in a highly polarized debate regarding the way in which the FTLRP was implemented and the extent to which it has helped to reduce the poverty levels of rural households or has even exacerbated poverty.

This is the necessary contemporary social, economic and political context within which the lives of newly resettled farmers must be set, in order – firstly to – identify the livelihood patterns emerging especially amongst A1 farmers, and – secondly – to assess whether fast track (as a land reform process), by creating a new group of smallholders, has compromised food security in Zimbabwe. The next two chapters will look at A1 farmers in Goromonzi district in relation to land reform, rural livelihoods and food security.
5.0 FTLRP AND ITS IMPACT ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY IN GOROMONZI DISTRICT – AN ANALYSIS OF A1 BENEFICIARIES

5.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform programme has brought about a change in the country’s agrarian structure. The major outcome of the programme has been the establishment of a wider land distribution pattern and the transfer of land ownership from minority white farmers to majority black farmers. While this has been a significant milestone, debate still continues on the way the land reform process was undertaken and on whether fast track reform has in fact been a success given the socio-economic challenges that the country is currently facing. Further, only minimal research has been done on the actual beneficiaries themselves and how the FTLRP has impacted on them, notably GoZ assessments (Buka Report, 2002; Presidential Land Review Committee, 2003) and specific independent studies undertaken by the AIAS (2002, 2003, 2004/5, 2006/7); as well as Marongwe (2008), Scoones et al., (2008, 2009), Wolmer et al., (2003, 2004) and Chaumba et al., (2003).18

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse a certain grouping of beneficiaries of FTLRP, specifically the A1 beneficiaries in Goromonzi district, and to discuss the livelihood patterns and trends which are emerging amongst them in the advent of the FTLRP. In particular, the chapter discusses the socio-economic background of beneficiaries, the livelihood practices of the resettled households and the resources available to resettled households for agricultural production.

5.2 Background to Study Area

Goromonzi is one of the nine districts in Mashonaland East province. The other districts are Chikomba, Mutoko, Murewa, Marondera, Hwedza, Mudzi, Seke and Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe (UMP). It is a district located 50 kilometres east of Zimbabwe’s capital city Harare. In terms of land use, it is unique in that it comprises both peri-urban and rural farming areas. It covers an area totalling 2,459 km² or 254,072 hectares. Mashonaland East

18 Many of these studies fall under the Livelihoods after Land Reform Research Initiative, which is a research initiative in large part funded through the UK's Economic Social Research Council and is co-ordinated by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.
province has a population of 1,127,413 and Goromonzi district has the highest population in the province, with about 13.68% (154,262 people) of the province’s population residing in Goromonzi district (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report, 2002:18). Of this population, 96.16% reside in rural areas with the remainder (3.84%) residing in urban areas (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report, 2002:18).

The district has a total of 37,966 households with an average household size of 4.06 people (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report 2002:27). The majority of households (70.47%) are male-headed households, with 29.53% being female-headed households. The district has a literacy rate of 97% for the population aged fifteen years and above (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report, 2002: 52). Overall, 73.3% (67,465 people) of the district’s population is between fifteen and sixty-five years (92,034) i.e. they make up the economically active age group (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report, 2002:62). Of this population of economically active people, 58.66% is employed in agriculture (Mashonaland East Provincial Census Report, 2002:76). The district has twenty-five wards with the most populated wards being Domboshawa (16,000), Mwanza (11,000) and Chinyika (10,000), all of which are communal areas.

5.2.1 Physical attributes (climate, geology, vegetation)
Goromonzi is located in Natural Region II and contains portions of both region IIa (247,072 hectares) and region IIb (7,000 hectares). Of this total area, 168,000 hectares are arable. Elevation in the district ranges between 1,500 metres and 1,700 metres above sea level. Rainfall in the region is between 900 and 1,200 mm per annum, with temperatures averaging a maximum of 25°C and a minimum of 10°C. The local soils are generally granitic and sandy. They are well-drained, coarse-grained, medium to deep, and of low inherent fertility. Most of the vegetation comprises miombo woodland with savannah grasslands in places, with the most common species of trees being acacias. The majority of agricultural crops are grown in the wet summer months of November to March, with wheat being grown in winter.

5.2.2 Land structure in Mashonaland East
The major land tenure and land use categories in the district are communal, large scale commercial, small scale commercial and state lands. There was no resettlement area in the district before the FTLRP (Marongwe, 2003:4). The four main communal lands (Figure
5.1) in the district are Chinamhora Communal Lands (35, 312ha), Chikwaka Communal Lands (40, 312.5ha), Chishawasha Communal Lands (10, 000ha) and Chinyika Communal Lands (4, 812.5ha) (Marongwe, 2003:4).

**Figure 5.1: Map of Goromonzi District**

![Map of Goromonzi District](image)

*Source – Department of the Surveyor General, Harare*
Mashonaland East province had a total of 1,171 large-scale commercial farms before FTLRP, with Goromonzi district having 257 farms. By 2003, a total of 913 farms in the province and 243 in the district had been gazetted for resettlement (PLRC, 2003:50).

5.2.3 Agricultural production in Goromonzi

Prior to the FTRLP, Goromonzi was known for intensive crop farming, dairy, horticulture and the production of small grains (PLRC, 2003:50). Most large-scale farmers grew maize grain, soya beans, seed maize, paprika and floriculture for export. The plots of smallholders grew mostly maize, soya beans, paprika and horticultural products (Marongwe, 2003:4). Goromonzi district is home to one of the largest remaining dairy farmers in Zimbabwe, Lonely Park farm near Acturus, whose dairy herd is about 1,000 cows. The district’s livestock herd before the fast track land reform programme stood at an estimated 100,000 (Jiri, 2007: 10).

5.3 Characteristics of A1 Land Reform Beneficiaries in Goromonzi

5.3.1 Socio-geographic origins of beneficiaries

An analysis of the evidence collected during the survey\(^9\) reveals that most of the A1 beneficiaries were resident in communal areas before they were resettled. This group of beneficiaries accounted for 61.3% of the total surveyed, with 6.3% of the beneficiaries coming from LSCF areas (Table 5.1). A significant proportion of the beneficiaries (29.2%) were from urban areas, which can be explained by Goromonzi’s close proximity to Harare. Of the beneficiaries from the communal areas, the majority were from communal areas within Goromonzi district.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Place of Origin} & \text{No.} & \% \\
\hline
\text{Communal areas} & 313 & 61.3 \\
\text{Urban areas} & 149 & 29.2 \\
\text{LSCF} & 32 & 6.3 \\
\text{Place of employment in another area} & 10 & 2.0 \\
\text{Other*} & 7 & 1.4 \\
\hline
\text{Total} & 511 & 100.0 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

*Other = diaspora and mining areas

\[\text{Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006}\]

\(^9\) AIAS Baseline Survey carried out in Goromonzi in November and December 2006.
5.3.2 Socio-economic nature of beneficiaries

Overall, 74.5% of the survey population was not currently in formal employment (i.e. formally employed within either the private sector or the civil service) at the time of the survey. Of those in formal employment, most were employed in the private sector as semi-skilled workers (7.6% of the total plot holders); 5.4% of the plot owners were uniformed civil servants (i.e. army, police or prison services). No plot owners interviewed were currently, or had been previously, farm workers (as shown in Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Current and Previous Formal Employment of Beneficiaries in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Employment</th>
<th>Current Profession</th>
<th>Previous Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in formal employment</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt sector managerial/skilled</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt sector semi-skilled</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pvt sector unskilled</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant managerial/skilled</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant semi-skilled</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant unskilled</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant uniformed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self employed</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm worker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

Prior to resettlement, 59.9% of the plot owners interviewed had not been in formal employment. This figure has subsequently increased to 74.5% and can be linked to the economic decline (discussed in Chapter 4) that has involved a decline in formal sector employment. The decline in formal employment has been more significant within the private sector.

5.3.3 Age and gender based allocation patterns

The majority of beneficiaries (33.8%) were between the ages of 46–55 years, with a significant proportion (28.1%) being between 36 and 45 years. Over 60% of the population of A1 household heads were found within the reproductive age group\footnote{In Zimbabwe, according to the Central Statistics Office (CSO), this age group is from 15 – 65 years.}. Most (86.6%) A1 plot owners were married (Table 5.3). The majority of the farmers that have been resettled
in Goromonzi district are men. Of the 608 A1 households surveyed, 79.9% of plot owners were male compared to 20.1% females. In this instance, plot „ownership“ refers to the person whose name appears on the offer letter; therefore, while male beneficiaries outweigh female beneficiaries in terms of outright land ownership, women still benefit indirectly through land reform i.e. through marriage.

Table 5.3: Marital Status of Plot Owner by Gender in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Plot owner</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.3.4 Household size

Most (32.8%) A1 households ranged between three to five persons per household, though there were a significant (29.7%) number of households that had only one person per household (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Household Size Ranges of Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household size ranges</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.3.5 Residency status

Contrary to mainstream debates, which have seen newly resettled farmers being termed „cell phone“ or „weekend“ farmers, in the case of A1 households surveyed in Goromonzi, the majority (76.4%) of plot holders indicated that they resided on their plots; 17.6% stayed in urban areas and, again, this is linked to the close proximity of Goromonzi to Harare (Table 5.5). Those staying off-farm (in communal areas and urban areas) may not
have established proper housing infrastructure for purposes of having a permanent presence on the plots. Therefore, the new land allocations are not just a source of production but also a site of reproduction.

Table 5.5: Residency of Plot Owners in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residency of plot owners</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stays on-farm</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban area</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal area</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.3.6 Mode of land access

At the time of the survey (in 2006), 79.5% of the A1 farmers interviewed had been formally allocated their land, and at least 83.1% of these households were in possession of offer letters issued by the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement (MLLRR). Only 14.4% had accessed their land through occupations while 5% of households said that they had initially occupied the land and were subsequently formally allocated that land (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Mode of Land Access of Beneficiaries in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of land access</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formally allocated</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation and then formal allocation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

Most households were allocated their land before 2004, with the majority having been allocated land in 2001 (31.3%) and 2002 (31.5%). While most households had been on their land for at least four to five years at the time of the survey, it is also important to note when farming operations actually began. The majority of respondents indicated that they started farming operations on their plots during the same year they were formally allocated the land. In the case of farmers allocated land in 2000, 74.2% of these households said that they commenced farming operations that same year, whilst – for 2001 – 80.8% of
households allocated land in that year began their farming operations within that year (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7: Year of Formal Allocation versus Commencement of Farming Operations in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of land allocation</th>
<th>Year when farming commenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(74.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.3.7 Land conflicts

Since their land allocation, farmers interviewed have faced very few conflicts and evictions or even threats of eviction. This could account for the fact that farmers have been able to commence farming activities in the same year in which they have been allocated their land. This is contrary to common arguments about chaos still ensuing on the farms, with claims about peasants, poor people and initial land occupiers being evicted by elites on a regular basis. Over 70% of households interviewed said that they had not been involved in any conflicts since they had been resettled. Of those who have been involved in conflicts, these conflicts have been mostly about boundary disputes, with 12% of households reporting that they had been in conflicts of this nature (Table 5.8). There were also still incidences of multiple plot ownership within the district, as well as some better off farmers using their own discretion to demarcate and fence land, thereby extending subdivisions to levels beyond what is stipulated in their offer letters.  

---

21 Interview with Mr. Sombrero – Lands Officer, Goromonzi District Lands Officer, August 2008.
Table 5.8: Source of Land Conflicts in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of conflict</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No land conflicts</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary dispute</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict over land/ownership</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to natural resources</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to infrastructure</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eviction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespassing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double allocation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanging plots</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud/forged documents</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land re-planning issues</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>473</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.4 Centrality of Agriculture to Rural Livelihoods

As highlighted in Chapter 2, agriculture remains central to rural livelihoods in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. However, within the FTLRP context, newly resettled farmers (especially A1 smallholders) have often been accused of being engaged in non-agricultural activities and not being involved in full-time farming like their large-scale predecessors. The survey attempted to assess the extent to which newly resettled A1 farmers engaged in non-farm income generating activities. Overall, across a range of income generating activities, less than 5% of households were involved in activities other than agriculture (Table 5.9). At the same time, a more in-depth analysis of this area is required, given the illegal nature of some of the activities on resettled farms (gold panning, firewood selling, river/pit sand harvesting and wildlife harvesting) and the possible unwillingness by participants in the survey to divulge their participation in such activities. The actual agricultural activities of A1 farmers in Goromonzi are discussed in the following chapter.
Table 5.9: Households in Goromonzi Involved in Non-farm Income Generating Activities (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-farm income generating activity*</th>
<th>No. Of Households</th>
<th>Seasonality of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold panning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood selling</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River/pit sand selling</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife harvesting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood carving</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone carving</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklaying</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vending of new &amp; second hand clothes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer brewing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair work</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multi-variant responses – percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.5 Resources Available to Newly Resettled Farmers for Production

5.5.1 Natural capital

The FTLRP has allowed households to access larger pieces of better quality land; 97% of households interviewed in Goromonzi received plots which ranged from 0.1-20 hectares in size. Two households reported that they had land holdings over 120 hectares, which still falls within the overall maximum farm size for Natural Region IIa set during the FTLRP (see Section 4.2). The average plot size in Goromonzi, amongst the resettled A1 farmers interviewed, was 7.64 hectares. The average arable area on each plot was 6.59 hectares.
Compared to the size of land holdings (and the arable land available), levels of cropping amongst the newly resettled households remain low. The majority of plot owners had between 1–19 hectares of arable land; but most households (89.2%) had between 0.1 to 5 hectares of their arable area cropped. Specifically, 31.1% of households within this category had between 1.01 and 3 hectares of cropped area, and 21.5% had between 3.01 and 5 hectares cropped (Table 5.10).

Table 5.10: Cropped Area versus Arable Area in Goromonzi District (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cropped area</th>
<th>Arable area</th>
<th>1-19ha</th>
<th>20-49ha</th>
<th>50-99ha</th>
<th>100-199ha</th>
<th>+200ha</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1-1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.01-3</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.01-5</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.01-10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1-20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.01-30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.01-50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.5.2 Financial/Economic and technical\textsuperscript{22} capital

5.5.2.1 Asset ownership and access amongst resettled A1 households

Many beneficiaries in both A1 and A2 schemes are new farmers who did not have their own stocks of farm equipment (Moyo, 2004:14). It has been very difficult to ascertain and audit equipment and assets found on farms in the wake of resettlement. According to Moyo (2004:14), large scale commercial farmers either sold their equipment, had equipment stolen or vandalised during land occupations, exported equipment, or warehoused equipment in anticipation of favourable settlement of their acquisition court contests. In 2000, the World Resources Institute estimated that there were at least 24,000 tractors in Zimbabwe, of which 23,000 were in the commercial farming sector (the government through the District Development Fund – DDF – had 789). Assessments done by the DDF suggest that 13,000 tractors were still operational, suggesting that 11,000 are either in storage, have been exported or are on sale in second hand outlets (Moyo, 2004:14).

\textsuperscript{22} For the purpose of this research, the term „technical capital” refers to extension support services and technological innovations and research available to resettled households, so that they are able to improve their productive capacities.
Newly resettled farmers need access to adequate productive tools so that they can improve their production levels. Amongst A1 farmers (in Goromonzi), most have hand tools and animal drawn implements with very few having access to power driven machines and equipment (Table 5.11). This is a common trend even in communal areas, and would be expected to be a similar trend amongst A1 farmers since most of the beneficiaries came from communal areas.

Table 5.11: Asset Ownership for Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership of Assets</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asset Poor*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns Hand Tools Only</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Tools and Animal Drawn Implements</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Tools, Animal Drawn and Power Driven Implements</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>608</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asset Poor: Household does not own any assets

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

The majority (51.6%) of the A1 households interviewed owned hand tools only, with 28% of households owning hand tools and animal drawn implements. However, whilst households may not own productive assets, they may still have access (Table 5.12) to them through other means, which may include borrowing or hiring of such assets. In terms of hand tools, most households have access to hoes (98.8%), axes (97.5%), picks (80.3%) and spades (70%). For animal drawn implements, the most accessed implement was the plough, with 38.3% of households having some sort of access to it. Power driven machinery and tools have the lowest number of households with access to them, with less than 10% of households able to access these assets (Table 5.12).
Table 5.12: Access to Productive Tools in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of asset</th>
<th>HH with asset access*</th>
<th>Ave no. of assets accessed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoes</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axes</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattocks</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picks</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spades</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spade forks</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel barrow</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knapsack sprayer</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal-drawn implements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planter</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripper</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridger</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrow</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spike-harrow</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power driven machinery &amp; equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor trailer</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planter</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripper</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water cart/bowser</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water pump</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Access either through ownership, borrowing or hiring

** Percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

Newly resettled farmers have also tried to enhance their productive capacities by putting in their own investments but levels of investment have been low. This is linked to issues around tenure insecurity, and the broader macro-economic challenges which have made it difficult for farmers to pursue investments in their land. However, as farmers have become more settled, they are attempting to put in place infrastructure and equipment on their plots.

5.5.2.2 Access to finance for A1 households

The Government embarked on the FTLRP without any external assistance or funding, due to the controversial nature of the process (see Chapter 4). Its own resources were not sufficient to effectively provide support for newly resettled farmers once they had received their land. At the same time, the private sector – especially the banking sector – has withdrawn a significant proportion of its financing from agriculture (see Section 4.4.2.2). Post-settlement support, especially in the form of financial resources, has been limited and
often directed mostly at the A2 farmers, such that financing for small-scale (A1 and communal) farmers remains a challenge. According to Tagarira (2007:7), banks have been largely biased towards A2 farmers because they are generally more capable of providing collateral security and more viable project proposals. In addition to this, the A2 farmers also have larger holdings that enable them to be more „bankable”.

Tagarira (2007) however concedes that, since the land reform programme began and has taken root, banks have had to be more innovative in their financing models so that they cater for both A1 and A2 farmers. In fact, some of the new/indigenous banks emerging in Zimbabwe have noted the importance of financing new farmers, and they are structuring their financing to meet the needs of the new agrarian structure and the new tenure regime. Such banks include Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group (ZABG), which now recognises offer letters and 99-year leases as suitable security for borrowing by A1 and A2 farmers respectively. However, internationally based banks such like Standard Chartered, Barclays and Stanbic still do not accept offer letters and 99-year leases as a form of collateral. A1 farmers interviewed in the survey, however, were still using their own financial resources (93.3%) for crop farming. Only 4.3% of farmers reported that they had received funding through government schemes, with 1.0% of farmers receiving financing from commercial banks (Table 5.13).

Table 5.13: Source of Finances for Crop Farming for Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Financial Resources for crop farming</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Financial Resources</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Schemes</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives and Friends</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Bank</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Companies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop/livestock sales</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>608</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006*

Financing is also being made available in the form of contract farming and out-grower schemes, but these have also been limited and access by A1 farmers to such programmes has been difficult. Contract farming involves agro-processors or exporters entering into crop growing partnerships with farmers, whereby processors provide inputs in exchange for exclusive buying rights to produce at a pre-agreed pricing formula (World Bank,
Out-grower schemes refer to schemes where agri-business has considerable control over the smallholder production process, providing a large number of services such as input credits, tillage, spraying and harvesting. The smallholder provides land and labour in return for this comprehensive extension/input package.

In Zimbabwe as a whole, the major companies which have been involved in contract farming and out-grower schemes are the GMB, Pannar Seed Private Limited, Pioneer and SeedCo (maize grain and seed), British American Tobacco (BAT), Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) (tobacco) and GMB and Interfresh (soya beans). These two options have been identified by the GoZ as a means by which finance can be put back into the agricultural sector by the private sector in providing support to newly resettled farmers. Amongst the resettled A1 farmers interviewed in the survey in Goromonzi, the most popular crop within out-grower and contract farming schemes was maize grain, though the number of households involved was still very limited – 10.4 % of households in the survey said that they were growing maize under contact farming, with 1.6% of households interviewed involved in a maize out-grower scheme (Table 5.14).

**Table 5.14: Households Involved in Contract Farming and Out-grower Schemes in Goromonzi (n = 608)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Households Involved</th>
<th>Contract Farming</th>
<th>Out-grower scheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize grain</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize seed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multi-variant responses – percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

In general, financial support for A1 farmers remains limited, as was the case prior to FTLRP where smallholder sector (communal and old resettlement) farmers lacked sufficient access to credit (see Chapter 3). This has also influenced investment levels on A1 farms. It is further evidence that investment in resettlement areas has not been influenced by lack of tenure security per se, but in large part because of the challenges farmers have in accessing resources to make substantial investments in equipment and infrastructure.
5.5.2.3 Household investment levels

Observations made in the field show that households mostly have been investing in housing and storage facilities for crops. In the case of farms designated under A1, infrastructure such as farm houses and storage barns were made state property, and households were supposed to share these assets or the infrastructure was to be used for community purposes (such as the conversion of farm houses to schools). As a result, households resettled under the A1 scheme normally accessed land without any existing infrastructure on it. In total, 50.5% of A1 farmers interviewed in the survey indicated that the main investments which they had put on the farm since resettlement had been shelter, which included farmhouses and toilets (Table 5.15).

Table 5.15: Investments on Farm since Resettlement by Farmers in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments on farm since resettlement</th>
<th>No. of Households*</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and irrigation facilities</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm structures</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm equipment and machinery</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not input any investments</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multi-variant responses
NB: Shelter – farmhouses, toilets etc
Water and irrigation facilities – boreholes, wells, dams etc
Farm structures – barns, shed, granary, greenhouses etc
Farm equipment and machinery – tractors, harvesters, dryers etc
Source: AILAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.5.2.4 Access to inputs for crop and livestock production

One of the major frustrations that newly resettled farmers have faced is access to inputs and support services for crop production. Key inputs such as seed and fertilizer have been in short supply. In the case of seed, during FTLRP some seed farms were acquired for resettlement, thereby affecting supply. Fertilizer companies have been constrained by the lack of foreign currency to import key ingredients, and this is linked to broader macro-economic conditions.

Whilst GoZ has attempted to ease the shortages in inputs through various input credit schemes and programmes (for instance, through the GMB), resettled households regularly have to source and buy their own inputs. Access to inputs within resettled areas remains limited (see Section 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) and this is reflected in the survey data collected,
where access levels for key crop and livestock inputs was less than 59%. The specific input which most households were able to access was seed, where 58.8% of households said that they had been able to access seed for their main/key crops (Table 5.16). Across the inputs analysed, the majority of households had to purchase their own inputs. The support offered by the state to the A1 households was limited. In addition, NGO and private sector input support was very limited, no doubt a reflection of their broader distant stance from newly resettled areas (see Chapter 4).

Table 5.16: Source of Key Crop Inputs for Farmers in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Inputs</th>
<th>Households with access</th>
<th>Source**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crop Inputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-chemicals</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livestock Inputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock feeds</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

**Multi-variant responses

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.5.2.5 Access to agricultural extension services

Resettled households have often been accused of lacking the skills to revive agriculture in Zimbabwe. An important source of information for farmers to gain these skills is through extension services. Public extension programmes in Zimbabwe prior to FTLRP were quite extensive especially in communal areas and old resettlement areas. There are four public institutions that are currently responsible for research and extension. These are the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX), Department of Agricultural Engineering (DAE), Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) and Department of Livestock Production and Development (LPD). Most A1 households in Zimbabwe have contact with AREX extension officers, who intervene in ways that have (in the past) proven successful in communal and old resettlement areas. These include master farmer training, farmer field schools, field days, trials and demonstrations, farmer groups, and exchange visits and competitions. Such hands-on training is especially relevant considering that farmers have to learn and gain new skills on site.
Other sources of extension – aside from government extension services – have been limited, with very few private companies and NGOs being involved in newly resettled areas such as Goromonzi. Prior to FTLRP, private sector research and extension took place almost exclusively in relation to the LSCF sector, and financial houses and banks channelled most of their resources to this sector (Makhado, 2003:8). The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) also operated through commodity associations at district levels and worked with AREX and NGOs to provide mostly extension services to smallholder and communal farmers (the ZFU had no research facilities or formal training institutions). The Goromonzi survey revealed that resettled A1 households had greater access to public sector extension services – 81.6% of households had access to AREX services, with at least 70% of these households having frequent contact with extension officers. Less than 4% of the households had access to private sector extension services (Table 5.17).

Table 5.17: Access to Extension Services for Crops and Livestock in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Advice</th>
<th>Households with access</th>
<th>Frequency of Contact** (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREX</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Irrigation and Technical Services</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Natural Resources</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Commission</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Services</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Livestock</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Input companies</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer Organisations</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives and Friends</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbouring Farmers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey  
**Percentage of farmers with access to advice  
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.5.3 **Human capital**

The skill and aptitude of newly resettled farmers has constantly been called into question in the debate around land reform. Some scholars argue that the FTLRP has seen skilled and competent commercial farmers being replaced by unskilled new farmers who lack the ability to drive Zimbabwe’s agricultural economy. New farmers are perceived as having no
capacity to fully utilise land, to produce diverse crops including specialised high value export commodities such as tobacco and horticultural crop, to realise high yields and to efficiently use inputs ranging from machinery to labour (Moyo and Chambati, 2007:13). Unlike the A2 scheme, the selection process of farmers under A1 resettlement had no established criteria for forms and levels of farmer skills (Makhado, 2003:1). This is not to say that newly resettled farmers do not have the capacities to acquire the required skills or the knowledge and experience around agricultural production. The majority (36.7%) of the Goromonzi A1 farmers interviewed had „Ordinary Level” qualifications (having finished secondary school), with only 4.7% having no formal education. It is also important to note that farmers have experience and skills from previous employment, which can be applied to the agricultural sector to improve smallholder agriculture. The majority of households had no formal training in agriculture. However, only 3.7% of these households had no farming experience. Just fewer than 50% of households without formal training had between one and five years of farming experience, and over 30% had at least ten years experience (Table 5.18). As highlighted earlier (in Chapter 4), little acknowledgement is given to the previous farming experience of resettled farmers. Often unfair comparisons are drawn between resettled farmers and previous large-scale farmers, resulting in the decrease in agricultural production levels being attributed to the individual capacity of resettled farmers.

Table 5.18: Formal Training versus Years of Farming Experience of Household Heads in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Farming Experience</th>
<th>No formal training</th>
<th>Certificate in Agriculture</th>
<th>Master Farmer Certificate</th>
<th>Advanced Master Farmer Certificate</th>
<th>Diploma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>16(3.7)</td>
<td>1(2.2)</td>
<td>1(3.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2(40.0)</td>
<td>20(3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 5</td>
<td>194(45.4)</td>
<td>14(31.1)</td>
<td>6(18.2)</td>
<td>1(16.7)</td>
<td>2(40.0)</td>
<td>217(42.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 10</td>
<td>79(18.5)</td>
<td>5(11.1)</td>
<td>5(15.2)</td>
<td>3(50.0)</td>
<td>1(20.0)</td>
<td>93(18.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 15</td>
<td>31(7.3)</td>
<td>6(13.3)</td>
<td>5(15.2)</td>
<td>1(16.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43(8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 – 20</td>
<td>37(8.7)</td>
<td>8(17.8)</td>
<td>3(9.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48(9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>70(16.4)</td>
<td>11(24.4)</td>
<td>13(39.4)</td>
<td>1(16.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>95(18.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>427(100.0)</td>
<td>45(100.0)</td>
<td>33(100.0)</td>
<td>6(100.0)</td>
<td>5(100.0)</td>
<td>516(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

A1 households, due to resource constraints, often make more use of family labour than their A2 counterparts, and they combine this with hired outside labour. The dominance of smallholders has therefore increased the prevalence of self- or family-operated farms. As
noted earlier in this chapter (Section 5.3.4), the average household size in the survey area was between three to five household members; 63.8% of households interviewed said that they used family labour on their plots (Table 5.19).

**Table 5.19: Type of Labour Used by Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of labour used on plots</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of households</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. of households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used Family Labour on Plot</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired outside Labourers</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006*

Significantly, A1 farmers are also employing outside labour (both permanent and casual workers), given that they have access to larger pieces of land (the average arable area on A1 land holdings is six hectares) when compared to the average land holding size in communal areas. Overall, 91.6% of A1 plot holders interviewed said that they hired outside labour on either a casual or permanent basis.

### 5.5.4 Social capital

Social capital can be described as the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001:4). Social capital has become extremely important for resettled households in Zimbabwe, in helping to cover or close gaps experienced in their attempts to pursue agricultural activities. The notion of social capital goes beyond kinship relations and social assistance, as it also entails more strictly economic relations that motivate individuals to engage in investments and transactions (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001:6). Farmers are making transactions (for example, exchanging equipment and information) in order to support each other as a means of facilitating the improvement and sustainability of production, although this may not entail equal exchange.

In this regard, newly resettled A1 farms are not homogenous and – even before resettlement – there was social differentiation between communal area households. Within resettled areas, some households have more resources than others and have been able to build up their asset base faster than poorer counterparts. Nevertheless, a trade-off system
seems to be emerging on A1 farms (in Goromonzi at least), where farmers assist each other in return for either monetary remuneration or access to equipment. Most often, respondents (51.8%) in the survey revealed that they shared productive infrastructure, with the hiring out of equipment being the second (37.6%) most offered service given by farmers to each other; 36% of respondents said that they shared advice and information pertaining to agricultural production with fellow resettled farmers (Table 5.20).

Table 5.20: Collaboration Between Resettled Farmers in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative Activities</th>
<th>Households*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of productive infrastructure</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal hiring of equipment arrangements</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of advice and information</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of social infrastructure</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal labour sharing</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined farming operations</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of seed and planting materials</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of same agricultural and social groups</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multi-variant responses – percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

*Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006*

Over and above the informal services farmers are offering to each other, they have also tried to organise themselves into groups. Amongst the A1 farmers interviewed in Goromonzi, the main institutions that are beginning to form are, it appears, farmers’ groups (Table 5.21). Respondents in the survey said that they main activities of the farmer groups centred on organising farmers to improve and increase production levels and access markets. More specifically, these activities range from assisting farmers to access loans, buying inputs, offering technical assistance and representing the needs of their members at different forums.
Networks and linkages that are emerging within resettlement areas are, however, not only limited to the resettled farmers based on a particular resettled farm. Households in the survey also indicated that resettled households have linkages with communal areas.

The major linkages identified by farmers between resettled households and communal areas were centred on resettled farmers having access to resources from communal areas, namely, labour, productive resources and inputs. Overall, 47.6% of respondents said that farmers were sourcing labour from communal areas, with 32.7% of respondents highlighting that newly resettled farmers are utilizing productive resources – such as ploughs and scotch carts from communal areas – whilst 29.7% of respondents were sourcing farming inputs from agro-dealers in communal areas. A significant proportion
(22.5%) of resettled households also noted that children from resettled areas were enrolled in schools located in communal areas (Table 5.22).

The linkages are not one way though, and reverse linkages also exist between communal areas and resettlement areas. The major reverse linkages identified were that communal area farmers were benefitting from grazing resources (35.2%) and the harvesting of firewood (33.4%) on resettled farms, and human mass movement from the communal areas to resettlement areas (i.e. the shift of individuals or households into newly resettled areas in search of employment, food and inputs) (26.3%). Only 1.2% of households in the survey identified employment creation as an actual benefit being experienced by communal areas in and through the establishment of the newly resettled areas (Table 5.23).

Table 5.23: Reverse Linkages Between Communal Areas and Resettlement Areas Identified by Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of reverse linkages between communal areas and A1 farmers*</th>
<th>Households*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA farmers benefitting from grazing resources in RAs</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA households harvesting firewood in RAs</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human mass movement from CA to RAs</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAs serving as markets for livestock in neighbouring CA</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA farmers benefitting from thatching grass in RAs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multi-variant responses – percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

5.6 Conclusion

FTLRP in Zimbabwe has been a controversial and contested process. The process of land transfers however has taken place and a new agrarian structure has been created, in which peasants (i.e. communal and A1 farmers) have become the dominant sector. This chapter has sought to understand the nature of the new A1 beneficiaries (including their many challenges) before undertaking – in the following chapter – an analysis of their production patterns and outputs. Often newly resettled farmers in Zimbabwe are dismissed as being unproductive and not having the capabilities of the former LSCF to ensure sustained agricultural production, yet the immediate on-the-ground environment in which they
operate is rarely analysed in relation to the macro-economic conditions which have been highlighted (in Chapter 4).

Many issues noted in this current chapter highlight the need for the GoZ to institute broader agrarian reforms which address the needs of the new agrarian structure created. Land reform (including redistribution) is but one facet of agrarian reform; whilst great strides have been made in Zimbabwe to transfer better quality land to poor rural households, the process of agrarian reform still needs to be tackled, given that newly resettled A1 households continue to face similar agrarian challenges as communal households did prior to the FTLRP (in the case of A1 farmers, this amounts to inadequate post-settlement support). Chapter 6 seeks to discuss the prevailing production patterns of A1 households in Goromonzi with these issues in mind.
6.0 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PATTERNS OF NEWLY RESETTLED A1 FARMERS IN GOROMONZI

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the discussion in the previous chapter on emerging livelihood patterns in newly resettled areas. It explores the production patterns of newly (A1) resettled farmers based on their levels of access to available resources, and links their current production patterns to levels of household food security. Through the use of survey evidence, as well as information gathered from key informant interviews and focus group discussions (with resettled A1 households at Swiswa 2 Resettlement Scheme, in Goromonzi), the chapter looks at levels of land utilisation, production patterns (exploring the crops grown and the variety of crops grown by households), livestock production patterns, and marketing patterns for both crop and livestock. I also consider the production constraints identified by farmers and the mechanisms they are using to overcome these challenges. The chapter concludes by linking farmers’ production, especially of food crops, with food security at the household level, focusing specifically on maize production, but highlighting other crops which are important for household consumption.

According to the agricultural extension officers working in Goromonzi district, there have been several changes in terms of production patterns and levels subsequent to the start of the FTLRP. On the whole, there has been an overall decrease in agricultural production levels in the district since the implementation of the FTLRP; this can be attributed to a number of factors which are discussed in this chapter and which are directly linked to the emerging livelihood trends described in the preceding chapter. Large-scale commercial farmers in the district prior to FTLRP mostly grew tobacco, horticultural products (especially floriculture and export vegetables), maize, soya beans and wheat (and they were also involved in dairy farming). The area was known for intensive large-scale production and high production levels, which resulted in several of the district’s maize farmers belonging to SeedCo’s Ten Tonne Club23. Further, Munhenga Farm (before it was sub-divided) was known as a leading dairy farm, with the Holstein cows kept on the farm producing record milk outputs, while the

---

23 The Ten Tonne Club was a prestigious grouping of commercial maize farmers able to produce ten tonnes/hectare, and was established in the 1940s by the Rhodesia Seed Maize Association.
Bromley area in the south east of the district was a major tobacco production area with yields averaging 3,000kgs/hectare.24

6.2 Land Utilisation Levels of A1 Farmers in Goromonzi

A1 households under FTLRP have access to an average of six hectares of land suitable for cropping and, amongst the farmers interviewed during the survey, their average land area was slightly more at 7.64 hectares (see Section 5.4.1). One of the major queries surrounding fast track land reform has been the extent to which households have been able to effectively utilise their available land. Extension officers interviewed noted that, generally speaking, there have been low levels of land utilisation. From the survey, the majority of households (51.9%) were still (in 2006) using less than 41% of the arable area available on their plots (Table 6.1). This can be linked to the (previously discussed) inadequate levels of productive resources and inputs available to farmers under the FTLRP.

Table 6.1: Levels of Land Utilisation Amongst Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land utilised by farmers on their plots</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 0.9%</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – 20%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 40 %</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 60%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 – 80%</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 – 100%</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

6.3 Production Patterns of A1 Farmers in Goromonzi

As noted, Goromonzi district prior to FLTPR was synonymous with large-scale intensive commercial production. The extension officers interviewed noted that resettled A1 farmers have concentrated mostly on growing maize and soya beans; some farmers though are growing tobacco commercially and vegetable crops on a small-scale (such as tomatoes and green leafy vegetables).

24 Interviews with Goromonzi District Extension Officers (Mr. Guti and Miss J. Chikarate) in August 2008.
6.3.1 Crop production levels

Farmers in Goromonzi grow a variety of crops, although maize was the major crop grown by the A1 households (83.5%) interviewed in the district. With regard to the variety of crops grown by households (Table 6.2), the majority of farmers (52.5%) grew only one crop. This was normally maize, but some farmers were only growing wheat, small grains or dry beans; 27% of households grew a combination of maize and one other crop, with the most popular combination being maize and groundnuts followed by maize and wheat; and 6.5% of households grew a combination of maize and two other crops, with the most common combination being maize, soya beans and groundnuts. Overall, 11% of households interviewed did not grow any crops in the previous season and the 2005/2006 season was their first season of cropping. This is likely due to the fact that they had just moved onto the property at the time of the survey. The discussion in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3) highlighted that 7.6% of households interviewed were resettled in 2005 and 2006. Farmers tried to balance the need to combine food crops (maize, groundnuts, small grains, dry beans) with cash crops (tobacco, soya beans, cotton, paprika, wheat). It is also important for households to grow a variety of crops (i.e. two or more crops) to safeguard against failure of any particular crop, but only about one-third of the households did so.
Table 6.2: Crop Matrix of Survey Area (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Crop Combination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

Farmers also grew some vegetable crops, though it was observed during field trips undertaken by the researcher that households did not consider these crops (e.g. rape, cassava, okra and cabbage) as their main commercial crops, since they were grown in gardens located within the family homestead area. The level of vegetable production for marketing, as recorded in the survey, was very low, as vegetables were mostly grown for domestic consumption. The most popular vegetable grown by A1 households interviewed were tomatoes (13% of households), rape (13%), onions (5%) and Irish potatoes (4%).

In the wake of recurrent droughts and food insecurity in the country, food crops have tended to be grown by farmers in an attempt to ensure that their households have enough food. Hence, the majority of farmers (52%) who grew maize said that they grew it specifically for their own consumption needs. In fact, compared to other crops, greater support has been provided by government in terms of provision of inputs and fertilizer for maize in order to address the issue of food security, through the schemes discussed previously.
In terms of crop outputs, A1 farmers’ output levels have tended to vary such that there is significant variation in productivity. The extension officers working with resettled A1 households have noted that the so-called ‘serious’ farmers had made significant headway in utilising their land and had high crop outputs. The success that such farmers were enjoying was evident in the fact that some resettled households had started to participate in local agricultural shows, with specific A1 farmers participating in the 2008 Goromonzi Agricultural Show.

Survey data however did reveal that, on average, production levels on newly resettled farms was still fairly low. Households growing maize recorded average yields of 1.5 tonnes per hectare and grew an average of 3.5 hectares of maize on their plots. The second most popular crop grown by resettled households in the survey were groundnuts, with average yields of 0.7 tonnes per hectare recorded (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Average Crop Production Levels of Households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop Type</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Average Production levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. Of producers</td>
<td>%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Foods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil seeds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key exports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

6.3.2 Livestock production

Livestock ownership patterns still remain low amongst the newly resettled A1 farmers interviewed in the survey. Forty-three percent (43%) of households owned cattle, whilst 33% of households owned poultry. Other livestock which respondents owned included goats (15.5%), pigs (2.0%), sheep (1.6%), donkeys (1.0%) and dairy cows (0.3%) (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Livestock Production Amongst Households in Goromonzi District (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of livestock</th>
<th>Households of</th>
<th>Average no. per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy herd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: ALAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

6.3.3 Marketing channels for agricultural produce

Resettled A1 households are not engaged in agriculture for the sole purpose of subsistence, but are also engaged in production for sale on the market. Households interviewed indicated that they sold their produce on various markets. However a key market was the GMB, which in the main bought the controlled (state-regulated) food crops of maize and wheat: Two hundred and sixty four (264) (51.9%) households that grew maize sold their crop to the GMB, whilst 12.4% of respondents sold their produce to local markets (i.e. local farmers and agro-processors) (Table 6.5). Farmers sell their grain to the GMB not necessarily because they offer the best price, but because of legal statutes and requirements that the government has put into place. The number of markets available to A1 farmers to sell their produce is however limited due to the reintroduction of the state monopoly around grain commodities (maize and wheat), and the hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe which has seen the role of private buyers severely limited. The lack of a variety of markets to sell farm produce has also reduced the prices that farmers are getting from the sale of their produce, making it difficult to reinvest their profits into the next farming season.
Table 6.5: Markets for crops grown by A1 households in Goromonzi (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop type</th>
<th>Market to which crop was sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oil seeds</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key exports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes neighbouring farmers and local private agro-processors

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

6.4 Major Crop Production Constraints

It is evident from the above discussion that A1 farmers within Goromonzi have not reached maximum levels of production given that their levels of land utilisation and crop yields are low and the ownership of livestock is still limited. The major production constraints which farmers in the survey have experienced since resettlement centre on the shortage of labour (63.9% of households), credit unavailability (61.5%) and input unavailability (56.4%) (Table 6.6). These constraints are linked to the broader macro-environment and political challenges facing the country, as well as to the continued marginalisation of A1 farmers and the entire smallholder sector. Smallholder farmers for instance lack support (inputs and credits) to improve their productive capacities and profit margins, in order for them to pay more competitive wages for hired labour. Hence the labour shortages that A1 households experience are in part linked to the fact that they cannot pay more competitive wages and offer better working conditions than their A2 counterparts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Production Challenge</th>
<th>No. (%*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of Labour</td>
<td>389 (63.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit unavailability</td>
<td>374 (61.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input unavailability</td>
<td>343 (56.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV and AIDS</td>
<td>208 (34.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erratic Rainfall Patterns</td>
<td>208 (34.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High prices of inputs</td>
<td>199 (32.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of markets</td>
<td>186 (30.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport costs</td>
<td>101 (16.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multiple responses – percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

Further discussions with key informants reiterated the unavailability of inputs and credit as significant constraints for A1 households, along with the lack of productive infrastructure like tractors, ploughs, harvesters, irrigation pipes and storage facilities for their crops. The main challenge around inputs concerns their unavailability and often late distribution (in specific reference to various state schemes), and the high cost of inputs accessible through the private sector. To the detriment of A1 farmers, several loopholes exist within the state-subsidised input and service schemes available to these farmers, such as Operation Maguta\(^25\), the GMB input schemes and the RBZ mechanisation programme (all highlighted in Chapter 4). In particular, inputs made available through government schemes in the district have been monopolised by A2 farmers and political elites\(^26\). Where and when A1 farmers have been able to benefit, they usually receive inputs last (after A2 farmers), or the inputs are distributed late and are inadequate for the season. Furthermore, macro-economic conditions – especially high rates of inflation – have pushed up the prices of inputs available outside of government schemes (i.e. on the open market) and made them beyond the monetary reach of A1 households\(^27\).

\(^25\) Operation Maguta is an initiative launched in 2005 in which the government has deployed Zimbabwe Defence Force members together with AREX officials to former commercial farms viewed as under-utilised to oversee maize and wheat production. In cases where there are existing tenants on the land and viable irrigation structures, tenants have been instructed to grow the prescribed crops of maize and wheat (irrespective of their own cropping plans). Tillage services and inputs under Operation Maguta are provided on condition that the crop is sold to the GMB.

\(^26\) Interview with Mr. Guti – Extension Officer Goromonzi District – August 2008.

\(^27\) Interview with Ms K. Manase – Programme Officer FOSENET – September 2008.
Under the RBZ Mechanisation Programme, A1 households in Goromonzi district have received ploughs, scotch carts and knapsack sprayers. In terms of Operation Maguta, they received maize seed in the season prior to the survey, but did not receive adequate fertilizer – on average households only obtained one 50kg bag of compound D for the entire season and with no reference to cropped area. In addition, tillage continues to be a major constraint for A1 households. The entire district of Goromonzi in 2008 had only four tractors allocated to A1 farmers by the government’s District Development Fund (DDF), who are also responsible for maintaining and operating them. In addition, only one of these tractors is regularly operative, as the others require significant repair work. These tractors need to service the 9,382 A1 units that have been created under the FTLRP (Goromonzi District Lands Office, 2007). Despite these challenges, the DDF had not received any tractors for Goromonzi under the RBZ Mechanisation Programme.28

Resettled A1 households lack adequate infrastructure, especially storage facilities. The situation has been further compounded because resettled farmers arrived on farms without their own productive equipment, such as tillage equipment. There was also significant vandalism (of greenhouses, cold rooms and tobacco barns) and theft of equipment (such as irrigation infrastructure) during the earlier years of the FTLRP. As well, A1 farmers have lacked the skills and experience to take over and continue using (and maintaining) any remaining mechanised infrastructure that was still functional. In relation to environmental/natural challenges to production, Goromonzi district has not been as severely affected by the recurring droughts which have been affecting Zimbabwe. Rainfall in the district during the seasons of the survey (2004/2005 and 2005/2006) was generally above normal during the season; however, whilst this has been the case, the temporal distribution has affected yields, due to prolonged mid-season dry spells29.

AREX officers in the district acknowledge that based on the experience they have had with newly resettled A1 farmers in the district, farmers in Goromonzi district do have the technical knowledge to farm. In addition AREX has four officers in each of the twenty-five wards in the

28 Interview with Mr. Guti – Extension Officer Goromonzi District – August 2008.
29 Interview with Mr. M. J. Hamandishe – Assistant District Administrator, Goromonzi District – August 2008.
district, to provide additional training to cover knowledge gaps, as well as to offer advice to resettled farmers. However, without adequate financial and technical support as well as the regular supply of inputs for farmers, production levels will remain very low and households will not realise the full benefits of land and agrarian reform.

6.5 Attempts to Overcome Production Challenges – Coping Mechanisms adopted by Households

In the light of the challenges A1 households in Goromonzi are facing in terms of improving their levels of production, they have adopted various coping mechanisms and strategies. Households for example have met the challenge of lack of infrastructure through the sharing of (certain types of) remaining infrastructure that is still functioning, such as irrigation infrastructure. Such arrangements see A1 households grouping together to share irrigation pipes, paying for electricity and pump maintenance together, but paying for water from the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) as individuals.

Farmers have also tried to organise themselves into farmer lobby groups at village and ward level and, through their village heads and ward councillors, have attempted to engage with relevant stakeholders to increase their access to inputs and services offered by government. These groups include Group Development Associations (GDAs) and Area Development Associations (ADAs). GDAs are groupings of resettled farmers at the village level (i.e. combining the different individual A1 units that have been created) whose role is to coordinate the activities of resettled households, as well as to lobby farmer needs and concerns to the village heads and extension officers working with farmers. A number of GDAs existing within a particular ward form an ADA. ADAs work with ward councillors to address the needs of households at the ward level. At the district level, farmers (at the time of my research) were in the process of establishing the Goromonzi Enterprise Farmers’ Association.

---

30 Interview with Mr. Guti – Extension Officer Goromonzi District – August 2008.
31 Village Heads are individuals who have been nominated to chair Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), which are the lowest unit of government administration in Zimbabwe.
32 Ward councillors are individuals who are elected to represent Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). WADCOs are over-arching bodies under which several villages fall. The Ward councillors represent their ward at the district level.
which was to be officially launched at the end of September 2008. This association would though represent the interests of both A1 and A2 farmers who became members of the association.

Farmers had in addition organised themselves into groups of ten in order to access fuel from the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). According to the extension officers in the district, NOCZIM policy is that only farmers who have a minimum of sixty hectares of land can access the facility. A1 farmers who on average have six hectares of land for cultivation are therefore encouraged to group together in order for them to access the facility. At the same time, in the 2007/2008 season, farmers with the assistance of AREX organised a stakeholders’ meeting to discuss preparations for growing winter wheat. However, representatives of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) failed to turn up for the meeting, despite the supply of adequate electricity for irrigation being one of the major concerns for farmers wishing to engage in wheat production.

In most instances farmers have resorted to using alternative inputs, for example, the use of organic manure instead of inorganic fertilizer, and untreated rather than chemically-treated maize seed. But organic manure is limited as livestock ownership amongst the resettled households is exceedingly low. Indeed, in more extreme cases, livestock has been bartered in an attempt to buy inputs from the black market, the private sector or from fellow farmers – such efforts are constrained by the exorbitant prices of inputs available from these sources. Where farmers have been unable to access adequate inputs, they have been left with no alternative but to reduce cropped areas.

In order to overcome the financial constraints, farmers have sourced alternative markets for their produce aside from the traditional markets (e.g. GMB), and insist on payment in cash instead of cheques or bank transfers, so as to combat inflation. Farmers have identified and made direct contact with new markets for vegetables within the affluent northern suburbs of

---

33 Interview with Jacqueline Chikarate – Extension Officer, Ward 7, Goromonzi District – August 2008.
34 Interview with Jacqueline Chikarate – Extension Officer, Ward 7, Goromonzi District – August 2008.
Harare. This is an alternative market to the traditional main market for vegetables in Mbare, Harare.

### 6.6 Household Food Security Levels

Households surveyed within the district reported that in the 2004/2005 agricultural season they relied primarily on their own production to supply household food needs, especially of the main staple food maize (Table 6.7). Hence, 63% of households said that their main source of food for the household was from their own production, and 37% of households said that their second major source of food was food they purchased from the market. Less than 1% of households surveyed said that they had to rely on food aid, food-for-work programmes or food rations from employers as their main source of food. Significantly, 82% of the households surveyed said that they had sufficient food to meet their annual consumption needs – through household production, and/or by access from other sources (through purchases, food aid/assistance). But 18% of households experienced food shortages for a number of reasons; the majority of these households said that the major causes of food shortages were erratic weather patterns and the shortage of inputs which affected production levels.

**Table 6.7: Main Food Source for the Past Season for A1 households in Goromonzi (n = 608)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Food Source</th>
<th>Main Source</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own production</td>
<td>383 (63%)</td>
<td>12 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>67 (11%)</td>
<td>225 (37%)</td>
<td>1 (0.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>5 (0.8%)</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>17 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for work</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
<td>4 (0.7%)</td>
<td>3 (0.5%)</td>
<td>15 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food rations from employer</td>
<td>4 (0.7%)</td>
<td>3 (0.5%)</td>
<td>3 (0.5%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multiple responses - percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

**Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006**

Intriguingly, the Assistant District Administrator highlighted that, within Goromonzi, household food insecurity has been more prevalent within the communal wards in the district, compared to the newly resettled areas. A1 households are said to be better off than their communal counterparts because they are engaged in both farming and off-farming activities. In the survey, 31.9% of households reported that engaging in off-farm activities was an important means by which they overcame food insecurity. In the 2005/2006 season, AREX Goromonzi calculated that sixteen of the twenty-five wards in the district were facing food insecurity.
deficits. Of these sixteen wards, only five were wards where resettlement had taken place (Cromlet, Great Bromley, Bromley, Mondale and Ruwa). Preliminary studies for the 2008/2009 season, by the District Council in conjunction with ZIMVac, indicate that six wards were facing grain deficits, all of which were communal wards. These were Dzete, Gutu, Mwanza, Chishawasha, Chinyika and Rusike wards.

Households have adopted various strategies to overcome food shortages, specifically at the household level. These include reducing the number of meals consumed (38.8% of households), engaging in off-farm income generating activities in order to get extra income to purchase food (31.9%), using reserve food stocks (19.4%), selling household assets or livestock (7.2%), as well as applying for food aid or assistance (2.1%) (Table 6.18). While these mechanisms may overcome food shortages in the short-term, they sometimes have long-term sustainability implications, notably in relation to the use of food stocks and the selling of assets or livestock.

Table 6.8: Coping Strategies Adopted by A1 Households in Goromonzi to Ensure Household Food Security (n = 608)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coping Strategies Adopted</th>
<th>No. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Frequency of meals</td>
<td>168 (38.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in off-farm activities</td>
<td>138 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used reserve food stocks</td>
<td>84 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold livestock</td>
<td>28 (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied for food assistance</td>
<td>9 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold household assets</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought food</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multiple responses - percentage calculated according to total A1 population of survey

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2006

The Assistant District Administrator argues that, on the whole, resettlement areas in Goromonzi district have not been severely affected by high levels of chronic household food insecurity. This statement seems to be a fair assessment. From the survey, it can be noted that the strategies adopted by households indicate that the level of food insecurity is not severe, as households still retain their productive and livestock assets; certainly, large-scale asset reductions have not occurred. Since the majority of households (63.3%) rely on

35 Interview with Mr. M. J. Hamandishe – Assistant District Administrator, Goromonzi District – August 2008.
36 Interview with Mr. M. J. Hamandishe – Assistant District Administrator, Goromonzi District – August 2008.
household production as their main source of food needs, they have been able to adopt other strategies to ensure that they have enough food at the household level until the next harvest, which do not involve selling off their tools of production or other production assets.

This is an indication of transitory food insecurity, but the situation can become chronic and more severe, especially if strategies are not put into place which will ensure an increase in production levels of A1 households. The discussion in Section 6.4 highlighted the low levels of land utilisation by resettled households and their low yields. On the one hand, output by famers (though low and augmented by other measures) was still enough to ensure that 82% of households had food for the entire year. On the other hand, the situation remains precarious as households have been literally living from hand to mouth, and have not been able to make significant retentions to build up reserve stocks, which are critical in the event of a major catastrophe or shock (for instance, droughts or floods) which would prevent farmers from having a good harvest in the following season.

At district level, the Assistant District Administrator argues that government has put into place various programmes in an attempt to improve household food security. These include the establishment of nutrition gardens and the Zunde RaMambo schemes in the communal wards. While the schemes have been established, they have been limited to communal areas and have not been effectively monitored to ensure that they are effective. In the 2007/2008 season, chiefs received inputs (seed and fertilizer) from the state, but local authorities did not make any follow up with regards to progress made in establishing how effectively the inputs were used.

The District Council though has been working with AREX, the local GMB office and ward councillors to organise resettled households to benefit from the government services and input schemes around food security, especially Operation Maguta, the Mechanisation Programme.

37 Zunde RaMambo (which means Chiefs Granary) is a traditional social security arrangement designed to address the contingency of drought or famine. This form of social security existed before the colonisation of Zimbabwe. Under this process the chief in any given locality designates land (referred to as the Zunde) for growing food crops as protection against food insecurity in the community, whilst members of the community provide their labour on a voluntary basis even though they do not all necessarily benefit directly from the harvest.
and the GMB Input Scheme. In recent years, no NGOs have been working in the district’s resettlement areas in terms of the provision of food aid or assistance programmes. The political standoff between the GoZ and western donors has resulted in NGOs not providing any assistance to resettled households. The Programme Officer at FOSENET highlighted this during her interview stating that none of their twenty network members work in resettlement areas and that donor funding they receive stipulates that they limit their work to communal or old resettlement areas. However, NGO involvement in communal areas within Goromonzi is not much different but, in Dzvete communal ward, the community is working with a local organisation Commutech\(^{38}\) in the area of small grain production, especially edible dry beans.

### 6.7 Resettled A1 Households at Swiswa 2 Resettlement Scheme

#### 6.7.1 Background

This particular case study focuses on A1 households resettled at Swiswa 2 (in Goromonzi). Along with the Munhenga Resettlement Scheme, the Swiswa 2 Resettlement Scheme is on land formerly called Munhenga Estate (prior to its acquisition). According to the extension officer in the ward, the previous farm owner grew tobacco and had a substantial dairy herd. The farm also has two dams, Munhenga Dam and Chidyausiku Dam.

The farmers resettled at Swiswa 2 are from the Apostolic Faith\(^{39}\) sect and have mostly come from the Chinamhora communal lands. In total, thirty-nine A1 households are part of the resettlement scheme. The households live some distance from important social services such as the clinic, which is over 20kms away and difficult for households to access due to transport shortages. In fact, the roads linking Swiswa 2 to the remainder of the (the previous Munhenga) farm and to the main road require significant upgrading.

Households have an average of six hectares available to use for agricultural purposes, for both crop and livestock production. Although the households have physically moved to this area,  

---

\(^{38}\) Community Technology Development Trust (Commutech) is an NGO established in 1994 and located in Harare, which is dedicated to contributing towards enhanced food security through sustainable use of agro-biodiversity by involving smallholder farmers in participatory research and development.

\(^{39}\) The Apostolic Sect or “Vapostori” is an African-based church which originated in Zimbabwe but has spread through southern, central and eastern Africa. Whilst there are different churches, they are characterised by their appearance: men shave their heads and grow beards, while women wear white dresses and scarves.
most of the beneficiaries (based on a focus group discussion in August 2008) say that they still maintained communal homes. This was because members of their extended families remained there, and they also retained livestock in those areas. A1 households also highlight that the communal areas are their ancestral homes; there is hence a sentimental attachment even though their main source of livelihood were their resettlement plots. Farmers at Swiswa 2 claim that they have accessed better quality land compared to the plots they had access to in communal areas. This greater access has created a platform for them to be able to produce enough food for their households, and to expand cash crop production. However, because of the macro-economic conditions prevailing in the country, they (like A1 farmers in Goromonzi generally) had not been able to sustain production levels.

According to the focus group participants, resettlement has also exposed households to new farming techniques that they had not been exposed to previously or had not an opportunity to use (such as irrigation), and this exposure allowed some of the households to expand the variety of crops they grow, beyond maize. Access to improved transport networks also enabled them to explore and access new urban markets in Harare (the farm is located approximately 30kms from Harare), and to get maximum financial return for their produce.

6.7.2 Agricultural production patterns at Swiswa 2

The main crops which A1 farmers at Swiswa 2 grow are maize, sunflower, groundnuts, round nuts, soya beans and vegetable crops like tomatoes, carrots and green leafy vegetables (such as Rape, Covo and Tsunga). In the 2008 agricultural season farmers, with the assistance of the extension officers in their ward, embarked on growing winter wheat (Plate 6.1) for the first time since they had been resettled.
Farmers in the focus group discussion gave various reasons as to why they grew particular crops. They have noted a need to balance out household food needs and the need to generate income. Food crops took first preference in order to meet household needs; however, they also recognised the importance of growing cash crops to earn income to buy farming inputs and food items, and pay for household expenses such as school fees for children. The households at Swiswa 2 resettlement have found it particularly advantageous to grow leafy green vegetables and tomatoes as a means to supplement household income since there was a ready market for these items in Harare. Such crops provide ready cash for farmers, as those who purchase in the market pay cash up-front for the products.

Livestock ownership and production is still very low amongst the plot holders at Swiswa 2. Farmers did own livestock such as cattle (which they used for ploughing their fields), though it seems that most livestock remain the communal areas. The more common types of livestock owned by households in the resettlement area were chickens and goats, which were mainly for household consumption and for trade with neighbouring households. In some instances, livestock have been used for barter trade for either inputs or for grain.
At times, farmers became engaged in some form of income-generating activity aside from farming; for instance, some household members are involved in petty trading such as the selling of clothes. The income derived from such activities was mainly used to buy farming inputs and food items such as cooking oil.

6.7.3 Major production challenges

Whilst resettled households have been exposed to new opportunities to improve their livelihoods, they still face a number of challenges. The most immediate challenge for households upon resettlement was the lack of housing and storage facilities. The area where households had been resettled was virgin land neighbouring the cattle pastures. The area did not have any housing infrastructure and so an immediate problem for households when they moved was the need to build housing and productive infrastructure (especially storage facilities). At the same time, households said that they had arrived with inadequate production equipment and tools. The remaining irrigation equipment (on the previous estate) was located on the other (Munhenga) resettlement land, where the previous owner had grown tobacco. Hence, households did not have ready access to water for their fields, as the area in which they had been resettled did not have any irrigation infrastructure to allow them to make use of the main dam (Munhenga Dam) on the farm. They were however able to identify a water source located in the hills on the farm (at Chidyausiku Dam). This dam though is far away from their actual plots, and farmers lack infrastructure and electricity to be able to pump water from the hills to their plots.

Another critical challenge experienced by the A1 farmers at Swiswa 2 since resettlement has been late planting of crops due to various problems around input supply, resulting in low production levels. Certainly, households indicate that the prevailing macro-economic conditions in the country have made inputs very expensive. The shortage of inputs (especially seed and fertilizer) has resulted in the emergence of a black market – inputs if not obtained from GMB or through other state schemes can only be found on the expensive black market. Within the surrounding communities, by the year 2008 there had been many cases of inputs being sold in foreign currency. Farmers are also failing to get fertilizer and chemicals for
some specialised crops, such as their wheat (Plate 6.2) and tomatoes, thereby reducing yields and quality of produce.

**Plate 6.2: Failed Wheat Crop Due to Lack of Fertilizer at Swiswa 2**

Where inputs have been available through government schemes, they have often been distributed late; further, as noted previously, A1 farmers are often the last to receive their inputs, after A2 farmers (who make up the elite or have political connections). Even when the Swiswa farmers do receive the inputs, these have not been enough for the entire season and/or cropped area. Another problem for the resettled farmers has been tillage, due to lack of access to tractors. None of the beneficiaries have tractors and they rarely make use of tillage support offered by the DDF and neighbouring A2 farmers. Where A1 farmers do have access to tractors, they receive diesel supplied by NOCZIM (the national petroleum company) late.

Another challenge mentioned by Swiswa households, which relates to accessing inputs, has been the lengthy and bureaucratic processes involved in accessing inputs supplied by the state. Often farmers have to make multiple trips from their plots either to the district offices (or to Harare) to make follow ups on applications they will have submitted as well as to make payments for inputs (e.g. with GMB); this results in profits being „eaten up” by travel costs.
Also there are high transport costs to bring inputs sourced from Harare and, in the case of transportation of diesel, transporters (because of the scarcity of fuel) want to be paid back in the form of diesel, which means that farmers have less diesel for tillage purposes. A black market exists in the area, with some individuals selling inputs for foreign currency. The village headman for Swiswa 2 lamented the corruption rampant within the nearby resettlement schemes and recounted how farmers who go to the GMB in search of seed and fertilizer are often turned away and told that the inputs are not available; yet A1 farmers often see truck loads of these inputs leaving the depot, usually destined for the farms of influential individuals within the district.

Farmers at Swiswa 2 highlighted the financial constraints that limited their agricultural production. They noted the lack of credit available for A1 farmers, and also how inflation was increasing production costs (yet producer prices paid to farmers did not match the ever rising production costs). Furthermore, government agencies such as the GMB were paying farmers late and this reduced the Swiswa farmers’ profit margins and affected their levels of viability (The extension officers interviewed in Goromonzi stressed that tobacco farmers as well had been experiencing problems of late payments). Swiswa farmers who supplied the main vegetable produce market in Mbare (in Harare) complained that the prices they received for their produce barely covered their current production and transport costs, and that severe inflationary pressures on these costs inhibited the prospects of ongoing and sustained production.

6.7.4 Attempts at overcoming challenges faced by farmers
Farming households at Swiswa 2 have attempted to overcome the challenges through various ways. Farmers have used their (admittedly limited and erratic) farm profits to begin building housing structures and storage facilities. Most of the structures are basic and rudimentary but serve the required purpose and function. In order to overcome the lack of infrastructure, especially irrigation equipment, farmers applied (successfully) to the District Lands Office to make use of land adjoining their plots which had been allocated as grazing land. This land (which was formerly used as cattle pastures) was closer to water located in the surrounding hills which the farmers had identified as a possible water source for their fields; using this
land would facilitate irrigation. Initially the farmers built trenches from the water reservoir in the hills to the new plots they had been given permission to use. In the process of constructing this irrigation system, the households have pooled together the money they have generated from agricultural production to obtain materials to make makeshift pipes to replace the dirt trenches. The piping materials include PVC piping, rubber hose and aluminium pipes, which have been salvaged or bought from neighbouring farmers (Plate 6.3).

Plate 6.3: Current Irrigation Infrastructure in Place at Swiswa 2 Resettlement

Because the water being used is coming from the hills surrounding the plots, the water is fed down by gravity force, that is, households use the pressure of the water as it flows down to irrigate their fields. The result has been that most of the plot owners have managed to grow vegetable crops all year round and, in 2008/2009, they embarked on growing winter wheat. Wheat did well because the farmers are not relying on electricity to power their irrigation, so they do not experience the disruptions in power supply that have wrecked havoc for electricity-driven irrigation elsewhere in the district and throughout the country. The gravitational force in fact is so strong that farmers have been able to set up sprinkler irrigation systems (Plate 6.4). Winter wheat needs constant irrigation at regular intervals for good yields, and farmers have been able to water their crop throughout the critical growing period without
any interruptions. The irrigation infrastructure is shared amongst the households that reside on the scheme. This is an important intervention by the A1 farmers because, prior to the FTLRP, the area where the Swiswa 2 resettlement plots are currently located did not have any irrigation infrastructure. Only one section of the farm had irrigation infrastructure – around Munhenga Dam – where the previous owner grew tobacco but no wheat.

**Plate 6.4: Winter Wheat Under Irrigation at Swiswa 2**

In addition, households at Swiswa 2 resettlement are taking steps towards setting up irrigation on their original fields. They have been in the process of digging trenches (Plate 6.5) where they will lay irrigation pipes. In the 2007/2008 agricultural season, they approached officials from Operation Maguta about this, who promised to send an engineer to assess farmers’ irrigation requirements. However, the assessment has not yet been carried out as the engineer has failed to come to see the farmers.
With regards to inputs, farmers at Swiswa 2 have tried to buy inputs from private sellers in instances where they have been unable to get inputs through the various government schemes. However, the inputs and services offered by the private sector are very costly and this reduces the profit margins of the farmers. In extreme cases, households have had to reduce the area they till and plant.

A1 Farmers at Swiswa have sought constant interaction with various authorities responsible for fast track resettlement and post-settlement services (the District Lands Office, GMB officials, Operation Maguta officials, ZESA representatives). Farmers have tried to lobby through their village structures (i.e. GDAs) and to their ward structures (i.e. ADAs), to access inputs and services from the state and state agencies, as well as assistance in accessing markets for their produce. However, the frequent visits they have made to either district offices or to Harare involve the expenditure of farming profits and are, in any point, regularly unsuccessful in terms of obtaining assistance. Often the result is that they find themselves frustrated by the highly bureaucratic processes involved in receiving assistance. In part
because of this, they are in the process of establishing a farmers association to improve lobbying.

6.7.5 Food security
Swiswa A1 farmers claim that they have been able to grow most of the maize required for household consumption on their plots. However, in the focus group discussion, the Village Headman reminded participants that whilst resettled farmers in the area had been able to produce adequate food for their household needs, there are instances in which the food produced does not last until the next harvest and, in addition, resettled households on the farm have experienced lean periods when food is not available. Aside from maize, Swiswa households grew other crops to supplement the households’ food requirements. These were mostly vegetables such as tomatoes, green leafy vegetables (like rape, tsunga and covo), potatoes, carrots, onions, butternut and cucumber.

6.8 Conclusion
This chapter explored the production patterns of A1 resettled households in Goromonzi as a whole (through the analysis of the survey data collected and key informant interviews) and it also considered the specific situation of A1 farming households at Swiswa 2 resettlement scheme. A1 households still rely primarily on agriculture as their main livelihood; however, their levels of production remain low. Mainstream debates on the low levels of productivity in resettlement schemes often stress the lack of skills of resettled households compared to the previous large-scale commercial farmers. However, as noted in the discussion, farmers have been restricted in their production capacity by a number of factors, which are not necessarily linked to the intellectual and skills capacities and experiences (or human capital) of resettled farmers. The broader macro-economic environment in Zimbabwe has greatly affected households’ access to inputs and services, as well as causing distortions in agricultural markets. Coupled with this is the continued general perception – even within official circles – that A1 households are purely subsistence farmers, who are unable to meet the requirements of commercial production (as is evidenced by the fact that A1 households are overlooked when it comes to the distribution of inputs by government).
The extension officers and the Assistant District Administrator noted that the livelihoods of A1 households in Goromonzi have been improving since the initial resettlement phase, as households have been able to produce enough agricultural crops to meet household needs and to earn sufficient incomes to, for instance, send their children to school. Whilst this is not the case across the board, certainly the more productive farmers have been able to improve their housing infrastructure, buy farming equipment like scotch carts, ploughs and irrigation pipes, invest in livestock cattle, and purchase other non-farm equipment such as home theatre systems and satellite dishes. This is more prevalent in instances where farmers have been able to venture into cash crops, especially tobacco.

Whilst access to more viable land has opened up various opportunities for resettled households, it is clear that the lives of farmers, especially A1 farmers, could be further improved if they were able to access adequate inputs on time to fully utilise their land. Households also needed assistance in improving housing infrastructure, as well as a deeper assurance (through tenure security measures) that they would not be moved from their plots. In some instances, A1 households had not invested in permanent structures because of the uncertainty of their stay on their particular plots. The above situation with A1 households highlights the fact that whilst access to land for households (through the FTLRP) has been important, without sufficient agrarian reforms to underpin and improve the support structures and markets within agriculture, sustained and productive agriculture especially in the smallholder sector will remain inhibited.
7.0 CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe has brought about a variety of social outcomes. Whilst it is clear that there has been a radical shift in the land ownership patterns and overall agrarian landscape, this has been accompanied by various political and socio-economic challenges; the most visible are the declining economy, rising poverty levels and food insecurity. The reform process has faced intense opposition from both within and outside Zimbabwe, and the problems which have arisen alongside land reform have been used as evidence to bring into question the GoZ’s policies around addressing Zimbabwe’s land and agrarian question through this latest phase of land reform. The research carried out has given a clear historical context to the land question in Zimbabwe and has highlighted how critical contemporary issues pertaining to improved rural livelihoods and food security have not been explicitly incorporated into Zimbabwe’s agrarian reforms.

Whilst it is generally agreed that the key to overcoming the economic and social challenges lie in reviving agricultural production, there is no clear agreement on the strategy which should be adopted to institute this recovery. The thesis has therefore paid specific attention to smallholder farmers because the key to agricultural recovery and improved food security possibly lies within this category of farmers. The smallholder sector comprising communal farmers, A1 households and old resettlement households, now constitutes over 90% of farmers in Zimbabwe and the farms they make use of constitute 75% of the total area under agricultural production in Zimbabwe. It was therefore one of the primary objectives of the research to understand the daily livelihoods and the levels of household food security of this group of farmers in the aftermath of the FTLRP.

7.2 Smallholder Livelihoods and the Link to Food Security
During the course of my research it became increasingly clear that despite the smallholder sector making up the majority of farmers in Zimbabwe, they continue to be overlooked by policy makers and are under-represented within the policy making arena. They are not critical partners in the process, unlike their large-scale colleagues with strong lobbying
bodies like the CFU and Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU). In the 1980s, the state made provision for improved agrarian support to communal farmers; there was a subsequent increase in their agricultural production levels, and the smallholder sector began to make significant inputs into national production levels of key crops like maize and cotton. Coupled with commercial agricultural production, the result was that (at national level) the country was producing enough maize to meet its domestic needs as well as to export to countries within the SADC region. This situation however hid the fact that production was not distributed equally across the country; hence, food insecurity existed at the household level throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially within the drier communal areas of the country. The supposed national self-sufficiency also served to legitimise the dominance of the large-scale commercial farming sector, and this resulted in government not being able to make significant in-roads in terms of carrying out extensive land reform, which was needed (together with the agrarian reforms it had started to put into place).

Hence, although there was an increase in overall levels of production, and despite improved livelihoods amongst communal households benefitting from agrarian reforms and resettled households who benefited from early land reform, this was not a sustained and inclusive process; certainly, the process failed to address the inherent challenge of rural poverty and precarious rural livelihoods. Poverty levels in rural areas continued to be high, and the early production gains of the 1980s slowly began to diminish in the 1990s as government support for the smallholder sector began to decline. Admittedly, there was a sustained effort to increase smallholder production, but this was not framed within an overall development framework which would address the problems of growing poverty levels and insecure livelihoods. The growing problem of household food insecurity, which began to emerge from the late 1980s, was evidence of the need for the state to go beyond agrarian reforms and to institute wider and far-reaching land reforms. Thus, the challenge of food insecurity in Zimbabwe since 2000 is not necessarily a new phenomenon. The situation has however become more intense given the political, economic and environmental context which has framed FTLRP.

The GoZ’s ongoing rhetoric of the importance of the smallholder sector has been highlighted, but agrarian policy and the reality on the ground show the continued preference to support the commercial sector in reviving agricultural exports and ensuring
food security. The smallholder sector is still viewed with the misconception that it is only growing crops for subsistence purposes. Further, although they have access to better quality land, small-scale farmers still lack sufficient post-settlement support. This is indicated by the fact that production levels are still low amongst resettled households. Production statistics since 2000 and the results of the household survey indicate that A1 farmers in Goromonzi still have low yields; this implies that extensive agrarian reforms still need to be undertaken in light of the new land-holding structure.

Using the sustainable livelihoods framework as the tool of analysis, it became clear that A1 farmers in the survey have not been able to fully utilise their plots. This failure mainly hinges around the lack of key productive equipment, inputs and financial support. Indeed, the micro-challenges faced by resettled households have been heavily shaped by the wider socio-economic and political challenges that Zimbabwe is facing. The decline in the Zimbabwean economy can be traced from the late 1980s, and worsened in the 1990s with the adoption of structural adjustment. The situation has been further worsened since 2000 with the decline of agricultural production and exports, and the withdrawal of bilateral support from the IMF and other major foreign donor agencies.

The Zimbabwean state has generally adopted a top-down, one-size fits all approach to solving the food security crisis, mainly centred on the distribution of agricultural inputs and productive infrastructure, coupled with the strict regulation of markets for key food crops like maize and wheat. However, this approach has not been sustained as the initiatives have not been structured within a clear rural development strategy which targets both the smallholder and commercial farming sectors equally to ensure sustained agricultural production and improved rural livelihoods. The policies adopted by the GoZ to revive agriculture, which are highly centralised and controlled, have not produced the incentives for resettled households to produce key crops like maize beyond household consumption needs. Despite resettled households being given subsidised inputs by the state, the prices offered for these crops have resulted in households increasing their investment in more profitable and less regulated crops like tobacco, cotton and soya beans.

This is further evidence that smallholders should no longer be perceived as purely subsistence growers, but are also producers who are responsive to changing marketing
trends and market incentives. They realise that, without adequate financial capital and market incentives, their agricultural productivity and ultimately their livelihoods cannot be sustained. Clearly, then, the GoZ’s strategy of subsidizing inputs and controlling prices is not sufficient and there is a serious lack of economic incentives for farmers to grow maize. In the end, it would seem that resettled farmers (especially A1 farmers) have been shouldering the burden of GoZ policy to keep food prices low for urban consumers. However, this means that farmers are unable to make profits to sustain their farming activities. This is occurring at a time when other livelihood strategies in rural areas are closing down.

The continued perception by the corporate sector of the smallholder sector as being high risk (due to their lack of infrastructure like irrigation and the lack of acceptable forms of collateral) is further evidence of the need for a shift in agrarian reforms which are targeted at increasing production levels in the smallholder sector. The state needs to be at the forefront of this drive to boost private sector confidence in the abilities of the smallholder sector (in order to increase private sector investment levels), especially for resettled A1 farmers who have been able to access better quality land. The state-assisted programmes still continue to place greater emphasis on the commercial agricultural sector. The survey results indicated that most A1 households still have to source their own inputs and have not been major beneficiaries in the subsidised input loan schemes. Further discussions with extension officers and with the farmers at Swiswa 2 revealed the challenges A1 farmers have in accessing subsidised inputs, as they are unable to pay the high prices charged by the private sector for these inputs.

Resettled A1 households have had to rely primarily on government assistance to be able to sustain their livelihoods. However, as the limitations and unsustainably of government support becomes evident to A1 households, they have had to adopt alternative strategies. Resettled farmers have tried to continue to produce despite the harsh macro-economic environment prevailing in Zimbabwe. For most households this has involved reducing the amount of land tilled, which in turn has lowered their production levels. It also entails not using the required amount of fertilizer resulting in reduced yields. As well, households have been limited in the range of crops they can grow, with the need to ensure adequate food for household consumption becoming the main priority.
Most households in the survey revealed that in the previous season they had been able to produce enough food to meet their domestic requirements until the next harvest. In instances where the food produced (or sourced through other means) has not been enough to meet household consumption needs until the next harvest, the most common coping strategy has been the reduction in the number of meals consumed and the engagement in off-farm income generating activities. Households have avoided adopting strategies like selling household assets which will potentially affect their long term ability to continue farming. A1 households in Goromonzi are also organising at the local level through different farmer groups and through their village and ward development committees to lobby relevant authorities to address their needs post-resettlement, though they have met with limited success.

Whilst state intervention is necessary, there is therefore need for more organised lobbying and advocacy by the smallholder sector if local communities are to have a say as to what happens with their lives and land. The example of smallholder households in Goromonzi has shown that farmers are trying to establish local famers groups to address the local level challenges, but there needs to be a national body representing the needs of smallholder farmers across the country to challenge the dominance of the CFU and ICFU. Traditionally, smallholders in Zimbabwe have been represented by the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU). The organisation has focused its efforts around provision of extension services and inputs to its members, but it now needs to shift its efforts towards lobbying the state for broader agrarian policy reform which would provide an environment conducive for improved smallholder livelihoods and overall agricultural development (thereby, addressing the challenge of rural poverty and ultimately food insecurity). The smallholder sector prior to fast track provided the bulk of the country’s domestic maize requirements, and any programmes which are adopted should restore the capacity of households to produce and ensure sustainable livelihoods.

7.3 The Way Forward - Food Security through Food Sovereignty

Addressing the challenge of food insecurity in Zimbabwe will not come from the adoption of top-down policies based on increased national yields which do not make a concerted effort to identify and analyse the needs of the smallholder sector by creating policies and incentives that encourage increased production. Government should shift its social policies
beyond just ensuring cheap food for the urban middle class, and develop strategies for a broader development framework in which rural development and urban development complement each other and one is not sacrificed over the other. Ultimately, the state must find a balance in relation to its social goal of food security; but not at the expense of the growth of the smallholder farming sector. Smallholders are not cheap labour to be exploited to produce food for growing urban needs; it is important for them to also have sustainable livelihoods. Households on A1 farms in most cases (previously) had precarious livelihoods in communal areas characterised by limited access to productive resources and financial assets. As a result, if nuanced strategies are not forthcoming to address these issues in resettlement areas, then rural poverty will simply be reproduced and not be effectively overcome.

At the same time, the GoZ is limited in terms of resources to fully address the needs of newly resettled farmers. Major food aid/relief NGOs should also be shifting their policies towards sustained agricultural recovery (alongside food aid assistance which they may be offering). Yet, within civil society in Zimbabwe, the needs of the smallholder sector have, firstly, been limited to mostly communal and old resettlement areas and, secondly, initiatives have centred on short-term relief efforts and not on sustained economic and agricultural growth in rural areas. The focus of NGOs should shift from offering food aid to partnering with and assisting rural communities in advancing towards sustainable agricultural production, and pushing the state to adopt policies that prioritise pro-poor agricultural development policies. However, major NGOs and donors still continue to refuse to work in newly resettled areas, as they argue that this would essentially endorse the FTLRP process (this, in turn, is linked to the political standoff between the GoZ and the West).

Globally there is a campaign (led by La Via Campensina) to improve support to small-scale farmers and a drive towards food sovereignty in order to address the problem of rising food insecurity. As highlighted in Chapter 2, at the core of food sovereignty is the development of sustainable policies which promote rural livelihoods practices which allow households the right to control the food they produce and eat. Essentially there is need for a more localised control of food production and trade versus the global food system dominated by corporate industrial agriculture. Any shift in GoZ and NGO agrarian policy
should therefore be aimed at affirming the rights of smallholder households to food security by creating a policy environment which promotes the use of sustainable agricultural technology, over which smallholder households would have control and easy access. Whilst the adoption of hybrid seeds and fertilizers has led to increased yields, it has exposed households to new risks given the fact that they have to rely on global and national market forces which they do not have control over, and these forces determine their access to and the price they have to pay for these inputs. The adoption of hybrid seeds has diminished diversity as farmers move away from lower yielding, more drought tolerant, locally adaptable and readily available open pollinated varieties. Like other green revolution-based technologies, the high yields of hybrid seeds are based on the use of large amounts of inorganic fertilizers, which in the long-term affect soil quality. The adoption of this form of technology requires high levels of financial resources, yet the smallholder sector continues to be ignored by financial service providers, and they have no control or input into the markets in which these products are sold.

In light of the global context, where food production levels are currently enough to meet food needs yet there is growing hunger and poverty levels, food sovereignty becomes critical. The current global capitalist food system does not meet the needs of the poor; further, it undermines rural livelihoods and portrays smallholders as inefficient agricultural producers. In the end, small-scale farmers are left to the dictates of global commodity chains and markets, which take production and marketing decisions out of the hands of the actual producers on the ground and into the boardrooms of the few companies controlling the markets. The main principles of food sovereignty are centred on the promotion of localised food systems which allow households, communities and states to set up parameters not only around food production but also the development path they follow. Food sovereignty therefore allows for the protection of rural populations from economic exploitation and unfair trade practices, by promoting food security and decent and sustainable rural livelihoods in the global South, and by ensuring that food is seen not merely as a trade item but also as a key for human sustenance and survival.

7.4 Relevance of Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in Analysing Rural Livelihoods

The sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) has been important in this analysis of smallholder beneficiaries of the fast track process. It has allowed the researcher to look at
the inter-linkages between the different aspects that make up rural livelihoods. The framework highlights the complex social and economic realities faced by rural households; it stresses how households arrive at decisions to determine the livelihood strategies they adopt; and it shows that decisions made are not necessarily purely economic or welfarist in nature, but a combination of both. The framework prioritises local realities and shows the linkages with wider socio-economic and political processes surrounding fast track reform. It thus allows one to delve below the broader macro-level analysis of Zimbabwe to analyse specific micro-level processes and see the linkages between the two. The sustainable livelihoods approach goes further than other rural livelihood analysis paradigms in that it does not see rural communities as passive and asset-less, and facing severe insufficiencies which can only be addressed by outside intervention. Rural households have critical assets especially in relation to local technical knowledge and farming techniques; in addition, the coping strategies they adopt highlight the fact that they are able to identify local solutions to address the challenges they may be facing. These strategies, which often become long-term interventions in livelihoods patterns, involve a range of both agricultural and non-agricultural activities, to which the livelihoods approach is particularly sensitive.

The SLF also brings into question the relevance of policy strategies that have been adopted by the state around rural development and improving food security in Zimbabwe, by demonstrating that the GoZ cannot simply revert back to the old agrarian policies from the 1980s or 1990s (these failed and continue to fail to fully address the livelihood challenges faced by smallholder households). Agrarian policies adopted by the state should entail enhancing the social and human capital of rural households and communities. This would involve resettled farmers taking ownership of their resources and having control and influence over their livelihoods, including what crops they grow and the food that they eat. Ultimately, these policies should make households less reliant on state subsidies and state support for the supply of inputs, which in turn would allow the state to work in pursuing a socio-economic and political environment which would enhance people’s capital and livelihoods. Policies at national and community levels should therefore be participatory and empower individuals, households, communities and ultimately nations to chart their development.
The question of food sovereignty therefore plays a vital role in ensuring a sustainable livelihood. Both notions – food sovereignty and sustainable livelihoods – centre on the empowerment of rural communities through enhancing local communities’ knowledge and capacity to ultimately make their main economic activities (whether it is farming or non-farming) more affordable and reliable. In order to ensure sustainable livelihoods and food sovereignty, there is need for empowered rural communities supported by national policies which protect domestic food crop production (as opposed to a globalised system in which countries become dependent upon expensive food imports). The same decentralised, diverse and locally-adapted farming systems that are farmer-centred (as opposed to market-centred) and which are important for sustainable rural livelihoods, also create the basis upon which food sovereignty can become a reality. It is therefore through the sustainable livelihoods framework that the different rural contexts that exist can be clearly understood and policies can be structured in order to ensure that the development needs of local communities can ultimately be met through an emphasis on food sovereignty.

7.4 Conclusion

The FTLRP process has had a significant impact on the livelihoods of smallholder households. Whilst it has opened up access for these households to larger pieces of better quality land, the agrarian infrastructure and policy to complement this improved access has not been adequately developed. Food insecurity in Zimbabwe is not a result of merely the FTLRP process alone and neither is it a phenomenon which started after the year 2000.

At the same time, there have been significant forces at play from within and outside the country which have contributed to the current crisis. The economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe, as pursued by the West, has undermined the capacity of the GoZ to carry out effective post-settlement support. Plus, the refusal of both local and international NGOs and donors to institute programmes specifically geared towards overall agricultural and rural development within new resettlement areas has also hampered the pace of agricultural recovery. Internally, the state continues to undermine the potential of the smallholder sector by failing to create a policy environment and overall rural development plan which addresses the needs of this sector as well as the need to address the underlying challenges of poverty and declining levels of production.
It will only be through a sustained effort by all stakeholders involved (the state, private sector, farmers, NGOs and donors) to create a macro-environment which encourages agricultural growth, rural development and sustained livelihoods that the challenge of food insecurity in Zimbabwe, especially at the household level, can ultimately be addressed. The building up of livelihoods therefore requires a holistic approach, of which food sovereignty is critical. In the case of fast track, post-settlement support to newly resettled smallholders has entailed highly centralised top-down approaches centred on input and equipment support schemes. Yet smallholder households have very little influence or control over the distribution of these inputs.

Livelihood assets therefore go beyond being simply a means to make a living and eradicating poverty. They provide the basis upon which communities have the power to act, and to challenge and change social and political rules that control the use and allocation of resources. Building up livelihood assets therefore requires an extensive consultative approach where communities are active partners in determining how their asset base can be improved. The sustainable livelihoods framework is crucial in helping to identify not only community livelihood assets, but in also charting a way forward with regards to their development. It is from this platform that communities can have a greater influence over their development and food sovereignty can become a reality.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/acf-zwe-4may.pdf


African Institute for Agrarian Studies. 2007. “Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe”.  
Regional Occasional Research Paper Series No. 3. Harare: African Institute for  
Agrarian Studies (AIAS) and Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT).


pp. 681–690.

Vol. 36(2) pp. 337-368.


New York: Zed Books

181


http://www.iss.nl/Media/Website/Files/LAND-pdfs/ISS-UNDP-policy-papers/Zimbabwe-paper


http://www.ntd.co.uk/idsbookshop/details.asp?id=419


http://www.ifpri.org/publication/commercialization-agriculture-under-population-pressure


APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Interview Schedules

a. Arex Extension Officers

1. Could you describe the main changes in the agricultural patterns that have taken place in the district since the inception of FTLRP – i.e. in terms of crop production, land use patterns?
2. What have been the overall production trends in the district since 2000?
3. How were production trends especially of A1 farmers in the 2005/06 season compared to other seasons since 2000?
4. What are the main services Agritex provides to A1 farmers in the district?
5. What are the major challenges being faced by A1 farmers in terms of production that have been identified by Agritex field officers?
6. What strategies have the A1 farmers undertaken to overcome these production challenges?
7. How do you propose that these challenges can be overcome?
8. How has the current macro-economic environment affected A1 farmers?
9. How has land reform helped communal and small-scale farmers in the district?
10. In what ways do you feel that lives of A1 farmers have improved since the inception of FTLRP? (in terms of income levels, food production, etc)
11. What are the government schemes aimed at improving food production and household food security within the district? (i.e. input distribution, operation maguta, mechanisation programme, etc)
12. What is the role of A1 farmers within these schemes and what support are they offered to increase their levels of production?
13. How have they benefitted from such schemes?
14. How well have A1 farmers responded to these schemes? Has it improved their levels of food crop production?
15. If no, why has been the main reason for this?
b. Rural District Council Officials

1. How many households in the district have benefited from FTLRP? (A1 and A2 resettlements to date)
2. Where have most of the beneficiaries for the A1 scheme come from?
3. How has FTLRP improved the livelihoods of the beneficiaries?
4. What have been the major causes of food insecurity in the district since 2000?
5. Which groups have been most vulnerable to food insecurity in the district? (newly resettled households, farm workers, communal households)
6. What programmes do you have to improve household food security in the district?
7. How do these programmes fit into the national policy/framework for improving food security?
8. What strategies have households employed in order to overcome the challenge of food insecurity in the district?
9. Which organisations (namely NGOs) are involved in food aid/assistance programmes in the district?
10. Where are their main areas of operation? Are these mainly communal or newly resettled areas?
11. How many households in the district are receiving food aid/assistance through these organisations?

c. District Lands Officer

1. How many A1 households have been resettled in Goromonzi district to date?
2. Where have the majority of the A1 beneficiaries come from?
3. What have been the major challenges faced by this office in resettling A1 households?
4. What are the major problems facing A1 farmers post-resettlement?

d. Fosenet Interview Guidelines/Questions

1. Could you please give me a brief background of Fosenet and the work it does.
2. How many members make up the network?
3. What are the roles of the different network members?
4. Does Zimbabwe have a national food security policy?
5. If yes, what are the major tenants of this policy and where does the work of Fosenet fit in?
6. According to FOSENET studies and reports on Zimbabwe, what have been the major challenges for Zimbabwe in attaining food security at both the national and household level since 2000?
7. Have household food security levels in Zimbabwe improved/worsened since the 2005/06 season?
8. What have been the main causes of this?
9. From your own research and work, which areas in Zimbabwe have been prone to experiencing household food insecurity?
10. How do household food security levels of A1 households compare to those of communal farmers?
11. How have current macro-economic conditions affected households’ abilities to maintain food security?
12. What livelihood strategies have households adopted to overcome the challenge of food insecurity or to maintain food security within the household?
13. What is Fosenet’s position on the way forward for Zimbabwe for it to achieve countrywide household food security?
Appendix 2 – Guidelines for Focus Group Discussion

Livelihoods
1. In what ways have your lives changed since you were resettled – what are the major changes have you encountered in your lives?
2. What are the major challenges that you have faced since you moved to the resettlement areas? (not agricultural production related)?
3. Do you still maintain communal/urban homes?
4. If yes why?
5. What social services do you need in your area?
6. How will this improve your lives?
7. What alternatives have you had to use in the absence of certain social services?
8. Aside from farming, what other income generating activities are people in the area involved in?
9. What is the income from these activities used for?

Agricultural Production
1. What are the major crops that you grow?
2. How do you balance out growing food and cash crops? Which crops take preference in your household?
3. How do you decide how much to retain for your household?
4. Do you keep livestock? What types and for what?
5. What are the major challenges affecting your agricultural productivity since 2005/06?
6. How do you overcome these challenges and how effective has this been?
7. What do you feel that you as A1 farmers need help with?
8. How have you tried to organise yourselves in order to lobby relevant authorities to assist you for the issues you need assistance with?
9. How successful has this been? What response have you received?
10. How have Zimbabwe’s economic conditions affected your production capacities?
11. How have natural disasters such as drought affected your farming?

Food Security
1. What is the major source of food in your house?
2. What are your major household food purchases?
3. Before moving onto your plots where did you get the maize consumed in your household?
4. Do you produce enough food for your household consumption?
5. How long does the food last for and where then do you get additional food for the household till the next harvest?
6. Aside from maize, what are the other crops that you grow to supplement your household’s food requirements? (looking for issues such as vegetables, beans, wild fruits, etc).