A PRECARIOUS BALANCE
Consequences of Zimbabwe’s Fast-Track Land Reform

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By

ASHLEY SARIMANA 600s1118
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR F. T. HENDRICKS

Department of Sociology and Industrial Sociology
Rhodes University
P. O. Box 94
Grahamstown
6140

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Abstract

This thesis is a detailed account of Zimbabwe's controversial fast-track land reform programme. Zimbabwe's land reform history has been discussed extensively, with a focus on land redistribution. The fast-track land reform programme transferred eleven million hectares of land from 4,000 white commercial farmers to 51,543 landless peasant families.

The thesis begins by offering some land reform theories and gives an overview of the land question in Southern Africa. This is followed by a discussion of Zimbabwe's land question from a historical perspective. Next is a periodised account of the successes and failures of land reform attempts made by the Zimbabwean government from independence in 1980 to 1998 when the fast-track land reform programme was conceived. Zimbabwe's political and economic situation at this time is significant. The context for fast-track land reform includes a discussion about the national question in Zimbabwe and the deteriorating status of white citizenship; the rise of Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans as a formidable force and the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change as a strong political party that was challenging, among others, the dominance of the ruling Zanu-PF party and its policies.

The blueprint for fast-track land reform is discussed in order to contrast it to how the reform unfolded in practice. In this regard, the response of the international community to the violence and lawlessness that characterised fast-track land reform is worth mentioning, especially since it has bearing on how Zimbabweans are trying to cope with life in a radically altered physical and social environment, following the land reform exercise.

The consequences of fast-track land reform are analysed in terms of development and the plight of Zimbabwe's farm workers; the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of farm workers, white commercial farmers and others in Zimbabwe's countryside and whether or not fast-track land reform beneficiaries can successfully engage in agriculture to improve their standard of living. The Vumba and Burma Valley case study is illustrative of how fast-track land reform was implemented and its socio-economic impact on Zimbabwe's poor and marginalised groups, for instance, female farm workers. The case study offers valuable insights about the survival strategies that ordinary people affected by the land reform exercise are adopting in order to cope with their new circumstances.

Data was gathered from a focus group discussion (pilot study), in-depth semi-structured interviews and observation on three farms, as well as interviews with a few government officials, government documents and newspaper reports.

The study is useful to countries that are planning or already implementing land reform, for example, South Africa.
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Thank you to my friends Prudence, Caroline, Adrienne, Anita, Ndivhuho and Paidamoyo for their support and patience; it kept me sane when the going got a bit rough.
Map 1: Map of Zimbabwe showing the major urban centres.


Map 2: Zimbabwe’s eastern border with Mozambique (showing the study area).

(http://recommend.org/Expedia_Maps.htm)
Map 3: Map of Zimbabwe showing the old provincial boundaries before Harare and Bulawayo became separate provinces.

Source: Meredith, 2003 (Copyright A. Karl/J. Kempt, 2002).
Members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association erecting a sign at the entrance to Parklands Farm, which they invaded and occupied. The farm was renamed after one of Zimbabwe’s liberation war heroes, Josiah Magama Tongogara.
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Introduction

This chapter begins with a general discussion on the imperatives for land reform. Selected theories about how land (and agrarian) reform should be implemented are also discussed because they are relevant to the study of Zimbabwe’s chequered land reform history. This section is followed by a contextualisation of this study on Zimbabwe’s land reform from 1998 to the present. The rest of the chapter provides an overview of the thesis by chapter.

1.1 Land Reform Theory

Land is the primary means of generating a livelihood for most poor people in developing countries and governments play a role in promoting and contributing towards socially desirable land allocation and utilisation through policies, including land reform, especially in economies with highly unequal land ownership distribution. Deininger (2003) and Christodoulou (1990) advise that where land distribution is highly unequal or large tracts of productive land are un-utilised or under-utilised, alongside deep poverty, governments should take redistributive measures including expropriation or the activation of rental markets to induce land transfers to increase ordinary people’s access to land if markets fail to address the problem. Such measures are necessary because grievances about unequal land distribution can trigger social strife and political instability, particularly in the context of economic hardship (Deininger, 2003; Christodoulou, 1990; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:35-71).

Land reform is part of a wider development plan which can offer better livelihoods to the poor and should be combined with other measures like access to non-land assets and working capital (El-Ghonemy, 1990). Integrating land reform into the broader context of economic and social policies that are aimed at development and poverty reduction goes a long way towards ensuring a land reform programme’s sustainability (Deininger, 2003; El-Ghonemy, 1990). According to Deininger (2003:28-29), most countries’ constitutions have provisions that give governments the right to override private ownership rights and compulsorily acquire land for the broader public benefit. In such instances, land is redistributed so that the society can share ownership and the benefits derived from land more equally.
Deininger (2003:173), Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) and Warriner (1969) believe that land reform must be transparent and that in most instances, landowners should be compensated for losses incurred. In theory, land reform is participatory, non-partisan and involves consultation with all stakeholders (current landowners, the landless or potential beneficiaries, various state bodies and ministries, possible donors) in its planning, financing and implementation. Deininger (2003) adds that needs-based approaches are preferable when selecting beneficiaries or allocating expropriated land during a land reform exercise.

In any context, compulsory land acquisition and redistribution implies breeching landowners’ property rights or eroding their tenure security. Moyo (1999:2 & 8) emphasises the importance of equity in any land reform exercise because it shows whether or not a government is genuinely committed to addressing the land question in a fair and equitable manner. Governments can limit multiple land ownership and recommend maximum farm sizes, in conjunction with land taxes, to limit speculative land concentrations, thus facilitating the break-up of large farms and the sale of land to those that do not have land (Deininger, 2003; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987; Warriner, 1969). The induced sale of excess unutilised or under-utilised land through the imposition of land taxes force landowners to use land more intensively. According to Deininger (2003:124, 166 & 168) land tax is either levied per square metre of land area (including or excluding building space) or is based on the land’s productive capacity, with tax levied off the value of unimproved or under-utilised land. Effective land tax administration requires property tax laws that assign clear property rights and tax obligations, together with the keeping of updated official records of property registers and the ownership status of each tract of land, the size of each tract of land and the value of each property (Deininger, 2003, 124, 166 & 168; Warriner, 1969).

Deininger (2003:124) notes, however, that land ownership ceilings and land taxes generally have a marginal impact on land redistribution because landowners simply sub-divide their land to circumvent the restrictions imposed by land ownership ceilings and land taxes. Deininger (2003:124) also points out that the success of these interventions is often limited because governments make exceptions for landowners engaged in the production of high value export crops. This partiality generates considerable latitude for arbitrariness and corruption, which ultimately, creates loopholes for individuals to own more than their fair share of land. Compulsory land acquisition is normally the remedy for such problems but Deininger (2003) and Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) emphasise the need for checks and
balances to monitor the state’s powers (prerogative) to expropriate land. Ideally, compulsory
land acquisition should be in accordance with well-defined judicial processes. Sustained
political will is required of a country’s leadership if genuine land reform is to be carried out

Land reform can be conservative (modest or minimal in its extent) or revolutionary in terms
of the rights (access to and control over land) that it seeks to promote and protect as well as
the processes (legal and policy-led changes/ interventions in land use rights) through which it
aims to transform land ownership patterns (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:25). Warriner (1969:41-
43) cites the Russian agricultural revolution as an example of a revolutionary reform that
violently displaced the Kulaks and successfully introduced state-farming but failed to support
the changes that had been set in motion by the revolution. Deininger (2003:140) on the other
hand cites Russia as an example of a country that undertook extensive land reform to redress
land imbalances inherited from the days of the revolution. He notes that out of an estimated
total of 195 million hectares of agricultural land, 126 million hectares (65% of the total) was
transferred into private ownership by 2000 (Deininger, 2003). Out of the 126 million
hectares, 118 million hectares were privatised through the issuing of land shares to 12 million
agricultural workers, retired agricultural workers, teachers and healthcare professionals. The
remaining land was privatised through land transfers for the creation of private farms and for
use as household plots (Deininger, 2003:140).

Warriner’s (1969) comparative survey of land policy reforms in India, Egypt, Denmark,
Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Persia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia and
Venezuela shows many reforms as being radical/revolutionary. Unfortunately, however,
Warriner notes that many of these reforms are largely unsuccessful, for instance, in Latin
America under communist dictatorships during the cold war era. Warriner (1969) suggests
that better planned, gradual approaches to land reform are more likely to be successful and
sustainable than their radical counterparts. Von Blanckenburg (1994:11) suggests that the
reason for these failures lie in the fact that many governments that have undertaken radical
land reform have tended to overemphasise political goals (with race at the core) without
considering the short-medium term economic ramifications. This has often led to inequitable
outcomes and economic collapse because of disruptions in agricultural production and loss of
jobs in agricultural and related sectors (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:3). Warriner (1969:376-
377) supports Von Blackenburg’s view and notes that the more revolutionary land reform is,
the greater the likelihood of reducing agricultural production. Although radical land reform policies succeed in expropriating land and reallocating it, they usually fail to follow-through with the administrative decisions needed for sustained agrarian reform. The principles and contentions above are used below to assess the successes of Zimbabwe’s land reforms, particularly the fast-track land reform programme undertaken from 1998 onwards.

1.2 The Agrarian Question

From an economic and social point of view, the agrarian question refers to the extent to which capitalism penetrates and transforms rural areas by establishing socio-economic relations based on wage labour, with concomitant class formation and differentiation (Hendricks, 1995a:45-46; Hendricks, 1995b:39). This transition requires secure land tenure for land owners who want to accumulate wealth from agricultural production by using the wage labour offered by those that do not own land.

Land tenure reform is ideally an integral part of any land reform and is meant to provide rural dwellers (not just people with private or titled property) with greater security of tenure by giving them permanent or legally protected rights to the land they use (Hendricks, 2001; Palmer, 1997:85 & 293; Moyo, 1995:282; Warriner, 1969:11 & 14). Tenure security refers to the nature and extent of people’s access to land (communal and individual), following comprehensive land reform. Deininger (2003:1-2, 4-5, 36-39 & 42-48) notes that more than 50% of Africa’s peri-urban population and more than 40% in Asia has informal and insecure land tenure rights (usufruct/access to land without ownership). In terms of gender, Muthoni-Wanyeki (2003) notes that women have limited or no land ownership rights in most of sub-Saharan Africa. It is common practice for women to have insecure, secondary usufruct rights in countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda. Women’s rights in these societies are gained either through marriage or through the women’s male kin. These rights also change when women’s social status changes (widowed, marries/re-marries).

Secure land tenure is an essential consideration when planning land reform because it reduces the risk of eviction at a later stage and gives individuals rights to allocate, use and sell land according to their circumstances (Moyo, 2003:18; Mbiba, 1999 cited in Larsson-Liden, 2000:159-160). Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) advocate for land tenure
reform along the same lines as the land-to-the-tiller programmes that were implemented in Asian countries like South Vietnam in the 1960s, as well as El Salvador in the 1980s. This form of tenure is different from the various tenancy arrangements that existed in many countries before that. Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) maintain that land-to-the-tiller reforms create smaller landholdings that are more productive per hectare compared to large farms. This is because the land-to-the-tiller system is based on the family farm model; whereby the farm owner and his family utilise their own labour ("sweat-equity").

Christodoulou (1990:15-21) outlines the main land tenure types as they have been applied over the years in different contexts as follows:

- Traditional communal tenure under chiefs or headmen (custodians) who hold land in trust for the community and decide how land is allocated for different uses.
- Labour tenancy where individuals offer their labour to the landowner in exchange for use of part of the land.
- Share-cropping (partnerships) on someone else's land. Part of the produce from the land is surrendered to the owner.
- Fixed-term tenancy whereby individuals are given permission by the land owner to use his land against payment of a rental fee, for a fixed period of time.
- 99-year leasehold permits on state-owned land.
- Private or individual titled freehold land (Christodoulou, 1990:15-21).

Policy makers need to agree on the most appropriate forms of tenure for smallholder farmers because financial institutions require formal individual land titles as collateral for loans and access to other agricultural resources and services that enable farmers to work their land profitably. Tenure security is particularly important in developing countries that have agriculture as their main economic activity (Moyo, 2003:34). Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) maintain that secure land tenure empowers and motivates new land owners (previously landless) and generally increases productivity and self sufficiency. However, Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) admit that whilst tenure security appears to be a precondition for improved productivity, it is not enough to sustain high productivity among new or established land owners.
Politically, the agrarian question refers to the opportunities for the formation of an alliance between rural peasants and the urban proletariat. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed that an alliance could be formed if politicians convinced the peasantry that their land and related rights would be protected (false pledge) if they supported an urban-based working class party (Hendricks, 1995a; Hendricks, 1995b). The strategy was also based on the assumption that the peasantry would become extinct as capitalism advanced. However, the strategy was used with mixed success in Germany (by the Social Democratic Party) and in Russia (under Lenin) because the peasantry is not a homogenous class and gaining their support is not as simple as it might seem in theory. There are different, yet overlapping interests and relations within the peasant class because some peasants are poor, others are average and a few are considered rich (Hendricks, 1995a:42-45; Hendricks, 1995b:41).

In terms of the political aspects of the agrarian question, Hendricks (1995a:41 & 46; 1995b:41-42) is sceptical about the possibilities for inter-class alliances between the urban working class and the peasantry in Southern Africa because most countries in the region have so far experienced low levels of capitalist accumulation in agriculture which would put them on an equal footing with the urban working class.

1.3 The Context of the Study
Zimbabwe's land reform history has been documented extensively since independence, mostly with a focus on land redistribution (Moyo, 1995:287). Moyo (1995:71) impresses the need for change in the scale of analysis of land reform, development and sustainability. Moyo (1995) suggests a change from international and national levels (macro) to local levels (micro) in order to adequately inform the premises on which appropriate land reform policies evolve. The topic is still worth studying because it highlights the importance of integrated approaches to land reform which link land redistribution to tenure reform and infrastructure provision in order to meet people's social and economic needs. This enquiry was precipitated by Zimbabwe's land reform efforts from the year 2000 onwards and began with the proposition that the way in which fast-track land reform was carried out in the Vumba and Burma Valley area east of the city of Mutare in Zimbabwe’s Manicaland Province was different from the rest of the country. Most landholdings in Vumba and Burma Valley were listed for compulsory acquisition under the fast-track land reform programme, yet some of them are still in the hands of white farmers. Although the compulsory land acquisition procedures (on paper) implied a uniform process overall, with some differences in respect of different agro-ecological zones, there were differences in the way in which land reform
occurred in practice, with particular reference to the land invasions that characterised the fast-track land reform programme. The Vumba and Burma Valley case study is illustrative of fast-track land reform generally and provides insight into the land reform’s consequences in this locality.

The assumptions for this enquiry were informed by one main reason; the fact that the most intense conflicts over land in Zimbabwe have traditionally (dating back to the second Chimurenga war of liberation) been around Kadoma, Mazowe, Marondera, Chinhoyi and Mt Darwin (Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces) (Chitiyo, 2003:170). Moyo (2000a:90) suggests that illegal land occupations were more prevalent in these same areas from 2000 onwards perhaps because the least land redistribution had occurred there since independence in 1980. Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces have some of the best soils in the country and as late as 2000, 70% of the land in these provinces was still owned by white commercial farmers (Moyo, 2000a:90). In contrast, the government had gazetted thirteen productive white-owned farms covering 17,000 acres in Mutare district in 1991, although seven of the thirteen farms where subsequently undesignated (Meredith, 2003:124-126). Further, it is believed that Mashonaland East province was most affected by political violence in the period between the onset of farm invasions in February 2000, the June 2000 parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential election because it registered the highest “No” votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002:105). Apart from the main urban centres, Mashonaland East had a concentration of white large commercial farmers who supported the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. The province came to be regarded as an opposition/MDC stronghold by the government because of its resounding rejection of the revised constitution and was targeted for chastisement when the illegal land invasions broke-out (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

The low incidence of land invasions in Mutare district (including Vumba and Burma Valley) can also be explained, partly, in terms of the significant number of Mozambican immigrants who are detached from the Zimbabwe’s struggle for land. Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces are located in the centre of the country and experienced the most intense political violence and farm invasions during the fast-track land reform, whereas Mutare district is virtually situated on the border with Mozambique (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:79; Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). The worst outbreak of violent land invasions occurred in August 2001 in the Chinhoyi farming district (60 miles south-west of Harare)
where squatters and war veterans laid siege on farming communities. The violent land occupations rapidly spread to Mhangura and Doma north of Chinhoyi, to Hwedza to the east of Chinhoyi. The land grab progressed from its epicentre in the Chinhoyi area to Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepepe, Macheke, Enterprise, parts of the Midlands province and parts of Manicaland province, mostly in the Headlands, Chimamamani and Odzi areas (Meredith, 2003:18,176 & 220).

War veterans, Zanu-PF youth militias and other landless people went on a rampage destroying crops and equipment, cutting-off water supplies and polluting water sources, slaughtering cattle and often driving off entire herds of livestock, ruining timber plantations, setting fire to grazing land, looting and burning down farmhouses, stealing tractors, vehicles and fertiliser, pulling down fencing, forcing farmers to provide them with food and transport, extorting from farmers, assaulting and threatening them as well as issuing them with false eviction orders (Meredith, 2003:196-221, Buckle, 2002). In contrast, Vumba and Burma Valley did not experience land invasions on this scale or intensity, and land occupations were mostly short-lived when they did occur. The case study addresses why illegal land invasions did not affect Vumba and Burma Valley in the same way as the rest of the country.

1.4 Outline of the Study
Chapter 2 traces Zimbabwe’s land reform history (successes and failures) from independence in 1980 until the inception phase of the fast-track land reform programme in 1998. This period is broken down into two main phases. Zimbabwe’s land reform Phase 1 covers the period from independence in 1980 to the adoption of the first economic structural adjustment programme in 1990. Phase 2 is from the 1990 economic structural adjustment programme to the inception phase of the fast-track land reform programme in 1998.

Chapter 3 discusses the political and economic context for the fast-track land reform programme from 1998 to the present, including the national question and white citizenship, economic decline, Zimbabwe’s ill-timed military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the strategic position of war veterans at the time that the reform was conceived and implemented and the June 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections. Fast-track land reform was aimed at addressing the huge imbalances in landholding patterns between blacks and whites that remained intact for almost 20 years after independence. In 1998, 70% of the country’s fertile land was still owned by 4500 white commercial farmers.
proving that market forces (the willing seller-willing buyer approach) had failed to overhaul the deep-rooted colonial legacy of racially unequal land distribution (Hall, 2003:278). The government’s objective with the fast-track approach was to compulsorily acquire and redistribute eleven million hectares of land on which to resettle 71,000 families between the inception of the fast-track land reform programme in 1998 and 2005 (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:20-22).

Chapter 4 outlines the fast-track land reform policy adopted by the Zimbabwean government for comprehensive (accelerated) land reform following the 1998 Donors’ Conference. The chapter outlines the institutional framework for land reform policy formulation and implementation, the criteria for the identification of land for compulsory acquisition, the land acquisition process itself, the budget outline and the time frame set for the programme.

Chapter 5 discusses how the fast-track land reform programme unfolded in practice. It discusses the constitutional amendments and presidential decrees that were issued regarding land reform and the controversial settler identification and emplacement process, especially with regards to farm workers. The chapter discusses what fast-track land reform achieved in terms of land acquisition and redistribution from the Inception Phase to the present, including the monitoring and evaluation procedures that were put in place. The fast-track land reform programme was highly controversial and critics, including the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2003), described it as “chaotic”, “opaque” and “problematic.” In terms of distributional outcomes, the fast-track land reform programme was heralded by Zimbabwe’s Ministers and other government officials as a successful “revolution about agrarian empowerment” (Chitiyo, 2003:166; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004) because it increased smallholder control of land from 56% to 70% (Moyo, 2004:25-26). The Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme for the period July 2000-August 2002 (Utete Commission) was inaugurated by the President 14 May 2003 with Dr Charles Utete as its chairman. The Utete Commission also hailed the successes of the land reform programme.

However, although the fast-track land reform programme revolutionised Zimbabwe’s agricultural landscape, the Utete Commission also drew attention to numerous problems including difficulties encountered in the process of acquiring and distributing land as well as
the variety of legal issues that remained unresolved in respect of these acquisition procedures (Utete Report, 2003). The Utete Commission also commented on the government’s limited financial and other resources and the administrative difficulties encountered by an overstretched bureaucratic apparatus because the fast-track land reform was hastily implemented (Utete Report, 2003).

Commentators, including Chitiyo (2003:166) and Bush and Szeftel (2000:178), have criticised the fast-track land reform programme’s implementation because it ignored laid down procedures and in the process undermined and infringed on people’s human rights. Many others have concluded that instead of its stated aims, fast-track land reform reduced Zimbabwe to a pariah or rogue state that is despised, ridiculed, isolated and beset by violence, lawlessness, famine and a growing welfare crisis (Jenkins and Knight, 2002).

Chapter 6 discusses the consequences of Zimbabwe’s land reform phase 3. It evaluates the land reform’s impact on peasants, farm workers, white farmers, opposition political parties, the media, the economy as well as the Zimbabwean government’s diplomatic relationships with the international community (donor and non-donor).

The chapter analyses the fast-track land reform programme in terms of development (Coetzee, 2001:119; Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393; Swanepoel 1997a:48; Preston, 1996:245 & 246; Seers, 1979) and McDowell’s (1996) theory of displacement and impoverishment. It discusses development issues and people’s dwindling socio-economic prospects, partly because of the unrealistic targets that the government set for itself after independence, a situation that was compounded by government corruption and failed economic structural adjustment (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). The fast-track land reform programme is analysed from a developmental point of view (displacement and poverty) because one of the main motivations for its implementation was the desire to distribute the country’s main means of production (land) more evenly, thereby giving ordinary people the means to earn a decent living. The Utete Report (2003:15-20) cites, among others, the following reasons for the fast-track land reform programme:

- To positively transform people’s socio and economic circumstances and
- To transform the rural economy by increasing agricultural production to enhance national food security and industrial development.
According to LandWeb (2000c), to meet these aims, the government initially committed itself to following a process of consultation, gender sensitivity and equity to reduce the marginalisation of vulnerable groups. However, in reality, instead of alleviating poverty by increasing the people’s income base, ordinary poor people became economically worse-off than they were before the reform (LandWeb, 2000c). In terms of the two outcomes above, Jenkins and Knight (2002:102) are equally sceptical and contend that the way in which land reform erupted in violence and caused so much destruction from 2000 onwards makes it highly unlikely that it can enhance people’s socio-economic circumstances. The plight of Zimbabwe’s farm workers and their dependents illustrates this point well. This constituency represented 20% of the country’s population and more than half of them became destitute because of fast-track land reform (Mlambo, 2003:201). McDowell’s (1996:6) comment that forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheaval or natural disaster has far-reaching consequences that ingrain the “multidimensionality of impoverishment and social disintegration” accurately describes farm workers’ struggle to survive after the reform.

Chapter 6 explains the birth of the first significant political opposition to Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu-PF party from widespread feelings of disillusionment with the government’s policies. The chapter shows how the government became increasingly reactionary and authoritarian when it was threatened by a fermenting legitimacy crisis, just before the 2000 parliamentary election, and after it (Karume, 2005; Meredith, 2003; Chan, 2003). Salmi’s (1993) typology of violence is used in this discussion of Zimbabwe’s political economy. Salmi (1993) contends that there are many different kinds of violence. Violence can be direct or indirect. Fast-track land reform constituted direct physical violence by the police (beatings, unlawful detainment) and ruling party militias and supporters (kidnapping, torture, murder) (Human Rights Watch, 2002:22-25). Less direct forms of violence were committed insofar as the land reform programme interfered with the fulfilment of many people’s (farm workers and farmers) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes (Meredith, 2003:167-170; Buckle, 2002). The 2005 urban clean-up campaigns are also discussed in this context.

Chapter 6 concludes by outlining the reaction of the international community to the fast-track land reform programme, particularly the apparent contradictions between the land reform policy (on paper) and its implementation.

Chapter 7 outlines the qualitative, case-study research design used in this investigation to answer two main questions;
• How many farms in the study area were affected by fast-track land reform and illegal farm occupations and how many are still operating at full capacity, or otherwise?
• What are the general responses of farmers and farm workers to the land reform programme in the area and why is this so? What exists now in terms of social dynamics and how can they be explained?

A focus group discussion was conducted as a pilot study. This was followed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with identified groups of respondents (government officials, white farmers and farm workers) to understand (outline and explain) the relationships/dynamics, micro-political issues and other influences at work in this locality. The questions posed to farmers and farm workers (not government officials) covered similar substantive material in order to describe and link events, processes and characteristics (to give an explanatory hypothesis) about the struggle for survival in the area studied; within the broader context of the sea of despair that has engulfed the majority of Zimbabweans since 2000.

The report is both descriptive and analytical in the presentation of its findings. A major aim of the study, from a phenomenological or interpretivist point of view, was to emphasise the social reality of the respondents directly affected by the land reform programme. The study’s focus on welfare issues is influenced by Moyo’s (1995:287) observation that most commentary on land reforms emphasises distributional outcomes (the transfer of land from the haves to the have-nots) and does not pay sufficient attention to the impact of reform efforts on the welfare and social reproduction of ordinary poor people. Moyo (1995:71) impresses the need for change in the scale of analysis of land reforms; from international and national levels to local levels (macro to micro) in order to appropriately and adequately inform the premises on which land policies evolve. Chitiyo (2003:187) echoes Moyo’s concerns when he cautions that Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme was short-sighted because it was preoccupied with “retributive justice.” Chitiyo (2003) believes that “true social justice” will only be achieved when the plight of poor, landless Zimbabweans, improves.

Subsequent investigation showed that some landholdings in the study area (twelve out of about 127 properties) were invaded between 2000 and 2002, but the invasions were brief in
most cases. Where the invaders have stayed (about seven of the twelve mentioned above), they pegged out parts of farms for themselves, planted crops and are co-existing with white farmers, unlike in Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces which were completely over-run when land invasions first broke out (Meredith, 2003:184; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 2000a:90). The enquiry also showed that most land in the study area has been listed for compulsory acquisition under the fast-track land reform programme, although some farms are still officially in the hands of their white owners. The status quo shows some degree of compromise by the stakeholders (farmers and farm workers) because they have vested interests in the continued existence of the farms. The chapter identifies individual and collective survival strategies in the aftermath of this significant chapter in Zimbabwe’s land reform efforts. An interesting range of localised socio-political and economic responses and new patterns of social organisation are highlighted as those directly affected by the land reform exercise, particularly former farm workers, try to address everyday issues of survival and social reproduction. This focus of the enquiry aims to make policy-makers more aware of people’s needs at local levels and hopefully influence how these are addressed.

The conclusions drawn from the study apply strictly to the three farms studied and no claims are made to portray the situation on these farms as being the same as that on other farms in Vumba and Burma Valley, Manicaland Province or the country as a whole.

Chapter 8 concludes the study by looking at the lessons that can be drawn by Zimbabwe’s neighbours from Zimbabwe’s experience of land reform from independence to the present because the land question continues to have political, economic as well as social relevance in most former settler colonies in which indigenous people were forcibly dispossessed of their land. An analysis of Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform is important to Zimbabwe’s neighbours, for instance, South Africa and Namibia, who are currently implementing land reform measures. Although agriculture is significantly less important in South Africa because it contributes less to the country’s GDP, employment and foreign currency earning than is the case in Zimbabwe (these differences mean that the pressure for land reform is weaker in South Africa than in Zimbabwe), Zimbabwe’s experience of land reform can still be instructive for South Africa’s own land reform because their economies are closely integrated and a repeat of the upheavals caused by fast-track land reform in Zimbabwe is highly undesirable (Jenkins and Knight, 2002: 287-293).
Despite the differences in the pre-eminence of land as a primary resource in South Africa and Zimbabwe, Jenkins and Knight (2002:287-293) note that the greatest poverty and underdevelopment is experienced in the rural areas of both countries. As such, Zimbabwe’s experience offers insights regarding what works and can be adopted by countries in the region in their own reform efforts; what can be modified to suit the specific needs of each country as well as what should be avoided in the implementation of comprehensive land reform so that land reform benefits those that need it the most, landless and poor people.
2

The Land Question

2.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the land question in Southern Africa. It goes on to give a historical overview of Zimbabwe’s experience of colonial land dispossession because this history provides the context for land reform after the attainment of political independence in 1980.

The bulk of this chapter traces the aims and successes of land reform in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1998 and is broken down into two main phases. Phase 1 covers the period from independence in 1980 to the adoption of the first economic structural adjustment programme in 1990. Phase 2 is from 1990 to the inception phase of the fast-track land reform programme in 1998.

2.2 Overview of the Land Question in Southern Africa
Land is a principle source of livelihood, security and status for most people in developing countries. In Africa, 61% of the people make their living from land as a primary means of production. Land plays a vital role in sustaining human society because it provides people with a place to live, a place to be employed, a place to pasture their livestock and access to natural resources (Bush and Szefel, 2000:173; Christodoulou, 1990:15, El-Ghonemy, 1990).

It is for these reasons that access to land is a crucial and ongoing concern (Hendricks, 1995b:54; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:10). Apart from its economic relevance, land is also considered sacred because it often has social cultural and religious significance, for example, as tribal burial grounds.

The land question refers to the unequal distribution of land, mainly as a result of colonialism and unequal power relations between the colonisers and the colonised (Warriner, 1969:233). The land reforms implemented in Southern Africa are best understood within the broad historical context of colonial dispossession and underdevelopment. Settler colonies like Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe experienced extensive land dispossession (43%, 89%, 49% and 49% by 1958 respectively) compared to Tanzania and Zambia’s experience of land alienation (0.9% and 3.0% by 1958 respectively) (Hendricks, 1995b:42-43). Colonialism instituted dualistic agrarian structures in the settler colonies where white
settlers owned most of the high value agricultural land and where engaged in commercial export production while indigenous populations lived in overcrowded reserves or homelands with infertile soils (Hall, 2003; Palmer, 2000:18). This experience of colonial land dispossession motivated anti-colonial struggles in countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia (Hendricks, 1995b: 39, 40 & 49). The main objective of land reforms in most former colonies has been to change racially biased power structures by reclaiming alienated land rights (transfer resource control) by removing discriminatory tenure systems and reducing ownership of large estates by people of foreign nationality (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:6; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987; Warriner, 1969:1).

According to Bush and Szefiel (2000:173) and Warriner (1969:11 & 14), the struggle for control over good quality land has political, economic and social aspects. Land reform in Africa is meant to achieve social justice and equality by re-aligning political independence with economic control over the main means of production, mainly land. The motivation for land reform in Africa, therefore, revolves around land distribution, access and ownership to enable people without economic assets to have a means of livelihood or to engage in productive employment, thus encouraging rural development and alleviating rural poverty (Hendricks, 1995b:41; Moyo, 1995:35; Riddell, 1992:82 & 101; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:8; El-Ghonemy, 1990). Palmer’s (1997) comparative survey of the land question in Southern and Eastern Africa shows how inequalities in the racial and gender allocation of land relate to poverty in Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which makes the land question a priority for the governments of these countries.

According to Raul Prebisch of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (cited in Warriner, 1969:5, 12 & 262), land reform is a critical social and economic “condition for balanced development” in countries whose economies are predominantly agricultural. In most developing countries, rural development is predicated on the need to improve human socio-economic conditions by reducing land scarcities. It is for this reason that land reform and resettlement policies are primarily aimed at alleviating poverty and land pressure (Palmer, 1997:82; McDowell, 1996:1).
2.2.1 Definitions of Land Reform

1. The narrow definition of land reform refers to the "redistribution of property rights in land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers, thus redistributing income by diverting resources to their use."

2. The broad definition of land reform encompasses "any improvement in the institutions of land tenure or agricultural organisation" (Warriner 1969).

Hendricks (2001:293) notes that there are no simple solutions to planning and implementing land reform because it carries political, economic and social risks. Debates abound over the constitutional legality, fairness and equitability of land acquisition and redistribution procedures, the efficacy of land reform administration and the political motivations that drive land reform whenever established property rights are at stake (Moyo, 1995:1 & 11). There are also no guarantees that the bigger the scale of reform the more benefits will accrue to the majority of those who need land (Warriner, 1969). Christodoulou (1990:18 & 158) maintains that there is "a variety and complexity of conditions, actors, interactions and dynamic influences that affect the genesis, progression and outcome of land reform," more so, because different stakeholders have unequal power (social and political clout), which impacts on their bargaining positions. Successful land reform, therefore, depends on a government’s sustained political power and will to resolve the issue in a decisive manner (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:177).

2.3 Zimbabwe’s Land Question in Historical Perspective

Land is a permanent element of community life in Zimbabwe because approximately 70% of the country’s population is rural (African Development Bank, 1993 cited in Hendricks, 1995b:54). Zimbabwe’s experience of land apportionment and the existence of a sustained and unequal land distribution twenty years after independence provided the backdrop for the ‘fast-track’ land reform programme which was implemented in 2000. The history of land dispossession in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) shows why land redistribution is such an emotive issue and why land reform is widely regarded as the key to economic independence and power. The process of land alienation in Zimbabwe is described below and shows why Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu-PF party felt justified in declaring in its May 2000 election manifesto that “Land is the economy and the economy is land” (or "Ivhu kuvanhu-Land to

Moyo et al (1991:1) emphasise that the gross inequality in land distribution in Zimbabwe was “neither achieved through democratic policy processes nor market-based principles” and it is this reality that makes Zimbabwe’s land question a major cause of racial and class conflict, fragmentation, hostility and antagonism. Land dispossession in Zimbabwe was initially effected by right of conquest by the British South Africa Company’s Pioneer Column. Violence was used to dispossess indigenous black people of their land and force them into inhospitable, tsetse-fly infested and dry areas where the land had low agricultural value. White settlers acquired more than half of the good quality land in ecologically favoured natural regions 1, 2 and 3 for their exclusive use (Meredith, 2003:114-115; Utete Report, 2003:10-14; Von Blankenburg, 1994:23; Astrow, 1983). Over time, land (and mineral/mining rights) was seized through a series of concessions and treaties including the 1888 Moffat Agreement/Treaty, the 1888 Rudd Concession and the Jameson Agreement (Chitiyo, 2003:162). This created fundamental social and political inequalities, great bitterness and resentment towards white colonial settlers. This inequality and resentment precipitated the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war and the first Chimurenga war of 1896/97 in which the indigenous people were defeated (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Chitiyo, 2003:160-161; Utete Report, 2003:10-14; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177; Von Blankenburg, 1994:2 &14).

The recommendations of the 1925 Morris-Carter Land Commission further prohibited indigenous people from purchasing land in white areas, effectively alienating the little land that blacks had access to at this point. The Morris-Carter Commission’s recommendations were later codified in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act which legally institutionalised the racial division of land. The Act created Native Reserves covering 21,127,040 acres or 22% of the total land surface (Utete Report, 2003:11). Approximately 7.5 million acres (7.8% of the country’s land surface) was set aside as native Purchase Areas for use by black master farmers. The black population (1 million in 1931) was allocated 29 million acres and the white population (48,000, of whom only 11,000 were settled on the land) were awarded 49 million acres (51% of the land surface). A further 18 million acres of state land (forests and national parks) was undesignated. Blacks were barred from moving onto designated white

The 1930 Land Apportionment Act was replaced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969 (after the Rhodesian Constitution of 1969 was passed) which gave white settlers access to half the country’s agricultural land. Thousands of black people were evicted from white farming areas and this entrenched the unequal division of land. Europeans controlled about 18.1 million hectares of land compared to 18.2 million hectares designated as Native Reserves and Tribal Trust Lands (Meredith, 2003:116-118; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Zinyama, 2001:163, 167 & 174; Made, 1998:191-195; Von Blackenburg, 1994; Astrow, 1983). This pattern of land ownership/distribution was grossly disproportionate because white settlers accounted for only 5% of the population.

White-owned large scale commercial farms (LSCF) eventually covered approximately 11.2 million hectares (about 28.7%) of the total land area. These holdings ranged from smallholdings of 200 hectares to extensive ranches in excess of 10 000 hectares (Chitiyo, 2003:161; Zinyama, 2001:165). The large-scale commercial farming sector was comprised of about 4 400 individual farming units held under registered freehold or 99-year leasehold tenure. About 1 784 of these farming units were owned by private local and international companies whilst Africans had communal tenure on Reserve land with little agricultural potential.

These injustices and grievances over land ownership fuelled resentment among the indigenous people and became a major motivating force behind the second Chimurenga/liberation war of 1972. The leaders of the liberation struggle promised that every African would be given land once the war was won (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Meredith, 2003:116-118; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Made, 1998:203; Hendricks, 1995b:43 & 50; Astrow, 1983).

The next section is periodised (by decade) to highlight the main arguments and debates that moulded the different stages in Zimbabwe’s land reform from independence to the present. The section also assesses the government’s successes (and failures) in acquiring and redistributing white-owned land to the black peasant majority.
2.4 Land Reform Phase 1 (1980-1990)
The success of the second Chimurenga war of liberation led Zimbabwe to independence from colonial rule in 1980. Independence was partly a result of the liberation war itself, as well as the Lancaster House negotiations which led to the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. Land redistribution was central to the post independence government’s aim of rectifying the many indefensible and untenable social, economic and racial inequalities and imbalances that existed, especially since large tracts of productive land were un-utilised or under-utilised. At independence, over-populated, over-tilled and over-grazed Native Reserves were home to more than 60% of the population on 16.2 million hectares compared to 15.6 million hectares owned by 5,500 white commercial farmers (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:12; Riddell, 1992:14). Land reform was not only crucial to assuage grievances over forcible colonial land dispossession but it was a necessary step that would guarantee political stability by improving the standard of living (alleviating rural poverty) of the largest and poorest section of the country’s historically disadvantaged black people population (Moyo, 1995:120). The aims and achievements of land reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990 are separated and discussed below.

2.4.1 Lancaster House Provisions and the Land Question
The Lancaster House Constitution sought to strike a balance between the protection of private property (mainly in white hands) and the new government’s need to distribute land ownership (and other assets) more widely. The land question proved the most difficult to resolve during the Lancaster House negotiations. Ian Douglas Smith (the former Rhodesian Prime minister), for instance, retained his 6,000 acre farm south-west of Harare (Meredith, 2003:55). The ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer’ principle and compensation for land in foreign currency was an integral part of the Lancaster House agreement that was eventually reached and it created problems for the new government (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6). The provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution were effective for ten years after independence, during which the government could only purchase land against the owner’s wishes (compulsorily) if such land was under-utilised or if the land was required for public purposes. In both instances, the owner had to be given prompt and full compensation in foreign currency (preferably British Pounds). The government’s ability to undertake land reform was restricted and in many cases, the government acquired poor quality land that was

2.4.2 Donors and Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Phase I
The clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement regarding land redistribution and the protection of white property rights were accepted by Zimbabwe’s black government after assurances that multinationals would provide funds to assist in land redistribution (Olaleye, 2005:6). International donors promised Zimbabwe a total of US$2 billion toward land reform. As the former colonial power, Britain was expected to play a pivotal role in Zimbabwe’s land reform and pledged £44 million which was broken down as follows:

- £20 million was a specific land resettlement grant
- £27 million was budgetary support to help meet the Zimbabwean government’s own contribution to the land reform programme
- £3 million was for miscellaneous expenses


2.4.3 The Government’s Land Reform Plans
According to Meredith (2003:11 & 122), white farmers were treated well soon after independence because they accounted for three-quarters of Zimbabwe’s agricultural output. They grew 90% of the cotton, virtually all the tobacco and other export crops like wheat, coffee, tea and sugar (accounting for one-third of total exports). White farmers employed
about one-third of Zimbabwe's wage earning labour force (271 000 people at independence in 1980) and these figures continued to rise steadily until the mid 1990s (Meredith, 2003:111 & 122). Apart from the restrictions on compulsory land acquisition imposed by the Lancaster House Constitution, Meredith (2003:121-122) maintains that the new government could not ignore the contribution of white farmers to the economy and was cautious with its land reform plans as a result. Despite this consideration, however, Meredith (2003:14) and Moyo (2000a:73) note that although the new government was compelled to give reassurances that there would be no nationalisation of farms, mines or industries soon after independence, its policy dialogue on land redistribution in the 1980s was “ideologically grounded in nationalistic, moralistic, patriarchal and statist philosophies.”

The government drafted a land resettlement programme which aimed to resettle 18 000 families on white-owned commercial farmland over a period of three years (1980-1983). Resettlement was the vehicle through which the government sought to even-out population densities (decongestion) and resource pressures in the Reserves that were occupied by blacks. The initial land resettlement programme was revised to form the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982. The new programme aimed to resettle 162 000 poor, landless and displaced families on 9 million hectares of commercial farmland (Moyo, 2004:1-2; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). The government’s long term objective was to transform the racially skewed ownership of the country’s prime land by Ensuring equitable and socially just access to land (transfer of not less than 60% of land from the commercial farming sector to the rest of the population using a villagised resettlement model (A1) to decongest overpopulated and over-stocked areas (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:7).

The government wanted to re-structure the country’s entire farming system including access to markets, credit and training, access to social, developmental and economic amenities as well as ensuring land tenure security for all types of landholdings in order to enhance agricultural productivity. The government hoped that these changes would eventually lead to black industrial and economic empowerment and long-term macro-economic growth and aimed to promote investment in agriculture through capital out-lays and infrastructure provision (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Moyo, 2004:1-2; Utete Report, 2003:15).

The 1985 Land Acquisition Act contained provisions for land redistribution, still with an emphasis on resettlement. The 1985 Land Acquisition Act gave the government the ‘right of
first refusal' on the sale of all private rural land (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; Buckle, 2002:11; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30). The government hoped to reduce population pressure in the communal areas and to improve rural agricultural production and household incomes by creating resettlement schemes covering 8.3 million hectares (Moyo, 1995:120; Riddell, 1992:82). The government planned to provide supporting economic and social infrastructure and technical services (electricity, wide tar all-weather roads and telecommunications) (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Zinyama, 2001:175; Made, 1998:197; Moyo, 1995:120). These investments were targeted to benefit peasant families that had been displaced by the war and to provide land and other resources to the landless, unemployed, ex-combatants and the destitute.

2.4.4 Settler Identification and Resettlement Models in Phase 1

The settler identification and land allocation criteria set during this phase is outlined below. The different categories of land reform beneficiaries did not have to possess any knowledge of farming or working capital, except what was necessary for subsistence (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82).

- Landless people or those willing to forgo claims to land in the communal areas
- Poor or unemployed people with dependents
- Returning refugees who had been displaced by the liberation war

Four resettlement models were devised to address the issue of resettlement and infrastructure provision. The government hoped to eventually indigenise the large-scale commercial farming sector by creating small, medium and large scale commercial farming resettlement schemes. The resettlement models adopted in this period are described below:

- **Model A**: each family was allocated a residential stand of 0.25 hectares or 1 acre in a nucleated village with 5-8 hectares of arable land for intensive cultivation and 30-200 hectares for communal grazing for a specified number of livestock, depending on the agro-ecological potential of the land.
- **Model B**: nucleated settlement with collective-cooperative style farming on 800-2000 hectares.
• **Model C**: an extension of Model A for intensive individual smallholder production around a centralised estate managed communally or supervised by the Agricultural Development Authority (state parastatal-ADA, formerly ARDA).

• **Model D**: similar to Model A, but primarily for game-ranching and livestock production on state land in poorer, drier agro-ecological regions (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:84; Zinyama, 2001:174).

### 2.4.5 Land Reform Successes in Phase 1

Resettlement Model A was the most common or popular, followed by Models B and C. Model D generally did not involve resettlement although about 20 000 families benefited from the additional grazing land that it provided (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Scudder, 2001; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:31; Riddell, 1992:18; Cusworth, 1992). Resettlement areas were considered state property and arable, grazing and residential land under resettlement Models A, C and D were governed by state permit tenure in terms of the Rural Land Act (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5). Resettlement Model B was governed by communal tenure (Made 1998; Palmer, 1997:81-82).

According to Deininger (2003:144-145), the resettlement programme succeeded in reducing rural poverty and inequality by allowing rural households to accumulate assets and gain income from crop production. An estimated 40 000 households benefited (3.1% of rural households) with each receiving an average of 59.28 hectares (Deininger, 2003:144-145). Before independence, the peasant sector produced only 6% of the country’s marketed agricultural output but this situation is reported to have improved significantly following land resettlement. Following examples of providing the destitute and unemployed with land and other resources in Burkina Faso, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Peru (Scudder, 2001:253), the Zimbabwean government provided inputs (seed, fertiliser, tillage tractors, credit, improved road transport, marketing facilities and agricultural extension) through parastatals under the Ministry of Lands. The parastatals included the Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (Agritex), the District Development Fund (DDF), Agricultural Development Authority (ADA), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and AgriBank. Resettled peasants were able to work their land to realise the ‘maize and cotton miracle’ or agricultural boom between 1980 and 1982/3 (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:102, 294). The agricultural boom was also assisted by international donors such as the Norwegian Agency.
for International Development (NORAD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Association (CIDA) who provided funding and technical assistance. It is reported that peasant sector production accounted for 55% of marketed maize and 20% of total marketed agricultural output in this period (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:102 & 294; Masilela and Weiner, 1996; Hendricks, 1995b:50-52; Moyo, 1987 cited in Moyo, 2003:34).

Agricultural collectivisation was implemented (resettlement Model B) alongside resettlement for homes and subsistence (Model A). Most co-operatives produced maize and small grains like millet, sorghum, rapoko, groundnuts and vegetables and a few produced cotton. Moyo (1998:225) notes, however, that most co-operatives operated below capacity because they did not have sufficient working capital for essentials such as irrigation infrastructure. In many instances, weed, pest and disease control activities were not carried out at the right time and entire crops were often destroyed (Moyo, 1998:225). According to Moyo (1998), agricultural collectivisation had limited success because of poor infrastructure, financing and management. It was a general failure in terms of production output and management efficiency because co-operative members lacked the requisite skills/training. About 8% of those involved in cooperative farming were illiterate, 53% had an education between grade 1-7 and only 5% had a secondary education (Moyo, 1998:223; Chiremba and Masters, 2003). The state was criticised for rushing into establishing farming co-operatives without putting in place the necessary institutional framework to promote investment and production. Technical assistance and other inputs such as credit, marketing, infrastructure, agricultural research and improved farm technology were also inadequate because of limited state resources (Moyo, 1998:215; Alexander, 2000; Made, 1998:203).

A small but influential number of black commercial farmers held land under freehold tenure in the African Purchase Areas. This rural bourgeoisie class was created through the colonial land Acts of the late 1960s and early 1970s mentioned above (Hendricks, 1995b:55). The number of these rich landowning peasants increased from 8 500 in 1977 to 9 500 in 1982 because of the government’s agricultural reforms which were aimed at eventually indigenising the large-scale commercial farming sector by creating small, medium and large scale commercial farming resettlement schemes under the A2 resettlement model (Chidzonga, 1993; Good, 1990; Harrison, 1987 cited in Hendricks, 1995b:51).
2.4.6 Land Reform Constraints/ Failures in Phase 1

The implementation of comprehensive land redistribution and resettlement was hindered by several factors soon after independence such that it fell far below the government’s targets. Government statistics show that 71,000 families, instead of the proposed 162,000, were settled on 3,498,444 hectares (3.5 million hectares) or 40% out of the projected 9 million hectares. Only 19% of the land acquired was classified as prime land and the rest was either marginal or unsuitable for cultivation or grazing (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). The government’s delivery of infrastructure (roads, fencing, dip tanks, housing, schools and clinics) lacked adequate technical support and it has been argued that the targets that the government has set for land reform were unrealistic and beyond its financial and logistical capacity (Meredith, 2003:120).

Land reform targets were difficult to achieve because of several reasons. The main reason was the constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement. The conditions of the agreement guaranteed white settler privilege and economic hegemony by protecting their property rights to the most productive agricultural lands (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:25; Astrow, 1983). The government could only acquire under-utilised agricultural land; if and when white farmers chose to sell land to the government, on a “willing-seller, willing-buyer” basis and white farmers were generally unwilling to sell their land (Deininger, 2003:144-145; Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30). In practice, this led to the acquisition of scattered, low quality land, which was not ideal for the establishment of large resettlement schemes (Meredith, 2003:119; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Hall, 2003:256; Lee, 2003:1; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 7; Buckle, 2002:11; Zinyama, 2001:163,167,174; Krieger, 2000:445; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 1998:191-195; Palmer, 1997:303; Moyo et al, 1991:15).

Another major constraint on the government’s ability to carry out significant land reform in this period was the prohibitive cost of acquiring land from white commercial farmers. The government struggled to pay for the little land that was made available because white farmers were entitled to receive compensation in foreign currency (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; LandWeb, 2000a; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30), especially since very little of the assistance pledged by Britain and America for land reform ever materialised (Human Rights Watch, 2002:7; Palmer, 1997:303). In this regard, Deininger (2003:153) notes that chronic under-
funding and mismanagement reduces the sustainability of land reform programmes and is a key reason why governments terminate or postpone land reforms. Palmer and Toulmin (2000) also caution that donor assistance in funding land reforms is a welcome gesture but the role of donors can be problematic. Zimbabwe's experience illustrates how donors can dictate the terms of land reform and literally hold the reforming government ransom. Jenkins and Knight (2002:81) maintain that the Zimbabwean government had abandoned its aims of implementing a sustained resettlement programme by 1983. They argue that the government's ambivalence on the matter was reflected in the lack of a budget allocation for further resettlement in the 1983/84 financial year (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:81).

2.4.7 Conclusion

Von Blanckenburg (1994:20) notes that the number of large white-owned commercial farmers had decreased from 6 100 to about 4 600 by the mid 1980s. However, land reform and resettlement in the 1980s progressed slowly and eventually stalled because it was very costly under the conditions outlined above. Land reform during this period saw little land transfer (15% of white-owned land transferred to 6% of the peasantry) (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Riddell, 1992:15). Von Blanckenburg (1994:29-31) estimates that by 1991, only a third of the resettlement targets set in 1985 had been achieved. Von Blanckenburg (1994:32) also argues that apart from the poor performance in terms of the number of people resettled, the people resettled were poorly selected, often because of their ties to the liberation struggle or other political merits rather than need.

Despite initial improvements in peasant production (the maize miracle above), comprehensive land reform remained an illusion (Hall, 2003:261; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 1998:191; Palmer, 1997:303; Hendricks, 1995b:50; Riddell, 1992:1). Land redistribution was insufficiently addressed, even though it was a central political and economic demand of Zimbabwe's two liberation wars (Moyo, 1999:1). Consequently, Zimbabwe's bi-modal agricultural-based economic structure; dominated by white large-scale commercial farmers (land holding, output, technology and infrastructure) was maintained (Moyo, 2000a:72). It is noted, however, that although Zimbabwe's land reform achievements in this period were modest, this early land reform attempt achieved one of the highest land acquisition and resettlement figures on the continent at the time (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a; Kinsey, 1999 cited in LandWeb, 2000a).
2.5 Land Reform Phase 2 (1990-1998)

The Lancaster House Agreement lapsed in April 1990 and there was little to show in terms of land reform (considering the scale of the problem) after a decade of independence so a more radical land policy was drawn up. The World Bank estimated that 3 million hectares of commercial farmland in natural regions 1, 2 and 3 were under-utilised and could be redistributed without depressing crop production or interfering with export targets (World Bank, 1991 cited in Von Blanckenburg, 1994:26; Riddell, 1992:82). Apart from addressing the problems that had been posed by the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, the government revisited the land issue to gain support for the 1990 elections.

2.5.1 Constitutional and Legislative Changes

In December 1990, parliament passed a constitutional amendment (number 11) that allowed the government to compulsorily acquire or confiscate privately owned land, fix compensation in local currency (not foreign currency as was previously required) and deny farmers the right to appeal the government’s decisions in court. Affected land owners could contest the acquisition of their landholdings to the Minister of Lands in writing; setting out the reasons for their objection (Chitiyo, 2003:163; Utete Report, 2003:15; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:34; Riddell, 1992:81). The government planned to acquire 5 million hectares of the remaining 11.2 million hectares (approximately half the remaining privately owned commercial farmland in ecological regions 2 and 3 in the 1990s) to resettle 110 000 families. Limits were placed on the number of farms that individual farmers could own, on absentee landowners and on foreign ownership of land (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in LandWeb, 2000a).

In respect of compensation, the December 1990 constitutional amendments allowed the government to use non-market solutions in determining the compensation that farmers would receive if their land was compulsorily acquired (Tshuma, 1997). New land valuation procedures were instituted, for example, the purchase price of land was based on ‘fair compensation’ for the value of buildings, dams, roads and other infrastructure on the property, not the market value of the land itself (Meredith, 2003:195). The new constitutional and legislative provisions stipulated that the government would pay at least half the compensation total for expropriated land when the land was acquired or within a reasonable time thereafter. Half of the outstanding balance would be paid within two years and the last instalment would be paid within five years (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:35). The government
argued that; “The white colonialists took our land without paying for it. Why should we pay them exorbitant prices?” (Meredith, 2003:122). The government retained the ‘right of first refusal’ in buying land that white farmers sold (Buckle, 2002:11). Numerous objections were raised by white farmers who argued that they were not consulted about the new land acquisition process and that the exercise disregarded their private property rights.

In January 1991, productive white farmers (about 4 000 represented by the Commercial Farmers Union) were reassured that they had nothing to fear when the new Land Acquisition Bill was brought before parliament (Meredith, 2003:121-122). The farmers where told that the Bill was mainly targeted at under-utilised land, land belonging to absentee landlords, foreign-owned (individual or companies), officially derelict land, land owned for speculative purposes (unutilised), over-sized farms and land belonging to individuals with more farms than were considered necessary (more than two) (Hall, 2003:269; Meredith, 2003:121-122; Krieger, 2000:445-446; Moyo, 1995:90). These land categories, including land already owned by the state, were to be redistributed first before productive land was affected. The new National Land Policy and Land Acquisition Act came into force in 1992 and enumerated the Zimbabwean government’s overarching land reform aims and objectives (Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6).

A Land Tenure Commission known as the Rukuni Commission was established in 1994 to address the problems of duplication of services and jurisdiction in land administration, transparency in land administration, as well as to limit farm sizes, introduce a land tax and regulate land use (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:274-275; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211, Mbiba, 1997). The Commission was also tasked to look into the issue of equity, including gender equality, in the land reform process (Moyo, 2003:4 & 38). The Rukuni Commission reiterated and enumerated the country’s overarching land reform aims and objectives. Limits were placed on the number of farms owned by individual farmers, on farm size (through land taxes), on absentee landowners and on foreign ownership of land. Extensive areas (blocks) were designated for land acquisition and resettlement (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). The Land Tenure Commission known as the Rukuni Commission recommended that all statutory land (now under freehold title) should be vested in a National Land Commission that would be composed of politicians and technocrats, and charged with the responsibility of ensuring both the effective implementation of the Land Acquisition Act.
in pursuit of a comprehensive land reform programme (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:274-275; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211). The status of Village Assemblies was reinforced and all village land was vested in these assemblies (now vested in the President) (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den Brink, 2000).

The constitutional amendments between 1990 and 1992, the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, the National Land Policy of 1992 and the Rukuni Commission of 1994 were the government’s way of addressing the problems encountered in implementing land reform Phase 1. The government gave itself more power to designate and expropriate large blocks of land for resettlement than was the case when the Lancaster House Agreement was effective (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Unfortunately, however, the proposed National Land Commission was not established until the fast-track land reform of 2000.

2.5.2 Land Reform and Economic Structural Adjustment
Zimbabwe began implementing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescribed economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990. The neo-liberal, pro-capitalist prescriptions of the programme led the government to abandon its Marxist-Leninist thinking (Burkett, 2000:471). In practice, restructuring the state’s fiscal and monetary policies meant the gradual reduction of state involvement in the economy by adopting freer labour practices, lifting price controls, reducing state subsidies to parastatals and reducing state expenditure on social, infrastructural and agricultural services (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:137-159; Moyo, 2000a:155). The tide of trade liberalisation led to the privatisation of previously state-owned marketing boards like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) and Cold Storage Commission (CSC) from 1994 (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:137-159; Moyo, 2000a:56). It is important to note, however, that land reform was not integrated into the ESAP framework because commercial farmers made the biggest contribution to agricultural exports and the country’s foreign currency earnings (Meredith, 2003:111 & 122; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8).

The largely white-owned commercial agricultural sector contributed 33% of formal employment and accounted for 40% of Zimbabwe’s exports. This realisation and re-evaluation made the government reluctant to radically down-size the white commercial
farming sector because it would have serious economic ramifications. The government hoped to improve the agricultural sector and eco-tourism’s contribution to the country’s GDP and foreign currency earnings by retaining a core of efficient large-scale commercial agricultural producers (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:1-3; Moyo, 2004:8-11). White farmers agreed to cooperate with the government on this basis, as well as the reassurances that the government had given them when the 1992 Land Acquisition Act was first tabled before parliament. White commercial farmers said they recognised the need for land redistribution and suggested that the government should use the 500 000 acres of land that it already owned, but had not redistributed, for resettlement. Alternatively, white farmers suggested that the government should focus on acquiring unproductive land, including farms owned by the black elite (Meredith, 2003:123).

2.5.3 Land Acquisition in the 1990s

Contrary to the reassurances that white farmers were given, the government designated 13 productive white farms (17 000 acres) for acquisition in Mutare district, although seven of the 13 designated farms were subsequently un-designated (Meredith, 2003:124). Again in 1993 the government designated 72 highly productive farms (475 000 acres) for acquisition. This time 27 farms out of the 72 farms that were designated were subsequently un-designated. Many white farmers challenged the legality of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act because farmers could not sell or lease their property once a farm was designated, except with the permission of the Minister of Agriculture. Farmers could not approach the courts or appeal to an independent body except the Minister of Agriculture (Meredith, 2003:124-126). White farmers argued that the land designation process was unconstitutional and deprived them of their rights to property.

On 28 November 1997, the government published a list of 1 503 farms (about 12 million acres or 45% of the land held by commercials farmers at the time) that it planned to expropriate. Affected farmers lost their title to the land, their ability to borrow money from banks using the land as collateral as well as the right to harvest crops on their farms and this fuelled racial tensions in the country (Meredith, 2003). By December 1997, 1 471 white-owned farms had been designated for compulsory acquisition. Farms owned by blacks, church organisations, plantation farms, farms with Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits and productive single owner farms where not designated for compulsory acquisition (Utete Report, 2003:15).
Britain, the United States of America, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tried to intervene in defence of the rights of white farmers and threatened to withdraw aid packages to Zimbabwe if white property owners were not assured of fair compensation in the land reform process (Meredith, 2003; Utete Report, 2003:15). Approximately 1 393 objections were lodged in the courts and about 510 of these were upheld. However, the courts could not rule against the government, in most cases, because land expropriation was seen to be in the public interest (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:35; Moyo et al, 1991:125). Thirty-two of the original 1 503 farms gazetted in November 1997 were eventually un-designated (Moyo, 2000a:15; Moyo, 2000b; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000).

2.5.4 Land Allocation Criteria and Corruption

Black small-scale commercial farmers/rural bourgeoisie with freehold land tenure first emerged around 1977 when the African Purchase Areas were created. These black farmers were initially numerically insignificant but they held considerable social, political and economic sway at the national level (Hendricks, 1995b:55). The ESAP period consolidated the position of these black commercial farmers and created the opportunity for closer interaction between them and state officials. Phase 2 of Zimbabwe’s land reform saw the revision of land allocation criteria, to reflect a preference for more experienced farmers who would be able to make productive use of the land (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82-83).

The Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) represented small and emerging communal, resettlement and commercial farmers but over 50% of ZFU members were poor, had inadequate land and about 40% of them rarely broke-even from farming (Moyo, 1999:16-17). The situation was conducive for the growing black bourgeoisie to seek a lose alliance with greedy government elites who would support their class ambitions. This situation gradually saw the reconstitution of the black agrarian bourgeoisie to include government elites who sought to promote land reform at the expense of the poor by accessing large land holdings for private gain and participation in lucrative agri-business (as happened in Kenya), thus diminishing the possibility of an egalitarian land reform (Moyo, 2000a:164; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:175; Palmer, 1997:84).

Zimbabwe’s land reform soon became embroiled in scandal. By 1990, Zimbabwe’s ruling elite had established themselves as a new class of land owners while the majority of black people waited for comprehensive land reform. In 1994, an independent newspaper
investigated increasing elite ownership of extensive prime lands and the exclusionary nature of economic empowerment. The newspaper discovered that one of the farms that the government had forcibly acquired from a white farmer in Hwedza (3 000 acres) had not been used for resettlement. Instead, it had been leased to Witness Mangwende, the former Minister of Agriculture (then serving as Minister of Education) who had aggressively pushed through the 1992 Land Acquisition Act (Meredith, 2003:126). It was also discovered that many other government-owned farms (bought from white farmers) that were originally earmarked for resettlement had been leased to senior government officials (governors, High Court judges, members of parliament) and ministers for nominal rent or no rent at all. The beneficiaries included the head of the President’s office (Charles Utete), the Air Force Commander (Perence Shiri), the Police Commissioner (Augustine Chihuri) and Harare’s then Executive Mayor (Solomon Tawengwa) (Meredith, 2003:127; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:45; Buckle, 2002:23).

Zimbabwe’s ruling elite managed to acquire about 8% of the country’s commercial farmland since independence, although most of it was not put to any productive use (Meredith, 2003:121). Despite these negative revelations, however, rhetoric over the land issue was popular around election times, for instance, during the 1995 general election campaign in which the government threatened to seize more white-owned farms without compensation (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51). The government was criticised for its corruption and the tradition of “predatory elite appropriation” (Chitiyo, 2003:163), which allowed state officials to own several farms; instead of allocating such land to genuinely landless people who needed it (Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Hall, 2003:267; United States Department of State, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szefiel, 2000:177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314).

2.5.5 Land Administration and Tenure

The main land tenure regimes that existed in Zimbabwe before independence and for a long time after it included customary/communal tenure, 99-year freehold tenure, license tenure and statutory allocation tenure. Customary/Communal Tenure was in terms of the Communal Lands Act. Inhabitants of communal land were not conferred land ownership rights to the land they occupied. Land use under customary tenure was not a right but was conferred at the discretion of the President (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb 2000). Rights of occupancy were conferred subject to the approval of a Rural District Council or
with special consent from the Minister of Local Government. Lack of security under this tenure regime meant that irrespective of the duration of occupation and investment, a family or community could be displaced (without compensation) to make way for infrastructural projects such as dams (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). This was the fate of communities in Manicaland’s Mutasa district when the Osborne Dam was constructed in the late 1990s.

Rural District Councils were central to the process of issuing land-use permits for community-related uses, for instance, religious and educational. A variety of other authority figures, for instance, kraal heads and village chairpersons were active in land allocation procedures, although this resulted in confusion and conflicts between traditional leaders and local government structures. This decentralisation also often led to corruption at the different levels (Rukuni, 1994; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a).

Most commercial farms where held under 99-year freehold tenure (Larsson-Liden, 2000:133; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:21 & 29). License Tenure was applicable to state land which was put to private use, for instance, for fishing, game parks, logging or safari purposes. This tenure regime fell outside the framework of leasehold tenure and was governed by contractual arrangements between individuals, companies or institutions and the state (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Jenkins and Knight (2002:45) note that in many instances after independence, land was leased to senior government officials and ministers for nominal rent or no rent at all under this tenure regime.

Statutory Allocation Tenure applied to state land allocated for a specific use by a statutory body. This was done in terms of an Act of Parliament that regulated and safeguarded the rights of the statutory body over the specified piece(s) of land. Examples included state lands used by the Forestry Commission and the Parks and Wildlife Board (LandWeb, 2000a).

Resettlement areas were regarded as state property and were governed by state permit tenure (Made 1998; Palmer, 1997:81-82). Un-alienated state land was a descriptive term (not a tenurial regime) used to refer to all vacant land which had not been allocated to any person or body (over which no occupation or use-rights existed). The state enjoyed title over such land by virtue of its sovereignty over all un-alienated land within the country’s borders (LandWeb, 2000a).

Land reform and resettlement created confusion between civil (District Councils) and traditional institutions (chiefs) and disputes arose over who had the power to register land
rights, allocate and administer land and resolve land disputes at local levels (Palmer, 1997:82; Reynolds, 1996). The 1994 Land Tenure Commission/Rukuni Commission was established to address the problems of duplication of services and jurisdiction in land administration, to promote transparency in land administration, as well as to limit farm sizes, introduce a land tax and regulate land use (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:274-275; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211, Mbiba, 1997). The Rukuni Commission was also tasked to look into the issue of equity, including gender equality, in the land reform process (Moyo, 2003:4 & 38).

The Land Tenure Commission consulted with several women’s and farmers organisations. The Commission found out that beneficiaries of land reform were discontent with annual permits of occupancy in resettlement areas. Land reform beneficiaries demanded that irrigation and resettlement schemes cease to be state land (Palmer, 1997:81-82). The National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe recommended that individual title be given to farmers for both arable and grazing land in resettlement areas (Larsson-Liden, 2000:130).

The Rukuni Commission recommended that all statutory land should be vested in a National Land Commission and the status of Village Assemblies was reinforced so that all village land became vested in them (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; van den Brink, 2000). In terms of the gender dimension, the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network sought freehold or leasehold titles to land for women (ZWRCN, 1996 cited in Larsson-Liden, 2000:160). Several other women’s organisations argued that women were a vulnerable part of the population (widows, divorcees) because they are discriminated against by customary practices and needed protected rights to land in their individual capacities (Metcalfe and Vudzijena, 1996; Rudecon Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996). Some of these issues and recommendations were incorporated into the government’s land policies, for example, the issue of farm sizes and land tax.

The government passed Statutory Instrument 419 on 24 December 1999 to prescribe maximum farm sizes with the view of speeding up land acquisition. Statutory Instrument 419 was to be complimented by the introduction of a land tax for farms that exceeded the recommended maximum farm sizes. The government passed a Land Tax Bill through the Cabinet Committee and the Bill was tabled before Cabinet. The government planned that once the Land Tax Bill was enacted, individuals owning farms larger than the maximum recommended sizes would pay tax (based on land surface alone) on the area above the
maximum limit. Individuals could keep over-sized farms and pay taxes if they so wished but had to subdivide such land (at their own expense) if they decided to sell or transfer it at a later stage. The land subdivision was meant to ensure that landholdings conformed to the recommended maximum farm sizes (van den Brink, 2000:12; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). Statutory Instrument 419 defined maximum A2 commercial farm sizes by Natural Region as shown by the Table 1 below:

Table 1: Maximum A2 Commercial Farm Sizes by Natural Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agro-ecological Zone/Natural Region</th>
<th>Small-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
<th>Medium-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
<th>Large-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
<th>Peri-urban Commercial Farms (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250-450</td>
<td>2 to 50 in all Natural Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>400-650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500-800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2 000-2 500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Van den Brink, 2000:2)

2.5.6 Evaluation of Land Reform in Phase 2

The 1990s were marked by the government's indecision, ambivalence and inaction over the land issue because of the arguments put forward by technocrats within government itself, for example, the then Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero, Associations that represented white economic interest and economists who supported economic liberalisation under ESAP (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:48, 83). According to Meredith (2003:123) land designation and acquisition procedures in the 1990s were inconsistent because the government did not follow the criteria set out in the 1992 Land Acquisition Act. Although the government still regarded land reform as the main vehicle for indigenising and empowering rural communities, it made low fiscal allocations for land acquisition (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). There was a misalignment between the government's stated land reform objectives and the mechanisms that were used to implement them, for instance, the low budget allocations for land reform already mentioned. The net effect of these was the stalling of a reform process which was already slow to begin with (Moyo, 2004). Where the government had targeted to resettle 7 500 families on 500 000 hectares per year from 1990 to 2000, it only managed to resettle 2 000 families on 50 000 hectares per year (Moyo, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Less than
1 million hectares of land were actually acquired for distribution in the 1990s and less than 20,000 families were resettled (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; LandWeb, 2000a). In 1999, according to Human Rights Watch (2002:7), nearly 11 million hectares of prime land remained in the hands of 4,500 commercial farmers, most of them white.

Zimbabwe’s land reform in the 1990s was criticised for its ‘techno-rational goals’ because policy makers were preoccupied with land management issues instead of land redistribution (Chitiyo, 2003:177; Moyo, 2000a; 200b). Economists maintained that the social and political gains of land reform would not compensate for consequent reductions in national income (economic). Von Blanckenburg (1994:7) supports this view that wholesale land expropriation is counter-productive and maintains that “an equal distribution of land is neither possible, because not enough land is available to satisfy all the needs of the landless, nor is it economically advisable.” Arguments against extensive land reform were based on the presumption that commercial farming is more efficient and profitable and that extensive reform would lower productivity because it implies the division of large landholdings into smaller ones (Larsson-Liden, 2000:129 & 133; Alexander, 2000; Warriner, 1969:37 & 45). Moyo (1995:278) maintains that dominant economic arguments during the ESAP period were flawed in that they over-estimated the productive role of commercial farmers and under-played increasing productivity among peasants and resettled farmers. Masilela and Weiner (1996) criticise the economic arguments used in this period because they compared high input commercial farms on medium-high potential arable land with lower input communal and resettlement areas with significantly greater soil and water constraints.

In spite of these objections, however, economists succeeded in convincing the government and stakeholders like the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) and the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) that expropriating large tracts of productive farmland from white commercial farmers would ruin the country’s economic base and was, therefore, undesirable (Made, 1998:197).

Commercial farms held under 99-year freehold tenure accounted for 11.2 million hectares of agricultural land between 1991-1993 and were the largest single employer; employing about a quarter of the country’s formal sector work force (about 1.9 million people) (Larsson-Liden, 2000:133; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:21 & 29). Large-scale commercial farms supplied a third of the manufacturing sector’s raw materials and were essential to the country’s domestic consumption and export/foreign currency earnings (commercial farms produced
tobacco, beef, milk and milk products, cotton, maize, sugarcane, coffee, tea, wheat, groundnuts, soya-beans, potatoes). Apart from the established value of commercial farms to the country, ESAP promised accelerated export-led economic growth by encouraging the conversion of existing land uses to a focus on horticultural production (cut-flowers, vegetables and fruits) and game ranching (Moyo, 2000a; 200b). Until 1996, ESAP’s neoliberal outlook held sway and demanded policy makers to consider the economic rationale of maintaining the productive and foreign currency earning capacity of commercial farms over the people’s political and social aspirations (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:3 & 32; Riddell, 1992:2 & 101; Moyo et al, 1991:125).

Skalnes (1995 cited in Moyo, 2000a:18 & 74) concludes that ESAP’s “contradictory macro-economic and agrarian policies were intended to curb excessive government intervention in land and related markets by using co-optation strategies to marginalise land reform,” thus validating existing unequal land ownership patterns. The shift towards land reform with an emphasis on promoting production efficiency and effective land use by committed, non-absentee land owners negated the promise and momentum of significant land reform which had been heralded by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Moyo, 2000a:15).

The government’s resolve in addressing the land question was neutralised as the government avoided widespread land expropriation from white farmers in order to retain investor confidence. Further, to this end, the government committed itself to assisting commercial farmers in evicting squatters from their land (Chitiyo, 2003:176-177; Chiremba and Masters, 2003). This state of affairs was testimony that markets alone could not facilitate significant land reform at the rate required to achieve the political and social/welfare objectives for which land reform was intended and this resulted in mounting disgruntlement amongst the black majority (Deininger, 2003:11-17,143).

According to Moyo (2000a:145), peasant farmers and the landless did not benefit from the purported socio-economic benefits of ESAP’s macro-economic land policy. Moyo (1999:2, 3 & 7) also comments that the outcomes of land reform (access to land and related resources) in this period were not transparent or equitable. Rural people were disgruntled by land reform because most of them desperately needed comprehensive land reform as a means of survival in the wake of dire economic hardships induced by ESAP. Moyo (2003:8) concludes that ESAP “effected pauperization on one hand and accumulation on the other” between the poor and the ruling elite. Urban and rural poverty increased dramatically and began to undermine
the government’s popularity (Moyo, 2000a:165). This situation was compounded by increases in the cost of living (150% between 1998 and 1999) because of high inflation and interest rates, severe food, water, fuel and electricity shortages. Real wages deteriorated drastically and people experienced widespread job losses, rising unemployment and a sharp decline in their standard of living (Larsson-Liden, 2000:128 & 131; Krieger, 2000:445; Burkett, 2000:471; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:33; Riddell, 1992:22). The economy’s dismal performance, partly because of failed structural adjustment and poor agricultural reform, fuelled domestic unrest which culminated in a mass stay-way or general strike on 9 December 1997. The protest was organised by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU, at the time comprised of 27 unions with a membership of 400 000, about a third of Zimbabwe’s formal labour force) (Meredith, 2003:140-141).

On top of these problems, government corruption and the general mismanagement of the land reform programme compelled Britain to withhold further support for Zimbabwe’s land reform after having spent £44 million on it since 1980 (Meredith, 2003:121 & 127). Britain offered two main reasons for suspending its financial support of Zimbabwe’s land reform. The first one, according to Bush and Szeftel (2000:178) was because “the wrong people were benefiting from land reform.” Government officials were benefiting from land reform instead of the poor and landless. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also refused to continue to bankroll Zimbabwe’s land reform and resettlement programme on this basis (Meredith, 2003:148-149, 157; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310).

The second reason for Britain’s withdrawal of financial support was given by Britain’s Minister for International Development who wrote to the Zimbabwean government in 1997 saying; “We do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe” (Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7). The Zimbabwean government reacted by saying that the money that it expected Britain to contribute towards its land reform was a matter of historic obligation (Human Rights Watch, 2002:7). It further accused Britain and America of seeking to frustrate its legitimate land reform efforts.

Zimbabwe’s experience of financial withdrawal by donors can be juxtaposed with that of Kenya, also a former British colony. Immediately after independence the new Kenyan government embarked on the ‘million acre scheme’ which distributed 300 000 hectares of formerly white-owned large estates to small farmers. Deininger (2003:145) attributes the
reform’s success (partly) to British funding. The British government’s Department for International Development (DIFD) continues to support several of Kenya’s land policies and projects (livestock, aquatic resources, land tenure, crops, natural resources management), mostly through bi-lateral funding arrangements, for example, it has invested £582 846 in Kenya’s forestry projects, £96 535 in water projects and £99 840 in natural ecosystem projects (Natural Resources Information System, accessed 05/05/2005).

2.5.7 Conclusion
Although the period 1990-1998 was characterised by comparatively radical land reform discourses and accompanied by supportive legislative changes to enable easier land redistribution, in practice, little land was transferred from the commercial farming sector to the poor (Moyo, 2000a:72, Moyo, 2000b). Land reform was politically unsatisfactory because ESAP’s neo-liberal economic imperatives contradicted the political objectives of accelerating land reform (Moyo, 1999:8). As discussed above, the neo-liberal influence of ESAP circumscribed the government’s land acquisition and allocation efforts. Instead of the government’s initial focus on giving land to the unemployed, displaced and destitute; the government adopted the Malaysian model of selecting capable or qualified small-scale black commercial farmers (represented by the CFU) as reform beneficiaries because it believed that they were better able to fully utilise the land (Larsson-Liden, 2000:133; Made, 1998:199; Moyo, 1995:61,118, 272 & 280; Stiles, 1994). Larsson-Liden (2000:130) quotes President Mugabe as having said in January 1993 that “land reform and resettlement is no longer a home making exercise.” Such pronouncements over the unresolved land issue sowed seeds of discontent among the people because as Riddell (1992:14) notes; “the Mugabe government’s legitimacy and power was based on a nationalist platform as well as an explicit commitment to socialism,” with the land question firmly embedded at the heart of people’s aspirations and expectations. The situation was worsened by recurrent droughts as well as ESAP-induced cuts in budget allocations to agricultural parastatals that assisted resettled farmers, resulting in bad harvests (Moyo, 1998:219).

Although the government maintained that the land issue was non-negotiable, the results of land reform in the 1990s proved otherwise. The land issue remained unresolved at a time when the number of people dependent on subsistence agriculture was growing much faster than the pace of land reform (Riddell, 1992:101). Widespread public discontentment over inadequate land reform and declining standards of living (the general strike and food riots)
renewed mobilisation and agitation for comprehensive land reform and eventually forced the
government to rethink its position on land reform. In 1997, the government vowed to
vigorously pursue the compulsory land acquisition agenda and to disregard court decisions
that stood in its way (Meredith, 2003). The government’s recommitment to land reform gave
birth to the third phase of Zimbabwe’s land reform which covers the period 1998 to the
present. This last phase is discussed in detail in the rest of this paper.
3
The Political and Economic Context for the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme

3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the context for the fast-track land reform programme in terms of Zimbabwe's social (the national question and the deteriorating status of white citizenship), economic decline, Zimbabwe's ill-timed military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 2000 and 2002 elections and the strategic position of war veterans at the time that the reform was conceived and implemented (Chan, 2003). War veterans were an important link between events that followed the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1997 to initiate debate on a new constitution and Phase 3 of Zimbabwe's land reform which began in 1998. Land reform in this period was still partly a response to the country's colonial history of large-scale expropriation of land rights from the indigenous people by white settlers, coupled with increased scarcity of productive land because of population growth. Zimbabwe's black majority was disgruntled because by 1999, predominantly white farmers still owned about 4,500 large-scale commercial farms (about 11 million hectares of prime land or 28% of the total land surface) (Human Rights Watch, 2002:2). Apart from the slow rate of land acquisition effected thus far; the land that had been acquired for redistribution had been allocated to government Ministers and senior officials, instead of the landless peasantry (Meredith, 2003:121-127; Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Hall, 2003:267; Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). The Zimbabwean government was under extreme pressure to urgently address the longstanding, unequal, race-based patterns of land ownership that persisted in the country more than two decades after independence.

The land issue was compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in other sectors of the economy (stagnation) in the aftermath of failed structural adjustment programmes. By 1996, an under-performing economy and rapidly deteriorating economic climate in Zimbabwe compelled many people to question the ruling Zanu-PF party's commitment to the ideals and principles it had set for itself during the liberation struggle (Buckle, 2002:12). Fast-track land reform was catalysed by growing political instability on two overlapping fronts. The fiscal
and economic crisis gave birth to strong political opposition (Movement for Democratic Change, MDC) and renewed mass mobilisation for land reform created a legitimacy crisis for the Mugabe regime on the eve of the 2000 parliamentary election (Deininger, 2003:133). In order to re-affirm its legitimacy and regain the people’s support, the government decided to pursue a radical course of action to address the land issue. Zimbabwe’s land reform from 2000 onwards was unlike any other attempts that the government had made before and it discussed in detail in the remaining chapters because it provides the background for the enquiry into the responses to fast-track land reform and the relatively infrequent and less-violent incidences of illegal land occupations in Vumba and Burma Valley, compared to other parts of the country.

3.2 Reconciliation and the National Question

The 1969 census showed that 41% of whites in then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) had been born there; 23% had been born in the United Kingdom and 22% had been born in South Africa (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). The Zimbabwean government pursued a national policy of reconciliation with the former colonial administration of white British settlers after independence in 1980. At independence, President Mugabe embraced Zimbabwe’s white community saying:

“If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself...The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten...It could never be a correct justification that because the white oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practiced by white against black or black against white” (cited in Meredith, 2003:15).

There were more economic continuities than discontinuities at independence because the white community still dominated Zimbabwe’s agriculture, commerce, industry and banking. It controlled bodies like the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ). The white community also possessed a virtual monopoly on high level skills (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:26, 39-40, 271). Despite all this, the government reassured the white community that there would be no nationalisation of white-owned farms, mines or industries (Meredith, 2003:14). The new
government was reluctant to radically alter the economic status quo in the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence (1980-1990) because it appreciated the need to retain the confidence of its former adversaries and investors. The government wanted to build a good working relationship with the white community to minimise the flight of essential skills that were needed to rebuild the country after the two liberation wars (Meredith, 2003:41; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

In the political arena, twenty of Zimbabwe’s hundred members of parliament (MPs) were white. The white MPs were selected separately by the white community from the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe and this arrangement was in force for the first five years of Zimbabwe’s independence in accordance with provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement (Olaleye, 2005:6; Utete Report, 2003:15; Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:25). Von Blanckenburg, (1994:128) notes that white farmers were not really influential in post-independence Zimbabwe’s ruling party or in parliament but the then prime minister, Robert Mugabe, specially appointed two white ministers. One of them was Dennis Norman, a former president of the Commercial Farmer’s Union. Norman became the Minister of Agriculture in a carefully planned strategy to control white farmers (containing their power and influence). White farmers numbered about 6,000 at independence in 1980 and owned about half the country’s land (two-thirds of the most fertile land). They employed about one-third of Zimbabwe’s wage earning labour force (271,000 people in 1980) (Meredith, 2003:14). White land ownership was protected by the Lancaster House agreement and this ensured their continued dominance of the economy (Olaleye, 2005:6; Deininger, 2003:144-145; Meredith, 2003:119; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Hall, 2003:256; Lee, 2003:1; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:25 & 82; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 7; Buckle, 2002:11; Zinyama, 2001:163,167,174; Krieger, 2000:445; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 1998:191-195; Palmer, 1997:303; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30; Moyo et al, 1991:15; Astrow, 1983). Apart from the guarantees given to them by the Lancaster House Agreement, white farmers (and the community in general believed that their rights were secure because the new government’s policy of reconciliation further allowed them to retain considerable property and personal wealth. White farmers were treated surprisingly well because they accounted for three-quarters of the Zimbabwe’s agricultural output (about one-third of total exports) (Meredith, 2003:55). According to Meredith (2003:44-45), the reassurances that white farmers received from the new government even convinced some of them to support it (Meredith, 2003:44-45). Unfortunately, however, this honeymoon did not last long.
3.3 The Deteriorating Status of White Citizenship

Despite the goodwill and reassurances given to the white community through the national policy of reconciliation outlined above, significant numbers of the white community (retired civil servants, former soldiers and policemen, skilled artisans and professionals like doctors, accountants, teachers, and nurses) left Zimbabwe at independence, mainly to South Africa. The exodus slowly gathered momentum and within three years of independence, about half the white population had emigrated. The white population fell from an estimated 300,000 to about 100,000 and this flight forced the government to import expensive expatriates to curb the skills deficit that was being created (Meredith, 2003:46 & 55; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:88, 190-19). Racial tensions first became apparent in 1985 when President Mugabe warned the white community that;

"...Those whites who have not accepted the reality of a political order in which Africans set the pace will have to leave the country. We are working with those whites who want to work with us. But the rest will have to find a new home." (cited in Meredith, 2003:56).

These tensions gradually snowballed in the 1990s. President Mugabe labelled the white community "a greedy bunch of racist usurpers" because they numbered no more than 80,000 by 1995, yet it still controlled most of Zimbabwe's mines, manufacturing industries and commercial agriculture (Meredith, 2003:123). President Mugabe denounced the white community for seeking to perpetuate economic domination and called for affirmative action in the "indigenisation of the economy" (Meredith, 2003:123-129). The Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) was launched in 1990 to facilitate black participation in, and control of the economy. The IBDC represented 4,000 black-owned businesses and in 1992, Z$150 million was set aside by the government to benefit black-owned businesses. The Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) was also established to channel about 30% of government tenders to black businesses (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:26, 39-40, 271).

White farmers were the natural targets because of their monopoly on Zimbabwe's agricultural sector, although they were periodically given reassurances by the government that they had nothing to fear because they contributed greatly to the national economy (Meredith, 2003; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Tshuma, 1997; Adams, 1995 cited in
LandWeb, 2000a). Without warning or consultation with the Commercial Farmer’s Union, the government gazetted thirteen productive white farms (17 000 acres) for compulsory acquisition in Mutare district. One of the designated farms was a dairy farm that supplied milk to Mutare and another was a leading tobacco producer (Meredith, 2003:124). The government designated another 72 highly productive farms (475 000 acres) for acquisition in 1993. The list included several farms that belonged to political opponents, for example, James Chikerema and Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole owned Churu Farm and was the original leader of Zanu and long time adversary of President Mugabe.

White farmers challenged the legality of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act because; once a farm was designated, the farmer could not sell or lease the property, except with the permission of the Minister of Agriculture. Farmers could not approach the courts or appeal to an independent body except the said minister (Meredith, 2003:124-126; Chitiyo, 2003:163; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:34; Riddell, 1992:81). The government maintained that the land issue was non-negotiable and vowed to disregard court decisions that prevented it from compulsorily acquiring white-owned land (Tshuma, 1997). The land issue became increasingly bitter. Britain, the United States of America, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tried to intervene to protect the rights of white farmers and threatened to withdraw non-humanitarian aid packages to Zimbabwe if white property owners were not assured of fair compensation for land that was expropriated from them (Meredith, 2003:123). In September 1993, President Mugabe denounced Western governments that were criticising his land policies as the two quotes below show:

“How can these countries who have stolen land from the Red Indians, the Aborigines and Eskimos dare to tell us what to do with our land?” (cited in Meredith, 2003:126).

“If white settlers just took the land from us without paying for it, we can in a similar way just take it from them, without paying for it, or entertaining any ideas of legality and constitutionality.” (Meredith, 2003:126).

The government alienated and demonised Zimbabwe’s white community through racist attacks carried by government-controlled newspapers because it resented continued white monopoly on economic power and blamed it for the country’s economic problems and vowed to pursue the land issue more vigorously (Chan, 2003). In October 1997, President
Mugabe announced; “We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent to any soul...If Britain wants us to compensate its children, it must give us the money...” (Meredith, 2003:138-139). The government said it was only prepared to pay compensation for buildings, dams, roads and other infrastructural improvements (at an unspecified date in the future), but not the land itself (Meredith, 2003:195). On 28 November 1997, the government published a list of 1503 farms (about 12 million acres or 45% of the land still held by white commercial farmers) that it planned to expropriate. Affected farmers lost their title to the land, their ability to borrow money from banks using the land as collateral as well as the right to harvest crops from their land. These developments fuelled the racial tensions that already existed. By the end of 1997, 1471 white-owned farms had been designated for compulsory acquisition. Thirty-two of the original 1503 farms gazetted in November 1997 were eventually de-listed because they had not been listed in terms of the set criteria for compulsory land acquisition (Meredith, 2003; Moyo, 2000a:15; Moyo, 2000b; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000).

3.4 The Rise of War Veterans as a Formidable Force

This section discusses Zimbabwe’s liberation war veterans because they played, and continue to play, a crucial role in Zimbabwe since the inception of the fast-track land reform programme. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had about 60 000 ex-combatants who fought the Chimurenga war of liberation. After de-mobilisation, about 20 000 of these ex-combatants were integrated into Zimbabwe’s National Army (Meredith, 2003:83; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). The rest were paid small monthly pensions for two years and then left to their own devices. Many of them had left school to join the liberation war and had no educational qualifications or vocational skills. About 30 000 of them were unemployed or destitute and roamed the towns looking for work (Meredith, 2003:83; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association was formed in 1989 to lobby the government for assistance to improve the plight of ex-combatants. The government opened negotiations with this body in 1991 and laws, including the War Victims Compensation Act of 1993, were passed in the war veterans’ favour. However, tensions existed between the government and the war veterans because many of the war veterans believed they had been short-changed by the government (neglected and disillusioned) (Human Rights Watch, 2002:8).

The composition of war veterans as a constituency changed significantly during the course of the fast-track land reform programme. In everyday usage, the term war veteran became
synonymous with a more dynamic and diverse mix of people including; legitimate/bona fide liberation war veterans, lawless gangs composed primarily of Zanu-PF supporters, youth militias (too young to have fought in Zimbabwe’s liberation war) and land hungry peasants (Buckle, 2002:29).

Zimbabwe’s growing economic crisis and the government’s own legitimacy crisis worsened when the government capitulated to liberation war veterans’ demands for pensions and disability compensations in 1997, following the defrauding of the War Victims Compensation Fund. The government was forced to suspend disbursements from the War Victims Compensation Fund in 1996 because between Z$450 and $500 million was looted from the fund by those who administered it (Meredith, 2003:133-134). Those implicated in defrauding the War Victims Compensation Fund included senior politicians, officials and their relatives. War veterans responded by demanding compensation from as far back as 1992. They also demanded that those responsible for looting the War Victims Compensation Fund be investigated but the government tried to ignore these demands. President Mugabe initially refused to meet with them but the war veterans were up for the challenge. Later, President Mugabe tried to appease the war veterans by appointing a commission of inquiry led by Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku to investigate the issue of the missing funds (Meredith, 2003).

The Chidyausiku Commission found that numerous government officials and their relatives had made claims for various questionable chronic illnesses and disabilities, and had been compensated, for example; Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri had been awarded Z$138 645 for “toe dermatitis”; Air Force Commander Perence Shiri had been awarded Z$90 249 for “poly arthritis and mental stress disorder”; Commander of the Defence Forces Vitalis Zvinavashe had been awarded Z$224 395 for “skin allergy and chest injuries”; Minister Joyce Mujuru had been awarded Z$389 472 for “poor vision and mental stress disorder” (Meredith, 2003:137; Buckle, 2002:238). The chairman of the War Veterans Association, Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi, had also been awarded Z$517 536 (US$43 300) for injuries which included “impaired hearing and sciatic pains of the thigh.” According to his claims, Hunzvi had a disability rating of 118% (Meredith, 2003:137; Buckle, 2002:238).

The Chidyausiku Commission also found evidence that the War Victims Compensation Fund corruption scam involved President Mugabe’s own relatives. His brother-in-law, Reward
Marufu, had been awarded Z$822 668 (about US$70 000) for “a scar on his left knee and ulcers.” In total Marufu was classified as having a 95% disability (Meredith, 2003:137).

Reeling from the embarrassment of this scandal, President Mugabe promised to resume compensation and pension payments to the war veterans but this was little consolation to the war veterans who proceeded to hold protest marches in Harare for three consecutive days in July 1997. They hailed insults at the government and denounced President Mugabe for neglecting them after independence. President Mugabe eventually agreed to meet with the war veterans on 21 August 1997 but by then, the war veterans had become more aggressive. Their demands then included the resumption of payments from the War Victims Compensation Fund, plus Z$50 000 once-off gratuities and monthly pensions of Z$20 000 (for life) for each of the 50 000 war veterans that were registered with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (Meredith, 2003:133-136).

Apart from monetary compensation, the war veterans also demanded that half the ex-combatants be given resettlement land by December 1997. The other half had to be allocated resettlement land by July 1998. The war veterans threatened to occupy white-owned farms if the government did not respond promptly to their demands (Olaleye, 2005:7; Meredith, 2003:133-136).

President Mugabe reluctantly gave-in to war veteran demands in September 1997 after the findings of the Chidyausiku Commission became public. Apart from the unbudgeted Z$50 000 once-off gratuities, Z$2 000 monthly pensions and land, President Mugabe (patron of the War Veterans Association) promised war veterans free health care and free education at an estimated cost of at least $4 billion, which the government did not have because of the fiscal crisis it was already in (Meredith, 2003:137). Donors, for example, the World Bank, suspended lending arrangements with Zimbabwe when President Mugabe announced in November 1997 that the war veterans would be paid their gratuities and pensions by Christmas 1997. The donors suspected that the money was being diverted to pay war veterans’ pensions and gratuities. These developments forced the value of the Zimbabwean dollar to plunge even further. Not only was the government’s decision ill-timed; it was not sustainable in the medium-long term and thus put tremendous strain on Zimbabwe’s finances (Meredith, 2003:148-149, 157; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310). The government tried to impose new taxes and levies to pay for the president’s pledges to the war veterans but this move was highly unpopular (Meredith, 2003:139).
3.5 Military Intervention in the Congo

Apart from the extra taxes introduced to pay war veterans, the Zimbabwean government decided to spend more money by intervening in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). President Mugabe became chairman of SADC’s defence arm in 1996 and decided, without consulting parliament or the cabinet, to intervene militarily in the civil war in the DRC. Zimbabwe initially deployed 3 000 troops, together with combat aircraft and armoured vehicles to the DRC. The number of Zimbabwean troops in the DRC eventually rose to about 12 000 and special allowances were paid to all the soldiers serving in the DRC. The intervention is reported to have cost Zimbabwe US$1 million per day (Chitiyo, 2003:177; Mlambo, 2003:195; Meredith, 2003:148-157; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:14; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Bush and Szefiel, 2000:177-178; Krieger, 2000:443-444; Burkett, 2000:471). The DRC president Laurent Kabila offered mining and timber concessions, preferential trade in diamonds, cobalt and other minerals so that Zimbabwe could recoup the costs of the intervention. Unfortunately, however, the main beneficiaries turned out to be a select group of Zimbabwe’s defence officials and other businessmen from amongst the ruling elite. These included Zanu-PF’s business controller Emmerson Mnangagwa, millionaire arms-dealer John Bredenkamp and Armed Forces Commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe. These individuals capitalised on the DRC crisis by transporting food and other consumer goods (hauling contracts) and supplying arms and ammunition (Meredith, 2003:148-149; Chan, 2003).

Opinion polls in Zimbabwe showed that the unbudgeted payments to war veterans and Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC were very unpopular decisions at a time when the country was already facing a severe financial crisis. Western governments and other donors queried the rationale of providing Zimbabwe with financial assistance for land reform and other economic initiatives when its leaders were prepared to squander obscene amounts of money on foreign adventures in which Zimbabwe had no real stake, and which did not benefit ordinary poor Zimbabweans (Meredith, 2003:148-149; Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). Zimbabwe’s creditworthiness proved questionable because of the government’s apparent economic recklessness at a time when Zimbabwe’s economic, social and political circumstances were deteriorating rapidly. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and Britain withheld loans from Zimbabwe in November 1997, despite the crippling balance of payments crisis it was already experiencing because of failed

The deteriorating economic situation provoked mass resistance, led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and led to a general strike on 9 December 1997 (Meredith, 2003:139). President Mugabe responded by issuing a decree under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act banning national strikes for six months. He also threatened to suspend the registration of any trade union found to be defying the decree and to imprison trade union organisers. Further, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) was mandated to investigate the ZCTU’s source of funding (Meredith, 2003:162; Raftopoulos, 1996:17). The worsening economic situation in Zimbabwe erupted in food riots across the country in January 1998 after a series of food price increases, where in many cases the prices of maize-meal, cooking oil and rice had doubled or trebled. The riots were reported as the worst outbreak of urban violence since independence and the army deployed troops on the streets to contain crowds of angry protestors for the first time since 1980 (Meredith, 2003:141; Sachikonye, 2002:14; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Larsson-Liden, 2000:131).

3.6 The National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for Democratic Change

Zimbabwe’s worsening economic crisis undermined the government’s popularity and threatened its legitimacy even more such that strong political opposition forces began to emerge. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) formed an alliance with civic organisations (church organisations, human rights groups, lawyers and journalists) and launched the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998 to initiate debate on a new constitution and to seek public support for it. The Secretary-General of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, was the president of the NCA (Olaleye, 2005:8; Karume, 2005:37-39; Meredith, 2003:162). The government countered this move by appointing its own Constitutional Commission in April 1999. Most of the Commission’s 400 members were Mugabe’s nominees from Zanu-PF and included 147 members of parliament. The Commission was mandated to draft a new constitution which would be put to the electorate in a national referendum (Olaleye, 2005:8).

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in September 1999 amidst these constitutional revisions and Morgan Tsvangirai was chosen as its leader (Olaleye, 2005:8; Meredith, 2003:163). The MDC was Zimbabwe’s first serious opposition political party. White Zimbabweans in general, and white commercial farmers and businesses in particular,
were among the most prominent MDC supporters and this gave Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu-PF party an opportunity to castigate the MDC as a front for “white imperialist interests” (Karume, 2005:39). The MDC was also widely popular amongst the black urban electorate (Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Raftopoulos, 2002) and there were other smaller parties like the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) that demanded an accountable and open government.

The government’s Constitutional Commission released its draft constitution in November 1999 but the draft constitution was reportedly full of loopholes, including provisions that would greatly strengthen the government and the President (by giving him sweeping powers) at the expense of parliament (Meredith, 2003:163). The proposed amendments did not provide sufficient oversight powers for parliament and the judiciary and would allow the president to, inter alia, serve an additional twelve years and to retain powers to appoint 30 of the 150 members of parliament (patronage). Without consulting the Constitutional Commission, President Mugabe inserted an amendment allowing the compulsory acquisition of white-owned land without compensation (Meredith, 2003:163-165; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:83; Buckle, 2002:13 & 41; Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; La Guardia and Blair, 2000; Centre for Democracy and Development Observer Mission, 2000). The Commercial Farmers’ Union was strongly opposed to this particular amendment and mobilised the white farming community against endorsing the revised draft constitution (Meredith, 2003:164).

The revised constitution was submitted to a national referendum in February 2000 and was rejected by between 53% and 60% of the votes cast, even though voter turnout was low (Olaleye, 2005:8; Utete Report, 2003:16 & 30; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:13). Meredith (2003:165) reports that only a quarter of the electorate voted (1 312 738 out of a potential 5 million voters). Buckle (2002:105) notes that Mashonaland East province registered the highest “No” votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum. Meredith (2003:165) also notes that most “No” votes came from urban blacks and that 60% of the votes were cast in the main centres of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and six other provincial towns. This defeat came amidst allegations that the government cunningly influenced the constitution drafting process by interfering with the appointment of members of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Constitutional Commission, as well as their work. The Centre for Democracy and Development Observer Mission (2000) reports that the “government’s partisan behaviour” created acrimony between the NCA and the Constitutional Commission.
and discredited the revised constitution in the eyes of the public. It is also noted that some constitutional amendments were inserted into the revised draft constitution against protests from members of the government’s own Constitutional Commission (Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; La Guardia and Blair, 2000; Centre for Democracy and Development Observer Mission, 2000).

As outlined above, the revision of the constitution and the referendum coincided with the rise of the MDC as a serious political opposition party that was challenging the government’s economic policies and governance (power-sharing, transparency and corruption scandals, mass unemployment and the DRC intervention) (Meredith, 2003:164). The ruling Zanu-PF’s defeat in the February 2000 referendum was historic in that it was the first time that the party had lost a popular vote since independence in 1980 (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Chan, 2003; La Guardia and Blair, 2000). This “humiliating defeat”, however, did not deter the government from pushing through the provision that would allow it to compulsorily acquire white-owned land without compensation (La Guardia and Blair, 2000). The government recommitted itself to land reform in order to maintain its legitimacy in the face of growing discontent and political opposition. The government announced that the constitutional amendment regarding land acquisition without compensation would come into effect within a month of the amendment being passed (Utete Report, 2003:16; Buckle, 2002:13). President Mugabe gave new impetus to the land question because, if manipulated well, it would boost the ruling party’s dwindling support base, especially in the rural areas (its traditional support base) where the land issue was still strongly associated with the liberation war (Meredith, 2003:164-165; United States Department of State, 2003; Krieger, 2000:443-444; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179; Chattopadhyay, 2000:315; Sachikonye, 2002:17; La Guardia and Blair, 2000).

3.7 The Original Plans for Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Phase 3

As Zimbabwe’s economic crisis worsened following the implementation of economic structural adjustment programmes, the role of donors became more central and two Donors’ Conferences where convened in Harare in 1998 to discuss Zimbabwe’s on-going land reform issues, particularly the financing of land acquisition/compensation of white farmers; bearing in mind the scandals and corruption that had derailed the process in the past. The Zimbabwean government met with Western donors in March 1998 and the Agriculture Minister, Kumbirai Kangai, signed undertakings to postpone the wholesale expropriation of
white-owned farms. Minister Kangai reassured donors that productive white farms would not be seized and that the few white farmers who would be affected by land reform would be compensated the full value of their land. The government also reassured donors that land reform would be conducted in accordance with the law and in a transparent manner (Meredith, 2003:142).

Another Donors’ Conference was held in Harare from 9-11 September 1998. Its aim was to build consensus among the various stakeholders and to devise a new, comprehensive land reform plan for Zimbabwe. Representatives from 48 countries and international organisations (including Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden (European Union) the United States of America, China, Cuba, South Africa, the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations Development Programme) and local delegates from the Commercial Farmers Union, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and civic organisations attended the conferences. The Zimbabwean government presented its case for land reform as one of basic human rights and political necessity. The delegates unanimously agreed on the political imperatives and urgent need to address persistent, race-based imbalances in Zimbabwe’s land ownership patterns (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete Report, 2003:16; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). They also agreed on the economic need for comprehensive land reform and resettlement in Zimbabwe because they believed that land reform could play a pivotal role in poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete Report, 2003:16; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8).

The Zimbabwean government and donors agreed that the new land reform programme would begin with a 2-year Inception Phase (learning/trial period) from October 1998 to June 2000 to ascertain its viability. The target for the Inception Phase was to acquire 841 farms covering 2.1 million hectares for resettlement. These farms had previously been designated for compulsory acquisition but, for various reasons had not been acquired. The government also wanted to redistribute the 118 farms/200 000 hectares (700 000 acres) which had already been offered by white farmers, particularly those that owned more than one farm (Meredith, 2003:144; Utete Report, 2003:16). It must be noted, however, that this seemingly voluntary, noble, goodwill gesture by white farmers was the result of increasing political and social pressures as the country’s economic fortunes ebbed away and the masses became increasingly agitated (Meredith, 2003:140-141; Sachikonye, 2002:14; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Larsson-Liden, 2000:131; Raftopoulos, 1996:17). The plan was for 1 million
hectares of the 2.1 million hectare target for the Inception Phase to be acquired based on market-value compulsory acquisition. However, in order to reduce the cost of compulsory acquisition, the government had to acquire the rest of the land from alternative sources. The government had the option to sub-divide large farms such as cooperatives under the Model B resettlement scheme which was implemented in the 1980s. It also had the option to sub-divide state-owned farms and to introduce a land tax to limit farm sizes (Van den Brink, 2000:4 & 11). It was projected that the Inception Phase would be implemented at a cost of US$189 million, which was broken down as follows:

- Land acquisition (33%)
- Land policy (4%)
- Infrastructure and support services (61%)
- Program management and contingencies (2%)

It was hoped that the Inception Phase would benefit 33 800 farm households, 75 000 non-farm households in Rural Service Centres (Growth Points) and 10 000 communal area households (Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Van den Brink, 2000:11).

The 2-year Inception Phase was to be followed by an accelerated or ‘fast-track’ land reform programme from July 2000 to December 2001. The fast-track land reform programme was intended to speed up the pace of land acquisition and resettlement (Moyo, 2004:22-25; Utete Report, 2003:16). It was envisaged that the fast-track land reform programme would identify and acquire 5 million hectares of land from various sources for acquisition and redistribution to the landless masses in 3-5 years. Apart from land acquisition, the land reform plan was meant to accelerate land planning and demarcation once acquired, settler emplacement and infrastructure provision in all provinces (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8; Utete Report, 2003:16-18).

The government initially wanted to resettle 30 000 families in each of the country’s 10 provinces and considered purchasing an equal number of farms in each province but these targets were subsequently revised. The new targets were to resettle 48 000 families in 2001; 42 000 in 2002 and 30 000 in 2003 countrywide and budgeted government resources and aid from the Donor Community would be used to provide infrastructure and support services for resettled families (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8; The Financial Gazette cited in Buckle, 2002:160).
3.8 Elections as a Catalyst for Land Reform

Warriner (1969:4) comments that the motives behind any land reform can be inferred from the political situation of a government at the time when the reform is implemented. In Zimbabwe’s case, it should be noted that, apart from monetary compensation, war veterans also demanded meaningful land reform. However, despite the slow rate of land reform from independence in 1980 until 2000, the government was opposed to illegal land occupations and actually assisted farmers in evicting squatters (through the law and court system, local authorities and the police) from private land. A squatter policy circumscribed land “self provisioning” because the government was under pressure from investors and stakeholders such as the CFU to maintain high agricultural output for the domestic market and for export (Moyo, 2000a:81). However, these provisions soon became irrelevant as renewed agitation for land reform grew from 1998 and came to a head in 2000.

Deininger (2003:146-147) also comments that the primary motivation behind why many governments in Africa and Latin America undertake land reforms is political, rather than economic. Such reforms are aimed at calming social unrest and allaying political pressures rather than increasing productivity or improving people’s general welfare. Phase 3 of Zimbabwe’s land reform can be viewed as one such attempt by a government to divert attention from other problems (political and economic) rather than as part of a long-term development strategy. The fast-track land reform programme was planned at the same time as the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The debacle with the war veterans over the looted War Victims Compensation Fund proved that the war veterans were a formidable force. The incident reasserted the importance of the unresolved land issue and the Zanu-PF government realised that the war veterans’ mob mentality could be useful in winning or coercing support for land reform, and to boost support for itself. Despite people’s widespread feelings of discontentment and disillusionment with the country’s progress since independence in 1980, President Mugabe desperately wanted his ruling Zanu-PF party to win the June 2000 parliamentary election. He also wanted to hold on to power by winning the presidential election that was scheduled for 2002. The government’s capitulation to war veterans’ demands renewed this constituency’s support for the government/ruling Zanu-PF party (Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). The government adopted a decidedly aggressive and openly racist (read nationalist and anti-imperialist) campaign through which it sought to exonerate itself in the eyes of the masses through a land reform crusade. White farmers were
portrayed as hindering equitable land redistribution in Zimbabwe and were repeatedly attacked in President Mugabe’s speeches (Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:101; Raftopoulos, 2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). The ruling Zanu-PF party had acquired a reputation for its “customary pre-election sabre-rattling” on the land issue; even though it had repeatedly failed to deliver on its promises for comprehensive land reform that would benefit the poor (Palmer, 1997:302). Krieger (2000:226) believes that the fast-track land reform programme was yet another opportunity for the government to use the land question as an election trump card to quell people’s discontentment over the economy’s poor performance.

The government formed what Chitiyo (2003:278) calls a “survivalist alliance” with war veterans and promised them 20% of the land that would be acquired and redistributed under the revamped, revolutionary fast-track land reform programme (Moyo, 2004:26). The alliance was formed primarily to defend the ruling party’s hegemony and to accelerate land reform based on forceful notions of social justice (Buckle, 2002:178). The government’s attitude was that it did not need the approval of white farmers to implement radical land reform measures (Krieger, 2000:226). Fast-track land reform was conveniently dubbed the ‘Third Chimurenga’ (liberation war). The government passionately implored and reinforced nationalist ideologies in its rhetoric and in Zanu-PF’s May 2000 election manifesto which declared; “Land is the economy. The economy is the land” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:10; Krieger, 2000:445; Kibble, 2004:366; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Buckle, 2002:49). The government incited racial hatred by using the emotive issues of land and race to win support for the impending elections and in the process, the war veterans (the government’s ally) became a law unto themselves (Buckle, 2002:178). The chairman of the War Veterans Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, said the land invasions that began in February 2000 happened for two reasons. One was to get land back to the black people and the other was to keep Zanu-PF in power. He added that there would be no peace in Zimbabwe if these two things did not happen (Buckle, 2002:76).

3.9 The 2000 Parliamentary Election
The government became increasingly intolerant of dissent in the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary election and is believed to have given war veterans and party militias covert support to attack and terrorise white commercial farmers and farm workers in a military-backed reign of terror which was dubbed “Operation Tsuro” (Kibble, 2004:365; Chitiyo, 2003:180; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:17). The Ministry of Defence announced that war
veterans were going to be re-trained and would become a reserve force attached to the
Zimbabwe National Army. War veterans were also incorporated into the police-force and
were deployed, together with the para-military police and Zanu-PF youths, from militia bases
across the country to victimise opposition strongholds (Buckle, 2002:226). A war veteran
leader, Andrew Ndlovu, threatened civil war saying that the war veterans constituted a
"reserve army" that could be called into active duty when needed. Ndlovu also threatened
that the war veterans would declare a military government if the MDC won the 2000

White farmers, farm workers and teachers in the rural areas were accused of supporting the
MDC. White farmers were accused of having arms of war and forming militant rogue armies
(Buckle, 2002:41 & 153). About 400 000 farm workers were employed by white farmers and
constituted a significant part of the rural electorate, together with their families (about 15%).
President Mugabe regarded them as enemies of his government, together with white farmers.
War veterans set up 're-education centres' on several farms that had been deserted because of
illegal farm invasions. The war veterans rounded up farm workers for indoctrination and
chastisement and forcing them to chant Zanu-PF slogans and to sing liberation songs.
Primary and secondary schools were invaded and teachers were harassed in front of pupils.
Some were beaten and others were taken to 're-education camps.' It is reported that about 6
000 rural people had fled from the countryside to Harare and other cities by the last week of
May 2000 because of the violence that swept across most farming communities (Meredith,
2003:177-178; Buckle, 2002:107). The Standard reported that war veterans and Zanu-PF
supporters warned hospital personnel not to treat victims of commercial farm invasions, or
risk being victims themselves (Buckle, 2002:131). Indiscriminate violence in the rural areas
forced almost 9 000 teachers, particularly in Mashonaland Central and East provinces, to
abandon schools and flee to nearby towns by mid-June 2000. An estimated 2 096 teachers
had been assaulted and 12 cases of rape, mainly of teachers' spouses were documented.
Twenty-five school pupils had also been abducted or raped. The Progressive Teacher's
Union of Zimbabwe reported that about 250 rural schools had been forced to close down
because of the violence (Meredith, 2003:178; Buckle, 2002:107 & 133).

The campaign of intimidation was not confined to the rural areas for long. It also targeted
MDC officials and supporters and the independent media in the urban areas (Meredith,
2003:180, 204; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51). These groups were raided on a regular basis by
para-military police, soldiers and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agents. MDC officials and supporters were beaten with rifle butts, chains and clubs and some received death threats. Some were raped, kidnapped and tortured and many were charged under the Law and Order Maintenance Act for inciting the violence. The mobs destroyed or looted property belonging to white commercial farmers, MDC members and suspected MDC supporters (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Kibble, 2004:366; Bush, 2003:536; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 2003:260; Makumbe, 2003; Mlambo, 2003; Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:10; McGregor, 2002:10; Raftopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002; Krieger, 2000:446-447). The terror spread to white-owned factories, offices and businesses (shops, restaurants, hotels) and subsidiaries of South African, British, American, Australian, Danish and other foreign companies. War veteran gangs interrupted management meetings and ordered the reinstatement of dismissed workers, they set up kangaroo courts, assaulted and abducted managers and staff and seized equipment. These atrocities extended to aid agencies and foreign embassies which President Mugabe regularly accused of assisting and funding the MDC (Karume, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003:18, 211-214). The secretary for foreign affairs in Zimbabwe’s Foreign Ministry (Willard Chiwewe) announced that the government could not guarantee the security of foreign embassies and donor agencies if they became agents or sympathisers of political parties (Meredith, 2003:213).

It is alleged that the police were instructed not to intervene in all these crimes and are reported to have watched opposition supporters being assaulted by war veterans. The police also unlawfully detained thousands of people (Meredith, 2003:211; Buckle, 2002). When it tried to intervene, the judiciary was accused of being pro-white by President Mugabe, his ministers and war veteran leaders. The government deliberately undermined the judiciary by ignoring court orders, including the one that was issued on 17 March 2000 by Justice Paddington Garwe. The order ruled in favour of white farmers declaring the on-going farm invasions illegal and ordered the police to evict invaders from occupied farms within twenty-four hours of the granting of the order (Meredith, 2003:170-172, 199-207; Buckle, 2002:17 & 25). The Deputy Police Commissioner is reported to have applied to the High Court for a variance or exemption on the High Court’s ruling. The Deputy Police Commissioner argued that the solution to the land issue lay in the political domain, not with the courts (Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). The application was unsuccessful and the original order was upheld, although it was still ignored. Buckle (2002:235) reports that Messengers of Court were given death threats when they served eviction notices on squatters and war veterans.
Regarding the court orders, in April 2000, President Mugabe said that the country’s political problems overrode

“...the little matter of trespass... I know there is an expectation that I will say to the war veterans ‘Get off the land.’ I will not say or do that. There is no policeman who is going there. We have said ‘No.’ If the British have their own police they must send them there...We cannot be expected to buy back our land that was never bought from us, never bought from our ancestors.” (cited in Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45).

In June 2000, a Danish-based organisation, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, reported that there was widespread evidence of mass psychological torture and community disruption in Zimbabwe because of intimidation and violence (Buckle, 2002:133). Many people, especially whites, are reported to have left Zimbabwe just before the June 2000 elections because they feared that the level of political violence would escalate into a civil war (Buckle, 2000:143). The MDC is also reported to have considered boycotting the elections because of the level of violence in the country (Buckle, 2002:91). On 1 June 2000, the MDC reported that its campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary election was free and safe in just 25 of the 120 constituencies (Meredith, 2003:182). By the time the June 24 and 25 parliamentary election were held, nearly 1 500 farms had been invaded and about 1 000 of these remained occupied (Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). On the voting days, some Zanu-PF youths and war veterans prevented people from reaching polling stations by setting up roadblocks or confiscating their identity cards and passports because people without proof of identity could not vote (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002:143).

Instead of a landslide victory, the ruling Zanu-PF party narrowly won the June 2000 parliamentary election. Zanu-PF won 62 seats (48% of votes cast, plus the 30 non-constituency seats appointed by the President from among his supporters), the MDC won 57 seats (47% of the votes) and the last contested seat went to an independent candidate (Olaleye, 2005:8). The MDC won all the seats in Harare and Bulawayo and ten of the twelve contested seats in Matebeleland. It also performed strongly in the Midlands and Manicaland provinces. To show how unpopular the Mugabe regime had become in the urban areas, Zanu-PF retained only one urban constituency in the whole country (Meredith, 2003:188). Zanu-PF’s unconvincing victory in the June 2000 parliamentary election made the Mugabe regime even more determined to intensify the onslaught on commercial farmers and urban dwellers
who voted against it. The situation became more desperate after the Amani Trust (a human rights group) published a summary of violence in the run up to the 2000 election as follows: 19 deaths and 5,070 incidences of political violence (86% of the perpetrators were Zanu-PF supporters and only 4% were MDC supporters) (Meredith, 2003:183). The Daily News Online (cited in Buckle, 2002:160) reported the number of deaths in the run-up to the parliamentary election to be as high as 33. Mashonaland East province was affected the most by political violence and Buckle (2002:105) believes that this is because the province registered the highest “No” votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum.

The international community was outraged by the human rights abuses that marked the election campaign and declared them neither free, nor fair (Kabemba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229). The MDC challenged the results of the election in 38 constituencies, arguing that violence, intimidation, fraud and other irregularities rendered them invalid (Kabemba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; Meredith, 2003:216-217).

3.10 The 2002 Presidential Election

The ruling Zanu-PF party’s systematic use of provocation, intimidation and violence in the 2000 parliamentary election laid the foundation for the 2002 presidential election. Violence was not confined to the parliamentary and presidential elections. It was also used to influence the outcome of parliamentary by-elections and mayoral elections, in which threats were used against headmen, chiefs, civil servants, teachers and nurses to ensure that they did not vote for the MDC (Meredith, 2003:179, 214, 215; Buckle 2002:5, 107 & 133).

The constitutional amendments passed in 2000 gave the state president unchecked executive powers, which effectively allowed the government to disregard the rule of law and the courts, and to unilaterally change laws under the guise of land reform (Buckle, 2002:35).

A series of repressive and highly unpopular laws that were meant to silence criticism by the local media and civic organisations, were passed in the run-up to the 2002 presidential election. These laws included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the General Laws Amendment Act, which was subsequently revoked after being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The new security laws made it a criminal offence to criticise the president (Karume, 2005:41; Meredith, 2003: 150-156, 180 & 204; Hall, 2003:275; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655; Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003; Kibble, 2004:365 & 369; Bush and
Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19). The Public Order and Security Act dates back to the 1960s when it was enacted by the Smith government to repress black nationalists. The Zanu-PF government used the Act to empower the police to restrict movement to and from political meetings and banned political rallies at will, unless the head of the party was personally present (Buckle, 2002:83). The courts were barred from granting bail to suspects in politically motivated crimes (effectively detention without trial). The security laws also created loopholes that allowed the government to interfere with the independence of the Electoral Commission and voter registration (Kabemba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111).

The new laws allowed the government to exercise tighter control over independent journalists and foreign correspondents (controlling their reporting) (Karume, 2005:41; Meredith, 2003:226; Chan, 2003). Journalists (Ray Choto, Mark Chavunduka and Clive Wilson of The Standard) were charged with treason and detained unlawfully in January 1999 over a report that was carried by The Standard about Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC (Meredith, 2003:150-156, 180 & 204). On 9 April 2000, Geoff Nyarota, the editor of the Daily News received death threats in a letter that accused him of a “lack of respect for our dear President” (Meredith, 2003:180, Buckle, 2002:69-70). The newspaper’s offices were attacked three days later when a powerful petrol bomb exploded in an art gallery below Nyarota’s office in central Harare but Nyarota survived the attack. Foreign journalists were accused of misrepresenting the different parties’ interests, exaggeration and biased reporting. Foreign journalists had their cars stoned on a regular basis and two foreign journalists were deported in February 2001 (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002:99).

The government gazetted new broadcasting regulations (using Presidential Powers) to ensure that 75% of all programming on radio and television was Zimbabwean content, however, the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) was exempted from the new regulations (Buckle, 2002:235). Independent newspapers (The Daily News, The Standard) were harassed at will. The Daily News was banned in rural areas like Murehwa and Shurugwi and vendors who tried to sell it there were threatened. The paper was confiscated from the few individuals who were seen reading it. To ensure the loyalty of civil servants, they were banned from taking the Daily News into government offices, especially since they had just been awarded a 65% pay increment (Meredith, 2003:180; Buckle, 2002:69, 106 & 108). In January 2001, Zanu-PF supporters seized and burnt copies of the Daily News in several
towns. On January 23, Chenjerai Hunzvi led a mob of 500 Zanu-PF supporters to the offices of the *Daily News* demanding that the paper be banned. Zimbabwe’s then Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, threatened to ‘silence’ (on television) the editors of the *Daily News*, the weekly *Independent* and the *Sunday Standard* for being “unpatriotic.” The printing presses of the *Daily News* were bombed a few hours later (Kibble, 2004:365 & 369; Meredith, 2003: 150-156, 180 & 204; Hall, 2003:275; United States Department of State, 2003; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Buckle, 2002:72; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655).

A sustained and systematic form of violence was used as a strategy to convince the electorate to vote for President Mugabe in 2002, even though the electorate no longer had confidence in his government because of decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and cronyism (foreword by Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). President Mugabe tried to discredit the MDC by claiming that it was counter-revolutionary and that it was created and controlled by Britain, the United States and the old Rhodesian network. The government described the MDC and farm workers as puppets of white commercial farmers and Britain (opposed to land reform) (Karume, 2005: 30-36; Moyo, 2004:27; Mlambo, 2003:196-197; Meredith, 2003:193 & 194; Raftopoulos, 2002; Krieger, 2000:447). President Mugabe refused to accept election observers from Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark and expelled the Swedish head of the European Union observer mission (Karume, 2005: 30-36). The Commander of the Defence Forces unambiguously expressed the government’s position by declaring that the military would not recognise the result of the election if President Mugabe lost the 2002 presidential election (Meredith, 2003:227-228).

The 2002 presidential campaign led to an upsurge of land invasions in 2001 and harassment of the opposition by war veterans because of the enactment of the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act which came into force in June 2001 and inflammatory statements made by several government officials. The Rural Land Occupiers Act protected land invaders who had occupied land from the start of land invasions in early 2000 until February 2001. The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year and nullified all court orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). President Mugabe also chose this crucial moment to grant amnesty to perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed between January and July 2000 (from the onset of land invasions in February 2000 to the June 2000 parliamentary election). The
main beneficiaries of this pardon were war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters who were involved in incidents of assault, abduction, torture and arson. Other crimes like murder, rape, theft and possession of arms were excluded from the amnesty although it is alleged that the police did not pursue such cases when Zanu-PF supporters were known to be the perpetrators (Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22).

Meredith (2003:18) notes that the worst outbreak of violence occurred in August 2001 in the Chinhoyi farming district (60 miles south-west of Harare). Liston Shields Farm was invaded after war veterans were encouraged to do so by Zanu-PF government ministers and MPs. One MP, Phillip Chiyangwa, was filmed (without his knowledge) instructing war veterans and Zanu-PF mobs to invade more farms. Chiyangwa said;

"If you get hold of MDC supporters, beat them till they are dead. Burn their farms and their workers’ houses, then run away fast and we will blame the burning of the workers’ houses on the whites. Report to the police, because they are ours" (cited in Meredith, 2003:221).

Mobs of party supporters went on the rampage across Chinhoyi district and many white farmers and farm workers were forced to flee for their lives. The violence spread to Mhangura and Doma (north of Chinhoyi) and to Hwedza (east of Chinhoyi) (Meredith, 2003:220). The invaders destroyed crops and equipment, cut off water supplies and set fire to grazing land. The owner of Liston Shields Farm and about twenty-one neighbours who responded to distress calls from the farm were arrested and assaulted. They were held in custody for two weeks before bail was granted and the Minister of Home Affairs claimed that the farmers had provoked the attack. The land grab became more frantic as soldiers, air force officers, war veterans, government officials, party officials and peasants descended on commercial farms in retaliation (Meredith, 2003:197). It is reported that government and Zanu-PF officials claimed many of the prized properties for themselves. Meredith (2003:230) notes, for example, that the Army Commander appropriated a farm that produced flowers and vegetables and seized assets worth US$20 million. The Staunton family had owned the farm for more than a hundred years but they were given just five days to leave their farm to make way for the new owner (Meredith 2003:230).

Victims of this surge in land invasions included black commercial farmers who were known supporters of the MDC. A Chegutu farmer, Philemon Matibe, had stood for the 2000
parliamentary election and had challenged the results when he lost. Matibe’s 1 100 acre farm was seized and divided among Zanu-PF supporters. These actions compelled Matibe to comment that the land reform programme was not about correcting colonial imbalances. He said; “It [land reform] is about punishing your enemies and rewarding your friends. This is about staying in power no matter what the damage is to your country or democracy” (cited in Meredith, 2003:221).

MDC officials and supporters continued to be abducted, beaten, tortured and sometimes murdered. MDC campaign rallies were disrupted and their party offices were raided. The para-military police, soldiers, war veterans and youth militias hunted down opposition supporters (raided shops, destroyed homes, set up roadblocks and demanded to see people’s Zanu-PF membership cards) and victims of political violence risked further assaults at the hands of the police (Human Rights Watch, 2002:22-25; Buckle, 2002). Human Rights groups (Amani Trust, Zimbabwe Human Rights Association/Zim Rights) reported that the police selectively enforced the law and that this was most notable when opposition party supporters were accused of instigating violence. In such cases, the police took swift action, in contrast to their inaction when Zanu-PF supporters where implicated in disturbances. The government repeatedly denied allegations that the police were becoming increasingly partisan or that the police failed to act when called upon to do so (Meredith, 2003:193 & 194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22-25).

President Mugabe won 56% of the votes, to Morgan Tsvangirai’s 42% (Meredith, 2003:225-228). Tsvangirai, Britain, the United States and the Commonwealth Observer Mission did not accept the election results and issued scathing reports which said the election results did not adequately reflect the free will of Zimbabweans (Kabemba 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229; Makumbe, 2003).

3.11 Conclusion
The ruling party’s campaign of terror, aided by war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters, ensured that the Zanu-PF won both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 Presidential elections, although both results have been disputed (Chitiyo, 2003:179; Meredith, 2003; McGregor, 2002:11; Krieger, 2000:448). These victories have been described as ‘stolen elections’ because they were won through a reign of terror that tried to obliterate political opposition, emasculate the independent media and undermine the judiciary (Makumbe, 2003; Meredith, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:17 & 19; Buckle, 2002; Krieger, 2000:448). These elections and the
fast-track land reform programme brought with them a disturbing and enduring by-product, which Kibble (2004:365) describes as a “holistic strategy of repression.” The fact that the perpetrators of grave injustices enjoyed impunity makes the situation even more disturbing (Chitiyo, 2003:198; Meredith, 2003, Buckle, 2002).

Hall (2003:276 & 280) and Kabemba (2005:26) describe Zimbabwe’s land issue as a pawn in broader political struggles, used in this instance for electioneering. The Zimbabwean government had periodically manipulated the land question before major elections and this time was no different (Meredith, 2003). Although the land question was fundamentally political, Skalnes (1994 cited in Moyo, 1999:14) criticises the Zimbabwean government for using “racial electioneering tactics” and “hiding behind populist rhetoric and nationalist ideology whilst serving the narrow and monopolistic interests of the ruling clique” (1996 cited in Moyo, 2000a:18-19). The government’s unprecedented partisan behaviour; strategy of violence in the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections left the entire population alarmed and panicked and led some commentators to question if the fast-track land reform programme was genuine. Ncube (2001 in Buckle, 2002) and Raftopoulos (2002:418) maintain that the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns were not about land at all, but about President Mugabe’s fear of losing power. Bush and Szeftel (2000:179) also conclude that the ruling Zanu-PF party hijacked and exploited the people’s legitimate need for land reform and used it as the backbone for its election campaign because it feared losing political power; not because of a genuine commitment to land redistribution, development or poverty alleviation.

Chapter 4 discusses the fast-track land reform policy in detail because it provides the basis on which the programme’s implementation is evaluation in Chapter 5.
4
The Fast-Track Land Reform Policy

4.1 Introduction
Zimbabwe’s chequered land reform history is a reflection of the political and economic constraining variables discussed in the previous chapter. Chapter 2 showed that the government’s land reform plans were plausible soon after independence. There was no doubt that gross injustices had occurred in Zimbabwe’s colonial past and no one could deny that some white farmers owned more than one farm (imbalance in landholding patterns between the black majority and white minority). Most stakeholders, including Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers, accepted the need for land reform in order to make more land available to landless blacks (Buckle, 2002:30; Moyo et al., 1991:124). Unfortunately, however, the government’s land reform efforts were undermined by an apparent lack of sustained political will by the government, as well as the greed and corruption of politicians and other opportunists who exploited successive land reform attempts to their own advantage (Kabemba, 2005:26; Riddell, 1992:17). Consequently, land reform failed to achieve results on the scale envisaged at independence (Utete Report, 2003:10-14).

Ncube (2001 in Buckle, 2002) also comments that white farmers were not entirely without blame in Zimbabwe’s land reform failures and subsequent political meltdown. Ncube (2001 in Buckle, 2002) maintains that many white farmers were content with the status quo in which the white minority owned most of the country’s productive land. White farmers were reluctant or unwilling to radically alter their access and control of the excess productive land that they owned. It has been argued that white farmers’ failure to cooperate with the government by selling excess land or their failure to be proactive in supporting the government’s land reform efforts (lack of commitment or passive resistance that) eventually led President Mugabe to portray land reform as a “war between blacks and recalcitrant whites” (Deininger, 2003:144-145; Buckle, 2002:11; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002).

Fast-track land reform was still mainly a response to Zimbabwe’s colonial history of large-scale expropriation of land rights, compounded by an increased scarcity of productive land due to population growth. This chapter begins with a brief summary of Zimbabwe’s land
reform impediments and achievements from independence in 1980 until 1998 because they give the contextual background for the fast-track land reform programme. It also briefly outlines the land reform guidelines set at the 1998 Donors' Conference as well as the financial and technical role of donors. The bulk of the chapter discusses how the Zimbabwean government's land reform policy for Phase 3 appeared on paper/in theory, including the institutional framework; the phased approach to the programme's implementation; budgetary and resource allocation aspects; land identification criteria and procedures for land acquisition.

4.2 Justification for Fast-Track Land Reform

The Zimbabwean government's efforts to change the country’s racially unequal colonial land distribution had modest results up until 1998. The Zimbabwean government pursued a national policy of reconciliation with the former colonial administration of white British settlers after independence in 1980 and this policy, together with the express provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, significantly limited the rate and extent of land reform in the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence (Utete Report, 2003:10-14; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002; Astrow, 1983). The number of white-owned large-scale commercial farms decreased from 6100 to about 4600 in the mid 1980s. This represented a transfer of 15% of white-owned land to 6% of the black peasantry (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:20; Riddell, 1992:15).

Government statistics show that 71000 families, instead of the proposed 162000, were settled on 3498444 hectares (3.5 million hectares) or 40% of the 9 million hectares that the government had hoped to acquire for resettlement in the 1980s. Only 19% of the land acquired during this period was classified as prime land (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:20; Riddell, 1992:15). Government statistics show that 71000 families, instead of the proposed 162000, were settled on 3498444 hectares (3.5 million hectares) or 40% of the 9 million hectares that the government had hoped to acquire for resettlement in the 1980s. Only 19% of the land acquired during this period was classified as prime land (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Von Blanckenburg (1994:29-31) estimates that by 1991, only a third of the revised resettlement targets set in 1985 had been achieved. Less than 1 million hectares of land were acquired for distribution in the 1990s and less than 20000 families were resettled (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; LandWeb, 2000a).

In 1999, 70% of Zimbabwe's most productive land was still owned by 4500 predominantly white large-scale commercial farmers. These farms covered about 11 million hectares of prime land or 28% of the total land surface (Human Rights Watch, 2002:2; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). To the politicians, the persistence of significant

Apart from the slow rate of land acquisition to change the country’s untenable, grossly disproportionate landholding patterns; land reform was marred by government corruption/cronyism in the 1990s. The land which the government had bought from white farmers and earmarked for resettlement had been allocated or leased to government ministers and senior government officials (governors, High Court judges, members of parliament) for nominal rent or no rent at all, instead of the landless peasantry. Beneficiaries included the head of the President’s office (Charles Utete), the Air Force Commander, the Police Commissioner and Harare’s then Executive Mayor (Meredith, 2003:127; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:45; Buckle, 2002:23). The Zimbabwean government was under extreme pressure to urgently address the longstanding, unequal, race-based patterns of land ownership that had managed to remain intact in two decades of independence.

The land question was compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in other sectors of the economy (stagnation) in the aftermath of failed structural adjustment programmes. The country’s general economic decline was exacerbated by the government’s unbudgeted gratuities and pension payments to liberation war veterans and Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The government was faced with a fiscal as well as a legitimacy crisis (political) because of these problems and was, therefore, compelled to address the land question with a heightened sense of urgency than before (Deininger, 2003:133; Buckle, 2002:12; Meredith, 2003:83, 133-139, 164-165, 148-149; Chan, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8; Jenkins and Knight, 2002).

Zimbabwe’s racially unequal land distribution was politically and economically indefensible, especially since large tracts of productive land were un-utilised or under-utilised in a country where the majority of the population is rural-based and derives its livelihood from agriculture and related activities. Land redistribution was seen as a necessary step towards alleviating rural poverty and improving the general welfare of historically disadvantaged black people.

4.3 The Blueprint for Fast-Track Land Reform

The Zimbabwean government had an elaborate, if not impressive, blueprint for its latest land reform programme (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete Report, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:4). The rest of this chapter outlines the land reform programme’s institutional framework for land reform policy formulation and implementation (including various stakeholders and government ministries); the phased approach to its implementation over ten years; budgetary and resource allocation aspects; land identification criteria for compulsory acquisition; the land acquisition procedure; beneficiary selection and emplacement and the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

4.3.1 The Institutional Framework for Land Reform Policy Formulation and Implementation

A participatory or consultative approach was used to produce the blueprint for this land reform programme. Key contributors included the Government of Zimbabwe, farmers organisations (Commercial Farmers’ Union and Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union), various industrial and financial organisations, the land taskforce of the National Economic Consultative Forum and several civic organisations (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:6). The main bodies that dealt with land reform policy formulation and implementation are outlined below:
The National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) was comprised of the private/industrial sector, financial institutions and civic organisations. The Forum, through its land taskforce, contributed towards the reform programme by consulting (formal meetings) with the government’s Working Party of the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:19).


The Working party of the CRD was composed of the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries involved in the CRD. The Working Party of the CRD was chaired by the Principal Director in the Office of the Vice President. The Working Party of the CRD assisted the CRD with recommendations regarding policy formulation (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:17; Utete Report, 2003:20).

The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development (IMCRRD) served both the CRD and the Working party of the CRD. The Director in the Office of the Vice President chaired the IMCRRD. This body made recommendations on policy matters but was primarily concerned with programme implementation, refinement and the appraisal of programme projects (technical aspects, including programme monitoring and evaluation) (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:17; Utete Report, 2003:20).

The National Land Acquisition Committee identified land for compulsory acquisition and coordinated the acquisition process. A three tier (decentralised) system was used to coordinate the Committee’s functions. The Committee was chaired by the Vice President’s Office at the national level; by Provincial Governors/Administrators at provincial level through Provincial Land Identification Committees and by District Administrators, through District Land Identification Committees (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:18; Utete Report, 2003:20). Representatives of Rural District Councils, traditional leaders and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ Association were also members of these committees. Zanu-PF party chairmen were represented at both local and national levels (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11-12).
The **Land Taskforce of Ministers** was a sub-committee of the National Land Identification Committee. The Land Taskforce had a mandate to coordinate and integrate the land acquisition process by ensuring that (through meetings of relevant command centres) line ministries mobilised and shared resources (allocation) effectively and efficiently in order to speed up land delivery and settler emplacement. The Land Taskforce of Ministers met weekly and was chaired by the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:18 & 19; Utete Report, 2003:20).

The **National and Provincial Command Centres Committee** served the Land Taskforce of Ministers. National and provincial command centres were mandated with data gathering and dissemination and the Secretary for Local Government, Public Works and National Housing chaired the National Command Centre Committee (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:18-19; Utete Report, 2003:20).

The following Ministries were represented in the institutional framework outlined above. This framework also included stakeholders from the private sector and farming community (through the NECF).

- Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement
- Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing
- Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development
- Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
- Ministry of Environment and Tourism
- Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation
- Ministry of Mines and Energy
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Transport and Communications
- Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
- Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
- The Department of War Veteran Affairs
- The Department of Information and Publicity
- Security Ministries (defence etc)
4.3.2 The Land Reform Implementation Schedule (2000-2010)

Fast-track land reform (excluding the Inception Phase) was to be implemented over a period of ten years (from July 2000 to December 2010). The table below shows the time frame which was proposed for each stage of the land reform programme’s 10-year implementation.

Table 2: Land Reform Implementation Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification of land to be acquired</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitability assessment of farms to be acquired</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazetting of properties to be acquired</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving of preliminary notices and acquisition orders</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing of court applications for confirmation of acquisition orders</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land valuation and assessment of compensation</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary planning and demarcation</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler selection and emplacement</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of access roads, water points and dip tanks</td>
<td>2000-2006/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed land-use planning</td>
<td>2000-2006/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of secondary infrastructure</td>
<td>2000-2006/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:20-22)

Elected officials in the civil service (Rural District Councils, District Administrators) constituted the official land allocation structure and individuals had to complete the prescribed application forms which would be available from these structures. The selection of beneficiaries was also deliberately targeted at landless peasants and special groups (affirmative action) such as women because they account for a significant part of the poor rural population (Meredith, 2003:195).

The fast-Track land reform programme adopted variations of Model A resettlement (0.25 hectares or 1 acre residential stand per family in a nucleated village with 5-8 hectares of arable land for intensive cultivation and 30-200 hectares for communal grazing) which was implemented soon after independence (Chiremba and Masters, 2003). Model A1 was planned for village resettlement and subsistence farming and Model A2 was planned for commercial farming. The two resettlement models adopted for the fast-track land reform programme are outlined below.

Model A1 was planned as an intensive decongestion model aimed at relieving land pressure in over-populated communal areas and to benefit landless peasants. The model was aimed at
eliminating squatting and disorderly settlements in both urban and rural areas as well as extending and improving the agricultural capacity/output of the peasant farming sector (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Utete Report, 2003:20).

Beneficiaries would be allocated individual residential plots in nucleated settlements some distance from their relatively small (3 hectares of arable land) enough for crops that can sustain a family and produce a small surplus. Individuals were to be given communal grazing for their livestock together with shared woodlots and water points. It was expected that the model would benefit 160 000 poor people selected from Rural District Council waiting lists or from other farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:12). The government officially reserved 20% of all resettlement plots (crop or livestock options) under model A1 for bona fide liberation war veterans; in accordance with the promise that the government made to this constituency before the programme’s implementation (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Moyo, 2004:26).

It was planned that resettlement A1 beneficiaries would have 99-year leasehold tenure with the option to purchase the land at a later stage. The leases were to be part of the Permit Tenure system that applied to resettlement land since the 1980s and married couples would be given leases or title deeds in the names of both spouses (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Utete Report, 2003:20 & 84-85). However, the permit tenure system is precarious and insecure because the rights of permit holders depend on the discretion of the Minister of Lands and Agriculture (rights are not enforceable). Under the resettlement programme, the Minister would purchase land for resettlement under the provisions of the Rural Land Act and all resettlement land would remain the property of the state. Beneficiaries would have occupation and use-rights that are transferred to them through resettlement permits (Chenaux-Repond, 1993 and Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a).

Model A2 was set aside for intensive small-medium scale commercial farming (average 134 hectares) and was to be administered by the Minister of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement in terms of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act Chapter 20:01. The A2 model was aimed at increasing the participation of black farmers in commercial farming (to promote the indigenisation of the commercial farming sector) by giving them easier access to land and infrastructure. The model was targeted at individuals older than 25 years of age and with experience, preferably those trained to be master farmers (demonstrated
ability/competence in farming). Beneficiaries had to have the resources/capital necessary to undertake commercial farming with little government assistance because the model was based on a full-cost recovery system for any assistance rendered to resettled farmers by the government. The principle of one farm per individual was adopted for land held under the A2 resettlement scheme and some A2 beneficiaries received irrigated land (Moyo, 2004:25; Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:20).

Resettlement A2 beneficiaries had to be prepared to permanently reside on their allocated farm. Alternatively, they had to hire a technically competent resident farm manager (Moyo, 2004:26; Utete Report, 2003:20; Van den Brink, 2000:14). Model A2 beneficiaries could engage in either crop or livestock farming or a combination of both, depending on ecological regions. Peri-urban farmers were expected to engage in horticulture, market gardening or crop farming (Moyo, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:20).

The land reform policy stipulated that applications for Model A2 land had to be processed in the province where applicants wished to be allocated land. Applicants would be short-listed and evaluated by a technical sub-committee of the relevant Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement Committee. The technical sub-committee would submit its recommendations to the Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement Committee which in turn would send its recommendations to the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. The Agricultural Land Settlement Board would consider all applications and make recommendations to the Minister of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement for their approval. The Minister’s approval would be endorsed by the National Land Allocation and Redistribution Committee before land was allocated to individuals. Successful applicants had to pay a deposit fee before a lease was issued (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:13-16, Utete Report, 2003:20). As was the case with the A1 resettlement model, the government officially reserved 20% of land allocated under Model A2 for war veterans (Moyo, 2004:26-27).

Model A2 resettlement land would be considered state land and its leasing would be regulated by the Agricultural Land Settlement Act and the Rural Land Act which were enacted before independence and have remained virtually unchanged (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Although freehold tenure was legally highly regarded as a secure and coherent tenure system, it was discredited for the fast-track land reform programme’s model A2 because of its colonial legacy of acquisition by conquest. It
was argued that freehold tenure lacked political and moral legitimacy because it represented ownership and control of land by a white minority (LandWeb, 2000a). Instead of the more traditional freehold tenure regime, the 99-year leasehold tenure system, with the option to buy the land after five years, was adopted for model A2 land (Van den Brink, 2000:14). The purchase price of the farm would be equal to the market value of the farm, minus the rent already paid. Rentals would be based on an open market rental evaluation, which would be adjusted every year according to an escalation factor (and reviewed after the first five years when the lessee can exercise the option to buy the land). As with Model A1 resettlement land, Model A2 leases or title deeds for married couples would be in the names of both spouses (Utete Report, 2003:20 & 84-85; Van den Brink, 2000:14-15).

4.3.3 Criteria for Land Identification and Compulsory Acquisition

Land identification for compulsory acquisition was to be based on the following main criteria:

- Derelict land: Land that has been abandoned or not used for an indefinite period of time.
- Under-utilised land: Land that is not being used to its full potential.
- Land registered to individuals with multiple ownership of land: Land owned by individuals who own more than one farm.
- Foreign owned land: Land owned by foreign nationals or companies and organisations.
- Land contiguous to communal areas: Land that is adjacent to communal areas so that the land can be used de-congest neighbouring communal areas without up-rooting entire communities to other locations.
- Lands with low infrastructural developments: Land with little investment or improvements of a permanent or semi-permanent nature (boreholes, irrigation pipes, dams, tobacco barns).
- Land under litigious ownership: Land which is the subject of court proceedings to establish its rightful owner and the rights of different parties that are claiming ownership of the land.
- Land under absentee landownership: Land usually held for speculative purposes (real estate whose value appreciates over time) without much agricultural activity carried
out or land that is leased to others because the owner is not engaged in farming (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:19; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12).

Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000 prescribed similar farm sizes according to Natural Regions as Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999, except that it prohibited the sale of land unless the piece of land in question conformed to stipulated maximum farm sizes shown by Table 3 below.

Table 3: Maximum Farm Sizes Prescribed by Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Maximum Land Sizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Utete Report, 2003:19)

There were several categories of land that were exempted from compulsory acquisition and these included farms belonging to church and mission organisations, as well as farms under Bi-lateral Investment Promotion Agreements. Also included were properties with Export Processing Zone permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre certificates. Plantation farms engaged in large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit and sugar cane were also excluded together with agro-industrial properties involved in the integrated production, processing and/or marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products (Utete, 2003:19).

4.3.4 The Land Acquisition Process

In theory, the National Land Identification Committee would identify land for compulsory acquisition. Four Ministries were officially involved in the process: Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; Local Government Public Works and National Housing; Rural Resources and Water Development; and Environment and Tourism. The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing would play the critical role in land identification, and Provincial Land Identification Committees coordinated the implementation process (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11-12). Three main land acquisition notices would be published in all state-owned national newspapers (The Herald, The Sunday Mail) and provincial newspapers (The Manica Post) by the Minister of Special Affairs in the
office of the President and Cabinet (Dr. J. L. Nkomo) in charge of Land, Land Reform and Resettlement. The notices would gazette the name of the designated landholding that was being acquired, the district in which the title deed was registered, the name of the title holder as well as the size of the landholding. The three main land acquisition notices read as follows:

1. Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land (in terms of sub-section (1) of section 5 and paragraph (iii) of sub-section 91 of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10).

2. Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land (in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10).

3. Confirmation of Section 8 Order in the event that compulsory land acquisition is contested in the courts (notice in terms of Section 7(3) of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10).

If the first notice was unopposed, the government would deploy evaluation officers to assess the amount of compensation payable for each landholding. Valuation reports would be submitted to the Compensation Committee which would be appointed by the Minister of Land, Land Reform and Resettlement in terms of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Act Section 19(5) specifies that ‘fair compensation’ (different from ‘fair-market value’) must be paid to the owner within 5 years of land acquisition. Compensation payment is spread over five years from the date of effective acquisition. At least half the compensation payable would be paid at the time the land was acquired (or within a reasonable time thereafter) and the remainder would be paid within two years of the acquisition (Utete Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5-6).

The second notice (vesting of lands) would be published after the land valuation team submitted a report to the Compensation Committee. In terms of the Land Acquisition Act, the effect of an acquisition order is that ownership of the land in question immediately vests in the acquiring authority (government). Title deeds would be transferred at a later stage but the land owner could be ordered to cease to use, occupy or to hold the land with immediate effect (Utete Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5).
Due legal process followed in the Administrative Court or Supreme Court of Appeal if the compulsory acquisition of gazetted lands was contested. Confirmation orders (third notice) would only be issued once legal matters had been concluded. If the Administrative Court did not confirm the acquisition of a particular piece of land, the law expressly provided for the return of such land to the owner. The Land Acquisition Act envisaged compensation claims by landowners (for losses/expenses incurred) if, in the end, the government did not acquire a particular piece of land or the Administrative Court did not grant a confirmation order for the acquisition of that land (Mushonawari, 2005:1; Utete Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5).

4.3.5 The Budget Outline for Land Reform

Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203) suggest that a successful land reform programme requires meticulous planning and financial considerations should be central to this planning. A successful land reform programme requires a budget which outlines the main stages that will be implemented (land acquisition and compensation, land demarcation and infrastructure provision). Table 4 below shows a breakdown of the government's official land reform budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>USS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Assessment</td>
<td>1 329 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Acquisition</td>
<td>184 032 993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Distribution</td>
<td>12 087 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer Support</td>
<td>26 244 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>709 937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation</td>
<td>7 798 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Support</td>
<td>177 234 386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>932 284 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td>94 574 923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building in the Division of Land Affairs</td>
<td>17 935 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency (5%)</td>
<td>90 573 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>1 902 044 044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:24)

The Zimbabwean government committed itself to bearing the full cost of land acquisition for the A1 resettlement model. It was expected that the model would account for three quarters of total land reform beneficiaries and consume about 80% of the land reform budget (about US$1.5 billion) because beneficiaries under this model (the poor and landless) would require more external support from the government (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and
Resettlement, 2004:6-7; Utete Report, 2003:87). The government planned to immediately provide new farmers with pegging for their plots, a housing unit per household through the Rural Housing Programme Loan Fund, a blair/pit toilet per household, a borehole per village of 20-25 families to provide clean drinking water, access roads and a dip tank for every 1,400 cattle, land preparation/tillage and crop packs (tillage, seeds and chemicals). Other infrastructure, such as clinics (for every 500 families), schools and rural service centres would be provided at a later stage or when resources became available (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Utete Report, 2003:18). It was projected that this massive undertaking in infrastructure provision would take up the bulk of the US$1.9 billion that was budgeted for the fast-track land reform programme and a phased-approach was adopted for the provision of limited basic infrastructure.

It was expected that the A2 resettlement model would require significantly less from the budget (US$387 million) because it was planned as a full-cost recovery model where resettled farmers would pay the government for the improvements made to the land by the former owner (housing, irrigation facilities, tobacco barns, green houses and standing/unharvested crops at the time of land allocation). The government planned to recoup costs through lease rentals and the payment of an agricultural land tax as well as the purchase price from resettled farmers who chose to exercise the option to buy their farms. In such instances, the farmer in question would pay an initial deposit to the government and pay the balance over five years (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:2; Utete Report, 2003:87).

4.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

There is a need for governments to assess what and how much (successes and failures) has been accomplished through the land reform programmes that they implement. This data is used by government agencies, together with donors financing the reform, to remedy problems in the land reform process. Donors are involved in the monitoring and evaluation process because they often pledge financial and technical assistance on condition that periodic progress reports are produced (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:192-194). Mechanisms to evaluate whether or not there is an actual shift in land ownership to previously landless people are an integral part of land reform planning. Monitoring is usually in the form of tabulations and quarterly reports that show how many hectares of land have been valued; how many land transfers have been effected through the issuing of land title
documents to previously landless people; how many landholdings are subject to contentions or conflicting claims; the incidence of problems encountered by beneficiaries; and plans for land improvement and related resource needs (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:192-194).

Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform policy stipulated that Land Inspectors had to produce annual agricultural census reports and quarterly status reports on resettled families under model A1. The reports had to enumerate the take-up rate of allocated plots by settlers and the status of government infrastructure and service provision. These periodic reports would assist in evaluating productivity and would act as a checking mechanism to determine settlers’ compliance with lease agreements or permit conditions and settlers who failed to comply with their lease conditions under model A1 would forfeit their leases (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:23; Utete Report, 2003:73-80).

The Ministry of Lands and Agriculture had to compile annual and quarterly status reports on the performance of model A2 beneficiaries for the first five years after resettlement. It would be the duty of ministry officials to evaluate new farmers’ productivity, check their compliance with lease agreements and to identify problem areas and evaluation reports for different farms would be classified as: successful, average or unsuccessful (Van den Brink, 2000). If there were problems, remedial action would, and in most instances, entail the provision of extension services or agricultural inputs. The Minister of Lands and Agriculture reserved the right to terminate lease arrangements with unsuccessful A2 farmers after the first five year period (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:23; Utete Report, 2003:73-80).

4.4 Donors’ Pledges for Zimbabwe’s Land Reform (1998 onwards)
Potential donors insisted that the land reform programme be closely supervised by the donor community to ensure that land reform benefited the intended beneficiaries. It was also stipulated that land had to be bought at market-related prices on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis (Meredith, 2003:142 & 143; Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Van den Brink, 2000:4). Donors supported and endorsed Zimbabwe’s land reform policy blueprint on the understanding that it would be governed by the following principles which were discussed at the 1998 Donors Conferences:
• A poverty reduction orientation consistent with Zimbabwe’s wider economic interests.
• Affordability.
• Transparency: Beneficiary participation and consultation with farmers’ organizations and donors.
• Respect for the rule of law.

The Zimbabwean government reassured potential donors and other stakeholders that land reform would be conducted in accordance with these principles and as a show of support, several countries and organisations pledged financial and technical assistance for Zimbabwe’s land reform programme (Van den Brink, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c). It was also agreed that a Technical Support Unit (TSU) would be constituted by the UNDP, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United States and Norway which would act as the clearing-office for the programme. It was agreed that the Technical Support Unit would be financed by the UNDP and would assist in the preparation/planning and implementation of the land reform programme.

A consultative committee of twelve donors including the World Bank, the UNDP, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the European Union, Britain, the United States, Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Norway and Sweden met with Zimbabwe’s government representatives in Harare two weeks after the September 1998 Donors’ Conference (Meredith, 2003:144). The twelve donors were prepared to contribute funds for Zimbabwe’s the land reform programme and the World Bank began negotiating a US$5 million Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL). The Zimbabwean government was expected to budget US$350 000 towards a Land Acquisition Fund and to appoint a coordinator for the Technical Support Unit (Van den Brink, 2000:2 & 11). The donors emphasised that their continued financial and technical support was on condition that the Zimbabwean government implemented the land reform plan as it was presented at the September 1998 Donors’ Conference (in terms of the guidelines above).

The next chapter shows how the land reform plan differed significantly from its implementation from 2000 onwards.
5

Land Reform Phase 3 in Practice

5.1 Introduction
Land grievances were the root-cause of the two Chimurenga wars of liberation which led to Zimbabwe's independence from British colonial rule, however, for various reasons, this fundamental issue remained unresolved in two decades of independence (Utete Report, 2003:10-14; Raftopoulos, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Raftopoulos, 1996; Astrow, 1983). The preceding chapter dealt with the Zimbabwean government's plans (policy) for fast-track land reform. This chapter discusses in detail how the land reform programme unfolded in practice. The chapter begins with a focus on the constitutional and legislative amendments and presidential decrees that where passed to facilitate the radical fast-track land reform and how these enactments led to the deteriorating status of white citizenship and white property rights. The government's desire to win the June 2000 parliamentary elections has been discussed in Chapter 3 and explains the urgency with which constitutional and legislative amendments were passed as the Zimbabwean government's relationship with the international community, particularly the former colonial power, Britain, deteriorated. The rest of the chapter is a detailed account of land acquisition (and illegal land invasions) and redistribution (allocation and settler emplacement) during fast-track land reform. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the fast-track land reform programme's successes and failures, for instance, its controversial settler identification process. This evaluation also enumerates some of the recommendations that were made by the Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme.

5.2 Constitutional and Legal Amendments to Facilitate Fast-Track Land Reform
The Zimbabwean government significantly revised the constitutional and legal framework in order to expedite the land acquisition process. This section outlines the legal changes that made Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform so controversial. As already mentioned above, Zimbabwe's white farmers had been reluctant to give up the excess land that they owned because of the Lancaster House provision which expressly stated that any land transfers from white farmers had to be on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis. The government justified the drastic, forceful measures that it took to effect fast-track land reform by blaming white farmers' failure to support or cooperate adequately with its previous land reform efforts.
(Deininger, 2003:144-145; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002:11 & 57; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). At independence celebrations in April 2000, President Mugabe lamented the fact that he had extended the hand of reconciliation to white Zimbabweans and they had rejected it. President Mugabe said that Zimbabweans “rejected the persistence of vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yesteryears, attitudes of a master class, master colour, master owner and master employer” (Buckle, 2002:56).

Constitutional amendment number 16 of 2000 gave President Mugabe unchecked executive powers which allowed the government (through presidential decrees) to disregard for the rule of law and the courts, thereby unilaterally changing any laws it wanted under the guise of land reform (Buckle, 2002:35). Although the revised draft constitution had been rejected in February 2000, the government went ahead and tabled a motion in parliament to amend the constitution. The Amendment Bill sought to pass the constitutional amendment which would enable the government to compulsorily expropriate white-owned land without paying compensation to the legal owners. The government also added a new section (section 16a) to the existing constitution. The added section provides *inter alia* that:

(1)(c)-the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and gain ownership of their land; and accordingly-
(i)-the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose; and
(ii)-if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement.

This amendment became law in April 2000 and it significantly extended the grounds on which land could be compulsorily acquired. The amendment absolved the Zimbabwean government of the duty to provide compensation for acquired land, except for tangible improvements. The wording of the amendment sparked a war of words between Britain and Zimbabwe and caused more tension with Zimbabwe’s white community (Meredith, 2003:171; Utete Report, 2003:19; Buckle, 2002:13 & 41-42; Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 10). The British government (Peter Hain and Robin Cook from Britain’s Foreign Office) categorically refused to be forced to pay for Zimbabwe’s land reform unless the criteria set at
the 1998 Donors’ Conference (a poverty reduction orientation, affordability, transparency, beneficiary participation and consultation with farmers’ organizations and donors and respect for the rule of law) were met (Buckle, 2002:42).

President Mugabe signed a decree under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1986 on 24 May 2000 amend the 1992 Land Acquisition Act and to enact temporary legislation (for a period of 6 months). The government’s aim was to streamline various procedural aspects of the land acquisition process and to prescribe new compensations rules in terms of the constitutional amendment above (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8-9; Utete Report, 2003:20; Human Rights Watch, 2002:10). The decree removed all legal obstacles to the government’s land reform plans by empowering the government to seize white-owned farms without paying compensation. About 804 white-owned farms and other properties were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in the state-controlled Herald newspaper on 2 June 2000. The properties included cattle ranches, flower farms, dairy estates, tobacco farms, a mission farm, a potatoe farm, game ranches, safari properties, abattoirs, a mine and other smallholdings. Landowners, occupiers and any person with an interest or rights in the gazetted properties and who wished to object to their compulsory acquisition had to lodge the objection, in writing, with the Minister of Lands and Agriculture by 2 July 2000 (Meredith, 2003:195 & 197; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Buckle, 2002:129-130; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179).

The one-man-one-farm policy was instituted together with ‘swap and subdivision’ options which would allow farmers to offer one piece of land as a substitute for a farm or farms gazetted for compulsory acquisition. Farmers also had the option to offer the government a sub-division or portion of a gazetted farm (Utete Report, 2003:20). Farmers were issued with eviction notices which gave them just thirty-five days to leave their farms (Meredith, 2003:195; Buckle, 2002:100). In August 2000, another 2 237 farms were added to the June list of 804 farms to give a total of 3 041 farms, covering just over 5 million hectares or 19 000 square miles (67% of Zimbabwe’s commercial farms). The additional farms were to be gazetted in batches/ lots after being processed for acquisition and resettlement (Buckle, 2002:172-173). On top of all this, in September 2000, the government ordered farmers to increase farm workers’ wages by 46%, forcing some of the remaining farmers to downsize their operations (lay-off some workers) in order to remain financially viable (Buckle, 2002:212).
On 6 October 2000, President Mugabe granted amnesty (Clemency Order No. 1 of 2000) to perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed between 1 January and 31 July 2000 (period covering the first wave of illegal land invasions and the June 2000 parliamentary election). Ninety-seven prisoners were released on 30 October 2000 and 89 of these had been convicted and were already serving prison sentences. The main beneficiaries were war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters who had been involved in incidents of assault, abduction, torture and arson. Other crimes like murder, rape, theft and possession of arms were excluded from the amnesty (Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22; Buckle, 2002:235 & 237).

On 26 October 2000, President Mugabe threatened to revoke the government's policy of reconciliation and prosecute whites for war crimes committed during the 1970s liberation war (Buckle, 2002:237). The Land Acquisition Act was amended again in November 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2002:10) and the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act came into force in June 2001. The latter Act was meant to protect land invaders who had illegally occupied farms from the start of land invasions in early 2000 until February 2001. The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year and suspended/nullified all court orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from occupied farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). In essence, this amendment legalised land occupations that had been carried out in clear violation of the law/legal procedures that existed at the time of the occupations.

In November 2001, the government again revised the country's legal framework to suit its aims. President Mugabe used his 'presidential powers' to amend the Land Acquisition Act, with retroactive effect from May 2000 and ordered the expropriation of a further 2,000 white-owned farms (without compensation) in November 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 10). The amendment altered the land acquisition procedure in that the ownership of designated land would now be transferred immediately to the acquiring authority (government), regardless of pending court actions against such acquisition. The immediate transfer of ownership served as a 90-day eviction notice for the previous farm owners. Failure to comply with these provisions or hindering the land acquisition process in any way attracted steep penalties, including imprisonment for up to two years. The amendment also gave the government the right to halt farming operations on designated farms at any time after the serving of a section 8 notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (Meredith, 2003:223; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). In November 2001, the Minister of Lands,
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (in terms of Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999) gazetted regulations limiting maximum farm sizes in both the main arable areas and the drier grazing areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13).

Each week from November 2001 onwards, new lists of designated farms were published in the government press. All land became eligible for redistribution, even though many white farmers had bought their farms with government approval (with certificates of ‘no interest’) after independence (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Buckle, 2002; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). The 2001 amendments to the Land Acquisition Act compelled the Supreme Court to overrule the December 2000 interdict which had been awarded to the CFU to prevent the government from acquiring more land. The earlier Supreme Court ruling was overturned because the fast-track land reform programme was suddenly ‘lawful’ because of the retroactive effect of the latest amendment to the Land Acquisition Act.

By May 2002, a total of 3,000 white farmers (about two-thirds of the total covering 12 million acres) had been given notice (reduced to 45 days) to vacate their properties without compensation or risk imprisonment. This number represented about 95% of the members of the Commercial Farmers Union (Meredith, 2003:195, 197 & 230; Buckle, 2002:129; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). The government also amended the Labour Relations Act in early 2002 with the effect that the owner of a farm that was compulsorily acquired had to pay benefits due to his/her employees when they were laid off. These severance packages would be paid through a Restitution Fund and the government would not pay compensation for infrastructural improvements on acquired farms if the concerned farmer did not produce proof of payment of severance packages for his/her former farm workers (Utete Report, 2003:29 & 36). Previously, the law required that the acquiring authority (government) would take responsibility for the previous land owner’s legal obligations towards workers on an acquired farm, on conditions no less favourable than those which existed before the acquisition (Human Rights Watch, 2002:33).

5.3 Racial Tensions and the Issue of White Property Rights

Moyo (1999:2, 3 & 7) comments on the Zimbabwean government’s neglect of several applicable principles of democracy and governance in addressing land rights during fast-track land reform. Moyo’s (1999) analysis is informed by a concern for the citizenship rights
and entitlements of Zimbabwe’s white citizens (an nationals) as well as regional labour migrants who have lived in the country for generations.
Zimbabwe is party to a range of international instruments which include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Under these treaties, the government must guarantee equal protection of the law to all persons, and must prosecute serious violations of enumerated rights (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 17) states that everyone has the right to property, alone or in association with others, and no one may be arbitrarily deprived of his/her property. Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights provides that “the right to property shall be guaranteed and may only be encroached upon in the public interest, in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). Judicial independence is a cornerstone of these international provisions because the judiciary acts to protect people’s rights.

Property rights are part of the conventions and treaties mentioned above. Formal rights imply an ability to draw on the state’s enforcement institutions to defend and uphold such rights under a system that is legitimate, legal and accountable. Property rights to land are social conventions concerned with the distribution of benefits derived from land use. They also provide a basis for the level of tenure security enjoyed by individual landowners, and land owners’ willingness to exchange these rights with others (Deininger, 2003:32). The right of governments to acquire land in the public interest is commonly recognised (Utete Report, 2003) because “the evolution of property rights is not automatic, neither is it independent of political factors” (Deininger, 2003:32). Property rights to land are not static and governments determine how they are defined, enforced and how they evolve in line with changing economic and social conditions, for instance, population growth and land pressure due to increased demand (Deininger, 2003:22 & 157-8).

Deininger (2003:126) notes that many countries, including industrialised countries, either prohibit foreigners from owning land (Bulgaria, Indonesia, the Philippines, Romania Switzerland and Tanzania) or permit land ownership by foreigners under very strict conditions. Deininger (2003) argues that the complete protection of existing property rights can only be justified if everyone has the basic minimum to maintain a decent standard of living. This, however, was not the case in Zimbabwe. The issue of white (read foreign) land ownership had been the source of much political friction in Zimbabwe from the colonial era.
and international donors and Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers accepted that the issue needed to be resolved, even though they could not agree on how to do this (Buckle, 2002:30; Moyo et al, 1991:124).

The constitutional and legislative amendments outlined above raised questions about the citizenship status of white Zimbabweans (not just farmers). The measures taken by the government to facilitate land reform infringed on the property rights of Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers and created much controversy, locally and internationally (Raftopoulos, 2002). Although section 18(1) of Zimbabwe’s Constitution stipulates that every person is entitled to the protection of the law, white farmers felt like they were being victimised. Heated, divisive political debates and legal battles ensued over compulsory land acquisition without compensation. Although the government was justified in pursuing a comprehensive land reform programme, the president’s racially charged rhetoric gave the impression of a conspiracy to drive whites out of the country (Van den Brink, 2000). The government unambiguously regarded whites as foreigners, not citizens or nationals, and many of President Mugabe’s speeches ordered them to leave the country because white land ownership and monopoly over the economy was regarded as an insult to Zimbabwe’s black population (Buckle, 2002; Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c; Raftopoulos, 1996). The government’s statements and actions concerning land reform essentially created an ‘us and them’ mentality along racial lines (xenophobia).

The constitutional and legislative amendments to the 1992 Land Acquisition Act were opposed by the Commercial Farmers’ Union, and the white community, because they disregarded their citizenship and property rights. White farmers and other observers were outraged because they did not think that these provisions were fair or just. White farmers objected to the constitutional amendments because they allowed the government to disregard due legal processes. White farmers also did not believe that the government would compensate them the market value of their landholdings, including capital investments, if their farms were compulsorily acquired for redistribution. The Zimbabwean government responded by saying that white colonial land expropriation was neither fair nor just and that the fact that a white minority still own 11 million hectares of Zimbabwe’s land was an insult to the country’s independence (Raftopoulos, 2002). The government interpreted objections from white farmers and outsiders (donors) as attempts to derail land reform, thus protecting
vested interests and benefits derived from the *status quo* of racially unequal land ownership (Van den Brink, 2000; Raftopoulos, 1996). The Zimbabwean government portrayed white farmers and the world at large as undermining its legitimacy, authority, autonomy and sovereignty. In early 2000, President Mugabe claimed that the [his] “revolution” was under attack from the whites, the British and the West who were “trying to sabotage the economy in their fight against the government” (Meredith, 2003:17). The battle lines between Britain and Zimbabwe were drawn when Zanu-PF launched its election manifesto for the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Part of President Mugabe’s speech read as follows:

“We will determine it [our destiny] ourselves, the people of Zimbabwe, not from Downing Street, not from the British parliament. And let those who are pretending that they can determine our future, realise that we have fought for it; we can still fight for it” (cited in Buckle, 2002:83).

Britain revoked all arms export licences to Zimbabwe following this statement. Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme intensified racial hostilities in the country and the worsening economic crisis led to the mass exodus of white Zimbabweans as refugees or asylum seekers to Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique and Uganda (Buckle, 2002:89). In mid-June 2000, President Mugabe stated that compulsory land acquisition was not going to be restricted to gazetted properties only. He announced that: “If we allow others to own portions of it [land], it must be out of our own will, our own desire, our own charity…” (cited in Meredith, 2003:184; Buckle, 2002:135).

Section 79b of Zimbabwe’s Constitution guarantees judicial independence but the government deliberately and systematically undermined the judicial system by disregarding court rulings/orders issued against it (to uphold the rights/claims of disgruntled white farmers and to remove invaders from white farms). The Deputy Police Commissioner applied to the High Court for an exemption on the High Court’s ruling. The Deputy Police Commissioner argued that the solution to the land issue lay in the political domain, not with the courts (Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). The application was unsuccessful and the original order for the police to remove invaders from occupied farms was upheld, although it was still ignored. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) launched two actions in the Supreme Court against the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme. The first
action challenged the legality of the fast-track land reform programme. The CFU argued that the laws under which the government was acting were unconstitutional (the use of Presidential Powers to acquire land) and that the programme was being carried out unlawfully (without compensation). The CFU challenged the police’s failure to comply with High Court orders to remove invaders from occupied farms and also argued that the land reform was being conducted in a politically and racially discriminatory manner (Meredith, 2003:197-198; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle, 2002:184 & 208).

On 10 November 2000, Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CFU and granted an interdict to stop further land acquisitions on the grounds that the fast-track land reform process was unconstitutional (Buckle, 2002:238). The fast-track land reform programme was declared illegal because the government was not complying with its own laws, for instance, land seizures were occurring when just the preliminary steps in the compulsory seizure process had been taken. The Supreme Court added that farmers had not been given enough time to appeal against the government’s acquisition orders. The court described the resettlement programme as “entirely haphazard and unlawful” because the government was allowing war veterans, villagers and unemployed urban dwellers to move onto farms with no regard for the law (Meredith, 2003:198; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle, 2002:241). Further, the Court said that land reform was being conducted unlawfully and unfairly because white farmers were not being adequately compensated (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

The second action by the CFU argued that the government was failing to comply with legally prescribed procedural requirements in implementing the fast-track land reform programme, for example, giving farmers thirty-five days notice to leave their farms, instead of the three months’ notice stipulated in the land reform programme’s guidelines (Meredith, 2003:197). On 21 December 2000, Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CFU. The Court ruled that the reform was being conducted in politically discriminatory manner because several government ministers had announced that only Zanu-PF supporters would receive resettlement land under the programme, especially since Zanu-PF officials were involved in settler selection and land allocation. The Supreme Court also ruled that farmers and farm workers had been deliberately deprived of the protection of the law when common law crimes were being committed against them with impunity because the police had been instructed not to intervene because land reform was considered a political matter (Meredith, 2003:198; Buckle, 2002:241). The Supreme Court ordered the police and the Minister of
Home Affairs to restore the rule of law in commercial farming areas by removing war veterans, squatters and other occupiers from occupied farms. The government was instructed to devise a lawful resettlement programme within six months (by 1 July 2001) (Meredith, 2003:198-199; Buckle, 2002:241).

The government was unperturbed when the legality and constitutionality of the constitutional amendments regarding land redistribution was queried. Following the Supreme Court rulings above, the government’s attitude and actions became more and more racially discriminatory, in contrast to the policy of reconciliation and nation building that it had adopted at independence (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:133; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3, 13 & 36; Raftopoulos, 2002; Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c; Moyo, 1999:2, 3 & 7; Raftopoulos, 1996). President Mugabe trivialised the concerns and panic of white farmers by stating that the country’s political problems overrode “the little matter of trespass” and that Zimbabwe’s black people could not be expected to buy back land that was never bought from them or their ancestors (Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). White farmers expected the state to uphold and enforce their property rights but this did not happen in many cases, even when the courts intervened. President Mugabe, his ministers and war veteran leaders repeatedly criticised the courts and accused the judiciary of being pro-white and obstructing the government’s legitimate land reform efforts. Court officials that ruled against the government were weeded out and their court orders were ignored (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Meredith, 2003: 170-172, 199-207; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 13; Buckle, 2002:17 & 25).

5.4 Land Reform and the Emasculation of the Judiciary

The Supreme Court was accused of being biased in favour of white landowners at the expense of the landless majority when it ruled that the land seizures that began in February 2000 where illegal. The Supreme Court was comprised of five judges; two white, two black and one of Asian origin. Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay was a British born, highly respected former Rhodesian Judge and he was singled out for attack even though he had been appointed by President Mugabe in 1990. The Information Minister called for the removal of Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay on 1 November 2000. The head of the High Court, Godfrey Chidyausiku (a former minister and head of the Chidyausiku Commission that investigated
the corruption involved in the War Victims Compensation Fund) also publicly accused Chief Justice Gubbay of bias in favour of white commercial farmers. Zanu-PF MPs tabled a motion in parliament urging President Mugabe to set up a tribunal to investigate Gubbay’s conduct (Meredith, 2003:199-201; Buckle, 2002:237). Zanu-PF’s parliamentary caucus passed a vote of “no confidence” in the Supreme Court and demanded the removal of all white judges. The Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, described white judges as “vestiges of the colonial era” and accused them of stifling the government’s land redistribution exercise by making racist judgments that favoured whites (Meredith, 2003:201). Minister Chinamasa said that the reform of the judiciary was overdue:

We must begin to exorcise the ghost of Ian Smith...by phasing out his disciples...The elements on the present bench associated with the Smith regime must know and be told that their continued stay on the bench is no longer at our invitation... (cited in Meredith, 2003:201).

A Zanu-PF MP, Christopher Mushohwe, claimed that Chief Justice Gubbay had been “infiltrated into Zimbabwe by British Intelligence to overthrow the government” and described him as “a Manchester man with links to very powerful Jewish financial interests” (Meredith, 2003:206). Supreme Court judges Gubbay, McNally and Ebrahim were given two-week ultimatums to resign or risk being removed from office in December 2000. War veterans threatened to attack the judges in their homes and Joseph Chinotimba (a war veteran leader) warned that there would be a blood bath if the land issue was not resolved in their favour (Meredith, 2003:202; Buckle, 2002:240; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). Zanu-PF officials also took turns to harass the judiciary. At the annual Zanu-PF congress in December 2000, President Mugabe denounced white land owners as “white devils” (Meredith, 2003:203). President Mugabe urged delegates to support the land reform programme saying:

“...no judicial decision will stand in our way...we should not be defending our position in the courts....they think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources...The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans, Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans...our party must continue to strike fear in the hearts of the white man, our real enemy. They must tremble...” (cited in Meredith, 2003:17-18 & 203; Buckle, 2002:240).
On 22 January 2001, Chief Justice Gubbay and Chief Justice Sandura met with Vice-president Simon Muzenda to discuss the on-going battles between the judiciary, the government and war veterans. The Vice President reprimanded the judges and Gubbay threatened to resign. Later that day, the Justice Minister called Gubbay and told him that the government accepted his resignation and that the government could not guarantee his safety (Meredith, 2003:205). Gubbay was forced to take early retirement and to stand down as chief justice by June 2001. The Justice Minister also called on two other Supreme Court judges (McNally and Ebrahim) suggesting that they too should take early retirement but both refused to comply with the minister’s demands. The two black judges (Wilson Sandura and Simbarashe Muchechetere) refused to see the Justice Minister when they were summoned (Meredith, 2003:205). The speaker of parliament, Emmerson Mnangagwa, stated that; “We should guard against the judiciary developing into an omnipotent entity devoid of any accountability” (Meredith, 2003:205). Minister Chinamasa summed up the government’s position as follows:

Judges should represent our interests because if they don’t, we will criticise them.
They are part of the three arms of government and if they behave like unguided missiles, I wish to emphatically state that we will push them out (cited in Meredith, 2003:205).

On 27 February 2001, Minister Chinamasa announced in the government’s Herald newspaper that Chief Justice Gubbay’s position would be terminated on 28 February 2001, not June 2001 as previously agreed. The government also said that it would not recognise any court rulings over which Gubbay presided from 1 March 2001 onwards. Gubbay was instructed to vacate his office and official residence the next day but he refused to do so. The Justice Minister and Gubbay’s lawyers eventually resolved, *inter alia*, that Gubbay would retain his position until 1 July 2001 but that he would take immediate leave and an acting Chief Justice would be appointed. The parties also agreed that no further steps would be taken by the government to remove other Supreme Court judges from the bench (Meredith, 2003:206). Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku (a more pliable candidate perceived to be loyal to the ruling Zanu-PF party) was chosen to become the acting Chief Justice in Gubbay’s place and was subsequently confirmed as the new Chief Justice and one of his first tasks was to reverse the December 2000 Supreme Court ruling which declared the government’s fast-track land reform illegal (Meredith, 2003:206-207; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle,
President Mugabe also took this opportunity to expand the number of Supreme Court judges from five to eight. Again, the three new appointees were known to be loyal to Zanu-PF (Meredith, 2003:206-207; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13).

This animosity and witch-hunting took place because the Zanu-PF government blamed continued white control of Zimbabwe’s economy for the deepening poverty that was being experienced in the country. The intimidation and victimisation of the judiciary successfully undermined its independence in deciding the issues raised by the controversial fast-track land reform programme but despite the general lack of optimism, many white farmers legally challenged issues regarding equity, property rights, citizenship and transparency in the land reform process (Olaleye, 2005; Makumbe, 2003b; Chan, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000). However, many other white farmers eventually lost hope in the judicial system because of the political wrangles (Buckle, 2002).

The overall effect of these problems, according to Mushonawari (2005), is that the number of legal proceedings brought before the courts extended the land acquisition period. Mushonawari (2005) reports that the acquisition of some landholdings was still being finalised and confirmation acquisition orders were still being issued by January 2005, instead of the 2000-2002 timeline projected for land acquisition.

5.5 The 2000 Farm Invasions

This section gives a detailed account of events that occurred in the Inception Phase of Zimbabwe’s land reform phase 3 (October 1998-June 2000). The land question had been used successfully to gain mass support for Zimbabwe’s liberation war and proved to be a useful political weapon in 2000 when it was manipulated by President Mugabe’s ruling Zanu-PF party to retain power in the face of serious opposition.

On 12 November 1998, the Minister of Lands Agriculture signed acquisition (designation) orders for 841 white-owned farms covering approximately 2 million hectares, instead of the 1 million hectare limit set for the Inception phase at the Donors Conference two months earlier (Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). The seizure of the farms was announced without prior notice or consultation with the affected farmers. By 28 November 1998, 1,471 farms had been gazetted for compulsory acquisition. However, 1,436 farms were eventually acquired out of the 1,471 because the acquisition of the original 841 farms had been contested in the courts by 27 November 1998. Only 85 farms were un-contested and of these, 59 were acquired (about 90,000 ha) at fair market value between September 1998 and 2 March 2000. Thirty-five of the
farms were erroneously earmarked for acquisition (in terms of the official land identification criteria) and were de-listed as a result. The acquisition of the other 721 farms was successfully challenged in court (Meredith, 2003:144; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8; Van den Brink, 2000:7). A further 45 farms were released through the sub-division of large state-owned farms and farming cooperatives under the old Model B resettlement scheme (Van den Brink, 2000:11).

The land question was used as a rallying cry for the June 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections in which it was used to instil fear within the white community and the political opposition (Meredith, 2003:144; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:83). The illegal farm occupations that characterised this period began on 26 February 2000 (after the unsuccessful 2000 constitutional referendum) and lasted until the 2002 presidential election and it is alleged that President Mugabe and the Zanu-PF government encouraged lawless gangs comprised of liberation war veterans, ruling party militias, unemployed youths (too young to have fought in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle in the 1970s) and landless peasants to carry out the violent invasions of 4 500 white-owned farms (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:76-82; Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:30; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51; Buckle, 2002: 29; Lineback, 2001; Krieger, 2000:446; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). On 28 February 2000 Zimbabwe’s Minister of Home Affairs issued a statement instructing land occupiers to leave occupied farms but President Mugabe retracted the statement (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13).

The first farms to be invaded were those that had been gazetted for compulsory acquisition in November 1997 but had not been successfully acquired (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:76-82; United States Department of State, 2003; Buckle, 2002:17; Lineback, 2001; Krieger, 2000:446; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). Farmers who were known to have supported the MDC in the February 2000 constitutional referendum were also singled out for attack. The invaders were armed with axes, iron bars, electric cables, chains, bricks, knobkerries, rubber truncheons and machetes descended on white farms and laid siege on them whistling, shouting and singing war songs. The invaders destroyed crops and equipment, stole tractors, vehicles and fertiliser, slaughtered cattle and often drove off entire herds of livestock. They prevented farmers from planting crops, looted farmhouses and farm workers’ dwellings before setting them on fire. They also set tobacco barns and grazing land on fire. The invaders allocated plots of land for themselves on invaded farms. They cut timber, cut off

As time went on and winter set in, the invaders began demanding fuel/petrol, transport, firewood and food (mealie-meal and beef) for the numerous political rallies that were taking place on occupied farms (Buckle, 2002:84, 113-118).

One of the most callous acts during this period was the poaching that took place at the Save Valley Conservancy. The conservancy was made up of several former cattle ranches and covered 850 000 acres (340 000 hectares). It was a thriving tourist destination with 600 elephants and several endangered species, including black rhinoceros. The conservancy was invaded in early 2000 and invaders pulled down fencing, disarmed, intimidated and assaulted ranch scouts before hunting and killing more than 1 600 animals worth an estimated $23 million by September 2000 (impalas, kudus, bushbuck, warthog, leopards, elephants, wild dogs, buffalo, cheetahs, zebra and even lions). They also burnt grass and chopped down trees in the conservancy, leaving very little vegetation for the animals (Meredith, 2003:167 & 196; Buckle, 2002:154, 208-209).

White farmers were issued with false eviction orders, kicked, punched, whipped and tortured in the Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa and Marondera areas before they were ordered off their farms or forced to sign away half their farms (Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). About 70 unofficial eviction notices were given to farmers in the Glendale area in one week in July 2000 (CFU cited in Buckle, 2002:161). According to the Commercial Farmers’ Union, extortion of money from white commercial farmers by war veterans and youth militias became commonplace and the practice was accompanied by threats of violence if farmers did not pay up (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:19; Buckle, 2002:5, 113-118). War veterans swooped down on Zimbabwe’s main tobacco growing region and forced tobacco farmers to take their crop to the auction floors, even though the selling prices were severely depressed. Buckle (2002:97) maintains that this was done in order to guarantee inflows of foreign currency into the country’s coffers so that the government could service some of its external debts and pay off some of its fuel bills.
The Commercial Farmers’ Union reported that nearly 400 farms out of 4,500 had been invaded by 8 March 2000 (Buckle, 2002). Towards the end of March 2000, the government announced a 21% increase in the pensions of war veterans. The increase was reported as an incentive, ostensibly for war veterans’ part in returning land to its rightful owners. Village heads were awarded similar packages to those of the war veterans, a privilege they did not have before. These incentives caused a public outcry because they meant that more taxpayers’ money was being used to support a programme that many people had reservations about (Buckle, 2002:28-29). By 4 April 2000, 922 farms had been invaded and 504 of these remained occupied (Buckle, 2002:33). By 14 April 2000, 1,065 farms had been affected by the illegal farm occupations. This time Acting President, Joseph Msika, called on war veterans to vacate occupied farms but again President Mugabe countered the order on his return from an official trip overseas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). President Mugabe dismissed the farm invasions as spontaneous, peaceful and lawful demonstrations by land-hungry peasants (Buckle, 2002:14). President Mugabe blamed the invasions on white farmers’ reluctance to surrender enough land for resettlement since independence (Meredith, 2003:170; Buckle, 2002:14 & 57). War veteran leaders also defended the invasions as a revolution that would liberate and return land to its rightful black owners (Meredith, 2003:169). Table 5 below shows the spatial distribution of illegal land occupations by province as of 30 April 2000.

Spatial Distribution of Illegal Land Occupations by province as of 30 April 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total affected since February 2000</th>
<th>Currently Occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mash Central</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash West (South)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash West (North)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash East</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1056</strong></td>
<td><strong>645</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5: Source: Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000)

The government is believed to have co-ordinated the farm invasions and given “key logistical and coercive support” to war veterans and other groups (Raftopoulos, 2002:414). It is reported that prominent Zanu-PF officials, the army (the notoriously brutal Support Unit and
the Air Force Commander, Perence Shiri) police officers and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) were given time off work to direct the farm occupations disguised as war veterans (in plain clothes). These officials ensured that the invaders had food and other essential supplies. Government vehicles were also reportedly used to transport invaders and AK-47 assault rifles and other automatic weapons were used in the invasions (Buckle, 2002:59; Amnesty International cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:2, 3 & 26). Further, the invaders were paid a daily allowance for their services (Meredith, 2003:167; Buckle, 2002:5 & 16). The chairman of the War Veterans’ Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, unambiguously spelt out the government’s objectives at Zanu-PF head-quarters in Harare on 15 March 2000 when he disclosed that he had been given Z$20 million by Zanu-PF at the end of February to organise the farm invasions and to campaign for Zanu-PF in the 2000 parliamentary election (Meredith, 2003:169; Buckle, 2002:84). A senior government official, Didymus Mutasa, openly admitted that the invasions were well orchestrated when he said “The whites have themselves to blame because they shot themselves in the foot by mobilising people to throw away the draft constitution” (cited in Meredith, 2003:169).

Farm workers were not spared the severe beatings and general harassment that white farmers were subjected to. About 400 000 farm workers were employed by white farmers and, together with their families, constituted a significant part of the rural electorate (about 15%). The Zimbabwean government and war veterans branded farm workers as traitors, sell-outs or enemies of the state who supported or allied themselves with the MDC and its white sponsors in rejecting the revised draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum (Karume, 2005; Meredith, 2003:177-178; Buckle, 2002:58, 71, 77 & 125; Raftopoulos, 2002. The perceived alliance between white farmers, the MDC and farm workers led to vicious attacks on farm workers by war veterans and youth militias. War veterans set up “re-education centres” on several deserted or “liberated” farms and rounded up farm workers for indoctrination and chastisement. Some farm workers had petrol poured over them and were set alight. Many were maimed because of the abuse they were subjected to by the invaders. Farm workers were forced to swear allegiance to the ruling Zanu-PF party and denounce the opposition (Meredith, 2003:177-178; Buckle, 2002:58, 71, 77 & 125; Raftopoulos, 2002).

Government officials and the police turned a blind eye to the violence in the farming communities and human rights groups reported that the police failed to apprehend perpetrators of violence. The police defied orders issued by the High Court instructing them
to remove illegal occupiers from white farms claiming that it was too dangerous for them to enforce the orders. When repeatedly asked to intervene, the Police Commissioner said there was nothing the police could do to stop the invasions. The Police Commissioner absolved the police of any responsibility by saying; “It is a political issue...What do you expect the police to do?...Talk to the politicians about it” (cited in Meredith, 2003:169; Buckle, 2002:13). Human Rights Watch (2002) reports that in the few instances were the police arrested suspects in politically motivated violence; they released them a few hours later without charging them. Buckle (2002:57) also notes that the few policemen who tried to help white farmers were victimised, for instance, Constable Chikwenya who was shot dead by war veterans in the Marondera area.

The outspoken war veteran leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi, was summoned before the High Court for his repeated defiance of High Court Orders (contempt of court) and he responded by saying; “It is President Mugabe’s prerogative to end the invasions...He said they [invaders] could remain on the farms and ordered the police not to evict them. I cannot challenge him” (cited in Meredith, 2003183-184; Buckle, 2002:75).

The first fatality since the land invasions broke-out was reported on 15 April 2000 when the 47-year old owner of Arizona Farm in Macheke (David Stevens) was murdered by war veterans and five other farmers were abducted together with Stevens’ foreman. Mr Stevens was shot at point blank range after his farm workers forced invaders off the farm. One man was arrested for the Stevens murder but the prosecution’s case was withdrawn because of insufficient evidence (Meredith, 2003:172-175, 177, 194; Buckle, 2002:50 & 240).

Stevens’ murder was followed by the pre-meditated murder of 42-year old Martin Olds who owned a ranch (Compensation Farm) in Matebeleland’s Nyamandlovu area outside Bulawayo. Olds was known to be sympathetic to the MDC and was attacked and murdered by war veterans on his ranch on 18 April 2000. Olds was shot in both legs, his house was set on fire and he was shot in the head in broad daylight. It is alleged that the police colluded with war veterans by setting up roadblocks to prevent people from responding to Olds’ distress calls (Meredith, 2003:172-175, 194; Buckle, 2002:54-55). These two murders were followed by assaults on Allan Dunn and John Weeks in Beatrice on 8 May 2000. Dunn was assaulted by war veterans on his farm at night and left for dead. Weeks was shot in the abdomen in an alleged robbery attempt at his farm. Both farmers died in hospital from injuries sustained in the attacks (Meredith, 2003:172-177 & 194; Buckle, 2002:50-55, 89 & 93). When these four white farmers had been killed, Chenjerai Hunzvi commented that:
“Like in any revolution, the path is always bloody, that is to be expected... no one should raise eyebrows over the death of four white farmers” (cited in Meredith, 2003:177). Tony Oates was the next victim. Oates was shot in the arm and through a lung on his farm (Skelton/Uitzight Farm) in Trelawney, and like the last two farmers before him, later died from his wounds (Buckle, 2002:115-116).

On 20 April 2000, the CFU received reports that more war veterans were moving into Matebeleland North and ordered the immediate evacuation of all commercial farmers. Similar instructions were given to farmers in the Headlands, Hwedza, Virginia, Macheke, Enterprise and Midlands areas (Meredith, 2003:176). The land grab was condemned locally and internationally but the government remained defiant. President Mugabe thanked the war veterans for “standing up where others would not stand up to acquire their vital resources (Buckle, 2002:135). The Justice Minister also condoned the violent nature of the land reform programme saying that “violence is a necessary tool for a successful land reform programme” (Meredith, 2003:218). By the time the June 2000 parliamentary election was held, 1 500 farms had been invaded and about 1 000 of these remained occupied (Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). More than 1 500 farms had been invaded by mid-June 2000 and a total of just over 1 600 commercial farms were occupied by December 2000, although some farms were occupied for short periods (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11 & 30; Buckle, 2002:135). The Commercial Farmers Union estimates that a total of 1 948 farms had been occupied by the end of 2001 (Buckle, 2002).

The incidence and severity of the farm invasions was highest in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central Provinces and the northern sector of Mashonaland West province, regardless of whether the farms were designated for compulsory acquisition or not (Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa, Marondera areas) (Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). Moyo (2000a:90) suggests that this was because the least land redistribution had occurred in these areas before 2000. The area has some of the best soils in the country and 70% of the land there was still in the hands of white commercial farmers involved in tobacco, wheat, horticulture and grain production (Moyo, 2000a:90). Although not all farm occupations were accompanied by violence, human rights organisations like Amnesty International, ZimRights and Amani Trust estimate that 5 078 violent incidences (arson, kidnapping, intimidation) had been documented, on and off the farms. These
incidences included 1,012 assaults, 8 rapes, 19 murders and 417 cases of property

Sidiropoulos (2004:110) and Human Rights Watch (2002) estimate that 90% of Zimbabwe’s
white commercial farming population (CFU’s membership of 3,500) was forcibly evicted or
forced to abandon their farms because of the violent and illegal land invasions and the
inaction of the police. The trail of destruction that characterised the fast-track land reform
programme compelled Britain’s junior Foreign Office minister, Peter Hain to announce that
Britain was prepared to accept 20,000 white Zimbabweans seeking asylum from the
upheavals in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe launched a verbal attack on Britain saying it was
acting to protect the interests of Zimbabwe’s white community and plotting to overthrow him
(Meredith, 2003:171; Buckle, 2002:27). Many whites are reported to have left Zimbabwe just
before the June 2000 elections because they feared that the level of political violence would
escalate (Buckle, 2000).

5.6 Land Acquisition in the Inception Phase of Fast-Track Land Reform

Government statistics show that 168,263.808 hectares of land were acquired in the Inception
Phase of the fast-track land reform programme between October 1998 and June 2000 (GoZ:
Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:6). Table 6 below shows the
number of farms, per province, that were acquired during this period.

Table 6: Farms Acquired in the Inception Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Farms</th>
<th>Extent (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,487.7533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16,449.9434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14,449.3840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33,749.1669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27,655.4582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18,480.7100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52,216.3934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9,908.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td><strong>168,263.808</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:28)
5.7 Fast-Track Land Acquisition

The Accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement (Fast-Track) programme was officially launched on 15 July 2000 with a budget of $1.3 million. According to the Utete Commission (2003), instead of being implemented until December 2001, in practice, the fast-track land reform programme was carried out until August 2002. It is worth mentioning that instead of the 5 million hectares target set at the Donors’ Conference in 1998, the government later planned to acquire between 8.3 million and 8.8 million hectares from the large commercial farming sector (Moyo, 2004:22-25; Buckle, 2002:159; Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Government figures indicate that between June 2000 and February 2001, a national total of 2706 farms covering 6,086,605.1317 hectares was gazetted for compulsory acquisition under the fast-track land reform programme as shown on Table 7 below (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8). As more social and political pressure was brought to bear on Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers, attempts were made to resolve the Britain-Zimbabwe land dispute through the September 2001 Abuja Agreement (Raftopoulos, 2002:415; Bush, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001).

Table 7: Fast-Track Land Acquisition between June 2001 and February 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Farms</th>
<th>Extent (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>153,997.5109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>362,920.6439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>700,062.6638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>648,902.7115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1,806,249.7880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>818,306.0313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>861,197.8368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>734,967.9455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,706</td>
<td>6,086,605.1317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:30)

In November 2001, the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) offered the government 562 farms (approximately 1 million hectares) of commercial farmland contiguous to communal areas under the auspices of the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI), which was brokered by the Commonwealth in Abuja, Nigeria (Raftopoulos, 2002:415; Bush, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001). Apart from land, commercial farmers pledged to assist resettled farmers with technical know-how and heavy-duty farm equipment such as
combine harvesters and planters (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13-14). Despite this intervention, President Mugabe announced the expropriation of a further 2,000 white-owned farms in November 2001 and the number of commercial farms to be expropriated was extended every week from November 2001 onwards. President Mugabe continued to alienate Zimbabwe's white community through racist attacks in his speeches and through what was generally perceived as state-sanctioned harassment, provocation, intimidation and humiliation by war veterans and Zanu-PF youth militias (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

Human Rights Watch (2002:12) and Buckle (2002:130) note that, with time, the land identification criteria in the government's land reform policy documents were abandoned and categories of landholdings that had been exempted from compulsory acquisition were designated (farms protected by Bi-lateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements and state-land that was leased for private use under Export Processing Zone and Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits). By June 2000, there seemed to be no distinguishable pattern to how land acquisition was being carried out. In practice, any piece of land could be compulsorily acquired and the sizes of the properties ranged between 33,000 hectares and less than 50 hectares. In addition to the official land identification criteria in the government's land reform policy documents, more and more land was acquired on one or more of the criteria below:

- Farms were neighbouring communities/communal area had a historical claim.
- Conservancies and plantation farms engaged in large-scale production of coffee, tea, timber, citrus fruits and sugar cane.
- Agro-industrial properties involved in processing or marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products.
- State-land that was leased for private use to individuals, companies or institutions under Export Processing Zone and Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits/license tenure/contractual arrangements with the state for fishing, game parks, logging or safari purposes (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a).
- Farms belonging to church organisations.
- Farms belonging to foreign nationals protected by Bi-lateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004).
• Farms belonging to MDC officials or known MDC supporters (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

• Farms on which the owner had a reputation for ill-treating his workers.

• Farms were the owner had regular conflicts with villagers in the neighbouring communal area.

By January 2002, 6 481 farms had been listed for compulsory acquisition. However, 918 of these farms were de-listed because they had been counted twice. Another 689 farms were de-listed after litigation or negotiation; leaving a total of 4 874 listed farms covering 9.23 million hectares (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11). In May 2002, about 3 000 white farmers (farms covering approximately 12 million acres) were given forty-five days notice to vacate their properties without compensation or risk imprisonment (Meredith, 2003: 195, 197 & 230; Buckle, 2002:129; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179).

5.8 Land Allocation: Settler Identification and Emplacement

This section is a summary of land allocation during the fast-track land reform programme. According to an interview conducted by Amnesty International on 28 November 2001, the Agritex (government’s agricultural extension services division) identified land for resettlement and sub-divided it. Although elected officials in the civil service (Rural District Councils, District Administrators, Chiefs) constituted the official land allocation structure, in practice, official channels were often superseded by informal processes governed by Zanu-PF committees, the army, war veterans and youth militias (Meredith, 2003:195; Amnesty International 2001 cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:26). Buckle (2002) notes that many land applications were made through war veteran commanders or Zanu-PF militias operating in a particular area or leading the occupation of a particular farm. War veterans influenced the beneficiary selection criteria by selectively issuing application forms and allocating land along party-political lines. People registered for land allocation with war veterans after showing national identity cards and Zanu-PF membership cards as proof of support for the government, thus excluding opposition MDC supporters from the land allocation process. It is reported that people who applied for land in this way also had to pay between Z$20 and Z$350 for 2-10 hectares of land which they were told would be allocated at a later stage (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12; Buckle, 2002:27 & 85). These processes were
illIfegulated and constituted discrimination because beneficiary selection was highly politicised. Land allocation was not always transparent and no provisions were made for appeals if applications were unsuccessful (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 26-29).

Land allocation according to political affiliation raised questions about the extent to which the real need for land was a criterion for land allocation, especially since the main beneficiaries turned out to be Zanu-PF officials, war veterans, card carrying Zanu-PF members, senior police officers and other security force personnel, civil servants and journalists affiliated with state-owned newspapers; many of whom have no farming experience (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). Meredith (2003:197) notes that the ruling elite (President Mugabe’s wife (Grace) and brother-in-law, ministers and senior officials) took the prized, most valuable properties for themselves, a repeat of the land corruption of the 1990s. Kibble (2004:367) suspected too that this trend would continue into the campaign for the 2005 parliamentary elections, where Zanu-PF supporters would be allocated peri-urban land as a way of buying votes.

According to government statements, 51 543 landless peasant families were identified for resettlement on 2.1 million hectares during Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform. Government figures show that 4 697 families were resettled during the Inception Phase of the fast-track land reform programme between October 1998 and June 2000 (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:6). Table 8 below shows a breakdown of resettlement figures for the fast-track land reform programme according to provinces.

Table 8: Resettlement Statistics for the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Land Area (ha)</th>
<th>Resettled Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>56 721</td>
<td>3 974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>189 991.3457</td>
<td>8 945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>107 613.82</td>
<td>4 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>182 651.782</td>
<td>6 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>309 245.2011</td>
<td>10 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>381 355</td>
<td>8 908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>587 179.2054</td>
<td>5 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>270 539.8113</td>
<td>3 755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 083 301.166</strong></td>
<td><strong>51 543</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:7 & 29)
Van den Brink’s (2000:11) figures, however, note that significantly less families (about 1700) were resettled in the same period at a cost of Z$200 million.

5.9 Resettlement Models and Tenure Regimes
According to Deininger (2003), secure land tenure can improve the welfare of the poor by enhancing their asset base. It also acts as an incentive that increases people’s willingness to invest in agricultural production. Secure land tenure gives landowners better credit access because title deeds can be used as collateral for bank loans. Deininger (2003) notes, however, that there is no ideal tenure system. Instead, tenure systems vary according to agrarian experience and the social and political environment of each country. This section discusses how the tenure regimes and resettlement models adopted for Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform operate in practice.

Model A1: The government had planned to resettle 160 000 poor people selected from Rural District Council waiting lists under the A1 resettlement model (Human Rights Watch, 2002:12). In practice, approximately 2 652 farms with a combined hectarage of between 4 231 080 hectares and 6.5 million hectares were allocated to between 127 192 and 130 641 households nationally under Model A1 between July and November 2003. The beneficiary take-up rate of allocated land under Model A1 was 97% (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:5). However, it has been noted that women and other disadvantaged groups (including opposition supporters) lost out in the beneficiary selection process (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3; LandWeb, 2000c). It is also interesting to note that although war veterans were a major force in supporting and driving the fast-track land reform programme, they did not receive the 20% of redistributed A1 land which they had been promised by the government. Instead, they received between 2% and 22% of land under the A1 resettlement scheme (below 15% nationally) (Moyo, 2004:26-27).

Although, in terms of the land reform blueprint, beneficiaries are supposed to have 99-year leasehold tenure with the option to purchase the land at a later stage (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13), in practice, legal lease contracts, permits or titles for redistributed land/new land owners have not been officially provided because of delays in the legal transfer of commercial farmland. Model A1 settlers are being issued temporary occupation licenses which will be converted into proper leases at a later stage. Inefficiencies also exist in other areas of land administration, namely, boundary
demarcation, registration and record keeping, thereby leaving the reform process incomplete. These delays also apply to titles for the few remaining large commercial farmers since there are numerous land cases still pending in the Administrative and Supreme Courts (Mushonawari, 2005:1; Moyo, 2004:27; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Hall, 2003:262-264; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3, 12-13).

**Model A2:** Approximately 1,672 farms covering between 2,198,814 hectares and 2.5 million hectares were allocated to 7,260 beneficiaries by 31 July 2003. The number of model A2 beneficiaries rose to 20,400 by November 2003. The take-up rate for allocated model A2 resettlement land ranged from 42% in Manicaland and 100% in Matabeleland South provinces. The national average take-up rate under model A2 was 66% by mid 2003 and some beneficiaries received irrigated land (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:5). According to the Utete Report (2003), the failure by 34% of applicants to take up their land allocations means that a considerable amount of land is lying fallow or unused while thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries have no land. In terms of the land reform policy, Model A2 beneficiaries had to be competent farmers but this criterion was not followed strictly in practice. According to press reports, model A2 beneficiaries included Zanu-PF officials, senior police officers and other security force personnel, civil servants and journalists affiliated with the state-owned newspapers and prominent Zanu-PF supporters; many of whom have no farming experience (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). As with Model A1 above, the 20% of model A2 land that war veterans were promised did not materialise. War veterans received between 7% and 17% of Model A2 land, depending on agro-ecological regions (Moyo, 2004:26-27).

As with model A1 above, in practice, legal lease contracts, permits or titles for most redistributed land/new land owners have not been officially provided because of delays in the legal transfer of commercial farmland and inefficiencies in other areas of land administration, namely, boundary demarcation, registration and record keeping, thereby leaving the reform process incomplete (Mushonawari, 2005:1; Moyo, 2004:27; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Hall, 2003:262-264; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3, 12-13). According to the Administrative Court in Manicaland, about 219 land acquisition dispute cases countrywide had been confirmed in favour of the government by January 2005 since 2002. As of January 2005, an estimated 5,099 cases were still pending and the number of
such cases continued to rise (Mushonawari, 2005:1). Table 9 below shows a breakdown of pending land cases by province as of January 2005.

Table 9: Unresolved Land Cases by Province as of January 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>1364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mushonawari, 2005:1)

The Utete Report (2003:33) recommended that these issues be addressed as soon as possible. It is worth noting too that in practice, the Ministry of Local Government (responsible for rental evaluation) has been unable to strictly implement the policy regarding the purchasing of A2 farms by resettled farmers (LandWeb, 2000a).

In November 2001, the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (in terms of Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999 above) gazetted regulations further limiting maximum farm sizes in the main arable areas, and the drier grazing areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). All village land is now vested in the President (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den Brink, 2000). Statutory land (state-land allocated for an identified, specific use by a statutory body in terms of an Act of Parliament, for example, state-lands leased to the Forestry Commission and the Parks and Wildlife Board) is now held under freehold title (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den Brink, 2000; LandWeb, 2000a).

5.10 Evaluation of Fast-Track Land Reform

Human Rights Watch (2002:4) concedes that Zimbabwe had well-developed plans to implement a comprehensive land reform programme but the government side-stepped them by condoning political violence and general lawlessness. The land reform programme’s methodology/execution became a major source of friction between Zimbabwe and the donor community. Chitiyo (2003:166) and Bush and Szeftel (2000:178) criticise the Zimbabwean government for failing to adhere to the guidelines (deliberately ignoring procedures) set at the September 1998 Donors’ Conference. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2003) describes
the land reform as “chaotic”, “opaque” and “problematic.” The Coalition (2003) contends that the reform programme was a short-sighted and “unsustainable political gimmick” that was carried out too rapidly. The Zimbabwean government began losing the confidence and goodwill of its donors at an early stage because of contradictory statements and actions by various government ministries and officials involved in the land reform process (Buckle, 2002:35-36, 167). The acrimony caused by the programme is evidenced by the court actions instituted by white commercial farmers (through the CFU) towards the end of 2000 mentioned above (Meredith, 2003:197). Many white farmers fled the country and bought farms in Malawi and Mozambique but some have stayed despite the violence, fear, insecurity, tension and uncertainty.

Other problems arose from pronouncements by some government ministers that only Zanu-PF supporters would receive resettlement land under the land reform programme. Such statements were compounded by the fact that war veterans, and youth militias under their tutelage, seemed to have carte blanche in land allocation and overrode, undermined and made a mockery of official land allocation structures such as Beneficiary Selection Committees (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Instead of improving the welfare of the poor and landless, and the country as a whole through increased agricultural output, the fast-track land reform programme reduced Zimbabwe to a pariah state that is despised, ridiculed, isolated and beset by violence, lawlessness, famine and a growing welfare crisis (Jenkins and Knight, 2002).

The fast-track land reform programme can be analysed in a number of different ways; the most obvious, and perhaps important one, being the transfer of land from whites to blacks. Despite the controversies and problems created by fast-track land reform; government ministers and other government officials in the army, police and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) heralded the programme as a “successful revolution about agrarian empowerment” (Chitiyo, 2003:166; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004). The programme was the most successful (compared to its predecessors) in terms of distributional outcomes or transferring white-owned land to black people. The land reform programme’s radical and forceful nature was defended by the Zimbabwean government because extensive land redistribution occurred and the land reform programme increased smallholder control of land from 56% to 70% under the resettlement models described above (Moyo, 2004:25-26; Utete Report, 2003). The Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the
fast-track land reform programme was chaired by Dr Charles Utete. The Utete Commission, and subsequent Utete Report (2003), also hailed the successes of the fast-track land reform programme in the face of "formidable odds", although it highlighted several problems in the programme's implementation (Utete Report, 2003; Chitiyo, 2003:166). However, although the fast-track land reform programme was highly successful in terms of distributional outcomes, the Utete Report (2003) the and Manica Post Farming Reporter (2005:18) note that more land is still needed to cope with demand, particularly for Model A2 resettlement land. The Utete Report (2003) notes that there demand for land is still high in Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West and parts of Matabeleland North and South provinces. It is also noted that not much de-congestion had taken place in Mberengwa and Zvishavane districts at the time the report was compiled (Utete Report, 2003:7). The Utete Report (2003:7) notes that the fast-track reform programme was often implemented in a haphazard manner in terms of the criteria for land identification for compulsory acquisition, the acquisition process and settler emplacement, for example, in parts of Mashonaland West adjacent to Harare and the western and north-western parts of Mashonaland province where land invasions were most prevalent.

Regarding the "formidable odds" encountered during the land reform's implementation, the Utete Report (2003:6 & 30) enumerates factors such as a hostile external political environment (including sanctions by the Commonwealth, America, Australia and the European Union), national macro-economic instability, legal and constitutional objections to compulsory land acquisition by white farmers and the exploitation of the land reform programme by opportunists pretending to be war veterans. According to the Utete Report (2003:31), certain people who did not have official status or authority interfered with the land reform programme, particularly land allocation in districts adjacent to main towns and cities (Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Gwanda being the most affected). The Utete Commission states that the government regrets the unwelcome intervention by such individuals or groups (2003). Statements about "regrettable violent incidences", ostensibly by misguided, criminally inclined elements pretending to be war veterans, were also mentioned in May 2000 when the Commonwealth's head of security, Don McKinnon, visited Zimbabwe to assess the situation in the country before the June 2000 parliamentary elections (Buckle, 2002:99). Again in August 2000, Zimbabwe's Minister of Home Affairs told the Financial Gazette that the police were ready to deal forcefully with "rogue elements within the war veterans' fraternity" for violent actions and ignoring court orders (Buckle, 2002:174).
Despite these pronouncements, however, some commentators are convinced that these so-called misguided elements were acting on the orders of the ruling party and government. Buckle (2002: 5, 16, 84 & 178), Chitiyo (2003:278) and Meredith (2003: 167-169) speak of a deliberate alliance (and payment) between the government and ‘war veterans’ which cannot be ignored. However, to prove its point, the government (Vice President Joseph Msika, successive Home Affairs Ministers Dumiso Dabengwa and John Nkomo, senior Zanu-PF spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira) deployed riot police a few times to evict some invaders (knocking down and burning the structures they had erected on occupied farms) from farms around Harare, for example, Stoneridge Estate and Blackfordby Farm. Other illegal land occupiers were removed from Kambuzuma Extension and parts of Chitungwiza, but each time this happened, other government officials (President Mugabe, Vice President Muzenda, the Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) would override the order to have the squatters removed, for instance, the Information Minister announced on 30 November 2000 that the government would not be removing squatters and war veterans from occupied farms (Buckle, 2002:191-192, 216 & 239).

Chitiyo (2003:160) points out that the fast-track land reform programme was froth with problems (legal, logistical) and describes the programme as a “revolutionary experiment in socio-agrarian engineering.” The Utete Commission (2003) and government officials variously admitted that several obstacles interfered with the land reform’s implementation, for example, resource constraints, disagreements over the legal framework, bureaucratic and related operational/procedural irregularities and inconsistencies in acquiring and redistributing land. The United Nations’ Development Programme (UNDP) was part of the land reform audit/evaluation structure. A UNDP report on land acquisition structures and procedures noted in 2002 that, in practice, the elaborate decentralisation of functions within the land reform programme’s institutional framework created serious implementation problems. The report stated that “weak capacity and poor coordination” compromised the reform programme’s effectiveness and efficiency (UNDP Interim Mission Report 2002 cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:12). The report expressed concern over the numerous links between the different ministries and between national, provincial and local/district levels because, in practice, these links created a lot of confusion and duplication. The UNDP noted that “complex, cumbersome consultations and decision-making processes involving numerous district, provincial and central government actors” made the land reform process

The complexities and inconsistencies in the land reform process resulted in a variety of legal issues that remain unresolved in respect of compulsory land acquisition, for example, land allocation to beneficiaries, especially under the A2 model; the assessment of the value of improvements on farms for compensation; as well as ownership and access to moveable assets on acquired farms (Utete Report, 2003). Some of these problems arose because the Technical Support Unit that was supposed to be set up before the start of the Inception Phase was never formed. The Administrative Court in Manicaland revealed that a significant number of white commercial farmers are seeking to reverse the government’s decision to compulsorily acquire their farms for resettlement, and the number of such cases continues to rise (Mushonawari, 2005:1). According to Mushonawari (2005:1), in most instances the Administrative Court has ruled in the government’s favour.

In spite of the radical nature of fast-track land reform, Von Blanckenburg’s (1994:33) rationalisation that, in any land reform, a portion of productive commercial farmland should be left intact and be devoted to the production of high value export crops is still relevant. It is noted, for example, with a view to restore viability in some crucial industries, the government de-listed some dairy farms in Mashonaland East province that had been designated for compulsory acquisition (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004). The Utete Commission (2003:5) established that 1 323 white farmers still held 1 377 agro-industrial farms covering 1 175 607 hectares by 31 July 2003. The total landholding under this category constitutes about 3% of land in the country, excluding land held by corporate entities. This is a huge decline from about 50% at independence in 1980. Zinyama (2001:175) notes that some of these farms have been down-sized or sub-divided into smaller units (averaging 854 hectares) to allow for resettlement around them. Another 960 large farms are owned by the state or by multinationals and continue to operate relatively normally although investment in infrastructure; and the total planted area has been reduced significantly (Moyo, 2004:28; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 14).

On the other hand, Human Rights Watch (2002:14) estimates that about 1 000 commercial farms had shut-down operations because their owners had been evicted (or allowed to stay
but not engage in farming activities by militias occupying the land) by 2002. The Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) believes the number of white-owned farms that are still operational (without being de-listed) is less than 650 and that several such farms are around the Midlands Province and Bindura area (Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Chitiyo, 2003:183).

Moyo (2004:28) notes too that 1,440 black-owned (government officials and other influential people) large-scale commercial farms were never gazetted for acquisition; neither were they sub-divided into smaller units. Moyo (2004:26-27) reports that about 142 black and white farmers still own multiple farms which they bought on the open market before the reform and that other influential individuals were allocated more than one model A2 farm under the fast-track land reform programme.

LandWeb (2000c) criticises the government for treating fast-track land reform as an event and not as a process. LandWeb (2000c) contends that the government limited the land reform programme to land acquisition and redistribution without paying enough attention to other issues that would flow from the reform, for instance, the environmental damage that would be caused by resettlement. LandWeb (2000c) notes that by September 2000, the fast-track land reform programme did not have clear plans for Environmental Impact Assessment studies or the enhancement of environmental sustainability. Zimbabwe has a total land surface area of 390,757 sq. km (150,872 sq. miles) and had a population of 11.6 million according to the 2002 census. LandWeb (2000c) contends that land pressure (population densities and land carrying capacities) should have been an integral part of the reform process. Mr. Tengendu of the Farmers Development Trust, an organization that trains farmers, pointed out in 2000 that contrary to government claims, a survey of new resettlement areas showed that resettlement was disorderly; mainly because farm and village aerial surveys were not being carried out. He also noted that the analytical work necessary for prudent farming practices was not being undertaken, for instance, there was no analysis of soil structure and capability before people were resettled (LandWeb, 2000c).

The Utete Report (2003) attributes some of these oversights to the fact that the government had limited financial resources and faced administrative difficulties because the bureaucratic apparatus was over-stretched in coping with the haste in which land reform was carried out (Utete Report, 2003; Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:15-16; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173; LandWeb, 2000b; LandWeb, 2000c).
Hall (2003:262-264) observes that apart from its immediate focus on land redistribution; fast-track land reform did not adopt a comprehensive restitution or tenure strategy. The most striking thing about the fast-track land reform programme, apart from the violence, is that concrete provisions were not made for about 300,000 former farm workers who lost their jobs and security of residential tenure on white-owned farms (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3). On the other hand, Chitiyo (2003:164) notes that “blitzkrieg style land invasions” during the land reform allowed the occupiers to assume automatic land ownership during the invasions. This ownership by conquest, however, proved to be problematic and untenable as early as mid-2000 and the government has been taking some steps to remedy the situation by evicting or shifting illegal land occupiers from illegally occupied farms and re-locating them elsewhere, provided alternative land is available (Mungoshi, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:33; Buckle, 2002:158). President Mugabe told a press conference with South African President Thabo Mbeki in mid-2000 that the government would remove war veterans from occupied farms but many believe that this was just window dressing as President Mugabe contradicted himself when he announced a few days later that war veterans would not be removed from occupied farms: “I didn’t say war veterans should be removed...The donors can stay with their money. We will not give up our land because of what the donors say.” (President Mugabe cited in the Daily News in Buckle, 2002:174 & 175).

The government did not have an efficient system of issuing land permits or leases to guarantee the tenure of resettled people. Consequently, some pieces of land were allocated multiple times to different people since new settlers did not have written proof that the land in question was allocated to them (Utete Report, 2003:33; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13). These problems have resulted in a high turn-over of new settlers as many leave resettlement areas after a short while. Human Rights Watch (2002:12) attributes this turn-over to conflicts between different groups of settlers over the allocation of some pieces of land. This situation, in turn, is disrupting agricultural production in new resettlement areas. The uncertainty over tenure security is exacerbated by the general rule that people forfeit land in the communal areas if they take up allocated land under the fast-track programme. Land in the communal areas is allocated for cultivation and housing by traditional leaders and villagers do not have absolute ownership of such land. The problem with this rule is that if a person is absent for an extended period of time, they forfeit their right to hold communal land and their land is re-allocated to someone else. Some newly resettled people are in a
dilemma where they have insecure tenure (no legal security) in the new resettlement areas and can easily be displaced with no access to communal land (Human Rights Watch, 2002:14-15).

5.11 Some Recommendations by the Utete Commission
The period between the lodging of appeals and the final determination or confirmation of acquisition orders by the Administrative or Supreme Courts is filled with uncertainty. This uncertainty negatively impacts farmers’ investment/business decisions, especially since landless peasants, former farm workers and newly resettled people moved onto disputed farms and started working the land before the courts gave a final ruling (Mushonawari, 2005:1). Representations were made by some white commercial farmers to the Utete Commission regarding their status after the land reform programme. The farmers included those that had been served with Section 8 orders yet they owned only one farm; farmers who fell under the agro-industrial category or those that had surrendered their other farm(s) to government and had been allowed to choose to keep one farm or sub-division thereof. The Utete Commission (2003:7) recommended that the government should conclusively and expeditiously address problems arising from the allocation of land sub-divisions to allow for productive land-use and a sense of certainty for the white farmers concerned, provided the farmers were in compliance with all criteria set by the government in this regard (review and rectification where deemed necessary). The Commission (Utete Report, 2003:7) also recommended that action be taken as soon as possible to regularise the situation regarding land which is held under Bi-lateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. Although such farms were officially exempted from the compulsory acquisition process, some were acquired despite the exemption (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

The Utete Commission recommended that the government make speedy efforts to de-list dairy farms in Mashonaland East province that had been gazetted for compulsory acquisition and about 185 such farms have since been de-listed in Mashonaland East (the highest number per province) (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:37). The Utete Commission (2003) also noted that several farms had been left intact, even though they exceeded the recommended maximum farm sizes, for instance, around the Midlands Province and Bindura area. The Utete Commission (2003) suggested that a review of this situation should take into account land use patterns in the relevant areas.
The Utete Commission recommended that land administration (land registration, resolution of boundary disputes, tenure, compensation, maximum farm sizes, multiple ownership, inheritance systems, farm swaps and sub-divisions, land tax and new settler allocations) be undertaken by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Development in conjunction with the Department of Lands and the Surveyor General. The Utete Commission suggested that these institutions be supported by the District Development Fund and the agricultural extension parastatal, ARDA (Utete Report, 2003:80). The Utete Commission recommended that speedy action be taken by the government to resolve land allocation issues arising out of, or outstanding from the land reform programme’s implementation, together with the issue of leases or other forms of legal title for land reform beneficiaries because tenure security is vital for assured, productive land-use. Particular reference was made to the case of applicants for A2 plots whose names were published in newspapers as confirmation that they met the criteria for land allocation. The Commission noted that despite satisfying the set criteria, many such applicants were still waiting to be allocated land by their local leaders (District Administrators, chiefs) (Utete Report, 2003). Some model A2 applicants were still waiting to be informed whether their applications were successful or not. Others were waiting to hear whether their plots, which were irregularly taken over by others, would be given back to them or if replacement allocations would be made, provided the land in question had not been de-listed (Utete Report, 2003:88).

The Utete Commission also recommended the establishment of a semi-autonomous National Land Board to facilitate the effective functioning of the Ministry of Land Affairs. The National Land Board would exercise both executive and advisory functions in conjunction with the Ministry of Land Affairs. Further, the Commission recommended that the National Land Board be empowered to ensure that land allocated/redistributed under the land reform programme be fully utilised (Utete Report, 2003:80). The Commission recommended a countrywide review of plots sizes allocated under the A1 and A2 models to ensure consistency and compliance with policy guidelines. With regards to statutory maximum farm sizes, the Utete Commission, while noting the rationale for these, recommended flexibility in their enforcement, taking into account land-use patterns in different ecological zones and the infrastructure already on the land (Utete Report, 2003:86).
5.12 Concluding Remarks

The Zimbabwean government initially committed itself to following a process of consultation, gender sensitivity and equity in its land reform programme because the programme was meant to reduce the marginalisation of vulnerable groups (Utete Report, 2003). LandWeb (2000c) notes, however, that the government abandoned these plans and excluded civil society participation (did not consult) during the fast-track land reform programme; resulting in controversial policy positions. Legal mechanisms for negotiating and resolving grievances were deliberately subverted in favour of authoritarian and violent means and the assessment of civic organisations in this regard is that political expediency took precedence over social and economic considerations (Hall, 2003:276 & 280; Chitiyo, 2003:179, 183 & 198; Meredith, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Bush and Szeftel, 2002; Sachikonye, 2002:13; McGregor, 2002:11; Buckle, 2002:101; Raftopolous, 2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179; Krieger, 2000:448).

According to Deininger (2003:149), the main challenge for land reform in Africa is to provide an agricultural base for a vibrant and productive rural sector but achievements thus far lag significantly behind expectations and Zimbabwe's experience of fast-track land reform demonstrates why this is so. An account of the fast-track land reform programme's catastrophic economic and social consequences shows that although the programme finally changed Zimbabwe's racially skewed land ownership patterns, it has not improved agricultural output or the general well-being of the society.

This chapter has shown that the fast-track land reform programme did not go as smoothly as had been hoped (Moyo, 2004:20-22). The programme sparked debates over whether the means used to implement it justified the ends achieved, regardless of the political necessity. Chitiyo (2003:183) questions whether Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform was a "grand emancipatory" or "grand totalitarian" project. The reactionary nature of the government's actions in the face of opposition leads one to conclude that the latter masqueraded as the former. Whilst one cannot deny that some degree of compulsion was necessary for the government to acquire land from white farmers for redistribution to landless peasants, it is debatable how much force would have sufficed. The political or diplomatic meltdown between Zimbabwe and the international community (mainly donors) over the land reform programme had dire economic ramifications. The consequences of land reform phase 3 are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
6

The Consequences of Fast-Track Land Reform

6.1 Introduction

It was established in the previous chapter that numerous constitutional, legal and administrative changes (amendments, enactments) were made by the Zimbabwean government in order to implement the fast-track land reform programme. However, according to Olaleye (2005), Makumbe (2003b), Chan (2003), Buckle (2002) and Moyo (1999:2, 3 & 7), these decisions or changes undermined democratic governance in Zimbabwe, instead of consolidating it. The government’s intolerance of political opposition parties and the independent media, its handling of white citizenship and property rights and the erosion of the separation of powers between the three tiers of government (executive, parliament and the judiciary) are examples that illustrate this point. These were systematically undermined even though political freedom and other civil liberties are enshrined in Zimbabwe’s constitution. The implementation of the land reform programme led to wanton disregard for the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of fear, both of which have had serious political, economic and social ramifications. Von Blanckenburg (1994) and Warriner (1969) express reservations about the implementation of radical land reforms and Zimbabwe’s experience of fast-track land reform proves that radical approaches to land reform can indeed be counter-productive. This chapter discusses the consequences of the land reform programme and evaluates its impact on peasants, farm workers, white farmers, opposition political parties, the media, the economy as well as the Zimbabwean government’s diplomatic relationships with the international community (donor and non-donor).

Apart from an evaluation of the fast-track land reform programme in terms of the amount of land transferred from white commercial farmers to blacks (previous chapter), this study sought to identify individual and collective survival strategies in the aftermath of this significant chapter in Zimbabwe’s land reform efforts. This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first one discusses fast-track land reform as it relates to development (Coetzee, 2001:119; Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393; Swanepoel 1997a:48; Preston, 1996:245 & 246; Seers, 1979) and McDowell’s (1996) theory of displacement and impoverishment. The land reform is analysed within a developmental framework because one of the main
motivations for its implementation was the government’s desire to distribute the country’s main means of production (land) more evenly, thereby giving ordinary Zimbabweans the means to earn a decent living. The Utete Report (2003:15-20) cites, among others, the following reasons for the fast-track land reform programme:

- To positively transform people’s social and economic circumstances.
- To transform the rural economy by increasing agricultural production to enhance national food security and industrial development.

According to LandWeb (2000c), to meet these aims, the government initially committed itself to following a process of consultation, gender sensitivity and equity to reduce the marginalisation of vulnerable groups (1998 Donors Conference). However, instead of alleviating poverty by increasing the people’s income base, the fast-track land reform programme has had devastating social and economic costs, such that many ordinary people believe that they are economically worse-off than they were before the land reform (LandWeb, 2000c). The government’s pronouncements on the successes of the programme have been overshadowed by the programme’s negative impacts on the economy. Jenkins and Knight (2002:102) are equally sceptical and contend that the way in which fast-track land reform erupted in violence and caused so much destruction from 2000 onwards drastically reduced its chances of enhancing people’s socio-economic circumstances. The plight of Zimbabwe’s farm workers and their dependents illustrates this point well. This constituency represented 20% of the country’s population and more than half of them became destitute because of this particular land reform exercise (Mlambo, 2003:201). McDowell’s (1996:6) observation that forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheaval or natural disaster has far-reaching consequences that ingrain the “multidimensionality of impoverishment and social disintegration” accurately describes Zimbabwe’s farm workers’ struggle to survive after fast-track land reform.

This situation is a major concern in light of Warriner’s (1969:13, 28-29, 234) contention that the primary test of the efficacy of land reform is measured by, *inter alia*, whether or not the social conditions or living standards of land recipients, and the society as a whole, improve because of the reform. Many would argue that Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform fails this test (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Meredith, 2003:231; Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition, 2003; Buckle, 2002:48, 109 & 142; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002; LandWeb, 2000c). Development issues are dealt with in relation to people’s dwindling socio-economic prospects, partly a result of the unrealistic targets that the government set for itself immediately after independence. These unrealistic targets were compounded by failed economic structural adjustment in the 1990s (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). Zimbabwe’s economic crisis deteriorated further with the implementation of fast-track land reform and this situation has implications for the immediate needs or socio-economic prospects, not just of newly resettled people (high levels of poverty, agricultural support and infrastructure provision), but the entire population.

The second part of this chapter analyses Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform as it relates to Salmi’s (1993) typology of violence. Salmi (1993) contends that there are many different kinds of violence. Violence can be direct or indirect and one would argue that both forms were a characteristic of fast-track land reform and have adversely affected Zimbabwe’s political arena (voter apathy). The section on violence traces the birth of the first significant political opposition to the ruling Zanu-PF party, mainly as a result of widespread feelings of disillusionment with the government’s policies since independence in 1980. The chapter shows how the government became increasingly reactionary and authoritarian when it was threatened by a fermenting legitimacy crisis, before the June 2000 parliamentary election and after it (Olaleye, 2005; Meredith, 2003; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Land reform constituted direct physical violence by the police (beatings, unlawful detainment) and ruling party militias and supporters (kidnapping, torture, murder) (Olaleye, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004; Meredith, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002; Makumbe, 2003b; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22-25). Less direct forms of violence were committed insofar as the land reform programme interfered with the fulfilment of many people’s (farm workers, farmers, the poor and vulnerable) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes (BBC News, July 2005; Meredith, 2003:167-170; Buckle, 2002).

6.2 People-Centred Development Theories
The word development is a normative concept that has the connotation of ‘favourable or good social change,’ ‘improvement’ and ‘transformation.’ Development is synonymous with “progress”, through which individuals and groups participate in making decisions that affect their lives (economically, socially and politically) (Swanepoel 1997a:48; Chambers, 1997
According to Coetzee (2001:119), the word development implies the “right to live a meaningful life” or “human well-being” (livelihood, security, equity and sustainability). Although the process of development can disrupt established patterns of living, people aspire towards this state of being because development implies “improved living standards, improved health and well-being and the achievement of whatever is regarded as a general good for society” in the long term (Thomas, 2000:23). It is expected, therefore, that development interventions should offer people the opportunity to become more than they already are (Coetzee, 2001:119).

Dudley Seers (1969 cited in Thomas: 2000:33) challenges the economic basis of development that emphasises productivity and economic growth without reducing poverty or meeting basic human needs. Seers (1979) poses the question; “What constitutes true development?” He argues that development should be much more than just economic growth (reflected in GDPs). His contention is that economic growth does not automatically translate to poverty reduction or the reduction of unemployment and inequality because development is social, political and economic (multi-dimensional).

Alternative approaches to development or discourses about ‘egalitarian development’ date back to the United Nations sponsored symposium on development in Mexico in 1974 and the International Labour Organisation’s World Employment Conference in 1976, both of which affirmed the importance of basic human needs. The UN symposium of 1974 led to the Cocoyoc Declaration which called attention to the needs of the poorest of the poor. The Cocoyoc Declaration insisted that any process of growth that does not address the most basic needs of the poorest people makes a mockery of the process of development.

The Basic Needs debate was a move away from narrow economic discussions and drew an important distinction between economic growth and the provision of the basic necessities; requirements or the minimum physiological needs of human beings for social existence. The Basic Needs Approach emphasised the importance of addressing people’s basic needs such as food, water, shelter, health, clothing, education, work and political participation (Coetzee, 2001; Preston, 1996:245 & 246). The Cocoyoc Declaration also included issues like choice, self-reliance, the right to vote and the right to an opinion because, ultimately, proponents of Alternative or People-Centred development understand poverty and underdevelopment as being synonymous with a “lack of choice or capability” (Kotze, 1988:43 cited in Treurnicht, 1997:27).
According to Eyben (1998 cited in Green, 2002:53), “a socially aware approach to development is one that recognises that all policies and programmes have social dimensions and implications across all sectors.” The role of governments in such an approach is to ensure that “poor and vulnerable groups either benefit directly from development interventions or...that the poor are not disadvantaged and made poorer as a result of their engagement with development processes” (Green, 2002:53). Proponents of Basic Needs or Human-Centred Approaches take development to mean progress in terms of combating or alleviating poverty (evidenced by low levels of material poverty, unemployment, maternal and child mortality as well as relative equality, better education), whilst restoring or enhancing basic human capabilities and freedoms because “human welfare and progress should be the ultimate goal of all development policies” (Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393). People-Centred development emphasises “people as agents of development; solving their own problems individually or through local organisations and networks” (Thomas, 2000:48; Coetzee, 2001). David Korten (1995 cited in Thomas, 2000:32-33) is one of the leading proponents of Alternative or People-Centred development and he believes that ‘authentic development’ is guided by three basic principles that support people’s aspirations for improved quality of life:

- **Justice:** priority must be given to assuring a decent human existence for all people.
- **Sustainability:** The earth’s resources must be used in ways that assure the well-being of future generations.
- **Inclusiveness:** Every person must have an opportunity to be a recognised and respected contributor to family, community and society.

*Alternative approaches* to development are criticised for being idealistic and ignoring the limits posed by historical and political contexts. Green (2000 cited in Green 2002:62) maintains that development is a concept informed by subjective or moralistic value judgements and “effective social analysis of any local situation must take into account the effect of policy contexts and macro-level influences” (social, political and economic constraints and motivations). Wisner (1988:49 cited in Swanepoel, 1997a:48) states that “development is part of local politics because the process of need definition and identification is political” and gaining access to available resources is also a political act which can cause tension and conflict. Swanepoel (1997b:56) cautions that the state’s role in
development is “informed by an attitude or a commitment demonstrated through national economic, social, technical and fiscal policy in support of development goals.” Swanepoel (1997b:58) notes further that whilst development policies ought to reflect the needs of intended beneficiaries, it is only “a relatively strong government with a strong legitimacy base that can really involve people in policy matters.” One can argue that this is where many third world governments fall short. Zimbabwe’s attempts to achieve and maintain a decent level of development have had mixed success as the next section demonstrates.

6.2.1 The Birth of Zimbabwe’s Economic Crisis

Many people believed that Zimbabwe had a bright future at independence. The then president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, advised President Mugabe: “You have inherited a jewel. Keep it that way” (cited in Meredith, 2003:14). Jenkins and Knight (2002) maintain that the seeds of Zimbabwe’s economic decline were sown soon after independence because of the ambitious and unsustainable policy initiatives undertaken by the government. The government had to satisfy certain domestic expectations in order to sustain its political legitimacy and adopted a strategy of balancing reconciliation (to retain the skills of white settlers in order to ensure economic stability) with black advancement. The new government’s economic policy was market-oriented but with a ‘growth with redistribution’ orientation to address the resource imbalances inherited from the colonial era (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:2). This strategy was the backbone of the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982/83-1984/85. The ‘growth with equity’ policy or economic growth and redistribution of resources to the previously disenfranchised black majority entailed reducing urban bias in the provision of public services by extending people’s access to schools, clinics, water, electricity, agricultural extension, research and credit, particularly in the rural areas. Also central to this policy was the question of land reform (Meredith, 2003:47; Jenkins and Knight, 2002).

The government’s plans were ambitious and required excessive government spending against available resources. The government funded these initiatives using aid money pledged by Western countries that admired the spirit of reconciliation and good-will that was adopted by the new government. According to Jenkins and Knight (2002:133), President Kissinger of America promised Zimbabwe US$1 billion in 1976 but in 1980, America’s official pledge was only US$25 million. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was held in March 1981. Zimbabwe was promised £636 million in development aid at this conference, bringing the total aid pledged close to £900 million.
(US$1.9 billion). The World Bank was the largest single donor and offered Zimbabwe Z$287.5 billion in soft loans, followed by the United States of America which provided Zimbabwe with a three year package of US$225 million and the European Economic Community (EEC) (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:133). A wave of aid workers and expatriate workers arrived in Zimbabwe after this conference to help rebuild the new state but the period of optimism and grand plans was short-lived as some pledges of assistance by the donor community were never honoured (Meredith, 2003:47; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:47).

According to Jenkins and Knight (2002), the government's post-independence policies necessitated pervasive government intervention in the economy to the point where, within a decade of independence, the government was losing political and economic direction. In terms of government intervention in education and health; enrolment increased in secondary education and there was a reduction in infant mortality because people who earned less than Z$150 per annum (US$238) were allowed free health from 1980 (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:87-88). By the mid 1990s, the government was struggling to satisfy and sustain the people's expectations in education and health provision, land reform and employment creation. The cost of living increased by 150% between 1998 and 1999 because of high inflation and interest rates. Real wages deteriorated drastically and people experienced widespread job losses. At least a third of the country's labour force was unemployed and there was a sharp decline in people's standard of living. Severe food, water, fuel and electricity shortages were experienced and these were accompanied by a deteriorating quality of social services (Larsson-Liden, 2000:128 & 131; Krieger, 2000:445; Burkett, 2000:471; Mwanza, 1999; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:33; Riddell, 1992:22). The needs of the poor were side-lined because of a lack of sustained political will by the country's leadership to commit to the socio-economic objectives set at independence. Despite the government's Marxist-Leninist (socialist) outlook and rhetoric, the living standard of the ordinary man had not improved significantly and the electorate became disillusioned (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:2 & 4). Voter apathy and the incidence of protests (rioting) increased notably.

Increased access to wealth by the ruling elite by the mid-1990s proved to be counter productive (crippling corruption and plundering of limited resources and gross mismanagement) when viewed against the government's stated poverty alleviation objectives (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:5; Manza, 1999). Zimbabwe's economy began under-performing because of failed economic structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s, yet the ruling
elite found ways to enrich itself. Fraud, forgery, embezzlement and theft became endemic in government departments and parastatals such as Air Zimbabwe, the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and the District Development Fund (DDF) (Meredith, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002).

The Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries scandal led to the Sandura Commission in 1988 in which several government ministers where implicated. Geoffrey Nyarota, Fredrick Shava and Maurice Nyagurnbo were convicted in the Willowvale debacle (Meredith, 2003). Buckle (2002:56) reports that there was a $28 million scandal in which the Minister of Agriculture was implicated and the GMB was under investigation for fraud involving in excess of $320 million and about $4 million was looted from the DDF by senior government officials. The War Victims Compensation Fund (chapter 3) was defrauded of an estimated $450-$500 million during this period (Meredith, 2003:133-134; Buckle, 2002:56 & 236) and land reform became embroiled in corruption as Zimbabwe's elite established themselves as a new class of land owners, while the majority of black people waited for comprehensive land reform (chapter 2) (Hall, 2003:267; Meredith, 2003:121-127; Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:45; Buckle, 2002:23; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177 &178; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314).

President Mugabe's second wife (Grace) was also involved in the rampant corruption. She acquired 10 acres of land in Harare's affluent Borrowdale suburb to build a mansion. It is alleged that she only paid ZS$78 206 for it even though it was valued at ZS$570 000. Grace also took advantage of an illegal housing scheme that was hatched by government officials in the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing to build houses for VIP beneficiaries (cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, defence and police chiefs). This scheme was later declared corrupt and illegal by the High Court (Meredith, 2003:109; Buckle, 2002:56). On top of all this corruption, the government made huge unbudgeted payments (gratuities, disability compensation and pensions) to Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans (Meredith, 2003:83 & 133-139; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8) and intervened militarily in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a decision which is reported to have cost Zimbabwe US$1 million per day (Meredith, 2003:139,148-157; Chitiyo, 2003:177; Mlambo,
From the 1990s, President Mugabe was no longer required to attend parliament and answer questions regarding government policies and he turned a blind eye to these problems and their cover-ups (Meredith, 2003:81-82, 95-102). Instead, following the 1995 elections, the president, all the cabinet ministers and members of parliament gave themselves lavish pay increases of 133%, yet health spending was cut by 43% and civil servants only received 20% pay increases (and no bonuses), forcing doctors, nurses and students to go on strike against declining standards of living in 1995 (Meredith, 2003:127-131; Mwanza, 1999). High level corruption allowed the governing elite to drive expensive cars, own multiple farms, business concerns, real estate/houses and travel overseas while the ordinary people suffered. Over all, the government took little or no action against the people involved in these scandals and corruption. A High Court Judge pointed out that nearly four years later, no action had been taken to recover the Z$450-500 million that was looted from the War Victims Compensation Fund. On war veteran leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi, had been charged (as a sacrificial lamb for fabricating medical records and claiming a 118% disability from the fund) by June 1998 but he was acquitted in November 2000 (Meredith, 2003:144-145; Buckle, 2002:238). Financial mismanagement was so rife that NOCZIM owed its suppliers Z$11 billion in debt by 12 October 2000, even though some of its top managers were arrested on corruption charges in June 2000 (Buckle, 2002:132).

Land reform’s modest results from 1980 to 2000 added to the government’s poor delivery record and it tried to assuage people’s feelings of disappointment by pursuing a radical land reform policy. Economists, bankers and businessmen warned that the government’s hasty plans to compulsorily acquire white-owned commercial farms would send the country into further economic crisis. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange plummeted soon after 1 471 farms were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in November 1997 because more than a third of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange were heavily dependent on agriculture and the acquisitions destroyed investor confidence. The shock-waves created by the land designation and the acute land shortages that were experienced in the rural areas meant that the unemployed had no safety-net in agriculture. The country’s economic problems fuelled domestic unrest which culminated in countrywide food riots in January 1998. The food riots had such an adverse effect on businesses that the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange went into

In the same week as the food riots, the government spent more than US$2 million on fifty new ministerial Mercedes-Benz vehicles (Meredith, 2003:141; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:50). Ten days later, the Presidential Pension and Retirement Benefits Amendment Bill was tabled in parliament to substantially increase the pensions, number of free vehicles, air travel, bodyguards, medical attention and staff that the president and his family and the country’s two vice presidents could enjoy for the rest of their lives. This extravagance amidst poverty (government’s priorities left a lot to be desired) induced another ZCTU-led nationwide mass stay-away in March 1998 (Meredith, 2003:141) but by then, most Zimbabweans were generally worse-off than they had been at independence because average wages were lower, unemployment had trebled, public services were crumbling and life expectancy was falling (Meredith, 2003:17).

6.2.2 Fast-Track Land Reform and Development

Zimbabwe was once a relatively prosperous country and was regarded as the breadbasket of Southern Africa (once held SADCC/SADC’s Food Security portfolio) but it now faces starvation. Fast-Track and reform devastated Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector and induced the collapse of the economy because most other industries in the country are linked to agriculture. The disruptions caused by land reform and illegal land occupations by those claiming to be war veterans drastically reduced the volume and value of marketed agricultural produce. Many farmers were forced to shut-down operations on their farms, for example, according to the Daily Telegraph (cited in Buckle, 2002:162), about forty farms that employed an estimated 10 000 people closed down in the Glendale area outside Harare. The Zimbabwe Standard reported that a maize shortage was imminent because maize planting was down by between 40%-60% in October 2000 (quoted in Buckle, 2002:236). The planting figures for winter wheat fell by a third in 2001 while maize and export crops like tobacco fell by about 70%. By December 2001, commercial maize planting declined to 45 000 hectares from 150 000 hectares in the 1999/2000 season. This general decline in production forced the price of vegetables to increase by 200% because of shortages (Kibble, 2004:367; Chitiyo, 2003:214; Meredith, 2003:231; United States Department of State, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:13; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Buckle, 2002:48, 109 & 142; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7; Chattopadhyay, 2000:307; LandWeb, 2000c).
The Commercial Farmers’ Union estimates that close to 250,000 (about 20%) of Zimbabwe’s national herd (beef and dairy cattle) had been forcibly de-stocked by late 2001 because of the looting associated with illegal farm occupations. Zimbabwe’s beef exports were compromised because of mob interference with fencing and quarantine arrangements and the illegal movement of cattle from communal areas to commercial areas; which increased the risk of disease communication (anthrax, foot-and-mouth). Outbreaks of anthrax were reported in Makoni North and Makonde in November 2000 and had spread to Chihota in Mashonaland East by December 2000. Further, over 1.6 million hectares of grazing land had been destroyed/burnt, creating milk and other shortages (Borland and Moyo, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Meredith, 2003:231; Buckle, 2002:48, 109,142, 238 & 241; LandWeb, 2000c). The country’s banks, for example, Standard Chartered Bank, repeatedly warned the government about the impending economic collapse and food shortages but their alarm was ignored. Despite the growing crises (political, economic and social), President Mugabe went on the campaign trail for both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections saying; “Zimbabwe is able to go it alone...If whites want to go [leave Zimbabwe], we will offer them an escort. Do you think we cannot farm tobacco, tea, sugar or oranges?” (cited in Buckle, 2002:48-49). Rousing nationalist sentiment and circumscribing white citizenship seemed to be the only thing that held sway at this point.

The fast-track land reform programme’s shock-waves in the agricultural sector had a severe, negative knock-on effect on Zimbabwe’s motor, clothing, textiles, timber, mining and tourism industries. Factory closures in these industries led to unprecedented job losses as more than 200,000 jobs have been lost since the beginning of 2000 (Mlambo, 2003:200-203; United States Department of State, 2003). Political instability and a severe lack of foreign currency forced many companies into liquidation. Foreign investment in Zimbabwe’s economy has dropped by 90% since 2000; resulting in the closure of many companies and massive unemployment estimated to be higher than 70% (Makumbe, 2003b; Buckle, 2002:89 & 142; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). During the fast-track land reform programme, President Mugabe announced that the government planned to indigenise Zimbabwe’s mining sector once land reform was complete. This announcement compelled private businesses to accelerate their exodus (Buckle, 2002:142). The property market (real estate) was also under serious threat and experienced a rapid decline (Buckle, 2002:142). The government’s reputation for condoning on-going incidences of politically motivated violence (lawlessness),
repression and anti-white hostility added to waning investor confidence. On 19 October 2000, the Matebeleland Chamber of Industries announced that half of its members would close down at the end of the year because of the harsh economic climate and analysts estimated that 200 000 jobs would be lost (Buckle, 2002:236). In November 2000, a leading pharmaceutical company, Johnson and Johnson, announced that it was relocating to South Africa because of continuing economic instability in Zimbabwe. On 30 November 2000, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) announced that 23% of local manufacturing companies were planning to disinvest from Zimbabwe owing to economic decline (Buckle, 2002:239).

Zimbabwe’s main holiday resorts, such as the Victoria Falls Hotel, reported increased cancellations and a significant reduction in bookings (by about 25%) in 2000. Kariba also experienced a sharp decline of about 80% of its normal number of visitors (Buckle, 2002:48, 105 & 142-143). Similar reports were made about tourism (a decline of 70%) in the Nyanga/Juliasdale area of Manicaland’s Eastern Highlands (Buckle, 2002:142-143). The decline in bookings meant reduced revenue in foreign currency. The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) resorted to emergency power rationing or load shedding because of the critical foreign currency shortage. Zimbabwe also experienced a crippling fuel shortage (petrol, diesel and paraffin) that brought surviving industries to their knees because the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) owed its suppliers Z$11 billion by October 2000 (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Makumbe, 2003b; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002:48, 56, 89, 132 & 236). Without a steady in-flow of foreign currency from the agricultural sector, hospitals ran out of essential drugs including medicine for diarrhoea and vomiting, contraceptive pills and condoms, as well as bandages and disposable gloves. The Ministry of Health reported that at least 2000 people were dying of AIDS per week in Zimbabwe yet most hospitals and clinics just had Aspirin, Chloroquin and Paracetemol to offer them (Buckle, 2002:234). These problems compelled the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) to call a general strike in July 2000 (Buckle, 2002:166-167).

Kibble (2004:369) comments on the brain-drain currently being experienced by Zimbabwe as 15% of its population is living outside the country, mostly as economic and political refugees. Skilled black middle class professionals (nurses, pharmacists, doctors, teachers, accountants and engineers) have fled the country to overseas destinations (Britain, Ireland,
Scotland, America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) or to neighbouring countries like South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in search of better wages and conditions of employment (Meredith, 2003:210; Bijlmakers et al, 1996; Bijlmakers et al, 1998; Gaidzanwa, 1999). The flight of human capital, and the withdrawal of official development assistance by international donors, has inadvertently added to the general collapse of most delivery systems in the country (health, education).

Ordinary, poor Zimbabweans were affected the most by the debilitating welfare crisis that was created by fast-track land reform. Between 60%-80% of the population is classified as living below the poverty line and as many as 6 million (half the population) have to contend with acute food shortages, especially in the rural areas (Kabemba, 2005:11; Karume, 2005:41; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Meredith, 2003:231; Makumbe, 2003b; United States Department of State, 2003; Bookstein and Lawson, 2002:635; Buckle, 2002:56; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). Bread riots broke out in Harare on 17 October 2000 following a 30% price rise. Food riots also broke out in Mutare on 24 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:236-237). People in the urban areas also experienced critical food shortages and sharp increases in the prices of basic food stuffs (mealie-meal, sugar, cooking oil, bread) as the inflation rate rose to 103.8% in November 2001, forcing Zimbabwe’s Real GDP to contract by 7.5% in 2001. As Zimbabwe’s food situation continued to deteriorate because of reduced cereal production, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) urged the government to intervene in December 2001 (Buckle, 2002). The inflation rate kept rising and reached 175% by the end of 2002. Zimbabwe’s inflation rate was over 400% in the third-quarter of 2003 and reached 600% by the end of 2003/beginning of 2004. The cost of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises amounted to a 25% decline in GDP between 2001 and 2004 (Kibble, 2004:368; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Utete Report, 2003:30; Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:14; Bush and Szeftel, 2002; Buckle, 2002:28 & 109; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Bush and Szeftel, 2000).

Zimbabwe has been unable to produce or import (was importing from South Africa, Zambia) enough food to feed its people for the past three years. About half of Zimbabwe’s population became dependent on food relief from January-February 2002 (basics like mealie-meal, cooking oil, soya, sugar-beans). Zimbabwe’s starving masses are at the mercy of international humanitarian relief organisations such as the Red Cross, Plan International, Care International and the United Nations’ World Food Programme which have been

6.2.3 Development: Prospects for Resettled Communities in Agriculture

Land is probably the most valuable economic asset in countries whose economies rely mainly on agriculture, like Zimbabwe, therefore, adequate training and capacity building (improved infrastructure) is a necessary step towards rural development (Deininger, 2003:154-155; Ghai and Radwan, 1983:12-15, 27-28). According to Warriner (1969:59), integrated land reform can be broken into two main phases. Phase 1 is concerned with land expropriation and redistribution. Phase 2 is concerned with the provision of the necessary support (credit, technical know-how/extension services, inputs like seeds, pesticides, herbicides and fertilizer, stock-feed) to create better farmers who can sustain reasonably high agricultural production (Warriner, 1969:26, 44, 47 & 267). Larsson-Liden (2000:130) and Moyo (1999:17) agree that for small-scale farmers to do well, they need access to better knowledge and skills, quality inputs and efficient marketing services. Christodoulou (1990:140) highlights this point by stating that technical and operational effectiveness are part (and outcome) of being able to/having the competence to make informed decisions.

Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203-226) distinguish between two types of support for resettled farmers and communities. The first one is geared towards realising the full agricultural potential of the land ('core support'). It is agreed (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:203-226; Scudder, 2001:256; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003) that agricultural production is enhanced or facilitated by direct measures, such as, access to credit, appropriate agricultural extension services, dip tanks, minimum all-weather roads for improved transportation, reasonable marketing networks, improved seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, storage and milling facilities; all of which help to boost production. The 'core support' defined above enables land reform beneficiaries to make productive use of the land they receive, thereby enhancing the productive capacity and commercial possibilities of the rural poor. Failure to
pay sufficient attention to capacity building and training before beneficiaries gain access to land can limit a government’s efforts to improve the plight of poor rural people. Most advanced countries (USA, Britain, France) subsidise their agricultural sectors and provide farmers with this kind of support (Warriner, 1969:34, 39, 60). In this regard, one notes that the Zimbabwean government offered this kind of support to resettled farmers/communities soon after independence and gradually withdrew it following the country’s ‘maize miracle’ in the 1980s. After the withdrawal, small farmers were unable to sustain high output levels and the situation was compounded by recurrent droughts from the mid 1980s (1982-84, 1986-87, 1991-92, 1994-95) and the adoption of neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes.

The Utete Report (2003) acknowledges that land reform cannot begin and end with land redistribution. The report reiterates the government’s position that fast-track land reform was aimed at positively transforming people’s socio and economic circumstances by transforming the rural economy in order to increase agricultural production, thereby enhancing national food security and industrial development. However, in terms of these outcomes, Jenkins and Knight (2002:102) are sceptical and contend that the land reform programme caused unprecedented destruction and it is unlikely that it can enhance people’s socio-economic circumstances in the short-medium term. Mlambo (2003:199-206), Jenkins and Knight (2002:102), Human Rights Watch (2002:3 & 14), Raftopoulos (2002:426), Bush and Szefter (2000:173) and LandWeb (2000b) maintain that the fast-track land reform programme lacked a comprehensive plan for Warriner’s (1969) Phase 2 (provision of the necessary support). Even the Utete Commission which was appointed by President Mugabe to evaluate the programme admits that it lacked adequate infrastructure provision to allow resettled communities and farmers to make productive use of the land and meet the aims outlined above (Utete Report, 2003:25).

So far, this chapter has outlined the extent of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis in terms of the sharp decline in agricultural production and its effect on other sectors of the economy namely; foreign currency shortages, fuel shortages, three-digit inflation, company closures, job losses and food shortages. In real or practical terms, the crisis means that the government and others cannot import farm machinery and other inputs because of the lack of foreign currency, for instance. From the onset, Mr Makumbe, a Political Science lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, was sceptical of the government’s ability (financial and administrative) to offer newly resettled communities the level of support they need to
become self-reliant. Mr Makumbe commented that; “The people will not get adequate infrastructure, financial support or training to cultivate the land productively...will damage the environment and the economy...” (quoted by the United States Department of State, 2003). The escalating cost of agricultural inputs (because of high inflation rates) is compounded by the prohibitive interest rates (and insufficient funds) offered by the state-owned Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) which provides loans to small-scale farmers. Other problems include the high cost of electricity (needed for irrigation, dairy farming and some horticultural processes) and crippling fuel shortages which interfere with the transportation of goods from the source to other industries or to the market. Bush and Szeftel (2000:173) note that to date, insufficient funds have been made available for basic infrastructure provision for fast-track land reform beneficiaries. Bush and Szeftel (2000) allege that peasant farmers have received little or no support in terms of credit, roads or technical know-how for them to be productive. In terms of the development theories/approaches above, it is this chronic “lack of choice and capability” that represents under-development and poverty (Kotze, 1988:43 cited in Treumicht, 1997:27).

The lack of comprehensive agricultural support is a predicament faced by many of Zimbabwe’s newly resettled peasant farmers (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173) because of delayed or inadequate ‘core support’ and physical infrastructure provision. The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, which funds the District Development Fund (DDF) and District Councils (for projects such as road, bridge and dam construction) in rural areas, are failing to cope with demand for agricultural inputs, extension services and physical infrastructure. The capacity of the Agritex (the government’s agricultural extension service wing) and the DDF (a development aid institution) to assist resettled farmers is reportedly far lower than was expected at the beginning of the land reform exercise and this has negatively impacted agricultural development and extension work (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:102; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 14; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173; LandWeb, 2000b; LandWeb, 2000c). The Agricultural Development Authority (ADA, formerly the Agricultural Rural Development Authority/ARDA) is responsible for “planning, coordinating, implementing, promoting and assisting agricultural and rural development” (Moyo et al, 1991:102) and is also failing to deliver these services to resettled communities, even with the assistance of the Farmers Development Trust (FDT).
The lack of empowerment evident in newly resettled areas, in turn, negatively impacts agricultural production. LandWeb (2000b) reports that some newly resettled farmers are abandoning their land or under-utilising it because they do not have the resources (basic inputs like fertiliser and seeds) to make productive use of it. In Matabeleland South Province, for example, LandWeb (2000b) reports that villagers are abandoning the small plots that they were allocated. Provincial officials in Matabeleland South revealed that only 1 000 out of the 9 000 people allocated land in the province have taken it (LandWeb, 2000b). The remainder have abandoned their plots because they are frustrated at the government’s failure to provide basic infrastructure (Utete Report, 2003:25; LandWeb, 2000b). Human Rights Watch (2002:3 & 14) also report that some potential settlers turned down the opportunity to own land because they do not have the means to work the land without government assistance. Many resettled people do not have farming equipment of their own to use, for example, tractors, ploughing disks, combine harvesters and irrigation pumps, pipes and sprinklers for crops and livestock in drought prone areas (Buckle, 2002). They also do not have assets to use as collateral when applying for bank loans which could help them procure the necessary farming inputs and equipment.

The situation described above shows that the overall capacity of land reform to increase production on resettled land is compromised because government support for resettled families (especially ordinary peasant A1 resettlement beneficiaries) is insufficient. These deficiencies make for a bleak future for small, recently resettled commercial and peasant farmers who are struggling to sustain viable operations (with high quality and consistently high yields) as a result. One is inclined to agree with the critics (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173; Land Web 2000c) that the government’s promises of support (administrative, financial, infrastructural and extension requirements-Chapter 4) were unrealistic because of the government’s limited resources and Zimbabwe’s dire economic circumstances.

6.2.4 Recommendations made by the Utete Commission

In spite of the above criticism, the Utete Report notes (although results were not computed statistically by the commission itself) that production in newly resettled areas shows appreciable performance especially under the A1 resettlement model. The Utete Commission reports that land reform beneficiaries are making full use of the land allocated to them (Utete Report, 2003:28). The Utete Commission notes further that in some areas, yields realised in
crops such as maize and tobacco were quite significant, considering the poor rainfall patterns in the seasons covered by the land reform programme (Utete Report, 2003:28). However, the Commission noted the need for timeous provision of adequate tillage services and inputs of all types as a recurring concern raised in most of these areas. Unfortunately, the government does not have enough resources to provide such inputs and infrastructure on that scale (Utete Report, 2003:31). In a bid to alleviate the problems outlined above and raise production levels on resettlement land, the Utete Commission made recommendations to government and some of them are outlined below.

The Utete Commission recommended a major overhaul/rationalisation of government departments involved in land and agricultural affairs so that all aspects of the land reform programme can be handled by two separate Ministries; a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Land Affairs. The Utete Commission suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture should deal with all agricultural matters, including water development and irrigation. It also proposed that the Ministry of Agriculture should house most, if not all, the parastatals currently engaged in agricultural activities of one kind or another (Utete Report, 2003:73-80). The Commission also recommended a comprehensive policy and approach for corporate-type models of land administration to allow local community participation in plantations, conservancies, safaris and forest areas in Matabeleland North and South, Masvingo and Manicaland provinces (Utete Report, 2003:94-95). This initiative is intended to enhance agricultural production to guarantee local food security and the development of the economy as a whole. It is also meant to ensure that returns to the country in export (foreign currency) multiply, for example, through value addition to raw materials (processing).

The Utete Commission emphasised the need for comprehensive and systematic planning of future agricultural development with particular focus on, among others; Human Capacity/Skills Development, Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer (Utete Report, 2003:73-80). In order to achieve the government’s goals for agrarian transformation, the Utete Commission encouraged the collaborative and coordinated participation of the local private sector, donor countries and other development partners to complement national initiatives through research and development, financing, irrigation development, environmental protection, skills development/capacity building, processing of produce and marketing (Utete Report, 2003:96-100). The Utete Commission emphasised that the need for a water resource development strategy because Zimbabwe is drought prone. The Utete
Commission proposed that irrigation must be viewed as a national priority and recommended that governmental institutions involved in water resource development should be harmonised and streamlined to enhance the effectiveness of their overall impact.

With regards to inputs and infrastructure provision, the Utete Commission said it is imperative that practical steps be taken to address input shortages (and the issue of exorbitant input prices) by carefully targeting agricultural assistance using the needs-based criteria (Utete Report, 2003:73-80).

6.2.5 The Government’s Inputs Credit Scheme
Fast-track land reform disrupted farming activities, which in turn led to a severe shortage of foreign currency and agricultural inputs. This section enumerates some measures that are being taken by the Zimbabwean government (and others) to rectify this situation (address the decline in the agricultural sector) in an attempt to resuscitate Zimbabwe’s economy. The Utete Report (2003) notes that most newly resettled farms are engaging in the production of tobacco, paprika, soya-beans and cotton. Some farmers in Manicaland and Mashonaland East provinces are also engaging in horticulture. The main problem, however, is that inputs are either inadequate or belatedly distributed, or both, for instance tillage services (Utete Report, 2003:38). In order to alleviate this situation, the government budgeted Z$77.64 billion for crops and livestock inputs in the 2002-2003 season, and a further Z$18.96 billion for irrigation schemes. The Department of Meteorological Services also contracted a local company, Agricair, to run “cloud-seeding” programmes for part of the 2004/2005 rainy season at a cost of ZW$2.7 million an hour. This move was necessitated by erratic rains and recurrent droughts in some parts of the country. Additional funds for these projects were made available through supplementary budgets to give a total of Z$96.6 billion that was set aside for inputs provision (Utete Report, 2003:38).

According to Manicaland’s Provincial Administrator (Interview, January 2005), newly resettled farmers are benefiting from the government’s agricultural input supply scheme which is meant to alleviate the critical shortage of tillage equipment, thereby increasing crop hectarage and improving yields per unit. Manicaland Province was given a maize target of 590 000 hectares for the 2004/2005 maize season. Maize targets for Manicaland’s Makoni, Chipinge and Mutare districts for the 2004/2005 maize season were 190 105 hectares, 64 390 hectares and 140 454 hectares respectively. Individual farmers were given planting targets; for example, 10 hectares had to be under maize crop for model A2 farmers (Interview with
Manicaland’s Provincial Administrator, January 2005). The Agricultural Development Authority (currently has a fleet of 25 tractors) managed to till 1 500 hectares in Manicaland province during the 2004/2005 planting season. The Mutare Rural District Council, in conjunction with the District Development Fund (DDF), also assisted farmers by ploughing just over 2 500 hectares in the province (Interview with Manicaland’s Provincial Administrator, January 2005).

About 11 000 tonnes of maize-seed was distributed to farmers in Manicaland Province during the 2004/2005 maize season. It was expected that 290 000 tonnes of Compound D planting fertiliser and 170 000 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate top-dressing fertiliser would be distributed in the province’s eleven districts by the beginning of the planting season. However, Zimbabwe was hit by a severe shortage of Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser and maize and soya-beans were the worst affected (yellowing) because of the nitrate deficiency (Interview with Manicaland’s Provincial Administrator, January 2005). Farmers in the province were urged to grow sunflowers for oil extraction, sugar beans and soya-beans by the Agriculture, Research and Extension Services (AREX) in case the maize crop was ruined by the fertiliser shortage (Manica Post Farming Correspondent, 2005:12). The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) managed to source a consignment of Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser from South Africa and Manicaland Province was allocated 2 520 tonnes, which was distributed through various GMB depots in the province (Manica Post Correspondent, 2005:3).

Premier Banking Corporation’s (Zimbabwe) Agri-Finance Manager revealed that the institution disbursed $Z42 billion to farmers in the 18 months from the beginning of 2004 to June 2005. Premier Banking Corporation supports the government’s land reform efforts and is assisting both large and small-scale commercial farmers (mostly through loans at concessionary interest rates) because the government does not have enough resources to support the land reform programme on its own (Sunday Mail Chief Reporter, 2005:6). The money is being used to buy inputs (seed and chemicals) and land preparation (tillage). One requirement for this loan facility is that beneficiaries must produce letters-of-proof that they were lawfully allocated land by the government. Farmers involved in crocodile farming, ostrich rearing and wheat production have so far benefited from this facility (Sunday Mail Chief Reporter, 2005:6).
The government has set up a $50 billion livestock purchasing scheme. The scheme is meant to re-stock the dwindling national herd which was depleted by recurrent droughts, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax and the looting that became characteristic of the fast-track land reform programme. The Manica Post reports that about 780 farmers have so far benefited from the $11.2 billion that has been disbursed through AgriBank (Post Farming Correspondent, 2005:12). Communal and Model A1 resettlement farmers are entitled to $10 million for beef cattle and $15 million for dairy cows. A maximum of $50 million for beef cattle and $80 million for dairy cows per farmer has been budgeted for Model A2 resettlement farmers. Small livestock producers are also entitled to a maximum of $20 million for piggery and $3.5 million for poultry projects from the livestock purchasing scheme (Post Farming Correspondent, 2005:12).

Tobacco is a major foreign currency earner for Zimbabwe and it was affected by recent droughts, erratic rains and disruptions caused by land reform. The Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group (ZABG), in conjunction with ABSA Bank of South Africa, has set-up a US$25 million input facility for the 2005/6 tobacco season through the Tobacco Development Cooperation. This initiative is part of the government’s ‘economic turnaround plan’ and was brokered by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe/RBZ to increase output from the tobacco sector (Mabwe, 2005:B1). Targeted beneficiaries include both small and large-scale tobacco growers from Zimbabwe’s main tobacco growing areas; namely Mashonaland East, Central and West Provinces and parts of Manicaland. The money is disbursed through farmers’ organisations and committees under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Mabwe, 2005:B1).

There have been similar developments in Zimbabwe’s horticultural sector. New Ziana (2005:10) reports that Zimbabwe’s floriculture production declined to below 20 000 tonnes from 24 000 tonnes of flowers worth US$86 million produced in the 2002 marketing season. Zimbabwe’s central bank considers horticulture a high growth sector worth investing in because it is strategic in terms of employment creation and foreign currency generation. The Netherlands is Zimbabwe’s biggest flower market and absorbs 60% of Zimbabwe’s floriculture produce. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) joined forces to finance and rehabilitate the flower growing sector (New Ziana, 2005:10). The RBZ has set aside Z$750 billion for the revival of horticultural estates and projects. It is expected that the money will be used for greenhouse construction and
irrigation, Rose propagation and Rose-stem supply, flower marketing and the construction and repair of cold rooms (New Ziana, 2005:10). Through this arrangement, experienced horticultural farmers have been given a special dispensation which guarantees them uninterrupted productive land tenure for 5-10 years (New Ziana, 2005:10).

Chattopadhyay (2000:314) contends that to redistribute land without correct and adequate extension of technical and financial support invariably undermines meaningful agricultural production. The seemingly unsystematic manner in which fast-track land reform was conducted (in practice) gives the impression that no concrete plans had been made to provide land reform beneficiaries with agricultural extension services and other support/inputs (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Buckle, 2002). It is credible, however, that the government has recently taken measures to address deficiencies in ‘core support’ delivery to encourage higher agricultural output from both the peasant and commercial farming sectors but many would argue (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173; Land Web 2000c) that the support that is currently available is still inadequate when compared to the demand that exists (a case of too little, too late because of insufficient planning), but at least it is available to new farmers who fit the criteria set for farmers to access the inputs outlined above.

6.2.6 Resettled Communities and Consumption Credit

At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had a diversified economy and was classified as a middle-income country with significant developments in health and education (Sachikonye, 2002:13). Fast-Track land reform had catastrophic economic and social consequences which led to the rapid deterioration of living standards for most Zimbabweans. The dire socio-economic situation outlined above demands what Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203-226) call ‘complimentary support.’ Complimentary support refers to non-agricultural, subsistence or ‘consumption credit’, with capacity building as its long term goal. Consumption credit or social infrastructure is beneficial to resettled communities because it is primarily concerned with the provision of food aid, water and sanitation. The provision of these basic services is a form of preventative intervention aimed at improving nutrition, thus boosting people’s immunity to diseases as well as reducing health hazards. In some cases complimentary support extends to the provision of basic health and education services (schools, clinics). Education provision is meant to benefit both children and adults (primary schools for

One of the perceived roles of governments is that of a benefactor whose function is to provide, rectify and finance people's basic needs, however, Zimbabwe's experience demonstrates that this is not always feasible. Commentators and stakeholders like Mr. Hungwe (President of the Zimbabwe National Farmer's Union), Mr. Tengengu (from the Farmers Development Trust) and Ms Chari (a gender lobbyist) are aware of the government's chronic lack of resources and its poor delivery record as far as infrastructure provision is concerned (cited in LandWeb, 2000c). With regards to fast-track land reform, a UNDP technical team noted in late 2001 that "the provision of roads, schools, clinics and boreholes was lagging far behind settler emplacement" and that the "provision of essential public infrastructure within a reasonable time would be impossible, given the government's past record and its current implementation capacity" (UNDP Interim Mission Report 2002:21-23 cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:15). Human Rights Watch (2002:16) notes, for example, that some resettlement schemes that where established in the 1980s remained without schools within walking distance or adequate clean water supplies because the government did not have the resources to provide such infrastructure. To date, insufficient funds have been made available for basic infrastructure provision for fast-track land reform beneficiaries (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173). Buckle (2002:230) comments too that the Zimbabwean government promised the electorate health, housing and education for all by the year 2000 but none of these promises have materialised. The critics are sceptical about the government's ability to provide basic services to families resettled under the fast-track land reform programme, thereby achieving real development in terms of the definitions above (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; LandWeb, 2000c). LandWeb (2000c), Preston (1996:311-312) and Pearson (2000) note, for example, that insufficient infrastructure provision impacts women more because they are primary caregivers to children (nutrition and education) and they are a support network for sick family members and others (clinics) in their communities.

The main function of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is to complement and assist in the development process (as partners) when governments are unable to provide particular services. One would expect a government in Zimbabwe's predicament to seek and welcome the help of NGOs but this has not been the case. The activities of NGOs in Zimbabwe are
closely monitored by the government because politicians are suspicious of their motives, which have been construed as interfering with, and undermining the country's political system (Karume, 2005:30-36). The Zimbabwean government issued a notice that required all civil society groups in the country to register with the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare under the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO Act) of 1995 (Karume, 2005:35). The campaign of intimidation already mentioned was mainly directed at civil society organisations, the media and political opposition parties from the beginning of 2000 (in preparation for the June 2000 and March 2002 presidential elections) but it was not confined to these groups. The campaign extended to aid agencies and foreign embassies (United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, USAID, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy) which the government regularly accused of furthering Western agendas in Zimbabwe through their assistance and funding of the MDC (Karume, 2005:30-36). The harassment of NGOs was mainly in the rural areas, for instance, in Chimanimani where war veterans led mobs of villagers in looting food aid that was donated by the European Union to benefit cyclone victims. The project was run by a German NGO (HELP), which war veterans claimed was a front for the MDC. Other NGOs subjected to this treatment included Care International which was involved in poverty alleviation, health, nutrition and emergency relief. The German-Austrian NGO SOS Children's Villages that looked after 5000 orphans was also invaded and forced to close temporarily (Meredith, 2003:18, 211-214). Meredith (2003:211-214) reports too that the offices of the German NGO (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation) which is involved in civic education programmes were ransacked in Harare.

The mistrust and hostilities between the Zimbabwean government and NGOs has led to the introduction of repressive laws and NGOs have been discredited because of alleged political bias. Several NGOs have been ordered to leave the country for various reasons, including criticising the fast-track land reform programme and the human rights abuses synonymous with it (Karume, 2005:30-36). The secretary for foreign affairs at the Foreign Ministry announced that the government could not guarantee the security of foreign embassies and donor agencies if they became agents or sympathisers of political parties (Meredith, 2003:213). This hostile reaction by the government is compounding the country's already bad infrastructure and service delivery situation because it has rendered NGOs ineffective/useless. It is unfortunate, however, that the brunt of this fall-out is felt by ordinary, poor Zimbabweans who do not have a choice in the matter; or the means to cope without the assistance of NGOs. In contrast, white commercial farmers used to provide their
workers and communities with subsidised basic social services like clean water, healthcare (clinics), schools and food stuffs (rations of maize, beans) but the practice has since stopped because of the upheavals caused by the land reform programme; to the detriment of these communities (Buckle, 2002). Development should ideally be a bottom-up process of empowerment (from grassroots level) and the role of the state, and NGOs, should be that of enabling and supporting community participation, capacity building and ownership of development. The next section shows a situation of growing economic disempowerment and desperation for many ordinary, poor Zimbabweans who were displaced or impoverished as a result of fast-track land reform.

6.2.7 Displacement and Social Disarticulation: The Plight of Zimbabwe’s Farm Workers

The United Nations (1999, cited in Vincent, 2001:6-7) defines internal displacement as “...persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence...and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.” Forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheavals or natural disaster has far-reaching consequences. McDowell (1996:6) argues that such consequences produce a “multidimensionality of impoverishment and social disintegration.” Cernea (1996:13, 21-22) explains ‘multifaceted impoverishment’ in terms of variables like “landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity, food insecurity and the disruption or destruction of formal and informal networks and social organisation” (impoverishment and social disarticulation). There is growing worldwide concern over such crises created by socio-political violence and resultant internal displacement of people in places like Burma, Angola, Burundi, Dafur in Sudan and the former Yugoslavia. Zimbabwe’s situation is no different. Cernea (2001:241; 1996:21) cautions that “the expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people’s productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods are constructed.” This has been the experience of both farmers and farm workers in Zimbabwe. Farm workers, who were in most instances landless labourers, lost their jobs and access to small gardens on their employers farms.

Zimbabwe experienced unprecedented internal displacement of thousands of people from its rural areas in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, as well as during and after the 2002 presidential election (including the urban clean-up campaign in 2005) (Meredith, 2003; Makumbe, 2003b; Buckle, 2002). The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP)
reports that at least 200,000 people were internally displaced in Zimbabwe because of land invasions and fast-track land reform (cited in Kabemba, 2005:23). The fast-track land reform was envisioned as part of a broader developmental agenda (Utete Report, 2003) but the current plight of former farm workers and recently evicted illegal land occupiers illustrates how ill-planned and ill-timed development efforts can further marginalise vulnerable people. Zimbabwe had between 300,000 and 400,000 wage earning farm workers in the commercial farming sector (about a quarter of the formal sector labour force), who together with their families constituted about a sixth (about 17%) of the country’s population before the land reform (Meredith, 2003:196). According to Krieger (2000:447), Zimbabwe’s farm workers have always been one of the country’s most vulnerable groups and have traditionally been an “invisible,” marginalised class, earning low wages (the government’s stipulated minimum wage for farm workers is ZS47,000), poor housing and involved in paternalistic relationships with white land owners. According to Amanor-Wilks (2000 cited in Mlambo, 2003:202; Loewenson, 1990) Zimbabwe’s farm workers experience some of the highest morbidity, malnutrition, mortality and illiteracy rates in the country. Zimbabwe’s farm workers were the victims of violent crimes and political injustice during the fast-track land reform exercise because they have always been politically inarticulate and therefore powerless and insignificant (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:174 & 179).

Fast-track land reform further marginalised Zimbabwe’s farm workers, many of whom did not own land in the communal areas (no alternative source of livelihood). The Commercial Farmers’ Union and the United Nations estimate that about 30,000 farm worker families had been forced off commercial farmland or laid-off work because of the shut-down of farming operations on farms by January 2002 (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:32). Only an estimated 80,000 farm workers out of the original 175,000 full-time farm workers that existed before fast-track land reform retained their employment on commercial farms (black and white owned), state-owned farms, estates and plantations by the beginning of 2003. A few others managed to secure employment with newly resettled farmers (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Chaumba et al, 2003). IRIN News (2003a; 2003b) reports that only a quarter of the farm workers who lost their jobs had received severance packages by the end of 2002.

According to Buckle (2002), more people were forcibly displaced (about 300,000 farm workers and 90% of Zimbabwe’s white farmers) in farming communities than have been resettled during fast-track land reform. Farm workers were not given any rights in the
commercial farming sector were they had been employed and lived. Although farm workers were not precluded from applying for land, one of the most striking things about fast-track land reform is that very little attention or concrete provisions were made to cater for the needs of the more than 245,000 former farm workers (about 70%) who lost their jobs and security of residential tenure on white-owned farms (compounds) (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Deininger, 2003:149; Chitiyo, 2003:166-167; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3). The social and economic disruption caused by the land reform programme devastated, not just farm workers, but their dependents too (an estimated 2 million people). As already noted, land allocation and resettlement under the fast-track land reform programme tended to be clandestine and former farm workers were neglected because of their perceived alliance with white farmers and the MDC (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3, 12, 26-29; Buckle, 2002: 27, 85 & 108).

The Secretary-General of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) said that farm workers were sidelined in land resettlement because of the vetting done by war veterans (asking for Zanu-PF party cards) (cited in the Daily News in Buckle, 2002:194). Although about 90% (11 million hectares) of white-owned commercial farms were compulsorily acquired for redistribution, farm workers as a constituency received only 5% of redistributed land under the decongestion A1 resettlement model. This very small percentage means that, individually, most farm workers did not get any land (Moyo, 2004; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). By October 2001, only 2,122 of the 123,979 households resettled (1.7%) were farm worker households (Human Rights Watch, 2002:33). About 25% of Zimbabwe’s farm workers were of foreign descent (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia). They came to the country as indentured labour between 1953 and 1963 and are precluded from owning land in Zimbabwe (have no claim to land in the communal or resettlement areas). The disproportionate land allocation created a dire situation for displaced families, particularly foreigners who had not acquired Zimbabwean citizenship, forcing some elderly, unemployed former farm workers of foreign descent to return to their countries of origin (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Utete Report, 2003:29 & 36; Meredith, 2003:231; Chaumba et al, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 32; Mbiba, 1995:147). This state of affairs has also forced many former farm workers to remain on acquired, designated, abandoned or occupied white commercial farms because they have nowhere else to go.
The Southern African Regional Poverty Network (2004) and Utete Report (2003:29 & 36) note that the continued presence of significant numbers of former farm workers on some farms (in conditions of destitution) is creating problems arising from the sprouting up of squatter camps all over the country, illegal gold panning, misuse of existing farm infrastructure and general criminal activity. These people are living in make-shift pole and dagga huts with no clean water (Mungoshi, 2004:6; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003). Buckle (2002:234-235) reports that about 40,000 former farm workers are squatting at Chikwiti in the Makonde communal area were they are living in abject poverty; forced to cope with sudden unemployment, severe food shortages and chronic under-nourishment. Mungoshi (2004:6) notes too that scores of recently evicted illegal land occupiers and their families are setting-up over-crowded make-shift squatter shelters under similar inhospitable conditions.

Cernea (2001:245) warns that displacement increases morbidity and mortality rates due to outbreaks of relocation-related diseases (parasitic and vector born diseases). Unsafe water supplies and poor sanitation also increase health risks and people’s vulnerability to epidemics like diarrhoea, dysentery and cholera which mostly attack infants, children and the elderly. From the plight of these communities, one can conclude that farm workers’ interests were not an integral part of the fast-track land reform agenda. Farm workers were not consulted to participate in the reform process and they were not empowered by it (Hall, 2003:279; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; IRIN 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:175). The plight of Zimbabwe’s farm workers and other poor landless people compels Chitiyo (2003:187) to conclude that fast-track land reform did not bring true social justice to ordinary people. In the light of the revelations above, the Utete Commission (2003:7) recommended that the government should urgently address the welfare needs of former farm workers.

6.2.8 Land Reform, Development and the Gender Dimension
Land is considered important for economic and social security in most societies but some customs, for instance, inheritance laws, in many African societies preclude women from owning land as individuals (independent of men). Customary gender discrimination undermines women’s access to land despite the fact that women often account for more than half the population, for example, in Uganda, Cameroon and Senegal (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003). Women are disempowered because they do not own or control land but have usufruct
rights and other nominal rights which depend on their relationships to men (fathers, husbands, brothers, uncles and sons) (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:1-28; Deininger, 2003:57-60; Moyo, 2003:32; Pearson, 2000:386; Cousins, 1993). Marriage is the primary means through which women (wives/daughters-in-law) gain access to land in sub-Saharan countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda and these rights differ depending on whether the marriage is recognised by the law (civil/Christian, Islamic or traditional) (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:2). Women in polygamous marriages, divorced and widowed women are vulnerable to land dispossession. Widowed women do not have automatic access to their husband’s land because access to the land depends on the duration of the marriage, whether the couple had children, the sex of the children and whether the widow plans to remarry (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:1-28). Women also have little or no control over benefits that accrue from the sale of produce from the land they have access to (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:1-28).

Preston (1996) observes that the present situation of women in the Third World is that of “relative disadvantage” and that much of the burden of poverty falls on women. Preston (1996:311-312) contends that this is because “women experience multiple deprivation and have poor or no prospects for regular employment.” Pearson (2000) discusses this phenomenon in what she terms the “feminisation of poverty.” The World Bank (1989 cited in Pearson, 2000:398-399) makes a similar observation and comments that “women tend to be disproportionately represented among the lowest income groups of whatever economy or society.” Women’s work is often not considered as proper work because it is done in the home (child-care, nursing and feeding the sick and disabled, household cleaning chores) but domestic work is not the only kind of work that women do. Rural women spend the majority of their time contributing towards their local agrarian economies and household incomes by weeding, harvesting, collecting animal fodder, water and wood fuel, processing foodstuffs and marketing surplus agricultural produce (Pearson, 2000:386) yet the majority of women do not own land. Hendricks (2001:301) observes that, despite these constraints on women’s land rights, men continue to benefit more from land restitution, redistribution and reform measures than women.

Although fast-track land reform revolutionised Zimbabwe’s agricultural landscape, it has been criticised for not being adequately gender-sensitive. Cousins (1993) notes that the extent to which women in Southern Africa have claim to land in their own right has varied
over time and remains inconsistent. This situation is compounded by land shortages in many countries, which perpetuate the customary, gender-based constraints on women’s land rights outlined above (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:27-28). Hendricks (2001:301) observes further that, despite the constraints on women’s land rights, men benefit more from land restitution, redistribution and reform measures than women. Zimbabwe’s experience of fast-track land reform illustrates this point.

Women account for 52% of Zimbabwe’s population and over 60% of them depend on land as a source of livelihood (Kabemba, 2005:26). Before fast-track land reform, women accounted for 70% of Zimbabwe’s farming sector labour force. Unfortunately, many female farm workers were employed seasonally and were not entitled to severance packages when they lost their jobs as a result of land reform (Meredith, 2003:231; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b). On paper, Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme was meant to benefit the landless masses and other specified groups, for example, women. The gender dimension of the agrarian reform was meant to economically empower women in light of the growing phenomenon of what Preston (1996) and Pearson (2000) refer to as the ‘feminisation of poverty’ among women-headed households. In October 2001, the government pledged to set aside a 20% quota of land acquired under the fast-track land reform for single women as well as married women, through joint ownership with their spouses. However, in practice, this commitment was not implemented as there was no legal or administrative framework in place to guarantee gender equality in land allocation (Human Rights Watch, 2002:30-31).

In practice, land allocation and resettlement was largely unregulated and beneficiary selection was politicised; to the extent that some targeted beneficiaries, for instance, women, did not benefit from land redistribution (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). Women received just 20% of the 5% of land allocated to former farm workers (Kabemba, 2005:26; Moyo, 2004:27; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). Women (individually) received between 12% and 24% of land allocated under Model A1 and between 5% and 21% of A2 land across the provinces (Moyo, 2004:26). Ms. Chari, a Gender Lobbyist, criticises the government for failing to implement a gender-responsive land reform programme that would empower women by entitling them to land (in more or less the same ratio as women in the total population) and safeguarding their rights to land in the same way as men (cited in LandWeb, 2000c). In this regard, the Utete Commission (2003:6, 84-85)
recommended that given the historically diverse and pivotal role of women in all aspects of agriculture in the communal lands and the need to strike an overall gender balance in this crucial sector of the economy; a 40% quota of land allocation and funding be reserved for women to ensure equity in, and the effectiveness of, the agrarian reform in the country. In reaching this decision, the Commission took into account the growing number of rural families headed by women (and children) as a result of the devastation wreaked on society by the AIDS pandemic and thought it prudent to seek to ensure the survival and stability of such households (Utete Report, 2003). The Utete Commission (2003) noted that women often have inadequate resources to take care of the sick, elderly, orphaned and indigent and that land ownership would go some way towards alleviating this situation.

6.3 Land Reform, Elections and Violence
It is important to define violence from the onset of this discussion. Salmi (1993:17) discusses the multiple dimensions of violence (direct, indirect, repressive) and defines it as “any avoidable action that constitutes a violation of a human right, in its widest meaning, or which prevents the fulfilment of a basic human need....including accidental outbreaks of violence, as well as patterns of structural violence...” Salmi (1993:17) defines direct violence as deliberate action which constitutes a direct attack on a person's physical or psychological integrity. This type of violence includes genocide, war crimes and murder as well as coercive actions such as forced removals and kidnapping. This section is an overview of Zimbabwe’s political arena before, during and after fast-track land reform. Zimbabwe’s political life during this landmark land reform exercise was marked by violence and repression in which the ruling Zanu-PF government criminalised opposition politics (Olaleye, 2005:7).

President Mugabe and the ruling Zanu-PF party carefully consolidated their position in Zimbabwean politics from the mid 1980s. President Mugabe became the leader of the ruling Zanu-PF party in 1984 and automatically became head of the 15-member Zanu-PF politburo which controls government policy. The president also had the right to appoint all the members of the politburo from amongst those most loyal to him (Meredith, 2003:80).

One cannot speak of violence in Zimbabwe without mentioning the victimisation of Ndebele and Karanga people in Matebeleland in the 1980s. Joshua Nkomo had led the Ndebeles in the liberation struggle under the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Mugabe and others had led the Shonas under the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), both of which had military wings supported by the USSR and China respectively. The two parties
had some ideological differences and tribal mistrust existed between them, especially after the signing of the negotiated Lancaster House Constitution. ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) dominated the liberation struggle and expected to have more say in its outcome because the Ndebeles are a minority in Zimbabwe. ZANU had preferred a military victory and had been reluctant to compromise in the Lancaster House negotiations and this created friction between the two parties (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:21).

The Zanu-PF government (under Mugabe’s leadership) sanctioned a campaign of terror and indiscriminate violence (including women and children) in Matebeleland between 1983 and the signing of the Unity Accord (between ZANU and ZAPU) in December 1987 to form Zanu-PF (Patriotic Front). The Northern Korean trained 5 Brigade and Zanu-PF youth brigades (modelled on China’s Red Guards and trained for special combat duties) were responsible for the Gukurahundi atrocities which the government claimed were necessary measures to deal with counter-insurgency in Matebeleland. These Special Forces were comprised of Shona-speaking ex-ZANLA forces (ZANU’s military wing) and were answerable directly to President Mugabe and his chosen army commanders. These forces also had different equipment, transport and weapons from the regular army and operated with impunity (Meredith, 2003:62-76).

The 5 Brigade’s reign of terror deliberately targeted Matebeleland’s civilian population and ex-ZIPRA soldiers and officials (ZAPU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) which the government referred to as dissidents. The violence included forced rallies were the Ndebele people were made to sing Shona-praise songs, curfews, abductions, interrogations, beatings, torture, public executions, mass murder and arson. Shops were forced to close and drought relief supplies were prevented from reaching villages that were faced with starvation and at least 10 000 civilians had been murdered by the end of the campaign (Olaleye, 2005:7). According to Meredith (2003), the scale of violence during the Gukurahundi campaign was worse than that experienced during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Analysts, including Meredith (2003:62-76, 231) have concluded that this tragedy was a form of ethnic cleansing in which violence was systematically used to achieve one objective; to coerce support for Zanu-PF by crushing political opposition from ZAPU, thereby establishing a one-party state.
During the Matebeleland reign of terror, Zimbabwe’s constitution was amended in 1986 to give the president powers to legislate unilaterally. The president could wield power arbitrarily (rule by decree) by using the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act which gave him legislative powers in lieu of parliament, thus parliament became more and more irrelevant (Meredith, 2003:79-80). The Electoral Act gave the president the sole right to appoint the Registrar-General and all the members of the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the Election Directorate and the Delimitation Commission responsible for determining constituency boundaries. In practice, this meant that there was no independent body to monitor elections and the president (and Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs) could change electoral laws by proclamation, issue statutory instruments and regulations (section 2(1) of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1986) regarding the conduct of elections; with the potential to substantially affect electoral competition and participation (Kabemba, 2005:20; Meredith, 2003:106). The Political Parties (Finance) Act was passed in 1986 and it entitled political parties that had more than 15 parliamentary seats to financial support from the government. In practice, because Zanu-PF had a clear majority in parliament, the state financed its election campaigns (advantage and systematic exclusion of the opposition) and opposition parties had to fend for themselves (Meredith, 2003:90).

One-Party rule was institutionalised through a policy of violence, patronage and co-optation epitomised by the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU in the aftermath of the Matebeleland massacre. In 1987, the positions of the Prime Minister and President were combined into an Executive Presidency through the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 6 and 7) Act of 1987. President Mugabe became the first Executive President and effectively held the posts of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1987 gave the Executive President the power to dissolve parliament and declare martial law (states of emergencies) by using the old colonial Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which remained on the statute books (Meredith, 2003:79-80). The Executive President could run for a maximum of five 6-year terms of office. The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1987 abolished the 20 reserved white seats in the House of Assembly (Lancaster House Agreement). It also introduced provisions for 8 provincial governors, 10 customary chiefs elected by the council of chiefs, which the president controlled and 12 presidential nominees to the Assembly. The Executive President controlled the appointment of all senior posts in the civil service, defence forces,
the police and parastatals (Olaleye, 2005:7; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:37). President Mugabe gave himself more powers over parliament just before the 1990 elections. He increased the number of parliamentary seats to 150 but only 120 were to be directly contested on the common voters’ roll. The remaining 20 seats were reserved for direct presidential appointments (after the abolition of the 20 reserved white seats). All these changes meant that even if opposition parties gained the majority of seats in a parliamentary election, they would not have enough seats to constitute a clear majority to form a government (Kabemba, 2005:9; Meredith, 2003 89-90).

The 1990 elections were marked by suppression of political opposition (Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement-ZUM) as gangs of Zanu-PF youths terrorised suspected opposition supporters in Harare’s high density areas. Public sector employees were threatened that they would be fired if they voted for Tekere’s party. President Mugabe also threatened the white community saying: “That Tekere nonsense should stop. If the whites in Zimbabwe want to rear their ugly terrorist and racist head by collaborating with ZUM, we will chop that head off” (cited in Meredith, 2003:91). The state-owned press was used as a propaganda instrument and the independent press was harassed and discredited (Meredith, 2003:81). Leaders of the University of Zimbabwe’s Student Representative Council were arrested and the police threw tear-gas canisters into the university’s residence halls, assaulted students and set up a detention camp opposite the university’s main gate, forcing the university to close (Meredith, 2003:88). Tekere was denied permission to hold a single rally, ZUM officials were detained and the party’s supporters were held on suspicion of subversion (Meredith, 2003:88). This same fate was to be meted on Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change almost a decade later. The hallmarks of Zanu-PF’s rule became police violence and intimidation, assaults, arbitrary arrests, contempt for the courts and wholesale presidential pardons for Zanu-PF supporters convicted of political violence.

President Mugabe consolidated his power through a policy of patronage. He bestowed favours on those loyal to him within the ruling party and government. The system of patronage became a source of upward mobility, status, power and wealth for Zimbabwe’s ruling elite (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:37). The president refused to discuss the issue of his retirement and government ministers and officials (the inner circle) that showed signs of dissent were publicly humiliated in speeches, demoted or fired (Makamure, 1991:109 cited in Jenkins and Knight, 2002:43). From then on, the white community, opposition political
parties and the press were vilified for being critical of the government and its policies. The ZCTU organised a mass stay-way (general strike) on 9 December 1997 in protest against the unbudgeted payments to war veterans and the involvement of the army in the DRC. Despite a High Court order permitting the peaceful demonstration, riot police was despatched to disperse protesters with tear gas and baton sticks. The secretary general of the ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai, was ambushed two days after the strike and was beaten unconscious (Meredith, 2003:140-141). Soon after that, President Mugabe issued a decree under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act banning national strikes for six months (Meredith, 2003:162; Tshuma, 1997).

The independent press, particularly The Standard, was vilified after reporting on Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC. The editor of The Standard (Mark Chavunduka) was unlawful detained and tortured by military intelligence officers and Central Intelligence Organisation agents at an army barracks in Harare for ten days in January 1999. The agents wanted to know the sources of the story. Chavunduka was allowed to contact his lawyer on the eighth day of his detention. A reporter for The Standard (Ray Choto) was also unlawfully detained (without being charged) and tortured in connection with this story (Meredith, 2003:150). Attempts to contact the two men were thwarted repeatedly until the High Court threatened to issue a warrant to arrest the Defence Minister. The two journalists were eventually charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The European Union and seven donor governments issued protests and about 150 lawyers and human rights activists demonstrated outside parliament demanding an end to state-torture and the use of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The police, armed with baton sticks, dogs and tear-gas were deployed to disperse the protestors (Meredith, 2003:151). President Mugabe ignored a petition signed by five judges of the Supreme Court and one High Court judge against the torture of the two journalists (Meredith, 2003:152). When the president eventually responded, he implied that the journalists had gotten what they deserved;

“If The Standard had not behaved in a blatantly dishonest and unethical manner, the army would not have acted the way it did. Any media organisation which wilfully suspends truth necessarily forfeits its right to inform and must not cry foul when extraordinary reaction visits them...They had through their own deliberate treasonable actions invited that reaction...” (cited in Meredith, 2003:153).
President Mugabe said he construed the judges’ behaviour as “an outrageous and deliberate act of impudence” (Meredith, 2003:153). He expressed a vote of no confidence in the twenty-five judges of the Supreme and High Court (seventeen of them black) and threatened to fire those that signed the petition over the torture of the journalists (including Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay). Despite this, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the charges brought against Chavunduka and Choto in a case brought by The Standard challenging the constitutionality of the section of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act under which the journalists had been charged. The Supreme Court ruled that the section in question contravened freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution (Meredith, 2003:155-156).

Zimbabwe’s constitution was revised in 1999-2000 and was submitted to a national referendum in February 2000. The constitutional revisions included provisions that would greatly strengthen the government and the Executive/President (by giving him sweeping powers) at the expense of parliament. The proposed amendments would also allow the president to, *inter alia*, serve an additional twelve years and to retain powers to appoint 30 of the 150 members of parliament (20% of MPs), without providing sufficient oversight powers. The proposed constitutional amendments were rejected by between 53%-60% of the votes cast, demonstrating the electorate’s lack of confidence in the government (Olaleye, 2005:8; Utete Report, 2003:16 & 30; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:13). After this result, the government felt like it was under siege from the political opposition (MDC which had been formed in 1999) and adopted drastic, reactionary measures to quell the tide of dissent.

The government resolved to use the emotive (and effective) land question to revive nationalist sentiment, thereby averting the focus of criticism from itself and onto white land owners. Salmi (1993:20) defines *repressive violence* as the “deprivation of human rights other than the right to life and protection from injury.” This form of violence entails the infringement of human rights such as freedom, dignity and equality (civil, political and social rights). Although “land reform is political in terms of who sets the agenda” and what is put on that agenda (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173) there have been numerous reports concerning the state’s infringement on people’s freedom of movement, association, assembly, expression and rights to fair trials (the MDC and its supporters and the independent media). The government ignored most democratic channels such as consulting different stakeholders in addressing the land issue. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Public
Order and Security Act and the General Laws Amendment Act were passed to silence criticism from the independent media and civic organisations (Karune, 2005:40-41; Kibble, 2004:365 & 369; Hall, 2003:275; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655) and many people questioned the ruling party’s sudden sense of urgency in addressing the land question when it had failed to do so in twenty years. The Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, Pius Ncube, is one such person who questioned the government’s motives and criticised it for the economic decline, high unemployment and corruption that was being experienced and the country. Pius Ncube received several death threats for his trouble, along with many others (Meredith, 2003:185-186; Buckle, 2002:99).

The government (and president’s) legitimacy was under threat and violence was the medium chosen to bolster its waning popularity and to retain political control under the guise of overdue land reform (Tshuma, 1997). President Mugabe lashed out at the white community saying that the peace and stability of the country was being “undermined by the acts of some white persons of British extraction…planted in our midst to undertake acts of sabotage…against the legitimate government of this country” (cited in Meredith, 2003:154). President Mugabe claimed that whites had pushed the government’s sense of racial tolerance to the limit and he singled out prominent figures including Clive Wilson of The Standard, Clive Murphy also from a newspaper, a lawyer (David Coltart) and chairman of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Mike Auret). He accused them of seeking to ruin national unity and loyalty and vowed to take stern action against them and their MDC ally. President Mugabe also accused Westerns embassies in Harare of acting as agents for subverting the government by assisting the increasingly influential labour movement (ZCTU under Tsvangirai’s leadership) (Karume, 2005: 30-36; Meredith, 2003:155).

In terms of Salmi’s definition of direct violence (1993), Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform constituted direct violence because gangs of party activists and liberation war veterans were deployed to rural areas to seize control of hundreds of white-owned farms. These groups (including the army) attacked and terrorised opposition supporters at will and with impunity because the police claimed that land reform was a political matter and refused to intervene (Meredith, 2003:211; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51; Buckle, 2002). Farmers and farm workers were killed, abducted and tortured; resulting in widespread internal displacement in the rural areas. This sustained campaign of intimidation and violence began toward to end of February 2000 (the start of illegal farm occupations), through the June 2000 parliamentary
election and lasted until after the 2002 presidential election, during which President Mugabe’s speeches regularly denounced political opposition as puppets of the West, particularly Britain. Violence was not confined to presidential or general elections but spread to parliamentary by-elections and mayoral elections in which headmen, chiefs, civil servants, teachers and nurses were cowed into voting for the ruling party (Meredith, 2003:215). Violence was not confined to the rural areas only as war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters invaded factories, offices, businesses, aid agencies and foreign embassies in the cities too (Karume, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Buckle, 2002).

As the June 2000 parliamentary election drew near, people in rural Matebeleland were forced to buy Zanu-PF party cards and they were threatened with the return of the 5 Brigade which committed the Gukurahundi atrocities. War veteran leaders also threatened civil war if the MDC won the election (Meredith, 2003:170). In Harare, MDC supporters and officials in strongholds like Budiriro, Chitungwiza and Mabvuku were raided on a regular basis (abducted, beaten, tortured and sometimes murdered) by paramilitary police, soldiers and operatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). The MDC candidate for Chitungwiza and his wife were seized in the middle of the night by soldiers. They were beaten with rifle butts, chains and clubs. The same happened to the MDC’s Mabvuku and Kambuzuma candidates (Meredith, 2003:179; Buckle, 2002:63). Chimanimani’s MDC candidate, Roy Bennet, was summoned to a meeting by CIO operatives, a police commander, war vets and Zanu-PF officials were he was ordered to withdraw from the 2000 general election. Bennet refused to comply and received death threats before his farm was invaded and his wife and workers were forced to chant Zanu-PF slogans. Kwekwe MDC candidate, Blessing Chebundo, also endured several murder attempts (Meredith, 2003:179). Kariba’s Zanu-PF candidate threatened the white community in May 2000 saying:

“Let me assure you whites here, that once you support MDC, Zanu-PF is not going to treat you as business people, but as politicians. Then if you are treated as politicians, it is like signing your own death warrant. The political storm will not spare you...” (cited in Buckle, 2002:105).

War veterans, led by Chenjerai Hunzvi, disrupted a “Peace, Justice and Reconciliation” march by civic groups on 1 April 2000. Although the demonstrators had permission for the march (and a court injunction ordering the police to protect them), they were attacked by
gangs that were armed with clubs, bricks, sticks, barbed wire and bottles whilst the police made no effort to intervene, except to throw tear-gas canisters at them (Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:31). On 10 April 2000, President Mugabe vowed that “The MDC will never form the government of this country, never ever, not in my lifetime or even when I die…” (cited in Meredith, 2003:177). He also boasted that he had a “degree in violence” (Meredith, 2003:233). A government minister (Nathan Shamuyarira) also boasted about Zanu-PF’s legacy of violence and intimidation saying; “The area of violence is an area where Zanu-PF has a very strong, long and successful history” (cited in Meredith, 2003:233). The MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was charged under the Law and Order Maintenance Act for allegedly inciting the violent overthrow of President Mugabe’s government (Meredith, 2003:214).

The chairman of the War Veteran Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, is believed to have used his Budiriro surgery as a base for sporadic violence, a torture centre for those suspected of supporting the MDC yet no action was ever taken against him (Meredith, 2003:179; Buckle, 2002:110). The international community criticised the government for the lawlessness (condoning the violence and illegal farm occupations) and President Mugabe responded by saying; “...In this country there was no democracy, the British never brought the rule of law. Now they think they can teach Mugabe the rule of law...moral lessons…” (cited in Meredith, 2003:180). Zimbabweans went to the polls on June 24 and 25 2000. Zanu-PF won 61 seats (48% of votes cast), plus the 30 non-constituency seats appointed by the president) but seven Zanu-PF cabinet ministers lost their seats. The MDC won 57 seats (47% of the votes) and the last contested seat went to another party, Zanu Ndonga (Olaleye, 2005:8; Meredith, 2003:188). The MDC won all the seats in Harare and Bulawayo and ten of the twelve contested seats in Matebeleland. It also performed strongly in the Midlands and Manicaland provinces. Zanu-PF retained just one urban constituency in the whole country (Meredith, 2003:188; Buckle, 2002:151).

The government’s battles with the courts continued in September 2000 over a case brought by an independent radio operator, Capital Radio. The Supreme Court ruled that the state’s monopoly on broadcasting was illegal and ruled that Capital Radio be allowed to operate. President Mugabe responded by issuing a decree imposing new broadcasting laws which made it illegal for radio stations to operate without a licence. Capital Radio obtained a High Court injunction barring the police from searching its premises and seizing its equipment but
the police ignored the injunction and raided Capital Radio and the homes of two of its directors. The police confiscated Capital Radio’s equipment and dismantled aerials (Buckle, 2002:235). The Minister of Home Affairs remarked afterwards that; “The days of going to court will soon be past. We won’t accept any resistance” (cited in Meredith, 2003:199).

The MDC tabled a motion to impeach President Mugabe on 26 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:237). Acrimony between the government and the judiciary was fuelled by the MDC’s legal petitions challenging the results of the June 2000 parliamentary election in thirty-eight constituencies (almost a third of the total) and the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme (Meredith, 2003:199-201). The MDC maintained that widespread political violence, intimidation, fraud and other irregularities rendered the results invalid. It also cited blatant abuses of the electoral system (allegedly rigged in favour of the ruling Zanu-PF) and questioned the credibility and transparency of the entire electoral process (Kabemba, 2005:19). The MDC argued that the government, through the Registrar General, banned independent voter education programmes conducted by civic organisations and deliberately obstructed voter registration and voting in urban centres. It is alleged that the Registrar General also interfered with the registration of election monitors and the independence of the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the Delimitation Commission and the Election Directorate; which are supposed to be independent, impartial and non-partisan (Kabemba, 2005:15). Several pieces of legislation were enacted to govern the electoral process and prevent the opposition from campaigning. The voters’ rolls were not available for inspection and constituency boundaries were not defined on time (Kabemba, 2005:10-11; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229; Makumbe, 2003; Buckle, 2002:99). The MDC candidate for Kariba eventually withdrew his petition against the June 2000 election result after receiving death threats. The chairman of the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights was severely beaten by Zanu-PF party militias and the police when he travelled to Sadza in Chikomba constituency to investigate the MDC’s case (Meredith, 2003).

President Mugabe nullified the MDC’s petitions by promulgating the Electoral (Modification) Act on 8 December 2000, a month before the High Court was due to begin hearings regarding the MDC’s petitions. The Act stated that, in a democracy, election results must be decided by voters themselves and not the courts. The MDC filed an urgent application with the Supreme Court challenging the Electoral (Modification) Act and the Supreme Court declared President Mugabe’s actions unconstitutional (Olaleye, 2005;
Meredith, 2003:199-201; Buckle, 2002:240). In April 2001, Judge James Devitte nullified the results of the 2000 parliamentary election in three constituencies which had been won by Zanu-PF (including Buhera North where Morgan Tsvangirai had stood unsuccessfully). Judge Devitte was denounced by a war veteran leader, Joseph Chinotimba, as “a judge for opposition political parties” (Meredith, 2003:216). Soon afterwards, Judge Devitte received death threats and resigned from the bench (Meredith, 2003:216-217).

President Mugabe claimed that the MDC was counter-revolutionary because it was created and controlled by Britain, the United States and the old Rhodesian network and that all of them were seeking to re-colonise Zimbabwe by controlling its economy and politics (Karurne, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003:226-227). The president also attacked church organisations for siding with these forces against his government (Meredith, 2003:192) and vowed that “There will never come a day when the MDC will rule this country…Never ever” (cited in Meredith, 2003:210). The president’s need for power is summed up in a statement that he made in 2001; “No matter what force you have, this is my territory and that which is mine I cling to unto death” (cited in Meredith, 2003:236). The Commander of the Defence Forces declared his allegiance to the ruling party by saying that the military would not recognise the result of the 2002 presidential election if President Mugabe lost (Meredith, 2003:227-228).

The 2002 presidential elections were also not considered free or fair by the MDC and most international observers (Britain and the United States) for the same reasons as the 2000 parliamentary elections. It is reported, for example, that the Registrar General secretly printed a supplementary voters’ roll and extended the period for voter registration by five weeks without informing the general public or the MDC. It is also alleged that the Registrar-General did not reveal how many people had registered to vote during this period. The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of July 2001 and the Electoral (Modification) Notice 2002 compelled millions of Zimbabweans to reapply for citizenship or lose it. The Electoral (Modification) Notice dealt with, among others, voters who had changed citizenship. As a result, thousands of names did not appear on the voters’ roll because many could not produce proof of citizenship or residence. Further, an estimated 1 million Zimbabweans living abroad were not allowed to vote (massive disenfranchisement) because postal votes were restricted to military personnel and diplomats (Kabemba, 2005:14 & 21-23; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229; Makumbe, 2003). President Mugabe won
56% of the votes to Morgan Tsvangirai’s 42% (Meredith, 2003:225-228) and the Commonwealth Observer Mission issued a scathing report saying that the election results did not adequately reflect the free will of Zimbabweans (Meredith, 2003:229). Soon after the election victory, President Mugabe denounced the British government saying Zimbabwe had “dealt a stunning blow to imperialism...In Africa, the black skin is the most important skin, not the white skin. In Africa, the African is supreme” (cited in Meredith, 2003:229). Tsvangirai was later charged with treason.

Salmi’s typology of violence (1993) includes various forms of indirect violence. Indirect violence was committed during the fast-track land reform exercise insofar as the reform programme interfered with the fulfilment of thousands of people’s (poor landless peasants, farm workers and farmers) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes. Salmi (1993:18) considers famine to be a form of indirect violence by “omission, indifference or neglect in a situation of latent danger or non-assistance with vital material needs.” Salmi (1993:18) argues that people starve or are severely under-nourished, not because of an absolute lack of food, but because food is not available for social or political reasons for which specific people or institutions can be held accountable.

Fast-track land reform exposed almost half of Zimbabwe’s population to famine (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110) and there have been allegations that relief food is being withheld from rural constituencies that are known to be opposition strongholds. Amin (1992:147 cited in Jenkins and Knight, 2002:43) notes that the politicisation (along party lines) of relief aid has always been a reality for Zimbabwe’s rural poor during drought years. The situation was no different when fast-track land reform disrupted food production and many people were forced to rely on food aid. Meredith (2003:231) reports that the state-controlled Grain Marketing Board was given the sole right to import and distribute maize, enabling Zanu-PF and party officials to give priority to Zanu-PF supporters. A government minister told villagers that; “You have to vote for Zanu-PF candidates...before government starts rethinking your entitlement to this food aid” (cited in Meredith, 2003:231). According to Salmi’s definition of famine, indirect violence is being committed by Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu-PF because insufficient delivery channels exist for relief food to reach the areas that need it the most. The government has an obligation to the affected populations, irrespective of their political affiliations but chooses to distribute food aid along party-lines.

Zimbabwe’s recent Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order is another example of indirect violence, which some analysts, including the United Nations (BBC NEWS, July 2005), have
condemned as retaliation by the government aimed at alienating and frustrating the political opposition and its supporters under the guise of an urban renewal exercise.

6.4 The World's Response to Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform

The World Bank, IMF and first world governments, particularly Britain and the United States, were willing to support the land reform programme financially and technically; on condition that the Zimbabwean government eliminated corruption amongst its top officials so that land reform would benefit the poor, landless people who needed it the most. Another condition was that the Zimbabwean government had to significantly improve its human rights record (Human Rights Watch, 2002:4). Regrettably, however, the Zimbabwean government failed to adhere to the guidelines (transparency, consultation, poverty alleviation orientation) set at the September 1998 Donors' Conference, thus forfeiting the various loans and other assistance that had been pledged for the fast-track land reform programme (Buckle, 2002:167). Zimbabwe's unlawful land grab attracted negative local (within Zimbabwe) and international attention. Locally, numerous civic organisations spoke out against the abuses of power and the violence in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches is one such organisation which criticised the government's trail of destruction:

Land reform...has been twisted into a fast-track to further the self aggrandisement of the chefs and misery for the masses. What should have improved the lot of every Zimbabwean is now viewed as irrevocably partisan, and is associated with disorder, violence and displacement...this has left the average Zimbabwean on the verge of utter destitution and hopelessness...obvious deficiencies in our leadership and governance... (cited in Meredith, 2003:221).

Zimbabwe's Evangelical Fellowship followed suit and condemned the on-going violence in the country (Buckle, 2002:99). The most vocal condemnation of Zimbabwe's worsening political violence and economic decay (human rights crisis) came from the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States and Australia (Karume, 2005:41-44; Sidiropoulos, 2004:109). The donor community imposed more conditions for the financial and technical assistance which they were offering the Zimbabwean government and sanctions were introduced later when negotiations and conditionalities failed to achieve their objective. The sanctions were aimed at promoting democracy and democratic behaviour by the Zimbabwean government as opposed to oppressing its people (the white community, political opposition...
and its supporters). It is interesting to note, however, that in a show of solidarity, or something akin to it, most African countries did not openly condemn Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform.

The United Nations defines sanctions (in general terms) as a complete or partial interruption of economic relations; sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, the severance of diplomatic relations, exclusion from, or suspension of, cultural and sports interactions as well as trade and technology embargoes by the imposing country or countries (or organisation/body) against a country, government or organisation (Sidiropoulos, 2004). The conditions and sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe’s government and ruling elite because of the human rights violations associated with fast-track land reform are enumerated below. This section also discusses responses by Zimbabwe’s neighbours to the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the international community in the context of ongoing debates about the efficacy of sanctions regimes imposed to pressure, persuade, or encourage accountability and responsible government (to manage and contain conflict) in accordance with international norms to protect citizens from repressive leadership (military dictatorships, oligarchies and widespread and sustained human rights abuses) (Sidiropoulos, 2004).

The main argument against the imposition of sanctions concerns the unequal power relations between countries. Because sanctions seek to punish, sanctions are resented by weaker countries when they are imposed by politically and economically stronger countries of the West like the United States (Sidiropoulos, 2004:118). Another problem with sanctions is that the population of targeted countries, not the offending ruling elites, suffers more from the impact of sanctions (collateral damage). Because of this realisation, there have been attempts to redefine and apply sanctions in a limited, more focused manner which is typified by references to targeted and smart sanctions (Sidiropoulos, 2004).

**Targeted sanctions** are narrowly defined and have targeted effects (specific), for instance, aviation and travel bans on individuals or arms embargoes.

**Smart sanctions** target ruling elites’ (and their families) travel abroad as well as their foreign assets, instead of a country’s entire population, thereby minimising the suffering of innocent civilians.

**Secondary sanctions** are different from targeted and smart sanctions. They are punitive measures (deterrents) against third party defaulters who help targeted governments to circumvent sanctions (Sidiropoulos, 2004).
Contradictions between the land reform policy as it was presented at the September 1998 Donors' Conference and its implementation were first noticed when 841 white-owned farms were designated for compulsory acquisition in November 1998 (the Inception Phase). The Zimbabwean government and donors had agreed that the compulsory acquisition route was reserved for the fast-track phase only. Furthermore, donors expected to be consulted on major decisions before they were implemented and this had not been the case with the issuing of these particular acquisition orders (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10). From the donors' perspective, this violation marred the spirit of goodwill that had been established amongst the stakeholders who attended the Donors Conference. The issuing of these land acquisition orders made donors apprehensive, which in turn led to delays in the disbursement of funds by Britain, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in January 1999. The discrepancies between the agreed form of land reform and its implementation made the donor community suspicious of the Zimbabwean government's intentions and motives in implementing this kind of forceful land redistribution (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10).

Loans were also withheld because the IMF and World Bank were concerned about Zimbabwe's military spending in the DRC following the unlawful detention and torture of journalists (Ray Choto, Mark Chavunduka and Clive Wilson of The Standard) who had reported on the issue in January 1999 (Meredith, 2003: 150-157, 180 & 204). A spokesperson for Britain's foreign ministry, Peter Hain, said; "We [Britain] will not fund repression or bankroll dictatorship" (cited in Meredith, 2003:157). The IMF asked the Zimbabwean government, jointly with the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF), to re-affirm its commitment to implementing an integrated land reform policy and action plan based on agreements reached at the September 1998 Donors' Conference (expanding stakeholder participation in programme planning and implementation) (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10).

On 5 February 1999, Minister Msika gave a Press Conference and issued a Press Release to clarify the Zimbabwean government's position regarding the land reform programme. Minister Msika reaffirmed that the government was still committed to agreements reached at the September 1998 Donors’ Conference and that this commitment had been ratified by Cabinet. Minister Msika said that the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Development (CRD) had invited the Land Task Force of the NECF to contribute to the preparation of the
Inception Phase Plan. Minister Msika added that the Minister of Lands and Agriculture was going to table the new Land Tax Bill (to establish maximum farm sizes for each of the country’s five main agro-climatic zones and to introduce a land tax on land area above the recommended maximum sizes) to Cabinet. The Minister reassured donors that the draft for the new National Land Policy was going to be adopted by Cabinet by January 2000 (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). Following these reassurances, donors emphasised that their continued support for the land reform depended on the government’s compliance (in actions) with the principles agreed to at the September 1998 Donors’ Conference, among others, continuous consultation, transparency and adherence to the law (Van den Brink, 2000:14). The donors agreed to further policy dialogue between the Zimbabwean government, the IMF and the World Bank.

The World Bank negotiated and signed a US$5 million Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) for the land reform’s Inception Phase on 7 May 1999, although the loan only become effective in January 2000. The United States, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway moved forward with the UNDP-coordinated Technical Support Unit project by signing the project document on 19 May 1999. Britain and the European Union sent a fact-finding field survey mission to Zimbabwe in May 1999 to assist with policy development. France provided technical assistance in re-planning the old Model B farms (cooperative-type resettlement schemes) which had been established in the 1980s (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10, 13-14).

The Zimbabwean government’s alleged support of the war veteran-led reign of terror during the 2000 farm invasions and its acquiescence (partiality to the rule of law) also brought its motives under scrutiny. President Mugabe’s defiance further soured the country’s deteriorating relations with the donor community. In May 1999, President Mugabe declared his dislike for the IMF;

“I do not like the IMF. It is a tool being used by the Western imperialists to subject us to their will. The IMF is being political and we will be political in our attitude towards it. It is a monster we do not deserve. We are better off without it. We will not die as a country. Never ever” (cited in Meredith, 2003:156).

In the same month, President Mugabe praised China for pledging to provide Zimbabwe with ‘soft loans’ (the birth of Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ foreign policy). He said; “If we get funds
from China the way we expect, as per their promises, there will not be any need for us to look for balance of payments support elsewhere” (cited in Meredith, 2003:157). When called upon to restore order and the rule of law, President Mugabe said:

Despite what they say about human rights, the Europeans are the most racist people, racist to the core...For all their appearances of being democratic, you just have to go to the United States to see how blacks live” (cited in Meredith, 2003:157).

The donor community began to see the fast-track land reform programme as part of an elaborate plan for short-term political expediency. It became apparent that the reform exercise was a desperate bid by the Mugabe regime to stay in power by appeasing agitated land-hungry masses before the 2000 general election (Buckle, 2002:101; Raftopoulos, 2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). As the former colonial power, the Zimbabwean government expected Britain to unconditionally give £36 million for the land reform programme, which it refused to do (Utete Report, 2003:16; Buckle, 2002:81). In March 2000, Britain announced that it was “not convinced that the Zimbabwe government had a serious poverty eradication strategy” (Britain’s Department for International Development cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:38). Britain did not believe that the Zimbabwean government was giving priority to land reform to help the country’s poor and landless people. It also voiced concerns about the lack of transparency in the settler identification process.
Fast-track land reform became synonymous with a strong anti-British and anti-white campaign as the Zimbabwean government defended its “autonomy and sovereignty from British interference” (BBC News, 2002a).

The donor community felt that the Zimbabwean government was pursuing a different agenda from the one presented at the 1998 Donors’ Conference. Donors were not convinced that the Zimbabwean government was committed to implementing a planned, sustainable and effective land reform programme and the Word Bank froze more than $200 million worth of aid for Zimbabwe’s land reform programme in 2000 (Buckle, 2002:35-36). The Zimbabwean government maintained that donors’ preference for a redistribution process based on market values hindered rapid reform, not just with this particular phase of the country’s reform history, but since independence (Human Rights Watch, 2002:41).
Regional heads of state from Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa met at the Victoria Falls to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe. The heads of state reiterated the Zimbabwean government’s position that international donors, particularly Britain, had an obligation to deliver on their pledges of support for Zimbabwe’s land reform (Buckle, 2002:81). Britain said it would help finance Zimbabwe’s land reform if the programme was taken seriously by the Zimbabwean government; provided the programme was implemented within the rule of law with the aim of improving the plight of the rural poor. Britain said it would not help if violence, intimidation and defiance of the law persisted. Britain wanted illegal land occupiers to be removed from farms and land to be transferred at free and fair prices, conditions which the Zimbabwean government refused to meet (Buckle, 2002:82). Palmer and Toulmin (2000) use the Zimbabwean government’s attitude and behaviour as an example of how governments can adopt narrow conceptions of the appropriate roles for donors and host governments in land reform.

Britain said it would indirectly make available £5 million towards land redistribution over 3-5 years from 2000. Britain said that this money would be made available only through non-governmental channels and Britain would make “a significant financial commitment” to support Zimbabwe’s land reform and lobby support from other international donors on the condition that a concrete plan for land reform was implemented in accordance the agreements made at the 1998 Donors Conference (Human Rights Watch, 2002:38; Buckle, 2002:81). Zimbabwe’s government continued to blame the international donor community and Britain for problems in the implementation of the land reform programme (because of conditions imposed on financial support).

By April 2000, SADC was voicing concerns about the effect that Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic and political situation was having on the region (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). According to Chitiyo (2003:184 & 185), Mozambique and Zambia did not endorse Zimbabwe’s “agricultural Africanisation” or “mono-racial coercive agricultural development” and quietly encouraged Zimbabwe’s displaced farmers to buy land in their countries.

The Commonwealth’s head of security, Don McKinnon, visited Zimbabwe for a meeting with President Mugabe in May 2000. After a 40-minute meeting, Mckinnon announced he believed that everything was being done to restore the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Buckle, 2002:98). This statement disturbed many people because it was becoming quite apparent that
the Zimbabwean government had lost control over the war veterans and its supporters, even though it made half-hearted statements about “regrettable violent incidences” (Buckle, 2002:99). The country was descending further into anarchy and this was compounded by the fact that the role of the police had been compromised because land reform was seen as a political issue (Meredith, 2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45, 96). The on-going human rights abuses forced the War Veterans Association to split in June 2000. A group calling themselves the Liberators’ Platform dissociated themselves from the rest of the rampaging war veterans and condemned the lawlessness in the country. The chairman of the Liberators’ Platform warned that the illegal farm occupations would have dire economic consequences. He also criticised the indifference shown by some Zimbabweans and Zimbabwe’s neighbours to the unfolding catastrophe as “incomprehensible and irresponsible” (Buckle, 2002:134).

The European Union imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe on 5 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:235) and on 6 October 2000, President Mugabe invoked his Presidential Powers to issue an amnesty for politically motivated crimes committed between 1 January 2000 and 31 July 2000 (Clemency Order No. 1 of 2000), although the amnesty did not extend to crimes like murder, rape and robbery (Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22; Buckle, 2002:235). The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act came into force in June 2001 to protect illegal land occupiers who had invaded farms from the start of land invasions in early 2000 until February 2001. The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year. It also nullified all court orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). From these actions, it became obvious to donors and other observers that the Zimbabwean government was actively, rather than accidentally, subverting good governance for personal and political gain (Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c).

South African President, Thabo Mbeki, publicly condemned Zimbabwe’s land grab for the first time on 26 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:237). The United States condemned political violence, the collapse of the rule of law, abuse of power and the erosion of the separation of powers between the executive, parliament and the judiciary in Zimbabwe. It also objected to the blatant abuse of the electoral system (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111, 113). The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Bill in January 2001. The Bill ordered U.S. representatives to oppose extensions of loans, bi-lateral assistance and debt-forgiveness to Zimbabwe by international
financial institutions and authorised the U.S. President (in consultation with foreign governments) to take action against individuals responsible for politically motivated violence and the breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:42 & 43; Human Rights Watch, 2002:38). The Bill set out conditions under which these measures would be lifted (restoration of the rule of law, respect of property rights, commitment to equitable, legal and transparent land reform in terms of agreements reached at the 1998 Donors’ Conference). The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Bill was signed into law in December 2001 (Karume, 2005).

Again, Britain voiced its objections to wanton human rights violations as well as the subversion of democratic imperatives apparent in the Zimbabwean government’s draconian press censorship measures and smear campaigns against political opposition (the MDC), Britain and America. The United Nations (Secretary General Koffi Annan on behalf of the UN) also expressed concern over the scope and scale of the fast-track land reform programme because it was being implemented with total disregard for the original objectives stated by the Zimbabwean government at the 1998 Donors’ Conference, and far beyond the targets set for land acquisition in both the Inception and Fast-Track phases (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). On 15 December 2000, the French Ambassador to Zimbabwe announced that France would not be funding Zimbabwe’s land reform programme because it was not being implemented within the law (Buckle, 2002:240). Soon after that, on 21 December 2000, a UNDP administrator, Mark Mallock Brown, submitted a report on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. The report recommended that the fast-track land reform programme be stopped and be revised significantly (Buckle, 2002:241).

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held a meeting of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 at which they expressed the view that Britain should honour its obligation to fund Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform, despite the contradictions between the policy documents and the programme’s implementation (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). Upon his arrival in Blantyre, Malawi for a SADC summit in August 2001, President Mugabe said; “Britain has a war with us. Blair wants his own version of colonialism in Zimbabwe and we will resist that…Sanctions or no sanctions, Zimbabwe will survive” (cited in BBC News, 2002a). The IMF and the World Bank refused to extend further loans to the Zimbabwean government. Zimbabwe was removed from the list of countries eligible to use resources under the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth facility in September 2001. The IMF also
resolved to withhold all technical assistance to Zimbabwe (Sidiropoulos, 2004:113; British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 01/06/2005).

Events in Zimbabwe continued to attract negative attention and attempts were made to resolve the Britain-Zimbabwe land dispute through the September 2001 Abuja Agreement (Raftopoulos, 2002:415; Bush, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001). A committee of nine Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met to discuss the ‘Zimbabwean situation’ from 6-7 September 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Ministers maintained that Zimbabwe’s land ownership and redistribution issue had to be addressed in a “transparent and equitable manner” which entailed the rule of law, respect for human rights and democratic principles (Meredith, 2003:222; Utete Report, 2003:18; Human Rights Watch, 2002:39). The ministers also agreed that Zimbabwe’s land reform had to be implemented in a fair, just and sustainable manner, which would take into consideration the interests of all parties concerned. This intervention was crucial because the volatile situation that existed in Zimbabwe at the time was becoming more divisive and threatened socio-economic stability in Southern Africa and the continent as a whole.

Following these deliberations, the Zimbabwean delegation accepted the terms of the Abuja Agreement and assured the world that there would be no further farm occupations and related violence (Utete Report, 2003:18). Unfortunately, however, the Abuja Agreement was a temporary reprieve. Representatives of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association declared that they were not bound by a truce with the Commonwealth and farm invasions continued, almost unabated. This defiance and antagonism was followed by an escalation of violent farm occupations between August and October 2001 (Commercial Farmers Union cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:39).

The European Union (EU) formally began consultations with the Zimbabwean government in October 2001 under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which regulates EU relations with African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. The Article incorporates human rights and good governance criteria into EU-ACP relations and states that “if there is no progress on human rights issues within 75-days of opening formal consultations, appropriate measures, including sanctions may be undertaken” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:38).

In the same month, Britain’s Minister of State announced Britain was still willing to contribute £35 million to Zimbabwe’s land reform, provided that the reform was carried out without violence and according to the rule of law; with the aim of empowering the rural
landless poor, as opposed to the cronyism experienced in the past (Peter Hain cited in Human Rights Watch 2002:38).

In December 2001, SADC Heads of State met to assess the progress on the ‘Zimbabwe situation.’ They concluded that violence had reduced significantly and stated that they were, therefore, opposed to sanctions proposed by the United States (in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of December 2001) and the European Union (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). Also in the same month, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) which was established to assess compliance by Commonwealth members with the Commonwealth Harare Declaration of 1991, expressed concern over continued violence, illegal farm occupations, political intimidation and infringements on the freedom and independence of the media. The CMAG’s report on the Zimbabwean situation contradicted the assessment made by SADC Heads of State and attested to “serious and persistent violations of the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values and the rule of law as enshrined in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991” (CMAG cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:39).

President Mugabe’s defiance and inflammatory statements about Britain are well known and bad reviews (by the U.S., Britain, the CMAG) concerning his government’s implementation of the fast-track land reform programme created more animosity between Zimbabwe and the rest of the world. The European Union, the Commonwealth and the United States put more pressure on the Zimbabwean government to reverse its draconic media and security laws and to guarantee free and fair elections before E.U. foreign ministers met in Brussels in late January 2002 to review the progress on Zimbabwe’s socio-political and economic situation. Again in January 2002, the UN Secretary General, Koffi Anan, encouraged the Zimbabwean government “to implement fully and faithfully” the actions it promised to take with regard to land reform and to allow freedom of speech and assembly, investigate political violence and respect the rule of law (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:40).

Another SADC Heads of State summit was held in January 2002 at which the Heads of State welcomed assurances by Zimbabwe’s President that the independent media would be allowed to function; judicial independence would be respected; political violence would be investigated; and people would have freedom of assembly (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40).
After all the negotiations (above) to convince the Zimbabwean government to reconsider its implementation of the fast-track land reform programme, the E.U. still cited continued political violence, infringements on media freedom and judicial independence and the illegal occupation of farms as key concerns that where not being addressed by the Zimbabwean government (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). The E.U. introduced targeted sanctions in February 2002 against 79 of Zimbabwe’s senior government officials (Britain was strongly in favour of sanctions and countries like France and Italy were somewhat reluctant). The sanctions included:

- Provisions for the freezing of personal assets belonging to key politicians (about 95) believed to be responsible for Zimbabwe’s human rights crisis.
- Prohibition of travel to E.U. countries by such persons (visa restrictions).
- The suspension or re-orientation of financial development cooperation programmes with the Zimbabwean government.
- An embargo on the sale of arms by E.U. member states to Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:111; Meredith, 2003:227).

The United States followed suit by imposing similar sanctions on the Zimbabwean government on 22 February 2002, in terms of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (Human Rights Watch, 2002:4 & 38). United States sanctions included; the freezing of financial and personal assets of Zimbabwe’s political elite believed to be responsible for the country’s human rights crisis, a travel ban on such persons and the barring of U.S. citizens from having financial dealings with the listed people (Sidiropoulos, 2004:111; Meredith, 2003:227).

The Commonwealth Chairpersons Committee on Zimbabwe (comprising South Africa, Nigeria and Australia) instituted sanctions on Zimbabwe in March 2002. In a bit to compel the Zimbabwean government to address the on-going political violence and human rights abuses, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth for a year (Karume, 2005:42; Zenit, 2003). The measure was imposed mainly because Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential election was marred by politically motivated violence and conditions in the country had not been conducive for the free expression of the will of the electorate (Sidiropoulos, 2004:111-112). The Commonwealth wanted the Zimbabwean government to:
- Constructively engage the opposition MDC.
- Stop the harassment of the opposition.
- Repeal repressive laws against the media.
- Address issues raised by the Commonwealth Observer Group after the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential election regarding electoral malpractice.
- Government engagement with the UNDP and the Commonwealth regarding lawful and transparent land reform (Karume, 2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:112).

On 13 June 2002, the IMF suspended Zimbabwe’s voting and other rights, as well as the provision of technical assistance to Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:43; Sidiropoulos, 2004:113; British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 01/06/2005).

In September 2002 (at the World Summit in Johannesburg) President Mugabe defended Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform by launching a scathing attack on British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and Britain’s colonial past. President Mugabe told the British leader; “Keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe...We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are, we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood” (cited by BBC News, 2002b). Following this statement, the Australian government imposed bi-lateral smart sanctions on Zimbabwe in October 2002. Australian sanctions included:

- A travel ban to Australia on Zimbabwe’s ministers and certain senior officials believed to be responsible for the country’s human rights crisis.
- A freeze on Australian assets held by such ministers and officials.
- Suspension of non-humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe.
- Prohibition of defence sales and suspension of all defence links between the two countries.
- The down-grading of cultural links between Zimbabwe and Australia.
- Suspension of bi-lateral ministerial contact between the two countries (Karume, 2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:112).

Apart from the sanctions outlined above, several other countries withdrew aid to Zimbabwe, except for humanitarian assistance to combat famine.
There was no real improvement on the issues raised by the Commonwealth Chairpersons Committee when the year of suspension lapsed. The Zimbabwean government pre-empted threats by the Commonwealth to further suspend its membership by resigning/withdrawing from the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003, ahead of a Commonwealth summit that was meant to decide whether or not Zimbabwe would remain suspended from the body (Zenit, 2003). The recalcitrant stance of the Zimbabwean government over the issue of embracing democratic values forced African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to vote for the continued and indefinite suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. Zimbabwe’s March 2002 suspension was renewed in December 2003 at the Abuja Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) (Sidiropoulos, 2004:111-112).

The lack of positive progress on the Zimbabwean situation led the Board of the IMF to institute proceedings to expel Zimbabwe from its ranks in December 2003 (Sidiropoulos, 2004:113; British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 01/06/2005).

President Mugabe blamed external forces for Zimbabwe’s problems. He demonised the sanctioning powers for causing deprivation and untold suffering to Zimbabweans, thus deflecting some of the blame from his government’s bad policies. President Mugabe maintained that the imposition of sanctions was not objective and that the imposing states had hidden agendas and double standards; a ploy by Western powers to undermine Zimbabwe’s autonomy and sovereignty. President Mugabe singled out Britain’s alleged pernicious involvement, through the E.U., to derail comprehensive land reform in Zimbabwe. He also criticised Britain for its conditional funding of Zimbabwe’s land reform efforts (Sidiropoulos, 2004).

Sanctions were imposed on the Zimbabwean government because of its increasingly bad governance record from the late 1990s. The sanctions were meant to encourage the Zimbabwean government to introduce political and economic reforms (Karume, 2005:41-44; Bush, 2003:535; Kibble, 2004:366). However, it is worth noting that while Britain (and other donors) felt strongly about transparency, the upholding of human rights and pluralism as preconditions for financial support towards Zimbabwe’s land reform; multi-party democracy was not instituted in Kenya until 1991, yet it was not a condition for British assistance in Kenya’s ‘million acre scheme’ already mentioned. These same conditions have not been met by countries like Bangladesh, Croatia, Guyana, Mozambique and Rwanda (which do not have the most impressive human rights records) yet Britain and other donors continue to
financially support their land policy projects (Natural Resources Information System, accessed 05/05/2005). When the donor community refused to commit themselves to supporting the controversial fast-track land reform programme, the Zimbabwean government resolved to go ahead with the programme despite the lack of support (Buckle, 2002:158; Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c). President Mugabe campaigned for the elections saying; “Zimbabwe is able to go it alone...If whites want to go [leave Zimbabwe], we will offer them an escort” (cited in Buckle, 2002:48-49).

Several African countries objected to European Union and United States sanctions against the Mugabe government. According to Sidiropoulos (2004:114), the fact that “whites owned a disproportionate share of land in Zimbabwe had substantial resonance in the region”, especially in former settler colonies like South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland that experienced extensive colonial land expropriation (ranging from 45%-87%). African countries generally supported Zimbabwe’s land reform plans in principle because of their shared history but they disagreed over the way the reform was conducted (Human Rights Watch, 2002:4). South Africa rejected the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, preferring instead to focus on ‘quiet diplomacy’ (to work towards a negotiated settlement amongst the main stakeholders). Sidiropoulos (2004:114-115) and Hall (2003:260) believe that this cautious position was informed by a consideration of what radical action would have on South Africa’s own land reform efforts.

Sidiropoulos (2004) also explains the solidarity shown to the Zimbabwean government, (alternatively, the ambiguous support for sanctions) by Zimbabwe’s neighbours and SADC, firstly as a result of their trade and diplomatic interconnectedness (balance of power). Secondly, and more importantly, it is a commonly held belief that even when sanctions are imposed multi-laterally, such sanctions are initiated at the behest of dominant powers like the United States and its allies in the European Union. Sidiropoulos (2004:118) contends that Zimbabwe’s neighbours saw the Zimbabwean government as having the courage to stand up to the “double standards” of the West, particularly Britain and the U.S. when they failed to agree on the root cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis (Karume, 2005:45). Consequently, the Zimbabwean government’s position was admired by some because sanctions were seen as an instrument of control imposed by the strong on the weak (Karume, 2005:45; Sidiropoulos, 2004). Following the initial criticism of the motives behind the imposition of sanctions on
Zimbabwe, however, some African countries eventually agreed with their imposition as the Zimbabwean government repeatedly broke all the promises and reassurances that it made/gave to the donor community and SADC (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3-4, 37 & 41).

As recently as June-July 2005, the E.U. increased to 120 from 95 the number of senior Zanu-PF officials barred from travelling to Europe. Interestingly, the updated list now includes a High Court judge (Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005:3). The Zimbabwean government believes that these additional sanctions are retaliation by Britain for the Zimbabwean government’s much criticised urban clean-up campaign, Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. Operation Murambatsvina was characterised by mass evictions and the demolition of illegal housing structures and unregistered or unlicensed trading areas where black market dealing in fuel, foreign currency and other commodities in short supply (criminal activities) were believed to be rife. Foreigners who were illegally in the country were also caught in the clean-up net. Hundreds of thousands of homes in Zimbabwe’s towns were torched or bulldozed between April and July 2005 and more than 700,000 people lost their homes or livelihoods. The clean-up campaign worsened the humanitarian crisis that was already existed in the country because of fast-track land reform. The United Nations condemned Operation Murambatsvina as a “disastrous”, “catastrophic injustice” carried out in an “indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering...” (cited in BBC News, July 2005).

The Zimbabwean government has said that the latest sanctions imposed on the country’s ruling elite were instigated by Britain (to strategically position itself) before taking over the presidency of the E.U. in July 2005 (Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005:3). Zimbabwe’s Minister of Information and Publicity, Mr Bright Matonga, said that the government is not bothered by this new development because it is just one in a long chain of measures put in place by the West to discredit the Mugabe regime following the March 2005 parliamentary election. Zimbabwe’s ruling elite is convinced that it is managing to circumvent the effect of these sanctions through its ‘Look East’ foreign policy. The Zimbabwean government has stated that its goal, and preference, is to cement relations with Asian countries, particularly China, since China is keen to access metals such as chrome and platinum from Zimbabwe (Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005:3).
6.5 The Urban Clean-Up Campaigns

The ruling Zanu-PF won the March 31 2005 parliamentary elections by a wider margin against the MDC than it did in June 2000, although just over 50% of the country’s 5.4 million registered voters went to the polls (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005:1-2). The government dubbed the March 2005 parliamentary election the “anti Blair elections” because they allowed the ruling party to reassert its dominance and authority in the country’s political arena by reversing the MDC’s 2000 victories (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005:1-2). At the opening of the 6th parliament, Zimbabwe’s newly elected speaker of parliament and Zanu-PF national chairman, Dr John Landa Nkomo, commented that Zimbabweans rejected servitude to Britain and foreign control in its domestic affairs, thus asserting its sovereignty (The Voice, 2005:5). The ruling Zanu-PF won 78 of the 120 contested seats and the MDC won 41 of the 120 seats in the March 2005 election. The last seat went to an independent candidate and former Minister of Information and Publicity, Professor Jonathan Moyo. Interestingly, out of Harare’s 18 constituencies, Harare South constituency was the only seat won by a Zanu-PF candidate (Herald Reporters, 13 April 2005:1-2); highlighting the ruling party’s continuing loss of urban support. Despite the lack of popularity in the country’s capital (and other major cities like Bulawayo), the March 2005 election result gave the ruling party a two-thirds majority in the country’s 6th parliament (including the 30 MPs appointed by the president). The opposition MDC is challenging the results of the March 2005 election in court and has filed 14 petitions citing electoral irregularities and intimidation by the ruling party (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005:1-2).

The Zimbabwean government embarked on Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order between April and July 2005. Hundreds of thousands of homes were torched and bulldozed and more than 700 000 people were left homeless in Zimbabwe’s cities and towns (BBC News, July, 2005). David Coltart (Zimbabwe’s shadow Minister of Justice) maintains that Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order was politically motivated and directed mainly at urban constituencies (chastisement) that supported the opposition in recent elections, including the February 2000 constitutional referendum (on BBC News, July, 2005). Coltart draws attention to the fact that what might have begun as an urban clean-up campaign (ostensibly to crack down on black-market trading and other criminal activities in slum areas) curiously spread to and affected certain (targeted) villages in rural opposition strongholds (BBC News, July, 2005). Meredith (2003:165) and Raftopoulos (2002:420-21) also note that Zimbabwe’s main political opposition, the MDC, has a strong support-base in the urban areas.
and that the Zanu-PF government considers the urban electorate to be against the state. Operation Murambatsvina added to the existing poverty and alienation of the country’s poor, many of whom were shipped off to Caledonia Farm (a transit camp outside Harare). Operation Murambatsvina constitutes both direct and indirect forms of violence defined by Salmi (1993) and was condemned in a report by the United Nations’ Special Envoy Mrs Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka who visited Zimbabwe from 28 June to 8 July 2005 to assess the impact of the operation. The UN report concluded that the operation was carried out with little warning and directly affected 700 000 people, whilst indirectly affecting a further 2.4 million people (Herald Reporter, 2005:1 & 5). Part of the report reads as follows:

“The scale of suffering is immense...about 700 000 people have lost their homes or livelihoods and another 2.4 million people have been affected...Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order was a disastrous venture...carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering...The scale of suffering is immense, particularly among widows, single mothers, children, orphans, the elderly and disabled persons” (BBC NEWS, July 2005).

The UN report strongly encouraged the Zimbabwean government to stop further demolitions and to provide people with secure tenure; affordable housing, water and sanitation as opposed to the “wanton destruction of homes, business premises and vending sites” (Herald Reporter, 2005:1 & 5). UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan, also expressed shock at the “catastrophic injustice” done to Zimbabwe’s poorest people (BBC News, July 2005).

Zimbabwe’s government officials (including Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, Dr Ignatius Chombo and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr S. Mumbengegwi) heavily criticised the UN report on Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. The Zimbabwean government described the report as being deliberately biased against the government with the aim of tarnishing Zimbabwe’s image. Government officials alleged that the report was the work of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s vendetta against Zimbabwe (through the UN). They also claimed that the figures cited in the report were exaggerated (Sunday Mail Reporter, 24 July 2005:4; Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005: 1 & 5). In the government’s defence, Minister Mumbengegwi insisted that Operation Murambatsvina was legal in terms of Zimbabwean law and was consistent with international provisions. According to the government, the operation targeted illegal building structures (housing and
business), informal trading areas (unregistered or unlicensed) and other places where provisional criminal activities such as black market dealing in fuel and foreign currency and other commodities was rife. Minister Mumbengegwi said Operation Murambatsvina was conceived not as an end in itself but as a precursor to Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle which the government began implementing in July 2005 “to provide decent, affordable accommodation and to create an enabling and conducive environment that promotes small to medium enterprises (SMEs)...in line with the ruling party’s manifesto and policy objectives for the March 2005 parliamentary elections” (Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005:1 & 5).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing emphasised that Operation Murambatsvina was being succeeded by a reconstruction exercise dubbed Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle which is intended to benefit people affected by Operation Murambatsvina. The two ministers said Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle was already underway and was supported by a government budget of $Z3 trillion (Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005:1 & 5; Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). Minister Chombo said Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle is part of the government’s efforts to provide homeless people with decent accommodation and about 3 100 people have already been allocate stands in Harare’s Hatcliffe Housing Scheme. Minister Chombo added that 2 260 houses are at various stages of construction, for example, at Whitecliff in Harare (Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). Beneficiaries of Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle in Harare’s Hatcliffe housing scheme received building materials from the government to help them construct temporary out-buildings in which to live whilst building proper residential structures. It is reported that each family was given four asbestos roofing sheets in July 2005 as a contribution towards the rebuilding exercise (Municipal Reporter, 23 July 2005:8). The government also pledged to assist displaced people by deploying ‘building brigades’ through the Local Government, Public Works and National Housing Ministry to help affected people with the construction of 2-roomed core houses. The people in these housing schemes were assured that they can stay in these temporary structures for a year, without being evicted (Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2).

According to government figures, Manicaland Province had utilised $Z87 253 billion of the $Z3 trillion reconstruction budget on 480 houses in Mutare, Rusape, Nyanga and Chimanimani by the end of July 2005 (Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). The government reported that 14 houses were at roof level and 1 000 stands had been serviced in Mutare alone and that
300 families had been identified to occupy these houses. It is also reported that some of the reconstruction funds have gone towards building factories and vendors’ markets in the province (Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). Minister Chombo announced that more farms would be acquired (from the few remaining white-owned farms) for Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle.

The Zimbabwean government maintains that Operation Murambatsvina and Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle are meant to uplift the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans in the long term, in spite of “sanctions and unwarranted vilification by Britain and its allies” (Herald Reporter, 2005:1 & 5). However, one cannot help but wonder what the affected people are meant to be grateful for because as the UN’s July 2005 report highlighted and criticised, it appears as though Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle was an after-thought, a plan hastily drawn up in reaction to public outcry over Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order; when hundreds of thousands of people were already homeless and destitute. The UN report also points out that regardless of whatever plans the Zimbabwean government might have had, it simply does not have the capacity to “fully address the needs of the affected population without assistance from the international community” (BBC News, July 2005).

6.6 Conclusion
This section on the relationship between fast-track land reform and development highlights the everyday reality of ordinary Zimbabweans after land reform, Operation Murambatsvina and the current Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle compares or fits into the government’s development objectives. From a humanitarian standpoint, one can debate whether the wholesale destruction of livelihoods experienced by the poorest and vulnerable people could have been avoided and whether more measures could have been taken to minimise the severity of the collateral damage involved. Fast-track land reform deepened the welfare crisis that already existed in Zimbabwe because of the degree of displacement and disempowerment experienced by the most vulnerable people.

In terms of politics and democratic governance, most Zimbabweans are disenchanted by the government’s conduct in carrying out its grand plan for land reform and urban renewal at the expense of the country’s poorest people. The horrific realities of this period will be entrenched in people’s minds for a long time to come and the situation is worsened by the fact that the government does not acknowledge that its policies (arguably well intended but ill-executed) are responsible for the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans. The land reform programme criminalised and thwarted hopes for free and fair political
participation because of the extent of political repression orchestrated and sustained by the government during its implementation.

Zimbabwe celebrated its silver jubilee or twenty-five years of independence in April 2005, but sadly, there is not much to show for it in terms of development and good governance. Through successive ill-advised and ill-executed policies and reactionary tendencies, the Zimbabwean government finds itself in the same position it was in at independence in 1980, except there is no war to blame for the carnage this time. It will take many years to rebuild Zimbabwe’s devastated economy (livelihoods and infrastructure) and social fabric after the wholesale displacement of both rural and urban populations. This mammoth task is even more daunting for everyone involved because the government has limited resources and is reeling under the burden of sanctions that could have been avoided, had the government heeded the warnings and advice of other parties that had a stake in the land reform process.
Case Study of Three Farms in Vumba and Burma Valley

7.1 Introduction
This section provides a detailed account of how fast-track land reform was experienced in the study area. The tentative proposition for the study was that Vumba and Burma Valley's experience of the fast-track land reform programme was somewhat different to the way in which the programme was carried out (in practice) in the rest of the country. This proposition was investigated and proven to be true insofar as differences were noted in the extent (scale or incidence) of illegal farm occupations, their duration and their intensity (Meredith, 2003:184; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 2000a:90). This study by no means suggests that illegal farm occupations or compulsory land acquisition did not take place in Manicaland or the study area. Illegal land invasions broke out countrywide at the end of February 2000 and according to the Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre (2000), by 30 April 2000, Manicaland province had 152 farms that had been affected by illegal farm invasions out of a national total of 1,056 that had been invaded at the time. About 85 of the 152 affected farms in Manicaland were still effectively occupied by 30 April 2000 (Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 2000).

Illegal farm occupations in Manicaland province were concentrated in the Headlands, Chimanimani and Chipinge areas (Buckle, 2002; Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 2000). Border Timbers Limited is one of Zimbabwe's big timber exporters and employed 3,500 workers in Zimbabwe's Eastern Border Districts (Manicaland), along the border with Mozambique. Border Timbers was covered by a Bi-lateral Investment Protection Agreement, and was therefore, officially exempted from the compulsory land acquisition process. However, Border Timbers was forced to close down most of its plants, except where critical export orders were being processed, in May 2000 when about forty war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters raided its Charter sawmills in Chimanimani (Buckle, 2002:97). Buckle (2002:97) reports that workers at the sawmill were forced to attend a rally for more than five hours and some of them were severely assaulted in the incident, although no arrests were made. Apart from job loses as a result of subsequent plant closures, Zimbabwe stood to lose millions of dollars in foreign currency.
There were also a few isolated incidences of illegal farm occupations that made headline news in the Odzi/Riverside area 20 km outside Mutare (along the Harare-Mutare highway), for example, the hostile takeover of Kondozi Farm by war veterans in June 2004. The Save Valley was similarly affected (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Incidents of farm invasions and land pegging were also reported in Vumba and Burma Valley, for example, on Ferndale Farm were one invader came dressed in army uniform and claimed to be from the notorious 5 Brigade which was responsible for the Gukurahundi atrocities in Matabeleland in the 1980s (Commercial Farmers’ Union Information Centre, 2000).

Despite these cases, however, illegal farm occupations in Manicaland’s Vumba and Burma Valley area (Mutare district) were relatively isolated and peaceful compared to those experienced in Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces were war veterans, Zanu-PF youth militias and other landless people went on a rampage for most of 2000 and 2001 (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:79; Meredith, 2003: 18,176, 184 & 220; Moyo, 2000a:90).

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section describes Manicaland Province and Mutare’s main geographical characteristics and the type of agricultural production that farmers are involved in. It also summarises the results of fast-track land reform in Manicaland province with respect to how much land was distributed in the province and how many families benefited from the land reform exercise.

The second section outlines the research methodology used for this study and why it was chosen. Data was gathered through a focus group discussion (pilot study) and in-depth interviews with government officials, three white farmers and twenty black farm workers. The questions (interview schedules) posed to two of the three categories of respondents (farmers and farm workers, not government officials) covered similar substantive material.

The final section profiles the 3 farms that make up the case study, followed by a qualitative analysis of how different socio-political and economic forces have influenced responses to fast-track land reform in the study area. The report is both descriptive and analytical in the presentation of its findings.

7.2.1 Manicaland Province and Mutare’s Main Geographical Characteristics

Manicaland province has seven administrative districts namely; Buhera, Chimanimani, Chipinge, Makoni, Mutare, Mutasa and Nyanga (see maps 1, 2 and 3 on pages iv and v). The province covers an area of 36 459 square kilometres and has a population of 1.6 million (1 566 899). According to the Utete Report (2003:41), Manicaland province has a high
population density of 42 people per square kilometre (against a national average of 31 people per square kilometre) and about 70% of the province’s population is found in the communal areas (Thomas, 1992 cited in Moyo, 1995:129; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manicaland). Out of Manicaland province’s seven administrative district, Buhera is 100% communal (Utete Report, 2003). According to Moyo (1995:179), only 18% of Manicaland’s population is found on large commercial farms, 3% on small commercial farms and 8% in resettlement areas.

Zimbabwe has five agro-ecological or natural regions based on factors such as relief/altitude, soil type and the amount of rainfall received annually. The most pressure for land reform was in Natural Regions 1, 2 and 3 which have reliable rainfall and soils that are well suited for crop farming. Modal farm sizes in Natural Region 1 vary between 1000-1500 hectares (Moyo et al, 1991). According to Zinyama (2001:166), farms in Manicaland province are generally smaller within the vicinity of large urban centres and in the higher rainfall regions north and east of the country. Small-scale commercial farms are generally less than 100 hectares in size. Statutory Instrument 419 of December 1999 prescribes maximum farm sizes for Region 1 as shown by Table 10 below.

Table 10: Recommended Maximum Farm Sizes for Natural Region 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agro-ecological Zone/Natural Region</th>
<th>Peri-urban Commercial Farms (ha)</th>
<th>Small-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
<th>Medium-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
<th>Large-scale commercial farms (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2-50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250-450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Van den Brink, 2000:2)

Mutare has a population of about 389,988 and a surface area of 5,650 square kilometres (http://www.statoids.com/yzw.html). The nearest communal area is Zimunya communal lands which lies twenty kilometres south of Mutare. Zimunya Township is a dormitory town with a few light industries and a vocational skills training centre. The township houses people who work in Mutare and commute between the two places everyday. According to Zinyama (2001:172), Zimunya had a population density of 162 people per square kilometre in 1982; the third highest for any rural area in the country and successive years have intensified the economic desperation felt by poor people in the area.
7.2.2 Manicaland Province's Contribution to Zimbabwe's Economy

Manicaland province falls under Zimbabwe's Natural Region 1, which is the most ideal for intensive farming (Moyo, 2000:28; see also Appendix 3). The Eastern Highlands of Manicaland province produce a diverse and specialised array of foreign currency earning crops. The area makes a significant contribution to Zimbabwe's economy in terms of tea, coffee, timber/Agri-forestry (Border Timbers Ltd, the Wattle Company, the Forestry Commission), horticulture (tropical and sub-tropical fruits, vegetables and cut-flowers), seed potatoe production and dairy farming. Zimbabwe is a small tea producer compared to other countries but its tea is of such superior quality that 60% of it is exported (Riddell, 1992:78). Zimbabwe also exports 99% of its coffee (the Arabica variety). The parastatal (ARDA), through its Katiyo Tea Estates, and the Tanganda Tea Company have a monopoly over the country's tea and coffee production in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands.

Moyo (2000:28, 91-92) notes that Manicaland province had the second highest number of horticultural producers in the country in 1995. The main export destinations for Zimbabwe's cut-flowers, vegetables and fruits are Holland, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and more recently, Asian markets. Farmers in Manicaland are a jewel to Zimbabwe's economy because their produce yields high returns. The Mutare City Council has even erected signs on the city limits which say: "Welcome to Mutare: The Jewel of the East" (Buckle, 2002:233). The drier areas of Manicaland province produce tobacco, sugar, wheat, cotton, sorghum and millet (Utete Report, 2003:41). The province is also popular with tourists (chalets, cottages and lodges) because of its natural physical attractions, including inland lakes and scenic mountains. The Vumba Mountains form part of the Eastern Highlands mountain range which stretches from Nyanga in the north to Chimanimani in the south.

7.3 Land Reform in Manicaland Province

It should be noted that the government designated and gazetted thirteen productive white-owned farms (covering 17 000 acres) for compulsory acquisition in Mutare district in 1992 when the 1992 Land Acquisition Act was enacted. These farms were designated out of a total of approximately 130 farms in Mutare district. One of the designated farms was a dairy farm that supplied milk to Mutare district. One of the designated farms was a leading tobacco producer. Seven of the thirteen farms designated for compulsory acquisition in 1992 where subsequently undesignated (Meredith, 2003:124-126).
Despite Manicaland province's significant contribution to Zimbabwe's GDP and foreign currency earnings, landholdings in the province were not exempted from compulsory acquisition during the fast-track land reform, except as specified in the official land acquisition criteria. Although Manicaland province is one of the most agriculturally productive of Zimbabwe's ten provinces, no additional exemptions were granted because provincial authorities regularly cited problems of land shortage and population pressure in the province's communal areas (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18; Utete Report, 2003).

Buckle (2002:130), a white farmer who lost her farm to illegal land occupiers in 2000 comments that by June 2000; there seemed to be no distinguishable pattern to how land acquisition was being carried out. She notes that some properties that were being gazetted for compulsory acquisition measured 33 000 hectares and others measured less that 50 hectares in size. However, officials at the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement offices in Mutare maintain that the land reform programme was evenly implemented countrywide and that any differences apparent in the process are because of local specificities that had to be considered. Government officials maintained that the official land acquisition criteria outlined in Chapter 4 applied to the whole country without exception.

Government statistics show that 20 farms covering 16 449.9434 hectares out of a national total of 85 (168 263. 808ha) were acquired in Manicaland Province in the Inception Phase (October 1998-June 2000) of the fast-track land reform programme (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:28). Government figures also indicate that between June 2000 and February 2001 (the fast-track phase), 159 farms covering 153 997.5109 hectares were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in Manicaland province against a national total of 2 706 farms covering 6 086 605.1317 hectares (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:30). The Utete Report (2003:43) adds that Tanganda Tea Company, Ariston Holdings and Eastern Highlands Tea plantations offered the government 1 397 hectares of land for the fast-track land reform programme. More land was acquired through the subdivision of 119 white-owned commercial farms after negotiations with provincial and district land identification committees (Utete Report, 2003:43 & 44). Table 11 below shows a breakdown of land acquisition in Manicaland Province.
Table 11: Land Acquired in Manicaland Province According to Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Figures from Dept of Lands</th>
<th>Figures by Land Review District Team</th>
<th>Gazetteed</th>
<th>Ungazetted</th>
<th>De-Listed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buhera</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimanimani</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipinge</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makoni</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutasa</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanga</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Utete Report, 2003:41)

Government of Zimbabwe statistics show that 3,974 families were resettled on 56,721 hectares in Manicaland province, against a national total of 51,543 landless peasant families resettled on 2,083,301.166 hectares (2.1 million) (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:7 & 29). About 1,080 former farm workers from an estimated 90,000 in Manicaland are reported to have been allocated land under model A1 resettlement (Utete Report, 2003:43). The Utete Report (2003:423) suggests that more land can be secured for model A1 resettlement, with necessary modifications, from about 40,000 hectares of state-owned land which is currently lying fallow in Manicaland’s Chisumbanje and Middle Save areas because of low beneficiary take-up of allocated land (42% against a national average of 66%) for allocated land under resettlement model A2.

It is somewhat surprising that Manicaland province has such a low take-up rate for allocated land when the province is reported to have a problem with high population pressure (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18; Utete Report, 2003). The failure by applicants to take-up allocated land means that a considerable amount of land is officially unoccupied while thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries have no land (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:7); more so because government statistics show that Manicaland Province received 23,000 applications for resettlement land
under the A2 resettlement model by mid-2005; yet only 1,040 farmers have been resettled under the A2 model in the province. This situation has compelled government officials to seek ways of acquiring more farms for resettlement before the December 2006 deadline when the land reform exercise officially ends (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18). Tables 12 and 13 below summarise fast-track land reform in Manicaland province.
Table 12: Total Designated Farms and De-Listed Farms in Manicaland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Number of Farms According to Government Figures</th>
<th>Total Number of Farms According to Figures Obtained By District Teams</th>
<th>Gazetted Farms (Ha)</th>
<th>De-listed Farms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>8758</td>
<td>9135</td>
<td>6422</td>
<td>10839108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Note the difference between farm totals according to government figures and district teams (Utete Report, 2003:24)

Table 13: Fast-Track Land Allocation and Beneficiary Take-Up Rates in Manicaland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Model A1 No. of Farms</th>
<th>Model A1 Hectares</th>
<th>Model A2 No. of Farms</th>
<th>Model A2 Hectares</th>
<th>No. of Beneficiaries A1</th>
<th>No. of Beneficiaries A2</th>
<th>% Take-Up Rate A1</th>
<th>% Take-Up Rate A2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>195 644</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>77 533</td>
<td>11 019</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>2 652</td>
<td>4 231 080</td>
<td>1 672</td>
<td>2 198 814</td>
<td>127 192</td>
<td>7 260</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Utete Report, 2003:24)
7.4.1 Methodological Framework

This research was undertaken to find out why illegal farm invasions were not as prevalent in Vumba and Burma Valley (east of Manicaland’s provincial capital, Mutare) compared to other parts of the country. The research also sought to find out people’s reactions or responses to fast-track land reform in the study area. Underpinning this study, from a phenomenological or interpretivist point of view, is an evaluation of how successful the land reform programme was in terms of people’s social and economic welfare (not land acquisition and redistribution), given the premise that the reform exercise (on paper) was planned as a deliberate and sustained intervention with specific emphasis on distributional outcomes, as well as a poverty alleviation orientation so that it would benefit the country’s poor and landless people by improving their incomes through agricultural production (Utete Report, 2003). The study’s focus on welfare issues is influenced by Moyo’s (1995:287) observation that most commentary on land reform emphasises distributional outcomes and does not pay sufficient attention to the impact that the reforms have on the welfare and social reproduction of ordinary poor people. Moyo (1995:71) impresses the need for change in the scale of analysis on land reform, development and sustainability (from international and national levels to local levels) in order to adequately inform the premises on which appropriate policies evolve.

Research was undertaken as an exploratory study to gain insight and comprehension of the socio-economic and political situation in the study area. Emphasis was put on the social reality of respondents directly affected by the land reform programme. No attempts were made to get definitive or replicable answers because the study is not representative of the country as a whole (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:80). The research sought to answer the following key questions:

- How many farms in the study area were affected by fast-track land reform and illegal farm occupations and how many are still operating at full capacity, or otherwise?
- What are the general responses of farmers and farm workers to the fast-track land reform programme in the area and why is this so? What exists now in terms of social dynamics and how can they be explained?
A qualitative research design was chosen for this study because phenomenological and critical approaches (interpretivism) emphasise understanding and interpreting the world from the perspective of the insider; than would be possible through quantitative means because “knowledge is situated and contextual” (Mason, 2002:56 & 62; Silverman, 2000:2 & 8). Interpretivism is both an ideology and a methodology which guides the way in which a researcher collects data and produces valid knowledge. This process entails collaborating with subjects in order to understand how social phenomena, relationships and processes develop and operate (Mason, 2002:175). An interpretation of these accounts recognises or acknowledges the socio-economic and political location of respondents because the social world is experienced subjectively (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:78; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:198). According to Mason (2002:3), interpretivism attempts to understand “how the world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted” because different people (individually and collectively) experience and interpret or understand the social world (the meanings they ascribe to things, their beliefs) or different situations in different ways. The methods employed when researching using this methodology include in-depth semi-structured interviews and observation (Livesey, 2002:4).

A case study was chosen to assess the social and economic impacts of fast-track land reform in Vumba and Burma Valley. The case study is a cross-sectional study, as opposed to a longitudinal one (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:76 & 78). Case studies offer the opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in detail within a limited time; to identify various processes at work and to show the interaction of different factors and how they are linked to different events. According to Bell (1993:9), a successful case study allows one to “illustrate relationships, micro-political issues and patterns of influences in a particular context.” However, Bell (1993:9) notes that it is difficult to cross-check information from a case study and generalisations are usually not possible.

7.4.2 Methods/Data Collecting Techniques
A combination of different techniques (multiple research methods) can be used so that the data generated can be cross-referenced to enhance its validity. Barbour and Kitzinger (1999:6) and Bell (1993:64) suggest that cross-referencing is necessary because some respondents answer questions differently depending on whether they are interviewed individually or in a group (tendency to give normative responses in a group situation). In this study, triangulation was done to cross-check the accounts of different respondents by
gathering data from a number of participants and other sources and comparing them to produce a balanced account. A focus group discussion, in-depth interviews and observation are the three mutually reinforcing data gathering techniques that were chosen for this study.

7.4.3 Research Implementation

a) Focus Group Discussion: The interview schedules for this study were tested in an exploratory focus group discussion (FGD) that was conducted with nine farm workers (3 from each of the 3 farms in the study) in June 2004. FGDs are cost-effective and quick to conduct and the focus group discussion was used as a pilot study to assess the interview schedules’ suitability regarding both objective and subjective aspects of the issues covered. The discussion was conducted because it was expected that respondents would be a bit apprehensive (feel intimidated, unsure or alienated) about discussing this topic. Respondents were informed about the research and what it wanted to achieve (ethical considerations) in order to get their consent and gain their trust (Mason, 2002:80-82; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:62). The FGD was conducted in the Shona vernacular and discussion centred on farm workers’ experience of fast-track land reform; what they thought it was about; their experience of it and their life after the land reform exercise. The interview schedules for the study were modified accordingly after the discussion.

Focus group discussions (FGDs) fall in the broad category of group interviews where small groups of people participate in a planned discussion on a defined topic. FGDs are a practical, quick and efficient way of gaining access to a relatively large forum of identified participants for in-depth discussion than is afforded by individual interviews (Macun and Posel, 1998:115 & 121). FGDs are used in the social sciences to help us understand how individuals and collectives perceive, organise, give meaning to and express their understandings of themselves and their experiences (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:5; Mishler, 1986 in Macun and Posel, 1998:118). FGDs afford researchers access to subjective meanings with a “complexity and depth” which quantitative methods cannot offer because FGDs rely on group dynamics (interaction) which allows participants to “draw on tacit assumptions and values and express themselves in ways that reveal particular discourses or systems of thought in which particular ideas or attitudes are embedded” (Macun and Posel, 1998:122). FGDs combine in-depth interviews with participant observation (what is said, the respondent’s tone of voice, posture, facial expressions) to answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions (explanation, not
enumeration) on topics that cannot be answered adequately or accurately using closed or open-ended survey questionnaires (Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:73-76).

According to Zeller (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127), FGDs are used in settings characterised by considerable levels of inequality and social or cultural distance; where it is suspected that respondents will be reluctant to give information on sensitive topics in an individual interview. FGDs, therefore, allow the researcher to canvass both verbal and non-verbal responses on a given topic in order to explore and account for human behaviour and experience (Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:73-76; Silverman, 2000:176; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:7; Macum and Posel, 1998:116).

There are some weaknesses associated with FGDs as a research technique. The general criticism against FGDs is that they are ‘exploratory’ and ‘impressionistic.’ Quantitative researchers regard data from FGDs as inconclusive and needing verification through more rigorous methods. Although the group forum has the potential to elicit a wide range of responses, it also contaminates (inhibits or distorts) individual responses (Merton, 1987 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:116-117). Albrectht (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127-128) elaborates on this point by commenting that participants may be compliant in their desire to please the facilitator or researcher. Participants tend to offer normative responses which do not give an accurate picture of the situation. The researcher’s mere presence or the fact that people are aware that they are being studied produces the Hawthorne Effect, whereby respondents or participants role-play certain behaviour because they think it is the correct or expected response. Albrectht (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127-128) notes too that individual responses can be shaped by “processes of identification, interpersonal solidarity and perceived pressure to conform to a dominant group position” (‘group think’). Regarding this particular criticism, female participants in the FGD conducted for this study were less forthcoming in the discussion, perhaps because Shona society discourages women from voicing their views/opinions in public, especially in the presence of men.

Secondly, power differences and presumed researcher bias/subjective judgment (where the researcher has economic, social and educational advantage over participants) can negatively affect the quality of data generated in any research, as well as its analysis and interpretation (Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:84; Silverman, 2001:57-60; Macun and Posel, 1998:123 & 129; Morgan 1988 in Macun and Posel, 1998:115). Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono (2002:77) note that participants might deliberately withhold information because of “psychological
impediments produced by the sum of social differences between the researcher and people in the focus group” (discomfort or embarrassment), for example, the researcher is a black, middleclass, university educated female interviewing mostly uneducated farm workers. These shortcomings limit the reliability and replicability of responses and data generated through FGIDs. However, the reliability of focus group data is enhanced by combining different research techniques (complementing focus group data through the triangulation method) to produce a complete and accurate picture of the issues under investigation (Macun and Posel, 1998:118, 129 & 132). The reliability of the data is determined by the coherence between all the techniques used and the integration of the data generated.

b) In-depth Interviews: The bulk of the research is based on individual interviews with farmers and farm workers, as well as observation. Individual consent was given before all individual interviews were conducted (Mason, 2002:80-82; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:62). Semi-structured, flexible and relatively informal interviews were used because they can be developed as the interview progresses (when clarity is needed) to generate a fairer and fuller representation of respondents’ perspectives (Mason, 2002:62 & 66; Silverman, 2000:89-90; Bell, 1993:91). Open-ended, explorative questions were asked to solicit responses (perceptions and accounts of experiences) on the research topic. Interview questions related to whether or not there have been as many land invasions in the study area compared to other places. Some questions centred on how both farmers and farm workers are coping (socially, economically and emotionally) in the aftermath of fast-track land reform; whether they think and feel they are better off because of it, or not (Appendix 1).

Considerable rapport was necessary in the interviews (with both farmers and farm workers), particularly regarding questions that involved attitudes and emotions because respondents tended to give half-hearted responses or partial explanations to the questions asked. One-on-one interviews were chosen to encourage farm workers to talk freely and fully in response to the questions after introducing the research as a study on farm workers’ socio-economic status over the past five years. However, some respondents remained somewhat reluctant to participate for fear of repercussions (victimisation by fellow farm workers or government agents) or their responses were inhibited as they did not want to discuss their problems in great detail because of the politically charged nature of events surrounding the land reform exercise. Fears and suspicions about the motives of the study could not be eliminated entirely but the female respondents opened up more and were easier to talk to than the men after a
few interviews had been conducted. Most of the interviews lasted between an hour and an-hour-and-a-half on average. Interviews with government officials were deliberately kept short in order not to antagonise the government’s position on the matter because too much probing could easily have been construed as dissent and the interviewer might have been identified with the political opposition or as an informant for foreign forces.

c) Observation: More insights were gained from what was seen (and over-heard) during visits to the three farms. Observation was used to cross-check the accuracy of what respondents revealed in the interviews (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:6). Observation also allowed the researcher to get an idea of how the community relates, for instance, the relationship between white farmers and farm workers. Media reports (television and newspapers) also provided valuable insights.

7.5.1 Respondents
Three white farmers, twenty black farm workers and provincial government officials were the chosen respondents for the study, although the different categories of respondents were asked slightly different questions. These respondents were chosen because Donnison (1994 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:124) maintains that the people who experience a particular thing should be consulted about it because “they are experts on the issue in ways that no-one else can be.” Zimbabwe’s white farmers and farm workers were targets for politically motivated violence during fast-track land reform and it is worthwhile to find out their views about the programme and how it affected them.

a) Farmers and Farm Profiles:
This section profiles three farms that were selected for the study from Manicaland’s Vumba and Burma Valley area. Two of the farms (Farms 1 and 2) exceeded the maximum sizes recommended for large-scale commercial farming in Natural Region 1 (250-450ha) by Statutory Instrument 419 of December 1999.

Table 14: Characteristics of the Three Farms in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm 1</td>
<td>707.5235ha.</td>
<td>Dairy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 2</td>
<td>866.18ha.</td>
<td>Mixed Farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 3</td>
<td>376.0419ha.</td>
<td>Mixed Farming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The government gazetted farms that were designated for compulsory acquisition in batches or Lots (not necessarily according to province) and the farms in this study were affected by the notices below. The *Manica Post* of 22-28 October 2004 (pB6-pB7) carried a notice in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 regarding the “Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land” by the government. The notice affected at least ten districts in the country [Lot 15 with a total of 193 farms] and Mutare district accounted for 28 of the 193 farms gazetted. Farms 2 and 3 were listed in this particular notice.

The *Manica Post* of 17-23 December 2004 (pB5 & pB7) carried a “Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10.” This notice applied to Lot 160 (229 farms across the country) and Mutare district accounted for 11 of the 229 farms. This time, Farms 1 and 3 were affected.

The *Manica Post* of 28 January-3 February 2005 (p13 & p14) carried a “Notice of application for confirmation of Section 8 Order in terms of Section 7(3) of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10.” This notice applied to Lot 10 (274 farms across the country) and was issued in respect of disputed lands (where acquisition is contested). Mutare district accounted for 29 of the 274 confirmed acquisitions and the 29 farms included two of the farms in the study (2 and 3).

**Farm 1**

The farm owner is 65-years old. He is originally from Britain but is a Zimbabwean citizen. The farmer’s wife and children are also Zimbabwean citizens. The farmer has been involved in farming since buying the farm before independence in 1980, although he would not say how much he paid for it (Interview notes, 2004).

Farm 1 is a dairy farm with a herd of about a hundred 100 pedigreed Brahman bulls, Hereford, Ayrshire, Jersey and Holstein cows. The farm also owns several Charolais heifers and a few cows of the indigenous varieties. The farm is also involved in sheep breeding and market gardening (mostly vegetables) on a smaller scale. The farm produces milk and milk products such as yoghurt, cheese, butter, buttermilk and sour milk. The dairy operation is highly mechanised and requires a lot of electricity, for example, to milk the cows and for refrigeration. The farm has four refrigerated trucks that transport its produce to supermarkets in Mutare and Harare (for export). The farm has 50 full time workers and the farmer believes that he has a good working relationship with his employees. The farmer communicates with his workers mostly through the farm’s black foreman. The farmer admitted that the
relationship can best be described as paternalistic, although it is significantly different from the despised master-servant relationship reminiscent of the colonial era (Interview notes, 2004).

Manicaland province has two dairy processing factories (in Mutare and Chipinge) but they are currently operating at 30% capacity according to the Utete Report (2003). Borland and Moyo (2004) add that Mutare alone produces 6% of Zimbabwe’s total milk production. The reduction in milk production is attributed to resettlement on some dairy farms and the escalating prices of stock-feed. According to the Utete Report (2003), Manicaland’s provincial dairy herd was about 8200 and has reduced to about 4900.

Farm 1 was not occupied or invaded but in April 2005 the government gazetted a list of farms whose compensation had been determined and whose planned acquisition was going ahead as previously gazetted (notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10). A total of 822 landholdings were listed countrywide (The Manica Post 8-14 April 2005:p11-13). The farmer said he is cautious about expressing his views regarding the fast-track land reform programme because he, or his family, might be victimised. He said:

There is always the threat that someone will come and order you off the farm at anytime, for the smallest reason... We are not safe, I do not think anyone is safe but what can we do? The fear we feel here is no different from people in the towns who are harassed on a regular basis for all sorts of reasons (Interview notes, 2004).

The farmer agrees that land reform was overdue but disagrees with the lawless manner in which it was implemented. He realises that white farmers are still targets of random politically motivated violence and that their cooperation is of no real consequence in a country were the rule of law is disregarded (Interview notes, 2004). The elderly farmer is struggling to accept that he is going to lose years of back-breaking hard work and investments and feels powerless to do anything about it. He put his life into the business, built it from nothing, mortgaged everything he owned to secure his family’s future but now he is considering retirement because he is too old to start a new career. The farmer said that as things stand; there is no incentive for him to make long term plans or invest in the business (expand the dairy operation) because he does not know whether he will be on the farm for another week, month or year. The farmer concluded by saying that it was up to his sons to
decide whether to continue farming or to try something else because they have become more directly involved in the day to day running of the farm in recent years. One of the farmer’s sons also owns a farm in the area which is registered in his own name (Interview notes, 2004).

Farm 2
The farmer is 58-years old. His parents trekked from South Africa in the 1940s, when he was just a small child, and got involved in farming. The farmer’s parents still have a farm registered in their name in the Burma Valley area. The farm owner is a Zimbabwean citizen and he speaks Shona’s Manyika dialect. Before fast-track land reform, the farmer owned two farms which were registered in his name. The farms were bought from white farmers who were leaving the country just before independence in 1980 and one of these farms has already been compulsorily acquired for redistribution (Interview notes, 2004).

Farm 2 is involved in mixed farming. It mainly grows fruit and vegetables (paprika, green beans, peas, carrots, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, cabbages, maize), and cotton and sunflowers (extraction of oilseed for the manufacture of cooking oil) on a small scale. The farming operation has high capital costs in terms of irrigation equipment, electricity for pumping water from reservoirs to the fields as well as chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides). Tomatoes, for example, are very susceptible to Red Spider Mite if chemicals are not sprayed on time. The farmer also cited frequent electricity cuts as a big problem where temperature control (cold room storage) is essential or at crucial times for irrigating crops. Farm 2 has 60 full-time workers and hires about 100 casual workers during the peak seasons because horticulture is labour intensive. Permanent farm workers have small pieces of land designated for their own use every year (maize and a variety of leaf vegetables). The farmer said he has a good working relationship with his workers and communicates with them directly (not through the foreman) (Interview notes, 2004).

The government gazetted a notice (in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10) announcing that compensation for 822 landholdings listed countrywide had been determined in April 2005. Farm 2 was one of the 822 listed farms (Manica Post 8-14 April 2005 p11-13). The farmer said the future of the farm (as a viable business operation) is hanging in the balance because there are about fifteen settler families that moved onto the farm almost a year ago. The farmer added that the financial future of the farm is almost certainly ruined.
because he, like many other displaced farmers across the country, owes banks millions in loans, which he might not be able to service (Interview notes, 2004). Ironically, the farmer was grateful that “the settlers have not made any demands and so far the situation has been relatively peaceful, but there are no guarantees...one cannot plan too far ahead.” He made this comment bearing in mind that invaders in other parts of the country (particularly Mashonaland) were reported as being hostile, arrogant and spiteful, more so when invaded farmers retaliated or confronted them (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

Although the farmer does not reside on the farm permanently, he said he did not feel safe because farmers have been harassed on occasion and their homes have been vandalised and looted by people claiming to be war veterans (Interview notes, 2004). Despite the violence, fear, insecurity, tension and uncertainty (growing criminality) in most commercial farming areas around the country, the farmer has decided to continue farming for the meantime until the acquisition of the farm is finalised (or the government changes its mind and de-lists the farm as it has been known to do). Although many white farmers across the country opted to sell their properties at prices far below their market value in panic before they were invaded, this farmer believes that the only options available to him are to either stop farming or carry on (“ride the storm”); or to leave the farming community for the city. This farmer has chosen to continue farming in the meantime. The farmer says he has not undertaken major developments on the farm (expansion or diversification) since 2000 because he does not want to incur heavier losses if, or when, the rest of his land is eventually taken. The farmer is hopeful that he can keep at least a small part of the farm for his children and their children (Interview notes, 2004).

**Farm 3**

The farmer is 49-years old, married and has children. He is of Dutch descent but he was born in Zimbabwe and is a Zimbabwean citizen. The farmer is one of three brothers who own land (separately) in Burma Valley and farming is all they have known their entire life. The farmer took over the running of Farm 3 from his aging father (Interview notes, 2004). Farm 3 is involved in mixed farming, mainly poultry farming and fruits (bananas, oranges, plums, mangoes and pineapples). The venture has a high capital outlay in terms of reservoirs and boreholes to supplement normal rainfall in drought years so that fruits that would otherwise not be viable can be irrigated. The fruits also need to be sprayed with chemicals regularly and the poultry part of the operation is susceptible to outbreaks of New Castle
Disease. Apart from poultry and fruits, the farm has a small gum/eucalyptus plantation (for making treated poles) and a small general dealer store. Farm 3 employs forty permanent workers and about 100 seasonal ones all year round, depending on which fruits are ready for picking. The farmer speaks Shona’s Manyika dialect but communicates with workers mainly through the farm’s black foreman (Interview notes, 2004).

The farmer is upset about the fast-track land reform programme. Although he agreed that the reform was inevitable, he objected to the extent to which white farmers were demonised by political forces in the country. He said that the Vumba and Burma Valley area did not escape the harassment that has become so common in the country and this state of affairs has deterred him from making further investments on the farm. Farm 3 was invaded and vandalised and part of it was occupied in early 2004 by a mix of people including peasants, unemployed youths from the surrounding areas, self-proclaimed war veterans and some excited farm workers who joined the land occupation bandwagon. The farmer said the illegal occupiers pegged-out individual plots with short wooden truncheons that were hammered into the ground to mark the boundaries and have been stealing from him (fertiliser, seeds). The farmer has a house on Farm 3 and another one in Mutare but he does not feel safe in either of them anymore and has hired private guards to protect his homes in case the occupiers become aggressive (Interview notes, 2004).

The farmer has considered selling the farm to the state to minimise his losses. He has also considered exploring other investment opportunities in the country but Zimbabwe’s economy is very volatile and there is a possibility that white Zimbabweans will be muscled out of other sectors of the economy like they were in agriculture. The farmer said that instead of acquiring land in Mozambique and Zambia or emigrating to South Africa, Australia and New Zealand like some of Zimbabwe’s displaced white farmers, he is considering starting a new life by opening businesses in Mozambique’s main holiday destinations (Interview notes, 2004). He is optimistic about his chances of success because he believes that there are a lot of opportunities in Mozambique, provided one has enough business savvy (Mozambique is rebuilding its economy after years of civil war).

b) Farm Workers
Twenty farm workers were chosen as respondents and all of them were black. Different categories with respect to farm workers were incorporated into the study (permanent and
seasonal, men and women, Zimbabwean and foreign, plus different educational levels) for the sake of comparison. Women were interviewed although they constituted a small percentage of the labour-force on the three farms. More than half the women were seasonal or casual workers or they were dependents living on the farms with relatives or spouses that work on the farms. Tables 15 and 16 below show the main characteristics of farm worker respondents in the study.

Table 15: Demographic Characteristics of Farm Workers in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Permanent farm workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Zimbabwean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: The Age Distribution of Farm Workers in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and educational levels can be aggregated to provide a composite picture or summary description of respondents using percentages and measures of central tendency (averages) to explain differences in attitudes and reactions among respondents (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:85 & 90).

Half the farm workers interviewed (10 or 50%) did not have formal education of any kind and casual workers made up the majority of these. This category is comprised mostly of immigrants and women. Seven of the farm workers interviewed (35%) have some primary school education (up to about grade 5) but many did not complete the seven years of primary schooling. Three of the farm workers interviewed (15%) have secondary school education between Forms 1 and 4 (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate and Cambridge Ordinary Level) and all of them are men.

c) Government Officials

Provincial government officials were asked how many farms there were in the Vumba and Burma Valley area and how many of these were designated for compulsory acquisition and
redistribution during the fast-track land reform programme. It was established that there were approximately 127 individual landholdings in the Vumba and Burma Valley area before the land reform exercise and that about half of these were designated or acquired for redistribution, mainly because they were either too big or the farmers owned more than one farm (Chapter 4). The three farms in the study were not derelict or under-utilised and they have infrastructure of a permanent or semi-permanent nature (boreholes, irrigation pipes, buildings). Provincial government officials in Mutare said that two of the three farms in the study (Farms 1 and 2) were in breach of the maximum sizes recommended for large-scale commercial farming in Natural Region 1 (250-450 hectares) by Statutory Instrument 419 of December 1999 and the excess land was needed to address problems of land shortage and population pressure in the province’s communal areas (Interview notes, 2004).

7.5.2 The Farmers’ Sense of Social Responsibility

When asked whether the farmers thought they had an obligation to their workers and community in areas like health, education/vocational skills development and income generating initiatives, all three farmers agreed that they had a moral obligation to the community. The farmers noted that Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers are often criticized for being indifferent and showing no compassion to their workers and other poor people. The same sentiment was expressed by Human Rights Watch (2002:12) in its observation that with time, the criteria for fast-track land acquisition came to include whether or not farm owners ill-treated their workers or whether they were in conflict with villagers in neighbouring communal areas. The three farmers in the study demonstrate their social responsibility by affording their workers and the community several non-cash benefits like firewood and small family gardening patches on designated sections on the farms. The farmers provide accommodation, pit latrines and safe water for drinking and other household use in farm compounds for farm workers and their families. Farmers in Vumba and Burma Valley (including the three farmers in the study) helped build and maintain two farm schools and a clinic. The farm schools are run jointly by several farmers and cater for their combined workforce. The schools might not be the best (or even meet the standard) but they provide the educational basics for the local community. The clinic provides basic healthcare for workers and their families, as well as others in the vicinity. The clinic educates the community about sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS and distributes condoms. It also offers supplementary feeding for children who are at risk of malnutrition.
Farmers in the area also operate several farm shops, for example, Glenburn farm store in Vumba which sells cooking oil, salt, candles, paraffin, bread, milk and other small household goods. The shops are for the convenience of workers who cannot afford to go to Mutare several times a month. As far as shopping is concerned, the three farmers in the study have arrangements where they provide transport to and from Mutare for their workers to do their month-end shopping.

The three farmers in the study have either owned or managed their respective farms as family businesses for an average of thirty years. All three farmers said they have made significant infrastructural improvements on their land to raise the productive potential of their enterprises and the value of their properties. The farms studied have reasonably decent living quarters for their workers (compounds), planters, tractors, farm trucks, barns, boreholes and small dams for irrigation. Farm roads and fences are also well-maintained because the farmers thought they would always have their land (Interview notes, 2004). The feelings (deceived, betrayed, humiliated, isolated and helpless) of the three white farmers in the study are shared by many others like them who have been affected by fast-track land reform.

Buckle (2002) was born and raised in Zimbabwe. Buckle (2002) and her husband were the proud owners of 1 000 acre Stow Farm in Marondera, 67km east of Harare. They had bought the farm with government approval (with a certificate of ‘No Current Interest’) and their farm was never designated for compulsory acquisition. Stow Farm was invaded in February 2000 and the Buckles lost everything as invaders pegged-out plots for themselves on their farm and plundered every resource in sight (Buckle, 2002). The Buckles were angry because their belief in justice and truth did not count for anything anymore when white farmers were stripped of any legal rights during the land reform process (Buckle, 2002).

The despair, depression, low morale and mental anguish (because of the general lack of security in farming communities and the fact that the police refused to intervene) eventually ate away the resilience that some farmers initially had when they refused to walk away from a lifetime of hard work, investment and many memories which they had scrimped and saved for (Meredith, 2003:184; Buckle, 2002). For the first time ever (or for the first time in many years) some farmers and their families had to find jobs in the formal sector after having been their own bosses and employed others for many years. The Buckles left Stow Farm towards the end of 2000 (Buckle, 2002) and in August 2005, the owner of Farm 1 decided to sell all his assets (farm equipment, cars and town house) and emigrate like many others had done.
Zimbabwe’s white commercial farmers can hardly be called cowards or quitters for leaving their farms or emigrating, given everything they have had to deal with.

7.6.1 Data Analysis

Sociology is concerned with establishing the fundamental organising principles of society. Data analysis (qualitative) involved interpretive reading of focus group data, individual interview transcripts and direct observations (Mason, 2002:66). Data analysis focused on socio-political and economic factors and how these have influenced people’s responses to fast-track land reform in the study area. Data was grouped according to key areas of interest or relevant interpretive categories for content analysis (to give meaning according to themes) (Mason, 2002:179). Data analysis tried to identify the main elements in the data generated and how these are linked. Fielding and Fielding (1986:12 cited in Silverman, 2000:176) note that “...the act of analysis is an interpretation, and therefore of necessity a selective rendering...” One acknowledges that the researcher is not always a neutral data collector and one needs to reflect on their influence on the research process. A constant-comparative method of analysis (on-going inspection and comparison of different fragments of data) was used to “synthesise and integrate data” (Silverman, 2000:179), thus reducing the effect of this inherent subjectivity. The three farmers in the study were given feedback on the findings. They were also given an opportunity to review the data with the researcher so that they could validate its accuracy by confirming whether or not the researcher’s interpretations are accurate (Mason, 2002:193).

7.6.2 Why Illegal Land Occupations Where Less Prevalent in the Study Area

It has already been mentioned that the incidence and severity of illegal farm invasions was highest in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central provinces as well as the northern sector of Mashonaland West (Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa, Marondera areas) (Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). The violence experienced in Mashonaland can be explained first in terms of the fact that the most intense conflicts over land in Zimbabwe have traditionally (dating back to the second Chimurenga war of liberation) been around Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces which cover Kadoma, Mazowe, Marondera, Chinhoyi and Mt Darwin (Chitiyo, 2003:170). Moyo (2000a:90) suggests that illegal land occupations were more prevalent in these areas because very little land redistribution had occurred there before 2000. Mashonaland East, West and
Central provinces have some of the best soils in the country and as late as 2000; 70% of the land there was still owned by white commercial farmers (Moyo, 2000a:90).

The Tangwena people had lived in the Nyanga area of Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands for hundreds of years and steadfastly refused to move when the Native Reserves where created in 1969. Their homes and crops were burnt down and their cattle were impounded by security forces. Chief Rekai Tangwena was charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act for making subversive statements against the colonial regime but the defiance of the Tangwena people caught the attention of the international community. Consequently, much of the land in the Nyanga area remained in black hands until independence when the state took over ownership of the timber plantations and national parks that form part of the Eastern Highlands. Chief Rekai Tangwena was a staunch supporter of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and assisted guerrillas, including President Mugabe, across the border into Mozambique. Chief Tangwena also initiated contact with Frelimo officials on behalf of guerrillas who were fighting Zimbabwe’s liberation war (Meredith, 2003:116-118). This link between Zimbabwe’s eastern border districts and the liberation war might have influenced the government (and war veterans) to look favourably on the area during the fast-track land reform.

It is also possible that Vumba and Burma Valley did not experience land invasions on the same scale or intensity as the rest of the country because Manicaland province generally has a mountainous terrain with rock out-crops (Nyanga, Chipinge, Chimanimani, Mutasa and parts of Mutare and Makoni districts). Farms in these districts are generally small, measuring approximately 150 hectares or less in some cases. The landholdings in Mutare district, in which Vumba and Burma Valley fall, are typically smaller than the national average. The relatively small size of landholdings in Manicaland is also influenced by the superior soil quality and generally high rainfall that it receives, which make it suitable for intensive agricultural production, as opposed to extensive, ranch-style farming (Utete Report, 2003). Zinyama (2001:166) also notes that farms in Manicaland province are generally smaller within the vicinity of large urban centres, of which Mutare is the provincial capital. The Utete Commission (2003:42) reports that these features made land acquisition in the area difficult. As a result, there are still about 62 400 people on official waiting lists for land allocation in Manicaland (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18; Utete Report, 2003:42).
Another explanation why illegal land occupations were not as frequent or destructive in Vumba and Burma Valley compared to the three Mashonaland provinces is that Mashonaland, particularly Mashonaland East province, registered the highest “No” votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum (Meredith, 2003:165; Buckle, 2002:105). The rejection of the revised constitution greatly humiliated and riled the ruling Zanu-PF party and its war veteran allies and Mashonaland East province was deliberately targeted for the worst politically motivated violence (chastisement), including the illegal land invasions (Buckle, 2002). The government regarded Mashonaland as an opposition/MDC stronghold (apart from the main urban centres) because of its concentration of white commercial farmers who supported the political opposition. In comparison, Manicaland province’s white farmers, including Vumba and Burma Valley, were politically less conspicuous. The illegal land occupations that did occur lasted for short periods (transitory) and the invaders did not leave the same trail of destruction as what happened in the three Mashonaland provinces (Meredith, 2003:196-221; Buckle, 2002). The invaders merely made their presence felt by pegging-off small individual farming plots of land on occupied farms, planting crops, pulling down fencing, stealing fertiliser and threatening farmers who questioned them about their presence on the farms.

One cannot ignore the politicised nature of the fast-track land reform programme. The ruling party narrowly won the 2000 parliamentary elections although it lost in major urban centres, including Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Zanu-PF also lost a significant number of votes in some rural parts of Manicaland Province (Chitiyo, 2003:179; Raftopoulos, 2002:420-21; McGregor, 2002:11; Krieger, 2000:448). The MDC won seven of the fourteen contested seats in Manicaland province in the June 2000 parliamentary election. The ruling Zanu-PF won six of the seats and the last one went to a smaller party, Zanu Ndonga (Herald Reporters, 13 April 2005:1-2). Although Manicaland’s support of the MDC might explain the reported cases of illegal farm occupations in hot spots like Headlands and Chimanimani, the political allegiance of farm workers in Vumba and Burma Valley partly explains why the area was spared the trauma of large-scale land occupations. Chitiyo (2003:201-202) notes that in 1999, 30% of Zimbabwe’s farm workers were of Malawian, Zambian or Mozambican descent and Manicaland had one of the highest concentrations of foreign migrant workers. Vumba and Burma Valley’s agricultural workforce is comprised of a significant number of Mozambican immigrants who fled the civil war in their country and others whose fathers came from Malawi and Zambia many years ago. This constituency is detached or
disconnected from Zimbabwe’s nationalist cause, which the government claims the fast-track land reform programme symbolised.

The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of July 2001 compelled thousands of naturalised Zimbabweans to reapply for citizenship or lose it. Children born in Zimbabwe of foreign parents were also affected and had to renounce their parent’s citizenship in order to qualify as Zimbabwean citizens. Kabemba (2005:23) notes that the most affected were migrants (or their children) from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Kabemba, 2005:23; Chitiyo, 2003:201-202; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b). The effect of amendments to the Citizenship Act were evident in the results for the March 2005 parliamentary election in which the ruling Zanu-PF won in thirteen of the fifteen constituencies contested in Manicaland province (except Mutare Central and Mutare North constituencies) (Herald Reporters, 13 April 2005:1-2). The majority of Vumba and Burma Valley’s farm workers have no real interest in Zimbabwe’s politics (apathy) because they cannot vote in Zimbabwean elections without the requisite documents. Labour migrants’ feelings of disaffection are compounded by the fact that they cannot own or be allocated land in Zimbabwe and this would negate any attempts that might have been made to mobilisation them to invade farms. The concentration of labour migrants in Vumba and Burma Valley means that the area was not identified as closely with white farmers and the MDC as was the case in Mashonaland where white farmers were literally hunted down and victimised (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002).

This investigation showed that several landholdings in the study area have been listed for compulsory acquisition under the land reform programme but several of them are still officially in the hands of their white owners and farming operations are still being carried out. In terms of Zimbabwe’s constitution, the compulsory acquisition of land by the state has to be confirmed by the Administrative Court (Utete Report, 2003:88) and in some cases, this has not yet happened. According to the Administrative Court in Manicaland, a significant number of white commercial farmers are seeking to reverse the government’s decision to compulsorily acquire their farms for resettlement. Mushonawari (2005:1) reports that 352 such cases had been brought before the Administrative Court in Manicaland Province alone by January 2005 and this might have deterred some of the unscrupulous activities of war veterans and their allies.
The low incidence of destructive, illegal farm occupations can also be explained in terms of Mutare’s high poverty rate which might have compelled farm workers (and others) to want to protect their sources of livelihood on commercial farms (purely for economic survival). According to Buckle (2002:233), Mutare’s population has grown massively in the past two decades but the city has suffered tremendously because service provision has not grown at the same rate. Mutare attained a high poverty rate in the period covering the fast-track land reform because of the country’s deepening economic crisis. The lack of employment opportunities means that farm labour for Vumba and Burma Valley farms, apart from foreign migrants, is drawn from Mutare’s main urban slum (Sakubva high-density area which has a population of 23,600) and Zimunya communal lands which lies twenty kilometres south of Mutare (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutare).

7.6.3 Human Agency: Survival Strategies in the Study Area

The fast-track land reform programme has entrenched pervasive insecurities regarding personal and economic survival. Hundreds of thousands of people (farm workers and white farmers, teachers) were violently displaced from the rural areas and forced to flee to the cities where they have no real economic prospects because of the escalating economic crisis discussed in Chapter 6 (Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Buckle, 2002). The study of Vumba and Burma Valley is an analysis of a microcosm of the general situation in most of Zimbabwe’s devastated farming communities following fast-track land reform. This section discusses the plight of Zimbabwe’s farm workers in the context of political repression and economic collapse. It outlines the survival strategies/alternative livelihoods that people are adopting in Vumba and Burma Valley to cope with this tragedy.

Bhaskar (1989) contends that social phenomena are a “synthesis of multiple determinants” at a particular place and time; and these in turn influence how people react to different situations. Refslund-Sorensen and Vincent (2001:266) support this view and draw attention to the fact that the ability (capacity to adapt) of internally displaced people to cope with such trauma is often overlooked because displaced people are seen as victims. Vincent (2001:1-5) suggests that there is a need to analyse the support mechanisms adopted by displaced communities in order to satisfy their immediate and long-term needs because such analyses can inform policy makers, donors and developers about the constraints faced by displaced communities and the available resources that can be used to assist them.
This analysis is concerned with how people have been affected by fast-track land reform and how they are dealing with the trauma of the losses they incurred in the process. Barth’s (1966) ‘transactionalist’, ‘actor-oriented’ framework of analysis is used to assess this aspect because it advocates that fieldwork must focus on the goals and strategies of individuals as they seek to maximise their economic and political interests, bearing in mind the role of the state as the locus of conflict and domination. Zimbabwe’s farm workers, for example, made/make up a considerable part of the country’s population but they were excluded or neglected in the planning and execution of the fast-track land reform programme. They became victims of displacement and politically motivated violence instead of being beneficiaries of the land reform programme. Farm workers across Zimbabwe lost their jobs and sources of livelihood, homes and sense of community.

Survival strategies refer to people’s motivations, their creativity and the comprehensiveness of their responses towards improving their material well-being and social cohesion in the face of adversity (Vincent, 2001:8). Subsistence strategies are aimed at improving people’s access to basic goods and services (sanitation, shelter, food and water). Subsistence strategies also offer or increase opportunities for employment and other economic activities (Refslund-Sorensen and Vincent, 2001:266; Vincent, 2001:11-12).

There have been varied responses to the fast-track land reform programme because as Raftopoulos (1996:13) notes, “a common experience of racism or inequality does not necessarily produce a homogenous national unity.” Christodoulou (1990:74-75) comments that casually employed agricultural workers are detached and mobile because of the precarious nature of their employment. This group is unlikely to act in a concerted way because they lack the necessary group cohesion. In contrast, regularly employed agricultural workers (skilled, semi-skilled) are more attached to their job and employer and are normally content with secure, regular employment, fair remuneration and acceptable working conditions. However, despite this lack of homogeneity amongst farm workers, the potential for concerted action always exists.

Veltmeyer (2003 cited in Moyo, 2003:9) supports Christodoulou’s (1990:74-75) view and comments that marginalised groups in the rural areas are often assumed to be passive and disempowered when in fact they are not. Instead of regarding peasants as powerless, defeated people, Petras (1997a, 1997b cited in Moyo, 2003:9) regards peasants as “an active and
empowered force” that is capable of defending its own interests. Veltmeyer (2003 cited in Moyo, 2003:41) supports this view when he explains Zimbabwe’s land invasions as “a tactic of class struggle and direct collective action.” The invasions can be seen as a strategy by peasants and other marginalised groups to gain access to land. Alavi (1973 cited in Christodoulou, 1990:86) also notes that “militancy or non-militancy are not absolute conditions, but, rather, they are contingent on changing conjunctures of social circumstances and movements.” All these arguments highlight the role of human agency in coping with catastrophes such as those induced by Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform.

The arguments submitted above highlight the fact that the on-going struggle for survival in the aftermath of fast-track land reform cannot be discounted in terms of the seeming passivity of constituencies such as farm workers (Kibble, 2004:370). This study shows that response strategies differ according to respondents’ gender, age and nationality (the status of immigrants discussed above). The farm workers interviewed had considerable insights about their situation and were pessimistic about what the government, or land reform, can do for them. Farm workers (Zimbabwean nationals) understood land reform to be a process whereby the poor and landless would be given land to improve their lives through agriculture. However, they feel that the fast-track land reform programme negatively impacted their lives instead of improving them. The farm workers said they know of people who lost their jobs on acquired farms and are now destitute (seeking shelter in disused tobacco barns and other places that are unfit for human habitation) or engaging in criminal activities to survive because very few of these people were allocated land by the government. The Utete Report (2003:43) notes that about 1 080 former farm workers out of an estimated 90 000 in Manicaland have been allocated land under model A1 resettlement. The remainder are either still employed on the farm sub-divisions retained by white commercial farmers or they have taken up employment with newly resettled model A2 farmers.

Farm workers said they feel abandoned by the government and resent the growing class differentiation within the black population. They highlighted the fact that the government’s policies and actions are erratic, unpredictable and disappointing because black elites are more concerned about their own enrichment when the poor continue to live in abject poverty. The government’s rhetoric over inadequate housing and unemployment, for example, has lost its previous allure and the disillusionment was evident in the voting patterns of some rural areas that have traditionally been the ruling party’s strongholds. There seems to be a growing
realisation that radical measures such as the fast-track land reform programme are not
enough to solve people’s poverty and unemployment woes and some farm workers’ loyalty
(Zimbabwean nationals) is torn between their employers (white farmers) and being patriotic
and supporting a government that has let them down many times before (Interview notes,
2004).

Respondents’ testimonies show a shifting balance of power between farmers and their
workers following fast-track land reform. The relationship between the two parties was
previously regarded as one-sided and dominated by white farmers. Paternalistic relations
existed on most white commercial farms because farm workers were isolated from other
people and other identities outside the farming communities (many born and bred on the
farms). Farm workers in Vumba and Burma Valley have adopted small and subtle ways
through which they are able to alter the balance of power between themselves and the
remaining, disempowered (because of the land reform) white farmers. Farm workers are
more willing to express their anger or discontent than before (for example, deliberately
working slowly and not meeting targets, damaging machinery or insulting the farmer without
fear of reprisal); not because they are a strong or significant constituency on their own, but
because of the weakened position of white farmers (Interview notes, 2004). This behaviour
shows that the farm workers have capitalised (somewhat) on the chaos ensuing from the fast­
track land reform exercise.

Farm workers admitted that there have been several farm occupations in the area but added
that many of the occupations were short-lived because the invaders were not from the area.
Farm workers (Zimbabweans and foreigners) also said they were afraid of being attacked or
victimised by war veterans. For migrant farm workers; being foreigners means being
subjected to xenophobic attitudes and behaviours (Interview notes, 2004). Labour migrants
are discriminated against or treated with contempt because they do not enjoy the same rights
as citizens (Chitiyo, 2003:201-202; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a;
2003b). Although farm workers on the studied farms are in limbo because the government
has not allocated them any land, they are not keen to move onto new land or forcibly take­
over control of the farms they work on, especially now since the government (armed police)
is forcibly evicting illegal land occupiers by torching their houses and belongings (Mungoshi,
2004:6). Most peasants and former farm workers who illegally occupied farms do not have
secure land tenure because they do not have title deeds to the land they currently occupy. It is
not just illegal land occupiers who have insecure land tenure. Some new farmers who were allocated land under the reform programme are being evicted from resettlement land even though they were given permission to farm without official ownership documents/title deeds. The farm workers believe that some newly resettled people are being displaced to make way for government officials and military personnel who will probably be absentee landlords and this state of affairs makes people’s future very uncertain (Interview notes, 2004).

Based on a cost-benefit analysis, most of the farm workers interviewed did not want to rock the boat or change the status quo because they believe that both the farmers and farm workers can benefit from continuing with life as before (preference for stability). Farm workers believe that the only realistic option they have is to make do with what is available because there is a form of mutual interdependency between the remaining white farmers and farm workers. In practice this means co-existing with white farmers for as long as possible (better the devil you know). Some of the workers who have been on the farms for a generation or more feel a strong sense of loyalty or close relationship with the farmers (Interview notes, 2004). The farm workers are reluctant to risk losing what they have by being aggressive if there was not much else to be gained in return. This response has been informed by concerns over job security (regular incomes) and subsidised benefits (seemingly small things) that have helped foster a sense of community in the area.

Farm workers appreciate what the farmers have done for them; which they say is infinitely more compared to the government’s rhetoric and neglect of farm workers. White farmers sunk boreholes and built small dams for water. They provide their workers and communities with subsidised schools and clinics, free housing in farm compounds and allow them access to thatch/grass, wood fuel, grazing land/pastures for small livestock (Interview notes, 2004). Pearson (2000:394) notes that women tend to supplement public services with their own labour because they carry the burden of shielding their families from potential diseases when there are inadequacies or a lack of access to basic water, sanitation or health services. The assistance rendered by farmers in these areas is appreciated more because the government has been unable to provide these lately. In essence, the old paternalistic relations prevail between farm workers and white farmers on the farms studied. Nothing much has changed on the farms, except for the down-scaling of operations since the government has expressed its intentions to compulsorily acquire the farms.
With the country’s high unemployment rate, rural-urban migration is no longer a viable option out of poverty. Although there was an initial surge in rural-urban migration by people displaced from white commercial farms in search of better economic prospects, high unemployment and inflation rates forced many to return to the farming areas. Chitiyo (2003:206-207) and IRIN News (2003a; 2003b) report that some former farm workers who moved to the cities have ended up in temporary squatter settlements and are earning meagre incomes in the informal sector or from criminal activities.

All the farm workers of foreign descent in the study do not have Zimbabwean citizenship and realise that they have nothing to gain from land reform. They said they prefer regular employment and remuneration on the farms because the farms are the only homes they have known, some for more than twenty years. The insecure rights of migrants mean that they struggle to get essential documents such as national identity cards, birth, death and marriage certificates (Refslund-Sorensen and Vincent, 2001:278). In turn, this difficulty means that female farm workers of Mozambican or Malawian origin (as primary care-givers) also struggle to access basic social services, especially since they do not qualify for welfare grants (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003b).

The younger farm workers in the study did not wish to settle elsewhere because they were born on the farms and grew up there. They do not have roots in the communal areas or their countries of origin (Interview notes, 2004). The immediate survival strategies that have been adopted by individuals and families to generate income in Vumba and Burma Valley include:

- Having just one meal a day and eating wild fruits and roots (some poisonous)
- Petty crime/theft
- Cattle rustling
- Prostitution
- Begging (street kids)
- Beer brewing and selling
- Bulk buying of foodstuffs like sugar to sell in Mozambique (illegal cross-border trading).
- Increase in child labour (children of school going age are doing piece-work to supplement family income.
- Illegal gold panning along rivers (Penhalonga in Mutasa district, Chimanimani) which creates physical hazards to both people and animals.
A significant number of displaced women and girls are engaging in high risk activities like prostitution in a country where a reported 5,000 people are dying from AIDS every week (Zimbabwe had an AIDS prevalence rate of 33.7% among adults in 2002) (United Nations estimates cited in Bookstein and Lawson, 2002:636; Sachikonye, 2002:15; Buckle, 2002). Most of the women interviewed expressed concern about their health and dignity but invariably concluded that they are doing what they have to do, using what is available, in order to survive with limited resources in a radically altered physical and social environment.

Some of the long-term survival strategies adopted in the study area include:

- Forming small farming cooperatives engaged in market-gardening or horticulture (citrus fruits, paprika), poultry farming, egg production, piggery projects and rabbit keeping.
- Crafts such as sewing/dressmaking, pottery, carpentry, wood and stone carving/curios, reed or tree bark weaving to make carpets, baskets, mats, hats and bags for tourists who frequent the area (Eagle Training Centre in Vumba).

The organisation, Zimbabwe Women in Agriculture is urging new women farmers to be trained in buying, selling and costing of agricultural produce. The organisation offers training in these areas at provincial, district and ward level to encourage the involvement of people at grassroots levels. Women farmers are being encouraged to engage in horticulture by growing a range of fresh vegetable produce including butternuts, tomatoes, baby-corn and cabbages. They are also encouraged to grow citrus and deciduous fruits as well as export flowers.

7.7 Conclusion

Admittedly, a sample of twenty farm workers and three farmers is small but it is adequate for a case study that seeks to describe and link events in order to give an explanatory hypothesis about the social reality of survival in the area studied; within the broader context of the sea of despair that has engulfed the majority of Zimbabweans since 2000. The conclusions drawn from the study apply strictly to the farms in the study and no claims are made to portray the situation as being the same on other farms in Vumba and Burma Valley, Manicaland province or the country as a whole.
The study revealed that some farms in the area have been invaded but that these incidences were not as violent and widespread as those witnessed in the three Mashonaland provinces (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 2000a). In most cases, the invaders (suspected Zanu-PF party militias from outside the area) who came onto farms in Vumba and Burma Valley left after a short while, probably because they got bored once the excitement wore off. Buckle (2002) reports that most illegal land occupiers across the country did not have the means to work the land they occupied or ‘liberated.’ In a few of the cases, the invaders have stayed and apportioned parts of the affected farms for themselves and have been planting crops. In such instances, the affected farmers and the illegal occupiers are sharing existing infrastructure, although the occupiers do not pay rent in cash or produce (Interview notes, 2004). It has also been noted that the remaining white farmers in Manicaland province are co-existing peacefully with newly resettled farmers. The Utete Report (2003:43 & 44) observes that this cooperation is mainly through out-growers programmes in tea and coffee production in Chipinge and through tillage and seed production for tobacco in Mutare and Makoni districts.

White farmers are distressed by the turn of events in Zimbabwe and fear for their lives on a daily basis. They feel anxious because they feel like they are being watched constantly and have to keep looking over their shoulders. Farmers in the study insisted that they should be judged based on their contribution to the economy as well as the welfare of their workers and other underprivileged people in their community. The farmers believe that their contribution explains, in part, why they are still on their farms with little or no animosity between themselves, their workers, the community and the few illegal occupiers who have set-up house on farms in the area (Interview notes, 2004).

The study uncovered an interesting range of localised socio-political and economic responses (new patterns of social organisation) as those directly affected by fast-track land reform, particularly farm workers, attempt to address everyday issues of social reproduction/survival given the many constraints that they face. The majority of ordinary poor people in Zimbabwe are faced with real and immediate economic or financial challenges which need to be addressed through creative strategies in order to improve individual and family incomes, livelihoods and quality of life.
Conclusion

8.1 Introduction
The failure to resolve Zimbabwe’s land question in the first decade of independence is not a unique experience. According to Sidiropoulos (2004:114), the fact that “whites owned a disproportionate share of land in Zimbabwe had substantial resonance in the region.” Former settler colonies identify with most of Zimbabwe’s experiences up until the fast-track land reform, for example, the resolution of the land question in South Africa, Swaziland and Namibia has been constrained by factors similar to those faced by the Zimbabwean government (willing-buyer-willing-seller clauses and other conditions that come with negotiated transitions to independence or democracy) (Lineback, 2001). Sidiropoulos (2004) and Bush and Szeftel (2002:11) contend that it is for this reason that African leaders were reluctant to support the international community in imposing sanctions on the Zimbabwean government over the controversial fast-track land reform programme. However, the perceived indifference, vacillation and contradictory pronouncements of SADC/regional Heads of States over the Zimbabwean government’s systematic use of repression and disregard for the rule of law and human rights (attacks on political opposition, the white community, the judiciary and the press) during the fast-track land reform programme became a cause for concern for the rest of the free world (Kibble, 2004:365-369; Hall, 2003:275; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7 & 9; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655; Krieger, 2000:448). This concern was raised because as Bush and Szeftel (2002:12) note, protecting and respecting the sovereignty of nation states when that sovereignty does not have a democratic base and a popular mandate is no more than supporting a dictatorship and such a situation can have serious and dire implications. This chapter concludes the current study with a discussion of the similarities and differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe’s experience of colonial land dispossession and their subsequent land reforms. The comparison is meant to highlight the possible implications of the latter’s recent land reform experience and what it could mean for on-going or future land reform efforts in Southern Africa.
8.2 Comparison between South Africa and Zimbabwe: Possible Implications

About 87% of South Africa’s land was expropriated from the indigenous black people by colonial settlers through the Glen Grey Act of 1899, Native’s Land Act of 1913 and the Native’s Trust and Land Act of 1936. Deininger (2003:150) notes too that blacks were also removed from designated white areas from 1913 onwards through what were known as ‘black spot removals.’ Black South Africans were prohibited from acquiring land outside the Native Reserves until the passing of the Abolition of Racially Based Measures Act of 1991 (Hendricks, 2001:290; 1995a:49). Despite this, however, the conciliatory nature of negotiations that led to South Africa’s democracy restricts what the post-apartheid state can do in terms of land reform (Hendricks, 2001:294-297), similar to Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House Agreement. South Africa’s Kempton Park negotiations involved compromises, including the adoption of policies of reconciliation and nation-building, which subsequently led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The new democratic governments in both South Africa and Zimbabwe tried to reconcile the aspirations of landless indigenous people and the property rights of white landowners and this conditioned the slow rate and modest achievements of land reform in both countries (Hall, 2003:255; Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:2).

The governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa, post-colonial and post-apartheid respectively, inherited stark inequalities in their resource distribution such that the black majority in both countries expected the redistribution of wealth and resources, including land, as a condition for the political legitimacy of the new democratic governments (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:287). Both countries had dualistic agrarian structures in which whites owned most of the high value agricultural land and were engaged in commercial export production and blacks lived in overcrowded Reserves or Homelands on infertile soils (Hall, 2003; Hendricks, 2001:291; Palmer, 2000:18; Hendricks 1995b:44). The land question is an emotive issue in both countries because as Jenkins and Knight (2002:293) and Hendricks (2001:300) note, the greatest poverty and underdevelopment is experienced in the rural areas of both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Jenkins and Knight (2002) note, however, that agriculture is relatively less important in South Africa because it contributes less to the country’s GDP than is the case in Zimbabwe. Agriculture is also a less significant employer and contributor to South Africa’s foreign currency earnings than in Zimbabwe and these differences mean that the pressure for land reform is weaker in South Africa than it was in Zimbabwe (Jenkins and Knight, 2002).
South African’s 1993 Reconstruction and Development Programme contains provisions for land restitution for individuals and communities that were forcibly removed from their land. It also aims to redistribute land in order to broaden access to the landless, land tenants, farm workers and new farmers who need it but cannot afford it, as well as to protect land tenure rights through tenure reform (Hall, 2003:262-264; Hendricks, 2001:295; 1995a:51). South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution upholds existing property relations by protecting rights to private property, thereby inadvertently entrenching existing material inequality in respect of land distribution and ownership (Hendricks, 2001:299). The contradiction between protecting existing white property rights and turning the social and economic rights of the previously disenfranchised black majority into a reality has, thus, helped to maintain South Africa’s unequal land distribution. So far, the South African government has implemented its land reform programme by buying privately owned land on a willing-seller willing buyer basis (at market related prices) and by transferring state-land to benefit landless individuals and communities. Hendricks (2001:298) notes, however, that the impact of this approach has been limited because of the government’s administrative and resource (human and material) constraints.

Zimbabwe’s experience of land reform under the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement showed that the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle retards the rate of land reform, especially since current landowners determine when, where and at what price they will sell their land. As was the case in Zimbabwe, Nkosi (1992 cited in Hendricks, 2001:291 and 1995a:49) notes too that after the abolition of apartheid, the white minority in South Africa is not inclined to give up control of the land they hold. Compensation for expropriated land is also prohibitive and the land reform process is slow because of protracted administrative and judicial procedures through the Land Commission and the Land Claims Court (Hendricks, 2001:296; 1995a:52). The result is that whites (approximately 60 000 farmers) retain monopoly over South African agriculture and the majority of blacks remain excluded and dispossessed (Hendricks, 2001:293 & 296; Hendricks; 1995a:41; 1995b:39).

Hall (2003:274) also draws parallels between land reform in Zimbabwe in the 1990s (ESAP period) and South Africa’s land reform in which issues about productivity and efficiency, good farming and good land management skills are pre-eminent in land reform debates. Hall (2003) contests this preference to allocate land to experienced small, medium and large-scale
previously disadvantaged commercial farmers who have their own capital at the expense of the poor majority. Hall (2003) contests this on the basis that it does not meet the criteria of, among others, social justice, equality and fairness that should ideally inform the land reform exercise given the country’s history.

The similarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa regarding colonial land expropriation and subsequent attempts to implement land reforms have caused alarm and panic in the wake of Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme. The social, economic and political carnage wrought by the fast-track land reform programme has led analysts to ponder whether South Africa (the government and landless peasants) will eventually take their cue from Zimbabwe’s radical reform exercise in a bid to implement comprehensive land reform; and with what consequences (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001; Lineback, 2001; Palmer, 2000). Despite differences in the pre-eminence of land as a primary resource, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s economies are closely integrated and Zimbabwe’s experience of land reform can be instructive for South Africa’s (and Namibia) on-going land reform. Fears abound that the violence which characterised Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme will spill over into other countries in the region that have pending land reforms. These fears are justified insofar as these countries have their own land crises and would like to avoid the lawless, chaotic and destructive Zimbabwe-style land grabs (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001; Palmer, 2000). According to Chitiyo (2003:185), South Africa suffered a wave of farm invasions in Kwazulu-Natal and farm murders in Gauteng Province in 2000. Hall (2003:260) also mentions land grabs that occurred in 2001 in Bredell, Kempton Park near the Johannesburg International Airport and in Khayelitsha outside Cape Town. In this regard, it is important to note that despite its history in social activism, the South African government recognises the importance of property ownership, protecting property rights and respecting the rule of law. Consequently, the police reacted swiftly to remove the squatters in the incidences mentioned above (Hall, 2003:260).

South Africa’s Constitutional Court has had to clarify key issues regarding the rights of the different parties (land owners, squatters, the police/government) involved in the event of land rights violations. Below are two of the cases that provide precedents for future land disputes. In the cases: Modder East Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, (SCA 187/03) and President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Safety and Security, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the National Commissioner of
Police v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, (SCA 213/03), the government disputed it obligation to landowner in question resulting in a protracted legal process to settle the matter. Cilliers (2005:16-17) reports that 74-year old farmer, Braam Duvenhage, bought 2 300 hectare Modderklip Boerdery farm near Johannesburg in 1965 and had worked it for forty years. The farm was first invaded on 20 May 2000 because of overcrowding and a shortage of land and shelter in the nearby Daveyton and Chris Hani informal settlements adjacent to it. A criminal charge of trespass was made to the police so that they could remove the squatters and the Johannesburg High Court granted an eviction order on 12 April 2001 against 15 000 illegal occupiers. The squatters were ordered to vacate the land within two months of the issuing of the order but failed to do so. The Ekhuruleni Council did nothing about the squatters and the police failed to assist the landowner in his attempts to get the state to assist in executing the High Court’s eviction order (Christmas, 2004).

The squatters built shacks on about 50 hectares of the farm, stole crops and planted their own vegetables without consulting the farmer. They also hunted birds and rabbits, stole a tractor, a bakkie, diesel fuel and looted the farmer’s barns (Cilliers, 2005:16-17). More squatters moved onto the farm every year but the government failed to intervene. The value of Duvenhage’s property dropped drastically because of the invasion and he continued to incur heavy losses. The squatters plundered his crops such that where he used to harvest 8 tonnes of maize per hectare; he could barely harvest a tonne per hectare (Cilliers, 2005:16-17). Up to 70 000 people eventually moved onto Modderklip farm and built shacks in a squatter settlement that came to be known as Gabon (Modder East squatters). This state of affairs forced the farmer to erect electric fences around the farm house and to hire guards to patrol the fields in a bid to prevent theft on the farm (Cilliers, 2005:16-17).

Police inaction in the Modderklip case compelled Duvenhage, together with Agri-SA (for the benefit of South Africa’s land owners in general), to seek further legal recourse. The original eviction order was confirmed and the Ekhuruleni Council was ordered to do something about the squatters. However, the government took the case to the Supreme Court of Appeal to appeal the order, and lost. The government took the case to the Constitutional Court and lost again in what many South African property owners see as a positive development (Cilliers, 2005:16-17; Christmas, 2004). The Constitutional Court “unequivocally stated in a far-reaching judgement” that illegal land invasions would not be tolerated in South Africa (Cilliers, 2005:16-17). Judge Pius Langa ruled that it is the government’s duty to protect
property rights and to provide housing for the homeless. Judge Langa stated that the government (Ministers and the police who ignored eviction orders issued to remove the squatters from Modderklip) were negligent (constitutional breach) in their failure to assist Duvenhage. The Constitutional Court also ruled that it was "unreasonable to expect individuals to shoulder the government’s responsibility of housing the homeless" (Lourie Bosman, President Agri-SA cited in Cilliers, 2005:16-17). The judgment emphasises that landowners should not be unduly prejudiced by the failure of the state to fulfil its obligations to cater for the socio-economic rights of vulnerable (but unlawful) occupiers. The Court stated that the government has a responsibility to remove squatters from land that is occupied illegally and to provide squatters with alternative accommodation (Christmas, 2004). The state (Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs) was ordered to remove the squatters from Modderklip farm and to compensate Duvenhage for the losses that he incurred over the five years that Modderklip was illegally occupied. Alternatively, the Court suggested that the government could buy Modderklip farm at a market related price. The state was also ordered to pay Duvenhage’s legal costs (approximately R70 000) together with its own legal costs (Cilliers, 2005:16-17).

The housing obligations of the state to vulnerable occupiers were first laid down in the landmark case; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others (I) SA 46 (CC). The Modderklip case demonstrates how these obligations impact on the possible eviction of vulnerable occupiers from private land (Christmas, 2004). The Modderklip judgment clearly states the rights and duties of the government and individuals involved in land disputes. In essence, the judgment gives landowners greater certainty over their rights in the event of land invasions. According to Christmas (2004), the Modderklip judgments are considered to be progressive in dealing with the thorny issue of the protection of property rights versus the socio-economic rights of occupiers because South African landowners can depend on the government to protect their property (land) rights in future (Cilliers, 2005:16-17).

8.3 Conclusion
Chapter 1 dealt with land reform theory and the agrarian question in general. It also provided an introduction to the Zimbabwean land reform process and the specifics of the chosen study area. Chapter 2 began with an exploration of the land question in Southern Africa and discussed the two phases of the Zimbabwean land reform process before the introduction of
fast-track land reform in 1998. Chapter 3 analysed the multi-faceted historical (political, economic and administrative) problems encountered in Zimbabwe's land reform process since they undermined a major developmental aim, that is, for land reform to positively impact the lives of the poor. The problems encountered in the land reform process between 1980 and 1998 and the unfolding social dynamics (continuing class divisions between blacks and whites, as well as growing class divisions amongst blacks themselves because of corruption) provided the context for the controversial fast-track land reform programme.

Chapter 4 dealt with the policy blueprint for the fast-track land reform programme (theoretical underpinnings, institutional framework, donor positions), as well as the political imperatives and social justification for the Zimbabwean government's 'no compromise' stance on the issue. Chapter 5 traced how fast-track land reform unfolded in practice and how this eroded the citizenship status and property rights of white Zimbabweans (and the independence of the judiciary), especially after the illegal farm invasions began.

Chapter 6 contextualised and discussed the consequences of the fast-track land reform programme. A deliberate attempt was made to look beyond just the amount of land transferred, but to focus on the immediate and long-term developmental impact of this land reform process. The conclusion is that fast-track land reform adversely affected different groups of people and different sectors of the economy. Ironically, fast-track land reform devastated Zimbabwe's most economically vulnerable people (including the 300,000 internally displaced farm workers); who were supposed to be the main beneficiaries of the programme. Further, lack of adequate government support has led to declining agricultural production since many of those that benefited from land redistribution are unable to utilise the land. The last part of Chapter 6 dealt with the international community's response to how Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform programme unfolded and exposed hundreds of thousands of people to the extremes of poverty.

Chapter 7 discussed the methodology employed in the case study of three farms in Vumba and Burma Valley. The case studies illustrate the consequences of fast-track land reform which are raised in Chapter 6 and goes further to explore the localised responses (survival strategies) that have been adopted by people in the study area.

The main point made by the study is that short-sighted, hasty and radical reforms can compromise the economic and democratic (political, legal and social) systems of a country. Instead, land reform needs to be well-timed, planned and budgeted for in order for it to
benefit the majority of landless people in a sustainable manner. Jenkins and Knight (2002:287-290) and Hendricks (2001:292; 1995a:51) impress the need for governments to have both administrative (political will and skilled personnel) and financial capacity to implement land reform and to support it in terms of infrastructure provision. Zimbabwe’s recent experience shows that whilst radical land reforms do succeed in transferring land from one group to another, they have the potential to be counter-productive in terms of broader development objectives, for instance, to transform agricultural sectors whilst enhancing people’s welfare through improved standards of living and consumption patterns. The significance of the South African land rights cases mentioned above is that they highlight the need to balance the needs of different groups and to uphold the rule of law by operating within the confines of the law.

It is hoped that the theories, narratives, analyses and reflections that make up this study make a contribution to the field of rural development, particularly the social impact of land reforms.
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Annexes/Appendices

1. Interview Schedules
   a) Government Officials

   1. How many farms are in the Vumba and Burma Valley area and how many of these were designated for redistribution?
   2. What were the criteria for land designation and how many designated farms were in fact redistributed during the fast-track land reform programme?
   3. Do you think that the Vumba and Burma Valley area’s experience of fast-track land reform is an exception to the general trend countrywide?
b) Farmers

1. What is your nationality?
2. How old are you?
3. Geographically, where do you originate from and how long have you been engaged in farming in Zimbabwe (1st, 2nd or 3rd generation Zimbabwean)?
4. Who owns the farm and how was it acquired (inherited or bought from another farmer or the government)?
5. What type of agricultural production are you involved in (dairy, horticulture or other)?
6. What are your feelings and attitudes about the fast-track land reform programme? Do you accept or recognise the legitimate need for land reform in the interest of social justice?
7. Has your farm been occupied or looted by peasants, war veterans, the urban poor or farm workers? Have you or your family been attacked physically or harassed? If not, how long do you think this reprieve will last? Do you think the situation is sustainable or is the compromise superficial?
8. Given the violence that characterised most land occupations across the country, do you feel safe or secure in your own home?
9. What are your plans for the future? Are you considered retiring, emigrating overseas, taking up farming in a neighbouring country, selling your farm and taking up another business here?
10. How would you describe relations between you and your farm workers? Is there a sense of community on the farm that both you and your workers want to preserve?
11. Do you think that you have a social obligation to your workers or community? Are you active in improving the plight of your workers and that of other underprivileged people in the community? What assistance have you given your workers in areas like health, education/vocational skills development and income generating initiatives?
12. What entitlements or benefits do your farm workers enjoy/have?
13. How do your farm workers negotiate their demands? Do you think the farm workers are organised or unified as a group (not necessarily as a Union)?
c) Farm Workers

1. What is your nationality?
2. How old are you?
3. What level of formal education do you have?
4. How do you feel (attitudes/views) about the recent fast-track land reform programme?
5. Do you believe that radical land reform or land ownership alone can alleviate rural poverty?
6. What are your plans for the future following this reform?
7. Would you like to own a big farm (individually or as a collective)?
8. Do you think you have the necessary skills (knowledge of farm management, production economics or marketing) to continue farming at the same level/standard as the commercial farmers?
9. Would regular employment, fair remuneration and acceptable working conditions suffice as an alternative to owning land?
10. How do you negotiate your demands to the farmer? Are workers organised, not necessarily in a Union?
11. What is the nature of relations between the farmer and farm workers? Are relations good or bad and what entitlements or benefits do farm workers enjoy/have?
12. Is there a sense of community that both farmers and farm workers want to preserve?
13. Do you think farmers have a social obligation to farm workers? Are farmers facilitating the social advancement of farm workers and other underprivileged people in the community?
14. What assistance have farmers given in areas like health, education/vocational skills development and income generating initiatives?
2. Properties in Vumba and Burma Valley (including Fern Valley and Fern Hill).

There were approximately 130 landholdings in Manicaland’s Vumba and Burma Valley area and about half of these were designated for compulsory acquisition during Zimbabwe’s land reform Phase 3. These properties are listed below:

1. Amsterdam Farm P/L - C. C. Hildebrand
2. Arussha Estate (Vumba)- A. W. F. Vermeulen
3. Away Farm P/L (Vumba)
4. Batanai Farm
5. Batterby Spruit Farm- D. Matongo
6. Bauline Farm (Rowa East)
7. Beastkraal of Clare Estate Ranch- Varmland Investments P/L
8. Begin Farm- H & A Vorster
9. Beulieu Farm
10. Bomponi/Bomhoni (Vumba)- M. B. Brown
11. Border Streams Farm (Vumba)
13. Britannia- Britannia Orchard P/L
14. Brooklands Farm- H. M. Bonyongwe
15. Brownhill Farm
16. Bungo Farm (Subdivided)
17. Burma of Clydsdale (subdivided)-Burma Park P/L (Burma Valley)
18. Burma Valley Bananas P/L (Burma Valley)
19. Bvumba Mountain Stream Rainbow Trout Farm (Vumba)
20. Casuarina Farm P/L (Vumba)
21. Chewood Court Farm- Du Toit
22. Chikonga Farm (Subdivided)
23. Chinamakoti Farm (Vumba)- Marron Farm P/L
24. Chinamakitori of Maonza- T. J. Grant
25. Chinamanda Farm (Burma Valley)- Valley Coffee Plantation P/L
26. Chinziwa Farm (section 2 of The Park Farm) (Vumba)
27. Clare Estate Ranch (subdivided)
28. Cloud Seven (Vumba)- J. A. Robertson
29. Cloudlands (subdivided) (Vumba)
30. Copp клиент- B & P. L. Van Niekerk
31. Crake Valley Farm (Vumba)- B. H. Brown
32. Derema Farm (Vumba)- Dr. C. Chikuku
33. Devon of Umvumba- Prince Julia Investments P/L
34. Devonshire Farm- W. J. Taylor
35. Dun Mow Farm (Vumba)- S. Makonyere
36. Duri Farm (Vumba)
37. Dutsi Farm- G. R. Matthews
38. Eastlands Farm- G. D. Mundell P/L
39. Edendale-Freezing Point Estate P/L
40. En Vant (subdivided)- En Vant Farm P/L
41. Epson (subdivided) (Vumba)- Border Timbers Ltd
42. Fairview Farm (subdivided)
43. Fairview South of Fairview- D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L
44. Fallen Angels (subdivided) (Vumba)
45. Falling Water Farm (Vumba)- Gibsons Investments
46. Fangundu Farm (subdivided) (Vumba)
47. Felsted (subdivided) (Vumba)
48. Fern Hill Farm- A. T. Mupota
49. Ferndale Farm (Vumba)- E & R. C. Palmer
50. Five Streams Farm (Vumba)
51. Fletcher C. C. Dairy Farm
52. Freshwater Farm (Vumba)
53. Glenburn Farm and Nurseries (Vumba)
54. Green Valley Vineyards P/L (Vumba)
55. Greencroft Coffee Estates T/A Fallscroft Estates (Vumba)
56. Greendale Farm (Vumba)
57. Gubinchen Farm
58. Gwindingwe Farm (Burma Valley)- H. J. Vorster P/L
59. Harmony Farm- R. M. Sithole
60. Have-S. Vivier
61. Hawkshed Valley Farm- D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L
62. Hawling Farm
63. Headlands- Freezing Point Estates P/L
64. High Henge Farm
65. Highlands (subdivided) (Vumba)- R. C. Donald
66. Hivu Estates and Nursery/Salime P/L (Vumba)
67. Howth (subdivided) (Vumba)
68. Kostad of Clare Estate Ranch- C. E. Kok
69. Leicester Farm
70. Lot 1 of Cloudlands Estates- I. L. Cripps
71. Lot 1 D of Highlands- Hill Billy Estates P/L
72. Lot 1 of Fangundu Farm (Vumba)- Brightside Farm P/L
73. Lot 1 of Orkey of Howth- P. D. Hulley
74. Lot 1 of Oukar Estate- C. H. Van Vuuren
75. Lot 1 of subdivision M of Manchester Brackenridge Farm (Vumba)- Chinamata Farm P/L
76. Lot 1 of Tobruk of Clare Estate Ranch- A. P. Sanderson P/L
77. Lot 12A of Bunga Farm- Firkinn Investments P/L
78. Lot 1 of Lot 12A of Bunga Farm- Sala Holdings P/L
79. Lot 2 of Cloudlands Estate- West Away Farm P/L
80. Lot 2 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- B. A. Van Buuren & Co P/L
81. Lot 5 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- O. W. Thawaties P/L
82. Lot 7 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- Brandhill P/L
83. Lot 8 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- B. A. Van Buuren & Co P/L
84. Lyndhurst Farm (Vumba)- Throb Enterprises (shelled pecan nuts).
85. Manchester Brackenridge Farm/Chinyabakwe Farm (subdivided)(Vumba)
86. Manyera Farm (Burma Valley)- D. M. Wiggins
87. Maonza Farm (subdivided)(Vumba)
88. Mapembi Estate- Mapor Estates P/L
89. Matanuska Farm (Burma Valley)- R. C. Hildebrand
90. Mazonwe Farm (subdivided)(Burma Valley)- Alvern Farming P/L
91. Merrydown Farm- P & P Hulley
92. Monkfield of Norseland- H. J. Vorster
93. Mount Malenji (subdivided)- Ragdale Investments P/L
94. Mount Shalom of Clare Estate Ranch - J & R Tobacco Estates P/L
95. Muneni Farm (Vumba)
96. Munzeiro Farm (Vumba)
97. Nahoon Estate Farm (Burma Valley) - Ferndale Investments P/L
98. Nahoon Farm (subdivided) (Burma Valley) - Ardingly Farms P/L
99. Nezomba Farm
100. Nimbus (Vumba)
101. Nyamakari Farm of Burma of Clydesdale (Burma Valley) - A. McGregor
102. Orkney Farm
103. Oukar Estate (subdivided) - H. A. Lock
104. Rilet Farm (Vumba)
105. Rio Farm (Vumba)
106. Rippling Streams (Vumba)
107. Ruparara Trout Farm - Ruparara Trout Farm P/L
108. Rutsenza of Mount Malenji - Makaba P/L
109. Sloghtholme Farms P/L
110. Subdivision A Portion Patridge Hill of Cloudlands - Patridge Hill P/L
111. Subdivision C of Chikonga Farm - Green Valley Vineyards P/L
112. Subdivision D of Chikonga Farm - Green Valley Vineyards P/L
113. Subdivision E of Chikonga Farm - Rhotalia Winery P/L
114. The Park Farm (subdivided) (Vumba)
115. The Wattle Company Vumba Estate (Vumba) - (wattle plantation)
116. Tree Tops (Vumba)
117. Tregenna Farm
118. Umvumba (subdivided) (Vumba)
119. Umwaouku - S. Vivier
120. Valhalla Farm - J. R. Hildebrand P/L
121. Vooruitsig of Clydesdale (Burma Valley) - Alvern Farming P/L
122. Vumba Agricultural Collective Cooperative Society (Vumba)
123. Vumba Gateway Gardens (Vumba)
124. Walmer (subdivided) (Vumba) - Border Timbers Ltd
125. White Horse Inn (Vumba)
126. Witchwood Farm (Vumba) - Witchwood Nursery P/L
127. Zaaibhoek of Clare Estate Ranch - A. C. Kok
3. Economic Activities in Vumba and Burma Valley

Vumba and Burma Valley farmers produce a diverse and specialised array of tropical and sub-tropical fruits and vegetables on contract for Manicaland’s hotels, restaurants, lodges and inns (White Horse Inn, Eden Lodge, Inn-on-the-Vumba). They also produce for the city’s vegetable market as well as the country’s canning factories, mostly situated in Mutare, for instance, Cairns Foods (incorporating Tomango, Border Streams and Cashel Valley brands). Flowers are grown for local florists and for export, together with grapes (and wines).

The area is also home to tobacco farms (for export), coffee plantations (export), dairy farms (cheese, butter and yoghurt for the local market and for export), trout farms (for local hotels and export) and timber plantations (local market and export) as shown by Table 17 below.

Table 17: Agricultural Production in Vumba and Burma Valley

| Timber Plantations | 1. Epson Estate owned by Border Timbers Ltd.  
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Fruits Orchards/Plantations (nectarines, bananas, peaches, oranges, grapefruit, mangoes, guavas, pineapples, apples, plums, litchis, avocados and strawberries). | 1. Border Streams Farm.  
2. Britannia Orchard P/L.  
3. Burma Valley Bananas P/L.  
| Tobacco | 2. Mount Shalom of Clare Estate Ranch. |
2. Chinyamanda Farm/Valley Coffee Plantation P/L. |
| Plant/Flower Nurseries (cut-flowers such as roses, Proteas and Chrysanthemums for export). | 1. Glenburn Farm and Nurseries.  
2. Hivu Estates and Nursery/Salime P/L. |
| Nuts (shelled pecan nuts) | Lyndhurst Farm. |
| Trout Farms | 1. Ruparara Trout Farm.  
2. Bvumba Mountain Stream Rainbow Trout Farm. |
| Dairy Farms | 1. C.C. Fletcher Dairy Farm  
2. Crake Valley Farm. |
| Chicken/Poultry Farms | 1. Valhalla Farm. |
4. Properties Designated or Compulsory Acquired in Mutare District

*The Manica Post* is Manicaland province’s state-owned weekly newspaper. Below are notices given by J. L. Nkomo, Minister of Special Affairs in the office of the President and Cabinet in charge of Land, Land Reform and Resettlement. The notices were given in terms of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10) and paragraph (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10).


*The Manica Post* 22-28 October 2004:pB6-pB7

Notice in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (Vesting of Land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land) [Lot 15; 193 Farms].

**Affected Districts:** Bindura, Chirumhanzu, Chipinge, Goromonzi, Kadoma, Gutu, Gweru, Hartley, Nyanga, Lomagundi, Makoni, Marondera, Mazowe, Melsetter, Murehwa, Ndanga/Bikita, Mwenezi, Shamva, Salisbury/Harare, *Umtali/Mutare, Hurungwe and Masvingo.

*Mutare district accounts for 28 of the 193 farms gazetted as shown in Table A below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title Holder/Owner</th>
<th>Farm/Plot</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>S. Vivier</td>
<td>Have</td>
<td>202.7145ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Five Streams P/L</td>
<td>Five Streams</td>
<td>1388.7402ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Freezing Point Estate P/L</td>
<td>Edendale</td>
<td>1362.000ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>C. H. Van Vuuren</td>
<td>Lot 1 of Oukar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>A. C. Kok</td>
<td>Zaaihoek of Clare Estate Ranch</td>
<td>11034826ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Patridge Hill P/L</td>
<td>Subdivision A Portion Partridge Hill of Cloudlands</td>
<td>246.7650 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>H. J. Vorster</td>
<td>Monkfield of Norseland</td>
<td>866.18ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Manica Post 17-23 December 2004: pB5 & pB7

Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 [Lot 160; 229 Farms].


*Bulilima-Mangwe, Charter, Goromonzi, Hartley and Marondera account for the bulk of farms gazetted under Lot 160. Mutare District accounts for 11 of the 229 farms as shown in Table B below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Title Holder/Owner</th>
<th>Farm/Plot</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Freezing Point P/L</td>
<td>Edendale</td>
<td>1362ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Freezing Point P/L</td>
<td>Headlands</td>
<td>1405ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>J. C. Franklin</td>
<td>Lot 1 of Premier Estate (*Old Mutare)</td>
<td>1657.05ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L</td>
<td>Fairview South of Fairview</td>
<td>413.4455ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ferndale Investments P/L</td>
<td>Nahoon Estate</td>
<td>444.2658ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. J. R. Hildebrand P/L  Remaining extent of Valhalla  376.0419ha.
8. H. A. Lock  Oukar Estate  867.5035ha.
9. Mapor Estates P/L  Lot 2 of Mapembi Estate  1903.6362 acres
11. Claremont/Nyanga Orchards P/L  Claremont (*Nyanga)  3327.218 morgen

Table B


Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 [Lot 160; 229 Farms].


*Bulilima-Mangwe, Charter, Goromonzi, Hartley and Marondera account for the bulk of farms gazetted under Lot 160.

Mutare accounts for 11 of the 229 farms (same as Table B above).

The Manica Post 28 January-3 February 2005: p2

Notice in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land) [Lot 19; 2 farms].

Of the two farms gazetted, one is in Mutare district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner/title-holder</th>
<th>Farm/Plot</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.D. Hulley</td>
<td>Lot 1 of Orkey of Howth</td>
<td>438.0069ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C

The Manica Post 28 January-3 February 2005: p15

Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 [Lot 16; total 41 Farms].

Affected Districts: Chipinge, Nyanga, Mazowe, Goromonzi, Makoni, Ndanga/Bikita and Umtali/Mutare districts.

Mutare District accounts for 17 of the 41 farms shown on Table D below:

Notice of application for confirmation of Section 8 Order in terms of Section 7(3) of Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (disputed lands) [Lot 10; 274 farms].


*More than 10 farms listed from each of the marked districts.

Mutare District accounts for 29 of the 274 farms as shown on Table E below:
Table E

The Manica Post 8-14 April 2005:p11-13

Notice by the Minister of Special Affairs in the Office of the President and Cabinet responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement.

Notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (Farms whose compensation has been fixed). The schedule listed 822 farms countrywide (across the 10 provinces).

Manicaland Province had 91 farms listed and Umtali/Mutare District accounted for 29 of the 91 farms as shown on Table F below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Landholding</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Beeste Kraal of Clare Estate</td>
<td>Varnland Investments P/L</td>
<td>1176.49ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brooksville</td>
<td>Bezuïdenhout Bros P/L</td>
<td>301.49ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Charlgrove Farm</td>
<td>Charlgrove P/L</td>
<td>521.49ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cloudlands Estate</td>
<td>Nyamani P/L</td>
<td>603.54ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cynara</td>
<td>Cynara</td>
<td>614.54ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Delamore</td>
<td>Dikanai Estates P/L</td>
<td>2047.38ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dieguns of Minverwag (Clare Estate)</td>
<td>Saalhoek Estates P/L</td>
<td>613.67ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Manica Post 8-14 July 2005:p11

Preliminary notice to acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (notice given by D.N.E Mutasa, Minister of State for National Security, Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement in the President’s office) [Lot 172; 30 Farms].

Only 1 farm was from Umtali/Mutare District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deed</th>
<th>Name of Landholding</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deed of transfer 471/74</td>
<td>Peplow Farm P/L-remainder of Dice Box</td>
<td>338.4737ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table G

The Herald 15 July 2005:pB13

The Manica Post 15-21 July 2005:p11

The Manica Post 22-28 July 2005:p11

Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 [Lot 175; 5 Farms].

Mutare District accounts for 2 of the 5 fives in Lot 175.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deed</th>
<th>Name of Landholding</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deed of transfer 1688/86</td>
<td>Valley Coffee Plantation P/L, remaining extent of Mazonwe</td>
<td>3746.2964ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deed of transfer 2564/75</td>
<td>Meidon Farm P/L lot 2 of Burma of Clydesdale</td>
<td>1236.6570ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table H