Understanding policy making and policy implementation with reference to land redistribution in South Africa: 
Case studies from the Eastern Cape

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by

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on land reform in post-apartheid South Africa and specifically on land redistribution, as one of the main pillars of land reform. There have been many studies undertaken on land redistribution in South Africa and these studies offer deep criticisms of the prevailing land redistribution model (a market-led, but state-assisted model) and the ways in which this model has failed to meaningfully address colonial dispossession of land. Further, studies have focused on post-redistribution livelihoods of farmers and the many challenges they face. One significant gap in the prevailing literature is a sustained focus on the state itself, and particularly questions around policy formation and implementation processes pertaining to land redistribution. Delving into policy processes is invariably a difficult task because outsider access to intra-state processes is fraught with problems. But a full account of land redistribution in South Africa demands sensitivity to processes internal to the state. Because of this, it is hoped that this thesis makes a contribution to the existing South African land redistribution literature. In pursuing the thesis objective, I undertook research amongst farmers on selected redistributed farms outside Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape, as well as engaging with both current and former state land officials. Based on the evidence, it is clear that the policy process around land in South Africa is a complex and convoluted process marked not only by consensus-making and combined activities but also by tensions and conflicts. This, I would argue, is the norm with regard to what states do and how they work.
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**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALPF</td>
<td>Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
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<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Communal Property Association</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
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<td>ECARP</td>
<td>Eastern Cape Agricultural Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
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<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Government</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>PLAS</td>
<td>Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>RDPP</td>
<td>Recapitalisation and Development Programme Framework</td>
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<td>SLAG</td>
<td>Settlement and Land Acquisition</td>
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<td>SLDP</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction and Research Methods

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is about land policy formation and policy implementation with regard to land redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa. It examines this with reference to a limited number of case studies of redistributed farms near Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape Province. Redistribution has been fraught with many difficulties and, given the central role of the state in pursuing redistribution, it becomes important to analyse the complexities of the policy process all the way down to farm-level.

This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. I first set out the research problem before going on to identify the main thesis objective (and subsidiary objectives). I then discuss the research methodology underlying the fieldwork for this thesis, including research techniques and fieldwork challenges. The chapter ends by briefly outlining the chapters to follow.

1.2 The Research Problem

Upon the attainment of democracy in 1994, the post-apartheid government instituted a new progressive constitution which embodied civil, political, social and economic rights for all citizens irrespective of race (Heller 2009:127). Additionally, in seeking to pursue socio-economic development on the basis of a more participatory mode of democracy, policy making and policy implementation were to entail significant decentralisation and delegation down to both provincial and municipal levels (involving provincial legislatures and municipal councils respectively) (South African Constitution 1996: Section 42). This democratic development thrust was also meant to incorporate groups outside of the state (including trade unions and civil society organisations) to counteract any centralised state-driven process of social transformation and to ensure citizen-driven policy formation processes. Though the South African state has now become politically answerable to the citizenry through inclusive national elections, the evidence since 1994 strongly suggests that popular processes of policy formation (and implementation) have been heavily compromised by a central state which
continues in a variety of ways to undermine bottom-up policy methodologies (Heller 2001, 2009).

Land reform is a policy arena in South Africa in which the state attempts to right the racial wrongs of the past and reverse their negative effects. Land redistribution in particular is undoubtedly the flagship of land reform policy in South Africa but it remains highly controversial. Mechanisms do exist for transferring large areas of land from the privileged white minority to the historically-oppressed (notably the landless and land-short poor in the former Bantustans) and to ensure an improvement in their agricultural-based livelihoods on redistributed farms, serious problems have emerged. (Hall 2010:176). More specifically, this laudable aim has been subordinated to the inadequacies of market-led land redistribution in which the state simply facilitates market transactions and the purchase of land, while also providing post-settlement support on redistributed farms which, in most cases, has been insufficient. Further, an examination of the three redistribution programmes (known by their acronyms as SLAG, LRAD and PLAS in order of appearance since 1994) makes it clear that there is an increasingly ‘productivist’ emphasis in land redistribution; in other words, production in-and-of-itself on redistributed farms is now the key objective while enhancing the livelihoods of the rural poor has been increasingly sidelined in redistribution policies (Jaricha 2013:83-88).

The land policy formation process in South Africa is not an uncomplicated linear progression as it is marked by significant intra-state tension and to-and-fro dynamics. Likewise, implementation of redistribution programmes entails a complex mix of state bodies (involving central, provincial and municipal tiers) which do not act necessarily in any coordinated and uniform manner (Wiebe 2001:101). Implementation, in the case of land redistribution, involves land and agricultural ministries at central and provincial levels, as well as both district and local municipalities. The relationship between these state bodies is often characterised by confusion, absence of coordination, competition and conflict, all of which clearly impacts on the redistribution of land and resettlement of farmers at farm level. Any coherent transfer of responsibilities from land departments (involving for instance the purchase of land) to agricultural departments (involving for example post-settlement support) seems absent. In this context, this thesis examines land policy formation and land policy
implementation (with an emphasis on the latter) in contemporary South Africa with particular reference to land redistribution, and it does so through a case study approach.

1.3 Thesis Objective

The main objective of the thesis therefore is to understand and explain land policy formation and implementation processes with respect to land redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa through a case study approach focusing on particular farms in the Eastern Cape Province. Subsidiary objectives, which are designed to address the main objective, including the following:

- To provide a historical account of the land redistribution policy formation process since 1994 at a national level, and with a particular focus on the last decade;
- To investigate the national, provincial and municipal tiers of government involved in policy implementation and the diverse relationships between them, including any tensions and conflicts which may exist;
- To examine the reasons why land redistribution objectives by the state are consistently not met and the ways in which the implementation processes impact on these state failures;
- To examine, at implementation level, the relationship between state bodies and non-state bodies and how these relationships impact on the implementation of land redistribution programmes; and
- To study a limited number of LRAD and PLAS farms in the Eastern Cape Province to determine how implementation processes play themselves out at farm level.

1.4 Qualitative Research

In pursuing the main thesis objective I use a qualitative research methodology. This methodology operates in terms of the standards and principles of an interpretivist paradigm which highlights the significance of the way subjects frame their understanding of their lives and the world around them. This is particularly important with respect to the fieldwork underpinning the thesis, namely, the farm-level case studies in which there are a multiplicity of subjects engaged in the redistribution process. (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:3) speak about a qualitative methodology in the following way:
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.

Qualitative researchers attempt to study human practices from the insiders’ perspective (also referred to as the ‘emic’ perspective).

The aim of qualitative research is thus considered as describing and understanding (Verstehen) human practices rather than explaining these practices (normally in terms of causal relationships) (Babbie and Mouton 2001:53). In accessing social reality, the most important analytical process in qualitative research is interpretation by the researcher, which requires a reconstruction and assessment of the life-worlds of research subjects as framed by the subjects themselves. In the end, interpretivism, “looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty 1998:67). This entails privileging the experientially-based views and perspectives of research subjects and the significance of these for their social practices (Newman 2006:88, Rapport and Overing 2000:305, Babbie 1990: 528, Babbie and Mouton 2001:269).

The interpretivist approach is suitable in addressing the main objective of the thesis, as the latter seeks to understand policy processes from the perspective of the various relevant stakeholders involved in these processes (state officials, civil society groups and resettled farmers) and the complexities of farm-level experiences and interactions. At the same time, this does not deny the importance of considering the structural conditions within which experiences take place and perspectives arise.

1.4.1 Sampling

In pursuing the fieldwork for the thesis, sampling had to be undertaken. Sampling involves the process of taking a non-representative or representative selection of a defined population or universe. In doing so, it facilitates more a manageable form of research without necessarily comprising validity and reliability with regard to fieldwork-based findings and conclusions.
There are two main types of sampling in social research, namely, probability (random) sampling and non-probability (non-random) sampling.

Probability sampling involves the selection of the research participants guided by the probability principle in which every unit of the population has an equal, calculable and non-zero probability of being included in the sample (Sarantokos 2013:169). This tends to be used quite extensively in quantitative research because it allows for statistical generalisations. Non-probability sampling technique is often used when it is not possible to completely delimit the population under study. In not allowing for statistical generalisation, it is quite different and a variety of criteria may be used by the researcher in selecting participants, including specialist knowledge of the research topic, and capacity or willingness to participate in the research (Oliver 2013).

This sampling technique tends to be used quite often in qualitative research and, for my purposes, a purposive sampling technique (as a kind of non-random sampling) was used. Purposive sampling in particular involves selecting a sample “on the basis of your own knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of your research aims” (Babbie and Mouton 2001:269). Purposive sampling may not allow for statistical generalisation (MacNealy 1994) but it still provides a strong basis for generating pertinent fieldwork evidence for a given research topic and objective. Consistent with Verstehen, it draws upon the experiences and perspectives of subjectively-selected research participants who are deeply familiar with the study site because of their intimate relationship to it.

The first sampling step involved the selection of the farms for the fieldwork, and the second step related to selection of subjects pertaining to the farms first selected. The farms were selected largely on the basis of ease of accessibility: they are located close to Grahamstown (where I study) and a local non-government organisation (linked to my thesis supervisor) works on these farms. But I also sought to ensure that I studied different types of land redistribution programmes to allow for an examination of similarity and difference. Thus, I selected farms under both the LRAD and PLAS programmes. I do not claim that my research findings for these farms are generalisable to South Africa. Nevertheless, my study of these farms reveals and illuminates social processes which no doubt resonate with situations on other redistributed farms elsewhere in the province and country.
The actual subjects involved in these selected farms were themselves purposively selected in large part because of their different structural positions in the policy formation and implementation processes and, in most cases, their specific experiences and knowledges with regard to the farms under study. These research participants included, perhaps most importantly, farmers on the land redistribution projects: three farmers from LRAD farms in near Grahamstown (Masizakhe, Kamvalethu and Masibambane) and two farmers from PLAS farms near Grahamstown (Outspan and Rockhurst). As will be discussed later, the government has introduced strategic partnerships (often involving white mentors) for these farms and hence I interviewed one strategic partnership mentor (Kobus Vermaak) because of the importance of strategic partnerships and his in-depth involvement on the farms.

Additionally, I incorporated current and former government officials into the fieldwork. The former officials were the former Director of Parks and Recreation at Grahamstown Makana Municipality (Kevin Bates) who worked within the LRAD programme and Michael Kenyon who is a former Director of Land Affairs in the Eastern Cape. Present government officials were an Agricultural Extension Officer at the Department of Agriculture (Zama Zikhali) in the Makana Municipality and Sinoxolo Gqala from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, as they are both directly involved in land redistribution processes. Phiwo Jwara from the Local Economic Development (LED) Unit in Makana Municipality was also interviewed based on the interactions which she has with the land redistribution beneficiaries in assisting them to farm successfully. Lastly various civil society individuals were research subjects. These were Nomonde Kiaka-Kahpa, a Community Development Worker coordinating the Land Access, Use and Resources Management and Education Programme at Masifunde, a Grahamstown-based non-government organisation; Professor Monty Roodt in the Department at Rhodes University Sociology Lecturer (who in the past was a Research Manager for the Investigative Division of the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights for the Eastern Cape and Free State and is also Director on the Board of the Border Rural Committee, another non-governmental organisation). Both Masifunde and Border Rural Committee work with resettled farmers.

Together, these research participants (state officials, civil society individuals, strategic partner and farmers themselves) enabled the collecting of fieldwork evidence from a range of
different perspectives and this facilitated the construction of an interpretivist perspective on policy formation and implementation in the case of the farms under study.

1.4.2 Data Collection Methods

The key method of data collection used for the thesis was interviews. Interviewing is a technique of gathering evidence from humans by asking questions and getting them to respond verbally; and presumably in a thoughtful manner. The individuals (noted above) were all interviewed to delve into their experiences and perspectives pertaining to land redistribution policy formation and implementation and, where appropriate, to the specific farms under study. The interviews were mostly carried out in English with the exception of the farmers who felt most comfortable using English and IsiXhosa interchangeably. All interviews were recorded and then transcribed.

There are many different types of interviews. For instance, there are structured interviews which use an interview schedule that is similar to the survey questionnaire in the sense that the questions are fixed and inflexible. There are also semi-structured and unstructured interviews which are both widely used in qualitative research. Semi-structured interviews consist of a list of open-ended questions based on the research topic being studied (Janse van Rensburg 2001:9) while unstructured interviews aim to obtain in-depth and nuanced evidence from interviewees. In the case of the latter, there may in fact merely be a limited number of topics or themes to be addressed rather than a long series of specific questions. As the research moves from structured to unstructured interviews, the degree of flexibility and openness in the interview session increases, and so does the possibility of the research subject raising issues which go beyond the original expectations of the researcher.

This thesis research used a mixture of these types of interviews. For some research subjects, structured interviews were used which precisely followed a preconceived interview schedule. This was particularly the case with regard to the (former and current) state officials and non-governmental organisation employees. All the interviews with the resettled farmers, on both LRAD and PLAS farms (Masizakhe CPA, Kamvalethu CPA, Masibambane CPA, Outspan CPA and Rockhurst CPA) were semi-structured. This though was not intentional, as the farmers spoke freely and openly about their day-to-day concerns and this led to deviations
from the original prepared interview schedule. This allowed me to become sensitive to issues of significance to the farmers and to probe these issues. In fact, all the interviews involved a degree of in-depth probing to maximise understanding of the relevant issues.

The interview guides appear in appendices A through to K. Besides interviews, the state officials and non-governmental organisations also provided primary documents pertaining to land redistribution policy and policy implementation, and these included reference to issues ranging from policy objectives to implementation challenges.

1.4.3 Data Analysis

As explained by Blanche, Durrheim and Kelly (2006:321), data analysis involves working thematically with the information gathered in the field. This entails systematically organising and reorganising the evidence – breaking it down, sifting and examining it, synthesising it, and searching for important patterns, sequences and processes. On this basis, it is then possible to start interpreting and analysing the evidence sociologically. There are many different ways of analysing data, depending in part on the type of research methods employed.

In my case, after transcribing all the interviews, I sought to identify reoccurring themes in the responses as they emerged from reading and re-reading the interviews. In doing so, different sections in the transcribed interviews were marked as falling directly under a particular theme or at least relevant to it. The themes though overlapped (i.e. they were not mutually exclusive) and quite often particular evidence was pertinent to more than one theme. In identifying the themes, I sought to remain sensitive to the concerns of the research subjects. I also noted differences between research subjects with reference to perspectives on a particular theme or more of the themes. The themes identified directly inform the character and content of discussion of the fieldwork evidence as presented later in the thesis.

1.4.4 Fieldwork Challenges and Ethical Considerations

As with all social research, there are always fieldwork challenges and ethical considerations. I detail these briefly below.
The main problem experienced during the research was that of access. To fully pursue the thesis objective, which speaks to land policy formation and implementation, it was critical to gain access to state officials and their knowledge, perceptions and experiences of land redistribution. Getting access to current state officials though was extremely difficult. Many were simply disinterested in sharing their knowledge or participating in the research. Instead of being interviewed, some would request emails to be sent so they could answer questions via email; however, I often received no follow-up emails from them. This of course was extremely discouraging and it means that some key state officials working on land affairs did not form part of this research. However, the state officials who were willing to engage with the research were extremely helpful and it is hoped that their wealth of knowledge and experience compensated for any loss of evidence emanating from the non-responses.

This research project addressed ethical issues by requesting that all the participants signed consent forms (see Appendix L), which were agreements allowing the researcher to publish an academic report based on the views expressed by the research subjects. Not all research subjects, and particularly the farmers, did not feel it necessary to have such a written arrangement. I also made it clear to the participants that they had the right to terminate their agreement at any point during the interviews (Altheide and Johnson 1997: 178). Participants were made aware that if they were not comfortable with their real names or institutional positions being used, pseudonyms could be provided so that they could freely voice themselves without any concerns. All agreed that I could use their names and positions.

1.5 Thesis Outline

I end this chapter by briefly indicating the ensuing structure of the thesis. In chapter two, I provide the theoretical framing for the thesis by setting forth sociological arguments about the public policy cycle, including policy formation and implementation. In the following chapter (chapter three), I provide a political economy of contemporary South Africa within which to understand the post-apartheid state’s land reform polices and specifically land redistribution policies and programmes. The fourth chapter focuses specifically on land reform in South Africa and reviews some of the relevant academic literature on land redistribution so as to contextualise my specific farm-based study. Chapter five then discusses and analyses the empirical evidence about the LRAD and PLAS farms based on a
range of themes. The last chapter (chapter six) offers a comprehensive overview of the entire thesis and, in particular, draws the connections between the theoretical framing and the empirical evidence.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framing of the Public Policy Process

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad theoretical framing for the thesis, given the main thesis objective focusing on land redistribution policy formation and implementation in post-apartheid South Africa. For this reason, the chapter focuses on the public (or state) policy process (including policy formation and implementation) and theories pertaining to it. I therefore discuss these key dimensions of the public policy process and then offer relevant theorising about them.

2.2 Policy Cycle

In understanding the public policy process, which takes the form of a policy cycle, it is important to note that policy per se entails decision-making and courses of action designed to achieve a desired effect or change (Cockrel 1997:1). Policy involves a flow of purposive decisions and actions over time such that it is in a constant state of flux and is subject to revision and renewal (Jordaan 2004:9). In the case specifically of the state, policy affects the public at large, and it involves what states do, how they do it and why they do what they do.

The policy process, including the public policy process, embodies a policy cycle as depicted in Figure 2.1 below. At the same time, it should not be assumed that the different steps in the policy cycle are totally mutually exclusive or that they exist in a purely linear fashion, with one discrete step necessarily following from another discrete step. The policy cycle notion tends to suggest this, but it is merely designed to provide an overall model or sense of the policy process with the realisation that, in practice, policy processes are more complex and convoluted (Jann and Wegrich 2007:44). Nevertheless, the model provides an important basis for discussing many of the ways in which policy is constructed, carried out and evaluated. The policy process involves the following stages (as shown in Figure 2.1): agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation and policy evaluation.
The public policy process is highly complex. Despite being subject to and guided by values, norms and institutional arrangements within specific national contexts, as an ongoing process it is quite flexible and is constantly subject to re-evaluation and adaptation (Gerston 2010:5).  

The process is often considered obscure and hidden because, though policies are made on public issues and in often in a public way, it involves mechanisms and procedures deeply embedded in state structures hidden from the view of the body politic. For this reason, the process often conjures up negative connotations of secrecy and underhandedness, as the notion of politics more broadly does. Nevertheless, public policy is meant to address and tackle social problems and challenges in the public interest or for the public good.

Public policy can be understood as having two dimensions, one political and other administrative (Hanekom 1987:8). The political dimension focuses on government (as the public face of the state) and how governments (including legislatures) debate and reach decisions about the activities and resources required to reach social objectives. The
administrative dimension relates to the actions taken by state institutions (the state bureaucracy) to realise the goals envisaged by government within the laid down parameters and resources allocated (Hanekom 1987:8). Of course, the state bureaucracy is not a monolithic entity but is marked by ministries and departments as well as hierarchal arrangements such that tensions within the bureaucracy may exist. And the relationship between the political and administrative may also be fraught by tensions and discontinuities. These two dimensions though, together, make-up the convoluted and un-linear public policy process from agenda-setting to policy evaluation. To reiterate, although there may be a ‘clear’ process as to how policy is supposed to be made and implemented (as illustrated in Figure 2.1), in reality the process is clouded and complicated by various factors including, as mentioned, tensions. In discussing phases of the policy process below, I draw upon but do not follow entirely the five stages as mentioned above.

2.2.1 Phases in the Public Policy Process

Goal or problem identification is a key first step in the in public policy process, and it is principally rooted in and dependent upon a particular social issue becoming a public issue and receiving the attention of policy makers (Starling 1979:11-12). Basically, the first step entails taking a problem and making it a policy issue worthy of debate in the public realm in an attempt to remedy the problem. This is necessary, because a social need does not in-itself become a public issue and policy issue if it does not emerge from the body politic and become visible to the state such that the state feels almost compelled to consider it and take action on it. For instance, the legislature may devote considerable attention to the problem and eventually authorise action around it (thereby leading, over an extended period, to the formulation of a policy).

However, a public issue must become significant enough before it becomes fully immersed in the policy process. Many times, social needs which become public issues never become formulated into policies. Thus, the fact that a public issue is not codified by the state in the form of a policy does not deny its significance but, for whatever reason, it was not addressed in and through policy. Often this entails what is often called a non-decision (Mazmanian and Sabaltier 1980:440). In the case of this thesis, the social need is land given the history of land
dispossession in South Africa and, over the past twenty years, it has become a critical public issue which has in fact been incorporated into policy through the policy formation process.

The formation of a particular policy is a complex and convoluted process which entails not simply the legislature but state ministries and departments which having a bearing on the public issue being addressed through the policy. Interest and pressure groups also may be involved, and often there are procedures to facilitate their involvement (at least at distance) in policy formation – this will regularly entail making specific proposals for legislation. This depends on the character of the state and its willingness to engage with popular inputs into policy formulation. In the end, a policy is formulated with its goals and means broadly set out in some form of documentation, though sometimes a policy dies before it is even born (Mazmanian and Sabaltier 1980:440). In this context, and for this thesis, the relevant policies focus on land and specifically land redistribution and indeed these policies have seen the light of day.

Policies provide broad goals, strategies and guidelines but, to be implemented, they first need to be adopted or concretised through more specific action. This may take the form of specific legislation drawing upon the key tenets of the policy or in specific programmes detailing particular strategies and methodologies for ensuring that the policy becomes effective. Otherwise, the policy remains a dead document. In the case of land redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa, the key way in which land policy has been concretised or adopted is through specific land redistribution programmes (which are discussed later in the thesis). It is important to note though that, even within a particular policy framework, there is room to manoeuvre for the state. Thus, the land redistribution programmes have changed over time but they all have been justified by the South African government and state as existing within the land policy framework.

Policy adoption can only fully take place through policy implementation or execution, and this is invariably the responsibility of the state bureaucracy (and the various tiers of the state) which actions policy adoption measures such as legislation (Mazmanian and Sabaltier 1980:440, Smith 1973). This is not an unproblematic process as, despite any thoughts to the contrary, the state bureaucracy does not stand above society as a neutral and unbiased implementer of policy. The state, and particular sections within, has its own sets of interests.
and ways of doing things which make execution a somewhat meandering process (Schattschneider, 1960:105). There are a significant number of state ministries, departments and agencies involved in policy implementation and this further complicates matters. In the case of land redistribution and the implementation of land redistribution programmes, these regularly include departments of land and agriculture as well as local state municipalities, and these do not necessarily work together as a harmonious whole (Butler and Allen 2008:423). There is also the question of state capacity, including financial, human and logistic resources, which may also lead to serious problems in implementation.

Policy implementation is quite significant for this thesis. Implementation means “carrying out, accomplishing, filling, producing or completing a given task” (Paudel 2009:36). Or, as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984: xxii-xxiii), put it, policy implementation is a process of interaction between setting goals and actually taking actions intended to achieve these goals. Implementation tends to carry the implication that the action has taken place successfully (or that the goals of policy have been achieved) but this is often not the case. But because implementation (as a noun) is not achieved does not mean that implementation (as a verb) does not happen as a process (Brynard and De Coning 2006:194). Policies are invariably being implemented but not necessarily successfully or even fully in line with policy intentions.

Brynard and De Coning (2008:195) thus argue that

Policies are continuously transformed by implementing actions that simultaneously alter objectives … It is policy design but redesign that goes on most of the time. Who is to say, then, whether implementation consists of altering objectives to correspond with available resources or of mobilising new resources to accomplish old objectives?.. Implementation is evolution..

When we act to implement a policy, we change it. In this sense, the implementation process does not mark the end of policy-making; it is simply a continuation of policy-making by other means or by another name. When policy is pronounced, the implementation process begins. Over the long run, what happens during policy implementation may have more impact on the ultimate end point of the policy process than any clear and strident intentions and objectives of the policy framers and makers.

Thus, understanding the process of policy implementation through which policies are put into practice is very important in understanding the complexities and outcomes of the public
policy process (Brink and Meijerink 2006:2). This is part because policy implementation is the stage in the policy process between the establishment of a policy and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects. This is where policy explicitly and directly seeks to address the social need which initially led to a public issue being translated into a public policy. Thus it is where policy meets reality head-on so to speak and where problems in policy come to the fore quite vividly (DeGroff and Cargo 2009). It is also where the state meets the people whose social needs are to be met by the policy. With regard to this thesis, this relates to the implementation of land redistribution programmes on specific redistribution farms where farmers are now seeking to pursue their lives and livelihoods.

Many problems exist with the implementation of policy. These often stem from the fact that there appears to be no consistency within the state bureaucracy as to how a particular policy is to be implemented, with divergences between and within tiers of the state (Edwards and Sharkansky 1978:295). This may stem from differing interpretations of policy, strategic and programmatic documents. Even when there is consistency in interpretation, lack of resources or incapacity problems make for in effective execution of policy. Incapacity may entail the absence of appropriate knowledge, training, skills and experiences in implementing policies within a particular policy domain (such as land) (Helga and Treib 2007:90). Furthermore, social tensions on-the-ground, or contestations between groups affected by a particular policy, may complicate the implementation process (Bain 1986).

The final stage of the policy process (which I do not examine in the thesis study) is the monitoring and evaluation of policy. This involves a determination of the appropriateness of the adopted policies and of the implementation processes by evaluating the results or impact of the policies, with a resultant feedback to determine whether adaption is necessary or not – an act which may start the policy cycle afresh (Butler and Allen 2008:423). In this respect, problems are bound to arise once the policy is actually being implemented, including that the costs involved in implementation far outweigh any intended benefits. Also, policy implementation regularly has unintended consequences. Though not a focus of the thesis, it will nevertheless be noted from the later discussion that – in relation to land redistribution – significant rethinking and reformulation even at policy level needs to be done if land redistribution is going to make a significant contribution to resolving the land question in post-apartheid South Africa.
2.3 Theories of Policy Making and Implementation

In the previous section I discussed the complexities of the public policy process, including the different stages in it and the many challenges faced. In this section, I speak more analytically about the policy process by focusing on theories about policy formation and of policy implementation. The theories discussed are designed to facilitate an understanding of land redistribution policy formation and policy implementation in contemporary South Africa with specific reference to my case studies. I do not claim that the theories presented are in any way exhaustive of theories about the state but, nevertheless, I do find them useful in guiding my understanding of public policy processes. I first discuss theories with relevance to policy formation, namely, pluralism and radical elitism.

Pluralism seeks to come to terms with the day-to-day complexities of public policy processes (Mann 1993:47). In doing so, it tends to see the state as an honest and impartial broker such that policy formation is ultimately the outcome of free competition between ideas and interests of interest groups and state bodies involved in the making of policy (Parsons 1995:134). It thus highlights the multiplicity of interest groups and role-players and their involvement in providing inputs around public issues into the state in terms of policy preferences; and the role of the state in, in large part, handling and mediating these preferences in formulating policy in an unbiased manner in the public interest (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963:632). The policy making process is seen as a complex and convoluted process involving competition in which the state seeks to ensure some form of consensus around a public issue as articulated through concrete policies. In this regard, the state itself is not seen as homogenous, as pluralism recognises the diversity of institutional arrangements within the state. But pluralism refrains from privileging any argument about state interests (or various interests within the state) insofar as these interests may also impact on policies adopted and implemented (Laski 1989:183). In this way, pluralism is a society-centred theory of policy formation which highlights societal interests and the impact these have on policies through inputting policy preferences into the state on public issues.

Pluralism is useful in that it captures policy processes as marked by negotiation, persuasion, bargaining and compromise in an open-ended trajectory. At the same time, it downplays the fact that interest groups are resourced to varying degrees such that these groups do not represent multiple sites of power with equal weighting in terms of engaging with and
influencing state policies. This is a fundamental weakness of pluralism as it brings to the fore that the state is not inherently unbiased but that it reflects relations of societal power. In other words, pluralism speaks to societal struggles around policies but fails to consider relationships of social domination which exist between prevailing interest groups in capitalist society. In the end, pluralism does not consider power differentials and how these impact on the policy-making process and the outcome of such processes in terms of concrete policies.

Radical elitist theory provides an important counterweight in this regard. This theory is of the stance that public policies reflect elite values, which generally preserve the status quo. Here, public policy may be viewed as reflecting the values and preferences of governing elites (Woll 1974:46). There may be policy preferences from different interest groups but invariably the more powerful groups (with significant resources at their disposal) are more likely to shape policy formation or even to block the formation of a particular policy around a particular social need. These powerful groups include the corporate or business elite as well as elites within the state itself who have their own sets of interests which are often compatible with business interests (Domhoff 2000). As C. Wright Mills wrote: “By the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realise their will, even if others resist it” (Mills 1956:77). Policies, therefore, are fundamentally shaped by the power elite and hence this theory privileges the existence of forms of social domination and the impact of these on policies. The elites, which often control the mass media, frame public debate such that certain important social needs may not become public issues; or, if they do, they will not enter into the policy formation process or they will become lost in the policy formation process (Anderson 2003). The state therefore is fundamentally biased and, because of this, elite theory is seen as a state-centred theory.

Thus, for elite theory, public policies do not flow upward from the people but rather downward from the interest values and preferences of elites. Cockrel (1997:3) used the analogy of ‘King and Kingmakers’ as it plays out in state and society with reference to policy-making. According to Cockrel (1997), ‘Kingmakers’ are the people who wield power; they may not necessarily be in the public eye but they hold power in shaping the policy agenda and policy itself. The ‘Kings’ comprise those who are visibly seen as the policymakers. This would refer primarily to government and the legislature, where policy is
apparently seen to be made and enacted. Meanwhile, behind closed doors and out of sight, the real policy-makers (the economic and political elites) are hard at work.

Ordinary citizens then are largely insignificant in shaping policy, and sometimes radical elitist theory speaks of them as a passive mass of people rather than as active citizens (Maselesele 2011). The masses do not frequently participate in policy making processes and are often are not heard let alone listened to by the elites. They simply feel the pinch of policy when it is implemented and impacts detrimentally on their lives. Therefore passive citizens exist, who are apathetic and ill-informed and their sentiments and views are manipulated by the elite for the benefit of the elite (Anderson 2003:13). And even public officials and administrators merely carry out policies decided on by the elite, which are then implemented downwards through the state bureaucracy in an almost seamless fashion. Policies may change incrementally but the elites are conservative and will allow any fundamental shifts in policies.

Radical elitist theory is important in emphasising the significance of forms of social domination and how this impacts on policy formation. This entails an important criticism of pluralist theory. But elitist theory overemphasises the existence of domination and fails to appreciate the existence of societal conflict and struggle despite the existence of domination; and this is a key strength of pluralism. But pluralism treats the state as an honest broker and devoid of its own sets of interests, a point which radical elitism emphasises. Elitism likewise emphasises the downward thrust of policy adoption and implementation within the state and, unlike pluralism, does not fully appreciate the tension and competition which often exist within state bureaucracies, which makes policy implementation a much more convoluted process than elitism is able to grasp. In the end, then, it is important to be sensitive to the views of both pluralism and radical elitist theory.

Theories of policy implementation are characterised by notions focusing on top-down processes and bottom-up processes as well as differing combinations (hybrids) of the two. In reflecting upon theories about policy formation, it is likely that radical elitism is similar to an emphasis on top-down processes and pluralism to bottom-up processes. As with theories of policy formation, hybrid models of policy implementation likely more fully capture the complexities of the execution of state policies.
The ‘top-down implementation’ perspective speaks of a clear-cut system of command and control from central state institutions down to local government and further down to the general public. It thus implies a highly rational and comprehensive approach to policy implementation. But this does not necessarily deny democratic oversight of implementation processes, with elected politicians either directly or indirectly delegating implementation authority to non-elected state bureaucrats who are then accountable to democratic authority (Sabatier 1986:22). The top-down perspective places strong emphasis on the ability of decision-makers to ensure the implementation of unequivocal policy objectives in a reasonably straightforward manner (Pulzl and Treib 2007:90).

The ‘bottom-up implementation’ perspective claims that implementation processes are marked by considerable flexibility and autonomy particularly at the lower tiers of the state and that policy adjustments take place through implementation on a regular and ongoing basis. Because of this, implementation processes are sensitive to local dynamics and pressures (including from interest groups), as state officials at local level try to implement policies in a locally-sensitive manner – which may, at times, mean that policies remain unimplemented. Hence, policy implementation is not simply imposed from above, but entails local consultations, concessions and compromises as a form of policy refinement or even adjustment (Pulzl and Treib 2007). On this basis, policies become reformulated at central state level as the readjustments made at local level work their way back up the state bureaucracy in a bottom-up process. At times, this perspective tends to be more programmatic than analytical in that it prescribes bottom-up processes while recognising that, in practice, top-down processes remain significant. As Palumbo and Colista (1987:108) argue, “discretion at lower levels is not only inevitable, but also desirable … [because] it is necessary for policies to be ‘reinvented’ so that they better fit local needs”.

Both perspectives are of significance but a kind of hybrid model of implementation is necessary. Undoubtedly, there is a downward thrust in policy implementation as any flexibility at local level takes place within narrowly-defined limits. Certainly, though, insofar as centrally-driven policies do not work for them, local state bodies may balk at the prospect of implementing them. Further, local state officials (despite being closer to ground level) may not be responsive to local dynamics and demands because their systems and resources inhibit them from acting in ways consistent with local social processes (Matland 1995). In this
context, the hybrid model recognises that policy implementation is more complex than either of the two perspectives is able to admit. Implementation processes engage to-and-fro movement as state officials responsible for execution of state policies recognise the need for responsiveness to both top-down policy pressures and bottom-up local conditions and demands (Parsons 1995:442).

2.4 Conclusion

Clearly, then, the public policy process is marked by considerable complexity, with policy formation and implementation processes being intimately connected. For instance, no matter how thorough and seemingly rationale the policy-making process may be, new and unanticipated problems may be encountered during implementation. There is no assumption though that policy implementation neatly follows from policy formation, or that their relationship is fully bounded, separate and sequential. In pursuing my study of land redistribution in contemporary South Africa, I remain sensitive to this intimacy and complexity. In examining land redistribution policy formation and implementation processes I draw upon the two sets of theories discussed in this chapter. However, I use these theories as mere guidelines to facilitate my understanding rather than imposing them on the evidence generated through the fieldwork. In the following chapter, I consider the political economy of land in South Africa within which to locate my later discussion of land reform and land redistribution specifically.
Chapter 3: Political Economy of Land in South Africa

3.1 Introduction

The history of land dispossession in South Africa is a harrowing one. This chapter aims to discuss the political economy of South Africa in relation to land and the interplay between economics, law and politics in the construction of a form of racial capitalism in the country. This sets the context for the following chapter on land reform in contemporary South Africa and specifically land redistribution. I provide a historical overview of the political economy of land, first looking at the segregation and then the apartheid period before going to examine the post-apartheid period and the macro-economic strategy which seems to structure and indeed limit the African National Government’s policies and programmes of redistribution in addressing the racial legacies of the past, including the land legacy.

3.2 Segregation Period 1910-1948

In 1910 South Africa became a nation-state called the Union of South Africa. This union was to be built upon a racially-exclusive polity in which black people were to be excluded from any meaningful political participation at all tiers of government. In other words, the nation-state was in effect a racial (white) state rooted in the development of a racial capitalism. During this period, lasting until 1948, pronounced racially-repressive legislation was promulgated, with such legislation aimed at undermining the economic, political and social position of blacks (Terreblanche and Nattrass 1990:7). This became apparent in the immediate years after 1910. For instance, in the economy, the Mine and Works Act of 1911 set the precedent for a statutory colour bar in the workplace to protect the interests of white labour and to resolve the poor white problem, and the 1911 Black Labour Regulations Act made it illegal for black miners to break their migrant-based employment contract or for anyone to attempt to persuade workers by offering high wages to break their contract.

Of particular significance to this thesis is the 1913 Natives Land Act, as it formed the bedrock of the racialised structuring of landholdings up until the end of apartheid in 1994. This piece of legislation legalised and legitimised the pre-1910 colonial dispossession of land.
by formally restricting black (and specifically black African) access to land – for agricultural purposes – to designed areas known as reserves. In white South Africa, white farmers were to hold freehold title over their land while, in the reserves, black Africans were to have mere possession under so-called customary tenure of what was state land. The act also introduced strict measures against ‘squatting’ by blacks on white farms, in order to increase the supply of cheap black labour to both the mines and white agriculture. This measure contributed to the impoverishment of the black peasantry and gave rise to an increasingly black proletariat (Walker 2008:1-2). This formalisation of racially-designated ownership and possession of land meant that the reserves consisted of a mere 8% of South Africa’s land (which was later increased to 13% in 1936), yet the black African population at the time amounted to three-fifths of the country’s population (James 2010:222).

The 1913 act, and state action subsequent to it, was not in any sense original in terms of its underlying intent and purpose. In fact, it drew upon earlier colonial thinking in such legislation as the Glen Grey Act passed by the Cape Colony in 1894. This earlier act was aimed at limiting the amount of land Africans could hold. This entailed for instance the ‘one-man-one-plot’ principle for purposes of drawing blacks into the monetary economy as wage labourers (Hebinck 2013:4). Severe limitations on the amount and size of plots, as later implemented in the reserves, compelled household-based landholders to seek additional off-farm sources of livelihood (in the form of a cash income) as agricultural production in the reserves became increasingly problematic. The migrant labour system, with men moving to work primarily on the mines, thus became embedded in the reserves. A range of taxes (such as poll taxes) in the reserves, which had to be paid in cash, also contributed to seeking cash employment. In certain areas of the country, African farmers prior to 1910 had responded positively to the emergence of a market-based economy and were able to produce agricultural goods not only for their households but for local markets. The reserve system inhibited this possibility, and hence this system must also be seen as an attempt to protect emerging white capitalist farmers at the time from market competition. Overall, households in the reserves invariably had one foot in the reserve and one outside the reserve, with the migrant labour force becoming a kind of semi-proletariat workforce (not totally dispossessed of all land).

Clearly, then, the roots of the later apartheid period are found in the segregation (and the pre-segregation) period. And successive white-dominated governments during segregation
pursued racial domination with great vigour. For instance, the Hertzog government of 1924-1933 (as with all later segregation governments) provided massive support to white farmers including by making investment capital available to white farmers through the Land Bank, building significant infrastructure in white farming areas and ensuring predetermined selling prices for farm commodities to enhance the profitability of white agriculture (Thompson 2000:160). In effect, white commercial agriculture was only made possible by extensive state support and subsidisation, such that white farmers became a critical support base for successive segregation governments. Clearly, they also benefited from the supply of cheap black labour which the reserve system increasingly guaranteed. And, in addition, the entire influx control system, which emerged most effectively through the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act and which sought to control the process of urbanisation of black Africans away from reserves, also facilitated a more or less constant supply of labour for white farmers.

This does not imply that the racialised system functioned un-problematically, as there was considerable black resistance to it and many ways in which black Africans evaded the controls placed over them. Indeed, there was also competition and conflict within the white polity which became more strained during the great depression between 1928 and 1932. The depression led to a decline of the Gross Domestic Product in the early 1930s, which meant that an unbridled racialised system of governance could be marked by dysfunctions. In this context, Hertzog was forced into a coalition government with Smuts’ (slightly more liberal) party in 1933 (Terreblanche and Nattrass 1990:7). The outbreak of the Second World War ended the coalition government. This took place after the parliamentary adoption of Smuts’ motion that South Africa should sever its links with Germany and fulfil her obligation to the Commonwealth. Hertzog, who favoured neutrality, later joined the strident Afrikaner nationalist party under Malan, who were totally opposed to fighting ‘Britain’s war’ (Horwitz 1967:128-129).

Before 1948, the Smuts government had appointed a commission in 1946 to examine the then-existing racialised system. The commission (known as the Fagan Commission) reported in 1948. It argued that permanent black urbanisation should not as restricted as it then existed, therefore, suggesting a relaxation of the influx control and pass law system. This was for the purpose of providing a more settled, stable and skilled workforce (with improved education and wages) which would as well, an expanding market for consumer goods.
produced by the white manufacturing economy (Horwitz 1967:142). In a certain sense, this would be simply legitimising important trends of urbanisation already taking place in the 1940s, as well as the limited reform measures of Smuts’ administration. The Fagan commission’s position in many ways represented the interests of white manufacturing capital (based in white urban areas) which spoke openly about the need for a permanent black workforce (with workers living with their families). The black miners’ strike of 1946, which involved single male migrant labourers subject to super-exploitation, seemed to justify such a position (Suzette 2003). This seeming liberalisation, as proposed by the Smuts government, was regarded with horror by Malan’s National Party. In fact in 1947, and in response to the setting up of the Fagan Commission, the National Party had appointed its own commission (the Sauer Commission) which recommended not a relaxation but a tightening-up of the racial controls over black land and labour. These were mere conflicts within the white polity, and a consensus existed amongst the white policy with regard to maintaining the outcome of land dispossession (namely, white South Africa and African reserves).

### 3.3 Apartheid Period (1948-1994)

The National Party gained electoral victory in 1948 on the basis of a platform of deepening racial domination and segregation, which led to the apartheid period. Though often understood as the victory of Afrikaner nationalism over English-style nationalism, it is clear that the apartheid government served the interest of the entire white polity. Nevertheless, it did additionally serve the specific needs of the white Afrikaner population (Terreblanche 2002:313). For instance, the existing state bureaucracy (including parastatals) was enlarged in order to generate Afrikaner employment opportunities, and a variety of whites-only welfare programmes were launched to redistribute wealth and uplift poorer Afrikaners (Lipton and Simkins 1993:6). As well, specifically Afrikaans-businesses were promoted to undercut the domination of the white economy by English-speakers. Thus, in 1946, the per capita income of Afrikaners was less than half that of white English-speakers. However, by 1970, after many years of government intervention and patronage, it had increased to 70%.

But apartheid legislation and programmes also reflected the interest of specific sectors of the white economy (irrespective of white ethnicity), notably agriculture and mining. Unlike manufacturing capital, these sections of capital preferred a more entrenched migrant labour,
influx control and African reserve system to meet their labour needs. However, the labour needs of manufacturing capital were not compromised by these changes. In this context, a flood of segregationist legislation were passed, including the 1950 Population Registration Act, the 1950 Group Area Act, the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the 1954 Black Resettlement Act and the 1953 Bantu Education Act. The last act, for instance, sought to protect white entry into the economy by pegging expenditure on black education to the level of taxes and revenue generated from the black population. Overall, this and other legislation were geared towards making sure that black people had no significant share in economic wealth, had no meaningful political representation in central parliament and were geographically and socially separated from white people.

Critical to all this was the emergence of the homeland or bantustan system (or grand apartheid), which was built on the existing reserve system. In the end, though perhaps working within the white economy (and preferably on a temporary basis), black Africans were expected to fulfil their political aspirations through the creation of so-called independent homelands (which entailed a divide-and-rule strategy because each homeland was designated in terms of ethnicity). In accordance with the objectives of apartheid, homelands were encouraged to adopt self-governance and become independent states. Even before so-called independence, homeland governments were established, forming a kind of indirect rule over the rural population. Customs and chieftainships, at least as understood by the apartheid government, were also reinforced in the homelands to bolster the system of indirect rule. As much as possible, Africans would also be physically confined to the homelands, as the apartheid government intensified the influx control and pass law system during the 1950s – which led to significant opposition from the African National Congress and its allies in struggle.

The system of bantustans came with betterment planning schemes, as a way of reorganising tenure, homesteads and agriculture on a supposedly more technicist and scientific basis. In doing so, betterment would – it was claimed – combat the deterioration of natural resources and contribute to agricultural development by modernising African agricultural methodologies. As with the chieftainship system, betterment entailed in its way an attempt to maintain control over the population in the “Natives area” (South African Democracy Trust, 2004:149). The African population in the reserves were moved from dispersed homestead
clusters to villages (thus becoming more visible to the gaze of the state) and the government once again reinvented tradition by turning the traditional leadership (chiefs and headmen) into paid state employees. The traditional leadership was expected to support government policy (including grand apartheid) in order to maintain their status and benefits. Those who opposed the government were replaced and even subject to relocation. The betterment schemes ultimately had detrimental effects, leading to rising poverty and malnutrition, infant mortality and adult morbidity (McAllister 1991:117). Further attempts to bring about rural development in the homelands (up until the 1980s) had no significant impact.

In the meantime, on white commercial farms during the apartheid period, white farmers continued to receive massive state support. And farm workers and dwellers continued to severely marginalised. Farms were sites of production and reproduction as workers and their families lived on farms in rudimentary compounds. White farms, under freehold title, were private spaces under the control of the farmer with the state not interfering at all in labour issues. In fact, in terms of national labour legislation, farm workers were not considered under the definition of an employee and hence they fell outside the scope of this legislation. They were very vulnerable to being dismissed or subject to violence, and evictions from farms were a regular occurrence as workers and their families had no permanent rights to tenure on a particular farm despite perhaps even being born there.

In many ways, in examining the political economy of land in South Africa before 1994, there was continuity in the shift from the segregation to the apartheid period. Any change was merely qualitative and entailed intensification and reinforcement of the existing racial system. In terms of policy formation and implementation, this was on the whole a whites-only affair with no meaningful popular input from outside the white population. Policies with specific regard to land, as Cross and Haines (1988: 90) argue, were merely imposed on the black African population, as they were designed and implemented in a “top-down, top-heavy management” manner. They land policies, at least in relation to the homelands, involved a fluctuating and confusing mix of technicist- and custom-based arguments. By the end of apartheid, South Africa was administered by a bureaucratic and racialised maze of state ministries and departments, homeland administrations and state agencies which were unresponsive to the popular demands of the oppressed people of South Africa (Chipkin and Meny-Gibert 2011:104). The black African population was not included in the formation of
state policies and the policies were implemented in a coercive manner to the detriment of even the minimum standards of democratic development. As a result, as Sol Plaatjie argued: “The South African Native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth” (Plaatjie 1916:21).

3.4 Post-Apartheid South Africa

During the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa was marked by significant political struggles and reoccurring economic crises, and the apartheid state started to bring about limited political and economic reforms. By the late 1980s, the crisis had reached endemic proportions such that the state sought to bring about a dismantling of apartheid but in the hope of retaining white benefits. This led to a transitional period in the early 1990s where significant behind the scenes negotiations were taking place, after the release from prison of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC). During the years of transition, through these lengthy negotiations as well as compromises, a settlement was reached and a new non-racial democracy was born in South Africa. The ANC easily won a significant majority in the first democratic national election in 1994 and it immediately set about restructuring the country’s economy and polity. Coming into power in 1994, the ANC inherited a slow growing economy, widespread poverty, vast racial inequalities and high and rising levels of unemployment (Bottaro et al. 2006:206). The ANC government was thus faced with revitalising economic growth and stability as well as rectifying the racial injustices of the past and bringing about a new social order. One the key initiatives was a post-apartheid constitution (finalised in 1996) which spoke about the importance of fundamental civil, political, economic and social rights for all citizens.

The aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the political economy of post-apartheid South Africa, but to highlights points relevant to a discussion of land in contemporary South Africa – which is pursued more directly in the following chapter. It is important to note that (prior to the end of apartheid) a degree of neo-liberal restructuring had already taken in place in South Africa. This was witnessed for instance in agriculture, where the apartheid state had increasingly withdrawn its support for white commercial farmers such that the latter found themselves more directly subject to market forces (with some farmers unable to weather the storm).
Deregulation and liberalisation has continued since 1994 as part of the ANC state’s outward-looking macro-economic strategy with a pronounced neo-liberal trajectory (Hendrick et al. 2013:14-15, Bernstein 2013:31) which emphasises growth before redistribution. This may seem odd given that, first and foremost, the ANC seemed poised to highlight the significance or wealth redistribution in tackling the apartheid past. In fact, the election of South Africa’s democratic government raised popular expectations that the ANC would effect a fundamental transformation of the South African political economy including addressing land dispossession as a fundamental signifier of racial domination. There was considerable tension within the ANC government and state during the latter half of the 1990s in terms of prioritising growth over redistribution or vice versa. In the final analysis, as the discussion below shows, growth won out.

3.4.1 Reconstruction and Development Programme

The ANC’s first macro-economic strategy involved the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This initiative, which tended to highlight the importance of redistribution, sought to mobilise all the country’s resources toward the final eradication of the vestiges of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future (Hall 2004:214). The RDP was drawn up by an ANC-led alliance (including the affiliated trade union federation) with a degree of consultation with non-state organisations (at least progressive research bodies) but, during the transition period, it needs to be noted that the ANC was also subject to considerable pressure from international financial institutions (notably the World Bank) to adopt a more neo-liberal agenda. There were indeed neo-liberal tendencies embedded in the RDP, including with regard to land reform.

From 1994 to 1996 the RDP became the guiding document of the Government of National Unity, located in an RDP Office within President Mandela’s Office. As a growth through redistribution policy, the RDP spoke primarily about “beginning to meet the basic needs of people: jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare” (Terreblanche 2003:89). RDP therefore aimed at overturning the apartheid past by focusing on – for the previously-oppressed – social security and social welfare, health care, housing and associated services, and land reform. The RDP soon became the paradigm within which all development policies
were to be discussed and pursued, an almost endless wish list in which the homeless, the landless and the unemployed were to have their basic needs met.

The RDP base document outlined an ambitious land reform programme that would serve as the driving force for a programme of rural restructuring and development. The programme, it was claimed, would amongst other things redress the injustices caused by past land policies, ensure the supply of both residential and productive land for rural spaces, and generate broad-based employment and other income-generating opportunities in the agrarian economy. Addressing the rural question was seen as critical because the majority of South Africa’s poor live historically in rural areas (with the poverty rate in rural areas being over 70% compared to less than 30% in urban areas) (Bradstock 2011:112). Meanwhile, in line with the RDP, the government planned to enhance the security, wages and working conditions of farm labourers by incorporating them within the mainstream labour legislation (Bradstock 2011:112). But while the state was to provide increased social protection for the agricultural labour force, state protection for white farmers continued to decline.

However, the RDP soon ran into trouble and doubts and criticisms were increasingly raised within both the private sector and state about the RDP’s appropriateness as a strategy for change. Certainly, significant state incapacity existed with regard to implementing it, though noticeable advances were being made for example with regard to providing low-income housing in urban areas (Terreblanche 2003:109). There were also cases of maladministration such as with regard to primary nutrition programmes taking place at provincial level. It was said to be particularly weak in formulating programmes for employment creation. But, additionally, it met with significant resistance and inaction. According to Bond (2000), the problem was not the RDP per se, but opposition to it. Hence, he claims that the RDP was “fatally undermined by timid politicians, hostile bureaucrats and unreliable private sector partners” (Bond 2000:90). Jay Naidoo, the RDP minister failed to command the respect of his ANC parliamentary colleagues and did not always see eye-to-eye with Mandela on RDP issues.

In the end, the redistributive intent behind the RDP seemed to stall quite early in the process and a more growth-orientated macro-economic strategy – which was always in some way not way below the surface of the RDP – came increasingly to the fore. Although the ANC
government hoped for economic growth rates of between 4% and 6% per annum in the years immediately after 1994, the actual growth rate was only slightly above the rate of population growth of about 2.5%. As economic growth considerations began to dominate government policy in the mid-1990s, the lofty social principles and commitments of the RDP (involving redistribution programmes) were given less prominence (Midgley, 2001:270). Fiscal discipline, balancing budgets and market-led growth became the new government discourse – not simply as an added goal to the RDP objectives, but as the very means of supposedly attaining these objectives. Because of this, no fiscal “space” was available for properly implementing the RDP, for the redistributive implications of its poverty-alleviation programme and for its emphasis on meeting basic needs (Terreblanche 2003:109). Though redistributive measures were to be shelved they were to be subordinate an economic growth trajectory.

3.4.2 The Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy

This basic clearly evident with the introduction in 1996 of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, a more mainstream neoliberal strategy. GEAR was developed by an exclusive technical team of fifteen policy makers comprised of officials from the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South African Reserve Bank, three state departments, academics and two representatives of the World Bank (Narsiah 2002:6-7). The ministry of the RDP was abolished in March 1996 and the office of the RDP was transferred to the office of the then Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki. Unlike the formation of RDP, which had a semblance of popular input, GEAR was not the product of consultation with a wide body of stakeholders. As Allister (2003:193-195) put it:

GEAR was an unvarnished free-market programme, directly in line with the neo-liberal agenda… a combination of relaxed exchange rates, privatisation, fiscal discipline and collaboration with the private sector to produce export-driven growth. Thus GEAR marked the completion of the ANC’s astonishing ideological U-Turn … It also caused great tension in the alliance, with COSATU and the SACP feeling their socialist concerns had been roughly cast aside. What rubbed salt into the wounds was that they felt the policy change had been forced on them without consultation. The ANC had presented GEAR without even a debate in its National Executive Committee. Some disgruntled alliance members accused the political organisation of having betrayed the revolution.
The notion of a U-turn is likely an overstatement, because neoliberal ideas were being articulated by the ANC even during the transition period. Nevertheless, GEAR did involve a shift from a growth-through-redistribution macro-economic strategy (as under RDP) to a redistribution-through-growth strategy.

GEAR therefore, in typical neo-liberal fashion, prioritised resolving inequality and poverty in and through higher growth rates based on the trickle-down effect. For the GEAR proponents, economic growth meant a higher rate of employment as a mechanism for transmitting income and wealth to the poor (McKinley 1997:141). This meant integrating South Africa’s national economy increasingly into the global capitalist economy on the basis of the comparative advantages of the country in terms of both the international exchange of commodities and inward and outward capital investments. Many of the key tenets of neoliberalism became apparent, including commercialisation and privatisation of state functions (Harsch 2001:5), including with regard to the provision of water. It also became manifested in land reform, with market-led reform becoming the cornerstone of land redistribution by means of the willing seller-willing model. At the same time, even under GEAR, there were signs of ongoing wealth redistribution and social protectionism: the former in the case of the massive social grant system and the provision of low-cost housing, and the latter with the employment protection of farm labourers through the Labour Relations Act of 1996 and heightened tenure security for farm dwellers through the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1994. In the end, South Africa was showing signs of its own variant of neo-liberal restructuring.

3.5 Conclusion

In large part, the ANC government has not shifted its macro-economic policies since the introduction of GEAR nearly twenty years ago. Three new strategies have thus emerged since then. In 2005, under the administration of Thabo Mbeki, GEAR was replaced by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) but it maintained a strong neo-liberal trajectory. The aims of ASGISA included significantly reducing poverty by 2010 as well as reducing unemployment from 28% in 2004 to 14% by 2012 (President’s Office 2006:3). As a macro-economic strategy it faced a range of constraints, such as the relative volatility of the national currency, barriers to entry into international markets, and foreign investment in large part restricted to take-overs rather than new investments. In this
context, and now under the ANC government of Jacob Zuma, ASGISA was replaced with the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010. The NGP recognised that significant work around inequality, poverty and unemployment still needed to be done by the state, yet it likewise did not deviate significantly from the neo-liberal path set out by GEAR (Government Communication and Information System 2013). Only a couple of years later, the government then introduced the National Development Plan (NDP) which is South Africa’s current socio-economic strategy with targets set off as far as 2030. The government has positioned the NDP as more of a developmentalist path than a neo-liberal path, and thus as a return to the principles of the RDP.

But a close reading of the NDP indicates that the ANC-led government has not come full circle and that neo-liberalism holds sway. Indeed, even if it espoused developmentalism in any genuine sense, significant questions remain as to whether the South African state has the sheer administrative capacity to become a developmental state and to pursue developmentalism. Meanwhile, subsequent to the RDP, it is clear that the state has become increasingly insulated from popular pressure and inputs into the state policy formation process, and that centralisation of state-decision making (as manifested as early as the formation of GEAR) prevails. This has implications for land reform in the country. As it stands, farm workers and dwellers on white commercial farms and people living under so-called communal tenure in the former Bantustans remain unorganised. The former remain subordinated to the farmer and the latter to the chieftainship system. They thus are excluded from processes leading to the formation of land and agricultural policies and programmes, and this has dire consequences for land reform in the country.
Chapter 4: Land Redistribution in South Africa

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examine South Africa’s land reform programme since 1994 with particular emphasis on land redistribution policies and programmes. Overall, land reform has been market by market-led restructuring though with significant state involvement. I first provide an overview of land reform in post-apartheid South Africa and then proceed with a more detailed discussion of land redistribution specifically, analysing critically the different redistribution programmes implemented. More specifically, I argue that land redistribution has in a very real sense been subject to elite capture despite state rhetoric about pro-poor redistribution. Throughout the chapter, I bring to the fore issues pertaining to land policy and implementation with reference to redistribution.

4.2 Land Reform Overview

Ruth Hall (2004: 213) argues that “[l]and reform is one way in which the ‘new’ South Africa set out to redress the injustices of apartheid and, by redistributing land to black South Africans, to transform the structural basis of racial inequality”. Hence, a strong justification for the post-apartheid state’s policies around land reform is addressing the racialised colonial condition inherited from the apartheid era which led to marked poverty and inequality along racial lines (Binswager and Deininger 1996). Land reform in South Africa has three pillars, which are discussed later: land restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution.

Restitution seeks to return specific tracts of land of great historical, cultural or ancestral significance to their ‘original’ owners (Walker 2008). Tenure reform aims to “ensure the security of tenure for all South Africans, regardless of system of land-holding” (Centre for Development Enterprise 2005:24). It thus seeks to strengthen the rights of people whose land tenure is insecure as a result of discriminatory laws and practices in the past: farm workers and dwellers living on privately-owned commercial land, and people living in the former homelands under the authority of traditional chiefs (Bernstein 2012). Redistribution of land aims to address the highly skewed ownership of land along racial lines. It is thus concerned
with the overall racially-imbalanced ownership of land and tries to restore land to landless
and land-short black citizens, without though necessarily compromising national agricultural
productivity (Thwala 2003).

The land question was central to the formation of the African National Congress (ANC), as it
emerged in the context of the passing of the 1913 Land Act which legalised land
dispossession. Though the struggle against racial domination ended up as a largely urban-
based struggle, the land question nevertheless featured prominently in the ANC’s discourse
during the liberation struggle. The critical document of the ANC, namely the Freedom
Charter from the 1950s, argued that

Our people have been robbed of their bright right to land, liberty and peace by a form of
government founded on injustice and inequality; ... Restrictions of land ownership on a racial
basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those work it to banish famine and
land hunger (Congress of the People 1955).

In light of the centrality of land dispossession to the ANC and need to undo this, discussions
around land reform were important during the transition period in the early 1990s prior to the
ANC coming to power in 1994. Indeed, after 1994, the ANC government launched a broad-
based consultative process which culminated in the publication of the White Paper on South
African Land Policy in 1997, which set out the vision and objectives of land reform from the
perspective of the ANC.

The process of consultation, involving conferences and workshops which included
international organisations such as the World Bank, led to a series of draft land documents
(du Toit 2011) which were distributed widely for comments by civil society organisations
before being finalised and consolidated in the White Paper. There were in fact approximately
thirty workshops, many of which were held in rural areas or involved various communities
located in rural areas (Bottaro et al. 2006:205). Leading and guiding this process was the
newly-established Department of Land Affairs, which seemed to be bringing about a people-
driven formulation of land policy (Department of Land Affairs 1997).

However, given the market-driven character of post-apartheid land reform, it seems that
powerful interest groups (for example the World Bank) provided more significant input into
land policy than landless or land-short rural communities. Hence, notwithstanding the
apparently inclusive land policy formulation process in the 1990s, this was shallow and short-
lived. The desire to widely consult and to ensure the participation of the broader body politic was certainly there but this did not translate into genuine or meaningful popular input. By the late 1990s, there was evidence of the increasing centralisation of decision-making around land policy as the Department of Land Affairs and the state executive more broadly took on an insular character (Anseeuw and Alden 2011:20). As the ANC in government grew in confidence, especially with the passage of the new constitution in 1996, any period of open-ended consultation was slowly coming to an end. As Cousins points out, “‘participation’, although stressed in the rhetoric of the time, was in practice taken to mean ‘consultation’. Real decision making power was retained by the ruling party …. In practice, there was an inner circle of trusted groupings an individuals, who participated most actively in debates on [land] policy” (Cousins 2004:17).

This was seen for example through the minimal impact of civil society inputs into land policy, including the ‘Land Reform Policy Proposals’ of the civil society alliance called the National Land Committee (NLC). Such proposals spoke more directly to the needs and aspirations of rural communities, as the NLC was linked to organisations affiliated to the land movement called the Landless Peoples Movement. The willingness of government to listen to civil society had weakened such that civil society groups began to experience “workshop fatigue” (Kahn, 2007:7-9). Civil society themselves had already been weakened, as many of the land activities from the 1980s took up positions within the Department of Land Affairs with the intent of influence government from within.

Land reform policies were initially developed, at least rhetorically, with reference to the early RDP with its emphasis on redistribution and poverty-reduction. In this light, the ANC committed itself to redistributing 30% of dispossessed land within five years of taking office (Department of Agriculture 1995). However, it was noted in the previous chapter that there has been a significant neo-liberal trajectory in South Africa since the mid-1990s despite the RDP at times implying a critique of neo-liberal reform in the interests of addressing – first and foremost – the racial legacy of the past. Thus, since 1994, South Africa has adopted a pro-market approach to land reform, and this was largely influenced by conservative forces within the country (including the powerful lobby of white agrarian capital) and international backing by notably the World Bank.
Market led reform has implications for different dimensions of the South African state’s land programme. For instance, it highlights the importance of private property rights when it comes to land tenure (even in the former Bantustans) so as to facilitate the existence of land markets and to provide immovable collateral for agricultural loans from financial institutions. But it is mainly discussed in relation to land redistribution and the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ framework for distribution. This framework has been propagated by the World Bank for a number of years and it is very controversial (Amanor and Moyo 2008). In line with the market-led approach, Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa enshrines (colonial) property rights under the ‘property clause’ (Ntsebeza 2007:105). At the same time, the constitution does allow for selective expropriation of land in the public interest (with compensation though) but this has not taken place on any significant scale. Market reform requires ‘fair and just’ compensation for land (meaning market prices) purchased from existing landowners by the state (Bond 2000, Schwartzman 2000). According to the Department of Agriculture, this underscores the necessity of an ordered redistribution programme which ensures the maintenance of national productive capacities in agriculture without neglecting the imperative of more equity (Ntsebeza 2007:106).

It is sometimes claimed that the willing buyer-willing seller modality inhibits the purchase of land by the state for redistribution purposes because of the financial constraints related to the national fiscus (Lahiff 2009:161). The fact that the South African state has failed consistently to meet its land redistribution targets is said to substantiate this claim. However, state incapacities also influence detrimentally the sheer volume of land transfers on a market basis and, at times, the state has not spent its complete budget for land purchases. Irrespective of the reasons behind the missed targets, the colonial condition pertaining to the land question remains unresolved, as the separation (labelled often as an agrarian dualism) between the (former) Bantustans and white commercial agriculture still prevails. Even within the former Bantustans, land tenure under chieftainship systems remains as it was under apartheid while, on white commercial farms, workers and dwellers remain vulnerable despite enhanced labour legislation protecting their rights.
4.3 Land Redistribution

Land redistribution aims at addressing the highly-skewed ownership of land along racial lines. It is not, strictly-speaking, rights-based in that it is driven by supply of land rather than demand for land. Nevertheless, since 1994, the ANC government has shown a strong commitment to rectify the racially-based land imbalances in the countryside. Below, I provide a schematic periodisation of land redistribution policies and programmes (or policy phases) in South Africa.

The first phase (1994-1999) involved policies focused on land access almost as an inherent right and as a basis for rural livelihoods even if it simply entailed subsistence farming. This phase was during the Mandela period and it fell directly under the stewardship of the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom. In line with constitutional provisions, Hanekom emphasised human and citizenship rights as well as gender and racial equity principles in addressing the land question (Hebnick 2013:37). Land redistribution was seen as facilitating the development of small-scale agricultural production as a springboard for the broader socio-economic development of rural areas (Davids, Habib and Southhall 2003:331). Redistributed farms would thereby contribute to food security (at least at household level).

This first phase, as implemented by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), involved the programme called SLAG – Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG). This entailed the use of discretionary grants provided to potential resettlement farmers by the DLA for the purchase of farmland on the open market. In the specific case of SLAG, the grant amounted to R15000 (later R16000) per household (Department of Land Affairs 1997). These grants, though mainly to be used for the purchase of land, could also be used for agricultural investments (on former Bantustan land or land acquired through the restitution programme) (Anseeuw and Mathebula 2008:3). The intended recipients of SLAG grants were the rural poor and, given the limited size of the grant per household, the purchase of farms under SLAG entailed a large number of recipients combining their grants to purchase a particular farm. And, considering the resource deficiencies of the recipients and the fact that the SLAG grants were used entirely for the farm purchase, funds for post-settlement agricultural investment and production were often negligible. With the Department of Agriculture failing to provide meaningful post-settlement support, many SLAG farms were doomed from the start even in terms of allowing for small-scale agriculture. In this respect, it was not unusual
to find that most SLAG recipients for a particular farm lived (and possibly worked) in a nearby town. Overall, the SLAG programme’s contribution to poverty reduction in rural areas was minimal.

The second land redistribution phase (1999-2004) involved a shift in policies involving a conscious decision to promote small-scale commercial farming and agricultural productivity. This is in part relates to the increasing emphasis on neo-liberal reforms at the macro-economic level and, after the 1999 national elections, the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. This fed into the land redistribution initiatives of the state in that the levelling of racial inequalities was now depicted as emerging through a focus on economic growth and productivity which, it was claimed, would have a knock-on effect on poverty and inequality (Hebnick 2013:37). At the same time, this led to Thoko Didiza becoming head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, who seemed to have a more cordial relationship with white agrarian interests compared to Hanekom. This seemed to imply a shift in power within the land and agriculture ministry. The focus on subsistence farming was abandoned and the development of an emergent commercial black farming sector became the ministry’s priority.

Land redistribution measures no longer aimed at transferring land to black households and promoting self-sufficiency, but rather at creating a structured small-scale commercial farming sector, improving farm production and creating rural-based employment. Thus the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme replaced SLAG and became the main programme of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000). The farms purchased under SLAG remained, but any new funding projects became limited to residential sites. LRAD provided grants (significantly larger than those under SLAG) to previously-disadvantaged people to assist them in purchasing farmland or to develop agricultural land they have already acquired privately (Aneesuw and Mathebula 2008:6). In the case of purchasing farmland, grants were provided to those who could demonstrate a resource base as well as agricultural capacity. The Department of Agriculture was though expected to provide post-settlement support. Like under SLAG, the relationship between the land and agricultural departments under LRAD were was not well-coordinated and there were significant gaps in communication and cooperation (Weideman 2004).
Besides land redistribution focusing on rural spaces, the South African government was also concerned with urban land issues. In 1997, the Department of Land Affairs adopted the Municipal Commonage Programme, and it became a sub-component of the LRAD programme. According to Badenhorst et al. (2003:593), the aim of land redistribution is to provide the landless or poor with land for residential and agricultural purposes in order to improve their livelihoods. This is essentially what the municipal Commonage Programme was intended to do, to make municipal and tribal land for grazing purposes in order for them to be able to improve and have a form of a livelihood.

In 2002, the Department of Land Affairs published an updated and extensively re-stated commonage policy. This addressed issues of programme performance in that it set out a detailed outline of how commonage projects should be implemented (Anderson and Pienaar 2003:6). The initially pro-poor objective of the programme remained in place, but it became clear that the LRAD ‘productivist’ shift would also impact on commonage programmes. As the 2002 policy notes: “[T]he primary aim of commonage is two-fold: providing access to land for supplementing income (subsistence user system), and as a steppingstone for emergent farmers (emergent farmer system)” (Anderson and Pienaar 2003:6).

Since the introduction of LRAD, a third (and current) phase in the land redistribution has emerged, namely, the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (or PLAS) (Jacobs, Lahiff and Hall 2003:4). Admittedly, this is a continuation of the ‘productivist’ thrust of LRAD but it deepens this thrust significantly. PLAS was adopted as a programme in 2006 and it is currently the only available mechanism for redistribution (though both LRAD and SLAG farms remain in existence). PLAS is supposed to simplify (and accelerate) the purchase of land by the state, as was stated by the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform Gugile Nkwinti (2010:1). This is supposedly done by decoupling land purchases from the approval of grants to intended beneficiaries, with one consequence being the appeasement of landowners who have vociferously criticised the prolonged and complex nature of land purchases under land redistribution.

Like the earlier programmes, PLAS entails voluntary land market transactions at market prices. Under PLAS, though, the state itself purchases farms on the open market and allocates them to applicant(s) on the basis of 3-5 year leasehold agreements, after which the lessee(s) has the possibility of purchasing the farm. Grants are not provided to prospective farmers for the land purchase (Greenberg 2010:5). Funds for investment in farm infrastructure are though
made available to PLAS beneficiaries for purposes of “recapitalisation and development” (Cousins 2013:14). Any possibility of eventually purchasing a farm is subject to showing significant signs of agricultural productivity and even lease agreements may not be renewed if productivity falls below state-expected targets.

PLAS has also been criticised for facilitating elite capture, a point I stress below. In the academic literature, a number of other concerns have been made about PLAS. PLAS increases the potential for the state to acquire properties and then subdivide them prior to being allocated to beneficiaries. But, in practice, there is little indication that subdivided land is being appropriately matched to beneficiaries’ needs (Hall 2009:83). It also remains dependent on the willing seller programme with the attendant risk that landowners may choose to sell only the most marginal, most remote and most ecologically fragile plots that they own (steep slopes, rainforests and desert margins), many of which may not currently be in production (Bond 2000, Schwartzman 2000). If used for redistribution, they can set even emergent PLAS farmers up for failure; as it has done under LRAD and SLAG.

Additionally, while PLAS farmers are lessees of the land owned by the state until such time as they can show evidence of managing farming activities on a productive basis, many PLAS beneficiaries are without properly-ratified and -signed lease agreements (Cousins 2013). There are also significant variations in any lease agreements in place, or intended to be in place. Some farmers are under the impression that the lease is for five years whereas some are of the understanding that it could be for 10 years and more (Cousins 2013:14). Due to the absence of long-term leases, or non-existent leases, some PLAS farmers feel the absence of security of tenure and are hesitant to invest on the farms. There is also evidence that some PLAS farmers are receiving favouritism by having preferential lease terms or insignificant lease payments (Ranwedzi 2011).

Furthermore, the state has introduced strategic partnerships between the PLAS farmer(s) and often white mentors, and funding under PLAS is conditional on entering into such partnerships (Cousins 2013:14). The partnership programme also affected the restitution programme. Partnerships are a response to number of high-profile land redistribution (and restitution) project failures including on areas of high-value agricultural land (often involving large amounts of fixed capital and thriving commercial operations) which existed prior to
being purchased or successfully claimed. But the programme also emerged because of farmer demands for agricultural assistance and training which the department of agriculture was not directly providing on a successful basis (Hall 2004:3). Partnerships clearly link back to the state’s increasing emphasis on agricultural productivity, with a de-emphasis on equity and redistributive concerns.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, in practice it appears that the state’s land redistribution programme now priorities – as redistribution beneficiaries – the financially better-off, more commercially-orientated and agricultural entrepreneurs (Lahiff 2011:68). The rhetoric is for instance found in a policy proposal of the Department of Land Affairs from 2006 (2006: 3):

The framework in terms of the strategy will target people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) in general, groups that live in communal areas, black people with the necessary farming skills in urban areas, and people living under insecure tenure rights. This framework seeks to contribute to the decongestion of the communal areas, secure on or off farm accommodation and create sustainable livelihoods. While the approach is pro-poor, it also caters emergent and commercial farmers.

The policy comes across as catering for all, even as pro-poor, but recent acquisitions under PLAS clearly show that land redistribution seeks to bring about a black small-scale commercial farming sector which can – above all else – produce the agricultural goods so to speak.

PLAS may also entail the purchase of land by the state before prospective beneficiaries are identified, thereby lessening the involvement of the eventual farmers in the purchase decision and in the immediate post-purchase planning for the land. This opens up the possibility of a more top-down approach to beneficiary selection and project implementation (Lahiff 2008:3). This implies that market-driven and state-driven approaches to land redistribution are not necessarily antagonistic to each other. In other words, a neo-liberal land reform model (such as the willing seller-willing buyer approach) which privileges the functionality of the market does not necessarily mean a down-sized and hands-off the market state. A strong interventionist state, and one marked by centralising tendencies like the South African state, does not go contrary to neo-liberal reform at least in the South African case.

Most recently, the current Zuma-led ANC government constantly reaffirms its commitment to land redistribution and has recently set the objective of redistributing 30% of the land by
2030. In this regard, the 30% target was meant to have been reached already in 2014. And the total redistributed by 2010 was only 5%. Explanations for the sluggish pace of redistribution are many. It is sometimes claimed that the limited budget allocation (only about 0.3% of the national budget) for land redistribution is far below the needs of achieving the stated aims of redistribution (Anseeuw and Alden 2011:25). In other words, the problem is explained by the fact that redistribution is based on market-led reform and land market prices. However, the state bureaucracy is also problematic when it comes to redistribution. There are significant indications of incapacity within the state ministries and departments responsible for land (and agriculture) such that, even if land confiscation took place, the state would find it extremely difficult to ensure efficient modalities of resettlement and post-settlement support. As is currently stands, the complex bureaucratic maze and problems of coordination and competition within the land and agriculture bureaucracies mean that that a particular redistribution project can take years even before people are settled on the farm (Anseeuw and Alden 2011:25).

In this regard, the land policy formation process in South Africa is not an uncomplicated linear progression but is marked by significant intra-state tension and to-and-fro dynamics. Likewise, implementation of redistribution programmes entails a complex mix of state bodies (involving central, provincial and municipal tiers) which do not act necessarily in any coordinated and uniform manner (Wiebe 2001:101). Implementation, in the case of land redistribution, involves land and agricultural ministries at both central and provincial levels, as well as both district and local municipalities. The relationship between these state bodies is often characterised by confusion, competition and conflict, all of which clearly impacts on the redistribution of land and resettlement of farmers at farm level.

4.4 Land Redistribution and Elite Capture

One of the key issues I have highlighted in this chapter is the increasing productivist stance of the state with regard to land redistribution. This invariably leads to ensuring that productively-capable black people are prioritised when it comes to resettlement. As Cousins (2013:12) succinctly argues:

> Many of these new policy shifts are highly problematic and, populist rhetoric to the contrary, are likely to result in elite capture of land reform as well as continued insecurity of tenure for
the majority of rural people in communal areas, on privately owned and restored or redistributed land. That these policies have been adopted in the centenary year of the 1913 Natives Land Act, which denied or rendered insecure black people’s ownership of land across most of the country, is deeply ironic.

Thus, even under the state’s flagship National Development Plan of 2012, and despite a new stress on broad-based and comprehensive rural development, there is clear confirmation of the prominence of productivist land reform practices including strategic partnerships (Hebnick 2013:38). This is also made clear in recent policies from 2013 (‘these policies’ alluded to by Cousins) related to land reform and redistribution, including the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (SLDP), Recapitalisation and Development Programme Policy (RDPP) and the Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework (ALPF). These policies effectively redefine the very character of land redistribution in South Africa.

SLDP applies to farms which are acquired through PLAS and it is targeted at black South Africans falling under four categories of ‘farmer’ beneficiaries (Cousins 2013:1): as subsistence producers, households with no or limited access to land; small-scale farmers farming for subsistence but when possible selling part of their produce on local markets; medium-scale commercial farmers already farming commercially at a small scale but unable to expand production because of land and resource constraints; and large-scale or well-established commercial farmers who are currently disadvantaged by location, size of land and other circumstances and with clear potential to increase the scale of agricultural production.

The explicit objective of the RDPP is to “usher black emerging farmers into the agricultural value chain as quickly as possible’ (Rural Development and Land Reform 2013:17). In doing so, its intent is to flush out capable farmers who in the end are not productive or profitable (including many PLAS farmers). These include failed commercial farmers who are abusing the strategic partnership element of the programme for personal gain, and city-based proxy farmers (sometimes known as cell-phone farmers).

The rationale of the ALPF is to attain higher levels of efficiency of land use and to optimise “total factor productivity” (van Wyk 2014: 1). The ALPF states that the target for land redistribution over the next six years is eight million hectares, of which half will be allocated to what it calls ‘smallholders’. The policy hinges in part on the idea that smallholder agriculture is important to rural development and agrarian transformation. The key objectives
of the policy is to “facilitate the participation of small farmers into mainstream agriculture” and “facilitate the redistribution of land and agricultural landholdings to co-operatives and family owned landholdings’ (Rural Development and Land Reform 2013:17). In doing so, the ALPF is calling for all redistribution beneficiaries to assume relationships with the private sector (elements from within agrarian capital) as only then can redistribution serve the functions of productivity and profitability (van Wyk 2014).

Cousins (2013) provides a damning critique of these policies, as indicated earlier. In relation to the SLDP, state land may be leased (or possibly sold) to difficult categories of farmers but the policy entails an explicit commercial bias. In other words, progress towards becoming a large-scale commercial farmer is what is assumed to constitute ‘success’ (Cousins 2013:18). Given the government’s perceptions of failure in the land redistribution programmes (equated with subsistence farming), this suggests that applicants for land who are deemed to fall within categories 3 and 4 are likely to be the main beneficiaries (Cousins 2013:18). In the case of the RDPP, land becomes wholly associated with maximising agricultural productivity and is devoid of all other possible meanings (such as food security).

Indeed, it is articulated as aimed at “rekindling the class of black commercial farmers destroyed by the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts” and refers constantly to the importance of ‘black emergent farmers’ (Rural Development and Land Reform 2013:17). ALPF assumes that strategic partnerships with white mentors or white agrarian capital are essential for success. However, the experience to date of strategic partnerships in land reform often reveals that black emergent farmers become subordinated to the strategic partner in decision-making processes and that the partnership benefits primarily the off-farm partner. Cousins (2013:19) therefore concludes that “market forces on their own tend to privilege the better-off, and only deliberate interventions in favour of the poor will ensure we have a land reform programme that fulfils its potential to help address poverty and inequality”. Land redistribution policies and programmes in post-apartheid South Africa have tended to ignore the basic needs and rights of rural people by placing the market and elite-driven restructuring at the front of the queue.
4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of land reform in post-apartheid South Africa with a focus specifically on land redistribution. It is argued that land redistribution has been marked by a pronounced neo-liberal and productivist leaning, though the state has increasingly intervened in setting the tone of redistribution. With regard to redistribution policy formation and implementation, it is clear that there has been a constant reworking of policy without any significant popular input, and that implementation is characterised by a bureaucratic maze which has led to an absence of inter-departmental coordination. Overall, the state has not shown significant capacity in pursuing land redistribution in any meaningful way.
Chapter 5: Case Studies of LRAD and PLAS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines particular LRAD and PLAS farms near Grahamstown to understand, at ground level, how policies which are created centrally play out when implemented. I tap into the narratives shared by the land beneficiaries of LRAD and PLAS projects and use these to understand the beneficiaries’ own understandings of LRAD and PLAS and the impact of these projects on their lives and livelihoods. In the next section, I examine the LRAD case of Trenthem Park as well as consider a sub-programme of LRAD, namely, municipal commonages. I then focus on two PLAS projects which are supposed to be particularly tuned to building an emergent black commercial agricultural class. In this context, I end off by focusing on the question of strategic partnerships at both the LRAD and PLAS farms, which have become quite controversial. The following, concluding chapter, speaks more explicitly to policy formation and implementation in relation to land redistribution in the light of the case studies.

5.2 LRAD Farms

The specific objectives and approach of the redistribution policy are set out in the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy, which formed the basis for the LRAD programme:

The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers. Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements. Government will assist in the purchase of land, but will in general not be the buyer or owner. Rather, it will make land acquisition grants available and will support and finance the required planning process. In many cases, communities are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, buy and jointly hold land under a formal title deed. Opportunities are also offered for individuals to access the grant for land acquisition (Department of Land Affairs 1997:38).

In terms of the implementation of LRAD by the Department of Land Affairs, poorer applicants were to be prioritised by means of a 5:3:2 ratio, whereby 50% of resources (land
and capital budgets) go towards the poor, 30% to a ‘middle category’ and 20% to wealthier (Jacobs, Lahiff and Hall 2003:5). Any exact formulation of these three categories, and the delineation between them, has however always remained vague within LRAD documentation issued by the department.

In the Eastern Cape, the majority of LRAD projects approved (approximately 70%) consisted of small groups not exceeding ten beneficiaries each, 24% involved groups numbering between 11 and 29 individuals, while 6% of groups comprised 30 or more participants (Lahiff 2002:24). Although projects with fewer members tend to have less land combined than those with more members, per capita land holding in the smallest group is substantially higher –72.8 hectares per person for groups with ten members or less as compared to only 15.1 hectares per person in groups with more than 30 members (Lahiff 2002:24). It could be concluded that LRAD, at least in the case of the Eastern Cape, has focused on creating relatively smaller projects in terms of the number of members per project but with substantial land per project member. Certainly over 70 hectares (per person) is a sizeable piece of land and this implies that LRAD farms in the province are consistent with the articulation of LRAD by the then lands minister (Thoko Didiza) as contributing towards the development of a class of black commercial farmers. However, with the restructuring of South Africa’s political economy along neo-lines lines, post-agricultural support for this class becomes hugely problematic and indeed inhibits the formation of the class. Of course, less well-endowed LRAD farmers would likely experience even greater post-settlement difficulties. This should not be surprising given that even established white commercial farmers, after the withdrawal of state support under neo-liberalism, have gone into bankruptcy, or downsized or moved into other land usages such as wildlife tourism (Jaricha 2013:88). Thus, the prospects for LRAD beneficiaries in terms of agricultural production let alone market integration becomes a challenge and this can see through the everyday realities faced by famers on LRAD farms. This is indeed the case with the LRAD farms outside Grahamstown which were studied for this thesis: Masizakhe, Masibambane and Kamvalethu.

In early 2003, Mr. G. Lang, a beef cattle farmer at Trenthem Park farm in Manley Flats, Grahamstown approached a local NGO called East Cape Agricultural Research Project (ECARP) with the prospect of selling his farm on the basis of the willing seller-willing buyer model. The farm was in excess of 2500 hectares in size and used for extensive beef cattle
grazing. The property had previously consisted of four separate farm properties where were purchased and consolidated by Mr. Long into Trenthem Park farm (Department of Land Affairs 2004). Each of the four units still retained the basic necessary farm infrastructure as they did prior to consolidation and hence the units could still be farmed as separate farming ventures. ECARP, in consultation with the land redistribution office of the Department of Agriculture in Port Elizabeth devised a proposal whereby Trenthem Park could be subdivided into four parcels for land redistribution purposes, namely: Masizakhe, Masibambane, Kamvalethu and Mlanjeni. Trenthem Park farm, consisting of these four parcels, would be disposed of by means of LRAD grant funding to 136 beneficiaries, with each unit being allocated to a particular sub-group amongst the beneficiaries.

Given the size of Trenthem Park farm and the number of beneficiaries, the average size of land available to each LRAD beneficiary farmer would be just over 18 hectares. Hence this LRAD project was designed to address the basic agricultural needs of a significant number of ‘the poor’ instead of a few ‘emergent [meaning commercial] farmers’ (to use the terms in the previous quotation from the department of land affairs). Each of the four units would have a Community Property Association (CPA), consisting of the farming beneficiaries, to act as the governing body for the unit and in whose name the title deeds would eventually be granted.

However, in line with the widespread criticisms of LRAD projects nationally, serious problems are said to exist on these four CPA properties. Thus a member of the Masizakhe Farmers CPA states that:

*People are complaining, at ground level the policies have transpired in a negative way. What we imagined and wanted is not what has happened in reality. The planning has not been done properly.* (Masizakhe Farmer ‘Bulelani’ November 2014)

It can be understood from this quote by Masizakhe farmer is that the positive hopes which the land redistribution beneficiaries had about redistribution and the CPA’s is not what has transpired to be. The farmers feel that there has been a replication in their future agricultural lives, and as a consequence have been able to reach the goals they wanted to reach via farming.

*We wanted to grow crops and harvest, and also graze cattle. Essentially, use the farm as a source of livelihood as the white farmer did. He was wealthy due to land; that is what we wanted* (Masizakhe Farmer ‘Litha’ November 2014).
Despite the comparatively small pieces of land available to them (certainly compared to the 2500 hectares of the former white owner prior to the LRAD project), they nevertheless envisaged the possibility of entering in the realm of commercial agriculture. After all, by the early 2000s, the ‘productivist’ discourse of the department of land affairs had become quite apparent and farmers were simply aspiring to the claims increasingly embodied in the LRAD programme which entailed helping them “move up the ladder of success” (James, 2007:184).

Whether this implies that post-settlement support for LRAD projects was being focused on (comparatively-speaking) resource-rich LRAD farmers (with larger hectares of land) is unclear, but certainly criticisms have arisen that LRAD has tended to be an “elitist programme” which was likely marginalising poor farmers (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2005:23). Certainly, LRAD became a programme designed to support the growth of a black commercial farming class. And while there are supposed to be elements of support for more subsistence-based and non-market farmers (or perhaps semi-commercial farmers who can produce market occasionally), the bulk of the resources may flow to the emerging farmers who provided more funds upfront under the state’s LRAD grant funding system. However, the evidence in the academic literature is that post-settlement support for LRAD projects has been, as a general tendency, insufficient and this is more likely what the Masizakhe farmers are highlighting than any marked bias against them by the state.

A Masibambane farmer, in explaining her experience as a land redistribution beneficiary under LRAD, spoke about how she and the other Masibambane beneficiaries have had mixed experiences

   We wanted to be part of the process, we learnt and then we got to be part of the process; we learnt and then we were given money by government, and we became beneficiaries. I would say my experience is half and half; it has its good moments but has its falls (Masibambane Farmer ‘Nomhle’ November 2014).

In speaking about the half and half situation, the good moment in part entailed their actual involvement in LRAD per se. In other words, given their historical experience of being denied access to sufficient and productive land, they now under LRAD have the opportunity of sustaining themselves through land-based livelihoods. The bad moment (the “falls” of LRAD) relates to their actual experiences at Masibambane and the inability to pursue the kind of commercially-based agricultural activities they initially imagined. But they were
producing agriculturally and for this they are thankful. This reiterates the claims made about LRAD-based agriculture at Masizakhe.

However, it is difficult to generalise about LRAD projects on this basis, even amongst the farmers who took over different sections of Trenthem Park farm. This becomes clear in the case of an LRAD farmer of Kamvelethu ‘Collin’ who explained:

“I started farming in 2006. When I came here I was using this little tool to farm, can you see it... [picks up the tool to show it] ...and now I have a bit of machinery to use to work the land. Now I have a car, it helps me to get around. I have to compliment the redistribution project, I had absolutely nothing. I have nearly ten cattle, 20 goats and crops. I have made progress, slowly but surely I am getting there.”

This statement makes it clear that it is not possible to paint all LRAD land redistribution projects with a black brush as failures, even from the perspective of the LRAD farmers themselves. There is in fact considerable unevenness in agricultural productivity between LRAD farmers even within a particular LRAD project (as is the case with the Trenthem Farm project), depending in part upon the amount of energy and time a particular farmer is prepared to invest in agricultural activities. Also, for the farmers, agricultural success or failure is contingent on the basis for measuring success. When farmers compare their current livelihoods on a LRAD project to their livelihoods prior to LRAD (as the Kamvalethu farmer did) then there may be a positive interpretation of the implications of LRAD. But when farmers compare their actual LRAD-based agricultural activities to what they envisaged might happen under LRAD (some degree of sustained commercial success) then LRAD is found wanting and criticisms by farmers arise. Success or otherwise is therefore not necessarily based on the form and degree of post-resettlement agricultural support by the state.

5.2.1 Sub-programme of LRAD: Municipal Commonages

The commonages programme initially fell under LRAD. The main aim of the municipal commonage policy is to “provide landless (or poor) with land for residential and agricultural purposes in order to improve their livelihoods” (Badenhorst et al. 2006:593). Pre-urban commonages in fact form part of the calculation of the percentage of land that the South African government wants to redistribute (Martens 2011:257). Under the control of the
relevant local municipality, they are intended to be used as a ‘springboard’ for the LRAD programme through the emerging farmer system ingrained in the commonage programme, and to alleviate property and contribute to economic development. Such a developmental role for local municipalities was captured in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government: “Developmental local government is local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve their lives” (DPLG 1998:38).

In this light, Atkinson (2005:4) argues that the commonage is, in many smaller towns in South Africa, “by far the most important developmental asset for the poor and often makes an important contribution to household food security”. Normally this entails a space for the keeping of livestock, though the number of households using the commonage for this purpose is often very limited. Such stockholders may then be considered as suitable candidates for a redistributed farm (Goldman and Reynolds 2008:131, Anderson and Pienaar, 2003). In fact, the revised Commonage Policy of 2002 clear delineates the kinds of commonage users expected and desired, namely, the subsistence user and the emergent farmer (Department of Land Affairs 2002). The emergent farmer bias in the commonage policy is articulated by Kevin Bates, the former Director of Parks and Recreation:

*The whole idea behind the commonages was that land which is allocated to stockholders could help them to get into a position where they could get into commercial farms and farm.*

More subsistence-based commonage users would still exist but, as individuals without limited or no access to finance, resources or credit, they would simply plod along at a survivalist level without any possibility of engaging with the redistribution programme more broadly through graduating from commonage user to commercial farmer under LRAD (or even PLAS). For other users, and after building up sufficient assets and skills, the commonage would be a stepping stone to commercial farming beyond the commonage setup.

In the meantime, on the commonages themselves, problems often exist. In the case of Grahamstown, the chairperson of the local Emerging Farmers’ Association in 2009 moved onto a farm that the municipality had been allocated for its commonage. He took over this farm for his own use and even charged other people to graze cattle on this land, and this led the municipality to evict him from this land (former Director of Parks and Recreation, Kevin
Bates). This suggests that larger stockholders, as members of the emerging farmers’ association, may dominate commonage usage (which is another sign of elite capture). As well, municipalities sometimes do not properly manage the commonage land or the infrastructure which for parts of it (including water sources and fencing), or find it very frustrating trying to do this on an ongoing basis:

*It has not always worked out well because with the commonages being close to town we’re in need of infrastructure. As fast as we were trying to introduce things like fences, municipal infrastructure was being stolen or vandalised; with unemployment people who were erecting houses were stealing these fences. With the result that the farmers said that because they don’t have infrastructure they are not going to pay the small stipend the farmers on commonages or so called farms are meant to pay* (former Director of Parks and Recreation Kevin Bates 2014).

It is not unusual to find cattle wondering through the streets of Grahamstown because the infrastructure supplied by the government has been vandalised (though sometimes it is because the municipality does not have the funds to ensure proper maintenance). Either way, the commonage programme is being undermined by other socio-economic challenges facing urban economies, notably high rates of unemployment and poverty as well local state capacity. In the end, these problems can only be fruitfully tackled at national – rather than local – state level.

5.3 PLAS farms

The main objective of PLAS is to accelerate the pace and increase the success of the land redistribution process by ensuring that land is acquired preferably in areas of high agricultural potential and thereby to maximise the productive use of agricultural land once acquired. Because of this, the implementation plan for PLAS claims to offer proper identification and selection of suitable beneficiaries, better planning of land and ultimately greater productivity (Lahiff 2008:21). Thus, in 2005, at a National Land Summit, the Minister of Land Affairs reaffirmed that certain measures need to be in place “to ensure that land and agrarian reform moves to the new trajectory that will contribute to …[a]… higher path of growth, employment and equity” (Department of Land Affairs 2007:6). This implies a needs-based approach to land redistribution is not sufficient (which was the original idea under SLAG) and that the state needs to take a more activist stance in guaranteeing suitable candidates for
PLAS farms, with suitable meaning farmers capable of maximising agricultural production and agricultural commodity market sales (Mfuywa 2012:20). Like the previous land redistribution programmes (SLAG and LRAD), PLAS has been criticised in the academic literature for failing to meet its objectives.

The Agriculture Officer at the Makana Muncipality’s Local Economic Development office offers a positive rendition of PLAS farms at least within the local municipal area. He explained how PLAS policies have transpired at farm level:

> At local level 70% projects have been successful especially in terms of poultry and crops. Livestock has been successful with commercial farmers … now I am talking about emerging farmers. Others are trying, they are trying but farming takes time, but it also depends on the project beneficiaries because if there is no commitment on their side it will fail (Agriculture Officer Phiwo Jwara 2014).

Indeed, there is considerable evidence at farm level that PLAS beneficiaries are extremely committed to maximising productivity and that – although simply tenants on state land with no clear end to their tenancy – they are expending considerable effort to become fully-fledged commercial farmers. This is supported by ECARP which works closely with PLAS farmers. As it states in a publication, “people spoke clearly about their desire to own land to plant to sell, to pay off the farm and to save some money” (ECARP 2014).

The experiences shared with me by farmers at Rockhurst and Outspan farms outside Grahamstown seemed to quite positive. Through PLAS, the farmers expressed how they had been able to improve their livelihoods by becoming skilled and competent farmers. A farmer from Rockhurst stated that:

> I would be lying if I said otherwise, everything is going well. I am farming and it’s all going forward. I have no complaints (Rockhurst Farmer ‘Joanna’ 2014).

In agreement with this statement, another PLAS beneficiary farmer of Outspan farm explained her experience of being a beneficiary of a PLAS farm saying:

> I would say it has generally been positive. Yes, there are some challenges but I would say it’s been positive. I have been able to improve my life, I have learnt a lot from the experience (Outspan Farmer ‘Sipho’ 2014).

From their perspective, then, PLAS has been a success. These limited examples of course cannot be generalised to PLAS as a whole. And, certainly, I do not want to paint a
dichotomous picture in which LRAD farm projects are hugely problematic by necessity while PLAS farm projects are the very opposite. But these PLAS farms do seem to involve some level of operational functionality with regard to agricultural productivity. Again, in part, this seems to the case because the farmers are comparing their current livelihoods with their pre-PLAS lives.

On the PLAS farms, the Recapitalisation and Development Programme Policy (RDPP) is applicable – known colloquially as RECAP by PLAS farmers and state officials. As discussed in the previous chapter, RECAP applies to PLAS farms, where the government buys land and equipment and leases it out to the beneficiaries. Essentially the farmers are on state-owned property and they have to prove they can become and are productive if they are to have any opportunity at all of remaining on the land as tenants or eventually owning it. RECAP offers an amount of money to CPAs, which allows the latter to buy necessary agricultural implements for the functioning of the farm. But this leads to a relationship of extreme dependency and reliance on the state such that if RECAP were to be discontinued, PLAS farmers may go under. As a farmer from the Outspan project explained:

*Everything is fine it is just that we need money from the government, RECAP. This usually really assists us in getting through with the farming.*

It is clear to see that for productivity to take place at farm level, it is very important for both government and the farmers to meet each other half-way, government, by ensuring that the resources needed by the farmers for productivity on farms to be efficient and the farmers by using those resources effectively and wisely.

SLDP, as noted in the last chapter, categorises farmers (for example, small-scale and large-scale) but it is claimed that in practice it prioritises the later. Because of this, resource-poor people become marginalised under PLAS. Successful PLAS farmer applicants are likely to be for example those with already-existing business interests (or with some capital to invest) such that a landless or land-short resident from the former Ciskei or Transkei would not be taken seriously as an applicant. In this regard, Zama Zikhali the Extension Officer at the Department of Agriculture in Grahamstown explained:

*Our job is to encourage them [the farmers] to be commercial farmers. However, with the agricultural industry we tend to have elderly clientele. You cannot create interest in old people who are set in their ways and do not necessarily see farming as a business*
but rather as a way of solely sustaining their livelihoods and this is where the shortcoming is.

With regard to the local Makana Municipality under which the studied farms exist, it is clear that PLAS is totally geared towards commercial farming and that a productivist discourse prevails. Any chance therefore of other meanings of land coming to the fore, such as a form of rural livelihood for household-based sustenance (a kind of peasant agriculture so to speak) would be ruled out from the start as undermining the attempt to integrate PLAS farms into the prevailing commercial model of agriculture propagated by the state.

5.4 Strategic Partnerships

The policies and programmes designed to support LRAD and PLAS projects can at times be problematic at farm level, notably the strategic partnership component of the ALFP. The ALPF assumes that strategic partnerships are a (if not the) key way forward for land redistribution farmers to be productive farmers. However, this in itself does not take into account how strategic partnerships have transpired, or been implemented in practice, on farms where LRAD and PLAS farmers are in partnerships – and particularly noteworthy is the social relationships which exist within these partnerships. In this respect, there is a significant degree of discontent amongst farmers. As a Masizakhe farmer claimed:

Mentoring should be about showing us the way, we have been on that farm for almost a decade but there is nothing although the mentorship has just started in 2010. When you follow this you find that you are being cheated openly. The problem is that there is no transparency, especially with the man we are with under the ‘strategic partnership’. The irony of the CPA being called Masizakhe (let us build ourselves) and is that we have a mentor that we do not really trust. The mentor is supposed to teach people according to the constitution but that is not what is being done and when you try to challenge this you are seen as an agitator, that is the problem – really (Masizakhe ‘Litha’ Farmer 2014).

This extract from an interview is just one example of widespread dissatisfaction with the mentoring falling under strategic partnerships. Though mentors are involved in post-settlement support and the farmers recognise the significance of such support for their on-farm lives and livelihoods, the way in which it is being ushered in seems to be insensitive to
the perspectives and even dignity of the farm beneficiaries. Because of this, an uncomfortable and tense situation may arise, as explained by another farmer from Masizakhe when he said:

*If you want to see apartheid you must go to that farm which I am a CPA member of.*

This is a very bold claim, as it effectively means that the relationship between the mentor and the farmers on this LRAD farm is marked by racist attitudes on the part of the mentor (at least from the perspective of the farmers), or at least a patronising tone in his dealings with the farmers.

It is notable in this regard that the business plan for Masizake indicates the payment which is due to mentors, with the payments coming from the state: full-time mentors are remunerated at R15,000 per month and part-time mentors are to receive R5,000 per month (Masizake Business Plan 2012). After the first year of agricultural production (the first production cycle), a full-time mentor is also to receive a share of any profit arising from the business operation to an amount of 30% of the profit (Masizake Business Plan 2012). These figures do not sit well with the beneficiaries, as they claim that the remuneration received for services rendered by the mentor is exceedingly high, particularly compared to what the farmers themselves receive. For example, the Masibambane CPA, using RECAP funds, bought 100 cattle and the mentor is said to have taken (based on a similar business plan for Masibambane) took 30 cattle for himself from the 100 purchased. The remaining cattle were then distributed amongst the members of the CPA. Quite likely, though, if indeed this happened, it would not be consistent with a genuine profit-sharing arrangement.

However, the farmer (Kobus Vermaak) who is acting as mentor of the Masizakhe and Masibambane CPA explained:

*The conditions were terrible before government intervened. Especially the social conditions, so I think government is doing a good job considering high levels of unemployment. What would the people be living from?*

The mentor sees the strategic partnership (as his role specifically) as a suitable means for the government to make sure that the beneficiary farmers are actually utilising the farm appropriately based on expert agricultural advice and guidance (provided by him) and therefore contributing to farmer productivity on redistributed farms. The mentor further suggests that there is a level of irresponsibility on the part on the farmers when it comes to
reinvesting profit into agricultural operations, an irresponsibility which is beyond his control and mandate:

Social conditions need to change, for instance when they get a profit share for example they spend it wrongfully and I cannot tell them what to do and not to do with their money. Instead of taking the money and investing it in a house ... something sustainable, they go and drink and they spend it all. They don’t know how to spend the money.

In other words, he argues that the land redistribution is being undermined despite his best intentions and hard work. Given the significance that the strategic partnership arrangement has currently, it remains unclear whether any reports submitted by the mentor to the state pertaining to agricultural operations has a bearing on the farmers’ security of tenure on the farms.

5.5 Conclusion

From this chapter, it seems clear that there is a strong productivist discourse underpinning the LRAD and PLAS farms under study and that the beneficiaries have in some way internalised it. But the productivist discourse is also used tactically by these redistribution farmers as a basis for critically assessing their respective LRAD and PLAS projects, even though there is some positive reflection on their livelihoods as well. As indicated, their assessment depends on drawing a comparison, sometimes with the past and sometimes with the claimed productivist objectives of redistribution. Their most critical thoughts appear to arise with regard to strategic partnerships, which some even claim involve an insidious racism. Embedded in their concerns about these partnerships is their broader sense of a loss of control over the redistribution process and dimensions of it (such as strategic partnerships). This relates explicitly to the themes of policy-making and policy-implementation with respect to land redistribution, as well as the form of involvement of land-short and landless people in these processes. In the last chapter, I return to these themes.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This final chapter to the thesis speaks to the question of land redistribution with regard to policy-making and policy-implementation in the light of the discussion in the previous chapter about the LRAD and PLAS projects studied in the Eastern Cape and in the context of the theoretical framing for the thesis. I first examine land redistribution policy-making and then land redistribution policy-implementation. I end by bringing the thesis together as a coherent unit by drawing the linkages between the theory discussed in chapter two and the land redistribution study contained in the thesis.

6.2 Land Redistribution Policy-Making

Overall, the meaningful participation of actual and potential land redistribution farmers in the formulation and implementation of land redistribution policies and programmes is minimal if not entirely non-existent. This is despite the fact that the state has initiated and organised numerous workshops on land over the past twenty years at which it has engaged with civil society organisations around land issues. Rarely have potential or actual land redistribution farmers been present at such workshops, in large part because they remain nearly completely unorganised – instead, NGOs have tended to dominate these workshops. At the same time, NGOs have organised alternative workshops (without inviting state land officials) attended by small and isolated grassroots groups (a mix of farm workers from commercial farms, former Bantustan residents, and redistribution farmers). In doing so, a list of land demands are often formulated and then issued to the state. These demands go far beyond current state land policies, including calls for expropriation of land, but the state has in large part ignored these calls for radical land reform.

It is clear that the formation of land redistribution policies is largely state-driven without any genuine popular participation. In other words, land policy formation is an exclusive and marginalising process which exists within the domain of the elites, and not only state elites. The most powerful lobby group when it comes to land redistribution policies is not rooted in
popular movements (which, as indicated, do not exist to any significant extent) but is based within commercial farmers in the form of their organisational wing, namely, AgriSA. It is widely known for instance that the South African state regularly consults with AgriSA and that, at times, the latter has been part of presidential working groups on land and agriculture in South Africa. The current emphasis on strategic partnerships, as discussed in this thesis, is (I would argue) a manifestation of the power of agrarian capital in influencing land redistribution policies and specific components of them. In fact, the entire productivist logic of land redistribution represents the influence and power of AgriSA. Insofar as farm workers, former Bantustan residents and other grassroots groupings have any influence on land redistribution policies, this does not arise from direct inputs into the state but from the state (through ANC party structures) sensing from a distance the frustrations and grievances of land-short and landless people. This in fact goes contrary to the spirit and finer points of the constitution, which calls for a participatory and inclusive process of policy making (Gumede 2008); and it reflects the centralisation of public policy-making in post-apartheid South Africa as discussed in chapter three.

In this sense, policy-making (including around land redistribution) represents a degree of continuity with the apartheid state, despite the more inclusive and democratic electoral system since 1994. The former Research Manager for the Investigative Division of the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights for the Eastern Cape and Free State (as well as currently Director of the Board of the NGO called Border Rural Committee), Monty Roodt speaks about apartheid to post-apartheid continuities when speaking of the market-led land reform process:

*The impact of apartheid is enormous. I mean 7-9% was allocated to blacks in reserves in 1913 which was later increased to 13% in 1936. And that was supposedly set aside for more than 80% of the population. This was inherited in 1994 and of course the response to land reform which some people regard as inadequate because of the willing buyer, willing seller clause which basically entrenches centuries of colonial dispossession.*

The ongoing existence of the willing seller-willing buyer model of land redistribution is testimony of the insensitivity of the post-apartheid state to popular demands around land, as it reflects (as I discussed earlier) the importance rather of multilateral financial institutions and notably the World Bank – and often through quite explicit and direct inputs – in the
formulation of land redistribution policy. This, as Roodt argues, simply reproduces the colonial and apartheid condition of land dispossession. Overall, then, land redistribution policies seem to reflect the interests and inputs of agrarian capital and the World Bank.

In this context, several observers and commentators have criticised land policy formation (including in relation to the Eastern Cape). Hadju (2006) for example points to the still existing unequal power relations between policymakers and local actors (including potential and actual land redistribution farmers), leaving the latter with the notion that they have limited control over their own future (Hebnick 2013:18). Public policy making is meant to be inclusive of a range of key groupings, including legislators at national, provincial and local government levels, state office bearers, civil society and the broader body politic (Ijeoma 2013:227). In practice, this often does take place. Thus the former Director of Parks and Recreation (Kevin Bates) explains that

> When it comes to policy-making, by-laws are what basically entail public involvement in the making of policies. Us officials have the so called professional knowledge and stand by council and to pass a by-law you need public participation.

Regrettably, this public participation is often absent. Just as the content of land redistribution policies and programmes increasingly entail some form of elite capture (as discussed earlier), the process leading to these policies and programmes also entails a form of elite capture. To reiterate, power is unequally distributed such that policy-making is not driven by public demands. As noted by Roodt:

> There is serious power imbalance; for instance the rural people don’t really have trade unions to represent them or social movements or powerful NGOs.

This means that an inclusive policy process around land redistribution policy is difficult to guarantee, if only because there is no sustained pressure on the state from popular organisations which act as a counterweight to the dominance of the interests of powerful agrarian interests in the country and the state’s inclination to work alongside these interests. Radical demands for land reform are therefore overlooked by the state or at least not taken seriously. In this respect, Nomonde Kiaka-Kahpha, a community development worker coordinating a land access and resource management programme at Masifunde (a NGO in Grahamstown) shared her stance on whether Masifunde had ever been involved in the process of land policy making in any genuine sense. She explained:
As with other organisations in the region we are always challenging that space, [but] we are not given that space because they [the government] say we are anti-government. We take part when there are policy proposals; then we will show the bill to the people concerned and explain it to them. So this is what we are doing as an organisation on the ground. Our recommendations are seldom, almost never taken into account. We deal with the aftermath of the policies.

Based on this, it can be seen that the policy-making process (with particular focus on the Eastern Cape in terms of land redistribution) easily marginalises groups which formally are meant to be engaged in the process of making public policy in South Africa. In describing the power relations between policy-makers and civil society, a former Director of Land Affairs in the Eastern Cape (Mike Kenyon) in fact claimed that marginalisation from policy making is broader than already argued. He claims that

*The policy process in the Eastern Cape has been racist because it has excluded white commercial farmers who have expertise; some of them are hostile to land reform but not all of them are hostile. You can’t ignore them, you have got to take them on board; how you do it is a different matter. What input do farm workers have into the policy process/people trying to farm in the trust [former Bantustan] areas? What are their particular needs? They may have different needs and different requirements of policy.*

While I find it difficult to comment on the claim about the marginalisation of white farmers in the Eastern Cape, Kenyon does highlight that the voices of farm workers and former Bantustan residents (and presumably other land-short people) are not being heard and their ‘requirements of policy’ are probably not being incorporated into land redistribution policies. By having a policy-making process on land which is in the main exclusive and elite-driven simply reproduces an apartheid-style of governance though in a less extreme form.

In the end, all relevant groupings have knowledge around land issues in post-apartheid South Africa, and they construct it in contrasting ways (Kirsten and van Zyl 1996:200-201), with some relying on everyday experience and others on technical expertise. But particular bodies of knowledge are privileged in shaping the policy-making on land redistribution, and often this is knowledge generated by so-called experts or (as discussed above) knowledge backed by power. This knowledge is often based on ill-conceived assumptions and assertions about the problems ingrained within the land question in contemporary South Africa, such that lives and livelihoods of rural people continue to be marked by poverty, marginalisation and
inequality. Thus, the form and content of land redistribution policy-making reflects the values, preferences and aspirations of economic and political elites.

6.3 Land Redistribution: Policy-Implementation

To quote again from the Masifunde community development worker: “Our recommendations are seldom, almost never taken into account. We deal with the aftermath of the policies”. In a very real sense, this seems to encapsulate the state of affairs when it comes to the land redistribution policy process. Landless and land-short rural people in contemporary South Africa only have the opportunity to engage with this policy at the implementation stage; but even in the case of implementation, questions may be raised about the extent and character of this engagement.

In this context, Sinoxolo Gqala from the Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs argues:

*The principle of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ has hindered our people from getting land through redistribution. Government has implemented policies which had good intent but in play out and reality have not been so successful because of other hindrances.*

Roodt, formerly of the commission on land restitution, also stresses a similar point:

*The fact that the state needs to buy land for the beneficiaries is a major impediment, the cost is huge and what tends to happen is that people inflate the prices to cash in on the process of redistribution.*

Land redistribution is taking place in the context of a neo-liberal paradigm, a paradigm which has been regularly criticised by land-based NGOs and the grassroots groups associated with them. This market-driven model of redistribution is facilitated and implemented by the state, a state which does even incorporate grassroots groups into the implementation process in any meaningful way – it is, in effect, simply imposed upon them. Hence, even in the case of business plans drawn up by CPAs for their respective redistribution projects, they are required to incorporate a strategic partner and ensure that the partner receives payment for services rendered. This is despite ongoing concerns expressed by the farmers about the racist and patronising inclinations of white mentors and the exorbitant payments received by them.
This though may not simply reflect neo-liberal propensities amongst state officials, as intimated by the critique of the willing-seller/willing-buyer approach in the quotation from Gqala. A serious problem which serves as a setback to the implementation of land redistribution policies is the question of state capacity, including efficient and adequate leadership within the state to implement redistribution policies effectively. The former Director of Land Affairs (Mike Kenyon), based on his institutional memory and subsequent developments, highlights the following:

Leadership within the state body is certainly problematic, between political and senior executives. If you look at how many director generals and ministers there have been in the department of rural development and land reform. What continuities have there been in the executive management?; that in itself says there have been too many challenges and a lot of levels of consistency and too many bad decisions. I think top management and political management has to take responsibility.

The discontinuities and sometimes outright confusion within the land (and agricultural) departments within the state bureaucracy, which exists at all levels, speaks to incapacity problems and inhibits the prospect of engaging in a highly-consultative process when it comes to implementation of land redistribution polices at farm level. This is also the case within local state structures with, for instance, the Makana Municipality based in Grahamstown recently being placed under ‘administration’ (that is, it is now under the direct control of the central state). To expect a state with capacity problems to reach out and incorporate potential and actual redistribution farmers in genuine processes of consultation is problematic, as this would entail extended and detailed procedures which will only complicate matters for state officials. Such complexity is likely to be avoided under conditions of incapacity. Thus, despite any willingness on their part to incorporate farmers in implementation processes, state officials may simply not have the ability to do so.

A further problem in popular involvement in the implementation of land redistribution programmes and therefore engaging with the state on a programmatic basis is the fact that even actually-existing redistribution farmers are not well-organised and often lack the skills needed to negotiate for terms and conditions favourable to them. In this regard, the business plans for LRAD and PLAS have often been pursued and completed with the assistance of NGOs (such as ECARP) if not by the NGOs themselves. This relationship of dependence and reliance on NGOs means that farmers are represented by others and fail to organise
themselves in a coherent way to present themselves directly to state officials unmediated by NGOs. The CPAs, in this regard, tend not to be effective in defending farmers’ interests. Further, as Bonti-Ankomah (2001) demonstrates, it is even difficult for individuals to come together as a group initially in order to access a state grant (which was necessary notably under LRAD and the earlier SLAG programme). He notes the existence of conflicts among potential (and actual) beneficiaries and how these conflicts have at times been manipulated by stakeholders such as state officials, landowners and even NGOs (Bonti-Ankomah, 2001:76). This also means that state officials may not be able to identify specific groups on the ground with whom to consult, despite their willingness to do so in implementing land redistribution programmes such as LRAD and PLAS.

6.4 Theoretical Reflections on Land Redistribution

Government policy for transformation in the arena of land redistribution in South Africa has indeed been hindered. The theories I have used in this thesis have allowed me to understand this hindrance more acutely, the pluralism theory used in the thesis allowed for the understanding of the policy process as a space marked with negotiation and a space which is inclusive of all the stakeholders involved in policy making and implementation. The theory was extremely useful in understanding the diverse arrangement of the state and the fact that it is not only state officials involved in the making and implementation of public policies. As a result of this, in the thesis it is not just state officials who were interviewed for data collection purposes. It was necessary to capture perspectives from the broad range of stakeholders involved in these processes. However, because pluralism is so focused on societal struggles and the bargaining and comprise in policy processes it tends to overlook the fact that not all stakeholders are equal. To account for this the thesis utilised the radical elite theory.

Certain stakeholders hold more bargaining power and this is because of elite capture as discussed earlier in the chapter. Power in policy processes rests in the hands of the powerful elite who frame public opinion and use their power to lay focus on what they deem as important, they ensure things remain the same (to their benefit) and this could explain why although land redistribution policies are aimed at the transformation of the land struggle in South Africa, and although there has been some amount of change, it has not been radical, a lot still remains the same. This can be deducted through the lived experiences shared by the
land redistribution beneficiary farmers. Although the farmers acknowledged a level of change, the overarching theme which could deduced from the experiences of the beneficiaries was that the conditions on the CPA farms is a rather familiar one, one of a certain level oppression and paternalism. The strategic partnerships tend to breed a situation where the beneficiary farmers feel beneath the mentor who mentors them in strategic partnership when they are actually supposed to be farmers in their own right. It would appear that Agricultural policy continues to be made and implemented in such a way that reproduces racial and class character which is a huge part of South Africa’s identity as a country.

It cannot be overlooked that land redistribution has been able to contribute to the reform of land. It has been able to usher goals rationalised goals within the national developmental framework and has attempted to deracialise commercial agricultural land in an attempt to benefit poor blacks South Africans. However, the true and significant change which land redistribution has the potential of ushering is clouded by programmes such the strategic partnerships and the neo-liberal agenda adopted by the ANC government concerned with production and food security this works at a huge advantage to white commercial agriculture. Thus, although there have been some changes namely through legislation, it does not necessarily amount to significant change because implementation and enforcement is poor due what the government prioritises. This is directly influenced by elites shaping policy and putting weight on interests that better suit and serve them.

In terms of policy implementation the ‘top-down’, ‘bottom up’ and ‘hybrid’ theories of policy implementation were used. The ‘top-down’ perspective aided to understand just how the elite and central government can shape and dictate policy at ground level. The ‘bottom-Up’ perspective was useful to see how policy can be considered to begin with the target groups and service deliverers, as they are the actual implementers of policy. However, the hybrid theoretical perspective which accounts for both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ theories provided a more wholesome perspective. The fact that the two are not in isolation, they are not in vacuums but interconnected. These theories have enabled me to understand the complex and convoluted processes of policy making and policy implementation in South Africa.
In all, the theoretical frameworks utilised in understanding policy making and implementation have been able to offer me a better understanding of the public policy-making and implementation processes, the stakeholders involved, as well as the role and responsibilities of those involved in policy processes. I would conclude that public policies need to be pursued by the fostering of a relationship between governance and partnerships with rest of society in the issue of land redistribution.
References


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Department of Land Affairs-memorandum, 2004. (ECARP Files)


Appendices

A. Interview Schedule: Masizakhe and Kamvalethu CPA Farmers
1. When you applied to be a beneficiary what did you think your experience would be?
2. As a beneficiary of land redistribution would you say you have been able to improve your livelihood?
3. But is there anything you would say you have learnt from your mentor?
4. Any Positives?
5. So would you say that land redistribution has not been able to redress racial inequalities, basically what land redistribution was intended for has not been correct/rectified?

B. Interview Schedule: Masimbane CPA Farmers
1. How did you get to be a land redistribution beneficiary?
2. How would you explain your experience of being a land redistribution beneficiary/depedent?
3. Have you been relatively successful as a farm, have you been able to farm and sell produce and also sustain your livelihood?
4. It seems as though you have done quite well, what would you say the way forward to a successful redistribution project is?
5. How would you explain your experience of collective farming?
6. What is your general view of land redistribution policies?
7. Do you farm for subsistence or commercial purpose?

C. Interview Schedule: Outspan and Rockhurst CPA Farmers
1. What has been your experience of being a beneficiary of a PLAS farm?
2. What would you tribute your positive experience of being a PLAS farm beneficiary to?
3. How would you say land redistribution as a pillar of land reform and has transpired?
D. Interview Schedule: Kevin Bates Director of Parks and Recreation at Grahamstown- Makana Municipality

1. How would you access the implementation and outcome of municipal commonage outcomes?
2. Have stock farmers been able to improve their livelihoods through the introduction of the commonages programme?
3. How would you explain the policy arena of policy making and policy implementation at the local tier of government regard land redistribution policies?
4. And how would you explain your involvement in policy making?
5. What would you say the way forward is in terms of policy making and implementation of policies which improve the commonages programme?

E. Interview Schedule: Nomonde Kiaka-Kahpa Community Development Worker Co-ordinating Land Access, Use and Resources Management and Education Programme at Masifunde

1. In your view, what impact has apartheid had on policy formation and implementation processes on land redistribution policies in South Africa?
2. To what extent would you say the administration of former homelands is responsible for the problematic nature of land redistribution policies in South Africa?
3. Would you say the state has been able to make and implement land redistribution policies that mobilise resources to reserve the human and material conditions of those displaced and/or disadvantaged by previous land policies?
4. What explanation would you provide for land redistribution policies struggling to achieve their objectives within projected timeframes?
5. The processes of policy formation and implementation is meant to be one where all stakeholders involved are equal, how would you describe the power relations between policy-makers and civil society? Whose voice is heard and considered?
6. What role would you say the various ministers of the Department of Land Affairs have influenced the direction of land redistribution policies over the years?
F. Interview Schedule: Professor Monty Roodt Sociology Lecturer, Research Manager for the Investigative Division of the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights for the Eastern Cape and Free and Director on the Board of the Border Rural Committee

1. In your view, what impact has apartheid had on policy formation and implementation processes on land redistribution policies in South Africa?
2. To what extent would you say the administration of former homelands is responsible for the problematic nature of land redistribution policies in South Africa?
3. Would you say the state has been able to make and implement land redistribution policies that mobilise resources to reserve the human and material conditions of those displaced and/or disadvantaged by previous land policies?
4. What explanation would you provide for land redistribution policies struggling to achieve their objectives within projected timeframes?
5. How would you explain the policy arena in South Africa?

G. Interview Schedule: Michael Kenyon former Director of Land Affairs in the Eastern Cape

1. In your view, what impact has apartheid had on policy formation and implementation processes on land redistribution policies in South Africa?
2. To what extent would you say the administration of former homelands is responsible for the problematic nature of land redistribution policies in South Africa?
3. Would you say the state has been able to make and implement land redistribution policies that mobilise resources to reserve the human and material conditions of those displaced and/or disadvantaged by previous land policies?
4. What explanation would you provide for land redistribution policies struggling to achieve their objectives within projected timeframes?
5. How would you explain the policy arena in South Africa?
6. The processes of policy formation and implementation is meant to be one where all stakeholders involved are equal, how would you describe the power relations between policy-makers and civil society? Whose voice is heard and considered?

7. The processes of policy formation and implementation is meant to be one where all stakeholders involved are equal, how would you describe the power relations between policy-makers and civil society? Whose voice is heard and considered?

H. Interview Schedule: Zama Zikhali Extension Officer at Department of Agriculture

1. How would you explain working on LRAD and PLAS farms?
2. What is your view of the policies of land redistribution (especially recent ones on PLAS)?
3. Would you say that beneficiaries are under pressure to join commercial farmers?
4. How would you explain the relationship between stakeholders involved in creating and implemented policies?
5. General Comments?

I. Interview Schedule: Sinoxolo Gqala from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (Province of the Eastern Cape)

1. In relation to land redistribution, what is your view of policy making and implementation at Provincial level?
2. Have you ever been involved in either of the processes?

J. Interview Schedule: Phiwo Jwara Agriculture Officer at Makana Municipality (Local Economic Development)

1. As Agriculture Officer how do you work with farmers who are land redistribution beneficiaries?
2. What is your view of the projects?
3. Would you say that there is enough post-settlement support from the government?
4. When you interact with beneficiaries, what do beneficiaries usually voice to you?
5. What would you say the way forward would be, to true and effective redistribution of land redistribution of land to reach projected time frames for policies?
K. Interview Schedule: Kobus Vermaak Strategic Partnership Mentor

1. What is your role as a mentor?
2. How would you describe the strategic partnership?
3. Are you of the view that your mentees are learning from you and have better farmers because of the partnership?
4. What is your view of land redistribution and policies under the pillar?
5. Have you been consulted in policy making or implementation with regard to land redistribution?

L. Consent Form Signed by Research Participants

Understanding Policy Making and Policy Implementation: The Case of Land Redistribution Policies in the Eastern Cape, South Africa

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason.

I agree to take part in the above study.

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