LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 'COLOURED' RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
IN PORT ELIZABETH, 1964 - 1976

BEVERLEY TAYLOR

ABSTRACT

Studies of racial territorial segregation affecting the coloured population in Port Elizabeth tend to perceive it as an outcome of a power struggle between central and local government over the implementation of apartheid legislation. This paper explores the underlying economic forces on the local government to bring about residential segregation and address the coloured housing crisis in the city. It is proposed that whereas central government motives for segregation were primarily political, local government was influenced largely by economic considerations. Local government objectives were severely compromised through both local industrial interests and the implementation of central government Group Areas policies.

Introduction

Much of the literature about removals, racial residential segregation, housing policies and housing provision, urbanisation and the urban process, management and administration of the urban environment, and conflict over the urban environment in South Africa, refers primarily to the African population. This is understandable, since national policy in these spheres has been directed almost exclusively at Africans. The effects of these policies on the coloured population has been secondary and has not received very much attention, especially in Port Elizabeth. More particularly, the role of local government has not been investigated.

The main aim in this paper is to explore the political and economic factors influencing local government in the residential segregation of coloured people that took place in Port Elizabeth during the 1960s and 1970s. Previous research on racial segregation in the city during that period concentrated on how central government legislation affected settlement patterns spatially; how such policies had an impact on aspects of the economy; and how segregation provided a powerful mechanism of control over certain sectors of the population. Studies adopted a predominantly political perspective and ignored economic considerations. Furthermore, the overemphasis on central government control left little room to analyse local government matters and the preferences and options it faced. It is argued in this paper that the territorial racial segregation of coloured people in Port Elizabeth, besides serving the political ends of the apartheid regime, was intended by local government to cater for the economic needs of industrialists and to encourage local economic growth and welfare. The physical outcome of these aims — the territorial segregation of the Port Elizabeth coloured population (Fig. 1) — has been considered elsewhere.

The implementation of Group Areas legislation in Port Elizabeth has often been portrayed as a battle between local and central government. The picture is of central government attempting to entrench apartheid ideology by forcing local authorities to implement its policies. Local government is regarded as resisting this high-handed manner of policy decision-making and the implementation of unpopular and, in its view, unrealistic legislation. Several studies document the outcome of this conflict at the local level. Christopher’s work, for example, traces statistically the growth of racial segregation in Port Elizabeth and considers broadly the effect that apartheid planning policy had on the pattern of settlement in the city and the implications this may have on future urban planning.

In other work, Davies details the effect that the Group Areas Act had on the redistribution of population in Port Elizabeth and on patterns of intra-urban shopping, service accessibility and the journey to work. Insight into the motives for territorial segregation have been examined by Nel who suggests that central government used Group Areas legislation not only to entrench its power but also to control the local population territorially. Although the political aspect of territorial segregation has been documented in all these studies, local economic motives have largely been neglected.
Local Economic Motives for Segregation

The growth of manufacturing industry in Port Elizabeth coincided with national economic growth. During the 1960s boom in the South African manufacturing industry, the local transport equipment industry in particular experienced rapid development. The motor vehicle component industry underwent significant development, particularly after the introduction of increased ‘local content’ legislation. In turn, other manufacturing industries were boosted, especially in the metal and engineering sectors. By the mid-1960s more than 40 per cent of all manufacturing employment in the Port Elizabeth region was directly related to the motor industry.6

As a result of industrial growth, the need for semi-skilled workers grew. The coloured population appears to have been targeted to meet this need, as whites filled most of the skilled labour positions and Africans were hired mostly as unskilled labour. The major structural change that occurred in the racial composition of industrial employment in Port Elizabeth between 1935/36 and 1963/64 was a substantial increase in black participation in the industrial labour market. Particularly in textiles, apparel and footwear, but also in the automobile industry, the increase in coloured employment was significant. Bethelsdorp was identified as the area which was supposed to provide a coloured labour reservoir for Deal Party and Struandale Industrial Township, and it is here that coloured housing development had taken place. By the mid-1960s the requirements for semi-skilled labour had largely been satisfied while the demand for skilled and unskilled labour remained.7 The demand for unskilled labour mainly by the food industry, was seasonal. The African population was presumably considered as being able to supply the necessary labour, particularly as this type of labour was promoted by the central government’s homeland policy.

Since the demand for local skilled labour outstripped local supply, artisans were recruited from overseas in the middle to late 1960s. The local government’s priority was to provide housing for these immigrants before meeting the housing needs of the indigenous population. This was so despite a chronic housing shortage for coloureds as a result of natural increase and in-migration to serve industrial development. The existing coloured housing backlog was neglected temporarily.8 The local government felt that it was urgent to provide housing for skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers (coloureds included) as it was likely that industrialists would relocate to other centres if they experienced any labour or housing difficulties.9 As a newspaper editorial remarked, “industrialists who may have their eye on Port Elizabeth as the location for a contemplated new automotive parts factory should not turn elsewhere because of a fear that the City may not be able to house their workers”.10

The Chairman of the Port Elizabeth City Council’s Housing Committee held the view that no industry had yet experienced such difficulties in Port Elizabeth. In fact, he claimed that Port Elizabeth’s past housing programme had been so successful that although the whole country was under pressure for housing, the situation in Port Elizabeth was not as acute as in other centres. It did appear, however, that local government envisaged that the industrial sector would help resolve the housing shortage by raising the wages paid to skilled and semi-skilled workers.

Local government in Port Elizabeth was confident that if industry could be attracted to the city, then workers would receive a wage which would cover the costs of providing them with (government-specified) economic housing. The City Council was thus eager to attract industry. Further, the need to meet the housing requirements of industrial workers was not only in order to keep industry in Port Elizabeth, but also to maintain a large enough reserve labour pool to attract industry. Substantial effort had already gone into providing housing and resettling Africans in African-designated areas during the 1950s. Consequently, local government felt that housing for the industrial unskilled African labour force was largely under control, and that it needed to address the crisis in accommodation for the industrial semi-skilled coloured labour force.

Financial Constraints on Local Government Housing Supply

Finance was a major problem related to housing provision for coloureds. After the Sharpville riots in 1960, central government increasingly emphasised African urban development in the ‘homelands’ rather than in the ‘white’ cities. Housing policy was formulated towards this end, and aimed to reduce the financial burden on central and local government. Housing policy also reflected the ongoing conflict between the tiers of government regarding their relative financial contributions towards housing, as well as the ideological ‘separate development’ orientation of policy.11 Central government stipulated that the financing of black housing in cities should be on an economic basis and that state-subsidised, large-scale, sub-economic housing12 was to be supplied in the ‘homelands’ to encourage Africans to relocate there. This meant that in the cities housing loans available to local government were for the construction of economic housing rather than sub-economic housing.13 The central authorities took little cognisance of the effect this would have on the coloured people living in urban areas where Group Areas legislation was being enacted forcibly.

In Port Elizabeth, many City Councillors feared that the aim of having the large local motor industries share the burden of financing housing schemes for their employees would chase away industrialists. Raising local wage rates was an obvious strategy, albeit one that industrialists would have been opposed to. As matters stood, low wages prevented private enterprise from developing land for housing because the level of wages paid generally necessitated the provision of sub-economic housing and loans. These were only available, though not forthcoming, through central state agencies.14

As from 1958, low interest rate loans for sub-economic housing were virtually unobtainable from central government: the government’s priority was to use its funds to provide economic and not sub-economic housing in urban areas, even if the demand for sub-economic housing was greater than that for economic housing.15 Contrary to local government’s expectations, the local wage rates were not high enough to enable workers to pay the economic rentals required by central government policy. It would have been relatively easy for local government to provide housing for those who could afford to pay economic rentals, since central government subsidies would have been forthcoming. However, the majority of the people requiring housing fell into the lowest income brackets. In the absence of state assistance, residential development or even redevelopment could not occur.

Local government faced additional problems in this regard. It did not have large rateable coloured housing schemes since most coloureds were in rented municipal housing. It did not want to incur the ire of the white ratepayers by raising their rates in order to generate funds for financing coloured housing. In addition, local govern-
ment did not have an equivalent of the Native Services Levy Fund out of which it could finance housing and infrastructure for coloured areas. These problems were compounded by the shortage of land, the expense of providing services, the shortage of staff, a building industry committed to private work, and administrative procedures and unrealistic standards set out by central government. 16

Through past experience in Gelvandale, a coloured residential area established in 1958, 17 Port Elizabeth’s civic authorities were aware that the provision of basic infrastructure, services and facilities was essential to maintain a docile and compliant workforce. Whereas local government felt compelled to provide a decent residential environment, it lacked the means to do so. In addition, rental arrears had reached alarming proportions particularly in the new coloured residential areas established in terms of local government’s slum clearance priorities. 18 Local government was not inclined to incur any further debts through developments of this kind, even though slum clearance remained a high priority for them. Reporting on Gelvandale, Port Elizabeth’s Medical Officer of Health stated that when slum tenants were rehoused regardless of their incomes and their increased expenditure on transport, the result was “unusually high arrear rents, bad debts and malnutrition”. To continue with removals would have worsened the situation. 19 As building costs and the interest rate on loans had doubled since the original schemes were built, the rentals in the new housing schemes would be higher, and local government would consequently incur even more debt.

In view of problems experienced in the provision of new housing, local government introduced cost-cutting strategies while simultaneously attempting to bargain with central government over Group Area demarcations. In the view of local government, these unnecessarily exacerbated the coloured housing crisis.

One cost-cutting strategy suggested by the Port Elizabeth City Engineer to overcome the problem of sub-economic housing requirements, was to build 788 4-roomed economic houses which could temporarily be subdivided into 1 576 2-roomed sub-economic houses until circumstances changed. Subdivision was to occur without government permission, which was considered to be unlikely. The scheme was an austerity one which excluded costs for drainage, water and electricity but which met with government approval. 20 Another cost-cutting step involved raising the rentals in existing coloured areas in compliance with pressure from central government to extract economic rentals from housing schemes built with government funds. 21

Local government also turned to the promotion of home ownership in an attempt to minimise its losses. One hundred Gelvandale houses (Extension 4) were converted into a selling scheme. In Korsten, four “experimental houses” were constructed by local government to gauge the popularity of home ownership amongst coloureds. In addition, the City Council cut back on maintenance costs in existing coloured townships. Increasingly, too, consideration was given to the employment of lower wage coloured artisans rather than whites for construction in the coloured townships.

Struggle between Local and Central Government

A major source of financial assistance and resources for residential development identified by local government lay in the hands of the central authorities. A major difficulty was that central government required that those finances be used to implement its own policies. The City Council did not always support these policies, particularly if their implementation was regarded as economically unsound or wasteful. The problem facing the Port Elizabeth City Council was how to gain access to development resources without being co-opted into implementing undesirable and ‘unreasonable’ policies.

Increasingly during the early 1960s, pressure was brought to bear by central government departments to ensure that the Port Elizabeth City Council complied with the implementation of Group Areas legislation. The central government Department of Housing was formed in 1962 to see that people were properly housed, to assess needs and requirements and, in co-operation with local government, to alleviate the position regarding the provision of housing. An additional function of the Department was to ascertain the need for financial assistance from the National Housing Fund for various income categories. The Department was to make capital available for services for economic and sub-economic housing schemes in order to carry out Group Areas policy, regardless of whether local government agreed with policy. If co-operation was not forthcoming from local government, the Department of Housing had the authority to implement central government policy unilaterally. “You will have to fit in with the whole pattern of Group Areas”, the Port Elizabeth City Council was warned. 22 The Council was informed that the Group Areas Board had legal power to acquire land, build houses, move families and claim the costs for doing so from local government. Furthermore, it was preparing to utilize these powers in Port Elizabeth. 23 A proposal for implementing Group Areas in the city was drawn up by the Department of Housing and handed to the local authority for consideration. 24

Under these threats and pressures, the City Council attempted to negotiate with central government over the extent of racial segregation required to satisfy apartheid. The Council tried to counter central government intrusions into local affairs by drawing up its own plans and suggestions for the implementation of Group Areas legislation. For example, racially mixed areas where coloured residents predominated, such as South End, were zoned coloured in the hope that they could remain as they were.

In its submissions to the central government, the City Council declared that the separation of various races into different areas was not a new idea. In fact, Port Elizabeth considered itself among the pioneers of residential segregation. The Council also argued that, even more than other cities, it had carried out segregation over a long period when providing new housing schemes and during slum elimination. 25 The Council was perplexed and distressed that the central government rejected its Group Areas proposals.

Even appeals on economic grounds had no effect. The Council argued that central government’s existing housing loan policy and unrealistically high housing standards did not ease the backlog of housing for Port Elizabeth’s coloured population. Furthermore, central government insistence on implementing its own group area plans exacerbated the housing shortage. The result was that local government would be required to provide housing for coloureds who were already properly housed but who were living in designated ‘white’ areas.

In order to have sufficient land for the extra housing commitments incurred through the implementation of Group Areas policy, the City Council was forced to acquire land at Bethelsdorp for coloured residential development.
The Bethelsdorp land, newly extended, was occupied by some 3 600 coloureds and 13 500 Africans who, in terms of the land transfer agreement, had to be accommodated adequately before Port Elizabeth's coloured population could be settled there. Owing to Group Areas legislation, an additional responsibility for relocating and housing Africans was assumed through negotiations for more land to house the coloured population.

The local authority was opposed to an artificially induced housing shortage created as a result of forceful implementation of central government's apartheid policies. It argued that removals in terms of Group Areas legislation was an unnecessary burden imposed by central government, and was one which would cause untold hardships to the affected community. Furthermore, the local authority was anxious that it would be identified as the perpetrator of hardships, and was reluctant to move people. Despite protest, the central government remained intransigent and insensitive.

The Port Elizabeth City Council continually tried to counter central government interference in local affairs and force it to recognise the power that was supposedly vested in local government. It did so by attempting to pre-empt central government plans or by getting it to negotiate the implementation of policies. In 1962 the Council established its own Housing Department to administer coloured and Indian areas. It entered into an agreement with the Department of Housing to acquire land and develop housing for Chinese, Indian as well as coloured families in areas demarcated by the central government. The agreement was on condition that the process was conducted in collaboration with the City Engineer in terms of a co-ordinated plan, and that the financial arrangements regarding the provision of services was acceptable. In effect, however, the local authority had little say in the matter and was forced to comply with the dictates of central government.

A further instance of local government powerlessness occurred in 1965 when the Council drew up a 5-year plan for the redevelopment of South End and presented it to central government. The motivation behind this initiative was the hope that central government would approve the municipal demarcation of Group Areas for Port Elizabeth, since this would enable coloureds who still required housing to be accommodated on land available in existing townships. In addition the Council stated that although it was prepared to provide some housing for people moved from white areas, it would not use force to remove them. Central government received the proposal with enthusiasm and set up a committee to co-operate with the local authority. The Community Development Board was to handle the initial steps "in order to launch the scheme with speed and vigour." The Department of Community Development also agreed that no-one should be forced to move until alternative accommodation was provided. Although the redevelopment process was to take place in collaboration with a local government representative, the local authority lacked the power to bargain in its own interests.

The Port Elizabeth City Council received the intrusion by central government with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it realised that housing could only be provided on the scale required with the assistance of central government resources. On the other hand, it resented being ousted as master in its own domain. The Acting Mayor noted "it seems we are small boys in our own municipal area which we are supposed to control". Local government control over Port Elizabeth was slipping alarmingly. There were few resources with which to bargain and, at best, the Council could resort to pleading on humanitarian grounds with a central government which was not open to such negotiation.

**Local Government and Group Areas Implementation**

The removal in South End differed little from that which the local government itself would have adopted in order to redevelop areas it had identified as slums, even though the removals took place under Group Areas legislation rather than the 1934 Slums Act. The path to increased racial segregation may well have been one that the local government itself would have followed, but the pressure applied by central government to implement apartheid policies speedily brought local government into confrontation with local communities.

If it had had more time, power and scope to respond to locally expressed problems, the Port Elizabeth City Council might have been able to ease the transition to greater racial segregation. Given the limitations imposed upon it by central government, however, local government became the target for local discontent over the implementation of the Group Areas Act. It also became increasingly apparent that the government's interests were national and were not concerned with stimulating economic growth in Port Elizabeth. Border industry policy concessions at the expense of development in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage were confirmation. The Council found itself in the invidious position of simultaneously supporting and opposing racial residential segregation and being incapable of preventing government intervention. It had also to bear the consequences of indignant local protest.

The key problem in the implementation of Group Areas legislation was the financial burden to both local government and the communities that were scheduled for removal. It was not apparent that either the government or local industrialists were concerned about whether the poorer families could actually pay for the housing that was being provided and to which they were being relocated. Rent arrears in the new housing estates were increasingly a problem with which local government had to contend, and was one which pressurised them to explore cost-cutting measures in housing provision. In addition, the City Council unsuccessfully sought financial subsidies and assistance from government to provide affordable housing. However, local government was constantly repulsed by central government and faced an uneasy compromise at the local level.

The Port Elizabeth City Council attempted to evade local criticism by arguing vehemently that the government should be seen to enact its own policies. Further, the Council argued that because of financial constraints it was not in a position to resist if the issue of housing provision was to be addressed. For instance, in 1968 the estimated housing backlog for coloured housing was 11 500 units and the building rate calculated was approximately 1 000 units a year. The City's Director of Housing, D. Cleary, argued that the formula for housing allocation devised by the central government was inadequate for effectively providing housing: 45 per cent of all new houses built at Gelnvale went to the Department of Community Development for resettling coloureds removed in terms of Group Areas legislation; 45 per cent went to the Municipal Health Department for slum clearance; 10 per cent to the Municipal Housing Department to be allocated to people on its waiting list. Cleary claimed that an allocation of 75 per cent to the Municipality would have been more reasonable as it would have enabled it to meet the housing backlog and clear slum areas.
The provision of housing along the lines sketched by Cleary would have placed local government in a more favourable light from the point of view of those who wanted to move from their existing homes. Yet the government took no notice of Cleary’s recommendations until 1976, by which time most of the Group Areas removals in Port Elizabeth were complete and central government priorities had been satisfied. Only then were local government priorities considered.

Furthermore, local government attempted in vain to secure rent subsidies from the Department of Community Development for coloureds who were forced to move from existing sub-economic residential areas to the new, more expensive townships. The Secretary for Community Development rejected the Council’s plea that rents in the new areas should be low. He argued that “a good many” of the families targeted for removal earned incomes in excess of the limits prescribed and could therefore afford economic rentals. He further reprimanded the City Council for its laxity in implementing government policies. The Town Clerk expedited the rehousing programme. The Secretary for Community Development for coloureds who were forced to move from their existing homes. Yet the government took no notice of Cleary’s recommendations until 1976, by which time most of the Group Areas removals in Port Elizabeth were complete and central government priorities had been satisfied. Only then were local government priorities considered.

The Town Clerk was accused of “denying poorer families within the authorized income limits the housing provided especially for them” and of “favouring and protecting those who could well fend for themselves”. Even if these allegations had some substance, they were a thinly veiled spur to have the Town Clerk expedite the rehousing programme.

The City Council appears to have been eager to promote the interests of local capital when it was within its power to do so. One possible reason was the attempt by local government to overcome its perceived powerlessness in relation to central government by cultivating influential local political and economic support. The logic was that by stimulating local economic growth the local government would enhance its political clout and money would be generated which could be used to resolve the housing crisis. But the Council underestimated the social conscience of industrialists. Few were concerned for the welfare of their workers beyond that for which they were legally responsible. As with the central government, local industrial employers were insensitive and unsympathetic to the circumstances of low income groups, and to local government’s financial inability to cope with housing them under centrally imposed legislation. For example, after a neighbouring industrialist had complained about the eyesore and “nuisance” of Malatsky Valley slum in Korsten — his firm often received international visitors — local government removed the desperately poor residents. Sixty nine of the 208 families residing in Malatsky Valley had no income whatsoever, and 62 had an income of less than R5 per month. The remaining 77 families were in a position to pay rental, but were not required to do so at Malatsky Valley. The City Council was insistent that these people should obtain work and be moved from their slum dwellings. The argument was made that if they wanted to work, they should obtain work on the Railways or as labourers, and that they must be told in no uncertain terms that they were getting homes and must pay for them. This was in spite of the fact that some residents had already been moved previously, only to be returned by local government to Malatsky Valley because they were unable to pay rent in the new townships.

Industrialists were quick to capitalise on local government fears that slums were health hazards. It was speculated that if the residents in Malatsky Valley were allowed to remain, areas that had been cleared of slum dwellers would once again become slums and the municipal policy of slum clearance would be a failure. The City Council consequently recommended rehousing the Malatsky Valley slum dwellers, irrespective of whether or not they could pay)

rental. They were moved to sub-economic housing in the coloured areas of Jarman and Gelvandale early in 1962.

Owing to the escalating costs of housing provision, most displaced people could not afford to buy their own properties, even though they had received some compensation from the government. Most were forced to live in Municipal schemes where only very basic housing and infrastructure was provided; local government attempted to minimise expenses in order to provide as many houses as possible. Invariably, the houses were small and grossly overcrowded. The areas to which coloureds were moved were therefore not an improvement on conditions in areas where they had lived previously. In 1965, the Port Elizabeth Medical Officer of Health reported that some of the worst slums existed in properties owned by the Council in Municipal Housing Schemes where 2-roomed houses accommodated families of 6-8 people of both sexes and all ages.

The poor conditions were confirmed by the City Council’s Director of Housing who pointed out that it was usually the lowest income families who required the largest houses to accommodate their offspring with some degree of decency. However, those classified as sub-economic were allocated the most austere 2-roomed houses. Consequently, the Medical Officer of Health argued, they had simply been removed from a wood-and-iron dilapidated slab to a brick slum with a little more air space.

The pattern also occurred among better-off coloured families who were reluctant to move because the housing offered by local government in the new areas was too small, and was without roads and shopping facilities, all of which they enjoyed in their present residential areas. Man people had to sell furniture in order to move into the smaller houses they were allocated. In addition, people complained that the removal completely disrupted the social network of informal economic activities which had enabled them to supplement their income and live decent lives on very low budgets.

The segregation and spatial restructuring of the coloured residential areas in Port Elizabeth was virtually complete by the mid-1970s. Although there were still some “problem” or “mixed areas” such as Kleinskool, most people were legally in their place, close to the industrial areas where they were supposed to find employment. The accelerated rate at which relocations had taken place in order to realise the apartheid ideal had not boosted the Port Elizabeth economy. Instead, because of severely limited industrial decentralisation policy incentives in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, and because of an unco-ordinated regional economic plan, economic growth was deflected away from the area.

Central government policies were not beneficial to the entire local community.

Conclusion

From the early 1960s, Port Elizabeth’s local government perceived the need to attract industry in the absence of central government housing provision. The intention was to create a local economic boom which would enable resolution of the coloured housing backlog. Local industrialists appear to have had their own economic welfare at heart and not that of their workers. Local government remained in a poor position to address the coloured housing shortage, a situation which was exacerbated by central government insistence on the implementation of Group Areas legislation. The era described was one in which local government may have continued to spatially identify and reorganise workers according to racial categories in order to
satisfy local industrial labour needs. However, because of the government's increasingly overt apartheid policy, the Council's own agenda was overlaid and accelerated by more rigorous and severe policies. Removals resulted from Group Areas legislation for which central government was largely responsible.

Local government in Port Elizabeth occupied a confused and contradictory position with regard to the implementation of Group Areas legislation. It simultaneously supported and opposed racial territorial segregation. In some respects, government policies coincided with local policies, the Council was prepared to support the government. This is particularly evident with regard to implementing racially segregated residential areas that benefited local economic ends. Local government strongly resented central government intervention when carrying out the national apartheid ideal proved financially burdensome. In addition, Group Areas removals were opposed by local government because they added an enormous burden to the existing shortage of housing. The implementation of these policies on terms set by the government was extremely undesirable to local government as it brought confrontation with the local community.

The Port Elizabeth local government was confident that if left to its own devices it was capable of organising and structuring the local political economy through the provision of what it envisaged to be 'appropriate' residential environments. These would be segregated, but not to the extent that the central government demanded. Segregation would also occur over a longer period. The only requirement which was made of the government was that it should formulate suitable housing policies and provide financial assistance. Similarly, the only requirement which the Council had of local industrialists was that they pay their workers adequate wages to ensure that suitable housing could be provided within a 'more realistic' housing policy framework. Such a step would promote local economic growth and welfare. Neither of these requirements was met. The result was that the persistent housing crisis could never be addressed properly by local government. The people who experienced the hardships of the housing shortage and removals were forced to bear the major portion of the costs of these policies.

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NOTES


4 Davies, W.J., 1971: Patterns of Non-White Population Distribution in Port Elizabeth with Special Reference to the Application of the Group Areas Act, University of Port Elizabeth, Institute for Planning Research, Series B, Special Publication No. 1, University of Port Elizabeth, Port Elizabeth.


8 The housing needs of Africans in Port Elizabeth had previously taken priority and had largely been met in the late 1950s through the provision of the KwaZakelwe site-and-service township.

9 As it was, the central government's border industrial development package (from which Port Elizabeth was excluded) provided a great incentive for industry to establish in the East London area. However, Port Elizabeth's advantage was that it had more skilled labour.

10 Eastern Province Herald, 21 July 1964.


12 Morris, op.cit. p. 79 notes for this period that the qualifying income limit for residence in sub-economic schemes for blacks was unchanged since 1954 when it was fixed at R25 per month except in areas where wages in the building industry were controlled and where the income limit was R30 per month.


16 Eastern Province Herald, 5 September 1964.

17 Gelvandale housed coloureds removed from the racially mixed Korsten area during the mid-1950s.

18 Evening Post, 1 September 1964.

19 Port Elizabeth (City), Mayor's Minutes, 1961.

20 Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Report of the Housing Committee, 7 October 1959.

21 The two areas affected were Schauder and Stuart Townships.

22 Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Meeting between the Council and delegates from the Department of Community Development, 10 December 1962.

23 Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Report of the Housing Committee, 12 September 1962.

24 See Davies, op.cit.: Nel, 1988: op.cit.


26 In 1965, the Port Elizabeth City Council and the District Council negotiated 36 sq miles (9 489 ha) of additional land through the incorporation of Behelsdorp (including Veeplaas).

27 Port Elizabeth (City), Mayor's Minutes, 1966 and 1965.

Eastern Province Herald, 12 May 1965.
Ibid.
Evening Post, 22 March 1968.
Eastern Province Herald, 8 June 1976.
Ibid.
Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Report on Housing, 14 January 1963.
Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Memorandum for consideration of the City Council, 10 December 1962.
Port Elizabeth (City), Council Minutes: Proceedings of the Housing Committee, 6 November 1961.
Port Elizabeth (City), Mayor’s Minutes, 1965, p. 142.
Personal interview, Mr D. Cleary, ex-director of Housing, Port Elizabeth Municipality, 5 March 1990.


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Beverley Taylor
Institute for Social and Economic Research
Rhodes University
Grahamstown 6140
SOUTH AFRICA